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Copyright © 2011. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC): Background and Issues : Background and Issues, Nova Science Publishers,

Copyright © 2011. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC): Background and Issues : Background and Issues, Nova Science Publishers,

TERRORISM, HOT SPOTS AND CONFLICT-RELATED ISSUES

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NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

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TERRORISM, HOT SPOTS AND CONFLICT-RELATED ISSUES

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NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

JACKSON A. VOLKERTS EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC): Background and Issues : Background and Issues, Nova Science Publishers,

Copyright © 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) : background and issues / editor, Jackson A. Volkerts. p. cm. Includes index.

ISBN:  (eBook)

1. National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.) 2. Terrorism--Prevention--Government policy--United States. 3. Terrorism--Prevention--United States. I. Volkerts, Jackson A. HV6432.N3823 2010 363.325'160973--dc22 2010038642

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

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CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

vii The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC): Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns Richard A. Best Jr. National Counterterrorism Center: 2009 Report on Terrorism National Counterterrorism Center

1

17

Statement of Mr. Russell Traver, Deputy Director for Information Sharing and Knowledge Development, National Counterterrorism Center, before the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on ―Sharing and Analyzing Information to Prevent Terrorism‖

87

Statement of Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on ―Sharing and Analyzing Information to Prevent Terrorism‖

91

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) National Counterterrorism Center

101

Chapter Sources

105

Index

107

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC): Background and Issues : Background and Issues, Nova Science Publishers,

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PREFACE The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist acts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be planned. As a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the NCTC is composed of analysts with backgrounds in many government agencies and has access to various agency databases. It prepares studies ranging from strategic assessment of the future terrorist threats to daily briefings and situation reports. It is also responsible, directly to the President, for planning (but not directing) counterterrorism efforts. This book provides an overview of the history, background, and issues for Congress with regard to the National Counterterrorism Center Chapter 1- The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist acts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be planned. Investigations of the 9/11 attacks had demonstrated that information possessed by different agencies had not been shared and thus that disparate indications of the looming threat had not been connected and warning had not been provided. As a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the NCTC is composed of analysts with backgrounds in many government agencies and has access to various agency databases. It prepares studies ranging from strategic assessment of the future terrorist threats to daily briefings and situation reports. It is also responsible, directly to the President, for planning (but not directing) counterterrorism efforts. The NCTC received a statutory charter in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458); it currently operates with a staff of some 600 analysts from a headquarters in

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northern Virginia. The Senate must consent to the appointment of the NCTC Director. Chapter 2- Consistent with its statutory mission to serve as the United States (US) government's knowledge bank on international terrorism, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is providing the Department of State with the statistical information required to assist it in the satisfying the requirements of Section 2656f of title 22 of the US Code (USC). Chapter 3- Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was not watchlisted. This statement will explain the reasons why – addressing the post 9/11 changes in U.S.Government watchlisting practices, the associated standards that were adopted by the U.S. Government, and the application of those standards to the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. It will also address lessons learned as we strive to improve the Intelligence Community‘s ability to support watchlisting and screening. Chapter 4- The attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, highlights the ever-present terrorist threat to our homeland. Over the past seven years, the TSC has played a vital role in the fight against terrorism by integrating terrorist information from the law enforcement and intelligence communities into a single database known as the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which populates the various terrorist screening systems used by the Government. Following the Christmas Day attempted attack intense scrutiny has been placed on the requirements to nominate individuals to the watchlist and particularly to the No Fly and Selectee lists, which are subsets of the TSDB. These requirements, or standards, have evolved over time based on the experience of the watchlisting community and the issuance of additional Presidential Directives. Throughout this process, the TSC has remained committed to protecting the American public from terrorist threats while simultaneously protecting privacy and safeguarding civil liberties. As our efforts continue to evolve in response to new threats and intelligence, your support provides us with the tools necessary to continue our mission. Let me begin by telling you about the Terrorist Watchlisting process and how this process related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. Chapter 5- The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) is the US Government‘s (USG) central repository of information on international terrorist identities as established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. TIDE supports the USG‘s various terrorist screening systems or ―watchlists‖ and the US Intelligence Community‘s overall counterterrorism mission.

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Preface

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The Terrorist Identities Group (TIG), located in NCTC‘s Information Sharing & Knowledge Development Directorate (ISKD), is responsible for building and maintaining TIDE.

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In: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC):… ISBN: 978-1-61122-315-6 Editors: Jackson A. Volkerts © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC): RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS

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Richard A. Best Jr. SUMMARY The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist acts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be planned. Investigations of the 9/11 attacks had demonstrated that information possessed by different agencies had not been shared and thus that disparate indications of the looming threat had not been connected and warning had not been provided. As a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the NCTC is composed of analysts with backgrounds in many government agencies and has access to various agency databases. It prepares studies ranging from strategic assessment of the future terrorist threats to daily briefings and situation reports. It is also responsible, directly to the President, for planning (but not directing) counterterrorism efforts. The NCTC received a statutory charter in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458); it currently operates with a staff of some 600 analysts from a headquarters in northern Virginia. The Senate must consent to the appointment of the NCTC Director.

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Two recent incidents—the assassination by an Army Major of some 13 individuals at Fort Hood Army Base on November 5, 2009 and the failed attempt to trigger a bomb on an airliner approaching Detroit on December 25, 2009—led to increased concern about counterterrorism capabilities domestically and internationally. An Executive Branch assessment of the December bombing attempt concluded that, whereas information sharing had been adequate, analysts had failed to ―connect the dots‖ and achieve an understanding of an ongoing plot. Attention has focused on the NCTC which is responsible for ensuring both the sharing of information and for all-source analysis of terrorist issues. Congressional hearings have been scheduled to review what was known in advance about the individuals involved in these two incidents. Congress may choose to go further to review the statutory responsibilities of NCTC as well as the record of the Center since it was established in 2004.

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INTRODUCTION The attempted attack on a US-bound airliner on December 25, 2009 and the earlier shootings at Fort Hood Army Base in November 2009 have led to increased concerns about the effectiveness of the laws, regulations, and organizational relationships created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to prevent future terrorist attacks. Although no system is infallible and the possibility of human errors has to be assumed, recent attacks appear to demonstrate specific failures by the Intelligence Community to ―connect the dots,‖ to bring together disparate pieces of information to provide clear warning of an impending attack. In regard to the December attack, President Obama stated that, ―this was not a failure to collect intelligence; it was a failure to integrate and understand the intelligence that we already had.‖1 Within the sprawling U.S. Intelligence Community, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was specifically established to bring together all available information on terrorism, analyze the information, and provide warning of potential attacks on the U.S. Some observers argue that the failed December aircraft plot as well as other incidents raise questions about the NCTC‘s ability to carry out its responsibilities. The challenges involved in sifting through mountains of data on a daily or even an hourly basis are acknowledged and supporters point out many unpublicized successes by NCTC working with its sister agencies. Nevertheless, questions exist about the

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roles and missions of NCTC and whether it is fulfilling its statutory responsibilities. Potentially, there are also concerns about the relationship between NCTC and the Counterterrorism Center of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which, prior to the establishment of NCTC, was responsible for performing much of NCTC‘s current mission.

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BACKGROUND A central lesson that Congress and the Executive Branch drew from the 9/11 attacks was that there had been inadequate interagency coordination partially as a result of separate statutory missions and administrative barriers. A series of investigative and legislative initiatives followed. In October 2001, provisions encouraging the exchange of law enforcement and intelligence information were included in the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56), sometimes described as ―breaking down the wall‖ between intelligence and law enforcement. In February 2002 the two congressional intelligence committees established a Joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. By the following December, the Joint Inquiry concluded that, ―for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to capitalize on both the individual and collective significance of available information that appears relevant to the events of September 11.‖2 The two intelligence committees recommended the establishment (within the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS)): . . .of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center that will dramatically improve the focus and quality of counterterrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence information, both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence Community. Congress and the Administration should ensure that this fusion center has all the authority and the resources needed to:  

have full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information, including ‗raw‘ supporting data as needed; have the ability to participate fully in the existing requirements process for tasking the Intelligence Community to gather information on foreign individuals, entities and threats;

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 

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integrate such information in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the United States in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities; implement and fully utilize data mining and other advanced analytical tools, consistent with applicable law; retain a permanent staff of experienced and highly skilled analysts, supplemented on a regular basis by personnel on ‗joint tours‘ from the various Intelligence Community agencies; institute a reporting mechanism that enables analysts at all the intelligence and law enforcement agencies to post lead information for use by analysts at other agencies without waiting for dissemination of a formal report; maintain excellence and creativity in staff analytic skills through regular use of analysis and language training programs; and establish and sustain effective channels for the exchange of counterterrorism-related information with federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community as well as with state and local authorities.3

At approximately the same time Congress, in the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296), enacted on November 25, 2002, provided the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with a specific mandate for an Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection in DHS. The mission of this office was to: To access, receive, and analyze law enforcement.information, intelligence information, and other information from agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies (including law enforcement agencies), and private sector entities, and to integrate such information in order to— (A) identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland; (B) detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States; and (C) understand such threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland. [and] To integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments (whether such information, analyses, or assessments are provided or produced by the Department or others) in order to identify priorities for protective and support measures by the Department, other

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agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. (4) To ensure, pursuant to section 202, the timely and efficient access by the Department to all information necessary to discharge the responsibilities under this section, including obtaining such information from other agencies of the Federal Government.4

The placement of this analysis center within DHS was not questioned prior to the signing of the Homeland Security Act in late November 2002, but there was, however, apparently considerable concern that DHS, as a new agency and not a longtime member of the Intelligence Community, would not be the best place for the integration of highly sensitive information from multiple government agencies. In the 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush revealed his instructions to ―the leaders of the FBI, the CIA, the Homeland Security and the Department of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location.‖5 Despite the statutory responsibilities of DHS for threat integration, in May 2003 the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was established (without a statutory mandate) to merge all threat information in a single location. Some Members of Congress expressed concerns about the possibility that the roles of the DHS intelligence analysis office and TTIC might be confused,6 but DHS was a partner in TTIC and gradually came to concentrate on serving as a bridge between the national intelligence community and state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies that had never been components of the national Intelligence Community.7 A year later, in July 2004, the 9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States), noting the existence of a number of various centers in different parts of the government assigned to combine disparate pieces of intelligence, called for the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center built on the foundation of TTIC but having a responsibility for joint planning for responding to terrorist plots in addition to assessing intelligence from all sources. The NCTC would, according to the 9/11 Commission, compile all-source information on terrorism but also undertake planning of counterterrorism activities, assigning operational responsibilities to lead agencies throughout the Government.8 In August 2004 shortly after publication of the 9/11 Commission Report, President Bush issued Executive Order 13354, based on constitutional and statutory authorities, that established the National Counterterrorism Center as a follow-on to TTIC. The NCTC was to serve as the primary organization of the

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Federal Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism (except purely domestic terrorism) and serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists. The NCTC would not just have the analytical responsibilities TTIC had possessed; it would also assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for counterterrorism activities, but NCTC would not direct the execution of operations. The Director of the NCTC would be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with the approval of the President. Some Members of Congress, however, remained concerned about the status of NCTC, the likelihood that Congress would have no role in the appointment of its leadership, and the possibility that an interagency entity might not be responsive to congressional oversight committees. In December 2004 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458), implemented many of the 9/11 Commission‘s recommendations. The Act established the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) along with the Office of the DNI (ODNI) and it created an NCTC with a statutory charter and placed it within the ODNI. In accordance with the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Director of the NCTC was henceforth to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The position of the NCTC Director is unusual, if not unique, in government; he reports to the DNI for analyzing and integrating information pertaining to terrorism (except domestic terrorism), for NCTC budget and programs; for planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations (other than intelligence operations) he reports directly to the President. In practice, the NCTC Director works through the National Security Council and its staff in the White House.

CURRENT NCTC CHARTER For the first time, NCTC had a statutory charter. P.L. 108-458 sets forth the duties and responsibilities of the NCTC Director:  

to serve as principal adviser to the DNI on intelligence operations relating to terrorism; to provide strategic operational plans for military and civilian counterterrorism efforts and for effective integration of countert-

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errorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries within and outside the US; to advise the DNI on counterterrorism programs recommendations and budget proposals‘ to disseminate terrorism information, including current terrorism threat analysis, to the President and other senior officials of the Executive Branch and to appropriate committees of Congress; to support the efforts of the Justice and Homeland Security Departments and other appropriate agencies in disseminating terrorism information to State and local entities and coordinate dissemination of terrorism information to foreign governments; to develop a strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence operations and law enforcement planning and operations; to have primary responsibility within the Government for conducting net assessments of terrorist threats; consistent with presidential and DNI guidance, to establish requirements for the Intelligence Community in collecting terrorist information.9

The NCTC is to contain a ―Directorate of Intelligence which shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations (except for purely domestic terrorism and domestic terrorist organizations) from all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the United States.‖10The Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 also tasked the NCTC Director with undertaking strategic operational planning for counterterrorism operations. The statute specifies that strategic planning is to include the mission, objectives to be obtained, tasks to be performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and the assignment of roles and responsibilities.11 However, NCTC may not direct the execution of such operations.12 In carrying out these planning responsibilities the NCTC Director is responsible statutorily to the President rather than the DNI. These unusual dual reporting responsibilities might lead to a situation in which the NCTC director could recommend policies to the President specifically opposed by the DNI. The extent of NCTC‘s planning responsibilities are unclear. The legislation did not repeal the authorities of other agencies to collect counterterrorism intelligence or prepare for counterterrorism operations. NCTC can prepare and obtain approval for counterterrorism plans, but it cannot ensure implementation. Some observers have expressed concern that

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DOD‘s own planning responsibilities under Title X of the US Code could be complicated by the NCTC role.

ONGOING ACTIVITIES The official NCTC website, summarizes the organization‘s understanding of its responsibilities: Lead our nation‘s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.

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The website further states,: By law NCTC serves as the USG‘s [U.S. Government‘s]central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups. NCTC also provides USG agencies with the terrorism analysis and other information they need to fulfill their missions. NCTC collocates more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement and homeland security networks under one roof to facilitate robust information sharing. NCTC is a model of interagency information sharing. .... NCTC also provides the CT [counterterrorism] community with 24/7 situational awareness, terrorism threat reporting, and incident information tracking. NCTC hosts three daily secure video teleconferences (SVTC) and maintains constant voice and electronic contact with major intelligence and CT Community players and foreign partners.13

With the approval of P.L. 108-458 in December 2004 the NCTC was established in law. The first Director, retired Navy Admiral John Redd, was confirmed by the Senate in July 2005. Redd was succeeded by Michael E. Leiter who was confirmed in June 2008 and currently heads the Center. NCTC is housed in suburban Virginia and has a staff of some 500 officials of which some 60 percent are on detail from other agencies. According to publicly available information, NCTC provides intelligence in a number of ways—items for the President‘s Daily Brief and the National Terrorism Bulletin both of which are classified. NCTC claims to provide the Intelligence Community with 24/7 situational awareness, terrorism threat reporting and tracking. According to one media report, ―agency-integrated

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teams [are] assigned by subject matter and geography [to] turn out reports disseminated to thousands of policy and intelligence officials across the government. Agency representatives sit around a table three times daily—at 8 a.m., 3 p.m. and 1 a.m.—to update the nation‘s threat matrix.‖14 NCTC maintains databases of information on international terrorist identities (in a system known as the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)) to support the Government‘s watchlisting system designed to identify potential terrorists. NCTC products are available to some 75 government agencies and other working groups and facilitates information sharing with state, local, tribal, and private partners. NCTC has also established Intelligence Community-wide working groups—a Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group and a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Counterterrorism Group and a working group for alternative analysis as part of an effort to improve the rigor and quality of terrorism analysis. NCTC also coordinates the DNI Homeland Threat Task Force that examines threats to the US from al Qaeda, other groups and homegrown violent extremists. Public information on NCTC‘s planning responsibilities is limited. One press account describes a National Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism prepared in June 2006. The Plan identified major objectives with more than 500 discrete counterterrorism tasks to be carried out by designated agencies. The objectives included disrupting terrorist groups, protecting and defending the homeland, and containing violent extremism.15 Observers suggest that the primary benefit of such generalized planning is requiring agencies to coordinate their initiatives and providing an opportunity to reduce duplication of effort and ensure that specific tasks are not neglected. The 2006 implementation plan has reportedly been updated but no details have been made public.

ASSESSMENTS OF NCTC From information available on the public record, NCTC appears to be structured to fulfill the mission it was assigned by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and other legislation. Most, if not all, congressional observers apparently believe, that NCTC‘s authorities are both appropriate and adequate.16 NCTC‘s organization reflects the determination to create, within the Intelligence Community, an office that could gather information from all

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government agencies and from open sources, analyze the data, and provide policymakers with greater situational awareness and warning of planned attacks. According to all available reports, NCTC has access to the databases of all intelligence agencies and it can draw upon analytical resources throughout the government to supplement its own files, but it is unclear to what extent the disparate databases are technically compatible or whether they are, or can be, linked in ways that permit simultaneous searching. One assessment of the NCTC undertaken by a student at the Army War college in 2007 concluded that ―More than two years since its inception, however, the NCTC has arguably achieved neither an acceptable level of effectiveness nor efficiency in performing its intended role.‖ The author, Army Col. Brian R. Reinwald, argued that in focusing on consolidating information from other agencies, the NCTC demonstrated ―a seeming unwillingness to take a bold implementation approach and a preference to avoid bureaucratic conflict.‖ Its ―vision statement inauspiciously paints a picture of a nonconfrontational think tank that identified issues, and attempts to merely influence the greater governmental efforts against counterterrorism.‖ In sum, Reinwald argued that NCTC‘s approach ―does not capture the literal roles and mission assigned by Congress, to plan, to integrate, delineate responsibility, and monitor.‖ Moreover, the large percentage of detailees from other agencies in NCTC ―sustains an environment that fosters continued loyalty of NCTC employees to their parent agencies rather than the NCTC itself.‖ The author, taking an expansive view of the NCTC‘s role argues that ―The U.S. requires a single federal entity focused on GWOT [Global War on Terror] counterterrorism strategy with the necessary authorities to integrate intelligence, conduct comprehensive interagency planning, compel specific action when required, and coordinate and synchronize the elements of national power for successful operations.‖17 Members of Congress have taken note of NCTCs ability to gather information from a variety of agencies and its contributions to preventing specific terrorist attacks. There remain concerns that the threat from Al Qaeda and other groups has not diminished.18 In a visit to NCTC in October 2009, President Obama addressed the representatives, ―it‘s clear for all to see—that you are one team—that you are more integrated and more collaborative and more effective than ever before.‖19

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TWO RECENT INCIDENTS For NCTC as for the Intelligence Community as a whole, in many cases the successes go unreported while the failures are trumpeted. However, two incidents in late 2009 led to widespread publicity about information sharing and counterterrorism analysis that led to significant congressional interest. Reports of the multiple assassinations that occurred in Fort Hood Army Base in Texas on November 5, 2009 led to expressions of concern about the Government‘s counterterrorism capabilities. The extent of NCTC‘s role, if any, in gathering information about Major Nidal M. Hasan prior to the incident has not been made available publicly. As Major Hasan was both a U.S. citizen and a commissioned officer much relevant information would have come from internal DOD information that would not necessarily be shared with NCTC. Press reports indicate, however, that he had been in contact with a known terrorist living in Yemen20. This type of information might have come to the attention of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and could have been available to NCTC. Whether NCTC did access such information and whether it notified the Army or other DOD elements is unknown. Ongoing investigations will probably provide more background on NCTC‘s role, but Congress may move to undertake its own assessment. The December 25, 2009 incident in which a Nigerian traveler, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to set off an incendiary device onboard an aircraft approaching Detroit was a more straightforward foreign intelligence problem. It did not involve a U.S. citizen nor was he an employee of the US Government. In this case, according to the Obama Administration, it was not the availability or the interagency sharing of data that was the problem; there were no major difficulties in collecting or sharing information (as had been the case prior to 9/11). The problem in December 2009 was inadequate analysis. Despite the information ―available to all-source analysts at the CIA and the NCTC prior to the attempted attack, the dots were never connected and, as a result, the problem appears to be more about a component failure to ‗connect the dots,‘ rather than a lack of information sharing.‖21 The Administration has pointed to several specific failures by the counterterrorism community generally and NCTC in particular: ―NCTC and CIA personnel who are responsible for watchlisting did not search all available databases to uncover additional derogatory information that could have been correlated with Mr. Abdulmutallab.‖ Further, ―A series of human errors occurred—delayed dissemination of a finished intelligence report and what appears to be incomplete/faulty database searches on Mr. Abdulmutallab‘s name and

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identifying information.‖ There was not a process for tracking reports and actions taken in response and there appears to have been a greater concern with the threat posed to American interests in Yemen than to the possibility of an attack by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on the US Homeland. The extent to which such failings belong solely or even significantly to NCTC as opposed to other agencies is as yet undetermined.

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POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS The Executive Branch is undertaking several investigations of the Fort Hood shooting and the December 25 airline attack. The reports may indicate organizational problems or individual malfeasance and Congress may choose to review those investigations. However, there may also be interest in a widerranging assessment of the role of various agencies and how they work together. In particular, Congress may act to review the statutory framework that created the NCTC in 2004 and how the Center has functioned in the years since. In particular, Congress may wish to satisfy itself that the NCTC has access to all appropriate information and intelligence. It may wish to assure itself that detaillees to the NCTC from other agencies are highly qualified and committed to the Center‘s mission and do not see their role as protecting their agency‘s bureaucratic equities. Congress may wish to assess the availability of adequate technologies at NCTC for accessing and sharing information. Although significant efforts have been made to remove the ―wall‖ between law enforcement and intelligence, there may be residual barriers especially those resulting from separate bureaucratic cultures. As in the case of Major Hassan the natural tendency to avoid over-involvement in law enforcement or the personnel policies of a cabinet department may have influenced the handling of information relating to contacts between a US person and a suspected terrorist in another country. Concern has also been expressed that NCTC might rely on authorities available to foreign intelligence agencies that do not encompass the restrictions on domestic intelligence gathering and law enforcement operations and that this approach may jeopardize privacy rights.22 Congress might seek additional information on NCTC policies regarding privacy rights of US persons. Congress exerts its greatest influence through authorization and appropriations legislation. However, NCTC is not a large collection agency and its relatively small budget goes mainly for personnel expenses. Some in

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Congress may find the number of NCTC personnel either excessive or inadequate, but changes in the number of positions would affect the NCTC budget but in relatively small amounts in comparison to the $49+ billion budget for all national intelligence programs. Some observers have argued that NCTC‘s information technology capabilities need to be enhanced, but it is unlikely that the budgetary implications would be dramatic. There will undoubtedly be varying assessments of NCTC‘s analytical products; observers argue, however, that judging the overall quality of analytical efforts can be challenging. Analysis is an intellectual exercise that incorporates education and training, experience, insight, determination and occasionally elements of luck. Simply replacing current officials with those with greater education, or paying them more or giving them more (or less) supervision will not guarantee better results. Some argue that the best approach is to build and maintain a culture of excellence. The unusual dual mission of the NCTC and the different reporting responsibilities of the NCTC Director to the DNI and the President may be a source of congressional interest. Are there contradictions between the two missions? Has the NCTC Director‘s direct link to the President caused difficulties with his relationship with the DNI? Does the NCTC monitor the responses of other agencies to analytical information it provides? What role does the CIA‘s Counterterrorism Center currently have and how do the two entities interact? Does the NCTC become involved in planning covert actions? Is there beneficial or counterproductive competition between the two centers? In general, how has NCTC‘s strategic analysis of the overall terrorist threat evolved in recent years? Is the relationship between strategic analyses and operational planning been carefully reviewed? What is the NCTC‘s current role in dealing with different agency approaches to specific terrorist threats? To what extent does the NCTC Director choose options and to what extent are different proposals forwarded to the National Security Council staff? Arguably most important, however, is the capability of ensuring that analysts are integrated into the counterterrorism effort, that operational planning is shared with analytical offices so that particular reactions or threats can be anticipated and assessed. The most important ―wall‖ may not be the one that existed between law enforcement and intelligence agencies prior to 2001, but the one that often persists between analysts and operators. The latter may lack the time and opportunity to integrate analytical efforts into their ongoing work, but if the country is aiming for a ―zero defects‖ approach to terrorism,

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Richard A. Best Jr.

close attention to intelligence is a prerequisite. Some experienced observers maintain that ―zero defects‖ is unrealizable, some failures are inevitable and argue that it is more responsible to minimize failures and limit their effects. The use of intelligence by policymakers and military commanders is in largest measure the responsibility of the Executive Branch, but some observers argue that the quality of analysis may be enhanced when analytical efforts are regularly reviewed by congressional committees and hearings are conducted to ensure that they are properly prepared and fully used.

End Notes 1

, President Barack Obama, ―The Urgency of Getting This Right,‖ January 5, 2010. U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, committee print, 107th Cong., December 2002, S.Rept. 107-351, H.Rept. 107-792, p. xv. 3 Printed in S.Rept. 107-351/H.Rept. 107-792, Errata Print, pp. 5-6. 4 P.L. 107-296, sec. 201. 5 U.S. President, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003. See also George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), p. 452. 6 See U.S. Congress, 108th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Homeland Security, Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and Its Relationship with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, Joint Hearing, July 22, 2003, Serial No. 64, Committee on the Judiciary; Serial No. 108-19, Select Committee on Homeland Security. 7 For recent intelligence efforts of DHS, see CRS Report R40602, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress, by Mark A. Randol. 8 See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004, especially pp. 400-406. 9 P.L. 108-458, sec. 1021, 118 Stat. 3674; 50 USC 404o(f). 10 50 USC 404o(i). 11 50 USC 404o(j). 12 50 USC404o(g). 13 http://www.nctc.gov/aboutus/about_nctc.html 14 Karen DeYoung, ―After Attempted Airline Bombing, Effectiveness of Intelligence Reforms Questioned,: Washington Post, January 7, 2010, p. A1. 15 See Karen DeYoung, ―A Fight Against Terrorism—and Disorganization,‖ Washington Post, August 9, 2006; cited in Eric Rosenbach, ―The Incisive Fight: Recommendations for Improving counterterrorism Intelligence,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 2008, p. 138. 16 See U.S. Congress, 110th Congress, 2d session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Michael Leiter to be Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Hearing, May 6, 2008, S. Hrg. 110-848. 17 Brian R. Reinwald, ―Assessing the National Counterterrorism Center‘s Effectiveess in the global War on Terror,‖ U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, March 20, 2007.

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See the comments of Senators Lieberman and Collins during a hearing by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Eight Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland, September 30, 2009, Federal News Service transcript. 19 Remarks by President Obama at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), McLean, Virginia, October 6, 2009. 20 Carrie Johnson, Spencer S. Hsu and Ellen Nakashima, ―Hasan Had Intensified Contact with Cleric,‖ Washington Post, November 21, 2009. 21 White House, ―Summary of the White House Review of the December 25, 2009 Attempted Terrorist Act,‖ January 7, 2010. 22 See Hon. Bennie G. Thompson, ―The National Counterterrorism Center: Foreign and Domestic Intelligence Fusion and the Potential Threat to Privacy,‖ University of Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law & Policy, Spring 2006, p. 6.

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Chapter 2

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER: 2009 REPORT ON TERRORISM National Counterterrorism Center

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FOREWORD Developing Statistical Information Consistent with its statutory mission to serve as the United States (US) government's knowledge bank on international terrorism, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is providing the Department of State with the statistical information required to assist it in the satisfying the requirements of Section 2656f of title 22 of the US Code (USC). This statute requires the State Department to include in its annual report on terrorism "to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year." NCTC keeps statistics on the annual number of incidents of "terrorism," but its ability to identify the specific group responsible for each incident resulting in death, injury or kidnapping is significantly limited by the availability of reliable open source information, particularly when attacks involve few casualties or occur in remote regions of the world. Moreover,

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specific details regarding victims, perpetrators, damage or other elements of the incident are frequently not fully addressed in open source reporting.

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Therefore, the statistical material in this chapter reflects the most comprehensive body of information available to NCTC for compiling data to satisfy the above-referenced statistical requirements and details incidents of "terrorism" that occurred in 2009 as reported in open source information.

This chapter is provided for statistical purposes only. The statistical information contained in the report is based on factual reports from a variety of open sources that may be of varying credibility. Any assessments regarding the nature of the incidents or the factual circumstances thereof are offered only as part of the analytic work product of the National Counterterrorism Center and may not reflect the assessments of other departments and agencies of the United States Government. Nothing in this chapter should be construed as a determination that individuals associated with the underlying incidents are guilty of terrorism or any other criminal offense. As with all entries in the Worldwide Incident Tracking System, the statistical information will be modified, as necessary and appropriate, when and if the underlying incidents are finally adjudicated. In deriving its figures for incidents of terrorism, NCTC in 2005 adopted the definition of "terrorism" that appears in 22 USC § 2656f(d)(2), i.e., "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." To record and update attack records, NCTC posts information in the repository for the US government's authoritative database on terror attacks, the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS). WITS is accessible on the NCTC website at www.nctc.gov for the public to have an open and transparent view of the NCTC data. NCTC will ensure that the data posted to the website is updated as often as necessary by regularly posting information about new or prior attacks.

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Considerations for Interpreting the Data Tracking and analyzing terrorist incidents can help us understand some important characteristics about terrorism, including the geographic distribution of attacks and information about the perpetrators, their victims, and other details. Year-to-year changes in the gross number of attacks across the globe, however, may tell us little about the international community's effectiveness either in preventing these incidents, or in reducing the capacity of terrorists to advance their agenda through violence against the innocent. NCTC cautions against placing too much emphasis on the use of attack data to gauge success or failure against the forces of terrorism. Furthermore, NCTC does not believe that a simple comparison of the total number of attacks from year to year provides a meaningful measure.

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Tallying attack data necessarily involves relying on frequently incomplete and ambiguous information—information for these statistics is not derived from federal government collection programs that are created or operated specifically to obtain attack data. The quality, accuracy, and volume of open source reporting can vary greatly from country to country. As a result, determining whether an attack meets the statutory criteria for a terrorist attack is often difficult and highly subjective. This is particularly true if the attack does not involve a large number of casualties because detailed information is not typically available on these events since they often do not receive heavy media coverage. Furthermore, in the parts of the world where there is little press coverage and sparse non-governmental organization presence, terrorist attacks often go unreported. Attack tallies do not provide a complete picture of the magnitude or seriousness of the terrorism challenge confronting a country or region. For example, the fact that 50 percent of the attacks in the NCTC database resulted in no loss of life means tallies are only one factor for assessing the danger of terrorism globally. Moreover, different factors weigh more heavily than others in assessing the dangers posed by terrorism. For example, an attack that kills 100 civilians is likely to be considered more alarming than an attack that damages a pipeline but harms no one; however, each attack is simply tallied as one incident. Counting protocols are necessary and inevitably require judgment calls that may impact the results. For example, NCTC protocols dictate that events identified as simultaneous and coordinated be

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recorded as one attack, as are secondary attacks that targeted first responders. For instance, on the morning of August 17, 2005, there were approximately 450 small bomb attacks in Bangladesh1, and, because they were coordinated according to a central plan, NCTC counted them as a single event. Other valid counting protocols could register these attacks as 450 separate attacks. Analyzing attack data from year to year to identify patterns and notable deviations or trends in the data is problematic, and may not always be meaningful. The availability, quality, and depth of open source reporting vary, making it hard to isolate whether the rise or fall of a particular data element from one year to the next is related to an increase or decrease in open source reporting or to a change in actual events.

Despite these limitations, WITS can be a valuable tool for facilitating empirical research on terrorism.

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METHODOLOGY UTILIZED TO COMPILE NCTC'S DATABASE OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS The data provided in WITS consists of incidents in which subnational or clandestine groups or individuals deliberately or recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants (including military personnel and assets outside war zones and war-like settings). Determination of what constitutes a terrorist act, however, can be more art than science; information is often incomplete, fact patterns may be open to interpretation, and perpetrators' intent is rarely clear. Moreover, information may become available over time, changing initial judgments about attacks. Users of this database should therefore recognize that reasonable people may differ on whether a particular attack actually constitutes terrorism or some other form of political violence. NCTC has made every effort to limit the degree of subjectivity involved in the judgments and, in the interests of transparency, has adopted a set of counting rules that are delineated below. Terrorists must have initiated and executed the attack for it to be included in the database; failed or foiled attacks, as well as hoaxes, are not included. Spontaneous hate crimes without intent to cause mass casualties are excluded,

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though it should be understood that often there is insufficient information to judge whether an attack was planned or spontaneous.

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Disclaimer: The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) contains details about incidents of violence against civilians and noncombatants (including military personnel and assets outside of war-like settings) from publicly available information. NCTC does not conduct research other than a review of information contained in open source reporting. NCTC analysts determine if an event meets the definitional criteria of 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) as an act of terrorism. NCTC is not responsible for errors and omissions in open source reporting. The judgment of NCTC is not intended to be a legally binding determination that an event is a terrorist act for any purpose other than providing statistical information. While genocidal events can be interpreted as the most extreme form of politically motivated violence against civilians, these types of attacks are excluded, in part because of the inherent difficulty in counting such events and because the inevitable undercount does not do justice to the scope and depth of such atrocities. Moreover, the question of whether or not acts of genocide should be included in the WITS database was posed to a panel of academics at the 2008 Brain Trust on Terrorism Metrics. The panel concluded that acts that meet the criteria for genocide are fundamentally separate from terrorist acts and should not be included in the database. Determining when perpetrators have targeted noncombatants can also be difficult. Military personnel and assets outside war zones and war-like settings pose one challenge to the noncombatant provision of the definition, while police under military command and control, and organized groups of armed civilians inside war zones and war-like settings pose another challenge. With the approval of the 2007 Brain Trust on Terrorism Metrics, NCTC developed a combatant matrix which details the various areas of war-like settings, and the common actors such as military police, militias, soldiers and other combatantlike actors. The analysts use the matrix in complex cases to determine when an act targeting combatant-like actors should be included in WITS. The combatant matrix is adjusted as the circumstances in world conflicts change or evolve. The distinction between terrorism and insurgency in Iraq was especially challenging in previous years, as Iraqis participated in both the Sunni terrorist networks as well as the former-regime-elements insurgency, targeting both civilians and combatants and often affecting both populaces.

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Terrorist attacks against combatants count as reckless and indiscriminate when terrorists could have reasonably foreseen that their attack would result in civilian casualties. Therefore, combatants may be included as victims in some attacks when their presence was incidental to an attack aimed at noncombatants, and some attacks may be deemed terrorism when it recklessly affects combatants. The WITS database contains a field that allows analysts to categorize an incident by event type. Event types are coded in the database as the following: armed attack, arson/firebombing, assassination, assault, barricade/hostage, bombing, CBRN, crime, firebombing, hijacking, hoax, kidnapping, near miss/non-attack, other, theft, unknown, and vandalism. While some incidents can easily be coded using this taxonomy, other kinds of attacks are more difficult to define. When it can be determined, incidents that involve multiple types of attacks are coded with multiple event types. Incidents involving mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and missiles generally fall under armed attack, although improvised explosive devices (IED) fall under bombing, including vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED). VBIEDs include any IED built into or made a part of a vehicle including cars, trucks, bicycles, and motorcycles. Suicide events are also captured, but the perpetrator must have died in the attack for the event type suicide to be included. Note: When an incident results in a premeditated kinetic event, then it is considered an attack under the methodology used by NCTC. For instance, the 25 December 2009 incident on a flight to Detroit, Michigan is counted in our statistics as an attack rather than excluded as a near-miss. The assailant detonated the IED, but it malfunctioned setting the bomber‘s clothing on fire, wounding one other passenger, and damaging the aircraft. Also when a would-be suicide bomber does not die in the attack, it is not considered a suicide attack. Therefore, the same Detroit flight incident, while counting as an attack, did not meet the criteria for a suicide attack. The WITS database categorizes victims of an incident. Civilians, businesses, students, military and police are some of the several dozen victims types captured in WITS. Additionally, the nationalities are recorded in WITS where open source media reports such information. The methodology presumes most victims to be local nationals unless otherwise reported in the press. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is particularly difficult to gather comprehensive information about all attacks and to distinguish terrorism from

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the numerous other forms of violence, including crime and sectarian violence. During the past twelve months, analysts have noted a decline in open source reporting in some provinces in Afghanistan where security has deteriorated. Thus, WITS has limited attack information for these provinces. We note, however, that because of the difficulty in gathering data on Iraq and Afghanistan, the dataset undoubtedly undercounts the number of attacks in these two countries. Finally, separating crime from terrorism can be difficult, particularly when the criminal act is used to support future terrorist operations. During the 2007 Brain Trust on Terrorism Metrics, outside academics approved a decision tree used by analysts to determine when a crime committed in support of terrorism would be included in WITS. For instance, a kidnapping for ransom by a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) would be included in WITS, but a bank robbery to fund future operations would not. In an effort to provide greater granularity and analytic service, in 2007 NCTC introduced to the database the concept of targeting characteristics. The purpose was to capture, where possible, the underlying motivating factors for attacks. Victims and facilities are coded, so as to enable searching for violence against specific targets, for example Westerners, Christians, and other groups targeted because of their cultural, ethnic, or religious identities. The intent of this field is not to identify all victims who happened to be Muslims, Christians, etc., but rather to identify victims who appeared to be targeted because they were Muslims, Christians, etc. Traditionally, NCTC only attributed attacks to perpetrators when a claim of responsibility was made or if reporting supported a belief that a particular perpetrator was responsible. Only those groups that have already been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department, that have themselves claimed responsibility for terrorist actions or status as a terrorist group, or that have been repeatedly and reliably suspected of involvement in specific terrorist activities are included in WITS. As noted, we often do not have sufficiently granular information to identify the perpetrator and as a result many of the attacks list an unknown perpetrator; for instance, in 2007 over 60 percent of all attacks were listed as having unknown perpetrators. Where we had information, we provided a confidence level of likely, plausible or unlikely. In an effort to improve analytic capability, and, at the request of a panel of outside academics, NCTC added a new confidence level in the 2008 data that is associated with perpetrators to assist researchers. The new value is Inferred.

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In instances where available information provides neither a claim of responsibility nor a belief that a particular perpetrator was responsible, NCTC may now infer a perpetrator. Such inferences are based on an evaluation of the characteristics of the attack and other factors, such as whether only one group is active in a particular region. In cases where the attack characteristics match the modus operandi of a single group, or a group is known to be the only one operating in the region, for example, an inference is made that associates a group with the attack. If desired, these inferences may be filtered out of the result set by excluding the confidence level of Inferred in WITS as shown below.

Filtering Inferred in WITS Classic

Filtering Inferred in WITS NextGen (use minus sign next to Inferred)

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Thus far, this data value is being utilized largely for the inference of Sunni extremist attacks in some countries and only applies to the 2008 and 2009 data. Such an inference is based upon the specific parts of the country in which the attack occurred, the attack method used, or both factors. NOTE: Users must be aware that such an analytic reference has not been applied in earlier years and as such queries must be carefully constructed to avoid fallacious conclusions about the change in the number of attacks conducted by Sunni extremists. If users do not wish to use this additional analytic reference they can maintain consistency across time-series data by filtering out the value as described above. Moreover, perpetrator characteristics may change over time. For instance, the Chechen rebels were previously categorized as secular/political, but are now categorized Sunni extremists because they declared themselves to be the Islamic Emirate of the Caucuses in October of 2007 and claimed attacks under this name. To be more analytically useful, the database also enables greater granularity with respect to the impact of attacks. Killed, wounded, and kidnapped figures are provided. Kidnapped victims who were later killed are counted as killed; and kidnapped victims either liberated or still in captivity are counted as kidnapped. Any attack hitting a facility is now coded with a damage estimate of Light ($1 to $500 thousand), Moderate ($500 thousand to $20 million), or Heavy (over $20 million). While it is inherently difficult to make damage assessments for attacks in different countries with different economic circumstances, these estimates allow users to garner a general sense of the overall level of attacks. Because terrorism is a tactic, used on many fronts, by diverse perpetrators in different circumstances and with different aims, NCTC cautions against using attack data alone to gauge success against the forces of terrorism. NCTC does not believe that a simple comparison of the total number of attacks from year to year provides a meaningful metric, for the following reasons: 

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We continue to refine our counting rules as the study of terrorism evolves. Interaction with academics and outside terrorism experts has convinced us that there will never be a bright red line around terrorist attacks, but that the definition of terrorism will always be a point of thoughtful debate. This evolution in our methodology for counting attacks is reflected in WITS and means that some types of year-toyear comparisons may be misleading. Fifty percent of the attacks in the database actually involve no loss of life whatsoever. An attack against a pipeline and a VBIED attack that

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kills 100 civilians each count as one attack in the database. Therefore, a comparison of such attacks may hardly seem meaningful. The nature of this exercise necessarily involves incomplete and ambiguous information. The motivation behind attacks, particularly those that do not involve mass casualties can be especially difficult to discern. As additional sources of information are found and as more information becomes available from the remoter parts of the world, we will continue to enrich the database. In the case of 2005, for example, incidents in Nepal grew dramatically, but this data can't be meaningfully compared to 2004 because it is clear that attacks on civilians were occurring at a substantially higher rate than was reflected in previous years' accounting.

In summary, tracking attacks against civilians and noncombatants can help us understand important trends related to the nature of the attacks, where they are occurring and who are the victims and the perpetrators. However, year-toyear changes in the gross number of attacks across the globe may tell us little about the effectiveness of the international community in preventing attacks, reducing the capacity of extremists to wage war, or preventing extremists from advancing their agenda through violence against the innocent.

NCTC OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS STATISTICAL MATERIAL Approximately 11,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 83 countries during 2009, resulting in over 58,000 victims, including nearly 15,000 fatalities. Attacks decreased by about six percent in 2009 and deaths by about 5 percent. This marks the second consecutive year for declines of both attacks and fatalities. Unlike the preceding four years where the Near East witnessed the greatest number of attacks, the largest number of reported terrorist attacks in 2009 occurred in South Asia, which also had, for the second consecutive year, the greatest number of fatalities. Together, South Asia and the Near East were the locations for almost two-thirds of the 234 high-casualty attacks (those that killed 10 or more people) in 2009.

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Of the 10,999 reported attacks, about 4,850, or 44 percent, occurred in South Asia. These attacks accounted for approximately 6,270 fatalities, or 42 percent of the worldwide total in 2009. Attacks in Afghanistan nearly doubled from 2008 and increased in Pakistan for the third consecutive year. Another 30 percent of the attacks occurred in the Near East with attacks in Iraq accounting for three-fourths of these incidents. Compared with 2008, attacks in Iraq declined by nearly one-quarter, continuing an ongoing decline since August of 2007. Since 2005, Iraq continues to be the country with the most attacks and fatalities due to terrorism. Almost 700 of the 850 reported attacks in Africa were associated with turmoil in the Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Compared with 2008, attacks in Africa rose by 140 (19 percent) and fatalities increased by over 250 (8 percent). The number of reported attacks in 2009 increased in the Western Hemisphere by about 27 percent, mostly attributable to increases in Colombia; in East Asia and the Pacific the number of reported attacks declined by 16 percent, mostly attributable to declines in the Philippines. Islamic extremists conducted several attacks in the United States, including two that resulted in fatalities. These attacks represent the most significant activity by such extremists in the United States since 2001.

Attackers Sunni extremists were identified with about one-half of all attacks in 2009. Almost 90 groups were associated with these attacks. According to open source reports, the Taliban claimed credit for the largest number of attacks causing the highest number of fatalities. Al-Shabaab was the second deadliest group, followed by al-Qa‘ida in Iraq as the third deadliest group. Largest Sunni extremist attacks 

On October 25, 2009, al-Qa‘ida in Iraq killed 155 people including 24 children, and wounded 720 in a double suicide VBIED attack in Baghdad, Iraq

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On December 8, 2009, al-Qa‘ida in Iraq killed 127 people including 12 students, and wounded 513 others in multiple suicide VBIED attack in Baghdad, Iraq On October 28, 2009, Sunni extremists killed 117 people and injured 200 others in a VBIED attack in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan On August 19, 2009, al-Qa‘ida in Iraq killed 101 people and wounded 1,200 others in a coordinated SVBIED and VBIED attack in Baghdad, Iraq On May 10, 2009, Sunni extremists killed 88 people and wounded 245 others including several journalists in mortar attacks in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia

Other notable Sunni extremist attacks 

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On February 9, 2009, the Taliban killed 15 people including 11 children, and wounded 15 others in a mortar attack on a school in Darra Adam Khel, North-West Frontier, Pakistan On August 27, 2009, al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula slightly wounded the Saudi minister of the interior for security affairs in a suicide bombing in Jiddah, Makkah, Saudi Arabia On November 27, 2009, Caucasus Emirate killed 39 people and wounded 95 others in an IED attack against a passenger train near Bologoye, Tverskaya Oblast', Russia On December 25, 2009, Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab injured one person when he allegedly detonated an IED that malfunctioned on a flight over Detroit, Michigan, United States

Of the remaining incidents, as many as 150 groups were identified as perpetrators. The largest non-Sunni attacks include the following: 

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On January 17, 2009, the Lord‘s Resistance Army killed approximately 400 people in assaults and incendiary attacks near Tora, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo On May 9, 2009, the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) killed 86 people including 25 children, and wounded 24 others including one child in an assault and armed attack in Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

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On November 23, 2009, Ampatuan clan members killed 66 people including 34 journalists in armed attacks in Ampatuan, Maguindanao, Philippines and Datu Abdullah Sangki, Maguindanao, Philippines .

Types of Attacks Most attacks in 2009 were perpetrated by terrorists applying conventional fighting methods such as armed attacks, bombings, and kidnappings. Drawing on the lessons learned from the Mumbai attack in 2008, Sunni extremist elements used suicidal militia style attacks in numerous large scale attacks in 2009. Terrorists continued their practice of coordinated attacks that included secondary attacks on first responders at attack sites; they also continued to reconfigure weapons and other materials to create improvised explosive devices, and used women and children to evade security countermeasures.

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Suicide attacks declined from 405 in 2008 to 299 in 2009. This was largely due to declining violence in Iraq. A total of 13 countries experienced suicide attacks in 2009. The country with the highest number of suicide bombings was Afghanistan with 99, followed by Pakistan with 84, and Iraq with 82. Attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan accounted for about 60 percent of all terrorist attacks. Attacks by female suicide bombers declined significantly from 2008, accounting for only seven of the 299 total suicide attacks. Three of these attacks occurred in Iraq, two occurred in Sri Lanka, and two occurred in Russia. In Thailand, Muslim separatists used a woman and child to park VBIEDs in an effort to avoid suspicion and security procedures.

Victims and Targets of Attacks As has been the case since 2005, substantial numbers of victims of terrorist attacks in 2009 were Muslim. 

Almost 48,000 individuals worldwide were either killed or injured by terrorist attacks in 2009. Based upon a combination of reporting and

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National Counterterrorism Center demographic analysis of the countries involved, well over 50 percent of the victims were Muslims, and most were victims of Sunni extremist attacks in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Open source reporting largely identifies victims as civilians – approximately two-thirds of almost 48,000 killed or injured. As such, the fidelity of victim types is difficult to obtain, but the fragmented reporting on it does yield some insights about the demographics of these victims.  

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

Police officers were a favored terrorist target, accounting for 14 percent of the total killed and wounded in 2009. Government officials, employees and contractors killed and wounded from terrorist attacks doubled from 2008 and accounted for five percent of the total victims. The press experienced its single worst day in history on November 23rd in a terrorist massacre in the Philippines that killed 34 members of the media, the largest number of reporters ever killed in a single incident.

TREND OBSERVED IN WITS DATA: ATTACKS ON OIL AND GAS SECTORS DECLINE IN 2009 Total attacks against oil and gas targets worldwide declined by 27 percent in 2009 and have steadily declined since 2006, according to Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) data. One of the most significant declines was in Iraq where attacks were down almost 50 percent—from 31 in 2008 to 16 in 2009—possibly due to the country‘s improved security situation. Excluding Iraq, attacks on the oil and gas sector in the Middle East were low, with four in 2009 versus eight in 2008. Attacks were also down 28 percent in Nigeria, where a ceasefire in the oil producing Niger Delta region temporarily halted militant attacks and thousands of militants accepted a government amnesty offer and disarmed in October 2009. Afghanistan saw a slight increase in attacks with 14 in 2009 compared to 10 in 2008, which is still relatively low for a war zone. While Pakistan saw attacks decline—59 in 2009 versus 80 in 2008—the number of attacks remained high in comparison to war zones due to the deteriorating security situation across the country that has

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prompted the Pakistani military to pursue operations against militants that operate there.

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Total Attacks Against Oil and Gas Sectors: 2005-09

STATISTICAL CHARTS AND GRAPHS

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Chart 2. Comparison of Attacks and Victims by Region

14,971 Total Deaths There is some double counting when multiple methods are used. Chart 3. Deaths by Method

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14,971 Total Deaths There is some double counting when joint claims are made. Categories include attacks either claimed, suspected, inferred or unknown.

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Chart 4. Deaths by Perpetrator Category

14,971 Total Deaths Children are double counted, typically as either civilians or students. Chart 5. Deaths by Victim Category

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Chart 6. Deaths by Country

25 Total US Deaths Numbers provided by Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affairs US number provided by the FBI Chart 7. US Citizen Fatalities by Country Numbers provided by the Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affairs and US numbers provided by the FBI

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Chart 8. US Fatalities as a Share of Total Fatalities Numbers provided by the Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affairs and US numbers provided by the FBI

Chart 9. Kidnappings by Country

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10,999 Total Attacks Some double counting occurs when multiple methods are used.

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Chart 10. Primary Methods Used in Attacks

32,664 Total Injuries Double counting occurred when multiple weapons were used. Chart 11. Injuries by Weapon

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7,469 Total Facilities Struck Double counting occurs when multiple facility types are attacked.

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Chart 12. All Attacks Involving Facilities by Category

10,999 Total Attacks Chart 13. Attacks Grouped by Fatality Range

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4 Total US Kidnappings Numbers provided by Department of State - Bureau of Consular

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Chart 14. US Citizen Terrorism Kidnappings by Country Numbers provided by the Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affair

58,142 Total Victims 10,999 Total Attacks Chart 15. Comparison of Attacks by Victims

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Chart 16. Attacks & Deaths Compared - 2005 to 2009

CHRONOLOGY OF HIGH-FATALITY TERRORIST ATTACKS High-fatality terrorist attacks were acts of violence that meet the statutory criteria for terrorism and involve 10 or more deaths.

January From on or about 1 January 2009 until on or about 31 January 2009, in Khan Yunis, Gaza Strip, and Gaza City, Gaza Strip, armed assailants fired upon and assaulted a group of political affiliates, killing up to 19 Fatah supporters, wounding at least 80 others, and arresting or putting under house arrest scores of others. The assailants stole cellular phones and computers belonging to Fatah during the arrests. Several schools and hospitals were used by HAMAS as makeshift detainment centers, causing unspecified damage. Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and HAMAS Executive Force claimed responsibility.

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On 2 January 2009, in Nagero, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), assailants fired upon the headquarters of the Garamba National Park, killing eight civilians, eight unidentified people, and two park rangers, wounding five people, and damaging the building and one aircraft. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 2 January 2009, between 2:00 and 2:30 PM, in Al Yusufiyah, Babil, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) he was wearing near a political campaign meeting and luncheon being hosted by a Sunni tribal leader in a meeting hall adjacent to his home, killing 23 people including tribal leaders, Sahwa Council members, and civilians; wounding 42 other people including tribal leaders, Sahwa Council members, and civilians; and damaging the tent. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 4 January 2009, at about 11:30 AM, in the Al Kazimiyah district of Baghdad, Iraq, a suicide bomber, wearing an improvised explosive device (IED), attacked the Imam Musa al-Kazim shrine during the Ashura pilgrimage, killing 29 Shia civilians (16 Iranian; 13 Iraqi) including children and six interior ministry (MOI) guards, wounding 72 Shia civilians (32 Iranian; 40 Iraqi) and seven MOI guards, and damaging an MOI checkpoint and several adjacent shops. It was believed that the bomber intended to detonate his explosives inside the mosque, but detonated his explosives at the outside MOI checkpoint upon fear of detection. No group claimed responsibility, but the United States military and Department of State both blamed the attack on the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). On 4 January 2009, at 7:07 PM, in front of the Government Polytechnic College, in Dera Ismail Khan, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) after which a suicide bomber detonated another IED targeting the police officers responding to the first explosion, killing five police officers, three civilians, two journalists, and wounding 14 police officers and 13 civilians. No group claimed responsibility. On 5 January 2009, in Mboroko sub-county, near Maridi, Gharb al Istiwa'iyah, Sudan, assailants with machetes and clubs attacked a village, killing between 35 and 45 civilians, two local chiefs, and several children, kidnapping nine civilians; and then set fire to residences, damaging several huts. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 8 January 2009, in Sambia, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants attacked the village, killing between five and 30 civilians and setting fire to and damaging many residences. No group claimed

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responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 8 January 2009, in Garbahaarrey, Gedo, Somalia, assailants attacked the city by unknown means, killing many police officers and several government officials. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed al-Shabaab al-Islamiya was responsible. On 9 January 2009, in Zaranj, Nimruz, Afghanistan, at a market on the Zaranj to Dilaram highway, a suicide bomber detonated his improvised explosive device (IED) near a police patrol, killing 12 civilians, one police officer, injuring five civilians, one police officer, and damaging several shops. No group claimed responsibility. On 9 January 2009, in Kana, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants attacked the village, killing 15 civilians; set fire to the village, destroying the entire village. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 9 January 2009, in Faradje, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants attacked the town, killing 20 civilians; and set fire to facilities, damaging a church and several residences. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. From 10 January 2009 to 11 January 2009, in Sambia, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed assailants attacked the village; then fired upon occupants, killing six civilians and one army Colonel and several of his troops. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 16 January 2009, in Muhajiriyah, Janub Darfur, Sudan, armed assailants fired upon and fired artillery at areas held by another group, killing as many as 47 civilians and wounding as many as 80 others. The assailants also set fire to and damaged the town. The Mani Arkoi Minawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM) claimed its members were attacked by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). On 17 January 2009, in the evening, in the village of Tora and Libombi, near Tora, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants set fire to a church, killing hundreds of worshippers. The assailants then attacked residents of several homesteads with axes and similar weapons, killing several civilians at each homestead. The assailants also set fire to and damaged several residences and businesses. On or about 29 January 2009, local self-defense forces found the bodies of 100 more victims. No group claimed responsibility,

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although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 24 January 2009, in the morning, on Maka Al-Mukarama Road in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, a suicide bomber attempted to detonate a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle. When police officers fired at the vehicle, the bomber intentionally crashed into a civilian bus, which detonated the VBIED, killing all 14 civilians on board and one police officer, wounding 14 civilians, and damaging the bus. In the fighting that followed, assailants and security forces fought with guns and mortars, killing between five and 15 civilians and wounding 16 others and seven children. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility. On 26 January 2009, in the villages of Melembe, Katambira, Nyamimba, and Mianga, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and near Masisi, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed assailants used machetes and fired upon civilians, killing 36 civilians. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) was responsible. On 26 January 2009, in Saravan, Sistan va Baluchestan, Iran, armed assailants fired upon and killed 12 border police officers. No group claimed responsibility.

February On or about 1 February 2009, in Remeka, Nord-Kivu of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), armed assailants using guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and machetes killed dozens of civilians and children. Assailants raped more than a dozen women, wounding the civilians and accusing them of collaborating with the Rwandan military. No group claimed responsibility, however it was widely believed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) were responsible. On 1 February 2009, in Markegaon, Kurkheda, Gadchiroli, Maharashtra, India, assailants fired upon a police patrol, killing 15 police officers. No group claimed responsibility, but authorities believed the Communist Party of IndiaMaoist (CPI-Maoist) was responsible. On 2 February 2009, at about 10:00 AM, in Tarin Kowt, Oruzgan, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a police checkpoint, killing 25 police officers, wounding

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scores of others and damaging the checkpoint. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 4 February 2009, near Barbacoas, Narino, Colombia, assailants stabbed 17 civilians to death. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) claimed responsibility. On 5 February 2009, at about 2:00 PM, in Khanaqin, Diyala, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) he was wearing near the Abu Dalshad restaurant, killing 16 civilians, wounding 12 others, and damaging the restaurant, seven vehicles, and 10 nearby shops. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 5 February 2009, at about 6:35 PM, in Dera Ghazi Khan, Punjab, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a Muslim religious procession, killing 30 civilians, 2 children, and wounding 48 civilians. No group claimed responsibility. On 9 February 2009, near Warder, Sumale, Ethiopia, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) and fired upon a minivan, killing seven civilians, three local officials from the towns of Warder and Galadi, and damaging the minivan. Assailants subsequently shot the survivors, killing three other civilians. No group claimed responsibility. On 9 February 2009, in Mahuliatand village, Nawada, Bihar, India, assailants fired upon a police team providing security for a Hindu festival, killing 10 police officers and wounding three others. The assailants also looted several weapons and rounds of ammunition. No group claimed responsibility, but it was widely believed the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) was responsible. On 9 February 2009, at about 2:00 PM, in Darra Adam Khel, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, armed assailants fired mortars at a military checkpoint but instead hit a school, killing 11 students, three civilians, one soldier, wounding fifteen people, and damaging the school. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 9 February 2009, near Vishvamadu, in Mullaittivu, North Eastern Province, Sri Lanka, a female suicide bomber mingled with a large group of internally displaced persons (IDP) seeking refuge and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to her body, killing 20 soldiers, eight IDPs, injuring 48 soldiers, and 40 IDPs and children. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was responsible. On 10 February 2009, in the morning, in Putukkudiyiruppu, North Eastern Province, Sri Lanka, armed assailants fired on a group of internally displaced

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persons (IDP) who were attempting to flee their village, killing 19 IDPs including children and injuring 75 others including children. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was responsible. On 11 February 2009, in Hokumati Nad-e 'Ali, in Helmand, Afghanistan, assailants detonated two improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting two private security vehicles, killing 14 security guards, wounding four others, and destroying two vehicles. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 11 February 2009, in the morning, in Kabul, Kabol, Afghanistan, two suicide bombers detonated two improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting two buildings of the prison department, while other assailants simultaneously entered and fired small arms on and threw grenades at both prison department buildings and a justice ministry building, killing 12 government employees, nine police officers, seven civilians, one child, wounding 60 government employees, 40 police officers, 28 civilians, damaging three government buildings and 10 police vehicles. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 11 February 2009, at about 5:00 PM, near Ricaurte, Narino, Colombia, assailants fired upon and killed 10 civilians. No group claimed responsibility, although the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) reported that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was responsible. On 11 February 2009, at about 3:00 PM, in the Rashid district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near a southwestern Madinat al Bayaa' neighborhood bus terminal where Shiite pilgrims were gathered for transportation to Karbala' to observe Arba'een, killing between eight and 16 Shia civilians, wounding between 33 and 45 others, and damaging 10 cars, the bus terminal, and a several vendor stalls in a nearby market. No group claimed responsibility. On 11 February 2009, near Al Fashir, Shamal Darfur, Sudan, assailants fired upon residents of the Wad'a area, killing 17 civilians, wounding 12 civilians, and destroying several military hardware, several businesses in the market, several livestock, and several residences. No group claimed responsibility, but it was widely believed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) was responsible. Between 12 February 2009 to 13 February 2009, in Kilambo and Kipopo, Masisi, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants fired upon a village, killing 13 civilians, wounding six others, and damaged 50 huts. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Democratic Forces for the LIberation of Rwanda (FDLR) were responsible.

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On or about 13 February 2009, in Sambia near Dungu, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants killed 14 Garamba Forest National Park guards and one soldier and damaged one vehicle by unknown means. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 13 February 2009, at about noon, in Al Musayyib, Babil, Iraq, a female suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) she was wearing near a tent filled with Shia pilgrims walking to Karbala' for Arbae'en, killing between 32 and 41 civilians including children and wounding between 40 and 53 other civilians and 28 children. No group claimed responsibility, although it was suspected the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 20 February 2009, in Chipopo, Kalehe, Sud-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants killed 40 civilians by unknown means and wounded several others. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) was responsible. On 21 February 2009, at 5:00 PM, in Ampara, North Eastern Province, Sri Lanka, armed assailants fired on a group of farmers, killing 12 civilians, two children, injuring many more civilians and two children. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was responsible. On 22 February 2009, at about 12:00 PM, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, two suicide bombers detonated vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) at the former Somali National University used by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) members from Burundi, killing 11 or 12 peacekeepers, wounding 15 others, and damaging the complex. Assailants also fired mortars at the peacekeepers, killing two civilians and damaging one house. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility. On 24 February 2009, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants fired mortar rounds at the military base in Tarabunka and fired upon soldiers in Taleex, Dabka junction and Howl Wadaag. The fighting killed 17 civilians, three police officers, two soldiers and one child, wounded between 47 and 88 civilians and three children, and damaged a pharmacy and several residences. The Islamic Party claimed responsibility. On 24 February 2009, in Malakal, A'ali an Nil, Sudan, assailants fired upon Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) troops, killing 16 soldiers and 26 civilians; wounding 33 soldiers and 21 civilians. No group claimed responsibility,

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although it was widely believed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was responsible. On 25 February 2009, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants fired mortar rounds at the military base in Tarabunka and fired upon soldiers and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers in other parts of the city, killing as many as 45 civilians and three police officers and damaging several houses. A mortar or artillery round fired by the security forces landed on a Koranic school in Towfiiq, killing two children and wounding between four and nine others. A leader of the Islamic Party claimed renegade elements of his group were responsible. On 25 February 2009, in Oddur, Bakool, Somalia, armed assailants attacked the town, killing 17 soldiers and civilians and wounding several others. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility.

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March On 5 March 2009, at 8:25 AM, in Hamza, Babil, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the al-Medhatiaya livestock market, killing between 12 and 13 civilians, wounding between 56 and 60 others, and damaging the market and killing 15 sheep. The VBIED attack was planned to target the market during its busiest day of the week. Hamza is a predominantly Shia community. No group claimed responsibility. Between 6 March 2009 and 7 March 2009, in Mustahil, Sumale, Ethiopia, assailants detonated improvised explosive devices (IED), fired mortar rounds, and fired upon an Ethiopian military convoy, killing 25 soldiers and civilians, wounding 30 soldiers and civilians, and damaging several vehicles. Fighting spread into nearby towns along the Somali-Ethiopian border. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) claimed responsibility. On 6 March 2009, in Mangaize, Tillaberi, Niger, armed assailants fired upon two cattle camps, killing 10 civilians, and set fire to hundreds of hectares of pasture. No group claimed responsibility although it was believed either the Niger Justice Movement (MNJ) or Malian bandits were responsible. On 8 March 2009, at about 10:30 AM, in the Sab'ah Nisan district of Baghdad, Iraq, a suicide bomber wearing an improvised explosive device (IED) and riding a motorcycle, attacked a crowd of police recruits outside the Baghdad Police Academy on Palestine Street in the eastern Bab ash Shaykh neighborhood, killing between 20 and 22 civilians and eight police officers

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and wounding between 58 and 61 civilians. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 9 March 2009, in the evening, in Bender Cassim, Bari, Somalia, assailants threw a hand grenade at a police checkpoint, killing seven police, several civilians, wounding six civilians, damaging several vehicles and a checkpoint. No group claimed responsibility. On 10 March 2009, at about 1:15 PM, in Abu Ghurayb, Al Anbar, Iraq, a suicide bomber, wearing an improvised explosive device (IED), attacked a group of Sunni and Shia tribal leaders and senior security officials touring a public market after attending a reconciliation meeting, killing 25 civilians, several tribal leaders and Iraqi military officers, and two reporters; wounding 42 other people, including tribal leaders, Iraqi military personnel, civilians, and children, and four reporters; and damaging several market stalls. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 10 March 2009, in Matara, Southern Province, Sri Lanka, a suicide bomber joined a crowd of civilians celebrating a festival and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing 15 civilians, injuring at least 45 others and a government official. The attack also damaged many vehicles and nearby shops. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was responsible. On 16 March 2009, in the morning, in Lashkar Gah, Helmand, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber dressed in a police uniform and standing 50 meters from the entrance of a security command, detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing nine police officers, two civilians, injuring 13 police officers, and 12 civilians. No group claimed responsibility. On 16 March 2009, near Pir Wadhai, in Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan, at a busy bus stop, a suicide bomber detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing 14 civilians, injuring 27 others and one child, destroying the bus stop, and damaging at least three vehicles including a passenger bus. The explosion also damaged a nearby rescue response building. No group claimed responsibility. On 19 March 2009, at 8:10 PM, in Landi Kotal, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan, armed assailants fired rockets and mortars at a military installation, injuring one Frontier Corps soldier and damaging the base. Several of the weapons landed in a warehouse in the nearby village of Gagra, killing eight Afghan civilians and damaging the warehouse. Other weapons landed in Kharghali village, where one mortar hit a passenger bus, killing

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seven civilians and damaging the bus. The attack resulted in 29 injured civilians and damage to several residences and buildings, a school, a market, and a religious school. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 20 March 2009, at about 10:00 AM, in Qarzai Kotal, Qush Tepa, Jowzjan, Afghanistan, armed assailants fired on a convoy of senior Qush Tepa officials, killing seven police officers, four province officials, and damaging at least one vehicle. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 21 March 2009, in several villages including Yanguma, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), armed assailants using machetes killed 12 civilians and kidnapped between 40 and 60 others including children. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 23 March 2009, in the evening, in Jalula', Diyala, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) inside a funeral tent for a family member of a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) official, killing between 11 and 24 civilians, several political affiliates, wounding between 28 and 47 civilians, several political affiliates, and damaging one tent. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 25 March 2009, in Sabari, Khowst, Afghanistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a civilian van, killing 10 civilians, wounding five civilians, two children, and damaging one van. No group claimed responsibility. On 26 March 2009, between noon and 1:00 PM, in the 'Azamiyah district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in an outdoor market in the northern Ash Sha'b neighborhood, killing between 12 and 22 civilians, four children, wounding between 35 and 48 civilians, and damaging several stalls and vehicles. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 26 March 2009, in Jandola, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a restaurant, killing 12 civilians, wounding 22 others, and damaging one restaurant. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 27 March 2009, in Bogyani, Jamrud, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber entered a mosque during Friday prayers and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing at least 55 civilians (28 Pakistani; 27 Afghan), 16 soldiers, 11 children (6 Pakistani; 5

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Afghan), injuring at least 100 civilians (50 Pakistani; 50 Afghan), 55 children (30 Pakistani; 25 Afghan), at least 25 soldiers, and destroying the mosque. The mosque was near a military checkpost which was damaged as well. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 30 March 2009, at about 8:00 AM, in Manawan, Punjab, Pakistan, between eight and 14 armed assailants, some wearing police uniforms, stormed the Manawan police training facility and began firing and throwing grenades indiscriminately at the parade field where hundreds of recruits were training. During the nearly eight hour siege, the assailants continued to fire with small weapons and detonated several improvised explosive devices (IED), and also held approximately 400 officers and trainees hostage. At least three of the attackers detonated the IEDs they were carrying when the police closed-in on them. In the end, at least 11 police officers and recruits, one civilian were killed, and at least 90 officers and recruits were injured. The facility also suffered unsubstantiated damage. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility.

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April On 1 April 2009, at about noon, in Kandahar, Kandahar, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at the front of a provincial government building. Three suicide bombers entered the building and fired small arms on its occupants and one of the suicide bombers detonated their improvised explosive device (IED), killing six police officers, five body guards, four government officials, two civilians, wounding 16 people, and damaging one government building. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 5 April 2009, at about 12:15 PM, in Chakwal, Punjab, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a gathering at a Shia meeting hall, killing 21 civilians, three children, wounding 140 civilians, and damaging one meeting hall. No group claimed responsibility. On 5 April 2009, in Miram Shah, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a military checkpoint and a military convoy, killing 12 civilians, five children, one soldier, wounding 21 civilians, 12 children, six soldiers, damaging five civilian vehicles, and one military checkpoint. No

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group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 6 April 2009, at about 2:00 PM, in Maligaon, Guwahati, Kamrup, Assam, India, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the parking area of a busy market, killing nine civilians, wounding approximately 57 others, and damaging two bicycles, two cars, approximately 20 motorcycles, and one police station. About two hours later, in Dhekiajuli, Sonapur, Assam, India, assailants detonated a VBIED in a marketplace, killing one civilian, wounding three others, and damaging the market. No group claimed responsibility, but authorities believed the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was responsible. On 6 April 2009, at about 9:00 AM, in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the al-Dakhel market, killing six civilians and four children, wounding 65 civilians, and damaging the market. No group claimed responsibility, but the United States (US) military blamed this attack on the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) while an Iraqi government source blamed Jaysh alMahdi (JAM) splinter groups. On 6 April 2009, at about noon, in the Rashid district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) nearly simultaneously in the predominantly Shia southwestern Umm al Maalif neighborhood near a market and health clinic, killing 12 civilians, wounding 32 others, and damaging the market, clinic, and several vehicles. No group claimed responsibility, but the United States (US) military blamed this attack on the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) while an Iraqi government source blamed Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) splinter groups. On 9 April 2009, in Kart-i-Lagan, Lashkar Gah, Helmand, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber approached police drug eradication unit convoy and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing six police officers, four civilians, injuring 10 others, seven police officers, and damaging at least four vehicles and several nearby shops. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 11 April 2009, at about 11:30 AM, near Al Iskandariyah, Babil, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) near a crowd of 250 Sunni Sahwa Council paramilitary members who were waiting to be paid by the Iraqi Army at a checkpoint, killing between nine and 12 paramilitary members and wounding 28 other paramilitary members and several Iraqi soldiers. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility.

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On or about 11 April 2009, at the Mogadishu port in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants launched mortar rounds at an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping ship docked in the port, damaging a warehouse and the port but causing no injuries. Some of the mortar shells landed in nearby residential areas killing one civilian and nine people, and wounding three civilians and 15 people. AMISOM peacekeepers retaliated with mortar fire wounding or killing several people and damaging several buildings. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility. On 12 April 2009, in the morning, in Mianga, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), assailants fired upon DRC army positions, killing 10 soldiers and 4 civilians including some children. Following the attack, the assailants kidnapped the village chief and cut his throat, killing him. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) were responsible. On 12 April 2009, at about 9:30 PM, in Damanjodi, Koraput, Orissa, India, approximately 250 assailants fired upon the National Aluminum Company (NALCO) bauxite mine, killing 10 Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) members, wounding eight others, and damaging the mine premises. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) claimed responsibility. On 15 April 2009, at about 4:00 PM, in the Wasti district of southern Kirkuk, At Ta'mim, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near a bus transporting Interior Ministry Oil Police (OP) personnel, killing 11 OP officers; wounding 13 others, five civilians, and three children; destroying the bus, and damaging several shops and civilian cars. The OP personnel all worked at Northern Oil Company facilities. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 15 April 2009, at 6:45 PM, in Charsadda, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a police checkpoint, killing 10 police officers, nine civilians, wounding seven police officers, nine civilians, and destroying one checkpoint. No group claimed responsibility. On 18 April 2009, at about 4:15 PM, in Doaba, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a military checkpost and detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing 25 soldiers, two police officers, injuring 48 soldiers, seven police officers, destroying eight military vehicles, the checkpost, damaging several military buildings, and two police vehicles. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility.

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On 20 April 2009, in Beledweyne, Hiiraan, Somalia, two groups fired upon each other, killing 10 people, wounding 30 others and one journalist from Holy Koran Radio. On 25 May 2009, the journalist died from his wounds. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed the Islamic Courts Union and the Islamic Party were responsible. On 23 April 2009, in the afternoon, in the Karradah district of Baghdad, Iraq, a female suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) from where she was hiding under an abaya near police officers and Red Crescent workers handing out food to displaced people, killing five children, two Red Crescent workers, between eight and 12 police officers, between 11 and 13 civilians, wounding between 50 and 52 people, damaging one apartment building and several nearby shops. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 23 April 2009, at about 2:30 PM, in Imam Ways, Diyala, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) he was wearing inside a restaurant where Iranian Shiite pilgrims had stopped, killing between 45 and 53 Iranian civilians, one Iranian child, two Iraqi civilians, wounding 60 Iranian civilians, between eight and 17 Iraqi civilians, destroying one restaurant, and damaging several nearby vehicles. No group claimed responsibility. On 24 April 2009, at about noon, in the Al Kazimiyah district of Baghdad, Iraq, two female suicide bombers, either wearing or carrying improvised explosive devices (IED) in their purses, detonated within five minutes of each other near the Shiite Imam Musa al-Kadhim Mosque, killing between 60 and 66 Shia pilgrims (41 Iraqis; 25 Iranians) and five children, wounding 124 Shia pilgrims (44 Iraqis; 80 Iranians) and several children, and damaging several shops. One bomber detonated her explosives close to one of the mosque's gated entrances and the other in a shopping area outside the mosque. No group claimed responsibility, but the Iraqi Interior Ministry blamed the attack on the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). On 25 April 2009, in Dir, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded when a group of children began playing with it, killing 13 children, wounding 40 children, and one civilian. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 29 April 2009, at about 4:30 PM, in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) about 10 minutes apart, one in a popular market and the other nearby, killing between 38 and 42 civilians, several children, wounding

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between 65 and 75 civilians, several children, and damaging several stalls in the market. A third VBIED was found and defused nearby before it exploded. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Islamic State of Iraq was responsible.

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May On 1 May 2009, in the evening, in Ghaziabad, Konar, Afghanistan, assailants fired on a military outpost, killing nine soldiers (4 Afghan; 3 American; 2 Latvian), one contractor, and damaging the outpost. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 1 May 2009, at about 4:30 PM, near Daw' al Qamar, Ninawa, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) he was wearing at a cafe near the Mosul Dam reservoir, killing between five and 10 Shiite Turkomans, wounding six others, and damaging the cafe. No group claimed responsibility. On 4 May 2009, in Shamal Zay, Zabol, Afghanistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a tractor-trolley, killing 10 civilians, two children, and damaging the vehicle. No group claimed responsibility. On 6 May 2009, near Sirguda village, in Dantewara, Chhattisgarh, India, assailants detonated a landmine improvised explosive device (IED) on a police party traveling on a tractor, killing two Special Police Officers (SPO), four civilians, and two Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) members and wounding three SPOs and damaging the tractor. The assailants also stole weapons and ammunition from the victims. No group claimed responsibility, but it was widely believed the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) was responsible. On 6 May 2009, at about 7:00 AM, in the Rashid district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the Alwat al-Rasheed produce market in the southern Durah neighborhood, killing between 11 and 15 civilians, wounding between 37 and 40 others, and damaging several market stalls and six cars. Police officers conducted a controlled detonation of a second VBIED found near the market's entrance and likely intended for first responders, causing no injuries or damage. No group claimed responsibility. On 7 May 2009, in southern Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, progovernment armed assailants attempted to kill a commander from another

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armed group. The ensuing fighting included the use of mortars and antiaircraft guns, killing up to 12 civilians and wounding 55 others. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility for fighting with Islamic Courts Union, who admitted to being part of the fighting. Between 9 May 2009 and 10 May 2009, in Busurungi, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants fired small arms and wielded machetes, killing at least 61 civilians and 25 children, wounding between three and 23 civilians and one child, and also set fire to the village, destroying the village. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) was responsible. On 9 May 2009, throughout the day, in the Wardhigley, Dayniile and Yaaqshid districts of Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, two groups fought each other with firearms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and mortar rounds, killing up to 18 civilians and children, wounding as many as 96 civilians and children, and damaging several residences and a tea shop. Assailants fired an RPG at a vehicle, killing a government security official and two of his bodyguards and damaging the vehicle. Assailants also fired upon and killed two business people in the Bakara market. Assailants threw a grenade into the home of a Member of Parliament (MP), wounding three relatives and a neighbor and damaging the residence. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility in the fighting with what was believed to be the Islamic Courts Union. It was widely believed the Islamic Party was also involved in the fighting. On 10 May 2009, in the afternoon, in Gereshk, Helmand, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a public market and detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing 18 civilians and children, two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers, two police officers, injuring 30 civilians and children, and damaging the market. No group claimed responsibility. On 10 May 2009, throughout the day, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants fired a mortar round which landed on the Abdarir Awrere mosque during afternoon prayers, killing 14 worshipers and the mosque's Imam, wounding 10 worshipers, and damaging the mosque. A mortar round from a separate attack landed near Mogadishu's soccer stadium, wounding several journalists. Assailants also fired mortar rounds at the presidential palace, causing no injuries or damage. Fighting erupted throughout the city between two armed groups against another armed group, killing an additional 73 civilians and wounding up to 229 others. Spokesmen for both the Islamic Party

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and al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed the groups had fought with what was widely believed to be the pro-government Islamic Courts Union. On 11 May 2009, in Darra Adam Khel, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a military checkpoint, killing seven civilians, two soldiers, one child; wounding 14 soldiers, 13 civilians; and damaging the checkpoint, one passenger van, and several trucks. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was responsible. On 14 May 2009, throughout the day, in the Bondhere, Yaaqshid, Karaan and Wardhigley districts of Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortar rounds at and fired upon Somali soldiers who returned fire in kind, killing 10 civilians and wounding up to 31 others. Assailants also fired mortar rounds at the presidential palace, but there were no injuries or damage reported. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed alShabaab al-Islamiya was responsible. On 15 May 2009, throughout the day, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, two groups of assailants fired small arms and mortars at each other, killing up to 18 civilians and wounding up to 42 others. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed al-Shabaab al-Islamiya was responsible for attacking the Islamic Courts Union. On 16 May 2009, at about 2:20 PM, in Kashkal, Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, outside an internet cafe and a car dealer on City Circular Road, assailants detonated a remote-controlled vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing eight civilians, five children; injuring 32 civilians, one child; damaging at least 17 vehicles, 15 shops, and several nearby residences. No group claimed responsibility. On 16 May 2009, throughout the day, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, two groups of assailants fired small arms and mortars at each other, killing 17 civilians and wounding up to 40 others. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed al-Shabaab al-Islamiya was responsible for attacking the Islamic Courts Union. On 20 May 2009, between 7:00 PM and 7:30 PM, in the Al Kazimiyah district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in a shopping district of the western Shu'lah neighborhood, killing 34 or 35 civilians, several children, three Iraqi soldiers; wounding between 67 and 80 civilians, several children; destroying one building; damaging about 11 vehicles and several other nearby shops. No

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group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 21 May 2009, in Tawitola, Gadchiroli, Maharashtra, India, assailants fired upon a police patrol, killing 16 police officers and damaging two police vehicles. The assailants also looted weapons and ammunition and set fire to the police vehicles. No group claimed responsibility, but it was widely believed the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) was responsible. On 21 May 2009, between 10:00 AM and 11:00 AM, in Durah neighborhood, in the Rashid district of Baghdad, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) he was wearing in al Athuriyin marketplace near United States (US) soldiers leaving a meeting in the southern Durah neighborhood, killing three US soldiers, 12 civilians, wounding between five and nine US soldiers, 25 civilians, and damaging several nearby shops. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 22 May 2009, at about 12:00 PM, near Miti, Sud-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed assailants fired upon a truck near Kahuzi-Biega Park, killing 10 civilians and three military passengers, wounding eight passengers, and damaging the truck. No group claimed responsibility. On 22 May 2009, at about 10:00 AM, about 12 kilometers from Pinga, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed assailants fired upon a truck, killing 14 civilians, the driver and his security guard and damaging the truck. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) was responsible. On 22 May 2009, in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in a busy downtown intersection, killing 10 civilians, wounding 75 others, damaging 24 shops, several vehicles, two hotels, and two movie theaters. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 24 May 2009, in the morning, in the Hamar-jajab area of the Wardhigley district of Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, a suicide bomber attempted to enter either a police or military facility with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). When guards fired at the vehicle, the bomber intentionally detonated the VBIED, killing seven soldiers and police officers and three civilians; and wounding four soldiers and five police officers and civilians. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility. On 26 May 2009, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fought security forces with firearms, killing up to 10 civilians and wounding two others. No group claimed responsibility.

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On 26 May 2009, in the Wardhigley district of Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants fired mortar rounds at the presidential palace which missed and landed in nearby neighborhoods, killing seven civilians and wounding several others. Three unidentified people died at a hospital from wounds they received from the attack. No group claimed responsibility. On 27 May 2009, at about 10:10 AM, in Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan, on Lawrence Road, between the offices of the Rescue-15 emergency police unit and the Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI), between two and four armed assailants stepped out of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and began firing and throwing grenades at the ISI building. When ISI guards returned fire, a suicide bomber detonated the VBIED, killing 14 police officers, nine civilians, five soldiers, one child, injuring at least 326 people, and causing severe damage to both the ISI and police buildings. The explosion also damaged several official police residences located in the compound, a nearby hospital and several other unidentified buildings as well as tens of vehicles. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 28 May 2009, at 7:45 PM, in Zahedan, Sistan va Baluchestan, Iran, an assailant detonated a suicide improvised explosive device (IED) at the Amir al-Mo'menin mosque, killing 25 civilians, wounding 145 others, and destroying the mosque. A second IED was discovered and safely disabled nearby. Jundullah claimed responsibility. On 29 May 2009, in Pashi Kotal, Shinkay, Zabol, Afghanistan, armed assailants fired at a logistics convoy, killing 15 contractors and damaging many vehicles. The assailants also set fire to several of the vehicles. The Taliban claimed responsibility.

June On 1 June 2009, in Farah, Afghanistan, armed assailants ambushed and fired upon guards working for a security firm, killing between 10 and 18 private security contractors and damaging 10 vehicles. The Taliban claimed responsibility. Between 1 June 2009 and 3 June 2009, in the Yaaqshid district of Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants fired firearms and artillery against Somali government troops, killing 18 civilians and about 12 soldiers, wounding several dozen civilians and soldiers. Nine of the civilians were killed and one civilian was wounded by at least 10 mortars, which also

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resulted in the killing of many animals, and destroying of several residences. In one attack a civilian was killed by unknown means and then his body was burned. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party claimed responsibility for the attacks. On 2 June 2009, in the afternoon, in Taawint Tassemat, between Timezrit Il Matten, Boumerdes, Algeria and Les Issers, Boumerdes, Algeria, armed assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) and fired upon a convoy, killing seven police officers and two educators, wounding one police officer, one educator and one civilian, and damaging three vehicles. One of the damaged police vehicles, driven by the injured police officer, went out of control and the assailants again attacked the vehicle, killing the formerly wounded police officer with a knife and then set fire to that vehicle. The assailants looted eight of the police officers' weapons. Al-Qa'ida Organization in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility. On 5 June 2009, in the Hayagai Sharqai village, near Dir, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) outside a mosque, killing 37 civilians, 12 children, wounding 37 civilians, 24 children, and damaging the mosque. No group claimed responsibility. On 5 June 2009 in Wabxo village, Ceelbuur, Galguduud, Somalia, armed assailants fired upon the pro-government Sufi group, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee'a, killing between five and nine civilians, between 32 and 60 paramilitary, wounding several dozen paramilitary and capturing four armed trucks. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party claimed responsibility. On 9 June 2009, at about 10:00 PM, in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, armed assailants drove a vehicle and shot their way through the guard-house of the Pearl Continental Hotel and injured seven security guards. Immediately after, at least one suicide bomber followed in a second vehicle and once inside the hotel premises, detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing 14 civilians (13 Pakistani; 1 foreign), five non-government organization (NGO) workers, two United Nations (UN) employees (1 Serb; 1 Filipino), one security guard, one journalist, injuring at least 42 civilians, 18 UN employees (1 British; 1 Somali; 1 German; 15 foreigners), two NGO workers, destroying the hotel, and damaging nearly 100 vehicles. The blast also damaged many shops located in and near the hotel, several banks, many residences and offices, and a mosque. The Abdullah Uzaam Brigade claimed responsibility. On 12 June 2009, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility.

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On 10 June 2009, at about 9:00 AM, in Al Bathah, Dhi Qar, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in a predominantly Shia outdoor vegetable market crowded with shoppers, killing 24 civilians and five children, wounding between 47 and 70 civilians, and damaging the market. No group claimed responsibility, but authorities suspected that the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) perpetrated this attack. On 17 June 2009 between El Mehir, Bordj Bou Arreridj, Algeria and Mansourah, Bordj Bou Arreridj, Algeria, armed assailants detonated two improvised explosive devices (IED) and fired upon a convoy, killing 18 or 19 National Gendarmerie police (gendarmes) and one civilian, wounding six gendarmes, one civilian, and one child and stealing six gendarme off-road vehicles, several weapons and several gendarme uniforms. One civilian was killed prior to the ambush when the assailants tried to use the civilian's vehicle for the attack. Al-Qa'ida Organization in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility. On 18 June 2009, at about 9:00 AM, in Beledweyne, Hiiraan, Somalia, a suicide bomber drove into the Medina Hotel with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing the Somali National Security Minister, the former Somali ambassador to Ethiopia, 10 military officers (6 Ethiopian; 4 Somali), several tribal elders, several Ethiopian and Somali soldiers, nine civilians and dozens of people; wounding two government officials and scores of people; and damaging the hotel. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility. On 20 June 2009, at about 1:00 PM, in Taza Khurmatu, At Ta'mim, Iraq, a suicide bomber, driving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), attacked the Shia Al-Rasul Mosque as worshippers were departing noon prayers, killing 47 Turkmen Shia civilians and 35 children, wounding 211 civilians including several children, and damaging between 30-50 homes, several shops, two dozen cars, and the mosque. A truck, carrying over an estimated ton of explosives was used as the VBIED. No group claimed responsibility, but it was widely believed that the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) perpetrated this attack. On or about 21 June 2009, in Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants killed 16 people in several villages by unknown means. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 22 June 2009, at 1:30 PM, in Khowst, Khowst, Afghanistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) and a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a

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government building, killing 10 civilians, wounding 34 civilians, seven children, and damaging several shops, several vehicles, and the government building. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 24 June 2009, between 6:45 and 7:00 PM, in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the Muraydi Market, killing between 62 and 76 civilians including children, wounding between 116 and 158 others, and damaging dozens of market kiosks and several vehicles. The bomb was placed on a trailer attached to a motorcycle and hidden underneath fruit and vegetables. No group claimed responsibility, although the district mayor blamed this attack on the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). On 26 June 2009, shortly after 9:00 AM, in the Ar Rusafa district of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in a market selling motorcycles in the central Nahdha neighborhood, killing between 13 and 19 civilians, wounding 45 others, and damaging several motorcycles. A motorcycle was used as the VBIED. No group claimed responsibility. On 29 June 2009, at about 2:30 PM, in Qada al Hamdaniyah, Ninawa, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) parked in a parking lot as police approached to defuse it, killing six police officers, one paramilitary member, two civilians, one child, wounding two police officers, nine civilians, damaging several vehicles, and one parking lot. No group claimed responsibility. On 30 June 2009, at about 5:30 PM, in the Shurjah district of northern Kirkuk, At Ta'mim, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in a Kurdish outdoor vegetable market, killing 35 civilians including several children, wounding 95 others including several children, and damaging 17 shops and houses. No group claimed responsibility, although the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was suspected of perpetrating this attack.

July Between 1 July 2009 and 4 July 2009, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants fired upon an army post, damaging the facility. Then, government troops, supported by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops, exchanged mortar and rocket fire with the assailants; killing at least 53

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civilians, one journalist, at least one child, several Somali government soldiers, and several AMISOM soldiers; wounding several children, scores of civilians, several Somali government soldiers, and several AMISOM soldiers; and destroying several residences and one gas station. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party claimed responsibility. On 1 July 2009, in Kuma Giridat, Shamal Darfur, Sudan, assailants attacked the village by unknown means, killing 13 civilians and wounding four others. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM) was responsible. On 4 July 2009, near Arshty, Ingushetiya, Russia, assailants fired upon a convoy of Chechen police vehicles, killing 10 police officers and wounding 10 others and damaging six police vehicles. No group claimed responsibility. On 8 July 2009, in the morning, in Mohammad Agha, Lowgar, Afghanistan, assailants detonated a remote-controlled vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing 12 students, 11 civilians, and four police officers; injuring many people; and damaging many shops. No group claimed responsibility. On 8 July 2009, at about 8:00 PM, in Qaryat Ba'wizah, Ninawa, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near a Shiite mosque, killing between nine and 13 civilians, wounding between 15 and 27 others, and damaging the mosque. No group claimed responsibility. On 9 July 2009, between 6:30 and 7:30 AM, in the Qalah district of central Tall 'Afar, Ninawa, Iraq, a suicide bomber disguised as a police officer detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) near the home of an antiterrorism police sergeant, killing the police sergeant, his wife, and his daughter; wounding his brother; and damaging their home. Shortly afterward, a second suicide bomber, also disguised as a police officer, detonated an IED near the crowd of civilians and first responders that had gathered at the site of the first bombing, killing 11 police officers and 22 civilians and wounding 82 civilians, including several children, and one other police officer. No group claimed responsibility, but authorities believed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. Between 11 July 2009 and 12 July 2009, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortars at the presidential palace, killing three Ugandan members of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Then, government troops, supported by AMISOM, exchanged firearm, mortar and rocket fire with al-Shabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party, killing at least 19 civilians, one senior official of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),

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and at least 12 Somali government soldiers; wounding 75 civilians and several dozen Somali government soldiers; and destroying several residences. AlShabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party claimed responsibility. On 17 July 2009, at 7:00 AM, in Bakalwa, Spin Buldak, Kandahar, Afghanistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED), killing six civilians, five children, injuring three civilians, and damaging one vehicle. No group claimed responsibility. On 20 July 2009, in Syah Koshah, Gulistan, Farah, Afghanistan, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded when it was struck by a vehicle, killing 12 civilians and children, injuring four civilians, and destroying the vehicle. Later, a second IED exploded after being struck by a vehicle transporting the bodies of the first attack, injuring the driver and damaging the vehicle. No group claimed responsibility. Between 20 July 2009 and 21 July 2009, at about 11:00 PM, in Mandje, about 100 kilometers west of Goma, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), assailants fired upon an Army base and fought with Congolese soldiers, killing 14 civilians, two children, and three soldiers. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) was responsible. On 21 July 2009, in Konduz, Kondoz, Afghanistan, assailants fired a rocket at military forces but missed, killing seven civilians and four children and damaging a mosque. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. Between 22 July 2009 to 23 July 2009, in the Hodan district of Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants exchanged gunfire and mortar fire with soldiers, killing between 15 and 25 civilians, wounding between 31 and 51 civilians, and damaging many homes. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed al-Shabaab al-Islamiya was responsible. Between 26 July 2009 and 1 August 2009, in Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria, assailants attacked police headquarters and churches using arrows, sticks, firearms, machetes and gasoline bombs, killing one prison guard, 23 police officers, and nine Christian civilians by unknown means, beheading and killing three Christian pastors, firing upon and wounding one police officer, assaulting and wounding one religious scholar, and kidnapping a correspondent of Daily Trust. The assailants set fire to and damaged 10 residences, 14 vehicles, two police stations, at least 20 churches, a government primary school, a prison, and offices of a state unemployment bureau, but caused no further injuries. The majority of the attacks occurred between 26 July 2009 and 27 July 2009, from late evening and throughout the next day.

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No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed Taliban Nigeria was responsible. On 30 July 2009, in Chattar, Sui, Balochistan, Pakistan, assailants fired upon a group of laborers who were loading sand into vehicles but caused no injuries. The assailants then kidnapped 11 laborers and set fire to and damaged two vehicles. Later, in Sangsila area, the assailants fired upon the police patrol dispatched to respond, killing one police officer, injuring 16 police officers, and kidnapping 19 others. On 31 July 2009, the assailants fired upon and killed four of the kidnapped officers, while one police officer escaped from captivity. On 9 August 2009, the assailants fired upon and killed four other police officers and released seven of the laborers. On or about 14 August 2009, the assailants killed nine more police hostages by unknown means. One 18 August 2009, three laborers and one police officer escaped captivity. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility. On 31 July 2009, between 1:00 and 1:30 PM, in the Sab'ah Nisan, 'Azamiyah, Karradah, and Rashid districts of Baghdad, Iraq, assailants detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) and a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) outside Shia mosques as worshippers were leaving afternoon prayers, killing 29 civilians, wounding 141 others, and damaging five Shia mosques. At about 1:00 PM, in the eastern Kamaliyah neighborhood, an IED was detonated near the Al-Hikmah Mosque wounding six worshippers. Also at about 1:00 PM, in the northern Ash Sha'b neighborhood, a VBIED was detonated near the Al-Shurufi Mosque, killing 24 worshipers and wounding 107 others. Again at about 1:00 PM, in the southeastern Az Za'faraniyah neighborhood, two IEDs were detonated near the Al-Sadriyyun Mosque, killing one civilian and wounding seven others. At about 1:00 PM, in the southeastern Diyala neighborhood, two IEDs were detonated near the Al-Rasul al-A'zam Mosque, killing four worshippers and wounding 17 others. At about 1:30 PM, in the southern I'lam neighborhood, assailants detonated an IED near the Al-Imam al-Sadiq Mosque, wounding four worshippers. No group claimed responsibility, but Sadrist officials blamed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

August On 1 August 2009, in the Central African Republic, assailants attacked several border towns by unknown means, killing 10 people and wounding several others. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible.

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On 3 August 2009, at 8:00 AM, in Herat, Herat, Afghanistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting the vehicle of a district police chief, killing eight civilians and three police officers including the police chief, wounding 27 civilians and one police officer, and damaging several police and civilian vehicles. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 6 August 2009, in Darveshan, Garmsir, Helmand, Afghanistan, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded when it was struck by a vehicle, killing 26 civilians and children, injuring six civilians and children, and destroying the vehicle. No group claimed responsibility. On 6 August 2009, in Niangara, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants kidnapped approximately 100 civilians. On or about 14 August 2009, a mass grave was discovered which contained the bodies of approximately 100 civilians, believed to be the victims of the kidnapping. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 7 August 2009, at about 1:00 PM, in Shirakhan, Ninawa, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near a Shiite Turkmen mosque as worshippers were leaving a joint prayer and funeral service, killing 39 civilians, wounding between 140 and 276 others, and destroying the mosque and a dozen surrounding houses. No group claimed responsibility, but authorities suspected the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 10 August 2009, at about 4:50 AM, in Khaznah, Ninawa, Iraq, assailants near-simultaneously detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), killing 30 civilians, wounding between 130 and 155 others, and damaging 72 homes and dozens of cars. The village was home to the Kurdish Shiite Shabak minority. No group claimed responsibility, but it was widely believed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 11 August 2009, at 10:00 AM, in Maywand, Kandahar, Afghanistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a civilian vehicle, killing nine civilians and one child, wounding five civilians, and damaging the vehicle. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 12 August 2009, in Gereshk, Helmand, Afghanistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a civilian van, killing eight civilians and several children, wounding one child, and destroying the van. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible.

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On 12 August 2009, in Bisiye, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants killed nine civilians, two police officers, and two Democratic Republic of the Congo Armed Forces (FARDC) soldiers by unknown means. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) were responsible. On 12 August 2009, at about 3:00 AM, in Mpama, Walikale, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo armed assailants fired upon the area of the Bisie cassiterite mine, killing three police officers and at least 16 miners, wounding at least 45 miners, and looting mineral ores, money and mining equipment. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Mai-Mai and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) were responsible. On 13 August 2009, at about 5:00 PM, in the Kala'a district of Sinjar, Ninawa, Iraq, two suicide bombers detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) they were wearing near the Ayoub Cafe, killing 21 civilians (20 Iraqi; 1 Egyptian), wounding between 30 and 34 others, and damaging the cafe. The cafe was frequented by members of the Yazidi sect. No group claimed responsibility. On 13 August 2009, in Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a group of police officers in front of the Iqbal Town police station, killing eight civilians and two police officers, wounding 22 civilians and 12 police officers, and damaging the police station and several other buildings. No group claimed responsibility. On 13 August 2009, at about 8:30 PM, in Buynaksk, Dagestan, Russia, assailants fired upon a police station and a nearby sauna, killing seven civilians, four police officers, and damaging the police station and the sauna. No group claimed responsibility. On 17 August 2009, at about 9:00 AM, in Nazran, Ingushetiya, Russia, a suicide bomber drove a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) through the gates of the Ingushetiya Interior Ministry headquarters and detonated the VBIED in the courtyard near a police station, killing 17 police officers and five civilians; wounding 194 civilians, 74 police officers, and 10 children; and damaging 30 vehicles, three government buildings and one apartment building. Later, assailants fired upon the police officers and emergency personnel that responded to the attack, killing three police officers and wounding two others. The Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade of the Caucasus Emirate claimed responsibility.

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On 19 August 2009, between 10:30 AM and 11:00 AM, in the Ar Rusafa and Al Karkh districts of Baghdad, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicleborne improvised explosive device (VBIED) on an overpass near the Finance Ministry in the central Bab al Muazzam neighborhood and assailants detonated a VBIED outside the Foreign Ministry near the central International (Green) Zone nearly simultaneously, killing between 82 and 101 government employees, civilians, and children; wounding between 563 and 1,203 government employees, civilians, and children; and damaging one overpass, scores of vehicles, three government buildings, scores of residences including apartment buildings, one school, one hotel, and several other buildings. Authorities discovered and safely defused two more VBIEDs near the Foreign Ministry. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility, but authorities also blamed Baathists from the former regime. Between 20 August 2009 and 22 August 2009, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants fired mortar rounds and firearms at at least one base and at least one checkpoint controlled by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), prompting retaliatory fire. In the ensuing crossfire, mortars and bullets hit populated locations, killing 12 civilians, six shop keepers, two members of Parliament, several AMISOM troops, and several soldiers; wounding at least 36 civilians, 12 children, several AMISOM troops, several soldiers, and dozens of people; and damaging one restaurant, at least one home, one hotel, at least one checkpoint, and at least one AMISOM base. Al-Shabaab alIslamiya and the Islamic Party claimed responsibility. On 24 August 2009, at about 2:30 PM and 3:00 PM, in An Nu'maniyah, Wasit, Iraq and near Al Kut, Wasit, Iraq, assailants detonated two improvised explosive devices (IED) magnetically attached to two buses transporting passengers from Baghdad, killing two children and between eight and 18 civilians, wounding between 11 and 25 civilians, and damaging both buses. No group claimed responsibility. On 24 August 2009, in Mingaora, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, assailants fired upon and killed 15 civilians. No group claimed responsibility. On 25 August 2009, at about 7:00 PM, in Kandahar, Kandahar, Afghanistan, assailants detonated five vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) targeting the local headquarters of a Japanese construction company, killing 23 contractors (20 Pakistani; several Afghani), 14 civilians, several children, and one humanitarian worker; wounding 62 civilians and several children; and damaging 40 shops, dozens of residences, and the

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company headquarters. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsibility. On 26 August 2009, in the morning, in Gran Rosario, near Tumaco, Narino, Colombia, armed assailants broke into a residence, then fired upon the occupants who were members of the Awa tribe, killing seven civilians and five children, wounding one civilian and one child, and damaging the house. No group claimed responsibility, although authorities believed the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was responsible. On or before 26 August 2009, in the Baish Banr area, in Manglaur, NorthWest Frontier, Pakistan, assailants attacked civilians by unknown means, killing 29 civilians. No group claimed responsibility. On 29 August 2009, at about 8:00 AM, in Ash Sharqat, Salah ad Din, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near a police station, killing between five and nine police officers, between two and five civilians, and one child; wounding between 13 and 19 police officers and between seven and nine civilians; and damaging one police station, 16 vehicles, and 20 stores. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 30 August 2009, in Mingaora, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber infiltrated a yard on the grounds of a police station where police trainees were gathered and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing 16 police officers, injuring 11 others, and damaging the police station. No group claimed responsibility.

September On 2 September 2009, at 10:30 AM, in Mehtar Lam, Laghman, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in front of the main mosque, killing 12 civilians, three government officials, several tribal elders, several religious scholars, and two security guards; wounding 48 civilians, several tribal elders, and several religious scholars; and damaging several government vehicles. The Taliban claimed responsibility. Between 5 September 2009 and 6 September 2009, overnight, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortars at the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops and a government checkpoint, prompting retaliatory fire. In the ensuing crossfire, mortars and bullets hit

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populated locations, killing at least three civilians, several children, and four other people, wounding at least 18 civilians, and damaging at least one house. No group claimed responsibility. On 6 September 2009, in Zuwaybi, Al Jawf, Yemen, armed assailants fired upon a community, killing many civilians and many children and damaging several residences. No group claimed responsibility, but it was believed that Huthist rebels were responsible. Between 10 September 2009 and 16 September 2009, in the villages of Bangadi, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Doromo, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants conducted a series of attacks, killing 12 civilians and 28 people by unknown means and kidnapping 30 civilians and 17 people. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 10 September 2009, at about 12:30 AM, in Wardak, Ninawa, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in a Kurdish village, killing 24 civilians and children and one Peshmerga paramilitary member, wounding between 13 and 41 civilians and children and two Peshmerga paramilitary members, and damaging 60 homes. A second suicide VBIED bomber subsequently attempted to attack the same village, but was shot and killed by Peshmerga militiamen before he could detonate his explosives. Other Peshmerga members found and safely defused a second VBIED. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed that the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 11 September 2009, in Chowreh, Oruzgan, Afghanistan, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting civilian vehicles, killing 11 civilians and three children and damaging two vehicles. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 11 September 2009, in Dur Baba, Nangarhar, Afghanistan, assailants attacked a police checkpoint by unknown means, killing 12 police officers, wounding three others, and damaging the checkpoint. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 11 September 2009, in the evening, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, assailants fired mortars at the city port but instead hit the local jail and a disabled veterans housing facility, killing 15 civilians, wounding 21 civilians, and damaging the jail and the veteran housing. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed that al-Shabaab al-Islamiya was responsible.

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On 12 September 2009, in Farah, Afghanistan, assailants fired upon a convoy carrying power supply equipment and food, killing nine soldiers (7 Afghan; 2 American) and two Water and Energy Department employees, wounding 12 soldiers, and damaging three military vehicles. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. On 17 September 2009, at noon, in Kabul, Kabol, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) convoy and detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing 10 civilians and six Italian soldiers, injuring 55 people and four Italian soldiers, and damaging eight vehicles, many buildings, many offices, and and many residences. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 17 September 2009, at about 11:30 AM, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, five suicide bombers detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) enclosed in United Nations (UN) vehicles nearly simultaneously at different locations on the Xalane African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base, killing 16 peacekeepers (12 Burundian; 4 Ugandan), several Senior Somali military officers, one civilian, and the deputy commander of the national police force; wounding at least three Senior Somali military officers, at least 21 peacekeepers, one American security employee, and 14 people; damaging the AMISOM headquarters and one building housing Dyncorp operations; and destroying the two stolen UN vehicles. The first VBIED targeted the AMISOM headquarters building where a high-profile meeting was taking place, and the second VBIED detonated on the Dyncorp compound. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility. On 18 September 2009, in Uztarzai, Kohat, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a public market near a hotel and detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing 40 civilians, injuring 80 others, and damaging the hotel, at least 49 shops, and 16 vehicles. Lashkar i Jhangvi claimed responsibility. Between 22 September 2009 and 23 September 2009, overnight, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortars and rocketpropelled grenades (RPG) at the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop bases, prompting retaliatory fire. In the ensuing crossfire, mortars hit populated locations, killing at least eight civilians and four people, wounding at least 17 civilians, and damaging several houses. The Islamic Party claimed responsibility. On 25 September 2009, in Dingba, Ango, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed assailants assaulted the village, killing 22 civilians with

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machetes and knives and kidnapping nearly a dozen people. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 26 September 2009, at noon, in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber threw a grenade and then detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in front of a bank, killing 11 civilians, wounding 94 others, and damaging 100 businesses, 100 shops, 49 vehicles, and the bank. No group claimed responsibility. On 26 September 2009, at 7:00 AM, in Bannu, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in front of a police station, killing seven civilians, five police officers, and one child; wounding 40 civilians, 31 police officers, and nine children; and damaging the police station. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 29 September 2009, at about 9:00 AM, in Maywand, Kandahar, Afghanistan, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded when it was struck by a passenger bus, killing 20 civilians and 10 children, injuring 39 civilians and children, and destroying the bus. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible. Between 30 September 2009 and 6 October 2009, in villages in and around Dingba, Ango, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed assailants attacked communities by unknown means, killing 26 people. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible.

October On 1 October 2009, at about 7:00 AM, in Chisimayu, Jubbada Hoose, Somalia, armed assailants from al-Shabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party fired upon one another with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and light weapons. In the crossfire, mortars and bullets hit populated locations, killing 28 civilians and wounding 120 others. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party both claimed responsibility for the fighting, but neither claimed responsibility for killing the civilians. On 5 October 2009, in the Bhimajuli area of Sonapur, Assam, India, assailants entered the village and fired upon civilians, killing 15 civilians and wounding six others. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) was responsible.

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On 8 October 2009, at 8:30 AM, in Kabul, Kabol, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near the outer wall of the Indian Embassy, killing 17 police officers and civilians, injuring at least 83 police officers and civilians, and damaging the embassy, many vehicles, many residences, and many shops. The Indian embassy was located near Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, which was also damaged. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 8 October 2009, in Gadchiroli, Maharashtra, India, assailants fired upon a police patrol, killing 17 police officers and wounding three others. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed a Maoist faction was responsible. On 9 October 2009, in the morning, in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber approached two passenger buses at the busy Khyber Bazaar and detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing 46 Pakistani and Afghan civilians and eight Pakistani and Afghan children, injuring at least 166 Pakistani and Afghan civilians and children, and damaging the two buses, approximately 60 shops, 20 vehicles, and a bus stop. No group claimed responsibility. On 10 October 2009, in Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan, assailants wearing army uniforms fired grenades and small arms upon a Pakistan Army headquarters checkpoint, killing at least six soldiers and damaging the checkpoint. Then, the assailants entered the headquarters compound and the headquarters building, where they held up to 40 civilians and military personnel hostage. On 11 October 2009, following a 22-hour standoff with the perpetrators, the Pakistan Army conducted a siege and exchanged gunfire with the assailants, killing two civilians and two soldiers, wounding five soldiers, and damaging the military building in the crossfire. Authorities rescued the hostages after the siege. Several of the assailants detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) strapped to their bodies to avoid capture, causing no further injuries. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 11 October 2009, at about 12:30 PM, in Ar Ramadi, Al Anbar, Iraq, assailants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in a parking lot near the Al Anbar Provincial Government building, followed approximately seven minutes later by a second VBIED in the same parking lot targeting first responders, killing 10 civilians and seven police officers, wounding 77 civilians, and damaging 30 vehicles. At about 1:20 PM, security personnel manning a checkpoint fired upon an assailant, causing the suicide bomber to detonate a VBIED near the Ar Ramadi General Hospital, where most of the evacuated casualties from the initial explosions had been brought,

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killing two police officers, wounding four others, and damaging the checkpoint. No group claimed responsibility, but authorities believed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible based on the tactics employed. On 11 October 2009, in Churchuru, Tachira, Venezuela, armed assailants kidnapped 12 civilian soccer players who were in the midst of a soccer match. On 25 October 2009, in Tachira, Venezuela, the bodies of 10 victims were found bearing gunshot wounds. A few days later, another body was found. One victim survived a gun shot wound to the neck. No group claimed responsibility, although authorities believed the National Liberation Army (ELN) was responsible. On 12 October 2009, at 11:00 AM, in Shangla, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting two military vehicles, killing 38 civilians, four soldiers, and three police officers, wounding 46 civilians and 10 soldiers, and damaging 12 shops and seven vehicles. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 15 October 2009, between 9:00 AM and 9:30 AM, in Manawan, Punjab, Pakistan, suicide bombers detonated improvised explosive devices (IED), fired small arms, and threw grenades at three different police installations, killing 12 police officers and nine civilians, wounding 50 police officers, and damaging all three police installations. In the first attack, at 9:10 AM, suicide bombers fired small arms, threw grenades, and detonated several IEDs targeting the Manawan Police Training School, killing nine police officers and one civilian, wounding 50 police officers, and damaging the police school. In the second attack, at 9:25 AM, one would-be suicide bomber fired small arms and threw grenades at the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) Provincial Headquarters, killing two police officers and seven civilians and damaging the headquarters. The would-be suicide bomber was killed by police officers before he could detonate his IED. In the third attack, at 9:30 AM, three suicide bombers fired small arms, threw grenades, and detonated three IEDs targeting the Elite Force Headquarters, killing one police officer and one civilian, taking hostage several civilians, and damaging the headquarters. Later the same day, police officers safely rescued the hostages. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 15 October 2009, in Kohat, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near a police station, killing eight civilians and three police officers, wounding 15 civilians, four police officers, and several children, and damaging the police

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station, seven civilian vehicles, and one police vehicle. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 16 October 2009, at about noon, in Tall 'Afar, Ninawa, Iraq, an armed suicide bomber attacked the Sunni Al Taqwa Mosque during Friday noon prayer services, firing upon and killing the mosque imam and one investigative judge. Then, the suicide bomber detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) he was wearing, killing 13 civilians and children, wounding between 80 and 98 civilians, and damaging the mosque. No group claimed responsibility, but authorities suspected the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was responsible. On 16 October 2009, at about 12:45 PM, in Cantonement, Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber approached the Police Criminal Investigative Agency building and detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing 10 civilians, three police officers, and two children; injuring 25 police officers, civilians, and children; and damaging the police building, a mosque on the premises, and several other nearby buildings. No group claimed responsibility. On 18 October 2009, in Pishin, Sistan va Baluchestan, Iran, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) vest in a marketplace, killing 20 senior commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and 37 civilians, wounding 150 civilians, and damaging the marketplace. Jundullah claimed responsibility. On 23 October 2009, at 1:45 PM, in Mohmand, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan, a landmine exploded when it was struck by a bus, killing 15 civilians and several children, wounding six civilians, and damaging the bus. No group claimed responsibility. On or about 24 October 2009, in Kiseguru, Nord-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants attacked the checkpoint at Kiseguru by unknown means, killing 10 civilians, wounding several others, and damaging several vehicles. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) was responsible. The FDLR denied responsibility. On 25 October 2009, at about 10:30 AM, in the Al Karkh district of Baghdad, Iraq, two suicide bombers near-simultaneously detonated vehicleborne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) outside the Ministry of Justice and the Baghdad Provincial Administration buildings in the central As Salihiyah neighborhood, killing 70 government employees, between 34 and 57 civilians, 24 children, and four Iraqi soldiers; wounding between 498 and 707 government employees and civilians (705 Iraqi; 2 Chinese), between six and 10 children, and three private security contractors; and damaging three

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government buildings (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, and Baghdad Provincial Administration), several water main pipes, one hotel, one embassy, and 156 vehicles. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 26 October 2009, at about 3:00 PM, in Karbala', Karbala', Iraq, assailants detonated a improvised explosive device (IED) attached to a minibus at a police checkpoint, killing between one and three police officers and between two and nine people, wounding five police officers, between one and seven people, and two children, and damaging the police checkpoint and the minibus. No group claimed responsibility. On 28 October 2009, at about 1:00 PM, in People's Mandi, Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, assailants detonated a remote-controlled vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at the crowded Mina Bazaar market, killing 117 civilians and children, injuring 200 others, and damaging at least 50 shops, 50 vehicles, many residences, many buildings, and a nearby mosque. No group claimed responsibility. On 28 October 2009, in the morning, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortars at the Mogadishu International Airport as the President of Somalia's flight arrived, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) headquarters, and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in Hodan district, prompting retaliatory fire. In the ensuing crossfire, mortars and bullets hit populated locations, killing at least three civilians and seven people and wounding at least 11 civilians and 12 people and destroying one AMISOM tank. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya claimed responsibility.

November On 2 November 2009, at about 10:40 AM, in Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan, a suicide bomber threw a grenade and detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in front of a National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) branch, killing 31 civilians, four soldiers, and three children; wounding 54 civilians and nine soldiers; and damaging many vehicles, several offices, one hotel, and the bank. No group claimed responsibility. On 5 November 2009, at 1:30 PM, in Fort Hood, Texas, United States, an armed assailant entered the Fort Hood Soldier Readiness Processing Center and opened fire, killing one civilian and 12 soldiers, wounding seven civilians, 17 soldiers, and 18 people, and damaging the facility. Civilian police officers

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from Fort Hood's Department of Emergency Services (DES) responded and the assailant fired upon them, wounding one police officer. No group claimed responsibility, although authorities believed an unaffiliated Sunni extremist was responsible. On 9 November 2009, at about 9:45 AM, in Adezai Village, Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber approached a crowd of people at a cattle market and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing 11 civilians, one government official, and one child; injuring 44 civilians and children; and damaging six vehicles, six shops, and killing 12 cattle. The TTP claimed responsibility. On 10 November 2009, in the afternoon, in Charsadda, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a crowded market on Farooq-e-Azam Chowkat, killing 27 civilians and seven children, injuring at least 100 civilians and children, and damaging many shops, four vehicles, and two passenger buses. The explosion also knocked down electrical wires. No group claimed responsibility. Between 13 November 2009 and 14 November 2009, overnight, in Dungu, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants attacked the Ngilima and Nongo localities by unknown means, killing eight civilians, two soldiers, and three people. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 13 November 2009, at 6:45 AM, in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) inside a military checkpoint in front of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) regional headquarters building, killing seven soldiers, seven ISI employees, and three civilians; wounding 11 ISI employees and 69 soldiers and civilians; damaging the headquarters building, the military checkpoint, one school, many vehicles, and several military and civilian offices. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 13 November 2009, at 7:15 AM, in Bannu, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a police station, killing nine police officers, two soldiers, three civilians, and one child; wounding 15 police officers, two civilians, and four soldiers; and damaging the police station and several vehicles. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 14 November 2009, at about 4:30 PM, in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a police checkpoint, killing seven

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civilians, four children, and one police officer; wounding 35 police officers and civilians; and damaging the checkpoint, seven vehicles, and many homes and shops. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 16 November 2009, at 11:00 AM, in Tagab, Kapisa, Afghanistan, armed assailants fired two rockets into a crowded market where tribal leaders were meeting with French military forces, killing 12 Afghan civilians, injuring at least 38 others and five French soldiers, and damaging the market. No group claimed responsibility. On 16 November 2009, at about 1:30 AM, near Abu Ghurayb, Al Anbar, Iraq, assailants wearing Iraqi Army uniforms and utilizing eight sport-utility vehicles (SUV) kidnapped and later fired upon and killed 12 civilians and children and one local Iraqi Islamic Party local leader who was also the imam of a nearby mosque. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 18 November 2009, in Sha'riyah, Janub Darfur, Sudan, assailants attacked members of the Al-Burgud Tribe by unknown means, killing 13 civilians, wounding three others, and kidnapping five others. No group claimed responsibility, although it was believed the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM) was responsible. On 19 November 2009, in Deh Rawod, Oruzgan, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body at a crowded shopping bazaar, killing eight civilians and two children, injuring eight civilians and two children, and damaging the bazaar. No group claimed responsibility. On 19 November 2009, at about 10:20 AM, in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, on Khyber Road, a suicide bomber approached the main gate of the Judicial Complex and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing 17 civilians and three police officers, injuring 50 people, and damaging many vehicles, several nearby buildings, and the complex gate. No group claimed responsibility. On 20 November 2009, at 9:30 AM, in Farah, Farah, Afghanistan, at a busy public square, a suicide bomber detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near a police post, killing 18 civilians, two police officers, and one government employee; injuring 22 civilians and police officers and eight children; and damaging the police post and the square. No group claimed responsibility. On 22 November 2009, in Djema, Haut-Mbomou, Central African Republic, 40 armed assailants attacked the village with guns, machetes and clubs, killing 12 people and kidnapping two government officials and at least two civilians. The assailants also set fire to and damaged several houses and

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looted at least two shops. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible. On 22 November 2009, at about 5:00 PM, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortars at Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop bases, prompting retaliatory fire. In the ensuing crossfire, mortars and bullets hit populated locations, killing at least 14 civilians, wounding at least 20 civilians, and damaging several houses. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party both claimed responsibility. On 23 November 2009, at about 9:30 AM, in Ampatuan, Maguindanao, Philippines, approximately 100 armed men stopped a five-vehicle convoy of civilians, journalists, and support staff en route to file a certificate of candidacy (COC) for a prospective candidate for the office of provincial governor, plus one additional vehicle believed by the assailants to belong to the convoy and held the occupants hostage. The assailants then fired upon the convoy and the additional vehicle, killing 13 of the prospective candidate's female family members, 34 journalists, nine political support staff members (2 lawyers; 6 drivers; 1 business supervisor), and six civilians, and damaging all six vehicles. On or about 23 November 2009, in or around Datu Abdullah Sangki, Maguindanao, Philippines, the assailants kidnapped, then fired upon and killed a backhoe operator and one other unidentified person. Authorities stated the backhoe operator and other person may have been killed in order to prevent them from appearing as witnesses to the armed attack. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed Ampatuan clan members and persons loyal to them were responsible. The Ampatuan clan denied responsibility and suggested the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) may have been responsible. The MILF denied responsibility. On 24 November 2009, in the morning, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortars at an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop base, prompting retaliatory fire by AMISOM backed by Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) troops. In the ensuing crossfire, mortars and bullets hit populated locations, killing 14 civilians, peacekeepers, and soldiers and wounding 15 civilians, peacekeepers, and soldiers. The Islamic Party claimed responsibility. On 27 November 2009, at 9:34 PM, near Bologoye, Tverskaya Oblast', Russia, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded on a section of railway tracks as the Nevsky Express train was passing by, killing 39 civilians, wounding 95 others, and damaging the train and a section of the tracks. Caucasus Emirate claimed responsibility.

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Between 29 November 2009 and 30 November 2009, overnight, in Nepopo village, Dungu, Orientale, Democratic Republic of the Congo, assailants attacked the village by unknown means, killing 10 civilians, wounding several others, and kidnapping several children. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible.

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December On 3 December 2009, in the morning, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, a suicide bomber walked into the Shamo Hotel and detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) during a graduation ceremony for Banaadir University, killing 18 students, four government ministers (3 Somali; 1 American), three journalists, at least one professor, and at least one doctor; wounding six journalists, one government minister, 26 students, three doctors and a dozen people; and damaging the hotel. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed al-Shabaab al-Islamiya was responsible. Al-Shabaab alIslamiya denied responsibility. On 4 December 2009, at about 1:15 PM, in Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan, a group of assailants, including suicide bombers, threw grenades, fired small arms, and detonated four improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting a mosque used by military personnel and their families, killing 17 children, 13 soldiers, and 10 civilians; wounding 86 children, soldiers, and civilians; and damaging the mosque and several nearby buildings. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. On 7 December 2009, at 8:45 PM, in Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan, at the Moon Market in Allama Iqbal Town, two suicide bombers near-simultaneously detonated the improvised explosive devices (IED) strapped to their bodies, killing 61 civilians and nine children, injuring 180 civilians and children, and damaging dozens of vehicles, several shops, several buildings, a police station, and a bank. No group claimed responsibility. On 7 December 2009, in Peshawar, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, on Sher Shah Suri Road, a suicide bomber approached the entrance of the sessions court and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing eight civilians, two police officers, and one government employee; injuring 50 people; and damaging at least 10 vehicles, several nearby buildings, and the court entrance. No group claimed responsibility.

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On 8 December 2009, at 10:00 AM, in the Rashid district of Baghdad, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a police checkpoint in the southern Durah neighborhood near the Baghdad Technical Institute, killing three police officers and 12 students, wounding between five and 23 students and civilians, and damaging the checkpoint and several vehicles. Approximately 30 minutes later, three suicide VBIEDs exploded within minutes of each other near the New Finance Ministry and Labor and Social Affairs Ministry buildings in the central Shorja neighborhood in the Ar Rusafa district, near the Nida'a Mosque on Palestine Street in the northern Al Qahirah neighborhood of the 'Azamiyah district, and near the Karkh Civil Court building in the Al Karkh district, killing 112 government employees and civilians, wounding between 425 and 490 government employees and civilians, and damaging dozens of vehicles, several police vehicles, three government buildings, three houses, and a public market. Thirty-four of the total fatalities occurred at the New Finance Ministry bombing. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. On 8 December 2009, at noon, in Qasim Bela, Multan, Punjab, Pakistan, a group of suicide bombers approached the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency's building, fired small arms and rockets at the checkpoint, then detonated their vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing eight civilians and four soldiers, injuring 30 civilians, soldiers, and children, and damaging the checkpoint, the ISI building, and several other nearby buildings. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On 14 December 2009, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortars at the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop base at Jaalle Siyad, prompting retaliatory fire by AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) troops. In the ensuing crossfire, mortars and bullets hit populated locations, killing at least 12 civilians, several peacekeepers, and several soldiers and wounding at least eight civilians and seven people. Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya and the Islamic Party claimed responsibility.

On 15 December 2009, at 2:45 PM, in Dera Ghazi Khan, Punjab, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting the home of a government official, killing 30 civilians and several children, wounding 90 civilians, and damaging the home of the government official, scores of shops, scores of vehicles, many other

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homes, several buildings, two banks, and one mosque. The government official was not injured. No group claimed responsibility. On 18 December 2009, at about 1:30 PM, in Timurgara, North-West Frontier, Pakistan, a suicide bomber detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near a mosque next to a police station, killing 10 civilians and two children, injuring 20 civilians and children and 12 police officers, and damaging the mosque, the police compound, and five vehicles. No group claimed responsibility. On 24 December 2009, between 1:20 PM and 1:30 PM, in Al Hillah, Babil, Iraq, assailants detonated a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) outside a bus station, then 25 minutes later detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the same area, killing 11 civilians and between five and 14 police officers, wounding between 70 and 75 civilians and 35 police officers, and damaging the bus station. No group claimed responsibility. On 24 December 2009, at about 6:00 PM, in Mogadishu, Banaadir, Somalia, armed assailants fired mortars at Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop bases, prompting retaliatory fire. In the ensuing crossfire, mortars and bullets hit populated locations, killing at least 10 civilians and five people, wounding at least 25 civilians and five people, and damaging several houses. The Islamic Party claimed responsibility. On 27 December 2009, at about 6:30 PM, in Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, in front of the Markazi mosque on CMH Road, a suicide bomber detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body during a Shiite religious procession, killing seven civilians and three police officers, injuring 80 civilians and police officers, and damaging the mosque and several shops and vehicles. No group claimed responsibility. On 28 December 2009, at about 4:10 PM, in Karachi, Sindh, Pakistan, on MA Jinnah Road, a suicide bomber joined a Shiite Muslim procession and detonated the improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to his body, killing 39 civilians and four children, injuring 83 civilians and children, and damaging many shops and vehicles. No group claimed responsibility. On 30 December 2009, between 9:30 AM and 10:10 AM, in Ar Ramadi, Al Anbar, Iraq, a possible suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a security checkpoint near the provincial government building; then approximately thirty minutes later, as the provincial governor went to survey the scene, a suicide bomber approached and detonated an improvised explosive device (IED), killing between 24 and

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29 civilians and police officers and one provincial council member, wounding between 54 and 102 civilians and police officers, two provincial council members, and one governor, and damaging the security checkpoint and 20 vehicles. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility. To: NCTC From: Brian Forst Date: March 12, 2010 Re: Afterword to the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism for 2010: Challenges, Accomplishments, and Prospects

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INTRODUCTION The National Counterterrorism Center deserves high praise for its work to expand our understanding of terrorism. Since the 17th and 18th century era of Enlightenment, humans have learned -- often slowly and painfully -- to overcome counterproductive impulsive responses to threats to their security by engaging instead in a process of creative and systematic reflection based on analysis of the evidence. Courage on the battlefield was indispensable in the Allied victory over Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, but victory was attributable in no small part as well to the enlightened analysis of data. It turns out that bravery is much more effective when it is deployed intelligently. The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) data reflect the same preference for understanding over primal impulses that can produce much graver threats to security than the things initially feared. The NCTC mission statement paves the way for such an approach to thinking about terrorism and developing effective counterterrorism strategy: "Lead our nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort."

Barriers to Orderly Understanding of Terrorism Criminologists have been stymied since long before World War II -- at least since the time of Cesare Lombroso -- by the problem of understanding the causes of aggression generally. The controversy still rages between the

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respective roles of nature and nurture, poverty and peers, urban, family, and personal stressors, and so on, but we do know much more today about importance of these influences and interactions among them than we did a century ago. This story of the evolution of thinking offers seeds of hope for an enlightened understanding of terrorism. The challenges presented by terrorism are in many ways more formidable than those presented by conventional crime. For one thing, while terrorism cases share the property of having a political motive, terrorism cases are in a kettle that contains a stew of cases that vary by type of extremism (Islamic, Christian fundamentalist, environmental, anti-globalization, etc.), whether connected to a larger network, extent of planning, type of attack (assassination, hostage taking, mass killing, etc.), ideological justification, nature of the target, weapon of choice, lethality, and other distinctive factors. These various subcategories of terrorism are as diverse as the major crime categories are different from one another. Terrorism is difficult to analyze empirically for a second reason: terrorists, to a greater extent than other criminals, tend to operate in unpredictable ways, aiming to create fear and turmoil. They rely on surprise to achieve both, striving to defy deterrence interventions. When terrorist screening protocols used in the months after the 9/11 attack ignored women as suicide bombers, terrorists responded by enlisting women to participate in suicide bombing. Terrorists tend to operate intentionally outside of predictable patterns to exploit elements of fear and uncertainty, so such patterns are less likely to show up in the data. In the case of terrorism, it may well be that the only thing that can be safely predicted is that successful acts of terrorism will continue to surprise us, even if infrequently. Terrorism is more difficult to analyze than other crimes for yet another reason: we do not have enough reliable data on cases of each major type of terrorism to provide a basis for statistical inference along the lines that parallel the analysis of conventional criminal justice data. That there have been too few terrorist cases on American soil to permit empirical analysis is a blessing for those of us who care first and foremost about the well-being of our children and grandchildren, but it is a curse for empirically oriented analysts interested in understanding terrorism. Open source data, which track terrorist incidents worldwide, are a beginning in the development of such analysis, but the relationship between cases reported in the open source arena and actual terrorist incidents remains largely unknown. Newspaper reporter Lincoln Steffens's (1931) remarkable account of creating the strong impression of a crime wave in New York solely by aggressively reporting ordinary crime

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incidents he had previously regarded as unworthy of coverage is a cautionary tale against temptations to put too much reliance on open source data. Nonetheless, the NCTC data sets provide a vital starting point to overcome barriers that impede useful empirical analysis for the prevention of terrorism.

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Prospects for an Understanding of Terrorism through Empirical Analysis That terrorism is more difficult to analyze than crime is no cause for despair. The prospects for our understanding of terrorism through the analysis of data maintained by the NCTC and other sources are considerable. The challenge is to see how the data can be improved and the analysis shaped to help us develop sound policies for preventing terrorism and responding to it when our efforts at prevention fail. The NCTC maintains data on the lethality of terrorism incidents (number of people killed) and the frequency of attacks annually by country, as well as data on the frequency of attacks committed by terrorist groups and longevity of each group. The distributions of these critical factors are more than interesting: they offer clear suggestions for the allocation of security resources. More can be done to establish the strongest predictors of each of these factors. One way to organize our thinking about how to establish the causal drivers behind these factors is through the development of coherent theoretical models, toward the goal of preventing terrorism. Several such models have clear relevance to the prevention of terrorism. (For more on these models, see Forst, 2009) The routine activities theory (or opportunity theory) gives us one such model. Opportunities for terrorism and other predatory crimes can exist only when there are willing offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of adequate guardianship to protect the targets from attacks. (Cohen and Felson, 1979) If any of these three components is absent or unmet for a particular situation, there will be no opportunity for terrorism. This theory has particular relevance for the development of commonsense situational controls in determining how to allocate scarce guardianship resources toward the prevention of crime -even in the absence of valid empirical estimates. On the willing offenders side, it has implications for a focus on the surveillance of extremists and the targeting of individuals and groups known to have ties with terrorists. Such analysis might begin with NCTC data or similar data maintained under the University of Maryland's START project, or by the RAND Corporation.

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Routine activities theory can offer insights as well into the development of a system of weights to assign to the allocation of target hardening and protective resources to accessible targets, in order to maximize the effectiveness of these resources. (Clarke and Newman, 2006) After the 9/11 attack, the United States has been much more diligent than before in tracking willing offenders, hardening targets, and creating guardianship. It may be no coincidence that several years have passed without a major attack. Still, the mix appears to be driven by factors that are often more political than rational, and analysts may be able to bring these problems to light and pave the way for more efficient allocations. Another model, which can be used in conjunction with the routine activities theory, is provided by the theory of games: the idea of a mixed strategy. (Luce and Raiffa, 1989; Enders and Sandler, 2006) From the guardian's perspective, the terrorist will have the most difficulty anticipating the likelihood of detection and capture if security agents and surveillance instruments are allocated randomly across the array of vulnerable targets in proportion to the value that the terrorist attaches to each prospective target, taking into account the cost to the terrorist of attacking each target. This randomized strategy will apply primarily to the allocation of personnel and other movable resources, although fixed protective resources such as barricades and other target-hardening capital resources should also be allocated in proportion to the value of the target, but in a fixed rather than random manner. Randomized and other strategies for preventing terrorist attacks can be assessed under a variety of scenarios by applying simulation gaming models. This analytic approach has proven useful in developing military strategies for dealing with both conventional (as in World War II) and unconventional combat operations, including insurgency and guerrilla warfare. (Myerson, 1997) It could prove equally useful for assessing alternative approaches to protecting any prospective target against threats posed by terrorism.

Conclusion I opened this afterword by recalling successes of World War II attributable to the enlightened analysis of data. The NCTC's own John Wigle, Chief of the Worldwide Incidents Team, has recommended, along a similar line (2009): "(A)n interdisciplinary team with operations research and social science experience -- using a suite of systems tools to collect, organize, analyze, and

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present data -- will most likely achieve the combination required for success" (p. 609). Reliance on an organized, thoughtful, and empirically informed approach will not prevent all future acts of terrorism. But such an approach can substantially reduce the risk of failures in our ongoing attempts to prevent terrorism.

REFERENCES [1] [2]

[3] [4]

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[5] [6] [7] [8]

Ronald V. Clarke & Graeme R. Newman. (2006). Outsmarting the Terrorists (Praeger,) Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson. (1979). "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach," American Sociological Review, Volume 44, pp. 588-608 Brian Forst, (2009). Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press) R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa. (1989). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (Mineola, NY: Dover) Walter Enders & Todd Sandler. (2006). The Political Economy of Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press) Roger B. Myerson. (1997). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) Lincoln Steffens. (1931). The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Grosset & Dunlop) John Wigle. (2009). "A Systemic Approach to Precursor Behaviors," Criminology & Public Policy, Volume 8, Number 3, pp. 607-621

End Notes 1

―ICN 200574834.‖ Online posting. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System. Last updated, 3/31/2010. National Counterterrorism Center. 4/29/2010 .

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Chapter 3

STATEMENT OF MR. RUSSELL TRAVER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION SHARING AND KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HEARING ON “SHARING AND ANALYZING INFORMATION TO PREVENT TERRORISM” STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD March 24, 2010 Committee on the Judiciary Sharing and Analyzing Information to Prevent Terrorism Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee: Thank you for your invitation to appear before the committee to discuss terrorist screening procedures in light of the attempted terrorist attack on Christmas Day. It is my privilege to be accompanied by my colleagues from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Departments of State and Homeland Security.

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Watchlisting Issues Associated with the Incident Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was not watchlisted. This statement will explain the reasons why – addressing the post 9/11 changes in U.S.Government watchlisting practices, the associated standards that were adopted by the U.S. Government, and the application of those standards to the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. It will also address lessons learned as we strive to improve the Intelligence Community‘s ability to support watchlisting and screening. 

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

Before the September 11 terrorist attacks, intelligence databases and watchlisting systems were badly disjointed. They were neither interoperable nor broadly accessible and, as a result, two of the hijackers – although known to parts of the U.S. Government in late1999, were not watchlisted until late-August 2001. To fix that systemic problem, the U.S. Government implemented Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6) in the Fall of 2003. Under the construct of HSPD-6, all collectors would provide information on known and suspected terrorists (except purely domestic terrorists) to NCTC which maintains a TOP SECRET database called the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). Every night a FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY extract of TIDE is provided to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to support all U.S. Government screening operations.  The determination of what information is passed from TIDE to the TSC is governed by the ―reasonable suspicion‖ standard which describes the minimum derogatory information for inclusion on the consolidated watchlist.  That criteria, approved by the Deputies Committee in the Fall of 2008, notes that ―individuals described as militants, extremists, jihadists, etc should not be nominated without particularized derogatory information.‖  The implementing instructions further state ―those who only associate with known or suspected terrorists, but have done nothing to support terrorism‖ are ineligible for the No Fly List (NFL) or Selectee List (SL).

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Mr. Abdulmutallab was in TIDE, but his name was not passed to the TSC for watchlisting. This was due to two factors:

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



The TIDE record that existed on Mr. Abdulmutallab was based primarily on information provided to the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria on November 20, 2009. The cable included one general sentence of derogatory information related to his possible association with Yemeni-based extremists. The entire watchlisting community agrees that the level of derogatory information contained in the November 20, 2009 cable did not meet the minimum standard highlighted above and was insufficient for any level of watchlisting--much less either the No Fly List or Selectee lists.  As a result, Mr. Abdulmutallab was entered into TIDE November 23, 2009, but his name was not passed to the TSC for watchlisting. Additional biographic information was added to the record over the course of the next week, but no additional derogatory information was provided.  In order to provide some context, on any given day hundreds of other names are added to TIDE and virtually all of them would have far more alerting derogatory information than Mr. Abdulmutallab‘s record. While the November 20, 2009 cable formed the basis for the TIDE record and the watchlisting status as of December 25, 2009, we learned after the incident of additional reporting that---had it been linked to the November 20, 2009 cable---could have supported a watchlisting nomination.  Had this information been linked to Mr. Abdulmutallab‘s record, his name undoubtedly would have been entered on the visa screening ―lookout‖ list and the border inspection list.  Whether Mr. Abdulmutallab would have been placed on either the No Fly List or the Selectee List would have been determined by the strength of the analytic judgment.  It is important to note that the linkage of these pieces of information appears far more apparent in hindsight than it would have at the time. The reporting existed in daily intelligence holdings that number well into the thousands. Partial names and different spellings complicated the linkage. To be sure, the Intelligence Community continues its efforts to improve performance, but linking two pieces of fragmentary information

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Russell Traver can be a very difficult analytic problem. The two cables existed largely ―in the noise‖ and there was simply nothing particularly alerting about either ―dot.‖

Lessons Learned 

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

First of all, it is necessary to dispel two myths:  This situation doesn‘t implicate the HSPD-6 watchlisting architecture. The National Counterterrorism Center continues to believe it is fundamentally sound.  This incident does not raise major information sharing issues. The key derogatory information was widely shared across the U.S. Counterterrorism Community. The ―dots‖ simply were not connected. The incident does highlight the following issues:  The U.S. Government needs to look at overall standards---those required to get on watchlists in general, and the No Fly List and Selectee List in particular.  The U.S. Government needs to improve its overall ability to piece together partial, fragmentary information from multiple collectors. This requirement gets beyond watchlisting support, and is a very complicated challenge involving both numbers of analysts and the use of technology to correlate vast amounts of information housed in multiple agencies and systems.

The men and women of the National Counterterrorism Center and the Intelligence Community are committed to fighting terrorism at home and abroad, and will seek every opportunity to better our analytical tradecraft, more aggressively pursue those that plan and perpetrate acts of terrorism, and effectively enhance the criteria used to keep known or suspected terrorists out of the United States.

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Chapter 4

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY J. HEALY, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HEARING ON “SHARING AND ANALYZING INFORMATION TO PREVENT TERRORISM” Good morning Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member Smith and members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and its role in the interagency watchlisting process. The attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, highlights the ever-present terrorist threat to our homeland. Over the past seven years, the TSC has played a vital role in the fight against terrorism by integrating terrorist information from the law enforcement and intelligence communities into a single database known as the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which populates the various terrorist screening systems used by the Government. Following the Christmas Day attempted attack intense scrutiny has been placed on the requirements to nominate individuals to the watchlist and particularly to the No Fly and Selectee lists, which are subsets of the TSDB. These requirements, or standards, have evolved over time based on the experience of the watchlisting community and the issuance of additional Presidential Directives. Throughout this process, the TSC has remained

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committed to protecting the American public from terrorist threats while simultaneously protecting privacy and safeguarding civil liberties. As our efforts continue to evolve in response to new threats and intelligence, your support provides us with the tools necessary to continue our mission. Let me begin by telling you about the Terrorist Watchlisting process and how this process related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

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TERRORIST NOMINATION PROCESS The TSDB, commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watchlist, contains both international and domestic terrorist information. The procedure for submitting information on individuals for inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist is referred to as the nomination process. The nomination process is the most fundamental and singularly important step in the watchlisting process. It is through this process that individuals are added to the Terrorist Watchlist. Nominations originate from credible information developed by our intelligence and law enforcement partners. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies are referred to as Originators in the watchlisting community because it is through their work that nominations are developed. Federal departments and agencies submit nominations of known or suspected international terrorists to the NCTC for inclusion in NCTC‘s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, which is the source of all international terrorist identifier information in the TSDB. NCTC reviews TIDE entries and nominates entries to TSC that include sufficient biographical or biometric identifiers and supporting derogatory information that meet the watchlisting standard described below. Similarly, the FBI collects, stores, and forwards to the TSC information relating to domestic terrorists that may not have connections to international terrorism. When submitting a nomination to NCTC, an Originator may, but is under no obligation to, submit recommendations regarding specific screening systems the nomination should be exported to (e.g., inclusion on either No Fly or Selectee list). If an Originator submits a nomination without a recommendation, NCTC may make an appropriate recommendation based on the totality of associated information. Recommendations made by NCTC will be passed to the TSC for final disposition. TSC accepts nominations when they satisfy two requirements. First, the biographic information associated with a nomination must contain sufficient

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identifying data so that a person being screened can be matched to or disassociated from a watchlisted terrorist. Second, the facts and circumstances pertaining to the nomination must meet the reasonable suspicion standard of review established by terrorist screening Presidential Directives. Reasonable suspicion requires articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the determination that an individual ―is known or suspected to be or has been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of or related to terrorism and terrorist activities.‖ The reasonable suspicion standard is based on the totality of the circumstances in order to account for the sometimes fragmentary nature of terrorist information. Due weight must be given to the reasonable inferences that a person can draw from the available facts. Mere guesses or inarticulate ―hunches‖ are not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. A TSC interagency group composed of members from the intelligence and law enforcement communities issued clarifying guidance to the watchlisting community in February 2009. TSC makes the final decision on whether a person meets the minimum requirements for inclusion into TSDB as a known or suspected terrorist and which screening systems will receive the information about that known or suspected terrorist. It is not uncommon for a nomination to have multiple recommendations throughout the watchlisting process. In the end, however, TSC works with NCTC and the Originators to ensure a nomination is exported to as many screening systems as the nomination information supports. The watchlisting and nomination process can best be described as a watchlisting enterprise because it requires constant collaboration between the Originators, NCTC, and TSC. NCTC relies upon the information provided by the intelligence and law enforcement community, TSC relies upon NCTC to analyze and provide accurate and credible information, and the screening community relies upon TSC to manage that information and to efficiently export it to their screening systems.

EXPORT TO SUPPORTED SYSTEMS Once a known or suspected terrorist is identified and included in the TSDB, TSC ensures the timely dissemination of the terrorist identity data to our screening partners. The utility of the watchlisting process is greatest when the information is efficiently disseminated to those who need it the most. The

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TSC‘s subject matter experts, who are composed of experienced analysts and designated agency representatives, review nominations to determine whether they meet the criteria for inclusion in the screening systems supported by the TSDB. The four major U.S. Government systems supported by the TSDB are: Department of State‘s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) for passport and visa screening; Department of Homeland Security‘s TECS system for border and port of entry screening; the No Fly and Selectee lists used by the Transportation Security Administration for air passenger screening; and the FBI‘s National Crime and Information Center‘s Known or Suspected Terrorist File (formerly known as the Violent Gang/Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF)) for domestic law enforcement screening. The criteria for inclusion in each of these systems are tailored to the mission, legal authorities, and information technology requirements of the department or agency that maintains the system. Accordingly, each of these systems contains a different subset of data from TSDB. The TSDB exports most pertinent to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab CLASS, TECS, and the No Fly and Selectee lists are discussed below.

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CLASS CLASS is a database administered by the Department of State‘s Bureau of Consular Affairs and is used by consular officers abroad to screen visa applicants for travel to the United States. CLASS accepts nearly all records from the TSDB because minimal biographic information is necessary for visa screening. In other words, given where (overseas) and when (well in advance of travel to the U.S.), the Government has time to work through what can sometimes be less than complete biographical information – time that might not otherwise be feasible in other screening situations like a routine traffic stop or a busy overseas airport where the presence of U.S. officials is often minimal. The Department of State also uses a screening system known as CLASS-PASSPORT to screen applications for U.S. passports. The TSC aids the Department of State in identifying known or suspected terrorists through two different processes. The first is the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process, whereby individuals that are watchlisted could be identified at the time of their visa application to visit the United States. When consular officers process visa applications, checks are run in CLASS to determine whether any derogatory information exists to warrant a visa denial.

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If it is determined that the visa applicant is a possible match to an individual on the Terrorist Watchlist, the consular officer requests an SAO. The SAO request is forwarded to the TSC, where the Department of State‘s subject matter experts at the TSC review the associated TSDB and TIDE records to determine whether the visa applicant is in fact the same watchlisted individual. The TSC‘s only role in this process is to determine if the individual applying for the visa is the same individual on the Terrorist Watchlist. In the case of a positive match, the TSC forwards the information to the Department of State‘s Visa Office, in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, to prepare an SAO in response to the request. The SAO is then forwarded to the consular officer adjudicating the visa, who has the authority to issue or deny visa applications. Individuals that are watchlisted at the time of their visa application could be identified through this process. The second State Department process supported by the TSC is the Visa Revocation Program. The Visa Revocation Program was initiated after 9/11 and is designed to identify individuals who may have received visas prior to that person being identified as a known or suspected terrorist. Every day, the Department of State automatically generates a report that identifies all individuals with a valid visa that could potentially match a person in the TSDB. State officers compare information in CLASS (exported from TSDB), to existing records of visa holders in the Department of State‘s Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). This chapter is then evaluated by the State Department experts at the TSC who determine whether there is a positive match to a watchlisted individual. If there is a positive match, then the TIDE record and related derogatory information is made available to the Department of State for review. The Secretary of State holds broad discretionary authority to revoke a visa. Therefore, TSC forwards the information to the Department of State‘s Visa Office to determine whether to revoke the visa. Individuals that are watchlisted in TSDB after receiving their visas can be identified through this process.

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TECS

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TECS serves as the Department of Homeland Security‘s primary lookout system and receives daily exports of TSDB records from the TSC. Additionally, TECS receives non-terrorist related subject records from more than twenty federal agencies, including a wide spectrum of data, and provides alerts for a variety of law enforcement needs. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the principal owner and primary user of TECS and uses the system to screen individuals at air ports, land, and sea ports of entry. Through TECS, CBP screens against the Terrorist Watchlist at all 327 ports of entry and by all of the 15 pre-clearance offices located in Canada, the Caribbean, and Ireland. They also use the Terrorist Watchlist to conduct screening operations at international mail and cargo facilities. Similar to CLASS, TECS accepts nearly all records from the TSDB. For subjects in TSDB, CBP is alerted to their travel when a commercial airline forwards the passenger manifest to CBP using the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). APIS enhances border security by providing officers with pre-arrival and departure manifest data on all passengers and crew members

No Fly and Selectee List The No Fly and Selectee lists are unique among TSDB subsets in that they are the only subsets within the Terrorist Watchlist that have their own substantive minimum derogatory criteria requirements, which are considerably more stringent than the reasonable suspicion standard required for inclusion in TSDB itself. Following the creation of the TSC in 2003, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee established the initial terrorist screening nomination criteria for the No Fly and Selectee lists in October 2004. At that time, the No Fly list consisted of substantive derogatory criteria that focused attention on individuals intending to commit acts of terrorism against civil aviation or the domestic homeland. Over time, that initial criteria proved to be too restrictive. Consequently, in February 2008, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee approved additional criteria that served to broaden the scope of terrorists eligible for the No Fly list. In other words, the criteria to place individuals on the No Fly list has broadened to make the No Fly list more inclusive to respond to additional terrorism threats. The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General recognized the

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significance of the additional criteria when, in a May 2009 report, it stated, ―Major security gaps have been addressed by adding No Fly criteria.‖1 For international terrorists, the process to be included on the No Fly list begins, as it does with every nomination, with a federal agency nominating an individual to NCTC for inclusion in TIDE. NCTC analysts review the nomination to ensure it meets nomination criteria and then forward the nomination to the TSC. Analysts at the TSC perform a comprehensive review of the nomination, which includes a review of the derogatory information contained in TIDE and the FBI‘s Automated Case System. During this process, if there is a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaging in terrorism or terrorist activity, the terrorist would be added to the TSDB. Placement on the No Fly list requires two components, sufficient biographical information and sufficient derogatory information. If additional information existed to satisfy any of the substantive derogatory criteria and the minimum biographic criteria for the No Fly list, the terrorist‘s name would be exported to the No Fly list as well. If the analyst reviewing the No Fly nomination determines that there is insufficient information to warrant inclusion on the No Fly list, the nomination is forwarded to the TSA (Office of Intelligence and/or the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)) subject matter experts at the TSC for further analysis and a final recommendation. The TSA subject matter expert will review the nomination and all accessible derogatory information associated with the individual and apply the No Fly and Selectee list criteria to that information. Based upon that review and analysis, the TSA/FAMS subject matter expert will then decide based upon that criteria whether the individual will be included on either the No Fly or Selectee list. Inclusion on the No Fly list prohibits a potential terrorist from boarding a commercial aircraft that departs or arrives in the United States. It also prohibits an airplane carrying an individual on the No Fly list from transiting United States airspace. The Selectee list is used to provide the individual with a secondary screening. Currently, TSA provides the No Fly and Selectee list to commercial air carriers who are then responsible for passenger prescreening against the No Fly and Selectee lists. With the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security‘s Secure Flight Program, the U.S. Government will assume the responsibility of passenger prescreening against the No Fly and Selectee lists, which will improve the overall effectiveness of this process.

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Actions since December 25, 2009 Before December 25, 2009, TSC did not receive a nomination to watchlist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and, as a result, he was not watchlisted in TSDB. Following the attempted terrorist attack, the President of the United States initiated a review of the facts that permitted Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board Northwest Airlines Flight 253. In his January 7, 2010 memorandum, the President concluded that immediate actions must be taken to enhance the security of the American people. These corrective actions were also required to ensure that the standards, practices, and business processes that have been in place since the aftermath of 9/11 are appropriately robust to address the evolving terrorist threat facing our Nation in the coming years. As a result, the TSC was given two instructions. The first was to conduct a thorough review of the TSDB and ascertain the current visa status of all known and suspected terrorists, beginning with the No Fly list. That process has now been completed. The second was to develop recommendations on whether adjustments are needed to the watchlisting Nominations Guidance, including biographic and derogatory criteria for inclusion in TIDE and TSDB, as well as the No Fly and Selectee lists. To do so, TSC convened its Policy Board Working Group with representation from NCTC, DHS, CIA, NSA, DOD, DOJ, DOS, and NSC to achieve interagency consensus. That process is underway and TSC is working with its interagency partners to develop appropriate recommendations for consideration by the President. As of yet, however, there have been no formal changes to watchlisting criteria, including the criteria for inclusion on the No Fly list, since February 2008 when those criteria were last expanded. At the direction of the White House and in conjunction with NCTC, the TSC has made some temporary and limited additions to the watchlist to counter the specific terrorist threat observed on December 25, 2009. As a result, a threat-related target group was identified and individuals from specific high-threat countries already residing in TIDE or TSDB were added to the No Fly and Selectee lists, or upgraded to TSDB if necessary, to prevent future attacks.

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CONCLUSION As the investigation into the events that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board Flight 253 continues, the TSC remains focused on fulfilling its Presidential and interagency mandates to share terrorist screening information with our domestic and foreign partners. We have a standing commitment to improve our operational processes, to enhance our human capital and technological capabilities, and to continue to protect Americans from terrorist threats while protecting privacy and safeguarding their civil liberties. Terrorist Watchlisting has been a vital tool in the counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and will continue to be so in the future. Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member Smith and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address this Committee. I look forward to answering your questions.

End Notes US Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation, OIG-09-64, May 2009.

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1

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In: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC):… ISBN: 978-1-61122-315-6 Editors: Jackson A. Volkerts © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 5

TERRORIST IDENTITIES DATAMART ENVIRONMENT (TIDE) National Counterterrorism Center

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What is TIDE? The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) is the US Government‘s (USG) central repository of information on international terrorist identities as established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. TIDE supports the USG‘s various terrorist screening systems or ―watchlists‖ and the US Intelligence Community‘s overall counterterrorism mission. The Terrorist Identities Group (TIG), located in NCTC‘s Information Sharing & Knowledge Development Directorate (ISKD), is responsible for building and maintaining TIDE. The TIDE database includes, to the extent permitted by law, all information the U.S. government possesses related to the identities of individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism, with the exception of Purely Domestic Terrorism information.

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National Counterterrorism Center

What Types of Conduct Warrant Inclusion in TIDE? A non-exclusive list of types of conduct that will warrant both entry into TIDE and terrorist screening nomination includes persons who:      



Commit international terrorist activity; Prepare or plan international terrorist activity; Gather information on potential targets for international terrorist activity; Solicit funds or other things of value for international terrorist activity or a terrorist organization; Solicit membership in an international terrorist organization; Provide material support, i.e. safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons, explosives, or training; Are members of or represent a foreign terrorist organization.

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Federal agencies nominate individuals for inclusion in TIDE based on evaluations of intelligence and law enforcement terrorism information.

How is Information from TIDE Used for Watchlists? Each day analysts create and enhance TIDE records based on their review of nominations received. Every evening, TIDE analysts export a sensitive but unclassified subset of the data containing the terrorist identifiers to the FBI‘s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for use in the USG‘s consolidated watchlist. This consolidated watchlist, which is a critical tool for homeland security, supports screening processes to detect and interdict known and suspected terrorists at home and abroad – for example, the Transportation Security Administration‘s ―No Fly‖ list and the Department of State‘s visa database, among others. For more information see www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/ counter terrorism/tsc.htm.

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Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)

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How Many Names Are in TIDE? As of January 2009, TIDE contained more than 564,000 names, but only about 500,000 separate ―identities‖ because of the use of aliases and name variants. U.S. Persons (including both citizens and legal permanent residents) make up less than five percent of the listings.

Why Are People without Terrorist Ties Sometimes Delayed when Traveling?

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Both TIDE and many of the end user screening systems are names based, which means that people with names similar to those in the database may be stopped for additional screening by TSA or at a port of entry. The Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS Trip) was launched in February 2007. Travelers can use this program to request resolution of possible watchlist misidentification issues with any of the department‘s component agencies at: http://www.dhs.gov/trip.

Are Names Ever Removed from TIDE? Yes. In 2008 more than 27,000 names were removed from TIDE when it was determined that they no longer met the criteria for inclusion.

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CHAPTER SOURCES

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The following chapters have been previously published: Chapter 1 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code R41022, dated January 15, 2010. Chapter 2 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a National Counterterrorism Center publication, dated April 30, 2010. Chapter 3 – These remarks were delivered as Statement of Russell Travers, before the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, given March 24, 2010. Chapter 4 – These remarks were delivered as Statement of Timothy J. Healy, before the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, given March 24, 2010. Chapter 5 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a National Counterterrorism Center publication.

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INDEX 9 9/11, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15, 82, 84, 88, 95, 98 9/11 Commission, 5, 6, 14

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A accounting, 26, 27, 29, 30 Afghanistan, 22, 27, 29, 30, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 57, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 76 Africa, 27 agencies, vii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 90, 92, 96, 102, 103 aggression, 82 air carriers, 97 air passenger screening, 94 airplane, 97 Al Qaeda, 10, 12 Algeria, 58, 59 appropriations, 12 Arabian Peninsula, 12, 28 architecture, 90 Asia, 26, 27 assassination, 2, 22, 82 assault, 22, 28 assessment, vii, 1, 2, 10, 11, 12 authorities, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 42, 50, 59, 61, 64, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 94

B Baghdad, 46, 74, 79 barriers, 3, 12, 83 bomb attack, 20 bombing, 2, 22, 28, 61, 79, 82 border security, 96 buildings, 44, 48, 51, 57, 65, 66, 69, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80 Bush, President, 5

C Caribbean, 96 cattle, 46, 75 Caucasus, 28, 66, 78 ceasefire, 30 Central African Republic, 64, 77 CIA, 3, 5, 11, 13, 14, 98 City, 39, 50, 52, 55, 60 civil liberties, viii, 92, 99 Communist Party, 42, 43, 51, 53, 56 community, viii, 5, 8, 11, 19, 26, 46, 68, 89, 91, 92, 93 competition, 13 consent, viii, 1, 6 coordination, 3, 7 cost, 84 counterterrorism, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 81, 99, 101 counterterrorism strategy, 10, 81 criminals, 82

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Index

culture, 13 Customs and Border Protection, 96

D

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Dagestan, 65 data mining, 4 data set, 83 database, viii, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 88, 91, 92, 94, 101, 102, 103 DCI, 6 deaths, 26, 39 defects, 13 denial, 94 Department of Defense, 5 Department of Homeland Security, 3, 4, 14, 94, 96, 97, 99, 103 Department of State, viii, 17, 34, 35, 38, 40, 94, 95 detection, 40, 84 displaced persons, 43, 44 disposition, 92 doctors, 78 double counting, 32, 33, 36

E East Asia, 27 elders, 59, 67 enforcement, viii, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 102 equipment, 65, 69 equities, 12 execution, 6, 7 Executive Order, 5 exercise, 13, 26 explosives, 40, 52, 59, 68, 102 exports, 94, 96 extremists, 9, 25, 26, 27, 28, 84, 88, 89

F family members, 77 farmers, 45 fidelity, 30 Filipino, 58 firearms, 54, 57, 62, 66

first responders, 20, 29, 53, 61, 72 flight, 22, 28, 74 foreign intelligence, 11, 12

G Gaza Strip, 39 genocide, 21 geography, 9 Germany, 81 globalization, 82 guardian, 84 guidance, 7, 93

H hate crime, 20 headquarters, vii, 1, 40, 62, 65, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75 homeland security, 8, 102 Homeland Security Act, 4, 5 hostage taking, 82 hotels, 56 housing, 69 human capital, 99

I impulses, 81 impulsive, 81 India, 42, 43, 50, 51, 53, 56, 71 inferences, 24, 93 information sharing, 2, 8, 9, 11, 90 information technology, 13, 94 insurgency, 21, 84 integration, 5, 6 intelligence, viii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 102 intelligence gathering, 12 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, vii, viii, 1, 6, 9, 101 interagency coordination, 3, 7 international terrorism, viii, 17, 92 Iran, 42, 57, 73 Iraq, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60,

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Index 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 76, 79, 80, 81 Ireland, 96

J Japan, 81 journalists, 28, 29, 40, 54, 77, 78 justification, 82

K kidnapping, 17, 22, 23, 40, 63, 64, 68, 70, 76, 77, 78 Kirkuk, 51, 60

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L law enforcement, viii, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 102 lawyers, 77 leadership, 6 legislation, 7, 9, 12 livestock, 44, 46 local authorities, 4 local government, 4, 5

M majority, 63 malfeasance, 12 marketplace, 50, 56, 73 matrix, 9, 21 media, 8, 19, 22, 30 membership, 102 methodology, 22, 25 Middle East, 30 military, 6, 8, 14, 20, 21, 22, 31, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 59, 62, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76, 78, 84 militia, 29 militias, 21 mining, 4, 65 missions, 3, 8, 13 modus operandi, 24 Moon, 78 Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 77

109

motivation, 26 Muslims, 23, 30

N National Security Council, 6, 13 NATO, 54, 69 Nazi Germany, 81 Nepal, 26 Nigeria, 30, 62, 89 No Fly, viii, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102 noise, 89 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 54, 69

O Obama Administration, 11 Obama, President, 2, 10, 15 Obama, President Barack, 14 operations research, 85

P Pacific, 27 paints, 10 Pakistan, 27, 28, 29, 30, 40, 43, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80 parallel, 82 Parliament, 54, 66 pasture, 46 peacekeepers, 45, 46, 51, 69, 78, 79 peacekeeping, 51 performance, 89 perpetrators, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 71 Philippines, 27, 29, 30, 77 PM, 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80 police, 21, 22, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81 port of entry, 94, 103 poverty, 82

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Index

prayer, 64, 73 Presidential Directives, viii, 91, 93 prevention, 83 primary school, 63 project, 84

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R reactions, 13 recalling, 85 recommendations, iv, 6, 7, 92, 93, 98 reconciliation, 47 relatives, 54 relevance, 83 reporters, 30, 47 Republic of the Congo, 27, 28, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 51, 54, 56, 59, 62, 64, 65, 68, 70, 73, 75, 78 resolution, 103 resources, 3, 10, 83, 84 Revolutionary Guard, 73 rights, iv, 12 rockets, 47, 76, 79 Russia, 28, 29, 61, 65, 78 Rwanda, 28, 42, 44, 45, 51, 54, 56, 62, 65, 73

S Saudi Arabia, 28 screening, viii, 82, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103 Secure Flight, 97 security forces, 42, 46, 57 Senate, viii, 1, 6, 8, 14, 15 sheep, 46 Shia, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 59, 63 simulation, 84 soccer, 54, 72 Somalia, 27, 28, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 66, 68, 69, 70, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80 South Asia, 26, 27 Sri Lanka, 29, 43, 45, 47 State Department, 17, 23, 81, 95 State of the Union address, 5

statistical inference, 82 statistics, 17, 19, 22 strategic planning, 7 Sudan, 40, 41, 44, 45, 61, 76 suicide, 22, 27, 28, 29, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82 suicide attacks, 29 suicide bombers, 29, 44, 45, 49, 52, 65, 69, 72, 73, 78, 79, 82 suicide bombings, 29 supervision, 13 supervisor, 77 support staff, 77 surveillance, 84 survey, 81 survivors, 43

T tactics, 72 Taliban, 27, 28, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79 taxonomy, 22 terrorism, viii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27, 39, 61, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 101, 102 terrorist acts, vii, 1, 21 terrorist attacks, 2, 3, 10, 19, 25, 26, 29, 30, 39, 84, 88 terrorist groups, 9, 83 terrorist organization, 7, 23, 102 Terrorist Screening Database, viii, 91 terrorists, 6, 8, 9, 19, 22, 29, 82, 84, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 102 Thompson, Bennie G., 15 threats, vii, viii, 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 13, 81, 84, 92, 96, 99 tracks, 78 trainees, 49, 67 training, 4, 13, 49, 102 training programs, 4

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Index transparency, 20 transportation, 44, 102 Transportation Security Administration, 94, 102 Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 103 trucks, 22, 55, 58

Venezuela, 72 victims, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 41, 53, 64, 72 violence, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 29, 39 visa, 89, 94, 95, 98, 102

W

U UN, 58, 69 uniform, 47 United Nations, 58, 69 United States, 105 USA Patriot Act, 3 UV, 76

V

walking, 45 War on Terror, 10, 14 watchlisting, viii, 9, 11, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 98 weapons, 29, 36, 41, 43, 47, 49, 53, 56, 58, 59, 70, 102 White House, 6, 15, 98 workers, 52, 58 working groups, 9 World War I, 82, 84, 85

Y Yemen, 12, 68

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vandalism, 22 vegetables, 60 vehicles, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81

111

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