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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

COUNTRIES, REGIONAL STUDIES, TRADING BLOCKS, UNIONS, WORLD ORGANIZATIONS

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YEMEN: BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND AL QAEDA ROLE

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COUNTRIES, REGIONAL STUDIES, TRADING BLOCKS, UNIONS, WORLD ORGANIZATIONS

YEMEN: BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND AL QAEDA ROLE

GABRIEL A. DUMONT Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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Copyright © 2010 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com

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Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

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CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations Jeremy M. Sharp

Chapter 2

Country Profile: Yemen Library of Congress - Federal Research Division

31

Chapter 3

Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb Committee on Foreign Relations

63

Chapter 4

Following the Money in Yemen and Lebanon: Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance and International Financial Institution Lending Committee on Foreign Relations

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vii

Chapter 6 Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Chapter 10

1

81

Opening Statement of Chairman John F. Kerry, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Yemen

111

Opening Statement of Dick Lugar, U.S. Senator for Indiana, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Yemen

115

Testimony of Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

117

Beware of False Analogies: Why Yemen is not Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia....It‘s Yemen Barbara K. Bodine

125

Turmoil in Yemen: How Understanding the Challenges Can Help Us Undermine al-Qa‘ida and the Radical Paradigm Emile Nakhleh

135

How to Apply Smart Power in Yemen Frederick W. Kagan and Christopher Harnisch

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vi Chapter 11

Contents Testimony of Gregory D. Johnsen, PhD. Candidate, Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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Index

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PREFACE With limited natural resources, a crippling illiteracy rate, and high population growth, Yemen faces an array of daunting development challenges that some observers believe make it at risk for becoming a failed state. Yemen is largely dependent on external aid from Persian Gulf countries, Western donors, and international financial institutions. As the country's population rapidly rises, resources dwindle, and terrorist groups take root in the outlying provinces, the Obama Administration is left to grapple with the consequences of Yemeni instability. This book is an overview of Yemen's history, U.S. relations and the role of Al Qaeda in the region. Chapter 1 - With limited natural resources, a crippling illiteracy rate, and high population growth, Yemen faces an array of daunting development challenges that some observers believe make it at risk for becoming a failed state. Between 2007 and 2008, Yemen ranked 153 out of 177 countries on the United Nations Development Programme‘s Human Development Index, a score comparable to the poorest sub-Saharan African countries. Over 43% of the population of nearly 24 million people lives below the poverty line, and per capita GDP is estimated to be between $650 and $800. Yemen is largely dependent on external aid from Persian Gulf countries, Western donors, and international financial institutions, though its per capita share of assistance is below the global average. As the country‘s population rapidly rises, resources dwindle, and terrorist groups take root in the outlying provinces, the Obama Administration and the 111th Congress are left to grapple with the consequences of Yemeni instability. Traditionally, U.S.-Yemeni relations have been tepid, as the lack of strong military-to-military partnership, trade relations, and cross cultural exchange has hindered the development of strong bilateral ties. During the early years of the Bush Administration, relations improved under the rubric of the war on terror, though Yemen‘s lax policy toward wanted terrorists and U.S. concerns about governance and corruption have stalled large-scale U.S. support. Over the past several fiscal years, Yemen has received on average between $20 and $25 million annually in total U.S. foreign aid. For FY20 10, the Obama Administration requested significant increases in U.S. economic and military assistance to Yemen. P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, provides a total of $52.5 million in economic and military assistance to Yemen, including $35 million in Development Assistance, $12.5 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $5 million in Economic Support Funds. As President Obama and the 111th Congress reassess U.S. policy toward the Arab world, the opportunity for improved U.S.-Yemeni ties is strong, though tensions persist over

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Gabriel A. Dumont

counterterrorism cooperation, and, in recent years, the broader U.S. foreign policy community has not focused on Yemen, its challenges, and their potential consequences for U.S. foreign policy interests beyond the realm of counterterrorism. The failed bomb attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 once again highlighted the potential for terrorism emanating from Yemen, a potential that periodically emerges to threaten U.S. interests both at home and abroad. Whether terrorist groups in Yemen, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, have a long-term ability to threaten U.S. homeland security may determine the extent of U.S. resources committed to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Some believe these groups lack such capability and fear the United States might overreact; others assert that Yemen is gradually becoming a failed state and safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives and as such should be considered an active theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations. Given Yemen‘s contentious political climate and its myriad development challenges, most long-time Yemen watchers suggest that security problems emanating from Yemen may persist in spite of increased U.S. or international efforts to combat them. Chapter 2 features a profile of Yemen. Chapter 3 - This chapter by the committee majority staff is part of our ongoing examination of Al Qaeda‘s role in international terrorism. U.S. and allied operations over the past several years have largely pushed Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of those fighters traveled to the tribal region on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan. But ongoing U.S. and Pakistani military and intelligence operations there have made it an increasingly inhospitable place for Al Qaeda. Consequently, hundreds-or perhaps even thousands-of fighters have gone elsewhere. New Al Qaeda cells or allied groups have sprung up in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and perhaps most importantly in Yemen and Somalia. These groups may have only an informal connection with Al Qaeda‘s leadership in Pakistan, but they often share common goals. Al Qaeda‘s recruitment tactics also have changed. The group seeks to recruit American citizens to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States. These Americans are not necessarily of Arab or South Asian descent; they include individuals who converted to Islam in prison or elsewhere and were radicalized. This chapter relies on new and existing information to explore the current and changing threat posed by Al Qaeda, not just abroad, but here at home. Chapter 4 - In the Fall of 2009, I directed my Senior Professional Staff Member for the Middle East, Dorothy Shea, to visit Yemen and Lebanon to gather information for two forthcoming committee reports. The first concerns security assistance, and is in follow up to the committee‘s 2006 report, ―Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign.‖1 The second report is the last in a series my staff have produced on lending by International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Although the circumstances facing Yemen and Lebanon differ greatly, I selected these two countries because they have both been major recipients of U.S. security assistance, particularly under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, while both countries have received substantial IFI lending, significant structural reforms are urgently needed to tackle long-term development challenges. The stakes in both countries are quite high. As this chapter was going to press, we learned about the magnitude of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in Yemen: on December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national who is believed to have received training, indoctrination, and explosives in Yemen, attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines flight. On January 3, 2010, the U.S. and British Embassies in Sanaa, followed by

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Preface

ix

several other Western embassies, temporarily closed due to credible threats of planned suicide attacks by al-Qaeda operatives. Separately, Anwar al-Awlaqi, the Yemeni-American radical cleric, has been linked to numerous terrorism suspects, including Nidal Malik Hasan, charged with the November 2009 Fort Hood massacre. Many analysts assess that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has taken advantage of the Yemeni government‘s preoccupation with an insurgency in the north and a secessionist movement in the south to exploit the country‘s large swaths of ungoverned spaces in an effort to consolidate and build capacity to launch terrorist operations. In addition to its multiple security challenges, Yemen, already the poorest country in the Arab world, faces daunting socio-economic crises, such as the depletion of its oil and water resources. The literacy rate is a little over 50 percent and unemployment was last estimated at 35 percent. Yemen‘s security and socio-economic challenges are inter-related, a reality that U.S. assistance programs must address urgently, creatively, and with unity of effort within the U.S. government and with like-minded donors. Lebanon, meanwhile, is still recovering from the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, as well as the 2007 fighting between Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Fatah al-Islam at the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp. The United States has a strong interest in helping to further the professionalization of the Lebanese security services and their ability to counter terrorist threats. We have made substantial investments toward this end, but the work is far from over. We must also work to ensure the sustainability of U.S. assistance. In addition, the international donor community needs to do a better job of encouraging the kinds of structural reforms that will be necessary to overcome the country‘s long-standing economic challenges, such as the massive public debt. While the key findings of this chapter will be incorporated as case studies in the broader committee reports, I wanted to share with you the entire staff trip report, which I believe provides useful insight into key issues underpinning the myriad challenges these two countries face and which U.S. security assistance, as well as IFI lending, is designed to help address. As the Congress and the Administration debate the issue of foreign assistance reform in general, and the role of security assistance in particular, as well as U.S. strategy to combat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, I hope that you will find this information helpful. Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 feature testimony before the U. S. Senate. Chapter 10 - President Barack Obama has made it clear that he does not intend to send American ground orces into Yemen, and rightly so. But American policy toward Yemen, even after the Christmas terrorist attempt, remains focused on limited counterterrorist approaches that failed in Afghanistan in the 1990s and have created tension in Pakistan since 2001. Yemen faces enormous challenges. Its 24 million people are divided into three antagonistic groups: a Zaydi Shiite minority now fighting against the central government (the Houthi rebellion); the inhabitants of the former Yemen Arab Republic (in the north); and the inhabitants of the former Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (in the south), many of whom are engaged in a secessionist rebellion. Its government is corrupt, its security forces have limited capabilities, and a large swath of its population is addicted to a drug called qat. The World Bank estimates that Yemen will stop earning a profit on its oil production by 2017 (oil now accounts for more than half of the country's export income). Only 46% of rural Yemenis have access to adequate water (40% of the country's water goes to growing qat), and some estimates suggest Yemen will run out of water for its people within a decade.

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American policy in Yemen has focused heavily on fighting al Qaeda, but it has failed to address the conditions that make the country a terrorist safe haven. Targeted strikes in 2002 killed key al Qaeda leaders in Yemen, and the group went relatively quiet for several years. The U.S. military has been working to build up the Yemeni Coast Guard (to prevent attacks similar to the one on the USS Cole in 2000) and to improve the counterterrorist capabilities of the Yemeni military in general. Chapter 11 features testimony before the U. S. Senate.

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In: Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role Editor: Gabriel A. Dumont

ISBN: 978-1-61728-165-5 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

YEMEN: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS



Jeremy M. Sharp

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SUMMARY With limited natural resources, a crippling illiteracy rate, and high population growth, Yemen faces an array of daunting development challenges that some observers believe make it at risk for becoming a failed state. Between 2007 and 2008, Yemen ranked 153 out of 177 countries on the United Nations Development Programme‘s Human Development Index, a score comparable to the poorest sub-Saharan African countries. Over 43% of the population of nearly 24 million people lives below the poverty line, and per capita GDP is estimated to be between $650 and $800. Yemen is largely dependent on external aid from Persian Gulf countries, Western donors, and international financial institutions, though its per capita share of assistance is below the global average. As the country‘s population rapidly rises, resources dwindle, and terrorist groups take root in the outlying provinces, the Obama Administration and the 111th Congress are left to grapple with the consequences of Yemeni instability. Traditionally, U.S.-Yemeni relations have been tepid, as the lack of strong military-to-military partnership, trade relations, and cross cultural exchange has hindered the development of strong bilateral ties. During the early years of the Bush Administration, relations improved under the rubric of the war on terror, though Yemen‘s lax policy toward wanted terrorists and U.S. concerns about governance and corruption have stalled large-scale U.S. support. Over the past several fiscal years, Yemen has received on average between $20 and $25 million annually in total U.S. foreign aid. For FY20 10, the Obama Administration requested significant increases in U.S. economic and military assistance to Yemen. P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, provides a total of $52.5 million in economic and military assistance to Yemen, including $35 million in Development Assistance, $12.5 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $5 million in Economic Support Funds. 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated February 2010.

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As President Obama and the 111th Congress reassess U.S. policy toward the Arab world, the opportunity for improved U.S.-Yemeni ties is strong, though tensions persist over counterterrorism cooperation, and, in recent years, the broader U.S. foreign policy community has not focused on Yemen, its challenges, and their potential consequences for U.S. foreign policy interests beyond the realm of counterterrorism. The failed bomb attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 once again highlighted the potential for terrorism emanating from Yemen, a potential that periodically emerges to threaten U.S. interests both at home and abroad. Whether terrorist groups in Yemen, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, have a long-term ability to threaten U.S. homeland security may determine the extent of U.S. resources committed to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Some believe these groups lack such capability and fear the United States might overreact; others assert that Yemen is gradually becoming a failed state and safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives and as such should be considered an active theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations. Given Yemen‘s contentious political climate and its myriad development challenges, most long-time Yemen watchers suggest that security problems emanating from Yemen may persist in spite of increased U.S. or international efforts to combat them.

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COUNTRY OVERVIEW Located at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is an impoverished Arab country with a population of 23.8 million. The country‘s rugged terrain and geographic isolation, strong tribal social structure, and sparsely settled population has historically made it difficult to centrally govern (and conquer), a feature that has promoted a more pluralistic political environment, but that also has hampered socioeconomic development. Outside of the capital of Sana‘a, tribal leaders often exert more control than central and local government authorities. Kidnappings of Yemeni officials and foreign tourists have been carried out mainly by dissatisfied tribal groups pressing the government for financial largesse or for infrastructure projects in their districts. A series of Zaydi1 Islamic dynasties ruled parts of Yemen both directly and nominally from 897 until 1962. The Ottoman Empire occupied a small portion of the Western Yemeni coastline between 1849 and 1918. In 1839, the British Empire captured the port of Aden, which it held, including some of its surrounding territories, until 1967. The 20th century political upheavals in the Arab world driven by anti-colonialism and Arab nationalism tore Yemen apart in the 1960s. In the north, a civil war pitting royalist forces backed by Saudi Arabia against a republican movement backed by Egypt ultimately led to the dissolution of the Yemeni Imamate and the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In the south, a Yemeni Marxist movement became the primary vehicle for resisting the British occupation of Aden. Communist insurgents eventually succeeded in establishing their own socialist state (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen or PDRY) that over time developed close ties to the Soviet Union and supported what were then radical Palestinian terrorist organizations. Throughout the Cold War, the two Yemeni states frequently clashed, and the United States assisted the YAR, with Saudi Arabian financial support, by periodically providing it with U.S. weaponry.

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Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS (9/2007)

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Figure 1. Map of Yemen

By the mid-1980s, relations between North and South Yemen improved, aided in part by the discovery of modest oil reserves. The Republic of Yemen was formed by the merger of the formerly separate states of North Yemen and South Yemen in 1990. However, Yemen‘s support for Iraq during Operation Desert Storm at that time crippled the country economically, as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states expelled an estimated 850,000 expatriate Yemeni workers (The United States also cut off ties to the newly unified state). In 1994, government forces loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh put down an attempt by southernbased dissidents to secede, but some southerners still resent what they perceive as continued northern political economic and cultural domination of daily life. President Saleh, a former YAR military officer, has governed Yemen since the unified state came into being in 1990; prior to this, he had headed the former state of North Yemen from 1978 to 1990. In Yemen‘s first popular presidential election, held in 1999, President Saleh won 96.3% of the vote amidst cries of ballot tampering. In 2006, Saleh stood for reelection and received 77% of the vote. The President‘s current and last term expires in 2013, barring any future constitutional amendments.

A Perpetually Failing State: Yemen and the Dilemma for U.S. National Security Policy Throughout his decades of rule, President Saleh has balanced various political forces— tribes, political parties, military officials, and radical Islamists—to create a stable ruling coalition that has kept his regime intact. He has also managed relations with a changing coterie of international supporters, including other Arab States, the Soviet Union, the United

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States, European countries, and numerous international organizations, seeking support in times of crisis and leveraging external assistance to meet internal challenges. Throughout this period, experts have periodically warned about the impending collapse of the Yemeni state and its potential consequences for regional or international security. President Saleh has consistently overcome obstacles to his continued rule, even as Yemen‘s overall political and economic situation has grown more serious. In recent years, a series of events, including more numerous and sophisticated Al Qaeda attacks, an insurgency in the north, and civil unrest in the south, have led some experts to conclude that Yemen may be on the verge of collapse, particularly given its increasingly precarious economic condition. As the country‘s population rapidly rises, resources dwindle, and terrorist groups take root in the outlying provinces, the Obama Administration and Congress are left to grapple with the consequences of Yemeni instability. Some experts suggest that the United States should focus more attention on Yemen because of the risks that state failure would pose to U.S. national security. Some advocates also note that instability in Yemen would affect more than just U.S. interests—it would affect global energy security, due to Yemen‘s strategic location astride the Bab al Mandab strait between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Others assert that, while increased lawlessness in Yemen most likely will lead to more terrorist activity, U.S. involvement in Yemen should stem from basic humanitarian concerns for a poverty-stricken population desperately in need of development assistance. Still other analysts suggest that Yemen is not of major significance to U.S. interests and is far more important to the Gulf Arab States, notably Saudi Arabia. U.S.-Yemeni trade is marginal, Russia and China are its major arms suppliers, and many of its conservative, tribal leaders are suspicious of U.S. policy in the region. With so many other pressing issues in the region to address (Iraq, Iran, the IsraeliPalestinian conflict), Yemen is often overlooked by U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders. However, the failed bomb attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 has once more thrust Yemen into the public spotlight and heightened its relevance for global U.S. counterterrorism operations in a way that other attacks, including attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Sana‘a during 2008, did not. Whether or not the United States can or should remain focused on Yemen over the long term remain open questions, even as some observers criticize policymakers for overlooking the country and underestimating the terrorist threat there. Many analysts suggest that policymakers focus on whether or not terrorist groups in Yemen, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have a sustainable ability to directly threaten U.S. homeland security. Such a determination, some argue, should dictate the extent of U.S. resources committed to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Some argue that these groups lack such a capability or can be denied such a capability with relatively limited U.S. support, and contend that the United States might overreact and jeopardize the Yemeni government‘s stability through increased direct assistance. Others assert that Yemen is a failing state, and suggest that since security problems emanating from Yemen may persist for some time that the U.S. government should adequately prepare for Yemen to become another theater for continuing U.S. counterterrorism operations. For many analysts, the reliability of the Yemeni government as a partner for the United States remains an open question. By all accounts, U.S. policymakers must take into consideration the Yemeni government‘s views of its own interests and goals when considering potential U.S. policy

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responses. Recent history suggests no clear answers to the question of how best to achieve U.S. security objectives vis-à-vis Yemen while pursuing parallel U.S. development, governance, and human rights goals.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS Attempted Christmas Day Airline Bombing: Background and Connection to Yemen

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Overview In the weeks and months before the attempted attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253, Obama Administration officials had already increased U.S. counter-terrorism operations inside Yemen.2 Throughout 2009, U.S. intelligence officials have expressed concern that Al Qaeda operatives and foreign fighters have been moving from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to Yemen and Somalia, though their numbers are unknown. In November 2009, the Fort Hood shooting and the perpetrator‘s alleged ties to a Yemeni cleric also emphasized the possible risks to U.S. homeland security emanating from Yemen. AQAP ‘s failed attempts in August and October to attack targets and a royal family member inside neighboring Saudi Arabia also have raised fears that the group has the potential to carry out operations inside the kingdom. With the Administration planning to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where 91 Yemenis are still incarcerated, and with general fears over gradual state failure in Yemen due to resource shortages, tribal insurrections, and poor governance, the United States has expanded its involvement in Yemen primarily in order to keep Islamist radicals there on the defensive. Recent U.S.-Yemeni Counterterrorism Cooperation against AQAP On December 17, 2009, press sources reported that Yemeni security forces carried out several raids and air strikes against AQAP terrorists and training camps, killing possibly 34 militants, including a top leader and four operatives.3 That same day, the official news agency of Yemen reported that President Obama called President Saleh in order to praise Yemen's efforts in combating terrorism.4 On December 19, the New York Times reported that the United States provided firepower, possibly missile strikes, intelligence, and other support to the government of Yemen as it carried out raids against AQAP.5 Then, on December 21, members of Al Qaeda were seen in a video posted by Al Jazeera, swearing revenge against the United States and the Yemeni government for its recent raids. According to the recording, an AQAP member stated: We are carrying a bomb to hit the enemies of God. O soldiers, you should learn that we do not want to fight you, nor do we have an issue with you. We only have an issue with America and its agents. So, be careful not to side with America.6

On December 24, new reports arose that Yemeni security forces with U.S. assistance carried out another air strike against a meeting of AQAP operatives, including the group‘s top leaders who had gathered in the southern province of Shabwa to plan attacks against the Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

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government in retaliation for the previous week‘s raids and bombings. Anwar al Awlaki (see ―Anwar al Awlaki‖ below for description) may also have been present at the meeting, though there has been no official confirmation of his whereabouts or whether he or the Al Qaeda leaders alleged to be present were killed in the air strike. Awlaki‘s relatives claim that he is still alive.

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Attempted Christmas Day Airline Bombing and Alleged Yemeni Involvement According to multiple reports, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian suspect accused of trying to ignite explosive chemicals to damage or destroy Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day, has claimed that he received equipment and training from Islamist militants in Yemen. On December 28, 2009, a jihadist website posted an alleged AQAP statement claiming responsibility for the attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, saying that it was done ―with direct coordination ... with the mujahidin in the Arabian Peninsula after the savage bombardment of cluster bombs and cruise missiles launched from US ships occupying the Gulf of Aden against the courageous Yemeni tribes in Abyan, Arhan, and finally, Shabwa.‖7 On January 2, 2010, President Obama stated, ―We‘re learning more about the suspect.... We know that he traveled to Yemen, a country grappling with crushing poverty and deadly insurgencies. It appears that he joined an affiliate of Al Qaeda and that this group, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, trained him, equipped him with those explosives and directed him to attack that plane headed for America.‖8 Abdulmutallab, 23, lived in Yemen between 2004 and 2005 while studying at the Sana‘a Institute for the Arabic Language. He then returned to the same school in August 2009 during the month of Ramadan and stayed in Yemen until December. However, school officials there claim he only spent a month on campus. Other reports indicate that Abdulmutallab may have been ―radicalized‖ while studying abroad in London, where he graduated from University College London in 2008. Investigators from the United States, England, Nigeria, and Yemen are determining if Abdulmutallab, while in London, corresponded with radical clerics in Yemen, such as Anwar al Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric who corresponded with the Fort Hood, TX, suspected shooter, Major Nidal M. Hasan, months before the November 5 mass shooting.

Administration and Congressional Response Additional U.S. Foreign Aid to Yemen The Obama Administration, which had already increased U.S. military and economic assistance to Yemen before the December 25 failed terrorist attack, has now pledged to boost FY20 10 State Department-administered aid to Yemen to $63 million, up from a total of $52.5 million specifically appropriated in P.L. 111-117, the FY20 10 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Additional funds may be appropriated in a possible spring-time supplemental aid bill to fund military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the Defense Department has pledged to more than double Section 1206 funding to Yemen in

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FY2010. In FY2009, DOD allocated $66.8 million in 1206 funds to provide equipment and training to Yemen‘s armed forces. By law, the overall allocation of FY20 10 Section 1206 funding was capped at $350 million, and as such, further 1206 funding may also be requested as part of a possible FY2010 supplemental appropriation. Some experts are concerned that the United States government may overreact to the Flight 253 incident and provide the Yemeni government with a ―blank check‖ in order to address its Al Qaeda problem. However, according to State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley, ―It is about more than just the money.... It takes time to build capacity to use these resources effectively. And it takes a political commitment by Yemen to meet its challenges head on. Yemen's performance has been good at times, but not consistent.‖9 According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. security assistance will be limited to mentoring and training of Yemeni counter-terrorist forces, saying, ―We've worked ... to support a growing Yemeni armed forces capability.... We are going to continue to support the Yemeni government in the execution of their strategy to eliminate these terrorists.‖10 As mentioned earlier, U.S. and other foreign counterterrorism training and intelligence cooperation is a politically sensitive issue for the Yemeni government. Since 2002, the United States has trained the Counterterrorism Unit of the Central Security Organization. According to one Yemeni officer, ―There is no doubt that we have all benefited a lot from the training.... [The U.S. and British involvement] is purely training, so there is no problem. When it is time to fight, we go on our own.‖11

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Yemeni Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba On December 28, Congressman Frank Wolf wrote to President Obama requesting that the Administration not release Guantanamo detainees to ―unstable‖ countries.12 After several other lawmakers called for a halt to all future transfers to Yemen, the Obama Administration agreed to suspend the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to Yemen.13 U.S. Political Support to President Saleh The Flight 253 incident has once again illustrated a longstanding dilemma for U.S. counterterrorism policy in Yemen. That is, for each successful or attempted Al Qaedainspired attack against U.S. interests in Yemen or abroad, the United States looks to the Yemeni government and its security forces for assistance—the same government that harbors, employs, and, to a certain extent, relies on Islamist political figures and some Islamist militants for political support. In January 2010, President Saleh remarked that ―Dialogue is the best way, even with Al- Qaeda, if they set aside their weapons and return to reason.‖14 In the weeks after the December 25 failed attack, many Administration officials have made it clear that there are no current plans to send major deployments of U.S. troops to Yemen, making the U.S. need for local cooperation evident. Ironically, many Yemeni government critics blame the growing instability on the government itself, suggesting that new leadership could resolve some of the country‘s more immediate political crises. According to one unnamed U.S. diplomat, ―Washington must work with and behind the regime, whatever its flaws, while trying to push Saleh toward reconciliation with his opponents.... I am afraid it will take more delicacy than the Pentagon can do.‖15 Others suggest that the United States attempt to internationalize its support to Yemen by bringing in Arab Gulf States, Britain, and the European Union, and other multilateral organizations. According to one unnamed U.S.

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official, ―He [President Saleh] hasn‘t always been eager for American support.... That‘s all the more reason to wrap this in broader international support. That makes it easier politically for him.‖16

U.S. Policy Options

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There are a number of challenges to expanded U.S. military and non-military action in Yemen, including limited local political support, limited local capacity to absorb or effectively administer U.S. assistance, a strong public antipathy to U.S. security cooperation, a local government that does not identify Al Qaeda as its primary domestic problem, limited U.S. government knowledge of Yemen‘s internal political dynamics, and a precarious security situation on the ground that prohibits direct U.S. support in outlying areas. Given these challenges, many observers have suggested that the range of options before Congress and the Obama Administration for dealing with AQAP and Yemen‘s long-term viability as a nation-state are limited. The following summaries describe some options that have been proffered; the selection is not exhaustive: 

Condition U.S. Assistance. There is some concern that just like after the 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing in Aden harbor, the United States might repeat a familiar pattern—an attack occurs, the United States scrambles to react, and then gradually the U.S. loses focus, as the Yemeni government reduces the capabilities of Al Qaedainspired militants to an internationally tolerable level without eliminating them. In this regard, some argue that in crafting his government‘s response President Saleh is likely to seek to avoid exacerbating political opposition at home while meeting the demands of the United States or other potential donors. This time, some suggest that the United States condition additional U.S. aid, either overtly or behind closed doors, on political and economic reform in order to improve Yemen‘s long-term prospects and stabilize existing political crises.

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Internationalize Assistance. For years, the United States has advocated for more development assistance for Yemen at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. However, some analysts suggest that due to the political sensitivities of greater U.S. involvement in Yemen, the United States should work multilaterally with Saudi Arabia, the EU, and other countries in both expanding military and economic cooperation there.

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The Minimalist Approach. Despite the flurry of recent media attention since the Flight 253 incident, some observers anticipate that the AQAP threat to the U.S. homeland is not nearly as dire as advertised and that the United States risks exacerbating the problem by becoming too involved in Yemen. While doing nothing may not be an option, these same observers suggest that a quiet, sustained, and deliberate approach may be best.

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MANIFESTATIONS OF STATE FAILURE IN YEMEN Terrorism and Al Qaeda

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In the late 1980s, after the U.S. and Saudi-supported Afghan rebels successfully ended Soviet occupation of their country, several thousand ―Arab Afghan‖ volunteers, who fought alongside the mujahidin (Islamic fighters), returned to Yemen and were subsequently embraced by the government and treated as heroes by many Yemenis. Some veterans of the Afghan war were integrated into the military and security forces. More importantly, during the civil war of 1994, President Saleh dispatched several brigades of ―Arab Afghans‖ to fight against southern secessionists. Perhaps because the Yemeni government successfully co-opted some Islamist hardliners and employed them to reinforce regime rule and because Al Qaeda itself was building its own capacity to conduct global terrorist operations, Yemen was not a major theater of Al Qaeda operations in the 1990s. However, one group, known as the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA), which was formed by a former Bin Laden associate and directly supported by the Yemeni government, was active throughout the 1990s.17 This group, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, also may have been involved in a plot to kill U.S. marines temporarily transiting through Aden on their way to Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope in December 1992, in what is considered one of Al Qaeda‘s earliest known endorsed attacks against U.S. personnel. The explosions at two hotels in Aden killed two tourists. Later, the AAIA was responsible for the December 1998 kidnapping of 16 foreign tourists (4 of whom died in a botched rescue attempt) and possibly the 2002 attack on a French oil tanker (Limburg) near the southern Yemeni port of Mukalla.

The USS Cole Bombing Al Qaeda‘s attack against the USS Cole in 2000 coupled with the attacks of September 11, 2001, a year later officially made Yemen a front in the so-called war on terror, though its importance to U.S. counterterrorism operations has wavered ever since. On October 12, 2000, an explosives- laden motorboat detonated alongside the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole while it was docked at the Yemeni port of Aden, killing 17 U.S. servicemen and wounding 39 others. Nearly 10 years after the attack, many details remain a mystery. In 2000, agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found some of the perpetrators. One suspect, Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, a Saudi national of Yemeni descent who served as Al Qaeda‘s operations chief in the Arabian Peninsula, was captured in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002 and handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the Washington Post, Al Nashiri had spent several months before his capture under high-level protection by the Yemeni government.18 Another Al Qaeda member, Walid bin Attash (also referred to as Tawfiq bin Attash), was named by the U.S. Department of Justice as an unindicted coconspirator in the Cole attack. Both Al Nashiri and Attash have appeared before military tribunals in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they have been held for several years in U.S. military custody. Nashiri may be tried in a military commission sometime in 2010. Attash, along with several other well-known accused terrorists, is to stand trial in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

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A third organizer of the Cole bombing, Jamal al Badawi, has been, to the frustration of U.S. officials, held in Yemeni custody despite two previous successful escapes (April 2003 and 2006) from his captors. After his second escape in 2006 (along with 22 other Al Qaeda convicts), in what many believe was an officially sanctioned prison break, Badawi turned himself in a year later, pledged his allegiance to President Saleh, and promised to cooperate with the authorities and help locate other militants. In October 2007, soon after his return to custody, the Yemeni government reportedly released Badawi from house arrest despite vocal protestations from the Bush Administration. Yemen has refused to extradite Badawi to the United States (Article 44 of the Yemeni constitution states that a Yemeni national may not be extradited to a foreign authority), where he has been indicted in the U.S. District Court in New York on murder charges. 19 According to one former FBI official, Badawi was ―the guy who recruited the bombers.... He was the local mastermind.‖20 According to former U.S. State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack, ―This was someone who was implicated in the Cole bombing and someone who can‘t be running free.‖21 Yemeni officials claim, however, that Badawi is now cooperating with the government in attempts to capture a new generation of more lethal jihadists. According to Rashad Muhammad al Alimi, Yemen‘s Interior Minister, ―The strategy is fighting terrorism, but we need space to use our own tactics, and our friends must understand us.‖22

Initial U.S.-Yemeni Counterterrorism Cooperation In the immediate aftermath of the Cole bombing, U.S. officials complained that Yemeni authorities were not cooperating in the investigation. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Yemeni government became more forthcoming in its cooperation with the U.S. campaign to suppress Al Qaeda. Many analysts believe that President Saleh embraced the slogan of the ―war on terror‖ in order to draw the United States closer to Yemen and extract as much intelligence and military support as possible. President Saleh requested U.S. military training and assistance in creating a coast guard23 to help patrol the strategic Bab al Mandab strait where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden.24 A program was launched soon thereafter. The United States provided technical assistance, equipment, and training to the AntiTerrorism Unit [ATU] of the Yemeni Central Security forces and other Yemeni Interior Ministry departments. Despite its enthusiastic embrace of U.S. counterterrorism support, Yemeni authorities were sensitive to possible public backlash against deeper U.S.-Yemeni military cooperation. After 9/11, many Yemenis feared that the United States would target their country next. Nevertheless, President Saleh reportedly allowed small groups of U.S. Special Forces troops and CIA agents to assist in identifying and rooting out Al Qaeda cadres hiding in Yemen, despite sympathy for Al Qaeda among many Yemenis. According to press articles quoting U.S. and Yemeni officials, the Yemeni government allowed U.S. personnel to launch a missile strike from an unmanned aircraft against an automobile in eastern Yemen in November 2002, killing six alleged terrorists, including Qaid Salim Sinan al Harithi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen and a key planner of the attack on the USS Cole.25 Yemen arrested al Harithi‘s replacement, Muhammad Hamdi al Ahdal, a year later. Over time, though U.S.-Yemeni cooperation continued, President Saleh eased pressure on Al Qaeda and its sympathizers inside the country as part of his delicate balancing of competing domestic and international interests. As mentioned earlier, 23 of Yemen‘s most wanted terrorists escaped a Public Security Organization (PSO) prison in 2006, in what many

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analysts believe was an inside job from within a Yemeni intelligence organization notorious for employing former ―Arab Afghan‖ volunteers and other jihadists. In the spring of 2008, FBI Director Robert Mueller traveled to Yemen in order to discuss counterterrorism issues with President Saleh, including an update on the status of Jamal al Badawi and other known Al Qaeda operatives. According to a Newsweek report, ―The meeting between Mueller and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh did not go well,‖ according to two sources who were briefed on the session but asked not to be identified discussing it. Saleh gave no clear answers about the suspect, Jamal al Badawi, leaving Mueller ―angry and very frustrated,‖ said one source, who added that he‘s ―rarely seen the normally taciturn FBI director so upset.‖26

Al Qaeda’s Resurgence As President Saleh eased pressure on Al Qaeda, other more pressing conflicts inside Yemen arose to distract the attention of security forces there. As will be discussed later, the Al Houthi conflict began in 2004, requiring deployments to the north of significant military resources and manpower. At the same time, southern Yemenis grew more vocal with some calls for outright secession, and the government in response cracked down against such dissent which too required significant new deployments of internal security forces. Meanwhile, at the regional level, U.S. involvement in Iraq created a new front for jihadists, some of whom would return to Yemen to replenish Al Qaeda‘s ranks there. In Saudi Arabia, security forces were waging an all-out campaign to thwart Al Qaeda-inspired militants, and some veterans of this fighting would eventually leave the kingdom for Yemen. Overall, analysts observed that a new generation of Yemeni militants was emerging with support from nationals of other countries. Many of these Islamist militants either fought coalition forces in Iraq or were radicalized in the Yemeni prison system. Moreover, unlike their predecessors, this new generation of Al Qaeda-inspired extremists was more inclined to target the Yemeni government itself, in addition to foreign and Western interests in Yemen. According to one analyst: The older generation, while passionate about global jihad, was more concerned with local matters, and more willing to play by the time-honored Yemeni rules of bargaining and negotiating in order to keep Saleh from destroying their safe haven. Not so with the new generation—they willingly criticize Saleh harshly, and seem immune to the lure of the negotiation room.27

Yemeni militants formed an affiliate of Al Qaeda, called, ―The Al Qaeda Organization in the Southern Arabian Peninsula,‖ though most observers simply referred to it as Al Qaeda in Yemen. At first, the group issued several statements demanding that President Saleh, among other things, release militants from prison, end his cooperation with the United States, renounce democracy and fully implement Islamic law, and permit Yemeni militants to travel to Iraq to carry out jihad. The group‘s leaders were part of the infamous 2006 jailbreak, in which 23 convicted terrorists escaped from a prison in the capital of Sana‘a.

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ATTACKS COMMITTED BY THE AL QAEDA IN YEMEN ORGANIZATION: 2006-2008 

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On September 17, 2008, Yemeni militants attacked the entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Sana‘a, killing 17 people including six of the attackers. One American, Susan Elbaneh,28 was killed. The militants were disguised as soldiers when they attacked a checkpoint outside the front gates. The U.S. State Department soon after the bombings announced that it would, for the second time in a year, authorize the departure of all nonessential personnel from Sana‘a due to the unstable security situation. On April 10, 2008, an explosion occurred at the headquarters of the Canadian oil company Nexum Petroleum. On April 6, 2008, three explosive rounds struck a housing complex used by foreigners, including American personnel, in an upscale neighborhood of Sana'a. No injuries were reported, but two days later, the U.S. Embassy announced that it was evacuating all non-essential personnel from the country. On March 18, 2008, a policeman and a student were killed and 20 wounded in an attempted bombing of the U.S. embassy in Sana‘a. On January 18, 2008, two Belgians, a Yemeni guide and a Yemeni driver were shot dead and four Belgians were wounded in an attack in Wadi Hadramout, east of Sana‘a. On July 2, 2007, a suicide bomber attacked a convoy of Spanish tourists, killing eight Spaniards and two Yemenis. The suicide attack was carried out using a car bomb that exploded in a tourist area near the ancient Yemeni temple of Balqis approximately 100 miles east of Sana'a. Two weeks prior to the attack, the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a had issued a warning to Americans traveling in Yemen to avoid visiting the site. Days after the bombing, Yemeni government officials admitted that they themselves had been warned about a possible Al Qaeda attack, but had not considered the temple site as a possible target. On March 29, 2007, Al Qaeda in Yemen assassinated the chief criminal investigator in Ma‘rib province, a man whom they believe was involved in the November 2002 U.S. air strike that killed the group's former leader. On September 15, 2006, only days before Yemen's presidential election, Yemeni security forces foiled two near simultaneous Al Qaeda suicide attacks on oil facilities in the northeastern region of Ma‘rib and on the Gulf of Aden coast at Dhabba. Al Qaeda fugitives, who months earlier had escaped from prison, were involved in the planning of the failed attack, which, had it succeeded, would have crippled Yemen's oil industry.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula In January 2009, Al Qaeda-inspired militants based in Yemen announced that the Saudi and Yemeni ―branches‖ of Al Qaeda were merging under the banner of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which formerly had denoted militants responsible for the wave of terrorist violence that swept Saudi Arabia from 2003 through 2007.29 The announcement came at the height of fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas militants in Gaza, and

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immediately after President Obama announced his intention to close the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although AQAP is led by a Yemeni militant (Nasir al Wuhayshi), one deputy (Sa‘id al Shihri) and another former deputy (Muhammad al Awfi30) are Saudi citizens who were repatriated from Guantanamo Bay in November 2007 (detainees #372 and #333 respectively). They then graduated from a Saudi government-sponsored rehabilitation program before returning to militancy.31 Some counterterrorism experts suggest that the presence of Saudi militants in Yemen indicates that Al Qaeda‘s presence in the kingdom has been significantly hampered by Saudi security forces.32 At the same time, experts also assert that the groups‘ merger is a sign that Al Qaeda has chosen Yemen as a safe haven and potential long-term base of operations from which to conduct terrorist attacks internally and possibly abroad.33 Throughout most of 2009, AQAP struck targets in Yemen and attempted several attacks inside Saudi Arabia, and many analysts were skeptical whether or not the group was capable of striking the U.S. homeland. The following is a summary of some AQAP attacks prior to the failed Christmas Day airline bombing of 2009: 

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In late November 2009, AQAP distributed a video claiming that it had executed a high-level Yemeni security official who had been kidnapped in Ma‘rib governorate in June. AQAP had accused the official of spying and recruiting tribes to monitor its movements. On November 4, AQAP militants killed three senior Yemeni security officials, including the chief of the Political Security Organization (P SO) in the Hadramawt, the regional security chief, and the head of the regional criminal investigation division. On October 13, Saudi security forces killed two AQAP militants in a shootout close to a border crossing in the southern Saudi Arabian province of Jizan. The slain terrorists, one of whom (Mohammed al Shihri) was a former Guantanamo detainee and brother-in-law of one of AQAP ‘s leaders, were disguised as women when their car was stopped at a highway checkpoint. They opened fire after being questioned by police. The terrorists reportedly were found with suicide vests and other weapons and may have been sent to Saudi Arabia to carry out a major attack. On August 27, 2009, Abdullah Asiri, a Saudi member of AQAP, returned to the kingdom from Yemen for a meeting with Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz Al Saud, the director of the kingdom's counterterrorism campaign. Bin Nayef had agreed to meet Asiri believing that the latter intended to turn himself in to Saudi authorities for rehabilitation. Instead, Asiri detonated a hidden explosive device during a Ramadan gathering in the prince's home. The explosion lightly wounded Bin Nayef, and the bomb may have contained the same chemicals used in the failed Christmas Day attack several months later. In March 2009, AQAP suicide bombers killed four South Korean tourists and their local Yemeni guide near the ancient fortress city of Shibam. A week later, they followed this suicide bombing with a second attack against a convoy of South Korean officials who had traveled to Yemen to investigate the murders in Shibam. Many analysts suggest that AQAP may have received assistance from a source in the security forces in order to carry out a bombing against a well- guarded foreign delegation on its way from the country‘s main airport.

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Assessing the AQAP Threat Nearly a year before the failed Christmas Day airline bombing, U.S. officials had warned that AQAP was growing in strength and capability. In February 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta said, ―I'm particularly concerned with Somalia and Yemen.... Somalia is virtually a failed state. Yemen is almost there. And our concern is that both could become safe havens for Al Qaeda, so we are watching those situations very closely.‖34 Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair stated, ―Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of operations for Al Qaeda to plan internal and external attacks, train terrorists, and facilitate the movement of operatives.‖35 In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in April 2009, Michael Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, remarked: We have witnessed the reemergence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, with Yemen as a key battleground and potential regional base of operations from which Al Qaeda can plan attacks, train recruits, and facilitate the movement of operatives.... We are concerned that if AQAP strengthens, Al Qaeda leaders could use the group and the growing presence of foreign fighters in the region to supplement its transnational operations capability.

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Finally, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Commander U.S. Central Command General David H. Petraeus stated: Yemen stands out from its neighbors on the Peninsula. The inability of the Yemeni government to secure and exercise control over all of its territory offers terrorist and insurgent groups in the region, particularly Al Qaeda, a safe haven in which to plan, organize, and support terrorist operations. It is important that this problem be addressed, and CENTCOM is working to do that. Were extremist cells in Yemen to grow, Yemen‘s strategic location would facilitate terrorist freedom of movement in the region and allow terrorist organizations to threaten Yemen‘s neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. In view of this, we are expanding our security cooperation efforts with Yemen to help build the nation‘s security, counter- insurgency, and counter-terror capabilities.36

Despite a flurry of senior-level attention from Administration officials—in May 2009, Deputy Director of the CIA Stephen Kappes visited Yemen for talks with President Saleh— the consensus among many outside experts for most of 2009 was that AQAP would concentrate its attacks inside Yemen and inside Saudi Arabia. They believed that AQAP‘s influence and ability to threaten U.S. and Western interests from Yemen remain limited. One analyst asserted that Al Qaeda‘s presence in Yemen is ―manageable and containable,‖ suggesting that the group‘s local leadership has splintered between the Saudi and Yemeni elements and that the group has limited support from ―Al Qaeda Central‖ in Afghanistan and Pakistan.37 Articles also cast doubt on reports that Al Qaeda militants increasingly were travelling from Pakistan to Yemen.38 For many observers, of greatest concern is the ability of AQAP to transform itself from what is believed to be a group of between 100 to 400 hard-core militants into more of a mass movement embedded into Yemen‘s age-old tribal structure. According to one expert, ―The longer AQAP is able to exist in Yemen‘s tribal communities without exposing them to major violence, the more likely it is that they will be able to become entrenched in the tribes through marriage and shared experiences. This was a key factor in Al Qaeda‘s ability to hide

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successfully in Pakistan‘s tribal areas, and would help AQAP to consolidate a territorial base and thus pose a more serious threat than it currently does.‖39 Although central governing power in Yemen has always remained weak, many observers in recent years have suggested that President Saleh‘s ability to secure tribal support in outlying provinces (such as Al Jawf, Ma‘rib, Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramawt) has diminished considerably. This is true particularly in areas where oil is extracted, as local tribes often claim that they rarely receive revenues generated from oil produced on their lands. According to one Yemeni expert, ―There is, as in Pakistan, some intertwining of politics, society and the security forces with Al Qaeda.... It can happen.... The enemy of my enemy is my friend, and you can turn it into the Kandahar of Yemen.‖ 40 Demands for greater autonomy in Yemen‘s southern provinces and even calls for outright secession also may have led to more local sympathy of AQAP. The leaders of AQAP also have sought to exploit regional tensions. In April 2009, the leader of AQAP issued a statement to disaffected southerners, saying: O freemen who are standing fast against injustice and oppression, what you are demanding is your right, which is guaranteed to you by your faith, and to which you are attracted by your instincts that do not accept humiliation and degradation. Let no one oppress you or do you injustice in the name of unity. You have tried the rule of socialism, and suffered from it all the tragedies you experienced. Now you are drinking from the same cup at the hand of the regime that governs you today. Now is the time for Islam to rule.41

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Profiles of AQAP Leaders and Other Radical Yemeni Islamists Nasir al Wuhayshi According to a number of sources, the leader of AQAP is a former secretary of Osama bin Laden named Nasir al Wuhayshi (alt. sp. Wahayshi). Like other well-known operatives, Al Wuhayshi was a member of the 23-person contingent who escaped from a Yemeni prison in 2006. Al Wuhayshi‘s personal connection to Bin Laden has reportedly enhanced his legitimacy among his followers. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, he escaped through Iran, but was arrested there and held for two years until deported to Yemen in 2003. He led Al Qaeda in Yemen until it merged with its Saudi counterpart in January 2009 when he became the overall leader of AQAP, though he is not considered as charismatic as his Saudi counterparts. Sa’id al Shihri Al Shihri (alt. sp. Shahri), who is the deputy commander of AQAP, is a Saudi national and former Guantanamo detainee. After his release in 2007, he participated in Saudi Arabia‘s deradicalization rehabilitation program. After leaving the kingdom and forming AQAP in Yemen, it was believed that his presence there would boost Al Qaeda‘s financing and operational capabilities. Al Shihri's family also has been active in AQAP. His wife reportedly was married to an AQAP militant killed by Saudi security forces in 2005. As mentioned earlier, his brother-in-law died in a shootout with Saudi police in Jizan in October 2009.

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Shaykh Abd al Majid al Zindani One source of strain in U.S.-Yemeni relations is the status of Shaykh Abd al Majid al Zindani, an alleged Al Qaeda financier and recruiter whom the U.S. Treasury Department designated in February 2004 a U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Al Zindani is the leader of Al Iman University located in the capital of Sana‘a. U.S. officials have accused Al Zindani of using the university as a recruiting ground for Al Qaeda, as some student groups openly advocate for a violent jihad against the West. According to one report, the university has ―a small contingent of students that veer away from the quietist trend of their colleagues. They tend to be foreign students that are drawn to Al Iman by Al Zindani's radical reputation.‖ Yemen has refused to turn Al Zindani over to U.S. authorities, as many observers believe that President Saleh is protecting him for political purposes.

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Anwar al Awlaki 38-year-old Yemeni-American Awlaki (alt. sp. Aulaqi) is infamous for his role in radicalizing Major Nidal M. Hasan in the months prior to the mass shooting at Fort Hood Army Base in Texas. After the failed Christmas Day airline bombing, new information suggested that Awlaki also may have played a role in radicalizing Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. Awlaki was born in New Mexico in 1971, and he hails from a prominent tribal family in the southern governorate of Shabwa. Awlaki lived in Britain and in the United States where he worked as an Imam and lecturer at several mosques, including in Falls Church, VA. He returned to Yemen in 2004 where he became a lecturer at Al Iman University mentioned above. He was arrested by Yemeni authorities in 2006 and interrogated by the FBI in September 2007 for his possible contacts with some of the 9/11 hijackers. According to various reports, he began openly supporting the use of violence against the United States after his release from prison.

The Al Houthi Revolt in Northern Sa’da Province Although combating Al Qaeda in Yemen may be a top priority for the United States, the Yemeni government faces two other domestic insurgencies that pose a more immediate risk to regime survival. One revolt, which has been raging for nearly six years in the northernmost governorate of Sa‘da, is known as the Al Houthi conflict. Its name is derived from the revolt‘s leaders, the Al Houthi family, a prominent Zaydi religious clan who claim descent from the prophet Muhammad. The late head of the family, Shaykh Hussein Badr ad din al Houthi, believed that Zaydi Shiism and the Zaydi community were becoming marginalized in Yemeni society for a variety of reasons, including government neglect of Sa‘da governorate and Saudi Arabian ―Wahhabi‖ or ―Salafi‖ proselytizing in Sa‘da. Perhaps in order to seize the attention of central government authorities more forcefully, Shaykh Hussein formed a radical organization called the Organization for Youthful Believers as a revivalist Zaydi group for Al Houthi followers who dispute the legitimacy of the Yemeni government and are firmly opposed to the rule of President Saleh.42 President Saleh is a Zaydi himself, though with no formal religious training or title. Shaykh Hussein Badr ad din al Houthi was killed by Yemeni troops in 2004. His son, Abdul Malik al Houthi, is now the leader of the group, though there have been numerous

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government claims that he was killed in battle in December 2009. The Yemeni government claims that Al Houthi rebels seek to establish a Zaydi theocratic state in Sa‘da with Iranian assistance, though some analysts dispute Iranian involvement in northern Yemen, asserting that the Yemeni authorities are using the specter of Iranian interference to justify large-scale military operations against the insurgents and calls for assistance from neighboring Gulf states. After five rounds of fighting followed by temporary cease-fires, a new round of violence started in the summer of 2009. By then, the Al Houthi conflict had transformed from an ideological /religious revivalist movement into more of a classic insurgency. The fundamental grievances that started the conflict in the first place have not been resolved. Sa‘da remains one of the poorest areas of Yemen, and experts believe the Al Houthi family seized upon the desperation of many of the province‘s inhabitants to build a religiously inspired insurgent movement capable of fighting guerrilla warfare in the region‘s mountainous areas. Although the government imposed a media blackout of the war in Sa‘da, numerous reports have indicated that the local population there has suffered tremendously and atrocities have been committed by both sides, and there has been a mass displacement of citizens from their homes due to indiscriminate bombing and artillery shelling. According to Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group,

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The insurgency is more a reaction to a dysfunctional government than an inspired, centralized, ideological movement. Although there is a core of ideologically motivated fighters, most members do not appear to have any kind of consistent national or international objective. Indeed, in order to mobilize more than just the marginal Zaydi revivalist groups, the Houthi leadership has portrayed its position as purely defensive against acts of state oppression and attacks by the Yemeni army.43

The war against the Al Houthi rebels remains localized, yet most Yemen experts believe that the longer it festers, the weaker it makes President Saleh appear politically, particularly to the military establishment. Before he unilaterally ended a round of fighting in July 2008, clashes had spread to an eastern suburb of the capital near the airport, and there were rumors of an aborted coup and shakeups within the military. Qatar has attempted to serve as a mediator between the warring parties and, in July 2007, brokered an 18-point peace plan which neither side has officially accepted.

Operation Scorched Earth In August 11, 2009, President Saleh launched Operation Scorched Earth in order to finally end the Sa‘da war. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, ―The suspicion is rising that the main reason that the government launched its offensive was to demonstrate to other dissenting groups around the country, including in particular separatists in the south, that it will not back down in the face of opposition, and will deploy all the means at its disposal to counter any threat.‖44 Government troops were unable to quell the rebellion, and the Yemeni government loudly alleged Iranian support to the Houthis in order to obtain Arab and Western financial and military support.

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Iranian Involvement? The Yemeni government has made numerous claims that the Iranian government is militarily, financially, and politically supporting the Al Houthi rebellion; however, most Western observers believe that in reality, only the latter may be true. In December 2009, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman stated that ―Many of our friends and partners have talked to us about the possibility of outside support to the Houthis and we have heard the theories about Iranian support to the Houthis.... To be frank, we don't have independent information about this.‖45 To date, Yemen has made a variety of unverifiable claims. In October 2009, the government said that its navy intercepted an armscarrying Iranian vessel destined for the Al Houthis. General Yahya Saleh, one of Yemen's counterterrorism chiefs and the President‘s nephew, said that ―The Houthis cannot fund and fight this war with pomegranates and grapes or drugs.... No doubt there is Iranian support, especially when you consider that the Yemeni state is spending billions of riyals.‖46 Iran itself seems to have benefitted from its alleged connection to the conflict by having others exaggerate its regional power and military reach, perhaps for their own political purposes. For example, once Saudi Arabia also began to forcefully echo Yemeni charges of Iranian meddling in Sa‘da and then intervene directly in the conflict itself, Iranian officials condemned joint Yemeni- Saudi action. Yemeni and Saudi charges have become so common and Iran‘s response so automatic that many media outlets have almost accepted the ―regional conflict‖ narrative that has been superimposed on top of what most experts still believe is, ultimately, a local affair. Saudi Arabian Involvement In November 2009, for reasons unknown, Houthi rebels reportedly attacked a Saudi border checkpoint and seized a strategic mountaintop inside Saudi territory, eliciting a major Saudi military response, including the extensive use of air power. The use of Saudi air power inside Yemen constitutes the first major external Saudi military action since the 1991 Gulf War. The Saudi navy also instituted a blockade in the northwest corner of Yemen to cut off any potential arms smuggling to the Houthis. With Saudi Arabia‘s much better equipped air force of European- made Tornado aircraft and U.S.-made F-15 fighters, President Saleh felt emboldened after their intervention and soon declared that ―the real war had just started.‖ As of late December, the Saudi military announced its intention to wind down its operations after claiming it had achieved its limited objectives of territorial defense and reestablishment of the security of its border. Saudi losses reportedly included 82 troops and border forces killed in action as well as 26 missing. Nevertheless, as of January 2010, fighting continues, and even Saudi Arabian involvement has not forced the Houthis to surrender. There are numerous theories posited by observers as to why the fighting persists. Some experts charge that there are elements of the Yemeni military with a vested interest, either financial or political, in seeing conflict persist. Others believe that President Saleh requires a decisive military victory in the north in order to demonstrate to southerners that secessionist action will be met by military force. Still, some analysts see the conflict tied to the behindthe-scenes-struggle for presidential succession in Yemen between two of the front-runners, the President‘s son Ahmed and head of the Republican Guards and Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, the President‘s half-brother and the commander of the army‘s northern forces. According to a recent New York Times article, ―The tension between the two old comrades [President Saleh

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and Ali Mohsen] is visible in the criticism of the way the war in the north is being handled, with government officials sometimes complaining that Mr. Mohsen set off renewed fighting there by occupying or destroying the mosques and holy places of the Houthis and building Sunni mosques and schools in the area. Mr. Mohsen‘s supporters have countered that the war has not been fully supported by the central government.‖47

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Unrest in the South For years, southern Yemenis have been disaffected because of their perceived secondclass status in a unified state from which many of their leaders tried to secede during the civil war in 1994. Unemployment in areas which comprised the former socialist state of the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) is reportedly high. Many southerners have felt cut off from government services and jobs and see persistent infiltration of Sana‘a‘s influence in their local government. In March and April 2008, tens of thousands of protesters, many of whom were angry over inflation and their exclusion from employment in the army, set fire to police stations and army property in the southern towns of Dhalae and Radfan (both north of Aden in Lahij governorate), and elsewhere in Hadramout province. Some protestors were former members of the defeated southern army in Yemen‘s 1994 civil war. In response, the government deployed only northern soldiers to southern areas. Several hundred protestors were detained. The key demands of south Yemenis include equality, decentralization, and a greater share of state welfare. Southerners have accused Saleh‘s government of selling off valuable southern land to northerners with links to the regime and have alleged that revenues from oil extraction, which is mostly located in the south, disproportionately benefits northern provinces.48 In addition, the once prosperous and liberal port city of Aden has deteriorated, as most business must now be conducted in the capital of Sana‘a. Furthermore, southerners complain of corruption, as each major southern province is ruled by a military governor with close ties to the president. According to a December 2009 report by Human Rights Watch: The security forces, and Central Security in particular, have carried out widespread abuses in the south—unlawful killings, arbitrary detentions, beatings, crackdowns on freedom of assembly and speech, arrests of journalists, and others. These abuses have created a climate of fear, but have also increased bitterness and alienation among southerners, who say the north economically exploits and politically marginalizes them. The security forces have enjoyed impunity for unlawful attacks against southerners, increasing pro-secessionist sentiments in the south and plunging the country into an escalating spiral of repression, protests, and more repression. While the government publicly claims to be willing to listen to southern grievances, its security forces have responded to protests by using lethal force against largely peaceful protestors without cause or warning, in violation of international standards on the use of lethal force. Protestors occasionally behaved violently, burning cars or throwing rocks, usually in response to police violence.49

Some analysts assert that the defection of a former Saleh ally, Shaykh Tariq al Fadhli,50 from the regime to the cause of the southern movement, is the main reason for recent alarm over potential violence in the south. Shaykh al Fadhli has openly called for separation of the

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south during rallies in his home southern province of Abyan. In response, the government has closed southern newspapers, arrested key southern leaders, and reinforced restive provinces with loyal army troops. The U.S. Embassy in Sana‘a released a statement in April 2009 that said: The United States embassy in Sana‘a views with concern reports of increasing incidences of political violence in southern regions of Yemen. The United States supports a stable, unified, democratic Yemen. We call on the Yemeni government, the political parties, civil society organizations and all concerned citizens of Yemen to engage in dialogue to identify and address legitimate grievances.

Overall, deteriorating economic conditions have significantly exacerbated north-south cleavages in Yemen. With oil production expected to end entirely over the next decade, the regime is rapidly running out of funds that it uses to buy the goodwill and political support of tribal elites, military officers, and former southern leaders. Barring any major new oil field discoveries or a new source of external aid, the situation is only expected to worsen in the years ahead.

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The Major Challenges: Water Depletion, Declining Oil Revenues, Rising Food Prices, and Qat Although terrorism, provincial revolts, and unrest in the south are all serious concerns related to Yemeni stability, they pale in comparison to the long-term structural resource and economic challenges facing a country with a rapidly growing population. To an outsider, these problems seem almost intractable, as bad government policies and crippling poverty exacerbate existing shortages, creating a feedback loop. For example, the central government subsidizes diesel fuel at a cost to the treasury of several billion dollars annually (nearly 11% of GDP). The diesel subsidy not only drains government revenue but also distorts commodity prices, and makes water pumping and trucking costs artificially low, thereby giving farmers no incentive to conserve water. Furthermore, the subsidy encourages smuggling (via the sale of reduced cost fuel at inflated rates to international buyers), which may be officially sanctioned at the highest levels. According to one recent report, ―Diesel smuggling is a facet of elite corruption that has led one international economist working in Yemen to complain that more and more people are being pushed into destitution while a handful of people are living as if there is no tomorrow.‖51 However, when the government attempted to lift the diesel subsidy in 2001 and 2005, riots ensued, and the policy was swiftly reversed. The cultivation of qat, a stimulant whose leaves are widely chewed throughout the Horn of Africa, also drains Yemen‘s scarce underground water resources. Qat is a cash crop,52 and its harvests surpass local coffee and wheat production, which has led to increased demand for food imports. Qat also may use as much as 40% of water resources consumed by local agriculture. As farmers drill deeper wells to access freshwater, the water table drops and drinking water becomes contaminated with minerals. Yemenis may now be using fossil water to irrigate crops. Most analysts believe that if Yemen‘s major aquifers are depleted, the only realistic solution to the country‘s water crisis would be a strategy based on increased water-

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use efficiency and the construction of several large-scale, expensive desalination plants. How such a massive investment in the infrastructure would be financed remains unknown. Though it is an age-old tradition and ingrained in Yemeni culture, qat chewing also cripples attempts at promoting sustainable development. Not only does it deplete the country‘s water resources and reduce food security, low-income chewers spend significant portions of their time and salaries (between 10% and 30%) on qat. According to one Yemeni social critic, ―No development can be achieved in Yemen as long as this plant called qat takes up 90 percent of the spare time of the Yemeni people.... Some may argue that this is an old tradition of Yemen just like the arms and jambiyas (traditional daggers). But even if that were so, harmful traditions must be thrown away.‖53 According to the World Bank, the culture of spending extended afternoon hours chewing qat is inimical to the development of a productive work force, with as much as one- quarter of usable working hours allocated to qat chewing. Chewing qat also suppresses the appetite, and its widespread consumption has been linked to growing child malnutrition rates. Qat chewing also reinforces social and political practices that exclude women, as prominent male politicians and business elites often conduct their business during an afternoon qat chew. The loss of oil revenue is another major challenge facing Yemen. Revenue from oil production accounts for nearly all of Yemen‘s exports and up to 75% of government revenue, yet most economists predict that Yemen will deplete its modest oil reserves in 10 to 15 years. Production has fallen nearly 25% over the last six years. In terms of diversifying its economy, though the government has developed alternative strategies, in reality, Yemen may become even more dependent on international assistance and worker remittances in the future. Its tourism industry suffers from chronic instability and frequent tribal kidnappings of foreigners. The Balhaf $4.5 billion liquefied natural gas plant (operated by the Yemeni government in partnership with Total and Hunt Oil) is now online, though experts believe that revenue generated from the project will only slightly stem the hemorrhaging of government funds. It is expected to generate approximately $30 billion to $50 billion in revenue for Yemen‘s treasury over the next 25 years.

Poor Governance and Uncertainty over Presidential Succession Although governance issues are far less tangible than the current military conflicts and resource shortages engulfing the Yemeni state, they are at the heart of all of Yemen‘s major problems. Although President‘s Saleh‘s government does not resemble those of allcontrolling, closed-off regimes created in places like North Korea and Myanmar, critics charge that despite Yemen‘s decentralized political culture, political and economic power has become far more concentrated in the President‘s inner circle, a trend that has exacerbated tensions in the north, south, and with tribal leaders whose support is critical in combating Al Qaeda. President Saleh has been in power for over 30 years and, like many long-serving leaders, has filled the top ranks of his military and intelligence services with extended family members in order to consolidate power. As mentioned earlier, his son Ahmed is commander of the Republican Guards and a possible presidential successor. Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, the President‘s half-brother, is a brigadier general whose forces have fought in Sa‘da and who is

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charged with protecting the capital. He also is considered a potential successor to Saleh and may be in competition with Ahmed Saleh. According to one report, ―Mr. Mohsen has signaled that he does not favor a direct succession of Ahmed Saleh to the presidency, diplomats and analysts said. Mr. Mohsen believes, they said, that the younger Mr. Saleh lacks the personal strength and charisma of his father and cannot hold the country together.‖54 President Saleh‘s three nephews also hold senior positions in the military and intelligence services. His nephew Colonel Amar Saleh is Deputy Chief of the National Security Bureau (NSB), an intelligence agency formed in 2002 designed to work in closer cooperation with foreign governments.55 Another nephew, Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, is Chief of Staff of the Central Security Organization (CSO), a division of the Ministry of the Interior which maintains an elite U.S.-trained Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU).56 Tariq Saleh is head of the Presidential Guard, the Yemeni equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service. Finally, the President‘s half-brother, Ali Saleh al Ahmar, is commander of the Air Force.57 Yemen‘s parliamentary elections have been postponed from April 2009 until 2011 in the hope that disagreements over electoral reform and possible amendments to the constitution can be resolved. The Obama Administration noted the decision ―with deep concern and disappointment,‖ and argued that the United States finds it ―difficult to see how a delay of this duration serves the interests of the Yemeni people or the cause of Yemeni democracy.‖58 In recent December 2009 by-elections to fill several vacant seats in parliament, the ruling General People‘s Congress (GPC) captured 10 seats, while independent candidates won two seats. The opposition coalition, named the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), boycotted the elections. Among many issues, the JMP has protested against the composition of the Supreme Election Committee for Elections and Referendums (SCER), a quasi-governmental body responsible for overseeing elections. The tasks of this independent body include drawing constituency boundaries, engaging in voter education and registration measures, and ensuring that elections proceed according to the law. The SCER is composed of seven members appointed by the president from a list of 15 candidates nominated by the House of Representatives. Candidates must receive nominations from at least two-thirds of parliamentarians. Opposition members accuse the GPC of nominating Saleh loyalists to the committee‘s board. One powerful opposition figure in Yemen is Hamid al Ahmar, the eldest son of the late Shaykh Abdullah al Ahmar, who during his lifetime headed Hashid tribal federation (the most powerful tribal coalition in Yemen), was president of the quasi-opposition party known as Islah (Reform), and served as speaker of the parliament. Hamid, was a major supporter of the primary opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election. In the summer of 2009, Hamid appeared on Al Jazeera television and called on President Saleh to step down from his office. With the death of his father, Hamid along with his brothers became the primary shareholders in the Al Ahmar Group, a Yemeni conglomerate with interests in the banking, telecommunications, oil, and tourism sectors.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS Somalia: Piracy, Terrorism, and Refugees

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Somalia is a source of hundreds of thousands of refugees who flee to Yemen each year over treacherous waters, and now a haven for pirates threatening the vital international shipping lanes of the Bab al Mandab strait, which oil tankers transit carrying an estimated 3 million barrels per day. Yemen‘s ability to combat piracy beyond its immediate shoreline and major ports is extremely small. Although the United States helped build Yemen‘s coast guard after the 2000 USS Cole attack, the country‘s shoreline is vast, and the number of patrol and deep water vessels in its fleet is limited. Though President Saleh has pledged to deploy 1,600 specially trained soldiers to fight piracy, in essence, the piracy issue is more of an opportunity for the Yemeni government to appear engaged to Western and fellow Arab states on an issue on which all parties have shared interests. While it is possible that Yemen could secure additional pledges of foreign support in the name of combating piracy, some observers have questioned whether or not smugglers may be selling subsidized Yemeni diesel in Yemen ports and East African markets where pirates refuel, although, as of January 2010, official confirmation of this potential trend has not been established. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 74,000 Africans crossed the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea on smugglers' boats and reached the shores of Yemen in 2009. This figure represents a staggering 50% increase over last year's 50,000 arrivals, itself a record.59 Many observers believe that as smuggler boats unload destitute Somali refugees in Yemen, they then return to Somalia with weapons, fuel, and other cargo purchased inside Yemen. Many refugees die at sea in storms or when forced overboard by accidents or smugglers seeking to avoid security forces.

Al Shabab and Possible Ties to AQAP? Some Western analysts have begun to examine potential linkages between terrorist threats emanating from Somalia and Yemen. To date, the only indication that Al Shabaab (translated as, ―The Youth‖), a Somali radical Islamist group which also is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), maintains close ties to AQAP is rhetorical. On January 1, 2010, an Al Shabaab official, Shaykh Mukhtar Robow Abuu Mansuur, said the group was ready to send reinforcements to AQAP should the United States attack its bases in Yemen. Leaders on both sides have pledged mutual support, and Yemeni and Somalian officials claim that they are providing each other with arms and manpower.60 Another report suggests that Yemenis ―make up a sizeable part of a foreign contingent that fights with Al Shabaab‘s Somali rank and file and supplies bomb-making and communications expertise.‖61 Other observers see less of a direct connection. According to one report, ―Shabaab has only recently turned to Al Qaeda, and then it was only from the East Africa cell of Al Qaeda, not from Yemen.... Shabaab has its own major conflict looming with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government.‖62

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Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Yemen desires to join the 24-year-old Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a sub-regional organization which groups Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman in an economic and security alliance. GCC members have traditionally opposed accession of additional states. Currently, Yemen has partial observer status on some GCC committees, and observers believe that full membership is unlikely. Others assert that it is in the GCC‘s interest to assist Yemen and prevent it from becoming a failed state, lest its instability spread to neighboring Gulf countries.63 In November 2006, an international donors‘ conference was convened in London to raise funds for Yemen‘s development. Yemen received pledges totaling $4.7 billion, which are to be disbursed over four years (2007-2010) and represent over 85% of the government‘s estimated external financing needs. Much of these pledges came from Yemen‘s wealthy Arab neighbors. In 2009, Saudi Arabia reportedly provided Yemen with an estimated $2 billion to assist with its budget deficit.64 The impediments to full GCC membership are steep. Reportedly, Kuwait, still bitter over Yemen‘s support for Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War, has blocked further discussion of membership. Meanwhile, Yemen needs to export thousands of its workers each year to the Gulf in order to alleviate economic burdens at home. Foreign remittances are, aside from oil exports, Yemen‘s primary source of hard currency.

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Arab-Israeli Conflict Yemen has usually followed mainstream Arab positions on Arab-Israel issues, and its geographic distance from the conflict and lack of political clout make it a minor player in the peace process. Yemen has not established any bilateral mechanism for diplomatic or commercial contacts with Israel. The Yemeni Jewish community (300 members) continues to dwindle, as many of its members emigrated to Israel decades ago. On December 11, 2008, Moshe Nahari, a Jewish teacher, was murdered in a market in Raidah, home to one of the last Jewish communities in Yemen. After the attack, President Saleh pledged to relocate Yemeni Jews to the capital. Yemen supports the Arab Peace Initiative, which calls for Israel‘s full withdrawal from all occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in exchange for full normalization of relations with all Arab states in the region. In the spring of 2008, President Saleh attempted to broker a reconciliation agreement between the competing Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah. During a March 2008 meeting in Sana‘a, Palestinian representatives from both groups signed a declaration (the Sana‘a Declaration) calling for the creation of a national unity government, but the talks fell apart over the issue of Hamas‘s role in a unified Palestinian Authority.

U.S. RELATIONS AND FOREIGN AID Traditionally, U.S.-Yemeni relations have been tepid, as the lack of strong military-tomilitary ties, commercial relations, and support of President Saleh has hindered the

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development of strong bilateral ties. During the early years of the Bush Administration, relations improved under the rubric of the war on terror, though Yemen‘s lax policy toward wanted terrorists and U.S. concerns about corruption and governance stalled additional U.S. support. Yemen continues to harbor a number of Al Qaeda operatives and has refused to extradite several known militants on the FBI‘s list of most wanted terrorists. (Article 44 of the Yemeni Constitution states that a Yemeni national may not be extradited to a foreign authority.) According to a report in the Washington Post, three known Al Qaeda operatives (Jamal al Badawi, Fahd al Quso, and Jaber A. Elbaneh), sought under the FBI‘s Rewards for Justice program, are in Yemen.65 Before his incarceration, Elbaneh was free in Sana‘a despite his conviction for his involvement in the 2002 attack French tanker Limburg and other attacks against Yemeni oil installations. In 2003, U.S. prosecutors charged Elbaneh in absentia with conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. One expert, Ali H. Soufan, a former FBI supervisory special agent, argues that ―If Yemen is truly an ally, it should act as an ally. Until it does, U.S. aid to Yemen should be reevaluated. It will be impossible to defeat Al Qaeda if our ‗allies‘ are freeing the convicted murderers of U.S. citizens and terrorist masterminds while receiving direct U.S. financial aid.‖66

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Yemeni Detainees in Guantanamo Bay As of January 2010, an estimated 91 Yemeni detainees remain incarcerated in the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. With the Obama Administration committed to closing the facility, U.S. officials are continuing to try to find a destination for the Yemeni prisoners. Although both the Bush and Obama administrations repatriated some Yemeni prisoners,67 there is a widespread belief, particularly among U.S. lawmakers, that many of them would return to militancy if under Yemeni government custody.68 U.S. officials have suggested that they be transferred to Saudi Arabia where they could participate in that government‘s rehabilitation program. However, according to one analyst, the Saudi option may not be viable because the program ―has processed fewer than 300 men since it opened two years ago, and the Saudis have plenty of their own candidates waiting to be rehabilitated. What's more, the Saudis are working within their own distinct social parameters and rely heavily on engagement with participants' relatives. It's unlikely that they would have the same sort of leverage over foreign nationals, even from a neighboring country.‖69 According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, ―They've [Saudi Arabia] probably done as good, if not a better, job of that than almost anybody and (we) explored the possibility of some of the Yemeni detainees coming through that system.‖70 The Yemeni government is pressing U.S. officials to fund a rehabilitation program for prisoners, similar to the Saudi Arabian government program, which uses clerics and social support networks to de-radicalize and monitor prisoners. Between 2002 and 2005, Yemeni Religious Affairs Minister and Supreme Court Justice Hamoud al Hittar ran an unsuccessful ―dialogue‖ program with Yemeni Islamists in which he attempted to convince prisoners that the concept of jihad in Islam allows defensive military operations, not offensive attacks. More than 360 militants were released after going through the program, but there was almost no

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post-release support, such as helping detainees find jobs and wives, key elements of the Saudi initiative. Several graduates of the Yemeni program returned to violence, including three of the seven men identified as participants in the September 2008 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Yemen. Other observers have suggested funding a Supermax-type prison in Yemen, though costs are uncertain, and there is little U.S. faith in the Yemeni authorities‘ ability to maintain security given the escape of so many convicted terrorists from Yemen‘s highest security facility in 2006.

U.S. Foreign Aid to Yemen

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Over the past several fiscal years, Yemen has received on average between $20 and $25 million annually in total U.S. foreign aid. However, for FY2010, the Obama Administration requested significant increases in U.S. assistance to Yemen. The State Department‘s FY2010 budget request sought an estimated $50 million in total aid. The request included $10 million in Foreign Military Financing, $35 million in Development Assistance, $4.8 million in Global Health-Child Survival funds, and about $2 million in other aid. P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, provides a total of $52.5 million in economic and military assistance to Yemen, including $35 million in Development Assistance, $12.5 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $5 million in Economic Support Funds

Military Aid U.S. military assistance to Yemen is divided between State Department-administered FMF funds and Department of Defense-administered 1206 funds. Overall FMF aid to Yemen is modest by regional standards and helps to maintain U.S. equipment provided to Yemen over several decades. In 2008, both countries signed a first-ever bilateral End Use Monitoring Agreement. Such an agreement is designed to allow for the verification of articles and services provided to Yemen under U.S.-sponsored military and security assistance, thus preventing the misuse or illicit transfer of these items and services. In November 2009, just days before a series of strikes against AQAP targets inside Yemen, the official news agency of Yemen reported that the United States and Yemen signed a new cooperation agreement to combat terrorism, smuggling, and piracy.71 The Obama Administration has not divulged the details of any such cooperation agreement to date. In June 2009, the Defense Department notified Congress of a significant obligation of FY2009 1206 DoD funds for various Yemeni security forces. Section 1206 Authority is a Department of Defense account designed to provide equipment, supplies, or training to foreign national military forces engaged in counter-terrorist operations. FY2009 DOD 1206 obligations include:   

$5.9 million for an aerial surveillance counter-terror initiative (helicopters with night-vision cameras), $30.1 million for Coast Guard patrol and maritime security to combat piracy (two boats, radios), $25 million for border security (360 4x4 armored pickup trucks)

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and $5.8 million for improving improvised explosive device (IED) ordnance mitigation.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1206 ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN FY2006: $4.3 million FY2007: $26 million FY2008: none FY2009: $66.8 million Total: $97.1 million

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Between FY2006 and FY2007, Yemen received approximately $30.3 million from the U.S. Department of Defense‘s Section 1206 account. Therefore, this most recent tranche of defense aid (totaling $66.8 million) is more than double the level of the previous two fiscal years combined.

Economic Aid Yemen receives economic aid from three primary sources, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Development Assistance (DA) account, and the Global Health Child Survival account (GHCS). In September 2009, the United States and Yemen signed a new bilateral assistance agreement to fund essential development projects in the fields of health, education, democracy and governance, agriculture and economic development. The agreement, subject to Congressional appropriations, may provide a total of $121 million from FY2009 through FY2011. As of January 2010, the Administration had not made public any planned request to amend or expand the agreement in light of the December 2009 attack. U.S. economic aid to Yemen supports democracy and governance programming. For almost five years, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has run programs in Yemen‘s outlying provinces to support conflict resolution strategies designed to end revenge killings among tribes. Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Yemen (Current year $ in millions) Aid Account (Foreign Operations) Economic Support Fund (ESF) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Development Assistance (DA) Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs (NADR) Global Health Child Survival International Military Education and Training (IMET) Totals

FY2006 7.920 8.4 15 — 1.441

FY2007 12.000 8.500 — 3.751

FY2008 1.500 3.952 4.913 4.034

FY2009 9.767 2.800 11.233 2.525

FY2010 5.000 12.500 35.000 ---

---

---

2.833

3.000

4.800

.924

1.085

.945

1.000

1.100

18.700

25.336

18.177

30.325

58.400

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In November 2005, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) suspended Yemen‘s eligibility for assistance under its threshold program, concluding that, after Yemen was named as a potential aid candidate in FY2004, corruption in the country had increased. Yemen became eligible to reapply in November 2006 and had its eligibility reinstated in February 2007, nearly six months after it held what some observers described as a relatively successful presidential election. Yemen‘s threshold program was approved on September 12, 2007. However, after reports of Jamal al Badawi‘s release from prison surfaced a month later, the MCC canceled a ceremony to inaugurate the $20.6 million threshold grant, stating that the agency is ―reviewing its relationship with Yemen.‖ Since then, there have been no reports on the status of MCC assistance to Yemen.

End Notes

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The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, divided between Zaydis, found in much of the north (and a majority in the northwest), and Shafi‘is, found mainly in the south and east. Zaydis belong to a branch of Shi‘ite Islam, while Shafi‘is follow one of several Sunni Muslim legal schools. Yemen‘s Zaydis take their name from their fifth Imam, Zayd ibn Ali. They are doctrinally distinct from the Twelvers, the dominant branch of Shi‘ite Islam in Iran and Lebanon. Twelver Shiites believe that the 12th Imam, Muhammad alMahdi, has been hidden by Allah and will reappear on Earth as the savior of mankind. 2 The New York Times reported that a year ago, ―The Central Intelligence Agency sent several of its top field operatives with counterterrorism experience to the country, according a former top agency official. At the same time, some of the most secretive Special Operations commandos have begun training Yemeni security forces in counterterrorism tactics, senior military officers said.‖ See, ―U.S. Widens Terror War to Yemen, a Qaeda Bastion,‖ New York Times, December 27, 2009. 3 In a report to the Yemeni parliament, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Rashad al Alimi said that Yemenis, Saudis, Pakistanis, and Egyptians were among the dead killed in the airstrike. 4 Open Source Center, "Saleh Gets Telephone Call From U.S. President Barack Obama," Sanaa SABA Online in English—official news agency of Yemen, December 17, 2009, Document ID# GMP20091217950043. 5 "U.S. Aids Yemeni Raids on Al Qaeda, Officials Say," New York Times, December 19, 2009. 6 Open Source Center, "Al-Qa'ida in Yemen Vows To Attack 'Americans' for Abyan Air Raid," Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, December 21, 2009, Document ID# FEA20091221 1002848. 7 Open Source Center, "Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula Claims Attempted Attack in US," Jihadist Websites -OSC Summary in Arabic, December 28, 2009, Document ID# GMP20091228535001. 8 "Obama Says Al Qaeda in Yemen Planned Bombing Plot, and He Vows Retribution," New York Times, January 3, 2010. 9 "Yemen Hasn't Gotten as Much Aid as Neighbors ; Terrorists There a Global Threat, Clinton Says," USA Today, January 6, 2010. 10 "Mullen Puts Limit on U.S. Military Role in Yemen," Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2010. 11 "Bureaucracy Hampers Yemeni Military Effort," Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2010. 12 "Rep. Wolf Urges Halt in Release of Detainees to Yemen," Congressional Quarterly Today - Online News Defense, December 29, 2009. 13 "Obama Halts Yemen Transfers but Vows Guantanamo Closure," Agence France Presse, January 5, 2010. 14 Shaykh Abd al Majid al Zindani, a leading hard-line Islamist leader inside Yemen, recently commented on U.S.Yemeni cooperation, saying ―We accept any cooperation in the framework of respect and joint interests, and we reject military occupation of our country. And we don't accept the return of colonization.... Yemen's rulers and people must be careful before a (foreign) guardianship is imposed on them.... The day parliament allows the occupation of Yemen, the people will rise up against it and bring it down.‖ See, ―Yemeni Radical Cleric Warns of Foreign Occupation,‖ Associated Press, January 11, 2010. 15 "Yemen Corruption Blunts Qaeda Fight," New York Times, January 5, 2010. 16 "U.S. Has Few Resources to Face Threats in Yemen," New York Times, January 9, 2010. 17 One observer has speculated that it may have been used in the fight against southern rebels. See, Gregory D. Johnsen, "The Resiliency of Yemen's Aden-Abyan Islamic Army," The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor , July 13, 2006, Volume: 4 Issue: 14.

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―Probe of USS Cole Bombing Unravels: Plotters Freed in Yemen; U.S. Efforts Frustrated,‖ Washington Post, May 4, 2008. 19 A Yemeni court condemned Badawi to death in 2004, although his sentence was commuted on appeal to 15 years in prison. 20 ―A Terrorist Walks Free,‖ Newsweek, October 27, 2007. 21 "U.S. Officials Visit Cole Bomber ; He is 'in our Custody,' Yemen Says," Washington Times, October 30, 2007. 22 "Yemen's Deals With Jihadists Unsettle the U.S.," New York Times, January 28, 2008. 23 "Response to Terror: U.S. to Train Yemeni Soldiers in Hunt for Al Qaeda Suspects," Los Angeles Times, February 12, 2002. 24 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Bab al Mandab is one of the most strategic shipping lanes in the world, with an estimated 3 million barrels per day of oil flow. 25 Before Al Harithi was killed by a U.S. unmanned aircraft, Yemeni forces had failed in their attempt to capture him. Soldiers who were sent to detain him were themselves captured by local tribesman protecting Al Harithi. 26 ―A Tense Impasse In Yemen,‖ Newsweek, May 5, 2008. 27 Brian O‘ Neill, ―New Generation of al-Qaeda on Trial in Yemen,‖ Terrorism Focus, Volume 4, Issue 39, published by the Jamestown Foundation, November 27, 2007. 28 Susan Elbaneh (age 18), from Lackawanna, New York, is the distant cousin of Jaber Elbaneh, a known militant sought by the FBI. Jaber Elbaneh, 42, has a $5-million U.S. bounty on his head. He has been indicted by a federal grand jury in New York for allegedly being the seventh member of the controversial Lackawanna Six, a group of Yemeni-American men imprisoned for traveling to an Al Qaeda training camp in 2001. 29 For more information on AQAP‘s attacks in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi government‘s campaign against the group, see CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard. 30 Al Awfi turned himself in to Saudi authorities in February 2009 and gave a lengthy public confession on Saudi TV. 31 A third Saudi Guantanamo detainee, Ibrahim al Rubaysh (#192), wrote an article in the eighth edition of AQAP‘s online magazine. According to one report, six other Saudi former Guantanamo detainees are reported to have joined AQAP. The Saudi newspaper Ukaz reported in February 2009 that Turki Asiri, Yusuf al Shihri, Jabir al Fifi, Fahd al Jutayli, Murtada Muqram and Mish'al al Shudukhi had all joined Al Wuhayshi's group in Yemen. See, ―Web: Rising Profile of Al-Qa'idah in Yemen,‖ Open Source Center, Caversham BBC Monitoring in English, April 27, 2009. 32 According to one Saudi commander, ―We have killed or captured all the fighters, and the rest have fled to Afghanistan or Yemen.... All that remains here is some ideological apparatus.‖ See, ―Saudis Retool to Root Out Terrorist Risk,‖ New York Times, March 22, 2009. 33 According to Saudi General Mansour al Turki, a spokesman for the Saudi Interior Ministry, ―They know they have more room to operate in Yemen than in Saudi Arabia.... They could provide themselves with safe havens, could find places to train, they could buy weapons, ammunition, explosive materials and probably it‘s easier for them to communicate and to meet than they would in Saudi Arabia.‖ See, ―Al-Qaeda in Yemen ‗a threat to Saudis,‘‖ Financial Times, April 23, 2009. Saudi Arabia is planning to construct an electric shield/fence across its border with Yemen. 34 Central Intelligence Agency, "Media Roundtable with CIA Director Leon E. Panetta," press release, February 25, 2009. 35 "Al-Qaeda 'Less Capable and Effective': US Intel Chief," Agence France Presse, February 12, 2009. 36 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan, Statement of David H. Petraeus Commander U.S. Central Command, 111th Cong., April 1, 2009. 37 Nicole Stracke, Al-Qaeda in Yemen - Still a Manageable Threat, Gulf Research Center, June 15, 2009. 38 According to one article in Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, ―There is currently no open source information to support the claims that Al Qaeda operatives are moving from Pakistan to Yemen. All the AQAP operatives identified by the authorities and the group itself are either Yemenis or Saudis. Many Saudis have clearly moved to Yemen, but this process is generally attributed to the crackdown that the kingdom began several years ago, rather than to growing pressure on Al Qaeda in Pakistan.‖ "Al-Qaeda hides in Yemen," Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, June 30, 2009. 39 Sarah Phillips and Rodger Shanahan, Al-Qa ’ida, Tribes and Instability in Yemen, Lowy Institute for International Policy, November 2009. 40 "Yemen‘s Chaos Aids the Evolution of a Qaeda Cell," New York Times, January 2, 2010. 41 Open Source Center, "Report on Al-Qaida's New Tactics in Yemen ," Al-Sharq al-A wsat Online in Arabic, July 22, 2009, Document ID#GMP20090722825002 . 42 According to Yemen expert Philip McCrum, historical Zaydi doctrine believes that rebelling against an unjust ruler is a religious duty. This belief originated from the actions of the sect‘s founder, Zayd bin Ali, who led an unsuccessful uprising against Umayyad Caliph Hisham in 740 because of the Caliph‘s despotic rule. See, Juan Cole‘s blog Informed Comment, ―The Houthi Rebellion in Yemen,‖ available online at http://www.juancole.com/2009/09/huthi-rebellion-inyemen.html

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Joost R. Hiltermann, "Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia‘s War Inside Yemen," Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2009. 44 Economist Intelligence Unit, "The Political Scene: Attempts to Implement Truce in Northern Yemen Fail," Country Report - Main report, October 6, 2009. 45 "U.S. Says has no Evidence Iran Backs Yemen," Reuters, December 11, 2009. 46 Open Source Center, "Yemeni Official Says Houthists Receive Iranian Support, Have 'Expansionist Agenda'," Doha Al Jazeera.net in English, November 16, 2009, Document ID#GMP20091116693003. 47 ―In Yemen, U.S. Faces Leader Who Puts Family First,‖ New York Times, January 5, 2010. 48 "Yemen: Southern Secession Threat Adds to Instability," Oxford Analytica, May 27, 2009. 49 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests, December 14, 2009. 50 According to one report, ―Sheikh Tariq al Fadhli fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet army during the 1980s. He also married into President Saleh‘s family. Al Fadhli belongs to a leading family in the southern governorate of Abyan who lost their land during the PDRY nationalization program. Al Fadhli returned to Yemen after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and played a key role in the post-Cold War settlement in Yemen. He helped President Saleh defeat the Socialists in Yemen‘s 1994 civil war and set about reclaiming his family land in Abyan. He remained a paid adviser to the Ministry of Interior.‖ See, Ginny Hill, ―Economic Crisis Underpins Southern Separatism,‖ Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2009. 51 Ginny Hill, Yemen: Fear of Failure, Chatham House, Middle East Programme, November 2008. 52 The World Bank estimates that qat cultivation employs one out of every seven Yemeni workers. 53 Lenard Milich and Mohammed Al-Sabbry, ―The ―Rational Peasant‖ vs Sustainable Livelihoods: The Case of Qat in Yemen,‖ Development - Society for International Development, 1995. 54 New York Times, January 5, 2010, op.cit. 55 According to one recent report, the NSB was established to ―provide Western intelligence agencies with a more palatable local partner than the Political Security Organization (PSO). The NSB is now responsible for dispensing $3.4 million of U.S.-provided tribal engagement funds to support the campaign against AQAP. See, Michael Knights, ―Strengthening Yemeni Counterterrorism Forces: Challenges and Political Considerations,‖ Policywatch #16 16, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 6, 2010. 56 Andrew McGregor, Yemen and the U.S.: Different Approaches to the War on Terrorism, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, May 10, 2007. 57 New York Times, January 5, 2010, op.cit. 58 U.S. Acting Deputy State Department Spokesman Gordon Duguid, ―Statement on Yemen Parliamentary Elections Postponement,‖ Washington, DC, March 3, 2009. 59 ―UNHCR Report Says 74,000 Africans Refugees Arrived in Yemen in 2009,‖ Agence France Presse, December 18, 2009. 60 "Somalis fleeing to Yemen prompt new worries in fight against al-Qaeda," Washington Post, January 12, 2010. 61 "Q+A-Somali-Yemeni Militant Ties in the Spotlight," Reuters, January 6, 2010. 62 "I s Al Qaeda in Yemen connected to Al Qaeda in Somalia?," Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 2010. 63 Bernard Haykel, ―Act locally: why the GCC needs to help save Yemen,‖ The National (UAE), January 7, 2010. 64 "Yemen Leader‘s Rule Presents Thorny Issues for US," New York Times, January 5, 2010. 65 ―Bounties a Bust in Hunt for Al-Qaeda,‖ Washington Post, May 17, 2008. 66 ―Coddling Terrorists In Yemen,‖ Washington Post, May 17, 2008. 67 14 Yemenis were repatriated from Guantanamo during the Bush Administration. In December 2009, six Yemeni prisoners were sent back to Yemen. According to one report, these six Yemenis all denied ties to Al Qaeda or the Taliban and pledged not to pick up arms against the United States. See, ―Yemen to Hold Six Returned Detainees Indefinitely, Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2010. 68 In May 2009, the U.S. Government issued figures showing that 74 of the 530 detainees in Guantánamo were suspected or known to have returned to terrorist activity since their release. 69 "Obama's Yemeni Gitmo dilemma," ForeignPolicy.com, May 8, 2009. 70 "U.S. mulls Saudi Scheme for Guantanamo Yemenis," Reuters, May 6, 2009. 71 "Yemen signs military deal with US," The National Newspaper (UAE), November 11, 2009.

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In: Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role Editor: Gabriel A. Dumont

ISBN: 978-1-61728-165-5 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

COUNTRY PROFILE: YEMEN

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Library of Congress - Federal Research Division COUNTRY Formal Name: Republic of Yemen (Al Jumhuriyah al Yamaniyah). Short Form: Yemen.

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Term for Citizen(s): Yemeni(s). Major Cities: The capital of Yemen is Sanaa. Other major cities are Aden, Taizz, Al Hudaydah, and Al Mukalla. Independence: North Yemen gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in November 1918, and South Yemen became independent from Britain on November 30, 1967. The Republic of Yemen was established on May 22, 1990, with the merger of North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen). Public Holidays: Public holidays other than New Year‘s Day, International Women‘s Day, Labour Day, Corrective Movement Anniversary, and National Day are dependent on the Islamic calendar and vary from year to year. For 2008 the holidays are: New Year‘s Day (January 1); Muharram, Islamic New Year (January 10); Ashoura (January 19); International Women‘s Day (March 8); Mouloud, Birth of Muhammad (March 20); Labour Day (May 1); National Unification Day (May 22); Corrective Movement Anniversary (June 13); Leilat al Meiraj, Ascension of Muhammad (July 30); first day of Ramdan (September 1); Eid al Fitr, end of Ramadan (October 1); National Day (October 14); Eid al Adha, Feast of the Sacrifice (December 8); and Muharram, Islamic New Year (December 29).



This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a Library of Congress publication dated August 2008.

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Library of Congress - Federal Research Division Flag: Three equal horizontal bands of red (on top), white, and black.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Medieval History

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In pre-Islamic times, the area that encompasses the present-day Republic of Yemen was called Arabia Felix—happy or prosperous Arabia—and was ruled by a number of indigenous dynasties in several different kingdoms. The most important cultural, social, and political event in Yemen‘s history was the coming of Islam around A.D. 630. Following the conversion of the Persian governor, many of the sheikhs and their tribes converted to Islam, and Yemen was ruled as part of Arab caliphates. The former North Yemen came under the control of imams of various dynasties, the most important of which were the Zaydis, whose dynasty lasted well into the twentieth century.

Former North Yemen By the sixteenth century and again in the nineteenth century, northern Yemen was controlled in the cities by the Ottoman Empire and in tribal areas by the Zaydi imam‘s suzerainty. The Ottoman Empire was dissolved in 1918, and Imam Yahya, leader of the Zaydi community, took power in the area that later became the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), or North Yemen. Underground opposition to Yahya began in the late 1930s, and by the mid1940s major elements of the population opposed his rule. In 1948 Yahya was assassinated in a palace coup, and forces opposed to his feudal rule seized power. His son Ahmad succeeded him and ruled until his own death in September 1962. Imam Ahmad‘s reign was marked by growing repression, renewed friction with the British over their presence in the south, and increasing pressure to support the Arab nationalist objectives of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. From 1958 to 1961, North Yemen was federated with Egypt and Syria in the United Arab States. Imam Ahmad‘s son Badr assumed power after Ahmad‘s death but was deposed one week later by army officers, led by Colonel Abdallah al Sallal, who took control of Sanaa and created the YAR. Immediately upon taking power, the officers created the ruling eight-member Revolutionary Command Council headed by Sallal. Civil war ensued between the royalist forces, supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan in opposition to the newly formed republic, and republicans, supported by Egyptian troops. In 1967 Egyptian troops were

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withdrawn, and by 1968, following a royalist siege of Sanaa, most of the opposing leaders had reconciled. In 1970 Saudi Arabia recognized the YAR.

Former South Yemen British influence increased in the southern and eastern portion of Yemen after the British captured the port of Aden in 1839. It was ruled as part of British India until 1937, when Aden became a crown colony, and the remaining territory was designated a protectorate (administered as the Eastern Protectorate and Western Protectorate). By 1965 most of the tribal states within the protectorate and the Aden colony itself had joined to form the Britishsponsored Federation of South Arabia. Over the next two years, two rival factions—the Marxist National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)—fought for power. By August 1967, the NLF was in control of most areas, and at the end of the summer the federation formally collapsed. The last British troops were removed on November 29. On November 30, 1967, the People‘s Republic of Yemen, comprising Aden and South Arabia, was proclaimed. In June 1969, a radical wing of the NLF gained power. The country‘s name changed to the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) on December 1, 1970.

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Road to Unification By 1972 the two Yemens were in open conflict. The YAR received aid from Saudi Arabia, and the PDRY received arms from the Soviet Union. Although the Arab League brokered a cease-fire and both sides agreed to forge a united Yemen within 18 months, the two Yemens remained apart. The following years saw continued unrest and conflict, culminating in the assassination of the president of the YAR in June 1978. A month later, the Constituent People‘s Assembly elected Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abdallah Salih as president of the YAR. Renewed fighting broke out in early 1979, but in March the heads of state of the two Yemens signed an agreement in Kuwait pledging unification. In April 1980, Abdul Fattah Ismail, who had been appointed head of state of the PDRY in December 1978, resigned and went into exile. He was replaced by Ali Nasir Muhammad, a former prime minister. In January 1986, Ismail returned from exile and resumed a senior position in the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP). More than a month of violence between Muhammad and Ismail‘s supporters resulted in Muhammad‘s ouster and Ismail‘s death. In February 1986, former prime minister Haydar Abu Bakr al Attas was named president of a newly formed PDRY government. In October a general election took place in the PDRY for the national legislature. In the YAR‘s first general election, held in July 1988, President Salih won a third five-year term. In May 1988, the governments of the YAR and PDRY agreed to withdraw troops from their mutual border, create a demilitarized zone, and allow easier border crossings for citizens of both states. In May 1990, they agreed on a draft unity constitution, which was ultimately approved by referendum in May 1991. The Republic of Yemen was officially declared on

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May 22, 1990. President Salih of the YAR became president of the new republic; Ali Salim al Baydh, secretary general of the Central Committee of the YSP was named vice president; and PDRY President al Attas was named prime minister. Al Attas led a transitional coalition Council of Ministers whose membership was divided between the General People‘s Congress (GPC; the party supporting President Salih) and the YSP (the party supporting Vice President al Baydh).

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Unrest and Civil War In late 1991 through early 1992, deteriorating economic conditions led to significant domestic unrest, including several riots. Legislative elections were nonetheless held in early 1993, and in May the two former ruling parties, the GPC and the YSP, merged to create a single political party with an overall majority in the new House of Representatives. In August Vice President al Baydh exiled himself voluntarily to Aden, and the country‘s general security situation deteriorated as political rivals settled scores and tribal elements took advantage of the widespread unrest. In January 1994, representatives of the main political parties signed a document of pledge and accord in Amman, Jordan, that was designed to resolve the ongoing crisis. But by May 1994, the country was in civil war, and international efforts to broker a ceasefire were unsuccessful. On May 21, 1994, al Baydh and other leaders of the former South Yemen declared secession and the establishment of a new Democratic Republic of Yemen centered in Aden, but the new republic failed to achieve any international recognition. On July 7, 1994, President Salih‘s troops captured Aden, thus ending the civil war. In August 1994, in an attempt to undermine the strength of southern military units loyal to the YSP, President Salih prohibited party membership within the armed forces; he also introduced amendments to the constitution abolishing the Presidential Council and establishing universal suffrage. In October he was reelected president and named GPC members to key cabinet posts; several ministerial posts were given to members of the Yemeni Islah Party (YIP), which had been loyal to Salih during the civil war.

1994 to Present Following the civil war, Yemen‘s currency, the riyal, was devalued; the cost of fuel doubled, water and electricity were in short supply, and food costs rose. Public demonstrations ensued, and the YIP was at odds with the GPC over economic reforms recommended by the World Bank. In the April 1997 parliamentary elections, the GPC garnered 187 seats and the YIP only 53 seats. A new Council of Ministers composed primarily of GPC members was named in May. The country continued to experience unrest due to economic hardship, coupled with increasing lawlessness, particularly against tourists. In September 1999, the first direct presidential election was held, reelecting the incumbent, President Salih, to a five- year term by an overwhelming margin. Constitutional amendments adopted in 2000 extended the president‘s term by two years. President Salih was reelected in September 2006. In October 2007, he announced comprehensive political reforms, some of which will not take effect until he is no longer in power, calling into question the prospects

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for implementation. The September 2006 elections for local and governorate council seats, as well as the May 2008 elections for governorate governors have left power largely in the hands of the ruling GPC.

GEOGRAPHY

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Location Yemen is located in the Middle East at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula between Oman and Saudi Arabia. It is situated at the entrance to the Bab el Mandeb strait, which links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean (via the Gulf of Aden) and is one of the most active and strategic shipping lanes in the world.

Size Yemen has an area of 527,970 square kilometers, including the islands of Perim at the southern end of the Red Sea and Socotra at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden.

Land Boundaries Yemen‘s land boundaries total 1,746 kilometers. Yemen borders Saudi Arabia to the north (1,458 kilometers) and Oman to the northeast (288 kilometers).

Disputed Territory A long-standing dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen was resolved in June 2000 with the signing of the Treaty of Jiddah. This agreement provides coordinates for use in

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delineating the land and maritime border, including the section in the eastern desert region of Yemen that potentially contains significant amounts of oil. Friction between the two countries in recent years over security of the borders appears to have been alleviated by the establishment of joint border patrols. However, in early 2008 Saudi Arabia reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the border in order to stem illegal crossborder activities. Following years of dispute between Yemen and Eritrea over ownership of the Hanish Islands and fishing rights in the Red Sea, in 1999 an international arbitration panel awarded sovereignty of the islands to Yemen. In 2002 Yemen established an economic and security link with Sudan and Ethiopia; because all three countries have been involved in disputes with Eritrea, the alliance has caused renewed tensions in the region.

Length of Coastline Yemen has 1,906 kilometers of coastline along the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.

Maritime Claims

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Yemen claims a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, a contiguous zone of 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles, and a continental shelf of 200 nautical miles or to the edge of the continental margin.

Topography Yemen occupies the southern end of the Arabian Plateau. The country‘s mountainous interior is surrounded by narrow coastal plains to the west, south, and east and by upland desert to the north along the border with Saudi Arabia. The Tihamah is a nearly 419kilometerlong, semidesert coastal plain that runs along the Red Sea. The interior mountains have elevations ranging from a few hundred meters to the country‘s highest point, Jabal an Nabi Shuayb, which is 3,760 meters above sea level. The highland regions are interspersed with wadis, or river valleys, that are dry in the summer months. Most notable is the Wadi Hadhramaut in eastern Yemen, the upper portions of which contain alluvial soil and floodwaters and the lower portion of which is barren and largely uninhabited. Both the eastern plateau region and the desert in the north are hot and dry with little vegetation.

Principal Rivers Yemen has no permanent rivers.

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Climate Temperatures are generally very high in Yemen, particularly in the coastal regions. Rainfall is limited, with variations based on elevation. The highlands enjoy a temperate, rainy summer with an average high temperature of 21° C and a cool, moderately dry winter with temperatures occasionally dipping below 4° C. The climate of the Tihamah (western coastal plain) is tropical; temperatures occasionally exceed 54° C, and the humidity ranges from 50 to 70 percent. Rainfall, which comes in irregular heavy torrents, averages 130 millimeters annually. In Aden the average temperature is 25° C in January and 32° C in June, but with highs often exceeding 37° C. Average annual rainfall is 127 millimeters. The highest mountainous areas of southern Yemen receive from 520 to 760 millimeters of rain a year. It is not uncommon for the northern and eastern sections of the country to receive no rain for five years or more. The Wadi Hadhramaut in the eastern part of Yemen is arid and hot, and the humidity ranges from 35 percent in June to 64 percent in January.

Natural Resources Yemen‘s principal natural resources are oil and natural gas as well as agriculturally productive land in the west. Other natural resources include fish and seafood, rock salt, marble, and minor deposits of coal, gold, lead, nickel, and copper.

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Land Use Only 2.9 percent of Yemen is considered to be arable land, and less than 0.3 percent of the land is planted with permanent crops. About 5,500 square kilometers of land are irrigated. According to the United Nations, Yemen has 19,550 square kilometers of forest and other wooded land, which constitutes almost 4 percent of total land area.

Environmental Factors Yemen is subject to sandstorms and dust storms, resulting in soil erosion and crop damage. The country has very limited natural freshwater and consequently inadequate supplies of potable water. Desertification (land degradation caused by aridity) and overgrazing are also problems.

Time Zone Yemen is three hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time.

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SOCIETY Population Yemen‘s latest census, conducted in December 2004, reported a population of 19.72 million persons, reflecting an average annual population growth rate of more than 3 percent. The U.S. government has estimated a population of 22.2 million persons as of July 2007, and the International Monetary Fund estimated almost 21 million persons in 2005. Yemen‘s population has more than doubled since 1975 and has grown approximately 35 percent since the 1994 census, making Yemen the second most populous country on the Arabian Peninsula. Adding to the growth of the native population is the influx of Somali refugees into Yemen— tens of thousands every year. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, there were almost 96,000 African refugees in Yemen in 2006, including more than 91,000 Somalis. The Yemen government estimated 300,000 Somalis in Yemen in 2007. According to the United Nations, Yemen‘s population in 2005 was 27.3 percent urban and 73.7 percent rural; population density was 40 persons per square kilometer.

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Demography Yemen‘s population is predominantly young. According to U.S. government and United Nations estimates, in 2007 about 46 percent of the population was under age 15; slightly more than half the population, 15–64; and less than 3 percent, 65 and older. The population was almost equally divided between males and females. In 2007 the birthrate and death rate were estimated to be 42.7 per 1,000 and 8.1 per 1,000, respectively. The infant mortality rate was almost 58 deaths per 1,000 live births. The rate was estimated to be higher for males than for females—more than 62 male deaths per 1,000 live births, as compared with about 53 female deaths per 1,000 live births. Despite an increase of 14 years in the last decade, life expectancy at birth in Yemen has remained low compared with other developing countries— 60.6 years for males and 64.5 years for females, or 62.5 years overall. The country‘s fertility rate was almost 6.5 children per woman in 2007.

Ethnic Groups and Languages Yemen‘s population is predominantly Arab, but it also includes Afro-Arabs, South Asians, and Europeans. Arabic is the official language; English is also used in official and business circles.

Religion Virtually all of Yemen‘s citizens are Muslims; approximately 30 percent belong to the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam, and about 70 percent follow the Shafii school of Sunni Islam. A few

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thousand Ismaili Muslims, who adhere to Shia Islam, live in northern Yemen. Fewer than 500 Jews (a fraction of the former population) also live in the northern part of the country. Yemen‘s constitution declares that Islam is the state religion and that the president of the republic must ―practice his Islamic duties.‖ The constitution also provides for freedom of religion, which the government generally respects but with limitations. The government prohibits the conversion and proselytizing of Muslims, requires permission for the construction of new places of worship, and permits non-Muslims to vote but not to hold elected office. Public schools provide instruction in Islam but not in other religions, although Muslim citizens are allowed to attend private schools that do not teach Islam. In an effort to curb ideological and religious extremism in schools, the government does not permit any courses outside of the officially approved curriculum to be taught in private and national schools. Because the government is concerned that unlicensed religious schools deviate from formal educational requirements and promote militant ideology, it has closed more than 4,500 of these institutions and deported foreign students studying there. The free practice of religion has met with some government opposition. In 2004 the government used military force to quell an armed insurgency led by a Shia cleric in the northern governorate of Sadah. In March 2007, the government abolished the al-Haq political party, whose members are linked to this insurgency movement, citing the party‘s failure to meet political party law requirements. In early 2007, for the third year, the government banned the observance of a religious holiday that is celebrated there by some Shia Muslims and reportedly limited the hours that mosques were allowed to remain open, reassigned imams thought to espouse radical doctrine, and increased surveillance and detention of members of the insurgent group. According to the U.S. Department of State, Yemen‘s government, in an effort to curb extremism and increase tolerance, monitors mosques for inflammatory sermons and threatening political statements and uses police and intelligence agencies to screen the activities of Islamic organizations tied to international organizations.

Education and Literacy According to composite data compiled by the World Bank, the adult literacy rate for Yemen in 2005 was 35 percent for females and 73 percent for males. The overall literacy rate for the population age 15 and older was 54 percent. By comparison, low-income countries in the aggregate average an adult literacy rate of almost 62 percent. There is a direct correlation between the very high rate of illiteracy and the lack of basic education. Although Yemen‘s laws provide for universal, compulsory, free education for children ages six through 15, the U.S. Department of State reports that compulsory attendance is not enforced, and the cost of attendance (approximately US$10 per student per year) is an additional deterrent. This deficiency is confirmed by World Bank statistics. In 2006 only 75 percent of Yemen‘s school-age population was enrolled in primary school; enrollment was even lower for the female population—only 65 percent. In that same year, only 37 percent of the school-age population was enrolled in secondary school, including only 26 percent of eligible females. These low enrollment numbers are in turn a reflection of the countrywide shortage of the requisite infrastructure. School facilities and educational materials are of poor quality, classrooms are too few in number, and the teaching faculty is inadequate. In

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September 2004, the World Bank approved a US$121 million, six-year project to improve the quality of basic education (grades one through nine). Under this program, classroom facilities will be expanded and upgraded, curricula and educational materials improved, and the Ministry of Education‘s capacity to implement new programs and resources strengthened. In March 2008, the World Bank approved a US$103 million, seven-year project to improve gender equity, and the quality and efficiency of secondary education, focusing on girls in rural areas. This program, a major goal of which is to improve teaching and learning practices in the classroom, will upgrade school facilities and provide learning equipment as well as school community grants. Yemen‘s government has in recent years increased spending on education—from 4.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1995 to 9.6 percent of GDP in 2005.

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Health Despite the significant progress Yemen has made to expand and improve its health care system over the past decade, the system remains severely underdeveloped. Total expenditures on health care in 2004 constituted 5 percent of gross domestic product. In that same year, the per capita expenditure for health care was very low compared with other Middle Eastern countries— US$34 according to the World Health Organization. According to the World Bank, the number of doctors in Yemen rose by an average of more than 7 percent between 1995 and 2000, but as of 2004 there were still only three doctors per 10,000 persons. In 2005 Yemen had only 6.1 hospital beds available per 10,000 persons. Health care services are particularly scarce in rural areas; only 25 percent of rural areas are covered by health services, compared with 80 percent of urban areas. Emergency services, such as ambulance service and blood banks, are non-existent. Most childhood deaths are caused by illnesses for which vaccines exist or that are otherwise preventable. In 2003 an estimated 12,000 people in Yemen were living with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), according to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.

Welfare According to the United Nations, in 2005 Yemen ranked 153 out of 177 countries on the human development index (HDI), a measure of life expectancy, education, and standard of living. Yemen had the lowest HDI ranking among the Arab states. Several welfare programs are in place, but they generally have been considered inadequate to meet the needs of Yemen‘s impoverished citizens (estimated to exceed 45 percent of the total population). The main social assistance program is the Social Welfare Fund, initially established to compensate for reductions in economic subsidies. In 2006 this program provided 1 million beneficiaries direct cash payments capped at US$10 per month and lump-sum payments for emergencies. In March 2008, the government announced it would double the amount of cash transfers under this program and also increase retiree monthly pension benefits by US$7.50. The Social Fund for Development was established in 1997 with World Bank funds. Through its first and

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second phases, the fund has supported improved access of Yemen‘s poorest population to basic social services, and more effective and efficient delivery of social services. For the third phase, which is ongoing, the Bank provided US$60 million of International Development Association credit and in June 2007 approved an additional US$15 million. The three main components of this project are community development, capacity-building, and microfinancing programs.

ECONOMY

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Overview At the time of unification, South Yemen and North Yemen had vastly different but equally struggling underdeveloped economic systems. Since unification, the economy has been forced to sustain the consequences of Yemen‘s support for Iraq during the 1990–9 1 Gulf War: Saudi Arabia expelled almost 1 million Yemeni workers, and both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait significantly reduced economic aid to Yemen. The 1994 civil war further drained Yemen‘s economy. As a consequence, since 1995 Yemen has relied heavily on aid from multilateral agencies to sustain its economy. In return, it has pledged to implement significant economic reforms. In 1997 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved two programs to increase Yemen‘s credit significantly: the enhanced structural adjustment facility (now known as the poverty reduction and growth facility, or PRGF) and the extended funding facility (EFF). In the ensuing years, Yemen‘s government attempted, with limited success, to implement recommended reforms—reducing the civil service payroll, eliminating diesel and other subsidies, lowering defense spending, introducing a general sales tax, and privatizing state-run industries. As a result, Yemen has received only a fraction of the aid initially allocated by bilateral and multilateral lenders. In late 2005, the World Bank, which, together with other lenders, had extended Yemen a four- year US$2.3 billion economic support package in October 2002, announced that, as a consequence of Yemen‘s failure to implement significant economic reforms and stem corruption, it would reduce financial aid by one-third, to US$280 million, over the period July 2005 through July 2008. Other funds pledged in the US$2.3 billion package were withheld as well. However, in May 2006 the World Bank adopted an assistance strategy for Yemen under which it will provide approximately US$400 million in International Development Association (IDA) credits over the period FY 2006 to FY 2009. In November 2006, Yemen‘s development partners pledged a total of US$5 billion in grants and concessional loans for the period 2007–10 to finance projects outlined in Yemen‘s five-year (2006–10) Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (DPPR). Recognizing that the country‘s oil reserves are rapidly depleting, the DPPR focuses on the development of the country‘s non-oil resources: natural gas, agriculture, fisheries, transshipment, and tourism. At a February 2008 meeting, international lenders in the Yemen Consultative Group announced that as of December 2007, 70 percent of the funds pledged (increased to US$5.3 billion) had been allocated. However, several attendees raised concerns about Yemen‘s lack of economic expansion, high population growth, worsening water crisis, and inability to contain security threats, all of which threaten to diminish the efficacy of international financial support. Yemen remains one

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of the poorest of the world‘s low-income countries; more than 45 percent of the population lives in poverty.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) For 2006 Yemen‘s GDP was estimated to be US$19 billion. GDP per capita was estimated to be in a range of only US$880–US$904. World Bank and other economists have calculated a real growth rate of 3.2–4.0 percent in 2006, decreasing to a range of 2.8–3.6 percent in 2007, and estimate that real GDP growth in 2008 will remain unchanged. The general decline in the GDP growth rate is attributed to decreased oil production, which has negatively affected exports of goods and services, coupled with increased demand for imports. In the period 2008–9, however, the financial support pledged by bilateral and multilateral donors in November 2006 and the construction of a liquefied natural gas plant (expected to begin exports in early 2009) should offset the anticipated sharp decline in oil revenue, enabling GDP growth to remain constant. All of the rates estimated and forecast by economists fall far short of Yemen‘s five-year (2006–1 0) development plan, which calls for sustained average annual real GDP growth of 7 percent. The World Bank also has set a target of 7 percent GDP growth rate per year in order for Yemen to achieve sustained economic development.

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Government Budget In 1995, in order to comply with conditions stipulated by the International Monetary Fund, Yemen began an economic reform program, one component of which is fiscal policy reform aimed at reducing deficits and expanding the revenue base. However, the government has failed to significantly reduce its primary expenditure—subsidies, especially the fuel subsidy. Fuel subsidies accounted for an estimated 8.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 and are forecast to rise to 11.8 percent of GDP in 2008. Coupled with the fuel subsidy, the government has continued to raise capital spending and increase civil service wages and pension benefits. Defense spending remains high, and in late 2007 the government adopted a supplementary US$1.3 billion budget to cover rising military costs stemming from internal security threats. Overall government spending is expected to increase by an annual average of approximately 14 percent in 2008–9. This trend has resulted in significant fiscal deficits—an estimated US$768 million in 2007 (3.7 percent of GDP) and US$1.2 billion in 2008 (4.9 percent of GDP); the deficit is forecast to reach US$2.3 billion in 2009.

Inflation The implementation of economic reforms, including the cessation of Central Bank of Yemen financing of government budget deficits, reduced inflation from an average of 40 percent during the years immediately following unification (1990–96) to only 5.4 percent in 1997. High oil prices and cuts in the fuel subsidy brought the rate of inflation back up to an

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average of 11.4 percent from 2001 to 2004 and to 11.8 percent in 2005. Despite efforts by the Central Bank to contain the effects of both additional reductions in government fuel subsidies and the imposition of a general sales tax in 2005, the average annual inflation rate was 20.8 percent in 2006. Although inflation slowed sharply in the first half of 2007 as a result of lower prices for foodstuffs and intervention by the Central Bank, higher food prices in the latter part of 2007 pushed the annual average to 10 percent. Given increases in international non-oil commodity prices and strong domestic demand, economists project that the average inflation rate will reach 14.6 percent in 2008.

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Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Agriculture is the mainstay of Yemen‘s economy, generating more than 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) since 1990 (20.4 percent in 2005 according to the Central Bank of Yemen) and employing more than half (54.2 percent in 2003) of the working population. However, a U.S. government estimate suggests that the sector accounted for only 12.4 percent of GDP in 2007. Numerous environmental problems hamper growth in this sector—soil erosion, sand dune encroachment, and deforestation—but the greatest problem by far is the scarcity of water. As a result of low levels of rainfall, agriculture in Yemen relies heavily on the extraction of groundwater, a resource that is being depleted. Yemen‘s water tables are falling by approximately two meters a year. The use of irrigation has made fruit and vegetables Yemen‘s primary cash crops. With the rise in the output of irrigated crops, the production of traditional rain-fed crops such as cereals has declined. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, in 2005 the production of qat, a mildly narcotic and heavily cultivated plant that produces natural stimulants when its leaves are chewed, rose 6.7 percent and accounted for 5.8 percent of GDP; its usage in Yemen is widespread. According to the World Bank and other economists, cultivation of this plant plays a dominant role in Yemen‘s agricultural economy, constituting 10 percent of GDP and employing an estimated 150,000 persons while consuming an estimated 30 percent of irrigation water and displacing land areas that could otherwise be used for exportable coffee, fruits, and vegetables. Although Yemen‘s extensive territorial waters and marine resources reportedly have the potential to produce 350,000–400,000 metric tons of fish each year, actual production is estimated to total only about 290,000 metric tons per year. The fishing industry is relatively underdeveloped and consists largely of individual fishermen in small boats. In recent years, the government has lifted restrictions on fish exports, and production has increased, yielding revenues valued at US$256 million in 2005. Fish and fish products constitute only 1.7 percent of Yemen‘s GDP but are the second largest export. In December 2005, the World Bank approved a US$25 million credit for a six-year Fisheries Management and Conservation Project to be launched in all coastal governorates along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This project is expected to improve fish landing and auction facilities, provide ice plants for fish preservation, and enable Yemen‘s Ministry of Fisheries to undertake more effective research, resource management planning, and regulatory activities.

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Mining and Minerals Yemen is a small oil producer and does not belong to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Unlike many regional oil producers, Yemen relies heavily on foreign oil companies that have production-sharing agreements with the government. Income from oil production constitutes 75 percent of government revenue and about 85 percent of exports. Yemen had proven crude oil reserves of more than 3 billion barrels in 2007, down from 4 billion in 2006, and these reserves are not expected to last beyond 2020; in addition, output from the country‘s older fields is falling. According to statistics published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, crude oil output averaged 380,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2006, a reduction from 400,000 bbl/d in 2005. Crude oil output is projected to be 360,000 bbl/d in 2007 and to decrease to 350,000 bbl/d in 2008. According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Yemen had 16.9 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves in 2007. Of this amount, 9 trillion cubic feet have been designated for the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by Yemen LNG (YLNG), which was formed in 1997 between Yemen Gas Company and various privately held companies. In July 2005, following years of setbacks, the government gave final approval to three LNG supply agreements, enabling YLNG to award a US$2.6 billion contract to an international consortium to build the country‘s first liquefaction plant at Balhat on the Arabian Sea coast. The plant is expected to deliver a total of 6.8 million tons of LNG per year; initial shipments are expected by early 2009, two-thirds for export to the United States and the remainder to Asia.

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Industry and Manufacturing The U.S. government estimates that Yemen‘s industrial sector constituted 40.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007. Together with services, construction, and commerce, industry accounts for less than 25 percent of the labor force. The largest contributor to the manufacturing sector‘s output is oil refining, which generates roughly 40 percent of total revenue. The remainder of this sector consists of the production of consumer goods and construction materials. Manufacturing constituted approximately 9.9 percent of Yemen‘s GDP in 2006. Almost all (95 percent) of the establishments are small businesses (one to four employees). Almost half of all industrial establishments are involved in processing food products and beverages; the production of flour and cooking oil has increased in recent years. Approximately 10 percent of the establishments are classified as manufacturing mixed metal products such as water-storage tanks, doors, and windows.

Energy Yemen‘s state-owned Public Corporation for Electricity (PEC) operates an estimated 80 percent of the country‘s electricity generating capacity (1 gigawatt) as well as the national power grid. Over the past 10 years, the government has considered various means of alleviating the country‘s significant electricity shortage, including restructuring the PEC, integrating the power sector through small-scale privatization of power stations, creating

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independent power projects (IPPs), and introducing gas-generated power plants to free up oil supplies for export. In March 2005, Siemens signed a US$160 million contract to build a 340megawatt gas-fueled power plant at Marib, with the potential to generate 1,000 megawatts. In November 2007, the Saudi Arabian government agreed to provide a US$101 million grant for this project. In May 2006, the World Bank approved a US$50 million loan to help finance the five-year Power Sector Project, which is designed to relieve critical power-sector supply constraints, enhance electricity supply efficiency and quality, and improve the efficiency of the PEC. In 2007 France‘s development financing agency, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), gave Yemen a US$37 million concessional loan to help build capacity in the electricity sector. In 2005 Yemen‘s diesel-run power plants generated 4.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, a level of production that is insufficient to maintain a consistent supply of electricity. Although demand for electricity remains high, it is estimated that only 42 percent of the total population has access to electricity from the national power grid, and supply is intermittent, with frequent blackouts. To meet this demand, the government plans to increase the country‘s power generating capacity an additional 1,400 megawatts by 2010.

Services International economists have reported that Yemen‘s services sector constituted 52.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004 and 53.1 percent of GDP in 2005. The U.S. government estimates that the services sector accounted for 46.7 percent of GDP in 2007.

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Banking and Finance Yemen‘s financial services sector is underdeveloped and dominated by the banking system. Yemen has no public stock exchange, but the government wants to establish one by 2011. The banking system consists of the Central Bank of Yemen, 16 commercial banks (nine private domestic banks, four of which are Islamic banks; five private foreign banks; and two state-owned banks), and two specialized state-owned development banks. The Central Bank of Yemen controls monetary policy and oversees the transfer of currencies abroad. It is the lender of last resort, exercises supervisory authority over commercial banks, and serves as a banker to the government. The largest commercial bank, the National Bank of Yemen, which is fully state-owned, and the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is majority state-owned, are currently being restructured with the goal of eventual privatization. Because of fiscal difficulties in both banks, in 2004 Yemen‘s government approved a plan to merge them, but no action has been taken. The large volume of non-performing loans, low capitalization, and weak enforcement of regulatory standards hamper Yemen‘s banking sector as a whole. Numerous banks are technically insolvent. Because many debtors are in default, Yemen‘s banks limit their lending activities to a select group of consumers and businesses; as a result, the entire banking system holds less than 60 percent of the money supply. The bulk of the economy operates with cash. Legislation adopted in 2000 gave the Central Bank the authority to enforce tougher lending

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requirements, and in mid-2005 the Central Bank promulgated several new capital requirements for commercial banks aimed at curtailing currency speculation and protecting deposits. In 2007 Yemen‘s banking law was amended to ease entry conditions for foreign banks and strengthen the oversight of Islamic banks. In March 2008, Yemen‘s parliament approved legislation establishing an independent deposit insurance agency to protect depositors with assets of US$10,000 or less.

Tourism Yemen‘s tourism industry is hampered by limited infrastructure as well as serious security concerns. The country‘s hotels and restaurants are below international standards, and air and road transportation is largely inadequate. Kidnappings of foreign tourists remain a threat, especially outside the main cities, and, coupled with attacks on foreigners in 2007 and early 2008, present a significant deterrent to tourism. In April 2008, the U.S. Department of State reiterated previous warnings to U.S. citizens, urging them to defer non-essential travel to Yemen because the security threat level remains high. In March 2008, Britain‘s Foreign Office issued a similar advisory. Recent statistics for tourist arrivals in Yemen are not available, but in 2005 the number rose to 336,000 from 274,000 in 2004.

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Labor According to the U.S. government, the agriculture and herding sector employs the majority of Yemen‘s working population (54.2 percent in 2003). Industry, together with services, construction, and commerce, accounts for less than 25 percent of the labor force. The country‘s unemployment rate is estimated to be 35 percent. According to the World Bank and other economists, Yemen‘s civil service is characterized by a large, poorly paid workforce, multiple salary structures, and an absence of effective enforcement measures to counter fraud. As the government has sought to appease discontent over a stagnant economy, civil service salaries have increased dramatically— doubling between 2000 and 2005. The 2005 budget reduced economic subsidies but in exchange required the government to make various concessions, including increasing civil service wages another 10 to 15 percent by 2007 as part of a national wage strategy. In 2006 the government provided across-the-board wage increases as the first phase of a four- phase Civil Service Modernization Project. The second phase was implemented in November 2007, providing an average 20 percent salary increase for all public-sector employees at an estimated cost of US$402 million. In March 2008, the government announced a US$15 per month increase in civil service and military personnel salaries. A major reform underway is the implementation of a biometric identification system for civilian and military personnel by September 2008; it is designed to eliminate the collection of multiple salaries by one employee. The Ministry of Civil Services is also developing other procedural reforms. The International Monetary Fund has stated that Yemen must reduce civil service salaries as a component of GDP, but this goal can be achieved only with continued reductions in the size of the civil service.

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Foreign Economic Relations During the 1990–91 Gulf War, Yemen supported Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait, thereby alienating Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both of which had provided critical financial assistance to Yemen. In addition to withdrawing this aid, Saudi Arabia expelled almost 1 million Yemeni workers. The resultant fall in expatriate remittances had a disastrous impact on Yemen‘s governmental budget. The civil war of 1994 further drained the economy, and in 1995 Yemen sought the aid of multilateral agencies. In 1996 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) granted Yemen a US$190 million stand-by credit facility, and the following year it approved two funding facilities that increased the country‘s credit by approximately US$500 million. However, the funding was contingent on Yemen‘s adoption of stringent economic reforms, a requirement that the country had limited success in fulfilling. As a result, the IMF suspended lending to Yemen from late 1999 until February 2001. In 2000 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia resumed financial aid to Yemen. In October 2002, bilateral and multilateral lenders led by the World Bank agreed to give Yemen a four-year economic support package worth US$2.3 billion, 20 percent in grants and 80 percent in concessional loans. This funding is almost eight times the amount of financial support Yemen received from the IMF. However, in December 2005 the World Bank announced that because of the government‘s continued inability to effect significant economic reforms and stem corruption, funding would be reduced by more than one-third, from US$420 million to US$280 million for the period July 2005–July 2008. In May 2006, the World Bank adopted a new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Yemen for the period FY 2006 to FY 2009, providing a blueprint for fostering the country‘s fiscal and human development improvement. The bank pledged to contribute approximately US$400 million in International Development Association (IDA) credits over the CAS time frame. In December 2005, the Japanese government pledged to write off US$17 million of the US$264 Yemen owes. That same month, Germany pledged to increase its annual aid to Yemen to US$83.6 million over the next two years; funding will go primarily to education and water improvement projects. In November 2006, the United Kingdom announced that aid to Yemen would increase 400 percent, to US$222 million through 2011. In June 2008, the Yemeni General Investment Authority and the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade jointly convened a symposium to advance the already strong trade and investment relationship between the two countries. During this meeting, China announced that it would provide a US$12 million grant to support development projects in Yemen. Yemen is a member of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, which since 1974 has contributed to the financing of economic and social development in Arab states and countries through loans and guarantees. In March 2004, the Arab League provided US$136 million to Yemen to finance infrastructure improvements. At a mid-November 2006 meeting in London, a group of bilateral and multilateral donors pledged US$5 billion over four years (2007–10) to fund economic development in Yemen. The goal of the meeting, which was jointly chaired by the World Bank and the government of Yemen, was to provide sufficient economic aid to Yemen to enable it to qualify for future Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) membership. More than 55 percent of the aid, which is primarily in the form of grants and has been increased to US$5.3 billion, will come from the GCC. In December 2007, the United Arab Emirates raised its pledge from US$500 million to US$650 million. Yemen was

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granted observer status at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999, and its application for full membership is currently under negotiation.

Imports Imports totaled US$4.7 billion in 2006, increased to an estimated US$6.7 billion in 2007, and are projected to increase to US$7.5 billion in 2008. This increase is due in part to Yemen‘s reliance on foreign capital goods for its gas and infrastructure programs. Yemen is a net importer of all major categories of products except fuels. Principal imports are machinery and transport equipment, food and livestock, and processed materials. The principal source of Yemen‘s imports in 2006 was the United Arab Emirates (15.8 percent of total imports); the bulk of these imports are actually re-exports from industrialized countries. Yemen received 12.3 percent of its total imports from China and 7.5 percent from Saudi Arabia.

Exports In 2006 Yemen‘s exports totaled US$7.3 billion. Crude oil is Yemen‘s main export, accounting for 85 percent of total exports in 2006. Yemen‘s non-oil exports are primarily agricultural products, mainly fish and fish products and coffee. In 2006 Asia remained the most important market for Yemen‘s exports, primarily China (29.9 percent of total exports), India, Thailand, and South Korea.

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Trade Balance Yemen‘s import and export values have increased and decreased dramatically in the past 10 years owing to shifts in global oil prices. As a result, the country‘s trade balance has fluctuated significantly from a deficit of almost US$800 million in 1998 to a surplus of US$1 billion in 2000. Rising oil prices resulted in a surplus of US$1.7 billion in 2005. The Central Bank of Yemen estimates that the trade surplus reached US$2.6 billion (about 13.3 percent of gross domestic product) in 2006.

Balance of Payments In recent years, Yemen‘s large non-merchandise deficits have contributed to a decline in its current-account position. Up until 2007, these deficits were offset by record export earnings, which resulted in large enough trade surpluses to keep the current account in surplus—US$633.2 million in 2005 and US$1.8 billion in 2006. In 2007, however, the rise in import spending resulted in an estimated current-account deficit of US$519 million, the first such deficit for Yemen since 1998. This deficit is projected to increase to US$660 million in 2008.

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External Debt In 1990 the newly unified Republic of Yemen inherited an unsustainable debt burden amounting to roughly 106 percent of gross domestic product. Debt rescheduling by the Paris Club creditor countries in the 1990s, coupled with assistance from the World Bank‘s International Development Agency, resulted in a drop in Yemen‘s debt stock to US$5.4 billion in 2006. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, Yemen‘s debt stock was US$5.8 billion (more than 25 percent of gross domestic product) by year-end 2007. According to the U.S. government, Yemen‘s reserves of foreign exchange and gold were US$7.9 billion in 2007.

Foreign Investment Yemen does not have a stock exchange, therefore limiting inward portfolio investment. Portfolio investment abroad is also very limited, with the result that portfolio flows are largely unrecorded by authorities. In the early 1990s, net direct investment was at its peak as foreign investors tapped Yemeni oil reserves, but since 1995 net direct investment flows have been negative because cost recovery for foreign oil companies has exceeded new direct investment. A US$3 billion liquid natural gas (LNG) construction project involving a consortium of foreign companies is underway following government approval in August 2005, with initial exports expected in early 2009. Such a project raises the prospect of increased foreign investment in the future as LNG facilities are built.

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Currency and Exchange Rate Yemen‘s currency is the Yemeni riyal (YR), which was floated on the open market in July 1996. Periodic intervention by the Central Bank of Yemen enabled the riyal to gradually depreciate approximately 4.2 percent per year from 1999 to 2003, and in varying amounts in subsequent years. However, in light of the weakening U.S. dollar, and in an effort to stem inflation, in 2007 the Central Bank of Yemen halted the riyal‘s depreciation. Its value averaged YR191.5 per US$1 in 2005, YR197 per US$1 in 2006, and YR 199 per US$1 in 2007. The exchange rate is expected to continue to average YR 199 per US$1 in 2008. In mid- August 2008, the exchange rate was nearly YR 200 per US$1. (EIU 2007, April 2008; Central Bank of Yemen))

Fiscal Year Yemen‘s fiscal year coincides with the calendar year.

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TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Overview As a direct consequence of its poverty, Yemen compares unfavorably with its Middle Eastern neighbors in terms of transportation infrastructure and communications network. Roads are generally poor, but several projects are planned to upgrade the system. Although there is no rail network, a rail line linking Yemen with Oman is under consideration by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Efforts to upgrade airport facilities have languished, and telephone and Internet usage and capabilities are limited. The port of Aden has shown a promising recovery from a 2002 attack; container throughput increased significantly in 2006 and set a record level in 2007. However, the agreement to turn over long-term management of the port‘s main facility, Aden Container Terminal, to DP World has become controversial and is not yet finalized.

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Roads Relative to Yemen‘s size, the road transportation system is very limited. Yemen has 71,300 kilometers of roads, only 6,200 kilometers of which are paved. In the north, roads connecting Sanaa, Taizz, and Al Hudaydah are good, as are intercity bus services. In the south, roads are generally poor and in need of repair, except for the Aden–Taizz road. In November 2005, the World Bank approved a five-year, almost US$50 million project to upgrade approximately 200 kilometers of intermediate rural roads and approximately 75 kilometers of village access roads as part of a larger effort to strengthen Yemen‘s capability for rural road planning and engineering. Plans are well advanced to build an estimated US$1.6 billion highway linking Aden in the south and Amran in the north. The road will include more than 10 tunnels and halve the travel time between the southern seacoast and the northern border with Saudi Arabia.

Railroads Yemen has no rail network, but a regional rail network planned by the Gulf Cooperation Council states is expected to include a 1,000-kilometer rail line linking Muscat, Oman, with the eastern Yemeni border outpost Shihen (also seen as Shahan). Under the supervision of the World Bank, three international consultancies have been preparing feasibility studies for this project since September 2007; their findings are expected by the end of 2008.

Ports Yemen‘s main ports are Aden, Al Hudaydah, Al Mukalla, and Mocha; Aden is the primary port. In addition, Ras Isa serves as the loading point for oil exports, and a small amount of cargo passes through Nishtun.

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Facilities at Aden consist of the Maalla Terminal and the Aden Container Terminal (ACT), which opened in March 1999. The port can handle roll-on-roll-off and container cargoes, as well as tankers. In November 2003, following the October 2002 bombing of the French supertanker Limburg off the Yemen coast and the resultant dramatic drop in throughput at the Aden port, the Port of Singapore Authority sold its majority stake in the ACT back to the Yemeni government. In June 2005, Dubai Ports International (later renamed DP World) was selected to upgrade and operate the ACT under a 35-year contract, but Yemen‘s parliament refused to approve the deal. Acknowledging both the wealth of DP World and the United Arab Emirates‘ strong economic support, in 2007 the Yemeni government resumed contract negotiations with DP World. Pending agreement on a final contract, which remains uncertain, Aden Gulf Seaports Corporation, a government entity, is managing the port. The port of Aden has recovered well from the 2002 bombing. In 2005 the port handled 317,897 twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEUs) of containers, slightly more than double the amount for 2003. The port handled 397,080 TEUs of containers in 2006 and a record 503,325 TEUs of containers in 2007.

Inland Waterways Yemen has no waterways of any significant length.

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Civil Aviation and Airports Yemen has 50 airports, 17 of which have paved runways. Of the 50 airports, four are international—Aden International, Sanaa International, Taizz, and Al Hudaydah. A major reconstruction and expansion of Aden International was completed in 2001, including a new runway that can handle large, long-haul aircraft. Plans to make that airport a regional cargo hub, with an ―air cargo village,‖ by 2004 have all but failed. Although construction began in January 2003, by year‘s end the managing company had dissolved. In December 2006, the chairman of the Aden Free Zone announced that US$250 million of funds allocated to Yemen at the November London donors‘ conference would be directed to this project. Yemenia is the national airline; it absorbed the former national carrier of South Yemen in 1996. It is expected that Yemenia, which is currently 49 percent owned by the Saudi government and 51 percent by the Yemen government, will eventually be privatized, but there has been resistance from the Saudis. In 2001 the airline carried 858,000 passengers. Because the airline‘s existing fleet of 12 aircraft is rapidly becoming outdated, in 2002 three new aircraft were leased for eight years, and in early 2006 the airline announced plans to acquire six new aircraft, with options for an additional four, beginning in 2012. In May 2006, the company allocated US$2 million for upgrades, including electronic ticketing and reservations.

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Pipelines According to the U.S. government, as of 2007 Yemen had a total of 1,402 kilometers of pipelines. This total includes pipeline designed for gas (71 kilometers), liquid petroleum gas (22 kilometers), and oil (1,309 kilometers).

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Telecommunications TeleYemen is the exclusive provider of international telecommunications for Yemen— fixed-line, telex, and Internet services—and is one of the mobile-phone operators. In 2003 the government-owned Public Telecommunications Corporation assumed full control of TeleYemen, and a year later it awarded a five-year management contract to France Telecom. According to the U.S. government, Yemen had only 270,000 Internet users in 2006. This low number is attributed to the high cost of computer equipment and connections in combination with the population‘s low level of income, as well as to the restricted bandwidth available on Yemen‘s outdated telephone network. In 2005 TeleYemen announced it would invest in the FALCON high-capacity loop cable system, which will improve Internet access, including broadband capability, and also expand international call accessibility. The cost of running a landline or owning a mobile telephone is out of reach for most of Yemen‘s poor population, resulting in very low telephone usage rates—3.9 fixed-line subscribers and 9.5 mobile subscribers per 100 persons in 2005. The U.S. government reported 968,400 landlines and 2 million mobile subscribers in Yemen in 2006. The technology used for domestic lines includes microwave radio relay, cable, and Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). In 2001 two private companies won 15-year licenses to provide mobile phone services. The growth of the companies‘ networks has resulted in coverage of about 60 percent of the population, but threats to internal security coupled with poor consumer payment history remain obstacles to future growth. In August 2005, the government awarded a contract to a joint venture between China Mobile and a group of Yemeni investors to take a 55 percent stake in Yemen‘s third mobile network; the government will retain a 25 percent share. In August 2006, the same conglomerate was awarded a contract for a fourth mobile network. The state-run Republic of Yemen Television and Republic of Yemen Radio operate the country‘s television and radio networks, respectively. According to the U.S. government, as of 1998 Yemen had six AM, one FM, and two shortwave radio broadcast stations and, as of 2007, three television broadcast stations, plus several low-power repeaters.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political System/Overview Since unification in 1990, Yemen has officially been a republic. According to the constitution, ―the political system of the Republic of Yemen is based on political and partisan pluralism.‖ In reality, however, the General People‘s Congress (GPC), which is headed by

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President Ali Abdallah Salih (who won re-election in September 2006 with 77 percent of the vote), dominates the government and continues to hold an absolute majority in parliament as a result of the 2003 elections. In 2001 several constitutional amendments, passed by national referendum, strengthened the powers of the executive branch. The president was given the authority to dissolve parliament without a national referendum, and his term of office was extended to seven years. The Shura Council appointed by the president was almost doubled in size and given enhanced legislative authority. Yemen‘s judiciary is perceived as weak and corrupt, and numerous government efforts to effect reform have as yet failed to improve the functioning of the judicial system. In April 2007, a presidential decree was issued declaring the appointment of a new prime minister and Council of Ministers. The ministerial changes were made in response to concerns about Yemen‘s declining economy and allegations of corruption. In October 2007, President Salih announced several constitutional reform measures designed to democratize Yemen‘s political system and empower local authorities, but the prospect for their implementation remains uncertain.

Constitution Yemen‘s constitution was ratified by popular referendum on May 16, 1991. It defines the republic as an independent and sovereign Arab and Islamic country and establishes sharia, or Islamic law, as the basis of all laws. In February 2001, several amendments were passed by national referendum extending the presidential term to seven years and the parliamentary term to six years and increasing the size and authority of the Shura Council.

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Branches of Government Yemen‘s current president, Ali Abdallah Salih, was reelected by universal suffrage in September 2006 for a seven-year term. He won the election with 77 percent of the vote, despite a challenge from the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) coalition candidate, Faisal bin Shamlan. The president appoints a vice president and a prime minister, who in turn appoints the 35-member Council of Ministers. Yemen‘s legislature is bicameral, composed of an elected 301-seat House of Representatives (parliament) and an appointed Shura Council with 111 members. The parliament, whose members serve six-year terms, enacts laws, sanctions general state policy and the socioeconomic plan, and approves government budgets and final accounts. The current parliament is dominated by the ruling party, the General People‘s Congress; as a result, it has failed to initiate legislation, instead debating policies that the government submits, and is generally perceived as an ineffective check on executivebranch authority. Pursuant to 2001 constitutional amendments, the Shura Council, whose role is primarily advisory, has the power to vote jointly with parliament on any legislative matters of the president‘s choice. Yemen has six types of courts: criminal, civil, personal status, special cases (e.g., kidnaping, carjacking, and acts of sabotage), commercial, and court-martial. In recent years, other limited- jurisdiction courts, e.g., juvenile and public funds courts, have been established under executive authority. The judicial system is organized in a three-tiered court structure.

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At the base are the courts of first instance, with broad powers to hear all manner of civil, criminal, commercial, and family matters. At the next level are the courts of appeal, one in each governorate and one in Sanaa. Each court of appeal has separate divisions for criminal, military, civil, and family issues. The highest court, the Supreme Court, settles jurisdictional disputes between courts, hears cases brought against high government officials, serves as the final court of appeal for all lower court decisions, and determines the constitutionality of laws and regulations. In addition to this formal court system, there is a system of tribal adjudication. It is responsible primarily for non-criminal issues, but in practice these courts adjudicate criminal cases as well.

Administrative Divisions Yemen is divided into 19 governorates. According to the U.S. government, for electoral and administrative purposes the capital city of Sanaa is treated as an additional governorate. A United Nations report on the preliminary results of Yemen‘s 2004 population census also lists Raimah as a new governorate.

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Provincial and Local Government Formal government authority is centralized in the capital city of Sanaa. Yemen‘s Local Authority Law decentralized authority by establishing locally elected district and governorate councils (last elected in September 2006), formerly headed by government-appointed governors. After the September 2006 local and governorate council elections, President Salih announced various measures that would enable future governors and directors of the councils to be directly elected. In May 2008, governors were elected for the first time. However, because the ruling party, the General People‘s Congress (GPC), continues to dominate the local and governorate councils, the May 2008 elections retained this party‘s executive authority over the governorates. In rural Yemen, direct state control is weak, with tribal confederations acting as autonomous sub-states.

Judicial and Legal System Yemen‘s constitution, as amended, stipulates that Islamic law (sharia) is the source of all legislation. All laws are based on a combination of sharia, old Egyptian laws, and Napoleonic tradition. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty; indigent defendants in felony cases are by law entitled to counsel, but in practice this does not always occur. Trials, which are generally public, are conducted without juries; judges adjudicate criminal cases. All defendants have the right of appeal. Women often suffer discrimination, particularly in domestic matters. Although Yemen‘s constitution provides for an autonomous judiciary and independent judges, in reality the judiciary is managed by an executive-branch council, the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), and judges are appointed and can be removed by the executive

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branch. The judicial system itself is considered weak; corruption is widespread; the government is often reluctant to enforce judgments; and judges are subject to harassment from tribal leaders, who themselves exercise significant discretion in the interpretation and application of the law. There have been several restructurings of the judiciary since the government initiated a judicial reform program in 1997, but none have resulted in any significant improvements in the functioning of the system or produced evidence of having reduced corruption.

Electoral System Yemen has universal suffrage for those age 18 and older. The constitution provides that the president be elected by popular vote from at least two candidates endorsed by parliament. In 1999 the first nationwide direct presidential election was held, giving Ali Abdallah Salih, the leader of the General People‘s Congress (GPC), a five-year term, which was extended to seven years in 2001. President Salih was reelected in September 2006 with 77 percent of the popular vote. The electorate also elects the parliament every six years, most recently in April 2003. The next parliamentary elections are to be held in April 2009. Although the various 2006 elections (presidential and local) were deemed by international observers to be generally open and competitive, there were reports of irregularities, such as underage and duplicate voting and the use of state funds to support GPC candidates.

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Politics and Political Parties Yemen‘s Political Parties Law mandates that political parties be viable national organizations comprising at least 75 founders and 2,500 members and not restrict membership to a particular region. The government provides financial support to political parties, including a stipend for newspaper publication. The ruling party, the General People‘s Congress (GPC), captured 238 of 301 seats in parliament in the 2003 elections. In the September 2006 elections for local and governorate councils, the GPC garnered 315 seats in the governorates (74 percent of the popular vote) and 5,078 local council seats (74 percent of the popular vote). In 2005 a coalition of five opposition parties formed the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) to effect political and economic reform. The JMP includes the northern-based, tribal, and Islamist-oriented Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah) and the secular Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), which represents the remnants of the former South Yemeni leadership. In the September 2006 presidential election, the JMP backed opposition candidate Faisal bin Shamlan, whose success in garnering 22 percent of the popular vote was viewed at the time as a first step in challenging the political stronghold of President Salih and the GPC. However, disputes between the GPC and the JMP in 2007 over election law amendments, coupled with the JMP‘s opposition to President Salih‘s proposed democratic reform measures, have halted initial attempts to forge a dialogue between the two parties.

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Mass Media Yemen‘s Ministry of Information influences the media through its control of printing presses, granting of newspaper subsidies, and ownership of the country‘s only television and radio stations. According to the U.S. Department of State, Yemen has nine governmentcontrolled, 50 independent, and 30 party-affiliated newspapers. There are approximately 90 magazines, 50 percent of which are private, 30 percent government-controlled, and 20 percent party-affiliated. The government controls the content of news broadcasts and rarely permits antigovernment material to be aired. Although Yemen‘s government claims it does not monitor Internet usage, the U.S. Department of State reports that the government does occasionally block political and religious Web sites. By law and regulation, newspapers and magazines must be government-licensed, and their content is restricted. There have been reports of journalists being physically attacked, as well as arrested and detained.

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Foreign Relations The 1990–91 Gulf War had a significant negative impact on Yemen‘s relations with its Arab neighbors. As a member of the United Nations Security Council during those years, Yemen abstained on a number of Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq and Kuwait, did not support economic sanctions against Iraq, and called for an ―Arab solution‖ to the crisis. Western and neighboring Gulf states responded by curtailing or canceling aid programs and diplomatic contacts. In particular, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cut off critical financial aid and budgetary support, and Saudi Arabia expelled almost 1 million Yemeni workers, all of which had a profound impact on Yemen‘s government finances. Yemen did not succeed in reestablishing diplomatic ties with Kuwait until 1999; in 2000, when a border agreement was signed with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait agreed to resume financial aid. The treaty Yemen signed with Saudi Arabia resolved a 50-year-old dispute between the two countries, providing coordinates for delineating the land and maritime border. In 1995 Yemen and Oman finalized the demarcation of their common border and currently have a strong trade relationship. Yemen‘s long-term goal is membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and its foreign policy is largely driven by its desire to secure the financial support of GCC member states. At a meeting of international donors in November 2006, the largest block of aid to Yemen, US$1 billion, was pledged by Saudi Arabia. Although relations with the West were strained as a result of Yemen‘s pro-Iraq stance during the first Gulf War, ties were re-established by the mid-1990s when Western democracies urged the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to extend financial assistance to Yemen. In 1999 the United States began using Aden as a refueling stop for the U.S. Navy. After the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in that harbor, Yemen strengthened its efforts against the Islamist groups responsible for the attack. In July 2001, the United States renewed the bilateral financial aid that had been frozen since the Gulf War. Since September 11, 2001, relations between Yemen and the United States are considered to be significantly stronger. Yemen reportedly values the military and financial support the United States provides, as well as its influence with the IMF, which has serious concerns about Yemen‘s commitment to economic reform. According to the U.S. Department of State,

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as of late 2007 the United States considered Yemen an important partner in the global war on terrorism, providing assistance in the military, diplomatic, and financial arenas. The U.S. government reaffirmed its commitment to provide economic and military support to Yemen during November 2005 and May 2007 meetings between the White House and President Salih. However, in April 2008 the United States embassy in Sanaa was the potential target of a mortar attack. This incident, coupled with Yemen‘s refusal to extradite two al Qaeda suspects convicted in Yemen of terrorist attacks, has strained relations between Yemen and the United States.

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Membership in International Organizations Yemen is a member of the United Nations (UN) and many of its affiliates and specialized agencies: Food and Agriculture Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Labour Organization, International Maritime Organization, International Telecommunication Union, UN Conference on Trade and Development, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Industrial Development Organization, Universal Postal Union, and World Health Organization. Yemen is also a member of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Monetary Fund, Council of Arab Economic Unity, Group of 77, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, International Criminal Court (signatory), International Criminal Police Organization, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Finance Corporation, International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, League of Arab States, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Investment Agency, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Organization of the Islamic Conference, World Intellectual Property Organization, and World Meteorological Organization. Yemen was granted observer status at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999 and in 2002 and 2003 submitted necessary documentation for full membership. The WTO working party on Yemen met in 2004 and twice thereafter to discuss Yemen‘s accession; negotiations are expected to take several years.

Major International Treaties Yemen is a signatory to various international agreements on agricultural commodities, commerce, defense, economic and technical cooperation, finance, and postal matters. Yemen is a Non-Annex I country under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Yemen is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol but has acceded to it, which has the same legal effect as ratification. Yemen is a signatory to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, a party to the Biological Weapons Convention, and has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. Yemen is also a party to environmental conventions on Biodiversity, Desertification, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, and Ozone Layer Protection.

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NATIONAL SECURITY Armed Forces Overview The armed forces of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen were officially merged in May 1990, but in May 1994 civil war broke out between the forces of the two former states, culminating in victory for the North. In October 1994, President Ali Abdallah Salih announced plans for the modernization of the armed forces, which would include the banning of party affiliation in the security services and armed forces, and in March 1995 the full merger of the armed forces was completed. The number of military personnel in Yemen is relatively high; in sum, Yemen has the second largest military force on the Arabian Peninsula after Saudi Arabia. Yemen‘s military consists of an army, navy, air force, and reserves. In 2007 total active troops were estimated as follows: army, 60,000; navy, 1,700; and air force, 5,000. In September 2007, the government announced the reinstatement of compulsory military service. Yemen‘s defense budget, which in 2006 represented approximately 40 percent of the total government budget, is expected to remain high for the near term, as the military draft takes effect and internal security threats continue to escalate. Despite these troop levels, Yemen‘s military equipment is considered to be light, outdated, and poorly maintained, particularly when compared with neighboring Gulf states.

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Foreign Military Relations Although no U.S. troops are based permanently in Yemen, the United States has provided military assistance and technical support in recent years. According to the U.S. Department of State, the resumption of International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance and the transfer of military equipment and spare parts to Yemen have improved defense relations between the United States and Yemen. In FY 2006, Foreign Military Financing for Yemen was US$8.4 million, IMET was US$924,000, and Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs received US$1.4 million. Nongovernment sources report that in addition to this aid, U.S. military advisers have trained Yemeni troops in counterterrorism techniques, and the United States has contributed to Yemen‘s border security by installing advanced technological immigration control systems. In an effort to bolster Yemen‘s maritime security and establish a coast guard capable of stemming terrorist activities, the United States has sent naval experts to train the new Yemeni coast guard and in 2004–5 donated 14 patrol craft to the coast guard. In 2005 an Australian company delivered 10 patrol boats to assist Yemeni government efforts to combat terrorism and illegal trafficking; the company will train crews to man the vessels.

External Threat In the aftermath of the 1990–91 Gulf War when Yemen sided with Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait, both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic ties with Yemen. Although these ties have been restored, tensions remain over the Saudi Arabia–Yemen border; in early 2008,

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Saudi Arabia reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the border in order to stem illegal cross-border activities. Despite increased border security, fugitive Islamist militants from throughout the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, regularly cross what is still perceived as a lax border into Yemen. This poses a security threat to a country battling terrorism on many fronts.

Defense Budget Yemen‘s defense spending has historically been one of the government‘s three largest expenditures and is expected to remain high as a result of the reinstatement of conscription and security threats posed by terrorism and tribal conflict. The defense budget increased from US$540 million in 2001 to and estimated US$823 million–US$1.1 billion in 2006. According to the U.S. government, the 2006 budget represents about 6 percent of gross domestic product.

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Major Military Units Yemen‘s military is divided into an army, navy, and air force. The army is organized into eight armored brigades, 16 infantry brigades, six mechanized brigades, two airborne commando brigades, one surface-to-surface missile brigade, three artillery brigades, one central guard force, one Special Forces brigade, and six air defense brigades, which consist of four antiaircraft artillery battalions and one surface-to-air missile battalion. The navy‘s major bases are located in Aden and Al Hudaydah; there are also bases in Al Mukalla, Perim Island, and Socotra that maintain naval support equipment. The air force includes an air defense force.

Major Military Equipment Yemen‘s army is reported to be equipped with 790 main battle tanks, 130 reconnaissance vehicles, 200 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 710 armored personnel carriers, 310 towed artillery, 25 self-propelled artillery, 294 multiple rocket launchers, 502 mortars, six Scud B (up to an estimated 33 missiles) and 28 other surface-to-surface missiles, 71 antitank guided weapons, some rocket launchers, some recoilless launchers, 530 air defense guns, and an estimated 800 surface-to-air missiles. The navy‘s inventory includes eight missile craft, six miscellaneous boats/craft, five inshore patrol craft, six mine countermeasures vessels, one landing ship (tank), two landing craft (mechanical), four landing craft (utility), and two support and miscellaneous tankers. The air force, including air defense, has 75 combat aircraft and eight attack helicopters, as well as assorted transport aircraft, training aircraft and helicopters, and both air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.

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Military Service In 2001 Yemen‘s National Defense Council abolished the existing two-year compulsory military service, relying instead on volunteers to fill posts in the military and security forces. In 2007 the government announced it would reinstate the draft to counter unemployment; approximately 70,000 new recruits are expected to join the military.

Paramilitary Forces Yemen‘s paramilitary force has about 71,000 troops. Approximately 50,000 constitute the Central Security Organization of the Ministry of Interior; they are equipped with a range of infantry weapons and armored personnel carriers. An additional 20,000 are forces of armed tribal levies. Yemen is building up a small coast guard under the Ministry of Interior, training naval military technicians for posts in Aden and Al Mukalla. The coast guard currently has 1,200 personnel.

Foreign Military Forces

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There are no permanent U.S. troops in Yemen, but military personnel have been deployed there in recent years for training purposes. Since the February 2006 escape of 23 Al Qaeda members from a prison in Sanaa, an international coalition of warships has patrolled the waterways off Yemen.

Military Forces Abroad Yemen‘s Middle Eastern neighbors who are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) participate in a defense force based in Saudi Arabia. Yemen is not a member of the GCC, and there are no reports of the country having a military presence outside of its own borders.

Police Yemen‘s primary and most feared internal security and intelligence-gathering force is the Political Security Organization (PSO), led by military officers; it reports directly to the president and operates its own detention centers. There are an estimated 150,000 personnel in the PSO. The Central Security Organization, which is part of the Ministry of Interior, maintains a paramilitary force and also has its own extrajudicial detention facilities. Also attached to the Ministry of Interior is the Criminal Investigative Department (CID) of the police, which conducts most criminal investigations and arrests. The total strength of the CID is estimated to be 13,000 personnel. According to the U.S. Department of State, members of the PSO and Ministry of Interior police forces have committed serious human rights

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violations, including physical abuse and lengthy detentions without formal charges. In 2002 the government established the National Security Bureau, which reports directly to the president and appears to have similar responsibilities to those of the PSO, but it remains unclear how the two organizations coordinate their responsibilities.

Internal Threat

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Analysts see the greatest challenge to the political dominance of the General People‘s Congress as stemming from a range of security threats posed by Islamist and tribal elements within Yemen. Yemen‘s topography contributes to a lack of central government control in the more remote governorates, which in turn has enhanced the authority of the country‘s wellarmed autonomous tribes. Tribesmen routinely kidnap foreign tourists and workers in order to extract political and economic concessions from the government; as recently as May 2008, two Japanese tourists were kidnapped in Marib. In northern Yemen, since 2005 al-Houthi rebels have carried out attacks against police and soldiers near Sadah; the attackers are believed to be followers of a militant Zaydi cleric killed by Yemeni security forces in September 2004. Despite the negotiation of cease-fires in March 2006, June 2007, and February 2008, thousands have been killed, and fighting continues. Several bombings were reported in May 2008. Since May 2007, in Aden and other southern governorate cities, security forces have battled demonstrations by former army officers, demanding reinstatement and better pensions, as well as unemployed workers. In 2008 these protests have grown in number and intensity. The government also faces a threat from militants from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Iraq who routinely cross the Yemen– Saudi Arabia border, as well as militant Islamists from Somalia who can access existing arms smuggling routes between the two countries.

Terrorism Yemen was the site of two major terrorist attacks—the suicide bombing attack against the USS Cole in October 2000 in the Aden harbor and the bombing of the French supertanker Limburg off the port of Al Mukalla two years later. In 2004 suspects linked to al Qaeda were prosecuted and convicted in Yemeni courts for the Aden attacks as well as other planned terrorist activities. In 2005 dozens of al Qaeda members were tried and convicted in Yemen of planning and perpetrating terrorist attacks against Yemeni officials and Western targets both in Yemen and abroad, including additional suspects linked to the USS Cole bombing. On February 3, 2006, 23 convicted al Qaeda members, 13 of whom were tied to the USS Cole and Limburg bombings, escaped from the maximum-security prison in Sanaa; most remain at large. In September 2006, four suicide bombers were killed in a foiled attempt to bomb two Yemeni oil facilities; two of the four have been identified as being among the group of 23 escaped prisoners. As of June 2008, two al Qaeda suspects convicted in Yemen of terrorist attacks have also been indicted in U.S. courts and are wanted for trial in the United States, but Yemen has insisted that its constitution precludes extradition of Yemeni citizens.

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Although al Qaeda continues to use Yemen as a base for training and operations, several incidents in the past two years demonstrate that the country itself is targeted for attack. In July 2007, a suicide bombing in Marib killed eight Spanish tourists; in January 2008, gunmen killed two Belgian tourists in Hadramout; in March 2008, a mortar attack that damaged a school was apparently aimed at the U.S. embassy; and in April 2008, bombs struck a residential complex inhabited by Westerners. According to the U.S. Department of State, Yemen‘s recent counterterrorism record is mixed. The government has been lax in enforcing terrorism convictions, provides lenient requirements for the completion of sentences to persons who surrender, has released all 12 returned Guantanamo detainees, and lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism law. However, Yemen‘s government continues to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of terrorist attacks. There is concern that Yemen‘s government has a limited capacity for stemming terrorism financing and has been unable to freeze the financial assets of United Nations–designated al Qaeda supporters. There are also reports that Yemeni jihadists are in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon and that Yemenites constitute one of the largest contingents of foreign fighters in Iraq (about 17 percent of total foreign fighters in Iraq according to some estimates).

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Human Rights According to the U.S. Department of State‘s annual report on human rights practices, Yemen‘s government has maintained a poor human rights record, continuing to commit various abuses, including the arbitrary arrest and killing of persons critical of the government, especially those affiliated with the al-Houthi rebels of Sadaa. Security forces, which are generally considered corrupt, often detain persons for prolonged periods of time without due process, subjecting them to torture and abuse. Violence and discrimination against women have been reported, as well as discrimination against persons with disabilities and against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities. The ruling party often controls the management of unions and trade union federations. Although Yemen‘s constitution protects privacy, government police forces routinely search citizens‘ property without warrants and monitor telephone, postal, and Internet communications. Yemen‘s constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press ―within the limits of the law,‖ but this protection is also violated. Police forces often threaten and harass journalists who are critical of the government in order to influence press coverage; physical attacks have also been reported. Some journalists have been placed on trial for writing articles critical of the president or reporting on issues deemed sensitive to the government, and newspapers have been temporarily shut down for the same reasons. In June 2008, the editor of a weekly newspaper was imprisoned for allegedly supporting the al-Houthi rebellion; the government‘s action is considered by the U.S. Department of State to be part of a ―distressing trend in Yemen of intimidation and prosecution of independent journalists.‖ Foreign publications are monitored for content and subject to censorship. Legislation was enacted in 2005 mandating that journalists reveal their information sources in certain circumstances and significantly raising start-up costs for newspapers and Web sites.

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In: Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role Editor: Gabriel A. Dumont

ISBN: 978-1-61728-165-5 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

AL QAEDA IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA: A TICKING TIME BOMB 

Committee on Foreign Relations LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, January 21, 2010. Dear Colleague: This chapter by the committee majority staff is part of our ongoing examination of Al Qaeda‘s role in international terrorism. U.S. and allied operations over the past several years have largely pushed Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of those fighters traveled to the tribal region on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan. But ongoing U.S. and Pakistani military and intelligence operations there have made it an increasingly inhospitable place for Al Qaeda. Consequently, hundreds-or perhaps even thousands-of fighters have gone elsewhere. New Al Qaeda cells or allied groups have sprung up in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and perhaps most importantly in Yemen and Somalia. These groups may have only an informal connection with Al Qaeda‘s leadership in Pakistan, but they often share common goals. Al Qaeda‘s recruitment tactics also have changed. The group seeks to recruit American citizens to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States. These Americans are not necessarily of Arab or South Asian descent; they include individuals who converted to Islam in prison or elsewhere and were radicalized. This chapter relies on new and existing information to explore the current and changing threat posed by Al Qaeda, not just abroad, but here at home. Sincerely,



This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Government Printing Office publication dated January 2010.

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Committee on Foreign Relations JOHN F. KERRY, Chairman.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the offshoot of Osama bin Laden‘s terrorist network operating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, has evolved into an ambitious organization capable of using non-traditional recruits to launch attacks against American targets within the Middle East and beyond. Evidence of its potential became front-page news after a young Nigerian trained at one of its camps in Yemen tried to blow up a passenger aircraft bound for Detroit on Christmas Day. For American counter-terrorism experts in the region, the Christmas Day plot was a nearly catastrophic illustration of a significant new threat from a network previously regarded as a regional danger, rather than an international one. The concern now is that the group has grown more dangerous by taking advantage of the weakened central government in Yemen, which is struggling with civil conflicts and declining natural resources. These experts have said they are worried that training camps established in remote parts of Yemen by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are being run by former detainees and veteran fighters from Afghanistan and Iraq and used to instruct U.S. citizens who have immigrated to Yemen to marry local women or after converting to Islam in American prisons. Law enforcement and intelligence officials told the Committee staff in interviews in December in Yemen and other countries in the region that as many as 36 American exconvicts arrived in Yemen in the past year, ostensibly to study Arabic. The officials said there are legitimate reasons for Americans and others to study and live in Yemen, but they said some of the Americans had disappeared and are suspected of having gone to Al Qaeda training camps in ungoverned portions of the impoverished country. Similar concerns were expressed about a smaller group of Americans who moved to Yemen, adopted a radical form of Islam, and married local women. So far, the officials said they have no evidence that any of these Americans have undergone training. But they said they are on heightened alert because of the potential threat from extremists carrying American passports and the related challenges involved in detecting and stopping homegrown operatives. The staff interviews were conducted just before the failed Christmas Day plot. The ability of Al Qaeda to expand beyond its core members by recruiting non-traditional adherents was one of the lessons drawn by counter-terrorism experts from the failed attempt to blow up the aircraft. The suspected bomber was a Nigerian man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 23, who had overstayed an education visa in Yemen by several months and had undergone explosives training at one of the remote Al Qaeda camps. His father, a respected retired banker and former Nigerian government official, had warned the U.S. embassy in Nigeria about his son‘s growing radicalism and disappearance while in Yemen, but Abdalmuttallab was able to use a U.S. visa to board the flight in Amsterdam with a bomb sewn into his underwear. He was overcome by passengers and crew members as he tried to detonate the device and has been indicted by a federal grand jury in Michigan on charges of attempted murder and attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.

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The Yemeni origins of the bomb plot, the Nigerian homeland of the accused bomber, and the flight path from the Netherlands underscored the fact that American counter-terrorism efforts cannot focus exclusively on a single country or region and that an attack could come from anywhere. These concerns are deepened by growing evidence of attempts by Al Qaeda to recruit American residents and citizens in Yemen, Somalia and within the United States. What is required is a measured, strategic assessment of the threats that exist today, wherever they originate. In important ways, the United States is safer than it was before the attacks of September 11, 2001. Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked effectively at home and abroad to disrupt threats and heighten vigilance. U.S. intelligence and military officials agree that Al Qaeda‘s capacity to carry out large-scale terrorist operations has been significantly degraded. Its financial and popular support is declining and U.S. and allied operations have killed or captured much of Al Qaeda‘s leadership, with the notable exceptions of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Polls show that support for the organization has weakened among Muslims because of its harsh tactics, including repeated suicide attacks that have killed thousands of innocent civilians in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries. The U.S. military has largely pushed Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and Iraq. While the military efforts should be praised, they have not eliminated the threat. Many fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda and other militant groups have taken refuge across the Afghan border in Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Authority, which remains a major safe haven. At the same time, intelligence and counter-terrorism officials said hundreds and perhaps thousands of veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have relocated to other places, primarily Yemen and Somalia. While Al Qaeda‘s short-term goals remain the same-to bring down a U.S. airliner, to push U.S. and NATO troops out of Afghanistan, and to attack a broad range of targets worldwide-its methods have changed in response to American successes against the core organization. Many groups acting under Al Qaeda‘s banner are only loosely affiliated with the leadership. More often, they raise their own money and plan and execute attacks independently. Operational decisions are routinely made at the local level, rather than by bin Laden or Zawahiri. Despite these changes, there are common elements that serve as warning signals to U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism officials. For example, Yemen and Somalia have a core of trained militants who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both Yemen and Somalia have weak central governments that exercise little or no control over vast swaths of their own territory and forbidding, harsh terrains that would make it virtually impossible for U.S. forces to operate freely. They have abundant weapons and experience using them on the battlefield. Government cooperation with American counter-terrorism efforts has historically been spotty and portions of both populations are hostile to the United States. In Yemen, the limited reach of the central government and changes in the country‘s demographics have permitted extremists to thrive. In addition to AQAP, Yemen confronts a tribal revolt in the north of the country, a secessionist movement in the south, and rising poverty rates. The country‘s foreign minister, Abu Bakr al- Qiribi, recently acknowledged that the rebellion and secessionist movement had distracted the government from going after Al Qaeda in the last year.

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AQAP, the primary terrorist group in the country, is closely linked to Al Qaeda. The local affiliate is led by a Yemeni militant who was involved in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in which 17 American sailors were killed. He was among 23 Al Qaeda fighters who escaped from a Yemeni prison in February 2006, reportedly with help from security officials. The group‘s deputy is a Saudi citizen who was released from Guantanamo in November 2007. After completing a Saudi government-sponsored rehabilitation program, he slipped south into Yemen and returned to militancy. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih has promised that his security services will track down members of Al Qaeda and there has been considerable cooperation between U.S. intelligence and military units and their Yemeni counterparts. But Salih‘s government angered Washington by releasing militants who claim to have renounced violence, including some former Guantanamo detainees and one of the masterminds of the Cole bombing. In early January, President Obama reflected these concerns when he suspended the release of further Yemeni detainees from Guantanamo, where they comprise about half the remaining population. Al Qaeda also is expanding its presence across the Gulf of Aden in Somalia. U.S. counter-terrorism officials told the Committee staff they fear American citizens are being recruited in Somalia for terrorist operations. They pointed to several Somali-Americans arrested in Minnesota in early 2009 after returning from fighting alongside al-Shabab, which is the dominant militant group in Somalia and has close ties to Al Qaeda. Officials also expressed concern about two dozen Americans of Somali origin who disappeared in recent months from St. Paul, Minnesota; similar disappearances have been reported in Ohio and Oregon. The vast majority of Somali-Americans has been alarmed by these developments and cooperated in investigations. While most of our counter-terrorism resources are rightly focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, the potential threats from Yemen and Somalia pose new challenges for the United States and other countries fighting extremism worldwide. The prospect that U.S. citizens are being trained at Al Qaeda camps in both countries deepens our concern and emphasizes the need to understand the nature of the evolving dangers. President Obama has pledged to strengthen our relationship with the Yemeni government through increased military and intelligence cooperation. Addressing emerging dangers in Yemen and elsewhere in the region constitutes a vital national security interest, and this chapter is intended to provide information that will help guide us in that mission.

1. AL QAEDA RECONSTITUTED Al Qaeda has been battered around the world since its attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The group is facing dwindling financial and popular support and difficulty working with other extremists around the world. U.S. and allied operations against Al Qaeda have killed or captured many of the organization‘s leaders, while the majority of Muslims around the world are repulsed by its methods. The U.S. military has pushed Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan. Similar U.S. success in Iraq has forced hundreds of fighters out of that country. As a result, the bulk of Al Qaeda fighters have relocated to Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Authority, along its border with

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Afghanistan. Large numbers have relocated to other parts of the world, including Yemen and Somalia. Despite setbacks, Al Qaeda is not on the run. The group has expanded its recruitment efforts to attract non-traditional followers and adapted its operations. U.S. law enforcement authorities told Committee staff they believe that as many as three dozen U.S. citizens who converted to Islam while in prison have traveled to Yemen, possibly for Al Qaeda training. As many as a dozen U.S. citizens who married Muslim women and converted to Islam also have made their way to Yemen. In some cases, Al Qaeda recruits have come from moderate backgrounds, like would-be Christmas bomber Omar Faruq Abdulmutallab, whose father is one of Nigeria‘s most highly-respected bankers and a former government minister. While goals have remained unchanged, the methods with which Al Qaeda tries to accomplish those goals have changed. Many groups linked to Al Qaeda are only loosely affiliated and act on their own. That said, recent history demonstrates that several factors bind Al Qaeda members together. The first is friendship forged on the battlefield. Arabs who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan call themselves ―Afghan alumni.‖ Thousands went to Yemen after the Soviets‘ defeat and were welcomed as heroes. Many of them fought again side-by-side in southern Yemen during that country‘s civil war in 1994. The second is discipleship. Most young Yemeni Al Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the September 11 attacks said they had decided to make jihad against the United States only after being prodded into doing so by the imams in their villages. Third are family and tribal ties, although this same dynamic can work against it in Somalia. Arabs have historically married across tribesand even nationalities-to cement alliances and power, and Al Qaeda benefits from this trend. Somalis, however, have tended to be a more insular society.1

Background Over the past eight years, Al Qaeda has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11 attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets, with a leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians and bin Laden, a Saudi of Yemeni descent. Most of the organization‘s plots either emanated from—or were approved by—the leadership. The Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Due to pressures from U.S. and international intelligence and security organizations, it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. The leadership, headed by bin Laden and Zawahiri, is thought to be in the mountainous border region of northwest Pakistan, where it continues to train operatives, recruit, and disseminate propaganda.2 But Al Qaeda cells or affiliated groups in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, North Africa, and Southeast Asia now represent critical players in the larger movement. Some cells receive money, training, and weapons; others look to the leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger narrative of global struggle. Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center, said in an April 2009 speech that the trajectory of Al Qaeda is ‗‗less centralized command and control,

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no clear center of gravity, and likely rising and falling centers of gravity, depending on where the U.S. and the international focus is for that period.‖3 The Al Qaeda network today also is made up of semi-autonomous cells which often have only peripheral ties to either the leadership in Pakistan or affiliated groups elsewhere. Sometimes these individuals never leave their home country but are radicalized with the assistance of others who have traveled abroad for training and indoctrination. The July 2005 London bombers are an example of semi-autonomous actors in the Al Qaeda universe, as is Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan living in Denver who was charged in September 2009 with conspiring to carry out bombings in the United States. The London bombers, radicalized in the UK, sought training in Pakistan before returning home to carry out their attacks. Similarly, Zazi reportedly was radicalized in the United States before traveling to Pakistan for training. Another category of today‘s Al Qaeda movement is self- radicalized individuals, who lack any connection to the larger network but accept Al Qaeda‘s theological arguments and strategic aspirations. One example is Michael C. Finton, arrested in September 2009 in Illinois on charges of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.4 Finton, 29, converted to Islam while serving in an Illinois prison from 1999 to 2005 for robbery and battery charges. According to a court affidavit, he traveled to Saudi Arabia in March 2008. An undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation agent posing as a low-level Al Qaeda operative met with Finton in the months leading up to his September arrest. The officer provided him with a van containing materials he said were explosives. Finton then parked the van outside a federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois, where he was arrested. There is no evidence that Finton underwent Al Qaeda training or conspired with others, like Zazi and the London bombers did. Despite Al Qaeda‘s transformation in recent years, its strategic objectives remain the same: to attack the United States and governments seen as supporting the Americans. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, told the Center for Strategic and International Studies in an August 2009 speech that ―Al Qaeda has proven to be adaptive and highly resilient and remains the most serious terrorist threat we face as a nation.‘‘5 The U.S. intelligence community assesses that Al Qaeda is ―actively engaged in operational plotting and continues recruiting, training, and transporting operatives, to include individuals from Western Europe and North America,‘‘ according to Leiter‘s testimony in September 2009 before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.6 Thanks in large part to the actions of the U.S. government, Al Qaeda and its leadership in Pakistan are under tremendous pressure. U.S. military and intelligence operations have reportedly degraded the leadership‘s capacity for conducting external operations and raising funds.7 Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2009 that Al Qaeda ―today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago.‘‘8 Though Al Qaeda affiliated groups have carried out numerous deadly terrorist attacks over the past two years, the leadership in Pakistan has demonstrated limited operational effectiveness during that same time span. In part because of the loss of top commanders and continued pressure from U.S. intelligence activities and those of foreign partners, Al Qaeda has been unable to orchestrate successful large-scale attacks. There is also some evidence that Al Qaeda is struggling to retain recruits and raise funds. In June 2009, the group‘s leader in

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Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, released an audio message asking for money because Al Qaeda members were short of food, weapons, and other supplies. 9 The Al Qaeda movement faces perhaps an even larger challenge in the form of a legitimacy crisis within Muslim communities. According to Blair, the United States has ―seen notable progress in Muslim opinion turning against terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.‘‘10 Muslim populations worldwide, some of which approved of Al Qaeda‘s actions in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, appear to have turned against the movement. The killing of innocent Muslims in Iraq and Pakistan, as well as the bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan in November 2005, produced a significant backlash. For example, a poll conducted by Jordan University‘s Center for Strategic Studies a month after the Amman bombings showed that only 20 percent of the population viewed Al Qaeda as a ―legitimate resistance group,‖ down from 67 percent in 2004.11 Over the past two years, several prominent religious scholars and former Al Qaeda associates-including Saudi fundamentalists Sheikh Salman al-Awda and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, one of Al Qaeda‘s original spiritual leaders—have spoken out against the indiscriminate tactics and ideology.

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A Continuing Threat in Pakistan U.S. officials remain concerned that Al Qaeda terrorists maintain bases and training camps in Pakistan and that the group appears to have increased its influence among the myriad Islamist militant groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Bin Laden and Zawahiri are believed to be hiding in northwestern Pakistan, along with most other senior operatives.12 Al Qaeda leaders have issued statements encouraging Pakistani Muslims to ―resist‖ the American ―occupiers‖ in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to fight against Pakistan‘s ―U.S.-allied politicians and officers.‖13 A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the United States concluded that Al Qaeda ―has protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in [Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas], operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.‖14 Islamabad reportedly has remanded to U.S. custody roughly 500 Al Qaeda fighters since 2001, including several senior operatives. U.S. officials say that drone-launched U.S. missile attacks and Pakistan‘s pressing of military offensives against extremist groups in the border areas have meaningfully disrupted Al Qaeda activities there while inflicting heavy human losses.15 The August death of Al Qaeda-allied Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, reportedly caused by a U.S.-launched missile, may have thrown Islamist militants in western Pakistan into disarray. Some analysts worry, however, that successful military operations are driving Al Qaeda fighters into Pakistani cities where they will be harder to target and, fueling already significant anti-American sentiments among the Pakistani people. The Pakistani military has conducted successful counter-insurgency campaigns to wrest two parts of the country from Pakistani Taliban control, the Swat Valley and South Waziristan. Still militants continue to use some of the rugged tribal areas as bases of operations. It is clear that there is a significant Al Qaeda threat in Pakistan. But there are significant Al Qaeda populations in Yemen and Somalia, too. As Al Qaeda members continue to resist U.S. and Pakistani forces along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, some of their comrades

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appear to be moving to Yemen and Somalia, where the political climate allows them to seek safe haven, recruit new members, and train for future operations.

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2. YEMEN: EXPLOITING WEAKNESSES There are parallels between Pakistan and Yemen, according to U.S. counter-terrorism officials, military leaders, and policymakers. Both have become havens for significant numbers of Al Qaeda fighters formerly active in Afghanistan. Both have weak central governments that have difficulty controlling vast swaths of their own territory and populations that are often hostile to the United States. The weak central government and alarming socioeconomic changes in Yemen have provided opportunities for terrorist groups to build and maintain a presence. The government‘s counter-terrorism efforts are further hobbled by the conflicts in the northern and southern parts of the country. Overall, Islamic extremist groups are not strong enough to topple President Salih‘s regime-he has co-opted several already-but they are capable of successfully striking a high value target, such as a foreign compound or an oil installation. On September 17, 2008, the Al Qaeda affiliate attacked the entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Sana‘a, killing 11 people. Six of the attackers also died. Observers note that despite such a brazen attack, Yemeni militants failed to breach the U.S. Embassy‘s outer layer of security and killed mostly Yemeni civilians rather than U.S. Embassy personnel. Nevertheless, media coverage may have been enough to satisfy the perpetrators, as the U.S. State Department soon after the attack announced that it would, for the second time in a year, authorize the departure of all nonessential personnel from Sana‘a.16 Yemen exhibits several traits that worry counter-terrorism and intelligence officials. Worsening socioeconomic trends have the potential to overwhelm the Yemeni government, further jeopardizing domestic stability and security across the region. Yemen‘s oil-the source of over 75 percent of its income-will run out by 2017, and the country has no apparent way to transition to a post-oil economy.17 More worrisome is the rapidly depleting water supply. Shortages are acute throughout the country, and Sana‘a may become the first capital city in the world to run out of water.18 The country‘s water is being consumed much faster than it is being replenished. A large amount of Yemen‘s water consumption is devoted to the irrigation of qat, a semi-narcotic plant habitually chewed by an estimated 75 percent of Yemeni men. Qat is blamed for decreasing productivity, depleting resources, and contributing to the poverty that leaves nearly half the population earning less than $2 per day.19 The country also faces one of the world‘s highest population growth rates, 3.4 percent a year, which strains the government‘s ability to provide services and contributes to an illiteracy rate of more than 50 percent.20

A Multifaceted Threat to U.S. Interests U.S. diplomats and law enforcement officials say that a significant threat to U.S. interests could come from American citizens based in Yemen. Most worrisome is a group of as many

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as three dozen former criminals who converted to Islam in prison, were released at the end of their sentences, and moved to Yemen, ostensibly to study Arabic. U.S. officials told Committee staff that they fear that these Americans were radicalized in prison and traveled to Yemen for training. Although there is no public evidence of any terrorist action by these individuals, law enforcement officials told Committee staff members that several have ―dropped off the radar‖ for weeks at a time. U.S. law enforcement officials said they are on heightened alert because of the potential threat from extremists carrying American passports and the related challenges involved in detecting and stopping homegrown operatives. Another concern is a group of nearly 10 non-Yemeni Americans who traveled to Yemen, converted to Islam, became fundamentalists, and married Yemeni women so they could remain in the country. Described by one American official as ―blond-haired, blue eyedtypes,‖ these individuals fit a profile of Americans whom Al Qaeda has sought to recruit over the past several years. Most of them reside in Sana‘a. Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born imam who reportedly was the spiritual advisor of Major Nidal Hassan, a U.S. Army officer accused of murdering 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas in November 2009, currently resides in Yemen. U.S. law enforcement officials told Committee staff that Awlaki counsels young Muslim fundamentalists to ―continue jihad‖ and to ―fight the Crusaders.‖ Although Awlaki has not yet been accused of a crime, U.S. intelligence and military officials consider him to be a direct threat to U.S. interests. Meanwhile, according to U.S. law enforcement officials, 34 members of Al Qaeda who came to Sana‘a from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo and who registered with the Yemeni government as Al Qaeda members, live in the immediate vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. These Al Qaeda fighters, upon registering their affiliation with the Yemeni government, promised to refrain from all terrorist activities.

Al Qaeda Transformation Underway in Yemen In January 2009, Al Qaeda militants in Yemen announced that the group‘s Saudi and Yemeni ―branches‖ were merging under the banner of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Saudi extremists had carried out a wave of terrorist violence that swept Saudi Arabia from 2003 through 2007, but they were driven south to Yemen after a crackdown. AQAP is led by a Yemeni militant21 who in 2006 escaped from a Yemeni prison along with 22 other Al Qaeda fighters, reportedly with help from Yemeni security officials. One of his deputies is a Saudi citizen who was repatriated to Saudi Arabia from Guantanamo in November 2007 and returned to militancy after completing a rehabilitation course in Saudi Arabia. Some counter-terrorism experts suggested that the presence of Saudi militants in Yemen indicates that Al Qaeda‘s presence in the kingdom has been significantly hampered by Saudi security forces and that they have gone to Yemen because of its more permissive environment.22 In recent months, AQAP has threatened to attack Yemeni oil facilities and the soldiers protecting them, Western interests in Yemen, and foreign tourists. In March 2009, AQAP suicide bombers killed four South Korean tourists and their local Yemeni guide near the city of Shibam. A week later, they carried out a second attack against a convoy of South Korean officials who had traveled to Yemen to investigate the murders. Some analysts suggested that

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AQAP may have received assistance from a source inside the security forces in order to carry out a bombing against a well-guarded foreign delegation on its way from the country‘s main airport. In 2009, several high ranking U.S. intelligence and defense officials suggested that Yemen was becoming a failed state and consequently a more important theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations. In February 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta said he was ‗‗particularly concerned with Somalia and Yemen. Somalia is a failed state. Yemen is almost there. And our concern is that both could become safe havens for Al Qaeda.‖23 A few months later, DNI Director Blair stated that ‗‗Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of operations for Al Qaeda to plan internal and external attacks, train terrorists, and facilitate the movement of operatives.‖ In his April 2009 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Commander of U.S. Central Command General David H. Petraeus said, ‗‗The inability of the Yemeni government to secure and exercise control over all of its territory offers terrorist and insurgent groups in the region, particularly Al Qaeda, a safe haven in which to plan, organize, and support terrorist operations.‖24 In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in April 2009, Michael Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, remarked ‗‗We have witnessed the reemergence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, with Yemen as a key battleground and potential regional base of operations from which Al Qaeda can plan attacks, train recruits, and facilitate the movement of operatives . . . We are concerned that if AQAP strengthens, Al Qaeda leaders could use the group and the growing presence of foreign fighters in the region to supplement its transnational operations capability.‖25 U.S. diplomats and western press reports indicate that Al Qaeda has grown bolder in Yemen in the past year. In late December 2009, Al Qaeda militants made a rare public appearance in southern Yemen, telling an anti-government rally that the group‘s war was with the United States, and not with the Yemeni army. Al- Jazeera television showed footage of the militant addressing the crowd while an armed comrade stood by as a bodyguard. Both were unmasked.26 Also in late 2009, Yemeni government officials said that Al Qaeda was responsible for a daring armored car robbery in Aden, which netted $500,000. No arrests have been made. American concerns have been reflected in stepped-up cooperation with the Yemeni military and security services. In December, the deputy director of the CIA, Stephen Kappes, visited the capital for consultations. After the Christmas Day bomb plot, President Obama announced that the United States would increase its training and equipping of Yemen‘s security forces.

A History of Violence and Extremism Christopher Boucek, a fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently wrote that, ‗‗Islamist extremism in Yemen is the result of a long and complicated set of developments. A large number of Yemeni nationals participated in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s. After the Soviet occupation ended, the Yemeni government encouraged its citizens to return and also permitted foreign veterans to settle in Yemen. Many of these Arabs were integrated into the state‘s various security apparatuses. As early as 1993,

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the U.S. State Department noted in a now-declassified intelligence report that Yemen was becoming an important stop for many fighters leaving Afghanistan. The report also maintained that the Yemeni government was either unwilling or unable to curb their activities. Islamist activists were used by the regime throughout the 1980s and 1990s to suppress domestic opponents, and during the 1994 civil war Islamists fought against southern forces.‖27 Al Qaeda‘s first known attack took place in 1993 in Aden. After several serious attacks in the early 2000s, including on the USS Cole and the French oil tanker MV Limburg, Yemen experienced a brief period of calm. Analysts believe this was the result of a short-lived ‗‗nonaggression pact‖ between the government and extremists and enhanced U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism cooperation. By 2004, however, a generational split by younger extremists, radicalized in part by the global Sunni Islamist revival and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, led to the emergence of a group not interested in negotiating with what it viewed as an illegitimate and un- Islamic government in Sana‘a. Several prison escapes of experienced and dangerous operatives further energized this younger faction, which launched a new campaign of violent attacks against oil facilities, foreign residents and tourists, and government security targets. Western targets in Yemen would make attractive targets for a resurgent Al Qaeda. Recent counter-terrorism measures in Saudi Arabia forced extremists to seek refuge elsewhere and analysts have observed a steady flow relocating to Yemen‘s under-governed areas.28 Saudi authorities recently released a list of 85 most-wanted terrorism suspects, 26 of whom are believed to be in Yemen, including eleven Saudis who had been detained at Guantanamo. For the central government, the Houthi rebellion in the north and the secessionist movement in the South represent threats to the survival of the state. Al Qaeda has attacked Yemeni government interests in the past, and Al Qaeda figures in the country have made public statements opposing the government. Senior Yemeni officials say frequently that their country is working with allies, including the United States, to fight terrorism. But U.S. officials complain that the Yemeni government often does not appear serious about the Al Qaeda threat because a number of high-profile suspects have either been released from custody or have escaped from Yemeni prisons. U.S. government officials describe Yemeni cooperation on counter-terrorism issues as ―episodic at best.‖29 Weapons and explosives from Yemen, where gunrunners operate with impunity, often find their way to Somalia and have been traced to attacks in Saudi Arabia, including explosives employed in a Riyadh bombing and assault rifles used in an attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah. More recently, a Saudi national who had been living in Yemen, attempted to assassinate Prince Muhammad bin Nayif Al Saud, the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister and Director of Counter-terrorism, by detonating a bomb concealed in his undergarments. The device was similar to the bomb used by Omar Faruq Abdulmutallab in his attempt to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day.30 U.S. law enforcement officials said both men received their training in Yemen. The U.S. government is aware of Yemen‘s needs, both in counter-terrorism and in economic security. The Obama administration requested-and Congress authorized-more than $50 million in economic and military aid, $35 million in development assistance, $12.5 million in foreign military financing, and $5 million in economic support funds. This represents an increase of more than 200 percent.

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3. SOMALIA: FAILURE BREEDS EXTREMISM Al Qaeda‘s tentacles reach deeply into Somalia and conditions similar to those in Yemen make it possible for the organization to extend its influence in the archetype of a failed state just across the Gulf of Aden from Arabian Peninsula. The threat from Al Qaeda and from its Somali affiliate, al-Shabab, is increasing. The administration has worked with the Somali president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton praised him last summer as the ―best hope‖ for his country in many years. The Obama administration has decided to bolster Sharif‘s embattled government by providing money for weapons and helping the military in neighboring Djibouti train Somali troops. Counter-terrorism may be our primary reason for increasing cooperation with Somalia, but the engagement must reach beyond those narrow goals in order to control the spread of Al Qaeda and its message. As Senator Russ Feingold told the Senate last August, U.S. policy should be rooted in a ―serious, high-level commitment to a sustainable and inclusive peace.‖ U.S. diplomats, law enforcement officers and intelligence officials in the region said that a key concern is Somalia‘s open, virtually defenseless border with Djibouti. The only official border crossing is at the village of Loyada, a dusty and impoverished outpost in the desert, where as many as 200 refugees per day arrive from Somalia and Ethiopia, most on their way to Yemen and the Gulf. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office in Djibouti reports that there are 10,000 Somali refugees there, with another 80-100 additional refugees processed every week. The Djiboutian government refuses to allow single men from Somalia into the country, fearing infiltration by al-Shabab or Al Qaeda. The United States has provided Djibouti with technical assistance to help improve the Loyada crossing, but authorities said more money is needed to secure the facility and to improve security at other crossings farther out into the desert. The border is utterly porous and easily breached, and Djibouti needs cameras and radar for the Coast Guard, as Loyada sits only a kilometer inland from the Red Sea. Djiboutian officials told Committee staff that their government has no resources to patrol either the land or sea border, even though at low tide refugees can easily walk through the salt marsh undetected. Furthermore, U.S. diplomats say that a coherent system is needed to share information on the movement of dangerous people across the border. A Committee staff member watched at least 50 people cross the border on a recent visit to Loyada, only about a third of whom had a passport or any other documentation. A man with an Iraqi passport was turned back by a Djiboutian immigration official who said that no Iraqi national had any reason to be in the area in the first place. The Djiboutian immigration official told a Committee staff member that he had recently turned away two Somali-Americans with U.S. passports, fearing that they were al-Shabab. He added that the pair could easily have walked a kilometer or two into the desert and crossed into Djibouti without being detected, as many people do. Americans attempting to cross from Somalia into Djibouti apparently is not unusual. The official told Committee staff that a significant number of Western passport holders, including Americans, have tried to cross illegally between Djibouti and Somalia in the past year. Recently, two Somali-Americans were arrested while trying to transit Djibouti on their way to Somalia for what the immigration official said was terrorist training. Both were prosecuted and jailed in Djibouti for illegal entry. U.S. officials add that Somali-Americans are taught

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techniques for avoiding detection by the FBI once they make their way to al-Shabab training camps. Officials in the region said that one of their major worries is that Al Qaeda is trying to take advantage of its Somali-American recruits by establishing a larger presence in Somalia and plotting attacks on the United States or American targets. Bronwyn Bruton, a Somalia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), underscored those worries recently in Foreign Affairs, writing that ―one of Washington‘s primary concerns about Somalia is that Al Qaeda may be trying to develop a base in the country from which to launch attacks against Western interests. Counter-terrorism officials also worry that more alienated members of the Somali diaspora might embrace terrorism. Somali-Americans were arrested in Minnesota in early 2009 after returning from fighting alongside al-Shabab, an extremist group associated with Al Qaeda, and in late August 2009, several Somalis were arrested in Melbourne for planning a major suicide attack on an Australian army installation.‖31 U.S. intelligence analysts have argued since the mid-1990s that Somalia is fundamentally inhospitable to foreign jihadist groups. Al Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous organization in Africa, but its foothold in Somalia has probably been facilitated by the involvement of Western powers and their allies. In fact, according to Bruton, the terrorist threat posed by Somalia has grown in proportion to the intrusiveness of international policies toward the country.32 Al-Shabab originally emerged as a wing of militant youths within the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the group that controlled much of Somalia prior to the country‘s December 2006 occupation by Ethiopian forces in cooperation with Somalia‘s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was struggling with the ICU for power. In the mid-1990s, Islamic courts began to emerge around the country, especially in the capital of Mogadishu. The absence of central authority in Somalia created an environment conducive to the proliferation of armed factions and a safe haven for terrorist groups. The three terrorists suspected of the 1998 attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, used Somalia to recruit, train, hide, and smuggle weapons. CFR‘s Bruton states that Ethiopia‘s occupation of Somalia, which was meant to oust the ICU, had a dangerous, albeit unintended consequence. ‗‗By then, the ICU had exhausted most Somalis‘ patience, and it dissolved, its leaders scattering in southern Somalia or fleeing to Eritrea. Ethiopia was forced to occupy Mogadishu to prop up the .TFG, and its presence ignited a complex insurgency.‖33 The U.S.-backed occupation also fueled anti-Americanism in the country.34 Bruton continues that ‗‗Responding to these developments, jihadists from the Middle East and as far away as Malaysia arrived to help al-Shabab. They brought with them suicide bombings and sophisticated tactics such as remote-controlled detonations. By the time Ethiopian forces withdrew in early 2009, al- Shabab‘s influence had spread.

Alliance or Not, a Specific Threat to Americans Exists Only two of al-Shabab‘s leaders have pledged fidelity to Osama bin Laden, but some young Al Qaeda fighters who trained in Afghanistan have moved to southern Somalia to train Somalis in al- Shabab camps there. In return, al-Shabab has provided these Al Qaeda trainers with bodyguards, according to Ethiopian government officials.

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Estimates of the number of Al Qaeda fighters in Somalia by American and African officials vary widely, from a low of 20 to a high of 300. African officials told the Committee staff that there has been a marked change in al-Shabab‘s tactics over the past five years, as the Somalis have adopted Al Qaeda‘s more lethal strategies. Al-Shabab and Al Qaeda appear to be cooperating closely in their administration of the training camps in southern Somalia, notes CFR‘s Bruton. ‗‗Some of these are reserved for imparting basic ideological precepts and infantry skills to newly enlisted Somali militia members, while others provide more advanced training in guerilla warfare, explosives, and assassination. The latter camps have become a magnet for foreign fighters coming from the Somali diaspora, other African countries, or the Middle East.‖35 Michael Leiter of the National Counterterrorism Center argues that al-Shabab‘s training camps are solely Somalia-focused, and that the group does not have goals beyond Somalia‘s borders.36 Al-Shabab certainly has launched terrorist attacks, but only against domestic opponents in the Somaliland and Puntland regions of Somalia. The Somali-American suicide bomber attacked a Somali opponent of al-Shabab, rather than western interests in Somalia. U.S. law enforcement officials contend, however, that al-Shabab would hit US or other Western targets outside of Somalia if it could. Leiter recently told Congress that al-Shabab has sent dozens of Somali Americans and American Muslims through training conducted by Al Qaeda. At least seven already have been killed in fighting in Somalia.37 Last summer, Al-Shabab released a video pledging cooperation with Al Qaeda. The video used an American spokesman and showed footage of a training camp featuring a former University of South Alabama student. Western diplomats also expressed concern about a possible rise in violence against U.S. and other Western interests in Sweden because of that country‘s growing Somali population. Sweden accepts 1,000 Somali refugees per month, according to western diplomats, and nearly all of those refugees at least initially settle in Gothenburg, Sweden‘s second largest city. The diplomats reported that pro-al-Shabab refugees in 2009 drove moderates out of the city‘s largest mosque and took control of its administration. Law enforcement officials believe that the pro-al-Shabab refugees are heavily involved in recruiting for the group, and they are encouraging new recruits to return to Somalia for training. These same officials estimate that there are currently 40 Swedish citizens in al-Shabab in Somalia.

State Failure Offers Further Opportunities for Terrorists One of Somalia‘s most serious problems is the lack of all but rudimentary government and civil society. As a result, even basic services like education are not available for many Somalis. Consequently, many parents send their children to Islamic schools or mosques for their education. But madrassas and mosques offer a very limited curriculum, and they tend to be fundamentalist in nature because they are financed by al-Shabab and the Saudi government. Djiboutian authorities complained that while most Gulf States build schools and hospitals in east Africa and send food and medicine to the region, the Saudi government builds mosques and sends Qurans. Analysts point out that in many areas al-Shabab is the only organization that can provide basic social services, such as rudimentary medical facilities, food distribution centers, and a

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basic justice system rooted in Islamic law. Western diplomats fear that al-Shabab will continue to win converts by providing services similar to the way Hamas found success in the Gaza Strip. Experts strongly caution that there is little the United States can do to weaken al-Shabab. The United States has launched air strikes to target high-level members of al-Shabab it believes have links to Al Qaeda. But experts say these air strikes have only increased popular support for al-Shabab. In fact, they argue that two of the only actions that could galvanize alShabab and increase its support within Somalia are additional air strikes by the United States, or a return of Ethiopian troops.38

4. CONCLUSION

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Terrorism is a tactic that can be defeated, but doing so represents a challenge of extraordinary proportions and a commitment to progress that will sometimes be slow. There are several steps that the United States can take, internally and in concert with foreign governments, to make terrorist operations more difficult, particularly in places like Yemen and Somalia, where the threat appears to be growing. First, U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic officials must cooperate closely to discern the terrorist threat, including that posed by Americans, and to address that threat. Information sharing is the most important component of this cooperation. The failed Christmas Day bomb plot demonstrated what can happen when U.S. government agencies fail to act on or disseminate information quickly and efficiently.

NO DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN AL-SHABAB AND SOMALI PIRATES Western diplomats and military officials agree that currently there is no direct connection between al-Shabab and Somali pirates, due primarily to clan and tribal differences. The pirates hail almost exclusively from Somalia‘s Majourteen clan, Issa Musa subclan, which are based in Puntland and Somaliland, in the central and northern parts of the country. Al-Shabab, however, is made up of Somalis of various clans from Mogadishu and southern Somalia that are not related to the Majourteen. Ethiopian academics describe al-Shabab as ―an opportunistic organization. Shabab speaks to southern Somalis by using nationalist rhetoric and money.‖ Most of the raiders and their backers on land are involved in piracy solely for the money. Al-Shabab, on the other hand, is ―not as xenophobic as the northerners. They welcome foreign fighters, who they call ‗Muslims.‘ They don‘t make any differentiation by nationality. Al-Shabab doesn‘t even have its own flag.‖ There is, however, an indirect connection. In the past year, the pirates have begun operating out of southern ports controlled by al-Shabab. This is a new development in 2009, according to U.S. diplomats. Pirates simply pay a ―user fee‖ to al-Shabab for use of the ports.

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Second, U.S. government cooperation with foreign partners must be redoubled across the counter-terrorism spectrum: Information-sharing, counter-terrorism and law enforcement training, and border control are all areas where allies will benefit from cooperation. Foreign partners are often the first line of defense: Djiboutian border patrol agents turn away suspect immigrants, Yemeni police raid an Al Qaeda safe house, or an alert immigration officer stops a suspicious traveler at an airport in Europe. But as the Christmas Day bombing attempt proved, one breakdown in the system can be disastrous. Finally, a viable counter-terrorism strategy must take into account the fact that terrorism is not created in a vacuum, and its causes must be addressed. The U.S. government must engage foreign partners on issues such as literacy, high birth rates, economic development, and human rights. All countries concerned must understand the dangers of attempting to solve the complex problem of terrorism through a one-dimensional military approach. The solution also lies in steady progress toward helping governments in conflict zones like Yemen and Somalia provide a sense of hope and a plausible vision of the future for their people.

End Notes 1

―To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East,‖ by Scott Atran, New York Times, December 13, 2009. See Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl, and Seth Rosen, ‗‗Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism,‖ Center for a New American Security, June 2009, p.10. 3 ‗‗Remarks by Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center,‖ at The Aspen Institute, April 9, 2009. 4 For more, see ‗‗Men Accused of Unrelated Bomb Plots in Ill., Texas,‖ Associated Press, September 24, 2009. 5 ―Remarks by John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,‘‘ at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 6, 2009. 6 ―Testimony of Michael Leiter at hearing ‗Eight Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,‘‘‘ before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, September 30, 2009. 7 ‗‗Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation,‘‘ before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 30, 2009. 8 ―Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,‘‘ Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 12, 2009. 9 William Maclean, ―Al-Qaida‘s Money Trouble,‘‘ Reuters, June 15, 2009. 10 ―Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,‘‘ Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 12, 2009. 11 Murad Batal Al-Shishani, ―Jordanian Poll Indicates Erosion of Public Support for Al Qaeda,‖ Terrorism Focus, Vol. 3, No. 6, February 14, 2006. 12 ―CIA Chief Says Bin Laden in Pakistan,‖ Reuters, June 11, 2009; ―Al Qaeda‘s Global Base is Pakistan, Says Petraeus,‖ Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2009. 13 See, for example, ―Qaeda‘s Zawahiri Urges Pakistanis to Join Jihad,‖ Reuters, July 15, 2009. 14 See http://www.dni.gov/press—releases/20070717—release.pdf. 15 ―U.S. Missile Strikes Take Heavy Toll on Al Qaeda, Officials Say,‖ Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2009; ―Al Qaeda Seen as Shaken in Pakistan,‖ Washington Post, June 1, 2009; ―Al Qaeda Weakened as Key Leaders are Slain in Recent Attacks,‖ Associated Press, September 19, 2009. 16 ―Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,‖ by Jeremy Sharp, Congressional Research Service, page 8. 17 ―Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,‖ by Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 102, September 2009. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/ 2002rank.html? countryName=Yemen&countryCode=ym®ionCode=me&rank=4#ym, January 12, 2009. 21 According to a number of sources, the leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen is a 32-year-old former bin Laden secretary named Nasir al Wuhayshi. Like other well-know operatives, Wuhayshi was a member of the 23-person contingent who escaped from a Yemeni prison in 2006. Wuhayshi‘s personal connection to bin Laden has

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reportedly enhanced his legitimacy among his followers. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, he escaped through Iran, but was arrested there and held for two years until he was deported to Yemen in 2003. See, Gregory D. Johnsen, ‗‗Al Qaeda in Yemen Reorganizes under Nasir al-Wuhayshi,‖ Terrorism Focus, Volume 5, Issue 11, published by the Jamestown Foundation, March 18, 2008. 22 According to one Saudi commander, ‗‗We have killed or captured all the fighters and the rest have fled to Afghanistan or Yemen. . . . All that remains here is some ideological apparatus.‖ See, ‗‗Saudis Retool to Root Out Terrorist Risk,‖ New York Times, March 22, 2009. 23 Central Intelligence Agency, ‗‗Media Roundtable with CIA Director Leon E. Panetta,‖ press release, February 25, 2009. 24 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Policy on Afghanistan , Pakistan, Statement of David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, 111th Congress, April 1, 2009. 25 ‗‗Al Qaeda Focuses on Yemen as Launchpad: U.S.,‖ Agence France Presse, September 30, 2009 26 ‗‗Qaeda Makes Rare Public Appearance at Yemen Rally,‖ The Washington Post, December 21, 2009. 27 ‗‗Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,‖ by Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 102, September 2009. 28 ―Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,‖ by Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 102, September 2009. 29 Convicted USS Cole bomber Jamal al-Badawi, for example, was arrested and convicted on terrorism charges related to the attack, and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He escaped twice, allegedly with the help of Yemeni security officials, surrendered twice, and then given conditional release. Despite protestations from the United States, the Yemeni government has refused to extradite Badawi to stand trial. He is currently free in Yemen. 30 On August 27, 2009, AQAP operative Abdallah Hassan al-Asiri, pretending to surrender to Saudi authorities, detonated a bomb hidden in his undergarments and made of pentaerythritol tetranitrate, or PETN, while in the presence or Prince Muhammad bin Nayif. Asiri spent weeks negotiating his false surrender and was invited, as other penitent ex-militants, to meet the prince during a Ramadan fast-breaking event. He bypassed some airport inspections because he was flown from southern Saudi Arabia on the princes own jet and was not required to change clothes nor thoroughly searched before he met the prince. US officials meanwhile said that Omar Faruq Abdalmutallab also tried to detonate a PETN bomb sewn under his undergarments. Abdulmutallab told US law enforcement authorities that he obtained the materials in Yemen. 31 ―In the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More,‖ by Bronwyn Bruton, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2009, pages 79–96. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Statement of Ken Menkhaus, ‗‗Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable U.S. Strategy Toward Somalia,‖ before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 20, 2009. 35 ‗‗Peacebuilding Amid Terrorism: Fragile Gains in Somalia,‖ by Andre Le Sage, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch #1594, October 27, 2009. 36 ‗‗U.S. Mulls Striking Somali Terrorist Training Camps,‖ Comments by Michael Leiter, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, April 20, 2009. 37 ―The Threat from Somalia,‖ The Washington Post, November 2, 2009. 38 ―Al-Shabab,‖ by Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, February 27, 2009.

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Chapter 4

FOLLOWING THE MONEY IN YEMEN AND LEBANON: MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LENDING 

Committee on Foreign Relations

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, January 5, 2010. Dear Colleague: In the Fall of 2009, I directed my Senior Professional Staff Member for the Middle East, Dorothy Shea, to visit Yemen and Lebanon to gather information for two forthcoming committee reports. The first concerns security assistance, and is in follow up to the committee‘s 2006 report, ―Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign.‖1 The second report is the last in a series my staff have produced on lending by International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Although the circumstances facing Yemen and Lebanon differ greatly, I selected these two countries because they have both been major recipients of U.S. security assistance, particularly under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, while both countries have received substantial IFI lending, significant structural reforms are urgently needed to tackle long-term development challenges. The stakes in both countries are quite high. As this chapter was going to press, we learned about the magnitude of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in Yemen: on December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national who is believed to have received training, indoctrination, and explosives in Yemen, attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound Northwest 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Government Printing Office publication dated January 2010.

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Airlines flight. On January 3, 2010, the U.S. and British Embassies in Sanaa, followed by several other Western embassies, temporarily closed due to credible threats of planned suicide attacks by al-Qaeda operatives. Separately, Anwar al-Awlaqi, the Yemeni-American radical cleric, has been linked to numerous terrorism suspects, including Nidal Malik Hasan, charged with the November 2009 Fort Hood massacre. Many analysts assess that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has taken advantage of the Yemeni government‘s preoccupation with an insurgency in the north and a secessionist movement in the south to exploit the country‘s large swaths of ungoverned spaces in an effort to consolidate and build capacity to launch terrorist operations. In addition to its multiple security challenges, Yemen, already the poorest country in the Arab world, faces daunting socio-economic crises, such as the depletion of its oil and water resources. The literacy rate is a little over 50 percent and unemployment was last estimated at 35 percent. Yemen‘s security and socio-economic challenges are inter-related, a reality that U.S. assistance programs must address urgently, creatively, and with unity of effort within the U.S. government and with like-minded donors. Lebanon, meanwhile, is still recovering from the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, as well as the 2007 fighting between Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Fatah al-Islam at the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp. The United States has a strong interest in helping to further the professionalization of the Lebanese security services and their ability to counter terrorist threats. We have made substantial investments toward this end, but the work is far from over. We must also work to ensure the sustainability of U.S. assistance. In addition, the international donor community needs to do a better job of encouraging the kinds of structural reforms that will be necessary to overcome the country‘s long-standing economic challenges, such as the massive public debt. While the key findings of this chapter will be incorporated as case studies in the broader committee reports, I wanted to share with you the entire staff trip report, which I believe provides useful insight into key issues underpinning the myriad challenges these two countries face and which U.S. security assistance, as well as IFI lending, is designed to help address. As the Congress and the Administration debate the issue of foreign assistance reform in general, and the role of security assistance in particular, as well as U.S. strategy to combat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, I hope that you will find this information helpful. I look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues and welcome any comments you may have on this chapter. Sincerely, RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY During a September 27–October 2, 2009, Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff visit to Yemen and Lebanon, staff gathered information to contribute to two forthcoming committee reports, one on security assistance, and the other on lending by International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Although the circumstances facing Yemen and Lebanon differ

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greatly, the two countries were chosen because the security threats facing both have been serious; hence, they have both been major recipients of U.S. security assistance, particularly under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, while both countries have received substantial IFI lending, significant structural reforms are urgently needed to tackle long-term development challenges. In both Yemen and Lebanon, although some problems persist in the management of the security assistance portfolios, the country teams have made a conscious effort to learn from past mistakes, and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission were exercising appropriate leadership over U.S. security assistance efforts. In both Yemen and Lebanon, U.S. security assistance has had a qualitative impact on the ability of the armed forces of the respective countries to counter terrorist threats. At the same time, in both countries, the United States and other international donors must guard against inappropriate uses of assistance. In Yemen, for example, the government may be tempted to divert U.S.-provided counter-terrorism assistance for use in the Houthi conflict in the North; in Lebanon, foreign aid donors must be mindful that without proper safeguards and transparency, local perceptions of favoritism in the apportionment of development assistance could exacerbate sectarian tensions. Finally, both Yemen and Lebanon are believed to receive substantial off-budget financial infusions from Saudi Arabia. While such cash transfers may help meet short-term needs, over the long term the lack of transparency surrounding them is unhealthy. Moreover, they may enable the perpetuation of poor governance practices, such as patronage. Among the key findings and recommendations are the following:

Yemen

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Yemen is in turmoil. Recent terrorist plots emanating from Yemen against the United States and Western interests have underscored that the threats emanating from a resurgent al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) pose a direct danger to U.S. national security. Yemen is simultaneously facing this and other security threats, as well as impending natural resource debacles, such as the depletion of its oil and water resources, and the fundamental economic development challenges of a least developed country. While the purpose of this staff visit was not to find solutions to these myriad problems, two things were clear: 1) The challenges facing Yemen are inter-related and cannot be addressed in isolation. However dangerous and immediate the country‘s security threats, they need to be dealt with in the context of the country‘s deteriorating socio-economic situation and persistent governance challenges; and 2) The United States lacks the leverage to resolve all of the problems facing Yemen on its own. It must work with the international community, including the IFIs, in addition to the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and Yemeni civil society groups to urgently address these challenges before they spin out of control. The United States and the ROYG have different priorities with respect to the myriad security threats that Yemen confronts. While the USG is focused on preventing alQaeda from making use of the country‘s ungoverned spaces to recruit terrorists and

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launch terrorist operations, President Saleh‘s top priority has been to defeat the Houthi insurgency in the north. December 2009 saw a potential turning point, with Yemeni forces, supported by the United States, escalating their operations against alQaeda. Military airstrikes on December 17 and 24, 2009 are said to have killed scores of al-Qaeda operatives, including, reportedly, some suicide bombers who were planning attacks against Western interests in Sanaa. Prior to this campaign, the ROYG was likely diverting U.S. counter-terrorism assistance for use in the war against the Houthis, and that temptation will persist. Sustaining ROYG commitment to the fight against al-Qaeda will be critical. This potential misuse of security assistance underscores the importance of enhancing the current end-use monitoring regime for U.S.-provided equipment. Indeed, the existing end-use monitoring protocols in place have revealed discrepancies between U.S. records of security assistance and those that are in the possession of Yemeni defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Department of State, and Embassy‘s Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) should work to reconcile these differences.2 In addition, they should conduct a thorough review of physical security and accountability procedures at the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF) compound. Civilian-military coordination at Embassy Sanaa is now excellent, with the Ambassador exercising Chief of Mission authority, as appropriate, over military local engagement efforts. Past problems resulting from a lack of coordination underscore the importance of unity of effort among all U.S. agencies. Making the most of a situation in which the military has been given a bigger role than is the norm in carrying out development work—under the banner of countering extremism—the USAID Mission in Yemen deserves credit for integrating military counterparts into its efforts, investing heavily in training and mentoring them, as appropriate. The Mission made the case that it would be well-served if some of the reservists deployed to Yemen for short (usually 6 months) tours could be re-deployed there for follow-on deployments. Considering the substantial investment the Mission makes in training these reservists, and the limited tours of duty for which they typically serve, this proposal is worthy of consideration.

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Lebanon is still recovering from the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, which inflicted great damage around Beirut, much of southern Lebanon, and other parts of the country. The 2007 fighting between Lebanese Armed Forces and Fatah al- Islam at the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp led to further casualties and damage. These circumstances necessitated a marked increase in U.S. assistance to Lebanon, particularly in the realm of security assistance, totaling several hundreds of millions of dollars. Because of these massive infusions of aid, U.S. security assistance programs in Lebanon have already come under sub stantial oversight. Previous oversight reports have recognized the concrete and measurable benefits that this quick-impact assist-

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ance had on the ground. They also identified some problems, many of them logistical in nature, particularly from the early days of implementation of assistance under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act. While not all of the problems have been eradicated, staff found that U.S. officials had taken steps to learn from past mistakes and avoid their duplication. Having received large sums of Section 1206 assistance over the past several years, the U.S. security assistance program for Lebanon is now relying on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for the longer-term sustainment needs, with no 1206 assistance requested for FY 2010. This is in keeping with the Congressional intent that the 1206 program be limited to helping partner nations confront urgent and emerging counterterrorism threats. The problem of official corruption was a recurring theme during this visit, with several interlocutors pointing to an overall lack of transparency, fueled by a lack of accountability in the Government of Lebanon‘s budget process, including off-budget revenues and expenditures. In addition, many observers perceived an unhealthy influence of the country‘s confessional political system on the apportionment of state resources. The U.S. Government, the IFIs and major Western donors all have procedures in place to guard against the misuse of foreign assistance. However, in the face of real or perceived confessional biases in the allocation of foreign assistance, donors should encourage still greater transparency. One interlocutor argued that, in the face of a succession of crises, the Government of Lebanon has become a master at manipulating international donors, relying on handouts rather than taking on much-needed structural reforms. Without minimizing the seriousness of the crises that Lebanon has confronted in recent years, international donors should guard against the pitfalls associated with a crisis-driven approach. Rather, against the backdrop of Lebanon‘s recent political and economic difficulties, international donors should press for structural reforms to address imbalances, including, importantly, Lebanon‘s crippling official debt.

INTRODUCTION On September 27–October 2, 2009, Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff visited Yemen and Lebanon to gather information to contribute to two committee reports. The first concerns security assistance, and is in follow up to the 2006 report, ―Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign.‖ The second is the last in a series on lending by international financial institutions (IFIs). Although the circumstances facing Yemen and Lebanon differ greatly, the two countries were chosen for this visit because they have both been confronted with serious security threats requiring substantial amounts of U.S. security assistance, particularly under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act.3 In addition, both countries will likely remain flashpoints in the foreseeable future, necessitating a long-term, sustainable, security assistance strategy. In addition, both countries have received substantial IFI lending, but significant structural reforms are urgently needed to tackle long-term development challenges.

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With respect to Yemen, the purpose of the visit was not to find solutions to the myriad and urgent challenges facing that country, or the particular threat posed by al-Qaeda there, which has claimed responsibility for the December 25, 2009 attempted bombing of a Detroitbound airplane. Background on these issues is offered below, however, to provide context for the observations and recommendations for U.S. engagement. Lebanon, meanwhile, is still recovering from the 2006 war between Hizballah and Israel, and has since been subject to prolonged periods of political gridlock. Indeed, the visit took place against the backdrop of lengthy negotiations to form a government of national unity following that country‘s June 7 elections. Therefore, the report offers background on the Lebanese political climate, including the sectarian politics behind these national unity talks, to provide context for staff observations on security assistance and IFI lending. In addition to key findings on those subjects, the report has sections on ―red flags‖ that warrant further attention. Recommendations are in italics.

YEMEN Background

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Yemen is in turmoil; many analysts have characterized it as a ―failing‖ or failed state. Its weak central government is led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has been in power since the 1990 merger between North Yemen and South Yemen (and who was President of North Yemen from 1978 to 1990). There is no clear successor. Outside of the capital, the central government enjoys little legitimacy, resulting in large swaths of ungoverned spaces. The President relies on patronage to perpetuate his influence. Socio-economic Challenges: The poorest country in the Arab world, Yemen faces daunting economic development challenges, coupled with serious security threats. On the economic front, Yemen is quickly depleting its oil, which has generated over 75 percent of its income. Water resources are also running out, largely as a result of poor resource management and a growing popular addiction to the mild narcotic qat, a water-intensive crop, the cultivation of which absorbs approximately one-third of the country‘s water. In addition, as a result of government subsidies, cultivation of qat has displaced that of other agricultural products, increasing the country‘s food insecurity.4 Demographic trends are only intensifying these problems: population growth exceeds 3.4 percent per year, and more than two-thirds of the population is under the age of 24. The unemployment rate was last officially estimated (in 2003) at 35 percent, and is probably higher. Literacy rates are about 50 percent.5 Security Threats: The security situation is extremely worrying. The Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) is engaged in several ongoing conflicts: 

Al-Qaeda has long been active in Yemen, as evidenced by the numerous attacks against Western targets for which it has claimed responsibility, going back to the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. As this chapter was going to press, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the December 25, 2009 attempted bombing of Northwest

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Airlines flight 253 by the Nigerian-born, Yemeni-trained Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; and on January 3, 2010, the U.S., British, and several other Western Embassies in Sanaa temporarily closed, due to credible threats of planned suicide attacks by al-Qaeda operatives. Al-Qaeda twice launched attacks on the U.S. Embassy in September 2008; the second of which resulted 16 dead, including the 6 attackers. In January 2009, al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP was likely responsible for the June 2009 kidnapping and murder/mutilation of nine foreign aid workers, as well as the botched suicide bombing that targeted Saudi Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in August 2009. Yemen is the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, and a disproportionate number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan are said to have been of Yemeni origin. Hundreds of these veterans may now be returning to Yemen, as al-Qaeda seeks to exploit the country‘s ungoverned spaces to plan and launch attacks. Since 2004, there have been several rounds of civil war between al-Houthi guerrillas of the Shi‘a Zaidi sect in the North and ROYG forces. Fighting erupted again in August, 2009 and has resulted in thousands of casualties, and 150,000 displaced persons. The ROYG‘s use of aerial bombardment and artillery has contributed to the high toll of civilian casualties. Simmering resentment over perceived, and real, disenfranchisement by residents of the South has perpetuated unrest and irredentism. The latter half of 2009 has seen an uptick in clashes between southerners and the now exclusively northern soldiers deployed in the South. Recent calls for secession by former Saleh ally Sheikh Tariq al-Fadhli raise the specter of civil war. Finally, Yemen faces the increasing phenomenon of piracy off the Somali coast. According to a report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 130 piracy incidents occurred in the Gulf of Aden in the first half of 2009, compared to 111 in all of 2008.6

What is the United States Government doing to help the ROYG confront these challenges, and how do we prioritize among them to best target our assistance? No doubt, the threat posed by AQAP is the most critical to U.S. national security interests, and the USG must do everything in its power to neutralize that threat. As Christopher Boucek argues in the above-mentioned Carnegie report, however, it would be a mistake to focus foreign aid—and the attention of policymakers—inordinately on seeking a military solution to Yemen‘s manifold problems. There is a clear linkage between Yemen‘s economic and social development challenges and its security threats. Indeed, the perceived—and real—lack of prospects for the future may be contributing to the appeal of Islamic extremism. As one Yemeni interlocutor put it: ―Either we give our young people hope, or someone else will give them an illusion.‖ The United States lacks the leverage to resolve the problems facing Yemen on its own. It must work urgently with ROYG and with partner civil society organizations in Yemen, and with like-minded partners in the international community, including the IFIs, and those with the most influence in Yemen, such as Saudi Arabia, urgently to address these challenges before they spin out of control.

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U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN

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Trends in U.S. Assistance to Yemen U.S. security assistance to the ROYG has increased dramatically in the past decade, as illustrated in the below table. Since the 2006 creation of Section 1206 authority in the National Defense Authorization Act, U.S. security assistance has been more heavily weighted to military- rather than civilian-funded programs: In FY 2006, Yemen received $4.3 million in Section 1206; in FY 2007, it received $26 million. In FY 2009, that figure jumped to $66.8 million. Levels of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), administered by the State Department, have been more volatile. After zero funding in this category in FY 2001, Yemen benefited from a $20 million spike in FY 2002, with significant variations in following years. Economic development assistance, meanwhile, has seen a steady upward trajectory. USAID-funded development assistance has grown from zero in fiscal years 2001-2003 to $4.9 million in FY 2008; $11.2 million in FY 2009. USAID has also funded Global Health programs in Yemen since FY 2008 at about $3 million/year. Economic Support Funds (ESF) have also steadily increased, from zero in FY 2001 to $15.2 million in FY 2007. After a temporary decrease in FY 2008 to $1.5 million, ESF shot back up to almost $20 million in FY 2009. In FY 2009, Yemen received just over $117 million in U.S. assistance, of which roughly $73 million (or 62 percent) was in the security domain. The balance went to ESF, Development Assistance (DA), Section 1207 Stabilization Programs, and Global Health. Some analysts have criticized this relative proportion of security assistance as indicative of a ―misallocation of priorities‖ in Yemen.7 The reality is more complex. In fact, the U.S. military is also supporting economic development and good governance. For example, the Special Operations Command/Central Command (SOCCENT) has been engaged in rural development programs in Yemen‘s tribal areas.

Red Flags Different Priorities: The United States and the ROYG have different priorities vis-à-vis Yemen‘s security threats. While the USG is focused on preventing al-Qaeda from launching further terrorist attacks from Yemen, and has provided counter-terrorism assistance to the ROYG for this purpose, President Saleh‘s top priority has been defeating the Houthi rebellion in the north. As a result of this difference in focus, there are serious concerns that U.S. counter-terrorism assistance, provided to assist the ROYG in combating al- Qaeda, has been diverted for use in the war against the Houthis.8 December 2009 may mark a potential turning point in the convergence of priorities, when Yemeni forces, supported by the United States, escalated their operations against al-Qaeda. Military air- strikes on December 17 and 24, 2009 are said to have killed scores of al-Qaeda operatives, including, reportedly, some suicide bombers who were planning attacks against Western interests in Sanaa. Even so, the temptation to divert U.S. counter-terrorism assistance for use in the war against the Houthis will persist. Sustaining ROYG commitment to the fight against al-Qaeda will be critical.

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The reported use of night-time raids in Saada raises questions about whether the 1206-funded night-vision equipment has been used in these raids.9 Likewise, concerned about the possibility of the Yemeni Air Force using propellant activated devices in aerial campaign in the North, the Embassy has put a hold on the provision of this equipment to the Yemeni Armed Forces. During the visit, the Embassy‘s FMF Officer expressed uncertainty about whether there was a clear U.S. policy prohibiting the use of U.S. security assistance in the Houthi conflict, and, if so, how this policy was being communicated to the ROYG. When staff mentioned this officer‘s apparent need for guidance to Ambassador Seche, he said the policy was clear, and that the OMC Chief was aware of it, as was the Yemeni government. But, he undertook to clarify to all OMC staff that U.S. assistance should not be used against the Houthis. The Ambassador also reviewed several instances in which U.S. policy against using U.S.-provided security assistance in the Houthi conflict had been conveyed to top Yemeni leaders.

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010 Request

Development Assistance Food Aid Economic Support Funds Foreign Military Financing International Military Education Training Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement NDAA Section 1206 NDAA Section 1207

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U.S. Assistance to Yemen (In Millions of Historic Dollars)10

0

0

0

2.0

0

0

1.5

4.9

11.2

35

38.5 0

0.6 2.0

29.6 8.0

38.4 16.7

0 7.8

11.5 20.8

0 15.2

2.2 1.5

0 19.8

0 0

0

20

1.9

14.9

10.4

8.4

9.7

4.0

2.8

10.0

0.2

0.5

0.6

0.9

1.0

0.9

1.0

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

0.8

0.8

0.5

1.9

0.2

2.3

2.5

2.5

3.6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.5

0

1.0

0

0

0

0

0

4.3

26.0

0

67

0

0

0

0

0

0

10

0

10

10

0

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Need for Improved End-Use Monitoring: OMC engages in end-use monitoring, with an inspection of night-vision equipment provided to the Counter-terrorism Unit and the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF) conducted as recently as June, and July, 2009, respectively. Several USG interlocutors expressed the view that the existing system of biannual monitoring is insufficient to determine with precision how U.S. assistance is being used, however. Moreover, in the most recent round of inspections, the FMF officer found that much equipment was unaccounted for. There were also significant discrepancies between DSCA‘s data on the quantity that had been provided and that which was in the Yemeni forces‘ inventories.

Recommendation

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In light of the above concerns about the Yemeni Armed Forces’ use of U.S. security assistance against the Houthis, the USG should develop a more robust end-use monitoring regime for Yemen, and for any other country where there is ongoing armed conflict in which U.S.-provided CT resources could be diverted.11 In addition, in accordance with OMC’s recommendations, DSCA, the Department of State, and OMC should conduct a thorough review of physical security and accountability procedures at the YSOF compound, making improvements a condition for further U.S. military assistance. A DSCA- appointed and -funded team should be sent to Yemen TDY to assist in this review.

DSCA-OMC Process Problems: OMC reported numerous breakdowns in communications with DSCA. As OMC representatives put it, ―DSCA needs to be revamped. It needs to be more accountable to Embassies.‖ This observation tracks with findings in a recent report issued jointly by the Inspectors-General of the Departments of State and Defense on Section 1206 assistance, which pointed to numerous instances of problems in information flow between DSCA and those who are responsible for security assistance at foreign embassies. Such problems concerned the status of assistance actually delivered, and even the quantity of materiel agreed in contracts.12

Pros and Cons of Increasing the Military Involvement in Foreign Assistance Asked for his views about the foreign policy implications of the growing military role in foreign assistance, Ambassador Seche expressed concerns about potential pitfalls if Chief of Mission authority in coordinating and overseeing such programs is circumvented. For example, the above-mentioned SOCCENT rural development program reportedly got off to a rocky start due to misperceptions on the part of tribal leaders about what the USG‘s intentions were. Fortunately, an embarrassing international incident was avoided. As a result of this incident, the Ambassador has more firmly asserted his primacy as Chief of Mission in approving such operations. In addition, the SOCCENT team learned some important lessons about the need to fully integrate its efforts with the Embassy‘s broader vision, and to take advantage of the regional expertise and cultural knowledge of their State Department and USAID colleagues.

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Asked about the pros and cons of using military resources to conduct the kinds of economic development activity that traditionally has been the purview of civilian agencies, Embassy staff indicated that while USAID has the comparative advantage with respect to conceptualizing, implementing, and overseeing development assistance, in Yemen at least, the Mission has had to learn to live with a bigger military role in this field. Many Embassy officers have chosen to embrace this reality, pointing out the advantages of being able to draw on the U.S. Military‘s vast personnel and financial resources. In addition, because these military officers operate under the authority of their respective commands, as opposed to under Chief of Mission authority, they are allowed to travel to some areas of the country that are off-limits to civilian personnel. Due to Embassy travel restrictions for civilian employees, USAID officers have not been out to visit some USAID-funded projects in many years.

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Civ-Mil Coordination Within the Embassy The need for better civilian-military coordination within the Embassy was identified in the 2006 ―Embassies as Command Posts‖ report. Ambassador Seche clearly takes seriously the exercise of Chief of Mission authority in these matters. He chairs bi-weekly meetings of the Embassy‘s inter-agency Counter-terrorism Working Group. Indeed, the military assistance program in Yemen has improved, thanks to this coordination between the military and civilian sides of the Embassy. Asked to characterize internal Embassy coordination, one military officer said it was ―phenomenal.‖ The USAID Mission Director agreed, praising the ―unity of purpose‖ pursued by the different actors on the country team. As evidence of the military‘s full integration, the USAID Mission Director pointed to the fact that military representatives had been invited to, and participated constructively in, USAID‘s strategic planning conference in Cairo, at which the Mission‘s new three- year strategy was developed. The SOCCENT Forward Lt. Col. in country said his team ―wouldn‘t think of doing anything that had not been fully coordinated with the country team.‖ Staff found this commitment to coordination and unity of purpose exemplary. No doubt, the personalities of the Embassy‘s leaders have contributed to this seamlessness, but staff found that the structures are in place to sustain it.

Regional Expertise and Continuity of Effort Another of the areas of potential pitfall identified in the ―Embassies as Command Posts‖ report was the deployment of military personnel with limited regional or linguistic expertise for short (usually six-month) tours. This phenomenon continues to be a problem in Yemen. The USAID Mission Director said he and his team make a substantial investment in training new military arrivals with whom they must work closely in carrying out joint programs. He emphasized that USAID is prepared to make this investment. He would like to see the Mission get more return on this investment, however. He suggested that reservists who are activated for six-month tours in Yemen as Civilian Affairs Officers or with the Military Information Support Team (MIST) return to their country of assignment for a follow-on deployment.

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Recommendation In Yemen, where USAID has invested heavily in training these reservists in development policy management and local culture, it is understandable that the Mission would want to improve returns on this investment. Such follow-on re-deployments also merit consideration more broadly.

USAID/Sanaa is actively seeking the redeployment of two such MIST team members, whose work has been quite well received. SOCCENT has also learned that in a country/region where local culture is built on relationships, episodic engagements will not succeed in delivering results. It has therefore embedded teams of trainers with the host government counterpart groups.

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FMF vs. 1206 Of the host government officials with whom staff spoke, there was little to no understanding of the differences between FMF and Section 1206-funded assistance. They did not distinguish at all between military-administered or civilian-administered programs. Their focus, understandably, was on the end result, i.e., what kind of materiel and training assistance could be provided, and how quickly. When asked about the relative advantages of 1206, as opposed to FMF, representatives from the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) expressed understanding for the relative slowness of the FMF process, from the Letter of Approval phase to actual delivery of materiel. Because FMF is meant for long-term sustainment, they said, long lead times (i.e., as much as three years of advance planning) can be built into the planning process. Section 1206 funds, while meant to have a quicker impact to deal with urgent needs, also suffer from delays, however, since a ―pseudo-FMF‖ process is followed once the funds have been approved. To help speed up the 1206 process, Embassy Sanaa‘s OMC team offered the suggestion that some of the steps in the approval process should be allowed to be pursued simultaneously, rather than sequentially. In addition, to mitigate the sometimes long lead times in procurement, one OMC officer suggested that the Section 1206 authority be amended to allow for disbursement for approved projects over a two-year period.13 Finally, to avoid situations in which Posts invest significant resources in developing proposals that end up not being approved, the Combatant Commands, with input from the State Department, should provide Embassies with a sense of the likelihood that their Section 1206 proposals would receive funding before the Embassies spend too much time in proposal development phase.

Recommendation These suggestions have the potential to improve effectiveness of the 1206 program and warrant further study.

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Constructive Criticism from Host Government End Users The Chairman of the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) expressed gratitude for the significant materiel support and training that the USG has provided the Yemeni Coast Guard. Specifically, the initial tranche of 44-foot motorized lifeboats allowed the YCG to start operating. Asked for constructive criticism about the program, the YCG requested additional assistance, more timely delivery, and in one case, easier-to-maintain motors: 

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A second tranche of Section 1206-funded boats, some 7-meters and some 13-meters, boosted the YCG‘s ability in the realm of protection, search and rescue, and training. These boats have limited endurance in the sea, however. The YCG now seeks to acquire medium-sized boats to conduct anti-piracy, anti-smuggling, and anti-terror missions. Without these boats, the YCG is unable to respond to Coalition Forces‘ warnings about Somali pirates in international shipping lanes. (The USG will provide two 87-foot boats funded under Section 1206, but delivery is not expected in 2011.) The Mercury outboard motors provided in some of the boats were deemed ―too sophisticated‖ (with their advanced electronic systems) for the YCG to maintain. The YCG expressed preference for Yamaha equivalents, which is better understood by local mechanics and for which spare parts are more easily accessible. (U.S. Marines were able to repair two out of four of these motors on a recent training exercise.) Approximately two years ago, the Army Corps of Engineers agreed to build a pier at the Gulf of Aden. This FMF-funded contract was opened for bidding, but no U.S. companies bid, either because of the security situation in Yemen or the relatively small size of the project. The YCG fulfilled its part of the agreement by preparing the infrastructure. The Coast Guard was concerned about the length of time that had lapsed without U.S. fulfillment of its commitment.

Specific areas for improvement cited by the Yemeni Air Force Colonel in charge of international cooperation include: 





Provision of English language labs: Through a mix-up at the port of entry, equipment and materials to create English language instruction labs, which had been designated to go to the Air Force, ended up being redirected to the YCG. Difficulties in Parts Repair Process: The Air Force has run into repeated problems when it sends parts back to the United States for repair. Many contractors erroneously believe that Yemen is not eligible to receive military assistance, so they disallow third-party transfers. A couple years ago, Yemen requested Excess Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE). The equipment was based in Europe. Unfortunately, a contract was never let for the refurbishment of this equipment, since it was unclear which of the services would be responsible for funding it. According to OMC, DSCA recently instructed the Air Force to take responsibility for this project.

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An Avoidable Problem in Provision of Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Yemen benefited from Excess Defense Articles amounting, on paper at least, to $36.3 million in FY 2007. According to OMC representatives, this number is artificially inflated, as Yemen is eligible to purchase EDA at drastically discounted prices. The EDA provided consisted of medical supplies, uniforms, and personal equipment. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Defense subsequently rejected some of the medical equipment provided, probably because some of it was Israeli-origin.14 Because most products in the EDA catalogue are not accompanied by descriptive photographs (which in this case would have shown Hebrew writing), the origin of the equipment was not known at the time of order.

1206: Consultations with Host Government vs. Managing Expectations Noting the recommendation in the August 31, 2009 joint report by the Inspectors General of State and Defense, OMC officials said it would not be helpful to engage in consultations with Yemeni military authorities in the 1206 proposal development phase. They expressed the opinion that the partnership is not mature enough to allow consultations prior to approval. To do so would risk raising expectations on the part of their Yemeni counterparts. OMC representatives explained that they make judgments based on their knowledge of the Yemeni military‘s needs.

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Overview of Development Issues and International Donor Assistance Yemen is beset by extreme poverty, economic stagnation, explosive population growth, deficient health and education systems, and rapidly depleting natural resources, all made worse by weak governance and endemic corruption. The country ranks 153rd on the Human Development Index. Yemen was already falling behind in its efforts to reach most Millennium Development Goals; the global economic crisis has compounded its economic woes, both from falling oil revenues and decreased remittances from Yemenis working abroad. The UN Development Program considers Yemen a least developed country (LDC), and the country‘s socio-economic indicators bear this out. The $16 in per capita donor assistance it receives is well below international averages for LDCs, however. (By comparison, Benin receives $36, and Mozambique $51, respectively, in per capita assistance.) Since its recent pledge of $83 million per year in development assistance for the next five years, the United Kingdom has become Yemen‘s largest bilateral donor. At a November 2006 donors conference in Paris, international donors pledged $5 billion for the period 2007-2010. Donors included: Saudi Arabia, the Arab Fund for Socio-Economic Development, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the World Bank Group, the Arab monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, Kuwait, Netherlands, Germany, the European Union, and the United States. For a number of reasons, many of the funds pledged at Paris have not yet materialized however. First, Yemen has not met some of the reform conditions some donors tie to their

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aid. In addition, implementation of projects is often constrained by Yemen‘s absorptive and capacity issues. That said, it should also be taken into consideration that Yemen is believed to receive substantial and regular off-budget financial infusions from Saudi Arabia. Many commentators view such cash transfers as deleterious, contributing to a lack of transparency and enabling the perpetuation of poor governance practices, such as patronage.

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The World Bank’s Program Yemen has experienced periods of steep decline in international donor assistance, following the 1991 Gulf War, when Yemen supported Saddam Hussein; and following its own civil war in 1994. Since this latter period, Yemen has been gradually rebuilding its relationships with development partners, and in recent years a number of donors have increased their involvement in Yemen, including beyond formerly project-based assistance. According to the World Bank Resident Representative, the Bank has about $1 billion in existing projects in Yemen, some of which have been ongoing for 4-5 years. The Bank‘s annual lending is between $120-130 million. For the past two years, Yemen has bene¬fited from International Development Association (IDA) grants; previously World Bank assistance took the form of credits. The Bank‘s assistance pledged at the 2006 Consultative Group (CG) meeting on Yemen account for about 8 percent of total pledges (compared to about 50 percent prior to the CG). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not have a permanent presence in Yemen but provides advisory services via the Article IV process. The last Article IV consultations took place from October 21 to November 3, 2008 in Sanaa. The Bank‘s objective in Yemen is to facilitate Yemen‘s further progress toward the Millennium Development Goals. These goals, in turn, are in sync with the ROYG‘s stated goals, as articulated in the National Reform Agenda, the focus of which is on human development, including education and health; water resource management; and good governance. The Bank measures the effectiveness of its programs in accordance with institutional standards, i.e., it produces Project Completion Reports when a project closes. The Bank brings out a new team not involved in the planning or implementation of the project to assess the World Bank‘s role and the government‘s role and solicits government comments. Before the report is made public, it is subject to review by the Independent Evaluation Department at the World Bank in Washington.

Need for Private Sector Investment Increased foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as domestic investment, will be critical if Yemen is to create needed jobs—and hope for the future—among its increasing population of young job seekers. According to the 2009 report of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, Yemen is experiencing a downward trend in FDI inflows. Gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP has also declined for the past two years. In the face of falling oil revenues and its rapidly depleting oil sector, the ROYG had been putting its hopes in the development of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. As the Country Director for the International Finance Corporation put it, however, the slump in the international market for

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LNG renders this strategy no longer viable. He made the case that, ―If Yemen‘s economic development prospects are to have any success, it will be as the result of very timeconsuming, hard-slogging micro-financing.‖ There are no quick fixes. Right now, he said, there is no coordination among donors on private sector development—a reality he intended to change. Nor were there any micro-finance banks based in Yemen, although one—alAmal— has announced plans to open there.

Recommendation To the extent that micro-finance banks need to be induced to enter the Yemeni market, international donors should provide incentives. Similarly, the international donor community in Yemen and the ROYG itself should focus more attention—and resources—on private sector development. The IFC has thus far provided business education training to 26,000 graduates, many of whom will become become trainers themselves. Such activities should be expanded and built upon.

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World Bank Investigative Panel: Oversight Run Amuck On June 18, 2009, the World Bank issued a 167-page World Bank Inspection Panel Report on an Institutional Reform Development Policy Grant, in which a poorly documented complaint on the part of a Yemen-based non-governmental organization was scrutinized in minute detail.15 Asked about how many staff hours had been spent on reviewing and explaining the Bank‘s actions in response to the group‘s ill-conceived accusations, the Bank‘s Resident Director admitted that an inordinate amount of staff time and effort, including at the executive level, had gone into this process. He explained that there had been political pressure in Washington to look into this case, since it was the first complaint ever received from the Middle East/North African region.

Recommendation This case was not worthy of the substantial staff time and resources that the Bank expended in responding to it. The U.S. Executive Director to the World Bank should weigh in with Bank leadership to ensure that some threshold of credibility is established prior to commitment of Bank resources in investigative panels.

Parliamentary Oversight While the Yemeni Parliament does not challenge the Executive Branch in exercising its oversight prerogatives, it has been more vigorous with respect to reviewing World Bank lending. In some cases, this has led to delays in project implementation, in one recent case, a 24-month delay. Nonetheless, the World Bank Resident Representative welcomed the Parliamentary role as ―healthy.‖

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Empowering Reform from Within Unhappy with the slow pace and uneven results of Yemen‘s reform efforts, a small group of largely Western-educated and well- connected intellectuals and technocrats, under the auspices of the President‘s son, developed a targeted action plan to focus the government‘s short- to medium-term reform efforts. This group took into consideration the Government‘s Third Five-Year Plan for Poverty Reduction, as well as other existing plans and strategies, but determined that these various plans sought to take on too many challenges at once. They therefore developed 10 priorities on which the ROYG should focus for the next year. Indeed, when staff asked the Vice Minister of Planning and International Cooperation to describe the ROYG‘s development strategy, he said that this 10-point plan was now the operating document. The 10 points are not perfect; they do not address head on the need to eliminate government subsidies for diesel, for example, relying instead on a strategy of seeking lower prices on the international market to reduce costs. That said, because this plan is ―locally owned,‖ in the words of one of its drafters, it stands a greater chance of success than reforms mandated by foreign donors.

Recommendation The international donor community should work to empower and support such locally owned reform processes.

LEBANON Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Background Lebanon and the United States have traditionally enjoyed close relations, reflecting the countries‘ cultural and political ties, as well as the bonds cultivated by a large LebaneseAmerican community. Lebanon is a democracy, but the country‘s democratic processes and institutions reflect entrenched confessional political affiliations. By agreement since independence in 1943, and affirmed in the 1989 Ta‘if Agreement, the country‘s top three constitutional positions are reserved for citizens from specific religious groups: the President is Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister is Sunni Muslim; and the Speaker of Parliament is Shi‘a Muslim. Confessional politics can be messy, as was seen in the lengthy period of negotiations to form a national unity government following the June 7th elections. The result was five months of inertia, as the caretaker government was not empowered to make significant decisions, including on security assistance and international financial institution lending. Further complicating matters, the Parliament has not passed a budget for the past five years. Official guidance allows Ministries to spend 1/12 of the previous year‘s expenditures each month, but a widening deficit suggests that more is being spent. Moreover, the substantial off-budget aid that the GOL is believed to receive from Saudi Arabia is not accounted for, contributing to a general lack of fiscal accountability.16

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It must also be taken into consideration that Lebanon is still recovering from the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, which left much of southern Lebanon and other parts of the country in ruins. The 2007 fighting between Lebanese Armed Forces and Fatah al-Islam at the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp led to further casualties and damage. According to the State Department, over $3.7 billion in civilian infrastructure was destroyed in both conflicts and thousands were displaced. Postwar donors‘ conferences in Stockholm in August 2006 and Paris in 2007 resulted in about $8 billion in pledges of mostly in-kind assistance, much of which was conditioned on economic reforms. U.S. assistance to Lebanon increased markedly after the 2006 war and even more so in the aftermath of the Nahr al-Barid conflict. Finally, no study of the impact of U.S. programs or assistance in Lebanon would be complete without taking into consideration the constraints imposed by the security situation there. Specifically, all U.S. Direct Hire employees must live on the Embassy compound. The Embassy‘s current facility is operating at full capacity with only very limited options for expansion. Employees‘ movements outside the compound must take place in armored vehicles with bodyguard protection, for which there are finite resources. In the words of the Deputy Chief of Mission, this reality ―effects everything we do—it limits everything we do.‖ For example, the USAID Mission is comprised of two US Direct Hires, but programs comparable in magnitude to the $100 million it will soon be managing would be staffed by many more in other countries. All too often, requests for official visits to Lebanon end up being denied, simply because there is not sufficient space to house the visitors. The Embassy is currently engaged in negotiations to purchase a property on which to build a new Embassy compound (NEC) that would be able to meet anticipated security and infrastructure needs, and the State Department has identified funding for this construction starting in 2011.

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Recommendation Given the importance of U.S. interests in Lebanon and the constraints placed on pursuing those interests by the current infrastructure limitations, the Department should, within existing budgetary resources, make the acquisition of land and building of a NEC a high priority, applying diplomatic pressure on those in a position to influence this outcome, as appropriate.

RED FLAGS 

The problem of official corruption was a recurring theme during this visit, with several interlocutors pointing to an overall lack of transparency, fueled by a lack of accountability in the official budget process, as well as off-budget revenues and expenditures. Many observers also perceive an unhealthy influence of the country‘s confessional political system on the apportionment of state resources. Speaking to the specific problems of corruption in the management of international donor assistance, one official charged that, ―The entire system is corrupt and inefficient.‖ He cited as examples cases in which waste water treatment plants were built with no connection to houses; roads were built before plumbing had been installed, requiring the newly constructed roads to be torn up and re-constructed. He attributed some of these

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problems to a ―shopping list approach‖ to foreign aid, and the absence of national priorities or a commitment to exploiting synergies. Manipulation of Crises: One interlocutor argued that, in the face of a succession of crises, the GOL has become a master at manipulating international donors, relying on hand-outs rather than taking on much-needed structural reforms. ―The whole international community has been blackmailed for ages. We don‘t need more money. We need to change the rules of the game. We need to change the structure. We need to break our dependence on foreign aid.‖

Recommendation Without minimizing the seriousness of the crises that Lebanon has confronted in recent years, the United States Government and other international donors should guard against this phenomenon. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that, while crises can be used an excuse for inaction, they can also be catalysts for addressing difficult issues.

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON

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Trends in U.S. Assistance As documented in the chart below, U.S. assistance to Lebanon has mushroomed in recent years. As recently as FY 2004, the United States provided Lebanon with little security assistance. There was no Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, and funds for International Military Education and Training (IMET) were limited to $800,000. The events of 2006 changed that. Hizballah acted as an independent militia in provoking and conducting war with Israel in the summer; it later sought to topple Lebanon‘s elected government. Thus, the United States vastly increased its security assistance to Lebanon to help enhance the effectiveness of its armed forces and their ability to rein in Hizballah. This assistance has taken the form of FMF, which has increased dramatically; and IMET, which has increased only moderately; in addition to significant infusions of assistance under Sections 1206, of which Lebanon has been one of the biggest beneficiaries; and 1207 of the Defense Authorization Act. In addition, in recent years Lebanon has benefited from over $60 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Assistance (INCLE) and about $19 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and related programs (NADR). Economic Support Funds (ESF) have also increased appreciably. From a baseline of $33.2 million in ESF in FY 2004, the figure jumped to $61.9 million in FY 2006 and $137.4 million in FY 2007. ESF in FY 2008 and 2009 was also substantial, but less than the 2007 peak figure. Most USAID funding in Lebanon has been provided through the Office of Transition Initiatives, which went from zero in FY 2005 for $39.7 million in FY 2006, and $25.7 million in FY 2007. Food aid also spiked during FY 2006.

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Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Assistance to Lebanon (In Millions of Historic Dollars)17

Development Assistance Food Aid Economic Support Funds Foreign Military Financing International Military Education Training Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement NDAA Section 1206 NDAA Section 1207

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010 Request

0.5

3.8

3.5

6.4

0

0

0

0

0.1

13.1

0.4

0

0

0

33.2

18.7

61.9

137.4

44.6

67.5

109.0

0

0

29.7

18

4.8+ 220

6.9

159.7+ 74

100

0.7

0.8

0.8

0.9

1.5

2.1

2.5

0.1

0.1

1.9

9.8

4.7

4.6

6.8

0

0

0

0.2+ 19 60

0.5

6.0

20.0

0 0

0 0

10.5 10.0

30.6 0

15.1 10.0

49.3 10.0

0 0

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Continuing Oversight Leads to Improved Operations Because Lebanon has been a major recipient of security assistance, it has already come under substantial oversight.20 These efforts have recognized the timeliness and effectiveness of U.S. security assistance, pointing to tactical data, such as the number of M-113 tanks that were made mission-capable as a result of Section 1206 assistance, and the number of bombing raids and medical evacuation flights flown with UH-1‘s in the Nahr al-Barid conflict. In addition, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) earned high marks for following up on the 1206 program with FMF and FMS investment to make 1206-funded capabilities sustainable over the long term. Not surprisingly, the reports also identified problems, particularly from the early days of Section 1206 implementation. The purpose of this chapter is not to re-hash previously published findings. However, staff did ask interlocutors in Lebanon about the extent to which they have made progress in resolving the more serious problems identified in these reports. For example: 

The DOD and State Inspectors General (IGs) identified a ―lack of cost management‖ in one case in which the USG paid $779,000 in fees to deliver spare parts for UH-IH helicopters valued at $598,000. In addition, the IGs determined that over $4 million in Section 1206 assistance had not been obligated prior to the end of the fiscal year— ―a lost opportunity to provide the vetted and approved assistance.‖ According to representatives of Embassy Beirut‘s Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), in both cases, problems stemmed from the difficulties associated with obligating the one-

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

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year monies of Section 1206. Although such difficulties persist, they reported that the Embassy has been successful in streamlining the 1206 process. The ODC is working with the LAF to overcome one of the other deficiencies cited in the IGs‘ report, i.e., a crippling lack of spare parts and tack shoes for the LAF‘s M113 armored personnel carriers. They have opened a new case to refurbish the M113s, since the spare parts that had been envisioned in an earlier 1206 case ended up being obsolete. The IGs identified multiple discrepancies between information available to DSCA and ODC about the status of 1206 cases. In several cases, DSCA reported that assistance that had been delivered to the Lebanese Armed Forces, while ODC reported that such assistance had not been delivered. The fact that the IGs were not able to reconcile these differences was telling. DSCA and ODC/Beirut have been working to address this problem through weekly conference calls.

Recommendation The Administration should develop a centralized information management system, with appropriate checks and balances for accuracy, to accurately track the status of all Section 1206 assistance.

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Internal and External Coordination The Embassy demonstrated excellent internal coordination on foreign assistance, with the Ambassador and DCM actively overseeing policy and coordination on the full range of issues associated with multiple security, reconstruction, and development assistance programs. On security issues, either the Ambassador or DCM chairs an interagency core group that meets weekly. In addition, the Embassy convened a group of international donors of security assistance to coordinate plans and action in that realm. Staff had the opportunity to meet with this group, which gathers every six- eight weeks, and which has sub-groups on border security, rule of law assistance, and assistance to the LAF. The U.S. Embassy maintains a matrix to track all international security assistance that it shares with that group. As a result of this coordination, there was widespread agreement among donors that the Lebanese Government, and the LAF in particular, needs to develop a national security strategy. In the words of a British defense official, thus far, the LAF‘s approach has been tactical -- built around the kinds of materiel and other assistance it has been able to receive from donors. His Spanish counterpart agreed, concluding that the contrary views sometimes expressed by the Defense Minister and the LAF Commander were reflective of the absence of a grand strategy. Donors recognized that confessional loyalties are a key factor.

FMF vs. 1206 U.S. security assistance to Lebanon has made a qualitative difference in the LAF‘s counter-terrorism abilities. In the words of an ODC representative, ‗‗We‘ve improved their

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mobility, their ability to communicate, and their ability to counter terrorist operations. We have helped prepare them for whatever the next round may hold.‖ This self-assessment is backed up by well-documented examples cited in the above-cited oversight reports. Asked for a more recent example of a tangible impact U.S. assistance had had on the ground, Embassy officers pointed to a recent incident in which LAF troops were able to use night vision goggles provided under this program to find and capture seven terrorists affiliated with Fatah al-Islam who had escaped from Roumieh prison. The question is: what is the best vehicle for providing security assistance? The Head of Planning for the LAF, who was well aware of the differences between the various pots of money, expressed a preference for 1206, which he perceived as ‗‗more efficient; more timely.‖ He indicated that the LAF looks to FMF for sustainment of 1206-funded equipment. Ideally, he said, the Government of Lebanon should fund such sustainment expenses out of its own budget. The current situation in Lebanon precludes that, however; he explained that the $30 million he has been promised for 2009 will meet only a fraction of the LAF‘s equipment and sustainment needs. Asked about the comparative advantages offered by FMF and 1206, representatives from the Office of Defense Cooperation indicated that, all things being equal, they preferred FMF as a vehicle for delivering security assistance. Even though FMF processes are slower than 1206, they welcomed the predictability of FMF, which is budgeted for each year, as opposed to 1206 which are awarded through a competitive process. Although 1206-funded assistance can be delivered more quickly, they said that the lack of certainty about whether individual 1206 program proposals will be approved detracted from the program‘s overall effectiveness. ODC representatives indicated that multi-year funding for 1206 would help make the program more effective.21 In the past, the lengthy lead time associated with preparing 1206 proposals and getting them approved resulted in Embassy Beirut‘s 1206-funded programs not being notified to Congress until May, allowing as little as three months for contracting. This kind of timeline is unrealistic, they said. In FY 2009, the Embassy resubmitted proposals that had not been approved the previous year.

Recommendation While this re-submission resulted in a speeding up of the 1206 process at Embassy Beirut this year, the tactic of re- submitting 1206 proposals that were not funded from a previous year raises questions about immediacy and the extent of the emerging nature of the threats that those proposals were designed to help the host country confront.

As an example of the interconnectedness that is sometimes seen between security assistance provided under Section 1206 and more traditional forms of security assistance, the ODC Chief noted that he had inquired whether 1206 funds could be used to cover Joint Combined Exercises and Training (JCET) programs in the area of counterterrorism. When ODC checked with counterparts with the Joint Chief of Staff, it was determined that JCETs, which are funded under Title X, Section 2011 funding, cannot be funded with Section 1206 monies.

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Recommendation Staff believes that this was the proper call, since JCETs, even if for the purpose of improving host countries’ counter- terrorism capabilities, represent a long-term training investment; whereas Section 1206 was designed to meet short- term, immediate counterterrorism needs.

One example of a successful and innovative 1206-funded assistance program is the provision to the LAF of the ―Lebanese Armed Caravan,‖ of up to four Cessna aircraft modified to provide close air support in counter-terrorism operations. Staff had the opportunity to make a site visit to the airfield to view the first such aircraft provided and receive a briefing on its applications. The assistance package included a significant training component. This assistance resulted in a qualitative boost in the LAF‘s capabilities and has been extremely well-received. Asked if there had been cases in which 1206-or FMF-funded programs had not been well conceived, ODC representatives pointed to a 1206 case involving D9 armored bulldozers. Because the armament had been carried out in Israel, the bulldozers would have been undesirable in Lebanon. As noted above, the United States opposes the Arab League boycott of Israel, which Lebanon observes. Fortunately, the Country Team caught the problem before the case moved forward.

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Assistance to the Internal Security Forces The United States has understandably focused the bulk of its security assistance on the LAF, which is responsible for border security, counterterrorism, and national defense. In addition, however, since FY 2007, the USG has also supported Lebanon‘s police, or Internal Security Forces (ISF), which is responsible for maintaining public order. This assistance, funded under the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Section 1207, is designed to help professionalize what has been a chronically underfunded institution lacking in credibility on the Lebanese street. Staff had the opportunity to visit the INCLEfunded police training center, including newly refurbished buildings and some currently under construction. Staff observed an ongoing train-the-trainer course in community policing, and heard positive testimonials from the trainees. According to the head of the ISF academy, the ISF started out with 7 instructors; as a result of this assistance they now have 29. The USG-provided courses include a basic training class for new recruits; a course for supervisors; a tactical training course; and a community policing program, a new concept in Lebanon that was thought to be appropriate for hightension communities, including, ultimately, Palestinian refugee camps such as Nahr al-Barid. Police commanders expressed appreciation for this U.S. assistance, which they credited with having a positive effect, as evidenced by increased mobility for police units, which was inferred as signifying greater acceptance of the ISF on the part of local residents.

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Reining in Contractor Expenses The security and infrastructure realities described above require that the Embassy rely on contractors to implement many aspects of U.S. security assistance programs. Because contractors are not U.S. direct hire employees, they do not fall under Chief of Mission authority and thus are not required to stay on the Embassy compound. The downside, according to ODC representatives, is that an inordinate proportion of U.S. assistance is devoted to contractors‘ expenses. ―We‘ve let the defense contractors go wild‖ in the words of one employee. A new Embassy compound that will be able to accommodate more official visitors will help mitigate this phenomenon.

Constructive Criticism from Host Government End Users The LAF‘s Head of Planning expressed gratitude for U.S. security assistance, tinged by some frustration over the long lead time required in some cases. For example, the abovementioned need to refurbish over 1200 armored personnel carriers had taken much longer than had been anticipated. The provision of spare tires for light trucks had also been delayed. Some of the radios that had been promised in 2007 were reported to still not be in use, because they are subject to a worldwide contract that has not yet been awarded. Uniforms that had been provided to the LAF Rangers were of the desert pattern, rather than the preferred urban design, which is more appropriate for the kind of fighting in which LAF troops are likely to engage.

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IFI LENDING Economic Situation The political stalemate and sporadic sectarian violence that Lebanon has seen in the past several years have greatly hampered economic activity. That said, Lebanon‘s free market economy is often credited for its resilience in the face of adversity, and indeed many international economists have assessed that the economy has performed reasonably well in the face of the international financial crisis. Many commentators site official Government statistics, which project the 2009 GDP growth rate at 8.5 percent. Similarly, Lebanon has been able to attract substantial domestic and international investment, in spite of the international financial crisis.22 Some GOL officials and economic analysts have cast doubt on the credibility of the official growth rate, however, and they point out that the increase in investment is reliant on the country‘s high interest rates. Moreover, the IMF has pointed out both publicly and privately that Lebanon‘s high public debt to GDP ratio remains a key vulnerability.23

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Overview of International Donor Assistance

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The seeds of Lebanon‘s enduring public debt problem were sown in the 1990s during the massive rebuilding effort that was launched after the civil war. Although the Government committed to a variety of economic reforms as part of the November 2002 Paris II donors conference, at which $4.4 billion in assistance was pledged, little progress was made in addressing mounting public debt, which reached a high of about 180 percent of GDP in 2006. The 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, followed by the 2007 fighting at the Nahr alBarid Palestinian refugee camp led to further destruction and economic pressures. GOL development priorities are outlined in a five-year action plan approved by the Cabinet. Focus areas include: water supply, waste water management, electricity, irrigation, and public infrastructure. Donors‘ conferences in Stockholm in 2006 and Paris in 2007 (―Paris III‖) resulted in about $8 billion in pledges, mostly concessional in nature.24 The lack of budget transparency in Lebanon makes the percentage of national budget funded by foreign assistance difficult to determine. Estimates vary between 25 and 35 percent. Much of the assistance pledged at Paris III was contingent on the Government meeting agreed economic reform benchmarks, including the elimination of government subsidies for electricity and privatizations of stateowned industries, such as telecommunications. Few of those benchmarks have been met, however; in particular, Paris III reforms that required legislative action went unfulfilled as the Parliament became embroiled in a prolonged political stalemate. As a result, many pledges have not been realized.25 With respect to the low rate of compliance with Paris III conditionality, one representative of an international financial institution questioned whether the international donor community should have been less ambitious.

The World Bank According to the World Bank Country Director, the Bank‘s current program in Lebanon is valued at $400 million. The program is focused on infrastructure and basic services, including the provision of electricity and water outside of Beirut; social sector support, including education and health; and overall financial management, starting with Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms. The 2007-2009 Interim Strategy Note (ISN) was comprised mostly of budget support, driven by the Paris III agenda, but as Bank officials told staff, the two years of the ISN program did not allow sufficient time to bring about the kinds of structural reforms that are needed in the Lebanese economy. They reported that there is some internal debate about the right ratio between budget support for structural reforms that are not likely to materialize in the near future, versus investment lending. Bank officials reported that they were working on a new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), but that no figure had yet been attached to it. Negotiations could not take place until a new government had been formed. Asked about the Bank‘s greatest successes, Bank officials told staff that, in the absence of an environment where structural reforms could be taken on, they were pleased with the progress they have been able to make through their technical assistance programs, especially the Public Financial Management (PFM) project, the aim of which is to bring a greater degree

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of transparency to the budget process. They explained that Lebanon‘s dual budget process has inherent disconnects between the planning and execution phases and is characterized by an overall lack of accountability. Through the PFM capacity-building project, the Bank has funded the provision of advisors to work directly in the Prime Minister‘s office, as well as the Ministries of Finance and Social Affairs. Bank staff credited this technical assistance with helping to build a culture of transparency in the capital spending process, and with spurring debate at the societal level about energy sector reform. Asked to comment on the obstacles to progress, one bank official pointed to the constraints of the domestic political situation: ―One lesson we learn over and over again is how difficult it is to judge what will be politically feasible.‖ For example, he said, the second tranche of the last ISN was never disbursed, because the GOL did not meet expectations with respect to energy sector reforms in the first tranche. In addition, they pointed out that all international assistance is funneled through the Council for Development and Reconstruction, which falls under the Prime Minister‘s office. Some interlocutors faulted the CDR for managing international assistance for the political benefit of the Prime Minister. Indeed, in a separate meeting, one GOL official asserted that the CDR-Prime Ministry relationship effectively circumvents the prerogatives of services-providing ministries, and is inconsistent with the intent of the constitution.

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The IMF in Lebanon The IMF opened a regional office in Beirut in January 2008, a move that, in the words of one official, was designed to signal improved relations. According to the IMF Resident Representative, the Fund‘s principal objective in Lebanon has been to help the GOL reduce its debt over time, according to the framework of Paris III. The Fund began an Emergency Post-conflict Assistance (EPCA) program in 2007, which has since come to an end. The IMF Resident Director explained that, in the absence of a government of national unity with whom to partner on implementing the Paris III agenda, there was no ongoing program. According to the IMF Resident Representative, the IMF would like to negotiate a stand-by arrangement, when possible. In the meantime, cognizant that the lack of a government could become an excuse for inaction, the Fund has proposed a staff monitored program.

Oversight As stated above, the Council for Development and Reconstruction has a mandate to execute all projects that have been agreed by the Cabinet; negotiate loans to finance the Cabinet-approved development goals; and develop overall plans and programs for sustainable development. Asked about opportunities for oversight of the foreign assistance process, GOL officials cited two mechanisms. The Lebanese Parliament must approve loans over a certain threshold. Indeed, according to a CDR official, about $1 billion in loans was awaiting Parliamentary approval at the time of this visit. After assistance is disbursed, the Lebanese Cour de Comptes (the equivalent of a Government Accountability Office) conducts audits.

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Recommendation As one interlocutor pointed out, the GOL would benefit from some kind of predisbursement audit, rather than rely on the ex post facto audits of the Cour de Comptes.

APPENDIX I. INTERLOCUTORS IN YEMEN

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Ambassador Stephen Seche and DCM Angie Bryan Acting Political Section Chief Faith Meyers and Economic Officer Roland McCay Special Operations, Central Command Forward Lt. Col. Rick Prins Office of Military Cooperation Deputy Lt. Col. Brit Smeal and FMF Officer Maj. Greg Mitchell Representatives of Yemeni non-governmental organizations working on conflict resolution issues Representatives of international organizations working on humanitarian assistance and refugee affairs USAID Mission Director Dr. Jeff Ashley and Deputy Director Sean Jones Deputy Finance Minister Jallal Yaqoub World Bank Resident Director Benson Ateng International Finance Corporation Country Director Raymond Conway Vice Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Hisham Sharaf Chairman, Yemeni Coast Guard Brigadier-General Ali Rassea Yemeni Air Force Col. Sheing Members of the Embassy Sanaa Military Information Support Team (MIST)

APPENDIX II. INTERLOCUTORS IN LEBANON Ambassador Michele Sisson and DCM Tom Daughton Office of Defense Cooperation officials, led by Chief Lt. Col. Jeffrey Pannaman Meeting with international donors of security assistance USAID Mission Director Denise Herbol Internal Security Forces General Munir Chaaban Visit to the INL-funded Police Academy with U.S. contractor training Visit to the Lebanese Armed Forces‘ ―Rangers‖ base. Regional Security Officer Paul Bauer Management Officer Christian Charette Political/Military Affairs Officer Mike Brennan IMF Resident Representative Eric Mottu World Bank Economist Sebnem Akkaya and Donor Coordination Chief Stefano Mocci Dr. Wafaa Charafeddine, Council for Development and Reconstruction Central Bank Director of Financial Operations Youssef El-Khalil Ministry of Finance Director General Alain Bifani

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Committee on Foreign Relations Public Affairs Officer Ryan Gliha

APPENDIX III. ACRONYMS

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AQAP: CG: CDR: CPS: DSCA: DCM: EDA: EPCA: ESF: FDI: FMF: GDP: GOL: IFI: IDA: INCLE: INL: IMF: ISN: LAF: LDC: LNG: MIST: NADR: NEC: ODC or OMC: PMF: ROYG: SOCCENT: YSOF: USAID: USG:

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Consultative Group Council for Development and Reconstruction Country Partnership Strategy Defense Security Cooperation Agency Deputy Chief of Mission Excess Defense Articles Emergency Post-conflict Assistance Economic Support Funds Foreign Direct Investment Foreign Military Financing Gross Domestic Product Government of Lebanon International Financial Institution International Development Association International State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs International Monetary Fund Interim Strategy Note Lebanese Armed Forces Least Developed Country Liquified Natural Gas Military Information Support Team Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs New Embassy Compound An Embassy‘s Office of Defense Cooperation, sometimes called Office of Military Cooperation Public Financial Management Republic of Yemen Government Special Operations Component of the U.S. Central Command Yemeni Special Operations Forces U.S. Agency for International Development U.S. Government

End Notes 1

The report can be found on the Government Printing Office‘s fdsys/search/home.action insert ″S. Prt. 109-52″ in the search line.

web-site—http://www.gpo.gov/

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For background on the respective roles and responsibilities of the various actors, see the December 4, 2009, Congressional Research Service (CRS) report prepared by Specialist in Inter¬national Affairs, Nina M. Serafino: ―Security Assistance Reform: Section 1206 Background and Issues for Congress,‖ which explains that major foreign military assistance programs have traditionally been carried out under State Department authority, oversight and guidance, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has been responsible for implementation. 3 Ibid. This chapter provides a thorough review of the evolution of Section 1206 authority. Because Lebanon and Yemen are the second and third largest recipients of Section 1206 funding to date, totaling $105.5 million and $97.3 million, respectively, the report goes into a fair amount of detail about the composition of the respective assistance packages. 4 According to State Department, only 3% of Yemen‘s land is arable. The country has long been a food importer. In 2009 the World Food Programme provided $55 million in assistance to 1.6 million beneficiaries in Yemen. 5 Statistics in this paragraph are widely cited in such reports as the State Department‘s Background Notes (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35836.htm); the CIA World Factbook (https:// www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html); and the reports of numerous non-governmental organizations. 6 Christopher Boucek, Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie En dowment for International Peace Middle East Program Number 102: September 2009, p. 16. 7 Boucek, p. 22. 8 Although the ROYG often seeks to portray the war in the north as ―counterterrorist‖ in nature and alleges that Iran is supporting and supplying weapons to the Houthis, these allegations have not been substantiated. 9 It is not possible to establish whether these night-time raids were enabled by U.S.-provided NVGs. The Yemeni armed Forces have also purchased night vision equipment from Russia and other sources. 10 To best reflect how much money was spent (not just planned for), where possible data reflects obligations, per fiscal year. Because of different U.S. Government accounting practices, however, this is not always possible. Therefore, data for Sections 1206 and 1207 reflects allocations, with data provided by the State Department‘s Office of the Coordinator for Foreign Assistance and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). All other data reflects obligations per fiscal year, with data through 2007 per the U.S. Agency for International Development‘s Greenbook (http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/). Data since that time comes from CRS. 11 Ambassador Seche told staff on October 20, 2009 that he had already directed OMC to develop a much more rigorous system. On November 11, 2009, State Department officials confirmed that such a system is being developed. 12 See the Interagency Evaluation of the 1206 Global Train and Equip Program, Inspectors General of the U.S. Department of Defense (Report No. ID-2009-007) and U.S. Department of State (Report No. ISP-I-09-69), August 31, 2009, in particular Appendix H: Lebanon Case Study, pp. 64–66. 13 In fact, in the FY 2009 Defense Authorization Act, the Congress provided authority for Section 1206 funds to be used in consecutive fiscal years, i.e., funds for a program that begins in one fiscal year may be used for that program in the next fiscal year. It is not likely that 1206 authorities would be expanded further for multi-year funding. Although the idea may warrant consideration from the perspective of logistical effectiveness, the notion of multi-year programming may run counter to Congressional intent in creating the 1206 mechanism to help partner nations combat urgent and emerging terrorist threats. See the above-referenced CRS report on ―Security Assistance Reform: Section 1206 Background and Issues for Congress‖ for a review of the legislative history and evolution of Section 1206 legislation. 14 Of course, the United States actively opposes the Arab League boycott of Israel. While some Arab states do not observe the boycott, Yemen does. 15 The Inspection Panel: Report No. 48995-YE Report and Recommendation: Yemen: Institu tional Reform Development Policy Grant (Grant No. H336-YEM), June 18, 2009. 16 For a general discussion on the need for fiscal transparency in Lebanon, see the 2009 report on Lebanon by the eStandards Forum of the Financial Standards Foundation: http:// estandardsforum.org/lebanon/standards/codeof-good-practices-on-transparency-in-fiscal-policy. 17 To best reflect how much money was spent (not just planned for), where possible data reflects obligations, per fiscal year. Because of different U.S. Government accounting practices, however, this is not always possible. Therefore, data for Sections 1206 and 1207, as well as the monies appropriated in the 2007 and 2009 supplemental spending bills, reflects allocations, with data provided by the State Department‘s Office of the Coordinator for Foreign Assistance and CRS. All other data reflects obligations per fiscal year, with data through 2007 per the U.S. Agency for International Development‘s Greenbook (http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov). Data since that time comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 18 In supplemental funding bills for FYs 2007 and 2009, Lebanon benefited from additional allocations for FMF in the amounts of $220 million and $74 million, respectively. 19 Similarly, supplemental funding for FY 2007 allowed for allocation of an additional $60 million in INCLE funding. 20 In addition to the committee‘s own Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign: A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, of December 15, 2006, see

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Interagency Evaluation of the 1206 Global Train and Equip Program, Inspectors General of the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, August 31, 2009; as well as Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries: Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, Sao Tome and Principe, by Eric Thompson and Patricio Asfura- Heim for CNA Analysis and Solutions, July 2008. The Government Accountability Office is also currently undertaking a review of Section 1206, at the conclusion of which it will publish its findings. 21 See footnote 12. The referenced CRS report on ―Security Assistance Reform: Section 1206 Background and Issues for Congress,‖ which explains that in the FY 2009 Defense Authorization Act, the Congress provided authority for Section 1206 funds to be used in consecutive fiscal years, i.e., funds for a program that begins in one fiscal year may be used for that program in the next fiscal year. 22 According to the IMF‘s 2009 Article IV Consultation Mission in Lebanon‘s Concluding Statement of March 5, 2009 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2009/030509.htm), Lebanon‘s gross reserves for 2009 were projected at over $20 billion, 47% of which were represented as foreign currency deposits in the banking system. 23 Ibid. IMF officials echoed this sentiment in private meetings with staff. They pointed out that, although the ratio has fallen to 160% from a high of 180% in 2006, it remained the highest in the world and is not sustainable over the long term. In a November 2009 briefing of SFRC staff, State Department officials indicated that the GOL‘s debt-GDP ratio had fallen further to about 150%, in part as a result of exchange rate fluctuations. 24 Of the approximate $7 billion pledged at Paris III, grants comprised about $1.5 billion. 25 According to the Paris III progress report issued in December 2008, By the end of 2008, 71% ($5.384 billion) of the Paris III pledges had been signed into agreements.

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Chapter 5

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HEARING ON YEMEN* WASHINGTON, D.C.--Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (DMA) delivered the following opening statement at a hearing on Yemen:

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Full text as prepared is below: Today we are here to discuss al Qaeda in Yemen, and the choices ahead for U.S. policy toward a nation whose challenges are daunting and numerous. But our thoughts and sympathy are with the people of Haiti, whose country has been shattered by an earthquake. Our doctors, troops, aid workers and volunteers are racing to reach those in desperate need, and Americans are making record donations. Next week this Committee will hold a hearing to review our response. But today we are sending our condolences and—urgently—our help to the Haitian people. This Administration and many on this Committee have long been concerned by the threat posed by al Qaeda‘s beachhead in Yemen. In fact, by Christmas, the Administration had already begun partnering with Yemen‘s government to go on offense against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Al Qaeda‘s presence in Yemen may not be new, but it is evolving. Last January, Saudi and Yemeni al Qaeda branches merged to form al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or ―AQAP.‖ In May, an AQAP bomber traveled from Yemen to launch a failed assassination attempt against a Saudi prince. Then, the foiled Christmas Day attack revealed AQAP‘s ambition to launch terrorist operations not just regionally, but globally and against America. Last night, the Foreign Relations Committee released a staff report on terrorism in Yemen and Somalia that reveals troubling new dimensions of the threat. According to U.S. law enforcement officials, over the past year, as many as three dozen American ex-convicts have traveled to Yemen upon release from prison. They reportedly went to study Arabic, but several have since disappeared, raising concerns that they may have gone to al Qaeda camps 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations publication dated January 20, 2010.

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John F. Kerry

for training. U.S. and Yemeni officials are also concerned about the whereabouts and intentions of a smaller group of Americans who have moved to Yemen, adopted a radical form of Islam, and married local women. As our enemies‘ tactics evolve, we need to keep up— and that includes taking a close look at the unique threat posed by American recruits into al Qaeda. We must recognize that al Qaeda is also just one of several profound, interlocking threats that Yemen faces. Consider how Yemen might look like in 2030: Its population has doubled, but its oil wells have disappeared and water has run dry. The central government, sapped by civil wars in the north and south, no longer exerts power outside a few population centers. Millions of refugees, many illiterate and unskilled, are pouring out into the Arabian Peninsula and beyond. And Al Qaeda is now deeply woven into Yemeni tribal society, having married into tribes and set up a network of schools and humanitarian aid in places forgotten by the central government. This scenario can be averted, but we need to craft a strategy that addresses our immediate, uncompromising need to go after al Qaeda while also ensuring that Yemen is not more dangerous in 2030 than it is today. First, the Administration is right to ratchet up our development and military aid in return for greater cooperation from President Saleh and his government. But we also need to enlist the help of others. Saudi aid dwarfs that of all other donors, including our own—and so does their leverage. The key will be to match Arab resources and local knowledge with Western technical and development expertise. Next week‘s London ministerial meeting on Yemen is a crucial chance to begin formulating an effective, coordinated effort commensurate with the scale of the challenge. Second, we need to be smart about how our actions are felt on the ground. AntiAmericanism runs deep in Yemen, and a narrow focus on al-Qaeda risks stoking resentment, raising al-Qaeda‘s profile and limiting the government‘s ability to sustain a partnership with us. If our development efforts can deliver concrete benefits not just to the ruling elite, but to a Yemeni society hungry for better job prospects, that will undercut the appeal of the extremist narrative. USAID‘s new assistance strategy to address the drivers of Yemen‘s instability is an important starting point. Government partnership, strong support from the international community, and a targeted approach focused on local institutions will also be vital ingredients of any future success. Third, we have to be realistic about Yemen‘s current capacity to fight al-Qaeda, and commit ourselves to improving it over time. Even before Christmas, the Yemeni military had begun taking the fight to al-Qaeda. But over time, nothing would do more to move counterterrorism further up the Yemeni government‘s priority list—not to mention dramatically improving Yemen‘s long-term prospects—than finding a way to turn down the temperature on the Houthi rebellion in the north and civil unrest in the south. The Houthi conflict is not primarily sectarian in nature, but as it drags on, it risks expanding into a regional proxy war. Most see no military solution to this conflict. We should work with the international community to contain the fighting, ensure that humanitarian supplies reach its victims, and eventually address its root causes. Likewise in southern Yemen, we must find ways to encourage President Saleh to address longstanding grievances before unrest becomes insurgency.

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Finally, we should view the threat posed by AQAP in the context of a global challenge. Al Qaeda‘s affiliates demand our attention, but the movement‘s nerve center remains in Pakistan. Many in Washington have recently begun a crash course in Yemen. We are fortunate to have with us today several genuine experts who have been studying Yemen for decades.

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Chapter 6

OPENING STATEMENT OF DICK LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FOR INDIANA, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE * ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HEARING ON YEMEN

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U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Dick Lugar made the following statement at today’s hearing. I thank Chairman Kerry for holding this timely hearing, and I join him in welcoming our distinguished witnesses. Last year, I was pleased to co-sponsor with Senator Cardin, S. Res. 341, which passed by unanimous consent in early December. The purpose of the resolution was to raise awareness about the problems Yemen faces, including the threat from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Among other points, the resolution called on the President to ―give sufficient weight to the situation in Yemen in efforts to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States, United States allies, and Yemeni civilians.‖ The resolution also emphasized the need to address Yemen‘s severe under-development and to promote good governance, without which stability in that country will be elusive. The appeal of Islamic extremism in Yemen is heightened by the country‘s staggering unemployment rate. With half the population under the age of 15, an enormous generation is coming of age without economic opportunity. As one thoughtful Yemeni official said recently, ―Either we give our young people hope, or someone else will give them an illusion.‖ The United States must work urgently and creatively to meet the potential terrorist threat from Yemen. But, we can‘t do it alone. First and foremost, we need the unequivocal commitment of Yemen‘s government to combat al-Qaeda. Our long-term strategy must account for the reality that pursuing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is neither logistically easy, nor politically popular with the Yemeni people. We need to communicate to Yemen‘s people that our battle is not with them. We should demonstrate our common interests in promoting economic prosperity, supporting good governance, and fighting violence and extremism. We should not be shy about advocating political reform and decentralization, goals that will both resonate with the Yemeni people and promote greater stability. To this end, we should develop common cause with reform-oriented officials in the government and 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations publication dated January 20, 2010

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Dick Lugar

with like-minded donors. We should help empower civil society organizations in Yemen that want to be part of the solution. Last Fall, I asked the Foreign Relations Committee minority staff to study the situation in Yemen. I am circulating the staff report (available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:54245.pdf), so that its findings may help inform our deliberations. Indeed, in my view, the debate about Yemen needs to be refocused. In the days since the foiled December 25th attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route to Detroit, the media has focused much attention on after-action analysis of the series of human and systemic errors that allowed the would-be bomber to board his flight. Much of this analysis is connected to fixing blame for the event. This reaction is inevitable, and perhaps necessary to correct security flaws, but it does not address the more difficult problem of the terrorist threat emanating from Yemen. If we are to have any hope of neutralizing this threat and helping that country move away from the brink of state failure, our nation‘s policymakers need to comprehend the intricate social, economic, and historic forces at play. That is why we are here today. I hope our witnesses will help inform the policy debate and generate options. To that end, I would ask our witnesses to offer their observations on the appeal of violent extremism in Yemen. What factors have allowed al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to regroup in Yemen? Has AQAP taken advantage of the Yemeni government‘s preoccupation with the rebellion in the north and a secessionist movement in the south? The existence of swaths of ungoverned spaces are inviting to this terrorist organization, but what kind of support network does AQAP enjoy in Yemen? What are AQAP‘s key vulnerabilities, and how can they be exploited? We also need to better understand Yemen‘s other conflicts. What are the dynamics of the war in the north, and the underpinnings of the secessionist aspirations of the south? What are the prospects that these conflicts can be resolved peacefully? Yemen also faces a multitude of socio-economic challenges, including depleting oil reserves, rapidly diminishing water resources, and widespread poverty and unemployment. To what degree is stability in Yemen dependent on addressing these problems? To the extent that Saudi Arabia exercises the greatest leverage over its neighbor, how can the United States most effectively partner with Riyadh to help address Yemen‘s challenges? Are there opportunities to work more effectively with the Gulf Cooperation Council? What creative ideas is the Administration bringing to the Friends of Yemen meeting in London this week? Finally, we need a comprehensive view of the humanitarian crises in Yemen. What are the obstacles to the provision of humanitarian relief to those who have been displaced? What is the status of Somali and Ethiopian refugees, and what more can be done to address their plight? Is there a nexus, as some have suggested, between AQAP and Somalia? I appreciate the depth of experience that our witnesses possess on these issues, and I look forward to their insights.

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Chapter 7

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TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, AND AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS* Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and Distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee today to discuss this important subject. The unsuccessful attack on a U.S.-bound aircraft on December 25, 2009 serves as a further reminder of the threats that can emerge when ungoverned and poorly governed places around the world are exploited by terrorists. The United States and the international community have been engaged in supporting good governance, sustainable development, and improved security in Yemen for years. Recognizing the growing threat emanating from Yemen, the United States has been significantly ramping up levels of both security and development assistance since FY 2008. In addition, this administration has developed a new, more holistic Yemen policy that not only seeks to address security and counter terrorism concerns, but also the profound political, economic, and social challenges that help Al-Qaeda and related affiliates to operate and flourish. Yemen is beset by a number of challenges and crises. The Senate recently noted these challenges with the passage of Senate Resolution 341, sponsored by Senators Cardin, Lugar, Casey, and Lieberman. Senator Kerry called for this hearing where the spotlight will shine brighter on the situation in Yemen. Other Members of Congress, including Senator Feingold, have regularly raised awareness of the threats emerging from Yemen that pose serious challenges to America‘s national security. The United States supports a unified, stable, democratic and prosperous Yemen. The Government of Yemen‘s approach must be a comprehensive one to address the security, 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations publication dated January 20, 2010.

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political, and economic challenges that it faces and the United States will be supportive in those efforts. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress as we refine and implement our strategy moving forward.

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CONTEXT FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD YEMEN Due to increasing concerns about instability in and threats emanating from Yemen, the Obama administration decided to undertake a full-scale review of our Yemen policy, under the aegis of the National Security Council, in the spring of 2009. The primary threat to U.S. interests in Yemen and a grave threat to the security and stability of the Government of Yemen (ROYG) is the presence of Al-Qaeda-related extremists in the country. This threat was brought home to the American public by the attempted bombing of NWA flight #253 on Christmas Day. As President Obama noted on January 2, the suspect ―traveled to Yemen, where it appears that he joined an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, and that this group – Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – trained him, equipped him with those explosives, and directed him to attack that plane headed for America.‖ The Al-Qaeda threat in Yemen is not new. Indeed, Al-Qaeda has had a presence in Yemen since well before the United States had even identified the group or recognized that it posed a significant threat. In 1992, Al-Qaeda militants attacked a hotel in Aden where American military personnel were staying, en route to Somalia to support the UN mission. Two individuals were killed, neither of them American. In the 1990s, a series of major conspiracies were based in Yemen, most of them aimed at Saudi Arabia. Following the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, the Yemeni government, with support from the U.S., dealt significant blows to Al-Qaeda‘s presence in Yemen through military operations and arrests of key leaders. During much of the subsequent period, the Government of Yemen became distracted by other domestic security concerns, and our bilateral cooperation experienced setbacks. After the May 2003 Al-Qaeda attacks in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia dramatically improved its counterterrorism efforts. Many radicals fled Saudi Arabia for Yemen, joining other fighters who had returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan. A group of senior Al-Qaeda leaders escaped from a Yemeni prison in 2006, further strengthening AlQaeda‘s presence. For the last five years, these terrorists have carried out multiple attacks against Yemenis, Americans, and citizens of other countries. In January 2009, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi Al-Qaeda operatives were now working together under the banner of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Evidence of the December 25 conspiracy indicates that AQAP has become sufficiently and independently capable of carrying out strikes against the United States and allies outside of the Arabian Peninsula, including in the U.S. homeland. Upon entering office, the Obama administration quickly understood that this Al-Qaedarelated activity, as well as poor and deteriorating development indicators – including poverty, illiteracy, and a lack of access to health care – troubling human rights conditions, and a bleak long-term economic outlook, demanded a reappraisal of our Yemen policy. We needed a strategy able to match the complexity and gravity of the challenges facing Yemen.

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The U.S. Government review has led to a new, whole-of-government approach to Yemen that aims to mobilize and coordinate with other international actors. Our new strategy seeks to address the root causes of instability, encourage political reconciliation, improve governance, and build the capacity of Yemen‘s government to exercise its authority, protect and deliver services to its people, and secure its territory.

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A TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY U.S. strategy toward Yemen is two-pronged: (1) strengthen the Government of Yemen‘s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from violent extremists within its borders, and (2) mitigate Yemen‘s economic crisis and deficiencies in government capacity, provision of services, and transparency. As Yemen‘s security challenges and its social, political, and economic challenges are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, so U.S. policy must be holistic and flexible in order to be effective both in the short and long term. The Government of Yemen faces a variety of security threats as well as challenges to the country‘s very cohesion. Three are particularly acute: the presence of Al-Qaeda and other violent extremists, the Houthi rebellion in the north of the country, and an increasingly militant protest movement in the south that has taken on secessionist overtones. The violent conflict in the Sa‘ada governorate of northern Yemen between the central government and Houthi rebels, and the protest movement in the South, which has led to riots and sporadic outbreaks of violence, are fueled by long-standing grievances. Just as the United States deplores the use of violence by these groups to achieve their political goals, a solely military approach by Yemen cannot produce a lasting and sustainable end to conflict. The continued fighting in the north against Houthi rebels has dire humanitarian consequences, with thousands killed and over 200,000 displaced in sometimes appalling conditions. We continue to call for a ceasefire and to encourage both parties to return to negotiations. While this is the sixth round of fighting and previous ceasefires did not last, we believe that serious political negotiations can address the core grievances that fuel the conflict as well as ensure that the Houthi rebels do not rearm or again threaten the Yemeni state. The United States will support the Government of Yemen‘s efforts to achieve a lasting peace that allows for the provision of humanitarian and development assistance in Sa‘ada, and will encourage its Gulf neighbors and other partners to do so as well. To assist those displaced by the conflict, USAID‘s Office of Food for Peace has donated $7.5 million in emergency food aid and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has contributed $3 million to relief efforts. The southern protest movement in Yemen is also extremely worrisome. The ROYG and southern leaders need to engage in a political dialogue that addresses political and economic grievances that stretch back to Yemen‘s unification in 1990. Decentralization offers one possible approach through which the central authority can devolve power and resources to individual governorates, encouraging local solutions to long-standing grievances. Al-Qaeda, related extremists, and other destabilizing non-state actors, to include criminal networks and tribal actors, benefit from these challenging circumstances in Yemen, including a weak central-government presence in the country‘s most restive areas. Despite certain commonalities, little evidence has emerged that the activities of these various non-state actors are related, although we must remain mindful of that potential.

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In the past year, senior administration officials have traveled to Yemen frequently, including, most recently, General David Petraeus, Deputy National Security Advisor Brennan and Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman to press our concern about Al-Qaeda‘s ability to operate from and within Yemen. The Government of Yemen‘s willingness to take robust measures to confront the serious threat Al-Qaeda poses to the nation‘s stability has been inconsistent in the past, but our recent intensive engagement appears to have had positive results. In the past month, Yemen has conducted multiple operations designed to disrupt AQAP‘s operational planning and deprive its leadership of safe haven within Yemen‘s national territory. Yemen has significantly increased the pressure on Al-Qaeda, and has carried out ai rstrikes and ground operations against senior AlQaeda targets, most recently on Friday of last week. The United States commends Yemen on these successful operations and is committed to continuing support for an effective counterterrorism effort that will include both security and economic-development initiatives. On the security front, the Departments of State and Defense provide training and assistance to Yemen‘s key counterterrorism units. Through Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/ATA) programs we provide training to security forces in the Ministry of Interior, including the Yemeni Coast Guard and the Central Security Force‘s Counterterrorism Unit (CTU). Future training could include border control management, crime scene investigation, fraudulent document recognition, surveillance detection, crisis management and a comprehensive airport security/screening consultation and assessment. We also see additional opportunities now to increase our training and capacity-building programs for Yemeni law enforcement. In addition, we are working with the Department of Defense to use 1206 funds for counterterrorism assistance to Yemen. With support from Congress, levels of U.S. security assistance and our engagement with our Yemeni partners has increased in recent years. The Departments of State and Defense coordinate closely in planning and implementing assistance programs. The United States also engages directly and positively with the people of Yemen through educational and cultural programs and exchanges. These initiatives contribute to the longterm health of our bilateral relationship and help allay suspicion and misunderstanding. Exchange programs have a multiplying effect as participants return to Yemen and convey to friends and family the realities of American culture and society, dispelling damaging but persistent stereotypes. As public understanding of U.S. policy and American values increases in Yemen, extremist and anti-American sentiment wanes. Along with severe poverty, resource constraints and governance problems, Yemen also confronts the challenge of a rapidly growing population. Per capita income of $930 ranks it 166th out of 174 countries according to the World Bank. Yemen is highly dependent on oil exports, but its oil production is steadily decreasing. Water resources are fast being depleted. With over half of its people living in poverty and the population growing at an unsustainable 3.2 percent per year, economic conditions threaten to worsen and further tax the government‘s already limited capacity to ensure basic levels of support and opportunity for its citizens. Endemic corruption further impedes the ability of the Yemeni government to provide essential services. The overarching goal of U.S. development and security assistance to Yemen is to improve stability and security by improving governance and helping to meet pressing socioeconomic challenges. Excluding for the moment 1206 and 1207 counter-terrorism funding, U.S. development and security assistance have increased in Yemen from $17.2 million in

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FY2008, to $40.3 million in FY2009. Although final determinations have yet to be made, total FY 2010 assistance may be as much as $63 million. These figures do not include approximately $67 million in 1206 funds for FY2009, the 1206 funds currently being discussed for FY2010, or additional funds from State, USAID, and USDA contingency funds in FY09 and FY10. U.S. security and stabilization assistance targets the economic, social, and political sources of instability in the country, while seeking to make improved conditions sustainable over the long-term by strengthening the governance capacity, political will, and effectiveness of the Yemeni government in addressing these issues. At the same time, our targeted humanitarian assistance is responding to acute humanitarian crises and helping to bridge the gaps between relief and development. Local conditions vary widely across Yemen‘s 21 governorates, for reasons related to geography, culture, relationships to the central authority, and governance practices. U.S. assistance must be based on an accurate and localized understanding of communities‘ needs. As security improves in the country, so will our ability – and that of other international donors – to work with the Government of Yemen to initiate education, health and other development programs in traditionally under-served areas of Yemen. It is essential that the impact of these programs be visible and tangible, that communities feel ownership of the projects being implemented, and that programs encourage positive linkages to legitimate governing structures. The United States is determined to halt and reverse troubling socio-economic dynamics in Yemen. Priorities for U.S. assistance include political and fiscal reforms and meaningful attention to legitimate internal grievances; better governance through decentralization, reduced corruption and civil service reform; economic diversification to generate employment and enhance livelihoods, and strengthened natural resource management. USAID is exploring opportunities to expand engagement with local civic and religious leaders on traditional practices and customs that can reinforce environmental sustainability, food security, and social cohesion. USAID will also work to build the capacity of Yemen‘s government ministries to deliver services more effectively, efficiently and responsively. Working in close coordination with other international donors, including Arab states, USAID can have a significant impact by improving the Yemeni government‘s ability to absorb and use effectively foreign assistance. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) works with Yemeni civil society to strengthen good governance and the rule of law, improve internal stability, and empower Yemenis to build a more peaceful and prosperous future. MEPI has 26 active programs in Yemen, including a number of local grant programs. These programs include training for Yemeni government ministries and advocacy and capacity building for emerging civil society and non-governmental organizations. Direct support of Yemeni organizations enables MEPI‘s assistance programs to be particularly flexible and to access communities in difficult to reach rural areas. MEPI-funded activities are, and will continue to be, coordinated with USAID and other programming. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) operates a program in Yemen to increase public awareness and understanding of religious freedom and tolerance with a particular focus on youth. This program is helping to counter extremism and encourage a culture of tolerance through a combination of training and events. In addition, DRL has solicited proposals for new programs in Yemen to support independent media and access to information, which will help strengthen transparent and accountable governance.

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CHALLENGES AHEAD Given the difficult political, economic, social, security, and governance challenges besetting the country, we must recognize progress will not come easily. But, as Secretary Clinton stated earlier this month, ―... the cost of doing nothing is potentially far greater.‖ The ROYG‘s ability to deliver services is limited by an inefficient, often corrupt, and poorly resourced bureaucracy. The Government‘s capacity to absorb assistance is similarly complicated by these limitations. In an effort to address these impediments, USAID‘s national governance program will work to bolster relevant institutions, including the National Audit Board and Supreme National Anti Corruption Commission. At a local level, the new USAID strategy works to promote better interaction between Yemenis and their government. Other donor nations and the World Bank are working to improve Yemens‘ bureaucracy so that the ROYG can be a better steward of development assistance and a more reliable service provider for its people. Unequal development and political marginalization of certain groups creates additional space for Al-Qaeda to operate and the absence of government services aggravates political disagreements. Limited and rapidly depleting natural resources also cloud Yemen‘s future. Oil serves as the government‘s primary source of revenue with 85-90% of export earnings, though oil production is decreasing and Yemen‘s reserves are projected to run out in ten to twenty years. Water scarcity is another concern, in part for its negative affect on agricultural production and potential. The United Nations World Food Program has deemed Yemen the most foodinsecure country in the Middle East. Demographically, the country is experiencing a youth bulge: according to a November 2008 USA ID-funded study, close to half the population is under the age of 15, and another one-third is between the ages of 15 and 29. Youth unemployment is a major problem, with some data suggesting a rate that is double that of adults. Yemen‘s population has doubled since 1990 and is set to almost double again by 2025 (from 19.7 million in 2004 to 38 million in 2025). The country‘s limited resources are inadequate to support the existing and expanding population. These conditions, among other factors, make Yemeni youth susceptible to extremist messaging.

ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF U.S. RESPONSE The United States is engaged with international partners, especially regional states, in working with the Government of Yemen to help address the need for rejuvenating the economy and promoting investment and job creation. Meeting in London in November 2006, the international community pledged $5.2 billion for Yemen, although a significant portion of those funds has yet to be provided, largely due to a lack of confidence in the ability of the Yemeni government to use this support effectively. The United States is providing assistance specifically aimed at increasing the capacity of the ROYG in this regard. We depend in these efforts on the involvement of Yemen‘s neighbors, which is important not just for Yemen‘s security, including border security, but also for its economic development. Secretary of State Clinton discussed increasing and coordinating international efforts to support Yemen at

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meetings during the UN General Assembly in September, 2009 and with members of the Gulf Coordination Council in Morocco in November, 2009. The United Kingdom will convene a ministerial meeting on Yemen in London on January 27. This meeting will help consolidate international support for Yemen, coordinate assistance efforts, and generate momentum in support of Yemen‘s political and economic reform efforts. We acknowledge the regional nature of the terrorism threat and the need for regionally coordinated responses. In consultation with the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. ambassadors from the Middle East host regular strategy sessions where interagency policymakers and representatives of the combatant commands meet to assess threats and devise appropriate strategies, actionable initiatives, and policy recommendations. These regional strategy sessions provide mechanisms for Ambassadors to tackle terrorist threats that one team, or one country alone, cannot adequately address. United States strategy in Yemen recognizes that improved governance capacity in the country will be key to securing long-term gains, in terms of development indicators and security and stability. Good governance and effective institutions enable effective development work. In order to help make the environment increasingly hostile to the spread of violent extremism, we must help facilitate an improved relationship between Yemeni citizens and their government. The work of USA ID, M EPI, DRL, and others is aimed at achieving these objectives.

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CONCLUSION We recognize quite clearly that the Al-Qaeda threat emanating from Yemen directly threatens U.S. vital interests. We must address the problem of terrorism in Yemen in a comprehensive and sustained manner that takes into account a wide range of political, cultural and socio-economic factors. Ultimately, the goal of U.S. and international efforts is a stable, secure and effectively governed Yemen. Towards this end, we will work to restore confidence between the Yemeni people and their government through the provision of basic infrastructure and public services. As the Government of Yemen grows more transparent and responsive to the requirements of its citizens, the seeds of extremism and violence will find less fertile ground and a more positive and productive dynamic will begin to prevail.

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In: Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role Editor: Gabriel A. Dumont

ISBN: 978-1-61728-165-5 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 8

BEWARE OF FALSE ANALOGIES: WHY YEMEN IS NOT IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN OR SOMALIA....IT’S YEMEN*

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Barbara K. Bodine To borrow from a fellow Missourian, reports of Yemen‘s demise are exaggerated. Depending on how we as well as the Yemeni government and the Yemenis handle this next year, it could become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Yemen is not a failed state. It is fragile and faces challenges – economic, demographic, political and security - that would sunder others. There are those who would write it off as a lost cause, dismiss it as a sink-hole of assistance, outsource the problems and the solutions to the neighbors or turn it into a Third Front when we have not yet completed nor been unquestioningly successful in the first two.      

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President Obama is correct that we should continue to partner with Yemen to deny al Qaeda sanctuary. The Yemeni Government requested assistance, training and equipment support in this effort. We responded affirmatively. This is necessary, but insufficient. The Administration has doubled economic assistance, but the levels are inadequate in and of themselves and in comparison to security assistance. This must be more than an American effort, but international donor conferences are rarely constructive, strategic or concrete. The fundamental challenges facing Yemen are resources and capacity not will. What is needed, therefore, is a sustained, comprehensive strategy to:  Avoid the temptation to apply false analogies from other conflicts Yemen is not Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia; templates do not work American boots on the ground will be counterproductive Apply the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan wisely  Efforts at security without legitimacy will not bring stability

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations publication dated January 20, 2010.

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Civilian-led and civilian-focused diplomacy and development are required upfront, early and long-term Build state capacity, e.g. civilian capacity; professionalized civil service Work through existing structures, not seek to create new ones Do not empower the military/police at the expense of the civilian Support democratic governance, including local administration, civil society, the media and public integrity programs Work with all parties including opposition groups Support sustained investment in education at all levels People are Yemen‘s major natural resource. Make that an asset. Support reconciliation solutions to northern and southern conflicts This means neither appeasement nor capitulation Support regionally-based negotiation efforts Support programs and capacity to address core grievances

A REVIEW OF THE BASICS Many of the basic facts are known, and much discussed in the past few weeks.   

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It is large, perhaps the size of France or Texas It is rugged and forbidding – mountainous along the coasts; desert in the interior It is populous (20 to 25 million), perhaps exceeding the population of the rest of the peninsula combined...and that population is growing at a staggering rate. It is bereft of sufficient natural resources to support its own population or provide either government revenue or meaningful exports. It lacks adequate arable land, surface water or oil. It is beset by three serious, unrelated security challenges – in the north with the Houthi rebellion, in the south with secession sentiments, and the east with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). And, finally, as both a reflection and a consequence of many of these factors, the central government works within a primordially decentralized political structure, limited services and corrosive reports of corruption.

Sounds like a failed state, but it isn‘t. 

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Yemen lacks the sectarian divides that exploded in Iraq. They are neither Sunni nor Shia and most certainly not Wahhabi. It would be a mistake to view the violence in the north, the al-Houthi rebellion, through a sectarian prism or assume and respond as if it were a Saudi-Iranian proxy war. The potential exists but that is neither the proximate cause nor the inevitable outcome. Yemen lacks the ethnic/linguistic cleavages of Afghanistan. Despite regional distinctions and distinct political histories, expanded upon below, there is a strong sense of Yemeni identity and tradition of inclusiveness. Contrary to the new conventional wisdom, the writ of the state extends beyond the capital.

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Yemen lacks the tradition of clan violence found in Somalia or of warlords in Afghanistan. Yemen is often described as a tribal society, but it would be a mistake to understand these tribes as vertical rather than horizontal structures and to vest in tribal leaders too much authority. There is far more fluidity to the society than the label ―tribal‖ applies and far greater traditional but effective participation and accountability. Yemen is politically more developed than any of the three template states. Congress, the Administration and major democracy-support organizations recognize Yemen as an emerging democracy with 20 years experience in free, fair and contested elections, including the last presidential election, non-sectarian, nationally-based multi-parties, open press and civil society. It is fragile and flawed but real.

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POLITICAL HISTORY AND CURRENT EVENTS When I worked on Iraq I was informed by one senior official, after an attempt to inject a little Iraqi history in the discussions, that ―we were smarter than history.‖ We‘re not, and policy made absent an understanding of history is fatally flawed. More so in a complex and ancient society such as Yemen. In the space of less than 50 years Yemen moved from anachronistic political systems to what most objective observers concede is an indigenous, democratic system. To say that the political integration is not yet complete, that the infrastructure of governance is insufficient, is an understatement few Yemenis would argue with. That is not the same as failure. Since the 1990 unification, only 20 years ago, the size of Yemen has more than tripled. The unification of north and south was precipitated by the collapse of the South‘s primary patron, the Soviet Union, but unification had been an article of faith since at least the Republican Revolution in the North in the 1960s and the end of the British colonial status in the South in 1967. As a start, the former North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen) were essentially east and west of each other. A significant portion of North Yemeni senior officials were from the South and a significant portion of South Yemeni officials were from the North. While the divide was roughly where the mountains hit the coastal plain, the divide was not along an easy Zaydi (not Shia) vs. Shafi (not Sunni) sectarian line. The unification was also more complex than the stapling together of an anti-monarchical republic and a lapsed Marxist-Leninist state. It was the unification of at least three rather than two distinct political cultures and historical memories. 

North Yemen: The highlands were a hereditary Zaydi theocracy closed to the outside world until the 1962 Republican Revolution. Saudi Arabia backed the monarchists; Nasser‘s Egypt the Republicans. The Revolution was the defining moment in modern Yemeni history. A vast majority of Yemenis live in the highlands on subsistence agriculture in small, scattered villages.

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Aden Port: A British Crown Colony from 1839 until 1967 and capital of Marxist South Yemen. Relatively modern, densely populated and directly governed by the British, with strong ties to India and the subcontinent. Aden Protectorates: 10 or so tribes, sultanates and emirates to the east of Aden Port under protectorate status from 1880s/1890s until the early 1960s. Sparsely populated, politically traditional and socially conservative. Allowed a considerable degree of autonomy under the British and an awkward fit with Aden in the events leading up to and following independence in 1967.

Although its international borders with Saudi Arabia were finally negotiated only 10 years ago, Yemen is not an artificial construct of the colonial era. It calculates its history in millennia not decades or centuries. Aden Port has been a prize for nearly as long, and there is evidence of a brief and unsuccessful Roman presence near Aden. Attempts by the Ottomans to control the north repeatedly ended in failure. Aden was a British Crown Colony and one of the jewels in that crown, serving as a major coaling station. The eastern portion, primarily the Hadramaut was under protectorate status only. Despite a century plus of British colonialism in the Aden, by and large, the Yemen highlands and the eastern reaches missed most of the colonial period. Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of North Yemen in 1978 following the assassination of two North Yemeni presidents, one by South Yemeni agents, in the space of nine months. (The South Yemeni president was assassinated in the same timeframe by a hard line rival). Eight months later, in early 1979, the South invaded the North, prompting massive US military assistance to the North and support from a broad number of Arab states, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The South was backed by the Soviet Union and its allies, including Cuba. From 1976 to 1982 the South also backed an insurgency in the North. What Ali Abdullah Saleh inherited in 1978 and struggled with into the 1980s was a state that essentially existed along the Sana‘a-TaizHodeidah roads, and in the daylight. The southern border with the People Democratic Republic of Yemen was volatile and the 2000 mile border with Saudi Arabia was contested and undemarcated. To compound the challenges of political histories, the union in 1990, while a negotiated agreement, was not between equals. North Yemen, while impoverished and underdeveloped, had approximately 15 million people; the South, with one of the best natural harbors in the world and a refinery, had less than 2 million and was abandoned by its patron and benefactor, the Soviets. In addition, whatever Aden‘s natural advantages, it had been decimated by the closure of the Suez Canal and its British infrastructure had been allowed to rot under the Soviets. The South brought few assets, great expectations and a number of liabilities into the union. South Yemen was an international – or at least and American – pariah. It was the first state placed on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list for the collection of Marxist and alphabet soup terrorist group training camps, and ranked exceedingly low on early Human Rights Reports. What it also brought to the union was a bureaucracy of over 300,000 officials, larger by several factors than that of the North. Finally, there remained unsettled scores between the traditional and disposed leaders of the former protectorates and remnants of the Marxist government. Governing Yemen is no easy undertaking. Resources have not kept pace with demands. Oil provided a respite but never at the levels commensurate with the neighbors, the needs or

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the expectations. Yemenis are fiercely independent and while demanding of government services will resist any heavy government hand. Their political and social worldviews run the gamut from well- educated, urban technocrats to simple farmers, from secular socialists through nationalists, a legal Islamist party to Salafi. It would be a mistake to assume all technocrats were liberals and reformers and that all farmers and tribesmen were Islamists or that any of these came in neat geographically defined packages. Yemen is not that simple. Any government must balance the competing needs and demands of this disparate and deeply politically engaged population. Any issue, program, official, rumor or fact will be debated at length both in Parliament and in the equally important qat chews. Patronage is an essential element of any government‘s ability to maintain power – even here – but it is not sufficient to explain the survival of the government over 30 years. Perhaps the best analogy is a juggler with plates on a stick. Each plate must be given its due attention or it, and perhaps all of them, will come crashing down. To the extent the three major security concerns – the Houthi, the southerners and AQAP – pose an existential threat to the survival of the government and the state it is not their desire or ability to replace the government but their ability to distract and divert attention and resources. This government and no foreseeable successor government can manage all three adequately and still provide even the basics in services. The juggler can only move so fast.

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THE US AND YEMEN Given the self-isolation of the North and British control of Aden, the US essentially ignored The Yemens for most of its modern history. One major exception – a US scholarship program in the late 40‘s and early 50‘s for forty young men, mostly Zaydi, to study in the US. Nearly all returned to Yemen, none cast their lot with the royalists and many went on to serve Yemen as technocrats, government ministers and the core of Yemen‘s political evolution over the next 50 years. President Kennedy‘s decision to recognize the Republican government in the North in 1962, barely three months after the Revolt irritated our friends the British, French and the Saudis. Finally, the US strongly and publicly backed Yemeni unity during the brief civil war and looked to Yemen to be a constructive partner after 9/11. Earlier this month, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, gave Yemen good marks on this last count, as had the previous Administration. Yemeni support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and Yemeni mujahedeen battling the Soviets in Afghanistan (a disproportionate number of whom came from the south) became liabilities in the relationship only in retrospect. Beyond that, Yemen figured as a secondary player in broader Cold War and regional politics. Nasser‘s Egypt squared off against the Saudi monarchy over the Republican Revolution. The Egyptians threw in the towel in 1967 following their defeat in the war with Israel, although at that stage the Republicans had essentially defeated the monarchists. South Yemeni meddling in the North reflected tensions along the Soviet-West fault lines as inherent tensions along the Yemeni border. Our decision to provide massive military assistance to the North in the 1979 border war reflected events in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa as much as any intrinsic interest in North Yemen.

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US economic development assistance and security cooperation with Yemen has been erratic and episodic. After the airlift of military equipment in 1979, the US essentially walked away from any relationship with the Yemeni military. That equipment, or some of it, was still in the Yemeni inventory when I arrived almost 20 years later as Ambassador. Economic assistance waxed and waned. In the best of times it included a vibrant and still wellremembered Peace Corps program, major agricultural development assistance and an active scholarship program. At other times, we virtually zeroed it out. When I arrived as Ambassador in 1997 we had essentially no development program, no USAID personnel, no Peace Corps, and no longer provided scholarships. The Yemeni decision not to support the 1990 UN Security Council Resolution on Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the 1994 Civil War are often cited as the reasons for this precipitous drop. However, Yemen was not alone among Arab states – including Jordan and Tunisia – on opposing non-Arab military action to liberate Kuwait and the Civil War lasted barely 2 months. It hardly represented a direct or continuous threat to US personnel. Basically, Yemen just slipped quietly off the radar screen. No major economic interests; no apparent security interest. Neither malicious nor benign neglect on our part. Just indifference. The mandate of my tenure as ambassador, with the full backing of the Department of State and General Zinni at Central Command, was to rebuild the relationship on as broad a front as possible, including security cooperation, democracy support, scholarships, economic development, and creation of a Coast Guard. The attack on USS Cole was not only an attack on the US but was seen by the Yemenis as an attack on them and an attack on the changing relationship. The perception of many Yemenis, including our friends, is that in recent years the aperture narrowed to security only or security first, and security as we defined it. We need to reopen that aperture.

YEMEN’S CHALLENGES; US OPTIONS It is not difficult to curb one‘s enthusiasm over our announced doubling of economic assistance to $40 million/year along with $120 million in military assistance. If we accept that there are somewhere in the neighborhood of 100-200 AQAP members in Yemen, and approximately 25 million Yemenis not affiliated with AQAP, we have upped our assistance to the non-AQAP Yemenis from less than $ 1/per year/per Yemeni to about a buck sixty per and have committed over $500,000.00/AQAP/year. I understand that there is not a direct dollar-to-dollar correlation between an effective level of development assistance and military assistance, but this is not good, and it‘s not smart and it is not effective. Yemen faces four major inherent challenges:    

Water: Finite, inadequate and diminishing rapidly Energy: Finite, inadequate and diminishing rapidly Political Infrastructure: Finite, inadequate and vulnerable Population: Apparently infinite, abundant and expanding rapidly

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These four challenges feed the three security challenges, two directly and AQAP indirectly. In both the northern rebellion and among the southern secessionists, a fundamental issue is the perception, the reality, of inadequate provision of governmental services. This is not to say that the central government is no more than a mayoralty. That reflects a lack of appreciation for the intrinsic character of the political and social system. It is also not to say that there is a demand for a strong central government. It is a demand for a more effective, efficient and responsive government, one that provides resources through credible support to the local administrations system and to the citizens.

Water Reports that Yemen, or at least the Sana‘a Basin, will run out of aquifer water imminently have been circulating for decades and will become true at some point. Demand far exceeds the monsoons‘ ability to replenish and antiquated irrigation methods and subsidized fuel for pumps exacerbate the problem. Desalinization plans are hampered by the exorbitant cost of transporting the water over several mountain ranges to the populated and agricultural highlands at roughly 4,000-8,000 feet. Proposals to relocate the entire Yemeni population to the coasts do not warrant extensive discussion. The financial costs and the social and political upheaval would be catastrophic.

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Energy Yemen did not share its neighbors' blessings in oil or gas. What they had is diminishing and/or in remote and inaccessible regions. To put it in perspective, Yemen‘s oil reserves are calculated at 3 BBL. That is roughly half of Oman‘s reserves; Oman‘s population, however, is one-tenth Yemen‘s. Iraq, with approximately the same size population, has reserves of approximately 115 BBL, plus water and arable land.

Population Yemen has one of the highest growth rates in the world and with a majority of the population under 25, a sonic baby boom is in the offing. As the trajectory climbs steeply, the pressures on water and energy will only increase as resources decrease. The low level of education is a significant drag on the development of the country. Schools are few and far between and teachers too often are imported to supplement the lack of Yemeni teachers, while too many Yemenis are unemployed. Prospects for foreign investment are hampered by the lack of a work force with the necessary skills.

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Political Structure Despite the theories of political science, Yemen has created a fragile, flawed but very real democratic structure and process that reflects the Yemeni character and traditions. Its flaws should be a focus of assistance not an excuse to disengage or not engage. The survival of this experiment is tied to the economic future of the state and the role of the neighbors and the donors. A major and under discussed challenge to the political structure is the generational change underway. The Famous Forty are rapidly leaving the scene as are those from the Republican Revolution and the independence fight in the South. The next generation does not share this history or the alliances forged. Traditional tribal leaders, such as Paramount Shaykh Abdullah alAhmar, have been succeeded by a coalition of sons. There is most certainly a jockeying for position throughout the next generation – tribal, power elites, merchant families and technocrats. It would be presumptuous for us to declare the winner. We have no idea. Yemeni politics are more kaleidoscope than mosaic. It would be dangerous for us to insert ourselves into the process directly or indirectly. Whoever succeeds Ali Abdullah Saleh will need the affirmation of the nascent democratic structures as well as the blessings of the power elites. We can support the structures and processes; we cannot assume or pick the winners.

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WHERE SHOULD THE US FOCUS? To focus disproportionately on immediate military and security capacity building is short-sighted. If our concerns about the threats from Yemen are sufficient to fund $120 million in security assistance and an implicit understanding that development of credible security structures is a long term investment, then our interest in keeping Yemen on the good side of the failure curve (recognizing that it may never be wholly prosperous) warrant an equal commitment to civilian capacity building over a similar long haul. We need to do more than invest in extending the authority of the state and invest as well in the legitimacy and the capacity of the state and the society. We cannot grant ―legitimacy‖ but we can assist in the development of those elements of the state that provide services to the citizens. The ―we‖ here is the US Government, the international community and the regional neighbors.   

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Develop a credible, efficient and effective civil service. This is not a sexy as training an army or the police. It is not as telegenic. It is critical. Support Yemeni efforts to mitigate opportunities for diversion and corruption by the development of governmental and non-governmental accountability structures. Support education and schooling, not through construction of schools (that is easy) but through elementary and secondary teacher training. Human capital is Yemen‘s untapped natural resource. Support governance initiatives in all three branches of government and civil society. Civil society development creates a cadre of next generation officials, e.g. the current Minister of Water was the head of an NGO. Support training of primary health care system such as the midwifery training in the 90‘s.

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Support restoration of Aden Port as a major entrepot for the Indian Ocean rim. This is Yemen‘s second major natural resource. Development of the Port would create employment and mitigate north-south tensions.

SOME FINAL THOUGHTS AND CAUTIONARY TALES – CIVILIAN CAPACITY NOT JUST MILITARY CAPABILITY In shaping a US strategy going forward in Yemen, we need to bear a few lessons of our own recent history as well as Yemen‘s long history in mind. We are not smarter than their history or our own.   

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We are dealing with a sovereign state, not a failed state, that has proven to be a credible if not always capable partner. The Yemeni government will undertake those actions that are in its own best national interest. We have shared priorities, but perhaps not in the same priority order. Our commitment needs to be to build state capacity, including efforts to assist the development of a civil service, parliament, judiciary and media/civil society – within a Yemeni context. Our involvement in state and human capacity development needs to equal if not exceed our commitment to build a military and police capability.

None of this guarantees success, however defined. However, a short-sighted, securitycentric and episodic engagement with Yemen could create the very failed state neither we nor the Yemenis want or can afford. If this set of proposals looks costly, the cost of dealing with the ramifications of state failure will be far greater. Thank you.

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In: Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role Editor: Gabriel A. Dumont

ISBN: 978-1-61728-165-5 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 9

TURMOIL IN YEMEN: HOW UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES CAN HELP US UNDERMINE AL-QA’IDA * AND THE RADICAL PARADIGM

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Emile Nakhleh Good morning. Thank you Mr. Chairman for inviting me to share my thoughts about Yemen with you and members of the Committee. In order to undermine the radical paradigm and disable the terrorist threat to the homeland, it is imperative that we understand the nexus between Yemen and both al-Qa‘ida Central and al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the realities that have made Yemen a hospitable environment for global jihadis and terrorists. The challenges we face in Yemen unfortunately are not unique; in fact, they are similar to other challenges that we have encountered in other countries and regions in which Al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates have found a safe haven. We need to be cognizant of these challenges in order to counter al-Qa‘ida. The threat is not new, and Islamic radicalism in Yemen goes back many years. This threat did not develop with the failed terrorist plot on Christmas Day, nor will it end with putting him away. Furthermore, the terrorist threat in Yemen cannot be viewed in isolation. We should analyze it in at least three different but inter-related contexts: the domestic realities of Yemen; the regional Arab Islamic environment; and the changing global reach of alQa‘ida. Please allow me to say a few words on each of the three contexts.

YEMEN The country possesses all the factors that often drive radicalism and extremism, including an authoritarian regime; a serious demographic problem; weak and ineffective government authority; non-existent rule of law; tribal fiefdoms and jealousies; sectarian conflicts; 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations publication dated January 20, 2010.

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dwindling resources; a Shia (Zaydi) rebellion and secessionist insurgency in the South; deep poverty; poor education; high illiteracy; and a long tradition of Islamic jihad. Yemen is a state at risk. 

Because of rampant lawlessness and weak governance, numerous radical tribal clerics who act as radicalizerS trainerS and recruiters roam the countryside in relative freedom.

Regime Ali Abdallah Saleh‘s regime has long been characterized by corruption, nepotism, repression, denial of human rights, a lukewarm commitment to reform, poor economic policies, and above all the willingness to make alliances with shady characters and centers of power in order to survive and bequeath his rule to his family. 

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Saleh‘s son, Ahmad, groomed to become the next president, heads the country‘s Republican guard and Special Forces. His three nephews—Amar, Yahya, and Tarek—hold key national security positions and the Presidential Guard. Saleh‘s half brother, Muhammad Saleh al-Ahmar, heads the air force. He has consolidated his control over the country through his family and has made Yemen a ―Family, Inc.‖ Saleh‘s ―alliances‖ with different tribal chiefs and radical Islamic centers of power and his use of coercion and co-optation have been designed to keep his regime in power. As the income from oil dwindles, Saleh‘s influence over tribal chiefs is receding and his authority beyond San‟ a is waning. Government authority beyond the capital is ineffective and almost non-existent; tribal chiefs and centers of power are the law in the provinces. Equally critical, for Saleh the key threat has always come from the Shia rebellion in the north and the secessionist Movement in the South. He has viewed Islamic radicalism and al-Qa‘ida as a manageable threat he could contain and make deals with. He has believed for many years that al-Qa‘ida‘s strategic goal has been to topple the Al Saud regime but not his. According to a Yemeni academic, ―The Saudis are the real prize for al-Qa‘ida, Yemen is the platform.‖ Saleh‘s cynical use of radical Sunni Islamic ideology in recent years to combat the other internal threats (for example, the Houthis in the north and the secessionist movement in the South) has inadvertently helped spread the Wahhabi Islamization of parts of Yemeni society, which made it a hospitable environment for radicalism and al-Qa‘ida supporters. The Islamic political party, Islah, which has worked with Saleh previously against internal challenges has lost confidence in Saleh‘s leadership and is turning against him. Saleh‘s legendary ability to juggle the different forces and ideological centers in Yemen in the past 30 years to maintain his hold on power has run its course. Hitching his wagon to ―America‘s war against al-Qa‘ida‖ would not stabilize his regime or keep Yemen from descending into chaos.

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Demographics Yemen‘s demographics present another discouraging picture.  

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Almost half of Yemen‘s 24 million total population is under 16 years old. Yemen has one of the highest rates of population growth in the world (3.45%). Yemen suffers from deep poverty—unemployment hovers around 35%, and almost half the population is below the poverty line. The rate of economic growth is below 3% and the rate of inflation is around 18%. Unemployment is even higher among the young. Like other states at risk, Yemen‘s population is large, young, poor, unemployed, poorly educated, anti-regime, and becoming more Islamized. The old traditional social contract, which allowed the regime a wide leeway to rule in lieu of state support for the safety and well being of the citizens, has all but disappeared. Literacy is barely 50%. If demographic, economic, and political trends continue, it is not unthinkable to see Yemen become a failed state in the next three years.

Islamic Radicalism As a country and a seafaring people, Yemen has had a long experience with Islamic movements, Islamic activism, and Islamic radical ideologies. In fact, Yemen and Islamic activism have intermingled since the early days of Islam in the 7th century.

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Yemen‘s Islam over the centuries has consisted of Sunnis belonging to the relatively moderate Shafi‘i School of jurisprudence and of Zydi Shia, especially in the north. Yemen‘s Islam has on many occasions been in the forefront of the fight against perceived unjust rulers and other enemies of Islam. Much of Yemen‘s Islamic militancy in past decades emerged among the tribes in rural provinces, including in Hadramaut—the ancestral home of Usama Bin Ladin. Wahhabi and other radical ideologies—Sunni and Shia—began to spread in Yemen in recent decades and to spearhead the struggle against domestic and regional rulers and against Western interests, policies, and personnel—the so-called near and far enemies. In the past three decades, Yemen exported many of its youth to do jihad in the name of Islam in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other parts of the Gulf. Numerous Muslim youth and activists from Southeast Asia, especially from Indonesia, have been radicalized in Yemen through education and training at conservative and radical institutions. Activists in Yemen—Islamists and traditional secularists, including socialists, Marxists, Ba‘thists, and Arab nationalists—no longer believe that gradual reform and change are possible from within through peaceful means. More and more groups and movements, including Islamic radicals and extremists, are turning to violence as the

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Radical Salafism In the past five years, Yemen has witnessed the emergence of a new brand of Salafi ideology that offers a conservative, rigid, intolerant, and exclusivist interpretation of the Koran and the Hadith. 

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This intolerant ideology has spread in countries struggling with youth bulges and weak economies, including Yemen, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan, Chad, Somalia, Afghanistan, and parts of Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The Salafi ideology shuns politics and has been critical of Islamic political parties for participating in elections. Such parties—for example, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Justice and Development in Morocco, Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait, AKP in Turkey, PAS in Malaysia, and Hizballah—have strongly rejected the Salafi ideology for its religious rigidity. Salafists in Yemen, as in other Muslim countries, have cooperated closely with alQa‘ida jihadists against existing regimes and their close association with the United States. Salafis have accused the US of waging a war on Islam. Saleh, like some other authoritarian regimes, has cynically used the Salafi ideology to weaken established Islamic political parties—for example, the Islah Party—and other anti-regime movements, including the Houthi rebellion and the Movement of the South. AQAP has indirectly benefited from the cozy regime-Salafi relationship.

The Houthi Shia Uprising Yemeni Zaydi Shia (one of the three Shia branches in the world; the other two being the Twelvers and the Isma‘ilis) have lived in Yemen and have managed to live peacefully with Sunnis and others in that country. Zaydis Shia imams ruled Yemen from the late 9th century until 1962; currently the Zaydis constitute approximately 40% of the population. Of all Shia factions, Yemeni Zaydis are the closest to Sunni Islam. 

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In recent years, however, the rise of radical Sunni activism, especially with the return of Sunni Jihadists from Afghanistan in the late 19080s and early 1990s, Zydis began to feel threatened by the anti-Shia radical Sunnis and Wahhabis. Hussein al-Houthi, who was a member of the Yemeni parliament in the 1990s and is fiercely anti -Wahhabi and anti al-Qa‘ida, started the uprising with his ―The Young Believers‖ this past year because of his objections to the Saleh regime, the pro-Us policies of the Saleh government, and the ascendant Sunni radicalism.

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In trying to crush the uprising, the regime has called on the Saudi military for help and direct involvement in the fighting. He has also enlisted Sunni radical groups to fight what he has described as a pro-Iranian ―Shia‖ movement. In fact, pro-alQa‘ida Yemeni radical Sunni figures, like Majid al-Zindani, former head of the Islah Party and a close ally of Bin Ladin, criticized the uprising as a ―sedition‖ or ―fitna.‖ The Houthi uprising has become a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Houthi‘s anti-regime stance, however, has found resonance among Zaydi and nonZaydi Yemenis, especially as the regime‘s overwhelming force has been unable to crush the uprising.

Saleh‘s growing support of US military actions against AQAP will likely weaken his position among Sunnis and undermine his efforts to fight the uprising in the north and the secessionist movement in the south. It is too soon, however, to predict how Saleh will solve this strategic dilemma. Two strategic questions come to mind: 

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First, will Saleh support the US and fail to defeat the domestic threats to his regime in the north and in the south or will he pay only lip service to the fight against AQAP and retain the support of the Sunnis? Second, as the Houthi uprising continues, as Iran and Saudi Arabia become more deeply involved in northern Yemen, and as Yemeni Shia forge closer relations with other Shia groups in the Arabian Peninsula—particularly in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait—will Saleh be forced to treat the uprising as a regional issue rather than a purely domestic matter, and will he abandon the fight against alQa‟ ida in order to regain the upper hand domestically? Or has time simply run out on such a calculation?

Southern Movement The new Yemen was created in 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the Marxist south‘s international patron, when the north (San‘a) and the south (Aden) merged into one state. The ―republican‖ north reflected a tradition of military authoritarianism, nationalism and Islamism; the south‘s background was socialist, Marxist, and populist. Almost two decades since the merger, some people in the south still harbor the view that the union was rammed down their throats and that they are under ―occupation‖ by the ―Saleh family-run dictatorial north.‖ The merger faced its first shock in 1994 when army units from the ―socialist South‖ revolted against the ―corrupt, crony‖ Saleh regime in the north. Saleh enlisted both the Saudis and the radical Salafi Islamists to fight the formerly Marxist forces and was able to crush the secessionist movement. 

Saleh‘s tactical reliance on the Saudis and the radical Salafis against his domestic enemies was the first in a series of such entanglements. Such arrangements reflect Saleh‘s deeply held view that the Wahhabi-Salafi ideology, the cornerstone of the al-

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Qa‘ida, is not a threat to him and that he could work with activists and jihadists who hold these views. That view dealt a severe blow when in early 2009, Tariq al-Fadhli, an Afghan jihadist from the south, broke with the Saleh regime and joined the ―Southern Movement‖ and since then he‘s become its leader. Salafi jihadists, tribal leaders, and traditional secularists in the south and across the country seem to be coalescing in a jihadist front against Saleh, which does not bode well for his ―one-man, family-run‖ regime, particularly at this juncture when he is under tremendous pressure from the US to support its counterterrorism war against AQAP.

REGIONAL CONTEXT The counterterrorism war against AQAP in Yemen is now organically linked to regional issues, players, and developments. The regionalization and internationalization of this effort, much to Saleh‘s dismay, is no longer a domestic Yemeni affair, which Saleh could manipulate like pieces on a chessboard. The regional context comprises the following ten components:  

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Growing US military involvement—albeit so far by proxy—in the Middle East outside Iraq. Saudi-Iranian military activity in the Arabian Peninsula and on-going Iranian support of Sunni and radical Islamist groups across the region. Yemen‘s geostrategic linkages to the Horn of Africa, the strategic Bab elMandab waterway between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Persian Gulf. A rising radical Salafi trend across parts of the Muslim world. The waning fortunes of al-Qa‘ida Central and the franchising of its terror operation into nations at risk, including Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and other places. Continued Islamization of Arab politics. Entrenched regime authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism, and denial of human rights in many parts of the Middle East, including in Yemen. On-going anti-al-Qa‘ida and anti-Taliban military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict and deepening misery in Gaza. Turkey‘s growing shift to the Arab Islamic south and expanding involvement in Arab and Islamic issues.

AL-QA’IDA The good news on the counterterrorism front is that more and more Muslim thinkers, writers, and media editorialists are openly criticizing al-Qa‘ida‘s violence and wanton terrorism. In fact, two days ago, a prominent UK Muslim group, ―Mihaj-ul-Quran,‖ issued a

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Turmoil in Yemen: How Understanding the Challenges Can Help Us Undermine… 141 lengthy fatwa (religious ruling) declaring suicide bombings, terrorism, and the killing of innocent civilians as ―absolutely against the teachings of Islam.‖ 

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Al-Qa‘ida is losing the moral ethical argument it had advanced previously, namely that the killing of innocent civilians, including many Muslims, was justified in the defense of Islam. According to Arab and Muslim media analysis and reports, al-Qa‘ida‘s inability to provide Muslim youth with jobs, education, economic development, and women and human rights, has plunged the organization in a crisis of legitimacy and authority. The recent formation of AQAP and its publicly promoted plots out of Yemen do not mask the crisis in recruiting, fund raising, and thinning bench of terror expertise that al-Qa‘ida Central is facing. Operations in Yemen might also indicate that al-Qa‘ida Central in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region has suffered under US predator and other attacks. President Obama‘s ―new beginning‖ speech in Cairo June 4 of last year created a bounce in the Arab Muslim world about a better future relationship between the US and the Muslim world, according to Arab and Muslim media reports. According to John Brennan, the President‘s senior advisor on counterterrorism, our values as a nation and our commitment to justice, respect, fairness, and peace are the most effective weapon we have in our arsenal to fight the forces of radicalism and terrorism. In addition, bringing hope, educational promise, and economic opportunity to the youth in Muslim societies is the best defense against the false promises of death and destruction promoted by al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates. Brennan‘s statement was a response to Muslim media reports that the bounce from President Obama‘s conciliatory rhetoric among Arabs and Muslims would be longlasting if it were followed by significant policy shifts on human rights, political reform, democracy, war crimes, closing Guantanamo, and by renewed efforts at the highest level to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

What Does This Mean and What to Do about It? Al-Qa‘ida Central and AQAP would want the US to declare Yemen a new front in the war on terror hoping we would initiate massive military operations in that country. We should not fall in their trap! ―Invasion‖ of yet another Muslim country, especially one located in the greater ―Land of the Two Holy Mosques,‖ will be a propaganda bonanza for al-Qa‘ida and other radical organizations. Like the ―invasion‖ of Iraq and Afghanistan, large US military operations in Yemen will be used to recruit new terrorists and jihadists; the last thing we need to do is to inadvertently help energize al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates. Al-Qa‘ida and other radical and extremist groups will be present in many Muslim countries regardless of the fortunes of Al-Qa‘ida Central. Al-Qa‘ida and other ideologically like-minded groups will continue to pose a threat to Western countries and to the Homeland and to American interests and personnel overseas.

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Regime behavior and policies in many Muslim countries—including authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism, and denial of human rights—as well as social and economic realities have inadvertently contributed to the rise of extremism in those countries. In Yemen as elsewhere, however, fighting and defeating these groups cannot and will not be accomplished by the force of arms alone.

Defeating al-Qa‘ida, AQAP, and similar terrorist groups requires a two-pronged longterm strategy. First, a continued, concerted effort to target and neutralize al-Qa‘ida leaders, operations, and training camps in Yemen and other countries where these leaders operate. 

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Radical AQAP operatives, leaders, and recruiting or enabling clerics— including Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Sa‘id al-Shehri, Qasim al-Raymi, Hizam al-Mujali, and Anwar al-Awlaki—might not represent the entire network and removing them from the scene might not eliminate the terror threat, but neutralizing them goes a long way toward weakening al-Qa‘ida, AQAP, and their affiliates. Effective targeting operations require intensive collection, analysis, and sharing of intelligence at home; transnational intelligence cooperation among intelligence services; a long-term commitment in resources and personnel; blocking recruiting on radical websites; and deep expertise in the radicalization process as well as in Yemen and other Muslim societies. Bilateral and transnational intelligence sharing can be most effective in undermining al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates in Yemen and elsewhere when it is based on professionalism, good tradecraft, genuine exchange of information, a strategic shared interest in fighting al-Qa‘ida, and a willingness to share relevant and appropriate intelligence and information. Several authoritarian regimes and security services, unfortunately, in Yemen and elsewhere have used the fight against terrorism as an excuse to muzzle peaceful, proreform civil society institutions and to deny their peoples the right to participate in the political process freely, openly, and without harassment.

Second, as President Obama and his senior counterterrorism advisor have said before and since the Christmas Day failed terrorist plot, US national interest dictates that we engage broader segments of Muslim societies in an effort to delegitimize the radical paradigm and undercut the extremist message of al-Qa‘ida. Such engagement should target Muslim communities and centers focusing on tangible initiatives in elementary and secondary education, micro investment and economic development, political reform, public health, clean water, agriculture, and science and technology. Although we would continue to engage regimes for national security reasons, the broader engagement should involve indigenous, credible and legitimate religious and political civil society communities that are committed to the welfare of their societies and the well being of their citizens. In Yemen, the Islah Party and private associations in the San‘a and Aden regions should be involved. The strategic goal of this engagement is to present Yemeni and other Muslim youth with a more hopeful future vision than the empty promises of al-Qa‘ida.

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Although some authoritarian regime, including Saleh of Yemen, will object to such a broad effort by the US, our policymakers working in concert with our European allies and a few moderate Islamic states will have to find ways to convince skeptical regimes that engaging their non-governmental institutions will not necessarily undermine the country‘s stability. On the contrary, such an engagement will likely eradicate civil conflict and promote peaceful regime-society relations.

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In order to have a chance of success, we must view the envisioned relationship between the US and the Muslim world as a long-term, generational project, which would require patience, expertise, and a national commitment at the highest levels of our government. It will also have to involve our European allies and a number of modernist Muslim states such as Indonesia and Turkey. In the past four centuries, Yemeni citizens, seafarers, and merchants have traveled to and settled in Indonesia. Their descendants have prospered in that country and attained senior positions in the Indonesian government and economy as well as in Indonesia‘s two largest Islamic NGOs—Muhammadiyya and Nahdlatul Ulama. Many Indonesian Muslim families have maintained familial relations with their Yemeni relatives and have sent their teenage children to study Arabic and the Muslim religion in Islamic madrasas in Yemen. Turkey‘s resurgence as a key player in the Arab Muslim world could be a positive factor in promoting tolerance and moderation in Yemen and other Arab and Muslim countries. Recent polling data from several Arab countries shows that majorities of respondents view Turkey positively and favor its growing involvement in the region. In education, business, and civil society, Turkey offers a tangible proof of the compatibility of Islam and democracy and could work with indigenous NGOs in Yemen and elsewhere to promote a more tolerant and modernizing vision of Islam. Finally, now that we are directing our attention to Yemen and to fighting AQAP in that unfortunate country, we should not lose sight of the social factors that drive radicalism and of the regional context of Yemen. As the administration proceeds with implementing some of the principles enunciated by the President in the Cairo speech, policymakers will have to demonstrate to our citizens and to the global community that terrorism threatens Muslim and non-Muslim countries alike; that engaging Muslim communities serves our national interest; that the process might not show results for several years; and that it requires deep expertise and resources. The utilization of the full array of US power and influence through diplomacy and other means complements the military in significant ways. Long-term engagement, if done smartly, selectively, and consistently, will help erode radicalism and discredit the recruiters of suicide bombers and the preachers of hate and terrorism. Thank you.

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In: Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role Editor: Gabriel A. Dumont

ISBN: 978-1-61728-165-5 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 10

HOW TO APPLY SMART POWER IN YEMEN

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Frederick W. Kagan and Christopher Harnisch

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The Salah government will side with us against al Qaeda if we side with it against insurgents. President Barack Obama has made it clear that he does not intend to send American ground orces into Yemen, and rightly so. But American policy toward Yemen, even after the Christmas terrorist attempt, remains focused on limited counterterrorist approaches that failed in Afghanistan in the 1990s and have created tension in Pakistan since 2001. Yemen faces enormous challenges. Its 24 million people are divided into three antagonistic groups: a Zaydi Shiite minority now fighting against the central government (the Houthi rebellion); the inhabitants of the former Yemen Arab Republic (in the north); and the inhabitants of the former Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (in the south), many of whom are engaged in a secessionist rebellion. Its government is corrupt, its security forces have limited capabilities, and a large swath of its population is addicted to a drug called qat. The World Bank estimates that Yemen will stop earning a profit on its oil production by 2017 (oil now accounts for more than half of the country's export income). Only 46% of rural Yemenis have access to adequate water (40% of the country's water goes to growing qat), and some estimates suggest Yemen will run out of water for its people within a decade. American policy in Yemen has focused heavily on fighting al Qaeda, but it has failed to address the conditions that make the country a terrorist safe haven. Targeted strikes in 2002 killed key al Qaeda leaders in Yemen, and the group went relatively quiet for several years. The U.S. military has been working to build up the Yemeni Coast Guard (to prevent attacks similar to the one on the USS Cole in 2000) and to improve the counterterrorist capabilities of the Yemeni military in general. But the U.S. has resisted supporting President Ali Abdallah Salah's efforts to defeat the Houthi insurgency, generating understandable friction with our would-be partner. As we have 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of an American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research publication dated January 2010.

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found repeatedly in similar situations around the world (particularly in Pakistan), local governments will not focus on terrorist groups that primarily threaten the U.S. or their neighbors at the expense of security challenges that threaten them directly. A strategy that attempts to pressure or bribe them to go after our enemies is likely to fail. Mr. Salah is an unpalatable partner, and we don't want to be drawn into Yemen's internal conflicts more than necessary. But he is the only partner we have in Yemen. If we want him to take our side in the fight against al Qaeda, we have to take his side in the fight against the Houthis. The U.S. must also develop a coherent approach that will help Yemen's government improve itself, address its looming economic and social catastrophes, and improve the ability of its military, intelligence and police organs to establish security throughout the country. The U.S. now maintains an earnest but understaffed and under-resourced USAID mission in the American embassy in Sana, the country's capital. But because of security concerns, U.S. officials are largely restricted to Sana and therefore cannot directly oversee the limited programs they support, let alone help address systemic governance failures. Yemen received $150 million in USAID funds in 2009—one-tenth the amount dispensed in Afghanistan; less than one-fifth the amount provided to Gaza and the West Bank; and roughly half of what Nigeria received. The Pentagon recently said it would like to double the roughly $70 million Yemen received in security assistance. But the total pool from which that money would come from in 2010 is only $350 million, according to Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell, and there are other pressing demands for those funds. The problems in Yemen will not be solved simply by throwing American money at them. But dollars are the soldiers of the smart power approach. Having a lot of them does not guarantee success, but having too few does guarantee failure. Developing a coherent strategy focused on the right objectives is important, and hard to do. The country team in any normal American embassy (like the one in Sana) does not have the staff, resources or experience to do so. The limited American military presence in Yemen does not either. Despite years of talk about the need to develop this kind of capability in the State Department or elsewhere in Washington, it does not exist. It must be built now, and quickly. The president could do that by instructing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to form a Joint Interagency Task Force on Yemen. Its mission would be to develop and implement a strategy to improve the effectiveness of the Yemeni government and security forces, reestablish civil order, and eliminate the al Qaeda safe haven. Its personnel should include the Yemen country team, headed by the ambassador, and experts from other relevant U.S. agencies as well as sufficient staff to develop and execute programs. An immediate priority must be to provide security to American officials in Yemen that will enable them to travel around, even though there will not be American forces on the ground to protect them. This strategy will require helping Yemen defeat the Houthi insurgency and resolve the southern secessionist tensions without creating a full-blown insurgency in the south. It will also require a nuanced strategy to help the Yemeni government disentangle al Qaeda from the southern tribes that now support or tolerate it. One of the key errors the Bush administration made in Afghanistan and Iraq was to focus excessively on solving immediate security problems without preparing for the aftermath. Too narrow a focus on improving counterterrorist strikes in Yemen without addressing the larger

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How to Apply Smart Power in Yemen

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context of the terrorist threat growing in that country may well lead to similar results. If the Obama administration wants to avoid sending troops to Yemen, it must act boldly now.

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In: Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role Editor: Gabriel A. Dumont

ISBN: 978-1-61728-165-5 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 11

TESTIMONY OF GREGORY D. JOHNSEN, PHD. CANDIDATE, NEAR EASTERN STUDIES, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE*

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INTRODUCTION Thank you Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar and member of the Foreign Relations Committee for inviting me here to speak to you today. I appreciate the attention this committee and Congress as a whole is paying to Yemen and the multitude of challenges that country is currently facing. Yemen is teetering on the brink of disaster but its problems, while extensive, are neither new nor unknown. They are, however, overwhelming. The numerous different crises are nearly debilitating in their totality. There are, simply put, too many problems of too severe a nature to deal with independently of one another or on a crisis-to-crisis basis. Instead Yemen and its challenges have to be understood and dealt with as a whole. In order to fully understand the realities of political life in Yemen one has to realize that the Yemeni state is beset by three distinct layers of conflict, only one of which is visible to outside observers, and that these three layers will increasingly plague the country in the coming years. All of these layers, while distinct, are exacerbating one another in ways that are not wholly knowable or predictable at this time. At the top is the struggle for power among the elite, which will take place out of sight, behind closed doors. In the middle is the trio of security challenges – al-Qaeda, the H uthi rebellion and the threat of southern secession – which the state is currently combating. Underlying both of these is the bedrock layer of what might be called structural challenges. This encompasses things like Yemen‘s rapidly dwindling oil reserves and its nearly depleted water table as well as chronic unemployment, poverty, an explosive birth rate, rampant corruption, low literacy rates, and an antiquated infrastructure. 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations publication dated January 20, 2010.

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Yemen‘s many problems defy easy or quick solutions and there is a limit both to the influence and the impact that the US, its allies and regional partners can have on the country‘s future. Certainly action must be taken, but this action must be both considered and cautious. Yemen‘s problems did not arise overnight and they will not be solved in a day. The odds are quite long against the type of success that will transform Yemen in a stable, durable and fully democratic state, but the costs of inaction or failure will be exceedingly high.

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I. ELITE RIVALRY In a country where his two immediate predecessors were assassinated within a year of each other, President Ali Abdullah Salih has survived 31 years in power by maintaining a great deal of political dexterity and by surrounding himself with relatives, childhood friends and close confidantes. The military and intelligence command structures resemble a Sanhan family tree. Both the style and the structure of his rule are now beginning to fracture. Yemen‘s economic straits means that he has less money to maintain his own patronage network as well as to play different factions off against one another as a way of keeping potential opposition groups perpetually dependent. Within his own Sanhan tribe the once strong bonds of loyalty are starting to show signs of strain. His oldest son and a quartet of nephews appear to be preparing for a post-Salih scramble for power, while another member of Sanhan, Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, remains the most powerful military commander in the country in charge of the 1st Armored Division. The downside of doling out military and intelligence commands to relatives is that there is a tendency for them to use their troops as personal instruments. Salih‘s efforts to tilt the game in favor of his son by forcibly retiring well-placed allies of al-Ahmar have created a great deal of animosity and anger within the ranks. Nor is the struggle just within the family. President Ali Abdullah Salih and other members of his family, which is often referred to as bayt al-Ahmar, after the name of his village, are all Zaydis. None, however, identify primarily as Zaydis, and indeed if they accepted all the teachings of traditional Zaydism they would be unacceptable as rulers. Another traditionally powerful family of 10 brothers – also known as bayt al-Ahmar – is also looking to turn its tribal and business muscle into political power. This family, which is unrelated to the president‘s family, is also Zaydi. Shaykh Abdullah alAhmar headed this family until his death from cancer in December 2007. He was also the paramount shaykh of the Hashid tribal confederation, speaker of parliament and head of the Islah party. His sons have had difficulty inheriting the full mantle of his leadership, and no one person has been able to consolidate the same amount of power that Shaykh Abdullah was able to command. His eldest son, Sadiq, was elected to succeed him as Shaykh ma-shaykh (paramount Shaykh) of Hashid, while a younger son, Hamid, is the most politically astute and active of his ten sons. This family, however, derives much of its power and prestige from its position within Hashid. It is also a favorite family of Saudi Arabia, who is quite active in supporting it financially. The members of this family self-identify more as tribesman from Hashid than they do as Zaydis, although it is impossible to be the former without also being the latter. Yemenis often speak of the contest for power between the two families, in a bit of Arabic pun, as a dispute between the two Bayt al-A hmars.

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Shaykh ‗Abdullah al-Ahmar and President Salih were never rivals in the traditional political sense that they were competing for the same constituency or even had the same political goals. Salih‘s Sanhan tribe is part of the Hashid confederation of which al-Ahmar was the shaykh ma-shaykh, while Salih is president of the republic of which al-Ahmar was a citizen. The two were bound to and dependent on each other in so many various ways that outright rivalry was precluded. Salih always supported al-Ahmar‘s candidacy for speaker of parliament even when his own party put forth a candidate, while al-Ahmar reciprocated by publicly backing Salih‘s presidential bids regardless of whether or not Islah put forth a candidate. Even their names seem designed to confuse outsiders as to their complicated relationship. President Salih came from the village of Bayt al-Ahmar, and many of his prominent relatives and comrades – Ali Muhsin, Muhammad Abdullah and Ali Salih – continued to use al-A hmar as a surname. For those with little experience in the country the result was an obscure jumble of similar names. Untangling the threads of which alAhmar belonged to which family was a task few had patience for. This delicate balance of power has not been maintained in the wake of al-Ahmar‘s death, and now the rivalry between the two Bayt al-A hmars is an open source of conflict in the country. The president has, for the moment, successfully co-opted the two youngest brothers into his security detail, but maintaining such an advantage will be increasingly difficult. In the midst of all this familial bickering the country continues to dissolve into semi-autonomous regions and various rebellions. It would be a mistake to judge the political scene on either electoral results or political affiliation. Neither is an accurate barometer of the political reality. The personalized networks of patronage are a much more accurate means of deciphering political loyalty. Generally speaking, western observers tend to ascribe more importance to political parties than they actually warrant. Instead, it is best to think in terms of power blocs and patronage networks.

II. SECURITY CHALLENGES A. Al-Qaeda I will begin with a word of caution: We are long past the point in Yemen of a magic missile solution to the al-Qaeda problem. Al-Qaeda is now too strong and too entrenched to be destroyed like it was in 2002, when the US assassinated Abu „Ali alHarthi. Lapsed vigilance by both the US and Yemeni government allowed al-Qaeda to reorganize and rebuild itself; to essentially resurrect itself up from the ashes of its initial defeat. Al-Qaeda in Yemen is now stronger than it has ever been in the past and whether it realizes it or not the US is in a propaganda war in Yemen with al-Qaeda and it is losing and losing badly. Al-Qaeda‘s narrative – with the notable exception of suicide attacks within the country – is broadly popular in Yemen. It has put itself on the right side of nearly every issue. At the same time US policy towards Yemen has been a dangerous mixture of ignorance and arrogance. Its continued insistence on seeing the country only through the prism of counterterrorism has induced exactly the type of results it is hoping to avoid. By focusing on

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al Qaeda to the exclusion of nearly every other threat and by linking most of its aid to this single issue, the United States has ensured that it will always exist.1

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The First Phase: 2001 - 2003 Al-Qaeda has regrouped and reorganized itself in Yemen. This is not the result of US successes elsewhere, but rather the result of US and Yemeni failures in Yemen. There have been two distinct phases of the war against al-Qaeda in Yemen. The first of which ran from October 2000 – November 2003, while the second and current phase of the war began in February 2006 with the prison break of 23 al-Qaeda suspects. In between these two phases there was an interlude of a little over two years in which it appeared as though alQaeda had largely been defeated in Yemen. But instead of securing the win, both the US and Yemeni governments treated the victory as absolute, failing to realize that a defeated enemy is not a vanquished one. In effect, alQaeda was crossed off both countries‘ list of priorities and replaced by other, seemingly more pressing concerns. While the threat from al-Qaeda was not necessarily forgotten in 2004 and 2005 it was mostly ignored. This lapse of vigilance by both the US and Yemen, I believe, is largely responsible for the relative ease that one of Osama bin Laden‘s former secretaries had in rebuilding al-Qaeda in Yemen in the wake of his escape from prison. The roots of al-Qaeda‘s involvement in Yemen pre-date by nearly a decade the September 11 attacks, but it was only those attacks and the implicit threat of US retaliation that finally compelled the Yemeni government to take the fight to al-Qaeda operatives in the country. Yemen‘s initial support for many returning Afghan Arabs, and the refuge it provided them when they were banned from returning to their home countries, eventually took its toll on the country when the USS Cole was attacked in October 2000. The attack killed 17 US sailors, and caused insurance rates for the port of Aden to skyrocket, resulting in a diplomatic and economic crisis for the Yemeni government. Following the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and particularly after the September 11 attacks in 2001 Yemen went out of its way to demonstrate its support for the war against alQaeda. For President Salih and others in the Yemeni government there was a distinct desire to avoid making the same mistakes it made in 1990 when it served on the UN Security Council. Yemen paid a heavy price – both politically and economically – for its failure to support the US against Iraq in the build-up to the first Gulf War. Motivated by fear and worried that if it did not take serious and significant steps someone else would, the Yemeni government began arresting anyone it suspected of harboring sympathies for al-Qaeda. Men who had spent time in Afghanistan, particularly those that returned to Yemen in the weeks surrounding the attacks were obvious targets, but the dragnet quickly expanded to include young men deemed to be security threats in governorates across the country. Within months Yemen‘s jails were full of hundreds of suspects many of whom the government had little if any evidence against. These men were tossed in security prisons with other more experienced fighters who did much to radicalize their younger more impressionable fellow inmates in the shared cells. This problem was largely overlooked at the time – what mattered was the moment and preventing any more immediate attacks – but this

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short-term solution would be one that would come back to haunt both Yemen and the US throughout multiple phases of the war against al-Qaeda. For the Yemeni government that was the strategy: corral as many people as it could in the hopes that the US would not attack. It was simple, brutal and not at all sustainable, but at least in the short term it did exactly what it was designed to: prevent an American attack. In retrospect it seems clear that the US was never going to strike Yemen, but in those early days no one knew what a wounded and enraged US was going to do. The problem for the US in Yemen is how to separate the al-Qaeda members out from those who only love jihad and work for the establishment of Shari„a law. Because if the US expands the war to include both – and it is incredibly easy to do so, the extension makes sense even – then it will end up fighting most of the country. It is a dilemma that in the early days of the war was never understood and now, when it is understood, never solved. The overreaction of governments like Yemen, largely as a result of US pressure, arresting nearly everyone it could link to al-Qaeda, with or without evidence, did not reduce radicalization but had the opposite effect. Young men left Yemen‘s security prisons more radical than when they were initially incarcerated. Many of these men were prepared for recruitment by their time in prison. The groundwork in numerous cases was not done not by al-Qaeda but rather by the government, which made these men tempting targets when they were eventually released. During a November 2001 visit to Washington, President Salih made sure that the US knew what side his country was on. Yemen followed Salih‘s words with actions, arresting anyone it suspected of harboring sympathy for al-Qaeda. It also worked closely with US intelligence services, coordinating the November 2002 strike on al-Qaeda‘s head in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi, which was conducted by an unmanned CIA drone. But this attack was the high-water mark of US-Yemeni cooperation, as a Pentagon leak, destroyed the cover story on which both countries had agreed. The US, it seems need a victory in the war on terror, and the assassination of an al-Qaeda leader was too good to pass up. Yemen, quite rightly, felt as though it had been sold out to domestic political concerns. Salih paid a high price domestically for allowing the US to carry out an attack in Yemen, and it took more than a year for the government to publicly admit that it had authorized Washington to act. The US was still paying the price for hubris a year later, in November 2003, when Yemen captured Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, al-Harithi‘s replacement. Instead of being granted direct access to the prisoner, US officials were forced to work through intermediaries. With the group‘s leadership dead or in jail, its infrastructure largely destroyed and the militants still at-large more attracted to the fighting in Iraq than a dying jihad at home, al-Qaeda looked to be largely defeated. It is probably misleading to talk about al-Qaeda in Yemen from 2001-2003 as if it was a coherent organization. Certainly there were al-Qaeda members in the country and these men had both motivation and weapons but they lacked the infrastructure and leadership to compose the type of fully formed strategy that their colleagues in Saudi Arabia were developing at the same time. In Yemen, al-Qaeda is more accurately described as individuals and groups of individuals, who began reacting against government pressure. The Yemeni government initiated the fight and al-Qaeda was largely unprepared to carry out the type of campaign that it would need to in order to be successful in Yemen. Its members had to readjust to Yemen‘s changing environment and organize on the run. The threat they posed at

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the time was limited; they were able to plan and launch attacks, but these tended to be narrow in scope and scale and impossible to build upon given the lack of any organizational direction. Instead of a sustained campaign of attacks that targeted government and western interests throughout the country, al-Qaeda operatives were only able to carry out a series of one-off attacks that seemed more worrying than they actually were. For Yemen, al-Qaeda and Islamic militancy has always been a largely western problem that affects the country the indirectly, but is nowhere near as pressing as the uprising in the north or threats of secession from the south. The latter are security issues that directly threaten the survival of the regime – existential threats – while al-Qaeda, at least in Yemen’s calculus, does not. Throughout 2004, both Yemen and the US slowly began to act as if the threat from alQaeda had been neutralized. Yemen became increasingly more occupied in turning its limited resources towards putting down the Huthi revolt in and around the northern governorate of Sa„dah and implementing bitter economic reforms that led to riots and widespread dissatisfaction. On the US side, there was a lack of clear policy goals. The US lost interest in the country, as illustrated by aid to Yemen in 2004-2007, and what little attention the US was paying to the country was directed towards things such as anti-corruption reforms and encouraging the country to take steps towards becoming a fully-formed democratic republic as part of the Bush administration‘s attempt to re-make the Middle East. During a November 2005 trip to the US, Salih was told that the Yemeni government was being suspended from a US aid program. The suspension shocked Salih, who was under the impression that he was going to be rewarded for Yemen‘s help in the war against al-Qaeda. Instead he was stung by the loss of $20 million in aid. The following day, his anger was compounded, when the World Bank told him that it was cutting aid from $420 to $280 million. Both cuts were attributed to rampant corruption within the Yemeni government.

The Second Phase: 2006 - Present Mistakes of policy and vigilance could be concealed when al-Qaeda was largely dormant in the country. But that dynamic changed with the February 2006 prison break, when 23 alQaeda suspects tunneled out of their two-room prison cell into a neighboring mosque where they performed the dawn prayers before walking out the front door to freedom. Among the escapees, were Jamal al-Badawi and Jabir al-Banna both of whom are on US most-wanted lists. Consequently, the US put a great deal of pressure of Yemen to track both men down. But, as is often the case, it was not the people the US was worried most about that caused the biggest problems, rather it was those it knew too little about that proved to be the most dangerous. Instead, of al-Badawi and al-Banna it would be Nasir al-Wahayshi and Qasim alRaymi that subsequently proved to be problematic. Seven of the original 23 escapees have been killed (including one by US shelling in Somalia), while the rest have either been recaptured or surrendered – although there are some conflicting reports.2 Nasir al-Wahayshi, the current head of al-Qaeda in Yemen, is a 34-year-old Yemeni from the southern government of Abyan. He spent time in one of Yemen‘s religious institutes before traveling to Afghanistan in the late 1990s, where he eventually became one of Osama

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bin Laden‘s assistants. He fought at the battle of Tora Bora before escaping over the border into Iran, where he was eventually arrested and extradited to Yemen in November 2003. His presence along with that of his deputy, Qasim al-Raymi, as the commanders of al-Qaeda illustrate what I think is one of the more worrying factors about the current version of alQaeda in Yemen – namely, how representative it is. Al-Qaeda is the most representative organization in Yemen. It transcends class, tribe and regional identity in a way that no other organization or political party does. Nasir alWahayshi and others within the organization have proven particularly talented at creating a narrative of events that is designed to appeal to a local audience. Something both the US and Yemen have been incapable of doing. In a sense, both have ceded the field of debate and discussion to al-Qaeda. Since its reorganization following a February 2006 prison break al-Qaeda in Yemen has went through three phases. 1. Rebuilding in Yemen: 2006 – 2007. 2. Relevancy in Yemen: 2008 campaign in Yemen 3. Regional Franchise: 2009 In each phase, al-Qaeda has publicly articulated its goals and then worked to square its actions with its rhetoric.

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2006-2007 Rebuilding the organization in Yemen after years of setbacks and neglect was not easy. The first attack, a dual suicide attack on oil and gas facilities in Marib and Hadramawt on the eve of the 2006 presidential election did little damage. The mastermind of the attack, Fawaz al-Rabi‘i, was killed less than a month later in a shootout with Yemeni security forces. In many ways, al-Rabi‘i's death paved the way for one of his fellow escapees, Nasir alWahayshi, to assume control of the organization in Yemen. Al-Wahayshi, who had served as a secretary to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, utilized his personal connections to this earlier generation of al-Qaeda leaders to build a following after his escape from prison. In late June 2007, Qasim al-Raymi posted an audiotape to Islamists forums and jihadi chatrooms stating that Nasir al-Wahayshi had been selected as the new amir, or commander, of al-Qaeda in Yemen. The message also served as a warning to the older generation of al-Qaeda militants in Yemen, who had come to a tacit non-aggression pact with the government.3 This agreement, the message stated, was tantamount to a ―treasonous alliance with tyrants.‖ The Yemeni government had managed to convince the militants not that their beliefs are incorrect, but rather that they were hurting their own cause and base of operations by acting violently within the borders of the state.4 Days later a second message was released, this time aimed at the Yemeni government, demanding, among other things, the release of alQaeda members in Yemeni prisons. The message also pledged revenge against those responsible for the assassination of al-Harithi in 2002. Already, in March 2007, al-Qaeda had

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assassinated Ali Mahmud al-Qasaylah, the Chief Criminal Investigator in Marib, for his alleged role in the assassination.5 Less than two weeks after al-Raymi’s first message, on July 2, al-Qaeda struck again. This time a suicide bomber attacked a tourist convoy in Marib, killing 8 Spanish tourists and two Yemeni drivers. One month later, on August 4, Yemeni special forces launched an early morning raid on an al-Qaeda safe house in the Marib and al-Jawf border region, killing four al-Qaeda militants, including one suicide bomber in training. The other three men had been implicated in both the assassination of al-Qasaylah and the attack on the Spanish tourists.6 Publicly al-Qaeda reacted to the strike with silence, but privately it was working under alWahayshi's leadership to rebuild and plan for the future.

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2008 In January 2008, it released the first issue of Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battles), its bi-monthly on-line journal. Once again, the public release was followed within days by another attack, this time on group of Belgian tourists in Hadramawt, which left two of them dead along with two Yemeni drivers.7 Little more than a month later, on February 24, a previously unknown group calling itself The al-Qaeda Organization of Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula: The Soldiers' Brigades of Yemen released a one-page statement on al-Ikhlas, a prominent password-protected jihadi forum, taking credit for the attack on the Belgian tourists as well as the assassination of Qasaylah and the suicide attack on the Spanish tourists.8 Initially, some intelligence officers in Yemen thought the group was a fiction that existed only on the internet to steal credit from al-Wahayshi's group. Other western analysts hypothesized that the Soldiers Brigades of Yemen had split from al-Wahayshi's group over strategic differences.9 Both were wrong. Over the course of the spring and summer of 2008 it emerged that the Soldiers' Brigades of Yemen were merely a semi-autonomous group of cells with some operational independence under the direct control of Hamza al-Qu'ayti, while still maintaining its allegiance to al-Wahayshi.10 In March 2008, al-Qaeda in Yemen released the second issue of Sada al-Malahim. This issue, like the previous one, included a number of articles and interviews, but it also announced that the organization was changing its name from al-Qaeda in Yemen to the alQaeda Organization of Jihad in the South of the Arabian Peninsula. A statement of responsibility posted to al-Ikhlas followed all of the attacks during the 2008 campaign, many of which were minor. On 23 July 2008, the Soldiers Brigades of Yemen posted an audiotape to al-Ikhlas threatening more attacks if al-Qaeda prisoners in Yemen‘s al-Mansurah prison in Aden were not released. The speaker on the tape identified himself as Hamza al-Qu‗ayti. Two days later, he made good on his threat when a suicide bomber attacked a military compound in Sa'yyun. Yemen responded weeks later when, acting on a tip from a local resident, it surrounded a suspected al-Qaeda safe house in Tarim. The ensuing shootout resulted in the deaths of five al-Qaeda members, including al-Qu'ayti, and the arrest of two others. The raid was widely seen as a much needed victory for Yemen. It claimed that with al-Qu'ayti's death it had killed the mastermind of the attacks that had been

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plaguing Yemen since the February 2006 prison break. To some degree, both the US and the UK bought this story, as both relaxed travel restrictions to the country. Unfortunately, all three governments overlooked the localized nature of al-Qu'ayti's cell, which should have suggested a diffusion of strength for alQaeda in Yemen. Five members of the cell were from al-Mukalla, while the other two came from the neighboring towns of Shabwa and al-Qatin. Al-Qaeda responded on September 17, which corresponded to Ramadan 17 the anniversary of the Battle of Badr, with an attack on the US Embassy in San„a, killing at least 19 people including the seven attackers. Following the attacks, issues five and six of Sada alMalahim were released.11 Both issues, but particularly issue six, show a strong Saudi influence and a marked increase in the quality of the religious scholarship in the journal. In my view, al-Qaeda in Yemen was the beneficiary of an influx of Saudi talent. In issue six it also began soliciting questions from its readership to which it said it would respond with fatawa (religious opinions) from its Shariah Committee. (Despite issuing some fatawa, it has since discontinued this practice.) This is a major mile marker along the organization‘s road to maturity. The journal also began to show itself adept at tapping into domestic Yemeni concerns, and using these to enhance its reputation as a truly representative movement with members from all regions and segments of society.

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2009 In January 2009, the group announced that the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al-Qaeda were merging to form a single, unified organization to be known as AQAP. This merger, which effectively transformed al-Qaeda from a local chapter to a regional franchise, indicated the organization‘s desire for regional reach. In many ways this new regional organization, which goes by the name al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, was indicative of al-Wahayshi‘s growing ambition. Throughout the first couple of years of his leadership - 2007 and 2008 – he worked hard to create a durable organizational infrastructure that could survive the loss of key commanders, which is why even though someone like Hamza al-Qu‗ayti was killed in August 2008, al-Qaeda was still able to launch an attack on the US Embassy only a month later. The Christmas day attempt was the logical extension of AQAP‘s ambitions to date, but one that few believed the group to be capable of at the time. AQA P and its predecessor, alQaeda in Yemen, have quickly moved through the stages of development in their bid to be capable of such an attack. The attempt also illustrates the extent to which Nasir al-Wahayshi, the current amir of AQAP, has modeled not only his own leadership style on that of Osama bin Laden, his former boss, but also fashioned his organization‘s goals on the template constructed by bin Laden in Afghanistan. Throughout 2009, AQAP carried out a number of attacks that illustrated the group‘s growing ambition and capabilities. In March, it dispatched a suicide bomber who killed South Korean tourists in Hadramawt. Days later it struck again, attacking a convoy of South Korean officials sent to investigate the attack. Later that summer, in August, the group launched one of its most ingenious attacks, an attempted assassination of Saudi Arabia‘s counterterrorism chief and deputy minister of the interior, Muhammad bin Nayif. The bomber, Abdullah Asiri, reportedly hid PETN explosives in his rectum as a way to avoid

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detection. That attack, of course, was eerily echoed by Abdumutallab‘s attempt on Christmas Day.12 AQAP learned from this initial failure with PETN. Many analysts believe that the reason Asiri‘s attempt was unsuccessful was that his body absorbed the majority of the blast – something the gruesome pictures of the bomb‘s aftermath also illustrate – which is why Abdumutalab hid the explosives in his underwear instead of inside his body. Saudi Arabia dodged another major strike in October 2009, when a roving police checkpoint stumbled across an al-Qaeda cell. The three al-Qaeda members had already made their way across the border into Saudi Arabia from Yemen when their Chevy Suburban was stopped at a checkpoint. One was driving and the other two were disguised as women in the back seat. The Saudi police unit had a female officer accompanying them and when she approached the car to inspect the women‘s identity the two individuals in the backseat – Ra‘id al-Harbi and Yusif al-Shihri, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee and the brother-in-law of Said al-Shihri, AQAP‘s deputy commander – opened fire. Both men were killed in the fighting while the driver was arrested and interrogated. His confessions led Saudi authorities to a number of other alQaeda operatives in the country. In the shadowy world of intelligence analysis too much often has to be pieced together from too little evidence, but the above account appears to be confirmed by the release of alHarbi and al-Shihri‘s wills by AQAP in December 2009. The wills, which were recorded before the pair traveled to Saudi Arabia, appear to indicate that the pair was on a suicide mission. Shortly after the wills were released on-line, the US and Yemen coordinate a trio of strikes against al-Qaeda targets in Yemen. It is still unclear what role the US played in the strikes but, according to the New York Times, it was intimately involved in the operations.13 One target was reportedly an al-Qaeda training camp in the southern governorate of Abyan, although others have disputed that characterization. That raid, which likely involved US firepower, killed a number of individuals, including al-Qaeda suspects as well as a number of women and children. The casualty numbers vary widely depending on the source, but Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs, Rashid al-Alimi told members of parliament on December 23 that an investigation was being conducted into the deaths of civilians. It is debatable whether the civilian casualties could have been justified if the US and Yemeni governments had killed al-Raymi - I would still argue they wouldn't and that it is a self-defeating strategy that expands rather than limits the al-Qaeda threat in Yemen, but I do concede there is a debate here - but I don't think the casualties can be justified if al-Raymi escaped. There are already a slew of pictures of dead children, mangled infants and corpses on jihadi forums. This is not something the Obama Administration wants to see underlined with a "Made in the USA" caption. Yemeni forces also conducted raids on two other al-Qaeda hideouts in and around San„a on December 17. In San„a, they arrested 14 individuals they accused of providing material assistance to al-Qaeda. Northeast of the capital in the Arhab tribal region, Yemeni counterterrorism forces raided a suspected al-Qaeda safe house. The raid resulted in the deaths of three al-Qaeda suspects, including a former Guantanamo Bay detainee, Hani alSha‗lan.14 But the target of the raid, Qasim al-Raymi, escaped the government‘s siege along with a fellow al-Qaeda suspect Hizam Mujali.

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Days later, on December 21, an al-Qaeda member later identified as Muhammad Salih al‗Awlaqi returned to the scene of the strike in Abyan and gave a short, impromptu speech to a rally protesting the attack that al-Jazeera caught on video. Fighter planes, apparently acting on US intelligence, tracked al-‗Awlaqi back to his tribal region in Shabwa and attacked a position where he was believe to be hiding on December 22. The initial bombing raid was unsuccessful, but two days later another strike on the same position succeeded in killing al-‗Awlaqi as well as a handful of other al-Qaeda suspects. Subsequent rumors that the target of the attack was a leadership meeting between Nasir alWahayshi, Said Ali al-Shihri and Anwar al-‗Awlaqi appear to be unfounded and none of the three are believed to be dead. The next day, of course, Umar Faruq Abdumutallab attempted to bring down a plane over Detroit. The subsequent statement released by AQAP on December 28 claimed that the attempt was in retaliation for the week of strikes, which it claimed were the carried out by US with Cruise missiles, but the chronology of Abdumutallab‘s travel make this more propaganda than fact. There is still much that is not known about Abdumutallab‘s time in Yemen. Not only where he went and who he spent time with but also whether he was a sort of trial balloon for AQAP or just the first of several bombers. For AQAP this was a relatively low-cost and lowrisk operation. It did not send one of its own members, but rather someone who sought the group out and who was, from an organizational perspective, dispensable. One thing that may help shed some light on this subject is whether or not Abdumutallab recorded a will that he left with AQAP leaders in Yemen. But even if he did it is doubtful that the organization would release it given his failed attempt. AQA P has always welcomed attacks on US interests anywhere in the world, but this was the first time the organization attempted to carry out an attack outside of the Arabian Peninsula. Even in the statement put out by AQAP claiming credit for the failed attack it focused on ―expelling the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula,‖ the group‘s stated raison d’etre. Although it did raise the rhetoric slightly, calling for ―total war on all Crusaders in the peninsula.‖ What this means for the future of the group is still far from clear. But one worry is that the reaction that the US has had to the unsuccessful attack may induce AQAP to devote more time and resources to similar attempts in the future. This, however, is largely dependent on the group‘s resources. Certainly there are talented and innovative individuals working within the organization in Yemen and these tend to attract motivated students and recruits. This should be a cause for concern. The only thing that is known with any degree of certainty at this date is that the attempted Christmas demonstrates that AQAP‘s imagination matches its ambitions. Yemen responded by carrying out a strike on January 15, 2010 on two vehicles, which were believed to be carrying eight al-Qaeda suspects, including Qasim al-Raymi. Initially, the Yemeni government reported that it had killed six of the militants, including al-Raymi, but a statement put out by AQAP on January 17 said that none of its members were killed although some had been wounded. AQAP version was corroborated by local press reports that claimed the AQAP fighters held a ―Thanksgiving‖ dinner in Marib to celebrate escaping the strike.15 The AQAP statement from January 17, in addition to warning people not to trust the Yemeni government, also hinted at a major strike to come. This warning has also been expressed by ‗Abdillah Haydar Shay‗a, a Yemeni journalist with good contacts within

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AQAP.16 The response, he says, will be an operation and not a statement. This is, of course, classic jihadi rhetoric - the proof will be in what you see and not what you hear - and for those with a long memory or who have been following Yemen for more than just the past three weeks this should sound eerily similar to what AQ in the South of the Arabian Peninsula (one of the precursors to the current organization) said after the death of Hamza al-Qu'ayti and four others in Tarim in August 2008. Of course, in September 2008 there was an attack on the US Embassy in San'a. It is clear, at least to me, that al-Qaeda in Yemen is stronger now than it has ever been in the past. The organization is attracting more recruits than ever before and is growing increasingly more skilled at utilizing these new members. This is not to say that Yemen is in danger of falling to al-Qaeda or anything of that sort. Instead, as Yemen grows weaker and as government power recedes further and further back into urban areas, this opens up a great deal of space in which al-Qaeda can operate. In the first phase of the war against al-Qaeda, Yemen and the US were working in concert and al-Qaeda was the top priority for both countries. This is no longer the case. Yemen is now preoccupied with the increasingly violent calls for secession from the south, threats of renewed fighting in the north and, most importantly, a faltering economy that makes traditional modes of governance nearly impossible. Al-Qaeda has learned that the more chaotic Yemen is the better it is for al-Qaeda. And Yemen is in extremely bad shape. Let me conclude with a couple of observations about the differences between the first phase of the war and the second phase. For al-Qaeda, the first phase was largely a reactionary one. The Yemeni government cracked down on al-Qaeda in the country; in many ways it initiated the fight. Al-Qaeda was largely unprepared to carry out the type of campaign that it would need to in order to be successful in Yemen. It had to organize on the run. This is no longer the case. The organization that al-Wahayshi is commanding, was built for exactly this type of war and now al-Qaeda is the one initiating the fight. Al-Qaeda learned some difficult lessons from the first phase of the war, while the US and Yemen seem more prepared to fight the enemy al-Qaeda was rather than the one that it has become.

B. Al-Huthi Conflict Background There are three minority Shi‗a sects in Yemen. The first and largest is known as the Zaydis, or Fiver Shi„a. Isma‘ilis, or Seveners, and Twelver Shi‗a, which is close to the type of Shi„ism practiced in Iran and Iraq, also exist in the country. The latter two groups are both numerically and politically negligible. The Zaydis, however, have a long and robust political tradition in Yemen, dating back to 893 when Yahya bin Husayn, or Imam Hadi ila al-haqq, first arrived in northern Yemen. Initially, he was summoned to act as an arbiter in a tribal conflict. But eventually, following his second trip to Yemen in 897, he established himself as the imam with his headquarters in the northern city of Sa„dah, which remains a Zaydi stronghold today.17 The political and religious office that he instituted in Yemen would survive, in various forms, until the 1962 revolution and the subsequent eight-year civil war in north Yemen. The civil war, which

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began as a palace coup, overthrew Muhammad al-Badr, the final imam of the Hamid al-Din dynasty in north Yemen. Following the bloodless coup that ousted the republic‘s first president in 1967, ‗Abd alRahman al-Iryani was named president. Al-Iryani was largely seen as a compromise figure. His village straddled what was understood to be the border between the Zaydi highlands and the Shafi„i lowlands, northern Yemen‘s two largest sects. The Shafi‗is are, of course, a Sunni sect, but the difference between Sunni and Shi‗a in Yemen is not as great as elsewhere. Much of this is the result of historical compromise. In the eighteenth century, Muhammad alShawkani, a Yemeni jurist, did much to incorporate Sunni teachings into the practice of Zaydism.18 Some scholars even referr to Zaydism as the ―fifth school of Sunni Islam.‖19 President Ali Abdullah Salih, the late Shaykh „Abdullah al-Ahmar, Ali Muhsin alAhmar and numerous other leading figures of contemporary Yemen are of Zaydi origins. Even Shaykh ‗Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who was designated a ―specially designated global terrorist‖ by the US in 2004, is a scion of a Zaydi family.20 But this identity is one of culture and tradition rather than a political allegiance. Relatively few Zaydis in contemporary Yemen identify as specifically Shi‗a.21 Instead, a key distinction is between Hashimis, or descendants of the prophet, and non-Hashimis.22 In post-revolutionary Yemen, the Hashimis have been largely excluded from power and many influential figures such as the late Qadi Isma‘il al‗Akwa‘ were actively anti-Hashimi. Following the 1990 unification of the YAR and PDRY, known more colloquially as North and South Yemen respectively, a number of Zaydis formed a political party, Hizb alHaqq. The party‘s charter adhered to the constitution at the expense of traditional Zaydi theology, acknowledging the president as the legitimate ruler of the country as opposed to an imam. Several influential Zaydi scholars, such as Badr al-Din al-H uthi refused to sign the document. Some of al-Huthi‘s sons did, however, serve terms in Yemen‘s parliament, including Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi, who was elected in 1993 as a member of Hizb alHaqq. But Husayn refused to seek a second term in 1997, deciding instead to dedicate himself to the defense of Zaydism in and around Sa‘dah. President Salih has long favored a divide-and-rule approach to governing, playing different factions off against one another, as a way of keeping potential opposition groups perpetually dependent. This style of ruling has led to numerous difficulties as particular groups are encouraged and then subsequently discouraged and oppressed when they are deemed to have grown too powerful. More specifically, in the governorate of Sa‗dah the government has long been both encouraging Wahhabi-like groups and allowing Saudi Arabia to fund these same groups against the more historical Zaydi power base within the region, although at times the government has also supported Zaydi groups against the Wahhabis. The clashes between these two sides were on-going throughout the 1990s, as Wahhabis destroyed Zaydi tombs and Zaydis retaliated.23

The Huthi Rebellion Finally, in 2004 the conflict went beyond periodic clashes between paramilitary forces on both sides and became an open war between the government and its Wahhabi/Salafi allies against a group of Zaydis that became known as the Huthi‘s, after the name of their leader

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Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi. The spark came in late June 2004, when the government overreached and attempted to arrest Husayn al-Huthi. Some reports date the beginning of the conflict to January 2003, when President Salih was implicitly criticized by members of a Zaydi group known as the Shabab al-Mu’minin, or The Believing Youth.24 Whatever the case, and each date has a precursor going back to 1962, fighting began after the failed attempt to arrest Husayn al-Huthi. Since then there have been six separate rounds of fighting between government forces and its local allies against the Huthis. According to one well-informed report, the conflict has ―evolved significantly since 2004,‖ as numerous tribes have been brought into the increasingly murky conflict, which has grown to include a number of local and diverse grievances against the government.25 The tentative cease-fire that was declared unilaterally by President Salih in July 2008 held until August 2009, when the government launched ―Operation Scorched earth.‖ On November 4, 2009 the war spilled over the border into Saudi Arabia. Like much of the conflict, the initial clashes that left at least one Saudi soldier and one Huthi fighter dead are clouded in conflicting and contradictory reports. The Huthis claim that they were responding to repeated strikes by the Yemeni military, which was using Saudi territory as a rear base to launch flanking maneuvers into Sa‗dah. Saudi Arabia, in turn, argued that it was retaliating against incursions by foreign rebels. Both sides maintain that the other fired first. Whatever the sequence of events, the result was the same. Saudi Arabia deployed a number of troops to its southern border and launched air and ground assaults on pockets of Huthi fighters, purportedly to drive them back across the border. These clashes are still on going. The latest round of fighting was sparked, at least in part, by the government‘s concern that its previous failures to put down the rebellion was emboldening calls for secession in the south. This desire to strike a decisive knockout blow has led to some of the fiercest fighting to date, with the government launching daily bombing raids on suspected Huthi targets. Throughout the conflict the government has alleged that the Huthis are receiving support from Shi‗a throughout the Middle East but particularly from Iran and Hizbullah. The government has also attempted to link the Huthis both to al-Qaeda and to southern secessionists in Yemen, which has called into question the veracity of much of its allegations. For its part, the Huthis have made similar fanciful claims in what amounts to a list of alleged actors that is as exhaustive as it is imaginative. Part of the problem is that the Yemeni government has learned that in order to be considered a priority it must link its domestic problems to larger regional and western security concerns. Towards this end, Yemen has deliberately confused al-Huthi supporters with those of al-Qaeda, blurring the lines between the two groups by including members of both on a single list of ―terrorists.‖ This tactic, it believes, will allow it to pursue the war against the Huthis under the guise of striking at al-Qaeda. It has also attempted to tap into Saudi fears of a rising Shi‗a threat on its southern border, playing up the Huthis‘ alleged international connections as well as obfuscating the traditional differences between Zaydism and twelver Shi‗ism. But it has yet to provide any firm evidence of direct Iranian support. Instead, the war in Sa‗dah is rapidly becoming just one more stick for Iran and Saudi Arabia to beat each other over the head with. The Iranian-Saudi Arabian dispute is a regional rivalry that is being grafted onto a war with local roots.

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There is, as more than five years of fighting have made clear, no military solution to the conflict. Even Saudi Arabia‘s direct involvement will prolong rather than shorten the war. Already its influence has significantly altered the complexion of the conflict, as some Yemenis are privately expressing their desire to see Saudi Arabia get a bloody nose in Sa‗dah.

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The Huthis The Huthis have often couched its rhetoric in anti-Western/anti-Israeli slogans. For instance, one of the most common slogans is ―death to America, death to Israel.‖ But this rhetoric should not suggest that the group is actively anti-western, as it has not carried out any anti-western attacks, despite support for the Huthis within San‗a. Instead, it appears that the group is using popular frustration against US and Israeli policies in the Middle East to both engender local support and to implicitly criticize President Salih who is an ally of the US and by extension, according to the local logic, also an ally of Israel. It would also be a mistake to suggest that the organization is primarily an anti- Sunni one, even though the vast majority of its opponents are Sunnis of the Salafi variety. It is not interested in attacking Sunni groups outside of the Sa‗dah governorate that are not involved in the current conflict. Nor has the group demonstrated a desire to involve itself in the current crises in the south over calls for secession. ‗Abd al-Malik al-Huthi, the current military leader, had his office put out a statement in May distancing the Huthis from the ―Southern Movement‖ following comments by Tariq al-Fadhli, suggesting that the regime was oppressing the people of Sa„dah in an interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat.26 Al-Fadhli fought in Afghanistan with Usama bin Ladin in the 1980s, suffering a wound during the Siege of Jalalabad. He later led a group of Afghan Arabs in a war of attrition against the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in and around his family‘s lands in the southern governorate of Abyan. His sister is married to Ali Muhsin alAhmar, the commander of the 1st Armored Division and the North West military quadrant. Al-Ahmar, who is not related to the Hashid family of the same name, is the military commander directing the war in Sa‗dah.27 The Huthis have also expressed little interest in combating other Shi‗a groups. Rather, it is more accurate to describe the Huthis as a defensive group, which believes its heritage is being eroded by an alliance between the Yemeni government and Saudi- backed Salafi groups in and around Sa‗dah. This understanding of the organization‘s motives helps to explain why it has acted the way it has, attacking local Salafi centers and striking at government forces. Despite the theological rhetoric and references on all sides, the Huthis are primarily a group driven by the local politics of Sa„dah. It believes the government has sided with its Salafi enemies against it, and as such the Huthis have evolved into a local anti-regime organization. The Huthis are a Zaydi/Hashimi movement, although this classification should not suggest that the movement wants to restore the office of the imamate as it existed in Yemen prior to the 1962 coup d’état and the subsequent civil war. Badr al-Din al-Huthi has denied that the H uthis are seeking the re-establishment of the imamate on several occasions.28 Despite these denials, the allegations persist thanks in large part to the government‘s continued insistence that this goal is at the heart of the conflict. In this way, the government has been able to portray the war as one in which it is seeking to preserve the republic against domestic enemies that wish to see Yemen return to an Imamate. This is a particularly loaded

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charge in Yemen, as most local histories resort to hyperbole when discussing the differences between the imamate and the republic. The government‘s accusations are often reported as fact in both the local press as well as in early histories of the conflict. For instance, one well-respected Yemeni historian, ‗Abd al‗Aziz Qa‘id al-Ma‗sudi, writes that both Husayn and Badr al-Din named themselves Imam.29 The tactics employed by the Huthis have remained fairly constant since the beginning of the conflict. The group typically employs ambushes aimed at the Yemeni military or its local allies and at times it has reportedly used land mines and checkpoints as a way of gaining control of territory in Sa‗dah. It has also, at times, resorted to assassinating military officials and kidnapping or capturing government soldiers. The Huthis‘ strategy has always been, at least in its own eyes, one of self-defense and survival. The Huthis see themselves as a community under attack, and this understanding has largely influenced the group‘s decision to engage in violence against the Yemeni government and its Salafi allies as well as against the different tribal and paramilitary forces that have been brought into the fighting. In 1995, Bernard Haykel identified the roots of the conflict, writing: ―The main issue of concern in all of these works was the preservation of the ZaydiYemeni heritage from extinction because of the onslaught of a proselytizing Wahhabi movement in such traditional Zaydi provinces as Sadah and the Jawf combined with neglect and opposition to Zaydi concerns and issues by the government in San‗a.‖30 These historical grievances and anxieties over extinction have evolved as the conflict has expanded and mutated since it began in 2004. The protracted nature of the war has also led to evolving justifications for the continuation of the conflict. The war has spread well beyond the core group of Zaydi and Hashimi purists who supported Husayn al-Huthi in 2004 to include a number of different tribesmen, who are responding to government destruction of crops, land and homes. Much of this destruction was presumably unintentional, but government shelling throughout the war has often been indiscriminate. This means that what was once a three-sided conflict between the government its Salafi allies and the Huthis has become much more complex. Now, tribesmen and other interest groups have been brought into the fighting on the side of the H uthis not out of any adherence to Zaydi theology or doctrine but rather as a response to government overreaching and military mistakes. In effect, after six rounds of fighting, the government‘s various military campaigns have created more enemies than it had when the conflict began. Saudi Arabia‘s military campaign against the Huthis has also served to expand and deepen the conflict. The sporadic clashes have, at times, been the result of government pressure to close local Zaydi schools while at other times these are tribal conflicts that are mistakenly reported as being directly related to the Huthi conflict. Unfortunately, the expanding nature of the war and the various actors now involved make differentiating between the two increasingly difficult. The government‘s continued ban on journalists and researchers traveling to Sa„dah has also contributed to much of this confusion. The Huthis operate much differently from Yemen‘s local al-Qaeda franchise, AQAP. The latter control little territory within the borders of the state, while the Huthis have managed to gain control of significant amounts of territory in and around Sa‗dah. AQAP is the most representative group or party in Yemen, including individuals from nearly every region and social class in the country. The Huthis, on the other hand, are largely limited to selfidentifying Zaydis, who see themselves under attack. But this is changing as the fighting

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continues and as more and more tribes are brought into the conflict on both sides. The kidnapping of a busload of doctors in June 2009 is evidence of this.31 In this case, there is a strong correlation to the growing strength and proselytizing nature of a Salafi/Wahhabi movement in and around Sa„dah and the emergence of a militant Zaydi movement. The Yemeni government has long supported the Salafis in Sadah against local Zaydi groups – although at times this support has been reversed – both as a way of keeping opposition groups weak and as a part of an unofficial anti-Hashimi stance by successive republican regimes.

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III. FOUNDATIONAL CHALLENGES If significant changes are not enacted in the coming years the state could very easily collapse, fragment, or see its power recede back to small urban pockets. This would be catastrophic not only for Yemen but for the Middle East and the international community as a whole. An unstable and chaotic Yemen would present numerous security challenges to regional and global powers, in addition to the humanitarian and economic issues that would inevitably accompany such a scenario. The two most pressing challenges that Yemen will have to deal with in the coming years are the loss of oil reserves and the depletion of its water table. The loss of these two resources will affect nearly every other sector of the economy and will coincide with a change in the country's political leadership. Compounding the situation is the fact that each challenge will affect other areas. For example, corruption will affect infrastructure, foreign investment, and unemployment, while illiteracy affects the birth rate and unemployment. Yemen will not have the luxury of dealing with each of these challenges independently of the others. It will be forced to face them as a group, which will further tax government resources beyond their capacity and make understanding and overcoming each individual problem more difficult. As the challenges become more pronounced the rate of collapse will intensify, making confronting these issues increasingly more complex for a government that appears to lack the political will and legitimacy to adequately address them. These challenges will all make fostering reform and democracy – let alone maintaining stability – an even more tedious and difficult task for foreign donors than it has been up to this point.

The Loss of Oil and Water Yemen's economy is largely based upon oil exports, which account for roughly 75 percent of the estimated $5.6 billion budget and 90 percent of the country's exports. Oil production declined by 5.9 percent in 2004 and by 4.7 percent in 2005. Early numbers for 2006, suggest that production has declined still further to a daily output of 368,000 bpd, which is a reduction of 25,000 bpd from 2005.32 Most observers project that the country‘s oil reserves will be exhausted within five to seven years at current rates of production, but if production is slowly eased back, which appears to be happening, Yemen could continue to export oil for another ten to twelve years. Some within the Yemeni government cling to the

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idea that further exploration could yield untapped new fields, but oil companies and most within the government consider the chances of this to be remote. Combine the loss of oil revenue with the depletion of Yemen's groundwater table, which is shrinking by as much as eight meters per year in some areas, and the potential for disaster is great. Per capita water supply in Yemen is roughly two percent of the world‘s average, which has had a devastating effect on the country‘s agriculture industries. More than half of the labor force works in agriculture but most of this is in small, subsistence level farming.33 This group has been hit hard not only by the reduction in water but also by the lifting of diesel subsidies, which is mostly used to fuel small water pumps. The cost of getting what little is left out of the ground has increased as well, making the situation more complex and difficult to manage than is usually assumed. This has had a real impact on the economy as Yemen, which was once a net exporter of grain, now imports 80 percent of its grain. Some suggest that the lifting of subsidies on diesel and fuel has the benefit of encouraging conservation. This is true to a certain extent, as a great deal of the country's precious water is wasted through mismanagement, but conservation is not itself a feasible solution to Yemen's water crisis. At best, it is a short-term stop-gap measure that will inevitably drive more Yemenis into poverty, and increase the demand for the state‘s already over-taxed resources. Sana is often predicted to be the first capital city in the world to run out of water, but the problem is even more acute in other parts of the country where families are dependent on the generosity of tribal shaykhs or neighborhood leaders. These men often purchase water for local constituents from private water companies that many have turned to in order to meet the needs of daily life. This has caused erosion in loyalty for the state, which aggravates tensions against an already brittle government. The loss of revenue from oil will in turn affect nearly every other segment of the country‘s economy, making it impossible for the government to continue to function at current levels of spending. This will undoubtedly create a greater strain on the infrastructure and lead to higher levels of unemployment and pervasive corruption. Yemen's current plans to diversify the economy away from oil are at once overly ambitious and completely inadequate. The Strategic Vision 2025 report lists both the fisheries and tourism industries as promising areas that can help ease the loss of oil revenues. But these are small steps that will come nowhere near making up for the loss of 90 percent of government revenue. The state currently lacks the security infrastructure to make tourism appealing to any but the most daring travelers, and repeated kidnappings will continue to dampen even these tourists. Terrorist attacks such as the Marib bombing in July 2007 and the one on the Belgian tourists in early 2008, will also take its toll on a fragile industry. Attempts to funnel rural migrants away from San'a and towards the coasts, as was mentioned earlier, will likely fail. Yemen is without the infrastructure to produce, package and ship fisheries' products on a large scale. Even if both of these areas were completely successful it is highly doubtful that they would produce the 50 percent growth in non-oil GDP over the next five years that Yemen needs if it is to keep pace with plans it has produced.

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The Economy The loss of oil and water will also exacerbate pre-existing economic problems that Yemen has yet to adequately address. There are a number of serious economic problems, of which the most pressing are: corruption, shadow employees, lack of investment, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, population growth, and infrastructure. These challenges will affect one another in profound ways that are not completely knowable at this time. But it is highly likely that these will coalesce in a manner that will make the combination of these problems a much more complex and pressing situation to handle than any one issue. These matters will continue to have a detrimental affect on Yemen's economy for the foreseeable future. Corruption is rampant in Yemen. It has become such a part of the culture of doing business that it is unlikely to change soon. Yemen's anti-corruption campaign, which was initiated in early 2006, does not appear to have had much of an impact on the levels of corruption. There has yet to be a high profile arrest and prosecution of someone caught pilfering public accounts. Even assuming those at the top have the will to change; it is unlikely that they can reverse years of abuse and corruption that now affects nearly every segment of society. This is not a problem that can be corrected quickly; instead it will take years of diligence and extreme transparency to reverse current trends. Unfortunately, the government‘s energies will become increasingly occupied with other economic and security concerns over the coming years, and it will likely lack the will and capital for the type of reform that is necessary. Issues of corruption are also evident in the phenomenon that has been termed "shadow employees," or "double-dippers" in Yemen. This is when one employee draws two or more governmental salaries. Official statistics on the numbers of such employees are difficult to find, but many observers believe the numbers to be in the tens of thousands. At times, Yemen has been successful in eliminating pockets of these shadow- employees from payroll records, but they are replaced almost as quickly as they are removed. This is partly due to the corrupt nature of Yemen's official bureaucracies, but it is also a result of powerful and influential individuals that dole out favors to their constituents through government salaries. In other words, élite groups within Yemen use the opaque nature of the system against itself by securing financial favors in the form of salaries for their dependants, who in turn offer their loyalty to the individual instead of to state institutions. Attempts to eliminate this phenomenon in any systematic way have been largely unsuccessful. The lack of foreign investment in the country has also been linked to corruption. Foreign businessmen have long been frightened away from investing in Yemen due to horror stories of being forced to buy plots of lands two or three times before it is finally stolen by a corrupt official. The lack of transparency and Yemen‘s dismal record of return on economic investment has also kept non-oil investment to a dismally low level. Yemen has hopes that its ambitious reform program, which has yet to be fully implemented, combined with goodwill from neighboring GCC countries, will help to reverse this trend. The Strategic Vision 2025 report suggests that Yemen believes it can attract $20-30 billion dollars in investments from Yemeni expatriates. This, like much that is in the report, seems to be a best-case scenario instead of a grounded and sober analysis of potential possibilities. Yemen hopes to also alleviate some of the strain through its new LNG terminal, which will largely be exported to

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the US. But estimates vary as to the amount LNG exports will provide, and it is unlikely that revenues will offset the lost in oil production. Yemen is also plagued by unemployment, which will continue to grow until the country's birth rate is brought under control. The government is the country's single largest employer, providing more than 30 percent of all jobs. It is forced to deal with roughly 50,000 new entrants into the job market every year. Already, unemployment is officially at 35 percent, although unofficial estimates put it as high as 45 percent. As the government loses revenue in the coming years, following the end of oil, it will be unable to provide both the employment and subsidies that its citizens have come to expect as it is forced to cut back on its spending. High unemployment rates have corresponded to an equally high level of poverty. In 1998, the World Bank estimated that 42 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. This number has increased significantly since then but, as with most numbers in Yemen, trustworthy and accurate statistics do not exist. In the absence of hard numbers, broad trends provide the best method of analysis. In this case, it is clear that poverty in Yemen is continuing to grow as the population increases at roughly 3.7 percent per year. This upward trend in unemployment numbers will continue to increase over the coming years as the government and agricultural industry become increasingly incapable of absorbing more individuals. The price of basic foodstuffs has also continued to grow over the past few years, forcing more and more Yemenis below the poverty line and unable to provide for their families. The country‘s low literacy rate further complicates Yemen‘s numerous other problems. Only 25 percent of females in Yemen are literate, which is one of the lowest rates in the world. (The literacy rate among males is significantly higher at 75 percent.) This problem is compounded by Yemen‘s weak education system, which features grossly overcrowded schools in many urban areas, while rural regions often suffer from a lack of electricity and buildings in which to hold classes. The high number of subsistence farms also takes its toll on childhood education, as children in rural areas spend their time in the fields instead of in the classroom. The literacy rate is a major problem that affects other challenges such as population growth. Yemen has one of the highest birth rates in the world, of seven live births per woman. Its population is growing at a rate of 3.7 percent per year, with no signs of slowing down. Officially, the population is listed at 20 million, although most observers claim it is closer to 23 or 25 million. It is likely that even high government officials do not have an accurate picture of the population growth rate. Yemen has hopes of lowering population growth to 2.6 percent, which it claims would leave the country with a population of 33.6 million in 2025. This is unlikely to happen, given the low rates of female literacy in the country and the government's reticence to openly discuss methods of family planning. Even if the government were to institute a nationwide campaign design to limit family size, it is doubtful that this would do much to ease the pressure. Many in rural areas distrust the Yemeni government, and centrally-designed, large-scale campaigns do not have a high rate of success in the country. Instead, to be successful, such a campaign would need to enlist the support of powerful individuals including prominent tribal shaykhs and perhaps most importantly religious leaders, imams, and prayer leaders in mosques. This is unlikely to happen given the low levels of education and societal divisions that exist in Yemen. The country's infrastructure is extremely antiquated, with little hope of keeping pace with the increase in demand that will come in future years. Electricity only reaches 40 percent of

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the population, and daily power outages are the norm, even in urban centers like San‗a. This and other infrastructural problems such as the lack of roads and water pipes in rural areas and the shantytowns that now surround most major urban centers are blamed on corruption within the government. This is true to a certain extent, but even a completely transparent government would have difficulties coaxing the needed amount of production out of the country's crumbling system of services. The government's impending cash crisis will mean that it will soon have little money to invest in such services, which will mean that electrical grids, sewage systems, roads and water pipes will continue to be over-taxed until they give way. The collapse of the country's infrastructure will immediately erode government legitimacy, while at the same time putting a much greater stress on the other weak points in the country‘s faltering economy.

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CONCLUSION There is a limit to the positive impact the US, its allies and regional partners can have in Yemen. Much of the country‘s future will continue to remain beyond human engineering and even a near perfect strategy will still leave too much to chance. In the absence of any easy or obvious solutions, Yemeni advisers and a surprising number of foreign experts are putting their faith in the country‘s blind ability to muddle through the multitude of challenges it will face in the near future. This belief is buoyed by intimate knowledge of the past – Yemen, they claim, has seen far worse and survived – but such an argument confuses history with analysis. And in Yemen hope, even desperate hope, is not a strategy. Any Yemen strategy will require a coordinated effort between the US, its allies and regional partners. Success in Yemen demands a localized, nuanced and multifaceted response to the country‘s many problems. Dealing with al-Qaeda in isolation from Yemen‘s other challenges is neither sustainable or desirable. Instead, it is a recipe for disaster. A narrow focus on counterterrorism may alleviate the problem for a short period of time, but it will do nothing to eradicate al-Qaeda within the country over the long term. Indeed, such a shortsighted approach will have exceedingly high long-term costs. Rolling back al-Qaeda in Yemen in any sort of sustainable way will require a great deal of expertise and in-depth, localized knowledge, which I am not sure neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia posses let alone the US and its allies. However, there are some steps that the US can take. These are less a blueprint for success than they are a basic checklist; nor is it comprehensive so much as it is a starting point. Bring in Saudi Arabia: The US must work behind the scenes to convince Saudi Arabia that US goals of destroying al-Qaeda in Yemen and stabilizing the country are in Saudi Arabia‘s best interest. This will not be easy, but it is essential. Without at least the tacit acceptance of Saudi Arabia anything the US attempts to do in the country can be subverted. This is not working through Saudi Arabia or running US policy through Riyadh, but rather convincing Saudi Arabia not to actively subvert or undermine US efforts in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is by far the most powerful foreign actor within Yemen, but it is not a monolithic one. Towards this end the US must draw Saudi Arabia out of the al-Huthi conflict in the north and

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use its considerable influence in San‗a and throughout the tribal regions in the north to help end active fighting in Sa‗dah as an initial step towards a cease-fire. Treat Yemen as a whole: The US and other European and western countries cannot afford to focus on the al-Qaeda threat in Yemen to the exclusion of every other challenge. There has to be a holistic approach and an understanding that all of the crises in Yemen exacerbate and play-off against each other. Simply targeting the organization with military strikes cannot defeat al-Qaeda. Something has to be done to bring a political solution to both the al-Huthi conflict as well as the threat of secession in the south. Not dealing with these will only open up more space for al-Qaeda to operate in as well as creating an environment of chaos and instability that will play to the organization‘s strength. Indeed, by focusing so exclusively on al-Qaeda and by viewing Yemen only through the prism of counter-terrorism the US has induced exactly the same type of results it is hoping to avoid. This demands much more development aid to the country as a way of dealing with local grievances in an attempt to peel-off would-be members of alQaeda.

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Reverse the Trend: The US must also swim up current against bureaucratic muscle memory and attempt to reverse recent trends. In particular it should move closer to the risk management side of the spectrum than remaining on the risk prevention side, where current US diplomacy is stuck. Certainly there are very real security threats in Yemen, but cloistering diplomats inside a fortress like embassy compound and having them scurry back to the fortress-like housing compound in Hadda is not a good way to get to know the country and it certainly does not provide the type of localized and nuanced knowledge that is a prerequisite for success in Yemen. Utilize Institutional Knowledge: Due to the very real security threats in Yemen, the country is an unaccompanied post, meaning that spouses are only allowed to come if they can find work inside the embassy while dependants of certain ages are not allowed to come. In practical terms this means that the US is sending younger and more inexperienced diplomats to a country that demands it send its most knowledgeable and experienced foreign policy hands. I have often criticized US policy in recent years towards Yemen as a dangerous mixture of ignorance and arrogance. And I continue to hold this view, though it pains me to do so, as I know many of the diplomats and many of them are brave and intelligent young women and men who perform extraordinary services. But as a whole, my pointed criticism remains, I believe, accurate. The short tours – 2-3 years – also have an impact, as much institutional knowledge is lost. In Yemen, personal relationships mean a great deal and there is too much seepage when a political officer is replaced after such a short time in Yemen. Not only does the incoming officer have to reinvent the proverbial wheel but they also have to relearn the tribal and political geography of an incredibly complex country. Many Yemenis view their relationships not through the prism of dealing with a US representative but rather with an individual and known entity while the constant turnover undermines trust within the country. Go on the Offensive: The US must be much more active in presenting its views to the Yemeni public. This does not mean giving interviews to the Yemen Observer or the Yemen Times or even al-Hurra, which is at least in Arabic. It means writing and placing op-eds in Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

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Arabic in widely read Yemeni newspapers like al-Thawra. (Newspaper editorials are often read aloud at qat chews.) I detailed a golden opportunity that the US missed with the Shaykh Muhammad al-Mu‘ayyad case in August in a report I wrote for the CTC Sentinel.34 This also means allowing US diplomats to go to qat chews in Yemen and even chew qat with Yemenis. The US should be honest about what qat is and what it does and not hide behind antiquated rules that penalize a version of the stimulant that does not exist in Yemen. Whether or not the US knows it, it is engaged in a propaganda war with al-Qaeda in Yemen and it is losing and losing badly. US public diplomacy is all defense and no offense in Yemen, this has to change or the results of the past few years will remain the roadmap for the future. And that future will witness an increasingly strong al-Qaeda presence in Yemen.

End Notes

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1

Gregory D. Johnsen, ―Welcome to Qaedastan,‖ Foreign Policy, January/February 2010. See also: Gregory D. Johnsen, ―The Expansion Strategy of al-Qa„ida in the Arabian Peninsula,‖ CTC Sentinel, September 2009, pgs. 8 -11. 2 Gregory D. Johnsen, ―Tracking Yemen‘s 23 Escaped Jihadi Operatives – Parts I and II,‖ Jamestown Foundation, September 27 and October 11, 2007. 3 Gregory D. Johnsen and Brian O‘Neill, ―Yemen Attacks Reveals Struggle among al-Qaeda‘s Ranks,‖ Terrorism Focus, 4 (22) July 10, 2007. 4 Kathy Gannon, Yemen Employs New Terror Approach,‖ Associated Press, July 4, 2007. 5 Gregory D. Johnsen ―Is al-Qaeda in Yemen Regrouping?‖ Terrorism Focus, 4 (15) May 22, 2007. 6 Gregory D. Johnsen ―Yemen Faces Second Generation of Islamist Militants,‖ Terrorism Focus 4 (27) August 14, 2007. 7 Gregory D. Johnsen, ―Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s 2008 Campaign,‖ CTC Sentinel, April 2008, pgs. 1-4. See also: Gregory D. Johnsen, ―Attacks on Oil Industry are First Priority for al-Qaeda in Yemen,‖ Terrorism Focus 5 (15) February 5, 2008. 8 Ibid; see also: The Soldiers Brigades of Yemen, ―Statement 1‖ www.al-ekhlaas.net, February 24, 2008. Al-Ikhlas, of course, was hacked on September 10, 2007 and its archives are now unavailable. I do, however, have hard copies of all 13 of the Soldiers Brigades of Yemen‘s statements. 9 This theory of the split has been most forcefully expressed by Nicole Strake of the Gulf Research Center. See, for example, Nicole Strake, ―Al-Qaeda in Yemen Divided but Dangerous,‖ The Peninsula, June 2008. 10 Gregory D. Johnsen, ―Assessing the Strength of al-Qa„ida in Yemen,‖ CTC Sentinel, November 2008, pgs. 10-13. 11 The two issues appear to have been released together due to the loss of al-Ikhlas as a forum. When alIkhlas went down on September 10, there was already a banner ad teasing the upcoming release of issue five of Sada alMalahim. Following the loss of al-Ikhlas it took al-Qaeda in Yemen another couple of months to regroup before it was able to publish both issue five and six on al -Faloja.net, with a short note apologizing for ―technical difficulties.‖ 12 Gregory D. Johnsen ―AQAP in Yemen and the Christmas Day Attack,‖ CTC Sentinel (Special Yemen Issue) January 2010, pgs. 1 – 4. 13 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, ―Threats Led to Embassy Closings, Officials Say‖ New York Times, January 3, 2010. 14 ―Security Report Discusses the details of operations targeting al-Qaeda,‖ (Arabic) Mareb Press, December 27, 2009. 15 ―Al-Qaeda holds a Banquet in Marib,‖ (Arabic) Mareb Press, January 17, 2010. 16 ―‘Aidh al-Shabwani present at Banquet,‖ (Arabic) News Yemen, January 17, 2010. 17 For more on the early history of the Zaydi Imamate in Yemen see Paul Dresch, Tribes Government and History in Yemen (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993) 167 – 173; also see „Ali bin Muhammad al„Alawi, Biography of al-Hadi ila al-haqq: Yahya bin Husayn (Arabic) (Beirut, Dar al-Fikr, 1981, 2nd edition). 18 Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003). 19 J. Leigh Douglas, The Free Yemeni Movement 1935-1962 (Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1987) 7. 20 Gregory D. Johnsen, ―al-Zindani, ‗Abd al-Majid,‖ Biographical Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East (Farmington Hills, MI, Thomson Gale, 2007). 21 International Crisis Group, Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb, May 27, 2009, 7.

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22

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In order to rule as an imam in Zaydi theology one must meet 14 different criteria, including descent from the prophet through Ali and Fatima. 23 Bernard Haykel, ―A Zaydi Revival?,‖ Yemen Update, No. 36, 1995. 24 International Crisis Group, Defusing the Saada Time Bomb, 3. 25 Ibid, 5. 26 Arafat Madabish, ―Tariq al-Fadhli to al-Sharq al-Awsat,‖ (Arabic) al-Sharq al-A wsat, May 14, 2009. 27 ―Salih and the Yemeni Succession,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Digest, August 29, 2008. 28 Jamal ‗Amar, ―Interview with Badr al-Din al-Huthi,‖ (Arabic) al-Wasat, March 19, 2005. 29 ‗Abd al-„Aziz Qa‘id al-Ma„sudi, The Formation of Zaydi Thought in Contemporary Yemen, (Arabic) (Cairo, Makatba Madbuli, 2008) 486. 30 Haykel, ―A Zaydi Revival?‖ 31 Ahmad al-Hajj, ―Yemeni Tribesmen Kidnap Medics,‖ Associated Press, June 11, 2009. 32 See, for example, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Yemen: Country Report, November 2005 and February 2007. 33 The World Bank, Yemen Development Policy Review, November 2006 and Republic of Yemen Country Assistance Evaluation, August 2006. 34 Gregory D. Johnsen, ―The Expansion Strategy of al-Qa ‗ida in the Arabian Peninsula,‖ CTC Sentinel, September 2009.

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INDEX 9 9/11, 9, 10, 16, 78, 129 9/11 Commission, 9

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A accountability, 84, 85, 90, 97, 98, 106, 127, 132 activism, 137, 138 Activists, 137 Afghanistan, v, viii, ix, 5, 6, 14, 15, 29, 30, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 79, 87, 118, 125, 126, 127, 129, 137, 138, 140, 141, 145, 146, 152, 154, 155, 157, 163 Africa, 20, 23, 75, 76, 129, 140 age, 14, 21, 29, 38, 39, 55, 86, 115, 122 aggression, 73, 155 agriculture, 20, 27, 41, 43, 46, 127, 142, 166 AIDS, 40 Air Force, 22, 89, 93, 107 airports, 51 Al Qaeda, 1, iii, v, vii, viii, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 111, 112, 113 ambassadors, 123 American culture, 120 appeasement, 126 Arab countries, 143 Arab world, vii, ix, 2, 82, 86 arbitration, 36 armed conflict, 90 armed forces, 7, 34, 58, 83, 99 arrest, 10, 62, 68, 156, 162, 167 Asia, 44, 48 assassination, 33, 76, 111, 128, 153, 155, 156, 157 assessment, 65, 120 assets, 46, 62, 128 assignment, 91

atrocities, 17 attacks, viii, ix, x, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 25, 29, 46, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 75, 76, 82, 84, 86, 88, 115, 118, 141, 145, 151, 152, 154, 156, 157, 159, 163, 166 authoritarianism, 139, 140, 142 authority, 10, 25, 45, 53, 54, 61, 75, 84, 88, 90, 91, 92, 104, 109, 110, 119, 121, 127, 132, 135, 136, 141 awareness, 115, 117

B background, 86, 109, 139 backlash, 10, 69 Bahrain, 24, 139 banking, 22, 45, 110 banks, 40, 45, 96 bargaining, 11 basic services, 76, 105 birth, 38, 78, 149, 165, 168 birth rate, 78, 149, 165, 168 bonds, 97, 150 border control, 78, 120 border crossing, 13, 33, 74 border security, 26, 58, 59, 101, 103, 122 breakdown, 78 Britain, 7, 16, 31, 46 brothers, 22, 150, 151 budget deficit, 24 budgetary resources, 98 bureaucracy, 122, 128 business education, 96

C cable system, 52 campaigns, 69, 164, 168 candidates, 22, 25, 55 capacity building, 121, 132

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Index

capital goods, 48 carjacking, 53 cash crops, 43 cast, 14, 104, 129 catastrophes, 146 cell, 23, 154, 157, 158 Chad, 138 changing environment, 153 chaos, 136, 170 Chief of Staff, 22, 102 childhood, 40, 150, 168 children, 38, 39, 76, 143, 158, 168 China, 4, 47, 48, 52 CIA, 10, 14, 29, 72, 78, 79, 109, 153 civil service, 41, 42, 46, 121, 126, 132, 133 civil service reform, 121 civil society, 20, 76, 83, 87, 116, 121, 126, 127, 132, 133, 142, 143 civil war, 2, 9, 19, 30, 34, 41, 47, 58, 67, 73, 87, 95, 105, 112, 129, 160, 163 Civil War, 34, 130 classroom, 40, 168 classrooms, 39 cleavages, 20, 126 cluster bomb, 6 Coast Guard, x, 26, 74, 93, 107, 120, 130, 145 cohesion, 119, 121 Cold War, 2, 30, 129 colonization, 28 commerce, 44, 46, 57 commercial bank, 45, 46 community, viii, ix, 2, 16, 24, 32, 41, 68, 82, 83, 87, 96, 97, 99, 103, 105, 112, 117, 122, 132, 143, 164, 165 comparative advantage, 91, 102 compatibility, 143 competition, 22 components, 41, 140 composition, 22, 109 confidence, 123, 136 conflict, 4, 11, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 27, 33, 59, 78, 83, 89, 98, 100, 106, 107, 108, 112, 119, 140, 141, 143, 149, 151, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170 conflict resolution, 27, 107 confusion, 164 Congress, 1, 2, 4, 8, 22, 26, 29, 31, 34, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, 73, 76, 79, 82, 102, 109, 110, 117, 118, 120, 127, 149 Constitution, 25, 53 construction, 21, 39, 42, 44, 46, 49, 51, 98, 103, 132 consumer goods, 44 consumption, 21, 70

contingency, 121 control, 2, 14, 32, 33, 52, 56, 58, 61, 65, 67, 69, 72, 74, 76, 83, 87, 128, 129, 136, 155, 156, 164, 168 convergence, 88 conversion, 32, 39 correlation, 39, 130, 165 corruption, vii, 1, 19, 20, 25, 28, 41, 47, 53, 55, 85, 94, 98, 120, 121, 126, 132, 136, 140, 142, 149, 154, 165, 166, 167, 169 costs, 20, 26, 34, 42, 62, 97, 131, 150, 169 Council of Ministers, 34, 53 counterterrorism, viii, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 18, 28, 58, 62, 72, 102, 103, 112, 118, 120, 140, 141, 142, 151, 157, 158, 169 credibility, 96, 103, 104 credit, 41, 43, 47, 84, 156, 159 crime, 71, 120 crisis management, 120 criticism, 19, 93, 170 crops, 20, 37, 43, 164 crown, 33, 128 crude oil, 44 cruise missiles, 6 Cuba, 5, 7, 9, 13, 25, 128 cultivation, 20, 30, 43, 86 culture, 21, 92, 106, 121, 161, 167 currency, 34, 46, 49, 110 current account, 48 curricula, 40 curriculum, 39, 76

D danger, 64, 83, 160 death, 22, 29, 32, 33, 38, 69, 141, 150, 151, 155, 156, 160, 163 death rate, 38 deaths, 38, 40, 156, 158 debt, 49, 85, 105, 106, 110 debtors, 45 decentralization, 19, 115, 121 decisions, 54, 65, 97 defense, 18, 27, 41, 57, 58, 59, 60, 72, 78, 84, 101, 103, 104, 141, 161, 164, 171 deficiency, 39, 40 deficit, 42, 48, 97 deforestation, 43 degradation, 15, 37 delivery, 41, 92, 93 democracy, 11, 22, 27, 97, 127, 130, 141, 143, 165 demographics, 65, 137 denial, 136, 140, 142 Department of Defense, 26, 27, 109, 110, 120 Department of Justice, 9

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Index deposits, 37, 46, 110 depreciation, 49 destruction, 64, 68, 105, 141, 164 detainees, 7, 13, 25, 26, 29, 30, 62, 64, 66 detection, 75, 120, 158 detention, 5, 13, 25, 39, 60 developing countries, 38 development assistance, 4, 8, 73, 83, 88, 91, 94, 101, 117, 119, 122, 130 development banks, 45 development policy, 92 diesel fuel, 20 differentiation, 77 direct investment, 49 disappointment, 22 disaster, 149, 166, 169 disbursement, 92, 107 discrimination, 54, 62 displaced persons, 87 dissatisfaction, 154 disseminate, 67, 77 diversification, 121 division, 13, 22 doctors, 40, 111, 165 Doha, 30 domestic demand, 43 domestic investment, 95 donors, vii, ix, 1, 8, 24, 42, 47, 51, 56, 82, 83, 85, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 105, 107, 112, 116, 121, 132, 165 doors, 8, 44, 149 draft, 33, 58, 60 drinking water, 20

E earnings, 48, 122 economic activity, 104 economic assistance, 6, 125, 130 economic cooperation, 8 economic crisis, 94, 119, 152 economic development, 27, 42, 47, 78, 83, 86, 88, 91, 96, 122, 130, 141, 142 economic growth, 137 economic indicator, 94 economic problem, 167 economic reform, 8, 34, 41, 42, 47, 55, 56, 98, 105, 123, 154 economic reforms, 34, 41, 42, 47, 98, 105, 154 economic systems, 41 Education, 27, 39, 58, 89, 99, 100 Egypt, 2, 32, 127, 128, 129, 138 election, 3, 12, 22, 28, 33, 34, 53, 55, 127, 155 electricity, 34, 44, 45, 105, 168

175

electronic systems, 93 employees, 44, 46, 91, 98, 104, 167 employment, 19, 121, 133, 168 energy, 4, 106, 131 engagement, 25, 30, 74, 84, 86, 120, 121, 133, 142, 143 England, 6 enrollment, 39 environment, 2, 71, 75, 105, 123, 135, 136, 170 environmental sustainability, 121 Eritrea, 36, 75 EU, 8 Europe, 78, 93 European Union, 7, 94 evacuation, 100 evolution, 109, 129 exchange rate, 49, 110 exclusion, 19, 152, 170 excuse, 99, 106, 132, 142 execution, 7, 106 exercise, 14, 55, 65, 72, 91, 93, 119 expenditures, 40, 59, 85, 97, 98 expertise, 23, 90, 91, 112, 141, 142, 143, 169 explosives, viii, 6, 9, 64, 68, 73, 76, 81, 118, 157, 158 exporter, 166 exports, 21, 24, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 120, 126, 165, 168 external financing, 24 extraction, 19, 43 extreme poverty, 94

F failure, 4, 5, 39, 41, 116, 127, 128, 132, 133, 146, 150, 152, 158 faith, 15, 26, 127, 169 family, 5, 15, 16, 17, 21, 30, 54, 67, 120, 136, 139, 140, 150, 151, 161, 163, 168 family members, 21 family planning, 168 farmers, 20, 129 fatwa, 141 FDI, 95, 108 FDI inflow, 95 fear, viii, 2, 19, 66, 71, 77, 152 fears, 5, 162 Feast, 31 fertility rate, 38 finance, 41, 45, 47, 57, 96, 106 financial crisis, 104 financial resources, 91 financial support, 2, 41, 42, 47, 55, 56 financing, 15, 41, 42, 45, 47, 62, 73, 96

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Index

fires, 17, 61 fiscal deficit, 42 fiscal policy, 42 fish, 37, 43, 48 fisheries, 41, 166 flight, viii, 64, 65, 73, 82, 87, 116, 118 focusing, 40, 142, 151, 170 food, 20, 21, 34, 43, 44, 48, 69, 76, 86, 109, 119, 121, 122 food products, 44 foreign aid, vii, 1, 26, 83, 87, 99 foreign assistance, ix, 82, 85, 90, 101, 105, 106, 121 foreign banks, 45, 46 foreign direct investment, 95 foreign exchange, 49 foreign investment, 49, 131, 165, 167 foreign nationals, 25 foreign policy, viii, 2, 56, 90, 170 formal education, 39 France, 28, 29, 30, 45, 52, 79, 126 franchise, 157, 164 free market economy, 104 freedom, 14, 19, 39, 62, 121, 136, 154 freshwater, 20, 37 frustration, 10, 104, 163 fuel, 20, 23, 34, 42, 119, 131, 166 fulfillment, 93 full capacity, 98 funding, 6, 26, 41, 47, 88, 92, 93, 98, 99, 102, 109, 120 funds, 6, 20, 21, 24, 26, 30, 40, 41, 51, 53, 55, 68, 73, 92, 94, 99, 102, 109, 110, 120, 121, 122, 146

G GDP, vii, 1, 20, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 95, 104, 105, 108, 110, 166 GDP per capita, 42 gender, 40 gender equity, 40 general election, 33 generation, 10, 11, 115, 132, 155 geography, 121, 170 Germany, 47, 94 goals, viii, 4, 63, 65, 67, 74, 76, 95, 106, 115, 119, 151, 154, 155, 157, 169 gold, 37, 49 goods and services, 42 governance, vii, 1, 5, 21, 25, 27, 83, 88, 94, 95, 115, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 132, 136, 146, 160 government budget, 42, 53, 58 GPC, 22, 34, 52, 54, 55 grades, 40

grand jury, 29, 64 grants, 40, 41, 47, 95, 110 gravity, 68, 118 greed, 7 grids, 169 gross domestic product, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 59 groundwater, 43, 166 groups, vii, viii, ix, 1, 2, 4, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 24, 56, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 75, 83, 92, 97, 101, 119, 122, 126, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 146, 150, 153, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 167 growth, 38, 41, 42, 43, 52, 104, 131, 166, 168 growth rate, 42, 104, 131 guidance, 67, 89, 97, 109

H Haiti, 111 Hamas, 12, 24, 77, 138 hands, 35, 170 harassment, 55, 142 health, 27, 40, 94, 95, 105, 118, 120, 121, 132 health care, 40, 118, 132 health care system, 40, 132 health services, 40 highlands, 37, 127, 128, 131, 161 HIV/AIDS, 40 homeland security, viii, 2, 4, 5 hopes, 95, 153, 167, 168 hospitals, 76 host, 92, 102, 103, 123 hotels, 9, 46, 69 House, 22, 30, 34, 53 housing, 12, 170 human development, 40, 47, 95 human development index, 40 human immunodeficiency virus, 40 human rights, 5, 60, 62, 78, 118, 136, 140, 141, 142 humanitarian aid, 112 humanitarian crises, 116, 121

I identification, 46 identity, 126, 155, 158, 161 ideology, 39, 69, 136, 138, 139 illiteracy, vii, 1, 39, 70, 118, 136, 165, 167 illusion, 87, 115 imagination, 159 imbalances, 85 IMF, 41, 47, 56, 95, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110 immigrants, 78 immigration, 58, 74, 78 implementation, 35, 42, 46, 53, 85, 95, 96, 100, 109

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Index imports, 20, 42, 48, 166 inclusiveness, 126 income, ix, 21, 39, 42, 52, 70, 86, 120, 136, 145 independence, 31, 67, 97, 128, 132 India, 33, 48, 128 indication, 23 indicators, 118, 123 indigenous, 32, 127, 142, 143 indoctrination, viii, 68, 81 Indonesia, 137, 143 industrialized countries, 48 industry, 12, 21, 43, 44, 46, 166, 168 inertia, 97 infant mortality, 38 infant mortality rate, 38 inflation, 19, 42, 49, 137 infrastructure, 2, 21, 39, 46, 47, 48, 93, 98, 104, 105, 123, 127, 128, 149, 153, 157, 165, 166, 167, 168 inmates, 152 insecurity, 86 insight, ix, 82 inspections, 79, 90 instability, vii, 1, 4, 7, 21, 24, 112, 118, 119, 121, 170 institutions, 39, 97, 112, 122, 123, 137, 142, 143, 167 instruction, 39, 93 insurance, 46, 152 integration, 91, 127 intelligence, viii, 5, 7, 10, 11, 21, 30, 39, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 142, 146, 150, 153, 156, 158, 159 intentions, 90, 112 interaction, 122 interest groups, 164 interest rates, 104 interference, 17 intermediaries, 153 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 57 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 57 International Criminal Court, 57 International Development Association (IDA), 41, 47, 95 international financial institutions, vii, 1, 85 international investment, 104 International Monetary Fund, 8, 38, 41, 42, 46, 47, 56, 57, 95, 108 international standards, 19, 46 international terrorism, viii, 63 internationalization, 140 intervention, 18, 43, 49

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investment, 21, 47, 49, 84, 91, 92, 95, 100, 103, 104, 105, 122, 126, 132, 142, 167 investors, 49, 52 Iran, 4, 15, 18, 28, 30, 79, 109, 129, 139, 155, 160, 162 Iraq, v, viii, 3, 4, 6, 11, 41, 47, 56, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 73, 87, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131, 137, 138, 140, 141, 146, 152, 153, 160 Iraq War, 129 Islam, viii, ix, 15, 25, 28, 32, 38, 39, 63, 64, 67, 68, 71, 82, 84, 98, 102, 112, 137, 138, 141, 143, 161, 171 Islamic law, 11, 53, 54, 77 Islamic movements, 137 Islamism, 139 isolation, 2, 83, 129, 135, 169 Israel, ix, 24, 82, 84, 86, 98, 99, 103, 105, 109, 129, 163

J Jamestown, 28, 29, 30, 79, 171 Jews, 24, 39 jihad, 11, 16, 25, 67, 71, 72, 136, 137, 153 jobs, 19, 26, 95, 141, 168 Jordan, 32, 34, 69, 128, 130 journalists, 19, 56, 62, 164 judiciary, 53, 54, 133 justice, 77, 141 justification, 67

K Kenya, 75 kidnapping, 9, 87, 164, 165 killing, 5, 9, 10, 12, 62, 69, 70, 141, 156, 157, 159 Kuwait, 24, 33, 41, 47, 56, 58, 94, 130, 138, 139

L labor, 44, 46, 166 labor force, 44, 46, 166 lack of confidence, 122 land, 19, 30, 35, 36, 37, 43, 56, 74, 77, 98, 109, 126, 131, 164 language, 38, 93 law enforcement, 65, 67, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 111, 120 laws, 39, 53, 54 LDCs, 94 leadership, viii, 7, 14, 17, 55, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 83, 96, 120, 136, 150, 153, 156, 157, 159 leadership style, 157 learning, 6, 40

Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

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Index

Lebanon, v, viii, ix, 28, 62, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 138 legislation, 46, 53, 54, 109 lender of last resort, 45 lending, viii, ix, 45, 47, 81, 82, 85, 86, 95, 96, 97, 105 life expectancy, 38, 40 lifetime, 22 light trucks, 104 line, 28, 50, 52, 78, 108, 127, 128, 156, 158, 168 links, 19, 35, 77 liquefied natural gas, 21, 42, 44, 95 literacy, ix, 39, 78, 82, 149, 168 literacy rates, 149 livestock, 48 loans, 41, 45, 47, 106 local authorities, 53 local government, 2, 8, 19, 146 love, 153 lower prices, 43, 97 loyalty, 150, 151, 166, 167

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M major cities, 31 Malaysia, 75, 138 management, 50, 52, 62, 83, 92, 98, 100, 101, 105, 120 mandates, 55 manpower, 11, 23 mantle, 150 manufacturing, 44 marginalization, 122 market, 24, 48, 49, 95, 96, 97, 168 measures, 22, 46, 53, 54, 55, 73, 95, 120 media, 8, 17, 18, 56, 70, 116, 121, 126, 133, 140, 141 membership, 24, 34, 47, 55, 56, 57 memory, 160, 170 men, 25, 26, 29, 70, 73, 74, 129, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 166, 170 mentoring, 7, 84 merchandise, 48 Mercury, 93 Mexico, 16 Middle East, viii, 30, 35, 40, 50, 60, 64, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 96, 109, 121, 122, 123, 140, 154, 162, 163, 165, 171 migrants, 166 militancy, 13, 25, 66, 71, 137, 154 military aid, 73, 112 military occupation, 28 military tribunals, 9

mining, 27 Ministry of Education, 40 minorities, 62 minority, ix, 82, 85, 116, 145, 160 misunderstanding, 120 mobile phone, 52 mobility, 102, 103 monetary policy, 45 money, 7, 45, 65, 67, 69, 74, 77, 99, 102, 109, 146, 150, 169 money supply, 45 morning, 135, 156 Morocco, 123, 138 movement, ix, 2, 14, 17, 19, 39, 65, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 82, 113, 116, 119, 136, 139, 157, 163, 164, 165 Mozambique, 94 murder, 10, 64, 87 Muslim states, 143 Muslims, 38, 39, 65, 66, 69, 76, 77, 141 Myanmar, 21

N narcotic, 43, 70, 86 nation, 8, 14, 68, 111, 116, 120, 141 National Public Radio, 79 national security, 4, 66, 83, 87, 101, 117, 136, 142 National Security Council, 118 nationalism, 2, 139 native population, 38 NATO, 65 natural advantages, 128 natural gas, 37, 41, 44, 49 natural resource management, 121 natural resources, vii, 1, 37, 64, 94, 122, 126 neglect, 16, 130, 155, 164 negotiating, 11, 73, 79 negotiation, 11, 48, 61, 126 Netherlands, 65, 94 network, 50, 52, 64, 67, 68, 112, 116, 142, 150 newspapers, 20, 56, 62, 171 next generation, 132 NGOs, 143 nickel, 37 Nigeria, 6, 64, 67, 146 North Africa, viii, 63, 67, 96 North America, 68 North Korea, 21

O Obama Administration, vii, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 22, 25, 26, 158

Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

Index objectives, 5, 18, 32, 68, 123, 146 occupied territories, 24 oil, ix, 3, 9, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 36, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 52, 61, 70, 71, 73, 82, 83, 86, 94, 95, 112, 116, 120, 122, 126, 131, 136, 145, 149, 155, 165, 166, 167, 168 oil production, ix, 20, 21, 42, 44, 120, 122, 145, 168 oil revenues, 94, 95, 166 operational independence, 156 opposition parties, 55 oppression, 15, 17 order, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 24, 36, 42, 59, 61, 62, 72, 74, 94, 103, 119, 123, 133, 135, 136, 139, 143, 146, 149, 153, 160, 162, 166, 172 oversight, 46, 84, 96, 100, 102, 106, 109 ownership, 36, 56, 121

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P Pakistan, viii, ix, 5, 14, 15, 29, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 78, 79, 110, 113, 118, 138, 140, 141, 145, 146 Paris Club, 49 Parliament, 96, 97, 105, 106, 129 partnership, vii, 1, 21, 94, 112 password, 156 payroll, 41, 167 peace process, 24 Pentagon, 7, 146, 153 per capita expenditure, 40 Persian Gulf, vii, 1, 138, 140 personal relations, 170 personal relationship, 170 persons with disabilities, 62 photographs, 94 physical abuse, 61 piracy, 23, 26, 77, 87, 93 planning, 5, 12, 29, 43, 50, 61, 75, 84, 88, 92, 95, 106, 120 plants, 21, 43, 98 police, 13, 15, 19, 39, 60, 61, 62, 78, 103, 126, 132, 133, 146, 158 policy responses, 5 political affiliations, 97 political leaders, 165 political opposition, 8 political parties, 3, 20, 34, 55, 138, 151 political power, 150 politics, 15, 86, 97, 129, 132, 138, 140, 163 polling, 143 poor, 5, 39, 50, 52, 62, 83, 86, 95, 118, 136, 137 popular vote, 55 population, vii, ix, 1, 2, 4, 17, 20, 28, 32, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 52, 54, 66, 69, 70, 76, 86, 94, 95, 112,

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115, 120, 122, 126, 129, 131, 137, 138, 145, 167, 168, 169 population density, 38 population growth, vii, 1, 38, 41, 70, 86, 94, 137, 167, 168 port of entry, 93 portfolio investment, 49 ports, 23, 50, 77 poverty, vii, 1, 4, 6, 20, 41, 42, 50, 65, 70, 116, 118, 120, 136, 137, 149, 166, 167, 168 poverty line, vii, 1, 137, 168 poverty reduction, 41 power, 15, 18, 21, 32, 33, 34, 44, 45, 52, 53, 67, 75, 86, 87, 112, 119, 129, 132, 136, 138, 143, 146, 149, 150, 151, 160, 161, 165, 169 power plants, 45 prayer, 168 predictability, 102 preference, 93, 102 presidency, 22 president, 19, 22, 33, 34, 39, 53, 55, 60, 62, 74, 128, 136, 146, 150, 151, 161 pressure, 10, 11, 29, 32, 68, 96, 98, 120, 140, 146, 153, 154, 164, 168 prices, 20, 42, 48, 94 primacy, 90 primary school, 39 prisoners, 25, 30, 61, 156 prisons, 64, 73, 152, 153, 155 privacy, 62 private schools, 39 private sector, 96 privatization, 44, 45 producers, 44 production, 20, 43, 44, 45, 122, 165, 169 productivity, 70 professionalism, 142 professionalization, ix, 82 profit, ix, 145 program, 10, 25, 28, 30, 40, 42, 55, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 109, 110, 121, 122, 129, 130, 154, 167 programming, 27, 109, 121 propaganda, 67, 141, 151, 159, 171 prosperity, 115 public awareness, 121 public debt, ix, 82, 104, 105 public health, 142 public service, 123 pumps, 131, 166

R radar, 71, 74, 130

Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

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Index

radicalism, 64, 135, 136, 138, 141, 143 radio, 52, 56 rain, 37, 43 rainfall, 37, 43 Ramadan, 6, 13, 31, 79, 157 range, 8, 42, 60, 61, 65, 101, 123 readership, 157 reality, ix, 18, 21, 52, 54, 82, 88, 91, 96, 98, 115, 131, 151 reason, 7, 17, 19, 74, 158 recognition, 34, 120 reconcile, 84, 101 reconciliation, 7, 24, 119, 126 reconstruction, 51, 101 recovery, 49, 50 recruiting, 13, 16, 64, 68, 76, 141, 142 reflection, 39, 126 reforms, 34, 41, 46, 85, 97, 105, 106, 121, 154 refugee camps, 103 refugees, 23, 38, 74, 76, 112, 116 region, vii, viii, 4, 12, 14, 17, 24, 36, 55, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, 92, 96, 140, 141, 143, 156, 158, 159, 161, 164 regulation, 56 regulations, 54 rehabilitation, 13, 15, 25, 66, 71 rehabilitation program, 13, 15, 25, 66 relationship, 28, 47, 56, 66, 106, 120, 123, 129, 130, 138, 141, 143, 151 relatives, 6, 25, 143, 150, 151 relief, 116, 119, 121 religion, 39, 143 remittances, 21, 24, 47, 94 repression, 19, 32, 136 reputation, 16, 157 resentment, 87, 112 reserves, 3, 21, 41, 44, 49, 58, 110, 116, 122, 131, 149, 165 resource management, 43, 86, 95 resources, vii, viii, 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, 20, 37, 40, 41, 43, 66, 70, 74, 85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 96, 98, 112, 119, 120, 122, 125, 129, 131, 136, 142, 143, 146, 154, 159, 165, 166 retaliation, 6, 152, 159 revenue, 20, 21, 42, 44, 122, 126, 166, 168 rhetoric, 77, 141, 155, 159, 160, 163 risk, vii, 1, 16, 94, 136, 137, 140, 159, 170 risk management, 170 rule of law, 101, 121, 135 rural areas, 40, 121, 168, 169 rural development, 88, 90 Russia, 4, 109

S sabotage, 53 Saddam Hussein, 24, 95 safety, 137 sales, 41, 43 salt, 37, 74 sanctions, 53, 56 Saudi Arabia, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 41, 45, 47, 48, 50, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64, 68, 71, 73, 79, 83, 87, 94, 97, 116, 118, 127, 128, 137, 138, 139, 150, 153, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 164, 169 scarcity, 43, 122 scholarship, 129, 130, 157 school, 6, 19, 28, 38, 39, 62, 76, 112, 132, 161, 164, 168 school community, 40 scores, 34, 84, 88, 128 sea level, 36 seafood, 37 search, 62, 93, 108 secondary education, 40, 142 Secretary of Defense, 25 security services, ix, 58, 66, 72, 82, 142 self-assessment, 102 self-fulfilling prophesy, 125 Senate, v, vi, ix, x, 14, 29, 68, 72, 74, 78, 79, 82, 85, 109, 111, 115, 117, 149 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vi, 79, 82, 85, 111, 115, 149 separation, 19 September 11, 9, 10, 56, 65, 66, 67, 152 service provider, 122 sharing, 44, 77, 78, 142 short supply, 34 shortage, 39, 44 signals, 65 signs, 30, 150, 168 Singapore, 51 skills, 76, 131 smuggling, 18, 20, 26, 61, 93 social class, 164 social contract, 137 social development, 47, 87 social services, 41, 76 social structure, 2 social support, 25 social support network, 25 socialism, 15 soil, 36, 37, 43 soil erosion, 37, 43

Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Index Somalia, v, viii, 5, 9, 14, 23, 30, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 111, 116, 118, 125, 127, 138, 140, 154 South Asia, viii, 38, 63 South Korea, 13, 48, 71, 157 Southeast Asia, viii, 63, 67, 137 sovereignty, 36 Soviet Union, 2, 3, 33, 127, 128, 139 space, 10, 98, 122, 127, 128, 160, 170 speech, 19, 62, 67, 68, 141, 143, 159 speed, 92 spin, 83, 87 stability, 4, 20, 70, 115, 116, 118, 120, 121, 123, 125, 143, 165 stabilization, viii, 2, 4, 121 standard of living, 40 standards, 26, 45, 95, 109 state control, 54 state-owned banks, 45 statistics, 39, 44, 46, 104, 167, 168 stimulant, 20, 171 stock exchange, 45, 49 strain, 16, 150, 166, 167 strategic planning, 91 strategies, 21, 27, 76, 97, 123 strength, 14, 22, 34, 60, 157, 165, 170 structural adjustment, 41 structural reforms, viii, ix, 81, 82, 83, 85, 99, 105 students, 16, 39, 159 sub-Saharan Africa, vii, 1 subscribers, 52 subsidy, 20, 42 subsistence, 127, 166, 168 Sudan, 36, 138 suicide, ix, 12, 13, 61, 62, 65, 71, 75, 76, 82, 84, 87, 88, 141, 143, 151, 155, 156, 157, 158 suicide bombers, 13, 61, 71, 84, 88, 143 summer, 17, 22, 33, 36, 37, 74, 76, 99, 156, 157 Sunnis, 137, 138, 139, 163 supervision, 50 supervisors, 103 suppliers, 4 supply, 44, 45, 70, 105, 166 Supreme Court, 25, 54 surplus, 48 surveillance, 26, 39, 120 survival, 16, 73, 129, 132, 154, 164 suspects, ix, 57, 61, 73, 82, 152, 154, 158, 159 sustainability, ix, 82 sustainable development, 21, 106, 117 Sweden, 76 sympathy, 10, 15, 111, 153 Syria, 32

181

T tactics, viii, 10, 28, 63, 65, 69, 75, 76, 112, 164 talent, 157 Taliban, 15, 30, 69, 79, 140 tanks, 44, 59, 100 Tanzania, 75 targets, 5, 13, 26, 61, 64, 65, 73, 75, 76, 86, 120, 121, 152, 153, 158, 162 teacher training, 132 team members, 92 technical assistance, 10, 74, 105 telecommunications, 22, 52, 105 telephone, 50, 52, 62 television, 22, 52, 56, 72 temperature, 37, 112 tension, ix, 18, 103, 145 territory, 14, 18, 33, 65, 70, 72, 119, 120, 162, 164 terrorism, viii, ix, 2, 5, 10, 20, 26, 57, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 90, 91, 99, 101, 103, 111, 117, 120, 123, 140, 141, 142, 143, 170 terrorist organization, 2, 14, 25, 67, 116 Thailand, 48 thoughts, 111, 135 threat, viii, 4, 8, 15, 17, 29, 46, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 81, 86, 87, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 129, 130, 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 147, 149, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 162, 170 threats, ix, 23, 41, 42, 52, 58, 59, 61, 65, 66, 69, 73, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 102, 109, 112, 117, 118, 119, 123, 132, 136, 139, 152, 154, 160, 170 threshold, 28, 96, 106 time frame, 47 torture, 62 total revenue, 44 tourism, 21, 22, 41, 46, 166 tracks, 90 trade, vii, 1, 4, 47, 48, 56, 62 trade union, 62 tradition, 21, 54, 126, 127, 136, 139, 160, 161 traditional practices, 121 traditions, 21, 132 trainees, 103 training, viii, 5, 6, 7, 10, 16, 26, 28, 29, 59, 60, 62, 64, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 81, 84, 91, 92, 93, 96, 103, 107, 112, 120, 121, 125, 128, 132, 137, 142, 156, 158 trajectory, 67, 88, 131 transformation, 68 ttransparency, 83, 85, 95, 98, 105, 106, 109, 119, 167 transport, 48, 59

Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest

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Index

transportation, 46, 50 transportation infrastructure, 50 transshipment, 41 trial, 9, 61, 62, 79, 159 tribes, 3, 6, 13, 14, 15, 27, 32, 61, 67, 112, 127, 128, 137, 146, 162, 165 trust, 159, 170 Turkey, 138, 140, 143

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U U.S. Treasury, 16 UK, 68, 140, 157 UN, 57, 94, 95, 118, 123, 130, 152 unemployment, ix, 46, 60, 82, 86, 115, 116, 122, 137, 149, 165, 166, 167, 168 unemployment rate, 46, 86, 115, 168 UNHCR, 23, 30 unions, 62 United Kingdom, 47, 94, 123 United Nations, vii, 1, 23, 37, 38, 40, 54, 56, 57, 62, 74, 122 United Nations Development Programme, vii, 1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 23, 74 United States, viii, ix, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 44, 56, 58, 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 82, 83, 87, 88, 93, 94, 97, 99, 103, 109, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 138, 152 universe, 68 urban areas, 40, 160, 168 urban centers, 169 USDA, 121

V vehicles, 59, 98, 159 vessels, 23, 58, 59 village, 50, 51, 74, 150, 151, 161 violence, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 26, 33, 66, 71, 76, 104, 115, 119, 123, 126, 127, 137, 140, 164

vision, 26, 78, 89, 90, 102, 109, 142, 143

W wages, 42, 46 walking, 154 war, vii, ix, 1, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 25, 32, 34, 57, 72, 82, 84, 86, 88, 98, 99, 105, 109, 112, 116, 126, 129, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 151, 152, 153, 154, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 171 war crimes, 141 War on Terror, 30 warlords, 127 waste water, 98, 105 water resources, ix, 20, 21, 82, 83, 116 waterways, 51, 60 Waziristan, 69 weapons, 7, 13, 23, 29, 59, 60, 65, 67, 69, 74, 75, 109, 153 welfare, 19, 40, 142 wells, 20, 112 Western countries, 141 Western Europe, 68 wheat, 20 White House, 57 withdrawal, 24, 30 witnesses, 115, 116 women, 13, 21, 62, 64, 67, 71, 112, 141, 158 workers, 3, 24, 30, 41, 47, 56, 61, 87, 111 working hours, 21 working population, 43, 46 World Bank, ix, 8, 21, 30, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 56, 94, 95, 96, 105, 107, 120, 122, 145, 154, 168, 172 World Trade Organization, 48, 57 worry, 69, 70, 75, 159 writing, 62, 75, 94, 164, 170 WTO, 48, 57

Y young women, 170

Yemen: Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role : Background, Issues and Al Qaeda Role, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest