Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture: Economic Issues Against the Background of Globalization 365834671X, 9783658346713

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Christian J. Jäggi

Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture Economic Issues Against the Background of Globalization

Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture

Christian J. Jäggi

Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture Economic Issues Against the Background of Globalization

Christian J. Jäggi Meggen, Switzerland

ISBN 978-3-658-34671-3 ISBN 978-3-658-34672-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34672-0

(eBook)

This book is a translation of the original German edition „Ernährung, Nahrungsmittelmärkte und Landwirtschaft“ by Jäggi, Christian J., published by Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH in 2018. The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence (machine translation by the service DeepL.com). A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors. # Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Introduction

In recent decades, the topic of nutrition has gained significant attention, especially against the backdrop of food security. On the one hand, nutrition has increasingly become a lifestyle and worldview issue, and on the other hand, food markets have changed significantly. Food culture has changed and become increasingly identity forming, even though the proportion of household expenditure on food and nutrition has decreased. At the same time, the demands of consumers have risen sharply. Instead of mass marketing of food, niche and sub-markets have emerged, each with their own specific product ranges, distribution channels and target groups. Formerly local producer markets have increasingly given way to global value chains, which on the one hand are subject to growing quality standards and on the other are controlled by globally active production and marketing chains. Ecological aspects such as climate change, scarcity of fertile and agriculturally usable soil, drought and water shortages will continue to change agriculture in the coming years and decades. There is a contradictory development here: on the one hand, industrial agriculture is still on the rise in many places. On the other hand, there is a countermovement in many countries towards small-scale agriculture, organic mixed farming and urban gardening. Given the still impressive population growth in many countries of the South, and particularly in Africa, the food problem is likely to remain topical. It may become even more acute if there is a marked increase in food prices. In this case, the likelihood of hunger riots and social unrest is likely to increase.

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Contents

1

Nutrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Nutrition as Cultural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Nutrition as an Expression of Lifestyle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Food and Globalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

1 3 6 9 10

2

Food Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Food: Products and Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Food Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Food Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

13 19 23 27 29

3

Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Agricultural Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Agricultural Soil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Race for Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Genetic Engineering and Seed Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 On the Globalisation of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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33 35 45 52 61 68 70

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Meat Industry and Fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Animal Husbandry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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77 79 84 86

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Agricultural Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Producer Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Consumer Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87 91 93 96

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Biodiversity and Organic Farming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Preserving Biodiversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 The Food Waste Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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99 100 101 102

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Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Digitisation as an Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Limiting the Sale of Agricultural Land to Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Innovative Products from Food Raw Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Reorientation Towards Garden-Type Agriculture? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Change of Diet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 Organic Farming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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105 110 112 112 113 117 117 121

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Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Ethical Guidelines for Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Information and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Ecological Awareness Pays Off Economically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

125 125 128 129 129

1

Nutrition

It is a basic requirement of biological systems that they must absorb substances and energy for their existence. The substances absorbed from the environment are transformed, incorporated into existing compounds or degraded. From this point of view, food intake is a core process of biological processes: “In the process, an energy cycle is set in motion that characterizes all life. In it, the individual subsystems intertwine to form chains of utilization that feed each other, consuming each other reciprocally” (Glauner 2014, p. 60). Biological food cycles follow—always according to Glauner (2014, p. 61)—two central laws: First, the law of balance and second, the law of value endowment. By the law of balance, Glauner (2014, p. 61) means the cycles and interactions, such as in the example of buzzard populations, or more generally: if a population of animals that serve as food for others grows, the population of the predator species that feeds on them also grows—with a time lag. If, as a result of increased hunting, the number of victim animals decreases, the number of hunting animals also decreases—again with a time lag. Because animals almost never feed on just one species, the cycles are of course much more complex in practice, but the principle always applies. So you can say that over time populations or ecosystems always fluctuate within the range of certain parameters, so there is a steady state over long periods of time. For example, lake systems are known to go through phases of complete desiccation, slow replenishment, medium water level, slight flooding to complete inundation over 7–10 years, and vice versa. At the same time, the law of value creation applies: every ecosystem produces—and consumes or destroys—matter, living beings and converts energy. As a rule, the subsystems that are successful in the long term are those that not only maintain themselves, but also create added value for the system as a whole. In the long term, a stable ecosystem must release precisely the amount of energy and produce the substances and organisms it needs to maintain its equilibrium. Expansive ecosystems perish in the long term, as do

# Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 C. J. Jäggi, Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34672-0_1

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Nutrition

ecosystems that cannot provide the substances they require, release the necessary energy or produce the necessary organisms. Humans are a component of many—but by no means all—ecosystems, which influence them on the one hand, but which they also influence themselves. This gives rise to a fundamental problem: people always view food from the perspective of their own survival and well-being. It is often overlooked that food production can also only take place within the framework of ecosystems. What humans perceive as inputoutput orientation—e.g. in terms of energy, labour and yield—is, from an ecological point of view, nothing but a flow equilibrium within (and between) different ecosystems. This applies to all production processes, whether for organic food or industrial machinery. According to the WHO, people need an average of 2100–2200 kcal/day to lead a healthy life. The absolute life minimum, the so-called basal metabolic rate, is 1200–1300 kcal/day. In Western countries, adults consume around 2400 kcal, adolescents 2900 kcal and a 7-year-old child 1830 kcal (see Feyder 2014, p. 24). At the turn of the millennium, an average of 2800 kcal per person was available worldwide, but divided very differently between developed countries (e.g. 3730 kcal in North America) and developing countries (2160 kcal; see Esnouf and Bricas 2013, p. 7). In addition, food is also distributed and accessible very differently within individual countries. However, not only the amount of energy is important for a healthy diet, but also the quality and balance of the nutrients consumed. 2000 or 3000 years ago, many tribes could simply pick or gather their food from nature. It was only with the advent of agriculture and as a result of the ever-increasing use of labour for food production that food, but also the (fertile) soil, increasingly lost their character as free goods: the more labour had to be put into production, the more the goods became tradable commodities and the more they lost their character as free goods. The nature of need satisfaction has also changed over time in that certain needs have lost weight and importance as the effort required to satisfy them has diminished. For example, over the last 500 years, the relative importance of food production compared to other products and services has declined, while new needs have emerged, such as for technical equipment, services, and so on. The proportion of total household expenditure spent on food has declined significantly since the middle of the twentieth century, while the importance of housing, energy and mobility has remained largely the same and has increased accordingly in relative importance. In Switzerland, for example, the share of private household expenditure on food fell from around 35% in the 1940s to around 8% in 2010 (see Oetliker 2013, p. 16). However, the thesis put forward by the British economist Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834)—at least up to the present time—that famines were unavoidable due to the large population growth and the only limited possible increase in food production, turned out to be wrong. To this day, famines are mainly the result of wars, climate change or economic crises. In the past, higher agricultural productivity, innovative production methods and, not to forget, global trade were able to compensate for local and temporary bottlenecks in the supply of food and population growth.

1.1

Nutrition as Cultural History

3

Table 1.1 Access to electrical energy and clean cooking facilities. (Source: One World, June 2017, p. 17)

South America without Brazil Sub-Saharan Africa China India Pakistan Indonesia

People without access to electricity (%) 15

People without clean cooking facilities (%) 5

79 0 66 63 42

68 33 25 31 27

But even today, not all people have access to clean food and energy. In 2017, for example, it was estimated that 2.5 billion people—nearly one-third of the world’s population—still did not have clean cooking facilities. Of these, around 1.5 billion lived in South Asia. At the same time, hundreds of millions of people had no energy connection (see One World, June 2017, p. 17). Table 1.1 shows how many people do not have electricity or clean cooking facilities. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that the demand for food will increase by 60% in the next 30 years (see Lehmann 2017, p. 12). At the same time, natural resources are not being used sustainably by agriculture or are even being destroyed by internal and external agricultural factors: soil erosion, soil salinization, pollutants, climate change and water pollution. Today, the concept of food security has prevailed in the discussion. According to FAO, there are four basic requirements for food security: availability of food through sustainable production, access to food, proper volume or use of food, and stability of food supply conditions (see Lehmann 2017, p. 12).

1.1

Nutrition as Cultural History

Probably one of the most profound revolutions in human development was the so-called “agrarian” or “Neolithic” (¼ New Stone Age) revolution (see Childe 2014, p. 145 ff.). The Neolithic period lasted roughly from 6500/6000 BC to 2000/1800 BC (see Haber 2014, p. 11 f. as well as Childe 2014, p. 158). However, other authors—such as Taylor and Entwistle 2015, p. 32—date the transition from hunter-gatherer societies to agricultural societies much earlier, to the period 15,000–10,000 BC. The agrarian revolution gave humans control over their own food procurement for the first time. Childe (2014, p. 145) distinguished two stages of the agrarian revolution: on the one hand, the deliberate cultivation and further development of wild grasses, tubers and trees, and on the other hand, the domestication and breeding of animals. Both forms of early agriculture were closely linked.

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Nutrition

With the invention of agriculture, human life changed fundamentally. Whereas earlier hunter-gatherer cultures limited themselves to extracting from nature the biomass needed for survival, but otherwise leaving it as it was, the agricultural revolution completely reorganized human coexistence. For the first time, agricultural techniques made it possible to produce more than people directly consumed. The peasant surplus production produced goods with exchange value, and with them the human economy develops with the market as a carrier and regulator, long before there were coins or paper money. The invention of agriculture and the surplus production it brought about, which exceeded people’s own nutritional needs, thus led to a fundamental, permanent division of people into farmers (producers) and non-farmers (consumers) (Haber 2014, p. 8).

This subsequently led to the formation of two different ways of life, namely urban settlements of non-agricultural population on the one hand and agriculturally active, rather decentrally living farmers on the other. Ur and Colantoni (2014, p. 369) have put forward the thesis that in early agrarian societies—such as in the city of Ur in Mesopotamia around 3000 BC—the weakness and inefficiency of political power meant that rulers had to concentrate so strongly on maintaining their power that state control over agriculture, the most important economic sector in societies of the time, was weak to non-existent. Accordingly, agricultural production and the associated transmission of agricultural know-how took place primarily on a decentralized basis, in local households. For this reason, peasants were relatively independent of central political authorities; indeed, they were not infrequently important centers of local resistance to overbearing central power. While political states and systems of government often collapsed and changed relatively quickly, agricultural production remained relatively stable—apart from famines and catastrophes. Until the nineteenth century, all European societies had periodically suffered from food shortages and the associated hunger (see Hirschfelder 2014, p. 23). It was only in the last 200 years that this changed: first the mass cultivation of potatoes became established, later technological progress in the form of railways and intercontinental steam navigation made the transport and import of food possible, and finally the mechanisation of agriculture and the use of artificial fertilisers led to significantly higher productivity in agriculture. Also, foods that had previously been common only among the upper classes, such as coffee, tea, sugar, and rice, increasingly prevailed among all population groups in the city and also in the countryside (see Hirschfelder 2014, p. 23). At about the same time, it was possible to make food more durable and transportable. One example of this was the industrial production of chocolate in the nineteenth century: while this had already been introduced in the Swiss army in the 1870s as a ration for troops, it gradually became established in all European armies up to the First World War due to its durability, transportability and high energy density (see Hirschfelder 2014, p. 24). Based on these developments, Chaffee and Cook (2017, p. 26 ff.) see a fundamental economic paradigm shift between the early hunter-gatherer societies and the early agrarian

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Nutrition as Cultural History

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societies and today: While societies and food were characterized by scarcity back then, there is an enormous abundance in today’s food supply. Therefore, completely different skills and competences were necessary back then: Food extraction, hunting skills, physical exertion, and the ability to stockpile. In contrast, today’s food consumer needs above all the knowledge and emotional distance to find his or her way in the oversupply, but also the ability to resist emotional triggers and affective temptations. It has become almost impossible to resist and, as Chaffee and Cook (2017, p. 28) put it, navigate through the many visual stimuli, cues, and cues regarding food. Research has shown that there is a paradox of choice: We experience stress and lower satisfaction with our choices when the number of possible options increases (see Chaffee and Cook 2017, p. 27). Therefore, the economic paradigm of scarcity should be questioned, especially from the perspective of today’s food supply. For centuries, farmers formed the majority of the population; it was not until the twentieth century that the peasant share of the population shrank to 10 or less percent in the industrialized countries. Thus, around 1900, 38.2% of the population in Germany still worked in agriculture, around 1950 it was still 24.3% and in 1999 just 2.7% (see Haber 2014, p. 89). In the same period, grain, potato, sugar beet and milk production per hectare increased by more than 100% (see Haber 2014, p. 89). The second major change in terms of nutrition was the industrial revolution and the beginning of the industrial age. The turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century can be regarded as the transition (see Haber 2014, p. 67). The associated new mode of production was accompanied by a transition from the previously dominant timber industry as an energy producer to fossil energy production, which was no longer based on renewable sources, but on coal and later oil. At the same time, cities increasingly detached themselves from the hitherto sole energy supplier, and forestry became less important. For the time being, however, agriculture remained untouched, with fields being cultivated exclusively by human and animal labour. At the same time, the diversity of species remained relatively broad. Thus, 18 cultivated plants were still cultivated in northern Germany in former times, which are hardly known today (see Haber 2014, p. 69). In the nineteenth century, mineral fertilizers prevailed—especially potassium salts and phosphates—and yields could be increased by a factor of 10–100 by adding the nutrients removed by the crops (see Haber 2014, p. 72). The same development as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe can be seen today at a global level. In 2015, 38.3% of the world’s population still worked in agriculture. The more developed a country is, the smaller the proportion of its population that is farmers. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, 56.5% of the population made a living from agriculture in 2015; in East Asia and the Pacific, 54.4%; in South Asia, 50.5%; in the Middle East and North Africa, 19.5%; and in Europe and Central Asia, just 12.9%. In highincome countries, the farming population reached an average of just 2.7% in 2015, such as 1.3% in Germany, 1.4% in the USA, 1.5% in Canada, 1.7% in France and Japan, 2% in Sweden and 3% in Switzerland (FAO 2015, p. 96 ff.).

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Nutrition

Nutrition as an Expression of Lifestyle

Many human cultures have regarded individual food consumption rather than communal meals as deviant (Pilcher 2014, p. xiii). Moreover, meals express hierarchies of various kinds, such as gender, ethnicity, status, and age. While there are basic needs in terms of food, each society knows its own ideas about what is good to eat (see Pilcher 2014, p. xiii). Shared meals were and are experienced as strengthening identity and promoting community. At the same time, shared meals separate “insiders” from “outsiders”, i.e. those people who “belong” from those who “do not belong” (see Pilcher 2014, p. xiii). In the recent past, there has been a profound transformation of food culture. Eating— especially among singles, but also in small families and among teenagers—has become detached from its temporal and spatial boundaries. In particular, the communal meal as an expression of sociability seems to have declined. Or in the words of Marí and Buntzel (2007, p. 41), “The ritual meal, in which the entire household is gathered around the table, is replaced by arbitrariness. Eating becomes a futuristic, chewing sideline. What is eaten, when, where and with whom corresponds less and less to conventional conventions.” This has also changed the social and identity-forming function of eating. Katharina Burger (2016, p. 30) has also pointed out that social and cultural identity aspects are expressed and reproduced through food, or even ethical-moral value judgements are generated: For example, certain vegans feel morally superior to meateaters or vegetarians, partly because they are not partly responsible for the death of animals. Conversely, quite a few meat eaters consider vegans or vegetarians to be “crazy”. Individual psychologists even see the cult of health and nutrition as a kind of quasi-religion. It is interesting that women eat more often and prefer vegetarian food than men. Table 1.2 shows which foods men prefer and which women prefer. According to Gardner (2013, p. 65), as people become more affluent, they switch to a more diverse diet. In developed societies, people consume more fruits, vegetables, and convenience foods. This is especially the case in urban regions. By 2050, experts believe these trends will increase, as will meat consumption. However, other forecasts also assume that meat consumption as a whole or the consumption of red meat—but not poultry meat— will decrease. In general, there is a twofold trend in individual countries: First, increased calorie consumption and, later, a shift to higher-quality proteins. Studies have shown that education also plays an important role in nutrition, not only in dietary content and the balance of food components, but also in cooking. The decisive factor here is above all the education of women: “The higher the education, the less time and effort is spent on cooking” (Rützler 2005, p. 33). Above all, the scarcity of time and the opportunity costs (i.e. the costs of work not carried out because of cooking) lead to a decrease in the willingness to spend time on cooking. The impact of this on family life can be glimpsed today—and is likely to be greater in the future. Among other things, this may mean that we unlearn the ability to cook classically (see Rützler 2005, p. 34), fixed meal times may be lost and—not the worst version—men will take on more cooking responsibility.

1.2

Nutrition as an Expression of Lifestyle

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Table 1.2 Preferred food of men and women. (Source: Keller 2012, p. 256) What men like to eat most Hunter’s cutlet, gypsy cutlet, rump steak, pepper steak, beef steak, knuckle of pork, knuckle of veal, mutton chop, roast hare, roast venison, wild boar, knuckle of pork, slaughter platter, brawn, liver loaf, curry sausage, French fries, bockwurst

What women like to eat most Baked potatoes, jacket potatoes with cottage cheese, potato casserole, potato soup, risotto, baked pasta with ingredients, pasta casserole, spaghetti with minced meat and tomato sauce, pasta salad, toast au gratin, egg pancakes with meat filling, steamed fish fillet, Italian salad, boiled red cabbage, cauliflower au gratin, courgettes, hot apple pockets, semolina porridge with sweet ingredients

However, individuals are not as free in their food and meal choices as they normally believe. Food choices are determined and constrained by the weather, modern media, business cycles, religion, local tradition, and what is available, among other factors (see Hirschfelder 2014, p. 19). In general, people’s food tastes are conservative. For example, we know from migration research that migrants usually change new languages or other habits faster than their food culture (see Hirschfelder 2014, p. 19). It can be said that hunger and thirst are anthropological constants, but that the way in which these needs are satisfied is variable and culturally determined. In addition, eating habits change over time. Also influencing eating behaviors are occupation, emotional stress, and type of living situation. Thus, with the growing proportion of single households—but also as a result of modern lifestyles—eating behaviour has shifted away from communal meals at fixed times towards individual eating at different times: “This reinforces the trend towards eating outside of meals. Existing structures dissolve as a result, and the communal meal becomes even more of a marginal phenomenon” (Hirschfelder 2014, p. 27). This “de-chronologization” (Hirschfelder 2014, p. 29) of food intake has led to the type of eating called “snacking” in recent literature, in the form of a more flexible and individualized food intake. The cultural anthropologist Isabelle de Solier (2013, p. 3) has pointed out that material food culture includes not only the food itself, but also the associated media and channels of mediation, such as cooking shows on television, nutrition blogs on the Internet, or cookbooks. The philosophy of nutrition also involves the body, the senses, feelings, health and body weight. Some researchers today even speak of “food cults”, i.e. quasi-religious groups that define themselves through food. Some of these groups hold quite extreme views on nutrition or have “extreme nutritional beliefs” (Cargill 2017a, p. 3). Such groups are somewhat cult-like in that two tendencies are central in them: firstly, the attempt to distinguish themselves from other groups or diets, and secondly, the effort to establish nutritional ideological sameness within a group of like-minded people (see Cargill 2017b, p. 9). As a sociological background to this development, Cargill (2017b, p. 11) sees the growing secular, i.e. no longer associated with a religious community, share of the

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population in many countries. This creates a worldview vacuum that is filled, among other things, by dietary worldviews. A particular manifestation of such nutritional worldviews is so-called “healthism” (Cargill 2017a, p. 4), which perceives and also shapes not only nutrition, but ultimately the entire life under the aspect of health. An important component of this attitude is, on the one hand, an “intense moralization of personal health” (Scott 2017, p. 160) and constant individual monitoring of health status, body weight, food intake and calorie consumption. In this context, food in general, and especially dieting as food restriction, is conceived as an expression of character reinforcement and personal morality. In rich, post-industrial societies, a distinct type of food cult, the so-called “foodie” (de Solier 2013, p. 7), has emerged. In this context, food, its production and its consumption—as de Solier (2013, p. 7) calls it—become a part of the self, i.e. of personal identity. The term “foodie” originates from the British style magazine “Harpers & Queen” and emerged in 1982 (see de Solier 2013, p. 7). Just 2 years later, in 1984, the magazine published a foodie handbook: “The Official Foodie Handbook”, written by journalists Ann Barr and Paul Levy. In her ethnographic study, de Solier (2013, p. 11) visited “foodies” at their most important place of activity: in the kitchen, “where they make and remake their identities through the productive practice of cooking” (de Solier 2013, p. 11). “Foodies” are—according to the findings of the study by de Solier (2013, p. 12 f.) in Australia— mostly members of the upper middle class, the majority have a tertiary or above-average education and earn slightly or significantly more than the average population. “Foodies” live predominantly in urban residential areas, the majority in “gentrified” inner-city neighbourhoods. Accordingly, foodies are found in all ethno-national groups, and Anglo-Saxon foodies are even in the minority among Australia’s younger generation. “Foodies” tend to be global and cosmopolitan in orientation. Of course, based on this description, one could also simply speak of a subgroup of the urban middle class population, which is just one among many fads. However, this is contradicted by the fact that the increased awareness of food and health is a fairly stable trend that has been observed for more than 30 years, which is already reflected in changes in eating behaviour, such as the increased influence of not only vegetarian but also vegan cuisine in many cities. Therefore, the vision of a “hybrid citizen-consumer” (de Solier 2013, p. 39) with high ethical-moral standards, in which the “selfless, active citizen” and the “self-referential, active consumer” merge into a kind of global, cosmopolitan, ethical-moral middle-class consumer of the future, seems realistic at best for a small minority of people in the rich countries and in the “emerging states”. Nevertheless, the new food consciousness has clearly spread in recent years. This can be seen, for example, in the fact that “food studies”, which was originally languishing on the fringes of established disciplines, has now established itself as an important and serious field of research at the interface of sociology, cultural anthropology and geography (see Pilcher 2014, p. xiv).

1.3

1.3

Food and Globalisation

9

Food and Globalisation

One of the first—and in my opinion still the best—definitions of globalization comes from Giddens (1990, p. 64). For him, globalization was the “intensification of worldwide social relations that link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occuring many miles away and vice versa”. Auernheimer (2015, p. 17) has mentioned transnational and transcontinental production chains, universal capitalization, the awareness of global interdependencies, and the relative loss of importance of nation-states as further and current aspects of globalization. If globalisation is understood to mean processes of worldwide integration and standardisation of hitherto local, national and regional phenomena (see Sobal and McIntosh 2014, p. 422), which relate not only to economic areas such as production, trade and consumption, but also to social behaviour and cultural lifestyles, then today we can also speak of a globalisation of food. In this context, the globalisation of cultural and lifestyle aspects is additionally reinforced not least by international tourism and worldwide migration (see also Jäggi 2016, p. 13 ff.). This is particularly true in the area of food. In the food sector in particular, more and more products, but also basic ingredients, are now coming from abroad, especially from China. In 2017, for example, 90% of the vitamins consumed in Europe already came from China—and many of them are no longer even produced in Europe (see Nöhle 2017, p. 30). In Germany alone, agricultural raw materials were imported for EUR 80 billion in 2015 (see Nöhle 2017, p. 32). In this context, as a consequence of the increased tonnages of lesser-known food raw materials and, in this case, little-known foodstuffs due to globalisation, not only the possibilities of fraud are growing. Quality management is also becoming increasingly difficult and demanding due to the more complex and less familiar supply chains (see Nöhle 2017, p. 32). For example, even the smallest deviations of less than 2% in annual tonnages of several thousand tonnes lead to additional profits in the five- to seven-digit range (see Nöhle 2017, p. 32). Whereas in the past supply chains were primarily intended to ensure a large output and the standardisation of the cheapest possible mass production, today supply chains are increasingly being used to meet and ensure specific quality requirements (see Hatanaka et al. 2006, p. 61). Two consequences result from all this: On the one hand, consumers are increasingly losing track of the food on offer. On the other hand, eating habits are tending to become more uniform worldwide, for example in terms of the food itself and the form in which it is consumed, such as individual and more time-flexible meals, fast-food diets, etc. This is leading to new health problems, such as the increasing prevalence of obesity. This gives rise to new health problems such as the increasing prevalence of obesity. Thus, Sobal and McIntosh (2014, p. 422 f.) even speak of a “globalization of obesity”. Even in societies where, due to diet—and high levels of poverty!—obesity was previously little known, the problem of obesity has increased in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (see Sobal and McIntosh 2014, p. 423). For example, since 1975, the number of overweight and obese children and adolescents worldwide has increased tenfold. In 2017, one had to assume an

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estimated 124 million obese and 213 million overweight minors. This is no longer just a problem in Western countries. For example, in 2017, more than 20% of children and adolescents were obese in the Middle Eastern countries of Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, as well as in North African countries, particularly Egypt. This was similar to the number in the USA (see Lahrtz 2017, p. 22). The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated the number of overweight people in 2005 already at 1.6 billion (see Busse 2010, p. 22). However, the classification into normal weight, overweight and obesity according to the Body Mass Index is more than problematic and also correspondingly controversial. It is undisputed, however, that the susceptibility to certain diseases increases with growing overweight. According to Sobal and McIntosh (2014, p. 424), all in all, obesity has gone from epidemic to endemic and from widespread to prevalent. In particular, they argue that the rapid proliferation of soft drinks, with their high sugar content, is one of the central causes of the global increase in obesity (see Sobal and McIntosh 2014, p. 426). The rise of fast food—though not as much as soft drinks—global sales of energy-dense foods such as meat, baked goods and preserved fruits have also contributed to increasing average body weight. High-energy foods that can be easily prepared also increase the tendency to gain weight. However, this “calorie overload” has also meant that the topics of losing weight, controlling one’s own body weight and being slim have increasingly become actual “cultural values” (see Sobal and McIntosh 2014, p. 427)—and have led to a backlash against the “globalization of obesity”, so to speak.

References Auernheimer, Georg (2015): Dimensionen der Globalisierung. Eine Einführung. Schwalbach/Ts.: Wochenschau Verlag. Burger, Katharina (2016): Essen nach Regeln. In: Psychologie heute. Heft 44/2016. 29 ff. Busse, Tanja (2010): Die Ernährungsdiktatur. Warum wir nicht länger essen dürfen, was uns die Industrie auftischt. München: Blessing. Cargill, Kima (2017a): Introduction. In: Cargill, Kima (Hrsg.): Food Cults. How Fads, Dogma, and Doctrine Influence Diet. Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield. 1 ff. Cargill, Kima (2017b): The Psychology of Food Cults. In: Cargill, Kima (Hrsg.): Food Cults. How Fads, Dogma, and Doctrine Influence Diet. Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield. 7 ff. Chaffee, Leighann R./Cook, Corey L. (2017): The Allure of Food Cults. Balancing Pseudoscience and Healthy Skepticism. In: Cargill, Kima (Hrsg.): Food Cults. How Fads, Dogma, and Doctrine Influence Diet. Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield. 21 ff. Childe, V. Gordon (2014): The Neolithic Revolution. In: Pilcher, Jeffrey M. (Hrsg.): Food History: Critical and Primary Sources. Origins. Volume 1. 145 ff. (urspr. 1951: Man Makes Himself. Man’s Progress through the Ages. Vol. 64. New York: Mentor Books (Erstpublikation 1936)). De Solier, Isabelle (2013): Food and the Self. Consumption, Production and Material Culture. London: Bloomsbury. Eine Welt (Juni 2017): Menschen ohne Zugang zu Energie. Facts & Figures. 17.

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Esnouf, Catherine/Bricas, Nicolas (2013): Context: New Challenges for Food Systems. In: Esnouf, Catherine/Russel, Marie/Bricas, Nicolas (Hrsg.): Food System Sustainability. Insights form duALIne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5 ff. FAO (2015): The State of Food and Agriculture. Social Protection and Agriculture: Breaking the Cycle of Rural Poverty. Rom. www.fao.org/3/a-i4910e.pdf (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Feyder, Jean (2014): Mordshunger. Wer profitiert vom Elend der armen Länder? Frankfurt/Main: Westend Verlag. Giddens, A. (1990):The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Glauner, Friedrich (2014): Elemente einer Nahrungsmittelethik für das 21. Jahrhundert. Ein Essay vom „richtigen“ Essen. In: Schank, Christoph/Vorbohle, Kristin/Quandt, Jan Hendrik (Hrsg.): Perspektive Nahrungsmittelethik. München: Rainer Hampp. 59 ff. Gardner, Brian (2013): Global Food Futures. Feeding the World in 2050. London/New York: Bloomsbury. Haber, Wolfgang (2014): Landwirtschaft und Naturschutz. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH. Hatanaka, Maki/Bain, Carmen/Busch, Lawrence (2006): Differentiated Standardization, Standardized Differentiation: The Complexity of the Global Agrifood System. In: Marsden, Terry/Murdoch, Jonathan (Hrsg.): Between the Local and the Global: Confronting Complexity in the Contemporary Agri-Food Sector. Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier Jai. 39 ff. Hirschfelder, Gunther (2014): Das Bild unserer Lebensmittel zwischen Inszenierung, Illusion und Realität. In: Leible, Stefan (Hrsg.): Lebensmittel zwischen Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Bayreuth: Verlag P.C.O. 7 ff. Jäggi, Christian J. (2016): Migration und Flucht. Wirtschaftliche Aspekte – regionale Hot Spots – Dynamiken – Lösungsansätze. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler. Keller, Markus (2012): Von der Mode zur bewussten Haltung. Vegetarianismus und andere alternativen Ernährungskonzepte. In: Bartmann, Wolfgang (Red.): Not für die Welt. Ernährung im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Gütersloh/München: F. A. Brockhaus. 252 ff. Lahrtz, Stephanie (2017): 213 Millionen übergewichtige Jugendliche weltweit. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 11.10.2017:22. Lehmann, Bernard (2017): Ernährungssicherheit. Vom Globalen zum Lokalen. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 11.3.2017. 12. Marí, Francisco/Buntzel, Rudolf (2007): Das globale Huhn. Hühnerbrust und Chicken Wings – Wer isst den Rest? Frankfurt/Main: 2007. Nöhle, Ulrich (2017): Prävention im Betrieb. In: Nöhle, Ulrich (Hrsg.): Food Fraud. Lebensmittelbetrug in Zeiten der Globalisierung. Hamburg: Behr’s Verlag. 29 ff. Oetliker, Ueli (2013): Wie viel geben wir für Wohnen und Energie aus? In: Die Volkswirtschaft. 11-2013. 14 ff. Pilcher, Jeffrey M. (2014): Preface. In: Pilcher, Jeffrey M. (Hrsg.): Food History: Critical and Primary Sources. Origins. Volume 1. Xiii ff. Rützler, Hanni (2005): Was essen wir morgen? 13 Trends der Zukunft. Wien: Springer. Scott, Michele (2017): Eschew Your Food. Foodies, Healthism, and the Elective Restrictive Diet. In: Cargill, Kima (Hrsg.): Food Cults. How Fads, Dogma, and Doctrine Influence Diet. Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield. 157 ff. Sobal, Jefrey/McIntosh, Wm. Alex (2014): Globalization an Obesity. In: Pilcher, Jeffrey M. (Hrsg.): Food History: Critical and Primary Sources. Contemporary Transitions. Volume 4. 422 f. Taylor, Ros/Entwistle, Jane (2015): Agriculture and Environment: Fundamentals and Future Perspectives. In: Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (Hrsg.): Handbook on the Globalisation of Agriculture. Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 31 ff.

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Ur, Jason A.; Colantoni, Carlo (2014): The Cycle of Production. Preparation, and Consumption in a Northern Mesopotamian City. In: Pilcher, Jeffrey M. (Hrsg.): Food History: Critical and Primary Sources. Origins. Volume 1. 355 ff.

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Since the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the liberalization of food production and trade at the world level has made a significant leap. Not only food companies in North America, Europe and Japan, but also in China, India, Brazil and Mexico have established themselves on the global market. Between 1971 and 2001, food imports increased not only by 45% in the developed world, but also in the developing world—and there by as much as 115% (see Halabi 2015, p. xxviii). Between the 1960s and the early 1980s, many traditional exporting countries of agricultural products in the Third World became net importers of agricultural products and food (see Halabi 2015, p. xxviii). Today, the food production value chain of production, trade, processing and packaging, and more and more distribution, is controlled by global food companies. According to the FAO (2003, p. 119), “a small number of companies dominate every part of the food chain in OECD countries”. Pfriem (2016, p. 145) has pointed out that transnational and global large-scale enterprises in the agri-food sector are establishing vertically integrated value chains, especially in the “emerging states”, and thus significantly increasing their market power. This development is not all positive. Today, for example, food contamination can quickly have a global impact. For example, the contamination of milk with melamine in China in 2008 led to the contamination of sweets, biscuits, chocolate, baby food, pretzels, ice cream, coffee and soy in Singapore, Indonesia, Canada, the USA, the Netherlands, the UK and Poland (see Havinga et al. 2015, p. 5). According to Konefal et al. (2014, p. 170), the global agro-industrial production system is in a process of restructuring. In contrast to previous restructurings, the main goal now is no longer to increase production, but to improve “quality”. Whereas until the turn of the millennium competition among supermarkets was primarily based on price, recently competition has shifted to quality in addition to price. Central criteria here are growing expectations and also rising market power of consumers, increasing importance of health

# Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 C. J. Jäggi, Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34672-0_2

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aspects and food safety (see Konefal et al. 2014, p. 171). The combination of increased consumer pressure and concentration processes in the retail trade have led to an increasing focus on social and ecological aspects in the production and distribution of food. Konefal et al. (2014, p. 171) even speak of an “economy of quality” in the food sector, which is simultaneously more profitable and more socially and environmentally compatible. In this context, the authors see three transformations in the global agro-food sector: firstly, a shift from local, regional or national production networks to global and concentrated agro-food networks; secondly, a transformation towards buyer-centred, demand-oriented production chains and thus a concentration on transnational supermarket chains; and thirdly, a positioning of the offers or suppliers via attributes such as quality, safety, labour and the environment (see Konefal et al. 2014, p. 171). However, the question arises as to how strongly this trend has already taken hold in the individual countries. However, global value chains also influence eating and nutritional habits in many countries. At the same time, increasingly industrial agriculture—such as animal husbandry or aquaculture in Asia—is reaching its ecological limits. But it would be an illusion to believe that the 1995 Uruguay Round brought about free agricultural trade worldwide. In 1995, the more than 150 World Trade Organization (WTO) states merely promised not to increase their tariffs and subsidies in the agricultural sector—but they were effectively assured of maintaining the status quo (see Bürgi Bonanomi 2014, p. 105). To this day, OECD countries have a great deal of room for manoeuvre in agricultural policy. The World Agricultural Report 2008 has impressively shown that agriculture in many areas of the world is structured in a way that damages biodiversity, promotes social injustice and, in some cases, cements hunger (see Weltagrarbericht IAASTD 2008; Wege aus der Hungerkrise 2014; Egloff et al. 2014, p. 121). A shortage of essential products—such as food—can have very different causes. Too little production is only one of them and often not the most important one. Sen (2003, p. 200) writes in this context: In an economic crisis, some areas of production are sometimes more severely affected than others. For example, in the Bengal famine (1943), the rates of exchange of food and certain products changed radically. Irrespective of the price relationship between wages and food, huge shifts took place in the relative prices of fish and grains. Bengali fishermen were among the worst hit occupational groups in the famine of 1943. Of course, fish is also a food, but it is one of the high quality foods, and the poor fishermen have to sell fish to buy cheaper calorie donors in the form of staples (in Bengal this is usually rice) in order to get enough nutritional value to survive. The balance of survival is based on this exchange, and a sudden drop in the relative price of fish to rice can destroy this balance.

For example, certain services are more susceptible to crises than certain products that are needed for survival: One can easily do without a barber, but not without bread. In Bengal in 1943, for example, the barter rate for haircuts and basic foodstuffs fell by 70–80% in some districts (Sen 2003, p. 201). It is even possible for famines to occur despite surplus food.

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15

For example, during the 1974 famine in Bangladesh, the amount of food available per capita in the country was greater than in other years between 1971 and 1976 (Sen 2003, p. 202). To avoid hunger, it is not so much the absolute amount of food produced that is important, but the extent to which the population has the means available to buy food: For example, comparing food production per capita from 1993 to 1995 with that from 1979 to 1981 in various Asian and African countries shows a decline of 1.7 percent in South Korea, 12.4 percent in Japan, 33.5 percent in Botswana, and 58.0 percent in Singapore. However, an increase in hunger is not observed in the economies concerned, because at the same time there has been a rapid increase in real income per capita through other means (e.g., industry and mining), and, moreover, they are more prosperous in the first place. Due to their participation in the increased income, the citizens of these countries have been able to secure more food for themselves despite declining production volumes (Sen 2003, p. 214 f.).

In other words, the decisive factor in combating hunger and malnutrition is not so much the productivity of agriculture or the quantity of production, but the financial possibilities of the hungry population to obtain food. Seen in this light, hunger and malnutrition are the direct result of poverty (see Feyder 2014, p. 23). It should be borne in mind that in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, in 2015, 46.9% of the population still lived on less than US$1.25 a day, and as many as 68.8% lived on less than US$2 a day (see FAO 2015, p. 94). Between 2014 and 2016, Ethiopia had an average of 30 million undernourished people; Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) and Tanzania each had around 20 million undernourished people; and Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and Madagascar had around 10 million undernourished people. One and several million undernourished people lived in each of the majority of countries in West, East and Central Africa during the same period, as well as in southern Africa (see Beasley 2017, p. 15). And in South Asia, as many as 24.5% of the population had to live on less than US$1.25 a day and 60.2% on less than US$2 a day (see FAO 2015, p. 94). The vicious circle of malnutrition and poverty can be represented graphically—following Leitzmann 2012, p. 30—as a cause-effect mechanism, as Fig. 2.1 shows. But what are the food markets like in the highly developed countries? In Germany, the food industry represented the fourth largest commercial sector in 2013 with a turnover of over EUR 175 billion, after the automotive industry, mechanical engineering and the chemical industry (see Vollborn and Georgescu 2014, p. 7). The food sector for children represents a special—and growing—market. As early as 2009, children and adolescents in Germany had between EUR 20 and 23 billion in pocket money at their free disposal each year (see Stein and Weingraber 2014, p. 112). In a survey, 64% of children and adolescents stated that they would spend parts of their pocket money (a total of EUR 1.35 billion) on sweets and snacks, 37% of children bought ice cream from this, 32% of children purchased drinks, mostly soft drinks (for a total of EUR 1.3 billion) and 27% spent parts of their pocket money on fast food and snack products (also a total of around EUR 1.3 billion) (see Stein and Weingraber 2014, p. 112). The product range of

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Fig. 2.1 Vicious circle of malnutrition and poverty

children’s food is also large. In 2012, Foodwatch counted around 1500 children’s food products offered throughout Germany. These included foods offered especially for children, edibles painted or decorated especially for children, products with additional gifts for children, or products with special access for children’s online communities (see Stein and Weingraber 2014, p. 114). It should be borne in mind that almost 75% of children’s foods are not nutritionally suitable for children (see Stein and Weingraber 2014, p. 114 f.). In some countries—such as the USA—the importance of nutrition, food and cooking has increased significantly. In the USA, for example—in contrast to most European newspapers—there are regular supplements or columns on the subject of nutrition and cooking. In this context, the weekly “Cooking Section” of the “New York Times”, for example, is “among the best to be found in the daily press worldwide on the subject of food and wine” (Defago 2017, p. 40). Opinion polls have also shown that the demand for

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17

information on the topics of food, cooking and wine in the USA has been steadily increasing for years. This is also shown by the great success of two food channels on American television. Although the interest in these topics is (still) significantly greater in the USA than in other western countries, it could well be that this trend will also take hold in Europe, Australia and in Asian countries. However, markets—including food markets—cannot be arbitrarily influenced or even artificially set up. The following example illustrates this very well: In colonial times, when Hanoi was under French occupation, the French were struggling with a large plague of rats. To combat the rats, they announced they would pay the residents of Hanoi a premium for each rat pelt they delivered. The result was: residents of Hanoi started to breed rats and thus aggravated the rat plague (see Binswanger 2010, p. 15 f.). In another example—in nineteenth century China—paleontologists tried to motivate farmers to participate in the search for dinosaur bones and offered a monetary reward for delivered bone parts. The— predictable—result: the farmers started to smash the bones they found in order to collect a higher monetary premium (see Binswanger 2010, p. 16). In both examples, the measurable indicator (number of rat skins or number of bone parts delivered) correlated negatively with the outcome (reduction of rat infestation or reconstruction of dinosaurs). Binswanger thinks that this is exactly what is happening again today in many areas of the economy and society, for example through the “discovery” of more and more new diseases and combating them through prevention. Another example would be the production of an everincreasing number of products, for example in the lifestyle or nutrition sector, which are supposed to have a positive effect on health. There is another side to the limitation of food markets: New product launches in food markets are and remain difficult. According to Haas and Meindl (2009, p. 160), just 5% of new food launches are still on the market after 2 years—and even high marketing budgets are no guarantee of a product’s success. Nestlé, for example, launched LC1, the first functional food—foods fortified with additives and advertised as having positive health effects—in Europe, but lost market leadership first to Danone and then to discount retailers. When LC1 was relaunched in Germany in 2002—despite an advertising budget of EUR 4 million—the declining audience appeal could not be stopped and 1 year later Nestlé finally parted with the LC1 brand, which was subsequently distributed by Müller Milch (see Haas and Meindl 2009, p. 160). Similar experiences were also made by companies from outside the sector, such as the pharmaceutical company Novartis. It launched the Aviva range of food products on the market and later had to withdraw them from the market because expectations had not been met. This failure was later explained by the—in this case unsuccessful—marketing paradigm of the “science push”, which promoted and marketed the functional food as a “high-tech” product between food and medicine. In contrast, functional food products marketed through a “consumer pull approach” are more successful. This approach is based on the needs, values and lifestyles of consumers and combines a technological innovation, for example in relation to an additive, with marketing that is credible and coherent for consumers (see Haas and Meindl 2009, p. 162 f.). According to marketing experts, functional foods are more successful with women because

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they have a higher health awareness than men and are correspondingly more willing to buy health-promoting products. However, with regard to nutrition and functional foods in particular, the level of education (being informed about the connection between food and health) and social status (greater disposable income) also play a role. According to a small survey, advertising (60%), curiosity (20%), encouragement by the partner or family members (16%) and health reasons (14%) play a major role in the purchase of functional foods, much less taste (10%) or appearance (6%) (see Haas and Meindl 2009, p. 170). It is no coincidence that the most advertised functional foods were and are also the most successful: Actimel and Activia (see Haas and Meindl 2009, p. 171). The two authors conclude that two things above all are decisive for the success of a functional food: belief in the promised health benefits and taste. Market success and efficiency depend on four factors that are often not fully present in practice. Binswanger (2010, p. 31) even suggests “that, in general, none of these conditions is fulfilled”: First, market entry must be possible for all, allowing full competition and thus market competition to emerge. Second, all market participants must be fully informed about market conditions, making markets transparent. Third, market participants must not have any material or personal preferences over other market participants: Only price should determine which product is purchased. And fourth, all market participants must behave rationally, i.e. suppliers must maximise profit (and minimise costs) and consumers must maximise utility (at the lowest possible price). Whoever deviates from the market price is economically punished for it. Movement in the market occurs whenever the market equilibrium is violated. Binswanger (2010, p. 34) gives the example of a banana trader in a fruit market: If, for example, a tourist gets lost on this market, then the traders will immediately fight over him, because there is the possibility of selling him bananas at an inflated price. If, as in this example, the condition of complete information of the market participants is no longer fulfilled, then an individual trader can certainly gain an advantage through active competitive behaviour. Only as long as all traders offer the same types of bananas and these are also produced everywhere at the same cost, and as long as the consumers are informed about the market prices, we have an ideal-typical market competition in which the price represents a fixed parameter for all suppliers and demanders.

So one could—somewhat pointedly—give producers the following advice: Prevent market transparency by offering a multitude of outwardly different products that hardly differ in cost (1), put together complicated and different service and product packages (2), constantly change your offer and thus prevent price comparisons (3), create the most complicated and constantly changing sales conditions possible (4)—and then market efficiency becomes a pure myth—and the cheekiest supplier wins. And that is exactly what is happening today: Examples for (1) are for example the electronics market in the area of PCs, smartphones and tablets; large parts of the food market; for (2) the private insurance market; partly the private education market; for (3) many banks that constantly change their fee schedules and general terms and conditions and foist them on customers in

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Food: Products and Services

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the form of page-long “general terms and conditions” that hardly anyone reads; for (4) again the insurance market.

2.1

Food: Products and Services

Cereals still form the core of human nutrition worldwide. While an average of 1.05 billion tonnes of cereals were consumed in 2011–2013, the OECD and FAO estimate the additional demand for cereals in 2013 at a further 150 million tonnes (see OECD-FAO 2014, p. 30). The OECD-FAO Agriculture Outlook 2014–2023 (OECD-FAO 2014, p. 30) projects that demand for coarse grains will increase by 20%, wheat by 12% and rice by 15%. The same report projects that by 2023 world cereal production will increase by almost 370 million tonnes (see OECD-FAO 2014, p. 33). In the European countries, different amounts are spent on food and groceries. The share of the respective household budget varied in 2015 from 8.6% in Luxembourg to 20.4% in Greece. Figure 2.2 shows the corresponding shares in the most important European countries. However, the figures differ depending on the country and the type of survey. In 2014, for example, the Swiss spent only 6.42% of their household income on food and non-alcoholic beverages, in addition to 5.57% on hotels and restaurants (see Bundesamt für Statistik 2016). This figure relates to all expenditure, i.e. also to the monetary, compulsory transfer payments to the state and insurance companies, which still accounted for 34.94% of total expenditure. Also important for meeting a need is the price trend. Food prices declined significantly in the second half of the twentieth century—calculated using the US dollar (1990) per tonne, adjusted for inflation by the G-5 Manufacturing Unit Value (MUV) Index—as Table 2.1 shows. In recent years, however, the trend in corn or wheat prices, for example, has been reversed at times, partly as a result of the production of biofuels from these staple crops and as a result of the drought in the USA in 2012. Slightly and sustainably rising prices support food supply in the long term. The Food Price Index, for example, has risen by 50% in the last 15 years (see Lehmann 2017, p. 12). Despite globalisation trends in agriculture, however, only a small proportion of the food produced worldwide ends up on the world market, depending on the product. For example, world trade in dairy products accounted for just 7.8% of world milk production in 2011. More than 90% of the milk produced is still traded regionally or consumed locally (see Salzer 2014, p. 23). However, even small quantities of a product entering the world market can lead to significant price fluctuations worldwide. Thus, even half a million tonnes more or less milk on the world market decides whether the world market price is bearable or already ruinous for producers (see Salzer 2014, p. 23). However, whether the global food industry is on the verge of collapse—as Busse (2010, p. 194) believes—is more than questionable. Volatile commodity prices are always

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Fig. 2.2 Europeans’ expenditure on food (share of household budget). (Source: de.sputniknews.com 2015; own representation) Table 2.1 Price development of some foodstuffs in US$ per tonne. (Source: Sen 2003, p. 251) Foodstuffs Wheat Rice Millet Corn

1950–1952 427.6 789.7 328.7 372.0

1995–1997 159.3 282.3 110.9 119.1

Price change (%) 62.7 64.2 66.2 68.0

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Food: Products and Services

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Fig. 2.3 Coffee production in selected countries. (Source: ICO 2017a, own representation)

absorbed by the market, and the food output of the agricultural industry is already impressive. Even if one takes into account undesirable developments—such as inadequate declaration of added substances, depletion of individual sources of nutritional raw materials such as overfishing of individual oceans, or hybridization of seeds: agriculture has never been as efficient as it is today, and never have so many people lived in food abundance as today. Coffee In 2016, a good 154 million 60 kg bags of coffee were produced worldwide. Brazil alone produced 55 million bags of this, although 20 million bags were consumed in the country itself. Overall, two-thirds of global coffee production came from Brazil, Vietnam, Colombia and Indonesia, as Fig. 2.3 shows (see Zoll 2017; ICO 2017a). The consumption side looks complementary. Apart from Brazil, which consumes more than a third of the coffee harvest itself, the majority of coffee exports—namely half of the global coffee harvest—go to the USA, Western Europe and Japan (see Zoll 2017; ICO 2017a, b, c). Figure 2.4 shows coffee consumption in some important countries. However, the selling prices of coffee are neither uniform worldwide nor do they develop in the same way in the individual countries, see Fig. 2.5. On the producer side, the structures are largely very “small-scale” (Zoll 2017, p. 35), while a few corporations dominate coffee sales to end customers. The market leader is Nestlé, followed by JAB. At the moment (2017), the coffee industry is in a consolidation phase, which analysts from Rabobank compare with the development in the beer business. In the premium business in particular, brands are becoming increasingly global and

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Fig. 2.4 Coffee consumption in some selected countries. (Source: ICO 2017b, own representation)

Fig. 2.5 Development of coffee retail prices. (Source: ICO 2017c; own representation)

2.2

Food Prices

23

important. The world’s most important coffee brands are currently Nestlé and Starbucks. There is no clear number three at the moment. Local markets and the type of products customers buy—roasted beans, ground powder, soluble powder or capsules—are still very different. In this context, demand is flattening out, but new coffee-based soft drinks are being developed (see Zoll 2017, p. 35).

2.2

Food Prices

Prices in line with market conditions arise as a result of exchange relationships between suppliers and consumers, whereby the current market price represents a kind of temporary equilibrium between the two. For the time being, price formation has nothing to do with ethical-moral “justice”; prices can therefore be neither “just” nor “unjust”. However, prices in line with the market—not only, but especially also—for agricultural products in poor countries can lead to a situation in which population groups with less purchasing power are unable to buy essential foodstuffs. In this case—economically speaking—the need is less than the want for these products. Conversely, agricultural prices in line with the market only result in a satisfactory income for efficient farmers or producers (see Anderegg 1999, p. 57). However, the question of socially “fair” prices does arise from an ethical and moral point of view, as well as from a social point of view: at the latest when products essential for survival become unaffordable for a large part of the population—e.g. in war situations, in a famine, etc.—the state—if it still exists or is capable of acting—has no choice but to intervene and ensure the basic supply of food. The possible measures have long been known: guaranteed minimum purchase prices (producers) and price reductions (consumers), rationing, promotion of self-sufficiency, etc. Jacques Berthelot (2001, p. 85) has rightly pointed out that there are no free world market prices in agricultural and food products—even in “normalized” markets: “world prices” of food and agricultural products are—according to Berthelot (2001, p. 85)—today the expression and result of negotiations between buyers and sellers, public institutions, national governments and international agreements. In particular, according to Berthelot (2001, p. 88), agricultural prices in no way reflect agricultural labour costs: this is why Berthelot (2001, p. 88) calls the liberal notion of the optimal allocation of resources “the biggest lie of all”. Berthelot (2001, p. 111), for example, criticises the European Union’s export subsidies on food as an “unacceptable dumping policy”. Figure 2.6 shows how food prices have evolved between 2000 and 2017. Futures on agricultural prices have been common for decades. In 2015, for example, there were hardly any agricultural products on which futures were not concluded. Such “exchange-traded bets on future performance” (Fuster 2015, p. 23) exist for staple food products such as wheat, maize or oilseeds, but also for fresh chicken eggs, frozen orange juice or spices such as coriander or cumin.

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Fig. 2.6 Food price trends between 2000 and 2017. (Source: FAO 2017; own representation)

However, food prices have developed very differently in the individual regions of the world, as shown, for example, in the OECD-FAO Agriculture Outlook 2014–2023 (OECD-FAO 2014, p. 28). For example, according to the FAO Food Price Index (FPI), inflation in internationally traded food was around 18% in Russia and China in January 2008, only to fall to just over 5% (Russia) or even 3% (China) in January 2014. In India, food inflation was highest in January 2010, at over 20%, while in the US and Japan it was around 2% at that time. Globally, food price inflation fell from over 10% in 2008 to around 7% in 2014 (see OECD-FAO 2014, p. 28). It is controversial whether speculation in foodstuffs leads to price increases in the traded foodstuffs or not. A meta-study by the Universities of Basel and Lucerne, which analysed around 100 papers on this question, found that the number of studies that found priceincreasing, no or price-reducing effects was roughly balanced (see Fuster 2015, p. 23). Moreover, only about a quarter of the included studies found a statistically significant impact of speculation on prices. Gardner (2013, p. 58) also argues that food speculation was “not a major factor in food price inflation” during the 2008 crisis. An OECD paper also came to the same conclusion.

2.2

Food Prices

25

Conversely, Schäfers (2016, p. 107) points out that in 2003 only US$13 billion flowed into agricultural commodity funds, whereas in 2008 it was already US$300 billion (see Pearce 2012, p. 42; Schäfers 2016, p. 107). At the same time, two-thirds of futures transactions today are for speculative purposes. Fuster (2015, p. 23) suggested that food price volatility is “quasi-inherent”. Moreover, as the volume of food futures increases, there tends to be a weakening effect: “The more speculators there are in a market, the more liquid that market becomes; and high liquidity generally leads to fewer fluctuations and thus to more consistency in the price level” (Fuster 2015, p. 23). Ultimately, real economic factors are primarily responsible for price developments. However, it should be borne in mind that larger markets are generally more susceptible to external influences—and that large markets are also more interesting for forward transactions. For example, fluctuations in transport prices have much less impact on small, local markets. Conversely, however, local revenue shortfalls can be compensated for by supplies from other regions. However, Gardner (2013, p. 63 f.) argues that it is hard to deny that index fund activities and, in particular, investments in hedge funds can have an inflationary effect in the food market and did so in the first decade after the turn of the millennium. Hachfeld (2014, p. 197) is also of the opinion that the price rally of recent years in the food sector cannot be explained solely by crop failures, climate change, increasing meat consumption, promotion of biofuel and similar real economic factors—and on the relationship between supply and demand. One major reason is the increase in speculative trading in food. Therefore, the price development of food and agricultural commodities must—at least partly—be seen against this background. From the beginning of June to the end of August 2010, wheat prices increased by 45% (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, August 24, 2010). Soybean prices increased by 10% in the same period, and corn prices also rose. Cocoa, coffee and sugar and even pork bellies and cattle also became more expensive. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung commented, “In other words ...: The rally in agricultural commodities is not limited to one particular variety, it is broad and now includes almost everything used as an input in the food value chain.” But where are these price increases coming from? On the one hand, harvests decreased as a result of climatic and meteorological deterioration—in Colombia, for example, a 20% drop in the coffee harvest was expected in mid-2010 due to weather. The major fires in Russia in the summer of 2010 destroyed large areas of agricultural land. In Australia, 18% of sugarcane acreage and 10 million tonnes of stored wheat were lost in early 2011 due to flooding (Koradi 2011). Other causes of rising food prices were natural disasters such as droughts in China, but also the loss of agricultural land due to growing urbanisation, increasing meat consumption (China) and the production of biofuels at the expense of food. At the beginning of 2011, the FAO food index for five selected foodstuffs, namely milk, meat, cereals, oils and fats, reached its highest level since its introduction in 1990. From January 2010 to January 2011, this index rose from 180 index points to 231 points. The prices of wheat (+100%), sugar, cereals, oils and fats rose extremely sharply (Koradi 2011).

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What is interesting about this development is the fact that the prices for milk remained relatively stable. One reason for this is probably the fact that milk production is largely local and regional and therefore less dependent on natural disasters on the one hand and less interesting for financial investors on the other. In spring 2011, there was an “alarming increase in the price of basic foodstuffs” worldwide (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 17, 2011). According to the World Bank, food prices rose by 29% in 2010, and between October 2010 and the end of January 2011 alone, food prices increased by 15%. According to World Bank President Robert Zoellick, food prices had thus reached dangerous levels. The unrest in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and other North African and Arab states at the beginning of 2011 was at least partly caused by the massive price increases. In Egypt, for example, food prices rose by 20% (Triebe 2011). Higher food prices also led to a highly explosive potential in a number of other states, such as Bolivia, Mozambique. On 31 March 2011, maize prices rose almost to their pre-collapse highs in 2008 (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, April 5, 2011). In 2010, the stock of maize in the USA fell by 15%. For almost half of the world’s population, rice is a crucial staple food. When rice prices skyrocketed in 2008, people took to the streets in many places, such as Haiti’s capital Portau-Prince (see Gmür 2013, p. 21). Protests also took place in other Latin American countries and in African and Asian states. From 1960 to 2012, global rice consumption grew almost steadily. The most important rice exporting countries include India, Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan and the USA (see Gmür 2013, p. 21). In 2012, it was estimated that the maize harvest in the USA would decline by 13%, despite the expansion of cultivated area by more than 4% (see Brüggemann 2012). 60% of the world’s traded maize came from the USA, which had a knock-on effect on global maize prices. Between July and August, corn prices on the futures markets increased by 50%. In addition to crop failures due to the drought of the century in the USA in 2012, the fact that 40% of the maize harvest in the USA is used for the production of ethanol, which was not changed by the drought, contributed to this development (see Brüggemann 2012). In general, there were enormous price fluctuations between 2005 and 2014 for staple foods such as wheat, maize and soya (see Leisinger 2014, p. 21). In 2013 and 2014, prices for staple foods fell again significantly (see Leisinger 2014, p. 21). Over the turn of the year 2014/2015, food prices fell sharply—incidentally in line with the price of oil. At the end of December 2014, the FAO price index fell to its lowest level since 2010 (see Gmür 2015, p. 37). Since the high in July 2012, the price of maize slumped by almost 50% to around US$180 per tonne by the end of 2014; between June and December 2014, the price of wheat fell by 20% and the price of soybeans by 30% (see Gmür 2015, p. 37). The World Bank saw a main reason for the rising food prices between 1997 and 2004 as well as between 2005 and 2012 in the rising oil prices. Thus, 52% of the price increases for maize and as much as 64% for wheat at that time were said to be explained by the more expensive oil (see Gmür 2015, p. 37). This would also explain the correlation between falling food and oil prices in the second half of 2014. In addition, in

2.3

Food Security

27

phases of price increases there are poor harvests caused by bad weather and, conversely, when food prices fall, there are large harvests as a result of good weather conditions. Experts expect global demand for food to increase over the next few decades, leading to rising food prices. They see three factors as the reasons for this: firstly, the growing world population by 2050 will require more food. Secondly, the rising standard of living for a significant proportion of the population will mean that proportionately more money can be spent on food. And thirdly, meat and fish consumption is likely to increase due to changes in dietary habits in many countries (see Müller 2011, p. 57). However, there are factors that could counteract this development: First, due to the significantly higher average age in the northern hemisphere, the demand for food per capita is likely to decline. Secondly, new food habits could also have the effect that less meat is consumed (vegetarianism, veganism, etc.). Thirdly, it is conceivable that increased health awareness could also lead to different eating habits (e.g. lower sugar consumption) or even to lower food demand.

2.3

Food Security

In recent years, food security has increasingly become a topic of international discussion. In 1996, the World Food Summit defined food security as follows: Food security exists “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to sustain healthy and active lives” (cited in Robinson and Carson 2015, p. 22). In combination with the expected increase in demand for food in the coming decades, climate-related risks with regard to food security are likely to increase significantly (see IPCC 2013/2014:WGII-18). A particular issue is the extent to which food should be supplied from within the country in order to achieve food security even in times of crisis. The extent of self-sufficiency varies from country to country and from product to product. This is illustrated by the example of Switzerland in Fig. 2.7. In the last 30 years, food governance, i.e. standardization and regulation practices in food production and marketing, have changed significantly: While before 1985 nation states were the most important and (almost) only regulatory bodies, between 1985 and 1994 companies also increasingly set, implemented and controlled food standards. From 1995 onwards, NGO standards were also added, so that today primarily governmental and corporate standards and secondarily NGO specifications determine food production (see Havinga 2015, p. 23 f.). Oosterveer (2015, p. 118) also points out that in the context of global food governance, national governments increasingly have to share responsibility for the safety and quality of food chains with private companies and NGOs. In this context, responsibility for product characteristics is increasingly delegated to “private, voluntary quality and safety systems”, with the need for global coalitions for standard setting growing and global “business-to-business standards” increasingly being applied (see Oosterveer 2015, p. 118). In Switzerland, for example, the constitutional initiative “For Food Security” (see Eidgenössische Volksinitiative „Für Ernährungssicherheit“ 2014) submitted by the Swiss

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Fig. 2.7 Food self-sufficiency in Switzerland. (Sources: Bader 2017, own research and own presentation)

Farmers’ Union on 8 July 2014 showed that food security is increasingly becoming a political issue among the general public. This demanded a better “supply of the population with food from diverse and sustainable domestic production” and measures “against the loss of cultivated land” (Federal popular initiative “For food security” 2014). The Swiss government considered the concern so important that it drafted a counter-proposal on March 14, 2017, which was submitted to a referendum on September 24, 2017. In order to ensure the supply of food to the population, the counter-proposal called for “the safeguarding of the basis for agricultural production, in particular cultivated land; food production that is adapted to the location and resource-efficient; a market-oriented agricultural and agri-food sector; cross-border trade relations that contribute to the sustainable development of the agrifood sector; e) a resource-conserving approach to food” (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft 2017, p. 8).

a) b) c) d)

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The national government’s counter-proposal met with great approval from the electorate: 78.7% of those who voted put a Yes in the ballot box, and all cantons adopted the constitutional article (see Hardegger 2017, p. 13). The Minister of Agriculture announced that he would use the new constitutional article as a guideline for Switzerland’s future agricultural policy. However, the consensus on nutrition policy does not seem to be as broad as is generally assumed. For example, Peter A. Fischer (2017, p. 1) polemicized against the compromise proposal of the federal government in an editorial of the liberal business daily Neue Zürcher Zeitung: He accused the farmers’ representatives of seeking a “completely superfluous” constitutional amendment, of wanting more money for their “fairly” produced products, and thus, among other things, of promoting the overuse of alpine pastures. He said that protecting Swiss agriculture already cost 1% of its gross domestic product, and that 3.3 billion francs, or 69,000 francs per head, were already being paid out to agriculture. Fischer, on the other hand, repeated—once again—the old liberal postulate of opening up markets and new free trade agreements, e.g. with the USA. This criticism fails to recognise that agriculture—and in particular labour-intensive organic farms—are under great national (large-scale distributors!) and international pressure, precisely because globalisation and liberalisation of world trade strengthen the market power of transnational food corporations, but also of supermarket chains and financially intensive industrial farms, while structurally disadvantaging environmentally friendly, small-scale and mixed farms. Other political observers accused the new constitutional article of containing “something for everyone” (Hardegger 2017, p. 13), for the advocates of free trade as well as for landscape and nature conservationists, for organic farmers as well as for consumers. But this—just like the comfortable voting result—is also an expression of the fact that there is a broad consensus on the issue of food security. What this consensus means politically in detail, however, is more than controversial. For example, Maya Graf, a Green member of the National Council from the canton of Baselland, said that this was the first time that sustainable trade had been included in the Swiss Federal Constitution, and Elisabeth Bürgi Monanomi, an expert in international law, said that this was the first time that the government in Bern had been given objectives according to which the federal government would have to negotiate trade agreements. However, this also threatens a conflict with the WTO, because cheap bananas must in principle be treated the same as organically produced bananas marketed according to the principles of fair trade (see Dyttrich 2017, p. 7).

References Anderegg, Ralph (1999): Grundzüge der Agrarpolitik. München/Wien: R. Oldenbourg. Bader, Urs (2017): Politik um Kartoffel und Kuh. In: Neue Luzerner Zeitung vom 12.9.2017. 11. Beasley, David (2017): Jahreszeiten des Hungers. In: Le Monde Diplomatique (Ausgabe Schweiz) vom November 2017. 15.

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Berthelot, Jacques (2001): L’Agriculture. Talon d’Achille de la mondialisation. Clés pour un accord agricole solidaire à l’OMC. Paris: L’Hamattan. Binswanger, Mathias (2010): Sinnlose Wettbewerbe. Warum wir immer mehr Unsinn produzieren. Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder. Brüggemann, Gerd (2012): Streit über erneuerbare Energien. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 16.8.2012. Bürgi Bonanomi, Elisabeth (2014): Von Ernährungssouveränität zu kooperativer Ernährungssouveränität. Genügend und gesunde Nahrungsmittel für alle Menschen. In: Widerspruch 64/2014. Zürich. 104 ff. Bundesamt für Statistik BfS (2016): Haushaltseinkommen und -ausgaben. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/ bfs/de/home/statistiken/wirtschaftliche-soziale-situation-bevoelkerung/einkommen-verbrauchvermoegen/haushaltsbudget.html (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Busse, Tanja (2010): Die Ernährungsdiktatur. Warum wir nicht länger essen dürfen, was uns die Industrie auftischt. München: Blessing. Defago, Alfred (2017): Mehr als Fast Food. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 19.10.2017. 40. De.sputniknews.com (2015): Ausgaben für Lebensmittel: Europäische Länder im Vergleich. 13.1.3015; aktualisiert am 5.10.2015. https://de.sputniknews.com/infographiken/ 20150113300565729/ (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Dyttrich, Bettina (2017): Eine Banane ist eine Banane – Details unerwünscht. In: WochenZeitung vom 28.9.2017. 7. Egloff, Lea/Eichenberger, Ursina/Siegenthaler, Tina (2014): Loconomie. Die Gemüsekooperative ortoloco. In: Widerspruch 64/2014. Zürich. 120 ff. Eidgenössische Volksinitiative „Für Ernährungssicherheit“ (2014): Initiativtext. www.admin.ch/ch/ d/pore/vi/vis447t.html (Zugriff 25.4.2018). FAO (2003): Trade Reforms and Food Security: Conceptualizing the Linkages. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization. FAO (2015): The State of Food and Agriculture. Social Protection and Agriculture: Breaking the Cycle of Rural Poverty. Rom. www.fao.org/3/a-i4910e.pdf (Zugriff 25.4.2018). FAO (2017): World Food Situation. http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Feyder, Jean (2014): Mordshunger. Wer profitiert vom Elend der armen Länder? Frankfurt/Main: Westend Verlag. Fischer, Peter A. (2017): Rückwärtsgewandt geht’s nicht vorwärts. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 9.9.2017. 1. Fuster, Thomas (2015): Essen – die verpönte Handelsware. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 1.9.2015. 23. Gardner, Brian (2013): Global Food Futures. Feeding the World in 2050. London/New York: Bloomsbury. Gmür, Heidi (2013): Das tägliche Brot der Armen. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 7.1.2013. 21. Gmür, Heidi (2015): Agrargüter werden billiger – Spekulanten haben Ruhe. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 24.1.2015. 37. Haas, Rainer/Meindl, Ingrid (2009): Motive, Werte und Produktionsanforderungen zum Verzehr funktioneller Nahrungsmittel – eine Anwendung der Means-End-Chain Analyse. In: Haas, Rainer/Meixner, Oliver/Pöchtrager, Siegfried (Hrsg.): Was wir morgen essen werden. Herausforderungen und Perspektiven für das Agrarmarketing der Zukunft. Festschrift für Walter Schiebel. Wien: facultas.wuv. 159 ff. Hachfeld, David (2014): Mit Essen spielt man nicht! Nahrungsmittelspekulation und Hungerkrisen. In: Schank, Christoph/Vorbohle, Kristin/Quandt, Jan Hendrik (Hrsg.): Perspektive Nahrungsmittelethik. München: Rainer Hampp. 197 ff.

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Halabi, Sam F. (2015): Introduction. In: Halabi, Sam F. (Hrsg.): Food and Drug Regulation in an Era of Globalized Markets. London: Elsevier. XXV ff. Hardegger, Angelika (2017): Ganz klares Ja zum Artikel über Ernährungssicherheit. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 23.9.2017. 13. Havinga, Tetty (2015): Conceptualizing Regulatory Arrangements: Complex Networks and Regulatory Roles. In: Havinga, Tetty/Casey, Donal/van Waarden, Frans (Hrsg.): The Changing Landscape of Food Governance. Public and Private Encounters. Cheltenham/GB: Edward Elgar. 19 ff. Havinga, Tetty/Casey, Donal/van Waarden, Frans (2015): Changing Regulatory Arrangements in Food Governance. In: Havinga, Tetty/Casey, Donal/van Waarden, Frans (Hrsg.): The Changing Landscape of Food Governance. Public and Private Encounters. Cheltenham/GB: Edward Elgar. 3 ff. ICO (2017a): Total production by all exporting countries. http://www.ico.org/prices/po-production. pdf (Zugriff 25.4.2018). ICO (2017b): World coffee consumption. http://www.ico.org/prices/new-consumption-table.pdf (Zugriff 25.4.2018). ICO (2017c): Historical Data on the Global Coffee Trade. http://www.ico.org/new_historical.asp (Zugriff 25.4.2018). IPCC (2013/2014): Klimaänderung 2013/2014. Zusammenfassung für politische Entscheidungsträger. Beiträge der Arbeitsgruppen I, II und III zum fünften Sachstandsbericht des zwischenstaatlichen Ausschusses für Klimaänderungen (IPCC). Genf: IPCC. Konefal, Jason/Mascarenhas, Michael/Hatanaka, Maki (2014): Governance in the Global Agro-food System: Blacklighting the Role of Transnational Supermarket Chains. In: Pilcher, Jeffrey M. (Hrsg.): Food History: Critical and Primary Sources. Contemporary Transitions. Volume 4. 170 ff. Koradi, Reinhard (2011): Gehen uns die Nahrungsmittel aus? In: Zeit-Fragen vom 8.3.2011. Lehmann, Bernard (2017): Ernährungssicherheit. Vom Globalen zum Lokalen. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 11.3.2017. 12. Leisinger, Christof (2014): Nahrungsmittel in Hülle und Fülle. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 20.10.2014. 21. Leitzmann, Claus (2012): Zwischen Mangel und Überfluss. Die globale Ernährungssituation. In: Bartmann, Wolfgang (Red.): Not für die Welt. Ernährung im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Gütersloh/München: F. A. Brockhaus. 14 ff. Müller, Johannes (2011): Ökonomische Zeitenwende. Globaler Systemwettkampf im 21. Jahrhundert. Was kommt nach dem Ende des Neoliberalismus? Marburg: Metropolis. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (24.8.2010): Wetter und Derivate treiben Rohwarenpreise. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (17.2.2011): Alarmierende weltweite Verteuerung von Grundnahrungsmitteln. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (5.4.2011): Hoher Maispreis wird zum Inflationsrisiko. OECD-FAO (2014): OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2014–2023. OECD Publishing. https://doi. org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2014-en (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Oosterveer, Peter (2015): Authority and Legitimacy in Governing Global Food Chains. In: Havinga, Tetty/Casey, Donal/van Waarden, Frans (Hrsg.): The Changing Landscape of Food Governance. Public and Private Encounters. Cheltenham/GB: Edward Elgar. 117 ff. Pearce, Fred (2012): Land Grabbing. Der globale Kampf um Grund und Boden. München: Antje Kunstmann. Pfriem, Reinhard (2016): Sie sind zufrieden, wenn wir es nicht sind. In: Pfriem, Reinhard: Ökonomie als Gemengelage kultureller Praktiken. Marburg: Metropolis. 143 ff.

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Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (2015): The Globalisation of Agriculture: Introducing the Handbook. In: Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (Hrsg.): Handbook on the Globalisation of Agriculture. Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 1 ff. Salzer, Irmi (2014): TTIP, GAP und die Macht der Konzerne. In: Widerspruch 64/2014. Zürich. 23 ff. Schäfers, Eduard (2016): Strukturen und Probleme einer globalisierten Welt. Göttingen: Cuvillier. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft (2017): Volksabstimmung vom 24. September 2017. Erläuterungen des Bundesrates. Bern: Bundeskanzlei. Sen, Amartya (2003): Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. Stein, Margrit/Weingraber, Sophie (2014): Kinder als Kunden der Nahrungsmittelindustrie. Gesundheitsförderung versus Gewinnmaximierung. In: Schank, Christoph/Vorbohle, Kristin/ Quandt, Jan Hendrik (Hrsg.): Perspektive Nahrungsmittelethik. München: Rainer Hampp. 107 ff. Triebe, Benjamin (2011): Wenn Weizen auf Weltreise geht. Die unzureichende eigene Landwirtschaft und die Verzerrung der Agrarmärkte gefährden die Versorgungssicherheit in Nordafrika und Nahost. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 19.2.2011. Vollborn, Marita/Georgescu, Vlad D. (2014): Food Mafia. Wehren Sie sich gegen die skrupellosen Methoden der Lebensmittelindustrie. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. Wege aus der Hungerkrise (2014): Die Erkenntnisse und Folgen des Weltagrarberichts. Vorschläge für eine Landwirtschaft von morgen. https://www.misereor.de/fileadmin/publikationen/ weltagrarbericht-2014-wege-aus-der-hungerkrise.pdf (Zugriff 18.8.2017). Weltagrarbericht IAASTD (2008): http://unesco.de/wissenschaft/biosphaerenreservate/biologischevielfalt/iaastd.html , vgl. auch http://www.weltagrarbericht.de/ (Zugriff 25.4.2017). Zoll, Patrick (2017): Kaffee – die Bohne, die die Welt auf Touren bringt. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 30.9.2017. 35.

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Agricultural policy is constitutive for many industrialised countries, if no longer statesupporting. This applies to the EU as a whole, to many EU states and also to Switzerland. The EU treaties are a good example of this. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the individual articles of the EU Treaty were renumbered, but the significance of agricultural policy was retained. In Art. 33 (previously: Art. 39), the agricultural policy objectives of the European Union were formulated as follows: Old version, Art. 33 (ex-Art. 39) “(1) The objective of the common agricultural policy is to: (2) The common agricultural policy and the special methods for its application shall take account of the following: (a) the specific nature of agricultural activity, which results from the social structure of agriculture and from structural and natural disparities between the various agricultural regions; (b) the need to make the appropriate adjustments in stages; (c) the fact that agriculture in the Member States is an economic sector closely linked to the economy as a whole”. (Source: EG-Vertrag 2009a; see also Anderegg 1999, p. 97) And Article 110 of the old EC Treaty (Article 131 in the Lisbon Treaty) stated with regard to world trade:

# Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 C. J. Jäggi, Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34672-0_3

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Article 110 “1. By establishing a customs union, the Member States intend to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers. 2. The common commercial policy shall take account of the favourable effects which the abolition of customs duties between Member States may have on increasing the competitiveness of undertakings in those States” (EG-Vertrag 2009b; see also Anderegg 1999, p. 97). The following is striking: Hardly in any other area are such complex and also contradictory goals formulated: increased productivity, increased income, stable markets, security of supply, “reasonable” consumer prices, harmonious development of world trade and elimination of trade restrictions. Is all this even feasible? How can high agricultural incomes go hand in hand with low consumer prices? Does not the removal of trade restrictions lead to dumping prices and lower incomes? And where does that leave security of supply? Anderegg (1999, p. 98) is not without reason in criticising the extremely “weak connection” between the agricultural policy objectives of the EU and the Federal Republic of Germany and the normative objectives in the area of fundamental social values and economic policy objectives. For example, the fundamental social value of “freedom” is not expressed at any point, and there is no “commitment to the other fundamental social values and the social market economy” (Anderegg 1999, p. 98). It should be kept in mind that— according to Salzer (2014, p. 29)—more than one third of the EU budget is spent on a common agricultural policy. Already in 2009, agriculture received 73.3% of the EU money earmarked for “natural resources”, a total of more than EUR 41 billion (see Trummer 2010, p. 72). In 2009, the EU subsidised through its first pillar “market organisation” through direct payments amounting to EUR 39 billion. Because the amounts originally linked to product volumes led to overproduction, payments were decoupled from production volumes in two reforms in 1992 and 2000. Today, EU support for agriculture is also channelled through the second pillar, “support for rural areas”. Support is provided for environmentally friendly investments, the switch to organic farming and farm-gate sales of products. Critics accused the EU subsidy policy that more than 50% of the subsidies went to large farmers, for example in 2007 to about 2749 farms (see Trummer 2010, p. 77). The Swiss Federal Constitution also describes the multifunctional character of agriculture in Art. 104. Among other things, it lists the secure supply of the population, the preservation of the natural basis of life, the safeguarding of the cultivated landscape, the decentralised settlement of the countryside, agricultural self-help and an appropriate income for farmers, in addition to which the obligation to declare agricultural products is laid down and the protection of the environment is guaranteed—and all of this, of course, in the same Art. 104 under the keyword “agriculture”!

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The discussion on food sovereignty has become increasingly important in recent years. For example, Art. 2, para. 4 of the revised Swiss Agriculture Act (Landwirtschaftsgesetz der Schweiz) states that federal measures “shall be guided by the principle of food sovereignty in order to take into account the needs of consumers for high-quality, diverse and sustainable domestic products” (Bundesgesetz über die Landwirtschaft 2017). Alexander et al. (2015, p. 11) have pointed out that there is hardly ever a holistic food policy, but that usually only individual pieces of the puzzle are found, such as mandatory labelling, marketing or food ingredients, etc. There is usually a lack of overarching and comprehensive regulations. This is especially true at the global level.

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Agricultural Production

Matthias Binswanger (2009, p. 30, quoted from Rampini Stadelmann 2014, p. 14) once pointedly said: “Compared to industry and the service sector ... agriculture has a decisive handicap: its most important production factor, soil, cannot be increased at will, unlike the production factor capital, which essentially determines production possibilities in other sectors”. This applies not only to soil, but basically to all natural resources, to the climate and to water. It is appropriate to question the concept of productivity in agriculture. For example, a study in the USA in 1994 came to the conclusion that—measured by the ratio of input and output—100 food units are produced from 5 units of input in traditional mixed agriculture, whereas 300 input units are required for this in industrial agriculture. In this sense, traditional mixed agriculture would be 60 times more productive than modern agriculture (see Rampini Stadelmann 2014, p. 15). However, the question arises on which basis productivity is calculated: In this case, the nutritional value was the basis for calculation. If one takes the working time spent as the basis for assessment, the calculation looks completely different. In recent years, agricultural productivity has increased enormously: According to the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), in the last 50 years the amount of wheat harvested worldwide has increased from 230 million tonnes to more than 720 million tonnes—with virtually no change in the area under cultivation. In the case of maize, the current harvest in 2014 was about four and a half times greater than 50 years ago, and for soybeans it was as much as 11 times greater. At the same time, the area under maize increased by almost 70% to 177 million ha, and that under soybean by around 370% to 118 million ha (see Leisinger 2014, p. 21). While maize yielded around 2 t/ha in the 1930s, the average yield in 2017 was up to 10 times as high (see Lanz 2017, p. 26). Whether productivity will continue to rise accordingly in the future must remain an open question—in the longer term, there appear to be limits to fertilizer supply and nitrogen production, which is highly energy-dependent (see Leisinger 2014, p. 21).

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Fig. 3.1 Undernourished people worldwide. (Sources: World Food Programme 2017, own presentation)

The latest figures show that even lower food prices cannot directly reduce hunger. While falling food prices tend to improve access to food for the poor, food producers, i.e. those working in farms and cooperatives, suffer from falling yields. In 2017, 795 million people in the world did not have enough to eat. Although the number of people suffering from hunger has fallen by 216 million since 1990 (World Food Programme 2017), it is still very high in absolute terms, see Fig. 3.1. Most people go hungry in Asia, the second largest number of hungry people is in Africa. While hunger in Asia declined from 1990/1992 to 1995/1997, in 2008 there were again almost as many undernourished people as in 1990. In Africa, on the other hand, the number of hungry people has increased continuously since 1990/1992 (see 2010, p. 26 f.). In Latin America, the number of hungry and undernourished people remained at about the same level as in 1990/1992. More specifically, the distribution of undernourished and hungry people varied across world regions, as Fig. 3.2 shows. According to these figures, the number of hungry people worldwide is decreasing, but the decrease was too small to reach the goal of halving hunger by 2015, which was formulated in the first Millennium Development Goal (see Feyder 2010, p. 24). Hunger primarily affects the rural population. According to a UN estimate, around 50% of the undernourished are small-scale farmers, 20% landless farmers and 10% pastoral nomads, fishermen and forest users (see Feyder 2014, p. 29). The remaining 20% of the undernourished live in the slums of the big cities.

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Fig. 3.2 Malnourished persons by world region. (Sources: World Food Programme 2017, own presentation)

Studies (see Alexander et al. 2015, p. 109; Esnouf and Bricas 2013, p. 5) project that with a global population of 9 billion people, about 60% more food will be needed in 2050. While demand for food in the US and Europe is barely rising, emerging markets are experiencing strong growth. The growing world population and declining arable land play a key role in this. New eating habits—for example, the growing consumption of meat in China—and increased purchasing power have led to a sharp rise in demand for certain foods. In addition, the production of ethanol requires foodstuffs such as corn. In addition, farmers pre-sell their produce through futures contracts and often banks and hedge funds take risk by selling commodity contracts. When crops fail, producers face the problem of not being able to deliver. They then have to stock up on replacements on the futures markets, which causes prices to rise (see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, August 24, 2010). In addition, many investors have discovered the commodity markets as a field of speculation and are also fuelling prices. Some factors suggest that food commodity prices will also rise in the longer term. Yes, observers see, for example, a considerable inflation risk in the price development of main foodstuffs—such as corn (see Neue Zürcher Zeitung of April 5, 2011). It is therefore more than questionable whether Anderegg’s (1999, p. 174) assessment that futures markets can be regarded as “the most highly developed form of market efficiency” is correct. On the contrary, derivatives, for example, lead to extreme pendulum swings in agricultural commodities, from which not only security of supply but also market

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stability suffers—which is, after all, one of the objectives of the European Union’s agricultural policy, as we have seen (see above). Agriculture plays a special role in liberalised world trade: If one measures the WTO’s agricultural treaty, the main pillar of the current order of world agricultural trade, against the ... criteria of fairness, the result is more than sobering. At the insistence of the developing countries, the agricultural sector was included in the multilateral order of world trade for the first time when the WTO was founded in 1995, and trade in agricultural goods was made subject to general rules. This reduced some of the distortions in global agricultural trade, but there is still a long way to go before trade barriers in favour of agriculture in the developing countries are substantially reduced. For example, rich countries still have de facto high barriers to market access for agricultural products from developing countries. A particular problem is the tariffs (tariff escalation) that arise with each stage of processing, making imports of processed agricultural products from developing countries difficult. In addition, massive “export competition” is taking place worldwide in order to secure or increase the sales opportunities of each country’s own agriculture. To this end, the industrialized countries use considerable export subsidies, sometimes in the form of export credits or commercial food aid. The end date for such subsidies was agreed to be 2013. Much more extensive still are the subsidies for domestic agriculture, especially in the industrialized countries, and more recently also in some emerging countries (Wallacher 2009, p. 115).

However, according to Robinson and Carson (2015, p. 4), subsidies in agriculture have decreased in most countries in recent decades. Between 2008 and 2010, an average of 20% of the income of European farmers in EU countries came from EU subsidies (see Buntzel 2012, p. 85). In many countries—and especially in most transition countries—income disparities between urban and rural populations are growing (see Weltentwicklungsbericht 2008, p. 25). This is also the case in many industrialized countries. Figure 3.3 shows the different shares of farmers’ income from state subsidies in the individual countries. It is true that agricultural income has grown in many countries in recent years. In Switzerland, for example, agricultural income rose by 4.7% in 2016 compared to the previous year and amounted to 64,000 francs per farm (see WBF 2017, p. 1). However, incomes vary greatly depending on the altitude region and area, as Fig. 3.4 shows. Many industrialised countries subsidise agricultural products, which they then supply to poor countries at dumping prices. Kenyan dairy farmers, for example, protested against the supply of subsidised milk powder from the EU to their country, whereupon the government in Nairobi increased import duties from 35% to 60%, thus protecting their farmers from EU imports. In a memorandum to the EU Commission on September 27, 2006, Kenyan smallholder farmers “resisted the EU’s common practice of using dumping prices to destroy ‘agricultural livelihoods’ in Africa” (Schäfers 2016, p. 109). In individual sectors—such as dairy products—the EU has become one of the largest exporters of agricultural products. From 2005 to 2008, for example, milk exports to Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries) increased by 39.3%, to West African countries by 47.8% and to the least developed countries by 45.1% (see Schäfers 2016,

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Fig. 3.3 Farmers’ income shares from government subsidies. (Sources: Buntzel 2012, p. 85, various OECD statistics, own research and presentation)

p. 109)—and this despite the fact that simple milk production in particular can be excellently combined with smallholder agriculture. Cereal exports from EU countries also increased by 191.7% to ACP countries, by 155.6% to East African countries and Southern Africa, by 98.2% to West Africa and even by 265.2% to least developed countries during this period. There have been similar increases in processed food and meat exports since 1995 (see Schäfers 2016, p. 109). The grotesque effects to which the combination of globally liberalized food trade and agricultural subsidies can lead are illustrated by food aid. While, on the one hand, the most fertile agricultural land in many African countries is being bought up by agro-corporations and domestic production of staple foods—e.g. cassava—is constantly declining, the same food multinationals are supporting the local population through food aid. Günter Hannich (2002, p. 91) described this connection as follows:

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Fig. 3.4 Labour earnings in Swiss agriculture by altitudinal region. (Source WBF 2017, p. 3; Agroscope 2017b, own presentation) Food aid is granted, for example, which ruins local agriculture. Because the “aid” is distributed free of charge, the local producers can no longer sell anything and have to close down. Often this creates real hardship because the country loses the ability to feed itself. Experts estimate that more than 90 percent of food aid is not used to bridge a temporary emergency, but as a disposal for the surplus production of the industrialized countries. The consequences of this “aid” are clearly illustrated by the example of Africa: grain imports doubled between 1975 and 1995. Food aid was even increased 90-fold between 1975 and 1999 and today goes largely to countries that were once regarded as Africa’s breadbasket (Hannich 2002, p. 91).

For example, while the annual food deficit in West Africa averaged EUR 144 million between 2000 and 2004, it rose to EUR 2.1 billion between 2013 and 2016. If we look only at basic food needs—i.e. if we deduct cocoa—the shortfall increases to EUR 8.5 billion (see Berthelot 2017, p. 1). The reasons for this development are, on the one hand, population growth, but on the other hand also the consequences of climate change and liberalised agricultural trade. This development is even evident among food exporters. India, for example, has been a net exporter of food since 1995, with a foreign trade surplus for agricultural products in the

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billions. In 2006, India’s foreign trade surplus for agricultural goods was US$5 billion (see Feyder 2010, p. 45). At the same time, there is still malnutrition and hunger in India. Another example is Cambodia: In the first decade after the turn of the millennium, Kuwait and Qatar cultivated rice in Cambodia—and at the same time the United Nations distributed food aid worth US$353 million to starving Cambodians (see Busse 2010, p. 207). And Tadco, a Saudi Arabian company and one of the largest agribusinesses in the Middle East, together with partner companies, invested US$40 million in exportoriented grain cultivation in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, while millions of people were undernourished or starving in all three countries (see Busse 2010, p. 207). In Madagascar, the South Korean corporation Daewoo was on the verge of leasing 1.3 million hectares of agricultural land—half of the usable agricultural land on the island (see Busse 2010, p. 207). Although the project failed after the opposition coup in March 2009, the foreign use of the land continued. In some Third World countries, the import of cheap food from abroad is now cheaper than domestic production. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, for example, imported rice from Thailand and China was cheaper than local rice in 2010. And massive imports of highly subsidized poultry meat from the EU forced half of the local poultry farmers in Côte d’Ivoire to give up by 1999 (see Feyder 2010, p. 97). A similar trend was seen among maize producers in sub-Saharan Africa. And in Sri Lanka, 70% of the milk consumed was imported from abroad in 2010 (see Feyder 2010, p. 98). New Zealand was the only industrialized country to abolish all subsidies for agriculture in the 1990s—with the predictable effect that only economic and agricultural interests prevailed at the local level, and other non-profit concerns such as nature and landscape conservation receded (see Primdahl and Swaffield 2004; Swaffield 2005; Haber 2014, p. 240). Haber (2014, p. 240) concludes from this: “Subsidies and other government support will therefore remain necessary”. However, there is always the question of the amount of the subsidy, the scope of the subsidy, the duration of the subsidy and the conditions to which the subsidy must be tied. How problematic the liberalisation of agriculture and the renunciation of state support or even the reduction of subsidies can be for farmers is also evident in states that still distribute subsidies. In 2017, for example, the Italian farmers’ association Coldiretti estimated the number of migrants and refugees working in southern Italian agriculture alone at around 120,000 (see Tschinderle 2017, p. 9). According to the Italian trade union Flai CGIL, however, the number of undeclared workers in agriculture is many times higher. In Foggia alone, for example, the union estimates the number of people working illegally in agriculture at 50,000. Although the Italian minimum wage in 2017 was EUR 7.50 an hour, many harvest workers in Foggia received just EUR 3.50 an hour for filling a crate of 300 kg of cherry tomatoes (see Tschinderle 2017, p. 9). Farm workers from Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal or Ghana fill around 10 crates per day, earning around EUR 35, often at temperatures of 45
C (see Tschinderle 2017, p. 9). But even where no foreign employees are hired at low wages, the work situation in agriculture can be stressful. For example, a study by Agroscope and the Zurich University

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of Applied Sciences (Zürcher Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften) in Switzerland found that farmers are more frequently affected by burnout than people with other occupations. A representative survey of 1358 (responding) farmers and their partners in summer 2016 found a 12% risk of burnout in agriculture, while the corresponding risk in the overall population of Switzerland was only 6.1%. Long working hours, a tense financial situation, and conflicts due to the close integration of work and family are often stresstriggering factors (see Agroscope 2017a). In 2013, a similar study in Germany using a standardised psychological burnout questionnaire revealed a similarly high burnout risk rate in agriculture (see Agroscope 2017a). Sarah D. Wald (2014, p. 190) has coined the image of “visible farmers and invisible farm workers.” For example, in the United States, according to the 2005 National Agricultural Workers Survey, 75% of agricultural workers were born in Mexico (Wald 2014, p. 191). So-called “sans papiers”—immigrants without valid residence permits—are significantly overrepresented in the agricultural sectors of many countries. There is also an above-average number of immigrants with poor residence status working in agricultural enterprises in many countries, such as Switzerland, e.g. seasonal workers, annual residents without a settlement permit, etc. In some cases, there are major differences between small and medium-sized enterprises. In some cases, there are major differences between small and medium-sized family farms, where family members and neighbours work, and large farms with a high proportion of foreign—and often poorly paid—workers. This is true for the USA (see Wald 2014, p. 193) as well as for many European countries. However, today more and more smaller companies are also forced to resort to cheap labour due to the low profit margin. In general, global agriculture is divided into two completely different types of farms: On the one hand, there are highly productive agricultural enterprises that are highly mechanized and produce using the latest technology, especially in the industrialized countries and in emerging economies such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Thailand, but increasingly also in other developing countries. This part of agriculture is growing rapidly. On the other hand, there are often very small and micro family farms—especially in developing countries—where production is mainly done by hand or at most with the use of animals. The mode of production ranges from subsistence farming to the sale of agricultural products on local markets and exports. In this context, the World Development Report (Weltentwicklungsbericht 2008, p. 6) spoke of “economic and social heterogeneity” as the “main characteristic of rural areas”. The vast majority of farmers in developing countries are smallholders. In 2014, according to estimates, 85% of farmers in developing countries cultivated land of less than 2 ha (see Feyder 2014, p. 29). These farms usually lack agricultural machinery. In 2005, of 1.3 billion farmers in the world, only just 28 million, or a good 2%, had a tractor and only 250 million, or about 19%, had working animals. Around 1 billion farmers (!) worked only with hand tools such as hoes, spades, sickles and machetes (see Feyder 2014, p. 31). According to Woertz (2015, p. 21), the productivity increases in agriculture largely bypassed small farmers or they were even the losers of this development.

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According to the World Development Report (Weltentwicklungsbericht 2008), 10 years ago two thirds of the world’s agricultural added value was generated in developing countries. In agrarian countries, agriculture contributed 29% of gross domestic product and provided employment for 65% of the workforce. In countries with transition economies and in urbanized countries, industries and services related to agribusiness often generated more than 30% of GDP (see Weltentwicklungsbericht 2008, p. 3). The following figures also show the extremely different degree of mechanisation: in 1998 there were 1578 tractors per 1000 inhabitants in the USA, in France 1355 tractors, in Germany 1005 tractors. In the same year, India had only 5.9 tractors per 1000 inhabitants, Brazil 4, China 1.4, Ghana 0.7 and Haiti only 0.1 tractors per 1000 inhabitants (see Feyder 2010, p. 35). This means two things: on the one hand, the liberalisation of agriculture is driving the concentration and automation of farms and production; on the other hand, more and more small farmers are being pushed out of agricultural production or are becoming purely subsistence farms with predominantly or exclusively manual labour. It should not be forgotten that small farms also have advantages: For example, small farms are generally more flexible and can respond more quickly to changing conditions than financially driven, high-tech agro-business systems (see Taylor and Entwistle 2015, p. 32). However, mechanized, industrial agriculture is also coming under pressure from another side. Broad-spectrum herbicides and other poisons are increasingly coming under fire. On July 7, 2017, for example, the state of California classified the total herbicide glyphosate as carcinogenic and banned its use. For the company Monsanto, which brought the substance onto the market around 40 years ago, this meant a bitter setback. All the more so as the European Union had only provisionally approved the product and was due to decide on a renewal of approval at the end of 2017. In contrast to the California Health and Environmental Protection Agency, the EU Commission originally recommended in 2017 a further approval of glyphosate for another 10 years, because allegedly the product was not carcinogenic. In contrast, environmental and nutritional organisations in Europe also called for a ban on the substance (see AHA—biorespect 2017, p. 3). In October, the EU Parliament demanded in a—legally non-binding—resolution to ban glyphosate-based herbicides from December 2022. At the end of November 2017, the EU member states decided to extend the approval of glyphosate by a further 5 years with a narrowly achieved qualified majority of 18 votes to 9 with one abstention in the responsible Conciliation Committee (see Höltschi 2017, p. 27). If the EU member states had not been able to agree on an authorisation, the decision on this would have been up to the individual EU member states (see Neue Zürcher Zeitung October 26, 2017, p. 26). It is not without piquancy that Germany’s consent to the extension of glyphosate approval in the EU until 2022 was given by CSU Agriculture Minister Christian Schmidt on his own initiative, although the SPD had spoken out against the approval and Germany would thus have had to abstain from voting in accordance with usual practice, which would probably have prevented a qualified majority in the EU Conciliation Committee (see Hess 2017, p. 7). I wonder whether the threat of the glyphosate manufacturer Monsanto with claims for damages of—according to lawyers—up to EUR 15 billion in the event of non-approval may have caused some

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governments and ministers to go weak in the knees. It is astonishing that both the EU Food Safety Agency (Efsa) and the European Chemicals Agency (Echa) concluded that glyphosate is safe “when used correctly” (see Hess 2017, p. 7). The testimonies of glyphosate victims at the so-called Monsanto Tribunal 2016 were impressive: Hundreds of cases of deformities and serious diseases such as kidney failure and cancer among humans, animals, and damage to plants were documented, worldwide: for example in Argentina, Sri Lanka, the USA, Germany and elsewhere. Although the tribunal, composed of international experts, had—as a civil society initiative—no legal binding force, its findings were unambiguous: the legal opinion published on April 18, 2017 (see Monsanto Tribunal 2017) demanded, among other things, the recognition and enshrinement of ecocide in the Rome Statute as the basis for the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Ecocide—according to the legal experts—should be placed on the same level as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The documented cases of damage caused by Monsanto’s glyphosate-based product Round-up are horrifying and documented worldwide. Given the widespread use of glyphosate, it is hardly surprising that Monsanto refused to participate in the Monsanto Court and continues to insist that the product is harmless—despite evidence to the contrary, including their own research. In Switzerland, a study on glyphosate conducted by the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office in 2016 in response to a question in parliament revealed that of over 230 food samples tested—including honey, wine, bread, potatoes and vegetables—40% contained measurable traces of glyphosate. The highest concentrations were found in pasta, breakfast cereals and legumes (see Luzerner Zeitung, November 20, 2017, p. 4). Although the researchers emphasised that the measured values were below the legal limits, this is not really reassuring when one considers how such limits are arrived at. Another consequence of the liberalization of the global food market is the sale of the best agricultural land to food multinationals or other foreign investors. It is easy for financially strong investors to buy up the best agricultural land—usually at the expense of the local population. This new form of “land grabbing”—also known as “land grabbing” (see Pearce 2012)—is evident in many countries in Africa. In Senegal, for example, more than 16% of agricultural land was already concentrated in the hands of a few national and foreign owners in 2011 (Berger 2011). Diana Senghor, director of the West African section of Pano, a media network of non-governmental organisations, and grandniece of the first Senegalese president Leopold Senghor, spoke of a new form of colonialism. Countries such as China, various Gulf states or South Africa deliberately bought and are buying up agricultural land (see Berger 2011). As a result, more and more arable land is lost to local smallholders—and usually it is the most terrible land. In addition, working conditions in many large food factories financed by foreign investors are catastrophic. Example: tomatoes In the Chinese port city of Tianjin, the Jintudi Foodstuff Co produces 2000 containers of tomato paste cans per year. The factory operates in three shifts. The workers earn around

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EUR 500 a month for a 56-h week, in great sticky heat and deafening noise. Although the can label says the canned food contains only tomatoes and salt, workers mix in additives such as soy fiber, starch and dextrose. Observers noted that workers were wearing protective masks and gloves—there may be other additives (see Malet 2017a, p. 12). Malet (2017a, p. 12) even speaks of “product counterfeiting”. With the invention of aseptic packaging in the 1980s to prevent microorganisms, tomato processing entered a new phase: Intercontinental trade in food became possible. In 2017, for example, all tomato paste exported to Germany or the Netherlands came from countries all over the world, including the USA, Europe or China—depending on the season, exchange rate, stocks and crop yields (see Malet 2017b, p. 12).

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Agricultural Soil

In 2017, there were over 5 billion ha of agricultural land. This consisted of 3.5 billion ha of grassland, 1.4 billion ha of arable land and 0.1 billion ha of permanent crops such as fruit cultivation or vines (see Lehmann 2017, p. 12). In recent years, the expansion of arable land has been mainly at the expense of ecologically valuable areas such as rainforests. However, many areas are not being used optimally. Differentiated surveys indicate that globally, arable land remained fairly constant between 1992 and 2012, but that there was a shift of arable land from Asia, Europe and North America to Africa and Latin America, see Fig. 3.5. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution and development of arable land by country type between 1961 and 2007. There is also the question of existing land reserves that have not yet been used for agriculture. The World Bank distinguished four types of countries with land reserves: • Countries with large land reserves and more than 70% of unused agricultural land are found mainly in Africa, but also in Latin America (Bolivia and Peru). • Countries with considerable land reserves, but little unused agricultural land, exist in Latin America (Basil, Argentina and Uruguay) and in Eastern Europe. • Countries with a lot of unused agricultural land but few land reserves are developing countries such as Rwanda, the Ethiopian highlands, Malawi, Kenya, the Philippines, Cambodia, Central American countries and Ukraine. Also in this category are many Middle Eastern countries due to limited water. • Countries with small land reserves and small shares of unused agricultural land include the densely populated countries of Western Europe and Asia, such as China, Vietnam, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan. In addition, countries in the Middle East such as Jordan and Egypt with a high proportion of artificially irrigated land fall into this category (see Woertz 2015, p. 148). Accordingly, experts expect agriculture to expand by 2030, especially in African and Latin American countries due to their land and water reserves. That is why many foreign

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Fig. 3.5 Arable land by continent and region. (Sources: Various FAO statistics, Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft 2016; own presentation)

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Fig. 3.6 Development of arable land by country type. (Sources: Statista 2016, own research and presentation)

investors are also buying land there—in some cases on very favourable terms. In contrast, countries with low land reserves and a lot of unused land are likely—such as the Philippines or Cambodia—to see investments primarily in productivity (see Woertz 2015, p. 148). However, agricultural land is used in very different ways. Figure 3.7 shows the share of different crops in Germany. The figures refer to the distribution of agricultural land in Germany in 2013. Of crucial importance for agricultural production is the ownership of the land. Already in historical times—for example in the Roman Empire—the ownership of land was a political issue—and led to the collapse of entire empires. Roman agricultural law, for example, knew three forms of lease contracts: • The temporary lease with a limited term, e.g. 5 years. In this case, the rent had to be paid in the form of money, in kind or working days on the owner’s estate. Not infrequently, long-term ties arose from the temporary lease (see Anderegg 1999, p. 15). • Leasehold tied generations of tenants to the landowner, which on the one hand put the tenants in a position similar to ownership, but on the other hand could also mean generations of dependence. • Compulsory tenancy was imposed on landowners to force the cultivation of the land. According to Anderegg (1999, p. 15), this was often the case on inferior land and often forced the tenant to stay in order to pay the rent owed.

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Fig. 3.7 Type of use of agricultural land in Germany. (Source: Pollmer et al. 2015, p. 37, own illustration)

In the USA in 1862, according to the Homestead Act, every settler was entitled to a piece of land of 65 ha, which he could acquire cheaply. With favourable weather conditions and reasonably fertile land, the settler could thus produce enough goods to feed a family. However, there were areas where this was not possible without irrigation, such as the Great Plains. Therefore, many farmers were dependent on irrigation water and were subject to the so-called “riparian principle”. This legal principle linked the disposal of water to the ownership of the water-bearing land, which proved to be a disaster for many farmers. It favoured landowners with underground or surface water resources or landowners near water bodies, and of these, in turn, the upstream riparians. They could build dams and divert water at will, while the downstream riparians lost out (see Dobner 2010, p. 39 f.). This led to conflicts. John Wesley Powel, one of the first pioneers in the Great Plains, therefore proposed to manage the entire area as commons and to slow down the westward

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expansion. He went unheard-and the disasters he predicted came to pass: in the late nineteenth century, early 1930s, 1950s, and again in the late 1980s, the Great Plains experienced years of water shortages, droughts, and dry spells. Particularly in the 1930s, farmers suffered greatly from drought and sandstorms, in part because they were trying to compensate for losses from the Great Economic Depression and had increased production. This resulted in the following vicious cycle: greater production and smaller purchasing power caused prices to plummet. This caused farmers to expand production, which in turn increased costs (seed, equipment, etc.). Finally, drought destroyed or reduced the harvest and forced many farmers to abandon their land (see Dobner 2010, p. 40 f.) Quite a few observers in Africa are of the opinion that famines such as those in 2011 in north-east Africa, but also in 2016 and 2017 in parts of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan were not least a consequence of the large-scale purchase of high-quality agricultural land by foreign investors (see also Jäggi 2016, p. 42). Other causes are, of course, ecological and climatic changes (drought) as well as armed conflicts such as those in Syria, northern Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Somalia, which, incidentally, were themselves also partly caused by deteriorating ecological conditions and the associated internal migration. In 2011, as part of the reporting of the economic, social and cultural human rights situation, only just 14% of the reporting states stated that they legally secured the rights to use land used for food production (see Buschmann 2013, p. 85). A total of 56 million ha of land were sold worldwide between 2000 and 2012. Around 90% of the land sold to investors was concentrated in 24 countries (see Michler and Ginten 2016). The International Land Coalition even estimated the land deals concluded and ongoing between 2000 and 2010 at 203 million ha (see Henkel 2013, p. 35). Figure 3.8 shows the share of foreign ownership of farmland in some selected countries. Land owned by foreign investors tends to be more fertile than average, has greater water availability and is better connected to international markets than land owned by small and medium landowners. Moreover, large-scale investments are usually based on registered property or use rights, while much of the land cultivated by locals often belongs to communities that do not hold property titles and have used the land for generations without documented property rights (see Henkel 2013, p. 35). Large investors usually produce for the international market, the small farmers mostly for domestic consumption. This means: “Where there is no contractually agreed quota of food that remains in the host country, its own food security is at risk. Thus it happens that the harvests of foreign investors are exported while the country receives international food aid at the same time—as in Sudan, for example” (Henkel 2013, p. 36; see also Misereor 2010, p. 5 as well as The Economist 2009). In Europe, too, the ownership structure of arable land has changed. Thus, in 2016, around 70% of agricultural land no longer belonged to the farmers who cultivated it (see Michler and Ginten 2016).

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Fig. 3.8 Foreign-owned farmland in selected countries. (Source: Michler and Ginten 2016; own representation)

In January 2010, the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Unctad adopted seven principles for responsible agricultural investment in response to the excessive buying spree: 1. Land and resource rights: Recognition and respect of existing rights to land ownership and access to natural resources. 2. Food security: Only investments that strengthen food security, not endanger it. 3. Transparency and good governance: Transparent procedures for land and resource allocation and related investments with accountability of all parties involved. 4. Hearing: Hearing of all parties directly involved and written recording of the results. 5. Economic viability and responsible investment behaviour: Respect for the rule of law and the principle of sustainability, adherence to best practice principles and sharing of profits.

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6. Social sustainability: Positive social impacts and redistributive effects without increasing social vulnerability. 7. Environmental sustainability: quantification of environmental impacts, measures to promote sustainable resource use, and avoidance, or reduction or mitigation, of negative impacts (see Weltbank 2010; Lallau 2011, p. 12; Henkel 2013, p. 39). But according to critics, these principles are merely voluntary recommendations, and in many places the weak state and local residents are unable to enforce them—not to mention that they do not in any way call into question the large-scale investment and purchase of agricultural land. NGOs complained that these seven principles mask rather than ameliorate the problem of land grabbing. Accordingly, the World Bank’s seven principles on land acquisition were and are rejected by many NGOs and representatives of small farmers (see Henkel 2013, p. 40). The FAO’s “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land Rights”, adopted in 2012, were more widely accepted. While these see large-scale investments in agriculture and land rights markets as an opportunity to promote rural development, they recommend limiting the size of individual projects. At the same time, they emphasize the contribution of smallholder structures to food security, poverty reduction and resource conservation (see Henkel 2013, p. 40). In 2009, the UN Special Representative on the Human Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, formulated 11 principles that should be observed in land purchases and leases: 1. Full transparency in the negotiations; 2. Change of land use rights and transfer of land rights only on a voluntary basis and with prior and fully informed consent (“free, prior and informed consent”); 3. Respect for the rule of law and recognition of individual and collective land rights; 4. Benefits for local communities; preference for contract farming models over land sales or leases: 5. Job creation and priority for labour-intensive production methods; 6. Avoidance of environmental damage, e.g. through greenhouse gas emissions, soil degradation or overexploitation of water resources; 7. Clear, written agreements and regular monitoring of compliance, e.g. with regard to the jobs to be created, involvement of the local population in value creation; 8. Guaranteeing local food security by keeping an appropriate share of the harvest in the country of production and supporting local small farmers; 9. Conduct ex ante impact analyses on food security, income and other factors; 10. Consultation of indigenous groups and respect for their rights; 11. Respect for and observance of the human rights and labour rights of the employees employed on the farm (see De Schutter 2009, p. 12 ff.; Henkel 2013, p. 41). Many land sales take place in areas and countries where there is poverty and hunger or malnutrition.

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In addition, the production of biofuels requires more and more land. A calculation based on the 2015 biofuel production targets with 8% of the fuel produced for transport purposes showed that by 2030, around 20–50 million ha of already cultivated agricultural land and a further 50 million ha of land not yet cultivated would have to be used to produce an equivalent proportion of biofuels (see Bringezu et al. 2015, p. 108). Measured in terms of the agricultural land available per capita worldwide, the agricultural footprint of the highly developed countries in particular is enormous. In 2007, for example, the EU-27 needed 0.31 ha of arable land per capita for cereal cultivation, i.e. a quarter more than it had in its own territory and a third more than was available per capita worldwide in 2007 (see Bringezu et al. 2015, p. 111). However, whether expropriating the large landowners and redistributing land to the small farmers and landless can be the ideal or even the only measure to solve the problem, as Ueli Gähler (2015, p. 12) believes, can be justifiably doubted in view of the many unsuccessful nationalisation measures over the last 100 years. However, even independently of state intervention, an impressive process of concentration has taken place in the agricultural sector of many countries in recent decades. In Switzerland, for example, the number of farms declined by almost 40% between 1990 and 2013, while the amount of farmland remained virtually unchanged (see Sauvin 2014, p. 43). In the same period, the number of people employed in agriculture in Switzerland—including family members—fell by a good 36%. While the number of migrants employed on farms rose by 1% between 1990 and 2012, that of Swiss nationals fell by 38%. These figures express a move away from family-owned, self-employed small farms towards industrial agriculture; correspondingly, the number of people employed in agriculture in wage employment rose from 14.2 to 19.2% (see Sauvin 2014, p. 42 f.).

3.3

The Race for Water

Our planet is about three quarters covered with water. That is a total of around 1.4  106 cubic metres of water. Every day, 1200 m3 of water evaporate worldwide, and a further 13,000 m3 are permanently contained in the atmosphere (see Grambow 2013, p. 1). Of the world’s available water resources, around 97.5% is saltwater. Of the remaining 2.5% freshwater, 68.9% is bound up in the polar ice caps and in glaciers, while groundwater accounts for a further 29.9%. A further 0.9% is bound as soil moisture and in swamps and bogs, and only 0.3% is easily accessible surface water, i.e. rivers and lakes (see Dobner 2010, p. 47). Only that part of the freshwater that is renewed in a hydrological water cycle during a year can be consumed without harming ecosystems. For example, water in the ocean needs 2500 years to be completely regenerated, and in permafrost regions renewal takes around 10,000 years, while deep groundwater and glaciers still need 1500 years for regeneration (see Dobner 2010, p. 47 f.). Overall, a reliable source of freshwater is the so-called “baseflow runoff”, i.e. the total volume of freshwater that fluctuates only slightly over the years

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and that can be consumed without artificial regulation. The “base-flow runoff” amounts to about 37% of the surface runoff, i.e. about 16,000 km3 per year (see Dobner 2010, p. 48 f.; Shiklomanov 1998, p. 10). Human rights also mean that all people have a right to sufficient water. According to Luise Buschmann (2013, p. 68), Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see ICESCR 1966), which formulates a universal right to an “adequate standard of living for himself and his family” in the form of “adequate food, clothing and housing”, implies a right for every human being to use water. This right to use water is multi-dimensional: it applies to drinking water, cooking food, washing, personal hygiene and agriculture (see Buschmann 2013, p. 68). In 2013, the amount of water consumed per capita in each country varied greatly depending on climate, economic structure, size of agriculture, etc. Figure 3.9 shows per capita consumption in a number of selected countries worldwide. However, there has to be distinguished between the consumed water und the amount of water being available to the population. Calculations assume that on average 1700 m3 of water per inhabitant and year are sufficient to satisfy all water needs (household, industry, agriculture and energy production). Below this limit, the countries concerned suffer regular or periodic water shortages (“water stress”). If the available water drops below 1000 m3 per person per year, then the country suffers from chronic water shortage, which has a negative impact on human health and industrial development (see Dobner 2010, p. 50). At less than 500 m3 per person and year, one speaks of absolute water scarcity. In 2017, more than 1 billion people—especially in Africa, South Asia and Latin America—had no access to clean drinking water (see Zeier 2017, p. 7). In 2006, the German Federal Government calculated that 2.7 billion people would be living in regions with extreme water shortages by 2025 (see Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 2006, p. 5). If income and water scarcity are related to each other, this results in the so-called “freshwater vulnerability”. Of course, the most vulnerable population group is the one with the lowest income and the greatest water scarcity, while poor access to drinking water can be compensated with a high income and, conversely, good access to water reduces vulnerability even with a low income. If we divide people into four income classes and four categories of water stress, the following picture emerges: in the mid-1990s, the first group—those with the lowest income and poorest water supply—comprised about 4% of the people on our globe, while the highest-income and most water-supplied group comprised about 2% of humanity. All others were somewhere in the middle (see Dobner 2010, p. 58). It should be borne in mind that in areas with severe water scarcity the poor population often suffers from additional problems. In some parts of Africa, for example, the nitrate contamination of wells is six to eight times higher than recommended by the WHO, which can lead to brain damage and even death in children, among other things (see Dobner 2010,

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Fig. 3.9 Water consumption per capita in some selected countries. (Source: Statista 2017, own representation)

p. 60). Those who cannot switch to more expensive bottled water—i.e. families with low incomes—are particularly at risk. In addition, low-income populations suffer more from climatically induced environmental changes and natural disasters. Between 1991 and 2000, for example, over 665,000 people died worldwide as a result of natural disasters, 90% of which were water-related. Of the victims, 97% lived in developing countries (see UNESCO 2003; Dobner 2010, p. 61).

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The Race for Water

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Water consumption per year by households and service providers in m 3 2003–2013 120

Belgium Bulgaria

100

Greece Spain Lithuania

80

Hungary Malta

60

Netherlands Poland Portugal

40

Sweden Norway Serbia

20

Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Fig. 3.10 Water consumption by households and service providers by country. (Source: Eurostat 2016, own presentation)

Around 69% of the world’s water is used in agriculture, 21% of the water consumed goes to industry—directly for production and for the manufacture of its raw materials—and around 10% of the water goes to households (see Dobner 2010, p. 66). In the various countries of Europe, not only was and is the level of water consumption very different, it also changed quite significantly between 2003 and 2013, see Fig. 3.10. However, the availability of (drinking) water and its consumption depends on countryspecific conditions (see Buschmann 2013, p. 79)—i.e. the climate, the share of agriculture and industry, and the standard of living—which naturally also affects the standards of water supply. The ratio of naturally available water (groundwater, rain) to water consumption is also important. For example, less rain falls in the Middle East today than in the past, and this already low amount of precipitation has decreased by a further 25% in recent years, and for years there was no rain at all (see Schäfers 2016, p. 103). At the same time, the population has grown strongly—and with it the required water. While the city of Sana’a in Yemen, for example, had 80,000 inhabitants in 1980, today it has 1.5 million (see Schäfers 2016, p. 104). The situation is similar in many cities in the Middle East—and in many other countries in the 20–30 degrees of latitude north and south of the equator. At the same time, large amounts of water are lost due to outdated irrigation methods (intensive irrigation instead of the drip method; dilapidated water pipes, overuse of groundwater supplies, etc.).

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Nonsensical agricultural projects have also exacerbated water scarcity. For example, Saudi Arabia invested US$85 billion in wheat cultivation in the 1990s. The country was then one of the world’s largest wheat exporters. But wheat production practically used up the water in the groundwater lake of around 500 km3—ten times the size of Lake Constance—that lies beneath the desert (see Schäfers 2016, p. 105). With the result that the project was stopped. One of the countries with the highest water consumption per capita today is the United Arab Emirates, which affords itself the luxury of golf courses in the desert, covered ski slopes, large aquariums and large outdoor water features (see Schäfers 2016, p. 105 as well as Barlow 2014, p. 117 ff.). This means that countries with massive water wastage are confronted with countries that suffer from severe water shortages. And often within individual countries there are also large differences between regions and population groups with high water consumption and those that have too little water or only access to poor-quality water. The UN body responsible for implementing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), requires all states to guarantee low-cost or free water supply (see Buschmann 2013, p. 93). According to Feyder (2014, p. 98), the world is facing a “gigantic deficit of freshwater”. This development, which has only recently begun and hardly noticeably, is progressing rapidly. The main causes are the sinking of groundwater levels in many countries, partly due to the drilling of thousands of wells and the associated water extraction. Millions of wells are extracting more water than can be supplied by the natural water cycle. In India, for example, the groundwater level is currently falling by more than a metre a year, and in many areas of Asia the risk of groundwater contamination by arsenic, for example, is increasing. In other places, groundwater is becoming salinized by seawater seeping in, not least due to excessive use of groundwater (see Dobner 2010, p. 79). But there is another side to the threat to the water supply. Many rivers have become cesspools in recent years. They suffer from permanent discharges of pollutants and accidents, as in recent years in Hungary, China, Romania and Peru. Many sea areas are contaminated by oil, and the seas are suffering more and more from gigantic plastic deposits. As early as 2011, UN marine experts classified the state of the seas as “alarming” (see Grambow 2013, p. 2). In megacities in particular, the supply of drinking water has become precarious, with water supply systems failing time and again— if they exist at all. According to UNEP estimates, six children die every minute worldwide as a result of water problems such as water shortage, water contamination, etc. (see Grambow 2013, p. 3). After the turn of the millennium, 70% of the world’s freshwater was consumed by agriculture, 20% went to industry and 10% to households (see Feyder 2014, p. 98). In 2016, around 86% of the world’s available water was used for food production. However, only 19% of agricultural land was artificially irrigated. However, artificially irrigated areas were more productive than other areas (see Michler and Ginten 2016).

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It should be borne in mind that in developing countries around 80% of water goes to agriculture, while in highly industrialised countries it is still 40% (see Feyder 2014, p. 98). Excessive groundwater is abstracted in China, India, the USA, Iran, Mexico, Jordan, Israel, Spain, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. Around 3.2 billion people lived in these countries after the turn of the millennium (Feyder 2014, p. 99). In many places, lakes are silting up or rivers are drying up. Lake Chad, for example, has shrunk by 95% since the 1960s, and the Aral Sea has lost 90% of its volume (see Feyder 2010, p. 154). A particular problem of water supply in agriculture—according to Taylor and Entwistle (2015, p. 44)—is soil salinization. In particular, the use of groundwater instead of rainwater for irrigation often leads to soil salinization, which can make the soil infertile in the long term. In various areas of Australia, for example, the soil was completely salinated because farmers used an antiquated system of irrigation by flooding the fields and thus loosening the salt from the soils, which remained on the fields after the water evaporated. And in the delta of the Senegal River, a 100,000 ha rice plantation was built on former grazing land by small farmers with money from the World Bank and a Japanese investor, but it only worked for a few years. This is because the soils were incorrectly irrigated and thus the salt collected on the surface, which made the entire land infertile (see Busse 2010, p. 206). And well known are also the deforestations in many areas of Amazonia in Peru and Brazil along the roads. In the process, agriculture could only be practiced for a few years on the reclaimed soils until they were so depleted that they became hard laterite soils on which nothing grew anymore. In 2010, only 1% of the irrigated land area was irrigated with the particularly effective drip irrigation method, which delivers the water directly to the plant in very small quantities, which in the best case is controlled electronically (see Dobner 2010, p. 68). The climate of the country is also a decisive factor for water consumption in the cultivation of crops. In France, for example, 530 L of water are needed to produce 1 kg of maize in irrigated agriculture, whereas in Egypt 1100 L are required (see Dobner 2010, p. 72). It therefore makes perfect sense to optimise the cultivation of individual crops on a regional basis, i.e. to plant them where their resource consumption is lowest. Unfortunately, quite a few countries do exactly the opposite: they subsidise the cultivation of products that place an additional burden on the water balance. In southern Europe, for example, water shortages have increased because agricultural products have been and are still being cultivated that are largely dependent on artificial irrigation. In Spain, for example, the EU subsidises large-scale olive cultivation to the tune of EUR 2.25 billion a year. In Spain, Greece and Portugal, the EU’s policy has led to the establishment of olive plantations in old—little-managed—forests and on unspoilt land, the water requirements of which are very high, particularly in the case of monoculture cultivation: in this way, water is withdrawn from precisely those regions that are already suffering from water shortages. This applies, for example, to Crete, Apulia and Andalusia (see Laskowski 2010, p. 27).

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In other European countries—such as Germany—water consumption has declined in recent years, although there has been regional overuse or even drawdown of groundwater supplies (see Laskowski 2010, p. 29). The issue of “water scarcity” has become increasingly important, especially since reunification, because precipitation in many places in eastern Germany is considerably lower than in western Germany. The Federal Environment Agency, for example, expects that by 2055 the state of Brandenburg will have to reckon with a temperature increase of 1.4 degrees compared with 2001 and a 16% decrease in the annual precipitation total (see Laskowski 2010, p. 31). More than almost any other area, agriculture is also influenced by climate change—and will be influenced in the future. According to IPCC 2013/2014 (:WGI-21), climatically induced changes in the global water cycle will not be uniform. Differences between dry and wet regions, as well as between wet and dry seasons, will increase. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC projects that in the twenty-first century, “renewable surface and groundwater resources will be significantly reduced in most arid subtropical regions ... leading to increased competition for water between different sectors” (IPCC 2013/2014: WGII-14). However, climate-related changes in the water balance are also to be expected in temperate regions and in countries with large water reserves—such as Switzerland. For example, lake water levels and water discharges will decrease in summer due to falling precipitation and the lower proportion of meltwater. In contrast, water levels and runoff will tend to increase in winter, because rain rather than snow is more likely to fall in winter (see Swiss Academies Factsheets 2017). An important dimension for securing the supply of drinking water is the legal side. In the USA, for example, the Harmon Doctrine of 1895 expressed an unrestricted claim to sovereignty in water matters for the upper riparian at the expense of the lower riparian. In a legal dispute over the use of the waters of the Rio Grande between the United States and Mexico, Attorney General Harmon claimed absolute sovereignty even for water in his own territory. After several years of negotiations, the U.S. conceded 74 million m3 of water annually to Mexico, with that amount later increased 24-fold. The Harmon Doctrine was not officially withdrawn until the early 1940s (see Dobner 2010, p. 11; footnote 4). The first overarching attempts at regulation between various states, in which unilateral changes to waterways were rejected, date back to 1911, but recommendations contained in the “Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers” adopted in 1966 and in the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997 also remained “altogether well-meaning but vague” (Dobner 2010, p. 11). Even the global water policy that began with the 1972 UN World Conference on Human Environment has hardly been able to change this—the water issue was and still is regulated “within the classical paradigm of state-centred politics” (Dobner 2010, p. 12). The example of Israel/Palestine and Jordan The catchment area of the Jordan River covers 18,300 km2. Both Israel and Jordan have pursued competing water development projects since the 1950s. Israel wanted to divert larger

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The Race for Water

59

volumes of water from the Sea of Galilee and the upper Jordan River to the sea coast, while Jordan planned to expand irrigation farming in the lower Jordan Valley. Military skirmishes with Syria occurred in connection with Israeli construction in the Upper Jordan Valley. It was not until the United States attempted to mediate in the water issue in 1953 that an agreement and division of water resources was reached at the technical level two years later under the so-called Johnston Plan. Admittedly, the Arab League did not ratify the Johnston Plan because it took the position that ratification would imply recognition of the State of Israel. Nevertheless, the planned projects subsequently came to fruition, partly because the United States made the allocation of its funding conditional on compliance with the Johnston Plan. Initially, the agreement was honored. But over time, water use shifted more and more in Israel’s favor. This was reflected, among other things, in per capita water consumption: in 1994 this was 360 m3 in Israel and 220 m3 in Jordan. During the peace negotiations in 1990, Jordan demanded a redistribution of the water use rights of the Jordan River, which Israel rejected. However, Israel was willing to discuss measures of improved water management. The 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty essentially established the Israeli position on water use. At the same time, joint water projects were identified that particularly benefited Jordan. However, the treaty remained vague on the exact project design. For example, one of the provisions was that Israel would provide Jordan with 50 million m3 of water per year from sources yet to be identified. In contrast, Jordan’s reading of the treaty was that Israel would concede up to 215 million m3 per year to Jordan. This contradictory view has meant that implementation has proved extremely difficult and to date only a small proportion of the measures have been realised. During the 1997 drought, a crisis situation arose in which Jordan threatened to break off diplomatic relations. In order to save the situation, Israel agreed to provide 25 million m3 of water from the Sea of Galilee for three years, after which the water would be obtained by other means. However, because this had not been possible before, this transfer was continued beyond that (see Dombrowski 2007/2008, p. 59 ff.).

The example of Jordan water use—like many other cases of transboundary water resources—shows one thing clearly: First, it takes not only technical solutions, but the political willingness to reach a solution. Second, within the framework of the nation-state system, there is usually a lack of a superordinate institution, recognized by all sides, which can reach agreement and enforce and monitor the implementation of the agreements, as well as sanction violations of them. From an economic perspective, the upstream-downstream utilization problem on transboundary rivers can be characterized as a unidirectional externalization of costs (see Dombrowski 2007/2008, p. 54). This is because “resource appropriation in the upstream, such as water abstraction or wastewater discharge, is usually accompanied by negative externalities (or externalities) in the downstream. In contrast, the provision of water-related infrastructure upstream can also cause positive externalities downstream” (Dombrowski 2007/2008, p. 54). The negative consequences of externalisation can be analysed using the famous Coase theorem. This theorem states that effective allocation can be achieved through bilateral negotiations with side payments or compensation payments and thus cooperation gains can be achieved. For this to happen, the rights of disposal must be well defined and the transaction costs must be sufficiently small. According to Coase, the rights of disposal

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are well defined if either the laissez-faire rule or the polluter pays rule applies. In the case of the laissez-faire rule, all rights lie with the producer of the damage, in this case the upper riparian; in the case of the polluter pays rule, the rights lie with the injured party (here: lower riparian). Transaction costs consist of the costs of entering into a contract (information and negotiation costs) and the costs of enforcing the contract (monitoring and enforcement costs). With the laissez-faire rule, actors achieve cooperation gains if the upstream riparian reduces the damage-producing activities to an efficient level (equivalence of the upstream riparian’s marginal benefit ¼ the downstream riparian’s marginal cost) and if the downstream riparian compensates the upstream riparian for the lost benefit, e.g. via a compensation payment (see Dombrowski 2007/2008, p. 55). The problem, however, is that in international river conflicts none of the conditions necessary for the validity of the Coase theorem are met: Firstly, there is usually no higher authority that defines and enforces the rules of disposition; secondly, voluntary agreements are needed to define the rights of disposition, which are often not possible; thirdly, incomplete information often makes it difficult to identify cooperation gains; and fourthly, protracted negotiations are often necessary, especially when more than two states are involved. Christian Zeier (2017, p. 8) has pointed out that countries that actively engage in water cooperation wage fewer or no wars against each other. In 2015, for example, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan signed an agreement on the Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, which expressed the agreement of the two riparian states with this dam project, as long as it did not cause “significant damage” to the countries concerned. There are 286 transboundary river basins worldwide, located in almost 150 countries (see Zeier 2017, p. 8). Accordingly, conflicts over water are frequent—especially in times of dwindling water resources. It is no coincidence that political and military conflict areas are located in geographical regions where there are also conflicts over water use. Examples include the Middle East (Turkey/Syria/Iraq and Israel/Palestine), the southern catchment areas of the Nile (Sudan/ South Sudan and adjacent states), and Central and South Asia (Kashmir/India/Pakistan and adjacent states). For this reason, transboundary water cooperation is one of the funding priorities of the German Federal Government (see Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 2006, p. 3). In this context, the Federal Ministry is active in four fields of action: In multilateral policy dialogue, the German government aims to strengthen “norm- and rulebuilding at the international level” (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 2006, p. 3); the promotion of regional cooperation aims to improve networking among cooperation partners; institutional and technical advice aims to strengthen “the effectiveness and efficiency of basin organizations in fulfilling their tasks” (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 2006, p. 3); and financial support is intended to promote local investment measures. Since the 1990s, global water management and water resources—despite fierce protests—have been dominated above all by demands for economization and privatization: “Water, once a pure public good, is now regarded as capable of private ownership, as an

3.4

Genetic Engineering and Seed Control

61

economic good, as a commodity” (Dobner 2010, p. 15). At the same time, drinking water policy today is increasingly shifting from municipal and national political institutions to global actors and institutions. This is especially true for the commercialization of drinking water production by food corporations. Chile is probably the country that has gone furthest in commercializing its water. Under the Pinochet military regime, a law was passed in 1981 that separated land and water for the first time. Water was designated a national public good, but one with market value. This allowed for the privatization of unrestricted and perpetual water use rights to private parties (see Barlow 2014, p. 130). Once the state had sold the rights, it had no way to intervene in the allocation of resources: “The process of privatization has been an absolute disaster for the Chilean people and the country’s ecosystems. Ownership of the water is now concentrated in a handful of companies, mostly of foreign origin, which produce mainly for export. ... Three companies own 90% of the water rights for nationwide energy production” (Barlow 2014, p. 131). Between 1990 and 2002, water consumption by large companies increased by 160% and continued to increase thereafter. Thus, Chilean statistics estimated an exponential increase in water consumption over the next 10 years (see Barlow 2014, p. 131). Barlow (2014, p. 72) therefore calls for industrial and commercial consumers to pay. In this way, part of the profits of private water users should be returned to the public. Barlow (2014, p. 135) also called for the “recapture of water resources” and a stop to speculation with water (see Barlow 2014, p. 262). Overall, there are three transgressions of the competence of nation states in drinking water policy today: First, ecological interdependence beyond national political institutions; second, tendencies towards globalized water management as part and consequence of economic globalization; and third, an increasing supranational regulatory practice beyond national and territorial references (see Dobner 2010, p. 18).

3.4

Genetic Engineering and Seed Control

Art. 4 of the EU Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (EU-Richtlinie zum Rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer Erfindungen) 98/44/EC (1998:L213/18) and Art. 53b of the European Patent Convention (EPC 1973) prohibit patents on plant varieties and animal breeds as well as “essentially biological” plant and animal breeding. EU Directive 98/44/EC, Art. 4 (1) The following shall not be patentable (a) plant varieties and animal breeds, (b) essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals (EU-Richtlinie 98/44/EC 1998:L213/18, see also Then and Tippe 2013, p. 75).

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European Patent Convention (EPC), Art. 53 European patents are not granted for: ... (b) plant varieties or animal breeds and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals. This shall not apply to microbiological processes and products obtained by means of such processes; ... (EPC 1973) However, this prohibition seems to have little and less effect in practice. In 2012, for example, around 1000 patents had already been applied for—and of these around 100 had already been granted—which related to conventional plant breeding (see Then and Tippe 2013, p. 76). By the end of 2011, almost 2000 patents on plants and around 1200 patents on animals had been granted with and without the use of genetic engineering. Among the patents for conventional plant breeding were melons, sunflowers, cucumbers, rice and wheat (see Then and Tippe 2013, p. 77). For example, Monsanto was granted European Patent EP 1962578 for melons whose natural resistance to certain plant viruses was transferred to other types of melons using conventional breeding methods—which is patented as Monsanto’s “invention” (see Then and Tippe 2013, p. 77). Similarly, Monsanto received a patent PI313970 for the natural resistance of Indian melon to the plant disease “Cucurbit yellow stunting disorder virus” (CYSDV). The kicker is that this patent allows Monsanto to “restrict access to any breeding material containing Indian melon resistance. Thus, this patent has a chilling effect on other breeders and may hinder the development of new melon varieties” (Then and Tippe 2013, p. 77). In 2011, the European Patent Office EPO granted the German company Bayer a patent (EP1616013) relating to the breeding of plants with increased stress resistance (see Then and Tippe 2013, p. 77). The two authors state that “This far-reaching patent gives Bayer monopoly rights over important crops, including both the genetically modified plants and the conventional breeding methods and resulting plants” (Then and Tippe 2013, p. 77). Time and again, the European Patent Office has ruled that plants, animals and even human sperm cells can be patented as “inventions”, although breeding is in principle not patentable (see Then and Tippe 2013, p. 78 ff.). This raises the question of how coherent the EPO’s decision-making practice is and why it does not adhere to the rules applicable to it in its patent granting practice. Case study In a ... study (Gelinsky 2012), attention is drawn to a case involving a German sunflower breeder. This case shows how property claims can be abused to prevent further breeding and how alarming the situation actually already is: The breeder had ordered seeds for sunflowers from Syngenta and Pioneer, which he needed to develop his own varieties. Contrary to the provisions of plant variety protection, which allows unrestricted access to breeding material for the purpose of further breeding, however, the use of this seed is extremely restricted according to the package insert. As a result, further independent breeding of these sunflowers, which is

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guaranteed under the plant variety protection, is hindered or even prevented (Then and Tippe 2013, p. 81).

European plant variety protection law, which also applies to Germany, has—based on the UPOV of 1991—provided for fees for the reproduction of protected varieties since the end of the 1990s. Patent law allows the patent holder to prohibit the cultivation of protected varieties as a matter of principle, as well as the transfer of seed—for example in the form of traditional seed exchange (see Gelinsky 2015, p. 7). At the same time, further breeding with protected varieties—despite existing “breeder’s” or “research privileges”—is becoming increasingly difficult because some of the biotechnologically produced plants can no longer be further developed for biological reasons. In the USA, companies have even enforced that the seeds used by farmers no longer belong to them at any time. Manufacturers now only license use for one growing season (see Gelinsky 2015, p. 7). The five seed corporations—Monsanto, DuPont Pioneer, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow—largely control the market. The first three control 54% of the seed trade worldwide (see Schilling 2015, p. 4). For years, these corporations have been working towards patenting plants and animals (see Vollborn and Georgescu 2014, p. 56). For example, in the second half of 2012 alone, 176 bio-patents important for agriculture were applied for at the German Patent and Trademark Office (DPMA) and the European Patent Office (EPO), and in the same period the two offices granted 82 patents, including for special breeding methods for animals and plants such as insect-resistant peppers or particularly resistant tomatoes (see Vollborn and Georgescu 2014, p. 56). According to Vollborn and Georgescu (2014, p. 57), a growing number of agribusinesses are also applying for patents on plants of classical breeds, such as cucumbers, tomatoes, pumpkins and melons. The aim of the agribusinesses is to control the entire value chain, i.e. plants, animal feed and the meat products, milk and eggs produced with them. In 2010, for example, Monsanto had even applied for property rights for biscuits and margarine in which genetically modified soya had been processed (see Vollborn and Georgescu 2014, p. 57). When such patents are granted, it endangers all free production and ultimately the free market economy in the food sector. Yes, ultimately the extensive granting of patents on genetically modified plants and animals and on new breeds prevents scientific and technical progress in the long term—the large food corporations would do well to take their global responsibility seriously and to refrain from monopolistic restrictions in breeding. If the corporations are not stopped, the world will face a catastrophe: Food production will then be in the hands of a few mega-corporations. Local plant species and varieties will be squeezed out, and farmers will have no possibility of acquiring unpatented seeds—they will become completely dependent on the multinationals in the industry. Consumers will no longer have a choice... (Vollborn and Georgescu 2014, p. 57).

This vision of horror may seem exaggerated—but there are two fundamental problems: firstly, with the granting of patents on living organisms and genomes, an important

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boundary has fallen, and secondly, there is an urgent need for regulatory mechanisms to protect traditional seeds and conventional breeding methods. In any case, farmers must be able to retain the unrestricted right to use traditional, freely available seeds and to continue breeding. It is precisely in the area of seeds that states should make every effort to prevent monopolies. On the other hand, farmers must learn once again not to use exclusively economic criteria for the seed they use—for example, the significantly higher yield of genetically modified hybrid products—but to include aspects of nature and landscape conservation and the preservation of biodiversity in their strategy. And this is precisely what agricultural subsidies should be aimed at. Apart from the legal problems (patent), breeders face the problem that biotechnologically produced plants can no longer be further developed by breeding for biological reasons (see Gelinsky 2014, p. 64). A particular problem of the globalised food industry is that large food corporations such as Monsanto deliberately breed new seeds that can only be sown once and from which hybrid plants grow whose fruits cannot be used as seed. In this way, the agro-multinationals make farmers dependent on them, dictate their prices and force them to grow their genetically modified products. In 2011, for example, the US corporation Monsanto already controlled over 50% of the seeds available on the Chinese market (see Ming 2011, p. 17). Italy must allow cultivation of genetically modified maize The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has handed down a ruling that is about ‘Gen-Mais’ (German; literally translated ‘genetical maize’, meaning ‘genetically modified maize’). A misleading word, because every plant has genes, even without its genetic material having been artificially altered. Nevertheless, the term has become commonplace. It stands for genetically modified maize, which many people neither want to eat themselves nor feed to farm animals—out of concern for their health and the possible effects on the environment. Now, after years of litigation, the European Court of Justice has ruled: Italy may not prohibit farmers from cultivating the largely pest-resistant maize variety MON 810 (case number C-111/16 ...). The ruling has general consequences for the legal situation regarding the cultivation of genetically modified food and feed in Europe. The judges ruled in the highest instance: states may only prohibit this if they have proven that the product ‘poses a serious risk to humans, animals or the environment’. These strict conditions would apply to both member states and the EU Commission. Currently, bans and restrictions on the cultivation of MON 810 are in force in 19 of 28 EU states (Zeit-online, September 13, 2017).

In addition, there is always bungling in genetic engineering. For example, Rémi Carayol (2017, p. 15) wrote that Monsanto and Inera had only carried out two backcrosses on transgenic cotton varieties instead of the usual six to seven. Backcrossing involves crossing hybrid varieties with the parent plant so that the product does not stray too far from the parent plant (see Carayol 2017, p. 15). Advocates of hybrid varieties—such as hybrid wheat—argue that these varieties yield around 10–15% more, with the same or even lower use of fertilizers and pesticides (see Aiolfi 2017b, p. 34). The major disadvantage of hybrid varieties from the farmers’ point of view is that most varieties are not suitable for producing seed, which is why farmers are

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heavily dependent on the major suppliers—and moreover, due to corresponding licensing agreements, can only switch to another producer with great difficulty, let alone to another seed supplier that does not offer hybrid varieties. The business model of simultaneously producing and distributing seed and hybrid plants that can no longer be reproduced is not without its dangers for the agro-multinationals either: In states with poor rule of law, collecting licenses is difficult, and seed production and storage tie up a lot of capital. In addition—and this is probably the greatest danger—the gene pool that has been spread and safeguarded over decades and centuries via locally and decentrally passed on seeds is in danger of becoming narrower or being lost altogether. Critics of food corporations—such as René Lehner (2017, p. 16)—argue that Monsanto and other food multinationals do not improve world food security with their techniques and products, but on the contrary reduce it: “...if you were to calculate all the damage Monsanto does to people and the environment, the company would be bankrupt. The figure would be hundreds of billions of dollars. The same goes for Bayer or any other corporation”. In recent years, genetically modified foods have made their way into many regions of the world. In various countries, legislators have reacted to the new situation. There are three main attitudes to GM foods: Some countries ban both cultivation and import—e.g. Russia—, a number of countries—especially in Europe as well as Turkey and Saudi Arabia—ban cultivation but allow imports, and many countries allow both cultivation as import and export—such as most countries in North and South America, China, India, Australia and a few countries in Africa such as South Africa and Sudan (see Hoffmann 2016, p. 12). In 2015, genetically modified plants were cultivated on 12% of the arable land worldwide (see Informationsdienst Gentechnik 2016). The cultivation of genetically modified crops is concentrated in a few countries, as Fig. 3.11 shows. The cultivation of genetically modified plants changed less between 2009 and 2015 than one would expect (Fig. 3.12). The situation in China is particularly contradictory. This country has a divided relationship with genetically modified organisms (GMOs). For example, in the cultivation of cotton—whose area under cultivation in China covers 2.92 million ha—95% of GMO plants are cultivated (see Aiolfi 2017a, p. 27). In contrast, China pursued a very restrictive GMO policy for years in the case of soy and maize, which are largely cultivated in the form of genetically modified plants in South America, for example, which is why the Chinese market remained closed to Western seed producers for a long time. In mid-2017, of six applications for GMO licences for the Chinese market, only two had received a positive response: that of the US company Monsanto and that of the Basel-based company Syngenta, which has since become Chinese-owned (see Aiolfi 2017a, p. 27). The dispute over the cultivation and marketing of genetically modified plants has now had repercussions that extend as far as the major food companies—with serious economic consequences. In the spring of 2017, Standard and Poors warned that Syngenta would need additional financial support from China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) to pay for the consequences of litigation and liability claims

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Fig. 3.11 Share of global GM cultivation by country. (Source: Informationsdienst Gentechnik 2016; own representation)

arising from the premature marketing of genetically modified corn in North America in 2013. According to a September 2017 announcement, an initial settlement with 440,000 American farmers could cost the corporation $1.5 billion, or more than 1 year’s profit (see Zulauf 2017, p. 9). Syngenta also faces heavy fines, which is why the planned capital raising of US$7 billion is likely to be burdened with an additional risk premium of between 0.5% and 2.5%, which will bring Syngenta an additional interest burden of US$140 million, or 10% of annual profits. At the end of 2016, Syngenta had only just 113 million in provisions for litigation (see Zulauf 2017, p. 9). Many European countries have their own regulations. For example, Art. 120, para. 1 of the Swiss Federal Constitution states: “Man and his environment are protected against the misuse of genetic engineering”. At the same time, the next paragraph specifies: “The Confederation shall issue regulations on the handling of germinal and hereditary material of animals, plants and other organisms. In so doing, it shall take account of the dignity of creation and the safety of humans, animals and the environment, and shall protect the genetic diversity of animal and plant species” (Art. 120 para. 2 BV). However, it is disputed where the limits of handling germinal and genetic material lie, where exactly “the dignity of the creature” begins and what handling of genetically modified animals and plants is permitted and what is not. In Switzerland, for example, a moratorium on the cultivation of genetically modified plants was enacted in 2005 and extended by parliament for 3 years in 2014 (see Scherer 2015, p. 8). In Switzerland, the Federal Council has once again extended the moratorium on the cultivation of genetically modified plants that has been in place since 2005. It now applies until 2021 (see Hoffmann

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Fig. 3.12 Development of cultivation of genetically modified crops 2009–2015 in million ha. (Source: Informationsdienst Gentechnik 2016; own representation)

2016, p. 12). The only exceptions are field experiments in research. Such experiments are underway with modified potatoes, wheat and apple tree crops. In 2017, the Swiss government—the Federal Council—sent the revised Genetic Engineering Act (Gentechnikgesetz) and the “Genetic Engineering Coexistence Ordinance” for consultation, which revealed that the cultivation of genetically modified plants is rejected by many: More than 70 comments rejected cultivation in principle (see Scherer 2015, p. 8). In practice, one problem is that most laws and regulations permit low levels of contamination by GMOs: for example, Article 12(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 stipulates that contamination with genetically modified material is permissible up to a level of 0.9%, without the foodstuff concerned therefore having to be specially labelled (see Girnau 2014, p. 176). In this context, the following paragraph 3 of the same regulation stipulates that “operators must be able to demonstrate to the competent authorities that they have taken appropriate steps to avoid the presence of such materials” (cited in Girnau 2014, p. 176). Accordingly, the burden of proof lies with the entrepreneur. The all-important question here is, of course, what measures can be expected of the entrepreneur. In addition,

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genetic contamination in the per mille range can already be decisive or have serious consequences. In any case, this regulation is anything but satisfactory. Even a “GM-free” food is hardly GM-free today: for example, a food containing less than 0.5% of a genetically modified plant does not have to be declared in Switzerland, auxiliary substances and additives do not have to be labelled, and meat, milk and eggs from abroad—including from the EU—largely come from animals fed with genetically modified plants (see Hoffmann 2016, p. 12).

3.5

On the Globalisation of Agriculture

The globalisation of agriculture is evident in production and the value chain on the one hand, but also in consumer behaviour on the other. There is both an objective development towards globalisation and a subjective perception of increased globalisation. In their handbook on the globalization of agriculture, Robinson and Carson (2015, p. 22) identify and discuss four key issues: First, the physical underpinnings of worldencompassing agriculture in ecological or environmental terms; second, policies to promote or prevent ongoing globalization; third, the key role of transnational corporations in the process of globalization; and fourth, various challenges related to the globalization of agriculture. All four areas are significant for current agriculture. Auernheimer (2015, p. 73) has pointed out that with globalization in agriculture, not only has the interdependence of individual actors increased, but more importantly, farmers have become more dependent on agribusiness corporations. Farmers have to get seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, antibiotics and veterinary supplies essentially from the hands of six global corporations, forcing them to make expensive investments and large financial inputs. One example of the globalization of the food industry—among others—is the Global Partnership for Good Agricultual Practices (GLOBALG.A.P), originally founded in 1997 by the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP) (see Oosterveer 2015, p. 124). GLOBALG.A.P. unites audits for food security standards and specific protocols for sustainable food production. Among other things, this was intended to overcome the confusion of safety and quality standards among individual retail outlets. At the same time, the EU developed uniform standards for maximum exposure of fresh produce to pesticides. A few years after their introduction, GLOBALG.A.P. standards were adopted by almost all leading European retail stores (see Oosterveer 2015, p. 125). In 2017, GLOBALG.A.P. was active in more than 120 countries (see GLOBALG.A.P. 2017), with close to 100,000 certified businesses (see Oosterveer 2015, p. 125). There are currently three forms of such private “governance initiatives” in the agricultural sector: firstly, so-called corporate social responsibility initiatives (CSR; see Jäggi 2017, p. 107 ff. for details), secondly, “codes of conduct” (CoC) and thirdly, private management and processing standards (see Kalfagianni and Fuchs 2015, p. 136). While CSR activities mainly aim at increasing the sense of responsibility within the company and

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the observance of social and humanitarian rights as well as environmental standards, “codes of conduct” can be understood as a kind of written guidelines that apply to companies’ dealings with their employees, customers, suppliers, government authorities and external stakeholders. Private management and processing standards are applied as binding technical-organizational management criteria in the production of products or services. According to Kalfagianni and Fuchs (2015, p. 136), private standards can be regarded as the “strictest form of private governance” and include internal and external process audits with corresponding sanctions. Private governance efforts increase profits on the one hand. They reduce transaction costs and other costs, they enhance the reputation of the company and lead to additional financial gains. On the other hand, private governance activities also lead to costs: they reduce information asymmetries and uncertainty among demanders, increase negotiation and coordination costs, and lead to additional effort in terms of creating instruments to enforce standards and sanction non-compliance (see Kalfagianni and Fuchs 2015, p. 137). All in all, the effectiveness of private “food governance” is a function of external pressure, the perception of a problem, and the external visibility of the initiative and the actors (see Kalfagianni and Fuchs 2015, p. 138). Decisive criteria for success are the size of the initiative (e.g. number of participating companies, market coverage, turnover or workforce), the existence and perception of previous food scandals and the proximity to retail outlets and customers (see Kalfagianni and Fuchs 2015, p. 138 f.). The two authors sum up success in the following formula: “Stringency ¼ External pressure + internal collaboration + availability of solutions + size and heterogeneity of membership” (Kalfagianni and Fuchs 2015, p. 139). Inter-firm networks are a special form of cooperation between individual firms at international and global level. They lead—in the positive case—to increased mutual learning, the implementation of collective practices and increasing peer monitoring. They also strengthen autonomy and preserve the independence of partners. In contrast to vertical integration of entire product chains, they preserve flexibility and do not exclude competition (see Casarosa and Gobbato 2015, p. 157). Another aspect of globalisation is the so-called “financialisation” of agriculture and food production. According to Epstein (2005, p. 3), “financialisation ... means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. Profits are no longer made through trade and commodity production, as in the past, but through financial activities (see Lawrence et al. 2015, p. 209). According to Lawrence et al. (2015, p. 310), the foundations for financialisation activities are corresponding financial products such as derivatives—e.g. futures, options and swaps—, communication technologies, the existence of transnational financial firms, the disappearance of virtual capital flow controls and the increasing blurring of differences between different types of financial institutions. The financialization of global agriculture has been facilitated by neoliberal deregulations, new information technologies, and the free flow of capital.

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Financial investments in increasingly globalised agriculture are interesting for the following reasons (see Lawrence et al. 2015, p. 312 f.): • The decline in the amount of farmland available per capita will, in the longer term, drive up land prices and thus also the prices of agricultural goods. • The outgoing oil will make agricultural land interesting for the cultivation of biofuels— for example, there was already an eightfold increase in capital invested in biofuels between 2004 and 2007 (see Lawrence et al. 2015, p. 312). • The growing middle classes in countries such as China, India and Indonesia will increase demand for food and agricultural products. • Climate change brings new investment opportunities. • In oil-rich but land- and water-scarce countries such as Libya, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, demand for food will increase, spurring investment by these states in other countries’ agriculture. • Opportunities for risk investment and speculation in agriculture and food production will continue to increase.

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Dezember 1991 und der Akte zur Revision des EPÜ vom 29. November 2000. https://www.epo. org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2016/d/ar53.html (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Eurostat (2016): Use of water by the domestic sector (households and services). All sources, 2003–13 (1) (m3 per inhabitant). YB16-de.png. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/2/ 24/Use_of_water_by_the_domestic_sector_%28households_and_services%29_%E2%80%94_ all_sources%2C_2003%E2%80%9313_%28%C2%B9%29_%28m%C2%B3_per_inhabitant% 29_YB16-de.png (Zugriff 25.4.2018) Feyder, Jean (2010): Mordshunger. Wer profitiert vom Elend der armen Länder? Frankfurt/Main: Westend Verlag. Feyder, Jean (2014): Mordshunger. Wer profitiert vom Elend der armen Länder? 2. Auflage. Frankfurt/Main: Westend Verlag. Gähler, Ueli (2015): Die Macht der Konzerne brechen. In: Antidot 20/2015. 11 f. Gelinsky, Eva (2012): Biopatente & Agrarmodernisierung – Wie sich Patente auf die gentechnikfreie Saatgutarbeit auswirken. http://www.gentechnikfreie-saat.de/informationen/positionen/europa/ patente-studie.html (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Gelinsky, Eva (2014): Saatgut im liberalisierten Weltmarkt. Von der mittelständischen Pflanzenzüchtung zur Saatgutindustrie. In: Widerspruch 64/2014. Zürich. 61 ff. Gelinsky, Eva (2015): Keine Ernährungssouveränität ohne Saatgutsouveränität! In: Antidot 20/2015. 7. Girnau, Marcus (2014): „Bio“ und Gentechnik. In: Leible, Stefan (Hrsg.): Lebensmittel zwischen Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Bayreuth: Verlag P.C.O.171 ff. GLOBALG.A.P. History (2017): http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/about-us/history/ (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Grambow, Martin (2013): Bestandsaufnahme. In: Grambow, Martin (Hrsg.): Nachhaltige Wasserbewirtschaftung. Konzept und Umsetzung eines vernünftigen Umgangs mit dem Gemeingut Wasser. Wiesbaden: Springer Vieweg. 1 ff. Haber, Wolfgang (2014): Landwirtschaft und Naturschutz. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH. Hannich, Günter (2002): Börsenkrach und Weltwirtschaftskrise. Der Weg in den Dritten Weltkrieg. Rottenburg: Kopp Verlag. Henkel, Marianne (2013): „Land-grabbing“ – Großinvestitionen in Agrarland zwischen Verhaltenskodex und der Frage nach der Zukunft der Landwirtschaft. Ethische Dimensionen der steigenden Nachfrage nach Land. In: Gottwald, Franz-Theo/Boergen, Isabel (Hrsg.): Essen und Moral. Beiträge zur Ethik der Ernährung. Marburg: Metropolis. 33 ff. Hess, Remo (2017): Fünf Jahre länger Glyphosat. In: Neue Luzerner Zeitung vom 28.11.2017. 7. Hoffmann, Claudia (2016): Die grüne Gentechnik erobert die Welt. In: Luzerner Zeitung vom 4.11.2016. 12. Höltschi, René (2017): Die EU verlängert die Glyphosat-Zulassung. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 28.11.2017. 27. ICESCR (1966): International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27. http://www. ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Informationsdienst Gentechnik (2016): Dossier: Gentechnik-Statistiken. Was wächst wo? Stand Juli 2016 http://www.keine-gentechnik.de/dossiers/anbaustatistiken/#c194 (Zugriff 25.4.2018). IPCC (2013/2014): Klimaänderung 2013/2014. Zusammenfassung für politische Entscheidungsträger. Beiträge der Arbeitsgruppen I, II und III zum fünften Sachstandsbericht des zwischenstaatlichen Ausschusses für Klimaänderungen (IPCC). Genf: IPCC. Jäggi, Christian J. (2016): Migration und Flucht. Wirtschaftliche Aspekte – regionale Hot Spots – Dynamiken – Lösungsansätze. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler.

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Rampini Stadelmann, Jules (2014): Mehr Agrikultur – weniger Landwirtschaft. Elemente eines nötigen Wandels aus kleinbäuerlicher Sicht. In: Widerspruch 64/2014. Zürich. 13 ff. Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (2015): The Globalisation of Agriculture: Introducing the Handbook. In: Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (Hrsg.): Handbook on the Globalisation of Agriculture. Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 1 ff. Salzer, Irmi (2014): TTIP, GAP und die Macht der Konzerne. In: Widerspruch 64/2014. Zürich. 23 ff. Sauvin, Philippe (2014): Arbeitskräfte in der schweizerischen Landwirtschaft. Schlechte Arbeitsbedingungen, tiefe Löhne, rudimentäre Rechte. In: Widerspruch 64/2014. Zürich. 41 ff. Schäfers, Eduard (2016): Strukturen und Probleme einer globalisierten Welt. Göttingen: Cuvillier. Scherer, Paul (2015): Gentech-Moratorium – wie weiter? In: Antidot 20/2015. 8. Schilling, Udo (2015): Wes Brot ich ess, des Lied ich sing. In: Antidot 20/2015. 4. Shiklomanov, Igor A. (1998): World Water Resources. A new Appraisal and Assessment for the 21st Century. Paris. Statista (2016): Flächen von Ackerland weltweit nach Ländergruppen im Vergleich 1961, 1991 und 2007. https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/161652/umfrage/ackerlandflaechen-nachlaendergruppen-seit-1961/ (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Statista (2017): Jährlicher Pro-Kopf-Wasserverbrauch in ausgewählten Ländern weltweit im Jahr 2013 (in Kubikmetern). https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/6378/umfrage/ wasserverbrauch-in-ausgewaehlten-laendern/ (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Swaffield, S. (2005): Landscape and Public Policy – Issue of Scale and Focus. Unveröffentlichter Vortrag an der Konferenz „Our Shared Landscape“ vom 2.-5.5.2005 in Ascona. Abstract in: Lange, E./Miller, V. (Hrsg.): Proceedings of the Conference. Zürich: ETH. 109 f. Swiss Academies Factsheets (2017): Brennpunkt Klima Schweiz. Vol. 12, No. 2, 2017. Bern: Akademien Wissenschaften Schweiz. Taylor, Ros/Entwistle, Jane (2015): Agriculture and Environment: Fundamentals and Future Perspectives. In: Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (Hrsg.): Handbook on the Globalisation of Agriculture. Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 31 ff. The Economist (2009): Buying Farmland Abroad. Outsourcing’s Third Wave. 23.5.2009. Then, Christoph/Tippe, Ruth (2013): Der patentierte Brokkoli. Über die Zunahme von Patenten auf konventionellen Züchtungen. In: Gottwald, Franz-Theo/Boergen, Isabel (Hrsg.): Essen und Moral. Beiträge zur Ethik der Ernährung. Marburg: Metropolis. 75 ff. Trummer, Paul (2010): Pizza Globale. Ein Lieblingsessen erklärt die Weltwirtschaft. Berlin: Ullstein. Tschinderle, Franziska (2017): Migration: Menschliche Maschinen. In: WochenZeitung vom 24.8.2017. 9. UNESCO (2003): Water for People. Water for Life. The United Nations World Water Development Report. Barcelona. Vollborn, Marita/Georgescu, Vlad D. (2014): Food Mafia. Wehren Sie sich gegen die skrupellosen Methoden der Lebensmittelindustrie. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. Wald, Sarah D. (2014): Visible Farmers/Invisible Workers: Locating Immigrant Labor in Food Studies. In: Pilcher, Jeffrey M. (Hrsg.): Food History: Critical and Primary Sources. Contemporary Transitions. Volume 4. 190 ff. Wallacher, Johannes (2009): Welthandel und Armutsbekämpfung. In: Dabrowski, Martin/Wolf, Judith/Abmeier, Karlies (Hrsg.): Globalisierung und globale Gerechtigkeit. Paderborn: F. Schöningh. WBF (2017): Medienmitteilung: Höhere landwirtschaftliche Einkommen 2016. 03.10.2017. https:// www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/49829.pdf (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Weltbank (2010): Rising Global Interest in Farmland. Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? Washington.

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Weltentwicklungsbericht (2008): Agrarwirtschaft für Entwicklung. Weltbank. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag. Woertz, Eckart (2015): Oil for Food. The Global Food Crisis and the Middle East. Oxford/GB. Oxford University Press. World Food Programme (2017): Hunger. Hunger weltweit – Zahlen und Fakten. http://de.wfp.org/ hunger/hunger-statistik (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Zeier, Christian (2017): Blauer Frieden nötiger denn je. In: Eine Welt. Nr. 3/September 2017. 6 ff. Zeit-online (13.9.2017): Mon 810: Italien muss Genmaisanbau erlauben. http://www.zeit.de/wissen/ umwelt/2017-09/mon-810-mais-monsanto-eugh (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Zulauf, Daniel (2017): Syngenta muss über die Bücher. In: Neue Luzerner Zeitung vom 5.10.2017. 9.

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While in Western and Northern Europe the share of animal calories in the diet has remained stable at a relatively high level since the 1980s and has even decreased slightly, the consumption of animal calories in Southern Europe increased significantly until the year 2000, only to decrease slightly since then (see Combris et al. 2013, p. 45). In contrast, the demand for animal calories in developing countries and “emerging states” continues to rise. From this, Combris et al. (2013, p. 45) conclude, for example with regard to cholesterol, that better information about food can lead to changes in dietary behaviour, but is not sufficient. In this context, meat products are considered “income elastic” (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 83). This means that as income increases, the proportion of the amount spent on meat increases—at least in the lower-income brackets. This is the case in practically all countries, and there is a considerable need to catch up in this respect, especially in developing countries. But above a certain income level in the upper range, the share of meat consumption falls again—reasons for this are greater health awareness, ideological attitudes (vegetarianism or veganism), “modern trends” or quite simply increasing age of the population. In 2014, developing countries produced around 60% of the meat produced worldwide. At the same time, the per capita consumption of meat in developing countries was 30 kg, while in industrialized countries it was around 80 kg (see Hirschfelder 2014, p. 31). Since 2000, global meat consumption has increased steadily, albeit to varying degrees. The strongest increase has been in the consumption of poultry meat, see Fig. 4.1. Thus, while meat consumption as a whole and especially the demand for beef and pork tend to stagnate, poultry meat is strongly trending and is now the fastest-growing sector in meat production (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 42). In 1810, average meat consumption was well below 20 kg per person per year. In Germany, meat consumption rose from 26 kg per capita and year to 85 kg per capita

# Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 C. J. Jäggi, Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34672-0_4

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World consumption of meat in million tons 140 120 100 pork 80

poultry beef

60

mutton and goat other meat

40 20 0 2000

2010

2013

2014

2015

Fig. 4.1 Development of global meat consumption. (Source: Landesanstalt für Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft 2017, p. 2; own representation)

between 1950 and 2005. Of this, 54.7 kg was pork, 17.7 kg poultry meat and 12.6 kg beef or veal (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 36). This increase was mainly driven by the lower and middle classes, who were increasingly able to afford meat with the advent of the economic miracle. On the one hand, people now had the financial means to afford meat more frequently, and on the other hand, industrial meat production lowered the prices of meat products. Whereas around 1900 25–30% of the food budget was spent on meat and sausage products, in 2007 this figure was just 5% (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 37). Global demand for meat is expected to increase significantly over the next decade as a result of greater urbanisation, higher incomes and different eating habits. The OECD-FAO Agriculture Outlook 2014–2023 assumes a global increase in meat consumption of 1.6% per year (see OECD-FAO 2014, p. 31). By 2026, the OECD and FAO expect meat production to increase by 13% compared to 2014/2016 (see OECD-FAO 2017, p. 110). There is considerable pent-up demand for meat, particularly in developing countries. In the past fifty years, global meat production has quadrupled from 71 to 300 million tons per year. The World Agricultural Report assumed that this trend will continue, especially because meat consumption in the emerging countries will converge with the so-called “western diet” of North America and Europe with its burgers, steaks and schnitzels. The FAO now expects meat production to increase to 455 million tons by 2050. At present, the average person on earth, from baby to vegan to grandmother, consumes about 42 kilograms of meat per year. In Germany, it was 87 kilograms of slaughter weight, of which then about 60 kilograms are consumed. Men eat in this country, by the way, twice as much meat as women. Recently, consumption in Germany has been declining slightly and the number of vegetarians and vegans has been rising rapidly. In addition, consumption is shifting more and more from

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beef to chicken. But the “average German” consumes the most pork. This is in common with the “average Chinese”, who have increased their meat consumption per capita six-fold over the last forty years. As the population in China almost doubled to 1.3 billion at the same time, the global demand for meat and animal feed increased enormously (Ways out of the hunger crisis 2014, p. 10).

The OECD and FAO expect a significant increase in world production of poultry meat and fish over the next 10 years (see OECD-FAO 2014, p. 32). World consumption of pork and beef will also grow—but at a much lower rate—and again mainly in developing countries. In recent years, the manufacture of products of animal origin has increasingly come under fire. This is not least because the interventions in life are particularly massive here: Breeding, genetic modification, animal husbandry, slaughter. In addition, there has recently been the use of nanotechnology (see Gottwald and Boergen 2013, p. 28).

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However, not only the agro-industry but also industrially operated agriculture on traditional or even organic farms has in some cases taken on frightening dimensions. For example, in Germany, about 40 million and in Switzerland about 2 million male chicks are killed per year directly after hatching because they have no use in modern agriculture (see Lahrtz 2013). Chickens for fattening, of which only the females are needed as laying hens, put on breast meat more slowly and the males grow much more slowly than the females for genetic reasons. That is why there is only one solution in business management terms: get rid of them! For animal welfare reasons, the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia has now issued a ban on killing male chicks. As recently as October 2013, neither the responsible ministry nor the Central Association of German Poultry Breeders or organic farms knew what to do with the thousands of male chicks. But due to business logic, it will probably be the case that either the poultry farms will move away from North RhineWestphalia or they will export the male chicks abroad to have them killed there! Factory farming leads to a variety of health problems. Laying hens, for example, are often affected by painful diseases of the reproductive organs, such as inflammation of the fallopian tubes or prolapse of the fallopian tubes. The high estrogen levels lead to a weak immune system. Many laying hens suffer from osteoporosis, which often leads to painful bone fractures (see Frank-Oster 2013, p. 102). In dairy cows, the large amounts of milk obtained through genetic selection often lead to lameness, inflammation, disorders of the reproductive organs, circulatory and behavioural problems. Cows with high milk production are more susceptible to injuries to the body, skin, limbs and hooves, and the risk of mastitis also increases (see EFSA 2009, p. 2; Frank-Oster 2013, p. 103). In the EU, around 80% of male piglets—i.e. around 100 million—are castrated every year. It can be assumed that castration usually takes place without anaesthesia (Frank-Oster 2013, p. 103).

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Fig. 4.2 Development of meat production and population figures in Germany. (Source: Pollmer et al. 2015, p. 34; own illustration)

However, meat production has decreased in several countries despite factory farming, for example in Germany between 1913 and 2013, see Fig. 4.2. This means: Despite the increase in factory farming, the number of animals bred has decreased. However, the situation is somewhat different in poultry farming: Here, the number of poultry bred increased between 1913 and 1970, only to decrease again until the year 2000 and to increase massively again in 2013, see Fig. 4.3. Due to the strongly polarised opinions on the subject of animal husbandry and in particular on factory farming, there are also very different, even contradictory assessments with regard to its ecological consequences. For example, it is pointed out that on almost 5 billion ha of arable land worldwide, only 1.4 billion ha are used to grow food for humans. In contrast, 3.4 billion ha of arable land are used primarily for permanent pasture. However, advocates of animal husbandry point out that this is not simply wasted arable land: rather, much of this land is located in dry, cold and mountainous regions, which is why it is not suitable for arable farming (see Pollmer et al. 2015, p. 36). In addition, many animals eat agricultural products that cannot be eaten directly by humans. Table 4.1 shows how much a fattening bull eats per day. This means that the fattening bull gains up to 1.5 kg/day. Fattening with maize silage is particularly favourable. As maize is an arable crop, fattening has partly shifted to arable

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Fig. 4.3 Development of the poultry population in Germany. (Source: Pollmer et al. 2015, p. 34; own illustration) Table 4.1 Feed of a fattening bull per day. (Source: Pollmer et al. 2015, p. 39) 12.00 kg 3.40 kg 1.70 kg 1.40 kg 0.30 kg 0.07 kg 0.04 kg 0.01 kg

Maize silage (whole plant, fermented) Potato pulp (residue from potato processing) Feed barley (not suitable for human consumption) Rapeseed extraction meal (residue of biodiesel production) Straw Mineral feed (iron, iodine, manganese, molybdenum, etc.) Fodder lime Road salt

areas (see Pollmer et al. 2015, p. 39). It makes particular sense to use wheat for livestock feed when wheat suffers from unfavourable weather (see Pollmer et al. 2015, p. 42). Table 4.2 shows the daily feed quantities and the feed composition of a dairy cow. The concentrate may vary, depending on the composition of the farm’s own fodder. Global Chicken Market In the last 20 years, the chicken meat market has changed fundamentally. Today, hardly any whole chickens are exported, but mainly chicken parts. In the EU countries, these are mainly chicken parts for which there is no market in Europe. The chicken is cut up into its

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Table 4.2 Daily feed quantities and feed composition of a dairy cow. (Source: Pollmer et al. 2015, p. 40) 21.00 kg 15.00 kg 3.50 kg 2.50 kg 2.10 kg 2.00 kg 1.00 kg 0.10 kg 0.05 kg 0.05 kg

Maize silage (whole plant, fermented) Grass silage Brewer’s grains, ensiled Feed barley (not suitable for human consumption) Sugar beet molasses pulp Soya expeller, steam-heated Rapeseed extraction meal (residue of biodiesel production) Fodder lime Road salt Mineral feed (iodine, copper, zinc, cobalt, etc.)

individual parts. Because different parts of the chicken are preferred in different regions and countries of the world, these are also only supplied with the corresponding parts: Americans and Europeans prefer chicken breast or only the fillet piece from the breast cap, the Japanese love dark chicken meat, the Chinese buy any amount of chicken feet and the poorest people in the world—for example in Africa—eat any meat as long as it is cheap (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 9). In this context, chicken meat exports to West Africa could be referred to as “residual recycling”, “co-products” or “leftover meat” (Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 10 as well as 53). These can be offered very cheaply because they occur “automatically” during production, do not incur any additional costs and do not find a market in Europe. In this respect, poultry companies are extremely inventive. According to Marí and Buntzel (2007, p. 56), “the suspicion is that parts ... [of] subsidised exported whole EU chickens are cut up, repackaged and relabelled in the Middle East and re-exported to East Africa”. Thus, Dubai has become a major transshipment point for European poultry, he said. In addition, poultry companies are always creating new products to recycle as much as possible. One example is “chicken nuggets”, which often contain low-quality meat. The market for chicken meat has changed completely, not only on the production and marketing side but also on the consumer side. Until 1996, for example, the West African state of Cameroon supplied itself with poultry, which often had free range—these chickens were referred to by the locals as “poulets bicylettes” (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 19). When Cameroon became a member of the WTO, along with the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), the problems began. Previously, each country had been able to set its import tariffs up to a maximum of 80%. Then the CEMAC countries agreed with the IMF and the World Bank to set a common import tariff on the meat of 20%. Cameroon had also previously set import quotas on chicken. These increased from 12 t in 1994 to 850 t in 1996. In 2003, the official import quota for chicken meat was 8500 t; however, 22,000 t were imported (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 21). In 2007, one could buy a kilogram of “frozen chicken” for EUR 1.20 at the Douzala market, while local

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poultry producers charged EUR 5 for a local chicken weighing about 1.5 kg. It was impossible to produce chicken meat in Cameroon for less than EUR 2 per kg (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 28). Imported chicken meat displaced domestic chicken. The economic consequences were severe: foreign exchange of EUR 16 million per year was lost due to chicken imports, and the state lost an additional EUR 10.5 million in tax revenue from domestic chicken production. The customs revenues theoretically received in return largely seeped into corruption (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 29). In addition, the supplier sectors of the local chicken farmers—above all maize and soya farmers—lost their sales area; if one takes the 22,000 t of imported chicken meat as a basis, this amounted to around 40,000 t of grain or—the equivalent of 110,000 jobs in Cameroon alone (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 29). Similar developments, and in particular a sudden increase in imports of chicken meat, have been observed since the 1990s in many other African countries and also in Caribbean states such as Haiti and Jamaica (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 60). In 2000, for example, Senegal had to reduce its import tariffs for chicken meat from 60% to 20% under pressure from the World Bank; the situation was similar in the other members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. The process was similar in each country: the dismantling of tariff barriers and opening of poultry markets to foreign competition, price undercutting of domestic poultry production—often by cheaper “leftover meat”—and in some cases establishment of their own frozen food chains in the country. In Senegal, poultry meat imports increased 11-fold by 2003 compared to 1999, in Ghana 8-fold (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 62). What is piquant here is that in many rich countries the poultry industry is directly or indirectly subsidized, while in poor countries no subsidies or support are directed. Many African countries cannot even make full use of the maximum tariffs allowed by the treaty and deposited with the WTO (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 65). Various factors are responsible for the changes in global poultry production—Marí and Buntzel (2007, p. 75) speak in this context of an “internationalization of the poultry economy”—: poultry meat is the (almost) only meat consumed in practically all cultures, and the technology for industrially produced poultry meat is readily available and traded worldwide. The technologies of the chicken sector are at about the same level worldwide. The input and technology supplying companies are not interested in market control—they want to sell and not establish exclusive market positions. The only exception in this respect is hybrid chickens, whose use is restricted by patents (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 75). For example, fattening chicks The business is organised in a very division of labour and structured hierarchically. At the top of the pyramid are the four hybrid chicken breeders in the world. They don’t have to be big at all. Their power is not based on their capital investment or their workforce size, but on the breeding skill, on their possession of the genetic starting material ... and on their perfect logistics. Their power is the trade secret and their control over the breeding lines, especially the origins and combination of the great-grandfather and great-grandmother lines. They never let the great-grandparents out of their hands... On the next lower level of the hierarchy, ladder are

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the multiplier farms, which hold the parent stock under license for the breeding companies and multiply them the hatching eggs for fattening. They are followed by the hatcheries, which hatch the fertilised eggs in thermal ovens and sell the hatched day-old chicks to the fatteners. The hatcheries are mostly owned by the meat companies, which conclude the contracts with the chicken farmers (Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 138).

In the classical agriculture of poor countries, the contribution of chickens to the livelihoods of the poor was varied and sometimes substantial. Eggs were easy to sell locally, the meat was consumed or sold on special occasions. Thus, chickens represented a kind of living “savings bank”, with the proceeds of which poor families could buy maize, soap, medicines or school utensils (see Marí and Buntzel 2007, p. 189). It is precisely this self-sufficiency function of home-raised chickens that has been lost today in many African and Caribbean countries due to mass imports of dumped chicken meat from Europe and America as a result of the opened world export markets for chicken meat.

4.2

Fisheries

As we saw in Sect. 3.5, global value chains formed by private actors have increased in recent years. This also applies to fisheries. In recent years, the overfishing of marine stocks has increased in many places due to the growing demand for fishery products. According to FAO 70% of fishing grounds were already overfished in 1999. In addition, the fishing grounds in the world’s oceans are shifting as a result of climaterelated changes: on the one hand, the fishing potential is shifting to higher latitudes due to rising temperatures; on the other hand, the increasing acidification of the upper water layers is leading to changes in fish stocks (see IPCC 2013/2014:WGII-18). Time and again, there are also production slumps for certain species. Salmon, for example, experienced one of the most severe crises in 2016. Norway, the number one producer of salmon, battled a massive infestation of sea lice, and Chile, the second-largest salmon producer, was surprised by the algae plague. According to the State Veterinary Office in Norway, 53 million salmon were reported to have died there, and for Chile, the FAO reported 27 million dead fish. This led to a significant drop in production for the two producing countries and the price rose to a level “where it really hurts”, according to Matthias Keller of the Fish Information Centre in Hamburg (see Kriener 2017, p. 1). Aquacultures with net cages had shown growth rates of over 6% for years, and the former “luxury fish” had been “democratized”, so to speak, and had become a mass product. At the same time, antibiotic use had been declining since the 1990s, with young fish being mechanically vaccinated against infectious diseases. But salmon lice have become largely resistant to the insecticides used. Another problem is that millions of salmon repeatedly escape from the pens during storms, mingle with wild salmon populations and contaminate their gene pools with their genetic material—some of which has degenerated. For some time now, attempts have also been made to re-educate the salmon—as predatory fish—in a

4.2

Fisheries

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“vegan” way: Instead of fish meal and fish oil, they are fed large amounts of vegetable oil, soy, grains and legumes. But the biggest challenge remains the fish lice. Due to the high fish density in the enclosures, the pests can multiply rapidly. They grow up to 12 mm in size and eat real holes in the fish body. The chemicals used against the lice are emamectin benzoate, which is known from fruit growing, or diflubenzuron, which is used against caterpillars and mosquitoes in forestry. Bleaching agents and disinfectants such as hydrogen peroxide are also used. In the process, the salmon have to be treated several times a year in separate basins—usually by means of tarpaulins stretched around the net enclosures (see Kriener 2017, p. 14). International fisheries agreements with fishing quotas are intended to prevent the overexploitation of fishing grounds. However, within the EU this has not been achieved so far. For example, from the 1970s to the 2000s, the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy led to overexploitation of fishing grounds (see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20.09.2017, p. 27). However, measures such as the discarding of vessels and fishing boats, the obligation to bring the fish caught ashore, the restriction of fishing days and the use of nets with larger holes have allowed fish stocks to recover to some extent. This can be seen, for example, in the cod, which has been increasing in number and size since around 2006, particularly in the northern North Sea. However, warmer water may also be playing a role here, as well as improved cooperation between the fishing industry, authorities and science (see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20.9.2017, p. 27). Despite efforts by a number of governments, however, success in saving fishing grounds from overfishing has been fairly unsuccessful elsewhere. In 1997, the food company Unilever and the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) founded the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). The MSC quickly became an independent global organisation to promote sustainable fisheries with the help of consumer pressure (see Oosterveer 2015, p. 127). To this end, the MSC founded its own label for environmentally oriented fish products. In the process, the certification process developed into a detailed management plan for responsible and sustainable fisheries. By June 2014, 237 fishing companies had been awarded the MSC label. Most of them were based in OECD countries, but a proportion were also based in countries such as South Africa, Vietnam and Mexico. In 2014, the MSC programme still included around 10% of the world’s fishing companies with more than 10 million tonnes of fish (see Oosterveer 2015, p. 127). As positive as all these efforts are—they cannot replace binding, intergovernmental regulations. Similar to GLOBALG.A.P., the MSC represents a kind of private food monitoring and quality assurance system that increases global food security and reduces environmental damage. However—and this is the other side—there is a lack of global public authority that ensures democratic decision-making and a balance of power in such arrangements. According to Oosterveer (2015, p. 128), an important basis for the authority and legitimacy of such networks is therefore missing.

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References Combris, Pierre/Maire, Bernard/Réquillart, Vincent (2013): Consumption and Consumers. In: Esnouf, Catherine/Russel, Marie/Bricas, Nicolas (Hrsg.): Food System Sustainability. Insights from duALIne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 27 ff. EFSA (2009): Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW). Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare on a request from European Commission on the overall effects of farming systems on dairy cow welfare and disease. In: EFSA Journal 1143/2009. 1 ff. Frank-Oster, Constanze (2013): Der unmoralische Kabeljau und warum wir trotzdem weniger Fleisch essen sollten. In: Gottwald, Franz-Theo/Boergen, Isabel (Hrsg.): Essen und Moral. Beiträge zur Ethik der Ernährung. Marburg: Metropolis. 97 ff. Gottwald, Franz-Theo/Boergen, Isabel (2013): Food Ethics – eine Disziplin im Wandel. In: Gottwald, Franz-Theo/Boergen, Isabel (Hrsg.): Essen und Moral. Beiträge zur Ethik der Ernährung. Marburg: Metropolis. 11 ff. Hirschfelder, Gunther (2014): Das Bild unserer Lebensmittel zwischen Inszenierung, Illusion und Realität. In: Leible, Stefan (Hrsg.): Lebensmittel zwischen Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Bayreuth: Verlag P.C.O. 7 ff. IPCC (2013/2014): Klimaänderung 2013/2014. Zusammenfassung für politische Entscheidungsträger. Beiträge der Arbeitsgruppen I, II und III zum fünften Sachstandsbericht des zwischenstaatlichen Ausschusses für Klimaänderungen (IPCC). Genf: IPCC. Kriener, Manfred (2017): Fette Fische. Die Umerziehung der Zuchtlachse. In: Le Monde Diplomatique (Ausgabe Schweiz) vom Oktober 2017. 1/14. Lahrtz, Stephanie (2013): Rettet die männlichen Küken! Nordrhein-Westfalen verbietet Tötung – Erlass selbst für Biobauern kaum umsetzbar. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 2.10.2013. Landesanstalt für Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft (2017): Vieh und Fleisch des Jahresheftes Agrarmärkte 2016. Version vom 30.1.2017. Schwäbisch-Gmünd: Landesanstalt für Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft und der ländlichen Räume. https://www.landwirtschaft-bw.info/pb/site/pbsbw-new/get/documents/MLR.LEL/PB5Documents/lel/Abteilung_4/Agrarmärkte 2016/08 (Zugriff 1.9.2017). Marí, Francisco/Buntzel, Rudolf (2007): Das globale Huhn. Hühnerbrust und Chicken Wings – Wer isst den Rest? Frankfurt/Main: 2007. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (20.9.2017): Kabeljaubestand erholt sich. 27. OECD-FAO (2014): OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2014-2023. Paris: OECD Publishing. https:// doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2014-en (Zugriff 25.4.2018). OECD-FAO (2017): OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2017-2026. Paris. OECD Publishing. https:// doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2017-10-en (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Oosterveer, Peter (2015): Authority and Legitimacy in Governing Global Food Chains. In: Havinga, Tetty/Casey, Donal/van Waarden, Frans (Hrsg.): The Changing Landscape of Food Governance. Public and Private Encounters. Cheltenham/GB: Edward Elgar. 117 ff. Pollmer, Udo/Keckl, Georg/Alfs, Klaus (2015): Don’t Go Veggie. 75 Fakten zum vegetarischen Wahn. Stuttgart: Hirzel. Wege aus der Hungerkrise (2014): Die Erkenntnisse und Folgen des Weltagrarberichts. Vorschläge für eine Landwirtschaft von morgen. https://www.misereor.de/fileadmin/publikationen/ weltagrarbericht-2014-wege-aus-der-hungerkrise.pdf (Zugriff 18.8.2017).

5

Agricultural Trade

Between 1970 and 2000 world agricultural trade multiplied. In 1970, for example, agricultural products worth US$52 billion were still being traded; in 1998 the amounts traded for agricultural products were already US$438 billion (see Klohn and Windhorst 2001, p. 8). Even if, as a result of price increases, the traded volume of agricultural products did not rise at the same rate, the increase in trade volume is nevertheless considerable. Between 1991 and 2015, the value of world agricultural exports grew from US$326,274 million to US $1,327,631 million, see Fig. 5.1. Although agricultural exports by the industrialized countries also increased in absolute terms, their relative share of world agricultural trade declined, as Fig. 5.2 shows. Even though more than 800 million people were still suffering from hunger in 2000, agricultural and food production grew faster in the twentieth century than the population, which after all rose from 1.7 to over 6 billion people from the beginning to the end of the millennium. At the same time, the share of agricultural and food products in world trade declined from 25% in 1960 to 17% in 1980 and 10% in 1998 (see Berthelot 2001, p. 19). In 2008, these products still accounted for 8.5% of world trade (see Gardner 2013, p. 36). At the same time, 27.5% of commodity trade (“primary products”) consisted of agricultural commodities. Between 1998 and 2008 alone, international trade in agricultural products tripled (see Esnouf and Bricas 2013, p. 23). The example of the EU shows how problematic the agricultural trade policies of individual countries are. The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) the EU is seeking with the countries of the South provide for tariffs on staple foods such as cereals (except rice) and milk powder to be reduced to zero within 5 years. Such a policy is not only likely to massively increase the food dependency of many ACP countries on foreign countries. It would also ruin local dairy farmers and producers of indigenous cereals such as millet, sorghum and maize, as well as other starchy products such as cassava, yam and plantain

# Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 C. J. Jäggi, Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34672-0_5

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Fig. 5.1 Development of world agricultural exports. (Source: Bundesministerium für Landwirtschaft 2017, p. 8; own representation)

(see Berthelot 2017, p. 1). This has also been recognized by many African countries. Thus, many ACP countries refused to join this Economic Partnership Agreement, such as Nigeria—representing 52% of the West African population—Tanzania and Uganda (see Berthelot 2017, p. 1). That these countries are not so wrong about their scepticism regarding EPAs is documented by the following figures: While the EU claimed that West Africa’s cereal exports would increase by 10.2% and beef exports by 8.4%, West African countries imported 3.4 million tonnes of cereal products and 84,895 tonnes of beef from the EU in 2016, while they exported just 22 tonnes of beef to Europe (Berthelot 2017, p. 14). In this context, the losses of the West African countries due to lost customs and VAT revenues are by no means compensated for by the EU aid payments. Overproduction in agricultural production in the 1960s led to a collapse in food prices in the 1970s. Subsequent declines in production in the grain-exporting countries of the United States and Canada and unforeseen crop failures in the Soviet Union caused world food stocks to fall to their lowest levels in 20 years in 1972 and 1973. As a result of the Middle East war in 1973, oil production was further reduced by the OPEC countries. While on the

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Fig. 5.2 Development of agricultural exports in some important countries. (Source: Bundesministerium für Landwirtschaft 2017, p. 8; own representation)

one hand the developing countries suffered from high food and oil prices, the OPEC countries accumulated huge amounts of petrodollars, which they invested in the commercial banks. International trade in agricultural products has changed markedly over the past 30 years, to the detriment of developing countries. Whereas at the beginning of the 1960s the developing countries had a foreign trade surplus of US$6.7 billion with the industrialized countries, this export surplus has gradually disappeared to date. In the late 1990s, trade in agricultural products was more or less balanced, with intermittent export surpluses and external deficits. In 2011, two-thirds of developing countries imported more food than they could export (see Schäfers 2016, p. 110). Accordingly, the FAO predicted a growing export deficit of developing countries in agricultural goods by 2030, with an import surplus of about US$31 billion—measured on the 1990 dollar value (see Gardner 2013, p. 33). According to FAO estimates, the 49 least developed countries will be most affected by this development. The agricultural trade deficit of the 49 poorest countries is expected to quadruple by 2030. Gardner (2013, p. 31) summarized recent trends in global food trade as follows: Today, global trade in agricultural products is hampered by many constraints. Traditional NorthSouth trade in food is changing, and both production and exports in developing countries are increasing. Recently, competition in trade of agricultural products between developed and less developed countries has increased, which is particularly evident in the competing food products in the North and the South. New trade flows are emerging as a result of

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changing food patterns, particularly in emerging states as a result of growing affluence and increasing internal migration to cities. Previous trade balances between highly developed and developing countries are changing. The growing geographic spread of major grain exporters is increasing global food security, while conversely world food trade is increasingly dominated by a few large companies. At the same time, multinationals can impose their conditions on farmers. Moreover, supermarket chains are losing market power to the large food corporations. In recent years, the major food corporations have pursued a strategy of better controlling their markets through horizontal and vertical integration in food production and transportation by road, rail, and sea (see Gardner 2013, p. 46). At the same time, new technical cultivation and production possibilities in the rich countries have wiped out previous competitive advantages of the southern countries. Tropical foodstuffs are still exported mainly from the South to the North. This is particularly true of palm oil, coffee, cocoa and tropical fruits. Because developed countries do not produce these products themselves, they have not taken protective measures for these markets. However, the demand for such products in the industrialized countries is increasingly saturated (see Gardner 2013, p. 34). Global agricultural trade breaks down into four areas: loose or unpackaged bulk food products, intermediate products in the production process, fresh horticultural products and industrially produced consumer end products. Since 1980, the share of unpackaged mass food products has declined, which is why this product type is no longer a suitable indicator of global agricultural trade (see Gardner 2013, p. 34). Today, wheat, cereals, coffee and cocoa beans are the most important unpackaged mass food products. While the developing countries import mainly unpackaged mass food products, the rich countries import mainly industrially produced consumer end products in the food sector. The future success of individual countries in food trade will depend on how competitive producers are and whether trade barriers can be removed. In the process, the financial demands on producers are also increasing: Input costs, investment in technology, and productivity standards-especially in livestock production-vary from region to region. Other factors include soil fertility and climate change (see Gardner 2013, p. 34). International agricultural trade has changed considerably in recent decades. Originally, the agricultural sector was granted a special role in the GATT. Quantitative import restrictions had remained permitted in order to protect domestic production. Moreover, the GATT had exempted the agricultural sector from the ban on export subsidies. These concessions to the agricultural policies of the industrialised countries had been used intensively, especially by the USA and Great Britain, and later also by Canada and the EU—and Switzerland. These protective mechanisms had strong implications for foreign trade. However, according to Josling (2015, p. 122), these GATT practices led to a “largely dysfunctional trade regime”. It was not until the Uruguay Round that the extensive regulatory freedom of world agricultural trade came to an end. Quantitative restrictions on imports were explicitly prohibited in the Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), with very

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few exceptions. Export subsidies and subsidized export volumes were capped and progressively reduced. In addition, the most trade-distorting domestic subsidies in agriculture were restricted. In the WTO Doha Round—which has not yet been concluded—export subsidies were to be abolished altogether, the possibilities of domestic subsidies further reduced and bound tariffs substantially reduced (see Josling 2015, p. 122 f.). Agricultural trade was the key sector in the Uruguay Round. In the 1980s and 1990s, a fierce dispute was going on between the US and the EC, with the former demanding a complete liberalisation of agricultural trade. The US, as the number one agricultural exporter, wanted to increase its agricultural exports given its trade deficit, while the EC wanted to protect its agricultural sector through trade restrictions. In addition, the US hoped to undermine the EC’s and later the EU’s strict health regulations, e.g. on hormone contamination of meat, by forcing the freeing of agricultural and food trade: After any dismantling of the trade restrictions, the regulations and the corresponding import controls could have been classified as illegal trade restrictions and thus in violation of GATT, which would have led to their repeal. An important link in the globalized but unjust world economic order is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On the recommendation—or rather: order—of the IMF, many poor countries—since they were dependent on further loans—initiated structural adjustment programmes that unilaterally hit the poorest: reduction of social subsidies, food subsidies, government spending on social welfare and education, abolition of price subsidies on basic foodstuffs. In various countries, this led to riots and massive protests against the structural adjustment programmes. In addition, according to the World Development Report (Weltentwicklungsbericht 2008, p. 117), it is precisely the transition countries and the highly developed, urbanised countries that are particularly protective of their agricultural sector, but not the poor and poorest countries.

5.1

Producer Markets

Over time, the share of sales revenue that farmers received for their produce has gradually decreased, as Fig. 5.3 shows. At the same time, prices for food and agricultural products are subject to longer-term fluctuations. The so-called Cobweb theorem—also known as the pig cycle—expresses the fact that agricultural markets are subject to periodic instability in the medium term. The hog cycle was observed and described in the 1920s by Arthur Hanau (1927, see also Hanau and Jasny 1930). With price-demand elasticity, an increase in demand in the current period leads to an increase in price in the next period. This causes demand to fall and, as a consequence, prices to fall. This in turn causes lower supply and leads to price increases and so on. The relatively long cycles—e.g. 3 years—are due to the relatively long production periods (e.g. breeding young animals and feeding them until they are ready for slaughter). The cyclicality results from the time span from price increase or production reduction to slaughter maturity (see Anderegg 1999, p. 135). Production cycles arise

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Fig. 5.3 Share of sales revenue generated by farmers for their products in Germany. (Sources: Anderegg 1999, p. 116, own research and presentation)

primarily in small, volume-limited markets and in production chains that extend over longer periods of time (see Anderegg 1999, p. 136). A particular problem is the fact that—especially in the agricultural and food sector— producer markets and consumer markets have emerged in many places that are separated in space and time. While farmers who were able to market their products locally offered them directly to consumers, in recent times the increasing spatial distance between production and consumption not infrequently led to the formation of separate producer and consumer markets, between which market agents mediated. Especially large spatial distances between producers and consumers, but also high transaction costs promoted this development (see Anderegg 1999, p. 147). However, this development seems to be reversing itself again in recent times with Internet trade and the high density of global traffic. An additional difficulty from the point of view of the agricultural producers is that, on the one hand, the processing companies in the food industry demand from the agricultural producers large quantities of raw materials that are as uniform as possible. This increases competitive pressure and the large buyers have great market power because they can depress prices. On the other hand, the retail trade demands products that are differentiated according to place, target groups and time, depending on the preferences of the target

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Consumer Markets

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groups. Consumer preferences are mainly in the direction of quality, health, slimness and— partly—sales-promoting packaging (see Anderegg 1999, p. 153). Producers have to meet these preferences—often in small quantities—which in turn leads to higher costs, but these can only be passed on in part through corresponding prices. Marí and Buntzel (2007, p. 136) have pointed out with regard to poultry production that in various sectors the contracting companies set the tone, which can lead to considerable price distortions and in part suspends the market mechanism. In this case, it is no longer the direct producer (farmer) who determines the price, but the prices are determined by those companies which control and partly monopolise the production chains.

5.2

Consumer Markets

As early as the nineteenth century, the statistician Ernst Engel (1857), when analysing correlations between expenditure on food and the level of income, found that as household income rises, expenditure on food rises in absolute terms but falls relative to income (see Engel 1857/1895 and Anderegg 1999, p. 108 f.). Lieske Voget-Kleschin (2013, p. 87) has pointed out that due to the situation regarding “organic”, conventional and genetically modified food, which can hardly be kept track of by the average consumer, the distance between food producers and consumers is growing, physically and psychologically. This also has economic consequences: The market becomes confusing, increasingly disintegrating into completely different sub-markets— e.g. meat market, vegetarian products, vegan products, organic products, etc. Possible consequence: The food market is increasingly becoming a supplier market. In addition, consumers are less and less satisfied with pure product quality, but are also increasingly demanding procedural requirements and process quality, such as animal welfare, local production, GMO-free production, etc. The first signs of a trend reversal are already emerging with regard to globalisation and the concentration on a few transnational food producers. Nestlé CEO Mark Schneider, for example, said at an investor conference in September 2017 that the young and youngest consumers—the so-called millennials, those born between 1980 and 2000—have a very different purchasing behaviour with regard to food than previous generations: Organic, regionally produced and wholesome foods, rather than mass-produced foods, were in vogue, while many Millennials would find globalized edibles “uncool” (see Aiolfi 2017, p. 12). Some of the food companies had recognized these new trends and would increasingly offer foods with lower sugar and fat content. Danone CEO Emmanuel Faber recently said at a consumer goods conference in Berlin that the food industry still wants to dictate to consumers what they should eat. Other observers also believe that the food industry has lost its sense of consumer needs (see Aiolfi 2017, p. 12). However, whether this already indicates a trend reversal in the direction of consumer markets and an advantage for smaller suppliers must remain open for the time being—even if, as a result of digitalisation, barriers to market entry have fallen and new suppliers have entered the market (see Aiolfi 2017,

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p. 12). According to a study by the Boston Consulting Group, small and medium-sized consumer goods suppliers in the USA have increased their market share from 43% to 46% at the expense of their large competitors, and there are indications that this trend could expand (see Aiolfi 2017, p. 12). Large companies have responded to the increasing segmentation of consumer markets by buying up smaller, innovative food providers. In 2017, for example, Nestlé bought innovative American companies such as Freshly (ready-to-eat meals), Sweet Earth (vegetarian and vegan foods) and Blue Bottle Coffee (a chain of coffee houses). Although these companies are still lightweights in terms of sales compared to Nestlé’s group sales, they show the new development. According to Aiolfi (2017, p. 12), food multinationals are now in a similar situation to the big pharmaceutical companies in the 1990s, when they bought up innovative firms and start-ups in the biotech sector on a large scale. However, the success of such a strategy, especially in the food sector, depends on the acquired companies retaining their own identity and their own life and independently working their specific target groups, with their own distinctive products and corresponding labels. In any case, nutrition seems to be increasingly becoming a lifestyle issue. This is increasingly giving rise to group- and class-specific market segments and submarkets. But it is still true that food quality is still and even increasingly becoming incomedependent. It is known, for example, that members of the lower classes—precisely because they have to spend a larger proportion of their income on food—turn to cheap and often inferior food, which can lead to health consequences such as obesity, cardiovascular disease, etc. But beyond that, the question arises whether Beck’s dictum of the risk society, according to which the major technological risks increasingly affect all population groups and strata and are partly not even perceived (see Beck 1986, p. 35 ff.), does not increasingly also apply to food, which is more and more frequently genetically modified and recently also nanotechnologically processed. The Nanoinformation Portal, an association of various Austrian ministries, administrative bodies, environmental organisations and research and educational institutions, addresses the significance, interrelationships and possible dangers of nanotechnology: What is possible with nanotechnology With the help of nanotechnology, food can be kept fresh for longer. The appearance, taste and consistency can also be changed. Important substances such as vitamins, minerals or flavourings can be surrounded by nanostructured materials and thus ‘encapsulated’. These capsules serve as protection for the active substances. Sensitive substances can thus be better processed. ... and what not We often hear about nanotechnology in foods from imaginative products. Examples of these magical products are milkshakes that are supposed to taste like vanilla, strawberry or chocolate depending on how vigorously they are shaken. Or pizza that is supposed to taste like salami, ham or mushrooms depending on how it is microwaved. However, such foods are only a vision and have nothing to do with the current reality.

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Research into nanomaterials is being carried out both by food manufacturers and by packaging manufacturers. In the packaging industry, the use of nanomaterials is already more advanced. Various encapsulation systems are realistic for food. Do we know everything yet? Little is known about what happens to intentionally manufactured nanoparticles when they enter the body with food. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) concluded in its 2009 study that there is still too little information to assess the health effects of nanomaterials in food. Currently, experts are of the opinion that degradable nanoparticles are harmless to health. If they are soluble nanoparticles that go into solution, they are no longer considered ‘nano’. What happens to particles that are insoluble and remain in their nano form still needs to be researched further (Nanoinformationportal 2017).

All this shows that many things are already possible and that there is probably still a lot to come, especially in the food sector. The consequences are still unforeseeable today and can be devastating under certain circumstances. However, the attitude of many food consumers is also contradictory. On the one hand, many consumers demand cheap food, on the other hand they also want GMO-free and organic food, and at the same time the secondary quality demands, for example in terms of appearance, size, etc., are constantly increasing. Can this work in the long term? It is becoming increasingly difficult for consumers to obtain sufficient information. Whether one can speak of a “disempowerment of the consumer as the dominant figure of the market equilibrium” (see Deutschmann 1996, p. 326) must remain open. But there is no doubt that there are difficulties. It is undisputed that the labelling requirement for foodstuffs, and especially for GMO-free foodstuffs, is completely inadequate. Even “GM-free” foods can contain small amounts of genetically modified substances. Voget-Kleschin (2013, p. 93), for example, states: All of these shows that neither the compulsory labelling nor the label ‘without genetic engineering’ meets the consumers’ desire for information on the absence of genetic engineering as a process quality. Furthermore, it can be assumed that a large proportion of consumers assume that the ‘non-GM’ label identifies products in the production of which the use of genetically modified organisms has actually been fundamentally avoided (and not just for a certain period of time). One could even add that the label also violates requirements for procedural quality in the sense of reliability of information about foodstuffs ....

An important—and possibly growing—trend is the demand for local products. A 2017 survey by a St. Gallen management consultancy found that over 80% of respondents had a positive view of regional products, with an average of 70% preferring a regional product for the same price (Feige et al. 2017, p. 5). Thus, out of 1260 respondents in German and French-speaking Switzerland, 82% had a positive or very positive view of regional products, and only just 1% viewed regional products negatively (see Feige et al. 2017, p. 7). Many consumers are also willing to pay more for regional products, on average up to

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20% of the retail price (see Feige et al. 2017, p. 5). The preference for regional products relates primarily to food, but goes beyond this.

References Aiolfi, Sergio (2017): Zeit, kleinere Brötchen zu backen. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 20.10.2017. 12. Anderegg, Ralph (1999): Grundzüge der Agrarpolitik. München/Wien: R. Oldenbourg. Beck, Ulrich (1986): Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt/Main: edition suhrkamp. Berthelot, Jacques (2001): L’Agriculture. Talon d’Achille de la mondialisation. Clés pour un accord agricole solidaire à l’OMC. Paris: L’Hamattan. Berthelot, Jacques (2017): Geplündert. Die neuen Freihandelsverträge schaden Afrika. In: Le Monde Diplomatique (Ausgabe Schweiz) vom November 2017. 1 ff. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (2017): Agrarexporte 2017. Daten und Fakten. Bonn: Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft. http://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/ Downloads/Broschueren/Agrarexporte_2017.pdf?__blob¼publicationFile (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Deutschmann, C. (1996): Marx, Schumpeter und Mythen ökonomischer Rationalität. In: Leviathan 24(3) 323 ff. Engel, Ernst (1857): Die Productions- und Consumtionsverhältnisse des Königreichs Sachsen. In: Zeitschrift des Statistischen Bureaus des Königlich Sächsischen Ministeriums des Inneren. No. 8/9. Erneut abgedruckt in: Engel, Ernst: Die Lebenskosten belgischer Arbeiter früher und jetzt. Dresden 1895. Esnouf, Catherine/Bricas, Nicolas (2013): Context: New Challenges for Food Systems. In: Esnouf, Catherine/Russel, Marie/Bricas, Nicolas (Hrsg.): Food System Sustainability. Insights form duALIne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5 ff. Feige, Stephan/Annen, Raphael/Hirsbrunner, Roman/Scharfenberger, Philipp (2017): Regionalprodukte: Was ist Herkunft wert? Eine empirische Studie. St. Gallen: htp St. Galler Managementberatung AG. Gardner, Brian (2013): Global Food Futures. Feeding the World in 2050. London/New York: Bloomsbury. Hanau, Arthur (1927): Die Prognose der Schweinepreise. In: Vierteljahreshefte zur Konjunkturforschung, Sonderheft 2/1927. Berlin. Hanau, Arthur/Jasny, N. (1930): Die Märkte der wichtigsten landwirtschaftlichen Produkte. In: Handbuch der Landwirtschaft. Band 1. Berlin. Josling, Tim (2015): Reflections on the Exceptional Treatment of Agriculture in the WTO. In: Josling, Tim: Farm Policies and World Markets. Monitoring and Disciplining the International Trade Impacts of Agricultural Policies. Singapur: World Scientific Publishing. 122 ff. Klohn, Werner/Windhorst, Hans-Wilhelm (2001): Weltagrarwirtschaft und Weltagrarhandel. Vechtaer Materialien zum Geographieunterricht (VMG). Heft 8. Vechta: ISPA. Marí, Francisco/Buntzel, Rudolf (2007): Das globale Huhn. Hühnerbrust und Chicken Wings – Wer isst den Rest? Frankfurt/Main: 2007. Nanoinformationsportal (2017): Lebensmittel. Österreichische Agentur für Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit AGES. Wien. http://nanoinformation.at/lebensmittel/lebensmittel-undnano.html (Zugriff 25.4.2018). Schäfers, Eduard (2016): Strukturen und Probleme einer globalisierten Welt. Göttingen: Cuvillier.

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Voget-Kleschin, Lieske (2013): Die Nachfrage nach gentechnikfreien Lebensmitteln als Beispiel der politischen Dimension von Kaufentscheidungen. In: Gottwald, Franz-Theo/Boergen, Isabel (Hrsg.): Essen und Moral. Beiträge zur Ethik der Ernährung. Marburg: Metropolis. 87 ff. Weltentwicklungsbericht (2008): Agrarwirtschaft für Entwicklung. Weltbank. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.

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Biodiversity and Organic Farming

In recent decades, biodiversity has been steadily declining in many areas of the world. One of the main reasons for this is the expansion of agriculturally used areas and thus the decline in natural habitats and existing ecosystems (see Bringezu et al. 2015, p. 112). Business as usual and the still growing world population—which is expected to reach 9.3 billion people in 2050 (see Russell and Omer 2015, p. 126)—is likely to lead to a further expansion of agricultural land and to further species losses. The rule that is still largely valid today, namely that the expansion of large-scale agricultural production is synonymous with the loss of biodiversity, urgently needs to be broken. One of the ways to do this is to promote organic and ecological cultivation and the spread of mixed crops. The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements IFOAM—the world’s largest federation of organic farming associations—has formulated four principles on how the relationship between man and nature could be put on a new footing through organic farming: • Health principle: Preserve and strengthen the health of the soil, plants and animals, people and the planet as a whole; • Ecological principle: Agriculture should be based on living ecosystems, work with them and imitate and strengthen them. • Principle of justice: Agriculture should be based on social relations and ensure justice with regard to the common environment and equal opportunities. • Principle of care: Agriculture should be practised in a precautionary and responsible manner, preserving the health and well-being of present and future generations and protecting the environment (see Rist 2014, p. 143).

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However, industrial farms can also contribute to biodiversity, for example by creating fallow areas and increasing the focus on mixed crops.

6.1

Preserving Biodiversity

For centuries, traditional agriculture in many countries had ensured that the biodiversity of crops was preserved and even expanded through the production and preservation of seeds. Until the advent of the industrial seed industry, farmers and some horticulturists in the USA, for example, had maintained and developed seeds (see Hicks 2013, p. 77). The Declaration on Sustainable Development adopted at the Rio de Janeiro Conference in 1992 gave a major boost to the biodiversity debate. In 1998, the European Union decided to adopt a biodiversity strategy by signing the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). This was concretized in 2006. It set itself the goal of halting the loss of biological diversity by 2010 (see Haber 2014, p. 131). However, as Haber (2014, p. 131) criticises, the EU only insufficiently integrated its biodiversity strategy into its other funding policies, which is why the 2010 target was missed. In 2011, the EU adopted another biodiversity strategy, scheduled for 2020, which adheres to what Haber (2014, p. 131) considers to be an unrealistic goal of halting the loss of biodiversity. As early as 1976, the German Federal Nature Conservation Act (Deutsches Bundesnaturschutzgesetz) had defined the preservation of nature’s ability to perform and function as one of four objectives. In its 1987 environmental report, the German Council of Environmental Experts recommended the “General Ecological Model” of the Netherlands by van der Maarel and Dauvellier (1978) as the basis for German environmental policy. The Dutch model distinguished four types of environmental services, namely production, carrier, information and regulatory services (see Haber 2014, p. 133). Within these four service categories—the information services were newly termed cultural ecosystem services—scientists from 95 countries identified a total of 28 ecosystem services between 2001 and 2005 under the supervision of the United Nations Environmental Programme UNEP as part of the so-called MEA study (see MEA 2005 as well as Haber 2014, p. 133). However, the MEA study is ambivalent: The MEA represents probably the most thorough, hardly surpassable summary of knowledge about the ecological situation of the planet and the humanity dependent on it, and is a unique achievement of the sciences responsible for it. Although it adequately addresses the diverse, even conflicting and often barely reconcilable details, its integrative approach suggests possible solutions to fundamental human-environment problems that do not stand up to reality. It is possible to quantify and compare individual ecosystem services (but by no means all of them), but this does not capture the services that result from their interaction. Therefore, we do not understand the influence of land use and management on them... This applies especially to the interrelationships between agriculture ... and nature conservation (Haber 2014, p. 134).

At the 13th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in December 2016, the participants made an urgent appeal to the global public to act

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quickly. Politics and business should make the conservation of biodiversity their central task (see Bundesamt für Umwelt 2017, p. 7 f.). In September 2017, the Swiss government adopted an action plan for the Swiss Biodiversity Strategy. In view of the fact that, according to a report by the Federal Office for the Environment, almost half of the habitats studied in Switzerland are threatened, the government adopted 26 measures for the direct and indirect promotion of biodiversity and for the communication of knowledge and raising awareness of biodiversity issues (see Bundesamt für Umwelt 2017). However, the report is very meagre in terms of content—if one disregards the list of ongoing and planned measures. Olivier de Schutter, professor at the University of Leuven (Universität Leuven) in Belgium and UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food 2008–2014, said one of the reasons for taking Monsanto to court was that its activities threatened biodiversity: We are now at a point where important decisions have to be made about how agricultural production should be directed. Do we want to move towards even larger monocultures dependent on fossil energy, pesticides and genetically modified crops? Or should we focus on diversified agriculture that respects ecosystems and is therefore much more sustainable and can also be highly productive, in that this type of farming works with nature rather than against it? To educate the public about the challenges ... we need such a tribunal to which we can address the major concerns raised by industrial agriculture—symbolized by Monsanto (de Schutter 2017, p. 24).

6.2

The Food Waste Problem

According to the FAO, 95–115 kg of edibles per capita per year are thrown away in industrialised countries (see Kunz et al. 2013, p. 23). A particularly large amount of waste is generated by fruit and vegetables. Depending on the region, Kunz et al. (2013, p. 23) estimate the proportion of fruit and vegetables that are planted, fertilized, irrigated and harvested but no longer consumed to be between 37% (Asia) and 50% (North and South America). Of the fish catch, 30–50% is not eaten, as are 10–25% of all dairy products (see Kunz et al. 2013, p. 23). According to Kunz et al. (2013, p. 25), 30–40% of potatoes and carrots are already sorted out in the field because they are too small, too big or not pretty enough. Figure 6.1 shows where most food waste is generated. As you can see, however, most of the food waste in the affluent countries is generated by the end consumer, i.e. at home in private households. Americans and Europeans throw away an average of 100 kg of food per year, a third of which is unopened and untouched. The reasons are many: food is simply not consumed and spoils, in other cases consumers are unsure or misinformed about expiration dates. Not surprisingly, older people—who have experienced scarcity—and the poor throw away less food. As a further cause, the FAO criticises overproduction as a result of false production incentives through subsidies (see Kunz et al. 2013, p. 26).

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Fig. 6.1 Where does food waste originate? (Sources Redlingshöfer and Soyeux 2013, p. 141 and further research; own presentation)

But much is also lost in the developing countries. Up to 80% of the harvest there is said not to reach the customer at all. The reasons are: Humid climate, incorrect storage, transport damage and missing packaging (see Kunz et al. 2013, p. 26).

References Bringezu, Stefan/Schütz, Helmut/O’Brien, Meghan (2015): Measuring and Managing the Global Agriculture Footprint of Countries’ Consumption. In: Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (Hrsg.): Handbook on the Globalisation of Agriculture. Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 106 ff. Bundesamt für Umwelt (2017): Aktionsplan Strategie Biodiversität Schweiz. Vom Bundesrat genehmigt am 6.9.2017. Bern: Bundesamt für Umwelt BAFU. De Schutter, Olivier (2017): Drei Gründe. Abschrift von einem Videobeitrag zur Unterstützung des Tribunals, übersetzt aus dem Englischen. In: Europäisches BürgerInnen Forum (Hrsg.): Ökozid. Konzerne unter Anklage. Internationales Monsanto Tribunal, Den Haag 2016. Basel: Europäisches BürgerInnen Forum (EBF)/CEDRI. 24. Haber, Wolfgang (2014): Landwirtschaft und Naturschutz. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH. Hicks, Molly E. (2013): Seeds and Sustainability: Why Keeping Seeds Local is an Act of Resistance and Resilience. In: Sadler, Thomas R./Mcilvaine-Newsad, Heather/Knox, Bill (Hrsg.): Local Food Networks and Activism in the Heartland. Champaign, Illinois, US: Common Ground. 77 ff. Kunz, Martin/Varga-Kunz, Simone/Fehlhaber, Karsten (2013): Verwenden statt verschwenden! Nachhaltig mit Lebensmitteln umgehen. München: Goldmann Verlag. MEA (2005): Millenium Ecosystem Assessment: Ecosystems and Human Well-Being. Synthesis. Washington: Island Press.

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Redlingshöfer, Barbara/Soyeux, Annie (2013): Losses and Wastage. In: Esnouf, Catherine/Russel, Marie/Bricas, Nicolas (Hrsg.): Food System Sustainability. Insights form duALIne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 136 ff. Rist, Stephan (2014): Von der Regulierung zur Demokratisierung. Antworten auf den globalen Hunger. In: Widerspruch 64/2014. Zürich. 137 ff. Russell, Noel/Omer, Amani (2015): Meeting the Food Security Challenge through Sustainable Intensification. In: Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (Hrsg.): Handbook on the Globalisation of Agriculture. Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 125 ff. Van der Maarel, E./Dauvellier, P. J. (1978): Naar en globaal ecologisch model voor de ruimtelijke entwikkeling van Nederland. Studierapports Rijksplanolog. Den Haag: Dienst. Vol. 9.

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Reinhard Pfriem (2016, p. 146 ff.) has formulated the following criteria for sustainable food responsibility: 1. Responsibility towards one’s own physical lifestyle: Nutrition also shapes our personality. 2. Responsibility for people’s health: Neither excessive (e.g. fat, sugar) nor inadequate diets are desirable; both endanger health and lead to large health care costs. 3. Responsibility for world nutrition: Not only global industrial agriculture, but also the strong orientation towards meat consumption (trophic pyramid!) partly strengthen one-sided nutrition, malnutrition and hunger. 4. Resource stewardship: Industrial production, new forms of production (genetic engineering) and factory farming destroy the natural environment, damage biodiversity and thus reduce long-term food security. 5. Responsibility towards animals: Animals, as sentient beings, have a right to animalfriendly living conditions. 6. Climate responsibility: Consumerism exacerbates climate change and creates entirely new problems. 7. Responsibility for the development of cultural competences: New cultural orientations and a re-evaluation of what is understood as worth living and prosperity should strengthen personal emancipation and development, growing self-sufficiency, decentralization and autonomy. On a more general, but also more comprehensive level, lie the four principles formulated by Friedrich Glauner (2014, p. 77), which should underlie the handling of food:

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• Solidarity and justice through sustainable regional and global food cycles; • Partnership, respect and responsibility towards the dignity and rights of all people, animals and plants; • Reciprocity in the form of subsidiarity and fairness, taking into account mutual benefit, ethical and ecological principles and respectful treatment of all life; • Humanity as a principle of responsibility for all as opposed to exuberant individual interests. But what does all this mean in concrete terms? Feyder (2010, p. 103 ff.) has proposed the following strategies based on recent developments in agriculture: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

a more active role for the state in development, the expansion of production capacities, renewed priority for agricultural policy in development, establishment of an industrial policy, a guarantee to developing countries that they will be allowed to protect their markets, the improvement of the Millennium Development Goals strategy, regulation of the financial sector, intensification of sustainable development, and promote regional cooperation and integration.

From an economic perspective, points 1 (more active role of the state), 5 (measures to protect markets) and 7 (regulation of the financial sector) are particularly problematic. Recent studies raise doubts as to whether the achievement of development goals can actually best be ensured through state efforts. Is it not rather the task of the state to improve the economic framework conditions and thus provide better conditions for economic innovation and development? In concrete terms, this means that the state should concentrate on its core tasks. Lean but efficient structures must be created in the judiciary and in state administration. The state must be able to guarantee security and the enforcement of the state’s monopoly on the use of force and—last but not least—ensure that corruption is effectively combated. Protecting markets—for example through import tariffs or other protectionist measures—is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, import tariffs are problematic because they can cause other countries to retaliate against their imports. On the other hand, while import tariffs can protect a country’s economy from cheaper imports in the short term, thereby strengthening its own manufacturing operations, in the long term they increase the risk that a country’s own operations and manufacturing structures will become obsolete, less competitive, and ultimately no longer globally competitive. If import tariffs are to be imposed, then they should only be temporary and with the clear aim of using the time gained to improve the structure and productivity of our own agriculture. The example of Indonesia has shown that the stabilization of food prices and a guaranteed purchase of produced food can reduce the risk of poverty (see Feyder 2010,

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p. 173). Especially accompanying basic and minimum prices for staple foods can increase agricultural production and thus reduce the risk of poverty among the rural population. Conversely, subsidizing staple foods over a longer period of time can become so expensive that financially weak governments—especially in poor countries—are completely overwhelmed by it. It is imperative that regulation of the financial sector be international or global, not national. If the history of communist countries to date has shown one thing, it is that unilateral nation-state measures in the financial and monetary sphere—such as no freely convertible currency, export controls, restrictions on free trade via tariffs or fiscal measures—never work in the long run. It would be much more important to introduce binding and enforceable regulations at the international level with regard to financial transactions, highly speculative financial transactions and financial products, short-term trading in shares and securities, and short-term trading. Beermann et al. (2016, p. 216) have rightly pointed out that the assumption of social responsibility by companies can have very different motives: Reputation and legitimacy purposes, strategic early recognition, development of new markets or proactive compliance management to meet legal standards—or a commitment to a basic corporate ethical orientation in the interest of the various social stakeholders. In their essay on social responsibility by the food industry, Beermann et al. (2016, p. 236) conclude that food responsibility is not only on the side of consumers, but also on the side of companies. At the same time, food sovereignty cannot simply be imposed on farmers. Agriculture in particular is under enormous economic pressure. In Switzerland, for example, 50% of cheese dairies disappeared between 2005 and 2015, i.e. around 700 businesses, and every year around 50 bakeries and butchers in Switzerland go out of business (see Berli 2015, p. 17). Berli (2015, p. 17) rightly stated that “in the struggle for the right to food sovereignty, the re-appropriation of value chains by the population is crucial”. This could not only preserve sustainable techniques and centuries-old knowledge, but also preserve food sovereignty and at the same time develop it further in line with needs. In Germany, the Schweisfurth Foundation is one of the drivers of the food ethics debate. For more than 25 years, it has campaigned for sustainable, humane, animal-friendly and environmentally sound agriculture (see Gottwald and Boergen 2013, p. 16). The interdisciplinary problems and complexity of food ethics have led to the founding of the German Network for Food Ethics DNEE in Germany (see www.dnee.de). In addition to scientific research, the network focuses on the implementation and enforceability of its findings. Investment protection agreements are an important aspect of the global food industry. These have made land grabbing, if not possible in the first place, then at least decisively easier. As early as 2003, Attac Österreich (2003, p. 162) proposed to establish a global “location protection”—instead of unilateral investment protection agreements like the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment MAI at that time or the planned multilateral agreements outside the WTO like the Trans-Pacific Partnership TTP, which Donald Trump—at least for the time being—let burst, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment

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Partnership TTIP of the EU with the USA or the European-Canadian Economic and Trade Agreement CETA. Among other things, this global “location protection” should enshrine the following principles: • • • • •

No tax exemptions, tax breaks or subsidies for direct investors, Payment of local minimum wages or better average wages, Compliance with the same social and environmental standards as “at home”, High and controllable share of primary products from domestic or local production, Commitment to cooperate with local or regional companies, e.g. in the form of joint ventures, clusters, etc.), • Payment of profit taxes where the corresponding sales are made, • Reinvestment of a large part of the profits locally in the developing or host country.

The thrust and content of these demands are undoubtedly debatable, but some of them represent a serious encroachment on corporate and commercial freedom. Moreover, it is forgotten or disregarded that especially in dictatorial systems or “emerging states” with many state regulations—such as China, India and certain Central Asian and African states—the lack of economic freedom poses a real threat to investment, for example when companies are nationalised without compensation or taken over by local firms. In principle, combined investment and site protection agreements would have to be negotiated that take appropriate account of the interests of both sides. This also applies in particular to the food industry and the agriculture associated with it. Attempts to withdraw food from speculative forward transactions are also controversial. In Switzerland, for example, this was the aim of the popular initiative “For food sovereignty—agriculture concerns us all”, which was submitted with 130,000 signatures (see Gétaz 2017, p. 96). This popular initiative of the Young Socialists demanded GMO-free agriculture, fair prices for peasant producers, stimulation of local production markets in agriculture, regulating tariffs for agricultural products and the alignment of agricultural and food policies with the interests and expectations of the population. The only problem with such initiatives is that the population wants not only food security and high-quality food, but also low-priced products—and one usually comes at the expense of the other. This popular initiative “For Food Sovereignty” shows yet another problem of national attempts at regulation: Jan Atteslander (2017, p. 9) has pointed out that the adoption of the initiative would violate WTO law bilateral agreements of Switzerland with the EU and free trade agreements with third countries. Under WTO law, reservations provided by WTO agreements may only contain sanitary and phytosanitary measures. However, these may only be linked to physical characteristics of the imported product, not to the method of production. Import restrictions on genetically modified foodstuffs would contradict the WTO’s ban on discrimination and Switzerland would most likely lose a corresponding complaint before the WTO. The free trade agreement and the agricultural agreement between Switzerland and the EU, as well as the EFTA agreements which Switzerland has concluded with third countries, would also prohibit the introduction of corresponding import duties. These examples show how problematic unilateral nation-state regulations

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are in agricultural trade and how urgent a worldwide, transnational regime is with regard to trade in agricultural products and corresponding global regulations. Based on the fundamental values of society, Ralph Anderegg (1999, p. 58) has formulated nine basic principles of agricultural policy which a just agricultural order would have to follow: • • • • • • • • •

consumer sovereignty, market organisation and external trade regime in conformity with competition rules, freedom of production, freedom and guarantee of property, ecologically compatible use of nature and provision of collectively usable goods, safeguarding the family farm as the central form of agricultural organisation, liberal financial constitution and agricultural (structural) policy, the freest possible organisation of the human capital sector in agriculture, guarantee of a free peasant labour constitution and a socially cushioned agricultural income policy.

Although some of these points require additional clarification, they can be considered as generally acceptable principles. Leitzmann (2012, p. 49) has pointed out that many generally accepted measures and approaches are immediately undermined: • the promotion of small-scale agriculture in poor countries often fails because of subsidised food in rich countries, • nutrition education faces strong competition from food advertising, • the improvement of sanitary facilities with water supply and disposal often fails due to a lack of coordination with municipal and regional authorities, • the electrification of rural areas and slum quarters often does not go hand in hand with community education facilities, • the cultivation of products for fair trade often faces the (almost) insurmountable obstacle of a lack of information and infrastructural hurdles, • long-term measures against climate change fail due to a lack of awareness, a lack of sensitisation to the issue and—last but not least—conflicting short-term interests of suppliers of “dirty energy”, • and the responsible use of water resources often fails due to a lack of awareness. The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, has set out five postulates on how people in rich countries can do something about hunger (see Busse 2010, p. 296 ff.): 1. 2. 3. 4.

not eat meat or eat less meat; make meals seasonal, so always eat what is available locally and seasonally; no consumption of genetically modified food; no consumption of biofuel and

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5. do not make financial investments in the agricultural commodities sector. Even if some of these demands may overshoot the mark—they certainly provide a basis for reflection!

7.1

Digitisation as an Opportunity

For a long time, the food industry and agriculture were less affected by digitalisation than other sectors of the economy. However, this has changed. Today, for example, agricultural robots are already being used in the field, using the camera to identify plants and classify them into desirable species—such as the crops beans or onions—and undesirable plants. Two moving arms at the bottom of the robot are used to spray the identified weeds with targeted herbicides. This can reduce the use of chemicals for weed control by a factor of up to 20 (see Leuzinger 2017, p. 3). Overall, the robotization of the economy has taken off rapidly, as Fig. 7.1 shows. According to the International Federation of Robotics (2016, p. 12), 75% of global robot sales in 2015 took place in the five countries China, South Korea, Japan, USA and Germany. These countries also represent the largest robot markets—in that order. The largest market for robots today is China. Robots are also increasingly being used in agriculture and the food industry. One important reason for this is the greatly simplified programming (see Feldges 2017a, p. 27). In Germany, the volume of the agricultural machinery market is 23,000 tractors, 1500 combine harvesters and 400 forage harvesters annually—in terms of cost, this amounts to around EUR 2 billion (see Feldges 2017b, p. 31). Although no exact figures are available for Switzerland, the rule of thumb is that the market in Switzerland is about one tenth of the German market, perhaps somewhat more given the highly subsidized Swiss agricultural sector. Today, the latest generations of agricultural machinery are equipped with cameras or sensors that can, among other things, distinguish crops from weeds, detect the necessary use of herbicides or determine drought conditions. Because time ¼ money in agriculture as well, a machine equipped with a fully automatic steering system can cover up to 30 km/h in a field and increase the area output per working day by up to 20% (see Feldges 2017b, p. 31). The accumulation of data volumes—such as the digital representation of a field, the marking of areas with increased fertiliser requirements, yield calculations per square metre or the measurement of the harvest yield—can be used to optimise the harvest yield while minimising the labour input. However, the cost of self-propelled vehicles often exceeds the financial means of individual farmers. A self-propelled forage harvester, for example, costs at least 250,000 Swiss francs. However, agricultural vehicles already in operation can also be converted, at a cost of between 10,000 and 25,000 francs. Analysts anticipate an increasing need for investment in agriculture due to digitalization—especially in view of the fact that the operation and use of complex programs has been greatly simplified in

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Fig. 7.1 Development of industrial robot sales since 2003. (Sources: International Federation of Robotics 2016, p. 11; Feldges 2017a, p. 27, own representation)

recent years. In addition, there is a considerable need for many farmers to catch up with regard to the increased use of IT, because—as Feldges (2017b, p. 31) put it—“many sceptical farmers need to be convinced of the benefits of digitalisation”. Many companies have also recognized this development. John Deere, for example, has bought Blue River Technologies to further expand the field of artificial intelligence in agriculture. The tractor manufacturer spent around US$300 million on the Sunnyvale, Silicon Valley-based high tech company in September 2017. Blue River Technologies is a global leader in computer vision, or digitized “seeing,” and in the development of robots for agriculture. These include devices for searching for undesirable growths in lettuce beds, but also the so-called “precision sprayer”, which selectively applies herbicides against predefined targets (see Delko 2017, p. 31). But digitalization goes much further. In 2013, for example, the company Khosla Ventures sold The Climate Corporation, which is active in the field of weather forecasting and aims to optimize the targeted use of artificial intelligence, to Monsanto (see Delko 2017, p. 31). What is already possible today with the help of digitalisation was demonstrated, for example, by a start-up company from ETH Zurich, Eaternity: this company has built up the

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world’s largest CO2 database for food, with the help of which the entire food chain from production to the consumer plate can be calculated. In view of the fact—according to Eaternity—that the food chain is responsible for around a third of the greenhouse gases emitted worldwide, the opportunities for optimisation are enormous. The eating habits of the Swiss alone would release 3 tonnes of CO2 per person every year. A cheeseburger, for example, has the same impact on the climate as 500 h of television (see Neue Luzerner Zeitung, October 6, 2017, p. 16). At least indirectly as a result of digitalisation, new forms of marketing are also emerging. Following the now widespread crowdfunding, innovative farmers have developed so-called “crowdordering”. While foreign markets are more lucrative for producers in poor countries, it is more difficult to access these markets. Some lack the necessary knowhow, other farmers don’t have the financial resources to do so, or they cannot meet packaging requirements. That is why new internet platforms—such as “Market Access” by the Swiss Fairtrade Organisation Gebana together with the University of Applied Sciences Northwestern Switzerland (Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz)—have created a direct marketing opportunity for farmers in the South. There you can buy directly from the producer, for example cashew nuts, organic citrus fruits, fruit juices or dried apricots, pistachios and almonds. Delivery is made when a product is ordered in sufficient numbers, for example after 1000 orders have been received (see Lorenz-Meyer 2017, p. 11). Market Access (Marktzugang 2016) has been online since May 2016, and by the end of 2017 was already receiving 500 orders a month. Another crowdordering initiative is Crowd Container in Zurich. Some of these platforms deliver directly, bypassing the retail trade, others—such as “We Make It” deliver by bike courier.

7.2

Limiting the Sale of Agricultural Land to Investors

At the beginning of 2015, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), in which employers, trade unions, farmers and consumers are represented, demanded in an opinion that individual states be allowed to set upper limits for the acquisition of agricultural land in order to protect small landowners and family farms (see Michler and Ginten 2016). Such a ceiling could defuse the problem of land grabbing in the long term. However, such a regulation would have to be applied primarily in the countries of the South—i.e. in Africa, Asia and Latin America—i.e. in areas where state power is limited or not present at all.

7.3

Innovative Products from Food Raw Materials

Many modern products today are manufactured on the basis of petroleum. Again and again, attempts have been and are being made to use renewable raw materials instead of non-renewable petroleum. The best-known example is probably the production of

7.4

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combustion fuel on the basis of biofuel. In Brazil in particular, agriculturally produced biofuel has a long tradition. However, in recent years biofuels have come under increasing criticism, either because their cultivation takes soil resources away from food production, or because the ecological balance sheet of biofuels is rather meagre or even negative. But more and more, other petroleum-based products such as plastics, plastic packaging, etc. are coming under the spotlight. For example, a young Swiss start-up company produced for the first time a protective smartphone case made of 97% renewable raw materials such as corn, sugar and vegetable oil (castor oil), which it calls “Biocase”. In doing so, the young entrepreneurs hope to save 13.1 tons of carbon dioxide in a production of 250,000 units. At the same time, the manufacturers emphasize that their case is just as robust and durable as a conventional plastic case (see Piazza 2017, p. 18). However, internationally registered patents reflect the economic strength of a country or continent, see Fig. 7.2. In these figures, it is striking that Asia has caught up strongly, while the USA and—even more strongly—Europe are falling behind in terms of (relative) growth in patents. The innovative strength of Latin America is very low and that of Africa even lower. If these figures are compared with the total area of agricultural land in the individual continents (see Sect. 3.2), the weakness of innovation in Latin America and especially Africa is even more striking. Africa in particular is likely to be home to a large number of small and microenterprises operating with the simplest of means. This shows how great the potential for agricultural innovation is on this continent in particular.

7.4

Reorientation Towards Garden-Type Agriculture?

One of the greatest challenges of global nutrition is to ensure food security in large cities and especially in poor neighbourhoods and slums. Thus, increasing urbanization is leading to growing challenges in the sustainable provision of food in cities, right across the board: in terms of transport and distribution, in terms of food quality, in terms of eating habits, and given the need for affordable prices for the poor. According to Esnouf et al. (2013, p. 236), all this raises the question of sustainable development, especially in cities. Possible strategies in this regard could be the introduction of urban agriculture and new ways and means of obtaining food (local purchase, transport routes to food outlets, preparation, etc.) in the neighbourhoods by the inhabitants. Various authors have proposed transforming industrial agriculture into a “garden-style agriculture” (Atlas der Globalisierung 2012, p. 58). This is not about increasing production, but about ensuring and developing diversity in agriculture, as the IAASTD World Agricultural Report (Weltagrarbericht IAASTD 2008), for example, states: “Only the reconnection of agriculture to the respective cultural, social and ecological characteristics can ensure the long-term conservation of water, forest and soil. Priority must be given not only to saving existing resources, but also to building up new resources of water and fertile soils, and to adapting to the threats of climate change” (Atlas der Globalisierung 2012, p. 58).

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Fig. 7.2 Patent applications by continent. (Source: Schäfers 2016, p. 45; own representation)

However, the question must also be asked whether a garden-like agriculture is sufficiently productive to produce the required food in sufficient quantities. In the USA in 2009, only just 23% of the population considered running a vegetable garden to be “normal” (see Knox 2013, p. 21). The problem is—according to Knox (2013, p. 21)—that even in the twenty-first century maintaining a vegetable garden is socially ostracized or has negative connotations and is associated with “poverty”, “eccentricity” or simply “old-fashioned”. Others think that a vegetable garden is “too much to do” (I myself, by the way, after sporadically helping to run a vegetable garden with composting, also agree with this last opinion—no doubt to the displeasure of my wife). Particularly in areas with a great shortage of food—for example in climatically extreme regions, in slums or in war zones—the question of self-sufficiency also arises. In 2004, for example, the now 52-year-old Brazilian Hans Dieter Temp launched the garden project Cidades sem Fome (Cities without Hunger) in São Paulo. In view of the fact that many people in the slums have hardly any money to buy vegetables and healthy food, Temp came up with the idea of growing potatoes, lettuce, beans, pumpkins and fruit in unoccupied plots. Residents grow lettuce, vegetables and fruit for their own use. They hardly ever have to shop at the supermarket and can even sell the surplus to neighbors. By 2013, Temp and his three female employees had established 21 gardens in the poorest areas on the eastern periphery of the big city (see Mously 2013, p. 13). In 2012, Temp already generated the

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equivalent of around EUR 160,000. Of the 21 gardens, 3 were already self-supporting in 2013, the rest were supported by sponsors. After an initial phase, the gardens are managed collectively by the smallholders and generate food and income for many people. Since 2011, schools have also been established in individual gardens (see Mously 2013, p. 13). The importance of “private gardening” is also increasing in South African cities—such as in the township of Khayelitsha in the Cape Town region. Many of their residents grow spinach, carrots, peas, lettuce, beets and other crops in their small gardens, which they then sell to feed themselves. Through the support of initiatives such as Soil for Life, they improve their knowledge of the cultivation of food and food plants: “In the past, we didn’t know many herbs and didn’t know anything about their effects,” said one resident (see Wuhrer 2017, p. 13). The Soil for Life organisation has existed since 2002 and finances seeds, seedlings, compost starters and teaching materials with small amounts of money— all of which is provided free of charge to the home farmers (see Wuhrer 2017, p. 13). Considering that 60% of the world’s population is expected to live in cities in 2030, and that today a significant part of the world’s population lives in slums and informal settlements, and that urban settlement areas will continue to expand—see FAO (2009, p. 2)—one can imagine that the production of food in cities and urban areas will become increasingly important. Therefore, already in 2009, FAO emphasized the great importance of private food production in cities. Food production, processing and sales generate income and employment for many urban households. This is why FAO has been supporting decentralised cooperation programmes for some time. More than 80 cities in the South receive various forms of support from FAO (see FAO 2009, p. 6). In this context, FAO support programmes in cities aim, among other things, to improve food security, especially in poor households, support effective and sustainable production of urban and peri-urban agriculture in cities, improve integrated agriculture and architecture, promote and protect urban and peri-urban environments, and increase resilience and adaptation to natural disasters (see FAO 2009, p. 7). Especially in countries or regions with economic problems or in slums the cultivation of vegetables in allotment gardens is an important source of food. For example, the Greek city of Larissa with about 160,000 inhabitants—together with the surrounding municipalities even 280,000 people live there—maintains vegetable gardens on the outskirts of the city for destitute and impoverished pensioners. Each plot covers 50 m2, on which its users grow lettuce, vegetables and other foodstuffs. The gardeners give 10% of the yield to the “solidarity shops”, which are small supermarkets owned by the city, from which the needy are supplied free of charge. In 2017, there were around 500 families registered in the vegetable gardens, some of whom owned land in the area themselves. In addition, a dairy cooperative sells fresh milk through vending machines. The cooperative has since expanded its offer to the cities of Thessaloniki and Athens (see Bernath 2017, p. 6). Local networks are undoubtedly a great opportunity for the urban vegetable garden movement, especially in areas with a lack of gardening tradition. Supporters of the vegetable garden movement have argued that local food networks generate knowledge and wisdom, as well as strengthen collective and economic vitality (see Sadler 2013, p. 37).

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Local garden and food networks can make an important contribution to the vitalization of villages and neighborhoods, strengthening neighborhoods and neighborhood support. Privately produced food means a welcome contribution to the nutrition of individuals and families in times of poverty and need. However, recreational vegetable gardening hardly pays off in the narrow economic sense. A lot of work and little compensation are normal. However, recreational horticulture makes it possible to break with economistic concepts of production and work and to spend one’s free time in a meaningful and satisfying way. At the same time, vegetable gardening generates material fruits in the form of edible plants, vegetables, berries and fruit. In the medium term, local food networks also represent an interesting source of income, as garden produce can be sold at local markets, in restaurants or neighbourhood shops. If it is also possible to involve local farms, this can certainly change the food situation in the longer term. Another—possibly strategic—dimension of local food networks has been pointed out by Molly E. Hicks (2013, p. 77). Local cultivation can break through or undermine species thinning and transnational corporate control of food production by nurturing, growing and further breeding native species. Hicks (2013, p. 78) points out that local production of seeds for the next growing season ensures individual and community food security as well as sustainability in the future. The exchange and trade of seeds between communities strengthens social cohesion, deepens community ties, and also secures agricultural knowhow for the future. Conversely, industrial seed production endangers natural ecosystems and implodes social communities. The disappearance of local seed production has gone hand in hand with the abandonment of small farms and local food production. As a result, much of the local plant diversity has also disappeared. Vandana Shiva et al. (2007, p. 80; see also Hicks 2013, p. 78) estimate that about 75% of the world’s grain diversity has been lost since the beginning of the twentieth century. As early as 2010, Jack Ralph Kloppenburg Jr. stated: “If true food sovereignty is to be established, control over genetic resources must be wrested from the corporations and governments that seek to monopolize them. Genetic resources must be permanently returned to social groups and/or social institutions with a mandate to conserve genetic diversity and allow its use by all on an equal basis” (Kloppenburg 2010, p. 152; translation from English by CJ). As a strategic thrust, Hicks (2013, p. 83) holds that the best way to protect plants and animals from diseases and pests is to build their resilience, which is only possible through genetic diversity in seeds. Therefore, the hybrid cereal mash of the big food companies must be stopped. It is also essential to keep seed production local and not to centralize it globally. As we have seen in Chap. 1, the economic input-output orientation is characterized by a linear view, whereas an ecological approach—not only in name—understands production as a changeable, but in the long run rather stable flow equilibrium of energy, substances and even living beings within and between ecosystems. Here, if economic goals can be incorporated into existing ecosystems in a way that allows them to sustain their activities, both can survive. If the economy extracts too many substances, destroys the foundations of

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existing ecosystems or overstretches their productivity, both—ecosystem and economic production—collapse. Of course, economics can—and does—try to redesign ecosystems in such a way that their output of desired inorganic or organic substances or of utilizable energy increases. The problem to date, however, is that the high complexity and multiple impacts of existing ecosystems are greatly underestimated, which in turn makes them more vulnerable to external influences and threats, such as monocultures for mass pests or genetically modified foods for reduced intergenerational reproduction—which, incidentally, as in the case of hybrids, is often deliberate.

7.5

Change of Diet

If one considers that the production of 1 cal of beef or lamb requires 11 cal of plant-based food, 1 cal of milk 8 cal and 1 cal of pork, poultry or eggs 4 cal of plant-based energy (see Feyder 2010, p. 163), then one has to ask oneself whether it makes sense to consume one or even two meals with meat every day. Animal-based foods require five times as much land as plant-based foods per food unit (see Bringezu et al. 2015, p. 107). The water requirements for meat and for plant-based foods are similarly different. While 13,500 L of water are required for 1 kg of beef, the production of 1 kg of wheat requires only 1100 L of water. There is no doubt that—especially the rich countries—should reconsider their food and eating habits. This does not mean that all people have to become vegetarians or even vegans. Much would already be achieved if, for example, people would reduce their meat consumption by half on average.

7.6

Organic Farming

Hans Herren (2017, p. 90) has pointed out that smallholder agriculture is still by far the largest employer on earth. In 2017, for example, it still provided a living for 2.6 billion people, or around 40% of the earth’s population. In contrast, industrial food production is many times more productive, but conversely causes significant environmental damage. In the countries of the North, agriculture contributes only a few percent to the gross domestic product, and only a few percent of the population still work for agriculture—in Switzerland it is less than 1%. The external costs are not (or no longer) included in the food prices paid by consumers, which is one of the reasons why organic products are considerably more expensive than conventionally produced food. The calculation is not actually correct, because organic and organic products often produced in mixed farming systems cause less external damage on the one hand, but on the other hand mixed farming cannot be mechanised and automated to the same extent as industrial monocultures.

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The World Development Report (Weltentwicklungsbericht 2008, p. 68) already recommended that developing countries diversify their agriculture and produce highervalue products. The same applies to the highly developed countries. The concept of permaculture should also be mentioned in this context. Permaculture means “permanent culture” and was developed in the 1970s by the two Australian ecologists Bill Mollison and David Holmgren. In principle, it is a planning system for agriculture that attempts to apply the guidelines and premises of nature, i.e. with great conservation of resources and the least possible environmental impact: “One virtually copies the patterns of nature, for example by cultivating in polyculture instead of monoculture, i.e. different species side by side instead of one species on a large area as is common in conventional agriculture” (Kvist 2014, p. 139). Hans Herren (2017, p. 91) has pointed out that food prices must be fair for both farmers and nature: “External costs must also be included. ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity’ (TEEB), an initiative of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), is working to calculate these costs. A first global analysis of beef production, for example, found that external costs—such as greenhouse gas emissions, conversion of forest to pasture, or air pollution—amount to around 170 US dollars per kilogram of beef protein” (Herren 2017, p. 91). Globally—and particularly in the South—smallholder agriculture is affected by food insecurity and poverty. Around 500 million smallholder farms still produce around 70% of the food consumed locally (see Sager and Lehmann 2017, p. 10). Financially, their production is often low or even unprofitable. In this context, small and micro farms often lack investment funds, land, secure access to markets, infrastructure equipment and knowledge. Many people working in small-scale agriculture are in debt, hardly cushioned socially and dependent on adverse climate and weather conditions. Seeds are either hardly affordable or not accessible at all, and many farms have to go into debt to acquire seeds. Conversely, there is often no compensation for the charitable services provided by these farms, such as landscape management, preservation of seed diversity and biodiversity (see Sager and Lehmann 2017, p. 10). In view of this situation, the strategy is actually clear: promotion incentives and financial compensation or tax relief for agricultural production that is close to the environment, ecological, with minimal external costs and takes place in small agricultural units—in contrast, removal of all subsidies for large-scale agriculturalindustrial farms, for large-scale farmers who cultivate genetically modified products and/or use herbicides, fungicides or insecticides on a large scale. In view of the current situation—according to Herren (2017, p. 91)—“organic farming, be it permaculture, near-natural, organic (especially organic 3.0 according to IFOAM), biodynamic, ... is not a luxury for the rich, but a survival necessity for all. Only with this approach can we succeed in putting food production on a sustainable course and securing it in the long term.” According to Herren (2017, p. 91), a broad conversion of agriculture in the industrialized countries to organic production methods would “lead to a slight, temporary decline in production, but this could be tolerated, given that more than 40% of food is wasted today”. However, the potential for increasing production, especially in smallholder

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agriculture in developing countries, is enormous, particularly with ecological methods. For example, according to a study by UNCTAD and FAO, with 1.9 million ha of agricultural land cultivated by 2 million smallholders, intensive organic farming practices can achieve more than twice the yields of traditional subsistence farming (see Herren 2017, p. 92). For example, 60 small farms in Kenya achieved significantly higher yields than conventional farming from the fifth year onwards as part of an organic farming project carried out by the Swiss Research Institute of Organic Agriculture together with local partners, and from the sixth year onwards the financial return was as much as 53% higher (see Herren 2017, p. 92). However, one should not make the mistake of confusing local production with sustainable production (see Brunori 2006, p. 141): local production must be oriented not only to local but also to supra-local markets in order to be sustainable—and conversely, transnational or global markets can certainly also be sustainable—for example in the marketing of local and sustainably produced products. The central idea of organic farming is that, in contrast to conventional agriculture, not only food is produced, but also public services are provided in terms of climate protection, water protection, biodiversity and landscape conservation. This multifunctional approach differs from industrial agriculture, which is geared exclusively to the highest possible yields with the lowest possible labour input. Social movements have long since developed around ecological, small-scale agriculture. In 1993, for example, numerous local movements of farmers around the world joined together to form the organisation “La Via Campesina”, which today involves around 200 million people (see La Via Campesina 2018). On the occasion of the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996, these groups presented their concept of food sovereignty. Today, the movement includes groups and organizations of disadvantaged and marginalized urban people, environmental associations, consumer groups, women’s organizations, fishermen, animal breeders, and many others (see Gétaz 2017, p. 94). Today, the postulate for food sovereignty has also become respectable in many governments. The initiators of “La Via Campesina” understand food sovereignty as “the right of the population of a country or region to a healthy and culturally adapted diet” (Gétaz 2017, p. 95) and the right to determine agricultural and consumer policies themselves, without being subject to or having to practice price dumping—for example due to global food markets. The business ethicist Ingo Pies (2017, p. 25) has rightly pointed out that there is a great deal of confusion among the public about the concept of growth and productivity, and that two completely different concepts of growth are in circulation: “According to the first concept, ‘growth’ means more output from more input, that is, more production from more resource input. According to the second concept, ‘growth’ comes primarily through innovation, that is, through the use of new ideas. This makes it possible to produce a given output with less input or, conversely, to produce more output with a given input. Here, then, production and resource input are decoupled” (Pies 2017, p. 25). One must therefore define whether by “greater productivity” and “growth” one means an increase in input—in energy, raw materials, technology, etc.—in terms of volume with

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correspondingly greater output, or less use of resources with the same or a smaller decrease in output. In addition, the individual factors of production are to some extent interchangeable, e.g. labour is replaced by energy and vice versa. Finally, the externalisation of production costs—for example in the form of environmental damage—plays an important role. In the eyes of Arvay (2013, p. 134 ff. as well as 146 ff.), smallholder agriculture is more productive in the second sense mentioned—i.e. in the form of lower resource use for the same or decreasing output. This type of agriculture protects against soil erosion through hedges, walls and terracing, and maintains biodiversity and local ecosystems through tree strips and mixed crops. It leaches the soil less and causes less soil damage (no use of heavy machinery), adds less pollutants to the soil, uses less water and energy, and enriches rural areas biologically, culturally and socially. Furthermore, small-scale agriculture is more productive as a result of less livestock per hectare, whereas intensive factory farming reduces the yield per hectare (see Schäfers 2016, p. 113). However, this depends on how one measures productivity: “Thus, if a farmer grows fruit, vegetables and cereals on one hectare of land, he can feed 30 people. If animals are kept on the same area for the purpose of producing eggs, milk and meat, the yield decreases and only five to ten people can be fed” (Schäfers 2016, p. 113). Here, however, it must be objected that this higher level of supply is not so much the result of small-scale agriculture, but is due to the higher trophic pyramid in meat production: because plant production is not consumed directly by humans, but is fed to the animals, which in turn are then eaten by humans, water and energy are lost; per trophic level, the loss can easily amount to a factor of 5–10. According to Franz-Theo Gottwald and Isabel Boergen (2011, p. 248), “smallholder agriculture needs to be strengthened—especially at the political level”. However, considering that in quite a few countries—such as Switzerland—farmers have one of the strongest political lobbies, it is essential to specify that (a) small-scale production methods must be strengthened, (b) these must be oriented towards organic-biological mixed production, and (c) food autonomy must be secured, for example in the form of non-saleable genetic and seed databases. For example, “innovations in organic agriculture ... can inspire the sector, and individual elements can enrich and strengthen traditional subsistence agriculture” (Gottwald and Boergen 2011, p. 248). Not only do approaches of innovative and interdisciplinary research need to be strengthened, but also “the structures of global agricultural markets need to be radically changed” (Gottwald and Boergen 2011, p. 248). But is it enough—and does it even make sense—as Gottwald and Boergen (2011, p. 249) believe, to eliminate export subsidies and redistribute and dismantle agricultural subsidies in the industrialized countries in the long term? Does not this even more favour the transnational agribusiness multinationals? Should not we rather systematically compensate all public services provided by agriculture? After all, the public receives something in return. This is precisely the idea that the Clean Drinking Water Association and its committed representative Franziska Herren have taken up in Switzerland. In their popular initiative— which had already been signed by 89,000 Swiss citizens within 7 months by mid-October 2017 (see Caprez 2017, p. 4)—the initiators demand nothing less than a restructuring of

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Swiss agriculture: Thus, only farms that do not use pesticides, do not feed their animals antibiotics and that only keep as many animals as they can feed from their own land without imported supplementary feed should be subsidized. Because agriculture is one of the biggest polluters of water, it is to be transformed—also with appropriately aligned subsidy criteria.

References Anderegg, Ralph (1999): Grundzüge der Agrarpolitik. München/Wien: R. Oldenbourg. Arvay, Clemens G. (2013): Friss oder stirb! Wie wir den Machthunger der Lebensmittelkonzerne brechen und uns besser ernähren können. Salzburg: Ecowin. Atlas der Globalisierung (2012): Die Welt von morgen. Paris: Le Monde Diplomatique. Attac Österreich (2003): Die geheimen Spielregeln des Welthandels. WTO-GATS-TRIPS-M.A.I. Wien: Promedia. Atteslander, Jan (2017): Initiative verletzt WTO-Recht. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 5.12.2017. 9. Beermann, Marina/Schattke, Hedda/Pfriem, Reinhard (2016): Die Übernahme gesellschaftlicher Verantwortung von Unternehmen in der Ernährungswirtschaft. In: Pfriem, Reinhard: Ökonomie als Gemengelage kultureller Praktiken. Marburg: Metropolis. 215 ff. Berli, Rudi (2015): Relokalisierung der Ernährungswirtschaft. In: Antidot 20/2015. 17. Bernath, Markus (2017): Ein Gemüsegarten für die Verlierergeneration. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 23.9.2017. 6. Bringezu, Stefan/Schütz, Helmut/O’Brien, Meghan (2015): Measuring and Managing the Global Agriculture Footprint of Countries’ Consumption. In: Robinson, Guy M./Carson, Doris A. (Hrsg.): Handbook on the Globalisation of Agriculture. Cheltenham, UK/Northhampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 106 ff. Brunori, Gianluca (2006): Post-Rural Processes in Wealthy Rural Areas: Hybrid Networks and Symbolic Capital. In: Marsden, Terry/Murdoch, Jonathan (Hrsg.): Between the Local and the Global: Confronting Complexity in the Contemporary Agri-Food Sector. Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier Jai. 121 ff. Busse, Tanja (2010): Die Ernährungsdiktatur. Warum wir nicht länger essen dürfen, was uns die Industrie auftischt. München: Blessing. Caprez, Cathrin (2017): Eine Bürgerin reisst eine Revolution an. In: WochenZeitung vom 12.10.2017. 4. Delko, Krim (2017): John Deere setzt auf Agrarroboter. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 5.10.2017. 31. Esnouf, Catherine/Russel, Marie/Bricas, Nicolas (2013): Conclusion. In: Esnouf, Catherine/Russel, Marie/Bricas, Nicolas (Hrsg.): Food System Sustainability. Insights from duALIne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 233 ff. FAO (2009): Food for the Cities. http://www.ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/ak824e/ak824e00.pdf (Zugriff 9.9.2017). Feldges, Dominik (2017a): Das grosse Geschäft mit Robotern. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 9.9.2017. 27. Feldges, Dominik (2017b): Die Bauern müssen sich erst noch daran gewöhnen. Digitalisierung erleichtert Schweizer Landwirten zwar die Arbeit, bleibt aber vielen weiterhin fremd. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 16.9.2017. 31. Feyder, Jean (2010): Mordshunger. Wer profitiert vom Elend der armen Länder? Frankfurt/Main: Westend Verlag.

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Three main conclusions can be drawn from what has been said so far: Firstly, there is a need for clear regulations on the relationship between the large food and agricultural corporations and the nation states; secondly, consumers should take more responsibility for their eating habits; and thirdly, investments in the food and agricultural sector should be geared more towards ethical and ecological criteria. But will that be enough? Quite a few ethicists and even some economists are calling for a fundamental restructuring of agriculture and the food industry. The problem, however, is that such a restructuring will hardly be possible without a corresponding restructuring of the world economic system, since agriculture and the food industry have only copied what has long since taken place in other economic sectors, such as industry: The financialisation of production structures, the globalisation of production and consumption, and the industrialisation and computerisation/technologisation of production.

8.1

Ethical Guidelines for Companies

It is more than doubtful whether the question “How will we feed ourselves tomorrow?” is only a question of food ethics from an individual perspective, as Petersen (2014, p. 27) believes. For especially against the background of global food markets and transnational value chains, the question of ethically produced, marketed and consumed food can no longer be answered in purely individual ethical terms. Is it not rather the other way round: The ethical question about food must be extended and in the last consequence become a central question of economic and corporate ethics—and a question about economic ethics and economic governance. There is already a whole range of efforts and initiatives to address these issues. Although many of these initiatives are limited to voluntary action and self-commitment—such as # Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 C. J. Jäggi, Nutrition, Food Markets and Agriculture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34672-0_8

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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)—efforts have increased in recent years to oblige transnational corporations to comply with human rights and environmental standards by legal means as well. One such project is the corporate responsibility initiative in Switzerland. The Swiss entrepreneur and lawyer Samuel Schweizer (2017, p. 9)—and member of the management board of Ernst Schweizer AG—stated unequivocally in a column that corporations headquartered in Switzerland violate human rights and fail to comply with minimum environmental standards. Of course, this also applies to corporations based in other countries. For this reason, Schweizer (2017, p. 9) advocated without any ifs and buts the anchoring of a due diligence obligation for human rights and the environment in the Swiss Federal Constitution—as called for in the so-called Corporate Responsibility Initiative. The federal popular initiative “For responsible companies—to protect people and the environment” (“Corporate Responsibility Initiative”) has the following wording: “The Federal Constitution is amended to read as follows: Art. 101a Corporate responsibility 1. The Confederation shall take measures to strengthen respect for human rights and the environment by business. 2. The law regulates the obligations of companies with their registered office, head office or principal place of business in Switzerland according to the following principles: a) Companies must also respect internationally recognised human rights and international environmental standards abroad; they must ensure that internationally recognised human rights and international environmental standards are also respected by the companies they control; whether one company controls another is determined by the actual circumstances; control can in fact also be exercised through the exercise of economic power; b) Companies are obliged to carry out appropriate due diligence; in particular, they are obliged to identify actual and potential impacts on internationally recognised human rights and the environment, to take appropriate measures to prevent violations of internationally recognised human rights and international environmental standards, to put an end to existing violations and to account for measures taken; these obligations apply to controlled undertakings as well as to all business relationships; the extent of such due diligence depends on the risks in the areas of human rights and the environment; in regulating the due diligence obligation, the legislator takes into account the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, which have low such risks; c) Undertakings shall also be liable for damage caused by their controlled undertakings as a result of violations of internationally recognised human rights or international environmental standards in the course of their business; they shall not be liable under this provision if they prove that they took all due care as required by point (b) to prevent the damage or that the damage would have occurred even if they had taken such care. d) The provisions adopted on the basis of the principles set out in subparagraphs a–c shall apply irrespective of the law designated by private international law” (Verein Konzernverantwortungsinitiative 2017, p. 4).

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Ethical Guidelines for Companies

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The purpose of this constitutional amendment was to force corporations based in Switzerland—including heavyweights in the food sector, chemical multinationals active in agriculture and large commodity traders—to act in an ethically responsible manner. Even if in the meantime this constitutional amendment was rejected by the majority of cantons on 29 November 2020—50.7 of Swiss voting population had accepted this proposal. This was a remarkable success. This development is already further along in other countries and at the international level in some cases: “At the international level, there is a great deal of momentum. Around six years ago, the UN Human Rights Council unanimously adopted the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights drawn up by Harvard professor John Ruggie. ... To ensure that everyone adheres to a minimum standard, there also needs to be an enforcement mechanism” (Schweizer 2017, p. 9). Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights—General Principles These guiding principles are based on the recognition a) the existing obligations of states to respect, protect and ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms; b) the role of business enterprises as specialised organs of society which perform specialised tasks and, as such, must comply with all applicable law and respect human rights; c) the need to match rights and obligations with adequate and effective remedies in the event of their violation. These Guiding Principles apply to all States and to transnational and other business enterprises, regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership or structure. These Guiding Principles should be seen as a coherent whole and should be interpreted both individually and collectively in the light of their objective to improve business and human rights standards and practices in a way that achieves tangible results for affected people and local communities, thereby also contributing to socially sustainable globalisation. These Guiding Principles shall not be interpreted as creating new obligations under international law or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have or be subject to under international law with respect to human rights. These Guiding Principles shall be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, with particular attention to the rights and needs, as well as challenges, of individuals belonging to groups or populations at particular risk of vulnerability and marginalization, and with due regard to the different risks that women and men may face. (Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte 2013, p. 1)

Specifically, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights require states to introduce and enforce binding legislation of human rights-compliant business law (Art 3) and to deny public funding and the use of public services to companies that violate human rights (Art 7c). States should be given “sufficient domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations” under investment protection (Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte 2013, p. 12, Art 9). Conversely, companies should not only respect human rights, but also prevent their actions from having adverse human rights consequences (Art. 11). Therefore, procedural rules should be established to ensure human rights obligations,

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compliance with human rights due diligence and, in the event of violations thereof, redress for adverse human rights impacts (Art. 15 as well as 22). In addition, states should establish state-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms (Art. 27), non-state-based grievance mechanisms (Art. 28) and, conversely, companies should establish in-house grievance mechanisms for individuals and local communities at the operational level (Art. 29). In individual countries—such as Switzerland’s corporate responsibility initiative—such efforts have provoked resistance from market-liberal forces and business circles, even with a streamlined, civil-law implementation. In contrast, other countries rely on criminal prosecution or a catalogue of administrative sanctions (see Schweizer 2017, p. 9). Today, the United Kingdom and France, among others, already require entrepreneurs to conduct a binding human rights due diligence.

8.2

Information and Education

For consumers in particular, it is of great importance that they are sufficiently informed about the production processes, the components of food and the effects of food production. On the one hand, this is because they can only bring their market power and thus their influence on the way food is produced to bear if they are sufficiently informed about food markets. On the other hand, future food supply depends crucially on whether people are aware of the links between food production, resource consumption and negative environmental impacts. This—and a corresponding health-conscious diet—can decisively facilitate a holistic, economically open, but also economically critical education. However, the question arises whether the view of Rieckmann et al. (2014, p. 29), according to which the transformation to a food and agricultural turnaround is only possible through individual education and through a change in values towards changed eating habits achieved through it, is not too narrow. Two things have to be taken into account: Food and eating habits go much deeper than—predominantly—cognitively mediated education; eating behaviour is decisively affective and also socially or socio-culturally shaped. Moreover, attitude research showed decades ago that—unfortunately!—changes in attitudes only lead to changes in behaviour in exceptional cases, if at all (cf. Jäggi 2016, p. 22 and in particular footnote 26). While it is undoubtedly correct to see universities—and by extension the education system—as “places of competence- and value-oriented engagement with sustainable nutrition” (Rieckmann et al. 2014, p. 39). The only question is: can such an approach have the necessary depth of impact and be sustainable enough? Do the large food corporations not have much more efficient weapons at their disposal to enforce their specific interests with efficient, global marketing, high media presence and the emotionalisation of food and nutritional needs on the basis of the latest psychological findings? All the more so because today, not only in the USA, the large corporations—and especially the food industry— decisively influence the contents of teaching materials through their school marketing, and

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usually not in a neutral, critical sense, but often in the form of hidden indoctrination and influence. Today, what is needed instead are economic and political incentives to realign and structure food markets and also to give them clear rules of the game—especially from the point of view of health management and in the interest of the common good.

8.3

Ecological Awareness Pays Off Economically

A particular problem is also the ecological damage caused by globalised agriculture and the food industry. Today, the food industry is a major contributor to environmental pollution and the increase in greenhouse gases, and climate change is leading to growing instability in food production and thus in market prices. In economic terms, the agricultural sector will be subject to far more uncertain framework conditions and unpredictable risks in the future than in the last 30 years (cf. Esnouf and Bricas 2013, p. 25). If studies on “ethical investments” are to be believed (cf. Jäggi 2017, p. 116), ecologically and ethically oriented investments are less risky, at least as lucrative in the long term and cause significantly fewer external costs to the environment and people than classic investments that are primarily geared to short-term returns. In this context—especially in the food sector—investors are required to act in a selfresponsible manner and with a focus on the common good. Shareholders, but also buyers of bonds or other financial products, should definitely pay attention to the public service effects of the corporate activities of food producers, for example. They have it in their hands to control or at least influence the activities of companies—and to do so more directly than any government regulation can. Institutional investors in particular, but also private shareholders, are called upon to play an active role in corporate strategy—and, if necessary, in operational management—in the classic liberal sense of economic effectiveness and social responsibility.

References Esnouf, Catherine/Bricas, Nicolas (2013): Context: New Challenges for Food Systems. In: Esnouf, Catherine/Russel, Marie/Bricas, Nicolas (Hrsg.): Food System Sustainability. Insights form duALIne. Cambridge: Cambridge Universität Press. 5 ff. Jäggi, Christian J. (2016): Doppelte Normativitäten zwischen staatlichen und religiösen Geltungsansprüchen. Am Beispiel der katholischen Kirche, der muslimischen Gemeinschaften und der Bahá’í-Gemeinde in der Schweiz. Münster/Berlin: Lit-Verlag. Jäggi, Christian J. (2017): Ökologische Baustellen aus Sicht der Ökonomie. Verlierer – Gewinner – Alternativen. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler. Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte (2013): Umsetzung des Rahmens der Vereinten Nationen „Schutz, Achtung und Abhilfe“ Berlin: Geschäftsstelle Deutsches Global Compact

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Netzwerk (DGCN). http://www.skmr.ch/cms/upload/pdf/140522_leitprinzipien_wirtschaft_und_ menschenrechte.pdf (Zugriff 25.4.2018) Petersen, Thomas (2014): Ethik, Nahrungsmittel und Verantwortung. In: Schank, Christoph/ Vorbohle, Kristin/Quandt, Jan Hendrik (Hrsg.): Perspektive Nahrungsmittelethik. München: Rainer Hampp. 19 ff. Rieckmann, Marco/Fischer, Daniel/Richter, Sonja (2014): Nachhaltige Ernährung im Wertediskurs – Beiträge einer Hochschulbildung für nachhaltige Entwicklung. In: Schank, Christoph/Vorbohle, Kristin/Quandt, Jan Hendrik (Hrsg.): Perspektive Nahrungsmittelethik. München: Rainer Hampp. 29 ff. Schweizer, Samuel (2017): Konzerninitiative: Gebot der Stunde. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 9.11.2917. 9. Verein Konzernverantwortungsinitiative (2017): Erläuterungen zur Eidgenössischen Volksinitiative „Für verantwortungsvolle Unternehmen – zum Schutz von Mensch und Umwelt“. Bern. http:// konzern-initiative.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/20170915_Erl%C3%A4uterungen-DE.pdf (Zugriff 25.4.2018).