Logica, or Summa Lamberti [1 ed.] 0268035350, 9780268035358

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Logica, or Summa Lamberti

Logica, or

Summa Lamberti

LAMBERT OF AUXERRE Translated with Notes and Introduction by

T HOM A S S . M A L ON E Y

University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana

Copyright © 2015 by the University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 undpress.nd.edu All Rights Reserved Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lambert, of Auxerre, active 1250. [Logica (Summa Lamberti). English] Logica, or Summa Lamberti / Lambert of Auxerre ; Translated with Notes and Introduction by Thomas S. Maloney. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-268-03535-8 (paperback) — ISBN 0-268-03535-0 (paper) — ISBN 978-0-268-08699-2 (e-book) 1. Logic—Early works to 1800.  I. Maloney, Thomas S., editor, translator.  II. Title.  III. Title: Summa Lamberti. BC78.L3L3613­  2015 160—dc23 2015000671

∞ The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and ­durability of the ­Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

The use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs is. —Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts

Contents

Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations Introduction

xi xiii xv

T R A N S L AT I O N O F L O G I C A , O R S U M M A L A M B E R T I

Chapter One.  PROPOSITIONS Preliminary Remarks Sound Words Names Verbs Expressions Propositions Categorical Propositions Hypothetical Propositions Categorical Propositions, continued Conversion Equipollency Modal Propositions

3 3 6 8 11 12 13 14 15 18 20 23 29 32

viii

Contents

Chapter Two.  PREDICABLES

59

Genus Species Differentiae Proprium Accident

61 65 66 72 74

Chapter Three.  CATEGORIES

77

Preliminary Remarks Substance Quantity Relation Quality Action Passion When Where Position Possession

77 83 88 93 98 109 111 112 113 114 115

Chapter Four.  REMARKS AFTER THE CATEGORIES

117

Comment on the Chapter Title Four Kinds of Opposition Priority Concomitance Change Possession

117 118 122 123 123 124

Chapter Five.  SYLLOGISM

125

Argument and Argumentation Four Species of Argumentation Syllogism in Detail Material and Formal Principles of Syllogisms Perfect and Imperfect Syllogisms To-Be-Said-of-All and To-Be-Said-of-None Quality and Quantity of Syllogisms Figures of a Syllogism

125 131 135 135 136 137 137 139

Contents ix

Chapter Six.  TOPICS

147

Definition of ‘Topic’ Maxims and Differentiae of Maxims Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Intermediate Topics Intrinsic Topics from Substance The Topic from Definition The Topic from Description The Topic from the Explanation of a Name Intrinsic Topics from Concomitants of Substance The Topic from a Whole The Topic from a Part Additional Topics from a Whole The Topics from Cause and Effect The Topics from Generation and What Is Generated The Topics from Destruction and What Is Destroyed The Topic from Uses The Topic from Associated Accidents Extrinsic Topics The Topic from Authority The Topics from a Greater and a Lesser The Topic from a Similar The Topic from Proportion The Topic from Opposites The Topic from Disparates The Topic from Transumption Intermediate Topics The Topic from Conjugates The Topic from Cases The Topic from Division

147 148 149 150 150 152 152 153 153 155 157 160 162 162 162 163 163 163 164 164 165 165 168 168 168 169 169 170

Chapter Seven.  SOPHISTICAL TOPICS

173

Dialectical and Sophistical Syllogisms Dialectical and Sophistical Disputations Goals of Disputation Fallacies Preliminary Remarks The Fallacy of Equivocation The Fallacy of Amphiboly The Fallacies of Composition and Division

173 175 176 179 179 181 187 191

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Contents



The Fallacy of Composition The Fallacy of Division The Fallacy of Accent The Fallacy of the Figure of a Word The Fallacy of Accident The Fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely The Fallacy of Ignorance Regarding Refutation The Fallacy of Begging the Original Issue The Fallacy of Consequent The Fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause The Fallacy of Treating More than One Question as One

194 200 204 208 214 225 231 236 241 246 249

Chapter Eight.  PROPERTIES OF TERMS

253

Signification Supposition Copulation Kinds of Suppositions Appellation Ampliation Distribution Relation

253 255 256 258 261 281 282 289

Appendix A. Corrections to Latin Text Appendix B. Questions and Objections

303 314

Notes Bibliography Index of Names General Index

323 416 432 437

Acknowledgments

I

wish to thank several very busy people who graciously responded to my requests for assistance in understanding this text and situating it among its contemporaries. They are, in alphabetical order, Jeremiah Hackett, Mariam Michèle Mulchahey, Alan Perreiah, Wendy Pfeffer, Paul Spade, Eleonore Stump, Paul Thom, and Simon Tugwell. I am also deeply appreciative of the labors of my student assistants, Tyler Self and Jeremiah Cunningham, and my brother and sisters, John and Martha Maloney and Mary Zena, for their painstaking proofreading. Finally, I am indebted to the staff at the University of Notre Dame Press for their painstaking attention to the production of this book. What would scholarship today look like were it not for talent like theirs at the presses?

xi

Abbreviations

Works Frequently Cited AL

Barnes

CHLMP

CTMPT

Aristoteles Latinus. Edited by G. Verbeke. Leiden: E. J. Brill; Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1957–. Vol. 1, pts. 6 and 7. Categoriarum Supplementa: Porphyrii Isagoge. Translated by Boethius. Anonymi Fragmentum, vulgo vocatum, Liber sex principiorum. Edited by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello with Bernard C. Dod. 1966. Vol. 5, pts. 1–3. Topica. Translated by Boethius, Fragment of a ­Second Rescension, and Translated by Anonymous. Edited by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod. 1969. Vol. 6, pts. 1–3. De sophisticis elenchis. Translated by Boethius. Fragment of a Translation by James of Venice and a Rescension by William of Moerbeke. Edited by Bernard G. Dod. 1975. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. ­Edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Bollingen Series, vol. 71, pt. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600. Edited by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. Vol. 1: Logic and the Philosophy of Language. Edited [and translated] by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. xiii

xiv GL

Abbreviations

Grammatici Latini. Edited by Heinrich Keil. 8 vols. Vols. 2–3, P ­ riscian. Institutiones grammaticae. 2 vols. Edited by Martin Hertz; Vol. 4, ­Donatus. De arte grammatica libri. Edited by Martin Hertz. Leipzig, 1855–80; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1961. GRP Greek & Roman Philosophy. Edited by Leonardo Tarán. 52 vols. Vol. 5, pt. 2, Commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione: Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Commentarii in librum Peri hermeneias. Vol. 1, Pars Prior; vol. 2, Pars Posterior. Edited by Karl Meiser. Reprint, New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1987. Introductiones William of Sherwood. Introductiones in logicam. Edited and translated (German) by Hartmut Brands and Christoph Kann. Philosophische Bibliotek, vol. 469. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995. Translated (English) by Norman Kretzmann. William of Sherwood’s Introduction to Logic. [Based on Grabmann’s emended text.] Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1966. Libera, Alain de. “Le traité De appellatione de Lambert de Lagny “Le traité” (Lambert d’Auxerre).” Archives d’Histoire Doctinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 48 (1981): 227–85. Logica Lamberto D’Auxerre. Logica (Summa Lamberti). Edited by Franco Alessio. Pubblicazioni della facoltá di lettere di filosofia dell’universitá di Milano, vol. 59. Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971. LM Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic. 2 vols. Vol. 1, On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallacy. Vol. 2, pt. 1, The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition. Vol. 2, pt. 2, The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition: Texts and Indices. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962 and 1967. Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. Series PL Latina. Paris, 1844–[82]. Bacon, Roger. Summulae dialectices. Edited by Alain de Libera. “Les Sd Summulae dialectices de Roger Bacon: Parts 1–2, De termino, De enuntiatione, Part 3, De argumentatione. Archives d’Histoire Doctinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 53 (1986): 139–289; 54 (1987): 171–278. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1987, 1988, respectively. Translated by Thomas S. Maloney. The Art and Science of Logic: A Trans­ lation of the “Summulae dialectices” with Introduction and Notes. Medieval Sources in Translation, vol. 47. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2009. Stump Stump, Eleonore, trans. Boethius’ De topicis differentiis. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978. Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis). Tractatus, Called Tractatus ­Afterwards Summule Logicales. Edited by Lambert Marie de Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972.

Introduction

I

n 1867 Carl Prantl called attention to the existence of what he identified as a summa on logic that has subsequently been found in fifteen manuscripts and attributed to a certain person by the name of Lambert.1 In 1910 Konstanty Michalski offered the opinion that Peter of Spain depended on Lambert when writing his Tractatus,2 but it was not until 1936 and 1937 that we hear anything more about this work, and then we are given only very brief references by, respectively, Martin Grabmann (Lambert depends on Peter) and Berhard Geyer.3 In 1969 L. M. de Rijk published a note on the date of Lambert’s Summa.4 One looks in vain for any additional comment on, or systematic analysis of, this Summa until 1971, when de Rijk included reference to part of it in his study of the notion of natural supposition in medieval logic.5 In that same year Franco Alessio edited the Latin text on which the translation here presented is based.6 In 1972 de Rijk published a new Latin edition of Peter of Spain’s Tractatus and paused in his introduction to comment on the relation of Lambert’s Summa to Peter’s Tractatus (none) and proposed a possible date for the Summa.7 In 1977 H. A. G. Braakhuis published a study of semantic issues in William of Sherwood’s Introductiones in logicam and offered what he calls a digression on the views of Lambert to point to a distinction Lambert makes apropos of the notion of supposition.8 In 1981 Alain de Libera presented a new (and first critical) edition of that part of Lambert’s Summa called “De appellatione.”9 In 1985 Georgette Sinkler wrote a comparative study of Roger Bacon and Lambert in which she points to the role in their works of determinatio in the ambiguity that gives rise to the fallacies of Composition and Division.10 Finally, in 1990, de Libera presented a comparison of Bacon and Lambert on the theory of determinatio itself.11 What this brief overview shows is that although Lambert’s work has been known to exist since 1867, it has only been in the past forty years or so that scholars have given it any serious attention. xv

xvi

Introduction

AUTHOR, DESIGNEE, DATE, AND PLACE OF COMPOSITION

Who was the author of the text presented here in translation, and when, where, and for whom and what purpose was it written?12 Alessio, de Rijk, and de Libera have attempted in recent years to answer at least some of these questions, and while there is some agreement among them, there is also substantial disagreement on certain fundamental issues. We need to look at each of their portraits as they paint them. Franco Alessio

Alessio’s view of Lambert’s life is as follows.13 The author of the Summa was a certain Lambert, born in Ligny-le-Châtel, educated within Parisian intellectual circles, and a master of arts at the cathedral school of Auxerre where he was also a canon. When the Dominicans opened a convent there in 1241 (and shortly thereafter a schola) Lambert did what numerous others were doing and joined this young community, sometime in the 1240s, thereby becoming one of the earliest members of that convent.14 And since the Dominicans were under a 1236 directive of the order to educate their novices, ­especially with respect to the new logic, he was given the task of teaching the arts. Between 1247 and 1256 he composed a summa on logic, which came to be known as the Summa Lamberti. Also during this period he became the teacher of Theobald, soon to become second king of Navarre and fifth count of Champagne, who ascended the throne of Navarre in 1253 and exercised his role as count of Champagne in 1256, after a three-year regency under his mother, Margaret of Bourbon. He publicly circulated at Paris the summa he had composed earlier, and it became utilized thereafter principally within the Dominican community. Possibly he preached a sermon in the cemetery of the church of Vitry in the presence of King Louis IX between 1254 and 1267; possibly he was an apostolic doorkeeper (hostiarius apostolicus); and he became a papal penitentiary sometime after the circulation of his Summa. He died and was buried in the Dominican convent of St. James in Paris. But on what is this view based? That the author of the summa is called “Lambert” is attested in four of the twelve known codices containing it and described by ­Alessio— those designated by him as C, K, I, and P—and there is subsequent attribution by chroniclers and historians.15 That this master was born in Ligney-le-Châtel is based on the attestation in the explicit of MS Troyes 2402, which reads: “Here end the summulae of master Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel.”16 This codex (T) and those Alessio names C and K also identify the author as a master.17 Was Lambert educated at Paris? Alessio does not address this question directly but does provide a lengthy discussion of the relation of Lambert’s Summa to Peter of Spain’s

Introduction xvii

Tractatus (none) and concludes that both rely on an (unnamed) common source, which, given the context of the remarks, leaves no doubt that he takes it to be Parisian.18 A fair reading of Alessio would be that he takes Lambert to have been educated within a Parisian influence but not necessarily at Paris.19 Alessio’s belief that Lambert was a canon of the cathedral in Auxerre and taught in its school before joining the order relies on the nineteenth-century historian MarieDominique Chapotin, who makes this assertion in his 1898 Histoire des dominicains ­de la province de France.20 Chapotin couples Lambert’s name with that of William of Noë and later quotes the (fifteenth-century) Liber de illustribus, which in turn identifies William as a (wealthy) canon of Auxerre whose entrance into the order there “at the time of the inception of the community” (in principio institutionis ordinis) rescued the brothers from their financial plight.21 This information about William of Noë, he tells us, he got from Gérard de Frachet’s (thirteenth-century) Vitae Fratrum and then says that Frachet uses the very same words as the Liber de illustribus.22 Whether other historians, like Lawrence Pignon (1430s), Giles Sutor (d. 1494), Daniel George Viole (1600s), Jacques Echard (1719), and/or the Abbé Lebeuf (1743) identify Lambert as a canon at Auxerre, Alessio does not say, although he refers to them frequently.23 Perhaps one of the most crucial claims Alessio needs to warrant, however, is that Lambert joined the Dominican Order at Auxerre during the 1240s, that is, shortly after the Dominicans opened a convent there. For this he quotes Viole, the sixteenth-­century author of a history of the churches in Auxerre, no doubt because Alessio takes the latter to have had direct access to the monumenta of the convent of Auxerre and the Liber de illustribus. Says Viole, “. . . it is necessary that Lambert the teacher has to be among the first Jacobins of the Convent of Auxerre.”24 This early transition from Canon Lambert to Friar Lambert is confirmed by Echard, who in 1719 also claims to have had access to Viole’s thirteenth-century sources and says that Lambert was “among the first and earliest members of his house, who then flourished in the thirteenth century, while the house was erected in 1240.”25 Lest one wonder at such rapid expansion of the Dominican presence and influence in France at this time, Alessio points out that the new Dominican foundations could only have come to be as a result of the largesse of what he calls the “potenti di alto prestigio,” people in high places.26 Thus he points to the association of Theobald, first king of Navarre and fourth count of Champagne and father of the student of Lambert, with the establishment of the Dominicans at Troyes in 1232; of Blanche of Castile, queen of France, with that of Chartres in 1231; of Countess Amitie of Joigny, direct descendant of Simon of Montforte, with that of Auxerre in the 1240s; and of Countess Matilde of Courtenay, who, he says, founded “a (new?)” Dominican schola at Auxerre in 1253. The name of Bernard of Sully, bishop of Auxerre, is also invoked in connection with support for the Dominican cause. Indeed, says Alessio, the very way in which cathedral schools were being forced to yield to the new schools of the orders was analogous to

xviii

Introduction

the way, a century and a half earlier, the monastic center of Saint-Germain at Auxerre was eclipsed by the cathedral school there. To summarize the last two points: Alessio’s claim that Lambert was a canon of the cathedral of Auxerre in the late 1230s and/or early 1240s is based on one 1898 source (Chapotin) who himself claims to have access to the fifteenth-century Liber de illustribus via Viole’s seventeenth-century Histoire des eglises d’Auxerre. That Lambert was one of the early members of the Dominican community in Auxerre is said to rest on three foundations. First and foremost there are the data to that effect in the thirteenthcentury monumenta of the convent in Auxerre as reported by Viole in the sixteenth century, Echard in the eighteenth century, and Chapotin in the nineteenth century. The second is the fact that these three historians are themselves convinced by the data in the monumenta. And the third is the rapid and manifest support the Dominicans gained in the region around Paris and the willingness of notable canons and academics to become friars. Alessio’s claim that Lambert began teaching the Dominican novices upon entering the order is based on the implications of what he takes to be a general directive of the Dominican Order in 1236 to instruct “the younger and teachable brothers in logic.”27 He sees confirmation of this movement toward the arts in a similar directive of 1250: “We mandate all Priors and Convents that, if they have any ones suitable, they are to insure that they are instructed in the arts in their convents.”28 And Alessio sees in the opening lines of Lambert’s Summa a reflection of the directives: “A knowledge of things to be said is very useful so that new students of the arts may know more fully what is taught in their summulae.”29 Alessio’s claim that Lambert became the teacher of young Theobald, second king of Navarre and fifth count of Champagne, moves the chronology ahead to the 1250s and is driven by wording in the explicit of the fourteenth-century Padua codex: “Here end the summule circulated in France by a Brother of the Order of Preachers who was called Lambert and afterwards was a penitentiary of our lord, the pope. But when he composed, he was the teacher of the king of Navarre. He was buried in the house of the Brothers of St. James.”30 As Alessio acknowledges, Geyer, while commenting on this explicit in his brief note in 1937, directs one to Theobald II as the person instructed by Lambert.31 The kings of Navarre for the first half of the thirteenth century were also the counts of Champagne: Theobald the Poet, first king of Navarre, fourth count of Champagne; Theobald, his son; and Henry III, his grandson. While Alessio does not spell out why he agrees with Geyer, the reasoning seems simple enough: on the assumption that one studies the arts when one is around fourteen to sixteen years old and on the assumption that Lambert had begun teaching as a Dominican sometime in the 1240s, Theobald the son was the only one of the three who was the appropriate age in the early 1250s. The father would have been fifteen in 1216; Theobald, in 1250; and Henry, in

Introduction xix

1264.32 Alessio points to three things that moved the father to call on Fra Lambert to become his son’s preceptor: Lambert’s fame as a teacher at Auxerre (he will later be called “magister ingeniosus” by his peers in the order); the general favor accorded this new order by the “potenti”; and the specific relationship Theobald I (the father) had with the Dominicans (having founded the Dominican house at Troyes).33 With this in mind Alessio points to the years from 1247 into the regency (1253–56) of his mother, Margaret of Bourbon, as those during which Lambert would have taken up the duty of being “teacher of the king of Navarre.”34 When, where, and for whom, according to Alessio, was the Summa composed? The answer to these questions is not entirely clear. His first pass at an answer comes in the context of his discussion of the foundation of the Dominican house at Auxerre, Lambert’s passage from canon to friar, and the Dominican directive to teach the arts and new logic to all those who were suitable. In that discussion Alessio says it was there in Auxerre that Lambert brought about the “elaborazione” of the Summa.35 So it would seem that he wants to say that it was composed for the Dominican novices in Auxerre and as a pedagogical tool in his role there as a teaching master of the arts. But later—in the context of discussing the significance of the claim in the explicit of the Padua codex that the Summa was written while Lambert was the teacher of the king of Navarre—he says that it was “begun and completed” in the period from 1247 up to, or into, the regency.36 Now that period, as was seen, is also when Lambert was Theobald’s teacher, and such a job would surely have taken Lambert away from Auxerre.37 This is possibly what prompts Alessio to add, in the context of speaking of where the work was composed, “Perhaps a posting for Lambert intervened in the same Dominican conventual schola in Troyes, or another about which we have no way to know.”38 In addition, he rejects Geyer’s claim that the work was written for that student. “It is not easy,” says Alessio, to think of the work as having been written for Theobald.39 So, in contrast to the first position, he holds it was not written for the Dominicans at Auxerre but was written (while he was Theobald’s teacher?) outside of Auxerre but not for Theobald. Finally, there is no indication, he says, that Lambert ever taught in Paris, even though Chapotin says that “the school at Paris counts him among its most famous scholars.”40 Nevertheless, Alessio is clear that the work was accomplished from 1247 to 1256, which, he says, lines it up with, or puts it a little earlier than, the Tractatus of Peter of Spain or the Introductiones in logicam of William of Sherwood.41 This leaves only the issue of when, where, and why the summa was edita, and the principal question here is the meaning of “edite” in the Padua explicit: does it mean disseminated, circulated publicly, or does it connote a revision of the material? Alessio is aware that such works as Peter’s Tractatus were composed at one time but publicly circulated much later, and that offers him the opportunity to interpret “edita” to mean the latter, but he does not make himself entirely clear on the point. Most probably he takes it to mean “disseminated, circulated, publicized.”42 Alessio contents himself with

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Introduction

answering the first question and does this simply by repeating the information in the Padua explicit: “Taken far from Auxerre, first into Champagne, then into France, it was in the oppidum insulense [Paris] that Lambert circulated the Summa.”43 Clearly, he thinks the work passed through two phases of composition even before being circulated.44 When he turns to discussing the various codices, he concludes that MSS A and T represent a first phase of composition and C and K a second, whereas F, P, S, and U reflect the edited version that came out of Paris. (S, he says, best reflects the original.)45 Alessio dates the circulation of the work with no more specificity than the years ­1247–56, years he also indicates for its composition. L. M. de Rijk

As part of his study of Peter of Spain’s Tractatus L. M. de Rijk took occasion to include “A Note on the Date of Lambert of Auxerre’s Summule.”46 In it he comes to the conclusion that the summa was composed for King Theobald II at the royal court of Pamplona or “more likely” at Troyes as part of his function as teacher of the king. The work was composed between 1253 and 1257, “when the king was anointed and is likely to have finished his studies.” And it was “published” (edita) in Paris between 1257 and 1276, “most likely” around 1260. Lambert, he adds, could have been made a penitentiary by either Pope Urban IV (1261–64) or Innocent V (1276), the latter also a Dominican and member of that community at St. James in Paris in 1255–64 and 1267–69. Clearly, Alessio’s and de Rijk’s dates of composition and circulation are not in agreement, but the explanation seems rooted in a five-year difference in the date of Theobald’s birth. Alessio, relying on H. d’Arbois de Jubainville, places it late in 1235; de Rijk, on the other hand, and drawing on the Nouvelle biographie générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusq’à 1850–60, says, “He must have been born in 1240 since he is told [sic] to have succeeded his father Theobald I after the latter’s death (1253) under the guardianship of his mother, Margaret of Bourbon, when he was in his thirteenth year.”47 In both scenarios Theobald would have been around thirteen to fifteen years old when he was Lambert’s student—a proper age for studying the arts—but recall that Alessio does not think the summa was composed for Theobald.48 Alain de Libera

In 1981 Alain de Libera presented a challenge to some of the more important facets of Alessio’s scenario. In his opinion and by contrast, the author of the Summa Lamberti was born in Lagny, was a secular cleric of the diocese of Meaux, not a Dominican, at the time of its composition, composed it for Theobald II while teaching him sometime during 1250–55 in Navarre (Pamplona), and edited and circulated the work in his leisure hours while serving in Paris from 1263 to 1265 as the administrator of Theobald II’s holdings. Sometime after this he became a Dominican and papal penitentiary.

Introduction xxi

What are the sources for this scenario? De Libera concedes that a birthplace of Ligny-le-Châtel as indicated in the Troyes explicit and accepted by Alessio has the ­support of the author of the article on Troyes (1855) in the Catalogue général des manuscripts des bibliothèques publiques des departments.49 He also acknowledges that Thomas Kaeppeli in his Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi (1980) “purely and simply” juxtaposes the three patronyms “Lambert of Auxerre,” “Lambert of Ligny,” and “Lambert of Lagny.”50 The difference between the Latin place-names here (respectively, “Liniacum” and “Latiniacum”), says de Libera, is “mince.”51 But, he points out, if one relies on the identification in the Troyes explicit (Ligny-le-Châtel), then one is faced with the fact that no other document is known that can shed further light on Lambert’s life and works.52 With the Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel ruled out on this ground, de Libera points to another Lambert, this one from Lagny, and declares his candidacy as “the sole possible hypothesis (although fragile).”53 De Libera discovers this name in the records of Theobald II by de Jubainville. He is described there as a cleric and “an administrator of the possessions” (in Champagne) of the king at Paris from 1263 to 1265.54 In partial support de Libera alludes to a letter from Pope Urban IV dated January 26, 1264, which identifies Lambert of Lagny at that time as a cleric, tells us his diocese is Meaux, and informs us that he is a master.55 Since it is “very likely,” says de Libera, that the Summa was composed between 1250 and 1255 (the preceptorate), it follows that this Lambert could not have been a Dominican when it was composed. It is also “very likely,” he says, that it was composed for Theobald in Navarre, although no justification for this belief is offered.56 Given Alessio’s claim of two stages in the composition, de Libera says one can imagine that the first phase takes its origin “from a relatively elementary pedagogical task,” whereas the second phase derives “from a more specific and deeper task.”57 He suggests that possibly the second phase was initiated by the need to provide a logic text to the new studium generale at Tudela (founded by Theobald in 1257) to support the lectures (given or not given by Lambert himself ). But, concedes de Libera, there is very little known about this.58 The circulation of the text, he says, took place in Paris during Lambert’s leisure hours while serving from 1263 to 1265 as the administrator of Theobald’s domains in Champagne. There the prior composition was augmented with additional tracts on the properties of terms such as De appellatione.59 The reference is to the section “De appellatione” in chapter 8 of the Summa, and de Libera’s study of it uncovers the influence of John le Page, a Parisian master who wrote a work called Appellationes and who would not have been teaching beyond 1235. This causes de Libera to speculate in two directions: if the Summa was composed in toto between 1250 and 1255, Lambert must have encountered the Appellationes while a student at Paris (thereby answering the question where he was educated); or, he could have learned of John’s theories during 1263–65 while he was Theobald’s agent in Paris. At any rate, de Libera thinks it “likely” that Lambert became acquainted with the ideas of John le Page in Paris and that he wrote the “De apellatione” in Paris between 1263

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Introduction

and 1265. Since de Libera speaks of both a circulation (editio) and an augmentation at Paris, he seems to be taking the “edite” of the Padua explicit to mean both a public circulation and a revision of the text. The strength of de Libera’s scenario seems to rest, then, on three documents that proximately or remotely associate the author of the Summa with Lagny. These are, first, the more informative Padua explicit, which tells us Lambert was a teacher of a king of Navarre, that he composed at one time and circulated the work at another, in Paris, and that he was a papal penitentiary; second, records of the counts of Champagne and their agents in the first half of the thirteenth century as reported by de Jubainville; and third, a papal document reflecting a mandate by Pope Urban IV for a canonry and prebend in Rheims on behalf of a Lambert of Lagny, who is further identified in January 1264 as a master and cleric of the diocese of Meaux. Let us observe, however, that no attempt is made by de Libera to integrate the data from the monumenta of Auxerre and the histories of the Dominican Order at Auxerre into his own scenario; nor are we given any grounds for associating Lambert with the Dominicans at Auxere. In the context of relating Lambert to John le Page he simply speaks of Lambert as a “future Dominican” and refers to his work as having come to us “under the name of him who had in the meantime become one of the first Dominicans of Auxerre.”60 Summary of the Biographies

Basically, and by way of summary, the three persons presented above are offering two views of the life of the author of the Summa Lamberti. What they hold in common is that his name was Lambert; that he was French, educated within a Parisian influence, and called upon to teach the young prince Theobald (soon to become the second king of Navarre and the fifth count of Champagne) around 1253–56; that in 1256 Theobald ascended the throne of Navarre and underwent a three-year regency by his mother; that Lambert wrote a summa on logic that went through two phases of composition even before being circulated in Paris; and that at some point he became, respectively, a Dominican and later a penitentiary of a pope. On other fundamental issues they differ. For Alessio, Lambert was a canon of the cathedral at Auxerre, entered the Order of Preachers, and taught in their new schola there, all in the 1240s; de Libera only speaks of him as becoming a Dominican sometime after 1264. It is not entirely clear for whom Alessio thinks the work was composed, the students at Auxerre or those at Troyes or some other posting; de Libera thinks it was composed for Theobald II. Alessio considers the work to have been “elabo­rated,” “begun and completed,” at some time from 1247 up to or into the regency (1253–56), although the latter half of this period is roughly the same period as that which Alessio lists as the time Lambert would have been Theobald’s teacher; de Libera

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thinks the first phase of composition was accomplished during 1250–55. De Rijk says it was written “at Troyes (or Pamplona)”; and de Libera says the first phase of composition occurred in Navarre (Pamplona), the second phase possibly for a new studium generale founded by Theobald in Tudela in 1257, and the tracts on the properties of terms added and the work circulated at Paris sometime during 1263–65, although it could have been composed in toto during 1250–55. Alessio thinks Lambert was born in Ligny-le-Châtel; de Libera, in Lagny. Finally, each adds a couple of items not mentioned by the other. Alessio mentions the possibility that Lambert both preached a sermon in the cemetery in Vitry before King Louis IX and was an apostolic doorkeeper. De Libera adds that Lambert was a (secular) cleric in the diocese of Meaux in (January) 1264, that he was influenced by the writings of John le Page, and that he served King Theobald in Paris from 1263 to 1265. Additions to the Biographical Data

Before raising the question whether these two biographies can be reconciled, a few items need to be added to, or clarified with respect to, the data adduced above. First, Alessio has stated the case well for the rapid expansion of the Dominicans in France and especially in the region around Paris. He refers to their establishments in Paris (1217), Chartres (1231), Troyes (1232), and Auxerre (1241). Lest anyone doubt the rapidity of this expansion, it could be added that Dominicans were also in Bologna and Lyon in 1218, had sixty houses in eight provinces by 1221, and were in the Holy Land, Greece, Poland, and Scandinavia by 1228. In 1229 they opened their first chair of theology in Paris and followed it with another in 1230.61 In 1248 they established additional general houses of study at Oxford, Cologne, Montpellier, and Bologna, and by 1256 they numbered five thousand priests and just less than two thousand clerics and lay brothers. In 1277 they had 404 convents. And, it should be noted, Dominic himself had mandated that there be no priory without a professor. So this is a community on the march, and it is no wonder, then, as we saw Alessio point out, that they gained favor with “people in high places,” such as Queen Blanche of Castile, wife of King Louis IX of France; the countess Amitie de Joigny; Bernard of Sully, bishop of Auxerre; and the countess Matilde de Courtenay; to say nothing of the father and son, Theobald I and Theobald II: Theobald I established a convent of Dominicans at Troyes in 1232, and his son established one at Provins in 1269.62 It could be added that we are given perhaps not too self-serving or misleading insight into the quality of such relationships when we hear Jordan of Saxony, first successor to Dominic, say in 1226 of Blanche of Castile that “the Queen tenderly loves the Friars.”63 Thus given this ­incredibly rapid expansion of the Dominican Order in the first half of the thirteenth century it is easy to see why Alessio could find it natural to accept Viole’s, Echard’s, and

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Chapotin’s view that Lambert was one of the early members of the Dominican convent in Auxerre. Second, there is some controversy over the identification of the author with Lignyle-Châtel, although it is not mentioned by either Alessio or de Libera, possibly with good reason. Alessio refers to that town on the basis of his transcription of folio 88v of MS Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, codex 2402, where he finds: “Here end the summulae of master Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel.”64 But on folio 95vb he also finds: “Predicables follow. In the month of November in the year 1281, the cleric John of Asconio bought the present book from the cleric Roger of Cheminon. In that first year Roger ordered [it] copied, as was said, by the cleric Lambert de Syvriaco.”65 Chapotin is aware of the first explicit, not by inspection of the manuscript, he tells us, but by finding it recorded as an entry (no. 2402) in the Catalogue genéral des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques des departments. On inspection of the manuscript he comes across the second quotation above and presents a different reading of the end: “copied, as was said, by the cleric Lambert of Ligny.”66 On the basis of what he sees before him Chapotin concludes that the Lambert mentioned in both places is not the canon of Auxerre turned Dominican but simply the cleric who copied the manuscript.67 Unfortunately, he does not comment further on the language in the first quotation—the clear and ordinary way of identifying the author of a work—and hence does not call attention to the fact that the Lambert there is designated as a master but in the second one as a copyist. Thus, even on that basis, the two texts do not seem to be talking about the same person. I have been successful in obtaining a photocopy of the relevant pages of the manuscript, and, while the ‘ri’ in ‘Syvriaco’ is somewhat hard to decipher and the ‘y’ has a mark above it (significant or insignificant?), it is quite clear that what is there should not be read as ‘Liniaco’ (Ligny).68 Third, among the services Lambert of Lagny rendered Theobald II in Paris from 1263 to 1265, the only one we know about in any detail turns out to be the purchase of several houses on the left bank for Theobald, who was elsewhere in his realm.69 Fourth, we learn from Pope Urban’s letter of January 26, 1264, that Lambert of Lagny was also a teacher (doctor) of Theobald’s younger brother, William, during the time he is elsewhere identified as purchasing houses for Theobald II.70 The date seems appropriate since William, born sometime in 1250, would have been about thirteen years old in 1264, depending on the month in which he was born.71 If Lambert of Lagny was once again engaged in teaching logic (this time to William), additional plausibility is accorded de Libera’s notion that perhaps Lambert of Lagny was engaged in revising the text of the Summa in his spare time while serving as Theobald’s agent.72 What the letter does not sufficiently show, however, is the degree to which William had the attention of the pope. During the period December 1263 to August 1264 alone, William is the subject of no less than eleven communications from Urban IV. On No-

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vember 17, 1263, when William would have been thirteen years old, the pope refers to him as the treasurer of Sens, intervenes to restore a prepositura he had already been awarded in the church of St. Martin of Tours that had wrongfully been awarded to another, and releases William from all judgments against him;73 on December 17 he resigns the prepositura;74 and on December 19 he is seen to be given a prepositura at the church of Lèrè.75 The document mentioned above indicates that at some point before January 26, 1264, he was also treasurer of Sens, the name by which he is most often identified in the papal documents;76 by February 1 he is prepositus of St. Martin of Tours church and given a benefice with the privilege of not residing;77 by February 13 he expresses a willingness to resign a canonry and prebend in Tudela;78 on July 4 the deacon of the church of St. Martin of Tours is instructed to reserve the prepositura for him that was just resigned, and the abbot of a monastery in Tours is charged to look after it until he accepts it;79 on July 13 he is identified as a canon of Paris and secures a prebend, and a day later the bishop of Paris is charged to accept him as a canon;80 and on August 9 Pope Urban defends William’s right against challengers to confer prebends as prepositus of the church of Lèrè.81 Since none of these duties required his residence, we are led to think of young William as residing in one of his brother’s newly purchased houses in Paris and being tutored there by Lambert when Lambert was not otherwise occupied with being Theobald’s agent. The Padua explicit, recall, says Lambert died at the convent of St. James. One could make the case, then, that Lambert gained additional favor with Pope Urban because of his relationship, not just with the king, but also with William, and this could eventually have some bearing on the next point. Fifth, the master Lambert of the Order of Preachers mentioned in the Padua explicit is said to have become a penitentiary of the pope after he composed and circulated his Summulae, so that would have been after 1256 (Alessio) or 1265 (de Libera). This tells us volumes about the kind of person he was, at least in the eyes of his peers and superiors. Authors seem to agree that the position of papal penitentiary was a highly coveted one, reserved for the very few, requiring someone who could render, in Alberto Zucchi’s words, “un giudizio sicuro” on extremely sensitive and perplexing issues, all in the name of none other than the pope and by his invitation. It required someone capable of researching canon law and knowledgeable about moral theology and ecclesiastical custom, to say nothing of possessing a sound grounding in the cura animarum. Hence the fame reported in the later historical record associated with Lambert as master and author of a summa logicalis must also have been augmented in no small part by his status as penitentiary.82 The title is clearly not just a symbolic one. According to Zucchi, the function of penitentiary has roots that go back to the fourth century but only “began to become delineated” in the eleventh century because of the increasing need of pilgrims sent by their bishops to the pope to be absolved from

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“the more atrocious and outrageous sins” (atrociora atque facinora), especially homicide.83 By the thirteenth century, he says, one sees this function even more clearly when the issues are ecclesiastical censures (excommunication, suspension, interdict), sentences of irregularity (prohibitions against exercising priestly duties), marriage dispensations, and possibly even the need to ensure that the poor have their petitions treated expeditiously.84 This and the growing number of pilgrims moved the pope to appoint priests (penitentiarii minores) to stand in for him, and when these were eventually gathered into colleges around the mid-thirteenth century, they were placed under a prior and lived something of a common life.85 All were under the supervision of a cardinal-bishop or cardinal-priest, the grand penitentiary (penitentiarius maior). In 1256 these priests were living in a house near the Lateran Basilica, and by 1277 they had a house in the Piazza San Pietro, but when the pope traveled they traveled with him. They had to give up whatever they were doing at the time of their appointment and reside wherever the pope was currently residing, and this could be significant for our understanding of where Lambert was at one point in his life.86 While it was clear from the beginning that these priests could be taken from either the secular clergy or the religious (sive de clero sive de claustro) and that no order had exclusive rights to the position, the Mendicants seem to have had the greatest representation in the minor penitentiaries. But they had to be thirty-five years old, of good families and reputation, suitably instructed (as judged by the other penitentiaries), and priests, not merely clerics in minor orders (since they would be hearing confessions and granting absolution).87 Lambert’s appointment as a papal penitentiary, then, provides us with a terminus ad quem when he would have advanced from minor orders to the priesthood and become a Dominican. It further requires, in the case of a Dominican, that the priest not be so far advanced in age that he would be unable to walk to Rome to take up the assignment.88 No one seems to know just how many minor penitentiaries were serving the pope in the mid-thirteenth century, but by the end of the century Boniface VIII had eight to eleven, a rather elite group of priests.89 According to Zucchi, the first Dominican major penitentiary was Hugo of Saint-Cher, and the second was Peter of Tarantaise, who also was the first Dominican cardinal and later Pope Innocent V (1276). He also lists twenty-five Dominican minor penitentiaries in the thirteenth century, among whom were notables: Raymond of Peñaforte, third master general of the order, ­1238–40, by Pope Gregory IX (1227–41); John of Wildeshusen, fourth master general, by Pope Gregory IX; and William of Moerbeke, translator of Aristotle, by Clement IV (1265–68) around 1268.90 Curiously, neither Zucchi’s list of penitentiaries nor that of Emil Göller includes the name of any Lambert.91 Apparently the only historical reference to a Dominican papal (minor) penitentiary by the name of Lambert in the mid-thirteenth century is the explicit of the Padua codex. But this does not necessarily mean that the explicit is in

Introduction xxvii

error. First, such appointments do not always get recorded, even in the papal registries. Zucchi mentions, for example, a certain Friar Morando of Siena (d. 1276), no less than a bishop.92 Of him, according to Zucchi, all the historians of the order say but not one records that he was a papal penitentiary, and yet he was “certainly” given that honor by Alexander IV, and it is recorded in the necrology of his convent. Second, P. Chouet has pointed out that the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 established priests in convents and cathedrals who were given the authority to absolve from reserved sins without the penitent having to travel to Rome.93 Such were called auxiliary confessors (confessores auxiliares) but were also referred to in the records as penitentiarii domini pape, the same title as found in the Padua explicit. Obviously, there would have been far more of these than of the minor penitentiaries in Rome, and as a result the honor and recognition would have been less. If we join that with the fact that no Dominican masters of arts are listed by Zucchi as minor penitentiaries throughout the whole thirteenth ­century—most are theologians or canon lawyers—we can see perhaps a possible explanation for the absence of confirmation elsewhere of the clause in the Padua explicit: the reference would be to Lambert’s status as an auxiliary confessor, an honor more appropriate to his status as a master of arts, and one that did not attract the attention of keepers of the records to the same degree as did the status of the minor penitentiaries in Rome. So, if indeed some pope did make Brother Lambert a papal penitentiary, minor or auxiliary, who was he? If one accepts either Alessio’s date of 1256 or de Libera’s of 1265 as the latest date of the circulation of the Summa, then we have at least a terminus a quo around which to speculate. De Rijk seems to be guided by the not unreasonable notion that a French pope is more likely to be the person, and so proposes for consideration two such: Jacques Pantaléon of Troyes, Urban IV (1261–64), and Peter of Tarentaise, Innocent V (1276).94 But to those should also be added Guy Foulques, Clement IV (1265–68), and Simon de Brion, Martin IV (1281–85). The four complete the list of French popes from 1243 to the end of the century. Any of these popes could be the correct one for the Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel in Alessio’s scenario, and Clement IV’s candidacy has the following to recommend itself. During the years of significance to this question (1254–84) there were nine popes: four Italian, four French, and one Portuguese. Clement IV was one of the French popes and created far more Dominican penitentiaries than any of the others. Drawing on Zucchi’s biographies, two of the Italians created a total of three Dominican penitentiaries, two of the French created a total of seven, and the Portuguese created none; but of the four French popes, Clement IV created six of the seven Dominican penitentiaries: a German, an Italian, a Frenchman, a Pole, a Fleming, and one from Dacia.95 But for the Lambert of Lagny in de Libera’s scenario the case would be different. It would probably not have been Urban IV (1261–64), since he does not identify Lambert of Lagny as a penitentiary in his letter of January 1264; the position would have been

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of more significance in the ecclesiastical context of the document than that of teacher of the brother of the king. In addition, Lambert of Lagny, as was seen, was a secular cleric engaged in teaching William, the brother of the king, in 1264 in Paris and would not yet have become a Dominican, much less have been in Rome, if such were necessary for the appointment. Nor would it probably have been Clement IV. The years 1265–68 simply do not afford enough time for Lambert of Lagny to move from cleric in minor orders to Dominican (after a probationary period as a novice) to ordination as a priest to gaining the attention of the pope. The cura animarum exercised by a penitentiary handling reserved sins would require, as already seen, considerable expertise and sophisticated judgment, all in the name of none other than a pope, and such comes only with long pastoral experience in a confessional. A maximum of three years would hardly be enough. But it could have been—de Rijk holds it as more probable—that it was Innocent V in 1276.96 De Rijk points out that this pope was formerly Dominican friar Peter of Tarentaise and lived in Paris (the convent of St. James) from 1255 to 1264 and from 1267 to 1269, and hence at least during the first of those postings could well have come to know Lambert of Lagny personally: Lambert was in Paris from 1263 to 1265. Nevertheless, one has to wonder whether even the eleven years between 1265 (when Lambert of Lagny completed his service to Theobald II) and 1276 are sufficient given all that would have had to occur. And Innocent V was only in office from February 22 to June 22 that year. But then the next French pope is Martin IV (1281–85). Clearly, the fact that Innocent was a Dominican best supports the case for his being the one who would have made Friar Lambert of Lagny a penitentiary, but for Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel, the number of Dominican penitentiaries created by Clement IV, the very short time Innocent V was in office, and Clement IV’s earlier dates (1265–68) would seem to make Clement IV the most probable candidate. Of course, if Lambert was only an auxiliary confessor he could have received this honor very late in life, and then Martin IV also seems plausible. The issue seems unresolvable with any degree of exactitude. The sixth and final addition I would make to the two major scenarios we have seen pertains to a second and later letter of Urban IV, this one dated June 5, 1264, in which the bishop of Liège is called upon at the request of “Brother Lambert, Apostolic Doorkeeper,” to secure a position as canon plus a prebend for a certain Arnould of ­Okieres.97 Alessio says that while it cannot be excluded that this Brother Lambert is the same as Brother Lambert of Auxerre, “it remains equally uncertain.”98 But perhaps the uncertainty can be removed, at least to a very great degree. The acta of the Dominican general chapter at Milan in 1270 speak of a Brother Lambert of Liège who was charged along with Brother Michael, prior of Lille, to offer a second opinion on a judgment against Brother Bartholomew of Tours rendered by Brothers Thomas Aquinas, Robert Kilwardby, and Latino Malabranca.99 Surely the Brother Lambert who is an apostolic doorkeeper at Liège in 1264 is the same as the Brother Lambert of Liège who served on

Introduction xxix

the commission in 1270, and such a person would hardly also be identified as Brother Lambert of Auxerre. The issue is not of importance to Alessio’s scenario, but it is to de Libera’s: the Lambert of Lagny who was identified as a secular cleric in Pope Urban IV’s letter of January 1264 could not have been this Lambert—and de Libera does not claim he was—because he would have had to become a Dominican and an apostolic doorkeeper at Liège by the following May, which is decidedly unlikely. Comments on the Augmented Scenarios of Alessio and de Libera

With the preceding additional data in mind, a few observations are in order apropos of the scenarios advanced by Alessio and de Libera. It has been seen that Alessio proposes that Lambert taught in the newly established convent school at Auxerre in the 1240s. This early, as opposed to a later, association with the Dominicans would then provide (a) a good rationale for associating his name as a scholar with Auxerre, (b) sufficient time for his teaching fame to be noticed by a king of Navarre, (c) a longer period in which to become known sufficiently as a seasoned confessor and gain the reputation that would merit him an appointment as a minor penitentiary or auxiliary confessor, and (d) a longer basis in time for the justification of the title “magister ingeniosus.”100 Alessio also raises the possibility that “a (new?) Dominican school” was opened at Auxerre in 1253 through the generosity of Matilde, countess of Courtenay.101 It is not clear if mentioning the possibility of a second Dominican school implies that he thinks Lambert may have taught in it. However, if it does imply this, there is an apparent contradiction in Alessio’s chronology since Lambert at that time would have been in Pamplona or Troyes teaching Theobald II. In addition, this “school” did not supplant or compete with the Dominican school at which Lambert, according to Alessio, had taught. Alessio is following Chapotin on this point, and Chapotin’s reference is to the repossession of a Jewish cemetery near the Dominican convent in Auxerre for the establishment of a home for Bons-Enfants, children who were promising but financially needy grammar school students.102 Such students were tonsured clerics, and their hospices were supervised ordinarily by a canon, scholasticus, or chancellor designated by the bishop. Typically there would be twelve boys from ten to eighteen years old to a house. The endowment plus their own procurement of alms would provide for them until they qualified for a benefice and could seek entrance to higher learning.103 Ordinarily these students would go out for their lessons, in this case, to the already established Dominican school. While Chapotin concedes there is no explicit documentation of Matilde’s giving the direction of their studies and the supervision of the house to the Dominicans, he says that the tradition that relates it “does not admit of doubt.”104 So mention of this new Dominican school in Auxerre by Alessio need not be taken to

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imply that Lambert may have taught there and with that understanding introduces no problem for Alessio’s chronology. Alessio seems to imply that the general chapter of 1236 mandated that the novices in Dominican convents were to be given instruction in both the old and the new logic. He even quotes the Latin text—“fraters iuniores et docibiles in logicalibus ­instruantur”— which, in support of his claim, he seems to be saying comes from that chapter’s proceedings.105 Judging from the detail in the Latin quotations it must surely be the case that Alessio had at hand a Latin text of the relevant part of the acta of one of the general chapters, but I have not been able to find the full text. His reference is to C. Douais, Essai sur l’organisation des études dans l’ordre des frères prêcheurs au treizième et au quatorzième siècle (1216–1342), but I do not find it there.106 So the exact source of Alessio’s quotation is at present unidentified. The question is, Is the quotation from a general chapter of 1236 or from some later chapter? If later, it loses some of its significance for the discussion here. Apropos de Libera’s scenario, a few comments. First, de Libera fails to comment on the claims by Viole, Echard, Lebeuf, and Chapotin on which Alessio makes his case for an early entry of Lambert into the Dominican Order and hence a Dominican authorship of the Summa. By way of recapitulation and further explanation, they are the following. The oldest sources are the monumenta of the convent of Auxerre.107 These would be any documents pertaining to the community there and would record all names of members of the community, especially of their entrance and death, and specific honors. Next is the Tabula Scriptorum Ordinis Praedicatorum (or the Catalogues of Stams and Upsalla) that records the names of, and information on, the Dominicans at Au­ xerre up to 1311. Sometime prior to his death in 1439, Lawrence Pignon, bishop of Auxerre, engaged in what Alessio calls a pure and simple “integration and revision” of the Catalogues and in doing so draws on the monumenta.108 Thus it is Pignon who tells us, “Brother Lambert of Auxerre wrote a summa logicalis, which is called Summa Lamberti.”109 Sometime before his death in 1494 Giles Sutor, Dominican of Auxerre, made what Alessio speaks of as a transcription of the monumenta called the Liber de illustribus. Just when after that the monumenta and the Liber de illustribus became lost is unclear.110 Clearly, in the 1600s parts of the monumenta preserved in the Liber de illustribus were used by Daniel George Viole in his Histoire des eglises d’Auxerre, a work that remains in manuscript form but takes us, says Alessio, to the monumenta via the Liber de illustribus. From the monumenta via Viole we hear that Lambert was a Dominican, a priest and teacher at Auxerre, was given the title “magister ingeniosus,” excelled his brothers in native ability, and composed a summa on the books of Aristotle which is now called Summa Lamberti.111 Viole goes on to report that the monumenta say Lambert was listed first after the bishops, generals, and provincials, that as a teacher he was among the more renowned because he wrote his Summa, that he (Viole) saw a

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four-hundred-year-old manuscript of the work, and that Lambert had to be “one of the first Jacobins of the Convent at Auxerre.”112 Clearly, Viole, who, Alessio thinks, had at least indirect access to the monumenta, takes Lambert to be one of the early Dominicans at Auxerre. Jacques Echard in the 1719 Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Recenciti expressly states that he has access to the monumenta (via the Liber de illustribus) when, having first passed on Pignon’s information, he says, “The same thing [namely, that Lambert wrote a summa logicalis that goes by the name of Summa Lamberti] is found in the monumenta of our house in Auxerre to which I had access, and in addition that he was among the first and earliest members of his house, who then flourished in the thirteenth century, while the house was established in 1240.”113 And in 1743 Abbé Lebeuf tells us that Lambert, a Dominican of the convent of Auxerre, wrote a summa on logic around 1250 that Giles Sutor calls the Summa Lamberti in the Catalogue of the Famous. Lebeuf cites Echard for the data, but Alessio assures us that it is “obviously” derived via Viole from the Liber de illustribus.114 Finally, we reach Marie-Dominique Chapotin, who in 1898 (with Viole and Echard) confirms that Lambert (among others he names) was there in the convent of Auxerre “from the first days of the Order” and adds what none others have claimed, namely, that Lambert was a canon in Auxerre before he became a Dominican.115 That Chapotin is claiming to have indirect access to the Liber de illustribus (via Viole?) is clear from the fact that he quotes Gérard de ­Frachet’s thirteenth-century Vitae Fratrum describing William of Noë (another former canon of the cathedral of Auxerre who, says Chapotin, also became an early Dominican at Auxerre) as “seeing the Brothers of this Convent there in the beginning of the Order,” and then he says these are “the very words of the Book of the Famous.”116 He gives the clear impression that he thinks William and Lambert entered the order at the same time and that William rescued the convent from financial disaster upon his entry. It is apparent from the above that Viole, Echard, and Chapotin are totally convinced that Lambert, Dominican and author of the Summa Lamberti, was one of the original group of Dominicans at Auxerre in the 1240s and that Chapotin takes him to be a canon before becoming a Dominican. But more important is the fact that they all claim to be relying on the monumenta via the Liber de illustribus, and this, in Alessio’s view, gives their claims considerable significance. Clearly, if the author of the Summa Lamberti was a Dominican in the 1240s, he could not be the Lambert of Lagny identified by de Libera. It is incumbent, then, on anyone who would take Lambert of Lagny to be its author to impeach Alessio’s sources. Until that is done, de Libera’s claim that the case for Lagny is “the only possible hypothesis (however precarious)” seems overstated.117 Second, de Libera claims, as discussed above, that if one were to accept Ligny-leChâtel as Lambert’s place of birth (following the explicit in the Troyes codex), one has to face the fact that there are no other documents that shed light on Lambert’s life and works except for the information in the Padua explicit.118 But this is the case with

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countless attributions of works in the Middle Ages, and the simple lack of availability of more information is hardly a justification for appeal to a different author, since it begs the question of the alternate data’s significance and relevance. Third and finally, the whole issue of Lambert of Lagny’s association with the Dominicans and his role as a papal penitentiary needs more extended comment by de Libera. He simply speaks of him as “the future Dominican of Auxerre” and one whose work has come to us “under the name of him who had in the meantime become one of the first Dominicans of Auxerre.”119 If one accepts the data on which the two scenarios are based—neither seems to contradict any known historical fact—either is clearly plausible. There is a long tradition that takes the author of the Summa Lamberti as an early Dominican of Auxerre. The case for the secular cleric Lambert of Lagny is based on an argument that in its barest form runs something like this: the work was composed around 1250 when the author was a teacher of Theobald, soon to be king of Navarre; a certain Lambert of Lagny was a secular cleric from 1263 to 1265, purchasing houses in Paris for that king and, I added, teaching the king’s brother; therefore that he taught that king and wrote the Summa for him (in the early 1250s) is the sole possible hypothesis, however fragile. I would have to say that until the monumenta of the Dominican convent of Auxerre and the Liber de illustribus and their interpretations by Viole, Echard, Lebeuf, and Chapotin are impeached, the more plausible scenario is that of Alessio.

RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS

If an evaluation of the data leads to the conclusion that Alessio’s is the more plausible scenario, it does so on the assumed reliability of the works of Sutor, Viole, Lebeuf, and Chapotin that Alessio uses to make his case for a Dominican authorship of the Summa Lamberti. While I am not aware of any published studies on the reliability of their works and sources, there are certain things that can be said about them, and they are significant for my principal question about the authorship of the Summa Lamberti. Here the principal sources are Simon Tugwell and Marian Michèle Mulchahey. Simon Tugwell

First, Chapotin lamented the fact that the Liber de illustribus, available up to the sixteenth century, was lost to him; but he assures us that he did have access to “certain extracts” from it sent to Rome and conserved in the archives of the order.120 No such document has as yet been found, but what one does find in those archives is a work titled “Remarques sur ce qu’il y a de plus considerable du Couvent d’Auxerre” from the end of the seventeenth or beginning of the eighteenth century.121 This is clearly not the

Introduction xxxiii

text to which Chapotin alludes, but it does seem to draw on the Liber de illustribus in that it quotes exactly the same Latin text as that which Chapotin quotes from the De viris illustribus in Les dominicains d’Auxerre.122 While this makes clear that there is yet another document to be considered in this quest, it does not seem to settle any of the outstanding issues. Second, the story of the financial rescue of the new Dominican convent of Au­ xerre, said by Chapotin to be found in Frachet’s Vitae Fratrum, is not to be found in the original text, nor was it part of the material collected on the occasion of the general chapter of 1259 and entrusted to him to write up. It accrued to the text while Master General Humbert of Romans was revising it in Paris early in 1260. More importantly, it does not name the canon who came to the rescue and neither does the “Remarques sur ce qu’il y a de plus considerable du Couvent d’Auxerre.”123 Thus it is quite likely that the identification of William of Noë as the generous canon was made by Giles Sutor when he composed the De viris illustribus in the fifteenth century. Third, we saw that Chapotin links the names of Lambert and William of Noë as early members of the convent of Auxerre. While it is true that the Liber de illustribus clearly presented William of Noë as one of the early members of the convent of Au­ xerre, this must be an error, because William is explicitly identified as still a canon of Auxerre on March 14, 1280, and June 4, 1281.124 In consequence, surely we must conclude that it is not safe to rely on the Liber de illustribus as proof that Lambert belonged to the first generation of Auxerre Dominicans.125 Fourth, we saw that Echard explicitly says that he had access to the Auxerre monumenta, which, in turn, he says, refers to Lambert as “among the first and earliest members of the convent of Auxerre.”126 But what are the monumenta to which he and the others refer? There are a variety of things that can be counted under that name. In the beginning, records of the convent of Auxerre, I have stated, would probably have been not much more than a list of names of members, when they joined, any honors accorded them, their accomplishments if noteworthy, and the date of their demise if known. As these documents get passed down, they get added to, and it is not out of the ordinary for the collector to supply information about an earlier period or even to surmise about missing information, indeed, fabricate data. As such the monumenta as they get passed on are a collection of historical fact and fiction. So the monumenta at issue here may very well not take us back further than the fifteenth-century Liber de illustribus. Echard himself, after all, speaks of Taegio’s compilations as monumenta even though they were completed in the sixteenth century. The same can be said of the late-seventeenth- or early-eighteenth-century “Remarques sur ce qu’il y a de plus considerable du Couvent d’Auxerre.” Clearly it attests to the early entrance of William of Noë and Lambert of Auxerre into the convent of Auxerre, but there is no reason to believe that its author had access to any documents on which to base this earlier than the (fifteenth-century) Liber de illustribus.127 The result is that the term “monumenta”

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need not connote in our context thirteenth-century documents associated with the convent of Auxerre. What these comments do, then, is to call into question the grounds for Alessio’s conviction that Lambert was a Dominican at Auxerre in the 1240s. If the monumenta and the Liber de illustribus could be so wrong in the case of William of Nöe, they could err with respect to Lambert. This would not mean that Lambert was not among the early members of that convent—the term is quite relative, after all—but it would compromise the claim that he was a first-generation member who could well have composed the Summa around 1247–56, as Alessio proposes. Marian Michèle Mulchahey

In her 1998 work—research, therefore, inaccessible to Alessio, de Rijk, and de Libera— Marian Michèle Mulchahey traces the development and expansion of the education of Dominican friars from the beginning of the order until 1350.128 While Lambert of Auxerre and his Summa do not feature prominently in her “First the Bow Is Bent in Study”: Dominican Education before 1350, Mulchahey does have occasion to mention him and it, and that is to point out that the treatise “apparently had no currency at all amongst the author’s confreres,” in contrast, she says, to the use made of the Dominican Peter of Spain’s Tractatus.129 In an ensuing footnote she makes several claims relevant to this inquiry: (1) Lambert of Auxerre was not a Dominican when he first composed his Summa, which disagrees with Alessio but agrees with de Libera; (2) the work was composed for Theobald II, also in disagreement with Alessio but in agreement with de Rijk and de Libera, though she offers no comment on where it was composed; and (3) the convent at Auxerre was founded in 1241, and Lambert is buried in the convent of St. James in Paris. Neither of these points has been contested, although it was pointed out that the necrology for the St. James convent is now missing. (4) Lambert circulated his Summa at Paris in the 1250s.130 Alessio holds for 1247 to 1256; de Rijk, 1257–76, but, he adds, “more likely” 1260; and de Libera, 1263–65. Just what Mulchahey takes for a date of composition she does not say, but it had to be prior to these dates of circulation. So her date for composition would have to be closer to the earlier years proposed by Alessio (1247–56) than to those of de Libera (1250–55). And, most important for the central issue, (5) Lambert was not a lector in arts in the new Dominican school in Auxerre, and his Summa does not derive from classroom teaching (there?) in the 1240s and 1250s. Why? Because there is “very little probability” that Auxerre would have had a studium artium during those years, given the negative attitude of the early Dominicans to the arts.131 The background for these comments is to be found in two sections of Mulchahey’s book where she wants to make it clear that the image of the Dominicans as being in the vanguard of the intellectual movements in the thirteenth century is greatly over-

Introduction xxxv

stated.132 The order was founded to combat heresy and defend orthodoxy, and this required that it remain orthodox in its own doctrine.133 Jordan of Saxony tells us that Dominic was not fond of the arts, referring to them as “these less fruitful studies.”134 Equally influential for the curriculum was the fact that Dominicans, as clerics, were under the canonical norms of clerical education, which proscribed among other things “the arts which they call liberal.”135 This leads Mulchahey to conclude that “the debate over the place of the arts in Dominican education is a story which occupies the central decades of the thirteenth century, not this formative period, and took longer to play itself out than has usually been supposed, perhaps precisely because it was the order’s canonical status and not merely its intellectual credibility which was at stake.”136 Thus we find John of St. Giles, who brought his chair of theology with him when he entered the Dominicans at Paris in 1230, warning, “When such men [the masters of arts] come to theology they can scarcely be separated from their science, just as is plain in certain ones who cannot be parted from Aristotle in theology, there putting brass, namely philosophical questions and opinions, in place of gold.”137 An anonymous colleague of his joins in: “There are some who have learned well the language of spiritual things, that is, theology, but who nevertheless introduce barbarisms into it, corrupting it with philosophy.”138 Thus Mulchahey speaks of the 1240s as “the decade for repeated reiteration of the constitutional proscription of ‘libri philosophici.’”139 Hence, and ironically, she thinks, a master, once he became a Dominican, would ordinarily not have been allowed in these early days of the order to continue lecturing in the arts and secular sciences. And yet, in spite of all the resistance, Mulchahey is able to record a slow and cautious willingness to add at least logic to the curriculum.140 Recruits into the order were often and increasingly coming from the ranks of masters of arts, much more than from those of theologians.141 In fact, Master General Jordan of Saxony recounts that a fourweek effort in the spring of 1226 recruited six masters of arts and other bachelors.142 Mulchahey names several of the more famous ones, including Albert the Great (in the 1240s),143 which leads her to say, “If anything was to begin to shift Dominican opinion on how best to achieve the order’s goals, it would be this new influx of friars.”144 The first focused step toward inclusion of logic in the curriculum comes in 1228 when the Constitution of 1220 was amended to allow the master general or the general chapter to dispense with its restrictions against the arts, and this tells us that there was a push for a more inclusive curriculum from the earliest days.145 Shortly after this, one of no lesser status than Roland of Cremona, a master of arts and a regent master of medicine at Bologna when he became a Dominican, made an appeal in two works around 1229–30 for the usefulness of logic for theology: “the teacher of theology ought not teach publicly unless he is adequately instructed in philosophy, especially logic, lest he be deceived by the fallacy of arguments . . . and [unless he is adequately instructed] in medicine, because of the allegories and moralities taken from the properties of

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things.”146 Attention has already been called to the fact that Alessio refers to a directive of a general chapter as early as 1236 that called for a course in the new and old logics for those younger brothers who were capable of such instruction.147 The word spread, and the number of postulants in that province surged, so that by 1245 the provincial chapter at Avignon felt obliged to caution against giving hope to students seeking entrance to the order that they would be able to study the arts.148 Between 1240 and 1245 the rules were mitigated to allow students in the Roman province to retain their books on logic and moral philosophy, even as they were required to surrender those on the secular sciences.149 More, this province itself seems to have had the authority to grant permission to study the forbidden books, even though, as we saw, this was originally reserved to the general chapter or master general.150 These facts lead Mulchahey to opine that by 1250 Master General John of Wildeshausen must have greatly relaxed the restrictions on just what could be taught in the curriculum and who could give the requisite permission.151 In 1241, for example, the provincial chapter at Limoges speaks of students already studying the arts,152 and in that year the same master general allowed a few specially chosen friars in Provence to study logic, probably in their own convents, says Mulchahey.153 Hence it is no surprise to see the provincial chapter at Narbonne in 1250 issue the following instruction (quoted by Alessio): “We concede [permission] to all the priors of convents that, if they have ones suitable, they are to ensure that they be instructed in the arts in their convents.”154 In 1250 two studia artium were established in Spain, followed two years later by two similar ones in Provence;155 in 1252 twelve students were assigned to study logic in Bayonne and an additional twelve in Marseilles.156 In 1256 studia artium were established in Bérziers, Cahors, Avignon, and Bordeaux.157 Following Wildeshausen as master general in 1254, Humbert of Romans stepped up the move to the arts and, though cautious and a moderate, led the general chapter in 1259 at Valenciennes to declare that all provinces henceforth were to have at least one studium artium to teach logic.158 Finally, the general chapter of 1261 at Béziers reiterates the call for promising students to be educated “in logicalibus.”159 Apropos of these forces both for and against instruction in logic from the inception of the order through the 1260s, Mulchahey concludes, “Clearly there was no hardand-fast rule about the institutional identity of the studia artium—apart from the fact that they were geared to providing instruction exclusively in logic. The different ­contexts for that instruction seen in different regions at different times demonstrate that decisions regarding the actual implementation of educational mandates were left in the hands of the individual provinces.”160 The above claims and arguments by Mulchahey merit a few comments. First, the claim that Lambert was not a Dominican when he first composed the Summa Lamberti is an assertion; there is no attempt on her part to provide an extended argument in its behalf in the footnote it opens or elsewhere. So just why she holds that opinion is not explicitly stated in this work.

Introduction xxxvii

Second, the data referred to by Mulchahey and reported above are said by her to render it “highly unlikely” that the convent at Auxerre would have been designated in the 1240s to initiate a studium artium. She does not comment on how likely it would have been for it to have had a lector in logic in its schola at that time.161 The convents were confronted with an increasing availability of masters of arts in their midst; Alessio alludes to a 1236 chapter (as yet unidentified) that called for the instruction of “the younger and capable Brothers” in logic; and, as we saw, restrictions were being lifted in the 1240s by John of Wildeshausen. This suggests that John thought it better to start the experiment in logic by teaching it in scholae rather than in studia. In addition, the 1250 permission to all priors to instruct those suitable in the arts was clearly given with full knowledge that there were only two studia artium, both in Spain and both currently in the making. Masters would be needed. But now a question arises: Were the restrictions on clerics and the cautious attitude toward logic so deep that it would be equally “highly unlikely” that an enlightened prior at Auxerre in the 1240s—a place with a long history of academic fame in the arts—would petition his provincial (or if necessary the master general, John, himself ) to utilize an available Dominican master of arts on the limited scale of a schola? And can we be so sure that it would have been equally “highly unlikely” that such a request would have been turned down? All friars were required to attend daily lectures on the scriptures and theology. Would not new recruits from among the active masters of arts, during these daily discussions of theology and scripture, have done just what Roland of Cremona did in 1229–30, namely, point out the usefulness of logic to these studies? Indeed, these masters could demonstrate that very usefulness right there, on the spot. They would have been in a position to remind their priors of the change in the constitution in 1228 that allowed for petition for permission to teach logic in the schola, and they would surely have pointed out the fact that such requests were already being made and that as a result logic was currently being taught in several scholae in Provence. Indeed, as Mulchahey remarked, students reacted enthusiastically to the possibility of studying logic in the Dominican scholae, and recruitment was up in those convents. That such requests would not have been urged by newly recruited masters of the arts and endorsed by enlightened priors seems counterintuitive, just on the face of it. So a general question remains: To what degree did the Dominican concerns about the usefulness of logic that delayed the establishment of Dominican studia artium also prevent the teaching of logic in their scholae? More specifically, is it plausible that Lambert could have been teaching logic in the 1240s in the convent schola of Auxerre, thereby gaining sufficient acclaim to be called to teach young prince Theobald around 1250? Mulchahey, as indicated, does not answer these questions directly.162 Nevertheless, her discoveries clearly count against a response in the affirmative. It is important, then, for other scholars studying the curriculum of the early Dominicans to weigh in here so that this issue can be resolved. Its resolution is crucial to the debate over who the ­author of the Summa Lamberti was.

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Conclusion

So where does this tour de force of all the relevant literature leave us? The most fundamental questions seem to be whether the author of the Summa Lamberti was a Dominican of the convent of Auxerre in the 1240s, and if he was, whether he would have been teaching logic in the schola there at that time. If the evidence I have reviewed is sufficient to support a positive answer to those two questions, then it would explain the long tradition of an early entry for Lambert into the order, perpetuated by Sutor, Viole, Echard, and Chapotin; it would allow Lambert to acquire sufficient fame as a teacher to warrant a king’s notice; it would make it feasible that he would compose a summa on logic around 1250; and it would provide additional time for Lambert to develop expertise and a reputation sufficient to explain his designation by a pope to be a papal penitentiary or auxiliary confessor. With such support the Friar Lambert proposed by Alessio becomes the likelier author of the Summa Lamberti, identified in the Troyes codex as born in Ligny-le-Châtel and in the Padua codex as teacher of the soon-to-be king of Navarre and a future papal penitentiary. It would also establish that the author was a Dominican at the time of the composition of the Summa Lamberti. When I reviewed the data assembled in this introduction in 2009 I came to the conclusion that “because there is insufficient reliable historical data to identify the author of the Summa Lamberti as a Dominican of Auxerre in the 1240s—helpful in accounting for an authorship in the early 1250s—and because there is historical evidence of a secular cleric of Meaux, Lambert of Lagny, associated with a king of Navarre and identified as a master holding a (later) teaching role in the household of that king, the claim that the author was not a Dominican at the time of its composition stands on more solid historical grounds than does the claim that he was a Dominican at that time.”163 But I was not totally comfortable with that assessment, in great part because, as I stated, there is something very counterintuitive in the notion of an order, all of whose members were taught scripture, theology, and homiletics as part of their formation as novices, finding themselves in need of logic to advance these three sciences, having in their midst a master of arts, not using his talents to offer instruction in logic. How does one do scriptural hermeneutics and evaluate and construct arguments in theology without logic? Did not Roland of Cremona in 1229 answer precisely that question: “The teacher of theology ought not teach publicly unless he is adequately instructed in philosophy, especially, logic, lest he be deceived by the fallacy of arguments.” The constitution of the order had been changed in 1228 to allow for that kind of teaching. There was the (unverified) 1236 directive of a general chapter to instruct “those teachable” in logic. The provincial chapter at Limoges spoke in 1241 of students already studying the arts, and John of Wildeshausen, the master general, was allowing specially chosen friars in Provence to study logic (and as Mulchahey was seen to say)

Introduction xxxix

probably in their own convents! At Avignon in 1245 applicants seeking instruction in the arts had to be turned away. Finally, by the 1250s the movement seems to have taken off: in 1250 two studia are established in Spain; in 1252, two in Provence; in that same year, twelve students were designated to study logic in Bayonne and twelve in Marseilles; in 1259 there was a directive of the general chapter requiring a studium in arts in every province; and in 1256 studia were mandated one each in Béziers, Cahors, Avignon, and Bordeaux. It is true that expansion occurred in the 1250s, but surely the push for it originated in the 1240s. It is no great stretch to see the directive of the provincial chapter of 1250 at Narbonne as grounded in the movement toward the arts in the 1240s: “We mandate all priors and convents that, if they have any ones suitable, they are to insure that they are instructed in the arts in their convents.” “In their convents.” The reference is not to the provincial studia but to the local scholae found in every convent in any province, to scholae just like the one at Auxerre. Now it seems reasonable to infer that if the teaching of logic is being increasingly mandated from 1228 on, masters in the arts are needed to do the teaching, and they were indeed flocking to this new order. So the picture in the 1240s in the convents was one in which novices being instructed in scripture, theology, and preaching needed training in logic, something called for by none less than Roland of Cremona, and which the fathers general and provincials found increasingly acceptable. Pressure for this would surely have been coming all along from the numerous masters of arts who were now Dominican friars. What seems to have been needed was “simply” a somewhat enlightened prior, with enough foresight to seek the requisite permission from his provincial to add logic to the convent’s curriculum. There is a certain momentum within the order in the 1240s to which I previously did not give sufficient weight. In its light it seems to me now quite plausible that a certain master of arts, Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel, possibly a former canon of the cathedral of Auxerre, now friar of the Dominican convent there, would have been called upon to teach logic in service to the curriculum in the schola of his convent. With this understanding of the data I now think it considerably more probable that the author of the Summa Lamberti was Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel than Lambert of Lagny. But when, where, and for whom did he compose this work? There is very little on which to base an informed answer to these questions. Nevertheless I would have little difficulty believing that Lambert, after completing his novitiate in the convent of Au­ xerre sometime in the mid-1240s, began to teach logic there and initiated the composition of a summa on logic for the use of his students. His reputation would have been enhanced thereby, and this could serve to explain why he was invited in the early 1250s to teach Prince Theobald, future second king of Navarre. While he was teaching the heir apparent (1250–53), probably at Navarre, he could easily have found time to polish it and compose the tracts on the properties of terms including “Appellation”—the second phase of composition mentioned by Alessio and de Libera—and then circulate the

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final work later in his career at Paris, where he died, all in keeping with the explicit of the Padua codex. Given the stages in which the work was composed, there is no one person or group for whom it was written: at first for the Dominican students at Au­ xerre, then completed for the use of Theobald, who, however, was ripped away from the arts by his father’s death in 1253 and his subsequent need to learn how to manage his unruly barons. This is the scenario I now find far more likely than the one associated with Lambert of Lagny.164

SOURCES

While Konstanty Michalski (1910) and Maurice de Wulf (1952) were equally convinced that Peter of Spain depended on Lambert when he wrote his Tractatus (there are passages that are word for word the same), while Grabmann was convinced in 1936 that Lambert had “brazenly utilized” the Tractatus when he wrote his Summa, and while Georgette Sinkler thinks that Roger Bacon expanded Lambert’s discussion of the determinatio that gives rise to the ambiguity characteristic of the fallacies of Composition and Division, recent evidence seems to be mounting that they are all independent of each other.165 Alessio, for example, supports such a claim when he singles out the different ways each initiates his presentation of supposition and points to the different order of the treatment of the property of terms, even after taking into account the fact that there is much variation in the order in the manuscript tradition of the Summa itself.166 De Rijk, writing the same year as Alessio (1971), adduces much the same evidence in support of his contention that Lambert did not rely on Peter’s Tractatus, and he adds a further reason: the Tractatus was not yet in use in Paris when the Summa was circulated (edita).167 In 1972 de Rijk had argued the case for John le Page as a possible source for Peter of Spain’s Tractatus; in 1981 de Libera made a similar case apropos of Lambert’s Summa. After a thorough study of the Appellationes and Syncategoremata of John le Page and the Summe Metenses and Syncategoremata of Nicholas of Paris, de Libera ­arrives at four conclusions relative to the issue of sources: (1) the “De appellatione” of Lambert was composed in “close mental dialogue” with the Appellationes of John le Page and is well situated in the Parisian tradition of logic represented by the works of the masters, ultimately by that of Nicholas of Paris; (2) the “De appellatione” reveals some affinity with the Summe Metenses and the Syncategoremata of Nicholas of Paris and the Dialectica Monacensis; (3) it was written with complete independence from the Tractatus of Peter of Spain; and (4) the Summa was principally used in the convent schools of the Dominicans and comes to us under the name of one who after a while became one of the first Dominicans of Auxerre.168

Introduction xli

De Libera bases these conclusions principally on a comparative analysis of texts and speaks of there being points of intersection too numerous to mention but does single out the following:169 first, the questiones that accompany and complete the exposition of the rules governing restriction in John le Page’s Appellationes as reflected in the three quaesita of Lambert’s “De appellatione” (paragraph 1302 in the text); second, the rejection of the notion of verbal restriction by an argument based on the necessity of syntagmatic contiguity between what contracts and what is contracted (1303); third, the use of an argument based on an inverse consequence (1321); fourth, the discussion of the sophism “‘Every man exists’ [is true], when no man exists” (1312); fifth, the presentation of the topic “The same time is signified in an affirmative and negative proposition” and its justification by the theory that the negation has no influence on the general signification of the verb (1329); sixth, the use of an argument based on the nature of logical contradiction (“Of anything there is either affirmation or negation”) (1327); and seventh, the distinction between a proposition taken per se and one taken as “a principle of inference” (656). Finally, de Libera adduces Lambert’s use of the distinction between “esse actu” and “esse actu sub termino” (1297), which to his knowledge only occurs elsewhere in the Syncategoremata of John le Page. All these, he says, establish a greater affinity between Lambert and John than is had between Lambert and all his contemporaries. It is difficult to know, continues de Libera, just when Lambert would have come into contact with the works of John le Page; the latter’s activity at Paris would not have extended beyond 1235. And since there are only two manuscripts of the Appellationes, both in Paris, one would hardly speculate on their diffusion into Navarre or Champagne. One can reasonably take it, he thinks, that Lambert became aware of the ideas expressed in it while he was at Paris functioning as the administrator of Theobald’s holdings and devoting his leisure hours to study. This would be compatible with a date of the composition of the “De appellatione” around 1263–65. But, continues de Libera, if one thinks of the composition of the whole of the Summa as occurring during the time he was tutor to the young Theobald (around 1250–55), then he would have had to be aware of le Page’s Appellationes or the theories internal to it between 1235 and 1250. And if this is so, then it is probable that it was as a student that he read or heard the text of le Page. Then one would regard the dependence of Lambert on John as a proof that the future Dominican from Auxerre learned his logic at Paris.170 Finally, in 1985 Georgette Sinkler, as we have seen, wrote in support of the claim that at least in one respect Roger Bacon’s Summulae dialectices is dependent on the Summa of Lambert. The issue is that of the notion of determinatio in the context of discussions of the fallacy of Composition and Division. In this context Sinkler points to three issues that she thinks support a claim of dependence of Bacon on Lambert: (1) Lambert’s far greater degree of specificity on the role of determination in the ambiguity; (2) the rejection of a third mode of Composition and of Division by Bacon and

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Introduction

its acceptance by Lambert, as well as the fact that examples employed by Lambert of the third mode are treated by Bacon in his second mode; and (3) the fact that the formula used by Bacon to report on the third mode is the very same used by Lambert, along with the additional fact that the example that Bacon analyzes to show that there is no third mode is precisely the one Lambert uses to illustrate his third mode.171 Thus she was seen to say: “Roger’s discussion seems to me to result from his attempt to improve on Lambert’s account of the nature of the compounded/divided ambiguity by working out that account in more detail.”172 De Libera comments directly on Sinkler’s claim and says that he is inclined to think that the theories of the two authors (Bacon and Lambert) were developed independently of each other but have roots in the same group of doctrines.173 They are marked, he says, by a reevaluation of the logical analysis in the light of the modist theory of construction. In point of fact, continues de Libera, there are numerous texts in which Bacon gives the impression of wanting to separate himself from Lambert, for example, in proposing a more detailed analysis of the nature of the ambiguity in Composition and Division in terms of determination, in rejecting the thesis of a third mode of Composition and Division (one adopted by Lambert), and in directly giving a central role to the notion of determination in conceptualizing the modes of the fallacy. By the same token, he adds, there are two points where it equally seems that Lambert depends on Bacon, namely, in broadening the discussion to a case where the proposition contains, not more than one determination and two determinables, but two determinations and one determinable, and in rejecting any possibility of the fallacy either where the determination is placed before or after the two determinables or where the determinable is placed before or after the two determinations. These considerations lead de Libera to conclude that Lambert and Bacon worked independently of each other and that neither is critiquing the other.174 They both, he thinks, “are reacting for different reasons to certain tendencies in the scientific and cultural melieu to which they at one time belonged: that of the University of Paris where, let us remember, terminism on the one hand, premodism then modism on the other, the Oxford tradition and the Parisian tradition, all met, without even mentioning the teaching of masters like Albert the Great and through him his probable source Robert Kilwardby, all which [tendencies] in the years 1250–1260 still had to accompany more or less obligatorily a reading of Sophistical Refutations, if only for this threepart division, accepted by Lambert, rejected by Bacon.”175

THE LATIN TEXT

In 1971 Franco Alessio edited the first printed edition of Lambert’s Summa, and in part 2 of his introduction to this work he gives a description of the twelve available

Introduction xliii

manuscripts known to be by Lambert that contain the Summa.176 Of these Alessio selects MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale Latin 16 617, fols. 64r–131r (copied in 1280 and which he identifies as MS S), as “the most correct and complete and least inexact in the sense of less unfaithful to the Summa that was edita [circulated] ‘in Francia’ by Lambert of Auxerre” and produces a printed text based on it.177 He notes that it is this manuscript that Peter of Limoges had in his possession when he was dean of studies in Paris in 1267–74 and on which he lectured—he died in 1304/6—and that it was in use at the Sorbonne until at least 1334.178 The work gives evidence of a master who was very concerned that his students be up to date on current trends in logic and understand well what they were being taught. This is exemplified in those parts of his Summa where the material is also found in other summas on logic of that time, such as those of William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, and Roger Bacon. Lambert seems to be at pains to give a slightly fuller explanation than the others. Should someone devise a set of criteria by which to judge the pedagogy reflected in the works of these four masters, I would hazard the guess that Lambert would come out on top, in spite of the seeming later preference for Peter’s Tractatus within the Dominican community and by others. While one must be deeply grateful to anyone who has the skill and patience and is willing to devote the time and effort to edit Latin manuscripts, it is lamentable that Alessio did not provide a critical apparatus for his edition of the Summa. But perhaps more frustrating to those who use Alessio’s text is the ever present need to emend it. The range and frequency of the problem is considerable: mere typos, such as qud for quod, ecum for cum; punctuation: dictum omne: animal for dictum: omne animal; probable misreadings of the manuscripts: posterius for prius, similiter for simpliciter; false information: quantitas for qualitas, posposita for preposita, conversa for convertens; contextually incorrect grammar: hoc for hec, converti for converte; and places where the text should have been corrected no matter what the manuscripts read: deus for sedens, impossibilis for inopinabilis, and so on, for other categories of mistakes. The list is quite long, and changes needed for a coherent, grammatically correct Latin text are listed in Appendix A. A quick perusal of that list indicates the extent of the problem for one who would read this work in the original language. One should note, however, that the changes proposed and utilized in the translation are not based on a reading of the manuscripts but on what one speculates Lambert’s original text might (or should) have said. A major exception to what has been said about the state of the Latin text is, of course, de Libera’s edition of the section in chapter 8 titled “De appellatione.” It reads very well and can be made sense of with only six likely emendations.179 A comparison of Alessio’s and de Libera’s editions of “De appellatione” (nos. 1267– 1345 in the translation) reveals a range of divergences. Some are insignificant, such as the use of pronouns and connectives, for example, sed, autem, ideo. One also finds four

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instances where de Libera’s text has “appellatum vel appellata” and Alessio’s only “appellata.”180 Another group of differences can be thought of as clarifications: from “signified things” (Alessio) to “imaginary things” (de Libera) in a context that clearly supports the latter; from “terms” to “time”; from “term” to “common term”; from “action” to “action or movement”; and from “Cum ‘homo’ appellatum habeat solum, supponit . . .” to “Cum ‘homo’ appellatum habeat, solum supponit. . . . ” In other places the difference adds precision to what Lambert is discussing: from “a sign” to “a sign of quantity”; from “another tense” to “a tense other than the present”; from “because it is an action that cannot be without a verb” to “because the action is an accident that cannot be without a subject”; and sometimes an example is supplied. Finally, there are several instances where de Libera’s edition adds considerable verbiage to Alessio’s. While these categories of variants overlap to a great degree, clearly the importance of the differences ranges considerably, although a close evaluation of all the differences does not reveal any inconsistency in doctrine in the two editions; that is, the text in the one does not contradict that in the other. On the assumption that a modern, critical edition of the whole Summa would reveal variants no greater than the sort to which I have alluded, one can proceed to use Alessio’s edition. But this would still entail making speculative corrections of the sort provided in Appendix A, and for this reason a new critical edition of the whole Summa is greatly to be desired. Finally, a word or two about the treatise on modal propositions found in MS Troyes.181 Alessio speaks of the manuscript as representing (along with one other) a still earlier phase of composition and reworking of the Summa for use by students.182 It has no chapter titled “Categories,” and, says Alessio, “it proves the complexity of the journey of the composition of the Summa.” Of special interest is the fact that it has a very brief treatise on modal propositions common only to what is found in MSS A and I and completely divergent from what is found in the other nine. Of it he says, “according to every likehood, because of its particular breadth and articulation, [the treatise on modal propositions] constitutes a text completely reworked (rimaneggiato), inserted into the corpus of the treatise in the place of the shorter redaction that was removed in the creation of the edition, which latter favors the larger and more articulated redaction collected by T in the form of an appendix in a coda to the Summa, with the precise indication that, in the internal order, this redaction was also supposed to precede the tract ‘Categories.’”

THE TRANSLATION

For whom is this translation intended? There are at least three groups of people who have reason to have recourse to a translation: (1) those who cannot read the original language at all; (2) those who have some facility in the original language but not

Introduction xlv

enough to make reading in it sufficiently pleasant to motivate them to read the work in the original; and (3) those who are reading the work in its original language but who, from time to time, get stumped and appreciate being able to have resort to the efforts of someone who has spent countless hours pondering the work as a whole and who has presumably been able thereby to find some degree of consistent expression for the more troublesome turns of phrase in it. This translation is offered as an aid to all three groups. To that end readers of the second and third sort will find on occasion a Latin word or phrase in parenthesis in the text of the translation or in the notes when the Latin text being translated is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for more than one rendering. The parenthetical insertion of the Latin alerts the reader to the fact that the original text presents more than ordinary difficulty ascertaining the exact intent of the author or that the translator is less than totally confident about just what that intent is. (See, e.g., 27, 341.) The reader will also find in the notes translated quotations from crossreferenced texts on logic; these are presented as a kindness to those who have limited access to the original works or who do not read Latin. Most of these works have yet to be translated into English. Where they appear in approved translations, I have used those translations. In some few cases the original Latin is supplied. This occurs when there is some special feature of the Latin text that recommends its inclusion along with the English translation. A translator has many additional decisions to make, and most resolutions are arguable. Some readers prefer a very readable text which takes great liberties with the syntax of the original language but retains the meaning intact; others see merit in a very literal rendering of the text, one that preserves the metaphors and sentence structure where possible and counts on the reader’s patience and perhaps love of Latin to get at the meaning. This translation attempts a middle road. Where Latin words have made their way into English on an etymological basis, the translation ordinarily uses the latter against any Anglo-Saxon rivals. Where the Latin is a bit unusual or one is a bit uncomfortable pinning the meaning down by the selection of a particular word or phrase, the English is followed by the Latin in parenthesis, as already mentioned. Tense and mood are sometimes changed (‘si voluerit’ or ‘si velit’ becomes ‘if one wishes’); the active and passive voices sometimes become interchanged (‘si dicitur’ becomes ‘if one says’); and context sometimes justifies an explicit exploitation of a narrower rendering for a fairly general term (‘dicendum est’ as ‘one should reply’). The fact that there are two editions now available for the section “Appellation” in chapter 8 requires a decision. On grounds of uniformity and consistency one could translate that section based on Alessio’s edition, employing the corrections found in Appendix A, and place a translation of de Libera’s edition in an appendix. Or one could employ de Libera’s text for that section. This translation adopts the second procedure and does not provide a translation of “Appellation” based on Alessio’s text (although one was made in order to discern the differences) for the simple reason that de Libera’s

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text with its critical apparatus removes the guesswork Alessio’s text sometimes requires and with it any good reason for consulting or employing that part of Alessio’s text.183 Where to break for paragraphs? Should the first (main) clause in a sentence like “And this will become more clear in the following rules, of which the first is this: . . .” be left as the concluding sentence of a preceding paragraph and the second (subordinate) clause be restated to read “The first is this: . . .” and used to initiate the next paragraph, or should the whole complex sentence be the opening line of a new paragraph?184 De Libera prefers the second, and on Latin syntactical grounds this makes good sense. The translation, however, often adopts the former on the grounds that the main clause introduces several rules and because, were someone quoting in English the rules announced here, the information to be quoted would begin with “The first rule is this” and what precedes that would be irrelevant. Alessio’s Latin text presents paragraph breaks only at distant intervals. One argument against following this method is the difficulty of locating the Latin sentence that corresponds to the translated one, and with paragraphs as long as his this is a major problem. (De Libera employs much shorter paragraphs.) So just exactly where in a translation of a text like Alessio’s is one to make such breaks? This translation attempts to break the text into logically coherent units, even though on some occasions it results in a single-sentence paragraph. Lambert’s Summa is a questions summa in the sense that it employs to a very high degree the scholastic method of proceeding by way of asking questions and providing responses. First one asks a question to which a yes or no can be given; next one provides responses pro and con to the question, a process that enables the reader to understand the context in which the question was debated when the text was written; the master then gives his response to the question, which may or may not adopt any of the reasons provided in the second step; and finally he offers a refutation of any of the pros and cons in conflict with his answer to the question. Sometimes Lambert follows the steps in their entirety (see, e.g., 1293), but more often than not he short circuits the process by simply posing an objection to which he immediately replies (246–47) or, less frequently, asking a question to which an im­ mediate reply is given (456). The text, then, presents us with a mixture of questions, straightforward answers, explanations, and objections. Such divisions suggest the kind of logical breaks that paragraphing can help reveal. And so the translation separates questions from pros and cons, and these from the master’s response, and the master’s response from any rebuttal to the pros and cons he desires to offer. Objections stand in one paragraph; responses to them in another. In addition, internal signals like ‘item’ (also), ‘preterea’ (in addition), and ‘notandum’ (one should note) often initiate paragraphs. In short, then, wherever the text reveals a significant logical shift the translation will indicate this by a paragraph break. Such paragraphing also allows for and encourages the insertion in brackets of headings for each of the logical units, if not for every paragraph. The practice has been

Introduction xlvii

employed to great effect by several translators and to a lesser degree editors when producing medieval texts. It enables the reader to see at a glance how the author is progressing in his material and at the same time provides a quick and convenient locator for tracking down various sorts of discussions. Lambert’s shift into the question-­ response mode is easily recognized by the reader through the use of bold type for the key terms ‘ask’ and ‘reply’ and their cognates. (See, e.g., 83–88.) Since, then, the trans­ lation does not produce a mirror image of the layout of the Latin text, I have inserted page and line references to the Latin text at the end of each paragraph in the translation. With these aids the reader can go from English to Latin or vice versa with complete ease. Alessio has divided Lambert’s Summa into eight units he calls chapters. Whether this reflects nomenclature in the manuscripts I do not know. There are no internal cross-references in the Latin text that use the term ‘chapter’, and twice (1267 and 1400) one finds ‘tractatum’ (tract or treatise) in reference to what had previously been said on supposition.185 This gives at least a prima facie case for a division quite different from Alessio’s. Then too one would probably not want to place the customary discussion of oppositions, priority, concomitance, change, and possession (581–609) rooted in Aristotle’s Categories 10–5 in a chapter by itself, as Alessio does, but rather in the tract or chapter on categories, unless there is a basis for it in the manuscript tradition. Should the paragraphs be numbered consecutively throughout the whole work or begin anew with each chapter? L. M. de Rijk’s edition of Peter of Spain’s Tractatus separates the text into tracts or treatises and then numbers the next level of division consecutively, starting with each treatise. However, this results in some of these subdivisions consisting in more than one paragraph where all but the first are not designated by a number. Reference to the text by treatise number and subdivision number, then, might or might not lead the reader directly to the desired paragraph. On the other hand, ­Albert J. Judy’s edition of Kilwardby’s De ortu scientiarum provides a number for every paragraph, and the series runs continuously throughout the book, even though the treatise itself is divided into chapters.186 This provides for a very simple (one-number) paragraph reference and leads the reader directly to the paragraph of the desired text. The clarity, simplicity, and directness of Judy’s method has been the motivation for its adoption for this translation. When Lambert refers to an earlier or later discussion in the text of some issue, I insert in parenthesis (not brackets) the number of the paragraph in the translation where the discussion occurs. From time to time the reader will notice a space separating the end of one paragraph and the beginning of the next. Quite often Lambert inserts a question and response in his discussion of a certain issue, and in this case, I use spacing to set the question and response off from the resumption of the original discussion (see, e.g., between 31 and 32). A space is also used in other cases to alert the reader to the fact

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that what is being discussed is somewhat different from what precedes, even though it does not merit a subheading to indicate this. If the spacing falls between pages of the translation, it is represented by centered asterisks. When Lambert wants to tell us what the sense of a certain proposition is he often states the proposition, for example, “This old man was a boy,” and then follows it with, “The sense is he who is an old man now was formerly a boy” (see 1333). The question is how to punctuate the latter. In the Latin text Alessio and de Libera place a colon after “The sense is” and then take what follows to be the proposition “He who is an old man now was formerly a boy,” in effect assuming that Lambert expresses the sense of one proposition by stating another proposition. That seems a somewhat odd convention to me, and so I (with very few exceptions) punctuate in this manner: “The sense is [that] he who is an old man now was formerly a boy.” In the notes the reader will often come across references to, and sometimes quotations from, the three other major mid-thirteenth-century extant treatises on logic, by William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, and Roger Bacon, as well as to some of the twelfth- and early-thirteenth-century treatises edited by L. M. de Rijk in his Logica modernorum. We have seen that Alain de Libera has shown that the Summe metenses and Syncategoremata of Nicholas of Paris, the Dialectica monacensis, and the Appellationes and Syncategoremata of John le Page have some affinity with Lambert’s Summa, and it seems appropriate to highlight these as an aid to future scholarly debate. On occasion de Libera provides the texts themselves for the reader to compare, so as a service I have presented many of these texts in translation. We have also seen that, with the exception of Georgette Sinkler, the current opinion seems to be unanimous that William, Peter, Bacon, and Lambert did not borrow from one of the others’ works in writing their own treatises. This being the case, I thought it beneficial to include references to and quotations from these contemporaneous works to give some idea of how these other writers were treating the issue under discussion by Lambert. The result, it is hoped, is that the reader will have a kind of general impression of what was being taught in some of the manuals of logic around the midpoint of the thirteenth century and how that may in some cases be related to earlier treatises that have come down to us and are preserved (principally) in de Rijk’s Logica modernorum. Not every issue that Lambert discusses is so referenced but only those for which other authors have something different or additional to say, or where the history of the issue seems interesting. (See, e.g., chapter 1, n. 57, where the reader is alerted to the considerable debate over what sort of proposition may be classified as a hypothetical proposition.) The inclusion of these texts should assist those in search of sources and connections. This work, then, is not simply a translation of a treatise on logic; it purports to offer something of a window onto the principal issues being debated at the midpoint of the thirteenth century with allusions to possible sources. Finally, a word or two on the translation of technical terms in a treatise on logic. While it is true that Lambert’s Latin is no more difficult to read and understand than

Introduction xlix

that of his contemporaries, all of them employ idioms that cannot be rendered literally into English. For example, the translation of ‘cadere a principali [voce]’ could draw on the embedded metaphor and result in “to fall from the principal word” in the sense that ‘grammarian’ falls away from ‘grammar’ with respect to its ending. Then again logicians speak of a consequentia in ipso and a consequentia e contrario, but here a literal rendering of these would be quite meaningless. In these cases Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump in their translations render the former by “is declined from its principal word” and the latter by “direct” and “indirect consequence.” Such Latin phrases in the medieval period were well established and employed universally, but translators today come up with all sorts of versions, which then mask the universality of the Latin phrases. In an attempt to get at least a modicum of continuity in the English translations of treatises on logic I have frequently adopted translations of technical terms and phrases proposed by Kretzmann and Stump in volume 1 of their Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, and I have chosen them because these translators seem to have an extraordinary ability to get it right. Hence, I hereby acknowledge a huge debt to them for saving me (and I am sure countless others to follow) a large amount of time fretting over how to express troublesome Latin words and phrases in contemporary English without falling into some kind of anachronism. In a couple of places where I disagree with their translation or where the Latin text is ambiguous I call attention to the fact in an endnote, but this is indeed quite rare.

T R A N S L AT I O N O F

L og ica , OR

Summa L amber ti

CHAPTER ONE

[PROPOSI TIONS ]

[PRELIMINARY REMARKS]

[1]  A knowledge of things to be said is very useful so that new students of the arts may know more fully what is taught in their summulae.1 [3.3–4] [The Trivium and Quadrivium]

[2] First, one asks why a student of the arts is said to study arts and not art. [3.5–6] [3]  One should reply to this that there are seven liberal arts and three of these are called the trivium: grammar, logic, and rhetoric. They are called the trivium [because they are], as it were, three paths to one thing, namely, discourse (sermo).2 All three of the trivium treat of discourse, but in different ways: grammar focuses on the congruity and incongruity of discourse, so that one may choose the congruous and flee the incongruous; logic focuses on the truth and falsity of discourse, so that one may choose the true and flee the false; but rhetoric pays attention to the elegance and inelegance of discourse, so that one may choose the elegant and flee the inelegant. [3.6–15] [4]  The other four are called the quadrivium, and thesea are the mathematical [arts], namely, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music. They are called the quadrivium, however, because they are four paths to one thing, namely, quantity. All the [arts] of the quadrivium treat of quantity, but they do it in different ways, for quantity

a.  Reading at p. 3.16 hee against hec.

3

4

T R A N SL AT IO N O F LO G I C A , O R SUM M A L A M B E RT I

is twofold, namely, continuous and discrete. And there are two kinds of continuous quantity: mobile and immobile. Geometry treats of immobile, continuous quantity because it pertains to the measurement of the earth. Astronomy treats of mobile, continuous quantity because it pertains to the motion of supercelestial bodies, namely, to the motion of the stars. These are bodies that are mobile with respect to location, not to form, for they are moved from place to place and so are mobile with respect to lo­ cation. But they are perpetual and are not destroyed, and so they are not mobile with respect to form. Discrete quantity, however, is number. But number can be taken in two ways: in itself and as such, or, in relation to sound. Arithmetic pertains to number taken in itself and as such; music pertains to number as it is related to sound. [3.15–31] [5]  The trivial arts can be called the trivium in another sense [because they are], as it were, three paths to one thing, namely, to eloquence, since they render a man eloquent. The [arts] of the quadrivium are called the quadrivium since they are four paths to one thing, namely, to wisdom, because they render a man wise. [3.31–4.2] [6]  Therefore, since there are seven arts in which a student of the arts must be instructed and which anyone teaching logic is required to have learned, a student of the arts is said to study the arts and not art. [4.2–5] [7]  One should know, however, that because of its difficulty and prolixity astronomy is not taught along with the other arts. In place of astronomy a brief treatise is taught called The Astrology of Marcian, and this Astrology of Marcian and the other six arts mentioned earlier are taught in their entirety (integre) and are required (de forma). [4.5–9] [8] One asks what an art is. [4.10] [9]  One should reply to this that an art is a collection of many precepts leading to one goal, i.e., a collection of many documents and many rules that are placed in an orderly arrangement for one purpose, namely, the knowledge of that about which one is principally concerned in the art.3 This is clear in the case of grammar, for all the rules and documents that are passed on in grammar are for the purpose of knowing what constitutes a complete and well-formed locution. And the case is similar in logic: all the things taught there are for the purpose of knowing what syllogism itself is and its species. Art is so called from ‘arto’, ‘artas’, for we are confined by the rules of an art and we are directed by them with respect to the things assigned to each art.4 [4.10–21] [Logic and Dialectic]

[10] One asks what logic is. [4.22] [11]  Logic is the science of discerning the true from the false by means of argumentation. Logic gets it name from ‘logos’, which means discourse, and ‘icos’, which means science, as it were, the science of discourse. [4.22–25]

Propositions 5

* * * [12]  But since there are three sciences of discourse, as has been said (3), and they each can be called logic, one asks why that name is assigned there to logic rather than to grammar or rhetoric. [4.25–28] [13]  One should reply to this that sometimes what is common to many is assigned to one because of [the latter’s] excellence or dignity. Clearly, ‘apostle’ is common to all the apostles, and if one says “apostle,” this is to be understood of Paul because of his excellence and dignity.5 Likewise, although ‘logic’ is a name common to all the [arts] of the trivium, nevertheless it is assigned to logic because [the latter] is more worthy and more excellent than the others are. This is clear from its definition: “Logic is the art of arts, the science of science. When accessible, all [of the sciences] are accessible, when inaccessible, all of the others are inaccessible. Without Logic there is no [science], and any [science] requires it.”6 [4.28–37] [14]  It can be said to be more worthy than the others are for another reason: the others derive their method from logic, for the scientific path, i.e., the way of proceeding in the sciences, is to define, distinguish, and combine or collect, i.e., to prove and disprove. No science other than logic teaches one how to define, distinguish, and combine; only logic does this, and so it directs the others and corrects them in their own way of proceeding. On account of this, it can be said to be more worthy than the others are in this respect, and so it excels grammar and rhetoric. [4.37–5.2] [15]  A sign of this is that Boethius, at the beginning of his Topics, divides logic into the art of discovering and the art of judging, and this division applies to no other art because logic alone sets out the method of discovering and judging.7 [5.2–6] [16] One asks what dialectic is. [5.7] [17]  Dialectic is the art of arts, providing the way to the principles of all methods.8 Only dialectic arguesa on the grounds of probability from the principles of all the arts. [5.7–9] [18]  And one should know that a method is a quick (brevis) and easy art, likened to a pathway (semita). Just as a pathway leads to the same destination as a broad road does, but more quickly and expeditiously, so do art and method lead to knowledge of the same thing, although method does this more easily than art does. Dialectic gets its name from ‘dia’, which means two, and ‘lexis’, which means reason, or [from] ‘logos’, which means discourse, as it were, an argument or discourse of two, namely, an opponent and a respondent in a disputation.9 [5.10–17] [19]  Then one asks what the difference is between logic and dialectic. [5.17–18]

a.  Reading at p. 5.9 probabiliter disputat against probabiliter, disputat.

6

T R A N SL AT IO N O F LO G I C A , O R SUM M A L A M B E RT I

[20]  One should reply to this that logic as an art and as a science is superior to dialectic. Logic is the science that teaches about every kind of syllogism, [whereas] dialectic [teaches] about dialectical syllogism or about apparently dialectical [syllogism]. Likewise, logic as an art employs every kind of syllogism, whereas dialectic uses only the dialectical one or the apparently dialectical one.10 [5.18–23] [21]  So, logic is handed down in all the books of logic, which are six, namely, in the Categories and On Interpretation, which are now called the old logic, and in the Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations, which four are called the new logic. Dialectic, on the other hand, is conveyed only in the Topics and On Sophistical Refutations.11 [5.23–28] [22]  One should know that science and art are different. Science gives a name without qualification to what it treats, whereas art involves a relation to a task. Hence, dialectic is called a science inasmuch as it teaches one how to construct a dialectical syllogism on the basis of its own principles; it is called an art to the extent that it employs dialectical syllogism to arrive at a conclusion.12 [5.28–34] [23]  Dialectical syllogism is the subject of dialectic and the instrument of dialectic. This can be seen in something analogous: a hammer can be a subject and an instrument in the craftsman’s art. A hammer is called a subject when the craftsman fashions it using his own principles, but it is called an instrument when, once the hammer is made, it is used to make other things. Similarly, dialectical syllogism is called the subject of dialectic when dialectic teaches one how to construct a dialectical syllogism, but it is called an instrument when, once constructed, dialectic employs [it] to arrive at a conclusion. And dialectic is called a science when it takes dialectical syllogism as its subject, [whereas] it is called an art when it uses the same thing for its instrument. [5.34–6.2] [24]  One should note that just as the whole intent of the grammarian is to ensure complete and well-formed locutions, so the whole intent of the logician is to achieve a perfect syllogism. So, to all [the questions] to which a logician gives a resolution, he does so by means of a syllogism.13 [6.3–6]

[SOUND] 14

[25] One asks why a logician begins with sound and not with something that is prior to sound. [6.7–8] [26]  One should reply that the logician is the craftsman of discourse and nothing prior to sound is relevant to the consideration of the craftsman of discourse. So he begins with sound as from something more fundamental. [6.8–11]

Propositions 7

[The Definition of ‘Sound’]

[27]  Sound is defined in this way: “Sound is whatever is perceived by the sense of hearing properly, per se, and in as much as [the sound] exists of itself ” (quicquid proprie et per se et quantum est de se per auditum percipitur). “Properly” is included because, if the ear, which is an organ, i.e., an instrument of hearing, is touched and perceives the touch, the touch is not a sound. Granted the ear has a sensation while it is being touched, nevertheless to perceive while being touched does not properly belong to it as an ear, but as a part of the body. [6.12–18] [28]  One should know that animals have five particular senses, which are hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch; of these, four have proper organs. Sight has the eye, for we see by means of the eye and not by any other; smell has the nose, for we smell by means of the nose and not by any other; hearing [has] the ear, for we hear by means of the ear and not by any other; taste [has] the tongue, for we taste by means of the tongue and not by any other. But the fifth, which is touch, does not allocate for itself any particular part of the body but is diffused throughout the whole body, and so there is tactile sensation in any part of the body. If the ear senses something while it is being touched, this is not something unique to it. [6.18–28] [29]  “Per se” is included [in the definition] because many things are perceived by hearing that are not sound because they are not perceived per se but are perceived by hearing through the instrumentality of their own vocal sound, such as a priest chanting and a dog barking. “Inasmuch as it exists of itself ” is included because, should there arise a sound and it is perceived by no one, the sound, nevertheless, exists because it is still audible, even though it is not heard. [6.28–33] [The Division of Sound]

[30]  Sound is divided in this way: one sort of sound is vocal sound (vox), the other is nonvocal sound. Nonvocal sound is of no interest to a logician.15 [6.34–35] [31]  But, then, if one asks why the definition of ‘sound’ is presented before its division, one should reply that what is not complex is wont to be known in two ways, namely, by definition and by division. The definition is derived from things [logically] prior [to what is defined], for a definition arises from a genus and differentiae, namely, from those things that have the modes of genus and differentiae.16 But genus and differentiae are prior to those things of which they are the genus and differentiae. Division is derived from things that [logically] come later (per posteriora), and so whatever has a definition is defined before it is divided. [6.35–7.1]

8

T R A N SL AT IO N O F LO G I C A , O R SUM M A L A M B E RT I

* * * [32]  A sound that is also voice is the same as vocal sound; and vocal sound is sound uttered by the mouth of an animal and formed by natural instruments. By the fact that [the definition of ‘vocal sound’] includes “uttered by the mouth of an animal” it is clear that, if [the sound] issues from some place in an animal other than the mouth, it is neither sound that is also voicea nor vocal sound. Natural instruments are these: mouth, lips, teeth, tongue, palate, throat, and suchlike.17 [7.1–6] [Nonsignifying and Signifying Vocal Sound]

[33]  Vocal sound is divided this way: one sort of vocal sound signifies, the other does not signify. Nonsignifying vocal sound is what signifies nothing, but it is not our present focus. Signifying vocal sound is what signifies something. [7.7–10] [Natural and Conventional Signifying Vocal Sound]

[34]  One sort of signifying vocal sound signifies naturally, the other does so at one’s pleasure.18 That is said to signify naturally that signifies something by its nature, e.g., the groans of the sick and the barking of dogs.19 [7.10–13] [35]  But one might argue that [natural vocal sounds] signify those things at one’s pleasure because they are names, and names signify at one’s pleasure. [7.13–14] [36]  One should reply to this that they signify them naturally, and it is not to be understood that those utterances (dictiones) signify at one’s pleasureb. But one is to understand that the cry that is called the groan of the sick signifies naturally because it signifies pain suffered by the one groaning. The barking of dogs likewise signifies naturally, namely, anger or joy, or some such thing. That the groan of the sick signifies naturally is clear because not only rational things but also nonrational things emit a cry by nature, and not by some other source, because of the pain they experience. [7.14–23]

[WORDS]

[37]  A vocal sound that signifies at one’s pleasure is one that signifies something at the will of the one who institutes [it].20 [7.24–25]

a.  Reading at p. 7.5 sonus vox against sonus. b.  Reading at p. 7.16 ad placitum against a natura.

Propositions 9

* * * [38]  On the other hand Aristotle says in Book Two of the Physics that there are two sources of things, namely, nature and will.21 Nature is an unchangeable source, for nature does not accustom itself to something contrary. This is clear in the case of fire: heat inheres by nature in it in such a way that cold cannot inhere in it. But the will is a changeable source, and hence is open to an opposite. This is clear because a man who is acting by will can sit or not sit, if he chooses. If, therefore, the significatum of a word were from the will of the one instituting it, the significatum could be changed, which is false.22 [7.25–34] [39]  One should reply to this that one speaks of will in two ways. In one sense inasmuch as it is free, and of such it is true that it is a changeable source; or we can talk of will inasmuch as it is considered by right reason or abstracted by reason, and in this sense will is not a changeable source—in this sense will is the source of imposing vocal sounds for signifying, and not in the first sense.23 [7.34–8.2] [40]  In many cases vocal sounds are imposed to signify things in accord with the properties of the things and also in accord with reason. For example, man (homo) is so called because he is made from earth (humus), and stone (lapis), as it were, from wounding a foot (laedens pedem), and so on for others.24 [8.2–5] [Combined and Uncombined Words]

[41]  Vocal sound signifying at one’s pleasure is the same as discourse (sermo). One sort of discourse is combined and the other uncombined. Uncombined discourse is that which does not embrace more than one thing in it, i.e., which is not composed of more than one thing, such as a word (dictio). According to Boethius a word is the naming that comes about through one simple vocable (unius simplicis vocabuli nuncupatio), whicha is the same as a term (terminus).25 A term is that into which a proposition is resolved. But combined discourse is that which embraces more than one thing in it, e.g., an expression (oratio), which arises from more than one word. [8.6–13] [42]  One should know that a term is the smallest [unit] in logic because a logician does not analyze beyond the term. Rather, he stops with the term because it is something indivisible, as far as he is concerned. [8.13–16] [43]  But one might ask why [the logician] does not concern himself with letters and syllables, as does the grammarian. [8.17–18] [44]  One should reply to this that grammar is more elementary than logic is. But what is explained in a more elementary science must be presupposed in a less

a.  Reading at p. 8.10 quod against que.

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e­ lementary one, and so the logician accepts from the grammarian that syllables are composed of letters, and words are made up of syllables—he offers no analysis of these. [8.18–22] [45]  But then it can be argued or objected: since the grammarian analyzes words, the logician ought to assume the grammarian’s [analysis of ] words and not analyze them [further]. [8.22–25] [46]  One should reply to this that the logician and the grammarian are concerned with words from different points of view. The logician looks at what is true and false with respect to discourse; but truth and falsity are caused by the narrowed significata of a word (a significatis specialibus dictionis), and so the logician looks at a word with respect to its narrowed significatum. But the grammarian pays attention to the con­ gruity and incongruity of discourse, and congruity and incongruity are caused by accidents which are immediately consequent upon the general significata of words. For this reason the grammarian principally looks at a word with respect to its general significatum. And so the logician does not assume the grammarian’s [analysis of ] words but does analyze them. The case was otherwise with respect to letters and syllables because the logician considers letters and syllables in a way different from the way a ­grammarian does. [8.25–37]­ [The Division of Words]

[47]  Some words are names, others are verbs.26 [8.38] [48]  Since according to grammarians there are eight parts of speech, here one could ask why the logician analyzes only names and verbs. [8.38–9.1] [49]  One should reply to this that according to Boethius names and verbs are to be thought of as the only two parts of an expression.27 The others are not parts of an expression but supplements to the parts of an expression. And so a logician, taking [the name and the verb] as principal parts, analyzes them alone. In one set of circumstances he takes, e.g., a pronoun as a name and a participle as a verb, but in other situations he reduces such [words] as indeclinables to principal [parts]. [Indeclinables] are not really called parts because they signify nothing definite of themselves but instead are called [parts] that consignify and so are named by a logician “things that consignify.” Priscian says this near the end of his Priscian Minor when he says: “These always consignify, i.e., they signify when joined to others but not by themselves; and so their signification is altered by force of the words joined to them.”28 [9.1–13] [50]  One is to speak first of names before verbs because substance is prior to action: a namea signifies substance but a verb action. [9.13–15] a.  Reading at p. 9.15 nomen enim against nomen autem.

Propositions 11

NAMES [The Definition of ‘Name’]

[51]  A name is a vocal sound that signifies at one’s pleasure, apart from time, whose parts taken by themselves signify nothing, finite, and direct. [9.16–18] [52]  Here one should note that a definition must apply only to the thing whose it is and must separate it from all others. Because of this the differentiae mentioned are included in the stated definition of a name to distinguish a name from every other thing. [9.18–21] [53]  “Vocal sound” is included there as a genus, for vocal sound is the genus of name: whatever is a name is a vocal sound but not vice versa. [9.21–23] [54]  “That signifies” is included to exclude vocal sounds that do not signify, which are not names, fora a name signifies that whose name it is. [9.23–25] [55]  “At one’s pleasure” is included to rule out vocal sounds that signify naturally, which are not names, for every name signifies at the pleasure of the one who imposes, namely, of the one who first imposes the name. [9.25–28] [56]  “Without time” is included to rule out verbs, which signify along with time.  9.28–29] [57]  But one could argue that ‘day’, ‘month’, and the like signify time and yet are names; it seems, therefore, that some names signify along with time. [9.30–32] [58]  One should reply that the names mentioned do signify time, but they do not signify along with time because they do not consignify time: it is one thing to signify time; it is another to consignify it.29 A word is said to signify that for which it was imposed to signify, as ‘man’ signifies man. But it is said to consignify that which accrues to it beyond its principal significatum, as ‘man’ consignifies the nominative case and a singular number and other things which accompany it: a consignificatum in logic is the same as an accent in grammar. It is true, therefore, that some names signify time because they convey time through their principal significatum. But no name signifies along with time because time accrues to no name. [9.32–10.5] [59]  “Whose parts taken by themselves signify nothing” is included in the definition of ‘name’ to rule out an expression, which is not a name. The parts of an expression signify something outside the expression. [10.6–8] [60]  But one could argue that ‘soup’ is a name and yet the different parts of this word seem to signify something, e.g., ‘so’ and ‘up’.30 [10.9–11] a.  Reading at p. 9.24 enim against autem.

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[61]  One should reply to this that ‘so’ and ‘up’ signify absolutely nothing as parts of the word ‘soup’. But if one recognizes that ‘so’ is an adverb and likewise ‘up’, and thus signify something, then they are not parts of the name ‘soup’. [10.11–15] [62]  “Finite” is included there to exclude infinite names, which are not names. An infinite name is one to which a negation is prefixed in such a way that the negation remains integral and that one thing composed of two wholes arises from the name and the negation, such as ‘nonman’. Such names are called infinite, as Boethius says in his book Categorical Syllogism, because they are such that they are able to signify an infinite number of things.31 Whatever ‘nonman’ signifies is not contained in man. A nonman can be a horse, a stone, and a house and whatever is not a man. The reason why it is not a name can be because every name in a given context (in aliquo) should be able to put an end to the question to which one is responding. But an infinite name can in no way put an end to the question to which one is responding, and so Boethius says that every name signifies something finite.32 But ‘nonman’, which is something infinite, quashes that. [10.15–29] [63]  “Direct” is included there to rule out the oblique cases of names, which are not names.33 Thus Aristotle in his book On Interpretation and Boethius say that ‘Catonis’ and ‘Catoni’ are not names.34 Every name joined to a verb of the present, past, or future tense signifies something true or false, which the oblique cases do not do: ‘of Cato is’ signifies nothing either true or false, and so the oblique cases are not names.35 [10.30–36]

VERBS [The Definition of ‘Verb’]

[64]  A verb is a vocal sound that signifies at one’s pleasure, along with time, whose separate parts signify nothing, and is finite and direct. [11.1–2] [65]  “A vocal sound that signifies at one’s pleasure” is included for the same reason stated in discussing names. [11.3–4] [66]  “Along with time” is stipulated to rule out names: time does not accrue to a name, but it does to a verb. [11.4–5] [67]  “Finite” is included to rule out infinite verbs, which are not verbs. An infinite verb is one to which a negation has been prefixed in such a way that the negation remains integral, and thus one thing is composed of two whole things, the verb and the negation, such as ‘nonruns’ and the like. It is called infinite because it indicates nothing determinate, for the nonwhite can become red and become black, and so on for others. The reason why it is not a verb can be because Aristotle says that a verb is

Propositions 13

always about something, i.e., it is always said about something that is.36 But an infinite verb is always abouta anything—what is or is not—i.e., it is said both of an entity and a nonentity.37 [11.5–16] [68]  “Direct” is specified to exclude the cases of a verb. The case of a verb is all verbs in a tense other than the present of the indicative mood.38 So, according to Aristotle, ‘ran’b and ‘was running’ are not verbs but cases of a verb. He gives the reason for this: every verb consignifies present time.39 The cases of a verb consignify those times that the present does notc embrace, i.e., the past and the future, and so they are not verbs. [11.16–23]

EXPRESSIONS 40 [The Definition of ‘Expression’]

[69]  An expression is a vocal sound that signifies at one’s pleasure whose parts taken separately signify something.41 [11.24–25] [Explanation of the Definition]

[70]  “A vocal sound that signifies at one’s pleasure” is included on the same grounds as it was in the case of a name and a verb, and “along with time” and “without time” are not placed there because some expressions signify along with time, such as ‘A man runs’, and some without time, such as ‘white man’. Likewise “finite” is not included because an expression can certainly be constructed from an infinite name and a verb, e.g., ‘A nonman runs’. Similarly “direct”d is not placed there because an expression can of course arise from an oblique case of a verb and an oblique case of a name.42 [11.25–33] [The Divisions of Expressions]

[71]  Expressions, moreover, are divided in this way: some expressions are perfect, the others are imperfect. A perfect one is one that makes complete sense in the mind of the listener, and, once heard, the mind of the listener is at rest, e.g., ‘A man runs’. An

a.  Reading at p. 11.15 de against in. b.  Reading at p. 11.19 cucurrit against currit. c.  Reading at p. 11.22 non complectitur against complectitur. d.  Reading at p. 11.32 recta against infinita.

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imperfect one is one that makes incomplete sense in the mind of the listener and, once heard, the mind of the listener is not at rest, such as ‘white man’. For the present, nothing is to be said about imperfect expressions. [11.33–39] [The Five Species of Perfect Expressions]

[72]  There are five species of perfect expressions according to Boethius:43 (1) interrogative, as in ‘Do you think the soul is immortal?’ (2) imperative, such as ‘Make a fire’; (3) optative, e.g., ‘Would that I were a good cleric’ (for the optative and entreating are the same); (4) vocative, such as ‘God, be with me’; and (5) indicative, e.g., ‘Socrates walks’.44 In the first four there is neither truth nor falsity. The indicative alone contains the true and the false; hence only the indicative is said to make a statement. So, omitting all the others, our present focus is on the one that makes a statement, and an expression that makes a statement is the same as a proposition.45 [11.39–12.9] [73]  If one asks about the quantity of ‘Make a fire’, or ‘Would that I were a good cleric’, or some such other, one should reply that they have no quantity. These hold no interest for the logician because they are not indicative, and the logician considers only the indicative. [12.9–13]

[PROPOSITIONS] [The Definition of ‘Proposition’]

[74]  ‘Proposition’ is defined this way: A proposition is an expression that signifies by indicating what is true and what is false.46 [12.14–16] [75]  Here one should note that the names ‘statement’, ‘word’, ‘assumption’, ‘question’, ‘conclusion’, and ‘proposition’ all amount to the same thing, for one and the same expression with respect to what is signified and substance can be called by all these names; hence they differ only in the way we conceive of them. An expression is called a statement when it is taken by itself and as such. It is called a question when it is asked by an opponent. It is called a word when it is given to an opponent by one who is making an argument a. It is called an assumption when an opponent takes it in the same sense as the respondent intends it. It is called a proposition when it is placed in an orderly arrangement to prove or imply a conclusion. But it is called a conclusion when it is concluded from premises or a premise. [12.16–27]

a.  Reading at p. 12.23 ab argumentante against argumentante.

Propositions 15

[76]  Expression, however, is said to be a genus with respect to all these, and so Boethius says in his Topics that “it is called a statement when it is taken only for itself, but it is a proposition if it is taken to prove something; it is a question if one asks something about it; and it is a conclusion if it is approved.”47 [12.27–32] [The Divisions of Propositions]

[77]  Propositions are divided in this way: one sort of proposition is categorical, another hypothetical. [12.33–34] [Categorical Propositions] 48

[78]  A categorical [proposition] is one that has a subject, a predicate, and a ­copula, such as ‘A man is an animal’, or something in the place of the predicate and copula, as in ‘A man runs’. The subject is that about which the predicate is said; the predicate is what is said of the subject; but the copula is what unites the predicate to the subject. It is called categorical from ‘cathegorizo, cathegorizas’, which means the same as does ‘predico -as’, and so categorical is the same as predicative.49 [12.34–13.2] [79]  And if one asks why a categorical is denominated more from the predicate than from the subject, the reason is clear: the predicate is more worthy than the subject is, and denomination ought to be from the more worthy. The predicate presents itself in the manner of form whereas the subject for the most part (pro tanto) in the manner of matter, because, just as form is received in matter and matter receives form, so the predicate is received by the subject and the subject receives the predicate. But form is more worthy than matter is, because form perfects matter. But perfection is more noble than what it makes perfect, and so the predicate is more worthy and more noble than the subject is. [13.2–11] [Affirmative and Negative Propositions]

[80]  One sort of categorical proposition is affirmative, the other is negative. An affirmative is one in which the predicate is affirmed of the subject, as in ‘A man is an animal’; a negative is one in which the predicate is removed from the subject, e.g., ‘A man is not an ass’. [13.12–15] [Universal, Particular, Indefinite, and Singular Propositions]

[81]  One sort of affirmative or negative categorical proposition is universal, another is particular, another indefinite, and another singular. [13.16–18]

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[82] A universal [proposition] is one in which a common term determined by a universal sign functions as the subject, as in ‘Every man is an animal’, and it is denominated universal from the universal sign giving the subject that disposition. A universal sign, moreover, is denominated from ‘universe’, and a universe is the same as a whole. And because a universal sign indicates that the term added to it is interpreted for all its supposita, it is called universal.50 Universal signs are ‘all’, ‘every’, ‘none’, ‘any’, ‘both’, and the like. [13.19–26] [83]  One could ask what the quantity of ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’ is. [13.26–27] [84] One argues that it is universal because a common term determined by a universal sign functions as the subject, and therefore it is universal. [13.28–29] [85]  On the other hand: a universal affirmative and a particular negative are contradictory, but ‘Some man is not quantitatively whole’ is a particular negative. If, therefore, ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’ is universal, since it is not negative but affirmative and has the same subject and the same predicate as the particular, ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’ is [the particular’s] contradictory. But this is false, for the two are true, and the law of contradictories in all instances is that if one is true the other is false. [13.29–38] [86]  One should reply to this that ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’ is singular because the whole that every man is (which is something singular, a whole discrete from other wholes, as from every ass, every lion, and so on for all things similar) functions as the subject in it. So, when one says ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’, it is the same as if one were to say that to be quantitatively whole applies to the discrete whole that is every man. [13.38–14.1] [87]  If one asks what the universal [proposition] is under which the singular [proposition] is contained (for a singular is under a universal), one should reply that this is its universal: ‘Every universal whole taken with a universal sign is quantitatively whole.’ Thus, just as ‘Socrates runs’ is the singular of ‘Every man runs’, so ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’ is the singular of that universal, for, just as ‘Every man runs; therefore Socrates runs’ follows, so ‘Every universal whole taken with a universal sign is quantitatively whole; therefore every man is quantitatively whole’ follows, and the argument proving this must be conceded. [14.2–12] [88]  One should reply to the argument on the other side (84) that sometimes a universal sign is a disposition of the subject and in no sense part [of the subject], and then it disposes the subject with respect to the predicate, indicating that the predicate inheres in each part of the subject, as when one says ‘Every man runs’.51 And in that case it is true that a universal sign added to the subject makes the proposition universal. But sometimes a universal sign is not a disposition of the subject but a part of the

Propositions 17

subject, and then it does not indicate that the predicate inheres in each part of the subject. When one says ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’, this does not make the proposition universal, and [the objection] is resolved in this way. In order for a proposition to be universal it is not sufficient that a universal sign be added to the subject; what is needed is for a disposition [to be added and] in such a way as not to be a part. But it is clear that it is a part of the subject and not just a disposition, for to be quantitatively whole is applicablea de se to man, for man is de se a universal whole, granted [man is also quantitatively whole] because a universal whole taken with a universal sign is quantitatively whole. And so the predicate ‘to be quantitatively whole’ applies to man because of the additionb of the universal sign to it, and similarly it is part of the subject with respect to such a predicate. Therefore, that it is a part derives from the nature of such a predicate.52 [14.12–33] [89] A particular [proposition] is one in which a common term determined by a particular sign functions as the subject, e.g., ‘Some man is an animal’; it is denomi­ nated particular on the basis of the particular sign. But a sign is called particular that indicates a common term to which is added a term [interpreted] for some part of it. Particular signs are, e.g., ‘some’, ‘a certain one’, ‘the one’, ‘the other’, ‘any’c, and the like. [14.34–40] [90] An indefinite [proposition] is one in which a common term governed by no sign (neither universal nor particular) functions as the subject, as in ‘Man is an animal’. It is called indefinite because it is unclear whether the common term in it is interpreted for one or for more than one, since it is determined by no sign. [14.41–15.2] [91]  Here one can ask what the quantity of ‘Man is a species’ is. [15.2–3] [92] One argues that it is indefinite because a common term determined by no sign functions there as the subject. [15.3–5] [93]  On the other hand, a particular and an indefinite [proposition] are converted. Therefore, if it is indefinite, it is the same to say ‘Man is a species’ and ‘Some man is a species’. But this is false, for ‘Man is a species’ is true, but ‘Some man is a species’ is false. [15.5–9] [94]  One should reply to this (91) that ‘Man is a species’ is a singular [proposition]. Although ‘man’ is a common name of supposita, nevertheless it is the proper name of a species, and because of this, since it functions there as a subject [naming] its own concept, namely, the species, and not with respect to its supposita, it is taken here

a.  Reading at p. 14.26 convenit against non convenit. b.  Reading at p. 14.30 additionem against addictionem. c.  Reading at p. 14.39 ullus against nullus.

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as a proper, not a common, [name]. That this is true can be confirmed by Priscian in Book One of Priscian Minor when he says that appellations can be proper names “with respect to the generic and specific forms of things,” i.e., with respect to the genus and species that are indicated, i.e., signified, by them.53 The argument that proves these things must be conceded. [15.9–19] [95]  In response to the argument on the other side (92) one should reply that ‘man’ does not function there as a subject in its capacity as a common term because it [functions], not on behalf of its supposita, but more as the proper name of a species, and so [the proposition] is not indefinite but more singular. [15.19–22] [96] A singular [proposition] is one in which a discrete term or a demonstrative pronoun or a common term with a demonstrative pronoun functions as the subject, such as ‘Socrates runs’, ‘He runs’, or ‘This man runs’. It is called singular because the subject in such is interpreted for only one thing and in no way for more than one. [15.23–27] [97]  If one were to argue that a discrete term seems to be common in that it can be said of more than one thing—for more than one thing can be named by the same discrete name, since more than one thing can be called by the same name, e.g., by the name ‘Peter’—one should reply to this that commonality is twofold, namely, verbal and real (realis). For a term to be common, verbal commonality alone does not suffice; it must also be real, i.e., both in what is signified and in word, as appears in the name ‘man’. But that commonality which is in a discrete term is only verbal, not real. This is clear, for, if more than one thing share the same proper name, this will involve equivocation, because the sharing will be only in word and not in what is signified; and it does not follow that a discrete term is common because of this. This is what Priscian intends in his Greater Work when he says that appellatives are naturally common, i.e., truly and properly, whereas proper [names] by chance, i.e., incidentally and improperly.54 [15.27–16.3] Hypothetical Propositions [The Definition of ‘Hypothetical Proposition’]

[98]  Hypothetical propositions follow.55 A hypothetical proposition is one that has two categorical [propositions] joined together by a bond for its principal parts. It is called hypothetical from ‘hypos’, which means under, and ‘thesis’, which means position, as it were, a subposition, because in a hypothetical proposition one proposition is subjected to another.56 [16.4–8]

Propositions 19

[Six Species of Hypothetical Propositions]

[99]  There are six species of hypothetical propositions: conditional, copulative, disjunctive, causal, local, and temporal.57 [16.9–10] [100] A conditional [proposition] is one whose parts are joined by the connective ‘if ’, as in ‘If it is a man, it is an animal’. It is called conditional by Boethius in his book On Hypothetical Syllogisms because it indicates that something is the case, on the condition that something else is the case.58 It requires for its truth that the antecedent could not be true without the consequent [also being true]; but for its falsity it requires that the antecedent could be true without the consequent [also being true].59 [16.11–17] [101] A copulative [proposition] is one whose parts are joined by the connective ‘and’, as in ‘Socrates runs and Plato argues,’ and it is denominated copulative from the copulative connective which joins the parts in it. For its truth it is required that both parts be true; for its falsity it suffices that either part be false. [16.18–22] [102] A disjunctive [proposition] is one whose parts are joined by the connective ‘or’, as in ‘Socrates runs or Plato argues’, and it is denominated disjunctive from the disjunctive connective which joins the parts in it. For its truth it requires that one of the parts be true, but for its falsity that both parts be false.60 [16.23–28] [103] A causal [proposition] is one whose parts are joined by the connective ‘because’, as in ‘Because the sun shines over the earth, it is day’, and it is denominated causal because its parts are joined together by a connective indicating a cause. It requires for its truth that the antecedent be the cause of the consequent; for its falsity it requires that [its antecedent] not be the cause. [16.29–34] [104] A local [proposition] is one whose parts are joined by the adverb ‘where’, as in ‘Socrates runs where Plato argues’, and it is denominated local from the adverb of place joining the parts in it. It requires for its truth that the two actions which are stated in the local [proposition] be carried out in the same place; but for its falsity that this not be the case. [16.35–17.2] [105] A temporal [proposition] is one whose parts are joined by the adverb ‘while’, as in ‘Socrates runs while Plato argues’, and it is denominated temporal from the adverb of time joining the parts in it. It requires for its truth that the two actions that are stated in the temporal [proposition] be carried out at the same time but for its falsity that this not be the case. [17.3–8] [The Difference between Categorical and Hypothetical Propositions]

[106]  Here one should note that there is a difference between a categorical [proposition] and a conditional hypothetical one, as Boethius says in the same book, because

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a categorical constitutes its force in the predication alone, i.e., in the affirmation of a predicate of a subject or the removal of a predicate from a subject.61 But a conditional constitutes its force in a consequence, for this is not affirmed of that, but that this is the case if that is the case, since it says that the consequent is the case if the antecedent is the case. [17.9–16] [107]  One should note that to the question raised by “What kind?” about a proposition one should reply categorical and hypothetical; by “What sort?” affirmative or negative; by “How many?” universal, particular, indefinite, or singular, and this is presented in this verse: What kind? categorical or hypothetical; What sort? negative or affirmative; How many? universal, particular, indefinite, singular 62 The reason for this can be that there are three things in a proposition: substance, quality, and quantity. ‘Categorical’ and ‘hypothetical’ name the substance of a proposition; ‘affirmative’ and ‘negative’ name the quality of a proposition; and ‘universal’, ‘particular’, ‘indefinite’, and ‘singular’ name the quantity of a proposition. And because one inquires about substance by “What kind?” about quality by “What sort?” and about quantity by “How many?” one should reply to the question raised by “What kind?”: categorical or hypothetical; by “What sort?”: affirmative or negative; and by “How many?”: universal, particular, indefinite, and singular.63 [17.16–31] [108]  One should note that one is not to ask “How many?” of a hypothetical proposition, because a hypothetical has no quantity of itself except that which it draws from the categoricals of which it is composed.64 [17.31–34] [Categorical Propositions, continued] [Categorical Propositions Sharing Terms]

[109]  Some categorical propositions share no terms, others one term, and still others both. Those that agree in neither the subject nor the predicate share no term, as in ‘Socrates runs’ and ‘An ass argues’. Those that agree only in their subjects or only in their predicates share one term, as in ‘A man runs’ and ‘A man argues’, or ‘A man runs’ and ‘An ass runs’. But those that agree in subjects and predicates share both terms, as in ‘Every man is an animal’ and ‘No man is an animal’. [17.35–18.5] [110]  Some propositions sharing both terms do so in the same order, others in a reverse order. They share in reverse order that agree in subject and predicate, but what is the subject in one is the predicate in the other, and vice versa, as in ‘No man is an ass’ and ‘No ass is a man’. They share both terms in the same order that agree in subject and

Propositions 21

predicate in such a way that what is the subject in one is the subject in the other, and likewise what is the predicate in one is the predicate in the other, as in ‘Every man runs’ and ‘No man runs’. [18.6–16] [111]  One should know that those that share in no way, and those that share in one term, and those that share in both terms in reverse order are not going to be the subject of our concern here (nullo modo se habent in fieri). [18.16–19] [Oppositions among Contraries, Subcontraries, Contradictories, and Subalterns]65

[112]  But some of those sharing both terms in the same order are contraries, others are subcontraries, others contradictories, and still others subalterns. A universal affirmative and a universal negative are contraries; a particular affirmative and a particular negative are subcontraries; a universal affirmative and a particular affirmative along with a universal negative and a particular negative are subalterns; and a universal affirmative and a particular negative along with a universal negative and a particular affirmative are contradictories.66 Contraries are, e.g., ‘Every man is an animal’ and ‘No man is an animal’, and they are called contraries by Boethius in his Categorical Syllogisms because the negation takes away universally what the affirmation asserts universally.67 Subcontraries are, e.g., ‘Some man runs’ and ‘Some man does not run’, and they are called subcontraries because they are placed under the contraries. Subalterns are, e.g., ‘Every man is an animal’ and ‘Some man is an animal’, and ‘No man is an animal’ and ‘Some man is not an animal’. They are called subalterns because one is contained under the other, namely, a particular under a universal. Contradictories are, e.g., ‘Every man runs’ and ‘Some man does not run’ and ‘No man runs’ and ‘Some man runs’. They are called contradictories by Boethius in the same book, who says that a universal affirmation and a particular negation face an affirmation or negation diagonally in a figure, and so he calls them contrapositionals (contraiacentes).68 [18.20–19.3] [The Triple Matter of Propositions]69

[113]  To know their laws, i.e., how they relate to truth and falsity one should note that the matter of a proposition is threefold: natural, contingent, and remote. Those propositions are said to be in natural matter in which the predicate naturally inheres in the subject, and the predicate is said to inhere naturally in the subject when it cannot be absent from the subject, so long as the subject remains. Those are said to be in contingent matter in which the predicate contingently inheres in the subject, and the predicate is said to inhere contingently in the subject when the predicate can be present or absent from the subject, with the subject remaining. Those are said to be in remote matter in which the predicate is naturally inapplicable to the subject, and a predicate is said to be naturally inapplicable to the subject when it has a repugnance for the subject

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in every respect to such a degree that it could never inhere in the subject.70 Natural matter can be called necessary, contingent [can be called] accidental [matter], and remote [can be called] impossible [matter].71 [19.4–19] [The Laws of Opposition in the Various Matters]

[114]  The law of contraries is such that if one is true the other is false, and vice versa in natural and remote matter. But in contingent matter, if one is true the other is false, and not vice versa, because in contingent matter they can be false at the same time. The law of subcontraries is such that if one is false the other is true in natural and remote matter and vice versa. And in contingent matter, if one is false the other is true and not vice versa, because in contingent matter they can be true at the same time. The law of contradictories is such that if one is true the other is false in every kind of matter and vice versa. The law of subalterns is such that if one is true the other is true and if one is false the other is false in natural and remote matter. But in contingent matter, if the universal is true, the particular will be true and not vice versa, because the particular can be true while its universal remains false.72 [19.20–24] [115] Here one could ask why contraries are able to share falsity but not truth.73 [19.25–39] [116]  One should reply to this that a universal [proposition] can be true in only one way, i.e., for the whole, for if ‘Every man runs’ is true, it is necessary that the predicate be applicable to, or inhere in, the subject for any suppositum. And when a universal is true for the whole, it is necessary that its contrary be false for the whole, and so they cannot share truth. A universal proposition, however, can be false for the whole or false for a part. So, if no man is running, or one is running and another is not, ‘Every man runs’ is false. But when a universal proposition is false for a part, then its contrary is false for a part, e.g., if some men run and others do not, ‘Every man runs’ is false for those not running, and so they can share falsity. [19.39–20.8] [117]  In this connection one could ask why subcontraries cannot be false at the same time—they are, after all, sometimes true at the same time. [20.8–9] [118]  One should reply to this that subcontraries cannot be true at the same time except in the case when their contraries can be false at the same time. The reason for this is because a true particular makes the universal opposed to it false: ‘Every man is white’ is not false except because ‘Some man is not white’ is true, and likewise ‘No man is white’ is not false except because ‘Some man is white’ is true. Similarly, a true universal causes the particular opposed to it to be false: ‘Some man runs’ is not false except because ‘No man runs’ is true, and likewise ‘Some man does not run’ is not false except because ‘Every man runs’ is true. So, subcontraries relate to the truth and falsity of their contraries in an opposite way. And because of this, when contraries can be false

Propositions 23

but not true at the same time, subcontraries will be able to be true but not false at the same time. This is what Boethius means in his Categorical Syllogisms when he says that subcontraries, in a sense, are the contraries of contraries, because they relate dissimilarly to truth and falsity.74 [20.9–27] Conversion 75

[119]  Having spoken of propositions sharing both terms in the same order, now one should speak of propositions sharing both terms but in reverse order. Reverse order is the same as conversion, but conversion is the principle for reducing imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones, and it is wont to come about by the change of a subject into a predicate and of a predicate into a subject. [20.28–34] [Three Kinds of Conversion]

[120]  There are three kinds of conversion, namely, simple, by limitation, and by contraposition. Simple conversion occurs when a predicate arises from a subject and vice versa, the quality and quantity remaining the same, and this is the way a universal negative and a particular affirmative are wonta to be converted in se, e.g., ‘No man is an ass’, therefore ‘No ass is a man’ and ‘Some man is an animal’, ‘Some animal is a man’. Conversion by limitation occurs when the predicate arises from the subject and vice versa, the quality remaining the same, but the quantity having been changed, and this is the way a universal affirmative is wont to be converted, e.g., ‘Every man is an animal’, ‘Some animal is a man’. Conversion by contraposition occurs when one makes a predicate of the subject and vice versa, the quality and quantity remaining the same, but with finite terms changed into infinite terms, and this is the way the universal affirmative and the particular negative are wont to be converted, e.g., ‘Every man is an animal’, ‘Every nonanimal is a nonman’ and ‘Some man is not an animal’, ‘Some nonanimal is not a nonman’.76 [20.35–21.12] [121]  Here one should know that in simple conversion and in conversion by contraposition, if the convertendb is true, the conversec will be true and vice versa; and if false, then false and vice versa.77 In conversion by limitation, if the convertendd is true, the conversee will also be true, but not vice versa, because the convertendf can be false and the converseg true, as in ‘Every man is white’, ‘Some white thing is a man’. [21.12–18] a.  Reading at p. 20.38 habent against habet. b.  Reading at p. 21.13–14 convertens against conversa. c.  Reading at p. 21.14 conversa against convertens. d.  Reading at p. 21.15 convertens against conversa. e.  Reading at p. 21.16 conversa against convertens. f.  Reading at p. 21.16–17 convertens against conversa. g.  Reading at p. 21.17 conversa against convertens.

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[122]  For this reason one should also know that if the convertenda is true, the converseb will be true; but this does not hold vice versa, for the conversec can be true while the convertendd is false, as was [just] seen in the case of conversion by limi­ tation. [21.18–22] [123]  One could propose examples against conversion of a universal negative, for, if one says ‘No old man will be a boy’, it is true. Likewise, ‘No boy was an old man’ is true. If on the other hand ‘No old man was a boy’ is converted, it will be false. And so ‘No boy will be an old man’ is not converted into ‘No old man will be a boy’. [21.23–28] [124]  Also, ‘No (male) citizen (nullus civis) is a woman’ is true, but if it is converted into ‘No woman is a citizen (civis)’, it is false. In like manner ‘No priest is a woman’ could be raised by way of objection, and so on for similar cases. [21.28–31] [125]  To the first counterexamples (123) one should reply that the proposition proposed for conversion, if its conversion is not evident, ought to be analyzed all the way to a substantival verb of the present tense. What precedes the verb ought to be exchanged with the predicate, but what follows the verb must be exchanged with the subject. Thus, when one says ‘No old man will be a boy’, it must be analyzed into ‘No old man is a boy in the future’, and this is wont to be converted by ‘No boy in the future is an old man’. Likewise, ‘No boy was an old man’ must be analyzed into ‘No boy is an old man of the past’, and this [is wont] to be converted into ‘No old man of the past is a boy’. If one does this, there will never be a counterexample so long as the terms are taken univocally and under the same determinations. So, they ought not be converted in the way proposed when presenting the counterexamples but in the way just explained. [21.31–22.1] [126]  To the other counterexamples (124) one should reply that, if the terms are taken completely univocally in the convertend and the converse, they will certainly be able to be converted, as was just said. Thus, just as ‘No (male) citizen is a woman’ is true, so also ‘No woman is a (male) citizen’, as long as ‘citizen’ is taken in the second as in the first. For when ‘No (nullus) citizen is a woman’ is uttered, ‘citizen’ is interpreted only for males because it is restricted to males by the addition to it of the adjoined masculine gender. Thus, the sense is [that] no citizen of the masculine gender is a woman, and just as this is true, so also ‘No woman is a male citizen’. The same is to be said of ‘No priest is a woman’. [22.2–11]

a.  Reading at p. 21.19 convertens against conversa. b.  Reading at p. 21.19 conversa against convertens. c.  Reading at p. 21.20 conversa against convertens. d.  Reading at p. 21.21 convertens against conversa.

Propositions 25

* * * [127]  Examples could be proposed against conversion of a particular affirmative, for ‘Some fire is extinguished’ and ‘Some man is dead’ are taken as true when con­verting and ‘Something extinguished is a fire’ and ‘Someone dead is a man’ as false. [22.11–15] [128]  One should reply to this that these expressions are per se false, so it is no wonder their convertends are false. [22.16–17] [129]  On the other hand, therefore, it is argued that when converting they are taken as true. [22.17–18] [130]  One should reply that use takes these in the sense that what was previously a fire is now something extinguished, and what was once a man is now something dead, for otherwise they could have no truth. But takena in this way they could of course be true and be converted into [propositions] that are true, just as ‘Something now extinguished was previously a fire’ and ‘Something now dead was previously a man’ are trueb. [22.18–24] [131]  One could propose examples against the stated conversion because ‘Some boy will be a man’ and ‘Some old man was a boy’ are true, but ‘Some old man will be a boy’ and ‘Some boy was an old man’ are false. [22.24–27] [132]  One should reply to these as was said (125) of the universal [conversions] ‘No old man will be a boy’ and ‘No boy was an old man’. [22.27–29] [133]  One can propose an example against the conversion of a universal affirmative because ‘Every man is white’ is converted into ‘Some white thing is a man’. But ‘Some white thing is a man’ is not true just at any time whatsoever, [and yet] ‘Every man is white’ is true. Therefore, there seems to be no conversion. [22.29–34] [134]  One should reply to this that a universal affirmative is converted into a particular affirmative but it is not converted with a particular affirmative.78 Thus, it is one thing to be converted into something and another to be converted with something. So, with respect to those of which one is converted with another, it is true that whenever the one is true so also is the other, but this is not true of those of which one is converted into another.79 [22.34–40] [135]  Thus, one should note that the conversion of a universal affirmative is different from the conversion of the others, for the others are converted with their conversesc whereas this is not converted with its conversed.80 [22.41–43]

a.  Reading at p. 22.21 accepte against accepti. b.  Reading at p. 22.22 ipse vere against ipsi veri. c.  Reading at p. 22.42 conversis against convertentibus. d.  Reading at p. 22.43 converso against convertente.

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* * * [136]  [One could object], you are able to prove that a universal affirmative is converted simply: ‘Every man is able to laugh’ can be converted into ‘Every thing able to laugh is a man’, and both are true; similarly, ‘Every man is an ass’, ‘Every ass is a man’, and both are false. The same is likewise argued of the particular negative, for ‘Some man is not a stone’ can be converted into ‘Some stone is not a man’, and both are true. Similarly, ‘Some man is not something able to laugh’, ‘Something able to laugh is not a man’, and both are false. [22.43–23.8] [137]  One should reply to this that the stated propositions can indeed be converted in the ways stated, but because the conversion common to all [subject] matter is not applicable to them, such a conversion is not attributed to them.81 The propositions called “in contingent matter” and “in remote matter” can have the stated conversion; but they would not have that conversion in the other matter, e.g., in ‘Every man is an animal’, ‘Every man is white’, and ‘Some man is not an animal’. Boethius says this in his Categorical Syllogisms.82 [23.9–17] [138]  One could ask whether a universal negative is wont to be converted by limitation. [23.17–18] [139] One argues that it can be, because ‘No man is an ass’ can certainly be converted into ‘Some ass is not a man’. [23.18–20] [140] But on the other hand Aristotle says in Book One of the Prior Analytics when explaining conversion that a universal negative is converted simply, as in ‘No pleasure is a good’, ‘No good is a pleasure’, making no mention of conversion by limitation.83 Likewise, Boethius says in his Categorical Syllogisms when explaining conversion that a universal negative is converted simply, making no mention of conversion by limitation.84 Since, therefore, it is not to be claimed that these devices (artifices) do not suffice, one argues that a universal negative is not wont to be converted by ­limitation. [23.20–29] [141]  One should reply to this that a universal negative is not wont to be converted by limitation because conversion by limitation is what applies to a proposition when one uses another [subalternate proposition] that has already been converted (que per naturam alicuius cui prius inest talis conversio alii debetur).85 And this is clear in the case of a universal affirmative, which is said to be converted by limitation because it is converted by using its particular. Hence, ‘Every man is an animal’ is converted by limitation into ‘Some animal is a man’ by means of ‘Some man is an animal’, which was first converted simply into ‘Some animal is a man’. If, therefore, a universal negative were converted by limitation, the conversion would be what applies to it when one uses another [proposition] that has already been converted simply. This cannot be the case except by using its particular, a particular negative, and then it would be true to say that a particular negative is converted simply. But this is false, and so a universal negative cannot be converted by limitation. [23.29–24.6]

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[142]  To what is objected (139), [namely], thata ‘No man is an ass’ is converted into ‘Some ass is not a man’ one should reply that it is false. The particular certainly follows from the universal, but it is not thereby converted with it, and the explanation for this has just been given. But then one should explain why ‘Some ass is not a man’ follows from ‘No man is an ass’, [and it is] because ‘No man is an ass’ is converted simply and so is converted this way: ‘No man is an ass, No ass is a man’. But any universal posits its particular, and so ‘No ass is a man’ posits ‘Some ass is not a man’ and ‘Some ass is not a man’ follows from ‘No man is an ass’. [24.6–18] [143] One asks what kind of argumentation comes about in a conversion. [24.18–19] [144]  It is not Example because similar is not inferred from similar; nor Induction because a universal is not inferred from singulars; not Syllogism because there are no two premises with one conclusion; nor three terms, which are required for a syllogism. It remains, therefore, that it be Enthymeme.86 [24.19–24] [145]  But then one asks how a conversion can be reduced to a syllogism, since every enthymeme is reduced to a syllogism. [24.24–26] [146]  One can reply to this that conversions can be reduced to syllogisms, and so the conversion of a universal negative is an enthymeme and can be reduced to the first mood of the second figure by additionb of a minor: ‘No man is an ass, every ass is an ass; therefore no ass is a man’.87 Conversion of a universal affirmative is an enthymeme, and it can be reduced to the first mood of the third figure by the addition of a major: ‘Every man is a man, every man is an animal; therefore some animal is a man’. Conversion of a particular affirmative is an enthymeme and able to be reduced to the fourth mood of the third figure by additionc of a major: ‘Every man is a man, some man is an animal; therefore some animal is a man’. [24.26–38] [147]  But one could argue against these reductions: since there must be three terms in every syllogism, and there are only two terms in the syllogisms reduced this way, there does not seem to be a sound reduction. [24.38–41] [148]  One can reply to this that conceptually there must be three terms in every syllogism, but in fact, every once in a while, two terms in a syllogism suffice. This is clear from Aristotle in his Prior Analytics who teaches how to syllogize from opposites this way: ‘Every discipline is scholarly, no discipline is scholarly; therefore no discipline is a discipline’.88 This is a syllogism from opposites, and yet factually there are only two terms there, namely, ‘discipline’ and ‘scholarly’. But conceptually there are three, for ‘discipline’ functions as a major and minor extreme, and ‘scholarly’ functions a.  Reading at p. 24.7 quod against quid. b.  Reading at p. 24.29 additionem against addictionem. c.  Reading at p. 24.36 additionem against addictionem.

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as the middle, and the syllogism is well formed. Likewise, although there are factually only two terms in syllogisms reduced this way, nevertheless conceptually there are three. Thus in the first syllogism (146) the same term in fact serves as a middle and as a minor extreme. But in the case of the two [remaining terms] the same term serves as a major extreme and a middle, and this suffices for a syllogism. [24.41–25.14] [149]  One could reply in a different and better way by contending that conversion is not an argument, and so neither is it Syllogism nor Enthymeme nor Induction nor Example. [25.14–16] [150]  Yet, [one could object], in some sense conversion presents itself as an argument in that it has a kind of consequence. There is a kind of consequence with respect to terms that are conceptually or factually three in number, in such a way that two propositions and a conclusion different from the premises can be construed from them, and such a consequence is what constitutes a syllogism or an argument. For the things mentioned belong necessarily to any kind of argument in that every argument is reducible to a syllogism. But there is no such consequence in conversion. [25.16–24] [151]  But in another sense a consequence is called a kind of alteration of one and the same thing with itself, and such a consequence is not reducible to a perfect syllogism since it does not contain in itself two propositions and a conclusion different from the premises. Nor does such a consequence have the force of an argument, but only the mode of an argument; such a consequence is found in a conclusion. For when one says ‘No man is an ass, therefore no ass is a man’, the conclusion is not different from the premises: the premise is only altered in the conclusion, but only in the sense that a predicate is made of the subject and vice versa. For this reason it cannot be reduced to a syllogism. [25.24–34] [152]  One could reply to this that conversion cannot be reduced to any kind of argumentation, and the reason for this is that conversion is the source of argumentation, just as a point is the source of a line. But there is no reduction of a source to what follows from the source, and so there is no reduction of conversion to some species of argumentation. [25.34–39] [153]  With respect to this one could ask this what the rationale is for the names of those conversions. [25.40] [154]  One should reply to this that, when a conversion is called “simple”, it is said that it arises simply and wholly, no change having been made in quality or quantity. It is called “by limitation” because it arises partially and by means of something else, for a universal affirmative is converted into a particular, and such a conversion belongs to it by means of another, i.e., by means of its own particular.89 Conversion is called “by contraposition” since contrary terms are asserted in the convertend and the converse, because when they are finite in the convertend they are infinite in the converse.90 [26.1–8]

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* * * [155]  If anyone should ask how ‘Both of these runs’ is converted, one should reply that, since it is a universal affirmative, it is wont to be converted into the particular affirmative ‘One of these running is this one’. [26.8–12] [156]  If one asks about ‘Neither of these runs’, one should reply that since it is a universal negative it is converted simply into ‘Neither of these running is one of these’. [26.12–14] [157]  And if one asks about ‘No wall is in stone’, ‘No pavement is in marble’, ‘No grape stem is in wine’, and suchlike, one should reply that ‘No wall is of stone’ is wont to be converted into ‘No entity of stone is a wall’, and one is to reply in a similar way with respect to the others. [26.14–19] Equipollency 91

[158]  Having spoken of propositions that convert, one must now speak about equipollent propositions, and first one should see what equipollence is. Equipollence is the equivalence of two propositions because of a sign and negation made on the same subject and the same predicate. Because of this it is clear that interchangeables (convertibiles) such as ‘A man runs’ and ‘Something able to laugh runs’ would not be equipollent because their equivalence does not derive from a sign and negation but from the nature of the terms that interchange. It is clear, likewise, that a convertenda and a converse are not equipollent—e.g., ‘No man is an ass’, ‘No ass is a man’—because they do not both haveb the same subject and the same predicate, but what is the subject in one is the predicate in the other, and vice versa. [26.20–32] [The Signs ‘Every’, ‘All’, ‘No’, and ‘Some’]

[159]  One should know that some signs are universal, others particular, e.g., ‘every’, ‘all’, ‘no’, ‘a certain one’, ‘some’, and the like, and that some universal signs are affirmative, others negative: affirmative, e.g., ‘every’, ‘all’; negative, e.g., ‘no’. [26.33–36] [Three Rules]

[160]  To better capture the equipollence of those propositions, three rules are to be asserted. First, the equipollence of contradictories is given, and it is this: Every sign

a.  Reading at p. 26.28 convertens against convertes. b.  Reading at p. 26.30 sunt de against sunt et.

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with a negation placed before it is equipollent to its contradictory [sign]. For example, ‘Not every man runs’ has the same value as ‘Some man runs’, and ‘Not no man runs’ [is equipollent to] ‘Some man runs’. Second, there is the rule of contraries, which is this: Every universal sign with a negation placed after it is equipollent to its contrary [sign], as in ‘Every man does not run’, ‘No man runs’. But the equipollence of subalterns is covered by the third rule, and it is this: Every sign with a negation placed before and after it is equipollent to its subaltern [sign]. For example, ‘Not every man does not run’, ‘Some man runs’, and ‘Not no man does not run’, ‘Some man does not run’. [26.36–27.8] [161]  Here one could ask why one does not teach about the equipollence of subcontraries between themselves, since it has been said above (112) that some propositions sharing both terms in the same order are contraries, others are contradictories, some are subcontraries, and others are subalterns, and since here one teaches about the equipollence of contraries between themselves, of contradictories between themselves, and of subalterns between themselves. [27.9–15] [162]  One can reply to this that the equipollence of propositions cannot be interpreted unless the sign is different in one and the other, and so, because the sign is the same sign in both subcontrariesa, the equipollence between them cannot be picked out. This is made clear in this way: the equipollence of the two [propositions] ‘Every man runs’ and ‘No man runs’ can well be interpreted by placing a negation after each of their signs, because ‘every’ and ‘no’ are different signs. But the equipollence of the two [propositions] ‘Every man runs’, ‘Every man does not run’ cannot be picked out, because the same sign remains in both, granted it is the same with respect to what is signified to say ‘Every man does not run’, ‘No man runs’. [27.15–25] [163]  One may ask why a negation placed before a sign makes it be equipollent to its contradictory [sign]. [27.26–27] [164]  One should reply that it is the nature of a negation to destroy, and hence what destroys asserts the opposite of what it finds. Therefore, a negation placed before a universalb affirmative sign places in it a nature opposed to universality and affirmation. This particular [nature] is a negation, and so it effects a particular negation, which was the contradictory of the universal affirmativec [sign]. For if a universal affirmative [sign] were changed into a particular affirmatived [sign] or into a universal negativee [sign], it would not entirely effect an opposite form. And so a universal affirmative sign

a.  Reading at p. 27.17 subcontrariarum against contrariarum. b.  Reading at p. 27.29 universali against universale. c.  Reading at p. 27.32–33 affirmativo against affirmative. d.  Reading at p. 27.33–34 particulare affirmativum against particularem affirmativam. e.  Reading at p. 27.34 universale negativum against universalem negativam.

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with a negation placed before it effectsa or constitutes a particular negativeb [sign]: it is the same to say ‘some’ with a negation placed before it in a particular affirmativec [proposition] and [to say] ‘no’ in a universal negatived [proposition]. [27.27–38] [165]  One may ask why a universal sign with a negation placed after it is equipollent to its contrary [sign]. [27.38–40] [166]  One should reply that a negation does not act on what precedes it but on what follows it, for every agent precedes that on which it acts. And so when a negation is placed after a universal sign, it does not change the latter’s universality, and hence [the proposition] remains universal, as it was before, but with a different quality. If it was affirmative before, it becomes negative afterwards, and vice versa, and in this way it is equipollent to its contrary. [27.40–28.3] [167]  Then one could ask why [a proposition] with a negation before and after the sign is equipollent to its subaltern. [28.3–4] [168]  One should reply, as was seen (166), that a negation placed before a sign acts on it whereas one placed after it does not. Because of this, when one says ‘Not every man does not run’, the negation placed after [the sign] does not act on it. So, when saying ‘Every man does not run’, [the sign] is still universal, but negative, and is the same as ‘no’. A negation placed before ‘no’ makes [the sign] a particulare affirmative one, and on this basis ‘not no’ is the same as ‘some’, and ‘Not every man does not run’ is the same as ‘Some man runs’, and one is to say f the same of the others. [28.4–13] [Four Verses Pertaining to Equipollence]

[169]  One should know that in the case of equipollent [signs] there are four verses of which the first speaks of the equipollence of the sign ‘every’, the second of the sign ‘no’, the third of the sign ‘some’, and the fourth of the sign ‘some . . . not’. [28.14–17] [170]  The first verse is this:92 “‘Every’, ‘no . . . not’, ‘not some . . . not’ are equivalent,” in which it is said that ‘every’ is equipollent to two [signs], namely, ‘no . . . not’ by the second rule, which is on contraries, and ‘not some . . . not’ by the third rule, on sub­ alterns. [28.17–22] [171]  The second verse is this: “‘Not some’, ‘no’, ‘every . . . not’ are associated,”93 in which it is said that ‘no’ is equipollent to two [signs], namely, ‘not some’ by the a.  Reading at p. 27.36 preposita sibi negatione ponit against ponit. b.  Reading at p. 27.36 particulare negativum against particularem negativam. c.  Reading at p. 27.37 affirmativa against affirmativo. d.  Reading at p. 27.38 negativa against negativo. e.  Reading at p. 28.10 particulare against particularem. f.  Reading at p. 28.13 dicendum against dicere.

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first rule, which is on contradictories, and ‘every . . . not’ by the second rule, on contraries. [28.22–27] [172]  The third verse is this: “‘Not noa’, ‘not every . . . not’, ‘some’ are associated,” in which it is said that ‘some’ is equipollent to two [signs], namely, ‘not no’ by the first rule, which is on contradictories, and ‘not every . . . not’ by the third rule, on sub­ alterns. [28.27–32] [173]  The fourth verse is like this: “‘Not every’ . . . ‘not’, ‘not nob . . . not’ refer to ‘some’ . . . ‘not’,” in which it is said that ‘some . . . not’ is equipollent to two [signs], namely, ‘not every’ by the first rule, which is on contradictories, and ‘not no . . . not’ by the third rule, on subalterns.94 [28.32–37] [The Signs ‘Both’, ‘Neither’, and ‘the One’]

[174]  One should understand about the signs ‘both’, ‘neither’, and ‘the one’ (alter) what was said about ‘every’, ‘all’, ‘no’, and ‘some’ (159), since, with respect to their equipollence, ‘both’ corresponds to ‘every’, ‘neither’ to ‘no’, and ‘the one’ to ‘some’. So, just as ‘every’ and ‘all’ with a negation placed after them are equipollent to ‘no’, the sign ‘both’ is equipollent to ‘neither’ with a negation placed after it; and understand things this way about the others. Likewise in the case of the words ‘always’, ‘never’, and ‘sometimes’: one should understand them in such a way that ‘always’ corresponds to ‘every’ and ‘all’, ‘never’ to ‘no’, and ‘sometimes’ to ‘some’. Just as ‘every’ and ‘all’ with a negation placed after them are equipollent to ‘no’, so ‘always’ with a negation placed after it is equipollent to ‘never’. [28.37–29.11] Modal Propositions 95 [Assertoric vs. Modal Propositions]

[175]  One should know that some propositions are assertoric and others are modal. Those are assertoric that state that a predicate inheres in a subject absolutely and with no kind of modality, as in ‘A man is an animal’. Those are modal that state that a predicate inheres in a subject with some kind of modality, e.g., ‘A man necessarily is an animal’. By this the statement is made that animal inheres in man with the modality of necessity, indicating that animal is not just in man, but that it is there by necessity. [29.12–19]

a.  Reading at p. 28.28 nullus against ullus. b.  Reading at p. 28.33 non nullus against nullus.

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[The Six Modes]

[176]  There are six modes that make a proposition modal that are signified by names: possible, impossible, contingent, necessary, true and false. As adverbs, however, they are signified in this way: possibly, impossibly, contingently, necessarily, truly, falsely. All these determine how a predicate is present in a subject and not just how the predicate or subject is.96 [29.19–25] [The Signs ‘Both’, ‘Neither’, and ‘the One’]

[177]  Thus, one should note here that these modes do not always make a proposition modal but only when they are directed to the composition, and not when they are predicated, since they can be taken as [adjectival] names, and not when they are determinations of predicates, since they can be taken as adverbs.97 [29.25–30] [178]  From this one can discern what a mode is. A mode is a nominal or adverbial determination directed to a composition determining how a predicate inheres in a subject and denoting the whole proposition by indicating how the proposition is and not just how the predicate is. From this it is clear that ‘Socrates runs swiftly’ and ‘Socrates runs well’ are not modal propositions or like [them], for how the predicate inheres in the subject is not determined in them but only how the predicate is. The sense of these is that Socrates’ running is good and fast. [29.30–39] [179]  Assertoric propositions have already been discussed (78–97), so here one must speak about modal ones. And because those with true and false in them are equipollent to assertoric ones in that they add nothing over and above them—it is absolutely the same to say ‘That a man is an animal is true’ and ‘A man is an animal’, and ‘That a man is an animal is false’ and ‘A man is not an animal’—so nothing [will be said] of those two modes for the present; but one must speak of the other four.98 [29.39–30.3] [Expressions de re and de dicto]99

[180]  One should know that one is accustomed to doubting about the propositions ‘For a man it is necessary to be an animal’ and ‘For a man it is possible to run’ and the like since they are ambiguous.100 In what sense ought they be said to be modal and in what sense not? And so their modality is to be looked at to make this more clear. [30.4–8] [181]  These kinds of expressions are distinguisheda because they can be de re or de dicto. When they are de dicto the whole dictum functions as the subject and the a.  Reading at p. 30.8 distinguuntur against distinguitur.

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mode is predicated in the sense of ‘That a man runs is possible’ or the dictum [in] ‘That a man is an animal is necessary’, and in this sense [the expressions] are always singular. But when they are de re the mode is not predicated but is directed to the composition, determining it, and one part of the dictum functions as the subject and the other is predicated in the sense of ‘For a man it is necessary to be an animal’ and ‘For a man it is possible to run’. [30.8–17] [182]  It should be said, therefore, that those [expressions] are never modal when they are de dicto but only when they are de re. The reason for this can be that every proposition in which the whole dictum functions as the subject is singular in that the whole singular dictum functions as the subject. Now from singular propositions nothing is appropriate to syllogize; therefore a syllogism cannot arise from modal propositions, which is false, because Aristotle teaches how to syllogize from pure modes in Book One of Prior Analytics.101 [30.17–23] [Assertoric vs. Modal Propositions (Continued)]

[183]  Also, modal propositions differ from assertoric propositions because the predicate in assertoric ones is indicated to inhere in the subject without a mode, whereas the predicate in the modal ones is indicated to inhere in the subject with a mode, thereby making the proposition modal. But when the mode is predicated, the mode is indicated to inhere in the subject without a mode; therefore, it will not be modal, namely, when the mode is predicated and the dictum functions as the subject. And this is true. [30.24–30] [184]  Propositions, therefore, are modal when they are de re. The mode must be arranged with the verb determining how one part of the dictum inheres in the other, and then the mode is equipollent with the verb, an impersonal verb for certain. And then it is the same to say ‘Socratem contingens est currere’ and ‘Socratem contingit currere’ (For Socrates it is contingent to run).102 Hence the discourse needs to be arranged in such a way that the accusative is joined to the impersonal verb [and placed] in the first position and the infinitive [is joined to the impersonal verb and placed] in the ensuing position, as has just been seen. [30.31–38] [185]  But Aristotle seems to be against this in his On Interpretation when he speaks of modal propositions.103 For he says that to be the case and not to be the case (esse et non esse) in these are subjects but that modes are appositions, i.e., predicates. By this he seems to say that the affirmative dictum in modals that is understood by ‘to be the case’ and the negative dictum that is understood by ‘not to be the case’ function as subjects, and the modes are predicated. [30.38–31.3] [186]  One should reply to this that Aristotle’s language ought not be understood in the way just stated, for a subject is spoken of in two ways. In one sense that is called

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a subject that is referred to a predicate and is one part of a proposition; in another sense that is called a subject which receives upon itself an accident, e.g., a substance is called the subject of an accident. Therefore, when Aristotle says that to be the case and not to be the case in modals are subjects, he is not thinking of the subject that is referred to a predicate but of the subject that receives upon itself an accident. Thus Aristotle wants to say apropos of modals that to be the case, namely, an affirmative composition, and not to be the case, namely, a negative composition, are subjects receiving modes upon themselves as their dispositions. Modes are appositions, that is, dispositions of an affirmative or negative composition, and are predicates, and so it is clear that the [prior] analysis (185) is not valid for it proceeds equivocally, understanding ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ inappropriately. [31.4–18] [Oppositions and Equipollency among Modal Propositions]104

[187]  One should know that each of the four modes makes four modal propositions, so the mode with possible in it constitutes four modal propositions, for [a mode] is asserted either without a negation or with a negation. If without a negation, it asserts one proposition in saying ‘It is possible to be’; if with a negation, it is either with one [negation] or with two. If with two, it makes a proposition such as ‘It is not possible not to be’; if with one negation, the negation is directed either to the mode or to the verb. If to the verb, it makes one such as ‘It is possible not to be’; if to the mode, it makes one such as ‘It is not possible to be’. One is to understand the others in the same way. And since there are four modes, there will be four times four propositions, and so there will be sixteen. [31.19–30] [188]  But some of these propositions are contraries, others are subcontraries, some contradictories, others subalterns, and some are equipollents. For understanding these one should know that every proposition with impossible in it without a negation and every proposition of the same mode with a negation directed to the verb are contraries, such as ‘It is impossible to be’, ‘It is impossible not to be’, and one is to understand those with necessary in them in the same way. They are called contraries because they obey the law of contraries. The law of contraries in universal [i.e., natural or necessary] and remote matter is that, if one is true, the other is false, and vice versa; but they can be false in contingent matter, because ‘For Socrates it is impossible to be white’ and ‘For Socrates it is impossible not to be white’ are false at the same time.105 [31.30–42] [189]  One should know that every proposition with possible in it [but] without a negation and every proposition of the same mode with a negation directed to the verb are subcontraries, such as ‘It is possible to be’, ‘It is possible not to be’. One should understand those with contingent in them in the same way. They are called subcontraries because they obey the law of subcontraries. The law of subcontraries is that if one is

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true, the other is false and not vice versa, for in contingent matter they can [both] be true at the same time, as in ‘For Socrates it is possible to be white’, ‘For Socrates it is possible not to be white’. [31.43–32.8] [190]  One should know that every proposition of any mode is contradictory to a proposition of the same mode to whose mode a negation is directed, if it is uniformly held to be either about something being the case or about something not being the case, that is, if something was affirmed or denied to be the case in both of the contradictories. [32.8–13] [191]  What the subalterns and the equipollents are will be clear in the following figure.106 [32.13–14] [The Four Series of Equipollent Propositions]

[192]  For understanding these one should know that there are four series of modal propositions, in each of which there are four propositions. [32.14–16] [193]  One should know that propositions of the same series are equipollent to each other; but how the propositions are taken in each series, [i.e., affirmatively or negatively], is clear from two rules: propositions of the first and second series are ­interpreted in the light of the first and propositions of the third and fourth [series] are interpreted in the light of the second. [32.16–21] [The First Rule]

[194]  The first rule is this: To whatever affirmed or denied dictum possible is assigned, contingent is assigned to it, impossible is removed from the same, and necessary is removed from its contradictory a opposite. By saying “affirmed,” the propositions of the first series are indicated, and they are ‘It is possible to be’, ‘It is contingent to be’, ‘It is not impossible to be’, and ‘It is not necessary not to be’. By saying “denied,” the propositions of the second series are indicated, and they are ‘It is possible not to be’, ‘It  is contingent not to be’, ‘It is not impossible not to be’, and ‘It is not necessary to be’. [32.21–30] [The Second Rule]

[195]  The second rule is this: From whatever affirmed or denied dictum possible is removed, contingent is removed from the same, impossible is assigned to the same,

a.  Reading at p. 32.24 contradictorio against contradictione.

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and necessary a is assigned to its contradictory b opposite. By saying “affirmed,” the propositions of the third series are indicated, and they are ‘It is not possible to be’, ‘It is not contingent to be’, ‘It is impossible to be’, and ‘It is necessary not to be’. By saying “denied,” the propositions of the fourth series are indicated, and they are ‘It is not possible not to be’, ‘It is not contingent not to be’, ‘It is impossible not to be’, and ‘It is necessary to be’. [32.30–39] [Oppositions and Equipollencies among the Four Series of Equipollent Propositions]

[196]  One should know that propositions of the first series are subcontrary to propositions of the second series, hence the verse: “Let the first series be for you the subcontrary of the second.” But propositions of the third series are contrary to propositions of the fourth series, hence the verse: “The third series is always contrary to the fourth.” Propositions of the first series are contradictory to propositions of the third series, hence the verse: “The third series is contradictory to the first.” Propo­ sitions of the fourth series are related in the same way to propositions of the second series, hence the verse: “The second conflicts with the fourth by contradicting.” One should know that propositions of the first series are subaltern to the propositions of the fourth series, hence the verse: “The first is under the fourth in the role of a particular.” Propositions of the second series are related in the same way to propositions of the third series, hence the verse: “By [the same] law the second is related to the succeeding series.”107 [32.39–33.15] [197]  One should know that to see better the equipollence and opposition of those modals one must use the modes possible and contingent with respect to the equipollence and opposition of those modals just as the sign ‘some’ and the mode impossible, the sign ‘no’ and the mode necessary, and the sign ‘every’ were usedc in the equipollence and opposition of their assertoric propositions. Hence, just as ‘Every man does not run’ is equipollent to ‘No man runs’, so ‘It is necessary not to be’ is equipollent to ‘It is impossible to be’; and just as ‘Every man runs’ and ‘No man runs’ are opposed, so ‘It is necessary to be’ and ‘It is impossible to be’ are opposed to each other; and one is to understand the others in the same way. [33.16–27]

a.  Reading at p. 32.33 necesse against necessarie. b.  Reading at p. 32.32 contradictorio against contradictorie. c.  Reading at p. 33.19 utebantur against utebatur.

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[The Quality and Quantity of Modal Propositions]108

[198]  To see what quality modal propositions have one should know that in modal propositions a negation can be directed to the mode or to the state of affairs, and strictly speaking every modal proposition ought to be called affirmative so long as the mode is affirmed, even though the state of affairs is denied.109 Hence, ‘For a man it is possible not to be an ass’ is an affirmative modal. A negative modal is one in which the mode is negated even though the state of affairs is affirmed. So, ‘For every man it is not possible to be an ass’ is a negative modal, and so on for others. But although it is true to speak this way when speaking strictly, nevertheless sometimes modals are called negative which are negative with respect to their states of affairs, even though they are affirmative with respect to their mode, as is clear from Aristotle in Book One of the Prior Analytics.110 [33.27–34.3] [199]  To know the quantity of a modal proposition one must look at the assertoric one from which it takes origin, for the modal one taking origin from it will have the same quantity as its assertoric has. For, just as ‘Every man is an animal’ is a universal assertoric, so ‘For every man it is possible to be an animal’ is universal. The same is to be understood with respect to the other quantities, i.e., the indefinite, the particular, and the singular.111 [34.4–10] [Conversion of Modal Propositions]112

[200]  To know modal conversions one should note that all modal propositions are so called from one of these six modes: true, false, possible, contingent, impossible, and necessary. Now let us see how they are converted in each of these modes. [34.11–15] [The Rule for Conversion of Modal Propositions with True in Them]

[201]  One should know that if the proposition was modal because of having the mode true in it, it is converted in the same way as its assertoric is: a universal affirmative is converted by limitation.113 For example, ‘For every man it is true that he is an animal’ converts into ‘For some animal it is true that he is a man’.114 A universal negative converts simply, so, ‘For no man it is true that he is an ass’ converts into ‘For no ass it is true that he is a man’. A particular affirmative converts simply, e.g., ‘For some animal it is true that it is a man’ converts into ‘For some man it is true that he is an animal’. But a particular negative is not converted, for ‘For some animal it is true that it is not a man’ is true, however ‘For some man it is true he is not an animal’ is false.115 [34.16–29]

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[202]  The justification (ratio) for this rule is that an assertoric proposition makes no other statement than that, if it is affirmative, the predicate truly inheres in the subject, or that, if it is negative, it truly does not inhere, and so the mode true is added to the inherence (composition) of the predicate with the subject with no change in the significatum of the proposition that formerly was assertoric. Hence, ‘Every man is an animal’ signifies the same thing as ‘For every man it is true that he is an animal’ does. Likewise in the case of a negative: ‘No man is an ass’ and ‘For no man it is true that he is an ass’. And so, since conversion signifies the significatum of a proposition, the way of converting modal propositions having true and false in them is absolutely the same as [the way of converting] assertoric propositions is. [34.29–40] [Four Rules for the Conversion of Modal Propositions with False in Them]116 [The First Rule Regarding False]

[203]  Four rules are given about propositions made modal by the mode false, and the first is this: A proposition made modal by the mode false is converted simply, if it is a universal affirmative, in the same way as its universal negative assertoric is. For example, ‘For every man it is false that he is an ass’ is converted into ‘For every ass it is false that it is a man’. [35.1–6] [204]  The justification for this rulea according to the Philosopher in his Prior Analytics [appears] when he says that a true or false expression is so called because a certain state of affairs obtains or it does not.117 But what is false is a nonentity, and hence the mode false added to the composition signifies that the predicate does not inhere in the subject and connotes a negation, which negation follows a universal affirmative sign, just as the mode itself follows the sign. Hence, it is the same to say ‘For every man it is false that he is an ass’ and to say ‘Every man is not an ass’, and this is equipollent to ‘No man is an ass’. And ‘No man is an ass’ is converted simply, and so too is ‘For every man it is false that he is an ass’. [35.6–17] [205] One objects to this rule in this way: ‘For every animal it is false that it is a man’ is true because ‘Every animal is a man’ is false. But if it is converted simply, it is converted this way: ‘For every man it is false that he is an animal’. But this is false, whereas the first was true. In simple conversion the converse has to be true, if the convertend is true, and vice versa; therefore it is not wont to be converted simply, and yet it is a universal affirmative made modal by the mode false. Therefore, the rule is ill founded. [35.18–25]

a.  Reading at p. 35.6 regule against regula.

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[206]  Also, according to the rule this follows: ‘For every man it is false that he is a grammarian, therefore for every grammarian it is false that he is a man’. The first was true but the second false. Therefore, the rule is ill founded. [35.26–29] [207]  One should reply to the first (205) that the first proposition, namely, ‘For every animal it is false that it is a man’, is ambiguous, because it can be [taken] de re or de dicto.118 If de dicto, it is a singular assertoric and true and has the sense of ‘For every a animal it is false that it is a man’, that is, the dictum ‘that every b animal is a man’ is false. And so it is wont to be converted simply as an assertoric singular, namely, into ‘The dictum “that every animal is a man” is false’. And it is taken in this way when it is to be apposedc, namely, when it is de dicto. But if it is de re, then it is a false universal modal and has the sense of ‘For every d animal it is false that it is a man’, that is, for every animal it is false that it is the case that it is a man, and so it is converted simply just as is a universal made modal by the mode false, namely, into ‘For every man it is false that he is an animal’. Nor is there any wonder that the convertend is false since the converse is false. And this is what one says about the [first] objectione (205). [35.29–36.4] [208]  And one is to reply in this way without reserve to the second [objection] (206). [36.4–5] [The Second Rule regarding False]

[209]  The second rule is this: If a proposition made modal by the mode false is a universal negative, it is converted by limitation, just as an assertoric universal affirmative is. For example, ‘For no man it is false that he is an animal’ is converted into ‘For some animal it is false that it is not a man’. The convertend is true as is the converse because it is false that a man (who is some animal) is not a man. [36.6–12] [210]  The justification for this rule, which has already been given (204), is that the mode false connotes a negation, which negation follows a universal negative sign just as this mode follows the sign. Hence, it is the same to say ‘For no man it is false that he is an animal’ and ‘No man is not an animal’; but this is equipollent to ‘Every man is an animal’. But ‘Every man is an animal’ is converted by limitation, and so ‘For no man it is false that he is an animal’ is converted by limitation. [36.12–20]

a.  Reading at p. 35.32 omne against omnem. b.  Reading at p. 35.33–34 dictum: ‘omne animal esse hominem’ est falsum against dictum omne: ‘hominem esse animal est falsum’. c.  Reading at p. 35.37 apponendo against opponendo. d.  Reading at p. 35.38 omne against omnem. e.  Reading at p. 36.4 proposito. Per against proposito per.

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* * * [211] One objects to this rule this way: ‘For no animal it is false that it is a man’ is false because it is false that an ass is a man, and it is converted into ‘For some man it is false that he is not an animal’ on the basis of the stated rule. But this is true because it is false that Socrates is not an animal, and similarly for singulars; therefore the rule is ill founded. [36.20–26] [212]  One should reply to this that in conversion by limitation it is not inappropriate for the convertenda to be false and the converseb to be true. ‘Every animal is a man’ is false, but ‘Some man is an animal’ is true, for in such a conversion the conversion is not with this but into this.119 [36.26–30] [The Third Rule Regarding False]

[213]  The third rule is this: If a proposition [made] modal [by the mode false in it] is a particular affirmative, it is not converted, just as neither is an assertoric particular negative. Hence, ‘For some animal it is false that it is a man, therefore for some man it is false that he is an animal’ does not follow. The convertend is false and the converse is true because it is false that an ass is a man. [36.31–36] [214]  The justification for this rule is clear from what has been said (204), for the mode false connotes a negation, which negation follows the particular affirmative sign just as the mode follows the sign. Hence, it will be the same to say ‘For some animal it is false that it is a man’ and to say ‘Some animal is not a man’. But this is a particular negative, which is not wont to be converted, and so ‘For some animal it is false that it is a man’ is not wont to be converted. [36.36–43] [215] One objects to this rule in this way: just as ‘For some man it is false that he is an ass’ is true, so ‘For some ass it is false that it is a manc’ is true. These propositions seem to involve simple conversion; therefore the rule is ill founded. [36.43–37.4] [216]  One should reply to this that, although a proposition with remote and contingent matter in it could in this way be converted with respect to terms, this cannot be done with respect to terms [for propositions] with natural matter in them, as is clear in the example given in the rule. And so such an exchange does not occur in virtue of a conversion; rather the terms that give rise to the [resultant] propositions are taken in virtue of their matter. [37.4–9]

a.  Reading at p. 36.27 convertentem against conversam. b.  Reading at p. 36.27–28 conversam against convertentem. c.  Reading at p. 37.1–3 ‘aliquem hominem . . . asinum’ against aliquem hominem . . . asinum and ‘aliquem asinum . . . hominem’ against aliquem asinum . . . hominem.

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[The Fourth Rule Regarding False]

[217]  The fourth rule is this: If a proposition made modal by the mode false is a particular negative, it is converted simply, in the same way as its assertoric particular affirmative is. For example, ‘For some man it is false that he is not an animal’ converts into ‘For some animal it is false that it is not a man’. Both of their parts are true: the convertenda because it is false that Socrates is not an animal and the converseb because it is false that a man (who is some animal)c is not a man. [37.10–16] [218]  The justification for this rule is in what has already been said (204), for the negation introduced by false and the explicit negation by which the particular proposition is called negative are directed to the same composition, namely, the inherence of the predicate in the subject, and so they are equipollent to a universal affirmative. Hence, it is the same to say ‘For some man it is false that he is not an animal’ and to say ‘For some man it is true that he is an animal’. But this converts simply, and so does its equipollent. [37.17–24] [219] One objects to this rule this way: it has already been said (179) that the judgment is the same with respect to assertoric propositions and to propositions made modal by the modes false and true, but assertoric propositions that are particular negatives are not converted; therefore if [a proposition] made modal by the mode false is a particular negative, it is not converted. [37.24–29] [220]  One should reply to this that it is true that the judgment in these is the same with respect to truth and falsity but not with respect to the mode of converting. For the mode false expressly placed in a modal proposition changes the quantity of the proposition by virtue of the negation that was introduced, and thus changes its conversions. And so in the mode false a different conversion hasd to be made before and after the adverb.120 [37.29–36] [The Rule for the Conversion of Modal Propositions with Possible in Them]

[221]  Modal propositions with possible in them are converted just as their assertorics are.121 [37.36–37] [222]  The justification for this rule is the following: the mode possible signifies possibility; but there is no possibility except with respect to the present and future. But

a.  Reading at p. 37.15 convertens against conversa. b.  Reading at p. 37.16 conversa against convertens. c.  Reading at p. 37.16 (qui est quoddam animal) falsum against falsum. d.  Reading at p. 37.35 debet against debetur.

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an assertoric proposition, whether in the present, such as ‘A man runs’, or the future, such as ‘A man will run’, is wont to be converted in the same way. And so the mode possible changes nothing with respect to the mode of the conversion of the assertoric proposition to which [the mode] accrues. Thus, a modal proposition with possible in it is converted just as its assertoric proposition is. [37.37–38.1] [223]  Examples are given against this rule. ‘For a boy it is possible to be an old man’ is true since ‘For an old man it is possible to be a boy’ is false. Similarly, ‘For one who sees it is possible to be blind’, ‘For one who livesa it is possible to be dead’, and ‘For wine it is possible to be vinegar’, and the like. [38.1–6] [224]  One should reply to this that the mode possible connotes the present or future. Hence, sometimes it presents a proposition with natural matter in it, e.g., ‘For a man it is possible to be an animal’; sometimes with remote matter in it, e.g., ‘For a man it is possible to be an ass’; and sometimes with contingent matter in it, and this in two senses. There are some accidental terms that signify forms relating contingently to each other in a reversible order, such as ‘black’ and ‘white’, ‘healthy’ and ‘sick’, and ‘hot’ and ‘cold’. There are other accidental terms that signify accidental forms relating to each other in an irreversible order, such as ‘present’ and ‘future’, ‘sighted’ and ‘blind’, ‘living’ and ‘dead’, and the like. If, therefore, the mode possible makes a proposition modal in the first, second, or third sense, it is interpreted indifferently for the present, but when it makes a proposition modal in the fourth sense, then it is interpreted only for the future. This is so because of the irreversibility of the forms, so that the sense is [that of] ‘For a boy in the present it is possible to be an old man in the future’. To signify b the reverse of the forms absolutely, the future must be expressed in the convertend in this way: ‘For an old man in the future it is possible to be a boy in the present’. The case is similar with respect to the other counterexamples, and so it is clear that in both cases the conversion is simple. [38.6–25] [The Rule for the Conversion of Modal Propositions with Impossible in Them]

[225]  With respect to modal propositions with impossible in them the same rules and justifications are given that were provided for modal propositions with false in them (204, 210, 214, 218). For just as false implies negation, as has been said (204), and hence provides a way of converting propositions with false in them, so too does the mode impossible.122 [38.25–30]

a.  Reading at p. 38.5 viventem against videntem. b.  Reading at p. 38.21 significandam against significandum.

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[The Rule for the Conversion of Modal Propositions with Necessary in Them]

[226]  If it is modal with necessary in it, no matter what the quantity and quality, it is converted in the same way as its assertoric is, as Aristotle says in his Prior Analytics.123 Hence, a universal negative with necessary in it is converted simply and likewise a particular affirmative, whereas a universal affirmative is converted by limitation. A particular negative is not converted, just as neither an assertoric particular negative is. ‘For every man it is necessary to be an animal’ is converted into ‘For some animal it is necessary to be a man’, and ‘For no man it is necessary to be an animal’ is converted into ‘For no animal it is necessary to be a man’. The justification for this rule is the same as that which was stated above (214) about true. [38.30–39.1] [227]  But there are examples against those conversions with necessary in them. First, against the universal affirmative, for the following are true: ‘For every grammarian it is necessary to be a man’, ‘For some grammarian it is necessary to be a man’, and ‘For every healthy or alert thing it is necessary to be an animal’. But the ones into which those are converted are false, for these are false: ‘For some man it is necessary to be a grammarian’ and ‘For some animal it is necessary to be healthy and alert’. [39.1–9] [228]  One can pose counterexamples to the conversion of a universal negative, for the following are true: ‘For no body it is necessary to be white’ and ‘For no man it is necessary to be a grammarian’, whereas these are false: ‘For no white thing it is necessary to be a body’ and ‘For no grammarian it is necessary to be a man’. [39.9–13] [229]  One should reply to [the first] (227) that a universal affirmative and [its] particular affirmative with necessary in them can certainly be converted into a particular affirmative, and the particular affirmative into which they are converteda is trueb, just as those that are converted are, so long as the terms are interpreted in the same sense in the convertend and the converse. For, when one says ‘For every grammarian it is necessary to be a man’ and ‘For some man it is necessary to be a grammarian’, they are true, and ‘grammarian’ is taken for its suppositum and not just for its form, and so the sense is [that] it is necessary that every thing that is a grammarian be a man.124 Likewise, if [‘grammarian’] is interpreted for its suppositum, then ‘For some grammarian it is necessary to be a man’ is true because the sense is [that] it is necessary that some man be that which is a grammarian, i.e., a man, because there is no other thing that is a grammarian except a man. And it is true when it is said that [the proposition] is false if ‘grammarian’ is interpreted for its form and not for its suppositum, as

a.  Reading at p. 39.17 convertuntur against convertitur. b.  Reading at p. 39.17 vera against una.

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is sufficiently clear.125 One is also to say the same thing about ‘For every healthy (or sick or alert) thing it is necessary to be an animal’. [39.14–31] [230]  Likewise, one should reply [to the second] (228) that a universal negative can be converted into a universal negative, and the convertend is false, as is the converse when the terms are taken universally in both. So, ‘For no white thing it is necessary to be a body’ is false because ‘white thing’ is interpreted for its suppositum. In the same sense ‘For a body it is necessary to be a white thing’ is false when ‘white thing’ is interpreted for its suppositum in the sense [that] it is necessary that no body be that which is a white thing, for this is false when that which is white is nothing other than a body. One is to say the same thing of ‘For no man it is necessary to be a grammarian’. [39.31–41] [The Rule for Modal Propositions with Contingent in Them]

[231]  For a clear understanding of modal propositions with contingent in them one should know that contingent is taken in many ways, as Aristotle proposes in his book Prior Analytics.126 [39.42–40.1] [Contingent Taken for Possible (Logically High or Superior)]

[232]  Contingent is taken in one way broadly as a kind of genus for all contingent things, which can be called [logically] high or superior contingent, and this sort of contingent is related in an opposite way to impossible but not to necessary, because whether something is necessary or not, it can still be called contingent.127 For example, ‘For every man it is contingent to be an animal’ and ‘For every man it is contingent to be white’. Contingent is taken similarly in modal propositions, and in this sense it is taken for possible. Thus, in the case of modals, whatever the quantity anda quality of a proposition with possible in it areb, such arec the quantity and quality of a proposition with contingent in it. And so a modal proposition with contingent in it and taken in this way converts in the same way as that with possible in it does, and as a result in the same way as its assertoric does, whatever quantity and quality it had.128 [40.1–13] [Contingent Taken for Necessary]

[233]  In another [second] sense contingent is taken more narrowly, namely, for a species of the contingent that is called [logically] high or superior and called contingent

a.  Reading at p. 40.9 quanta et against quanta est. b.  Reading at p. 40.9 sunt against est. c.  Reading at p. 40.10 sunt against est.

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taken for possible, which has already been treated (232). Contingent taken for possible is divided in this way: one is necessary, the other not necessary. An example of necessary a is ‘For a man it is contingent to be an animal’ and ‘For no man it is contingent to be a horse’; the example is Aristotle’s in Book One of his Prior Analytics.129 But in these propositions contingent is taken for necessary because it is necessary that every man be an animal and it is necessary that no man be a horse. That necessary can be called contingent Aristotle proves in this way in Book One of his Prior Analytics:130 ‘It is not contingent to be’, ‘It is impossible to be’, and ‘It is necessary not to be’ are all equipollent for they are in the third series of modals. Therefore their [contradictory] opposites, namely, ‘It is contingent to be’, ‘It is not impossible to be’, ‘It is not necessary not to be’ [are all equipollent], as is clear, for they are in the first series. Therefore, ‘It is not necessary not to be’ and ‘It is contingent to be’ are equipollent. And so, ‘It is not necessary not to be, therefore it is contingent to be’ follows. But ‘If it is necessary to be, then it is not necessary not to be’ follows because the first series is subaltern to its contrary. Therefore, ‘If it is necessary to be, then it is contingent to be’ follows because whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent. And indeed it does because the fourth order implies the first as subalternate to [the former], and on the basis of this contingent in one sense is the same as necessary. [40.13–36] [Contingent Taken for Not Necessary for Either Way, Natural or Indefinite]

[234]  In another [third] sense contingent is also spoken of truly, that is, truly in the strict sense, as not necessary, which can be called “for either way” (ad utrumlibet) as in ‘For a man to walk’.131 From this it is clear that contingent taken for necessary is wont to be opposed to impossible and to contingent taken for not necessary. For example, ‘For a man it is contingent to be an animal’ is opposed to both ‘For a man it is impossible to be an animal’ and ‘For a man it is not necessary to be an animal’, for a proposition with contingent in it that is taken for necessary is in the fourth series of modals, but that with impossible in it is in the third series, which series are opposed as contraries are. That with not necessary in it is in the second series, and that with contingent taken for necessary in it is in the fourth series, which series are opposed as contradictories are. [40.36–41.9] [235]  Note, therefore, that a proposition with contingent in it taken for necessary is converted in the same way as its assertoric is because it is converted in the same way as a proposition with necessary in it is, whatever quantity or quality it had. [41.9–11]

a.  Reading at p. 40.17–18 necessarium ut against non necessarium ut.

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* * * [236]  Here one asks whether contingent taken for possible (which we call [logically] high) and divided into necessary and not necessary is named by these two terms univocally or equivocally. [41.12–14] [237] One argues [that it is named] univocally because genus is predicated of its species univocally, and it was said above (232) that contingent taken for [logically] high is taken for possible: it is, as it were, the genus of all contingent things; therefore it is said univocally of necessary and not necessary. [41.14–18] [238]  On the other hand Aristotle says in his Prior Analytics contingent is said of these equivocally.132 [41.18–19] [239]  One should reply to this (237) that contingent taken for [logically] high is said of contingent taken for necessary and not necessary neither strictly equivocally nor strictly univocally but analogically, because [it is analyzed] in a primary and secondary sense, as ‘a being’ [is said] analogically of a substance and an accident. This is clear from the following. Contingent taken for possible signifies a certain potency for being, which potency as potency relates to being and to not-being, and this is to speak in the strict sense. Another sort is the potency that is said to be linked to act and relates only to being; this is called potency in a less strict sense, because potency strictly indicates a distance from act, not [a potency] linked to act. But contingent taken for not necessary indicates a potency distinct [from act], whereas contingent taken for necessary bespeaks a potency linked [to act]. For this reason it is clear that the potency spoken of by the name ‘contingent’ is seen as such primarily in contingent taken for not necessary and secondarily in contingent taken for necessary. For necessary has less the sense of something contingent than does not necessary, and in this way is the nature of analogy clear in the name ‘contingent’ when it is said of contingent taken for necessary and not necessary. [41.19–37] [240]  One should reply to the first argument (237) that contingent taken for [logically] high is not a univocal genus for all contingent things but, as it were, an analogical genus. [41.37–40] [241]  One should reply to the second (238) that a logician frequently takes the analogical and the equivocal for the same thing; hence ‘equivocally’ there ought to be glossed “that is, analogically.” [41.40–42.2] [242]  Now that we have seen this, let us approach the conversion of propositions made modal by contingent taken for not necessary in them, which is called contingent for either way, about which there is a very great problem. To understand this clearly one should give the definition of contingent taken for not necessary which Aristotle gives in his book Prior Analytics,133 and it is this: contingent taken for not necessary is what is not necessary. When it is posited in being, ‘not’a accrues to impossible. It is the

a.  Reading at p. 42.9 nullum against ullum.

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same as were one to say contingent is what is neither necessary nor impossible, as in ‘For a man it is contingent to walk’, for it is neither necessary nor impossible that a man walk. ‘Contingent’ taken in this way is divided into contingent taken for natural and contingent taken for indefinite. That is called contingent taken for natural which relates more to being than to not-being, and yet can be prevented. For example, that a man become gray-headed in old age is naturally contingent because it is more related to something being the case than to something not being the case. But it can be prevented either because he will not be a man in old age or, if he will be, he will be able to avoid becoming gray-headed in his old age. In this way it is possible that that to which it is more ordered does not come about but rather its contrary. Contingent taken for indefinite is what does not relate more to something being the case than to something not being the case, such as for a man to walk. Impossible and necessary are opposed to contingent taken both as natural and as indefinite, as is clear from the just stated definition that is common to contingent taken for natural and indefinite. [42.3–25] [Rules for Conversion of Affirmative Modal Propositions with Contingent Taken for Not Necessary in Them]

[243]  Once we have seen these things, many rules are given, and first with respect to an affirmative conversion, second with respect to a negative conversion. [42.26–27] [The First Rule]

[244]  This rule is given about an affirmative conversion: All affirmative propositions of whatever quantity or quality with contingent taken for not necessary (whether natural or indefinite) in them can be converted into the opposite quality. To be converted into an opposite quality occurs when, the terms remaining in the same order, [the dictum] is transformed from [asserting] something not to be the case into something to be the case, or vice versa. For example, ‘For every man it is contingent to be white’, which is a universal affirmative with contingent taken for indefinite in it, can be converted into its opposite quality, as in ‘For every man it is contingent not to be white’. Similarly, ‘For every man it is contingent to become gray-headed in old age’, which is a universal affirmative with contingent taken for natural in it, can be converted into ‘For every man it is contingent not to become gray-headed in old age’. These negatives that are seen with respect to [propositions] with contingent taken for natural in them will be treated more fully in what follows (258–74). [42.27–41] [245]  A justification for this rule is available, and the first is taken from the name ‘contingent’ because it is called “contingent for either way,” and thus it appears from its name that something is not determined to be the case or not to be the case, but either one can occur. And so, just as ‘It is contingent to be’ can be said, so can ‘It is contingent

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not to bea’ be said. The second justification is taken from the previously given (234) definition of this sort of contingent, for, as is clear in its definition, the name ‘contingent’ is neither impossible nor necessary because what is not impossible to be is contingent to be, as is clear in the first series of modals, and what is not necessary to be is contingent not to be, on the basis of the second series. Therefore, in such a contingent it follows without doubt that, if something is contingent to be, it is contingent not to be, and vice versa. [42.41–43.12] [246] One objects to that rule in this way: there is affirmation or negationb of anything but not both of the same thing at the same time. To be white and not to be white, to become gray-headed and not to become gray-headed, and to be and not to be are all opposed as affirmation and negation are. Therefore, if one is true, the other is not true of the same thing; if it is contingent that a man be white, it seems to be impossible that it is contingent that the man not be white. [43.13–18] [247]  One should reply to this that for a man to be white and the man not to be white are opposed as contradictories. So, when they are predicated of one alone, i.e., of the same thing, it is necessary that one be false, as in ‘Socrates is white’, ‘Socrates is not white’, and likewise for the others. But ‘It is contingent to be white’ and ‘It is contingent not to be white’ are not opposed as contradictories are, just as affirmation and negation are not. Instead, both are affirmative because it has been said in what was previously stated (177) that a modal proposition is not negative except when the negation is directed to the mode and not to the verb. [43.19–27] [248] One objects to this [rule] in this way: they are said to be converted into the opposite quality; but there are no opposite qualities except affirmation and negation; therefore if one is affirmative, the other will be negative. [43.27–30] [249]  One should reply to this that according to Aristotle in his Prior Analytics [these two propositions] are not said to be converted into an opposite quality on the basis of the one being affirmative and the other negative—indeed, both are ­affirmative— but because one has an affirmative signification and the other a negative one, i.e., on the basis of the words themselves, since one signifies affirmatively and the other negatively; but with respect to what is signified both are affirmative.134 [43.30–36] [The Second Rule]

[250]  A second rule is given about these propositions which is this: All affirmative propositions of whatever quantity with contingent taken for not necessary (whether

a.  Reading at p. 43.5 contingit non esse against non contingit esse. b.  Reading at p. 43.13–14 affirmatio vel negatio against affirmato vel negato.

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natural or indefinitea) in them can be converted in the same way as their assertorics are: the universal affirmative by limitation; the particular affirmative simply. For example, ‘For every man it is contingent to walk’ is converted into ‘For something that is walking it is contingent to be a man’ and ‘For some man it is contingent to walk’ [is converted into] ‘For something that is walking it is contingent to be a man’, and both of these have contingent taken for indefinite in them. Similarly, ‘For every man it is contingent to become gray-headed’, ‘For something that becomes gray-headed it is contingent to be a man’, and both of these have contingent taken for natural in them. [43.37–44.4] [251]  The justification for this rule is what was assigned above (234) with respect to the conversion of propositions made modal by the mode possible in them. [44.4–6] [252] One objects to that [rule] this way: if the convertend is a single proposition, the converse ought to be a single one, but ‘For every man it is contingent to be white’ is one proposition and one only, and yet it is converted into ‘For every man it is contingent not to be white’, as is clear from the rule stated above (244); therefore ‘For some white thing it is contingent to be a man’ cannot be its converseb. [44.6–12] [253]  One should reply to this that, when one speaks of the same kind of conversion, there is one convertend for one converse. But the ways of converting those propositions are different, namely, into an opposite quality and in the manner of their assertorics. The first way is proper for those propositions by reason of the thing signified by the predicate, which is contingent for either way, but the second way is proper for those propositions by reason of the quality and quantity of those propositions, and in this respect they are similar to their assertoric ones. With respect to the first way there is the first rule (244); with respect to the second way there is the second rule (250). [44.13–22] [The Third Rule]

[254]  There is a third rule with respect to these propositions, and it is this: When there are affirmative propositions of whatever quantity andc they are propositions with contingent taken for indefinite in them, then they are converted in the same way as their assertoric ones are. Contingent d is taken broadly for contingent taken for indefinite, both in the convertend and in the converse. But when there are propositions with contingent taken for natural in them, contingent e is taken differently in the convertend a.  Reading at p. 43.39 nato sive infinito against natum sive infinitum. b.  Reading at p. 44.11 conversa against convertens. c.  Reading at p. 44.24 et sunt against sunt. d.  Reading at p. 44. 25–26 contingens against convertens. e.  Reading at p. 44. 28 contingens against convertens.

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and the converse: in the converse it is taken for contingent as natural, whereas in the convertend it is taken for possible. For example, ‘For every man it is contingent to be white’, ‘For something white it is contingent to be a man’, and likewise ‘For some man it is contingent to be white’, ‘For something white it is contingent to be a man’. The convertends are propositions with contingent taken for indefinite in them and so are propositions with contingent taken for not necessary in them. The case is similar for the converses, as is clear of itself. But when one says ‘For every man it is contingent to become gray-headed’ and ‘For something becoming gray-headed it is contingent to be a man’, the converse is a proposition with contingent taken for natural in it and thus one having contingent taken for not necessary in it, but the convertend is a proposition with contingent taken for possible in it. For the sense is [that] it is possible for someone becoming gray-headed to be a man. If it were not a proposition with contingent taken for not necessary in it, it would be false, since ‘For someone becoming gray-headed it is not necessary to be a man’ is false because everything becoming gray-headed necessarily is a man. [44.22–43] [255]  Likewise in the case of a particular affirmative, as in ‘For some man it is contingent to become gray-headed’. This is a proposition with contingent taken for natural in it and so with not necessary in it, but its convertend, namely, ‘For someone becoming gray-headed it is contingent to be a man’ is a proposition with contingent taken for possible in it, as was pointed out (254) in the case of the universal convertend. [44.43–45.5] [256]  The justification for the first part of this rule is [that], just as the subject with respect to such a contingent relates indifferently to being white and not to being white, so a man relates indifferently to being white or not being white—such an accident relates indifferently to inhering in such a subject or another, e.g., whiteness inheres in a man or a horse or some other term. So, just as it is contingent that a man be or not be white, so it is contingent that a white thing be or not be a man, and so in propositions with such a contingent in them the convertend is taken in the broad sense, namely, for a proposition with not necessary in it both in the convertend and the ­converse. [45.5–15] [257]  The justification for the second part of this rule is this: a subject does not necessarily require itself to be contingent in the natural sense, e.g., a man does not necessarily become gray-headed, nor is his head necessarily curly, nor is his eye necessarily watery. But contingent in the natural sense does necessarily require something of the subject, e.g., becoming gray-headed necessarily requires that the subject be a human being, and [so does] curliness of the head, and so on for the others. When, therefore, a statement is made with contingent taken for natural in it, e.g., in the convertenda, contingent is taken for not necessary, which is something able to be prevented, as in ‘For

a.  Reading at p. 45.22 convertente against conversa.

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every man it is contingent to become gray-headed’. But when a statement is made that has a subject possessing that sort of contingency, e.g., in the conversea, the contingent is taken for possible, which is a genus for necessary and not necessary, as was said above (233), and it renders the locution true for necessary because it cannot be blocked, as in ‘For someone who becomes gray-headed it is contingent to be a man’. [45.15–29] [The Rule for the Conversion of Negative Modal Propositions with Contingent Taken for Not Necessary in Them]

[258]  Having seen this, one should now speak of a negative conversion of a proposition with contingent taken for not necessary in it, which is twofold, as has been said (242). [45.29–31] [259]  One should know because of the rule that it is not possible to form negative propositions with contingent taken for natural in them. Rather in such negative ones that seem to have contingent taken for natural in them contingent is taken for possible. For example, ‘For no man it is contingent to become gray-headed’ and likewise ‘For some man it is contingent not to become gray-headed’ are not [propositions] with contingent taken for natural in them but rather with contingent taken for possible. Hence, the sense is [that] it is contingent that no man become gray-headed, i.e., it is possible that every man not become gray-headed, and similarly it is contingent that some man notb become gray-headed, i.e., it is possible that some man not become gray-headed. [45.31–41] [260]  The justification for this rule is this: contingent taken for natural, although it can be blocked, relates more to something being the case than to something not being the case, and so propositions that resonate with something not being the case, namely, negatives, do not serve the nature of propositions with contingent taken for natural in them, for it is not innate to a man not to become gray-headed but rather its opposite; therefore they are not propositions with contingent taken for natural in them. Nor are they [propositions] with contingent taken for indefinite in them, because they are not equally related to something being the case and something not being the case but more to something being the case. Nor are they [propositions] with contingent taken for necessary in them, for it is not necessary that a man not become gray-headed. It is left, therefore, that they be [propositions] with contingent taken for possible in them. And this is what Aristotle says in Book One of the Prior Analytics, [namely], that propositions with contingent taken for natural in them are not always wont to be

a.  Reading at p. 45.25 conversa against convertente. b.  Reading at 45.39–40 contingit non against non contingit.

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formed negatively but rather are more taken affirmatively.135 And so it is that such propositions are wont to be converted in the same way as negative ones with contingent taken for possible in them are, which have been treated above (232). [45.41–46.12] [261] One objects to this rule this way: affirmative propositions with contingent taken for natural in them are converted into the opposite quality, and this is done in this way, e.g., ‘For every man it is contingent not to become gray-headed’, ‘For every man it is contingent to become gray-headed’. Now the terms and modes in the converse and the convertend must be held uniformly and not differently, but in the affirmative contingent is held for contingent taken for natural; therefore also in the negative. Therefore, negative propositions with contingent taken for natural can be formed. [46.13–20] [262]  One should reply to this that contingent for either way is held uniformly with respect to genus, because in an affirmative and negative proposition it is held for contingent taken for not necessary but not uniformly with respect to species, because in the affirmative it is held for contingent taken for not necessary with respect to the species that is contingent taken for natural. In the negative, however, it is held for contingent taken for not necessary with respect to the species that is contingent taken for natural or [with respect to] an acceptance that is contingent taken for possible, because the sense of ‘For every man it is contingent not to become gray-headed’ is [that of] ‘It is not necessary that every man not become gray-headed’, which by the first series has the same [logical] value as ‘For every man it is possible to become gray-headed’. And so it is clear that contingent in the negative is not held for contingent taken for natural but as possible. [46.20–33] [Rules for the Conversion of Negative Modal Propositions with Contingent Taken for Indefinite in Them]

[263]  These rules are given for negative propositions with contingent taken for indefinite in them. [46.33–34] [The First Rule]

[264]  A universal negative proposition with contingent taken for indefinite in it is converted into its opposite quality, and not otherwise. For example, ‘For no man it is  contingent to be white’ is converted into ‘For every man it is contingent to be white’. [46.34–37] [265]  The justification for the first part of the rule is this: because such a contingent relates indifferently to something being the case and to something not being the case, if it is contingent for one, it is contingent for all. [46.37–40]

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[266]  The justification for the second part is this: if a universal negative proposition with such a contingent in it is converted simply, something unacceptable follows, namely, that the universal affirmative is converted simply, which is clear in this way: ‘For every man it is contingent to be white; therefore for no man it is contingent to be white’ follows by conversion into the opposite quality. But if ‘For no man it is contingent to be white’ can be converted simply, there follows from it ‘Therefore for every white thing it is contingent to be a man’, because ‘For no white thing it is contingent to be a man, therefore for every white thing it is contingent to be a man’ follows by conversion into an opposite quality. Therefore, from beginning to end it follows: ‘If for every white man it is contingent to be white, then for every white thing it is contingent to be a man’. Since this is unacceptable, it is left that a universal negative with contingent taken for indefinite in it is not converted simply. [46.40–47.13] [267] One objects to this rule in this way a: A property of what is [conceptually] broader is applicable to what is [conceptually] more narrow, and contingent taken for possible is broader than contingent taken for indefinite is, but a universal negative with possible in it is converted simply, as has already been said (221); therefore, a universal negative with contingent taken for indefinite ought also to be converted simply. [47.14–18] [268]  Also, Aristotle proposes this in his Prior Analytics when he speaks of contingent taken for [logically] high, i.e., for possible, and he offers as an example of such ‘For no tunic it is contingent to be white’; therefore that can be converted simply.136 But it is a fact that it is [a proposition] with contingent taken for indefinite, because a tunic no more relates to being white than black; therefore a universal negative with contingent taken for indefinite in it can be converted simply. [47.18–25] [269]  One should reply to the first (267) that contingent taken for indefinite can be considered in two ways: either with respect to the nature of what is broader that is contained in it, namely, contingent taken for possible, which is the ability to be the case, or with respect to its proper nature, which always adds to that broader [ability] an indifference to something being the case and to something not being the case. In the first sense the conversion that is in those propositions with contingent taken for possible in them belongs to a proposition with contingent taken for indefinite in it; in the second sense the conversion spoken of in the preceding rules belongs to it. For example, one thing is applicable to a man inasmuch as he is a sensitive animal and another inasmuch as he is a man, such as to be naturally tame. And because the more narrow diminishes the more broad, they are said to have that conversion which is in them inasmuch as they have contingent taken for indefinite in them and not inasmuch as they have possible in them. [47.25–37]

a.  Reading at p. 47.14 sic against si.

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[270]  One should reply to the second (268) that it is impossible to give an example of a genus except in one of its species or of contingent except in one of its species. The nature of contingent taken for indefinite is in the example presented, and so it is wont to be converted into its opposite quality [but] not by simple conversion; and Aristotle does not propose it as an example of such. The nature of contingent taken for possible, i.e., [logically] high, is also present there because a genus is contained in any of its ­species and thus it can be converted simply, and Aristotle uses it in this way in the stated example. In the other acceptance [the proposition] has contingent taken for indefinite in it and cannot be converted simply, and so the objection does not prevail. [47.37–48.7] [The Second Rule]

[271]  The second rule is this: A particular negative proposition with contingent taken for indefinite in it converts simply and into the opposite quality. For example, ‘For some man it is contingent not to be something white’ converts by opposite quality into ‘For some man it is contingent to be something white’, and then it is converted simply into ‘For some white thing it is contingent not to be a man’. [48.8–13] [272]  The justification for the first part of this rule is this: since such a proposition is one with contingent taken for indefinite in it, it relates indifferently to something being the case and to something not being the case, and so it is converted into its opposite quality. The justification for the second part of the stated rule is this: since such a proposition is converted by opposite quality into a particular affirmative, and a particular affirmative is converted simply, it is clear that it can be converted simplya. [48.13–20] [273]  On the other hand: simple conversion occurs with no change in quality and quantity. If, therefore, a particular negative is converted simply, it is converted into a particular negative. And the conversion of a particular affirmative is into a particular affirmative. Therefore one does not prove by such a conversion that a particular negative is converted simply. [48.20–25] [274]  One should reply to this that one proceeds in this way to prove the simple conversion of a particular negative with contingent taken for indefinite in it, [namely], that a particular negative with contingent taken for indefinite in it can be converted by opposite quality into a particular affirmative. For example, ‘For some man it is contingent not to be something white’ is converted into ‘For some man it is contingent to be something white’. But since ‘For some man it is contingent to be something white’ is a

a.  Reading at p. 48.20 simpliciter against similiter.

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particular affirmative, it can be converted simply into ‘For some white thing it is contingent to be a man’. But since ‘For some white thing it is contingent to be a man’ is a proposition with contingent taken for indefinite in it, it can be converted by opposite quality into ‘For some white thing it is contingent not to be a man’. Therefore from the beginning: ‘For some man it is contingent not to be something white’ can be converted into ‘For some white thing it is contingent not to be a man’, and so it remains that it can be converted simply. Such a conversion is not proved only by simple conversion of a particular affirmative, as the objection was supposing, but by conversion of a particular affirmative by opposite quality. [48.25–43] [Contingent Taken for Often and as Rare]

[275]  In closing one should note that, even though in the accepted senses of contingent no express mention has been made of contingent taken for often and contingent taken for rarely, there are contingents taken for often for two reasons. [48.43–49.3] [Contingent Taken for Often]

[276]  Sometimes [they occur] because events (contingencies) have an infallible cause, and once that cause is in play, then they come about necessarily, granted they are not occurring always but in a place and at a time. That the moon is eclipsed in this way is called contingent taken for often, and likewise that the sun necessarily is eclipsed, for when the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon, the moon is necessarily eclipsed. Similarly, when the moon is interposed between us and the sun in a direct line (recto dyametro), the sun is necessarily eclipsed.137 This sort of contingency is contained under contingent taken for necessary. So, proofs based only on necessary things occur, and they are rooted in this sort of contingency. [49.4–12] [277]  Some [other] contingents are sometimes called often because they relate more to something being the case than to something not being the case. They can be prevented, and yet more often than not they come about and are blocked on fewer [occasions], e.g., for a mother to love her child, for a cloud to rain, and the like. And this sort of contingency taken for often is contained under contingent taken for natural. Hence, dialectical syllogisms arise which are based on probable things that happen often and more often than not, and they are rooted in this sort of contingency. [49.13–19] [Contingent Taken for Rare]

[278]  Contingents are called rare in two senses. In one sense because they have a cause of the semblance of their occurance, although not of their existence (causam apparentum sui eventus, non tamen existentie), and because they occur on fewer occa-

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sions and more often than not are blocked. For example, that a mother does not love (which has a cause of semblance, e.g., in Medea), that one walking around at night steals, that one who is discovered is an adulterer, and others such, if there are any. And such a contingent is opposed to contingent taken for natural and is contained under contingent taken for possible, just as negation is opposed to affirmation.a Sophistical syllogisms arise in great part by means of the fallacy [called] “The Contingent” from contingent taken for natural, ‘about’ whichb we have already spoken (242), and from such a contingent [i.e., contingent taken for rare].138 [49.20–29] [279]  In another sense contingents are called rare because of a total lack of cause and because of the nature of their occurrence, as are those that happen by chance and fortune, such as when someone is walking about it happens that a rock falls [on him] or he falls down, and the like. Such are opposed to contingent taken for necessary because they can be the case or not be the case; but demonstrations are not based on such. These are contained, therefore, under contingent taken for not necessary ( for ­either way) but not under contingent taken for natural. And such contingents relate more to something not being the case than to something being the case. It remains, therefore, that it is contained under contingent taken for indefinite. [49.29–38] [Rules for the Conversion of Propositions with Contingent Taken for Often and Rare in Them]

[280]  One should know, therefore, that, whether propositions are formed with contingent taken for often in them in the first or second sense or with contingent taken for rare in them in the first or second sense, they are converted in the same way as propositions with contingent in them, under which these modes of contingent are contained, and their conversion and the explanation of their conversion are sufficiently clear from the previously stated rules (244, 250, 254, 259, 264, 271). [­49.38–43]

a.  Reading at p. 49.27 affirmationi. De against affirmationi de. b.  Reading at 49.27 quo against quibus.

CHAPTER TWO

PRE DICA BL ES

[281]  Predicables follow.1 One should know that ‘predicable’, ‘predicate’, and ­‘category’ all differ.2 [50.2] [Categories]

[282]  A category is nothing other than an orderly arrangement of broad to narrow concepts predicable as classes in a line running to the side and vertically. Within a category some things are placed above [others], such as a most general genus; other things [are placed] under them in a straight line, e.g., a most general genus, subalternate genera, and a lowest species; and something [is placed] at the side, such as differentiae. So, the whole order among the most general genus, lowest species, subalternate genera, and collateral differentiae is called a category, as is clear from the Tree of Porphyry in the treatise on predicables.3 [50.2–13] [The Number of Categories]

[283]  There are ten categories, just as there are ten most general genera, and these are substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, position, when, where, and possession.4 [50.14–16] [Predicates and Predicables]

[284]  That which stands in a relationship to a subject in a proposition is called a predicate, and they are four: differentia, accident, genus, and proprium.5 A predicable

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is the same as something sayable [of something] and ‘predicable’ can be distinguished, for according to Porphyry one sort is universal and the other is singular.6 [50.16–20] [Singulars]

[285]  A singular is what is predicated of one thing alone, as is ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’.7 [50.21] [286] But against this Aristotle says in the Categories that there is no predication with respect to primary substance, and he calls an individuala a primary substance.8 Hence, he wants to suggest that an individual is predicated of no thing. [50.22–25] [287]  For this reason one should reply that ‘predication’ is spoken of in two ways, strictly and broadly. Strict predication occurs when what is [logically] priorb to something is said of it, as a species is predicated of an individual and a genus of a species— species is prior to individuals, and genus is prior to species. Aristotle is thinking of that kind of predication and, in this sense, only a universal is predicated. ‘To be predicated of ’ in the broad sense conveys the same thing as ‘to be said of ’ does, in such a way that no proposition is thereby constituted (ita ut non fiat vis in hac propositione).9 Drawing on this Boethius says that no proposition is truer than that in which the same is predicated (said) of itself. An individual can be predicated in this [broader] sense, and he understands it in this sense here. [50.25–51.4] [Universals]

[288]  But a universal is the same as what is naturally suited to be said of more than one thing. It is better to include there “naturally suited to be said of ” than “is said of ” because not every universal is said of more than one thing, whereas every universal is naturally suited to be said of more than one thing. [51.4–7] [Different Kinds of Universals]

[289]  To make this clear one should note that one kind of universal is what is multiplied in more than one suppositum existing at the same time, such as man, because there is more than one man existing at the same time. Another is the universal that is not multiplied in more than one suppositum existing at the same time but successively, e.g., fenix, for there is at one and the same time no more than one fenix, but

a.  Reading at p. 51.24 individuum against individua. b.  Reading at p. 50.27 prius against posterius.

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there is always one fenix successively, and fenix is multiplied in that way. (The story goes that when the fenix wishes to die it gathers into itself various kinds of aromatic substances in consequence of which it burns, and then another fenix is generated from the ashes.) A third universal is what is multiplied in more than one suppositum neither at the same time nor successively, e.g., sun and moon, for there is only one moon and one sun and they will endure forever.10 And so it is clear that not just any sort of universal is said of more than one thing. Nevertheless, with respect to itself, i.e., with ­respect to the nature of a universal form, it is naturally suited to be said of more than one. [51.7–21] [The Five Predicables]

[290] But predicables are genus, species, differentia, proprium, and accident. [51.22–23]

[GENUS] [The Definition of ‘Genus’]

[291]  Genus is what is predicated of more than one thing differing in species with respect to what a thing is, as animal is predicated of a man and a horse, which are different in species.11 [51.23–25] [Explanation of the Definition]

[292]  To understand the phase “differing in species” one should know that ‘differing’ is spoken of in as many ways as ‘same’ is spoken of. [51.25–27] [293]  ‘Same’ is spoken of in three ways according to Aristotle in his Topics: same in genus, same in species, and same in number.12 They are the same in genus that are under the same genus, as are man and ass. They are the same in species that are under the same species, as Socrates and Plato are under man. ‘Same in number’ is spoken of in three ways: the same in name and definition, the same in proprium, and the same in accident. Those things are called the same in name or signification of which there is only one signification but which have more than one name, e.g., Marcus Tullius.13 Those are the same in definition of which the definition of the onea is that of the other, such as are man and rational animal. They are the same in proprium of which one is a

a.  Reading at p. 51.36 unius against unum.

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proprium of the other, as is able to laugh and man. They are accidentally the same of which an accident of the onea is that of the other, e.g., Socrates and the whiteness he has. [51.27–40] [294]  Likewise, ‘different’ is spoken of in three ways, namely, in genus, in species, and in number. Things different in genus are those whose genera are different, e.g., man, which is contained under the genus animal, and tree, [which is contained] under the genus plant. Things different in species are those that are under different species, although they are under the same genus, as are man and ass. Things numerically different are those of which one adds a number to that of the other, as do Socrates and Plato. [51.40–52.6] [295]  By the words “with respect to what a thing is” (291) one touches on [the fact] that genus is predicated substantially of its species and is wont to be predicated with respect to what, which appropriately responds to the question raised by “What [kind of thing is it]?” By the words “differing in species” genus is distinguished from species. By the words “with respect to what a thing is” it is distinguished from differentia, proprium, and accident.14 [52.6–12] [296]  One can argue against the definition stated above (291): since difference is understood by ‘more than one’ (for whatever are more than one are different), once ‘more than one thing’ is included in the definition, it is superfluous to add ‘differing’. [52.13–16] [297]  One could argue that genus is predicated of more than one thing agreeing, and not differing, in species, for man is a species and ass is a species, and so man and ass agree in species; therefore, animal is predicated of these as of things that agree in species. [52.16–20] [298]  One could argue that to be predicated with respect to what [something is] is not to be predicated substantially, for, if it were, there could be no genus except in the category of substance, since accidents are different from substance. [52.20–23] [299]  One should reply to the first of these (296) that “differing” is qualified by “in species,” and it is certainly true that whatever are more than one are things that are different but not that whatever are more than one are different in species. And so, although different things are understood by “more than one thing”, things different in species are not understood by “more than one thing.” Hence, “differing,” so qualified, is not superfluous. [52.24–30] [300]  One should reply to the second (297) that ‘species’ has two senses. In one it is the common name of an intention, and in this sense it is true that man and ass agree in species because each is a species. In another sense ‘species’ conveys the same thing

a.  Reading at p. 51.39 unius against unum.

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as ‘specific’ difference does, and it is interpreted in this way here. So, the sense is [that of ] ‘more than one thing differing in species’, i.e., of more than one thing that differ by means of a specific differentia, for the differentia that constitutes a species, i.e., the specific differentia, differs from one species to the next. In this way there are different species of which the same genus is predicated, when species is interpreted in this sense. And so the objection carries no weight, for it proceeds by way of equivocation. [52.30–40] [301]  One should reply to the third (298) that ‘what’ has two senses, namely, a what with respect to what is signified and mode and a what with respect to mode and not to what is signified. It is said of substances in the first sense and of accidents in the second sense, and Aristotle proposes this in Book One of the Topics when he says that who says that a man is an animal indicates absolutely a what with respect to mode and signifies a what with respect to what is signified.15 A man and an animal are substances, and so who says a man is an animal indicates a what with respect to what is signified, and animal is related to man as genus to its species. For this reason who says a man is an animal indicates a what with respect to what is signified and mode. But who says white is a color indicates a what with respect to mode and signifies a quality with respect to what is signified, for white and color are accidents. And so, who says white is a color is signifying a quality, and color relates to white as genus to its species. Who says white is a color indicates a what with respect to mode because of that relationship. [52.40–53.13] [302]  And so, genus, whether in the category Substance or Accident, can be predicated in this way with respect to what [something is] on the basis of mode when it is related to one of its inferiors. And such a predication with respect to what according to mode suffices for a genus and such a predication is substantial, even though it is not between substances. Something false was being assumed in the argument, for it assumes that only a substantial predication occurs between substances, which is false. For just as a substantial predication occurs when a genus is predicated of a species with respect to substances, as when one says ‘A man is an animal’, so also a substantial predication occurs when a genus is predicated of a species with respect to accidents, as in ‘White is a color’. [53.13–24] [A Second Definition of ‘Genus’]

[303]  ‘Genus’ is defined in another way: Genus is that under which species is placed. [53.24–25] [The Divisions of Genus]

[304]  ‘Genus’ is divided in this way: some genera are most general, the others are subalternate genera. [53.25–26]

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[305]  To make this clear one should note that in every category there are some most general genera and some lowest species and that between the most general genera and the lowest species are the subalternate [genera and species].16 A most general genus is that above which there is no other overarching genus; a lowest species is that under which there is no lower species; and subalternates are those positioned between a most general [genus] and a lowest [species]. Genera and species have relationships to different things, for they are species with respect to the higher things and they are genera with respect to the lower things. [53.26–35] [306]  One can argue against the phrase “in every [category],” etc. (305): if there are some most general [genera] in every category, since every plural generates its ­singular, at the very least there will be two most general genera in every [category]; and since there are ten categories, there will be twenty [most general] genera, which is false. [53.35–40] [307]  One should reply to this that the phrase “in every [category],” etc., ought to be understood in such a way that there is a descent from the phrase “in every” and from “some” in this way: in every category there is one most general genus and in another a different one, and so on. Thus the phrase is true and so the opposition is illfounded, for it proceeds from a false descent from “every,” not from “some.” It is like saying ‘Helen bore ten times ten sons’, given the fact that she bore one at one time and another at another time and so on up to ten. If there is descent from “ten times ten” the phrase is true, but if there is descent from “ten times,” and not from “ten,” the statement is false, because it follows then that she bore ten at one time and ten at another, and so on. [53.40–54.12] [308]  Also, one could argue, as the Philosopher proposes, that what is so called because of its superabundance applies to only one thing. Since, therefore, a most general genus is so called because of superabundance, it is applicable to only one [genus], and so there will be only one most general genus. [54.12–16] [309]  One should reply to this that what is so called because of superabundance applies to only one in the same genus, but in more than one [genus] more than one thing can certainly be so called because of the given superabundance, for there can certainly be one ass among asses that is the strongest and one man among men. Similarly, there is one most general genus in one category, and there are more than one most general genus in more than one category. [54.16–22] [310]  But in this connection one could ask why there is only one most general genus in one category but there are more than one lowest species. [54.22–24]

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[311]  One should reply to this that the most general is so called because of its superabundance with respect toa everything else in its genus. For example, substance in the category Substance is the most general [genus] with respect to all thatb are in the category Substance. And because in that one respect only one thing is so called because of superabundance, so in one category there is only one highest genus. But species is not so called because of a superabundance with respect to everything else in its genus, for man is not called a lowest species with respect to ass but with respect to the individuals that are contained under it. And because there can be more than one such relation in the same category, there can be more than one lowest species in the same category. [54.24–35]

[SPECIES] [The Definition of ‘Species’]

[312]  ‘Species’ is defined in this way: species is what is predicated with respect to what [something is] of more than one thing numerically different.17 For example, ‘man’ is predicated of Socrates and Plato who are things numerically different, for individuals are said to be numerically different. [54.36–39] [Seven Characteristics of an Individual]

[313]  According to Porphyry each and every c individual consists of characteristics (proprietates) the collection of which it is impossible to find in any other thing.18 These characteristics are seven, and they are time, place, form, figure, one’s own parentage, and one’s own denomination, for it is impossible for these seven to exist at the same time in the same way in one thing as they exist in another.19 [54.39–55.1] [314]  But one could object: since those characteristics are accidents, and substance is not made up of accidents, and since individuals are substances, therefore they do not consist of similar characteristics. [55.1–4] [315]  One should reply to this that it is of course true that the substance of an individual is not constituted by these characteristics. But individuals are said to be constituted by these characteristics with respect to their being known, for one a.  Reading at p. 54.25 respectu omnium against omnium. b.  Reading at p. 54.27 que against qui. c.  Reading at p. 54.40 unumquodque against unumquoque.

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i­ndividual is distinguished from another by means of those characteristics. And because of this one does not say that individuals consist of those characteristics, for individuals consist of matter and form with respect to their being. But because knowledge follows upon the being of an individual and individuals are known by those characteristics (since one is distinguished from another by them), so he says that they consist of those characteristics. It does not follow from this that substance is made up of accidents with respect to its being but only with respect to its being known. And this is true because, according to Aristotle in On the Soul, accidents contribute much to the knowledge of a substance.20 [55.4–18] [316]  One should note in this connection that, although those common characteristics are taken differently, the combination of those characteristics is unique so that the combination of characteristics found in one is never found in another. [55.18–22] [317]  One should also note: species is [indicated to be] distinguished from individuals by “predicated of more than one”; species is distinguished from genus by “numerically different”; and these are distinguished from differentia, proprium, and accident by “with respect to whata [something is].” [55.22–26] [The Second Definition of ‘Species’]

[318]  [‘Species’] is defined in another way: species isb what is placed under genus. [55.26–27] [The Divisions of Species]

[319]  Species is divided in this way: some species are lowest, the others are subalternate. A lowest species is one under which no other is lower. A subalternate species is one that can be a genus and a species in different respects: it is a species with respect to what is [logically] higher, but it is a genus with respect to what is lower. [55.27–31]

[DIFFERENTIAE] 21 [Three Kinds of Differences]

[320]  ‘Difference’ is threefold: broad, strict, and more strict. Difference in the broad sense is that by which one thing differs from another or the same from itself by

a.  Reading at p. 55.25 quod quid against quod. b.  Reading at p. 55.26 est que against et que.

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a separable or ordinary accident, e.g., a white Socrates differs from a black Plato or an old Socrates from himself as a boy. Hence, a difference in the broad sense is nothing other than an ordinary or separable accident. A difference in the strict sense is that by which one thing differs from another by an inseparable accident, as a simian-looking Socrates differs from an aquiline-looking Plato. Hence, a difference in the strict sense is nothing other than an inseparable accident.22 [55.31–40] [321]  But one could object to this: since difference and accident are different predicables, it does not seem that a difference could be a separable or inseparable a­ ccident. [55.40–56.2] [322]  One should reply to this that one and the same thing cannot be a difference and an accident in the same respect, although in different respects the same thing can certainly be a difference in the broad or strict sense and an accident. White in relation to the substance in which it exists, i.e., in which it inheres, is an accident, for the being of an accident is to inhere. But white, inasmuch as it causes the subject in which it exists to differ from a black thing, is a difference. A difference causes [a thing] to differ, and in this sense the same thing cannot really be a difference and an accident, although we can think of it as being a difference and an accident. [56.2–10] [323]  Also, since Aristotle says in Book Four of the Topics that a nonentity has no differences, one could argue that there is no difference between an entity and a non­ entity, and so Socrates as an old man could not differ from himself as a boy since he cannot be at the same time an old man and a boy.23 [56.11–14] [324]  One should reply to this that something can be an entity in two ways: in reality and in a mind.24 For there to be a difference or diversity between things it is not necessary that each exist in reality; it suffices that the one thing exist in reality and the other in a mind, for one correctly says that he is like his dead father, even though [his father] does not exist except in thought. Similarly, for there to be a difference between Socrates the boy and the old man it suffices that he be an old man in reality and be thought of as a boy. And when it is objected that nonentities have no differences, one is thinking of a nonentity that is in no sense an entity, neither in reality nor in a mind. [56.14–25] [Specific Differentia]

[325]  ‘Difference’ in the stricter sense conveys the same thing as ‘specific differentia’ does, and a specific differentia is that by which one species differs from another, as man differs from ass in rationality. Such a differentia added to a genus constitutes man, and in this sense it is called a specific differentia. [56.25–29]

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[Aristotle’s Five Definitions of ‘Differentia’]

[326]  Aristotle gives five definitions of such a differentia; the first four are less strict and the fifth the most strict. (1) A differentia is that by whicha a species exceeds a genus. (2) A differentia is what is predicated with respect to a qualification (in eo quod quale) of more than one thing numerically different. (3) A differentia is what is naturally suited to divide those things that are under a genus. (4) A differentia is that by which single things differ among themselves.25 And (5) a differentia is not just any of the things that divide those things that are under the same genus but what leads to their being, and that of it that is a part pertains to the substance of that thing (et quod eius quod est pars est secundum quod quid est illius rei). [56.29–39] [327]  The stated definitions differ in this wayb: the first four are less strict, whereas the fifth is the most strict, as has been said (326). The first four differ in this way: the differentia is only related to two things: to the species it constitutes and to the genus it divides. The first two are given in relation to the species that a differentia constitutes. But they differ, for a differentia does two things with respect to species: a specific differentia falls into the constitution of a species, and so one has the first definition, for a species exceeds a genus in this specific differentia; also, ‘differentia’ is predicated of something that constitutes a species, and in this sense there is the second definition. The other two are given in relation to genus, which they divide. But they differ, for a differentia does two things: it divides those things that a genus unites, and the third definition is taken in this sense; and it causes those things divided in this way to differ from each other, and in this sense there is the fourth definition. In this way it is clear how the stated definitions differ. [56.39–57.12] [328]  Against the first definition (326) one could ask: since a genus contains under it a speciesc and the differentiae of that species and of other species, one could argue that a genus has more differentiae than a species does, and so species does not exceed genus in differentiae. [57.12–16] [329]  One should reply to this that a genus exceeds a species in the containment of subject parts, for it contains all the differentiae of that species and other species, and the objection proceeds along this line. But a species exceeds a genus in the containment of integral parts, which are placed in the definition of a species. Species has more differentiae than genus does, which is clear, for in the definition of ‘man’ one includes ‘mortal rational’ beyond what is included in the definition of ‘animal’. And along this

a.  Reading at p. 56.31 qua against quam. b.  Reading at p. 56.39 dicte: quattuor against dicte quattuor: c.  Reading at p. 57.13 speciem against species.

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line a definition is given in this sense: a differentia is that by which a species exceeds a genus, i.e., [a species] has more differentiae in its constitution than a genus does. ‘Animal’ is defined in this way: animal is sensitive animate substance, whereas ‘man’ is defined in this way: man is mortal rational sensitive animate substance. [57.16–29] [330]  One could argue against this definition: since a definition is applicable to any thing defined, and any part of an animal is a sensitive animate substance, therefore any part of an animal is an animal, which is false. [57.29–32] [331] Since body is the proximate genus of animal it ought to be included in [the latter’s] definition more than substance should be, which is the remote genus of animal.26 For according to Aristotle in Book Six of the Topics a definition ought to be constructed from a proximate genus and not from a remote one.27 [57.33–37] [332]  One should reply to the first (330) that “sensitive animate substance” is the true definition of ‘animal’. But one should know that something is a sensitive animate substance either because it includes in its perfection a sensible soul, and such is an animal, or because it has some ability (not from itself but from another) by which it can have sensations, and such is not an animal but a part of an animal. A soul, according to what Aristotle proposes in his On the Soul, is the perfection of a whole and, by consequence, not that of a part.28 Thus a part has an ability to have sensations, not from itself, but from its whole. And so it is clear that ‘sensitive’ is interpreted in different ways depending on whether it is included in the definition of ‘animal’ or whether it is said of a part of an animal. And for this reason it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. [57.37–58.6] [333]  One should reply to [the second objection] (331) that ‘body’ is equivocal, and something equivocal should not be included in a definition; so ‘substance’, not ‘body’, is included in the definition of ‘animal’. ‘Body’ is equivocal for body as substance and for body as quantity. Body is a threefold quantity. It is dimension with length, and this is a line, and so a line is length without width. It is dimension with width, which presupposes length, and this is a surface, and so a surface is width having length without depth. And it is dimension in a straight line with depth, which presupposes length and width. Length can be without width and depth, but width cannot be without length, nor depth without density, nora density without length and width. Body as quantity is the threefold dimension that is length, width, and depth. Body as substance is the subject of this dimension. So, body as quantity is the threefold dimension that is an accident and body as substance is the subject having that dimension as its accident. When, therefore, it is said that a definition ought to be constructed from a proximate genus, it is true except when the genus has an impediment because of which it cannot enter into the definition.29 [58.6–28]

a.  Reading at p. 58.19–20 nec spissitudo against spissitudo autem.

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* * * [334]  Against the second definition (326) one can argue: since a definition ought to be applicable to only that of which it is affirmed and this definition is applicable to an accident—an accident is said of more than one thing with respect to a q ­ ualification— it seems that [the definition] is inaccurate. [58.28–31] [335]  One should reply to this that, although the wording of the stated definition is applicable to an accident and a differentia, it is defined with respect to what is signified. There is a twofold qualification: a substantial qualification with respect to what is signified—the existing substance hasa only the mode of an accident—and there is an accidental qualification, which is an accident with respect to what is signified and mode. A differentia is classified among substantial qualifications, whereas an accident is classified among accidental qualifications, and it differs in this way with respect to what is signified when it is included in the definition of ‘differentia’ and of ‘accident’; and because of this their definitions differ. [58.31–40] [336]  Against the third [definition] (326) one could argue that it seems to apply to a proprium for a proprium distinguishes those things that are under the same genus, e.g., able to laugh. [58.40–59.1.] [337]  One should reply to this that a differentia is naturally suited to divide on the basis of substance those things that are under the same genus. If a proprium divides those things that are under the same genus, it does so on the basis of accident. For as Boethius says, every proprium issues from the class of accidents.30 [59.1–5] [338]  Against the fourth [definition] (326) one could argue: since a definition ought to be applicable to all contained under what is defined, then if a differentia is that by which single things differ from one another, and if rational is a differentia, then single things differ [from one another] by being rational, which is false. [59.5–8] [339]  Also, if single things differ by a difference and a difference is something, a difference differs from others by another difference, and that by another difference, and so on to infinity. But this is absurd, for a process to infinity is condemned in art as well as nature. [59.9–13] [340]  One should reply to the first [objection] (338) that the sense of the definition “a differentia is that by which single things differ from one another” is that single things, to the extent to which they differ, do so by some difference, whatever it may be, but it is not necessary that all things differ by being rational, as the objection concludes, but that all things differ by some difference, whatever that difference may be, and so those objections proceed from a false understanding of the definition. [59.14–20]

a.  Reading at p. 58.34–35 substantia habet against substantia, habet.

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[341]  And this is clear by analogy: it is said in Porphyry’s book that species is what is called the form of everything.31 But this seems to be false since there is no [one] form for everything. Because of this [and in reply] it ought to be understood that species is what is said of the form of something, whatever [the species] may bea. Words are not always to be understood in their literal senseb (in eo sensu quem faciunt) but in the sense in which they are intendedc (in sensu quem fiunt) because the property of a locution is not always to be looked at, but the cause of the locution, as is clear among people who speak in ordinary ways (apud convenienter loquentes).32 If one says, “The wolf is in the fable,” one understands it not in the literal sensed but in the sense in which it is intendede. [59.20–30] [342]  One should reply to the second [objection] (339) that some things are those that differ by means of themselves, but other things are those that differ by something they have. For example, man and ass do not differ by means of themselves but by ­something they have, namely, by their differentiae. But differentiae differ by means of themselves and not by something they have. The definition is understood of those who differ by something they have and not by means of themselves, and so [the latter] is not understood of a differentia. [59.30–36] [343]  One could object against the fifth definition (326) that it seems to apply to a genus. A genus leads a species to be and is part of a species. A differentia alone does not lead a species to be, although a differentia with a genus does, and so a genus is a part of the being of a species, just as a differentia is.33 [59.36–60.1] [344]  One should reply to this that the definition ought to be understood in this way: a differentia is not just any of the things that divide those things that are under the same genus but is that distinguishing thing that leads to their being. Andf by the first part [of the definition] a differentia is distinguished from a genus—a differentia is something divisive of those things that are under the same genus, which is not something applicable to a genus. By the second part [of the definition] differentia is distinguished from proprium and accident, which do not lead a species to be, and by the third part differentia is distinguished from species, for a differentia is a part [of a species that leads] to the being of a species, whereas a species is the whole being of the species and not a part. And in this way it is clear that differentia is distinguished from all the other predicables by the parts included in this definition, and for this reason this definition is the most strictly applicable to ‘differentia’. So one should reply that the a.  Reading at p. 59.25 quecumque sit illa against quicumque sit ille. b.  Reading at p. 59.26 quem faciunt against quod faciunt. c.  Reading at p. 59.26 quem fiunt against quod fiunt. d.  Reading at p. 59.29 quem facit against quod facit. e.  Reading at p. 59.30 quem fit against quod fit. f.  Reading at p. 60.4 Et per against Et cum per.

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objection is based on an omission of the first part of the definition of ‘differentia’ by which a differentia is distinguished from a genus, and so it carries no weight. But genus and differentia agree in this that both lead to the being and are a part of the being of a species, but they do it differently: a differentia is divisive of those things that are under the same genus, whereas a genus is not.34 [60.1–20] [The Divisions of Differentia]

[345]  ‘Differentia’ is divided in this way: some differentiae are divisive, others are constitutive. And one should note that the very same thing that is divisive is also constitutive, but it is said to be constitutive of species and divisive of genera. For example, rational and nonrational are differentiae and are divisive of animal, for they divide animal, and they are also constitutive of species—rational is the constitutive differentia of man, whereas nonrational of nonrational animal. [60.20–26] [346]  But someone might object: since things that divide when taken by disjunction ought to be converted with what is divided, then rational and nonrational are converted with animal, if they are differentiae that divide animal; therefore whatever is rational or nonrational is an animal, which is false, for an intellectual soul is rational or nonrational and yeta is not an animal. [60.26–32] [347]  One should reply to this that rational and nonrational are differentiae that divide animal and when taken by disjunction are converted with animal. But it must be understood that in such a division what is divided ought always to be found with the things that divide, and so the counterexample has no merit since what is divided is always said of every thing of which the things that divide are said. Thus whenb one says “Some animals are rational, others are nonrational,” one should understand that it is one thing to be a rational animal and another to be a nonrational animal. And so the counterexample of the soul has no merit because it is neither a rational animal nor a nonrational animal, and hence no animal at all. [60.32–41]

[PROPRIUM] 35 [The Four Senses of ‘Proprium’]

[348]  Proprium is spoken of in four ways: what is applicable to one [species] alone and not to all [members of that species] is called a proprium in the first sense, as to be

a.  Reading at p. 60.32 tamen against ita. b.  Reading at p. 60.37 cum against ecum.

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a grammarian is a proprium of man because it is applicable to an individual man and not to all men. What is applicable to every [member of a species] but not only [to every member of that species] is called a proprium in the second way, as to be two-footed is a proprium of man because it is applicable to all men but not to [man] alone because it is applicable to birds.36 What is applicable to all [members of a species] and to them alone, but not always, is called a proprium in the third way, because it is a proprium of man to grow gray-headed only in old age because it is applicable to every man and to him alone, but not always. What is applicable only to one species and to every thing contained under that species and always is called a proprium in the fourth way, as to be able to laugh is a proprium of man, for it is applicable only to the species man and to every one contained under that species, and always. [60.42–61.11] [349]  But note that a man is not said to be able to laugh because he is always actually laughing but because he is naturally suited to laugh. This sort of proprium is what is called a proprium in the strict sense, and it is defined in this way: a proprium is something that does not indicate what the being of a thing is.37 It inheres only in a species and is predicated interchangeably with a species.38 [61.11–15] [350]  But someone might object: a man is said to be able to laugh, not because he is always actually laughing, but because he is naturally suited to laugh, and yet to be able to laugh is a proprium of man in the strict sense. By analogy, it seems that to grow gray-headed is a proprium of man in the strict sense for, although a man is not always actually growing gray-headed, yet he is naturally suited to grow gray-headed. [61.16–20] [351]  Similarly, although a man is not actually a grammarian, yet he is naturally suited to be a grammarian, and accordingly [able to be a] grammarian will be a proprium of man in the strict sense as is able to laugh. [61.20–23] [352]  One should reply to [the first objection] (350) that ‘proprium’ in the strict sense (as has been pointed out [349]) does not indicate actuality but aptitude. Nevertheless it is necessary that the aptitude introduced by a proprium in the strict sense come to fruition naturally, always, and through a definite action, as appears in the case of the aptitude introduced by the ability to laugh, which [aptitude] in youth and old age can naturally come to fruition by its own action. But the case is not the same with the aptitude to grow gray-headed introduced in the case of man, for that aptitude is not wont to come to fruition by its own action except in old age. [61.23–31] [353]  Likewise, [one should reply to the second objection (351) that] the aptitude that is in a man to be a grammarian is not naturally suited to come naturally to fruition by its own action but more by acquisition: knowledge of the perfect is derived by ­acquisition, not by nature. [61.31–35]

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[ACCIDENT] [The Definitions of ‘Accident’]

[354]  Accident is what is present or absent without the destruction of a subject.39 Another definition is: accident is what is able to inhere and not to inherea in the same thing. With reference to this there is another: accident is what is neither genus nor species nor differentia nor proprium but inheres in a subsistent subject.40 [61.36–40] [The Divisions of Accident]

[355]  Accident is divided in this way: some accidents are separable, the others inseparable. A separable accident is one for which it is appropriate for it to be separated from its subject, e.g., white in a man is a separable accident. An inseparable one is one for which it is not appropriate for it to be separated from its subject, as blackness in a crow is an inseparable accident.41 [61.40–62.1] [356]  One could argue against the first definition (354): this definition does not seem to apply to all accidents since death and burning are accidents and yet, when they occur, destroy a substance. [62.2–5] [357]  One should reply to this in many ways. First, the qualification “without the destruction of a subject” can (a) qualify the verb “is present,” and this is how the opponent takes it, although this is not how the definition is to be understood; or (b) it can complete the verb “is present,” and this is how the definition is to be understood, but then it provides no counterexample.42 In a second way it can be said that death and burning are not accidents but intermediary states between substance and accidents. Aristotle says in the Metaphysics that some entities are substances, some are accidents, and some are states intermediary between substance and accidents, such as generation and destruction and the like.43 And so, since death and burning are destructions, they are states intermediary between substance and accident and are not accidents, and hence the counterargument in this context is not valid.44 [62.5–17] [358]  One can argue against the division of accidents (355) that it seems to be contrary to the definition (354). In the definition it is supposed that every accident is separable because it can be present or absent, whereas in the division it is said that some are separable and others inseparable.45 [62.17–21]

a.  Reading at p. 61.38 inesse against esse.

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[359]  One should reply to this that ‘separable’ can be taken in two ways, actually or in thought (actu vel intellectu), and every accident is separable in thought, although some are actually inseparable. When, therefore, it is supposed in the definition that every accident is separable, [the accident] is understood to be separable in thought. But when it is said in the division “some are separable, some are inseparable,” the one is understood to be separable in thought, the other actually inseparable, and so there is no contradiction.46 Porphyry puts it this way: “Blackness accrues inseparably to a crow and an Ethiopian; but a crow can be thought of as white and an Ethiopian as shining with gleaming whiteness,” i.e., as white.47 [62.21–31] [360]  But someone could ask: if one thinks of a white crow, one thinks of it either as existing or not existing. If [one is thinking of it] as existing, then the crow is white, and so Porphyry speaks falsely when he says that black inheres in a crow inseparably. If one is thinking of it as not existing, by that same rationale man could be said to be nonmortal, although this is not the case. And so it can be objected that a species can be thought of without the differentia of that species, which is false. [62.31–37] [361]  One should reply to this that one who is thinking of a crow as white is thinking of what does not actually exist but yet is thinking of what can exist in thought. Since a subject is not made up of accidents, one thinking can think a crow to be other than black, since black is an accident and does not pertain to the essence of the crow. Hence, a crow can as well be thought of as being under whiteness as being under blackness, as far as the nature of the subject is concerned. But it does not follow from this that man can be thought of as nonmortal, because the differentia of a species pertains to the essence of the species, without which differentia there could have been no species, nor could one be thought of as being. And so in this sense the examples of an inseparable accident and a differentia of a species were not analogical. [62.37–63.9]

CHAPTER THREE

CATEG ORI ES

[PRELIMINARY REMARKS] 1

[362]  Prefacing a few things that are necessary in order to understand the categories, we first distinguish with Aristotle three modes of predicating.2 Some of the things that are said are equivocals, others are univocals, and still others are denomi­ natives. [64.2–5] [Equivocal, Univocal, and Denominative Terms]

[363]  Those things are called equivocals whose name alone is common and the definition of their substance in accord with that name is different. For example, if ‘animal’ signifies a real animal and a fictional animal, only the name is common to them, and their definition is of two things, that is, the definition in accord with the name will be different. One says of a fictional lion on a wall, “Look at the terrifying animal,” and we say the same thing of a living lion, equivocating on ‘animal’ for both. We say of the statues of kings, “These are such and such kings,” and we likewise say of those who are still reigning, “These are such and such kings,” taking the name ‘king’ equivocally. [64.6–15] [364]  But those things are called univocals whose name is common and the definition of their substance in accord with that name is the same. For example, the name ‘animal’ is common to a man and a cow and an ass (and so on for others), and likewise its definition in accord with that name is the same. We say a man is an animal and a cow is an animal, and a man is a sensitive animate substance and a cow is a sensitive animate substance, and so they have a common name. Their definition in accord with that name is the same, for nothing is a man inasmuch as he is an animal except a sensitive animate substance, and likewise for a cow. [64.16–25] 77

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[365]  Whatever differ from something only in grammatical case ending and have appellation in accord with that name are called denominatives, e.g., ‘grammarian’ from ‘grammar’ and ‘brave’ from ‘bravery’. They differ only in their case ending, i.e., only by their falling away, for the one falls away from, i.e., is derived from, the other, e.g., ‘grammarian’ from ‘grammar’.3 [64.26–30] [366]  To make clear what has been said one asks why those definitions are placed at the beginning of the Categories and of what use they are. [64.30–32] [367]  One should reply to this that there are ten categories.4 Those ten categories can be referred to their [logical] superior, namely, to being (ens), and thus they equivocate in being since ‘being’ is said in a prior sense of a substance and in a secondary sense of an accident.5 All categories other than Substance are Accidents, and so they are said to be equivocal. Or, any category can be referred to what are [logically] below it, and in this sense they are univocal because genus is predicated univocally of its species or inferiors. Or, the ten categories can be compared to what are superiora, and in this sense they are called denominatives because quantity, referred to a substance, denominates a particular amount (ipsa quanta), quality, a [particular] quality (quale), and so on. By this is made clear the purpose for which definitions of this sortb are ­constructed.  [64.32–65.11] [368]  Second, one asks why equivocals are spoken of in the plural, and so on for others. [65.12–13] [369]  One should reply to this that whether the reference is spoken of in the first sense or in the second there are always more than one, and so they are always defined in the plural. [65.13–15] [370]  Third, one asks why they are defined by ‘are called’ and not by ‘are’ when saying “Those things are called equivocals” and not “Those things are equivocals.” It seems they ought to be defined in terms of being because a definition indicates what the being of something is; therefore, etc. [65.15–18] [371]  One should reply to this that the ten categories are something in nature, and so they are defined by the natural arts in terms of being, which consider them ­inasmuch as they are something in nature. But Aristotle considers them as things sayable, and so he defines them with reference to being-called and not with reference to being, and by this the solution to the objection is made clear. [65.18–23]

a.  Reading at p. 65.8 superiora against superiorem. b.  Reading at p. 65.11 huiusmodi against huius.

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* * * [372] One objects to the stated definition (363) in this way: “those things are called equivocals whosea name alone is common,” and it seems one speaks inaccurately. It is not equivocals alone that seem to have a name in common but also univocals, as is clear by the definition of ‘univocals’ (364). [65.24–28] [373]  One should reply to this that ‘alone’ can exercise its exclusion with respect to other names in such a way that the sense is [that] equivocals alone have a common name, with the result that names other than equivocal ones do notb, and so runs the objection. But the definition is not to be understood in this way. Or, [‘alone’] can exercise its exclusion with respect to the concept, i.e., the definition, with the result that the sense is [that] those things are called equivocals whosec name alone is common, i.e., that have a commonality in name only, so that not [even their] definition [is common]; in this sense the definition is accurate. [65.28–36] [374] One objects to the second [definition] (364) in this way: those things are [called] univocals whose name is common and the definition of their substance in accord with that name is the same. On the other hand univocals are different, e.g., man, ass, and so on. But different things have different definitions; therefore univocals do not have the same definition but different ones. [65.36–40] [375]  One should reply to this that, when it is said that the definition of their substance is the same, it is not understood that all univocals have the same definition. It is to be understood that all things that are under one univocal share the definition of that univocal. For example, Socrates and Plato share the definition of ‘man’d, and man and ass share the definition of ‘animal’, and so on. [65.40–66.3] [376] One objects to the third [definition] (365) in this way: whatever differ only in grammatical case ending are called denominatives, e.g., ‘just’ from ‘justice’, according to the logician, or ‘justice’ from ‘just’e, according to the grammarian. But on the other hand just as ‘grammar’ is in the nominative case so is ‘grammarian’; therefore they are not different in grammatical case ending. [66.3–8] [377]  One should reply to this that denominatives differ only in their grammatical case ending, i.e., only in a falling away, i.e., in derivation, and are not different by the accident that is a case ending, as was objected. [66.8–11]

a.  Reading at p. 65.25 quorum against quarum. b.  Reading at p. 65.31 equivoca non against equivoca. c.  Reading at p. 65.33–34 quorum against quarum. d.  Reading at p. 66.2 hominis against homini. e.  Reading at p. 66.5 iusto against iustus.

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* * * [378]  After this one asks why the logician says that ‘just’ comes from ‘justice’, whereas, vice versa, the grammarian says ‘justice’a derives from ‘just’. [66.11–13] [379]  One should reply to this that a grammarian is a craftsman attentive to the senses (sensibilis), i.e., sensitive, less cultivated than a logician. Now since a grammarian is attentive to the senses, he judges what can be seen and perceived to be prior and more fundamental, and this is a concrete accident. For example, white can be seen in a subject in which it is present, whereas whiteness cannot be seen by itself. But a logician is a subtler craftsman and sees that a concrete accident is something composed with the subject that has it, as are a white thing and a black thing, and so on. But an abstract accident is something simple, and the simple is prior to the composed. And so the logician says that the concrete is derived from the abstract. [66.13–23] [Uncombined and Combined Locutions]

[380]  Some things are said without combination, e.g., ‘man’ or ‘runs’, and others with combination, e.g., ‘A man runs’.6 [66.24–25] [The Eight Ways of Being in Something]7

[381]  But before one of the members of this division is subdivided, the ways of being-in must be distinguished because they are necessary for the ensuing division and for some things that are said later. Therefore, something is said to be in something in the first way as an integral part is in its whole, e.g., a finger in a hand and a wall in a house. Second, the way an integral whole is in its parts, as a house in a wall, a roof, and a foundation. Third, as a species is in a genus, e.g., man in animal, and anything [logically] inferior in what is above it. Fourth, the way a genus is in a species, and as each and every thing that defines is in what is defined, i.e., its definition. [66.26–35] [382]  But one objects in this way to the claim that some things are said without combination, e.g., ‘animal’: ‘animal’ is something composed of letters and syllables; therefore it does not signify without combination.8 [66.35–38] [383]  One should reply to this that there are two kinds of combinations: one pertains to letters and syllables, and a logician does not concern himself with this kind but assumes it from the grammarian; the other kind pertains to the combination of words in an expression, and this is what the logician intends when he says that ‘animal’ signifies without combination. [66.38–42]

a.  Reading at p. 66.13 iustitia against iustitiam.

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* * * [384]  In addition one objects in this way to the claim that a part is in its whole and a whole in its parts, and similarly a species in its genus and a genus in its species (381), because it seems to be impossible that I be in a house and a house be in me. Likewise, it seems to be impossible that a part be in its whole and a whole be in its parts, and similarly a genus in its species and a species in its genus. [66.42–67.5] [385]  One should reply to this that it is not impossible for something to be in something and for that same thing in which it is, to be in it in different respects. So one should note that a species is in its whole by containment, because genus contains under itself all its species. But genus is in its species by predication. In like manner an integral whole is in its parts by a kind of result: from the arrangement of a roof, walls, and a foundation there results the whole that is a house. But integral parts are in their whole by containment. [67.5–15] [386] The fifth way of being-in is the way form is in matter, and this fifth [way] is subdivided because one kind [of form] is substantial form, e.g., a soul is the substantial form of a body; and another kind is accidental form, e.g., white with respect to a man. The first of these is called being-in in the strict sense, the way form is in matter—I am speaking of substantial form, e.g., a soul in a body—; the other is said to be-in the way an accident is in its subject, e.g., whiteness in a wall. The sixth way of being-in is the way something is in its primary efficient cause, as governance in one governing or in the hand of a king. The seventh way is the way something is in its goal, as we are tending in God to Him through our good works.9 The eighth way is as something is in its container and generally the way what is located is in its location. [67.16–27] [387]  Aristotle distinguishes these eight ways, but Boethius assigns a ninth because he divides the fifth into two, as has been said.10 [67.27–29] [To Be Said of a Subject and to Be in a Subject]11

[388]  Among the things that are, (1) some are said of a subject but are in no way in a subject, such as the genera and speciesa of a substance and the differentiae of a substance. These are all called universal substances by extension of the name ‘substance’, e.g., man, animal, rational. To be said of a subject, as is meant here, is for something [logically] superior to be said of what is contained under it, as animal [is said] of man, man of Socrates, and color of whiteness. To be in a subject, as is meant here, is the way an accident is in its subject. (2) But others are neither said of a subject nor are they in a subject, such as individuals in [the category] Substance. (3) Others are said of a

a.  Reading at p. 67.31 species against species,.

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subject and are in a subject, e.g., the genera and species of the nine categories other than Substance. They are said of things under them and are in their subject the way an accident is in its subject, for color is said of whiteness as of something under it and is in a body as in a subject. (4) Still others are in a subject but are in no way said [of a subject], the way grammar is in aa subject, namely, the soul, but it is in no way said of the subject, [and] the way a certain color is in a certain body as in ab subject, but is said of no subject, for every color is in a body and generally all particular accidents are in a certain subject, namely, a body, but they are said of no subject. When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, everything said of what is predicated is also said of the subject, the way man is said of a certain man, and animal is said of man, because animal is predicated of a certain man, as in ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘A man is an animal’. [67.30–68.11] [389] One objects in this way: according to this rule ‘Man is an animal, and animal is a genus; therefore man is a genus’ follows. But this is false and therefore the rule from which it follows. [68.11–13] [390]  One should reply to this that the rule is to be understood of substantial predication, in accord with which something [logically] superior is always predicated of what is contained under it. And because genus is in no way predicated of animal as something lower, so neither is genus predicated of man. [68.13–17] [391]  There are different species and differentiae of the different genera not subalternately placed, e.g., animal and knowledge, which are different genera.12 Animal is divided by these differentiae, namely, rational and mortal. Species are of this sortc: man, goat, cow, etc. The differentiae of knowledge are natural and moral; but moral is divided by these differentiae: some knowledge is natural, another is moral, and still another is linguistic.13 [68.18–24] [392] One objects to this rule (391) in this way: rational and mortald are different genera and not subalternately placed,14 and yet they have the same differentiae, as is clear: some rational things are corporal, the others are noncorporal—corporal such as a man and noncorporal such as an angel.15 And likewise, some mortal things are corporal, the others are noncorporal—corporal such as an ass, noncorporal such as the heavens.16 Therefore it seems that the rule is not accurate. [68.24–30]

a.  Reading at p. 68.1 quodam against quidem. b.  Reading at p. 68.3 quodam against quidem. c.  Reading at p. 68.21 huiusmodi against huius. d.  Reading at p. 68.25 mortale against morale.

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[393]  One should reply to this that the rule is to be understood in this way: “of the different genera, etc.,” the different genera are not contained under some one [genus], and because rational and nonrational are contained under body, the rule is not to be understood of them. Nothing prevents subalternate genera from having the same differentiae, for the [logically] higher things are predicated of the lower. Therefore the subject will also have whatever differentiae the predicate had. [68.30–37] [The Categories]

[394]  The things that are said with no combination (380) signify, taken singly, substance or quantity or quality or relationa or where or when or position or possession or doing or undergoing.17 Let the following be taken as examples: for substance: a man and a horse; for quantity: two cubits long, three cubits long; for relation: more, double, half; for quality: white; for place: in a place; for time: yesterday; for position: lying down, sitting; for possession: having shoes on, being armed; for doing: cutting, burning; and for undergoing: being cut, being burned. [68.37–69.2]

[SUBSTANCE] 18

[395]  Having treated these things, now one must speak of each and every one of these categories individually, and first of Substance since it is prior to the others. It is defined in this way by Aristotle in his Categories: a substance is what is strictly and primarily and in the fullest sense said and is neither in a subject nor said of a subject, e.g., a man or a horse.19 [69.3–8] [396] One objects to this definition in this way: it seems that the adverbs “strictly,” “primarily,” and “in the fullest sense” are superfluous since they seem to signify the same thing. [69.8–11] [397]  In addition, Aristotle defines ‘substance’ either as a category or not as one. If as a category, then he defines it poorly since he speaks of what is not said of a subject, and ‘substance’ as a category is predicated of everything containedb under it. If not as a category, then it is irrelevant to it. [69.11–16] [398]  One should reply to [the first] (396) that those adverbs are not superfluously apposed there since “strictly” is included to distinguish it from an accident, which, although the latter supposits [for things] (supponere), properly speaking [an

a.  Reading at p. 68.39–40 ad aliquid against aliquid. b.  Reading at p. 69.14–15 contentis against continentis.

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accident] does not exist except in virtue of the subject in which it exists, e.g., a white thing. “Primarily” is included to distinguish it from genus, which, although properly speaking [a genus] subsists, i.e., supposits [for things] (subsistere sive supponere), it does not do this primarily but through its species. “In the fullest sense” is included to distinguish it from the differentiae of species, which, although they strictly and primarily subsist, i.e., supposit [for things], they do not do this in the fullest sense, whereas individuals [do], since there is nothing under them. And in this way it is clear that the adverbs included there are not superfluous.20 [69.16–26] [399]  The solution to the second (397) is already clear since he does not intend here to define ‘substance’ as a category but ‘primary substance’, which is designated by individuals. [69.26–29] [400]  As to the objection to the contrary that [the definition] is irrelevant (397), one should reply that that is not true since he does not propose to define substance there as it is indicated by the action of standing-under, i.e., suppositing. And because a primary substance stands under [Substance] more than the others, [namely, secondary substances], do, it is placed under [Substance] along with all the things of its genus; and ita is defined in this way there. The species in which are those things that are principally called substances along with the genera of those species are called secondary substances, such as man and animal, for there is a man in man, which is a species. Likewise in animal, which is a genus. And to be-in is taken there the way something [logically] inferior is in something higher. Individuals of substance are called primary substances because they stand-under others in a prior sense. The genera and species of bodies are called second substances because they stand-under in a secondary sense. [69.29–70.1] [401]  All the things that are said of a subject are predicated by name and definition, as man is predicated of Socrates in name and definition. Hence, Socrates is a man and he is a mortal rational animal, and likewise for the others. Certainly in most cases neither the name nor the definition of those things that are in a subject (“in a subject,” I say, as an accident is) is predicated of the subject, e.g., this whiteness and this white, and generally all particular accidents. This whiteness or this white is predicated neither by name nor definition of the body in which it is present, as is clear. Nevertheless in some cases nothing prevents a name from being predicated of a subject, as ‘white’ is predicated of a subject, since it certainly is in a subject as in a body. We say that the body is white, but the definition of ‘white’ is never predicated of the body.21 [70.2–14] [402]  With respect to secondary substances species is more substance than genus is, for it is closer to primary substance. For this reason individuals are called primaryb substances in that they are subjects for all other things and all others are predicated of

a.  Reading at p. 69.34 ipsa against ipsam. b.  Reading at p. 70.17 primae against principales.

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them or are in them as in a subject, and so they are called substances in the fullest sense. Just as primary a substances relate to all other things, so species relate to genus, for species lie under a genus, the genera that are predicated of species; but species are not predicated of genera. Therefore, it is clear from these things that species is called more a substance than genus is. Some of those species are not genera. None of them is more a substance than another is, for man is not more a substance than horse is. The case is similar for primaryb substances: a man is not more a substance than a horse is. [70.15–28] [403]  But one can ask why Aristotle, when defining ‘substance’, as has been seen (395), does not divide it before defining it but defines one part of the division and ­appends the second when he says, “secondary substances,” etc.22 [70.28–31] [404]  One should reply to this that he cannot explain the division lest it seem that ‘substance’ be spoken of equivocally. Nevertheless he defines the first part of the division and appends the second, thereby indicating this sort of division: one kind of ­substance is primary and the other secondary. [70.31–36] [What Is Common and Proper to Substance]23

[405]  Having seen these things we must now speak of what is common and proper to Substance.24 [70.37–38] [406] [First], what is common to all substances is not to be in a subject, because to be in a subject pertains to an accident. This is clear with respect to primary substances in virtue of the definition of ‘primary substance’, whereas it is clear of secondary [substances] by induction and syllogism. By induction in this way: ‘Man is not in a subject, horse is not in a subject, and so on for the other secondary substances; therefore no secondary substance is in a subject’. By syllogism in this way: ‘None of the thingsc that are in a subject are predicated in name and definition, but every secondary substance is predicated in name and definition; therefore no secondary substance is in a subject’. Not to be in a subject is not proper to substance for it also applies to differentia, and this is understood of the differentiae of substance. [70.38–71.6] [407]  But one objects to this sort of commonality in this way: the Philosopher says that, when Socrates is generated, man is generated in him, [and] if man is generated in him, then it is in him, but man is a substance; therefore a substance is in a subject. [71.6–10]

a.  Reading at p. 70.20 primae against principales. b.  Reading at p. 70.26 primarum against principalium. c.  Reading at p. 71.1 nullum eorum against nulla earum.

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[408]  Also, my hand is a substance, but my hand is in me; therefore it seems that a substance is in a subject [and] therefore there is no commonality.25 [71.10–12] [409] I reply to the first (407) that of course I concede that, when Socrates is generated, man is generated in him, but it does not follow thereby that man is in Socrates as an accident is in a subject; man is in him the way something [logically] superior is in something contained under it. We are speaking there of being-in as an accident is in a subject, and so the objection carries no weight. [71.12–17] [410]  One should reply similarly to the second (408) that my hand is in me as an integral part is in its whole and not the way an accident is in a subject, and so the objection carries no weight. [71.17–20] [411] [Second], it is appropriate for secondary substances and the differentiae of substance to be predicated univocally. These are all predicated of primary substances in name and definition, and therefore are univocally predicated. [71.20–23] [412] [Third], every primary substance signifies a discrete thing, i.e., an individual and something one in number. But ‘secondary substance’ seems to signify a discrete thing because [a secondary substance] is in a primary [substance] and pertains to its essence. But it does not signify a discrete thing but rather signifies something common. What is signified by ‘secondary substance’ is not one thing in the sense of what is signified by ‘primary [substance]’. [71.23–29] [413] [Fourth], nothing is contrary to a substance. Yet this is not proper to substance, but also to many others, e.g., quantity, for nothing is contrary to two cubits in length. Likewise, there is nothing contrary to ten or to any such [number]. [71.29–32] [414] [Fifth], a substance does not admit of more or less. I am not saying that one substance does not stand-under more than another does, but I do say that each and every substance is neither increased nor decreased with respect to its being. For example, white is sometimes said to be more white and sometimes less white, but Socrates is not more a man at one time than at another, nor more a man than Plato is. But this is not proper to substance because it [also] applies to quantity and relation. [71.32–39] [415]  But one objects to this in this way: a boy is a substance, but he is older in old age than in youth; therefore substance is susceptible to more and less. [71.39–42] [416]  One should reply to this that there is a difference between more (magis) and less and greater (maius) and less since more and less indicate increase and decrease whereas greater and less indicate extension, which extension relates to quantity. Hence, I certainly concede that substance admits of greater and less, when it is taken extensively, as in the objection—a boy is older in old age than in youth—but it does not admit of more and less taken intensively, since a boy is not more a human being in old age than in youth, although he can certainly be older. [71.42–72.7]

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* * * [417]  [Sixth], since a substance is numerically one and the same thing, it is proper in the fullest sense for it to be able to admit of contraries, and this even to the extent of a change in itself. This is so proper to substance that it is not applicable to any other [category]. For example, a certain man, although he is numerically one and the same thing, sometimes becomes white, sometimes black, and likewise hot and cold, indolenta and studious. But no such thing is seen in the other [categories]. For example, the sameb color is not white and black, nor can it be; nor is numerically one and the same action indolentc and studious, and the case is similar for others. [72.7–15] [418]  But one objects to this in this way: it seems to be self-contradictory because it was said above (413) that a substance has no contrary and yet it is [also] said there (416) that a substance admits of contraries. [72.15–18] [419]  In addition, it seems it would not be proper in the fullest sense to substance because it applies to things other than substance, namely, to expressions. One and the same expression admits of contraries, namely, truth and falsity, and since an expression is not a substance but a quantity, it is clear that it applies to something other than s­ ubstance. [72.18–23] [420]  One should reply to the first of these [objections] (418) that it is not selfcontradictory because it is different to say that a substance has no contrary and [to say that] a substance admits of contraries. Those contraries that a substance admits of are not contrary to the substance itself but are contrary to each other, just as white and black, which can be in Socrates in succession, are not contrary to Socrates but are contrary to each other, as is sufficiently clear. [72.23–29] [421]  One should reply to the second (419) that, although an expression like ‘Socrates sits’ is sometimes true, sometimes false, this is not because of a change in [the expression] but because of a change in a state of affairs. For example, when Socrates stands up the expression is false, but it is not changed; when Socrates is sitting, it is true. Hence, the expression is said to be true and false depending on what the state of affairs is or is not. So note that true and false are in states of affairs as in a subject and they are in an expression as in a sign. Thus there is an equivocation on the way of ­being-in when true and false are said to be in states of affairs and in an expression. And, likewise, ‘admits of ’ is taken equivocally when one says that a state of affairs admits of true and false and an expression admits of true and false, just as ‘admits of ’ is

a.  Reading at p. 72.12 pravus against parvus. b.  Reading at p. 72.13 idem against eadem. c.  Reading at p. 72.15 prava against parva.

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taken equivocally when it is said [that] urine admits of health [and] an animal admits of health, for urine admits of health because it signifies it, whereas an animal because it is its subject. And so this proprium, [namely, admits-of-contraries], does not apply to an expression but only to a substance.26 [72.29–73.1]

[QUANTITY] 27 [The Two Species of Quantity]

[422]  Some quantity is continuous, the other is discrete. [73.2] [423]  Discrete quantity is, e.g., a number and an expression, and so it has two species. A number has no common boundary to which the parts of number are adjoined. For example, in ten, five and five or three and seven are joined to no common boundary but are always separate and discrete. A number is a multitude gathered together or fused from units.28 Likewise, the syllables in an expression are not adjoined to a common boundary, but each is separated from the other.29 [73.2–10] [424]  One kind of continuous quantity is a line, another a surface, another a body, and in addition to these a time and a place; hence it has five species. That a line is continuous is clear because that whose parts are joined to one common boundary is called a continuum. A line is of this kinda because its parts are joined to a common boundary, namely, to a point. Likewise, the parts of a surface [are joined] to a line and the parts of a body to a surface. The parts of time [are joined] to now, as the past and the future are to the present. Similarly, the parts of a place are joined to the same boundary as the parts of a body are, because of which a place will be continuous. [73.11–21] [425]  [To speak] more comprehensively, however, one kind of quantity consists of parts bearing a relative position to each other, the other kind [consists] of those not bearing a relative position to each other.30 This is clear in the case of lines, whose parts bear a relative position to each other, for every single one of them lies somewhere, with the result that you can think and designate where each one lies on a surface. Likewise, the parts of a surface have a position, and where each [part] lies and which ones are contiguous will be designated. The case is similar for a body and a place. But in the case of a number no one can perceive how its parts have a position relative to each other or where they lie or what parts are contiguous. Nor [can this be done] in the case of time, for nothing remains of the parts of time, and what does not remain can have no position but rather a kind of order. With respect to a moment in timeb one thing is before

a.  Reading at p. 73.15 huiusmodi against huius. b.  Reading at p. 73.34 quoad tempus against quod temporis.

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it, another is after it. Similarly in the case of number, because one is counted before two, and two before three, and so they have an order but not a position. Likewise for an expression, for none of its parts remains, as was said [of time], and one cannot look beyond it because there is no position of parts of that of which nothing remains.31 These we have named are the only quantities in the strict sense; all othersa are [quantities] in a secondary sense. [73.21–41] [426]  And with reference to this we speak of other “quantities.” For example, we speak of much white because a surface is large, of a long action because the time is long and much, and also of much motion. But no one of these per se is called a quantity. For example, if one assigns how much an action is with respect to time, he will define it as annual, i.e., of one year or of one month. Or, when assigning how much white there is, he will in some sense define it by saying that there is as much white as there is surface. Therefore only the quantities that have been mentioned (423–25) are quantities in and of themselves in the strict sense; nothing [will be said] directly of the others but perhaps incidentally. [73.41–74.8] [427]  To make the preceding clear one first asks why one does not define ‘quantity’ before one divides [it], and it seems that one ought first define: any univocal ought first be defined and then divided, but quantity is a univocal; and therefore it is wont first to be defined and then divided. That it is a univocal is clear since it is one of the genera. But genus is wont to be predicated univocally; therefore it is clear that it is a univocal. The first seems [true] because, just as one defines ‘quality’, so one ought to be able to define ‘quantity’, since, just as on the basis of a quality we are calledb “qualified,” so on the basis of a quantity [we are called] “quantified.” Therefore by [the Topic] from similars, just as one defines ‘quality’ by saying that quality is that on the basis of which we are calledc “qualified,” so one is able to define ‘quantity’ by saying that quantity is that on the basis of which we are calledd “quantified.” [74.9–20] [428]  Beyond that it seems one speaks incongruously when one says, “Some quantity is continuous, some is discrete” (422), as if one were to say [that] some science is white, some is blacke. [74.20–23] [429]  One should reply to the first of these [objections] (427) that something can be a generic subject ( genus subiectum) or a genus taken as a category. An example of a generic subject is syllogism—it is the generic subject of all of logic—whereas an example of genus taken as a category is Substance, Quantity, and others like them. When, a.  Reading at p. 73.41 alie vero omnes against alia vero omnia. b.  Reading at p. 74.17 dicimur against dicimus. c.  Reading at p. 74.18 dicimur against dicimus. d.  Reading at p. 74.19 dicimur against dicuntur. e.  Reading at p. 74.22–23 alia alba alia nigra against aliud album aliud niger.

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therefore, something is defined, it is defined in virtue of its ability to be the subject of a science. But quantity cannot be of this sort and so it cannot be defined. It is clear that there can be no one science of quantity taken as one of the categories since the characteristics or properties (which are the same thinga) for any one science have to be demonstrated of the subject of that science in the same way as true and false, perfect and imperfect (the characteristics of a particular syllogism) are demonstrated of syllogism: one syllogism is called true, another false, one perfect, another imperfect. But the characteristics of discrete quantity cannot be demonstrated of quantity in general, as is clear. Even and odd are features of discrete quantity, namely, number, and they cannot be demonstrated of quantity in general because, if they were demonstrated of quantity in general, they would be demonstrated of continuous quantity, since it is contained under Quantity in virtue of [the latter] being something general. But this is false because even and odd cannot be demonstrated or predicated of a line, which is a continuous quantity. A line is not called even and odd in the sense that ‘even’ conveys the same thing as ‘per’ does in French and ‘not even’ the same thing as ‘non per’ does in French. Likewise, straight and curved, the characteristics of a line, cannot be demonstrated of a number, for a number is not called straight or curved. So there are different sciences of the species of Quantity, namely, geometry, arithmetic, music, astronomy, as was seen on the first page of this book (4). With this in mind the solution to the first objection is clear since it is said [there] that quantity is something univocal and, therefore, ought to be defined before it is divided. This is true unless there is something preventing it, as was just seen, and so it cannot be defined. [74.23–75.11] [430]  One should reply to the second [objection] (427) that the definition of a [logical] superior ought to be applicable to any of its inferiors.32 But if one had defined ‘quantity’ by saying that quantity is that on the basis of which we are called “quantified,” this definition would not apply to discrete quantity, for with respect to discrete quantity we do not speak of b how much but of how many. [75.11–16] [431]  One should reply to the third [objection] (428) that with reference to “some quantity” one understands “one kind,” to which those adjectives are referred, since the sense is: “some quantity, etc.,” i.e., some things under the genus Quantity are continuous, the others discrete.33 And ‘under the genus’ is not expressly stated lest it seem that quantity could be a generic subject. In addition, the division is into neither genus to indicate the huge difference there is between continuous and discrete quantity, so neither connotes diversity. For one speaks accurately of different things [when saying] that a child is different from its father, but one does not say that [the child] is another [kind of thing], and the solution to the objection is made clear in this way.34 [75.16–25]

a.  Reading at p. 74.32 que eedem sunt against quod idem est. b.  Reading at p. 75.14 dicimus against dicuntur.

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[What Is Common and Proper to Quantity]35

[432]  Having seen these things one must now speak of what is common and proper to Quantity. [75.26–27] [433] The first of these is that quantity has no contrary, as there is nothing contrary to two cubits long, three cubits long, nor to a line or a surface, nor likewise to another, because contrariety, strictly speaking, belongs to qualities, but not to all, as will be seen below (522).36 But quantity is not quality, and therefore quantity has no contrarity. [75.27–32] [434] One objects to this in this way: few and many are quantities, but many is contrary to few; therefore somethinga is contrary to a quantity. [75.32–34] [435]  Likewise, large and small are quantities and yet are contrary to each other; therefore it seems that the previously stated contrariety is inaccurate.37 [75.34–36] [436]  Also, an expression is a quantity, but one expression is contrary to another; therefore something is contrary to a quantity. [75.36–37] [437]  One should reply to the first of these [objections] (434) that many and few and great and small are more in the genus Relation than in Quantity, as is clear, for a man is called large compared to a small one. If no man were large, no one would be called small. Likewise, many is said in comparison to few. For example, city dwellers are said to be few compared to villagers. Indeed, there must be numerous villagers but few city dwellers since there are so many more [villages]. And [there must be] many in a house but few in a theater since there are so many more [houses]. And because there is contrariety in things related, these can be contrary to each other. [75.38–76.5] [438]  Or one should reply (434–35) in another way that large and small are not contraries, and neither are many and few, which makes sense. If large and small are contraries, it is acceptable for something to be simultaneously both large and small, for someone is large compared to someone else and the same is smallb compared to another and it is acceptable [for these contraries] to exist simultaneously because [an individual] admits of simultaneous contraries. But this is false and unacceptable, for no one is simultaneously both healthy and sick or white and black. So it is clear that there are no contraries either in the genus Quantity or in the genus Quality. [76.5–13] [439]  One should reply to the last [objection] (436) that one expression is not made contrary to another on the basis of it having a certain quantity but rather because of its quality, namely, by reason of its affirmation and negation, which are qualities of

a.  Reading at p. 75.34 aliquid against aliud. b.  Reading at p. 76.9 ipse parvus against ipsum parvum.

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an expression, as has been seen in what has preceded (80). From that, one is given an example apropos of something having sensation: in a man there are two things, a body and a soul. A man is called heavy by reason of his body and not by reason of his soul, since no soul is heavy. Likewise, one expression is not made contrary to another by reason of its quantity but by reason of its quality. [76.14–22] [440] The second propertya is that quantity does not admit of more and less.38 One line is not said to be more a quantity than another is and a ternary [number] is not more a number than a quinary one is, and so on. [76.22–25] [441]  On the other hand, it has been said when discussing the genus Substance that a substance does not admit of more or less except by means of quantity.39 Therefore, if a substance admits of more and less in virtue of its quantity, so also does a quantity for an even stronger reason. [76.25–28] [442]  In support of this, one line is longer than another is, but a line is a quantity; therefore a quantity admits of more and less, and so there is no [such] propertyb. [76.29–31]

[443]  One should reply to the first [objection] (441) that, as was seen (416) when discussing the genus Substance, more and less are different from greater and less since more and less indicate intension and greater and less indicate extension. In the first argument (441) it is supposed that a substance admits of more and less in terms of quantity. But this is false, nor was this said when discussing the genus Substance (414– 16), but rather that a substance admits of greater and less and this is in terms of the extension of a quantity. [76.31–38] [444]  And on the basis of this I readily agree that quantity likewise admits of greater and less, as the second argument (442) demonstrates, since one line is longer than another is, but it is not more a line. By this the solution to the second is made clear. [76.38–42] [445] [Third], it is proper in the strictest sense to quantity that something be called equal and unequal on the basis of it, as a number is equal or unequal to another number, and a body to another body, and a line to another line, and so on.40 [76.42–77.2]

[446] One objects to this in this way: it seems that one ought similarly to say it is proper in the strictest sense of quantity that something be said on the basis of it to be even and odd, just as a number is said to be even or odd. [77.2–5] [447]  One should reply to this that “proper in the strictest sense” ought to be applicable to only one [species] and to every [member of that species], but if I had said

a.  Reading at p. 76.22 proprietas against contrarietas. b.  Reading at p. 76.30 proprietas against contrarietas.

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“proper in the strictest sense, etc.,” this would not have been applicable to every [species of] quantity because it would not have been applicable to continuous quantity. But equal and unequal are so proper to quantity that they apply to every [species]. Thus the even number two can be called equal to another number [that is a multiple] of two, and so on. [77.5–11]

[RELATION] 41 [The Definition of ‘Relative Things’]

[448]  Those are called relatives whose essence is that they are said to pertain to other things, or [what] in whatever other way [are directed] to another, as that which is double is said of another, namely, [its] half, and vice versa, as half is half of double, and as a father is father of his child, and a child is child of a father, and greater is greater by a greater, and similar is similar by a similar.42 [77.12–17] [The Three Species of Relation]

[449]  There are three species of relatives. Some are spoken of with respect to equiparity as are those that are called by the same name, like similar similar by a similar, equal equal by an equal, dissimilar dissimilar by a dissimilar, near near by something near; others are those in a superior position, e.g., lord, double, triple, for a lord is placed over a servant and double over half; and still others are [spoken of ] with respect to subordination, such as servant and half, for they are placed under others and others are placed over them, as a lord is placed over his servant, a father over his child, and double over its half, for a servant is placed under his lord and a half under its double.43 [77.17–26] [450]  To further clarify Relation one first asks about its placement after Quantity, and it seems that Quality should precede Relation since a cause ought to precede what is caused, but a quality is the cause of a relation; therefore it should precede it. The minor stands since two things share some quality equally, e.g., whiteness and blackness are called similar, but what is similar is something relative; therefore it seems that the quality by which it is caused [to be relative] ought to precede. [77.26–33] [451]  In support of this the simple is prior to the composed, but quality is something simple whereas relation something composed; therefore Quality a, etc. The minor stands since there can be no relation except between at least two extremes. [77.34–37] a.  Reading at p. 77.35–36 qualitas against quantitates.

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[452]  In support of this Aristotle, when first announcing the categories, placed Quality beforea Relation; therefore it seems that when discussing them one ought to discuss Quality b.44 [77.37–40] [453]  One should reply to the first of these [objections] (450) that it is true that a cause should precede what is caused, but when it is said [that] a quality is the cause of a relation, one should reply that not only is a quality a cause of a relation but so also is a quantity c, as is clear in the following: double and half, equal and also unequal, and so on for many. So one should reply that a quantity can be the sufficient cause and first source of a relation in some cases. And so Relation follows immediately after Quantity as what is caused [follows] its cause. In addition, a middle shares the nature of its extremes, and to show that a relation is wont to be caused by these two, namely, a quantity and a quality, it is placed between the two. [77.40–78.8] [454]  One should reply to the second (451) that it is true that the simple is prior to what is composed of that simple, but a relation is not composed of a quality; therefore the argument does not hold. [78.8–11] [455]  One should reply to the third (452) that, when first announcing the categories, he arranged them on the basis of an order of the greater awareness. And because a quality is able to be judged and recognized because it is within a subject, whereas a relation is not (since a relation is nothing other than an orientation [to something]), he placed Quality before Relation. But when he was discussing them, he arranged them according to the order of nature, and because a relation can exist without a quality doing so, he arranged [the categories] in a different way when discussing them here, placing Quality d after Relation.45 [78.11–19] [456]  But if one asks why he discussese quantity before quality, one should reply that a quantity is an accident inhering more immediatelyf in a substance than a quality does, since the Philosopher says that as soon as there is a substance there is a quantified [substance], and so he discusses quantity and not quality immediately afterg substance.46 [78.19–24] [457] One objects to the definition of ‘relation’ (448) in this way: the definition indicates identity, yet disjunctionh [indicates] difference. But difference is repugnant a.  Reading at p. 77.38 preponebat against posponebat. b.  Reading at p. 77.40 qualitate against quantitate. c.  Reading at p. 77.43–78.1 quantitas against quantitatis. d.  Reading at p. 78.18 qualitatem against quantitatem. e.  Reading at p. 78.20 determinat against non determinat. f.  Reading at p. 78.21 immediatius against immediatus. g.  Reading at p. 78.23 post against prius. h.  Reading at p. 78.25 disiuinctio against coniunctio.

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to  identity, yet ‘or’ is found there [in the definition]; therefore [‘relation’ is] poorly ­[defined]. [68.24–27] [458]  One should reply to this that a disjunction or conjunction should not be found in a definition well constructed from a genus and differentiae. The definition there is not a well-constructed one but rather a clarification (declaratio) of relations. And as a clarification of this one should note that relative things sometimes are so called by comparison to generation, as a father is the father of his child, but at other times by their grammatical case endings, as greater is greater by a greater, near is near by something near, and so on. And so an intermediate disjunctiona is included there [in the definition]. [78.27–34] [What Is Common and Proper to Relation]47

[459]  What is common to Relation follows, the first of which is [that some] relations have contraries, e.g., virtue is contrary to vice and discipline to ignorance since each is related to the other. But this does not apply to every relation for double has no contrary, and neither does triple.48 [78.35–39] [460]  Also, one asks what the relative things are that have contraries. [78.39–40] [461]  One can reply to this that those relative things have contraries that are caused by a quality, whereas the other ones do not, and that things that are relative admit of more and less, e.g., something similar is called more and less similar. But this does not apply to all relative things for something is not more double or less double, nor triple, nor a father more a father and less a father. [78.40–79.2] [462]  Then one asks whatb the relative things are that admit of more and less and what [the ones are that do] not. [79.2–3] [463]  And one should reply to this that the relative things that are caused by a quality admit of more and less, whereas those that are caused by a quantity, such as double, triple, do not, and so on. [79.3–6] [464] [Second], all things that are relative are so called with respect to a reciprocity (ad convertentiam), as a servant is servant to a lord, a half is half of its double, more is more than less, less is less than greater, and likewise in other [instances]. But sometimes the reciprocity arises in a difference in grammatical case ending, as a discipline is said to be the discipline of one disciplined, and one disciplined is said to be

a.  Reading at p. 78.34 disiunctio against coniunctio. b.  Reading at p. 79.2 que against quare.

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disciplined by a discipline, and a sense is called the sense of something sensed, but something sensed is called something sensed in virtue of a sense.49 In this way it is clear how [relative things] are so called sometimes with respect to reciprocity in accord with a difference in grammatical case ending. [79.6–14] [465] One objects to this in this way: ‘man’ and ‘something able to laugh’ are converted and yet are not relative [terms]; therefore it seems that there is no commonality since it applies to something else. [79.14–17] [466]  One should reply to this that interchangeability, conversion, and reciprocity (convertibilitas, conversio, et convertentia) are different: interchangeability pertains to terms (e.g., ‘man’ and ‘able to laugh’ are interchanged [converti]), conversion pertains to propositions, and reciprocity pertains to relative things. [79.17–20] [467] [Third], relative things seem to be concomitant in nature: double and half are concomitant, father and child, and so on for many; or, things relatively placed place themselves, and things removed remove themselves. But this is not true in all cases, for what is knowable and knowledge are relative things. What is knowable, however, seems to be prior to knowledge. If the knowable is removed, knowledge is taken away. But knowledge does not remove the knowable, for if there is nothing knowable, there is no knowledge. But if there is no knowledge, nothing prevents there being something knowable, and so on in many other cases, e.g., a sensory faculty and what is sensible. [79.21–29] [468] One objects to this commonality in this way: the Philosopher says that quantity arrives as soon as substance does;50 therefore it seems that [concomitance] is  not proper to relation since it applies to another, namely, to substance and to ­quantity. [79.29–32] [469]  One should reply to this that sometimes ‘concomitant’ hasa three senses, in nature, in time, and in place: concomitant in nature, as are relative things; concomitant in place, as are an accident and the subject in which it is; and concomitant in time, as are two twins born at the same time. I say, therefore, that, when the Philosopher says that quantity arrives as soon as substance does, he does not mean to say that substance and quantity are concomitant in nature but in time, which is clear from the phrase “as soon as,” which denotes time. And so whatever amount the delay might be, substance is naturally prior to quantity, and so it is clear that he is not thinking of concomitance in nature. [79.32–43]

a.  Reading at p. 79.33 dicitur against dicuntur.

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[A Second Definition of ‘Relative Things’]

[470]  There is another definition of ‘relative things’, and it is this: relatives are those things whose very being is to be directed in one way or another to something else, and this is a stricter definition of ‘relative things’.51 [79.43–80.3] [471] One objects to this definition in this way: one thing has only one being, and a definition indicates the being of a thing; therefore one thing must have only one definition. [80.3–5] [472] The solution: it is true that one thing considered in one way has only one definition, but one thing considered in different ways can of course have different defi­ nitions. So one should note that some things are relative only with respect to being said, and others with respect both to being said and to being. Those things are relative only with respect to being said of which, when one is prevented from being said, so is the other, although its being is not prevented. For example, a tall man is called tall with respect to a short one, and he is tall. But if the short one is destroyed, [the other] is no longer called tall. Nevertheless his height is not destroyed since he is stilla tall. Things relative with respect both to being said and to being are those of which, when one is destroyed with respect both to being said and to being, so is the other, as a father and his child are. If the child is destroyed, the father as a father is destroyed with respect to being said, because he is no longer called a father, and with respect to being, because he is no longer a father. The first definition (448) addresses things relative only with respect to being said, which is clear from the fact that the doubt is raised there.52 The second one addresses things relative with respect both to being said and to being, and this definition is the strictest definition of things that are relative. [80.5–24] [473]  One argues in this way against what has been said (472), [namely], that if a child is destroyed, the father is destroyed: on countless occasions we see that, when a child dies, the father does not die because of it. [80.24–26] [474]  One should reply to this that such things that are relative are not called relatives with respect to their substances but with respect to their intentions, which are paternity and filiation, and so on for others. When, therefore, it is said that if one of two relative things is destroyed the other is also destroyed, one is to understand this of the intentions on the basis of which they are called relative things and not of their substances. So when it is said that if a child is destroyed a father is destroyed, what is at issue is not the thing that the father is, i.e., his substance, and one is to reply in this way in the case of all things that are relative. [80.26–34]

a.  Reading at p. 80.15 adhuc against ad hunc.

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* * * [475] [Fourth], it is proper to relative things that, if one knows how to define one of two relative things, one knows how to definea the other. For example, if one wanted to define ‘double’, one knows how to define that of which it is double, and the Philosopher says that it is necessary to use both in the definitions of each.53 [80.35–39]

[QUALITY] 54 [The Definition of ‘Quality’]

[476]  I call that a quality on the basis of which we are calledb qualified [in some respect or other]. For example, we are called white on the basis of whiteness and we are calledc black on the basis of blackness, and so on. [80.40–81.1] [477] One objects to this definition in this way: a good definition should include reference to something [logically] superior, but ‘quality’ is something taken broadly or very broadly; therefore it has nothing above it that could be included in its definition; therefore it seems that the definition given here of ‘quality’ is not a good one. [81.1–5] [478]  A first definition should belong to everything contained under the thing defined, but we are not saidd to be qualified by just any quality, as will be showne below (503, 516), since we are not called virtuous from virtue; therefore the definition is not a good one. [81.5–9] [479]  One should reply to the first [objection] (477) that a true definition should include reference to something [logically] higher, but a true definition of ‘quality’ is not presented there (476) but rather a kind of clarification (declaratio) of it. Thus, one should note that no highest genus can be truly defined since there is nothing higher through which a true definition could be constructed. [81.9–13] [480]  One should reply to the second [objection] (478) that we are not called virtuous on the basis of virtue, i.e., from a virtue, but we are called studious from virtue, just asf we are called qualified, namely, studious, from virtue. That argument contained the fallacy of Consequent, as is sufficiently clear.55 [81.13–17]

a.  Reading at p. 80.36 diffinire against quod diffinire. b.  Reading at p. 80.40 dicimur against dicuntur. c.  Reading at p. 80.41 dicimur against dicuntur. d.  Reading at p. 81.7 dicimur against dicimus. e.  Reading at p. 81.7–8 habebitur against habebatur. f.  Reading at p. 81.15 sicut against sic adhuc.

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[The Four Species of Quality] [The First Species of Quality]56

[481]  There are four species of Quality, and the first is habit and disposition. A habit differs from a disposition in that a habit is more permanent and stable, e.g., virtues and knowledge. For knowledge is changeablea only with difficulty, unless perhaps the knowerb or the one who possesses virtue undergoes a great alteration either from sickness or from something of the sort, for justice and chastity are not easily changed. Those [qualities] that are easily altered are called dispositions, e.g., heat and cold, sickness and health, and suchlikec. Hence, when a man has knowledge and virtue in his soul, he can be said to be knowledgeable and virtuous, and qualities of this sortd are named habits. But when he is well disposed to knowing in that he has natural talents and willingly studies, then he is said to have a disposition. Habits are dispositions, but not vice versa, for those who have a habit are disposed in a certain way, better or worse, to the things they have. But dispositions are not habits. So a habit can be defined in this way: a habit is a quality that is difficult to change, whereas a disposition is a quality that is easily changed.57 [81.18–35] [482] One objects to the first species of Quality in this way: it seems that habit cannot be in the first species of Quality because one category cannot be the species of another category, but habit is a category; therefore it cannot be in the first species of Quality.58 [81.35–40] [483]  In addition, one can object in this way to the claim that habits are dispositions: a habit is difficult to change and a disposition is easy to change, but what is difficult to change is not easily changed; therefore habits are not dispositions. [81.40–82.1] [484]  One should reply to the first of these [objections] that the habit that is the category differs from the habit that is in the first species of Quality because habit as a category indicates apparel of the body, e.g., to be armed, to have shoes on, etc. This is clear from its definition, such as “habit is the adornment of bodies and of those things that are able to accompany a body.” But the habit that is in the first species of Quality indicates a habit of the soul, e.g., knowledge and virtues, which have being in the soul. [82.1–8]

a.  Reading at p. 81.21 mobilis against mobili. b.  Reading at p. 81.22–23 scientem against scientiam. c.  Reading at p. 81.25 huiusmodi against huius. d.  Reading at p. 81.27 huiusmodi against huius.

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[485]  One should reply to the second [objection] (483) that, when it is said that habits are dispositions, it is understood that a habit is a disposition with respect to use, not with respect to acquisition. For example, one knowing grammar is not said to be one who is disposed to acquire grammar but one disposed with respect to using it, by offering it as a gift to others. [82.8–13] [486]  Or, one should reply in a different way, that the predication is not formal but causal. For example, sunlight is said to be daylight causally but not formally, because daylight is nothing other than the shining of the sun on the earth. Likewise for the issue at hand, habits are dispositions causally but not formally, because we arrive at habits through dispositions, and the solution is made clear in this way. [82.14–19] [The Second Species of Quality]59

[487]  The second species [of Quality] is natural power or lack of power to do or undergo something easily, as one is said to be health-makinga who has a natural power preventing [him] from suffering from certain accidents, whereas one is said to be sickmakingb who has a natural lack of power to prevent any or little suffering.60 For example, what is hard has a natural power for not being cut quickly and what is soft a natural power for being cut quickly. Runners and boxers are spoken of similarly, not because they engage in their [characteristic] activities, but because they have a natural power for doing so easily.61 [82.19–27] [488] One objects to this species of Quality in this way: it seems there is no natural lack of power in the second species of Quality. No genus contains privations, but a lack of power indicates a privation; therefore no genus contains [a lack of a power], and consequently [there is no natural lack of power] in the second species of Quality, as it seems. [82.27–32] [489] The solution: there are two kinds of privation. One kind is pure privation, which posits nothing, as darkness does, which signifies nothing other than a lack of light, and as sin does, which signifies nothing other than a lack of good. Privations of this sortc are not in a genus, since they posit nothing. But there is another kind of privation that is not pure privation and does posit something. For example, he who is illmakingd is said to be lacking in power, not because he is totally lacking in power, but because he is not getting better (immobilis) and is little able to carry on (pati). And

a.  Reading at p. 82.21 sanativus against sanatus. b.  Reading at p. 82.22 egrotativus against egrotatus. c.  Reading at p. 82.35 huiusmodi against huius. d.  Reading at p. 82.37 egrotativus against egrotatus.

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privations of this sorta canb certainly be in a genus, since they are not pure privations but posit something. [82.32–41] [The Third Species of Quality]62

[490]  The third species of Quality is passive qualities and passions. Sweetness, bitterness, and all others like these pertain to this [species], along with hot and cold, and white and black, because the subjects that admit of these are denominated qualified from them. For example, honey is called sweet because it admits of sweetness, and a body is called white in that it admits of whiteness, and so on. [82.41–83.4] [491]  One should note that they are not called passive qualities because the things that admit of them undergo something, for honey is not called sweet because it has undergone something, nor is fire called hot because it has undergone something from heat; and this is the case with respect to many others. But they are called passive qualities because they imply passions, as sweetness [implies] taste and heat touch, and the others likewise [imply something]. [83.4–10] [492]  Hence one should note that the following difference exists between passive qualities and passions: passive qualities are ones that pass away only with difficulty and are stable, (a) whether the qualities of this sortc are naturally produced—honey is naturally sweet and not because sweetness is communicated to it by something extrinsic, and likewise fire is also said to be naturally hot; or (b) whether the qualities of this sortd are produced by something extrinsic ande are stable and decline only with difficulty— these are called passive qualities; or (c) whether pallor and blackness develop in something on the basis of its natural substance—this is a passive quality in it, for we are calledf qualified on the basis of them; or (d) whether blackness and pallor occur because of a long sickness or because of heat or because of something of the sort, and it does not easily pass away and remains stable in its life—these are also called passive qualities, and we are likewise called qualifiedg on the basis of them. [83.10–24] [493] But passions are said to be whatever come from these passive qualitiesh; they are easily changed and quickly pass away. We are not calledi qualified on the basis of

a.  Reading at p. 82.39 huiusmodi against huius. b.  Reading at p. 82.40 possunt against prius sunt. c.  Reading at p. 83.12 huiusmodi against huius. d.  Reading at p. 83.15 huiusmodi against huius. e.  Reading at p. 83.16 et against de. f.  Reading at p. 83. 20 dicimur against dicimus. g.  Reading at p. 83.24 dicimur against dicuntur. h.  Reading at p. 83.24 passibiles qualitates against passiones. i.  Reading at p. 83.26 dicimur against dicimus.

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them: one is not called blushing because one is caused to blush from shame, and one is not called pale to whom pallor comes from fear, but rather because one has undergone something. They are called passions of this sorta because they are easily changed, whereas qualities are not. Of course suchb passions qualify the subject in which they are present, but they do not denominate it and so are in no way named qualities. Similarly, both passive qualities and passions are found in the soul. For example, we are called irate from natural anger and demented from dementia, and passive qualities are of this sortc, for we are calledd qualified on the basis of them. But whatever come from these that quickly pass away are called passions. For example, if someone sad becomese more angry, he is not thereby denominated angry, since one is made more angry through passions of this sortf, but one is said to have undergone something more. And so what the difference is between passions and passive qualities is clear: what come easily and go away easily are named passions; what are long-lasting and difficult to change are passive qualities. [83.24–43] [494]  Against [this] it seems that passion is not in the third species of Quality because passion is one of the categories (550); therefore it is not in the third species of Quality. [83.43–84.3] [495]  One should reply to this that the names ‘passion’, ‘reading’ (lectio), ‘action’, and so on, signify action and passion. Passion, therefore, can be considered as implied by action, and in this sense it is one of the categories. And this is clear from its definition: passion is an effect and consequence of action. Or it can be considered as a quality implying a passion with respect to something else, as white [implies] sight, and sweetness and bitterness [imply] taste. In this sense it is in the third species of Quality, and in this sense passion is taken actively, whereas in the first sense it was considered ­passively. [84.3–11] [The Fourth Species of Quality]63

[496]  The fourth species of Quality is form and constant figure surrounding something, such as straightness and curvedness and any thing similar, should there be any.64 A sort (quale quid) is indicated on the basis of each of these. Triangular and quadrangular is said to be a sort, along with curved and straight. With respect to figure

a.  Reading at p. 83.29 huiusmodi against huius. b.  Reading at p. 83.30 huiusmodi against huius. c.  Reading at p. 83.35 huiusmodi against huius. d.  Reading at p. 83.36 dicimur against dicuntur. e.  Reading at p. 83.37 fit against sit. f.  Reading at p. 83.38 huiusmodi against huius.

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each and every onea is said to be a sort, but thick and thin and smooth and wrinkled will be thought to signify qualities. [84.11–17] [497]  But [this analysis] seems to be alien to the codivision of this [species] of Quality, which is about quality. Both seem to signify a kind of positioning of parts: dense is so called in that its parts are close to each other; thin in that its parts are distant from each other; smooth in that its parts lie straight; and wrinkled in that one part is higher, another lower. [84.17–23] [498]  Perhaps there will appear other modes of Quality, but the modes that are principally spoken of are those that have been mentioned, and the qualities are such as have been stated. [84.23–25] [499] One objects to the fourth species of Quality in this way: figure is in the genus Quantity; therefore it will not be in the fourth species of Quality. [84.25–27] [500]  In addition, straight and curved are characteristics of continuous quantity; therefore they will not be in the fourth species of Quality. [84.27–29] [501]  One should reply to the first [objection] (499) that ‘figure’ indicates to me two things: a kind of surface that goes around the perimeter of a square, as [does] the figure of a circleb, [and] ‘rectangularity’ indicates to me the surface that is included within the rectangularity, and in this sense it is in the genus Quantity; or one can speak of the rectangularity that is a quality of a figure, and in this sense it is in the genus Quality. [84.29–35] [502]  One should similarly reply to the second [objection] (500) that ‘curved’ and ‘straight’ can name the very subject of quantity, namely, a line, and in this sense they are in the genus Quantity, or they can name the quality of a line, namely, curvedness or straightness, and in this sense they are in the fourth species of Quality. [84.35–40] [What It Means to Be Qualified]

[503]  “Those things are called qualified,” etc., [is said] because it had already been stated (476) in the definition of ‘quality’: “I call a quality that on the basis of which we are calledc qualified.”65 Thus, after the species of Quality [Aristotle] clarifies the term ‘qualified’ included in the definition, speaking in this way: those things are called qualified which on the basis of what has been said are expressed denominatively (e.g., grammarian from grammar, just from justice, brave from bravery) or that are so called from some quality nondenominatively.66 [84.40–85.4]

a.  Reading at p. 84.15 unquaque against unumquodque. b.  Reading at p. 84. 31 circuli against circularis. c.  Reading at p. 84.42 dicimur against dicuntur.

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[504]  This can occur in threea ways, [first], because some things are expressed by a quality nondenominatively in that a name has not been imposed for that quality, just as a runner and a boxer are so called in two senses because a runner in one sense is so called from the art of running and a boxer from the art of boxing. In this sense they are in the first species of Quality (481), and these arts are habits, which areb in the first species of Quality. [85.4–10] [505]  In a second sense a runner is so called, not because he has the art of running, but because he has the natural power to do this easily, and likewise the boxer, not because he has the art of boxing, but because he has the natural power of boxing. And in this sense these things are said to be qualified in virtue of the same natural powers on the basis of which they are called qualified, and in this sense the runner and the boxer are in the second species of Quality (487). [85.10–16] [506]  In a [third] sense things are said to be qualified nondenominatively because a name has been imposed for the quality, but what is called qualified in virtue of it does not share in that name, for example, studious from virtue, since one is called studious, not virtuous, from virtue.67 And so there are three ways of interpreting ‘qualified by a quality’. [85.16–21] [507] One objects to the definition “Those things are said to be qualified,” etc., (476) in this way: a definition expresses unity, but plurality is repugnant to unity; therefore, since the definition is given in the plural, it does not seem to be a good one. [85.21–24] [508]  In addition, it seems that one ought not give there an explanation of being qualified since, just as being qualified follows from a quality, so being quantified [follows] from a quantity, but one did not give an explanation above of being quantified; therefore by the Topic from a similar one should not give [here] an explanation of being qualifiedc. [85.25–27] [509]  One should reply to the first that it is true that a true definition, constructed from a genus and differentiae, should be stated in the singular, as the definition of ‘man’ by ‘mortal rational animal’ is stated in the singular, but no true definition is present there (476); rather a kind of clarification (declaratio). The reason why the definition is stated in the plural is this: sometimes we are calledd qualified on the basis of the first species of Quality, sometimes on the basis of the second, sometimes on the basis of the third, and sometimes on the basis of the fourth, as is clear. Sometimes we are callede a.  Reading at p. 85.4 tripliciter against dupliciter. b.  Reading at p. 85.9 sunt against est. c.  Reading at p. 85.27 de quali against a quali. d.  Reading at p. 85.33 dicimur against dicimus. e.  Reading at p. 85.36 dicimur against dicimus.

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qualified denominatively from a quality, as has been seen (476); sometimes from a quality for which no name has been imposed, as in the case of a runner and a boxer; sometimes we are calleda qualified in virtue of a quality for which a name has been imposed but not denominatively, as from virtue we are called studious and not virtuous. And so, because we are called qualified from a quality in many ways, its clarification is stated in the plural and not in the singular. [85.27–43] [510]  One should reply to the second [objection] (508) that the case is not similar between ‘qualified’ and ‘quantified’, because we are calledb qualified on the basis of every kind of quality but we are not calledc quantified on the basis of every kind of quantity, as was seen above (429), and so the case is not similar. [85.43–86.3] [511] One objects in this way to what was said above (506), namely, that one is called studious but not virtuous from virtue: bravery is a virtue, but one is called brave from bravery d; therefore from the Topic from a similar one is called virtuous from v­ irtue. [86.4–7] [512]  One should reply to this that the case is not similar between ‘brave’ and ‘virtuous’e for what I am calling “virtuous” indicates a fullness of virtue but not what I am calling “brave.” And so one can be called brave from bravery, since ‘brave’ does not express a fullness of virtue, but one is never called virtuous from virtue but instead, from virtues, since ‘virtuous’ indicates a fullness of virtue. [86.7–13] [513] But on the other hand, the Philosopher says that who has one [virtue] has more than one, i.e., all, but who has all is virtuous; therefore (from beginning to end) one is called virtuous from virtue. [86.13–16] [514]  The same is argued by another line of reasoning: he who has one virtue either has all or does not; if he does not, then he is lacking one; if he is lacking one, he is not in the state of grace; if he is not in [the state of ] grace, he is in sin; if he is in sin, he loses all virtue; therefore one necessarily concludes that he who has one virtue has more, i.e., all. [86.16–21] [515]  To make this statement clear one should note that such is the collection or combination of virtues that who has one ought to have all, and who is missing one is missing all, as the apostle James says in the canonical epistle: “Whoever keeps the whole law but offends in one point has become guilty in all,” etc., and in Chapter 9 of Ecclesiastes: “Who has sinned in one matter loses many good things.”68 [86.21–28] a.  Reading at p. 85.39 dicimur against dicimus. b.  Reading at p. 86.2 dicimur against dicimus. c.  Reading at p. 86.3 dicimur against dicimus. d.  Reading at p. 86.6 fortitudine against fortitudo. e.  Reading at p. 86.8 forti et virtuoso against fortis et virtuosus.

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[516]  One should reply to the objection that who has one [virtue] has all, but who has all is virtuous, therefore one is called virtuous from virtue (513) that it is certainly true that who has one has all and that who has all is virtuous; but it does not follow thereby that one is called virtuous from virtue but rather from virtues. Thus, speaking about virtue as such and not in relation to the one possessing it, it is not true that one is called virtuous from virtue. Time and time again we notice someone lacking in selfcontrol engaging in works of justice: he gives alms, he enters a monastery, and he engages in other good acts. But he is called studious from them, not virtuous, because he studies how to engage in those good works. But because he does not act well in that he is in sin, he is not called virtuous from them. Hence the Philosopher says that one achieves the highest good by acting well frequently.69 One who lives in luxury engages in those good works but does not act well, and so he is called studious from them but not virtuous. [86.28–87.4] [517]  And there is a similar argument there: who has eyes has a head, but who has a head is possessive of a head; therefore one is called possessive of a head from his eyes. [87.5–7] [518]  One should reply to this that an argument of this sorta is not valid, for it should arrive at its conclusion in this way: who has eyes has a head, but who has a head is possessive of a head; therefore who has eyes is possessive of a head. And then the argument would follow well since it would follow well by reason of possession and by reason of being, but it does not follow by reason of denomination, because one is not called possessive of a head from eyes but from a head. [87.7–13] [519]  Similarly, the first argument (513) follows well by reason of possession and by reason of being but not by reason of denomination, for this follows well: who has one [virtue] has all [virtues], but who has all is virtuous. Hence, it is sufficiently clear that the [fallacy] Figure of a Word is in the two arguments because of the change in the conclusion.70 [87.13–18] [520] One objects to the claim that we are called studious from virtue (506) in this way: we are aware of some holy men, just and chaste, and yet they do not study; therefore it seems one speaks incorrectly when [one says] we are called studious from virtue. [87.18–22] [521]  One should reply to this that, just as a cleric diligently studies his scriptures, so a workman [studies] how to accomplish his tasks; hence, just as a cleric diligently studies logic or one of the other sciences, so a just man [studies] how justice is to be accomplished and a shoemaker [studies] shoemaking, and so on for other arts. So

a.  Reading at p. 87.7 huiusmodi against huius.

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‘study’ is defined in this way: study is the intense application of the mind to accomplish or reflect on something, and this is the way the solution is made clear. [87.22–28] [What Is Common and Proper to Quality]71

[522]  What is common or proper to Quality follows, and the first is this: there is contrariety in qualities, as whiteness [is contrary] to blackness and justice is contrary to injustice. But this is not proper to Quality because it does not belong to every [kind of quality], for figure has no contrary, nor does any intermediate color.72 [87.29–33] [523]  Courteously one asks what the qualities are that have a contrary and which do not. [87.34–35] [524]  One should reply to this that contrariety inheres in that quality that does not depend on quantity, except for intermediate qualities, which have no contraries— there is nothing contrary to pale or gray, and so on for other intermediate colors. But there is nothing contrary to the qualities that depend on quantity, for there is nothing contrary to quantity, just as there is nothing contrary to triangle or quadrangle. ­[87.35–41] [525] [Second], if one of a pair of contraries is something qualified, the other will be qualified. For example, justice is the contrary of injustice, but justicea is a quality; therefore injustice is a quality. And something just is something qualified; therefore something unjust is something qualified, and it is the same as if one were to say that contraries have being in the same genus. [87.41–88.5] [526] But on the other hand, good and evil are contraries and yet are not in the same genus because good is in the genus virtue and evil is in the genus vice. Therefore it seems it is not true to say that contraries are in the same genus. [88.5–8] [527]  One should reply to this that ‘genus’ has two senses, namely, a logical one and a moral one. But good and evil have being in the same logical genus because they are both in the genus Quality, and the Philosopher is mindful of that when he says that contraries have being in the same genus.73 But good and evil do not have being in the same moral genus but in different ones, because good is in the genus virtue, whereas evil is in the genus vice, and the Philosopher is not talking about this. [88.9–16] [528] [Third], quality admits of more and less, for one thing is called more and less white than another, and one man is called more a grammarian than anotherb is. But this is not strictly proper to every quality c for a quadrangle does not admit of more

a.  Reading at p. 88.2 iustitia against iniustitia. b.  Reading at p. 88.17–18 alter against alterum. c.  Reading at p. 88.19 qualitati against quantitati.

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and less, nor a circle nor rectangularity nor triangularity, since they depend on quantity, and quantity does not admit of more and less. [88.16–23] [529] But against this Aristotle says in the category Quantity, “You say the white is as large as the surface is,” but since a surface is a quantity, it does not admit of more and less; therefore, as it seems, neither does Quality since it is in it.74 [88.23–25] [530]  One should reply to this that when Aristotle says “as large as it is,” etc., he is speaking about a surface with respect to its extension, which is clear from the fact that he says “large.” I of course concede that as much as the surface is extended so much is the white extended on it, but the white is extended no more than the surface on which it is present is extended. But a quality certainly admits of more and less, and more and less indicate nothing other than increase and decrease, and this is the way the solution is made clear. [88.26–33] [531]  But one should note: what admits of more and less does not admit of it by reference to its genus. So a baser earthen color (vilior color de mundo) is not called less a color than a nobler earthen one is, nor also is a nobler earthen color more a color than a baser earthen color is. Furthermore, neither [does it admit of more and less] by reference to its species. Hence, one whiteness is not more whiteness than another existing in a subject or in a tunic or in anything of the sort. How, therefore, does [a quality] admit of more and less? By reference to the subject in which it is present, just as snow represents more white than a large tunic does, yet the whiteness in the snow is not more white than that which is in the tunic, [and] just as the whiteness in the snow is not more a color than that which is in you. In this way it is made clear how quality admits of more and less, [namely], by reference to the subject in which it is present and not by reference to its genus or species.75 Therefore not all things qualified admit of more and less, as was seen above (528). None of the things that have been discussed is proper to Quality. [88.33–89.9] [532] [Fourth], similar and dissimilar differ on the basis of qualities alone, for one thing is not calleda similar to another on the basis of just anything but on the basis of something that is qualified, for it is proper to Quality for something to be called similar or dissimilar on the basis of it. [89.9–13] [533] But on the other hand: similar and dissimilar are in the genus Relation, as was seen (449); therefore strictly speaking they will not be proper to Quality. [89.13–15] [534]  One should reply to this that ‘similar’ and ‘dissimilar’ can designate for me the subject of the quality on the basis of which some things are called similar and dis-

a.  Reading at p. 89.11 dicitur against dicit.

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similar, and in this sense they are in the genus Substance. Or [they can designate] the very qualities of those subjects, and then are in the genus Quality. Or they can designate for me some one respecta between two things [that arises from] the two sharing some quality, and in this sense they are in the genus Relation. And it is not inappropriate for the same thing to be in different genera in different respects. [89.15–23]

[ACTION] 76

[535]  Action follows, and it is defined in this way by the author of Six Principles: “action is that on the basis of which we are said to act on what is subjected, as one who cuts something is so called in that he cuts.”77 [89.24–26] [536] One objects to that definition in this way: he says “action is that on the basis of which,” etc., but a carpenter acts with an axe on that on which he acts; therefore the action pertains to the axe. But this is false because it is a substance; therefore [‘action’] is incorrectly defined. [89.26–30] [537]  Besides, he speaks of [acting] “on what is subjected.” But against [this one argues that] water is placed over a fire, and also wood, and yet the fire acts on them; therefore it is said to act not only on what is subjected [to it] but also on what is placed over it; therefore the definition seems to be incorrect. [89.30–34] [538]  In addition, he seems to define ‘action’ incorrectly because the same thing does not serve to define itself, but action and acting are the same thing because according to the Philosopher the thing signified is the same that is introduced by ‘action’ and by ‘acting’; therefore he acts incorrectly when he includes “to act” in the definition of ‘action’.78 [89.34–39] [539] Furthermore, why does he not include ‘doing’ (facere) [in the definition] just as he does ‘acting’ (agere)? [89.39] [540]  And one asks how ‘acting’ and ‘doing’ differ? [89.39–40] [541]  Finally, it seems he incorrectly defines ‘action’ by including “we are said” in [the definition]: an action is not just in a man but also in other animals and in the elements; therefore he seems to define ‘action’ insufficiently when he includes “we are said” there. [89.40–90.4] [542]  One should reply to the first [objection] (536) that “on the basis of which” can indicate a formal cause, the way someone is formally called a carpenter on the basis of the art that is carpentry, and so on for other actions, and the definition is to be understood in this sense; or it can indicate an instrumental cause, the way something is

a.  Reading at p. 89.20 respectum against respectu.

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axed by means of an ax. It is not taken in this sense in the definition (535) but in the first sense. [90.5–11] [543]  One should reply to the second [objection] (537) that to be placed under something has two senses: either as a body or as an agent. But I say that, although water and wood are placed over a fire inasmuch as it is a body, yet they are placed over it inasmuch as it is an agent, and in this sense the definition stilla remains a good one since they are placed overb it in as much as it is an agent. [90.11–16] [544]  One should reply to the third [objection] (538) that ‘acting’ and ‘action’ signify the same thing, although differently: ‘action’ signifies in the manner of a habit whereas ‘acting’ in the manner of an act, and a habit is wont to be known by an act. And since this definition is one that conveys knowledge (cognoscitiva), ‘action’ is accurately defined by ‘to act’. [90.16–20] [545]  One should reply to the fourth [issue] (539) that ‘acting’ is broader than ‘doing’ since ‘acting’ includes the action of a good or evil man, but ‘doing’ only the action of a good one. So when someone sins, he is said to act, and that action cannot strictly be called a doing since sin is nothing other than a lack of good. Strictly speaking, doing pertains only to a good man. And because ‘acting’ is broader than ‘doing’ in that it indifferently pertains to this action or that one, it is apposedc in the definition of ‘action’. [90.20–28] [546]  And the solution to the fifth [issue] (540) is made clear by [the preceding], namely, what the difference is between acting and doing. [90.28–29] [547]  One should reply to the last [objection] (541) that he defines only our actions in that they are more worthy than other actions or [than those] of other agents because they proceed from our will, whereas the actions of such [latter] agents proceed from a natural movement. Since he does not intend to define there this or that action but generally every kind of action, one ought to respond in a different way because one should reply differently and better by saying that he is speaking in the person of an agent, whoever that may be, and so the definition still remains a good one. [90.29–38] [What is Common and Proper to Action]

[548]  What is proper and common to Action follows, and the first is that it is naturally proper [to Action] of itself to cause a passion in what is subject to it, for every action effects a passion.79 [90.39–42] [549] [Second], to act and to undergo admit of the contraries more and less, for to heat is the contrary of to make cold, and to be made hot [is the contrary of] to be

a.  Reading at p. 90.16 adhuc against ad hoc. b.  Reading at p. 90.15 superponuntur against superponitur. c.  Reading at p. 90.27–28 apponitur against opponitur.

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made cold, and to be gladdened [is the contrary of] to be made sad. For this reason [Action and passion] admita of a contrary. And so [they admit] of more and less, for being heated is more or less, and likewise being gladdened and being saddened, and so on.80 [90.42–91.4]

[PASSION] 81

[550]  Passion follows, which is defined in this way by the author of Six Principles: “passion is an effect and consequence of action,” e.g., being heated is brought about by heating.82 [91.5–7] [What is Common and Proper to Passion]83

[551]  [With respect to what is common and proper to Passion], first, it is proper to passion to be brought about by an action. [91.7–8] [552] [And second], passion is not in the thing acting but in the thing acted upon, i.e., in the thing undergoing [something] and [what] first receives the action of the thing that is acting, for the thing that strikes a blow is not said to be undergoing [something] but the matter receiving the action. [91.8–10] [553] One objects to the definition of ‘passion’ in this way: it seems that there ­ ccurs there a disdain for words because “effect” and “consequence” are the same or o seem to signify the same thing; therefore if one is stated, it is superfluous to add the other. [91.11–14] [554]  In addition, he does not include ‘passion’ in the definition of ‘action’ (535); therefore he should not include ‘action’ in the definition of ‘passion’. [91.14–16] [555]  One should reply to the first [objection] (553) that a consequence and an effect are different because a consequence begins with an agent and is turned into a passion, but an effect is said to be an action on the thing that undergoes [something]. And we see [‘effect’] signify a passion as well as a consequence, and so it is stated before ‘consequence’ in the definition of ‘passion’; and this is the way the solution to the first [objection] is made clear. [91.16–21] [556]  One should reply to the second [objection] (554) that he does not expressly place ‘passion’ in the definition of ‘action’, although he supposes it by a kind of circumscription or circumlocution of ‘passion’ when using the words “on what is subjected” (535). Or, one should reply differently that a definition should be constructed from things known, and because we did not know what a passion was, so he does not include

a.  Reading at p. 91.1–2 recipiunt against recipit.

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‘passion’ in the definition of ‘action’; but because we know from what preceded what an action is, he legitimately includes ‘action’ in the definition of ‘passion’. These [comments] are sufficient. [91.21–29]

[WHEN] 84

[557]  When follows, which is defined in this way by the author of Six Principles: “when is what is left behind from the things adjoined to time.”85 For example, yesterday, which in my case is past, constitutes a when. Hence, I have as many whens as I have days, if my age is divided into days; if into years, I have as many whens as years; if into months, I have as many whens as months. [91.30–35] [558]  [He continues], “But time is not a when, althougha the definition of both is related.86 The past also is not a when, although a when is its effect, while at the same time it is not something producing an effect (non effectio) insofar as the when is something said to have been. The present also is not a when, but inasmuch as it is equal or unequal its effect, by which something is said to be present now, is a when. Future time likewise is not a when, but that which is in the future is, since it must happen inasmuch as it is said to be something in the future.”87 [91.35–92.4] [559]  [He adds], “There is one kind of when from the fact that it passes, and another from the fact that it is taking place, and still another from the fact that it is necessary for it to happen.” [92.4–6] [560]  [And he also points out], “Just as one kind of time is composed and the other simple—the composed is what consists in a composed action, whereas the simple is what reduces to the simple—so one kind of when is simple, the other composed—the simple is what has being and nonbeing in an instant, and the composed is [what has being and nonbeing], e.g., in a day, today, in a week, and so on.” [92.6–11] [561] One objects to the definition in this way: first, since there are five continuous quantities, namely, line, surface, body, place, and time, why are two categories made up from the last two, namely, from place and time—the categories made up from them are called When and Where—and not from the other three? [92.11–17] [562]  In addition, one argues against the definition of ‘when’ in this way: something unknown ought not fall into a definition, since a definition should make what is defined clear, but if what time is, is unknown, then it is uselessly included in the definition of ‘when’. [92.17–20]

a.  Reading at p. 91.36 autem against enim.

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[563]  Besides, it seems that the definition is not a good one: every definition should be converted with what is defined, but that one is not converted; therefore it is not a good proof, for we see many things left over from the accompaniment of time that are not whens, e.g., hail and rains and the likea; therefore it seems that the definition is not a good one. [92.20–25] [564]  One should reply to the first of these [objections] that the first three species of Quantity, namely, surface, line, and body, are intrinsic to a thing, whereas the other two, namely, time and place, are extrinsic. And so, since they are outside a thing by their actions, when acting on those things, they can leave or generate something. Hence, time by its continuation or from its ongoing nature is left over, and when is caused to be. Place comes from the containment of a place. But the case is not the same with respect to the [first] three sorts, for they are intrinsic [to a thing] and because they cannot do anything (rem agere) there. [92.25–34] [565]  One should reply to the second [objection] (562) that to give an explanation of time pertains more to the natural [philosopher] than to the logician, and so, since this author is a logician, he did not want to intrude by defining time. Nevertheless, he makes time itself clear through the words that are included afterwards (560), [i.e.], when it is said that one kind of time is simple, the other composed. [92.34–39] [566]  One should reply to the last [objection] (563) that hail and rains are not left over from the accompaniment of time but from the heat of the air and from the currents of wind in the air. So, when we use words like ‘inclement weather’ or ‘rainy time’ or ‘hot time’ or something of the sortb, we speak improperly of time by taking it for air. [92.39–93.2]

[WHERE] 88

[567]  Where follows, which is defined in this way by the author of Six Principles: “where is the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscription of a place.”89 For example, water collected in a container adopts the figure of the container and is transfigured in accord with the figure of the interior surface of the container, and the configuration that it has from the interior surface of the container is named ‘where’. This is sufficiently clear from its definition since the configuration of the collected water circumscribes the body and proceeds from the circumscription of that place, namely, of the container in which it had been poured. [He continues], “But a place is

a.  Reading at p. 92.24 et pluvie et huiusmodi against pluvie et huius. b.  Reading at p. 93.1 huiusmodi against huius.

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in that which it takes over, and where is in that which is circumscribed and surrounded.” [93.3–13] [568] One objects to the definition of ‘where’ in this way: it seems that ‘place’ inappropriately appears in the definition of ‘where’, since it is not yet known what place is, and a definition should be constructed from things known. [93.13–16] [569]  In addition, he speaks of “the circumscription of a body,” but against this [one may object]: just as a body has being in a place, so does an angel and a soul; and so it seems that he ought to speak of the circumscription of a substance, just as he speaks of the circumscription of a body. [93.16–19] [570]  Besides, he seems to speak inaccurately when he says “where is the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscription of a place,” since circumscription is an accident, but one accident does not have being in different substances; therefore it seems he speaks inaccurately when he says that it is in a where, i.e., around a where, and in a place. [93.19–24] [571]  One should reply to the first [objection] (568) that place pertains to the natural [philosopher] and not to the logician, and because this author is a logician, he is unwilling to go beyond the limits of the logician by defining ‘place’. And yet the logician sufficiently clarifies ‘place’ by the words that follow when he says, “But place is in that which it takes over and circumscribes.” [93.24–29] [572]  One should reply to the second [objection] (569) that place contains and circumscribes a thing located, for a body is circumscribed by a place in accord with the parts of the body, and it is also contained by the place. But while an angel and a soul have being in a place, nevertheless they are not circumscribed by the place since they have no circumscribable parts. But they are of course contained in a place as a soul [is contained] in a body. And this is the way the solution is made clear. [93.29–35] [573]  One should reply to the last [objection] (570) that the circumscription indicated by ‘where’ and the circumscription indicated by ‘place’ are different, since the circumscription of place bespeaks an active circumscription, whereas the circumscription indicated by ‘where’ bespeaks a passive circumscription, and this is clear from what was said (567) about a container and the water collected in that container. ­[93.35–40]

[POSITION] 90

[574]  Situation, i.e., position, follows, and it is defined in this way by the author of Six Principles: “position is the situation of parts and the arrangements [of parts] for generation.91 [94.1–3] [575] One objects to this definition in this way: ‘conjunction’ is a name of di­ versity since it joins diverse things, but a definition indicates identity and identity

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is  ­repugnant to diversity; therefore a conjunction is incorrectly included in this ­definition.  [94.3–6] [576]  One should reply to this that a conjunction ought not be placed in a wellconstructed definition proceeding by genus and differentiae. To indicate this one should know that there are two kinds of position, namely, natural and accidental, and my conjunction occurs there for that reason. An accidental position is one such as sitting, standing, lying, and suchlike, for a man is so positioned in the place in which he is that he sits, and a standing man stands, and so on. A natural position is one that proceeds from nature, just as some animals are so naturally positioned that they walk bent over, as brute animals do, and others straight up, as men do. On the basis of this different position generation is carried out differently in us and in animals. Furthermore, man has such a position from nature that he has eyes above a nose and a nose above a mouth and a mouth above a chin, and so on for each [feature]. The first kind of position, namely, accidental, is touched on by the first part [of the definition] and the second by the second part. Thus it is clear what position is along with the solution to the argument. [94.6–22]

[POSSESSION] 92

[577]  Possession follows, which is defined in this way by the author of Six Principles: “possession pertains to bodies and the things that adorn a body.”93 [94.23–25] [578] One objects to this definition and resolves the objection in the same way as before (576). So one should note that a conjunction occurs in the definition to indicate that possession belongs not only to bodies but also to the parts of a body, as to be armed and to have shoes on are possessions of a body, and to have shoes on and to have a head are possessions of the parts of a body. Hence, a man is not said to have shoes on with respect to his whole body but only with respect to his feet. A possession of bodies is touched on by the first part of the definition, whereas a possession of the parts of a body is touched on by the second part. This is the way what possession is and the solution to the argument are made clear. [94.25–35] [What Is Common and Proper to Possession]

[579]  [The author says,] “Possession admits of more and less, for a knight is said to be more armed than a foot soldier is, and one who has shoes and military footwear on [is said to be] more shod than one is who has only one of these.”94 [He continues], “But nothing is contrary to possession, for being armed and having shoes on are not contraries, for the same one who is armed also has shoes on. It is clear that the one is not contrary to the others, and so on. But it is proper to possession to exist in more

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than one thing, e.g., in a body and in the things that adorn a body, in accord with the distinction of the parts. You will finda this in few other principles, for you will discover similar things in Quantity alone and in those things that are with respect to something (ad aliquid): a respect to something (as it may be figuratively called) such as a likeness, whichb isc present in more than one similar and dissimilar thing. But the quantity that is in numerals, e.g., a number, is truly always growing in accord with a multifarious ascension of unities. You will findd absolutely nothing like a number able to be dis­ tributed in parts, but not every relation or quantity is such. But possession consists in more than one, as in those things that are on a body and in those things that adorn a body.” [94.35–95.14] [580]  These [comments] suffice for the Categories. [95.14.]

a.  Reading at p. 95.5 invenies against inveniens. b.  Reading at p. 95.8 que against omission in text. (See AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 52.11.) c.  Reading at p. 95. 8 inest against insunt. d.  Reading at p. 95.11 invenies against inveniens.

CHAPTER FOUR

REMARKS AFTER THE CATEGORIES

[COMMENT ON THE CHAPTER TITLE]

[581]  After the things that have been said [about the categories], let us speak of the things that come after the categories.1 [96.2] [582]  First, one argues that the things that come after the categories should be called “remarks before the categories” because it was said above (362) that the things that come before the categories serve to understand the categories, and so they are placed before the categories. Buta the things that come after the categories serve [to understand] the categories; therefore the reason why [what precede the categories] are called “remarks before the categories,” it would seem, is the same reason why [what follow the categories] should be called “remarks after the categories.” [96.3–8] [583]  One should reply to this that the things that come before the categories and those that come after the categories serve to understand the categories, but differently. Those that come before the categories serve to understand the categories in themselves, as every one of them is compared to something [logically] superior to it, namely, to being (ens), either as they are mutually compared or as one generic class is compared to all lower than it; and this was seen when discussing the things that come before the categories. But the things that come after the categories serve to understand certain things that are within [each] category, e.g., the knowledge of what they have in common and what is proper to each, which is clear with respect to each of the categories. For it was said in an earlier part (413) that there is nothing contrary to substance, [and] in Quantity it was likewise said (433) that there is nothing contrary to quantity. a.  Reading at p. 96.6 Sed against Sec.

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­ pposition is commona to contrariety, and so it is necessary to see what opposition isb. O In addition, it was said (422) in Quantity that one kind of quantity is continuous, the other is discrete, but every distinction and division comes from different and opposite things; and so it isc necessary to look at opposition. It was said in discussing the ­preceding (395) that Substance was to be examined first, before the other categories, because substance is prior to accident and all the other categories are accidents. Because of this it is necessary to see in how many ways ‘prior’ is spoken of. It was said in Relation (467) that some things that are related are naturally concomitant, and so it is good to look at how many ways things are said to be concomitant. Mutation is wont to occur with respect to substance—a white man becomes black—and because all mutation is change, it is necessary to look at change. It was said (481) that habitus (habit) is in the first species [of Quality] and that habitus (Possession) (577) is [also] one of the categories, and so it is necessary to see in how many ways ‘possession’ is spoken of. This is the way the solution is clear as to how each of the remarks after the categories serves [to clarify] something that was said within the categories, and why these follow, and why the remarks that precede the categories are placed before them.2 [96.9–97.3]

[FOUR KINDS OF OPPOSITION] 3

[584]  It is said that one thing is opposed to another in four ways: some opposites are relative opposites, others are contrary opposites, some are contradictory opposites, and others are privative opposites. Relative opposites are things like a father and his child, a lord and his servant, and so on. Privative opposites are things like possession and privation, e.g., sight and blindness, hearing and deafness. Contrary opposites are things like white and black, good and evil, and so on. Contradictory opposites are things like affirmation and negation, e.g., ‘He sits’, ‘He does not sit’. [97.4–11] [Relative Opposites]

[585]  What relative things are has already been stated (448–49). [97.11–12] [Contrary Opposites]

[586]  Contrary things are those that are placed under the same genus, distance themselves from each other to the greatest degree, and inhere in an alternating way in

a.  Reading at p. 96.21 communis against communitas. b.  Reading at p. 96.22 est . . . sit against erat . . . esset. c.  Reading at p. 96.25 est against erat.



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the same thing susceptible [to them], unless one of them is naturally determined, e.g., the whiteness of a swan and snow, the blackness of a crow, of an Ethiopian, and of charcoal, and the hotness of fire: coldness is never present in fire, nor can snow be black, nor a crow white, and so on. [97.12–17] [587]  It is clear that somea contrary things are not opposed in the same way as relative things are because one relative is spoken of with respect to the other. But this is not the case with those things that are opposed as contraries are, for good is not called good with respect to evil but with respect to the contrary [of evil]. Nor is white [called] white with respect to black, and so on. [97.17–21] [588]  In addition one should note that some contraries are such that, in all the things in which they come to be present and of which they are predicated, it is necessary that [only] one of them inhere [at a time]; there is no intermediate between these contraries. For example, infirmity and health are naturally wont to occur in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that one of these be in the subject as completingb [it] and [the other as] exceeding (habundans) [it]. But there is no intermediate between these, neither between infirmity and health, nor between even and odd, nor between what is complete and what is excessivec, of which, however, it isd necessary that one or the other inhere. [97.21–30] [589]  Some [contraries] have an intermediate, e.g., white and black are wont to arise naturally in a body. It is not necessary that one or the other of these be in the body; not every body is white or black, because [those colors] have an intermediate between them, and so on. There ise an intermediate between them, namely, pale and gray and whatever other colors there are. Similarly, indolentf and studious are predicated of a man, and so on for many others. It is not necessary that one or the other of these inhere in those of which they are predicated, for not all things are indolentg or studious, whereas their intermediate is what is neither indolenth nor studious. [97.30–41] [590]  In some cases names have been imposed for those that are intermediate, e.g., ‘white’ and ‘black’ and ‘pale’ and ‘gray’; but in some cases it is not suitable to assign names for an intermediate: the intermediate is determined by the negation of each [contrary] (summum), e.g., it is neither good nor bad, it is neither indolenti nor studious, it is neither just nor unjust, and so on. [97.41–98.2]

a.  Reading at p. 97.17 Quedam against Quod. b.  Reading at p. 97.26–27 perfectivum against perfectum. c.  Reading at p. 97.28–29 habundans against habundantem. d.  Reading at p. 97.29 est against non est. e.  Reading at p. 97.33–34 Est against Si est. f.  Reading at p. 97.35 pravum against parvum. g.  Reading at p. 97.38 prava against parva. h.  Reading at p. 97.39 pravum against parvum. i.  Reading at p. 97.43–98.1 pravum against parvum.

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[591]  In addition one should note that contraries are wont to occur with respect to the same thing either in genus or in species. Infirmity and health are naturally wont to come about in the body of an animal, and also whiteness and blackness in a body, but justice and injustice in a soul. Yet it has been said that all contrary things are either in the same genus, e.g., white and black are wont to be in the same genus, for color is their genus; or they are wont to be in contrary genera, e.g., justice and injustice, for virtue is the genus of justice, whereas iniquity is the genus of injustice; or they are ­genera themselves, e.g., good and evil are not in a genus but are the very genera of others. [98.2–11] [Privative Opposites]

[592]  Privative opposites are those things that are wont to occur in connection with the same thing in an irreversible order—it is quite acceptable to arrive at a privation from a possession, but not vice versa, for it is impossible to regress naturally from a privation to a possession. For example, blindness and sight are wont to occur in connection with an eye, but one readily goes naturally from having sight to blindness, but not vice versa. [98.11–17] [593]  This is clear since privative opposites are not opposed in the same way as relative [opposites] are, for sight is not said to be that which pertains to its opposite— sight is not the sight of blindness—nor is it in any way spoken of in relation to it. Likewise, neither is blindness a blindness of vision; blindness is called a certain privation of vision, but it is not called blindness in respect of vision. [98.17–22] [594]  This is clear for another reason: since all related things are spoken of with respect to reciprocity (464), if blindness were one of those things that are related, botha would be reciprocated; but they are not reciprocated, for sight is not called the sight of blindness. [98.22–26] [595]  Since privative opposites are not opposed as contraries are, it is clear by the same reason that in the case of contraries it is possible for there to be a change in either one when something susceptible exists, unless one of them inheres naturally, as to be hot [inheres in] fire: it is possible for the healthy to become sickb, and vice versa, and for something white to become black, and vice versa, and so on. But this is not the case with privative opposites, since in the case of privative opposites it is impossible for a change to occur in just one. A change can occur from possession to privation, but it is impossible [for there to be a change] from privation to possession. A blind man does not see again, nor when one becomes bald can one ever again regain one’s hair,

a.  Reading at p. 98.24 utraque against utrique. b.  Reading at p. 98.30 languescere against languere.



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nor when one loses one’s teeth does one ever get them back again, as is sufficiently clear. [98.26–37] [596]  It is clear that the things that are privatively opposed are not opposed in the way that those contraries are of which one inheres in a subject determineda by nature, as heat is in fire, because there is no change from one into the other, for there is no change from privation into possession, although there is a devolution from possession to privation. In this way it is clear how privative oppositesb are different from the other previously stated things. [98.37–43] [Affirmation and Negation as Opposites]

[597]  It is clear that whatever are opposed as are an affirmation and a negation are opposites in no way like the preceding, for in these alone it is always necessary that one of them be true and the other false. This is not the case with those things that are related or with contraries or with possession and privation. [98.43–99.5] [598]  This can be shown in the case of related things: a father and his child are relatively opposed, but if ‘There is a father’ is true, it is not because of this that it is necessary that ‘There is a child’ be false. Instead, if ‘There is a father’ is true, then likewise ‘There is a child’ [is true], and vice versa. [99.5–8] [599]  The case is similar with contraries: it is not necessary that if one be true the other be false, for when Socrates does not exist, ‘Socrates is well’ is false, and likewise ‘Socrates is sick’, since the two, namely, healthy and sick, are opposed as contraries. But if Socrates exists, then one is true and the other false. [99.8–13] [600]  In the case of privative opposites, neither is true if there is no [subject]. If there is [a subject], one is not always true: Socrates being sighted is opposed to Socrates being blind the way a privation and a habit are. But if there is no Socrates, both are false, namely, that Socrates is blind and that Socrates has sight. If Socrates exists, it is not always the case that one is true and the other false, for perhaps he never hadc sight or teeth, and in this case both are false, [namely], that Socrates has sight and that Socrates is blind, and likewise these are both false, [namely], that Socrates has teeth and that he has no teeth. [99.13–22] [601]  In the case of an affirmation and a negation, whether [the subject] exists or does not, one is always true and the other always false. If he exists, for Socrates to be sick and not to be sick it is clear that one of these is true and the other false, and likewise, if he does not exist. To be sick, if he does not exist, is false but not to be sick is

a.  Reading at p. 98.39 determinato against determinante. b.  Reading at p. 98.42 opposita against opposite. c.  Reading at p. 99.20 habebat against habent.

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true. Therefore only in the cases [where] whatever are opposed [are opposed] as an affirmation and a negation are will it always be proper for one of them to be true and the other false. [99.22–30] [Good and Evil as Contraries]

[602]  Furthermore, one should note that it is necessarily contrary to good to be evil. This is clear from an inductiona of singulars, as infirmity [is contrary] to health, injustice to justice, and weakness to strength. Likewise in other cases: a good is sometimes the contrary of an evil, and sometimes an evil [is the contrary] of an evil. Sicknessb, being an evil by excess, has a contrary, since [excess] itself is an evil. But one will observe this in few cases; in the majority of cases a good will always be the contrary of an evil. More, it is necessary in the case of contraries that, if one exists, the other does not inhere: if c health inheres in every healthy thing, there will be no sickness; likewise, if all [men] are white, whiteness inheres, but blackness does not. [99.30–41]

[PRIORITY] 4

[603]  Something is called prior to another in four senses. In the first and strict sense something is called prior to another in time on the basis that one is older and senior to another. For example, someone twenty years old is said to be prior to one who is only ten years old. What is called prior in the second sense is what is not reversed in a subsisting sequence, for one is prior to two: when two things exist, the direct consequence is that one exists, but not vice versa.5 What is called prior in the third sense is what has to do with order. For example, the principles of the sciences are prior to their conclusions, in grammar syllables are prior to words in speech, and a preface is prior to a narrative. What is called prior in the fourth sense is what is better and more honorable, for most are accustomed to calling prior the more honorable and more beloved among themselves. And this sense of ‘prior’ can be called prior in dignity. [99.42–100.13] [604]  Besides the four senses that have been stated there is another sense of ‘prior’: when things are reciprocal in a sequence having to do with essence and one is in some way the cause of the other, the one is appropriately called naturally prior. For example, a state of affairs is the cause of the truth of an expression made about that state of affairs: ‘that a man runs’ is converted with the expression ‘A man runs’. For if it is true that

a.  Reading at p. 99.32 inductionem against inductione. b.  Reading at p. 99.34 egestas against egestati. c.  Reading at p. 99.39 si sanis against sanis.



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a man is running, then ‘A man runs’ is truea, but not vice versa. For a state of affairs is the cause of a true or false expression, but a true expression is not the cause of the existence of a state of affairs, for it is from the fact that a state of affairs exists or does not that an expression is called true or false.6 [100.13–22]

[CONCOMITANCE] 7

[605]  Things are said to be concomitant absolutely and strictly whose generation exists at the same time, for neither of them is prior or posterior, and these are called concomitant in time. Things are said to be concomitant in a second sense that are interchangeable and neither is the cause of the other, such as whatever are relative, e.g., double and half, father and child, and so on. Things are said to be concomitant in a third sense that divide a genus, e.g., man, horse, lion, and so on—they divide the genus animal—or also these differentiae, namely, rational and nonrational. These last two senses are called naturally concomitant, but the first is called temporally con­ comitant. [100.23–33]

[CHANGE] 8

[606]  There are six species of change, namely, generation, destruction, increase, decrease, alteration, and local motion. Generation is the transition from nonbeing to being. Destruction is the regression from being to nonbeing. Decrease is the lessening of an existing thing.9 Alteration is the change from one quality into its contrary quality or into an intermediate [quality], e.g., when someone changes from whiteness to blackness or into one of the intermediate colors. Local motion is the change from one place to another. Local motion has six species or differentiae: up, down, forward, backward, right, and left, for change occurs with respect to all these directions. [100.34–101.1] [607]  But rest is contrary to change and likewise to generation and destruction; decrease [is contrary] to any increase; rest in a place [is contrary] to local motion [and] change into a contrary place seems especially to be opposed [to it], e.g., from the lowerb to the higherc. It is not easy to assign a contrary to the remaining stated change, namely, alteration.10 [101.1–7]

a.  Reading at p. 100.19 ‘homo currit’ est verum against homo currit. b.  Reading at p. 101.5 id quod inferius against ea que inferius. c.  Reading at p. 101.4 que superius against qui superius.

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[POSSESSION] 11

[608]  Possession is spoken of in many ways. In the first sense something is said to possess a quality, e.g., a discipline or a virtue. In the second sense something is said to possess magnitude, such as two cubits, three cubits. In the third sense something is said to possess things that adorn a body, e.g., a cloak or a tunic, or [things that are] on a hand such as a ring; and possession taken in this sense is one of the ten categories and is defined this way: “possession pertains to bodies and the things that adorn a body,” e.g., being armed, having shoes on, and the like, and names may be made up similarly in other instances.12 With respect to this adornment, the former is said to possess and the latter to be possessed. In the fourth sense something is said to possess a hand or a foot or another member [of the body]. In the fifth sense something is said to possess the contents of a container, as a bottle possesses wine or a bushel possesses grainsa of wheat. In the sixth sense someone is said to possess ownership, e.g., a house or a field. In the seventh sense someone is said to possess the way someone possesses a wife. And with respect to this last sense Aristotle says that this sense is the most foreign to what possession is because of the fact that a man possesses a wife and is possessed by her, for the matrimonial bond binds indissolubly for a lifetime.13 [101.8–25] [609]  And Aristotle says there that other senses of ‘possession’ will surface, but virtually all that are customarily mentioned have been stated. [101.25–27]

a.  Reading at p. 101.20 grana against genera.

CHAPTER FIVE

SYLLO G I SM

[ARGUMENT AND ARGUMENTATION]

[610]  Syllogism follows,1 and because syllogism is a species of argumentation and [because] ‘argument’ is included in the definition of ‘argumentation’, one should look at what an argument is and what an argumentation is, and how many species of argumentation there are and what they are.2 [102.3–6] [611]  According to Boethius in his Topics an argument is a reason producing belief about a matter in doubt.3 [102.7–8] [612]  To make this clear one should note that ‘reason’ is spoken of in four ways.4 In the first sense reason is said to be a power of the soul, the reason that dominates other powers, such as the rational and the concupiscible onesa. In the second sense reason is said to be the same thing as a definition, e.g., in Book One of the Categories: “Equivocals are called,” etc.5 There reason is taken as a definition. In the third sense reason is said to be the same thing as an objection or argumentation, and it is taken in this sense by people speaking in an ordinary way, as when one says, “That reason supports the claim,” or something of this sort. In the fourth sense reason is said to be the same thing as the middle that implies or proves a conclusion, and it is interpreted in this way in the definition of ‘argument’ in the sense that an argument is a reason producing belief about a matter in doubt—an argument is the middle implying or proving a conclusion, for a conclusion must be implied and proved by a middle.6 [102.8–21] [613]  One should note that reason spoken of in the fourth sense is the object of reason [in the first sense], the rational power in a man, for what is apprehended or accepted by reason is called the object of reason. But the middle, by which a conclusion a.  Reading at p. 102.10–11 dominat ceteres virtutes ut rationalem et concupiscibilem against dominatur ceteris virtutibus ut rationali et concupiscibili.

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is proved, is apprehended and arranged in an orderly way by reason to imply such a conclusion. [102.21–26] [614]  According to Boethius argumentation is the unfolding (explicatio) of an argument by means of an expression.7 [102.26–27] [The Difference between Argument and Argumentation]

[615]  To make this clear note that there is a difference between an argument and an argumentation. An argument is nothing other than a middle by which a conclusion is proved [and] in which the whole force of the argumentation consists, whereas an argumentation is said to be the whole expression composed of premises and conclusion. For this reason an argumentation is the unfolding of an argument, since the force of the middle is implicit and included before it is compared to the extremes. But when it is arranged in an orderly way with the extremes, then its force unfolds. And because there is in argumentation this relation of a middle to its extremes by means of the placement of premises with respect to a conclusion, argumentation is an unfolding of an argument by an expression composed of premises and a conclusion. [102.27–103.6] [616]  One should know for a better understanding of the difference between an argumentation and an argument that [Boethius] also says there that an argument is the power of inferring and the discourse (sermo) of argumentation.8 It is called a power because the middle, in which the whole power of argumentation consists, is a form, i.e., the perfection of the argumentation. A power and a form are the same in substance, although they differ in definition. Since a form does two things—it brings matter to completion and is the source of operations (as is clear in the case of a soul, which brings a body to completion and is the source of a body’s operations)—it is called a form in comparison with the matter it brings to completion but is called a power inasmuch as it is a source of operations. In this [latter] sense a middle, namely, the argument, is called a form in comparison with the expression composed of premises and a conclusion—this is the argumentation which it completes. But it is [also] called a power inasmuch as it is a source of implying or proving a conclusion by means of premises. [103.6–20] [617]  An argument is called the mind of an argumentation from its effect, namely, in that it moves the mind to believe [something], or it can be called the mind [of an argumentation for another reason]: just as the mind is a kind of possessiona of the soul by which the soul functions, so an argument is something by which an argumentation functions.9 [103.20–24] [618]  An argument is called the judgment of an argumentation because the controversy over what is said in the conclusion is ended by the argument. Hence, just as in

a.  Reading at p. 103.23 possessio against positio.

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law one speaks of “rendering a judgment” when a controversy between a plaintiff and an accused is ended by a judge, [an argument] is so called in this sense. [103.24–29] [619]  Against the definition of ‘argument’ (611) one could argue [that], since ­ ristotle says in Book Eight of the Topics that an argument is a dialectical syllogism, it A seems that here another definition has been inappropriately given.10 [103.30–33] [620]  Also, a definition ought always apply to what is defined, but to produce belief does not always apply to an argument; therefore it is inaccurately included in its definition. The major stands because a definition and what is defined are inseparable; the minor stands because, if a conclusion is proved to a layman by means of an argument, the layman will not thereby believe that it is proved by means of the argument, and so there will be no belief about a matter in doubt. [103.33–39] [621]  Furthermore, that Socrates is running can be proved by means of an argument to one who knows that Socrates is running, and so there will be no argument producing belief about a matter in doubt but rather about a matter that is certain, which is against the definition of ‘argument’. [103.39–104.2] [622]  One should reply to the first [objection] (619) that here ‘argument’ is taken in the strict sense, whereas in Book Eight of the Topics it is not taken strictly because [it is taken] for a dialectical argument. And for this reason it is not inappropriate for different definitions to be given there and here. [104.2–6] [623]  One should reply to the second [objection] (620) that to produce belief is related to two things, namely, to him who produces the belief and to him in whom the belief arises, as health is related to a physician and to someone sick. Hence, even though a physician does not always heal, he is said to have a complete knowledge of health if he takes into account all possible [means of healing], that is, if he does what he ought to do, as Aristotle remarks in Book One of the Topics.11 Likewise, even if no belief about a matter in doubt arises in the layman, nevertheless the argument is said to produce belief about a matter in doubt because there was no defect on the part of the argument but on the part of the layman who failed to understand it. [104.6–15] [624]  One should reply to the third [objection] (621) that, even if something is certain, it can yet be taken as doubtful. So, although the argument produces belief about a matter that is certain, [it does this] not about something certain as certain but as something in doubt. And an argument never produces belief except about something to which a question is attached; but what is inquired about is a matter in doubt or something taken as doubtful. [104.15–20] [The Divisions of Argument]12

[625]  One should know that Boethius divides arguments in his Topics in this way: some arguments are probable and necessary, others are probable but not necessary, others are necessary but not probable, and still others are neither probable nor

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n ­ ecessary.13 To make this division clear one should know what is probable and what is necessary. [104.20–26] [626]  Probable, according to Boethius in that same work, is what seems [to be true] to everyone or to most or to the most notable (noti).14 So that is probable that seems [true] to those who are in the class of all or of most wise men or of the most notable. Thus that is called probable that seems [to be true] to each and every craftsman on the basis of his own skill. [104.26–31] [627]  Necessary, according to Boethius in the same work, is that which is as it is said to be and cannot be otherwise.15 Therefore those arguments are called necessary and probable to which the mind of one who hears them easily consents and that have in themselves the ring (similitas) of truth, e.g., ‘Every whole is greater than any of its parts; therefore a house is greater than its walls’. [104.31–35] [628]  Probable and not necessary are those to which the mind of the one who hears them easily consents but that do not have in themselves the ring of truth, e.g., ‘She is a mother; therefore she loves’—there is a counterexample in Medea.16 [104.36–38] [629]  Necessary but not probable are those to which the mind of the one who hears them does not easily consent and yet that have in themselves the ring of truth, e.g., ‘The moon is positioned between us and the sun; therefore the sun is undergoing an eclipsea’. [104.38–105.3] [630]  Neither necessary nor probable are those to which the mind of the one who hears them does not consent, nor do they have in themselves the ring of truth, e.g., ‘Diogenes lost his horns; therefore he had horns’.17 [105.3–5] [631]  One should know that the dialectician considers probable and necessary arguments, and likewise probable and nonnecessary ones, but this is by reason of their probability. The demonstrator considers probable and necessary ones, and likewise necessary and nonprobable ones, but this is only by reason of their necessity. But the sophist considers arguments neither necessary nor probable. [105.5–11] [632]  But one could ask whether ‘argument’ is taken the same way in the definition (611) and the division (625) just given. [105.11–13] [633]  And one should reply to this in the negative, for ‘argument’ is interpreted more strictly in the definition than in the division. What is defined is argument that is truly argument and can be called argument, and argument in this sense contains under it the first three kinds of arguments that can be called arguments. What is divided is argument that contains under it four kinds of arguments of which the first three can be called arguments whereas the fourth cannot be called argument, according to Boethius in the same work.18 And so argument is divided in this way: that which contains under

a.  Reading at p. 105.3 eclipsi against eclipsim.

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it both what truly is an argument and what truly is not an argument. For this reason it could be argued that the stated division is more a declaration (annuntiatio) about argument than a division, just as “Some men are alive, others are dead” is more to be called a declaration about man than a division. [105.13–26] [634] But one will say that the third [kind of ] argument—what is necessary and not probable (629)—does not seem to be able to be called argument for this reason: an argument produces belief about a matter in doubt, but what is not probable cannot produce any belief; therefore the kind of argument that is not probable produces no belief, and so is not argument. [105.27–32] [635]  One should reply to this, according to Boethius in the same work, that some [arguments] are probable per se, others because of other things.19 Those called probable per se are they to which the mind of the one who hears them easily consents, and as soon as they are heard they are proved; but those called probable because of other things are they which, as soon as they are heard, are not proved but are demonstrated by things that precede them. Therefore those which are necessary and not probable are called nonprobable, not because they are probable in no sense at all, but because they are not probable per se. Nevertheless they are proved by other things. So even though they do not produce belief before they are proved by other things, nevertheless, once proven by other things, they can produce belief in some matters, and so an argument can arise from them. Such, moreover, are the propositions of geometry taken as derived (posterius) in geometry: they are necessary, but their necessity does not appear unless they are demonstrated by other propositions that precede them. Hence in geometry a derived proposition always presupposes preceding ones. [105.32–106.7] [636]  Should anyone ask why the fourth kind of argument (630) falls under the division of argument (since it cannot be called argument, as was said [631]), one can reply that argument taken in the fourth sense cannot be called argument. It has the manner of argument and seems to be dialectical, although it is not; it is sophistical. But a sophistical one gives the appearance of a dialectical one but is not actually a di­ alectical one. And so it gives the appearance of argument mostly because of its format and falls under the definition of ‘argument’. [106.7–15] [The Differences among Propositions, Questions, and Conclusions]20

[637]  From what has been stated (611–18) it is clear what an argument is and what an argumentation is and how they differ. But because an argumentation arises from propositions and a conclusion, the conclusion is the same as a question, according to Aristotle; and so to make what has been said more clear one should know what a proposition, a question, and a conclusion are. [106.16–20]

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[638] ‘Proposition’ is defined in many ways on the basis of which it is interpreted many ways. (1) It is defined in the Prior Analytics in the sense of a syllogism’s source that implies in general matter [and] in which [source] truth and falsity is not con­ sidered.21 An example would be ‘Every B is A, every C is B; therefore every C is A.’ In this sense a proposition is an affirmative or negative expression of something being about something or of something not being about something. (2) It is defined in the Posterior Analytics in the sense of being the source of a demonstration, and in this sense a proposition is one of the parts of a statement, namely, the one that is true, for a demonstrative syllogism is composed only of [propositions] that are true.22 (3) It is defined by Boethius in his Topics in the sense of being the source of a syllogism making something known in probable matter, that is, [the source] of a dialectical syllogism.23 In this sense a proposition is an expression signifying something true or false, and this definition is given with respect to a proposition on the basis of its substance. (4) It is defined in this way by Aristotle in Book One of the Topics in the sense of being the source of a dialectical syllogism: a dialectical proposition is an interrogation believable on probable grounds (interrogatio probabilis) to everyone, to the majority, or to the most recognizeda.24 (5) In Book Eight of the Topics [it is defined] in this way: A di­ alectical proposition is such that, being well grounded for the most part, no one proposes a counterexample (est contra quam sic se habentem in pluribus non est dare instantiam).25 But this definition differs from the one Aristotle gives in Book One of the Topics, for ‘proposition’ is defined (6) in Book One of the Topics in the sense of being the source of a dialectical syllogism in the dialectic that inquires.26 But (7) it is defined in Book Eight of the Topics in the sense of being the source of a dialectical syllogism in the dialectic that questions.27 But they are defined differently by Aristotle and Boethius: Boethius’s definition of ‘proposition’ is given on the basis of its substance, that is, on the basis of itself, whereas the definitions of ‘proposition’ by Aristotle are given on the basis of use, that is, with reference to us. [106.21–107.11] [639] A question, according to Boethius in his Topics, is a proposition that has been set forth with doubt and ambiguity.28 And one should note that there is a difference between doubt and ambiguity. A question has ambiguity when we have arguments for neither side of a contradiction, e.g., for this sort of question: Is [the number of ] stars even or odd? But a question contains a doubt when we have arguments on both sides of a contradiction, e.g., for this sort of question: Is the world eternal or not? Doubting occurs because of the conflicting arguments on both sides of the contradiction. Because of this Aristotle says in the Categories that to doubt about singular things is not useless.29 [107.12–22] [640] A conclusion, according to Boethius in the same work, is a proposition proved by arguments.30 And one should note that “by arguments” (in the plural) is

a.  Reading at p. 106.37–38 notis against notis non extranea.

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correctly included for Boethius is speaking there with respect to probable matter in which the argument produces belief about a matter in doubt or argues by sign with respect to a conclusion. One sign alone does not suffice to produce belief; more than one is needed. Because of this “proved by arguments” is more competently said than “by an argument.”31 [107.22–30]

[FOUR SPECIES OF ARGUMENTATION]

[641]  There are four species of argumentation, which are syllogism, enthymeme, example, and induction. [107.31–32] [Syllogism] [The Definition of ‘Syllogism’]

[642]  A syllogism is an expression in which, when certain things have been asserted and conceded, something else must occur by means of what have been asserted and conceded.32 For example, ‘Every animal is a substance, every man is an animal; therefore every man is a substance.’ The whole is an expression in which a conclusion follows with necessity from the two premises that are asserted; the conclusion is different from the premises, and the whole expression is called a syllogism. [107.32–39] [The Explanation of the Definition]33

[643]  For an explanation of this definition one should know that “expression” is included there as a genus with respect to syllogism, for every syllogism is an expression, but not vice versa. [107.39–108.2] [644]  The other things that follow in the definition are included to exclude other species of argumentation that are not syllogism, such as ineffective combinations [of propositions] and certain defects in syllogism discussed in Book Two of the Prior A ­ nalytics, such as Begging the Original Issue and The False Following Not Because of This, i.e., Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause.34 [108.2–7] [645]  By “certain things” enthymeme is excluded, for in an enthymeme one concludes from some thing, not from some things. [108.8–10] [646] By “asserted,” induction and useless combinations are excluded, for ­“asserted” in the definition of ‘syllogism’ is the same as ‘disposed’ or ‘arranged in mood and figure’.35 An arrangement of this sorta in mood and figure is not found in an ­induction or in useless combinations.36 [108.10–14] a.  Reading at p. 108.13 cuiusmodi against cuius.

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[647]  By “must,” example is excluded which has only probability, and by “something else occurs,” Begging the Original Issue is excluded, not inasmuch as it is a sophistical Topic, but in the sense of its analysis in Book Two of the Prior Analytics as a defect of syllogism taken as such.37 [108.14–19] [648]  By “by means of what have been asserted,” Following Not Because of This, i.e., Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause, is excluded, not inasmuch as it is a sophistical Topic, but in the sense of its analysis in Book Two of the Prior Analytics as a defect of syllogism taken as such.38 [108.19–23] [649]  One should note that “ineffective combinations” is said when no conclusion can be inferred from two propositionsa joined together.39 For example, an ineffective combination will occur if in the first figure a universal affirmative is found in the major and a universal negative in the minor. And Aristotle proves this in Book One of the Prior Analytics in this way40: one can take terms in which, when the premises are arranged in such and such a way, a universal negative [conclusion] stands, and [one can take] other [terms] in which, when the premises are arranged in such and such a way, a universal affirmative [conclusion] stands, and in this way a conclusion can be drawn as from premises in such an arrangement. The inference is grounded in the maxim, “If one of two opposites can stand with certain [terms], the other does not follow from them,” and if the negative can stand, the affirmative does not follow. And so, since the affirmative and the negative with different terms can stand with the premises in the stated arrangement, neither follows. Take the terms ‘animal’, ‘man’, and ‘horse’. A universal affirmative [conclusion] will be able to stand with the premises in the stated ­arrangement in this way: ‘Every man is an animal, no horse is a man; therefore every horse can be an animal’.41 Again, take the terms ‘animal’, ‘man’, and ‘rock’. A universal negative [conclusion] will be able to stand with the premises in the stated arrangement in this way: ‘Every man is an animal, no rock is a man; therefore no rock is an animal’. One is to understand something similar in other cases of ineffective combi­ nationsb. [108.23–109.4] [650]  It can likewise be said that those qualifiers are included in the definition of ‘syllogism’ (642) to exclude all the fallacies, both verbal and extraverbal. Thus, by “certain things,” the verbal fallacies and one extraverbal one—Treating More than One Question as One—are excluded, for “certain things” in the definition of ‘syllogism’ conveys the same thing as ‘of one thing’ does.42 [109.4–10] [651]  All the fallacies are defective in that there are propositions in them that are ambiguous. In the fallacy Treating More than One Question as One there is a proposition that has more than one proposition in it (propositio plures).43 The propositions in

a.  Reading at p. 108.25 propositionibus against propositionis. b.  Reading at p. 109.3–4 coniugationibus against coniugationis.

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the stated fallacies are deficient only in not being single and in the unity that ought to be present in the propositions of a syllogism. By “asserted,” i.e., disposed or arranged, the fallacy of Consequent is excluded, in which there is no proper order: what ought to be the consequent is asserted as antecedent, and vice versa. By “must occur,” the fallacy of Accident is excluded and likewise the fallacies of Ignorance about Refutation and In a Certain Respect and Absolutely can be excluded, for in the paralogisms of those three nothing comes about by necessity. By “something else,” Begging the Original Issue is excluded, in which the same thing is set out first and then concluded. By “by means of what have been asserted and conceded,” Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause is excluded, in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises. [109.10–25] ­ [652]  One can object to the definition of ‘syllogism’ (642) [that] (a), since there are two premises and a conclusion in a syllogism, each of which is an expression, it would be more competently said that a syllogism is expressions than that it is an expression. In connection with this, one asks (b) whether a syllogism is one expression or more than one, and if one, by what kind of unity it is one. [109.26–30] [653]  Also, since some expressions are perfect and others imperfect, one asks whether a syllogism is a perfect or an imperfect expression. If perfect, since some of these are indicative, others imperative, some optative, others vocative, and still others interrogative, one asks which of these is a syllogism. [109.30–35] [654]  And since it was said (642) that a conclusion is different from premises, one asks how this can be true, for it seems that it is not different from premises, because nothing different is asserted in a conclusion than is asserted in the premises. [109.35–38] [655]  One should reply to the first [question] (652b) that a syllogism is one expression, but one should note that things as well as discourse have a threefold unity. First, there is the unity of indivisibility in a thing, and in virtue of this unity a point is said to be one. Second, there is the unity of composition, and in virtue of this unity a man is said to be one from a composition of soul and body. And third, there is the unity of order, in virtue of which the world is said to be one. Speaking as a logician, the unity of a term in discourse corresponds to the first sort of unity in a thing; hence a term is one in virtue of the unity of indivisibility, according to the logician.44 The unity of a proposition in discourse corresponds to the second sort of unity in a thing; hence a proposition is one in virtue of the unity of composition. The unity of a syllogism in discourse corresponds to the third sort of unity in a thing; hence a syllogism is one in virtue of the unity of order. It is, therefore, correctly said that a syllogism is an expression, and not expressions, for it is one expression in virtue of the unity of order and not in virtue of the unity of composition or indivisibility. [109.39–110.10] [656]  One should reply to the other thing objected (652a)—that there are two premises and one conclusion in a syllogism of which each is an expression—that this is true. Any conclusion and any of the premises is per se an expression in virtue of its

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unity of composition. But the whole formed by the conclusion and premises is one expression in virtue of its unity of order. And it is called a syllogism more from this sort of unity than from any other in that the premises are not considered in se or per se, and likewise neither is the conclusion, but rather the premises in a syllogism are considered inasmuch as they are arranged to imply a conclusion. And in this way it is clear that a syllogism is one expression, and it is also clear by what sort of unity it is one. [110.10–21] [657]  One should reply to the other thing [asked] (653) that a syllogism is a perfect expression. And one could argue that, just as in the class of [all] things the most perfect is that which is one in virtue of its order, namely, the world (as Aristotle proves in his The Heavens and the Earth), so in the class of all discourses that discourse is the most perfect which is one in virtue of its order, namely, the syllogism.45 A syllogism, therefore, is one and perfect and is an indicative [expression]. [110.21–27] [658]  But one should note that some expressions are indicative, [namely], those which indicate the being (esse) of something, the way a definition is an indicative expression of the being of what is defined, for a definition indicates what the being is. Another kind is the indicative expression that indicates the being of something in something, e.g., the statement that indicates the being of a predicate with its subject, as in ‘that Socrates runs’. Still another kind is the indicative expression that indicates the being of something in something and by means of it, and such is a syllogism because it indicates that the major extreme is predicated of the minor by means of the ­middle. [110.27–34] [659]  One should reply to the other question (654) that a conclusion is not different from its premises with respect to matter. When one argues, nothing materially different is asserted in the conclusion than was in the premises, but the conclusion is different from the premises with respect to form. The form of a proposition is its composition, and the composition in the premises is different from that in the conclusion. In the conclusion the extremes are combined with each other, namely, the major extremity with the minor extremity; but in the premises the middle is combined, as in the second figure, or the extremes with the middle, as in the third figure, or one extreme with the middle and the middle with the other extreme, as in the first figure. [110.34–111.3] [Enthymeme]46

[660]  An enthymeme is an incomplete or truncated syllogism, and it is so called from ‘en’, which means “in,” and ‘timos’, which means “mind,” for in an enthymeme one proposition is always retained in the mind, which, once stated, the syllogism ­becomes perfect.47 Sometimes the major is retained, as in ‘Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is an animal’. Here ‘Every man is an animal’ is retained, which is the major.

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Sometimes the minor is retained, as in ‘Every man is an animal; therefore Socrates is an animal’. The proposition ‘Socrates is a man’, which is the minor, is retained in the mind. [111.4–12] [Induction]48

[661]  Induction is the progression from singular things to something universal. In an induction a universal is inferred from several singular things brought together at the same time, e.g., ‘Socrates runs, Plato runs (and so on for [other] singulars); therefore every man runs’. [111.12–16] [662]  One should note that “progression” in the definition of ‘induction’ does not denote a corporal act where one is said to progress from one place to another but denotes an act of reason, for it pertains to reason to make an inference from the gathering together of many singulars from which something universal is inferred. ‘Progression’, therefore, names a mental act, not a corporal one. [111.16–21] [Example]49

[663]  Example concludes from one similar thing to another similar one, as here: ‘A sailor is not to be chosen to govern a ship by lot but by art; therefore a master is not to be chosen to govern schools by lot but by art’. [111.21–24]

[SYLLOGISM IN DETAIL]

[664]  Having seen these things, one should return to syllogism, our main interest here. [111.25–26] [665]  One should know, moreover, that some principles of syllogism are general, others specific. The more general ones are those that are found in every syllogism, and of these some are material, others formal. [111.26–29] [Material and Formal Principles of Syllogisms] 50

[666] Material [principles] are the terms and the propositions, but the terms are remote matter, whereas the propositions are proximate matter. In a syllogism there are three terms, which are the major extremity, the minor extremity, and the middle term. The major extremity is the one placed in the major proposition along with the middle; the minor extremity is the one placed in the minor proposition along with the middle; the middle term is the one placed before the conclusion and never

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placed in the conclusion. In a syllogism there are two propositions, namely, the major and the minor, and a conclusion that follows from the major and the minor. [111.29–38] [667]  There are two formal principles of a syllogism, namely, figure and mood. The figure corresponds to the remote matter of a syllogism; the mood corresponds to the proximate matter. The figurea is the arrangement of the three terms by due predication and subjectionb. The mood is the arrangement of the three propositions on the basis of due quality and quantity.51 [111.38–112.1] [Perfect and Imperfect Syllogisms] 52

[668]  But the principles of a syllogism that are more specific are said to be those that are specifically found in some syllogisms, and some of these are the things that perfect syllogisms that are perfect and others are the things that perfect syllogisms that are imperfect. There are two principles that perfect imperfect syllogisms, namely, conversion and reduction per impossibile. [112.1–6] [669]  Some syllogisms are perfect, the others imperfect. According to Boethius in his Categorical Syllogisms a perfect syllogism is one to which nothing is lacking from without for an integral proof, and its necessity is per se evident.53 Such are the first four moods of the first figure, which Boethius calls indemonstrable, because they are not demonstrated by others; direct, because they are set forth without a conclusion; perfect, because they are approved by themselves; and primary, because all the others are resolved into them.54 Thus the five indirect moods of the first figure and all of the second and third figure that conclude indirectly are imperfect.55 They are reduced to one of the first four moods of the first figure by conversion or [reduction] per ­impossibile. [112.6–18] [670]  But note that a syllogism is not called imperfect with respect to its being— every syllogism concludes with necessity, and the perfection of a syllogism consists of this—but it is called imperfect with respect to its evidence. Thus an imperfect syllogism, according to Boethius in the same work, is one for which nothing is lacking for its perfection.56 Nevertheless, in the assumed [premises] some things are lacking, [and this is clear] when one concludes in such a way as if he had saidc [that a syllogism] is not called imperfect because something is lacking to it with respect to its being, but because something is lacking to it with respect to the evidence for its implication. The moods other than the first four conclude less evidently, but the ground (ratio) of the implication in them is evident by reduction to one of these four moods.57 [112.18–29]

a.  Reading at p. 111.41 figura est against est. b.  Reading at p. 111.42 subiectionem against subiectorum. c.  Reading at p. 112.24 dixisset against diceret.

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[To-Be-Said-of-All and To-Be-Said-of-None] 58

[671]  To-be-said-of-all occurs when there is nothing subsumed under the subject of which the predicate is not said. To-be-said-of-nothing occurs when there is nothing subsumed under the subject from which the predicate is not removed. Briefly, to-besaid-of-all is in that proposition in which a universal affirmative sign is added to the subject; to-be-said-of-nothing occurs in the proposition in which a universal negative sign is added to the subject.59 [112.30–37] [672]  And one should note that Aristotle in his Prior Analytics says that it is the same to say to-be-said-of-all and to-be-in-as-in-a-whole (esse in toto).60 And he is to be understood [to be speaking] of an identity in fact, for to-be-said-of-all is conceptually different from to-be-in-as-in-a-whole. To-be-in-as-in-a-whole indicates the relation of a subject to a predicate, whereas to-be-said-of-all indicates the relation of a predicate to a subject. When one says, ‘Every man is an animal’, there to-be-in-as-in-awhole is present, for man is said to inhere totally in animal. Likewise, to-be-said-of-all is present there, for ‘animal’ is said of every man. One should understand something similar with respect to the other two, not-to-be-in-as-in-a-whole and to-be-said-ofnothing. [112.37–113.6] [673]  What conversion is has already been stated (119); what it is to reduce per impossibile will be stated later (701, 707). [113.7–8] [674]  To-be-said-of-all is a principle that perfects affirmative syllogisms; to-besaid-of-nothing is a principle that perfects negative syllogisms. [113.8–10] [Quality and Quantity of Syllogisms]

[675]  Some syllogisms are affirmative, the others negative; some are universal, others are particular. [113.10–12] [Five Rules Pertaining to the Quality and Quantity of Syllogisms]61

[676]  But the first rule to be known is: The syllogism is affirmative whose conclusion is affirmative, and negative whose conclusion is negative, universal whose conclusion is universal, and particular whose conclusion is particular. And the reason for this rule can be that a thing ought to be denominated from its goal and its last thing: a conclusion is the goal and last thing in a syllogism, for the premises in a syllogism are arranged for producing a conclusion. [113.12–19] [677]  There is another rule: If one of the premises is negative, the conclusion will be negative. The reason for this can be that, if one of the premises is negative, there will be a difference between one extremity and the other, which is clear, since from

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two negatives nothing follows, as will be stated later (679). If one of the premises is negative, it is necessary that the other be affirmative. The middle coincides with the ex­tremity in an affirmative one that arises from the middle and one extremity. But the middle does not coincide with the other extremity in a negative one that arises from the middle and the other extremity, and it is by reason of the middle that it coincides with one extremity and not with the other. There is a difference between the ­extremities; therefore, since the conclusion arises from the extremities, it is necessary in the conclusion for one extremity to be removed from the other, which comes about by a negation. And so the conclusion will be negative as long as one of the premises is negative. ­[113.19–32] [678]  There is another rule: If one of the premises is particular, the conclusion must be particular. The reason for this can be that, when one of the premises is a particu­lar affirmative, the middle agrees in the manner appropriate to something particular (particulariter) with one of the extremes in one of the premises. And because there is no agreement between the extremes except by way of the middle, one ex­tremity no more agrees with the other extremity than one extremity does with the middle. And so in the conclusion it is necessary that an extremity agree in the manner appropriate to something particular with the extremity, just as the middle in the [particular] premise agreed in the manner appropriate to something particular with an extremity. It is the same thing if one of the premises was a particular negative. Just as the middle in one of the premises does not agree in the manner appropriate to something particular with the other extremity, so one extremity in the conclusion does not agree in the manner appropriate to something particular with the other extremity. [113.32–114.2] [679]  There is another rule: One may not syllogize from entirely negative propositions. The reason for this can be that in every syllogism something in the conclusion is understood to be removed from something or something to be affirmed of something. But before something is affirmed of something, it is necessary that there be something agreeable to both by means of a middle. And then it will be necessary that both of the premises be affirmative because of the agreement between the middle and both extremities. And so when the conclusion is affirmative, it is necessary that both premises be affirmative. But if something is removed from another, this cannot happen except because of a difference found between those things. This difference will belong to one of them and not to the other, for, if two things differ in something, as do Socrates and Plato in whiteness, the whiteness belongs to one but not the other. Since, therefore, the difference is the middle in a syllogism, the difference is affirmed of one extreme, or the extreme is affirmed of it, [or the difference] is denied of one [extreme] or the other extremity is denied of it. And so, if something is understood to be removed from something [in one of the premises], the other proposition will be affirmative. Therefore, whatever may be concluded syllogistically, one of the premises will be affirmative. [114.2–20]

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[680] Finally, there is another rule: One may not syllogize from purely particular, indefinite, or singular propositions. These are all equivalent as far as the constitution of a syllogism is concerned, for without a universal proposition there will be no syllogism, as Aristotle says in Book One of his Prior Analytics.62 [114.20–24] [Figures of a Syllogism]

[681]  Having seen these things, one should now speak about the figures of syllogisms. And because a figure, as was said (667), is the arrangement of the three terms by due predication and subjection, so there are three figures on the basis of which the terms in a syllogism are arranged in three ways. The middle term serves either as the subject in the major proposition and is predicated in the minor, and this is the first figure; or it is predicated in both premises, and this is the second figure; or it serves as the subject in both premises, and this is the third figure, which is clear from these verses:63 The first [figure] makes [the middle] a subject first and a predicate second. The same seeks twice to be predicated by the nature of the second [figure]. The same seeks twice to be made a subject [in] the third [figure]. [114.25–36] [The First Figure]

[682]  The first figure follows. One should know that the first figure has nine moods of which four conclude directly and five indirectly. Those moods are said to conclude directly in whose conclusion the major extremity is predicated of the minor [extremity]; [those are said] to conclude indirectly when the minor extremity is predicated of the major [extremity] in the conclusion. One should know the first rule in the first figure: In the moods concluding directly the major is always universal and the minor affirmative.64 [114.36–115.5] [The Four Moods That Conclude Directly]

[683] The first mood of those that conclude directly consists of a universal affirmative major and minor concluding in a universal affirmative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, everything able to laugh is a man; therefore everything able to laugh is an animal’. [115.5–9] [684] The second mood consists of a universal negative for the major and a universal affirmative for the minor concluding in a universal negative, as in ‘No man is a stone, everything able to laugh is a man; therefore no thing able to laugh is a stone’. ­[115.9–12]

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[685] The third mood consists of a universal affirmative and a particular affirmative concluding in a particular affirmative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, something able to laugh is a man; therefore something able to laugh is an animal’. [115.12–16] [686] The fourth mood consists of a universal negative and a particular affirmative concluding in a particular negative, as in ‘No man is a stone, something able to laugh is a man; therefore something able to laugh is not a stone’. [115.16–19] [687]  One should know that by means of those four moods every kind of propositiona serves as a conclusion: by the first, a universal affirmative; by the second, a universal negative; by the third, a particular affirmative; and by the fourth, a particular negative. [115.19–23] [The Moods That Conclude Indirectly]

[688]  There follow the moods that conclude indirectly.65 [115.24] [689] The first of these consists of a universal affirmative major and minor concluding in a particular affirmative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, everything able to laugh is a man; therefore some animal is something able to laugh’. This syllogism is imperfect and needs perfecting. But to perfect a syllogism is nothing other than to reveal its necessity. [115.24–30] [690]  Boethius points out the necessity in this syllogism in his Categorical Syllogisms in this way: some proposition follows from anything, [and] that into whichb it is converted can follow from it, but from the premises ‘Every man is an animal’ [and] ‘Everything able to laugh is a man’ there evidently follows ‘Everything able to laugh is an animal’, which is converted into ‘Some animal is something able to laugh’; therefore it can follow from them, and this is the way its necessity is made clear.66 [115.31–37] [691]  It could [also] be shown in this way, according to Aristotle: whatever follows from a consequent follows from its antecedent, but from ‘Every man is an animal, everything able to laugh is a man’ there is the consequent ‘Everything able to laugh is an animal’, which can be antecedent to ‘Something able to laugh is an animal’, which is converted into ‘Some animal is something able to laugh’. Just as the universal follows from them, so it and the particularc into which it is converted followd from them. ­[115.37–116.3] [692]  The syllogism can be perfected in another way, [namely], by its reduction to the third mood that concludes directly. In this way the conclusion that was ‘Some animal is something able to laugh’ would then be converted and ‘Something able to laugh is an animal’ will be had. Let the minor proposition ‘Everything able to laugh is

a.  Reading at p. 115.21 propositionis against problematis. b.  Reading at p. 115.33 quam against qua. c.  Reading at p. 116.2–3 particularis against particulariter. d.  Reading at p. 116.3 sequuntur against sequitur.

Syllogism 141

a man’ be converted and ‘Some man is something able to laugha’ will be had. Then let a particular be converted from this and one will have ‘Something able to laugh is a man’. Finally let the major be taken, which was ‘Every man is an animal’, and in this way the third mood that concludes directly will be had: ‘Every man is an animal, something able to laugh is a man; therefore something able to laugh is an animal’. [116.3–13] [693] The second mood that concludes indirectly consists of a universal negative in the major and a universal affirmative in the minor concluding in a universal negative, as in ‘No man is a stone, everything able to laugh is a man; therefore no stone is something able to laughb’. The mood is reduced to the second mood that concludes directly when the conclusion is converted simply. [116.13–19] [694] The third mood [that concludes indirectly] consists of a universal affirmative in the major and a particular affirmative in the minor concluding in a particular affirmative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, something able to laugh is a man; therefore some animal is something able to laugh’. This is reduced to the third mood that concludes directly when the conclusion is converted simply. [116.19–24] [695] The fourth mood [that concludes indirectly] consists of a universal affirmative in the major and a universal negative in the minor concluding in a particular negative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, no stone is a man; therefore some animal is not a stone’. This is reduced to the fourth mood that concludes directly when the major is converted by limitation and the minor simply and the propositions are transposed in such a way that the minor becomes the major and vice versa.67 [116.24–30] [696]  The fifth mood [that concludes indirectly] consists of a particular affir­ mative in the major and a universal negative in the minor concluding in a particular negative, as in ‘Some man is an animal, no stone is a man; therefore some animal is not a stone’. This is reduced to the fourth mood that concludes directly when the major and minor are converted simply and the propositions are transposed, as ­before (686). ­ [116.30–36] [The Second Figure]

[697]  The second figure follows in which the first rule should be known: if the major is a particular, nothing follows. Also, nothing follows from [premises that are] entirely affirmative.68 There are four moods in this figure. [116.37–40] [698] The first [mood] consists of a universal negative in the major and a universal affirmative in the minor concluding in a universal negative, as in ‘No man is a stone, every pearl is a stone; therefore no pearl is a man’. This is reduced to the second [mood] of the first [figure] when the major is converted simply. [116.40–117.2]

a.  Reading at p. 116.9 risibile against risibilis. b.  Reading at p. 116.17 risibile against risibilis.

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[699] The second [mood] consists of a universal affirmative in the major and a universal negative in the minor concluding in a universal negative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, no stone is an animal; therefore no stone is a man’. This is reduced to the second [mood] of the first [figure] when the minor and conclusion are converted simply and the premises are transposed, as before (684). [117.2–7] [700] The third [mood] consists of a universal negative in the major and a particular affirmative in the minor concluding in a particular negative, as in ‘No stone is an animal, some man is an animal; therefore some man is not a stone’. This is reduced to the fourth [mood] of the first [figure] when the major is converted simply. [117.7–11] [701] The fourth mood consists of a universal affirmative in the major and a particular negative in the minor concluding in a particular negative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, some stone is not an animal; therefore some stone is not a man’. This is reduced to the first [mood] of the first [figure] by [reduction] per impossibile. To make a reduction per impossibile in the second figure is to infer from the [contradictory] opposite of the conclusion that is substituted for the minor, along with the major, the contradictory opposite of the [original] minor, in this way: take the contradictory opposite of ‘Some stone is not a man’ (which was the conclusion in the stated syllogism) and ‘Every stone is a man’ will be had. Let that be the minor, and take the major of the stated syllogism (which was ‘Every man is an animal’) and one has: ‘Every man is an animal, every stone is a man; therefore every stone is an animal’. This conclusion contradicts the contradictory opposite of the minor of the first syllogism (which was ‘Some stone is not an animal’), and one will have the first mood of the first figure.69 [117.11–26] [The Third Figure]

[702]  The third figure follows in which the first rule should be known: If the minor is negative, nothing follows. There is another rule: In the third figure there is no conclusion except a particular one.70 There are six moods in this figure. [117.27–30] [703] The first [mood] consists of a universal affirmative major and minor concluding in a particular affirmative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, every man is something able to laugha; therefore something able to laugh is an animal’. This is reduced to the third [mood] of the first [figure] when the minor is converted by limi­ tation.71 ­[117.30–34] [704] The second mood consists of a universal negative in the major and a universal affirmative in the minor concluding in a particular negative, as in ‘No man is a rock, every man is something able to laughb; therefore something able to laugh is not a rock’. This is reduced to the fourth [mood] of the first [figure] when the minor is converted by limitation.72 [117.34–39] a.  Reading at p. 117.32–33 risibile against risibilis. b.  Reading at p. 117.37 risibile against risibilis.

Syllogism 143

[705] The third [mood] consists of a particular affirmative in the major and a universal affirmative in the minor concluding in a particular affirmative, as in ‘Some man is an animal, every man is something able to laugha; therefore something able to laugh is an animal’. This is reduced to the third [mood] of the first [figure] when the major and conclusion are converted simply and the propositions are transposed, as before (685). [117.39–118.1] [706] The fourth [mood] consists of a universal affirmative in the major and a particular affirmative [in the minor] concluding in a particular affirmative, as in ‘Every man is an animal, some man is something able to laughb; therefore something able to laugh is an animal’. This is reduced to the third [mood] of the first [figure] by simple conversion of the minorc. [118.1–6] [707] The fifth [mood] consists of a particular negative in the major and a universal affirmative in the minor concluding in a particular negative, as in ‘Some man is not a stone, every man is something able to laughd; therefore something able to laugh is not a stone’. This is reduced to the firste [mood] of the first [figure] by a [reduction] per impossibile. To reduce per impossibile in the third figure is to infer from the contradictory opposite of the conclusion substituted for the major, and along withf the minor, the contradictory opposite of the major, which is clear enough from what has already been said (701).73 [118.6–13] [708] The sixth [mood] consists of a universal negative in the major and a particular affirmative in the minor concluding in a particular negative, as in ‘No man is a stone, some man is something able to laughg; therefore something able to laugh is not a stone’. This is reduced to the fourth [mood] of the first [figure] when the minor is converted simply. [118.13–18] [A Mnemonic for Reduction to the First Figure]

[709]  The following verses ought to be noted so that the preceding might be more easily retainedh in the memory:74 Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipton Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum Cesare, Ca[m]pestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti Felapto, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison [118.18–24]

a.  Reading at p. 117.42 risibile against risibilis. b.  Reading at p. 118.4 risibile against risibilis. c.  Reading at p. 118.5 minori against maiori. d.  Reading at p. 118.9 risibile against risibilis. e.  Reading at p. 118.10 primum against primam. f.  Reading at p. 118.12 cum minori against minori. g.  Reading at p. 118.16 risibile against risibilis. h.  Reading at p. 118.18 comprehendantur against comprendentur.

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[The Significance of the Number of Words, Syllables, Vowels, and Consonants in the Verse]

[710]  One should know that there are nineteen words in these four verses by which all the moods of the three figures are designated in such a way that by the first two verses (in which there are nine words) the nine moods of the first figure are designated, so that by the first [word] the first [mood is designated], by the second, the second, and so on for the others taken in order. The four moods of the second figure and the six moods of the third figure are designated by the third and fourth verses. ­[118.25–32] [711]  One should know that, if there are more syllables than three in any word, they designate nothing, but are only included there for the sake of meter. [118.32–34] [712]  And one should know that by the vowel of the first syllable one is to understand the major proposition; by the vowel of the second syllable the minor; and by the vowel of the third the conclusion. [118.34–36] [713]  One should note that by ‘a’ a universal affirmative is designated, by ‘e’ a universal negative, by ‘i’ a particular affirmative, and by ‘o’ a particular negative. [118.36–38] [714]  One should know that all moods other than the first four of the first figure are reduced to those first four in such a way that the mood that begins with ‘b’ is reduced to the first [mood], with ‘c’ to the second, with ‘d’ to the third, and with ‘f ’ to the fourth.75 [118.38–42] [715]  One should know that the proposition designated by the vowel that ‘s’ follows is converted simply; but if ‘p’ follows, it is converted by limitation; and if there is a ‘m’ in the word, transposition of the premises occurs. [118.42–119.2] [716]  One should know that the imperfect moods that are designated by a word that begins with ‘b’ and in which an ‘o’ is included must be reduced per impossibile to the first mood of the first figure in such a way that the conclusion must arise from the contradictory opposite of the proposition indicated by the vowel that ‘c’ follows, and the contradictory opposite of the conclusion must be substituted for that ­proposition.76 [119.2–8] [717]  But still, to make the preceding more clear, one might ask the reason for the names of the terms placed in a syllogism, which are called the major extremity, the minor extremity, and the middle term. [119.9–12] [718]  One could reply [that] the major extremity is what is always predicated of the minor [extremity] in the conclusion in the moods that conclude directly, and so the major extremity is the predicate and the minor [extremity] is the subject, fora what is predicated follows that which serves as a subject. This is the probable explanation to be

a.  Reading at p. 119.15 enim against autem.

Syllogism 145

givena for most of this sortb. And because what follows is broader, it was said that the major extremity is predicated [and] that the minor [extremity] serves as a subject with respect to it. But what is uniative of some things is called a middle with respect to them, and because the middle term in a syllogism unites an extremec with an extreme, it is named a middle. From this one can take it that the major proposition is denominated from the major extremity that is asserted in it along with the middle, and the minor [proposition] is so called from the minor extremity that is asserted in it along with the middle. [119.12–24] [719]  Since it has been said (687) that every kind of propositiond serves as a conclusion throughout the four moods of the first figure, one objects that the other moods of the first, second, and third figures are superfluous. [119.25–27] [720]  One should reply to this, as was said (669), that some in the class of syllogisms are perfect, the others are imperfect. Granted, therefore, that in using a perfect syllogism every kind of propositione can serve as a conclusion throughout the first four moods of the first figure, the others are not thereby superfluous. A propositionf serves as a conclusion throughout the other [moods] when using an imperfect syllogism, for the ways of concluding by a perfect and an imperfect syllogism are different. [119.27–34] [721]  Someone could object [that], since there is one figure in which the middle is predicated in both premises, and another in which the middle serves as the subject in both, and another in which it serves as the subject in one and is predicated in the other, it seems that there ought to be a fourth figure in which the middle is predicated in the major and serves as the subject in the minor. [119.34–39] [722]  One should reply to this that there are only three figures of a syllogism, and the reason is because the middle in a syllogism either has the condition, i.e., mode, of something very general or of something first in the order reflected within a category g, and thus there is the second figure, in which the middle is placed over the extremities;77 or it has the mode of something very specific or of something last in the order reflected within a categoryh, and thus there is the third figure, in which the middle serves as subject with respect to the extremes; or it has the mode of something intermediary in

a.  Reading at p. 119.16 dicenda against dici. b.  Reading at p. 119.16 huiusmodi against huius. c.  Reading at p. 119.21 extremum cum against extremo cum. d.  Reading at p. 119.26 propositionis against problematis. e.  Reading at p. 119.30 propositionis against problematis. f.  Reading at p. 119.32 aliqua propositio against aliquod problema. g.  Reading at p. 119.42 predicamenti against probabilium. h.  Reading at p. 120.1 predicamenti against probabili.

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the order reflected within a categorya in that it serves as subject with respect to one extreme and is placed over the other, and then there is the first figure, in which the middle serves as the subject in one [premise] and is predicated in the other. There can be no other figure in which the middle would be predicated of the major extremity and serve as the subject of the minor extremity, for it would be necessary on the basis of that arrangement of the middle to take the major as false, if it is taken as universal, or it would be necessary to take [the major] as particular, and then the conclusion would not follow. For, were one to say ‘Every animal is a man, every man is something able to laughb; therefore everything able to laugh is an animal’ the major would be false. And if [the major] is taken as a particular, the conclusion does not follow.78 [119.39–120.12] [723]  If someone objects [that] ‘Everything able to laugh is a man, every man is an animal; therefore everything able to laugh is an animal’ follows well and yet the middle is predicated in the first [premise] and serves as the subject in the second, and so this fourth figure is something possible, one should reply that this syllogism is not actually a syllogism, though virtually it is a syllogism, and it is the same as this: ‘Every man is an animal, everything able to laugh is a man; therefore everything able to laugh is an animal’. The middle is the same in both, and the [same] conclusion is implied in virtue of the same middle in both. But there is a difference here because in the first [syllogism] the propositions are transposed since the minor is placed before the major.79 Therefore it is in no other figure than the first, since the middle serves as the subject with respect to the major extremity and is predicated of the minor [extremity], as is clear in the conclusion. In order for it to have been a figure other than the three it would have been necessary for the middle to be predicated of the major [extremity] and function as subject with respect to the minor [extremity]. But that is not the case, as was clear. [120.12–27] [724]  Finally, should someone ask why the fourth mood of the second figure and the fifth [mood] of the third [figure] are said to be reduced per impossibile, one could reply that in the reduction of the stated moods one takes the contradictory of the conclusion, and for the other premise one takes the contradictory opposite of one of the premises. So one contradictory is substituted for the other. And because contradictories are impossible, that reduction can be called per impossibile, where one contra­ dictory is asserted for another. [120.27–34]

a.  Reading at p. 120.3 predicamenti against probabili. b.  Reading at p. 120.10–11 risibile against risibilis.

CHAPTER SIX

TOPICS

[725]  Since syllogistical argumentation as dialectical and as confirmed by a di­ alectical Topic has been treated above, now one is to speak about dialectical Topics, and first one should see what a Topic is.1 [121.2–5]

[DEFINITION OF ‘TOPIC’]

[726]  A Topic is the ground of an argument or that from which one draws a suitable argument.2 [121.5–6] [727]  But one should note that a Topic in dialectic is not strictly so called except metaphorically by its likeness to a natural place. And because all transitions (transferentes) [from a literal sense to a metaphorical one] are made on the basis of a likeness, as Aristotle proposes in Book Six of the Topics, one should know that there is a likeness between a dialectical Topic and a natural place.3 For just as a natural place contains within itself the thing located and preserves it, so also in logic a Topic contains an argument and preserves it in its goodness, for an argument does not prevail unless it can be confirmed by some Topic. [121.6–15] [728]  Similarly, a dialectical Topic is not strictly called a ground except by analogy with natural ground. For just as one sitting in his chair enjoys stability and firmness, and [just as] one sitting can be drawn out of the chair in which he is sitting, so, analogically, a Topic in logic is that in which an argument has stability and firmness and is that from which an argument is drawn or can be drawn. [121.15–20]

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[MAXIMS AND DIFFERENTIAE OF MAXIMS]

[729]  ‘Topic’ is divided into a Topic that is a maxim and a Topic that is the differentia of a maxim. [121.21–22] [730]  A Topical maxim is the same as a maxim: it is the maximal proposition, known per se, undemonstrated by something else, supporting the force of an argu­ mentation, such as, of whatever a definition is predicated the thing defined is also predicated. It is called a maxim because of the dignity it has, for this proposition is believable of itself since it is not proved by something else, although others are proved through it.  121.22–28] [731]  But a Topic that is a differentia of a maxim is that by which one maxim differs from another, as a species and a genus do. A definition and what is defined differ greatly from each other because one is given by genus and species and the other by definition and thing defined. So one should note that these terms indicate the differentiae of maxims. Maxims come from the differentiae of maxims. Each of these simple terms, ‘genus’ and ‘species’, ‘definition’ and ‘thing defined’, is by itself a differentia of a maxim. [121.28–122.1] [732]  One should note that the first part of the definition of ‘Topic’ ought to be applied to the Topical maxim and the second part to the Topic that is the differentia of a maxim. A Topical maxim is the ground of an argument because it contains the argument and makes it firm. But the Topic that is the differentia of a maxim is that from which one draws a suitable argument. Thus, when one asks from where in an argument the Topic comes, one should answer, “From the differentia of the maxim and not from the maxim.” [122.1–7] [733]  One should also note that, as Boethius proposes in his Topics, the maxim by which an argument is confirmed is sometimes contained inside the argument, sometimes outside it.4 If the following argument arises—‘Kingship is a more lasting good than consulship is, for kingship is a dignity that lasts for the life of a man whereas a consulship lasts only a year, what is more long lasting is a good and is better than a  short-term good; therefore kingship is better than consulship is’—the maxim by which this argument is confirmed is within the argument, namely, that longer-lasting goods are better than those of short duration. But if one should say ‘An envious man is one who is troubled by the goods another possesses, but the wise man is not bothered by another’s possessions; therefore an envious man is not a wise man’, the maxim by which the argument is confirmed is: Those whose definitions are different are themselves different. But this is contained outside the argument, not inside it. [122.7–22] [734]  But here it seems that a maxim could be included in every argument. ­[122.23–24]

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[735] But on the other hand, a maxim is a Topic, but a Topic is something outside a thing and is not part of the thing; therefore a maxim, since it is a Topic, will be outside an argument and not a part of the argument. [122.24–26] [736]  One should reply to this that a maxim can be considered in two ways: with respect to its consistency, [i.e.], inasmuch as it consists of a subject and a predicate, and in this sense it is a proposition and so can be included within an argument; in another way it can be considered with respect to its force, namely, inasmuch as it contains and confirms an argument, and in this sense it is a Topic, and in this sense it is outside the argument and is not part of the argument. And so on the basis of different notions it can be within and outside an argument. [122.26–34]

[INTRINSIC, EXTRINSIC, AND INTERMEDIATE TOPICS]

[737]  The Topic that is a differentia of a maxim is divided into intrinsic, extrinsic, and intermediate Topics. [122.35–36] [738]  Topics are intrinsic when the argument is taken from terms included in the question; extrinsic Topics are those that are taken from terms outside the question; and intermediate Topics are those that are taken partly from terms included in the question and partly from terms outside the question. One understands this in this way: a Topic is not assigned except where there is an argument. But in every argument there is a conclusion that was a question before a conclusion was drawn. And so an argument is said to produce belief regarding a thing in doubt, that is, about a conclusion that was a question and thus is in doubt before it is proved.5 [122.36–123.4] [739]  Intrinsic Topics, therefore, are those that are taken from terms included in the conclusion, that is, that are taken in accord with the compatible nature of the terms included in the conclusion, for intrinsic Topics hold between those terms that are naturally agreeable to each other.6 This is manifested in this way: if one asks whether Socrates is an animal and one argues ‘Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is an animal’, the Topic is from a species, and so the Topic is intrinsic: a genus is asserted in the conclusion, not a species, because ‘animal’ is included there. And so on the basis of a nature agreeing with animal that Topic is called an intrinsic one. It is taken from a term included in the conclusion in that it is taken from the nature of the term that agrees naturally with the term included in the conclusion. [123.4–16] [740]  But extrinsic Topics hold between terms that naturally disagree with each other. Because of this they are said to be taken from terms placed outside the conclusion, for they are taken on the basis of the incompatible nature of the terms that are asserted in the conclusion. [123.16–21]

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[741]  Intermediate Topics are those that hold between those terms that partially agree and partially disagree, and so they are said to be taken partly from the terms included in the conclusion and partly from those outside the conclusion. Grammatical cases and conjugates present themselves in this sense, e.g., ‘whiteness’ and ‘white,’ which agree in this that, when one is posited, the other is posited, and when one is destroyed, the other is destroyed.7 They disagree in this that they do not signify in the same way, for one signifies a form abstractly whereas the other concretely. That form is said to be signified abstractly which is signified absolutely as such [and] not as it inheres in a subject or with no comparison to a subject with respect to its mode of signifying. That form is said to be signified concretely which is signified as something inhering in a subject or as it is concretized and joined with it, for ‘white’ signifies a form in a subject [and] inasmuch as [the form] is mixed with the subject or joined to it. They also disagree in this that neither is predicated of the other. [123.21–36] [Intrinsic Topics]

[742]  Some intrinsic Topics are froma substance, others are from the concomitants of substance. And they are called Topics from substance that hold in the case of concomitant terms, and they are called from substance because one of the interchangeables expresses the whole substance or being of the other interchangeable. They are called Topics from the concomitants of substance that hold between such things of which one pertains to the substance of the other, but the one does not totally express the being of the thing, as a part [expresses] the being of a whole. A genus is not the whole being of a species, nor is a part the whole being of its whole; a genus is, however, concomitant with the whole being of its species and a part [is concomitant with] the being of its whole, because a species is not without its genus nor a whole without its part. [123.36–124.5] [INTRINSIC TOPICS FROM SUBSTANCE]

[743]  There are three Topics from substance, [namely], the Topic from definition, from description, and from the explanation of a name. [124.6–7] [The Topic from Definition] 8

[744]  A definition is an expression indicating the being of a thing by means of the substantial things that are wont to come about from a genus and substantial differena.  Reading at p. 123.37 a substantia against substantia.

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tiae.9 The thing defined is that whose being is expressed by such an expression. The Topic from definition is the relationship of a definition to the thing defined, and it contains four arguments and four maxims, for a definition can serve as a subject or a predicate. If it functions as a subject, it does this either affirmatively or negatively. Similarly, if it is predicated, it does this either affirmatively or negatively. [124.7–14] [745]  Examples make this clear: ‘A mortal rational animal runs; therefore a man runs’. The Topic is from definition; the maxim: Whatever is predicated of the definition is also predicated of the thing defined. Likewise, ‘A mortal rational animal does not run; therefore a man does not run.’ The Topic is from definition; the maxim: Whatever is removed from the definition is also removed from the thing defined. When making it a predicate it is syllogized in this way: ‘Socrates is a mortal rational animal; therefore Socrates is a man’. The Topic is from definition; the maxim: Of whatever the definition is predicated the thing defined is also predicated. Likewise this: ‘A stone is not a mortal rational animal; therefore a stone is not a man’. The Topic is from definition; the maxim: From whatever the definition is removed the thing defined is also removed. [124.14–25] [746]  One should know that just as there is a Topic from definition so is there a Topic from the thing defined, and it contains four arguments and four maxims, just as the Topic from definition does. And so one can arguea from the thing defined to its definition, and vice versa. [124.25–28] [747]  One should also know that a Topic gets its name from what implies and not from what is implied. Thus, when a definition is what implies, the Topic is from definition; but when the thing defined is what implies, the Topic is from the thing defined. What implies is what is stated in the premise; what is implied is what is stated in the conclusion. [124.28–33] [748]  If someone were to ask why a Topic gets its name more from what implies than from what is implied, one could reply that a Topic is nothing other than a relationship of what implies to what is implied. This relationship is had more by what implies than by what is implied or it is more grounded in what implies than in what is implied, for, once what implies is asserted, what is implied is always asserted. And once what implies is asserted, the relationship that what implies has to what is implied is asserted. But once what is implied is asserted, what implies is not asserted, except rarely, namely, when the Topic is between interchangeables. And then what implies asserts, not because of the nature of what is implied, but because it is something interchangeable. And so [a Topic] gets its name more from what implies than from what is implied. [124.33–43]

a.  Reading at p. 124.27–28 argumentare against argumnetare.

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[The Topic from Description] 10

[749]  The Topic from description follows. A description is an expression indicating the being of a thing through its accidental characteristics; the thing described is that whose being is indicated by such an expression. The Topic from description is the relationship of a description to the thing described.11 [125.1–4] [750]  One should note that there are two sorts of descriptions: one is that which results from a genus and differentiae and accidents, as “animal capable of knowledge and naturally tame” is a description of man; the other is the description that arises from a collection of several characteristics with respect to the same subject, the way “grammarian, musician” isa a description of Socrates and the son of Sophronicus. [125.4–9] [751]  One should know that one can argue from a description to the thing described and from a thing described to its description, just as from the definition to the thing defined and from the thing defined to its definition. And one draws exactly the same number of arguments and maxims from the Topic from description and the thing described as [one draws from the Topic] from a definition and the thing defined. [125.10–14] ­ [The Topic from the Explanation of a Name] 12

[752]  The Topic from the explanation of a name follows. An explanation of a name is an exposition of one name by other names; what is explained is what is thus exposited. The Topic from the explanation of a name is the relationship of an explanation to what is explained. [125.15–18] [753]  One should know that there are three sorts of explanations. One provides more [explanation] than the thing explained does, e.g., one gives this explanation or exposition: a stone is a foot wounder. The explanation is broader than the thing explained for many things wound a foot that are not stones. A second sort of explanation is one that provides less than the thing explained does, e.g., if ‘syllable’ is explained by ‘a group of letters’, ‘group’ provides lessb than ‘syllable’ does for there can be a syllable of one letter. A third sort of explanation is one that is interchangeable with the thing explained, e.g., if ‘philosopher’ is explained by ‘lover of wisdom’: the explanation is interchangeable with the thing explained. The Topic from an explanation of a name is only valid in the case of the explanation that is interchangeable with the thing e­ xplained.13 [125.18–31] [754]  There is a Topic from an explanation and from the thing explained, just as there is a Topic from definition and the thing defined. And the same number of argu-

a.  Reading at p. 125.9 est descriptio against et descriptio. b.  Reading at p. 125.25 in minus against minus.

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ments and maxims are taken here as there when one posits an explanation and a thing explained, just as in the case of a definition and a thing defined. [125.31–34] [755]  But one could argue against the preceding in this way: it seems that the Topics about which mention has been made can get their names from accidents as well as from substance, for an accident can have a definition, a description comes from accidental characteristics, and an explanation of a word or name is per accidens some sort of explanation. [125.35–39] [756]  One should reply to this that, when Topics are said to be from substance, ‘substance’ is not taken strictly and truly, but ‘substance’ is taken for being, for those are called Topics from substance that are among such of which one wholly expresses the being of another. And ‘being’ is taken broadly here for the being of a name as in the Topic from the explanation of a name, for substantial being as in the Topic from definition, and for accidental being as in the Topic from description. [125.39–126.3]

[INTRINSIC TOPICS FROM CONCOMITANTS OF SUBSTANCE]

[757] Topics from concomitants of substance follow, and they are the Topic from a whole, from a part, from a cause, from an effect, from generation and destruction, from uses, and from associated accidents. [126.4–6] [The Topic from a Whole]

[758]  The Topic from a whole is divided on the basis of different kinds of wholes. There is a certain kind of whole that is a universal whole, another is an integral whole, another a quantitative whole, another a modal whole, another a locational whole, and another a temporal whole. [126.7–10] [The Topic from a Universal Whole or from a Genus]14

[759]  A universal whole is said to be superior and essential to, or substantial with, its inferior, of which it can be predicated, as a genus isa a universal whole with respect to its species and individuals of its species, and a species is called a genus with respect to its own individuals.15 The Topic from a universal whole is the relationship of that whole to its part. With respect to it an argument is always taken destructively in this way: ‘A stone is not an animal; therefore a stone is not a man’. The Topical maxim from a universal whole: From whatever a universal whole is removed any part of it is also removed. [126.10–18] a.  Reading at p. 126.12 est against et.

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[760]  Or the Topic can be named another way the Topic from a genus. [126.18–19] [761]  If anyone objects that Boethius in his Topics argues constructively by the Topic from a genus in this way: “Virtue is advantageous; therefore so is justice; but virtue is a genus with respect to justice,” one should reply that there are two sorts of implications.16 One is that which holds by reason of form, in virtue of the relationship that holds between what implies and what is implied; the other is that which holds by reasona of matter, in virtue of the terms in which the implication occurs. When, therefore, it is said that the Topic from a genus always holds destructively, this is true by reason of form. For such is the relationship between genus and species that, when a genus is asserted, its species is not thereby asserted; but when the genus is destroyed, the species is necessarily destroyed. But if an argument holds constructively by the Topic from a genus, this will be by reason of the matter and not by reason of form. For if anything is predicated essentially or substantially of a superior, the same is predicated of its inferior, for whatever pertains to the essence or substance of a genus pertains to the essence or substance of its species. Thus, in an essential predication such an implication holds, and because of it ‘Virtue is advantageous; therefore justice is advantageous’ follows, because ‘advantageous’ is predicated essentially of virtue, just as ‘An animal is a substance; therefore a man is a substance’ certainly follows by reason of the matter. [126.19–38] [The Topic from an Integral Whole]17

[762] The Topic from an integral whole follows. An integral whole is what is ­composed of parts possessing quantity, and the Topic from an integral whole is the relationship of that whole to its part, from which an argument is always taken constructively in this way: ‘There is a house; therefore there is a wall’. The Topical maxim from an integral whole: When an integral whole is posited, any part of it is also p ­ osited. ­[126.39–127.3] [The Topic from a Quantitative Whole]18

[763]  The Topic from a quantitative whole follows. A quantitative whole is a common term taken with a universal sign, and the Topic from a quantitative whole is the relationship of that whole to its part, from which one draws an argument in this way: ‘Every man runs; therefore Socrates runs’, and so on. Or, ‘No man runs; therefore Socrates does not run’, and so on.19 The Topical maxim from a quantitative whole: Whatever is posited of a quantitative whole is also posited of any of its parts, or, Whatever is removed, etc. [127.4–11]

a.  Reading at p. 126.24 ratione against rationem.

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[The Topic from a Modal Whole]20

[764]  The Topic froma a modal whole follows. A modal whole is a name or a verb taken without a determination with respect to itself taken with a determination, e.g., ‘man’ with respect to ‘white man’ and ‘runs’ with respect to ‘runs well’. One draws an argument from it destructively in this way: ‘A stone is not a man; therefore a stone is not a white man’. The Topical maxim from a modal whole: From whatever is removed from a modal whole its part is also removed. [127.12–19] [The Topic from a Temporal Whole]21

[765]  The Topic from a temporal whole follows. A temporal whole is a word that adverbially comprises all times, as do ‘always’ and ‘never’, from which one draws an argument constructively in this way: ‘God always is; therefore God is now’. The Topical maxim from a temporal whole: In whatever a temporal whole inheres its part also inheres. It can be argued in this way with respect to its part in the negative.22 [127.20–26] [The Topic from a Locational Whole]23

[766]  The Topic from a locational whole follows. A locational whole is a word indicating adverbially every place, from which one draws an argument constructively in this way: ‘God is everywhere; therefore God is here’. The Topical maxim from a locational whole: In whatever a locational whole inheres its part also inheres. [127.27–31] [The Topic from a Part]

[767]  The Topic from a part follows. And one should know that there are as many kinds of parts as there are of wholes. Thus there is a part of a universal whole, of an integral whole, of a quantitative whole, of a modal whole, of a temporal whole, and of a locational whole. [127.32–35] [The Topic from a Species or from a Subjective Part]24

[768]  A part of a universal whole is that which is subordinate to its whole, of which its whole is essentially predicated, e.g., ‘Man is a part of animal and Socrates is a part of man’. The Topic from a part of a universal whole is the relationship of that [part] to its whole. From this one draws an argument constructively containing two

a.  Reading at p. 127.12 de loco a toto against de toto.

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arguments (one using a species as a subject, the other predicating a species) in this way: ‘A man runs; therefore an animal runs’, or ‘Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is an animal’. The Topical maxim from a part of a universal whole: Whatever is predicated of a species is also predicated of its genus, or Of whatever a species is predicated its genus [is also predicated]. [127.35–128.1] [769]  This Topic can be named in another way the Topic from a species or from a subjective part. And a species is called a subjective part because it is a subject with respect to its whole, and in this it differs from an integral part, for an integral part cannot be made a subject with respect to its whole. One does not say ‘A wall is a house’, though one correctly says ‘A man is an animal’. On this point there is another difference between an integral part and a subjective part because in any subjective part its whole is wholly maintained per se, as animal is contained in man and man in Socrates. But an integral whole is not maintained in any one of its parts but in all combined, for a house is not wholly contained in a wall. [128.1–12] [The Topic from an Integral Part]25

[770]  The Topic from an integral part follows. An integral part is what pertains to the constitution of an integral whole, from which one draws an argument destructively in this way: ‘There is no wall; therefore there is no house’. The Topical maxim from an integral part: When an integral part is destroyed, its whole is destroyed. [128.13–17] [The Topic from a Quantitative Part]26

[771]  The Topic from a quantitative part follows. This can be taken under a term distributed by a universal sign, from which an argument can be taken constructively and destructively in this way: ‘Socrates runs (and so on for the others); therefore every man runs’, or ‘Socrates does not run (and so on for the others); therefore no man runs’. The Topical maxim from a quantitative part: What inheres in all the parts inheres in the whole, and what does not inhere, etc. [128.18–24] [The Topic from a Modal Part]27

[772]  The Topic from a modal part follows. A part of a modal whole is a name or verb taken with a determination with respect to itself taken without a determination, from which an argument is drawn constructively in this way: ‘Socrates runs well; therefore Socrates runs’. The Topical maxim from a modal part: When a part of a modal whole is asserted, its whole is asserted, e.g., ‘Socrates is a white man; therefore Socrates is a man’. The maxim: Of whatever a modal part is predicated its whole is also ­predicated. [128.25–32]

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[The Topic from a Temporal Part and from a Locational Part]28

[773]  The Topics from a part of a temporal whole and from a locational whole follow. A part of a temporal whole is a word adverbially expressing a part of time; a part of a locational wholea is a word adverbially expressing a place, from which an argument can be taken destructively. From the first in this way: ‘Socrates is not now; therefore Socrates is not always’. The Topical maxim from a part of a temporal whole: From whatever a temporal part is removed its whole is also removed. From the second in this way: ‘Caesar is not here; therefore he is not everywhere’. The Topical maxim from a part of a locational whole: From whatever a part of a locational whole is removed its whole is also removed. [128.33–42] [Additional Topics from a Whole]

[774]  In this regard, and in addition to the wholes that have been mentioned, other wholes can be proposed, e.g., a copulative whole, a disjunctive whole, a virtual whole, and a successive whole. Thus, arguments can be taken from all of these.29 ­[128.43–129.3] [The Topic from a Copulative Whole]

[775]  A copulative whole occurs when things are concomitantly joined together by a copulative word. It holds constructively from the whole to its part, [and] it holds destructively from a part of this whole to its whole. An example of the first: ‘Socrates runs and argues; therefore Socrates runs’. The Topical maxim from a copulative whole: When the whole thing joined is posited, its part is also posited. An example of the second: ‘Socrates does not run; therefore he does not run and argue’. The Topical maxim from a part of a copulative whole: When a part is destroyed, its whole is also destroyed. [129.3–10] [The Topic from a Disjunctive Whole]

[776]  A disjunctive whole occurs when two things are joined by a disjunctive conjunction. An argument holds destructively from this whole to its part, but one holds constructively from a part to its whole. An example of the first: ‘Socrates neither runs norb argues; therefore Socrates does notc run’.30 An example of the second:

a.  Reading at p. 128.35 pars totius against pars. b.  Reading at p. 129.15 nec against vel. c.  Reading at p. 129.15 non currit against currit.

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‘­Socrates runs; therefore Socrates runs or he argues’. The Topical maxim from a disjunctivea whole: When the whole thing disjoined is destroyed, its part is also destroyed; and when a part is posited, its whole is also posited. [129.11–18] [The Topic from a Virtual Whole]

[777]  The Topic fromb a virtual whole follows. A virtual whole is what is simple in itself, has no quantity, but possesses several powers and capacities; e.g., a rationalc soul, existing as simple in itself, has vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers.31 An argument holds destructively from such a wholed to its part, but an argument holds constructively from a part to the whole in this way: ‘A stone has no soul; therefore it has no vegetative power’ and ‘A plant has a vegetative power; therefore it has a soul’. The Topical maxim from a virtual whole: When a virtual whole is destroyed, any of its parts is also destroyed, just as the capacity or power that ise a part of it is destroyed; and when any of its powers is asserted the whole is also asserted. [129.18–29] [The Topic from a Successive Whole]

[778]  A successive whole is what has several parts that do not continue in existence at the same time but one after the other, e.g., a day. An argument holds destructively from that whole to its part but constructively from a part to its whole in this way: ‘It is not daytime; therefore it is not midday’ and ‘It is midday; therefore it is daytime’. The maxim: When a successive whole is destroyed, any of its parts is also destroyed, and when one of its parts is asserted, its whole is also asserted. 129.29–35] [Enduring and Successive Things]

[779]  And one should know that some things are in the class of successive things and others are in the class of enduring things. Successive things are those that are while they come to be, but once they come to be are no longer, e.g., a day, running, and the like. Enduring things are those that are not while they come to be, but are once they come to be, such as a house. So successive things are in a state of coming into being and not in a state of actual being, whereas enduring things are in a state of actual being and not in a state of coming into being. In successive things one part follows another, but a.  Reading at p. 129.16–17 disiuncto against disiunctum. b.  Reading at p. 129.18 loco a toto against toto. c.  Reading at p. 129.21 rationalis against sensibilis. d.  Reading at p. 129.22 toto against loco. e.  Reading at p. 129.28 est against sunt.

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what endures is a simultaneous whole. For this reason, and speaking of successive things, it is true to say that what comes to be is, but when speaking of enduring things it is true to say that what comes to be is not. [129.35–130.2] [Reduction of All Wholes to Universal and Integral Wholes]

[780]  One should know that, although there are several sorts of wholes, yet among them there are two that are fundamental, namely, the universal whole and the integral whole, to which two sorts of wholes all the other wholes are reduced. Hence, those wholes from which an argument holds destructively with respect to their parts are wont to be reduced to a universal whole, i.e., to the nature of a universal whole. But those wholes from which an argument holds constructively are wont to be reduced to the nature of an integral whole. [130.3–10] [781]  One should note, however, that, as Boethius says in his Divisions, a virtual whole in some [sense] has the nature of an integral whole, in this [sense], namely, that any power or part of a soul is not the whole soul, just as a wall is not the whole house.32 But it has the nature of a universal whole in that it is predicated of its parts, for a vegetative soul is a soul, and a sensitive soul is a soul, and likewise a rationala [soul is a soul]. These are powers or capacities of a soul. [130.10–17] [Constructive and Destructive Implications from Wholes and Parts]

[782]  One should know that whenever an argument holds something destructively from a whole to a part, it will hold constructively from a part to a whole, and vice versa. So a part that is implied constructively from its whole never implies its whole constructively in itself—which is to be understood of one part alone and not of all taken together at the same time, for parts taken together at the same time, of which each follows constructively per se from its whole, of course imply their whole constructively. But it ought not be called the Topic from a part but from parts sufficiently stated, as, for example, if one says ‘There is a roof, there are walls, there is a foundation, and so on for the others; therefore there is a house’; and similarly ‘Socrates runs, Plato runs, and so on for the others; therefore every man runs’. [130.17–28] [783]  But one will ask whether the Topic from parts sufficiently stated is reduced to one of the Topics discussed or is a different Topic from the others. [130.28–30] [784]  One should reply that it is not a different Topic from the others but instead is reduced to the Topic from definition. Aristotle says in On the Soul near the beginning

a.  Reading at p. 130.16 rationalis against rationale.

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that there are two sorts of definition, formal and material.33 He gives a formal definition in this way: a house is a shelter protecting us from winds, rainstorms, and calamities, that is, fires; but he gives a material definition in this way: a house is wood, stones, tiles, etc. Therefore ‘house’ is wont to be defined by its parts. It is the same thing with respect to other integral wholes. If, therefore, one predicates from parts sufficiently stated to their whole, the Topic will be from a material definition. [130.30–40] [The Topics from Cause and Effect]

[785]  The Topics from a cause and from an effect follow. There are four causes: efficient, material, formal, and final; one draws arguments from these and their e­ ffects. [131.1–3] [The Topics from an Efficient Cause and from the Effect of an Efficient Cause]34

[786]  An efficient cause is what moves and operates to the end that a thing is. The Topic from an efficient cause is its relationship to its effect. [131.3–5] [787]  Some efficient causes are sufficient and direct, others are insufficient and indirect. [131.5–7] [788]  That [cause] is sufficient and direct which by itself and without another suffices for the production of its effect. One draws an argument from this constructively and destructively: ‘The sun shines upon the earth; therefore it is daytime’ and ‘The sun does not shine upon the earth; therefore it is not daytime’. The maxims are: When a sufficient and direct efficient cause is posited, its effect is also posited, and when it is destroyed its effect is also destroyed. One can argue both constructively and destructively in the same way from the effect of that cause. [131.7–14] [789]  An efficient cause that is insufficient and indirecta is that which by itself is not able to produce its effect. One draws an argument from this [cause] destructively in this way: ‘There is no house builder; therefore there is no house’. The maxim: When an insufficient and indirect efficient cause is destroyed, its effect is also destroyed.35 An argument can be taken constructively from the effect of this cause in this way: ‘There is or was a house; therefore there is or was a house builder’; or destructively in this way: ‘There is no and was no house; therefore there is no and was no house builder’. The maxim: When an effect of an insufficient and indirect efficient cause is posited, its cause is also posited, and when it is destroyed its cause is also destroyed. [131.14–23]

a.  Reading at p. 131.14–15 mediata against immediata.

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[The Topics from a Material Cause and from the Effect of a Material Cause]36

[790]  A material cause is that from which a thing comes to be. But there are two sorts of matter: permanent and transient. [131.23–25] [791]  That matter is called permanent whose nature is retained in its material. One draws an argument destructively from these in this way: ‘The Moors have no iron; therefore they have no iron weapons’. The maxim: When a permanent material cause is destroyed, its effect is also destroyed. One argues constructively from the effect of this cause in this way: ‘The Moors have iron weapons; therefore they have iron’. The maxim: When an effect of a permanent material cause is posited, its cause is also p ­ osited. [131.25–32] [792]  Transient matter is that whose nature is not retained in its materiala. One draws an argument from this destructively in this way: ‘There is and was no water and wheat; therefore there is and was no bread’. One draws an argument constructively from its effect in this way: ‘There is bread; therefore there wasb wheat’. The maxims are: If there is or was no transient material cause, neither is there or was there its effect, and if there is an effect, there was a cause. [131.32–38] [The Topics from a Formal Cause and from the Effect of a Formal Cause]37

[793]  A formal cause is the completion of a thing, for form gives being to a thing and preserves it in being. One draws an argument constructively and destructively from this in this way: ‘There is whiteness; therefore there is something white’ and ‘There is no whiteness; therefore there is nothing white’. The maxims are: When a formal cause is posited, its effect is also posited, and when it is removed, its effect is also removed. One can argue constructively and destructively from the effect of this cause, as is sufficiently clear. [131.38–132.2] [The Topics from a Final Cause and from the Effect of a Final Cause]38

[794]  A final cause is that for the sake of which something comes to be or something of a certain sortc comes to be.39 One draws from this an argument constructively and destructively in this way: ‘Beatitude, i.e., happiness, is good, and therefore virtue is good’; ‘Punishment is bad; therefore sin is not good’. The maxims are: That whose

a.  Reading at p. 131.33 materiali against materiato. b.  Reading at p. 131.36 fuit against fuerunt. c.  Reading at p. 132.2 cuiusdam generis against genera cuius.

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goal is good is itself also good, and that whose goal is bad is itself also bad. One can argue constructively and likewise destructively from the effect of this cause. [132.2–9] [The Topics from Generation and What Is Generated] 40

[795]  The Topic from generation follows. Generation is a progression from nonbeing to being, and the Topic from generation is the relationship of generation to what is generated, from which one draws an argument constructively in this way: ‘The generation of this man is good; therefore he is good’. The maxim: That whose generation is good is itself also good. And one can argue destructively, for the maxim is: That whose generation is bad is itself also bad. The Topic from what is generated is [the relationship of what is destroyed to its destruction, from which an argument can be taken constructively and destructively], e.g., ‘He is good; therefore his generation is good’ and ‘He is bad; therefore his generation is bad’. The maxims are: If a the thing generated [is bad its generation is also bad, and if the thing generated is good its generation is also good]. [132.10–18] [The Topics from Destruction and What Is Destroyed] 41

[796]  The Topic from destruction follows. Destruction is the passage from being to nonbeing. The Topic from destruction is the relationship of destruction to what is destroyed, from which an argument can be taken constructively and destructively in this way: ‘His destruction is bad; therefore he is good’ or ‘His destruction is good; therefore he is bad’. The maxim: That whose destruction is bad is itself good, and that whose destruction is good is itself bad. The Topic from what is destroyed is the c­ onverse. [132.19–26] [The Topic from Uses] 42

[797]  The Topic from uses follows. A use, as taken here, is the action of a thing that is done by that thing; e.g., the use of an axe is cutting and the use of a horse is horseback riding, for riding a horse is an action that a horseback rider does by means of a horse. The Topic from uses is the relationship of a use to that by which the use is exercised, from which one draws an argument in this way: ‘Horseback riding is good; therefore a horse is good’. The maxim: That whose use is good is itself also good.43 [132.27–33]

a.  Reading at p. 132.18 si against cuius.

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[The Topic from Associated Accidents] 44

[798]  The Topic from associated accidents follows. Associated accidents are those which concomitantly have being in the same subject and rarely is one found without the other, as are motherhood and love. The Topic from associated accidents is the relationship of one accident to another which is concomitant with it, from which one draws an argument in this way: ‘She is a mother; therefore she loves’.45 The maxim: In that in which one concomitant accident inheres the other also inheres. [132.34–40] [799]  But one should know that some associated accidents are sometimes concomitant and sometimes not, e.g., to be corrupt and to be an adulterer. No dialectical Topic is taken from these but rather a sophistical one, which is [the fallacy of ] Consequent.46 Other [associated accidents] are those of which one follows from the other, as repenting follows from having done something wrong, and from these follows a di­ alectical Topic. In such accidents there is a maxim: In that in which the secondary [associated accident] inheres the primary also inheres, for in that in which repenting inheres having done something wrong also inheres.47 [132.40–133.5]

[EXTRINSIC TOPICS]

[800]  Extrinsic Topics follow. There are seven extrinsic Topics, which are the Topic from authority, from a greater, from a lesser, from a similar, from proportion, from opposites, and from transumption. [133.6–8] [The Topic from Authority] 48

[801]  Authority, as the term is used here, is a judgment by a wise man in his own field of expertise. The Topic from authority is the relationship of this [wise man] to that which is proved by that [relationship], from which one draws an argument in this way: ‘An astronomer says that the heavens are things that are revolving; therefore the heavens are things that are revolving. The maxim: Any expert should be believed in his own field of expertise. [133.9–13] [802]  And one should know that this Topic is also named by another name, [namely], the Topic from the judgment by a thing.49 [133.13–14] [803]  But one could ask why it is named more from the judgment by a thing than from the judgment by a man, since it was said (801) that authority is a judgment by a wise man, and so by a man. [133.15–17]

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[804]  One should reply to this that someone could make a judgment about a thing other than the way the thing really is, and such a one is deceived and is not wise, or one can make a judgment about a thing on the basis of the way it really is, and such a one judges correctly and is wise. The judgment of a wise man is drawn from the thing itself, for, according to Aristotle in Book One of Sophistical Refutations, wise men make a judgment on the basis of the nature and truth of a thing and not on the judgment of a man, if they disagreea onb the nature of the thing.50 So the Topic from authority derives its name from the judgment by a thing and not from the judgment by a man, for nature contributes more to that judgment than man does. [133.17–26] [The Topics from a Greater and a Lesser] 51

[805]  The Topics from a greater and from a lesser follow. A greaterc, as the term is used here, is called that which has a greater power and capability than something else has in doing certain things that pertain to it. A lesser is called that which has a lesser power and capability than a greater one has. The Topic from a greater is the relationship of the greater to the lesser and is destructive in this way: ‘A king cannot capture a fortress; therefore neither can a knight’. The maxim: If that which seems the more to inhere does not inhere, neither does that which seems the less to inhere. The Topic from a lesser is the relationship of the lesser to the greater, and is constructive in this way: ‘A knight can capture a fortress; therefore a king can also’. The maxim: If what seems the less to inhere does inhere, what seems the more to inhere also inheres. [133.27–37] [The Topic from a Similar] 52

[806]  The Topic from a similar follows. Those things are similar that inhere similarly. The Topic from a similar is the relationship of one similar thing to another similar thing, from which one draws an argument constructively in this way: ‘As the ability to laugh inheres in a man, so the ability to neigh inheres in a horse, but the ability to laugh is a proprium of man; therefore the ability to neigh is a proprium of horse’. [One argues] destructively in this way: ‘As the ability to neigh inheres in a man, so the ability to laugh inheres in a horse, but the ability to neigh is not a proprium of man; therefore the ability to laugh is not a proprium of horse’. The maxim: The judgment about similars is similar.53 [133.38–134.4]

a.  Reading at p. 133.24 dissentiant against dissentiat. b.  Reading at p. 133.24 de natura against natura. c.  Reading at p. 133.27 maius against magis.

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[The Topic from Proportion] 54

[807]  The Topic from proportion follows. A proportion is the relationship of similarity of things placed side by side. The Topic from proportion is the relationship of one proportional to the other, from which one draws an argument in this way: ‘As the pilot of a ship is related to the sailing of the ship, so the rector of a school [is related] to the administration of the school, but in the case of sailing a ship the pilot should be chosen by art and not by lot; therefore in the case of administering a school the rector should be chosen by art and not by lot’. The maxim: The judgment regarding proportionals is the same. [134.5–12] [808]  One should note that this Topic differs from the Topic from a similar, for in the case of the Topic from a similar the relationship is on the basis of a similarity in the inherence, as when one says ‘As the ability to laugh inheres in a man, so the ability to neigh inheres in a horse’. But in the case of the Topic from proportion the comparison is not made on the basis of a similarity of inherence but on the basis of a similarity in the relationship, e.g., ‘As the pilot of a ship is related to the sailing of the ship, so the rector of a school is related to the administration of the school’. Thus, there is a similarity because of the words “is related,” for a proportion is of a relation to a relation, whereas a similarity is of a thing to a thing. [134.12–21] [The Topic from Opposites]

[809]  The Topic from opposites follows. ‘Opposites’, as the term is used here, contains under it those things that are truly opposites as well as those that are disparate but not truly opposite. There are four kinds of opposites: some are contraries, others are contradictories, some are privatives, and others are relatives.55 [134.22–26] [The Topic from Contrary Opposites]56

[810]  Contraries are those things which, when placed under the same genus, stand farthest from each other and mutually repel each other, as black and white are under the same genus because they are under color. In point of fact one stands farthest from the other because their nature is different and they mutually repel each other because they cannot concomitantly be in the same subject with respect to the same part. [134.26–31] [811]  Some contraries are indirect, the others are direct. Those are direct of which there is nothing intermediate, e.g., healthy and sick; but indirect things are those of which something is intermediate, such as white and black, of which gray and red and the like are intermediate. The Topic from contraries is the relationship of one contrary to the other. [134.31–36]

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[812]  One draws an argumenta from immediate contraries in this way: ‘Socrates is healthy; therefore he is not sick’, and vice versa. The maxim: If one of a pair of immediate contraries inheres in something, the other is removed from the same thing, and if one is removed, the other inheres. But this is to be understood of a subject that remains the same.57 Thus, from the affirmation of one of a pair of immediate contraries of something there follows the negation of the other with respect to the same subject, but from the negation of the one there does not follow the affirmation of the other with respect to the same subject, unless it is supposed that the subject is something that can receive those contraries. [134.36–135.2] [813]  One draws an argument from mediate contraries in this way: ‘This is white; therefore it is not black’, but this does not follow vice versa. The maxim: If one of a pair of mediate contraries inheres, the other does not inhere or is removed from the same subject, but not vice versa, for it does not follow that, if one does not inhere, the other does inhere. [135.2–7] [The Topic from Privative Opposites]58

[814]  Privative opposites are those such as privation and possession. These are wont to take origin with respect to the same subject at a naturally determined time and in an irreversible order, e.g., blindness and sight, which are wont to occur in connection with an eye. [135.8–11] [815]  “At a determined time” is said because an animal is not said to have sight or be blind before the determined time for seeing, as a dog ought not be said to be blind or to have sight before the ninth day after its birth, for a period of nine days is required for a dog to see, since before this it does not seeb. But after nine days, if it has the use of sight, it ought to be said to see; but if not, it ought to be said to be blind. [135.11–17] [816]  “In an irreversible order” is included because there is an order between possession and privation. It is possible to move from possession to privation, but it is not possible to pass from privation to possession or for there to be a reversal. [135.17–20] [817]  One draws an argument from this Topic in this wayc: ‘Socrates has sight; therefore he is not blind’, and vice versa, so long as the subject remains the same. The maxim: If one of a pair of privative opposites inheres in something, the other is removed from the same subject, and if one is removed, the other inheres, so long as the subject remains. [135.20–25]

a.  Reading at p. 134.37 argumentum against argomentum. b.  Reading at p. 135.15 videt against vident. c.  Reading at p. 135.20 sic against hic.

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[The Topic from Contradictory Opposites]59

[818]  Contradictory opposites are those things which are opposed with respect to affirmation and negation, e.g., sitting and not sitting. The Topic from contradictory opposites is the relationship of one of a pair of contradictory opposites to the other, from which one draws an argument in this way: ‘That Socrates runs is true; therefore that Socrates does not run is false’, and vice versa. The maxim: If one of a pair of contradictory opposites is true, the other is false, and vice versa. [135.26–32] [The Topic from Relative Opposites]60

[819]  Relative opposites are those things of which one is said to be related to the other on the basis of mutuality (convertentia), for a servant is called the servant of a lord and a lord is called the lord of a servant, according to Aristotle in his Prior A ­ nalytics.61 [135.33–36] [820]  But one should note that it makes a difference to speak of relative things and relatively opposed things, for relative things are so called when they are related to different subjects. A relation is a certain form that necessarily always inheres in more than one thing because of the regard (respectus) thata it introduces, and relatives are things that, once posited, posit each other, and once destroyed, destroy each other. [135.36–40] [821]  One draws an argument from these constructively and destructively in this way: ‘There is a father; therefore there is a child’ and ‘There is no father; therefore there is no child’. The maxim: When one of a pair of relatives is posited, the other is also posited, and when one is removed, the other is also removed. [135.40–136.2] [822]  If someone should ask whether the Topic from relatives is intrinsic or extrinsic (738), one should reply that it is an intrinsic Topic and it is included under the Topic from a definition, for one relative is the definition of the other: a father is the father of a child, and a child is the child of a father. They are called relative opposites when they refer to the same subject, for there is no opposition between things that are in different subjects. But when they are related to the same thing—whiteness in Socrates and blackness in Plato are not opposites for they are readily compatible with each other—then whiteness and blackness are opposites when they are related to the same subject, for then they are not concomitantly compatible with each other. One draws an argument from relative opposites in this way: ‘Socrates is the father of Plato; therefore he is not the son of the same [Plato]’. The Topic is from relative opposites; the maxim: If

a.  Reading at p. 135.39 quem against quod.

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one of a pair of relative opposites inheres in something, the other is removed from the same subject. [136.3–16] [The Topic from Disparates] 62

[823]  A Topic from things that are not truly opposites follows, which is called the Topic from disparates. Disparates are those things which do not fall under any of the four kinds of stated oppositions but have incompatible forms that cannot be compatible in the same subject, e.g., a man and an ass. One draws an argument from this [Topic] in this way: ‘Socrates is a man; therefore he is not an ass’. The Topical maxim from disparates: If one of a pair of disparate opposites inheres in something, the other is removed from the same subject. [136.17–24] [The Topic from Transumption] 63

[824]  The Topic from transumption follows, but one should know that there are two kinds of transumption. One kind occurs when a word or an expression signifying one thing is transferred to signify something else in virtue of some similarity, as ‘smiling’ is transferred to signify the same as ‘blooming’ does, e.g., when one says ‘The meadow is smiling’, for both signify joy. A sophistical Topic is wont to arise on the basis of this sort of transumption.64 The other kind of transumption is one which occurs when a better-known name is taken for a less-known name. For example, if ‘wise man’ is taken for the name ‘philosopher’, a dialectical Topic is wont to arise on the basis of this transumption. [136.25–34] [825]  The Topic from transumption is the relationship of transumption to the transferred or to what is transferred, from which one draws an argument in this way: ‘A wise man is not envious; therefore a philosopher is not envious’.65 The maxim: Whatever belongs to something under a better-known name belongs to it under a lessknown name. [136.34–39] [826]  One should note that the Topic is different from the Topic from the explanation of a name because, in the case of the Topic from the explanation of a name, one name is explained by another name, as ‘philosopher’ is by ‘lover of wisdom’. But in the case of the Topic from transumption, no explanation is given; instead, a better-known [name] is taken for a less-known name, and what inheres in the better known is concluded to inhere in the less known. [136.39–137.2]

[INTERMEDIATE TOPICS]

[827]  Intermediary Topics follow, and they are three: the Topic from conjugates, from cases, and from division. [137.3–4]

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[The Topic from Conjugates] 66

[828]  Conjugates are what are imposed on the basis of the same thing [signified], although they signify it in different ways because they signify one thing concretely and the other thing abstractly, as ‘white thing’ and ‘whiteness’ do. Thus, Boethius says in his Topics that those things are called conjugates which, having been drawn from the same form, have flowed in different ways; that is, those things which, having been imposed on the basis of the same form, signify it in different ways.67 The Topic from conjugates is the relationship of the one conjugate to the other, from which one draws an argument constructively and destructively in this way: ‘Justice is good; therefore what is justa is good’. The maxim: What inheres in one conjugate also inheres in the other, and what does not inhere in the one conjugate also does not inhere in the other. [137.4–15] [829]  In another sense conjugates are called something principal and something derived. Something principal is that from which another is taken, whereas something derived is that which is taken from another; e.g., ‘justice’ is a principal [name] but ‘just’ is a derived [name]. And one can argue between a principal thing and a derived thing by comparing the two principal things with the two derived things, or vice versa, constructively and destructively, in this way: ‘Whiteness is a color; therefore something white is something colored’. The maxim: If something principal is predicated of something principal, then what is derived is also predicated of what is derived; and if not, then also not. [137.15–22] [The Topic from Cases] 68

[830]  A case is here called an adverb declined from a name and the name from which it declines, e.g., ‘just’ and ‘justly’. Thus Boethius says a case is the inflection of a name into an adverb.69 The Topic from cases is the relationship of one caseb to another, from which one draws an argument constructively and destructively in this way: ‘What is done justly is done goodly; therefore what is just is good’.70 The maxim: What applies to one case also applies to the other, and what does not apply to one case also does not apply to the other. [137.23–29] [831]  But someone could ask why a name and the adverb denominated from it are called cases, e.g., ‘goodly’ from ‘good’. Those names that are imposed on the basis of the same form are nevertheless in different ways called conjugates and not cases, granted one is declined from the other, e.g., ‘goodness’ and ‘good’. [137.29–34]

a.  Reading at p. 137.13 iustum against iustitia. b.  Reading at p. 137.26 casus against causati.

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[832]  One should reply to this that the declension is greater between those that are called cases than between those that are called conjugates, for in the former an adverb is declined from a name, and a name from another name, and so both are declined, as is clear in the example of ‘good’ and ‘goodly’. But with conjugates, although what is derived is declined from a principal [name], it is not necessary that the principal [name] be declined from another, and so both are not declined as ‘goodness’ and ‘good’ are. And so, because of the greater declension between a name and an adverb than between names that are called conjugates, the former are called cases, but not the latter. [137.34–138.3] [833]  One should note that cases may be called conjugates and conjugates [may be called] cases when using these words casually (convenienter), for cases are imposed on the basis of the same form, although one signifies nominally and the other adverbially. Likewise with conjugates: one is declined from the other. But when speaking strictly (per appropriata) and distinguishing these from one another, the former are called cases whereas the latter conjugates. [138.3–9] [The Topic from Division] 71

[834]  The Topic from division follows, and one should know that there are two sorts of division. One occurs by means of negation, as that does in which one divided thing is expressed by means of a negation, such as ‘Every animal either has feet or it does not’; the other occurs by means of partitiona, as does that in which both divided things are expressed by a partitionb, and this occurs in six ways. For genus is divided into its species, e.g., some animals are men, others are asses; a whole is divided into its parts, e.g., some part of a house is a wall, another a roof, another a foundation; a vocal sound is divided into its significations, e.g., ‘dog’ signifies an animal that can bark, a celestial star, and a marine animal; a subject is divided into its accidents, e.g., some men are white, others black; an accident is divided into its substancesc, e.g., some whites are animals, others are swans, others are stones, e.g., a pearl; and accidents are divided into accidents, e.g., some white things are liquid, e.g., milk, others are solid, e.g., a pearl. [138.10–24] [835]  It is fitting to argue by the Topic from division in the division that occurs by means of negation and likewise in that which occurs by means of partition. [138.24–26]

a.  Reading at p. 138.13 partitionem against positionem. b.  Reading at p. 138.14–15 partitionem against positionem. c.  Reading at p. 138.21 substantias against substantia.

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[836]  In that [argumentation] which occurs by negation one argues by this Topic when one of the divided things is proved to belong to the othera divided thing by a syllogism ad impossibile. [138.26–28] [837]  A syllogism ad impossibile is one in which one first concludes to something impossible and then from an explanation of that impossible [proposition] there occurs a regression to one of the premises by demolishing it. For example, if one intends to prove that time has no beginning by leading to something impossible, let this question surface: Time either has a beginning or it does not. If it is given that it has a beginning, one argues in this way: ‘Everything that has a beginning had nonbeing before it was, but time had a beginning, as was granted; therefore it had nonbeing before it was; therefore there was a time when there was no time, but to have been implies time; therefore, there was time when there was no time. This is impossible; therefore it is impossible that time have a beginning; it follows, therefore, that time has no ­beginning’. [138.28–41] [838]  In that deduction there are two movements: one in which it is concluded that there was a time when there was no time; the other in which the regression occurs by demolishing the impossible [proposition], and likewise by demolishing what was previously granted, namely, that time had a beginning, from whose destruction it follows that time has no beginning. [138.41–139.3] [839]  In the whole process there is the Topic from division, which is made up of an intrinsic and an extrinsic Topic, and for this reason it is called an intermediate Topic. The intrinsic Topic occurs with respect to the first movement, i.e., in that movement a conclusion followed from the proper nature of a beginning—‘beginning’ was a term in the proposed question—and it can be said that it is the Topic from definition, for to have a beginning is nothing other than to have nonbeing before being. The extrinsic Topic occurs with respect to the second movement, i.e., in that movement one concludes from the destruction of one of the pair of opposites that the other opposite is true. [139.3–13] [840]  The Topic from opposites is also present—one argues by this Topic in the division that occurs by partitionb. [139.13–14] [841]  But one should know that in that division sometimes different things can be concomitant, as is possible in the division of utterances into significations, and sometimes they can be concomitant, as is possible in the division of a subject into opposite accidents. For example, one asks whether a dog is a substance, and one argues in this way: ‘ “Dog” signifies a dog that can bark, a celestial star, and a marine fish, each of which is a substance; therefore “dog” signifies a substance in any of its significations’. One also asks whether Socrates is well or sick, and argues in this way: ‘He is well; therefore he is not sick’. [139.15–24]

a.  Reading at p. 138.28 alio diviso against diviso. b.  Reading at p. 139.14 partitionem against positionem.

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[842]  The Topic from division [comprises] these two arguments taken together and of neither by itself. One of them arises by the division of an utterance into its significations and the other by the division of a subject into its accidents. It comprises an intrinsic and an extrinsic [Topic], and so it is called an intermediate [Topic], for in the first argument there is the Topic from parts sufficiently stated implying their whole, whereas in the second there is the Topic from opposites. These are the things Boethius says about this Topic near the end of Book Two of his Topics.72 [139.24–31] [843]  If someone should ask in order to make the preceding clear what sort of argumentation ought to be called Topical argumentation and to what sort ought it be reduced, one could reply that the argumentation is enthymematic on the basis of the form of the arguments presented above in the stated Topics, and that it could be reduced to syllogistical argumentation.73 Let examples be given in a few cases so that they can be seen by them [to hold] in all cases. ‘A man runs; therefore a mortal rational animal runs’. This is an enthymeme from a minora and a conclusion. If the majorb is posited, it will be a syllogism in the third [mood] of the first figure in this way: ‘Every man runs, a mortal rational animal is a man; therefore a mortal rational animal runs’. [139.31–41] [844]  Nor should one wonder that a universal that is taken in an indefinite enthymeme is taken in a syllogism, because without a universal no syllogism can occur, whereas there can certainly be an enthymeme without a universal. Likewise, ‘Socrates runs; therefore a man runs’ is an enthymeme that can be reduced to a syllogism in this way: ‘Every thing that is Socrates runs, Socrates is a man; therefore a man runs’. Similarly, ‘There is a house; therefore there is a wall’ is an enthymeme that can be reduced to a syllogism in this way: ‘There is any part of a house, a wall is a part of a house; therefore there is a wall’. ‘There is a house’ and ‘There is any part of a house’ refer to the same thing in reality (idem est in re); so one can be taken for the other. Similarly, ‘A stone is not an animal; therefore a stone is not a man’ is an enthymeme that can be reduced to a syllogism in this way: ‘Every man is an animal, a stone is not an animal; therefore a stone is not a man’, and this is a syllogism in the fourth mood of the second figure. [139.41–140.14] [845]  For the sake of brevity let these things suffice, for in a certain sense the path to others can be had by these. [140.15–16]

a.  Reading at p. 139.38 minori against maiori. b.  Reading at p. 139.38 maior against minor.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SOPH ISTICA L TOPICS

[846]  Having discussed dialectical Topics, on the basis of which a dialectical syllogism is wont to arise, one should now speak of sophistical Topics, in accord with which a sophistical syllogism is wont to arise.1 [141.1–3]

[DIALECTICAL AND SOPHISTICAL SYLLOGISMS]

[847]  Some syllogisms are dialectical, others are sophistical.2 [141.3–4] [848]  According to Aristotle in Book One of the Topics a dialectical syllogism is one that is syllogized from probable things.3 Two things are needed for a dialectical syllogism, namely, goodness of matter, which is the probability of the propositions from which it originates, and goodness of form, which is the appropriate arrangement of terms in the figure and mood of the propositions. When he says “from probable things” he touches on the goodness of the matter, and when he says “syllogized” he touches on the goodness of the form. [141.4–11] [849]  A sophistical syllogism according to Aristotle in the same work is one that comes from things that seem probable, is seemingly syllogized, and is one that is seemingly syllogized from probable things.4 [141.11–14] [Three Kinds of Sophistical Syllogisms]

[850]  One should note that on the basis of the three parts included in this definition Aristotle touches on the three kinds of sophistical syllogism, which are one defective in matter, one defective in form, and one defective in both. By “seems probable” 173

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he touches on defect of matter; by “seemingly syllogized” he touches on defect of form. So by the first part he touches on something defective in matter, by the second something defective in form, and by the third something defective in both. [141.14–21] [851]  One defective in matter is still a syllogism because it retains due figure and mood, in which the form of a syllogism consists; but improbable propositions are taken in it and so it is said to be defective in matter. One defective in form does not truly, but only seemingly, retain due figure and mood, although probable propositions are routinely included in it, and so it is said to be defective in form. One defective in both does not truly retain due figure and mood, but only seemingly, and probable propositions are not included in it, and so it is said to be defective in both: in matter and in form. [141.22–31] [The Significance of Semblance in Syllogisms Defective in Matter, in Form, and in Both]

[852]  One should know that a sophistical [syllogism] is something seeming, and that which seems is nonexistent. For this reason it is required that in every sophistical syllogism some semblance occur, for otherwise it would not be sophistical. But this semblance is properly in the sophistical syllogism defective in form, because it always arises with respect to a sophistical Topic. In every sophistical Topic there is a cause of a semblance and a defect. In the other defective sophistical syllogisms, e.g., in that defective in matter and in that defective in both, the semblance arises by means of one defective in form. For this reason syllogisms defective in matter and in both must so be constructed that they have their semblance from one defective in form. [141.31–142.9] [853]  One defective in form is constructed in this way: ‘All water is natural, every bath is water; therefore a bath is natural’. This contains a defect in form, for it is the paralogism of Accident.5 [142.9–17] [854]  One defective in matter must so be constructed that one of the premises in it has its appearance from one defective in form. Therefore let the conclusion of the previously stated paralogism be taken and let one defective in matter be constructed in this way: ‘Every bath is natural, this bath is a bath; therefore this bath is natural’. The defect is in the matter for the major is false, and it has its semblance from the previously stated syllogism defective in form, whose conclusion it was. [142.17–19] [855]  One defective in both is constructed in this way: ‘Every man is an animal, nothing able to laugh is a man; therefore nothing able to laugh is an animal’. The defect there belongs to the form because the arrangement is in the first figure and the minor is negative; but from a negative minor nothing follows in the first figure. There is also present a defect in the matter because the minor is false, and so the minor can have its semblance from [a syllogism] defective in form in this way: ‘No proprium of a man is a man, everything able to laugh is a proprium of a man; therefore nothing



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175

able to laugh is a man’. But there is a defect in the form because it is the paralogism of ­Accident. ­[142.19–29]

[DIALECTICAL AND SOPHISTICAL DISPUTATIONS]

[856]  One should know that, just as the dialectician uses a dialectical syllogism in a dialectical disputation, so a sophist uses a sophistical syllogism in a sophistical disputation, for some disputations are dialectical and others sophistical.6 [142.29–31] [857]  A disputation can be described in this way: a disputation is a syllogistic act of one [person] to another to manifest something proposed. For a disputation one needs an opponent’s and a respondent’s action of disputing that comes about by means of a syllogism leading to a conclusion. [142.32–37] [858]  According to Aristotle in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations a di­ alectical disputation is one that syllogizes from probable things and addresses a contradiction (est collectiva contradictionis); that is, a dialectical disputation is able to conclude from probable things to both sides of a contradiction.7 According to Aristotle in the same work a sophistical disputation is one that syllogizes from things that seem probable but are not.8 [142.37–143.2] [859]  But then it would seem from what has already been said (849) that the definition [of ‘sophistical syllogism’] fits only the disputation that arises by means of a syllogism defective in matter, for it was said above (850) that by “syllogized” the goodness of form is touched on and by “seem probable” a defect of matter, and these occur in a [syllogism] defective in matter, not in the other sophistical [kinds]. Since, therefore, these two are touched on in the definition of ‘disputation’ (857), it seems that ‘disputation’ is defined as that which arises only by means of a [syllogism] defective in matter. [143.3–10] [860]  Because of this one should reply that the definition is of a sophistical disputation constructed by means of any sophistical Topic, but one should also say that “seem probable” can have two senses: either in itself or with respect to an implied conclusion. A syllogism defective in matter arises from things that seem probable in themselves but are not, in that they are false, whereas a syllogism defective in form arises from things that seem probable with respect to the conclusion but are not. ­Although they are probable in themselves, they are not with respect to the conclusion, for they do not imply well. [143.10–19] [861]  Similarly, “syllogized” can be interpreted strictly [for syllogized] or for paralogized. In the stated definition (849), therefore, “seem probable” is taken in the sense of being common to that which seems probable but is not and to that which seems probable with respect to the conclusion but is not. [143.19–23]

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[862]  Likewise, “syllogizes” is interpreted for syllogizing strictly and for paralogizing, and in this way the stated definition will fit the disputation that arises by means of a syllogism defective in matter, for it syllogizes from things that seem probable but are not, as well as the disputation executed by means of a syllogism defective in form, for it paralogizes from things that seem probable with respect to a conclusion but are not. It will fit, moreover, the disputation carried out by means of a syllogism defective in both, for one defective in both has nothing other than [what comes] from one defective in matter and from one defective in form, since it is something intermediate composed of both. [143.23–33] [863]  One should reply, then, to the argument on the other side (859) that “seem probable” and “syllogizes” are more appropriately a interpreted in the definition of ­‘disputation’ (857) than they were interpreted above in the definition of ‘sophistical syllogism’ (849), as was sufficiently explained. And because it is supposed in the argument that they are interpreted in the same way here and there, the argument carries no weight. [143.34–39] [Sophistical Disputation as Directed to a Goal]

[864]  Because a sophistical disputation is, if nothing else, a movement, and movement in nature gets its name from a terminus or end—the movement to whiteness is called whitening—and since art imitates nature as much as it can, movement in art will get its name from a terminus or end. A sophistical disputation is directed to a goal (meta) as to an end, and so it will receive different specific denominations on the basis of the diversity of its goals. Hence, different species of sophistical disputations are distinguishedb with respect to their different goals.9 Therefore, because a goal is the end of a sophistical disputation and an end is the first to move a cause since every agent works toward some end, and because an end imposes necessity on things that pertain to the end, so one must first speak of goals. [143.40–144.11] [GOALS OF DISPUTATION] 10

[865]  There are five goals, which are Refutation, Falsity, Paradox, Solecism, and Babbling.11 And one should note that they are called goals by analogy with a goal in the natural order. In natural things a goal is the same as a terminus or end, and because they are the termini or ends of sophistical disputation—whenc a respondent is led to a.  Reading at p. 143.35 convenientius against conveniens. b.  Reading at p. 144.6 distinguuntur against distinguitur. c.  Reading at p. 144.16 eo quod against ex quo.



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one of the mentioned goals the sophistical disputation is terminated—they are called goals. [144.11–17] [866]  Refutation is the denial of something already conceded or the concession of something already denied. So a respondent is said to be led to the goal of Refutation when, by force of argumentation and in the same disputation, he is forced to deny what he previously affirmed or to affirm what he previously denied. [144.18–22] [867]  Falsity, as a goal, is the obvious falsity of a proposition proved by argumentation by an opponent and conceded by a respondent. “Obvious” is stated because an opponent does not lead a respondent to the goal of Falsity unless [the fact of having been led to Falsity] is obvious. “Of a proposition” is included there because one sort of falsity is that of contradiction, to which falsity one is led who concludes to two con­ tradictory things, as in ‘Socrates runs and does not run’. This sort of falsity pertains to the goal of Refutation, for whoever concedes such a falsity is refuted. The other sort is the falsity of a proposition, to which falsity he is led who concedes some obviously false proposition to be true, e.g., ‘that a man is an ass’; and this sort of falsity pertains to the goal of Falsity. He who concedes this sort of falsity has been led to the goal of ­Falsity. [144.23–35] [868]  Paradox is what is against the opinion of all or of most of the wise. So he is said to be led to the paradoxa that is a goal when, by force of argumentation, he is compelled to concede something that is against the opinion of all or of most of the wise. [144.36–40] [869]  But one could object: since an obvious falsity is something impossible, and everything impossible is a paradox, one could argue that Falsity and Paradox are the same goal, since Falsity is not a goal unless it is obvious. [144.40–145.1] [870]  One should reply to this, according to Aristotle in Book Eight of the Topics, that nothing prevents some false things from being probable by means of certain true things.12 Since, therefore, the paradoxical and the impossible are the same, it does not follow that, if something is obviously false and impossible, it is thereby paradoxical, since it could be probable, according to Aristotle. And so, therefore, what was stated in the argument, namely, “Everything impossible is a paradox,” was false. And so one could be led to the goal of Falsity, but one will not be led thereby to the goal of Paradox or the improbable. [145.1–9] [871]  Note that paradox and something improbable are really the same but differ in definition. Something is called improbable in that it does not have any support for its assertion, whereas there is obvious support for the contrary. Something is called paradoxical because a soul does not apprehend it or consent to it.13 [145.9–14]

a.  Reading at p. 144.37 inopinabile against impossibile.

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* * * [872]  Solecism, according to a grammarian, is a vice engaged in against the rules of the art of grammar with respect to the parts of speech. Not solecism itself but how to use it is explained by Aristotle in On Sophistical Refutations in this way: to engage in solecism is for a respondent to use a grammatically incorrect locution taken from an expression in a locution asserted by way of an expression or argument.14 To use a grammatically incorrect locution is to speak without conformity to the rules and principles of the art of grammar. From this it is sufficiently clear that a sophist thinks of solecism differently than a grammarian does: a grammarian considers solecism with respect to its substance, showing in what and when it is wont to occur, whereas a sophist considers solecism with respect to its use, showing how it is possible to use solecism. [145.15–26] [873]  In this connection there is another difference: [solecism] is taken by a grammarian as a vice and a sort of irregularity to be avoided in grammar, whereas it is taken by a sophist as an end terminating a sophistical disputation. Or [one could put it] this way: solecism is thought of by a grammarian in the sense of it being a vice or something inappropriate that prevents the comprehension of a congruous and perfect sentence, whereas it is thought of by a sophist in the sense of it being something inappropriate that prevents the comprehension of the truth of a proposition. [145.26–33] [874]  Such, then, is the case with solecism in the minds of the sophist and the grammarian, but it is different with each, as was seen (872–73). And nothing prevents different people from interpreting the same thing differently. He is led to this goal who is compelled by force of argumentation to concede some incongruous ex­ pression. [145.34–38] [875]  Babbling is the pointless repetition of the same thing in the same part [of an expression]. He is led to this goal who is compelled by force of argumentation to concede the same thing stated frequently and immediately and without any cause. “In the same part” is stated because, if the same thing is repeated in different parts, no babbling occurs, as in ‘There is a man; a man is able to laugh’. “Pointless repetition” is included because there is no babbling when something is repeated twice to emphasize a claim (ad maiorem expressionem sententie). [145.39–146.5] [A Hierarchy within the Goals of Sophistical Disputation]

[876]  But one should know that the sophistical disputation which is directed to Refutation is the one a sophist likes most, and it can be called the first species of sophistical disputation. The second is that which is directed to conclude to Falsity; the third is the one directed to Paradox; the fourth is that which is directed to Solecism; but the last is the one directed to Babbling.15 [146.6–11]



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[The Purpose of Sophistical Disputation]

[877]  One should know that the end of sophistical disputation is seeming wisdom and glory, for the sophist argues to the end that he might seem to be wise and hence achieve glory. [146.11–14]

[FALLACIES] [Preliminary Remarks]

[878]  Having treated of the goals that are the ends of sophistical disputation, one should speak of the things by which one arrives at this end, for one arrives at this end by paralogisms that occur on the basis of sophistical Topics. For this reason one should speak of sophistical Topics and of the paralogisms created by them. [146.15–19] [879]  There are thirteen sophistical Topics, i.e., thirteen fallacies. Six of the fallacies are verbal and seven extraverbal. [146.20–22] [880]  But one could object to this division: since a word as it is taken here and a locution are the same thing, and all fallacies occur in a locution, all will be verbal and none extraverbal. [146.22–24] [881]  One should reply to this that without doubt a word as it is taken here and a locution are the same thing, and that all fallacies are materially in a locution and never outside a locution and are likewise verbal and never extraverbal. When, therefore, it is said that some fallacies are in a locution, i.e., verbal, and others extraverbal, it ought not be said that some are in a locution, i.e., verbal. Rather, it ought to be understood that some fallacies have a verbal semblance because of a word, and these are called verbal, whereas the others have a locutional semblance because of what is signified, and these are called extraverbal. So this division of fallacies occurs in general with respect to the causes of semblance in them and not with respect to the matter in which these fallacies are wont to occur, which [latter] the objection was supposing, and so it did not prevail. [146.25–37] [882]  The verbal fallacies are these: Equivocation, Amphiboly, Composition, ­Division, Accent, and the fallacy of the Figure of a Word. [146.38–39] [883]  And one should know that there is ambiguity in all of these, according to Aristotle in his On Sophistical Refutations.16 He says that, when the same thing is not signified by the same names or expressions, one of these six fallacies arises. Where

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there is identity in name and expression but diversity in signification, ambiguity is present, for ambiguity is nothing other than a unity in vocal sound accompanied by a diversity in signification. [146.39–147.5] [884]  But one should know that there are three kinds of ambiguity: actual, potential, and imaginary, with respect to which the verbal fallacies are distinguished among themselves.17 [147.5–7] [885]  Actual ambiguity is said to be present when there is identity in vocal sound with respect to matter and form. The letters and syllables are called the matter of a vocal sound; the pronunciation of the vocal sound is called its form, and this is true of a word as well as of an expression. A word is present in the strict sense on the basis of it being present in speaking, and inasmuch as it is such its form is its pronunciation. Likewise, an expression is in the strict sense an utterance of a mouth, and inasmuch as it is such its form is its pronunciation. When, therefore, there is a vocal sound with the same letters and syllables and words and the same pronunciation, [but] signifying different things, actual ambiguity is present. [147.7–16] [886]  Potential ambiguity is said to be present when there is identity in vocal sound with respect to matter but not with respect to form. When, therefore, there is a vocal sound with the same letters, syllables, and words, but not with the same pronunciation, signifying different things, potential ambiguity is present. [147.16–20] [887]  Imaginary ambiguity is said to be present when there is no identity in vocal sound either in matter or in form but agreement only in the configuration of the word. When, therefore, a similar configuration of a word is present, not with the same letters and syllables or with the same pronunciation, imaginary ambiguity is present. [147.20–25] [888]  The first [kind of ambiguity] is called actual because an identity in vocal sound is present with respect to matter and form. But form and act are the same thing. And because denomination occurs with respect to form, it is called actual on the basis of the formal identity that is present. The second is called potential on the basis of the identity in vocal sound that is present only because of the matter, for matter is what potency is, since matter of itself is not in act except by means of form. The third is called imaginary because of the minimum agreement that obtains among the things in which that ambiguity is present. ‘Imaginary’ is derived from ‘imagination’, for imagination is a certain power of the mind that comprehends things weakly. Hence, those in whom imagination thrives are easily deceived, for when, seeing a depicted image on a wall, they sometimes believe they see demons because of the similarity. Imaginary ambiguity is so called in relation to the power of imagination because its semblance is minimal. [147.26–42] [889]  One should know that the effectiveness of deceiving in actual ambiguity is greater than in potential and in potential than in imaginary: where the semblance is greater, a greater defect is latent, and so the suitability for deceiving is greater. ­[147.42–148.2]



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[890]  As was said (883), the verbal fallacies are distinguished on the basis of this ambiguity a. Some involve actual ambiguity, as Equivocation involves that which is in a word and Amphiboly involves that which is in an expression. Composition, Division, and Accent involve potential ambiguity, but Composition and Division occur in an expression whereas Accent in a word. [148.3–8] [891]  But one could ask: since actual and potential ambiguity occur in a word and an expression, and on the basis of this they are different sophistical Topics, why is this not wont likewise to occur with respect to imaginary ambiguity? [148.8–11] [892]  One should reply to this that imaginary ambiguity takes origin from a similarity in the configuration of a vocal sound, i.e., in its grammatical ending. But this is present per se in a word, but by means of a word in an expression, and so per accidens; hence there is no sophistical Topic with respect to the imaginary ambiguity that is in an expression. But with respect to it, it is only present inasmuch as it is in a word, because everything per accidens is reduced to something per se. [148.11–17] [893]  Among these fallacies one should first speak of Equivocation. [148.18–19] [894]  But one should know in general that there are two things in every fallacy: a cause of semblance and a cause of defect, i.e., falsity. Every fallacy is a sophistical Topic, but the sophistical [Topic] is a semblance and something nonexistent; so semblance and nonexistence pertain to the notion of a fallacy. The cause of semblance moves one to believe what is not the case; the cause of falsity makes what is believed to be false. [148.19–24] [The Fallacy of Equivocation] 18

[895]  One should see what equivocation is, what the fallacy of Equivocation is, what the cause of semblance is, and what the cause of the falsity is, and how many and what the species, i.e., modes, of this fallacy are. [148.24–27] [The Definition of ‘Equivocation’]

[896]  Equivocation is said to be present when different definitions of a thing are united as such in the same name, and this occurs when one word signifies more than one thing. [148.28–30] [897]  But someone will object that each thing has only one perfection, signification is the perfection of a word; therefore each word will have only one s­ igni­fication. ­[148.30–32] a.  Reading at p. 148.3 multiplicitatem against multiplicatem.

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[898]  One should reply to this that things have two sorts of perfection: primary and secondary. What completes and constitutes a thing in being is called its primary perfection; what accrues to a thing after its naturala completed being is called its secondary perfection. So the primary is substantial and pertains to the being of a thing and the secondary is incidental and pertains to its well-being. When, then, it is said that each thing has only one perfection, this is true of its primary perfection, but a thing can have more than one secondary perfection. Just as a man has only one soul, which is his primary perfection, yet he can have more than one secondary perfection, for a man can be just, wise, and the like, and there is only one subject of all of these, although there is more than one contrary. Similarly, a word can have only one primary perfection, namely, its pronunciation, yet it can have more than one secondary perfection, i.e., signification. The pronunciation of a word is its primary perfection; signification is its secondary perfection. And with respect to multiple significations there is one word, one vocal sound, but it signifies more than one thing, and so it is more than one with respect to its signification. Since a sign is spoken of in relation to its significatum, if the significatum is multiplied, it is necessary to multiply the sign, with the result that, if the significata are more than one, the signs must be more than one. [148.33–149.9] [Equivocation as Deception and as Suitability to Deceive]

[899]  To see better what the fallacy of Equivocation isb one should know that the fallacy is spoken of in two ways. In one way it is called the deception generated by means of a sophistical Topic when it deceives because of the ineptness of someone making a judgment; in the second way the fallacy is called a certain suitability of the things that deceive to deceive or to cause [one to be deceived], and the fallacy is taken in this sense here and not in the first way.19 [149.10–15] [The Definition of ‘The Fallacy of Equivocation’]

[900]  The fallacy of Equivocation is the deception taking origin from the fact that a word signifies more than one thing. [149.15–17] [The Cause of Semblance and the Cause of Falsity]

[901]  The cause of semblance is the sameness in word with respect to matter and form, causing one to believe in a sameness in what is signified. The cause of falsity is the multiplicity of things that are signified. [149.17–19]

a.  Reading at p. 148.36 naturale against naturalem. b.  Reading at p. 149.10 sit against est.



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[The Three Species of Equivocation]

[902]  There are three modes, i.e., species, of this fallacy, and the first takes origin (as is commonly held) from the fact that a word principally signifies more than one thing. The second species takes origin from the fact that a word signifies one thing but is predicated of a more than one thing in such a way that [it is predicated] of b the one in a prior sense and of c the other or others, in a secondary sense. Thus, on the basis of this species equivocation occurs in analogical terms. An analogical term signifies one thing under different definitions, i.e., in a primary and secondary sense, in the case of the things of d which it is predicated. For example, ‘entity’ signifies one thing, but in a primary sense it is predicated of e substance and in a secondary sense of f accident, and so it is an analogical term. The third species takes origin from different consignifications which occur when one word is taken for different consignificata, that is, different accidents. So one should see how paralogisms are wont to be formed in these different species of Equivocation and how they ought to be resolved.20 [149.19–34] [Examples and Solutions of the First Species]

[903]  One paralogizes in this way in the first species: ‘Every dog runs, a sea animal is a dog; therefore a sea animal runs’. [149.35–36] [904]  One should reply to this that the paralogism is not valid, for ‘dog’ is something equivocal and signifies principally three things: something that barks, something marine, and a celestial star. On this basis the major and minor are ambiguous. [149.36–40] [905]  There is another [example] in the same species: ‘Grammarians learn, but grammarians are knowledgeable people; therefore [knowledgeable people] learn’, which seems to be unacceptable because learning pertains to those who are i­ gnorant. [149.40–42] [906]  One should reply to this that the major and conclusion are ambiguous: ‘to learn’ is something equivocal, for it can signify the same as ‘to communicate an expertise’ does, which is the effect of a teacher, and in this sense it is true that knowledgeable people learn; or it can signify to receive an expertise from a teacher, which is an effect pertaining to a disciple, and in this sense it is false that knowledgeable people learn.21 [149.42.150.5] a.  Reading at p. 149.23 de against a. b.  Reading at p. 149.24 de against ab. c.  Reading at p. 149.24 de against ab. d.  Reading at p. 149.28 de against a. e.  Reading at p. 149.29 de against a. f.  Reading at p. 149.29 de against ab.

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* * * [907]  All the paralogisms that arise from different definitionsa or from different “pointings to [something]” (ex diversa demonstratione) can be reduced to this species, such as ‘Every herb that grows in my garden I eat, this is an herb that grows in my garden (pointing to a similar herb); therefore, etc.’. [150.5–9] [Examples and Solutions of the Second Species]

[908]  One paralogizes in the second species in this way: ‘Everything healthy is an animal, urine is healthy; therefore urine is an animal’. [150.10–11] [909]  One should reply to this that ‘healthy’ is something equivocal, for ‘healthy’ can be said of the subject of health, and in this sense an animal is called healthy; or [it can be said] of a sign of health and thus of something indicating health, and in this sense urine is called healthy; [it can be said] of something causing health, and in this sense food is called healthy; or [it can be said] of something preserving health, and in this sense one’s diet is called healthy. [150.11–16] [910]  Note that the health is the same in all these instances because it is the health of an animal. But this is primarily in a subject and secondarily in other things, and so ‘healthy’ is primarily said of a subject, namely, of an animal, and secondarily of other things. In this sense the major and minor are ambiguous: when one says ‘Everything healthy is an animal’, ‘healthy’ can indicate the health that is in a subject, and in this sense it is true, or it can indicate another [relationship to] health, and in this sense it is false. Likewise for ‘Urine is healthy’: if it names the health that is in a sign, it is true; if another, it is false.22 [150.16–25] [911]  Another paralogism in the same species: ‘Whatever are beneficial things are good things, evil things are beneficial things; therefore evil things are good things’. ­[150.25–26] [912]  One should reply to this that ‘beneficial’ is used equivocally, namely, of something good and something evil, but principally of a good thing and secondarily of an evil thing. Good is absolutely beneficial whereas evil, not absolutely, but in a certain [context], namely, to avoid a greater evil, just as to cast cargo overboard at sea is evil but is beneficial to avoid a danger from the sea. Accordingly, the major and minor are ambiguous because, if ‘beneficial’ is interpreted in both senses for what is absolutely beneficial, the major is true and the minor false; but, if for what is beneficial in [a certain] context, the major is false and the minor true. [150.27–36]

a.  Reading at 150.6 ratione against relatione.



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* * * [913]  Paralogisms that come from transferrence of terms are reduced to this species, e.g., ‘Whatever laughs has a mouth, the fields laugh; therefore the fields have a mouth’, and the like.23 [150.36–39] [914]  One should reply to this that the major and minor are ambiguous: ‘to laugh’ can be taken strictly and thus names the action of a man, and in this sense the major is true and the minor false; or it can be taken in a transferred sense, and then it conveys the same thing as ‘to flower’ does, and in this sense the major is false and the minor true. And note that ‘to laugh’ is transferred to ‘to flower’ because of the likeness of these actions to each other, for both are something merry. [150.39–151.2] [915]  Paralogisms that come from different relations denoted by prepositionsa are reduced to this species, e.g., ‘Whatever is from Montmartre is earth and stone, but this nun is from Montmartre; therefore she is earth and stone’. Similarly: ‘That cloth is from England, England is a land; therefore that cloth is from land’, and the like. [151.2–8] [916]  One should reply to the first that the preposition ‘from’ can name the relationship of a material cause, and in this sense that to which it is added names that from which the thing materially comes, and in this sense the major is true but the minor false; or it can denominate the relationship of a place, and in this sense that to which it is added namesb where the thing comes from with respect to its origin or home, and in this sense the major is false but the minor true. And so the major and minor are ­ambiguous. [151.8–15] [917]  One should reply similarly to the second (915) that ‘That cloth is from England’ is true, if the word ‘from’ names the relationship of a place, and it does not follow thereby that it is materially from land. [151.15–18] [918]  These paralogisms are reduced to the second species of Equivocation in that the prepositionc ‘from’ is primarily said to denominate the relationship of a material cause but secondarily the local relationship of a place. [151.18–21] [919]  But one will object that the prepositiond ‘from’ denominates the relationship of a cause, and so one asks of what sorte of cause does the prepositionf ‘from’ denominate a relationship when it denominates the relationship of a place. [151.21–24]

a.  Reading at p. 151.4 prepositiones against propositiones. b.  Reading at p. 151.12–13 nominat against nominat,. c.  Reading at p. 151.19 prepositio against propositio. d.  Reading at p. 151.21–22 prepositio against propositio. e.  Reading at p. 151.23 cuiusmodi against cuius. f.  Reading at p. 151.23 prepositio against propositio.

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[920]  One can reply that it denominates the relationship of an efficient cause, for Porphyry says that place is a source of generation in the way a father is, and likewise it is a source of conserving a thing, as is said in Book Four of the Physics.24 [151.24–28] [Examples and Solutions in the Third Species]

[921]  One paralogizes in the third species in this way: ‘Whoever was healed is healthy, someone afflicted was healed; therefore someone afflicted is healthy’. To make this paralogism clear one should note that ‘someone afflicted’ is interpreted here for someone sick at an earlier time, who was in the process of regaining his health, and now has been made well. [151.29–33] [922]  One should reply, therefore, that the major of this paralogism is true and the minor is ambiguous, for ‘Someone afflicted was healed’ is ambiguous because ‘someone afflicted’ can consignify present time, and then it supposits for someone sick in the present time, and so is false. And the conclusion, ‘Someone afflicted is healthy’, follows, which is false because it indicates that someone is sick and well at the same time. Or it can consignify past time, and then it supposits for someone sick, and thus is true, but the conclusion does not follow, for in ‘Someone afflicted is healthy’, ‘someone afflicted’ always supposits for someone sick in the present time and never for someone sick in the past.25 [151.33–152.5] [923]  One solves the following paralogism the same way: ‘Whoever was getting up stands, but someone sitting a was getting up; therefore someone sitting stands’. And another paralogism in this species: ‘Whoever are the bishops (episcopi) are men, these asses are the bishop’s (episcopi); therefore these asses are men’. [152.5–9] [924]  One should reply to [the latter] that the minor is ambiguous, for the word ‘episcopi’ can be in the nominative plural case, and thus the major is true and the minor false, and in this sense a conclusion follows that is false. (It is no wonder that something false follows from something false.) Or it can be in the genitive case, and then it is true, but the conclusion does not follow. Similarly, one could reply that the major is ambiguous with the same ambiguity: it is true, if it is in the nominative case, and false, if it is in the genitive. [152.9–16] [925]  But one should note that the fallacy of Amphiboly can occur in this last species, nor is this unacceptable. According to Aristotle in his On Sophistical Refutations nothing prevents the same expression from presenting several occasions for being fallacious, that is, nothing prevents several sophistical Topics from being assigned to the same expression, so long as this is done for different reasons. [152.16–21]

a.  Reading at p. 152.6 sedens against deus.



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[926]  In the previously stated paralogism, therefore, equivocation can certainly occur, given its relationship to the word ‘episcopi ’, inasmuch as it can have different consignificata. Equivocation takes origin from one word signifying more than one case or gender, and so on for other accidents. But Amphiboly comes from different ways of construing, and so Amphiboly is there, given its relationship to the word ‘episcopi’ ­inasmuch as [one can] construe [the word] one way or another under the different things consignified. [152.21–29] [927]  But be alert to the fact that primarily the fallacy of Equivocation is present and only consequently a Amphiboly, for the difference in the things signified is primarily in the word, and the different ways of construing [it] follow from this difference in the things signified. [152.29–33] [Etymology of ‘Paralogism’]

[928]  One should note that ‘paralogism’ comes from ‘para’, which means in the manner of, and ‘syllogismus’, as it were, formulated in the manner of a syllogism, because it is constructed in this way so that an opponent might deceive a respondent more obviously.26 [152.33–36] [The Fallacy of Amphiboly] 27

[929]  Amphiboly follows, which is derived from ‘amphi’, which means doubt, and ‘bolos’, which means interpretation, as it were, an interpretation provoking doubt. So amphiboly is said to be present when different interpretations are united at the same time in the same expression, and this occurs when one and the same expression signifies more than one thing. [152.37–41] [The Definition of ‘The Fallacy of Amphiboly’]

[930]  The fallacy of Amphiboly is the suitability to deceive deriving from the fact that an expression, while remaining one and the same in matter and form, signifies different things. [152.41–153.1] [The Cause of the Semblance and the Cause of the Falsity]

[931]  The cause of semblance is the unity, i.e., identity, of the same expression in matter and form, causing one to believe there is a unity in the interpretation; the multiplicity of things signified is the cause of falsity. [153.1–3] a.  Reading at p. 152.30 consequenti against contingenti. See Logica, p. 154.34.

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[The Three Species of Amphiboly]28

[932]  There are three species of this fallacy: the first comes from the fact that the expression principally signifies more than one thing; the second derives from the fact that the expression signifies more than one thing by transference; the third takes origin from the fact that the expression taken by itself and in isolation signifies only one thing but joined to another expression signifies more than one. [153.4–9] [Examples and Solutions in the First Species]

[933]  One paralogizes in the first [species] in this way: ‘Whomever I would want myself to accept I would want them to accept me, those fighting I would want a me to accept; therefore I would want those fighting to accept me’.29 [153.9–12] [934]  One should reply to this that the minor b is ambiguous because ‘myself ’ in the accusative case can be considered as preceding the verb in the infinitive mood and ‘those fighting’ as following it, and in this sense it can be said to be true, but the conclusion does not follow.30 If vice versa, then it can be said to be false, and the conclusion follows. [153.12–16] [935]  Another paralogism similar to this: ‘It is contingent that Socrates speaks, Socrates is silent; therefore it is contingent that one who is silent speaks’. [153.16–18] [936]  One should reply to this that the conclusion, ‘It is contingent that one who is silent speaks’, is ambiguous because ‘one who is silent’ can belong with the verb in the infinitive mood, [i.e., ‘speaks’], by preceding it. In this sense it is false, and the sense is that someone, while silent, is speaking, and in this sense the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Or it can belong after it, and in this sense it is true, and the sense is that someone is speaking about him who is silent, and in this sense it follows from the premises.31 [153.18–24] [937]  There is this paralogism in the same species: ‘Whatever is Aristotle’s is possessed by Aristotle, this book is Aristotle’s; therefore it is possessed by Aristotle’. ­[153.24–26] [938]  One should reply to this that the minor is ambiguous. ‘Aristotle’s’ in the genitive case can present itself in a possessive relationship, and then it can be false in the sense [that] the book is in the possession of Aristotle. Or it can present itself in the relationship of an efficient cause, and then it is true in the sense that the book was writ-

a.  Reading at p. 153.11 vellem against vellent. b.  Reading at p. 153.12 minor against maior.



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ten by Aristotle. The conclusion follows in the first sense but not in the second. The major, etc., can be recognized to have the same ambiguity, as is sufficiently clear. ­[153.26–33] [Examples and Solutions in the Second Species]

[939]  One paralogizes in the second species in this way: ‘Whoever plows the seashore breaks the ground with a plow, he plows the seashore (indicating someone who works in vain); therefore he breaks the ground with a plow’. [153.33–36] [940]  One should reply to this that the expression ‘He plows the seashore’ can be interpreted in two ways: literally, and in this sense it conveys the same thing as ‘breaks the ground with a plow’ does; and in a transferred sense, and then it conveys the same thing as ‘works in vain’ does. It is taken in the first sense in the major and in the second sense in the minor, from which double interpretation comes Amphiboly. [153.36–41] [941]  One should note that ‘to plow the seashore’ is readily used metaphorically for ‘to work in vain’, for these two have a similarity between them: both are fruitless. [153.41–154.1] [942]  From the fact that the paralogism just presented involves amphiboly it can be recognized that it is not always necessary that there be different ways of construing in paralogisms of Amphiboly, for the same way of construing is in ‘The seashore is plowed’ when taken literally and when taken in a transferred sense. So it suffices for amphiboly to be present that there be unity in the expression in matter and form but that the difference in the interpretations be caused in whatever manner, either by different ways of construing or by something else. [154.1–9] [Examples and Solutions in the Third Species]

[943]  One paralogizes in the third species in this way: ‘Whatever knows this knows, someone knows grammar; therefore grammar a knows’. [154.9–11] [944]  One should reply to this that the major is ambiguous in that the pronoun ‘this’ can be in the nominative case and be construed as preceding the [first] verb ‘knows’, and in this sense it is false because it signifies that what is known knows, and a false conclusion follows. Or it can be in the accusative case and then [is construed] as following the [first] verb ‘knows’, and in this sense it is true and signifies that one who knows b knows, and the conclusion follows. [154.11–17] [945]  So these paralogisms are similar to this one: ‘Whatever sees this sees, someone sees a column; therefore a column sees’. [154.17–19]

a.  Reading at p. 154.11 grammatica against grammaticam. See p. 154.19. b.  Reading at p. 154.16–17 scientem against scitum.

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[946]  One should reply that the major is ambiguous, just as in the preceding, and this is sufficient. [154.19–20] [947]  Also: ‘What you say to be this you say to be, a stone you say to be; therefore stone-you say to be’.32 [154.20–21] [948]  One should reply similarly that the major is ambiguous. The pronoun ‘this’ can be in the nominative case and thus it is false in the sense [that] what you say is you-this-existing-thing you say to be what is said by you, and the conclusion follows in such a way that the pronoun ‘you’ is construed with the nouna ‘stone’. If it is in the accusative case,33 it is true in the sense [that] you say to be what was said by you, but the conclusion does not follow. [154.22–28] [949]  But someone will object that in these three last-mentioned paralogisms there seems to be equivocation, since one word in each of them is taken with different consignificata, and Equivocation comes from this. [154.28–31] [950]  One should reply to this that there is amphiboly in the stated paralogisms, and equivocation can of course be there too, but first and principally they are paralogisms of Amphiboly, and consequently, of Equivocation. They are in the third species of Amphiboly, as has been seen (932), for in each of them there is one expression that by itself and isolated signifies only one thing, in itself having no species of Equivocation or Amphiboly, but joined to another expression signifying more than one thing. And this does not come from joining one word to another word but from the conjunction of an expression with an expression. Since, therefore, the ambiguity that derives from the fact that one expression taken by itself signifies only one thing but joined to another principally signifies more than one on the basis of amphiboly, these paralogisms principally have the nature of Amphiboly. [154.31–155.2] [951]  But because it follows from this ambiguity that one word is taken in different cases, consequently the paralogisms can be ones of Equivocation. For example, when one says ‘Whatever knows this knows’ (943), the expression ‘this knows’ signifies only one thing, if taken by itself, for when it is uttered by itself the pronoun ‘this’ is always construedb as the subject of the verb ‘knows’. Otherwise a subject would be lacking in the expression and it would be imperfect and unacceptable in logic, since it would not be true or false. But when it is joined to another expression by saying ‘Whatever knows this knows’, then it signifies more than one thing, for the pronoun ‘this’ can be the subject, or it can be construed with what follows, with the verb ‘knows’, as was seen (944). The case is similar for others.34 [155.2–14]

a.  Reading at p. 154.26 nomen against pronomen. b.  Reading at p. 155.7 construitur against constuitur.



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[The Fallacies of Composition and Division] 35

[952]  Composition and Division follow. But since Aristotle saysa near the end of Book One of On Sophistical Refutations that opposites placed next to each other shed more light, and Composition and Division are opposites, so a few things must be said about these together for the sake of greater clarity.36 [155.15–19] [953]  The things to be seen about Composition and Division are, namely, what composition and division are and what the fallacies of Composition and Division are, what the cause of semblance in these is, what the cause of the falsity is, when an expression ought to be said to be compounded and divided, and what and how many species or modes of paralogizing there are in these fallacies.37 [155.19–23] [What Things Constitute Composition and Division]

[954]  Composition as it is taken here is the fallacious composition of things that ought to be divided; Division is the fallacious division of things that ought to be compounded. In Composition there is a fallacious composition; in Division there is a fallacious division.38 Hence it is that an expression is said to contain Composition that is false in the compounded sense but true in the divided sense, whereas that is said to contain the fallacy of Division that is false in the divided sense and true in the compounded sense.39 [155.24–30] [The Definitions of the Fallacies of ‘Composition’ and ‘Division’]

[955]  The fallacy of Composition is the suitability to deceive that comes from the fact that an expression, one and the same in matter but differing in form, signifies different things. The expression is believed to be true in the compounded sense because it is true in the divided sense. The fallacy of Division is the suitability to deceive that comes from the fact that an expression, remaining one and the same in matter but differing in form, signifies different things. The expression is believed to be true in the divided sense because it is true in the compounded sense.40 [155.31–39] [How Composition and Division Are the Same Yet Different]

[956]  So one should note that the fallacies of Composition and Division are in agreement because in both there is an identity in matter and in the material c­ omponents

a.  Reading at p. 155.15 dicat against dicit.

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of an expression, which are the letters, syllables, and words. They differ in this that in Composition the divided sense moves one to believe in the composed sense; in Division the composed sense moves one to believe in the divided sense. [155.39–156.5] [The Causes of Semblance and Falsity]

[957]  In the fallacy of Composition the cause of semblance is a divided expression materially identical with a compounded expression. For when a divided expression is true and the one deceived sees that the matter of the compounded and divided expression is the same, he likewise believes that the form is the same, and so he believes that it is true in the compounded sense as it is in the divided sense. The cause of falsity is the diversity between the compounded and divided senses. Since a compounded and divided expression are different in form, the compounded sense is different from the divided sense. [156.5–11] [958]  In the fallacy of Division the cause of semblance is a compounded expression materially identical with a divided expression. For when a compounded expression is true and the one deceived believes that the matter of the compounded and divided expression is the same, he likewise believes that the form is the same, and so he believes that it is true in the divided sense as it is in the compounded sense. The cause of falsity is the diversity between the compounded and divided senses. For just as a compounded and a divided expression are not the same in form, so the divided sense and the compounded sense are not the same. [156.11–22] [Additional Comment on What Constitutes Composition and Division]

[959]  One should know that an expression is called compounded when its words are arranged according to the position that is more appropriate to thema, but it is called divided when they are removed from that position and located in a position less appropriate to them.41 It can therefore be said this way: an expression is compounded when what should be compounded are compounded, that is, when those things that are naturally more suited to be asserted together are asserted together.42 But [an expression] is divided when what should be compounded are divided, that is, when the things that ought to be asserted together are separated.43 [156.22–29] [960]  To make this more clear let this example be given: ‘Whatever lives always is’.44 It is divided when [‘always’b] is arranged with the verb ‘lives’, for it more correctly is wont to be arranged with the verb ‘is’ than with the verb ‘lives’. Since the word ‘­always’

a.  Reading at p. 156.24 eis against in eis. b.  Reading at p. 156.31 ‘semper’ ordinatur against ordinatur.



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is an adverb, and an adverb is adjoined or determined within the force of a verb, it is more grammatically correct for the adverb ‘always’ to be arranged with the more principal verb than with a less principal or subordinate one, for a principal verb presents itself as more in the nature of a verb than does a nonprincipal or subordinate one.45 And because the verb, namely, ‘is’, is the principal verb and the verb ‘lives’ is the nonprincipal or subordinate one, the adverb ‘always’ is more correctly wont to be arranged with the verb ‘is’ than with the verb ‘lives’. When, therefore, the adverb ‘always’ is compounded with the verb ‘is’, things that ought to be compounded are compounded and the expression is a compounded one. But when the adverb ‘always’ is divided from the verb ‘is’ and arranged with the verb ‘lives’, those things that ought to be compounded are divided and the expression is a divided one.46 [156.29–157.4] [961]  One should note that the expression ‘Whatever lives always is’ is an expression containing Composition, for it is false in the compounded sense, namely, when the adverb ‘always’ is arranged with the verb ‘is’; but it is true in the divided sense, namely, when it is arranged with the verb ‘lives’. And from this can arise this sort of para­logism: ‘Whatever lives always is, Socrates lives; therefore Socrates always is’. ­[157.4–11] [962]  To make clear what was said note that words have a twofold composition: the one pertains to what is signified, the other to [its] vocal sound. Composition with respect to vocal sound is one that occurs in words inasmuch as it requires an order of vocal sounds; the other is one that occurs among words arranged in an expression to render the locution true. What, therefore, was said (959) [namely], “an expression is called compounded when the things that ought to be compounded are compounded,” should be understood of composition with respect to vocal sound and not with respect to what is signified.47 [157.12–19] [963]  But one objectsa in this way: when things that ought to be compounded are compounded, then [an expression] occurs the way it ought to occur, because it seems that from such a composition truth would result more than falsity would. And so a compounded expression ought more to be called true in the compounded sense than called false, since in this way what ought to be compounded are always compounded in it, the contrary of which was stated above (962). For it was said above that the expression that is false in the compounded sense, but true in the divided sense, involves Composition. For when speaking of composition with respect to what is signified it is true that, when things that ought to be compounded are compounded, [the expression] occurs the way it ought to occur apropos of what is signified. Truth results from that sort of composition, and the objection proceeds along that path. [157.19–30]

a.  Reading at p. 157.19 Opponit autem aliquis against Si aliquis opponat.

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[964]  But [one should reply to this that], when speaking of composition with respect to vocal sound, if things that ought to be compounded are compounded, then it occurs the way it ought to occur apropos of vocal sound; but truth does not thereby result from the composition. For this sort of a composition of things that ought to be compounded with respect to vocal sound easily permitsb falsity, as was seen in the expression ‘Whoever lives always is’, which is false in the respect that things that ought to be compounded are compounded. An objection along this path contradicts nothing and so is invalid, for it supposes that the claim that an expression is compounded when things that ought to be compounded are compounded is wont to be understood of composition apropos of what is signified. This is false, but one does understand it of composition apropos of vocal sound, as was seen (962). [157.30–41] [965]  Someone could ask: since an expression is called compounded when things that ought to be compounded are compounded, why is one not called divided when things that ought to be divided are divided? [157.41–158.1] [966]  One should reply to this that composition and division are related as privation and possession are. Composition is like possession, whereas division is like privation; so they are privatively opposed. But privation is not wont to occur except with respect to that from which possession is wont to arise—for possession and privation have the same subject—and so with respect to the things from which division is wont to arise. Just as, therefore, composition occurs with respect to things that ought to be compounded, so also division occurs with respect to things that ought to be compounded. And just as an expression is compounded when things that ought to be compounded are compounded, soc an expression is called divided from the division of the things from whose composition it was called compounded. [158.1–9] [The Fallacy of Composition] [The Three Species of Composition]48

[967]  The modes or species of these fallacies follow. First one should see in how many modes it is possible to paralogize in the fallacy of Composition. But one should know that in paralogisms something is always compounded with something else, and this can happen in two ways: it can happen in such a way that what is compounded with something is not [also] divided [from something else] or [in such a way] that it is [also] divided from something else, and this in two ways: either because it is divided

a.  Reading at p. 157.33 huiusmodi against huius. b.  Reading at p. 157.34 permittit against premittit secundum. c.  Reading at p. 158.8 ita dicitur against ut dicitur.



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from something asserted in the expression, or from something implied. Because of this there are three species of paralogizing in the fallacy of Composition.49 The first results from the fact that something is compounded with something but what is so compounded is not [also] divided from something else. The second species results from the fact that something is compounded with something and is [also] divided from something else asserted in the expression. The third results from the fact that something is compounded with something and is [also] divided from something else not stated in the expression but implied. [158.10–24] [Examples and Solutions in the First Species]

[968]  One paralogizes in the first species in this way: ‘If that someonea walk is possible, it is possible that he walk; that a seated man walk is possible; therefore it is possible that a seated man walk’. [158.24–27] [969]  One should reply to this that the minor is ambiguous. The accusative ‘seated man’ can be compounded with the infinitiveb ‘walk’ or it can be divided from it.50 In the first sense it is compounded and false, and the sense is that the dictum ‘that a seated man walk’ is possible, and this is false. For in speaking in this way, one signifies that the action of walking inheres in the seated man at the time at which he is sitting, and in this way it follows that a seated man walks. In the second sense it is divided and true, and the sense is that he who now is sitting has the ability to walk later, and this is true because in speaking in this way one signifies that the action of walking can inhere in a seated man, not at the time at which he is sitting, but at another time. [158.28–38] [970]  Now this amounts to the same thing as saying that the minor can be de re or de dicto.51 When, therefore, the accusative is compounded with the infinitivec it is de dicto, and in this sense it is false, for in this way one signifies that the ability is in the whole dictum and that the parts of the dictum are united together with respect to the same time. In this sense the whole dictum ‘that a seated man walk’ is possibled and ‘is possible’ is predicated. But when the accusativee is divided from the infinitivef it is de re, and then it is true because in this sense one signifies that the ability inheres in one part of the dictum with respect to the other, and the parts of the dictum are not united with respect to the same time but with respect to this time and that, and in this way the accusative ‘seated man’ is the subject and ‘walk is possible’ is predicated. [158.38–159.6] a.  Reading at p. 158.25 si quemcumque against quicumque. b.  Reading at p. 158.29 infinitivo against infinitivum. c.  Reading at p. 158.40 infinitivo against infinito. d.  Reading at pp. 158.43–59.19 dictum ‘sedentem ambulare’ contingit against dictum ‘sedentem ambulare contingit’. e.  Reading at p. 159.1 accusativus against actus. f.  Reading at p. 159.2 infinitivo against infinito.

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* * * [971]  But someone could object: since that accusative serves as subject for the infinitivea and is construed with it, it does not seem that it can be divided from it, which is against what was said. [159.6–9] [972]  One should reply to this that for something to be divided from another occurs in two ways: either on the basis of pronunciation or on the basis of construction. It is true that this accusative cannot be separated from that infinitiveb by construction; nevertheless it can be divided on the basis of pronunciation in such a way that there is a sort of pause or noncontinuous pronunciation between the accusative and the infinitivec.52 And Aristotle seems to propose this in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations when he says that one does not signify the same thing if one speaks while dividing and compounding, that is, if when speaking one divides by means of a noncontinuous pronunciation and compounds by a continuous pronunciation.53 [159.9–18] [973]  One should note that this paralogism is appropriately in the first species of Composition for, inasmuch as the accusative is compounded with the infinitived, it is not [also] divided from something else. [159.18–21] [974]  One should also note that ‘That a seated man walk is possible’ is compounded when the accusative is compounded with the infinitivee and divided when it is divided from it. For when an accusative serving as a subject is construed with an infinitivef, it is more appropriate as far as the utterance is concerned for that accusative to be directly, rather than indirectly, joined to the infinitiveg. It is directly joined to it when it is compounded with it because then the expression has this sort of arrangement: ‘That a seated man walk is possible’; but it is indirectly joined to it when it is divided from the same, and then the expression has this sort of arrangement: ‘For a seated man it is possible to walk’.54 [159.21–31] [975]  But someone will object on the basis of what was said: whether ‘That a seated man walk is possible’ be taken de re or de dicto, ‘possible’ in it is always construed with the verb ‘is’ and as following [the dictum]. Since, therefore, the verb ‘is’ is personal and in the indicative mood, only a nominative case can be the subject of such, or something used in place of the nominative case. Since there is no nominative case

a.  Reading at p. 159.7 infinitivo against infinito. b.  Reading at p. 159.12 infinitivo against infinito. c.  Reading at p. 159.15 infinitivum against infinitum. d.  Reading at p. 159.21 infinitivo against infinito. e.  Reading at p. 159.23 infinitivo against infinito. f.  Reading at p. 159.25 infinitivo against infinito. g.  Reading at p. 159.26 infinitivo against infinito.



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there that serves as a subject, it is necessary that something be used in place of the nominative case and construed with the verb ‘is’ and precede [it]. But this cannot be the accusative ‘a seated man’ but rather the whole [clause] ‘that a seated man walk’ because ‘that a seated man walk’ will always serve as the subject in this expression, and so the whole dictum will always be the subject. But when the whole dictum functions as the subject, then [the expression] is de dicto; therefore it will always be de dicto and never de re. [159.31–160.3] [976]  One should reply to this that, grammatically speaking, it is true that in the expression ‘That a seated man walk is possible’ ‘that a seated man walk’ always functions as the subject of the verb ‘is’. A grammarian does not distinguish expressions with respect to them being de re and de dicto, for to be de re and de dicto contributes nothing to congruity but to truth and falsity. And because a logician, although not a grammarian, considers truth and falsity, a logician can readily grasp different things in one expression under the same construction. According to a grammarian [his own] reasoning makes sense, but not according to a logician, for according to a grammarian the whole ‘that a seated man walk’ always serves as the subject. But according to a logician ­[either] the whole ‘that a seated man walk’ can function as the subject, which happens when it is de dicto, or the accusative ‘a seated man’, which occurs when it is de re. ­[160.3–17] [977]  The explanation for this is that a subject is taken in one way by a grammarian and in another way by a logician. According to a grammarian a subject is what is subjected to a verb; according to a logician a suppositum, i.e., a subject, is that of which a predicate is said. And because ‘a seated man’ [in the accusative] cannot function as the subject of the verb ‘is’, whereas the whole ‘that a seated man walk’ can of course serve as its subject, so for a grammarian the subject is always the whole ‘that a seated man walk’. Because the predicate, namely, ‘to be possible’, can readily be said of the whole ‘that a seated man walk’, and similarly, the predicate ‘is possible to walk’ can readily be said of the accusative ‘a seated man’, therefore both a part of a dictum and the whole dictum can correctly function as a subject for a logician. [160.17–29] [978]  That a logician can readily grasp different things in one expression under the same construction is clear because, if one says ‘Of all things opposed the science or knowledge is the same’ and ‘The same is the science of all things opposed’, according to a grammarian the construction is the same in both and the judgment is the same in both.55 But a logician judges differently of ‘Of all things opposed the science is the same’ and of ‘The same is the science of all things opposed’, for he says the first is true but the second false. When one says ‘Of all things opposed the science is the same’, ‘science’ is broadened by the sign ‘all’ that precedes it and stands necessarily for more than one. And then the sense of the expression is that the science of the true and the false is the same, such as logic, and [the science] of the healthy and the sick is the same, such as medicine, and so on for other opposites, in such a way that it is understood that the knowledge of the true and the false is one [kind] and that of the healthy and the sick is

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another, but it is not the same as that which is of the true and the false. This is true, for there are different sciences of different opposites and not the same one. But when one says ‘Something is the science of all things opposed’, ‘science’ stands determinately for one [science] because the sign follows it and does not act on ‘science’. And then the sense is [that] there is some science, one and the same, that treats of all things opposed. This is false, for there is no science that pertains to all things opposed, although there are different ones for different [things opposed]. [160.29–161.8] [979]  Another paralogism similar to that: ‘If a for someone it is possible to write, it is possible that he write, for a man not writing it is possible that he write; therefore it is possible that a man not writing write’. [161.8–11] [980]  This paralogism is resolved in the same way as the preceding (969). [161.12–13] [Examples and Solutions in the Second Species]

[981]  One paralogizes in the second species in this way: ‘Whoever knows the alphabet now has learned it, but this one (indicating someone who learnedb the alphabet a long time ago) knows some of the alphabet; therefore he now has learned it’. [161.14–17] [982]  One should reply to this that the major is ambiguous because the adverb ‘now’ can be compounded with the verb ‘has learned’c, and in this sense it is compounded and false and the conclusion follows; or it can be divided from the same and placed with the verb ‘knows’, and in this sense it is divided and true and the conclusion does not follow. [161.17–21] [983]  One should note that the expression is called compounded when ‘now’ is compounded with ‘has learned’d but divided when it is divided from the same, for in the above expression ‘has learned’e is the principal verb and the verb ‘knows’ is not the principal one butf a subordinate one.56 An adverb is more correctly wont to be arranged with a principal verb than with a nonprincipal one, as was seen above (960). [161.21–27] [984]  There can be another solution to the same as Priscian says in Priscian Major near the end of the tract “On Adverbs”: adverbs “are more correctly placed before verbs” than placed after them.57 Since, therefore, in the previous expression ‘now’ is

a.  Reading at p. 161.9 si quemcumque against quemcumque. b.  Reading at p. 161.16 didiscit against est discit. c.  Reading at p. 161.18 didiscit against discit. d.  Reading at p. 161.22–23 didiscit against discit. e.  Reading at p. 161.23 didiscit against discit. f.  Reading at p. 161.25 sed against vel.



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asserted before the verb ‘has learned’a and asserted after the verb ‘knows’, it seems that its more correct arrangement is with the verb ‘has learned’b than with the verb ‘knows’. So the expression is called compounded when ‘now’ is asserted with the verb ‘has learned’c but divided when it is removed from it. [161.27–36] [985]  One should also note that the paralogism is appropriately in the second species of Composition for, in virtue of the fact that the adverb ‘now’ is compounded with the verb ‘has learned’d, it is divided from the verb ‘knows’, which was actually included in the expression. [161.36–39] [Examples and Solutions in the Third Species]

[986]  One paralogizes in the third species in this way: ‘That which can carry one only can carry more, but this ship, which cannot carry more, can carry one only; therefore that which cannot carry more can carry more’, which is impossible.58 [161.40–162.2] [987]  One should reply to this that the major is ambiguous for ‘only’ can be compounded with ‘one’, and then ‘only’ is taken syncategorematically e, and then it is compounded and false in the sense that what canf carry one only, that is, only one and nothing else, can carry more, and in this sense the conclusion follows. Or it can be divided from ‘one’ and placed with the participle ‘being’ implied there, and in this sense it is taken categorematically g and is divided and true in the sense that what can carry one alone, that is, one entity alone, i.e., by itself, can carry more, and in this sense the conclusion does not follow. [162.2–12] [988]  One is wont to resolve the paralogism in another way by saying that the negation understood in ‘only’ can be directed to the verb ‘can’, and in this sense the major is compounded and false in the sense [that] what cannot carry one plus another can carry more, or it can be directed to the verb ‘carry’, and in this sense it is divided and true in the sense that what can carry h one plus another can carry more.59 [162.12–18] [989]  But the first way of speaking is better, for on the basis of the first way of speaking the third species of Composition is clearly distinguished from the other two, whereas this does not happen in this way in the second way of speaking. [162.18–21]

a.  Reading at p. 161.31–32 didiscit against discit. b.  Reading at p. 161.33 didiscit against discit. c.  Reading at p. 161.35 didiscit against discit. d.  Reading at p. 161.38 didiscit against discit. e.  Reading at p. 162.4–5 sincategorematice against sincategorice. f.  Reading at p. 162.6 potest ferre against ferre. g.  Reading at p. 162.9 categorematice against categorice. h.  Reading at p. 162.17–18 ferre against non ferre.

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[990]  One should note that that paralogism is appropriately in a third species of Composition for, in virtue of the fact that ‘only’ is compounded with ‘one’, it is divided from the participle ‘being’ implied there. [162.21–25] [991]  One should also note that the expression is called compounded when ‘only’ is compounded with ‘one’ but divided when it is divided from the same, for with respect to the arrangement of vocal sounds a word placed in an expression relates more to another placed there than to one implied.60 [162.25–29] [992]  But one could object that to interpret a word syncategorematically and cate­ gorematically a involves the fallacy of Equivocation, but it happens that way in the stated paralogism, as was seen; therefore it seems that it is the paralogism of Equivocation and not of Composition. [162.29–33] [993]  One should reply to this that this principally is a paralogism of Composition, for ambiguity occurs in it because of the composition of ‘only’ withb ‘one’, as was seen. But it follows from that ambiguity that ‘only’ is taken syncategorematically and categorematically c, [and] consequently the paralogism of Equivocation can be involved. It is not inappropriate for there to be different fallacies in the same paralogism on the basis of different understandings, as was seen (925). [162.33–40] [The Fallacy of Division]

[994]  The modes of paralogizing in the fallacy of Division follow. [162.41] [The Three Species of Division]61

[995]  But one should know that in the paralogisms of Division something is always divided from something else, and this can happen in two ways. It can be such that what is divided from another is not recompounded with something else or what is divided is recompounded with something elsed, and the [latter] can happen in two ways: either because it is compounded with something actually asserted in the expression, or with something implied. [162.42–163.3] [996]  Because of this there are three species in the fallacy of Division corresponding to the three species already discussed in the fallacy of Composition (967). The first species results from the fact that something is divided from something else but what is

a.  Reading at p. 162.30 categorematice et sincategorematice against categorice et sincategorice. b.  Reading at p. 162.35 cum against ab. c.  Reading at p. 162.37 sincategorematice et categorematice against sincategorice et categorice. d.  Reading at p. 163.1 aliquo vel illud divisum componitur cum aliquo against aliquo.



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so divided is not recompounded with something else asserted in the expression. The second comes from the fact that something is divided from another, and what is so divided is recompounded with something else asserted in the expression. The third devolves from the fact that something is divided from another and what is so divided is recompounded with something else not actually asserted in the expression but ­implied. [163.3–13] [Examples and Solutions in the First Species]

[997]  One paralogizes in the first species in this way: ‘Whatever things are two and three are even or odd, but five are two and three; therefore five are even or odd’.62 ­[163.14–16] [998]  One should reply to this that the minor is ambiguous for ‘three’ can be divided from ‘two’ or compounded with the same. In the first sense it is divided and the conjunctive expression false in the sense of ‘Five are two and five are three’, and in this sense the conclusion follows. In the second sense it is compounded and has a linked predicate (predicatum copulatum) and is true in this sense: ‘Five are two and three taken together’, for two and three are integral parts of five. [163.16–23] [999]  One should note that this paralogism is appropriately in the first species of Division for, inasmuch as the term ‘three’ is divided from ‘two’, it is not recompounded with something by means of a composition, as was happening earlier with a sense of composition; in addition it is then linked to the other expression. [163.23–27] [1000]  One should also note that it is called divided when it is a conjunctivea ­[expression] but compounded when it has a linked predicate. For, since a conjunction is conjunctive of the parts of an expression, to have being as a part of an expression happens more to what is, strictly speaking, simple than to something complex; it seems to exercise its function more correctly by conjoining simple things than complex ones. [163.27–33] [1001]  There is another paralogism similar to that: ‘Whatever is more is at least so much and more, but what is at least so much is equal andb what is more is unequal; therefore what is more is equal and unequal’. [163.33–36] [1002]  One should reply to this that the major is ambiguous in the same sense as the minor was in the preceding paralogism (997). [163.36–37]

a.  Reading at p. 163.28 copulativa against copula. b.  Reading at p. 163.35 equale et against equale.

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[Examples and Solutions in the Second Species]

[1003]  One paralogizes in the second species in this way: ‘Whomever I made a slave being a free man I made a slave of a free man, but I made you a slave being a free man (indicating someone I made a free man who was previously a slave); therefore I made a free man of a slave’, which is false.63 [163.38–42] [1004]  One should reply to this that the minor is ambiguous. The adverb ‘being’ can be divided from ‘slave’ or compounded with the same.64 In the first sense it is divided and false and the conclusion follows in the sense of ‘You, being a free man, I made a slave’, that is, I made a slave of a free man. In the second sense it is compounded and is true in the sense of ‘You, being a slave, I made a free man’, that is, I made a free man of you, a slave, but the conclusion does not follow. [163.42–164.6] [1005]  One should note that this paralogism is appropriately in the second species of Division for, inasmuch as ‘being’ is divided from ‘slave’, it is asserted with ‘free man’, which is actually included in the expression. [164.6–9] [1006]  One should also note that this expression is called divided when ‘being’ is divided from ‘slave’ and asserted with ‘free man’ and compounded when it is compounded with ‘slave’, for ‘being’ is an adverb and is a determination of ‘slave’ and of ‘free man’. But a determination ought naturally to follow ‘slave’, something determinable, as a specification, that is, as what specifies. So when ‘being’ in the preceding expression follows ‘slave’ and precedes ‘free man’, it is more correctly wont to be arranged with ‘slave’ than with ‘free man’.65 [164.9–19] [Examples and Solutions in the Third Species]

[1007]  One paralogizes in the third species in this way: ‘Of whichever men one hundred divinea Achilles left are more than one hundred; but fifty of men one hundred divineb Achilles left; therefore fifty are more than one hundred’. [164.20–23] [1008]  One should reply to this that the minor is ambiguous because ‘one hundred’ can be divided from ‘of men’ and then compounded with ‘men’ in the accusative case implied there, and in this sense it is divided and false in the sense [that] divinec Achilles left one hundred men of the fifty men, which is impossible, and the conclusion follows. Or ‘one hundred’ can be compounded with ‘of men’, and it is its adverb and in

a.  Reading at p. 164.21 divus against dives. b.  Reading at p. 164.22 divus against dives. c.  Reading at p. 164.27 divus against dives.



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the genitive case, and in this sense it is compounded and true in the sense [that] divinea Achilles left fifty men of the hundred men, which is possible, but the conclusion does not follow. [164.23–33] [1009]  One should note that this paralogism is appropriately in the third species of Division for, inasmuch as ‘one hundred’ is divided from ‘of men’ in the genitive case, it is compounded with ‘men’ in the accusative case, [which latter] is not actually asserted in the expression but implied. [164.33–37] [1010]  One should also note that this expression is called divided when ‘one hundred’ is divided from ‘of men’ and compounded when it is compounded with it, for ‘of men’ is something determinable because it is a substantive. For ‘One hundred’ [and] ‘fifty’b are certain sorts of determinations, since they are adjectives. But adjectives ­modify a substantive. But what modifies something, naturally follows it, and so for that reason ‘one hundred’ follows ‘of men’ whereas ‘fifty’ precedes it.66 With respect to the order of the words the arrangement is more correct when ‘of men’ is conjoined with ‘one hundred’ because, when it is conjoined with ‘fifty’, it occurs with a sense of d ­ ivision. [164.37–165.5] [Rules for Construing Words in a Statement]67

[1011]  To make what was said clear note that one can gather from what was said that in the paralogism of Composition and also of Division sometimes one asserts (A) one determination and two determinables and (B) two determinations and one determinable.68 But when two determinables are asserted [there are two possibilities. One possibility (A1) is that] one is more principal than the other, and then the expression is called compounded from the composition of the determining thing c with a particular determinable, and it is called divided from its division from it. Since its determination is dependent, its dependence can more be terminated by something more principal than by something less principal, as is clear in the example ‘Whatever lives always is’.69 [The other possibility (A2) is that] both the determinables are equally principal, and then the expression is called compounded from the composition of the determining thing with the determinable that the determination follows, and it is called divided from its division from it. Since a determination is naturally posterior to its determinable and modifies the determinable—a modificationd ought to follow what it ­modifies—a determination by its very nature as a modification ought to follow the

a.  Reading at p. 164.31 divus against dives. b.  Reading at p. 164.41 quinquaginta against quingenta. c.  Reading at p. 165.11 determinantis against determinabilis. d.  Reading at p. 165.20–21 determinabile, specificatio against determinabile specificationis.

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determinable, as was clear in the example ‘I made you a slave being a free man’.70 But when (B) one determinable and two determinations are asserted, then the expression is called compounded from the composition of the determining thing that has more the nature of a determining thing with the determinable, and it is called divided from its division from it. That determination has more the nature of a determining thing which follows its determinable than that which precedes it does, as was seen (1010) in the example ‘Fifty of men, etc.’.71 [165.6–30] [1012]  Along with these things note that for there to be the fallacy of Composition and Division from the composition of one determining thing with two determinablesa it is required that the determination be asserted intermediate between the two determinables.72 If it is asserted after or before those two determinablesb, there would be no fallacy.73 Similarly, there is no fallacy of Composition or Division from the composition of one determinable with two determining thingsc, unless that determinable is asserted intermediate between those two different determining thingsd. If it is asserted before or after those two determining things, there would be no fallacy. So if one says ‘Whatever always livese is’ or ‘Whatever always is lives’, there is no fallacy; there is only a fallacy when speaking in this way: ‘Whatever lives always is’. One is to understand something similar in other cases. [165.30–43] [The Fallacy of Accent] 74

[1013]  The fallacy of Accent follows, about which one should see what an accent is, and what the fallacy of Accent is, what the cause of semblance is, what the cause of falsity is, and how many modes there are of paralogizing in it. [166.1–4] [The Definition of ‘The Fallacy of Accent’]

[1014]  Accent is a certain law and a certain rule for raising and lowering a s­ yllable, or it is a certain rule for pronouncing a vocal sound on the basis of raising or lowering. The fallacy of Accent is the suitability to deceive taking origin from the fact that a word, while remaining one and the same in matter, though differing in the way it is pronounced, signifies different things. [166.5–10]

a.  Reading at p. 165.33 determinabilibus against determinantibus. b.  Reading at p. 165.35 determinabilibus against determinantibus. c.  Reading at p. 165.37 determinantibus against determinabilibus. d.  Reading at p. 165.38–39 determinantia diversa against determinantes diversas. e.  Reading at p. 165.41 semper vivit against vivit semper.



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[The Cause of Semblance and the Cause of Falsity]

[1015]  The cause of semblance in this fallacy is the unity of a vocal sound materially uncombined that lengthens the unity of the accent and, consequently, lengthens the unity of what is signified. The difference in the things consignified consequent upon the difference in the accents is the cause of the falsity. [166.10–14] [The Three Species of Accent]75

[1016]  But one should note that, since a syllable has four accidents differing among themselves—tenor (accent), breathing, time, and number of letters—‘accent’, as it is taken here in the fallacy of Accent, contains under itself tenor (accent in the strict sense), time, and breathing. This fallacy, therefore, comes from a diversity of accent, time, and breathing. It can be said, therefore, that there are three species or modes in this fallacy. [166.14–21] [1017] The first [species] comes from the fact that a vocal sound can be governed by different accents in such a way that [it is governed] by one principal one or by more than one principal one, which is to say that a vocal sound is interpreted as a word or as an expression. One should know that any word of whatever number of syllables, whether of one or more than one, has only one principal accent, although it cana have more than one nonprincipal accent. Every syllable has its own accent, so there are as many accents in a word as there are syllables. But one syllable has the principal accent, the others nonprincipal accents. The second species comes from the fact that one accent is changed into another, e.g., an acute into a grave, and vice versa. A change from a lengthened time to a shortened one, or vice versa, follows the change of accent. And one should note that an acute accent is one that elevates the syllable or causes it to rise, whereas a grave one is one that lowers it or causes it to fall. The third species comes from the fact that one breathing is changed into another, e.g., a rough into a smooth, or vice versa: with exhalation it is rough, but without exhalation smooth. [166.21–38] [Examples and Solutions in the First Species]

[1018]  One paralogizes in the first paralogism in this way: ‘Whatever God made invite He made unwillingly, He made clusters of grapes in vite; therefore he made clusters of grapes unwillingly’. [166.38–41]

a.  Reading at p. 166.26–27 potest against possunt.

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[1019]  One should reply to this that the minor is ambiguous because the word ‘invite’ can be one word, and on the basis of this it is governed by one principal accent, and in this sense it is false and a false conclusion follows. Or it can be an expression, namely, a prepositiona with its own objectb, and on the basis of this it is governed by two principal accents, and in this sense it is true and the conclusion does not follow. The major can be distinguished in the same way, as is sufficiently clear. [166.41–167.4] [Examples and Solutions in the Second Species]

[1020]  One paralogizes in the second species in this way: ‘For whatever men it is fitting that they pendere it is fitting that they undergo punishment, it is fitting for just men to pendere; therefore it is fitting for just men to undergo punishment.76 [167.4–7] [1021]  One should reply to this that the minor is ambiguous, for the middle [syllable] of the word ‘pendere’ can have an acute accent—and then it conveys the same thing as ‘to suffer a punishment’ or ‘to be hung’ do—and thus it pertains to a thief, and in this sense the minor is false and a false conclusion follows. Or it can have a grave accent—and then it conveys the same thing as ‘to inflict a punishment’ or ‘suspend a punishment’ do—and thus pertains to a judge, and in this sense the minor is false and the conclusion does not follow. The major can be analyzed in the same way, as is sufficiently clear. [167.7–15] [1022]  Note that a change in time follows a change in accent in the word ‘pendere’, for when the middle syllable is emphasized it has a lengthened time and when it is suppressed it has a shortened one. Thus, the fallacy can be present from the change in time as well as fromc the change in accent. [167.15–19] [1023]  Note also that these two verses are presented apropos of the different significations of the word ‘pendere’: Pendo: suspended; I hang while I lift up my weight. Pendo: I inflict a penalty; he pays a penalty who suffers one. ‘Pendere’ with the middle [syllable] lengthened pertains to a thief who is hung; ‘­ pendere’ with the middle [syllable] shortened pertains to a judge who renders judgment about a thief, and likewise to the official who hangs the judged thief. [167.19–27]

a.  Reading at 167.1 prepositio against propositio. b.  Reading at 167.1 casuali against causali. c.  Reading at p. 167.19 ex against et.



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[Examples and Solutions in the Third Species]

[1024]  One paralogizes in the third species in this way: ‘Whoever hamatur is seized by a hook, a woman amatur; therefore she is seized by a hook’.77 [167.27–28] [1025]  One should reply to this that the minor is ambiguous because the word ‘(h)amatur’ can be with an exhalation or without an exhalation. If it is without an exhalation, then it has a [light] breathing, and in this sense it is true and the conclusion does not follow. Or it can be taken with an exhalation, and then has a rough breathing, and in this sense the minor is false and a false conclusion follows. The major can be analyzed the same way, as is sufficiently clear. [167.28–35] [1026]  One should note that in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations Aristotle does not present other paralogisms of this fallacy but only presents two expressions in which the ambiguity in accord with this fallacy occurs, of which one is this: “Metuo longas noctes pereunte Lidia dormis.”78 There is ambiguity in this because the vocal sound ‘metuo’ can be a word, and then it conveys the same thing as ‘I fear’ does, or an expression, and then there are two ablatives, and then it is the same thing as saying ‘while I am yours’.79 The other is “Heu quianama tanti tanxerunt equora mundi.” There is ambiguity in this because the word ‘quianam’ can be taken intransitively, and then is sharpened at the end and conveys the same thing as ‘why’ does, or causally, and then it is made grave at the end.80 [167.35–168.5] [1027]  But a question could arise from the preceding: since there are four accidents of a syllable and the fallacy arises with respect to three, as was seen (1016), why does one not arise likewise with respect to the fourth, which is the number of letters? [168.5–7] [1028]  One should reply to this that in the fallacy of Accent an uncombined word must have a material identity. And because the identity can remain even after a change in accent, time, and breathing, but not after a change in the number of letters, so the fallacy cannot occur with respect to the fourth accident. Nor does one prevail if one speaks about or brings up the sign of exhalation, which is aspirated [and] not pronounced lightly in a word, for that sign of exhalation is not a letter.81 [168.8–15] [1029]  Someone will object: a logician does not analyze all the way to syllables but stands on a term as on his smallest [unit]; so syllables or the accents of a syllable are not his concern; therefore he ought not get involved with accents. [168.15–18]

a.  Reading at p. 167.41 quianam against quia non.

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[1030]  One should reply to this that there are two kinds of subjects: the subject in which [the accident] is received, that is, in which it is present, and this is a syllable; and the subject in which it is perceived, that is, in which part it is seen, and this is a word or term. For although any syllable is wont to be taken with an accenta, yet the accent is never perceived in a syllable unless [the latter] is a word or placed in a word. But a logician or sophist (who is a certain kind of logician) is concerned about the accent, not by reason of the subject in which it is received, but by reason of the subject in which it is perceived, namely, of a word, about which a sophist is concerned. [168.18–27] [1031]  One could argue against this that it does not come under the consideration of various philosophers, for a grammarian and a sophist are different sorts of philosophers. It does not seem, therefore, that accent comes under the consideration of a sophist, since its consideration pertains to the grammarian. [168.27–31] [1032]  One should reply to this that [the same thing] does not fall under the consideration of different craftsmen in the same way and for the same purpose, but the same thing can certainly fall under the consideration of different craftsmen in different ways and for a different purpose, for accent is considered by both the grammarian and the sophist. The grammarian pays attention to accent, determining what an accent is and what species of accent is appropriate to which vocal sound, and for the purpose of teaching. But a sophist pays attention to accent on the basis of which a deception can occur from the difference in accents in a vocal sound that follows upon a difference in the things consignified, all with respect to the same matter that, however, differs in the way it is pronounced, [and all] for the purpose of deceiving. [168.31–42] [The Fallacy of the Figure of a Word] 82

[1033]  The fallacy of the Figure of a Word follows, about which one should see what a figure of a word is and what the fallacy of the Figure of a Word is, what the cause of semblance is, what the cause of falsity is, and how many modes of paralogizing there are in that fallacy. [168.42–169.3] [The Nature of a Figure]

[1034]  Since Aristotle says in his Categories [that] the fourth kind of Quality is form or the constant figure surrounding something, it can be said that figure is a quality that is noticed in the disposition of the parts in a whole.83 Thus, two things are said to be of the same figure in that they have a similar arrangement of their parts. But

a.  Reading at p. 168.22 cum accentu against accentum.



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the figure of a word, as it is taken here, is the likeness of a word to a word, which is noticed in the similar arrangement of the words. [169.3–10] [The Definition of ‘the Fallacy of the Figure of a Word’]

[1035]  The fallacy of the Figure of a Word is the suitability to deceive taking origin from the similarity of one word to another. [169.10–12] [The Cause of Semblance and the Cause of Falsity]

[1036]  The cause of semblance in this fallacy is the similar formation with respect to a word and the similar arrangement of one word with another, causing one to believe that there is an absolute identity in the terms. [169.12–15] [1037]  One should note that to have the complete cause of semblance in this fallacy it is necessary to extend the similar relation of words one to another that comes from the similar ending of a vocal sounda to that [relation] which comes from the similar functions of a term when it serves as a subject and predicate and to that [relation] which comes from the similar impositions of vocal sounds to signify. [169.15–20] [1038]  The cause of falsity is the difference lying hidden under that similar configuration. [169.21] [The Three Species of the Figure of a Word]84

[1039]  There are three modes in this fallacy. Aristotle says in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations that expressions arise on the basis of the Figure of a Word when dissimilar things are interpreted similarly, that is, when dissimilar things are analyzed or signified in a similar way.85 Expressions, therefore, on the basis of the Figure of a Word come from a similar interpretation, i.e., from a similar analysis of dissimilar vocal sounds. But this similar interpretation of dissimilars can come from a similarity in the ending of a vocal sound, from a similarity in the functioning of a term as a subject or predicate, and from a similarity in the imposition of a vocal sound to signify. And for these reasons there are three modes of paralogizing in this fallacy. [169.22–32] [1040] The first [mode] occurs when one accidental gender is changed into another, e.g., masculine into feminine or feminine into neuter or neuter into one of these. This mode comes from the similarity in ending, for one who is deceived believes those vocal sounds have a similar gender because of the similarity in ending of the vocal sounds. The second mode occurs when one categorical genus is changed into another,

a.  Reading at p. 169.18 vocis against vocis que.

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e.g., a substance into an accident or into a quantity or into some other; or when one species of a category is changed into another species of the same category, e.g., continuous quantity into discrete, or vice versa. And this mode comes from the similar functions a term has when serving as a subject or a predicate, for a terms have an agreement among themselves in being a subject or predicate in all the categories—terms function as subjects and predicates in the categories of accidents (at least in the neuter gender) as well as in the category Substance, for one can correctly say ‘Someone white runs’, ‘Someone running is white’ just as ‘A man is an animal’, ‘An animal is a man’. And so because of this agreement one who is deceived believes that one [genus or species] can be taken under the other and be placed where the other would be placed. The third mode occurs when a sort is changed into a particular thing, that is, when something common is taken as if it were something singular, and this mode occurs from the similarity in imposition of a vocal sound to signify.86 What is common and [what is] proper are imposed to signify in the same way because they are under the mode of a singular. This is what Aristotle says in his Categories, [namely, that] under the figure of an appellation this singular something seems to be a substance, that is, every substance whether common or proper seems to signify a particular thing, that is, something singular under the figure of an appellation, that is, under the similarity in the imposition of a vocal sound to signify.87 Imposition of any vocal sound occurs for a singular thing, and so one who is deceived, seeing that there is this agreement between what is common and proper, believes that what is common can be taken for what is proper. [169.32–170.24] [Examples and Solutions in the First Species]

[1041]  One paralogizes in the first species in this way: ‘Whiteness inheres in a muse and a poet, but a muse is white; therefore a poet is also white’.88 [170.25–26] [1042]  One should reply to this that something masculine is interpreted for something feminine, that is, something masculine is taken as if it were something feminine, for ‘poet’ is in the masculine gender and it is taken incorrectly in the conclusion as if it were something feminine. If ‘musa’ (muse) and ‘poeta’ (poet) have a similar ending, it does not follow thereby that they are of the same gender. [170.26–31] [1043]  Another paralogism in which something feminine [virtue] is taken for something masculine [habit], e.g., ‘Every habit (habitus) is good, virtue is a habit; therefore virtue (virtus) is good (bonus)’. [170.32–34]

a.  Reading at p. 1704 nam against nam cum.



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* * * [1044]  Another is that in which something neuter [crowd] is taken for something masculine [people], e.g., ‘Every people (populus) is one, the crowd is a people; therefore the crowd (vulgus) is one (unus)’. [170.34–36] [1045]  There is a defect in all these paralogisms in that a gender is believed to be the same on the basis of a similar ending, which is not true. [170.36–38] [1046]  Note that the fallacy of the Figure of a Word with respect to the first species occurs not only when one gender is mistaken for another, but it can also certainly occur when the number is mistaken for another, as here: ‘“Dogma” and “poma” (the fruits of a tree) have a similar ending, but dogma is good; therefore the fruits of a tree are good’. It could also occur from mistaking one case for [another] case, and yet Aristotle makes mention only of mistaking one gender for [another] gender. The reason for this can be that a mistake is more accustomed to arise with respect to gender than to another accident. [170.38–171.6] [Examples and Solutions in the Second Species]

[1047]  One paralogizes in the second species in this way: ‘Whatever you bought yesterday you ate, you bought raw meat; therefore you ate raw meat’. [171.7–9] [1048]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid, for here one categorical genus is changed into another, namely, Substance into Quality. The distributive ‘whatever’ distributes only for things in the category Substance or for those that have the mode of a substance. So only what is a substance or what has the mode of a substance ought to be taken under it. Since, therefore, ‘raw’ indicates something in the category of Quality, it is not a substance or something having the mode of a substance. Because it indicates what it signifies concretely and not abstractly, it is incorrectly taken under [Substance]. [171.9–17] [1049]  Another paralogism in the same species: ‘However much fingers you had yesterday you have today a, but yesterday you had ten fingers; therefore you have ten today’. [171.17–20] [1050]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid, for here one species of a category is changed into another species of the same [category], for a continuous quantity is changed into a discrete one. ‘However much’ indicates only things having continuous quantity. Since, therefore, ‘ten’ is taken under the same and [‘ten’] indicates a thing of discrete quantity (because it indicates a number and a number is a

a.  Reading at p. 171.19 hodie against hodies.

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discrete quantity), so it is incorrectly taken under [the species continuous quantity]. One should know that ‘however many’ is distributive of discrete quantity just as ‘however much’ is distributive of continuous quantity. [171.20–29] [1051]  Another paralogism in the same species: ‘In whomever cutting inheres, in the same thriving inheres, but in whomever cutting inheres he cuts something; therefore in whomever thriving inheres he thrives something’, which is false because ‘thriving’ is intransitive whereas ‘cuttinga’ is not. [171.29–33] [1052]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid for one categorical genus is mistaken there for another, that is, Quality is mistaken for Action, that is, a quality is taken as if it were an action, for ‘cutting’ signifies an action whereas ‘thriving’ a quality. But because of the similar endings of these two, one who is deceived believes the two signify an action, and incorrectly. [171.33–39] [1053]  But someone will object: since ‘thriving’ is a verb, and according to Priscian every verb signifies acting or undergoing, it does not, then, signify a quality but acting or undergoing.89 [171.39–41] [1054]  One should reply to this that there are two things in a verb, namely, the thing signified and the mode of signifying. With respect to the mode of signifying it is true that every verb signifies acting or undergoing, and Priscian is speaking in this sense. But with respect to what is signified this is not true, for the thing signified by the verb can certainly be a quality, e.g., the thing signified by ‘whiteness’, which is a quality.90 Granted, therefore, that ‘thriving’ signifies acting or undergoing in its mode of signifying, yet what is signified by it—invigoration or vigor—is a quality, just as a cutting, which is what is signified by the verb ‘I cut’, is an action. And it is when speaking of the thing signified that one says in the resolution of the paralogism that ‘thriving’ signifies a quality b. [171.41–172.9] [Examples and Solutions in the Third Species]

[1055]  One paralogizes in the third species in this way: ‘An animal is Socrates, an animal is Plato; therefore an animal is Socrates and Plato’, which is false, for ‘animal’ in the conclusion supposits for numerically one animal, and numerically one animal is not Socrates and Plato.91 [172.10–13] [1056]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid because a sort is mistaken for a particular thing, that is, something common is mistaken for an indi-

a.  Reading at p. 171.33 secare against sedere. b.  Reading at p. 172.9 qualitatem against quantitatem.



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vidual. In the premises ‘animal’ is something common and is taken for something common: for one suppositum in the first and for another in the second. But in the conclusion it is taken for numerically one and the same animal. In this sense a sort is interpreted for a particular thing, and the Figure of a Word arises in this way. [172.14–20] [1057]  It is sufficiently clear that for a sort to be interpreted for a particular thing constitutes the Figure of a Word, for no fallacy occurs if an individual is put in the place of this common thing; rather, there will be an excellent argument in this sense: ‘Cicero is Socrates, Cicero is Plato; therefore Cicero is Socrates and Plato’. So it is clear that to take something common as if it were an individual causes this fallacy. [172.20–26] [The Third Species of the Figure of a Word and Changes in Supposition]92

[1058]  One should note in the paralogism discussed earlier (1055) there is the fallacy of From More than One Determinate Supposition to One Determinate Supposition, for when one says ‘An animal is Socrates’, ‘animal’ has determinate supposition. Likewise, when one says ‘An animal is Plato’ in the same way and in the conclusion, one proceeds from two determinate suppositions to one determinate one. Thus, inasmuch as the fallacy the Figure of a Word comes from proceeding from more than one determinate supposition to one, the paralogism is in the third species of the Figure of a Word, but [a paralogism] never [comes] from such a process unless a sort is interpreted for a particular thing. [172.26–36] [1059]  One should also note that every paralogism that comes from a change in supposition, i.e., from different modes of suppositing, is reduced to this third species. If the Figure of a Word comes from a change in supposition, a sort will always be interpreted there for a particular thing, as in ‘Every man is an animal; therefore an animal is every man’. Here the fallacy of the Figure of a Word occurs because the supposition of the term ‘animal’ is changed: in the first [proposition] it has confused immobile supposition, but in the conclusion determinate.93 Similarly a sort is interpreted here for a particular thing, for ‘animal’ is taken in the first for something common because it is held for more than one, whereas in the conclusion it is taken for an individual because it is held or taken for one suppositum determining the sign ‘is’. If [the name of] an individual were put in the place of ‘animal’, the argument would be excellent in this way: ‘Every man is Socrates; therefore Socrates is every man’. [172.36–173.11] [1060]  One should note that something [logically] superior or common is called a sort, and the reason is because every inferior is naturally compared with its superior and the superior is predicated of its inferior with respect to a what (quid), so something common or superior is called a what.94 But it is called a quality (quale) because it is something universal and the form of the things that are contained under it. So a predication is called formal when a universal is predicated of its inferior. But form is a quality, and so a universal or something superior is called a sort (quale quid), whereas

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a singular is called a particular thing because it is something discrete and distinct in itself. [173.11–20] [How the Figure of a Word Differs from All Other Fallacies]

[1061]  One should note that the fallacy of the Figure of a Word differs from the other verbal fallacies, for in the other fallacies something is signified that is not believed to be signified, but in this one what is believed to be signified is not signified. [173.20–23] [Extraverbal Fallacies]

[1062]  The extraverbal fallacies follow, which are seven, namely, Accident, In a Certain Respect and Absolutely, Ignorance Regarding Refutation, Begging the Original Issue, Consequent, Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause, Treating More Than One Question as One. [173.24–27] [The Fallacy of Accident] [Accidents, Subjects, and Attributes and Their Placements in the Three Figures

of Syllogisms]95

[1063]  Among these one should first speak of Accident. And because in para­ logisms that arise on the basis of Accident it is always necessary that three things be discovered—a subject, an accident, and something attributeda or an attribute—let us first see what term ought generally be called the subject, what the accident, and what the attribute, and by this one will see what an accident is.96 Later, one should see what the fallacy of Accident is, what the cause of semblance is, what the cause of falsity is, and how many modes of paralogizing there are in it. [173.28–35] [1064]  One should know that in every paralogism of Accident the major ex­ tremity is generally the attribute. And because the major extremity is always placed in the conclusion, the predicate of the conclusion is always the attribute, for something is always attributed in the conclusion to the subject or to the accident. But the subject and the accident are always placed in the minor proposition. Sometimes, however, the accident is the middle [and] the subject the minor extremity, and this happens in para­ logisms in which there is the arrangement of the first and second figures. Sometimes the subject is the middle and the accident the minor extremity, and this happens where there is the arrangement of the third figure. Note, therefore, that an accident is spoken

a.  Reading at p. 173.30–31 secundum rem subiectam et accidens et assignatum vel attributum against secundum rem, substantiam et accidens assignatum et attributum.



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of differently as a middle [in the first and second figures] and as a minor extremity [in the third].97 [173.35–174.4] [1065]  One should know, therefore, that an accident as a middle is something universal and is predicated of a subject per se and absolutely, but in relation to the attribute [the accident] is alien to [the attribute]. And then the subject, which is the minor extremity, is said to be that of which the accident is predicated. This is clear in the paralogism ‘Man is a species, Socrates is (a) man; therefore Socrates is a species’. Here ‘species’ is the attribute and is the predicate in the conclusion; ‘man’ is the accident, for per se and absolutely it is predicated of ‘Socrates’, but by attribution to the attribute ‘species’ it is extraneously predicated of the same. Man, inasmuch as it is a species, is an alienated predicate and does not belong to ‘Socrates’, for Socrates is not man, which is a species, but Socrates is a subject because ‘man’ is truly, absolutely, and per se predicated of ‘Socrates’ but not in relation to it as a species. The accident, when it is the minor extremity [in the third figure], is something universal that is predicated of the subject. But when there isa an attribute that truly belongs to the subject and is alien to [the subject’s] accident, then the subject, which is the middle [in the third figure], is that of which the accident and the attribute are truly predicated, but the attribute is not applicable to the accident. This is clear in ‘Socrates is an individual, Socrates is a man; therefore man is an individual’. ‘Man’ is the accident for it is truly predicated of ‘Socrates’, which is the subject. But ‘individual’ is alien to ‘man’, which [individual] was the attribute applicableb to ‘Socrates’, for ‘Socrates’ is the subject of which ‘individual’ and ‘a man’ are truly predicated, although ‘individual’ is not predicated of ‘man’. [174.4–30] [1066]  By this it is clear what an accident is in the fallacy of Accident. The accident spoken of here is not what is spoken of in contrast to substance, e.g., when it is said that white is an accident and a man something substantial, but an accident is said to be what is predicated per se, absolutely, and truly of a subject. But in relation to an attribute [of the subject] it is not predicated of the same subject, which occurs in paralogisms that have the arrangement of the first and second figures, and it is said to be an accident that is truly predicated of a subject. But the attribute that is truly applicable to the subject is alien to that accident, as in paralogisms that have the arrangement of the third figure. [174.31–40] [1067]  The reason why it is called an accident is this: every accident has a nature alien to that of which it is an accident, for the nature of a subject and an accident is different. And because an accident as it is taken here relates extraneously inasmuch as it is related to a subject and to an attribute, so the name ‘accident’ is assigned by reason of its extraneousness. So ‘accident’ conveys the same thing as ‘alienated’ does. [­ 174.40–175.3]

a.  Reading at p. 174.20 autem est against autem. b.  Reading at p. 174.28 conveniens against inconveniens.

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[1068]  The fallacy of Accident, therefore, is said to be the suitability to deceive coming from something extraneously relating to something inasmuch as it is related to different things. [175.3–6] [The Definition of ‘the Fallacy of Accident’]

[1069]  The fallacy of Accident is a certain suitability to deceive because of a particular identity of an accident with a subject preceding their total identity with each other. [175.7–10] [The Cause of Semblance and the Cause of Falsity]

[1070]  The cause of semblance in this fallacy is the partial identity of an accident with a subject, causing one to believe there to be a total identity between them. The cause of falsity is the difference between an accident and its subject lying hidden under the partial identity. [175.10–14] [The Three (or Four) Species of Accident]98

[1071]  Because they are deceived in this fallacy because of a partial identity that we believe to be total between an accident and a subject, so they are sometimes deceived by believing that what inheres in the accident inheres in the subject, sometimes vice versa, and sometimes by believing in something that inheres in the subject that the accident inheres in. On the basis of this there are three modes of paralogizing in this fallacy. [175.14–19] [1072] The first mode occurs when what inheres in the accident in the [major] premise is attributed to be in the subject in the conclusion. And in paralogisms of this mode the arrangement of the first figure is present, in which [paralogisms] the accident is the middle and the subject is the minor extremity. The second mode occurs when what inheres in the subject in the [major] premisea is attributed to inhere in the accident in the conclusion. And in paralogisms of this mode the arrangement of the third figure is present, in which [paralogisms] the accident is the minor extremity and the subject is the middle. The third mode occurs when that in which the accident inheres in the [major] premise is attributed to inhere in the subject in the conclusion. And in paralogisms of this mode the arrangement of the second figure is present, in which [paralogisms] the accident is the middle and the subject is the minor extremity. But one should know in this connection that, in order to have a greater variety than these

a.  Reading at p. 175.24–25 premissa against premissis.



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modes in the modes of this fallacy, it can be said that a [fourth] mode in this fallacy occurs when one proceeds from a divided predication to a conjoined one, and on the basis of this four modes will occur in this fallacy. Nevertheless, the fourth can well be reduced to the second. [175.20–37] [Examples and Solutions in the First Species]

[1073]  One paralogizes in the first species in this way: ‘Man is a species, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is a species’. [175.37–38] [1074]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid for ‘species’, the attribute, is attributed to inhere in ‘Socrates’, the subject, because it had inhered in ‘man’, the accident. But it is not necessary that whatever inheres in the accident inhere in the subject. So although ‘a man’ inheres in ‘Socrates’, it does not follow thereby that ‘species’ inheres in ‘Socrates’ becausea it inhered in ‘man’. [175.38–176.1] [1075]  But someone will object: according to Aristotle in his Categories when one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever are said of the predicate are also said of the subject.99 Thus, since ‘man’ is predicated of ‘Socrates’ as of a subject, it seems that ‘species’ is said of ‘Socrates’, since it is said of ‘man’. [176.1–6] [1076]  One should reply to this that Aristotle’s rule is to be understood in this sense, [namely], when a predicate is taken in the same sense in which it is related to a subject and in which it is related to what is said of that predicate, as in ‘A man is an animal, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is an animal’. Here ‘man’ is taken in the same sense when it is said of ‘Socrates’ and when ‘animal’ is said of it. So it follows well that ‘animal’, which was said of ‘man’, is said of ‘Socrates’. But in what was proposed, [‘man’] is not taken in the same sense when it is said of ‘Socrates’ and when ‘species’ is said of it. For ‘man’ is held for a suppositum and is something natural when it is said of ‘Socrates’, but it is held for a concept and is something in the mind when a species is predicated of it. So, although ‘man’ is said of ‘Socrates’ and a species is said of ‘man’, it does not follow thereby that a species is said of ‘Socrates’, because ‘man’ is not taken uniformly in the major and the minor. And since ‘man’ is the middle, it is clear that the middle is changed in the stated paralogism. [176.6–23] [1077]  Another paralogism in the same species: ‘All water is natural, every bath is water; therefore every bath is natural’. [176.24–26] [1078]  One should reply to this, just as to the previously stated paralogism, that it is invalid, for here the same thing is attributed to the subject and the accident, for

a.  Reading at p. 176.1 quia against qui.

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‘natural’ is the attribute that is attributed in the major to ‘water’, the accident, and in the minor to ‘bath’, the subject. Thus, one should know that the middle is not taken uniformly in the major and minor; rather, it is changed. For water is the middle, and in the major it is taken as it stands in its own proper nature, for to be something natural belongs to water on the basis of its own proper nature. But in the minor water is taken, not as it stands in its own proper nature, but as it is altered in a certain sense by something accruing from without, for a bath is not water in accord with the proper nature of water, but is water to which something accrues from without because it is water heated by fire. [176.26–39] [Examples and Solutions in the Second Species]

[1079]  One paralogizes in the second species in this way: ‘Socrates is an individual, Socrates is a man; therefore a man is an individual’. [176.40–41] [1080]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid, for ‘individual’, the attribute, is attributed in the conclusion to inhere in ‘man’, the accident, because in the major it inhered in ‘Socrates’, the subject, and thus the same is attributed to inhere in the subject and the accident. Thus it is to be resolved by saying that the middle is not taken uniformly in the major and the minor but rather is changed, for ‘Socrates’ is the middle, and it is not taken in the same way in the major and the minor. [176.41–177.8] [1081]  To make this clear note that, just as a species has something from the nature of its genus, so it has something from its own proper nature, just as a man has it from the nature of his genus that he senses, for he senses because he is an animal, not because he is a man. But from his own proper nature he has it that he is tame, for he is tame because he is a man, not because he is an animal. Similarly, an individual has something from the nature by which he is an individual, but [also] something from the nature of his species, just as Socrates has it from the nature by which he is an individual that he is from a certain place, of a certain parentage, and so on for the other characteristics of which an individual consists. But from the nature of his species he has it that he is a man, an animal. In the major, therefore, ‘individual’ is attributed to ‘Socrates’ on the basis of what he has from his proper and singular nature, for Socrates is not an individual by reason of the nature of something [logically] higher than he but by reason of his own proper and singular nature, by which he differs from other singular things. But in the minor ‘man’ is attributed to the same [‘Socrates’] on the basis of what he has by reason of the nature of something higher than he, for Socrates is a man in virtue of a common nature in which all individual mena agree, and with these things in mind ‘Socrates’ is taken differently in the major and minor.100 [177.8–26]

a.  Reading at p. 177.24 omnes singulares against omnia singularia.



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* * * [1082]  Another paralogism in the same species: ‘I know Coriscus, it is Coriscus who is approaching; therefore I know who is approaching’. [177.26–27] [1083]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid, for here ‘knowing’, the attribute, is attributed to inhere in ‘who is approaching’, the accident, because it inhered in the major in ‘Coriscus’, the subject. But it is not necessary that whatever inheres in the subject inhere in the accident. Thus, one should know that the middle is related in different ways to the extremes, for ‘Coriscus’, the middle, inasmuch as it is related to the major extremity, stands in its proper nature, but inasmuch as it is related to the minor extremity, it stands or receives upon itself a certain kind of nature which it did not previously have, namely, the act of approaching, in virtue of which it does not stand in its proper nature. And so ‘Coriscus’ presents itself in a different sense in the major and minor, and hence it does not follow that, if knowing inheres in Coriscus of itself, it thereby inheres in him inasmuch as the approaching inheres in him. [177.28–42] [1084]  But someone will object [that] the following is a good argument: ‘I am ­ itting Socrates, Socrates is someone sitting; therefore I am hitting someone sitting’. h Therefore [from the Topic] from similars the argument ‘I know’, etc. (1082) will be good. [177.42–178.2] [1085]  One should reply to this that without doubt the argument ‘I am hitting Socrates’, etc. is good, but not ‘I know’, etc., and the reason is this: there are two things in a Coriscus approaching, namely, the substance of Coriscus and his accident, namely, the approaching. And likewise, the same knowledge is equally originally generated of both of these, for the substance as well as the accident are wont to be known. So knowledge can fall upon the one in such a way that it stands there but is not directed to the other. Because of this it does not follow that, if knowledge falls upon Coriscus, it thereby falls upon his approaching, or vice versa. The case is not the same with respect to the blow for Socrates and someone sitting, for the blow does not equally primarily inhere in Socrates and someone sitting. Rather, it inheres in someone sitting by means of Socrates, for someone sitting is not struck except because Socrates is struck. And so it follows well that, if the blow inheres in Socrates, it also inheres in someone sitting, and in this sense the case was not similar for the act of hitting and of knowing. [178.2–16] [Examples and Solutions in the Third Species]

[1086]  One paralogizes in the third species in this way: ‘A man is an animal, an ass is an animal; therefore an ass is a mana’. [178.17–18]

a.  Reading at p. 178.18 asinus est homo against homo est asinus.

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[1087]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid, for here in the conclusion ‘man’, the attribute, is attributed to inhere in ‘ass’, the subject, because ‘animal’, the accident, inhered in ‘man’ in the major and in ‘ass’ in the minor. But it is not necessary that that in which an accident inheres also inhere in the subject, for even though two things agree in some term, it does not follow thereby that the one is the other. So it is to be resolved [by saying] that the middle is related differently to the extremes, for ‘animal’, the middle, is related to the major extremity inasmuch as it stands for an animal that is a man but to the minor [extremity] inasmuch as it stands for an animal that is an ass. [178.18–29] [1088]  Another paralogism similar to that: ‘Honey is ruddy, gall is ruddy; therefore gall is honey’. [178.29–31] [1089]  One should reply to this just as to the immediately preceding paralogism, and here ‘honey’ is the attribute, ‘gall’ the subject, but ‘ruddy’ is the accident. [178.31–33] [Examples and Solutions in the Fourth Species]

[1090]  One paralogizes in the fourth species in this way: ‘This dog is yours and it is a father; therefore it is your father’. [178.34–35] [1091]  One should reply to this that in this paralogism the attribute is ‘being yours’, the subject is ‘dog’, and the accident is ‘father’. Thus, since ‘being yours’ in the major is attributed to ‘dog’ as such and in the conclusion it is attributed to the same inasmuch as it belongs to it to be a father, the same thing is attributed to the subject and to the accident, and so the fallacy of Accident is present there. When ‘This dog is yours’ is said in the major, ‘being yours’ is predicated of ‘dog’ as such and absolutely. But when ‘This dog is your father’ is said in the conclusion, ‘being yours’ is predicated of ‘dog’ inasmuch as it belongs to it to be a father. The sense of the conclusiona [is that] this dog is your father, that is, this dog, as a father of another dog, is your [father], in such a way that ‘fatherb’ is thus called a predicate.101 [178.35–179.4] [1092]  Another paralogism similar to that: ‘This statue is yours and it is a work; therefore it is your work’. [179.4–6] [1093]  One should reply to this just as to the immediately preceding paralogism. Here ‘being yours’ is the attribute, ‘statue’ is the subject, and ‘work’ is the ­accident. ­[179.6–8]

a.  Reading at p. 179.2 conclusionis: iste against conclusionis iste:. b.  Reading at p. 179.4 pater against canis.



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[Rules for Inferring Something Conjoined from Divided Things] 102

[1094]  One should note that paralogisms of this species ought not to be formed in a way other than they are formed. One intends to infer something conjoined from the different predicates taken as different, and because this occurs in the way they are formed, it suffices to form them thus. To know when it is permitted to infer something conjoined from different things and from which things not, one should know that every predicate is either substantial or accidental. On this basis, if two predicated things are divided, either both are substantial, or both accidental, or one is substantial and the other accidental. If both are substantial, they are either interchangeable or not. [179.8–18] [1095]  If they are interchangeable, one may not infer something conjoined from different things because Babbling would occur. Thus, ‘Socrates is a man and is able to laugh; therefore Socrates is a man able to laugh’ does not follow. One should note that here the predicate is called substantial, which always inheres in a subject so long as the subject endures. [179.18–22] [1096]  But if they are not interchangeable, as [in the case where] one is broader and the other narrower, and if what is broader precedes and what is narrower follows, the inference holds well, as in ‘Socrates is an animal and is a man; therefore Socrates is an animal man’. [179.22–26] [1097]  But if what is narrower precedes and what is broader follows, the inference is invalid and it is Babbling, as in ‘Socrates is a man and is an animal; therefore Socrates is a man animal’. The explanation for this is that the latter is not understood in the former, but vice versa. [179.26–30] [1098]  But if both are accidental, either one is a disposition for the other to inhere or not. If one is [such a disposition], the inference is good, as in ‘Socrates is colored and is white; therefore he is colored white’. Likewise this follows well: ‘Socrates is quantified and qualified; therefore Socrates is quantified qualified’, for he cannot be white unless he is colored, nor can he be qualified unless he is quantified. And so colored is a disposition for white to inhere, and similarly quantified for qualified to inhere. [179.30–37] [1099]  But if there is no disposition for the other to inhere, then something conjoined never follows from divided things. Thus, this does not follow: ‘Socrates is white and is knowledgeable about music; therefore Socrates is white knowledgeable about music’, for white is not a disposition for knowledgeable about music to inhere because neither is something material or in potency with respect to the other. Likewise this does not follow: ‘This dog is yours and is a father; therefore it is your father’ (1090), for to be yours and to be a father are accidental things of which neither disposes for the other to inhere. Likewise, this does not follow: ‘This one is a monk and is white; therefore he is a white monk’, for someone can have a white body and a black habit. So to be

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white and to be a monk are accidental things of which neither disposes for the other to inhere. [179.37–180.5] [1100]  But if one is substantial and the other accidental, then the inference always follows, as in ‘Socrates is a man and is white; therefore he is a white man’. [180.5–8] [1101]  One should note from the preceding that it can be the case that, when an inference from divided things to something conjoined does not hold, either Babbling or the fallacy of Accident will occur. [180.8–10] [Rules for Inferring Divided Things from Something Conjoined]

[1102]  One should know that, just as it is not permitted to infer something conjoined from divided things, likewise it is not always permitted to infer something divided from something conjoined. [180.10–12] [Three Kinds of Determinations]

[1103]  To make this clear note that a predicate is called conjoined when it is taken with a determination. But there are three kinds of determinations: one is a contracting determination (contrahens), the second is an expanding one (distrahens), but the third is called an improper one. [180.12–16] [1104]  The determination that restricts its determinable, but does not divide it, is a contracting one. ‘This thing that is white’ is such a determination. If the predicate is taken with such a determination, then one is permitted to infer from what is conjoined, e.g., ‘Socrates is a white man; therefore he is a man and is white’. [180.16–21] [1105]  The determination that divides its determinable, asserting its opposite, is called an expanding one, e.g., ‘This thing that is dead’. If the predicate is taken with such a determination, one is never permitted to infer divided things from something conjoined. Thus, ‘Socrates is a dead man; therefore he is a man; therefore he is dead’ does not follow. When ‘dead man’ is said an opposed disposition is present in the adjective, that is, something is added there that asserts the opposite of that to which it is added, for ‘dead’ added to ‘man’ asserts the opposite of a man. [180.21–29] [1106]  The determination that can be said both of an entity and of a nonentity is called an improper one, and such a disposition is something imaginary. If the predicate is taken with such a disposition one is never permitted to infer divided things from something conjoined, for ‘The Antichrist is an imaginary man; therefore he is a man and is imaginary’ does not follow, for ‘imaginary’ can certainly be saida both of an entity and of a nonentity. [180.29–35]

a.  Reading at p. 180.35 dici against esse.



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[1107]  One should note that the determination called improper differs from a contracting and an expanding determination in this: that a contracting determination is said only of an entity, whereas an expanding one is said of a nonentity. An improper one, however, is said of an entity and a nonentity and thus divides completely with respect to ‘entity’. [180.35–40] [1108]  One should also note that in these [last two] the inference from something conjoined to divided things does not hold; rather, the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely occurs there. [180.40–42] [The Significance of Changed Relationships in the Middle]

[1109]  One should note that, as was seen in all the previously stated paralogisms, when the fallacy of Accident occurs it is necessary that the middle be changed. But it is certainly permissible for the middle to be changed and the fallacy of Accident will not thereby occur, e.g., ‘Every man is an animal, something white is a man; therefore something white is an animal’. There is no fallacy of Accident here. Nevertheless, ‘man’, the middle, is changed, for in the first [premise] it is related to the major extremity as to something essential to itself, [but] in the seconda it is related to the minor extremity as to something accidental to itself. [180.42–181.8] [1110]  For this reason one should know that not just any change in the middle effects the fallacy of Accident. The fallacy of Accident arises only at the time when the middle is taken in different senses in such a way that the middle taken in one sense is alien to itself taken in the other sense. And it occurs in this way in paralogisms where the arrangements of the first and second figures are present, or when the middle is taken in different senses in such a way that the attribute and the accident correctly belong to it taken in that sense. But then the attribute is alien to the accident, as occurs in paralogisms in which the arrangement of the third figure is present. [181.8–17] [The Fallacy of Accident and Affirmations]

[1111]  One should know that the fallacy of Accident only occurs in affirmative [paralogisms] of Accident, as is clear in these paralogisms: ‘A man is not an individual, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is not an individual’. ‘Individual’ is the attribute that in the conclusion is denied of ‘Socrates’, the subject, because in the major it was denied of ‘a man’, the accident. But if one says ‘Socrates is not a species, Socrates is a man; therefore a man is not a species’, here ‘species’, the attribute, is denied in the conclusion of ‘a man’, the accident, because in the major it is denied of ‘Socrates’, the ­subject. [181.17–27] a.  Reading at p. 181.7 secunda against secundo.

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[Aristotle’s Two Examples]

[1112]  One should note that in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations Aristotle posits two paralogisms in this fallacy.103 [181.28–29] [1113]  The first of these is ‘From a man Coriscus is different, Coriscus is a man; therefore he is different from himself ’. [181.29–31] [1114]  Here there seems to be the arrangement of the first figure, and ‘Coriscus’ is the subject, ‘a man’ is the accident, and ‘being different from’ is the attribute. Thus, what was first attributed to the accident in the major is attributed to the subject in the conclusion. One ought to understand that the whole—‘that Coriscus is different from’—is the major extremity, whereas ‘a man’ is the middle and ‘Coriscus’ is the minor extremity. [181.31–37] [1115]  One should also note that in this paralogism ‘a man’, the middle, is changed because of its relation to the major and minor extremities. There are two things in ‘man’, namely, a form, which is humanity, and supposita that share that form. ‘Man’, therefore, is related to the major extremity by reason of the suppositum that shares the form that is in it, for it does not belong to any singular man to be different from [another] man by reason of form, because that is the same in all the supposita. But it can of course belong to some singular man that he be different from [another] man by reason of the suppositum, for supposita differ among themselves. But it is related to the minor extremity by reason of form, which is shared by the supposita. When one says ‘Coriscus is a man’, here is a predication of something [logically] higher of something lower, which is formal, and so it is predicated by reason of form. It is interpreted, then, in the major for a suppositum and in the minor for a form, and in this way it is changed. [181.37–182.11] [1116]  The second paralogism is this: ‘From Socrates Coriscus is different, Socrates is a man; therefore from a man Coriscus is different’. [182.12–13] [1117]  Here there seems to be the arrangement of the third figure, and ‘Socrates’ is the subject, ‘man’ is the accident, and ‘being different from’ is the attribute. Thus, what was first attributed to the subject in the major is attributed to the accident in the conclusion. For one should understand that the whole—‘that Coriscus is different from’—is the major extremity, ‘Socrates’ is the middle, and ‘a man’ is the minor ­extremity. [182.13–19] [1118]  Note that in this paralogism ‘Socrates’, which is the middle, is changed because of its relation to the major and minor extremities, for, as was said above ­(1080–81, 1115), an individual has something from the nature of its species. Since, therefore, Socrates is an individual, he has something from the nature by which he is an individual, and in this way he is related to the major extremity, for one singular is not different from another except by the nature by which he is an individual. But he has something from the nature of his species, and in this way he is related to the minor



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extremity. For when one says ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘man’ is predicated of ‘Socrates’ in virtue of a common nature in man that is the same in all singulars. Therefore it is taken in the major with respect to the things that it has from the nature by which it is an individual but in the minor with respect to the things that it has from the nature of its species, and in this way it is changed. [182.19–33] [1119]  But someone will object: in the fallacy of Accident the premises ought to be true and the conclusion false, but in the first paralogism of Aristotle (1113) ‘From a man Coriscus is different’ is a premise, [whereas] in the second (1116) it is the conclusion; therefore it seems that Aristotle would have it for true and for false, which is impossible. [182.33–37] [1120]  One should reply to this that in the proposition ‘From a man Coriscus is different’ ‘a man’ can be taken by reason of the form that is humanity, and in this sense it is false and the conclusion is asserted with this understanding in the second para­ logism. Or it can be taken by reason of the supposita that share that form, and in this sense it is true, and the premise is asserted with this understanding in the first para­ logism. It is true that it can be true and false, and this is certainly possible on the basis of different understandings, but nevertheless it is impossible on the basis of the same understanding. [182.37–183.2] [The Fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely] 104

[1121]  The fallacy In a Certain Respect and Absolutely follows. With respect to it one should see what is called a word in a certain respect and what a word absolutely, what the fallacy In a Certain Respect and Absolutely is, what the cause of semblance is, what the cause of the falsity is, and how many modes of paralogizing there are in it. [183.3–7] [The Definition of the Fallacy of ‘In a Certain Respect and Absolutely’]

[1122]  A word is called “in a certain respect” that is taken with a determination determining it; a word [is called] “absolutely” that is taken without such a determination. The fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely is the suitability to deceive coming from the particular identity of a word taken in a certain respect with the word taken absolutely, yet simulating [that] a total identity exists between them. [183.8–13] [The Cause of Semblance and the Cause of Falsity]

[1123]  The cause of semblance in this fallacy is the particular identity of a word taken in a certain respect with the word taken absolutely, causing one to believe them to be absolutely the same. The cause of falsity is the difference between a word taken in a certain respect and the word taken absolutely. [183.14–17]

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[The Two Principal Modes in This Fallacy]

[1124]  There are two principal modes of paralogizing in this fallacy. One occurs when one proceeds from a word taken in a certain respect to the word taken absolutely; the other is present when one proceeds vice versa, namely, from a word taken absolutely to the word taken in a certain respect, for this fallacy arises in both of these two modes. And because there is always a restricting determination in the case of a word taken in a certain respect, so inasmuch as there are different determinations there are different modes of paralogizing proceeding from a certain respecta to absolutely, or vice versa. [183.17–26] [The Six Species of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely]105

[1125]  (1) There is a restricting (diminuens) determination that contracts that to which it is added to a material or integralb part, as when one says ‘white with respect to teeth’. ‘With respect to teeth’ is a restricting determination with respect to ‘white’, contracting it to an integralc part, because to teeth. (2) There is a restricting determination that contracts that to which it is added to a subjective part, as when someone says ‘imaginary entity’, for ‘imaginary’ divides with respect to the notion of an entity [considered] absolutely, and in some sense contracts ‘entity’ to a subjective part. ‘Entity’ can be divided into entity in act and entity in potency or in imagination, just as what is [logically] superior can be divided into its inferiors. (3) There is a restricting determination that contracts that to which it is added to a modal part, as when one says ‘imaginary eye’ or ‘dead man’, for ‘imaginary’ divides with respect to ‘eye’ and is a modal part with respect to an eye.106 (4) There is a restricting determination that contracts that to which it is added to a local part, as when one says ‘It is good to punish one’s father in court’. (5) There is a restricting determination that contracts that to which it is added to a temporal part, as when one says ‘It is good to fast during Lent’. And (6) there is a restricting determination that implies a certain respect, as when one says ‘Riches are not good for a fool’. [183.26–184.3] [Examples and Solutions in the Six Species]

[1126]  On the basis of these six determinations one customarily paralogizes in six modes, proceeding from in a certain respectd to absolutely. For example, (1) ‘An Ethioa.  Reading at p. 183.25 secundum quid against quid. b.  Reading at p. 183.27–28 integralem against intelligibilem. c.  Reading at p. 183.30 integralem against intelligibilem. d.  Reading at p. 184.4 secundum quid against quid.



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pian is white with respect to teeth; therefore he is white’; (2) A chimera is an imaginary entity; therefore it is an entity’; (3) ‘This is a dead man; therefore it is a man’; (4) ‘It is good to punish one’s father in court; therefore it is good to punish one’s father’; (5) ‘It is good to fast during Lent; therefore it is good to fast’; (6) ‘Riches are not good for a fool or for one who abuses [them]; therefore they are not good’. [184.3–10] [1127]  One should reply to all these paralogisms that they are invalid because one proceeds in them from a word taken in a certain respect to a word taken absolutely. But a word taken in a certain respect does not assert a word taken absolutely, as is sufficiently clear. [184.10–14] [1128]  But Aristotle seems to be against this in Book Two of the Topics near the end, when he says that “it is possible for [something] to inhere in a certain respect, and it is possible for [something] to inhere absolutely,” and in such a way that [something] in a certain respect can inhere absolutely.107 [184.14–17] [1129]  One should reply to this that a word taken in a certain respect is a word with a determination. One sort of determination is one that does not restrict with respect to that to which it is added, as when one says ‘A white man runs’, and Aristotle is speaking in Book Two of the Topics of that sort of a certain respect in which such a determination occurs. But such a word taken in a certain respect of course implies its word taken absolutely. The other sort of determination is one that restricts with respect to that to which it is added, as when one says ‘dead man’ and ‘imaginary eye’, and that sort of a certain respect in which such a determination occurs is taken in the paralogism of this fallacy, for that sort of a certain respect does not imply its word taken absolutely. And so it is clear that ‘in a certain respect’ is interpreted differently here and in Book Two of the Topics. For this reason there is nothing contrary [in the o ­ bjection]. [184.18–30] [1130]  Someone will object: this follows well: ‘This one is curly with respect to his heada; therefore he is curly absolutely’. Likewise: ‘This one is simianb with respect to his nose; therefore he is simianc absolutely’. It seems, therefore, that [from the Topic] from a similar this follows: ‘He is white with respect to his teeth; therefore he is white absolutely’. [184.31–35] [1131]  One should reply to this that there are two kinds of accidents: some are accidentsd that have being determinately in one part of the body but not just in any part, e.g., curliness in the head and simianness in the nose, and such denominate a whole subject from a part. There are others that do not determine for themselves a part

a.  Reading at p. 184.31 secundum caput against capud. b.  Reading at p. 184.32 simus against simius. c.  Reading at p. 184.33 simus against simius. d.  Reading at p. 184.36 accidentia against genera.

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of the body, e.g., whiteness and blackness, which can be in any part of a body. Such do not denominate a whole from a part. In the case of the first [sort of determination] it follows well that what inheres in a part inheres in the whole because it allocates to itself a part, and then no fallacy arises. But in the case of the second [sort of determination] it does not follow because they do not allocate to themselves any part of a body. Thus, the first and the second sorts of determinations are not similar. [184.35–185.5] [Examples of Inferences from a Word Taken Absolutely to One Taken in a Certain Respect]

[1132]  One should know that, when proceeding negatively and affirmatively from a word taken absolutely to a word taken in a certain respect, in as many modes as there can arise paralogisms in this fallacy in so many modes can they arise vice versa, as should someone say ‘This is a man; therefore he is a dead man’, and similarly ‘This is not a man; therefore he is not a dead man’. And one can occur in this way in other modes, as is sufficiently clear. [185.6–12] [1133]  One should reply to these paralogisms and those similar that they are invalid, for there is a movement in these from a word taken absolutely to the same word taken in a certain respect. But a word taken absolutely does not posit a word taken in a certain respect, just as neither vice versa. [185.12–15] [1134]  But someone could object: since Aristotle never presents paralogisms in this fallacy in which there is a movement from a word taken absolutely to a word taken in a certain respect, it seems that Aristotle is incomplete or that one is not to consider such a movement as fallacious. [185.15–20] [1135]  One should reply to this that this fallacy arises more frequently when proceeding from a word taken in a certain respect to a word taken absolutely than vice versa. Because of this he presents paralogisms of this fallacy when proceeding from a word taken in a certain respect to a word taken absolutely more than vice versa in order to signal that it arises more frequently in this way and less frequently in the other way. But he does not deny that this fallacy can certainly occur when proceeding from a word taken absolutely to a word taken in a certain respect. [185.20–27] [Four Examples from Aristotle]

[1136]  One should also note that the four paralogisms that Aristotle presents on the basis of this fallacy in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations can be formulated in this way:108 (1) ‘Every entity exists, a chimera is an imaginary entity; therefore a chimera exists’. (2) ‘Every thing that is not an entity does not exist, an ass is not a man entity; therefore an ass does not exist’. (3) ‘An Indian is black and is white with respect



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to his teeth; therefore he is white and black’. Here the defect occurs with respect to the fact that the individual is concluded to be white and not with respect to the fact that he is concluded to be black. And (4) ‘Socrates is white with respect to his feet and is black with respect to his hand; therefore he is white and black’. And the defect occurs with respect to the fact that one concludes that Socrates is white and with respect to the fact that one concludes that Socrates is black. [185.27–39] [1137]  One should reply that these paralogisms are invalid because being absolutely does not follow from being in a certain respect, nor does nonbeing absolutely follow from nonbeing in a certain respect. In the first, third, and fourth [examples] one concludes from being in a certain respect to being absolutely, but in the second, from nonbeing in a certain respect to nonbeing absolutely. [185.39–186.4] [1138]  But someone will object: ‘This one is not a man; therefore he does not exist’ contains the fallacy of Consequent from the destruction of the antecedent, for it follows vice versa. Therefore, the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely will not occur here. [186.4–7] [1139]  One should reply to this that it is not inappropriate for more than one fallacy to be in the same expression but on the basis of different reasons. Thus, in the previously stated paralogism the fallacy of Consequent a and the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely can certainly be present on the basis of different operative principles, that is, on the basis of different causes of semblance. If one believes that ‘It is not a man; therefore it does not exist’ follows because it follows vice versa, then the fallacy of Consequentb is present, for in this sense what follows the first operative principle is, therefore, a good converse consequence. But if someone believes that ‘It is not a man; therefore it does not exist’ follows because of the particular identity that obtains between not being a man and not existing, then the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely is present. And then the operative principle is the particular identity of a word taken in a certain respect and the word taken absolutely. And on this issue Aristotle places this paralogism in the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely.  ­[186.7–23] [Insolubles]

[1140]  One should also note that on the basis of this fallacy paralogisms are wont to arise that are insoluble. They are called insoluble, not because they cannot be solved, but because they are difficult to solve.109 [186.23–26]

a.  Reading at p. 186.10 consequentis against contingentis. b.  Reading at p. 186.14–15 consequentis against contingentis.

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[Aristotle’s Examples of an Insoluble]

[1141]  With respect to these Aristotle places these paralogisms in Book Two of On Sophistical Refutations, of which one is this: let it be supposed that someone begins to speak in this way: ‘By God, Ia am commiting perjury.110 Then it is asked whether he who swears in this way swears truthfully or not. If one says that he truthfully swears, against [this one opposes]: if one truthfully swears, one swears the truth, but he swears he is perjuring himself; therefore he swears the truth; therefore that he perjures himself is true, and so he perjures himself; therefore he falsely swears, which is opposed to what was given. If one says that he falsely swears, against [this one opposes]: he swears that he perjures himself; therefore that he perjures himself is true, and he swears this; therefore he swears something true, and who swears something true does not swear falsely, which is opposed to what was given. [186.26–36] [1142]  In response to this one should reply with Aristotle in On Sophistical Refutations: he who starts out speaking in this way, ‘By God, I am committing perjury’, swears that he commits perjury.111 When, therefore, one asks whether he who swears in this way swears truthfully or not, one should reply that such a one swears falsely absolutely, for he commits perjury b, butc in a certain respect he swears truthfully. On the supposition that he swears falsely, then the deduction that was given should be conceded with respect to the first part. [186.36–187.2] [1143]  And one should reply that this follows well in this way: ‘He swears that he is committing perjury; therefore that he is committing perjury is true’, when afterwards one says: ‘He swears this; therefore he swears something true’. [187.2–4] [1144]  One should say that here there is the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely for he who swears that he is committing perjury does not swear something true absolutely, but only in a certain respect. And so it does not follow that such a one truthfully swears, but better that he falsely swears, since he is committing perjury absolutely. Nevertheless, he truthfully swears in a certain respectd, namely, with respect to the fact that he is committing perjury. [187.4–10] [1145]  Another [insoluble] that Aristotle similarly presents: let it be supposed that someone starts out speaking in this way: ‘Ie am saying something false’.112 Then let the one speaking in this way ask: ‘Am I saying something true or am I saying something false?’ If one says, ‘True’, against [this he opposes]: ‘All that I am saying is that I a.  Reading at p. 186.28 ego against ergo. b.  Reading at p. 186.40. se against se,. c.  Reading at p. 186.40 autem against aut. d.  Reading at p. 187.9 secundum quid against ad quid. e.  Reading at p. 187.11 ego against ergo.



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am saying something false, and this is true; therefore I am saying something false’, which is the opposite of what was given. If one says ‘False’, against [this he opposes]: ‘I am saying nothing except that I am saying something false; therefore that I am saying something false is false, but this is something false; therefore I am not saying something false; therefore I am saying something true, since I am saying that every statement that is true is falsea’. [187.10–18] [1146]  One should reply to this with Aristotle in Book Two of On Sophistical Refutations: whoever starts out speaking like this: ‘I am saying something false’ says something false absolutely, but something true in a certain respect.113 When, therefore, the one who speaks in this way asks: ‘Am I saying something true or am I saying something false?’ one should respond [that] he is saying something false absolutely, but something true in a certain respect. The deduction, therefore, that was made, if it is given that he is saying something true, should be conceded. With respect to what was inferred and supposing that he is saying something false, one should speak in this way: this does not follow: ‘I am saying nothing other than that I am saying something false; therefore that I am saying something false is false’, becauseb the solution is clear: when one says ‘I am saying something false’ it is the same as were one to say ‘I am uttering this false statable’, and ‘false’c supposits for false statables other than ‘that I am saying something false’, but it supposits for that one in a certain respect. [187.18–31] [1147]  The reason for this is that a part does not supposit absolutely for that of which it is a part but only in a certain respect. What supposits for another is a whole with respect to it, as ‘man’ can supposit for Socrates because it is a whole with respect to Socrates. So since ‘false’d is a part of this stateable, it does not supposit for it except in a certain respect. And because in that inference one proceeds as if ‘false’e were s­ uppositing absolutely for the statable ‘that I am saying something false’, so this movement is not valid; rather, the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely occurs there. ­[187.31–39] [The Fallacy of Ignorance Regarding Refutation] 114

[1148]  The fallacy of Ignorance Regarding Refutation follows, about which one should see what a refutation is, what the fallacy of Ignorance Regarding Refutation is, what the cause of semblance is, what the cause of the falsity is, and how many modes of paralogizing there are in it. [187.40–188.2] a.  Reading at p. 187.18 esse falsam against vel falsa. b.  Reading at p. 187.27 quia against quod. c.  Reading at p. 187.29 ‘falsum’ against falsum. d.  Reading at p. 187.35 ‘falsum’ against falsum. e.  Reading at p. 187.36–37 ‘falsum’ against falsum.

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[The Definition of ‘Refutation’]

[1149]  According to Aristotle in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations a refutation is a contradiction of one and the same [attribute], not of the name alone, but of the thing together with the name, and not of a synonym but of the very same name, on the basis of things that were given, and [following] necessarily, without including what was [stated] at the beginning, in the same respect, in the same relation, in the same way, and at the same time.115 [188.3–7] [What Refutation Adds to Syllogism]

[1150]  To make this definition clear one should know that every refutation is a syllogism and in addition it adds a contradiction to the syllogism, for according to Aristotle in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations a refutation is a syllogism containing a contradiction of the [original] conclusion. Thus, every refutation is a syllogism, but not every syllogism is a refutation. There are included, therefore, in that definition certain conditions that are common to a syllogism and a refutation; but certain ones are associated with a syllogism inasmuch as it is a syllogism, and certain ones with a refutation inasmuch as it is a refutation. [188.8–16] [Explanation of the Definition of ‘Refutation’]

[1151]  The first two conditions—“a contradiction of one and the same [attribute], not of the name only, but of the thing together with the name, and not of a synonym”— are as much common to a syllogism as to a refutation, for these two conditions indicate an identity in name and thing. But there can be no syllogism or refutation unless there is an identity in name and thing, for if someone says ‘Every sword is good, some blade is a sword; therefore some blade is good’, nothing follows from these because there is a deficiency in identity of name. Also, if someone says ‘Every dog runs, the celestial star is a dog; therefore the celestial star runs’, it does not follow because of the deficiency there in identity of thing. The syllogism is blocked, therefore, by lack of identity in name and by lack of identity in thing. And the case is similar for a refutation, since it is a syllogism. Thus it is clear that these conditions are common to a syllogism and a refutation. [188.16–30] [1152]  But two other conditions follow—“on the basis of things that were given, and [following] necessarily, without including what was [stated] at the beginning”— [and] are associated with the syllogism inasmuch as it is a syllogism. Two things are required to have a syllogism perfect in special matter: a necessary inference from premises to a conclusion and a manifestation (notificatio) of a conclusion by means of



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the premises. The necessary inference is touched on by “on the basis of things that were given, and [following] necessarily”; manifestation is touched on by “without including what was [stated] at the beginning.” For if what is [stated] at the beginning were continued, nothing [new] would arisea, and Begging the Original Issue will be present, as will be clear below (1170). [188.30–40] [1153]  The other four that follow, namely, “in the same respect, in the same relation, in the same way, and at the same timeb,” are associated with a refutation inasmuch as it is a refutation, that is, inasmuch as it adds the naturec of a contradiction to a syllogism, for, lacking either of these conditions, a contradiction is lacking. [188.40–189.4] [1154]  One should also know that a refutation is sometimes one syllogism but sometimes two syllogisms. It is one syllogism when, given one part of a contradiction, the other is syllogistically concluded. For example, if one is given this: ‘Socrates is not running’, then let this be said: ‘Every man runs, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates runs’. This is a refutation that is one syllogism because the syllogism occurs here with respect to one part of a contradiction and not with respect to the other. [Refutation] involves a double syllogism when both parts of a contradiction are syllogistically concluded, that is, when a syllogism arises with respect to both parts of a contradiction, as in ‘Every mother loves, Medea is a mother; therefore Medea loves; no one who kills loves, Medea is one who kills; therefore Medea does not love’. What, therefore, was said above (1150), [namely], a refutation is a syllogism containing a contradiction of the [original] conclusion, ought to be understood in this way: a refutation is a syllogism in which the contradiction of a proposition previously conceded is concluded, which occurs when there is one syllogism, or the contradiction of something previously conceded, which happens when there is a double syllogism.116 [189.4–21] [1155]  One should also note that, although there is one way of speaking when saying that a refutation is a contradiction and [another when saying that] a refutation is a syllogism containing a contradiction of the [original] conclusion, the same thing is understood by both. For when one says that a refutation is a contradiction, it should be interpreted in this way: a refutation is a syllogism in which the contradiction of something previously conceded is concluded. It should be interpreted in the same way if one says that a refutation is a syllogism with a contradiction of the [original] conclusion, as has been seen above (1150). So, although the wording is different, the sense is yet the same. [189.21–29]

a.  Reading at p. 188.39 fieret against fiet. b.  Reading at p. 189.1 secundum idem . . . eodem tempore against idem . . . tempore. c.  Reading at p. 189.3 natura against naturam.

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[1156]  One should know that “of one and the same,” which was included in the definition of ‘refutation’ (1149) so that there be no Babbling, refers to different things, for ‘of one’ refers to the subject and ‘of the same’ to the predicate, so that one would understand that the contradiction which is concluded of one subject and one predicate must be of what was previously conceded or previously concluded, for there is no contradiction except between those propositions that have the same subject and the same predicate. [189.30–37] [1157]  One should note that “not of a synonym but of the very same” found in the definition of ‘refutation’ is not one differentia by itself but an exposition of what preceded it, namely, of a name, so that the sense would be: together with a name, and not of a synonym but of the very same, namely, name, which is not a synonym but the same name, for in a contradiction not only is there required an identity in thing but also in name. [189.37–43] [Etymology of ‘Synonym’]

[1158]  One should also note that ‘synonym’ is derived from ‘syn’, which is ‘with’, and ‘onoma’, which is ‘name’, for they are called synonyms because they accompany one another, e.g., when there is more than one name of one thing, like ‘sword’ and ‘blade’. [189.43–190.3] [The Definition of ‘the Fallacy of Ignorance Regarding Refutation’]

[1159]  Ignorance regarding refutation is the omission of some part of the definition of ‘refutation’, and it is called ignorance regarding refutation, not because the refutation ignores [something], but because it is ignored, so that ‘ignorance’ is understood passively and not actively. But the fallacy of Ignorance Regarding Refutation is the suitability to deceive coming from an omission of some part or some parts or from an omission of some of the things that are required for a true refutation. [190.3–10] [The Cause of Semblance and the Cause of Falsity]

[1160]  The cause of semblance is the apparent contradiction of the things that are concluded, for by the fact that there appears to be a contradiction, there seems to be a true refutation, when there is none. The cause of the falsity is the lack of contradiction that follows from a lack of true refutation. [190.10–14] [Two Ways of Considering This Fallacy]

[1161]  Because of this consequence one should note that Ignorance Regarding Refutation can be considered in two ways. [190.14–15]



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[1162]  In one way inasmuch as there is an omission of any of the parts included in the definition of ‘refutation’, and in this sense ignorance regarding refutation is not a separate fallacy but one common to all the other fallacies both verbal and extraverbal. Since there are some conditions in a refutation associated with syllogism, and some that are associated with refutation, and some that are common to refutation and syllogism, but paralogisms of any fallacy offend against syllogism or refutation, [therefore] all arise on the basis of ignorance regarding refutation, and in this sense this fallacy is not distinct from the others. [190.15–24] [1163]  Ignorance Regarding Refutation can be considered in another way inasmuch as it is an omission of one of the four conditions that, taken together, make up a refutation or are associated with refutation inasmuch as it is refutation, which are “in the same respect,” “in the same relation,” “in the same way,” and “at the same time.” And in this sense Ignorance Regarding Refutation is a separate fallacy distinct from the others. [190.25–30] [The Four Species of Ignorance Regarding Refutation]117

[1164]  One should say, therefore, that there are four ways of paralogizing in this fallacy on the basis of the number of the conditions. The first way of paralogizing occurs when the condition “in the same respect” is omitted; the second occurs when “in the same relation” is omitted; the third when “in the same way” is omitteda; and the fourth when “at the same time” is omitted. [190.30–35] [Examples and Solutions in the Four Species]

[1165]  One paralogizes in these modes taken in order in this way: (1) ‘A is twice as great as b in length, but not in width; therefore it is double and not double’. (2) ‘Two are twice one and are not twice three; therefore they are double and not double’. (3) ‘He runs quickly, but he does not run wisely; therefore he runs and he does not run’. (4) ‘Yesterday Socrates was just, the day before he was not just; therefore he was just and not just’. [190.35–42] [1166]  One should reply to these paralogisms and to those like them that they are invalid, for no conclusion that is true is concluded in them, although one might seem apparently to be concluded. Each of these omits one of the conditions without which there is no true contradiction or true refutation. So in the first the condition “in the same respect” is omitted; in the second the condition “in the same relation”; in the third the condition “in the same way”; and in the fourth the condition “at the same time.” [190.42—191.6]

a.  Reading at p. 190.32 omittitur against amittitur.

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[Two Differences between Ignorance Regarding Refutation and In a Certain Respect and Absolutely]118

[1167]  One should also note that this fallacy and the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely are different. In paralogisms of Ignorance Regarding Refutation two determinations are always asserted in the premises. When one says ‘A is twice as great as b in length’ there is one determination, and when one says afterward ‘It is not twice as great in width’ there is another determination, and so there are two determinations. But in paralogisms of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely it is not always necessary to assert twoa determinations. Rather, one may well paralogize with one determination in the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely, as in ‘He is white with respect to his teeth; therefore he is white’, although one may also certainly paralogize with two determinations, as in ‘Socrates is white with respect to his foot, and he is not white with respect to his hand; therefore he is white and not white’. [191.6–19] [1168]  There is another difference: in paralogisms of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely a restricting determination is always asserted that does not imply its determinable. But in paralogisms on the basis of Ignorance Regarding Refutation a nonrestricting determination is always asserted that clearly implies its determinable. [191.19–23] [The Fallacy of Begging the Original Issue] 119

[1169]  The fallacy of Begging the Original Issue follows, about which one should see what an issue is, what begging an original issue is, what the cause of the semblance is, what the cause of the falsity is, and how many modes of paralogizing there are in it. [191.24–27] [The Definition of ‘Begging the Original Issue’]

[1170]  An issue, as it is taken here, is what one originally intends to prove. Begging the original issue is the assumption of something in order to prove what is intended to be proved when what is assumed is as equally known as, or less known than, what is intended to be proved. He begs the original issue who does not prove what is intended to be provedb, but rather assumes what is equally known, orc not more but d

a.  Reading at p. 191.13–14 ponere duas against ponere. b.  Reading at p. 191.32 probari against probare. c.  Reading at p. 191.33 vel against et. d.  Reading at p. 191.33 sed against vel.



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less known, for the purpose of proving what is intended. The fallacy of Begging the Original Issue is the suitability to deceive coming from the fact that we believe there is a difference between premises and a conclusion when the conclusion is the same as the premises. [191.27–37] [The Cause of the Semblance and the Cause of the Falsity]

[1171]  The cause of the semblance is the apparent difference between what is doing the implying and what is implied, together with the necessity of the consequence. Since the conclusion appears to be different from the premises, and a consequence is necessary, the one who is deceived believes that there is no defect there. The cause of the falsity is the identity between what does the implying and what is implied, together with a lack of manifestation (notificatio) of what is implied by what does the ­implying. [191.37–42] [1172]  But one should know that paralogisms of this fallacy do not block an implication, because they do indeed imply. But they block manifestation because they prove nothing. For there to be a proof it is required that what does the implying be better known than what is implied. But in paralogisms of this fallacy what does the implying is always as equally known as or less known than what is implied, but never better known, and so [the premises] do not block a syllogism that implies, but they do one that proves (sillogismus inferens sed probans). [191.42–192.6] [The Five Species of Begging the Original Issue]

[1173]  But one should know that this fallacy is wont to arise in as many modes as it is fitting to beg what is in the original issue, as Aristotle proposes in the beginning of On Sophistical Refutations.120 But it is possible to beg what is in the original issue in five ways, as Aristotle proposes in Book Four of the Topics near the end.121 [192.6–10] [1174] The first mode occurs when the same thing is begged in its very self, that is, when the same thing is taken toa prove itself, which can happen by assuming the same thing with respect to what is signified and name, as in ‘A man runs; therefore a man runs’; or the same in reality but not in name, e.g., ‘Marcus runs; therefore Tullius runs’;122 and similarly: ‘A mortal rational animal runs; therefore a man runs’. The second mode occurs when a particular is begged in a universal, that is, when a universal is assumed to prove a particular b. For example, if someone wanted to prove that the science of contraries is the same and assumes this: ‘Of all opposed things the science is

a.  Reading at p. 192.12 ad against ab. b.  Reading at p. 192.17–18 particulare against particularem.

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the same’, then ‘Of contrary things the science is the same’ is begged, for under that universal there is actually the particular. The third occurs when a universal is begged in particulars, that is, when particulars are assumed to prove something universal, e.g., ‘Socrates is an animal, Plato is an animal, and so on for singulars; therefore every man is an animal’.123 The fourth mode occurs when something conjoined is begged in things that divide, that is, when the things that divide it are assumed to prove something conjoined, as in ‘Medicine pertains to the healthy, medicine pertains to the sick; therefore medicine pertains to the healthy and the sick’. The fifth occurs when something convertible is begged in its convertible, e.g., this: ‘Socrates is similar to Plato; therefore Plato is similar to Socrates’; and likewise, ‘A man runs; therefore something able to laugh runs’. [192.11–32] [The Difference between the First and Fifth Species]

[1175]  So that the difference between the fifth mode and the first is clear one should note that to beg a convertible in a convertible is not the same as to beg the same thing in its very self, just as for some things to be the same is not the same as for some things to be convertibles. The same thing is said to be begged in the same thing when something is begged in something that is the same as it in being and essence. But something convertible is said to be begged in its convertible when something is begged in something that accompanies it necessarily but is not really the same as it. This is sufficiently clear in the case of a proprium and its subject, which necessarily accompany themselves but are not really the same thing, for an accident is not really the same as its subject. [192.32–193.3] [Begging the Original Issue in What Is Signified but Not in Name]

[1176]  It can, therefore, be said that there are five modes of paralogizing in this fallacy on the basis of the five modes of begging the original issue. But since it was said in the first mode (1174) that the same thing can be begged in the same thing with respect to what is signified and name, or the same [can be begged] in the same thing with respect to what is signified and not with respect to name, one should note that this fallacy does not occur when the same thing is begged in the same thing with respect to what is signified and in name, although it is able to occur when the same thing is begged in the same thing with respect to what is signified and not with respect to name. The reason for this is [that], where the fallacy is present, there has to be some degree of concealment. But when the same thing is begged in the same thing with respect to what is signified and in name, absolutely no difference appears between them, and so the cause of semblance is lacking that must be present in the fallacy of Begging the Original Issue. But if the same thing is begged in the same thing with respect to



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what is signified and not with respect to name, then some sort of difference can appear between them and so the cause of semblance that is or ought to be present in the fallacy of Begging the Original Issue can remain. [193.3–16] [Examples and Solutions in the Five Species]

[1177]  Paralogisms can be formed in this fallacy from the examples given in the previously stated modes taken in order in this way: ‘A mortal rational animal runs; [therefore a man runs]’ (1174). Also, ‘Of all opposed things the science is the same; therefore, of all contrary things the science is the same’ (1174), and so on. [193.17–21] [1178]  With respect to these two paralogisms and to those like them one should reply that they are invalid, for the conclusion must be manifested by means of the premises, and so the premises must be better known than the conclusion is. But in these paralogisms the conclusion is equally known with the premises because it is the same as the premises or actually understood in them. Nothing, therefore, is proven, but what is in the original issue is begged. [193.21–26] [1179]  But someone could object: when a dialectical Topic occurs by proceeding from a definition to something defined, and similarly by proceeding from a quantitative whole to its parts, and similarly an induction occurs by proceeding from singulars to a universal, one certainly is permitted to infer a convertible from its convertible. It does not seem that the fallacy of Begging the Original Issue occurs in these processes, which is against what was said (1174). [193.27–32] [1180] One replies to this in one way thus: there are some who use their senses more, whereas there are others who use their intellect more. Those are said to be users more of their senses to whom sensible things are better known, and those are said to be users more of their intellect to whom intelligible things are better known. Singular things, moreover, are said to be more sensible, whereas a universal [is said to be more] intelligible, because according to Aristotle in Book One of the Physics a universal is known by reason and a singular by the senses, for something is universal while it is being understood but singular while it is being sensed.124 Likewise, something accidental is sensible, but something substantive is more intelligible. Similarly, what defines is more intelligible than what is defined is because the things that define are more universal in themselves than what is defined is. If, therefore, one proceeds from a universal to a particular, or from a subject to its characteristic (proprietas), or from a definition to what is defined, then, with respect to those who use their intellect (to whom a universal is better known than a particular is, a subject than a characteristic, a definition than what is defined), the process will be a good one and a dialectical one. But with respect to those who use their senses (to whom a singular is better known than a universal is, an accident than a substance, what is defined than a definition), Begging the

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Original Issue will be present. And so a good process and a sophistical Topic will occur in the same argument with respect to different [processes], but not with respect to the same [processes]. [193.32–194.12] [1181] One replies a second way thus: there are two kinds of predicates: some are substantial, e.g., to be an animal and the like; others are accidental, e.g., to run and the like. Substantial things belong in a prior sense to [logical] superiors and by means of superiors to inferiors. But accidental things belong in a prior sense to inferiors and by means of inferiors to superiors. If, therefore, there is a substantial predicate that is concluded about an inferior by means of superiors, the Topic will be dialectical; but if it is vice versa, the Topic will be sophistical. Moreover, if it is an accidental predicate that is concluded about superiors by means of inferiors, the process will be good; but if this happens vice versa, Begging the Original Issue will be present. [194.12–22] [1182]  One can reply a third and best way:a a dialectical Topic and Begging the Original Issue can certainly occur at the same time in the same argument, but in different respects. It is possible that in some argument, with respect to the opponent, the major extremity might be known [to belong] more to the middle than to the minor extremity, and so a premise will be better known to the opponent than the conclusion is. It is also possible that in the same argument, with respect to the respondent, the major extremity might be known [to belong] more to the minor [extremity] than to the middle, and so the conclusion will be better known to the respondent than a premise is. And on this basis, with respect to the respondent, what ought to be proved is begged, but with respect to the opponent, the process is good. And so it is not inappropriate for a dialectical Topic and a sophistical one to occur in the same argument, although not in the same respect but in different ones. [194.23–35] [1183] Generally, therefore, one should know that, whenever the major extremity is known [to belong] more to the middle than to the minor extremity, the process is good, but if it occurs vice versa, Begging the Original Issue will always be present. ­[194.35–38] [The Name of This Fallacy]

[1184]  One should also know that this fallacy can be named Begging the Original Issue. The begging is of what is in the original issue and the begging is of what is from the original issue. But it is called Begging the Original Issue because what is begged is what is principally intended to be proved, namely, the conclusion. But it is called begging of what is in the original issue because a conclusion is begged that was in the premises as in its cause, and so as in its source, for the premises are the material cause

a.  Reading at p. 194.23 optime: in eodem argumento against melius in eodem argumento:.



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of a conclusion. But it is called begging of what is from the original issue because a conclusion is begged that is brought about from the premises as from its source, for a conclusion is brought about from one term of the major proposition and from another of the minor proposition. [194.39–195.7] [The Fallacy of Consequent] 125

[1185]  The fallacy of Consequent follows, about which one should see what a consequent is, what the fallacy of Consequent is, what the cause of the semblance is, what the cause of the falsity is, and how many modes of paralogizing there are in it. [195.8–11] [The Definition of ‘the Fallacy of Consequent’]

[1186]  A consequent, as it is taken here, is what follows from an antecedent. The fallacy of Consequent is the suitability to deceive coming from the fact that we believe that there is an absolute identity between an antecedent and a consequent, when, however, there is none, because of the fact that we believe that the consequence is converted, when it is not converted. [195.12–16] [The Cause of Semblance and the Cause of Falsity]

[1187]  The cause of semblance is the identity of the antecedent and the consequent, for when, once an antecedent is asserted, the consequent is asserted because of the identity that obtains between them, one who is deceived believes that likewise, once a consequent is asserted, the antecedent is asserted, and once an antecedent is destroyed, the consequent is also destroyed. The cause of falsity is the difference between the antecedent and the consequent. [195.17–22] [The Two Species of Consequent]

[1188]  One ordinarily paralogizes in this fallacy by an assertion of a consequent and by a destruction of an antecedent, and on the basis of this there are two modes of paralogizing in this fallacy. The first occurs by an assertion of a consequent, that is, when we believe that, once a consequent is asserted, the antecedent is also asserted, just as, once an antecedent is asserted, the consequent is asserted. The second mode occurs by a destruction of an antecedent, that is, when we believe that, once an antecedent is destroyed, the consequent is also destroyed, just as, once an antecedent is asserted, the consequent is also asserted. [195.23–30]

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[Necessary and Probable Consequences]

[1189]  But one should know that there are two kinds of consequences, namely, one in which, once an antecedent is asserted, the consequent is necessarily asserted, and thisa can be called a natural or necessary one. The other is a consequence in which, once an antecedent is asserted, the consequent is not thereby necessarily asserted, but, as more frequently happens, the consequent accompanies the antecedent, and thisb can be called a probable consequence or a more-often-than-not consequence. This is wont to occur between accidents that accompany one another in something and rarely separate themselves from one another. [195.30–38] [Examples and Solutions in the First Species]

[1190]  Paralogisms can arise in both of these sorts of consequences in accord with the first mode of this figure, according to Aristotle in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations.126 One paralogizes in a necessary consequence in this way: ‘If it is honey, it is something ruddy, but this is something ruddy (indicating bile); therefore bile is honey’. Another paralogism similar to that: ‘If the ground has been rained upon, it is wet, but it is wet; therefore it has been rained upon’. [195.39–196.4] [1191]  One should reply to this that in these paralogisms one argues from the assertion of a consequent, and so the fallacy of Consequent occurs there, for although, once an antecedent is asserted, the consequent is also asserted—once man is asserted, animal is asserted—yet it is not the case that, once a consequent is asserted, the antecedent is also asserted—once animal is asserted, man is not also asserted—for being ruddy is consequent to honey and being wet to being rained upon. For this reason it is permitted for ‘something ruddy’ to follow from ‘honey’ and for ‘wet’ to follow from ‘rained upon’, but it does not follow vice versa. [196.4–12] [1192]  One paralogizes in a probable consequence in this way: ‘If someone is an adulterer, he is corrupt, but this one is corrupt; therefore he is an adulterer’. Another paralogism similar to that: ‘If someone is a thief, he is one who wanders about by night, but this one is one who wanders about by night; therefore he is a thief ’. [196.12–16] [1193]  One should reply to this that these paralogisms are invalid, for although on many occasions being an adulterer and being corrupt accompany themselves, and being a thief and being one who wanders about by night, yet it is possible not to be an adulterer and to be corrupt and to be one who wanders about by night and not to be a thief. Although being corrupt follows from being an adulterer, this is not the case vice

a.  Reading at p. 195.32 hec against hoc. b.  Reading at p. 195.36 hec against hoc.



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versa. Similarly, although being one who wanders about by night follows from being a thief, this is not the case vice versa. Rather, the fallacy of Consequent in these para­lo­ gisms occurs there because of an assertion of the consequent. [196.16–24] [Examples and Solutions in the Second Species]

[1194]  One paralogizes in the second mode in this way: ‘Everything that has been made has a beginning; therefore what has not been made has no beginning, but the world has not been made; therefore the world has no beginning; therefore it is eternal’, which is false. [196.25–28] [1195]  For an understanding of this paralogism one should note that the world has an efficient beginning, namely, God, for it was created by God. Yet it was not made, for, strictly speaking, that is said to be made which comes from some sort of preexisting matter. The world was not made that way, for it was not made from preexisting matter but from nothing. Thus, it was not made but created. [196.28–34] [1196]  One should reply to this paralogism (1194) that it is invalid, and is defective on the basis of the fallacy of Consequent from a destruction of a consequent, for to be made is antecedent to having a beginning, and once to be made is asserted, to have a beginning is also asserted. But, once to be made is destroyed, to have a beginning is not thereby destroyed. Rather, it can readily be that something has a beginning but will not a thereby be made but created. So, just as ‘If there is a man,b there is an animal; therefore if there is no man, there is no animal’ is invalid but contains the fallacy of Consequent from a destruction of the antecedent, likewise, the previously stated paralogism is invalid. [196.34–197.2] [1197]  Someone could object: since the fallacy of Consequent is wont to come from something insufficient and by proceeding from something [logically] inferior to something higher when denying, and similarly from the higher to the lower when affirming, and similarly when proceeding from a proposition having two causes of truth to one or to what has only one, or when proceeding from a proposition having more than one cause of truth to what has fewer—there is no mention of these, it seems, in the previously stated modes—so the previously stated assignmentc of modes is ­insufficient. [197.3–11] [1198]  One should reply to this that it is certainly true that the fallacy of Consequent comes from something insufficient and from the other stated modes, but the modes in the fallacy of Consequent are not thereby insufficiently assigned, for they are

a.  Reading at p. 196.41 sed non against non. b.  Reading at p. 196.43 est, animal est against est animal, est. c.  Reading at p. 197.11 assignatio against alligatio.

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reduced to the following. (1) When the process is defective from something insufficient the fallacy of Consequent comes from the assertion of the consequent. For example, if one says ‘Socrates runs, Plato runs; therefore every man runs’ the defect is from something insufficient and the fallacy of Consequent occurs from an assertion of the consequent. Those singular [propositions] followed legitimately from the universal one, but the universal one does not thereby follow from the singular ones. (2) Similarly, if the process is from something [logically] higher to something lower when affirming, the fallacy of Consequent occurs on the part of the consequent, as in ‘It is an animal; therefore it is a man’. Although animal follows from man, man does not follow from animal. (3) Similarly, if one proceeds from a proposition having different causes of truth to one having only one, or from a proposition having more than one cause of truth to one having fewer, the fallacy of Consequent occurs from the assertion of a consequence, as in ‘Caesar is not just; therefore he is unjust’ for ‘Caesar is not just’ follows from ‘Caesar is unjust’, but not vice versa, according to Aristotle in Book Two of On Interpretation when he says [that] a negative [proposition] with a finite predicate follows froma an affirmative one with an infinite predicate; but it is not converted.127 And so once ‘Caesar is unjust’ is asserted, ‘Caesar is not just’ is asserted, but not vice versa. ‘Caesar is not just b’ has two causes of truth, for it can be true because Caesar does not exist, and so he is not just, or because Caesar exists and is unjust. But ‘Caesar is unjust’ has only one cause of truth, for it can be the case that Caesar exists but is unjust. [197.11–40] [1199]  In this way, therefore, are these three modes reduced to the first mode of paralogizing in this fallacy, which occurs from the assertion of a consequent. But if one proceeds from something [logically] lower to something higher when denying, the fallacy of Consequent comes fromc the destruction of an antecedent, as in ‘It is not a man; therefore it is not an animal’. Man precedes animal, and although, once man is asserted, animal is asserted, animal is not thereby destroyed when man is destroyed. And so it is clear that, whenever the fallacy of Consequent occurs, the paralogism will either occur on the part of the consequent or it will be from the destruction of an antecedent. Two modes in this fallacy are, therefore, sufficient. [197.40–198.10] [1200]  One should note that the consequence in which the fallacy of Consequent occurs holds well vice versa, for the fallacy of Consequent occurs in ‘If there is an animal, there is a man’, but the converse consequence holds well, for ‘If there is a man, there is an animal’ is a good consequence. This is generally true when the fallacy of consequent occurs in a natural or necessary consequence, but it is not true in the fallacy of Consequent that occurs in a probable or more-often-than-not consequence.128 [198.10–18]

a.  Reading at 197.32 ad affirmativam against affirmativam. b.  Reading at p. 197.36 Cesar non est iustus against Cesar est iniustus. c.  Reading at p. 198.4 a destructione against ad destructionem.



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* * * [1201]  Someone will object: ‘This one is corrupt; therefore he is an adulterer’ is a dialectical Topic, for the Topic from associated accidents seems to be present. The sophistical Topic, therefore, will not occur there, the contrary of which was said (1192), for it was said that the fallacy of Consequent is present there. [198.19–23] [1202]  One should reply to this that some associated accidents are those that naturally or necessarily accompany one another, as do lactation and to have given birth; and the dialectical Topic holds among such associated accidents. In the case of natural accidents, in whatever the posterior inheres the prior also inheres and necessarily, for in whatever [having] milk inheres, so also does to have given birth. Other associated accidents are those that sometimes accompany one another and sometimes not, e.g., one who wanders about by night and being a thief. In the case of such, if one is taken to infer the other, there is always the fallacy of Consequent, e.g., if I say ‘This one is one who wanders about by night; therefore he is a thief ’. But if more than one such are taken to infer the other, the Topic will be a dialectical one, e.g., if I say ‘This one is one who wanders about by night, he has earned nothing and has spent a fair amount, nor does he have anyone who would provide for what he spends; therefore he is a thief ’. So here it is quite possible that there is a dialectical and a sophistical Topica among such associated accidents, but in different senses. If the associated accidents are such that they necessarily accompany one another, the Topic will be dialectical by inferring the prior from the posterior. But if the associated accidents are such that they do not necessarily accompany one another, and if one is taken to imply the other, there is always the fallacy of Consequent. But if more than one is taken to imply the other, the Topic will be dialectical, for one sign alone does not produce belief, whereas several do. [198.23–199.2] [1203]  Since the deception in this fallacy comesb from the identity that obtains between an antecedent and a consequent, one could ask why it is better named the fallacy of Consequent than of Antecedent. [199.2–5] [1204]  One should reply to this that a dialectical Topic receives its name from the middle in a dialectical argument, for the Topic is said to be from a definition when the middle in the argument is a definition, as in ‘A mortal rational animal runs; therefore a man runs’. Similarly, a sophistical Topic receives its name from the middle term. And because in the paralogism of the fallacy of Consequent that which is the middle always follows from what is concluded, so this fallacy receives its name from this middle that is something that follows. When one says ‘If it is a man, it is an animal, and if it is an animal, therefore it is a man’, ‘animal’ is the middle, ‘man’ is what is concluded, and

a.  Reading at p. 198.37 locus against locut. b.  Reading at p. 199.3 proveniat against provenit.

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‘animal’ follows from ‘man’. Similarly, when one says ‘If it is a man, it is an animal; therefore if it is not a man, it is not an animal’, ‘man’ is the middle, ‘animal’ is what is concluded, and a denied man follows from the denied animal, for ‘If it is not an animal, it is not a man’ follows. So, if that a to which one concludes is denied, the denied middle follows in a paralogism of this fallacy; but if that which is concluded is affirmed, the affirmed middle follows. [199.5–23] [The Fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause] 129

[1205]  The fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause follows, about which one should see what a noncause treated as a cause is, what the fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause is, and about the cause of the semblance and the cause of the falsity, and how many modes of paralogizing there are in it. [199.24–27] [The Definition of ‘the Fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause’]

[1206]  A noncause treated as a cause is a proposition that, although it is taken with propositions that are causes of implying a conclusion, [and] while contributing nothing to the implication of that conclusion, nevertheless shares a term with the propositions implying the conclusion. But the fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause is the suitableness to deceive coming from the fact that a proposition that is not a cause of implying a conclusion is taken along with propositions that are such. One who is deceived believes it to be a cause of implying the conclusion because of the fact that it shares a term with the propositions that are causes. [199.28–37] [The Cause of Semblance and the Cause of Falsity]

[1207]  The cause of semblance is the fact that a proposition which is not a cause shares a term with propositions that are causes. When a proposition that is a cause and a proposition that is not a cause share in this way, one who is deceived believes that the one as well as the other contribute to the implication of the conclusion. One should know, however, that the proposition that is not a cause treated as a cause must share a term with one of those premises that is a cause; otherwise, it does not seem to be a cause, and so there would be no semblance. [199.37–200.3] [1208]  The cause of falsity is the difference between the proposition that is not a cause and those that are causes in the sense in which they are causesb. [200.4–5]

a.  Reading at p. 199.21 id against ad id. b.  Reading at p. 200.5 cause against causa.



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[Occurrence of This Fallacy in Arguments That Reason ad Impossibile]

[1209]  One should know that there are no distinct modes in this fallacy, nor does Aristotle distinguish any modes in this fallacy but says that this fallacy is wont to arise in syllogisms ad impossibile.130 [200.5–8] [1210]  One should also know that some syllogisms are ostensive and some are ad impossibile. An ostensive syllogism is one in which there are two premises implying one conclusion in which there is cloture (status) and no regression to any of the premises occurs, e.g., ‘Every man is an animal, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is an animal’. A syllogism ad impossibile is one in which there are two conclusions, in the first of which something impossible is concluded, and later in the second conclusion, by an interpretation of that impossible one, a regression occurs to one of the premises by destroying it, as willa be seen in the paralogism that follows. [200.8–18] [1211]  Aristotle proposes in Book One of On Sophistical Refutations that this ­fallacy does not occur in ostensive syllogisms but only in syllogisms ad impos­ sibile.131 [200.18–20] [An Example and Solution of This Fallacy]

[1212]  One paralogizes in this fallacy in this way: let someone propose to show that a soul and life are not the same thing, and then let this be taken: ‘A soul and life are the same thing’. Next, let something false be taken from which something necessarily false follows, and after that let this be concluded to be false: ‘A soul and life are the same thing’. Let, therefore, this paralogism arise: ‘A soul and life are the same thing, death and life are contraries, but death is a corruption; therefore life is a generation; thereforeb to live is to be generated (which is false); therefore also the first, namely, a soul and life are the same thing; therefore a soul and life are not the same thing’.132 There are two conclusions here. In the first of these it is concluded that life is a generation, and in addition that to live is to be generated. But afterward, in the second conclusion, from an interpretation of that false one, a regression comes to ‘A soul and life are the same thing’ by destroying it. [200.21–34] [1213]  One should reply to this that this paralogism is invalid; rather the fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause is present. The proposition ‘A soul and life are the same thing’ is not the cause of the conclusion ‘Life is a generation’ or further ‘To live is to be generated’, for, once ‘A soul and life are the same thing’ is removed and the

a.  Reading at p. 200.18 videbitur against videbatur. b.  Reading at p. 200.28 quare against quia.

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other propositions remain, there follows from this that life is a generation and that to live is to be generated. But it seems to be a cause in that it is counted along with the others that are causes implying the conclusion, and it shares a term with one of them. Because, therefore, one understands from something falsely concluded ‘A soul and life are the same thing’—as if it were the cause of that false conclusion, when it is not, even though it seems to be—so it is false on the basis of treating what is not a cause there as a cause. And this is the way this paralogism is solved. [200.34–201.7] [1214]  But beyond this one will object: since in the stated example, once ‘A soul and life are the same thing’ is removed, the false conclusion followsa from this and from the premises, namely, that life is a generation and that to live is to be generated, [and] since the false does not follow b except from the false, I ask what the false proposition is from which the false conclusion follows. [201.8–13] [1215]  One should reply to this that ‘Death is a corruption’ is false for the reason that follows: it cannot be said that someone is moved by a motion from whichc he follows. For example, the generation of an animal is a certain sort of motion from which the life of an animal follows, for first the animal is generated and then it lives; but life is not the generation. Similarly, the corruption of an animal is a certain sort of motion from which the conclusion that is death follows, for first the animal is corrupted and then it dies, or death follows. Since, therefore, corruption is the motion from which death follows, it cannot be truly said that death is the corruption. This, therefore, is false: ‘Death is a corruption’. A false conclusion follows from this false thing along with the other, and so it is no wonder that the false follows well from the false. [201.13–25] [1216]  Someone could object that in paralogisms of whatever fallacy the premises seem to be the cause of the conclusion, when they are not. But, as was said (1206), that proposition is said to be a noncause treated as a cause that seems to be a cause of a conclusion when, however, it is not. On the basis of this, therefore, it will be able to be said that the fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause will occur in any p ­ aralogism. [201.25–31] [1217]  One should reply to this that it is possible for a proposition that seems to be a cause and is not a cause to occur in two ways: in one way such that, once the propositiond itself is removed, the conclusion follows from the other remaining propositionse; in the other way [such that], once it is removed, the conclusion does not fola.  Reading at pp. 201.9 and 201.11 sequatur against sequitur. b.  Reading at p. 201.11 sequatur against sequitur. c.  Reading at p. 201.15 quem against quam. d.  Reading at p. 201.33 propositione against conclusio. e.  Reading at p. 201.33 ad alias propositiones residuas against aliis propositionibus residuis.



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low. In the first way a proposition that is not a cause treated as a cause is taken in paralogisms of the other fallacies, for something in them is taken in the premises that is not a cause of implying the conclusion, but, once removed, the conclusion does not follow. If one says ‘Man is a species, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is a species’, neither of the propositions here is a cause of the inferreda conclusion, but were one of them removed, the conclusion would not follow. If, therefore, it is clear that a proposition that is not a cause treated as a cause is taken in a different way in this fallacy than in the others, [then it is clear] why one is not to assign this fallacy in paralogisms of the other fallacies. [201.31–202.2] [The Fallacy of Treating More than One Question as One] 133

[1218]  The fallacy of Treating More than One Question as One follows, about which one should see what more than one question treated as one is, what its fallacy is, what its cause of semblance is, what the cause of the falsity is, and how many modes there are of paralogizing in it. [202.3–6] [The Definition of ‘the Fallacy of Treating More than One Question as One’]

[1219]  Treating more than one question as one occurs when more than one thing is asked about one, or one thing of more than one, or more than one thing of more than one, but whose multiplicity lies hidden to a respondent. The fallacy of Treating More than One Question as One is the suitability to deceive coming from the fact that the one who is deceived believes a question to be single that is multiple and responds with one answer to it as if it were single. [202.7–13] [The Cause of the Semblance and the Cause of the Falsity]

[1220]  The cause of the semblance is the apparent unity of a question that in truth is multiple. The cause of the falsity is the multiplicity of the question that appears to be single. [202.13–15] [The Nature of a Question That Is More than One]

[1221]  One should note that a question that is multiple appears to be single because of the similarity it has with a question that is single; such a similarity obtains between a question that is single and a question that is multiple. A question that is

a.  Reading at p. 201.37 illate against inferende.

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single is one that has within it, and truly contains, the two sides of a contradiction. For example, if one asks, “Is a man an animal or not?” it is truly a question that is single and has within it two sides. Similarly, a question that is multiple has within it two sides. For example, if one asks, “Are these two things good or not good?” (intending two things of which one is good and the other not good), it is truly a question that is multiple and has within it two sides. In this way, therefore, a question that is single and a question that is multiple are similar in their way of asking. Because of this similarity one who is deceived is moved to believe that a question that is multiple is single. ­[202.15–29] [The Three Species of Treating More than One Question as One]

[1222]  But one should know that, in as many ways as it is possible for a question to be multiple, in so many modes is it suitable to paralogize in this fallacy, namely, by asking more than one thing of one, or one thing of more than one, or more than one thing of more than one. And on this basis there are three modes of this fallacy. The first mode occurs when more than one thing is asked of one; the second when more than one thing is asked of more than one; and the third when one thing is asked of more than one. [202.30–36] [An Example in the First Species]

[1223]  One paralogizes in the first mode in this way: let it be asserted that Socrates is running and is not arguing, and then let it be asked: “Is Socrates running and arguing?” If one answers, “Yes,” [one concludes] ‘Therefore he is arguing’, which is against what was asserted. If one answers, “No,” [one concludes] ‘Therefore he is not running’, which is against what was asserted. [202.36–40] [Two Examples in the Second Species]

[1224]  One paralogizes in the second mode in this way: on the assumption that one thing is good and the other not good, let it be asked whether they are good or not good. If one answers that they are good, [one concludes] ‘Therefore the latter is good’, when it was assumed to be bad. If one answers that they are not good, [one concludes] ‘Therefore the former is bad’, when it was assumed to be good, which is false. ­[202.40–203.2] [1225]  Another paralogisma similar to that: on the assumption of two things of which one is blind and the other has sight, let it be asked whether these are blind or have sight. If one answersb that they are blind, one concludes of something that has

a.  Reading at p. 203.2–3 alius paralogismus against aliis paralogismis. b.  Reading at p. 203.5 dicatur against detur.



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sight that it is blinda. If [one answers] that they have sight, one concludes of something blind that it has sight. [203.2–6] [An Example in the Third Species]

[1226]  One paralogizes in the third mode in this way: on the assumption of two men let it be asked: “Do you think that this one and this one is a man?” If one answers, “Yes,” [one concludes] ‘Therefore who strikes this one and this one strikes a man and not men’, which is false. [203.6–10] [Solutions in the Three Species]

[1227]  One should reply to these paralogisms that they are invalid, for they are defective in this that in each of them a multiple question is always placed first, from which, when a single answer is given as if the question were single, something inappropriate is concluded in such a response. Answers that are multiple, and not single, have to be given to questions that are multiple. And so once such a question is posed, he answers poorly who gives a single answer, since he ought to give more than one. Once, therefore, such a question is proposed, heb ought to respond to it with multiple answers, and in this way one does not conclude something inappropriate to it c, whereas if he gives a single response, he concludes something inappropriate to it. For example, given the question whether they are good or not, and assuming two things of which one is good and the other bad, a respondent ought to say that one is good and the other bad. Nothing inappropriate follows from that answer, but something inappropriate does follow if a single response is given. The case is similar for others. [203.11–26] [1228]  Someone could object against the name of this fallacy: since a syllogism does not come from questions as questions but from propositions, likewise it rather seems that this fallacy ought better be named Treating More than One Proposition asd One instead of Treating More than One Question as One. [203.27–31] [1229]  One should reply to this that for this fallacy to occur it is always necessary to place a question that is multiple at the beginning, to which, if the respondent gives one answer because he believes that there is only one question, something inappropriate to it is concluded from his answer. For this reason a deception occurs in the respondent from the question that is multiple which he believes to be single, and the

a.  Reading at p. 203.6 cecum against cecus. b.  Reading at p. 203.18 debet against debent. c.  Reading at p. 203.20 ipsam against ipsum. d.  Reading at p. 203.31 ut against vel.

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cause of the semblance of this fallacy is from the question that seems to be single. Because the cause of the semblance is what causes the fallacy to occur, so it has its name from the question from which the cause of the semblance of this fallacy comes. ­[203.31–42] [1230]  One should reply to the argument that it is of course true that a syllogism does not arise from questions but from propositions, and paralogisms do likewise. But in paralogisms of this fallacy, once a question is first posed, then propositions are formed from the answer. From these one concludes against one who poorly responds. The conclusion, therefore, follows from propositions and not from questions, as the objector would have it. But because this fallacy has its semblance from the question that precededa the answer from which propositions are formed and not from the propositions [themselves], so it derives its name from a question and not from a p ­ roposition. [203.43–204.10]

a.  Reading at p. 204.7 precessit against processit.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PROPE RTI ES OF TERMS

[Introductory Remarks]

[1231]  Since a logician considers terms, it is appropriate to discuss terms themselves and their properties, because whoever is to consider a subject must also consider its properties.1 But there are many properties of a term, namely, supposition, appellation, restriction, distributiona, and relation, of which relation has already been discussedb.2 But, because signification is, as it were, the perfection of a term and because the properties of a term are founded on signification, one ought for the sake of clarity in what follows to see at the outset what the signification of a term is and how it differs from supposition. [205.2–11]

[SIGNIFICATION] 3 [The Definition of ‘Signification’]

[1232]  The signification of a term is the concept of a thing, for which concept of a thing (intellectus rei) a vocal sound is imposed at the will of the one instituting it, for, as Aristotle proposes in Book One of On Interpretation, vocal sounds are signs of a­ ffections (passiones) that are in a soul, that is, in an intellect, whereas concepts are signs of things.4 [205.12–16]

a.  Reading at p. 205.6 distributio against distinctio. See 1366. b.  Reading at p. 205.6–7 dictum against dicendum.

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[The Explanation of the Definition]

[1233]  To understand this one should know that four things are needed for a vocal sound to signify: a thing, a concept of the thing, a vocal sound, and a union of the vocal sound with the concept of the thing. [205.16–19] [1234]  The thing is said to be what, existing outside a soul, is apprehended by the soul by means of its representation (species), e.g., a man or a stone. What is called the concept of the thing is the thing’s representation or likeness within the soul. For according to Aristotle in Book Three of On the Soul not the stone but the representation of the stone is in the soul, and by means of that representation the soul apprehends the thing. The vocal sound is what is put forward along with the concept of the thing. Then the signification is joined to the vocal sounda and the signifying vocal sound is caused to have signification. [205.19–26] [1235]  And although both the concept of a thing and a vocal sound are similarly natural because they are formed by natural principles, a vocal sound is nevertheless said to signify at the will of the one instituting it, because the union of the concept of the thing with the vocal sound comes from the will, and it is in this that the imposition of a vocal sound consists. [205.26–29] [Direct and Indirect Signification of Vocal Sounds]

[1236]  In this way, therefore, a vocal sound is primarily, per se, and directly a sign of the concept of a thing, but in addition it is indirectly a sign of the thing. Just as it is said that whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused, so can it be said in its own way that what is the sign of a sign is a sign of what is signified. Thus, since a vocal sound is a sign of a concept and a concept is a sign of a thing, so [a vocal sound] is also a signb of a thing. A vocal sign that is a sign of a sign, i.e., of a concept, will be a sign of what is signified, namely, of a thing, but directly it is a sign of the concept and indirectly a sign of the thing.5 [205.29–206.6] [The Difference between Signification and Supposition]6

[1237]  Signification differs from supposition in this that signification is prior to supposition, for signification is the concept of a thing that is represented by means of a vocal sound. Before [the concept’s] union with a vocal sound there is no term; rather,

a.  Reading at p. 205.25 voci against vocis. b.  Reading at p. 206.3 signum against significatum.



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a term is constituted in the union of the concept of a thing with a vocal sound. Supposition, however, is a certain property of a term so constituted.7 [206.6–11] [1238]  There is another difference because signification is only extended to the [signified] thing for which a term is imposed. But supposition is not only extended to the thing signified by a term, but also can be extended to supposita [logically] containeda under that [signified] thing. For example, the signification of ‘man’ extends only to man, not to the things containedb under man, for ‘man’ signifies man, not Socrates or Plato. Nevertheless, ‘man’ can supposit for Socrates and for Plato and for man. [206.11–19]

[SUPPOSITION] 8 [The Four Definitions of ‘Supposition’]9

[1239]  Supposition follows. But one should know that supposition is said to occur in four ways.10 In the first way supposition is said to be the substantive designation or significationc of a thing.11 In the second way supposition is said to be the acceptance of a proposition as true and proven, as it is often found in disputations.12 In the third way supposition is said to be the locational arrangement of a part of an expression in the role of something of which something else is said, as supposition is said to be in a name with respect to a verb, for a name supposits relative to a verb and a verb is said of a name.13 (Appellation corresponds to this kind of supposition, and appellation can be said to be the locational arrangement of that which is said of something else.)14 In the fourth way supposition is said to be the acceptance of a term ford itself or for its [signified] thing, or for some suppositum [logically] containede under its [signified] thing, or for more than one suppositum containedf under its [signified] thing.15 [206.20–33] [1240]  Here the focus is on supposition in the fourth way, for it is in this way that supposition is a property of a term, not in the preceding three. Supposition in the third way pertains to the grammarian and not to the logician. In the second way supposition belongs to a proposition and not to a term, for in disputations a term is not supposed whereas a proposition is. In the first way supposition is a special kind of signification of a term and not a property of a term. This is clear in this way: what is said is true if it is

a.  Reading at p. 206.15 contenta against contempta. b.  Reading at p. 206.16 contenta against contempta. c.  Reading at p. 206.22 significatio against signatio. (See Logica, p. 206.42–207.3.) d.  Reading at p. 206.31 pro against per. e.  Reading at p. 206.32 contento against contempto. f.  Reading at p. 206.32–33 contentis against contemptis.

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stated in this way: “The substantive designationa of a thing is [a kind of] signification.” Therefore, since whatever is said of a definition can be said of the thing defined (745), if the substantive designation or signification of a thing is the definition of ‘supposition’, it could be said that supposition is signification. But if it is signification, it is not the supposition that is a property of a term. Therefore, it is left that supposition used in the first way is not the supposition that is at issue here. That is true, but supposition used in the first way is the signification of a substantive term, and copulation (the adjectival signification of a thing) corresponds to that kind of supposition ­[206.33–207.8]

[COPULATION] 16 [Supposition and Copulation]

[1241]  But one should know that the supposition at issue here is spoken of in two ways: broadly and strictly. Supposition broadly speaking is, as has already been said (1239), the acceptance of a term for itself or for its [signified] thing, as when one says ‘Man is a species’, ‘White pierces [sight]’;17 or it is the acceptance of a term for a suppositum or for the supposita of its [signified] thing, e.g., if one says ‘A man runs’, ‘A white thing runs’. For when one says ‘Man is a species’, ‘man’ is interpreted for itself or for its [signified] thing and not for any suppositum. But if one says ‘A man runs’, it is interpreted for a suppositum. Likewise, when one says ‘White pierces [sight]’, ‘white’ is interpreted for itself b or for its [signified] thing, because the predicate applies to ‘white’, not by reason of a suppositum, but by reason of its form. But when one says ‘A white thing runs’, it is interpreted for a suppositum. [207.9–21] [1242] Suppositionc broadly speaking is divided into supposition strictly speaking and copulation. Broadly speaking both substantival and adjectival terms supposit, but strictly speaking supposition belongs to substantival terms and copulation to adjectival terms. [207.22–26] [1243]  Supposition strictly speaking is the acceptance of a term representing a thing that is stable and stands on its own, in accord with which it can be interpreted for itself, for its own [signified] thing, ord for a suppositum or supposita contained under its [signified] thing.18 [207.26–29]

a.  Reading at p. 206.42 designatio against sigificatio. b.  Reading at p. 207.19 se against re. c.  Reading at p. 207.22 suppositio against supposito. d.  Reading at p. 207.28 pro se sive pro re sua, sive against pro re sua, non.



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[The Definition of ‘Copulation’]

[1244]  Copulation is the acceptance of a term representing a dependent thing, in accord with which it can be interpreted for its own [signified] thing or for a suppositum or supposita contained under its [signified] thing. [207.30–32] [Words That Both Supposit and Copulate]

[1245]  Some words supposit a term, such as substantival names, others copulate a term, such as adjectival names used adjectivally. But others supposit and copulate, such as substantival adjectives and those that are adjectival with respect to thing [signified] but substantival with respect to utterance, e.g., ‘knight’, ‘duke’, ‘count’, and the like, and similarly those that determine a concrete suppositum, e.g., ‘Quirinus’, ‘Gradivus’, ‘Enosigeus’. For thesea, as Priscian says in his treatise on names in Priscian Major, “do not need the addition of other names.”19 Thus they can supposit by themselves in that they determine a concrete suppositum by associating it with themselves, as ‘Quirinus’ determines Romulus, ‘Gradivus’ Mars, ‘Enosigeus’ Neptune. For ‘Quirinus’ conveys the same thing as ‘spear’ does, and so to be called Quirinus is the same as to be said to be armed with a spear; and because Romulus was always accustomed to march armed with a spear he is called Quirinus. ‘Gradivus’ comes from ‘gradus’ (step), and Mars, who is called the god of war because he goes to battle step by step, i.e., in an orderly fashion, is called Gradivusb. ‘Enosigeus’ comes from ‘enos’, meaning deep, and ‘sicheus’, which means silence, as it were, a deep silence. And so Neptune, who is the god of the sea, is called Enosigeus from the depth of the sea and from the silence present in the depth of the sea. [207.32–208.10] [Words That Neither Supposit nor Copulate]

[1246]  Some words neither supposit nor copulate, such as syncategorematicalc words.20 [208.11–12] [Supposition and Copulation, Not Signification, as Properties of Terms]

[1247]  From the preceding it is clear that supposition is the signification of a term and a property of a term, and copulation likewise. ‘Supposition’ is takend differently

a.  Reading at p. 207.38 hec against hoc. b.  Reading at p. 208.7 Gradivus against Gravidus. c.  Reading at p. 208.11–12 sincategorematice against sincategorice. d.  Reading at p. 208.15 sumitur against supponitur vel sumitur.

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when it is the signification and when it is a property of a term, and copulation likewise, as was seen (1245). Here the focus is on the supposition and copulation that are the properties of terms and not insofar as they are the significations of terms.21 [208.13–19] [1248]  If someone asks why supposition is appropriate to substantives and copulation to adjectives, it is clear from what has been said what one should reply. To supposit belongs to what stands on its own and represents its stable [signified] thing, but to stand on its own and represent its stable [signified] thing is a property of substantives. To copulate, however, belongs to what adjoinsa and to what represents a dependent thing; but to adjoin and represent a dependent thing is a property of adjectives. So, strictly speaking, supposition belongs to substantives, whereas copulation to ­adjectives. [208.19–27]

[KINDS OF SUPPOSITIONS]

[1249]  Supposition is first divided in this way: one kind of supposition is natural, the other is accidental.22 [208.28–29] [1250]  Natural supposition is what a term has of its own and from its nature.23 A term is said to have this when it is uttered by itself, that is, when it is adjoined to no other. But a term having that supposition supposits not only for the things that [presently] share its form, but indeed it supposits for all the things that share its form, namely, for present, past, and future things [sharing that form]. This supposition is called natural because it is not an extrinsic but an intrinsic relationship (intentio), for that is natural whose source is from within.24 [208.29–36] [1251]  Accidental supposition is what a term has from what is adjoined to it, and a term supposits in this [kind of supposition] in accord with the requirement of that to which it is adjoined. If someone says ‘A man exists’, [‘man’] supposits for present men because it is adjoined to a present-tense verb; if one says ‘A man existed’, for past men; if one says ‘A man will exist’, for future men.25 This kind of supposition is called accidental because it inheres in a term from without, for what inheres in something from without is accidental to it.26 [208.37–44] [1252]  One kind of accidental supposition is simple, the other is personal. [209.1–2] [1253]  Simple supposition is that according to which a term is interpreted for itself or for its [signified] thing without relation to the supposita containedb under it.27 That

a.  Reading at p. 208.23–24 adiacentis against adiectivis. b.  Reading at p. 209.4 contenta against contempta.



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supposition is called simple that is in a term by reason of its form, and it is because form is of itself simple and indivisible that the supposition that is in a term from a form is called simple.28 That the form is simple and indivisible is found in the book Six ­Principles.29 [209.2–8] [1254]  But one should note that not to have a relation to the supposita can occur either in such a way that [a term] is related to them in no way, neither determinately nor indeterminately, or in such a way that there is a relation, not determinately, but indeterminately. On this basis it can be said that there is a certain kind of simple supposition in which a term is in no way related to supposita but is interpreted only for its [signified] form. The term ‘man’ has this kind when one says ‘Man is a species’, and this is simple supposition in the strict sense. But there is another kind of simple supposition in which a common term is not related to supposita determinately and yet has a relation to them indeterminately. The term ‘man’ has this kind of supposition when one says ‘I know there is a man in England’. Likewise ‘pepper’ when one says ‘Pepper is sold here and in Rome’. Buta this is called simple supposition less strictly than the first kind is. [209.8–22] [1255]  Personal supposition is that according to which a term is interpreted for a suppositum or supposita. It is called personal supposition for the following reason: in the case of rational substance a suppositum or individual is the same as a person, for Boethius defines ‘person’ in this way: a person is an individual substance belonging to rational nature since an individual in the case of rational substance is a person.30 And because in the case of other things individuals are taken by analogy with rational things, the supposition in which a term is interpreted for supposita or individuals is called personal. This is not done because all individuals are persons, for only individuals pertaining to rational substance are persons. Other individualsb certainly not. But all individuals are either persons or are taken as persons by their analogy with persons.31 [209.23–35] [1256]  One kind of personal supposition is discrete, the other common.32 [209.36] [1257]  Discrete supposition is what a discrete term has in itself, as in ‘Socrates runs’, or in something equivalent, e.g., when a common term is taken with a demonstrative pronoun, as in ‘This man runs’.33 It is called discrete, moreover, because a term having such supposition is interpreted for something absolutely discrete. [209.37–210.2] [1258]  Common supposition is the kind that is appropriate to a common term, and it is called common because it is appropriate to a common term. [210.2–4]

a.  Reading at p. 209.21 autem against enim. b.  Reading at p. 209.33 alia against alie.

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* * * [1259] One kind of common supposition is determinate, the other is confused.34 [210.5–6] [1260]  Determinate supposition is what a common term has when it can be taken indifferently for one thing or for more than one. For example, when one says ‘A man runs’, ‘man’ in this has determinate supposition, for it is true if one man is running or if more than one is. But it is called determinate because, for the truth of a proposition in whicha a common term is used having this kind of supposition, it suffices that the common term be interpreted necessarily for one suppositum. It is not, however, required that it be interpreted necessarily for more than one, although in this kind of supposition it can be interpreted for more than one. It is necessary, therefore, that a common term in this kind of supposition be interpreted determinately for one; but if for more than one, that is incidental. [210.6–17] [1261]  Confused supposition is what a common term has when it is interpreted necessarily for all its supposita or for more than one. But it is called confused from the multitude of supposita for which a term having such supposition is interpreted, for where there is a multitude there is confusion. [210.18–22] [1262]  One kind of confused supposition is strong and mobile, the other weak and immobile.35 [210.22–23] [1263]  Strong mobile supposition is what a common term has when it is interpreted necessarily for all its supposita and a descent can be made under it. This happens when a universal affirmative sign is added directly to a common term, as when one says ‘Every man runs’, and likewise when a universal negative sign is added indirectly or directly to a common term, as when one says ‘No man is a stone’.36 For in this the term to which the sign ‘no’ is indirectlyb added, namely, ‘stone’, and likewise the one to which it is directly added, have strongc mobile confused supposition.37 The universal affirmative sign confuses and distributes the term to which it is directly added, whereas [when it is] indirectly adjoined, it confuses but does not distribute. The universal negative sign, however, confuses and distributes the common term directly and indirectly adjoined to it. Likewise, a common term to which negation is directly added has this kind of supposition, as when one says ‘Not a man runs’, which is to say ‘No man runs’. Or indirectly, as when one says ‘I do not see a man’, which is to say ‘Not: I see a man’ (Nullum video hominem).38 This supposition is called strong because a term having that supposition cannot be interpreted for more than it is interpreted for.

a.  Reading at p. 210.11 qua against una. b.  Reading at p. 210.31 mediate against immediate. c.  Reading at p. 210.33 vehementem against vehementer.



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It is called mobile with respect to a term having such supposition because in a term having such supposition a descent can be made on behalf of the supposita containeda under it. [210.23–211.3.] [1264]  Weak immobile supposition is what a common term has when it is interpreted necessarily for more than one suppositum containedb under it, but not for all, nor can a descent be made under it. A term to which the affirmative universal sign is indirectly added has this kind of supposition. For example, when one says ‘Every man is an animal’, ‘animal’ has confused weak immobile supposition, for ‘animal’ here is not interpreted for all its supposita, nor can a descent be made under it.39 It is called weak because a common term with such supposition is not interpreted for all its supposita. It is called immobile because one is not permitted to make a descent under a term having such supposition. [211.3–14] [1265]  One should note that confused supposition is strong whenever it is mobile, but is not, vice versa, mobile whenever it is strong, for it can certainly be strong and immobile. When one says ‘Only every c man runs’, ‘man’ has strong but immobile ­confused supposition, for the exclusive wordd [‘only’], added to the distributed term, prevents a descent being made under it. [211.14–21] [1266]  Likewise, there is confused but immobile supposition when a [distributive] sign is added to a common term in the singular or plural and it is interpreted collectively, as when one says ‘Every man hauls a boat in’, given that all the men are hauling a boat in and none by himself. Likewise, when one says ‘All the apostles are twelve’. [211.21–26] [APPELLATION] 40 [Preliminary Remarks]

[1267]  Because appellation is a kind of supposition, one should speak of appellation after the treatise on supposition.41 [L 251.1–2] [Four Definitions of ‘Appellation’]42

[1268]  So now one should know that appellation is spoken of in four ways. ­­[L 251.3–4]

a.  Reading at p. 211.3 contentis against contemptis. b.  Reading at p. 211.5 contentis against contemptis. c.  Reading at p. 211.18 ‘tantum omnis against tantum ‘omnis. d.  Reading at p. 211.19 dictio against dicto.

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[1269]  In the first way proper naming or the proper name of any person is called appellation, on the basis of which someone is named ‘Peter’ or ‘John’. But appellation taken in this sense is nothing other than the institution of a vocal sound to ­signify a complex or noncomplex thing, and ‘appellation’ is often taken in this way in Obligations, on the basis of which one says ‘a’ appellates Socrates or that a man runs.43 [L 251.4–10] [1270]  In the second way appellation is said to be a property of names, on the basis of which some names are said to be appellatives. But appellation taken in this sense is nothing other than the assertiona of a common nature containing more than one suppositum under it, for an appelative is something common to more than one whereas something proper pertains to one thing. [L 251.11–252.3] [1271]  In the third way appellation is said to be the acceptance of a term for a suppositum or supposita contained under its signified thing whether or not those ­supposita are existing things. And ‘appellation’ taken in this way belongs to terms having supposita under them either actually or potentially, and also to names of imaginary things.44 [L 252.4–8] [1272]  In the fourth way appellation is said to be the acceptance of a term for a suppositum or supposita existing actually, and our present focus is on appellation spoken of in this fourth way.45 [L 252.9–11] [1273]  But one should know that appellation as it is taken here differs from supposition as something [logically] inferior differs from its superior, for appellation is inferior to supposition: wherever there is appellation there is supposition, but not vice versa.46 For appellation, strictly speaking, only occurs in a common term when it is interpreted for a suppositum or for supposita that actually exist under it; but supposition can occur in a discrete term and in a common term when it is interpreted for a suppositum or supposita under it that actually or potentially exist.47 Supposition can even occur in a common term when it is interpreted by itself without any relation to its suppositum or supposita.48 [L 252.11–253.5] [1274]  So there can be natural and accidental, discrete and common, simple and personal supposition, as was seen above (1250–64), but appellation is always personal supposition.49 And so just as supposition is [logically] superior to personal supposition and personal supposition is a kind of supposition, supposition is superior to appellation and appellation is a kind of supposition. [L 253.5–254.3] [1275]  One should know that some words are (1) appellative and appellate or have appellata on their own—common substantival names are of this kind. (2) Others are appellative and have appellata, not on their own, but in virtue of something else— common adjectival names are of this kind, for they are appellative, and yet they have

a.  Reading at p. 252.1, ed. de Libera, positio against petitio.



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no appellata except through their substantives, because there is no individuation in accidents except through substance. (3) There are other names that are not appellative, do not appellate, and have no appellata, as are the names of imaginary things such as ‘chimera’ and ‘goat-stag’. (4) And there are other names that are not appellative but are appellata—proper names are of this sort, for proper names are called appellata, supposita, and singulars. Thus, they are named by different names but for different reasons. They are called appellata because they are appellated (named) by their [logical] superiors, for superiors are predicated of their inferiors according to name and definition, for one correctly says ‘Socrates is a man’. Here something superior is predicated of its inferior explicitly according to its name and implicitly according to its definition. Likewise, one correctly says ‘Socrates is a mortal rational animal’. Here something ­superior is predicated of something inferior explicitly according to definition and implicitly according to name, for the definition of ‘man’ is mortal rational animal. Superiors, therefore, give themselves to their inferiors because they are predicated of them according to definition. They also give their names to them because they are predicated of them according to name. And since superiors give their names to their inferiors they are named (appellated) by them, and because of this they are called appellata. But they are called supposita because they are placed under, or made into subjects for, their superiors, yet they are called singulars because they name something discrete and individual, which applies to one thing singularly. [L 254.4–255.12] [1276]  But one should know that, strictly speaking, appellata are not given that name unless they are actual existents, for what is, and not what is not, is properly appellated. So one correctly says that appellation is supposition for existing things.  ­ [L 255.13–16]

[Appellation and Common Terms]

[1277]  One should know that appellation applies only to a common term, for to have appellata is a property of a common term and not of any other term.50 But sometimes appellation applies to a common term for all its supposita, and this occurs when, by the addition of a sign of quantity, it is distributed for all its actually existing supposita, as when one says ‘Every man runs’. But sometimes it applies to it determinately for one of its supposita, and this occurs when nothing that distributes it is added to it, yet it stands determinately, as when one says ‘A man runs’.51 [L 255.17–256.2] [1278]  For the clarification of the rules that are given in Appellations one should know that some terms are substantial, such as substantival names, others are accidental, such as adjectival names. [L 256.3–5] [1279]  With respect to serving as a predicate there is no difference between substantial and accidental terms, for accidental and substantial terms serve as predicates

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in the same way anda are added to a verb of any tense. Likewise, when serving as a subject of a present-tense verb there is no difference between substantial and accidental terms, for substantial and accidental terms serve in the same way as subjects do when they are added to a present-tense verb. But there is a difference between substantial and accidental terms when they serve as the subject of a past- or future-tense verb. [L ­256.5–13]

[Appellation of Substantial and Accidental Common Terms] 52

[1280]  This will become clear in the following rules, of which the first is this: A substantial or accidental common term, not restricted by any other means, serving as the subject or predicate of a present-tense verb having no ampliating force of its own or from anything else, is restricted to suppositing for present things, if it has an appellatum or appellata; but if it does not have an appellatum or appellata, it reverts to nonexisting things.53 [L 256.14–257.2] [An Explanation of the Rule]

[1281]  For an explanation of this rule one should know that “common term” is included in it to distinguish it from a discrete term, which can be neither restricted nor ampliated. [L 257.3–5] [1282]  “Substantial or accidental” is included in it because there is no difference between a substantial and an accidental term when they serve as the subject of a p ­ resent-tense verb. [L 257.5–7] [1283]  “Not restricted by any other means” is included in it because, in virtue of something added to a term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb, a term can certainly supposit for something other than a present thing. For example, when one says ‘A man who has been is’, ‘man’ serves as the subject of the verb ‘is’, and yet because of the modifying clause included in it, it supposits for something past. [257.7–12] [1284]  “Serving as the subject or the predicate” is included in it because there is no difference between a substantial and accidental term when it serves as the subject or the predicate of a present-tense verb. [L 257.12–14] [1285]  “Of a present-tense verb” is included in it to distinguish it from a verb of another tense, for a term supposits differently when added to a present-tense verb and when added to a verb of a tense other than the present. [L 257.14–258.2] [1286]  “Having no ampliating force” is placed there to distinguish it from verbs having an ampliating force, for a term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb having an ampliating force supposits not only for present things, but can also supposit for past and future things. [L 258.2–6] a.  Reading at p. 256.8, ed. de Libera, et cuiuscumque against cuiuscumque.



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[1287]  One should note that there are some verbs that have an ampliating force, as do these: ‘can’, ‘is praised’, ‘is thought about’. So if one says ‘A man can run’, ‘man’ is ampliated here to supposit for present and future men; likewise when one says ‘A man is praised’, ‘man’ supposits for present and future men; likewise when one says ‘A man is thought about’, ‘man’ supposits for present and future men.54 [L 258.7–12] [1288]  But in order to know which verbs ampliate and which do not one should know that an action can be related to a substance in two ways: in one way with respect to that in which it is and of which it is stated—as when one says ‘Socrates runs’, the running that is in Socrates and is said of Socrates is stated relative to, or is related to, Socrates. In the other way as regards that of which it is stated, although it is not in it, as when one says ‘Caesar is praised’: here praise is stated of Caesar, although it is not in Caesar but in the one who is praising. Likewise, when one says ‘A chimera is thought about’, that is, it is an entity in one’s thought, here thought is stated of the chimera, although it is not in the chimera but in the one who is thinking. Likewise, when one says ‘The Antichrist can exist’, here the ability to exist is stated of the Antichrist, although it is not in the Antichrist but in the material principles from which the Antichrist is brought forth. One should say, therefore, that verbs that signify an action that is related to the subject, is in the subject, and is said of the subject do not ampliate, whereas those that signify an action that is related to the subject, is said of the subject, and yet is not in it do ampliate.55 [L 258.13–259.6] [1289]  “Of its own or from anything else” is included in it (1280) because there are some verbs that have an ampliating force on their own, e.g., ‘can’, and the like, as is clear, but there are others that have an ampliating force from something adjoined. For example, if one says ‘A man is thinkable’, ‘man’ is ampliated, and yet the verb ‘is’ has no ampliating force on its own, but rather from what was adjoined, that is, from ‘thinkable’. [L 259.7–11] [1290]  “Is restricted to suppositing for present things” is included in it to indicate that a present-tense verb restricts a term added to it to present things and not to others. [L 259.12–14] [1291]  “If it has an appellatum or appellata” is included in it because there are some common terms that have more than one appellatum at the same time that are actual, such as ‘man’ and ‘ass’; there are others that have more than one appellatum neither at the same time nor successively but only one, e.g., ‘sun’ and ‘moon’;56 and there is another common term that never has more than one appellatum at the same time that is actual, but always only one successively, although it can certainly have more than one, but not at the same time, such as ‘phoenix’. When, therefore, there is a common term that has only one appellatum or more than one, and it serves as the subject of a present-tense verb that has no ampliating force, it always supposits for the appellatum it has or the appellata it has that are actual, but it never supposits for something nonexistent or for nonexistent things. But if it does not have an appellatum or appellata, it reverts to nonexisting things, which is to say, if a common term serves as

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the subject of a present-tense verb and has no appellatum or appellata, then it is necessary for it to revert to nonexisting things, that is, for it to supposit for nonexisting things. So, on the supposition that no rose exists, if one says ‘Every rose exists’, the term ‘rose’ supposits for nonexisting things.57 [L 259.14–260.16] [1292]  Briefly, therefore, it can be said that the point of the previously stated rule is this: when a common term serves as the subject of a present-tense verb, and there is no impediment either on the part of the term or on the part of the verb, then the term always supposits for something present or for present things, if it has an appellatum or appellata; but if it does not have an appellatum or appellata, then it supposits for nonexisting things. [L 261.1–6] [1293]  In connection with what has been said one asks about the truth of the proposition ‘Every time is’. [L 261.7–8] [1294]  On the basis of what has been said it seems that it is true, because the ­common term in it, namely, ‘time’, serves as the subject of a present-tense verb. Since, therefore, ‘time’ has an appellatum, namely, present time, it is restricted to suppositing for present things and so for existing things. The sense, therefore, will be this: ‘Every time that is, is. But this is true; therefore so is the first [proposition]. [L 261.8–262.2] [1295]  But it seems that it is false. ‘Every time is; therefore the past is’ follows, and likewise ‘therefore the future is’. But these are false; therefore so is the first [proposition]. [L 262.2–4] [1296]  One should reply that ‘Every time is’ is false; hence, the argument that proves this must be conceded. [L 262.5–6] [1297]  For the resolution of the opposing argument one should note that there are some terms that signify enduring things, such as ‘man’ and ‘ass’, but there are others that signify successive things, as do ‘time’ and ‘day’.58 Note also that some thingsa exist actually and othersb actually exist under a term.59 Those things are said to exist actually that exist presently, whereas those things of which the term is presently predicated in an affirmative proposition are said actually to exist under a term.60 Finally, note, therefore, that when a common term is distributed, it is distributed not only for things that exist actually but also for things that are actually contained under the term, whether the term signifies an enduring or a successive thing. [L 262.7–264.4] [1298]  But one should know with respect to terms signifying an enduring thing that there is no difference between existing actually and actually existing under a term, although there is a difference with respect to terms signifying a successive thing. For example, ‘man’ is a term signifying an enduring thing, and what actually exists under

a.  Reading at p. 262.10, ed. de Libera, quedam against quidam. b.  Reading at p. 263.1, ed. de Libera, quedam against quidam.



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that term, namely, a man, exists actually, for that of which ‘man’ is presently predicated in an affirmative proposition exists actually, on the supposition that there is a man. [L 264.5–10] [1299]  But ‘time’ is a term signifying a successive thing, and there is something actually under that term that, nevertheless, actually is not, for time is predicated in the present (presentialiter) of past and future time in an affirmative proposition since the propositions ‘Past time is time’ and ‘Future time is time’ are true.61 And yet the past actually is not, and neither is the future, although they are times. [L 264.11–17] [1300]  One should reply, therefore, to the argument (1294) that it is true that time has an appellatum, and in ‘Every time is’ it serves as the subject of a present-tense verb; so it supposits for present, i.e., existing things. But [it does so] not only for things that exist actually but also for things that actually exist under the term. The sense, then, of ‘Every time is’ is this: every time that is, is, and every time that is a time is.62 Hence, since the past is a time, and also the future, it follows from this that past and future time are, which is false, and so the first [proposition] is false. So the sense of the proposition ‘Every time is’ is inadequately expressed when one says that the sense is [that] every time that is, is, and so [the argument] does not arrive at a correct conclusion. [L 265.1–11] [1301]  If one asks why in the case of terms signifying an enduring thing there is no difference between existing actually and actually existing under a term, whereas there is a difference in the case of terms signifying a successive thing, one should reply that a term signifying a successive thing is a kind of whole composed of parts that do not exist at the same time but in respect of an earlier and a later, as is clear in the case of time. So what actually is not can certainly be a part of this whole that exists actually, and thus something can actually be under that whole or under that term which nevertheless does not exist actually. But a term signifying an enduring thing is a kind of whole that is composed of parts that exist at the same time, for when such a whole exists, all its parts must exist at the same time. And so what actually is under that term or under that whole actually is because of its endurance.63 [L 265.12–266.2] [Three Questions Regarding Restriction]

[1302]  Because it was assumed in the previous rule (1280) that a common term is restricted by a present-tense verb and is restricted to suppositing for present things, so that the rule may be more clear three things are briefly asked. The first is whether a common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb can be restricted by it. The second is whether the former is restricted by such a verb to suppositing for present things, i.e., for existing things. And the third is whether this restriction by the stated verb occurs in the same way in affirmative and negative expressions. [L 266.3–10]

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[The First Question and Opinions]

[1303]  With respect to the first [question], one objects that a common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb cannot be restricted by it because what restricts and what is restricted have to be in the same place. This is clear when one says ‘A white man runs’: ‘man’ is restricted by ‘white’ because ‘man’ and ‘white’ are in the same place.64 But if one says ‘A man is white’, ‘man’ is not restricted here by ‘white’ because they are not in the same place. The verb and the term serving as the subject are not in the same place because one is in the position of the subject and the other in the position of the predicate; therefore, this term cannot be restricted by this verb.65 [L ­266.11–19] [1304]  Also, if the term is restricted by the verb, this only occurs by reason of the tense of the verb; but thisa cannot happen by reason of the tense of the verb. The proof: tense is a consignification of a verb, which is an accident of a verb; but in the case of a verb its signification is prior to its consignification. But a verb does not restrict a common term by reason of its signification—when one says ‘A man runs’, ‘man’ is not restricted to men who are running; therefore neither does a verb restrict in virtue of its consignification, as is apparent by the Topic from a greater, and so it will not restrict by reason of tense.66 [L 267.1–8] [1305]  On the other hand, it is possible for a universal proposition with contingent subject matter to be true, for ‘Every man runs’ can be true.67 But it cannot be true unless the common term in such a proposition is restricted by a present-tense verb. It is impossible if ‘man’ is interpreted for past and future men; therefore it must be either that the common term in it is restricted by the verb or that [the proposition] is impossible, but one ought not say it is impossible;68 therefore it remains to say that the common term in this is restricted by the verb and for the same reason as in the other cases. [L 268.1–9] [1306]  One should reply to this that a common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb is restricted by it, but only so long as the verb signifies an action related to the subject, is stated of the subject, and is in the subject. If the verb is such that it signifies an action that is stated of the subject but is not in the subject, it does not restrict but ampliates, as was seen above (1288). And so it is that it is likewise restricted by a verb in the past and future tense, as will be indicated later (1326). [L268.10–16] [1307]  But one should note that this sort of restriction comes about in the following way. In a verb there are two things: an action and a composition.69 The action considered in itself is indifferent to any time, but the action or movement is restricted

a.  Reading at p. 267.2, ed. de Libera, hoc fieri. Probatio against hic fieri probatio.



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by time (which is the measure of motion) to being in the time that is its measure. So the action of a present-tense verb is located in the present, the action of a past-tense verb in the past, and the action of a future-tense verb in the future. This is the way, therefore, that the action of a verb is restricted by the tense of the verb. And because the time that is the measure of the action is the measure of the composition by means of the action, if the action is restricted, the composition is restricted. Because the action is an accident that cannot be without a subject, the [action] is also said of the subject by means of the composition that unites the one extreme with the other in the expression. And so the subject of the action is also asserted in the very same time frame in which the action and the composition are asserted, and the subject is restricted in this way to the time to which the action and the composition [are restricted]. But the subject of that action is the common term serving as the subject of the verb.70 [L 268.17–269.13] [1308]  It is clear, therefore, that a common term serving as the subject of a verb is restricted by the latter, and so this restriction occurs, not directly, but indirectly in virtue of the tense of the verb. For first the action of the verb is restricted by its tense, then the composition, and finally the common term serving as the subject of that verb. Hence, the argument that proves this must be conceded. [L 269.13–17] [1309]  One should reply to the first argument in opposition (1303) that it must be said that there are two kinds of restriction. There is one in which what restricts and its disposition is the source for understanding what is restricted. This kind is wont to arise by the addition of a name and a modifying clause, and it is true of this kind that what restricts and what is restricted must be in the same place.71 There is another kind of restriction in which neither what restricts nor its disposition is the source for understanding what is restricted. This is wont to arise through a verb by reason of the verb’s tense, and it is not true of such that what restricts and what is restricted are wont to be in the same place. Now, since the argument drew its conclusion based on restriction stated in the second sense, it is invalid.72 [L 269.18–270.4] [1310]  One should reply to the other argument (1304) that without doubt the restriction does not arise from a verb except by reason of its tense. It is also true that time is a consignification of a verb and that the signification of a verb is prior to its consignification. But it does not follow thereby that, if restriction does not arise by reason of signification, it could not arise because of consignification. The consignification that is the tense of a verb contributes more to bring about restriction than its signification does, and that is because the consignification that is the tense is first the measure of a verb’s signification, i.e., action, and then of the suppositum, i.e., the subject, of the action. But a measure restricts what is measured because the quantity of what is measured is on the basis of the quantity of the measure. And so, although no restriction arises by reason of the signification of a verb, it can certainly still arise by reason of the consignification of a verb. When, therefore, it is said in opposition that the argument seems to hold on the basis of the Topic from a greater, one must reply that

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this is false, for signification does not contribute more to restriction than consignification does; rather, it contributes less, as has [just] been seen. [L 270.5–18] [The Second Question and Opinions]

[1311]  Next one asks about the second [question] (1301), [namely, whether a present-tense verb restricts a term to suppositing for present things]. [L 270.19] [1312]  It seems that a common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb is not restricted to suppositing for existing things, for ‘Every man exists’ is false when no man exists; therefore its contradictory, ‘Some man does not exist’ will be true. But if the common term in the negative proposition supposits for existing things, it will be false, which is impossible, for it is impossible for two contradictories to be false at the same time. It remains, therefore, that [‘man’] does not supposit for existing things and yet serves as the subject of a present-tense verb. If the common term supposits for existing things, it is clear that [‘Some man does not exist’] is false. If, when no one is running, one assigns running to a runner, it will be assigned truthfully, as if one says ‘One running runs’. But if running is removed from the one who runs, it will be removed falsely, as if one would say ‘One running is not running’. Likewise, if existing is removed from one existing, it will be removed falsely. But when one says ‘Some man does not exist’, if ‘man’ supposits for existing men, existing is removed from something existing, for the sense is [that] some man who exists does not exist. Therefore it will be false.73 [L 270.19–271.14] [1313]  ‘No man exists; therefore Caesar does not exist’ follows, and ‘[therefore] the Antichrist does not exist’ follows. But Caesar is past and the Antichrist is future. Since they are taken under the common term ‘man’ that serves as the subject of a present-tense verb, it seems that this common term supposits not only for present men but also for past and future ones. [L 271.15–272.3] [1314]  An argument made in connection with the first problem (1302) can be used on the other side. ‘Every man runs’ is possible, which would be impossible unless the common term were restricted to suppositing for present men, because running cannot presently apply to nonexistents, namely, to something past or future. Since, therefore, the proposition is not impossible, it remains that a common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb in it is restricted by the verb to suppositing in that proposition for present men, and this will occur in the same way in other p ­ ropo­sitions. [L 272.4–11] [1315]  Some are accustomed to reply to this that one is to speak in two ways about a proposition in which a common term serves as the subject of a present-tense verb. In one way inasmuch as it is taken in itself and absolutely in its character as a statement. They say that in this sense the common term suppositing in it is restricted to suppositing for present things. In the other way it can be taken as a source for implying something from itself, in its character as a proposition. They say that in this sense



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the common term in it is not restricted to suppositing for present things, but rather it can supposit for existents and nonexistents, and this is by reason of the implication that is based on the relationship of the terms, a relationship of terms that has nothing to do with any difference of tense.74 [L 272.12–22] [1316]  One can argue in this way against this: one kind of restriction is that made by something adjoined; another is that made by a verb by reason of the tense of the verb. But a restriction made by something adjoined restricts a term to the same thing both in a proposition taken by itself and in a proposition insofar as it is a source for implying something.75 For, if one says ‘Every white man runs’, ‘man’ is restricted to white men whether that proposition is taken by itself or something is inferred from it. Therefore, [from the Topic] from a similar a restriction made by reason of tense will restrict a term in a proposition to the same thing whether the proposition is taken by itself or something is inferred from it. [L 272.23–273.6] [1317]  On the supposition that every man who exists is running, ‘Every man runs’ is true, if it is taken by itself. But if something is inferred from it, it will be false on the basis of the previously stated resolution, because in [the original], in so far as something is inferred from it, the [common] term supposits not only for existing men but also for nonexisting ones. The same proposition, therefore, will be true and false, because it is true when taken absolutely, but is false when related to another, which is unacceptable. Something [taken] absolutely and [taken] in relation do not constitute a real difference; instead, truth and falsity are caused by a state of affairs, because Aristotle says in the Categories “An expression is called true or false from the fact that something is or is not the case.”76 [L 273.7–16] [1318]  Because of this one should reply that the previously stated solution is not valid. Rather, one should say that a common term serving as the subject of a ­present-tense verb is restricted to suppositing for present things, but [only], as was said (1306), so long as the verb signifies an action related to the subject, is stated of the subject, and is in the subject, and the common term serving as the subject of that verb has an appellatum or appellata. Thus, the argument that proves these things must be ­conceded. [L 273.17–23] [1319]  One should reply to the first argument in opposition (1312) by saying that it is certainly true that if no man exists, ‘Every man exists’ is false because existing is attributed to nonexistents. But ‘Some man does not exist’ is true, although the sense of ‘Some man does not exist’ is not [that] some man who does exist does not exist, but [that] some man who does not exist does not exist. So existing is removed from someone nonexistent. In both of these the common term supposits for someone nonexistent because it does not have an appellatum or appellata, and so it must revert to nonexisting things. The argument, moreover, is worthless because it concludes with a term having no appellatum or appellata, whereas it must conclude with a term that has an appellatum or appellata. But such a term, and not the one having no appellatum or appellata, is restricted to suppositing for present things. [L 274.1–13]

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[1320]  One should reply to the other argument (1313) that ‘No man exists; therefore Caesar does not exist’ does not follow, nor does ‘therefore the Antichrist does not exist’ follow. Things being as they are now, when one says ‘No man exists’, since ‘man’ has appellata, it supposits only for existing men; thus what does not exist ought not be included under it. And so, since Caesar and the Antichrist do not exist, they ought not be included under ‘man’. But just as there would be no [logical] relationship in ‘No man who exists, exists; therefore some man who does not exist does not exist’, so there is no [logical] relationship if one infers ‘No man exists; therefore Caesar does not exist’ and likewise ‘[therefore] the Antichrist does not exist’. [L 274.14–275.2] [1321]  But someone will object: ‘No man exists; therefore Caesar does not exist’ does indeed seem to follow, for ‘Caesar exists; therefore a man exists’ follows. Therefore by an inverse consequence (which certainly holds with respect to contradictories) it seems that ‘No man exists; therefore Caesar does not exist’ certainly does follow.77 But the proof is that ‘Caesar exists; therefore a man exists’ follows, for when one says ‘Caesar exists’, I ask whether ‘Caesar’ stands for what there is now of Caesar or for what there was of Caesar. But one is not to say that it stands for what there is now of Caesar or for the dust or ashes to which Caesar has been reduced, for if it stood for what there is now of Caesar, ‘Caesar exists’ would be true, which no one would concede. It is left, therefore, that when one says ‘Caesar exists’, it stands for what there was of Caesar. Since he was a man, ‘Caesar exists; therefore a man exists’ follows perfectly. [L 275.3–15] [1322]  One should reply to this that ‘Caesar exists; therefore a man exists’ does not follow, just as ‘No man exists; therefore Caesar does not exist’ does not follow. And to that by which ‘Caesar exists; therefore a man exists’ is proved one should reply in this way: it is of course true that when one says ‘Caesar exists’, ‘Caesar’ stands for what there was of Caesar, and hence it stands for the man who was and thus for something nonexistent. Nevertheless ‘Caesar exists; therefore a man exists’ does not follow, for just as there would be no [logical] relationship if one were to say ‘A man who does not exist’ [and infer from it] ‘therefore a man who exists’, so there is no [logical] relationship [when one says] ‘Caesar exists; therefore a man exists’. When one says ‘Caesar exists’, ‘Caesar’ stands for a man who does not exist, whereas when one says ‘A man exists’, since ‘man’ has appellata, it stands for a man who exists. [L 275.16–276.6] [1323]  Thus note that, just as when a common term serves as the subject of a present-tense verb it supposits for nonexisting things, if it has no appellatum or appellata, so when a discrete term serves as the subject of a present-tense verb it stands for something nonexistent, if there is no actual appellatum belonging to the discretea term.78 [L 276.7–11]

a.  Reading at p. 276.10, ed. de Libera, discreti against communis.



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[1324]  Since mention has been made (1321) of an inverse consequence, in order to know what it is that is called by that name, one should note that according to Aristotle in Book Two of the Topics there are two kinds of consequences, namely, a direct consequence and an inverse consequence.79 A consequence is direct when the opposite of the consequent follows from the opposite of the antecedent, as in ‘If it is a strength, it is a virtue; therefore if it is a weakness, it is a vice’. A consequence is inverse when the opposite of the antecedent follows from the opposite of the consequent, e.g., ‘If a man exists, an animal exists; therefore if an animal does not exist, a man does not exist’. [L 276.12–20] [The Third Question and Opinion]

[1325]  Next one asks about the third [question, namely, whether a present-tense verb restricts the common term to suppositing for present things in the same way in an affirmative and negative proposition]. [L 276.21] [1326]  It seems that restriction by the verb occurs in the same way in an affirmative and negative proposition in this way: a verb restricts a term by reason of its tense, as was seen (1306), but the same tense remains in the verb in an affirmative and a negative proposition, for a negation does not remove the tense; therefore the verb restricts the term in the same way in an affirmative and a negative proposition.80 [L276.21–277.4] [1327]  Unless the verb restricted the term in the same way in an affirmative and a negative proposition, there would be no contradiction, for a contradiction is an affirmation and negation of the same thing. But it is certain that there is contradiction; therefore it is also certain that the verb restricts the term in the same way in an affirmative and a negative proposition.81 [L 277.5–9] [1328]  On the other hand an affirmative adjunct restricts a term to one thing and a negative adjunct to another, for ‘white’ and ‘nonwhite’ do not restrict to the same things. Similarly, an affirmative modifying clause restricts [a term] to something other than a negative modifying clause does, for ‘man’ is restricted to one kind of thing when one says ‘man who runs’ and to another when one says ‘man who does not run’. Therefore [by the Topic] from a similar an affirmative verb restricts [a term] to something other than a negative verb does, and so the restriction will not be made in the same way by the verb in an affirmative and in a negative proposition. [L 277.10–278.6] [1329]  One should reply to this that the verb does restrict the term in the same way in an affirmative and a negative proposition, as the first two arguments prove (1326 and 1327), which must be conceded.82 [L 278.7–9] [1330]  One should reply to the opposing argument (1328) that the restriction made by a verb is not the same as that made by an adjunct and a modifying clause. That which occurs through the verb does so by reason of consignification because [it is

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produced] by reason of [the verb’s] tense. Because a negation does not remove or change the consignification of a verb, so that sort of restriction occurs in the same way when it is affirmed and denied. But the sort that occurs through something adjoined or by a modifying clause arises by reason of the principal signification. And because negation removes the principal signification in what is adjoined and in a modifying clause, so restriction by an affirmed and negated adjunct does not occur in the same way, nor by an affirmed and negated modifying clause. [L 278.10–279.3] [The Second Rule Regarding the Appellation of Substantial and Accidental Common Terms]

[1331]  The second rule of appellations is this: A common term pertaining to accident that is not restricted by any other means and serves as the subject of a past-tense verb can supposit for present and past things; the term serving as the predicate supposits [only] for past things. But, if a term pertaining to substance serves as the subject or the predicate of a past-tense verb, it always supposits for past things.83 [L 279.4–9] [The Third Rule Regarding the Appellation of Substantial and Accidental Common Terms]

[1332]  The third rule is this: A common term pertaining to accident that is not restricted by any other means and serves as the subject of a future-tense verb can supposit for present and future things; when serving as the predicate it is interpreted only for future things. But, if a term pertaining to substance serves as the subject or the predicate of a future-tense verb, it is always interpreted for future things.84 [L 279.10–15] [The Proof for the Second Rule]

[1333]  That a term pertaining to accident and serving as the subject of a pasttense verb could supposit for present and past things is clear in this way: ‘This old man was a boy’ is true on the supposition that someone who is at present an old man is indicated. But it cannot be true unless the subject in the proposition is interpreted for someone present, while the predicate for someone past. The sense is [that] he who is an old man now was formerly a boy. But in this sense the term ‘old man’ is interpreted for present men and yet serves as the subject of a past-tense verb. Therefore, a common term pertaining to accident and serving as the subject of a past-tense verb does supposit for present things, and there is no doubt that it can supposit for past things; therefore, it can supposit for present and past things. [L 279.16–280.2]



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[The Proof for the Third Rule]

[1334]  That a common term pertaining to accident and serving as the subject of a future-tense verb can supposit for present and future things is clear in this way: let it be given that Socrates is in the next to last instant of his youth and that he lives until he is an old man. Then, indicating Socrates, one can truthfully say ‘That boy will be an old man’. ‘This boy will be an old man’ is true because it can have two senses, namely, [that] he who will be a boy will be an old man, or [that] he who is a boy will be an old man. And since it is not true in the sense that he who will be a boy will be an old man because from now on, as was given, he will not be a boy, it is left that it is true in the sense [that] he who is a boy will be an old man.85 In this sense ‘boy’ supposits for present boys and yet serves as the subject of a future-tense verb. Therefore, a term pertaining to accident and serving as the subject of a future-tense verb can supposit for present things and there is no doubt that it can supposit for future things. Thus, if one says ‘Something white ran’, the sense is [that] what is or was something white ran. Likewise, if one says ‘Something white will run’, the sense is [that] what is or what will be white will run.86 [L 280.3–18] [1335]  But one asks: Since a term pertaining to substance and serving as the subject or predicate of a verb is interpreted according to the requirement of the verb—if it serves as the subject or the predicate of a present-tense verb, it is always interpreted for present things; if for a past-tense verb, it is interpreted for past things; and if for a ­future-tense verb, it is interpreted for future things—why is it not similar for a term pertaining to accident? [L 280.19–281.3] [1336]  And it seems that [the situation] ought to be the same as it is in the case of a term pertaining to substance. A verb restricts by reason of tense, but the same tense remains in a verb when a term pertaining to substance and one pertaining to accident serve as its subject. Therefore, a term pertaining to substance and one pertaining to accident ought to be restricted by the verb in the same way. [L 281.4–8] [1337] One asks why a term pertaining to accident and serving as the predicate of a verb is interpreted according to the requirement of the verb, but not so when it serves as the subject of a verb.87 [L 281.9–11] [1338]  It seems that a term pertaining to accident would have to be interpreted according to the requirement of the verb when it serves as the subject, just as it does when it serves as the predicate.88 As was said above (1306), the tense of a verb first restricts the action and then the composition and finally the subject. Since, therefore, the composition is equally related to the extremes—it is something intermediate uniting

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the extremes—it seems that the way restriction is in the subject or suppositum by way of the composition is the way it ought to be in the predicate or appositum. So a term pertaining to accident is restricted in the same way when serving as a subject and as a predicate. [L 282.1–9] [1339]  ‘Something white will be Socrates’ is indefinite and affirmative; it can, therefore, be converted simply into ‘Socrates will be white’. But the judgment about convertibles is the same; therefore, if ‘white’ is interpreted only for a future thing in ‘Socrates will be white’, ‘something white’ is interpreted in the same way only for a future thing in ‘Something white will be Socrates’. So ‘white’ will be restricted in the same way when it serves as a subject and when it serves as a predicate. [L 282.10–15] [1340]  One should reply to the first of these (1336) that it is certainly true that a term pertaining to substance serving as the subject of a past- and future-tense verb is interpreted according to the requirement of the verb, but this is not the case with respect to a term pertaining to accident. For a term pertaining to substance is restricted by a past- and future-tense verb when it serves as its subject, but not a term pertaining to accident. The reason for this can be that a subject is not directly restricted by a verb because of tense but by means of what the verb signifies, as was said above (1306).89 Thus, a restriction occurs in the subject in accord with what the thing [signified] by the verb requires. But the thing [signified] by the verb is not related to the subject in which it is present by reason of an accidental form but a substantial one, because what the verb signifies is an accident and requires something stable and constant in which to occur, as in a subject; but an accidental form is not of this sort whereas a substantial one is. [L 282.16–27] [1341]  Likewise, a subject does not submit itself to a verb by reason of an accidental form, but by reason of a substantial form since a subject by the very nature by which it is a subject must be something stable and constant,90 and so the nature of a subject as a subject is incompatible with an accidental form. And so a subject is not restricted by a verb because of its tense or by reason of an accidental form through the thing [signified] by the verb but only by reason of a substantial form.91 Since, therefore, a term pertaining to substance is imposed on the basis of a substantial form and one pertaining to accident on the basis of an accidental form, a term pertaining to substance and serving as the subject of a verb is restricted by [the verb], but a term pertaining to accident and serving as its subject [is] not [restricted by the verb].92 [L 282.27–283.8] [1342]  One should reply to the argument by which the contrary is proved (1336) that it is certainly true that the tense of a verb remains the same when a term pertaining to substance or to accident serves as its subject; it is also certainly true that a verb restricts a term by reason of its tense. But it does not follow thereby that it restricts in the same way a term pertaining to substance and to accident serving as its subject. Since the restriction occurs from the tense not directly but by means of the thing [signified] by the verb, it occurs in accord with what the thing [signified] by the verb requires.



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And because the thing [signified] by the verb relates to the term only by reason of a substantial and not an accidental form, the restriction occurs in a term pertaining to substance because it is imposed with respect to a substantial form and not in a term pertaining to accident because the latter is imposed with respect to an accidental form. [L 283.9–20] [1343]  One should reply to the second question (1338–39) that it is certainly true that a term pertaining to accident and serving as the predicate of a verb is interpreted according to the requirement of the verb, but not when it serves as the subject. The reason for this can be [that], as has been said (1340), the nature of a subject as a subject is incompatible with an accidental form, for a term pertaining to accident cannot be a subject because of its accidental form. But the nature of a predicate as a predicate is not incompatible with an accidental form, for a term can certainly be predicated on the basis of an accidental form. Thus, although a verb is not related to a term pertaining to accident in the latter’s character as a subject, yet it certainly does relate to it in its character as a predicate. So a term pertaining to accident is restricted by a verb when it serves as a predicate but not when it serves as a subject. [L 283.21–284.5] [1344]  One should reply to the first argument by which the contrary is proved (1338) that it is true that the composition relates equally to the extremes, since it is an intermediary uniting them. But it does not follow thereby that the restriction in a term pertaining to accident and serving as a subject occurs by means of the composition. It does occur in a term pertaining to accident serving as a predicate, for the composition does not have to do with an extreme that is a term pertaining to accident and serving as a subject in virtue of its character as an accident. It does indeed have to do with an extreme that is a term pertaining to accident and serving as a predicate. A term pertaining to accident can have the character of a predicate but not the character of a subject. [L 284.6–14] [1345]  One should reply to the second argument (1339) that ‘Something white will be Socrates’ has two interpretations, for it can be taken in the sense [that] what will be white will be Socrates or in the sense [that] what is white will be Socrates. In the sense [that] what will be white will be Socrates it is converted simply into ‘Socrates will be white’, but not in the other sense. The judgment is the same in both instances because ‘white’ is interpreted in both instances for something in the future. But in the sense [that] what is white will be Socrates it is converted in this way: ‘Socrates will be that which is white’, so that the implication ‘which is’ occurs in the predicate just as it does in the subject in such a way that by means of the implication the term pertaining to accident is interpreted for something present when it serves as a predicate, just as it was interpreted when serving as a subject. The argument, therefore, is invalid for it supposes that ‘Something white will be Socrates’ is converted in both its interpretations into ‘Socrates will be something white’, which is not true, as was just seen. [L ­284.14–285.6]

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[Kinds of Restrictions]93 [The Definition of ‘Restriction’]

[1346]  Next comes restriction and ampliation, but first restriction, which is the opposite of ampliation, for one opposite cannot be completely known unless the other is known. According to Aristotle in Book Six of the Topics near the beginning “those who define well consignify contraries at the same time,” that is, those who assign well the definition of one contrary introducea along with itb the definition of the other ­contrary.94 [226.13–19] [1347]  But first one should see what restriction is, which can be shown in this way: Restriction is a lessening of the scope of a common term in virtue of which the common term is interpreted for fewer supposita than its actual supposition requires. This is clear: when one says ‘white man’, ‘man’ is restricted by ‘white’. Although in virtue of its actual supposition it can be interpreted for men of whatever color, yet by the nature of the adjective ‘white’ its supposition is narrowed to being interpreted for white ones only. [226.20–28] [1348]  And one should note that “common term” is accurately includedc in the definition of ‘restriction’, and this occurs to distinguish [a common term] from a discrete term, which cannot be restricted or ampliated. [226.28–31] [The Divisions of Restriction] [Natural and Use-Governed]95

[1349]  Restriction occurs in many ways. In one way it occurs by means of something added to a restricted term; it occurs in another way when nothing is added to what is restricted. And on this basis one kind of restriction can be called natural, the other use-governed (usualis). That kind is called natural which occurs by means of something added to the restricted term, because the term is restricted in accord with the nature of what is added to it. That kind is [called] use-governed which is in a term [but] not by means of something added, and it is called use-governed because it arisesd from use and not from the nature of something added to the restricted [term]. This

a.  Reading at p. 226.19 insinuant against insinuat. b.  Reading at p. 226.19 hac against hic. c.  Reading at p. 226.29 ponitur against apponitur. d.  Reading at p. 226.38 provenit against proveniet.



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kind of restriction is wont to occur in the term ‘king’ when one says ‘The king is coming’: the term ‘king’ is restricted to suppositing for the king of the country in which the sentence is uttered. [226.31–227.3] [Natural Restriction by Means of Nondiminishing Clauses]

[1350]  Natural restriction is spoken of in many ways; it can occur by means of a word or by means of a clause (per orationem). [227.3–4] [1351]  It occurs by means of a clause when a clause that does not imply diminution or ampliationa modifies a term, for then the term is restricted to suppositing for those [supposita] to which the modifying clause applies.96 For example, when one says ‘A man who is white runs’, ‘man’ is restricted to white men. [227.4–9] [1352]  There is one kind of modifying clause, howeverb, that does imply diminution, e.g., ‘who is dead’ or ‘who does not exist’; the other kind implies ampliation, such as ‘who can exist’. These, howeverc, do not restrict, for restriction is said to be in a term when the term is not demolished by what is addedd to it but is interpreted for fewer supposita than its actual supposition would require. That thesee do not restrict is because the kind of clause that implies diminutionf demolishes what it modifies, whereas the kind that implies ampliation causes a term to be interpreted for more than its actual supposition would require. Hence, these do not restrict. [227.9–18] [Natural Restriction by Means of a Word’s Signification or Consignification]

[1353]  The kind of restriction that occurs by means of a word can occur because of signification or consignification. [227.19–20] [Natural Restriction Because of Consignification]

[1354]  [Restriction] can occur because of consignification by means of a name as well as a verb: it arises by means of a name because of its gender; by means of a verb because of its tense. An adjectival nameg restricts its substantive because of its gender, for if the adjective is of the masculine gender, it restricts the substantive to males, and

a.  Reading at p. 227.5–6 ampliationem against implicationem. b.  Reading at p. 227.9 autem against enim. c.  Reading at p. 227.11–12 Hee autem against Hec enim. d.  Reading at p. 227.12 advenit against adveniet. e.  Reading at p. 227.18 hee against hec. f.  Reading at p. 227.15 diminutionem against divisionem. g.  Reading at p. 227.23 nomen against nomen masculini.

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if of the feminine [gender] to women. So when one says ‘Homo est albus’ (A human being is white) ‘human being’ is restricted to males; if one says ‘Homo est alba’ (A human being is white) [‘human being’] is restricted to females.97 [227.20–27] [1355]  Restriction occurs by means of a verb because of a past, present, and future tense, for a present-tense verb restricts to present men, a past-tense to past men, and a future-tense to future men, as was seen in connection with appellation (1280). ­[227.28–31] [1356]  One should note that restriction made because of consignification is different from that made because of signification in this respect that, in the restriction made because of signification, it is always necessary that what restricts and what is restricted be put in the same place, and that the one be directly adjoined to the other. But in the restriction that occurs because of consignification it is not necessary that what restricts and what is restricted be put in the same place, and it is not necessary that the one be directly adjoined to the other. The reason for this is that in the restriction brought about because of signification what restricts is a source for understanding what is restricted, but in the restriction brought about because of consignification what restricts is not a source for understanding what is restricted. [227.31–42] [Natural Restriction Because of Signification]

[1357]  The restriction that occurs by means of a word because of signification can occur in many ways. [227.42] [1358]  One kind occurs because of something that does not have the same [grammatical] case as what is restricted, as when one says ‘Socrates’ ass’; here ‘ass’ is restricted to supposit for Socrates’ ass. [228.1–3] [1359]  Another kind occurs because of something in the same [grammatical] case with what is restricted, and this can occur by means of a term pertaining to substance, and it occurs when something [logically] inferior is added to its superior in an appositive construction. For example, if one says ‘An animal (man) runs’ (animal homo currit), here ‘animal’ is restricted to suppositing for the animal that is a man. This can alsoa occur by means of the specific differentia added to a genus. For example, if one says ‘rational animal’, here ‘animal’ is restricted to something rational. It can also occur by means of a demonstrative pronoun. For example, if one says ‘That man runs’, ‘man’ is restricted to a determinate man. This can also occur by means of a term pertaining to accident, such as by an adjectival name or by a participleb, for when one says ‘A white man runs’, ‘man’ is restricted to white men, and likewise when one says ‘A running man argues’, ‘man’ is restricted to those who are running. [228.3–17]

a.  Reading at p. 228.8 etiam against enim. b.  Reading at p. 228.14 participium against proprium.



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[Adjectives and Restriction, Diminution, and Ampliation]

[1360]  Every adjective that is not diminishing, that does not have the force of ampliating, and is directly adjoined to a term restricts it. An adjective such as ‘dead’ is something diminishing, and, strictly speaking, this [term] does not restrict but demolishes [a term]. For example, if one says ‘dead man’, ‘man’ is nota restricted but brought to naught or demolished. Another kind of adjective is one that causes a term to be ­interpreted for more than its actual supposition would require, and this kind of term does not restrict but ampliates. So if one says ‘A man can run’, [‘man’] is not restricted but ampliated. [228.17–25]

[AMPLIATION] 98 [The Definition of ‘Ampliation’]

[1361]  Ampliation follows. Ampliationb is an extension of the scope of a common term in accord with whichc the common term can be interpreted for more supposita than its actual supposition requires. This is clear. When one says ‘A man can be the Antichrist’, ‘man’ is ampliated by ‘can’. For, although ‘man’, serving as the subject of a present-tense verb, is interpreted only for present men as regards its actual supposition, nevertheless ‘man’ is ampliated to be interpreted for a future man by the nature of the verb ‘can’, and in this way its supposition is extended. [228.26–35] [Ampliation by Means of Names, Verbs, Adverbs, and Participles]

[1362]  Sometimes ampliation occurs by means of a name, sometimes by means of a verb, sometimes by means of an adverb, and sometimes by means of a participle. There are certain names that have the power to ampliate, e.g., ‘possible’, ‘necessary’; and likewise there are certain verbs, like ‘can’, ‘is praised’; and similarly there are certain adverbs, such as ‘potentially’, ‘necessarily’; and likewise there are certain participles, e.g., ‘being able’, ‘praised’. [228.35–40]

a.  Reading at p. 228.21 non against enim. b.  Reading at p. 228.26 ampliatio against ampliato. c.  Reading at p. 228.27 quam against quod.

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[Ampliation by Means of Supposita and by Means of Times]

[1363]  Ampliation can be divided in this way: one kind of ampliation occurs by reason of supposita, the other by reason of times, for some of the things that ampliate, do so with respect to supposita, others with respect to times. [228.40–229.1] [1364]  Those that cause a term to be interpreted for both actual and nonexistent supposita are said to ampliate with respect to supposita. Verbs whose corresponding action is related to the subject, is said of the subject, but is not in the subject are of this sorta, such as ‘can’, ‘is thought’, ‘is praised’. Other things ampliate in the same way that have the power of those verbs, such as certain names, adverbs, and participles, if they derive from those [verbs]. [229.1–8] [1365]  Those that cause a term to be extended to all the differences of time are said to ampliate with respect to times, such as those words that include within themselves all the differences of time, as do ‘necessarily’, ‘necessary’, ‘always’. So, when one says ‘A man is an animal necessarily’, it is notb different from saying ‘That is, in every temporal reference being an animal belongs to a man’, namely, in the present, the past, and the future. [229.8–14]

[DISTRIBUTION]

[1366]  Although much could be said about distributions, for the sake of brevity let us say just a little for the moment. We must now see what distribution is and what it is to distribute. [229.15–18] [The Definition of ‘Distribution’]

[1367]  Distribution is the division of one thing intoc divided things and to distribute is to divide one thing intod divided [parts]. But distribution occurs by the additione of a universal sign to a term having subjective orf integral parts under it. For there are two kinds of parts, subjective and integral, and accordingly one kind is a universal sign distributive of integral parts, e.g., ‘whole’, and the other is a universal sign distributive of subjective parts, e.g., ‘all’, ‘every’, ‘each’, ‘any’, and the like. [229.18–25] a.  Reading at p. 229.3 cuiusmodi against cuius. b.  Reading at p. 229.12 non aliud against aliud. c.  Reading at p. 229.18 in divisa against indivisa. d.  Reading at p. 229.19 in divisa against indivisa. e.  Reading at p. 229.19–20 additionem against addictionem. f.  Reading at p. 229.21 vel against et.



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[Distribution with Respect to Integral and Subjective Parts of Universal Terms]

[1368]  A sign distributive of integral parts is wont to be added to an integral whole, indicating that the whole is divided into integral parts, fora distribution is brought about in a whole by means of a sign, for the sign distributes. So distribution is actively present in [the sign], but the whole is distributedb, and hence distribution is passively present in it. But signs distributive of subjective parts are wont to be added to a universal whole.99 [229.25–31] [Perfect and Imperfect Universals]

[1369]  One should know, moreover, that ‘universal’ is ambiguous. One kind of universal is that which completely and perfectly has the nature of a universal, whereas there are other kinds of universals that in some respect fall short of the nature of a complete and perfect universal. [229.31–32] [1370]  That is said to have completely and perfectly the nature of a universal which is in many things and is said of many things [that exist] actually and at the same time and in the natural order, e.g., ‘man’. For things being as they are right now, man is in many singular things and is said of many things [that exist] actually and at the same time and is something existing in the natural order.100 [229.32–40] [1371]  But there are other universals and they are lacking in some of those respects, for sun and moon are universals and are in many things, but not actually, or at the same time, or successively, nor are they said of many things, because there is only one sun and there is only one moon.101 Similarly, phoenix is a kind of universal, and although it is in many and is said of many, this is [so] successively because when one phoenix is demolished another is generated. But it is never in many at one time nor said of many at the same time, for there is always actually only one phoenix. Likewise the names of imaginary things such as chimera and goat-stag are wont to be in many things and are said of many things, but they are not things existingc in the natural order but only within the soul. [229.40–230.8] [Distribution by Means of Universal Signs]

[1372]  Note, therefore, that universal signs distributive of subjective parts can correctly and completely be added to any of the universals mentioned. Hence ‘every

a.  Reading at p. 229.27 enim against autem. b.  Reading at p. 229.29 distribuitur against distribuit. c.  Reading at p. 230.7 alique existentia against aliquid existens.

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sun’, ‘every moon’, ‘every phoenix’, and ‘every chimera’ are well formulated. The reason for this can be thata a universal sign distributive of the subjective parts of a term to which it is added requires nothing other than that the term be imposed on the basis of a universal form and that the form be able to be participated by more than one suppositum actually or potentially, either in reality or in the soul.102 And because this is found in any of the universals mentioned, the sign can be added to each of them. ­[230.8–18] [Distribution in Several Categories]

[1373]  One should know that some signs distributive of subjective parts are distributive of things that are in the category Substance, e.g., ‘every’, ‘all’, ‘no’, ‘any’, ‘each’, ‘both’, ‘neither’; others are distributive of things that are in the category Quality, such as ‘of whatever sort’, and the like; others again are distributive of things that are in the category Quantity, e.g., ‘as much as you please’, ‘however much’, and the like; and still others are distributive of things that are in the category of discrete quantity, such as ‘however many’, ‘as many as you please’, and the like. [230.18–26] [Universal and Particular Signs]

[1374]  But note that distribution does not come about by means of particular signs but only by means of universal ones, for universal signs have the power to distribute; particular ones do not. [230.27–29] [Distribution by Means of Negation: Two Rules]

[1375]  One should know that not only universal signs have the power to distribute, but so also does negation. For we have a first rule: a negation renders immobile the supposition of the term it precedes and whose supposition it finds mobile, and it renders mobile the supposition it finds immobile. So if one says ‘Not every man runs’, the supposition of the term ‘man’ is madeb immobile where before the arrival of the negation it was mobile. But if one says ‘Socrates does not see a man’, the supposition of the term ‘man’ is made mobile and there can be a [logical] descent from the term; before the arrival of the negation the supposition of the term was immobile. And so the term is distributed by this sort of negation. The reason for the rule can be [that] negation by its nature is destructivec, so it effects the opposite of what it finds. When, therefore, it

a.  Reading at p. 230.12 quod against nam. b.  Reading at p. 230.34 efficitur against manet. c.  Reading at p. 230.41 natura destructiva against nature destructive.



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finds mobile supposition it renders it immobile, and when it finds immobile [supposition] it renders it mobile. [230.29–43] [1376]  There is a second rule about negation: when two negative universal signs are placed in an expression, the first is equipollent to its contrary and the second to its contradictory. For example, if one says ‘Nothing is nothing’, this is the same as were one to say ‘Everything is something’. The reason can be because there is a rule of this sort for equipollents: a universal negative sign with a negation placed aftera it is equipollent to its contrary. But when two universal negative signs are placed in the same expression, the negation of the second sign is placed after the first sign, and so the first universal negative sign is equipollent to its contrary because of the negation placed after it. But there is an additional rule for equipollents: a universal sign with a negation placed beforeb it is equipollent to its contradictory. But when two universal negative signs are placed in the same expression, the negation of the first sign is placed before the second sign, and so the second universal negative sign will be equipollent to its contradictory because of the negation placed before it. [230.43–231.16] [Distribution by Means of Negative and Affirmative Signs]

[1377]  One should know that a universal negative sign has a greater powerc for distributing than does a universal affirmative sign, for a universal affirmative sign confuses and distributes a common term directly joinedd to it, but it confuses and does not distribute a term indirectly adjoined. A universal negative sign, however, confuses and distributes the common term it precedes whether it is directly or indirectly adjoined to it. So if one says ‘No man is an ass’, there can be a descent in both the subject and the predicate. [231.16–25] [1378]  The reason why a universal negative term confuses and distributes a common term indirectly adjoined to it and that it precedes can be this: it is the same to say ‘No man is an ass’ and ‘Every man is not an ass’. Hence, the negation belonging to the universal sign used in the subject position [in the first statement] follows a term used in the subject position [in the second statement] bute precedes the term used in the predicate position. And because a term used in the predicate position has immobile supposition before the arrival of the negation, after the arrival of the negation it has mobile. For, as has been said (1375), a negation renders mobile the supposition of the term it precedes and which it finds immobile. And so in virtue of the negation that is a.  Reading at p. 231.6 postposita against posposita. b.  Reading at p. 231.11 preposita against postposita. c.  Reading at p. 231.17 virtutem against universalitatem. d.  Reading at p. 231.19–20 adiunctum against additum. e.  Reading at p. 231.30 vero against verum.

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in it the universal negative sign distributes the term it precedes and to which it is directly adjoined. [231.25–38] [Collective and Distributive Distribution of a Universal Affirmative Sign]

[1379]  One should know that the universal affirmative signs ‘all’ and ‘every’, which are distributive of a universal whole, are sometimes interpreted divisively and sometimes collectively. They are said to be interpreted collectively when they indicate that the predicate is attributed to its parts taken all together and not to each one taken by itself. Then one is not permitted to make a descent within the parts of the subject, as when one says ‘Every man hauls a boat in and no one by himself ’. But they are interpreted divisively when they indicate that the predicate is attributed to the subject for the parts of the subject, and then a descent within the parts of the subject is certainly permitted, as when one says ‘Every man runs’. [231.39–232.5] [1380]  Note that the universal affirmative sign distributive of a universal whole is wont to be interpreted collectively especially [when it is] in the plural, as when one says ‘All the apostles are twelve’. But it is not so strictly wont to be interpreted collectively [when it is] in the singular. One is to speak of the universal sign distributive of an integral whole in the same way, for it can be interpreted divisively, as when one says ‘The whole house is white’, or collectively, as when one says ‘The whole house is worth one hundred marks’. [232.5–13] [A Rule Regarding Universal Affirmative Signs]

[1381]  There is the first rule: When a universal affirmative sign is added to a term having under it two kinds of parts, namely, species and individuals, the sign can distribute the term for the species or for the individuals, or for proximate or remote parts, or for the single things belonging to the genera or for the genera of single things, as is customarily assigned in ‘Every soul is in you’. [232.14–20] [1382]  Note that it is the same thing to speak of species, proximate parts, and genera of single things, for species are called the proximate parts of genus because genus is said of species first and by means of species it is said of individuals. Species are called the genera of single things, i.e., of singulars, for singulars are under speciesa just as species are under genus. Likewise it is the same thing to speak of individuals, remote parts, and single things belonging to genera, for individuals are more remote from genus than species is, yet they do not share a genus except by means of a species. They are called the single things belonging to genera because single things have the relation to species that species have to genus. [232.20–31]

a.  Reading at p. 232.25 sub speciebus against sub species.



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[Adaptive Distribution]

[1383]  One should know that a universal sign sometimes makes an adaptive distribution (distributio accomoda) and an adaptive distribution is said to occur when a common term, unrestricted by an adjective or by a clause and to which a universal sign is added, is not interpreted for all its supposita, but for some. When one says ‘Every man is fearful at sea’, ‘man’ does not supposit here for all its supposita, but only for men actually at sea, for the sense is [that] every man who is at sea is fearful at sea. This distribution, moreover, is called adaptive, i.e., adapted, distribution because, strictly speaking, no such distribution ought to belong to the term in such a situation, but it has been adapted to it so that a locution that is taken for true in ordinary usage may be true that would otherwise be false.103 [232.31–43] [1384]  When a universal sign is added not only to a term in the nominative case but also in an oblique case one asks whether the sign interpreted in the oblique case indicates the quantity of the proposition as it does when it is taken in the nominative case. Let ‘Socrates sees every man’ be taken as an example and one asks what its ­quantity is. [233.1–5] [1385] One argues that it is singular for this reason: that is singular in which a discrete term serves as subject, but a discrete or singular term serves there as subject; therefore it is singular. [233.5–8] [1386]  But it seems it is universal. The syllogism ‘Every man Socrates sees, Plato is a man; therefore Plato Socrates sees’ (Omnem hominem Sortes videt, Plato est homo; egro Platonem videt Sortes) is good. But no syllogism arises without a universal [proposition]. But that is a [good] syllogism, and so there is a universal [proposition] in it. But no such is there except ‘Every man Socrates sees’ (or vice versa); therefore one argues that it is universal.104 [233.8–14] [1387]  One should reply to this that ‘Socrates sees every man’ and its like can be taken in the role of a statement (enuntiatio) or in the role of a proposition (propositio). This is clear from the fact that the principles of a statement and the principles of a proposition are found in it. The principles of a statement are a name in the nominative case and a verb or some grammatical form of a verb, as is set forth in On Interpretation.105 Since, therefore, there is a name in the nominative case and a verb in ‘Socrates sees every man’, it has the principles of a statement. But it has the principles of a proposition inasmuch as a proposition is either a firsta [term] and middle [term], or a middle [term] and last [term]. For since a syllogism arises from propositions, the parts of a

a.  Reading at p. 233.22–23 primum against principium.

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syllogism and of a proposition are the same. But the parts of a syllogism are a firsta [term], a middle [term], and a last [term], i.e., there is a major extreme and a minor extreme and a middle term, as is explained in the Prior Analytics.106 Thus, since the major extreme and the middle term occur in the major proposition, the principlesb of the major proposition are the first [term] and the middle [term]. But since the minor extremity and middle term are placed in the minor proposition, its principles are the middle [term] and the last [term]. Since, therefore, ‘Socrates sees every man’ can be a major proposition, as was seen in the complete syllogism (1386), it has in itself the first [term] and middle [term], which are the principles of a proposition. [233.14–35] [1388]  It is clear that [‘Socrates sees every man’] can be taken in the role of a statement and a proposition for another reason. According to Aristotle in On Interpretation a statement is an expression signifying something true or false.107 Since ‘Socrates sees every man’ is such, it can be taken in the role of a statement. But it is a proposition when it is placed in an orderly arrangement to imply a proposition or conclusion. Since it is of this sortc—it can be the major proposition in a syllogism, as has been seen (1386)—it is clear that it can be taken in the role of a proposition. [233.35–234.4] [1389]  When, therefore, one asks what the quantity of ‘Socrates sees every man’ is one should reply that, taken in the role of a statement, it is singular because in that way a discrete term serves as the subject in it. But taken in the role of a proposition it is universal, since in that way it is possible to syllogize from it—this would not happen without a universal [proposition] and there is no universal [proposition] other than it in the syllogism stated above. [234.4–11] [1390]  The arguments, therefore, that have been presented conclude correctly, for both proceed along different paths. The first concludes that [the utterance] is singular when it is taken in the role of a statement, but the second concludes that it is universal when it is taken in the role of a proposition. So both are to be conceded. [234.11–16] [1391]  One should note that, when ‘Socrates sees every man’ is taken in the role of a statement, the subject is a name in the nominative case. Because the subject holds first place in a statement, it is then to be arranged in such a way that the name in the nominative case is asserted first by speaking in this way: ‘Socrates sees every man’. But when it is taken in the sense of a proposition ‘man’ [in the accusative case] is the subject for, as was seen in the stated syllogism (1386), ‘man’ [in the accusative case] or ‘man’ [in the nominative case] is the middle. But in the arrangement of the first figure the middle is what functions as the subject in the first [proposition] and as the predicate in the second. Since, therefore, ‘man’ [in the nominative case] is predicated in the

a.  Reading at p. 233.25 primum against principium. b.  Reading at p. 233.29 principia against principium. c.  Reading at p. 234.2 huiusmodi against huius.



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second [proposition], ‘man’ [in the accusative case] ought to serve as subject in the first, and then [the proposition] ought to be arranged to place ‘man’ [in the accusative case] before [the verb] by saying ‘Every man sees Socrates’ (Omnem hominem videt Sortes). [234.16–27] [1392]  One should also note that when the stated expression is a statement it draws its quantity from [a term in] the nominative case, but when it is a proposition it draws its quantity from [a term in] an oblique case. So one should know in general that every statement draws its quantity from [a term in] the nominative case, for it draws its quantity from the subject, and in a statement the subject is always a name in the nominative case. But a proposition draws its quantity sometimes from [a term in] the nominative case and sometimes from [a term in] an oblique case. The reason for this is that a proposition is an assertion for something else, namely, for acquiring (in habendo) [something else], or is an assertion fora concluding something else. So a proposition will indicate an ordered relationship toward another. And because a proposition is sometimes related to the other by reason of [a term in] the nominative case and sometimes by reason of [a term in] an oblique case, it sometimes draws its quantity from [a term in] the nominative case and sometimes from [a term in] an oblique case. When one says ‘Every man runs, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates runs’ the major is in an ordered relationship to the others by reason of [a term in] the nominative case. But when one says ‘Every man Socrates sees, Plato is a man; therefore Plato Socrates sees’ (Omnem hominem Sortes videt, Plato est homo; Platonem videt Sortes) the major is ordered to the others by reason of [a term in] an oblique case. [234.28–235.2]

[RELATION]

[1393]  Relations follow, and first one should know that ‘relation’ is said in one way to be a reciprocal connection of certain things that have a mutual dependence on one another. Related things are taken by Aristotle in accord with ‘relation’ used in that sense in the Categories, they being defined in this way: relatives are those things whose essence is that they are said of other things, and whose being is to be associated with something else.108 For relatives are those things that have dependence on something else with respect both to being and speaking. [235.3–11] [Relatives of Superiority, Subordination, and Equality]

[1394]  Some of the relatives just mentioned pertain to superiorityb, e.g., ‘father’ and ‘lord’, for these imply a certain kind of dignity by reason of which they are placed

a.  Reading at p. 234.36 in concludendo against concludendo. b.  Reading at p. 235.11 superpositionis against suppositionis.

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above others. Others pertain to subordination, e.g., ‘son’ and ‘servant’, for they imply a certain kind of subjection by reason of which they are made subject to others. Still others are equal in status, e.g., ‘companion’, ‘friend’, ‘similar’, and ‘dissimilar’, for they are imposed on the basis of some quality that is predicated equally of a the things in which it is present. Hence, they are called relatives of equal status because of the special character that is there. Concern here is not about relation or about relatives spoken of in those ways. [235.11–20] [Relation as Recollection of What Went Before]

[1395]  In a different sense ‘relation’ is said to be a calling to mind of a thing that has gone before. A relative that calls to mind what has gone before is considered in accord with ‘relation’ used in that way, for a relative makes mention of what was placed before it. ‘Relative’ and ‘relation’ are taken in this way by philosophers and our concern here is with relation and relatives in this sense. Difficulties in sophisms are often caused by relatives of this sort, and because of this a knowledge of them is useful for logic. [235.21–27] [Relatives of Substance and Accident]

[1396]  Some of the previously mentioned relatives are relatives of substance, others relatives of accidents. Relatives of substance are those that indicate that the calling to mind occurs for a substance that has preceded; relatives of accidents are those that repeat accidents that have gone before. Some relatives of substance are nouns, such as ‘who’ (quis), and ‘the other’ (alius); others are pronouns, e.g., ‘himself ’ (ipse) and ‘he’ (ille).109 [235.27–33] [Relatives of Identity and Diversity]

[1397]  Some relatives of substance are relatives of identity, such as ‘who’ (qui); some are relatives of diversity, e.g., ‘the other’ (alius). But there is a difference between a relative of identity of substance and a relative of diversity, because a relative of ­identity of substance refers to numerically the same substance thatb is conveyed by the ante­ cedent and supposits for it. So it refers to its antecedent and supposits for numerically the same thing for whichc its antecedent supposits. For when one says ‘Socrates runs,

a.  Reading at p. 235.17 de against ab. b.  Reading at p. 235.38 que against qui. c.  Reading at p. 235.38 ea against eo.



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who argues’, the relative ‘who’ refers to Socrates and supposits for Socrates, for the sense is [that of ] ‘Socrates runs, who argues’, i.e., Socrates runs, which Socrates argues. But the relative of diversity of substance supposits for something other than its antecedent, although it refers to its antecedent. For when one says ‘Socrates runs and the other argues’, ‘the other’ refers to Socrates but supposits for someone other than Socrates, for the sense is [that] Socrates runs and someone other than Socrates argues, e.g., Plato or anyone else. [235.33–236.8] [Simple and Personal Relations]

[1398]  But someone will object: ‘Woman, who damned [us], saved [us]’ in the familiar saying is taken for true, but this cannot be unless the relative ‘who’ supposits for something numerically other than its antecedent: Eve damned us but the virgin Mary saved us. Since, therefore, ‘who’ is a relative of identity of substance, one argues that a relative of substance does not supposit for numerically the same thing for which its antecedent supposits, which contravenes what was said before (1397). One can speak in the same vein with respect to these: ‘Wood was the cause of death and it was the cause of life’; similarly, ‘Man sinned and he redeemed’; likewise, ‘My hands, which made you, have been pierced with nails’. [236.8–18] [1399]  One should reply to this that there are two kinds of relations, namely, simple and personal. On the one hand a simple relation is said to occur when a relative and its antecedent do not supposita for numerically the same thing but for something the same in species, as is clear in what was said before (1398). That relation is called simple, however, in that it arises because of the species that what the relative supposits for and what the antecedent supposits for share. But a species is a form, and a form is simple and indivisibleb; therefore a relation constituted on the basis of a species is called simple.110 [236.19–27] [1400]  On the other hand it is called personal when the relative and the ante­cedent do suppositc for [numerically] the same thing, as when one says ‘Socrates runs, who argues’. That relation, moreover, is called personal because it occurs on the basis of a suppositum; but a suppositum is the same thing as a person or as something considered in its likeness to a person, as was claimed earlier (1255) in the treatise on suppositions; so a relation brought about on the basis of a suppositum is called p ­ ersonal. [236.27–33] [1401]  What was previously said in assigning the difference between a relative of identity and a relative of diversity is understood [to apply] when a personal relation

a.  Reading at p. 236.21 supponunt against supponit. b.  Reading at p. 236.26 indivisibilis against individualis. c.  Reading at p. 236.28 supponunt against supponit.

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occurs, but counterinstances were given when a simple relation occurs. Because of this there is no contradiction. [236.33–37] [1402]  But note that strictly speaking a relative of identity of substance and its antecedent always supposit for numerically the same thing; if something else occurs, something inappropriate occurs. So all those [propositions] in which a relative of identity of substance and its antecedent supposita for numerically different things are inappropriate. Nor are such [propositions] to be brought together in a consequence, i.e., they are not to be accepted by people speaking in an ordinary way. [236.37–43] [Simple and Personal Demonstrativity]

[1403]  Note accordingly that just as relation is said to occur in two sorts, namely, simple and personal, so also is demonstrativity. Personal demonstrativity occurs when a certain suppositum is indicated [by a demonstrative] and no suppositum other than the one indicated is understood by that demonstrativeb, e.g., if one says ‘This one is Socrates’, indicating Socrates by the demonstrative. But simple demonstrativity occurs when a certain suppositum is indicated [by a demonstrative], but a suppositum other than the one indicated by that demonstrativec is understood, [the other one being] nevertheless alike in species with the one that is indicated [by the demonstrative]. For example, if someone says ‘This herb grows in my garden’, having indicated [by the demonstrative] a sage plant in someone else’s garden, the sense is [that] this herb, namely, one like it in species and nature, grows in my garden. [237.1–12] [Reciprocal and Nonreciprocal Relative Pronouns]

[1404]  Some relative pronouns are reciprocal, the others are nonreciprocal. A reciprocal relative is one that is always placed in the same clause (clausula) as its antecedent is, as when one says ‘Socrates sees himself ’. A nonreciprocal relative is one that is never placed in the same clause as its antecedent is, as when one says ‘Socrates runs, Plato sees him’, for ‘him’ is a nonreciprocal relative and yet refers to Socrates. [237.12–19] [1405]  One should note that a reciprocal relative is the same as its passive for it refers to a substance that is acted upond by itself. For when one says ‘Socrates strikes himself ’, the same substance both inflicts and receives the blow. So ‘himself ’ is a reciprocal relative. [237.19–23]

a.  Reading at p. 236.40–41 supponunt against supponit. b.  Reading at p. 237.4 illud demonstrativum against illam demonstrationem. c.  Reading at p. 237.8 illud demonstrativum against illam demonstrationem. d.  Reading at p. 237.21 patitur against paritur.



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[Relative Pronouns as Relatives of Identity]

[1406]  One should note that every relative pronoun is a relative of identity and not one of diversity. The reason for this is that all diversity derives from form and no pronoun is imposed on the basis of a quality or form, for a pronoun signifies a subject without a quality. So no pronoun conveys any diversity, and for that reason no pronoun could be a relative of diversity. [237.24–30] [Relative Pronouns as Relatives of Substance]

[1407]  Note that every pronoun is a relative of substance and not of accident, and the reason for this is [that] every pronoun, insofar as it depends on the force of the matter of the utterance (quantum est de vi vocis materie), signifies a substance. Thus, no pronoun signifies an accident and no pronoun could be a relative of accident. ­[237.30–35] [Relatives of Accident]

[1408]  Some relatives of accidents are nouns, e.g., ‘of such a kind as’ (talis, qualis), others are adverbs, e.g., ‘in such a way as’ (qualiter, taliter), ‘as often as’ (quotiens, t­ otiens), and ‘when’ (quando). [237.35–37] [1409]  Also, some names of relatives of accidents are relatives of identity, e.g., ‘of such a kind as’ (talis, qualis) and ‘of such a sorta’ (huiusmodi, cuiusmodi), and others are relatives of diversity, such as ‘other’ (alter) and ‘of another sort’ (alterius modi). ­[237.37–40] [1410]  But there is this sort of a difference between a relative of identity of accident and a relative of diversity: a relative of identity of accident refers to an accident that is not numerically the same but the same in species or genus. For example, when one says ‘Socrates is white and Plato is of that sort’, the sense is [that] whiteness is in Socrates as it is in Plato, but it is not numerically the same whiteness in both; rather, the whiteness that is in both is the same in species. But a relative of diversity [of accident] refers to an accident different in either species or genus. For example, when one says ‘Socrates is white and Plato is other, or of another sort’, the sense is [that] whiteness inheres in Socrates and not in Plato; more, a color different in species from the whiteness of Socrates inheres in Plato. [237.40–238.8] [1411]  But if one asks to what is ‘of such a sort’ (talis) referred when one says ‘Socrates is white and Plato is of such a sort’, one should reply that ‘of such a sort’ refers

a.  Reading at p. 237.39 huiusmodi, cuiusmodi against huius, cuius.

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to ‘as’ (qualis) which is understood there. For the sense is [that] as is Socrates, so is Plato. But it refers to a quality that is the same in species in Socrates and Plato, for the sense is [that] as is Socrates, so is Plato, i.e., Socrates and Plato have a quality that is the same in species. [238.8–14] [1412]  If one asks to what ‘other’ refers and what is referred to when one says ‘Socrates is white and Plato is other’, one should reply that ‘other’ refers to ‘white’ and refers to a quality other in species than the quality that is in Socrates. For the sense is [that] Socrates is white and Plato is other, [i.e.], Socrates has such a quality, namely, whiteness, but Plato has a quality other in species than whiteness, e.g., blackness or one of the others differing in species from whiteness. [238.15–22] [Relatives of Quality and Quantity]

[1413]  Some names of relatives of identity of accidents are relatives of quality, such as ‘of such a sort as’ (talis, qualis), others of quantity, e.g., ‘as much as’ (tantus, quantus), and still others of discrete quantity, e.g., ‘as many as’ (tot, quot). [238.22–25] [Mutual Relatives]

[1414]  One should also note that some relatives are mutually relative, e.g., ‘he’a and ‘who’ and likewise ‘so’ and ‘as’ and the like. They are called mutually relative because the one refers to the other and vice versa. For when one says ‘Heb who runs ­argues’, ‘who’ refers to ‘he’ and ‘he’ to ‘who’. In the same way when one says ‘As Plato is, so is Socrates’, ‘as’ refers to ‘so’, and vice versa. [238.25–32] [1415] One objects that ‘who’ and ‘he’ cannot mutually refer to one another when one says ‘He who runs argues’, for a relative is taken on the basis of an antecedent. If, therefore, one refers to the other and vice versa, the one will be the antecedent of the other and vice versa. Therefore, the one will be taken on the basis of the other and vice versa, and then each of the two will be what terminates and is terminated, which seems to be impossible. [238.32–38] [1416]  Also, a relative is posterior to its antecedent. If, therefore, one refers to the other and vice versa, each of the two will be prior and posterior, which seems to be impossible. [238.38–40]

a.  Reading at p. 238.26 ipse, qui against qui. b.  Reading at p. 238.29 ille against iste.



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[1417]  One should reply to this that a mutual relation is quite possible for it is indeed possible that one relative establishes the dependency of the other and vice versa. This is made clear by the example of two very long pieces of wood. If one of them is erected by itself, it will not be able to stand up on its own unless it is fastened to the earth or supported by something standing. But if the top of one of the pieces of wood is supported by the top of the other piece of wood, then the one will hold the other and the one will stand up by means of the other in such a way that what neither is able [to do] by itself both are able [to accomplish] when applied at the same time. In the same way, granted one of the relatives cannot be used in a locution by itself without an antecedent terminating it, when two relatives that have a mutual correspondence are used in a locution, one is terminateda by the other by application of the one to the other. On this basis, therefore, a mutual relation isb possible. [238.40–239.11] [1418] In reply to the first objection (1415) it is indeed true that each of the two is both terminating and terminated, but not in the same way. Although it would be absurd for the same thing to be both terminating and terminated in the same way, it is not absurd [if these things are done] in different ways. That this happens in this way is clear when one says ‘He runs who argues’: ‘he’ terminates ‘who’ and is terminated by ‘who’ and likewise vice versa. But ‘he’ terminates ‘who’ with respect to a definite suppositum, whereas ‘who’ terminates ‘he’ with respect to a quality by virtue of the action [of the verb] joined to it. In this sense ‘he’ terminates with respect to a suppositum and is terminated with respect to a quality c, whereas ‘who’ terminatesd with respect to a qualitye but is terminated with respect to a definite suppositum. [239.11–22] [1419]  One should reply to the other [objection] (1416) with respect to relatives that depend on antecedents and are terminated by antecedents that it is certainly true that a relative is posterior to its antecedent. But this is not true with respect to relatives that depend on things subsequent to them and are not terminated by an antecedent, for in the case of mutual relatives both do not depend on an antecedent, nor are both terminatedf by an antecedent. Indeed, the one depends on something subsequent and is terminatedg by that subsequent thing, and that one is prior. But the other depends on an antecedent and is terminated by an antecedent, and that one is posterior. Therefore, in the case of mutual relatives it is not that both are prior and posterior, but that one is prior and the other posterior. This is clear when one says ‘He runs who

a.  Reading at p. 239.10 finitur against finiuntur. b.  Reading at p. 239.11 est against et. c.  Reading at p. 239.20 qualitatem against quantitatem. d.  Reading at p. 239.21 finiens against finies. e.  Reading at p. 239.21 qualitatem against quantitatem. f.  Reading at p. 239.28 finitur against finiuntur. g.  Reading at p. 239.29 finitur against finiuntur.

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argues’: ‘he’ signifies a substance that seeks to be made definite by something that follows; hence, it is terminated by the subsequent thing to which it refers. But ‘who’ signifies a substance that seeks to be made definite by that which is antecedent; hence, it is terminated by the antecedent to which it refers. [239.22–37] [1420]  Note that in the case of mutual relatives the one that depends on a subsequent thing has the place and nature of an antecedent, whereas the one that depends on the antecedent rather has the place and nature of a relative. [239.37–41] [Rules Regarding Relatives] [Rule One]

[1421]  One should take it as a rule that a relative of identity related to a common term refers to it in the same way as to its antecedent. [239.41–43] [1422]  One should know, however, that a common term can be taken in three ways: for the utterance, for a suppositum or appellatum, and for a concept or form. And so there is this verse: Now an appellatum, now itself, now the thing signified The word supposits. Each one is threefold, therefore. That is, a word or common term supposits now an appellatum, i.e., it is sometimes interpreted for an appellatum; now it supposits itself, i.e., it is sometimes interpreted for itself, i.e., for its own utterance; and now it supposits a significatum, i.e., sometimes it is interpreted for a significatum, i.e., for the concept or common form for which it is imposed to signify: ‘man’ is a name proper to a species, whereas ‘animal’ is a name proper to a genus. A common term, thereforea, can be taken in these three ways. ­[239.43–240.12] [1423]  Therefore, when a relative refers to a common term only b insofar as it is taken for its own utterance, it refers [to it] for the utterance, as in ‘“Man” is a monosyllable and itc is common in gender’.111 But if it refers to a common term taken for a suppositum, it refers [to it] for the suppositum, as in ‘A man runs who argues’. But if it refers to a common term taken for a concept, it refers to it for the concept, as in ‘Man is a species and itd is a lowest species’. [240.12–20] [1424]  Accordingly one should note that [when] some predicate suited to a common term is attributed to it under one interpretation, it is necessary that the relative a.  Reading at p. 240.11 ergo against enim. b.  Reading at p. 240.13 tantum against terminum. c.  Reading at p. 240.15 dissillaba et ista against dissilabus’ et ‘istud. d.  Reading at p. 240.20 species et ista against species’ et ‘istud.



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clause (relatio) attribute [to it] a predicate suitable to it under the interpretation under which [the term] occurred as its antecedent; otherwise the locution will be false. So if some predicate suitable to it [and interpreted] for a suppositum is attributed to a common term interpreted for the utterance, the locution will be false, for example, if one says ‘“Man” is a monosyllable and hea runs’. [240.20–27] [Rule Two]

[1425]  One should take [the following] as a rule: If two antecedents are placed before a relative, the locution is ambiguous because the relative can refer to the one or the other. For example, when one says ‘A man is not an ass and he is rational’, ‘he’ can refer to ‘man’ and in this sense [the expression] is true, or to ‘ass’ and in that sense it is false. And it can be said this ambiguity gives rise to the fallacy of Equivocation, for, since a relative draws its signification from an antecedent and signifies the same thing as its antecedent, inasmuch as it refers to different things it signifies different things, andb equivocation is caused by different significations. [240.28–37] [1426]  But note that a relative should not for this reason be said to be equivocal in its own right, for there are many locutions in which relatives are used where there is no equivocation. So, because a relative derives that ambiguity from the nature of the different antecedents to which it refers, it ought to be called an equivocal relative, not in its own right, but by virtue of the different antecedents to which it refers. Therefore, it is not equivocal unless it refers to different things. [240.37–241.3] [Rule Three] [The Quantity of a Clause with a Relative in It]

[1427]  One should take [the following] as a rule: Since a relative depends on the antecedent to which it refersc and by which it is terminated, the proposition in which a relative is used likewised depends [for its quantity] on [the quantity of] the proposition in which the antecedent is used.112 One cannot judge the quantity of a proposition that begins with a relative, i.e., in which the relative is the subject, except in the light of a judgment about the quantity of the proposition in which the antecedent is used as the subject, for a relative proposition has the quantity [of the proposition] in which the

a.  Reading at p. 240.27 dissillaba et ista against dissilabum et iste. b.  Reading at p. 240.37 et against ergo. c.  Reading at p. 241.5 refert against refert denotat. d.  Reading at p. 241.5 finitur, similiter against finitur. Similiter.

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antecedent is used in the subject position. But if we want to take the contradictory of a proposition in which a relative is used as the subject, let us first take the contradictory of one in which the antecedent occurs in the subject position; and then let us take the contradictory of the proposition in which the relative is useda in the way we take the contradictory of the proposition in which the antecedent is used. For example, if one says ‘Every man runs and he argues’, we take the contradictory of ‘he argues’ just as we take the contradictory of ‘Every man runs’ by placing a negation before the whole proposition saying ‘It is not the case that every man runs.’ One ought to take the contradictory of ‘He argues’ in the same way. And the reason for this is that it is permissible to use the antecedent in place of the relative. If one says ‘Socrates runs and he argues’, one may use the antecedent in the place of the relative saying ‘Socrates runs and Socrates argues’. On this basis, therefore, the antecedent may be used in place of the relative. [241.3–26] [1428]  It seems the same judgment applies to the quantity of a proposition in which the antecedent is used and of a proposition in which the relative is used, if both are placed in the subject position. [That our focus here is on terms where both are] in the subject position has already been stated (1427) (a parte subiecti ideo dictum est). For if the antecedent, but not the relative, is used in the subject position, or vice versa, so that the antecedent is used in the predicate position and the relative in the subject position, the proposition in which the relative is placed can be of a quantity other than that of the propositionb in which the antecedent is used. This is the case with ‘Socrates runs [and] every man sees him’ and with ‘Socrates sees every man [and] he runs’, given that ‘he’ refers to ‘every man’. [241.26–36] [1429]  The question whether a relative refers to its antecedent along with [the antecedent’s] disposition or without it is often asked. And because one sort of relative is reciprocal and another notc, let us raise the question briefly first with respect to a reciprocal relative and second with respect to a nonreciprocal one.113 [241.37–40] [1430] One argues that a reciprocal relative does refer to its antecedent along with [the antecedent’s] disposition, and let the proposition ‘Every man sees himself ’ be taken as an example. Thend let the following argument be made: a reciprocal relative takes a definite signification and supposition from its antecedent, for a relative signifies the same thing as its antecedent does and supposits for the same thing for which its antecedent [supposits]; therefore the relative should supposit for everything

a.  Reading at p. 241.15 sumitur against sumetur. b.  Reading at p. 241.33 illa illius propositionis against illa. c.  Reading at p. 241.40 . . . aliud non, against . . . aliud, non. d.  Reading at p. 242.1 ergo against erga.



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for which its antecedent does; therefore if the antecedent supposits universally, so does the relative. But when one says ‘Every man sees himself ’, ‘man’ supposits universally; therefore since ‘himself ’ is its relative, it refers to it universally, and so along with its disposition. [241.40–242.9] [1431]  Also, one may use an antecedent in place of a relative; therefore one may use ‘every man’ in place of ‘himself ’. It is the same, therefore, to say ‘Every man sees himself ’ and ‘Every man sees every man’. But in this way the antecedent is repeated along with its disposition; and so it is also referred to along with its disposition. ­[242.9–14] [1432]  On the contrary, if one assumesa that every man sees himself aloneb, then ‘Every man sees himself ’ is true, as is evident if one proves it inductively. But thenc it is not the same to say ‘Every man sees himself ’ and ‘Every man sees every man’; therefore, one argues, ‘himself ’ does not refer to ‘man’ along with its disposition. [242.14–19] [1433]  One should reply to this that a reciprocal relative sometimes refers to a discrete term. In that case it refers to its antecedent along with [the antecedent’s] disposition, and then one may indeed use the antecedent in place of its reciprocal relative. For example, if one says ‘White Socrates sees himself ’, this is the same as ‘White Socrates sees white Socrates’. But sometimes [a reciprocal relative] refers to a common term, and then the common term is interpreted either universally or not. If not, one may certainly use the antecedent in place of d the reciprocal relative, and then it refers to its antecedent along with [the antecedent’s] disposition. For example, if one says ‘A white Socrates sees himself ’, this is the same as ‘A white Socrates sees a white man’. But if the common term to which it refers is interpreted universally, then the reciprocal relative refers to its distributed antecedent individually, i.e., one by one for each of its singulars. And it supposits for everything for which its antecedent does, although not in the same way. For the antecedent supposits universally in the sense of something common, whereas the reciprocal relative refers to the antecedent to each and every thing covered by the common term in the sense of something discrete (pro unoquoque universitatis sub ratione discreti). And because the relative reciprocal does not supposit in the same way as its antecedent does when taken universally, in that case the reciprocal relative does not refer to its antecedent along with [the antecedent’s] disposition, nor may one use the antecedent in place of the relative. [242.19–39] [1434]  The reason why the reciprocal relative does not refer to its antecedent taken universally in the sense of something common but refers to each and every thing covered by the universal term in the sense of something discrete is this: by reason of its

a.  Reading at p. 242.14 posito against positio. b.  Reading at p. 242.14–15 quilibet . . . solum against ‘quilibet . . . solum’. c.  Reading at p. 242.16 tunc against cum. d.  Reading at p. 242.26 loco relativi against relativi.

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reciprocal character a reciprocal relative implies the greatest discreteness and definiteness (certitudo). The fact that a reciprocal relative has an unusual declension that no other pronoun in the third person has is an indication of this, fora the unusual declension is caused by the limitation and definiteness. And because distinctness is repugnant to commonality in the manner in which it is expressed by a universal sign, a reciprocal relative does not refer to a common term taken universally in the sense of something common, but rather refers to it in the way indicated. Thus it is clear that a reciprocal relative sometimes does and sometimes does not refer to its antecedent along with [the antecedent’s] disposition. [242.39–243.10] [1435]  The last argument made on this side (1433–34) ought to be granted, for it proves that a reciprocal relative does not refer to an antecedent taken universally along with [the antecedent’s] disposition, which is true. [243.10–13] [1436]  In response to the first objection on the other side (1430) it should be said that it is certainly true that a reciprocal relative acquires a definite signification and supposition from its antecedent. So it supposits for everything for which its antecedent does, but not in the same way, as was seen (1433), since the nature of discreteness prohibits this. And so it does not follow that a reciprocal relative supposits universally, as its antecedent does, but singularly. [243.13–19] [1437]  In response to the other argument (1431) one should say that it is indeed true in the case of a nonreciprocal relative, for one may use the antecedent in place of it. It is of course likewise true in the case of a reciprocal relative when it refers to a discrete term and to a common term not taken universally. But it is not true in the case of a reciprocal relative when it refers to a common term taken universally, since the nature of distinctness blocks this, as is clear enough. [243.19–26] [1438]  Having looked at these things one asks whether a nonreciprocal relative refers to its antecedent along with [the antecedent’s] disposition. [243.26–27] [1439] One argues that it does. ‘This (hic) man is white and he (iste) is black’ is impossible in that it indicates that what is white is black at one and the same time, which is impossible. But if a relative refers to an antecedent without [the antecedent’s] disposition, [the proposition] could be true now, because in this case what would be expressed by it is not literally that something white is black, but rather that a man is white and that a man who does not have [the disposition of] whiteness is black, which is clearly possible. Nevertheless it is absurd that what is impossible can be true; therefore what it follows from will be absurd. But it does follow from the claim that a relative refers to its antecedent without [the antecedent’s] disposition; therefore it would always refer to it along with [the antecedent’s] disposition. [243.27–38]

a.  Reading at p. 243.3 enim against autem.



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[1440]  On the contrary, one sort of disposition is extrinsic, e.g., ‘white’, ‘every’, and the like, which is expressed extrinsically by utterances; the other sort of disposition is intrinsic, e.g., a grammatical case, for a grammatical case is a disposition of a substance in relation to an action. Then one argues: a relative clearly refers to its ante­ cedent without [the antecedent’s] intrinsic disposition, i.e., under another case than the one thata preceded, as when one says ‘Socrates runs [and] I see him’. Therefore, by [the Topic] from a similar it could refer to its antecedent without [the antecedent’s] extrinsic disposition because it does not always refer to [the antecedent] with [the antecedent’s] disposition. [243.38–244.3] [1441] In reply to this some argue in this way: there are two sorts of dispositions. One sort of disposition is absolute, the other relative.b The absolute sort is, e.g., ‘white’, ‘black’, and the like—they that dispose a subject in itself and absolutely and not in relation to a predicate. They say, therefore, that a relative refers to its antecedent along with [the antecedent’s] absolute disposition. A relative disposition is, e.g., ‘every’, ‘no’, and the like—they that do dispose a subject in relation to a predicate. It is not necessary that a relative always refer to the antecedent along with its relative disposition; indeed sometimes it does, sometimes it does not, depending on the requirement of the locutions in which such a disposition is used. [244.4–15] [1442]  Nevertheless, one can reply in a different way and better: a nonreciprocal relative of identity of substance always refers to its antecedent along with [the ante­ cedent’s] disposition, whether it be absolute or relative, when a personal relation obtains. There seems to be no reason why it ought to refer to its antecedent with an absolute disposition more than with a relative disposition. So, if it refers to its ante­ cedent along with [the antecedent’s] absolute disposition, it would refer to it along with [the antecedent’s] relative one. The reason for this is as Priscian indicates in Book One of Priscian Minor in the passage “Moreover determination accrues to a pronoun,” etc.114 But relatives were invented to get rid of ambiguity and create certitude. For if one says ‘Ajax came to Troy [and] Ajax fought bravely’, there is doubt whether one has in mind the same Ajax, for there were two Ajaxes, and the action of the one could be understood of the other and the other of the one. But when one says ‘Ajax came to Troy and the same fought bravely’, it is certain that these two actions are understood of the same Ajax because of the relative apposed there. For a nonreciprocal relative of identity of substance in a personal relation refers to its antecedent, and such a relative and its antecedent supposit for numerically the same thing. Therefore, because a disposition does not introduce something numerically the same as that which it disposes—rather, the antecedent and its disposition are the same as a subject and its accident—a relative

a.  Reading at p. 243.43 quam qui against quem. b.  P. 244.6 delete the whole line.

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refers to the antecedent attributed to it either without [the antecedent’s] disposition or with the disposition that disposes it, whether that disposition be absolute or relative. So when one says ‘A white man runs and this one argues’, the sense is [that] a white man is running and this white man is arguing. The case is similar when one says ‘Every man runs and this running every man is arguing. The argument that proves this must be granted. [244.15–245.1] [1443]  In response to the argument on the other side (1440) one should reply that there is no similarity between a grammatical case, whicha is an intrinsic disposition, and the extrinsic disposition that is ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘every’, ‘no’, and suchlikeb. A change in case does not change numerical identity; rather, a thing remains numerically the samec throughout various cases. But a change of extrinsic dispositions does change numerical identity. And because it is required that a relative and its antecedent suppositd for numerically the same thing, as was seen (1436), a relative can indeed refer to its antecedent under another grammatical case, for numerical identity can clearly be present along with that change of case. But it cannot refer to [its antecedent] under a different extrinsic disposition, because the same numerical identity does not remain along with that disposition of change or change of extrinsic disposition. Therefore, neither can the relative refer to its antecedent without that extrinsic disposition, because that disposition becomes something numerically the same as the antecedent to which the relative refers. But the relative and the antecedent must supposit for numerically the same thing, which would not be the case if [the relative] referred to [the antecedent] without [the antecedent’s] disposition. [245.2–19]

a.  Reading at p. 245.3 qui against que b.  Reading at p. 245.4–5 consimiles against comsimilis. c.  Reading at p. 245.6 eadem against eodem. d.  Reading at p. 245.9 supponant against supponat.

APPENDIX A

C orre c t ions to L at i n Te xt

The changes that are presented here represent a wide range of suggestions for alterations to Franco Alessio’s edition of Lambert of Auxerre’s Logica and Alain de Libera’s edition of the section “De appellatione” in chapter 8 of that work. The column to the left indicates the page and line reference to that text. Chapter One 3.16 hec] hee 4.43 rettificat] rectificat 5.9 probabiliter, disputat] probabiliter disputat 7.5 sonus] sonus vox 7.16 a natura] ad placitum 8.10 que] quod 9.15 nomen autem] nomen enim 9.24 autem] enim 11.15 in] de 11.19 currit] cucurrit 11.22 complectitur] non complectitur 11.32 infinita] recta 12.23 argumentante] ab argumentante 14.26 non convenit] convenit 14.30 addictionem] additionem 14.39 nullus] ullus 20.38 habet] habent

21.13–14 21.14 21.15 21.16 21.16–17 21.17 21.19 21.19 21.20 21.21 22.21 22.22 22.22 22.22 22.42 22.43 24.7 24.29 24.36 26.28 26.30 303

conversa] convertens convertens] conversa conversa] convertens convertens] conversa conversa] convertens convertens] conversa conversa] convertens convertens] conversa convertens] conversa conversa] convertens accepti] accepte converti] converte veros] veras ipsi veri] ipse vere convertentibus] conversis convertente] converso quid] quod addictionem] additionem addictionem] additionem convertes] convertens sunt et] sunt de

304

Appendix A

27.17 contrariarum] subcontrariarum 27.29 universale] universali 27.32–33 affirmative] affirmativo 27.33–34 particularem affirmativam] particulare affirmativum 27.34 universalem negativam] universale negativum 27.36 ponit] preposita sibi negatione ponit 27.36 particularem negativam] particulare negativum (signum) 27.37 affirmativo] affirmativa 27.38 negativo] negativa 28.10 particularem] particulare 28.13 dicere] dicendum 28.28 ullus] nullus 28.33 nullus] non nullus 30.8 distinguitur] distinguuntur 32.24 contradictione] contradictorio 32.32 contradictorie] contradictorio 32.33 necessarie] necesse 33.19 utebatur] utebantur 35.6 regula] regule 35.32 omnem] omne 35.32 omnem] omne 35.33–34 dictum omne: ‘hominem esse animal est falsum’] dictum: ‘omne animal esse hominem’ est falsum 35.37 opponendo] apponendo 35.38 omnem] omne 36.4 proposito per] proposito. Per 36.27 conversam] convertentem 36.27–28 convertentem] conversam 37.1–2 aliquem hominem . . . asinum] ‘aliquem hominem . . . asinum’

37.2–3 37.15 37.16 37.16 37.35 38.5 38.21 39.17 39.17 39.24 40.9 40.9 40.10 40.17–18 42.9 43.5 43.13–14 43.39 44.11 44.24 44.25–26 44.28 45.22 45.25 45.39–40 47.14 48.20 49.27 49.27

aliquem asinum . . . hominem] ‘aliquem asinum . . . hominem’ conversa] convertens convertens] conversa falsum] (qui est quoddam animal) falsum debetur] debet videntem] viventem significandum] significandam convertitur] convertuntur una] vera supposita] supposito quanta est] quanta et est] sunt est] sunt non necessarium ut] necessarium ut ullum] nullum non contingit esse] contingit non esse affirmato vel negato] affirmatio vel negatio natum sive infinitum] nato sive infinito convertens] conversa sunt] et sunt convertens] contingens convertens] contingens conversa] convertente convertente] conversa non contingit] contingit non si] sic similiter] simpliciter affirmationi de] affirmationi. De quibus] quo

Chapter Two 50.2 qud] quod 50.27 posterius] prius



51.24 51.36 51.39 54.25 54.27 54.40 55.25 55.26 56.31 56.36 56.39

Appendix A

individua] individuum unum] unius unum] unius omnium] respectu omnium qui] que unumquoque] unumquodque quod] quod quid et que] est que quam] qua singularia] species dicte quattuor] dicte: quattuor 57.13 species] speciem 58.19–20 spissitudo autem] nec spissitudo 58.34–35 substantia,] substantia 59.25 quicumque sit ille] quecumque sit illa 59.26 quod faciunt] quem faciunt 59.26 quod fiunt] quem fiunt 59.29 quod facit] quem facit 59.30 quod fit] quem fit 60.4 Et cum per] Et per 60.32 ita] tamen 60.37 ecum] cum 61.38 esse] inesse Chapter Three 65.8 superiorem] superiora 65.11 huius] huiusmodi 65.25 quarum] quorum 65.31 equivoca] equivoca non 65.33–34 quarum] quorum 66.2 homini] hominis 66.5 iustus] iusto 66.13 iustitiam] iustitia 67.31 species,] species 68.1 quidem] quodam 68.3 quidem] quodam 68.21 huius] huiusmodi 68.25 morale] mortale

68.39–40 69.14–15 69.34 70. 17 70.20 70.26 71.1 72.12 72.13 72.15 73.15 73.34

305

aliquid] ad aliquid continentis] contentis ipsam] ipsa principales] primae principales] primae pincipalium] primarum nulla earum] nullum eorum parvus] pravus eadem] idem parva] prava huius] huiusmodi quod temporis] quoad tempus 73.41 alia vero omnia] alie vero omnes 74.17 dicimus] dicimur 74.18 dicimus] dicimur 74.19 dicuntur] dicimur 74.22–23 aliud album aliud niger] alia alba alia nigra 74.32 quod idem est] que eedem sunt 75.14 dicuntur] dicimus 75.34 aliud] aliquid 76.9 ipsum parvum] ipse parvus 76.22 contrarietas] proprietas 76.30 contrarietas] proprietas 77.35–36 quantitates] qualitates 77.38 posponebat] preponebat 77.40 quantitate] qualitate 77.43–78.1 quantitatis] quantitas 78.18 quantitatem] qualitatem 78.20 non determinat] determinat 78.21 immediatus] immediatius 78.23 prius] post 78.25 coniunctio] disiunctio 78.34 coniunctio] disiunctio 79.2 quare] que 79.33 dicuntur] dicitur 80.15 ad hunc] adhuc 80.36 quod diffinire] diffinire

306 80.40 80.41 81.7 81.7–8 81.15 81.21 81.22–23 81.25 81.27 82.21 82.22 82.35 82.37 82.39 82.40 83.12 83.15 83.16 83.20 83.24 83.24 83.26 83.29 83.30 83.35 83.36 83.37 83.38 84.15 84.31 84.31 84.42 85.4 85.9 85.27 85.33 85.36 85.39 86.2 86.3

Appendix A

dicuntur] dicimur dicuntur] dicimur dicimus] dicimur habebatur] habebitur sic adhuc] sicut mobili] mobilis scientiam] scientem huius] huiusmodi huius] huiusmodi sanatus] sanativus egrotatus] egrotativus huius] huiusmodi egrotatus] egrotativus huius] huiusmodi prius sunt] possunt huius] huiusmodi huius] huiusmodi de] et dicimus] dicimur dicuntur] dicimur passiones] passibiles qualitates dicimus] dicimur huius] huiusmodi huius] huiusmodi huius] huiusmodi dicuntur] dicimur sit] fit huius] huiusmodi unumquodque] unaquaque circuicionem] circuitionem circularis] circuli dicuntur] dicimur dupliciter] tripliciter est] sunt a quali] de quali dicimus] dicimur dicimus] dicimur dicimus] dicimur dicimus] dicimur dicimus] dicimur

86.6 86.8

fortitudo] fortitudine fortis et virtuosus] forti et virtuoso 87.7 huius] huiusmodi 88.2 iniustitia] iustitia 88.17–18 alterum] alter 88.19 quantitati] qualitati 89.11 dicit] dicitur 89.20 respectu] respectum 90.15 superponitur] superponuntur 90.16 ad hoc] adhuc (See p. 90.37.) 90.27–28 opponitur] apponitur 91.1–2 recipit] recipiunt 91.36 enim] autem 92.24 pluvie et huius] et pluvie et huiusmodi 93.1 huius] huiusmodi 95.5 inveniens] invenies 95.8 pluribus] que pluribus (See AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 52.11.) 95.8 insunt] inest 95.11 inveniens] invenies Chapter Four 96.6 Sec] Sed 96.21 communitas] communis 96.22 erat . . . esset] est . . . sit 96.25 erat] est 97.17 Quod] Quedam 97.26–27 perfectum] perfectivum 97.28–29 habundantem] habundans 97.29 non est] est 97.31 et] sed 97.33–34 Si est] Est 97.35 parvum] pravum 97.38 parva] prava 97.39 parvum] pravum 97.43–98.1 parvum] pravum 98.24 utrique] utraque 98.30 languere] languescere 98.39 determinante] determinato



98.42 99.20 99.32 99.34 99.39 100.19 101.4 101.5 101.20

Appendix A

opposite] opposita habent] habebat inductione] inductionem egestati] egestas sanis] si sanis et non] et (?) qui] quod ea que] id quod genera] grana

Chapter Five 103.10–11 dominatur ceteris virtutibus ut rationali et concupiscibili] dominat ceteres virtutes ut rationales et concupiscibiles 103.23 positio] possessio 105.3 eclipsim] eclipsi 106.37–38 notis non extranea] notis 108.13 cuius] cuiusmodi 108.25 propositionis] propositionibus 109.3–4 coniugationis] coniugationibus 111.41 est] figura est 111.42 subiectorum] subiectionem 112.24 diceret] dixisset 115.21 problematis] propositionis (See p. 119.26–32, esp .32.) 115.33 qua] quam 116.2–3 particulariter] particularis 116.3 sequitur] sequuntur 116.9 risibilis’] risibile’ 116.17 risibilis’] risibile’ 117.32–33 risibilis] risibile 117.37 risibilis] risibile 117.42 risibilis] risibile 118.4 risibilis] risibile 118.5 maiori] minori 118.9 risibilis] risibile 118.10 primam] primum 118.12 et minori] et cum minori

307

118.16 risibilis] risibile 118.18 comprehendentur] comprehendantur 119.15 autem] enim 119.16 dici] dicenda 119.16 huius] huiusmodi 119.21 extremo cum] extremum cum 119.26 problematis] propositionis 119.30 probelmatis] propositionis 119.32 aliquod problema] aliqua propositio 119.42 probabilium] predicamenti 120.1 probabili] predicamenti 120.3 probabili] predicamenti 120.10–11 risibilis] risibile Chapter Six 123.37 substantia] a substantia 124.27–28 argumnetare] argumentare 125.9 et descriptio] est descriptio 125.25 minus] in minus 126.12 et] est 126.24 rationem] ratione 127.12 de toto] de loco a toto 128.35 pars] pars totius 129.15 vel] nec 129.15 currit] non currit 129.16–17 disiunctum] disiuncto 129.18 toto] loco a toto 129.21 sensibilis] rationalis 129.22 loco] toto 129.28 sunt] est 130.16 rationale] rationalis 131.14–15 immediata] mediata 131.33 materiato] materiali Cf. line 24 fuerunt] fuit 131.36 genera cuius] cuiusdam 132.2 generis

308

Appendix A

132.18 cuius] si 133.24 natura] de natura 133.24 dissentiat] dissentiant 133.27 magis] maius 134.37 argomentum] argumentum 135.15 vident] videt 135.20 hic] sic 135.39 quod] quem 137.13 iustitia] iustum 137.26 causati] casus 138.13–14 positionem] partitionem Cf. line 26 138.14–15 positionem] partitionem 138.21 substantia] substantias 138.28 diviso] alio diviso 139.14 positionem] partitionem 139.38 maiori] minori 139.38 minor] maior Chapter Seven 143.35 conveniens] convenientius 144.6 distinguitur] distinguuntur 144.16 ex quo] eo quod 144.37 impossible] inopinabile 148.3 multiplicatem] multiplicitatem 148.36 naturalem] naturale 149.10 est] sit 149.23 a] de 149.24 ab] de 149.24 ab] de 149.28 a] de 149.29 a] de 149.29 ab] de 150.6 relatione] ratione 151.4 propositiones] prepositiones 151.12–13 nominat,] nominat 151.19 propositio] prepositio 151.21–22 propositio] prepositio 151.23 cuius] cuiusmodi

151.23 152.6 152.30

propositio] prepositio deus] sedens contingenti] consequenti (See p. 154.34.) 153.11 vellent] vellem 153.12 maior] mino 154.8 uticumque] utcumque 154.11 grammaticam] grammatica (See p. 154.19.) 154.16–17 scitum] scientem 154.26 pronomen] nomen 155.7 constuitur] construitur 155.15 dicit] dicat 156.24 in eis] eis 156.31 ordinatur] ‘semper’ ordinatur 157.19 si aliquis opponat] opponit autem aliquis 157.33 huius] huiusmodi 157.34 premittit secundum] permittit 158.8 ut dicatur] ita dicitur 158.25 quicumque] si quemcumque 158.29 infinito] infinitivo 158.40 infinito] infinitivo 158.43– dictum ‘sedentem ambulare 159.1 contingit’] dictum ‘sedentem ambulare’ contingit 159.1 actus] accusativus 159.2 infinito] infinitivo 159.7 infinito] infinitivo 159.12 infinito] infinitivo 159.15 infinitum] infinitivum 159.21 infinito] infinitivo 159.23 infinito] infinitivo 159.26 infinito] infinitivo 161.9 quemcumque] si quemcumque 161.16 est discit] didiscit 161.18 discit] didiscit 161.22–23 discit] didiscit



Appendix A

161.23 discit] didiscit 161.25 vel] sed 161.31–32 discit] didiscit 161.33 discit] didiscit 161.35 discit] didiscit 161.38 discit] didiscit 162.4–5 sincategorice] sincategorematice 162.6 ferre] potest ferre 162.9 categorice] categorematice 162.17–18 non ferre] ferre 162.30 sincategorice, et categorice] sincategorematice, et categorematice 162.35 ab] cum 162.37 sincategorice et categorice] sincategorematice et categorematice 163.1 aliquo] aliquo vel illud divi­ sum componitur cum aliquo 163.28 copula] copulativa 163.35 equale] equale et 164.21 dives] divus 164.22 dives] divus 164.27 dives] divus 164.31 dives] divus 164.41 quingenta] quinquaginta 165.11 determinabilis] determinantis 165.20–21 determinabile specificationis] determinabile, specificatio 165.33 determinantibus] determinabilibus 165.35 determinanitbus] determinabilibus 165.37 determinabilibus] determinantibus 165.38–39 determinantes diversas] determinantia diversa 165.41 vivit semper] semper vivit 166.26–27 possunt] potest

309

167.1 propositio] prepositio 167.1 causali] casuali 167.19 et] ex 167.24 producta] correpta 167.25 correpta] producta 167.41 quia non] quianam 168.22 accentum] cum accentu 169.18 vocis que] vocis 170.4 nam cum] nam 170.9 homo’. Ideo] homo’, ideo 171.19 hodies] hodie 171.33 sedere] secare 172.9 quantitatem] qualitatem 173.30–31 secundum rem, substantiam et accidens assignatum vel attributum] secundum rem subiectam et accidens assignatum et attributum accidens, et assignatum vel attributum 174.20 autem] autem est 174.28 inconveniens] conveniens 175.24–25 premissis] premissa 176.1 qui] quia 177.24 omnia singularia] omnes singulares 178.18 homo est asinus] asinus est homo 179.2 conclusionis iste:] conclusionis: iste 179.4 canis] pater 180.35 esse] dici 181.7 secundo] secunda 183.25 quid] secundum quid 183.27–28 intelligibilem] integralem 183.30 intelligibilem] integralem 184.4 a quid] a secundum quid 184.31 capud] secundum caput 184.32 simius] simus 184.33 simius] simus

310

Appendix A

184.36 genera] accidentia 186.10 contingentis] consequentis 186.14–15 contingentis] consequentis 186.37 ergo] ego 186.40 se] se, 186.40 aut] autem 187.9 ad quid] ad secundum quid 187.11 ergo] ego 187.18 vel falsa] esse falsam 187.23 quoad quid] secundum quid 187.27 quod] quia 187.29 falsum] ‘falsum’ 187.35 falsum] ‘falsum’ 187.36–37 falsum] ‘falsum’ 188.39 fiet] fieret 189.1 idem . . . tempore] secundum idem . . . eodem tempore 189.3 naturam] natura 190.32 amittitur] omittitur 191.13–14 ponere] ponere duas 191.32 probare] probari 191.33 et] vel 191.33 vel] sed 192.12 ab] ad 192.17–18 particularem] particulare 194.23 melius in eodem argumento:] optime: in eodem argumento 195.32 hoc] hec 195.36 hoc] hec 196.28 aeternus] eternus 196.41 non] sed non 196.43 est animal, est] est, animal est 197.11 alligatio] assignatio 197.32 affirmativam] ad affirmativam 197.36 Cesar est iniustus] Cesar non est iustus 198.4 ad destructionem] a destructione 198.37 locut] locus

199.3 199.21 200.5 200.18 200.28 201.9 201.11 201.15 201.33 201.33

201.37 203.2–3 203.5 203.6 203.18 203.20 203.31 204.7

provenit] proveniat ad id] id causa] cause videbatur] videbitur quia] quare sequitur] sequatur sequitur] sequatur quam] quem conclusio] propositione aliis propositionibus residuis] ad alias propositiones residuas inferende] illate aliis paralogismis] alius paralogismus detur] dicatur cecus] cecum debent] debet ipsum] ipsam vel] ut processit] precedit

Chapter Eight 205.6 distinctio] distributio (See 1366.) 205.6–7 dicendum] dictum 205.25 vocis] voci 206.3 significatum] signum contempta] contenta 206.15 206.16 contempta] contenta 206.22 signatio] significatio 206.31 per] pro 206.32 contempto] contento 206.32–33 contemptis] contentis significatio] designatio 206.42 207.19 re sive] se sive 207.22 supposito] suppositio 207.28 pro re sua, non] pro se sive pro re sua, sive contemptis] contentis 207.29



Appendix A

207.32 contemptis] contentis 207.38 hoc] hec 208.7 Gravidus] Gradivus 208.11–12 sincategorice] sincategorematice 208.15 supponitur vel sumitur] sumitur 208.23–24 adiectivis] adiacentis 209.4 contempta] contenta 209.21 enim] autem 209.33 alie] alia 210.11 una] qua 210.31 immediate] mediate 210.33 vehementer] vehementem 211.3 contemptis] contentis 211.5 contemptis] contentis 211.18 tantum ‘omnis] ‘tantum omnis 211.19 dicto] dictio 211.40 petitio] positio 212.1 contemptis] contentis 212.10 suppositum] suppositionem 212.17 per] pro 212.24 cuius] cuiusmodi 212.26 cuius] cuiusmodi 212.32 cuius] cuiusmodi 212.40 ‘animal rationale mortale’] animal rationale mortale 213.25 appellando] apponendo 213.27–28 cuiuscumque] et cuiuscumque 213.28 addatur] addantur 213.39 existentiam] existentia 214.2 suppositi] supponenti 214.13 et] ut 215.3 terminum] tantum 215.5 supposita appellata] appellata 215.5 sempre] semper 215.10 qui habent] que habet 215.12 situs] si terminus

311

215.25 hoc] hac 215.38 sunt] sunt actu 215.39–40 presenter] presentialiter 215.40 que sunt actu sub termino dicuntur] dicuntur esse actu sub termino 215.41 presenter] presentialiter 215.43– qui presenter] que 216.1 presentialiter 216.8 presenter] presentialiter 216.9 illud est] est 216.17 terminus] tempus 216.21 quod est, est] quod est 216.22 presens] preteritum 217.13 ad] ab 217.16 termino] verbo 217.18 sed quia] sed 218.23 additum] additionem 218.23–24 implicationem] ampliationem 218.40 quia] quia si 218.41 mensuretur] mensure 218.41 quantitatis] quantitas 219.13 fit] sit 219.28–29 presenter] presentialiter 221.6–7 habeat solum,] habeat, solum 221.22 erit] esset 221.34 habitudo] habitudo si diceretur 222.11 Contra] Postea 222.11 termino] tertia (quaestio) 222.15 quia] quare 222.19 sed] quia 223.16 Quarta] Quod 223.41 currit] cucurrit 223.42 currit] cucurrit 224.16 restringi] restringit 224.17 primus modus] post modum 225.18 accidentali] substantiali 225.28 supponenti . . . apponenti] suppositi . . . appositi

312 225.39 225.40 226.8

Appendix A

apponenti] appositi supponenti] suppositi apponenti . . . supponenti] appositi . . . suppositi 226.9 albus] album 226.19 hic] hac 226.19 insinuat] insinuant 226.29 apponitur] ponitur 226.38 proveniet] provenit 227.5–6 implicationem] ampliationem 227.9 enim] autem 227.11–12 Hec enim] Hee autem 227.13 adveniet] advenit 227.15 divisionem] diminutionem 227.18 hec] hee 227.23 masculini] masculini generis 228.8 enim] etiam 228.14 proprium] participium 228.21 enim] non 228.26 ampliato] ampliatio 228.27 quod] quam 229.3 cuius] cuiusmodi 229.12 aliud] non aliud 229.18 indivisa] in divisa 229.19 indivisa] in divisa 229.19–20 addictionem] additionem 229.21 et] vel 229.27 autem] enim 229.29 distribuit] distrubuitur 230.7 aliquid existens] alique existentia 230.12 nam] quod 230.34 manet] efficitur 230.41 nature destructive] natura destructiva 231.6 posposita] postposita 231.11 postposita] preposita 231.17 universalitatem] virtutem 231.19–20 additum] adiunctum 231.30 verum] vero

232.25 sub species] sub speciebus 233.22–23 principium] primum 233.25 principium] primum 233.29 principium] principia 234.2 huius] huiusmodi 234.18 optinet] obtinet 234.35–36 in habendo] habendo 234.36 concludendo] in concludendo 235.11 suppositionis] superpositionis 235.17 ab] de 235.38 qui] que 235.38 eo] ea 236.21 supponit] supponunt 236.26 individualis] indivisibilis 236.28 supponit] supponunt 236.40–41 supponit] supponunt 237.4 illam demonstrationem] illud demonstrativum 237.8 illam demonstrationem] illud demonstrativum 237.21 paritur] patitur 237.39 huius, cuius] huiusmodi, cuiusmodi 238.17–18 qualitatem alteram qualitas altera 238.26 ‘qui’] ‘ipse’, ‘qui’ 238.29 iste] ille 239.10 finiuntur] finitur 239.11 et] est 239.20 quantitatem] qualitatem 239.21 finies] finiens 239.21 quantitatem] qualitatem 239.28 finiuntur] finitur 239.29 finiuntur] finitur 240.11 enim] ergo 240.13 terminum] tantum 240.15 dissilabus’ et ‘istud] dissillaba et ista



240.20

313

Appendix A

species’ et ‘istud est] species et ista 240.27 dissillabum et iste] dissillaba et ista 240.37 ergo] et 241.5 refert denotat] refert 241.5 finitur. Similiter] finitur, similiter 241.15 sumetur] sumitur 241.33 illa] illa illius propositionis 241.40 aliud, non] aliud non, 242.1 erga] ergo 242.14 positio] posito 242.14–15 ‘quilibet . . . solum’] quilibet . . . solum 242.16 cum] tunc 242.26 relativi] loco relativi

243.3 243.43 244.6 245.3 245.4–5 245.6 245.9

autem] enim quem] quam qui absoluta . . . respectiva] que] qui comsimilis] consimilia eodem] eadem supponat] supponant

De Libera’s Edition of “De appellatione” 252.1 petitio] positio 263.1 cuiuscumque] et cuiuscumque 263.2 quidam] quedam 263.3 quidam] quedam 267.2 hoc fiere. Probatio] hic fieri probatio 276.10 communis] discreti

APPENDIX B

Questions and Objections

Numbers at the end indicate paragraph numbers in Thomas Maloney’s translation of Franco Alessio’s Latin text. ‘Q’ indicates a question; ‘O’ indicates an objection The wording of the questions and objections is not always exactly what is found in the text but does express their intent. On occasion Lambert presents the full format of a disputed question (e.g., 1293)—question, argument for, argument against, resolution, and refutation of the contrary positions given in the pro and con section. In such instances the pro or con that opposes his position is treated as an objection and is designated by ‘O’.

C HA P T E R ON E : P ROP O SI T ION S Q. Q. Q. Q. Q. Q. Q. Q. O. O. Q.

Why is a student of the arts said to study arts and not art? 2 What is an art? 8 What is logic? 10 Why is ‘logic’ assigned to logic and not to grammar and rhetoric? 12 What is dialectic? 16 What is the difference between logic and dialectic? 19 Why does a logician begin with sound instead of with something prior to sound? 25 Why is the definition of ‘sound’ presented before its division? 31 Natural vocal sounds signify the groans of the sick, not naturally, but at one’s own pleasure. 35 If the significatum of a word were from the will it could be changed. 38 Why does the logician not concern himself with letters and syllables? 43 314



O.

Appendix B

315

The logician ought to accept the grammarian’s analysis of words and not analyze them further. 45 Q. Why does the logician analyze only names and verbs? 48 O. Some names signify along with time. 57 O. The parts of some words signify something on their own. 60 Q. What is the quantity of ‘Make a fire’ or ‘Would that I were a good cleric’? 73 Q. Why is a categorical proposition denominated more from the predicate than from the subject? 79 Q. What is the quantity of ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’? 83 O. ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’ cannot be a universal proposition. 85 Q. What is the universal proposition under which one finds ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’? 87 Q. What is the quantity of ‘Man is a species’? 91 O. ‘Man is a species’ is indefinite. 92 O. A discrete term can also be a common term. 97 Q. Why can contraries share falsity but not truth? 115 Q. Why cannot subcontraries be false at the same time? 117 O. There are examples against the conversion of a universal negative proposition. 123–24 O. There are examples against the conversion of a particular affirmative. 127 O. When converting, ‘Some man is dead’ is taken as true. 129 O. ‘Some boy will be a man’ cannot be converted. 131 O. There are examples against the conversion of a universal affirmative. 133 O. The universal affirmative can be converted simply. 136 Q. Can a universal negative be converted per accidens? 138 O. A universal negative can be converted per accidens. 139 Q. What kind of argumentation is conversion? 143 Q. How can a conversion be reduced to a syllogism? 145 O. No conversion can be reduced to a syllogism. 147 O. Conversion is a syllogistic argument. 150 Q. What is the rationale for the names of the various types of conversion? 153 Q. How is ‘Both of these runs’ converted? 155 Q. How is ‘Neither of these runs’ converted? 157 Q. Why cannot subcontrary propositions be equipollent to each other? 161 Q. Why does a negation placed before a sign make it equipollent to its contradictory sign? 163 Q. Why is a universal sign with a negation placed after it equipollent to its contrary sign? 165 Q. Why is a proposition with a negation before and after the sign equipollent to its subaltern? 167 O. Aristotle says that dictums are subjects, and modes are predicates. 185

316 O. O. O. O. Q. O. O. O.

O.

O. O. O.

Appendix B

There are examples against the four rules for the conversion of modal propositions with false in them. 205, 211, 215, 219 There are examples against the rule for the conversion of modal propositions with possible in them. 223 There are examples against the rule for the conversion of universal affirmative modal propositions with necessary in them. 227 There are examples against the rule for the conversion of universal negative modal propositions with necessary in them. 228 Does ‘contingent’ taken as possible mean necessary and not necessary univocally or equivocally? 236 ‘Contingent’ taken as possible means necessary and not necessary univocally. 237 ‘Contingent’ taken as possible means necessary and not necessary equivocally. 238 Not all affirmative propositions of whatever quantity or quality with contingent taken for not necessary in them can be converted into the opposite quality. 246, 247 Not all affirmative propositions of whatever quantity with contingent taken for not necessary in them can be converted in the same way as their assortorics can. 252 It is possible to form negative propositions with contingent taken for natural in them. 261 A universal negative with contingent taken for indefinite in it can be converted simply. 267, 268 A particular negative with contingent taken for indefinite in it cannot be converted simply. 273

C HA P T E R T WO : P R E DIC A B L E S O. O. O. O. O. O. Q. O. O. O.

Aristotle says that an individual is predicated of no thing. 286 It is superfluous to appose ‘differing’ in the definition of ‘genus’. 296 Genus is not what is predicated of more than one thing differing in species. 297 To be predicated with respect to what [a thing is] is not to be predicated substantially. 298 It is not the case that there are some most general genera in every category. 306 There is only one most general genus. 308 Why is there only one most general genus in a category but more than one lowest species? 310 Individuals do not consist of Porphyry’s seven characteristics. 314 A difference cannot be an accident. 321 There is no difference between an entity and a nonentity. 323



O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.

Appendix B

317

Species does not exceed genus in differentiae. 328 The definition of ‘animal’ as sensitive animate substance is inaccurate. 330 The second definition of ‘differentia’ also applies to an accident. 334 The third definition of ‘differentia’ also applies to a proprium. 336 The fourth definition of ‘differentia’ is too broad. 338 The fourth definition of ‘difference’ involves an infinite regress. 339 The fifth definition of ‘differentia’ also applies to a genus. 343 The differentiae of a genus cannot be both divisive and constructive. 346 To grow gray-headed is a proprium of man. 350 To be able to be a grammarian is a proprium of man. 351 The first definition of ‘accident’ does not apply to all accidents. 356 The division of accidents is against the definition of ‘accident’. 358 The notion of an inseparable accident is incoherent. 360

C HA P T E R T H R E E : C AT E G OR I E S Q.

Why are the definitions of ‘univocals’, ‘equivocals’ and ‘denominatives’ placed at the beginning of Aristotle’s Categories? 366 Q. Why are ‘equivocals’, ‘univocals’, and ‘denominatives’ spoken of in the plural? 368 Q. Why are equivocals, univocals, and denominatives said to be called such and not said to be such? 370 O. It is not only equivocals whose name alone is common but also univocals. 372 O. Univocals do not have the same definition. 374 O. Denominatives are not different in grammatical case ending. 376 Q. Why does the grammarian say ‘just’ is denominated from ‘justice’ and the logician claim the reverse? 378 O. There are no uncombined words that signify. 382 O. The claim that a part is in its whole, and vice versa, is false. 384 O. The rule that, when one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, everything said of what is predicated is also said of the subject is inaccurate. 389 O. There are different genera not subalternately placed that have the same differentiae. 392 O. The words ‘strictly’, ‘primarily’, and ‘in the fullest sense’ in the definition of ‘substance’ are superfluous. 396 O. Aristotle’s definition of ‘substance’ is poorly constructed. 397 Q. Why does Aristotle define ‘substance’ before dividing it? 403 O. Two examples indicating that not to be in a subject is not something common to all substances. 407, 408 O. Substance admits of more and less. 415

318

Appendix B

O. The claim that substance cannot admit of contraries is too broad. 418, 419 O. Why does one not divide Quantity before one defines it? 427 O. To say that some quantity is continuous and some discrete is to speak incongruously. 428 O. Quantity has a contraries. 434, 435, 436, 441, 442 O. It is proper to speak of something as quantitatively (in the strictest sense) even or odd. 446 O. Quality should precede Relation when enumerating the categories. 450, 451, 452 O. The definition of ‘relation’ contains a disjunction. 457 Q. What relative things have contraries? 460 Q. Which relative things admit of more and less? 462 O. Nothing is common to relative things such as man and able to laugh. 465 O. Concomitance is not proper to the category Relation. 468 O. One thing must have only one definition. 471 O. It is false that, if a child is destroyed, the father is destroyed. 473 O. The definition of ‘quality’ is not a good one. 477, 478 O. Habit cannot be in the first species of Quality. 482 O. Habits are not dispositions. 483 O. Natural lack of power is not in the second species of Quality. 488 O. Passion is not in the third species of Quality. 494 O. Figure is not in the fourth species of Quality. 499 O. Straight and curved are not in the fourth species of Quality. 500 O. The definition of ‘quality’ is not a good one. 507 O. One ought not give an explanation of being qualified when discussing Quality. 508 O. One is called “virtuous” from his virtue. 511, 513, (520) O. To have one virtue one must have all. 515 O. One is called “possessive of a head” from his eyes. 517 O. One is not called “studious” from his virtue. 520 Q. Which qualities have a contrary and which do not? 523 O. Contraries are not in the same genus. 526 O. Quality does not admit of more and less. 529 O. Similar and dissimilar are not proper to Quality. 533 O. The definition of ‘Action’ is incorrect. 536, 537, 538, 541 Q. Why is ‘doing’ not included in the definiton of ‘action’? 539 Q. How do acting and doing differ? 540 O. The definition of ‘Passion’ contains superfluous words. 553 O. The definition of ‘Passion’ should not appose ‘Action’. 554 Q. Why are categories made up of two of the species of continuous quantity and not from the other three? 561 O. Something unknown appears in the definition of ‘When’. 562



Appendix B

319

O. O. O.

The definition of ‘When’ is not a good one. 563 Something unknown appears in the definition of ‘Where’. 568 The definition of ‘Where’ should speak of the circumscription of a substance, not just that of a body. O. The definition of ‘Where’ includes inaccurate language. 570 O. A conjunction is incorrectly included in the definition of ‘Position’ and ‘Possession’. 575, 578

C HA P T E R F O U R : R E M A R K S A F T E R T H E C AT E G OR I E S O. Things that come after the Categories should be called “Remarks before the Categories.” 582

C HA P T E R F I V E : SY L L O G I SM S O. O. Q. O. O. O. Q. Q. Q. Q. O. O. O. Q.

The definition of ‘argument’ is inappropriately given. 619 “Producing belief ” is inaccurately given in the definition of ‘argument’. 620, 621 Is ‘argument’ taken the same way in the definition and division of that term? 632 The kind of argument that is not probable and does not produce belief is not an argument. 634 Why does the fourth kind of argument (neither necessary nor probable) count as an argument in the division of ‘argument’? A syllogism is more than one expression. 652a By what kind of unity is a syllogism only one expression. 652b Is a syllogism a perfect or an imperfect expression? 653 How can a conclusion be different from the premises. 654 What is the rationale for the names of the terms in a syllogism? 717 All moods other than the first four of the first figure are superfluous. 719 There ought to be a fourth figure. 721 ‘Everything able to laugh is a man, every man is an animal; therefore everything able to laugh is an animal’ is an example of a syllogism in a fourth figure. 723 Why is the reduction in the fourth mood of the second and third figures described as “per impossibile?” 724

C HA P T E R SI X : TOP I C S O. A maxim is not part of an argument. 734 Q. Why does a Topic get its name more from what implies than from what is implied? 748

320 O. O. Q.

Appendix B

The Topics from an explanation, from definition, and from description get their names from accidents and are not Topics from substance. 755 The Topic from a genus holds constructively. 761 What sort of argumentation should be called Topical argumentation and to what sort of argumentation should the latter be reduced? 843

C HA P T E R SE V E N : FA L L AC I E S O. ‘Disputation’ is defined in such a way that a disposition can arise only from syllogisms defective in matter. 859 O. Falsity and paradox are the same goal of disputation. 869 Q. Why cannot actual and potential ambiguity in a word or expression occur in the case of imaginary ambiguity? 891 O. Each word can have only one signification. 897 Q. Of what sort of cause does the preposition ‘from’ denominate a relationship when it denominates the local relationship of a place? 919 O. The three examples of paralogisms in the third species of Amphiboly are examples of the fallacy of Equivocation. 949 O. A compounded expression ought more to be called true in the compounded sense than false. 963 Q. Why is an expression not called divided when things that ought to be divided are divided? 965 O. The subject of an infinitive does not seem to be able to be divided from it. 971 O. All modal expressions where the dictum functions as the subject will be de dicto. 975 O. The example of a paralogism in the third species of Composition is an example of the fallacy of Equivocation. 992 Q. Why does no fallacy of Accent arise from the fourth accident of a syllable, namely, the number of letters? 1027 O. Accent is not the concern of a logician or a sophist. 1029, 1031 O. A verb signifies acting or undergoing but not a quality. 1053 O. The inference ‘Man is a species, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is a species’ is not fallacious. 1075 O. The inference ‘I know Coriscus, it is Coriscus who is approaching; therefore I know who is approaching’ is not fallacious. 1084 O. In Aristotle’s two examples of Accident he uses the same proposition in each, yet in one it is to be taken as true and in the other as false. 1119 O. According to Aristotle something can inhere absolutely and at the same time in a certain respect. 1128



Appendix B

321

O.

The inference ‘If he is white with respect to his teeth, he is white absolutely’ is not fallacious. 1130 O. ‘This one is not a man; therefore he does not exist’ contains the fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely, not that of Consequent. 1138 O. One is permitted to infer a convertible from its convertible without begging the original issue. 1179 O. The number of species of the fallacy of Begging the Original Issue is insufficient. 1197 O. The inference ‘This one is corrupt; therefore he is an adulterer’ does not commit the fallacy of Consequent. Q. Why is the fallacy better named Consequent than Accident? 1203 Q. In ‘A soul and life are the same thing,’ etc. what is the false proposition from which the false conclusion follows? 1214 O. The fallacy of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause will occur in all paralogisms. 1216 O. The fallacy of Treating More than One Question as One Question is better called Treating More than One Proposition as One Proposition. 1228

C HA P T E R E IG H T: P ROP E RT I E S OF T E R M S Q.

Why is supposition appropriate to substantives and copulation to adjectives? 1248 Q. Is ‘Every time exists’ true? 1293 O. ‘Every time exists’ is false. 1294 Q. Why in the case of enduring things is there no difference between existing actually and actually existing under a term? 1301 Q. Is a common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb restricted by it? O. A common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb cannot be restricted by it. 1303, 1304 Q. Is a common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb restricted by it to suppositing for existing things? 1311 O. A common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb is not restricted to suppositing for existing things. 1312, 1313 O. ‘No man exists; therefore Caesar does not exist’ follows well. 1321 Q. Is a common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb restricted by it to suppositing for existing things in the same way in affirmative and negative propositions? 1325 O. A common term serving as the subject of a present-tense verb is not restricted by it to suppositing for existing things in the same way in affirmative and negative propositions. 1328

322 Q.

Appendix B

Why is a term pertaining to accident serving as a subject or predicate of a verb not interpreted according to the requirement of the verb? 1335 O. A term pertaining to accident serving as a subject or predicate of a verb is interpreted according to the requirement of the verb. 1336 Q. Does a sign in an oblique case indicate the quantity of the proposition as it does in the nominative case as in ‘Socrates sees every man’? 1384 O. ‘Socrates sees every man’ is a singular proposition. 1385 O. A relative of substance does not supposit for numerically the same thing for which its antecedent does. 1398 Q. To what does ‘of such a sort’ refer in ‘Socrates is white and Plato is of such a sort’? 1411 Q. To what does ‘other’ refer in ‘Socrates is white and Plato is other’? 1412 O. In ‘He who runs disputes’ ‘he’ and ‘who’ cannot be mutual relatives and refer to each other. 1415, 1416 Q. Does a relative refer to its antecedent along with the latter’s disposition? 1429 O. A relative does refer to its antecedent along with the latter’s disposition. 1430, 1431 Q. Does a nonreciprocal relative refer to its antecedent along with the latter’s disposition? 1438 O. A nonreciprocal relative does not refer to its antecedent along with the latter’s disposition. 1440

Notes

Introduction 1.  “So it also cannot be more remarkable if we find yet a second representative of this logic in Lambert of Auxerre (around the middle of the thirteenth century) who is a younger contemporary of William of Sherwood as well as an older contemporary of Petrus Hispanus” (Demnach kann es auch nicht mehr auffallend sein, wenn wir noch einem zweiten Vertreter diesser Logik an Lambert von Auxerre [um die Mitte des 13.Jahr] treffen, welcher als jüngerer Zeitgenosse des Wilhelm Shyreswood, sowie als älterer des Petrus Hispanus zu bezeichnen ist). (Carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abenlande, vol. 3, B [Leipzig, 1867], p. 25; also in Franco Alessio, Logica [Summa Lamberti] [Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971], p. xiii, n. 1.) Three of the fifteen manuscripts are no longer extant. (See Logica, pp. xxxiii–xxxv.) All translations in this work are mine unless otherwise indicated. 2.  Konstanty Michalski, “Les courants philosophiques à Oxford et à Paris pendant le XVI siècle,” Bulletin Internationale de l’Académie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres, Classe d’histoire et de philosophie (Cracovie: Imprimerie de l’Université, 1920), p. 61. 3.  See Martin Grabmann, Handschriftliche Forschungen und Funde zu den philosophischen Schriften des Petrus Hispanus, des späteren Papstes Johannes XXI, Sitzungs­berichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, Heft 9 (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1936), pp. 30, 31, and 42; and Berhard Geyer, “Zu den Summulae logicales des Petrus Hispanus und Lambert von Auxerre,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 50 (1937) 511–13, henceforth “Zu den Summulae logicales”; also in Logica, p. xiii, respectively, nn. 2 and 3. For Grabmann’s statement see below, n. 165. 4.  L. M. de Rijk, “On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain’s Summule logicales: Part IV: The Lectura tractatuum by Guillelmus Arnaldi, Master of Arts at Toulouse (1235–1244). With a Note on the Date of Lambert of Auxerre’s Summule,” Vivarium 7 (1969): 161–63, henceforth “On the Genuine Text.”

323

324

Notes to Pages xv–xvi

5.  L. M. de Rijk, “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis in Mediaeval Logic,” Vivarium 9 (1971): 71–107, esp. pp. 89–96, henceforth “The Development of Suppositio ­Naturalis.” 6. See Logica in bibliography. 7.  Tractatus, pp. lxxx–lxxxiv. This treatment expands on the conclusions he came to in his note on the date of Lambert’s Summa in 1969, for which see above, n. 4. 8.  H. A. G. Braakhuis, “The Views of William of Sherwood on Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation to Those of Roger Bacon,” Vivarium 15 (1977): 11–142, esp. pp. ­133–36. 9.  “Le traité,” “Introduction,” pp. 227–50, and text, pp. 251–85. 10.  Georgette Sinkler, “Roger Bacon on the Compounded and Divided Senses,” in The Rise of British Logic: Acts of the Sixth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Balliol College, Oxford, 19–24 June 1983, ed. P. Osmund Lewry, Papers in Mediaeval Studies, vol. 7 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), pp. 145–71. See also below, n. 167. 11.  Alain de Libera, “De la logique à la grammaire: Remarques sur la théorie de la determinatio chez Roger Bacon et Lambert d’Auxerre (Lambert de Lagny),” in De Ortu Grammaticae: Studies in Medieval Grammar and Linguistic Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. G. L. Bursill-Hall, Sten Ebbesen, and Konrad Koerner, Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, vol. 43 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990), pp. 209–26, henceforth “De la logique à la grammaire.” See also below, n. 175. 12.  An earlier version of the answer to this question can be found in Thomas S. Maloney, “Who Is the Author of the Summa Lamberti?,” International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2009): 89–106. 13. Alessio presents his view of Lambert’s life in his Logica, pp.  xvi–xxiii and­­ xxviii–xxxii. 14.  In the thirteenth century three different kinds of schools came to be associated with the Dominicans (and other religious communities): schola, studium, and studium generale. Every convent was supposed to offer its members elementary instruction in scripture and theology; this educational program was called a schola. It was under the direction of the prior of the convent, and it served principally the immediate members of that convent, although others from the town might be permitted to attend the lectures and discussions. Because the age and intellectual ability of the members of a convent would, of course, vary greatly, at one point it was decided that it would be appropriate to gather some of the best students from the whole province and educate them together. This program was called a studium, and its curriculum was under the direction of a provincial chapter. Finally, both of these institutions are to be distinguished from a studium generale, which was a graduate program offering degrees in theology, canon law, and medicine and mostly associated with one of the various universities. It was under the governance of the master general and drew students from all the provinces. 15.  For the various explicits of the twelve extant codices see Logica, pp. xxxvi–lvi. One notes there that three other codices attribute the summa to implausible others: to Walter Burley (A), to Matthew of Hradecz (H), and to a master Lambert, Brother of St. Victor (U).



Notes to Pages xvi–xviii

325

16.  “Expliciunt summule magistri Lamberti de Liniaco castro,” in Logica, p. xxi. 17.  For the attributions see Logica, pp. xxxix, xlviii, and liv. 18.  Logica, pp. xxiii–xxviii. 19.  See below, n. 40. 20.  Marie-Dominique Chapotin, Histoire des dominicains de la province de Provence: La siècle des foundations (Rouen, 1898), p. 354, henceforth Histoire des dominicains; also in Logica, p. xxix. 21.  Histoire des dominicains, p. 355 and no. 2. Alessio takes the Liber de illustribus to be a late-fifteenth-century transcription by the Dominican bishop Giles Sutor (after 1494) of the then surviving parts of the now lost monumenta of the convent of Auxerre (Logica, p. xviii). Chapotin says the work was not available in his time but that he had access to it via Daniel George Viole’s Histoire des églises d’Auxerre, Bibliothèque de la Ville d’Auxerre, MS 155, vol. 3 (= vol. 4). (Histoire des dominicains, p. 348, n. 1.) Viole’s work is also called by Alessio Mémoire sur l’histoire du diocèse d’Auxerre. Logica, p. xxxv. 22.  Histoire des dominicains, p. 355 and n. 2. 23. See Logica, pp. xviii–xix. 24.  “. . . il faut que le docteur Lambert ait esté de[s] premiers Jacobins du Couvent d’Auxerre.” (Logica, p. xviii; for the full text see below, n. 112.) Viole, Histoire des églises d’Auxerre, Bibliothèque de la Ville d’Auxerre, MS 155, vol. 3, fol. 2496–97 (= vol. 4, fol. 1086); also in Logica, p. xix. 25.  For the text see below, n. 113. Clearly Alessio does not accept Echard’s exact date except as a terminus a quo, and the reason may be his awareness that Chapotin tells us that the countess Amicie of Joigny only initiated the process of persuading the Dominicans to locate and buy property in Auxerre in 1240. Possibly this date was recorded there and Echard took it as the date of the convent’s foundation. (That the entry was provided by Echard and not Quétif is indicated by the asterisk beside it.) See Logica, pp. xx–xxi; and Histoire des dominicains, p. 349. 26.  For this and what follows see Logica, p. xx. 27.  “Fratres iuniores et docibiles in logicalibus instruantur.” C. Douais, Essai sur l’organisation des études dans l’ordre des frères prêcheurs au treizième et au quatorzième siècle (1216–1342) (Paris, 1884), p. 7 ff. passim, as cited in Logica, pp. xxi–xxii.  28.  “Concedimus universis prioribus et conventibus, ut, si quos habent ydoneos, quod faciant eis legi de artibus in suis conventibus,” in Acta Capitulorum Provincialium Ordinis Praedicatorum: Première Province de Provence, Province Romaine, Province d’Espagne (1239–1302) (Toulouse, 1894), ed. C. Douais, p. 40, henceforth Acta Capitulorum Provincialium; also in Logica, p. xxi. 29.  See opening lines of the translation; for the Latin text see Logica, p. 3, lines 3–4. 30.  “Expliciunt summule edite in Francia a quodam fratre de ordine predicatorum qui vocatus fuerat Lambertus et postea fuit penitentiarius domini pape sed quando composuit fuit magister regis Navarre qui est sepultus in domo fratrum Parisius ad sanctum Jacobum.” (MS Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria, Codex latinus 647, fol. 131v, as found in Logica, p. xxx.) The pope, says Alessio, would probably have been Pope Urban IV (1261–64).

326

Notes to Pages xviii–xix

The importance of this explicit in determining many of the details of Lambert’s life cannot be overstressed. In this regard de Rijk writes, “the author of our colophon appears to have had a sound sense of chronology, as may be seen from his distinction between the composition and the edition of the work and from his explicit information that Lambert was a penitentiary of the pope after the edition of his Summule.” “On the Genuine Text,” p. 161; emphasis his. 31.  Berhard Geyer, “Zu den Summulae logicales,” p. 512. Geyer makes no comment there on the significance of the distinction between composition (compositio) and circulation (editio). 32.  Theobald I was born in 1201, Theobald II in 1235, and Henry in 1249. See M. H. D’Arbois de Jubainville, Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne, vol. 4, pt. 2 (Paris, 1864), p. 341, henceforth Histoire des ducs. 33.  Logica, p. xxx; and for the reference to “magister ingeniosus” see p. xviii. 34.  Logica, pp. xxx–xxxi. It should be noted that Alessio speaks of Theobald II’s accession to the thrones of Navarre and Champagne as having occurred in 1256. In point of fact, Theobald’s father died in July 1253. Theobald was seventeen at the time and needed to be eighteen to ascend the throne of Navarre and twenty-one to rule in Champagne, hence the regency from 1253 to 1256. While age played a role, then, in the delay of his accession to the throne of Navarre, he did ascend it on November 27, 1253. Other factors were operating, such as the barons’ pressure—surely resisted for some time by Theobald and Margaret—for Theobald to swear an oath before he became king that he would draw up a charter that, among other things, would create “un conseil de régence.” Margaret was excluded “from all participation or governance” by the barons, so shortly after the oath was given and Theobald was recognized as king of Navarre (although as yet uncrowned) she left Navarre, never to return. While de Jubainville can say that Margaret ruled “peacefully” for her son in Champagne during the regency, things did not go so smoothly in Navarre. There was threat of war with the kingdom of Castile, the barons were pressing old grievances, and de Jubainville speaks of an “insubordination of the people of Navarre who wanted to profit by the troubles of the Regent in order to recoup their ancient liberties or to acquire new ones.” With all this going on in Navarre, it seems highly unlikely that Theobald would have been willing or able to continue his study of the arts, and so a date of 1250 up to his father’s death (July 1253) or possibly his accession to the throne (November 1253) seems about right for the period of the preceptorate. For the above see Histoire des ducs, pp. 350–53 and 361. 35.  “It is therefore in the context of those rules and with this type of student—‘the young ones and teachable ones’—of the Convent of Auxerre, that the elaboration of the Summa Lamberti has been taking place” (È pertanto nel contesto di quelle regole e con siffatta scolaresca di ‘iuniores et docibiles’ del convento di Auxerre che si è venuta compiendo la elaborazione della Summa Lamberti). Logica, p. xxii. 36.  “. . . in either case we have to presume that the Summa was at that time [1247–56] begun and completed” (in ogni caso è da presumere che la Summa risultasse a quel tempo avviata e compiuta). Logica, p. xxxi. 37.  Logica, pp. xxx–xxxi.



Notes to Pages xix–xx

327

38.  “Forse è intervenuto uno spostamento di Lamberto nella stessa schola conventuale dominicana di Troyes, o altro che non ci è dato di intravedere.” (Logica, p. xxxi.) 39.  Logica, p. xxxi; and Geyer, “Zu den Summulae logicales,” p. 512. Why it is difficult to think of the work as being composed for Theobald he does not say. 40.  “L’école de Paris le comptait parmi ses maîtres les plus fameux.” (Logica, p. xix; Marie-Dominique Chapotin, Les dominicains d’Auxerre [Paris, 1892], p. 27, henceforth Les dominicains.) (Alessio also cites p. 354 of Chapotin’s Histoire des dominicains, but the text is not to be found there.) Alessio dismisses the reference to Paris on the grounds that he can find no other source to support it. 41.  Logica, p. xxxi. 42. See Logica, p. xxix. Alessio does not come right out and say that he takes “edita” to refer to a circulation of the Summa, as opposed to a redaction or revision of it, but he goes to the trouble of referring to an article by Jean Destrez and G. Fink-Errera whose focus in part is to call attention to the fact that the composition of a work is not the same as its circulation, and Alessio associates the various manuscripts of Lambert’s Summa with these two processes. On the distinction between compositio and editio see Jean Destrez and G. Fink-Errera, “Des manuscrits apparemment datés,” Scriptorium 12 (1958): 92–93. For de Rijk’s interpretation of the term ‘editus’ see “On the Genuine Text,” pp. 161–62; for Alessio’s understanding see Logica, xxxi; and for de Libera’s see “Le traité,” pp. 231–32. 43.  “Tratto lontano da Auxerre, prima nella Champagne, poi in ‘Francia,’ è nell’oppidum insulense, che Lamberto edita la Summa. . . .” Logica, p. xxxi. 44.  Logica, pp. lvi–lxiii. 45.  Logica, p. lvi, lx–lxiii. De Libera alludes to Alessio’s assignments of manuscripts to the (different) processes of composition and circulation but concludes that this hypothesis cannot be considered without first responding to the two questions of the identity of the author and of his sources. “Le traité,” p. 228. 46.  “On the Genuine Text,” pp. 160–62. What follows is derived from this source. 47.  Ibid., p. 161. For the article on Theobald see Nouvelle biographie générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu’a 1850–60, “Thibaut V,” published by Firmin Didot Frères under the direction of Hoefer, reprinted, vols. 45–46 in one (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde et Bagger, 1969), col. 152. I would note only that the author of the article provides just one reference, and that is to Auguste-Alphonse Étienne-Gallois’s Les ducs de Champagne (Paris, 1843), a very small work (68 pp.) that traces the origins of the duchy of Champagne up through the reign of Charles Martel in the eighth century. It provides no information at all on Theobald II, so it is unclear on what source the date of 1240 for his birth is based. 48.  De Rijk’s source takes Theobald II to have been born in 1240 (de Jubainville, 1235) and to have been thirteen years old (de Rijk correctly says “in his thirteenth year” or “twelve years of age”) when he “succeeded his father” and the regency began. De Rijk then speaks of an anointing in 1257 (presumably shortly after the end of the regency) when Theobald was “seventeen years old.” But depending on the month of this occasion, and if Theobald was born late in the year (as de Jubainville holds), then in 1257 the king would probably have been in his sixteenth year. Neither de Rijk’s source nor de Rijk comments on the apparent

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conflict between a date of 1240 for Theobald’s birth and the issue of the age of majority in Navarre and Champagne. De Rijk further notes, but dismisses without comment, Ulysse Chevalier’s claim in Répetoir des sources historiques du Moyen Âge, Bio-bibliographie, of 1250 as the year of the king’s birth as “a misprint.” See “On the Genuine Text,” p. 161 and n. 2; and Répetoir, vol. 2 (repr. New York, 1969), col. 4452, as cited in “On the Genuine Text,” p. 161, n. 2. 49.  Vol. 2, “Troyes” (Paris, 1855), pp. 999–1000, as cited in “Le traité,” p. 230, n. 9. 50.  “Le traité,” p. 230; and Thomas Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, vol. 3 (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae, 1980), pp. 58 and 60. 51.  “Le traité,” p. 230. 52.  He writes: “Unfortunately, if one can admit a priori the possibility that the author of the Summa was ‘master Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel,’ called later ‘Brother Lambert of Auxerre,’ one must recognize that, with the exception of the information provided by the explicit of the Padua manuscript, no document exists which directly or indirectly could enlighten us on the life and work of him whom D. G. Viole calls ‘magister ingeniosus’” (Malheureusement, si l’on peut bien admettre a priori la possibilité que l’auteur de la Summa soit “maître Lambert de Ligny-le-Châtel,” appelé par la suite “Frère Lambert d’Auxerre,” il faut avouer qu’à l’exception des indications fournies par l’explicit du manuscript de Padoue, aucun document ne subsiste qui, directement ou indirectement, pourrait nous éclairer sur la vie et l’œuvre de celui que D. G. Viole appelle “magister ingeniosus”). “Le traité,” p. 230. 53.  “Le traité,” p. 231. 54.  De Jubainville characterizes him in two ways: “un administrateur sépare” and “­ administrateur du domaine de Thibaut V.” Histoire des ducs, vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 472 and 540. 55.  “To William of Limigni, Archdeacon Preiciacensis of the Church of Chartres, and Henry, called Tuebeuf, canon of Paris. . . . We commend to your judgment a beloved son, master Lambert of Lagny, cleric of the diocese of Meaux, teacher of a beloved son William, Treasurer of Sens, dearest blood-brother in Christ of our . . . illustrious King of Navarre, Palatine Count of Champagne and Brie, at the request of the king himself who implores for him apostolic grace, that you all or your alternate through you or another or others cause on our authority the same master to be received as a canon in the church of Rheims and as a brother, and that you provide for him a prebend, if one is vacant there at this time, or, if nothing prevents, as quickly as your ability offers itself to that end. Given in the Old City, 7 Kalends of February [January 26, 1264], in the third year [of Our pontificate]. (Guillelmo de Limigni, archidiacono Preiciacensi in ecclesia Carnotensi, et Henrico dicto Tuebues, canonico Parisiensi. . . . Hinc est quod nos dilectum filium magistrum Lambertum de Latiniaco, clericum Meldensis diocesis, doctorem dilecti filii Guillelmi, thesaurarii Senonensis, germani carissimi in Christo filii nostri . . . illustris regis Navarre, Campanie ac Brie comitis palatini, obtentu ipsius regis pro eo apostolicam gratiam implorantis, favore specialis gratie prosequentes, discretioni vestre mandamus quatenus vos vel alter vestrum per vos vel alium seu alios eundem magistrum in ecclesia Remensi auctoritate nostra faciatis recipi in canonicum et in fratrem eique provideatis de prebenda, si vacat ibidem ad presens, vel quamprimum ad id obtulerit se facultas, non obstante. Datum apud Urbem veterem, VII



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kalendas februarii, anno tertio.) Les registres d’Urbain IV, ed. Jean Guiraud, vol. 3, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 2nd ser. (Paris: Libraire des écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 1904), p. 151, no. 1227; also in “Le traité,” p. 231, n. 14. Interestingly, and contrary to the papal document, de Jubainville does not speak of Lambert as a master, even though he gives evidence that he pays attention to such titles, as in the case of one of Theobald I’s and Theobald II’s ministers of finance whom he identifies as “master John de Provins, cleric.” Histoire des ducs, vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 465–66. 56.  “Le traité,” p. 231. 57.  Ibid., pp. 231–32. 58.  Ibid., p. 232. 59.  Ibid., p. 233. 60.  “. . . le futur Dominicain d’Auxerre” and “. . . le nom de celui qui était devenu entre temps l’un des premiers dominicains d’Auxerre.” Ibid., respectively, pp. 235 and 249. 61.  For this and what follows immediately see W. A. Hinnesbusch et al., “Dominicans,” in The New Catholic Encyclopaedia, ed. Faculty of The Catholic University of America, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (New York: Gale, 2003), pp. 849–50. The first chair at Paris was filled by Roland of Cremona (“the glory of the University of Bologna”), and the second came as a result of the secular master John of St. Giles’s becoming a Dominican, both happening during the great dispersion when the other masters were on strike. See James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1983), pp. 61–63. 62. Respectively, Logica, p. xx; and de Jubainville, Histoire des ducs, vol. 6 (1866), nos. 3598, 3609, 3610, 3658, and 3672. 63.  The Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. Charles G. Herbermann et al., vol. 12, “Preachers, Order of,” by Pierre-Marie-Felix Mandonnet (New York: Encyclopedia Press, 1913), p. 368Ca. This edition, as opposed to that of 2003, contains internal references to original sources such as Potthast and Balme. 64.  “Expliciunt Summule magistri Lamberti de Liniaco castro.” Logica, p. liv. 65.  “Sequitur de predicabilibus. Anno Domini MoCCooctogesimo primo, mense novembri emit Johannes de Asconio clericus a Rogerio de Cheminon clerico presens (corr.: presentem) librum. Qui Rogerius fecerat scribere anno primo ut dictum est Lamberto de Syvriaco clerico.” Logica, p. liv. 66.  “Anno Domini MoCCooctogesimo primo, mense novembri, emit Johannes de Asconio, clericus, a Rogerio de Cheminoti, clerico, presentem librum, qui Rogerius fecerat scribere anno primo, ut dictum est, Lamberto de Liniaco, clerico.” Les dominicains, p. 27, n. 2. 67.  “That Lambert of Ligny is not the canon of Auxerre turned Dominican, but simply a cleric and a copyist” (Ce Lambert de Ligny n’est donc pas le chanoine d’Auxerre devenu dominicain, mais simplement un clerc et un copiste). Ibid. 68.  I am indebted to Mr. Paschal Jacquinot of the Service photographie of the Médiathèque de l’aggomération Troyenne for sending me gratis a photocopy of fol. 95 of codex 2402 of the Bibliothèque municipale de Troyes.

330

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69.  Histoire des ducs, vol. 6 (1866), nos. 3304, 3334, 3341, 3345, and 3362. For de Jubainville’s comments on these transactions: ibid., vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 387–88. 70.  For Pope Urban’s letter see above, n. 55. The letter is addressed to William de Limigni, archdeacon of Le Pincerais in the diocese of Chartres, and Henry, called Tuebuef, canon of Paris. The latter would seem to be the same person as the cleric of Theobald II whose service is listed by de Jubainville for the year 1270, shortly after Lambert’s employment. Histoire des ducs, vol. 4, pt. 2, p. 533, n. b. 71.  For his birth see Histoire des ducs, vol. 4, pt. 1, p. 341; and for the year of his death see the two entries for May 1267, where Theobald II is recorded making an offering to the chapters of Saint-Quiriace de Provins (twice) and Saint-Etienne de Troyes for prayers for his deceased brother, William. (Ibid., vol. 6 [1866], nos. 3408 and 3409.) Again in June 1270 a similar offering is made, but this time it also honors the death of his father, mother, and his brothers William and Peter. (Ibid., no. 3657.) Between Theobald and William there was another brother, Henry, born Dec. 3, 1249, who upon Theobald’s death in 1270 becomes Henry III of Navarre, sixth count of Champagne, and rules for four years. At the time of Pope Urban’s letter Henry would have just become fourteen years old, also a proper time for studying the arts, but Lambert of Lagny is not mentioned as his teacher. 72.  That William may have been something of a handful is suggested by an entry in April 1263—he would have been twelve or thirteen—that says Brother James (or Giraud) of Valenciennes renounces his right to any action “against the relatives of the venerable William, brother of the King of Navarre” (contre les gens d’homme vénérable Guillaume, frer du roi de Navarre) for sickness (maladie) caused James (or Girard) by William. See Histoire des ducs, vol. 4, pt. 1, p. 344; and vol. 6 (1866), no. 3338. 73. See Les registres d’Urbain IV (1261–1264), ed. Jean Guiraud, vol. 4 (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Thorin & Fils, 1901), p. 385, no. 2332. It could be pointed out that up to the time of the Council of Trent benefices could be conferred on a tonsured cleric from the age of seven on, depending on the duty attached to the benefice. Obviously, if the celebration of Mass was required, the person would have to have been ordained a priest. 74.  Ibid., p. 388, no. 2344. Curiously, he is identified in this document as Canon of Sens and not as Treasurer of Sens. 75.  Ibid., p. 389, no. 2351. 76.  Both de Jubainville and the document of Urban IV indicate he was a cleric; that he was also Treasurer at Sens is attested to in the January 26, 1264, papal document. See Histoire des ducs, vol. 6 (1866), no. 3408; “Le traité,” p. 231, n. 14; and Les registres du Urbain IV, ed. Jean Guiraud, vol. 3 (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Thorin & Fils, 1901), p. 151, no. 1227. 77.  Les registres du Urbain IV, ed. Guiraud, p. 151, no. 1227; and p. 179, no. 1326. 78.  Ibid., p. 182, no. 1339. 79.  Ibid., p. 288, nos. 1835 and 1836. 80.  Ibid., p. 319, nos. 1988 and 1990. 81.  Ibid., p. 326, no. 2034. 82.  Alberto Zucchi, Roma domenicana: Note storiche (Florence: Revista Memorie Domenicane, 1943), p. 55, henceforth Roma domenicana. Penitentiaries were held in such high estimation, says Zucchi, that they were to be considered “prelates of the whole world” and



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were given diplomatic missions. Humbert of Romans, when master general of the order, proposed on the floor of the Council of Lyons that when conclaves took too much time electing a pope, the penitentiaries should be given a voice. Ibid. 83.  Ibid., pp. 44 and 54. 84.  “. . . that [the penitentiary] mercifully expedite and hear in the case of just petitions the poor having various kinds of business with the court, who because of their lack of means are sometimes rejected by some” (ut pauperes habentes in curia diversa negotia, qui propter indigentiam quandoque ab aliquibus repelluntur, misericorditer expediret, et in suis iustis petitionibus exaudiret). (Ibid., p. 45.) This was reported by Raymond de Montforte’s earliest biographer to have been said to Raymond by Pope Gregory IX when he made him a penitentiary. Ibid. 85.  Just how communal the life was seems to be a matter of some doubt. Zucchi quotes F. Sacchini, who says, “There was no sharing of life, but rather, with equal pay each handled his own domestic affairs privately in conformity with his own judgment” (nulla erat vitae communio, sed pari stipendiourm honore, suam privatim quisque domesticam rem pro suo arbitrio administrabant [sic]). Ibid., p. 56. 86.  Ibid., p. 71. Eventually all four major basilicas had penitentiaries associated with them. Over the years the Dominicans became assigned to St. Mary Major, the Franciscans to St. John Lateran, the Jesuits to St. Peter, and the Benedictines to St. Paul outside the walls. 87.  Ibid., pp. 55–56. 88.  Mandonnet points out that Dominicans were forbidden to ride horses. Catholic Encyclopedia, 1913, p. 357a. 89.  Roma domenicana, p. 60. Pius IV (1559–65), the next great reformer of the Sacred Penitentiary as it was then called, thought twelve was just right for St. Mary Major Basilica, but Pius V (1566–72) thought that number was “way too many” (nimis multum). Ibid., p. 108. 90.  Ibid., pp. 79–86. 91.  Ibid. Alessio (Logica, p. xxxi, n. 42) cites pp. 85–95 of Emil Göller’s Die päpstliche Pönitentiarie von Ihrem Ursprung bis zu Ihrer Umgestaltung unter Pius V, vol 1, Die päpsliche Pönitentiarie bis Eugen IV, Bibliothek des Kgl. Preussischen Historischen Instituts in Rom, vol. 3 (Rome: Verlag von Loescher, 1907) to show that Göller does not list Lambert among the major penitentiaries (paenitentiarii maiores) of the appropriate period in the thirteenth century. I would add that neither does his name appear when Göller lists the minor penitentiaries of that period on pp. 129–32. 92.  Roma domenicana, p. 82. 93.  P. Chouet, La Sacrèe Pénitencerie apostolique (Lyon, 1908), pp.  52–53; also in ­Logica, p. xxxii, n. 42. 94.  “On the Genuine Text,” p. 161. 95.  Zucchi gives a brief biography of the twenty-five Dominican penitentiaries in the thirteenth century. See Roma domenicana, pp. 78–86. 96.  De Rijk does not give a reason for his claim. For this and what follows immediately see his “On the Genuine Text,” p. 161.

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97.  “Episcopo Leodiensi mandat ut Arnoldum de Okieres, canonicum ecclesiae s. Bartholomaei Leodiensis, obtentu fratris Lamberti, hostiarii apostolici, in ecclesia s. Dionysii Leodiensis in canonicum cum praebenda recipi faciat, canonicatu s. Bartholomaei prius dimisso.” Orvieto, June 5, 1264. (Les registres d’Urbain IV, ed. Guiraud, p. xxxi, n. 41.) While the title “Apostolic Doorkeeper” (Ostiarius apostolicus) does tell us something about the status of this Brother Lambert, what is far more significant is that he has gained sufficient status in ecclesiastical circles to be requested to be the petitioner in such a request to the pope. 98.  “Still, one cannot exclude it, but it remains equally uncertain that the ‘Brother Lambert’ who becomes ‘Apostolic Doorkeeper’ at Liege in 1264 is to be identified with Lambert of Auxerre” (Non si può escludere, ancora, ma rimane parimenti incerto, che con Lamberto d’Auxere sia da identificarsi il ‘frater Lambertus’ che risulta ‘hostiarius apostolicus’ a Liege nel 1264). Logica, p. xxxi, n. 41. 99.  See R. Creytens, “Pierre de Tarentaise, professeur à Paris et prieur provincial de France,” in Beatus Innocentius PP. V (Petrus de Tarantasia O.P.): Studia et Documenta (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae, 1943), p. 99. The relevant part of the acta reads: “Fratris [sic] Bartholomaeo Turonensi, quia ordinationi Magistri de consensu suo factae et litteris suis praeceptoriis non obedivit, et quia in facto cujusdam testamenti fecit unum grave scandalum Ordini secutum, et quia in facto illius testamenti in excusationem suae culpae magistrum culpavit, sicut patuit nobis de praedictis per litteras dilectorum Fratrum Fratris Thomae, et Fratris Rachba, et Fratris Latini, et iterum per litteras Fratris Michaelis Prioris Insulensis et Fratris Lamberti Leeodiensis [sic], inquisitorum super iis deputatorum, injungimus ei duodecim dies in pane et aqua et sex psalteria, et privamus illum sigillo praedictionis generalis, et quod voce in omnibus tractatibus Ordinis sit privatus, et quod in Ordine non posit esse praelatus, nisi in omnibus his cum eo per generale capitulum fuerit dispensatum. Absolvimus etiam eum a vicaria quam ei commiserat Magister super Fratres qui vadunt cum crucesignatis ultra mare.” Histoire des dominicains, p. 597–98, n. 3. 100.  It is de Libera’s conclusion that the Summa Lamberti was “principally used within the studia of the Order of Preachers” (“Le traité,” p. 249). Alessio says it was “certainly” used up to the end of the thirteenth century in Dominican scholae in Perugia and Florence, “probably” in Padua, “without doubt” in Auxerre, and then in Franciscan convents allied (colligati) with the Dominicans at Auxerre such as St.-Aubin des Bois and Clairvaux. He also speaks of a university connection in the early fourteenth century that is “less certain,” given the prevailing presence of Peter of Spain’s Tractatus at the Sorbonne, Ave Maria, and Paris and in the fifteenth century at Prague. Logica, p. xxxii. 101.  “. . . it was by the gift and concession of the same Matilda that, around 1253, a (new?) Dominican schola was established on the grounds of an old Jewish cemetery” and “As far as we know of the structure of the Dominican convent scholae, such as was exactly that established at Auxerre in 1253” (“fu per dono e privilegio di Matilde stessa che attorno al 1253 fu edificata una [nuova?] schola domenicana sul terreno di un antico cimitero ebraico”) and “Per quanto conosciamo delle strutture delle scholae conventuali domenicane, quale era appunto quella edificata ad Auxerre nel 1253.” Logica, respectively, pp. xx and xxi. 102.  See, respectively, Histoire des dominicains, p. 353, and J. M. Reitzel, “The Medieval Houses of Bons-Enfants,” Viator 11 (1980): 179–207, esp. 179–92. See also Lebeuf, Mémoires



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concernant l’histoire civile et ecclésiastique d’Auxerre et de son ancien diocése, vol. 3 (Auxerre; Paris, 1855), p. 180; and vol. 4 (1855), p. 106, no. 183, henceforth Mémoires. 103.  By the end of the thirteenth century at Paris such houses were also established for these kinds of students at the university level. See J. M. Reitzel, “The Medieval Houses of Bons-Enfants,” Viator 11 (1980): 190. 104.  Histoire des dominicains, p. 353. 105.  “. . . and it was one of these Dominican masters normally qualified as ‘lectors on the new logic’ on whom the clear decisions of Dominican chapters (an example of which goes back to 1236) imposed a double course of logic (‘the younger and capable brothers are to be instructed in logic’) for the formation of the young Preachers” (e che fu dunque uno di quei maestri domenicani normalmente qualificati come ‘lectores logicae novae’ a cui precise delibere capitolari domenicane [esemplare quella risalente al 1236] imponevano per la formazione dei giovani Predicatori un doppio corso di logica [‘fratres iuniores et docibles in logicalibus instruantur’]). Logica, pp. xxi–xxii. 106.  Paris, 1884. Alessio’s reference is stated as “p. 7 e ss. e passim” of that work. 107.  For this and what follows immediately see Logica, pp. xvi–xx. 108.  “We know that Pignon’s Catalogue [of Brothers Who Were Famous Because of Their Teachings] limited itself to a pure and simple integration and retouching of the anonymous Tabula Scriptorum Ordinis Praedicatorum or Stams’s Catalogue [of Famous Dominicans] (kept up until 1311); but we are in a position to see that the source, of which the Dominican Lawrence Pignon—Bishop of Auxerre until 1439—had to make use, cannot be other than the Monumenta of the Dominican Convent of Auxerre” (Noi sappiamo che il Catalogo ­Pignon si limita a pure e semplici integrazione e ritocchi della anonima Tabula scriptorum ordinis Praedicatorum o Catalogo di Stams [condotta sino al 1311]; ma siamo in condizione di vedere che la fonte, di cui il domenicano Lorenzo Pignon—Vescovo di Auxerre sino al 1439—deve essersi servito, non può essere altra che i Monumenta del convento domenicano di Auxerre). Logica, p. xviii. 109.  “Fr. Lambertus de Antissiodoro scripsit summam logicalem, quae dicitur ‘Summa La[m]berti.’” Laurent Pignon, Catalogus fratrum qui claruerunt doctrina, in G. G. Meersseman, ed., Catalogi et Chronica Accedunt Catalogi Stamsensis et Upsalensis Scriptorum O. P. (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae, 1936), p. 31, no. 95; also in Logica, p. xvii. 110.  Chapotin says the Liber de illustribus was kept up to date until the sixteenth century. Histoire des dominicains, p. 348, n. 1. 111.  “Brother Lambert, Father and magister ingeniosus of this Convent, who in his time dedicated himself to study, excelled his contemporaries in native ability and left to pos­ terity a praiseworthy work. Hence, he composed a summa on the books of Aristotle, which from then to modern times is called the Summa Lamberti” (Lambertus, huius Conventus pater et magister ingeniosus; qui temporibus suis operam dedit studio: sic suos coetaneos ingenio excellevit; operam [sic] laude dignam relinquit posteris: unde summam super libros philosophi composuit, quam abhuc modernis diebus Summa Lamberti nuncupatur.) D. G. Viole, Histoire des églises d’Auxerre, MS 155, Bibliothèque de la Ville d’Auxerre, fol. 1110, henceforth Histoire des églises, as quoted in Logica, p. xviii, n. 15.

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112.  Viole writes, “Lambert is indicated [Alessio inserts “namely, in the Liber de illustribus = Monumenta”] first after the above mentioned bishops, generals, and provincials. In his capacity as teacher he is among the more renowned for having composed a summa on philosophy on the books of Aristotle, called Summa Lamberti. And if that is what I once saw under that title among the manuscripts of the Library of the Abby of St. Peter of Chartres in Beausse, the author is from a long time ago and the script is that of four hundred years ago or thereabout. But then it has to be that the teacher Lambert was among the first Jacobins of the Convent of Auxerre” (Lambert est marqué le premier après les susdit Evesques Generals et Provinciaux en qualité de docteur des plus renommés pour avoir composé une Somme de Philosophie sur les livres d’Aristote, appellée Summa Lamberti; et si c’este celle que j’ay veu autrefois sous ce titre parmy les manuscripts de la Bibliothécque de l’Abbaye de St. Pére de Chartres en Beausse, l’autheur en est ancien, le caractere forman est ce de quattre cens ans ou environ; car ainsi il faut que le docteur Lambert ait esté de[s] premiers Jacobins du Couvent d’Auxerre). Histoire des églises d’Auxerre, as noted in Logica, p. xviii. 113.  “Frater Lambertus de Autissiodoro Gallus Burgundus laudatur a nostro Laurentio Pignon in suo Scriptorum ordinis catalogo no. 92 diciturque scripsisse Summam Logicalem quae etiam dicitur Summa Lamberti. Qui loquendi modus sua aetate celebrem fuisse indicat. In monumentis domus nostrae Autissiodorensis mihi commodatis idem habetur et additur hunc ex primis et antiquioribus eius domus sodalibus fuisse, qui proinde saeculo XIII floruerit, cum anno MCCXL ea domus erecta fuerit.” Jacques Quétif and Jacques Echard, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Recenciti, Notisque Historicis Et Criticis Illustrati, vol. 1 [Paris, 1719–21], p. 906; also in Logica, p. xvii, where Alessio correctly points out that the number of the entry in Pignon’s Catalogue is 95, not 92. 114.  Mémoires, vol. 4, p. 393, n. 2; and Logica, p. xix. 115.  Histoire des dominicains, p. 354. 116.  “Il n’est pas sans intéret de placer, à côté du récit fait par le prieur d’Auxerre et recueilli par Gérard de Frachet, les termes memes du Livre des Illustres: ‘ . . . Guillelmus de Noa . . . hujus civitatis ecclesiae cathedralis canonicus. . . . Ipse vero fratres hujus conventus videns degentes in principio insititutionis ordinis . . .’ .” Ibid., pp. 354–55, n. 2. 117.  “In the absence of any comparable document pertaining to Lambert of Ligny, it seems to us that the only possible hypothesis (however fragile) is to consider that the author of the Summa Lamberti is master Lambert of Lagny” (En l’absence de tout document comparable, relatif à Lambert de Ligny, il nous semble que la seule hypothèse possible [quoique précaire] est de considérer que l’auteur de la Summa Lamberti est ‘Maitre Lambert de Lagny’). “Le traité,” p. 231. 118.  For the quotation see above, n. 52. 119.  “Le traité,” respectively, pp. 235 and 249: “. . . qui était devenue entre temps l’un des premiers dominicains d’Auxerre.” 120.  Histoire des dominicains, p. 348, n. 1. Simon Tugwell informs me that he and the librarian of the Dominican archives in Rome, after a thorough search, were unable to find the “certain extracts” to which Chapotin refers. Simon Tugwell, letter to author, Rome, Janu­ ary 14, 2007.



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121.  I am indebted to Simon Tugwell for calling my attention to this work, and he cites it as Archivio generalizio dell’Ordine dei Predicatori XIV lib. S 521–30. 122.  The reference is to Les dominicains d’Auxerre (Paris, 1892), p. 27, n. 3. 123.  I am indebted to Simon Tugwell for the information pertaining to the second document. Simon Tugwell, letter to author, Rome, January 14, 2007. 124. See Gallia Christiana in provincias ecclesiasticas distributa: qua series et historia archiepiscoporum, episcoporum, et abbatum franciae vicinarumque ditionum ab origine ecclesiarum ad nostra tempora deducitur et probatur ex authenticis instrumentis ad calcem positis (Farnsborough [Hants], U.K.: Greg International, 1970), instrumentum 179–80. I am in­ debted to Simon Tugwell for calling my attention to this. 125. Ibid. 126.  See above, n. 25. 127.  “Again one finds among the first Religious of that convent Brother Lambert, who passed all his life in study; he was called Magister Ingeniosus and composed a summa on the works of Aristotle which today is called the Summa Lamberti” (On trouve encor entre les premiers Religieux de ce couvent Frère Lambert qui employa toute sa vie à l’etude; on le surnomme Magister Ingeniosus, il composa une somme sur les livres d’Aristote qu’on appelle aujourduy Summa Lamberti). Archivio generalizio dell’Ordine dei Predicatori XIV lib. S 523. 128.  Marian Michèle Mulchahey, “First the Bow Is Bent in Study”: Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), henceforth Mul­ chahey. 129.  Mulchahey, p. 244 and n. 93. Although de Rijk identified Peter as a Portuguese, he is now taken to be a Spanish Dominican. See Angel d’Ors, “Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum,” Vivarium 35 (1997): 21–71; “Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (II): Further Documents and Problems,” Vivarium 39 (2001): 209–54; and “Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (III): ‘Petrus Alfonsi’ or ‘Petrus Ferrandi’?,” Vivarium 41 (2003): 249–303. 130.  “. . . and it is there [Paris] that he edited his text for publication in the 1250s.” (Mulchahey, p. 245, n. 93.) A little earlier in the book she speaks of the Summa as having joined Peter’s Tractatus on the continent “by the 1250s.” (Ibid., p. 240.) But the latter claim would seem to conflict with her claim that the work was written for Theobald II, since he would not have been Lambert’s student until the early 1250s. The other claim would not necessarily pose a conflict but would require that Lambert of Lagny be in Paris in the late 1250s, a period somewhat earlier than the years 1263–65 designated by de Jubainville. 131.  One needs to keep clear, for what follows, the difference between two of the types of Dominican schools described earlier, the schola and the studium. (See above, n. 14.) Mulchahey’s reference here is to a studium, the educational program in the arts (logic) conducted at the provincial, not local, level. 132.  Mulchahey, respectively, pp. 54–71 and 220–38. 133.  Ibid., p. 54. 134.  Ibid., p. 55. 135.  Ibid., pp. 55–56.

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136.  Ibid., p.  59. Even though Mandonnet can be seen to say “the Preachers made study their chief occupation, which was the essential means [to achieving the goals of the Order], with preaching and teaching as the end,” one can get a further impression of what Mulchahey is reporting from the following, written by Humbert of Romans, fifth master general (1254–63), himself a master and a moderate reformer. Speaking of the value of education in his Expositio Regulae B. Augustini but wishing to warn of its pitfalls, he says: “And so it is clear that that sort of study is reprehensible which treats either of what is too high, or too subtle, or what exceeds one’s competency, or the curious, or the new, or things that are too numerous, or because [it proceeds] too vaguely, or one lectures cursim, or because nothing is retained in the heart, or because one is detained too much therein, or because [good] deeds do not grow along with knowledge, or because study is not directed to a worthy end: all of which religious persons, the more they ought to exhibit themselves as irreprehensible, the more they ought be wary” (Sic igitur patet quod studium est reprehensibile qui versatur vel circa nimis alta, vel circa nimis subtilia, vel circa vires excedentia, vel circa curiosa, vel circa nova, vel circa nimis multa, vel quia nimis vage, vel quia cursim legitur, vel quia nihil cordetenus retinetur, vel nimis ibidem homo detinetur, vel quia cum scientia non crescunt opera, vel quia non ordinatur studium ad finem debitum: quae viri religiosi tanto magis cavere debent quanto magis debent se in omnibus irreprehensibiles exhibere). (Respectively, Catholic Encyclopedia, 1913, p. 357a; and B. Humberti de Romanis Opera, vol. 1, De vita regulari 4.148, ed. Joachim Joseph Berthier [Rome, 1888], p. 448.9–16.) To put the above in perspective, however, one should note that just prior to it Humbert offers seven reasons why the study of philosophy is useful: for the defense of the faith, the destruction of errors, an understanding of the scriptures, corroboration of the faith, the sharpening of the mind (acutio ingenii), motivation for virtue, and for the honor of the order. (See B. Humberti de Romanis Opera, vol. 1, De vita regulari, pp. 435.20–438.28.) In Humbert himself, then, we can see the debate that was going on within the order in the 1250s. Humbert’s solution is to allow only those friars “who have a vast capacity and a great aptitude” for grasping philosophy to study that science. Mulchahey, p. 231. 137.  Mulchahey, pp. 226–27. 138.  Ibid., p. 227. 139.  Ibid., p. 228. 140.  During this period, Mulchahey warns, Dominican officials made a clear distinction between logic and the other branches of philosophy, and one should understand any reference to the arts by such officials in this period as a reference only to logic. Roland of Cremona had introduced a distinction between the necessary tools of logic and the less than necessary tool of natural philosophy; others in the 1240s utilized a similar distinction between logic and the other disciplines. See Mulchahey, p. 228. 141.  Mulchahey explains that one reason for this is the fact that most of the recruiting missions were to cities, such as Bologna and Liège, which had no schools of theology whose faculty could be recruited. Mulchahey, p. 70. 142.  Ibid., p. 60. 143.  Ibid., pp. 68–69.



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144.  Ibid., p. 70. 145.  Ibid., pp. 59–60. 146.  Ibid., p. 62. She says that he may also be reacting to Gregory IX’s recent letter to the theological masters at Paris urging them not to corrupt their teachings with philosophy. Ibid., pp. 64–66. 147.  For the quotation see above, n. 105. I find no reference to it by Mulchahey. 148.  Mulchahey, p. 220, “When receiving [a candidate], let no one be given hope of studying the arts” (Item, nulli recipiendo detur spes quod ponatur ad artes); and Acta Capitulorum Provincialium, p. 28. 149.  Mulchahey, p. 228. 150.  Interestingly, it is Humbert of Romans who is prior of the province of Rome at this time and who presumably gave the permission to study the books on logic and ethics. Ibid., pp. 229–30. 151.  Ibid., p. 229. 152.  “Again, let every convent reserve the first available bible for the students who in the present chapter have been selected to study in the arts with the permission of the master [general]” (Item, studentibus qui in presenti capitulo assumpti sunt ad studendum in artibus de licencia Magistri, quilibet conventus reservet primam bibliam vaccantem). Acta Capitulorum Provincialium, p. 20. 153.  Mulchahey, p. 220. 154.  “Concedimus universis prioribus conventualibus ut si aliquos habent idoneos, quod faciant eis legi de artibus in suis conventibus.” Acta Capitulorum Provincialium, p. 40; Logica, p. xxi (with a slight variant in the text: “prioribus et conventibus” for “prioribus conventualibus”); and Mulchahey, p. 221, n. 4. 155.  Mulchahey, p. 221. These were followed in 1256 by four additional ones in Provence, and by 1269 the province had ten such studia, each rotating among three convents, with the result that all the convents in the province were involved. 156.  Acta Capitulorum Provincialium, p. 46. 157.  Ibid., p. 67; Mulchahey, p. 221. The Latin name of the second city mentioned here is Caturcum. Mulchahey takes it to be Chorges, but the Acta in 1244 use it for Cahors. See Acta Capitulorum Provincialium, p. 26. 158.  Mulchahey, p. 222. 159.  Ibid., p.  233; Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, vol. 3, ed. Benedict Marie Reichert, vol. 1, Acta Capitulorum Generalium ab Anno 1220 usque ad Annum 1303, ed. Andrew Frühwirth (Rome: S. C. Propaganda Fide, 1898), p. 109. 160.  Mulchahey, p. 238. 161.  For the distinction between a schola and a studium see above, n. 14. 162.  I suspect, however, that she would reply that such a failure to utilize the talents of its own recruits seems now counterintuitive only for someone who has not yet grasped just how unsure so many of the Dominicans were at that time about the usefulness of logic for friars whose principal concern should be theology and scripture. 163.  Maloney, “Who Is the Author of the Summa Lamberti?”

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164.  While both scenarios are possible in that neither rests on anything that is clearly contradicted by any of the historical sources, Kaeppeli’s identification of Lambert of Auxerre, Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtal, and Lambert of Lagny as the same person can no longer be sustained. 165.  Grabmann: “I, on the other hand, tend more to believe that Lambert of Auxerre brazenly used Petrus Hispanus” (Ich neige umgekehrt mehr der Meinung zu, dass Lambert von Auxerre eher den Petrus Hispanus benützt hat). (Handschriftliche Forschungen und Funde zu den philosophischen Schriften des Petrus Hispanus, des späteren Papstes Johannes XXI, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-­ historische Abteilung, Heft 9 [Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1936], pp. 30–31 and 42.) Konstanty Michalski: “it is necessary to note that the Summulae Logicae of Peter of Spain are not an original work: they are born from the juxtaposition of propositions taken almost word for word from the Summa of Lambert of Auxerre” (il faut noter d’abord que les Summulae Logicae de Pierre d’Espagne ne sont pas une oeuvre originale: elles sont nées de juxtaposition de propositions tirées presque toujours textuellement de la Summa de Lambert d’Auxerre). (“Les courants philosophiques à Oxford et à Paris pendant le XVI siècle,” Bulletin internationale de l’Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres, Classe d’histoire et de philosophie [Cracovie: Imprimerie de l’Université, 1920], p. 61; also in Logica, xxiv and xxvii.) And Sinkler: “Roger’s discussion seems to me to result from his attempt to improve on Lambert’s account of the nature of the compounded/ divided ambiguity by working out that account in more detail.” See “Roger Bacon on the Compounded and Divided Senses,” in Lewry, The Rise of British Logic, p. 146; also in de Libera, “De la logique à la grammaire: Remarques sur la théorie de la determinatio chez Roger Bacon et Lambert d’Auxerre (Lambert de Lagny),” in De Ortu Grammaticae: Studies in Medieval Grammar and Linguistic Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. G. L. BursillHall, Sten Ebbesen, and Konrad Koerner, Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, vol. 43 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990), p. 219, henceforth “De la logique à la grammaire.” 166.  Logica, pp. xxv–xxvi and xxviii. 167.  Tractatus, pp. lxxx–lxxxiv. 168.  “Le traité,” pp. 233 and 249. 169.  For what follows see “Le traité,” pp. 234–35. 170.  Chapotin speaks of Lambert as having been a student at Paris, but Alessio rejects this because of the lack of documentation to support it. (Les dominicains d’Auxerre [Paris, 1892], p. 27, as cited in Logica, p. xix, n. 19.) Alessio also references Chapotin’s Histoire des dominicains, p. 354, but I find no mention of the issue there. 171.  Sinkler, “Roger Bacon on the Compounded and Divided Senses,” p. 146. 172.  Ibid.; also in de Libera, “De la logique à la grammaire,” p. 219. 173.  “Holding the work of Lambert to be later than that of Roger . . . , we are for our part inclined to think that the two theories pertain to the same group of doctrines” (­ Tenant l’oervre de Lambert pour postérieure à celle de Roger . . . , nous sommes quant à nous enclin à penser que les deux theories appartiennent à un meme univers de doctrines). “De la logique à la grammaire,” p. 219.



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174.  Ibid., pp. 219–20. 175. Ibid. 176. See Logica, pp. xxxiii–lvi. 177.  Ibid., p. lvi. 178.  Ibid., p. lxiii. 179.  See end of Appendix A, this volume. 180.  In both Alessio’s and de Libera’s editions one finds “petitio” where one would expect “positio” in the sentence: “Appellation in this [second] sense is nothing but a petitio of a common nature.” (Respectively, Logica, pp. 251.12–252.1, and “Le traité,” p. 211.41; translation 1217.) Three MSS have “participatio.” Just what a term would be doing were it to petition a common nature is unclear. The translation emends the text and footnotes the emendation. 181.  MS Troyes, Bibl. Comm. Cod. 2402, fols. 1ra–96rb. On fol. 95rb one reads: “Conversion and the explanation of quantity is sufficiently clear from the preceding rules. Predicables follow. In the year of our Lord 1281.” Logica, respectively, pp. xxxiii and lxii. 182.  For this and the quotations that immediately follow see Logica, pp. lxi–lxii. 183.  One may find a superb English translation of chapter 8 of Alessio’s edition of the Logica (on the properties of terms) in Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 113–33. 184.  See “Le traité,” p. 256.14 and p. 1226 in the translation. 185.  “Le traité,” p. 251.1–2. 186.  Albert J. Judy, ed., Robert Kilwardby: De ortu scientiarum (London: British Academy, 1976). The numbers run from 1 to 670. Chapter One.  Propositions 1.  What are the “things” the knowledge of which is said to be useful for understanding the arts? Since there is no clear division in chapter 1, one could make a case for what is discussed in 1–24, 1–46, or 1–73. The sole criterion is that they must be useful for any of the arts and not just logic. It may, however, be the case that all of chapter 1 is intended as introductory, as is the case in Nicholas of Paris’s Summe Metenses where, at the end of chapter 1, after a discussion of roughly the same material as found in Lambert’s first chapter, he says, “Having seen the introductory things, one must now look at suppositions.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 454. 2.  L. M. de Rijk describes five definitions of ‘art’ used in the Middle Ages, and Lambert’s use of ‘paths’ (viae) plays prominently in the second of them. This use of ‘paths’, de Rijk says, is an adaptation from Ps.-Cicero Ad herennium 1.1: “Art is a kind of rule that conveys a clear path to, and an explanation of, how to accomplish something” (Ars est preceptio quedam que dat certam viam rationemque faciendi aliquid). LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 172. 3.  This (second) definition of ‘art’ as “a collection of many precepts leading to one goal” was frequently used in the medieval period, and as far as I know its source is still uncertain. De Rijk notes it is found in the treatise on logic Ut dicit, the Parisian treatise in B. N. lat., 15.170, the Cum sit nostra, Roger Bacon’s Summulae dialectices, and the theological

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Summa Alexandri Halensis. See, respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp.  172–73; vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 379.2–3; ibid., p. 417.9–10; Sd Prologue 2, trans. Maloney, 1; and vol. 4 (Quarrachi, 1924), p. 322b. 4.  Alain de Libera notes that this derivation of ‘ars’ from ‘arto’ is found in the Metalogicon of John of Salisbury, the De divisione philosophiae of Gundissalinus, and the Liber introductorius of Michael the Scot. See, respectively, Metalogicon 1, n. 12, ed. Webb (Oxford, 1929), p. 31.1–2; De divisione philosophiae, ed. Bauer, p. 44.18–45.4; and Liber introductorius, MS Paris B. Nat. lat., n.a.l. 1401, fol. 32vb: “Nam ars dicitur ab arceo, -ces, vel ab arto, -as, que verba accipiuntur in significatione pro constringere,” cited by Gauthier, “Notes sur Siger de Brabant (fin) II: Siger en 1271–1275; Aubry de Reims et la scission des Normands,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 68 (1984): 41, ad 270, as cited in de Libera, Sd, pp. 152–53. 5.  This literary device is called antonomasia, and in virtue of it one readily finds ­Aristotle spoken of as “the philosopher” and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) as “the commentator.” 6.  “Logica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum qua aperta omnes aperiuntur et qua clausa omnes alie clauduntur, sine qua nulla, cum qua quelibet.” Logica, p. 4.35–37. 7. Boethius De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1173C, trans. Stump, p. 29. 8.  While Peter of Spain also provides this definition of ‘dialectic’, most draw in one way or another more directly on that in Augustine’s De ordine: “When, therefore, would one move to construct other things, unless one would first distinguish, note, set out, and project the discipline of disciplines, which they call dialectic, as one’s very own sort of device and instrument? This teaches one to teach, this teaches one to distinguish; in this very [discipline] reason demonstrates and makes known what it is, what it desires, for what it is useful. It knows how to know; it alone not only desires, but is able, to make people know” (Quando ergo transiret ad alia fabricanda nisi ipsa sua prius quasi quaedam machinamenta et instrumenta distingueret notaret digeret proderetque ipsam disciplinam disciplinarum, quam dialecticam uocant? Haec docet docere, haec docet discere; in hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat atque aperit, quae sit, quid uelit, quid ualeat. Scit scire, sola scientes facere non solum uult sed etiam potest). (Respectively, Tractatus 1.1; and De ordine 22.13, n. 18, ed. R. P. H. Green, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, vol. 29 [Turnholt: Brepols, 1953], p. 128.5–11.) Cf., e.g., Introductiones Parisienses: “Or, as Augustine says: dialectic is the art of arts, the science of sciences, without which there is no [art/science]” (Vel, sicut dicit Augustinus: Dialectica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, sine qua nulla). LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 357.7–8. 9.  This is the etymology presented by Peter of Spain and Roger Bacon but not by William of Sherwood; henceforth, Peter, Bacon, and William. See Tractatus 1.1; and Sd Prologue, 21, trans. Maloney, 6. 10.  On this distinction see Pierre Michaud-Quantin, “L’Emploi des termes logica et dialectica au moyen age,” in Artes libéraux et philosophie au moyen age, Actes du Quatrième Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale, Université de Montréal, Canada, 27 ­August–2 September 1967 (Montréal: Institut d’Études Médiévales; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1969). Lambert’s comparison and its rationale are not made by William, Peter, or Bacon.



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11.  The temporal division between the new and the old logic was roughly the middle of the twelfth century when Latin translations of the other works of Aristotle began to appear. Yet even before this there were works besides those mentioned by Lambert that comprised what was to be called “the old logic”: Boethius’s and Marius Victorinus’s translations of Porphyry’s Isagoge (Introduction) to the Categories of Aristotle; two commentaries by Boethius on that work, along with his commentaries on Aristotle’s On Interpretation and Cicero’s Topics; and several works by Boethius: Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos, De syllogismo categorico, De syllogismis hypotheticis, De differentiis topicis, and De divisionibus. 12.  Lambert’s distinction seems to be that between a well-organized body of principles (science) and the use of those principles (art). (See also 23.) Bacon seems to want to employ the same grounds for a distinction between logic as a science and logic as an art but fails to do so since both end up being the exercise of the principles, and logic as an art is also said to be a science: logic as a science is “the habit of distinguishing what is true from what is false by means of rules or maxims or dignities,” and logic as an art is “reason attentively discerning, that is, the careful science of disputing.” Sd Prologue 11 and 19, trans. Maloney, 3 and 6. 13.  William’s and Peter’s introductory material is roughly equivalent to Lambert’s, but Bacon comments on several issues not directly addressed by them. Thus, Bacon discusses the two kinds of arts and science (liberal and mechanical), four requirements of logic as a science, seven things investigated by logic as an art, logic as philosophy and as the instrument of philosophy, and instruction on how to begin the study of logic. See Sd Prologue, trans. Maloney, 1–8 passim. 14.  For parallel treatments of this topic in thirteenth-century textbooks on logic see those of William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.1.1–1.1.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 22–23; Tractatus 1.2; and Sd 2.4–23, trans. Maloney, 111–18. William, Peter, and Lambert all move from instruction on what logic and dialectic are to a few comments on the nature of statements as a way to explain why one would next take up the issue of the elements of statements (words) that are ultimately sounds. Bacon, however, goes directly to a consideration of the five predicables, postponing his discussions of sounds to the beginning of Part Two: Statements. See, respectively, Introductiones 1.0–1.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 21–22; Tractatus 1.1–2; and Sd Prologue 1.1, trans. Maloney, 1. Lambert, William, and Peter follow the same order that Nicholas of Paris presents. See Summe Metenses 1, LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 452. 15.  The usual examples of nonvocal sounds like the crashing of trees and footsteps are provided by William, Peter, and Bacon. See, respectively, Introductiones 1.1.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 22; Tractatus 1.2; and Sd 2.8, trans. Maloney, 113. 16.  For the notions of genus and differentiae see 291 and 325, respectively. 17.  The source for such anatomical specificity may be Boethius: “An utterance is the percussion of air by the tongue which is produced by an animal through certain parts of the throat which are called passages” (Vox est aeris per linguam perccussio, quae per quasdam gutturis partes, quae arteriae vocantur, ab animali profertur). In librum Aristotelis perihermeneias 1, 2nd ed., ed. Karl Meiser, in GRP, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 4.18–20. See also LM, vol. 2, pt. 2: Ut dicit, p. 380.8–11; Cum sit nostra, p. 418.3; and Introductiones Parisienses, p. 357.28–29.

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18.  The distinction intended here is that between instinctive vocal sounds and human language. For the notion of signifying at one’s pleasure see 37–40. 19.  Bacon has much more to say on natural vocal signification than do William, Peter, or Lambert, and even discusses the notion of animals communicating within their species. See his Sd 2.10–23, trans. Maloney, 114–18; and Compendium studii theologiae 2.36, ed. and trans. Thomas S. Maloney, Roger Bacon: Compendium of the Study of Theology, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 20 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), henceforth Cst, followed by paragraph number. 20.  In translations of medieval texts human language is said to consist of conventional or arbitrary signs (signa ad placitum) to emphasize that it takes root in a social context where people agree in some broad sense to use certain (vocal) sounds to convey thought to others. And indeed one could point to a work by Augustine well known at this time, his De doctrina christiana, to justify a claim that medievals had such a social context in mind when they pondered how words get attached to things: “Therefore just as all of these significations move men’s minds in accordance with the consent of their societies, and because this consent varies, they move them differently, nor do men agree upon them because of an innate value, but they have a value because they are agreed upon” (Sicut ergo hae omnes significationes pro suae cuiusque societatis consensione animos mouent et, quia diuersa consensio est, diuerse mouent, nec ideo consenserunt in eas homines, quia iam ualebant ad significationem, sed ideo ualent, quia consenserunt in eas). (2.24.37, ed. Josef Martin, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, vol. 32 [Tournai: Brepols, 1962], p. 60.19–22; trans. D. Robertson Jr., St Augustine: On Christian Doctrine [New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958], pp. 60–61.) But J. Engels has studied the relevant texts and concludes that Boethius had a greater impact on medievals on this issue than Augustine did. He concludes, “A curious fact: whereas the definition of a sign formulated by Augustine passed down through the Middle Ages, the collective aspect of the linguistic sign, although pointed out by him, has been almost eclipsed by the Boethian ‘ad placitum’. ” (“La doctrine du signe chez saint Augustine,” in Studia Patristica, vol. 6, ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, vol. 81 [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1962], p. 373.) For Boethius naming was an exercise of the will freely making choices, and there is little nod toward a social, interactive context: “That alone with merit will be called a name which they who were imposing names for things first uttered as a word. For who first imposed the name ‘circus’ for a circus seems to have spoken this way: ‘Let this be called “circus”’. And so this first case is called the nominative because it is a name” (Quod enim primus vocabulum nomina rebus imponentes dixerunt, id solum nomen vocabitur merito. Qui enim prius circo circum nomen imposuit, ita dixisse videtur, Dicatur hoc circus. Atque ideo primus hic casus nominativus vocatur, quod nomen sit). (De syllogismo categorico libri duo 1, PL 64.796A.) Priscian also betrays the paradigmatic mode of naming: “That is direct which is called nominative, for through it naming occurs, as in ‘Let this one be named “Homer,” that one “Virgil”’” (Est autem rectus, qui et nominativus dicitur. Per ipsum enim nominatio fit, ut nominetur iste Homerus, ille Virgilius). (Institutiones 5.72, GL, 2, p. 185.11–12.) My suspicion is that Lambert’s use of ‘ad placitum’ had more of a Boethian than Augustinian ring to it—see below, especially 55—and so I translate the phrase literally instead of by ‘­conventional’. For Engels’s full text see “La doctrine du signe,”



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pp. 366–73; and also his “Origine, sens et survie du terme boecien ‘secundum placitum’,” Vivarium 1 (1963): 87–114. 21. Aristotle Physics 2.192b1 ff. 22. The significatum of a word is roughly the meaning of the word. But because ‘meaning’ and ‘signification’ do not have exactly the same meaning, I am anglicizing the Latin ‘significatum’ to indicate that it is a term with a technical meaning. 23.  “Imposing words to signify” is the medieval way of talking about the way words become associated with extralinguistic things. Adam, explicitly creating names for all the creatures of the world, is a sort of paradigm for the way in which names get attached to things, although Boethius’s reference to the first person to call a circus by the name ‘circus’ is a more proximate source. (De syllogismo hypothetico libri duo 1, PL 64.796A.) Bacon also makes reference to the naming of infants at baptism and the naming of pets. See his Cst 97. If we read this paragraph (39) in the light of Physics 2.1, Lambert seems to want to respond that, just as heat is an unchangeable feature of nature called fire and yet can bring about many changes in nature such as the burning of logs, so will is an unchangeable feature of nature called man and yet can bring about many changes in nature such as the impositions of names, a rational (free) act. 24.  For the example of ‘homo’ see Isidore Etymologiae sive Origines XI.I.4, in Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum Libri XX, ed. W. M. Lindsay, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911; reprinted 1957, 1962); for that of ‘lapis’ see ibid., XVI.III.1 ff. A different type of example could be onomatopoetic words. 25. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64.797B. 26.  For other discussions of names (nouns) and verbs see Aristotle On Interpretation 2–3; and William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.1.3–4, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 23–24; Tractatus 1.4–5; and Sd 2.29–81, trans. Maloney, 122–36. 27.  “The only two parts to be thought of are the name and the verb, for the others are not parts but additions to an expression. For just as the bridle and cinch are not parts of a four-horse team but are in a certain sense bindings and, as has been said, additions are also not parts, so connectives and prepositions and other suchlike are not parts of an expression but things that bind [the parts] together” (Nomen et verbum duae solae partes sunt putandae. Caeterae enim non partes, sed orationis supplementa sunt: ut enim quadrigarum frena vel lora non partes, sed quaedam quodammodo ligaturae sunt et, ut dictum est, supplementa non etiam partes, sic conjunctiones et praepositiones et alia hujusmodi non partes orationis sunt, sed quaedam colligamenta). (Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64.796D.) Adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns are classified as names, and interjections as adverbs. Here and in the succeeding lines Lambert will distinguish oratio in the grammatical sense (having eight parts) and the logical sense (having two parts). In the translation I try to remain faithful to these two senses of the term and translate ‘oratio’ by ‘speech’ when Lambert is using it as a grammarian would and by ‘expression’ when the logician’s sense is at issue. 28.  For the quotation Alessio cites Institutiones grammaticae 17.10, GL, vol. 3, p. 114.18– 20, but in that context Priscian is speaking of prepositions and connectives. Elsewhere

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­ risican points to the names of numbers from four to one hundred, ‘mille’ (thousand), the P letters of the alphabet, adverbs, and interjections as examples of indeclinable names in Latin. See ibid., vol. 2, p. 184.16–18; and vol. 3, p. 60.1. 29.  William says these signify time but “not by means of tense” (non per modum temporis). Introductiones 1.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, p. 24. 30.  The term used as an example in the text is ‘magister’ (teacher), which breaks down into ‘magis’ (more) and ‘ter’ (thricely), but obviously it cannot be used to illustrate the point in English. As will be seen, the response to this objection lacks the precision it needs. ‘So’ and ‘up’ when taken outside the word ‘soup’ do signify something, but what they signify outside their combination in ‘soup’ is not what they signify when combined in it, and that is what differentiates them from names in an expression, which signify the same thing within and without the combination in an expression. 31. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64.795B. Bacon has a lengthier digression on infinite names and points to Boethius’s claim in his In librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias that ‘nonman’ signifies something, but the something is the indefinite something that man is not: “Cum vero dico non homo, significo quidem quiddam, id quod homo non est, sed hoc infinitum.” (2nd ed., ed. Meiser, in GRP, vol. 5.2, p. 62.3–5.) Among Bacon’s comments are the following: (1) infinite names can be said to posit nothing since what they do signify or give to be understood is common to both entities and nonentities; (2) a negation such as ‘not man’ differs from an infinitization such as ‘nonman’ (or ‘not-man’) in that the former conveys nothing to be understood whereas by the latter both entities and nonentities can be understood; (3) some terms like ‘entity’, ‘one’, and ‘something’ cannot be made infinite because they would then posit nothing because of the scope of what each signifies, along with adjectives, pronouns, signs such as nemo, connectives, some adverbs (‘well’ and the like are exceptions), and interjections. See Sd 2.31–40, trans. Maloney, ­123–25. 32. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64.795D. This analysis is unique to Lambert among the four contemporaries. 33.  The distinction between direct and oblique names is that between names in the nominative and vocative (and sometimes accusative) cases in Latin and names in all other cases. 34. Aristotle On Interpretation 2.16a34–16b1; and Boethius In librum Aristotelis perihermeneias, ed. Meiser, GRP, vol. 5.2, p. 63.18–19. 35.  See Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo 1, PL 64.795D: “For every name, when it is joined to a verb, indicates something either true or false” (Omne enim nomen junctum cum est verbo, aut verum aut falsum demonstrat). 36. Aristotle On Interpretation 3.16b10–15. 37.  Bacon agrees with Boethius that any use of an infinite verb in an expression effects a negative expression. Boethius says, “Infinite verbs which have been joined [to subjects] in a proposition produce not an affirmation but a negation. . . . For negation is always produced from an infinite verb” (Verba vero quae sint infinita iuncta in propositione non adfirmationem, sed perficere negationem. . . . Semper enim fit infinito verbo negatio). (Sd 2.61, trans. Maloney, 132; and In librum Aristotelis pereihermeneias, ed. Meiser, GRP, vol. 5.2, p. 258.16–21.) Against this theory see Albert the Great, Liber 1 Perihermeneias, Tractatus 3,



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chap. 2, ed. Augustus Borgnet, Opera Omnia, vol. 1 (Paris: Vives, 1890), p. 403b; and Henry of Ghent, which latter acknowledges that some say that one may not use an infinite verb in an expression, and responds, “But this is simply false, because they are brought to this by their inability to distinguish between a negation that renders a verb infinite and one that makes an expression negative” (Sed hoc simpliciter falsum est, quia moventur eoquod nesciunt distinguere inter negationem infinitantem verbum et facientem orationem negativam, quarum distinctio patet ex predictis). (De 13de Eeuwse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen: Inleidende Studie en Uitgave van Nicolaas van Parijs’ Sincategoreumata, ed. H. A. G. Braakhuis, vol. 1 [Leiden: Krips Repro Meppel, 1979], p. 358, henceforth, Eeuwse Tractaten; also in de Libera in Sd, p. 227[c]). William and Peter both agree with Bacon and Lambert that infinite verbs are not considered verbs by logicians and hence imply that they could not be used in a well-constructed expression. (See Introductiones 1.1.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 24; and Tractatus 1.5.) Kretzmann translates William’s example of the infinite verb ‘non currit’ by “does not run,” which makes it a negative verb rather than an infinite one. It should be ‘nonruns’ or ‘not-runs’, granted William would not allow such to be used in an expression. 38.  The terminology here seems as yet unsettled. Lambert and Bacon employ the language of ‘direct’ vs. ‘cases’ to distinguish a verb in the present tense indicative mood (verbum rectum) from one in any other tense or mood (casus verbi), whereas William and Peter use the language of direct and oblique (rectum or obliquum). 39. Aristotle On Interpretation 3.16b16–17. In fact, Aristotle does not give an explicit reason for the privileged status of the present tense, and Lambert, having made the technical point that a “verb” in any tense or mood other than the present indicative is not a verb, will ignore this claim henceforth and speak of such as verbs. 40.  For other discussions of expressions (orationes) see Aristotle On Interpretation 4; and William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.2.1–3, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 25–28; Tractatus 1.6; and Sd 2.82–93, trans. Maloney, 137–38. 41.  See Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo 1, PL 64.797A. 42.  When presenting this definition of ‘expression’ it is customary for medieval authors to point out that the elements in the first half are to be taken in the senses they had in the definition of ‘name’ and ‘verb’ and that those in the second half serve to distinguish an expression from a name. But beyond this there is considerable license on whether to comment on the notions of time, finitude, and directness. William and Peter say nothing on all three, and neither does the Ut dicit. On the issue of whether to include reference to time (along with or without) in the definition, the Ars Emmerana and the Ars Burana simply tell us not to include it. (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 151.23–25 and 181.23–25.) The Introductiones Parisienses, Cum sit nostra, and Dialectica Monacenses and Bacon give us a reason: some expressions signify along with time, others apart from it: those made up of only names (Bacon) or are imperfect expressions (Cum sit nostra) signify along with time; the others do not. Respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 358.26–27, 419.11–12, and 436.30–31; and Sd 2.85, trans. Maloney, 137. On the issue of whether to include reference to directness (direct/oblique), all the sources just mentioned ignore it, except the Ars Burana, which instructs us not to employ reference to directness in the definition, and the Introductiones Parisienses, which says that

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expressions are not inflected (nulla oratio . . . inflectitur per casus). Respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 181.24–25 and 358.27–28. On the issue of whether to include reference to finiteness, all these sources ignore the issue, except the Ars Burana, which says not to include such a reference, and the Introductiones Parisienses and Cum sit nostra, which simply state that no expression can be made infinite. Respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 181.24–25 and 419.13. Bacon, it should be noted, agrees with the latter point when writing of infinite verbs where, drawing on Boethius, he says that no verb remains infinite when used in an expression. Sd 2.61, trans. Maloney, 132; and In librum Aristotelis perihermeneias 4.10, 2nd ed., ed. Meiser, GRP, vol. 5.2, p. ­258.16–21. Thus Lambert’s instruction that the nature of an expression does not preclude the inclusion of a name or verb in an oblique case is quite exceptional and raises the question of just what kind of example he has in mind and whom, if anyone, he is following in this matter. Possibly, he has in mind simply the case of an infinitive with the subject accusative. See below, 181 and 184. 43. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64.797CD. 44.  How as yet unsettled the nomenclature for these types of sentences is can be seen from the following: William seems to conflate imperative and entreating expressions, speaks of a conjunctive (e.g., ‘when I am reading’), and of an infinitive expression (‘For Socrates to run’). (Introductiones 1.2.2, trans. Kretzmann, p. 25.) Peter mentions only imperatives, optatives, and a conditional expression he calls a subjunctive. (Tractatus 1.6.) Bacon lists indicative (interrogatory or statemental [ennuntiativa]), optative, entreating, imperative, and vocative. But, on Boethius’s authority, entreating expressions, he warns, should be reduced to optative ones even though ordinarily they are classified as imperatives, and vocatives are reduced to imperatives. He also says that Boethius rejects conjunctive statements as imperfect ones because two verbs are involved, and the statement should be denominated from (we would today say) the independent clause and not the dependent one, which would make such to be indicative statements. See Sd 2.88–93, trans. Maloney, 138; and De syllogismo categorico libri duo 1, PL 64.797CD. 45.  William adds: “. . . since the response ‘either it is true or it is false’ is appropriate only to it.” (Introductiones 1.3.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 26.) One can also note that the unexpressed referent of the grammatical subject in the statement found in the Introductiones Parisienses giving the reason why all propositions must be stated in the indicative mood, namely, “because it can be had by virtue of the vocal sound alone” (eoquod virtute ipsius vocis solius habetur), can possibly be found in the Ut dicit when the author says that it is “because [a proposition] indicates what is true or false by means of [the indicative expression] (quia ex virtute ipsius indicat verum vel falsum). (Respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 359.1–2 and 382.8–9.) Lambert gives in 72 one reason why the logician is only interested in the indicative mood, and the author of the Dialectica Monacensis supplies an additional one: only such can be used to construct syllogisms. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 468.6–7. 46.  Lambert inserts, as does the author of the Dialectica Monacensis, the words “by indicating” at the end of what otherwise is the common definition of ‘proposition’. (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, 468.12–13.) The author of the Dialectica Monacensis explains, “‘By indicating’ is included in the predicate because of such appellations as ‘For Socrates to run’ and ‘For Plato



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to dispute’, for they do not do this in the indicative mood, although they signify what is true and false” (Hoc autem quod dico ‘indicando’ apponitur propter huiusmodi appellationes ‘Sortem currere’, ‘Platonem disputare’, que licet verum vel falsum significant, non tamen cum indicativo modo). (Ibid., p. 468.15–18.) The author then goes on to explain that the reason why Aristotle and Boethius also omit the phrase is because they had already excluded all expressions other than indicative ones by their understanding that ‘expression’ (oratio) applies only to perfect expressions. (Ibid., p. 468.19–26.) Apropos of the common definition William points out that in chapter 5 of On Interpretation a definition is given with a different emphasis: “an expression signifying something of something else or something apart from something else.” (Introductiones 1.3.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 26; and On Interpretation 5.17a21.) The two definitions together bring out what the medievals took to be essential to the notion of a proposition. 47.  Cf. Boethius De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1174C, trans. Stump, p. 30. 48.  For other discussions of the notion and divisions of a categorical proposition see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.3.4–1.4.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 27–29; Tractatus 1.8–10; and Sd 2.98–122, trans. Maloney, 140–47. 49.  It seems that where an attempt is made to present the derivation of the Latin ‘predicare’ (predicate) an author will resort, as here, to ‘kaqegwri/zw’ instead of (correctly) to ‘kathgore/w’. See LM, vol. 2, pt. 2: Ars Emmerana, p. 152.14–16; Ars Burana, p. ­183.4–6; and Introductiones Parisienses, p.  359.20–22; and William’s Introductiones 1.3.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 27; Peter’s Tractatus 1.7; and Bacon’s Summulae dialectices, 2.98, trans Maloney, 140. Kretzmann also points out that the latinized form of the second person singular (‘cathegorizas’) given by William (and, I would add, the other authors) is incorrect Greek. 50.  The supposita of a term are its referents. 51.  In 82 and 89 Lambert speaks of propositional quantifiers as determining common terms. Here in responding to this question he speaks of them as dispositions of common terms. 52.  Lambert’s reply seems to trade on the following notions. There are two ways for something to be quantitatively whole: (1) to have this of its very nature (de se), as does a species such as man; or (2) to acquire this by the disposition effected by the addition of a universal quantifier to a common term, as in ‘every man’. Now if we think of the species man as one species as opposed to every other species, even though we are thinking of every man we are still thinking of one discrete class, and this means, implies Lambert, that we can use ‘every man’ in the proposition ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’ without the second of the two senses of ‘every’ coming into play and rendering the proposition universal. If the issue were addressed in the language of supposition theory Lambert could be said to hold implicitly what Bacon holds explicitly, namely, that ‘man’ in ‘Man is a species’ has simple supposition but can also be interpreted to have discrete personal supposition, namely, when the species is taken as a unit over and against all other species. This requires, he says, a distinction between discrete supposition in the strict sense, as in ‘This man runs’, and in the broad sense, as in ‘Man is a species’. Lambert’s interpretation of ‘Every man is quantitatively whole’ involves discrete personal supposition in Bacon’s broad sense. See Sd 2.438–56, trans. Maloney, 221–24, and below, 94.

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53. Priscian Institutiones grammaticae 17.44, GL, 3, p. 135.7–8. 54.  Ibid., 24–25, GL, 2, pp. 58.14–59.4. 55.  For other discussions of hypothetical propositions see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  34–35; Tractatus 1.16–17; and Sd 2.147–83, trans. Maloney, 154–64. 56.  Lambert presents the standard definition and etymology of ‘hypothetical’. Ars Emmerana adds that hypothetical propositions are also called composed ones (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 158.21–22) and Ut dicit and Introductiones Parisienses remind that such propositions can also be denominated from ‘ypotesi’, which means “condition,” and in this sense only conditional propositions are hypothetical ones. (Ibid., pp. 382.21–22 and 359.24–26.) Peter speaks of the components as “principal parts” (Tractatus, 1.16) and joins Cum sit nostra in pointing out that they are “two categorical propositions,” whereas the Ars Burana and Cum sit nostra speak of them as the antecedent and consequent propositions. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 183.7–8 and 425.22–24. 57.  The number of species of hypothetical propositions is clearly not yet fixed. The Ut dicit and William and Peter describe the principal three: conditional or consecutive, disjunctive, and conjunctive or copulative. (Respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 382.23–27; ­Introductiones 1.5, trans. Kretzmann, p. 34; and Tractatus 1.16.) The author of Cum sit nostra speaks of five species, adding temporals and causals to the basic three. (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 425.27–426.28.) Bacon also enumerates five, adding to the original three both causals and expletives (expletive, e.g., ‘Socrates runs, but Plato argues’). (Sd 2.211, trans. Maloney, 170.) The Dialectica Monacensis describes six species where conditionals along with temporals, locals, and causals are called hypotheticals in the strict sense, whereas the others are hypotheticals only generally speaking. (Ibid., pp. 484.17–485.15.) And the authors of the Ars Emmerana and Ars Burana refer to seven species, adding to the others what is called “an adjoined proposition” (propositio adiuncta), one introduced by ‘in order to’ (ut). (Ibid., pp. 159.1–2 and 190.29.) William says explicitly, Bacon implicitly, that only conditionals are hypotheticals in the strict sense. (Introductiones 1.5, trans. Kretzmann, p. 34; and Sd 2.216 and n. 133, trans. Maloney, 170.) Peter makes no such claim. The author of the Ars Emmerana expresses doubt whether such propositions as ‘Socrates is as large as Plato is’, ‘Mark is such a man as Tully is’, and ‘That which Mark is Tully is’ are to be classified as categoricals or hypotheticals—he says he neither agrees nor disagrees with either characterization—but concludes that it is “more safe” to take them as hypotheticals. One can then, he says, make up names for them, respectively, ‘quantitatives’, ‘assimilatives’, and ‘substantives’. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 159.29–160.2. 58. Boethius De syllogismo hypothetico libri duo, PL 64.832. 59.  Peter and Bacon add that every conditional proposition that is true is necessary, and every such that is false is impossible. Tractatus 1.17; and Sd 2.171, trans. Maloney, 161. 60.  When authors pause to discuss the truth value of disjunctive propositions, more often than not they will say, as does Lambert here, that such are true if one of the disjuncts is true. (See William, Introductiones 1.5, trans. Kretzmann, p. 34; Ars Burana, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 191.16–17; and Cum sit nostra, ibid., p. 426.1–2.) This formula is general enough to



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allow for both hard (complete) and soft (incomplete) disjunctions, but the Dialectica Monacenses points out that the disjunctive connective ‘vel ’ (or) is said to be taken “disjunctively” when one of the disjuncts is false and “subdisjunctively” when one (or both) is true. (Ibid., p. 485.16–21.) Bacon employs this distinction explicitly, seems to require the disjunctive sense—a hard or complete disjunction where the disjuncts are either contradictory or (directly) contrary, i.e., no middle ground is possible—and says that on Boethius’s authority such a disjunctive proposition can be reduced to a conditional one, with the result that the disjunctive connective is ultimately (secundum virtutem et intellectum) a conditional one. (Sd 2.151 and 2.153–62, trans. Maloney, 155 and 155–58; and De syllogismis hypotheticis libri duo 1, PL 64, 875A, ad sensum.) Peter says disjunctive propositions are true if either disjunct is true but “less properly” so if both are true. Tractatus 1.17. 61. Boethius De syllogismo hypothetico libri duo, PL 64.832C. 62.  A student would have been given this verse in an abbreviated form: “que ca vel hyp; qualis ne vel af; un quanta par in sin.” With the abbreviations spelled out the verse reads: “que categorica vel hypothetica; qualis negativa vel affirmativa; universalis quanta particularis, indefinita, singularis.” De Rijk finds evidence of the mnemonic “from as early as about 1200.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 414. 63.  Kretzmann points out that the notions of quantity and quality as applied to propositions “are not Aristotelian but seem to have originated in the logic of the twelfth century,” and he cites Abaelard Super perihermenias, in Abaelardiana inedita, ed. Lorenzo MinioPaluello, vol. 1 (Rome: Edizione di storia e letteratura,1958), p. 23, as an example. See Introductiones, trans. Kretzmann, p. 28, n. 29. 64.  While Lambert’s claim here is standard, Bacon is more prolix and addresses the issue of the quantity of a conjunctive hypothetical proposition, saying: (1) when the connective joins statements, there is no quantity; (2) when a categorical statement has a conjunctive predicate, the quantity does not change thereby; and (3) a categorical statement with a conjunctive connective in the subject is universal. (Sd 2.217–29, trans. Maloney, 144–51.) In discussing the quality of conjunctive, disjunctive, and conditional hypotheticals he employs an analysis based on a distinction between an action carried out and an action signified (actus exercitus, actus signatus) and points out that acts of affirmation and negation are directed to the relation between the two clauses (actus exercitus) and not to the claims in each of the clauses (actus signatus). Sd 2.230–35, trans. Maloney, 174. 65.  For other discussions of the square of opposition see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.4.3–1.4.4, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 29–33; Tractatus 1.11–12; and Sd 2.123–24, trans. Maloney, 148–49. For a brief comment on the twelfth century origins of the notations A-E-I-O see L. M. de Rijk, LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 402–3. 66.  At this point almost all other treatises will present a diagram of the square of oppositions. Lambert’s does not, and neither does the Ars Burana. The Introductiones Parisienses refers to one—“as is clear in the figure”—but does not actually present it. (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 188 and 361.) Apropos of the square of oppositions Kretzmann notes that it “has some remote ancestors in the tables to be found in [Aristotle’s On Interpretation] Chapter 10, but it occurs in this traditional form as early as the second century A.D. in the logic manual of Apuleius of Madaura.” Introductiones, trans. Kretzmann, p. 32, n. 39.

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67. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64.800B. 68. Ibid. 69.  For other discussions of the triple matter of propositions see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.4.4, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 33–34; Tractatus 1.13; and Sd 2.125–33, trans. Maloney, 150–51. 70.  This way of stating the basis on which the material quality of propositions is distinguished is the most common. But the author of Ut dicit distinguishes on the basis of whether what and how the proposition signifies corresponds to the facts: if what is asserted could not be otherwise, the matter is necessary, as in ‘God exists’; if it could be otherwise, the matter is contingent, as in ‘A man is white’; and if it could in no way be otherwise, the matter is remote (impossible), as in ‘A man is an ass’. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 384.26–385.1. 71.  This sentence acknowledges the unsettledness of the terminology. Bacon speaks of necessary matter; William calls Lambert’s remote matter separate matter; and the Ut dicit also acknowledges that some speak of remote matter as impossible matter, although the author uses ‘remote’. (Respectively, Sd 2.125, trans. Maloney, 150; Introductiones 1.1.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 33; and LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 385.1–2.) None of the authors in LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, use or mention the term ‘accidental matter’. 72.  Thus, the original square of opposition is altered somewhat when the propositions are qualitatively necessary: A. All men are animals I. Some men are animals

E. No men are animals O. Some men are not animals

A-E, A-O, I-O, and I-E are contradictory; A-I and E-O are such that, if one is true so is the other, and if one is false, the other is false also. Only the A-O and E-I (contradictory) relations remain unaltered in all three kinds of matter. 73.  The objection should warn that it assumes propositions with contingent matter in them. See the preceding paragraph. 74. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64, 800C. In this context William and Bacon point out that a universal affirmative with a common term as subject, such as ‘Every man is just’, and a particular negative with a discrete term as subject, such as ‘Socrates is not just’ (or the corresponding E-I propositions), are contraries. (Introductiones 1.4.3, trans. Kretzmann, p. 31; and Sd 2.133, trans. Maloney, 151.) Kretzmann says he knows of no one prior to William who pointed this out (Introductiones, trans. Kretzmann, p. 31, n. 38), although, he continues, Aristotle makes the point in On Interpretation 7 (17b28) and says that ‘Socrates is white’ is the denial of ‘Socrates is not white’. But I would note that the Di­ alectica Monacensis assures us that I and O propositions with singular subjects are contradictory, not subcontrary. (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 474.12–15.) Note also that the relation between such propositions in Bacon’s Summulae dialectices is incorrectly labeled “subcontraries.” Sd 2.133, trans. Maloney, 151. 75.  For other discussions of the notion of conversion and its three kinds see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 3.0.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 58–59; Tractatus 1.15; and Sd 3.21–50, trans. Maloney, 277–84.



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76.  Any medieval author who presents the three forms of conversion states that A and O propositions are able to be converted by contraposition and gives examples. But some provide additional information. For example, the Ars Emmerana says that the conversion of an O proposition results in “false argumentation unless it is understood cum constantia because the antecedent can be true without the consequent.” (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 157.26–28.) The Ars Burana tells us that contraposition is “irregular” (the terms are different in the convertend and converse) and that Boethius names only simple conversion and conversion by limitation. (Ibid., p. 190.19–23.) The Ut dicit says that I propositions are not converted in this way because such would be “incongruous” and then concludes the discussion of conversion by presenting the mnemonic simpliciter feci convertitur aut per acci, per contra cato; sic est conversio tota and explains that ‘a’ signifies a universal affirmative proposition, ‘e’ a universal negative, ‘i’ a particular affirmative, and ‘o’ a particular negative. (Ibid., pp. 385.34–386.4.) The Cum sit nostra presents a slightly different mnemonic: simpliciter feci convertitur eva per acci, cato per contra; sic fit conversio tota (ibid., p. 427.1–3), and Bacon repeats it with the exception of a change of ‘asto’ for ‘cato’ (Sd 3.30, trans. Maloney, 279). The Dialectica Monacensis tells us that Aristotle calls this sort of conversion “an inverse consequence” (consequentia econtrario). (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 478.7–8.) And finally William points out something not touched on by the others, namely, that some say that the particular affirmative can sometimes, but not always, be converted by contraposition, as in ‘Some animal is a man; therefore some nonman is a nonanimal’. Introductiones 3.0.3, trans. Kretzmann, p. 58. 77.  The convertend is the proposition to be converted and the converse that into which the convertend is converted. In subsequent discussions Lambert, having given examples of two propositions, will refer to “the converse” (or to “the convertend”), and it will not always be immediately clear to which of the propositions he is referring, especially given the lamentable errors in the manuscript tradition, as indicated in the footnotes. 78.  I am indebted to Paul Thom for calling my attention to an earlier use of this distinction by Robert Kilwardby: “Et dicendum quod universalis affirmativa convertitur in particulare, non tamen convertitur cum particulare” (In libros Priorum analyticorum expositio [printed under the name Aegidius Romanus] [Venice, 1516; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1968], fol. 6rb21–24). He also informs me it is used by Albert the Great in his commentary on the same work from around the same time as Lambert’s Logica, for which see Albert’s Liber I Priorum Analyticorum, in Opera Omnia, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 1 (Paris: Vivès, 1890). 79.  See 141 and 154 where the process of converting by limitation is described. 80.  Lambert seems to follow the language prescribed by this rule for the most part. He announces the rule here in 133–35, reaffirms it in 212, and employs it in 139, 141, 154, and

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226 (first example). In 136 and 142 (and elsewhere) the rule is violated by an objector, and then corrected in the reply. However, in 141 an I proposition is said to be converted into another, and in 156, 157, and 226 an E proposition is said to be converted into another, and these seem inconsistent with the rule asserted in 135. 81.  For the reference to “all [subject] matter” see 113. 82. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64.806A. 83. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.2.25a6. 84. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo, PL 64.804D ff. 85.  This process is referred to again in 159. 86.  For these species of argumentation see below: 663 (Example), 642 (Syllogism), 660 (Enthymeme), and 661 (Induction). 87.  For the notions of figure and mood see, respectively, 681 and 683 (and 774). 88. Aristotle Prior Analytics 2.15.64a1–4. 89.  This process was also described in 141. 90.  This is the last mention of contraposition, and no comment is made explicitly and directly about whether the convertend converts into or with its converse, other than the general remark in 135 that all conversions other than that by limitation are conversions with. 91.  For other discussions of equipollency see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.6.0–1.6.6, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 35–39; Tractatus 1.18; and Sd 2.134–37, trans. Maloney, 152. The question equipollence is meant to address is summed up nicely by Alexander Broadie: “Given that of two propositions one is contradictory, contrary, subaltern, or subcontrary to the other, then the question can be raised: By what (if any) placing of negation signs in the first proposition is it transformed into a proposition equivalent to the second? The rules of equipollence provide an answer to this question.” Introduction to Medieval Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 153. 92.  For the ensuing references to rules see 160. 93.  William says these are “equal” (aquiparantur); Peter and Bacon do not present these verses. See Introductiones 1.6.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 37. 94.  Where Lambert has “refer to” (referunt) William has “stick together” (adhaerent). 95.  For other discussions of modal propositions see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.7.0–1.7.6, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 39–50; Tractatus 1.19–25; and Sd 2.245–411, trans. Maloney, 177–210. See also Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993); and Joke Spruyt, “Thirteenth-Century Discussions on Modal Terms,” Vivarium 32 (1994): 196–226. Henrik Lagerlund concludes it is “plausible” that Lambert and Bacon depend on Robert Kilwardby for their discussion of modal propositions, “judging from the similarities of the problems they discuss and their solutions to these problems.” In turn he points to Averroes as the source for Kilwardby’s interpretation of the modal syllogistic. See Lagerlund’s Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 70 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), p. 21, henceforth, Lagerlund. 96.  Lambert and Bacon seem to be exceptional in considering ‘true’ (‘truly’) and ‘false’ (‘falsely’) as modal operators. Most disqualify these two on the grounds that they do not



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serve to distinguish a modal proposition from its basic assertoric one, as Lambert concedes in 179. (See Sd 2.259–62, 268, and 270, trans. Maloney, 179, 181, and 182; and cf., e.g., William, Introductiones 1.7.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 40–41, or Peter, Tractatus 1.22.) The Dialectica Monacensis says that were they to be counted they would be modal operators in word but not in truth. See LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 478.27–479.2. 97.  ‘Contingent’ can serve as an adjective and modify ‘running’ as in ‘Socrates’ running is contingent’, and ‘contingently’ can serve as an adverb and modify ‘runs’ as in ‘Plato runs contingently’, and in neither case does the term function as a modal operator: both statements are assertorics, not modals; ‘contingent’ and ‘contingently’ characterize (describe), respectively, a substance and an action. (William takes ‘Socrates runs contingently’ to be assertoric and ‘Socrates contingently runs’ to be modal; on this point see Introductiones, trans. Kretzmann, p. 45, n. 78.) But when they are used modally they are directed (ferri) to the action of the composition of a subject and a predicate and serve to describe that ­“action” as in ‘That Plato runs is contingent’, not what sort of action is being talked about by the verb ‘runs’. Since it seems to be Lambert’s principal concern in this paragraph we should presumably take his claim that these six (twelve) terms are not modal operators “when they are predicated” to be a use of ‘predicated’ to mean simply to categorize, describe, designate, and not to be a use in the syntactical sense of statemental predication of the sort ‘S is P’. Immediately below he will labor to make the case that in modal statements the modalities are never predicated of, only directed to, the composition expressed in the dictum. For the distinction between describing and being predicated of see L. M. de Rijk, “‘Categorization’ as a Key Notion in Ancient and Medieval Semantics,” Vivarium 21 (1988): 1–18. 98.  Lambert will return to discuss true and false as modals when he treats of the conversion of modal propositions, 201–20. Because of what follows immediately simply note that here Lambert formulates these modal propositions this way: ‘That a man is an animal is true’ (Hominem esse animal est verum), where the modal operator is positioned at the end of the expression. 99.  For other discussions of the notions of expressions de re and de dicto see Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 7.69–71; and Sd 3.482, trans. Maloney, 393. Lagerlund points out that this distinction has its origins in Peter Abelard’s longer commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation but claims that “it is not discussed at all by any of these authors [Anonymous Aurelianensis III, Albert the Great, Bacon, or Lambert] in the context of modal syllogistic.” (Lagerlund, p. 35.) But Lambert discusses it in 181 and Bacon in Sd 3.482, trans. Maloney, 393, both in the context of modal propositions. 100.  Lambert will henceforth formulate all his modal propositions in the way exemplified here whenever the subject of the dictum is expressly stated: ‘Hominem necessarium est esse animal’ (For a man it is necessary to be an animal). (For additional comment on this arrangement of terms see 974.) When the subject is not expressly stated we find modal propositions formulated in two ways, along the lines of ‘Sedentem ambulare est possibile’ (That a seated man walk is possible) or ‘Possibile est esse’ (It is possible to be). (See, e.g., respectively, 181 and 187.) We have already seen in 179 a fourth way of stating modals, the more traditional way: ‘Hominem esse animal est verum’ (That man is an animal is true). Peter states it as a rule that the dictum must stand in the place of the subject and the modal

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operator in the predicate (as we saw Lambert do by way of exception in 179), and William, judging by his examples, seems to agree, along with the author of the Dialectica Monacensis. (Respectively, Tractatus 1.22; Introductiones 1.7.1–3, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 40–43; and LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 478.2–3.) Other authors, however, e.g., those of the Ars Burana, Ut dicit, and Cum sit nostra, along with Bacon, place the dictum in either the subject or predicate position. (See LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, respectively, pp. 208.9, 11, and 209.17–8; 390.5; 428.6 and 429.2; and Sd 2.265 and 321, trans. Maloney, 181 and 194.) None seems to arrange the terms as Lambert does. The translation reflects Lambert’s unique arrangement of terms. 101. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1–22.24a10–40b15. 102.  These two formulations of ‘contingere’ cannot be translated into English differently, but the distinction he wants to make is a purely grammatical one and is the same as that between the verbal forms ‘is loving’ and ‘loves’. 103. Aristotle On Interpretation 12.21b25–30. 104.  For other discussions of the interrelations of modal propositions see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.7.6, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 47–50, 28; Tractatus 1.24–25; and Sd 2.345–411, trans. Maloney, 199–210. 105.  For the notions of natural, remote, and contingent matter see 113. 106.  According to Alessio the figure is missing in the MSS. (Logica, p. 32. n. 28), but see 194–97. 107.  This line in William’s text reads: “Hac (ed. Grabmann, and Brands and Kann; haec, ed. Lohr) habet ad seriem se lege secunda sequentem”; Peter’s is the same, but possibly because of the difficulty in understanding it he adds an alternate: “Ordo subalternus sit primus sive secundus” (Let the first and second be related subalternately). See Introductiones 1.7.6, trans. Kretzmann, p. 49; and Tractatus 1.25. 108.  For other discussions of the quality and quantity of modal propositions see William and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 1.7.4–5, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 46–47, 26–27, and Sd 2.322–25 and 329–44, trans. Maloney, 172–73 and 194–98. 109.  The state of affairs (esse) referred to is the verbal action signified within the dictum. See above, 181. The Cum sit nostra and Bacon agree with Lambert that the presence or absence of a sign of negation directed to the modal operator dictates the quality of a modal proposition. (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 429.31–32; and Sd 2.324–25, trans. Maloney, 196.) But the Ut dicit, the Dialectica Monacensis, and William speak of two qualities because of the two compositions—that within the dictum and that between the dictum and the modal operator when such is an (adjectival) name like ‘necessary’. Thus, William says that if one is asking about the “form of speaking” (forma loquendi) the negation is directed to the mode, but if one is asking about what is signified (secundum rem) it is directed to the predicate. (Respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 392.19–26 and 479.35–480.7; and Introductiones 1.7.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 46.) William acknowledges that he disagrees with Aristotle, and the Dialectica Monacensis points out that, if one is speaking of a modal proposition with an adverb for the modal operator, the proposition’s quality is judged on the basis of its basic assertoric formulation. 110.  Alessio gives Prior Analytics 1.3.25b20 for the reference, but there Aristotle is making the opposite claim: “the statements that it is possible that A belongs to no B or does



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not belong to some B are affirmative in form. . . .” (Trans. A. J. Jenkinson, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 41.) I have not found where an exception is mentioned, i.e., where a modal proposition of the type ‘It is possible that no man is running’ is classified as negative. Possibly he has in mind modal E and O propositions containing a modal adverb, as in ‘Contingently Plato does not run’. 111.  This is the customary response to the issue of quantity, but a few authors go a bit further, still thinking of modal propositions with an (adjectival) name as the modal operator. William, Bacon, and the Dialectica Monacensis speak of two quantities because of the two subjects that admit of quantification. Thus, with respect to the dictum as subject (Bacon’s subject of attribution), the modal proposition is singular, but with respect to the subject within the dictum (Bacon’s subject of locution), that proposition can be of any quantity. The Dialectica Monacensis then adds that, in the case of modal propositions with modal operators that are adverbs, the quantity is that of their basic assertoric formulations. See Introductiones 1.7.5, trans. Kretzmann, p. 47; Sd 2.322–23, trans. Maloney, 195; LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, respectively, pp. 392.1–5, 429.23–30, and 480.718. 112.  It seems that Bacon but not William or Peter treats of the conversion of modal propositions, for which see Sd 3.51–66, trans. Maloney, 285–88. 113.  By way of reminder, the assertoric proposition related to a modal proposition is simply the proposition that would result if the modal operator and the terms necessary to accompany it were removed from the modal proposition: the assertoric version of ‘For every man it is true he is an animal’ is ‘Every man is an animal’. 114.  In the discussions of the modals true and false I am not translating the Latin ­infinitive literally because the result would be the quite stilted and possibly unclear: “For every man it is true to be an animal.” 115.  In 120 Lambert made the claim that O propositions are indeed converted, not directly or by limitation, but by contraposition. Thus here the converse would be ‘For some nonman it is true he is not a nonanimal’. 116.  There is a separate rule for each of the four kinds of propositions, and they turn out to be the following: A and I convert simply, E converts by limitation, and O does not convert. 117. Aristotle Categories 5.4b6–10; Alessio suggests Prior Analytics 1.2.25a1. 118.  For these notions see 181. 119.  For this distinction see 134 and 141. 120.  The “adverb” here is the word ‘false’. 121.  Aristotle says that such O propositions are not converted, but, while acknowledging this, Bacon provides an example. See Prior Analytics 1.3.25a35; and Sd 3.61, trans. Maloney, 286. 122.  A and O convert simply, E converts by limitation, and I does not convert. 123. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.3.25a28–30. 124.  The form at issue would be grammar. Apropos of Lambert’s analysis here Henrik Lagerlund says that Lambert may be Richard of Campsall’s source for his similar interpretation. (See Lagerlund, p. 65, n. 17.) Richard was a master of arts and then secular theologian

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at Oxford and died around 1308. If Lagerlund is correct, this suggests that Lambert’s Logica was circulated outside Dominican circles and at Oxford. 125.  Bacon’s analysis of this issue is more complex, but he arrives at basically the same solution. Sd 3.54–60, trans. Maloney, 285. 126. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.13.32b5 ff. 127.  To speak of this broad (communis) notion of contingent as “high” (alta) is to speak of it in the context of its position on the Tree of Porphyry where genera are always placed higher than species. It is also called contingent taken for possible. See 233 and 236–41. 128.  A converts by limitation, E and I simply. See 221. 129. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.13.32b5. 130.  Ibid., 32a20 ff. 131.  For this notion see also 242. Lagerlund points out that, while Lambert identifies this kind of contingency with what is not necessary and not impossible, Bacon along with Kilwardby and Albert the Great consider it to be “indefinite contingency,” that which can be or not be with no inclination one way or the other. (See Lagerlund, p. 24.) This is to say that Lambert’s notion is a little more general than that of the other three. See Sd 2.392, trans. Maloney, 207. 132. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.13.32b5 ff. 133. Ibid. 134.  Ibid., 1.3.25b20–25. Both propositions in 244 contain “It is contingent,” and in that sense both are affirmative “with respect to what is signified” (secundum rem). But the dictum in the first (“every man is white”) is an affirmation whereas that in the second (“every man is not white”) is a negation, so “on the basis of the words themselves” (secundum vocem) one signifies affirmatively and the other negatively. 135.  Ibid., 1.13.32b1–2. 136.  Ibid., 1.3.25b10. 137.  The “translation” of ‘recto dyametro’ by “in a direct line” seems to be required by the context but is not a literal translation of the Latin. The Latin phrase itself does not seem to be one found in medieval treatises on geometry or physics. 138.  The Latin text for the last two sentences in the translation in this paragraph seems to call for some kind of emendation, so I provide it in full: “et tale contingens opponitur contingenti nato et continetur sub contingenti pro possibili sicut negatio opponitur affirmationi de contingenti nato de quibus habitum est supra et de tali contingenti fiunt sillogismi sophistici maxime per fallaciam contingentis.”

Chapter Two.  Predicables 1.  For other discussions of predicables see Aristotle’s Categories, Porphyry’s Isagoge, and William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, trans. J. L. Ackrill, in Barnes, vol. 1; and Porphyry the Phoenician, Isagoge, trans. (English) Edward W. Warren, Medieval Sources in Translation, vol. 6 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975), henceforth



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Isagoge, trans. Warren; Introductiones 2.0.1–2.1.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 51–56; Tractatus 2.1–21, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 80–88, 1–21; and Sd 1.1.1–48, trans. Maloney, 9–25. 2.  Anticipating what will be said immediately following, one can say that predicables are the different relations in which something said of something can stand to that other. Aristotle named four: definition, genus, property, and accident; and Porphyry added species and differentia and dropped definition. To predicate (as the medievals use the term) is to say something of something else as in ‘white thing’ or ‘A thing is white’. And categories (predicaments) are (ten) classes of things that can be said of something: substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, time, place, position, and possession. 3.  The allusion is to Porphyry’s Isagoge where, however, one finds no reference to such a tree. Nevertheless it is traditional to refer to the arrangement of genera and species in the manner described by Lambert as the Tree of Porphyry because of its somewhat conical shape. For the notion of a differentia see 325. 4.  These are the subjects of discussion of the next chapter. 5.  Ordinarily one would expect to find species listed here as a fifth predicable. See below, 290, where it is supplied. 6.  “For some predications are said of only one thing, as individual terms like ‘Socrates’, ‘this man’, and ‘this object’; but others are said of many things, such as genera, species [sic] differences, properties, and accidents that occur jointly in many and not uniquely in some one thing.” (Isagoge, trans. Warren, pp. 30–31.) On the distinction between these two senses of ‘predication’ see L. M. de Rijk, “‘Categorization’ as a Key Notion in Ancient and Medieval Semantics,” Vivarium 26 (1988): 1–18. 7.  William adds to proper names pronouns and a common noun with a pronoun. See Introductiones 2.0.2, trans. Kretzmann, p. 51 and n. 2. 8.  “For from a primary substance there is no predicate, since it is said of no subject. . . .” Aristotle Categories 5.3a36, trans. J. L. Ackrill, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 6. 9.  In this sense ‘white’ is said to be predicated of ‘man’ in ‘white man’. 10.  This notion is repeated in 1291. Bacon offers an explanation for the special status of these: “because the form in each of these occupies all the matter naturally suited to it in one individual.” Sd 1.1.48, trans. Maloney, 25. 11.  The phrase “with respect to what a thing is” is an English translation of ‘in eo quod quid est’, which in turn is Boethius’s translation of Aristotle’s phrase “e/n tw|~ ti/ e/sti” in Topics 1.5.102a33–102b3. One predicates “with respect to what a thing is” when the predicate indicates the whole substance of the subject. Such is also called an essential predication. See, e.g., Ut dicit, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 387.34–388.3. For a second definition of ‘genus’ see 303. 12. Aristotle Topics 1.7.103a5–14. 13.  Marcus Tullius was a famous Roman orator who was most frequently cited in medieval literature by his nickname “Cicero.” 14.  There seems to be a difference in opinion as to which part of the definition of ‘genus’ serves to distinguish genus from proprium. The Cum sit nostra, Dialectica Monacensis, and Lambert claim it is the phrase ‘with respect to what a thing is’, whereas the Ut dicit and

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­ illiam say ‘differing in species’ does this. See, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, respectively, pp. 432.20–23, W 508.11–21, and 387.26–28; and Introductiones 2.1.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 52. 15.  “It is clear, too, on the face of it that the man who signifies what something is signifies sometimes a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes some one of the other types of predicate. For when a man is set before him and he says that what is set there is a man or an animal, he states what it is and signifies a substance; but when a white colour is set before him and he says that what is set there is white or is a colour, he states what it is and signifies a quality.” Aristotle Topics 1.9.103b29–33, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 172. 16.  The language here—higher/lower—continues to draw on the positions of genera and species in the Tree of Porphyry, for which see 282. ‘Higher’ connotes conceptually broader and ‘lower’ conceptually more narrow. 17.  For a second definition see 318. 18.  See Boethius In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta 2, ed. Samuel Brandt, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. 48 (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1906), p. 234.14 ff. 19.  Lambert has omitted ‘country’ from the list. See Jacqueline Hamesse, ed., Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique [Porphyry], Philosophes Medievaux, vol. 17 (Paris: Béartice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), p. 300, no. 13. 20. Aristotle On the Soul 1.1.402b23–24. 21.  In this section Lambert will discuss three senses of the term ‘differentia’—broad, strict, and more strict; only the third is the predicable that is the focus of this section: that which added to genus results in a species, for which see below, 336. Because of the technical sense it has, and to distinguish it from the other kinds of differences he mentions, I am (where the third sense is clear) anglicizing the Latin word and using it to indicate this ­notion. Thus ‘differentia’ (pl. ‘differentiae’) is the difference that contracts a genus to form a species. 22. The Dialectica Monacensis adds being blind and sighted as inseparable accidents that constitute a difference in the second (strict) sense. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 510.7–9. 23.  “. . . for ‘not-being’ has not any species at all.” Aristotle Topics 4.6.128b9, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 216. 24.  An entity “in thought” (in intellectu) or “within the mind” (secundum animam) is one having the ontological status of an idea or image. 25.  Here ‘differentia’ could also be translated by ‘difference’ since it no longer bears its technical meaning. See below, 340. 26.  This objection may have its roots in Boethius’s statement that the genus of animal is animate body. See Boethius In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta 2, ed. Brandt, p. 206.11–12. The author of the Tractatus Anagnini explains that Porphyry (actually Boethius) should have used the adjective ‘corporeal’ in place of the substantive ‘body’ and said that animate corporeal substance is the genus of animal. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 231.7–11. 27. Aristotle Topics 6.5.143a19–29. 28. Aristotle On the Soul 2.2.413b14–414a28. 29.  The impediment here is the fact that ‘body’ is an equivocal term.



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30.  The text cited by Alessio Boethius actually says the opposite: “. . . nothing prevents an accident from sometimes becoming a proprium, but as such it is not a proprium.” (Topicorum Aristotelis libri octo Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii interprete, PL 64.913D.) No doubt he has in mind what Porphyry had pointed out, namely, that a proprium is predicated equally of all members of a species, whereas even an inseparable accident admits of more and less. See Isagoge, trans. Warren, p. 62. 31. Porphyry Isagoge, trans. Boethius, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 8.17–18. Cf. Isagoge, trans. Warren, p. 34. 32.  Elsewhere the notion of ordinary language is conveyed by “apud communiter loquentes.” See Logica, pp. 59.28 and 236.43. 33.  The notion of something (genus or differentia) leading to the being of an essence (conducens ad esse speciem or ad esse speciei) comes from Boethius’s commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, for which see Boethius In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta 2, ed. Brandt, p. 272.3–4. 34.  For additional objections on this issue and variations on some of the above see Tractatus Anagnini, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 232.1–36. 35.  ‘Proprium’ means a characteristic that is always associated with one species only and thereby serves to distinguish one species from another, e.g., the neighing of a horse. I anglicize it to indicate that it has this technical meaning in this period. 36. The Cum sit nostra includes ‘always’ in the definitions of ‘proprium’ in the first two senses. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 433.11–12. 37.  It “does not indicate what the being of a thing is” because, being an accident and not part of the substance of the thing, it cannot tell us what kind of a thing the substance is but only how it is qualified, e.g., able to laugh. 38.  The proprium that is the predicable is the fourth sort of proprium. As such it is a characteristic that is singled out for special denomination because it is one that is always and uniquely associated with all the members of one and only one species. Thus we find the following description in the Dialectica Monacensis: “A proprium is what is predicated in respect of a qualification of more than one and converted with the species of which it is a proprium” (proprium est quod predicatur de pluribus in quale et convertitur cum specie cuius est proprium). LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 511.9–10. 39. The Dialectica Monacensis says of this (standard) definition: “‘Is present’ or ‘is absent’ resonates exclusively with potentiality, not actuality” (hec verba ‘adest’ et ‘abest’ solum sonant in potentiam et non in actum). It goes on to say that the stated definition should also add that the presence or absence of an accident without its subject’s destruction should be understood either of a real separation or of a purely imagined one. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 511.14–25. 40.  The first two definitions are preferred by Aristotle to the third because the third, he points out, requires one to know the other predicables. Topics 1.5.102b10–15. 41.  While the language admits of the claim that Lambert is saying that, in the case of separable accidents, the accident can exist on its own independently of its subject, this is not something he (or any medieval) would accept. The intended notion is that something could be a bush and be, e.g., two feet tall. Note also that some authors give swans as an example of

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a subject with an inseparable accident, on the false assumption that swans can only be white. See, e.g., William, Introductiones 2.1.5, trans. Kretzmann, p. 56, where William points out that such is the nature of a (white) swan that even if we were to think of it as black we would still be thinking of a swan since the color is only an accident and not something pertaining to the swan’s essence. Lambert will make this point in 361. 42.  This response seems to be a very unusual one to this (standard) objection. 43. Aristotle Metaphysics 10.7.1057a18 ff. 44.  The objection in 356 is also found in Cum sit nostra, but there the reply simply asserts that combustion is an inseparable accident. (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 433.17–22.) Bacon also addresses this objection and in his first reply distinguishes between accidents that are paths to the being and nonbeing of a subject and those that are consequent to the existence of the subject, disposing it separably or inseparably. He acknowledges that Porphyry does not count the prior sort (generation and corruption) as accidents. His second reply is less easy to understand: “Or, one could reply that the subject of generation and corruption is the material source (principium materiale) of something capable of being generated and corrupted, because it always remains without its own corruption. And so generation and corruption can be absent without the corruption of their subject, and likewise with respect to death and combustion.” Sd 1.1, 37–39, trans. Maloney, 22. 45.  One finds this objection also in the Dialectica Monacensis, but the reply is somewhat different. The author says that the description and the division proceed along different paths. The description addresses the formal nature of accidents, and so says every accident is inseparable. But the division is a material consideration that addresses the notion of the subject in which the accident inheres, and from this point of view some accidents are separable while the others are inseparable. He concludes by reminding that what is an inseparable accident in one context (white of snow) is separable in another (white of a man). LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 512.9–21. 46.  This is a poor response, first, because it contradicts the claim in this paragraph that “every accident is separable in thought,” and, second, because it would mean that accidents in the first division (like the color of a house) are separable only in thought, which is false. 47. Porphyry Isagoge, trans. Boethius, p. 20.9–12; and Isagoge, trans. Warren, pp. 48–49. The quotation is substantially accurate but does not contain “shining with gleaming whiteness” (nitens candore). Peter supplies this phrase, and this supports the notion that Peter and Lambert sometimes draw on a common source. See Tractatus 2.16, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 86.

Chapter Three.  Categories 1.  In 362–93 Lambert presents various considerations treated in the beginning of Aristotle’s Categories which came to be called “Prae-praedicamenta” (Remarks prior to the Categories). In chapter 4 Lambert will present what came to be called “Post-praedicamenta” (Remarks after the Categories). In between these is the treatment of the ten categories.



Notes to Pages 77–82

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2. Aristotle Categories 1.1a1 ff. For other discussions of the ten categories see Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 88–101; and Sd 1.2, trans. Maloney, 26–109. And for a general discussion of Aristotle’s categories see William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 25–32. 3.  The distinction is between abstract names like ‘bravery’ and concrete ones like ‘brave’ derived from them. Bacon presents a much more thorough discussion of denominatives and denominative predication, for which see Sd 1.2.10–35, trans. Maloney, 30–34. 4.  For the names of these categories see 394. 5.  The reason for this is that the notion of substance does not include that of accident, whereas that of accident includes reference to substance: that which inheres in a substance. Hence, substances do not depend on accidents for their being, whereas accidents do depend on substance for their being. Thus ‘substance’ is said of itself and an accident analogically, in two senses partly different and partly the same. 6.  Practically all of the text in 380–88 is found verbatim in Peter’s Tractatus (3.2–5, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 89–91, 2–5) with the exceptions of the objections and replies. This again suggests that Peter and Lambert are drawing on a common source. 7.  For other discussions of the eight modes of inherence see Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.2, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 89–90, 2; and Sd 1.2.46–64, trans. Maloney, 38–40. 8.  The example in the text is ‘homo’, which has letters and syllables, but its English translation ‘man’ has letters but only one syllable. Hence, ‘animal’ has been substituted in the translation. 9.  Peter’s example is a bit more clear: virtue in happiness. See Tractatus 3.5, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 90, 5. 10. Aristotle Physics 4.3.210a14–26; and Boethius In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor, PL 64.172BC. Boethius is not mentioned in this context by William, Peter, and Bacon or by the authors in LM. 11.  For other discussions of this issue see Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.3, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 90, 3; and Sd 1.2, 46–49, trans. Maloney, 38. 12.  Genera subalternately placed are those that are species of a common genus, e.g., ­living matter and nonliving matter with respect to matter. Thus knowledge (having knowledge) is a species of animal, not a genus on the same level as animal on the Porphyrean Tree, since it is narrower in concept than animal is. 13.  Peter points to rational and nonrational as the differentiae of animal, and speaks of linguistic as a differentia of knowledge, not moral knowledge. 14.  Were the genera subalternately placed they would be species of the same proximate genus. 15.  Lambert speaks loosely when he calls ‘rational’ and ‘mortal’ genera. They are differentiae, not genera. Differentiae not subalternately placed are those that do not have the same proximate genus. Thus rational and nonrational are differentiae subalternately placed.

362

Notes to Pages 82–85

16. The medievals believed earthly material things were made up of the four elements (air, earth, fire, water) but that anything nonspiritual above the earth but within the cosmos was made up of a fifth element (ether). 17.  These are the ten categories listed by Aristotle in the Categories. When he first lists them Quantity is followed by Quality. (Categories 1.4.1a25–26.) But when he discusses them Quantity is followed by Relation and it by Quality. (See Categories 1.7 and 1.8, and Topics 1.9.103b23–25.) As early as the Ut dicit it is becoming clear that the number ten was not always taken as sacrosanct: “And it is said that the categories are that many and not more. . . . If the truth be known, they lie, for Aristotle does not say that they are that many and not more.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 386.26–87.4. 18.  For other discussions of Substance see Aristotle Categories 5; and Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3, 6–13, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 91–93, 6–13; and Sd 1.2.85–123, trans. Maloney, 48–64. 19. Aristotle Categories 5.2a11–14. 20.  Lambert seems here to take ‘subsist’ and ‘supposit’ to mean much the same thing. The parallelism in this paragraph requires us to read him as saying in the penultimate ­sentence that individuals subsist and supposit for things, which latter claim reflects inappropriate usage of the language of supposition theory. But see 400 where ‘to supposit’ is clarified to convey the same thing as ‘to stand under’ does. What he discusses here in 398 is clearly stated in the Dialectica Monacensis by an exclusive appeal to this latter notion of standing under: “Primary substance is distinguished from all others by means of these three differentiae. And note that this description is directed to a first substance, not on the basis of the nature of its essence (non secundum naturam essendi), but on the basis of its ability to stand under (secundum virtutem substandi). By the differentia ‘strictly’, therefore, all ­accidents taken as accidents are excluded, e.g., white, black, none of which strictly and by itself stands under. But because some things that are not strictly substances stand under, although not as primary substances (licet non primo), e.g., line, triangle, and the like—the differentia ‘primarily’ is intended to exclude suchlike, which, although they strictly stand under their qualities, nevertheless do not stand under except to the degree they are in substances. The differentia ‘in the fullest sense’ is added to remove secondary substances, which do not stand under in the fullest sense because they do not stand under all things. Primary substances, because they do stand under all others, i.e, both secondary substances and accidents, are said to stand under in the fullest sense.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 515.1–14. 21.  This is to say that all common accidents are predicated denominatively, i.e., under names derived from the abstract names that signify their natures. See Topics 3.1.116a23– 28. See also Sten Ebbesen, “Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to Such Terms as ‘Album,’” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 107–74. 22.  Only the first half of the division presented by Aristotle in Categories 5 is quoted in 397, but reference to the second part is mentioned midway in 400. 23.  For other discussions of these issues see Aristotle Categories 5.3a6–4b19; Peter, Tractatus 3.8–13, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 92–93, 8–13. Bacon does not present this material.



Notes to Pages 85–90

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24.  Here begins a discussion of what Substance has in common with other categories and what is unique to it. (See Aristotle Categories 5.3a7–4b19.) The discussion is interrupted by objections and responses (407–10, 415–16) but picks up again in 411 and 417. Interestingly, the language of 406, 411, and 417 is practically word for word what is found in Peter’s Tractatus, suggesting again a common source. See Tractatus 3.8–13, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 92–93, 8–13; and Logica, pp. 70.37–71.6, 71.20–39, and 72.7–15. 25.  The commonality is not-to-be-in-a-subject. See 406. 26.  Bacon provides a lengthy discussion of the various species of substance. See Sd 1.2, 91–123, trans. Maloney, 50–64. 27.  For other discussions of Quantity see Aristotle Categories 6; and Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.14–16, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp.  93–94, 14–16; and Sd 1.2.124–40, trans. Maloney, 65–68. 28.  The author of the Dialectica Monacensis offers a point of clarification: “But note that ‘unity’ is ambiguous. One sort is that from which and by which every thing is one, and this sort is nothing other than the formal cause in each thing; it is not the source of number since it is a substantial form. There is another sort of unity different from the previous sort in the way corporeal quantity (corpus quantitas) differs from corporeal substance (corpus substantia); and it is the source of number.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 518.27–32. 29. The Dialectica Monacensis points out that spoken sound, and by extension any (oral) expression, fits into three categories: it is a substance with respect to its material cause (a pulse of air); it is a quantity with respect to its formal cause (long and short syllables measuring divisions in the air); and it is a quality in the third species of quality with respect to its final cause (in being that to which the ear is sensible). LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 518.35–519.11. 30.  This paragraph discusses a second or additional division of Quantity based on whether or not the quantities can be said to have a position relative to something else. ­Lambert’s discussion is practically word for word that found in Boethius’s translation of ­Aristotle’s text in the Categories. The Dialectica Monacensis contents itself with announcing the “second division” and stating that line, surface, body, and place have position, whereas time, number, and expression do not. But one finds an expanded version of this material in the critical apparatus of de Rijk’s edition of Peter’s Tractatus. See, respectively, Aristotle Categories 6.5a15–37, trans. Boethius, AL, vol. 1, pts. 1–5, pp. 14.25–15.17; LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 519.12–18; and Tractatus, pp. 33–34. 31.  After the parallel statement in the apparatus of the Tractatus the text adds by way of clarification: “I am speaking of an oral expression. Were one speaking of a written expression nestled within a written text one could look ahead or backwards since the written expression remains.” Tractatus, p. 34, line 4, of the critical apparatus. 32.  This seems rather to be a response to part of the first objection. 33.  This is a reply to the second objection; I find no clear reply to the third objection. 34.  Lambert seems to be somewhat original in pointing out that Quantity reflects an exception to the general rule that all highest genera are predicated univocally of their ­species.

364

Notes to Pages 91–95

35.  For other discussions of these issues see Aristotle Categories 6.5b11–6a35; and Peter, Tractatus 3.16, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 94, 16. Bacon does not present this material. 36.  Cf. 449 where Lambert says there are no contraries in the category Quality. Note also that the Dialectica Monacensis adds that this lack of contrariness, properly speaking, is a proprium in the second sense where the property is found in every member of a species but not in just one species. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 519.20–21. 37.  The contrariety to which he refers and is said to be inaccurate (nulla) is unclear. Presumably the sense is that what was previously said about contraries in the genus ­Quantity—that there are none (433)—is inaccurate. 38.  This property also is a proprium in the second sense: found in every member of a species but in more than one species. See the Dialectica Monacensis, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 519.21–22. 39.  The objection is perhaps based on a curious reading of what is said in 414. 40.  Here the property is a proprium in the fourth sense (see above, 348), and so it belongs to one species alone, to every member of that species, and—Lambert should have added (as does the Dialectica Monacensis)—always. See LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 519.20–21. 41.  For other discussions of Relation see Aristotle Categories 7; and Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.17–20, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp.  94–96, 1­ 7–20; and Sd 1.2.141–200, trans. Maloney, 69–85. 42.  “Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur quecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud.” (Logica, p. 77.12–14.) The definition is found in B ­ oethius’s translation of Aristotle’s Categories 7.6a36, AL, vol. 1, pts. 1–5, p.18.4–6. Kretzmann and Stump translate Peter’s definition in this way: “Things that are what they are in virtue of being said to be of other things or to be to other things in any other way are said to be related” (emphasis Kretzmann). (CTMPT, p. 94, 17.) See also below, 470, for a second ­definition. 43.  Bacon speaks of two species, equiparity and nonequiparity, and then, ultimately drawing on Boethius’s De arithmetica, gives a lengthy discussion of superparticular and superpartient numbers (ratios). (See Sd 1.2, 151–94, trans. Maloney, 73–83; and Boethius De arithmetica 1.21–23, PL 64.1099D–1110A.) For a possible more immediate source for  Bacon see the Accessus philosophorum VII artium liberalium, ed. Claude Lafleur, Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle, Publications de l’Institut d’Études Médiévales, vol. 23 (Montréal: Université de Montréal; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1988), pp. 192–94. 44.  See above, n. 17. 45.  I find no such explanations in Aristotle’s comments on these categories. 46.  I find no such comment in Aristotle’s discussion of the categories Substance and Quantity. 47.  For other discussions of these issues see Aristotle Categories 7.6b15–8b24; and Peter, Tractatus 3.19–20, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp.  95–96, 19–20. Bacon does not present this material.



Notes to Pages 95–99

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48.  To have a contrary is a property that applies neither to every member of a species nor to one species alone, as the author of the Dialectica Monacensis reminds us. (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 520.5–7.) For the other characteristics that are proper or not proper to relation see 464, 467, and 475. 49.  The four examples are more easily seen in the original Latin: disciplina disciplinati disciplina; disciplinatum disciplina disciplinatum; sensus sensati sensus; and sensatum sensu sensatum. 50.  I find no such explanations in Aristotle’s comments on these categories. 51.  Kretzmann and Stump translate Lambert’s text in this way: “Those things are related whose being consists in being in a certain condition with respect to something else.” (CTMPT, pp. 95–96.) For the first definition of ‘relation’ see 448. 52.  Why Lambert does not take the second disjunct in the first definition to be talking about real relations is not clear. Equally unclear is what the doubt is that is associated with the first definition. Possibly it is simply the general one expressed in Categories 7.8a13: “It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances.” 53. Aristotle Categories 8.8b13–15. The (fourth) property discussed by Aristotle in Categories 7 is the straightforward one that, if one definitely knows something is relative, one definitely knows that to which it is related. (7.8a35–b7.) Boethius renders the Greek for “definitely knows” by ‘deffinite novit’, and Peter and the Dialectica Monacensis follow Aristotle via Boethius. But for some reason Lambert recasts the issue into one of defining. One cannot help thinking that Lambert’s “diffinire noverit” (know how to define) and “diffinire voluit” (wanted to define) are misreadings of Boethius’s “deffinite novit” (definitely knows). See trans. Boethius, AL, vol. 1, pts. 1–5, pp. 22.24–23.5; Tractatus 3.20, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 96, 20; LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 520.25–29; and Logica, p. 80.37. 54.  For other discussions of Quality see Aristotle Categories 8; and Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.21–26, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 96–98, 21–26, and Sd 1.2.201–24, trans. Maloney, 86–87. 55.  For the fallacy of Consequent see 1186. Note that Kretzmann and Stump translate ‘studiosus’ by ‘diligent’ in the parallel context in Peter’s Tractatus, thereby deriving ‘diligent’ from ‘virtue’. (Tractatus 3.25, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 97, 25.) That is a good translation, but Lambert seems to have a slightly different take on the derivation that justifies the translation here of ‘studiosus’ by ‘studious’. See below, 521. 56.  For other discussions of the first species of Quality see Aristotle Categories 8.8b26– 9a13; and Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.21, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 96, 21, and Sd 1.2.202–10, trans. Maloney, 87. 57. The Dialectica Monacensis adds: “On Aristotle’s authority natural habits are different from acquired ones since in the case of acquired habits acts precede habits, but vice versa for natural ones: before one acquires virtue one must act well frequently, but the habit of seeing or the potentiality for seeing is prior to the act [of seeing].” LM, vol. 2, pt.  2, p. 521.11–15; and Boethius In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor, PL 64.243D.

366

Notes to Pages 99–106

58.  Habit, taken as a category, will be discussed in 588 but under the name ‘Possession’. In Latin ‘habitus’ is translated both by ‘habit’, to indicate a quality, and by ‘possession’, to indicate adornments of the body. 59.  For other discussions of the second species of Quality see Aristotle Categories 8.9a14–27; and Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.22, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 96, 22, and Sd 1.2.211–17, trans. Maloney, 88. 60.  Bacon’s description of these qualities is more complete. See Sd 1.2.213–15, trans. Maloney, 88. And note that Kretzmann and Stump translate ‘sanativus’ and ‘egrotativus’ in Peter’s Tractatus as if they were in the neuter gender, which then changes the meaning from a person being health-making, i.e., having a quality that makes the person healthy, as here, to something extraneous to the person that renders the person healthy, e.g., medicine. See Peter, Tractatus 3.22, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 96, 22. 61.  The presentation of this standard material in the Dialectica Monacensis adds a ­reference to spiritual and corporal qualities, and also distinguishes three species of natural qualities: “The second species of Quality is a natural power or lack of power. Some of these are in the soul, some in the body. Some of the natural powers that are in the soul are ones that move [a subject] (motive), others are ones that apprehend (apprehensive). Those that move [a subject] are something rational, irrational, concupiscent; the apprehending ones are a sensory faculty, imagination, reason, intellect. But the natural powers and lack of ­powers in a body are, e.g., natural health and sickness with respect to an animal, the natural power to box well with respect to a boxer, and to run well with respect to a runner, and their opposites. Natural hardness, likewise, with respect to something hard, and natural softness with respect to something soft.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 521.16–24. 62.  For other discussions of the third species of Quality see Aristotle Categories 8.9a28–10a10; and Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.23, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 96–97, 23, and Sd 1.2.218–22, trans. Maloney, 89. 63.  For other discussions of the fourth species of Quality see Aristotle Categories 8.10a–24; and Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.24, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 97, 24; and Sd 1.2.223, trans. Maloney, 90. 64. The Dialectica Monacensis says that ‘form’ in the definition is a reference to animate things in the same sense that ‘figure’ is a reference to inanimate things. Then it gives a second understanding of these qualities: figure has to do with the exterior linear dispo­ sition of a body as complete, whereas form, e.g., curved, triangular, is said of that linear disposition of a body as imperfect and in process toward completion. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 522.6–11. 65.  What is stated in this and the succeeding paragraph is nicely summarized in 520. 66.  Categories 8.10a32–10b8. 67.  For the explanation of this see 521. Aristotle’s example is that of being called ­upright because of one’s integrity. See Aristotle Categories 8.10b7–8. 68.  Epistle of James 2.10 and Ecclesiastes 9.18 (Vulgate). 69.  Alessio suggests Nicomachean Ethics 2.2.1104a ff., for the reference; I would suggest 2.1 passim. For comment on what books of the Nicomachean Ethics were available



Notes to Pages 106–111

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in Latin translation at this period see Georg Wieland, “The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in CHLMP, pp. 658–72. 70.  For the fallacy of the Figure of a Word see 1033. 71.  For other discussions of what is common and unique to quality see Aristotle Categories 8.11a11–39; and Peter, Tractatus 3.26, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 97– 98, 26. Bacon does not present this material. 72.  An intermediate color is any color between white and black. The Dialectica Monacensis points out that contrariety is proper neither to all qualities nor to quality alone. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 522.14–15. 73. Aristotle Categories 6.6a17. 74.  Ibid., 5b2. 75.  In response to the theory that qualities like health do not vary in degree but that the subjects who possess them vary in the degree to which they possess them Aristotle remarks: “For some people dispute about such cases. They utterly deny that one justice is called more or less a justice than another [is], or one health more or less a health, though they say that one person has health less than another [has], justice less than another [has], and similarly with grammar and the other conditions. At any rate things spoken of in virtue of these unquestionably admit of a more and a less: one man is called more grammatical than another [is], juster, healthier, and so on.” (Categories 8.10b33–11a4, trans. J. L. Ackrill, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 17.) When Boethius translates this, much is left out and what remains would not inform his medieval readers that Aristotle offered no opinion on the theory he mentions. See trans. Boethius, AL, vol. 1, pts. 1–5, p. 29.1–16. 76.  For other discussions of Action see Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.27, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 98, 27; and Sd 1.2.225–29, trans. Maloney, 92–95. 77.  Anonymi Fragmentum Vulgo Vocatum “Liber sex principiorum” 2.16, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 38.14–15, henceforth, Liber sex principiorum. This work is by an unknown twelfth-century Latin author, comes to us as a fragment of a larger work, and discusses only six of Aristotle’s ten categories. The Dialectica Monacensis provides two divisions of action: the first into that whose origin is a soul or a body; the second that which is natural, voluntary, or violent, where violent is unhelpfully characterized simply as “issuing from violence.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 522.24–523.14. 78.  I have not found where Aristotle says this. 79. The Dialectica Monacensis adds that this property applies to every natural action and to natural action alone. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 523.15–17. 80. The Dialectica Monacensis adds: “And these (properties) are applicable to­ neither every [action and passion] nor to [action and passion] alone.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. ­523.17–18. 81.  For other discussions of Passion see Peter and Bacon, respectively, Tractatus 3.28, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 98, 28, and Sd 1.2.230–32, trans. Maloney, 96–97. 82.  The full definition reads: “Passion is an effect and consequence of action on the basis of which these things are acted upon but not those things according to which some things are more animating (animantiora) as a brute is more animating than a tree is and a rational thing more animating than a nonrational thing is.” (Liber sex principiorum 3.29, AL,

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Notes to Pages 111–112

vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 41.8–11.) Apropos of the divisions of passion the Dialectica Monacensis says they are the same as for action “for every passion accompanies its own proper action.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 523.21–24. 83.  Aristotle mentions by name the rest of the categories at this point in their presentation but offers no further comment other than an allusion to his initial remark that “last year” comes under the category Time. (Categories 6.2a3.) Peter imitates him and proceeds immediately to a presentation of Aristotle’s remarks after the Categories (Categories 10–15), which Lambert will present in chapter 4. 84.  The author of the Liber sex principiorum explains why this category should not be called Time: “Time differs from When because something is measurable according to time, e.g., a year is called a long time and motion is called much when it lasts much time. But nothing is measured with respect to when, but at one point or another it will be said to be and will be declared to be temporal and variable with respect to the same” (Distat autem tempus ab eo quod quando est quoniam secundum tempus aliquid mensurabile est, ut annus quidem dicitur tempore diuturnus, et motus multus dicitur eo quod multo tempore permaneat; at secundum quando nihil mensuratur sed aliquando dicetur esse, et secundum idem temporale et variabile pronunciabitur). (Liber sex principiorum 4.42, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 43.20–44.3.) For Bacon’s discussion of When see Sd 1.2.237–40, trans. Maloney, 101–3. 85.  “Quando vero est quod ex adiacentia temporis derelinquitur.” Liber sex principiorum 4.33, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 42.1. 86.  Since what is being claimed in this paragraph is somewhat unclear, I am supplying the Latin text with one correction and Alessio’s punctuation. “Tempus autem quando non est; utriusque autem [enim Alessio] est ratio coniuncta, preteritum quoque quando non est: effectus autem eius est, et etiam non effectio [effectus autem eius et infectio que est, Liber sex principiorum, AL vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 42.3–4], secundum quod aliquid dicitur fuisse quando est; instans quoque quando non est, sed secundum quod equale vel inequale est; eius autem effectus quo aliquid dicitur nunc instans esse, quando est. Futurum similiter tempus quando non est sed id quod futurum est, quoniam contingere est necesse secundum quod aliquid dicitur futurum esse.” Logica, pp. 91.35–92.4. 87.  I am indebted to Paul Thom, Paul Spade, Eleonore Stump, Alan Perreiah, and Jon McGinnis for comments on what Bacon is trying to say in this paragraph; much of the ­language in the translation is derived from McGinnis’s suggestions. Clearly the Latin text is enigmatic, as evidenced by the variations in these scholars’ comments, but its lack of clarity is attributable to the Liber sex principiorum (4.33–34), which Lambert is quoting. (See AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 42.2–9.) It is perhaps also noteworthy that neither Peter nor Bacon reflects this analysis in his discussion of When. The Dialectica Monacensis alone of the works published by de Rijk in the Logica Modernorum gives an analysis of When, and in doing this makes two points relevant to understanding Lambert: (1) when is the direct effect of time (inmediatus effectus temporis) and (2) present when differs from past and future whens in that it is simultaneous with its cause (simul cum sua causa), the latter somewhat curious in that all effects are simultaneous with their causes. (See LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 523.31–32 and 524.4–5.) Lambert clearly embraces the first notion but then seems to draw on an additional one, namely, that time is a continuum (see 564), whereas when is



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a definite point within past, present, or future time, the effect, as it were, of time. We saw him say earlier (424), “The parts of time [are joined] to now.” Perhaps Lambert would be comfortable with the phrasing of the following questions: “When in the past (time) did you do it?” and “When in the future will you do it?” The question asks about a particular point (effect) in (the more fluid) time (cause) and clearly draws on a distinction between the now when and time. This notion of past and future time, where time is taken as a continuum, makes sense, but present time cannot be thought of as a continuum. It does not make sense to ask, “When in the present (time) are you doing it?” Lambert gives his explanation of how he squares the analysis in 558 with the claim in 557 that yesterday, a month, or a year can be a when in 560. 88.  For another discussion of the category Where see Bacon, Sd 1.2.241–46, trans. Maloney, 104–5. 89.  Liber sex principiorum 5.48, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 45.8–9. 90.  For another discussion of the category Position see Bacon, Sd 1.2.133–36, trans. Maloney, 67. 91.  Liber sex principiorum 6.60, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 48.14–15. 92.  For another discussion of the category Possession see Bacon, Sd 1.2, 247–51, trans. Maloney, 106–9. 93.  Liber sex principiorum 7.69, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 51.11–12. See also 608. 94.  For this and what follows see Liber sex principiorum 7.70–72, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 51.18–52.18, parts of which are omitted by Lambert.

Chapter Four.  Remarks after the Categories 1.  For other discussions of these remarks see Aristotle Categories 10–15; and Peter, Tractatus 3.29–33, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp.  98–101, 29–33. William and Bacon do not present these issues as comment on the concluding section of Aristotle’s ­Categories. 2.  On the pedagogical principle that terms should be defined (and divided) before they are used—a principle employed throughout this textbook—one cannot help considering the justifications given by Lambert here as failing to meet the objection. 3.  For other discussions of contrary opposites see Aristotle Categories 10–2; and Peter, Tractatus 3.29, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 98–99, 29. 4.  For other discussions of priority see Aristotle Categories 12; and Peter, Tractatus 3.30, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 99–100, 30. 5.  The point here is that if we know that two things exist, we know that one thing exists, but if we know that one thing exists, we do not necessarily know that two things do. See Aristotle Categories 12.14a32. 6.  The Latin text of the penultimate sentence reads: “Si hec enim hominem currere est verum, homo currit, et non e contrario.” (Logica, p. 100.18–19.) Ironically, the addition in the translation of quotation marks (made to avoid Lambert’s otherwise tautological expression) and the necessary emendation leave Lambert misspeaking in saying that the

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contrary does not follow; it does follow, and Aristotle and Peter acknowledge it. (See, respectively, Categories 12.14b14–20 and Tractatus 3.30, p. 40.26–27, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 100, 30.) The point he wants to make is clarified by the last sentence: the truth value of a statement is dependent on its correspondence with a state of affairs, and this is what is not “vice versa.” Lambert seems momentarily confused here and is thinking that the last sentence requires him to deny reciprocity. Aristotle and Peter both grant what is claimed in the last sentence but would reject that its truth somehow serves to justify the insertion of “but not vice versa” earlier. 7.  For other discussions of concomitance see Aristotle Categories 13; and Peter, Tractatus 3.31, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 100, 31. 8.  For other discussions of change see Aristotle Categories 14; and Peter, Tractatus 3.32, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 100–101, 32. 9.  Lambert has inadvertently left out the definition of ‘increase’. Peter defines it this way: “Increase is an addition to an already existing quantity.” See Tractatus 3.32, p. 41.17–18, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 100, 32. 10.  On this point see Aristotle Categories 14.15b6–15. 11.  For other discussions of Possession see Aristotle Categories 15.15b16–32; and Peter, Tractatus 3.33, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 101, 33. 12.  For the definition see Liber sex principiorum 7.69, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, p. 51.11–12. See also above, 588. 13.  See Aristotle Categories 15.15b28–30. The comment on the indissolubility of marriage is of course Lambert’s, not Aristotle’s. Chapter Five.  Syllogism 1. For other discussions of the material presented in this chapter see Aristotle Prior and Posterior Analytics; and William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 3.0.1–3.3.0, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 57–68; Tractatus 4, and trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 217–26; and Sd 3.1–249, trans. Maloney, 271–325. 2.  There is considerable variation in the discussion of these two terms by twelfthand thirteenth-century logicians, although all such discussions clearly take root in Boethius’s De differentiis topicis 1. See, e.g., LM, vol. 2, pt. 2: Ars Emmerana, pp. 1163.10–14 and 164.13–165.4, Ars Burana, pp. 193.7–194.3, Introductiones Parisienses, p. 362.22–27, Ut dicit, pp. 394.7–8 and 401.2–6, Cum sit nostra, pp. 434.9–10 and 438.2–6, Dialectica Monacensis, p. 487.1–12; and Peter, Tractatus 5.2, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, pp. 226–27, 2; and Bacon Sd Proemium 14 and 3.1–6, trans. Maloney, 4 and 271–72. William does not discuss them. 3. Boethius De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1174D, trans. Stump, p. 30. 4.  Peter adds two additional senses of ‘reason’ to Lambert’s four: form imposed on matter and a common essence predicated of many things (essence, species, differentiae). See Tractatus 5.1, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 226, 1. 5. Aristotle Categories 1, 1a1–2.



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6.  From a purely pedagogical point of view all talk of the function of the middle in a syllogism is premature until the notion is defined and discussed. See 666 and 718. 7.  Boethius writes: “but the expression (elocutio) of the argument is called the argumentation. So the argument is the strength (virtus), mental content (mens), and sense of argumentation; argumentation, on the other hand, is the unfolding (explicatio) of the argument by means of discourse (oratio).” De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1174D, trans. Stump, p. 30.26–31. 8.  Alessio suggests the same reference as immediately above. 9. The Cum sit nostra offers a somewhat different interpretation of Boethius’s reference to mind: “An argument and an argumentation are different because an argument is within a mind (in mente), an argumentation outside a mind (extra mentem).” (LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 438.1–3; and Boethius De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1174D, trans. Stump, p. 30.28.) Stump translates ‘mens’ by ‘mental content’ in this context, but the second occurrence of ‘mens’ in 631 seems to prevent this usage here. 10. Aristotle Topics, possibly 8.11.161a34–35, read perhaps in light of the opening lines of the Topics: “Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinions about any subject presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid saying anything contrary to it.” Topics 1.1.100a20–22, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 167. 11.  Topics 1.3.101b8–10. 12.  William and Peter implicitly present divisions of argument when they distinguish among demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistical syllogisms. Bacon, however, gives explicit and lengthy attention to these different ways of arguing. See Sd 3.146–240 (demonstrative), 241 (falsigraphic), 243–49 (dialectical), and 364, 371, 412–18 (sophistical), trans. Maloney, respectively, 304–23, 324, 325, and 370, 371, 379–81. 13. Boethius De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1180C, trans. Stump, p. 39.24–27. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16.  In Euripides’ tragedy by the same name, Medea, princess of Colchis and scorned wife of Jason, kills their two sons. Her reason: “to make you [Jason] feel pain.” Medea, ad finem. Cf. 798. 17.  Boethius’s example is worded a little differently: “Diogenes has horns, for everyone has what he never lost.” De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1181A, trans. Stump, p. 40.15–16. 18.  Ibid., 1181B–C, trans. Stump, pp. 40.20–41.11. 19.  Ibid., 1181C, trans. Stump, p. 41.1–11. 20.  Neither William, nor Peter, nor Bacon presents these clarifications. 21. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1.24a15. 22.  The reference to “parts of a statement” is probably a reference to Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a9–11, where Aristotle says: “A proposition is the one part of a contradiction, one thing said of one; it is dialectical if it assumes indifferently either part, demonstrative if it determinately assumes the one that is true.” Trans. Jonathan Barnes, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 116. 23.  For the reference Alessio suggests Boethius De differentiis topicis (1, PL 64.1174, trans. Stump, cf. p. 30), but Boethius is not speaking specifically of probable matter there.

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24. Aristotle Topics 1.1.100a30–100b24. To speak of a dialectical proposition as a question is to draw on what Aristotle says in Topics 8.2.158a16: “For a dialectical premiss must be of a form to which it is possible to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ . . . ,” i.e., when the proposition is reformulated as a question to which a “Yes” or “No” is an appropriate response. (Trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 266.) See also Topics 1.10.104a9–10. For the correction to the text see Aristotle Topics 1.1.100a25–30, wherein he distinguishes between deductive and dialectical deduction precisely on the grounds that the former uses premises that are “primitive and true . . . which are convincing on the strength of not anything else but of themselves,” in contrast to those based on “reputable opinion,” i.e., those “accepted by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable among them.” Hence, if the text is not emended in the way indicated, we would be confronted with a conflation of the two notions of the two kinds of deductions. Trans. W. A. Pickard-­ Cambridge, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 167. 25. Aristotle Topics 8.2.158a2–5. 26.  Ibid., 1.10.104a8–9. 27.  Ibid., 8.2.158a16–19. I have not found these two sorts of dialectic (i.e., inquiry and question) clearly distinguished in the Topics. 28. Boethius De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1177C, trans. Stump, p. 34.36–38. The terms “and ambiguity” are an addition by Lambert to Boethius’s text. 29.  “Still, to have gone through the various difficulties is not unprofitable.” Aristotle Categories 7.8b21–24, trans. J. L. Ackrill, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 14. 30. Boethius De differentiis topicis 1, PL 64.1174C, trans. Stump, p. 30.14–15. 31.  For Stump’s conjecture regarding why Boethius speaks of arguments (in the plural) in his definition see her Boethius’ “De topicis differentiis” (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 99–100. A sign, according to Aristotle, is “a demonstrative proposition necessary or reputable; for anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being.” Prior Analytics 2.27.70a6–8, trans. A. J. Jenkinson, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 112. 32.  This is the standard definition of ‘syllogism’ given by William, Peter, and Bacon, and it derives from Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 1.1.24b19–20. 33.  For other presentations of the explanation see Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1.24b21– 22; and William and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 3.0.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 57–58; and Sd 3.15–18, trans. Maloney, 275. Peter offers no explanation. 34. Aristotle Prior Analytics 2.5–7.57b17–59a42 and 2.17.65a38–66a15, respectively. For the notion of ineffective combinations see 649. For the other defects (peccata contra sillogismum) see Prior Analytics 2.5–7.57b18–59a41. 35.  Another pedagogical lapse: the notions of mood and figure mentioned here and figure in 646, 649, and 659 are not defined until 667. 36.  For Lambert’s notion of induction see 661. Aristotle says that “induction proceeds through an enumeration of all the cases.” (Prior Analytics 2.23.68b29, trans. A. J. Jenkinson, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 110.) Induction, he also says, is different from deduction: “And in a way induction is opposed to deduction: for the latter proves the extreme to belong to the third



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term by means of the middle, the former proves the extreme to belong to the middle by means of the third.” Ibid., 68b32–34. 37.  For the notion of example see 663. For Aristotle’s comment on Begging the Original Issue see Prior Analytics 2.16.64b28–65a37. 38. Aristotle Prior Analytics 2.17.65a18–66a15. 39.  Ibid., 2.1–4.52b8–57b16. 40.  Ibid., 1.4.26b21–26. 41.  The combination of terms is ineffective: while the proposition that is the conclusion is true, its truth does not follow from the premises. 42.  “. . . ‘quibusdam’ enim in diffinitione sillogismi idem est quod unius.” (Logica, p. 109.9–10.) In 656 Lambert told us that syllogisms require at least two premises, so it is not clear to what “of one thing” refers and why it is stated in the genitive case. He may be simply trying to say that it only takes one fallacy to invalidate an otherwise sound syllogism. Whatever the case, it is not clear how the reason given here explains why “when certain things have been asserted and conceded” is inserted in the definition of ‘syllogism’. 43.  Medievals, following Aristotle and Boethius, distinguish between propositions that are single (simplices) and multiple (plures) on the basis of whether one or more than one answer can be given to them. Lambert does not analyze the distinction, but Bacon gives an unusually thorough treatment of it. See Sd 2.184–235, trans. Maloney, 165–74. For further information on the distinction see Thomas S. Maloney, “Roger Bacon on the Division of Statements into Single/Multiple and Simple/Composed,” Review of Metaphysics 61 (2002): 297–321; and his “Boethius on Aristotle on the Division of Statements into Single/Multiple and Simple/Composed,” Carmina Philosophiae 12 (2003): 49–69. 44.  For Lambert’s justification of this claim see above, 44 and 46. 45. Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1.208a23ff. 46.  For other discussions of Enthymeme see Aristotle Prior Analytics 2. 27.70a9 to the end; Peter, Tractatus 5.3, trans Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 227–28, 3; and Bacon, Sd 3.136–38, trans. Maloney, 300. William does not discuss enthymemes. 47.  With a minor alteration (‘time’ for ‘timos’) the etymology given here is also found in the Summe Metenses, Ars Burana, and Introductiones Parisienses. Those works along with the Dialectica Monacensis also present the notion that one of the premises in an enthymeme is retained in the mind. Neither notion is presented in the Ut dicit and Cum sit nostra, both simply defining ‘enthymeme’ as an argumentation containing one premise and one conclusion. Bacon proposes a derivation of the term from ‘en’ and ‘mime’. In point of fact the correct derivation is from ‘εν’ and ‘θύμος’. See, respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 478, vol. 2.2, p. 194.27–28, p. 363.19–20, p. 488.3–4, p. 394.13–15, p. 434.12–13; and Sd 3.137, trans. Maloney, 300. 48.  For other discussions of Induction see Aristotle Prior Analytics 2.23.68b15–36; Peter, Tractatus 5.3, trans Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 227, 3; and Bacon, Sd 3.139– 40, trans. Maloney, 301. William does not discuss induction. 49.  For other discussions of Example see Aristotle Prior Analytics 2.24.68b37–69a19; Peter, Tractatus 5.3, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 228, 3; and Bacon, Sd 3.141, trans. Maloney, 302. William does not discuss Example.

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50.  For other discussions of these material principles see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 3.1.0, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 59–60; Tractatus 4.2, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 218, 2; and Sd 3.69–71, trans. Maloney, 290. 51.  For the notions of “due predication and subjection” see 681; for those of “due quality and quantity” see 675–80. 52.  For other discussions of this division see William and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 3.0.2, trans. Kretzmann, p. 58; and Sd 3.19, trans. Maloney, 276. Peter does not mention it in this context. 53. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo 2, PL 64.812C. 54.  Ibid., 823A. 55.  In each of these the major term serves as the subject and the minor term as the predicate of the conclusion. They are imperfect, then, because of the need for conversion. 56. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo 2, PL 64.812C. 57.  This point is stated another way in 689. 58.  For other discussions of these notions see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 3.1.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 61 and n. 22; Tractatus 4.1, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 217, 1; and Sd 3.20, trans. Maloney, 277. 59.  For example, respectively, ‘All men are mortal’ and ‘No men are mortal’. 60.  “That one term should be in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be predicated of all of the first.” Prior Analytics 1.1.24b26–27, trans. A. J. Jenkinson, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 40. 61.  Peter and Bacon supply similar rules (though not in the same order) that are meant to cover all syllogisms, and Peter presents one omitted by Lambert in this context: “The middle must not be placed in the conclusion.” (See, respectively, Tractatus 4.4, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 218–19, 4; and Sd 3.80–83, trans. Maloney, 292.) Thus, in relation to Lambert’s list, Peter omits Lambert’s first rule, states twice the latter’s third rule, and adds one. Bacon also omits Lambert’s first rule. William, however, is singularly parsimonious: “Note that nothing follows from two negatives or from two particulars.” ­Introductiones 3.3.0, trans. Kretzmann, p. 68. 62. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.4.26a15. 63.  The mnemonic is omitted by William and Peter, but Bacon includes it in abbreviated terms. (Sd 3.73, trans. Maloney, 290.) This results in the following three figures, where S stands for the subject in the conclusion, P for the Predicate in the conclusion, and M for the remaining (middle) term: First Figure Second Figure Third Figure Major M P P M M P Minor S M S M M S Conclusion S P S P S P 64.  There is not always agreement on what rules are to be associated with each figure. For example, and apropos of the first figure, William, Peter, and Bacon present these rules. William: “In the first figure nothing follows directly if the major is particular or the minor



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negative.” Peter: “If the minor premise is negative, nothing follows . . . if the major premise is particular, nothing follows.” Bacon: “A universal affirmative and a particular negative can be concluded in the first figure because both the minor and major can be universal, particular, affirmative, or negative.” See, respectively, Introductiones 3.3.0, trans. Kretzmann, p. 68; Tractatus 4.5, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 219, 5; and Sd 3.84, trans. Maloney, 292. 65. The Dialectica Monacensis points out that the first four moods come from Aris­ totle’s Prior Analytics, whereas the five that conclude indirectly come from Boethius. See, respectively, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 492.9–12; Prior Analytics 1.4.25b26–26b34; and De syllogismo categorico libri duo 2, PL 64.814C. 66. Boethius De syllogismo categorico libri duo 2, PL 64.805C. 67.  Of the procedure described Kretzmann writes: “The use of conversion by limitation here (as in the attempts to reduce Darapti to Darii and Felapton to Ferio . . .) does not produce a genuine reduction because this kind of conversion (unlike the other two kinds) is not a reversible operation. Thus, instead of showing that Fapesmo may be derived from Ferio, this ‘reduction’ might be taken to show that Ferio may be derived from Fapesmo, which is of no use in this justification-procedure and certainly not what was intended. The mistake, however, is Aristotle’s; Sherwood (and, e.g., Peter of Spain) can be blamed only for repeating it. See An. pr., Bk. I, Ch. 6 (28a17–29).” (Introductiones, trans. Kretzmann, p. 64, n. 30.) 68.  Apropos of the second figure William, Peter, and Bacon present various rules. William: “Nothing follows directly if the major is particular or the minor negative.” Peter: “If the major premise is particular, nothing follows . . . nothing follows from premises that are entirely affirmative . . . the conclusion is always negative.” Bacon: “In the second figure the major is always universal and the conclusion negative.” See, respectively, Introductiones 3.3.0, trans. Kretzmann, p. 68; Tractatus 4.7, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 221, 7; and Sd 3.85, trans. Maloney, 292. 69.  More correctly, ‘Every stone is an animal’ does not contradict the contradictory opposite of the original minor ‘Some stone is not an animal’; it is its contradictory opposite. 70.  Apropos of the third figure William and Peter present the same rules as Lambert does, but Bacon says: “In the third figure the minor is always affirmative and the conclusion particular.” See, respectively, Introductiones 3.3.0, trans. Kretzmann, p. 68; Tractatus 4.10, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 222; and Sd 3.86, trans. Maloney, 292. 71.  See above, n. 67. 72.  See above, n. 67. 73.  Note, however, that reduction per impossibile proceeds differently in the second and third figures. In the second figure the contradictory opposite of the conclusion substitutes for the original minor, whereas in the third figure it substitutes for the original major. See 701. 74.  In 711–16 Lambert shows how the various vowels and consonants and their placements in these words are significant. The mnemonic here was devised to be an aid to memory in reducing all syllogisms other than the first four of the first figure to the first four in the first figure; however, it gets passed down with not a little variation.

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First, as to the names themselves: the spellings given by Lambert are for the most part the traditional ones. However, one finds ‘Capestres’ here, ‘Camestres’ in the Dialectica Monacensis and Lohr’s and Brands and Kann’s editions of William’s Introductiones (3.2, ed. Lohr, p. 246; ed. Brands and Kann, p. 76.243), but ‘Campestres’ in the Cum sit nostra and Grabmann’s edition of William’s Introductiones (which Kretzmann changes to ‘Camestres’ in his translation), and ‘Cambestres’ in the Introductiones Parisienses, Ut dicit, and Peter’s Tractatus. Second, all who present the mnemonic tell us that the vowels ‘a’, ‘e’, ‘i’, ‘o’ indicate the four basic proposition types we saw in 80–81. Third, all of the authors just mentioned point out that the first letter of the names of the fifteen imperfect moods indicates the name of the mood of the four perfect moods (the first four of the first figure) to which imperfect moods are reduced: B to B, C to C, D to D, and F to F. Fourth, almost always the letter ‘p’ is designated to indicate that a conversion by limitation is required in the reduction; the Dialectica Monacensis uses ‘b’. The letter ‘m’ is chosen to indicate that the premises must be interchanged—its relationship to a preceding vowel is inconsequential. When simple conversion is required it is always indicated by ‘s’. But to indicate reduction per impossibile there is considerable variety. The Cum sit nostra, Peter, and Bacon choose ‘c’; the Introductiones Parisienses designates ‘r’; William selects the appearance of ‘b’ and ‘r’ in the same word; and Lambert selects the appearance of ‘b’ and ‘o’ in the same word (716). Fifth, the Cum sit nostra, Peter, Bacon, and Lambert inform us that the vowel immediately before the consonant that indicates what method of reduction is to be used indicates which proposition (major, minor) is affected: the first three vowels appearing in each name represent, respectively, the major, minor, and conclusion. Sixth, Lambert and Peter point out that any syllables beyond three (Baralipton and Frisesomorum) tell us nothing about the way to reduce the syllogism; they are there only for the sake of meter (Lambert) or are superfluous (Peter). Seventh, the Cum sit nostra seems to be unique in beginning the second line with Baralipton, thereby visually separating the four perfect moods of the first figure from the five imperfect ones of that figure. While William and the Dialectica Monacensis place Darapti (correctly) at the beginning of the fourth line—the beginning of the third figure—Peter, Bacon, Lambert, Introductiones Parisienses, Ut dicit, and Cum sit nostra place it at the end of the third line. Nevertheless, all treat it as indicative of the first mood of the third figure. Eighth, is there a correct spelling of the name variously indicated by ‘Capestres’, ‘Camestres’, ‘Campestres’, ‘Cambestres’? Clearly, only the second is correct. To reduce Camestres to Celarent one is to (s) convert simply the minor and the conclusion and (m) transpose the major and minor. (See 699 and 715.) Since no conversion by limitation (p) is envisioned, and transposition (m) is needed, Lambert errs on both counts. Curiously, only two of the eight texts I am examining have Camestres, granted an additional three have Cambestres, as was seen. Turning to a different word, one finds Felapton in the Ut dicit, Cum sit nostra, Dialectica Monacensis, William, and Bacon, but Felapto in the Introductiones Parisienses, Peter, and Lambert. Finally, Feriso is found in place of Ferison in the Dialectica Monacensis.



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And ninth, the greatest variation in the tradition centers on the selection of a letter to designate the need for reduction per impossibile. Curiously, the Ut dicit and Dialectica Monacensis fail to provide one at all, although they of course employ the procedure. Since only Baroco and Bocardo involve this sort of reduction, the choice of ‘c’ is appropriate, as occurs in the Cum sit nostra, Peter, and Bacon. William’s choice of ‘b’ and ‘r’ is not a good one. It requires one to use the initial letter of the word, which is at odds with the convention; it falsely suggests that Baralipton reduces per impossibile; and the vowel preceding the ‘r’ indicates the wrong premise for the substitution—it should be the minor in Baroco and the major in Bocardo, a task correctly carried out by the designation of ‘c’. Lambert’s use of ‘b’ and ‘o’ is better but again employs an initial letter and needs two additional rules to make it work: (1) the ‘o’ at issue must be the first appearance of that letter in a word beginning with ‘b’, and (2) the syllable in which the ‘o’ appears indicates the premise for substitution but the ‘o’ must not immediately precede ‘r’. (Cf. 715.) Baralipton is correctly ruled out because the ‘o’ appears in the fourth syllable (see 711), and the ‘o’ designates the correct premise in Baroco (minor) and Bocardo (major). But the most inexplicable choice is made by the Dialectica Monacensis in selecting ‘r’, for this would require extending the list beyond Baroco and Bocardo to five others, not counting initial letters and Camestres (since the ‘r’ is not preceded by a vowel), and none of these requires reduction per impossibile. For additional brief comment on the history of this mnemonic see L. M. de Rijk, LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 401–2. 75.  See above, n. 74, “third.” 76.  See above, n. 74, “ninth.” 77.  In the second figure the middle serves as a predicate in both premises. Therefore the locution “placed over” must trade on the notion that predicates (ordinarily) signify something broader than their subjects do, and therefore something logically higher on the Porphyrean Tree. 78.  An example of a sound argument (Ferio) in the fourth figure is: ‘No animals are vegetative things, some vegetative things are trees; therefore some trees are not animals’. 79.  Mere transposition of premises should not be a problem, given what is said in 715 about words having ‘m’ in them, granted in all cases where transposition appears conversion precedes the transposition. See 695–96, 699, and 705.

Chapter Six.  Topics 1.  For other discussions of Topics see Aristotle Topics; and Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor, PL 64.1173–1216, trans. Stump; and William, Peter, and Bacon, ­respectively, Introductiones 4.0.2–4.3.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  70–104; Tractatus 5.4–77, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 228–45, 4–77; and Sd 3.250–361, trans. Maloney, ­326–68. ‘Locus’ is Boethius’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘τόπος’ and it is sometimes translated by ‘dialectical ground’ or ‘Topic’. I have chosen the latter and am capitalizing it to call attention to the fact that it is a term with a technical sense here. See 726.

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For modern introductions to and discussions of the notion of Topics see several works by Eleonore Stump: “Boethius’ Works on Topics,” Vivarium 12 (1974): 77–93; “Topics: Their Development and Absorption into Consequences,” in CHLMP, pp. 237–99; and “Logic in the Early Twelfth Century,” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Synthese Historical Library, vol. 32 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 31–55. See also N. J. Green-Pederson, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages: The Commentaries on Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Topics (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984) and “The Topics in Medieval Logic,” Argumentation 1 (1987): 407–17; and Sten Ebbesen, “The Theory of Loci in Antiquity and the Middle Ages,” in Arumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, ed. Klaus Jacobi, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 38 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), pp. 15–39. 2.  Boethius defines a Topic in this way: “A Topic is the seat of an argument, or that from which one draws an argument appropriate to the question under consideration.” De differentiis topicis libri quattor 1, PL 64.1174D, trans. Stump, p. 30.32–34. 3. Aristotle Topics 6.3.140a10. 4.  “Such a proposition is sometimes contained within the boundaries of an argument, and sometimes it supplies force to the argument and makes [it] complete from without.” Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1185B, trans. Stump, p. 46.35–37. 5.  The reference to questions is a reminder that the quest for propositions that confirm arguments is discussed by Aristotle and the medievals in the context of a dialectical exchange between a questioner and a respondent. Hence the type of question at issue is called a dialectical question, i.e., one that admits of a simple “yes” or “no,” “true” or “false,” and not a question of the sort “What is the nature of time,” a doctrinal question. (See Topics 8.12.158a16.) Hence every syllogism, composed of such propositions, is resolving a problem implied in the conclusion of the argument and rendered explicit when the conclusion is stated as a (dialectical) question. See Aristotle Topics 1.10–11, e.g., 104a9–10. 6.  Bacon’s explanation of an intrinsic Topic is especially helpful in that it points to the role of the middle term in a syllogism: “. . . every argumentation ought to resolve a question. . . . Every question, moreover, has two terms, namely a predicate and a subject. One must, therefore, discover a middle between the two terms placed in the question in order to compose or divide those terms [i.e., answer the question]. We discover that middle in some Topic, for example, in one that is the differentia of a maxim, and if this Topic pertains especially greatly to either of the terms placed in the question in such a way that it indicates its whole nature or a part, then it is called an intrinsic Topic because it pertains to the intrinsic nature of the term placed in the question. If it pertains in no way to the nature of the terms placed in the question and is entirely alien, it is called an extrinsic Topic. But, if it maintains a sort of middle status and is neither entirely alien nor entirely consonant and internal, it is called an intermediate Topic.” Sd 3.257–62, trans. Maloney, 327. 7.  The reference to grammatical cases (casus) and conjugates (coniugata) recalls what was said about denominatives: abstract qualities like whiteness cannot be predicated or said of something unless their names are concretized, as happens when ‘white’ is formed from ‘whiteness’.



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8.  For other discussions of the Topics from a definition and from the thing defined see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 72–73; Tractatus 5.6–7, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 230–31, 6–7; and Sd 3.267–72, trans. Maloney, 329; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1187A–D, trans. Stump, p. 49.9–50.36. 9.  To speak of the being of a thing (esse rei) in this context is to talk of the thing’s essence (essentia rei), and this is to answer the question, What is it?, by defining it. 10.  For other discussions of the Topics from description and from the thing described see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 73–74; Tractatus 5.8, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 231, 8; Sd 3.273–78, trans. Maloney, 330; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1187B–D, trans. Stump, pp. 49.38–50.22. 11.  On the use of accidents for description Boethius says: “Although these definitions which arise from accidents seem in no way to show the substance, nevertheless proofs taken from description also seem to be taken from the Topic from substance since descriptions are often put in place of a true definition which shows the substance.” De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1187C, trans. Stump, p. 50.5–10. 12.  For other discussions of the Topics from the explanation of a name see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 74–75; Tractatus 5.9, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 231–32, 9; and Sd 3.279–83, trans. Maloney, 331; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64, 1187D–1188A, trans. Stump, p. 50.23–36. 13.  Lambert has forgotten to state the maxim, but Peter puts it this way: “. . . ‘A lover of wisdom is running; therefore a philosopher is running’. Where does the Topic come from? From the explanation of a name. The maxim: Whatever is predicated of the explanation is predicated also of what is explained.” Tractatus 5.9, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 232, 9. 14.  For other discussions of the topic from a universal whole or from a genus see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.4, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  75–77; Tractatus 5.12, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 233, 12; and Sd 3.287–89, trans. Maloney, 333; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1188B–C, trans. Stump, p. 51.12–24. 15.  While it is somewhat unusual to speak of species as a genus of individuals I have resisted the temptation of translating it by ‘class’ because Lambert will again use this terminology in 1443. 16. Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1188B, trans. Stump, ­p. ­51.15–18. 17.  For other discussions of the Topic from an integral whole see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.6, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 78–79; Tractatus 5.14, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 233–34, 14; and Sd 3.294–99, trans. Maloney, 336; and Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64, 1188C–D, trans. Stump, p. 51.25–32. 18.  For other discussions of the Topic from a quantitative whole see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.8, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 79–81; Tractatus 5.15, trans.

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Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 234, 15; and Sd 3.300–302, trans. Maloney, 337; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64, 1189B, trans. Stump, p. 52.33–55. 19.  Lambert omits to state explicitly that this Topic holds constructively and destructively, but the examples make this clear. 20.  For other discussions of the Topic from a modal whole see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.14, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 83–84; Tractatus 5.16, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 235, 16; and Sd 3.306–7, trans. Maloney, 340; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189A–B, trans. Stump, p. ­52.27–37. 21.  For other discussions of the Topic from a temporal whole see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.10, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  81–82; Tractatus 5.18, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 235, 18; and Sd 3.305, trans. Maloney, 339; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189B, trans. Stump, p. 52.38–40. 22.  E.g., ‘God does not exist now; therefore God does not always exist’. For the Topic see 773. 23.  For other discussions of the Topic from a locational whole see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.12, trans. Kretzmann, p. 82; Tractatus 5.17, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 235, 17; and Sd 3.303–4, trans. Maloney, 338; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64, 1189C, trans. Stump, p. 53.6–7. 24.  For other discussions of the Topic from a species or from a subjective part see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  77–78; Tractatus 5.13, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 233, 13; and Sd 3.290–93, trans. Maloney, 334–35; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1188C–D, trans. Stump, pp. 51.37–52.8. 25.  For other discussions of the Topic from an integral part see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.7, trans. Kretzmann, p.  79; Tractatus 5.14, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 234, 14; and Sd 3.299, trans. Maloney, 336; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1188D–1189A, trans. Stump, p. 52.9–26. 26.  For other discussions of the Topic from a quantitative part see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.9, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 8–81; Tractatus 5.15, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 234–35, 15; and Sd 3.301, trans. Maloney, 337; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189B, trans. Stump, p. 53.3–5. 27.  For other discussions of the Topic from a modal part see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.15, trans. Kretzmann, p. 84; Tractatus 5.16, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 235, 16; and Sd 3.307, trans. Maloney, 340; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189A–C, trans. Stump, pp. 52.27–53.7. 28.  For other discussions of topics from a temporal part and from a locational part see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.11 and 4.1.13, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 81 and 82; Tractatus 5.18 and 17, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 235, 18 and 17; and Sd 3.305 and 304, trans. Maloney, 339 and 338; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189B–C, trans. Stump, pp. 52.38–40 and 53.6–7. 29.  In 780 Lambert will acknowledge that all these additional Topics can be reduced to the Topics from a universal whole and from an integral whole. This no doubt explains why Boethius, William, Peter, and Bacon do not explicitly address these Topics.



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30.  In Latin the premise reads: “Socrates nec currit vel disputat.” While this could be read to say “Socrates does not run or he argues,” that reading would not imply the conclusion as stated, so the translation takes ‘vel’ to have the sense of a second ‘nec’. 31.  Lambert’s language here and in 781 would seem to suggest that on the issue of the plurality of souls—whether a human being’s ability to act vegetatively, sensitively, and rationally indicates one form with three functions or three forms each with its own proper ­function—he is on the side of those who maintain only a virtual distinction among the various powers of one soul as opposed to those who hold a formal distinction among them. See 781. 32.  Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii De divisione liber, ed. and trans. by John Magee, Philosophia Antiqua, vol. 77 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998), p. 40.20–24. 33. Aristotle On the Soul 1.1.403b1–7. 34.  For other discussions of the Topics from an efficient cause and from the effect of an efficient cause see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.18, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 86–87; Tractatus 5.19, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 236, 19; and Sd 3.314, trans. Maloney, 341; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189C, trans. Stump, p. 53.8–12. 35.  Presumably, Lambert considers a house builder (domificator) an insufficient and indirect cause of a house because he must use tools and materials for its construction. 36.  For other discussions of the Topics from a material cause and from the effect of a material cause see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.151–56, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 84–85; Tractatus 5.20, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 236–37, 20; and Sd 3.309–11, trans. Maloney, 341; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189C–D, trans. Stump, p. 53.21–28. 37.  For other discussions of the Topics from a formal cause and from the effect of a formal cause see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.17, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 85–86; Tractatus 5.21, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 237, 21; and Sd 3.312–13, trans. Maloney, 341; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189D–1190A, trans. Stump, p. 53.35–38. 38.  For other discussions the Topics from a final cause and from the effect of a final cause see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.19, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 87–88; Tractatus 5.22, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 237, 22; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1189D, trans. Stump, p. 53.29–34. 39.  The first half of the disjunct in this sentence is the traditional definition of a final cause. The second adds nothing by way of clarity, even with the emendation, which is made by pure conjecture. 40.  For other discussions of the Topics from generation and from what is generated see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.20, trans. Kretzmann, p. 89; Tractatus 5.23, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 237–38, 23; and Sd 3.317, trans. Maloney, 342; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1190A, trans. Stump, pp. 53.39–54.1, 6–8. 41.  For other discussions of the Topics from destruction and from what is destroyed see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.21, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 90–91;

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Tractatus 5.24, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 238, 24; and Sd 3.319, trans. Maloney, 344; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1190A, trans. Stump, p. 54.1–3, 8–9. 42.  For other discussions of the Topic from uses see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.22, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 91–92; Tractatus 5.25, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 238, 25; and Sd 3.318, trans. Maloney, 343; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1190A–B, trans. Stump, p. 54.3–4, 10. 43.  William, Peter, and Bacon confirm that the Topic holds also destructively: That whose use is bad is itself also bad. (See, e.g., Tractatus 5.25, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 238, 25.) But does it follow that, if the horseback riding is bad, e.g., for a person with arthritis in the hips, the horse is bad? To answer this one must recognize that what is being said to be bad is not the effect horseback riding has on a rider—bad if he or she has arthritis in the hips—but the ride that a horse gives as a result of moving in various gaits. So possibly an example of bad horseback riding would be what a rider experiences from a bucking horse or perhaps a reluctant one, i.e., a ride that would not ordinarily be called ­useful. 44.  For other discussions of the Topic from associated accidents see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.1.23, trans. Kretzmann, p. 92; Tractatus 5.26, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 238–39, 26; and Sd 3.320, trans. Maloney, 345; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1190B, trans. Stump, p. 54.11–19. 45.  In 628 this example was said not to have “the ring of truth’ (similitas veritatis). 46.  For the use of this example as a sophistical Topic see 1192. 47.  In the examples the primary (prius) associated accident is being repentant and the secondary (posterius) is having done something wrong. Note that the temporal order of the events is reversed. Peter adds the maxim: If the primary associated accident does not inhere in something, neither does the secondary associated accident. (Tractatus 5.26, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 239, 26.) 48.  For other discussions of the Topic from authority see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  93–94; Tractatus 5.36, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 243, 36; and Sd 3.322, trans. Maloney, 347; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64, 1190C, trans. Stump, p. 54.26–34. 49.  Here and in 804 Lambert wants to emphasize that the way things are in the extramental world dictates what we can truthfully say about them—the basis for a correspondence theory of truth. The legal adages “Res ipsa loquitur” (The facts speak for themselves) and “Res clamat ad dominum” (The thing cries out for its owner) draw on this notion and provide the context in which to interpret Lambert’s use of the genitive case in “iudicium sapientis” (judgment by a wise man) in 801 and “iudicium rei” (judgment by a thing) here. In each case I think the translator’s use of ‘by’ rather than ‘of ’ brings out what Lambert wants to say in these two places. In the latter, he wants to say that it is the facticity of the object that in an extended sense judges our claims about it. See especially 804 where the judgment by a wise man is said “to be drawn from the thing itself ” (ab ipsa re trahitur) and Aristotle is invoked to remind that where there is a conflict between our judgment and the nature of a thing (si natura rei dissentiat), it is the thing that is to prevail. Logica, p. 133.21.



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50.  Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 1.164b23–165a30. 51.  For other discussions of the Topic from a greater and from a lesser see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.3–4, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 95–96; Tractatus 5.32, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 241, 32; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1190D–1191A, trans. Stump, p. 55.7–26. 52.  For other discussions of the Topic from a similar see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  94–95; Tractatus 5.33, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 241–42, 33; and Sd 3.324, trans. Maloney, 348; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1190C–D, trans. Stump, pp. ­54.35–55.6. 53.  One finds a variant in the wording of the maxim in Peter’s Tractatus: ‘The judgment concerning similars is the same’ and ‘If one of a pair of similars inheres, so does the other; or, if one does not inhere, neither does the other’. Tractatus 5.33, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 241–42, 33. 54.  For other discussions of the Topic from proportion see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  96–97; Tractatus 5.34, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 242, 34; and Sd 3.327, trans. Maloney, 351; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1191A–B, trans. Stump, p. 55.30–40. 55.  When reading authors on the previous Topics one comes across claims such as “One argues constructively from this Topic” or “One argues destructively from this Topic.” But in Topics from opposites the premise and the conclusion have different qualities—one is positive, one is negative, e.g., ‘Socrates is white; therefore he is not black’. From which, then, is the argument to be denominated constructive or destructive? It seems the authors are not in agreement. William and Bacon denominate on the basis of the quality of the conclusion; Peter on the basis of the quality of the premise. Lambert, as we shall see, avoids the problem by not denominating the arguments constructive or destructive. 56.  For other discussions of the Topic from contrary opposites see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.6, trans. Kretzmann, p.  97; Tractatus 5.29, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 240, 29; and Sd 3.329–33, 340, and 345, trans. Maloney, 353–55, 359, and 362; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1191C, trans. Stump, p. 56.8–12. 57.  Neither William, nor Peter, nor Bacon makes this important point. 58.  For other discussions of the Topic from privative opposites see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.7, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 97–98; Tractatus 5.30, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 240, 30; and Sd 3.334–35, 341, and 346, trans. Maloney, 356, 360, and 362; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1191C–D, trans. Stump, p. 56.13–23. 59.  For other discussions of the Topic from contradictory opposites see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.8, trans. Kretzmann, p. 98; Tractatus 5.31, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 241, 31; and Sd 3.329, 337–39 (and 344), and 348 (at first Bacon denies there is such a Topic, then he treats it, and finally offers a warning), trans. Maloney, respectively, 353, 358, and 362; and Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1191D–1192A, trans. Stump, p. 56.32–39. 60.  For other discussions of the Topic from relative opposites see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.9, trans. Kretzmann, p.  98; Tractatus 5.28, trans.

384

Notes to Pages 167–173

Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 239–40, 28; and Sd 3.336, trans. Maloney, 357; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1191D, trans. Stump, p. 56.24–31. 61. Aristotle Categories 7.7b18. 62.  It is not clear on whom Lambert is basing his treatment of this Topic from disparates. Neither Boethius, nor William, nor Peter, nor Bacon treat of this Topic, nor do I find explicit reference to it in the works published in de Rijk’s Logica Modernorum. 63.  For other discussions of the Topic from transumption see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.2.10, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  99–100; Tractatus 5.35, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 242–43, 35; and Sd 3.354, trans. Maloney, 363; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1192A, trans. Stump, pp. 56.40–57.18. 64.  The sophistical Topic would be the Fallacy of Equivocation, for which see 895. 65.  Lambert’s definition involves redundancy. Peter’s is: “The relationship of one transferred thing to another” (habitudo unius transumpti ad aliud). Tractatus 5.35, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 243, 35. 66.  For other discussions of the Topic from conjugated names see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.3.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 100–101; Tractatus 5.38, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 244, 38; and Sd 3.357, trans. Maloney, 366; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1192B–C, trans. Stump, pp. ­57.25–58.2. 67. Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1192B, trans. Stump, p. ­57.25–27. 68.  For other discussions of the Topic from cases see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.3.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 101–2; Tractatus 5.39, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 244, 39; and Sd 3.356, trans. Maloney, 365; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1192B–C, trans. Stump, pp. 57.23–58.2. 69. Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1192B, trans. Stump, p. ­57.23–25. 70.  ‘Goodly’ is an acceptable English adverb derived from ‘good’, but it is improperly used here to illustrate Lambert’s point about derivations. It also appears in 831 and 832, but there it is employed without offense. 71.  For other discussions of the Topic from division see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 4.3.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  102–4; Tractatus 5.40, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 244–45, 40; and Sd 3.358, trans. Maloney, 367; see also Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1192C–1194A, trans. Stump, pp. ­58.3–60.18. 72. Boethius De differentiis topicis libri quattuor 2, PL 64.1193A–1194A, trans. Stump, pp. 58.3–60.18. 73.  For the notion of enthymemes see 660.

Chapter Seven.  Sophistical Topics 1.  For studies of the fallacies see Sten Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi: A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), and “The Way Fallacies Were Treated in Scholastic



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Logic,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin 55 (1987): 107–34; L. M. de Rijk, On the Twelfth-Century Theories of Fallacy, in LM, vol. 1; Irène Rosier, “L’un et le multiple: Problème sémantique de la tradition médiévale des Commentaires sur les Réfutations Sophistiques d’Aristote,” Modèles Linguistiques 5 (1983): 39–68; and Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003). 2.  Since Lambert has already treated of the strictly demonstrative syllogism in chapter 5, he should not be understood here to be rejecting the commonly accepted tripartite division of syllogism. 3. Aristotle Topics 1.1.100a18–30. 4.  This is what Aristotle calls contentious reasonings. See Topics 1.1.100b24–101a4. 5.  For Lambert’s derivation of ‘paralogism’ see 928. 6.  Bacon describes four kinds of disputations: didactic (doctrinalis), dialectical, one that examines (temptativa), and sophistical. Sd 3.367, trans. Maloney, 371. 7. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 2.165b2–4. 8.  Ibid., 165b7–9. 9.  Not all distinguish species of disputation based on the five goals. Peter does, but William and Bacon do not. See Tractatus 5.13. 10.  For other discussions of the five goals of disputation see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.0.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  133–34; Tractatus 7.13; and Sd 3.384–91, trans. Maloney, 376. 11.  Where some medievals speak of falsity Aristotle speaks of fallacy. See On Sophistical Refutations 3.165b14–5. 12. Aristotle Topics 8.11.161a31. 13.  Peter offers a considerably different understanding of paradox: the improbable involves a relation to reasons that are clearly contrary, whereas paradox occurs “inasmuch as the mind does not want to apprehend or consent to [the paradox] but rather flees and disagrees.” Tractatus 7.16. 14. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 3.165b21. 15.  For the hierarchy see Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 3.165b13–21. 16. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 4.165b25–30. While Alessio suggests On Sophistical Refutations 4.165b25–30, Aristotle’s remarks on ambiguity there pertain only to the fallacy of equivocation. But see below, 884–90, where Lambert distinguishes three kinds of ambiguity and applies them to five of the six verbal fallacies, omitting the Figure of a Word. 17.  For a general overview of the medieval approach to the ambiguity at issue in the fallacies see Alain de Libera, “Reference et champ: Genése et structure des théories médiévales de l’ambiguïté (IIe–XIIIe siècles),” Medieoevo 10 (1984): 155–208. The source for this triple division was often said to be Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on On Sophistical Refutations (see, e.g., Peter, Tractatus 7.25), but Ebbesen has made it clear that it first appears in the writings of the second-century physician Galen and then resurfaces in a commentary on On Sophistical Refutations by Michael of Ephesus around 1130. See Sten Ebbesen, “Philoponus, ‘Alexander’, and the Origins of Medieval Logic,” in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 447.

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18.  See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 4.165b30 ff., and for his solution 19.177a9 ff. For other discussions of this fallacy see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 135–39; Tractatus 7.26–39; and Sd 3.424–61, trans. Maloney, 383–89. 19.  The preference for the second notion of ‘equivocation’ seems to be commonly accepted. See, e.g., Peter, Tractatus 7.26. 20.  Equivocation in the first sense occurs when one word means more than one totally different thing, e.g., ‘bat’. In the second sort of equivocation the meanings are in some sense related. A substance is an entity and so is an accident, but since accidents are dependent on substances for their being, and not vice versa, the being that a substance has is ontologically superior to that which an accident has, but the difference is one of degree, not so total as that found in the examples of equivocation in the first sense. Equivocation in the third sense derives from different accidents, not substances, and these can be the accidents of the Latin language—case, gender, number, tense, etc.—or of things—the nine Aristotelian categories of accidents. Thus one word like ‘domus’ can mean “a house,” or “of a house,” or a phrase like ‘sedens surgebat’ can mean “one who is sitting was getting up” or “one who was sitting was getting up,” a difference in time with respect to the same person. Bacon distinguishes five (or six) kinds of equivocation, all based on diminishing degrees of difference in what is signified. See, respectively, his “De signis” 36–46, ed. K. M. Fredborg, Lauge Nielsen, and Jan Pinborg, “An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon’s Opus maius: ‘De signis’,” Traditio 34 (1978); Compendium studii theologiae 129–41, ed. and trans. Thomas S. Maloney, Roger Bacon: Compendium of the Study of Theology, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 20 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), henceforth Cst, followed by paragraph number; and Thomas S. Maloney, “Roger Bacon on Equivocation,” Vivarium 22 (1984): 85–112. 21.  In standard English (whatever the case with a regional usage) one does not hear ‘to learn’ used in the way required by Lambert’s first sense, as in “I learned him his alphabet.” But I am indebted to E. J. Ashworth for pointing out that Liddel and Scott say that ‘discere’ in late Latin also had the meaning of ‘docere’, which may be what Lambert is drawing on here. Peter takes the first sense of ‘to learn’ to be to understand the teacher and the second sense to be to retain what the teacher says. Tractatus 7.30. 22.  This sentence offers a reminder that statements employing analogical terms, even when such do not bear the primary meaning of the term, can still be true—if they say something true when employing the secondary meaning of the term. 23.  For an excellent study of this species of equivocation and specifically the phrase ‘the fields laugh’ (prata rident) see Irène Rosier-Catach, “Prata rident,” in Langages et philosophi Hommage à Jean Jolivet, ed. Alain de Libera, Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal, and Alain Galonnier, Études de philosophie médiévale, vol. 74 (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1997), pp. 155–76. 24.  Porphyry says: “In another sense (2) genus means the source of each man’s birth, whether from his father or from the place in which he was born. . . . In fact each man’s fatherland, in a way, is a source of his birth, just as his father is.” (Porphyry Isagoge, in Porphyry the Phoenician: Isagoge, trans. Edward W. Warren, Medieval Sources in Translation, vol. 16 [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975], p. 29.) Aristotle says: “Further, the



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locomotions of the elementary bodies . . . show not only that place is something, but also that it exerts a certain influence. Each is carried to its own place, if it is not hindered, the one up, the other down. Now these are regions or kinds of place—up and down and the rest of the six directions.” Physics 4.1.208b8–14, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in Barnes, vol. 1, 355. 25.  For the claim that present participles like ‘laborans’ (someone afflicted) can signify present or past time see Priscian Institutiones grammaticae 17.180, GL, vol. 3, p. 199.23–24. 26.  I suspect this paragraph originally appeared somewhere earlier in the treatise. ‘Paralogism’ first appears in 853. 27.  See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 4.166a6 ff., and for his solution 19.177a16 ff. For other discussions of Amphiboly see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 139–40; Tractatus 7.40–48; and Sd 3.463–73, trans. Maloney, 390–91. 28.  For other discussions of these species and for representative examples see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 139–40; Tractatus 7.45–47; and Sd 3.469–73, trans. Maloney, 391. 29.  See Peter, Tractatus 7.48; and Bacon, Sd 3.469, trans. Maloney, 391. 30.  The two readings of the minor would be ‘I would want me to accept those fighting’ and ‘I would want those fighting to accept me’. The first is true, the second false. Peter points out that the fallacy occurs in both premises, but Lambert’s exposition fits the minor and not the major. Bacon’s comment is also restricted to the minor. See, respectively, Tractatus 7.47; and Sd 3.469, trans. Maloney, 391. 31.  The two readings of the conclusion are ‘It is possible that one is speaking (about) one who is silent’ and ‘It is possible that one who is silent is speaking’. The first is true, the second false. 32.  The first reading of the major would be “What you say to be, this-you say to be, a stone you say to be; therefore stone-you say to be.” The alternate reading would be “What you say to be this, you say to be, a stone you say to be; therefore stone-you say to be.” Because of the complexity of this paralogism I am including the full text for paragraphs 947–48: “Item: ‘quod tu dicis esse hic tu dicis esse; lapidem dicis esse, ergo lapis tu dicis esse’. Similiter dicendum quod maior est duplex; nam istud pronomen ‘hic’ potest esse nominativi casus et sic est falsa sub hoc sensu: ‘quod tu dicis esse tu existens hic quod dicitur a te dicis esse’ et sequitur conclusio ita quod sit constructio huius pronominis ‘tu’ ad hoc nomen [pronomen, Alessio] ‘lapis’ si sit accusativi casus vera est sub hoc sensu: ‘tu dicis esse quod dictum est a te’, nec sequitur conclusio.” Logica, p. 154.20–28. 33.  It is not clear just what can be in the accusative case here. 34.  For a considerably more detailed comparison of the relationship between equivocation and amphiboly see Peter, Tractatus 7.49–56. 35.  See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 4.166a23 ff. and 166a33 ff., respectively, and for his solutions 20.177a32–177b34. For other discussions of Composition and Division see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 140– 44; Tractatus 7.57–76, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 245–57, 57–76; and Sd

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3.475–508, trans. Maloney, 392–97. For reflections on many of the concepts employed in these fallacies see Alain de Libera, “De la logique à la grammaire: Remarques sur la théorie de la determinatio chez Roger Bacon et Lambert d’Auxerre (Lambert de Lagny),” in De Ortu Grammaticae, ed. G. L. Bursil-Hall, Sten Ebbesen, and Konrad Koerner (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990), pp. 209–26, henceforth, “De la logique.” 36.  I have not found this comment by Aristotle in his presentation of the fallacies of Composition and Division. (See On Sophistical Refutations 4.166a23–38.) William treats Composition and Division together, whereas Peter, Bacon, and Lambert separate the two. For a modern analysis of these two fallacies see Georgette Sinkler, “Medieval Theories of Composition and Division” (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1985). 37.  As is clear in this paragraph, the terms ‘composition’ and ‘division’ are used equivocally throughout the discussion of these fallacies. They can name the fallacies themselves, or they can name the grammatical processes of combining or separating terms. I shall capitalize the terms when they refer to the former but not when they simply refer to the latter. 38.  Peter distinguishes the two on the basis of appropriate construction: “When the words in the expression are arranged in accordance with the more appropriate place, then the expression is said to be compounded. But if the words are divided from that place and put in a less appropriate place, then the expression is divided.” (Tractatus 7.61, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 248, 61.) Bacon is in agreement: “The fallacy of Division is the deception arising from an explicit or implicit division of things that ought to be joined together, as the fallacy of Composition is the deception arising from an explicit or implicit joining of things that ought to be disjoined.” (Sd 3.493, trans. Maloney, 395.) This represents the traditional way of defining these two fallacies, and clearly Lambert stands in that tradition. William, however, defines them in the exact opposite way, and this must be kept in mind when reading him: “Composition is the connection of things that are more disposed to be compounded. Division, on the other hand, is the separation of things that are more disposed to be divided.” (Introductiones 6.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, p.  140.) And Kretzmann gives assurance that this is not the result of a scribal error: “The use [he makes] of this unusual version of the doctrine . . . suggests that the unemended text is faithful to Sherwood’s intentions.” Ibid., n. 48. 39.  Peter seems to condemn just such a theory when he warns that those are wrong who say that Composition occurs when an expression is false in the compounded sense and Division occurs when it is false in the divided sense: “it is not true in all cases.” His point: the expression could be false in both senses. Tractatus 7.63, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 250, 63. 40.  Clearly, then, to remove the fallacy one is to combine fallaciously divided words and divide fallaciously combined words, which is precisely what Peter instructs one to do. See Tractatus 7.63, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 250, 63. 41.  See 964 for further clarification of this approach. The appeal here to a kind of natural positioning of words in sentences derives from the modist grammarians. See de Libera, “De la logique,” p. 215. 42.  For further comment on this principle see 964.



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43.  The big question up to now has been the norm for appropriate composition and division. Here one finds the first general criterion: natural suitability. Later more specific rules will be provided. See 960, 991, 1006, and 1011–12. 44.  Sten Ebbesen takes this example of Composition to illustrate the differences among Equivocation, Amphiboly, Composition, Division, and Accent and adds comment on the history of the use of pauses (pausatio) when speaking to indicate how words are to be grouped to avoid fallacious statements. See his “Suprasegmental Phonemes in Ancient and Medieval Logic,” in English Logic and Semantics: From the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, ed. H. A. G. Braakhuis et al., Acts of the Fourth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Leiden; Nijmegen, 23–27 April 1979, Artist­ arium Supplementa, vol. 1 (Nijmegen: Ingenium Press, 1981), pp. 331–59. 45.  The contrast here is between a verbum principale and a verbum implicativum. They are, respectively, the verb in the main clause and the verb in a subordinate clause in a complex sentence. For this reason I am translating ‘verbum implicativum’ by ‘subordinate verb’. See also 991, 1006, and 1011–12. Note also that here one is given a first rule for construing a sentence: adverbs are to be taken with the main verb rather than with the subordinate one in a complex sentence. See also 991, 1006, and 1011–12. The explanation given by Lambert is the same as William presents. (Introductiones 6.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, p. 143.) In Peter’s language the main verb (‘is’) is (as here) called the principal verb and it is said to be predicated actually and to have the unconditional nature of a verb. The verb in the subordinate clause (‘lives’) then is said not to be predicated actually (of the subject of the main clause?) but to be included in the subject (of the sentence?). Since both verbs “have a natural aptitude for being predicated,” both are verbs “unconditionally as far as their dispositions go, but it is not the case that both are actually verbs unconditionally.” (Tractatus 7.61, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 249, 61.) Peter then agrees with Lambert that when ‘always’ is taken with ‘is’ the expression is compounded, and divided when it is taken with ‘lives’. 46.  So ‘Whatever lives, always is’ contains no fallacy (and has a compounded sense), and ‘Whatever lives always, is’ is fallacious (and has a divided sense). 47.  Here we see how the grammarian and the logician, or the modist logician and the terminist logician, provide different analyses of these fallacies. 48.  For other discussions of the species and examples of Composition see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 141–44; Tractatus 7.68–72, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 252–55, 68–72; and Sd 3.479–91, trans. Maloney, 393–94. 49.  The existence of a third mode of Composition (and Division) was highly controversial and leads de Libera to make several remarks. (1) William presents only the first two of the three species of Composition and Division stated here, and Bacon stands with him. (I would add that the reason Bacon gives is based on the grounds that the two senses are to be rooted in the selfsame words and hence anything taken implicitly would be an addition.) (See Sd 3.490, trans. Maloney, 394.) (2) It is reasonable to conclude that Bacon borrowed the twofold division from William or from William’s source. (3) The only major author before

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1250 who is known to have used the triple division is Albert the Great (ed. Borgnet, 2, 548a), so the division seems to have a Parisian origin. (4) On this point one can think of Bacon as depending on Albert or on Albert’s source reaching back to the teaching at Paris of Robert Kilwardby; de Libera supplies (p. 223) a transcription of the relevant text from Kilwardby’s commentary on On Sophistical Refutations from MS Cambridge, Peterhouse 205, fol. 285vb. (5) The division presented by William constitutes a first grammatical reformulation of the traditional logical, or better, dialectical division found notably in the Glossae in Aristotelis Sophisticis Elenchis where it is attributed to James of Venice: “There is composition according to him [Master James] when something is composed with something and afterward it is taken dividedly and from without. . . . Or, composition is when a vocal sound is composed with something and afterward is separated from it and joined with another.” (LM, vol. 1, p. 209.24–26, .32–33; emphasis de Libera’s.) (6) Bacon then speaks of Composition as “the connection of things that ought to be disjoined, i.e., of those things that later are divided, not of those that are naturally suited to be divided” and of Division as “the disjoining of things that ought to be compounded, that later are compounded, not [of those] that are naturally suited to be compounded.” (Sd 3.545 and 548 [emphasis de Libera’s], trans. Maloney, 413.) (7) The substitution of naturally suited for afterward “marks a deepening of the semantic reflection on the phenomenon of the (fallacious) composition and division of the propositional sense, the transformation of a ‘dialectical’ analysis of the mechanism of the fallacia into a ‘logico-grammatical’ analysis of the ‘natural sense’ of phrases confused or changed in the disputes over sophisms. The two elements coexist in Bacon’s text, . . . but it is the second, i.e., the theory of the ‘natural sense’, that attracts his attention more.” “De la logique,” pp. 212–24. 50.  Throughout this discussion the infinitive in the Latin appears in English as ‘that . . . walk’; the reference is to the verb in the dictum. 51.  For the notions of de re and de dicto see 181 and 970. 52.  This response, says de Libera, makes a more explicit distinction between the proper domains of grammar and logic than does Bacon’s. De Libera continues: “This possibility of ‘multiple considerations’ comes thus to correct the initial thesis of Lambert’s Summa, a thesis of grammatical flavor explaining that one must not confuse the compositio secundum vocem (which is to say, the arrangement of the terms ‘according to the desired location’ [secundum situm magis eis debitum]) and the compositio secundum rem (which is to say, the arrangement of the terms according to the criterion of the logical verification [ut reddant locutionem veram]) and affirms that the natural sense of a phrase is had when ‘what ought to be composed are composed’ on the level of vocal sound, and not on the level of things.” (Emphasis de Libera’s.) The grammarian can speak authoritatively on the natural interpretation of a phrase by looking at its construction, but it takes a logician to distinguish between the simple case of a composed expression (oratio composita) and one that has the fallacy of Composition (oratio secundum compositionem). “De la logique,” pp. 220–21. 53. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 20.177b2–7. Apropos of the distinction between division on the basis of construction (secundum constructionem) and on the basis of pronunciation (secundum prolationem) de Libera offers a few comments, and in doing this gives a concise picture of the medieval terminist perspective. (1) Statements susceptible to



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Composition or Division present themselves on several levels: (a) materially, as an identity (identitas) with the possibility of several formal points of view; (b) as having an action or perfection, which comes about through their utterance; and (c) as having signification. Thus William speaks of an identity with respect to substance (secundum substantiam) and difference with respect to action (secundum actum) and what is signified (secundum rem), and this becomes for Peter a distinction between material identity (identitas materialis) and difference in perfection (diversitas perfectionis) and difference in what is signified (diversitas secundum rem). Both are talking about what happens when (materially) one and the same group of words is actualized or interpreted in more than one way through pronunciations (modi proferendi) that utilize pauses that enact different arrangements and thereby different meanings. (2) The material level is not merely the literal level; one has to add the arrangement of the words (ordinatio) to the identity each of the syllables and words has. (3) Given the material arrangement of the words in a statement, one must utter the statement (ordo prolationis), and this requires the application of theories of inclusion (inclusio) that provide rules for grouping words together. (4) The arrangement can then be equally considered in its rapport with the very construction of the terms it deploys. It is that which situates at one and the same time the meeting place and the battle site between logic and grammar, terminism and modism. It is here also that the term, the concept, or the problem of determination (determinatio) comes into play. (“De la logique,” pp. 210–21.) Elsewhere, and with an eye on subsequent developments, de Libera adds: “We see then that the opposition by [John Duns] Scotus [1265/6–1308] between constructio and prolatio, far from constituting an isolated formulation of a late confrontation between modism and terminism, is, in effect, at the heart of the discussions of Parisian terminist logicians of the second half of the thirteenth century, and this from the 1250s. The doctrine of Lambert constitutes, from this point of view, one of the first terminist attempts to delineate the respective authorities (powers) of logic and grammar in the matter of the semantics of propositions. The delineation, accepted by Scotus, must have been obvious even to modist logicians.” “De la logique,” p. 221. 54.  Possibly here one sees the reason why Lambert prefers to write his modal statements with the modal term in the middle—to emphasize that such must be read de re and not de dicto. 55.  E.g., one cannot know the meaning of ‘father’ without knowing that of ‘child’. (See 448–49 for the notion of relatives.) Then the question arises as to whether there is one science of all opposite things or whether each pair of opposites has its own science. See Aristotle Topics 2.3.110b16–21. 56.  For previous reference to a subordinate verb (verbum implicativum) see 960. 57. Priscian Institutiones grammaticae 15.39, GL, 3, p. 89.15–17. This is the explanation William uses. See Introductiones 6.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, p. 143. 58.  “Quod unum solum potest ferre plura potest ferre, sed ista navis que non potest plura ferre unum solum potest ferre; ergo quod non potest plura ferre plura potest ferre.” (Logica, p. 161.40–162.2.) There seems to be considerable variety in the way this paralogism is stated and analyzed. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge translates Aristotle’s example in this way: “One single thing if you can carry many you can carry too.” (See On Sophistical Refutations

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Notes to Pages 199–204

4.166a30, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 281.) For William’s analysis of this paralogism see William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, trans. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1968), p. 87; for Peter’s see Tractatus 7.72, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 254–55, 72; and for Bacon’s see Sd 3.490–91, trans. Maloney, 394. 59. Peter adopts this analysis. See Tractatus 7.72, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 255, 72. 60.  Here we have a second rule for determining how words are to be grouped in grammatically correct sentences: a word is to be construed with another explicitly stated rather than with one implicitly stated. See also 960, 1006, and 1011–12. 61.  For other discussions of the species and examples of Division see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, p. 144; Tractatus 7.75–76, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, pp. 255–57, 75–76; and Sd 3.498–508, trans. Maloney, 396–97. 62.  Peter’s example is different in wording: “Whatever things are two and three are three; but five are two and three; therefore five are three.” Tractatus 7.75, trans. Kretzmann and Stump, CTMPT, p. 256, 75. 63.  W. A. Pickard-Cambridge translates Aristotle’s example in this way: “I made thee a slave free.” See On Sophistical Refutations 4.166a36, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 281. 64.  Bacon correctly describes ‘being’ as a participle in this context. Sd 3.506, trans. Maloney, 396. 65.  Here one finds a third rule for determining how words are to be construed in a sentence: modifiers are to follow the word they modify. See also 960, 991, and 1011–12. 66.  This is not a new (and fourth) rule; it is simply an application of the third rule, stated in 1006. 67.  Bacon sets forth fourteen rules that instruct on the grammatically proper way to construct sentences; see Sd 3.509–44, trans. Maloney, 398–412. For an analysis of Bacon’s rules see Paola Muller, “La dottrina delle Fallaciae in dictione in Ruggero Bacone,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 3 (1992): 453–90, esp. 476–82. For a comparative study of Lambert’s and Bacon’s rules see de Libera, “De la logique,” pp. 209–26. 68.  De Libera appeals to this expansion from one determination with two determinables to two determinations and one determinable as one of two “decisive” indications by which Lambert seems to want to separate himself from Bacon, which, however, de Libera does not want to be taken as a claim that there was any dependence of Lambert on Bacon (or vice versa). See “De la logique,” p. 219; for the other reason see “De la logique,” p. 219. 69.  Here the first rule is being applied, for which see 960. 70.  This represents an application of the third rule, for which see 1006. Note also that the phrase ‘per naturam specificationis’ could be construed with what precedes it, and then what is placed between dashes would read: “by the very nature of specification a specification ought to follow what it specifies.” 71.  Here the third rule is being applied, for which see 1006. 72.  Here and elsewhere in this paragraph several emendations are made with respect to the terms ‘determining things’ and ‘determinables’. In support of the changes see 1006 and 1010 where the terms are used correctly and consistently.



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73.  De Libera takes the claim here to provide the second “decisive” reason for thinking that Lambert may have wanted to separate himself from Bacon. See “De la logique,” p. 219; and above, n. 68. 74.  For other discussions of the species and examples of Accent see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 145; Tractatus 7.79–80; and Sd 3.560–64, trans. Maloney, 417–18. Note that Sherwood does not distinguish species and that Peter and Bacon present only two species. 75.  For other discussions of the species and examples of Accent see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 145; Tractatus 7.79–80; and Sd 3.560–64, trans. Maloney, 417–18. Note that Sherwood does not distinguish species, and that Peter and Bacon present only two species. 76.  This fallacy arises because ‘pendere’ can mean two different things depending on whether the vowel in the middle syllable is short (as in the major) or long (as in the minor). As used in the major, the verb comes from ‘pendo’, meaning “suffer a punishment,” but as used in the minor, it comes from ‘pendeo’ and means “inflict a punishment” or “suspend a punishment.” 77.  Clearly there is no ambiguity or cause of deception when the two statements are read, since the verb is spelled differently in each. But when the first is pronounced without the exhalation indicated by the ‘h’ at the beginning, ambiguity does arise. 78.  Aristotle does not discuss the fallacy of Accent in Book One, and in Book Four, where it is presented, he gives two examples relevant to the species under discussion from Homer’s Iliad. See On Sophistical Refutations 4.166a39–166b9. 79.  In the first sense the sentence would be translated by ‘I fear you sleep throughout the night while Lydia perishes’; in the second sense by ‘Sleepest thou, Lydia, while I, thy lover true, die throughout the livelong night?’ For the latter see Horace, Odes 1.25.7–9, trans. C. E. Bennett, in Horace: The Odes and Epodes, Harvard Classical Series (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 70–71. 80.  In the first sense one takes ‘quia nam’ as one word, ‘quianam’, and then the sentence can be translated by ‘Alas, why have such [storm clouds] touched the calm seas of the world?’ In the second sense ‘quia’ and ‘nam’ are to be taken as separate words, and while ordinarily they mean much the same thing, Peter Helias tells us that in the text under consideration ‘quia’ is to be taken as an interrogatory in a dialogue, and thus in Lambert’s second sense the translation would read “Alas,” [laments Polynurus]! “Why?” [asks Neptune]. “Because such [storm clouds] have touched the calm seas of the world,” [responds Polynurus]. (See Peter Helias, Summa super Priscianum, vol. 2, ed. Leo Reilly, Studies and Texts, vol. 113 [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993], p. 945.83–94. I am indebted to E. J. Ashworth for the reference.) Cf. Virgil, Aeneid, Book 5, line 13, where the helmsman Polynurus is addressing Neptune: “Eu! quianam tanti cinxerunt aethera nimbi”; in the translation by H. Rushton Fairclough, “Alas, why have such clouds girt the heavens.” See Virgil, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 446. 81.  This comment illustrates the fact that much of what was still being said in the Middle Ages about this fallacy has its roots in Aristotle and his commentators who were writing about rough breathings in Greek, which indeed are not letters but a mark above a

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Notes to Pages 208–213

letter. In Latin, however, this is not the case, as was seen in the examples of ‘amatur’ and ‘hamatur’, where the hard breathing or exhalation was indicated by a letter, namely, ‘h’. 82.  See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 4.166b10–19 and for his solution 22.178a4– 179a10. For other discussions of the Figure of a Word see William, Peter, and Bacon, ­respectively, Introductiones 6.1.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 146–50; Tractatus 7.83–100; and Sd 3.565–617, trans. Maloney, 419–34. See also Reinhard Hülsen, “Concrete Accidental Terms and the Fallacy of Figure of Speech,” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 175–85. 83. Aristotle Categories 8.10a10–15. 84.  For other discussions of the species and examples of Accent see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.1.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 149–50; Tractatus 7.92–100; and Sd 3.570–614, trans. Maloney, 420–32. 85. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 4.166b10–19. 86. ‘Sort’ (quale quid) is italicized to signal that it is being used in a technical sense, and as such it indicates a genus or species. ‘Sort’ and ‘particular thing’ are the English translations of Boethius’s ‘quale quid’ and ‘hoc aliquid’, which in turn are his translations of Aristotle’s ‘poi/on ti’ and ‘to/de ti’ found in Categories 5.3b10–24 where Aristotle points out a difference between primary substances, e.g., this man, and secondary substances, e.g., man: the former indicate individuals, but the latter indicate classes with certain qualities. But they do not merely indicate qualities in the way ‘white’ indicates the quality whiteness. Genus and species “mark off the qualification of a substance—they signify substance of a certain qualification.” (Trans. J. L. Ackrill, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 6.) For Lambert’s explanation of the term see 1060. 87. Aristotle Categories 5.3b10. 88.  The fallacy does not appear in the English translation in 1041–44 and 1039. 89. Priscian Institutiones grammaticae 8.1, GL, 2, p. 369.1–2. 90.  This happens in this sentence: ‘The white paint whitens the house’. 91.  It is clear here, and will become increasingly evident immediately below, that a discussion of this fallacy requires an understanding of the theory of supposition, but that comes only in chapter 8. For the notion of supposition see, e.g., 1249–66. 92.  By choosing to postpone a discussion of supposition (theory of reference) until the last chapter Lambert creates a pedagogical problem by referring to it here. William, Peter, and Bacon all treat supposition before they discuss the fallacies. For Lambert’s treatment of supposition see 1239–66. 93.  For these kinds of supposition see 1260 and 1264. 94.  To speak of a substance as a what (quid) with a distinguishing formal quality (quale) hearkens back to Aristotle’s use in the Categories (4.1b25 ff.). One may ask of something what kind of substance it is, and one answers this by appeal to the form which qualifies it and distinguishes it from all other kinds of substances. Clearly, then, the meaning of ‘quality’ in our present context is not that which we saw when Lambert discussed the Category called Quality, an accident. In the present context ‘quality’ names the formal element in a substance. Hence, to ask about a genus or species is to ask about something (a secondary substance) that is identifiable among others because it is formally characterized by some



Notes to Pages 214–225

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quality. The accident quality and the formal element quality both characterize the thing, but they do it in importantly different ways: the former accidentally, the latter substantially. Each genus and species, then, is a sort (quale quid), i.e., a (secondary) substance qualified through a form. Thus, and apropos of the formation of the technical term ‘quale quid’, Peter says: “Species and genus as something common have the nature of a qualis (quality) but as something predicated in quid signify a what (substance). And such is a quale quid since it is something common and predicated as a what.” Tractatus 7.98. 95. See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.166b28–36, and for his solution 24.179a26–180a22. For other discussions of Accident see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 150–53; Tractatus 7.102–19; and Sd 3.619–38, trans. Maloney, 435–38. See also J. M. Gambara, “Medieval Solutions to the Sophism of Accident,” in Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, ed. Klaus Jacobi, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 38 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), pp. 431–50. 96.  In discussing this fallacy these terms acquire a different meaning than we have seen before. For the difference see 1066–67. 97.  It will be helpful in understanding this fallacy if the following arrangement of subject, accident, and attribute are kept in mind. In the three figures they are as follows: First Second Third accident attribute attribute accident subject attribute subject accident subject accident subject accident subject attribute subject attribute accident attribute 98.  For other discussions of the species of Accident and examples see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.1, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  152–53; Tractatus 7.108–15; and Sd 3.627–37, trans. Maloney, 437. In what follows, note that while the first species occurs in the first figure, the second species occurs in the third figure, and the third species in the second figure. Peter shows that two different species of Accident can be expressed in the same figure, but Bacon recommends that all species of this fallacy should be represented in the first figure “so that the defect may be clearer.” See, respectively, Tractatus 7.109 and 114; and Sd 3.626, trans. Maloney, 436. 99. Aristotle Categories 3.1b10. 100.  See also below, 1115 and 1118. 101.  For another analysis of this paralogism see 1099. 102.  The remote source for the rules that follow is Aristotle when he discusses which predicates form a single predicate and which do not, apropos of which he reminds: “Clearly, then, one is led into many absurdities if one lays down without restriction that the compounds come about.” See On Interpretation 11.20b31–21a32, quotation, 21a4–5, trans. J. L. Ackrill, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 33. 103. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.166b33–37. 104.  See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.166b36–167a20, and for his solution 25.180a23–180b39. For other discussions of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely see

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­ illiam, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.2, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 153–55; W Tractatus 7.120–30; and Sd 3.648–61, trans. Maloney, 441–42. 105.  William says that a respect is the same as a determination and then distinguishes two kinds of determinations: strict and unstrict. The latter, he says, lead to deception, but not the former. (Introductiones 6.2.2, trans. Kretzmann, p. 153.) Kretzmann refers one to de Rijk’s Logica Modernorum for the twelfth-century roots of this distinction and examples. See Introductiones, p. 153, n. 124; and LM, vol. 1, pp. 130–31, 372–73, and 528–29. 106.  Sometimes this sort of determination goes by the name ‘alienating determination’, in the sense that it “destroys” the thing it determines. See, e.g., William and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.2, trans. Kretzmann, p. 154; and Sd 3.654, trans. Maloney, 442. 107. Aristotle Topics 2.11.115b11–13. 108. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167a1–14. 109.  For additional information on insolubles see Paul Vincent Spade, “The Origins of the Mediaeval Insolubilia-Literature,” Franciscan Studies 33 (1973): 292–309; and “Insolubilia,” CHLMP, pp. 246–53. 110. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 25.180a35–180b2. 111. Ibid. 112.  Ibid., 180b1–9. 113.  Apropos of this solution Aristotle says: “. . . it is not easy to see whether it is saying what is true or saying what is false which should be stated without qualification.” On Sophistical Refutations 25.180b4, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in Barnes, vol. 1, p. 307. 114. See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167a21–35, and for his solution 26.181a1–14. For other discussions of Ignorance Regarding Refutation see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp.  155–57; Tractatus 7.131–40; and Sd 3.662–73, trans. Maloney, 443–45. 115.  “Elenchus est contradictio unius et eiusdem, non nominis solum sed rei et nominis non synonimi; sed eiusdem nominis ex hiis que data sunt, de necessitate, non continuato quod erat in principio, secundum idem, et ad idem, et similiter, et in eodem tempore.” (Logica, p. 188.3–7.) Note that ‘nominis’ in ‘eiusdem nominis’ is not part of Aristotle’s text: “Nam elenchus est contradictio eiusdem et unius, non nominis sed rei, et nominis non sinonimi sed eiusdem, ex his quae data sunt ex necessitate, non connumerato quod erat in principio, secundum idem et ad idem et similiter et in eodem tempore.” (On Sophistical Refutations 5.167a23–27, trans. Boethius, AL, vol. 6.1–3, p. 12.13–17.) Later (1196), Lambert will acknowledge that he has supplied ‘name’ as the antecedent of ‘of the very same’ in this definition (1149). 116.  To make the distinction clearer the phrase ‘previously conceded’ on its second occurrence should be read to imply “previously concluded,” for it is the conclusion of the first syllogism that is taken as conceded and then contradicted in the conclusion of the second syllogism, as is seen in the Medea example. 117.  For other discussions of the species and examples of Ignorance Regarding Refutation see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 155–56; Tractatus 7.135–38; and Sd 3.668–72, trans. Maloney, 444.



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118. For other discussions of these differences see William and Peter, respectively, ­Introductiones 6.2.3, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 156–57; and Tractatus 7.139–40. Bacon does not address this issue. 119. See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167a36–9, and for his solution 27.181a15–20. For other discussions of Begging the Original Issue see William, Peter, and Bacon, ­respectively, Introductiones 6.2.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 157–59; Tractatus 7.141–49; and Sd 3.674–88, trans. Maloney, 445–47. 120. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167a36. 121. Aristotle Topics 8.13.162b32–163a14. 122.  Lambert’s example, ‘Albus currit; ergo candidus currit’ would require that ‘albus’ and ‘candidus’ be translated by ‘white’, which would fail to exemplify the point. The example I have substituted is from Bacon’s Summulae dialectices 3.679, trans. Maloney, 446. 123.  But see 782 where this argument is said to hold from the Topic from (material) parts sufficiently stated. 124. Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a21–15. 125. See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167b1–20, and for his solution 28.181a22–30. For other discussions of the fallacy of Consequent see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 159–62; Tractatus 7.150–63; and Sd 3.639–47, trans. Maloney, 438–40. 126. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167b1–8. 127.  Bacon also alludes to this same claim in Aristotle’s On Interpretation, but I find no such explicit statement by the latter, though it can certainly be inferred from what he says in that work in chapter 10 and Prior Analytics 1.46.52a15–52b39. For Bacon’s use of the principle see Cst 106. 128.  For the notion of a consequence “more-often-than-not” see 1189. 129.  See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167b21–35. For other discussions of Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.6, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 162–65; Tractatus 7.164–70; and Sd 3.689–98, trans. Maloney, 448–49. 130. Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167b23. 131. Ibid. 132.  For the correction see Peter of Spain, Tractatus 7.167. 133.  See Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 5.167b37–168a16, and for his solution see 30.181a36–181b24. For other discussions of Treating More than One Question as One see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 6.2.7, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 165–67; Tractatus 7.171–78; and Sd 3.699–710, trans. Maloney, 450–52.

Chapter Eight.  Properties of Terms 1.  From here to the end of his book Lambert presents what can with minor reservations be called a theory of the reference of terms. This material was not developed systematically by Aristotle and hence came to be called the New Logic in contrast to the Old Logic found in Aristotle’s six books on that subject (the Organon). The focus of chapter 8,

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then, is to spell out how terms in statements stand for things, whether the things for which they stand are mental constructs or extramental entities. In medieval parlance a word that stands for something is said to supposit for it. For recent and comprehensive studies on the medieval theory of supposition see Paul Desmond Henry, “Supposition and Signification in English Logic,” in English Logic and Semantics, ed. H. A. G. Braakhuis et al., Artistarium Supplementa, vol. 1 (Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1981), pp. 361–87; and L. M. de Rijk, “The Origins of the Theory of the Property of Terms,” CHLMP, pp. 188–96. 2.  Lambert has already treated the category of Relation (448–75) but will end his treatise with a discussion of the supposition of relative terms, for which see 1393–1443. In addition to properties included in the list here he also includes in this chapter discussions of signification (1232–38), copulation (1241–48), and ampliation (1361–65). While Peter, Bacon, and Lambert do not expressly classify signification as a property of a term, William does. See Introductiones 5.0.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 105. 3.  For other discussions of signification see William and Peter, respectively, Introductiones 5.0.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 105; and Tractatus 6.2. Bacon has no similar extended comments on signification in his Summulae dialectices. 4.  “Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same.” (Aristotle On Interpretation 1.16a4–8, trans. J. L. Ackrill, ed. Barnes, vol. 1, p. 25.) See also above, 37, where Lambert presents the notion of language as vocal sounds fashioned at the will of individuals and which function as signs (signa ad placitum) of their thoughts. 5.  This theory of signification is held by practically all medievals when Lambert is writing; Bacon is the most noteworthy exception. Bacon’s point is that the intent of the one who invents a name for something (impositio prima) is to name the object and not one’s concept of the object. Therefore names of original imposition are directly signs ad placitum of the things they name and indirectly natural signs of their mental representations (images and concepts). In the Summulae dialectices of ca. 1247 Bacon contents himself with saying that nouns by signification name only existing things, but by 1267 he presents in the section “De signis” of his Opus maius a full-blown epistemological basis for the theory stated above and repeats it in his last work in ca. 1292. Respectively, Sd 2.556, trans. Maloney, 248; the whole of his “De signis”; and part 2 of his Compendium studii theologiae, ed. and trans. Thomas S. Maloney, A Compendium of the Study of Theology, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittlealters, vol. 20 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), pp. 64–119. See also Thomas S. Maloney, “The Semiotics of Roger Bacon,” Mediaeval Studies 45 (1983): 120–54. 6.  For other discussions of this difference see William and Peter, respectively, Introductiones 5.0.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 105; and Tractatus 6.3. 7.  L. M. de Rijk calls attention to the fact that Lambert differs from William in holding that signification is not a property of a term, whereas Lambert differs from Peter in contending that signification is (logically) prior to supposition. See “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis in Mediaeval Logic,” Vivarium 9 (1971): 89, henceforth “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis”; Introductiones in logicam 5.0.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 105; and Tractatus 6.3.



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8.  For other discussions of supposition see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 5.1.2–5.1.14, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 107–20; Tractatus 6.3–12; and Sd 2.414– 627, trans. Maloney, 212–68. For recent studies focused on Lambert’s theory see L. M. de Rijk, “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis,” pp. 89–102; and H. A. G. Braakhuis, “The Views of William of Sherwood,” Vivarium 15 (1977): 133–36. 9.  William defines supposition as “an ordering of the understanding of something under something else” (ordinatio alicuius intellectus sub alio); Peter says it is “the acceptance of a substantive term for something” (acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo); and Bacon presents two definitions (Lambert’s fourth and third, respectively), saying that he is adopting the second of the two: “In one way supposition is said to be a property of a common term compared to the individuals that are its supposita, according to which we say that a common name like ‘man’ signifies a quality together with a substance, i.e., humanity, and supposits individuals, namely, Socrates and Plato and others. In a second way supposition is said to be a property of a subject term (a suppositum) in as much as it supposits for something else (alii supponit) and functions as the subject in an expression.” See respectively, Introductiones 5.0.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 105; Tractatus 6.3; and Sd 2.415–16, trans. Maloney, 212. 10.  De Rijk, relying on Robert Steele’s edition of Bacon’s Summulae dialectices, says “[Lambert’s fourfold] distinction is quite different from that found in the Sumule [Summulae?] dialectices.” Actually, the same fourfold division, though not in the same order, is found in the Seville manuscript (Biblioteca Columbina 5–2–40) of the Summulae dialectices and is (now) printed in the critical apparatus of de Libera’s more recent edition of the work. (See “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis,” p. 91, n. 54; and Sd p. 265, [84]). The two definitions in de Libera’s edition are from the Oxford manuscript (Bodlian, Digby 204). 11.  De Rijk points out that supposition in the first sense “is a special kind of signification, not a term’s property” (as Lambert will say in 1240). This is the supposition, de Rijk continues, proper to a substantive term in contradistinction to the supposition of an adjectival term, called copulation. (“The Development of Suppositio Naturalis,” p. 91.) Later Lambert will make it clear that he is principally interested in the supposition that is not signification but a property a term has. See 1240 and 1247. 12.  Supposition in this sense is not a property of terms and has the sense of ‘suppose’ in ‘Let us suppose for the sake of argument you are right’. 13.  To supposit relative to a verb is what grammatically happens when one term in a statement (the subject) is placed under (sub-ponitur) a broader term expressed by the verb or predicate. 14.  For the notion of appellation that Lambert accepts see 1272–74. The “locational arrangement” alluded to here presumes that the subject has a place in a sentence and that the verb or predicate has a different one. 15.  Thus, respectively, ‘man’ can stand for the word ‘man’, for the concept or species man, for a particular man, or for several or all men; the context of the utterance in which it is used (one hopes) makes clear which of these the speaker intends. 16.  The ensuing paragraphs are all that Lambert has to say on copulation. William defines ‘copulation’ as “an ordering of the understanding of something over something else” (ordinatio alicuius intellectus supra alium); Peter defines it as “the acceptance of an adjec-

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tival term for something” (termini adiectivi acceptio pro aliquo); and Bacon as “the joining or adjacent [grammatical] inclination of a concept signified by the relation of one word to another” (rei significatae per unam dictionem ad aliam adiectio vel adiacens inclinatio). Respectively, Introductiones 5.0.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 105; Tractatus 6.3; and Sd 2.630, trans. Maloney, 269. 17.  The definition of ‘white’ is curious. Medievals, following Aristotle, define ‘white’ as a color that pierces sight. (See Aristotle Topics 3.5.119a31–32.) Boethius translates the Aristotelian text: “albi color disgregativus visus.” (AL, vol. 5, pts. 1–3, p. 59.) In a part of the Timaeus as yet unknown to Lambert one finds: “Wherefore we ought to term white that which dilates the visual ray.” (Timaeus 67e, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in The Collected Works of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961], p. 1191.) Allan Bäck translates the phrase ‘disgregativum visus’ by ‘standing out in sight.’ See his “Scotus’ Formal Distinction,” in Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain, ed. Ignacio Angelelli and Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2000), p. 415. 18.  When de Rijk quotes this definition he emends it as I have but fails to note that the second ‘sive’ is a correction for ‘non’ in the text. (“The Development of Suppositio Naturalis,” p. 93.) Kretzmann and Stump fail to change ‘non’ (not) to ‘sive’ (or) in their translation. See CTMPT, p. 107. 19. Priscian Institutiones grammaticae 2.28, GL, 2, p. 60.14. 20.  Syncategorematical terms are those which, as Kretzmann explains, “have special logical or semantic effects on subjects, predicates, or combinations of subjects and predicates,” e.g., ‘every’, ‘all’, ‘only’, ‘except’. (Introductiones, trans. Kretzmann, p. 13.) Separate books listing and analyzing these terms were being created at this time. While Lambert, William, and Peter do not define this term, Bacon does: “Syncategorematical nouns are those that signify modes and dispositions of those others [categorematical terms].” Sd 2.54, trans. Maloney, 129. 21.  Having reviewed all the distinctions Lambert has made up to this point Braakhuis concludes: “Thus, in my opinion, the result of our digress [on Lambert] can be that Lambert of Auxerre distinguishes clearly between supposition as a kind of signification and supposition as a property of a term and accordingly, between supposition as a kind of signification (cfr. William’s suppositio secundum habitum) and natural supposition.” “The Views of William of Sherwood,” p. 136. 22.  There is a sense in which Lambert is making a new beginning here, and in making this particular distinction he joins Peter but not William or Bacon. See Tractatus 6.4. 23.  As de Rijk points out, there is a close affinity between signification and natural supposition. Signification enables a word to stand by its nature for all actual and possible individuals that share the (universal) nature it signifies. However, this function of signifying can be impeded by an adjunct, an extrinsic factor. So when the word can exercise its signifying function unobstructed, it has natural supposition; otherwise it has accidental (simple or personal) supposition. This leads de Rijk to speak of natural supposition as virtual supposition. As such it is neither actual supposition nor signification but “the general property of a term resulting from its having signification.” “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis,” p. 99.



Notes to Pages 258–259

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24.  De Rijk points out that by the fourteenth century all terms having supposition were required to have a propositional context. Only John Buridan (1290–1358) and Vincent Ferrer (1350–1419) speak of natural supposition, and then only after the term underwent “a reinterpretation and passed from what may be termed ‘non-contextual’ to ‘a-temporal’ supposition.” (“The Development of Suppositio Naturalis,” p. 107.) Bacon, however, had already adopted the contextual requirement as the principal ground for the distinction between signification and supposition: terms signify inside and outside of expressions, but they supposit only within. Sd 2.418–19, trans. Maloney, 212. 25.  While the examples might suggest otherwise, Lambert does indeed hold that accidental supposition can be effected by adjectives and relative clauses and not simply by predicates in propositions. He makes this clear when treating of appellation (1280, 1284, 1292) and restriction (1347, 1348, 1352, and 1353). Thus ‘white’ narrows the supposition of ‘man’ in ‘white man’ to men who are white, and ‘who was’ restricts ‘man’ in ‘A man who was runs’ to someone in the past. He also speaks of a use-governed restriction (restrictio usualis), where no adjunct is present. See 1349. 26.  The language and examples here, as de Rijk points out, strongly suggest that Lambert holds the view that accidental supposition occurs only within a proposition, i.e., where the adjoining term is the predicate of a proposition, as did William (see next paragraph), the Cum sit nostra, and Bacon. But when one gets to Lambert’s discussion of appellation one will see that such is not the case, for, as de Rijk concludes, Lambert also allows for nonpropositional restrictions in an attributive context such as ‘white man’. See “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis,” pp. 99–102. The Cum sit nostra and Bacon both hold explicitly that terms have supposition only within an expression, not outside it. (See LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 446.31–32; and Sd 2.418–19, trans. Maloney, 212.) But apropos of William, Braakhuis cautions that, while William might be correctly interpreted to hold that “a term has a (natural) capacity to stand for all the individuals that actually participate in the form signified by that term . . . it should be remarked . . . that . . . William assigns this function explicitly to the signification of a term.” Braakhuis continues, “I am not convinced, for that matter, that wordings like terminus supponit de se [a term supposits of itself] show necessarily the factual admittance of natural supposition as a property of a term outside any context.” Phrases like terminus per se sumptus [a term taken by itself ] or per se positus [posited on its own] are better indicators, he says, but the important thing to remember, he concludes, is that the admittance of natural supposition seems to accompany the definition of ‘supposition’ as the acceptance of a term for something. “The Views of William of Sherwood,” pp. 139–40. 27.  This is also Bacon’s notion of simple supposition, but simple supposition for William and Peter occurs when a common term stands for what it signifies (its concept). William says that when a term stands for itself it is said to have natural supposition. Peter does not mention supposition in the latter sense in his formal division of supposition, and when he speaks of natural supposition he refers to the supposition of a common term for all its supposita, past, present, and future. Respectively, Sd 2.421, trans. Maloney, 213; Introductiones 5.1.2–5.1.3, trans. Kretzmann, p. 107; and Tractatus 6.4–6. 28.  There are two major differences between natural supposition and accidental simple supposition, as de Rijk points out. (1) A term having natural supposition is unlimited with

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Notes to Pages 259–260

respect to its supposita; they can be possible or actual. But a (subject) term having accidental supposition must supposit in accord with the requirements of the predicate. This is why (2) Lambert says that terms that supposit naturally do so from their nature, whereas those that have (accidental) simple supposition supposit by reason of their forms—the different forms signified by the different terms for which they were imposed to signify. See “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis,” pp. 97–98. 29.  Anonymi Fragmentum Vulgo Vocatum “Liber Sex Principiorum,” ed. Lorenzo MinioPaluello, AL, vol. 1, pts. 6–7, possibly p. 35.1–2. 30.  “. . . naturae rationabilis individualis substantia.” Boethius Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, in Theological Tractates, ed. and trans. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1926), p. 84.3–4. 31.  Lambert seems to be somewhat unusual in providing an explanation of why ‘personal’ is used to name this sort of supposition. 32.  Bacon employs the distinctions here as does Lambert; however, for William common and discrete are subdivisions of formal supposition, whereas for Peter they are the initial subdivisions of supposition itself. Respectively, Sd 2.424, trans. Maloney, 214; Introductiones 5.1.4, trans. Kretzmann, p. 108; and Tractatus 6.4. 33.  While the examples of discrete supposition are the ordinary ones, William makes it clear that the demonstrative pronoun ‘iste’ (this [man]) by itself in a sentence has such supposition, and Bacon is in explicit agreement with William but then provides the example of ‘Iste homo currit’ where ‘Iste currit’ would have better illustrated his claim. He also, but alone of the four, points out that a universal term like ‘relation’ has discrete supposition when it is used as the name of one sort of relation. See, respectively, Introductiones in logicam: Einführung in die Logik, ed. Hartmut Brands and Christoph Kann (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1995), p. 136.53; and Sd 2.425–26, trans. Maloney, 215. 34.  It is at this level that William, Peter, Bacon, and Lambert first reach agreement on their division of supposition. Respectively, Introductiones 5.1.6, trans. Kretzmann, p. 108; Tractatus 6.8; and Sd 2.427–28, trans. Maloney, 216. 35.  Confused supposition is divided by William into merely confused (immobile) and distributive (mobile), as is the case also with Bacon. Peter, however, divides it into confused by necessity of sign or mode on the one hand or by necessity of concept (necessitate rei) on the other. He then debates the distinction and concludes that “all confusion is by necessity of sign or mode.” See respectively, Introductiones 5.1.7, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 108–9; Sd 2.431–34, trans. Maloney, 218–20; and Tractatus 6.9–12. 36.  A sign is added directly when it immediately precedes the term it qualifies; it is added indirectly when at least one term intervenes between it and the term it affects. 37.  The sense of ‘supposition’ Lambert has adopted does not preclude substantive terms in the predicate having supposition. But there is a controversy on this point, and those more heavily influenced by grammatical considerations prefer to speak of subject terms alone as having supposition. Thus Bacon only begrudgingly says a few words about the supposition of terms in the predicate “because one is to speak with the majority yet think with the minority.” See Sd 2.511–19, trans. Maloney, 238. 38.  I see no way to translate the second example into standard English and preserve the adjectival relation of the negative term in Latin. Literally it would be ‘No do I see man’.



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39. Peter offers a very lengthy analysis of ‘Every man is an animal’ and concludes that ‘animal’ in that statement has simple supposition because “it supposits only for the nature of a genus,” and Bacon gives a similar analysis. See Tractatus 6.6 and 9, trans. Mullaly, p. 7, 9–19; and Sd 2.580, trans. Maloney, 253. 40.  In 1981 de Libera wrote an analysis of Lambert’s treatise “De appellatione” and presented a new edition of that treatise. From this point to the end of Lambert’s treatment of appellation (1267–1345) the translation is based on de Libera’s edition of Lambert’s “De appellatione” as found in Alain de Libera, “Le traité De appellatione de Lambert de Lagny (Lambert d’Auxerre),” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 48 (1981): 227–85: introduction (227–50), text (251–85), henceforth, “Le traité,” followed by page and line number. Page references within the translation to de Libera’s text are indicated by page number preceded by ‘L’, e.g., L 251. The major points he makes in his introduction and notes are incorporated in the endnotes of this translation. Liberty has been taken in reparagraphing de Libera’s text to conform to the norms employed in the translation of Alessio’s text. For other discussions of appellation see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 5.3.1–5.3.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 122–31; Tractatus 10.1–4; and Sd 2.520–619, trans. Maloney, 238–65. 41.  De Libera notes that Nicholas of Paris holds the same notion of appellation: “Since appellation is a characteristic (nota) of those things that belong to a term in as much as it stands in a proposition, so having examined the supposition of terms, we must now look at their appellation and the difference between appellation and supposition.” Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 51, a; and Summe Metenses, LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 458. 42.  Neither William, nor Peter, nor Bacon presents these four definitions 43.  For the notion of obligations de Libera directs one to M. A. Brown, “The Role of the Tractatus de obligationibus in Medieval Logic,” and to L. M. de Rijk, “Two Separate Tracts on falsi positio and impossibilis positio,” respectively, “Le traité,” p. 251, b; Franciscan Studies 26 (1966): 26–35; and Vivarium 12 (1974): 94–96. 44.  De Libera points out that this kind of appellation is in other contexts called natural supposition. “Le traité,” p. 243. 45.  This is appellation in the strict sense in that it is speaking of the denotation only of things that actually exist. De Libera points out that one finds this understanding of appellation as supposition for actually existing things in authors as different from Lambert as Peter of Spain and Nicholas of Paris. The contrast, he continues, between the third and fourth definitions corresponds to the two branches of the controversy on semantics related by Bacon: Is appellation, taken as supposition for only existing things, an intrinsic property of terms (as Bacon wants), or is it an extrinsic property determined by a context, an assertion in a present-tense proposition? Lambert, having embraced natural supposition, inclines to the latter view. “Le traité,” p. 243. 46.  This is to say that ‘supposition’ is the broader (superior) term for it includes under it things that both exist and do not exist, whereas ‘appellation’ only the former. For a strictly parallel reading the terms ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ in the second line of this paragraph should be reversed.

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De Libera notes that Lambert is “very close” to the distinction between supposition and appellation espoused by Peter and refers one to the Tractatus, pp. 197.8–10 and 197.4. (See “Le traité,” 252, c.) He then adds that the same theory is found in the Summe Metenses: “Nevertheless, one should know that the appellation of a term is its supposition for things that are. So, appellata are called present supposita; supposition is for what exists and what does not exist. From this the difference between appellation and supposition is made clear. . . . But a term does not appellate except for what truly exists.” (LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 458.) For other discussions of the difference between appellation and supposition see William and Peter, respectively, Introductiones 5.3.1, trans. Kretzmann, p. 122; and Tractatus 6.1. Bacon does not contrast the notions as explicitly as do the other two, but cf. Sd 2.527 and 2.556–57, trans. Maloney, 240 and 248. 47.  While this sentence can be read to be saying that only common and not discrete terms have appellation, it is somewhat ambiguous, depending on how ‘only’ is construed— only common terms or only actually existing supposita. Lambert states his position in the controversy clearly in 1277. De Libera notes that Lambert is here defining personal supposition and calls attention to De suppositionibus: “Personal supposition is that on the basis of which a term is interpreted for a suppositum or supposita.” Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 253, f; and Paris, B. N. lat., 16 617, fol. 121v. 48.  The supposition here is simple supposition. De Libera notes that Lambert places simple supposition (pro re sua) and material supposition (pro se) on the same plane, and adds that one can find a similar claim in Ralph Strode and Bacon: “Simple supposition occurs when a term does not stand for a person or an inferior thing, but rather for an utterance, as in ‘“Man” is an utterance’; or for what is signified, as in ‘Man is the noblest of creatures’.” Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 253, g; for the reference to Strode see Alfonso Maierù, Terminologia logica della tarda scolastica, Lessico intellectuale europeo, vol. 8 (Rome: Edizioni dell’Anteneo, 1972), p. 313; and Sd 2.421, trans. Maloney, 213. 49.  De Libera notes that Lambert again separates himself from Peter, who proposes two sorts of appellation for common terms, namely, those having simple supposition (‘Man is a species’) and those having personal supposition (‘A man runs’). (Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 253, h; and Tractatus, pp. 197.21–198.9.) De Libera adds that this leaves Lambert again “more coherent” than Peter who had said in his tract on ampliation that “restriction and ampliation arise in the context of personal supposition.” (Tractatus, p. 194.7–8.) “In consequence,” concludes de Libera, “it would be difficult to reconcile the definition of appellation and the rules for restriction by verbs formulated in Chapter 11 of the Tractatus only for common terms.” See especially Tractatus, p. 203.1–7. 50.  Peter extends the notion to singular terms like ‘Socrates’. (Tractatus, p. 197.16–19.) Thus Peter adds: “A singular term signifies, supposits for, and appellates the same thing because it signifies an existing thing.” This leaves Lambert, says de Libera, “more coherent” than the Portuguese logician who said earlier in his tract on ampliation that “a discrete term like ‘Socrates’ is neither restricted nor ampliated.” (Ibid., p. 194.17–18.) And I would add that Bacon also allows for discrete appellation. (Sd 2.524, trans. Maloney, 239.) Normally, appellation is not said to be applied to discrete terms. Finally, the logician, here called Portuguese, is Peter of Spain; he is once again argued to have been a Spaniard. See Angel



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d’Ors, “Petrus Hispanus O. P., Auctor Summularum,” Vivarium 35 (1997): 21–71; “Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (II): Further Documents and Problems,” Vivarium 39 (2001): 209–54; “Petrus Hispanus O. P., Auctor Summularum (III): ‘Petrus Alfonsi’ or ‘Petrus Ferrandi’?” Vivarium 41 (2003): 249–303. 51.  De Libera notes that Lambert is here acknowledging two sorts of appellation: determinate personal (that taken in determinate supposition) and distributive (personal appellation of a term distributed by a universal sign). (“Le traité,” p. 256, i.) While this has no parallel in the Tractatus, Bacon contends that appellation can be divided in the same way as personal supposition. See Sd 2.524, trans. Maloney, 239. 52.  For two additional rules see 1331 and 1332. 53.  For other statements of this rule and its explanation see William, Peter, and Bacon, respectively, Introductiones 5.3.2–5.3.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 123–31; Tractatus 11.10; and Sd 2.529–81, trans. Maloney, 241–54. De Libera notes that for Lambert, then, appellation is a kind of restricted supposition. (“Le traité,” p. 257, k.) One finds, he adds, this same notion in Peter and the two Parisian masters, Nicholas of Paris and John le Page. Nicholas of Paris: “An unampliated common term joined to a present-tense verb not having the power to ampliate and taken absolutely is restricted to present things, i.e., to suppositing only for something present.” (Summe Metenses, LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 459.) “. . . a common term is restricted to suppositing for present things by what is consignified in the verb or when in a composition, just as a certain rule in Appellations indicates.” (Syncategoremata, ed. H. A. G Braakhuis, De 13de Eeuwse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen, Inleidende Studie en Uitgave van Nicolaas van Paarijs’ Sincategoreumata, vol. 2 (Leiden: Krips Repro Meppel, 1979), p. 30, henceforth, Tractaten. John le Page: “Since the verb restricts the subject by reason of the time of what is signified or consignified with respect to composition, when one says ‘A man runs’, ‘man’ is restricted to present men. . . . And because of this the verbs to which the earlier mentioned names are adjoined do not always supposit for the already mentioned substance that, generally speaking, is related to a quality, but sometimes supposit for a substance related determinately to a quality on the basis of a temporal difference; and a determination of this sort is produced by time. . . . And because of this, when one says ‘A man exists’, the signification is determined by ‘man’ to serve as the subject of the verb for a substance in which humanity now exists and not for one in which the quality existed or in which it will exist.” Tractaten, vol. 1, pp. 234–35 and 219–20. 54.  De Libera calls attention to Peter’s claim: “A common term suppositing for a verb having the power to ampliate either from itself or from something else is ampliated to those things that can be under the form of the suppositing term.” “Le traité,” p. 258, l; and Tractatus, p. 196.1–3. See also 1363. 55.  De Libera notes that the background for this distinction is found in Aristotle’s Categories where he distinguishes things that are sayable of a subject but can never be in one, such as man; those that can be present in a subject but never be sayable of one, such as knowledge; and those that can be both in and sayable of a subject, e.g., knowledge as present in a man and predicable of grammar. (Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 259, m; and Aristotle Categories 2.1a20–b9.) There is no exact parallel remark among Lambert’s contemporaries.

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Notes to Pages 265–266

On the ampliating terms see Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum: “. . . when one says . . . ‘Something is thinkable’, ‘something’ is restricted for both existing and nonexisting things. And this occurs because the form expressed by the predicate (forma predicati) does not link it to the subject (non copulat rei subiecti) but to something related to it (alicui respectu illius). So, when one says ‘A chimera is thinkable’, the thinkability (opinabilitas) is not linked to the chimera but to something related to the chimera.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 729.27–32. 56.  Kretzmann and Stump change ‘unicum terminum’ (ed. Alessio; ‘unum tantum’, ed. de Libera) to ‘unici termini’ to read: “. . . but are unique terms—‘sun’ and ‘moon’.” See “Le traité,” p. 260.3, and CTMPT, p. 118. 57.  Apropos of the issue discussed in this paragraph de Libera makes the following points. (“Le traité,” p. 260, o.) (1) Lambert does not seem to acknowledge Aristotle’s requirement in On the Heavens 1.1.268a16–18 that the universal distributive sign ‘all’ is appropriately used only when it modifies a common term having a minimum of three appellata. (2) Nor does he seem to recognize that his contemporaries use the phrase ‘sufficient appellata’ to refer to this requirement, e.g., Vincent of Beauvais: “But one should note that the stated rule is customarily applied in the case of a term having a sufficiency of appellation; a term of this sort is said to have three appellata. So, it is customarily said that a common term without a sufficiency of appellations reverts to nonentities by suppositing for them.” (Speculum doctrinale, Duaci, 1524 [anastatic ed., Graz, 1965], p. 241.) (And I would add that William includes the phrase in his statement of the rule; Introductiones 5.3.2, trans. Kretzmann, p. 123.) (3) Bacon explicitly attributes the requirements of the three appellata to Aristotle and directs his reader to Book One of On the Heavens, and, I would add, so does Peter. (Respectively, Bacon’s Summa de sophismatibus et distinctionibus, ed Robert Steele, Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Bacon, vol. 14 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937], p. 144.27–30; and Peter’s Tractatus, pp. 212.22–213.3). (4) For a discussion of the theory of sufficient appellata see William, Introductiones 5.3.4, pp. 124–26; Bacon, Sd 2.537–41, trans. Maloney, 241–42; and Introductiones Parisienses, LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 372.8–9. (5) For once Lambert and Peter agree in the claim that, if a universal common term like ‘phoenix’ has only one appellatum, it does not supposit for the previously existing phoenixes. (Tractatus, p. 216.10–14.) (6) The development of this issue figures equally in John le Page’s Appellationes. And (7), as pointed out earlier in “Le traité,” the anonymous author of the Dialectica Monacensis, along with John le Page and Lambert, rejects the theory of “sufficient appellata”: “Having seen these things, one should know that a common term does not need multiple appellata in order for it to be restricted; rather, it suffices that it have only one.” Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 247, n. 59, and LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 620.30–33. 58.  For the distinction ‘enduring things’/‘successive things’ de Libera recommends the following (“Le traité,” pp. 262–63, p). Peter’s Syncategoremata: “Some things are enduring, others are successive, and they differ from each other in several ways. The first difference is that things are called enduring whose being is all at the same time, as are a man, a stone, a piece of wood, the air, the earth; but things are called successives whose being is not all at the same time but in succession, e.g., motion and time.” Tractaten, vol. 1, p. 283.



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John le Page’s Syncategoremata: “Some things are things that are while their beginning is, some things [are things] that are not [at their beginning]. Likewise, some things are things that are while their end is, others are things that are not [while their end is]. For example, no successive thing is while its end or its beginning is. This is clear in the case of change and time because, if there is change, there will be and there was change, and if there is time, there will be and was time. This is so because time is composed of a before and an after.” Ibid., p. 199. Robert Bacon’s Syncategoremata: “Successive things are they whose being is in transition, such as time and change; enduring things are they whose being endures in such a way that the whole is temporally simultaneous, e.g., a man, a stone.” Ibid., p. 138. On the other hand, notes de Libera, propositions with ‘begins’ in them dealing with enduring things are given exposition by copulative propositions wherein the first member is a negation of the present and the second an affirmation of the future. This doctrine is adopted by all the logicians of the thirteenth century. The differences among the authors are uniquely seen apropos of the analysis of propositions with ‘ceases’ in them. “Le traité,” p. 262, p. In fact, continues de Libera, if the three previously cited authors agree in attributing an analysis by an affirmation of the present and a negation of the future for enduring things and an analysis by a negation of the present and an affirmation of the past for successive things, some authors like William, Henry of Ghent, and Nicholas of Paris propose entirely different solutions. (Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 262, p; for William, Syncategoremata, ed. R. O’Donnell, “The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood,” Mediaeval Studies 3 [1941]: 76–77; for Henry, Tractaten, vol. 1, pp. 370–71; and for Nicholas, Tractaten, vol. 2, pp. 251.14–252.9.) Unfortunately we do not know the position of Lambert on this point. On the other hand, says de Libera, the definition of ‘enduring things’ and ‘successive things’, given below, very much resembles that of John le Page. One may also note that the definition given in the De locis is directly opposed to the celebrated theory of Thomas Aquinas according to whom the enduring things are defined by the coincidence of becoming and having been made (fieri and factum esse). The text of John’s De locis reads: “One should know that some things are in the class of successives, others in the class of enduring things. And those things are successives which, when they come to be, are, and when they have been made, are not, e.g., a day, a run, and the like. Enduring things are they that, when they are coming to be, are not, but when they have been made, are, e.g., a house. So successive things are in a state of becoming and not in a state of having been made, whereas enduring things are in a state of having been made and not in a state of becoming. [99v] In successive things one stage is after another but what is enduring is wholly at the same time. For this reason when one speaks of successive things it is true to say ‘what is coming to be is’ whereas when speaking of enduring things it is true to say ‘what is coming to be is not’.” On Thomas Aquinas see Alain de Libera, “L’instant du changement selon saint Thomas d’Aquin,” in Métaphysique, Histoire de la Philosophie, Recueil d’études offert à Fernand Brunner (Neuchâtel: A la Baconnière, 1980), pp. 99–109. 59.  Lambert wants to distinguish two groups of things here: que sunt actu and que sunt actu sub termino. To help distinguish them (and following Kretzmann and Stump [e.g., CTMPT, p. 119]) I am translating the former by ‘things that exist actually’ and the latter

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by ‘things that actually exist under a term’. But the different placement of ‘actually’ has no foundation in the Latin text. 60.  De Libera notes that this distinction is believably borrowed from John le Page’s Syncategoremata: “One should say to this that the rule in Appellationes—a common term, etc.—is not to be understood in the sense that the common term supposits for what exists actually but for what actually exists under a term. For example, when one says ‘What can be is’, ‘can be’ is not restricted to suppositing for things that exist actually but for things that can actually be. To be is one thing, but it is something else to actually exist under a term, for all the things of which a term is truthfully predicated actually are under the term. So, since Antichrist does not exist actually, nevertheless, he actually is under the term ‘can be’.” Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 263, q; and Tractaten, vol. 1, pp. 242–43. In the case of enduring things, continues de Libera, for Lambert (see 1298) “what is in act under a term is at the same time and necessarily in act in reality (dans le réal), whereas, in the case of successive things, what is in act under a term could well be at the same time developing in reality.” John le Page and Lambert are proceeding along the same path. Thus John says in his Syncategoremata: “But if one should ask why being and being under a universal differ with respect to the phases of time, but not with respect to the instances of man, one should reply that this is the case because time is successive, but the whole successive is that whose parts do not exist at the same time, but consists of parts that do not remain at the same time. For this reason it is not right for a phase of time (pars temporis) to exist, but this must obtain if one speaks of a instance of man. This is because man is not a whole whose parts are successive, nor do they relate on the basis of a before and after.” Tractaten, vol. 1, p. 243. De Libera also points out that this meeting of Lambert and John has no equivalent in the texts of their contemporaries. “Le traité,” 263, q. 61.  Kretzmann and Stump omit the translation of ‘presentialiter’ in this sentence. See Logica, p. 264.13; and CTMPT, p. 119. 62.  The translation of Alessio’s edition reads slightly differently: “The sense, then, of the proposition is this: ‘Every time exists’, that is, every time that exists and every time that is a time exists.” Logica, p. 216.20–22. 63.  As a general comment on the discussion of enduring and successive things de Libera points out that the distinction, whose origin is obscure, forms the basis of the medieval discussion on propositions expressing change by means of the verbs ‘begins’ (incipt) and ‘ceases’ (desinit). The correlation, he says, between this distinction and the one discussed earlier (between actually existing and existing actually under a term) constitutes a properly semantical response to the problem of the denotation of entities whose parts do not exist simultaneously, such as the Phoenix, time, and movement. “Le traitè,” p. 245. 64.  To be “in the same place” in this context means to be adjacent to one another in a statement. 65.  De Libera notes that this claim is also mentioned in Nicholas of Paris’s Syncate­ goremata: “If the time by which a term in the subject position is restricted is in the predicate, this cannot be the case. Restriction is a kind of action, but every action involves contact, as Aristotle says in Book One of On Generation and Corruption; therefore, what do not contact



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themselves cannot act on each other and be acted upon by each other. But the predicate has no contact with the subject and does not directly attach to it, because an intermediate ­composition always falls between them. Therefore what is in the predicate does not act on the subject.” (Respectively, “Le traité,” pp. 266–67, r; Tractaten, vol. 2, p. 31.1–8; and On Generation and Corruption 1.6.322b22–25.) I would add here that to make this point more obvious the proposition should be expressed with an explicit copula as in “A man is ­running’. This same position, continues de Libera, can be found in Bacon’s Summulae dialectices and his “De signis.” (Respectively, Sd 2.560–65, trans. Maloney, 249–50; and “De signis” 114, ed. K. M. Fredborg, Lauge Nielsen, and Jan Pinborg, “An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon’s Opus maius: ‘De signis’,” Traditio 34 [1978]: 120.) And, de Libera concludes, it is commonly held by terminist logicians and implies that the verbal copula is not part of the predicate. 66.  De Libera notes that Nicholas of Paris’s Syncategoremata presents the same argument in a slightly different form: “Again, when one says ‘A man runs’, if the predicate ‘runs’ restricts the subject ‘man’, it is clear that ‘man’ does not supposit except for men who are running. But if a restricted term is distributed, it will only be distributed for those for whom it is restricted. On the assumption, therefore, that only three men are running, ‘All men are running’ will be true. But this is false; therefore, the tense of the predicate does not restrict the subject.” Respectively, “Le traitè,” pp. 267–68, s; and Tractaten, vol. 2, p. 31.12–17. And even better, says de Libera, one finds it in the Dialectica Monacensis: “But some say that a present tense verb restricts the term to which it is adjoined to supposit only for present things. But then one asks the source for this. If one says from the time consignified in the verb, this does not seem to be the case because, when I say ‘A man runs’, ‘man’ is not restricted by the principal significatum of ‘runs’, namely, running (a cursu), to men who are running. Therefore, it is also not restricted by its consignificatum, namely, by time. That ‘man’ is not restricted by ‘runs’ to men running is clear because, were this the case, ‘Every man runs’ would be true because ‘man’, since it would be restricted only to those running, would be distributed for running men. Then ‘Every man runs’ would be the same as ‘Every running man runs’. That this is false is clear because ‘man’ in the stated locution is not restricted by the verb’s principal signification; therefore, neither by its consignification.” Respectively, “Le traitè,” pp. 267–68, s; and LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 619.9–21. 67.  This is more fully stated as ‘For every man it is possible to run’. 68.  The translation of Alessio’s text reads a little differently: “It is impossible if ‘man’ is interpreted for past and future men; therefore it must be that, either the common term is interpreted for present things and is restricted by the verb, or that [the proposition] is impossible. 69.  The composition intended here is of course that of the subject and the predicate in an expression. 70.  The author of the Dialectica Monacensis spells this theory out in equal detail but in somewhat different terms: “One should reply that, as was pointed out [in an objection], time/tense is not consignified with respect to the subject nor with respect to the predicate, but with respect to the composition [of the subject with the predicate] which is restricted to present time if the [verb’s] tense that is consignified with respect to it is present. But since the composition directly pertains to both the subject and the predicate, if it is such that its

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truth requires its extremes to be present, then it restricts them to present things.” So subject and predicate terms get temporally restricted directly by the composition and indirectly by the tense of the verb. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 620.1–7. 71.  The disposition referred to is the characterization signified by the adjoined term, e.g., ‘running’ in ‘a running man’. 72.  For the notions of disposition and place (situs) de Libera suggests John le Page’s Appellationes and for the argument over different places he points to fol. 63va: “But time is not different for the subject with respect to place because time accrues to the verb by reason of its composition, not by reason of an action.” Respectively, “Le traité” p. 270, t; and Appellationes, Paris, B. N. lat., 15 170, fol. 63ra–b. 73.  This argument seems to de Libera to be borrowed from John le Page’s Appellationes: “Again, if no man exists, ‘Every man exists’ is false; therefore its contradictory ‘Some man does not exist’ is true. But if ‘man’ in the negative proposition were contracted to present men, the sense of ‘Some man does not exist’ would be [that] some man who exists does not exist. ‘Some man who exists does not exist’ is false; therefore, ‘Some man does not exist’ will be false, and these two contradictories will be false at the same time, which is impossible. One should say, therefore, that in a negative proposition with a present-tense verb in it a common term is not contracted to present men.” “Le traité,” p. 271, v. De Libera adds that one can see the same thing in the Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum: “Some say that ‘A rose does not exist’ is impossible because the sense is [that] a rose that exists does not exist.” Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 271, v; and LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 724.36–37. Earlier in “Le traité,” de Libera makes the point that in addition to John le Page’s Appellationes the only parallel text to that of Lambert here seems to be the Dialectica Monacensis: “One should reply that the terms in a negative [proposition] are restricted in the same way in the negative [proposition] as they are in an affirmative one, and by the same thing, namely, composition. . . . To what has been objected . . . , namely, that ‘Every man exists’ is false when only two men exist, therefore, its contradictory will be true, namely, ‘Some man does not exist’ . . . one should reply that it would be true if its contradictory were taken as true. But it is not taken [as true] because the sign ‘every’ in ‘Every man exists’ is extended to a nonentity to which being is attributed when it does not belong. Hence, it is a false lo­ cution. But in ‘Some man does not exist’, since the term ‘man’ requires multiple appellata, it is restricted to suppositing for existing things from which being has been removed by the negation. Hence, the locution is false. And this is not contradictory to the first since ‘man’ is not taken for the same thing in both cases. For it had ought to be of the same subject and predicate.” Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 246, n. 59; and LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 621.10–24. 74.  For this distinction de Libera directs one to John le Page’s Appellationes, B. N. lat. 11, 412, fol. 84v, but he does not supply the Latin text. “Le traité,” p. 272, w. 75.  What Lambert calls here “a proposition taken by itself ” was more correctly categorized as “a statement” taken in itself and absolutely in the previous paragraph. For the distinction see 75. 76. Aristotle Categories 5.4b5–10. 77.  For the notion of an inverse consequence see 1324. For Lambert’s argument de Libera directs one to John le Page’s Appellationes: “But ‘No man exists; therefore Caesar



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does not exist’ certainly does follow. This is clear from the inverse consequence ‘If Caesar exists, some man exists; therefore if no man exists, then Caesar does not exist’.” (“Le traité,” p. 275, y.) For the notions of inverse (e contrario) and direct (in ipso) consequences see 1324. Also, Bacon employs these kinds of consequences when discussing the Topic from opposites. Sd 3.349–53, trans. Maloney, 245–47. 78.  Apropos of the change made in the last phrase of this sentence I would note that de Libera’s critical apparatus indicates that ‘communis’ (common) and not ‘discreti’ (discrete) is found in all the manuscripts he is referencing. See “Le traité,” p. 276. 79. Aristotle Topics 2.8.113b30. 80.  One is able to find the same argument, says de Libera, in John le Page’s Appellationes: “Again, a common term in a present-tense affirmative proposition is contracted to present things by reason of the consignificatum of time . . . but the same tense remains in an affirmation and a negation . . . but a negation does not remove the general signification . . . therefore in a present-tense affirmation a common term is contracted to present things and is contracted to present things in a present-tense negation.” “Le traité,” p. 277, a. Peter’s claim, says de Libera, while basically the same as Lambert’s and John’s, formally is entirely different: “There is a rule that every verb taken absolutely when it has no force to ampliate either from itself or another restricts the term serving as its subject (sibi supponentem) with respect to consignification, which is time, and not with respect to its signification. Therefore, tense is the cause of its restriction. But the same tense remains in an affirmative and its negative opposite, e.g., ‘A rose exists’ and ‘A rose does not exist’. Therefore, the cause of restriction is the same in both.” Tractatus 9.15. 81.  This argument, notes de Libera, plays an equal role in John le Page’s Appellationes, and he points to B. N. lat., 15 170, fol. 64ra; he does not, however, supply the Latin text. “Le traité,” p. 277, b. One also finds it, he says, in Nicholas of Paris’s Syncategoremata: “It must be taken similarly as it is taken in contradictories that differ by affirmation and negation, as is clear in the definition of ‘contradiction’ apropos of true and false. But when one says ‘Some man runs’, ‘man’ is restricted; therefore in ‘No man runs’.” Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 277, b; and Tractaten, vol. 2, p. 34.1–4. De Libera also points to Bacon’s Summulae dialectices: “To these one should reply that a [subject] term in a negative proposition—I mean in an indefinite and particular one— stands for an entity, just as it does in an affirmative one, because a negation changes nothing in the term since it follows and does not precede. There is doubt, however, about the case of a universal negative. And yet, I think that the term likewise stands in that case for something present, because a negation negates the same thing that an affirmation affirms, and only it.” (Respectively, “Le traité,” p. 277, b; and Sd 2.591, trans. Maloney, 260.) Note also that in the quotation in “Le traité,” p. 277, b, line 8, the text should read “stat pro ente” and not “stat pro non ente.” 82.  As de Libera notes, John le Page arrives at the same verdict in his Appellationes: “One should reply to the first [argument] that a common term included in a present-tense negative proposition is restricted in the same way as in an affirmative one; for otherwise there would be no contradiction, as was said (pointed out 11 412).” “Le traité,” pp. 278–79, c.

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83.  The Dialectica Monacensis says that such subjects and predicates are restricted to suppositing for only past things, but then adds: “And the word ‘only’ does not exclude present things which are and also were, but those which are and were not. LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 626.5–10. 84.  This rule in the Dialectica Monacensis and its explanation apropos of the future tense parallels its presentation of the second rule, for which see the preceding note. See LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 626.29–33. 85.  Lambert’s assertion “from now on” contradicts the assumption given as “in the next to last instant of his youth.” But note that MS R reads “in the last instant of his youth,” which avoids the contradiction. (“Le traité,” p. 280, n. 18.) The rebuttal here would have been more effectively given in terms of the distinction between compounded and divided senses (see next note): as compounded the statement is false (one cannot be a youth and an old man at the same time), but as divided it is true (at different times he who was once a youth is an old man). 86.  De Libera notes here that, while the two analyses of ‘white’ are interpreted as disjunctives, the whole discussion could have been worked together successfully through the theory of composition and division. (“Le traité,” p. 280, d.) I would add that it applies to the analysis given in this whole paragraph. In that theory one says that a proposition is taken in the divided sense when the supposition of the subject term is not restricted by the tense consignified by the verb, and in the compounded sense, and vice versa. The compounded sense is then said to involve continuous utterance of the proposition and the divided sense discontinuous utterance, and so, as de Libera remarks, ways of speaking become ways of logically signifying. For an application of the theory he points to William’s Introductiones in logicam: “If compounded, it must be pronounced with continuity, and the continuity of the subject with the predicate signifies that the supposition [of the subject] must be strictly indicated by the predicate. In that case ‘man’ [in ‘A man has run’] supposits for past [men] and not for present [men] except insofar as they are past. If divided, it must be pronounced with discontinuity (as in ‘A man has run’), and the discontinuity of the expression signifies that the supposition [of the subject] is not strictly indicated by the predicate.” (5.3.5; trans. Kretzmann, p. 127.) Kretzmann suggests that in the discontinuous pronunciation perhaps stress was placed on the pronunciation of ‘has run’. (Ibid., nn. 91–92.) In addition Kretzmann analyzes the proposition ‘A man has run’ in this way: ‘It has been the case that there is at least one individual such that it is a man and it is running’ (compounded sense) and ‘There is at least one individual such that it is a man and it has been the case that it is running’ (divided sense). In this analysis ‘it has been the case that’ serves as a tense operator making the consignification of time in the past-tense verb clear. Ibid., n. 88. 87.  At this point in his edition of the text, de Libera presents two additional responses for consideration. (“Le traité,” p. 281, e.) They are the following. From the Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum: “But one can ask the reason why a term pertaining to accident does not have the same supposition on the part of the subject as on the part of the predicate in the case of a past-tense verb. The reason for this is that, since the subject is like matter (sit loca materie) in a proposition, a common term used as the subject is more fundamentally regarded thanks to the suppositum than thanks to the form, when



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that term has a suppositum and a form in itself. Thus, since the past has in itself the present and the past, the form is given to be understood vaguely both this [time] and that. But since the predicate is like form in a proposition, the term used in the predicate, when it conveys a form, is more fundamentally regarded in virtue of the consignification of the verb thanks to the form than thanks to the suppositum. So, since signification of the past is more fundamentally in a verb of the past tense than in any other tense, the form joined by the term used in the predicate more fundamentally is regarded with respect to the past tense than with respect to the future.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 726.24–727.3. From the Summe Metenses of Nicholas of Paris in a discussion of ‘The blind see and the deaf hear’: “One should say that those terms can signify on the basis of matter or on the basis of form. If on the basis of matter, [the propositions] are true, and the sense is [that] those who are or who were blind see. If on the basis of form, they are false, and the sense is [that] those who are blind, while they are blind, see. And to the objection that one ought to interpret the term on the basis of form one should reply that this is not the case, because a subject is not contracted to not being able to supposit for both what is and for what was.” Ibid., pt. 1, p. 461. 88.  Kretzmann and Stump’s translation, following Alessio’s text, reads: “. . . would have to supposit (supponere) according to . . . .” See Logica, p. 224.14; and CTMPT, p. 131. 89.  De Libera’s edition reads: “mediante re verbi”; Alessio’s edition reads: “mediante re, id est actu verbi” (by means of the thing [signified], i.e., by the verb’s action). See respectively, “Le traité,” p. 282.22; and Logica, p. 224.35–36. 90.  Alessio’s text reads: “Likewise, a subject does not subject itself to a verb except for the reason by which a subject must be something stable and constant (Similiter, nec subiectum subicit se verbo nisi ratione qua subiectum debeat esse fixum et stans). “Logica,” p. 224.41–43. 91.  “Et ideo non restringitur subiectum a verbo ratione temporis, aut re verbi ratione forme accidentalis, sed solum ratione forme substantialis. . . .” (Ibid., p. 225.2–3.) Kretzmann and Stump translate this text a little differently by supplying an additional disjunctive connective between “verbo” and “ratione temporis”: “And so it is not because of an accidental form but only because of a substantial form that a subject is restricted by the verb, by the verb’s time [tense], or by the thing the verb [signifies].” De Libera’s more recent edition of Lambert’s “De appellatione” reads at the relevant point: “. . . mediante re verbi. . . .” “Le traité,” p. 283.4. 92.  To be imposed on the basis of, or with respect to, a (substantial or accidental) form (imponi a forma) is simply one of the medieval ways of drawing on the notion that whatever words name is either a substantial or accidental form (e.g., respectively, humanity or whiteness) or something having such forms (e.g., Plato or something white). 93.  From 1346 to the end we return to Alessio’s edition of the Logica. Peter, but not William or Bacon, presents an extended treatment of restriction, for which see Tractatus 11.1–19. For analysis of the medieval theories of restriction see Alain de Libera, “On Some 12th and 13th Century Doctrines of Restrictio: Hommage à Geoffrey L. Bursill-Hall,” ed. Konrad Koerner, Hans-J. Niederehe, and Robert H. Robins, Historiographia Linguistica 7 (1980): 131–43.

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94. Aristotle Topics 6.1.139a24–30. 95.  For Peter’s description of this distinction see Tractatus 11.2 and 11.18. To these he adds another kind of restriction called “by the transitivity of a verb” (per transitionem verbi). See Tractatus 11, 19. 96.  Note the distinction Lambert makes between a diminishing clause and a restricting clause: the former negates what it modifies while the latter simply interprets the term for fewer supposita than it is otherwise capable of having. See 1352 and 1360. 97.  The author of the Dialectica Monacensis speaks of the theory here adopted by Lambert as one that some held in the past (“quidam tenebant”), and the principle ground seems to be the notion that what is consignified occurs by means of what is signified. He concludes: “one should reply that ‘citizen’ in ‘A citizen is white’ (Civis est albus) is in no way restricted by the adjective ‘white’ but rather has common supposition for a male or a female.” LM, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 618.22–24. 98.  William’s and Bacon’s comments on ampliation are found passim in their explanations of the first rule on appellation; Peter has a separate (brief ) treatise on it. See, respectively, Introductiones 5.3.2–5.3.5, trans. Kretzmann, pp. 123–31; Sd 2.529–81, trans. Maloney, 241–54; and Tractatus 11.1–4. 99.  By way of examples a house is an integral whole and a species (man) is a universal whole. 100.  “Illud autem dicitur habere naturam universalis complete et perfecte quod est in multis et de multis dicitur actu simul et existens in rerum natura ut ‘homo’; rebus enim existentibus ut nunc, ‘homo’ est in multis singularibus et de multis dicitur simul et actu, et est aliquid existens in rerum natura.” (Logica, pp. 229.35–40.) Kretzmann and Stump translate this in the following way: “That is said to have the nature of a universal completely and perfectly that is actually in many things and is said of many things at once, and that is existent in the nature of things—e.g., man; for, while things are as they are now, man is in many singulars and is said of many things at once and actually, and it is something existent in the nature of things.” (CTMPT, p. 140.) Kretzmann and Stump separate ‘actually’ from ‘at once’ for the first occurrence but not the second, whereas the fact that the pair are used twice by Lambert but in reverse order suggests to me that they are not to be separated. Finally where Kretzmann and Stump take ‘at once’ to qualify ‘is said’ in the first sentence and both phrases to modify ‘is said’ in the second, I have them both qualifying ‘many things’ in both sentences, for which see 1370. 101.  “Sunt autem alia universalia que defficiunt ab aliquibus eorum : sol enim et luna sunt universalia et sunt in multis, non tamen actu, nec etiam simul nec successive nec de multis dicuntur quia unicus est sol et una est luna.” (Logica, p. 229.40–230.1.) Kretzmann and Stump translate this as follows: “There are, however, other universals that fall short in some of these respects. For sun and moon are universals and are in many things, but not actually, nor are they said of many things either at once or successively, because the sun is unique and there is one moon.” CTMPT, p. 40. 102.  For “imposed on the basis of a universal form” (imponatur a form univesali) Kretzmann and Stump have “the term be informed by a universal form” (informatur a forma unversali). See CTMPT, p. 140.



Notes to Pages 287–301

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103.  To say that no such distribution is owed to the term in such a situation clearly contradicts the point he wants to make and is stated clearly in what follows. He should have contented himself with simply saying that ‘every man’ in ‘Every man is afraid at sea’ is not owed accomodated distribution of itself (de se), instead of saying “in such a situation.” Also, “strickly speaking” (proprie loquendo) is not a proper contrast with “in ordinary usage” (in communi usu). 104.  For the rationale for the word order in these propositions see 1391–92. 105. Aristotle On Interpretation 5.17a10. 106. Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.4.25b31–4. 107. Aristotle On Interpretation 4.17a3. 108. Aristotle Categories 7.6a36. For a modern study of the notion of relatives in the medieval period see Irène Rosier, “Relatifs et relatives dans les traits terministes des XIIe et XIIIe siècles. Première partie: termes anaphoriques ou relatifs et règles d’anaphores (relatio),” Vivarium 23 (1985): 1–22; “Duxième partie: Propositions relatives (implicationes), Distinction entre restrictves et non restrictives,” Vivarium 24 (1986): 1– 21. 109.  For comment on relatives of accident see 1407–10. 110.  William also considers this to be a case of simple supposition—his third submode of such—and adds that it is often called unfixed supposition (suppositio vaga). The pronoun indicates the species in so far as the latter relates to more than one individual in an undesignated way (non signata). This leads Kretzmann to note that John of Salisbury also holds that such expressions “should be understood as remaining general.” Introductiones 5.1.11, tr. Kretzmann, pp. 112 and 115, and n. 43. 111.  After corrections the text reads: “‘Homo’ est dissilabus et istud est communis generis.” (Logica, p. 240.15.) In the next paragraph (in the translation) Lambert gives a different example: “‘Homo’ est dissilabum et iste currit.” (Ibid., p. 240.28.) The translation of both of these texts states just what needs to be said to illustrate the issue at hand, but the Latin is somewhat confusing. Presumably ‘dissilabus’ and ‘dissilabum’ are variants for ‘syllaba’ (syllable), but why the two different endings? What is the (neuter) referent of ‘istud’? Ordinarily ‘Homo’ is said to be thought of as a vox (vocal sound) or dictio (word), in which case ‘istud’ should be ‘ista’, or ‘homo’ could be thought of as a terminus, in which case ‘istud’ should be ‘iste’. The same thing applies, mutatis mutandis, to the proposition at the end of the next paragraph in the translation. 112.  Peter speaks of an “old” (ab antiquis) theory that maintained that “no proposition begun with a relative has a contradictory” on the grounds that ‘He does not argue’ is the contradictory of ‘He argues’ and the sign of contradiction clearly negates the verb, not the relation of the relative to its antecedent. He considers the old theory erroneous on several grounds but reminds that the relative is compared to its antecedent and to its verb and that the contradiction should and does pertain to its relation to the verb and not to its antecedent precisely because contradictions pertain to predications. The contradictory of ‘He argues’, he says, is ‘It is not the case that he argues’. Tractatus 8.13. 113.  For the latter discussion see 1438. 114. Priscian Institutiones grammaticarum 18.56–57, GL, 3, pp. 141.20–142.20.

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Index of Names and Works

In this index I indicates the Introduction and Roman numerals indicate page numbers of the Introduction. Bold numbers refer to chapters of the translation, n. and nn. indicate endnotes, and all other numbers indicate paragraph numbers in the translation. Abelard, Peter, 1, n. 99 Accessus philosophorum VII artium liberalium, 3, n. 43 Albert the Great, xxxv, xlii; 1, nn. 37, 78, 99, 131; 7, n. 49 Alessio, Franco, xv, xvi–xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxvii, xxviii, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix, xl, xlii, xliii, xliv, xlv, xlvi, xlvii; I, nn. 13, 21, 25, 30, 34, 40, 42, 91, 100, 113, 170, 180; 1, nn. 28, 106; 3, n. 86 Alexander IV, xxvii Alexander of Aphrodisias, 7, n. 17 Amitie of Joigny, xvii, xxviii Anonymi Fragmentum Vulgo Vocatum “Liber sex principiorum,” 3, nn. 77, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 94; 4, n. 12; 8, n. 29 Anonymous Aurelianensis, 1, n. 99 Apuleius of Madaura, 1, n. 66 Arbois de Jubainville, Henry d’, xx, xxi, xxii; I, nn. 32, 34, 48, 54, 55, 69, 70, 76, 130 Aristotle, 337, 382, 408, 467, 479, 480, 524, 651–52, 705, 871, 960–61, 1078, 1170; 2, n. 2; Categories, 21, 286, 366, 395, 452, 455,

432

612, 639, 1034, 1040, 1075, 1317, 1393; 1, n. 117; 2, nn. 1, 8; 3, nn. 2, 17, 18, 22, 24, 27, 30, 35, 41, 42, 47, 52, 53, 54, 56, 59, 62, 63, 66, 67, 71, 75, 83; 4, nn. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13; 5, n. 29; 7, nn. 86, 94; 8, nn. 55, 108; Metaphysics, 357; Nicomachean Ethics, 516; 3, n. 69; On Generation and Corruption, 8, n. 65; On Interpretation, 21, 63, 185, 1198, 1232, 1387, 1388; 1, nn. 11, 26, 39, 40, 46, 66, 74; 7, nn. 102, 127; 8, n. 4; On Sophistical Refutations, 21, 858, 872, 883, 925, 952, 972, 1026, 1039, 1112, 1136, 1141, 1142, 1146, 1148, 1150, 1173, 1190, 1211; 7, nn. 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 35, 49, 53, 58, 63, 78, 82, 95, 104, 113, 114, 115, 119, 125, 129, 130, 133; On the Heavens, 657; 8, n. 57; On the Soul, 315, 332, 784, 1234; Physics, 38, 920, 1180; 1, n. 23; 7, n. 24; Posterior Analytics, 21, 638; 5, nn. 1, 22; Prior Analytics, 21, 140, 148, 182, 198, 204, 226, 231, 233, 238, 242, 249, 260, 268, 638, 644, 647, 648, 649, 675, 680, 819, 1387; 1, nn. 110, 117, 121, 134, 135, 136; 5, nn. 1, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 46, 48, 49, 60, 65; 7,



Index of Names and Works

433

n. 127; Topics, 21, 293, 301, 323, 331, 619, 622, 623, 638, 727, 848, 870, 1128, 1129, 1173, 1324, 1346; 2, nn. 23, 40; 3, nn. 17, 21; 5, nn. 10, 11, 24, 25, 26, 27; 6, n. 5; 7, nn. 4, 55; 8, n. 17 Arnould of Okieres, I, n. 97 Ars Burana, 1, nn. 42, 49, 57, 60, 67, 76, 100; 5, nn. 2, 47 Ars Emerana, 1, nn. 42, 49, 56, 57, 76; 5, n. 2 Ashworth, E. J., 7, nn. 21, 80 Augustine: De doctrina christiana, 1, n. 20; De ordine, 1, n. 8 Averroes, 1, nn. 5, 95

54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 66, 68, 71; De divisione liber, 781; 6, n. 32; De syllogismo categorico, 41, 49, 62, 72, 115, 122, 141, 144; 1, nn. 11, 20, 27, 31, 32, 35, 44, 67, 74; 5, nn. 53, 56, 65; De syllogismo hypothetico, 100; 1, n. 23; In categorias Aristotelis, 398; 3, n. 57; In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta, 2, nn. 26, 33; In Librum Aristotelis peri hermeneias, 63; 1, nn. 17, 31, 34, 42; Topicorum Aristotelis interpretatio, 2, n. 30 Boniface VIII, xxvi Braakhuis, H. A. G., 1, n. 8; 8, n. 8 Brown, M. A., 8, n. 43

Bacon, Roger, xv, xl, xlii, xlviii; Compendium studii theologiae, 1, nn. 19, 23; 7, nn. 20, 127; 8, n. 5; “De signis,” 7, nn. 20, 25, 66; 8, n. 5; Summulae dialectices, xli, xlii, xliii, xlviii; 1, nn. 3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 26, 31, 37, 38, 40, 42, 44, 48, 49, 52, 55, 57, 59, 60, 64, 65, 69, 71, 74, 75, 76, 91, 93, 95, 96, 99, 100, 104, 108, 109, 111, 112, 121, 125, 131; 2, nn. 1, 10, 44; 3, nn. 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 18, 23, 26, 27, 35, 41, 43, 47, 54, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 71, 76, 81, 84, 87, 88, 90, 92; 4, n. 1; 5, nn. 1, 2, 12, 20, 32, 33, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 58, 61, 63, 64, 68, 70, 74; 6, nn. 1, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 66, 68, 71; 7, nn. 6, 9, 10, 18, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 38, 48, 49, 52, 58, 61, 64, 68, 73, 74, 75, 82, 84, 92, 95, 98, 104, 106, 114, 117, 118, 119, 122, 125, 127, 129, 133; 8, nn. 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 16, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 53, 57, 65, 77, 81, 93, 98 Bartholomew of Tours, xxviii Bernard of Sully, xvii Blanche of Castile, xvii, xxiii Boethius, 1, nn. 11, 20, 24; Contra Eutychen, 1311; 8, n. 30; De arithmetica, 3, n. 43; De differentiis topicis, 15, 76, 611, 625, 638, 639, 733, 761, 828, 842; 1, n. 11; 5, nn. 2, 7, 9, 17, 18, 19, 23, 28; 6, nn. 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 48, 51, 52,

Chapotin, Marie-Dominique, xvii, xviii, xix, xxiv, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxviii; 1, nn. 21, 25, 110, 120, 170 Chouet, P., xxvii Clement IV, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii Cum sit nostra, 1, nn. 3, 17, 42, 56, 57, 60, 76, 100, 109; 2, nn. 14, 36, 44; 5, nn. 2, 9, 47, 74; 8, n. 26 Destrez, Jean, I, n. 42 Dialectica Monacensis, xl, xlviii; 1, nn. 45, 46, 57, 74, 76, 96, 100, 109, 111; 2, nn. 14, 22, 38, 39, 45; 3, nn. 20, 28, 29, 30, 36, 38, 40, 48, 53, 57, 61, 64, 72, 77, 79, 80, 82, 87; 5, nn. 2, 47, 65, 74; 8, nn. 57, 66, 70, 73, 83, 84, 97 Dominic, xxiii, xxxv Douais, C., xxx Ebbesen, Sten, 3, n. 21; 6, n. 1; 7, nn. 1, 17, 44 Ecclesiastes, 515 Echard, Jacques, xvii, xviii, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxviii; I, n. 25 Engels, J., 1, n. 20 Euripides, 4, n. 16 Fink-Errera, G., I, n. 42 Frachet, Gérard de, xvii, xxxi, xxxiii Galen, 7, n. 17 Geyer, Berhard, xv, xviii, xix; I, n. 31 Grabmann, Martin, xv, xl; I, n. 165 Gregory IX, xxvi; I, nn. 84, 146

434

Index of Names and Works

Gui Folques. See Clement IV Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae, 1, n. 4 Henry (brother of Theobald II), I, n. 71 Henry, Paul Desmond, 8, n. 1 Henry III, xviii; I, nn. 32, 71 Henry of Ghent, 1, n. 37; 8, n. 58 Henry Tuebeuf, I, n. 55 Horace, 7, n. 79 Hugo of Saint-Cher, xxvi Humbert of Romans, xxxiii, xxxvi; I, nn. 82, 136, 150 Innocent V, xx, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii Introductiones Parisienses, 1, nn. 8, 17, 42, 45, 49, 56, 66; 5, nn. 2, 47, 74; 8, n. 57 Isidore of Seville, 1, n. 24 Jacques Pantaleon. See Urban IV James, Epistle of, 515 James of Venice, 7, n. 49 John Buridan, 8, n. 24 John Duns Scotus, 7, n. 53 John le Page: Appellationes, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xl, xli, xlviii; 8, nn. 57, 60, 72, 73, 74, 77, 80, 81, 82; Syncategremata, xl, xli, xlviii; 8, nn. 53, 58, 60 John of Asconio, xxiv John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, 1, n. 4; 8, n. 110 John of St. Giles, xxxv; I, n. 61 John of Wildeshausen, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii Jordan of Saxony, xxiii, xxxv Judy, Albert, xlvii Kaeppeli, Thomas, xxi; I, n. 164 Kneale, William and Martha, 3, n. 2 Kretzmann, Norman, xlix; I, n. 183; 1, nn. 37, 49, 63, 66, 74; 3, nn. 21, 42, 51, 55, 60; 5, nn. 67, 74; 7, n. 105; 8, nn. 18, 20, 56, 59, 61, 86, 88, 91, 100, 101, 102, 110 Lagerlund, Henrik, 1, nn. 95, 99, 124, 131 Lambert of Liège, xxviii, xxxi, xxxii Lambert of St. Victor, I, n. 15 Latino Malabranca, xxviii Lebeuf (Abbé), xvii, xxx; I, n. 102

Liber de illustribus, xvii, xviii, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxiv Libera, Alain de, xv, xvi, xx–xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxvii, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxix, xl, xli, xlii, xliii, xliv, xlv, xlvi, xlviii; I, nn. 45, 100, 180; 1, nn. 4, 38; 7, nn. 17, 23, 35, 41, 49, 52, 53, 67, 68, 73; 8, nn. 10, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 63, 65, 66, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93 Logica (Lambert of Auxerre), author of: composed for, xix–xxi, xxxix; date of, xix– xxi, xxxviii–xl; Dominican, xxvi–xxviii, xxxiv–xxxvii, xxxviii–xl; Lambert of Lagny, xx–xxii, xxxviii–xl; Lambert of Ligny-leChâtel, xvi, xxiv, xxxviii–xl; Latin manuscripts of, xlii–xliv; sources for, xl–xlii; translation of, xliv–xlix Louis IX, xvi, xxiii Maierù, A., 8, n. 48 Maloney, Thomas S., I, n. 12; 4, n. 43; 7, n. 20; 8, n. 5 Mandonnet, Pierre-Marie-Felix, I, nn. 63, 88, 136 Marcus Tullius Cicero, 293, 1057, 1174; 2, n. 13; Topics, 1, n. 11 Margaret of Bourbon, xvi, xix, xx; I, n. 34 Martin IV, xxvii, xxviii Matilde of Courtenay, xvii, xxiii, xxix Matthew of Hradecz, I, n. 15 Michael (prior of Lille), xxviii Michael of Ephesus, 7, n. 17 Michael the Scot, Liber introductorius, 1, n. 4 Michalski, Konstanty, xv, xl; I, n. 165 Morando of Siena, xxvii MS. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale Latin: 15 170 (Appelationes), 8, n. 72; 16 617 (De suppositionibus) 8, n. 47 Mulchahey, Marian Michèle, xxxii, xxxiv–xxxvii, xxxviii; I, nn. 130, 131, 136, 140, 141, 147, 157 Muller, Paola, 7, n. 67 Nicholas of Paris, xl, xlviii, lii, lxiii; Summe Metenses, xl, xlviii; 1, nn. 1, 14; 4, n. 47; 8, nn. 41, 46, 53, 87; Syncategoremata, xl, xlviii; 8, nn. 53, 66, 81



Index of Names and Works

Peter Helias, 7, n. 80 Peter of Limoges, xliii Peter of Spain, xv; Syncategoremata, 8, n. 58; Tractatus, xv, xvii, xix, xx, xxiv, xl, xliii, xlvii; I, nn. 100, 130; 1, nn. 8, 9, 14, 15, 26, 37, 40, 44, 48, 49, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 65, 69, 75, 91, 95, 96, 99, 100, 104, 107; 2, nn. 1, 47; 3, nn. 2, 6, 7, 9, 11, 18, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 35, 41, 47, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 71, 76, 81; 4, nn. 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11; 5, nn. 1, 2, 4, 46, 48, 49, 50, 58, 61, 64, 68, 70, 74; 6, nn. 1, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 68, 71; 7, nn. 9, 10, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 45, 48, 58, 59, 61, 62, 74, 75, 82, 84, 94, 95, 98, 104, 114, 117, 118, 119, 125, 129, 132, 133; 8, nn. 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 22, 27, 32, 34, 35, 39, 40, 43, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 57, 80, 93, 95, 98, 112 Peter of Tarantaise. See Innocent V Pignon, Laurence, xvii, xxx, xxxi, l; I, n. 108 Plato, Timaeus, 8, n. 17 Porphyry, 282, 284, 313, 341, 359, 360, 920; 1, nn. 11, 127; 2, nn. 1, 2, 3, 16, 26, 30, 33, 44, 47; 7, n. 24 Prantl, Carl, xv Priscian, 49, 94, 97, 984, 1053, 1054, 1245, 1442; 1, nn. 20, 28; 7, n. 25 Ps.-Cicero, 1, n. 2 Raymond of Peñaforte, xxvi; I, n. 84 Richard of Campsall, 1, n. 124 Rijk, Lambert Marie de, xv, xvi, xx, xxiii, xxviii, xxxiv, xl, xlvii, xlviii; I. nn. 30, 42, 48, 96, 129; 1, nn. 2, 3, 62, 65, 97; 2, n. 6; 3, n. 30; 5, n. 74; 7, nn. 1, 105; 8, nn. 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 18, 23, 24, 26, 28, 43 Robert Bacon, Syncategoremata, 8, n. 58 Robert Kilwardby, xxviii, xlii, xlvii; 1, nn. 78, 95, 131; 7, n. 49 Roger of Cheminon, xxiv Roland of Cremona, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix; I, nn. 61, 140 Rosier, Irène, 7, nn. 1, 23, 108

435

Simon de Brion. See Martin IV Simon de Montforte, xvii Sinkler, Georgette, xv, xl, xli, xlii, xlviii; I, n. 165; 7, n. 36 Spade, Paul Vincent, 3, n. 87; 7, n. 109 Strode, Ralph, 8, n. 48 Stump, Eleonore, xlix; I, n. 183; 3, nn. 42, 51, 55, 60, 87; 5, nn. 9, 31; 6, n. 1; 8, nn. 18, 56, 59, 61, 88, 91, 100, 101, 102 Summa Alexandri Halensis, 1, n. 3 Sutor, Giles, xvii, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxviii; I, n. 21 Theobald I, xviii, xix, xx, xxiii; I, nn. 32, 55 Theobald II, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxvii, xxix, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxvii, xxxix, xl, xli; I, nn. 32, 34, 39, 47, 48, 55, 70, 71, 130 Thom, Paul, 1, n. 78 Thomas Aquinas, xxviii; 8, n. 58 Tractatus Anagnini, 2, nn. 26, 34 Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum, 8, nn. 55, 73, 87 Tugwell, Simon, xxxii; I, nn. 120, 121, 123, 124 Urban IV, xx, xxi, xxii, xxiv, xxvii, xxviii, xxix; I, nn. 30, 76 Ut dicit, 1, nn. 3, 17, 42, 45, 56, 57, 70, 71, 76, 100, 109; 2, nn. 11, 14; 3, n. 17; 5, nn. 2, 47, 74 Vincent Ferrer, 8, n. 24 Vincent of Beauvais, 8, n. 57 Viole, Daniel George, xvii, xviii, xxiii, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxviii; I, n. 21, 52, 112 Virgil, Aeneid, 7, n. 80 Walter Burley, I, n. 14 Wieland, Georg, 3, n. 69 William (brother of Theobald II), xxiv, xxv, xxviii, I, n. 54, 71, 72 William of Limigni, I, nn. 55, 70 William of Moerbeke, xxvi William of Nöe, xvii, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxiv William of Sherwood: Introductiones in logicam, xv, xix, xliii, xlviii; I, nn. 1, 8; 1, nn. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 19, 26, 29, 37, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 55, 57, 60, 65, 69, 71, 74, 75, 76,

436

Index of Names and Works

William of Sherwood:(cont.) 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 104, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112; 2, nn. 1, 7, 41; 3, n. 9; 4, n. 1; 5, nn. 1, 2, 12, 20, 32, 33, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 58, 61, 63, 64, 68, 70, 74; 6, nn. 1, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 66, 68, 71; 7, nn. 9, 10, 18, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 45, 48,

49, 53, 58, 61, 74, 75, 82, 84, 92, 95, 98, 105, 106, 114, 117, 118, 119, 125, 129, 133; 8, nn. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 42, 46, 53, 57, 86, 93, 98, 110; Syncategoremata, 8, n. 58 Wulf, Maurice de, xl Zucchi, Alberto, xxv, xxvi, xxvii; I, nn. 82, 85, 95

General Index

In this index, I indicates the Introduction, and Roman numerals indicate page numbers of the Introduction. Bold numbers refer to chapters of the translation, n. and nn. indicate endnotes, and all other numbers indicate paragraph numbers in the translation. References are often only to the beginning of a discussion of the indicated term. Accent, fallacy of: def. of, 1014; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1015, 1070; three species of, 1016–17; fourth species, 1072; examples of, 1018–26 accident: inhering in whole vs. part, 1131; associated, 798, 1201–2 Accident, fallacy of: role of subject, accident, attribute, 1063–67; not the category called Accident, 1066; rationale for the name ‘Accident,’ 1067; def. of, 1068, 1069; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1070; three (four) species of, 1071–72; examples of, 1073–93; rules for inferring conjoined things from those divided and vice versa, 1094–1102; three kinds of determinations, 1103–7; only in affirmations, 1111; Aristotle’s examples of, 1112–18 Action, category of: def. of, 535; acting vs. doing, 545; what is common and proper to, 548–49 actu et simul, 289 adverbs: in modal propositions, 176–78; before principal verbs, 983–84 alteration, 606

amare vs. hamare, 1024 ambiguity in fallacies, 883; three kinds of, 884–92 Amphiboly, fallacy of: def. of, 930; cause of semblance and falsity of, 931; species and examples of, 932–51 ampliation: vs. restriction, 1360; def. of, 1361; by means of names, verbs, adverbs, participles, 1362; by means of supposita and times, 1363–65 angels and souls, having being in a place, 572 antonomasia, 1, n. 5 appellation: four def. of, 1268–72; and supposition, 1273–74; appelative words and appellata, 1275; and existents, 1276; and common terms, 1277; first rule regarding, 1280–92; which verbs ampliate, 1288; special terms, 1289, 1291, 1297–1300; existing actually and actually existing under a term, 1301; three questions on conditions under which a common term as subject of presenttense verb appellates, 1302–30; second rule regarding appellation, 1331, 1333; third rule, 1332, 1334

437

438

General Index

argument: def. of, 611; and argumentation, 615; called power of inferring, discourse of argumentation, a mind, the judgment of an argumentation, 616–18; divisions of, 625; sufficiency of appellata for, 8, n. 57 argumentation: def. of, 614; species of, 641; topical reduced to enthymeme and syllogism, 843 art: def. of, 9, 13; 1, nn. 2, 3, 4 assertoric vs. modal propositions, 175, 183 astronomy, not taught, 7 attribute: role of in fallacy of Accident, 1063–67 authority: def. of, 801 babbling, 865, 872–74, 876 Barbara, Celarent, etc., 709 Begging the Original Issue, fallacy of: def. of, 1170; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1171; blocks manifestation, not implication, 1172; species of, 1173–76; examples of, 1177–78; name of fallacy, 1184 being: vs. being said, 472; prior and secondary sense of, 367 being-in: eight ways of, 381, 385, 386 body: vs. substance, 333 case (grammatical), 365, 377, 830–33 categorical propositions: def. of, 78; affirmative and negative, 80; universal, 82; particular, 89; indefinite, 90; singular, 96; difference from conditional, 106; sharing terms, 109; oppositions among, 112, 116, 118; triple matter of (natural, contingent, remote), 113; laws of opposition and triple matter of, 114 category: def. of, 282; number of, 283; predicates vs. predicables, 284; things called vs. are, 371 causal propositions: def. of, 103 causes: efficient, 786; material, 790; formal, 793; final, 794; sufficient and direct, 788–89 change: species of, 606 clarification vs. definition, 458, 479, 509 clause: implying vs. not implying diminution, 1351–52 cleric, 72, 73, 521 commonality: verbal and real, 97

Composition, fallacy of: def. of, 954–55; contrasted with Division, 953–66; cause of semblance and falsity of, 957; three species of, 967; 7, n. 49 conclusions: vs. propositions, questions, 637; def. of, 640; vs. premises, 659 concomitance (simul): three senses of, 605; natural and temporal, 605 conditional propositions: def. of, 100; difference from categorical, 106 congruity, of discourse, 46 conjugates, 828–29, 832–33 consequences: necessary and probable, 1189; direct (in ipso) and inverse (e contrario), 1324 Consequent, fallacy of: def. of, 1186; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1187; two species of, 1188, 1198–99; necessary and probable consequences, 1189; examples of, 1190–96; name of, 1203–4 consignificatum: in logic same as accent in grammar, 58 contraposition, 120 contraries: intermediate, 588–90, 811; direct and indirect, 811 conversion, 119; three kinds, 120, 154; by limitation explained, 141, 154; into vs. with, 134–35; reducible to a syllogism, 146, 148–49, 152; of universal negatives, 123, 138; of particular affirmatives, 127; of universal affirmatives, 133; as enthymeme, 144; and consequences, 150; explanation of names of, 154; conversion, convertibility, and reciprocity, 466 copulation: def. of, 1244–45 copulative propositions: def. of, 101 crow, 359–61 de re, de dicto, 181, 970; origin of, 1, n. 99 decrease (change), 606 definition: formal and material, 784 demonstration, 631 demonstrativity: simple and personal, 1403 denominatives: def. of, 365, 376 destruction, 606 determinations: ought to follow, 1006, 1010; rules for, 1011–12; contracting



General Index

(contrahens), separating (distrahens), improper, 1103–08, 1125; restricting (diminuens), 1124–25, 1129 dialectic, 16, 631; Augustine’s def., 1, n. 8 dialectical syllogism, 23, 619, 622, 638 dici de omni, de nullo. See said-of-all differences. See differentia differentia, 2, n. 21; three kinds of, 320; def. of, 326; Aristotle’s five, 326; divisions of, 345 discere: taken as docere, 7, n. 21 disjunctive proposition: def. of, 102 disposition, 82, 88, 186; species of quality, 481, 485; in inferences, 1098; source of restriction, 1309; absolute and relative, 1441 disputations: dialectical and sophistical, 856, 858; goals of sophistical, 864–77 distribution: def. of, 1367; with respect to integral and subjective parts, 1368; by perfect and imperfect universals, 1369; by means of universal signs, 1372, 1374; among the categories, 1373; by negation: two rules, 1375–76; by negative and affirmative signs, 1377–78; collective and distributive, 1379–80; by affirmation: a rule, 1381–82; adaptive (accomoda), 1383 division: two sorts of, 834 Division, fallacy of: def. of, 954–55, 995; cause of semblance and falsity of, 958; three species of, 996; 7, n. 49; on basis of construction vs. pronunciation, 7, n. 53; examples of, 997–1010 Dominicans: education of, xxxiv–xxxvi, xxxvi– xxxvii; I, nn.136, 140 enthymeme, 641, 660 entity: in act, in potency, in imagination, 1125 equipollency, 158, 1376; three rules of, 160–68; explanation of three rules of, 163–68; four verses, 169–73; in modal propositions, 187–99; and interchangeables, 158 equivocals: def. of, 363; taken by logicians as analogicals, 241 Equivocation, fallacy of: def. of, 896, 900; cause of semblance and falsity of, 901; species of, 902; examples of, 903–27; vs. Amphiboly, 925 Ethiopian, 359

439

example: def. of, 663 explanation: kinds of, 753 expression (oratio): def. of, 69; division of, 71; five species of, 72; as statement, 75–76; a species of Quantity, 423; indicative, three sorts of, 658. See also proposition fallacies: verbal vs. extraverbal, 881; ambiguity in, 883, 884–92; cause of semblance and falsity of, 894. See also under individual names falsity, 865, 875–76, 1095, 1097. See also sophistical syllogism figure: a species of Quality, 496; of a syllogism, 667 Figure of a Word, fallacy of: def. of, 1034–35; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1036–38; three species of, 1039–40; examples of, 1041–57; vs. other fallacies, 1061 form: species of Quality, 496 generation, 606, 795 genus: def. of, 291; second def. of, 303; divisions of, 304 grammar, logic, and rhetoric, 3 grammarian: vs. logician, 379, 976–78, 1030, 1240; grammarian and sophist, 1032 Habit: species of quality, 481; clothing (see Possession, category of) health-making, 487 how (quale): relation to sort (quale quid), 1060 hypothetical propositions, 98; species of, 99–105; have no quantity, 108 Ignorance Regarding Refutation, fallacy of: def. of, 1149, 1151–53, 1156–57, 1159; refutation and syllogism, 1150–55; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1160; two modes of, 1161–63; four species of, 1164; examples of, 1165–66; vs. fallacy of In a Certain Respect and Absolutely, 1167–68 imposition, 1, n. 23 In a Certain Respect and Absolutely, fallacy of, 1122; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1123; two modes of, 1124; six species of, 1125; examples of, 1126

440

General Index

indeclinable words, 49 individual: seven characteristics of, 313 induction: def. of, 661 inferences: from conjoined and divided things (in fallacy of Accident), 1094–1102 inherence. See being-in insolubles: two, 1140–47 interchangeable propositions, 158; and equipollency, 158 judgment by a thing (iudicium a re), 804 letters and syllables: of no concern to logician, 43–44 line, 424–25 local propositions: def. of, 104 locutions: combined and uncombined, 380 logic, 11; vs. dialectic, 19; old, l; 1, n. 11; 8, n. 1 logician: vs. grammarian, 976–78, 1030 matter of propositions: natural (necessary), contingent (accidental), remote (impossible), 113; and laws of opposition, 114; in modal propositions, 216, 224; permanent and transient, 791–92 maxim, topical. See Topics meaning: vs. signification, 1, n. 22 metuo, 1026 mnemonics: for kind, quantity, quality of a proposition, 107; for equipollencies, 169; Barbara, Celarent, etc., 709; 5, n. 74; for kinds of figures of syllogism, 681; for relation of common term to utterance, suppositum or appellatum, and concept, 1422 modal propositions, 175, 177–79; vs. assertoric, 175, 183–86; six modes of, 176, 200; what a mode is, 177–78; nature of a mode, 178; with true/false, 179, 201, 203–20; de re and de dicto, 180–82; formulation of, 1, n. 100; de dicto never modal, 182; accusative first, infinitive second, 184; requires an impersonal verb, 184; modes are appositions, 186; four series of, 187, 193; opposition and equipollency of, 187– 99; negatives directed to mode or state of affairs in, 198; quality and quantity of, 198–

99; conversion of, 200: with true, 201; with false, 203–20; with possible, 221–24; with impossible, 225; with necessary, 226–30; with contingent, 231–80: as possible, 232; as necessary, 233; as not necessary, 234–43; rules for conversion of affirmative/negative modal propositions with contingent as not necessary, 243–62; rules for conversion of negative modal propositions with contingent taken as indefinite, 263–74; as often and rare, 275–80; dependence of Lambert on Kilwardby, 1, n. 95 mood: of syllogism, 667 motion: local, 606 names: def. of, 51; infinite, 62; 1, n. 31; oblique cases of, not names, 63 number, 423 opposed things: science of, 978 opposites: among propositions, 112; in various matters, 114–18; among things: relatives, 585; contraries, 586, 810, direct and indirect, 811–13, intermediate, 588–90; privatives, 592, 814; affirmation and negation, 597; good and evil, 602; contradictories, 818; relatives, 819; disparates, 823 opposition: square of, 112; 1, n. 66 oratio: grammatical vs. logical sense, 1, n. 27 paradox, 865, 868–70, 876 passion: species of quality, 490; vs. passive quality, 492–93; not a category, 495 Passion, category of: def. of, 550; what is common and proper to, 551 pendere, 1020 penitentiary: papal, xxv–xxviii per impossibile reduction. See reduction per impossibile perfection: primary and secondary, 898 person: def. of, 1255 Place, category of. See Where, category of Position, category of: def. of, 574; natural and accidental, 576 Possession, category of: def. of, 484, 577; clothing, 484; what is common and proper to, 579; seven senses of, 608



General Index

power: species of quality, 487 predicables: def. of, 284 predicate: linked (predicatum copulatum), 1000; alienated (extraneum), 1065–67; substantial and accidental, 1181 predication: in quid, 295–302, 317; in quale, 301, 335, 1060; 7, n. 93; in eo quod quale, 326; in a name and definition, 401, 406, 411 priority: four senses of, 603 privation, 489; division like it, 966 pronouns: relative: reciprocal and nonreciprocal, 1404–5; as relatives of identity, 1406; as relatives of substance, 1407 pronunciation: in equivocation, 972 proportion: vs. similarity, 808 proposition: def. of, 74, 638; synonyms of, 75; as statement, word, assumption, proposition, conclusion, 75–76; division of, 77; sharing terms, 109–11; triple matter of, 113; vs. question, conclusion, 637; single and multiple, 5, n. 43. See also specific kinds of propositions proprium: four senses of, 348 quadrivium, 4 quale. See how (quale) quale quid. See sort (quale quid) qualified: to be, 503–21, esp. 512–16 Quality, category of: def. of, 476; species of, 481–502; ‘qualified’ (qualia), 503; what is common and proper to, 522–34 Quantity, category of: species of, 422; problem with defining, 427; what is common and proper to, 432–47; arrives as quickly as substance does, 469 question: vs. proposition, conclusion, 637; def. of, 639; multiple, 1221 quianam, 1026 reason: four senses of, 612 reduction per impossibile, 701, 707, 724 refutation, 865, 866–67, 876, 1149–51, 1153–59. See also Ignorance Regarding Refutation, fallacy of relation (treatise): def. of, 1393; of superiority, subordination, equality, 1394; of recollection, 1395; of substance and accident, 1396;

441

of identity and diversity, 1397, 1401–2; simple and personal, 1399; and demonstrativity, 1403; reciprocal, 1429; nonreciprocal, 1438 Relation, category of: def. of, 448; second def. of, 470; species of, 449; what is common and proper to, 459, 464, 467, 475; placement within categories, 450–56; relation of reciprocal and nonreciprocal pronouns, 1404–5 relatives: reciprocal and nonreciprocal, 1404–5, 1438; of identity, 1406, three rules regarding, 1421–28; of substance, 1407; of accident 1408–10; of quantity and quality, 1413; mutual, 1414; termination of, 1417– 19; and ambiguity, 1425; quantity of clause with relative, 1427–43 restriction: by adjunct and consignification, 1309–10, 1316, 1356; def. of, 1347; usegoverned, 1349; natural, 1349: by means of nondiminishing clauses, 1350–52, by means of word’s signification or consignification, 1354–56, by signification, 1357–59 said-of-all: vs. be-in-as-in-a-whole, 671–72 schola, studium, studium generale, I, n. 14 semblance: in fallacies, 894. See also sophistical syllogism sensible: vs. intelligible, 1180 sign: universal, when a disposition and when not, 88 signification: def. of, 1232; four things needed for, 1233–35; direct and indirect, 1236; vs. supposition, 1237–38; at one’s pleasure, 1, n. 20 singular statement: quantity of, 1384–92 singulars: def. of, 285 Situation, category of. See Position, category of solecism, 865, 872–74, 876 sophistical syllogism, 849; uses arguments neither necessary nor probable, 631; defective in matter, form, both, 850–51, 853–55; role of semblance in, 852; directed to a goal, 864; goals of, 865 sort (quale quid), 1040, 1056–60; 7, n. 86

442

General Index

soul: human, as simple, 777, 781, 898; one or several in each animate thing, 6, n. 31 sound: def. of, 27; audible if no one present, 29; division of, 30; vocal, 33: natural, 34, at one’s own pleasure (conventional), 37; matter and form of, 885 species: def. of, 312; second def. of, 318; div. of, 319; not subalternately placed, 391–92; more a substance than genus is, 402; one not more a substance than another is, 402, 414 statement (enuntiatio), 75. See also expression (oratio); proposition subject: said of vs. being in a, 388; in modal propositions, 975–78; in fallacy of Accident, 1072; relation to verb in restriction, 1340–45 substance: secondary, as signifying something discreet, 412 Substance, category of: def. of, 395; what is common and proper to all, 405, 406, 411–14, 417; primary and secondary, 400 successives: vs. enduring things, 779, 1297–1301; 8. n. 58 supposition: four def. of, 1239–40; broad vs. strict, 1241–43; property and signification of a term, 1247–48; divisions of, 1249: natural, 1250, accidental, 1251, simple, 1253, personal, 1255, discrete, 1257, common, 1258, determinate, 1260, confused, 1261, strong mobile, 1263, weak immobile, 1264; and appellation, 1267, 1273–77; and standing under, 3, n. 20 syllogism: of two terms, 148; def. of, 642–43; as one expression, 655–56; material principles of (terms, propositions), 666; formal principles of (figure, mood), 667; perfect and imperfect, 668; quantity and quality of, 667, 675, 676; three figures of, 681: first, 682, second, 697, third, 702, no fourth figure, 721–22; rules for quality, quantity of, 676–80; mnemonic for kind, quantity, quality of a proposition, 107, 709; for reduction to first figure, 709–16; 5 n. 74; ad impossibile, 836, 1209–11; vs. refutation, 1150–55; that implies vs. proves, 1172.

See also dialectical syllogism; sophistical syllogism syncategorematical words, 1246 temporal propositions, 105 term, 41–42; substantial (substantival) and accidental (adjectival), 1242, 1245, 1275, 1278 time: species of Quantity, 424–25. See also When, category of Topics: def. of, 726; 6, n. 1; maxims of, 730, 736; differentia of maxim, 731; divisions of, 737 Treating More than One Question as One, fallacy of: def. of, 1219; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1220, 1229; multiple question, 1221; three species of, 1222; examples of, 1223–27 Treating What Is Not a Cause as a Cause, fallacy of: def. of, 1206; cause of semblance and falsity of, 1207–8; no modes of, 1209; in syllogisms ad impossibile, 1209–11; example of, 1212–13 tree of Porphyry, 2, n. 3 trivium, 3; relation to eloquence, 5 truth: truth values in propositions, 100–105; correspondence theory of, 604, 1317 unity: three sorts of, 655 universals: def. of, 288; not every universal said of more than one thing, 288–89; species of, 289 univocals: def. of, 364 verbs: def. of, 64; cases of, 68; infinite verb not a verb, 67; signification of vs. mode of signifying, 1054; action and composition of, 1307 vocal sound. See sound When, category of: def. of, 557; not time, 558 Where, category of: def. of, 567 wholes: six kinds of, 758; integral vs. subjective, 769; all reducible to universal and integral wholes, 780 wolf: in the fable, 341 words: combined and uncombined, 380, 383, 394; ineffective combinations of propositions, 649; vs. terms, 41

Thomas S. Maloney is professor of philosophy at the University of Louisville. He is the editor and translator of a number of books, including On Signs by Roger Bacon.