The Countries of North Africa: Background and Issues : Background and Issues [1 ed.] 9781617615276, 9781617614378

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. The Countries of North Africa: Background and Issues : Background and Issues, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010.

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. The Countries of North Africa: Background and Issues : Background and Issues, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated,

GLOBAL POLITICAL STUDIES

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THE COUNTRIES OF NORTH AFRICA: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

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POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

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The Countries of North Africa: Background and Issues : Background and Issues, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated,

GLOBAL POLITICAL STUDIES

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THE COUNTRIES OF NORTH AFRICA: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

VINCENT G. LUCIANO EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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Copyright © 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA The countries of North Africa : background and issues / editor, Vincent G. Luciano. p. cm. Includes index.

ISBN:  (eBook)

1. Africa, North--Politics and government--21st century. 2. Africa, North--Economic conditions--21st century. 3. Terrorism--Africa, North. 4. Human rights--Africa, North. 5. Africa, North--Foreign relations. 6. Africa, North--Foreign relations--United States. 7. United States--Foreign relations-Africa, North. I. Luciano, Vincent G. JQ3198.A58C68 2010 961.05--dc22 2010029852

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

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CONTENTS

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Preface

vii

Chapter 1

Algeria: Current Issues Carol Midgalovitz

1

Chapter 2

Country Profile: Algeria Library of Congress

15

Chapter 3

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Jeremy M. Sharp

47

Chapter 4

Libya: Background and U.S. Relations Christopher M. Blanchard

93

Chapter 5

Morocco: Current Issues Carol Migdalovitz

143

Chapter 6

Tunisia: Recent Developments and Policy Issues Alexis Arieff

159

Chapter 7

Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts Carol Migdalovitz

183

Index

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PREFACE This book provides an overview of the countries of North Africa including: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Western Sahara. This compilation explores the regions history, current governments and politics, economies, military profiles, foreign policies, and their relations with the United States. Chapter 1- The overall situation in Algeria has not changed much in the past few years. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was reelected for a third term in April 2009 and has no clear successor. The voice of the military, the most significant political force since independence, has been muted. Low voter turnout in the May 2007 parliamentary election may have indicated lack of public faith in the political system, and so authorities specifically boasted of a higher turnout in the 2009 presidential election. Terrorism persists at home; Algerian terrorists operate across the southern border into the Sahel; and Algerians continue to be linked to terrorism abroad. The U.S. State Departments lists the two Algerian groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).The more notorious and active is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. Terrorism provides a rationale for Algeria‘s uneven human rights record. Hydrocarbons are overwhelmingly the predominant national export, and export revenues have been affected by the global recession. Public investment has yet to remedy the country‘s many socioeconomic ills. Bouteflika has energized foreign policy and broadened cooperation with the United States. U.S.- Algerian relations are generally good and highly focused on counterterrorism. See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts, by Carol Migdalovitz. Chapter 2-Early inhabitants of the central Maghrib (also seen as Maghreb; designates North Africa west of Egypt) left behind significant remains

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Vincent G. Luciano

including remnants of hominid occupation from ca. 200,000 B.C. found near Saïda. Neolithic civilization (marked by animal domestication and subsistence agriculture) developed in the Saharan and Mediterranean Maghrib between 6000 and 2000 B.C. This type of economy, so richly depicted in the Tassili-nAjjer cave paintings in southeastern Algeria, predominated in the Maghrib until the classical period. The amalgam of peoples of North Africa coalesced eventually into a distinct native population that came to be called Berbers. Distinguished primarily by cultural and linguistic attributes, the Berbers lacked a written language and hence tended to be overlooked or marginalized in historical accounts. Chapter 3- This chapter provides an overview of U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic relations, Egyptian politics, and U.S. foreign aid to Egypt. It also includes a political history of modern Egypt. U.S. policy toward Egypt is aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive administrations have long viewed Egypt as a moderating influence in the Middle East. At the same time, in recent years, there have been increasing U.S. calls for Egypt to democratize. Congressional views of U.S.-Egyptian relations vary. Many lawmakers view Egypt as a stabilizing force in the region, but some Members would like the United States to pressure Egypt to implement political reforms, improve human rights, and take a more active role in reducing Arab-Israeli tensions. The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of $2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. In FY2010, the United States is providing Egypt with $1 .552 billion in total assistance. Congress appropriated FY20 10 aid to Egypt in two separate bills; P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, included $1 .292 billion in economic and military assistance, and P.L. 111-32, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY2009, contained $260 million in FY20 10 military assistance. Chapter 4- Libyan-U.S. rapprochement has unfolded gradually since 2003, when the Libyan government accepted responsibility for the actions of its personnel in regard to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and announced its decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs. In response, U.S. sanctions were gradually removed, and, on May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya‘s listing as a state sponsor of terrorism. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31, 2006, when the United States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy.

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Preface

ix

Libya was removed from the lists of state sponsors of terrorism and states not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts in June 2006. Chapter 5- The United States government views Morocco as a moderate Arab regime, an ally against terrorism, and a free trade partner. King Mohammed VI retains supreme power but has taken incremental liberalizing steps. Since 9/11, Moroccan expatriates have been implicated in international terrorism, and Morocco has suffered terror attacks. Morocco takes a proactive approach to countering terror, but some of its measures may be setting back progress in human rights. Morocco‘s foreign policy focuses largely on Europe, particularly France and Spain, and the United States. In the Middle East, it supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has severed diplomatic relations with Iran for bilateral reasons. See also CRS Report RS21464, Morocco-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, by Raymond J. Ahearn and CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts, by Carol Migdalovitz. Chapter 6-Tunisia has a stable, highly authoritarian government led by President Zine ben Ali, who was elected for a fifth term in October 2009. Ben Ali‘s Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party controls parliament, state and local governments, and most political activity. There are significant limitations on human rights but marked advancements for women and girls. Tunisia has experienced occasional attacks by Islamist terrorists, and Tunisian expatriates have been arrested in Europe and North America on terrorismrelated charges. Tunisia is a non-oil-exporting, middle-class country with a diverse, growing economy, and high unemployment. U.S.-Tunisian relations today largely emphasize cooperation in countering terrorism, although Tunisia would like greater focus on trade. Chapter 7- Since the 1970s, Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have vied for control of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish territory. In 1991, the United Nations arranged a cease-fire and proposed a settlement plan that called for a referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration into Morocco. A long deadlock on determining the electorate for a referendum ensued. The U.N. then unsuccessfully suggested alternatives to the unfulfilled settlement plan and later called on the parties to negotiate. In April 2007, Morocco offered an autonomy plan. In 2007 and 2008, the two sides met under U.N. auspices, but made no progress due to their unwillingness to compromise. In August 2008, in an effort to restart the process, the new U.N. Secretary General‘s Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, U.S. Ambassador (ret.) Christopher Ross

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convened a small, informal, preparatory meeting of the parties in Vienna. The issue has affected Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations and wider regional cooperation. The United States supports the U.N. effort and has urged the parties to focus on autonomy—a solution that would not destabilize its ally, Morocco. Some Members of Congress support a referendum and are frustrated by delays, others support Morocco‘s autonomy initiative. The United States contributes funds, but no manpower, for the United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). P.L. 110161, December 26, 2007, contained a provision expressing concern about human rights in the Western Sahara.

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Chapter 1

ALGERIA: CURRENT ISSUES* Carol Midgalovitz

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SUMMARY The overall situation in Algeria has not changed much in the past few years. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was reelected for a third term in April 2009 and has no clear successor. The voice of the military, the most significant political force since independence, has been muted. Low voter turnout in the May 2007 parliamentary election may have indicated lack of public faith in the political system, and so authorities specifically boasted of a higher turnout in the 2009 presidential election. Terrorism persists at home; Algerian terrorists operate across the southernborder into the Sahel; and Algerians continue to be linked to terrorism abroad. The U.S. State Departments lists the two Algerian groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).The more notorious and active is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. Terrorism provides a rationale for Algeria‘s uneven human rights record. Hydrocarbons are overwhelmingly the predominant national export, and export revenues have been affected by the global recession. Public investment has yet to remedy the country‘s many socioeconomic ills. Bouteflika has energized foreign policy and broadened cooperation with the *

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report RS21532, dated January 21, 2010.

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United States. U.S.- Algerian relations are generally good and highly focused on counterterrorism.

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GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS After a 1965 coup, the military became the most significant political force in Algeria. In 1992, it carried out another coup to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from coming to power, leading to a decade of war between security forces and Islamist terrorists. In 1999, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a civilian with military backing, won the presidential election after all other candidates withdrew, charging fraud. In April 2004, he was reelected with 83.5% of the vote in a multiparty contest; the military was officially neutral. International observers hailed that election as progress toward democratization even though the bureaucracy and judiciary had manipulated the political process to favor Bouteflika in the pre-election period. Many saw Bouteflika‘s victory as an accurate reflection of the popular will and an endorsement of his effort to decrease violence and for continued political stability.1 There have been persistent rumors about the 72-year-old president‘s health since 2005, but no apparent concern that he lacks a clear successor. The military probably will play a role in the choice of Bouteflika‘s replacement. In November 2008, a joint session of parliament adopted constitutional amendments that, among other provisions, abolished presidential term limits and allowed Bouteflika to run for a third term.A huge salary increase for legislators may have spurred the amendments‘ passage by 500 out of 529 cast. Some critics had argued that the constitutional changes required a national referendum, but the Constitutional Court disagreed. Hence, on April 9, 2009, Bouteflika as expected won another term as president with more than 90.24% of the vote over five challengers, none of whom was seen as having a remote chance of ending his leadership. The Interior Ministry claimed a 74% voter turnout. Once again, the President‘s rivals alleged fraud and that the authorities had inflated turnout figures. Some attributed the military‘s acquiescence this time to their inability to find an alternative to Bouteflika.2 The President heads the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and the High Security Council, and appoints the prime minister. On June 23, 2008, Bouteflika named National Democratic Assemblage (RND) leader Ahmed Ouyahia, who had served as prime minister from 1995 to 1999 and from 2003

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Algeria: Current Issues

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to 2006 and who is known to be close to the military, to the post again. After his re-election in 2009, Bouteflika reconfirmed Ouyahia as prime minister. Ouyahia is considered a possible successor to Bouteflika. Media reports suggest that Bouteflika‘s younger brother, Said, also may have presidential ambitions. The bicameral, multiparty parliament is weak. The 380-seat National People‘s Assembly was last elected on May 17, 2007, with a voter turnout of 36.5% – the lowest ever, reflecting lack of popular faith in the political system. Parties in the governing coalition placed at the top: the FLN won 23% of the vote and 136 seats; the RND 10.3%, 61 seats; and the moderately Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society (MSP) 9.6%, 51 seats; 18 other parties and 33 independents also won seats. The Council of Nations has 144 seats, onethird appointed by the president and two-thirds selected by indirect vote. FLN has 29 seats, RND 12, MSP 3; independents and presidential appointees also are represented.

Source: CRS Graphics Figure 1.Map of Algeria and its Neighbors

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TERRORISM3 Up to 200,000 lives were lost to terrorism and related violence between 1992 and 2000. Two Algerian groups are U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was most active from 1991 to 2001 and last attacked in 2006. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) split from GIA in 1998, declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2003 and, after Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu Musab Abdulwadood) became ―emir‖ or leader, united with it officially on September 11, 2006, taking the name Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM or Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)). AQIM seeks to replace the current Algerian regime with an Islamic state and calls for jihad against the United States, France, and Spain. The practical meaning of the union with Al Qaeda is uncertain and analysts suggest that links between AQIM and Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan/Afghanistan are nominal, but mutually beneficial.4 Adopting the famous name may have enhanced AQIM‘s legitimacy among extremists and facilitated recruitment, while enabling Al Qaeda to burnish its international credentials. Since ―uniting‖ with Al Qaeda, AQIM‘s rhetoric against the West and governments in the region, and its calls for jihad against the United States, France, and Spain have increased. AQIM‘s cohesiveness has been questioned as it may operate in relatively autonomous cells and has experienced defections. After Droukdel became leader, AQIM increased its attacks against the government, security forces, and foreigner workers. In 2007, it shifted tactics to more frequent, ―Iraqi style,‖ suicide attacks, with simultaneous bombings of the Government Palace (the prime and interior ministries) and a suburban police station on April 11, 2007 and of the Constitutional Council and the U.N. headquarters on December 11, among other attacks. In addition, an AQIM suicide bomber unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Bouteflika on September 6, 2007. All of these attacks resulted in many civilian casualties. After a relative lull, AQIM again targeted security forces in the summer of 2008. In August, suicide bombers perpetrated a particularly bloody assault on a police academy, resulting in more than 40 deaths. In 2009, AQIM operations mainly took place outside of the capital, perhaps because security forces have made it more difficult to operate in Algiers. It also continued to focus on the Berber region of the Kabylie, in northeastern Algeria, where the security presence was reduced after civil unrest in 2005, on Algeria‘s the vast Sahara desert provinces, and increasingly, in line with its regional pretentions, into the Sahelian countries of Mauritania,

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Algeria: Current Issues

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Niger, and Mali.5 Different AQIM commands may be operating in the Sahel. In June, gunmen killed 24 gendarmes (paramilitary police) in an ambush about 218 miles east of Algiers. In July, they ambushed a military convoy in Tipaza Province, 90 miles west of Algiers; at least 14 soldiers were killed.6 In May, AQIM claimed responsibility for executing a British hostage in Mali; in June, it shot a U.S. aid worker while attempting to kidnap him in Nouakchott, Mauritania and, in August, it attacked the French Embassy in that city. In November, an AQIM cell kidnapped three Spanish relief workers in Mauritania and unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap U.S. embassy employees in Niger. AQIM raises funds by kidnapping for ransoms and by trafficking in arms, drugs, vehicles, cigarettes, and persons. It also gets small-scale funding from cells in Europe.7 AQIM communicates via sophisticated internet videos. Algeria is a major source of international terrorists and was the fourth largest supplier of anti-coalition fighters to Iraq.8 Some Algerians were captured in Afghanistan and, at one time, a total of 26 were held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; most have been repatriated. The Bush and Obama Administrations sought assurances from Algiers that repatriated detainees would not pose a future danger and would be treated fairly. Several disappeared after their return amid fears that Algeria has secret detention facilities. Algerians have been arrested on suspicion of belonging to or supporting AQIM in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Britain. In addition, several major international terrorist plots have involved Algerians. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian trained in Afghanistan was arrested after attempting to enter the United States from Canada; he was convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot to carry out bomb attacks in Los Angeles. His associates and other Algerians in Canada were linked to the GIA and Al Qaeda. In January 2003, six Algerians were arrested in a London apartment with traces of ricin, a deadly poison with no known antidote. In October 2009, two French brothers of Algerian origin, one a worker at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, were arrested in France after intelligence agencies came to suspect them of ―criminal activities related to a terror group,‖ i.e., AQIM.9

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COUNTER TERRORISM After President Bouteflika took office, he sought to add peaceful means to the government‘s resources to counter terrorism. In September 1999, a national referendum approved the ―Civil Concord,‖ an amnesty for those who had fought the government. In September 2005, another referendum approved the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, including an amnesty for all except murderers, rapists, and bombers, exemption for security forces from prosecution for crimes of the 1990s, and compensation for families of victims of violence and the disappeared. Critics charge that it has resulted in the freeing of recidivist terrorists or that it failed to provide accountability for the disappeared and for truth-telling about the role of the security forces. A presidential commission determined that excesses of unsupervised security forces were responsible for the disappearances of 6,146 civilians from 1992 to 2000 and recommended compensation. Organizations representing victims‘ families claim up to 20,000 disappeared. The government has extended the amnesty period indefinitely and has controversially extended it to some former GSPC leaders. Some 18,000 troops have been deployed to the Saharan provinces and along Algeria‘s borders with Mali, Niger, and Mauritania to combat AQIM. Recognizing the immensity of the Sahara Desert-Sahel territory, Algeria believes that increased intra-regional cooperation is needed both to counter AQIM and prevent greater foreign, non-African involvement in the region. It fears that AQIM‘s propensity to kidnap Westerners for ransom might spur direct foreign intervention. Algiers also seeks to impede AQIM‘s ability to extract large ransoms from Western governments and, thereby, to build up a treasury to pay more recruits and acquire arms. Algeria is providing arms, equipment, fuel, and other assistance to Mali and attempting to mount joint operations with forces from Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. In July 2009, the leaders of Algeria, Libya, and Mali agreed to work in concert against AQIM. Later in the year, the military leaders of Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania also agreed to cooperate more.

HUMAN RIGHTS A state of emergency declared in 1992 remains in effect. According to the U.S. State DepartmentCountry Report on Human Rights Practices-2008,

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human rights problems in Algeria include restrictions on freedom of association which significantly limit citizens‘ ability to change the government through elections, failure to account for persons who disappeared in detention in the 1990s, reports of torture and abuse, official impunity, abuse of pretrial detention, poor prison conditions, limited judicial independence, and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and assembly. There also have been increased limitations on religious freedom and problems with security-based restrictions on movement, corruption and lack of government transparency, discrimination and violence against women, and restrictions on workers rights.10 Algerian officials fault the Report for failing to take into account what they believe have been improvements in human rights practices. The State Department‘s International Religious Freedoms Report-2009 noted that U.S. officials had raised concerns with Algerian interlocutors about religious discrimination, government orders to close some churches (which had been operating without official permits that have been required since 2006), and the treatment of Muslims who wish to convert to other religions.11 Algerian law prohibits efforts to proselytize Muslims. The Department‘s Trafficking in Persons Report places Algeria on the Tier 2 Watch List with regard to human trafficking because it ―does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. In January 2009, the government approved new legislation that criminalizes trafficking in persons for the purposes of labor and sexual exploitation. Despite these efforts, the government did not show overall progress in punishing trafficking crimes and protecting trafficking victims and continued to lack adequate measures to protect victims and prevent trafficking.‖12 A group with specific concerns are the Berbers, natives of North Africa from before the 7th century Arab Muslim invasions who seek language and cultural rights and an end to government discrimination and neglect. In April 2001 (―Black Spring‖), the death of a Berber youth in custody sparked riots in which security forces killed 126 people. The government agreed to compensate the victims and recognize Tamazight, the Berber language, as a national but not an official language (as Berber activists want but President Bouteflika opposes). The government engaged in a dialogue with Berber representatives known as the Arouch. In January 2005, the government agreed to rehabilitate protesters and remove security forces from Berber areas, and established a joint committee to follow up.

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ECONOMY

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Hydrocarbons are the engine of the economy, providing about 60% of the budget revenues, 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and 97% of export earnings.13 In the past decade, high oil prices boosted foreign monetary reserves and economic growth, fueled a construction boom, eased unemployment somewhat, and produced early repayment of foreign debt. In 2009, however, the global recession resulted in a significant decline in hydrocarbon exports and a concomitant drop in revenues. The country earned $42 billion from hydrocarbon exports in 2009 compared to $76 billion in 2008.14 A 2005-hydrocarbon law diminished the monopoly of SONATRACH, the state energy company, opening the sector for private and foreign investment. A 2006 law, however, required international companies to give SONATRACH a 51% stake in new oil, gas, and related transport projects. In 2008, Algeria‘s Energy Minister Chakib Khelil held the rotating presidency of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); at the time, he blamed the weak dollar, speculators, and geopolitical tensions for rising oil prices, not the market.15 Khelil seeks formation of a ―gas OPEC‖ to protect exporters.

ALGERIA BASIC FACTS Population: 34.18 million (2009 est.) GDP growth rate: 3.5% (2008 est.) GDP per capita: $6,900 (2008 est.) Inflation rate: 4.4% (2008 est.) Unemployment: 12.8%* 2008 est.) Exports: petroleum, gas, petroleum products Export Partners: United States, Italy, Spain, France, Netherlands (2008) Imports: capital goods, food, consumer goods Import Partners: France, Italy, China, Spain, Germany, United States (2008) Source: CIA, World Factbook, December 29, 2008. *The unemployment rate for young Algerians often is estimated at 25% to 50% or higher.

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Algeria: Current Issues

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Algeria has several pipelines supplying gas to Europe and plans for more. In July 2009, Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria agreed to build an ambitious $10 billion Trans-Saharan pipeline to ship natural gas to Europe. The aim of the project is to facilitate the economic development of the transit countries and provide Europe with another source of energy security. Other new projects include the TransMed pipeline to transport Algerian gas via Tunisia to Italy and the Galsi pipeline to transport gas directly from Algeria to Italy. Algeria also is expanding its exploration and drilling for oil. The government is directing some of its hydrocarbon revenues for development. A $140 billion, five-year plan that ended in 2009 invested in infrastructure, highways, ports, airports, and water resources.Another five-year plan for the period 2009-2014 has followed. These public investment plans are intended to generate non-carbon growth and employment. Yet, despite the country‘s considerable oil and gas income and investments, there are chronic socioeconomic problems: high unemployment and underemployment; inadequate housing, health services, and education; decaying infrastructure; great inequality of income distribution; and government corruption.16 These conditions have sparked social protests in several areas of the country. Algeria has applied to join the World Trade Organization, but has many problems to overcome first. Among them is central control of the economy that is only easing slowly, with a very selective privatization program. The government argues that its conditions for foreign investment need to encourage domestic companies as well. In October 2008, Finance Minister Karim Djoudi asserted that the global financial crisis would not affect Algeria because it is not present in international banking, has sharply reduced its national debt, relies increasingly on domestic financing to fund development, and rejected total convertibility of the dinar (the national currency). Officials also boasted of $135 billion in foreign reserves. As noted above, however, the financial crisis has resulted in a sharp drop in Algeria‘s export earnings. Moreover, critics continue to point to the absence of a modern financial market, an undeveloped stock exchange, an underdeveloped banking system, and a failure to integrate in the world economy as weaknesses.17 Others suggest that a continuing tide of illegal young Algerian immigrants to Europe is evidence of the failure of the economy to serve the people.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS After independence in 1962, Algeria was in the forefront of Third World politics, especially the Non-Aligned Movement, and very active in the Arab world and Africa. It was considerably less active in the 1990s, when it was preoccupied by domestic violence. Since Bouteflika became President, Algeria has reemerged as a regional actor, especially in Africa. Algeria‘s relations with neighboring Morocco are strained because Algeria supports and hosts the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), which seeksindependence for the former Spanish Sahara, known as the Western Sahara. Thousands of Saharoui occupy several refugee camps in the Tindouf area of southwestern Algeria. The camps are under the purview of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but run by the POLISARIO. Morocco also claims and largely occupies the Western Sahara. Algeria considers the problem of the Western Sahara to be one of decolonization requiring resolution by the U.N. and maintains that it is not a party to the conflict. It views with favor the direct, unconditional talks between the POLISARIO and Morocco that began in June 2007 in response to a U.N. Security Council call. However, no progress was reported from those talks and they have yet to resume. Algeria says that it would like to improve bilateral relations with Morocco by excluding the Western Sahara issue from that equation. Yet, Algiers has not reopened its border with Morocco, which Algiers closed 14 years ago in retaliation for Moroccan accusations that Algerians were involved in terror attacks in Marrakesh. Algiers maintains that smuggling, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration need to be dealt with before it opens the border and that opening would endanger Algeria‘s national security.18 It also believes that Morocco has more to gain in trade and tourism than Algeria if the border were reopened. Algerians note that Morocco continues to levy accusations against Algeria on the Western Sahara issue at the same time that it seeks benefits from Algeria. Algeria and France, its former colonizer, have complex relations. France is Algeria‘s major trading partner. About four million Algerians and individuals of Algerian descent live in France, but France has decreased visas for Algerians out of fear of terrorism and absorption difficulties. With France‘s support, Algeria signed an association agreement with the European Union (EU) in 2001 and has participated in the Europe-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) since 1995. Under Bouteflika, French-Algerian relations have warmed considerably. However, a planned treaty of friendship fizzled when

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France rejected Algeria‘s demand for an apology for the crimes of colonization. President Nicolas Sarkozy refuses to apologize, but acknowledges that colonialism was ―profoundly unjust.‖ He seeks to deepen bilateral business and trade ties, advance civilian nuclear energy cooperation, and promote the EU Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), a community of states bordering the Sea. France‘s inclusion of Algerians on a list of persons subject to ―meticulous inspection‖ for security purposes at French airports prompted Algiers to demand that Algerians be removed from the list and to cancel, or at least postpone, a January 2010 visit by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to Algeria. In March 2009, Algeria enacted a law making it a crime to leave ―the national territory in an illegal manner‖ in order to address European Union concerns about illegal immigration as well as to stop human trafficking. At the same time, Algeria wants Europe to assist with development in order to strike at the causes of emigration.

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RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES U.S.-Algerian ties date from a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1775. Algerians have fond memories of President Kennedy‘s support for their independence from France. Relations suffered later due to Cold War ideological differences; Algeria was a socialist republic with close ties to the Soviet Union. They were energized when Bouteflika met President Bush several times. Bouteflika attended the June 2004 G-8 summit of industrialized states and Russia in Sea Island, Georgia. U.S. policy has tried to balance appreciation for Algeria‘s cooperation in counter-terrorism with encouragement of democratization. U.S. officials have urged Algiers to lift the state of emergency and described the April 2004 presidential election as an important phase in a democratic process. Algeria receives limited U.S. aid. In 2009, it is receiving $400,000 in Development Assistance (DA) and $800,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET). For FY2010, the Administration requested $950,000 for IMET, $900,000 in DA, and $970,000 for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). In 2005, the United States and Algeria launched a Joint Military Dialogue to foster exchanges, training and joint exercises. Algeria participates in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but prefers

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bilateral activities with the United States that recognize its regional importance. As part of TSCTP, U.S. Special Forces train, equip, and aid national forces in fighting the AQIM in southern Algeria and the Sahel.19 U.S. intelligence also is shared.20Algerian authorities also have shared information regarding terrorists of Algerian origin with U.S. counterparts. Algeria participates in the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue and in NATO naval exercises. To support Algeria‘s efforts to combat terrorism, the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has listed leaders of AQIM, including Droukdel, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. On September 29, 2009, a U.S. State Department spokesman said that ―Al Qaeda in North Africa (sic) gave us an opportunity to boost our ties with Algeria‖ because ―the presence of militant groups represents a common challenge for both of us. ―After meeting President Bouteflika in November, General William E. Ward, head of the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), told the Algerians that the United States is determined ―to strengthen and improve bilateral relations and work closely with Algeria in several areas related to our mutual interests in security cooperation,‖ including the fight against violent extremism. In an acknowledgement of Algeria‘s regional power and ambition, he stated, ―we appreciate Algeria‘s leadership in dealing with regional questions related to security and the fight against terrorism.‖ Ward said that ―terrorist and criminal activities in the Maghreb and the Sahel region remain a threat to the entire region and beyond it…. If the countries of the region have decided to organize themselves, it means that they are aware of the proper measure of the threat. We share their assessment of the situation and we support their efforts to secure and stabilize the Sahel.‖21 During a December 2009 visit to Washington to ―strengthen the AlgerianU.S. partnership,‖ Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and other officials, and commended Algerian-U.S. cooperation, especially in the military sector, which he described as ―very ambitious.‖ He said that the cooperation included ―exchanging information and training human resources.‖22 The United States was first to invest in the hydrocarbon sector after the 2005 liberalization law opened it to foreigners. Economic ties have broadened beyond the energy sector, where most U.S. investment has been made, to financial services, pharmaceuticals, and other industries, although U.S. investors confront many bureaucratic and policy obstacles. Algeria receives duty-free treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In June 2007, Algeria and the United States signed an agreement to cooperate in

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the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but other countries have and will build reactors for Algeria. Despite improving ties, Washington and Algiers strongly disagree about some U.S. Middle East policies. Bouteflika condemned the use of force against Iraq and called for the early withdrawal of foreign troops. He criticized U.S. charges against Syria, but Algeria only abstained from voting on a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Algeria supports the Arab Peace Initiative, which promises full normalization of relations with Israel after it withdraws from Arab lands. It roundly criticized Israel‘s military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008January 2009. Algeria considers the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to be the result of ethnic conflict and poverty—not a genocide—and is concerned about its regional implications. In particular, Algeria objects to the International Criminal Court‘s warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir because it finds unacceptable a trial of a head of state by an international court and because the warrant impedes a political solution to the Darfur situation. The Algerian government condemned the inclusion of Algeria on the list of countries from which air travelers to the United States have been subject to heightened screening in the aftermath of a Nigerian‘s failed attempt to bomb an airplane en route from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. Algeria‘s ambassador to the Washington complained, ―This is a burden an discrimination against the citizens of Algeria who do not pose any particular risk to the people of the United States.‖23 The Algerian Foreign Ministry presented an official protest on the issue to the U.S. Ambassador in Algiers.

End Notes 1

Marwane Ben Yahmed, ―Les Raisons D‘Un Plebiscite,‖ Jeune Afrique Intelligent, No. 2258, 1814 April 2004. 2 Africa Research Bulletin, April 1-30, 2009, p. 19732, citing Africa Confidential. 3 See also, Jean-Pierre Filiu, ―Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?‖ Carnegie Papers, No. 104, October 2009, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 4 Yaroslav Trofimov, ―Islamic Rebels Gain in the Sahara,‖ Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2009. 5 See also, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2008, released April 30, 2009, available online at http://www.state.gov. 6 Some attributed the second ambush to the Protectors of Salafi Call, which reportedly had split from the GSPC and, therefore, is not considered part of AQIM. Others attributed the attack to a different regional command of AQIM or suggested that AQIM is encroaching on the Protectors‘ territory. ―Algerian Army Launches ‗Large Scale‘ Operations an Al-Qaidah

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Maghreb,‖ El-Khabar website, August 2, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, ―Five Regions Reportedly Designated for ‗Terrorist Deployment‘ in Algeria, El-Khabar website, August 5, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East,―Retreating of the Salafi Call Protectors,‖ Echourouk el Youmi website, August 17, 2009, BBC Monitoring Newsfile. 7 See also, Michael Jonson and Christian Nils Larson, ―Illegal Tender: Funding Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,‖Janes Intelligence Review, October 2008. 8 Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Harmony Project, ―Al-Qaida‘s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,‖ January 2008. 9 Emily Andrews, ―Big Bang Scientist Admits Plotting Al Qaeda Atrocity,‖ Daily Mail, October 12, 2009. 10 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2008, Algeria, February 25, 2009,online at http://www.state.gov. 11 U.S. State Department, International Religious Freedom Report – 2009, October 26, 2009, online at http://www.state.gov. 12 U.S. State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 16, 2009, online at http://www.state.gov. 13 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Algeria, March 2009, online at http://www.state.gov. 14 ―Algeria Expects $42b in Energy Income This Year,‖ Middle East and North Africa Financial Network, MENAFN.com, December 29, 2009. 15 Randah Taqiy-al-Din, ―‗OPEC‘ Decides to Maintain its Current Production,‖ Al-Hayat, March 6, 2008, BBC Monitoring Middle East. 16 Algeria is placed 111 out of 180 rankings of countries on Transparency International‘s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, online at http://www.transparency.org. 17 William Maclean, ―Algerian Shielded from Financial Turmoil,‖ Reuters, October 5, 2009. 18 ―Zerhouni Responds to Call by Rabat, Algeria not in Hurry to Open Border,‖ El-Khabar, March 23, 2008, BBC Monitoring Middle East, ―Algerian President Advised by Military to Keep Border with Morocco Closed,‖ Al-Quds al-Arabi website, August 1, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 3, 2009. 19 ―Desert Shadows,‖ Africa Confidential, Vol. 45, No. 4, February 10, 2004, p. 8. 20 Brian Whitmore, ―US Pushes Antiterror Alliance for North African Nations,‖ Boston Globe, April 11, 2004. 21 ―AFRICOM Commander Strengthens US-Algerian Cooperation in Algiers Visit,‖ Liberte, November 26, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 14, 2009, ―Africom Commander says no US Bases to be Set Up in Algeria,‖ El Watan website, November 26, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East. 22 ―Algerian Foreign Minister Commends US Ties,‖ Algerian Radio, December 9, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East. 23 Eric Lipton, ―Some Cry Foul as New Travel Rules Take Effect,‖ International Herald Tribune, January 5, 2010.

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Chapter 2

COUNTRY PROFILE: ALGERIA* Library of Congress

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COUNTRY Formal Name: People‘s Democratic Republic of Algeria (Al Jumhuriyah al Jazairiyah ad Dimuqratiyah ash Shabiyah). Short Form: Algeria (Al Jazair). Term for Citizen(s): Algerian(s). Capital: Algiers, with a population of about 1.7 million, or 3 million including suburbs, in 2004. Major Cities: After Algiers, the most populous cities are Oran, Constantine, and Annaba. According to 2004 estimates, Oran has a population of 700,000; Constantine, 350,000; and Annaba, 235,000.

*

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented edition of a United States Library of Congress publication, dated May 2008.

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Independence: Algeria celebrates independence from France on July 5, 1962.

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Public Holidays: Official holidays include New Year‘s (January 1); Ashoura (January 19, 2008*); Birth of Muhammad (March 20, 2008*); Labor Day (May 1); Ben Bella‘s Overthrow (June 19); Independence Day (July 5); Ascension of Muhammad (July 30, 2008*); Beginning of Ramadan (September 1, 2008*); End of Ramadan (October 1, 2008*); Anniversary of the Revolution (November 1); Feast of the Sacrifice (December 8, 2008*); and Islamic New Year (December 29, 2008*). Dates marked with an asterisk vary from year to year according to the Islamic calendar. Flag: Algeria‘s flag features a red crescent and a red five-pointed star against two equal vertical bands of green and white in the background. The crescent, the star, and the color green symbolize Islam, the state religion.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Prehistory of Central North Africa: Early inhabitants of the central Maghrib (also seen as Maghreb; designates North Africa west of Egypt) left behind significant remains including remnants of hominid occupation from ca.

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200,000 B.C. found near Saïda. Neolithic civilization (marked by animal domestication and subsistence agriculture) developed in the Saharan and Mediterranean Maghrib between 6000 and 2000 B.C. This type of economy, so richly depicted in the Tassili-n-Ajjer cave paintings in southeastern Algeria, predominated in the Maghrib until the classical period. The amalgam of peoples of North Africa coalesced eventually into a distinct native population that came to be called Berbers. Distinguished primarily by cultural and linguistic attributes, the Berbers lacked a written language and hence tended to be overlooked or marginalized in historical accounts. North Africa during the Classical Period: Phoenician traders arrived on the North African coast around 900 B.C. and established Carthage (in presentday Tunisia) around 800 B.C. During the classical period, Berber civilization was already at a stage in which agriculture, manufacturing, trade, and political organization supported several states. Trade links between Carthage and the Berbers in the interior grew, but territorial expansion also brought about the enslavement or military recruitment of some Berbers and the extraction of tribute from others. The Carthaginian state declined because of successive defeats by the Romans in the Punic Wars, and in 146 B.C. the city of Carthage was destroyed. As Carthaginian power waned, the influence of Berber leaders in the hinterland grew. By the second century B.C., several large but loosely administered Berber kingdoms had emerged. Berber territory was annexed to the Roman Empire in A.D. 24. Increases in urbanization and in the area under cultivation during Roman rule caused wholesale dislocations of Berber society, and Berber opposition to the Roman presence was nearly constant. The prosperity of most towns depended on agriculture, and the region was known as the ―granary of the empire.‖ Christianity arrived in the second century. By the end of the fourth century, the settled areas had become Christianized, and some Berber tribes had converted en masse. Islam and the Arabs: The first Arab military expeditions into the Maghrib, between 642 and 669, resulted in the spread of Islam. By 711 the Umayyads (a Muslim dynasty based in Damascus from 661 to 750), helped by Berber converts to Islam, had conquered all of North Africa. In 750 the Abbasids succeeded the Umayyads as Muslim rulers and moved the caliphate to Baghdad. Under the Abbasids, the Rustumid imamate (761–909) actually ruled most of the central Maghrib from Tahirt, southwest of Algiers. The imams gained a reputation for honesty, piety, and justice, and the court of

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Tahirt was noted for its support of scholarship. The Rustumid imams failed, however, to organize a reliable standing army, which opened the way for Tahirt‘s demise under the assault of the Fatimid dynasty. With their interest focused primarily on Egypt and Muslim lands beyond, the Fatimids left the rule of most of Algeria to the Zirids (972–1148), a Berber dynasty that centered significant local power in Algeria for the first time. This period was marked by constant conflict, political instability, and economic decline. Following a large incursion of Arab bedouins from Egypt beginning in the first half of the eleventh century, the use of Arabic spread to the countryside, and sedentary Berbers were gradually Arabized. The Almoravid (―those who have made a religious retreat‖) movement developed early in the eleventh century among the Sanhaja Berbers of the western Sahara. The movement‘s initial impetus was religious, an attempt by a tribal leader to impose moral discipline and strict adherence to Islamic principles on followers. But the Almoravid movement shifted to engaging in military conquest after 1054. By 1106 the Almoravids had conquered Morocco, the Maghrib as far east as Algiers, and Spain up to the Ebro River. Like the Almoravids, the Almohads (―unitarians‖) found their inspiration in Islamic reform. The Almohads took control of Morocco by 1146, captured Algiers around 1151, and by 1160 had completed the conquest of the central Maghrib. The zenith of Almohad power occurred between 1163 and 1199. For the first time, the Maghrib was united under a local regime, but the continuing wars in Spain overtaxed the resources of the Almohads, and in the Maghrib their position was compromised by factional strife and a renewal of tribal warfare. In the central Maghrib, the Zayanids founded a dynasty at Tlemcen in Algeria. For more than 300 years, until the region came under Ottoman suzerainty in the sixteenth century, the Zayanids kept a tenuous hold in the central Maghrib. Many coastal cities asserted their autonomy as municipal republics governed by merchant oligarchies, tribal chieftains from the surrounding countryside, or the privateers who operated out of their ports. Nonetheless, Tlemcen, the ―pearl of the Maghrib,‖ prospered as a commercial center. The final triumph of the 700-year Christian reconquest of Spain was marked by the fall of Granada in 1492. Christian Spain imposed its influence on the Maghrib coast by constructing fortified outposts and collecting tribute. But Spain never sought to extend its North African conquests much beyond a few modest enclaves. Privateering was an age-old practice in the Mediterranean, and North African rulers engaged in it increasingly in the late sixteenth and early

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seventeenth centuries because it was so lucrative. Algeria became the privateering city-state par excellence, and two privateer brothers were instrumental in extending Ottoman influence in Algeria. At about the time Spain was establishing its presidios in the Maghrib, the Muslim privateer brothers Aruj and Khair ad Din—the latter known to Europeans as Barbarossa, or Red Beard—were operating successfully off Tunisia. In 1516 Aruj moved his base of operations to Algiers but was killed in 1518. Khair ad Din succeeded him as military commander of Algiers, and the Ottoman sultan gave him the title of beylerbey (provincial governor). Under Khair ad Din‘s regency, Algiers became the center of Ottoman authority in the Maghrib. Subsequently, with the institution of a regular Ottoman administration, governors with the title of pasha ruled. Turkish was the official language, and Arabs and Berbers were excluded from government posts. In 1671 a new leader assumed power, adopting the title of dey. In 1710 the dey persuaded the sultan to recognize him and his successors as regent, replacing the pasha in that role. Although Algiers remained a part of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman government ceased to have effective influence there. European maritime powers paid the tribute exacted by the rulers of the privateering states of North Africa (Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco) to prevent attacks on their shipping. The Napoleonic wars of the early nineteenth century diverted the attention of the maritime powers from suppressing what they derogatorily called piracy. But when peace was restored to Europe in 1815, Algiers found itself at war with Spain, the Netherlands, Prussia, Denmark, Russia, and Naples. In March of that year, the U.S. Congress also authorized naval action against the so-called Barbary States. France in Algeria: As a result of what the French considered an insult to the French consul in Algiers by the dey in 1827, France blockaded Algiers for three years. France then used the failure of the blockade as a reason for a military expedition against Algiers in 1830. By 1848 nearly all of northern Algeria was under French control, and the new government of the Second Republic declared the occupied lands an integral part of France. Three "civil territories"—Algiers, Oran, and Constantine—were organized as French départements (local administrative units) under a civilian government. Colons (colonists),or, more popularly, pieds noirs (literally, black feet) dominated the government and controlled the bulk of Algeria‘s wealth. Throughout the colonial era, they continued to block or delay all attempts to implement even the most modest reforms. From 1933 to 1936, mounting social, political, and economic crises in Algeria induced the indigenous

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population to engage in numerous acts of political protest, but the government responded with more restrictive laws governing public order and security. Algerian Muslims rallied to the French side at the start of World War II as they had done in World War I. But the colons were generally sympathetic to the collaborationist Vichy regime established following France‘s defeat by Nazi Germany. In March 1943, Muslim leader Ferhat Abbas presented the French administration with the Manifesto of the Algerian People, signed by 56 Algerian nationalist and international leaders. The manifesto demanded an Algerian constitution that would guarantee immediate and effective political participation and legal equality for Muslims. Instead, the French administration in 1944 instituted a reform package based on the 1936 Viollette Plan that granted full French citizenship only to certain categories of "meritorious" Algerian Muslims, who numbered about 60,000. The tensions between the Muslim and colon communities exploded on May 8, 1945, V–E Day. When a Muslim march was met with violence, marchers rampaged. The army and police responded by conducting a prolonged and systematic ratissage (literally, raking over) of suspected centers of dissidence. According to official French figures, 1,500 Muslims died as a result of these countermeasures. Other estimates vary from 6,000 to as high as 45,000 killed. In August 1947, the French National Assembly approved the governmentproposed Organic Statute of Algeria. This law called for the creation of an Algerian Assembly with one house representing Europeans and "meritorious" Muslims and the other representing the remaining 8 million or more Muslims. Muslim and colon deputies alike abstained or voted against the statute but for diametrically opposed reasons: the Muslims because it fell short of their expectations and the colons because it went too far. War of Independence:In the early morning hours of November 1, 1954, the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale—FLN) launched attacks throughout Algeria in the opening salvo of a war of independence. An important watershed in this war was the massacre of civilians by the FLN near the town of Philippeville in August 1955. The government claimed it killed 1,273 guerrillas in retaliation; according to the FLN, 12,000 Muslims perished in an orgy of bloodletting by the armed forces and police, as well as colon gangs. After Philippeville, all-out war began in Algeria. From its origins in 1954 as ragtag maquisards numbering in the hundreds and armed with a motley assortment of weapons, the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale—ALN), the military wing of the FLN,

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had evolved by 1957 into a disciplined fighting force of nearly 40,000 that successfully applied hit-and-run guerrilla warfare tactics. By 1956 France had committed more than 400,000 troops to Algeria. In 1958–59 the French army had won military control in Algeria, but political developments had already overtaken the French army's successes. During that period in France, opposition to the conflict was growing, and international pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence. When Charles De Gaulle became premier of France in June 1958, he was given carte blanche to deal with Algeria. De Gaulle appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part. Muslims, including women, were registered for the first time with Europeans on a common electoral roll to participate in a referendum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958. Despite threats of reprisal by the FLN, 80 percent of the Muslim electorate turned out to vote in September, and 96 percent of them approved the constitution. In February 1959, de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. Then, in a September 1959 statement, de Gaulle uttered the words "selfdetermination," which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France. Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, backed by units of the army, staged an insurrection in Algiers in January 1960 that won mass support in Europe. French forces defused the insurrection. However, in April 1961 important elements of the French army joined in another unsuccessful insurrection intended to seize control of Algeria as well as topple the de Gaulle regime. This coup marked the turning point in the official attitude toward the Algerian war. De Gaulle was now prepared to abandon the colons, the group that no previous French government could have written off. Talks with the FLN reopened at Evian in May 1961. In their final form, the Evian Accords allowed the colons equal legal protection with Algerians over a three-year period. At the end of that period, however, Europeans would be obliged to become Algerian citizens or be classified as aliens with the attendant loss of rights. The French electorate approved the Evian Accords by an overwhelming 91 percent vote in a referendum held in June 1962. On July 1, 1962, some 6 million of a total Algerian electorate of 6.5 million cast their ballots in the referendum on independence. The affirmative vote was a nearly unanimous mandate.

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Independent Algeria, 1962–Present: The creation of the People‘s Democratic Republic of Algeria was formally proclaimed on September 25, 1962. The following day, after being named premier, Ahmed Ben Bella formed a cabinet that linked the leadership of the three power bases—the army, the party, and the government. However, Ben Bella's ambitions and authoritarian tendencies ultimately led the triumvirate to unravel and provoked increasing discontent among Algerians. The war of national liberation and its aftermath had severely disrupted Algeria's society and economy. In addition to the physical destruction, the exodus of the colons deprived the country of most of its managers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, physicians, and skilled workers. The homeless and displaced numbered in the hundreds of thousands, many suffering from illness, and some 70 percent of the work force was unemployed. The months immediately following independence had witnessed the pell-mell rush of Algerians, their government, and its officials to claim the property and jobs left behind by the Europeans. In the 1963 March Decrees, Ben Bella declared that all agricultural, industrial, and commercial properties previously owned and operated by Europeans were vacant, thereby legalizing confiscation by the state. A new constitution drawn up under close FLN supervision was approved by nationwide referendum in September 1963, and Ben Bella was confirmed as the party's choice to lead the country for a five-year term. Under the new constitution, Ben Bella as president combined the functions of chief of state and head of government with those of supreme commander of the armed forces. He formed his government with no need for legislative approval and was solely responsible for the definition and direction of its policies. Essentially, he had no effective institutional check on his powers. Opposition leader Hosine Ait-Ahmed quit the National Assembly in 1963 to protest the increasingly dictatorial tendencies of the regime and formed a clandestine resistance movement, the Front of Socialist Forces (Front des Forces Socialistes—FFS) dedicated to overthrowing the Ben Bella regime by force. Late summer 1963 saw sporadic incidents attributed to the FFS. More serious fighting broke out a year later. The army moved quickly and in force to crush the rebellion. As minister of defense, Houari Boumediene had no qualms about sending the army to put down regional uprisings because he felt they posed a threat to the state. However, when Ben Bella attempted to co-opt allies from among some of those regionalists, tensions increased between Boumediene and Ben Bella. On June 19, 1965, Boumediene deposed Ben Bella in a military coup d'état that was both swift and bloodless.

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Boumediene immediately dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the 1963 constitution. Political power resided in the Council of the Revolution, a predominantly military body intended to foster cooperation among various factions in the army and the party. Boumediene‘s position as head of government and head of state was not secure initially, but following attempted coups and a failed assassination attempt in 1967–68, Boumediene succeeded in consolidating power. Eleven years after he took power and after much public debate, a long-promised new constitution was promulgated in November 1976, and Boumediene was elected president with a 95 percent majority. Boumediene‘s death on December 27, 1978, set off a struggle within the FLN to choose a successor. As a compromise to break a deadlock between two other candidates, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, a moderate who had collaborated with Boumediene in deposing Ben Bella, was sworn in on February 9, 1979 (and subsequently reelected in 1984 and 1988). In June 1980, he summoned an extraordinary FLN Party Congress to produce a five-year plan to liberalize the economy and break up unwieldy state corporations. However, reform efforts failed to end high unemployment and other economic hardships, all of which fueled Islamist activism. The alienation and anger of the population were fanned by the widespread perception that the government had become corrupt and aloof. The waves of discontent crested in October 1988, when a series of strikes and walkouts by students and workers in Algiers degenerated into rioting. In response, the government declared a state of emergency and used force to quell the unrest. The stringent measures used to put down the riots of ―Black October‖ engendered a groundswell of outrage. In response, Benjedid conducted a house cleaning of senior officials and drew up a program of political reform. A new constitution, approved overwhelmingly in February 1989, dropped the word socialist from the official description of the country; guaranteed freedoms of expression, association, and meeting; but withdrew the guarantees of women‘s rights that had appeared in the 1976 constitution. The FLN was not mentioned in the document at all, and the army was discussed only in the context of national defense. The new laws reinvigorated politics. Newspapers became the liveliest and freest in the Arab world, while political parties of nearly every stripe vied for members and a voice. In February 1989, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut—FIS) was founded. Algeria‘s leaders were stunned in December 1991 when FIS candidates won absolute majorities in 188 of 430 electoral districts, far ahead of the

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FLN‘s 15 seats, in the first round of legislative elections. Faced with the possibility of a complete FIS takeover and under pressure from the military leadership, Benjadid dissolved parliament and then resigned in January 1992. He was succeeded by the five-member High Council of State, which canceled the second round of elections. The FIS, as well as the FLN, clamored for a return of the electoral process, but police and troops countered with massive arrests. In February 1992, violent demonstrations erupted in many cities. The government declared a one-year state of emergency and banned the FIS. The voiding of the 1991 election results led to a period of civil conflict that cost the lives of as many as 150,000 people. Periodic negotiations between the military government and Islamist rebels failed to produce a settlement. In 1996 a referendum passed that introduced changes to the constitution enhancing presidential powers and banning Islamist parties. Presidential elections were held in April 1999. Although seven candidates qualified for election, all but Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who appeared to have the support of the military as well as the FLN, withdrew on the eve of the election amid charges of electoral fraud. Bouteflika went on to win 70 percent of the votes. Following his election to a five-year term, Bouteflika concentrated on restoring security and stability to the strife-ridden country. As part of his endeavor, he successfully campaigned to grant amnesty to thousands of members of the banned FIS. The so-called Civil Concord was approved in a nationwide referendum in September 2000. The reconciliation by no means ended all violence, but it reduced violence to manageable levels. An estimated 80 percent of those fighting the regime accepted the amnesty offer. The president also formed national commissions to study reforms of the education system, judiciary, and state bureaucracy. President Bouteflika was rewarded for his efforts at stabilizing the country when he was elected to another fiveyear term in April 2004, in an election contested by six candidates without military interference. In September 2005, another referendum—this one to consider a proposed Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation—passed by an overwhelming margin. The charter coupled another amnesty offer to all but the most violent participants in the Islamist uprising with an implicit pardon for security forces accused of abuses in fighting the rebels.

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GEOGRAPHY Location: Algeria is located in northwestern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea between Morocco and Tunisia.

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Size: Algeria has an area of almost 2.4 million square kilometers, more than four-fifths of which is desert. Nearly 3.5 times the size of Texas, Algeria is the tenth largest country in the world and the second largest in Africa. Land Boundaries: Algeria shares borders with Morocco (1,559 kilometers), Mali (1,376 kilometers), Libya (982 kilometers), Tunisia (965 kilometers), Niger (956 kilometers), Mauritania (463 kilometers), and Western Sahara (42 kilometers). Disputed Territory: Algeria has border disputes with Morocco and Libya. Disagreements between Algeria and Morocco concern smuggling activities along the border, jurisdiction over territory in southeastern Morocco, and Morocco‘s claim to Western Sahara. Libya claims 32,000 square kilometers of southeastern Algeria. Length of Coastline: Algeria‘s 998-kilometer northern border stretches along the southern edge of the Mediterranean Sea from Morocco in the west to Tunisia in the east. Maritime Claims: Algeria claims a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and an exclusive fishing zone of 32–52 nautical miles.

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Topography: A sharp contrast exists between the relatively fertile, mountainous, topographically fragmented north, dominated by parallel ranges of the Atlas Mountains, and the vast expanse of the Sahara Desert in the south. The fertile Tell region in the north, extending eastward from the Moroccan border, is the country's heartland, containing most of its cities and population. The Tell is made up of the hills and plains of the narrow coastal region, several Tell Atlas mountain ranges, and intermediate valleys and basins. South of the Tell, the High Plateaus region stretches more than 600 kilometers eastward from the Moroccan border. This region consists of undulating, steppe-like plains lying between the Tell Atlas Mountains to the north and the Saharan Atlas mountains to the south. The High Plateaus region averages between 1,100 and 1,300 meters in elevation in the west, dropping to 400 meters in the east. Northeastern Algeria consists of a massif area extensively dissected into mountains, plains, and basins. It differs from the western portion of the country in that its prominent topographic features do not parallel the coast. The Algerian portion of the Sahara extends south of the Saharan Atlas for 1,500 kilometers to the borders with Niger and Mali. The desert is an otherworldly place, scarcely considered an integral part of the country. Far from being covered wholly by sweeps of sand, it is a region of great diversity. Immense areas of sand dunes occupy about one-quarter of the territory. Much of the remainder of the desert is covered by rocky platforms, and almost the entire southeastern quarter is taken up by highlands. Principal Rivers: Algeria‘s largest river, the Chelif, flows 725 kilometers from the Tell Atlas into the Mediterranean Sea. Climate: The coastal lowlands and mountain valleys are characterized by a Mediterranean climate, mild winters, and moderate rainfall. In this densely populated region, temperatures average between 21° C and 24° C in the summer and drop to 10° C to 12° C in the winter. Average temperatures and precipitation are lower in the intermountain High Plateaus region. The desert is hot and arid. Most of the country experiences little seasonal change but considerable diurnal variation in temperature. Rainfall is fairly abundant along the coastal part of the Tell, ranging from 400 to 670 millimeters annually, with the amount of precipitation increasing from west to east. Precipitation is heaviest in the northern part of eastern Algeria, where it reaches as much as 1,000 millimeters in some years. Farther inland the rainfall is less plentiful.

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Natural Resources: Algeria‘s natural resources consist of petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, uranium, lead, and zinc. Algeria has proven oil reserves of 12.3 billion barrels, a relatively modest amount. Proven natural gas reserves are estimated at 161.7 trillion cubic feet, the eighth largest in the world. Land Use: In 2007 Algeria‘s land use was as follows: 3 percent, arable; 0 percent, permanent crops; 13 percent, permanent pastures; and 84 percent, other. More than four-fifths of Algeria‘s territory is desert.

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Environmental Factors: A disturbing environmental trend is the encroachment of the Sahara Desert on the fertile coastal and highland Tell and inland Saharan Atlas regions. Poor farming practices and overgrazing have led to soil erosion. The dumping of sewage and waste from the petrochemical industry has damaged the Mediterranean coast. Water is scarce, so a premium is placed on conservation and desalination. For centuries desert nomads have relied on creative irrigation techniques, including the use of underground water tunnels and palm fronds to draw moisture. In 2007 General Electric was helping to build Africa‘s largest seawater desalination plant in Hamma, Algeria. The goal for the Hamma facility is to supply 20 percent of the water needed by the city of Algiers. Time Zone: Algeria‘s time zone is Central European Time (Greenwich Mean Time plus 1 hour).

SOCIETY Population: As of July 2007, Algeria‘s population was estimated to total 33.3 million. The population was growing at an annual rate of 1.2 percent. More than 90 percent of the country‘s population is concentrated along the Mediterranean coast, which constitutes only 12 percent of the country‘s land area. Therefore, the overall population density of 14.2 people per square kilometer is deceptive. About 59 percent of Algeria‘s population is urban. Drought conditions have led to an internal migration of farmers and herdsmen to the cities to seek other employment. High unemployment encourages emigration. In 2007 Algeria‘s net migration rate was estimated at –0.33 migrants per 1,000 people. Algeria also hosts more than 100,000 Sahrawi

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refugees from Western Sahara, who began taking refuge in Algeria in the 1970s following Spain‘s withdrawal and the eruption of a struggle for control of the territory. Most live in desert areas of western Algeria and depend on the United Nations and other relief agencies for their survival. Demography: In 2007 population distribution by age was as follows: 0– 14 years, 27.2 percent; 15–64 years, 67.9 percent; and 65 years and older, 4.8 percent. As this distribution indicates, Algeria has a very young population, which poses a challenge for the labor market and the education system. According to the World Health Organization, life expectancy in 2005 was 71 years (70 years for men and 72 years for women). In 2007 the birthrate was estimated at 17.11 per 1,000 people, and the death rate was estimated at 4.62 per 1,000 people. The infant mortality rate was 28.78 per 1,000 live births, and the fertility rate was 1.86 children born per woman.

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Ethnic Group(s): An estimated 99 percent of the population is Arab– Berber, combining Islamic faith with North African Berber cultural identification. Europeans constitute the remaining 1 percent. Unrest persists in the Kabylie region in the northeast in response to restrictions on Berber ethnic, cultural, and linguistic rights. Languages: The official language is Arabic. French is the language of business, and Berber (Tamazight) is also spoken. In October 2001, the government recognized Berber as a national language but not as an official language. As a result, the language issue remains contentious. Religion: Sunni Islam is the state religion, and Muslims constitute 99 percent of the population. The remaining 1 percent of the population is Christian, mostly Roman Catholic but also Methodist and Evangelical Christian. Algeria‘s Jewish population is barely a trace of its former presence, reportedly numbering only about 60 persons. The government imposes restrictions on religious freedom (not all of which are strictly enforced in practice), including prohibition of proselytizing by non-Muslims, controls on imported religious materials (both Muslim and non-Muslim), and limits on public assembly by non-Muslims without a license. The government provides financial support for mosques, imams, and the study of Islam in public schools. As part of its regulation of the practice of Islam, the government prohibits the dissemination of Muslim literature promoting violence and

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monitors teaching in religious schools and preaching by imams in order to prevent extremism.

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Education and Literacy: Algeria‘s literacy rate is estimated at 69–70 percent, higher than in Morocco and Egypt but subpar by international standards. The breakdown by gender is 79 percent for males and 61 percent for females. A lag persists for women despite progress since independence in 1962. Education consumes one-quarter of the national budget. Algeria faces a shortage of teachers as a result of the doubling in the number of eligible children and young adults in the last 12 years. Education is free and officially compulsory for Algerians up to age 16, but actual enrollment falls far short of 100 percent. Enrollment drops off sharply from primary to secondary school. In fact, only about half the eligible population is enrolled in secondary school, which consists of two three-year cycles beginning at age 12. In addition, Algeria has 10 universities, seven university centers( centres universitaires),and several technical colleges. The primary language of school instruction is Arabic, but Berber-language instruction has been permitted since 2003, in part to ease reliance on foreign teachers but also in response to complaints about Arabization. Health: According to the latest available statistics from the World Health Organization, in 2002 Algeria had inadequate numbers of physicians (1.13 per 1,000 people), nurses (2.23 per 1,000 people), and dentists (0.31 per 1,000 people). Access to ―improved water sources‖ was limited to 92 percent of the population in urban areas and 80 percent of the population in rural areas. Some 99 percent of Algerians living in urban areas, but only 82 percent of those living in rural areas, had access to ―improved sanitation.‖ According to the World Bank, Algeria is making progress toward its goal of ―reducing by half the number of people without sustainable access to improved drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015.‖ Given Algeria‘s young population, policy favors preventive health care and clinics over hospitals. In keeping with this policy, the government maintains an immunization program. However, poor sanitation and unclean water still cause tuberculosis, hepatitis, measles, typhoid fever, cholera, and dysentery. In 2003 about 0.10 percent of the population aged 15–49 was living with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). The poor generally receive health care free of charge, but the wealthy pay for care according to a sliding scale. Access to health care is enhanced by the requirement that doctors and dentists work in public health for at least five years. However, doctors are

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more easily found in the cities of the north than in the Sahara region in the south. Welfare: In 2005 Algeria ranked 104 out of 177 countries in the United Nations‘ human development index, a measure of overall well-being. Approximately half the Algerian population lives below the poverty line. About 45 percent of wealth is concentrated in the hands of the top 5 percent of the population, a phenomenon that is partly the result of collusion among businessmen, public officials, and military officers.

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ECONOMY Overview: Algeria‘s economy is in the midst of a difficult and halting transition from state control to an open market. The economy depends heavily on the hydrocarbons industry, which is highly cyclical. In the current highprice environment for oil and natural gas, Algeria‘s economy is experiencing an upswing, and hydrocarbons account for about 60 percent of revenues, 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and 95 percent of exports. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is encouraging Algeria to diversify its economy, in part to reduce the country‘s high rate of unemployment (15.7 percent in 2006) but also to promote stability and to assist in the transition to a market economy. Under the leadership of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999– ), the government is pursuing an economic reform program that embraces not just diversification but also other IMF initiatives such as deregulation, banking reform, and trade liberalization. However, the program is expected to encounter bureaucratic resistance, particularly in the area of privatization. Much improvement is needed; in a 2007 survey of business conditions in 178 countries, the World Bank ranked Algeria 125 for ease of doing business. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 2007 Algeria‘s estimated GDP was US$125.9 billion according to the official exchange rate. Using purchasing power parity, estimated GDP was US$268.9 billion, or US$8,100 on a per capita basis. The estimated real growth rate was 4.6 percent. In 2007 industry accounted for 61 percent of GDP, services constituted 31 percent, and agriculture provided the remaining 8 percent.

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Government Budget: In 2007 government revenues of US$58.5 billion exceeded expenditures of US$41.4 billion. Receipts from the hydrocarbons industry usually account for roughly 60 percent of revenues.

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Inflation: In 2007 the estimated inflation rate was 4.6 percent. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Algeria‘s agricultural sector, which contributes about 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) but employs 14 percent of the workforce, is unable to meet the food needs of the country‘s population. As a result, some 45 percent of food is imported. The primary crops are wheat, barley, and potatoes. Farmers also have had success growing dates for export. Cultivation is concentrated in the fertile coastal plain of the Tell region, which represents just a slice of Algeria‘s total territory. Altogether, only about 3 percent of Algerian territory is arable. Even in the Tell, rainfall variability has a significant impact on production. Government efforts to stimulate farming in the less arable steppe and desert regions have met with limited success. However, herdsmen maintain livestock, specifically goats, cattle, and sheep, in the High Plateaus region. Algeria‘s climate and periodic fires are not conducive to a thriving forestry industry. However, Algeria is a producer of cork and Aleppo pine. In 2005 roundwood removals totaled 7.8 million cubic meters, while sawnwood production amounted to only 13 million cubic meters per year. Algeria‘s fishing industry does not take full advantage of the Mediterranean coast, in part because fishing is generally done from small family-owned boats instead of large commercial fishing trawlers. However, the government is attempting to boost the relatively small catch—slightly more than 125,000 metric tons in 2005—by modernizing fishing ports, permitting foreigners to fish in Algerian waters, and subsidizing fishingrelated projects. Mining and Minerals: Algeria‘s Ministry of Energy and Mines is responsible for overseeing the nation‘s mineral production. State-owned steel and gold production companies were privatized in 2001–2. In 2005 the major products of Algeria‘s non-energy mining sector were as follows: iron ore (151,775 gross weight metric tons); zinc concentrates (4,463 metric tons); mercury (276 kilograms); phosphate rock (878 metric tons); barite (53 metric tons); unrefined salt (197 metric tons); and crude gypsum (1,460 metric tons).

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Industry and Manufacturing: In 2007 industry accounted for 61 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), but about half of that amount was attributable to the hydrocarbons sector. By contrast, manufacturing‘s share of GDP was only about 5 percent, and the trend line was downward. The main drag on manufacturing is inefficient state-owned enterprises, which suffer from a lack of investment and operate well below capacity. Some of Algeria‘s top manufactured products are cement, footwear, pig iron, steel ingots, and trucks. Energy: A member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Algeria exports both crude oil and natural gas, and elevated energy prices in recent years have led to an improvement in the country‘s budget, external debt, and foreign currency reserves. Algeria has proven oil reserves, as of January 2007, of 12.3 billion barrels, a relatively modest amount. Out of more than 2.1 million barrels of oil produced per day in 2006, more than 1.8 million barrels were exported. Proven natural gas reserves are estimated at 161.7 trillion cubic feet, the eighth largest in the world. Out of 2.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas produced in 2004, 2.1 trillion cubic feet were exported. Algeria‘s top natural gas customers, in order, are France, Spain, Turkey, the United States, and Belgium. Algeria‘s largest oil field, Hassi Messaoud in the Sahara Desert, contributed 440,000 barrels per day in 2006. A hydrocarbons law passed in April 2005 removes many restrictions on foreign energy companies. In 2004 Algeria‘s electricity production was 29.4 billion kilowatt-hours, slightly exceeding electricity consumption of 27.4 billion kilowatt-hours. Services: In 2007 Algeria‘s services sector accounted for 31 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) but employed the majority of the workforce. The services sector is undergoing deregulation and is being opened to private and foreign competition. Insurance, banking, air transportation, and air courier services already have been deregulated. However, most banks are still public, and the capital markets are severely underdeveloped. Tourism is weak, reflecting the low quality of accommodations and the fear of insurgencyrelated terrorism. Banking and Finance: Algeria‘s banking sector is dominated by public banks, which suffer from high levels of non-performing loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As of 2007, public banks controlled 95 percent of total bank assets. In 2007 nonperforming loans represented a towering 38 percent of

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total loans at public banks, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates. Modest progress has been made in implementing several reforms proposed by the IMF, including replacing bank credits to SOEs with government subsidies; boosting bank supervision, accountability, and transparency; and modernizing the payments system. One specific reform that has been achieved is the establishment in 2006 of the Algerian Real Time Settlements system, which facilitates the prompt and reliable electronic transfer of payments. In November 2007, the proposed sale and privatization of Crédit Populaire d‘Algérie was postponed because of turbulent market conditions. Recently, HSBC and Deutsche Bank announced that they would commence commercial banking (in the case of HSBC) and investment banking (in the case of Deutsche Bank) in Algeria. Only a few companies are listed on the underdeveloped and relatively opaque Algiers stock exchange. Tourism: Algeria‘s tourism industry, which contributes only about 1 percent of GDP, lags behind that of its neighbors Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria receives only about 200,000 tourists and visitors annually. Ethnic Algerian French citizens represent the largest group of tourists, followed by Tunisians. The modest level of tourism is attributable to a combination of poor hotel accommodations and the threat of terrorism. However, the government has adopted a plan known as ―Horizon 2025,‖ which is designed to address the lack of infrastructure. Various hotel operators are planning to build hotels, particularly along the Mediterranean coast. Another potential opportunity involves adventure holidays in the south. The Algerian government has set the goal of boosting the number of foreign visitors, including tourists, to 1.2 million by 2010. Labor: The largest employer is government, which claims 32 percent of the workforce. Even though industry is a much larger part of the economy than agriculture, agriculture employs slightly more people (14 percent of the workforce) than industry (13.4 percent of the workforce). One of the reasons for this disparity is that the energy sector is very capital-intensive. Trade accounts for 14.6 percent of the workforce, while the construction and public works sector employs 10 percent, reflecting the government‘s efforts to upgrade the country‘s infrastructure and stock of affordable housing. At the end of 2006, the unemployment rate was about 15.7 percent, but the rate among those under the age of 25 was 70 percent. In 2005 the labor participation rate was only 52 percent, versus an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average of 70 percent. New entrants to the

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workforce and the lack of emigration options make unemployment a chronic problem and an important challenge to the government. Given its highly capital-intensive nature, the hydrocarbons industry is not in a position to employ many job seekers.

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Foreign Economic Relations: In its foreign economic relations, Algeria is seeking more trade and foreign investment. For example, Algeria‘s hydrocarbons law passed in April 2005 is designed to encourage foreign investment in energy exploration. Increased production could raise Algeria‘s profile as a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. In keeping with its pro-trade agenda, Algeria achieved association status with the European Union (EU) in September 2005. Over a 12-year period, the association agreement is expected to enable Algeria to export goods to the EU tariff-free, while it gradually lifts tariffs on imports from the EU. Algeria has signed bilateral investment agreements with 20 different nations, including many European countries, China, Egypt, Malaysia, and Yemen. In July 2001, the United States and Algeria agreed on a framework for discussions leading to such an agreement, but a final treaty has not yet been negotiated. Ultimately, trade liberalization, customs modernization, deregulation, and banking reform are designed to improve the country‘s negotiating position as it seeks accession to the World Trade Organization. Imports: In 2007Algerian imports totaled US$26.08 billi on. The principal imports were capital goods, foodstuffs, and consumer goods. The top import partners were France (22 percent), Italy (8.6 percent), China (8.5 percent), Germany (5.9 percent), Spain (5.9 percent), the United States (4.8 percent), and Turkey (4.5 percent). Exports: In 2007 Algeria exported US$63.3 billion, more than twice as much as it imported. Exports accounted for 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Hydrocarbon products constituted at least 95 percent of export earnings. The principal exports were petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products. The top export partners were the United States (27.2 percent), Italy (17 percent), Spain (9.7 percent), France (8.8 percent), Canada (8.1 percent), and Belgium (4.3 percent). Algeria supplies 25 percent of the European Union‘s natural gas imports. Trade Balance: In 2007 Algeria posted a positive merchandise trade balance of US$37.2 billion.

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Balance of Payments: In 2007 Algeria achieved a positive current account balance of US$31.5 billion. High prices for Algeria‘s energy exports are the main driver for the improvement in the current account balance.

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External Debt: Reflecting strong oil export revenues, external debt is on a downward trajectory. For example, these revenues facilitated early repayments of US$900 million in loans from the African Development Bank and Saudi Arabia. In March 2006, Algeria‘s purchase of 78 aircraft from Russia led to the cancellation of Algeria‘s entire debt to Russia. In 2006 external debt was estimated at US$4.4 billion, down from US$23.5 billion in 2003. Foreign Investment: In 2006 foreign direct investment (FDI) in Algeria totaled US$1.8 billion. The petrochemical, transport, and utilities sectors have been recent beneficiaries of FDI. FDI into the oil sector was expected to rise as a result of a hydrocarbons law, approved in April 2005, that created a more even playing field for foreign oil companies to compete with Algeria‘s stateowned oil company, Sonatrach, for exploration and production contracts. Algeria also is seeking foreign investment in power and water systems. Foreign Aid: As of August 2006, cumulative World Bank assistance to Algeria totaled US$5.9 billion, encompassing 72 projects. Currently, the World Bank is pursuing seven projects, specifically budget modernization, mortgage finance, natural disaster recovery, energy and mining, rural employment, telecommunications, and transportation. In 2005 economic assistance to Algeria from the United States amounted to US$4.4 million, most of which was attributable to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the remainder to International Military Education and Training (IMET). MEPI encourages economic, political, and educational reform in the Middle East. In 2006 IMET, which provides U.S. military training to foreign troops, had a budget of US$823 million. In 2005 the European Union contributed US$58 million to Algeria‘s economic development under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Currency and Exchange Rate: Algeria‘s currency is the dinar (DZD). The dinar is loosely linked to the U.S. dollar in a managed float. Algeria‘s main export, crude oil, is priced in dollars, while most of Algeria‘s imports are priced in euros. Therefore, the government endeavors to manage fluctuations in the value of the dinar. As of April 2008, US$1 was equivalent to about DZD64.6.

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Algeria‘s foreign currency reserves have grown rapidly since 2000, reflecting rising prices for exported oil. At the end of 2007, foreign reserves totaled US$99.3 billion, up from US$12 billion in 2000 and the equivalent of almost four years of imports. Fiscal Year: Calendar year.

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

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Overview: Since independence in 1962, Algeria‘s transportation system has been neglected. The country has a very limited road system and an antiquated rail network that is oriented more toward cargo than passenger traffic. Port activity revolves around the export of hydrocarbons. In the view of the World Bank, Algeria‘s air travel, railroad, and bus systems are too dependent on government subsidies, in contrast to the country‘s ports and airports, which operate self-sufficiently. A state-owned airline faces diminished private competition. Algeria‘s telecommunications system is also underdeveloped, particularly in rural areas. Roads: Algeria has 107,000 kilometers of roads, 72 percent of which are paved. Road conditions are poor as a result of a lack of maintenance. An east– west expressway is planned, with most construction expected to be completed by 2010. Railroads: Algerian National Railways (Société Nationale des Transports Ferroviaires—SNTF) manages Algeria‘s 4,940-kilometer rail network, which suffers from mostly antiquated rolling stock, poor signaling equipment, and low worker productivity. In 2001 SNTF purchased 15 new locomotives from General Motors. At most 300 kilometers of broad-gauge track, dedicated to cargo traffic between iron-ore mines and the port of Annaba, are electrified. Rail lines service Algiers, major cities along the Mediterranean coast, and the border with Tunisia. Terrorism against the rail system led to a decline in the number of passengers carried, the distance traveled by passengers, and the amount of freight carried during the late 1990s. In Algiers a 26.5- kilometer metro line has been under construction since 1991 and is scheduled to open beginning in 2008.

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Ports: Algeria has the following Mediterranean ports: Algiers, Annaba, Arzew, Bejaïa, Dellys, Ghazaouet, Jijel, Mostaganem, Mers el Kebir, Oran, and Skikda. The busiest port by far is Arzew, which handles about 40 percent of Algerian crude oil exports; Skikda has the second largest share. Algeria plans to expand the petrochemical facilities at Arzew, but in general the port sector suffers from a lack of investment in container handling and other equipment. Inland Waterways: Algeria has no navigable inland waterways.

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Civil Aviation and Airports: Algeria has 137 airports, 53 of which have permanent surfaces. The country‘s principal international airport is Algiers Houari Boumediene Airport. In 2006 the airport opened a new terminal for international operations with an annual capacity of 6 million passengers. Algeria‘s primary airline is state-owned Air Algérie, which dominates the sector in spite of competition from eight private airlines, notably including Khalifa Airways, which has a history of financial difficulties. Pipelines: The state-owned Algerian oil company, Sonatrach, manages more than 2,400 kilometers of crude oil pipelines. The longest pipeline carries oil 805 kilometers from the Hassi Messaoud oil field to the port of Arzew. Sonatrach is building a parallel pipeline to more than double capacity. The only oil pipeline that crosses into another country runs 257 kilometers from the In Amenas oil field to the Tunisian export terminal at La Skhira. A network of natural gas pipelines emanates from the Hassi R‘Mel natural gas field. Two pipelines carry natural gas from Algeria to Europe: the 1,078-kilometer TransMediterranean Pipeline to Italy and the 1,609-kilometer Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline to Spain. Additional natural gas pipelines to Europe are planned. These additions should expand Algeria‘s gas export capacity to Italy from 30 billion cubic meters in 2005 to 88 billion cubic meters in 2010; gas export capacity to Spain is expected to grow from 12 billion cubic meters to 40 billion cubic meters over the same interval. Furthermore, Algeria and Nigeria have proposed the construction of a 4,300-kilometer trans-Saharan natural gas pipeline from Nigeria via Algeria and under the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, with a target date of 2015. Telecommunications: Outside of the urban north, Algeria‘s telecommunications network is underdeveloped, and in general ownership of telephones, computers, televisions, and radios is very limited. According to the

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World Bank, it takes an average of 174 days to secure a telephone line in Algeria, the second longest time among 51 developing countries surveyed. However, the telecommunications sector has begun to expand since the government authorized the privatization of the sector in 2000. In accordance with this policy, Algérie Télécom, a new joint-stock company, assumed control of fixed-line and mobile telephone service from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, which will be responsible for regulating the sector. In 2005 Algeria had an average of 78 telephone mainlines and 416 mobile subscribers per 1,000 people. Telephone service is better in the north, particularly in urban areas, than in the rural south, where it is sparse. In 2005 some 88 percent of Algerian households had television sets. In 1999 there were 46 television broadcast stations, plus 216 repeaters, as well as 25 AM, one FM, and eight shortwave radio stations. In December 2007, commercial operators announced their intention to launch satellite broadcasting of three television channels and four radio stations in 2008. In 2005 Algeria had 11 personal computers and 58 Internet users per 1,000 people, respectively. In 2007 the country had 2,077 Internet hosts. In 2005 an Algerian Internet service provider began to manufacture laptop computers, setting the production goal of 1 million per year.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Government Overview: The Algerian government is a multi-party republic with a constitution and a strong presidency. In 1992 Algeria‘s military-led government canceled the second round of national legislative elections following the overwhelming success of an Islamist party in the first round. This action led to a popular revolt that ultimately cost the lives of as many as 150,000 people. In the early 2000s, the government offered amnesty to the rebels; violence has since abated, but a state of emergency continues. The overwhelming re-election of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in April 2004 reflects his success in restoring relative stability to the country following a period of bloody civil strife. Branches of Government: Algeria observes a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The president is the head of state and has wide-ranging powers, including the ability to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, who serves as head of

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government. The president is also commander in chief of the armed forces, and the current president also serves as minister of national defense. The president is elected to a five-year term and may be re-elected once. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected to a second term in April 2004, reportedly with 85 percent of the vote. However, he is seeking changes to the constitution that would enable him to serve a third term beginning in 2009.Although the prime minister appoints the Council of Ministers, the president heads both the Council of Ministers and the High Security Council, which advises the president on national security issues. Algeria has a bicameral parliament. The lower chamber is the 389member National People‘s Assembly (Assemblée Populaire Nationale— APN), and the upper chamber is the 144-member Council of the Nation. Members of the APN are popularly elected for five-year terms. The last elections for the APN were held in May 2007. Regional and local authorities elect two-thirds of the Council of the Nation, while the president appoints the remaining members. The members serve six-year terms; half stand for election or appointment every three years. The Council of the Nation was last constituted according to this procedure in 2003. Legislation may originate with either of the chambers or with the president. Although Algeria‘s constitution mandates an independent judiciary, the executive branch exercises some influence over its operations. Ordinary courts have initial jurisdiction over civil proceedings. Each of the 48 provinces has a court of appeal that reviews initial court decisions. The Supreme Court has the highest jurisdiction. Administrative courts have jurisdiction over minor disputes. The State Council, which was established in 1998, regulates the administrative courts. The Court of Auditors oversees public spending and services. The nine-member Constitutional Council ensures that legislation is consistent with the constitution and supervises elections. The High Islamic Council encourages the application of Islamic case law. Military courts have jurisdiction over cases involving security- or terrorism-related charges brought against both military personnel and civilians. Constitution: Algeria‘s constitution was adopted on November 19, 1976. It was subsequently modified in 1979 and amended in 1988, 1989, and 1996. The constitution mandates a multi-party state, but the Ministry of Interior must approve all parties. Article 2 designates Islam as the state religion. Administrative Divisions: Algeria is divided into 48 provinces (wilayas; sing., wilaya): Adrar, Aïn Defla, Aïn Temouchent, Alger, Annaba, Batna,

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Bechar, Bejaïa, Biskra, Blida, Bordj Bou Arreridj, Bouira, Boumerdes, Chelif, Constantine, Djelfa, El Bayadh, El Oued, El Tarf, Ghardaïa, Guelma, Illizi, Jijel, Khenchela, Laghouat, Mascara, Médéa, Mila, Mostaganem, M'Sila, Naama, Oran, Ouargla, Oum el Bouaghi, Relizane, Saïda, Sétif, Sidi Bel Abbes, Skikda, Souk Ahras, Tamanghasset, Tébessa, Tiaret, Tindouf, Tipaza, Tissemsilt, Tizi Ouzou, and Tlemcen. Provinces are further subdivided into communes.

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Provincial and Local Government: A governor (wali), appointed by the president and subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, heads each of Algeria‘s 48 provinces. Elected assemblies govern each province and commune, the next lower administrative division. In November 2005, the government held special regional elections to address under-representation of Berber interests in regional and local assemblies. Judicial and Legal System: The top three sources of Algerian law are treaties or conventions ratified by the president, the legal code, and Islamic law. French jurisprudence has not been observed since 1975. According to the constitution, defendants are entitled to a public trial, during which they are presumed innocent, they may confront witnesses, and they may present evidence. They also have the right to appeal the verdict. Despite these constitutional protections, defendants, particularly women, are sometimes denied due process, including the opportunity to examine government evidence, according to the U.S. Department of State. Electoral System: Universal suffrage applies at age 18. Presidential elections, which are held every five years, are next scheduled for April 2009. Legislative elections, also held every five years, were held on schedule in May 2007. Three parties allied with President Bouteflika won a total of 249 out of 389 seats in the National People‘s Assembly. Politics and Political Parties: The Ministry of Interior must approve all political parties, and, according to the constitution, membership may not be ―based on differences in religion, language, race, gender, or region.‖ The most influential political party is the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale—FLN), which holds 136 out of 389 seats in the National People‘s Assembly. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika does not officially belong to any political party, but he is honorary chairman of the FLN. In February 2005, the FLN voted to support Bouteflika after a dissident faction agreed to drop

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opposition to his policies. Other major parties are the Front of Socialist Forces, the Movement for National Reform, the Movement of Society for Peace, and the National Rally for Democracy. In 1992 the government outlawed the Islamic Salvation Front. Altogether, Algeria has about 40 political parties. Mass Media: Algeria has more than 45 independent French-language and Arabic-language publications as well as four government-owned newspapers (two published in French and two in Arabic), but the government controls all printing presses and advertising. The newspapers with the largest circulations are El-Khabar (530,000), Quotidien d’Oran (195,000), and Liberté (120,000); all three are employee-owned. The government also owns all radio and television outlets, which provide pro-government programming. In 2004 and 2005, the government increased the access of Berber language and culture to both print and broadcast media. In general, the state exercises considerable control over Algeria‘s mass media, and harassment of the press increased following President Bouteflika‘s re-election in April 2004. The print media practice self-censorship to avoid various forms of government pressure, including defamation lawsuits and the potential withholding of state-controlled advertising. In 2004 two newspapers were closed or suspended over debts owed the state-owned printing company. In its 2007 Freedom of the Press report, Freedom House classified Algeria as ―not free,‖ reflecting the government‘s policy of harassing, intimidating, and sometimes imprisoning journalists. During the civil strife from 1993 to 1997, mostly Islamist factions murdered some 57 journalists. Foreign Relations: Algeria maintains diplomatic relations with more than 100 countries. From January 2004 until December 2005, Algeria held a nonpermanent, rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council. Algeria and the United States have a somewhat ambivalent relationship, but the two countries formed strategic ties in the battle against radical Islam following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Relations between Algeria and France also are ambivalent because of the mixed legacy of French colonialism. However, the French language remains influential, and France is a major trading partner for Algeria. In December 2007, Algeria and France signed a new agreement for scientific and cultural cooperation. They also agreed to cooperate in the development of nuclear energy for civilian uses. In Africa, Algeria‘s diplomatic initiatives include hosting peace talks between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000, cooperating with Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa on the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (an African

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Union development initiative), and promoting the Arab Maghreb Union (an economic bloc encompassing Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia). Algeria supports the Polisario, a Western Sahara independence movement, by providing it with sanctuary in southwestern Algeria. The border region between Morocco and Algeria has been the site of terrorist violence. Although Morocco lifted visa requirements for Algerians in 2004, Algeria has declined to reciprocate. In the Middle East, Algeria advocates the Palestinian cause. Membership in International Organizations: Algeria belongs to the following international organizations: African Development Bank, African Union, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa,Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development,Arab Maghreb Union,Arab Monetary Fund,Bank for International Settlements,Food and Agriculture Organization, Group of 15, Group of 24,Group of 77,International Atomic Energy Agency, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International Chamber of Commerce, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, International Criminal Court (signatory), International Criminal Police Organization, International Development Association, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,International Finance Corporation, International Fund for Agricultural Development,International Hydrographic Organization, International Labour Organization, International Maritime Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Olympic Committee, International Organization for Migration, International Organization for Standardization, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, International Telecommunication Union,Islamic Development Bank, League of Arab States, Multilateral Investment Geographic Agency,Nonaligned Movement, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (partner), Organization of American States (observer), Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, Organization of the Islamic Conference,Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,United Nations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Industrial Development Organization,Universal Postal Union, World Customs Organization,World Health Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization,World Meteorological Organization, World Tourism Organization, and World Trade Organization (observer).

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Major International Treaties: In the area of arms control, Algeria is a party to the following conventions: Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Partial Test Ban. Algeria has signed, but not ratified, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Geneva Protocol. Regarding the environment, Algeria is a party to the following conventions: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, and Wetlands. In the area of counterterrorism, Algeria is a party to the following conventions: Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Against the Taking of Hostages, Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

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NATIONAL SECURITY Armed Forces Overview: Algeria‘s military, paramilitary, and police forces are more concerned about an internal threat from Islamic extremists than a definable external threat. The military is attempting to control the internal threat through operational and surveillance activities. Russia has supplied most of the military‘s equipment. Foreign Military Relations: Algeria‘s leading arms supplier is Russia, and the second most important supplier is China. In March 2006, Algeria purchased 78 aircraft from Russia, leading to the cancellation of Algeria‘s entire debt to Russia. The United States has been reluctant to provide Algeria with arms, although the two nations began a dialogue on military relations in 2004. The United States trains Algerian troops under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. External Threat: Algeria does not face a clearly defined external threat. Theoretically, Algeria could become embroiled in a serious dispute with

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neighboring Morocco over Algeria‘s support for the Polisario Front, a Western Saharan independence movement.

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Defense Budget: In 2006 Algeria‘s defense expenditures totaled about US$3 billion, corresponding to about 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Major Military Units: Algeria‘s active-duty military consists of 120,000 in the army (including 75,000 conscripts), 7,500 in the navy and coast guard, and 10,000 in the air force. In addition to active-duty personnel, Algeria has about 150,000 military reserves assigned to the army. The army is organized in six military regions. Possible reorganization into a divisional structure is on hold. Major army units include two armored divisions, three mechanized divisions, one airborne division, one independent armored brigade, and five independent mechanized infantry brigades. Additional battalions are as follows: 20 independent infantry, two artillery, five air defense, and six antiaircraft artillery. The air force is organized in five fighter/ground attack squadrons, eight fighter squadrons, two reconnaissance squadrons, two maritime patrol squadrons, two transport squadrons, one tanker squadron, four attack helicopter squadrons, seven transport helicopter squadrons, and 10 training squadrons. The navy and coast guard have bases at Mers el Kebir, Algiers, Annaba, and Jijel. Major Military Equipment: According to the most recent issue of The Military Balance, published annually by the International Institute for Security Studies, Algeria‘s army has the following equipment: 920 main battle tanks, 139 reconnaissance vehicles, 1,084 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 910 armored personnel carriers, 375 towed artillery, 170 self-propelled artillery, 144 multiple rocket launchers, 330 mortars, an unspecified number of antitank guided weapons, 180 recoilless launchers, 300 antitank guns, at least 288 surface-to-air missiles, about 875 air defense guns, and an unspecified number of surface-to-air missiles. The navy has two submarines, nine principal surface combatants, 22 patrol and coastal combatants, three amphibious craft, and three logistics and support craft. The air force has 204 combat aircraft and 33 attack helicopters. Military Service: Military service is compulsory for males aged 19–30. The term of service is 18 months, consisting of six months of basic training and 12 months of civil projects.

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Paramilitary Forces: Algeria‘s paramilitary forces include the 20,000member Gendarmerie Nationale, which is subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense; the 1,200-member Republican Guard, an elite corps of the Gendarmerie Nationale; an estimated 16,000 national security forces in the General Directorate of National Security under the Ministry of Interior; and 150,000 militia and guards. Foreign Military Forces: No foreign forces are based in Algeria. Military Forces Abroad: Algeria has deployed observers with United Nations Missions in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Sudan.

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Police: Responsibility for maintaining law and order is shared by the 60,000-member Gendarmerie Nationale, under the Ministry of National Defense, and the 30,000-member Sûreté Nationale, or national police force, under the Ministry of Interior. The Gendarmerie Nationale is mainly active in rural and remote areas of the country, while the Sûreté Nationale is primarily an urban police force. Algeria‘s various security forces have been involved in counterterrorism operations and have been accused of excesses in the battle against Islamist groups. They also face complaints of harassing journalists. Internal Threat: Algeria faces a threat from domestic Islamist radical groups. In December 2007, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) carried out dual suicide bomb attacks in Algiers against a Coast Guard barracks in Dellys and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Batna. The attacks resulted in about 52 deaths, but President Bouteflika was not harmed. Islamist groups rose up in rebellion in 1992 after the government halted a national election that would have given power to the militant Islamic Salvation Front. Related terrorism, which cost the lives of as many as 150,000 people, has abated since the government began to offer amnesty to rebels. Berber unrest also remains a concern and periodically manifests itself in the form of demonstrations to protest restrictions on ethnic, cultural, and linguistic rights. Terrorism: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the successor organization to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat—GSPC), one of two groups that had been competing for influence in Algeria. The other was the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé—GIA). Al Qaeda was instrumental in establishing

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the GSPC as an alternative to the GIA, which continues to operate in a diminished form. In 1996 Osama bin Laden encouraged the GSPC to break away from the GIA because he disapproved of the GIA‘s extremely unpopular policy of massacring Muslim civilians who were not jihadists. Bin Laden shares the GSPC‘s Salafist beliefs, which advocate a restoration of the stringent form of Sunni Islam practiced by companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Although avoiding wanton violence against civilians, the GSPC targets the security services of Algeria‘s secular government. In one notorious incident in 2003, the GSPC seized European tourists visiting the Sahara Desert. Fourteen of the hostages were released after more than five months in exchange for ransom paid by the German government; the fifteenth hostage died while in custody. After 1992 terrorism flared when the government canceled the second round of elections in which an Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front, held a substantial lead after the first round. Ensuing civil strife led to the death of as many as 150,000 people. In the early 2000s, the government offered amnesty to the rebels; violence has since abated, but a state of emergency continues. President Bouteflika, who was re-elected in April 2004, enjoys broad support because of the success of his amnesty programs in ushering in a period of relative stability. In September 2005, Bouteflika‘s approach was once again endorsed when a popular referendum on the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation passed by an overwhelming margin. The charter provides for a continuing amnesty program for all but the most violent insurgents, exoneration of the security services for alleged misdeeds in fighting the insurgency, and compensation for the victims of violence. Human Rights: In its annual country report on human rights practices released March 2008, the U.S. Department of State noted the persistence of a number of human rights problems in Algeria. Continuing problems listed in the report include failure to account for past disappearances; alleged incidences of abuse and torture of detainees; official impunity, arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial detention; denial of due process and fair trials; limited judicial independence; restrictions on civil liberties such as freedoms of speech, religion, press, and assembly; government corruption; and discrimination against women and minorities. According to Transparency International‘s Corruption Perceptions Index, Algeria ranked 99 out of 179 countries in transparency in 2007.

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Chapter 3

EGYPT: BACKGROUND * AND U.S. RELATIONS Jeremy M. Sharp

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SUMMARY This chapter provides an overview of U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic relations, Egyptian politics, and U.S. foreign aid to Egypt. It also includes a political history of modern Egypt. U.S. policy toward Egypt is aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive administrations have long viewed Egypt as a moderating influence in the Middle East. At the same time, in recent years, there have been increasing U.S. calls for Egypt to democratize. Congressional views of U.S.-Egyptian relations vary. Many lawmakers view Egypt as a stabilizing force in the region, but some Members would like the United States to pressure Egypt to implement political reforms, improve human rights, and take a more active role in reducing Arab-Israeli tensions. The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of $2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. In FY2010, the United *

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report RL33003, dated March 25, 2010.

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States is providing Egypt with $1 .552 billion in total assistance. Congress appropriated FY20 10 aid to Egypt in two separate bills; P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, included $1 .292 billion in economic and military assistance, and P.L. 111-32, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY2009, contained $260 million in FY20 10 military assistance. After several failed attempts to form a new Egypt aid mechanism, Congress passed into law a new provision in P.L. 111-117 (section 7042) that called for the possible establishment of an endowment to ―further the shared interests‖ of the United States and Egypt. Congress specified that up to $50 million in economic aid may be set aside for an endowment, though lawmakers noted the process is in its early stages. Appropriators stated that ―the conferees recognize that discussions and negotiations on such an endowment will take time, and direct the Secretary of State to consult with the Committees on these efforts. Consultation should include explanation of the specific definition of shared interests, and how such interests would be furthered through an endowment. The conferees note that such funds are subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.‖ For FY2011, the Obama Administration is seeking $1 .552 billion in total assistance, the exact same amount as the previous fiscal year. The Administration‘s request includes $1.3 billion in military assistance and $250 million in economic aid.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 

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President Mubarak’s Health. In March 2010, President Hosni Mubarak underwent a successful operation in Germany to remove his gallbladder. Before his surgery, President Mubarak temporarily turned over presidential authority to Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif. The president is expected to make a full recovery. Mubarak‘s health has been a subject of intense speculation for some time due to uncertainty over who will succeed him. Synagogue Restoration. In March 2010, the Egyptian Supreme Council of Antiquities completed a $1.8 million restoration of the synagogue of Maimonides in Cairo. Although the synagogue‘s unveiling received international press coverage, the Egyptian government deliberately tempered domestic media coverage due to

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widespread public opposition to Israel‘s policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Overall, Egyptian leaders and the public at large are opposed to normalizing ties with Israel beyond official diplomatic ties into the domains of trade, culture, and tourism. Mohamed ElBaradei. Egyptian domestic politics received a jolt in late 2009 when 67-year-old Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 2005 Nobel Prize winner, publicly expressed his intention to return to Egypt to reform the political system, amend the constitution, and possibly run for president as an independent candidate in 2011. Because independent presidential candidates must meet extremely rigid criteria in order to run, ElBaradei has called for free and fair elections that are monitored by both Egyptian judges and international monitors. He also has insisted that the constitution be amended in order to remove all ―legal impediments that limit the majority of the people from becoming candidates.‖ Since returning to Egypt in February 2010 after a 27-year absence, ElBaradei has formed a new political organization called the National Association for Change. Some observers have suggested that ElBaradei is trying to emulate President Barack Obama‘s campaign rhetoric and mobilize the Egyptian masses to his cause of reform. He remarked in one interview, ―My goal is for Egypt to save itself. Help me in order to help you. If you want this country to change, then every one of you must participate to show his desire.‖1 In response, President Mubarak has said that ElBaradei can run for president as an independent so long as he respects the constitution. Many observers of Egyptian politics have suggested that the ―ElBaradei phenomenon‖ is one of the most major developments in recent years, and some analysts have speculated whether his entry into politics will force President Mubarak to run for reelection, postponing the potential candidacy of his son Gamal. Murder Trial. In March 2010, Egypt‘s highest appeals court ordered a new trial for a wealthy former legislator who had been convicted and sentenced to death for paying a retired police officer to murder Suzanne Tamim, a famous Lebanese singer who was found stabbed to death in her Dubai apartment in July 2008. Socioeconomic inequality and resentment of Egypt‘s ruling elite has grown in recent years, and the court‘s ruling may only heighten middle and lower class public resentment.

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Jeremy M. Sharp 



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

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Christian-Muslim Clashes. In January 2010, six Coptic Christians and a policeman were killed when three gunmen opened fire on a crowd leaving church on the night of the Coptic Christmas Eve in the town of Naga Hammadi north of Luxor in Upper Egypt. The attackers were Muslim and were reportedly retaliating for an alleged rape of a Muslim girl by a Christian man in the same town back in November 2009. The attack and the ensuing violence it sparked was one of the most deadly instances of Muslim-Coptic conflict in the past decade. The incident highlighted the persistence of sectarian tension, particularly in Upper Egypt, as many Copts accuse the government of ignoring the issue. After the incident, 16 Members of Congress sent a letter to President Mubarak calling for a serious review of recent and recurring acts of violence and discrimination against Christians in Egypt. Border Guard Killed by Hamas Sniper. On January, 9, 2010, an Egyptian border guard was shot dead by a Palestinian sniper. The attack occurred at the same time as Palestinian youths clashed with Egyptian police in the border town of Al Arish several miles from the Gaza border. The incident has further strained relations between the Egyptian government and Hamas. Underground Gaza Barrier. In December 2009, reports surfaced that the Egyptian military had begun constructing a subterranean steel wall along the border with Gaza in order to block tunnel smuggling. This ―iron wall‖ is expected to be between 70 and 100 feet deep and run 6 miles along the Egypt- Gaza border. According to one Egyptian official, ―it will stop at least 60% of the contraband going to Gaza.2‖ The United States and Israel have both responded positively to reports of the wall‘s construction. According to U.S. State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid, ―We believe that weapon-smuggling should stop and that measures taken to stop that weapon-smuggling should be, could be carried out, yes.‖ One high-level Israeli military official said that it marked a ―significant shift in [Egypt's] fight against Hamas; it shows that they, too, are feeling the threat of a Hamas armed with Iranian rockets.‖3 Netanyahu-Mubarak Meeting. In December 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Egypt for meetings on reviving the Israeli- Palestinian peace process with President Mubarak. Afterward, Prime Minister Netanyahu issued a statement saying he was ―very encouraged by the commitment of President

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Mubarak to promote the peace process between us and the Palestinians.‖4

Figure 1. Map of Egypt

CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS Presidential Succession: Who Will Follow Hosni Mubarak? Uncertainty over the potential successor to 81-year-old President Hosni Mubarak has clouded Egyptian domestic politics and U.S.-Egyptian relations for the last decade.5 Based on a series of constitutional amendments enacted in the last few years, ruling elites have worked to establish the veneer of a legal framework to facilitate a smooth transition of power, despite claims by the opposition that the amendments are illegitimate. For potential presidential candidates not from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), Egyptian

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law sets a high bar for establishing eligibility to run. For example, amended Article 76 states that for any candidate to run for president, he or she has to gain the approval of 250 members of elected assemblies and municipalities, including, among other signatures, 25 members of the Shura Council (upper house), which is almost entirely composed of pro-ruling party members. In addition, a candidate representing a political party must be a member of the party‘s respective higher board for at least one year. Parties that have had at least one member in either house of parliament since May 1, 2007, are eligible to nominate a candidate for the presidency until 2017. Finally, all parties that nominate a candidate must have been legally operating for at least five consecutive years before the starting date of candidature. The next presidential election is scheduled for the fall of 2011. Gamal Mubarak, the president‘s 46-year-old son, is, according to most experts, the overwhelming favorite to follow his father. The younger Mubarak has had a meteoric rise to the highest levels of the NDP, suggesting to many observers that his accession to the presidency may be imminent. Gamal Mubarak is already deputy/assistant secretary general of the NDP party, and was appointed to the NDP ‘s new 50- member Supreme Council, which will choose the party‘s presidential candidate. In the summer of 2009, the Coptic Pope Shenouda III wholeheartedly endorsed Gamal Mubarak stating, ―I wish and pray for God to prolong Hosni Mubarak‘s life, but the presidency issue has got nothing to do with succession.... Most Egyptians love Gamal Mubarak and they will vote for him ahead of any other candidate running against him in elections—that is if they find anyone to run against him.‖6 During President Mubarak‘s visit to the United States in August 2009, he stated in an interview that ―We have never discussed it. Nobody knows who will succeed—we have elections. When the time comes for elections, the people will vote.‖7 Should the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt‘s only organized opposition movement, choose to oppose an NDP candidate, the group would need to field an independent candidate. The Brotherhood is an illegal organization and is not recognized as a political party. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that it can obtain the necessary signatures of standing politicians, most of whom are NDP members.8 Unless a new figure comes to light in the next two years, analysts have speculated that the only other viable candidate for the presidency is Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman. However, at age 73, it is unlikely that Suleiman, should he become president, would rule for a long period of time. Furthermore, as head of Egypt‘s General Intelligence Service (GIS), Suleiman would need to retire from military service since active-duty military officers

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are not allowed membership in political parties. In addition, if Suleiman desired party sponsorship, he would need to be a member of a party‘s supreme council for at least one year before the election. Suleiman is currently engaged in a number of sensitive diplomatic operations and is one of President Mubarak‘s closest confidants, making his departure from military service unlikely. Among the various transition scenarios posited, observers suggest the following would appear to be the most credible: 

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

In 2011, Gamal Mubarak represents the NDP against a token opposition figure. Omar Suleiman is retained as intelligence chief and continues to manage sensitive foreign affairs issues and internal security. Others have speculated that this scenario is likely several years after 2011, noting that President Mubarak could stand for reelection in 2011. An Egyptian military officer carries out a soft coup, in which constitutional proceedings are set aside and civilian elites quietly acquiesce to the military‘s reassertion of power. According to Michele Dunne, an expert on Egypt at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ―Some Egyptian observers believe that the military will intervene and put one of its own into the presidency instead of Gamal, perhaps with support from members of the NDP old guard. As there are no military officers in the Supreme Council, such a course would require setting aside or twisting the elaborate legal and constitutional framework developed in the last two years, which seems unlikely under present circumstances but remains possible.‖9

If President Mubarak becomes incapacitated or dies in office, Article 84 of the Constitution states: In case vacancy of the Presidential office or the permanent disability of the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the People‘s Assembly shall temporarily assume the Presidency; and, if at that time, the People‘s Assembly is already dissolved, the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall take over the Presidency, provided, however, that neither shall nominate himself for the Presidency, subject to abidance by the ban stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 82. The People‘s Assembly shall then proclaim the vacancy of the office of President. The President of the Republic shall be chosen within a maximum period of 60 days from the day the Presidential office becomes vacant.

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Some analysts fear that a less-than-smooth transition of power could open the door for the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize its supporters and demand an Islamist government. If such a situation were to occur, many observers wonder whether the military and security establishment would remain in their barracks or reenter politics to establish order. Recent unrest in Iran following its disputed election has raised concern that similar unrest could take place in Egypt. Others assessments have been less dramatic, as many experts believe that the Egyptian political system is stable and that the chances of popular revolution or military counter-coup are remote. Egyptians themselves have admitted that widespread popular apathy and disenchantment with politics overall are some of the steepest obstacles for reformers to overcome.

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Egypt and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Overview Although Egypt‘s regional prominence has gradually declined over decades, it still plays a vital role assisting the United States government in navigating the complexities of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, intraPalestinian politics, and the overall quest for Middle East peace. Egypt has continually sought a more active U.S. role in peacemaking and, like most Arab countries, has criticized U.S. support for Israel as ―unbalanced.‖ Nevertheless, Egypt and Israel have maintained their 1979 peace treaty obligations and, although their relations remain cool, have conducted a dialogue on issues of mutual concern, such as isolating Hamas. Egypt is a firm supporter of the Palestinian Authority (PA) government in the West Bank and has unsuccessfully tried for months to secure a Palestinian unity government which could reestablish a PA presence in Gaza. Most importantly, Egypt would like to keep Hamas contained. The secular Mubarak regime is opposed to Islamists wielding real political power, and it fears that Hamas could serve as a model for Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activists who may seek to establish an Iranian-style theocracy in Egypt. In addition, Egypt seeks to maintain a mostly sealed border with Gaza in order to keep Palestinian civilians from entering the Sinai peninsula in large numbers, as they did during a January 2008 border breach. According to one Palestinian commentator, ―For Egypt, the issue of Hamas is not just about politics and their relationship with the Muslim Brothers. It is also about security and elationship with Sinai Bedouins. Cairo fears the prospect of Hamas sleeper cells in Sinai being activated to carry out anti-Israeli attacks.‖10

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For several years, General Omar Suleiman has spearheaded Egypt‘s regional diplomatic efforts. Suleiman has close contacts with high-level Israeli and Palestinian officials, including Hamas leaders, and is generally well regarded in U.S. policymaking circles and Congress. In June 2008, Suleiman was instrumental in brokering an unofficial ―cease-fire‖ between Israel and Hamas. The United States supported Egypt‘s role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas, which, as a U.S.- designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), is sanctioned by the U.S. government.

Current Egyptian Mediation Efforts Egyptian diplomacy between rival Palestinian factions and Israel and Hamas is focused on achieving a Palestinian unity government and a prisoner exchange11/long-term Israeli-Hamas cease-fire. When taken together and if successful, these conditions would, in Egypt‘s view, lay the necessary foundation for all sides to begin final-status negotiations for a permanent settlement to the conflict. However, while Egyptian officials have conducted multiple rounds of talks and shuttle diplomacy, their efforts have borne little fruit, as there have been no major breakthroughs in the Israel-Hamas and Hamas-Fatah talks. Hamas has reportedly demanded that any prisoner exchange deal for captured Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit involve the return of an estimated 450 Palestinian prisoners, including several high-profile leaders such as Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, who was just elected to the Palestinian faction‘s Central Committee.12 Egyptian-mediated Palestinian unity talks are stalled over differing views on how to integrate PA and Hamas security operations, when and how to conduct Palestinian presidential and legislative elections, and whom to appoint to government positions. Both sides have had difficulty in discussing the critical issues at play, as they instead have focused on consolidating their power in the territories they respectively control. The Smuggling Tunnels Though it has persisted for decades, smuggling via a network of underground tunnels beneath the 8-mile Egypt-Gaza border has become widespread due to Israel‘s total blockade of Gaza, Hamas‘s demand for weapons, and the lack of viable economic alternatives to black-market activity on both sides of the border. Over the last three years, arms smuggling has increased dramatically due to intra-Palestinian fighting and Israeli-Palestinian violence. At the same time, the demand for commercial items inside Gaza has skyrocketed due to the international aid boycott of the Palestinian

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Authoritythat followed the formation of a Hamas-led government in 2006 and Israel‘s closure of the Gaza Strip following Hamas‘s 2007 Gaza takeover. One goal of Israel‘s 2008-2009 war in Gaza was to destroy as many underground tunnels as possible. Although Israeli military officials estimate that repeated aerial bombardments destroyed hundreds of tunnels, numerous reports indicate that smuggling activity has resumed. Experts note that a number of systemic factors contribute to the ongoing smuggling trade between Egypt and Gaza, including: 

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



the prevalence of smuggling amongst Egyptian Bedouins in the Sinai Peninsula. The Bedouin community is largely self-governed and partially dependent on smuggling goods, people, drugs, and arms for its livelihood. Aside from the tourist industry, the Egyptian government has invested little in Bedouin areas. Furthermore, the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty limits the number of Egyptian army and police forces who can patrol parts of the Sinai, making it difficult to enforce the rule of law there. the ease of tunnel construction. According to numerous media reports, tunnels are financed by tightly knit Palestinian and Bedouin clans on both sides of the border for $30,000-$ 120,000 each, depending on a tunnel‘s length and depth.13 The equipment needed to build a successful tunnel (electric generators, cable, telephone wire, pipes, plastic containers) is widely available, and labor costs are cheap. Once built, a tunnel can recoup its owner‘s investment in just a few months, and Hamas allegedly taxes proceeds from the sale of smuggled goods, giving the group a vested interest in the enterprise.14 the lack of security forces on both sides of the border with the political will to halt smuggling. On the Gaza side of the border, there is no non-Hamas entity capable and/or willing to stop smuggling. In fact, authorities there encourage and, as previously mentioned, even tax the trade. On the Egypt side, a 750-man Egyptian Border Guard Force (BGF) was deployed along the border following Israel‘s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.15 Over the last two years, Israel has questioned Egypt‘s political will to stop arms smuggling, though in recent months Israel has refrained from its previous public criticisms. In August 2008, Israeli defense officials acknowledged that they had received information from IDF military intelligence that Egypt was making an extra effort to curb the flow of weaponry and explosives into Gaza.16 Although Egypt may be more diligent in halting

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weaponssmuggling, others allege that BGF troops look the other way when it comes to smuggling items other than guns and ammunition. According to one tunnel owner, ―There‘s too many people interested in keeping the tunnels open. There‘s too much money to be made.‖17 In July 2009, two Egyptian policemen were arrested for accepting a $5,000 bribe to smuggle a Palestinian family cross into Egypt via the Rafah border crossing.18

U.S. Border Monitoring and Tunnel Detection Assistance In late 2007, the Bush Administration and the Egyptian government agreed to set aside $23 million of Egypt‘s FY2009 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) toward the procurement of more advanced detection equipment, such as censors, surveillance cameras, remote-controlled robotic devices, seismicacoustic tunnel detection equipment, and the computers to process seismic data.19 On June 16, 2008, U.S. Embassy in Cairo Spokesman Robert Greenan said that a U.S. Defense Department team had begun training Egyptian forces in using electronic equipment, including instruments that measure ground fluctuations, to detect smuggling tunnels.20 In FY2009, Congress provided Egypt with $50 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) aid for the purchase of Backscatter x-ray machines to be used at the Rafah border crossing. Reports indicate that U.S. assistance to the BGF in Rafah is somewhat deterring smuggling activity. According to one Gaza tunnel owner, ―The Egyptians have deployed everywhere on the other side and they have set up cameras. We haven't been able to bring anything.‖21 According to another smuggler, ―The Egyptians are closing the tunnels because the Jews and the Americans are putting pressure on them.... The situation now is dangerous.‖22 In another report, a smuggler stated, ―We know the Egyptian police established checkpoints to stop shipments coming to the tunnel areas.... They ambushed trucks at tunnel shafts and they confiscated the goods before they bombed the tunnel.‖23 Reportedly, Egyptian forces also are pumping water into tunnels to cause them to collapse, while Hamas has accused Egypt of using gas to suffocate smugglers. Israeli security officials suggest that Egyptian efforts have stymied some arms smuggling, but Hamas weapons trafficking continues. According to Israeli Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin, ―The situation is better than before, but the Gaza Strip has still not been hermetically sealed to smuggling.‖

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The Economy and U.S-Egyptian Trade and Investment By far, the biggest challenge facing Egypt today is its ability to remain competitive in the global economy and build a 21st-century workforce. The obstacles to meeting these goals are familiar to many observers and other developing nations: high poverty levels,24 an inadequate and overstressed education system, inadequate housing and decaying infrastructure, and pervasive corruption, among other problems. In 2009, Egypt was ranked 111 out of 180 countries on Transparency International‘s Global Corruption Perception Index.25 Egyptians themselves understand their challenges, and an economic ―dream team‖26 of well-regarded economists and businessmen has been spearheading an economic reform program that, together with high global high oil prices, achieved successive years of strong growth between 2005 and 2009. Economic growth in Egypt rests on the government‘s ability to stimulate the private sector. The state can no longer guarantee employment for every young Egyptian, particularly the hundreds of thousands of college graduates entering the labor market each year. In recent years, the state has reinvigorated its privatization program by divesting shares in the state-dominated banking and insurance sectors. Additionally, the government removed import service fees and surcharges and reduced the average weighted rate for tariffs. The government also streamlined the tax system, canceled many customs duties, and forced smaller banks to merge with the country‘s four largest banks. Nevertheless, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce 2009 Country Commercial Guide for Egypt, ―Although the reformers have developed considerable momentum, red tape remains a business impediment in Egypt, including a multiplicity of regulations and regulatory agencies, delays in clearing goods through customs, arbitrary decision-making, high market entry transaction costs, and a generally unresponsive commercial court system.‖27 Egypt‘s economy has somewhat recovered from the recent global recession and, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, GDP growth in 2010 could be slightly higher than 5%. Income inequality is a major source of concern for both foreign observers and Egyptians themselves. Although agriculture accounts for a smaller percentage of GDP than in years past, nearly 30% of all workers are small farmers. There is a pervasive public perception that most middle- and lower- class Egyptians have not benefitted from recent years of strong macroeconomic growth. Egypt is the world‘s largest importer of wheat, and recent high food prices angered the general public and drained the government‘s coffers.28 In order to ease public pressure, the government

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has raised public-sector wages, launched a stimulus plan, and expanded subsidy benefits for millions of citizens, though all these policies have added to Egypt‘s national debt. According to official figures, the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP will rise to 8.4% in 2010, up from 6.9% in 2009.

U.S.-Egyptian Trade The United States is Egypt‘s largest bilateral trading partner, while Egypt is the United States‘ 48th-largest trading partner. Egypt is one of the largest single markets worldwide for American wheat and is a significant importer of other agricultural commodities, machinery, and equipment. The United States also is the second-largest foreign investor in Egypt ($8.8 billion in 2008), primarily in the oil and gas sector.29 Since the mid-1990s, Egyptian officials have sought to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, claiming that an Egyptian- American FTA could boost Egypt‘s economy by as much as 3%. As a first step, the two parties signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 1999. The TIFA established a Council on Trade and Investment (TIFA Council) composed of representatives of both governments and chaired by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and Egypt‘s Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade. Intellectual property rights (IPR) protection was a contentious issue in pre-FTA negotiations held under the TIFA. In 2008, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) moved Egypt to its Watch List (from Special 301 Priority Watch List), reflecting improvements in its enforcement of intellectual property rights. In the past, Egypt had been cited by U.S. trade officials for lax IPR enforcement and issuance of market approvals for unauthorized pharmaceutical products. In May 2009, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk and Egyptian Minister of Trade and Industry Rachid Mohammed Rachid signed a U.S.-Egyptian Plan for a Strategic Partnership, which aims to further promote economic cooperation between the United States and Egypt. According to Minister Rachid, ―We want to double trade (with the United States) in the next four years.‖ As part of their announcement, both sides agreed to add two more Qualifying Industrial Zones in Upper Egypt (in Beni Suief and Al Minya). Qualified Industrial Zones In 1996, Congress authorized the creation of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) in order to entitle goods jointly produced by Israel and either Jordan or Egypt to enter the United States duty free. In December 2004, Egypt finally reached an agreement with Israel to designate several QIZs in Egypt under the

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mandate of the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Agreement. Goods produced in Egyptian QIZs allow Egyptian-made products to be exported to the United States duty-free if the products contain at least 10.5% input from Israel. Egypt would like to see this percentage reduced to around 8%, which is the case with the U.S.-Jordanian-Israeli QIZ agreement. Most products exported from Egyptian QIZs are textiles. According to the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, exports to the United States from Egypt‘s 15 QIZs rose to $744.7 million in 2008 up from $288.6 million in 2005, and products manufactured in QIZs now account for one-third of Egyptian exports.30 In 2009, the United States designated two areas in Upper Egypt as potential QIZs (Beni Suief and Al Minya).

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Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Women’s Rights As a major recipient of U.S. assistance, Egypt has been of great interest to lawmakers, some of whom believe that portions of U.S. aid should be conditioned on improvements in Egypt‘s human rights record. According to the U.S. State Department‘s 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, ―the government‘s respect for human rights remained poor, and serious abuses continued in many areas.‖ The 2009 report, as in past years, documents several instances of torture allegedly carried out by Egyptian security forces. The prison system, particularly detention facilities used for incarcerating suspected Islamist radicals, has come under international scrutiny for exacerbating militancy in the region due to its tendency to harden some criminals who have been tortured over prolonged periods of time. Several of Al Qaeda‘s leaders, including second-incommand Ayman al Zawahiri, are former prisoners in Egyptian jails. On the positive side, the 2009 report did mention that the government had taken some steps forward in specific areas, stating: The government promulgated procedures for members of unrecognized religions, including the Baha'i faith, to obtain national identification documents and reportedly issued 17 such documents and 70 birth certificates to Baha'i during the year. The government also permitted the newly formed Real Estate Tax Collectors Union, the country‘s only independent labor union, to operate. For the first time in the country‘s history, a UN special rapporteur and an independent expert visited at the government‘s invitation.31

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Table 1. U.S.-Egyptian Trade: 2006-2009

U.S. Exports to Egypt U.S. Imports from Egypt Balance

2006 4,132.7 2,395.8 1,736.9

2007 5,346.8 2,376.7 2,970.1

2008 6,030.0 2,370.0 3,660.0

2009 5,257.5 2,057.7 3,199.8

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Source: TradeStats ExpressTM - National Trade Data. Notes: Based on data collected by the Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau.

Religious Freedom In its 2009 report on religious freedom in Egypt, the U.S. State Department concludes that ―the status of respect for religious freedom by the Government declined somewhat during the reporting period, based on the failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of increased incidents of sectarian violence.... The Government continued to sponsor ‗reconciliation sessions‘ following sectarian attacks, which generally obviated the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against Copts and precluded their recourse to the judicial system for restitution. This practice contributed to a climate of impunity that encouraged further assaults.‖ Although the Egyptian constitution provides for equal rights without regard to religion, in practice, discrimination against Copts, Baha‘is, and other small religious communities persists at the both the official and societal levels. In Egypt, certain residual issues can trigger outbursts of sectarian violence. These include: 



Land disputes. Conflicts over land ownership have triggered a number of violent incidents involving members of different religious sects, particularly in rural Upper Egypt. Religious conversions. The conversion of Copts to Islam, as well as the marriage of Coptic women to Muslim men, has been a constant irritant in Muslim-Coptic relations. Converts to Christianity in Egypt also may face bureaucratic obstacles in registering their new religious status with the government. There also is the issue of forced conversions. While the 2008 State Department report states that there were no reports of forced religious conversion carried out by the government, there were (as in past years) reports of forced conversions of Coptic women and girls to Islam by Muslim men, in some cases allegedly involving kidnapping, rape, and forced marriage.

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

The State Department notes that these reports are disputed and often include inflammatory allegations and categorical denials. Church repair and construction. Copts have consistently complained of excessive bureaucracy when repairing or building churches. For example, the 10 articles of ―Humayun,‖ or the Humayun Code, a portion of Ottoman legislation from 1856, still controls the building or repair of churches in Egypt and is a source of great aggravation to Coptic Christians. Under this law, a license is required to erect a church. In addition, there are 10 restricting conditions for the construction of churches, including a minimum distance between churches and between a church and the nearest mosque, as well as the absence of objection on the part of Muslim neighbors. In December 2004, President Mubarak issued a new decree that devolved church repair and reconstruction decisions to the provincial level and stipulated that churches would be permitted to proceed with rebuilding and repair without legal hindrance. However, permits for construction of new churches require a presidential decree.

Typically, after an outbreak of Coptic-Muslim violence, both the government and the Coptic Orthodox Church rapidly respond to ease communal tensions. However, more often than not, the Egyptian government only acts to redress the immediate causes of violence rather than the underlying symptoms. Despite being nearly 10% of Egypt‘s population of 81 million, Copts are not widely represented at the highest levels of Egyptian institutions. There are few, if any, Christians serving as governors, police commissioners, city mayors, public university presidents, or deans. Christians hold less than 2% of the seats in the People‘s Assembly and Shura Council. There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services and armed forces. Public funds compensate Muslim imams but not Christian clergy. There have been reports of periodic discrimination against small minority communities of Baha‘is (an estimated 2,000 Baha‘is live in Egypt). However, in January 2008, an Egyptian court ruled that Baha‘is may obtain state documents if they omit listing their faith on their identification cards, a move that repudiates the Muslim religious establishment‘s longtime refusal to recognize the Baha‘i faith. In March 2009, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court‘s ruling and allowed followers of the Bahai faith to obtain ID cards without falsely listing their faith as one of the only three recognized by the state. According to Hossam Bahgat, director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, ―It is a significant development in our legal

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history as a nation.... It is the first legal institution to sanction, or even accommodate, the idea that you can be Egyptian and follow a religion outside the three recognized ones.‖32 In 2009, the United States Commission on Religious Freedom placed Egypt on its watch list due to ―serious problems of discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations against members of religious minorities, as well as non-conforming Muslims, [which] remain widespread in Egypt.‖

Women’s Rights Although Egyptian women played major roles in the country‘s drive for independence and many women currently serve in prestigious public posts, women face a number of obstacles at the legal, religious, and cultural levels. As in many parts of the Arab world, women are underrepresented in official leadership positions. Personal status laws governing marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance discriminate against women. Domestic violence also is a major issue, as some estimate that as many as one-third of all married Egyptian women have faced some form of physical abuse.33 In recent years, new non-governmental organizations have started to provide services and counseling to women who may be too afraid to go to the authorities. Sexual harassment also is a daily challenge for many women. According to a 2008 study released by the Egyptian Center for Women‘s Rights (ECWR), 62% of Egyptian men admit to sexually harassing women and 83% of Egyptian women reported being harassed.34 Female genital mutilation (FGM) remains a serious problem because of widespread cultural acceptance, despite the government‘s attempts to eliminate the practice. Quota for Women in Parliament In the spring of 2009, parliament passed a new law35, which expanded the seats in the People‘s Assembly (lower house) from 454 to 51836, with all of the 64 new seats reserved for women. Over the last 20 years, female representation in the People‘s Assembly has noticeably declined. Women claimed nine of 454 seats in the 2005 legislative election. Only four women were elected, with the remaining appointed by President Mubarak. The quota will be in effect for parliamentary elections scheduled in 2010 and 2015 but will expire thereafter. Under the new law, women candidates may vie for quota seats or general seats. The opposition has criticized the new quota, asserting that it will only expand the ruling NDP party‘s hold on political life since women with connections to the ruling party will receive the most

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resources and support. The new quota will be applied only in the lower house and not in the Shura Council or upper house.

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GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has officially been a republic, and its political system has developed some aspects of a democracy, though most observers continue to describe Egypt as an authoritarian regime dominated by a strong president, who draws his support from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and the military. Under the 1971 constitution, authority is vested in an elected president who must stand for reelection every six years.37 The president appoints the cabinet, which generally drafts and submits legislation to the legislature, the People‘s Assembly (lower house) and the Shura Council (upper house). The People‘s Assembly debates legislation proposed by government ministries and calls for amendments to government-sponsored bills but rarely initiates its own bills. The Shura Council has modest legislative powers and must ratify treaties and constitutional amendments. Overall, analysts consider Egypt‘s legislative branch to be weak; the ruling party constitutes an overwhelming majority. Based on low voter turnout in recent elections, there is a clear lack of public confidence in the parliament.

EGYPT AT A GLANCE Population: 78.8 million (July 2009 est.) GDP per Capita (PPP): $6,000 (2009) Religions: 90% Sunni Muslim, 9% Coptic Christian Literacy Rate (over age 15) : 71% (83% of males, 59% of females, 2005 est.) Unemployment Rate: 9.7% (2009 est.) Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 2010.

In the People‘s Assembly, 508 members are elected and 10 are appointed by the president; 176 members of the Shura Council are elected and 88 are appointed. 38 People‘s Assembly members are elected for five-year terms, and Shura Council members for six-year terms (one-half the Council members are elected every three years). The NDP controls 324 seats in the Assembly, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated members hold 88 seats, and the remaining seats

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are held by a mix of independents and secular opposition parties. NDP members won 84 of the 88 seats contested in the June 2007 Shura Council election. Religious parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are officially banned.

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The Role of the Military in Egyptian Society Although military officers no longer play a direct role in the affairs of the civilian-run government, the military remains the preeminent institution in society, and has been called on by successive governments to maintain internal security and regime stability.39 The military also provides employment and social services for hundreds of thousands of young people in a country with annual double-digit unemployment rates. Military experts have often asserted that Egypt‘s armed forces are bloated and maintain manpower at unnecessary levels for peacetime, while others contend that the large size of the military is justified by the services it provides to soldiers and their families. Some experts estimate that the military trains 12% of young Egyptian males and that defense industries employ over 100,000 people.40 The military has its own companies that produce consumer products, pharmaceuticals, and manufactured goods. The officer corps also benefit from higher salaries, better housing, and highquality health care, which help ensure their loyalty to the government. Some members of the opposition have criticized these special benefits and the military‘s fiscal autonomy, asserting that there is little civilian control over the military‘s budget.

The National Democratic Party (NDP)41 As the ruling party, the NDP dominates the political scene in Egypt, controlling well over 80% of the seats in parliament. The party itself is more of a coalition of business and political elites than a coherent and disciplined organization with a unifying ideology. In the 2000 parliamentary election, popular dissatisfaction with the status quo led to the defeat of many NDP incumbents, though the party maintained its super-majority in parliament after a number of ―independents‖ who had been NDP members rejoined the party. Thereafter, NDP officials embarked on a campaign to improve the party‘s public image, holding the first party congress in 10 years in 2002. Since then,

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the NDP has held conferences in each successive year, touting a number of political reforms under the slogan of ―new thinking.‖ More importantly, the president‘s son, Gamal Mubarak, was appointed to the NDP‘s higher policy council, and other young figures have become more visible in the party.

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The Judiciary Many Egyptian reformers and democracy activists believe the judicial branch of government offers the best hope for instituting checks and balances against executive authority. Despite the fact that judicial independence is enshrined in the Constitution, the Egyptian state has a long history of attempting to coerce judges.42 Created in 1969 by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Supreme Judicial Council attends to matters of appointment, promotion, and transfer of judges. Nevertheless, in general, the civilian court system is well regarded and operates independently of the executive branch. However, there is an entire parallel justice system to deal with security- related and highprofile political cases. The State Security Emergency Courts try cases in which the defendant has been accused of violating the 1981 emergency law, which, among other things, prohibits gatherings of more than five people and limits speech and association.43 Since 1992, military courts have tried civilians for terrorism and other security-related offenses. Under the emergency law, the government can hold an individual for up to 30 days without charge. On May 26, 2008, parliament approved a two-year extension of the emergency laws, which have been in place since Sadat‘s assassination in 1981. During his 2005 election campaign, President Mubarak pledged to introduce a number of reforms, including the elimination of the emergency laws which have been used to quell political dissent by holding people without charge for long periods and referring civilians to military courts, where they have fewer rights. Some judges spoke openly about election abuses allegedly committed by pro-government forces in 2005. The government responded by detaining several high-profile judges, sparking large-scale protests. Mahmoud Mekki and Hisham Bastawisi were stripped of their judicial immunity and detained after publicly charging electoral fraud during parliamentary elections in 2005. Bastawisi, who suffered a heart attack before his hearing, was warned that another offense would lead to his dismissal from the judiciary, while Mekki was cleared of all charges. According to Steven Cook, an Egypt expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, ―Egypt‘s judges had proved that they could in many ways act as the conscience of the Egyptian people, many of whom want

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a more open and democratic future. Without becoming partisan themselves or pouring into the streets as the lawyers of Pakistan regularly do, Egypt‘s judges can help shape Egypt‘s political future.‖44 Judicial oversight of elections is a major issue facing the judicial branch. Earlier versions of the Constitution required that ―balloting take place under the supervision of a judicial body.‖ In 2000, Egypt‘s Supreme Constitutional Court struck down the former election law because, according to experts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ―it did not provide for judicial oversight of each polling station and failed to give judges the necessary authority over balloting.‖45 Amended article 88 of the Constitution46 transfers the oversight of elections to a higher committee, which, although made up of some judges, removes most from direct oversight of balloting stations. According to the new chairman of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Judicial Council Adil Abd al Hamid, ―It is impossible to have a judge to monitor each ballot box, either in presidential, parliamentary or municipal elections.... The number of judges is not enough.... We can only allocate a judge to monitor the general polling station. Judges‘ participation in monitoring the election was at the expense of their judicial work.‖47

POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND CIVIL SOCIETY Over the past few years, political opposition in Egypt has broadened to include an array of groups, both secular and religious. However, despite a growing chorus of regime critics, particularly over the internet, the Muslim Brotherhood remains the only well-organized opposition movement in Egypt today. Nevertheless, labor strikes and spontaneous demonstrations organized by activist bloggers have received more international attention as of late, despite widespread political apathy and resignation that pervades Egyptian society. A handful of legal opposition parties, which must be approved by the government, serve as the token, official opposition to the NDP.48 Most experts regard Egypt‘s legal opposition parties as divided with limited popular support. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the principal opposition parties secured just 17 seats, despite widespread popular dissatisfaction with the ruling NDP. In 2005, these parties fared even worse, winning just 12 seats.

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The Muslim Brotherhood49 The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in Egypt in 1928 to turn Egypt away from secularism and toward an Islamic government based on sharia (religious) law and Muslim principles.50 The Muslim Brotherhood operates as a religious charitable and educational institution, having been banned as a political party in 1954; however, many Muslim Brotherhood members run for parliament as independents. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, 17 independent candidates regarded as Brotherhood sympathizers were elected. In 2005, Brotherhood-affiliated candidates won 88 seats in parliament. Over the years, the Egyptian government has alternated between tolerating and suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood, sometimes arresting and jailing its members, and other times allowing them to operate almost without hindrance. Many foreign observers agree that the organization has renounced the use of violence as a political tactic, while many Egyptian officials continue to perceive the Brotherhood as a threat and are unwilling to legalize the movement.51 In the United States, the issue of whether or not to recognize the Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate political actor continues to perplex policymakers, particularly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. On the one hand, there has been a general reluctance to push for Islamist inclusion in politics, out of concern that, once in power, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood will pursue policies counter to U.S. interests in the region or will transform states into theocracies like Iran.52 On the other hand, some experts believe that if Islamists were brought into a functional democratic system, then they would temper their rhetoric in order to appeal to a wider audience. According to U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey: The Muslim Brothers is a banned group in Egypt, and there are no direct relations with them. But we deal with political personalities through parliament. The day of President Obama‘s address, invitations were issued to independent personalities who could be from the Muslim Brothers and were elected through Parliament and recognized. But there is no direct dialogue between us and them. The channels are open, and it is possible to contact official personalities through parliament.53

Most analysts believe that, from an organizational standpoint, the Brotherhood is the only movement capable of mobilizing significant opposition to the government, though opinions vary on how much mass

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support the Brotherhood commands. As is typical for Islamist groups across the region, the Muslim Brotherhood is strongest among the professional middle class, controlling many of the professional syndicates (associations), including those representing engineers, doctors, lawyers and academics.54

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Civil Society in Egypt Although political opposition continues to be stymied, observers note that, over the past two decades, Egypt has developed a vibrant civil society, which some development experts hope will further democratization in the country. The term ―civil society‖ generally refers to the growing number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), charities, and advocacy groups that openly operate in Egyptian society. Many of these groups pursue so-called ―safe issues,‖ such as women‘s rights, economic development, and social equality, as a way to work toward the much broader goal of democratization. While others focus more directly on human rights, voter education, and election monitoring. Often times, the Egyptian government has created its own associations in order to boost its reform image at home and abroad, such as the government- sponsored National Council on Human Rights. Critics charge that such official associations have hampered the space in which independent civil society can operate, as well as the resources they can garner. In Egypt, NGOs are required to apply for legal status and, according to Association Law 84-2003, NGOs must be registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. There are an estimated 16,000 registered civic organizations in Egypt. In some cases, it may take years before the ministry rules on an application, and many groups are routinely rejected. Often, no response is given to the application, leaving an organization in legal limbo. If an NGOs application is rejected, it has few legal rights and can be shut down. Its members can be imprisoned. However, even registered NGOs must tread carefully when engaging in sensitive political issues, as some groups have been periodically closed or have had their legal status revoked. NGOs also must report all foreign donations to the Ministry of Social Affairs. Overall, tolerance for the activities of non-registered groups varies, and many NGOs operate without any legal protection.55 According to the U.S. State Department‘s 2008 Human Rights Report, Several leading human rights groups and civil society organizations continued to press legal challenges against government decisions that prohibit

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Jeremy M. Sharp them from registering under the NGO law. Although these organizations generally were allowed to conduct operations, albeit on a limited basis, they did so in technical violation of the NGO law with the omnipresent prospect of government interference and/or closure looming over them.56

In 2009, Egyptian lawmakers proposed new amendments to the NGO law to halt foreign funding to NGOs altogether. According to independent MP Mohamed El Omda, ―Funding is the new tool for neo-colonialism, both cultural and political.‖57 Though most observers expect the proposed amendments to fail, a complete ban on foreign funding to NGOs would deal a serious setback to U.S. government democracy-promotion efforts in Egypt, such as USAID democracy and governance programs and the State Department‘s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) small grants to Egyptian NGOs program. 58

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Organized Labor While reform-minded intellectuals and conservative Islamists have served as the backbone of political opposition in Egypt, a series of successful worker strikes in 2007 led some analysts to speculate that organized labor could become one of the most effective opposition movements in Egypt today. Low wages and rising inflation led to several strikes at mostly government-owned textile factories. One strike, at a textile factory in the Nile Delta town of Mahalla al Kubra, took the form of a week-long sit-in of an estimated 20,000 workers. Protestors not only demanded a wage hike, but expressed opposition to the government‘s economic liberalization strategy, fearing that privatization would lead to job cuts. According to Joel Benin, a professor at the American University in Cairo, ―It seems like the decision is to pacify the workers and give them what they want and crack down on the intellectuals and not give them anything.... The workers are more of a threat.‖ A report by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace speculated that recent strikes represented a departure from the tradition of workers holding sit-ins while work continued, because strikes were seen as hurting Egypt‘s national interest. This perception changed, however, as the reform process advanced. A new feature of the most recent strikes is that they are ending peacefully, whereas in the past they would be broken by police force. Some analysts have interpreted this as a sign of the increased societal

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tensions around economic reform, while others have seen it as a result of increased international scrutiny.59

Between 2008 and 2009, as inflation increased and average incomes stagnated, labor strikes have become widespread. According to Hamdi Abdelazim, an economist and former president of the Cairo-based Sadat Academy, ―The success of the labor actions in 2007 and 2008 encouraged workers to demonstrate and call strikes to realize longstanding demands.... Many people now see labor strikes as the only means of forcing the government to address their grievances.‖60 While Egyptian workers belong to a number of trade unions, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (also referred to as the General Confederation of Trade Unions) is the sole legally recognized labor federation. In April 2009, workers from the Real Estate Tax Authority (RETA), also known as the Real Estate Tax Collectors Union (RETCU), were recognized by the Ministry of the Labor Force as an independent union, a move that some international labor law experts are calling unprecedented in Egypt.

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U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT Overview Since 1979, Egypt has been the second-largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S. foreign assistance. In FY2009, Egypt was the fourth-largest aid recipient behind Israel, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, respectively. In the past decade, overall U.S. assistance to Egypt has declined from $2.1 billion in FY1 998 to $1.55 billion in FY20 10 owing to a gradual reduction in economic aid. In July 2007, the Bush Administration signed a 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Israel to increase U.S. military assistance from $2.4 billion in FY2008 to over $3 billion by 2018. Egypt received no corresponding increase in U.S. military aid; instead, the Bush Administration pledged to continue to provide Egypt with $1.3 billion in military aid annually, the same amount it has received annually since 1987. Unlike Israel and Jordan, the Bush Administration did not sign a bilateral MOU with the Egyptian government.61 Congress typically earmarks foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign operations appropriations bill.

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The Debate over U.S. Assistance to Egypt Although U.S. assistance has helped cement what many deem to be a successful 30-year Israel- Egypt peace treaty, as time has passed, critics of continued U.S. assistance to Egypt have grown more vocal in arguing that U.S. aid props up a repressive dictatorship and that, to the extent that any U.S. funds are provided, policymakers should channel them toward supporting opposition or civil society groups. Over the past five years, Congress has debated whether U.S. foreign aid to Egypt should be conditioned on, among other things, improvements in Egypt‘s human rights record, its progress on democratization and religious freedom, and its efforts to control the EgyptGaza border. Some Members believe that U.S. assistance to Egypt has not been effective in promoting political and economic reform and that foreign assistance agreements must be renegotiated to include benchmarks that Egypt must meet to continue to qualify for U.S. aid. Successive administrations, some lawmakers, and the Egyptian government assert that U.S. assistance to Egypt is symbolic of a strong strategic partnership which directly benefits U.S. national security interests. Proponents of strong bilateral ties argue that Egypt is key to maintaining a strong military presence in the oil-rich Persian Gulf and projecting power in south and central Asia. Reducing Egypt‘s aid, they argue, would undercut U.S. strategic interests in the region, including support for Middle East peace, U.S. naval access to the Suez Canal, and U.S.- Egyptian intelligence cooperation. U.S. military officials argue that continued U.S. military support to Egypt facilitates strong military-to-military ties. The U.S. Navy, which sends an average of a dozen ships through the Suez Canal per month, receives expedited processing for nuclear warships to pass through the Canal, a valued service that can normally take weeks otherwise required for other foreign navies. Egypt also provides over-flight rights to U.S. aircraft. In addition, some U.S. lawmakers argue that cutting aid, particularly military assistance, harms the United States since all of Egypt‘s FMF must be spent on American hardware and associated services and training.

Promoting Democracy in Egypt: Differing Perspectives Although funding for democracy promotion is not the only way to promote reform abroad, its use in Egypt has been a lightning rod of controversy over the last six years. The Egyptian government has staunchly opposed foreign support to independent civic groups that demand government accountability, as well as civic groups that have not received government

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approval. During the Bush Administration, policymakers and Members of Congress directed some amounts of Economic Support Funds toward USAID programming in the democracy and governance (D&G) sector and toward direct support to Egyptian NGOs. However, some experts note that only a small proportion of the D&G funds are spent on independent Egyptian groups and an even smaller proportion to groups that do not receive approval from the Egyptian government. The vast majority of USAID D&G assistance goes to Government of Egypt-approved consensual, government-to-government projects.62 Most importantly, in FY2005, Congress directed that ―democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval of the GoE [government of Egypt],‖ language which remained in annual foreign operations appropriations legislation until FY2009 (see below). 63 Egypt claims that U.S. assistance programs must be jointly negotiated and cannot be unilaterally dictated by the United States. P.L. 111-117, Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY20 10, contains general legislative language on the use of U.S. funds to NGOs, stating in section 7034: With respect to the provision of assistance for democracy, human rights and governance activities in this Act, the organizations implementing such assistance and the specific nature of that assistance shall not be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country.64

Between FY2004 and FY2009, USAID obligated approximately $206.4 million in economic assistance toward the D&G sector in Egypt. However, as overall ESF aid to Egypt has decreased, so too has U.S. democracy assistance. In FY2009, the Bush Administration unilaterally cut overall economic aid to Egypt by more than half, requesting $200 million in ESF. Therefore, because U.S. economic assistance is divided among several sectors (health, education, economic development, and democracy promotion), fewer funds were available in FY2009 for D&G aid ($20 million instead of previous appropriations of up to $50 million). The FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), provided the full $200 million request and then capped funds earmarked for democracy programs at $20 million. In the past, Congress had set a floor for democracy promotion funds rather than a ceiling. The law also did not include language found in earlier appropriations laws that stated, ―with respect to the provision of assistance for Egypt for democracy, human rights and governance activities, the organizations implementing such assistance and

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the specific nature of that assistance shall not be subject to the prior approval by the Government of Egypt.‖ P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY20 10, provided $25 million in economic aid for democracy promotion (or 10% of total economic aid) and restored previous language stating that ―not less than $25,000,000 shall be made available for democracy, human rights and governance programs‖ in Egypt. Some analysts believe the Obama Administration would like to ease tensions with the Egyptian government by de-emphasizing democracy assistance. Others assert that U.S. funding has been largely ineffective anyway and that assistance should be channeled into areas that make a more immediate impact on the daily lives of average Egyptians. According to Steven Cook at the Council on Foreign Relations:

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As surveys and focus groups consistently demonstrate, if people in the Arab world want anything from America, it‘s the kind of technical assistance that makes a tangible difference in their daily lives. And a healthier, wealthier and better-educated Egyptian population is more likely to start demanding personal and political freedoms—the kind of demands that may, someday, actually lead Egypt to democratize and sustain it when it does.65

In remarks with a group of visiting Egyptian democracy activists in May 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton remarked: Well, we always raise democracy and human rights. It is a core pillar of American foreign policy. And I think that there is a great awareness on the part of the Egyptian Government that with young people like this and with enhanced communications, it is in Egypt‘s interest to move more toward democracy and to exhibit more respect for human rights. And so we're going to continue to engage in that dialogue.... We've spent, as you know, many billions of dollars over the last years promoting NGOs, promoting democracy, good governance, rule of law. And I want to stress economic opportunity because out of economic opportunity comes confidence, comes a recognition that people can chart their own future.66

In October 2009, USAID ‘s Inspector General issued an audit of the agency‘s democracy and governance activities in Egypt. Among other findings, the audit concluded that:

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The impact of USAID/Egypt‘s democracy and governance activities has been limited based on the programs reviewed. In published reports, independent nongovernmental organizations ranked Egypt unfavorably in indexes of media freedom, corruption, civil liberties, political rights, and democracy. Egypt‘s ranking remained unchanged or declined for the past 2 years, and the impact of USAID/Egypt‘s democracy and governance programs was unnoticeable in indexes describing the country‘s democratic environment. The Government of Egypt signed a bilateral agreement to support democracy and governance activities (page 5), but it has shown reluctance to support many of USAID‘s democracy and governance programs and has impeded implementers‘ activities. Despite the spirit with which the U.S. Congress espoused the civil society direct grants program, the Government of Egypt‘s lack of cooperation hindered implementers‘ efforts to begin projects and activities through delays and cancellations.67

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Economic Aid The United States has significantly reduced economic aid to Egypt over the last decade. There are several reasons for the reduction in U.S. assistance. Overall, U.S. economic aid to Egypt has been trending downward due to a 10year agreement reached in the late 1990s known as the ―Glide Path Agreement.‖ In January 1998, Israeli officials negotiated with the United States to reduce economic aid and increase military aid over a 10-year period. A 3 to 2 ratio similar to total U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt was applied to the reduction in economic aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and $40 million reduction for Egypt), but Egypt did not receive an increase in military assistance. Thus, the United States reduced ESF aid to Egypt from $815 million in FY1998 to $411 million in FY2008.68 For FY2011, the Administration is requesting $250 million in ESF for Egypt, the same amount it has received since FY2009.

The Endowment With the expiration of the Glide Path agreement, the continued expansion of Egypt‘s economy, a growing desire for more U.S.-Egyptian trade, and a reluctance by Egypt to accept ―conditions‖ for U.S. aid, U.S. and Egyptian officials have expressed a desire to ―graduate‖ Egypt from U.S. bilateral economic assistance.69 However, neither the United States nor Egypt seem to agree on how aid should be reduced over the coming decade. Egypt would like

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to establish an endowment to jointly fund development projects.70 The Mubarak government argues that based on current aid levels, Egyptian debt repayments to the United States exceed U.S. foreign assistance.71 Some analysts believe that the proposed endowment, which reportedly would be matched by the Egyptian government on a dollar-for-dollar basis, would serve as a substitute for the annual appropriations process and shield Egypt from potential conditions mandated by Congress. For several years, there was limited U.S. interest in pursuing an aid endowment. However, S. 1434, the Senate version of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010, included a provision that would provide up to $200 million for an endowment to ―further the shared interests of the United States and Egypt.‖ After several failed attempts to form a new Egypt aid mechanism, Congress passed into law a new provision in P.L. 111-117 (section 7042) that called for the possible establishment of an endowment to ―further the shared interests‖ of the United States and Egypt. Congress specified that up to $50 million in economic aid may be set aside for an endowment, though lawmakers noted the process is in its early stages. Appropriators stated that ―the conferees recognize that discussions and negotiations on such an endowment will take time, and direct the Secretary of State to consult with the Committees on these efforts. Consultation should include explanation of the specific definition of shared interests, and how such interests would be furthered through an endowment. The conferees note that such funds are subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.‖

Military Aid The Administration has requested $1.3 billion in FMF for Egypt in FY20 1 1—the same amount it received in FY2010. FMF aid to Egypt is divided into three general categories: (1) acquisitions, (2) upgrades to existing equipment, and (3) follow-on support/maintenance contracts.72 According to U.S. and Egyptian defense officials, approximately 30% of annual FMF aid to Egypt is spent on new weapons systems, as Egypt‘s defense modernization plan is designed to gradually replace most of Egypt‘s older Soviet weaponry with U.S. equipment.73 That figure is expected to decline over the long term due to the rising costs associated with follow-on maintenance contracts. Egyptian military officials have repeatedly sought additional FMF funds to offset the

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escalating costs of follow-on support. They point out that as costs rise, static aid appropriations amount to a reduction in net assistance. U.S.-Egyptian co-production of the M1Al Abrams Battle tank is one of the cornerstones of U.S. military assistance to Egypt. A co-production program began in 1988. Egypt plans to acquire a total of 1,200 tanks. Under the terms of the program, a percentage of the tank‘s components are manufactured in Egypt at a facility on the outskirts of Cairo and the remaining parts are produced in the United States and then shipped to Egypt for final assembly. General Dynamics of Sterling Heights, MI, is the prime contractor for the program. Although there are no verifiable figures on total Egyptian military spending, it is estimated that U.S. military aid covers as much as 80% of the Defense Ministry‘s weapons procurement costs. Egypt also receives Excess Defense Articles (EDA) worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually from the Pentagon.74 Egyptian officers participate in the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program ($1.4 million requested for FY2011) in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term. IMET assistance makes Egypt eligible to purchase training at a reduced rate. Bright Star is a multinational training exercise co-hosted by the United States and Egypt that helps foster the interoperability of U.S. and Egyptian forces and provides specialized training opportunities for U.S. Central Command Forces (CENTCOM) in the Middle East. In addition to large amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt benefits from certain aid provisions that are available to only a few other countries. Since 2000, Egypt‘s FMF funds have been deposited in an interest bearing account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and have remained there until they are obligated. By law (P.L. 106-280), Congress must be notified if any of the interest accrued in this account is obligated. Most importantly, Egypt is allowed to set aside FMF funds for current year payments only, rather than set aside the full amount needed to meet the full cost of multi-year purchases. Cash flow financing allows Egypt to negotiate major arms purchases with U.S. defense suppliers.

Recent Arms Sales Notifications In FY2010, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of the following proposed arms sales to Egypt using FMF funds:

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







December 17—One Fast Missile Craft and related equipment, prime contractor is Vision Technology Halter-Marine of Gulfport, MS, estimated value: $240 million. December 17—Upgrades to 156 F- 110-GE-1 00 engines through the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and associated parts, prime contractor is General Electric Aviation of Cincinnati, OH, estimated total potential value: $750 million. December 17—20 RGM-84L/3 HARPOON Block II Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles, prime contractor is The Boeing Company in St. Louis, MO, estimated potential value: $145 million. December 14—450 AGM-1 14K3A HELLFIRE II missiles, prime contractor is HELLFIRE Limited LLC, estimated potential value: $51 million. October 9—24 F-1 6C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft and associated parts weapons and equipment, as well as other Non-MDE equipment and construction services. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company in Fort Worth, TX. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $3.2 billion.

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Table 2. Recent U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt ($ in millions) Fiscal Year 1948-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Request Total

Economic 23,288.6 815.0 775.0 727.3 695.0 655.0 911.0 571.6 530.7 490.0 450.0 411.6 250.0 250.0 250.0 30,820.8

Military 22,353.5 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,292.3 1,289.6 1,287.0 1,300.0 1,289.4 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 39,211.8

IMET 27.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.4 43.0

Total 45,669.4 2,116.0 2,076.0 2,028.3 1,996.0 1,956.0 2,212.2 1,865.3 1,821.5 1,778.2 1,751.3 1,702.2 1,551.3 1,551.9 1,551.4 70,075.6

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Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1946-1997 (millions of dollars) Year

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1946 1948 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1972

Military Military Loan Grant 9.6 — —

Total

1.4 0.1 1.2 12.9 4 66.3 33.3 1 0.6 44.8 65.9 73.5 200.5 146.7 95.5 97.6 27.6 12.6 1.5

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

I.M.E.T Misc. Economic Grant Grant — 9.3 Surplus 0.3 UNWRA — 1.4 Surplus — 0.1 Tech Asst — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

D.A. Loan —

D.A. Grant —

ESF Loan —

— — — — — 7.5 — — — — 15.4 — 20 36.3 — — — — 1.5

— — 0.4 12.9 3.3 35.3 2.6 0.7 0 2 5.7 2.3 2.2 2.3 1.4 2.3 1.5 0.8 —

— — — — — — — — — — — — 20 10 — — — — —

ESF P.L. 480 I P.L. 480 II Grant — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — 13.2 — — 33.9 36.6 48.6 114 78.5 85.2 84.9 16.4 — —

— — 0.8 — 0.7 23.5 17.5 0.3 0.6 8.9 8.2 22.6 44.3 19.6 8.9 10.4 9.7 11.8 —

946.

Table 3. (Continued)

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Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 TQ 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Total 0.8 21.3 370.1 464.3 552.5 907.8 943.2 2588.5 1167.3 1681.2 1967.3 2332 2470.8 2468.7 2539.1 2317 2174.9 2269.6 2397.4 2300.2 2235.1 2052.9 1868.6

Military Military Loan Grant — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1500 — — — 550 — 700 200 900 425 900 465 — 1175 — 1244.1 — 1300 — 1300 — 1300 — 1294.4 — 1300 — 1300 — 1300 — 1300

I.M.E.T Grant — — — — — — 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8 2.4 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.8 0.8

Misc. Economic Grant — — — — — — 0.1 Narc. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

D.A. Loan — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

D.A. Grant — — — 5.4 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1.5 — — — — —

ESF Loan — — 194.3 150 429 600 617.4 250 280 70 — — — — — — — — — — — — —

ESF P.L. 480 I P.L. 480 II Grant — — 0.8 8.5 9.5 3.3 58.5 104.5 12.8 102.8 201.7 4.4 107.8 14.6 1.1 99.2 196.8 11.7 133.3 179.7 12.5 585 230.7 22.4 585 285.3 16.1 759 272.5 28.9 771 262 31.9 750 238.3 16.8 852.9 237.5 13.7 1065.1 213.8 13.2 1069.2 217.5 6.6 819.7 191.7 3.9 717.8 153 2.6 815 150.5 1.2 898.4 203 — 780.8 165 52.5 892.9 40.4 — 747.0 — 4.1 561.6 35 6.2

946.

Table 3. (Continued) Year

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1995 1996 1997P Total

Military Military Total Loan Grant 2414.5 — 1300 2116.6 — 1300 2116 — 1300 45669.4 4550 17803.5

I.M.E.T Misc. Economic Grant Grant 1 — 1 — 1 — 27.3.0 11.2

D.A. Loan — — — 80.7

D.A. Grant 0.2 — — 82.8

ESF Loan — — — 2620.7

ESF P.L. 480 I P.L. 480 II Grant 1113.3 — — 815 — 0.6 815 — — 15923.8 4,114.3 455.1

Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. No U.S. aid programs for years 1947, 1949, 1950, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971. P.L. 480 II Grant for 1993 includes $2.1 million in Sec. 416 food donations. Q = Transition Quarter; change from June to September fiscal year * = less than $100,000 I.M.E.T. = International Military Education and Training UNRWA = United Nations Relief and Works Agency Surplus = Surplus Property Tech. Asst. = Technical Assistance Narc. = International Narcotics Control D. A. = Development Assistance ESF = Economic Support Funds P.L. 480 I = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I Loan P.L. 480 II = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title II Grant P = Preliminary

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APPENDIX. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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Egypt during the Colonial Era Egypt‘s relations with the West, including its current friendly relations with the United States, are colored by a long history of foreign intervention in Egyptian politics, which has made Egypt, along with other Arab states, wary of outside influences on their domestic affairs. In the 19th century, Egypt was a semi-autonomous province in the Ottoman Empire, which by then was in decline and being propped up by the British in order to serve as a buffer between it and Czarist Russia. At the time, Egypt was viewed as extremely valuable to the British and French empires and was prized for its agricultural output, large domestic market, and strategic location between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Most importantly, the British saw Egypt as vital to securing the sea route to its most prized colony, India. Ottoman weakness led its Sultans to grant Europeans certain legal protections and economic advantages in Egypt, which stifled the Egyptian economy by flooding it with European manufactured goods, driving local merchants out of business.75 Over time, Egypt developed a ―cash crop‖ economy based almost solely on the export of cotton, the price of which constantly fluctuated, leaving the economy vulnerable and dependent on good harvests. Without a strong, diverse economy, Egypt could not generate enough capital to fund its modernization, leading it to become even more financially dependent on the West, as it rulers borrowed huge sums from European banks. Six years after the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, Egypt was forced to sell all of its shares in the Suez Canal Company, which operated the Canal, in order to make payments on its foreign-owned debt. When Egypt could no longer pay its debts, the British and French became directly involved in Egyptian politics—a trend that would continue until the mid 20th century. 76

The Constitutional Monarchy and the British Britain unilaterally declared Egyptian independence in 1922, and for the next three decades, political power in Egypt was contested among three main actors: the British, the Egyptian monarchy, and the nationalist Wafd party, which was the driving force behind the Egyptian independence movement

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after World War I. Thousands of British troops remained stationed near the Suez Canal, and British officials served in the Egyptian ministries. Egypt‘s king could appoint a government and dismiss parliament, but ultimately relied on the British for support. The Wafd party dominated parliamentary elections during Egypt‘s experiment with parliamentary democracy (1922-1952), though the Wafd gradually began to lose popularity to more radical organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

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Nasser and Egypt during the Cold War By the early 1950s, anti-British sentiment in Egypt had sparked civil unrest, allowing a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, to oust the king in what is referred to as the July 1952 revolution. The Free Officer Movement ushered in an era of military involvement in Egyptian politics, as all of Egypt‘s presidents in the post-revolutionary period have been high-ranking officers. In the aftermath of the coup, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, the most charismatic of the Free Officers, succeeded in gaining total control over the government. Nasser abolished the monarchy and outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood (1954), which at the time was the only potential rival for power. Nasser would rule Egypt until his death in 1970. During the Nasser era, Egypt found itself at the center of superpower competition for influence in the Middle East. Wary of taking sides, Nasser managed, for a short period, to steer Egypt clear of either the Soviet or Western ―camp‖ and was instrumental in helping to establish the non-aligned movement. U.S.-Egyptian relations soured when Nasser turned to the Soviets and the Czechs in 1955 for military training and equipment after the West, frustrated by Nasser‘s repeated rejections and his support of Algerian independence against the French, refused to provide Egypt with defense assistance. A year later, following a U.S.-British decision to retract an offer of economic assistance and help for the construction of the Aswan Dam, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company to use its revenues to finance the dam project. (Egypt owned the Suez Canal, but the British-French company operated the Canal, and collected the revenues from which it paid a small rent to Egypt.) In October 1956, Israel, France, and Britain invaded Egypt—Israel to stop Palestinian guerrillas from using Egypt as a base for operations against Israel, and France and Britain to occupy the Canal. President Eisenhower persuaded the three countries to withdraw from Egypt in early 1957, which briefly improved U.S.-Egyptian relations.77

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After the 1956 Suez War, Nasser‘s popularity soared, as he came to embody Arab nationalism in the post-colonial era. Nasser did not hesitate to brandish his newfound authority and developed a muscular Egyptian foreign policy that attempted to destabilize pro-Western governments in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, support Palestinian guerrilla action against Israel, create a unified Arab state by merging briefly with Syria (the United Arab Republic 1958-1961), and intervene against the Saudi-backed royalists in the Yemeni civil war.78 However, Egypt‘s defeat at the hands of Israel in the June 1967 War and other setbacks temporarily deflated Nasser‘s popularity and crushed his ambitions to spread a pan-Arab ideology across the region. On the domestic front, Nasser turned Egypt into a socialist dictatorship with absolute power in the hands of the president. All banks and commercial firms were nationalized, large landowning estates were broken up into much smaller parcels and held in a state trust, and all political parties were banned. The precursor to the present National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed by Nasser in 1962 and was called the Arab Socialist Union. It served as the Egyptian republic‘s first mass party and an extension of the ruling elite. Other movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were forced to go underground, as Nasser arrested thousands of Brotherhood activists after a failed Brotherhood assassination attempt against him in 1954.79

Egypt-Israeli Peace After Nasser‘s death in 1970, Vice President Anwar Sadat, one of the original Free Officers, became president of Egypt. At the time, Egypt was humiliated by its defeat in the June 1967 War and the ensuing loss of the Sinai Peninsula to Israel. In addition, military rebuilding expenditures were absorbing nearly 25% of Egypt‘s gross domestic product. Under these circumstances, Sadat calculated that a military victory was needed to boost his own legitimacy and improve Egypt‘s position in any future negotiations with Israel. The October 1973 War, which initially took Israel by surprise, was costly for both sides, but succeeded in boosting Sadat‘s credibility with the Egyptian people, enabling him to embark on a path which would ultimately sever Egypt‘s ties to the Soviet Union and bring it closer to the West. In November 1973, Egypt and the United States restored diplomatic relations (which had been cut off in 1967), and in December, the two countries participated in the Geneva peace conference. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger‘s shuttle diplomacy led to Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian- Israeli

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disengagement agreements in 1974 and a second set of Egyptian-Israeli disengagements in 1975. The United States resumed economic aid to Egypt in 1975 after an eight-year hiatus.

The Camp David Agreement and 1979 Peace Treaty On November 20, 1977, President Sadat made his historic visit to Israel, where he addressed the Knesset (parliament). Sadat‘s visit was symbolic as he became the first Arab leader to visit Israel, thereby implicitly recognizing the Jewish state. Sadat believed that his initiative would jumpstart the Arab-Israeli peace process, which had stalled. In the late summer of 1978, Israeli and Egyptian leaders accepted an invitation from President Carter to attend talks at Camp David, MD, intended to save what had been a faltering peace process. After nearly two weeks of clandestine and exhausting negotiations, on September 17, 1978, Egypt and Israel, with the United States as a witness, signed two agreements, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. The first ―framework‖ called for an autonomous Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip following an Israeli withdrawal. The latter agreement ultimately led to the signing of the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Israel maintained that the two agreements were not linked, as it did not want to be obligated to grant self-determination to the Palestinians. On March 26, 1979, President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty,80 the first ever between Israel and an Arab country, in a ceremony at the White House. Three days later, the Arab League voted to expel Egypt from it ranks. At the time, the rest of the Arab world felt betrayed by Egypt for making a separate peace with Israel. The 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter Administration pledged to ―endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.‖81 In his letter to Egypt, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote that ―the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales.‖82 Ultimately, the United States provided a total of $7.3 billion to both parties in 1979. The Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-35)

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provided both military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, respectively, though this ratio was not enshrined in the treaty as Egypt would later claim. For Egypt, U.S. funds helped to subsidize its defense budget and upgrade its aging Soviet hardware. Egypt became the second-largest recipient of U.S. aid after 1979. The U.S. assistance program in Egypt also helped modernize the country‘s infrastructure, as U.S. economic assistance was used to build Cairo‘s sewer system, a telephone network, and thousands of schools and medical facilities. The United States also helped organize the peacekeeping mission along the Egyptian-Israeli border and the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO), and still maintains a rotating infantry task force as part of it.83

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Egypt under Mubarak Sadat‘s rule came to an abrupt end in 1981, when he was assassinated during a military parade in Cairo by soldiers who also belonged to the Jamaah Islamiyah (Islamic Group) and Al Jihad, the more radical offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hosni Mubarak, Sadat‘s vice president and former commander of the Egyptian Air Force, immediately ascended to the presidency and has remained in office to the present day. Under Mubarak, Egypt has continued to maintain good relations with the United States, as evident in Egypt‘s 1991 decision to join the allied coalition against Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm. The United States and Egypt began conducting bi-annual joint military training exercises in 1983. U.S. and Egyptian armed forces served together in Somalia in 1991, and were part of an international peacekeeping force in Bosnia in the mid 1990s. Egypt now assembles the ―Abrams‖ M-1 tank at a government facility near Cairo (some components are shipped from the United States and other components are manufactured in Egypt). Following the path laid out by Sadat, Egypt has remained at peace with Israel, although critics have characterized this as a ―cold peace.‖ Mubarak has made a number of attempts to serve as a broker for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. During the Mubarak era, conflict between Egyptian Islamists and the Egyptian authorities continued, culminating in a period (1992-1997) of violent confrontations between Islamic militants and Egyptian police. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the ensuing U.S. focus on promoting democracy in the Middle East, the Mubarak regime has come

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under increasing U.S. pressure to accelerate political reforms and make Egypt more democratic. In an effort to control the reform agenda without relinquishing their grip on power, Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) have instituted some political reforms, while emphasizing the need for economic growth as a precondition for democratic change.

Author Contact Information Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs [email protected], 7-8687

End Notes

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1

―Using Diplomatic Touch, an Outsider Challenges the Grip of Egypt‘s Ruling Party,‖ New York Times, February 27, 2010. 2 ―Egypt Tightens Gaza Barrier to Close Tunnels,‖ Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2010. 3 ―Jane‘s Defence Weekly, ―Egypt Erects Underground wall to Thwart Hamas Smugglers,‖ December 11, 2009. 4 ―Netanyahu ‗very encouraged‘ by Mubarak‘s Commitment to Peace Process,‖ Jerusalem Post, December 29, 2009. 5 In 2004, President Mubarak fainted during a speech before parliament generating rumors that his health was rapidly deteriorating. 6 ―Coptic Pope Likes President‘s Son, Los Angeles Times, July 29, 2009, Babylon & Beyond Blog. 7 ―‗I have Never Discussed Succession with my Son,‘ says Mubarak,‖ Daily News Egypt, August 18, 2009. 8 Article 76 states that signatures must come from ―250 elected members of the People‘s Assembly, the Shura Council and local popular councils on governorate level, provided that those shall include at least 65 members of the People‘s Assembly, 25 of the Shura Council and ten of every local council in at least 14 governorates.‖ 9 Michele Dunne , ―Egypt‘s National Democratic Party: The Search for Legitimacy,‖ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 16, 2007. 10 International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, Middle East Report #85, April 23, 2009. 11 Israel has been trying to secure the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier kidnapped by Hamas on June 25, 2006. 12 ―Israeli Source Confirms Progress on Shalit Deal, US Said Involved in Efforts,‖ Open Source Center, August 13, 2009, OSC Summary, Document ID#GMP20090813738007. 13 ―Gaza‘s Subterranean Resistance,‖ The National, January 22, 2009. 14 ―Hamas Making $20 million a Month from Gaza Smuggling Tunnels,‖ Ha 'aretz, August 31, 2008.

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15

When Israel unilaterally dismantled its settlements and withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, it negotiated a new security arrangement with Egypt to bolster efforts to secure the Egyptian side of Rafah. After extensive Israeli-Egyptian talks, Egypt deployed 750 border guards to secure the Philadelphi Route. The memorandum of understanding between Israel and Egypt delineated the type of equipment the Egyptians may use (small arms and jeeps, no heavy armor) and the length of the patrol area (14km on the ground and 3 km into the sea). 16 ―Intel Branches Split on Egypt‘s Role,‖ Jerusalem Post, August 5, 2008. 17 ―Gaza Smugglers Ready to Resume Work,‖ Associated Press, February 11, 2008. 18 ―Egypt Police Arrested Smuggling Gaza Family,‖ Daily News Egypt, July 14, 2009. 19 ―Egypt to Bolster Gaza Border,‖ Washington Post, January 7, 2008. 20 ―US trains Egypt Forces in Gaza Tunnel Detection,‖ Agence France Presse, June 16, 2008. 21 ―Gaza Smugglers Say Egypt Tightening Tunnel Trade,‖ Agence France Presse, February 8, 2009. 22 ―Israel: Rafah Tunnel Smugglers Say Business Down 60% After IDF Operation,‖ Jerusalem Post, February 6, 2009. 23 ―Egypt Puts the Bite on Gaza Tunnel Smugglers,‖ Reuters, April 28, 2009. 24 In Egypt, an estimated 20% of the country‘s 80 million citizens live in poverty (international estimates suggest that up to 40% of Egyptians live on less than $2 a day.) 25 See, http://www.transparency 26 The architects of Egypt‘s liberalization plan include Ministers of Finance Youssef BoutrosGhali, Minister of Investment, Mahmoud Mohieddin, and Foreign Trade and Industry Minister Rachid Mohamed Rachid. 27 U.S. Department of Commerce, Doing Business in Egypt: 2009 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies. 28 Bread is heavily subsidized in Egypt, with prices affordable to anyone, though in limited quantities. As food prices have increased, consumer demand for subsidized bread has risen. Many observers assert that the entire subsidy system is broken, as many governmentsubsidized bakeries conspire with corrupt bureaucrats and inspectors to sell their allotments to private bakeries. Larger families in need of more bread must turn to private distributors, whose prices skyrocketed in 2008, and shortages compelled President Mubarak to order the military to bake additional loaves. Between 2007 and 2008, an estimated 11 people died in bread lines either from heat exhaustion or stab wounds suffered in altercations for positions in line. In 1977, when the Egyptian government temporarily lifted its bread subsidy, 70 people were killed in rioting, and then President Sadat had to order the military to deploy to Cairo to restore order. For five days, the government lost control of its capital city. 29 The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Egypt was $7.5 billion in 2007 up from $6.5 billion in 2006. The Apache Oil Corporation is a major investor in Egypt‘s oil and gas sectors, and the single largest U.S. investor in Egypt. Other major American corporate investors include: American Express, AIG, American Standard, Bechtel, Bristol- Myers Squibb, Citibank, Coca-Cola, Commercial International Bank, Devon Energy, Energizer, ExxonMobil, Eveready, General Motors, GlaxoSmithKline, Guardian Industries, H.J. Heinz, Johnson and Johnson, Microsoft, Procter and Gamble, Pfizer, PepsiCo, Pioneer, and Xerox. Foreign investors in Egypt‘s energy sector must, by law, provide the Egypt General Petroleum Company a 15% stake in a local venture. Egypt‘s labor laws also restrict the foreign workforce composition of any one company operating in Egypt to 10%. 30 ―Peace Treaty‘s Trade Tensions a Trial ,‖ The National , March 26, 2009. 31 See, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm 32 ―Egyptians Win the Right to Drop Religion from ID Cards,‖ Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 2009. 33 Human Rights Watch, ―Divorced from Justice: Women‘s Unequal Access to Divorce in Egypt,‖ June 2004. Available online at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/egypt1204/. 34 ―In Egypt, Sexual Harassment Grows,‖ Christian Science Monitor, September 23, 2008.

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Between 1979 and the mid 1980s, there was a 30-seat quota for female parliamentarians in the People‘s Assembly. 36 Of the 518 total seats in the People‘s Assembly, 508 are elected and 10 appointed by the President. 37 In 1980, the Constitution was amended to allow the president to run for an unlimited number of terms, rather than one as was stipulated in the 1971 Constitution. An English language version of the Egyptian Constitution is available at http://www.parliament. gov.eg/EPA 38 One half of the elected members of the People‘s Assembly and the Shura Council must be farmers and laborers (Art. 87 and Art. 196 of the Constitution). 39 In 1986, President Mubarak called on the military to put down riots in Cairo, sparked by the protests of police conscripts who were angry about low pay and poor working conditions. The military also was deployed in 1977 during riots over a temporary reduction in food subsidies. 40 Imad Harb, ―The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?,‖ Middle East Journal, Washington, Spring 2003. vol. 57, Issue 2, p. 269. 41 The NDP‘s website is at http://www.ndp.org.eg/index_en.htm. 42 Article 65 of the Constitution states that ― The State shall be subject to law. The independence and immunity of the judiciary are two basic guarantees to safeguard rights and liberties.‖ 43 Sentences issued by the State Security Emergency Courts cannot be appealed except on procedural grounds, and are subject to ratification by the president, who can annul both convictions and acquittals. See, Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms, published jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), March 6, 2008. 44 Steven A. Cook, ―Adrift on the Nile: The Limits of the Opposition in Egypt,‖ Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009. 45 Nathan Brown, Michele Dunne, and Amr Hamzawy, Egypt’s Controversial Constitutional Amendments, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2007. 46 Article 88 states that ―balloting shall be conducted on one single day. An independent and impartial higher committee shall supervise elections in the manner regulated by the law. The law shall set out the functions, method of formation and guarantees for the committee, which shall have among its members current and former members of judicial bodies. This committee shall form general committees to supervise elections in constituencies as well as committees to administer the balloting process and vote tallying and sorting committees. The general committees shall be composed of members of judicial bodies and vote tallying and sorting shall be made under the supervision of the general committees in accordance with the rules and procedures stipulated by the law.‖ 47 BBC Monitoring Middle East, ―Egypt‘s New Chief Judge says Judiciary should Stay Away from Politics,‖ Egyptian Channel 1 TV’s live weekly program Viewpoint , July 13, 2009. 48 By law, political parties must be approved by the seven-member Political Parties Committee (PPC). Since 1977, the Committee has approved 19 political parties and rejected almost 50. The most recent party to obtain a license was the Democratic Front Party, made up of former NDP members, which was established in May 2007. 49 For more information, see CRS Report RL3 3486, U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 50 The Muslim Brotherhood is generally considered the parent organization of Brotherhood branches throughout the Middle East. Former Brotherhood members have formed a number of radical and extremist off-shoots, including Hamas. See Gilles Kippel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 151. 51 During the 1940s and early 1950s, the Brotherhood‘s paramilitary wing waged a guerrilla campaign against British rule and, after independence, against Nasser. 52 According to Essam al Arian, a leading figure in the movement, ―The Muslim Brotherhood does not recognize Israel and rejects the Camp David agreement.... If a popular referendum

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were held, we‘re sure the people would also reject it.‖ See, ―Egyptian Government, not People, Recognize Israel,‖ Inter Press Service, December 21, 2007. 53 Open Source Center, ―Interview With US Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey,‖ Cairo AlJumhuriyah in Arabic, June 27, 2009, Document ID# GMP20090627007001. 54 John Walsh, ―Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood,‖ Harvard International Review (Cambridge): Winter 2003, Vol. 24, Issue 4, p. 32. 55 Human Rights Watch, ―Margins of Repression: State Limits on Non-Governmental Organization Activism,‖ July 2005. Available online at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/07/04/egypt11217.htm. 56 U.S. State Department‘s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Egypt, 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, February 25, 2008. 57 ―Deputy Proposes Ban on Foreign Funding of Civil Society Organizations,‖ Daily News Egypt Online, February 23, 2009. 58 For a list of MEPI‘s Egyptian grantees, see http://www.medregion.mepi.state.gov/egypt.html 59 Sufyan Alissa, ―The Political Economy of Reform in Egypt: Understanding the Role of Institutions,‖ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Middle East Center, October 2007. 60 ―Egypt: Labor Strikes Point to Economic Pain,‖ Inter Press Service, March 16, 2009. 61 A year after the 2007 US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the United States will provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a five-year period. Under the terms their non-binding MOU, this first-of-its-kind deal commits the United States, subject to future Congressional appropriations and availability of funds, to providing Jordan with $360 million per year in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $300 million per year in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). 62 CRS conversation with Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director, Middle East Democracy and Development Project, Brookings Institution, September 1, 2009. 63 Congress sought to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt was being appropriately used to promote reform. In conference report (H.Rept. 108-792) language accompanying P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, conferees specified that ―democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval of the GoE [government of Egypt]. The managers intend this language to include NGOs and other segments of civil society that may not be registered with, or officially recognized by, the GoE. However, the managers understand that the GoE should be kept informed of funding provided pursuant to these activities.‖ 64 P.L. 111-117. The conference report accompanying the Act notes, ―The requirements of section 7034(m)(4) of this Act shall apply with respect to the provision of assistance to Egyptian NGOs.‖ 65 Steven A. Cook, ―Washington‘s Pyramid Scheme Spending Money on Democracy Promotion in Egypt only made Matters Worse. Here‘s how to Help,‖ Newsweek, June 1, 2009. 66 U.S. Department of State press release, ―Remarks With Visiting Egyptian Democracy Activists Before Their Meeting Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State,‖ May 28, 2009. 67 USAID, Audit of USAID/Egypt’s Democracy and Governance Activities (Audit Report No. 6263-10-001-P), October 27, 2009. 68 In FY2003, Egypt, along with Israel and several other regional governments, received supplemental assistance as part of the FY2003 Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11). It included $300 million in ESF for Egypt, which could have been used to cover the costs of up to $2 billion in loan guarantees. The loan guarantees were to be issued over three years. 69 CRS conversation with U.S. and Egyptian officials, January 9, 2008. 70 The Senate version of the FY2008 Foreign Operations bill (H.R. 2764), contained an amendment, entitled ―The United States-Egypt Friendship Endowment,‖ that would have

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provided up to $500 million in ESF to establish an endowment to ―further social, economic and political reforms in Egypt.‖ 71 Egypt‘s debt repayments to the United States, as of 2006, stood at an estimated $370 million a year, based on a total debt estimated at $4.2 billion. 72 According to U.S. defense officials, Egypt only allocates the minimum amount of FMF funds necessary for follow- on maintenance, resulting in inadequate support for weapon system sustainment. 73 According to a 2006 Government Accountability Office report, over the life of Egypt‘s FMF program, Egypt has purchased 36 Apache helicopters, 220 F-16 aircraft, 880 M1A1 tanks, and the accompanying training and maintenance to support these systems, among other items. See http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06437.pdf. 74 According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), past EDA sales and grant transfers have included two PERRY class and two KNOX frigates, numerous HAWK parts, mine rakes, helicopter spare parts, assorted armored vehicles (M60 tanks and M1 13 APCs) and various types of munitions. 75 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Egypt: A Country Study, accessible at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ egtoc.html. 76 Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. The British invaded in 1882 and established a de facto protectorate. They would keep a sizeable military force in Egypt until the 1950s. 77 M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War, London: Longman, 1991, p. 409. 78 During the Yemeni Civil War of 1963 through 1967, Egypt reportedly used mustard bombs in support of South Yemen against Saudi-backed royalist troops in North Yemen. See Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Egypt Special Weapons Guide, available online at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/index.html. 79 One of the Brotherhood activists arrested was Sayyid Qutb, a writer and former government official whose writings provided a philosophical foundation for Islamic radicalism. Qutb spent years in prison and, after being briefly released in 1964, was rearrested and hanged in 1966. See Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 62. 80 A copy of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is available online from MidEast Web Gateway at http://www.mideastweb.org/egyptisraeltreaty.htm. 81 Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel, March 26, 1979. Available online at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/peace%20process/ guide%20to%20the%20peace%20process/usisrael%20memorandum%20of%20agreement. 82 Letter on United States Defense Assistance to Egypt, March 23, 1979. The Search for Peace in the Middle East, Documents and Statements, 1967-79, Prepared for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Congressional Research Service, 1979. 83 The MFO is an independent (non-UN) peacekeeping mission, created as a result of the 1979 peace treaty. The MFO‘s expenses are funded in equal parts by Egypt, Israel, and the United States with additional contributions from Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. For more information on the MFO, see http://www.mfo.org/Default.asp?bhcp=1.

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Chapter 4

LIBYA: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS

*

Christopher M. Blanchard

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SUMMARY Libyan-U.S. rapprochement has unfolded gradually since 2003, when the Libyan government accepted responsibility for the actions of its personnel in regard to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and announced its decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs. In response, U.S. sanctions were gradually removed, and, on May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya‘s listing as a state sponsor of terrorism. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31, 2006, when the United States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy. Libya was removed from the lists of state sponsors of terrorism and states not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts in June 2006. Until late 2008, U.S.-Libyan re-engagement was hindered by lingering disagreements over outstanding legal claims related to U.S. citizens killed or injured in past Libyan-sponsored or supported terrorist attacks. From 2004 onward, Bush Administration officials argued that broader normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations would provide opportunities for the United States to *

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report RL33142, dated March 16, 2010.

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address specific issues of concern to Congress, including the outstanding legal claims, political and economic reform, the development of Libyan energy resources, and human rights. However, some Members of Congress took steps to limit U.S.-Libyan re-engagement as a means of encouraging the Libyan government to settle outstanding terrorism cases in good faith prior to further normalization. Under the terms of a Claims Settlement Agreement reached between the Libyan and U.S. governments in August 2008, funds are now available to settle specific outstanding legal claims. Congress supported the final stages of U.S.-Libyan negotiation on the agreement by passing S. 3370, the Libyan Claims Resolution Act (P.L. 110-301), which authorized the creation of an entity with legal immunity to receive settlement funds from Libya or other sources and to distribute them to U.S. plaintiffs. On October 31, 2008, the Bush Administration certified the receipt of $1.5 billion in settlement funds, and President Bush signed Executive Order 13477 stating that claims covered by the agreement were settled. The State Department has referred claims to the Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission for adjudication. When Scottish authorities returned convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi to Libya on humanitarian grounds in late 2009, the ensuing outcry in the United States and United Kingdom highlighted the continuing influence of past U.S.-Libyan differences. Nevertheless, the 111th Congress and the Obama Administration have inherited a U.S.-Libya relationship that is largely free of the formal constraints that once precluded cooperation. The relationship remains relatively undefined after decades of tension and latent conflict have come to a close. Libya has experienced a period of significant economic growth in recent years but remains defined politically by Muammar al Qadhafi‘s controlling influence over a decentralized, opaque, and authoritarian political system. Economic and political reform efforts are emerging in Libya, with some limitations. Current U.S. policy concerns include ensuring Libya‘s positive contribution to the security and economic prosperity of North Africa and the Sahel, securing commercial opportunities in Libya for U.S. firms, and addressing persistent human rights issues. The Obama Administration is requesting $875,000 in FY2011 foreign assistance funding for Libya programs. This report provides background information on Libya and U.S.Libyan relations; discusses Libya‘s political and economic reform efforts; and reviews current issues of potential congressional interest.

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS The Obama Administration is requesting the following FY2011 foreign assistance funds for Libya programs: $250,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $350,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET), and $275,000 in counterterrorism and border security assistance (Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account, NADR). As of March 7, 2010, the Administration has not signaled its specific requests for Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund (NDF) or Global Threat Reduction (GTR) programs, Middle East Partnership Initiative programs, or Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership programs involving Libya. The State Department estimates that the U.S. government will spend at least $780,000 in FY2010 funding on Libya programs. In September 2009, the U.S. State Department notified Congress of its intent to obligate $2.5 million in FY2009 Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance for Libya programs; the notification was placed under a congressional hold and was subsequently amended in consultation with members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The amended program will use $2.3 million in FY2009 ESF funds, none of which will support programs or institutions involving members of Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi‘s family. In August 2009, Scottish authorities released convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi on compassionate grounds in light of his diagnosis with terminal prostate cancer and a medical prognosis that reportedly projected that he would die within three months. His release was highly controversial, and outrage among some parties in the United Kingdom and United States grew after Al Megrahi was greeted publicly by a cheering crowd upon his arrival in Tripoli. Al Megrahi remains ill, but has survived longer than the reported prognosis used to justify his release, leading members of the Scottish parliament to demand that their government provide further information about the medical advice it relied upon as well as about Al Megrahi‘s current medical condition. The U.S. Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) is currently accepting and adjudicating various categories of terrorism-related claims in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Libya Claims Settlement Agreement and State Department letters of referral. This includes claims related to the Pan Am 103 bombing. Al Megrahi‘s disputed release immediately preceded the September 2009 visit of Muammar al Qadhafi to New York for the United Nations General Assembly; that visit in turn fueled new controversy over the Libyan leader‘s

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accommodation during his stay and his remarks at the meeting. In October 2009, Al Qadhafi called for his relatively reform-oriented son, Sayf al Islam, to take a leadership position in the country. Sayf al Islam subsequently was appointed General Coordinator of the Popular Social Command, a position which could give him substantive executive and oversight authority as the equivalent of head of state. The appointment followed months of speculation about whether or not Sayf al Islam had fallen irreparably out of favor among his father‘s more conservative supporters. However, speculation about Sayf‘s position relative to other political factions continues, since, to date, he has not publicly exercised the authorities implied by the appointment. Mutassim al Qadhafi, another of the leader‘s sons, visited Washington in April 2009 in his official capacity as his father‘s national security adviser. He appeared publicly with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with whom he reportedly discussed security cooperation, among other issues.

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BACKGROUND AND RECENT HISTORY The north African territory that now composes the Great Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahirriya1 has a long cultural history as a center of Phoenician, Carthaginian, Roman, Berber, and Arab civilizations. Modern Libya‘s distinct regions and tribally influenced society create a complex political environment that is made up of diverse constituencies from northwestern Tripolitania, northeastern Cyrenaica, and the more remote southwestern Fezzan (see Figure 1). Significant economic and political changes have occurred since Libya became independent in 1951. These changes have been fueled by the country‘s emergence from Italian colonization, the discovery of vast oil and natural gas reserves, and the domination of political life by the authoritarian government of Muammar al Qadhafi,2 who overthrew the Libyan monarchy on September 1, 1969. The legacies of anti-Italian insurgency and World War II combat, international pressures associated with the Cold War, and complex relationships with Arab and African neighbors have all shaped Libya‘s development. See Appendix A for a discussion of Libya‘s pre-Qadhafi history, other background information, and a list of historical resources.

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The Qadhafi Era

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On September 1, 1969, a cabal of Libyan military officers led by army Captain Muammar al Qadhafi seized important government institutions in the eastern city of Benghazi and abolished the Libyan monarchy. Facing negligible internal resistance, the leadership of the Movement, known as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), established authority and announced that it would direct the activities of a new cabinet. The RCC also made statements affirming Libya‘s Arab and Islamic identity and its support for the Palestinian people. After renaming the country the Libyan Arab Republic, the RCC announced the promotion of Captain Qadhafi to Colonel and named him commander in chief of Libya‘s armed forces.3 Like Qadhafi, the other members of the RCC were pan-Arabist and socialist ideologues from rural and somewhat marginalized communities. The United States did not oppose the 1969 coup, as the RCC initially presented an anti-Soviet and reformist platform.

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. Figure 1. Map of Libya

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Colonel Qadhafi and the RCC focused intensely in their early years in power on taking steps to safeguard ―national independence‖ and consolidate their rule through populist and nationalist political and economic programs. The members of the RCC were determined to secure the immediate and full withdrawal of British and U.S. forces from military bases in Libya, which occurred on March 28 and June 11, 1970, respectively. Italian expatriates were expelled and their assets were confiscated on October 7, 1970. All three dates subsequently were declared national holidays. The new government also pressured U.S. and other foreign oil companies to renegotiate oil production contracts and cede a larger share of production revenues. Some British and U.S. oil operations eventually were nationalized. In the early 1970s, the RCC gradually reversed its stance on its initially icy relationship with the Soviet Union and extended Libyan support to revolutionary, anti-Western, and antiIsraeli movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. These policies contributed to a rapid souring of U.S.-Libyan political relations, although economic relations, particularly U.S. oil purchases from Libya, remained steady.

The Green Book and Qadhafi’s Ideology Beginning in the early 1970s, Muammar al Qadhafi and his regime carried out drastic and frequent reorganizations of Libyan political and economic life in line with his ―Third Universal Theory.‖ The theory, which blends pan-Arab, Islamic, and socialist values, is enshrined in Qadhafi‘s three-volume Green Book. The redistribution of land and wealth, the allocation of fluctuating oil revenues, and a near total decentralization of political institutions reshaped Libya‘s social landscape in line with Qadhafi‘s principles. These trends also helped Qadhafi and his supporters maintain political control. Overseas, Qadhafi promoted his political and economic ―Third International Theory‖ as an alternative to the capitalist and communist systems of the United States and the Soviet Union for the developing countries of the Third World. Qadhafi‘s confrontation with the United States was both a catalyst for and product of the Libyan government‘s violent and destabilizing activities abroad, Qadhafi‘s ideological fervor, and his regime‘s gradual drift into the Soviet sphere of influence. Terrorism and Confrontation with the United States In line with his ideological precepts, Muammar al Qadhafi long characterized Libyan backing for anti-colonial, separatist, and Islamist movements and terrorist groups around the world as legitimate support for

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parties seeking self determination. The United States and others categorically and continuously rejected Libya‘s policies as unacceptable sponsorship of illegitimate terrorism and subversive violence. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. officials cited the existence of training camps in Libya and other Libyan government support for a panoply of terrorist groups including the Abu Nidal organization, the Red Army Faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Irish Republic Army. Libyan-sponsored bombings and assassinations also drew sharp international criticism, especially killings of Libyan dissidents and the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772 in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, Libyan-trained individuals led brutal rebel movements across Africa, including Foday Sankoh‘s Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor‘s National Patriotic Front of Liberia.4

Qadhafi’s Arab-Israeli Intransigence The Arab-Israeli conflict was another particularly pointed source of tension between the United States and Qadhafi: Libya remained distinctly opposed to negotiation or reconciliation with Israel throughout the Cold War era and the 1990s, promoting armed struggle as the only viable means to end Israel‘s occupation of territory it captured from neighboring Arab states in 1967. At times, Qadhafi‘s positions led to deep bilateral rifts between Libya and Egypt, particularly under Anwar Sadat, as well as confrontations with PLO leader Yasir Arafat. Qadhafi and his security services provided support, training, and safe harbor for Palestinian terrorist groups until the late 1990s. After a temporary reconciliation with Arafat during the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, Qadhafi returned to voicing complete opposition to the Oslo peace process and called for Arab leaders to avoid further recognition of or negotiation with Israel. In recent years, Qadhafi publicly has maintained his opposition to Arab engagement with Israel in the face of continued Israeli occupation and settlement activity. He also has called for a ―one state solution‖ based on reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes be called ―Isratine.‖ In a January 2009 opinion editorial in the New York Times Qadhafi rejected the ―tired rhetoric of partition and twostate solutions,‖ and argued that ―the compromise is one state for all, an ‗Isratine‘ that would allow the people in each party to feel that they live in all of the disputed land and they are not deprived of any one part of it.‖5 Central to Qadhafi‘s position is the proposal that Palestinian refugees be granted ―the

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right of return for Palestinian refugees to the homes their families left behind in 1948,‖ which is rejected by the Israeli government. More recent controversy has focused on reports that Qadhafi declined to meet with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas during his visit to Libya in February 2010; Qadhafi received a telephone briefing from Hamas political bureau chairman Khaled Meshaal days later.6 Libya is the host of the March 2010 Arab League summit, and Arab leaders have vigorously debated who should represent the Palestinian people at the meeting amid the absence of a final reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas.7

International Isolation and Signs of Change Following the imposition of U.N. sanctions in the aftermath of the Libyansponsored airliner bombings of the late 1980s, Libya entered a period of increasing international isolation. The compounded effects of a loss of oil revenue, restrictions on the travel of senior officials, an international air travel ban, and an arms embargo brought significant pressure on Qadhafi and his government. Signs of change began to emerge in 1999 when Libya agreed to pay compensation for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and allowed two intelligence agents to stand trial for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Qadhafi‘s offers of counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and his late 2003 decision to dismantle Libya‘s weapons of mass destruction and long range missile development programs marked further steps toward new relationships with the United States and the international community. Qadhafi pledged to end his government‘s support for violent political movements around the world in December 2003, and the Libyan government has participated in peacemaking efforts in a number of African conflicts, including hosting and subsidizing U.N. World Food Program aid flights to Darfur, Sudan from Libyan territory. New oil production agreements and improved relations with the United States and a number of European and Asian countries have demonstrated the tangible benefits of Libya‘s apparent new political orientation. Libya was elected as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in October 2007. Libya held the seat for 2008 and 2009, and held the Council presidency in January 2008 and March 2009. In February 2009, Qadhafi was elected as the chairman of the 53-member African Union (AU), giving him a new platform to pursue his active foreign policy toward Africa. His attempt to extend his one-year tenure was unsuccessful and, in January 2010, the AU chose Malawian President Bingu Wa Mutharika as its new chairman.

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CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S.-LIBYAN RELATIONS The relationship between the United States and Libya has been tense for much of the last 35 years but has normalized gradually since late 2003. The Libyan government‘s past support for international terrorism, its history of intervention in regional conflicts, and its now-abandoned pursuit of weapons of mass destruction proved to be persistent points of contention with the United States. The Libyan government has long taken issue with what it regards as unbalanced U.S. military and financial support for Israel and what it describes as unwarranted U.S. intervention in the affairs of Arab states. In the past, these differences led to a number of confrontations and engagements between U.S. and Libyan armed forces, the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions by the United States, and, reportedly, some limited, covert U.S. efforts at regime change.8 As sanctions were removed in recent years, a number of U.S. oil companies successfully bid for reentry into Libya‘s energy market, and other U.S. businesses have resumed trade relationships with Libyan firms. The restoration of full diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya in 2006 was expected to open a new chapter in the bilateral relationship and bring a long period of U.S.-Libyan confrontation to a close. However, until late 2008, U.S.-Libyan relations remained clouded by mutual frustration. Libyan officials expressed dissatisfaction with the pace and scope of normalization with the United States and alleged that Libya had not gotten what was promised when it decided to abandon weapons of mass destruction and terrorism in 2003. Considerable discontent also remained apparent in some U.S. quarters, including among some Members of Congress. New terrorism concerns delayed Libya‘s removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list until 2006, and Libyan engagement with legal counsel and U.S. officials on terrorism cases led to charges that Libya was not acting in good faith to resolve outstanding claims. The Libyan government responded to congressional pressure with increasingly direct statements warning that if its relations with the U.S. government and U.S. business community remained complicated by outstanding terrorism claims, U.S. companies could miss opportunities to bid on lucrative Libyan government contracts to refurbish and expand the country‘s infrastructure. The Administration and the U.S. business community supported normalization with Libya while continuing to engage Libya on outstanding terrorism claims.

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Throughout this period, some participants on both sides supported efforts to find an agreeable formula for resolving outstanding issues so that the United States and Libya could reap the potential benefits of a fully normalized relationship. Bilateral negotiations bore fruit in mid-2008 in the form of a Comprehensive Settlement Agreement (see below). Congress supported those negotiations by authorizing the creation of an independent entity to manage settlement funds and by opening the prospect of conditional legal immunity for Libya. The Bush Administration viewed Libya as a model for potential rapprochement with other state sponsors of terrorism and sought to establish and expand counterterrorism, military, and economic cooperation with Libyans through foreign operations budget requests. The Obama Administration has now embarked on an effort to more fully define the goals and scope of renewed U.S.-Libyan relations. To date, the Obama Administration‘s foreign assistance funding requests for Libya programs have remained relatively limited and have not expanded significantly. During the second session of the 111th Congress, Members may influence future developments through consideration of FY2011 foreign assistance requests for Libya, oversight of security cooperation or other bilateral assistance programs, and through the funding and oversight of preliminary plans to construct a new U.S. embassy in Tripoli.

Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement From January 2008 onward, the enactment by Congress of changes in terrorism liability provisions and the awarding of significant monetary damages to the families and estates of U.S. victims of the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772 heightened the intensity of U.S.-Libyan engagement on outstanding terrorism claims.9 In particular, new terrorism liability provisions appear to have signaled to both the Libyan authorities and the Bush Administration the urgency of the need to resolve outstanding legal claims in order for renewed bilateral relations to reach their full potential. Confidential negotiations began in early 2008 on a comprehensive settlement, while the Bush Administration publicly underscored its desire ―to show the Libyans that they made the right decision‖ in abandoning weapons of mass destruction and eschewing terrorism.10 Negotiations continued through mid-2008, and the prospect of success led to collaboration between the Congress and the

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executive branch aimed at providing potential relief for Libya from the liability changes in the event of a finalized claims settlement agreement.

Settlement Details On August 14, 2008, Libya and the United States signed a comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement.11 The agreement provides for the establishment of a humanitarian settlement fund to receive donations sufficient to address the outstanding legal claims of U.S. terrorism victims and Libyan claims related to U.S. military strikes. 



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



The agreement‘s stated objective is to ―reach a final settlement‖ of claims, ―terminate permanently all pending suits‖ and ―preclude any future suits‖ arising from personal injury, death, or property loss caused by certain defined acts12 that occurred prior to June 30, 2006. The agreement calls for the establishment of a humanitarian settlement fund to receive contributions. The agreement also directs the parties to open accounts for the distribution of funding to their respective nationals from the central fund. Upon receipt of $1.8 billion in funding, the agreement calls for the central fund account to distribute $1.5 billion dollars to the United States‘ national account and $300 billion to Libya‘s national account. Thereafter, the agreement requires each party to terminate any suits pending in its courts, preclude any new suits, and restore ―the same sovereign, diplomatic, and official immunity‖ to the other party, its personnel, and property ―as is normally provided to other states.‖ Further distribution of the funds from the national accounts is precluded until the immunity restoration provisions are satisfied. Claimants‘ suits also must be terminated in order for them to be eligible to receive distributions from the national accounts.

On October 31, 2008, the Administration, acting according to the terms of the Libya Claims Resolution Act (S. 3370, P.L. 110-301), certified the receipt of $1.5 billion and stated the received funding was sufficient to meet the claims requirements outlined in section 5(a)(2) of the act. An accompanying memorandum of justification stated: This amount is sufficient to ensure the remaining payment of $536 million for the Pan Am 103 Settlement and $283 million for the LaBelle settlement.... The remaining $681 million is sufficient to ensure fair

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Christopher M. Blanchard compensation for the claims of nationals of the United States for wrongful death or physical injury in those cases described in the Act which were pending against Libya on the date of enactment of the Act (August 4, 2008) as well as other terrorism-related claims against Libya.13

The certification rescinded the applicability of several terrorism liability provisions to certain cases involving Libya, including Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (see Appendix B for more information).

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Settlement Eligibility and Adjudication In December 2008 and January 2009, the State Department referred all eligible outstanding claims to the U.S. Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission for final adjudication and certification. Claims for physical injury were referred in December 2008, and six additional categories of claims were referred in January 2009. Claim forms and documentation for the December 2008 referral must be submitted to the FCSC by July 23, 2009. Claim forms and documentation for the January 2009 referral must be submitted to the FCSC by July 7, 2010. Information on the Libya claims settlement adjudication process and awards to date is available at the Commission‘s website at http://www.usdoj.gov/fcsc/libyaclaims.htm.

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya Although U.S. sanctions on Libya were lifted in 2004 and terrorismrelated restrictions on foreign assistance were rescinded in 2006, Congress acted to limit the Bush Administration‘s ability to provide foreign assistance to Libya as a means of pressuring the Administration and the Libyan government to resolve outstanding terrorism claims. The Bush Administration‘s October 2008 certification (see ―Settlement Details‖ above) ended standing restrictions on the provision of U.S. foreign assistance contained in appropriations legislation for FY2008 and FY2009.14 Assistance requests submitted by the Bush and Obama Administrations for FY2009 and FY2010 included funding for programs to reengage with Libyan security forces after ―a 35-year break in contact‖ with their U.S. counterparts and to support Libyan efforts to improve security capabilities in areas of common concern, such as border control, counterterrorism, and export/import monitoring.

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Table 1. Recent U.S. Foreign Assistance to Libya Current U.S. $, thousands Account Nonproliferation Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) Economic Support Fund (ESF) International Military Education and Training (IMET) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Annual Total

FY2008 Actual 1,000

FY2009 Actual 750

FY2010 Estimate 300

FY2011 Request 275

-

2,300 -

330

350

-

-

150

250

1,000

3,050

780

875

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Source: U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2010 and FY2011. Available at http://www .state.gov/f/releases/iab/.

For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $350,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding for Libya to ―support education and training of Libyan security forces, creating vital linkages with Libyan officers after a 35-year break in contact.‖15 Participation in the IMET program also makes the Libyan government eligible to purchase additional U.S. military training at a reduced cost.16 The Bush Administration‘s FY2009 request for IMET funding indicated that ―the Government of Libya would pay for additional training and education with national funds.‖ However, no IMET funding was provided in FY2009, according to State Department budget documents. The Obama Administration also requested Foreign Military Financing assistance for Libya for the first time in FY2010, with the goal of providing assistance to the Libyan Air Force in developing its air transport capabilities and to the Libyan Coast Guard in improving its coastal patrol and search and rescue operations. FY2011 FMF assistance is being requested to support Libyan participation in a program that assists countries seeking to maintain and upgrade their U.S.-made C-130 air transport fleets. In both FY2010 and FY2011, the Administration‘s request has indicated that, ―additional funding will be sought through the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) initiative, focusing primarily on anti-terrorism assistance, counterterrorism finance, terrorist interdiction, and de-legitimizing

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terrorist ideology through educational, cultural, and information programming.‖ Libya has been invited to join the TSCTP, but, as of March 1, 2010, was not a participant.

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Funding for New U.S. Embassy Construction In conjunction with the restoration of full diplomatic relations, the United States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy, which has moved to an interim location. Libyan demonstrators attacked and burned the former U.S. Embassy in December 1979. Plans to procure property for a new U.S. embassy were placed on hold, after delays in securing funding and approval complicated negotiations during 2007.17 The Bush Administration requested $109.9 million in FY2008 Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) funds for property procurement and construction of a new U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. The Senate report on the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (S.Rept. 110-128, H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) did not include the requested ESCM funds. The State Department‘s FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011 budget requests indicate that requested ESCM funds may support the acquisition of property for a future new embassy compound (NEC) in Tripoli.

Counterterrorism Cooperation Muammar al Qadhafi immediately condemned the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks as ―horrific and gruesome,‖ and his government has taken steps to improve U.S.-Libyan counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing since 2001. The Libyan government has long perceived Al Qaeda as a threat because members of Libya‘s Islamist opposition have been linked to Al Qaeda and other foreign jihadist organizations (see ―Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)‖ below). This has contributed to Libya‘s willingness to expand counterterrorism cooperation with U.S. authorities. Qadhafi has characterized members of Al Qaeda as ―heretics‖ in prominent public statements and has described his government‘s intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation with the United States as ―irrevocable.‖ Libya has taken direct action to limit the activities of known Al Qaeda associates within its borders, including elements of its own Islamist opposition allied with Al Qaeda. Libya is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. According to the U.S. Department of State‘s 2008 Country Report on Terrorism (issued April 2009), the Libyan government ―has continued to

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cooperate with the United States and the international community to combat terrorism and terrorist financing.‖ This included efforts to support U.S. counterterrorism initiatives against the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, or GSPC).18 U.S. officials hope to extend counterterrorism assistance to Libya during FY2010 and FY2011, including potential assistance under the framework of the interagency Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which involves all of Libya‘s neighbors, except Sudan and Egypt.19

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROFILE

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Muammar al Qadhafi: A Profile Muammar al Qadhafi was born in 1942 near the central coastal city of Sirte. His Arabized Berber family belongs to the relatively small Qadhafa tribe, and his upbringing was modest. As a young man Qadhafi identified strongly with Arab nationalist and socialist ideologies espoused by leaders such as Egypt‘s Gamel Abdel Nasser. Although he was excluded from the elite Cyrenaica Defense Forces on a tribal basis during the Libyan monarchy period (see Appendix A), Qadhafi was commissioned as a regular army captain following stints at the Libyan military academy in Benghazi and the United Kingdom‘s Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Following his return to Libya, he led the September 1, 1969, overthrow of the Libyan monarchy with a group of fellow officers. He was 27 years old. Qadhafi has proven to be a controversial, complex, and contradictory political survivor during his long reign in Libya, in spite of numerous internal and external challenges to his rule. He has exercised nearly complete, if, at times, indirect political control over Libya over the last 30-plus years by carefully balancing and manipulating complex patronage networks, traditional tribal structures, and byzantine layers of national, regional, and local governance. Libya‘s foreign and domestic policies nominally have been based on his personal ideology. In the past, Qadhafi and his supporters have imposed his theories with realistic purpose and precision, not hesitating to crush coup attempts, assassinate dissidents abroad, or sponsor violent movements and terrorist attacks against Libya‘s perceived external enemies.

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Personally, Qadhafi often is described as mercurial, charismatic, shrewd, and reclusive. He is married and has eight children: seven sons and one daughter. An April 1986 U.S. air strike in retaliation for a Libyan-sponsored anti-American bombing in Berlin hit one of his homes in Tripoli, killing his adopted infant daughter and hospitalizing members of his immediate family. The incident reportedly continues to be a source of personal anger and resentment for Qadhafi: he has preserved the bombed out ruins of the home in the military compound where it stood, and he remarked on the death of President Ronald Reagan in 2004 that the former U.S. President had died before he could be prosecuted for the ―ugly crime that he committed in 1986 against the Libyan children.‖20

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Political Dynamics Libya‘s often contradictory political dynamics are a product of competing interest groups seeking to influence policy within the confines of the country‘s authoritarian political system and amid Libya‘s emergence from international isolation. Elements of Muammar al Qadhafi‘s ideology permeate political discourse on many security and foreign policy issues, while in other cases, such as economic reform, new frameworks are being embraced to meet society‘s current and changing needs. The legacies of colonial occupation and Libya‘s struggle for independence continue to influence Libyan politics; rhetorical references to preserving sovereignty and resistance to foreign domination are common in political statements. Most Libyans also accept a prominent role for Islamic tradition in public life: Islam is the official religion and the Quran is the basis for the country‘s law and its ―social code.‖ Tribal relationships remain important, particularly with regard to the distribution of leadership roles in government ministries and in politicalmilitary relations. Tribal loyalties remain strong within and between branches of the armed services, and members of Qadhafi‘s tribe, the Qadhafa, have held many high-ranking government positions, reportedly including key positions in the air force. Members of larger, rival tribes, such as the Warfalla, have opposed the regime on grounds of tribal discrimination. Some Libyan military and security officials staged limited, unsuccessful coup attempts against Qadhafi in 1993 and 1996 based in part on tribal and familial rivalries. The Qadhafi government has performed periodic reassignments and purges of the officer corps to limit the likelihood of organized opposition reemerging from

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within the military. However, these political considerations have affected the military‘s preparedness and war fighting capability. Political parties and all opposition groups are banned in Libya under law number 71 of 1972. Formal political pluralism is frowned upon by many members of the ruling elite, even as an increasing number of regime figures advocate for greater popular participation in existing government institutions. Opposition groups, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, appear to have shifted their political strategies toward gradual attempts to influence national policy making in contrast to others‘ confrontational efforts to change the makeup of the regime. Prominent figures in Libyan politics include Muammar al Qadhafi‘s son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi,21 General People‘s Committee Secretary Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi, National Oil Company chief Shukri Ghanem, Foreign Minister Musa Kousa, and prominent members of the security establishment, including army leader and original RCC member Abu Bakr Younis Jaber.

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Government Structure Libya has a unique political system composed of nominally decentralized and participatory levels of government. Muammar al Qadhafi and his closest supporters exercise final authority over domestic and foreign policies by means of their control of the implementation mechanisms of the national government—the sizeable military and security apparatus and a handful of powerful ministries. Qadhafi‘s ideological emphasis on ―the authority of the people‖ is the stated basis for the operation of Libya‘s multiple levels of government. Although participation in these institutions is mostly open and political leaders routinely encourage citizens to take part in their deliberations, most external observers regard Libya‘s political system as largely authoritarian and undemocratic. The U.S. State Department‘s annual human rights reports document ongoing restrictions on political life and human rights in Libya (see ―Political Reform and Human Rights‖ below).

The “Authority of the People” A hierarchy of ―people‘s congresses‖ make up Libya‘s government and serve as venues for the exercise of ―popular authority‖ as defined by Muammar al Qadhafi‘s ideology. At the local level, citizens meet in Basic People‘s Congresses to appoint representatives to regional and ultimately the national General People‘s Congress. Participation in the basic congresses is

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open to all Libyan citizens, although participation rates are notoriously low and Qadhafi regularly makes public statements expressing his disappointment with participation levels and urging broader popular involvement in public affairs. At the March 1, 2000, session of the General Peoples‘ Congress, Qadhafi abolished the positions of 12 General People‘s Committee (cabinetequivalent) secretaries and reassigned their duties to provincial committees. Secretariats of foreign affairs, justice, public security, and finance remained under the authority of the centralized General People‘s Committee. Some experts have argued that the decentralization was designed to deflect popular criticism from the central government and further dilute political opposition within the country. In March 2006, the Libyan government announced the replacement of Secretary (prime minister-equivalent) of the General People‘s Committee Shukri Ghanem by former Health Minister Al Baghdadi Ali al Mahmudi. A cabinet reshuffle and the creation of seven new ministries also were announced. The replacement of the reform-oriented Ghanem was interpreted by some observers as an effort by conservative and hard-line elements of the Libyan political establishment to reassert control over the speed and direction of Libya‘s reform efforts. Ghanem now serves as the director of the National Oil Company, where he is involved with ongoing international bidding for oil exploration and production-sharing agreements. A further reshuffle in March 2009 elevated long-time intelligence chief Musa Kusa to the position of Foreign Minister, and further changes in the leadership of the General People‘s Congress were enacted in January 2010.

Proposals for the Dissolution of State Ministries and Revenue Distribution In March 2008, Qadhafi announced his intention to dissolve most government administrative bodies and institute a Wealth Distribution Program whereby state oil revenues would be distributed to citizens on a monthly basis for them to administer personally, in cooperation, and via local committees.22 Citing popular criticism of government performance in a long, wide-ranging speech, Qadhafi repeatedly stated that the traditional state would soon be ―dead‖ in Libya and that direct rule by citizens would be accomplished through the distribution of oil revenues. Defense, foreign affairs, security, and oil production arrangements reportedly would remain national government responsibilities, while other bodies would be phased out. In early 2009, Libya‘s Basic People‘s Congresses considered variations of the proposals, and the General People‘s Congress voted to delay implementation. As of early

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2010, there is no indication that new support for the initiative is forthcoming from within the General People‘s Congress, and, as such, the plan appears to be shelved for the time being.

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Opposition Groups The government has dealt harshly with opposition leaders and groups over the last four decades, establishing special ―people‘s courts‖ and ―revolutionary committees‖ to enforce ideological and political discipline and to punish violators and dissidents. Abroad, Libyan intelligence personnel have monitored, harassed, and, in some cases, assassinated expatriate dissidents, some of whom were referred to as ―stray dogs.‖ In recent years, some in the Libyan establishment have reached out to opposition figures and exiles, facilitating engagement and negotiating the return of some former regime opponents to Libya. Libya‘s myriad opposition movements can be categorized broadly as Islamist, royalist, or democratic in orientation. However, their activities and effectiveness have been largely limited by disorganization, rivalry, and ideological differences. New efforts to coordinate opposition activities have begun in response to Libya‘s reintegration to the international community and the emergence of a broader political reform debate in the Arab world. However, most observers do not regard any of Libya‘s current opposition groups as a serious threat or alternative to the current government.

Exiles In the past, government officials and intelligence operatives have monitored and taken violent action against expatriate opposition groups and leaders, including in Europe and the United States. Clandestine opposition groups also have carried out assassinations and attacks against Libyan government officials abroad. Opposition groups in exile include the National Alliance, the Libyan National Movement (LNM), the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Islamist Rally, the National Libyan Salvation Front (NLSF), and the Republican Rally for Democracy and Justice. A royalist contingent based on the claim to the throne by Mohammed al Sanusi, the grandson of the former king, is based in London. These groups and others held an opposition conference in July 2005 in London and issued a ―national accord,‖ calling for the removal of Qadhafi from power and the establishment

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of a transitional government.23 A follow-up meeting was held in March 2008.24 In a September 2005 interview, then-Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam characterized some of the regime‘s expatriate opponents as individuals who fled the country after committing economic crimes or collaborating with foreign intelligence services. He then invited any expatriate dissidents who had not committed crimes to return to Libya.25 In August 2005, the government announced the return of 787 exiles who agreed to reconcile with the Qadhafi regime.26 Regional observers characterized the return of prominent dissidents in August 2006 as evidence of an unofficial reconciliation program between the Libyan government and its expatriate opponents.27 The Qadhafi Development Foundation reportedly facilitated the return of a group of 33 exiles in January 2010.28

The Muslim Brotherhood Like other political organizations and opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood is banned in Libya under law number 71 of 1972. Since the late 1940s, when members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood first entered Libya following a crackdown on their activities, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has existed as a semi-official organization. Hundreds of Brotherhood members and activists were jailed in 1973, although the Brotherhood eventually reemerged and operated as a clandestine organization for much of the following two decades. In 1998, a second round of mass arrests took place, and 152 Brotherhood leaders and members were arrested. Several reportedly died in custody, and, following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent Brotherhood leaders were sentenced to death and over 70 were sentenced to life in prison. The government announced a retrial for the imprisoned Brotherhood activists in October 2005, and in March 2006, the group‘s 84 remaining imprisoned members were released.29 The controller general of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Suleiman Abdel Qadir, describes the Brotherhood‘s objectives as peaceful and policyfocused, and has called for the cancellation of laws restricting political rights.30 Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has reached out to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood by publicly characterizing the organization as nonviolent and non-seditious. Abdel Qadir responded to political reform statements by Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi in 2007 with calls for more inclusive, consultative decision making.31 In a November 2008 interview with Qatar-based satellite channel Al Jazirah, Abdel Qadir expressed appreciation for the younger Al Qadhafi‘s attempt, while noting that the fact that outreach has taken place under the

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auspices of the Qadhafi Foundation and not through official state organs undermines their significance. He also repeated calls for reform and reconciliation aimed at creating a constitution and protecting civil rights for Libyans.32

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is a violent Islamist movement opposed to the Qadhafi government. Its imprisoned leaders have been engaged in a dialogue with the Qadhafi Foundation for several years, and over 100 LIFG members have been released. In 2009, some of the group‘s leaders issued a lengthy series of writings, referred to as ―the recantations,‖ outlining their rejection of the use of violence (see below). However, Libyan and U.S. concerns about LIFG‘s domestic and international activities persist. According to the Department of State, the LIFG has attempted to assassinate Qadhafi, most recently in 1996, and may have participated in the planning of the May 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca, Morocco.33 The group‘s reported ties with Al Qaeda came under scrutiny in July 2009 after group members based in Britain reportedly renounced the group‘s affiliation with Al Qaeda, and contrasted the LIFG with others who use indiscriminate bombing and target civilians. In November 2007, Al Qaeda figures Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Layth al Libi announced the merger of the LIFG with Al Qaeda, which many terrorism analysts viewed at the time as having political rather than operational relevance.34 Al Libi was killed in an air-strike in Pakistan in February 2008. Al Qaeda Affiliation and Recantations In a July 2009 statement, LIFG members in Britain characterized the November 2007 Al Qaeda affiliation announcement from Al Libi as ―a personal decision that is at variance with the basic status of the group,‖ and sought to ―clearly emphasize that the group is not, has never been, and will never be, linked to the Al Qaeda organization.‖35 The statement stressed that LIFG members abroad support ―the dialogue underway between the group‘s leadership and the Libyan regime if it should lead to an end to bloodletting, the release of prisoners, the spreading of security and justice, the reunion of families, and to permitting preaching, educational, and political activities.‖ The statement warned that the group would ―preserve [its] lawful and natural right to oppose the regime if it does not turn its back on its previous policy that has led to tension and deadlock.‖ Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has overseen an effort to engage with LIFG leaders in an effort to encourage them to renounce violence and links with

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other violent groups. Reports on the dialogue suggest it is similar to processes completed or underway in other countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In 2009, the government and the LIFG reach an agreement in which LIFG leaders renounced violence against the Libyan state, and, later in 2009, the dialogue resulted in the issuance of written ―recantations‖ of the LIFG‘s former views on religion and violence.36 In October 2009, over 40 LIFG prisoners were released, alongside other Islamists. The United States froze the LIFG‘s U.S. assets under Executive Order 13224 in September 2001, and formally designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004. In February 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five individuals and four entities in the United Kingdom as Specially Designated Global Terrorists for their role in supporting the LIFG.37 On October 30, 2008, Treasury designated three more LIFG financiers.38 Some observers have characterized the designations as a gesture of solidarity with Libya and have argued that the ability and willingness of the LIFG to mount terror attacks in Libya may be limited. Others claim that some LIFG fighters have allied themselves with other violent Islamist groups operating in the trans-Sahara region, and cite evidence of Libyan fighters joining the Iraqi insurgency as an indication of ongoing Islamist militancy in Libya and a harbinger of a possible increase in violence associated with fighters returning from Iraq.39 Reports suggest that eastern Libya may be a stronghold for LIFG members and other extremist groups that could pose a threat to Libya‘s security.

Political Reform and Human Rights The 2009 U.S. Department of State report on human rights in Libya (released March 11, 2010) characterizes Libya‘s human rights record as ―poor.‖40 According to the report: Continuing problems included reported disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest; lengthy pretrial and sometimes incommunicado detention; official impunity; and poor prison conditions. Denial of fair public trial by an independent judiciary, political prisoners and detainees, and the lack of judicial recourse for alleged human rights violations were also problems.41

The report also stated that ―security personnel reportedly routinely tortured prisoners during interrogations or as punishment,‖ but added that

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reports of instances of torture had declined over the last year according to foreign observers. The Qadhafi Development Foundation‘s Human Rights Society issued a report in December 2009 stating that the Society had ―received a large number of complaints regarding cases of torture, illtreatment, unlawful and unjustified detention, denial of freedom, and a clear premeditated violation of the law.‖ Since 2003, Libyan political figures, including Muammar al Qadhafi and his son Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, have made a series of public statements and policy announcements in an effort to repair Libya‘s reputation with regard to human rights practices. Some tangible steps have been taken, and Libyan authorities have reported that legal reforms are underway that may improve the protections and rights afforded to citizens. Judicial entities associated with human rights abuses and political control in the past, such as ―revolutionary courts‖ and ―people‘s courts,‖ reportedly have been dismantled. As a result, some observers have expressed cautious optimism that political, social, and religious freedom may improve in Libya. Others continue to warn that such reforms may be merely cosmetic and meant to support the government‘s efforts to improve its domestic legitimacy and international standing. A December 2009 Human Rights Watch report concluded that the past five years have witnessed an improvement in the human rights situation, though far less than promised or required. There are less frequent reports of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances compared to the two previous decades. There has been greater tolerance of freedom of expression and some progress in addressing gross violations of the past, though this remains very unpredictable.42

Legal and Institutional Reform Libyan law prohibits the activities of all political opposition groups and restricts the free exercise of speech and the press.43 Since Qadhafi‘s 1969 coup, little legal recourse has been available to citizens accused of political crimes. Nevertheless, officials have announced plans to embark upon a full review of the country‘s Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to eliminate restrictive laws regarding political activity. Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi also has called for a constitution to clarify the power of different legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in Libya and has endorsed ongoing legal reforms as a means to ―provide a free environment that is suitable for a normal political life.‖44 He renewed these calls in an August 2007 speech and indicated that a constitutional drafting process would begin. The speech called

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for the guarantee of ―independent institutions,‖ including the central bank, the supreme court, the media, and civil society. He also outlined four ―red lines‖ to guide reform efforts: Islamic law, the territorial integrity of Libya, security and stability, and ―Muammar al Qadhafi.‖45 In support of the reform efforts, some institutional changes have been instituted to improve political and human rights conditions. In March 2004, the General People‘s Committee Secretariat of Justice and Public Security was split into two separate secretariats in an effort to establish greater judicial independence. In January 2005, the General People‘s Congress approved a law abolishing judicial institutions known as ―people‘s courts‖ and ―revolutionary courts‖ that tried suspected regime opponents, sometimes in secret. International human rights organizations welcomed the abolition of the people‘s court system as an ―important step‖ and urged Libyan authorities to grant new trials to prisoners convicted by the courts, including several who were convicted in late 2004. In December 2009, the Qadhafi Development Foundation called for the abolition of the State Security Court, which has in some instances assumed the former activities of the people‘s court system.

Human Rights Monitoring The Libyan government has not permitted the establishment of independent human rights organizations but invited international human rights groups Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to Libya for the first time in 15 years. In late 2004 and early 2005, representatives from both organizations toured various security facilities and prisons and met with selected imprisoned dissidents. A January 2006 Human Rights Watch report based on research conducted during the visit concluded that ―Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi and his inner circle appear unwilling to implement genuine reform, especially in the areas of free expression and association,‖ although the Libyan government had taken ―some positive steps‖ to improve human rights conditions since 2003.46 Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi has publicly supported a pro-human rights agenda and created the Human Rights Society operating under the auspices of the Qadhafi Development Foundation. Fathi al Jahmi The death of Fathi al Jahmi, Libya‘s most internationally recognized political prisoner, shortly after his release from Libyan custody in May 2009, brought a negative end to a long-running issue of contention in U.S.-Libyan relations. Al Jahmi was imprisoned in 2002 after publicly calling for elections and press reforms and for criticizing Muammar al Qadhafi and the

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government. President George W. Bush praised Al Jahmi‘s subsequent release in March 2004 under a suspended sentence, but Al Jahmi was soon rearrested after he repeated his calls for reform and expanded his criticism of Qadhafi in interviews with regional satellite channels, including U.S.-funded Al Hurra. Al Jahmi subsequently was detained and remained in ill health throughout his detention. Bush Administration officials repeatedly called for Al Jahmi‘s release,47 and U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, reportedly raised the issue in private with their Libyan interlocutors.48 On March 17, 2009, U.S. State Department spokesman Robert Wood stated that the Obama Administration continued to call for Al Jahmi‘s ―unconditional release, as well as his ability to travel and seek medical care where he wishes.‖ In response to the news of his death, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said, ―we had welcomed his release to Jordan. We regret that his poor state of health, however, did not allow him to fully recover upon transfer.‖

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Libyan Foreign Policy Libyan foreign policy since the 1990s has been defined by a shift from engagement with other Arab states to a greater focus on Africa. The prominent role played by Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi ensures that foreign relations remain personality driven, somewhat unpredictable, and characterized by close relationships with non-state actors and opposition movements in a number of neighboring states. In recent years, Qadhafi publicly has maintained his opposition to Arab engagement with Israel in the face of continued Israeli military occupation and settlement activity in the West Bank. He also has called for a ―one state solution‖ based on reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes be called ―Isratine.‖ Qadhafi has criticized the Arab League‘s Arab Peace Initiative, arguing that it does not represent the views of all Arabs and would be detrimental to the interests of Palestinians. Qadhafi‘s diplomatic engagement in Africa remains active, particularly his efforts to mediate between governments and rebel factions in neighboring Sudan, Niger, and Chad and his proposals for the establishment of an United States of Africa, which many African leaders consider quixotic and regard with suspicion. Qadhafi‘s term as chairman of the African Union during 2009 created opportunities for him to advocate for greater African unity and for a more powerful voice for the African Union in international bodies. However, his attempts to extend his tenure as chairman were unsuccessful.

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Libyan defense officials have informed their U.S. Defense Department counterparts that the Libyan government opposes the potential introduction of non-African military forces on the continent on a permanent basis. Libyan officials reportedly support the proposed security capacity building mission of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), if only in general terms.49 The Arab Maghreb Union, of which Libya is a member, rejected the presence of foreign military forces on its members‘ territory at a 2007 summit in Rabat, a move seen as underscoring Libya‘s opposition to stationing of U.S. forces in North Africa under the new command.50 AFRICOM‘s Deputy for Military Operations, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, has stated that, ―the U.S.AFRICOM does not need to station large operational units across the African continent,‖ and that ―small numbers of forces will come to the continent to do a particular activity and then ... depart.‖51 AFRICOM Commander General William Ward met with Qadhafi in Libya in May 2009, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz indicated during a March 2010 trip to Washington, DC, that U.S-Libya military dialogue would begin in earnest in 2010.

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Energy and the Libyan Economy Until the discovery of oil in 1959, Libya‘s economic viability was seriously questioned by many outside observers. Foreign aid and subsidies largely supported the national budget, until the introduction of massive amounts of oil revenue transformed the country‘s economy and social fabric. Following the September 1, 1969, military coup, Qadhafi and his government restructured Libya‘s economy along socialist lines, placing a heavy emphasis on national management of industry and resource allocation. However, the economy remained highly dependent on oil revenue and thus highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices.52 The government has announced its intention to reverse state ownership trends associated with the country‘s long experiment with socialism. Economic diversification and resource management remain challenges for the government and private sector as they seek to revive the economy and capitalize on interest from foreign investors. Oil revenue has been the lifeblood of the Libyan economy and government since exports began in 1961. The International Monetary Fund projects that hydrocarbon (oil and gas) revenue will account for an estimated 80% of Libya‘s government revenue in 2009 and 2010.53 Rising oil prices through mid-2008 spurred corresponding growth in the economy. Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi has stated that Libyans have been ―very happy‖

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with higher price levels in the global oil market, although he has underlined the importance of creating alternative sources of revenue and economic growth in public statements.54 Current economic forecasts suggest that rising import costs and lower global oil prices may combine to reduce Libya‘s trade and fiscal surpluses over the coming two years.

Oil Reserves and Production Capacity According to Oil and Gas Journal, Libya‘s proven oil reserves are estimated at 43.7 billion barrels (ninth-largest in the world). The Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) manages oil production activity and negotiates exploration and production agreements with foreign companies. Oil exploration and production are carried out on the basis of a 1955 oil law, and Libyan authorities reportedly are drafting a new law to govern production activities and reform the foreign investment approval process. Foreign investment is regulated through exploration and production agreements negotiated by foreign companies and the NOC. In September 2006, Libya established a Council for Oil and Gas Affairs to regulate oil and gas exploration and production and to approve decisions about the development of the oil and gas sector.55 Most of Libya‘s oil is exported to Italy, Germany, France, and Spain. However, following the resumption of crude oil exports to the United States in June 2004, oil shipments to U.S. refiners have increased, from 56,000 barrels per day in 2005 to an average of 102,000 barrels per day in 2008.56 In 2009, the average declined slightly to 77,000 barrels per day.57 Until recently, Libyan oil production had steadily declined from its peak of 3.3 million barrels per day (b/d) in 1970 due to the deterioration of production equipment and infrastructure related to strict investment controls and international sanctions. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Libya produced an average of 1.88 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2008, which officials have stated is currently the sector‘s maximum capacity. Since the termination of U.N. and U.S. sanctions in 2003 and 2004, Libya has sought foreign investment to rehabilitate and expand its oil production capacity and expects $11 billion in oil production related investment from 2005 to 2015. Current government production targets are 2.3 million b/d by 2013.58 Natural Gas Libya‘s proven natural gas reserves are estimated to be 54 trillion cubic feet, although, like the country‘s oil reserves, Libya‘s gas holdings may be significantly higher given the generally under-explored status of Libyan

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territory. As with oil production, the development of natural gas production and export capacity has been limited by restrictive investment policies and international sanctions. Nevertheless, Libya has been able to use natural gas for some domestic power generation and for limited exports to some European countries. Shell is currently exploring for natural gas deposits and has developed a plan to upgrade Libya‘s aging liquefied natural gas plant at Marsa al Brega.59 Libyan authorities also are reportedly pursuing pipeline agreements with neighboring North African states to improve export access to European markets. In May 2007 representatives from British Petroleum (BP) announced the signing of an extensive natural gas exploration and LNG export agreement with Libya. In July 2008, representatives from Russia‘s Gazprom visited Libya and expressed interest in purchasing Libya‘s natural gas exports and cooperating with Libya on new natural gas export pipelines to Europe. According to Gazprom, Libya and Gazprom decided ―to initiate the thematic negotiations on the purchase of the currently available hydrocarbon volumes from the Libyan party.‖60 In late 2009, Gazprom officials projected that negotiations to assume Italian company Eni‘s operations in Libya‘s so-called ―Elephant‖ oil field would be concluded by the middle of 2010.

MILITARY PROFILE AND WMD DISARMAMENT The Libyan Military Structure, Training, and Equipment Libya‘s mostly conscripted military forces are small relative to the large amount of weaponry at their disposal (see Table 2 below). Most outside military analysts regard the training and leadership of Libyan forces as poor and identify a lack of combined arms and joint service planning as factors that limit their overall effectiveness. The Qadhafi government historically has made the acquisition of weapons and equipment a higher priority than training or creating high-quality military support infrastructure. Libya‘s army, navy, and air forces are equipped with a broad range of aging Soviet and Eastern Bloc equipment, although the country‘s poorly maintained inventories also include some U.S. and Western European arms, including French Mirage fighters and U.S. C-130 transports.61 Libya‘s exorbitant military spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s yielded an unmanageable crop of diverse weapon systems from various sources and

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manufacturers. Purchases declined significantly during the 1990s because of international sanctions, which limited the revenue available for defense spending. Libya‘s current military leadership presides over a largely stored and surplus catalogue of weaponry with poor maintenance records.62 The military also lacks sufficient numbers of trained personnel to operate the military equipment currently in its possession.

Arms Sales63 The subject of renewed arms sales to Libya remains a sensitive subject in the United States and some European countries whose citizens were killed in Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks during the 1980s. The European Union lifted its arms embargo against Libya in October 2004. The U.S. ban on export of defense articles lapsed at the end of a 45-day congressional notification period, on June 30, 2006. Qadhafi reportedly has expressed interest in procuring U.S., European, and Russian weapon systems. France, Spain, Ukraine, and Russia are among the countries reportedly interested in refurbishing and replacing Libya‘s weapon stocks.64 The United Kingdom‘s Defense Export Services Organization (DESO) reportedly has labeled Libya a ―priority‖ market in documents promoting exports by UK arms manufacturers, and press reports have detailed meetings between DESO representatives and Libyan authorities since 2004.65 In August 2007, the European aerospace and defense group EADS signed a contract to provide Milan anti-tank missiles to Libya in the wake of a visit by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to negotiate the release of imprisoned Bulgarian medics. Both sides denied any quid pro quo arrangement. France is upgrading several 1970s era F1 fighters in Libyan possession.66 In conjunction with a state visit by then-Russian President Vladimir Putin in April 2008, a number of potential arms sales were discussed by the Russian press, including fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines, and sophisticated air defense missiles.67 In return, Russia agreed to cancel Soviet-era Libyan debt. A November 2008 visit by Muammar al Qadhafi to Russia did not produce any publicly announced weapons sales, creating speculation that the Libyan leader was seeking other sources of new military equipment. A January 2010 visit to Moscow by Libyan military leader Abu Bakr Younis Jaber revived speculation about Libyan purchases of Sukhoi Su-35 and Su-30 fighters, along with advanced air defense systems.

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Christopher M. Blanchard Table 2. Libyan Military Personnel Service Army (~ half conscript) Air Force Navy Revolutionary Guard Corps Reserve People‘s Militia Total

Personnel 50,000 18,000 8,000 3,000 40,000 119,000

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, February 2010; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, ―Libya,‖ Middle East Military Balance, September 2007.

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WMD Programs and Disarmament68 Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Programs Despite Libya‘s membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi made several efforts to acquire nuclear weapons related technology assistance, beginning in the early 1970s. The most renowned was his reported unsuccessful request for a working nuclear weapon from China in the 1970s. Other unsuccessful attempts to acquire nuclear energy technology useful to the development of nuclear weapons were subsequently made through contacts with the Soviet Union, the United States, France, India, Pakistan, Japan, and Argentina.69 Nonetheless, most experts agree that Libya never had a dedicated indigenous nuclear weapons program. Over the next 25 years, Qadhafi made several public statements in which he argued that Arab states were compelled to develop their own nuclear weapons capability in response to Israel‘s development of nuclear weapons.70 Libya established a small nuclear research reactor at Tajura in 1979 with Soviet assistance, and entered into several rounds of negotiations with Soviet and French authorities for the construction of large nuclear power facilities that were never concluded. According to several press accounts, Libyan officials reached an agreement with Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1997 for Khan and his illicit proliferation network to provide the Libyan government with a nuclear weapons design and the uranium enrichment technology it desired. These accounts and International Atomic Energy Agency reports describe how, over the next six years, a complex network of companies and

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individuals in Malaysia, Switzerland, Pakistan, Spain, Turkey, South Africa, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates supplied Libya with uranium enrichment components.71 Libya‘s chemical weapons programs were more advanced and independent than its nuclear weapons development activities. In 1986 and 1987, U.S. officials suspected Libya of using Iranian-supplied chemical weapons against military forces in neighboring Chad and provided the Chadian military with protective equipment to guard against further Libyan attacks.72 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Libyan government developed chemical weapons production facilities at Rabta, Sebha, and Tarhuna with technology acquired from a number of Western European and Asian firms.73 The plants produced large amounts of chemical weapons and components, including 23 tons of mustard gas. Libya‘s ballistic missile program relied on foreign technical assistance to produce Scud-B and a limited number of Scud-C missiles but was limited by a lack of indigenous technical skill and ineffective management.74

Termination of WMD and Missile Programs In 1999, Libyan officials approached the Clinton Administration and offered to dismantle Libya‘s chemical weapons programs in exchange for a loosening of U.S. terrorism sanctions. The offer was rejected in an effort to maintain pressure on Libya to comply with U.S. and United Nations demands in the Lockerbie airliner bombing case. Following the Lockerbie settlement, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and intelligence chief Musa Kusa re-engaged with U.S. and British intelligence authorities beginning in March 2003 regarding Libya‘s weapons of mass destruction programs. The October 2003 naval interception of the freighter BBC China, which was carrying centrifuge components to Libya, accelerated negotiations and led to assessment visits by U.S. and British personnel later that month and in early December 2003. On December 19, 2003, Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam read a statement on Libyan national television announcing the government‘s decision to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and long range missile programs and to invite international inspectors to Libya to remove materials and perform verifications. Qadhafi publicly endorsed the statement, paving the way for the removal of WMD-related equipment from Libya in January and March 2004.75 Subsequent reviews of seized material and interviews with Libyan officials indicated that Libya remained far from developing a nuclear weapons capability, although A.Q. Khan sold Libya a crude nuclear weapons design and some components necessary to begin a uranium enrichment program.

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However, as of late 2003, Libya had not obtained key pieces of equipment, such as a sufficient number of high-precision rotors to power its enrichment centrifuges.76

Motives for Disarmament Officials and independent observers have attributed Libya‘s decision to end its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction to a number of factors. Administration officials have argued that U.S. military action in Iraq in 2003 demonstrated to Libya the resolve of the Bush Administration to eliminate perceived threats to U.S. security posed by states associated with terrorism and in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, Libyan officials have denied that external pressure or threats influenced their government‘s decision making processes and have characterized the decision as a sovereign initiative to restore Libya‘s ties with the international community and improve its security and economy. Most independent observers have argued that Libya‘s decision was a calculated move designed to extricate the country from the international sanctions regime that was limiting its economic activity and contributing to the deterioration of its vital oil and natural gas infrastructure. Libyan officials have pointed to the financial and economic rewards associated with its international re-engagement, although, prior to and following the restoration of full diplomatic relations with the United States, Qadhafi has stated his belief that Libya should be more directly and substantively rewarded for its decision to disarm and re-engage. International Controls and Inspections Libya acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. Libya‘s nuclear research facility at Tajura has been subject to IAEA safeguards since 1980. Since Libya announced its intent to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) have monitored and assisted in ongoing disarmament activities. Libya signed an ―additional protocol‖ agreement in March 2004 granting IAEA inspectors greater access to its nuclear facilities. The IAEA continues to evaluate Libyan disclosure statements related to the scope of its uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development activities, particularly with regard to the sources of the materials Libya acquired from the proliferation network of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. As a result of the 2003 WMD disarmament decision, Libya signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and acceded to the Chemical Weapons

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Convention (CWC) in 2004. Libya also committed to eliminating all its ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometer range with a payload of 500 kilograms and agreed to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. Libya, the U.S., and the UK established a Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee (TSCC) to oversee the elimination of Libyan WMD and MTCR-related missile programs in September 2004. As of October 2005, all materials and components associated with Libya‘s nuclear weapons development program had been removed and all associated activities had stopped. Libya returned highly enriched nuclear fuel assemblies weighing 17 kilograms from its Tajura research reactor to Russia in 2004, and Russia replaced them with low enriched uranium fuel in December 2005 as part of a program co-sponsored with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy.77 During the summer of 2006, Libya returned a further 3 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the Tajura reactor to Russia.78 Libya has signaled its desire to continue its nuclear energy and materials development plans under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). France signed a nuclear energy agreement with Libya in July 2007 that could result in the construction of a nuclear reactor to fuel water desalinization plants. In August 2007, Libyan officials confirmed that they were negotiating with unspecified foreign governments for the sale of 1,000 tons of uranium yellow cake ore stored at a former nuclear facility in Sebha.79 Libyan officials also reportedly have signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia and Canada. Libya has submitted an inventory of its chemical weapons and related activities to the OPCW and has destroyed over 3,600 munitions designed to disperse chemical agents. The OPCW has verified Libya‘s inventory of 23 metric tons of mustard gas and over 1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals and approved the conversion of a chemical weapons facility into a pharmaceutical plant for the production of HIV/AIDS and malaria medication. In December 2009, the OPCW stated that only 2% of Libya‘s chemical weapons stockpiles had been destroyed as of December 31, 2008.80 Libya requested a stockpile destruction deadline extension in August 2009 citing logistical, financial, and political challenges. In its request, Libya proposed to begin its chemical agent destruction by October 25, 2010, following the addition of additional equipment at its chemical weapons destruction facility.81 The OPCW Conference of State Parties considered the Libyan request at its December 2009 meeting and amended Libya's intermediate deadlines, extending the new final deadline to May 15, 2011.82

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FURTHER READING AND HISTORICAL RESOURCES Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya, State Univ. of New York Press, Albany, 1994. Lisa Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1986. Scott Anderson, ―The Makeover,‖ New York Times Magazine, January 19, 2003. Mansour O. El Kikhia, Libya’s Qadhafi, Univ. Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1997. Muammar al Qadhafi, Kitaab al Akhdar (The Green Book), Green Book World Center for Research and Study, Tripoli, 1983. Richard B. Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, Univ. Press of Florida, Gainesville, 2004. Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2002. Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, 2008. Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi, Naval Institute Press, 2003. Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006. Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), Libya since 1969: Qadhafi’s Revolution Revisited, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

APPENDIX A. LIBYA’S PRE-QADHAFI HISTORY Libya’s Colonial Experience The Ottoman Empire and Qaramanli Dynasty Ottoman forces first occupied the coastal regions of the territory that now constitutes Libya in the mid-16th century. However, Ottoman administrators faced stiff and near constant resistance from tribal confederations and a rival independent state in the Fezzan region, all of which limited the Ottomans‘ political influence. Beginning in 1711, a semi-independent state under Turkish official Ahmed Qaramanli emerged in Tripoli and established control over the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, with Fezzan remaining

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contested. The Qaramanli family maintained its power and independent rule until the early 19th century through naval privateers and pirates under its control who were used to collect tribute and ransom from merchant vessels seized in the Mediterranean Sea.

“The Shores of Tripoli” The Qaramanli naval forces of Tripoli formed one component of a regional grouping commonly referred to as ―the Barbary pirates,‖ which played a pivotal role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the young United States. Beginning in the late 1780s, a series of confrontations between U.S. merchant ships and naval raiding parties from Tripoli and other neighboring city-states such as Algiers and Tunis led to the destruction of U.S. maritime cargo and the seizure of U.S. hostages. Subsequent negotiations between the United States and the governments of the Barbary states concluded with the signing of some of the first bilateral treaties in U.S. history, including U.S. agreements to pay tribute to Tripoli in exchange for the safe passage of U.S. vessels off what is now the Libyan coast. Disputes over the terms of this bilateral agreement and continuing attacks on U.S. merchant ships impressed upon the U.S. government the need for a naval protection force to safeguard U.S. commercial activity in the Mediterranean. This need eventually was satisfied by the creation of the United States Navy by Congress in April 1798. An attack on the U.S. consulate in Tripoli in 1801 and further attacks on U.S. ships sparked open hostilities between the newly commissioned light naval forces of the United States and the privateers of Tripoli. Frequent naval engagements from 1801 to 1805 were often won by U.S. forces, but one skirmish in 1804 ended with the grounding of the U.S.S. Philadelphia and the capture of her crew. The conflict culminated in the overland seizure of the eastern Libyan city of Darnah by U.S. Marines and a team of recruited indigenous forces in 1805—the basis for the reference to ―the shores of Tripoli‖ in the Marine Corps hymn. The fall of Darnah compelled the Qaramanli leadership in Tripoli to relent to demands to ransom the U.S. prisoners and sign a ―treaty of peace and friendship.‖ Efforts to repatriate the remains of U.S. personnel killed in these early 19th century military engagements with Tripoli are ongoing.83 The decline of Qaramanli naval power following the confrontation with the United States contributed to the dynasty‘s steady loss of political power. Ottoman authorities reoccupied Tripoli in 1835 and began a campaign to pacify and co-opt the region‘s tribal confederations. The Ottomans solicited the cooperation of the leaders of a conservative revivalist Sufi order known as

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the Sanusiyah based in Cyrenaica, which they allowed to raise an independent militia and participate in a tacit ruling partnership. Although the Ottoman administrative structure imposed in the 19th century formed the basis for a centralized state, the penetration of Ottoman political power remained incomplete and regional resistance to Ottoman reforms and central authority persisted into the 20th century.

Italian Annexation and Post-War Uncertainty Italy annexed Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1911, and the Ottoman Empire‘s subsequent release of its claim to its territory in 1912, marked the beginning of a violent 20-year period of resistance to Italian rule led by the Sanussi order and local tribes. The Italian occupation authorities dismantled the remaining Ottoman governing structures and disrupted the activities of social and cultural institutions across Libya. Sanussi resistance fighters were defeated during World War I, and the international community formally recognized Italian control over the territory in 1924. A second round of antiItalian insurgency spurred a violent crackdown by Italian forces under Mussolini, who renamed the territory Libya in 1929. Resistance based in Cyrenaica was worn down and ultimately crushed by 1931. In 1934, Italian peasant colonists began entering the provinces, leading to the displacement of local farmers and the uprooting of established agricultural communities across the country. The population of Cyrenaica remained hostile to Italian rule and its Sanussi leaders allied themselves with British colonial forces in neighboring Egypt. During the Second World War, Libya served as a staging ground for Italian and German attacks on French North Africa and British-held Egypt. Pivotal battles took place in Cyrenaica from 1940 to early 1943, when German and Italian forces were forced from Libya by British troops under General Bernard Montgomery. British-organized Sanussi fighters played a role in supporting allied operations against German and Italian forces. Following the war, Libya‘s provinces were divided under British and French protection until the disposition of Italy‘s former colonies could be negotiated. Protracted and complex negotiations continued for years. In November 1949, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 289 declared that the three disparate regions would be united in a single, independent state. The resolution also dispatched a United Nations Commissioner to assist a national assembly representing the regions in creating institutions for a new state that was to assume sovereignty no later than January 1, 1952. The strength of tribal and regional identities complicated

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the subsequent negotiations and strongly influenced the new government following independence.

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Independence and Monarchy, 1951-1969 A constitution agreed to by the U.N.-assisted National Constituent Assembly in October 1951 established a federal system of government with central authority vested in King Idris As Sanussi I and legislative authority vested in a Prime Minister, a Council of Ministers, and a bicameral legislature. On December 24, 1951, the United Kingdom of Libya became one of the first independent states in Africa. The first parliamentary election was held in February 1952, one month after independence. Political parties were banned by the king shortly after independence was declared, and Libya‘s first decade of independence was characterized by continuous bargaining and rivalry among the provincial governments over taxation, development, and constitutional issues. In 1963, King Idris replaced the federal system of government with a unitary monarchy that centralized royal authority, in part to streamline the development of the country‘s newly discovered oil resources. Prior to the discovery of marketable oil in 1959, the Libyan government was largely dependent on economic aid and technical assistance it received from international institutions and through military basing agreements with the United States and United Kingdom. The U.S.-operated air base at Wheelus field outside of Tripoli served as an important Strategic Air Command base and center for military intelligence operations throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Oil wealth brought rapid economic growth and greater financial independence to Libya in the 1960s, but the weakness of national institutions and Libyan elites‘ growing identification with the pan-Arab socialist ideology of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser contributed to the gradual marginalization of the monarchy under King Idris. Popular criticism of U.S. and British basing agreements grew, becoming amplified in wake of Israel‘s defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 Six Day War. King Idris left the country in mid-1969 for medical reasons, setting the stage for a military coup in September, led by a young, devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar al Qadhafi.

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APPENDIX B. NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, TERRORISM, AND RELATED CLAIMS

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Background: Pan Am Flight 103 On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded on Pan Am flight 103 en route from London to New York, killing all 244 passengers and 15 crew on board and another 11 people in the town of Lockerbie, Scotland. On November 14, 1991, the United States and Scotland indicted two Libyan intelligence agents for their alleged roles in the bombing: Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifah Fhimah. Under a U.N.-negotiated agreement, Fhimah and Al Megrahi were tried on murder charges under Scottish law in The Hague beginning in 1999. Fhimah was acquitted and Al Megrahi was convicted: he was sentenced to serve a life sentence in a Scottish prison. Al Megrahi appealed his conviction and the length of his 27-year sentence before the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC). Some observers in the United Kingdom, including lead Scottish Lockerbie investigator Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, questioned Al Megrahi‘s conviction and argued that the Lockerbie investigation should have been reexamined.84 Claims periodically resurfaced that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command may have planned the bombing for Iran in retaliation for the downing of an Iranian airliner by the U.S. Navy in 1988.85 In November 2006, the Scottish commission ruled that Al Megrahi‘s appeals could be heard in Scottish courts, and in June 2007, the SCCRC granted Al Megrahi the right to a second appeal of his conviction.86 (See below.) In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility ―for the actions of its officials‖ and agreed to a settlement agreement that called for successive payments to the families of Pan Am 103 victims following the termination of U.N. and U.S. sanctions.87 As of October 2005, Libya had issued payments of $4 million per victim following the termination of U.N. sanctions in September 2003 and a second payment of $4 million to each victim‘s family following the termination of bilateral U.S. sanctions in September 2004. The Libyan government withdrew funds for a final payment of $2 million from a designated escrow account after several deadline extensions because of delays in the United States government‘s rescission of Libya‘s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.88 The previously negotiated final round of $2 million payments was worth over $500 million. Under the terms of the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, the Bush Administration certified that sufficient funds

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for the final Lockerbie payment were made available to settle the remaining outstanding claims.

Lockerbie Appeal and Megrahi’s Release Proceedings for the second appeal for Abd al Baset Ali al Megrahi opened in October 2007, and preliminary hearings were held in an effort to determine the scope of his appeal. Defense attorneys sought access to classified information regarding key pieces of evidence, reportedly including classified intelligence documents related to the supply of timers by a Swiss company to the Libyan intelligence service. The documents reportedly originated with a third country‘s government, and that government refused to grant permission for the documents to be made available to the court by British authorities.89 In May 2008, the British government filed a Public Interest Immunity (PII) order with the Scottish court seeking to keep the documents secret, but the court ruled that the government was required to ―produce for the court the documents in question ... subject to appropriate security measures.‖90 In June 2008, the prosecution reportedly argued to restrict the appeal to the original terms under which the appeal was granted, while the defense reportedly argued that new evidence should be considered. Al Megrahi‘s appeal for release on bail on the basis of his diagnosis with terminal prostate cancer was denied. In July 2009, the Libyan government submitted an ―application for compassionate release‖ to Scottish authorities requesting that he be allowed to return to Libya. Under the terms of a prisoner transfer agreement signed between the United Kingdom and Libya, Megrahi could have been eligible to serve the remainder of his prison term in Libya if he agreed to drop his pending appeal in the Scottish court system. Families of some U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing stated their opposition to his release in consultations with Scottish legal authorities. Ultimately, Megrahi did not choose to drop his appeal, but was ordered released on compassionate grounds by Scottish authorities outside of any arrangement involving the prisoner transfer agreement. His release, return to Libya, and subsequent public welcome in Tripoli ignited severe controversy in the United Kingdom, and several parties in the United States, including the Obama Administration, criticized what they perceived as a ―hero‘s welcome‖ for Megrahi. Megrahi‘s health and survival have emerged as subjects of continuing scrutiny, amid reports that his release was agreed partly based on a prognosis that he would not survive longer than three months and his continuing battle with his cancer in Libya.

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Background: La Belle and UTA Flight 772 Compensation claims for U.S. victims of the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin and the 1989 Libyan-sponsored bombing of a French passenger aircraft also have been pending in U.S. courts. Two U.S. servicemen, Sgt. Kenneth T. Ford and Sgt. James E. Goins, were killed in the La Belle bombing, and 80 other U.S. servicemen and women were injured. Some were permanently disabled.91 On September 19, 1989, a mid-air explosion killed 171 passengers and crew of the French airline UTA flight 772 over Niger in western Africa, including seven U.S. citizens. On March 10, 1999, a French court found six Libyans guilty in absentia for bombing the DC10 aircraft. In January 2008, U.S. District Judge Henry H. Kennedy ruled that Libya was directly responsible for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and ordered the Libyan government and specific Libyan officials to pay $6 billion in damages to the families and estates of six U.S. victims of the attack. Libya made payments to German and French victims for the two bombings.92 Legal representatives of the La Belle victims and representatives the Libyan government met several times in 2006 to discuss settlement terms, and reached an agreement in which the victims and their families relinquished further claims against Libyan government in return for a Libyan commitment to make specified settlement payments. The U.S. parties signaled their acceptance of the agreement by signing and transmitting to Libyan government representatives legal documents known as Release of Claims forms. The Libyan government did not make the payments described under the terms of the agreement, and the U.S. parties filed a motion before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the settlement agreement.93 In early July 2007, President Bush reportedly identified the resolution of the La Belle settlement as an issue of importance for further consolidation of U.S.-Libya relations in a letter to Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi. Under the terms of the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, the Bush Administration certified that sufficient funds for the LaBelle payments were made available to an independent entity under the supervision of the U.S. Secretary of State. Reporting suggested that some UTA plaintiffs have expressed dissatisfaction with the arrangements, stating, ―The courts have decided that Libya carried out the UTA 772 attack, and has awarded us compensation under the rule of law. [S. 3370] will invalidate the court‘s judgment, and allow Libya to avoid a court judgment.‖94

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Reestablishing Normal Bilateral Relations The reestablishment of normal bilateral relations between the United States and Libya has proceeded incrementally in the wake of Libya‘s December 2003 decision to relinquish its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. 

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On February 11, 2004, the United States opened a two-person interest section at the Belgian embassy in Tripoli, which was expanded to a larger Liaison Office in June 2004. The White House announced several measures on February 26, 2004, including recisions on bans on using U.S. passports to travel to or through Libya, and U.S. citizen expenditures in Libya. On September 20, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13357 that ended most economic sanctions against Libya, allowed air flights between the two countries, permitted Libyan purchases of U.S.-built aircraft, and released approximately $1 billion in Libyan assets that had been frozen in the United States. On September 28, 2005, President Bush issued two waivers of Arms Export Control Act restrictions on the export of defense articles to Libya. The waivers allowed U.S. companies to ―possibly participate‖ in Libya‘s efforts to destroy its chemical weapons and precursor stockpiles, along with the refurbishment of eight C-130 transport planes purchased by Libya in the 1970s that have been withheld for the last 30 years. The President has not indicated when or if the aircraft will be delivered.95 On May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya‘s listing as a state sponsor of terrorism and a country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31, when the United States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to Embassy status. On June 30, 2006, one day after the 45-day congressional notification period for the rescission of Libya‘s terrorism-related designations ended, the remaining restrictions on U.S. trade with Libya were removed, including the ban on the export of U.S. defense articles. Certain dual-use technology exports remain restricted under revised U.S. Commerce Department national security guidelines.96

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On September 30, 2006, President Bush signed the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 6198/P.L. 109-293), which removed Libya from the terms of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 107-24).

Prior to the announcement of plans to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya, some Members of Congress vocally supported further U.S. engagement in response to Libya‘s decision to rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile development programs.97 Many Members welcomed the announced changes, although some Members were vocal in calling for the Administration to obtain assurances from the Libyan government that it would adequately resolve the outstanding claims of some U.S. terrorism victims. The fulfillment of the Claims Settlement Agreement and the signing of Executive Order 13477 officially recognized the settlement of outstanding claims from the U.S. government‘s perspective, although some concerns may remain among private parties.

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Congressional Efforts on Behalf of U.S. Terrorism Victims Congressional concern over the outstanding legal claims of U.S. terrorism victims accompanied efforts to restore full diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya for several years. Congressional concerns related to a number of claims, including some related to prominent cases such as the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin, the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and the 1989 bombing of French airline UTA Flight 772 over Niger (For more information on these attacks and related claims, see Appendix B). From 2007 through mid-2008, an atmosphere of brinksmanship characterized U.S.-Libyan engagement, particularly with regard to outstanding terrorism claims. Some terror victims‘ families, associated legal counsel, and some Members of Congress sought to leverage remaining symbols of diplomatic normalization and new U.S.-Libya economic ties to pressure Libya to resolve pending cases. This included efforts to delay the construction of a new U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and postpone the confirmation of the Administration‘s nominee for the U.S. ambassadorship to Libya. Congress also enacted legislation to prohibit U.S. foreign assistance to Libya for FY2008 and to alter immunity and damage award provisions relating to Libyan-sponsored acts of terrorism.

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Liability Changes under Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181 Legislation enacted in January 2008 altered the legal environment in which some outstanding terrorism cases were being considered, and further complicated U.S.-Libyan relations. Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181, the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 4986, signed January 28, 2008) amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28 U.S.C.§§ 1602-1611) in order to provide a federal cause of action to sue foreign governments designated as state sponsors of terrorism for damages (including punitive damages) arising from terrorist acts committed or supported by that state.98 The provision includes measures designed to facilitate the enforcement of judgments by allowing a claimant to subject foreign government assets to liens of lis pendens as soon as a suit is filed and by permitting the attachment of indirectly held property to satisfy a final judgment. It also permits the refiling of certain dismissed cases, nullifying certain legal defenses that might have been available to defend against them, and permits the filing of new cases related to previously filed cases that would otherwise be time-barred. As such, the provisions could have proven applicable to Libya because Libya was previously designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and remained subject to lawsuits by victims of terrorist acts that were committed or alleged to have been committed by agents of Libya. Nearly $1.7 billion had been awarded against Libya, with an additional $5.3 billion awarded against certain named Libyan officials,99 with some twenty additional cases pending. As long as there were pending claims or outstanding judgments against Libya under the terrorism exception to the FSIA, U.S. companies doing business with Libya may have been subject to litigation by judgment creditors who believed the U.S. company was in possession of Libyan property that is subject to execution on a terrorism judgment.100 From January 2008 onward, legal representatives of U.S. terrorism victims reportedly filed liens of lis pendens on Libyan assets related to current contracts with legal and lobbying firms such as Blank & Rome, the Livingston Group, and White & Case.101 President Bush vetoed the original version of the bill (H.R. 1585) on December 27, 2007, based on concern that potential court proceedings related to Section 1083 of H.R. 1585 could tie up billions of dollars in Iraqi government funds in the United States, thus undermining efforts to rebuild Iraq and train Iraqi security forces. Conditional waiver authority for Iraq was included in H.R. 4986 and subsequently exercised.102 However, no specific provisions were included to limit the applicability of the provisions to Libya. In March 2008, the Administration proposed amending Section 1083 to include a new waiver provision to permit an exception with respect to all states

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whose designation as sponsors of terrorism have been rescinded if the President determines that the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.103 Under the terms of the Libyan Claims Resolution Act (P.L. 110-301), the applicability of Section 1083 provisions to Libya was suspended once the Bush Administration certified the receipt of $1.5 billion in settlement funds and issued Executive Order 13477 stating that claims covered by the agreement were settled.

End Notes

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1

The Arabic word jamahirriya means ―state of the masses‖ or ―peoples‘ authority‖ and was added to Libya‘s official name in 1978 by Col. Muammar al Qadhafi to reflect Libya‘s nominally decentralized political system. The adjective ‗great‘ was added in 1986. 2 Multiple spellings of Muammar al Qadhafi‘s first and last names are used in the Western press. This chapter uses a phonetic spelling; others reflect varying pronunciations. 3 Over time, Qadhafi stopped using his military title and identifying himself with a formal government position. Although he retains de facto control over Libya‘s affairs, he is now commonly referred to as the ―Guide of the Revolution‖ or ―Brother Leader.‖ 4 See Paul Richards, ―War as Smoke and Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991-2,1994-5,1995-6,‖ Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 78, Issue 2, Spring 2005; Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones, Broadway Books, New York, 2004, pp.23-25; The Economist, ―Foday Sankoh,‖ Vol. 368, August 9, 2003, p. 73; Economist, ―Qaddafi Says Farewell, Arabia, and Sets His Sights on Africa,‖ Vol. 351, April 24, 1999; I. Abdullah and P. Muana, ―The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,‖ in C. Clapham (ed.) African Guerrillas, London: James Currey, 1998, pp. 179-193; Scott Anderson, ―The Makeover,‖ New York Times Magazine, January 19, 2003; and Douglas Farah, ―Gaddafi ‗Meddling‘ in Africa,‖ Washington Post, August 16, 2003. 5 Muammar Qaddafi, ―The One-State Solution,‖ New York Times, January 22 2009. 6 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Report GMP20100305825009, ―PA‘s Abbas Reportedly Under Pressure From Fatah, PLO To Boycott Summit in Libya, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, (London) March 5, 2010; and, 7 For more information, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 8 Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi, Naval Institute Press, 2003; Bernard Gwertzman, ―Shultz Advocates U.S. Covert Programs to Depose Qaddafi,‖ New York Times, April 28, 1986; and Clifford Krauss, ―Failed Anti-Qaddafi Effort Leaves U.S. Picking Up the Pieces,‖ New York Times, March 12, 1991. 9 In January 2008, U.S. District Judge Henry H. Kennedy ruled that Libya was directly responsible for the bombing of UTA Flight 772 and ordered the Libyan government and specific Libyan officials to pay $6 billion in damages to the families and estates of six U.S. victims of the attack. 10 U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman quoted in Jay Solomon, ―U.S. Vies to Seal Libya Settlement, Preserve Detente,‖ April 2, 2008. 11 Claims Settlement Agreement between the United States of America and the Great Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, August 14, 2008. Text and Annex provided to CRS by U.S. Department of State.

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The acts defined in Article One of the agreement include ―an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking or detention or other terrorist act, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act‖ or ―military measures‖. 13 Certification Under Section 5(a)(2) of the Libyan Claims Resolution Act Relating to the Receipt of Funds for Settlement of Claims Against Libya, with Memorandum of Justification, signed and transmitted to Congress October 31, 2008. 14 The certification satisfied the requirement in Section 654 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act FY2008 (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764, signed December 26, 2007) relating to the provision of foreign assistance to Libya. Under the terms of Section 101 of H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329, signed September 30, 2008), the provision of FY2009 foreign assistance funding for Libya was prohibited prior to the certification issued on October 31, 2008. 15 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2010, Volume II, Request by Region, p. 442. Available at http://www.state. gov/documents/ organization/124072.pdf. 16 Section 21(c) of P.L. 90-629, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), states that IMET recipient countries are eligible to purchase non-IMET training at reduced cost. Section 108(a) of P.L. 99-83 amended the AECA to provide this reduced cost benefit to IMET recipients. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements the authority provided in P.L. 99-83 to apply a lower cost to U.S. military training purchased by IMET recipient countries through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. At present, the ―incremental rates‖ applied to the FMS training purchases of IMET recipient countries are calculated according to the terms outlined in Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 15, Chapter 7 (Sections 0711 and 0712). 17 CRS Analyst consultation with State Department personnel, May 2008. Plans for the new embassy compound included an office building, support annex, and quarters for a Marine Security Detachment. 18 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism - Libya, April 30, 2007. 19 As noted above, the Obama Administration‘s FY2010 foreign assistance request states that TSCTP funds may support counterterrorism assistance programs for Libya once the government agrees to join the initiative. The Bush Administration reportedly intended to extend TSCTP assistance to Libya, but Libya did not agree to participate in the program. See Ann Tyson, ―U.S. Pushes Anti-Terrorism in Africa,‖ Washington Post, July 26, 2005. 20 Khaled El-Deeb, ―Gadhafi: Regrets Reagan Died Before Being Tried for 1986 Air Strikes on Libya,‖ Associated Press, June 6, 2004. 21 For a detailed profile of Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi and a discussion of questions about the possibility of his succeeding his father, see Yehudit Ronen, ―Libya‘s Rising Star: Said AlIslam and Succession,‖ Middle East Policy, Vol. XII, No. 3, Fall 2005, pp. 136-44. 22 BBC Monitoring Middle East, ―Libyan leader says cabinet must be dismantled,‖ March 2, 2008; and, ―Libyan Leader Addresses Libyan People‘s Congress; Dissolves Cabinet,‖ OSC Report GMP20080305864001, March 3, 2008. 23 May Youssef, ―Anti-Gaddafists Rally in London,‖ Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo), No. 749, June 30 - July 6, 2005; Al Jazeera (Doha), ―Opposition Plans to Oust Al Qadhafi,‖ June 25, 2005; Middle East Mirror, ―Libya‘s Fractured Opposition,‖ July 29, 2005. 24 ―Libyan Opposition Groups Meet in London To Reiterate Commitment To Save Libya,‖ OSC Report GMP20080329825012, March 29, 2008. 25 ―Libya‘s Shalgam on Ties With US, S. Arabia, Opposition,‖ OSC Report GMP 20050924512001, September 24, 2005. 26 UPI, ―Libya Says Hundreds Return From Exile,‖ August 20, 2005. 27 Khalid Mahmoud, ―Libya: Surprise Return of More Opponents Following Secret Contacts,‖ Al Sharq Al Awsat (London), August 19, 2006.

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―Libyan Opposition Members Reportedly Return Home,‖ OSC Report GMP20100102950009, January 2, 2010. 29 Afaf El-Geblawi, ―Libya Frees All Jailed Muslim Brotherhood Members,‖ Agence France Presse, March 3, 2006. 30 ―Al Jazirah TV Interviews Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Current Situation,‖ OSC Report - GMP20050803550006, August 3, 2005. 31 ―Libyan MB Concerned Over Sayf al-Islam‘s Statements Regarding New Constitution,‖ OSC Report - GMP20070830282001, August 30, 2007. 32 ―Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Official on Libya‘s Foreign, Domestic Politics,‖ OSC Report GMP20081111635001, November 10, 2008. 33 U.S. Department of State, ―Libya,‖ Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, April 2005. 34 ―Al-Zawahiri, Al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Joins Al-Qa‘ida,‖ OSC Report FEA20071104393586, November 3, 2007. 35 ―Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Abroad Issues Statement Supporting Regime Dialogue.‖ OSC Report - GMP20090703825003, July 3, 2009. 36 ―Report on ‗Seething Anger‘ in Libya Over Dismantling Al Qa‘ida-Linked Cells,‖ OSC Report GMP20080630825001 June 30, 2008; ―Libya: Jailed Islamic Group Leaders ‗Preparing‘ To Renounce Armed Violence,‖ OSC Report GMP20080706837002, July 6, 2008; ―Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Source Announces Ideology Revision Nearly Complete,‖ OSC Report GMP20090615825012, June 15, 2009; and OSC Reports, GMP20090911452001, GMP20090911452002, GMP2009091145200, GMP20090910488004, GMP20090911452004, GMP20090915452001, ―Libyan Newspaper Publishes Libyan Fighting Group Retractions,‖ September 2009. 37 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing Al Qaida- Affiliated LIFG,‖ JS-4016, February 8, 2006. 38 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Three LIFG Members Designation for Terrorism,‖ HP-1244, October 30, 2008. 39 Alison Pargeter, ―Militant Groups Pose Security Challenge for Libyan Regime,‖ Janes Intelligence Review, Vol. 17, No. 8, August 2005, pp. 16-19. 40 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Libya - 2009, March 11, 2010. 41 Ibid. 42 Human Rights Watch, ―Truth and Justice Can‘t Wait: Human Rights Developments in Libya Amid Institutional Obstacles,‖ December 12, 2009. Available at http://www.hrw.org/node/87097. 43 According to the U.S. State Department, Libyan law provides for freedom of speech ―within the limits of public interest and principles of the Revolution.‖ In practice, criticism of the government and Qadhafi are restricted and often punished. By law, most print and broadcast media in Libya are owned and operated by government authorities, and the activities of private newspapers and broadcasters have come under scrutiny since early 2009, when outlets that had been given limited space to practice independent journalism were renationalized. Satellite and Internet access are limited and partially censored. 44 ―Libyan Leader‘s Son on Call to Reopen Human Rights Files,‖ OSC Report – GMP 20050820537003, August 20, 2005. 45 ―Libyan Leader‘s Son Outlines his Version of Democracy,‖ OSC Report – GMP 20070823950058, August 20, 2007. 46 Human Rights Watch, ―Libya: Words to Deeds The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform,‖ Volume 18, No. 1(E), January 2006. 47 On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement urging ―the Libyan government to fulfill their promise to release without condition‖ prominent political activist Fathi al Jahmi. U.S. Department of State Deputy Spokesman Tom Casey, Press Statement: Washington, DC, March 31, 2008

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Issues Related to United States Relations With Libya On-the-Record Briefing Washington, DC, May 15, 2006. 49 Testimony of Theresa M. Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa before the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, August 2, 2007. 50 Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam stated, ―The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) will not allow the presence of any foreign soldier on its soil, because people in this region object to that, the authorities are not thinking of such presence and even others are aware of the fact that this region will not accept the presence of any kind of foreign troops on its territory.‖ ―Libyan Foreign Minister on Maghreb Union, US Military Command in Africa,‖ OSC Report GMP20071201950028, November 30, 2007. 51 Voice of America, ―U.S. Military Delegation in Nigeria for AFRICOM Talks,‖ November 29, 2007. 52 See Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1998. 53 International Monetary Fund, Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, IMF Country Report No. 09/294, September 2009. 54 ―Libyan Leader Says ‗Problems Abroad‘ Solved,‖ OSC Report GMP20050919710040, September 19, 2005; Reuters, ―Libya Very Happy With High Oil Prices - Gaddafi,‖ July 4, 2005. 55 The prime minister serves as the chairman of the Council. Other members include outside experts, the head of the NOC, the ministers of economy, trade, employment, finance, and the central bank governor. Vahe Petrossian, ―Libya Sees Panel on the Fast Track,‖ Upstream, September 15 2006; and, Reuters, ―Libya Oil Licensing Round Attracts Many Offers - NOC,‖ September 26, 2006. 56 U.S. Energy Information Admin. (EIA), Libya Country Analysis Brief, July 2009. 57 CRS calculation based on EIA U.S. Imports by Country of Origin data, Monthly-thousand barrels per day, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ dnav/pet/pet_move_ impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_m.htm. 58 EIA, Libya Country Analysis Brief, July 2009. 59 WWP Report on Oil, Gas & Petrochemicals, ―Libya: Multi-billion Dollar Joint Venture Agreement to Modernize Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Plant,‖ June 1, 2005. 60 Polya Lesova, ―Gazprom seeks to buy all of Libya‘s oil, gas exports,‖ MarketWatch, July 10, 2008. 61 Facts on File World News Digest, ―U.S. Bars Libya Planes, Training,‖ September 20, 1975; and Washington Post, ―Libya‘s Qaddafi Praises Carter, Urges Closer Ties,‖ June 13, 1977. In 2004, Libya sold 40 of its aging Mirage fighters to Pakistan. 62 Senior Middle East security analyst Anthony Cordesman has described Libya as ―the world‘s largest military parking lot.‖ For a more detailed profile of the Libyan military, see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 15, 2004, pp. 79-85. 63 For a detailed account of Libya‘s recent military procurement activities, see Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa, ―Procurement – Libya,‖ June 22, 2009. 64 AFP, ―French Defence Minister Holds Talks in Libya,‖ February 5, 2005; Andrew Borowiec, ―Paris Strengthens Military Ties with Libya,‖ Washington Times, February 17, 2005; and Flight International, ―France Eyes Libyan Deal,‖ August 1, 2006. 65 Antony Barnett, ―MoD targets Libya and Iraq as ‗Priority‘ Arms Sales Targets,‖ Observer (London), September 24, 2006; and, Independent (London), ―MoD targets arms deals with Libya,‖ March 9, 2007. 66 ―Under the negotiated deal, France would supply Libya with 14 Rafale aircraft as part of a larger arms package valued at between $5.7 billion and $6.4 billion. Forecast International Defense Intelligence Newsletters, ―Deadline for Libyan-French Arms Package Negotiations Likely to be Extended,‖ June 12, 2008; Reuben Johnson, ―Dassault denies sale of Rafale to Libya is imminent,‖ Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 26, 2009.

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Tor-M1 air defense missiles were reported as part of the potential package along with MiG29SMT fighter interceptors and Su-30MK multi-mission fighter aircraft. ITAR-TASS World Service (Russia), ―Russia-Libya military cooperation increasing,‖ April 17, 2008. 68 For a detailed discussion of Libya‘s WMD programs and disarmament see CRS Report RS21823, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Sharon Squassoni. 69 John K. Cooley, ―Qaddafi‘s Great Aim for Libya is a Nuclear Capability of its Own, Christian Science Monitor, November 12, 1980; New York Times, ―Nuclear Energy Aide And Foreign Adviser Appointed in Tripoli,‖ January 8, 1981; Joshua Sinai, ―Libya‘s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,‖ Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 92-100; and Associated Press, ―Japan Company Sold Atomic Plant to Libya,‖ March 12, 2004. 70 In 1987, for example, Qadhafi said that, ―Now that the Israelis possess the atomic weapon, the Arabs have nothing before them except to work day and night to possess the atomic weapon in order to defend their existence.‖ Reuters, ―Gaddafi Urges Arabs to Develop Nuclear Weapons,‖ September 2, 1987. See also San Francisco Chronicle ―Khadafy Wants Arab ABombs,‖ June 23, 1987; and Agence France-Presse, ―Libya Urges Arabs to Get Nuclear Arms,‖ January 27, 1996. Qadhafi made similar remarks in a March 2002 interview: ―We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction that the Israelis have ... Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that weapon.‖ John Bolton, Remarks to the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, May 6, 2002. 71 The IAEA does not directly identify Dr. Khan or Pakistan as a source for nuclear weapons designs or enrichment equipment disclosed by Libya. Leslie Lopez, ―Libyans Got Nuclear Training at Malaysian Company, Police Say,‖ Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2004; Stephen Fidler and Mark Huband, ―Turks and South Africans ‗Helped Libya‘s Secret Nuclear Arms Project‘,‖ Financial Times, June 10, 2004; Craig Whitlock and Shannon Smiley, ―Germany Arrests Man in Libyan Atomic Case,‖ Washington Post, October 12, 2004; Douglas Frantz and William C. Rempel, ―New Find in a Nuclear Network,‖ Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2004. 72 Elaine Sciolino, ―U.S. Sends 2,000 Gas Masks to the Chadians,‖ New York Times, September 25, 1987. 73 Joshua Sinai, ―Libya‘s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,‖ Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 92-100; Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) et al., ―Educational Module on Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation: Case Study: Libya,‖ 1998-2001. 74 Andrew Koch, ―Libya‘s Missile Programme Secrets Revealed,‖ Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 18, 2004. 75 Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula A. DeSutter Before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, September 22, 2004; and, Douglas Franz and Josh Meyer, ―The Deal to Disarm Kadafi,‖ Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2005. 76 William J. Broad, ―Libya‘s Crude Bomb Design Eases Western Experts‘ Fear,‖ New York Times, February 9, 2004; David Crawford, ―Libya Was Far From Building Nuclear Bomb,‖ Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2004; and William J. Broad, ―Arms Control Group Says U.S. Inflated Libya‘s Nuclear Bid,‖ New York Times, March 25, 2004. 77 International Atomic Energy Agency, Staff Report: Removal of High-Enriched Uranium in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, March 8, 2004; RIA Novosti (Moscow), ―Russia Supplies 14kg of Low-Enriched Uranium to Libya,‖ December 23, 2005. 78 William C. Mann, ―U.S. Says Libya Has Returned 20 Kilograms of Weapons-grade Uranium to Russia,‖ Associated Press, July 27, 2006; U.S. National Nuclear Safety Administration, ―NNSA Secures Nuclear Material from Libya,‖ July 27, 2006; and Associated Press, ―Oak Ridge Workers Assess Uranium in Libya,‖ July 29, 2006.

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Katherine Griffiths, ―Libya Stalls on Pledge to Destroy Stock of Uranium,‖ Daily Telegraph (UK), August 13, 2007; BBC Monitoring/Al Jazeera (Qatar), ―Libyan Official Slams UK Paper‘s Uranium Allegations, Says Supply ‗Known,‘‖ August 13, 2007. 80 According to the OPCW, ―Destruction levels remained at 0% of Category 1 chemical weapons and 39% (551 metric tonnes) of Category 2 chemical weapons.‖ Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction in 2008, Fourteenth Session C-14/4, December 2, 2009. 81 The facility is known as the ―Rabta Toxic Chemical Disposal Facility and Ruwagha Chemicals Reloading System.‖ The Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Request for Extension of the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the Destruction of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, OPCW Executive Council, EC-58/NAT.5/Add.1, October 14, 2009. 82 OPCW Conference of State Parties, Decision: Extension of the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the Destruction by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, C-14/DEC.3, December 2, 2009. 83 See Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine, ―Return Oldest U.S. MIAs,‖ Volume 94, Issue 1, September 1, 2006; and the Somers Point Historical Society, information available at http://www.richardsomers.org. 84 Sunday Times (London), ―Focus: Was Justice Done?‖ October 23, 2005; Magnus Linklater, ―It‘s Time To Look Again at Lockerbie,‖ The Times (London), October 26, 2005. 85 Derek Lambie, ―Diplomat ‗Evidence‘ May Clear Megrahi of Flight 103 Bomb,‖ Express on Sunday (UK), September 24, 2006. 86 An executive summary of the SCCRC‘s findings in support of further appeal is available online at http://www.sccrc.org.uk/ViewFile.aspx?id=293. 87 Letter from the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah to the President of the Security Council, reprinted in United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office Release - ―UK Calls for Lifting of UN Sanctions on Libya,‖ August 15, 2003. 88 On April 21, 2004, Libya extended its unilaterally set deadline for the recision and payment to the victims‘ families to July 22, 2004. Libya extended the deadline a second time to September 22, 2004. Lawyers and U.S. negotiators secured a third extension to April 30, 2005; however, Libya froze the final round of $2 million payments (worth an estimated $500 million) and reasserted its demand for removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list. Associated Press, ―Libyan Central Bank Takes Back Last Batch of Compensation Money Due to Lockerbie Victims,‖ April 9, 2005. 89 John Robertson, ―Angiolini Rapped over Lockerbie File,‖ The Scotsman (UK), December 21, 2007. 90 Ian MacKenzie, ―Scottish judges call for secret Lockerbie papers,‖ Reuters, May 29, 2008. 91 See Robert Lee Beecham, et al., v. Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 01 CIV 02243, District of Columbia Circuit. 92 Libya paid a total of $33 million in compensation to the victim‘s families in July 1999. France re-negotiated the settlement in 2003 and received about $1 million for each victim. See Robert L. Pugh, et al. v. The Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Civ. A. No. 02-2026, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 93 At issue is the question of whether the Libyan representatives who participated in the meetings with the U.S. parties when the terms of the agreement were outlined has ―apparent authority‖ to represent the Libyan government and commit to binding agreements on its behalf. See Robert Lee Beecham, et al. V. Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Civ. A. No. 01-2243 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 94 Adam Graham-Silverman, ―Congress Clears Measure Limiting Further Terrorism Lawsuits Against Libya,‖ Congressional Quarterly, July 31, 2008. 95 The C-130s remain in storage at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Georgia. They reportedly remain militarily useful, bur will require technology upgrades and significant repair. The Administration reportedly has declined to release the planes, but may plan to allow their

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sale and the return of the proceeds, minus repair and storage costs, to Libya. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, ―Bound to the Ground: Libyan C-130s Still Parked 30 Years After Purchase,‖ May 2, 2004; and, Renae Merle, ―After 30 Years, Libya Can‘t Get Its Planes, Might Get Repair Bill,‖ Washington Post, August 18, 2006. 96 Inside U.S. Trade, ―BIS Removes Libya‘s State Sponsor-related Export Controls,‖ Vol. 24, No. 36, September 8, 2006. 97 After an August 2005 visit to Libya, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman Lugar called Libya ―an important partner for [the United States] on the war against terrorism,‖ and indicated that he would ―work constructively on the assumption that it‘s in our best interest to normalize the relationship, to get an embassy there, to get an ambassador.‖ Representative Lantos introduced the ―United States-Libya Relations Act of 2005‖ (H.R. 1453) calling for the dispatch of a charge d‘affaires to Libya, the negotiation of an agreement for the establishment of a full U.S. embassy in Tripoli, and a number of cooperative security, economic, and cultural initiatives. Sylvia Smith, ―Libya Wins Lugar, Souder‘s Praise,‖ Fort Wayne Journal Gazette, September 25, 2005. 98 See CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea. 99 For legal analysis, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea. 100 The new legislation addresses the rights of third parties who have an interest in property that may be subject to levy in execution on a judgment. The conference report for H.R. 1585 (H.Rept. 110-477) applies to P.L. 110-181 and states the conferees intention with regard to the application of Section 1083 was to ―encourage the courts to protect the property interests of such innocent third parties by using their inherent authority, on a case-by-case basis, under the applicable procedures governing execution on judgment and attachment in anticipation of judgment.‖ 101 Kevin Bogardus, ―Libya contracts targeted to fund terror victims‘ compensation,‖ The Hill, June 4, 2008. 102 The waiver authority provided in Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181 requires the President to determine that a waiver for Iraq is in the national security interest of the United States and will ―promote the reconstruction of, the consolidation of democracy in, and the relations of the United States with, Iraq.‖ The President also must determine that Iraq continues to be a reliable ally in combating international terrorism. President Bush waived the application of Section 1083 of P.L. 110-181 to Iraq on January 28, 2008, by issuing Presidential Determination No. 2008-9. 103 Text of the Administration proposal was included in the correspondence from U.S.-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman, and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leaders Harry Reid, et al., March 18, 2008.

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Chapter 5

MOROCCO: CURRENT ISSUES* Carol Migdalovitz

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SUMMARY The United States government views Morocco as a moderate Arab regime, an ally against terrorism, and a free trade partner. King Mohammed VI retains supreme power but has taken incremental liberalizing steps. Since 9/11, Moroccan expatriates have been implicated in international terrorism, and Morocco has suffered terror attacks. Morocco takes a proactive approach to countering terror, but some of its measures may be setting back progress in human rights. Morocco‘s foreign policy focuses largely on Europe, particularly France and Spain, and the United States. In the Middle East, it supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has severed diplomatic relations with Iran for bilateral reasons.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS The Moroccan royal dynasty has ruled the country since 1649. The reigning king, Mohammed VI, ascended to the throne in 1999. He is *

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report RS21579, dated February 3, 2010.

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committed to building a democracy, but he remains the preeminent state authority. The king chairs the Council of State that endorses all legislation before it goes to parliament, appoints the prime minister and ministers of foreign affairs, interior, defense, and Islamic Affairs, and approves other ministers. He sets the agenda of parliament in an annual Speech from the Throne, dissolves parliament, calls elections, and rules by decree. The king also has a ―shadow government‖ of royal advisors and is head of the military. Reforms depend on the king‘s will, and he has undertaken several hallmark liberalizing initiatives. The king also is said to be tied to significant economic enterprises in the country. The September 2002 election for the 325-seat Chamber of Representatives, a weak lower house chosen by universal suffrage, was deemed the first free, fair, and transparent election ever held in Morocco. The September 2007 election also met international standards, but only 37% of the voters turned out and 19% cast blank ballots, reflecting widespread disillusionment with the political process and popular understanding of the powerlessness of the legislature. The nationalist Istiqlal (Independence) Party, Morocco‘s oldest party, placed first. Its Secretary-General, Abbas al Fassi, became Prime Minister and formed a four-party coalition government with a 34-member cabinet, including an unprecedented five women ministers. The moderate and well-organized Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), also known as Al Misbah (the beacon) Party, had expected to win the election; it placed second and charged irregularities, but accepted the legitimacy of the outcome. Some 23 parties and blocs plus independents are represented in the current legislature. In August 2008, Fouad Ali al Himma established the Party for Authenticity and Modernity (PAM). Al Himma is a former classmate of King Mohammed VI and former deputy interior minister. He was elected to parliament as an independent in 2007 and became chairman of its Committee on Foreign, Defense, and Islamic Affairs. Al Himma has not assumed the leadership of PAM; he is deputy leader and considered the party‘s de facto head. In September 2008, PAM formed an parliamentary alliance with the National Rally of Independents (RNI) and it has sought alliances with other parties known as recipients of royal patronage. PAM‘s ideology is incoherent, but its goals reportedly are to ―rationalize‖ the political landscape by diminishing the number of parties, encourage more participation in politics, and challenge or marginalize the PJD.1 In May 2009, PAM pulled out of the coalition government. The Movement Populaire (MP/Popular Movement)

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joined the government and provided some stability as did some new appointments. Few were surprised by PAM‘s first place finish with 21.6% of the vote in elections for seats on municipal councils on June 12, 2009, when PJD took sixth place. PAM also placed first in the October 2, 2009 elections for onethird of the 270 seats in the Chamber of Counselors, the upper house. PAM offers a sharp contrast to other parties, which are led by much older men who view women with suspicion and probably put them on electoral lists mainly to meet official quotas, and reach out to voters only before elections. Some politicians fear that PAM is a nascent state party similar to those in Egypt and Tunisia that might be used to dominate politics.2 Moreover, some observers predict that Al Himma will be the next prime minister. The Islamist Al Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity/JCO), officially banned as a political movement, is the largest grassroots organization in the country and is led by Shaykh Abdessalem Yassine. It is considered more closely attuned to constituents than political parties. JCO called for a boycott of the 2007 national election, arguing that participation was pointless without constitutional reform—ostensibly aimed at diminishing the role of the monarchy. It often conveys its views in street demonstrations, e.g., against the Family Code, in support of the Palestinians and against Israel, etc.

TERRORISM The monarchy often asserted that its claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammed was a shield against Islamist militancy. This belief has been shattered since September 11, 2001, as expatriate Moroccans have been implicated in terrorism abroad, and Morocco has suffered from terrorism at home. Morocco has tried to distance itself from its expatriates, blaming their experiences in exile for their radicalization. German courts tried two Moroccans for aiding the 9/11 terrorists. A Moroccan imam was ―the spiritual father of the Hamburg cell‖ that helped execute and support the 9/11 attacks; he founded the Salafiya Jihadiya (Reformist Holy War/‖Jihadists‖) movement.3 A French-Moroccan, Zacarias Moussaoui, was tried in the United States as the 20th hijacker for 9/11. Eighteen Moroccans allegedly linked to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan were detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; three remain there. Returnees have been convicted in Moroccan courts.

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Numerous small, isolated, tactically limited Salafi jihadist cells are the main threat to Morocco‘s domestic security. Such cells perpetrated their major attacks in 2002, with the murders of locals who had committed ―impure acts‖ such as drinking alcohol. In 2003, a jihadist spiritual leader, who had fought in Afghanistan and praised the 9/11 attacks and Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, was convicted of inciting violence against Westerners. In February 2003, Osama Bin Laden listed Morocco among the ―oppressive, unjust, apostate ruling governments,‖ which he characterized as ―enslaved by America‖ and, therefore, ―most eligible for liberation.‖4 To some observers, this fatwa or religious edict appeared to trigger attacks in Morocco on May 16, 2003, in which 14 suicide bombers identified as Salafiya Jihadiya adherents linked to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) and Al Qaeda attacked five Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca, killing 45 and injuring more than 100. A large GICM network later was implicated in the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, for which two Moroccans were convicted. (A Moroccan court convicted one of their accomplices recently.) Moroccans suspected of GICM affiliation were arrested in several European countries. In 2005, the U.S. State Department designated GICM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), but the Department now states that ―much of the GICM‘s leadership in Morocco and Europe has been killed, imprisoned, or are awaiting trial.‖5 The Moroccan government convicted the group‘s alleged leader in absentia for his role in the Casablanca attacks, but he remains free in exile in the United Kingdom which found insufficient evidence against him.6 Moroccan and European authorities continue to disrupt cells that they say are linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM/ also known as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)), formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a group originating in Algeria with regional ambitions. AQIM has not perpetrated a successful terrorist attack in Morocco, where its threat stems mainly from the potential transfer of operational capabilities to inexperienced radicals and from its active efforts to recruit and incite Moroccans. In April 2007, two suicide attacks occurred near the U.S. Consulate and the American Language Center in Casablanca; the bombers killed only themselves. In September 2009, Moroccan security services arrested 24 suspects who allegedly were linked to a terrorist network linked to Al Qaeda specialized in recruiting volunteers for Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Moroccans have fought with insurgents in Iraq.

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COUNTERTERRORISM Morocco is cooperating with U.S. and European agencies to counter terrorism at home and abroad. The U.S. State Department recognized that in 2008:

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The Moroccan government pursued a comprehensive counterterrorism approach that, building on popular rejection of terrorism, emphasizes neutralizing existing terrorist cells through traditional law enforcement and preemptive security measures, and prevented terrorist recruitment through comprehensive counter-radicalization policies. Morocco aggressively targeted and dismantled terrorist cells within the Kingdom by leveraging policing techniques, coordinating and focusing the security services, and expanding and bolstering regional partnerships. These efforts resulted in the neutralization of numerous Salafi Jihadi-inspired terrorist groups....7

To counter radical Islamism, Morocco also has exerted greater control over religious leaders and councils, created new theological councils, retrained imams, deployed supervisors to oversee their sermons, closed unregulated mosques, retrained and rehabilitated some individuals convicted of terrorrelated crimes to correct their understanding of Islam, and launched radio and television stations and a website to transmit ―Moroccan religious values‖ of tolerance. In 2005, the king launched a $1.2 billion National Initiative for Human Development to redress socioeconomic conditions extremists exploit for recruitment. Observers have questioned its effectiveness.

HUMAN RIGHTS The U.S. State Department described human rights problems in Morocco in 2008 in the following way: Citizens did not have the right to change the constitutional provisions establishing their monarchical form of government or the establishment of the practice of Islam. Reports of torture and other abuses by various branches of the security forces persisted, and prison conditions remained below international standards. Reports of arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and police and security force impunity continued. Politics, as well as corruption and inefficiency, influenced the judiciary, which was not fully independent. The government restricted freedoms of speech, religion, and the

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press. Corruption was a serious problem in all branches of government. Trafficking in persons continued, and child labor, particularly in the unregulated informal sector, remained a problem.8

At the king‘s initiative, parliament enacted revolutionary changes to the Family Code or Moudawana in January 2004, making polygamy rare by requiring permission of a judge and the man‘s first wife, raising the legal age for marriage for girls to 18, and simplifying divorce procedures for women, among other changes to improve the status of women. However, family court judges have not applied the law strictly and women continue to suffer from inequality and violence.9 The king also created an Equity and Reconciliation Commission to provide an historical record of abuses before 1999, to account for the ―disappeared,‖ and to compensate victims. In 2001, he launched a dialogue on Berber culture, and the government has since authorized the teaching of Berber dialects and issued a textbook in Berber.10 After the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, parliament passed antiterrorism laws to define terrorist crimes and establish procedures for tracking terrorist finances. Human rights activists expressed concern about their legislative restrictions on the press, detention without charge, and reduced requirements for the death penalty. Other observers questioned whether elements in the regime were using the threat of Islamist terror to roll back reforms. Some worried that detention may create radicals who will eventually be released into society.11 Problems with human rights practices in Morocco also involve the Western Sahara issue (see Foreign Policy, below) as seen in the case of Aminatou Haidar, an advocate for Saharoui self-determination. When she returned from receiving a human rights prize in the United States in November 2009, Haidar wrote ―Western Sahara‖ as her address on customs forms to reenter Laayoune (alt: El Ayoun), but the authorities rejected the forms, claimed that she had thereby renounced her citizenship, confiscated her passport, and expelled her to the Spanish Canary Islands. Haidar then went on a highly publicized 32-day hunger strike. After reported pressure from the United States, Haidar was allowed into Laayoune in what Moroccan authorities described as ―a humanitarian gesture.‖12

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ECONOMY Large portions of Morocco‘s gross domestic product (18.8%) and labor force (44.6%) continue to depend on agriculture and are vulnerable to rainfall fluctuations. Through internal and Western Saharan mines, Morocco controls 75% of the world phosphate market and is the world‘s leading exporter of phosphates, which are used in fertilizers. The phosphate industry and much of the economy are dominated by the royal family and the so-called ―500 families‖ who control large, multi-sectoral holding companies and are close to the monarchy. Services and tourism are considered growth sectors, with tourism and remittances from abroad providing foreign exchange. Remittances from an estimated 3 million expatriates, mainly in France, Spain, Italy, and Belgium, account for about 9% of the gross national product.

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MOROCCO: BASIC FACTS Population: 31.3 million (July 2009 est.) Gross Domestic Product growth rate: 4% (2009 est.) Gross Domestic Product per capita: $4,600 (2009 est.) Inflation: 2% (2009 est.) Unemployment: 9.1% (2009 est.) Exports: clothing, electronic components, inorganic chemicals, transistors, crude minerals, fertilizers (including phosphates), petroleum products, fruit, and vegetables Imports: crude petroleum, textile fabric, telecommunications equipment, wheat, gas and electricity Major Trading Partners: France, Spain, Brazil, Italy, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, United States Source: CIA, The World Factbook, January 15, 2010.

The public sector remains large, although there is a successful, if erratic, privatization program. Foreign direct investment has grown despite the impediments of excessive red tape and corruption.13 Economic growth and reforms have been insufficient to reduce the unemployment, especially of the young, and poverty which drive Moroccans abroad and produce terrorists. The current government‘s goals include achieving 6% gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, creating 250,000

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new jobs, and building 150,000 housing units a year until 2013. While perhaps overambitious, these targets reflect the government‘s intent to combat poverty and unemployment. The government‘s plans have been affected by the global financial crisis/recession which has resulted in thousands of job losses in textiles and automotives, as well as in decreases in tourist spending, expatriate remittances, and exports, especially phosphates. In 2009, however, a surge in farm yields offset these difficulties and helped produce positive growth. Oil price increases have detrimental effects on the economy because imports supply 97% of the country‘s energy needs. This situation has prompted Morocco to adopt a more proactive approach to diversity its energy sources. In November 2009, the government announced plans to invest more than $9 billion to install 2,000 megawatts of solar power and have 42% of the country‘s electrical capacity rely on that source by 2020. It also has expressed interest in an ambitious European plan, called Desertec, to draw solar power from the Sahara. Morocco‘s reported plans to pursue a domestic nuclear energy program have not advanced beyond the consideration and planning phase.

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FOREIGN POLICY Western Sahara The dispute between Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) over the former Spanish colony south of Morocco remains unresolved. Morocco occupies 80% of the Western Sahara, considers the region its three southern provinces, will only accept a solution that guarantees it sovereignty over ―the whole of its territories,‖ and will only negotiate on that basis. The king submitted an autonomy plan for the region to the U.N. in April 2007, and Moroccan and Polisario negotiators met four times under U.N. auspices in 2007 and 2008.14 In line with his autonomy initiative, King Mohammed VI has pursued policies of decentralization or regionalization that he says are intended to empower residents of his Saharan provinces. On April 10, 2007, then Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns stated that the United States considers the Moroccan autonomy plan for the Western Sahara ―serious and credible.‖ In 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that U.S. policy on the

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issue is unchanged and she called on Morocco and Algeria to engage in unconditional negotiations. The current Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary General for the Western Sahara, former U.S. Ambassador Christopher Ross, was appointed in January 2009. He has made several visits to the region and convened an ―informal meeting‖ of the parties in Austria in August 2009. Secretary General Ban Kimoon has announced that the next set of informal talks will take place in Westchester County, New York, on February 10-11, 2010. In October 2001, Morocco had authorized French and U.S. oil companies to explore off the Saharan coast, and the prospect of discoveries, as yet unrealized, may have hardened Morocco‘s resolve to retain the region.

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Algeria Morocco and Algeria have a longstanding regional rivalry. The Western Sahara is the main impediment to improving their bilateral relations and to reviving the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), a loose organization of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya. Morocco refuses to compromise on the Western Sahara issue for the sake of bilateral relations or the UMA. Algeria hosts and backs the Polisario. Despite these disagreements, there is some cooperation to counter terrorism and illegal immigration. In July 2004, the king abolished visa requirements for Algerians entering Morocco; in April 2006, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika reciprocated the gesture. Since March 2008, Morocco has repeatedly requested that Algeria reopen their land border, but Algeria refuses to do so on the grounds that it would be detrimental to its national security and benefit Morocco more than Algeria.

Europe Morocco‘s Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) came into force on March 1, 2000, and is supposed to lead to a free trade agreement by 2012. In October 2008, Morocco became the first southern Mediterranean country to be granted ―advanced status relations‖ by the EU, opening up EU markets more for Moroccan products. Morocco participates in the EU‘s EuroMediterranean Partnership and its Neighborhood Policy Plan and receives considerable EU aid€190 million ($265 million ) annually. Illegal

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immigrationof Moroccans and of sub-Saharan Africans transiting Morocco to Europe and drug (cannabis)-trafficking have caused friction in MoroccanEuropean relations. High unemployment drives Moroccan youths to Europe and EU-funded programs to shift farmers in the underdeveloped Rif Mountains from cannabis cultivation to alternative crops have not been successful. Morocco traditionally has had good relations with France and Spain, its former colonizers. Relations with France, Morocco‘s largest trading partner, are particularly close. Paris officially supports U.N. efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute and Morocco‘s autonomy proposal for the region, and blocks Security Council initiatives on the matter that Morocco rejects. Morocco‘s relations with Spain have been intermittently discordant. Spain possesses two enclaves on Morocco‘s Mediterranean coast, Ceuta and Melilla, that are vestiges of colonialism and are claimed by Morocco. In October 2001, Morocco recalled its ambassador from Madrid after pro-Saharan groups in Spain conducted a mock referendum on the fate of the region. In July 2002, Spanish troops ejected Moroccan soldiers from the uninhabited Perejel/Parsley or Leila Island off the Moroccan coast that Spain says it has controlled for centuries. Diplomatic ties were not restored until January 2003. That July, Morocco complained that Spain lacked neutrality on the Sahara issue when it chaired the Security Council and, in October, Spain suspended arms sales to Morocco due to the Perejel crisis. Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero visited Morocco in April 2004, and King Juan Carlos I visited in January 2005; on both occasions, joint statements called for a negotiated settlement to the Sahara issue—the Moroccan position. Moroccan soldiers have served under Spanish command in the U.N. stabilization mission in Haiti and Moroccan gendarmes have joined Spanish patrols to combat illegal immigration in the Strait of Gibraltar. However, visits to Ceuta and Melilla by the Spanish prime minister in January 2006 and monarchs in November 2007 again set back relations. The two neighbors also have an unresolved dispute concerning territorial waters between Morocco and the Spanish Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean. Morocco‘s ―super port‖ at Tangiers will pose competition that concerns Spanish ports. Financed by Gulf countries, its construction began in June 2009 and it is expected to achieve full capacity in 2014. Nonetheless, territorial disputes appear secondary to the two neighbors‘ continuing and productive cooperation in countering terrorism and illegal immigration. Morocco notably assisted Spanish authorities in the investigation of the March 2004 bombings in Madrid and this relationship continues.

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Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. Figure 1. Map of Morocco

Middle East The king chairs the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and supports international efforts to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in viable, contiguous, Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. He recognizes President Mahmud Abbas as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people in Abbas‘s dispute with Hamas and urges Palestinian national unity in order to achieve their rights. Morocco closed Israel‘s liaison bureau in Morocco and Morocco‘s office in Tel Aviv in reaction to Israel‘s conduct during the first Palestinian intifadah (uprising) in 2001.The offices have not reopened. Morocco condemned Israel‘s conduct against Palestinian civilians during its December 2007/January 2008 military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Moroccan political groups of all stripes held some of the largest rallies in the

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Arab world in protest. In October 2009, Mohammed VI called on ―the international community … to exert pressure on Israel to make it cease its oppressive practices directed against the helpless Palestinian people, and to compel it to return forthwith to the negotiating table, comply with UN resolutions….‖15 In November, Foreign Minister Fassi-Fihri said that normalization of relations with Israel was not on the table under current conditions and that Morocco continued to support that Arab Peace Initiative – which promised Israel full normalization of relations in exchange for its withdrawal from all Arab territories. However, the king and others keep up contacts with Israeli officials and, in August 2005, he personally congratulated Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on Israel‘s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The link may be unbreakable because some 600,000 Israelis are of Moroccan origin, and about 25,000 of them travel to Morocco yearly. (There are about 5,000 Moroccan Jews still in Morocco.) In March 2009, Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Iran, blaming it for ―intolerable interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom.‖ The Foreign Ministry accused the Iranian Embassy in Rabat of seeking to spread Shi‘a Islam in the 99% Sunni kingdom. It also charged Iranian officials with making unacceptable remarks following Morocco‘s expression of solidarity with Bahrain in the face of Iran‘s claim to Bahrain.16 The situation rapidly deteriorated. Tehran charged that Morocco‘s decision harmed ―the unity of the Islamic world‖ and the solidarity needed to support the Palestinian people. Rabat rejected the allegation and argued that, ―Iran is not qualified to speak for the Islamic world.... Morocco does not need lessons from Iran or anybody else to show solidarity with the Palestinian people....‖17 Shortly after the dispute began, King Mohammed VI acknowledged the Holocaust in a speech read in his name at a ceremony in Paris, thereby indirectly answering Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad‘s Holocaust denials. It was said that the speech was the first time an Arab leader took such a stand on the Holocaust.18

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES The United States and Morocco have long-term, good relations. Successive Administrations, of both political parties, have viewed Morocco as a steady and close ally and as a moderate Arab state that supports the ArabIsraeli peace process. In January 2009, King Mohammed VI congratulated President Obama on his election and seized the opportunity ―to say how

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satisfied I am with the special strategic partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the United States of America.‖19 On April 8, after meeting Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi-Fihri, Secretary of State Clinton said, ―We are so committed to our relationship and have a very high regard for the extraordinary progress that has taken place in Morocco ... and we look forward to deepening and strengthening our relationship.‖ In 2004, President Bush designated Morocco a major non-NATO ally. Morocco is part of NATO‘s Mediterranean Dialogue, has hosted and participated in NATO military exercises, and has joined NATO‘s Operation Active Endeavor, monitoring the Mediterranean Sea for terrorists. In addition, bilateral U.S.-Moroccan military exercises are held regularly. Morocco also is cooperating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). In December 2007, the Defense Department announced an Foreign Military Financing (FMF) sale to Morocco of 24 F-16 aircraft and associated equipment and services for up to $2.4 billion. They will be delivered in 20112015.

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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Morocco (in thousands of dollars)

ESF FMF IMET INCLE NADR DA 1207

FY2008 Actual 15,374 3,625 1,713 496 1,119 4,136

FY2009 Actual 0 3,655 1,916 1,000 625 18,000 5,080

FY2010 Estimated 3,000 9,000 1,800 750 1,200 19,546

FY2011 Request 3,000 9,000 1,900 3,000 Not Available 24,500

Notes: FMF=Foreign Military Financing, ESF=Economic Support Funds, IMET=International Military Education and Training, INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, NADR=Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Activities, DA=Development Assistance. 1207 funds are appropriated for the Department of Defense and transferred to the State Department for ―Stabilization and Security.‖20

Table 2. U.S. Trade with Morocco (in millions of dollars)

Exports to Morocco Imports from Morocco

2007 1,181.7 586.6

2008 1,297.55 812.0

2009 1,457.3 425.9

Source: World Trade Atlas database.

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Bilateral ties have been strengthened by cooperation in the fight against terrorism and improving trade relations. An FBI team helped investigate the Casablanca bombings, and the FBI and CIA Directors have visited Rabat for consultations. A free trade agreement (FTA) with Morocco, P.L. 108-302, August 17, 2004, came into effect on January 1, 2006. The United States has increased aid to Morocco to assist with countering terrorism, democratization, fighting poverty, and the FTA. In August 2007, the Millennium Challenge Corporation Board approved a five-year, $697.5 million grant for Morocco.

End Notes

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1

James Liddell, ―Morocco: Modern Politics or Politics of Modernity?‖ Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2008. 2 Socialist Union of Popular Forces politician Idriss Lashgar, quoted in Africa Research Bulletin, October 1-21, 2008, p. 17714. 3 ―An Islamic Cleric Becomes the Focus of Madrid Inquiry,‖ Asian Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2004. 4 ―Moroccans Say Al Qaeda Masterminded and Financed Casablanca Suicide Bombings,‖ New York Times, May 23, 2003. 5 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, released on April 30, 2009. 6 Olivier Guitta, ―Alive and Well and Living in London,‖ Weekly Standard, May 7, 2007. 7 Ibid. 8 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2008, Morocco, February 25, 2009. 9 ―Morocco: New Law, Same Old Men,‖ Inter Press News Service, July 31, 2009, see also Steven Erlanger and Souad Mekhennet, ―Law Empowering Women Leaves Many Behind,‖ International Herald Tribune, August 20, 2009. 10 The Berbers are the original inhabitants of North Africa before the Arabs invaded in the 8th century. 11 Jill Carroll, ―Morocco‘s Harder Line on Security Challenges Reforms,‖ Christian Science Monitor, April 9, 2007. 12 ―Saharan Activist‘s Return to Morocco ―Humanitarian‖ – Spokesman,‖ MAP News Agency (Rabat)) December 19, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East. 13 The U.S. State Department reported that in 2008 ―corruption was a serious problem in all branches of government.‖ U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2008, Morocco, February 25, 2009. Morocco is ranked 80 out of 180 countries on the Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2008, available at http://www.transparency.org. 14 For text of plan, see http://www.map.ma/eng/sections/politics/sahara_issue__full_t/view. 15 ―King Calls for Pressure on Israel to Comply with UN Resolutions,‖ Maghreb Arabe Presse, October 28, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20091028950071, 16 Statement of Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, MAP News Agency, March 6, 2009, BBC Monitoring Newsfile. 17 ―Moroccan Government Spokesman on Reasons Behind Severing Ties with Iran,‖ Al-Quds alArabi, March 9, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.

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19

Alfred de Montesquiou, ―Morocco Challenges Middle East‘s Holocaust Mindset,‖ Associated Press, July 27, 2009. ―King Congratulates Barack Obama on Investiture, MAP news Agency, January 20, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East. For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense ―Section 1207‖ Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, by Nina M. Serafino.

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In: The Countries of North Africa: Background... ISBN: 978-1-61761-437-8 Editors: Vincent G. Luciano © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 6

TUNISIA: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY ISSUES* Alexis Arieff

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ABSTRACT On January 14, 2011, Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine ben Ali fled the country after several weeks of increasingly violent protests. The protests initially seemed to stem from discontent related to high unemployment, but eventually spiraled into an unprecedented national challenge to Ben Ali‘s authoritarian regime. As of January 15, the speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, has assumed the role of interim president, in line with constitutional prerogatives. On January 17, a ―unity‖ cabinet was formed, which includes three leaders of officially sanctioned opposition parties. Ruling party figures have nonetheless retained control of key posts, while members of banned Islamist and leftist political movements have not been invited to participate. Tunisian authorities have promised political reforms and elections within 60 days. However, the impact of recent developments is difficult to predict. Violence between protesters, security forces, and unidentified gunmen persisted in urban centers as of January 17. The political shifts of recent weeks have been accompanied by speculation over the views and roles of Tunisia‘s security forces, portions of which orchestrated the crackdown *

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a Congressional Research Service publication, dated January 18, 2011.

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Alexis Arieff on demonstrations while others appear to have influenced Ben Ali‘s decision to resign. Prior to the December-January protests, Tunisia had been seen as a stable, autocratic government since its independence from France in 1956. Ben Ali, who was in power for 23 years, was elected for a fifth term in October 2009 in an election widely seen as flawed and boycotted by leading opposition parties. His Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party exerted strong control over parliament, state and local governments, and most political activity. The government cultivated strong ties with France and the European Union, its largest trading partner. Tunisia is a non-oilexporting, middle-income country with a growing economy but high unemployment. The unexpected and rapid upheaval in Tunisia raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region, pertaining to the struggle between entrenched forces loyal to the former regime and an unorganized popular movement without a clear leader; the potential shape of the new political order; the potential future role of Islamist and/or radical movements in the government and society; the role of the military as a political power-broker; and the difficult diplomatic balance—for the United States and other partners—of encouraging greater democratic openness while not undermining other foreign policy priorities. Recent developments also have potential implications for Congress related to the oversight to U.S.-Tunisian bilateral relations and assistance, and to broader questions of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Many analysts believe the events in Tunisia could affect political stability in other countries in the region with authoritarian-leaning, Western-backed regimes. Current U.S.-Tunisian relations largely emphasize military cooperation, although Tunisia has pushed for a greater focus on trade. Congress has been supportive of security assistance programs in Tunisia, directing the State Department in FY2009 and FY2010 to allocate levels of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) that surpassed budget requests by the executive branch. According to private sector analysis, the United States is Tunisia‘s primary supplier of military equipment. U.S. officials, who grew increasingly critical of the government in the days prior to Ben Ali‘s departure, have since called for free and fair elections.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: EXIT OF PRESIDENT BEN ALI Tunisia has undergone major political upheaval in recent weeks. It was previously considered a stable, albeit highly authoritarian, country that cultivated close ties with Western powers, particularly France and the

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European Union. On January 14, President Zine el-Abidine ben Ali fled the country after several weeks of increasingly violent protests.[1] The protests initially seemed to stem from discontent related to high unemployment, but quickly spiraled into an unprecedented popular challenge to Ben Ali‘s authoritarian regime. These events have sparked international concern over stability in a region associated with secure, autocratic regimes, and some analysts have speculated that anti-government movements in neighboring countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, could be strengthened by Tunisia‘s example. Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, who has been in office since 1999, initially assumed power in Ben Ali‘s absence, but on January 15, Ghannouchi turned over the role of acting president to the speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, in line with constitutional prerogatives.[2] On January 17, Ghannouchi announced the formation of a ―unity‖ cabinet, which included members of civil society as well as three leaders of officially sanctioned opposition parties. These were Ahmed Najib el Chebbi of the Progressive Democratic Party, the largest of the legal opposition parties, who was named minister for regional development; Ahmed Brahim of the Ettajdid Movement, a leftist party, who was appointed minister for higher education and scientific research; and Mustafa Ben Jaafar, leader of the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties party (and a medical doctor), who was named health minister. Key positions, such as prime minister and the ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs, were retained by ruling party figures, and the internal stability of the government appeared to be threatened by discontent among some opposition supporters who accused their leaders of being overly conciliatory to elements of the former regime. Members of banned political parties were not invited to participate in the government. The two most significant are the Islamist movement Ennahda, led by Rashid Ghannouchi (no relation to the prime minister), and the leftist Congress for the Republic (CPR) party, led by Moncef Marzouki. Both leaders, who have been living in exile, have announced plans to return to Tunisia. Authorities have promised political reforms, including freedom of expression, the release of political prisoners, investigations into corruption under the former regime, and the lifting of restrictions on the Tunisian League for Human Rights. They have also pledged elections within 60 days. However, it is difficult to predict whether these promises will be upheld, and whether the coming weeks will see an end to the uprising or further chaos. Looting, shootings, and violent confrontations between protesters, security forces, and gunmen in civilian clothes persisted in Tunis and other urban centers as of

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January 18. The protesters appear to lack a central leader and are not necessarily aligned with an identifiable political or ideological movement. Ben Ali‘s unexpected departure has led analysts to examine the role and cohesion of Tunisia‘s security forces, amid recent indications of internal divisions. Some analysts have speculated that the military—historically seen as relatively apolitical—may have played a key role in bringing an end to Ben Ali‘s presidency; such speculation has centered, in particular, around General Rachid Ammar, the military chief of staff, who is reported to have refused orders to open fire on demonstrators.[3] On January 16, the government announced arrest warrants for the former head of presidential security, Ali Seriati, and several of his ―accomplices,‖ for allegedly plotting against the state.[4] International media reports have referenced continuing violence by ―militias‖ seen as allied to the former president, whose relationship to formal security structures remains unclear.[5] As previously noted, the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally party (RCD) has retained control of the ministries of defense and the interior, indicating continuity for the senior military and police hierarchy. Still, security forces have displayed potentially divergent motivations in recent days, countering ongoing civilian protests aimed at dislodging the RCD from the unity government, while combating organized violence by unidentified but reportedly highly armed elements in downtown Tunis who may be linked to the former regime.

December-January Protests The anti-government protests began in late December 2010. Unrest was first reported on December 24 in the interior region of Sidi Bouzid, where thousands of demonstrators rioted and attacked a government building after a 26-year-old university graduate set himself on fire to protest police interference and a lack of economic opportunities for young people. The protests quickly spread to the nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala, as well as other urban centers. On January 12, riots erupted in the capital, Tunis; the military deployed to the streets and a national curfew was imposed. The following day, rioters ransacked a private home belonging to one of Ben Ali‘s wealthy relatives in the beach community of Hammamet, underscoring the deep antipathy many Tunisians feel toward members of the ruling elite. Authorities imposed a state of emergency on January 14, prohibiting any

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gathering of over three people and authorizing the use of force against ―any suspect person who does not obey orders to stop.‖[6] Public demonstrations had previously been very rare in Tunisia, as state repression and surveillance of dissidents had been effective at curbing the expression of anti-government views. Police have repeatedly opened fire on demonstrators and arrested protesters, journalists, opposition party members, lawyers, and rights advocates, according to news reports. Some detainees have reportedly been tortured.[7] According to official figures, dozens of civilians have been killed in clashes with security forces; the true toll may be higher. The government response was also initially characterized by attempts to further curtail the use of news sites and social media, which some are reportedly using to organize and publicize the protests. Since the departure of Ben Ali, the government‘s response has been somewhat tempered and more reconciliatory, and the focus of security forces has turned toward containing disorder while using nonlethal force to disrupt some demonstrations. On January 18, Prime Minister Ghannouchi said in a television interview that he had instructed the security forces not to open fire on demonstrators as soon as Ben Ali had left the country, and promised that ―all those who initiated this massacre, this carnage, will be brought to justice.‖[8] Prior to his exile, Ben Ali offered a widening series of concessions on political and civil rights in an effort to stem the anti-government uprising. The president reshuffled his cabinet, replaced the governor of the Sidi Bouzid region—where the demonstrations began in December—and the interior minister, and promised 300,000 new jobs. At the same time, he initially maintained that police had used their weapons only in ―legitimate defense‖ against attacks by demonstrators, and accused protest leaders of being foreigninfluenced ―extremists‖ and terrorists.[9] On January 13, Ben Ali gave an address on national television in which he pledged to step down when his term was up in 2014, to allow fresh parliamentary elections before then, and to end state censorship. However, these promises did not placate demonstrators, who continued to call for Ben Ali‘s immediate resignation and the dissolving of the RCD.

The U.S. Response U.S. criticism of the government‘s response to the demonstrations, although initially muted, mounted as the protests widened. On January 7, the State Department released a statement relaying concern about the

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demonstrations and related government Internet surveillance. The statement called on ―all parties to show restraint as citizens exercise their right of public assembly‖ and noted that U.S. officials had ―conveyed our views directly to the Tunisian government.‖[10] In response, the Tunisian government summoned U.S. Ambassador Gordon Gray to protest the United States‘ characterization of events. On January 11, State Department spokesman Mark Toner stated that the United States was ―deeply concerned by reports of the use of excessive force by the government of Tunisia,‖ and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview with the Saudi-funded Arabic-language satellite television channel Al Arabiya that ―we are worried, in general, about the unrest and the instability, and what seems to be the underlying concerns of the people who are protesting.‖[11] At the same time, Clinton stressed that ―we are not taking sides,‖ and indicated that she had not been in direct communication with senior authorities since the protests began. In a speech in Doha, Qatar, on January 13, Secretary Clinton challenged Middle Eastern leaders to address the fundamental needs of their citizens and provide channels for popular participation, or else risk facing instability and extremism. Events in Tunisia provided a vivid backdrop to her remarks. On January 14, after Ben Ali‘s departure, President Barack Obama stated, ―I condemn and deplore the use of violence against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia, and I applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people.‖ He also called on the Tunisian government to hold ―free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and aspirations of the Tunisian people.‖[12] Secretary Clinton echoed the president‘s call for free and fair elections and also called for the Tunisian government to ―build a stronger foundation for Tunisia‘s future with economic, social, and political reforms.‖ She added, ―On my trip to the Middle East this week, I heard people everywhere yearning for economic opportunity, political participation and the chance to build a better future. Young people especially need to have a meaningful role in the decisions that shape their lives. Addressing these concerns will be challenging, but the United States stands ready to help.‖[13]

BACKGROUND: THE GOVERNMENT UNDER BEN ALI Prior to the December-January demonstrations, Tunisia was seen as having a stable, authoritarian government that placed a higher priority on

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economic growth than on political liberalization. It had had only two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: the late Habib Bourguiba and Zine el-Abidine ben Ali, a former Minister of National Security, Minister of the Interior, and Prime Minister, who became president in 1987. Constitutional amendments approved in May 2002 lifted term limits for the presidency and raised the age allowed for a candidate to 75. Ben Ali easily won a fourth five-year term on October 24, 2004, with 94.49% of the vote and a 91% voter turnout. He won yet another term on October 25, 2009, with 89.62% of the vote and an 89.4% voter turnout. The 72-year-old Ben Ali was not eligible to run again unless the constitution were revised once more. In the run-up to the 2009 presidential election, opposition Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) candidate Ahmed Najib el Chebbi decided not to compete in order not to give the authorities what he termed ―fake legitimacy.‖ The Constitutional Council rejected the candidacy of Secretary General of the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties (FDTL) Mustafa Ben Jaafar because he allegedly had not been selected at least two years before the date of submission of his candidacy as required by a 2008 law. Ben Jaafar threw his support to Renewal Movement (Ettadjid/formerly communist) leader Ahmed Brahim, who had criticized the government for harassing and imposing restrictions on his campaign. Brahim won 1.56% of the vote. Mohammed Bouchiha of the Party of Popular Unity (PUP) won 5% of the vote and Ahmed Inoubili of the Democratic Unionist Union (UDU) 3.8%; both represent ―official‖ opposition parties. The electoral system grants 75% of the seats in parliament to the party that wins a simple majority in the elections and 25% to all other parties based on their share of the vote. The latter are considered ―official‖ opposition parties in that the government allows them to hold seats in parliament. Nine parties ran for seats in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house of parliament) in October 2009. The PDP boycotted the elections after the authorities rejected PDP‘s election lists for 17 of the 26 constituencies. FDTL also was prevented from running. Ben Ali‘s RCD won 151 out of 214 seats.[14] Six other parties also won seats. A referendum in 2002 created a Chamber of Advisors (upper house) of 126 members: 85 elected by municipal councils, professional associations, and trade unions, and 41 appointed by the president. Municipal elections were held in May 2010. The PDP boycotted, while the ruling party won nearly 90% of the municipal seats. After the 2009 elections, then-U.S. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said, ―We were concerned about the recent elections. The government of Tunisia did not allow international election monitoring. We are not aware that

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permission was granted to any credible independent observers. We will continue to press for political reform.‖[15] Tunisian authorities rejected the criticism, claiming that observers from 23 countries had vouched for the integrity and transparency of the election.[16] After the 2004 election, the U.S. State Department had stated, ―The ruling party‘s domination of state institutions and political activity precluded credible and competitive electoral challenges from unsanctioned actors.‖[17] The same conclusion could be applied to the 2009 elections. The powerful president appoints the prime minister, the cabinet, and 24 regional governors. Parliament does not originate legislation and passes government bills with minor or no changes. There is no vice president, and Ben Ali did not publicly cultivate a designated successor.

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Suppression of Islamist Politics The government under Ben Ali routinely emphasized the threat of Islamist extremism (see ―Terrorism,‖ below) in order to justify its authoritarian rule. The government harshly suppressed Ennahda (Renaissance), an Islamist political party which authorities considered to be a violent, domestic terrorist group, after unearthing an alleged conspiracy in 1991. Ennahda denied the accusation, but, in 1992 Tunisian military courts convicted 265 Ennahda members on charges of plotting a coup. In November 2008, authorities released all 21 remaining imprisoned Ennahda members. However, a former leader of the group, Mohammed Sadiq Chourou, was rearrested three weeks later after demanding that the movement be rehabilitated and allowed to resume its political activities; he was sentenced to one year in jail, which was later extended by one year. Some analysts consider Ennahda‘s exiled leader, Rashid Ghannouchi, to be a moderate seeking to accommodate Islam with democracy.[18] In June 2010, another exiled Ennahda figure, Dr. Abdelmajid Najjar, was permitted to return to Tunisia, where he called for the return of other exiled Islamist leaders and ―political reconciliation.‖[19] In December, however, two Ennahda members were sentenced to jail for allegedly ―reviving a banned organization.‖[20] Following Ben Ali‘s exile, Ghannouchi announced he was planning to return to Tunisia from exile in London, and that Ennahda would consider participating in the government if invited. Ghannouchi reportedly added that he would not run for president.[21]

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Human Rights The Ben Ali government effectively used the fear of an Islamist threat and the example of Islamist-fueled civil conflict in neighboring Algeria to systematically suppress human rights and fail to carry out political reforms. Ben Ali maintained that he was ushering in democratic reforms in a ―measured way‖ so that religious extremists could not exploit freedoms.[22] Still, most observers saw no evidence of even a gradual reform program. As the U.S. State Department‘s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices demonstrate, Tunisian security forces have been accused of a wide range of abuses, including extrajudicial arrests, denial of due process, torture, and other mistreatment of detainees. The Ben Ali government routinely infringed on citizens‘ privacy rights and imposed severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. It was intolerant of public criticism and used intimidation, criminal investigations, the court system, arbitrary arrests, residential restrictions, and travel controls to discourage human rights and opposition activists.[23] In a 2010 report , Amnesty International accused Tunisian authorities of ―subverting‖ human rights organizations and other dissenting groups ―by infiltrating them and provoking turmoil.‖[24] The government also tried to squelch criticism of its human rights practices made outside of the country. In 2010, the parliament passed legislation making it a crime to ―establish, directly or indirectly, contact with officials of a foreign state, institution or foreign organization with the aim of inciting them to harm Tunisia's vital interests and its economic security.‖[25] The U.S.-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported in 2008 that Tunisian ―authorities aggressively counter criticism at international forums by recruiting ‗spoilers,‘‖ and described how one such group tried to dominate discussion at a Johns Hopkins University event featuring Tunisian journalist and human rights activist Sihem Bensedrine, who had been jailed and physically abused in Tunisia.[26] The same tactic was deployed at a May 2009 National Democratic Institute event with opposition figure Ahmed Najib el Chebbi.[27] In April 2010, Human Rights Watch researchers were prevented from holding a press conference in Tunis to discuss a recent report documenting repressive measures that Tunisian authorities impose on former political prisoners.[28] CPJ also described the government‘s use of charges unrelated to journalism against journalists as a way to protect itself from international scrutiny.

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Reporters Without Borders (RSF) listed President Ben Ali among the world‘s worst press freedom ―predators‖[29]; the organization‘s website is blocked in Tunisia. International human rights organizations have noted that Tunisia‘s Internet policies are among the world‘s most repressive: all Internet cafes are state-controlled; authorities aggressively filter Internet websites and reportedly conduct surveillance at Internet cafes; President Ben Ali‘s family and friends control local Internet service providers (though the current status of this censorship regime is in flux); and independent bloggers have been jailed. In August 2009, RSF reported that the National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT), which had tried to be independent and autonomous, had been taken over by members or supporters of the ruling RCD party at an extraordinary congress held two months before national elections. In November 2005, Tunisia hosted the U.N. World Summit on the Information Society in an effort to burnish its image, but its conduct had the opposite effect. Before the summit, local authorities closed the Association of Judges, which had called for a more independent judiciary, and prevented conferences of journalists and the League of Human Rights. They also beat a French correspondent who had reported on clashes between police and supporters of Tunisian hunger strikers. During the conclave, the European Union complained after plainclothes policemen physically prevented international non-governmental organizations from meeting and then stopped the German ambassador from meeting with their representatives. The Swiss government protested after its delegation head‘s speech that referred to these events was censored. After the summit, Tunis banned the International Federation of Journalists‘ website. On a positive note in human rights practices, Tunisia has long been in the forefront of Arab countries guaranteeing women socio-economic rights and affording them educational and career opportunities. It is the only Arab Muslim country that bans polygamy. Women serve in the military and in many professions and constitute more than 50% of university students; the first woman governor was appointed in May 2004. In 2006, the government banned the headscarf from public places, claiming that it was protecting women‘s rights and preventing religious extremism. Critics charged that it was violating individual rights.

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TERRORISM Tunisian authorities have emphasized terrorism as a potential domestic threat, while Tunisian nationals have been implicated in terrorism abroad. In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.[30] TCG sought to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia and was considered to be a radical offshoot of Ennahda. The TCG was suspected of plotting, but not carrying out, attacks on U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), previously known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), actively recruits Tunisians and reportedly had ties with the TCG.[31] In January 2007, in somewhat mysterious circumstances, Tunisian security forces claimed to have engaged in gun battles with terrorists linked to the GSPC who had infiltrated from Algeria and possessed homemade explosives, satellite maps of foreign embassies, and documents identifying foreign envoys. Eastern Algeria is an AQIM/GSPC stronghold. Some 30 Tunisians were subsequently convicted of plotting to target U.S. and British interests in Tunisia. AQIM later claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Austrian tourists in Tunisia in February 2008. Algerian and Tunisian authorities have arrested Tunisians along their border, going in both directions. Tunisian expatriates suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been arrested in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Western Europe, and the United States. Some are detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and their possible return to Tunisia has proven to be somewhat controversial.[32] On April 24, 2009, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), told a House Appropriations Committee subcommittee that the perpetrators of suicide bombings in Iraq that month may have been part of a network based in Tunisia.[33] Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to acknowledge an Al Qaeda presence in Tunisia in a taped message broadcast in October 2002, when he seemed to claim responsibility for the bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba, noted for its Jewish minority, in April 2002. In all, 14 German tourists, five Tunisians, and two French citizens were killed in the attack.[34] France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement in the attack. In January 2009, French authorities put two alleged culprits on trial.

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In December 2003, the Tunisian parliament passed a sweeping antiterrorism law. The U.S. State Department called it ―a comprehensive law to ‗support the international effort to combat terrorism and money laundering.‘‖[35] Since passage of the law, as many as 2,000 Tunisians have been detained, charged, and/or convicted on terrorism-related charges.[36] Critics claim that the law ―makes the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of terrorism.‖[37] Rights advocates have also accused anti-terror trials of relying on excessive pretrial detention, denial of due process, and weak evidence. In June 2008, an Amnesty International report, In the Name of Security: Routine Abuses in Tunisia, detailed concerns ―regarding serious human rights violations being committed in connection with the government‘s security and counterterrorism policies.‖

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ECONOMY During the presidency of Ben Ali, many analysts contended that there is an implicit social contract between the government and its citizens, which promoted economic stability and middle-class standards of living at the expense of political freedom. Until the December-January protests, this strategy appeared to have worked. Tunisia has almost completed a transition from a socialist to a market economy. It is considered a middle-income country, and one of the best-performing non-oil exporting Arab countries. Widespread home and car ownership support that characterization. Ben Ali‘s 2004 election manifesto called for diversification, that is, ending reliance on textiles (which have been a primary engine of economic growth), due to increased competition from China; modernization by providing investment incentives to foreign businesses and passing legal reforms; liberalization with an anticipated free-trade zone with the EU; and privatization. The textile sector has since shifted to higher quality goods. The tourism sector also has been emphasized; it is a major employer and earns some 11% of the country‘s hard currency receipts.[38] Tunisia has also attempted to attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. Unemployment remains a major problem, however; the official rate is high and the unofficial rate is believed to be even higher.

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In 2008, social unrest broke in the impoverished mining region of Gafsa, where unemployment is particularly high. The government sent in the army to aid the police, who were unable to contain the demonstrations. Some 38 people were imprisoned in connection with the protests on charges of forming a criminal group with the aim of destroying public and private property, armed rebellion, and assault on officials during the exercise of their duties. They were paroled in November 2009. Released trade unionist Adnan Hadji stated that demands for improving deplorable conditions in the mines had been made in a legal way and that the demands were about real things, such as pollution, unemployment, disease, and maldistribution of wealth.[39] The European recession in 2009 affected the Tunisian economy, producing a decrease in exports, a contraction in the industrial sector, and a lower expansion in services. Tunisia‘s economy nevertheless fared relatively well given the severity of the global economic crisis, and the country did not experience a recession. The government responded to the economic setbacks with fiscal stimulus emphasizing development projects, the creation of more state jobs, and increases in state payrolls.[40] In September 2010, the IMF projected that economic growth would reach 3.8% in 2010, after having slowed to 3% in 2009; the Fund predicted that Tunisia‘s growth could continue to increase gradually, ―provided that policies and reforms planned by

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the authorities aimed at enhancing Tunisia‘s competitiveness, developing new markets, and supporting new sources of growth in sectors with high added value bear fruit.‖[41]

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RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES The United States and Tunisia have enjoyed continuous relations since 1797, prior to French colonization. Tunisia was the site of major battles during World War II, and was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 as part of the Allied campaign known as Operation Torch. A U.S. cemetery and memorial near the ancient city of Carthage holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a strongly pro-Western foreign policy despite a brief experiment with leftist economic policies. The United States considered Tunisia under Ben Ali to be an ally, a moderate Arab, Muslim state, and a partner in international counterterrorism efforts. However, Tunisia did not support the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 war against Iraq and, when the 2003 war in Iraq began, Ben Ali expressed regret and fear that the conflict might destabilize the Middle East.[42] Tunisian officials‘ criticism was not voiced directly at the United States and was circumspect, and their stance did not harm bilateral relations. U.S.-Tunisian relations today largely emphasize cooperation in counterterrorism, although Tunisia would like greater focus on increasing trade (see below). Despite generally positive bilateral ties, U.S. officials have recently expressed concern over Tunisia‘s record on political rights and freedom of expression. In a January 2010 speech on global Internet freedom, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton singled out Tunisia as one of five countries contributing to a ―spike in threats to the free flow of information.‖[43] In July, the State Department expressed ―deep‖ concern over ―the decline in political freedoms, notably severe restrictions on freedom of expression in Tunisia,‖ particularly with regard to the sentencing of an independent journalist, Fahem Boukadous, to four years in prison, reportedly in connection with his coverage of the Gafsa protests in 2008.[44] Tunisia rejected U.S. criticisms, contending that Boukadous‘ arrest was unrelated to ―journalistic activity.‖ The United States strongly criticized Tunisia‘s reaction to anti-government demonstrations in January 2011 (see ―Recent Developments: Exit of President Ben Ali,‖ above). Numerous international and regional news reports and analyses have referenced internal communications among U.S. diplomats that have been

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highly critical of political repression and corruption among Ben Ali‘s inner circle and family. Some analysts have speculated that reports of such communications may have played a role in sparking the antigovernment protests.[45] The U.S. State Department‘s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has a regional office in Tunis, responsible for programming to enhance political, economic, and educational reforms in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco as well as Tunisia, which opened in August 2004. MEPI has implemented very few bilateral programs in Tunisia. Critics suggest that the United States has sent mixed signals to Tunisia by aiding the military while not strongly supporting democratizing elements, despite expressing a desire for reform in the Middle East. U.S.-Tunisian trade is relatively low in volume because Tunisia is a small country and conducts most of its trade with Europe. In 2009, the United States imported $325.8 million in goods from Tunisia and exported $502.1 million in goods to Tunisia.[46] Tunisia is eligible for special trade preferences, that is, duty-free entry for listed products, under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program. The United States and Tunisia have a trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) and a bilateral investment treaty. TIFAs can be the first step toward a free-trade agreement (FTA). The Tunisian government has expressed interest in concluding an FTA with the United States, but it has not made the reforms needed to proceed toward one.

U.S. Assistance U.S. aid to Tunisia focuses on military assistance and counterterrorism cooperation. A U.S.- Tunisian Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Tunisia relies on U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance to ―maintain its aging 80‘s and early 90‘s era inventory of U.S.-origin equipment, which comprises nearly 70% of Tunisia‘s total inventory.‖[47] FMF and ―Section 1206‖ security assistance funds have also provided Tunisia with equipment for border and coastal security, which the United States views as a key area of counterterrorism prevention.[48] Since 2003, this equipment has included helicopters, machine guns, body armor and helmets, parachutes, and night vision devices for sniper rifles. Other equipment has been provided through the State Department‘s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, with plans to procure seven Scan Eagle Unmanned

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Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with $4.1 million in FY2008 PKO funds forfeited by Mauritania (which had been temporarily rendered ineligible for security assistance due to a military coup).[49] DSCA also reports that Tunisia has been one of the top twenty recipients worldwide of International Military Education and Training (IMET) since FY1994.[50] According to private sector analysis, the United States is Tunisia‘s primary supplier of military equipment, purchased through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements.[51] Tunisia is one of ten countries participating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a State Department-led regional program aimed at helping North African and Sahelian countries better control their territory and strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities. The Defense Department allocated over $13 million between FY2007 and FY2009 on TSCTP-related military cooperation with Tunisia, including bilateral and multinational exercises, regional conferences, and Joint-Combined Exchange Training programs, which are conducted by U.S. special operations forces.[52] This is in addition to nearly $19 million in Section 1206 funds allocated in FY2008 and FY2009, which have supported the provision of equipment (as discussed above) and training related to counterterrorism. Tunisia also cooperates in NATO‘s Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO‘s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls at Tunis. Table 1. U.S. Aid to Tunisia$ Thousands FY2008 Actual

FY2009 Actual

FY2010 Estimate

FY2011 Request

FMF

$8,300

$12,000

$15,000

$4.9,000

ESF

$1,200

$800

$2,000

0

IMET

$1,700

$1,700

$1,950

$2,300

INCLE

$198

0

0

0

NADR

$100

$425

$200

0

1206

$10,000

$8,800

0

unavailable

Notes: FMF: Foreign Military Financing; ESF: Economic Support Funds, IMET: International Military Education and Training funds, INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds, NADR: Nonproliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining, and Related Programs funds. Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2010-FY2011.

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Congress has been supportive of U.S. military assistance in Tunisia in recent years. In an explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, signed into law on March 11, 2009, appropriators allocated $12 million for FMF assistance for Tunisia, far more than the State Department‘s budget request for $2.62 million. At the same time, appropriators wrote in a joint explanatory statement that ―restrictions on political freedom, the use of torture, imprisonment of dissidents, and persecution of journalists and human rights defenders are of concern and progress on these issues is necessary for the partnership between the United States and Tunisia to further strengthen.‖[53] Similarly, in the conference report accompanying P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, signed into law on December 16, 2009, appropriators directed the State Department to allocate $18 million in FMF for Tunisia , $3 million above the requested amount. The conference report also allocated $2 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF)—the amount requested—for ―programs and activities in southern Tunisia and to promote respect for human rights, as proposed by the Senate.‖[54]

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OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES Tunisia sympathizes with the Palestinians; it hosted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982-1993 and still hosts some PLO offices today. Tunisia had an interests office in Israel until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Israelis of Tunisian descent are allowed to travel to Tunisia on Israeli passports, and the Israeli and Tunisian foreign ministers sometimes meet. In September 2005, President Ben Ali sent a personal letter to then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, praising his ―courageous‖ withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The then Israeli Foreign Minister, who was born in Tunisia, and Communications Minister attended the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia in 2005. (Prime Minister Sharon was invited along with leaders of all U.N. member states; his invitation provoked demonstrations in Tunisia.) Tunisia and the EU have cemented a close relationship by means of an Association Agreement, aid, and loans. More than 60% of Tunisia‘s trade is conducted with Europe.[55] The Association Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and went into effect on January 1, 2008, eliminates customs tariffs and

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other trade barriers on manufactured goods, and provides for the establishment of an EU-Tunisia free trade area in goods, but not in agriculture or services. Negotiations on the provision of ―advanced status‖ for Tunisia vis-à-vis the EU, which would provide even greater trade benefits, are ongoing.[56] Tunisia receives aid from the EU‘s EuroMediterranean Partnership (MEDA) program and soft loans from the European Investment Bank, the financing arm of the EU. The Europeans hope that their aid will help Tunisia to progress economically, and thereby eliminate some causes of illegal immigration and Islamic fundamentalism. The EU and Tunisia have discussed additional cooperation to control illegal immigration and manage legal immigration flows, a subject that probably is of greater interest to Europe than to Tunisia. At the same time, EU leaders have expressed concerns over Tunisia‘s record on human rights and political freedom. In January 2011, amid the antigovernment protests, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, stated that although the EU seeks to strengthen bilateral ties, this process ―obviously requires increased commitments on all issues, in particular in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.‖[57] Tunis is the headquarters location of the African Development Bank (AfDB), which receives significant financial support from the United States.[58]

OUTLOOK The unexpected and rapid turn of events in Tunisia raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region. Recent events also raise potential issues for Congress pertaining to the oversight of U.S.-Tunisian bilateral relations and assistance, and to broader U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East. Questions include: •

•

What actions or developments may bring an end to the continued violence in Tunisia? Will popular demands for an end to RCD participation in the government lead to ongoing demonstrations and confrontations with security forces? What is the role of the military in steering political developments? What will the future Tunisian government and political order look like? What will be the nature and role of previously banned groups,

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•

• •

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•

177

such as Islamist and leftist political parties? Will there be a free and independent press and civil society in Tunisia? Which individuals and groups currently enjoy significant public credibility in Tunisia, and what are their expected courses of action? Has Tunisians‘ experience of secular authoritarianism made the public more likely to place their trust in extremist groups? What is the likely impact of the unrest on foreign investment and economic growth in Tunisia and the region? Will the recent events in Tunisia spark similar uprisings in neighboring states? Will they provoke a preemptive crackdown by other governments? What are the potential medium- to long-term effects of such a crackdown? What has been the impact to-date of U.S. public statements and actions related to Tunisia, and what are the prospects for future U.S. influence on the evolution of events? How, if at all, should the U.S. government reshape its assistance programs for Tunisia in response to recent and continuing events? What position should the United States take vis-à-vis popular anti-government demonstrations in the region? What course of U.S. action will be most likely to fulfill foreign policy and national security goals?

AUTHOR CONTACT INFORMATION Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs [email protected], 7-2459

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report was originally written by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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REFERENCES [1]

[2]

[3] [4]

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[5]

[6] [7] [8] [9]

[10] [11]

[12] [13]

Ben Ali went to Saudi Arabia. France, which had been seen as a strong backer of the former president, signaled he was not welcome there, according to news reports. See Catherine Bremer, ―Analysis-French Race to Adapt to New Maghreb Mood,‖ Reuters, January 17, 2011. Article 57 of Tunisia‘s constitution, adopted in 1959, states that ―should the office of President of the Republic become vacant because of death, resignation, or absolute disability,‖ the President of the Chamber of Deputies ―shall immediately be vested with the functions of interim president of the republic for a period ranging from 45 to 60 days.‖ The Article further stipulates that elections should be held during that time period to elect a new president for a five-year term, and that the interim president may not stand as a candidate. Margaret Coker, ―Tunisia Names Caretaker Government, Credits Army,‖ The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2011. David D. Kirkpatrick, ―Military Backs New Leaders in Tunisia,‖ The New York Times, January 16, 2011. Angelique Chrisafis, ―Confusion, Fear and Horror in Tunisia as Old Regime‘s Militia Carries on the Fight,‖ The Guardian (UK), January 17, 2011. Tunisia 7 Television, ―Tunisian Authorities Declare State of Emergency,‖ via Open Source Center. Reuters, ―Interview-UN Rights Boss Urges Tunisia to Probe Killings,‖ January 13, 2011. David D. Kirkpatrick, ―Tunisia Unity Government Fractures,‖ January 18, 2011. Global Insight, ―Unrest in Tunisia Highlights Underlying Troubles,‖ January 7, 2011; Agence France Presse (AFP), ―Tunisia Leader Slams ‗Terrorist Acts,‘ Pledges More Jobs,‖ January 10, 2011. U.S. State Department, ―Recent Protests and Website Hackings in Tunisia,‖ January 7, 2011. AFP, ―US Concerned About Reports of ‗Excessive Force‘ in Tunisia,‖ January 11, 2011; and U.S. State Department, ―Secretary of State Interviewed on Al Arabiya,‖ January 11, 2011, via Congressional Quarterly (CQ). The White House, ―Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,‖ January 14, 2011. U.S. State Department, ―Recent Events in Tunisia,‖ January 14, 2011.

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[14] The RCD is the current incarnation of the Neo-Destour Party, which was formed in 1934 and led the movement for independence. [15] U.S. State Department Daily News Briefing, October 26, 2009; via CQ. [16] ―Tunisia Denies U.S. Critics on Election Transparency,‖ Xinhua News Agency, October 28, 2009. [17] U.S. State Department, ―Tunisia,‖ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004, released February 28, 2005. [18] Azzam S. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. [19] Quds Press, ―Tunisian Opposition Leader on His Return, Need for Reconciliation with Islamists,‖ June 15, 2010, via BBC Monitoring. [20] Al Jazeera TV, ―Islamists Jailed in Tunisia for ‗Attempt to Revive‘ Ennahda Movement,‖ December 6, 2010, via BBC Monitoring. [21] Mohammed Al Shafey, ―Exiled Tunisian Islamist Leader Vows to Return,‖ Asharq Alawsat, January 17, 2011. [22] ―Tunisian President Says He Wants to Share Experience in Handling Islamic Extremism with Bush,‖ Associated Press, February 13, 2004. [23] U.S. State Department, ―Tunisia,‖ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2009, released March 11, 2010. [24] Amnesty International, ―Tunisia Urged to End Subversion of Groups Critical of the Authorities,‖ July 12, 2010. [25] Human Rights Watch, ―Tunisia: A Move against Human Rights Defenders,‖ June 17, 2010. [26] Committee to Protect Journalists, Special Report on Tunisia, September 23, 2008. [27] A CRS analyst was present at this discussion. [28] Sarah Leah Whitson, ―A Tighter Tunisia,‖ The Los Angeles Times, April 19, 2010; see Human Rights Watch, Repression of Former Political Prisoners in Tunisia: ―A Larger Prison,‖ March 24, 2010. [29] RSF, ―Predators,‖ updated May 3, 2010, at [http://en.rsf.org/ predators, 21.html]. [30] U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, released April 30, 2007. [31] Craig S. Smith, ―Tunisia is Feared as New Islamist Base...,‖ International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2007. Note, GSPC renamed itself Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in January 2007. For further background on AQIM, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.

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[32] An editorial in the Orange Country Register on November 16, 2008 stated, ―In 2006, the U.S. sent two prisoners (from Guantanamo) to Tunisia with the explicit understanding that they would not be tortured or mistreated. The Tunisian government broke its promise and inflicted cruel treatment and kangaroo-court trials.‖ In May 2009, the United States asked Italy to receive two Tunisian detainees who objected to their return to Tunisia for fear that they would be subjected to torture. On May 26, 2009, the Tunisian Minister of Justice said that his government was prepared to receive another 10 Guantanamo detainees. ―Tunisia asks US to Hand Over two Guantanamo Detainees,‖ Al-Jazeera TV, May 29, 2009. [33] House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Holds Hearing on the US Central Command, April 24, 2009, via CQ. [34] ―Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,‖ Financial Times, October 10, 2002. [35] U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, released April 29, 2004. [36] U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010. [37] Jeremy Landor, ―Washington‘s Partner,‖ Middle East International, March 5, 2004, pp. 23-24 [38] U.S. State Department, ―Background Note: Tunisia,‖ October 13, 2010. [39] ―Tunisia Releases Mining Area Detainees on Parole,‖ Al-Jazeera, November 5, 2009. According to human rights advocates, Tunisian authorities continued to monitor and repress activists in Gafsa throughout 2010. [40] ―Tunisia Continues Fiscal Stimulus in 2010 Budget,‖ TransArabia, November 14, 2009. [41] Joël Toujas-Bernate and Rina Bhattacharya, International Monetary Fund, ―Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But Unemployment Persists,‖ September 10, 2010. [42] ―Ben Ali Expresses ‗Deep Regret‘ at Start of War Against Iraq,‖ Tunis Infotunisie, March 20, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document AFP20030320000266. [43] U.S. State Department, ―Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks on Internet Freedom,‖ January 21, 2010; via CQ. [44] U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, July 9, 2010. Boukadous was convicted of ―belonging to a criminal association‖ and spreading

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[45] [46]

[47] [48]

[49]

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[50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56]

[57] [58]

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materials ―likely to harm public order.‖ For further background on Boukadous‘ sentencing, see Committee to Protect Journalists, ―Tunisia Must Release Ailing Journalist on Hunger Strike,‖ October 21, 2010. E.g., Christopher Alexander, ―Tunisia‘s Protest Wave: Where It Comes From and What It Means,‖ ForeignPolicy.com, January 3, 2011. U.S. International Trade Commission data. While Tunisian imports of U.S. goods did not fluctuate significantly during the economic recession, U.S. imports from Tunisia nearly halved between 2008 and 2009. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ―Tunisia Summary,‖ updated January 13, 2011. P.L. 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2006, Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. For more information, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: ―Section 1206‖ Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino. This assistance is described as supporting the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Ibid. Forecast International, International Military Markets—Middle East & Africa, ―Tunisia: Section 3—Market Overview,‖ May 2009. Funding figures provided to CRS by the State Department. Congressional Record, February 23, 2009, p. H2417. Congressional Record, December 8, 2009, p. H14350. World Trade Organization, Tunisia Profile, October 2010. See European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, Tunisia, at [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country -cooperation/tunisia/tunisia_en.htm]. AFP, ―EU Calls for Release of Tunisian Protesters,‖ January 10, 2011. See CRS Report RS22690, The African Development Bank Group, by Martin A. Weiss, for further background.

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In: The Countries of North Africa: Background... ISBN: 978-1-61761-437-8 Editors: Vincent G. Luciano © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 7

WESTERN SAHARA: STATUS * OF SETTLEMENT EFFORTS Carol Migdalovitz

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SUMMARY Since the 1970s, Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have vied for control of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish territory. In 1991, the United Nations arranged a cease-fire and proposed a settlement plan that called for a referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration into Morocco. A long deadlock on determining the electorate for a referendum ensued. The U.N. then unsuccessfully suggested alternatives to the unfulfilled settlement plan and later called on the parties to negotiate. In April 2007, Morocco offered an autonomy plan. In 2007 and 2008, the two sides met under U.N. auspices, but made no progress due to their unwillingness to compromise. In August 2008, in an effort to restart the process, the new U.N. Secretary General‘s Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, U.S. Ambassador (ret.) Christopher Ross convened a small, informal, preparatory meeting of the parties in Vienna. The issue has affected Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations and wider regional cooperation. The *

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report RS20692, dated August 19, 2009.

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United States supports the U.N. effort and has urged the parties to focus on autonomy—a solution that would not destabilize its ally, Morocco. Some Members of Congress support a referendum and are frustrated by delays, others support Morocco‘s autonomy initiative. The United States contributes funds, but no manpower, for the United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). P.L. 110-161, December 26, 2007, contained a provision expressing concern about human rights in the Western Sahara. See also CRS Report RS21579, Morocco: Current Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, and CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz.

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HISTORY The territory now known as the Western Sahara became a Spanish possession in 1881. In the mid- 1970s, Spain prepared to decolonize the region, intending to transform it into a closely aligned independent state after a referendum on self-determination. Morocco and Mauritania opposed Spain‘s plan and each claimed the territory. Although their claims were based on historic empires, the Western Sahara‘s valuable phosphate resources and fishing grounds also may have motivated them.1 At Morocco‘s initiative, the U.N. General Assembly referred the question to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). But, on October 12, 1975, the ICJ did not find a tie of territorial sovereignty between Morocco and the Western Sahara. In response, on November 6, 1975, King Hassan II of Morocco launched a ―Green March‖ of 350,000 unarmed civilians to the Western Sahara to claim it. Spanish authorities halted the marchers, but, on November 16, Spain agreed to withdraw and transfer the region to joint Moroccan-Mauritanian administration. The independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro, or Polisario, founded in 1974, forcefully resisted the Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover. In the 1970s, about 160,000 Sahrawis left the Western Sahara for refugee camps in Algeria and Mauritania. With Algeria‘s support, the Polisario established its headquarters in Tindouf, in southwest Algeria, and founded the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976. Mauritania could not sustain a defense against the Polisario and signed a peace treaty with it, abandoning all claims in August 1979. Morocco then occupied Mauritania‘s sector and, in 1981, began building a berm or sand wall to

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separate the 80% of the Western Sahara that it occupied from the Polisario and the Sahrawi refugees. Morocco‘s armed forces and Polisario guerrillas fought a long war in the desert until the U.N. arranged a cease-fire and proposed a settlement plan in 1991. U.N. Security Council Resolution 690 (April 29, 1991) established the United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) and called for a referendum to offer a choice between independence and integration into Morocco. However, over the next decade, Morocco and the Polisario differed over how to identify voters for the referendum, with each seeking to ensure an electoral roll that would support its desired outcome. In March 1997, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan named former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III as his Personal Envoy to break the deadlock. Baker brokered an agreement to restart voter identification, which was completed in 1999 with 86,000 voters identified. MINURSO then faced more than 130,000 appeals by those denied identification as voters who were supported by Morocco. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1301 (May 31, 2000) asked the parties to consider alternatives to a referendum. The U.N. concluded that processing appeals could take longer than the initial identification process and that effective implementation of the settlement plan would require the full cooperation of Morocco and the Polisario, and the support of Algeria and Mauritania. Because Morocco and the Polisario would each cooperate only with implementation that would produce its desired outcome, full cooperation would be difficult or impossible to obtain. The U.N. also stated that it lacked a mechanism to enforce the results of a referendum.

THE BAKER PLAN AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS The Secretary-General‘s June 20, 2001, Report on the Western Sahara proposed a framework agreement that became known as the Baker Plan to confer on the population of the Western Sahara the right to elect executive and legislative bodies and to control a local government and many functional areas. The executive would be elected by voters identified as of December 1999, that is, by an electorate favoring the Polisario and excluding Moroccansupported appellants. Morocco would control foreign relations, national security, and defense. A referendum on final status would be held within five years, with one-year residence in the Western Sahara then the sole criterion for

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voting. That electorate would favor Morocco by including its settlers as well as native Sahrawis.2 Annan hoped that Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria, and Mauritania would negotiate changes acceptable to all. After Baker met representatives of Algeria, Mauritania, and the Polisario, however, Annan, on his and Baker‘s behalf, doubted the parties‘ political will to resolve the conflict and cooperate with U.N. efforts.3 The Security Council could not agree on a new approach and both sides and Algeria rejected partition. In January 2003, Baker presented a compromise that did not require the consent of the parties.4 It would lead to a referendum in which voters would choose integration with Morocco, autonomy, or independence. Voters would be Sahrawis on the December 1999 provisional voter list, on the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees repatriation list as of October 2000, or continuously resident in the Western Sahara since December 30, 1999 (therefore including Moroccan settlers). The U.N. would determine the voters, without appeal. In the interim, a Western Sahara Authority would be the local government and Morocco would control foreign relations, national security, and defense. Morocco objected, mainly questioning why the U.N. was reviving the referendum option; it also was upset by the use of the word ―independence‖ instead of the vaguer ―self-determination‖ to describe an option.5 On April 9, 2004, Morocco declared that it would only accept autonomy as a solution.6 It called for negotiations only with Algeria, insisting that the Western Sahara is a bilateral geopolitical problem. Underlying these views was a rejection of any challenge to Morocco‘s physical possession of the territory. Algeria concluded that the Baker Plan was a ―gamble‖ that should be taken and the Polisario accepted it, too. Algeria declined to negotiate, insisting that it is not a party to the dispute and not a substitute for the Sahrawis. The Polisario rejected autonomy and insisted on the right to choose self-determination in a referendum. James Baker resigned as the Secretary-General‘s Personal Envoy in June 2004. The Baker Plan has not been mentioned in Security Council resolutions since then. In July 2005, Annan appointed Danish diplomat Peter van Walsum as his new envoy. Van Walsum indicated that he could not draft a new plan because Morocco would only endorse one that excludes independence, while the U.N. could not endorse a plan that excludes a referendum with independence as an option. He concluded that the remaining options were deadlock or direct negotiations. Since the former was unacceptable, responsibility rested with the parties. Van Walsum also reported that the Western Sahara was not high on the international political agenda and that

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most capitals seek to continue good relations with both Morocco and Algeria. Hence, they acquiesce in the impasse.7 Security Council Resolution 1754 (April 30, 2007) called on Morocco and the Polisario to negotiate without preconditions on a political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara. In 2007 and 2008, the two sides met and held consultations with van Walsum four times at Manhasset, New York, but neither was willing to discuss the other‘s proposals, i.e., Morocco‘s for autonomy and the Polisario‘s for a referendum. Algeria, Mauritania, and other interested countries were present. In April 2008, van Walsum stated that ―an independent Western Sahara is not a realistic proposition,‖ prompting the Polisario to accuse him of bias in favor of Morocco, call for his replacement, and refuse to return to negotiations. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon did not reappoint van Walsum in August 2008.

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CURRENT SITUATION On January 7, 2009, the Secretary-General named U.S. diplomat Christopher Ross as his new Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara. Ross suggested that the parties hold small, informal preparatory meetings, and an initial session was held in Vienna on August 11. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continues to support confidence-building measures such as exchanges of family visits and telephone calls between Western Saharan residents and the refugees.

MOROCCAN AND ALGERIAN VIEWS Morocco and Algeria are rivals with different decolonization histories and different political systems. Algeria emerged from a bloody revolution with a leftist orientation, while the Moroccan monarchy survived intact from a much less violent struggle with France. Almost since independence, the neighbors have competed for regional preeminence, and the Western Sahara is where the contest is now joined. From the beginning, the Western Sahara issue has unified Moroccans and reinforced support for a monarchy that had survived two coup attempts. King Mohammed VI has strongly reasserted Morocco‘s claim to the region since he

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ascended to the throne in July 1999. Although the territory may be a shortterm financial liability, its actual and potential resources may be a long-term economic boon. Furthermore, Moroccan authorities see the Western Sahara as a check on Algeria‘s regional ambitions being pursued via what they consider Polisario surrogates. On April 21, 2001, the King suggested decentralization as the best option for the Sahara and, in November 2002, he declared that a political solution must respect Morocco‘s territorial integrity.8 Morocco has markedly increased investment in the region to reinforce its claim to sovereignty. On April 11, 2007, Morocco presented an autonomy plan for the Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty, without the prospect of independence, for negotiation to the U.N. Secretary-General.9 Abdelaziz Bouteflika became President of Algeria in April 1999. An activist in the Algerian revolution, he and his countrymen see the Western Sahara as one of the world‘s last decolonization campaigns. If the Polisario won control of the region, Algeria would benefit by gaining access to the Atlantic Ocean. Should the issue simply simmer, it still is a low-cost way to keep Morocco bogged down. Algeria has unwaveringly supported its protégé‘s desire for self- determination. Algeria and the Polisario reject the Moroccan autonomy plan and insist on a referendum on self-determination. With strong ties in sub-Saharan Africa, Algiers is probably responsible for the SADR‘s African Union (AU) membership and for many African governments‘ recognition of the SADR; Latin American governments also have recognized it. The Polisario has specifically received support from South Africa and Venezuela. Morocco suspended its membership in the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the AU, and has not joined the AU because of the AU‘s acceptance of the SADR.

PROSPECTS Morocco‘s response to the 2003 Baker Plan and subsequent official statements indicated a diminished willingness to compromise at the same time that Algeria and the Polisario then appeared more willing to compromise. The Polisario has since become less compromising in its insistence on selfdetermination, while Morocco will not bend on its autonomy proposal. In other words, the current impasse is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

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The Polisario periodically threatens a return to armed struggle, but it remains unable to resume a military campaign without the aid and presumably the permission of Algeria, which are not expected. Algeria is focusing on its economy and international image and is concerned about resurgent Islamist terrorism. It has nurtured closer ties with the United States, France, and Spain that would be strained if it allowed a return to violence over the Western Sahara. Moreover, some of the Polisario‘s threats may only be rhetoric to enable entrenched leaders to appease vocal, young militants. In addition, the Polisario is disadvantaged militarily. It has between 3,000 and 6,000 soldiers, although much of the civilian refugee population could be mobilized to support a guerrilla campaign. They would confront about 100,000 Moroccan troops stationed in the Western Sahara. With civilian support services, the Moroccan presence in the region may total 300,000. The Moroccan army has a total strength of 175,000, with 150,000 more in reserves. The Polisario has instigated popular demonstrations for independence in the Western Sahara, but it has not resorted to terrorism that would cost it sympathy abroad and denies all Moroccan allegations that it has links to Al Qaeda. The Western Sahara is a transit point for illegal Moroccan, Sahrawi, subSaharan African, and South Asian migrants attempting to reach the Canary Islands (Spain) by boat. The Secretary- General has noted a significant increase in operations to smuggle migrants through the Western Sahara since 2003. Morocco and the Polisario have justified violations of the cease-fire as actions to curb smuggling. Morocco appears to be using the need to control illegal immigration as a pretext to bolster its forces. In other words, it is tightening its hold on the region. As long as the Western Sahara issue is unresolved, relations between Morocco and Algeria are unlikely to be normalized. Algeria had indicated that it was willing to develop bilateral relations without a resolution to the conflict, but Morocco insisted that the Western Sahara was too important an issue to set aside, noting that Algeria shelters and hosts people who carry weapons against Morocco. In March 2008, Morocco called for reopening its border with Algeria, but Algeria said that the border would remain closed until agreement on many issues, including a solution for the Western Sahara. Both have since reiterated these views. Due to the Western Sahara dispute, the Arab Maghreb Union, of which both are members, has not held a summit since 1994.10

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UNITED STATES POLICY The United States supported the U.N. settlement plan and the Baker Plan. It has not recognized the SADR or Morocco‘s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. President George W. Bush expressed understanding of ―the Moroccan people‘s sensitivity over the Sahara issue‖ and said that the United States did not seek to impose a solution.11 Then-U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns described Morocco‘s 2007 autonomy plan as ―a serious and credible proposal‖ and the State Department has since urged the parties to focus on establishing a mutually- acceptable autonomy regime in their negotiations.12 U.S. support for the U.N. peace effort is given in the context of valued U.S.-Moroccan relations as U.S. officials view Morocco as a moderate Arab ally, collaborator in countering terrorism, constructive player in the IsraeliPalestinian peace process, and leader in Arab efforts to reform and democratize. U.S. officials would prefer a solution to the Western Sahara dispute that would not destabilize Mohammed VI‘s rule. They also believe that a settlement would enhance regional stability and economic prosperity. The United States contributed $17,840,000 in FY2008 and an estimated $8.4 million in FY2009 to the U.N. for MINURSO. The State Department has requested $14,097,000 for FY20 10.13 Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton suggested that MINURSO is a costly operation that has helped to perpetuate the status quo, while current U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice so far has agreed with the common U.N. and State Department view that it has maintained the cease-fire. Some Members of Congress have endorsed Morocco‘s autonomy initiative. Others support a referendum and are concerned about the human rights in the Western Sahara. In the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-161, December 26, 2007, Congress said that an additional $1 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) may be made available to Morocco if the Secretary of State certifies, inter alia, that it is allowing all persons to advocate freely their views regarding the status and future of the Western Sahara through the exercise of their rights to peaceful expression, association, and assembly and to document violations of human rights in that territory without harassment. The Polisario, the U.N., and international non-governmental organizations report on Moroccan suppression of protests in the Western Sahara, while Morocco alleges human rights abuses in the refugee camps.

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Source: CRS graphics Figure 1 . Western Sahara, MINURSO, and Refugee Camp Sites

End Notes 1

The possibility of oil and gas reserves (as yet unproven) off the Atlantic coast surfaced years later and has probably increased both sides‘ desire for the region, but the lack of a resolution to the Western Sahara dispute deters exploration. 2 U.N. Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S/2001/613, June 20, 2001, and S/2002/41, January 10, 2002. U.N. documents are accessible via http://www.un.org. 3 Ibid. 4 U.N. press release, June 2, 2003. The plan is in annex II of the U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2003/565, May 23, 2003.

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5

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―Morocco Says ‗Nothing New‘ in Algeria‘s Statements on Western Sahara,‖ Al-Jazeera TV, July 17, 2003, transmitted by BBC Monitoring Middle East-Political. 6 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/325/Add.1, April 23, 2004, ―Reply of the Kingdom of Morocco to Mr. Baker‘s Proposal Entitled ‗Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of Western Sahara.‘‖ 7 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2006/249, April 19, 2006. 8 ―Moroccan King Buries W. Sahara Referendum Idea,‖ Reuters, November 7, 2002. 9 Text accessible via http://www.maec.gov.ma/. The Polisario says it, too, had presented a proposal to the U.N. on April 7, 2007, calling on the U.N. to organize a referendum to allow the Sahrawi to choose among three options: independence, merger with Morocco, or autonomy. If they chose independence, then the Polisario offered to negotiate with Morocco to ensure its economic and security interests and deal with the issue of what the Front refers to as Moroccan ―settlers.‖ ―Polisario Front Head Favours Dialogue with Morocco, Denies Al-Qa‘idah Presence,‖ Al –Jazeera TV, December 12, 2008, BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 14, 2008. 10 The Arab Maghreb Union, including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania, was founded in 1989 to promote regional cooperation. 11 Message by President Bush to King Mohammed VI, MAP, BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 3, 2003. 12 ―‗Serious and Credible,‘ in Washington‘s Own Words,‖ http://www.autonomyplan.org which appears to be an official Moroccan government website, and U.S. Department of State, response to taken question, May 2, 2008. 13 As of April 2009, the MINURSO mission consisted of 185 military observers, 27 military troops, and 6 civilian police from 27 countries. The United States is not represented in MINURSO.

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INDEX 9 9/11, ix, 143, 145, 146

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A abolition, 116 absorption, 10 abuse, 7, 46 accommodation, 96 accountability, 6, 33, 72 acquisitions, 76 activism, 23 Activists, 90 administrators, 126 advocacy, 69 aerospace, 121 affirming, 97 Afghanistan, 4, 5, 71, 145, 146 Africa, viii, 10, 13, 14, 16, 25, 27, 41, 42, 98, 99, 100, 117, 118, 129, 132, 136, 137, 139, 156 AFRICOM, 12, 14, 118, 139 agencies, 5, 28, 58, 147 agricultural sector, 31 agriculture, viii, 17, 30, 33, 58, 149 Air Force, 86, 105, 122 airplane, 13 airports, 9, 11, 36, 37 Al Qaeda, vii, 1, 4, 5, 12, 14, 45, 60, 106, 107, 113, 145, 146, 156, 189 Algeria, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,

22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 146, 151, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192 alienation, 23 allied coalition, 86 amalgam, viii, 17 anger, 23, 108 annual rate, 27 apathy, 54, 67 appointees, 3 appointments, 145 appropriations, 71, 73, 76, 77, 90, 104 Arab countries, 54 Arab world, 10, 23, 63, 74, 85, 111, 154 architects, 88 Argentina, 122 armed forces, 20, 22, 39, 62, 65, 86, 97, 101, 185 arms control, 43 arrest, 13, 46, 114 arrests, 24, 112, 115, 147 Asia, 72, 98 Asian countries, 100 Asian firms, 123 assassination, 23, 66, 84 assault, 4, 18 assessment, 12, 123 assets, 32, 98, 114, 133, 135 attachment, 135, 142 Austria, 151 authorities, vii, 1, 2, 12, 56, 63, 86, 94, 95, 96, 102, 106, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121,

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122, 123, 127, 128, 131, 138, 139, 146, 148, 152, 184, 188 autonomy, ix, 18, 65, 150, 152, 183, 186, 187, 188, 190, 192 Ayman al Zawahiri, 60, 113

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B background, 16, 94, 96 background information, 94, 96 Bahrain, 154 bail, 131 ballistic missiles, 125 banking sector, 32 banks, 32, 58, 82, 84 bargaining, 129 Belgium, 32, 34, 149 benchmarks, 72 bias, 187 Big Bang, 14 births, 28 blends, 98 Boeing, 78 bomb attack, 5, 45 bombing, viii, 93, 95, 100, 102, 108, 113, 123, 130, 131, 132, 134, 136 border control, 104 border crossing, 57 border security, 95 Bosnia, 86 Brazil, 149 breakdown, 29 Britain, 5, 82, 83, 113 broadcast media, 41, 138 brothers, 5, 19 budget deficit, 59 bureaucracy, 2, 24, 62

C Cabinet, 137 Camp David, 85, 89 campaigns, 188 cancer, 131 candidates, 2, 23, 24, 49, 51, 63, 68 cannabis, 152

capacity building, 118 capital goods, 8, 34 capital markets, 32 carbon, 9 case law, 39 catalyst, 98 cattle, 31 censorship, 41 Census, 61 central bank, 116, 139 Central Europe, 27 CERN, 5 certification, 104, 137 Chad, 117, 123 challenges, 58, 69, 107, 118, 125 charities, 69 checks and balances, 66 child labor, 148 China, 8, 34, 43, 122, 123, 149 cholera, 29 Christianity, 17, 61 Christians, 50, 62 CIA, 8, 149, 156 citizenship, 20, 148 civil liberties, 46, 75 civil rights, 113 civil servants, 22 civil society, 69, 72, 75, 90, 116 civil war, 84 civilization, viii, 17 cleaning, 23 climate, 31, 61 close relationships, 117 closure, 56, 70 Coast Guard, 45, 105 Cold War, 11, 83, 96, 99 colleges, 29 collusion, 30 colon, 20 colonization, 11, 96 color, iv, 16 commercial bank, 33 community, 11, 56, 100, 101, 107, 111, 124, 128, 154 community support, 101

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Index compensation, 6, 46, 100, 104, 132, 141, 142 competition, 32, 36, 37, 83, 152 compilation, vii complaints, 29, 45, 115 composition, 88 conference, 84, 90, 111, 142 conflict, ix, 10, 13, 18, 21, 24, 50, 54, 55, 86, 94, 99, 127, 143, 153, 186, 189 confrontation, 98, 101, 127 consent, 186 conservation, 27 Consolidated Appropriations Act, viii, 48, 73, 74, 90, 106, 137, 190 consolidation, 132, 142 Constitution, 39, 53, 66, 67, 89, 138, 142 constitutional amendment, 2, 51, 64 consumer demand, 88 consumer goods, 8, 34 consumption, 32 conviction, 130 copyright, iv Copyright, iv corruption, 7, 9, 46, 58, 75, 147, 149, 156 cost, 24, 38, 45, 77, 105, 137, 188, 189 cotton, 82 Council of Ministers, 2, 39, 129 counsel, 101, 134 counseling, 63 counterterrorism, vii, ix, 2, 43, 45, 93, 95, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 133, 137, 147 coup, 2, 21, 22, 53, 54, 83, 97, 107, 108, 115, 118, 129, 187 court proceedings, 135 credentials, 4 creditors, 135 crime, 11, 108 criminals, 60 criticism, 99, 110, 117, 129, 138 critics, 2, 9, 67, 72, 86 crops, 27, 31, 152 crude oil, 32, 35, 37, 119 Cuba, 5, 145 cultivation, 17, 152

195

culture, 41, 49, 148 currency, 9, 32, 35, 36 current account, 35 current account balance, 35 cycles, 29

D damages, iv, 102, 132, 135, 136 danger, 5 Darfur region, 13 database, 155 death penalty, 148 death rate, 28 deaths, 4, 45 debts, 41, 82 decentralization, 98, 110, 150, 188 decolonization, 10, 187, 188 defamation, 41 defendants, 40 deficiency, 29 democracy, 64, 66, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 83, 86, 90, 142, 144 Democratic Party, 51, 64, 65, 84, 87 democratization, 2, 11, 69, 72, 156 demonstrations, 24, 45, 67, 145, 189 denial, 46, 115 Denmark, 19 Department of Commerce, 58, 88 Department of Defense, 137, 155, 157 Department of Energy, 125 Department of Justice, 94, 95, 104 deposits, 120 deregulation, 30, 32, 34 destruction, 22, 124, 125, 127 detainees, 5, 46, 114 detection, 57 detention, 5, 7, 46, 60, 114, 115, 117, 137, 148 developing countries, 38, 98 developing nations, 58 diplomacy, 55, 84 diplomatic efforts, 55 diplomatic engagement, 117 direct action, 106 direct investment, 149

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196

Index

disability, 53 disappointment, 110 disaster, 35 disclosure, 124 discourse, 108 discrimination, 7, 13, 46, 50, 61, 62, 63, 108 displacement, 128 disposition, 128 dissatisfaction, 65, 67, 101, 132 dissidents, 99, 107, 111, 112, 116 District of Columbia, 132, 141 diversification, 30, 118 diversity, 26, 150 doctors, 29, 69 dogs, 111 Doha, 137 domestic violence, 10 donations, 69, 81, 103 draft, 21, 186 dream, 58 drinking water, 29 drugs, 5, 56 due process, 40, 46 dumping, 27 duty free, 59 duty-free treatment, 12 dynamics, 108

E earnings, 8, 9, 34 economic activity, 124 economic assistance, 35, 73, 75, 83, 85, 86 economic cooperation, 59, 102 economic development, 9, 35, 69, 73 economic growth, 8, 87, 94, 119, 129 economic liberalization, 70 economic reform, 30, 58, 71, 72, 94, 108 economy, viii, ix, 8, 9, 17, 22, 23, 30, 33, 58, 59, 75, 82, 118, 124, 139, 149, 150, 189 Education, 11, 29, 35, 43, 77, 81, 95, 105, 155 Egypt, vii, viii, 16, 18, 29, 34, 41, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,

71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 99, 107, 114, 128, 145 election, vii, 1, 2, 3, 11, 24, 38, 39, 41, 45, 52, 53, 54, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 129, 144, 145, 154 electricity, 32, 149 embargo, 100, 121 emigration, 11, 27, 34 employees, 5 employment, 9, 27, 35, 58, 65, 139 encouragement, 11 enemies, 107 enforcement, 59, 135 enrollment, 29 enslavement, 17 EPA, 89 equality, 20, 69 equipment, 6, 36, 37, 43, 44, 56, 57, 59, 76, 78, 83, 85, 88, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 140, 149, 155 Eritrea, 41, 45 EU, 10, 34, 151 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 35, 151 European Union, 10, 11, 34, 35, 121, 151 exchange rate, 30 execution, 135, 142 Executive Order, 94, 114, 133, 134, 136 exercise, 77, 109, 115, 190 exile, 111, 145, 146 expenditures, 31, 44, 84, 133 experts, 52, 54, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 110, 122, 139 exploitation, 7 exploration, 9, 34, 35, 110, 119, 120, 191 explosives, 56 exporter, 149 exports, 8, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 60, 118, 119, 120, 121, 133, 139, 150 extraction, 17 extremists, 4, 43, 147

F factories, 70 faith, vii, 1, 3, 28, 60, 62, 94, 101

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Index farmers, 27, 58, 89, 128, 152 FAS, 91 fatwa, 146 FDI, 35 fears, 5, 6, 54 Feast, 16 fertility, 28 fertility rate, 28 fertilizers, 149 financial crisis, 9, 150 financial market, 9 financial support, 28, 85, 101 fiscal surpluses, 119 fish, 31 fishing, 25, 31, 184 flight, 72, 132 flooding, 82 fluctuations, 35, 57, 118, 149 focus groups, 74 food prices, 58, 88 footwear, 32 Ford, 132 foreign affairs, 53, 110, 144 foreign aid, viii, 47, 72 foreign assistance, viii, 47, 71, 72, 76, 90, 94, 95, 102, 104, 134, 137 foreign direct investment, 35, 88 foreign exchange, 149 foreign intelligence, 112 foreign investment, 8, 9, 34, 35, 119 foreign policy, vii, ix, 1, 74, 84, 100, 108, 117, 143 formula, 102 France, ix, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 32, 34, 41, 83, 88, 119, 121, 122, 125, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 149, 152, 187, 189 fraud, 2, 24, 66 free trade, ix, 143, 151, 156 freedom, 7, 28, 61, 72, 75, 115, 138 freedom of expression, 115 Freedom Support Act, 134 friction, 152 friendship, 10, 127 full capacity, 152

197

funding, 5, 70, 72, 74, 90, 94, 95, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 137

G gallbladder, 48 gangs, 20 Gaza Strip, 13, 49, 56, 57, 85, 88, 153, 154 GDP per capita, 8 General Motors, 36, 88 Generalized System of Preferences, 12 genocide, 13 Georgia, 11, 141 Germany, 5, 8, 34, 48, 91, 119, 123, 140, 149 global economy, 58 God, 52 governance, 70, 73, 74, 75, 90, 107 government funds, 135 government revenues, 31 grassroots, 145 gross domestic product, 8, 30, 31, 32, 34, 44, 84, 149 gross national product, 149 grounding, 127 grouping, 127 growth rate, 8, 30, 149 Guantanamo, 5, 145 guidelines, 125, 133 guilty, 132

H Haiti, 152 Hamas, 13, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 87, 89, 100, 153 harassment, 41, 63, 190 headquarters, 4, 184 health services, 9 heart attack, 66 heat exhaustion, 88 hepatitis, 29 highlands, 26 highways, 9 HIV, 29, 125 HIV/AIDS, 29, 125

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Index

honesty, 17 host, 100 hostage taking, 137 hostilities, 127 hotels, 33 housing, 9, 33, 58, 65, 150 human development, 30 human development index, 30 human immunodeficiency virus, 29 human resources, 12 human rights, vii, viii, ix, x, 1, 7, 46, 47, 60, 63, 69, 72, 73, 74, 94, 109, 114, 115, 116, 143, 147, 148, 184, 190 hydrocarbons, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36

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I ideology, 65, 84, 106, 107, 108, 109, 129, 144 image, 65, 69, 189 IMF, 30, 33, 139 immigrants, 9 immigration, 10, 11, 151, 152, 189 immunity, 66, 89, 94, 102, 103, 134 immunization, 29 imports, 34, 35, 36, 150 inclusion, 11, 13, 68 income distribution, 9 incumbents, 65 independence, vii, ix, 1, 7, 10, 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 29, 36, 42, 44, 46, 63, 66, 82, 83, 89, 98, 108, 116, 129, 150, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192 Independence, 16, 20, 126, 129, 139, 144 India, 82, 122 inefficiency, 147 inequality, 9, 49, 58, 148 infant mortality, 28 inflation, 31, 70, 71 informal sector, 148 inheritance, 63 inspectors, 88, 123, 124 institutional change, 116 insurgency, 32, 46, 96, 114, 128 integration, ix, 183, 185, 186 intellectual property, 59

intellectual property rights, 59 intelligence, 5, 12, 52, 53, 56, 72, 100, 106, 110, 111, 123, 129, 130, 131 interest groups, 108 interference, 24, 70, 154 International Atomic Energy Agency, 42, 49, 122, 124, 125, 140 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 42 International Chamber of Commerce, 42 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 42 International Criminal Court, 13, 42 International Monetary Fund, 30, 33, 42, 118, 139 International Olympic Committee, 42 international standards, 29, 144, 147 international terrorism, ix, 101, 142, 143 interoperability, 77 interrogations, 114 intervention, 6, 82, 101 intifada, 99 investment bank, 33 investors, 12, 88, 118 Iran, ix, 54, 68, 130, 134, 143, 154, 156 Iraq, 5, 13, 14, 84, 90, 114, 124, 135, 139, 142, 146 iron, 27, 31, 32, 36, 50 Islam, 16, 17, 28, 39, 41, 46, 61, 89, 96, 108, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 123, 137, 138, 147, 154 Islamic law, 40, 116 Islamic state, 4 Islamic world, 154 Islamism, 147 isolation, 100, 108 Israel, 13, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 59, 71, 72, 75, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 99, 101, 117, 122, 129, 145, 153, 154, 156 issues, 39, 53, 54, 55, 61, 69, 94, 96, 102, 108, 129, 189 Italy, 5, 8, 9, 34, 37, 119, 128, 149

J Japan, 91, 122, 140

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Index Jews, 57, 154 jihad, 4 Jordan, 59, 71, 84, 90, 117 journalism, 138 journalists, 41, 45 judicial branch, 38, 66, 67 judiciary, 2, 24, 39, 66, 89, 114, 147 jurisdiction, 25, 39 justification, 103

K kidnapping, 5, 61

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L labor force, 149 landscape, 98, 144 laptop, 38 Latin America, 188 law enforcement, 147 lawyers, 67, 69 leadership, 2, 12, 22, 24, 30, 63, 96, 97, 108, 110, 113, 120, 121, 127, 144, 146 Lebanon, 13, 84 legal protection, 21, 69, 82 legislation, 7, 39, 62, 64, 73, 104, 134, 142, 144 liberalization, 12, 88 liberation, 22, 146 Liberia, 99 life expectancy, 28 liquefied natural gas, 120 literacy, 29 litigation, 135 livestock, 31 lobbying, 135 local authorities, 39 local government, ix, 185, 186 Lockheed Martin, 78 logistics, 44 loyalty, 65 lying, 26

M machinery, 59

199

majority, 21, 23, 32, 49, 64, 65, 73 malaria, 125 Malaysia, 34, 123 management, 118, 123 mandates, 39 manpower, x, 65, 184 manufactured goods, 65, 82 manufacturing, 17, 32 marginalization, 129 Marine Corps, 127 market economy, 30 marriage, 61, 63, 148 mass media, 41 Mauritania, 4, 6, 25, 42, 151, 184, 185, 186, 187, 192 measles, 29 media, 41, 48, 56, 75, 116 medical care, 117 medication, 125 Mediterranean, viii, 10, 12, 17, 18, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33, 36, 37, 82, 127, 151, 152, 155 Mediterranean climate, 26 membership, 40, 53, 122, 188 merchandise, 34 mercury, 31 Microsoft, 88 middle class, 69 Middle East, viii, ix, 13, 14, 35, 42, 47, 54, 70, 72, 77, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 95, 98, 122, 137, 139, 140, 143, 153, 156, 157, 192 migrants, 27, 189 migration, 27 militancy, 60, 114, 145 military, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 30, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 64, 65, 66, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 136, 137, 139, 140, 144, 153, 155, 189, 192 military aid, 71, 75, 77 military exercises, 155 military government, 24

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Index

military occupation, 117 military spending, 77, 120 militia, 45, 128 minorities, 46, 63 modernization, 34, 35, 76, 82 moisture, 27 momentum, 58 monopoly, 8 Morocco, vii, ix, 10, 14, 18, 19, 25, 29, 33, 42, 44, 113, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192 Moscow, 121, 140 murder, 49, 130 Muslims, 7, 20, 21, 28, 63

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N national debt, 9, 59 National Defense Authorization Act, 104, 135 national policy, 109 national security, 10, 39, 45, 72, 96, 133, 136, 142, 151, 185, 186 nationalism, 84 native population, viii, 17 NATO, 12, 155 natural gas, 9, 27, 30, 32, 34, 37, 96, 119, 124 natural resources, 27 Nazi Germany, 20 neglect, 7 negotiating, 34, 111, 125, 154 net migration, 27 Netherlands, 8, 19 NGOs, 69, 70, 73, 74, 90 Nigeria, 9, 37, 41, 139 Nile, 70, 89 Nobel Prize, 49 North Africa, 1, iii, vii, 7, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 28, 94, 118, 120, 128, 139, 156 North America, ix nuclear energy, 11, 13, 41, 122, 125, 150 nuclear power, 122 nuclear weapons, 122, 123, 124, 125, 140

nurses, 29

O Obama Administration, 5, 48, 74, 94, 95, 102, 104, 105, 117, 131, 137 obstacles, 12, 54, 58, 61, 63 oil, ix, 8, 9, 27, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 58, 59, 72, 88, 96, 98, 100, 101, 110, 118, 119, 124, 129, 139, 151, 191 oil production, 98, 100, 110, 119, 120 oil revenues, 98, 110 Operation Desert Storm, 86 opportunities, 77, 93, 94, 101, 117 opposition movement, 52, 67, 70, 111, 117 opposition parties, 65, 67 optimism, 115 Organization of American States, 42 Osama Bin Laden, 146 Ottoman Empire, 19, 82, 126, 128 outreach, 112 overgrazing, 27 oversight, 67, 96, 102 ownership, 37, 61, 118

P Pakistan, 4, 67, 71, 113, 122, 123, 139, 140 Palestinian Authority, 54, 56, 100 Pan Am flight 103, 130 parallel, 26, 37, 66 Parliament, 63, 68 partition, 99, 186 pastures, 27 peace process, 50, 85, 99, 154, 190 peacekeeping, 86, 91 Pentagon, 77 performance, 110 permission, iv, 131, 148, 189 permit, 135 perpetrators, 61 Persian Gulf, 72 personal computers, 38 pharmaceuticals, 12, 65 phosphates, 27, 149, 150 physical abuse, 63

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Index piracy, 19 plants, 123, 125 platform, 97, 100 poison, 5 police, 4, 5, 20, 24, 43, 45, 49, 50, 56, 57, 62, 70, 86, 89, 147, 192 political instability, 18 political leaders, 109 political opposition, 67, 69, 70, 110, 115 political participation, 20 political parties, 23, 40, 53, 84, 89, 145, 154 political party, 40, 52, 68 political pluralism, 109 political power, 54, 82, 127 politics, vii, viii, 10, 23, 47, 49, 51, 54, 68, 82, 83, 108, 109, 144, 145, 156 polling, 67 polygamy, 148 Popular Front, ix, 10, 99, 130, 150, 183, 184 popular support, 67 population density, 27 ports, 9, 18, 31, 36, 37, 152 poverty, 13, 30, 58, 88, 149, 156 poverty line, 30 precipitation, 26 preparedness, 109 presidency, 8, 38, 52, 53, 86, 100 prisoners, 55, 60, 113, 114, 116, 127 prisons, 116 privateers, 18, 127 privatization, 9, 30, 33, 38, 58, 70, 149 procurement, 57, 77, 106, 139 production capacity, 119 production targets, 119 prognosis, 95, 131 programming, 41, 73, 106 project, 9, 83 proliferation, 122, 124 properties, 22 property rights, 59 proposition, 187 prosperity, 17, 94, 190 prostate cancer, 95, 131 protectorate, 91 public affairs, 110

201

public health, 29 public interest, 138 public investment, 9 public life, 108 public schools, 28 public sector, 149 punishment, 114 purchasing power, 30 purchasing power parity, 30

Q Qatar, 112, 141 questioning, 186 quotas, 145

R race, 40 radicalism, 91 radicals, 60, 146, 148 radio, 38, 41, 147 rainfall, 26, 31, 149 Ramadan, 16 rape, 50, 61 rapists, 6 RCD, ix recession, vii, 1, 8, 58, 150 recognition, 74, 99, 188 recommendations, iv reconciliation, 24, 61, 99, 100, 112, 113, 117 reconstruction, 62, 142 recruiting, 146 Red Army, 99 redistribution, 98 reelection, 49, 53, 64 reflection, 2 reformers, 54, 58, 66 reforms, viii, 19, 24, 33, 47, 66, 87, 91, 115, 116, 128, 148, 149 refugee camps, 10, 184, 190 refugees, 28, 99, 185, 187 regional cooperation, x, 6, 183, 192 rejection, 113, 147, 186 relevance, 113

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202

Index

relief, 5, 28, 103 religion, 16, 28, 39, 40, 46, 61, 63, 108, 114, 147 remittances, 149, 150 rent, 83 repair, 62, 115, 141 replacement, 2, 110, 187 Republic of the Congo, 45 reputation, 17, 115 requirements, 42, 85, 90, 103, 148, 151 resentment, 49, 108 reserves, 8, 9, 27, 32, 36, 44, 96, 119, 189, 191 resistance, 22, 30, 97, 108, 126, 128 resolution, 10, 13, 128, 132, 189, 191 resource allocation, 118 resource management, 118 resources, 6, 18, 64, 69, 94, 96, 129, 137, 184, 188 respect, 49, 60, 61, 73, 74, 90, 135, 188 restitution, 61 retaliation, 10, 20, 108, 130 revenue, 100, 118, 121 Revolutionary Guard, 122 rewards, 124 rhetoric, 4, 49, 68, 99, 189 rights, iv, 7, 21, 23, 28, 45, 46, 60, 61, 66, 69, 72, 74, 75, 89, 109, 112, 114, 115, 116, 142, 148, 153, 190 rockets, 50 rule of law, 56, 74, 132 rural areas, 29, 36 Russia, 11, 19, 35, 43, 82, 120, 121, 125, 140

S sabotage, 137 Saddam Hussein, 86 sanctions, viii, 93, 100, 101, 104, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 130, 133 Saudi Arabia, 35, 114, 149 scholarship, 18 screening, 13 Second World, 128 Secretary of Defense, 85, 139, 142

secularism, 68 security forces, 2, 4, 6, 7, 24, 45, 56, 60, 104, 105, 135, 147 security services, 46, 62, 99, 146, 147 seismic data, 57 seizure, 127 Senate, 76, 90, 106, 142 sensitivity, 190 service provider, 38 settlements, 88 sewage, 27 shape, 67 sheep, 31 shores, 127 shortage, 29 Sierra Leone, 99, 136 Sinai, 54, 56, 84, 140 single market, 59 smuggling, 10, 25, 50, 55, 56, 57, 189 Smuggling, 55, 87, 88 social fabric, 118 social services, 65 socialism, 118 soil erosion, 27 solidarity, 114, 154 Somalia, 86, 146 South Africa, 41, 123, 140, 188 South Asia, 189 sovereignty, 108, 128, 150, 184, 188, 190 Soviet Union, 11, 84, 98, 122 space, 69, 138 Spain, ix, 4, 5, 8, 18, 19, 28, 32, 34, 37, 119, 121, 123, 143, 149, 152, 184, 189 speculation, 48, 96, 121 speech, 7, 46, 66, 87, 110, 115, 138, 147, 154 spelling, 136 Spring, 7, 89, 136, 140 stab wounds, 88 stabilization, 152 state control, 30 State Department, vii, 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 14, 50, 60, 61, 69, 70, 90, 94, 95, 104, 105, 106, 109, 117, 137, 138, 146, 147, 155, 156, 190

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Index state of emergency, 6, 11, 23, 24, 38, 46 state-owned enterprises, 32 statistics, 29 statute, 20 steel, 31, 32, 50 stimulus, 59 stock exchange, 9, 33 storage, 141 strategy, 70 submarines, 44, 121 sub-Saharan Africa, 152, 188, 189 subscribers, 38 subsidy, 59, 88 subsistence, viii, 17 succession, 52 Sudan, 13, 45, 100, 107, 117 suicide, 4, 45, 113, 146 suicide attacks, 4, 146 suicide bombers, 4, 146 suicide bombings, 113 supervision, 22, 33, 67, 89, 125, 132 supervisors, 147 support services, 189 suppression, 190 Supreme Council, 48, 52, 53 Supreme Court, 39 surplus, 121 surrogates, 188 surveillance, 43, 57 survey, 30 survival, 28, 131 suspects, 146 Switzerland, 91, 123 sympathy, 189 symptoms, 62 syndrome, 29 Syria, 13, 84

T tactics, 4, 21 takeover, 24, 56, 184 tangible benefits, 100 tanks, 44, 77, 91 tariff, 34 tax system, 58

203

taxation, 129 technical assistance, 74, 123, 129 telecommunications, 35, 36, 37, 149 television stations, 147 temperature, 26 tension, 50, 94, 99, 113 tensions, viii, 8, 20, 22, 47, 62, 71, 74 tenure, 100, 117 territory, ix, 6, 11, 13, 17, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 96, 99, 100, 118, 120, 126, 128, 139, 183, 184, 186, 188, 190 terrorism, vii, viii, ix, 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 32, 33, 39, 45, 46, 66, 93, 94, 95, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 113, 123, 124, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 151, 152, 156, 189, 190 terrorist acts, 135 terrorist attacks, 41, 68, 86, 93, 100, 106, 107, 121, 148 terrorist groups, 98, 99, 147 terrorists, vii, ix, 1, 2, 5, 6, 12, 145, 149, 155 textiles, 60, 150 Third World, 10, 98 threats, 21, 124, 189 Title I, 81 Title II, 81 torture, 7, 46, 60, 114, 115, 137, 147 tourism, 10, 33, 49, 149 trade liberalization, 30, 34 trade union, 71 trading partner, 10, 41, 59, 152 trafficking in persons, 7 training, 11, 12, 35, 44, 57, 72, 77, 83, 86, 91, 99, 105, 120, 137 trajectory, 35 transaction costs, 58 transparency, 7, 14, 33, 46, 88, 156 transport, 8, 9, 35, 44, 105, 133 transportation, 32, 35, 36 treaties, 40, 64, 127 trends, 98, 118 trial, 13, 40, 49, 100, 114, 146 tuberculosis, 29 Turkey, 32, 34, 123

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204

Index

Turks, 140 turnout, vii, 1, 2, 3, 64 typhoid, 29 typhoid fever, 29

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U U.N. Security Council, 10, 13, 100, 185, 191, 192 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 114, 138 U.S. history, 127 U.S. policy, viii, 11, 47, 55, 94, 150 U.S. Secretary of Commerce, 142 U.S. Treasury, 12 UK, 121, 125, 138, 141 Ukraine, 121 UN, 60, 91, 141, 154, 156 unemployment rate, 8, 33, 65 UNHCR, 187 United Arab Emirates, 123 United Kingdom, 94, 95, 107, 114, 121, 123, 129, 130, 131, 141, 146 United Nations, ix, 10, 28, 30, 41, 42, 45, 81, 95, 123, 128, 183, 185 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 10, 42 United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 42 universities, 29 UNRWA, 81 uranium, 27, 122, 123, 124, 125 urban areas, 29, 38 urbanization, 17 use of force, 13

V variations, 110 vegetables, 149 vehicles, 5, 44, 91 Venezuela, 188 vessels, 127 victims, 6, 7, 46, 102, 103, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 141, 142, 148 video, 5

videos, 5 violence, 2, 4, 6, 7, 20, 24, 28, 38, 42, 46, 50, 55, 61, 62, 63, 68, 99, 113, 114, 146, 148, 189 voicing, 99 voiding, 24 voters, 144, 145, 185, 186 voting, 13, 186

W wages, 59, 70 waiver, 135, 142 waste, 27 water resources, 9 watershed, 20 waterways, 37 weakness, 82, 129 wealth, 19, 30, 98, 129 weapons, viii, 20, 44, 55, 57, 76, 77, 78, 93, 100, 101, 102, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 133, 134, 140, 141, 189 weapons of mass destruction, viii, 93, 100, 101, 102, 123, 124, 133, 134, 140 West Bank, 49, 54, 85, 117 Western Europe, 120, 123 White House, 85, 133 wholesale, 17 withdrawal, 13, 28, 56, 85, 98, 154 witnesses, 40 WMD, 120, 122, 123, 124, 140 workers, 4, 5, 7, 22, 23, 58, 70, 71 working conditions, 89 World Bank, 29, 30, 35, 36, 38, 42 World Trade Organization, 9, 34, 42 World War I, 20, 83, 96, 128

Y Yemen, 34, 91 young adults, 29

Z zinc, 27, 31

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