Marsilius of Inghen: Acts of the International Marsilius of Inghen Symposium ; Nijmegen, 18-20 December 1986 9070419290, 9070419297, 9789070419295

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MARSILIUS OF INGHEN

ARTISTARIUM A Series of Texts on Mediaeval Logic, Grammar & Semantics EDITORS L. M. de RIJK &

H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS

E. P. BOS Lei den

C.H.KNEEPKENS Nijmegen

&

Vol. 1: L. M. de Rijk, Anonymi auctoris franciscani Logica ,,Ad rudium" (edited from the MS Vat. lat. 946), Nijmegen 1981 Vol. 2: Ralph of Beauvais, Glose super Donatum, ed. C. H. Kneepkens, Nijmegen 1982 Vol. 3: L. M. de Rijk, Sorne 14th Century Tracts on the Probationes terminorum (Martin of Alnwick O.F.M., Richard Billingham, Edward Upton and others), Nijmegen 1982 Vol. 4: Johannes Buridanus, Questiones longe super Librum Perihermeneias, ed. Ria van der Lecq, Nijmegen 1983 Vol. 5: John of Rolland, Four Tracts on Logic (Suppositiones, Fallacie, Obligationes, Insolubilia), ed. E. P. Bos, Nijmegen 1985 Vol. 6: Thomas Bricot, Tractatus Insolubilium, ed. E. J. Ashworth, Nijmegen 1986 Vol. 7: L. M. de Rijk, Sorne Earlier Parisian Tracts on Distinctiones sophismatum, Nijmegen 1988 Vol. 8: Ralph of Beauvais, Liber Tytan, ed. C. H. Kneepkens, Nijmegen 1991 SUPPLEMENTA to ARTISTARIUM: Vol. 1: English Logic and Semantics, from the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, Nijmegen 1981 Vol. II: Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L. M. de Rijk, Nijmegen 1985 Vol. III: Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, Nijmegen 1987 Vol. IV: Ockham and Ockhamists, Nijmegen 1987 Vol. V: Peter of Spain on Composition and Negation, by Joke Spruyt, Nijmegen 1989 Vol. VI: John Buridan's Tractatus de infinito, ed. J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Nijmegen 1991 Vol. VII: Marsilius of Inghen, Nijmegen 1992

ARTISTARIUM SUPPLEMENTA

-----VII-----

MARSILIUS OF INGHEN ACTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARSILIUS OF INGHEN SYMPOSIUM ORGANIZED BY THE NIJMEGEN CENTRE FOR MEDIEVAL STUDIES (CMS) NIJMEGEN, 18-20 DECEMBER 1986

EDITED BY

H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS & M. J. F. M. HOENEN

Nijmegen Ingenium Publishers

1992

ISBN 90 70419 29 0 Copyright 1992 by lngenium Publishers, P.O. Box 1342, 6501 BH Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Ali rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher. PRINTED by KRIPS REPRO MEPPEL, THE NETHERLANDS.

CONTENTS

PREFACE Marsilius of Inghen: A Dutch Philosopher and Theologian H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS and M.J.F.M. HOENEN

VII 1

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitat Heidelberg J. MIETHKE

13

Marsilius of Inghen as Theologian W.J. COURTENAY

39

Der Glaube bei Marsilius von Inghen CH. HEITMANN

59

Marsilius of Inghen on Theology as Science E.P. BOS

81

Marsilius of Inghen on the Principles of Natural Philosophy with an edition of Quaestiones in De caelo 1, XIV E.P. BOS

97

The Eternity of the World according to Marsilius of Inghen with an edition of the dubium in II Sent. q. 1 a. 2 M.J.F.M. HOENEN

117

143 On the Notion of Constructio in Conceptualist Grammar: Quaestio XXXV of the Doctrinale-Commentary preserved in Erfurt, Amplon, Q 70A C.H. KNEEPKENS Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke des Marsilius von 173 Inghen M. MARKOWSKI BIBLIOGRAPHY INDICES

195 207

PREFACE

The papers published here were given at the Symposium on Marsilius of Inghen organized by the Nijmegen Centre for Medieval Studies (CMS), held at the University of Nijmegen, December 18-20, 1986. Being the first symposium on this Dutch philosopher and theologian, its general theme embraced tapies concerning his biography and career as well as specific aspects of his thinking. Not incorporated in the present volume is the round-table discussion on editing the major works of Marsilius. The scholarly interest and concern for Marsilius of Inghen is growing. It is therefore to be hoped that this collection of papers will serve both as a new contribution to Marsilius scholarship, and represent some currently interesting tapies in Marsilius. We trust that future conferences and studies will bring to light the impact of his thought upon subsequent philosophy and theology. A bibliography of scholarship on Marsilius of Inghen and a list of editions being worked on is published in Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 31 (1989), 150-167.

Nijmegen, October 1990 H.A.G. Braakhuis M.J.F.M. Hoenen

MARSILIUS OF INGHEN: A DUTCH PHILOSOPHER AND THEOLOGIAN INTRODUCTORYLECTURE

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS & M.J.F.M. HOENEN

"A Phoebus (God of the Sun) overshadowing the radiant stars of heaven, a vast sea to which the little streams cede" - this is how Marsilius was described more than a century after his death on the frontispiece of the Strasbourg edition of his Commentary on the Sentences) One might be inclined to put these laurels down to some regional pride of sorts, as Marsilius is praised there as the light and origin of the University of Heidelberg. On the other hand, however, there is the fact that Marsilius's works were used as obligatory textbooks in the curriculum of many other universities, including those of Cracow, Erfurt, and Vienna. Moreover, the socalled via Marsiliana was one of the acknowledged approaches in logic and semantics until well into the fifteenth century. In point of fact, the works of Marsilius were regularly used at universities in Germany and other countries in Central Europe until some time in the sixteenth century.2

Quam superat phoebus radiantia sidera coeli Ut cedunt magna flumina parva mari Tantum Marsilius sophiae praecellit honore Heidelbergensis lux et origo sco/ae. This poem is actually quite similar to the one by Andreas Cornucervinus, which occurs in the collection of poems in honor of Marsilius in the edition of 1499, referred to in note 8, differing from it in only the last lines:

Quam superat Phoebus radiantia sidera coeli Ut cedunt magna flumina parva mari Tantum Marsilius sophiae praecellit amore Cuius (in hoc foelix) budoris ossa tenet. 2 See M. Markowski, Marsilius von Inghen, Verfasserlexikon VI, ed. K. Ruh et al. (BerlinNew York 1985), 141, and E.J. Ashworth, Review of E.P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen: Treatises on the Properties of terms etc, Vivarium 24 (1986), 159-160.

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H.A.G. Braakhuis & M.J.F.M. Hoenen

It is surprîsing to note, then, that Marsilius, obviously one of the most

influential thinkers ever born in the Netherlands, has been largely ignored by his fellow-country men of later generations. Only in recent years has this situation slowly begun to change. A sad example of the neglect into which Marsilius has fallen is an incident that occurred some years ago at the University of Nijmegen itself. When a new area was added to the university campus, the streets, according to usage, were to be named after great Dutch scholars, such as Erasmus of Rotterdam, Philip of Leyden and Gerard Groote. Naturally, the name of Marsilius of Inghen was among the candidates suggested in the committee, as he had been not only a famous Dutch philosopher, but a native of Nijmegen as well. Yet, the suggestion was dismissed, largely because the chairman of the naming committee was unable to find Marsilius in his encyclopedia. The street in question was eventually named after Thomas Aquinas - a perfectly famous philosopher and theologian, but without the slightest biographical connection to this country. The symposium on Marsilius of Inghen was not organized, of course, to restore Marsilius's daim to a street of his own in the city of Nijmegen. lts aim is rather the restoration of the scholarly attention this influential Dutch philosopher and theologian may rightfully daim in his native country and native town. The commemoratio n of the University of Heidelberg's foundation, exactly six centuries ago this year, and of Marsilius's close involvement therein, seemed a proper occasion for us to further organize and stimulate the study of Marsilius. This not only because of his undisputedly important place in the development of late medieval thought, but also for a more practical reason, viz., so as to be better prepared for the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of his death in 1996. In this introductory paper we shall first briefly discuss the connections between Marsilius and the city of Nijmegen, and in a broader context the Low Countries. We shall try to vindicate Nijmegen's daim toits connection with this important thinker. Secondly, we shall in broad outline sketch the nature of his thought, and its place in the development of fourteenth-cent ury philosophy and theology generally. There is some controversy and confusion over what was Marsilius's place of birth. lt is sometimes claimed that he was a native of Ingen, a small town in the neighbourhood of Nijmegen.3 More often, however, it is argued that 'de 3 See, e.g., A. Thorbecke, Die Anfiinge der Universitiit Heidelberg (Heidelberg 1886), 9, and more recently M. Markowski, Marsilius von Inghen, 136, and A. Pattin, Pour l'histoire du

2

Marsilius: A Dutch Philosopher and Theologian

Inghen' should be taken as only a surname, and that Marsilius came from Nijmegen or its surrounding districts. 4 Starting with the second view, we can indeed be confident that 'de Inghen' is used as a surname. As is argued by Toepke, the name occurs frequently in the books of the Universities of Heidelberg and Cologne. 5 The surname view is also confirmed by records of the Duchy of Gelre, such as taxation lists. Here we find that in Marsilius's lifetime there were De Inghen's living in many villages of that part of the country, e.g., in Deest, Herveld, Ewijk, KerkAvezaath, and Tiel.6 Interestingly, no De Inghen's were recorded in Inghen itself. Having established the fact that 'de Inghen' was a surname, a further question arises. On the Rotulus of 1362 of the English nation at the University of Paris, Marsilius is mentioned as 'Marcilius de Inghen de Novimagio, Coloniensis diocesis', and in the Proctor's Book he is referred to as 'Mercilius de Novimagio'.7 May we infer from this that he was a native of Nijmegen? Toepke has argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. He points out that there is a problem with the reference on the Rotulus. In the Oratio funebris for his colleague Marsilius, Toepke daims, Nicholas Prowin mentioned that Marsilius belonged to the diocesis Trajectensis - the diocese of Utrecht, not that of Cologne.8 As Nijmegen belonged to the diocese of Cologne, Toepke concludes, Marsilius cannot have been a native of Nijmegen itself. Rather, he must have corne from a small town in the vicinity of Nijmegen, belonging to the diocese of Utrecht, which borders that of Cologne not far from Nijmegen. Toepke's interpretation of the evidence of the Rotulus is that Marsilius's place

4

5 6 7

8

sens agent. La controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun, ses antécédents et son évolution, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 1, VI (Leuven 1988), 305. lt should be noted that in fact Ingen is situated at a distance of some 25 km from Nijmegen. See, e.g., G. Toepke, Die Matrikel der Universitiit Heidelberg von 1386 bis 1662, III (Heidelberg 1893), 882 (=note to Part II, p. 607, nr.1); G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik 1: Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1921, 4. Abh. (Heidelberg 1921), 7, and E.P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen: Treatises on the Properties of Terms (Dordrecht 1983), 7. See reference in previous note. See Schatting van den Lande van Gelre voor het Overkwartier en de Betuwe van 1369, ed. P.N. van Doorninck (Haarlem 1903), 138, 147, 158, 168, 177. See Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and E. Châtelain, Vol. 3 (Paris 1894), 91, and Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis, Vol. 1: Liber Procuratorum Nationis Anglicanae (Alemanniae), ed. H. Denifle and E. Châtelain (Paris 1894), 289 and 293. See also Du Boulay, Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, IV (Paris 1668, Reprint Frankfurt/Main 1966), 974: "Marcilius de Inghen, alias de Novimagio Colon. Dioec." See Oratio funebris, in: Ad il/ustrissimum Bavarie ducem Philippum Comitem Rheni Palatinum et ad nobilissimos filios epistola, [Mainz 1499], foll. diiiv -[dvir].

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H.A.G. Braakhuis & M.J.F.M. Hoenen

of origin, presumabl y in accordanc e with existing custom, is registered by the name of the nearest important town.9 Ritter, in his influential monograp hy on Marsilius, follows Toepke on this point.10 In our opinion, however, the. interpreta tion of Toepke and Ritter is not warranted . It should be noted that the reference to the diocese of Utrecht quoted by Toepke is not found in the Oratio funebris itself, but only in the title that was given toit in the Mainz edition of 1499, in which the oratio is part of a defence of the nominalis t via.11 This source - acknowled ged by Toepke to be the only contempo rary source available12 - is therefore nota contempo rary witness for the question whether Marsilius really belonged to the diocese of Utrecht. · As a matter of fact, then, there are no specific reasons to doubt the reliability of the evidence given by the Rotulus and the Proctor's Book, viz., that Marsilius was a native of Nijmegen. As is also claimed by Toepke, the record on the Rotulus is probably based on a statement of Marsilius himself.13 It may be noted in passing that in 1357 a certain Florentius of Inghen was a citizen of Nijmegen;1 4 we have unfortuna tely not been able to establish a connection between Marsilius and him. Neverthele ss, apart from Marsilius's own statement as reported in the Paris Rotulus, and the references in the Proctor's Book, there are other facts (to which we shall presently return) directly connectin g him to the city of Nijmegen. We may therefore be confident that Marsilius was a native of Nijmegen. Having settled the question of origin, we may ask ourselves what its significanc e is. To be sure, it is proper to call Marsilius a Dutch philosoph er 9 G. Toepke, Die Matrikel III, 882: "Dieser bestimmten und zweifellos von Marsilius selbst herrührende n Angabe (= Marcilius de Inghen de Novimagio Coloniensis diocesis) steht die allgemein gehaltene und allein, soviel mir bekannt, hier noch ais die eines Zeitgenosse n des M. in Betracht kommende Angabe des Nicolaus Prowin in seiner Oratio funebris in exequijs venerabilis M. Marsilij de Inghen gegenüber, nach welcher Letzterer 'diocesis Traiectensis ' war. (. .. ) Will man sich also nicht einfach an die Angabe des

Marsilius halten, sondern sie mit der des Prowin in Einklang bringen, so giebt es nur

10 11 12 13 14

4

einen Ausweg: M. stammte aus einen Orte in der Umgegend von Nimwegen, welcher zur gedachten Diôcese gehôrte (N. grenzte an die Utrechter Diôcese), und hat nur nach der Sitte der Zeit statt des kleineren und weiteren Kreisen nicht bekannten Geburtsorte s eine in der Nahe liegende grôssere Stadt genannt." See reference in note 4. See Oratio funebris, fol. diiiv. See the text quoted in note 9. See note 9. This can be gathered from the notes on the Burgersboek van Nijmegen Il, as preserved in the Archives of the city of Nijmegen.

Marsilius: A Dutch Philosopher and Theologian

and theologian. But he was also a master in Paris until about 1379, and a master in Heidelberg from 1386 until his death in 1396. Should he not as properly be reckoned among the French or German thinkers? What is more, did he at all have a real and substantial connection with the life and culture of the Low Countries? These are surely pertinent questions. However, we should first bear in mind the fact that demarcations of this kind in the field of medieval studies are decisively and officially based on a person's place of birth. Thus Marsilius's works are covered by the Dutch section of the Lexicon Latinitatis Medii Aevi. This means that researchers in the Netherlands share a special responsibility toward the study and edition of the work of Marsilius. Secondly, as far as Parisis concerned, we should not forget that the system of nationes implied that students and masters formed groups according to their region or country of descent - in the case of the Netherlands together with other, mainly German countries. Membership of these 'national' strongholds within the university was not inconsequential, as was ominously felt during the Western Schism.15 Moreover, we know that masters and students in most cases kept in touch with their region of origin and with their fellow-students. In the case of Marsilius, there seem to have been friendly contacts with his fellow-student Gerard Groote.16 On a different level, we know of contacts with his native town. In 1382, the authorities of Nijmegen treated Marsilius to a very rich banquet.17 It is interesting to note that this reception falls in that period of Marsilius's life of which we know virtually nothing (1379 to 1386). Perhaps we may infer that Marsilius stayed in this region during these years? A little earlier, a certain 'Mercelis van Inghen' is mentioned in the Landvrede of the Duchy of Gelre of January 6, 1377. It is not clear, however, whether he is the same as our Marsilius of Inghen.18 These considerations suffice to daim that Marsilius of Inghen is part of the history and culture of our country. Turning presently to the second part of this paper, in which we shall give a provisional sketch of Marsilius's thought, the place Marsilius occupied in the culture and history of the Low Countries will perhaps be substantiated. 15 See, e.g., G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik I, 27-31. 16 See note 33 below. 17 See Rekeningen der stad Nijmegen 1382-1543, ed. H.D.J. van Schevickhaven and J.C.J. Kleijntjes, I (Nijmegen 1910), 28: (1382) propinationes "magistro Marcelio de Ingen de 4 quartalibus vini 2 [Iibrae] 13 sol. 4 d." 18 See Gedenkwaardigheden uit de geschiedenis van Gelderland door onuitgegeven oorkonden opgehelderd en bevestigd, ed. Is. An. Nijhoff, III (Arnhem 1839), 30.

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H.A.G. Braakhuis & M.J.F.M. Hoenen

The reputation Marsilius enjoyed as a master in Paris - the fame which brought him the invitation to act as founding master of the University of Heidelber g - was based on his work as a philosoph er, or as it was then called: as an artist. At that time, the curriculum of the faculty of arts embraced all branches of philosoph y as defined in the Aristotelia n tradition. However, special attention was given to logic (in a wide sense of the word) and to natural philosophy . Against this backgroun d it should not corne as a surprise that three of the notions that are often mentioned as characteris tic of Marsilius's views are of a logico-phi losophical nature: 'Ockhamis m,' 'nominalis m,' and 'terminism .' Already shortly after his death Marsilius was ranked with Ockham, and called 'epicurus litteralis' by Johannes de Nova Domo.19 Unfortuna tely, however, none of the above three labels applies as unambigu ously or unproblem atically as the careless ease with which they are sometimes used might suggest. As regards 'Ockhamis m,' we are nowadays not so confident any more that the typically 'Parisian' way of philosophi zing, associated with such names as John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Nicholas Oresme, and Marsilius of Inghen, was really barn under the influence of Ockham's writings. We should also consider the possibility of other English influences (e.g., of the Mertonenses), as well as the idea that the rise of the Parisian approach to philosoph y was an independ ent developm ent within Paris itself, stimulate d rather than originated by similar developm ents across the Channel. A more or less definite answer in this matter would require better knowledg e of the developm ents in Paris in the first half of the fourteenth century, and especially the developm ent of Buridan's views in relation to the introducti on of Ockhamis t and other English theories. At this point we should not forget that even our alleged certainties with regard to the introducti on of Ockhamis t theories in Paris and the reactions evoked by them, have not remained unchalleng ed. Professors Courtenay and Tachau have argued that the condemna tion of 1340 was in point of fact hardly directed against Ockham's views at all; to the extent that Ockham or

19 See Z. Kaluza, Les querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècles, Quodlibet 2, Richerche e strumenti di filosofia medievale (Bergamo 1988), 20.

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Marsilius: A Dutch Philosopher and Theologian

Ockhamists were affected by the condemnations of 1339-1341, so they argue, this was chiefly for reasons of ecclesiastical politics. 20 Whatever difficulties may have beset the 1340s, Marsilius's study and activity were not immediately affected by them, as he started his work in the 1360s. At that time, the problems and suspicions surrounding the logico-semantical approach to philosophy and theology seem to have subsided. Perhaps this change of climate had occurred especially under the influence of the work of John Buridan. Marsilius is often said to have been a pupil of Buridan. 21 Others have argued that Buridan was perhaps Marsilius's teacher through his works, but not in person.22 As a matter of fact, it would seem to be qui te unlikely that Buridan had personally been Marsilius's teacher. He was probably already dead at the time Marsilius was studying in Paris; also (and especially so) there is the fact that Marsilius and he belonged to different nationes. One way or another, it is clear from Marsilius's writings that generally speaking his views on logic and semantics are in agreement with Buridan's, although they differ on certain specific issues.23 Marsilius's writings in this field, like those of Buridan, include the usual technical treatises on the consequences (the theory of logical validity), on obligationes (rules for staging logically valid disputations), and on insolubilia (paradoxes). These treatises have become characteristic of the Ockhamist or nominalist tradition. Speaking of the obligationes, mention should be made of master William Buser, under whom we know Marsilius incepted.24 As was established by Dr. Kneepkens, William Buser was the author of a treatise on obligationes on which Marsilius's treatise depends heavily.25 Buser's treatise achieved considerable dissemination and authority in ltaly, which brought him the 'honour' of being mentioned by the ltalian humanists among the barbari Brittanni, along with Ockham, Ferrybridge and Swineshead - a pest for true philosophy, according to the humanists. Now, if this is the honour due to

20 W.J. Courtenay and K. Tachau, Ockham, Ockhamists and the English-German Nation at Paris, 1339-1341, History of Universities 2 (1982), 53-96. 21 See, e.g., G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik I, 11. 22 E.P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen, 8. 23 See E.P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen, 254. 24 See G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik I, 9, note 1. 25 C.H. Kneepkens, The mysterious Buser again: William Buser of Heusden and the 'Obligationes' tract 'Ob rogatum', English logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries, ed. by A. Maierù (Napoli 1982), 159.

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H.A.G. Braakhuis & M.J.F.M. Hoenen

Buser, it is also deserved by Marsilius - which is just to remind us that the 'Parisian' way of logic was certainly not universally acclaimed. As regards the second label mentioned above, that of 'nominalism ,' it is clear that Marsilius's outlook, like Buridan's, may be called nominalistic in much the same sense as Ockham's. Marsilius shared the view of Ockham and Buridan that no universality whatsoever is to be found in the real world. The real world consists only of concrete individual things with their own individual qualities (substances and accidents). Universality is tied to the level of the human mind, which is able to form concepts and terms that can be used universally. Terms and concepts, that is, can be used to refer to several individual things, like the concept/term 'homo' can be used to refer to Peter, Paul, John, etc. As compared to Ockham, however, the semantic constraints of nominalism are somewhat loosened by Marsilius. Whereas for Ockham only the res extra can be the real significate of a term, for Marsilius also the term itself can be a real significate, albeit not the ultimate significate. Much the same holds for Marsilius's and Ockham's views concerning the abject of knowledge or science. According to Ockham, the abject can only be the proposition itself. Marsilius, whose view agrees with that of Buridan, distinguishe s between the scibile propinquum (the proposition or conclusion itself), and the scibile remotissimum (the thing signified by the terms of a proposition).26 Similar remarks apply to the priority of the suppositio personalis. In Ockham there is a tendency towards the view that all propositions which cannot be true if their terms are taken in personal supposition, cannot be true de virtute sermonis. Marsilius, again in line with Buridan, takes a far more liberal stand with regard to these propositions and with regard to the usus loquendi in general. Turning now to 'terminism,' the third characteristi c mentioned above, we should observe that it is often applied in a very broad sense, denoting any kind of philosophy that deploys the logical device of the proprietates terminorum. 'Terminism' is thus synonymous with using the logica modernorum, the medieval developmen t of logic as opposed to the logica antiqua. In this sense the term is essentially neutral, encompassin g both the realism of Walter Burley and the nominalism of William of Ockham. But 'terminism' may also be used in a more restricted sense, indicating a philosophy that not only makes use of the logica modernorum, but that is essentially focused on the relation between term and reality, applying it to the division of the sciences, as well as to the analysis and solution of all sorts of scientific problems. In 26 See G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the proposition. Ancien! and medieval conceptions of the bearers of truth and falsity (Amsterdam-L ondon 1973), 251.

8

Marsilius: A Dutch Philosopher and Theologian

this restricted sense, 'terminism' is characteristic of the brand of philosophy that apparantly goes back to Buridan. It is exemplified in the work of Marsilius, insofar as his philosophy is marked by a nominalist outlook: he shares with Buridan the view that the universality of words (nomina) and mental concepts is not merely required for knowledge (necessary condition), but that science in all its branches is just that system of words and concepts (necessary and sufficient condition). Especially this last aspect is typical of terminist philosophy sensu stricto. A closely related characteristic is the shared reductionist logico-semantical approach to problems in philosophy of nature, roughly that of analyzing our manner of speech (and our manner of thinking) about physical reality. Surprising as it may seem, the manner of philosophizing by logico-semantical analysis as practiced by Marsilius did not encumber his esteem for the metaphysical and other views of the great thirteenth-century masters, especially those of Thomas Aquinas. It should be clear from the above that the philosophy of Marsilius of Inghen is 'Ockhamist' only in a fairly loose sense of the word. It shared nominalism and some of its consequences with Ockham, but even in the field of logic, semantics and theory of science it differed from him in detail. The same goes for various aspects of their outlook on natural philosophy and metaphysics. If we finally turn to his theology, we see that Marsilius displays there a more

explicit return to older, thirteenth-century views, as was already noted by Ritter.27 His position in the Commentary on the Sentences is often in line with that of twelfth- and thirteenth-century masters such as Richard of St. Victor, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, although he also dicusses the new nominalistic views. A related trait of Marsilius's theological work must not be left unmentioned here, viz., its pastoral care and its obvious piety. In one place, for example, when discussing an argument of Holcot to the effect that Cod is the cause of every reality, therefore also of culpable evil (malum culpae), Marsilius remarks that such a conclusion may be offensive to the ears and should therefore not be uttered in the schools without proper explication, let alone in sermons.28 ln the same context, Marsilius declares that theology, according to him, 27 See G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik I, 139-183. 28 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (Strasbourg 1501, Reprint Frankfurt/Main 1966), Lib. I q. 45 a. 2, fol. 191 vb: " (. .. ) tamen quia conclusio simplicium aures posset offendere et occasionem scandali praebere, non reputo quod haec in scholis sit tenenda sine addito 'mali culpae Deus est causa' et minus in sermonibus."

9

H.A.G. Braakhuis & M.J.F.M. Hoenen

should be a work of piety and of edification.29 Similar reactions to 'impious' arguments are also found elsewhere in his Commentary on the Sentences. In our opinion, the devout and edifying attitude encountered in Marsilius's theological work is in complete agreement with the testimony of Nicholas Prowin in his Oratio funebris. There Marsilius's life and death are described as that of a man of deep devotion.30 This picture is borne out in a more prosaic way, perhaps, by the contents of Marsilius's library, which included several works by St. Bernard, Richard of St. Victor, and other monastic writers. 31 Whether or not Marsilius was a Carthusian monk, as has been disputed by Prof. Gruys - as far as his devotional attitude is concerned, he might as well have been one. 32 It is not inconceivable that we find in this attitude traces of the influence of Marsilius's fellow-student Gerard Groote, spiritual father of the so-called devotio moderna. We have reason to believe that Marsilius and Groote kept in touch after their time in Paris, where they had been fellow-students in the German natio. This may be gleaned from the greetings Gerard sent to a certain Marsilius in Cologne, who in all likelihood was our Marsilius, then canonicus in Cologne. 33 Furthermore, from a sermon by the famous Dutch preacher Johannes Brugman we learn that there had been contacts between master Henry of Oyta and Gerard Groote. There is reference to a letter from Henry to Gerard, in which he answered him that he did not see how he would improve by leaving the university and becoming a preacher. As Henry is reported to have said, his teachings at the university could make a far more valuable contribution through the education of many more clergymen, who in their turn would evangelize the world.34 Is it too far-fetched to suppose 29 Ibidem: "Non est enirn scientia sacra scientia praesurnptionis vel logicalis superstitionis sed pietatis quae non destruere debet sirnplices sed aedificare". lt should be noted that the word 'logicalis' is not found in the Mss. 30 Oratio funebris, [dvr]-[dvir]. 31 See G. Toepke, Die Matrikel I, (Heidelberg 1884), 678-685. 32 A. Gruys, Cartusiana. Un instrument heuristique. Bibliographie générale. Auteurs cartusiens (Paris 1976), 132. Cf. also N. Molin, Historia cartusiana ab origine ordinis usque ad tempus auctoris anno 1638 defuncti III, (Turnholt 1966), 266. 33 Geert Groote, Epistolae, ed. W. Mulder, Tekstuitgaven van Ons Geestelijk Erf 3 (Antwerp 1933), 8: "Utinarn rnagistri Marcilii vestri, rnagistri Arnoldi de Lochern etcetera Deus spiriturn et corda suscitaret et dilataret ad edificandurn et supplendurn passiones, que desunt corpori Christi, quod est Ecclesia." The letter probably dates frorn the year 1374. 34 See Johannes Brugrnan, Verspreide sermoenen, ed. Arn. van Dijk, Klassieke Galerij 41 (Antwerp 1948), 157: "Sed et magister Gerhardus Groet prirnitus in Trajecto et in aliis locis laboravit prelatis et focaristis convertendis, sed parurn profecit: plus profecisset, si ab inicio Parvulis inforrnandis se occupasset sicut fecerunt discipuli ejus et adhuc faciunt. (... ) Hinc eciarn scripsit magister Henricus de Oytha, farnosus doctor Pragensis, rnagistro

10

Marsilius: A Dutch Philosopher and Theologian

that Gerard had also urged Marsilius to leave the university and become a preacher? Whatever the case may be, the attitude of devotion displayed by Marsilius in his theological work is certainly the same as expressed by Henry in his letter to Groote. If it is correct to surmise that Marsilius's theological work shows the influence of Gerard Groote and of the devotio moderna, then we have again reason to believe that the work of Marsilius of Inghen indeed forms part of the cultural development of the Low Countries.

Gerhardo Groet: 'Multum,' inquit 'edificor de zelo vestro, etc.; sed quod creditis me quoad hoc plus posse proficere dimittendo universitatem in qua sum et predicando populis, nonvideo. Ecce enim nunc per me edificantur clerici sine numero, qui mittuntur deinde ad evangelisandum per totum mundum, quorum quilibet plus me valet proficere.' Hec ille."

11

MARSILIUS VON INGHEN ALS REKTOR DER UNIVERSITÂT HEIDELBERG*

J. MIETHKE

Wir, Ruprecht der elter, etc. bekennen etc. daz wir meister Marsilius von Inghen zu unserem pfaffen gewonnen haben und daz er uns getruw und holt sin sal, unsern schaden zu warnen und unser bestes zu werben, und auch daz er uns unsers studium zu Heidelberg ein anheber und regirer und dem furderlich for sin sal als er uns daz alles glopt und gesworne hat, und darumb salien wir im geben jerlichen zweihundert gulden, zu iglicher fronvasten funftzig gulden, und verschaffen im die of unser herbesture, die wir ierliche setzen of unser stat zu Heidelberg, und heissen auch unsere burger doselbes, daz sie dem selben meister Marsilien als unserm verweser des obgenanten unsers studium die obgenanten zweihundert gulden iars bevor abe geben und reichen salien, von unserer obgenanten sture zu iglichem vorgenanten zil. Orkunde diz brif versigelt mit unserm anhangenden ingesigell.

Unter dem 29. Juni 1386 stellte die Kanzlei des Pfalzgrafen bei Rhein dem magister artium Marsilius von Inghen in schonstem Amtsdeutsch des 14. Jahrhunderts diese Urkunde aus. Und da es um viel Geld ging, um 200 fl. jiihrlich, erhielt nicht nur der Empfiinger das Originalpergament ausgehiindigt, sondern man schrieb den Wortlaut auch in ein Register ein. Daher kennen wir überhaupt den Text, und wissen, daB da am 29.

*

Eine leicht veriinderte Fassung dieses Artikels (mit einer geringeren Zahl von Nachweisen und mit grôfitenteils übersetzten Quellenzitaten) erschien in: Ruperto Carola 76 (1987), 110-120. 1 Urkundenbuch der Universitiit Heidelberg, hg. v. E. Winkelmann (Heidelberg 1886), Bd. 1, nr. 3, 4-5, vgl. den iihnlichen Revers, mit dem Ruprecht Il. den Matthiius von Krakau aufnimmt und verpflichtet, bei Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch 1, nr. 38, 60f.

13

J.Miethke

Juni zu einem wahrhaft fürstlichen Saliir ein Gründungsrektor für die Universitiit Heidelberg angestellt worden ist, oder, um es korrekter auszudrücken, in die familia des Pfalzer Kurfürsten aufgenommen wurde, ein Gründungsrektor, der im Auftrage des greisen damals sechsundsiebzigjah rigen Pfalzgrafen Ruprecht I.2 mit seinem Sachverstand und seiner Energie uns unsers studium... ein anheber und regirer und dem furderlich for sin sal... Die Bürger Heidelbergs, die das hohe Jahresgehalt mit ihrem Steueraufkommen zu begleichen hatten, werden angehalten, Marsilius ais unserm verweser des obgenanten unsers studium, d.h. ais amtlichen Stellvertreter des Fürsten für das Studium die angewiesenen Zahlungen pünktlich zu leisten. Der derart beurkundete Auftrag blieb keineswegs papierenes Programm. Es stellte sich auch Erfolg ein: im Jahr 1986 hat die Universitiit Heidelberg ihr 600. Jubiliium feierlich begangen nach einer langen und wechselvollen Geschichte, die freilich hier nicht zu rekapitulieren ist. Des Kurfürsten, der die Hochschule gegründet hat, hat die Universitiit ausdrücklich gedacht, sie triigt als Ruprecht-Karls-Uni versitiit noch heute seinen Namen wenigstens ais Teil ihrer Selbstbezeichnung. Marsilius muf.S damit zufrieden sein, daf.S das philosophische Seminar auch heute noch am "Marsiliusplatz" gelegen ist3. Das ist gewiiS nicht wenig: man wird es den Heidelbergern hoch anrechnen, daJS sie den hohen Aufwendungen der damaligen Bürger zum Trotz dem kleinen Platz diesen Namen gaben. Aber wenn man heute eine Umfrage veranstaltete danach, wer Marsilius war, wüiSte es doch nur ein Kenner ungefahr zu sagen. Ich will nun keineswegs etwa ein Loch im doch schon überreichlichen Jubiliiumsprogramm Heidelbergs nachtriiglich stopfen. Das Jubelfest ist bereits im Oktober 1986 definitiv abgeschlossen worden und bedarf keiner Nachbesserung. In Jubiliiumspublikati onen wurde des Gründungsrektors dabei auch schon mehrfach gedacht. Es wiire in Nijmegen auch kaum der rechte Ort zu solchem Vorhaben. Ich môchte freilich auf diesem 2 Zu ihrn etwa J. Miethke, Ruprecht I., der Erbauer der Stiftskirche in Neustadt a. d. W. und Gründer der Universitat Heidelberg, Ruperto Carola 75 (1986), 23-30. M. Schaab, Geschichte der Kurpfalz, Bd. I (Stuttgart 1988), 91-102. 3 Zuletzt D. Griesbach, A. Krarner, M. Maisant, Die neue Universitat, Semper apertus, Festschrift (Heidelberg 1985), Bd. V, hg. v. P. A. Riedl, 79-112, hier 93f., Abb. ebda. Bd. VI, Tafel 73-75 (auch selbstandig u. d. T.: Die Gebiiude der Universitiit Heidelberg, hg. von P. A. Riedl (Berlin/Heidelberg usw. 1987), Bd. 1-2).

14

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

Symposion, das dazu bestimmt ist, die theoretischen Leistungen des niederlandischen Gelehrten zu würdigen, mich auf die praktische Tatigkeit des Universitatsrektors von Heidelberg konzentrieren, auf seine Aufbauerfolge und Kampfe, seine Ziele, soweit sie erkennbar sind, und seine Ergebnisse auf jenem Felde, das auch an den heutigen Universitiiten überall auf der Welt die Aufmerksamkeit der Gelehrten erfordert. Auch im Mittelalter namlich bewegt sich die theoretische Wissenschaft nicht in einem luftleeren Raum "blof5er" Theorien, sondern in der von Freunden, Gegnern, Konkurrenten, auch indifferenten Mitmenschen wimmelnden sozialen Welt der konkreten Geschichte. Wenn es also ein Historiker unternimmt, im illustren Kreis der Theoriegeschichte einen Einwurf zu machen und an die "politischen" Tatigkeiten des Marsilius zu erinnern, so geschieht das, um die Rahmenbedingungen - nicht der Theorie, wohl aber - des Theoretikers in das Gedachtnis zu rufen. Dabei wird die Situation einer kleinen deutschen Universitat am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts keineswegs als logischer Auftakt im Rückblick auf 600 Jahre triumphaler Erfolge erscheinen, sondern, so ist es jedenfalls die Absicht, in ihrer Offenheit sichtbar werden. Es wird zu prüfen sein, was Marsilius bewirken wollte, was er bewirken konnte und wo er sich vergebens dem Zug der Zeit widersetzte. Über die Anfünge des Planes, im Westen des Reiches in der Kurpfalz eine Universitiit zu eroffnen, sind wir nur sehr unvollstandig unterrichtet4. GewiB kennen wir den Text der Privilegien, die die Verwirklichung des Planes ermoglichten und begleiteten, wir kennen darüber hinaus auch einige Daten und wissen etwa, wann die Universitat ihren Lehrbetrieb eroffnete, auch wann der pfalzgrafliche Rat den endgültigen Beschluf5 faf5te, mit der Universitiitsgründung Ernst zu machen. Aber wer sich da im fürstlichen Rat mit welchen Argumenten für das Unternehmen einsetzte, wer sich mit welchen Argumenten dagegen stemmte, was letztlich für den Fürsten den Ausschlag gab und auf welche Krafte er sich stützen konnte, all das ist uns vollig unbekannt. Das heiBt nun freilich 4 Grundlegend die Darstellung von G. Ritter, Die Heidelberger Universitiit, Ein Stück deutscher Geschichte (Heidelberg 1936; Neudruck 1986). Zuletzt dazu etwa E. Wolgast, Die Universitiit Heidelberg 1386-1986 (Berlin/Heidelberg usw. 1986), 1-16. G. SeebaB, Heidelberg - Universitiitsgründung im Spannungsfeld des Spiitmittelalters, Ruperto Carola 74 (1986), 15-21. J. Miethke, Universitatsgründung an der Wende zum 15. Jahrhundert, Heidelberg im Zeitalter des Schismas und des Konziliarismus, Die Geschichte der Universitiit Heidelberg, Vortriige im Wintersemester 1985/86, Studium generale (Heidelberg 1986), 9-33. Schaab, Kurpfalz (wie Anm. 2), 120-122.

15

]. Miethke

nicht, dafS darüber Historiker nicht spekuliert hiitten: wir wollen uns hier aber zuniichst an das halten, was wir wissen kônnen. Der Gründungs rektor selbst, Marsilius von Inghen, hat in dem (verlorenen) Rektorbuch, das er anlegte, und das nach einem Auszug gerade eben zusammenh iingend gedruckt zu erscheinen beginnt5, einen Bericht über die Gründungs akte verfafSt, ut modus incepcionis dicti studii universis posteris innotescat, utque statuta que incepta et acta sunt pro eius bono regimine et ad que tenenda constringun tur et constringent ur magistri presentes pariter et futuri, in quacumque facultate fuerint magistrati, insuper et scholares, ea sub compendio presenti libro duxi inscribenda, ne forte per ignorantiam eorum aliquis ipsis vel alicui ex eis contravenire presumat ... 6 Diese verpflichten de Kurzfassun g der Gründungsg eschichte, die sozusagen modellhaft und verhaltensp riigend für die Zukunft Konflikte vermeiden helfen sollte, ist natürlich kein Bericht sine ira et studio, wie Marsilius ja selber zugibt. Er liefert uns zwar eine dürre Datenliste und wenige Siitze zum Inhalt der Privilegien, macht aber ebenfalls keine Aussagen über Motive oder Parteiungen . In dieser Modellgesch ichte der Universitiit sgründung werden in wohlüberle gtem Ablauf die Gründungsakte einzeln hintereinan der gereiht. Zuerst wird die Supplik genannt, die namens des Pfalzgrafen Ruprecht I. dem Papst der romischen Obedienz im Schisma, Urban VI., am 23. Oktober 1385 in Genua vorgelegt wurde, quatenus in opido eorum insigni de Heydelberga Wormaciensi s diocesis generale studium in omnibus facultatibus ad instar studii Parisiensis omnibus privilegiis illi Parisiensi studio concessis insignitum institui dignaretur.7 Diese Supplik, deren niihere Umstiinde oder genauer Wortlaut Marsilius in seinen Bericht nicht aufgenomm en hat, ist am 23. Oktober auch signiert, d.h. genehmigt worden. Nach Zahlung der üblichen Gebühren, wohl auch der ebenso üblichen Handsalben und Nebengebüh ren ist dann, so wird gesagt, das piipstliche Privileg sieben Monate spiiter, am 24. Juni 5 Acta universitatis Heidelbergensis I.l, Die Rektorbücher der Universitiit Heidelberg, Bd. 1, Heft 1, hg. v. J. Miethke, bearbeitet von H. Lutzrnann u. H. Weisert (Heidelberg 1986) (künftig AUH I). 6 AUH 1, nr. 72, 146-148, hier Zl. 4-10. 7 Zl. 15-18.

16

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg (1386) in SchloiS Wersau dem Pfiilzer Kurfürsten auch überbracht worden8 - wer der Überbringer war, wissen wir nicht. Auch Marsilius konnte es gewesen sein, doch steht uns kein Anhaltspunkt dafür zur Verfügung. Am 26. Juni, zwei Tage spiiter, fiel dann im GroiSen Rat der endgültige BeschluiS, mit dem so glatt sich abwickelnden Plan nun auch wirklich Ernst zu machen - offenbar war darüber mit der Bezahlung der gewii5 nicht niedrigen Taxen und Schmiergelder zur Erlangung der piipstlichen Bulle noch keineswegs entschieden gewesen!

In diesem Zusammenhang nun berichtet Marsilius in unpersonlicher Fassung auch von seinem eigenen Engagement als Gründungsrektor, von dem ich schon erziihlt habe. Anlafüich dieses Beschlusses damals - und jedenfalls in engem zeitlichen Zusammenhang mit ihm, denn die zitierte pfalzgrafliche Bestellungsurkunde datiert nur drei Tage nach dem GründungsbeschluiS - sei auch Marsilius von Inghen in den geschworenen Rat Ruprechts aufgenommen worden: Fuitque pro tune receptus magister Marsilius de Inghen ... in dicti ducis senioris consilium iuratum ac deinceps stipendiis largis dotatus. Er habe den Auftrag erhalten, ut pro dicti studii inchoacione in facultate arcium operam daret efficacem.9 Nach Marsilius ist dann als Helfer und zweiter Artist auch der Magister Heilmann Wunnenberg (aus Prag)lO in den kurfürstlichen Rat aufgenommen worden: receptus fuit ... , ut eciam idem studium in facultate arcium iuvaret inchoare - hier ist von einer groiSzügigen Bezahlung schon nicht mehr die Rede. SchlieBlich stieiS wenig spater auch ein Theologe, der Pariser Doktor der Theologie Reginald von Aulne, ein Zisterzienser aus der niederrheinischen Diozese Lüttich, zu dem Gründungskonsortium. Auch er wird unter Vertrag genommen: honorifice receptus stipendiis certis est retentus, ut dictum studium iniciaret in facultate theologie, so formuliert es Marsilius in seinem Eintrag ins Rektorbuch.11 8 Zl. 21-24. 9 Zl. 28-32. Der Auftrag im offiziellen Revers (oben bei Anm. 1) war deutlich weiter gefailt! 10 Vgl. S. Schumann, Die nationes an den Universitiiten Prag, Leipzig und Wien, Ein Beitrag zur iilteren Universitiitsgeschichte, Phil. Diss. FU Berlin (Berlin 1974), 129 mit Anm. 135. Auch F. Pelster, Der Heidelberger magister artium und baccalaureus theologiae Heilmann Wunnenberg ais Lehrer des Marsilius von Inghen und Erklarer der Sentenzen, Scholastik 19 (1944), 83-86. 11 (wie Anm. 6), Zl. 32-40. Vgl. H. Keuilen, Die Matrikel der Universitiit Kiiln, Bd. 1, 2. Aufl., Publikationen der Gesellschaft für Rheinische Geschichtskunde 8 (Bonn 1928), 8 (nr. 11.1), d. h. Reginald ist nicht nur der erste Theologe, der sich in Heidelberg in die

17

J.Miethke

Erst jetzt war die notwendige Dreizahl von Magistern erreicht, denn, so müssen wir ergii.nzen: Tres faciunt collegium 12 . Jetzt erst konnte man den nii.chsten Schritt tun. Für das zu gründende studium, für das der Papst sein Genehmigungspriv ileg geschickt hatte, konnte jetzt auch der tragende Personenverband, die universitas gebildet werden. Der Pfalzgraf stattete darum nun das studium auf Drii.ngen des Marsilius, wie ausdrücklich erwii.hnt wird, mit 5 grofSen Privilegien aus, die auf den 1. Oktober datiert sind, aber wohl erst eine Woche spii.ter, am 8. Oktober, den Magistern ausgehii.ndigt wurden. Marsilius vergilSt nicht, zwei Punkte eigens hervorzuheben: einmal sind die Urkunden von den drei Ruprechten, dem regierenden Ruprecht I. einerseits und seinen mitregierenden Verwandten Ruprecht II. und Ruprecht III. andererseits, jeweils gesiegelt worden, und sie tragen aufSerdem auch das Siegel der Stadt Heidelberg. Sodann hii.lt Marsilius fest, dafS er (spii.ter) eigens eine grofSe Archivtruhe, eine archa universitatis habe herstellen lassen, die er offenbar aus eigener Tasche bezahlt hatte und die er in der Heiliggeistkirche aufstellen liefS, um die Privilegien und andere wichtige Papiere der Universitii.t zu verwahren.13 Die universitas konnte jetzt offenbar den Lehrbetrieb aufnehmen, was auch am 18. und 19. Oktober geschah. Der Anfang war feierlich, doch kümmerlich. Die Magister teilten sich die Aufgaben. Nach einem festlichen Gottesdienst des Theologen de spiritu sancto, der den Auftakt bildete, hielten die drei Magister am folgenden Tag jeder seine Eroffnungsvorlesun g. Aber wirklich vollstii.ndig konstituiert war die Universitii.t noch immer nicht. Dafür bedurfte es noch der Wahl eines Rektors, denn die Beauftragung des Marsilius als verweser des Pfalzgrafen, als Amtstrii.ger genügte dafür natürlich nicht. Warum man das noch weiter hinauszogerte, wird klar, wenn wir den Fortgang des von Marsilius geschilderten Verlaufs ins Auge nehmen. Wie er schreibt, stiefS - endlich, so dürfen wir ergii.nzen - drei Wochen spii.ter als dritter Artistenmagister Dietmar Swerthe aus Prag14 zu den drei Heidelbergern. Matrikel aufnehmen lieil, er ist auch der erste, der in der Kôlner Matrikel erscheint. 12 Digesten 50, 16, 85, ed. Th. Mommsen, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Bd. 1 (Berlin 1877 u.ô.), 860. 13 AUH 1, nr. 72, Zl. 41-51; vgl. nr. 103, 173. Die Privilegien selbst bei Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch 1, nr. 4-9, 5-13 (auch AUH 1, nr. 5-9, 33-49). Zur Datierung vgl. Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch 1, nr. 1, 3, Zl. 5-8. 14 Schumann, Die nationes (wie Anm. 10), 129 mit Anm. 134.

18

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

Damit war auch die Artistenfakultiit mit der Mindestzahl eines Kollegiums ausgestattet und konnte gültige Wahlen vollziehen. Am 17. November 1386, genau 5 Wochen nach der Eroffnung der Lehrveranstaltungen, fand die Wahl des ersten Rektors statt. Die Magister einigten sich offenbar ohne Schwierigkeiten. Die drei Artisten liefSen sogar den vierten, den Theologen Reginald von Aulne mitwahlen, freilich ohne Prajudiz für die Zukunft, quia pauci adhuc erant magistri arcium15. - Zum Vergleich hat man mit Recht auf die Situation der unmittelbaren Konkurrenten Heidelbergs hingewiesen16: in Koln 1387 haben 21 Magister den ersten Rektor gewahlt, in Erfurt 1392 wenigstens noch 10! Die Wahl in Heidelberg fiel jedenfalls auf Marsilius von Inghen, der damit aus einem fürstlichen Kommissar zum Rektor der Universitat wurde, ohne daf5 er deshalb etwa seine Stellung im fürstlichen Rat hatte aufgeben müssen17. Einen Tag spater bitten der Rektor und die Artistenmagister den Pfalzgrafen um die Gewahung der nôtigen Siegel. Und Ruprecht gibt das groBe Universitiitssiegel und das kleinere Rektorsiegel auch sogleich in Auftrag18. Es geht jetzt Schlag auf Schlag - ich verzichte darauf, mich der Chronik der Tage entlang zu bewegen, wenn das auch durchaus seinen eigenen Reiz hatte. Halten wir kurz ein. Die Daten, so dürftig sie auch sind, lassen doch die Rechtsauffassungen des Marsilius von Inghen deutlich hervortreten. Einmal erfahren wir wiederum eigentlich nichts über die Personen, die handeln, über ihre Motive und Hoffnungen, über ihre Bedenken und Befürchtungen. Eine idealtypische Gründungsgeschichte wird erzahlt, reduziert auf den auBeren Ablauf der Akte.

15 AUH 1, nr. 73, 149 (bes. ZI. 7). 16 E. Wolgast, Sechshundert Jahre Universitii.t Heidelberg, Ruperto Carola 75 (1986), 716, hier 8. Vgl. bereits Ritter, Heidelberger Universitiit (wie Anm. 4), 72. 17 Dazu allgemeiner P. Moraw, Heidelberg: Universitat, Hof und Stadt im ausgehenden Mittelalter, Studien zum stiidtischen Bildungswesen des spiiten Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit, hgg. von B. Müller, H. Patze, K. Stackmann, Abh. d. Akad. d. Wiss. in Gôttingen, Philol.-hist. KI., IIl.137 (Gôttingen 1983), 524-552. 18 AUH 1, nr. 74, 149f. Vgl. unten Anm. 43.

19

J. Miethke Sodann sollte die Hochschule, die da gegründet wurde, sich dezidiert an das Pariser Vorbild anlehnen. Doch war diese Bestimmung natürlich eher programmatisc her Natur. Schon von den vier Gründungsma gistern des Berichtes kamen nur zwei aus Paris, die anderen beiden aber aus Prag. Und dieses zunachst noch ausgewogene Verhaltnis sollte sich noch bis zum Dezember 1387 nach Matrikeleintra gungen sehr zu ungunsten von Paris verschlechtern : 9 Magistern und Bakkalaren der oberen Fakultaten aus Paris standen insgesamt 23 gegenüber, die aus Prag gekommen waren, nur 2 weitere aus anderen Universitaten liefSen sich inskribieren. Bis 1388 lassen sich 44 Personen nachweisen, die direkt von Prag an das neugegründete Heidelberg übersiedelten19. Das ausdrücklich formulierte Programm der Anlehnung an Paris, das so offenkundig gegen die statistische Aufteilung der Ursprungsorte formuliert war, IafSt vielleicht gen, für dieses Mal konnte Marsilius sich noch einmal durchsetzen. Die acht Magister entschieden sich zu seinen Gunsten: statutum fuit concorditer perpetuis temporibus observandum, es sei auf alle Zeiten gültig in Heidelberg, daiS auch künftig der Rektor stets ausschlieiSlich ein Magister der Artisten sein salle und daiS, wer sein Magisterium oder Doktorat in einer hoheren Fakultiit bereits erlangt habe, nicht mehr zum Rektor erwiihlt werden dürfe, sicut hoc Parisius est consuetum et observatum et in privilegio ducis est expressum. Zum Ausgleich gewissermaiSe n wurde bestimmt, künftig salle in den Universitiitsve rsammlungen nicht mehr nach Kôpfen, sondern mit je einer Fakultiitsstimm e abgestimmt werden, so daiS der einzige Jurist ebensoviele Stimmen habe, wie selbst 20 oder 100 Artistenmagist er, quia eciam ita Parisius consuetum. Diese und weitere Beschlüsse salle der Rektor in modum statuti inviolabiliter perpetuis temporibus observandi ins Rektorbuch eintragen. Man spürt formlich, worauf es Marsilius bei seiner Notiz ankam. Mehrmals steht im Text ein Hinweis auf die Bindekraft der damals 30 Vgl. R. C. Schwinges, Deutsche Universitiitsbesucher im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, Studien zur Sozialgeschichte des Alten Reiches, Verôff. des Inst. für europ. Gesch. Mainz, Abt. Universalgesch. 123 (Stuttgart 1986), 369f., 372.

24

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

gefaBten Beschlüsse. Und ebenso sichtbar wird im Fortgang, dafS Marsilius bei allem Eifer und allem EinflufS, den er zweifellos hatte, auf die Dauer, auf die er ja gerade zielte, sich nicht durchzusetzen vermochte. Auch hier verzichte ich auf eine genaue Darstellung der einzelnen Etappen, aber zunachst auf dem Wege einer probeweisen Einführung unter Suspendierung des alten Statuts - wurde noch zu Lebzeiten des Marsilius, 1393 zunachst31 und dann über eine Verlangerung des Provisoriums immer wieder, entschieden, dafS in Heidelberg deinceps eligatur rector inter omnes doctores et magistros nostre universitatis, auch sollten alle doctores et magistri der Universitat die Wahler sein. Das passive wie das aktive Wahlrecht wurde damit allgemein auf die Magister und Doktoren übertragen. AufSerdem wurde die Wahlperiode des Rektors neu auf ein Halbjahr festgelegt; in dieser Form sollte sie das ganze Mittelalter hindurch bis zum Jahre 1522 Bestand haben, als schliefSlich das andernorts schon langst übliche jahrliche Rektorat auch in Heidelberg eingeführt worden ist32. Am 15. Juni 1393 war dieses Statut zum ersten Male beschlossen worden diesmal von 18 versammelten Magistern. 12 Tage spiiter wurde ein neuer Rektor gewahlt. Kann man es als Zufall ansehen, dafS Konrad von Soltau dabei das Rennen machte?3 3 Marsilius hatte offenbar nachgeben müssen, und er hat das, wie es scheint, letztlich ohne starre Rechthaberei getan. Er hat seinen langwierigen Kampf um die "Pariser Losung" in diesem Punkte schlicht aufgegeben, denn das neue Statut ist 1393 "ohne Gegenstimme (nemine discrepante)" beschlossen worden, und wurde 1395 erneut verlangert34, ebenfalls noch zu Lebzeiten des Marsilius. Offenbar hat Marsilius also der neuen Regelung auch 1395 nicht weiter widersprochen. DafS er sie gebilligt hatte, wird man daraus nicht ohne weiteres schliefSen dürfen. Aber er gab einer Entwicklung nach, die, wie sie sich auch anderwarts an den neu gegründeten Universitaten in Mitteleuropa zeigte35, 31 Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch I, nr. 31, 53-55 (künftig in AUH I, 2, nrr. 160-161 ). 32 H. Weisert, Die Verfassung der Universitiit Heidelberg 1386-1952, Abh.d.Heidelberger Akad. der Wiss., Phil.-hist.Kl. 1974, 2 (Heidelberg 1974), 21f. u. 55f. 33 H. Weisert, Die Rektoren und die Dekane der Ruperto Carola zu Heidelberg 1386-1985, Semper apertus, Festschrift, Bd. IV, hg. v. W. Dôrr (Berlin usw. 1986), 299-417, hier: 303,nr. 28. 34 Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch I, nr. 31, 55 (künftig AUH I, 2, nr. 161). 35 Zur Dauer des Rektorats in Kôln vgl. unten Anm. 54.

25

J. Miethke übermiichtig war und überall durchaus iihnliche Lôsungen brachte. Das Rektorat eines Artistenmagisters war an der Pariser Universitiit des 13. Jahrhunderts mit ihren relativ grofSen Studentenzahlen durchaus funktional, entsprach damals auch der kurzfristigen Dauer akademischer Lehre in allen Fakultiiten, wo man meistens nur im Durchgang zu anderen Karrieren eine Zeit lang tiitig war. Die geringere Frequenz an den sich provinzialisierenden Universitiiten des 14. Jahrhunderts einerseits, die zunehmende Professionalisierung aller Fakultiiten, die dem Universitiitslehrer eine durchaus gelungene Lebenskarriere erôffnete, andererseits, wirkten an einer Auflôsung dieses alten Modells der Verfassung mit. Denn die Professionalisierung bedeutete, dafS die Artistenstudenten stiirker und stiirker ihr Studium nicht mehr ausschliefSlich als Durchgangsphase für die hôheren Fakultiiten auffafüen. Die Artistenfakultiit bestand hinfort sozusagen als Hôhere Schule, die nicht überwiegend mehr ihre Fortsetzung in einem Studium der anderen Wissenschaften fand, oder sie doch dort nicht finden mufSte. Andererseits wuchs damit auch die soziale Distanz zwischen den Artisten und den Dozenten der hôheren Fakultiiten, erst recht zwischen Artistenstudenten und den etablierten Professoren der Theologie, der Medizin oder der Rechte, was eine effiziente organisatorische Zusammenfassung einer Universitiit unter einem Artistenmagister als ausschliefüiche Modellvorstellung sehr erschwerte36. DafS dabei nicht allein das Prestige der einzelnen Wissenschaft als solcher mafSgeblich war, das beweist das Aufkommen des spiitmittelalterlich-frühneuzeitlichen Adelsrektorats an deutschen Universitiiten, wo ja auch ein Rektor ohne eigentlich wissenschaftliche Qualifikationen, dafür aber mit umso stiirker ins Auge fallender sozialer Distanz an die Spitze gestellt wurde. In Heidelberg spielte aufSerdem ganz gewifS die Tatsache eine Rolle, dafS die Artes-Fakultiit in ihren bescheidenen Dimensionen einer Gliederung der Studentenschaft in Artistennationen keinen Raum gewiihrte. Ohne die Nationen aber fehlte einem Artistenrektor Pariser Musters eine ausreichend breite Abstützung. Die Niederlage des Marsilius war also gewifS kein Zufall. Es verdient aber unsere Beachtung, dafS er offenbar, auf verlorenem Posten kiimpfend, seine Entscheidung durchaus seinen Einsichten anzupassen verstand37. 36 Vgl. Schwinges, Universitiitsbesucher (wie Anm. 30), 368f. 37 Damais hat sich Marsi!ius keineswegs aus der Universitiit oder nur von Konrad von

26

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

Die Universitat Heidelberg hat ihrem Gründungsrek tor im ersten Jahrzehnt ihres Bestehens haufig zum Rektor gemacht. Achtmal hatte er bis 1393 das bis dahin vierteljahrliche Rektorat übernommen, ôfter als jeder andere Professor, denn sonst waren 1393 nur noch Heilmann Wunnenberg und Nikolaus Burgmann je dreimal und Friedrich von Sulzbach und ein Verwandter des Marsilius von Inghen, der Magister Franco von Inghen, je zweimal Rektor gewesen. Ein neuntes Rektorat mit der neuen sechsmonatige n Amtsperiode hat Marsilius dann noch einmal in seinem Todesjahr 1396 auf sich genommen. Er starb als Rektor seiner Universitat am 20. August 1396. Es waren offenbar diese insgesamt fast zwei Jahre im Rektorat, die für die Stabilisierung der Universitat entscheidend wurden. Marsilius hat, wie es scheint, mit zaher Zielstrebigkeit die Konsolidierun g des Studiums verfolgt und mit Energie, Einsatzfreude und Phantasie Hilfestellunge n gegeben, neue Moglichkeiten erkundet und realisiert und schlieBlich eine fast letale Krise gemeistert. Ich mochte diese Behauptungen ganz knapp beleuchten, um die Leistung des Marsilius von Inghen als Rektor der Universitat Heidelberg zu illustrieren. Seine Hilfestellung auf gewohnten Bahnen bestand etwa darin, daB er die BeschluBfassu ng über Statuten offenbar mit Verve voranbrachte. Das Rektorbuch zeigt in den Monaten seiner Rektorate besonders haufig nichtdisziplina re statutarische Eintrage. Natürlich war im ersten Rektorat der Regelungsbeda rf auch relativ groB. Da muBte beschlossen werden über Stundenplan und Festkalender, über Matrikelliste, Immatrikulationsgebühre n und Immatrikulati onseide und über die Zulassung anderwarts graduierter Magister oder Doktoren. Da muBten auch die Soltau zurückgezogen. Der Kampf der Universitat um die Freilassung des in Gefangenschaft geratenen Konrad von Soltau, den Marsilius zu seinem eigenen machte, verdiente hier eine eigene Beleuchtung. Vgl. Marsilius' eigenhandige Aufstellung über die Kosten, die ihm persiinlich entstanden waren, ohne dalS er wahrscheinlich sie jemals erstattet erhielt, ed. G. Tiipke, Die Matrikel der Universitiit Heidelberg, Bd. 1 (Heidelberg 1884), 676 (Marsilius kommt auf die erhebliche Gesamtsumme von 18 Gulden und 12 Schilling); in Marsilius' stuba versammelten sich am 2. Weihnachtsfeiertag, am 26. Dezember 1395 die wichtigsten Magister, um die Schritte der Universitat zu beraten (vgl. künftig AUH I, 2, nr. 185 ). Zu den Einzelheiten des Konflikts vor allem immer noch G. Tiipke, Die Harzer und deren Nachbarn auf der Universitat Heidelberg in den Jahren 1386-1662, Zeitschr. des Harzvereins für Geschichte und Alterthumskunde 13 (1880), 139-189, hier 140-144. (Die wichtigsten Aktenstücke künftig in AUH I, 2).

27

J. Miethke Fakultiitsstatuten der einzelnen Fakultaten erlassen werden. Marsilius hat das nicht alles selber geplant oder gar beschlossen, seine Rektorate zeigen nur seine besondere Aufmerksamkeit für diese Fragen in den von ihm stammenden Eintragungen38. Der wirtschaftlichen Sicherung der Magister und Studenten hat gewifS nicht er allein seine Bemühungen gewidmet. Durch seine Pariser Erfahrungen gewitzt, hat er aber von Anfang an das wenige, was damals üblich war, mit Eifer in Gang gesetzt. DaJS er beim Kurfürsten für die wirtschaftlichen Belange seiner Hochschule eintrat, werden wir noch sehen: in der ersten Zeit war freilich verstandlicherweise da über die Erstausstattung hinaus nicht so leicht voranzukommen. Mehr Aussicht hatte es, den Weg an die Kurie anzutreten, um vom Papst entsprechende Pfründzuweisungen, oder doch wenigstens die Verleihung von Expektanzen an die Universitatsmagister und Scholaren zu erbitten, durch die dem einzelnen Universitatsmitglied Pfründeinkünfte in freilich oft trügerische Aussicht gestellt wurden. Aus Heidelberg wissen wir nur, da13 die Universitat unter vielen begleitenden Beratungen und Beschlüssen sofort nach ihrer Eroffnung die iiltere Pariser Übung, an die Kurie einen sogenannten Supplikenrotulus abzuschicken, ohne Abstriche übernommen hat. Leider hat die Kurie der romischen Obedienz in der Schismazeit ihre Supplikenregister nicht entfernt so sorgfaltig geführt, wie die avignonesische, in der die Supplikenrotuli der Pariser Universitiit und die der anderen franzosischen Universitaten im allgemeinen erhalten blieben39. Aus dem romischen papstlichen Archiv haben wir dagegen überhaupt kaum überlieferte Akten. Immerhin sind aus dem Heidelberger Universitiitsarchiv, wo eigentlich keine besondere Veranlassung bestand, diese Rotuli aufzuheben, noch hinreichend Bruchstücke und Nachrichten erhalten, die uns die besondere Aktivitat der neuen Gründung in diese Richtung 38 Da das Rektorbuch nicht im Original erhalten blieb (vgl. G. Tôpke, Matrikel Heidelberg, Bd. 1, 623f., und J. Miethke, AUH I, 6), JaJSt sich eine Entscheidung darüber, welcher Eintrag in ein Rektorat des Marsilius fiillt, nicht immer mit absoluter Sicherheit treffen. Aus der Reihenfolge und der Zeitstellung liifü sich aber eine Zuweisung mit hinreichend groJSer Bestimmtheit in den meisten Fiillen erreichen. 39 Vgl. J. Verger, Le recrûtement géographique des universités françaises au début du 15e siècle d'après les suppliques de 1403, Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire 82, 2 (1970), 855-922. Jetzt besonders H. Diener, Die Hohen Schulen, ihre Lehrer und Schüler in den Registern der piipstlichen Verwaltung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts, Schulen und Studium (wie Anm. 20), 351-373, bes. 359-364.

28

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

hin bezeugen. Offenbar hat man diese Texte vor allem deshalb festgehalten, um das "Know how" zu speichern, wie man etwas zu tun habe, um die Aussichten auf Erfolg so günstig wie moglich zu gestalten40. So wissen wir denn für Heidelberg über die manchmal wichtige Reihenfolge der Eintragungen in dem ersten Rotulus, den die Universitiit an Urban VI. schickte, relativ gut Bescheid. Ein Statut darüber hat Marsilius im Rektorbuch festgehalten41. Als besonderes Kennzeichen dieser Bestimmungen kann man das Bestreben bezeichnen, als entscheidendes Kriterium der Reihenfolge vorwiegend korporationsspezifische, nicht allgemein soziale Geltung zu wiihlen. Das heiBt, daB nach dem Rektor, den Doktoren und Lizentiaten der Theologie, denen des kanonischen Rechts und der Medizin die magistri actu regentes der Artistenfakultiit folgen sollten, worauf sich die übrigen Artistenmagister und die baccalarii der hoheren Fakultiiten anschlossen, um schliefüich mit den Bakkalaren der Artisten und den Scholaren abzuschlieBen. Die Reihenfolge sollte, so wird immer wieder eingeschiirft, erfolgen für die Juristen "... nach der Reihenfolge ihrer Aufnahme in unsere Hochschule ... (secundum ordinem sue recepcionis in studio nostro)"; für die Bakkalare der Medizin, bzw. für die Artistenbakkalare "... nach ihrem Graduierungsalter ... (secundum etates suas in gradu baccalariatus, bzw. secundum ordinem etatis sue in gradu)"; für die Artistenscholaren "... nach ihrem Alter und der Reihenfolge ihrer Immatrikulation (secundum etates suas et inscripciones suas in matricula universitatis)". Kein Wort bisher von kirchlichen Priilaten und vom Adel, wie Marsilius ausdrücklich notiert, der das Statut wieder einmal ins Rektorbuch eingetragen hat: Advertendum est quod in premissis non est [acta mentio de nobilibus et magnas status habentibus in studio nostro ... , es solle auf ausdrücklichen BeschluB der universitas allein iuxta genus, statum, quem tenent in studio, mores ac scientiam die Reihenfolge ermittelt werden. GewiB war die Reduktion der Ordnungskriterien auf rein inneruniversitiire WertmaBstiibe ein Schritt, der Konflikte zurückdriingen 40 Das gilt vor allem für AUH I, nrr. 69-71 (141-146), die zum Bestand des juristischen Dekansbuchs gehi:iren (aus dem Rektorbuch vgl. nur die nrr. 85, 90f., 159-161, 164f.), wiihrend die Aufbewahrung des groBen Rotulus von 1401 (Teildruck bei Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch I, nr. 54, 80-91, künftig Volldruck in AUH I, 3) sich aus diesem Motiv natürlich nicht erkliiren liiBt. 41 AUH I, nr. 85, 159-161. Vgl. dazu die Eri:irterung von Schwinges, Universitiitsbesucher (wie Anm. 30), 367-370.

29

J.Miethke

konnte, wenn man sich auf ihn zu einigen vermochte. In Prag hatte die Diskrepanz zwischen den sozialen Ansprüchen der Juristen und dem eifersüchtigen Rangbewu!Stsein der Artisten und Theologen im Jahre 1372 zu einer Spaltung der Universitat in zwei Universitaten geführt42. In Heidelberg wollte man ahnliche Entwicklungen wohl von vorneherein ausschlie!Sen. Man hat darüber diskutiert, ob diese Bestimmung als Zeichen eines Fortschritts im Sinne einer "Verbürgerlichung" der Provinzuniversitate n aufzufassen sei, oder, was sicherlich richtiger ist, als utopischer Versuch, dem sonst so haufig übermachtigen Adelsprinzip einen Riegel vorzuschieben. In unserem Zusammenhang kommt es auf eine Entscheidung dieser Kontroverse nicht an. Jedenfalls wurde in Heidelberg versucht, und sei es in unzeitigem Vorgriff, die allgemeine Situation der Gesellschaft gleichsam aus der künstlichen Ordnung der Universitat auszugrenzen - und damit Konflikte innerhalb der Universitat zu verkleinern oder auszuschalten. Marsilius hat damals den Vorsitz geführt: hat er nicht auch das Konzept geteilt? Hatte Marsilius für die rechtliche Normierung des universitaren Lebens anscheinend einen besonderen Sinn, so suchte er auch die Selbstdarstellung der Universitat nach au!Sen und innen zu bedenken. Zwei rasche Entscheidungen sind ihm zuzurechnen: noch am 18. November 1386, einen Tag nach seiner Wahl zum ersten Rektor der Universitat, hat er den Kurfürsten davon überzeugt, da!S die junge Korporation auch die notigen Siegel zur Bekraftigung ihrer rechtsgeschaftlich en Willenserklarunge n benotige. Ein hervorragender, uns unbekannter Goldschmied43 hat die heute noch erhaltenen Typare des gro!Sen Universitatssiegels und des kleineren Rektorsiegels auf kurfürstlichen Befehl hin hergestellt. Die Universitat konnte diese unentbehrlichen Zeichen der Rechtspersonlichk eit, die nach den zeitgenossischen Anschauungen unbedingt zum Ausweis einer privilegierten Genossenschaft gehorten, somit schon bald in Gebrauch nehmen - und Marsilius hat es nicht unterlassen, diesen Entschlu!S des Kurfürsten, der, wie er schreibt, auf seine eigene Intervention und auf die Bitte der an42 Zuletzt Moraw, Universitiit Prag (wie Anm. 20), 39f. 43 Die Universitat Heidelberg stand in Beziehungen zu dem Goldschmied Hans Flasche, der ihr am 8. Januar 1401 sein Haus mit Hof und Garten in der Augustinergasse verkaufte unter Vorbehalt eines Wohnrechts auf Lebenszeit, vgl. AUH 1, nr. 67 u. 68 (138-141).

30

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

deren beiden Artistenmagister hin erfolgte, im Rektorbuch sauberlich zu verzeichnen 44 . Wenig spater dann, im Februar 1388, es war bereits sein zweites Rektorat, das er verwaltete, konnte er ebenso klar eintragen, daiS auf seine Anregung hin aus den Überschüssen, die bei der Kollekte für die erste Rotulusgesandtschaft nach Rom an die Kurie übrig geblieben waren, und die ja unter verschiedenen Rektoren 45 eingesammelt worden war, für die Anschaffung einer virga communis universitatis, eines Universitatsszepters ausgegeben werden sollte. Man lieiS in einer prachtigen Ausführung bei einem uns wiederum unbekannten Goldschmied ein noch heute in wesentlichen Stücken existierendes Szepter herstellen, das als vergoldeter Silberstab mit einer ansehnlichen Bekronung im Gewicht von insgesamt 561/2. Mark und einer halben Unze (d.h. von zumindest ca. 13 kg46) auch seinen erheblichen Preis hatte: 56 schwere Rheinische Taler und 2 Schilling StraiSburger Pfennige - eine bedeutende Summe, die noch das Durchschnittsjahressalar eines Artistenmagisters übertraf47. Wie wir aus der Abrechnung des Marsilius nach dem Rektorat in dieser Amtsperiode wissen, blieb die Universitat ihm damals 12 Gulden und 2 Schilling schuldig48. Die Vermutung ist naheliegend, daB hier Marsilius personlich einen VorschuB für die gemeinschaftliche Reprasentationsaufgabe geleistet hatte. Ob er diesen Geldbetrag, von dem ein Scholar etwa ein Jahr lang leben konnte, jemals von der Universitat zurück erhalten 44 AUH 1, nr. 74 (149f.), vgl. dazu zuletzt J. M. Fritz, in: Mittelalterliche Universitatszepter, Meisterwerke europaischer Goldschmiedekunst der Gotik, Ausstellungskatalog (Heidelberg 1986), 18f., nr. 2. - Zur Geschichte der Pariser Universitiitssiegel zuletzt W. Maleczek, Papsttum (wie Anm. 21), 93, 107-109. Zum bildlichen Programm vor allem H. Boockmann, Ikonographie der Universitiiten, Bemerkungen über bildliche und gegenstiindliche Zeugnisse der spiitmittelalterlichen deutschen Universitiiten-Geschichte, Schulen und Studium (wie Anm. 20), 565-599, hier 569-574. 45 Es waren neben Marsilius selbst Heilmann Wunnenberg, Johannes Berswort de Tremonia (aus Dortmund) und Johannes von Wachenheim, vgl. Weisert, Die Rektoren (wie Anm. 33), 302. 46 Vgl. H. Witthôft, Umrisse einer historischen Metrologie zum Nutzen der wirtschaftsund sozialgeschichtlichen Forschung, Maft und Gewicht in Stadt und Land Lüneburg ( .. .) vom 13. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert, Verôff. d. Max-Planck-Instituts f. Gesch. 60/1-2 (Gôttingen 1979), z. B. 65 (Lüneburger Mark ca. 243 g), 72 (Kôlner Mark ca. 230 g), 93 (schwedische Mark ca. 213 g). 47 AUH 1, nr. 97, 169, zum Szepter Fritz in: Universitatszepter (wie Anm. 44), 16f., nr. 1., Boockmann, Ikonographie (wie Anm. 44), 574f. Zu den Zahlungen an Magister vgl. etwa den Finanzbericht des Konrad von Soest (wie unten Anm. 61), bes. 369. Einzelaufstellungen bei H. Weisert, Universitiit und Heiliggeiststift, Die Anfünge des Heiliggeiststifts zu Heidelberg, Ruperto Carola 64 (1980), 55-77, u. 65/66 (1981), 72-87. 48 Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch II, Reg. nr. 40, 5 - nach Tôpke, Matrikel Heidelberg, 1, 27.

31

J. Miethke hat, ist uns nicht bekannt. Wenn Marsilius wirkungsvoll und groBzügig im Amte des Rektors seine eigenen bedeutenden Mittel für seine Universitat einsetzte, so tat er damit ohne Zweifel das, was man damals von einem Rektor erwartete und was andere an seiner Stelle gewiB auch zumindest angestrebt hatten. Trotzdem war es sicherlich auch ein groBes Verdienst, das sich der Gründungsrektor damit erworben hat49. Er hat aber darüber hinaus in einer geführlichen Krisensituation der jungen Gründung energisch und besonnen das schlingernde Schiff wieder auf Kurs gebracht und anschlieBend für eine bleibende Stabilisierung zu sorgen vermocht. Damit hat er zur endgültigen Konsolidierung der Heidelberger Gründung noch einmal entscheidend beigetragen. Marsilius war nicht Rektor, als eine Katastrophe über die junge Gründung hereinzubrechen drohte. Nach dem "Prager" Magister Dietmar Swerthe, der an der Wahl des ersten Rektors teilgenommen hatteSO, mit dem ersten Heidelberger rotulus an die Kurie gereist war und der selber das Rektorat in Heidelberg von Ende Juni bis zum 10. Oktober 1388 versehen hatte, hatten die Artisten den ebenfalls aus Prag zugewanderten Magister Berthold Suderdick aus Osnabrück51 gewahlt. Kurz darauf, nur wenig mehr als einen Monat spater, im November 1388, muB es zum Eklat gekommen sein. Marsilius selbst hat zornbebend in die Matrikel eingetragen52, was da geschah: Rektor Berthold et una secum magistris Hertlevo de Marka et Theoderico de Monasterio et fere simul omnibus scolaribus, paucis in comparatione demptis, zogen von Heidelberg fort 49 Damit setzte er nur fort, was er bereits - den institutionellen Erwartungen in einer mittelalterlichen Universitiit voll entsprechend - in Paris getan hatte, vgl. die bereits von Ritter, Marsi/ius (wie Anm. 23), 14, zusammengestellten Belege (Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle u. Ae. Châtelain, Bd. 3 (Paris 1894), ND Bruxelles 1964, nrr. 1338 und 1369, 166 u. 200). Zum Erwerb der Toumosen für Heidelberg vgl. unten Anm.60-61. 50 Vgl. oben Anm. 14. Die Gesandtschaft in Rom AUH I, nr. 90 (164f.). 51 Schumann, Die nationes (wie Anm. 10), 131 mit Anm. 146, sowie Keu15en, Matrikel Kain (wie Anm. 11), 42* (nr. 16) und 11 (nr. I 22) 52 Topke, Matrikel Heidelberg (wie Anm. 37), Bd. I, 34. Zu Hartlevus de Marka und Teodericus de Kerkering (auch er ein Rektor in K61n!) vgl. neben Schumann, Die nationes, 146, bzw. 130 mit Anm. 254, bzw. 165, Keu15en, Matrikel Koln, 42* (nr.1) und 7 (nr. I 20), bzw. 44* (nr. 47) und 6 (nr. 16). Zu den Beziehungen des Hartlevus zu Marsilius: J. Miethke, Autograph des Heidelberger Gründungsrektors Marsilius von Inghen, Bibliotheca Palatina, Katalog zur Ausstellung, Textband, hg. v. E. Mittler (Heidelberg 1986), 43-45, hier 44b-45a.

32

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

nach KOln, wo gerade erst im Frühjahr des Jahres 1387 eine neue, eine stiidtische Universitat gegründet worden war. Diese Massenflucht zur niederrheinischen Konkurrenz zog nachweislich einen GrofSteil der wenigen Magister von Heidelberg fort, aber auch viele Studenten. Eine Teilauszahlung der Matrikel erbrachte, dafS von den 421 Universitatsbesuchern aus den Diôzesen KOln, Lüttich, Utrecht, Cambrai und Münster, die in den 15 Jahren von 1386 bis 1401 sich in Heidelberg hatten immatrikulieren lassen, 127 sich auch in KOlns Matrikel finden, das sind ca. 30% ! Fünfzehn Magister aus Heidelberg sind allein im ersten Jahr in die Kôlner Matrikel eingetragen53, darunter auch das Gründungsmitglied, der Theologe Reginald von Aulne, der frühere Heidelberger Rektor Johannes Berswort, sowie der erste gewahlte Rektor der Universitiit KOln, der Artistenmagister Hartlevus de Marka. Johannes Berswort und Dietrich Kerkering sind dann rasch in KOln zum Rektor gewahlt worden und auch der flüchtige Heidelberger Rektor Berthold Suderdick hat bereits 1392/93 wieder das (in KOln zunachst ebenfalls dreimonatige) Rektorat am neuen Ort seiner Lehre übernommen54. Über die Gründe gibt Marsilius selbst eine nüchterne Auskunft: Attende

hic recessum rectoris propter epydemiam et guerras et fere omnium scholarium et errectionem studii Coloniensis, so schreibt er als zusammenfassende Marginalnotiz in die Matrikel55, und die moderne Forschung ist ihm in dieser Einschatzung gefolgt. In der Tat hat die in Heidelberg aufflackernde Pest, verbunden mit dem Heidelberger Anteil am grofSen Stadtekrieg von 1388 zwischen Fürsten und Stiidten im Südwesten des Reichs, der damals noch nicht entschieden war56, die Attraktion der Kôlner Neugründung ungemein verstarkt. DafS der Rektor mit 53 Diese Zahlen hat schon G. Ritter, Universitiit, 72, errechnet. 54 Vgl. nur Keussen, Matrikel Kiiln (wie Anm. 11) 42* (nrr. 1, 7, 16, usw.), 4 (nr. I 6), 5 (nrr. I 7, 11, 12), 6 (nrr. I 14, 16), 7 (nr. I 20), 8 (nr. II 1), 11(nrr.II22, 25, 26), usw. - zur Dauer des Rektorats vgl. die Aufstellung ebda. 42*: nur die ersten beiden Rektorate in Kêiln dauerten ca. 6 Monate, ab 1394 wird es zunehmend üblich (ab 1398 scheint es dann die Regel), zwei dreimonatige Rektorate hintereinander zu bekleiden. Jetzt auch E. Meuthen, Die alte Universitiit, Kêilner Universitatsgeschichte, 1 (Kêiln/Wien 1988), 68f. 55 Tôpke, Matrikel Heidelberg, Bd. l, 34, Anm. 4. 56 Zu diesem Krieg vgl. immer noch die anschauliche Schilderung von L. Hausser,

Geschichte der rheinischen Pfalz nach ihren politischen, kirchlichen und literarischen Verhiiltnissen, Bd. 1 (Mannheim 21856, Neudruck Speyer 1978), 182-184. Handbuchdarstellung etwa durch F. Baethgen, Schisma und Konzilszeit, Reichsreform und Habsburgs Aufstieg, Gebhardts Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte, 9. Aufl. hg. v. H. Grundmann, Taschenbuchausgabe Bd. 6, dtv WR 4206 (München 1973 u.êi.), 24f.

33

J. Miethke fortgezogen war, war ein besonderes Problem: im Rektor verkorperte sich die universitas und man konnte die Frage stellen, ob damit nicht die ganze Universitat abgezogen sei57. Hier erwies sich der Nutzen des Drangens auf gediegene Symbole: weder Siegel noch Szepter waren den Weg nach Kôln mitgegange n. Erst recht war Marsilius geblieben. Vielleicht sah er keine Veranlassun g, seine Position in Heidelberg zugunsten unklarer Zukunftsaus sichten aufs Spiel zu setzen, obwohl er ein Kanonikat und die Dignitat des Thesaurars am Kôlner Stift St. Andreas innehatte58 und also auch in Kôln "versorgt" gewesen ware: Marsilius blieb in Heidelberg und übernahm sofort interimistisc h das Amt des Rektors für den - freilich nùr kurzen - verbleibenden Rest dieser Amtsperiod e: ob ihm dazu seine "Verwesersc haft", sein Vikariat für den Pfalzgrafen geholfen hat, das Ruprecht 1. ihm seinerzeit eingeraumt hatte, wissen wir nicht. Jedenfalls leitete er anscheinend sofort energische Schritte zur Begrenzung des Schadens ein. Und in der Tat gelang es ihm, den Bestand seiner Universitat zu sichern. Es kennzeichne t seine Klarsicht, daf5 er damit nicht schon zufrieden war, sondern daf5 er hinfort standig bestrebt scheint, mit Hartnackigk eit, Phantasie und Einsatzbere itschaft die wirtschaftli chen Grundlagen des Heidelberge r Studiums zu festigen und zu erweitern. Zuerst gab der Regierungsan tritt Papst Bonifaz' IX. Anlaf5 zu einem neuen Supplikenrotulus, der diesesmal von Marsilius personlich, zusammen bezeichnenderweis e mit Konrad von Soltau nach Rom gebracht worden ist. Wichtige Privilegien, die Bestellung papstlicher Konservato ren und die Inkorporatio n von 12 nahegelegen en Stiftspfründ en, sind damals erreicht worden59. Nach dem Tode Ruprechts 1. verstand es Marsilius zudem geschickt, den Nachfolger Ruprecht Il. zu der Stiftung einer exorbitanten Summe von angeblich 3000 fl. auf einmal an seine Universitat zu veranlassen 60, als er 57 H. Jakobs, Auswanderun gen aus der Universitiit Heidelberg in Pestzeiten, Das Beispiel Eppingen 1564/65, Ruperto Carola 75 (1986), 65-75, hier 69. 58 AUH 1, nr. 72 (147, Zl. 29f.). 59 Vgl. AUH 1, nrr. 11und60 (46-49 u. 118-124). 60 Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch 1, nr. 29, 50-51. Freilich ist anscheinend nicht die gesamte Summe zur Auszahlung gelangt: vgl. bereits Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch 1, Nr. 29, Nachbemerku ng (51) und besonders künftig AUH 1, 2, nr. 156 (fol. 48r-v), wo zum November 1392/Jan. 1393 in einem Eintrag des Marsilius ausdrücklich vermerkt wird, der Pfalzgraf habe von den weiteren der Universitiit zur Aus16sung der Toumosen zur

34

Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

dem Pfalzgrafen 1390 bei seiner Rückkehr aus Rom die Kommutation einer moglichen, aber offenbar unerwünschten Jubelwallfahrt zum Rom des piipstlichen "anno santo" 1390 schmackhaft zu machen wuf5te61. Nach der Urkunde hatte der Kurfürst 3000 Gulden für kirchliche Zwecke seines Landes auszugeben und wahrscheinlich denselben Betrag an die Kurie Bonifaz' IX. abzuführen62. Dann durfte er damit rechnen, derselben Abliisse und Indulgenzen teilhaftig zu werden, die fromme Rompilger dort anhiiufen konnten. Die Universitiit hat aus den damals ihr vom Fürsten überschriebenen Zolleinnahmen von Bacharach und Kaiserswerth63 bis zum Jahre 1798 feste Einnahmen von betriichtlicher Hohe ziehen konnen64. Wie für die Pfalz allgemein waren so die Rheinzolle auch für die Heidelberger Universitiit eine wesentliche finanzielle Basis und stets sprudelnde Einnahmequelle. lch müfSte jetzt noch über die grofSe Politik der Universitat in der Schismazeit und des Marsilius Anteil daran berichten. Der Kampf in Heidelberg gegen die Pariser Lizenzen, die der dortige (natürlich im Verfügung gestellten 2000 fl. nur 1000 fl. wirklich ausgezahlt, et alii mille sumi debebant de pecuniis, quas habebat universitas tam adhuc de aliis datis per dictum dominum ducem, quam restantibus de testamento domini prepositi [d.i. Konrad von Gelnhausen], quam eciam de pecuniis, quas recepit universitas de libris sibi ad collegium assignatis sumptis in expulsione ludeorum. Der Pfalzgraf - es war Ruprecht II. - nutzte also offenbar die Gelegenheit zu einer Generalbereinigung der Finanzlage der Universitiit, bei der er zugleich auch einen erklecklichen Teil seiner Verpflichtungen einzusparen in der Lage war, indem er schon geleistete Auszahlungen nachtraglich ais Teil der pii usus deklarierte. 61 Die Initiative des Marsilius ist ausdrücklich bezeugt im Finanzbericht der Universitat, erstattet 1410 durch den damaligen Rektor Konrad von Soest an Kurfürst Ludwig III., vor!aufig (nicht ohne Fehler) gedruckt bei J. F. Hautz, Geschichte der Universitiit Heidelberg, Bd. II (Mannheim 1864, Neudruck Hildesheim 1980), 366-370, nr. XVIII, hier 368, Zl. 12-16 (künftig AUH 1, 2 nr. 446). 62 Diese Zahlungen (über die freilich keinerlei Nachrichten überliefert sind) müssen dann vorausgesetzt werden, wenn Papst Bonifaz IX. diese besondere Gnade nicht aus politischen Gründen ohne Gegenleistung gewahrt hat (worüber wir ebensowenig wissen; es widersprache jedoch der damais üblichen Praxis), vgl. allgemein A. Esch, Bonifaz IX. und der Kirchenstaat, Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom 29 (Tübingen 1969), 56-58 (mit der a!teren Literatur). 63 Winkelmann, Urkundenbuch 1, nr. 32 (56f.) 64 Vgl. dazu im einzelnen etwa H. Brunn, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Universitiit Heidelberg von 1558 bis zum Ende des 17. /ahrhunderts, phi!. Diss. (masch.) Heidelberg 1950, bes. 112-117, und G. Merkel, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Universitiit Heidelberg im 18. /ahrhundert, Verôff. d. Komm. f. gesch. Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg, B 73 (Stuttgart 1973), 4, 153-173, bes. 160f. Zuletzt M. Vetter, Zur Finanzierung der Universitat Heidelberg im Mittelalter, Die Einnahmen aus den Rheinzôllen in Bacharach und Kaiserswerth bis zum Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts, Ruperto Carola 78 (1988), 59-66.

35

J. Miethke Schisma clementistisch e) Kanzler erteilt hatte65, ware da ebenso zu nennen, wie andere Aktivitaten66, an denen wir unseren Marsilius als überzeugten Anhanger der romischen Obedienz eifrig beteiligt sehen. Darauf soll hier nicht mehr niiher eingegangen werden. Doch ich meine wirklich nicht, eine saubere Rollenteilung zwischen dem Rektor der Universitiit und dem kurfürstlichen pfaffen, dem Mitglied des kurfürstlichen Rates und Hofes Marsilius vornehmen zu konnen. Auch auf diesem Felde hat Marsilius seine Meinungen kriiftig und mehrheitsbilde nd in seiner Universitiit zu verbreiten gewuBt. Wieweit er bei Hofe die politische Haltung der Pfalz mitbestimmte, das freilich entzieht sich unserer Kenntnis. Das alles bleibe hier unbehandelt. Ein kurzes Wort noch zu Marsilius' letztem Dienst für seine Heidelberger Universitiit. Am 23. Juni 1396 war Marsilius zum letzten, zum 9. Male zum Rektor gewiihlt worden, am 20. August dieses Jahres ist er gestorben67, nicht ohne in den Monaten zuvor die Manuskripte seiner Bibliothek sorgfaltig durch eigenhiindige Aufschriften testamentarisc h zu vergeben. Den Lowenanteil erhielt die Universitiit Heidelberg, die dann aber nachweislich ohne Rücksicht auf die wenigen anderen Verfügungen den ganzen Bestand in ihre Obhut nahm68, eine wichtige Quelle der Schiitze der Universitiitsbib liothek noch in spateren Zeiten. Auch Marsilius hat damit zur materiellen Fundierung der universitas studii heydelbergensis einen bemerkenswer ten Beitrag geleistet.

65 Vgl. vor allem AUH 1, nr. 93 u. 102 (167 u. 171f. - Eintrage in das Rektorbuch, von denen nur der letzte wahrscheinlich von Marsilius stammt, der erste wohl aus dem Rektorat des Johannes Berswort). 66 Etwa die Beratungen mit Abgesandten des franzosischen Konigs zur Kirchenfrage, zu denen die Universitat eine Abordnung stellt, an der Marsilius teilnimmt, vgi. AUH 1, nr. 124 (Regest; Text künftig in AUH 1, 2). Auch die Errichtung eines Studienhauses der Zisterzienser rèimischer Observanz anstelle des Pariser Collegium Sti. Bemardi gehôrt hierher, vgl. etwa AUH 1, nr. 56, 1lüf., dazu ebenda, nr. 2, 13f. Dazu die gediegene Untersuchung von J. M. Grothe, Cistercians and Higher Education in the Late Middle Ages with a special reference to Heidelberg, PhD-Thesis: Catholic University of America, Washington D.C. 1976 (masch.). 67 Weisert, Die Rektoren (wie Anm. 33), 303, nr. 34. 68 Das Verzeichnis seiner Bücher (237 Tite!) hat die Universitat sowohl ins Rektorbuch, ais auch - in anderer Fassung - in die Matrikel aufgenommen, ed. Tôpke, Matrikel Heidelberg, Bd. 1, 678-685 (eine weitere Ausgabe ist für AUH 1, 2 vorgesehen). Zur MiBachtung der eigenhandig in die einzelnen Manuskripte eingetragenen Verfügungen des Marsilius durch die Universitat vgl. Miethke, Autograph (wie Anm. 52), 44b.

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Marsilius als Rektor der Universitiit Heidelberg

Ich breche ab. Wir haben nur einen Auszug aus den vielfaltigen Aktivitiiten des Rektors Marsilius von Inghen hier behandelt. Marsilius hat, an der Grenze zwischen zwei Epochen der europiiischen Universitiitsgeschichte stehend, bei der Transformation Pariser Traditionen und ihrer Umgestaltung für die kleineren Verhiiltnisse der spiitmittelalterlichen Landesuniversitiiten entscheidende Weichen stellen helfen. Für Heidelberg hat er in einigen Punkten sich nicht durchsetzen kônnen, in anderen hat er die Gestalt dieser Universitiit bis ins 18. und 19. Jahrhundert hinein gepriigt. So haben die Folgen seiner praktischen Tiitigkeiten noch liingere Nachwirkungen gehabt, als seine akademischen Zweckschriften mit ihrem ohnedies groBen Widerha1169. Freilich steht Marsilius in seiner praktischen Tiitigkeit noch deutlicher in der Reihe seiner Zeitgenossen und spricht vor allem als Repriisentant des 14. Jahrhunderts zu uns, das in mancherlei Hinsicht uns niiher ist, als wir es selber immer wissen. Vielleicht hat Marsilius nicht zuletzt dazu beigetragen, daf5 das so ist, wie es ist.

69 Stark wirkungsgeschichtlich orientiert ist der schone Essay von R. Specht, Marsilius von Inghen, über die Bedeutung des ersten Rektors der Universitat Heidelberg, Ruperto Carola 75 (1986), 17-22. Zu der handschriftlichen Überlieferung seiner Schriften jetzt die Übersicht von M. Markowski, in diesem Band.

37

MARSILIUS OF INGHEN AS THEOLOGIAN

W.J.

COURTENAY

In the early 1390s, probably in the autumn of 1392, Marsilius of Inghen began his lectures on the Sentences at Heidelberg either in the theological lecture hall of the Franciscan convent or, more likely, in the newly acquired Marienkapelle.1 The Heidelberg faculty of theology at that time was still quite small. It no longer possessed its founding member, the Cistercian Reginald of Aulne, who was a doctor of theology from Paris and who abandoned the town on the Neckar for the metropolis of Cologne in 1389.2 Conrad of Gelnhausen, who for a time had apparently also served as a regent in theology, had died in 1390.3 Conrad of Soltau, who had arrived in 1387 from Prague, was apparently the sole remaining doctor of theology, providing lectures on the Bible (perhaps repeating

1 On June 15, 1393 Marsilius is mentioned for the first time in the Heidelberg documents as bachelor of theology, and in November and December of 1394 he is described as baccalarius formatus; Urkundenbuch der Universitiit Heidelberg, ed. E. Winkelmann, 2 vols. (Heidelberg 1886), I, 53 and 59. By the time Marsilius began his lectures on book four of the Sentences, he had learned of the death of James of Eltville, which occurred in 1393 ("magister meus bonae memoriae Magister Jacobus de Erbaco" on fol. 475va in the Strasbourg edition of 1501). These facts, alongside the massive size of Marsilius's commentary and the two-year reading of the Sentences required at Heidelberg, make it almost certain that it was delivered across the biennium 1392-94. Before the confiscation of the Jewish synagogue and its renovation and dedication to St. Mary as a meeting place and lecture hall of the theological faculty in 1391 [Urkundenbuch I, 51-53; Die Amtsbücher der Universitiit Heidelberg, Reihe A: Die Rektorbücher der Universitiit Heidelberg I/1: 1386-1410, ed. J. Miethke (Heidelberg 1986), 11-12], the Franciscan cloister served that purpose; see Jürgen Miethke, Universitatsgründung an der Wende zum 15. Jahrhundert: Heidelberg im Zeitalter des Schismas und des Konziliarismus, Die Geschichte der Universitiit Heidelberg: Vortriige im Wintersemester 1985/86 (Heidelberg 1986), 9-33, at 20-23. 2 Miethke, Universitii.tsgründung, 19-21. 3 Conrad of Gelnhausen is specifically referred to as having been regent in theology (Urkundenbuch I, 13: "de die anniversario domini Conradi de Geylnhusen nuper regentis in hac alma universitate in sacra theologia et cancellarii primi dicti studii").

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those he gave on the Psalms at Prague in 1385).4 Heilmann of Wunnenberg, the other member of the founding triumvirate of the university along with Marsilius and Reginald, was already a bachelor of theology from Prague by 1386 and was still at the rank of formed bachelor when Marsilius lectured on the Sentences and used him as a socius for purposes of debate in his principial lecture. John Holzsadel, was a fellow sententiarius with Marsilius, thus creating the three bachelors or socii minimally necessary for the confrontational setting of the baccalaureate.s Despite the crisis of 1388-89 occasioned by the founding of the University of Cologne, the arts faculty was on a sufficiently solid basis to permit its most prestigious lecturer, Marsilius, to turn his attention toward the completion of his theological degree, which he accomplished sometime between June 17, 1395 and June 23, 1396, not long before his death on August 20, 1396.6 At the time of his inception, there were at least two regent masters of theology (both from Prague): Conrad of Soltau and Matthew of Cracow, the second of whom had arrived at Heidelberg in 1394. 7 For reasons that are unclear, both Marsilius and John Holzsadel, in that order, were promoted to the magisterium before Wunnenberg, who 4 Gerhard Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik 1: Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften (Heidelberg 1921), 38-39. On Conrad of Soltau's Psalms commentary see Friedrich Stegmüller, Repertorium biblicum medii aevi, Vol. 2 (Madrid 1950), 253-54. On July 18, 1394 Nicholas Prowin is mentioned along with Matthew of Cracow as regent masters in theology (Urkundenbuch 1, 58). We do not know when Prowin began his regency. 5 Marsilius von Inghen, Quaestiones super IV libros Sententiarum (Strasbourg 1501), fol. 1vb: "arguam cum venerandis magistris meis et patribus Magistro Heilmanno Wunnenbergher baccalario formato huius almae universitatis et decano Nuhusensis, et Domino Johanne de domo sancti Guilelmi baccalario actu legenti"; and Ritter, Marsilius, 38. On Wunnenberg see Gustav Ti:ipke, Die Matrikel der Universitiit Heidelberg von 1386 bis 1662, Vol. 1 (Heidelberg 1884), 7; Franz Pelster, Der Heidelberger Magister artium und Baccalarius theologiae Heilmann Wunnenberg ais Lehrer des Marsilius von Inghen und Erkliirer der Sentenzen, Theologische Quartalschrift 125 (1944), 83-86; Sabine Schumann, Die "nationes" an den Universitiiten Prag, Leipzig und Wien. Ein Beitrag zur iilteren Universitiitsgeschichte, Phil. Diss. Freie Universitiit Berlin, 1974, 129 n. 135. The Iast item is taken from Miethke, Universitiitsgründ ung, 30. Wunnenberg apparently helped Marsilius provide lectures in philosophy during the first academic year of 138687 (Urkundenbuch I, 1: "ut eciam idem studium in facultate artium iuvaret inchoare"), but gave (repeated?) lectures on the Bible or the Sentences in the following year for the faculty of theology; Ti:ipke, Die Matrikel 1, 15, Anm. 2: "... Wunnenberg ... magister in artibus solemnis et baccalarius sacrae theologiae actu Iegens cursus suos in eadem," cited and commented on by Pelster, Heidelberger Magister, 85. 6 Ritter, Marsilius, 40; Pelster, Heidelberger Magister, 85, note 12. 7 Ritter, Marsilius, 38-39. Nicholas Prowin may still have been regent (Urkundenbuch I, 58).

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Marsilius as Theologian

apparently remained at the rank of baccalarius formatus for a decade or more, perhaps forever.8 Although Gerhard Ritter acknowledged that Marsilius had begun his theological studies at Paris in 1366, he assumed his continuing duties in the arts faculty and his eventual involvement in university and church politics prevented his making any significant progress in the higher faculty. For Ritter, Marsilius's real theological training began after he left Paris in 1377, most likely when he went to Germany in or before 1386. Ritter was puzzled by Marsilius's description of his fellow bachelors Wunnenberg and Holzsadel as his masters or teachers, and by Marsilius's later mention of James of Eltville as another of his masters.9 While Ritter hypothesized a possible period of residence and study at the Cistercian monastery of Eberbach in the Rheingau, where James was abbot, similar to the sojourn Henry of Langenstein made there before going on to Vienna, Ritter dismissed any serious influence of Wunnenberg or Holzsadel on Marsilius, preferring to view Conrad of Soltau as his acknowledged teacher in theology. Franz Pelster subsequently found new evidence, which he interpreted to mean that Wunnenberg was indeed the teacher of Marsilius and that his relationship developed through the degreerequired lectures Wunnenberg supposedly gave on the Bible and the Sentences at Heidelberg between 1387 and 1392.10 For Ritter (and Pelster), then, Marsilius's massive Sentences commentary was the first fruit and founding (surviving) document of Heidelberg theology, entirely reflective of the milieu of German theology during the papal 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 38-40. 10 Pelster, Heidelberger Magister, 83-86. Pelster's article was initiated by his discovery of an editorial insertion in the 1596 edition of Peter Aureoli's Scriptum super Sententias that described Heilmann as "praeceptoris Marsilii Inghen." Pelster's argument, however, is flawed. He recognized that Wunnenberg already had his B.Th. from Prague in 1386 but argued that he was required to read the Bible cursorily and to lecture on the Sentences at Heidelberg, and thus was Marsilius's teacher. But Wunnenberg would not have been called baccalarius in sacra pagina unless he had, at Prague, begun or completed some of the activities required of the bachelor. That Wunnenberg was not formatus upon his arrivai at Heidelberg meant, assuming the omission of that word was intentional, that he had not completed ail the necessary academic acts, or spent the required number of years, or paid ail the fees. Moreover, the apparent failure of Wunnenberg to become D.Th., according to Pelster, resulted from his election as dean of St. Cyriacus in Neuhausen bei Worms and thus his departure from Heidelberg, but Wunnenberg was already dean of Neuhausen when Marsilius referred to him in the opening questions of his Sentences commentary, and one gains the impression that Wunnenberg was resident in Heidelberg and performed the role of one of Marsilius's socii.

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schism. Although Marsilius came from the lower Rhineland (and was thus Dutch by the modern political map), and although he had a long career as the most distinguished regent master of arts at Paris in the 1360s and 1370s, Ritter and others have viewed him, particularly the theological Marsilius, as German and Heidelberg through and through. Despite the small amount of study across the last century devoted to Marsilius's theology, in comparison to the study of his commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus and thus of Marsilius as logician and natural philosopher, the Stand der Forschung on Marsilius as theologian can be summarized as follows. Marsilius began the serious study of theology at Heidelberg under German teachers who had received their training at Prague. All of his serious theological activity and writing can be placed in the last five years of his life when he was in his early fifties. His monumental Quaestiones super quatuor Sententiarum is to be placed in a German milieu, specifically Heidelberg, in the early 1390s. It is exactly those assumptions that will be modified in the following analysis of Marsilius's theological career and his role as theologian. Let me begin by solving, or dissolving, the puzzle of Marsilius's teachers. As 1 have written elsewhere,11 the term "magister meus" had, by the middle of the fourteenth century at Paris and elsewhere, become a courtesy title through which one addressed one's immediate academic colleagues or, on occasion, referred to academic forefathers. Just as the term socius did not mean an exact contemporary in the act of reading the Sentences but someone with whom one debated during the baccalaureate years who might be a year or two senior or junior,12 so the phrase "my reverend master" (reverendus magister meus) and parallel phrases had by 1355 at Paris become the standard form in which one referred to a fellow bachelor or a senior colleague. An enormous number of mistakes in the dating of academic careers in the fourteenth century and of lines of academic affiliation or training have been based on a misunderstanding of the broader meaning of the term socius and the almost innocuous meaning of the term magister meus.13

11 W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton 1987), ch. 6; id., Antiqui and Moderni in Late Medieval Thought, Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (1987). 12 W.J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham (Leiden 1978), 89. 13 In addition to the problems confronted by Ritter and mentioned above, the same false assumptions undermine some of the dating in Adolar Zumkeller's and Damasus Trapp's

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Marsilius as Theologian

The latter did not imply a master-pupil relationship nor any particular reverence or emotional attachment. It implied only academic Hoflichkeit, much as we might, when speaking formally at an academic meeting refer both to friends and enemies as "my esteemed colleague". Similarly, when the pope addressed someone as "my beloved son", he did not imply paternity nor necessarily any sincere affection. Pelster recognized that the expressions magister meus and pater meus were courtesy forms of address ("Hoflichkeitsf ormel der Anrede") used among sententiarii and applied, respectively, to seculars and religious, but his observation was buried in a brief publication where it did not attract notice.14 Moreover, he failed to recognize that the expressions magister meus and pater meus as courtesy titles could be applied equally to those in and outside religious orders, and could also be applied to those who were not simultaneously reading the Sentences. Pelster incorrectly assumed that outside the introductory or principial lecture on the Sentences, the expression magister meus implied a master-pupil relationship.15 References in Marsilius and other writers, however, force us either to hypothesize some extremely awkward if not impossible master-pupil relationships, or to acknowledge that the expression was probably never anything other than a courtesy title. Neither Wunnenberg nor Holzsadel were teachers of Marsilius, nor did he ever daim they were. The same can be said of James of Eltville. This practice of courtesy titles also explains Marsilius's mysterious reference early in his commentary to Gregory of Rimini as "our master brother Gregory" (frater magister noster Gregorius). 1 6 Here the corporate noster has been substituted for the persona! meus, but its use is identical. These persona! pronouns are not possessive, and no relationship is being described. The same is true of Marsilius's frequent references to magistri nostri or doctores nostri. As the context clearly indicates, these doctors are not from Heidelberg, nor are they exclusively German, nor are they Ockhamist. The phrase doctores nostri included any and all prominent theologians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, most of them research on fourteenth-century Augustinian theologians, as it does some of the dating in my work before 1978. 14 Pelster, Heidelberger Magister, 84. I was unaware of Pelster's position on this issue until late in 1986. 15 Ibid.: "ln anderen Fallen ware eine solche Bezeichnung ohne die Existenz des entsprechenden Verhaltnisses (ein Verhiiltnis von Lehrer und Schüler) kaum zu verstehen." 16 Marsilius, Quaestiones, fol. 13ra.

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Parisian graduates, whom Marsilius summoned up as part of his cloud of witnesses. On individual points he could and did disagree with individuals in that group, and no theological party or school of thought was intended by that expression. There is no corresponding "your masters" or "their school", except as one thinks of the authorities of some other discipline, such as canon law.17 The broader, less persona! and possessive meaning of the phrase "our masters" requires a reconsideration of the evidence on which Anneliese Maier based her conjecture that Marsilius taught at Pavia sometime between 1378 and 1386.18 The fact that a Pavian professor of medicine and natural philosophy, John Marliani, writing two generations later, would enlist the support of Inghen by citing him as Marsilius noster says much about the respect in which he held Marsilius, but it says little or nothing about whether Marsilius ever taught anywhere in Italy. Who then were Marsilius's theological teachers? Did he study theology at Heidelberg under Reginald of Aulne, Conrad of Gelnhausen, and Conrad of Soltau before he began to read the Sentences, or did he undertake that task without further study beyond what he had acquired at Paris before his departure. We simply do not know. Marsilius describes his academic rank in 1386 simply as magister artium, but in July of 1394, when we know he was bachelor of theology and possibly even baccalarius formatus, he is still described simply as "master of arts."19 Marsilius does not enlighten us directly about his teachers nor about the sources of his theological thought. The latter can only be gleaned from the reading of his Sentences commentary, and the former must remain a matter of considerable conjecture.

17 In light of this, we need to re-examine the meaning of the expression "scola nostra" in John Hiltalingen of Base! and other Augustinians. It certainly does not mean a particular school of thought, as Zumkeller assumed, and it may even be broader in meaning than simply earlier doctors among the Augustinian Hermits, as I have elsewhere maintained. It may, instead, be identical with the phrase "the common teaching of the schools". 18 A. Maier, Internationale Beziehungen an spatmittelalterlichen Universitaten, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. 2 (Rome 1967), 331-33, and tentatively accepted by E.P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen: Treatises on the Properties of Terms (Dordrecht 1983), 9. 19 On the inconsistency of the acknowledgement of academic titles in the Heidelberg documents with regard to Marsilius compare Urkundenbuch I, 1, 53, 58, 59. Marsilius's insistence on following the Parisian university mode!, which limited the choice of rector to those who were regent masters of arts, may at times have encouraged him to minimize his progress and status in the theological faculty.

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The first question that confronts us is: How far did Marsilius progress in his theological studies at Paris before his departure in 1377? There is no mention of him in the surviving documentation of the theological faculty, but that is not remarkable, since there is little information on secular theologians before inception. We know that Marsilius matriculated in the faculty of theology at Paris in the autumn of 1366, four years after he incepted as magister artium (Sept. 27, 1362).20 If he progressed at a normal, uninterrupted rate, he would have completed the required five years of study by 1371 and be ready to read cursorily on two books of the Bible, and then on the Sentences.21 But did he? Almost everything we know of the Parisian career of Marsilius reveals him as an active and prominent teacher, writer, administrator, and representative of the arts faculty. It is unlikely that he would have studied under John Buridan even had the latter lived long enough to be in Paris when Marsilius began his studies, since they belonged to different nations in the arts faculty, but he could not have avoided being aware of Buridan's writings, and he was certainly influenced by them. From 1362, when he incepted as regent master in arts under William Buzer of Utrecht, until the spring or summer of 1377, when he left Paris for 20 Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and E. Châtelain, Vol. 3 (Paris 1894), 188, in a letter of May 29, 1369 from Pope Urban V to Marsilius. Subsequently cited as CUP. Denifle indicated, but without providing supporting evidence, that Marsilius was a fellow of the Sorbonne. 21 The picture of the Paris theological curriculum given by Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, ed. F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden, Vol. 1 (Oxford 1936), 474-79, which suggest six years of study, followed by two years of Bible lectures and a year of responses (nine years total), before being allowed to advance to the reading of the Sentences is based on a fusion of evidence drawn from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. It is far more likely that the 1364 statutes for the theological faculty at Bologna, which were based on those of Paris, reflect contemporary Parisian practice. At Bologna a secular admitted to read the Sentences had to be a master of arts (or its equivalent), to have studied theology for at least five years ("in theologia audiverit studiosus ad minus per quinquennium sub uno vel diversis magistris in theologia"), and to have read cursorily on two books of the Bible assigned to him by the dean of the faculty of theology. See F. Ehrle, I più antichi statuti della facoltà teologica dell' università di Balogna (Bologna 1932), 17. The Matthew commentary of Marsilius, which is of a greater interest than Ritter indicated, is the work of a cursor or biblical bachelor and would have been read before undertaking the Sentences. Whether it was written at Paris in the early 1370s or, more likely, at Heidelberg c. 1390-91 is unknown. It is extant in an autograph manuscript, Vat. Pal. lat. 142, fols. 27-172. See R. Berndt, Marsilius von Inghen ais Erkliirer des Matthaus-Evangelium s, Semper Apertus, 600 fahre Ruprecht-Karls-Universitiit Heidelberg 1386-1986, ed. W. Dôrr (Heidelberg 1985), 1, 71-81; J. Miethke in Bibliotheca Palatina. Katalog zur Ausstellung vom 8. Juli bis 2. November 1986 Heiliggeistkirche Heidelberg: Textband, ed. E. Mittler (Heidelberg 1986), 43-45.

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W.J. Courtenay Avignon and Rome on university business, his almost continuous teaching and administrative activities within the English nation in the Parisian arts faculty are well documented.22 Moreover, some of his commentaries on Aristotle's works appear to be products of his teaching at Paris, specifically his Expositio and Quaestiones on the Ars vetus and his Abbreviationes libri physicorum.23 Such activities do not preclude adequate progress in theology simultaneously. It was not unusual to study in a higher faculty (usually theology or canon law) and yet continue to teach in the arts faculty.24 The incarne from student fees and from the nation was a favored way of paying for the early stages of one's higher education both at Paris and Oxford. Such dual citizenship could last up until one was licensed or incepted in theology as regent master, although the heavier duties as sententiarius and baccalarius formatus encouraged most to give up their regency in arts by that stage. The arrangement of lecture times for the lower and higher faculties at Paris permitted one to lecture in arts while attending lectures in theology,25 and it may even have been possible to lecture in both faculties within the same academic term if an individual had sufficient physical and mental discipline and energy.

22 Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis, Vol. 1: Liber Procuratorum Nationis Anglicanae (Alemanniae), ed. H. Denifle (Paris 1894), 272-73, 285-86, 289, 293-94, 29899, 307-10, 312, 314, 316, 320-21, 324, 326-31, 335, 337, 341, 351, 360, 397-99, 401, 403, 405, 408-11, 415, 419-20, 426-28, 430, 436, 440, 442-44, 448, 450-51, 453-55, 458-60, 462, 464-65, 471-72, 475, 477, 481, 483, 486-88, 490-91, 497, 499, 502-4, 508, 511-13, 516-17, 519. 23 Ritter, Marsilius, 37-38, 186, 193-94; C.H. Lohr, Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: Johannes de Kanthis - Myngodus, Traditio 27 (1971), 323-34. One manuscript of the Expositio super veterem logicam is dated 1374, and the Quaestiones veteris artis and Abbreviationes libri Physicorum frequently use Parisian examples. Bos, Marsilius, 8, has remarked, however, that "the bulk of his philosophical writing, including his works on logic, was composed between 1362 and 1367," which would place that in the Parisian period. Bos continues (8-9), "From 1367 onwards, he was involved in University poli tics, and during his la ter Heidelberg sojourn ... his main emphasis was on

theology." But the Liber procuratorum reveals that Marsilius was intensely engaged in philosophical lectures during the years 1374-75. Moreover, his commentary on De generatione was clearly composed at Heidelberg, and the documents from Heidelberg and the colophon on the De generatione commentary suggest that Marsilius was lecturing in the arts faculty at Heidelberg from 1386 to at least 1389. 24 Nicholas of Autrecourt up to the time of his licentiate in theology continued to teach philosophy in the Rue du Fouarre. Walter Wardlaw taught in the arts faculty when he was a formed bachelor in theology. 25 Lectures in the arts faculty often occupied the first hours of the morning, while the ordinary and extraordinary lectures in theology were usually given in late morning or early afternoon.

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Twice during his early studies in theology Marsilius was elected rector of the university by the arts faculty. These terms of office were brief: once during the first three months of the 1367-68 academic year, and then again during the summer of 1371.26 As nuntius he took the university rotulus to Avignon in 1369.27 During the biennium 1371-73 he continued to lecture in the arts faculty but avoided most administrative and promotional duties.28 Then from 1373 until 1377 his active role in the affairs of his nation resumed. He thus could have began his baccalaureate during the biennium 1371-73, but the university documents are silent on whether in fact he did, and his occasional administrative duties in the period from 1367 to 1371 would probably have slowed his academic progress. At the time of the founding of the University of Heidelberg, whether accurately or as a matter of university politics, Marsilius described himself as master of arts, while he described Wunnenberg as master of arts and bachelor of sacred scriptures, i.e., theology.29 There is another piece of evidence on Marsilius's Parisian career that has, to date, not been noticed. A generation aga Damasus Trapp, while working on the Sentences commentary of the Augustinian Hermit Angelus Dobelin, noticed a reference that Angelus made to the opinion of an otherwise unidentified "Master Marsilius".30 Trapp identified the citation as a reference to a contemporary Augustinian theologian and humanist, Luigi Marsigli of Florence, who according to Trapp became master of theology in 1379, the same year as Angelus. When 1 first saw Trapp's identification almost a generation aga, and not then suspecting that "magister" could be a courtesy title or realizing the extent to which Sentences commentaries were subject to later revision, 1 wondered how it was that an Augustinian Hermit, who as a religious would never have reigned in arts, could have been called "master" four or five years before his inception in theology. And 1 wondered at the time 26 27 28 29

CUP III, 166, 200. AUP I, 329. AUP I, 404-26. Urkundenbuch l, 1. If Marsilius had completed the stage of sententiarius before leaving Paris in 1377, he would probably have so described himself in the founding documents of 1386, unless there were overriding political or juridical reasons not to do so. The strength of the argument that Marsilius would have revealed his rank as bachelor of theology if he had achieved it, is somewhat diminished by the 1394 reference to Marsilius simply as magister artium, a year after we are certain he was a bachelor of theology; Urkundenbuch I, 58. 30 D. Trapp, Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century, Augustiniana 6 (1956), 146-274, at 267; id., Angelus de Dobelin, Doctor Parisiensis, and His Lectura, Augustinianum 3 (1963), 389-413.

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whether the reference might not rather be to the most prominent "Master Marsilius" at Paris c. 1375 when Angelus was reading the Sentences, namely Marsilius of Inghen.31 The context of the passage in Angelus's commentary is itself fascinating. In exploring the question of whether positing a First Being is a strictly philosophical truth, Angelus quoted at length the opinion of an unidentified author to the effect that the supposition of a First Being is an inference from experience that cannot be strictly demonstrated, just as the principle of causality itself cannot, or the hypothesis of substances that lie beneath the perceptible, accidenta! qualities of things.32 The argument is 31 Trapp asserted (Angelus, 390) that the magisterial year for Angelus (1379) was attested to in the various manuscripts of Archange Guin, Elenchus Doctorum Augustiniensium Theologicae Facultatis Parisiorum (Bouches du Rhône arch. depart. 5-H-29; Paris, Arch. nat. s. 3640; and Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 5657a). In Trapp's discussion (Angelus, 389), it is unclear whether the text of Angelus's commentary, which exists only in an autograph copy (Jena, Univ. bibl., Elec. fol. 47, fols. 1-124), should be dated to the year before he read (because of the occasional use of the future tense), the year in which he read (because of the differing designations of John Klenkok), or five years after he read (because of the reference to "Magister Marsilius"). Dobelin's designation of John Klenkok as "reverendus pater" at the beginning of his commentary and "Klenkok piae memoriae" at the end strongly suggests but does not prove that Dobelin received news of Klenkok's death in Avignon (1374) while Dobelin was reading the Sentences at Paris, thus in 1374-75. 32 Jena, Univ. bibl., Elec. Fol. 47, fol. 79va-80ra: "Quantum ad primum tune ponit una opinio quod non sit purum philosophicum ponere in entibus aliquod primum ... Et vocat illa opinio purum philosophicum quod homo habens usum rationis et bona naturalia ut bonum ingenium et intellectum, et huiusmodi, per deductionem naturalem circumscripta fide haberet dicere. Et tune probat conclusionem sic: quia si sic, vel hoc posset ratione naturali dicere quod esset substantia vel accidens; non accidens, quia substantia est imperfectius, quia sic primum non esset perfectius aliis; nec substantia, quia substantia naturaliter cognosci non potest, quia sic posset naturaliter in sacramento altaris cognosci quando esset ibi panis vel non. Exista infert quod non est purum philosophicum ponere substantiam esse in rerum natura .. . secundo infert quod non est purum philosophicum substantiam distingui ab accidentibus ... Et ponit ista opinio talem conclusionem: quod philosophia communis fundatur super propositiones creditas ... Aliam conclusionem ponit: quod non est purum philosophicum ponere causas esse in mundo, etiam positis substantiis et accidentibus. Probat eam sic, quia non potes! probari aliquid esse causam nisi quia ad actionem talis rei sequitur aliam rem de novo capere suum esse. Sed ista consequentia non valet: ista res agit, et alia res producitur de novo, ergo producitur ad actionem eius, vel ergo est causa istius, quia sic sequitur quod sol esset causa animae rationalis quando producitur quando sol agit. Nec potes! probari quod approximatio et actio sua facit rem de novo produci, quia saepe agens nititur quantum potes!, et tamen nihil producit. Sed contra hoc arguitur sic: Expertum est quod ad positionem ignis et approximationem aliquod calefactibile, calefacit de novo; et non posito igne, non sit calor iste; ergo potest probari ignem esse causam caloris, et eodem modo arguitur de aliis causis naturalibus.

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familiar as the position for which Nicholas of Autrecourt was summoned to Avignon in 1340 and condemned in 1346. 33 Autrecourt, however, was not Angelus's source. His quotation was taken verbatim and at length from the Sentences commentary of an English Benedictine known simply as Monachus Niger, who was cited in Parisian works by 1342. 34 The close parallels between the opinions of Monachus Niger and Autrecourt suggest borrowing, but the direction of influence - and thus the precise

Ad istud conceditur quod expertum est quod calor sit quando ignis approximatur calefactibili. Sed non sequitur expertum est [ms: esse] calorem poni in esse ad positionem ignis, ergo ex hoc potest [ms: non potest] probari ignem esse causam caloris. Quia expertum est quod existentibus tenebris homo timet et horret, et tamen non sequitur: ergo ex hoc potest probari quod tenebrae aliquid causent, cum nihil sint; et eodem modo de caecitate quae causat obscuritatem in caeco, et tamen nihil potest causare." 33 J. Lappe, Nicolaus von Autrecourt, Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 6.2 (Münster 1908); J. Weinberg, Nicolaus of Autrecourt (Princeton 1948). 34 The text is from Monachus Niger, Sent., q. 3, a. 1, the crucial portion of which has been transcribed by Leonard A. Kennedy, Theology the Handmaiden of Logic, Augustiniana 33 (1983), 142-164, at 162-163: "Circa solutionem istius dubii, primo ponam istam conclusionem: quod non est purum philosophicum ponere aliquod primum in entibus. Et voco hic purum philosophicum quod homo habens usum rationis et bona naturalia, ut bonum ingenium, bonum intellectum, et huiusmodi, per deductionem naturalem circumscripta fide vel secta haberet dicere istam conclusionem. Probo quia esset philosophicum purum quod esset unum primum, vel hoc posset deduci ex ratione naturali quod esset substantia vel accidens. Non accidens, quia est imperfectius substantia, et primum non esset imperfectius aliis. Nec quod esset substantia, quia naturaliter substantia cognosci non potest, quia sic posset in sacramento al taris cognosci quando esset ibi panis et quando non. Exista conclusione sequitur alia: quod non est purum philosophicum ponere aliquam substantiam esse in rerum natura ... Ex ista sequitur correlative hic quod non est purum philosophicum ponere substantiam distingui ab accidentibus ... Alia est conclusio quod non est pure philosophicum ponere causas esse in mundo etc., positis substantiis et accidentibus. Patet quia non potest probari aliquid esse causam nisi quia ad actionem talis rei sequitur aliam rem de novo capere suum esse. Sed ista conclusio non videtur: ista res agit et alia producitur de novo, igitur producitur ad actionem eius, vel igitur istud est causa istius. Quia sic sequeretur quod sol esset causa istius animae rationalis quia producitur quando sol agit. Nec potest probari quod approximatio et actio sua facit rem de novo produci, quia frequenter agens nititur quantum potest, et tamen nihil produxit. Contra: experimentum est ad positionem ignis et approximationem ad calefactibile sit calor de novo, et non posito igne non sit calor ille. Igitur potest probari ignem esse causam caloris; et eodem modo arguo de aliis causis naturalibus. Ad istud concedo quod experimentum est quod calor sit quando ignis approximatur calefactibili. Sed non sequitur: experimentum est calorem poni in esse ad praesentiam ignis, igitur ex hoc potest probari ignem esse causam caloris. Quia experimentum est quod, existentibus tenebris, homo timet et horret; igitur ex hoc potest probari quod tenebrae aliquid causant, cum tenebrae nihil sint. Et eodem modo est de caecitate quae causat timiditatem in caeco, et tamen nihil potest causare."

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dating of their respective Sentences commentaries - has not yet been determined.35 What concerns us here is the fact that our "Magister Marsilius" maintained that all arguments from causality, in fact the principle of causality itself, was habit-formed expectation based on experience, and he interpreted Aristotle in this way. It is the nature of the human intellect, when it sees the same sequential relationship many times, to infer that the principle is universal. Thus we believe that every fire burns, even if we have not experienced and can never experience every fire.36 After completing his commentary Angelus realized that this position was more controversial than he had originally thought, and that. it had been condemned earlier at Paris. He hastened to add in the margin of his autograph copy that he did not hold this position, and he cited the appropriate condemned articles at the bottom of that folio. The opinion of Master Marsilius, however, confirms the accuracy of Pierre d'Ailly's subsequent remark that Autrecourt had been condemned for views that were later taught in the schools at Paris.3 7 The remarkable twist in all this is that the opinion of Master Marsilius cited by Angelus Dobelin, c. 1375, can be found almost verbatim in book two, question one of the Sentences commentary of Marsilius of Inghen.38 A similar passage is found in 35 Autrecourt was a bachelor of theology by March 4, 1338 (Reg. Vat. Benedict XII, an. 4, p. 2, ep. 43, fol. 39v), which means the latest year in which he could have read the Sentences would be 1337-38. Adam Junior and Monachus Niger read the Sentences in the same year, and the extant (and probably only) version of Adam's commentary must be dated after Dec. 1335, since Adam refers to Fitzralph as dean of Lichfield, and before 1342, since it is cited by Gregory of Rimini; see J.-F. Genest, Le De futuris contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine, Recherches Augustiniennes 14 (1979), 249-336, at 269-71. It is possible that Monachus Niger (and Adam Junior) read the Sentences in 1336-37, and that Autrecourt had access to those opinions by 1337-38. It may also be that Autrecourt's writings, through Benedictine circles, circulated in England by 1338 and became a source for Monachus Niger. [It has recently (1989) been discovered by Zenon Kaluza that Bernard of Arezzo became provincial minister of Tuscany in 1337, a position he held until his death in 1342. His reading of the Sentences at Paris - and thus Autrecourt's sentential year as well - occurred before Bernard's election and has been conjectured by Kaluza as 1335-36 or 1336-37. If there is direct influence, it would appear to run from Autrecourt at Paris to Monachus Niger in England. Kaluza's study will appear in a Festschrift for Kurt Flasch due to be published in 1991.] 36 Angelus Dobelin, Sent., q. 32 (II, dist. 17), Jena, Univ. bibl., Elec. Fol. 47, fol. 80rb: "Ad istud respondebat Magister Marsilius quod in consimilibus processibus Aristoteles 'naturaliter' locutus est, quia hoc inest intellectui 'naturaliter' quod quando videt aliquid fieri in pluribus - et non videt instantiam - quod consentiat in universalem: quod omnis ignis sit naturaliter calefactivus, etc." 37 Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, transi. P. V. Spade (Dordrecht 1980), 58. 38 Marsilius, Sent., fol. 205va: "Tertio praemitto quod natura est intellectus humani quod cum invenit universalem aliquam in pluribus singularibus veram, et non videt rationem

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Marsilius's commentary on the Prior Analytics and may well be found in his Physics commentary and in other writings dating from his Parisian period.39 There can be little doubt that the "Master Marsilius" in question is none other than Marsilius of Inghen. Moreover the source for Marsilius' position on induction and causality was not Autrecourt but Jean Buridan.40 There is no particular reason to suppose that Angelus was citing the passage from the Sentences commentary of Marsilius and thus that they may have been reading simultaneously at Paris, but it does indicate that Marsilius by 1375 was already famous at Paris within the theological faculty for certain positions that he retained in his later works, instantiae quare non esset ita in omnibus, assentire universali. Patet, quia hoc modo fiunt nota omnia principia quae surgunt ex experientia, ut ostendit Philosophus, II Posteriorum, cap. ult.; item idem innuit in prologo Metaphysicae. Et experimur in nabis, nullus enim nostrum est quin assentiat huic: omnis ignis est calidus, et non ex alia via quam ea quae nunc dicta est, nullus enim nostrum sensit omnem ignem." 39 Marsilius von Inghen, Quaestiones super libros priorum analyticorum (Venice 1516; Frankfurt 1968), fol. 36va: "Respondetur quod causa huius est naturalis inclinatio intellectus ad veritatem, intellectus enim per veritatem perficitur." "... quatuor requiruntur. Primo iudicium actuale sensus quo iudicat hoc esse verum, ut hune ignem esse calidum. Secundum, memoria: quod iste ignis ibi servatus fuit calidus, et quod alius alibi servatus fuit calidus, et sic de aliis ... Tertium est experientia acquisita per multas tales memorias. Est autem experientia iudicium singulare de aliquo quod est tale procedens, eo quod iudicans mullas talis generis sive speciei recordatur se sensisse talia, ut quis nostrum videns ignem a remotis adhuc non tangens eum propter memoriam de multis aliis ignibus quod sensimus esse calidos, iudicat ipsem esse calidum, et hoc modo iudicium vocatur experientia. Quartum est illatio propositionis universalis ex multis talibus singularibus et naturali inclinatione intellectus, intellectus enim noster per experientiam inveniens istum ignem esse calidum, et alium, et nusquam inveniens instantiam nec videns rationem diversitatis, propter quam unus ignis debeat esse calidus, et non alter, ex naturali sua inclinatione quam habet ad veritatem statim assentit universali, puta quod omnis ignis est calidus." I would like to thank Dr. Hoenen for bringing this passage to my attention. 40 Buridan, Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik (Paris 1518; Frankfurt 1964), Il, q. 2, fol. 9va-9vb: "Et ideo sciendum est, sicut determinat Aristoteles in fine Posteriorum, quod aliqua sunt principia indemonstrabilia accepta per sensum (ut quod iste ignis est calidus), alia autem accepta per memoriam (ut quod ignis quem heri tetigi, fuit calidus), et aliqua sunt accepta per experimentum, ut quod iste ignis, quem scilicet ego nunc tango, est calidus: hoc enim scio per hoc quod alios tetigi, quos sensi calidos, et per memoriam de illis iudico experimentali iudicio etiam quod iste ignis est calidus, licet non sentiam eum esse calidum." "Postea etiam sunt aliqua principia universalia, quae propter experimenta in multis singularibus consimilibus conceduntur ab intellectu propter naturalem inclinationem intellectus ad veritatem, sicut quod omnis ignis est calidus ... Et ista principia non statim a principio cognoscuntur ... immo solum conceduntur, quia sic vidimus in pluribus singularibus et in nullis potuimus invenire instantiam." For discussions of this and similar passages in Buridan see Anneliese Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spiitscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome 1955), 388-389; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, John Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt on Causality and Induction, Traditio 43 (1987), 237-255.

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and it raises the question of how much of Marsilius's Heidelberg Sentences commentary was derived from the writings and sources of Marsilius during his Paris years, and whether some of the Sentences commentary may have been organized or written initially at Paris. What does the content of Marsilius's Sentences commentary reveal about its academic and intellectual milieu? There is no question that the commentary, in the form in which we have it, was composed and read at Heidelberg. The question is over whether its content was conceived and organized at Heidelberg or whether some of it, perhaps much of it, was a product of a Parisian environment. The first thing to be noted is that for a work composed in 1392-94, it appears somewhat frozen in time. Marsilius cites a rich array of fourteenth-cen tury sources,41 including several from the generation of 1340-70: Gregory of Rimini, Hugolino of Orvieto, John of Ripa, James of Eltville, and sections betray a familiarity with the Sentences commentary of John Hiltalingen of Basel. Yet apart from his two Heidelberg contemporarie s, Wunnenberg and Holzsadel, who are cited only at the beginning of his commentary and only as socii, not as recent authorities, no post-1370 authors are mentioned by name. He does not cite his fellow secular theologians, such as Nicole Oresme, Henry of Langenstein, Pierre d'Ailly, or Henry Totting of Oyta, all of whom were known at Paris and/ or Prague by the la te 1370s. He does not cite the opinions of Conrad of Ebrach or Dionysius of Montina, both of whom became popular in the last quarter of the fourteenth century. He does not cite Conrad of Soltau, whose commentary must have been available to him at Heidelberg.42 Perhaps the fact that Marsilius left Paris in 1377 and was intensely involved with church politics and the founding of Heidelberg in the subsequent decade is sufficient reason why he did not stay more abreast of 41 One must be careful to keep in mind that a medieval author's selection of sources was not solely a matter of choice but depended on the availability of texts. Moreover, occasional citation, especially when it is simply the linking of a name and opinion rather than the quotation of an argument, is no proof that the original text was available. Heavy reliance on a small number of authors may reveal preference, or it may only indicate what was at hand. 42 Not all sources, of course, are acknowledged, and scholastic authors in the second half of the fourteenth century often reused arguments and sections of earlier authors without mentioning the source. Sorne parallels between the theological opinions of Marsilius and those of Henry Totting of Oyta and Conrad of Soltau have been noted by other contributors to this volume, but it has yet to be established that those opinions are found only in Oyta and Soltau and could not have been derived from earlier authors on whom Oyta and Soltau relied.

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developments in theological literature after 1370. But it could also suggest that much of the material for his commentary may have initially been assembled not too long after 1370. A second feature of his commentary is its heavy dependence on theologians from religious orders, especially the Augustinian Hermits. In order of most frequent citation, Marsilius's principal acknowledged sources or authorities, including those whose opinions he favored and those of whom he was sometimes critical, are Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, followed by Giles of Rome and Bonaventure, and then Gregory of Rimini, Peter of Tarantasia, Durand of St. Pourçain, Adam Wodeham, and Duns Scotus. Among those known but less frequently cited are Henry of Ghent, William of Ockham, Peter Aureoli, James of Eltville, Hugolino of Orvieto, Alexander of Hales, Peter of Alvemia, Godfrey of Fontaines, Herveus Natalis, Robert Holcot, and John of Ripa. Marsilius's preference for citing the opinions of traditional Augustinians (Giles and Thomas of Strasbourg), in contrast to the newer approaches of Gregory and Hugolino, can also be seen in John of Basel's strong dependence on Thomas of Strasbourg. Such an Augustinian bias was not usual among Sentences commentaries written between 1370 and 1400 save among the Augustinians and Cistercians whose close, symbiotic relationship has been noted and detailed by Trapp.43 If it were not certain that our commentary was by Marsilius, its list of acknowledged sources would place it in the intellectual world of Augustinian and Cistercian theologians. The time and place where we would expect such intellectual horizons to be formed would be Paris in the decade from 1365 to 1375, just before the Parisian lectures of Pierre d'Ailly and Henry Totting of Oyta, and at a time when Parisian theology was dominated by John Hiltalingen of Basel, Simon of Cremona, Gottschalk of Nepomuk, James of Eltville, Dionysius of Montina, and Angelus Dobelin. The fact that most of these theologians were German may have been an additional point of contact and sympathy. The single most remarkable feature of Marsilius's sources, however, is the small influence exercised by William of Ockham. In contrast to Pierre d'Ailly and Gabriel Biel, who cite Ockham frequently and positively, Marsilius has comparatively few references to Ockham. When he is mentioned, Marsilius as often disagrees with him as follows his opinion. For example, on the question of the object of knowledge, Marsilius sides with Ockham (whom he feels shares the common opinion on this issue) 43 Trapp, Augustinian Theology, 251-68.

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that the immediate abject of assent is the proposition. The wording of Marsilius's position is that of Buridan, not Ockham, although Buridan is not cited in his Sentences commentary.44 Marsilius contrasts this position with the theory of the complexe significabile, which he attributes to Gregory of Rimini, and which he rejects with the comment "This way of speaking de complexe significabilibus either is so subtle that it exceeds all ability to grasp it, at least my own, or perhaps it was put forward out of ignorance of logic."45 When Marsilius cornes to the issue of whether theology is practical or speculative, however, he rejects the position of Scotus, Ockham, and Gregory in favor of that of Thomas Aquinas.46 Marsilius found helpful some of the critical analysis Ockham and Adam Wodeham applied to the paralogisms of the Trinity,47 yet the subtlety of their arguments, especially those of Wodeham, sometimes eluded him.48 Moreover, on those issues on which Ockham's views were either unique or distinctive, such as his definition of intuitive cognition, his rejection of species, his treatment of impetus theory, or his reinterpretation of the Aristotelian categories, with its implications for natural philosophy, Marsilius either ignored those problems or rejected Ockham's position.49 Even on those issues that were not distinctively Ockhamist but to which Ockham subscribed and which blended well with his thought, such as his view of convenantal causality, or his application of the dialectic of divine power to problems of ethics, human merit, grace, and justification, Marsilius ignored Ockham's contribution and modified the approach and 44 The similarity of Marsilius's and Buridan's positions has been noted by E.P. Bos, A note on an unknown manuscript bearing upon Marsilius of Inghen's philosophy of nature, Vivarium 17 (1979), 61-68. 45 Marsilius, Sent. I, q. 2, a. 3, fol. 12va: "Hic modus loquendi de complexe significabilibus vel est adeo subtilis quod imaginationem communium excedit, et praesertim meam, vel fortassis est ex ignorantia logicae introductus." 46 Ibid., q. 3, a. 1, fol. 21vb: "Ego ad opinionem primam, scilicet Sancti Thomae, magis sum inclinatus." Marsilius also rejected Ockham's position on the gift of the Holy Spirit (Ibid., q. 21, a. 1, fol. 88rb). 47 Ibid., q. 6, a. 2, fol. 38va; q. 8, a. 3, fol. 47ra. 48 Ibid, q. 8, a. 3, fol. 47 ra: "Item modus secundum Adam est subtilis, sed ego non bene intelligo eum, nec est communis." 49 In Sent. IV, q. 8, a. 1 (fol. 538ra), for example, Marsilius rejects the idea of annihilation in the transubstantiation of the bread and wine. He also accepts (Sent. IV, q. 9, a. 1, fol. 548rb-va) the idea of quantity, as an accidentai quality of the substance of bread, remaining after consecration; fol. 548vb: "supposita opinione quae ponit quod extensio, qua extenditur substantia, sit res distincta a substantia ... " Bos, Note on an unknown manuscript, gives additional places (Abbrev. Physicorum, fol. 3vb) where Marsilius accepts Buridan's position that quantity is a res distincta a substantia, and notes that Marsilius (Abbrev. Physicorum, fol. 40rb) follows Francis of Marchia's version of impetus instead of following either Buridan or Ockham.

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solutions in his own way. This can be seen in his use of the distinction of absolute and ordained power, which was a tool of analysis frequently employed by Marsilius but one that he saw more in terms of law-changing than of simple logical possibility or capacityso The same holds true for his ethical theory, where he grants God's ability to abrogate the commandments of the second table of the law, but insists that only the morality of the outward act would be changed, not the intention. In altered conditions in which murder, theft, and adultery would be permitted, fulfilment of those acts by a good Christian would not be out of hatred, avarice, or lust, but only out a desire to fulfil the will of God.51 Marsilius's view of Ockham, at least as reflected in his Sentences commentary, is remarkable in light of the fact that Marsilius has been traditionally and consistently seen as an Ockhamist. Ritter considered it axiomatic that Marsilius was one of the leading figures of the Ockhamist school at Paris and subsequently at Heidelberg. The second part of the title of his book on Marsilius expressed this axiomatic truth. When, through his examination of Marsilius's Sentences commentary, it became evident that Marsilius depended far more on the antiqui, especially on Thomas Aquinas, than he initially believed possible, Ritter was compelled to explain this eclecticism as a positive independence of thought as well as a conscious departure from certain aspects of Ockham's theology. Much of Ritter's book deals with the problem of explaining why the Ockhamist Marsilius appears, in the theological domain, to have been so independent of Ockham. Yet, like the false problem created by the misunderstood meaning of the phrase "magister meus", there has been a false problem occasioned by the traditional depiction of Marsilius as Ockhamist. This tradition is largely 50 The dialectic of absolute and ordained power is used in alrnost every question in Marsilius's cornrnentary, and for the rnost part his use is the traditional theological one that distinguishes between simple capacity without regard for what Cod wills, and God's will as expressed in his ordinations. The legalistic interpretation of "absolute power" did influence Marsilius inasrnuch as he frequently uses the expressions "de lege absoluta". Sorne passages reflect this legal approach to the suspension of the law even more; Sent. I, q. 20, a. 2 (fol. 84rb): "potest uno modo intelligi de potentia Dei absoluta, scilicet agendo praeter legern quarn prornulgavit." Sent. I, q. 43, a. 1 (fol. 183rb): "quae secundurn cursurn naturae possunt esse, vel etiarn secundurn potentiarn Dei ordinatarn ... " On the history of the rneaning of this distinction see rny Convenant and Causality (London 1984), chs. 4 and 12. 51 For Marsilius's discussion of God's ability to suspend the cornrnandrnents of the second table of the law (but not the first), and what this would rnean for hurnan motivations in such acts, see Sent. I, q. 46, a. 2 (fol. 195v-196r).

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grounded in the lists of names or authorities cited as approved or proscribed in the course of the Wegestreit in the fifteenth century.52 But these documents were never meant to be read as lists of a Nominalist or Ockhamist school. That misreading was the result of school-minded historians of medieval thought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, who were steeped in hermeneutical models of Schulmeinungen and Lehrrichtungen. If one assumes that there was an Ockhamist school at Paris in the fourteenth century of which Buridan, Rimini, Marsilius, Albert of Saxony, and d'Ailly were the principal members, then one is forced to explain why and how it was that Marsilius does not appear to be a thorough-going Ockhamist. But Marsilius's purported abandonment of the strict Ockhamist tradition, his purported failure to maintain strict school allegiance, is exactly what does not need to be explained because it was never part of Marsilius's world. Marsilius's name appeared among the authorities favored by the via moderna because he was a terminist in logic and had written useful textbooks in the areas of logic and natural philosophy that adopted a terminist approach. But in this he probably owed more to John Buridan than to Ockham, and like Buridan, Marsilius apparently did not subscribe to the major assumptions of Ockham's natural philosophy. Terminism and Ockhamism are not the same thing, and they were not so identified in the fourteenth century nor throughout most of the fifteenth. lt was precisely that misidentification and confusion created by subsequent historians, who assumed that the lists of approved or proscribed authors represented schools of thought, that led to seeing Marsilius as the major Vertreter of an Ockhamist school at Paris and Heidelberg. Much remains to be done on Marsilius's theology in general, as well as his stand on the various aspects of Ockham's thought. But to the degree that Heidelberg's reputation as a centre for Ockhamism in the fifteenth century was based on the supposed Ockhamism of Marsilius, a reassessment of Marsilius should have a profound effect not only on our view of the intellectual development of the second half of the fourteenth century, 52 John de Nova Domo (Maisonneuve) in his treatise on universals viewed Buridan and Marsilius as followers of Ockham, and the favorable list from Cologne in 1425 and the unfavorable lists from Louvain and Paris in 1427 and 1474 respectively again place Marsilius in the company of Buridan and Ockham. See F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia (Münster 1925); N.W. Gilbert, Ockham, Wyclif, and the 'Via Moderna', Antiqui und Moderni, ed. A. Zimmermann, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 9 (Berlin 1974), 85-125. On Jean de Maisonneuve see Zenon Kaluza, Les querelles doctrinales à Paris: nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIVe et du xve siècles (Bergamo 1988).

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but on that of the fifteenth century and of the intellectual climate on the eve of the Reformation as well.

57

DER GLAUBE BEI MARSILIUS VON INGHEN Versuch einer Erschlie:Bung von In Sent. III, 14 und 1, 2

CH. HEITMANN

Am Anfang meiner Bemühung, den Glaubenstra ktat des Marsilius von Inghen vorzustellen , stand das Problem der Unzugangli chkeit und Undurchsic htigkeit seines Sentenzenk ommentars, die ermüdende Breite seiner Erôrterunge n. Es blieb die Frage, ob die hier versuchte Darlegung nicht immer mit Vereinfachu ngen und Verkürzung en sich begnügen muf5te, wenn sie verstandlich sein wollte. Trotz aller Bedenken muBte der Mut zu solcher Vereinfachu ng aufgebracht werden, zugleich aber sollte da, wo es moglich war, etwas von der Denkstruktu r und Methode dieses Werkes durchschein en. Die hier versuchte ErschlieBun g des Glaubenstra ktates muB sich ihrer Vorlaufigke it und Begrenzung stets bewuBt bleiben. Das hermeneuti sche Problem, vor das der Sentenzenk ommentar des Marsilius von Inghen den heutigen Leser stellt, ware nur zufriedenstellend losbar, wenn wir den spatscholast ischen Lehrbetrieb der Pariser theologisch en Fakultat mit seinen besonderen Formen der disputatio in Breite vorführen und zugleich die Lehrentwic klung des behandelten Glaubensbe griffes in den vorausgehe nden Jahrzehnte n aufzeigen konnten. Beides ist beim gegenwartig en Forschungs stand noch nicht moglich. Ich muB mich daher mit einer allgemeinen , skizzenhaft en Einführung begnügen. Marsilius von Inghen steht mit seinem theologische n Hauptwerk in der Tradition der Pariser Sentenzenk ommentare der Mitte des 14. Jahrhundertsl. Die seit Duns Scotus zunehmend e logische Formalisier ung ist bei 1 Die von Ritter vorgeschlagen e Datierung des Sentenzenkom mentars des Marsilius auf die Heidelberger Jahre (1386-1396) kann sich nur auf die endgültige Fassung dieses Werkes beziehen. Die Problemdisku ssion weist zurück auf die Pariser Debatten vor 1370. Vgl. Gerhard Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik, I: Marsilius von Inghen und die

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ihm bis zum auBersten gesteigert und in schulmaBiger Regelhaftigkeit durchgeführt. Offensichtlich war dabei die Praxis der theologischen Disputationen richtungweisend. In ihnen lag das Schwergewicht auf dem Spiel der Argumente und Gegenargumente2: Auf die Frage des Magisters konnte der Respondent seine Thesen ausführlich entfalten und begründen; dann würde er vom Disputanten mit weiteren Fragen in die Enge getrieben, er muBte versuchen, die Einwande des Gegners zu widerlegen. lm Fortgang der Disputation konnten weitere Opponenten eingreifen und die Diskussion ausweiten. Das einfache Gegeneinander von Respondent und Opponent war in der Praxis des Disputierens immer komplizierter und undurchsichtiger geworden. Diese Entwicklung spiegelt sich in der Anlage der Sentenzenvorlesung wider. Dabei verlauft alles nach einem festen Ritual mit bestimmten Regeln, das Spiel der Konklusionen, Probationen und Argumentationen wird anscheinend wichtiger als der inhaltliche Fortgang der Darstellung. Formal bestimmen folgende Merkmale den Aufbau einer Quaestio. Die Erorterung beginnt mit der Zerlegung in Voraussetzungen (supposita) und Ziel der Frage (quaesitum). Darauf folgt eine Reihe thesenartig formulierter Argumente, die rationes principales, mit kurzen Begründungen, in denen nur selten Autoritiiten zitiert werden. Dieser Teil entspricht der Ansicht des Opponenten - den obiectiones bei Thomas von Aquin -, er ist stets der Meinung des Autors entgegengesetzt. Dann folgt kurz eine Gegenmeinung, oft mit Berufung auf den Magister Petrus Lombard us. Der zweite, ausführliche Teil der Quaestio bringt die Hauptargumentation, er ist in Artikel aufgegliedert, die weiter vielfach unterteilt sind. Die Erürterung schreitet nur allmahlich von Lehrsatz zu Lehrsatz beweisend fort, immer wieder unterbrochen durch erganzende Problemstellungen (Correlaria), Zweifelsfragen (Dubia) und Wahrscheinlichkeitssatze (opiniones probabiles) mit den sich anschlieBenden Beweisen und

Lôsungen (Solutiones) 3 .

okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akadernie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. KI. 1921, 4. Abh. (Heidelberg 1921), 39; ebenso Egbert P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen: Treatises on the Properties of Terms, Synthese Historical Library, vol. 22 (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster 1983), 9. 2 vgl. Gerhard Ritter, Die Heidelberger Universitiit, I. Band: Das Mittelalter 1386-1508 (Heidelberg 1936), 202f. 3 vgl. Ritter, Marsilius von Inghen, 73ff.

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Der moderne Leser ist bei der Lektüre dieser Texte bald ermüdet und frustriert, er sucht vergebens nach den Zusammenhangen. Hinzu kommt die Fülle von Zitaten aus den Kirchenviitern und iilteren Scholastikern, die oft über viele Zeilen wë>rtlich ausgeschrieben werden. Dem Kenner der Probleme im theologischen Diskurs des 14. Jahrhunderts sind die Fragestellungen, die Thesen und die termini technici schon vertraut; Vieles, das schon liingst die Schuldebatten bestimmt, wird noch einmal aufgegriffen und mit zahlreichen Begründungen neu einer Losung zugeführt. Es empfiehlt sich, für den Glaubenstraktat den Problemstand kurz zu umreHSen, wie er sich bei Duns Scotus und Ockham darstellt4. Vieles, das im 13. Jahrhundert noch mit natürlichen Vernunftgründen erreichbar schien, wurde von Duns Scotus in den Bereich des Glaubens verwiesen, der als fides acquisita das Ergebnis der Glaubensverkündigung war. Er ermoglichte es dem Menschen, mit den natürlichen Mitteln der Verstandestatigkeit der Offenbarung zuzustimmen (assentiri), auch ohne daJS dabei die eingegossene Glaubensgnade (fides infusa) tiitig würde5. Für diese Zustimmung (assensus) schien eine hinreichende Glaubwürdigkeit der Offenbarung erforderlich. Zehn von Duns Scotus aufgestellte rationes sollten diese Glaubwürdigkeit garantieren. Zu ihnen gehë>rten neben der prohetischen Verkündigung des Alten Testaments im Hinblick auf das Neue und der Einhelligkeit der Schrift, sowie der auctoritas scribentium, auch die VernunftgemiiJSheit der Offenbarung und die stabilitas Ecclesiae im Gegensatz zu den Sekten6. Beim Glaubensakt liegt das Gewicht auf der menschlichen Seite, auf der fides acquisita; sie kann den Menschen auf die Erlangung der Glaubensgnade hin disponieren. Erworbener und eingegossener Glaube bringen gemeinsam den Glaubensakt hervor. Doch die fides acquisita hat groJSere Bedeutung für die GlaubensgewiJSheit; denn sie ist erfahrbar7. Ockhams Glaubensverstiindnis schlieJSt sich in vielen Punkten an Duns Scotus an. Auch er schiitzt den erworbenen Glauben, die fides acquisita,

4 vgl. Elisabeth Gôssmann, Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis im Mittelalter, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, Bd. I, Fasz. 2 b (Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1971), 109-123. Zu Duns Scotus vgl. Ludwig Walter, Das Glaubensverstiindnis bei Johannes Duns Scotus, Verôffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes, N.F. 5 (München/Paderbom/Wien 1968). 5 vgl. Gôssmann, Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis, 113. 6 vgl. Gèissmann, Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis, 114; Josef Finkenzeller, Offenbarung und Theologie nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, Beitriige zur Gesch. u. Theol. d. MA, XXXVIII, 5 (Münster 1961), 38-42. 7 vgl. Gèissmann, Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis, 114f.

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sehr hoch. Bei den einzelnen Glaubensakten gegenüber den verschiedenen Glaubenswahrheiten, den articuli fidei, erwirbt er jeweils einen besonderen Glaubenshabitus. Der durch die eingegossene Gnade verliehene habitus ist jedoch nur ein einziger; er richtet sich auf das Grundprinzip des Glaubens, daB alles Offenbarte wahr ist8. Dieser eingegossene Glaubenshabitus ist derselbe beim gelehrten Theologen und beim einfachen frommen Weib. Er verleiht erst die Verdienstlichkeit des Glaubensaktes9. Gegenüber den metaphysischen Grundlagen der Glaubensbegründung macht sich bei Ockham eine gewisse Skepsis geltend, die jedoch die historischen Voraussetzungen der Offenbarung nicht in Zweifel zieht. Die fides infusa ist das gemeinsame Band, das die Glaubenden des Alten Bundes mit den getauften Christen verbindet, das Übergreifende des Glaubens an die Wahrheit der Offenbarung GotteslO. Unmittelbare Vorstufe der theologischen Erorterung über den Glauben bei Marsilius von Inghen sind die Sonderentwicklungen des Glaubensdiskurses bei den Theologen der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts, bei Robert Holkot, Thomas Bradwardinus und den Augustinereremiten Gregor von Rimini und Hugolino von Orvieto. Die Darstellung ihrer Auffassungen hatte eine eigene Untersuchung verlangt, die den Rahmen dieser Arbeit überschreiten würde. Der Glaubensbegriff des Marsilius von Inghen soll an Hand von drei Textstücken seines Sentenzenkommentars dargelegt werden11: a) Buch III, Quaestio XIV, art. 1: Ob der Glaube eine Tugend ist? (fol. 447ra - 453ra) b) Buch III, Quaestio XIV, art. III: Ob der Glaube der Alten und der Modernen derselbe ist? (fol. 456vb - 460rb) c) Buch 1, Quaestio Il, art. II und III: Ob die Theologie eine Wissenschaft ist? (fol. llrb - 19ra)

8 vgl. Gordon Leff, William of Ockham. The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester 1975), 342; Gôssmann, Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis, 12lf; Jürgen Miethke, Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie (Berlin 1969), 271-275. 9 vgl. Gôssmann, Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis, 121. 10 vgl. Gôssmann, Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis, 123. 11 Bei den folgenden Ausführungen wird die erste Ausgabe des Sentenzenkommentars (Questiones Marsilii super quattuor libros Sententiarum) zugrundegelegt, gedruckt in StraBburg 1501 bei Martin Flach. Ein Nachdruck erschien 1966 in Frankfurt am Main. Der lateinische Text wird in den Anmerkungen ziemlich ausführlich zitiert, da der Frühdruck durch die Fülle der Abkürzungen nicht immer leicht lesbar ist.

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Da dem zuletzt genannten Textabschnitt im Rahmen des Symposiums ein eigener Vortrag von E.P. Bos gewidmet ist, wird hier nur nach der Rolle des Glaubens innerhalb der Theologie als Wissenschaft gefragt. A. Wenn ich mich zuerst dem ersten Artikel der XIV. Quaestio von Buch III zuwende, ist es angebracht, zunachst eine Inhaltsübersicht des Artikels zu geben: Der Artikel gliedert sich in drei Teile: Teil I gibt in vier notae eine genaue Begriffsbestimmung von fides und virtus. Teil II beweist, daB der Glaube eine Tugend ist in einer Folge von vier conclusiones, die jeweils in mehrere Beweisgange (probationes) untergliedert sind. Teil III, der bei weitem umfangreichste Abschnitt (mehr als 16 Textspalten), entwickelt vier Zweifelsfragen (dubia), zum Teil in sehr ausführlicher Einzelerorterung mit Argumenten und Gegenargumenten: 1. Ob der Glaube nur eine Tugend ist (una virtus)? 2. Ob die Liebe die Form des eingegossenen Glaubens ist? 3. Ob der Glaube die erste der Tugenden ist (prima virtutum)? 4. Ob der Glauben gewisser (certior) als das Wissen ist? In der Einzelbesprechung beschiiftige ich mich zunachst mit der Begriffsbestimmung der fides (Teil I), dann komme ich zu den Hauptschritten des Beweises (Teil II) und schlief5lich greife ich einige Argumentationen der dubia I, III und IV heraus (Teil III). Die Begriffsbestimmung unterscheidet fünf unterschiedliche Bedeutungen von fides: a) fides als potentia naturalis oder Fahigkeit zum Glauben (habilitas, facultas seu facilitas ad credendum). - b) fides als habitus. - c) fides als Glaubensakt (actus). - d) fides als Glaubensgegenstand (obiectum). - e) fides als Sakrament12. Darauf werden zwei Arten des habitus unterschieden: der habitus infusus und der habitus acquisitus. Bei dem eingegossenen habitus wird eine weitere Unterteilung in zwei Arten gegeben: die fides formata und die fides informis 13 .

12 Marsilius von Inghen, In Sent. III q. XIV art. I, fol. 447 vb: "Primo est notandum, quod fides quandoque sumitur pro potentia naturali vel habilitate ad credendum. Et de hoc habetur ad Romanos I: Gratias ago Deo meo, quia fides vera annuntiatur (Rom. 1,8), id est potentia vel facultas seu facilitas ad credendum. - Secundo modo sumitur pro habitu. -Tertio pro actu. - Quarto pro obiecto. - Et quinto pro sacramento". 13 ibid., fol. 447 vb: "Pro habitu accipitur dupliciter: Uno modo pro habitu infuso, alio modo pro (habitu) acquisito. Pro habitu infuso dupliciter: Uno modo pro habitu, quo inclinamur ad firmiter assentiendum ex caritate eis quae non apparent et instituta sunt

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Mit dieser Begriffsanalyse klart Marsilius zwar sehr schulmaBig, aber in geschickter Weise im voraus das begriffliche Instrumentariu m für die kommenden Erorterungen. Dabei sind die genauen Ausführungen zur fides formata besonders aufschluBreich : Sie ist jener habitus infusus, der uns geneigt macht zum festen Zustimmen durch die caritas; diese Zustimmung bezieht sich auf das Unsichtbare und das von Gott Eingesetzte, d.h. die gottliche Heilsordnung; der Glaube daran ist für den Menschen heilsnotwendig 14. Wahrend die Bestimmung der fides informis wenig prazis bleibt, treten die Merkmale des habitus acquisitus deutlich hervor. Er laBt sich aus verschiedenen Prinzipien herleiten, entweder aus der logisch denkenden Vernunft, dann ist er opinio und zugleich Zustimmung zu einem Akt der opinio, bzw. der fides habitualis; oder er gründet auf der Autoritat (auctoritas), d.h. der Heiligen Schrift, dann ist er glaubige Haltung

(credulitas)15. Drei Arten des Glaubensaktes (actus fidei) werden unterschieden: er ist klare Schau (clara visio), Glaubensbewe gung (motus fidei) und Festhalten an den VerheiBungen (observantia promissorum); d.h. Schau der Seligen, Glaube der Christen im Pilgerstand (fides viatorum) und Glaube der Menschen des Alten Bundes an die prophetischen VerheiBungen 16. In einem abschlieBenden Teil werden die beiden Formen der Tugend einander gegenübergest ellt, die virtus infusa und die virtus acquisita. Die eingegossene Tugend ist nach einer Definition Augustins (retract. I,9) die gute Eigenschaft des Geistes, die ein rechtes Leben moglich macht, die niemand schlecht gebrauchen kann und die allein Gott im Menschen wirkt. Die erworbene Tugend bringt der Mensch in Zusammenwir ken mit Gott in seiner Seele hervor, sie entsteht durch Gewohnheit17.

14 15

16

17

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per Deum, ut credantur ad hominis salutem. Et haec vocatur fides formata ... (448 ra) Secundo modo est habitus inclinans ad talia credendum, sed non ex caritate, quae vocatur fides informis". ibid., fol. 447 vb. ibid., fol. 448 ra: "Habitus acquisitus diversificatur iuxta diversitatem principiorum, ex quibus inducitur. Nam si ex ratione dialectica dicitur habitus opinio, et assensus actus opinionis vel fidei habitualis ... Et si fuerit ex auctoritate vocatur credulitas". ibid., fol. 448 ra; "Si pro actu sumitur, tripliciter sumitur; Uno modo pro clara visione ... Secundo (modo) pro motu fidei, scilicet actuali assentiri ... Et tertio pro observantia promissorum". ibid., fol. 448 ra; "Secundo est notandum, quod virtus ... definitur ... sic: Virtus est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur. Et sumitur ex dictis beati Augustini libro 1. retractationum, c. IX carptim. Et videtur dari de virtute theologica vel infusa. Acquisitas enim virtutes ex consuetudine non solum Deus, sed etiam homo Deo cooperando in anima producit";

Der Glaube bei Marsilius

Doch Marsilius will diese beiden Formen der Tugend auch noch in anderer Weise bestimmen, als virtus im eigentlichen Sinne (proprie) und im weiteren Sinne (large). Hier zeigt sich bei ihm die Vielfalt scholastischen Gliederns und Definierens, der Wechsel der Gesichtspunkte, der zur Losung der Fragen notig erscheint. Tugend im eigentlichen Sinne ist die gute Eigenschaft, die den Menschen in Stand setzt, das wahre letzte Ziel seines Lebens handelnd zu erreichen. Diese Tugend wird von Gott geschenkt, der Ungliiubige besitzt sie nicht18. Die Tugend im weiteren Sinne determiniert die Fiihigkeit des Menschen zum Guten hinsichtlich seiner eigenen Handlungen so, daB er nicht unfühig ist, per hominem das letzte Ziel zu erreichen. Aber ihm fehlt der eingegossene Gnadenhabitus, durch den er Gott gefallen kann, d.h. sein Tugendhandeln ist nicht verdienstlich19. Diese Unterscheidung der virtus im eigentlichen Sinne (proprie) und im weiteren Sinne (large) ist der Ausgangspunkt für die Losung der Frage, ob der Glaube eine Tugend ist, d.h. für den zweiten Teil des ersten Artikels. Die erste conclusio lautet: Fides informis ist keine Tugend im eigentlichen Sinne. Beweis dafür ist, daB die fides informis Potenz und Akt nicht so vervollkommnet, daB der Mensch handelnd das letzte Ziel des menschlichen Lebens, d.h. die Seligkeit, erlangt2D. Dies ist die Folgerung aus der oben angeführten Definition der Tugend im eigentlichen Sinne. Voraussetzung (antecedens) ist, daB ohne die beformende caritas niemand das ewige Leben verdient. Der Grund dafür ist, daB das ewige Leben super hominem ist und jenseits dessen, was der Mensch ex puris naturalibus, aus seinen eigenen Kriiften, vermag. Um das ewige Leben zu verdienen, ist es erforderlich, daB der Mensch bei seinem Handeln durch den eingegossenen habitus unterstützt wird21. 18 ibid., fol. 448 rb: "Quarto est notandum, quod haec virtus potest sumi dupliciter: Uno modo proprie pro qualitate bona perficiente potentiam et actum eius, prout per ipsum homo natus est ad verum finem ultimum vitae sic agendo pertingere. - Secundo modo large pro habitu bono determinante potentiam ad bonum respectum sui ipsius proprii actus, sic quod per eam sic agendo non sit defectus, quin per hominem ultimus finis attingatur. Inter quae est tanta differentia, quod iuxta primum modum virtutis in infideli nulla est virtus, quia in eo nullus est habitus dirigens actum eius, quod per ipsum sic agendo natus est attingere beatitudinem, eo quod sine fide impossibile est placere Deo". 19 ibid., fol. 448 rb. 20 ibid., fol. 448 rb: "Venio ad secundam (partem), ubi est prima conclusio: Fides informis non est virtus primo modo. Probatur, quia fides informis non perficit potentiam et actum eius, ut per ipsum sic agendo homo possit ad finem ultimum vitae humanae pertingere". 21 ibid., fol. 448 rb: "Igitur consequentia tenet per definitionem virtutis primo modo dictae. Et antecedens patet, quia sine caritate nullus meretur vitam aeternam, ut saepe dictum

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Der zweite Beweis für die erste conclusio: fides informis ist keine Tugend im eigentlichen Sinne, geht davon aus, daiS im ewigen Leben nicht nur der Intellekt, sondern auch der Wille liebend und genieBend (diligendo et fruendo) vollkommen sein wird. Daraus ergibt sich, daiS auch der Intellekt, der dem Willen untergeordn et ist, durch die fides infusa auf das credere hingeordnet sein muB. Weiter ergibt sich daraus, daiS der hôhere Teil, der Wille, durch den eingegossen en Liebeshabit us gottformig (deiformis) wird und durch die Liebe dem Intellekt befiehlt, er salle sophistische n Vernunftgrü nden nicht zustimmen, sondern seine eigene Vernunft als Gefangene in den Dienst des Glaubens geben und damit den articuli fidei ganz fest zustimmen. Denn nur so disponiert er seine Handlungen zur Seligkeit22. Die zweite conclusio benützt den Begriff virtus im weiteren Sinne (commu niter); sie lautet: Fides informis ist eine Tugend. Sodann wird aus der Defizienz der virtus acquisita im Hinblick auf das Ziel der Seligkeit die Unentbehrli chkeit der fides informata gefolgert23. Die dritte conclusio lautet: Fides informata caritate, der durch die Liebe beformte Glaube ist wahrhaft Tugend. Es ist klar, sagt die probatio, daB dies die gute Eigenschaft des Geistes ist, durch die man recht im Glauben lebt und die man nicht zum Bôsen gebrauchen kann. Mit dem durch die cari tas formierten Glauben beginnt das geistliche Leben (vita spiritualis), also ist er Tugend. Denn es heiBt Habakuk 2,4: "Der Gerechte lebt aus dem Glauben". AuBerdem werden wir durch den Glauben gerechtfertig t; also ist der Glaube Tugend. Die Folge ist, daiS jeder nur aus Tugend gerecht

est. Cuius causa est, quia, cum vita aeterna sit omnino super hominem et super ea quae homo ex puris (448 va) naturalibus potest, ad hoc, quod aliquis eam promereatur, requiritur, quod ad agendum per ea fructuose per infusos habitus adiuvetur". 22 ibid., fol. 448 va: "Secundo, cum in vita aeterna non solum intellectus in intelligendo, sed etiam voluntas in diligendo et fruendo perfecta erit, ex hoc contingit, quod pro ipsius adeptione pars intellectualis, quae inferior est ad partem volitivam, etiam per fidem infusam recta sit in credendo. Sed plus ex eo igitur, scilicet quod pars superior, puta voluntas, habitu infuso caritatis deiformis sit et ab hac caritate inferiori praecipiat, ut sophisticis rationibus non consentiat, sed sui ipsius rationem in obsequium fidei captivam teneat et articulis fidei firmissime assentiat. Sic eius actus ad beatudinem utriusque disponit et praeparat..." 23 ibid., fol. 448 va: "Secundo conclusio: Sumendo virtutem communiter, fides informis est virtus. Probatur, quia est habitus bonus determinans potentiam ad bonum respectu sui ipsius proprii actus, sic quod per eam sic agendo non sit defectus, quin homo suum finem valeat adipisci ... Et antecedens patet, quia fides infusa, cum sit a Deo, est habitus laudabilis et determinat potentiam ad assensum articulorum fidei, qui est proprius effectus fidei".

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wird. Das antecedens ergibt sich aus Rom. 5,1: "Wir sind also gerecht gemacht aus dem Glauben und haben Frieden mit Gott". 24 Der Glaube als wahrhafte Tugend, die fides formata caritate, ist rechtfertigender Glaube, der den Menschen zur Seligkeit, zum "Frieden mit Gott" führt. Die drei ersten conclusiones zeigen, wie weit der Bereich des Glaubens hier gefaBt wird, wie sich die Argumentation ganz im Theologischen bewegt. Keine abstrakten logischen Gedankenfolgen, sondern zentrale theologische Aussagen kommen als Beweise zur Sprache. So führt auch der dritte Teil des Artikels mit den vier dubia nicht in abseitige scholastische Fachdiskussionen, wenn auch die breite Entfaltung der Untersuchung das nahelegen mag; auch in diesen Erorterungen kommen wichtige theologische Einsichten ans Licht, die für die Grundhaltung der Theologie des Marsilius von Inghen bezeichnend sind. Ich kann hier nur weniges Wichtige herausgreifen. Das erste dubium, das die Frage stellt, ob der Glaube nur eine virtus ist, erürtet in diesem Zusammenhang das für die Spiitscholastik wichtige Problem der Einheit oder Vielheit des Glaubenshabitus. Innerhalb der fides acquisita findet Marsilius eine Vielfalt von Glaubenshaltungen vor: Aus der Verschiedenheit der Glaubensakte folgt auch eine Unterschiedlichkeit der Glaubenshabitus: Denn anders ist der habitus, mit dem der Gliiubige dem Satz zustimmt: Die Sündenvergebung wird dem, der Reue empfindet, von Gott zuteil. Anders ist der Glaubenshabitus, welcher der Auferstehung der Toten zustimmt. So gibt es in demselben Gliiubigen mehrere habitus fidei: bei verschiedenen Glaubensgegenstiinden ist auch der Glaube verschieden25. Andererseits spricht der Apostel Paulus von dem "einen Glauben" aller Christen (Eph. 4,5). Der Widerspruch liiBt sich losen, wenn man das Einheitsprinzip des Glaubens in der fides infusa erkennt. Eigentlich ist der Akt des eingegossenen Glaubens in der gliiubigen Seele nur einer. Auf ihm gründen sich alle partikularen Glaubensakte. Dieser grundlegende Glaubensakt gibt nur folgenden 24 ibid., fol. 448 va: "Tertia conclusio: Fides formata caritate est vere virtus, sumendo virtutem proprie. Ista est Magistri (Petri Lombardi) in littera. Et apparet, quia est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur in credendo et qua non contingit male uti. - Secundo, quia ipsa vitam spiritualem incipit; igitur est virtus. Consequentia tenet; antecedens patet Habachuc Il: Iustus ex fide vivit. - Tertio, quia per fidem iustificamur: ergo est virtus. Consequentia tenet, quia nullus fit iustus nisi ex virtute. Antecedens patet ad Romanos V: Iustificati ergo ex fide pacem habemus ad Deum". 25 ibid., fol. 449 ra: "Confirmatur sic: Alius est habitus, quod fidelis assentit huic: Remissio peccatorum fit a Deo ipsi contrito; et alius est, quo assentit huic: Resurrectio mortuorum erit.... Ergo in eodem fideli sunt plures habitus, quorum quilibet erit fides".

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Siitzen seine Zustimmu ng: Gott ist. - Gott ist wahrhaftig . - Alles durch die erste unfehlbar e Wahrheit Offenbart e ist wahr. Dieser grundlege nde Zustimmu ngsakt ist von der fides infusa gewirkt26 . Mit diesen Auffassun gen über fides acquisita und fides infusa bewegt sich Marsilius von Inghen ganz in der Tradition Ockhams27. Das dritte dubium fragt, ob der Glaube die erste der Tugenden ist. Dabei wird nicht nur über die Rangordn ung der drei theologisc hen Tugenden gesproche n, sondern vielmehr der Begriff des "Ersten" von verschiedenen Seiten aus beleuchte t: Das Erste kann das Anfiinglic he und Unvollko mmene sein, aber auch das Grundlege nde. AuiSerdem ist das Verhiiltnis des Glaubens zu den anderen theologisc hen Tugenden vielfiiltig, je nachdem es sich um fides informis oder fides caritate formata handelt. Der Wechsel der Gesichtsp unkte und Deutunge n zeigt den Glauben in immer neuer Sicht28. Das vierte dubium fragt, ob der Glaube sicherer sei als das Wissen. Das Problem der Theologie als Wissensch aft, dem wir spiiter unsere Aufmerksamk eit schenken werden, ist bei dieser Frage mit im Spiel. In sechs Thesen, die teilweise ausführlic h begründet werden, sucht Marsilius die Frage zu beantwort en: Einwiinde und darauf folgende Antworte n mit vielfachen Beweisen schliel5en sich an. Es ist hier nur moglich, den wesentlic hen Inhalt der sechs Thesen vorzutrag en, die siimtlich den Vorrang des Glaubens vor dem Wissen zu begründen versuchen . Dabei rückt schon die erste These die Rolle des Glaubens in den heilsgeschichtlich en Kontext. Der Glaube gehë>rt zum Pilgerstan d des irdischen Lebens, er bleibt voll von Riitseln gegenüber dem Wissen, das den Seligen einst in der visio beatifica zuteil werden wird29. Aber entsprech end dem 26 ibid., fol. 449 rb: "Sed in oppositum est, quod etiam Apostolus dicit: Omnium Christianor um esse unam fidem, ad Ephesios 1111. Quanto magis unius Christiani erit solum una fides et non distinctae. De hac dubitatione est conclusio responsalis haec: In eiusdem fidelis anima est eadem fides simplex in numero infusa respectu omnium articulorum credendorum . Probatur sic: Ille habitus est unus, cuius primus et proprius actus est unus, sed in anima fideli actus proprius fidei infusae est unus .... proprius actus fidei infusae, super quem omnes actus alii eius particulares fundantur, est assentire huic: Deus est. Et secundo huic: Deus est verax. Tertio huic: Omne revelatum per primam veritatem infallibilem est verum". 27 vgl. Gordon Leff, William of Ockham, 342-345. 28 Marsilius von Inghen, In Sent. III q. XIV art. I, fol. 450 vb-452 ra. 29 ibid., fol. 452 ra: "Dicitur primo, quod, si scientia sumatur pro clara visione, notum est, quod scientia est certior fide. Patet, quia illa est clara, fides est aenigmatica . Unde, sicut gloria gratiam et patria viam, sic haec scientia fidem certitudine praecedif'.

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Status des reinen Pilgers ist der Glaube der würdigste habitus unter allen geistigen habitus. Diese Würde empfüngt er aus seinem Gegenstand; denn er allein vermittelt unmittelbarer und direkter ein Wissen von Gott als alle anderen Wissensformen30. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dal.S man die Erkenntnismôglichkeiten menschlicher Wissenschaft in dieser Welt gering ansetzen mül.Ste. "Wenn man über die (methodische) Sicherheit des Forschens und Denkens spricht, sind viele menschlichen Wissenschaften sicherer als der Glaube, weil das gewisser genannt wird, was vom Intellekt in seinem Sein klarer durchschaut und im Erkennen vollstandiger erfal.St wird. Dies kommt der Wissenschaft im eigentlichen Sinne deswegen zu, weil sie sich auf die Dinge erstreckt, die der Intellekt mit dem natürlichen Licht (der Vernunft) ohne die Unterstützung eines hôheren Lichtes zu erkennen vermag"31. Aber diese Erkenntnismôglichkeiten der humanen Wissenschaft finden ihre Grenze, wie die Gegenstiinde, über die der Glaube Einsicht vermittelt, das natürliche Licht des Intellekts übersteigen. Um solche Gegenstiinde zu erfassen, bedarf der Intellekt des eingegossenen, hôheren Lichtes32. Wenn der Gegenstand des Erkennens Gott ist, macht keine Wissenschaft, die der Mensch aus dem natürlichen Licht (der Vernunft) haben kann, diesen so ausgedehnt, so klar und unverhüllt bekannt wie der Glaube eines einfaltigen, glaubigen Menschen33. In Fragen des Glaubens besitzt der simplex fidelis eine hôhere Einsicht als der gelehrte Philosoph. Sein Glaubenswissen bringt vollkommener das Wesen Gattes zum Ausdruck als der Gottesbeweis des Aristoteles im XII.

30 ibid., fol. 452 rb: "Sexto ex dictis dicitur, quod pro statu puri viatoris habitus fidei inter omnes habitus intellectuales eam non includentes est dignissimus. Patet et primo ex obiecto, quia immediatus et directius de Deo ... Secundo ex modo, quia est certior. Tertio ex mirabilitate, quia mirabiliorum est, immo et ad cogitandum suavium". 31 ibid., fol. 452 rb: "Quarta propositio, quod loquendo de certitudine speculationis sic multae humanae scientiae certiores sunt fide, quia sic certius dicitur, quod ab intellectu secundum suum existere clarius perspicitur et in cognoscendo plenius attingitur. Modo hoc convenit scientiae proprie dictae, eo quod illa est de his, in qua intellectus potest visui luminis naturalis sine iuvamine luminis superioris". 32 ibid., fol. 452 rb: "Ideo cognita ab intellectu quo ad modum essendi suum plenius attinguntur et clarius inspiciuntur quam ea, de quibus est fides, quae lumen naturale intellectus excedunt nec intellectus ea credit nisi lumine infuso et superiori". 33 ibid., fol. 452 ra: "Nam cum obiectum eius sit Deus, nulla scientia, quae de eo potest per hominem haberi ex lumine naturali, reddit eum sic extense et ita clare et nude notum, sicut facit fides unius simplicis hominis fidelis".

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Buch der Metaphysik3 4. Kritik an den Gottesbewe isen und Skepsis hinsichtlich der natürlichen Theologie findet sich auch schon bei Ockham; sie verstiirkt sich in der Mitte des 14. Jahrhundert s. Doch die ÂuJSerungen des Marsilius von Inghen über den simplex fidelis und seine Überlegenh eit weisen voraus auf die Devotio moderna und Nicolaus Cusanus. Die Glaubensha ltung des simplex fidelis zeigt sich in dem festen Anhangen an den Glaubensart ikeln. Die Begriffe adhaerere und adhaesio stammen aus der Mystik35 und beziehen sich auf die liebende Zuwendung zu Gott und zum Erlôser. Der Gliiubige vertraut Gott mehr als sich selbst, er hiingt dem Glaubensart ikel an, weil er von Gott offenbart wurde. Dieses Anhangen ist nicht kritiklose Festigkeit oder Halsstarrig keit (pertinacia), wie bei den Hiiretikern, die sich an ihren irrigen Meinungen festklammer n36. Schlechthin muJS der Glaube sicherer genannt werden als die durch menschliche n FleiB erworbenen habitus; denn er stützt sich auf die edlere Wahrheit (veritas nobilior), die schlechthin unfehlbarer ist als jede menschliche Lehre37.

34 ibid., fol. 452 ra: "Demonstravit enim Philosophus XII. Metaphysicae admodum paucas propositiones , quibus multo plures scit fidelis etiam simplex, et quae perfectius exprimunt divinam essentiam, videlicet, quod est trinus et unus, ad quod numquam ascendit lumen naturale". 35 z.B. die Schrift des Benediktiners Johannes von Kastl "De adhaerendo Deo". Vgl. Martin Grabmann, Der Benediktinerm ystiker Johannes von Kastl, der Verfasser des Büchleins "De adhaerendo Deo", Mittelalterlich es Geistesleben, Band I (München 1926), 489-524. 36 Marsilius von Inghen, In Sent. III q. XIV art. I, fol. 452 ra: "Tertia propositio, quod fidelis firmius adhaeret articulo complexo credito quam demonstratae conclusioni scitae. Plus enim credit Deo quam sibi; modo articula adhaeret (452 rb) ut revelato per Deum. Forte dicis, quod talis firmitas adhaesionis saepe est mala, ... quia haeretici firmissime adhaerent saepe suis erroribus, immo moriuntur pro eis. Ergo talis firmitudo nociva est. Respondetur, quod firmitas adhaesionis articuli fidei semper bona est, quia est ex eo, quod creditur Deum fallere non posse .... quandoque aliqui firmiter inhaerent suis propriis opinionibus vel haeresibus, et ista est pertinacia. ... Secus est in determinatis per Ecclesiam et revelatis per Spiritum Sanctum". 37 ibid., fol. 452 rb: "Quinto dicitur, quod simpliciter loquendo fides debet dici certior quam habitus per humanam industriam acquisiti. Patet, quia nobiliori innititur veritati, scilicet divinae. Alii autem habitus mediis humanitus inventis innituntur. Modo simpliciter infallibilior est veritas prima quam omnis humana doctrina".

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B.

Das Thema des dritten Artikels der XIV. Quaestio ist die Frage, ob der Glaube der Alten und der Modernen dasselbe enthalt38. Es ist das Problem der Übereinstimmung der Glaubensinhalte im Alten und Neuen Testament. Marsilius gliedert das Problem in zwei Teilfragen39: a) War der Glaube der Vater von gleicher Art (eadem specie) wie unser Glaube? b) Hatte der Glaube der Vater im Hinblick auf das Heil den gleichen Inhalt wie der unsrige? Die erste Frage wird sogleich positiv beantwortet: Als eingegossener Glaube war der Glaube der Vater in ganz besonderer Weise dem Glauben der Jünger Christi ahnlich. Das wird ex actu, ex obiecto und ex fine bewiesen. Die Âhnlichkeit des Glaubensaktes besteht darin, daB sie an Gott glauben, daB sie glauben, daB die Gott die erste Wahrheit ist, und daB alles durch Gott Offenbarte wahr ist, endlich daB sie jener Offenbarung ex caritate anhangen4D. Der Glaube der Vater und der der Jünger Christi hat als theologische Tugend, als fides infusa, die erste Wahrheit zum Gegenstand. Das gemeinsame Ziel ist bei beiden die himmlische Seligkeit41. Bei der zweiten Frage nach der Identitat des Glaubensinhalts treten jedoch die Unterschiede hervor. Das zeigt sich besonders bei den einzelnen Glaubensaussagen über die Erlosungstat Christi, bei Inkarnation, Kreuzestod, Auferstehung und Himmelfahrt. Sie haben keine Entsprechung im Glauben der Vater des Alten Testaments. Die Frage wird dann so prazisiert: Waren die Alten verpflichtet, explicite zu glauben, daB der Erloser kommen wird? Wenn das der Fall ist: Wieviele Artikel über den Erloser waren von ihnen zu glauben?42 38 Marsilius von Inghen, In Sent. III, q. XIV art. III, fol. 456 vb: "Utrum idem contineat fides veterum et modernorum?" 39 ibid., fol. 456 vb: "In quo etiam de tribus volo videre: Primum: Utrum fides Patrum fuerit eadem specie cum fide nostra? - Secundo: An ad salutem habuerit eadem credere, quae nobis proponuntur credenda? -Tertio: De ipso quaesito in propria forma". 40 ibid., fol. 456 vb: "Quantum ad primum est conclusio responsalis haec: Fides veterum infusa specialissime simile erat in se cum fide fidelium sequentium Christum .... Probatur tam ex actu quam ex obiecto quam ex fine. Ex actu, quia similis illius et iustius proprius actus, scilicet credere in Deum, scilicet credere primam veritatem esse, omnia revelata per eam vera existere et illis ex caritate inhaerere". 41 ibid., fol. 456 vb: "Ex obiecto, quia illa sicut ista fuit virtus theologica primam veritatem habens pro obiecto. Ex fine, quia illa fuit via ad gloriam sicut ista". 42 ibid., fol. 457 ra: "... omnes concedunt, quod non habebant tot explicite credere esse futura de Redemptoris incarnatione, quot nos explicite credimus esse praeterita, quia quod esset surrecturus et in carne caelos ascensurus, quae nos credimus esse praeterita. Sed manet

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Es folgt darauf zunii.chst eine Reihe von Argumenten, die sowohl in der heilsgeschichtl ichen Phase des Naturgesetzes (bis zum Gesetzgebung am Sinaï) als auch in der Phase des alten Gesetzes einen solchen Glauben an den zukünftigen Erlôser für unnôtig halten. Der Glaube an den Schëipfer, den Erhalter und Lenker der Welt sei ausreichend gewesen. Diesen Argumenten stellt Marsilius pro parte opposita zwei Texte Augustins entgegen. Dieser sagt im Enchiridion (cap. 31, § 118), daB keiner der Gerechten des Alten Bundes ohne den Glauben an Christus das Heil finden konnte. In einem Brief an Optatus43 hat er diese Aussage noch verstii.rkt: "Jenes ist der heilige Glaube, den wir bekennen, daB kein Mensch, weder der ii.lteren noch der jüngeren und der neuesten Zeit, von der Ansteckung des Sündentodes befreit wird, die er sich bei der Geburt zugezogen hat, es sei denn durch den einen Mittler zwischen Gott und den Menschen, den Menschen Christus Jesus". Wie meistens in scholastischen Quaestionen nimmt das Oppositum oder (Sed Contra) die Richtung der Lôsung schon voraus. Die Lôsung wird allerdings erst môglich durch eine neue Unterscheidun g im Glaubensakt. "Glauben an den Erlôser kann man zweifach verstehen: in einer Weise explicite, wie es der Fall wii.re, wenn die heiligen Vii.ter geglaubt hii.tten, der Sohn Gottes werde unsere Menschennatu r annehmen, er werde aus der Jungfrau geboren werden, am Kreuz leiden und sterben, am dritten Tage auferstehen und in den Himmel auffahren. Auf andere Weise implicite, d.h. glauben, daB der Erlôser kommen wird"44. Auf diese Unterscheidun g folgt die erste conclusio der oben gestellten Frage: Allen Vii.tern des Alten Bundes war der Glaube an den Erlôser zum Heil notwendig, sei es der implizite oder der explizite Glaube45.

principale dubium: Utrum tenebantur explicite credere futurum Redemptorem; et si sic, quot articulas de eodem?" 43 Augustinus, Epist. 190 ad Optatum (Migne, P.L. 33, col. 858): "Ilia tamen sit fides salva, qua credimus nullum hominum, sive maioris sive parvulae quamlibet et recentis aetatis, Iiberari a contagione mortis antiquae et obligatione peccati quod prima nativitate contraxit, nisi per unum mediatorem Dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum (1 Tim. 2,5)." 44 Marsilius von Inghen, In Sent. III q. XIV art. III, fol. 457 va: "Pro solutione huius dubii est notandum, quod credere in Redemptorem potest intelligi dupliciter: Uno modo explicite, ut si sancti Patres credidissent Filium Dei nostram humanitatem assumpturum, ex virgine nasciturum, in cruce passurum et moriturum, tertio die resurrecturum et in caelos ascensurum. Alio modo implicite, et est credere Redemptorem futurum". 45 ibid., fol. 457 va: "Qua distinctione praemissa dicitur primo, quod omnibus veteribus ad hoc quod salvarentur necessaria fuit fides Redemptoris implicita vel explicita".

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In einer zweiten conclusio wird diese Aussage erlautert: Für die einfachen Menschen, die simplices, war der explizite Glaube an den Erlôser nicht notwendig, für sie genügte es, zu glauben, dafS er kommen wird und dafS dies in der Weise geschehen würde, wie es diejenigen heiligen Vater glaubten, denen es vom Herm offenbart worden war46. Diese besondere Offenbarung ist Gegenstand einer dritten conclusio: Jenen Vatern, denen Gott etwas ausdrücklich offenbart hatte, war ein expliziter Glaube an bestimmte Glaubensartike l um so notwendiger, je klarer ihnen diese Offenbarung zuteil geworden war47. Die Unterscheidun g zwischen simplices und patres sancti bei den Vatern des Alten Bundes, zwischen implizitem und explizitem Glauben, erlaubt es Marsilius, eine mehr oder weniger vorhandene Übereinstimm ung auch bei den Glaubensinhal ten zwischen Altem und Neuem Testament anzunehmen. Dies erfordert das heilsgeschichtl iche Denken, das schon in der dem Artikel zugrundeliege nden Frage vorausgesetzt ist. Entsprechend hat Marsilius auch die Autoritaten den beiden groBen Theologen der Heilsgeschichte, Augustinus und Hugo von St. Viktor entnommen. Ja er betont seine tiefe Übereinstimm ung mit den Auffassungen Hugos ausdrücklich: "Diese conclusio ist im Geiste Hugos von St. Viktor, der (in De Sacramentis Christianae fidei, I, IV, 6) sagt: Wir glauben, dafS es von Anfang an immer in der Kirche Menschen gegeben hat, die Glaube und Erkenntnis von der Inkarnation und dem Leiden des Erlôsers hatten, an die andere Menschen einfaltigeren Glaubens sich anschlossen, die durch ihre guten Taten erlôst wurden"48.

46 ibid., fol. 457 vb: "Secunda conclusio: Simplicibus non erat necessaria explicita fides Redemptoris, sed suffecit eis credere, quod esset venturus et quod hoc fieret iuxta modum, quem credebant eorum maiores, scilicet sancti Patres, quibus hoc erat a Domino revelatum". 47 ibid., fol. 458 ra: "Tertia conclusio: Quod Patribus, quibus Deus aliqua expresse revelaverat, tanto maior fuit necessaria fides explicita respectu articulorum, quanto clarior fuerat ipsis revelatio facta". 48 ibid., fol. 458 ra: "Haec conclusio est de mente Hugonis (de Sancto Victore) libro primo de Sacramentis parte quarta, capitulo VI in fine dicentis: Credimus semper fuisse in Ecclesia etiam ab initio, qui haberent fidem et cognitionem incarnationis et passionis, quibus adhaerendo alii fide simplici et bene agendo salvabantur". (Hugo von St. Viktor, De sacramentis Christianae fidei, Liber 1, pars X, c. VI; Migne, P.L. 176, col. 339 D mit mehreren Abweichungen vom Zitat des Marsilius). Zu Hugos Glaubensbegriff vgl. Stephan Ernst, Gewiftheit des Glaubens. Der Glaubenstraktat Hugos von St. Viktor ais Zugang zu seiner theologischen Systematik, Beitrii.ge zur Gesch. d. Philos. u. Theo!. d. MAs, N.F. 30(Münster1987).

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Der dritte Artikel der XIV. Quaestio führt den Glaubensdiskurs von der scholastischen Debatte des spaten Mittelalters zurück in das heilsgeschichtliche Denken der Kirchenvater und der Theologen des 12. Jahrhunderts, er stellt Marsilius von Inghen in eine konservative theologische Stromung hinein, die bisher erst im Laufe des 15. Jahrhunderts im Gefolge der Devotio moderna deutlicher fafSbar wurde. Reichen ihre Anfiinge bis in die siebziger Jahre des 14. Jahrhunderts zurück?

c. Die beiden ersten Quaestionen von Buch I sind, wie in allen Sentenzenkommentaren, den Einleitungsfragen gewidmet, dem Wissenschaftsbegriff und dem Theologieverstandnis, Problemen, die in der Spatscholastik meist kontrovers und in grofSer Ausführlichkeit behandelt wurden. Die Frage von Glauben und Wissen steht hier im Mittelpunkt der Erürterung. Es kann nicht die Absicht der folgenden Ausführungen sein, diese Erorterung mit ihrem geschichtlichen Hintergrund vorzustellen; das ist anderswo mit grofSerer Kompetenz geleistet worden49. Ich mufS mich vielmehr damit begnügen, einige Aspekte des Glaubensbegriffs, die in der zweiten Quaestio deutlicher hervortreten, als Erganzung zur bisherigen Untersuchung des Glaubenstraktates herauszustellen. Die beiden ersten Artikel der zweiten Quaestio sind vorlaufigen Klarungen gewidmet, den erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretischen Voraussetzungen (Artikel I) und allgemeinen Bemerkungen zum Theologiebegriff (Artikel II). Erst der dritte Artikel behandelt die Fragen des Wissenschaftscharakters der Theologie mit der üblichen Ausführlichkeit. lm ersten Artikel schildert Marsilius von Inghen die Art und Weise der Entstehung von Kenntnissen und gibt dabei eine Einteilung des gesamten Wissens in neun divisiones, die sich stufenweise auseinander ableiten lassenSO. Die Theologie ist in diesem Wissenschaftssystem ein Teilbereich der noticia assensiva, der zustimmenden Erkenntnis, die auf der noticia apprehensiva aufbaut. Innerhalb dieser auffassenden 49 Über den Wissenschaftsbegriff der zweiten Quaestio des ersten Buches ist inzwischen eine Monographie von Egbert P. Bos erschienen, die mir jedoch bisher nicht zuganglich war. 50 Marsilius von Inghen, In Sent. I q. II art. I, fol. 10 rb - 11 rb.

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Erkenntnis erfaBt der Lehrende die Bedeutung eines Satzes. Ob diese Satz wahr ist, vermag er erst durch den Beweis, der eine conclusio zur Folge hat, zu erkennen. Diese durch den Beweis und das SchluBverfahre n gesicherte Erkenntnis macht die Zustimmung moglich, sie ist noticia assentiva 51 . In diesem formalen Sinne ist auch die Theologie eine zustimmende Erkenntnis; auch sie arbeitet mit Beweisen, Folgerungen und Konklusionen. Doch es gibt auch eine noticia assensiva ohne vorausgehend en Beweis. Neben unmittelbarer Sinnes- und Erfahrungserk enntnis trifft das auch für den Glauben zu; seine Zustimmung entsprang aus der Autoritiit des im Offenbarungsw ort Redenden, d.h. Gottes. So repriisentieren Theologie und Glaube zwei verschiedene Weisen von zustimmender Erkenntnis52. Der zweite Artikel stellt unter diesen Voraussetzung en die Frage nach der Theologie. Als Wissenschaft gehort sie in den Bereich der noticia assensiva, aber ihre Grundlage ist nicht das natürliche Licht (der Vernunft), sondern die Offenbarung. Ihr Gegenstand ist Gott, das Lebensziel des in dieser Welt pilgernden Menschen, das nur durch die eingegossene Gnade der fides formata erreicht werden kann53. Theologie kann man in drei verschiedenen Weisen verstehen: 1) Theologie ist habitus oder Akt, wodurch wir dem zustimmen, was in der Heiligen Schrift überliefert ist. So ist Theologie im eigentlichen Sinne (proprie) Glaube. Denn das in der Schrift Überlieferte ist als gottliche Offenbarung Gegenstand des Glaubens54. 51 ibid., fol. 11 ra: "Noticiarum proportionalium aliqua est apprehensiva, ... alia est assensiva, qua propositioni apprehensae assentimus, ut discipulus audiens conclusionem, quam magister vult probare; ante probationem habet de ea noticiam apprehensivam, dum intelligit quid significet, sed assensivam, donec probetur, non habet". 52 ibid., fol. 11 ra: "(Noticia assensiva) sine probatione est quadruplex: Quaedem enim singularium, quae vocatur noticia assensiva sensus vel sequens sensum ... - Secunda est, quae sequitur experientiam cum iuvamine intellectus .... - Tertia est principiorum evidentium ex implicatione suorum terminorum ... - Quarta est assensus genitus ex auctoritate dicentis, sicut credimus, quod Deus est trinus et unus ... quarta vocatur fides". 53 ibid., fol. 11 ra: "Noticia autem assensiva genita per probationem praeviam communiter sequitur naturam medii per quod probatur. Unde quadruplex videtur: ... Et quarta est, quae in consequentia necessaria infert conclusionem ex praemissis creditis, ... et tale communiter est noticia conclusionis, quae probatur discursu theologico". ibid., art. II, fol. 11 rb: "Sed sacra theologia habet Deum pro subiecto, prout est finis vitae viatoris fide formata attingibilis". 54 ibid., fol. 11 rb: "... est notandum, quod theologia potest capi ... uno modo pro habitu vel actu vel utrisque simul, quo vel quibus assentimus his, quae in Sacra Scriptura traduntur ... Et haec theologia proprie est fides, quia manifestum est, quod traduntur in ea, ut a Deo revelata sunt, et ut sunt obiectum fidei".

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2) Theologie verteidigt den geoffenbarten, bekannten und geglaubten Inhalt des Glaubens gegen die Hiiretiker; sie erkliirt ihn den weniger Gebildeten, die solcher Unterweisung bedürfenss. 3) Theologie leitet aus den Glaubensartikeln und den Worten der Heiligen Schrift Schlüsse (conclusiones) und Siitze (propositiones) her. In diesem Sinne ist sie eine beweisende Wissenschaft, die sich im theologischen Diskurs vollzieht und nach theologischen Wahrheiten sucht56. Die Theologie ist also Glaube, Apologetik und Verkündigung, sowie beweisende Wissenschaft. Die Theologie als Wissenschaft legt folgende drei Fragen (dubia) nahe:57 a) Was ist ein theologischer Satz (propositio)? b) Wie vollzieht sich der theologische Diskurs? c) Was ist theologische Wahrheit? Nur die Beantwortung der dritten Frage soll uns hier beschiiftigen, sie ist für den Glaubensbegriff von Bedeutung. Denn theologische Wahrheit findet sich strenggenommen nur in den Glaubensartikeln und im Kanon der Bibel. lm weiteren Sinne aber umfaBt sie alles das, was ein Theologe implicite oder explicite in seinem Glauben bekennen muJ558. In diesem Sinne ist theologische Wahrheit in vier verschiedenen Überlieferungsbereichen zu finden: 1) lm Glaubensartikel des Symbolum Apostolicum. 2) lm positiven Satz des biblischen Kanons. 3) In den von der Kirche rezipierten authentischen Chroniken, den Miirtyrerberichten und der auBerkanonischen Überlieferung über die Aposte!. 4) In den sancti Ecclesiae, den Kirchenviitern, und den Konzilien59. 55 ibid., fol. 11 rb: "Secundo modo theologia dicitur habitus, quo per huiusmodi revelata nota et credita fides et ea, quae in Sacra Scriptura traduntur, defenduntur contra haereticos et declarantur apud simpliciores indigentes". 56 ibid., fol. 11 va: "Tertio (modo) theologia dicitur habitus alicuius conclusionis vel propositionis deductae ex articulis fidei sive ex dictis Sacrae Scripturae ... " 57 ibid., fol. 11 va: "Hic surgunt dubia: Quid sit propositio theologica? Secundum quid sit discursus theologicus? Quid est veritas theologica?" 58 ibid., fol. 11 vb: "Ad tertium dicitur, quod veritas theologica, si stricte sumitur, dicitur veritas in articulis fidei vel canone Bibliae expressa, vel quae ad aliquem talem cum una manifeste vera vel pluribus talibus potest inferri. Si large sumatur, tune veritas theologica est, quam theologus tenetur confiteri ex fide implicite vel explicite". 59 ibid., fol. 11 vb: "Et sic quadruplex invenitur: Prima est articulus fidei in symbolo Apostolorum expressus, quicumque sit ille. - Secunda est propositio in canone Bibliae assertive posita, quaecumque fuerit. - Tertia est veritas chronicarum authenticarum ab

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Diese Aufzahlung der theologischen Wahrheitsquellen schlief.St mit folgender Feststellung: "Der Glaube nütigt die Glaubigen, der Kirche zu gehorchen, die, weil sie vom Heiligen Geist gelenkt wird, nicht irrt und auch nicht in die Irre führt, wenn sie solches festsetzt. Wie ein Katholik all diesem implicite glauben muB, so auch allem, was daraus gefolgert wird. Deshalb muB bei Anerkennung des Vorausgehenden auch der rechten Folgerung zugestimmt werden"60. Auch der Begriff der Wissenschaft (scientia), den Marsilius zu Beginn des dritten Artikels bestimmt, hat einen eigentlichen Sinn, der den Ausführungen des Aristoteles in den Analytica Posteriora entspricht, und einen weiteren, der mit dem Glaubensbegriff übereinkommt61. Wie Aristoteles die Wissenschaft auf unbeweisbaren Axiomen, den principia perse nota, aufbauen IaBt, so beruht auch bei diesem weiteren Begriff die Wissenschaft auf Prinzipien, die mit Gewif.Sheit und ohne Beweis bekannt sind, namlich durch die Offenbarung und durch den Glauben62. Eine scharfe Entgegensetzung von Glauben und Wissen wird von Marsilius abgelehnt. Beide erganzen sich und decken sich vielfach. Doch der Glaube muf.S dem Wissen vorangehen, denn "durch Glauben kommt man zur Erkenntnis und nicht umgekehrt" (Augustinus). Der besondere Vorrang des Glaubens wird deutlich im Bericht von der fidelis muliercula, dem glaubigen Weiblein, das mehr und bessere, ja heilsamere Einsichten über das Gottliche hat als samtliche Philosophen Ecclesia receptarum, ut historiae de martyribus et martyriis apostolorum vel martyrum, et consimiles. Sub quibus etiam comprehenduntur veritates, quae ab Apostolis ad nos devenerunt, vel etiam, quae Patribus divinitus revelatae sunt et ab Ecclesia receptae, etiam si non sint expressae in canone Bibliae.... - Quarta est veritas omnium Sanctorum Ecclesiae et Conciliorum, quibus non est derogatum, et omnium, quae ex his vel eorum aliquibus vel aliquo cum alio vero manifesto possunt inferri". 60 ibid., fol. 11 vb: "Nam fides cogit fideles ad oboediendum Ecclesiae, quae, quia Spiritu Sanctu regitur, non fallitur neque fallit talia statuendo. Et sicut omnibus his catholicus implicite debet credere, ita etiam omnibus consequentibus ad ea, eo quod concesso antecedente consequentiae bonae concedendum est consequens". 61 ibid., art. III, fol. 12 ra: "Sciendum, quod scientia, quando proprie sumitur, ... debet esse habitus firmus de conclusione necessaria per demonstrationem acquisitus, id est acquisitus ex primis principiis veris per se vel per experientiam notis mediate vel immediate. Alio modo scientia capitur largius, prout est assensus veri necessarii. Et sic non esset dubium, quin aliqua fides sit scientia, ut fides istius scilicet: Deus est trinus et unus". 62 ibid., fol. 12 ra: "Sicut enim scientia naturaliter producta procedit ex principiis simpliciter primis et sine probatione notis, ita etiam in illo modo habitus de conclusione generatur ex principiis certitudinaliter et sine probatione cognitis, sed notis per revelationem sive per fidem".

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mit dem natürlichen Licht (der Vernunft). Denn Christus hat durch sein Glaubenslicht, die fides infusa, die Herzen der einfachen Menschen, der simplices, erleuchtet63. Freilich kann die theologischen Wissenschaft bei der Deutung der Heiligen Schrift viele wahre Einsichten haben, ja viele Erkenntnisse erwerben, die im Glauben der simplices nicht eingeschlossen sind64. So konnen im theologischen Diskurs im AnschluJS an bestimmte propositiones auch Erkenntnisse gewonnen werden, die im Schriftkanon nicht zum Ausdruck kommen65. Dennoch sind die auf diese Weise erworbenen Zustimmungen zu bestimmten Schlüssen nicht starker als der Glaube. Obwohl der Student der Theologie bei seinem Fortschreiten im Denken im extensiven Sinne groJSere Erkenntnis gewinnt, ist der intensive Zuwachs nicht groJSer als jene Glaubenszustimmung, die er aus den Prinzipien der Theologie von jeher immer schon besaJ566. Der Glaube ist die Konstante, die dem theologischen Diskurs vorausgehen muJS und die bei allem Fortschritt im Denken grundsatzlich unüberholbar bleibt. Am Ende dieses Versuchs, einige wichtige Aspekte des Glaubenstraktates bei Marsilius von Inghen zu erhellen, soll ein kurzer Blick auf die von ihm zitierten Autoritaten geworfen werden. Neben den Kirchenvatern, Ambrosius, Hieronymus, Augustinus, Gregor und Boethius, werden vor allem Hugo und Richard von St. Viktor haufig und mit besonderer Hochachtung genannt, dazu Thomas von Aquin, von dem lange Textzitate aus der Summa Theologiae angeführt werden67. Ockhams Name erscheint

63 ibid., fol. 14 rb: "Et beatus Augustinus dicit super lohannem: Per fidem venitur ad cognitionem et none contrario. Tanta est virtus catholicae fidei, quod plures et expressiores et salubriores cognitiones de divinis habet fidelis muliercula quem habere possunt omnes philosophi in puro lumine naturali. Benedictus itaque mediator Dei et hominum, qui tanto lumine sua fide illuminare ac ditare voluit corda simplicium". 64 ibid., fol. 17 rb: "Instructus in Sacra Scriptura potest multos sensus veros habere, multasque noticias sibi acquirere in fide simplicium non inclusas". 65 ibid., fol. 17 va: "Per discursum theologicum etiam possunt acquiri noticiae adhaesivae propositionum in Sacro Canone non expressarum". 66 ibid., fol. 17 vb: "Licet studens in theologia per processus theologicos acquirat noticiam maiorem extensive quam prius habuit, tamen non maiorem acquirit intensive quam sunt assensus fidei, quos habet de principiis theologiae". 67 Die Quellenbenützung und -zitierung zeigt sich besonders charakteristisch in den Correlarien des dritten Artikels der zweiten Quaestio von Buch I. Ausführliches Referat aus Richard von St. Viktor in fol. 14 va und vb, 15 ra. Wôrtliche Zitate aus der

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nur vereinzelt und nicht ohne Vorbehalt, auch der mehrfach erwahnte Gregor von Rimini wird durchaus kritisch betrachtet. Die Auswahl der zitierten Autoritaten bestatigt den konservativen Zug, der auch in der sachlichen Argumentation zu beobachten war. Ein endgültiges Urteil über den geschichtlichen Hintergrund des Sentenzenkommentars wird erst môglich sein, wenn auch die nicht namentlich zitierten Quellen ermittelt sind, wenn die Zielrichtung der Polemik eindeutig feststeht. Eine abschlief.Sende Würdigung kann nur mit Vorsicht gewagt werden. Der Sentenzenkommentar des Marsilius von Inghen erschlief.St sich in seiner schulmaf.Sigen Gründlichkeit und Pedanterie, in den durchgangigen logischen Beweisverfahren, zunachst nur schwer. Erst bei sorgfaltiger Lektüre und genauer Interpretation werden die Akzente deutlich, die er setzen môchte; hinter dem schwerfalligen Apparat wird die persônliche Frômmigkeit und Glaubenshaltung des Theologen sichtbar. Sie zeigt ihn in der Nahe der Mystik und der Devotio moderna, verwandt ahnlichen konservativen Strômungen in der Theologie des 15. Jahrhunderts. War er einer ihrer Vorlaufer? Diese Frage kann erst durch weitere, umfassende Studien zu seiner Theologie beantwortet werden.

Summa Theologiae des Thomas von Aquin in fol. 15 vb (Prima Pars, q. XXXII, art. I) und 16 ra.

79

MARSILIUS OF INGHEN ON THEOLOGY AS SCIENCE

E.P. BOS

1. Introduction Is theology a science according to Marsilius of Inghen? Or, to put it more precisely: is our human theology according to Marsilius of Inghen a science in the strict sense? The problem here has to do with human theology, that is: it concerns the way in which a human being has scientific knowledge of divine things; the problem does not concern God's own theology, by which God knows Himself, or the theology of the blessed (i.e. the angels or human souls in heaven after death) by which they know God. Nor shall 1 discuss the end (finis) of theology, i.e. whether theology is a speculative or practical or affective science, that is: whether theology is directed towards knowledge, action, love or whatever other end or combination of endsl. In the present contribution 1 shall discuss in main lines the habitus (disposition) of theology, theology as knowledge of conclusions, its certainty and lack of evidence, its necessity, its subiectum primum (first formal object) and the subalternation of theology. Whether or not theology is a science in the sense intended here was a much debated topic in the Middle Ages. Foremost, these discussions can be found in the prologues to the Commentaries on the Sentences by medieval theologians. There are a number of modern studies on the subject: for general studies of the twelfth and thirteenth century 1 especially refer to the works by Chenu2 and K6pf3. Authors of about 1300

2 3

According to Marsilius theology is primarily a speculative, secondarily a practical science: see Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (Strasbourg 1501, reprint Frankfurt/Main 1966), Prologue, book I, qu. III, fol. 2lra-27ra. M.-D. Chenu, La théologie comme science au xme siècle (Paris 1957). U. Kôpf, Die Anfiinge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert (Tübingen 1974).

81

E.P. Bos and of the fourteenth century have been discussed in rnonographs e.g. by Streuer on Peter Aureo1i4. Marsilius of Inghen's view on theology as a science has scarcely been investigated. ln Ritter's pioneering work on Marsilius' life and thought only a few rernarks on the subject can be found5; in rny recent book6, on Marsilius' second question of the first book of his Cornrnentary on the Sentences ('Is theology one science and is God its forrnal object?')7, 1 have discussed various topics related to his view on theology in sorne detail, e.g. on knowledge in general, the object of assent, faith etc. ln the present contribution 1 shall discuss Marsilius' theory of theology as a science in a cornprehensive way and compare it with his view of naturally acquired science, and atternpt to place his theory in its historical context.

2. Two other views on theology as a science In the second question of the first book of his Cornrnentary on the Sentences (cornpleted 13948) Marsilius presents different views on the scientific character of theology. Arnong other things he gives a catalogue of nine different conceptions (this catalogue lacks detail and precision), as well as an elaborate discussion on theology as 'erleuchteter Glaube' ('illurninated faith'), to use Beurner's9 terrninology, a view which can partly be ascribed to Henry of Ghent (before 1240 - 1296). 1 shall return to this view belowID. In the period before Marsilius we rnay find two different views on theology as a science which are in a sense opposite to each other. They are presented by Marsilius in various degrees of elaboration. These views can also be found in e.g. the Cornrnentary on the Sentences by the Augus-

4

S. Streuer, Die theologische Einleitungslehre des Petrus Aureoli auf Grund seines Scriptum super primum Sententiarum und ihre theologiegeschichtliche Einordnung (Werl,

Westfalen 1968). 5

G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik I. Marsilius von lnghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historisch e Klasse 1921, 4 (Heidelberg 1921), 139. 6 Marsilius van lnghen: Kennis, wetenschap en theologie. Uitgegeven, ingeleid en van aantekeningen voorzien door E.P. Bos (Baarn 1987). 7 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), fol. 17rb. 8 Ritter, Marsilius von lnghen, 40. 9 J. Beumer, Erleuchteter Glaube. Die Theorie Heinrichs von Gent und ihr Fortleben in der Spatscholastik, Franziskanische Studien 37 (1955), 129-160. 10 See section 2.2.

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tinian theologian Thomas of Strasbourg (d. 1345) who influenced Marsilius in some respectsl 1, and who calls these views 'opposite' to each other12.

2.1. Theology as a science of inferences (scien tia consequen tiarum)

In this view, the scientific character of theology is denied to a certain degree, at least so Thomas of Strasbourg says. Marsilius describes this position as follows13: 'A certain doctor says: theology is a science of inferences; knowing that these inferences are valid a theologian can deduce them (i.e. the consequents - E.P. Bos) from the Holy Scriptures; this doctor says, however, that the antecedent is believed, just as the consequent, and therefore neither is known according to this doctor'. Marsilius does not give a detailed description. Thomas of Strasbourg gives an example:14 on the assumption that 'in the one divine nature there are three different persons', it is inferred that 'the difference between these persons is relative' (supposito quod in una natura divina sint tres persane distincte sequitur quod earum distinctio sit per relativa) (this apparently implies: 'there is, at least, no difference in reality'). Thomas concludes that this view reconstructs theology as a kind of logic: theology reasons from what is believed to what is believed, and does not combine propositions that are believed with something known. From Marsilius' short description we can infer that he hardly calls this kind of theology a science15: like Thomas of Strasbourg he probably considers it as a kind of logic, which is not a science in the primary sense. Marsilius does not ascribe this view of theology to a specific theologian; neither does Thomas of Strasbourg16, nor do e.g. Peter Aureoli and Herveus Natalis who also discuss it in their Commentaries on the Sentences17. It is not easy to ascribe the view, as far as presented by Marsilius, to someone in particular, neither is this easy on the basis of

11 Cf. Ritter, Marsilius von Inghen, 85; 141. 12 Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (Venetiis 1564, reprint Ridgwood, New Jersey 1965), fol. 5rb. 13 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), fol. 17rb. 14 Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. 1564), fol. 6ra. 15 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), fol. 17ra. 16 Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. 1564), fol. 6ra-rb. 17 Streuer, Petrus Aureoli, 73.

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Peter Aureoli's text, as Streuer has pointed out18. Perhaps Marsilius had Odo Rigaldus (d. 1275) in mind, the only theologian 1 know who opines that theology is a scientia consequentiaru m, though not precisely in the same sense as Marsilius indicates. According to Streuer19, we may find in Odo's works the inference: 'Moses has spoken by inspiration of the Holy Ghost: therefore the words of Moses are true'. By this consequentia Odo tries to defend, Streuer says, theology against the objection that it depends on human will. Neither Marsilius nor Thomas of Strasbourg interpret Odo's view precisely in this way, however.

2.2. Theology as illuminated faith

Another view is in a certain sense opposed to the one just mentioned. According to this view, theology is a science in a strict sense, because theology possesses a higher light than faith alone, and therefore it possesses evidence. From this it follows, according to Marsilius' description of this view2D, that theology is a science like a naturall y acquired science. The existence of such a higher light is argued for, first, on the basis of authoritative texts of Augustine: there are many 'rich of spirit' possessing such a light, it is said21. Secondly, Marsilius gives what he calls a 'rational' argument: if God would not have given this higher light to man in this life, He would not have provided man with everything necessary for his salvation22. Marsilius continues: on the basis of these texts and arguments some theologians say that man in the present life possess a kind of intermediary light on truths of faith; this light, they say, ranks higher than faith, but is lower than the light of glory possessed by angels and souls after death who are face to face with God23. So much for Marsilius' text. Marsilius does not ascribe this second view to a theologian in particular. No doubt, Henry of Ghent is among the 'some' theologians. In his

18 19 20 21 22

Streuer, Petrus Aureoli, 72-73. See note 18. Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), fol. 18ra. See note 20. Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), fol. 18ra-rb. The 'rationality' of this argument is the modus tollendo tollens. 23 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), fol. 18rb.

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Summa quaestionum ordinariarum Henry says24 that man can know truths of faith in three ways: 1) merely on basis of faith: in this way man assents to the Bible, the revelation of God who cannot deceive; 2) on the basis of the vision of truths of faith: in this way, the Saints know truths in Heaven; 3) on the basis of evidence resulting from understanding; in this way our intellect knows what is taught by faith. E.g., our intellect knows the meanings of these terms: 'Father', 'Son', 'Holy Ghost'. Now, our intellect understands with the help of a supernatural light, that is the special illumination by God, that the Holy Ghost proceeds bath from the Father and the Son, not only from the Father (as is taught e.g. by the Arians in the early church). Henry's theory of illuminated faifü25 is an interpretation of Augustine's theory of illumination. For true knowledge a special light is needed26.

3. The Parisian Condemnations of 1270/1277

Before discussing Marsilius' own view, let us consider the Parisian condemnations (1270/127727). From these it may be deduced that theology is to be considered as science. In these condemnations it is said (condemnation 15328), that it would be an error to believe that one who is acquainted with theology, does not know anything other than what he knew before (quod nihil plus scitur propter scire theologiam). Other theses point out that it would be an error to believe that the Christian law contains fables and falsehoods (condemnation 17429) and that the teachings of theologians are based on fables (condemnation 15230). Bishop Etienne Tempier, who issued the condemnations, probably intended to say by these and other theses that theology should be interpreted as a science and not, for example, as just an ability to relate the Bible24 Summa quaestionum ordinariarum (Parisiis 1520, reprint St. Bonaventure 1953), Pars 1, art. XIII, qu. 6, fol. 94-5. 25 As has been said, the expression is Beumer's (Erleuchteter Glaube). Beumer also gives other texts to sketch Henry's view, e.g. from Henry's Quodlibeta. 26 Beumer (Erleuchteter Glaube, 140-160) mentions followers and opponents of Henry's views. 27 In Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (C. U.P), éd. H. Denifle et A. Châtelain, tôme I (Paris 1889). 28 In P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle (Louvain 1908), no. 182. See also: condemnation 175 (ibid., no. 180). 29 C.U.P., no. 174; Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, no. 181. 30 C.U.P., no. 152; Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, no. 183.

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staries. From other condemnati ons that are concerned with specific doctrines for example with the eternity of the world31, it becomes clear that in theology grounds (causae) can be found. So in this respect, theology meets the requirement s of science brought forward by Aristotle; this is the way at least, in which Thomas of Strasbourg interprets condemnati on 15332.

4. Marsilius on science and theology In this section I shall try to give an outline of Marsilius' view on theology as a science by opposing it with his conception of naturally acquired science. I shall particularly draw attention to Marsilius' criticism of Henry of Ghent's view. During the period from about 1150 up to 1250 all works of Aristotle have become accessible to the Latin West by translations, especially in Paris and Oxford. Aristotle's reconstructi on of science became very influential, not only with respect to the medievals' conception of naturally acquired sciences, but of theology as well.

4.1. Marsilius on naturally acquired science In my view Marsilius' theory of science can be described in terms of at least the following essential elements: 1. the habitus ('disposition ') of a science; 2. science as knowledge of conclusions; 3. the certainty of scientific knowledge; 4. science as necessary knowledge; 5. the subiectum primum ('forma! object') of science; 6. subalternati on of science.

4.1.1. The habitus ('disposition ') of a science Science is a habitus, or disposition which is a kind of property of a human being in virtue of his soul Marsilius says33. By way of this disposition a man can elicit acts of scientific knowledge, e.g. he can actually know (on the basis of premisses) the conclusion that all pieces of copper tend 31 E.g. C.U.P., no. 90; Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, no. 183. 32 Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. 1564), fol. 6ra. 33 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book 1, qu. Il, art. 2, fol. llrb.

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towards the centre of the earth. As disposition science may be compared with other human beings having developed powers, e.g. the capacity to produce tables, etc. The description of science in terms of a disposition expresses the task of the science, not its structure. The notion of the habitus of a science goes back to Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, VI, iii.

4.1.2. Science as knowledge of conclusions

Aristotle says that science is knowledge of conclusions proved by inference, especially by syllogism, from premisses34. Following Aristotle Marsilius says that the premisses are acquired by induction, with the help of the intellect, which is naturally inclined to see the primary principles of things35. The syllogistic form to be preferred above all others is 'Barbara'. Ideally a scientist knows all causes of a thing he studies, which are expressed in the middle-term of the syllogism, but because of the imperfections of the human intellect in the present state, knowledge of one single conclusion which is perfectly known, is sufficient36.

4.1.3. The certainty of scientific knowledge

A natural scientist possesses certain knowledge of the premisses, acquired ultimately by induction with the help of the intellect, and of the conclusion. The basis of this kind of certainty is evidence according to Marsilius, the final criterion of natural certainty in fourteenth-century philosophy37.

4.1.4. Science as necessary knowledge

Traditionally, science is associated with necessity. According to some earlier philosophers this necessity is founded in the things themselves; 34 See note 33. 35 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super libris Priorum Analyticorum (Venetiis 1516, reprint Frankfurt/Main 1968), Book II, qu. XX, fol. 36ra. 36 Marsilius of Inghen, Abbreviationes super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Venetiis 1521), Prohemium, fol. 2vb. 37 Cf. e.g. F.C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. III/2: Ockham to Suarez (London 11953, 1968), 128-131.

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according to Marsilius, however, this necessity is a property of a proposition of which the terms refer to things. Of these things it is always true to say that they posses the property denoted by the predicate-term. ('Necessity' is taken here in an omnitemporal sense, it seems). This reference by terms is elucidated by Marsilius in his theory of suppositio, which I cannot discuss here38. Marsilius distinguishes different forms of necessary propositions39. First an example of an absolutely necessary proposition is Deus est ('God exists'). This proposition is true every time it is formulated. Of course, God always exists, by definition; so the proposition is always true and therefore necessary. Problems arise, however, when necessary propositions are to be formed about contingent objects which do not exist necessarily or need to exist at the time of the utterance. The example given by Marsilius40 shows how science can be about contingent things, e.g. about a triangle. A triangle necessarily possesses three angles the sum of which is equal to the sum of two right-angles. This is true even when no triangles exist at the time someone forms a proposition which determines the sum of the angles. Triangles are contingent things, and therefore need not exist; hence a proposition should be formulated as a conditional or a temporally necessary proposition, that is: either as 'if there is a triangle, it possesses three angles of which the sum is equal to the sum of two right-angles', or 'whenever there is a triangle etc.'. Thus formulated the proposition does not necessarily refer to a contingent, or not-necessary object which exists at the time of the utterance. In his Questions on the Prior Analytics, Marsilius further mentions41 a conditionally necessary truth ('if there is a man, it is an animal'), and a temporally necessary truth ('thunder is a noise in the clouds'). 'Thunder' sometimes supposits for something, and in that case, 'noise in the clouds' supposits for the same. We may conclude that scientific and, therefore, according to Marsilius, necessary propositions can be about contingent things. These contingent things should be instances of a kind, however. It is unlikely, I feel, that ac38 See Marsilius of Inghen, Treatises on the Properties of Terms. A First Critical Edition of the Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, Restrictiones and Alienationes with Introduction, Translation, and Appendices by E.P. Bos (Dordrecht/Boston 1983). 39 Quaestiones super libris Priorum Analyticorum (ed. 1516), Book I, qu. XXIX, fol. 15rb16ra. 40 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book I, qu. II, art. 3, fol. 13rb. 41 See note 39.

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cording to Marsilius, scientific propositions can be formed about unique things as such, e.g. Socrates as this individual. Marsilius explicitly says that it is not possible to have scientific knowledge of a future contingent, e.g. 'The Day of Judgment will come•42. The characteristics 2-4 of science primarily originate in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Il, xix.

4.1.5. The subiectum primum (first formal object) of a science

For a science to have a competence of its own, which is not shared by other sciences, it must have a subiectum primum, a formal object proper to a science. The notion of a first formal object of a science usually is expressed in the Middle Ages by 'subiectum primum scientiae', or just 'subiectum scientiae'. 1 shall try to present a short outline of Marsilius' conception43 of a science's first formal object. 1 have dealt with it elsewhere in more detai144. According to our master's definition, the subiectum primum of a science is that formal object to which all other objects of the science are related, and that does not exceed the goals (mete)45 of that science46. One of Marsilius' examples is the subiectum primum of logic, viz. argumentatio ('argument')47 . Primarily this subiectum primum is a mental term: it is the most general term that can be predicated of all principal objects of the science, e.g. of a syllogism, in 'a syllogism is a (kind of) argument'. All objects of logic, not only the syllogism, but also the terms which are parts of a syllogism are (in various degrees) related to the subiectum primum. This subiectum denotes all things belonging to the subiectum: it 'supposits' for them. Furthermore, the subiectum primum gives unity to the 42 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book 1, qu. Il, art. 3, fol. 18ra. 43 Esp. Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book 1, qu. Il, art. 5, fol. 19ra-20rb. 44 E.P. Bos, Het subject van de menselijke theologie volgens Marsilius van lnghen (ca. 1340-1396), Praesidium libertatis. Lezingen gehouden op de filosofiedag 1985 te Leiden. Redactie Caroline van Eck en Herman Philipse, Filosofische reeks van de Centrale Interfaculteit van de Universiteit van Amsterdam XIII (Delft 1985), 269-277. 45 not 'boundaries', in my opinion. Cf. Kretzmann in William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, Translated with an introduction and notes by N. Kretzmann (Minneapolis 1966), 133 (n. 7). 46 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book 1, qu. Il, art. 5, fol. 19rb-ra. 47 Ibid., fol. 19ra.

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science. This function is very important to Marsilius. In the second question of his Commentary on the Sentences he devotes a separate, although short, article48 to this function of subiectum. The subiectum primum unifies all conclusions known in a science. Marsilius' theory as to how the subiectum primum gives unity to a science is not very clear in all respects, however. First, Marsilius says that a science is one because of the unity of its formal aspect (in the same way as Thomas Aquinas says in his Summa Theologiae49); secondly, he says a science is one because of the unity of attribution, i.e. all abjects are related to a central point (a kind of analogy in the way Henry of Ghent advocatesSO), and finally, he says that a science is one because all abjects p.ave the same end (e.g. the production of an argument in logic). To my mind, Marsilius does not clearly distinguish between these interpretations. The notion of a subiectum primum of a science goes back to various remarks made by Aristotle on the genus-subject of a science, particularly in his Posterior Analytics I, vii and Metaphysics, IV, ii and X, iv.

4.1.6. The subalternatio (subalternation) of sciences

Because of the subiectum primum, a science has its own range, but it is possible that one science is not completely independent of another. One science may be subalternate to another, i.e., it may receive its principles and axioms from another science. In this way e.g. music is subordinate to arithmetic51. The theory of the subalternation of sciences goes back to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, I, ix and xiii.

4.2. Marsilius on theology as a science It was a common view in the Middle Ages that theology is based on revelation: it starts from principles which are believed. Marsilius also

advocates this view: according to him, an unbelieving persan cannot

48 Ibid., art. 4, fol. 19ra-rb. 49 Summa theologiae, ed. by P. Caramello (Taurini 1952), I, q. I, art. 4, p. 4. 50 Henry of Ghent, Summae quaestionum ordinariarum (ed. 1520), art. VI, qu. 3, ad 2, fol. 46r. 51 The example is Thomas Aquinas': Summa Theologiae (ed. 1952), I, qu. I, art. 2, p. 3.

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learn theology as such52. Every beginning student of theology should believe, Marsilius says, what the Bible says assertive (that is: 'positively'53): it goes without saying that one should not believe that 'there is no God' for this statement may be found in the Bible, but it is said by the fool of Psalm xms4. Faith is ultimately a gift of Godss. This faith is also brought about by an act of the human will by which a man assents to the Bible56. This is a secondary constituent of faith, however. The revealed principles of theology are not evident to the human intellect in his present state of viator ('pilgrim'). Though the words of the Bible (e.g. that God is triune) are obscure to some extent57, the believer is certain of their truth. Marsilius repeatedly emphasizes that theology takes its principles from revelation or, in its summarized form, from the articles of faith58. In Marsilius' view this fact determines the scientific character of theology. I shall now outline Marsilius' view on theology as a science in terms of the characteristics of science distinguished above.

4.2.l. The habitus (disposition) of theology In his Commentary on the Sentences Marsilius gives59 four views on the habitus of theology. According to the first view6o, the theological habitus is that by which a theologian assents to what the Bible says and nothing more. Marsilius does not ascribe this view to a specific theologian, but he probably had Godfrey of Fontaines (ca. 1250-ca. 1306) in mind61. Marsilius concludes that theology thus conceived is identical with faith.

52 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book I, qu. II, art. 3, fol. 18ra. 53 Ibid., fol. 13rb. 54 Ps. XIII:l in the editio vulgata, in modern versions: Ps. XIV:l. 55 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book III, qu. XIV, art. 2, fol. 453ra. Cf. Ritter, Marsilius von Inghen, 146-149. 56 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book I, qu. II, art. 3, fol. 13rb. 57 Ibid., fol. 14ra. 58 Ibid., fol. 449ra. 59 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book I, qu. II, art. 2, fol. llrb-12ra. 60 Ibid., fol. llrb. 61 Godfrey of Fontaines, Le neuvième quodlibet, éd. par J. Hoffmans (Louvain 1928), 281293, notably 281.

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According to the second view62, a theological habitus is that by which a theologian can defend faith and the Bible against heretics and can instruct simple minded people. This view on the disposition of theology resembles the one advocated by Peter Aureoli (d. 1322)63. In the third view6 4 mentioned by Marsilius it is said that by his habitus a theologian assents to conclusions drawn from the Bible. A theologian starts with principles of faith and deduces conclusions. Perhaps Marsilius had Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) in mind. In his Commentary on the Sentences65 William of Ockham (ca. 1285-1347) gives a similar description of the habitus of theology as discussed here. Ockham illustrates this description with a text which definitely originates from Thomas Aquinas'

Summa Theologiae66. According to the fourth view67 a theological habitus is a combination of the first three views, or of the second and the third view, Marsilius says. In this view the disposition of a theologian comprises the whole of knowledge of the Bible, the defense and elucidation of the Bible, the premisses and conclusions of faith. This view is wide-spread, Marsilius says, and it is the best. Though he is not very explicit Marsilius seems to adopt this position. Apparently he considers the theological disposition as a whole, and believes that the different aspects described in the first three views are always present together. In this respect, Marsilius sides with Thomas of Strasbourg in his criticism68 of Durand of St. Pourçain (d. 1334) who opined that a theologian possesses various dispositions, viz. the third three described above.

62 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book 1, qu. II, art. 2, fol. llrb-ra.

63 Peter Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, Prologue, distinctions 1-VIII, 64 65

66 67 68

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vols., ed. by E.M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series no. 3 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1956), Prohemium, sectio I, art. 3, nr. 92-129, p. 159-171. Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book I, qu. II, art. 2, fol. 1lra. William of Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio. Prologus et distinctio prima. Edd. G. Gal et St. Brown (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1967), Book I (prologue), qu. VII, p. 184, lines 7-20. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ed. 1952), I, qu. I, art. 2, p. 3. Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book I, qu. II, art. 2, fol. llra. Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. 1564), Book I, qu. II, fol. 6ra.

Marsilius on Theology as Science

4.2.2. Theology as knowledge of conclusions As has been said, the first principles of theology are principles of faith: they can be found in the Bible. A theologian deduces conclusions from these principles in a logically valid way. So, just as sciences acquired naturally theology is knowledge of conclusions. Marsilius is especially remarkable for his elaborate description of the principles of theology from which the theological conclusions are deduced. He mentions eight69: 1. God exists (not, Marsilius adds: 'something exists'; Marsilius concludes here that theology is not metaphysics). 2. God is the highest good, infinitely good and infinitely veracious. 3. God has revealed that something exists, therefore something exists. 4. Every statement revealed by God is true. 5. Intrinsic principles are e.g. 'God cannot be measured', 'God is the highest good'. 6. Articles of faith and truths deduced from them. 7. Sorne theological truths are logically prior to others. 8. The same truth is a principle of theology or a conclusion of theology, each in a different way. 1 cannot discuss in detail this doctrine of theological principles. The following two remarks may suffice: 1. According to Lang70 Henry Totting of Oyta (ca. 1330-1397), who wrote his Commentary on the Sentences in 1378-1380, was the first71 to give an elaborate list of principles of theology. Marsilius' view seems to be based on Henry's in this respect. 2. This list of principles does not alter fundamentally Marsilius' Aristotelian conception of the nature of principles, 1 believe.

4.2.3. The certainty of theology The first principles of theology are truths of faith. The theologian firmly believes their truth and is certain of them. Other than in naturally ac-

69 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book 1, qu. Il, art. 3, fol. 18vb-19ra. 70 A. Lang, Die theologische Prinzipien/ehre der mitte/alterlichen Scholastik (Freiburg 1964), 204. 71 According to Lang (ibid., 204) an exception is Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280).

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quired sciences, these principles are not evident. On account of this, theology is not a science in the strict, but in a broader, secondary sense72. A conclusion known with evidence never follows from premisses not evidently known. A conclusion cannot be known in a stronger degree than the weakest degree in which at least one of the premisses is known73. This view on the nature of theological premisses is the basis of Marsilius' rejection of Henry of Ghent's daim that theology possesses evidence74. Marsilius says that theological conclusions cannot be known with evidence, because its principles are truths of faith, or articles of faith. Faith cannot be taught on the basis of evident truth. Marsilius rejects the opponents' view with the help of texts of Durand of St. Pourçain. There are no enlightened men in the sense intended: there are, however, men who are especially prompted or inspired by God to defend faith, but they do not possess a special light. Marsilius' same view on theology as a science implies also that he cannot accept the view on theology as a scientia consequentiarum75. According to Marsilius theology is more than just logic, and a theologian can combine premisses which are believed with premisses which are known.

4.2.4. Theology and necessary knowledge

On the basis of authoritative texts a theologian assents to necessary truths, Marsilius says, viz. to many articles of faith, e.g. 'God is triune', 'the Virgin has given birth' etc. These truths are simpliciter (absolutely) necessary, though their necessary character is not evident to man in his present state76. So, to the viator it is not evident how the trinity proceeds from God's essence. One may conclude that in Marsilius' theory necessity, certainty and evidence no longer imply each other, as it was in traditional Aristotelianism.

72 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book 1, qu. II, art. 3, fol. 13rb; fol. 17rb-18rb. 73 Ibid., fol. 17ra. 74 Ibid., fol. 18 (for Henry's view, see above, section 2.2). 75 Cf. above, section 2.1. In later centuries, this formula becomes a definition of logic. 76 Ibid., fol. 18ra.

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Theology as a whole is not a science, Marsilius says77, for one should make exception for contingent theological truths, e.g. 'the Day of Judgment will corne'. Science cannot be about a future contingent, though it is certain that the Day of Judgment will corne.

4.2.5. The subject of theology

Like other sciences theology has a subiectum primum, viz. God as the end of man in this present life78. This first formal object is not: God in His absolute nature, as Thomas Aquinas thinks, at least according to Marsilius79. Our master believes that the imperfect human understanding cannot comprehend such a subject. The Bible teaches us that God is the end of human life. This is also evident, Marsilius adds, on the basis of the natural intellectBO. The subiectum primum is said of all principal objects of theology: these principal objects are the objects studied in the four books on the Sentences by Peter Lombard (ca. 1095-1160): book I: the trinity; book II: Godas creator, and creation in respect of its end: eternal life; book III: God as the restorator of mankind; book IV: the sacraments. Further, theology studies e.g. sins: these are also related to God, although negatively81. The unifying function of the subiectum primum of theology is especially important, as has been said above82. Theology is not a loose collection of conclusions known. Marsilius describes this function in terms of God as the end of human life, which is Marsilius' third interpretation of the unifying function of the primum subiectum.

77 Marsilius ernphatically says: 'whole' should be taken syncategorernatically (see the corollary to his conclusion 8, fol. 18ra), because not every part of theology is a science, viz. not the contingent truths; theology as such is a science, as has been pointed out. 78 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book I, qu. II, art. 5, concl. 3, fol. 20rb-ra. 79 Ibid., fol. 19vb. 80 Ibid., fol. 20rb. 81 Ibid., fol. 20va. 82 See above, section 4.1.5.

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E.P. Bos 4.2.6. Subalternation of theology In Marsilius' Commentary on the Sentences we find a few remarks suggesting that theology is a subalternate science, viz. that it receives its principles from God's self-knowledge and the knowledge the blessed have of God83. Theology receives its principles from a higher light, Marsilius says84.

5. Conclusion According to Marsilius theology is a science although in a large sense, because its principles are not evident.

83 Quaestianes super quattuar libras Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book 1, qu. II, art. 5, fol. 2lra. 84 ln his Abbreviationes super acta libras Physicarum (ed. 1521), fol. 2ra, Marsilius notes that natural theology is subordinated to metaphysics.

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E.P. BOS

In his Abbreviated Commentary on the Eight Books of Aristotle's Physics (Abbreviationes super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis1 ), Marsilius of Inghen presents what he calls a 'traditional' division of philosophy interpreted by him as 'universal science' (scientia universalis). The main sections are 'principal' (principalis) and 'subsidiary' (adminiculativa) philosophy. 'Principal philosophy' is subdivided into three parts: 1. wisdom, or metaphysics, or first philosophy; 2. philosophy of nature; 3. moral philosophy. 'Subsidiary philosophy' covers the seven artes liberales ('arts worthy of a free man')2: grammar, rhetoric, logic (the so-called trivium) and arithmetics, music, geometry and astronomy (the so-called quadrivium). Marsilius has compiled works on all parts of 'principal' and 'subsidiary' philosophy mentioned above, though not on every single section of the artes Zibera/es, as far as we know3. If one takes into consideration that Mar1 2

Abbreviationes super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Riserva III, 15 (Venetiis 1521), fol. 2ra. Note that in documents of the University of Paris from 1255 onwards 'facultas artium' refers to ail philosophical studies in contradistinction to revealed theology (see e.g. C.H. Lohr, The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle, The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600. Ed. by N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg; associate ed.

3

E. Stump (Cambridge etc. 1982), 87). Marsilius distinguishes between 'liberal arts' and naturally acquired philosophy. It is not certain whether the commentary on the second part of Alexander de VillaDei's Doctrinale, preserved in ms. Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 70a, fol. 95-173, can be attributed to Marsilius of Inghen: see the contribution of C.H. Kneepkens to the present volume.

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silius has written several works on revealed theology as well (notably his

Commentary on the Four Books of the Sentences 4 ) he may be called a voluminous writer. From the period of his teaching up to the second half of the seventeenth century Marsilius was famous as a logician and as a natural philosopher. His works originated a 'via Marsiliana'. In the present contribution I aim to elucidate the principles according to which, in Marsilius' view, a natural philosopher operates. I shall discuss this problem in connection with a specific question in one of his works, viz. one of the questions of his commentary on Aristotle's De caelo: whether, if there were more worlds, the earth of another world would move to the centre of this world. This problem about the principles of natural philosophy arouses interest, I think, for at least the following reasons: 1. In the thirteenth century, Aristotle's works became widely known in the Latin West in translations, and, generally speaking, the philosophers who discussed problems of natural philosophy followed Aristotle's views. The fourteenth century presents a different picture, however. Aristotle was criticized in many ways: the medieval philosophers of that period came to hold different opinions than those of Aristotle, foremost, so they said, on the basis of their own sensory experience. The present contribution aims to explain Marsilius' position in this respect. 2. A natural philosopher could corne across problems which could also be solved from the viewpoint of faith. Well-known problems of this kind concerned the eternity of matter and of movement, the eternity of the world and the immortality of the soul. In the Middle Ages philosophers came up with different solutions to these problems from the viewpoint of natural reason, in contradistinction to the viewpoint of faith. The Faculty

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Treatises by Marsilius on arithmetics, music and geometry have not corne down to us, it seems. For a survey of Marsilius' works, see G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik, 1: Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historisc he Klasse 1921, 4 (Heidelberg 1921), 186-192; Marsilius of Inghen, Treatises on the Properties of Terms. A First Critical Edition of the Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, Restrictiones and Alienationes, with Introduction, Translation, Notes and Appendices by E.P. Bos (Dordrecht/Boston 1983), 9-20. Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (Strasbourg 1501, reprint Frankfurt am Main 1966).

Marsilius on the Principles of Natural Philosophy

of Arts in Paris asked the magistri to swear an oath to defend the orthodox views of the church in such cases5 . As has been said, 1 shall try to elucidate Marsilius' view on the principles of natural philosophy in connection with question XIV from his Commentary on Aristotle's De caelo. This commentary is preserved in manuscript Cuyk en St. Agatha (The Netherlands), Kruisherenklooster (Monastery of the Crutched Friars), C 12, ff. 123ra-171rb6. In the manuscript this commentary is ascribed to a magister Mercilius (sic). This ascription to master Mercilius as well as other considerations have led me to suggest elsewhere7 that this commentary should be regarded as a genuine work by Marsilius. In a recent article Thijssen has confirmed this suggestion for the time being8. Anneliese Maier has discussed the problem on the principles of natural philosophy in her stimulating paper 'Das Prinzip der doppelten Wahrheit'9. In this article she pays attention to John Buridan, Marsilius' master in many respects in natural science and logic, but devotes only three pages to Marsilius of Inghen on this score. ln the present contribution 1 shall try to elaborate Marsilius' views on this point. The question which 1 shall use as example is edited in an appendix to this articlelO. In his commentary on the De caelo Marsilius discusses various problems to which Aristotle's work gives rise. According to Marsilius, who bases his cosmology mainly on Aristotle, the universe consists of five principle elements, viz. earth, water, air and fire in the sublunary region, and ether (the quintessence, the fifth element) in the spheres and planets. The earth is at rest in the centre of the universe and is surrounded by ten spheres, seven for the seven planets then known (including the sun), one for the sphere of the fixed stars and two other spheres which help to explain the

5 6

See esp. A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spiitscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome 1955), 3. For a description, see L.M. de Rijk et O. Weijers, Repertorium Commentariorum medii

aevi in Aristotelem Latinorum, quae in bibliothecis publicis neerlandicis asservantur (Amsterdam 1981), 7-17. E.P. Bos, A Note on an Unknown Manuscript Bearing upon Marsilius of Inghen's Philosophy of Nature. MS Cuyk en St. Agatha (The Netherlands), Kruisherenklooster C 12, Vivarium 17 (1979), 61-68. 8 J.M.M.H. Thijssen, The Short Redaction of John Buridan's Questions on the Physics and their Relation to the Questions on the Physics Attributed to Marsilius of Inghen, Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age LU (1985), 262. 9 Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, 3-44. 10 Below, pp. 108-116. 7

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various movements of the stars and the planetsll. Marsilius explicitly denies that there are more spheres connected with one single planet; moreover, he adopts epicycles in his system. So in these latter two respects, he seems to have followed Ptolemy rather than Aristotle. We can learn from Marsilius' commentary on the De caelo that, according to the Aristotelian laws of movement, the elements strive to obtain their natural places. The element earth tends towards the centre of the universe, fire to the upper part of the sublunary region, water and air take their natural places between earth and fire. These four elements move in straight lines. The ether, however, moves in a circular movement. The world is full, there is no empty space: the Aristotelian horror vacui. In the chapters VIII and IX of the first book of his De caelo Aristotle discusses the problem whether there can be more than one world. This is an important problem to him, because earlier philosophers, e.g. Anaximander, Empedocles and the Atomists, accepted the existence of more worlds in some way or another: Aristotle criticizes their theories which allow the existence or more worlds, presenting several arguments of which I mention only few12: if there existed more worlds, they all would consist of the same elements; these elements would have the same natural motions. This means that all earth must move naturally towards the same centre, and all fire to the same circumference. The difference in distance to the centre is not relevant. Furthermore, if there were more worlds, this could only be by force; the inclination to the natural places would not have been taken away from the elements. Neither could there be a different end for numerically different parts of one element: otherwise, parts of some element in our world would also move in different directions, which is not the case. So much for the arguments I have selected from Aristotle. Marsilius discusses this problem in questions XIV and XV of his commentary. The title of question XIV is: 'If there would be more worlds, would the earth of another world move towards the centre of this world?13' (utrum, si essent plures mundi, terra alterius mundi moveretur ad medium istius mundi). The title of question XV is: 'Are there, or can there be more worlds?' (utrum sint, vel possint esse plures mundi)I4. Marsilius 11 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones libri De caelo et mundo preserved in the manuscript indicated in the text (henceforth abbreviated as: 'In DCM'): Book Il, qu. XIII, fol. 159va. 12 Aristotle, De caelo, 1, viii, 276 a 18 - 277 a 12. 13 In DCM, f. 138ra; see the edition in the appendix, p. 108, lines 21-22. 14 In DCM, f. 139ra.

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discusses these problems, as well as Aristotle's solutions, in the period after the condemnations of 1277 by Bishop Etienne Tempier of Paris 15 . Sorne of the condemned theses explicitly deal with the possibility of more worlds. In the 34th proposition 16 bishop Tempier condemns the error that the first cause (God) could not make more than one world; in the 44th proposition17 the opinion is criticized that one first agent can not bring about a multiplicity of effects. The background of these condemnations is the doctrine of God's omnipotence; as the first cause God is not determined by anything whatever, let alone to produce one effect only (in immediate causation, is probably meant) which is the case in natural agents which act from necessity and not freely. In this contribution I shall concentrate on Marsilius' question XIV18. As has been said, the problem is whether, if there were more worlds, the earth of another world would move to the centre of this world19. First: in his question XV Marsilius says that Aristotle is right from his point of view that there cannot be more worlds separate from each other. He goes on to explain20 that more worlds can not exist alongside each other, neither with the same centre, nor eccentrically. A natural philosopher is right, Marsilius says, according to the rules of human understanding21. Nevertheless, speaking absolutely, there can be more worlds. Then the problem is solved from the point of view of faith: God can create more worlds. He is absolutely free and not bound by the regularities of our world. Now back to question XIV: even if there were more worlds, Aristotle's conclusion does not follow (viz. that the earth of another world would move to the centre of our world). The main reason, according to Marsilius, is that the heavens of a world cannot be penetrated by other elements22.

15 In Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis I, ab anno MCC usque ad annum MCCLXXXV, édité par H. Denifle et A. Châtelain (Paris 1889), pp. 543-555. Cf. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et /'averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle, Les philosophes Belges, VI (Louvain 1908), 175-191. 16 = Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, nr. 27. 17 = Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, nr. 28. 18 I have discussed question XV elsewhere, see E.P. Bos, Marsilius van Inghen en mogelijke werelden, Algemeen Neder/ands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 75 (1983), 4-12. 19 Marsilius says: iste ('that'); did he point to a drawing? 20 In DCM, fol. 140ra. 21 See note 20. 22 In DCM, fol. 139rb; see the edition in the appendix, p. 115, Iines 4-7.

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E.P. Bos It should be noted here that some contempora ries of Marsilius, viz. John

Buridan (ca. 1300-shortly after 1358), Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320-1382) and Albert of Saxony (ca. 1330-1390) solve the problem which is discussed here, in more or less the same way as Marsilius does23 (1 cannot enter into details here). All these masters received their education at the University of Paris and, at least during some period of their careers, were active as masters at this University. One could distinguish two kinds of criticism on Aristotle in Marsilius' text, 1 think: 1. Criticism from the viewpoint of natural philosophy, though this criticism is often based on principles taken from Aristotle himself. Aristotle and natural philosophy are no longer the same in this period. 2. Criticism from the viewpoint of faith. God's omnipotenc e is contrasted with the regularities of nature; because God is a free cause, it must be assumed that God can do more than the necessities of natural things imply. The way the natural intellect considers things does not transcend the data of the senses, what is known in virtue of itself (what we would call necessary truths) and what can be deduced from these data. A theologian takes his starting-poi nt from revelation (the Bible) which he accepts on the basis of faith and without what Marsilius calls 'experience', that is: on a natural basis24. Ad 1: Marsilius does not agree25 with Aristotle that, if there were more worlds, there would be a natural movement of the earth of another world towards the centre of this one. Marsilius opines that there is no reason to assume that the earth of that other world has that inclination, because that other world is supposed to be of the same species as any other world. Moreover, the heaven rules everything: it moves a heavy element downwards, and a light one upwards. The caelum can not be penetrated by the other elements if they were to move towards the centre of another world. In Buridan's Commentar y we find the same argument26. Buridan concludes that Aristotle did not prove what he said. 23 John Buridan, Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo, edited by E.A. Moody (Cambridge, Mass. 1942, reprint New York 1970), Book I, qu. XVII, p. 83; Nicole Oresme, The Questiones super De cela of Nicole Oresme, edited by C. Kren, 2 parts, (Michigan, University Microfilms 1965), Book I, qu. XVII, p. 243; Albert of Saxony, Questiones subtilissime Alberti de Saxonia in libros De cela et mundo (Venetiis 1520), Book I, qu. XII, fol. C 2ra. 24 In DCM, f. 139ra; see the edition in the appendix, p. 112, lines 22-27. 25 In DCM, f. 139rb; see the edition in the appendix, p. 114, line 36, p. 115, lines 1-3. 26 Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo, Book I, qu. XVIII, ed. 1942: p. 86, lines 27-32.

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In Marsilius' question XIV, Aristotle's theory is refined by way of what might be called 'experiments', if one take 'experiment' in the sense that it does not teach a scientist something new but only confirms his theory. Aristotle, for instance, says, according to Marsilius, that a larger piece of earth moves downwards more quickly (in its natural inclination) than a smaller one; so, the larger quantity will move more slowly, too, when thrown upwards, than a smaller quantity. There is an objection in Marsilius' text27 (which can also be found in Oresme's corresponding question28) that, when a small piece of lead is thrown away, a larger piece (e.g. a spear) can be thrown further. Marsilius says that Aristotle's thesis is correct when one takes into consideration that this small piece of lead is so small that it does not possess a receiving virtue (virtus receptiva)29 which can not accept the impetus given by the thrower. Another refinement concerns Aristotle's statement that a violent movement is slower at the end than at the beginning. An objection is that iron moves more quickly towards a magnet at the end than at the beginning30. Marsilius' answer is that Aristotle's statement is correct. A magnet attracts by way of tractus (it gives 'attractions'); it does not move something else by way of pulsus ('impulses')31. Ad 2: From the viewpoint of natural philosophy, there cannot be more worlds separate from each other in the senses indicated above. Absolutely speaking, or from the point of view of faith, viz. in relation to God's omnipotence, there can be more worlds. God's causality is free, because it is not identical with natural causality. God's freedom is to do what He wishes32 (elsewhere33, Marsilius calls this the libertas complacentiae); God can even break through the order of the present creation by doing miracles (Marsilius calls this the libertas oppositionis34). God's acts are only limited by the principle of contradiction, for He can not create something which at the same time and in the same respect is not that 27 In DCM, f. 139rb; see the edition in the appendix, p. 113, Jines 32-35. 28 Questiones super De celo, ed. 1965: p. 245, lines 30-35. 29 In DCM, f. 139ra; see the edition in the appendix, p. 114, Jines 6-10. Nicole Oresme, Questiones super De celo, ed. 1965: p. 247, Jines 36-45. 30 In DCM, f. 139rb; see the edition in the appendix, p. 114, lines 1-2. Nicole Oresme, ed. 1965: p. 247, Jines 52-54. 31 In DCM, f. 139rb; see the edition in the appendix, p. 114, Jines 11-16. Nicole Oresme, ed. 1965: p. 247, line 55-p. 249, line 57. 32 In DCM, f. 139rb; see the edition in the appendix, p. 114, lines 22-24. 33 E.g. in the Questiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, ed. 1501, Book I, qu. X, art. 3, f. 52ra; cf. Ritter, Marsilius, 160ff. 34 See reference in note 33.

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thing. Gad can create more worlds, of which the kinds (species) might differ from the kinds in our world. This implies different places and different kinds of movement for the elements, Marsilius says. So the doctrine of God's omnipotence leads to a thought experiment35. Other than the three Parisian philosophers mentioned above, Marsilius explicitly discusses in article Il of question XV36 the principles of natural philosophy. The title of this article is: a natural philosopher should not concede that there are more worlds. Marsilius gives four notes and one conclusion: The notes: 1. A natural philosopher takes as his principles what is taught by sensory experience (which is the starting point of induction), and what is known in itself (definitions, analytical truths, the principle of contradiction etc.). Of course, he also accepts the conclusions drawn from these principles. 2. The thesis of note 1 is now applied to the problem of question XV: a natural philosopher does not possess experience of more worlds separate from each other, nor is this known in itself, nor can this be deduced from natural principles. 3. The metaphysician teaches that there is only one Gad, he does not prove it. Marsilius apparently suggests that Gad is a free cause. The metaphysician can only conceive of Gad as a necessary agent. 4. In the same kind of causation one single agent can only cause one single effect immediately. The conclusion from notes 1-4 is: a natural philosopher, who proceeds in the light of natural reason, and a metaphysician, who proceeds in a what Marsilius calls a 'metaphysical' light, should hold that there is just one world. As has been said, the problem whether the element earth of another world would move to the centre of this world depends on the question 35 In DCM, f. 139rb; see the edition in the appendix, p. 114, lines 22-24. 1 shall not omit Buridan's fascinating description of a thought experiment: when Buridan tries to demonstrate that the movement of the elements of other worlds to one centre outside that world is not possible, he refers to the order in this world. If this order is changed, the natural movement with which we are acquainted is changed. Suppose, Buridan says, that in His omnipotence God would annihilate the ether and the other elements except for the air in a certain house, and one piece of the earth would rest in the air, this piece would move neither upwards, nor downwards, because there would be no 'up' and 'down'. See John Buridan, Quaestiones super libros quattuor De caelo et mundo, Book 1, qu. XVII, ed. 1942: p. 86, line 33-p. 87, line 8. 36 In DCM, f. 140ra-rb.

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whether there are or can be more worlds. In question XV of his Commentary on the De caelo Marsilius discusses this problem and solves it in the way I have indicated. Marsilius says that, from the viewpoint of a natural philosopher, there can only be more worlds successively, while the principle element of the present world, viz. the heaven, remains the same, such that there is essentially no difference between the world which exists now and that of a thousand years ago. Succession in time marks no essential difference, according to Marsilius. His De caelo-commentary is not the only place where he discusses the problem, however: in his theological Commentary on the Sentences Marsilius says37 that God could have created better or worse worlds, both intensive (that is with respect to the content: the species could have been better or worse than the species of our world) and extensive (with respect to the number of inhabitants of our world, which could be other than the number of the inhabitants of the present world). The background of Marsilius' Commentary on Aristotle's De caelo is the doctrine of God's omnipotence, a prominent doctrine in fourteenth century thought. According to this doctrine the creation is a contingent, not a necessary result of a free agent, viz. God. This doctrine is opposed to what the Medievals themselves interpreted as Ancient necessitarianis m, according to which the present world is a necessary product from a first agent. A natural philosopher cannot transcend the limits of natural reason, while a Christian acknowledges the contingency of creation. This is best understood if one compares Marsilius' words with e.g. Thomas Aquinas', who in his Commentary (expositio) on Aristotle's De caefo38 cannot accept the possibility of the existence of more worlds. The present world is unique. For if there were more worlds, and we use the term 'world' univocally and not equivocally or ambiguously, the elements of other worlds would have the same nature and movements as the elements of our world. Therefore, the elements of another world would move towards the same centre as the elements of our world. This would imply that the element earth of another world would go upwards towards what is the centre for all elements, which is impossible. So Thomas concludes that there is just one world. Other than Marsilius he 37 Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. 1501), Book!, qu. 43, art. II, f. 183rb ff. 38 Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis Libros De caelo et mundo, De generatione et corruptione, Meteorologicorum expositio ... , ed. Raymundus M. Spiazzi O.P. (Taurini/Romae 1952), Book!, xvi, p. 79-80 (nrs. 160-162).

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cannot conceive of worlds with elements of different natures and he does not bring forward God's omnipotence in virtue of which there could be more worlds. In the fourteenth century, the radical contingency of our world which is a consequence of God's omnipotence, is underlined. I conclude: 1. A natural philosopher proceeds from principles acquired by sensory experience which is the starting point of induction, and from principles which are known in themselves. Induction, Marsilius says39, starts with knowledge of individuals and obtains, together with the activity of the human intellect which is inclined towards truth, evident knowledge of the principles of natural philosophy40. 2. As a natural philosopher, Marsilius adopts the principles of Aristotle's philosophy. He is by no means a slavish follower, but criticizes Aristotle on the basis of Aristotle's own principles and on the basis of sensory experience. 3. Sorne problems discussed by a natural philosopher can also be solved from the viewpoint of faith. Marsilius distinguishes between 'speaking absolutely (or simpliciter)', i.e. from the viewpoint of faith, and 'speaking from the viewpoint of natural reason', i.e. relative to the regularities of the present world. The latter proceeds from empirical, the former from logical possibilities. In discussing problems handed down by e.g. Aristotle, a natural philosopher should always be aware, that a problem can be differently solved, viz. from the viewpoint of faith, which teaches God's omnipotence. It would go too far to speak, with Anneliese Maier, of a theory of double truth: as has been explained, Marsilius wishes to emphasize the radical dependency of creation on God's will, and, therefore, the hypothetical character of natural philosophy. As has been said, Thomas Aquinas, like other thirteenth century thinkers, did not accept the possible existence of more worlds: this world is good, at least as good as a created world can be, and therefore one. For Thomas Aquinas the best order is the logically best order, for Marsilius (as for other fourteenth century philosophers, such as

39 Questiones super libris Priorum Analyticorum (Venetiis 1516, reprint Frankfort am Main 1968), Book I, qu. 20, fol. 36ra. 40 Marsilius' view on natural philosophy is more positive than that of Buridan's, who does not consider the principles and conclusions as absolutely evident (cf. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, 385).

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Duns Scotus and William of Ockham), the natural order is just a possible one, which could be otherwise41.

41 Cf. L.M. de Rijk, La philosophie au moyen âge (Leiden 1985) (originally in Dutch: Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte, Traditie en vernieuwing, Assen 1977, 21981), 144.

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APPENDIX 5

10

Edition of Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones Libri De caelo et mundo, Liber I, qu. XIV, from ms Cuyk en St. Agatha (The Netherlands), Kruisherenklooster (Monastery of the Crutched Friars), C 12, f. 138va - 139va. I have used the orthography of classical Latin. Square brackets ([ ... ]) indicate the insertion of section-titles by the present editor. The numbers in superscript refer to the apparatus criticus, the letters in superscript refer to the apparatus fontium.

15

[LIBRI PRIMI QUAESTIO QUARTA DECIMA] 20

(F. 138va) UTRUM, SI ESSENT PLURES MUNDI, TERRA ALTERIUS MUNDI MOVERETUR AD MEDIUM ISTIUS MUNDI [Rationes ante oppositum] 25

(1) Arguitur primo quod non. Si essent plures mundi, terra alterius

30

35

mundi non posset ascendere in proprio mundol; igitur terra alterius mundi non moveretur ad etcetera. Consequentia tenet: quia non posset moveri ad medium istius mundi nisi ascenderet in proprio mundo2. Antecedens patet: quia, si sic, non posset ascendere a suo medio. Confirmatur ad imaginationem: nam est possibile quod sint plures mundi. Immo, de facto possibile est per potentiam Dei. Et tamen propter hoc non oporteret quod medium alterius moveretur ad istum mundum. (2) Secundo: si essent plures mundi, terra istius mundi quiesceret in medio sicut nunc; igitur terra alterius etiam quiesceret in medio sicut nunc; igitur terra alterius etiam quiesceret in medio. Consequentia tenet: 1 2

proprio rnundo] propriurn rnundi ms. proprio rnundo] propriurn rnundi ms.

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s

10

15

20

quia similis ratio est utrobique. Antecedens probatur: quia, quicquid moveret eam, esset3 eiusdem naturae sicut nunc. (3) Tertio: si essent plures mundi et terra sic moveretur, vel ergo moveretur illic naturaliter, vel violente; sed nullum istorum potest dici; igitur etcetera. Maior patet sufficienti divisione. Minor dedaratur: non naturaliter, quia tune terra in proprio mundo moveretur a medio, quod repugnat naturae terrae; non violente, quia si sic, tune veniens ad istum mundum etiam moveretur violente, quod non est dicendum. (4) Quarto: si essent plures mundi, terra istius quiesceret necessario in suo medio; igitur etcetera. Consequentia tenet. Antecedens probatur: quia si essent plures mundi, caelum indinaret terram eius ibi sicut terram hic ad quietem. Consequentia tenet: quia essent eiusdem naturae. Antecedens pro secunda parte patet: quia nihil potest eam totam movere a medio, et hoc est per conservationem caeli. (5) Quinto: si essent plures mundi, ignis istius non moveretur in concavum lunae istius; igitur etcetera. Antecedens probatur: quia, si essent plures, ignis ita bene quiesceret ibi in concavo orbis lunae sicut istius. Nec posset dividere istius nec istius; igitur etcetera. (6) Sexto: si sic, vel inter eas imaginaretur medium aliquod, vel nihil; sed nullo modo terra istius moveretur ad terram istius, igitur etcetera. Maior patet sufficienti divisione. Minor demonstratur: non dicetur quod aliquod mediat: quia sic esset aliquod corporeum quod esset nec pars istius, nec istius. Si nihil, tunc4 inter eas esset vacuum.

25

[Oppositum] Oppositum est de intentione Philosophia et Commentatorisb in isto primo, capitulo tertio. 30

3 4 a b

esset] et esset ms. tune] iter. ms. Aristoteles, De Caelo, I, viii, 276 a 18 - 277 b 26 (Nicole Oresme, too, refers to this text by 'tractatu tertio', see ed. Kren, 1965, p. 245, line 18, and p. 969 ad 18). Averroes, In de caelo, l, c. 76-98, ed. Iuntina, tomus V (Venetiis 1562, Frankfurt am Main 1962), f. 51r D-66v I.

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[Solutio quaestionis] [Divisio articulorum] s

Hic erunt tres articuli: in primo videbitur positio Aristotelis; in secundo ostenditur quod philosophus naturalis non habet concedere plures esse mundos; in tertio videbitur quando rationes Aristotelis concludant, vel non.

10

[Articulus primus] Quantum (f.138vb) ad primum videtur quod positio Aristotelis posset reduci ad quinque conclusiones. [Con cl usiones]

15

[Conclusio prima]

20

25

30

Prima est quod terra in isto mundo naturaliter movetur ad locum medium et ignis a medio. Istam Philosophus probat primo sic: (a) quia, si non naturaliter, sed violente moveretur, sequeretur quod parva terra vel parva pars terrae velocius moveretur quam magna. Consequens falsum. Et probatur consequentia: quia maior terra plus posset resistere violentanti quam minor. (b) Secunda probatio Philosophi est: si terra violente moveretur ad medium, sequeretur quod in fine tardius moveretur quam in principio. Consequens falsum, ad experientiam. Et patet consequentia: quia motus violentus tardior est in fine quam in principio. (c) Tertio: nisi sic, sequeretur quod motus contrarius esset ei naturalis, puta a medio. Falsitas patet: quia iste debetur levitati. Et patet consequentia: quia, cui unus motus rectus est violentus, alter est sibi naturalis. [Conclusio secunda]

35

Secunda conclusio: si esset alter mundus, corpora simplicia essent eiusdem speciei specialissimae cum corporibus simplicibus istius.

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s

10

(1) Quod probo sic: quia si non, sequeretur quod li 'terra' non diceretur de eis univoce. Patet consequentia: quia species specialissimae non dicuntur univoce de rebus diversarum specierum. Et tune ultra: ibi non esset vera terra nec verus ignis; igitur nec verus mundus. (2) Secundo: istas oportetS esse eiusdem speciei specialissimae quibus idem motus et eaedem operationes conveniunt; sed oportet6 corpora simplicia et motus simplices ibi sicut hic; igitur etcetera. Maior patet: quia operationes et motus diversificant speciem. Sed sic est de istis. Minor patet: quia ibi essent corpora mobilia et ista non possent moveri nisi circa medium vel per rectam lineam. [Conclusio tertia]

15

20

25

Tertia conclusio Philosophi est quod omne corpus quod naturaliter inclinatur ad aliquem locum, inclinatur ad eum a quacumque distantia. Patet per experientiam: (1) quia, ubicumque ponitur terra, naturaliter tendit deorsum et ignis sursum. (2) Confirmatur: parvitas et magnitudo corporis non variant quando ad unum locum tendunt. Igitur nec parvitas nec magnitudo distantiae. Consequentia tenet: quia magis videtur7 parvitas vel magnitudo rei intrinseca . Antecedens patet: nam ubi servatur tota terra, illic parva glaeba. (3) Tertio, parvitas vel magnitudo non variat speciem essentialem rei; sed tendentia in (f. 139ra) locum naturalem semper sequitur speciem; igitur etcetera. Maior nota est. Minor patet per Commentatoremc dicentem: 'Motus ad locum naturalem sequitur substantiam'. [Conclusio quarta]

30

Quarta conclusio: corpora simplicia unius speciei specialissimae tendunt ad unum locum numero naturalem. Patet: (1) quia, ubi una terra, ibi quaelibet terra, et ubi unus ignis, ibi quilibet ignis.

5 6 7 c

oportet] oporteret ms. oportet] oporteret ms. videtur] propinqua add. ms. Averroes, In de caelo, IV, c. 24, ed. Iuntina, tomus V, f. 252r F (uncertain reference).

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(2) Etiam probatur sic: locus naturalis sequitur speciem specialissimam rei; sed omnium istius speciei specialissimae est idem locus naturalis 8 ; igitur etcetera. Maior patet: quia ideo dicitur locus naturalis. [Conclusio quinta et responsalis]

5

IO

Ex quo sequitur conclusio quinta responsalis quod, si esset alius mundus, terra istius moveretur naturaliter ad medium istius. Probatur: quia, si sic, tune terra istius esset eiusdem speciei specialissimae cum ista, per secundam conclusionem. Ergo tenderet ad eundem locum naturalem cum ista, per conclusionem quartam. Sed terra istius mundi tendit naturaliter ad medium istius, per conclusionem primam; igitur etcetera. Istud9 nec potest distantia impedire, ut dicit conclusio tertia. Haec de primo.

15

[Articulus secundus] [Notabilia] [Notabile primum]

20

25

Quantum ad secundum nota quod consideratio naturalis philosophi non excedit sensum et experientiam sicquod philosophus naturalis non habet aliquid ponere nisi quod est per se notum vel experientia notum vel quod potest ex hiis deducere: quia philosophus naturalis dicitur 'cognoscens naturam rerum'. Patet etiam: quia, si philosophus vellet aliqua ponere sicut theologus, sine experientia, nullus crederet sibi. [Notabile secundum]

30

35

Secundo nota quod philosophus naturalis nullam experientiam de hoc habet quod sint plures mundi: quia non extra istum mundum, nec potest esse; ergo non habet hoc ponere. Etiam esse plures mundos non est per se notum. Item, ex nullis quae nos ponimus est deducibile plures esse mundos.

8 9

idem locus naturalis] eadem species ms. istud] ista ms.

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[Notabile tertium] Tertio nota quod metaphysicus ad tantum ascendit quod solum ponit unum esse Deum. Patet duodecimo Metaphysicaed. 5

[Notabile quartum]

10

Quarto nota quod secundum Philosophum, duodecimo Metaphysicaee, ab eodem agente simplici in eadem specie causandi procedat immediate solum unicus effectus: quia idem in quantum idem semper est aptum natum facere idem, secundo De generationef. [Conclusio]

15

20

Ex quo sequitur conclusio quod naturalis in lumine naturali et metaphysicus in lumine metaphysico non ponit nisi unum mundum. Prima pars patet: quia nec est per se notum nec experientia nec probabiliter deducibile ex istis. Secunda pars patet ex tertio notabili: quia solum ponit unicum Deum, et per quartum notabile: ab eodem agente solum procedit unicus (f. 139rb) effectus. [Articulus tertius] [Dubitationes contra aliquas conclusiones]

25

[Contra primam conclusionem] Quantum ad tertium est prima dubitatio contraIO primam conclusionem. [lnstantiae]

30

(1) Videtur enim quod non sit verum: quia lapis posset esse ita parvus

35

quod, cum aliquantulum violente proiceres, remotius (si esset maior) ad maiorem distantiam proiceres pomum vel plumbum. Ergo prima non videtur procedere. d e f 10

Aristoteles, Metaphysica, XII, viii, 1072 a 23-26. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, XII, viii, 1074 a 33-38 (uncertain reference). Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, II, x, 336 a 27-28. contra) circa ms.

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(2) Contra secundam probationem videtur esse quod ferrum movetur violente ad magnetem, et tamen velocius in fine quam in principio. [Respohsio ad instantias] 5

10

15

(Ad 1) Pro isto nota quod, quando violentans est minus, non potest tantum sicut maius. Et hoc est ex defectu virtutis receptivae, quia est tam parva quod non est receptiva impetus tanti. Et patet per hoc ad rationem primam: quia ratio Philosophi est bona, nam non diffinitur de potentia receptiva parvi11. (Ad 2) Pro secunda instantia adverte quod motus ferri ad magnetem fit per tractum sic quod magnes a tata specie habet quandam virtutem, a qua multiplicat circumquaque de se species quae sunt attractivae ferri. Et ergo in fine velocius trahit propter maiorem virtutem attractivam. Et hoc non impedit rationem Philosophi. Tamen conceditur quod ferrum sic movetur violente, sed tamen est motus tractus. [Contra secundam conclusionem]

20

25

30

Contra secundam conclusionem et eius probationem ponitur haec conclusio: non oportet, si esset alter mundus, quod propter hoc corpora simplicia alterius essent eiusdem rationis cum corporibus simplicibus istius. Posset enim facere alium mundum cuius corpora simplicia essent alterius speciei ab istis. Ad primam: transeat antecedens: et conceditur quod iste mundus sit alterius speciei, et hoc loquendo fideliter. Ad secundam: conceditur totum assumptum. Sed negatur quod hoc oporteret de corporibus simplicibus istius et istius quod essent eiusdem speciei specialissimae: quia conceditur quod etiam ista loca et motus ad ista sint alterius speciei vel rationis. [Contra tertiam conclusionem]

35

Contra tertiam conclusionem ponitur secunda conclusio: si esset unus alius mundus sicut est iste, terra istius nullo modo vellet esse cum terra istius. Probatur: quia terra istius propter istum non appeteret esse ibi; ergo

11 parvi] passi ms.

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s

nec ista hic. Consequentia tenet: quia supponitur esse eiusdem rationis. Antecedens probatur: quia quiescit hic ita naturaliter sicut ibi. Item, frustra appeteret hoc: quia ibi non posset venire. Etiam, si esset alter mundus, caelum istius non gubernaret mundum alterius, nec e conversa. Tamen caelum omnia regit, scilicet inclinat grave deorsum et leve sursum. Et ergo ratio sua non valet quia12 antecedens est impossibile. [Contra quartam conclusionem]

10

Quarta conclusio est quod omnia (f. 139va) corpora simplicia unius speciei specialissimae tendunt naturaliter etcetera. [Instan tiae] 15

20

Contra quam sunt aliquae dubitationes: (1) Diceret enim aliquis: 'Videtur enim quod corpora simplicia non debeant tendere ad unum locum eundem13 in numero, sed in alia loca in specie. (2) Item, ignis qui est hic, servatur per unum actum ad sphaeram lunae, et ignis qui14 est Romae per alium actum. (3) Tertio, si esset unus alter mundus, corpora simplicia istius non moverentur ad istum'. [Responsio ad instantias]

25

30

35

(Ad 1) Ad primum dicitur quod conclusio est vera. Pro quo adverte quod corpora caelestia unius speciei, quando coniunguntur, faciunt unum. Secundo nota quod locus totalis istorum est unus in numero. Tune dicitur quod hoc non sufficit quod ferantur ad similem locum: quia iste locus totalis est unus15. (Ad 2) Ad secundum dicitur quod verum quod non feruntur ad eundem locum partialem, sed bene ad eundem locum totalem. (Ad 3) Tertia soluta est. Haec de tertio. 12 13 14 15

quia] nisi inquantum ms. eundem] idem ms. qui] quod ms. unus] unum ms.

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[Ad rationes ante oppositum]

s

10

1s

20

Ad rationes ante oppositum. (Ad 1) Ad primam: conceditur antecedens. Et conceditur quod non movetur: quia philosophus reputat antecedens impossibile . Et ergo ambas concederet. Ad confirmatio nem dicitur quod ratio concludit apud catholicos. (Ad 2) Ad secundam: concederetI 6 totum naturaliter loquendo quod inclinaretur ad medium istius quia reputaret antecedens impossibile. (Ad 3) Ad tertiam: concederet philosophus quia reputat antecedens impossibile. (Ad 4) Ad quartam: ista ratio concludit veritatem. (Ad 5) Ad quintam: philosophus concederet, et cum hoc diceret quod moveret. Et diceret quodl 7 non posset dividere caelum quia reputat antecedens impossibile. (Ad 6) Ad sextam dicitur quod nihil. Ad probationem : negatur consequentia: quia, si vacuum esset, ipsum esset aliquid. Quia, si esset, ipsum esset locus. Haec de quaestione.

16 concederet) conceditur ms. 17 quod) posset dividere caelum et add. ms.

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THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO MARSILIUS OF INGHEN Study with an edition of the 'dubium' in II Sent. q. 1 a. 2

M.J.F.M. HOENEN

The issue of the eternity of the world has given rise to profound and widespread controversies, especially in medieval and ancient times. We may think here of the late thirteenth-century (1277) and early fourteenthcentury discussions that have corne down to us not only in the various commentaries on the Sentences and Quaestiones disputatae, but also in the so-called Correctoria.1 We are well acquainted with the development of the discussion during the thirteenth and first part of the fourteenth century, as well as with the various views and arguments that contributed to it.2 Less is known about the development of the controversy in the second half of the fourteenth century. To be sure, there are a large number of fourteenth-century commentaries on the Sentences in which the question is raised.3 By way of introduction, we shall briefly review those fourteenth-century century

On the Correctoria - which are an interesting source of knowledge regarding the debates between Franciscan and Dominican theologians - see F. van Steenberghen, La philosophie au xiiie siècle, Philosophes Médiévaux IX (Louvain-Paris 1966), 489-490; M.D. Jordan, The Controversy of the Correctoria and the Limits of Metaphysics, Speculum 57 (1982), 292-314, and M.J.F.M. Hoenen, The Literary Reception of Thomas Aquinas' View on the Provability of the Eternity of the World in De La Mare's Correctorium (1278-9) and the Correctoria Corruptorii (1279-1286), The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries, ed. J.B.M. Wissink, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 27 (Leiden etc. 1990), 39-68. 2 See, e.g., L. Bianchi, L'errore di Aristotele. La polemica contra l'eternità del monda ne! xiii secolo, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Iettere e filosofia dell'Università di Milano 104 (Florence 1984) (with an extensive bibliography) and R.C. Dales, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 18 (Leiden etc. 1990). 3 This is already clear from the incipits in F. Stegmüller, Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols. (Würzburg 1947). See, e.g., Vol.Inn. 78; 175; 336; 407; 454;536;559;951.

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views and arguments that are most relevant for our understandi ng of Marsilius of Inghen's position in the debate. Marsilius lectured on the Sentences at the end of the fourteenth century, at the University of Heidelberg.4 Professor of Theology at this newly founded university (1386) was Conrad of Soltau (t 1407), sometime professorat the University of Prague, and author of a concise and widespread commentary on the Sentences.5 In this work, Conrad defends the daim that it is impossible for a created thing to be eternal. His main argument in support of this contention, viz., that being eternal and being created are contradictor y attributes, can also be found in Marsilius.6 Bath authors are responding to the views of Thomas of Strasbourg (t 1357), who, unlike Conrad and Marsilius, held that it is not contradictor y to say that it is possible for a created being to be eternal. 7 With Thomas of Strasbourg we may well have introduced one of the most influential theologians of the second half of the fourteenth century, and of some time after. In many commentari es on the Sentences of this period his influence is perceptibly present. This is especially true of the commentari es written at Central European universities, such as Cracow, 4 See G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik I: Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Sitzungsberic hte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch -historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1921, 4. Abh. (Heidelberg 1921), 39, and the contributions of W.J. Courtenay and J. Miethke elsewhere in this volume. 5 On Conrad of Soltau and his commentary on the Sentences, see G. Ritter, Die heidelberger Universitiit. Ein Stück deutscher Geschichte (Heidelberg 1936), 60 and 330-331. On Conrad of Soltau see also H.-J. Brandt, Universitiit, Gesellschaft, Politik und Pfründen am Beispiel Konrad von Soltau (t 1407), The Universities in the Late Middle Ages, ed. by J. IJsewijn and J. Paquet, Mediaevalia Lovaniensia 1-6 (Leuven 1978), 614-627, and id., Konrad von Soltau, Neue Deutsche Biographie, Bd. 12 (Berlin 1980), 531b-532b (with bibliography). 6 See Conrad of Soltau, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (Stuttgart, Württ. Landesbibl., Cod. Theo!. Fol. 118), Lib. 2 q. 1, fol. 55vb: "Ista non sunt compossibilia quorum rationes formales contradicunt. Sed aeternum et creatum sunt huiusmodi, quia aeternum est quod non habet esse post non esse et creatum habet esse post non esse. Patet igitur quod implicat 'aliquid creatum fuisse ab aeterno'. Igitur Deus non potest hoc facere." Compare the edition below 'Ad quartam, tertio', p. 141, lines 15-20, p. 142, lines 1-3. 7 See Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (Venice 1564, republished Ridgewood, New Yersey 1965), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb and 128rb. Compare also Conrad of Soltau, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (Stuttgart, WLB Cod. Theo!. Fol. 118), Lib. 2 q. 1, fol. 55rb-55va: "Quantum ad primum articulum doctor, quem ego communiter sequor, scilicet Thomas de Argentina, ponit duas conclusiones (. .. ). Sed contrarium istius videtur mihi esse sustinendum." The quidam's four arguments 'quod sic' refuted by Marsilius in the quaestio below, can be found in the commentary on the Sentences of Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 6; arg. 4; arg. 5 and arg. 8.

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Prague and Heidelberg.s The commentary of Marsilius is no exception to this rule.9 A third theologian with whom we should concern us here is Henry Totting of Oyta (t 1396). When starting his commentary on the second book of the Sentences, in Prague, 1370, this theologian defended in a principiumlO the view that the world cannot possibly be eternal.1 1 His argument is significant for our understanding of Marsilius' position. "It is impossible", he argues, "that a being, different from God, is infinite and immeasurable. Therefore no other being than God can be eternal." 12 The transition made here by Henry of Oyta from the impossibility of a creature's infinity and immeasurability to the impossibility of its eternity, also occurs in Marsilius. For Henry of Oyta it was the main argument on this subject. And the same goes for Marsilius. Focussing more specifically on the opinions and arguments of Marsilius himself, let us try to ascertain to which tradition his line of reasoning belongs. According to him, it is impossible for the world to be eternal. What are his arguments, and on what assumptions are they based? In a quaestio of the principium of the second book of his commentary on the Sentences, where the question of Creation is broached, he introduces one 8 On Thomas of Strasbourg and the influence of his commentary on the Sentences, see A. Zumkeller, Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und philosophischtheologische Lehre, Analecta Augustiniana 27 (1964), 212-214. In the quaestio of his principium to the second book of the Sentences (written 1443/4 in Cracow) Matthias de Labiszyn quotes the view of Thomas of Strasbourg on the etemity of the world, a view with which he agrees, see Krak6w, Bibl. Jag., 2234, fol. 61r-v (the name of Thomas of Strasbourg appears on fol. 59r). Compare Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, foll. 127vb-128vb. On Matthias de Labiszyn's life and works, see B. Chmielowska and Z. Wlodek, Maciej z Labiszyna, Materialy do historii filozofii sredniowieczney w polsce iii(xiv) (1971), 3-55, esp. 14. 9 See, e.g., G. Ritter, Studien zur Spiitscholastik 1, 42. 10 On some general characteristics of a principium, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, Einige Notizen über die Handschriften und Drucke des Sentenzenkommentars von Marsilius von Inghen, Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 56 (1989), 117-163, esp. 123-124. 11 On Henry Totting of Oyta's life and views, see A. Lang, Heinrich Totting von Oyta. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten deutschen Universitiiten und zur Problemgeschichte der Spiitscholastik, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters XXXIIl/4-5 (Münster 1937); F. Rosenthal, Heinrich von Oyta and Biblical Criticism in the Fourteenth Century, Speculum 25 (1950), 178-183 and A. Maierù, Logica aristotelica e teologia trinitaria. Enrico Totting da Oyta, Studi sui xiv secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier, a cura di A. Maierù e A. Paravicini Bagliani, Storia e Letteratura 151 (Rome 1981), 481-512. On Oyta's principia, see A. Lang, Heinrich Totting von Oyta, 53-4. 12 Compare A. Lang, Heinrich Totting von Oyta, 199, n. 180.

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of his main assumptions, viz., that God is an immeasurable spiritual quantity.13 It is this crucial premiss, and its specific interpretation by Marsilius, on which the entire argumentation hinges. God is an immeasurable spiritual quantity; therefore, no creature can be equal to God, neither in duration nor in any other way. Hence, Marsilius condudes, no creature can be eternal. ln order to understand his argument, it is necessary to appreciate the meaning of the concept of an 'immeasurable spiritual quantity'. We shall start our investigation with an analysis of this notion. The idea of God's quantity derives from the doctrine of the Trinity; it was used by many theologians other than Marsilius, among whom Bonaventure (t 1274), Thomas Aquinas (t 1274) and Giles of Rome (t 1316), in dealing with the question concerning the equality of the three divine Persons.14 These theologians base their daims on the words of Aristotle, in support of the view that things can be distinguished as to their equality and inequality in virtue of their quantity.15 Things are equal if they have the same quantity; things are unequal if they are of a different quantity. Usually a further distinction was made between three aspects of this quantity, each being an indication of equality and inequality: viz., duration, extension, and power.16 One thing is unequal to another thing if it is e.g. older, or larger, or if it can produce a greater effect. As Marsilius 13 See our edition below, p. 137, lines 8-10. 14 See Bonaventure, Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum, Editio minor, Opera theologica selecta 1 (Florence 1934), Lib. 1 d. 19 p. 1 a. u. qq. 1-2, 273a-276a; Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, Editio nova, cura P. Mandonnet, Tom. 1 (Paris 1929), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 1 aa. 1-2, 460-465; Giles of Rome, In primum librum Sententiarum (Venice 1521, reprint Frankfurt a/Main 1968), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 3 (p. 2 q. 1), fol. 105rb-105vb, and Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (Strasbourg 1501, reprint Frankfurt a/Main 1966), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, foll. 90vb-91rb. Compare Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, Editio tertia, Tom. 1, Pars II, Spicilegium bonaventurianum (Rome 1971), Lib. 1d.19, cc. 1-3, 159-161. 15 Compare Aristotle, Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus 1/1-5, Union académique internationale, Corpus philosophorum medii aevi (Bruges-Paris 1961), translatio Boethii, [6], 17-8. See also Boethius, In categorias Aristotelis, MPL LXIV (Paris 1860), Lib. 2, col. 216c. 16 See Bonaventure, Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 p. 1 a. u. q. 2, 275a; Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 1 aa. 1-2 divisio primae partis textus, 459; Giles of Rome, In primum librum Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 3, fol. 105val, and Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 90vb. Compare Fulgentius Ruspensis (= Pseudo-Augustine), De fide ad Petrum seu de regula fidei, cura et studio J. Fraipont, CCSL XCI/ A (Tumholt 1968), n. 4, 714, and Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 c. 1, 159.

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puts it, these three aspects are an exhaustive division of quantity. Every kind of equality and inequality can be reduced to one or more of these three aspects.17 The aspects in question, however, relate to corporeal extended quantity, and hence do not apply to God or the three divine Persans, at least not without due consideration. For this reason, the meaning of the three aspects was accommodated to fit the purpose. The corporeal aspect of 'duration' was changed into the spiritual aspect of 'eternity'; the corporeal aspect of 'extension' into 'perfection'; and the corporeal aspect of 'power' was changed into the spiritual aspect of 'power' - all in order to be able to speak of the aspects of a spiritual quantity.18 These three spiritual aspects also give an exhaustive division of quantity.19 The three divine Persans are equal in each of the three aspects, and are therefore equal to one another. As Marsilius puts it, "There is one eternity, one goodness, and one power for all three divine Persons."20 Moreover, each of the three aspects coïncides with the divine essence, whence they cannot be distinguished from God's essence.21 What does all this mean for our inquiry? From the responses Marsilius gives to the objections put forward at the beginning of the quaestio edited below, we know that he greatly stressed the difference between the divine essence's production of the Son and its production of Creation.22 The production of the Son cannot be compared to the production of Creation, he argues in the first response, because the Son is equal to the divine essence in all respects, except for those qualities that belong to Him as a Persan of the Trinity. When the Son is brought forth by the Father, something is produced that is equal to the Father in all essential respects, 17 Marsi!ius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 90vb: "Et omnem modum quantitatis corporalis et aequalitatis vel inaequalitatis ad aliquem dictorum modorum (viz., 'duratio', 'extensio' or 'multitudo' and 'virtus', MH) invenimus reduci." 18 See Giles of Rome, In primum librum Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 19 q. 3 (p. 2 q. 1), fol. 105 val, and Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 90vb. 19 Compare Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 1, fol. 176rb. 20 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 91ra: "( ... ) in divinis omnium trium personarum est una aeternitas, una bonitas et una potentia." 21 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 1, fol. 91ra: "( ... ) omnia haec (viz., 'aeternitas', 'bonitas' and 'potentia', MH) in Deo idem dicuntur quod essentia." See also, id., op. cit., fol. 91rb. 22 See our edition below, p. 139, lines 17-23.

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because numerically the same essence is involved.23 For that reason, he continues in the third response, the Son can be brought forth by the Father only in a natural way, that is, of necessity and of eternity. Creation, on the other hand, is different from God, not only in that it is not God, but also in that it cannot possibly be equal to God, either in duration, in perfection, or in power. Therefore it is not possible for God to bring forth Creation in any other way than freely and not of eternity. This means that two things are sharply contrasted by Marsilius, viz., the Son, being equal to God's essence, and Creation, being different from God's essence. The Son is equal to God's essence, matching it in duration, perfection and power. Creation, on the other hand, is different from God's essence, differing from God in duration and perfection as well as in power. Furthermore, we have seen that, in the first place, only what is equal to God Himself, He can produce necessarily and eternally; and secondly, that which is different from Him, He can only produce freely and not eternally. Now it is necessary to know why, according to Marsilius, Creation should differ from God not only in perfection and in power, but in duration as well. For on answering this question, we shall know why, firstly, he thought it impossible for Creation to be eternal, and secondly, why Creation can only be produced freely by God. Let us start with the first point: why should Creation differ from God in perfection, in power, as well as in duration? Why is it simpliciter impossibile, as Marsilius puts it, for God to produce something equal to Himself in either one or in all three of these respects? The answer is short; it can be stated in a three-word sentence: God is infinite. Because of the immeasurableness of God's essence, so Marsilius argues, there is no way in which God can produce something that is wholly (simpliciter) equal to Himself.24 This conclusion, based on the assumption of God's infinity, is the starting-point of Marsilius' argument. 23 See also Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 3, fol. 92rb: "Nam cum in qualibet persona sit tota essentia, vel verius, quaelibet persona sit ipsa essentia, et quaelibet persona est in illo in quo est sua essentia, eo quod non deserit suam naturam, patet, quod quaelibet personarum sit in alia et non extra aliam." On Marsilius' doctrine of the Trinity, see W. Môhler, Die Trinitiitslehre des Marsilius von Inghen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie des Spiitmittelalters (Limburg/Lahn 1949). 24 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181ra: "(. .. ) Deus propter immensitatem simpliciter nequit producere ei simile simpliciter." Compare the edition below, p. 137, lines 8-14.

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The view expressed in the starting-point is not a novel one. The idea that no creature can be wholly equal to God was embraced by almost all theologians, including Thomas Aquinas. As the latter puts it, only God Himself is uncaused and simpliciter infinite. Everything produced by God is somehow caused and limited, thus not as infinite as God is. Therefore, nothing that is produced by God can be wholly equal to God.25 Now on the basis of this starting-point Marsilius builds up his argumentation. He proceeds to make two consecutive steps in order to prove by means of a final third step that Creation cannot possibly be eternal. These three steps answer to the three aspects of spiritual quantity mentioned above. Each step is based on the previous one, whereas the first step is based on the starting-point itself, viz., the daim that nothing can be wholly equal to God. The method used here may rightly be called an ordo mathematicalis, as does the incipit of the 1501 impression of Marsilius' commentary on the Sentences.26 The first step, based on the starting-point, is as follows. As God cannot possibly produce anything that is wholly equal to Himself (produce ad extra, that is), it is impossible for him to produce something that is able to produce the same effect as He can.27 God is immeasurable in every aspect and in relation to every effect that He can bring forth, whence God cannot possibly bring forth an effect that is capable of the same as He is. Every effect produced by God is limited in power.28 No effect has the same productive power as God has. For God is infinite, and hence He can always produce more than any creature whatsoever.29

25 Compare, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis (Ottawa, Canada 1953), I q. 7 a. 2 ad lum, 38a. 26 See Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), fol. lra: " clarissimi viri domini Marsilii Inguen super libros Sententiarum edita in studio Heidelbergensi incipiunt feliciter, ordine optimo quasi mathematicali certissimo." This incipit, however, does not occur in the Mss of the first book of Marsilius' commentary on the Sentences (Isny, Bibl. der Nikolaikirche, Hs. 48; Krak6w, Bibl. Jag., 1581, Leipzig, Universitiitsbibl., 568 and Stuttgart, Württ. Landesbibl., Cod. Theo!. Fol. 113). 27 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor /ibros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181ra: "(. .. ) non plus videtur posse ei (viz., Deo, MH) producere simile respectu unius effectus producendi quam simpliciter; sed nequit ei simpliciter producere simile, ergo nec respectu particularis effectus dati vel dabilis." Compare the edition below, p. 137, lines 12-14. 28 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor /ibros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181ra. 29 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor /ibros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181 va.

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This first step has taken us to one of the aspects of quantity that express the difference between God and Creation, viz., the aspect of 'power'. It is impossible for God to produce an effect that is capable of the same as He is. Therefore, every effect differs from Godin power. But Marsilius takes us one step further. Not only is it impossible for God to produce an effect that is capable of the same as He is, but it is also impossible that He should produce an effect that is infinitely perfect. For if God were able to do so, Marsilius argues, He should also be able to produce an effect that is equal to Him in power. But the latter is impossible. Therefore so is the former.30 Again we have corne across an aspect of quantity that brings out the difference between God and Creation. If God cannot bring forth an effect that is infinitely perfect, every creature differs from God in perfection. Marsilius has not taught us anything new so far. Both points can also be found in the works of other theologians. Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, to name but two, are of the same opinion in holding that God cannot possibly produce a being that is capable of the same as He is. No creature can create another creature from nothing. This can only be done by God, who is the cause of every creature's being.31 And both Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg hold that God cannot possibly bring forth a creature that is as perfect as He is. Only God is pure act, as Thomas Aquinas says. Only God is not wanting in any perfection.32 These theologians, then, are of the same mind in holding that there is an unbridgeable difference between God and Creation, as to their power and their perfection. But what about the third aspect, that of duration? 30 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol. 181va: "(. .. ) videtur mihi sequi, quod Deus non possit producere aliquam speciem vel aliquod individuum sive spirituale sive corporale infinitae perfectionis. Patet, quia pari ratione posset producere infinitam virtutem in movendo, cuius contrarium dicit conclusio praecedens (= conclusio 4, op. cit., fol. 181ra: Videtur mihi

sequi, quod Deus non possit facere virtutem infinitam in movendo, MH)." Compare the edition below, 'secundo praemitto', p. 137, lines 12-14. 31 Compare Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 43 q. 1 a. 2 c., 1005; id., De potentia, Quaestiones disputatae Vol. II, cura et studio P. Bazzi e.a. (Turin-Rome 1965), q. 3 a. 4 ad 15, 48a-b; id., Summa theologiae (ed. cit.), I q. 45 a. 5 ad 3um, 289a, and Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in !III libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 1 a. 3, fol. 125va. 32 Compare Thomas Aquinas, De potentia (ed. cit.), q. 1 a. 6 c., 21b; id., Summa contra gentiles, cura et studio C. Pera e.a. (Turin-Rome 1961), Lib. 1 c. 28, nn. 259-260, 40, and Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in III! libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 44 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3, fol. 116rb.

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Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg are both of the opinion that it is not impossible for God to have created something from eternity. "Everyone agrees on this", we read at the beginning of De aeternitate mundi, "that because of His infinite power, God was able to create something that has always been."33 According to Aquinas, then, it is not contrary to God's infinity to produce something that is eternal. So, in this respect a creature may be equal to God. This is not to say, however, that a creature may be eternal in the same way as God is, for eternity proper can only be attributed to God. Only God is immutable. All creatures, on the other hand, are mutable, as Thomas says in the Summa theologiae.34 Yet Thomas believes it to be possible for a creature to participate in God's eternity, and thus to exist from eternity. The same view we find again in Thomas of Strasbourg. He, too, believes that it follows precisely from God's power that He is able to produce something from eternity. "To voice the praise of God's power", he says, "and notwithstanding the opinions of others, 1 maintain that God could have made something from eternity, and that not even the slightest contradiction is implied in this."35 He, too, believes that a creature can be equal to God in duration, in spite of its mutability. For even though each creature has a beginning as to its origins (because each creature has been created), this does not mean that it must also have a beginning as to its duration.36 Marsilius however is of a different opm10n. God cannot produce a creature that is equal to Him in power, nor one that is as perfect as He is, 33 Thomas Aquinas, De aeternitate mundi, ed. Leonina 43 (Rome 1976), 85a: "(. .. ) omnes consentiunt, in hoc scilicet quod Deus potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, considerando potentiam ipsius infinitam ( ... )." On Thomas' view, see J.F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington D.C. 1984), 191-214. 34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (ed. cit.), 1 q. 9 a. 2 c., 47a-b, and id., op. cit., 1 q. 10 a. 3 c., Sla. 35 Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in !III libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb: "Sed utrum Deus secundum huiusmodi potentiam (viz., potentiam activam creatricis essentiae, MH) ab aeterno potuerit effectum sine contradictionis implicatione producere? Quamvis sollemnes doctores se reputent oppositum demonstrasse, ad divinae tamen potentiae praeconium extollendum ad praesens teneo, quod Deus hoc potuit absque omni implicatione contradictionis." 36 Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in !III libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2 ad primum, fol. 128rb: "Dato ergo, quod creatura ab aeterno fuisset, adhuc posset esse variabilis, quia esse simpliciter invariabile est solum de ratione eius, cuius propria mensura est aeternitas proprie dicta." and id., op. cit., ad tertium: "(. .. ) de ratione creaturae est habere principium originis, seu factionis; sed habere principium originis et factionis, et non habere principium durationis, ista non contradicunt (. .. )."

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nor one that exists from eternity (as God Himself does). In order to establish this point, Marsilius takes a third step on top of the two already mentioned. "There is no reason whatsoever", he argues, "to assume that God is able to produce something that is equal to Him in duration, but that He is unable to do so as regards power or perfection." The latter two are impossible, and therefore sois the former.37 Marsilius takes this third step to be justified in virtue of the following analogy. God can always make an individual or a species that is superior to any of the individuals or species created so far. For God is infinitely powerful, whence there are no limits to His power. Each creature can therefore be surpassed in perfection by some other creature produced by God.38 An analogous case can be made for duration. Each creature can be surpassed in duration by some other creature produced earlier by God. Marsilius takes it that there is no reason to deny the latter possibility while affirming the former. If God is credited with the capacity of bringing forth a creature that is better or more powerful than any existing creature, then He should also be credited with the capacity of bringing forth a creature antecedent to any other existing creature. Consequently, it is impossible for a created thing to be eternal. For, given any created being whatsoever, say, the world, it is possible for God to have created the same or another world earlier. Hence the world cannot possibly be eternal, for otherwise it would be impossible for God to have created the same or another world earlier. So, according to Marsilius, there is an absolute difference between God and Creation with respect to the third aspect of quantity, viz., that of duration. God is eternal, whereas Creation is not. This difference is properly called 'absolute', since it is impossible that God should have created such a world, that He could not possibly have created the same or another world earlier. How should this argumentation of Marsilius be evaluated? In the first place it should be kept in mind that not all theologians agree with the premiss from which Marsilius takes his last step. Not all theologians, that 37 See the edition below, 'tertio praemitto', p. 137, lines 15-18, p. 138, lines 1-9. 38 See the edition below, p. 137, lines 15-18, p. 140, lines 1-16. Compare Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 43 a. 2, fol. 184ra-b: "Omni specie huius universi producti Deus in infinitum perfectiorem potest producere. Haec probatur sic, quia virtus infiniti vigoris omni finito quantumlibet maius potest producere, non solum in magnitudine, sed etiam in perfectione. Sed est notum fideli, quod Deus est infiniti vigoris et quod omne dependens est finitum, igitur."

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is, share his belief that God can always create an individual or a species that is superior to any other individual or any other species. Henry of Ghent (t 1293), for one, and with him e.g. Godfrey of Fontaines (t after 1306) and Peter Aureoli (t 1322), are reluctant on this point.39 In the words of Godfrey of Fontaines, if we were to assume that God can infinitely continue to produce ever better creatures (as Marsilius' premiss takes it to be possible), then all essential order in the created world would collapse.40 On the other hand, to be sure, there were also theologians who sided with Marsilius. We may think of Thomas Aquinas, Thomas of Strasbourg and Conrad of Soltau.41 They hold that there is no boundary to God's infinite power, and that God might therefore have made a creature that is better than any given creature. If this point is denied, so they argue, it should also be denied that God's power is infinite and that it cannot be limited. These theologians, then, agree with the premiss of Marsilius' third step. However - and this is quite interesting - Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg do not draw the conclusion that God might also have created a being antecedent to any given being. As we have already seen, they believe that God can in effect produce an eternally existing creature. The fact that God is hence unable to produce this same being or some other being earlier, does not interfere with His infinity. Rather, God's power to bring forth an eternal creature should be seen as the very expression of His infini ty. This survey may suffice to show that what seemed so obvious to Marsilius, to such an extent that it made the contrary seem irrational to him, was in fact not so very obvious at all. For theologians like Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, holding that because of His infinity 39 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta (Paris 1518, reprint Louvain 1961), Quodl. 5 q. 3, fol!. 155vR-156rT; Godfrey of Fontaines, Les quatre premièrs quodlibets, par M. de Wulf et A. Pelzer, Les philosophes Belges II (Louvain 1904), Quodl. 4 q. 3, 243-7; Peter Aureoli, Commentariorum in primum librum Sententiarum pars secunda (Rome 1596), d. 44 a. 4, foll. 1055aB-1056bD. 40 Godfrey of Fontaines, Les quatre premièrs quodlibets (ed. cit.), Quodl. 4 q. 3, 244. Same argument in Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta (ed. cit.), Quodl. 5 q. 3, fol. 156rT. 41 Compare Thomas Aquinas, De potentia (ed. cit.), q. 3 a. 16 ad 17, 90a; id., Summa theologiae (ed. cit.), I. q. 25 a. 6 c., 178a; Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 d. 44 q. 1 a. 2, fol. 116rb: "Potentia Dei est infinita et simpliciter illimitata, ergo ultra omnem creaturam productam semper poterit producere perfectiorem." and Conrad of Soltau, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (Stuttgart, Württ. Landesbibl., Cod. Theo!. Fol. 118), Lib. 1 dd. 42-43, fol. 51 va: "Potentia Dei est infinita. Hoc satis patet per Scripturam et dicta Sanctorum et probatur ratione sic. Deus non potest tam perfectum effectum producere, quin posset perfectiorem effectum producere. Igitur est infinitae potentiae productivae."

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God could have made better species, are nevertheless of the opinion that God could have made the world from eternity. And conversely, theologians like Henry of Ghent and Peter Aureoli, holding that God could not possibly have made the world from eternity,42 are of the opinion that God could not possibly have continued infinitely to make better species. In other words, theologians sharing the premiss of Marsilius' last step do not share his conclusion; theologians sharing his conclusion do not share his premiss. Seen in this light, Marsilius' line of thought becomes all the more interesting. He argues that it follows from God's infinity that He is different from all creatures, not only in power and in perfection, but in duration as well. Each of the three aspects of quantity is brought to bear on this difference. Every creature is entirely different from God. This line of reasoning in Marsilius is so intriguing because it draws quite radical conclusions from the concept of God's infinity. Moreover, we have seen just now that his argumentat ion is not as natural or intuitively plausible as he thought it to be. Does all this mean that his reasoning is unique? As may presently become clear, the argument is not unique. Let us look at some other thinkers who have used this same line of thought. At the beginning of this paper we have pointed out the relevance of Henry of Oyta's principium of 1370. In this principium, which has survived in only a few manuscripts, 43 the author argues that no other being than God could possibly have existed from eternity. He makes use of a line of reasoning similar to that of Marsilius. God is pure act, Henry says, and He is infinite and immeasurab le, and it is impossible for any other being than God to be infinite and immeasurab le. In every being but God there is a certain measure of potentiality, whence its being, its specifications and its action, can always be added to. Therefore, no other being could possibly have existed from eternity.44 42 R.C. Dales, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the Wor/d, 165-70 (Henry of Ghent), and Peter Aureoli, Commentariorum in secundum librum Sententiarum Tomus II (Rome 1605), d. 1 q. 1 aa. 1-4, foll. 8aF-16bE. 43 Compare A. Lang, Heinrich Totting von Oyta, 53. 44 Henry of Oyta, Principium II (Wien, Oesterr. Nationalbibl., Cod. Pal. Vind., 4004), fol. 134r: "Utrum possibile sit aliquam entitatem quae non est Deus fuisse ab aeterno. ( ... ) Antequam dicam ad quaesitum principale, praemittam quasdam conclusiones ex quibus inducam responsionem ad quaesitum. Conclusio prima sit ista quod simp!iciter est impossibile aliquod ens aliud a Deo infinite et immense [esse add. Ms, sed del.] fuisse vel futurum esse. Probatur. Supposito quod Deus sit actus purus qui simpliciter infinite et immense est, quod ad praesens non probo, sed suppono, quia omnes vocant illud Deum quod est purus actus et quod est immense, et etiam patet ex hoc quod est omnipotens, et ex

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The similarity between the arguments of Henry and Marsilius cannot fail to be noticed. Like Marsilius, Henry of Oyta exclusively links up eternal being with perfection, immeasurability and infinity. Unlike Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, neither Marsilius nor Henry distinguishes between 'eternity proper' on the one hand, which in effect implies absolute perfection, and can only be attributed to God, and on the other hand 'being from eternity', which to our two Thomases does not imply absolute perfection, and can therefore also be attributed to creatures. According to Henry of Oyta and Marsilius, however, these two concepts are implied by one another, and should therefore not be distinguished. Both concepts express a single perfection, that of God's infinite perfectness. Over and against this infinite perfection stand created beings, necessarily finite, imperfect and unequal to God. Consequently, Creation cannot possibly be eternal properly speaking, nor can it be from eternity in the larger sense. Linking up not only 'eternity proper' but also 'being from eternity' exclusively with God's perfection, is a rather remarkable manoeuvre; we should do well to inquire as to when and where the identification of the concepts of 'eternity proper' and 'being from eternity' makes its first appearance. As we shall see, Henry of Oyta and Marsilius of Inghen are part of an old tradition on this point. For example, there are some remarks in the commentary on the Sentences by Albert the Great (t 1280) (who also held the view that a created world cannot be eternal),45 from which it is clear that the same line of thought was current at least as early as in the first half of the thirteenth century. As is stated by Albert, many thinkers were opposed to the view that it is possible for the world to have existed from eternity, in virtue of the argument that created being differs from God in all respects, hence hoc quod ipse est quo maius cogitari non potest (... ). Ex hoc arguitur sic. Deus est actus purus et est infinite et immense, et non est possibile quod cum ipso sit aliquis actus purus qui etiam sit infinite et immense, igitur non est possibile aliquod ens aliud a Deo esse infinite et immense. Consequentia patet ex hoc, quod non est possibile aliquid esse infinite et immense, nisi etiam ipsum sit actus purus, ex eo quod omne potentiale potest aliqualiter esse vel se habere vel agere qualiter nunc non est [agit in marg.], et per consequens imaginabile est ipsum recipere additionem suo esse vel in suo aliqualiter esse vel in suo agere, et per consequens non infinite et immense est (. .. ).'' 45 On Albert's view, see, e.g., J. Hansen, Zur Frage der anfangslosen und zeitlichen Schôpfung bei Albert dem Gro15en, Studia Albertina, hrsg. von H. Ostlender, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Supplementband IV (Münster 1952), 167-188; and A. Zimmermann, Alberts Kritik an einem Argument für den Anfang der Welt, Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung, hrsg. von A. Zimmermann, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 14 (Berlin-New York 1981), 78-88.

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also in duration. Only God is without a beginning. Therefore, every creature has necessarily been created with a beginning in time; for else it would be equal to God.46 As a matter of fact, this point of view is brought forward in the Summa Halensis (written before 1245), and in a form which is strongly reminiscent of Marsilius' argument. Like Marsilius, it stresses the difference between God's production of the Son and His production of Creation. Only that which is substantially equal to God, so the Summa argues, can have been produced eternally and without a beginning in time. All that is different from God, on the other hand, cannot possibly be eternal or without a beginning in time.· For nothing that is not God can equal God's eternity and perfection. Therefore, the Summa concludes, no creature can exist from eternity.47 Once again we corne across the identification of perfect being and being from eternity, as well as the emphasis on the absolute difference between God and Creation. Both points have reappeared in Marsilius. The Summa Halensis refers to the De Trinitate of Richard of St. Victor (t 1173). 48 This twelfth-century theologian had argued in favour of the identification of 'immeasurableness', 'eternity proper', and 'being from eternity', and had consequently established that no creature can exist from eternity, but that it must necessarily be created in time. For there can only be one immeasurable eternal substance, and only this can be infinite, and 46 Albert the Great, Commentarii in II Sententiarum, ed. A. Borgnet Vol. 27 (Paris 1894), d. 1 B a. 10, 29a: "Objiciunt multi, quod in nullis creatura comparabilis est Creatori, ergo nec in duratione, ergo non debet esse sine principio durationis, sicut Deus." Albert was composing the ordinatio of the second book of the Sentences in 1246, see J.A. Weisheipl, The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great, Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. by J.A. Weisheipl (Toronto 1980), 22. 47 Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica 1 (Ad Claras Aquas 1924), Lib. 1 p. 1 inq. 1 tract. 2 q. 4 m. 2 c. 1 contra: a., 90a; id., op. cit., c. 4 ad quod obicit c., 93a; id., op. cit., respondeo, 95b: "Cum ergo constet mundum et creata esse creaturas vel entia a Deo in diversitate substantiae, impossibile erit mundum et creata esse aetema vel non habere principium suae durationis. Est igitur hic ordo rerum: est enim aliquid quod procedit ab alio in identitate substantiae et est coaeternum illi, sed non eiusdem personalitatis: sicut Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus est coaeternus Patri; et est aliquid quod procedit non consubstantiale et non est eiusdem personalitatis cum illo a quo procedit nec est coaeternum illi: talis est omnis creatura respectu Dei." Id, op. cit., ad lum, 96a; id., op. cit., ad lOum, 97b (here the concept of immeasurableness is used); id., Summa theologica Il (Ad Claras Aquas 1928), Lib. 2 inq. 1 tract. 2 q. 2 tit. 4 c. 1a.1 ad llum, 87b and id., op. cit., ad 12um, 88a. As is known, the first and second book of the Summa halensis are largely a compilation from writings of Alexander of Hales and Johannes de Rupella, see V. Doucet, op. cit., Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libris 1 et II (Ad Claras Aquas 1948), cccvi. 48 See Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica 1 (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 p. 1 inq. 1 tract. 2 q. 4 m. 2 c. 1 contra: a., 90a and id., op. cit., c. 4 ad quod obicit a., 93a.

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this is God.49 As an interesting aside, we may mention here that Marsilius had in his possession a considerable number of works by Richard of St. Victor; he must surely have been acquainted with his thought. 50 One question is still open, viz., whether God can only produce a thing freely if the thing produced is altogether different from Him, especially also in duration. Here, too, Marsilius dissents from the views of many other theologians, most notably from those of Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg. The latter two held that God's ability to produce an eternally existing creature does not interfere with His freedom. God's action is immediately effective, also in acting freely. For God is able to act freely and with perfect effectiveness without having to engage in timeconsuming reflections. So there is no reason whatsoever, they argue, to assume that God's will must precede its effect in time.51 Marsilius, however, is of a quite different opinion. He holds it to be positively contrary to God's freedom to believe that God could have produced an

49 See Richard of St. Victor, De trinitate, Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, publié par Jean Ribaillier, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age VI (Paris 1958), Lib., 2 c. 7. p. 113-4: "Jam ex superioribus agnovimus et pro certo habemus quod substantia divina non sit aliud aliquid quam inmensitas sua, quam eternitas ipsa. Unde et de inmensitate et eternitate constat quod quevis earum sit idem quod altera. Constat itaque quia qui eternitatem habet, inmensitatem utique non habere non valet. Sed si inmensitate carere non potest qui est eternus, erit procul dubio simul utrumque eternus et inmensus. Sicut ergo non possunt esse plures inmensi, sic esse non poterunt pl ures eterni." and id., op. cit. c. 8, p. 115: "Que igitur ab illo (viz., Deo, MH) fiunt, divinam illam et incorruptibilem et incommutabilem substantiam materiam habere non possunt. (... ) Constat itaque, quod veraciter credimus, quod solus Deus sit increatus. Sicut ergo solus a semetipso, sic absque dubio et solus ab eterno." 50 See G. Tôpke, Die Matrikel der Universitiit Heidelberg von 1386 bis 1662 I (Heidelberg 1884), Anhang IV, Accessionskatalog der Universitatsbibliothek, 679-80: "Item (407.) multi tractatus et sermones beati Bernhardi, Anselmi, Richardi et aliorum in vno volumine. ( ... ) Item (444.) plures libros Richardi de Sancto Victore in vno volumine." This and many other works were bequeathed by Marsilius to the university library of Heidelberg in 1396. Quotations from Richard of St. Victor's De trinitate can be found in Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 1 a. 1, fol. 3rb, and id., op. cit., Lib. 1 q. 2 a. 3, foll. 14va and 16ra-b. 51 See Thomas Aquinas, De aeternitate mundi (ed. cit.), 87a-b: "( ...) uoluntas non est necessarium quod precedat duratione effectum suum; nec agens per uoluntatem, nisi per hoc quod agit ex deliberatione: quod absit ut in Deo ponamus. (... ) Praeterea, uoluntas uolentis nichil diminuit de uirtute eius, et precipue in Deo. Sed omnes soluentes ad rationes Aristotilis quibus probatur res semper fuisse a Deo, per hoc quod idem semper facit idem, dicunt quod hoc sequeretur si non esset agens per uoluntatem; ergo etsi ponatur agens per uoluntatem, nihilominus sequitur quod potest facere ut causatum ab eo numquam non sit." The same argument can be found in Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria de !III libros Sententiarum, (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2 arg. 4, fol. 127vb.

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effect from eternity. It is inconceivable, so he argues, that something is brought about freely without its not-being preceding its coming-to-be. Only if the effect does not exist at first, and the cause may hence precede its effect in time, is it possible for the cause to act freely, since only on this assumption the cause might possibly have produced a different effect.52 Therefore, eternal things cannot possibly have been produced freely, as they have always existed. If we are to assume that God acts freely, so Marsilius argues, then we should for consistency's sake deny the possibility of the world's eternity. This does not mean that God needs time in order to act freely. Marsilius shares the opinion of Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg, viz., that God can produce something freely without having to engage intimeconsuming reflections (for otherwise God's simplicity and perfection would be compromised).53 But he nevertheless holds that God can produce a thing freely, only if it is unequal to Godin duration. If the thing produced were to be equal to God in duration, it would not be brought forth freely by God, but in the manner of a natural cause. And this is impossible in the case of Creation: if God were to produce something in a natural way, the thing produced would be equal to God not only in duration, but also in perfection and in power. This equality, however, can only be a property of the Son, and not of any of the creatures.54 In short, what is different from God can only be brought forth freely and not from eternity. Let us conclude here. As far as the problem studied above is concerned, Marsilius clearly stands in a different tradition from that of e.g. Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of Strasbourg. Marsilius believes that the world cannot possibly be eternal. His view and his argumentation are associated with a line of thought that is to be found in Richard of St. Victor, the Summa Halensis and Henry of Oyta. In the arguments presented by Marsilius, all emphasis is on God's immeasurability and infinity, as well

52 See the edition below, p. 139, lines 6-14, p. 141, lines 2-5. 53 Compare Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 44 a. 1, fol. 186rb: "Sed quod esse liberum libertate oppositiones sit perfectionis simpliciter, patet, quia cum Dei immutabilitate stat." and id., op. cit., ad 4um, fol. 187vb: "(. .. ) voluntati divinae nihil resistit, et ergo statim ea posita ponitur effectus." 54 See the edition below, p. 138, lines 21-26, p. 139, lines 1-5, and p. 140, lines 16-23, p. 141, lines 1-5. Compare Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 1 q. 44 a. 2, fol. 189ra: "( ... ) concedendum est quod aliqualiter Deus sit ad intra qualiter causare non potest ad extra, quia necessario est ad intra, et impossibile est quod necessario causaret ad extra.''

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as on the difference between Gad and Creation. The created world cannot possibly exist from eternity, since Gad alone is infinite and immeasurable.

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APPENDIX 5

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The present edition is based on the manuscript Isny, Bibliothek der Nikolaikirche, Hs. 48 (= J), Krak6w, Bibl. Jag., 1268 (= K), Tübingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336a (= T) and on the edition printed by M. Flach at Strasbourg in 1501 (= F). As far as we know, J, K, T and F are the only sources preserving the text of the dubium edited below (II Sent. q. 1 a. 2). J was written after 1415 by Gerardus Casterkem (master at the University of Heidelberg). K and T presumably date from the third or fourth decade of the 15th century. F has probably been corrected by Flach's corrector Matthias Schürer. Because J is the oldest manuscript, and was presumably written at Heidelberg (where up to 1489 Marsilius' autograph was available), J has been used here as the basic manuscript, although K also has a good text. J and T are somehow connected (see the cri tic al apparatus).1 We chose for an alternative reading or word order only where J goes against both K, T and F, and in the following cases: 6) nec] am. J T. 36) produceret] producere J T. 37) ad] am. J T. 42) mensuratur] mensurat J T. 43) est] am. J F. 57) intelligens] intellectus J T. 58) volens] voluntas J T. 70) maius] magis J K. 74) ipso] ipse J T; ipsum F. 88) voluntas] voluntatis J K. 89) esset] am. J T; est F. 98) equum esse bovem] hominem esse asinum J T. 106) maximam] maxime J KT.

25

30

35

In all these cases, the reading of J appears in the critical apparatus. Only once did it seem necessary to deviate from the reading of the four sources in favour of the logical structure of the text. 'Potuit' on p. 141, line 4, has been corrected by us from the original reading of 'ponit' in J, K, T and F. Orthographical differences and the alternative readings ille / iste and ergo / igitur have not been noted as variants. Ner in J, K and T has been read as

On these details, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, Einige Notizen über die Handschriften und Drucke, 118-153.

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'negatur',2 although it cannot be ruled out that 'negetur' (as in F) was meant. The orthography, capitalization and punctuation have been adapted to modern usage. 5

SIGNS AND ABBREVIATIONS

J

=

Isny, Bibl. der Nikolaikirche, Hs. 48

= Krak6w, Bibl. Jag., 1268 T = Tübingen, Wilhelmsstift, Gb 336a F = Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Strasbourg 1501 (M.

K 10

Fla ch)

J is the basic manuscript 15

add. ed.

om. sup. lin.

addidit / addiderunt editor omisit / omiserunt supra lineam

20

30

[J fol. 365a; K fol. 17r; T unfoliated; F fol. 206vb] Hic consuevit moveri:3 Utrum catholice loquendo mundus possit4 esse coaeternus Deo, vel potuitS produci coaeterne Deo. Ubi primo manifestum est, quod nec nunc nec6 deinceps in futurum potest mundus esse coaeternus Deo eo, quod iam in praeteritum transivit ipsum habuisse esse post non esse, quod 2 3 4

5 6

Cf. A. Cappelli, Dizionario di abbreviature latine ed italiane, Sesta ed. (Milan 1985), 233b. moveri] dubium add. F. possit] potest J. potuit] potuerit F. nec] om. JT.

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Deus non potest facere non fuisse praeteritum. Sed utrum potuit7 produci coaeterne Deo, de hoc doctores nostri sunt diversi. Quidama dicunt quod sic, et moventur ex illo,s quia Filius est aeternaliter productus9 a Patre. Quare ergo non possetlO Deus etiam11 producere [F fol. 207ra] creaturam sine initio? Non12 videtur maior implicatio13 in uno quam in alio. Secundo,b quia si non, hoc maxime esset quia producitur libere et ex voluntate. Et in talibus videtur quod productum necessario habeat initium. Sed hoc non obstat, quia ubi producens14 est aeternum et deliberatione non indiget quin coaeterne sibi posset15 producere. Tertio,C quia non minus potest aliquid16 esse coaeternum Deo quam ignis, si esset aeternus splendor.17 Modo, beatus Augustinusd dicit sexto De Trinitate c. 1: "Si ignis esset aeternus, splendor ab eo genitus esset coaeternus." Ergo etiam potuit Deus producere creaturam vel rem dependentem sibi coaevam. Quarto,e quia humanus intellectus potest intelligere vel apprehendere Deum fuisse ab aeterno rerum productorem. Sed plus potest Deus18 facere quam homo apprehendere, ergo etc. Maiorem probant per dictum beati Augustinif decimo19 De Civitate Dei ex verbis Platonis dicentis: [K fol. 17v] "Mundus semper fuit [J fol. 365b] semper existente eo qui eum fecit". 7 a 8 9 10 11 12 13 b 14 15 c

potuit] potuerit F. Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (Venice 1564, republished Ridgewood, New Yersey 1965), Lib. 2 d. 1q.2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 6. illo] quattuor motivis K. productus] produœns J. posset] possit J. etiam] om. T. non] ideo T. implicatio] contradictionis add. F. Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 4. produœns] productum F. sibi posset] sibi possit K F; posset sibi T. Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 5.

16 potest aliquid] aliquid potest J; potest aliud KT. 17 splendor] om. K F. d Augustine, De trinitate, cura et studio W.J. Mountain auxiliante Fr. Glorie, CCSL L e 18 f

19

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Opera Pars XVI/1(Turnhout1968), Lib. VI, In. 1, p. 228. Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum (ed. cit.), Lib. 2 d. 1 q. 2 a. 2, fol. 127vb arg. 8 (almost verbatim). potest Deus] Deus potest K. Augustine, De civitate Dei, ad fidem quartae editionis Teubnerianae quam a. 19281929 curaverunt B. Dombart et A. Kalb, paucis emendatis mutatis additis, CCSL XLVII Opera Pars XIV /1(Turnhout1955), Lib. X, c. 31, p. 309. X]IoK T.

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Etiam Philosophus et Avicennag et20 fere omnes dicunt mundum fuisse ab aeterno, et tamen Avicennah ponit mundum a Deo factum.21 Minorem probant per beatum Augustinum i Epistula 3 ad Volusianum dicentem: "Demus igitur Deo aliquid passe, quod nos fateamur22 investigare2 3 non passe. In rebus enim mirabilibus tata ratio est voluntas facientis." Sed salva reverentia hanc opinionem defendendam 24 mihi non videtur.25 Pro cuius declaratione primo suppono, quod immensitas quantitatis spiritualis maiestatis divinae stat in tribus, scilicet in aeterna duratione et26 interiori perfectione et in27 exterioris effectus possibili2 8 productione . Dictum est de hoc satis quaestione 23 respiciente distinctione m 19 et 20.i Secundo praemitto, quod Deus ad extra non potest facere effectum maximum in perfectione vel extensione. De hoc satis29 dictum est ut probavi30 eo modo quo potui quaestione 42 circa31 distinctione m 42 et 43.k Tertio praemitto, quod non videtur rationale quod plus possit magis facere sibi aequale in duratione aeternitatis, quam in maxima quod potest producere suae productivae potestatis. Vola dicere, quod non32 plus est rationale quod possit sibi33 aequare aliquid in duratione sic quod anterius

Cf. J. Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis, Philosophes Médiévaux XVII (LouvainParis 1974), p. 156 (202) and Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Édition critique de la traduction Latine médiévale par S. van Riet, Avicenna Latinus (Louvain 1977-80), Tract. IX, c. 1, p. 446. 20 et] om. K. h Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina (ed. cit.), Tract. IX, c. 1, p. 443. 21 factum] et add. F. i Augustine, Epistolae cl. III, ep. 137 c. 2 n. 8, MPL 33 col. 519. 22 fateamur] fatemur J. 23 investigare] investigari F. 24 defendendam] defendentium K F. 25 videtur] sic add. F. 26 et] in F. 27 in] om. T. 28 possibili] possibilis J. j Marsilius of lnghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (Strasbourg 1501, reprint Franfurt a/Main 1966), Lib. 1 q. 22 a. 3, foll. 90vb-91rb. 29 satis] om. K F. 30 ut probavi] et probatum F. 31 circa] om. K. k Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol!. 180va-182vb. 32 non] sol us add. K. 33 sibi] illo K. g

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in duratione nunquam potuisset34 producere, quam35 in vigore potestatis sic quod aliquid produceret36 quo maius nihil possit ultra vel potuisset maius producere. Probo sic, quia sicut ad37 agens naturale perfectum sequitur aequalitas in effectu quoad simultatem temporis, ita etiam sequitur extremum potestatis, sic scilicet, quod nihil ultra secundum illum statum potest producere. Ergo etiam eodem modo, si potuit producere maximum in duratione [F fol. 207rb] a parte ante, quare non posset38 producere maximum39 in potestate vel extensione? Nulla est ratio.

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Ex his infero conclusionem negativam, quod Deus non potuit producere creaturam sibi coaeternam. Probatur sic, quia non plus potuit producere sibi maximum in duratione, quam sibi maximum40 in potestate vel extensione, per suppositionem tertiam. Sed non potest producere sibi maximum41 in extensione vel in vigore sive virtute, per suppositionem secundam. Ergo conclusio vera. Secundo, quia de natura creaturae est esse sub tempore. Sed nullum tempus potest esse aeternum eo, quod tempus aeternum non mensuratur.42 Ergo de ratione creaturae est43 nullo modo aequari Deo. Non deduco partes brevitatis causa. Tertio, quia Deus nullo modo potest facere eo modo quo faceret si ageret per modum agentis naturalis. Sed si ageret per modum agentis naturalis, tune produceret creaturam coaeternam sicut et maximam. Ergo repugnat44 maiestati posse producere coaeternam.45 Tenet consequentia.46 Et patet maior, quia si posset47 agere per modum agentis naturalis, [K fol. 18r] tune posset facere maximum [J fol. 366a] quod posset,48 et sic tantum, quod ultra potuisset] produxisse vel add. T. quam] quod K. produceret] producere J T. ad] om. J T. posset] possit J. 39 maximum] in duratione a (. .. ) posset producere maximum om. K. 40 in duratione quam sibi maximum] om. T. 41 maximum] in duratione quam sibi maximum in potestate vel extensione per suppositionem tertiam add. (underlined) K. 42 mensuratur] mensurat J T. 43 est] om. J F. 44 repugnat] repugnaret F. 45 coaeternam] aeternam J; sicut et maximam add. (underlined) K. 46 tenet consequentia] consequentia tenet J. 47 posset] possit J. 48 posset] possit J. 34

35 36 37 38

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nihi149 possitSO nec extensive nec intensive, cum sit agens infinitum cui omnia oboediunt. Minor patet, quia agens naturale non faceret plus quam coaeterne. Confirmatur, quia non potest51 plus produxisse52 coaeterne quam iuxta extremum potentiae. Sed secundum non potest, per dicta in 42 distinctione,1 ergo nec primum. Quarto quaero a te:53 Utrum dependens coaeternum emanasset per intellectum et voluntatem libere, vel non?54 Si dicis quod non, tune Deus non potuit ad extra sic agere, quia catholice55 non potest ad extra56 agere nisi intelligens57 et volens58 etiam libertate oppositionis. Si dicis quod libere emanavit, tune utique habet esse sic, quod prius non fuit. Ergo non est coaeternum. Et patet consequentia. Probatur59 antecedens, quia imaginatio non capit, quod aliquid ab aliquo producatur libere ad esse quin ante habuit non esse. Secus est de agente naturali in quo productum adaequatur producenti.

15

20

Ad rationes alterius opinionis.60 Ad primam conceditur antecedens, et negatur61 consequentia quod ideo potuit creaturam sine initio producere. Et ad probationem,62 non est simile de Filio et de creatura, quia Filius est natus aequalis in omnibus, ubi non est relationis oppositio. Creatura autem in nullo potest aequari Deo nec in duratione nec in perfectione nec extensione, non solum in non esse Deum, sed etiam in non esse maximum quod Deus63 potest, ut dictum est in quaestione 42.m

49 50 51 52 1 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 m

ultra nihil] nihil ultra J. possit] posset K T. potestl potuisset T. produxisse] se add. K. Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol!. 180va-182vb. a te] om. J. vel non] necne F. catholice] loquendo add. F. extra] sic add. (underlined) K. intelligens] intellectus J T. volens] voluntas J T. probatur] patet T. opinionis] viae T. negatur] negetur F. probationem] quod add. F. Deus] om. J. Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum (ed. cit), Lib. 1 q. 42 a. 3, fol!. 180va-182vb.

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Ad secundam conceditur maior quod64 in libere productis productum est necessario omni modo65 finitum duratione a parte ante, perfectione et [F fol. 207va] virtute. Tu dicis, quod hoc non oportet ubi producens est aeternum vel infinitum quod deliberatione non indiget; eodem modo dicere passes quod ad producendum maximum effectum quem posset66 producere67 se extendere posset,68 quod in dicta quaestione est improb!ltum. rnco itrrquD, quoà contr!l n!ltul'!lm !lg1Jntü1 intinih m!t ~Pôdu~~M maximum sive in duratione sive in extensione sive69 in potentia sic, quod maius70 illo producere nunquam potuisset. Et imaginatio tua hic non valet, quia tu supponis quod sicut Deus potest71 producere sibi coaevum a parte post, quod ita potuit producere sibi coaevum a parte72 ante. Et non est simile, quia quod est coaevum a parte post, est sibi coaevum ex gratia73 sic quod potest ipsum non conservare et aliud eo diutius. Quod autem esset coaevum sibi a parte ante, esset sibi sic coaevum quod ipso74 nihil prius producere potuisset. Ad tertiam conceditur75 maior, et negetur76 minor. Et ad probationem dicitur, quod ignis non potest esse aeternus nec aliquid77 sibi coaeternum. Sed ad beatum Augustinum dicitur, quod voluit declarare78 quod rationabiliter Filius est coaeternus Patri, quia Pater eum producit naturaliter, sicut79 ignis calefacit. Modo, si per impossibile esset ignis coaeternus80 et esset lucidus, si esset medium susceptibile, splendor eius esset [K fol. 18v] aeternus eo, quod naturaliter produceret [J fol. 366b] sibi81 splendorem. Et ideo82 non posset83 poni differentia inter durationem ignis et splendoris. 64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83

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quod) om. T. omni modo] omnino J. posset) possit J. posset producere) producere posset K. posset) possit J. sive] etiam add. K F. maius] magis J K. Deus potest] potest Deus K. parte) post quod ita (. .. ) coaevum a parte om. K. coaevum ex gratia) ex gratia coaevum K. ipso] ipse J T; ipsum F. conceditur) concedetur K. negetur] negatur K. aliquid) aliquid vel aliud K. declarare) declamare K. sicut) sic K. coaetemus) aetemusJ. produceret sibi] sibi produceret J. ideo] om. K. posset] possit J.

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Et ita Pater ad intra coaeterne generat sibi84 Filium, quia naturaliter sicut ignis calefacit, ita Pater generat Filium. Secus est de productis ad extra quae generantur libere, ubi necessario praecedit85 producens productum eo, quod aliud86 potuit87 ante velle producere, et quia voluntas88 immense prior est eo. Item, quia necessario eius esse esset89 in tempore possibili vel imaginario, cum mutabilis sit, quod aeternitati convenire non posset.90 Ad quartam, quod humanus intellectus saltem in ista vita aeternitatem positive91 non potest intelligere eo, quod est infinita. Infinitum autem secundum quod92 infinitum est ignotum, ut habetur primo Physicorum.n Sed negative apprehendit eam, ut Deum fuisse sine93 initio.94 Sic intellexerunt Philosophus,95 Commentator,96 Avicenna0 , 97 quod mundus esset aeternus et non habuisset initium. Secundo, cum dicitur quod etiam sic potest intelligere de creatura, dicitur quod hoc est, quia apprehendit Deum naturaliter agere, qualiter tamen agere non potest ad extra. Et in hoc deficit argumentum. Tertio dicitur, quod creaturam esse coaeternam Deo intellectus hominis non potest intelligere plus quam equum esse bovem,98 quamquam conceptus equi99 et bovis affirmative possunt combinari100 dicendo 'Equus101 est bos'. [F fol. 207vb] Et ideo sicut non potest Deus facere quod102 equus103 sit bos, nisi forte assumendo utramque naturam secundum unam opinionem, ita non potest facere creaturam 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 n 93 94 95 96 o

97 98 99 100 101 102 103

generat sibi] sibi generat J; sibi om. F. praecedit] procedit F. aliud] eo quod aliud add. T. potuit ed.] ponit J KT F. voluntas] voluntatis J K. esset] om. J T; est F. posset] possit K. positive] saltem add. J. quod] est add. J. Cf. Aristotle, Physica, Lib. I, c. 4, 187b7-8. sine] sup. lin. J. initio] sui esse add. F. Philosophus] philosophi KF. Commentator] et add. J. Cf. J. Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 156 (202) (= Aristotle); Averroes, ubi? and Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina (ed. cit.), Tract. IX, c. 1, p. 446. Avicenna] Aristoteles add. K F. equum esse bovem] hominem esse asinum J T. equi] hominis F. possunt combinari] potest combinare F. equus] homo F. quod] ut F. equus] homo F.

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sibi coaeternam. Nec104 beatus Augustinus voluit quod Deus omnia illa potest quae105 homo false potest combinare, ut naturam humanam esse naturam divinam, vel independentem. Quarto, quod philosophi erraverunt credentes Deum naturaliter agere ad extra. Et ideo posuerunt sibi rem dependentem coaeternam et maximam 106 in perfectione quam possit facere. Et sicut unum est impossibile ita et aliud. Sed in rei veritate, sicut unum non est possibile ut quod faciat unum tam perfectum quod perfectius facere non possit, ita et aliud107 ut quod potueritl08 sic aliquidl09 facere quod prius istol 10 facere nunquam 111 potuerit.112 Quod autem beatus Augustinus dicit quod Deus aliqua potest quae nos intelligere non valemus, hoc est verum ut quod Deus est homo vel quod natura humana divinae est unita in unitate113 suppositi, quod sufficit. Hoc tamen est114 respectu possibilium simpliciter, sed quod coaeterna sit producta res Deo vel aequalis suae producibilitati in virtute, magnitudine vel duratione est simpliciter impossibile. Et ergo hoc Deus non potest. Hoc de quarto et de toto.115

104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111

112 113 114 115

142

nec] haec F.

quae] quae add. K. maximam] maxime J K T. aliud] sed in rei (... ) ita et aliud om. K. potuerit] potuit T. aliquid] autem K. isto] ista K. nunquam] non J. nunquam potuerit] non potuit T. unitate] unione T; unitatem F. est] om. T. toto] secundo articulo add. K F.

ON THE NOTION OF CONSTRUCTIO IN CONCEPTUALIST GRAMMAR: Quaestio XXXV of the Doctrinale-Commentary Preserved in Erfurt, Amplon. Q 70A and Attributed to a Master Marcilius

C. H. KNEEPKENS

1. Conceptualist Grammar: an Introduction "Der Grammatiker beschaftigt sich nur mit dem Lautsubstrat, das in den verschiedenen Sprachen verschieden ist. Deshalb gibt es keine universelle Grammatik, sondern nur die partikularen Grammatiken der Einzelsprachen". Thus Jan Pinborg recapitulated an important conclusion drawn by Aurifaber1 in his attack on the linguistic tenets of the modistic grammarians at Erfurt in 1333. In the anti-modistic view, the general aspects of language, the so-called communia omni lingue, are outside the grammarian's domain. Unlike their predecessors, the modistae, the anti-modistic scholars of the first part of the 14th century considered the study of these universals to be part of the logician's province. The reason for this is obvious. In their view, language universals do not primarily belong to the level of spoken or written language, but to the mental level only: the language of concepts was the universal language. Consequently, they claimed that only a grammar of concepts could be a speculative scientia, since unlike spoken language, concepts are universal and the same for all men. Dealing with concepts, however, was not grammar, but logic. Joined together (to produce propositions), these concepts can build only true or false mental propositions, and the judgment of truth and falsity was the logician's 1 See J. Pinborg, Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter (Münster-Kopenhagen 1967), 181 and 158. For a recent discussion of Aurifaber's position in the early fourteenth-century philosophical movements see S. Lorenz, Studium generale Erfordense. Zum Erfurter Schulleben im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart 1989), 224-39.

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domain. On the other hand, they assigned the study of the grammars of the individual languages, in which congruency was at the centre, to the grammarian. These particular grammars were dealing with language phenomena which differ according to the respective languages, which were not the same for all people. Consequently, grammar was a scientia practica. The history of anti-modistic grammatical thought in the early fourteenth century is a relatively unexplored area. As Pinborg pointed out in his pioneering study mentioned above, it flourished in nominalist circles, and not without reason modern scholarship has identified (late 14th-c.) anti-modistic thought with nominalism.2 Sorne ten years before Aurifaber, William of Ockham maintained a similar position about the scientific status of grammar. This resulted in the rejection of an absolute parallelism between the structures of mental and spoken language especially as regards his doctrine of the secondary linguistic categories. Although in both mental and spoken language we are confronted with secondary linguistic categories, (accidentia), according to Ockham this does not imply that they completely coincide. There are only two accidentia of the noun which he accepts as occurring in both mental and spoken language, viz. number and case, which both have an overtly significative function. For instance, the mental predicate "animalia", Ockham argued, differs from the mental predicate "animal" in the same way as the vocal predicate "animalia" differs from the vocal predicate "animal". In other words, the mental propositions "homo est animal" and "homo est animalia" are two different propositions, one of which can be true and the other false.3 According to Ockham the situation of the "purely" grammatical, i.e. non-significati ve, accidentia as gender and figura is entirely different. The proposition "vir est alba" is grammatically incongruous, but this is a problem which only exists on the spoken level; on the mental level this incongruency disappears. This means that the grammatical accidens 'gender' is not a secondary semantic category as for instance number, case and mood are. Consequently, gender only functions on the spoken level of language. It is but a general tool to (better) express and

2

J. Pinborg, Die Entwicklung, 182, even wrote: "Diese Sprachauffassung ist nur im

nominalistischen Kontext moglich". See also M. A. Covington, Grammatical Theory in the Middle Ages, in: Th. Bynon and F. R. Palmer (eds.), Studies in the History of Western Linguistics in Honour of R. H. Robins (Cambridge 1986), 34-35. 3 The importance of this position is immediately clear, when we consider the propositions "Pater est deus" and "Pater et Filius sunt deus" or "dei".

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communicate the propositions of mental language in Latin. 4 In Ockham's opinion grammar deals with those properties of the voces which are the causes of congruency and incongruency.s The absolute predominancy now attributed to mental language in which the universal aspects of language are stored, excludes discussions about congruency from speculative language science. For the mental "utterance": (x) Socrates est homines is not so much incongruous as false, unlike: (x) Socrates est alba which is true, but "by accident" incongruous, viz. when expressed in Latin.6 Thus we see that in the early fourteenth century the object of grammar, viz. linguistic congruency, is transferred exclusively to the level of "ad placitum" utterances, and that grammar is deprived of its speculative nature, and so reduced to the status of a "scientia practica". It is a dialectician who occupies himself with the sermo mentalis which is only interesting for him in so far as it is true or false. This mental sermo is the "same" for all people (idem apud omnes) and in consequence the only subject of speculative grammar, but falls outside the jurisdiction of the grammarian. This situation, i.e. the relegation of grammar to the status of practical science, must gradually have altered during the fourteenth century. ln the Conceptus, one of his earlier works, (written about 13727), Pierre d'Ailly (1352-1420) discussed mental language and openly argued (ch. 39) that the

4 Ockham, Summa logicae, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gal, S. Brown (St. Bonaventure 1974), I, 3 [p. 12, 44-6]: "Accidentia autem propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis sunt genus et figura. Talia enim accidentia nominibus propter necessitatem significationis non conveniunt." 5 Ockham, Expositio in librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis, ed. G. Gal (St. Bonaventure 1978), prooem. [p. 136, 23-7]: "nam in grammatica determinatur de vocibus proprietates ex institutione eis convenientes determinando, congruitatem vel incongruitatem in oratione causantes vocibus attribuendo, videlicet quae vox est nomen, quae verbum, cuius generis, cuius casus, et sic de multis aliis." 6 In these fourteenth-century discussions the emphasis is put on the difference between the mental [i.e. universall and spoken [and by definition "accidentai"] "utterances". In the late twelfth century, however, it was stressed that it was the mie of the concordance of gender, and not so much the judgement whether or not the spoken sequence [alba] had to be used, which belonged to the domain of grammar as a "universal" science. 7 Cf. P. V. Spade, Peter of Ailly: Concepts and Insolubles. An Annotated Translation (Dordrecht 1980), 1.

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two central syntactic notions, 'regimen' and 'constructio', by nature "pertain to mental terms". 8 The same holds true for the semantico-syntactic notion of 'exigence' (exigentia). It is important to stress that here we are not dealing with features which exclusively belong to the particular languages, but instead with general structures and rules, a daim which incidentally was also made by the grammarians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries for spoken language. But unlike the modistic grammarians the conceptualist linguists did not consider central notions such as 'constructio', 'congruitas', and 'perfectio', as passiones which could be conceived of as separate from the words themselves. These are not, they argued, based on modi significandi activi as their "causa efficiens". Their only cause is "nature". Just like a man generates a man, and a lion a lion, by its very nature the mental verb / concept 'videre' requires the mental nominative / concept 'Socrates' and the mental accusative / concept 'Platonem' to express that Socrates sees Plato.9 Thus the central notions 'regimen' and 'constructio' continue to adjust the basic relationships of the terms of a sentence, although now it is a mental sentence, but this happens not because of modi significandi, but by nature. This adjustment is principally detached from truth and falsity; it intends to generate a "well-formed" (congruous) mental "utterance". How important the notion of congruency had become for mental language, may be derived from the fact that any judgment about truth and falsity was taken to presuppose congruency. In other words: an utterance, be it in spoken or mental language, cannot be true or false, if it is not congruous. How this new approach works at the mental level, can be illustrated as follows: The mental string: {nominative (nominal) concept of Sortes} {singular third persan indicative present tense active concept of seeing} {accusative (nominal) concept of Pla to }l o

8 Cf. Spade's transi. ad loc. Cf. also W. Hübener, "Oratio mentalis" und "oratio vocalis" in der Philosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts, in: J. P. Beckmann et al. (eds.), Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13 (Berlin 1981), 492. 9 Cf. Pierre d'Ailly, Destructiones modorum significandi, Conceptus, ed. L. Kaczmarek (Halle Westf. 1983), 45. 10 It must be stressed that this concept of an adjectival verb is in itself a "complex concept"; cf. Pierre d'Ailly, Conceptus, cap. 72. For the logical counterpart of this type of analysis, see S. Ebbesen, The Summulae, Tractatus VII De Fallaciis, in: J. Pinborg (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the 3rd European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Sernantics, Copenhagen 16-21November1975 (Copenhagen 1976), 150.

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represents the "congruent mental sentence (oratio)": {Socrates sees Plata), regardless of its representation at the spoken level. However, when we take the following string of concepts: {accusative (nominal) concept of Sortes} {singular third persan indicative present tense active concept of seeing} or: {plural second persan subjunctive pluperfect tense passive concept of hearing) {singular third persan indicative present tense active concept of seeing}, we are confronted with "incongruous mental sentences" on which the notions of truth and falsity have no bearing. In bath the incongruous mental sentences the elementary rules of linguistic government are violated. So congruency precedes truth and falsity in mental language, too. We find this opinion clearly expressed in Pierre d'Ailly's Destructiones:ll "in orationibus mentalibus est congruitas et incongruitas . ... Omne verum vel falsum est congruum. Omnis propositio mentalis indicativi modi non interrogativa est vera vel falsa. Ergo propositio mentalis indicativi modi non interrogativa est congrua." D'Ailly based himself on Aristotle's De interpretatione, in which treatise he said to have found "quod verum et falsum presupponunt congruum".12 For the conceptualist linguists, mental language completely dominates spoken language. The latter is ad placitum, the result being that the vocal string:

11 Traditionally attributed to Pierre d'Ailly; see however S. Lorenz, Studium generale Erfordense, 230 sqq., who daims the authorship of this treatise for Thomas Manlefeldt. 12 Ed. Kaczmarek, p. 38, III (Via verior), concl. 1. We find the same view expressed by Eberhard Knaab von Zwiefalten (1458) in his Tractatus contra modos significandi: "[Pal. lat. 1589, f. 207v] Prima in orationibus mentalibus est congruitas et incongruitas. Probatur sic: quia in quibuscumque est ueritas aut falsitas, in illis est congruitas uel incongruitas. Si in orationibus mentalibus est ueritas aut falsitas ... cum oratio sit indicatiui modi non interrogatiua, in eis est congruitas et incongruitas. Maior nota quia uerum et falsum presupponunt congruum. Videtur primo Perihermeias ubi dicitur: cum dico 'Cathonis est' uel 'non est' nondum uerum uel falsum est. Etiam ex sexto Metaphisice: uerum et falsum sunt in anima. Igitur minor erit uera." For the relationship between Pierre d'Ailly's Destructiones and Knaab's treatise, see J. Pinborg, Die Entwicklung, 207 (see also below, p. 155).

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(x) /Sortem currit/ can be absolutely congruous, if the speaker and the hearer agree that /Sortem/ indicates the nominative (nominal) concept of Sortes. ln d'Ailly's Destructione s we find as the sixth conclusion of the "via verior" that congruitas, constructio and regimen all three belong more intrinsically to the mental than to the spoken and written sentence. However, this does not imply that from an ontological point of view the congruitas of a sentence has its own status. D'Ailly explicitly argues that it is the same as the oratio congrua.13 Thus in the linguistic universe of these scholars the modi significandi did not exist as "conceptual" entities, neither did the passiones of the sentences like constructio, congruitas and perfectio as the modistae had accepted. From a linguistic point of view we may conclude that the conceptualis ts had a very simplified "linguistic" ontology, which showed an apparent corresponde nce with their view on reality. They accepted only the existence of individuals or entities composed of individuals , and not the existence of abstract entities. So the only inhabitants of their linguistic world were words (= concepts) and combination s of words (= combination s of concepts), and not properties and passiones in addition.

2. The Commentar y on the Doctrinale Preserved in MS Erfurt, Ampl. Q. 70A 2.1 Introductory remarks The doctrinal tenets which we find in Pierre d'Ailly's writings, are the theoretical framework of a commentary on the second part of Alexander de Villa Dei's Doctrinale, which has been preserved in the folios 95 - 173 of the manuscript Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 70A. The commentar y consists of thirty eight quaestiones: the first one of which is devoted to general epistemolog ical issues, the next thirty three deal with regimen, the subject of the first part of Alexander's secunda pars, whereas the last four discuss construction al topics, the second and last part of the pars secunda of the Doctrinale.

13 Destructiones, ed. Kaczmarek, p. 70, 1476: "Nam congruitas orationis non est aliud quam oratio congrua".

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In the manuscript the commentary is attributed to a certain magister Marcilius, whose name was deleted and replaced with the name of Symon. As I have discussed elsewhere,14 Simon Dacus, the modistic author of the Domus gramatice cannot be considered a serious candidate for the authorship of this nominalistically orientated grammatical work. The same holds true for another grammarian, called Simon, who in the modistic tradition wrote the commentary on Priscian, preserved in the MS Erfurt, Amplon. O. 10.1s Although at present there is no conclusive evidence that the master Marcilius should be identified with Marsilius of Inghen, so far Inghen's candidacy has not raised any serious objections on the basis of either doctrinal or chronological arguments. References to a pope at Avignon, named Clemens, and several towns of the northern Netherlands in combination with codicological evidence and the epistemological and linguistic positions held by the author show that the commentary must have been composed in the third quarter of the fourteenth century by an author coming from the northern parts of the Law Countries, who was an adherent of the scientific terminism of Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen.16

2.2 The Doctrinale-Commentary and Conceptualist Grammar First, we have to bear in mind that according to the author of the Doctrinale-commentary grammar is a scientia speculativa, at least that grammar which deals with the concepts, i.e. mental language: "et illa

scientia finaliter sciscetur in speculari" .17 Like Pierre d'Ailly, the author refuses to accept the status of an independent concept for the grammatical notions. From an ontological point of view, there is no difference between 'regimen' and the 'dictio recta /

regens': "Regimen gramaticale non est quid distinctum a dictione regente et recta".1 8 For if there were an ontological distinction, we would consequently fall into a sort of "Third Man" trap and would have to accepta 14 Cf. C. H. Kneepkens, Erfurt, Ampl. Q. 70A: A Quaestiones-commenta ry on the Second Part of Alexander de Villa Dei's Doctrinale by Marsilius of Inghen ? An Explorative Note on Specimen of Conceptualist Grammar, Vivarium 28 (1990), 26-54. 15 At least if both texts have not been written by the same author. In my view, the evidence for the identity of the authors of these texts is meagre. 16 Cf. C. H. Kneepkens, Erfurt, Ampl. Q. 70A. 17 Kneepkens, Erfurt, Ampl. Q. 70A, 54. 18 Kneepkens, Erfurt, Ampl. Q. 70A, 51.

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third conceptus in addition to the mental dictio regens and the mental dictio recta. For it is argued that every concept must be a pars orationis: Quaest. 1, art. 3 [f. 96vb; C. H. Kneepkens, Erfurt, Ampl. Q. 70A, 51] "non est possibile aliquem esse conceptum in anima, quin ille sit alicuius partis orationis. Et loquor de conceptu simplici. Patet quia alias oporteret ponere plures partes orationis quam octo", and therefore this third concept must also be a part of mental speech. This would imply that we could not be dealing with a combination of two, but of three partes orationis! However, between the first two of them there exists government : so there is another concept, which in its turn must be combined, and so on: Quaest. I, art. 3 [f. 96vb-7ra; Kneepkens, ibid., 52] "Confirmatu r tercio quia ex quo per aduersarium : "Regimen gramaticale est distinctum a dictione regente et recta", queritur de secundo distincto utrum ipsum unitur alii [alio MS] constructibi li uel non, non potest dici quod non, eoquod in oratione ponitur cum alio constructibi li uel cum aliis. Ergo oportet quod sic. Tune arguitur ultra: Vel ergo ipsum unitur aliis constructibi libus per se uel per aliud. Si per se, eadem ratione dicendum est de primo [se. distincto], scilicet quod unum constructibi le per se unitur alteri. Si per aliud, tune regimen esset istorum. Queritur de isto alio utrum ipsum unitur aliis constructibilibus per se uel per aliud. Et ita fieret processus in infinitum, qui prohibet per Aristotilem in multis lacis". ln the same way the other key notion of syntax, viz. 'constructio ', is defined as the dictiones adinuicem constructae. The construction of a constructibile is in fact, that constructib ile construed with another constructibi le by the intellect: Quaest. I, art. 1 [f. 95vb; Kneepkens, ibid., 47] "in proposito capietur constructio pro dictionibus adinuicem constructis ad causandum sensum orationis ita quod oratio constructibi lium est constructibi lia constructa et constructio constructibi lis est constructibi le constructum cum alio per intellectum. "

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The notion of 'regimen' is introduced, as soon as there is mention of "congruously conceiving" (congrue concipere). For we form only the concept of a governing word, when we conceive of a sentence of an intelligible meaning, in which one concept is the instrument by which the intellect if it wants to conceive in a congruous way, is compelled to form another concept in a certain case. This implies that the grammatical construction precedes the grammatical government. From a grammatical point of view constructio is primary and regimen depends on it. There can be no regimen without constructio. Quaest. II, art. 2 [f. 98va] "Quarto est notandum quod non quandoque concipimus oracionem sub racione qua ipsa est intelligibilis sensus, formamus conceptum regentis. Sed magis descendendo quando concipimus oracionem esse intelligibilis sensus ubi unus conceptus est instrumentum quo intellectus, si congrue uelit concipere, artatur ad formandum alium conceptum sub certo casu, tune formamus conceptum regentis cum ceteris condicionibus postea addendis. Ex quo sequitur corrolarie quod iste terminus 'constructio gramaticalis' est superior ad istum terminum 'regimen gramaticale' eoquod ubique est regimen gramaticale, ibi est constructio gramaticalis, sed non econuerso." A similar hierarchy is found in the notions 'exigere' and 'regere'. 'Regimen' is defined as a qualified 'exigentia'. This view at the same time underlines the semantic foundation on which also this approach to syntax is based: Quaest. II, art. 2 [f. 99ra] "Septimo et ultimo est notandum quod regere gramaticale itaque est describi: Regere gramaticale est unam diccionem aliam instrumentaliter exigere ad standum in debito casu non ut eodem sui, si ex ipsa diccione regente et recta debeat fieri oratio congrua. In ista diffinicione ponitur19 'exigere' loco generis. Vnde li exigere est per se superius ad ly regere sicut patebit in tercio articulo. Additur notanter "instrumentaliter", quia intellectus et Deus principaliter exigunt diccionem stare in tali uel in tali casu. Sed una diccio mentalis est instrumentum mediante quo intellectus artatur ad

19 bis pas. MS.

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