Latvian Impact on the Bolshevik Revolution 088033035X, 9780880330350

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ANDREW EZERGAILIS, professor o f His­ tory at Ithaca College, is the author of The 1917 Revolution in Latvia ( East European Monographs, VIII, 1974) and co-editor of The Baltic Provinces o f Russia betw een tbe 1905 and 1917 Revolutions (Böhlau Verlag, Köln,

1985). He has also published widely in aca­ demic journals on Russian Revolutionary, Latvian, Soviet, and Communist topics.

The East European Monographs comprise scholarly books on the history and civiliza­ tion of Eastern Europe. They are published in the belief that these studies contribute substantially to the knowledge of the area and serve to stimulate scholarship and research.

THE LATVIAN IMPACT ON THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION THE F IR S T PHASE: SEPTEMBER 1917 to A PRIL 1918

Andrew Ezergailis

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER DISTRIBUTED BV COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK 1983

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, NO, CXUV

Copyright O 1983 b y A ndrew Ezergailis Library o f Congress Card Catalog N um ber 8 3 4 0 4 7 7 ISBN 0-88-33-035-X P rinted in th e U nited S tates o f A m erica

DEDICATION

I dedicate th is b ook to Jin is Ezergailis (1898)» m y fath er, who lived and fought through th e events described in it.

CONTENTS U tt o f IButmalom U st o f Tablet List o f Maps GLOSSARY PREFACE INTRODUCTION

vi vit vil viii vii 1

PARTI. BOLSHEVIKS IN LATVIA

Chapter I THE CAUSES OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION IN LATVIA

11

Chapter II LATVIA AFTER THE FALL OF RIGA

33

Chapter III THE ELECTIONS IN LATVIA

68

Chapter IV THE ISKOLAT REPUBLIC

91

PART H. LATVIANS AND LENIN

Chapter V LATVIANS AND LENIN IN THE AUTUMN OF 1917

169

PART m . LATVIANS IN RUSSIA

Chapter VI THE LATVIAN BOLSHEVIKS IN PETROGRAD BEFORE THE STRELKI

249

Chapter VII PETROGRAD AFTER THE INSURRECTION

260

Chapter VIII THE LATVIAN STRELKI ARRIVAL IN PETROGRAD

270

Chapter IX THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SMOLNY BATTALION

Chapter X THE 6th TUKUMS REGIMENT IN PETROGRAD Chapter X I THE STRELKI IN EARLY 1918: FIRST BATTLES, RETREAT, DEMOBILIZATION NOTES INDEX

283 301

343 370 411

U S T O P ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 1•

2, 3. A* 5.

6. 7* S» 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15* 16* 17.

18. 19. 20« 21, 22.

A ll-Russian People Eater* Caricature o f N icholas 11 A 1906 caricature Ridiculing Latvian Landed Peasantry A L atvian Streiki U nit in Summer» 1917 Displaying a B anner: Long liv e International A L atvian Streiki U nit afte r th e Fall o f Riga in N itaure V alm iera Church» th e m eeting place o f th e Second Congress o f th e Lat vian Soviet o f D eputies F our A ctivists o f th e lakolat : F. R ozini-Ā zls, O to Kārklini» Jān is K röm inJ-Püäts, Jānis Vilks J . B ērzins-Siem elis S em jon N achim son C olonel Ju k u m s V ācietis K ārlis P eterso n s P etro g rad B olshevik G ro u p , P . Stučka (first from rig h t) L atvian R ed G uard D etachm ent fro m th e P u tilo v F acto ry J. Zvirgzdinfi an d E . Ju rg aitis, Tw o R ed G uards S tanding W atch a t L en in 's O ffice in Sm olny, O cto b er 1917 P . S tu čk a circa 1917 Jē k a b s P eterss A L atv ian R ed G u ard D etachm ent In M oscow N ovem ber 191 7 S m o ln y In s titu te in 1 917

Latvian Streiki on the Way to Smolny November 1917 Streiki from Tukums Regiment in Petrograd »1918 A m otorized Streiki Unit in Moscow Streiki on the Wall o f the Kremlin in Moscow, 1918 Commander o f the Red Army J. Vācietis and Leon Trotsky in 1918

vi

22

30 35 57 135 151 179 207 23S 236 251 253 253 256 257 259 292

296 303 358 360 366

U S T O F TABLES

Page Table 1.

Elections o f Cēsis, V alka, and Valm iera D istrict Land Councils 38 Table 2. Election Results o f Riga Dome 75 Table 3. Com position o f th e Vidzeme Land C ouncil,August 2 9 79 Table 4. A nticipation in the Elections o f August 20 and 27 in Selected Places o f Valmiera and Valka D istricts 84 Table 5. Results o f th e D istrict Elections 85 Table 6 . Results o f th e C onstituent Assembly Elections in th e Streiki Regim ents 87 Table 7. Results o f the C onstituent Assembly in the Streiki Regiments 89 Table 8 . C onstituent Assembly Election R esults in th e X II Army and the Latvian Streiki Regim ents 90 Table 9 . Membership o f Iskolat 108 Table 10. M embership o f Latvia’s Soviet 111 Table 11. Agrarian Reform s in Vidzeme 146 Table 12. Market Prices in Valka 148-149 Table 13. Size o f Streiki Units in April 1918 365 U S T OF MAPS Frontline Before August 1 8 ,1 9 1 7 Frontline A fter Fall o f Riga Battle o f Valka, November 7 ,1 9 1 7 Defense o f Taurida Priace, January 5 ,1 9 1 8 Battle o f Rogatshev, January 2 9 ,1 9 1 8 Location o f Latvian Streiki Regiments in A pril 1918 The Organizational Chart o f th e Latvian Streiki D ivision, 1918 Locations o f Latvian Streiki B attles During 1918

48 49 233 325 349 367 368 369

GLOSSARY Cēsis—Venden Daugava—Dvina or Düna River Desyatin—1.09 hectais Iskoborsev—The Executive Committee o f Soviet o f Deputies o f the North­ eastern region Iskolastrei—The Executive Committee o f th e Soviet o f Latvian Streiki Iskolat—The Executive Committee o f the Latvian Soviet o f Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasant Deputies Iskorad—The Executive Committee o f the Soviet o f Riga (or o f Trenchdiggers) Deputies b k o so l-T h e Executive Committee o f the XII Army Soviet o f Deputies Kurzeme—Kurland or Courland Latgale—Latvian-speaking part o f the Vitebsk Gubemiia Pagasts—The smallest administrative unit in Latvia’s (excepting Latgale) countryside Puds—40 pounds v e rst-1 .06 kilometers Vidzeme—The Latvian-speaking part o f Livonia

PREFACE The work originated in my collaboration w ith Stanley Page, from th e OCNY, with whom I wrote a paper, presented at the annual convention o f the American Historical Association, 1976: ‘T h e Lenin-Latvian Axis in the November Seizure o f Power,*' that later appeared in th e Canadian Slavonic Popen» XIX, March 1977. Stanley Page has been a pioneering scholar on Latvian Bolshevism in this country and th at is n o t th e only reason why collaboration w ith him was m ost inspiring. A lthough we arrived at the correct conclusions in th at paper, th e full story o f Latvian Bolshevism, its im pact on Lenin and the Revolution could not be u n ­ folded in a short study and by necessity we had to m ake large generali­ zations and remain skeletal in form : point tow ards th e evidence rath er than fully explore it. Inasm uch as we still do n o t have free access to th e Soviet archives, this study does n o t pretend to fill up all th e gaps o f th e Latvian saga in the Bolshevik Revolution. This study has been pieced together m ainly from new spaper accounts o f the day, published sources—docum ent and m em oir collections—and studies o f Soviet historians. I am grateful to th e librarians o f th e Soviet Latvian Libraries: E. Arajs, th e D irector o f th e Fundam ental Library o f the Latvian SSR Academy o f Sciences, A. Deglava, th e D irector o f th e Latvian SSR S tate lib ra ry , and th eir staffs w ho have been m ost fo rth ­ coming in supplying me w ith m icrofilm s and o th e r m aterials an d w ere most gracious hosts during m y visits to Riga. I also w ant to than k th e IREX, th e Ithaca College ad m in istratio n , and the Latvian Academ y o f Sciences fo r covering m y trav el expenses to and in Riga. I am especially grateful to th e A m erican C ouncil o f

ix

X

TH E LA TV IA N IMPACT

Learned Societies fo r a grant th a t freed m e from teaching d u ties during th e Spring o f 1981, giving m e th e o p p o rtu n ity to co m p lete th e w o rk . A lthough m eetings w ith m y colleagues in Riga have b een b rie f and conversations fleeting, I have learned m uch fro m th em an d m arveled at th eir th o ro u g h com m and o f m aterials connected w ith th e sto ry o f th e Latvian Bolsheviks. Among th e historians w h o , o n m y visits, im pressed m e very m uch w ere P. K rupnikovs and I. A pine fro m th e L atvian SSR S tate U niversity, V . B erzins, A . Spreslis, L. D ribins, R . G reitjan e from th e Latvian A cadem y o f Sciences, V . S teins, th e D irecto r o f th e Latvian R ed S treiki M useum , w ho also supplied m e w ith som e rare p h o to g rap h s, an d th e late S. Ziem elis, th e E ditor-in-C hief o f th e fo rth co m in g Latvian Encyclopedia. I also w ant to th an k J. K reslins fo r being fo r m any y ears a supportive th o rn in m y side, lest 1 stray to o far from th e ‘‘evidence,” an d U . Ģ erm ānis from Stockholm w ho supplied m e w ith som e m icrofilm s w h en 1 needed th em . Bogdan M ieczkowski, Ithaca C ollege, has b een a h elp fu l friend giving advice liberally o n m yriad org an izatio n al an d e d ito ria l m atters connected w ith th e book.

INTRODUCTION

H u t the Soviet Government in its early years of existence came through by the skin of its teeth is known to many specialists and admitted by the Soviets themselves. That it was the Latvians who on many occasions helped Lenin's regime to survive, though not recognized by the Western experts on the Revolution, and not so readily admitted by the Soviets, is an equally well known fact by those who experienced the Revolution directly and those who have become acquainted with the full comple­ ment of sources. For example, it is easy to show that the Government could not have suppressed the SR revolt in June 1918 w ithout the Latvians, and it could be shown that the Latvians were the ones to con­ tain the Polish Corps under J. Dowbor-Musnicki in January o f 1918 and the Kaledin forces on the Don, February 1918. But when, where, and how did the relationship between the Govern­ ment o f Lenin and the Latvians begin? In the West the whole scale o f the relationships is still unilluminated, and this work will take th e curious student only part o f the way. The word impact in the title o f this work has been chosen advisedly: on the one hand, it is used to say th at the Latvian role in the Bolshevik Revolution was more than m om entary, accidental, or coincidental; and o n the other, to avoid the other danger, one th at some have fallen in to , o f claiming that the Latvians “made” the revolution. The title o f th e book will certainly jar those historians in the West who have gone through th e “evidence” o f the Bolshevik Revolution and have w ritten books about it, and have found no traces o f Latvian participation in the event.

2

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

One may ask, why have we not heard about the Latvian! before, and how could it be possible that a nation so small (only a little over 2 million) could have played a role so eventful as to affect the course o f history of all Eastern Europe, certainly alt o f the area inhabited by the llQflQOfiOQ people o f the erstwhile Russian Empire. The answer to the first question is that in the West people have heard about the Latvian role in the revo* lution, but that was a long time ago—certainly John Reed, Louise Bryant, Bessie Beatty, and Albert Rhys Williams, four Americans who saw the revolution with their own eyes, knew about the Latvians and so did numerous American travelers and residents who spent any significant time in Russia during the Civil War.1 It is only when ‘‘history* began to be written that the Western student interest in the event veered in other directions. As for the smallness argument, there is nothing we can say if the evidence brought forth in this book is not believed, except to say that statistical comparisons, in this demographic sense, are not to be taken as solid evidence for anything. Small nations and “ unknown” people have come from the outside, from the periphery o f empires and civilizations to leave their mark on history over and over again. The Bolshevik Revolution apparently is no exception. From the statistical point o f view, indeed, the number o f Latvians participating in the events described in this work is insignificant, and, if one is to believe in the power o f numbers, the Latvian role in the Revolution would need to be con. sidered as miraculous. It is hoped th at this work will do b o th : destroy confidence in numbers and collaterally also th at in miracles. It must be recalled that nobody inside o r outside o f Russia gave much o f a chance to the Bolshevik Government for survival during its fust two years o f existence. Among the negative voices was the German Foreign office* whose calculations were usually quite accurate. The Socialist Revolutionaries in June 1918 came as close as anyone to toppling the Soviet regime. And yet th e num erous prédictions did tu rn o u t to be false: and the reason for it m ay be th at they all underrated th e Latvians. They alt knew about the Latvians, some w anted to b u y them o ff, b u t may it be suggested th at their prédictions turned o u t to be w rong because they approached th e problem in purely num erical term s—th ey counted up the number o f Latvians and then concluded th a t th eir num bers were insigni* ficeiit.

Introduction

3

The work is divided into three parts; the Latvian Bolsheviks in Latvia, September 1917 to February 1918; Lenin and the Latvians; and the Latvians in Russia, November 1917 to April 1918. This work is specifically concerned w ith the Bolshevik, as distinct from th e Russian, Revolution and consequently the m aterial is organized accordingly. By the same token this book is not about the Latvian R eso­ lution, although here the relationship in the early chapters is m uch closer. In 1917, Latvia, though the word existed in the vernacular, as yet was not a unified country, consisting o f three parts, Kurzeme (K urland), Latgale, which was part o f Vitebsk Gubem iia, and Vidzeme, the Southern part o f Livonia. The unification o f the three sections, historically each having different backgrounds, was part o f the Revolution in 1917. Kur­ zeme had been under German occupation since 1915, and therefore it did not undergo th e Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 directly. But since most o f th e Kurzeme residents were refugees or had been expelled due to Russian scorched earth policy in retreat, they did participate in th e revo­ lution in Vidzeme and in num erous Russian cities, significantly augm ent­ ing the mood o f radicalism in the centers o f their settlem ent.9 During th e autum n o f 1917, there were num erous, perhaps incom ­ patible, social groups in Vidzeme. There was th e local, settled population and th e refugees, th e usurpers so to say; then there were th e landless peasants (and th e Kurzem e refugees to some degree were part o f them ) and th e landed ones, th e barons, m ostly Germ an, o f th e large latifundias, and th e “grey barons” —th e Latvian landowning d ass; there were th e dvflians and th e soldiers, th e All-Russian XII Army being billeted th ere; there was a m ix o f nationalities, Latvians m aking up th e m ajority o f th e dvilian population, and th e Russians and Ukrainians com prising th e military m ajority; there were th e people in pow er, officers and landed wealth, who during 1917 had been stripped o f th eir pow er and its charis­ ma, insecure o f their footing in th e autum n, and th e plain radicalized soldiers, and th e hom eless, to w hom power had descended b u t w ho were inexperienced and unaccustom ed to th eir new statu s; th ere w ere th e h u n ­ gry, th e looters and th e vandals, and those w ho treasured th eir possessions. There were a lo t o f aim less people, th e X II A rm y having becom e a large unwleldly mass th a t was in th e process o f disintegration, and y et n o t fully dissolved, still as if, w ith o u t a head, having an indication o f its form er con­ tours.

4

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

O f these conflicts, from the Bolshevik point o f view, th e m ost impor­ tant one was the conflict between the landed and the landless peasants. The Latvian Bolsheviks featured this conflict as their ideological necessity because on the basis o f this conflict, the bifurcation o f th e peasantry in Latvia into classes, they could argue th at th e Revolution in Latvia stood on a higher developmental ground than the one in Russia, where this diversification into classes had not occurred. Consequently th e Latvian Bolsheviks argued th at they can speed up th eir revolution, as they did to a much quicker pace than in Russia. In a sense, Vidzeme o f late 1917 was a m icrocosm o f th e Russian Em­ pire in the y ean o f the Civil War. And this analogy has yet a deeper mean­ ing: in Vidzeme, as to a lesser degree, and yet to a significant degree, in the Empire at large, there were the Latvian Bolsheviks w ho, in resisting the disintegration, the d rift, had organized a stru ctu re, had given Vidzeme a government. In the erstwhile Em pire, th e organizational framework during th e y ean o f Civil War, b u t especially in 1918, was provided by the Latvian Streiki, th e 9 Regiments led by Latvian Bolsheviks. The Latvian impact on th e Bolshevik R evolution did n o t begin upon the Latvian Streiki entrance in to Russia’s Civil War, b u t rather much earlier in Latvia itself, and this logic th en also predeterm ines th e order o f chapters in this w ork. The significant fact o f th e w hole Bolshevik Revolution is th at th e Bolsheviks in Latvia had com e to pow er gradually, through th e Soviets and th e elections, m aking any event like th e November Revolution unnecessary there. Before th e Bolsheviks had w on anything inside o f Russia, th ey had a solid base in Latvia, a platform from which they could organize further effo rts. Lenin o f course hoped th at similar platform s could be established elsewhere in R ussia, especially in Petro­ grad, b u t as events showed th e attem p t ended in failure. In C hapter I the causes o f th e Bolshevik R evolution in Latvia are discussed In order to provide th e stu d en t w ith th e general background o f th e situation in Latvia, th e predisposing facto rs th a t m ade th e choice o f th e Bolshevik alternative a n atu ral o n e. H ere th e 1905 Revolution, especially as it was distilled b y th e creative sp irits th e re a fte r, played a crucial ro le .4 In o th e r w ords, th e m ajor causative elem ent in th is work is seen as th e crucible o f th e revolution itse lf, ra th e r th a n th e conflict o f social classes, th e p attern m onotonously and rep eated ly perceived by Soviet scholars. C hapter n describes L atvia a fte r th e fall o f R iga, which

occurred on August 2 0 , 1917, th e autum n m onths when on one level chaos reigned in Vidzem e. This chapter has a degree o f overlap w ith Chapter X o f th e a u th o rs previous book The 1917 Revolution in Latvia (Boulder, Colorado, 1974). Those students interested in a m ore thorough understanding o f th e 1917 background in Latvia m ay w ant to consult that work. In part th at w ork is a study o f th e Revolution in Latvia up to the fall o f Riga, while th is w ork only begins at th at point. Chapter 111 covers th e elections o f 1917 in Latvia, in which th e Bolshe­ viks scored resounding victories. The nature o f Latvian political parties is described and some statistical analysis o f the results provided. Chapter IV tackles th e com plicated story o f the establishm ent o f the Bolshevik government in Latvia—the Iskolat Republic. This was a unique creation w ithin th e erstw hile Russian Em pire, and up to date it has re­ ceived only the scantiest analysis in Soviet Latvian history books, and none in the West. In com parison to th e Council o f Peoples* Commissars, as the analysis will show, th e Iskolat was in m uch m ore thorough control o f th e area under its purview th a t th e form er had over Petrograd. While th e Latvian Streiki were called o u t to Petrograd to provide help to th e Council of Peoples* Commissars, th e Latvians did n o t need such aid and th e Council o f Peoples* Commissars had none to give, had th e need arisen. Chapter V , entitled “ Latvians and Lenin in A utum n 1917,** examines the relationship betw een Lenin and Latvians th at began after 1905 and analyzes th e Latvian role in November 1917 in th e context o f Lenin's “plans.”4 Chapter VI considers th e Latvian Bolshevik activities in Petrograd before the Streiki entrance in to th e C apital, and C hapter V II describes the conditions in Petrograd after th e November Insurrection and before the Streiki arrival. Chapter V m describes th e StreUd trek to Petrograd, from th eir location in Vidzeme to their quarters in th e C apital. In late November tw o Latvian Streiki form ations were shipped to Petrograd to help stabilize th e situ­ ation: the 6 th* Tukum s Latvian Streiki Regim ent (2500 m en) and th e Special Latvian Sm olny B attalion (320 m en, later increased to over 500). Chapter IX considers th e activities o f th e Sm olny B attalion—th e guard­ ing o f the Bolshevik H eadquarters and th eir functions w ithin th e city : arresting o f the opposition to th e Bolsheviks, takeover o f th e banks in Petrograd, stopping o f wine and vodka pogrom s, th e disarm ing o f wild

6

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

bands o f sailors and soldiers o n th eir journey hom ew ards, and the variety o f o th er tasks th a t th e Sm olny battalion perform ed for th e government and th e newly organized Cheka. C hapter X considers th e 6 th Tukum s R egim ents' activities In Petro* grad. A large part o f th e chapter deals w ith th e role th a t the men o f the Tukum s played In th e dispersal o f the All Russian C onstituent Assembly. It also glues inform ation about th e sorties th a t th e Tukum s Regiment was asked to perform outside o f th e Capital, such as going to Finland to stay th e advances o f th e Finnish W hite forces, traveling to Omsk to open up th e grain shipm ent to Petrograd, blasting up F ort Ino in th e Finnish Gulf, and containing th e anarchists w ithin Petrograd itself. C hapter XI covers th e entrance o f th e o th e r Latvian Streiki, eight regim ents, in to Russia and th e com m encem ent o f th e battles against Bolshevik enem ies. In th e very early phase o f th e Civil War th e Streiki were significant in winning tw o encounters: th e b attle o f Rostov against th e forces o f Kaledin in the S outh, and th e b attle o f R ogatchov in January 1918 against th e Polish Corps near Mogilev. The Germ an assault that com m enced o n February 18 drove all o f th e rem aining Latvian Streiki units in to Russia. The chapter describes th e re tre a t, regrouping, demobili­ zation, and th e creation o f th e Latvian Streiki Division th a t entered into th e new Red Army as th e first m ajor m ilitary form ation. The German advance ended th e first o f R ussia's Civil War, it eliminated th e Bolshevik gains in th e S outh, in th e U kraine, in F inland, and In the West o f Russia. It elim inated th e one solid Bolshevik Governm ent in Russia—th e Iskolat Republic o f Latvia. The Latvian im pact on th e Bolshevik R evolution, how ever, did not cease w ith April 1918, its greatest force perhaps still lay in th e years to com e. But by April 1918 th e Latvians can claim to have m ade these major contributions to Bolshevism In Russia: • The Streiki assurred th e safety o f th e Council o f Peoples' Com* m issars, first in Petrograd, later in Mosoow. • Helped to stabilize th e situation in Petrograd and M oscow, city­ w ide. • C ontained th e Finnish W hites from m aking overhasty gains. • Elim inated th e 'th r e a t" from the C onstituent A ssem bly.

Introduction

7

• Gaw muscle to the fledgling Cheka. • Opened the grain route from Omsk to Petrograd and Moscow. • Won the battle o f Rostov. • Won the battle o f Rogachov. • Took control o f Archangelsk. • Were the first major troops to enter the Red Army. • Worked out the organizational skills and patterns that served the Bolsheviks in organizing larger military formations» in fact the whole Red Army. • Selected a first class m ilitary mind, in Colonel Vācietis, to lead the Red Army through its most difficult organizational phase and through some o f the most difficult battles against the Czechs and other White forces during 1918* There is much more to the Latvian story that this work has not ex­ plored. Most o f the participants in the events have joined the “regiments of the stars,” to use an old StieUd expression, and the memories o f those who still live have faded* In the 1920’s and early 1930*s studies o f the Streiki were very active; in the Soviet Union, numerous collections o f memoirs, among them those o f Commander Jukums Vicietis, were printed. These volumes o f memoirs, though frequently contradictory and inaccurate as to dates and places, are the best source that is avail­ able to us. During the mid-1930’s the Streiki studies were ended and most of the people who engaged in them were destroyed. In 19S0, scholars in Soviet Latvia reactivated the studies, and they have made considerable progress not only in republishing some o f the materials from the 1930’s but also in collecting new evidence from the living Latvian activists. Streiki and others. In Riga there has been built a prominently displayed museum o f the Latvian Red Streiki* In the I960** the Soviet Latvian scholars have delved into the Red Army archives, and some o f their latest books are based on archival information* One o f the most valuable works that they have found in the archives is an unpublished manuscript o f the History o f the Civil War in 1918, penned by Jukums Vicietis. It appears th at as yet the Cheka archives which may hide a wealth o f information about the Latvians have not even been opened

s

T H E LA TV IA N IMPACT

to th e Soviet researchers. The L atvian S treiki c o n trib u tio n s, however, have b een w orked o u t in considerable d e ta il a n d clarity in th e studies o f Soviet L atvian h isto rian s. F o r th o se stu d en ts in th e West w ho are in te re ste d in pursuing the L atvian S treik i saga to th e e n d , th ere is no w o rk in th e W estern languages to recom m end, b u t m ost o f th e im p o rtan t Soviet L atvian studies have b een tran slated in to R ussian. Am ong th em th e im p o rta n t o n es are: J . J . K aim iņš, Latishkie S treiki v Borbe za pobedu V olikoi Oktiabrskoi

Socialisticheskoi R evohitsti, R iga, 1 9 5 3 . B. A . T om anis, Za Svobodnuiu R ossliu Za Svobodnuiu L atviiu , Latish* skie S treiki i KrasnogvardeKsi v pervii g o d so v eitsk o i v lasti, Moscow, 1975. V . B erzins, Latishskie S treiki v Borbe za Sovetskuiu L atviiu (1919g.) R iga, 1965. A . I. S p ied is, Latishskie S treiki p o Strazhe Zaboevanti O ktiabra, 1917*

1918 gg., R iga, 1967. Istoriia LatishkJkh Strelkov, Z in ā tn e , R iga, 1970 o r its abbreviated version Revoliutsionrtie L atishskie S treiki, R ig a, 1 9 8 0 . T he b riefest accu rate o u tlin e o f th e S treik i h is to ry c a n b e fo u n d in V .V . S te in , B o ev o ip u t’LatishskU K rasnikh S trelkov, R ig a, 1 9 7 8 .s T he sto ry o f th e L atvian S treik i in g en eral o u tlin e u p to th e October R ev o lu tio n , in G erm an, can b e fo u n d in U . G erm an is, O berst F aderif

und d ie lettischen Schutzen im W eltkrieg u n d in d er O ktoberrevolution , S to ck h o lm , 1974. T he process o f » (R e a liz a tio n o f th e S treik i o n th e Riga fro n t in early 1917 is covered in C h ap ter IX o f A . E zerg ailis, The 1917

R evolution in Latvia, B o u ld er, C o lo rad o , 1 9 7 4 . T hose readers w ho are in te re ste d in th e h isto ric a l b ackground of Latvia m ay co n su lt A rnold S pekk t's H isto ry o f L atvia (S to c k h o lm , 1951), A lfred B ilm anis, A H istory o f L atvia (P rin c e to n , 1 9 4 7 ) o r Reinhart W ittram ’s Baltische G eschichte (M ü n ch en , 1 9 5 4 ).

PA RTI BOLSHEVIKS IN LATVIA

CHAPTER I THE CAUSES OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION IN LATVIA 1917 T h e L e ttish soldiers, w ho alone o f th e X II A rm y sto o d against th e G erm ans / in th e d efen se o f R iga] u n til th e y w ere c u t dow n, o n e reg im en t 3 0 0 0 to I S , and th e reason th e y sto o d against th e G erm ans was n o t because th e y didn*t lik e th e G erm ans, b u t because th e y w ere revo lu tio n ists, and th e y saw im m ed ia tely th a t th e G erm ans w ere th e rep resen ta tives

of

a

m ilita ry

capitalism

a d vancing o n R ussia.

John R eed1

D ie A natom ie des M enschen ist ein Schlüssel zu r A natom ie des A ffen. D ie Andeutungen a u f H öhres in den untergeordneteren Tfüerarten können dagegen nur verstanden wer­ den, w enn das H öhere selbst schon bekannt ist.

Karl Marx* The question regarding the causes o f the Bolshevik Revolution in Latvia is a term incognita-it has hardly ever been raised. This contention perhaps may be taken as an overbearing one, especially by the historians in Latvia, 11

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THE LATVIAN IMPACT

who have gone into a rather detailed analysis o f Latvia’s social life, but upon reflection it seems that all o f the analysis th at historians In Latvia and in the West have done has been to search for the causes o f Revolution in Latvia rather than the causes o f the Bolshevik Revolution th ere .3 The Latvian commitment to Bolshevism (and by “Latvian” I do not mean that o f all Latvians), was o f a special and advanced variety. If any sector o f the Russian empire’s population can be designated as a vanguard o f Bolshevism, it seems the Latvians would qualify. As we shall see, the Latvians, and here I mean mainly but not solely the Streiki, were the main force o f support for Lenin, especially in the first year o f Soviet power. Within this Latvian force one must include not only Latvians from Latvia itself but also the Latvian refugees and evacuees that were living in just about all industrial centers o f the Empire. Soviet historians have begun to research the Latvian Bolshevik group activities in Russia’s cities, and they have found that in most o f these cities where Latvians were settled they had organized Red Guard detachm ents in 1917, and frequently the Latvians performed city-wide leadership roles .4 That the Latvians in dia­ spora were a significant source in replenishing the Latvian Streiki units at various stages o f the Civil War has also been well established .3 To become revolutionary is one thing; to be established as a maximaJist/revohitionaiy vanguard th at even up to today is in large measure the dominant pattem im itated the world over, means to step over a qualitative threshold. The problem o f the causation o f revolutionary maximahsms is not a uniquely Latvian problem : we encountered it in French history in the search for the roots o f Jacobinism , and even earlier the problem may perhaps be raised w ith th e egalitarians in the English Puritan revolution. No area o f historical craft has been so burdened with controversy (perhaps also clichés) as has th e problem o f causation. This is not the place to review th at controversy, except to say th a t for the purposes o f this study, the pattern suggested by Karl M arx in th e citation above win be followed. There is no reason w hy historians m ust begin with th e Illusory proposition th at it is the past th a t determ ines history’s unfolding; we m ay very well reverse th e procedure, and begin w ith the assumption th at it is th e future th at determ ines th e past. It is m ore profit­ able, as suggested by M arx, to read history backw ards from the m ature structure and m ore highly developed stage (from th e anatom y o f man back to th e simians) and thereby see th e potentialities and th e threads leading tow ards th e event.

The Causes o f th e B o lsh evik R evo lu tio n

13

What, th en , are th e height* o f Latvian Bolshevism from which the study o f th e causes o f Latvian B olshevk revolution should begin? Numer­ ous aspects o f th e Latvian Streiki participation in th e Civil War could be taken, but fo r purposes h ere, to exem plify th e p o in t, tw o events will be briefly sum m arized: th e h isto ry o f th e Latvian Iskolat Republic and that o f th e Latvian Streiki Sm olny B attalion. ( 1) The Iskolat Republie . Iskolat was th e governm ent th at ruled in the unoccupied p art o f Latvia fo r about four m onths u n til th e German forces put it o u t o f business in m id-February 1918. The ém igré historians so far have had th e tendency to brush o ff th e republic as a negative development im itative o f Bolshevik rule in Petrograd .6 Even in Soviet Latvia, th e Iskolat has n o t been th e subject o f m uch scru tin y , although the Latvian SSR A cadem y o f Sciences published th e m inutes o f th e Iskolat in 1973, and m ost Soviet Latvian histories o f th e 1917 R evolution give some atten tio n to it. In th e in troduction to th e published m inutes, th e role o f th e Iskolat was described as follow s: “ Iskolat becam e th e central organ o f th e w hole unoccupied Latvia and in essence to o k o n th e functions o f Latvia’s first government.’*7 Professor Uga Apine sums up th e role o f Iskolat thus: w. . . Iskolat quickly organized th e takeover o f pow er by th e local Soviets in all o f th e unoccupied p art o f Latvia and successfully m anaged its economy, was resolving th e agrarian and food questions, and organized schools and cultural life. U nder difficult conditions w ide m asses becam e involved in creative w ork. T he representatives o f th e w orking people in the Soviets w ent abo u t like th e real ow ners o f th eir land. In taking over the functions o f Land and C ity C ouncils, th e com m issariat o f th e d istricts, and o th er functions o f th e o ld o rd e r, Iskolat w as careful to observe th a t transition be gradual, so th a t regular task s, th e supply o f food relief fo r soldiers and refugee fam ilies, e tc . w ould n o t b e in terru p ted .’* A pine also notes th at it was th e Iskolat th a t accepted th e decree m andating th e use o f the Latvian language in all o fficial adm inistrative fun ctio n s in L atvia .6 Basically Apine is also co rrect in noting a dialectical relationship betw een the state organs in P etrograd an d Iskolat. “ T he system o f soviets th a t w ere established in th e unoccupied p a rt o f L atvia a fte r th e O ctober revolution became part o f R ussia’s soviet system . A nd th a t w as n o t determ ined b y any decree o f a cen tral o rg an , b u t it was Latvia’s o w n sovereign w ill.” 9 Although these Soviet acco u n ts aie c o rre c t, th e y d o n o t n o te , 1 . th a t the O ctober victory in L atvia w as n o t th e sam e th in g as it w as in P etro g rad ,

14

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

the Bolsheviks in effect already holding power long before October, 2. th at the bkolat Republic had a m uch firm er control in Latvia than did th e Council o f People’s Commissars ln Petrograd, although in both places chaotic conditions prevailed, and 3. th a t, though It is tru e th at the Iskolat’s goals were similar to , if not identical w ith, those o f th e People's Commissars, it is not known th at Petrograd in any way helped th e Iskolat, but it is a fact that about 3000 Latvian Streiki were sent to Petrograd from Latvia for purposes Of ending the chaos and counterrevolution there. Basically the Latvians were not im itative o f the developm ents in Petro* grad, although some borrowing did take place. With regard to the comparison w ith Petrograd, F r. R ozini (Āzis), the Chairman o f the Iskolat said in the November 9 th Session: T h e only trouble is that in Russia the Soviet Government m ust be constructed from the to p and it cannot be constructed from b elo w . . . Because o f that the decisions and directives o f th e Soviet Government in Petrograd are sabotaged .” 10 Another aspect o f the role o f th e Iskolat was emphasized by R. Salna, a delegate from Petrograd to th e Congress o f Latvian Workers, Soldiers and Landless Peasant Deputies m eeting December 16: "Without Latvia, Finland and other revolutionary peripheral regions, Russia cannot accomplish what is needed to establish th e governm ent o f working people .”11 We do not o f course know w hat could have becom e o f th e Iskolat ex* périment had not the German forces interfered w ith It; it would be too far fetched to suggest th at th e Iskolat could have served as a model for socialists in other areas o f th e Empire to follow , b u t in com parison to the Bolsheviks in 1919, when they returned to Latvia in a surly m ood, the Iskolat were going about their business w ith a great deal o f commitment and seriousness, and a minimum o f violence. Although revolutionary order prevailed in the Iskolat Republic, non-Bolshevik newspapers were closed and non-Bolshevik parties banned, nobody was executed. In Febru­ ary 1918 there were several hundred political prisoners in the Iskolat Republic who at th e tim e o f the German assault w ere transported to Russia. Some o f these prisoners were found shot dead near Pskov but it does not appear th at th e Iskolat was responsible for these d eath s .10 (2) The Latvians in Smoiny, The historiography o f th e Latvians in the Smolny Battalion is similar to th at o f th e Iskolat R epublic. Among the historians in th e West a great deal o f confusion prevails o n th e subject,

fh e Causes o f th e B o lsh evik R evo lu tio n

15

snd in Latvia, although there is a great deal o f memoir literature avail­ able and most general accounts of the revolution give a short description of the activities o f the battalion, there is no monographic study on this important topic. Suffice it to say for the purpose here that the tasks that the Streiki in the Smolny had to perform included not only the security o f the Council o f People’s Commissars but many aspects of security in the city at large. There is no doubt that the men of the Smolny battalion performed the most confidential tasks for the new government that included work under normal circumstances performed by police.u Although the full documentation is as yet not in, we have reason to think that the Smolny battalion was integrally connected with the early activities o f the Cheka, that the men o f the Smolny Battalion were called upon to perform military, paramilitary, and police duties for the budding organ of revolutionary justice. Solzhenitsyn, speaking about the 1920’s, says: " ...b a c k in the twenties all the jailers were Latvians, from the Latvian Red Army units and others, and the food was all handed out by strapping Latvian women.” 14 Solzhenitsyn may not be fully accurate about the Latvians in the Cheka during the 1920*s, but it is noteworthy that the partition of labor between Latvian men and women that Solzhenitsyn speaks about first made its appearance in the Smolny institute in the fall o f 1917. To further understand and characterize Latvian Bolshevism, it may be illustrative to note some o f the differences between the 1905 and 1917 Revolution in Latvia:14 1. In 1917 in Latvia there was not much anti-baronial, anti-German opinion. Not even the 700-year enserfment was much mentioned. It is not likely that the Latvian intelligentsia by 1917 had "forgiven” the Baltic barons; far from it, but in 1917 their concerns were dif­ ferent. In a sense the Baltic Germans had become a non-existent group. The Social Democrats (Bolsheviks), the largest Latvian party, had reoriented Latvian thinking away from national concerns to social ones, and the Liberals, who otherwise would have discussed the Ger­ mans, were mostly discussing the Bolsheviks. We must also remember that it was the Petrograd Government that during the course o f the war had undercut the Germans in the Baltic. In 1917 there wasn’t a single German newspaper in Latvia. The absence o f German

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

16

newspapers in 1917, o n th e one h an d , fo r historians have created an inform ation gap about th e German activities and policies, and on the o th er, at th e tim e prevented th e Germ ans from com m unicating and organizing resistance against th e corrosion o f th eir p osition. 1917, no d o u b t, was th e beginning o f th e final decim ation o f th e German position in th e Baltic, b u t it w as done very qu ietly in Latvia. 2. The “red rooster *1 o f 190S is n o t p u t to use hi 1917. Instead o f the destruction o f 1905 in Latvia, especially am ong th e Bolsheviks, the emphasis was on th e preservation and husbanding o f people’s proper* ty . We may assume th at th is attitu d e to a high degree em anated from Bolshevik confidence in th eir ow n pow er. In contrast to Russia, the Bolsheviks in Latvia called for th e takeover o f G erm an latifundias as wholes to be preserved in tact and m anaged b y local com m ittees. This transfer o f German estates in Latvia began in m idsum m er and con* tinned until th e final days o f th e Iskolat R epublic. 3. The Latvian Bolshevik attitu d e tow ards th e church w as sim ilar to their attitu d e tow ards th e Germ an b a ro n s-it has becom e nonexistent. The acts o f sacrilege so characteristic o f 1905 w ere n o t repeated nor imi­ tated in 1917. In th e autum n o f 1917 churches w ere tak en over by the Bolsheviks and used as assem bly halls, b u t th ere w ere no interruptions o f services, nor were pastors paddled o r forced to carry red flags.4 4 . In 1905 th e Latvian nation was basically u n ited , as it w as no longer by th e autum n o f 1917. While in 1905 th e G erm an barons were the recipients o f Latvian anger, by 1917 th e m ajor Bolshevik oratorical and forensic th ru st was aim ed against th e “ grey barons** and the bourgeois. A lthough b y th e end o f th e Iskolat R epublic th e lands of th e Latvian peasantry w ere n o t sequestered, th e Bolshevik program anticipated th a t developm ent, and it is very likely th a t, had th e Iskolat Republic lasted for about a year o r m ore, Latvia w ould have been th e first area o f collectivized agriculture in th e erstw hile Russian em pire. The num erous confiscated G erm an latifu n d ias w ere already functioning to som e degree as collectives. B ut even m ore sharply than o n th e land q uestion, th e Latvian intelligentsia w as split on the nationality question and civil liberties.

p te Causes o f th e B olshevik R evolution

17

5 . In 1905 the revolution in Latvia, though very violent, was lest de­ veloped than in 1917. In 1905 th e Latvian political parties did not fully know w hat they w anted, they were still just searching for their aims. By 1917 th e goals had been decided upon. In 1905 the Latvian revolutionaries, M arxists and o th ers, thought o f th e revolution in th e context o f European liberal/parliam entarian revolutions. In 1917 the Bolsheviks, alm ost from th e very beginning o f th e Revolution, were leading Latvia tow ards a proletarian révolutionna w orker and landless peasant republic. In th eo ry th e Russian Bolsheviks had developed the concept o f prevastanfa, th e passing o f the revolution into th e prole­ tarian phase w ithout allowing th e liberal order to be established. What the Russians had w orked o u t in th eo ry , th e Latvians were proceeding to carry o u t in practice. In Latvia there was no O ctober R evolution; at least the changes th a t it introduced were m inim al. When th e Latvian Bolsheviks came to pow er in Latvia is n o t so d e a r, perhaps as early as June; th e takeover o f pow er was in a tru e sense a gradual one. Before discussing th e specific causes o f Bolshevik ascendancy in Latvia it seems necessary to Indicate som e general and generic aspects o f Bolshe­ vism as such, since th e concept o f th e nature o f a social phenom enon is structurally connected to th e assignm ent o f its causes. Both in a sense are ideologically satu rated .1

1. F irst, th e Bolsheviks are characterized b y a high sense o f ju stice. One could perhaps go as far as to say an extrem e form o f ju stice. Their sense o f ju stice has b o th synchronic and diachronic dim ensions, th a t is (at least during th e revolutionary stage) th ey n o t only desire to ro o t out injustices in all contem porary societies, th ey are also anim ated by injustices com m itted in th e p ast. The counterpart o f th e sense o f justice in th e Bolshevik m ind is egalitarianism . In fact these tw o con­ cepts are so closely linked th a t it is im possible to say w hich precedes the o th er. H ad A lexis de T ocqueville 16 lived in o u r cen tu ry , no d o u b t he would have perceived egalitarianism in th e Bolshevik conception as th e dom inant and prim ary dem and. As alm ost everything in Bolshe­ vik ideology, th e co n cep tio n o f ju stice is dou b le edged: if on th e o n e extrem e it has affin ities w ith P lato n ic striving fo r th e ideal, th e n o n th e other it is capricious a t b ea t, an d perhaps inseparable from revenge.

18

TH E LATVIAN IMPACT

2. Striving for order is the second major predeliction o f the Bolsheviks. They were the supreme rationalists o f the Russian Revolution and in that sense very, very modem specimens o f hum anity. We know that order eluded the Bolsheviks even more than justice, but that does not change the fact that it was an object o f their striving and one o f the motivating forces behind their actions. It was the principle o f rational­ ism that guided Lenin in constructing the party and state apparatus, and it was a pert o f the Bolshevik economic and juridical design. In this context, it may be germane to note that in the autumn o f 1917 during the campaign for power the Bolsheviks stressed the promise to bring about equitable distribution o f food and goods, ordered government, and an end to chaos, even more than the promise o f peace and land. 3. If in their striving for order and rationalism the Bolsheviks were exem­ plars of modernity, then simultaneously they also had a biblical, one is tempted to say antediluvian, side as well. The 1917 Revolution in Latvia was not one to inspire much poetry, but Andrejs UpTts very early in March did write one poem o f which the first stanza was as follows: The hour has struck. . . With red flags unfurled. With united power o f workers. And weapons o f comrades soldiers. We redeem the sins o f the world Old Babel-you have fidlen in your own muck.19 Apocalyptism, even more unconcealed than in UpTts’ poetry, per­ meates Bolshevik political tracts. On a certain level the whole Bolshe­ vik program and political writings can be read as Manichean literature in which the forces o f fight and darkness, right and corruption struggle for the dominion o f the world. There are, o f course, differences be­ tween biblical and Bolshevik apocalyptism, but they are identical io the totality o f anticipated change and in the concept o f duality be­ tween the old and the new world. The Bolsheviks were not only to bring a new society—they were to lead the old one to perdition. Tbs

The Causes o f th e Bolshevik R evolution

19

severity o f B olshevik ju stic e w as o n ly equalled b y th e avenging angels in th e B ook o f R evelations o f S t. Jo h n .

4 . The Bolsheviks possessed a m iraculous ab ility to em asculate th e left. Not o n ly w ere th e liberals an d th e liberal le ft rendered powerless when co n fro n tin g th e B olsheviks, b u t, e w n m ore fatefully fo r Russia, so was th e non-B olshevik L e ft. This is a subject w orthy o f a m ore thorough discussion th a n space w ould allow here, b u t p art o f th e answer m ay b e , firs t, in th e ir ab ility to subsum e under th eir aegis th e whole E uropean as w ell as R ussian R evolutionary trad itio n ; and second, in th eir ab ility never to d ep art from giving th e im pression th a t th ey were th e tru e spokesm en o f th e dow n-trodden w orking people. While other p arties, lib eral and rev o lu tio n ary , w ere trying to im press th e public w ith th e ir “ leftism ” (and Bolsheviks are n o t fully free o f th is game o f o u tleftln g th e le ft), th e Bolsheviks w ere m ore concerned w ith rhetorically placing them selves in th e position o f th e protectors o f th e little people o f e a rth and lab o r. It is n o t clear w hat th e factors were in th is situ atio n th a t helped th e Bolsheviks to m aintain th e upper hand, b u t th e follow ing tw o aspects o f th e ir rhetoric m ay give us a partial answ er : 1. A very im p o rtan t featu re o f th e Bolshevik literature is th e claim o f u n m ask in g -th e Bolsheviks w ere engaged in a constant process o f unm asking. T he ever repeated result o f th is unm asking was to discover bourgeois/capitalist associations and conspiracies. In th e com petition w ith th e le ft th e Bolsheviks w ere able to associate all o f th e leftist co m p etito rs w ith these bourgeois conspiracies. 2. The Bolsheviks w ere n o t afraid o f being schism atic. While th e left at large was concerned w ith u n ity , th e Bolsheviks w ere n o t afraid to draw d istinctions and sp lin ter th e “ united” fro n t. Viewing th e Bol­ shevik w ritings from th is a s p e c t.it appears th a t, unlike politicians th e world over, th e Bolsheviks w ere less interested in placating hostile opinions th an in antagonizing and forcing th em tow ards confron­ ta tio n . F rom th e p o in t o f view o f all contem porary theories o f persuasion th e Bolshevik approach m ay seem like a topsy turvy one, y et th e Bolsheviks have been am ong th e m ost successful p er­ suaders th a t th is w orld has seen.

20

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

In the preceding pages the discussion o f the causes o f the Bolshevik Revolution has in great measure already been anticipated and enough has been said to gather that the answer to the problem is to be sought in the spiritual realm o f the mind rather than in so called "objective fa c ts" The 1905 Revolution The 1905 Revolution in Latvia11 was not just a mere dress rehearsal-, it was the major event that tempered th e Latvian revolutionaries, raising their radical consciousness and opened possibilities for further develop, m ent, let us call it m aturation. Looking back on the 1905 Revolution from the perspective o f 1917, it was brutal, naive, and short. The 1905 event was basically unexpected; it came as a surprise and there was no program on the agenda. In 1905 the Revolution had to be invented as h developed. There were European examples to be im itated, but they did not fit the revolution in Latvia—for one, no European revolution had started with a blood bath as did th e Revolution in Petrograd and Riga. It was the 1905 Revolution th at caught th e Latvians within a dialectic o f violence which for those days was o f an unseen magnitude. On the one hand the Latvians performed a considerable am ount of wül. ful acts, but on the other they became victims o f violence against them. From the point o f view o f the Latvians, the violence com m itted against them was much m ore vicious than th e acts they perform ed. On Januaiy 13 the death toll in Riga was 70. In the period from 1905 to 1907 the punitive expedition claimed another 2500 people. Revenge, if estab* lished, is the perfect cause o f hum an actions, and the violence of the 1905 Revolution opened a possibility for Bolsheviks to summon Latvians under their colors as no other event had. The in tention is not to mini, mize th e violence com m itted by th e Latvians during th e course o f 1905, but it must be noted th at th e damage th a t the Latvians had committed until 1908 was basically against property w hile th e damage to Latvians was m ostly against people. The m ajority o f the Latvian Streiki, w ho joined th e reds in 1917, guarded th e Government in Sm olny and th e K rem lin, and performed tasks for th e Cheka, experienced th e 1905 R evolution at ages from 7*17. No event in the Baltic underm ined th e established social bonds is

The O u tset o f th e B olshevik R evolu tion

21

ra d ic ally a s d id th e 1 9 0 5 R e v o lu tio n . T he L atv ian y o u n g sters o f co u rse w ere n o t le a rn e d en o u g h to u n d ersta n d th e M arxist an aly sis o f ideologies a n d th e ir c o n n e c tio n w ith social conservatism « b u t o n th e level o f p rax is th e 1905 R e v o lu tio n ta u g h t th e m th e sam e lessons n ev erth eless. F ro m th e p o in t o f view o f th o s e d efen d in g th e estab lish ed o rd e r, th e 1905 R evo­ lu tio n ta u g h t th e L atv ian s th e w ro n g lessons: o n th e o n e h a n d , th a t th e estab lish ed o rd e r can o n ly c o n tin u e in p o w er b y m eans o f violence (fro m th e M arx ist p o in t o f view th a t o f co u rse w as also tru e b efo re 1905 b u t a fte r i t in M arx ist view th e so cial re la tio n s sto o d u n m ask ed ) a n d o n th e o th e r h a n d , th a t th e sta tu s q u o w as w eak , u n ab le to resist m ass p o litic s. T o w h a t d egree th e G erm an b aro n s an d th e ir c o n ta c ts in P etro g rad w ere resp o n sib le fo r th e d ecisio n to sh o o t p eo p le. Is n o t k n o w n . T he u ltim a te resp o n sib ility o f co u rse re sts w ith N icholas 11 a n d h is advisers. A fte r 1905 th e L atv ian s, h o w ev er, g en erally believed th a t th e b aro n s w ere in o n th e d ecisio n , an d fro m th a t tim e o n th e c ru st o f social co u rtesy ceased to ex ist b etw e en th e L atv ian s a n d th e G erm ans, F ro m 1905 also d a te s th e b elief in th e ex isten ce o f a n in te rn a tio n a l cabal (a b e lie f th a t loom ed very large in 1 9 1 7 ) th a t h as co n sp ired to liq u id a te rev o lu tio n aries fro m th e face o f th is e a rth . It is said th a t L atvians played a d isp ro p o rtio n a te ly large ro le in th e B olshevik R ev o lu tio n o f 1 9 1 7 -1 9 2 0 , an d indeed th a t m ay b e a m a tte r o f p u zz le m e n t, b u t w e m ust rem em ber th a t th e assault o n L atvians in 1 9 0 5 /1 9 0 8 w as also d isp ro p o rtio n ately large. In th is c o n ­ n ec tio n it m ay also b e p ro p e r to n o te th a t th e tech n iq u e an d p ro ced u re o f rev o lu tio n ary trib u n a ls w ith w h ich th e L atvian B olsheviks re tu rn ed to L atvia in 1 9 1 9 an d w h ich w ere used w ith fe ro c ity against th e G erm an p asto rs an d relativ es o f th e b aro n s w ere first o f all used b y th e ts a r’s p u n itiv e e x p e d itio n in 1 9 0 6 /0 8 . In less sanguinary co n seq u en ces, th e 1905 R ev o lu tio n also seeded th e L atvian re v o lu tio n ary tra d itio n : It provided sym bols an d m arty rs as w ell as th e w h o le co n cep t o f rev o lu tio n . In o th e r w o rd s, 1905 m ade rev o lu tio n fo r L atvians c o n c re te , th a t is p o e tic . T he L atvian S ocial D em o cratic W orkers P arty T he L atvian S ocial D em ocratic W orkers P arty m u st b e considered as a m ajor c re a to r o f L atvian B olshevism , T he B olshevik tak eo v er o f th e L atvian P arty is an elab o rate s to ry , an d th e D em ocratic b ran ch o f th e

S g b ftrw tw fo s itifwfftw «ftheis.

The AO Russian Cannibal.

fk e Canon o f th e B olshevik R evolution

23

Party (sometimes referred to as Mensheviks) have argued that this take* over was an unnatural process largely accomplished with the connivance and conspiracy o f the Bolsheviks. Without getting into the historio­ graphical controversy between Latvian Bolsheviks and Mensheviks» we can note that the Latvian Party in either variation represented a very Leftist branch o f Social Democratism in Russia» considerably to the left of the Bund for example. The difference that existed between the Latvian Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was much more a matter of personalities than it was o f programs. Before 1917 we cannot say with assurance that the Latvian Mensheviks were distinctly advocating a parliamentarian regime in Russia nor that the Latvian Bolsheviks were insistent upon a dictator­ ship o f the proletariat. Until 1917 the Latvian Party was a united one. The Party's prestige among the Latvian people was enormous» and it was the only Party that continued to exist after the repressions o f 1906/ 08. Consequently» the Latvian SD in 1917 not only represented a pro­ gram and an organization but also a tradition—it was the embodiment of the Latvian revolutionary ethos» its symbols and history. More than anything else the Latvian Party was the vehicle that kept the 1905 Revo­ lution in general and the need for revenge in particular alive. The most frequently sung revolutionary song of 1917 was: “With Battlecries on Your Lips You Fell,** a song that was written only hours after the massa­ cre on January 13, 1905. Freely translated, the first stanza o f the song goes: With battle cries on lips you fell With fervent hearts you died. Your death is sanctified and free, Dear as a talisman it*U be.1* The Image o f blood and the fallen comrades are elaborated upon through­ out the song, and it ends with a solemn oath that the live ones wilt march on to avenge the dead. It was fortunate for Latvian Bolsheviks that the Latvian Party did not fall apart until 1918.*° The relationship between the Latvian Bolshe­ viks and Mensheviks was a complicated m atter, but basically, with the help o f some Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks were able to keep the main body o f the Party unified under Bolshevik auspices, and thus receive the heritage

24

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

o f the Latvian Party in tact. Upon reflection it seems th at the unity o f this heritage, th e roots o f the Party, its association w ith the 1905 Revolution, and its Hannibal o ath , as it was called, to revenge was m ore important in attracting followers than its program. Approaching the Bolsheviks from the point o f view o f the program, their success m ay mystify us, for it was not one th at could be understood by th e common people for whom it was ostensibly intended. The War. The war created greater havoc among Latvians than among any other people in the Empire,91 except for the Polish Jews who were forcefully evacuated from the frontier region in 1915. About 800/XX) people, close to half o f the Latvians in th e w orld, were evacuated or fled from their homes in the period from 1915 to 1917. If th e Latvians from Vidzeme had not felt the effect of the w ar until 1917, then they were hit by it with vengeance after the fall o f Riga in August 1917. Especially the southern regions o f Vidzeme were sacked by the retreating Russian forces, and from then on commenced a system atic plunder o f Vidzeme which lasted until German occupation in February 1918. It is not so dear how the war strengthened Latvian Bolshevism, b u t we may assume that people finding themselves in these extrem e circum stances believed to need extreme solutions for their problem s. Although there are no statistics available, it was believed in 1917 th at Bolshevism found propor­ tionately greater appeal among the refugees than am ong the population in general. The war quite naturally created th e apocalyptic landscape which provided a fertile ground for th e m illennial Bolshevik visions to mature. U tetature and Ideology Between the R evolutions. The line between aesthetics and ideology was n o t as sharply drawn in this revolutionary epoch as it may be in som e o th er periods. There were various reasons for this entwining: in p art it was done for Aesopean purposes, b u t it was also because the w riters them selves were partymen, and the critical arm o f literature was dem anding th a t literature be a crucible o f revolution. The quest for proletarian literatu re was the first item on th e agenda o f literary c ritic s." If M arxism has deep parallels with literature in its essential structure, th en a t least th e literature in this period had m any parallels w ith M arxism , som e o f them constiom , others unconscious.

The Causes o f the Bolshevik Revolution

25

Most o f the themes that we found present in Bolshevism in the earlier pages o f this chapter were also teeming in the literature o f this era. This period was a very rich one in Latvian literature, and there is no intention to make any generalizations about it as the whole; here the purpose is to separate out a number o f themes bearing upon the problem under dis­ cussion. The following are the themes: vengeance, apocalyptic visionarism, the notion o f the final struggle, and negativism towards Latvia's peasan­ try. As the writers to illustrate these themes I have taken: Jānis Rainis, Andrejs Upfts,and Arveds ŠvSbe. Rahils and the themes o f revenge, apocalypse and final struggle. The greatest literary genius o f this period, Jānis Rainis (1865-1929), was also one o f the most committed revolutionaries and Marxists, though perhaps not a Bolshevik. His works had a higher readership in this period than those o f any other living Latvian author. His association with revo­ lutionary causes dates back to th e 1880’s. In 1905 he became the poet o f the Revolution: he was inspired by it and in turn he inspired his readership. In 1906 he fled to Switzerland where he lived until 1920. After 1905 the failure o f the revolution tortured him to the degree th at he refused to accept its failure, and in verse after verse he proclaimed th e eventual victory o f the Revolution and inveighed against the reaction for massacring th e revolutionaries. In Rainis’ verses, the blood-soaked soil o f Latvia becomes a holy ground, an object o f worship and veneration. This blood is im bued w ith life and force, it does not enter th e world o f th e dead but lives o n to summon future generations to struggle, th e final struggle. This will be th e final struggle because th e reaction has spent its m oral au th o rity , and because th e struggle will be a struggle o f vengeance. A few samples from these revenge poem s follow: All land,

Our latvis One large graveyard It has become. The bloodsoaked soil Is holy and blessed Once to death surrendered, But anew by blood regained.1*

TH E LATVIAN 1MPAc^

26 N one w hom y o u slaughtered, We shall fo rg et, Regardless how long th e roll-call. All shall b e nam ed and m issed. ALL!

T he slaughtered souls Will lead us in b a ttle . Y our palaces And to rtu re cham bers w ill ra ttle .94

S teel, you’re n o t a sword y e t, O nly in plow shares y o u Shim m er bright w hite. Awaken steel!

A w aken, awaken! Go o u t and lead us. H earts o f iro n , cast fo r us, Tem per b y ham m er and fire. Awaken steel!25

For every hero th a t has been sh o t. Springs fo rth replacem ent, a ten fo ld lo t. On th e spot w here blood was surging. The firey sprouts o f freedm en bourgeon.24

A pocalyptism is n o t peculiar to Rainis am ong L atvian, or for that m atter w orld, literary creato rs, b u t In R ainis o n e w ould find a very full, varied, and subtle developm ent o f it. There is reason to argue, as one au th o r has, th a t R ainis, though a professed ath eist, buried in an unsancti­ fied graveyard, was basically a religious p o et.27 He certainly studied the w orld religions for his apocalyptic insights. The m ain elem ents o f Rainis* apocalyptism w ere: th e corrupted n atu re o f th e present w orld (medio­ crity being one o f its sins) th e im m inence o f th e last judgm ent, its severity, and th e purification th a t w ould resu lt.

The Causes o f th e Bolshevik R evolution

27

The silent earth wül open up. Belch sulphur smoke And swallow you.38 All one, sm oke, fire and th e killed. H um anity hastens the Future Kingdom to build.39 Visions o f a new w orld in which conflicts have been resolved are also frequently to be found in Rainis* works. Although this apocalyptism is present in Rainis* w ork from beginning to end, it is especially strong in th e period under d iscussion . The sun, the great heavenly light, symbol o f love and regeneration, sun as deity for Rainis is central. The sun is also one o f th e m ost frequently invoked symbols o f Bolshevik art. Rainis w rote an ecstatic poem entitled A ve sol in which th e sun serves both as th e em bodim ent o f th e new w orld and as th e vehicle th at brings it about. N um bers/m easures disappear in distance, Tim e and space unite as one. Piles o f stars from th e Milky w ay, V apors o f glowing light— Pass us. The sun th ith e r races and th e fam ished souls rush fast along: “ New sun, reveal yourself, reveal yourself.” 30 Rainis w as a m an o f extrem es: be either h o t o r cold b u t never luke­ w arm , he freq u en tly urges. To be ready fo r b attle was a constant clarion call in Rainis* p o etry —n o t ju st any b attle b u t a final and an uncom pro­ m ising o n e. Class struggle is an o th er them e in Rainis* p o etry , especially th e early lyrics, an d u n til th e very en d o f his life he w anted to be know n as th e poet o f th e underclass. Especially in his satirical verse, Rainis puts th e fo rth rig h t, honest and conscious underclass against a perfidious and in­ dulged bourgeoisie. In his apocalyptic and cosm ic w orks there is also a struggle betw een tw o cam ps, b u t th e class aspects o f it are im plied rather th a n ex p licitly sta te d .

28

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

By finding the similarity o f themes between th e Bolshevik utopia and that o f Rainis, I do not in any way want to argue th at Rainis was a Bolshevik or that he even sympathized w ith the Bolsheviks. Rainis' eye ranges over the whole spectrum o f literary/aesthetic them es and Images and he was never as cerebral or theoretical as were th e Bolsheviks. But on the level o f images and m atters o f emotive structures, th e sim ilarity between the Bolshevik vision and some o f the them es o f Rainis is high. Literary genius o f the scope th at Rainis had cannot be readily indexed, and many other political ideologies, including fascism, have found inspiration in his works. Rainis' relationship to Bolshevism, though not direct, was more than coincidental. Negative Portrayal o f Latvian Landed P easan try -U p ls and švābe. The Latvian population at large was unprepared for the Bolshevik assault on the Latvian landed peasantry in 1917, and one may assume they did not take the Bolsheviks very seriously on th e m atter. The liqui­ dation o f the peasant farms that was the critical plank in the Bolshevik land program o f 1917 was in no direct sense anticipated in Social Demo­ cratic programs before th at year. In fact there was no reason for people unconnected with the party to believe th at any conflict between the landed peasantry and the Party existed or was in th e offing. We do, however, find anticipants o f the conflict in literature m ost directly expres­ sed in the works o f Andrejs U pfts and Arveds Švābe. Arvāfo Švābe (1888-1959), th e future dean o f Latvian historiography, wrote two novels in th e period between th e revolutions: How Dobuls

Went to Visit the Grey Baron (KÜ D obuls brauca pie pel3c3 barona viesos) 1911, and Inteliģenti, 1912. Though neither w ork is considered to have literary distinction, they contain acerbic portrayals o f Latvia's country­ side in general and Latvia's landed peasantry in particular, švābe himself wrote about the Dobuls work :

“A s partial prototypes fo r the story I used m y fa th er and mother; The conflict between the tw o sodai spheres and intellectual per• suasions, I was able to portray only In black and w hite , idealizing the farmhand Dobuls and ridiculing proprietor K uikis. Regardless how m iniscule was the story's literary m erit, a t th e tim e it had an

The Causes o f th e B olshevik R evolution

79

undeniable social function, because fo r the first tim e in literature I introduced the farm hand and his antagonist the grey baron, which was a name given by people themselves. The story had a great suc­ cess in le ftist circles. . . The following is ŠvSbe's description o f peasant quarters in Riga:

“Yes, in this place trade goes on day and night-a mucous stream o f d b t flow s forever here in the name o f patriotic wheeling-dealing; everything here is bought and sold-flesh and soul: m ilky cows and sturdy horses are purchased, farm hands are bought fo r days, weeks, m onths; behind closed doors the flesh o f women is bought fo r one hour, two . .. and the butcher palms the shanks o f cattle fo r sale w ith his d irty fingers: *how much m eat w ill / get out o f it? ' but the grey barons ogle the oncoming women w ith carnal stares: *how much pleasure w ill I get tonight?** In IntcUgenti the negativism in the portrayal o f the grey batons is equally venomous. The antagonist o f the novel tells his friend o f his dismissal from grey baron Kuikis’ hom estead;

“- A t the tim e when papa Kušķis gave me the book and in place o f salary fille d up m y bag w ith curses,- / shook o ff the manure o f the grey barons from m y fe e t, broke o ff a sapling to get m yself a walking stick, and took o ff w ith hopes fo r a vagrant’s lunch. The m ud o f the road stuck to m y boots, the sack o f books and under­ wear made by shoulders sore, and the spider legs o f fo g crawled behind m y collar and soaked m e to the skin. Got to Riga to m y comrades where 1 stayed in bed w ith pneumonia fo r three weeks. Later th e novel’s hero receives a teacher’s certificate» and then he has an opportunity to return to th e bailiwick o f the grey barons once m ore. Visiting a grey baron’s homestead» he makes these observations:

From every com er o f the buddings there sm iled three fattened, greasy sisters: Prosperity, Com fort, and Well-being. " What else is there fo r the farm er to desire?“ the antagonist queries

30

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

„$a»emitttreftii“ ibeofe.

,,Un taut man otf par melt! tomtit jaftra^bà, butjtu man fata* toftinfdj, fatal femet jtubritl, eS buljtu brofaafl, taimigat*. . . un ia man ari maifei peetiupttu, ntUmaf pajumte man buptu atiaeen... 2a ii pate tautai filtri, tal te tuttà." 3f Satm. 6oj.»bem. €atueenibal prottomajijal „Sfcifem lautu faubim".

The 1908 caricature ridicules the desire of Latvian homesteaders for partitioning of lands, who recalcitrancy holds to the idea of one’s own farm inspite of the threat of hunger that may result from that policy.

The Causes o f the Bolshevik Revolution

31

him self and gives the answer: “ . . this soul desires that a single farmhand would plow all fields, would rush from dawn to sunset, would eat as little as an ant and would ask only fo r half a hundred rubles a year. This would be the only reform that was needed, and then the level o f Baltia would rise to that o f ancient Greece, and the struggle around us w ill no longer disturb our ears, Andre]* UpTts (1877-1970) was a man o f much greater literary talent than Svibe, and consequently his portrayal o f Latvia’s peasantry was much more complicated. His portrayal is not so much a satire or a pastiche as was $ vibe’s but a "realistic” zeroing in on the hardships o f country Ufe. UpTts* tetralogy Robežnieki (The Boundary People) is on the one hand a Bildungsroman o f the younger son Jānis Robežnieks, the one destined to be educated and depart from the farm stead, on th e other hand it is a work in the tradition o f realism saturated w ith pain, hatred, lacerations, and hum iliation. In UpTts* depiction there is nothing pastoral or rom antic, by the tim e he is through, there isn't even fresh air in Latvia’s countryside. Here are ju st a few quotations from UpTts* m asterwork, as they may per­ tain to th e them es o f o u r concern. At the beginning o f th e novel Jaunie avoti (The New Springs), Jānis and M ārtiņi Robežnieki see a pair o f boots sticking out from behind a bush;

To Jānis they appear fm tiia r. Then Uke a cold shiver, or a spray o f icy water the notion rushes through , . .N o -th e soul sh o u ts-it cannot be! Dare n o t be! The drunk is not our fa th er . . . Old R obežnieki, elder o f the church, steelhard ascetic, peerless un? blem ished exemplar, would n o t deep Uke a common drunk and a vagabond. . . . Under him he feels the foundation give, on which rested the unlim ited adm iration towards the fa th er and the patriarchal order. The shattering o f th e granite foundations was audible. The ancient edifice o f truths and convictions was smashed. The hundreds o f ropes th a t tw isted and wove together th e mem­ bers o f th e fa m ily were stretched o u t like threads o f linen, testing th eir strength, and strum m ing across them ran th e coarse finger o f destiny.

32

T H E LA TV IA N IMPACT

MSrtinS a little later sums up his attitude towards the land and his family; They are all g u ilty in ou r fa te , fa th e r, fa th e r's fa th e r and his fathers father. They a ll were glued to th is p lo t o f land, th e y carried this load w ithout bitterness o r d is g u s t.. . th e y w ere collapsing under th e w eight o f th e burden, b u t th e y d id n o t h a te it. D o y o u remem­ ber our grandfather how he w asted aw ay fro m labor in consum ption. A load o f w ood fe ll on his fa th e r -h e was p u lled fro m under it h a lf dead w ith a broken ribcage A ll o u r grandm others have died young or in m iddle age. The end o f o u r m o th er is n o t fa r off. And w e have th eir lukew arm cow ardly blood. T hat is w hy w e stick to th is piece o f land. I t gobbles up a m an in tw e n ty years. Jin is in tellects: / shad q u o te th e great w ords to y o u : H om eland. L atvia. Forefathers.

The Latvian peasants love th e com er o f land th a t has been worked b y th eir ancestors. T hey love th e ir hom eland.

Mārtiņi cuts him off: A s apiece o f rock loves th e sw am p in w hich it soaks.

The discussion of the causes o f the Bolshevik Revolution in Latvia was subdivided into /our clusters. They were the 1905 Revolution and the impact it had created on the consciousness o f Latvians, the role o f the Latvian Social Democratic Party as organizers o f the revolution and pro­ tectors o f the revolutionary ethos, the unsettlement th at the war brought about in Latvia, and the role literature played in furthering revolutionary consciousness. Each one o f these factors could be broken down for more detailed study and some, especially in the literary area, could be topics worthy o f monographic scrutiny.

CHAPTER 2 LATVIA AFTER THE FALL OF RIGA

In the deep woods muddy soldiers were digging pits end building log huts ha lf­ underground, covering the roofs w ith dirt and branches-for winter quarters. AB through this back country soldiers swarmed. Each patch o f forest was fu ll o f artillerylimbers and horses, squadrons o f cavalry bivouacked under trees, and in the sullen downpour thin curls o f blue smoke m ounted straight up into the cold, quiet air.1 John Reed Although in Latvia th e Bolshevik takeover o f power did not happen the way it did in Russia (Petrograd), we can still observe after the fall o f Riga two different phases o f government in Latvia. The first phase was characterized by extrem e pluralism o f adm inistrative form s (the emphasis is on the word form s), coexistence o f traditional, elected, and revolution­ ary councils w ith crisscrossing authorities, th at lasted to about November 8. And th e second, lasting until th e German occupation February 2 1 , 1918, th at could be called th e period o f Soviet pow er, when th e authority descended upon th e Iskolat at th e center and locally to th e corresponding soviets. In a real sense th e pow er in Latvia was already in th e hands o f Bolsheviks before November, b u t this pow er was exercised through th e

33

34

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

form s b o th soviet and traditional. And th ere is another difference between these tw o periods. During th e first phase political opposition against the Bolsheviks» though in m inority, continued to exist in som e councils and th e opposition press was still vigorous, w hile in th e Iskolat period all political opposition and its press was suppressed. During th e first phase th e governm ental situation bordered on anarchy, each tow n and pagasts was left to fend for itself, in th e second, signs o f bureaucratization and over centralization began to show.

Administration of Vidzeme to November, 1917 By th e summer o f 1917 th e adm inistrative order in Vidzeme had be* come a very com plicated one, several organs claim ing authority over Vidzeme’*, by extension also Latvia’s, affairs. The highest and most com plicated, though perhaps n o t the m ost pow erful organ in Vidzeme, was th e Vidzeme Provisional Land Council. It had th e m ost highly de­ veloped com m ittee system and its m ode o f operation was parliamentary. From a strictly adm inistrative point o f view it was able to tackle all problem s th at came to th em , but it suffered from tw o political de­ ficiencies: first, it was provisional, m eaning th at it was n o t an elected council; and second it was internally split betw een th e liberals and the Bolsheviks. Though the tw o factions could agree on th e small admini­ strative m atters, on th e big questions o f th e d ay, th e agrarian and national question, th e Council was incapable o f acting in unison. Until th e elections o f th e Vidzeme Land C ouncil, th a t were held on the very day o f German advance, August 20, th e tw o forces w ithin the Council were about equally split w ith the Bolsheviks o n decisive votes able to command a one o r tw o vote m ajority.1 In th e elections th e Bolsheviks won a 63% landslide, giving them an 8 vote edge, tw o o r th ree o f which represented Mensheviks. Though after the election Bolsheviks commanded th e Council itself, in th e adm inistrative stru ctu re, th e com m ittees, until th e final dissolution o f the Council, there continued to w ork numerous non-Bolsheviks, especially Mensheviks. Among th e Bolsheviks in Latvis there were considerable groups which believed th a t it w as th e Vidzeme Land Council rather than th e Soviets through w hich th ey should pro­ claim pow er. This appeared to be an especially enticing alternative after O ctober 10, when the non-Bolsheviks, w ith th e exception o f the

jjjtvia After the Fall o f Riga

A group of Latvian Streiki displaying a banner: Long Live the International

35

36

TH E LATVIAN IMPACT

Menshevik*, left th e Council, breaking th e relations w ith th e Bolsheviks over th e Nationality question.9 The Provisional Government** link w ith V idzem e w as th e Provincial Commissar, as the erstwhile governors came to be called after the March Revolution. The Provisional Governm ent appointed th e Commissar but it was done w ith consultations w ith th e Latvians. A fter an embittered squabble between th e Liberals and th e Social D em ocrats th e Provisional Government in May appointed Dr. A. Priedkalns, a Social Democrat at Vidzeme Commissar and K. Ulm anis, a lib e ra l, as Vice-Commissar. Though the Bolsheviks have never claim ed Priedkalns as one o f theirs, in the disputes between th e Bolsheviks and lib e ra ls during 1917, he con­ sistently took the Bolshevik side. The powers o f th e Commissar in the context o f 1917 were basically adm inistrative/financial rather than political. He appears to have been an im portant figure in preventing the complaints from non-Bolsheviks, Latvian and G erm an, from reaching Petrograd. Inasmuch as the office o f th e Com m issar, though basically under Bolshevik control, was connected w ith th e Provisional Govern­ m ent and further yet to th e trad itio n o f th e office o f th e prerevolution­ ary Governor, th e Commissariate was th e first th a t th e Iskolat eliminated in November. (See Chapter 4 .) The German dom inated traditional L andrat also nom inally continued to exist until January 1918, b u t its seat was in T artu E stonia, and its effect on Latvia as far as one can tell German portion o f Latvia’s population very end.4 The next adm inistrative level below four Districts: Riga (which was p retty

was non -ex isten t. T o be sure the continued to consult it until the th e Provincial in Latvia were the m uch tak en over b y th e G enius

forces) Valmiera, Cēsis, and Valka. The C om m issariats fo r th e Districts were also in law appointed b y th e Provincial G overnm ent, upon the recommendation o f th e Provincial Com m issar. B ut in as m u ch , as in midApril 1917, when the selection process began th ere was n o real Com­ missar in Vidzeme, th e selection w as done b y th e Bolsheviks from the Riga Soviet, and it appears th a t th e Provisional G overnm ent never exer­ cised Its prerogative. The D istrict Commissars chosen w ere J. K ioders for Riga, F . Sflarajs for Cēsis, V . Jansons fo r V alm iera, and T . liv e n tā b for VaDca D istricts. They all, w ith th e ex cep tio n o f U u en tāls, w ho was a M enshevik-internationalist, were Bolsheviks. W ith th e ex cep tio n o f Kroders

Latvia A fter th e Faß o f Riga

37

who lost his position due to German takeover o f the District, they con­ tinued in their jobs until November, when the Iskolat dissolved the of­ fices.9 The District Commissariats were confirmed in their positions by the District Provisional Land Councils. Since the oommissais were Bolsheviks all o f their Immediate aids were also Bolsheviks.9 While the Initiating forces for the organization o f the Vidzeme, Pro­ visional Land Council were liberals,7 the organization o f the Provisional Land Councils in the Districts were In the hands o f the Bolsheviks. In all but Cēsis Provisional Land Councils when they were selected, the major­ ities belonged to the Bolsheviks. In Cēsis the Bolsheviks, lacking majority In the founding Congress, did not get the control o f the Land Council and consequently Cēsis had no Provisional Land Council.1 In the elections o f the District Land Councils, that were scheduled lor August 27, but in reality due to the disruptions caused by the retreat took place at various times, the Bolsheviks won majorities in all District Land Councils. (See Table 1.) In addition to all o f the elected Councils there were also the Soviets. Among them , the most important ones were the Riga Soviet and the Iskolastrd (the Executive Committee o f the Latvian Streiki Soviet), both o f which had nationwide influence. As the consequence o f the instructions from the V Latvian SD Congress m July about three weeks before the fall of Riga the First Iskolat (the Executive Committee o f Latvia’s Soviet) was elected, which was to serve as the roof organization and coordinate Latvia’s Soviets. Eventually in November all power in Latvia descended into the hands o f this Soviet, but that is a subject o f a separate chapter. The only counterforce against the Bolsheviks in Latvia which the Bolsheviks to some degree respected was the Iskosol (the Executive Committee o f the XII Army Soviet) which until November was con­ trolled by the Mensheviks, but in no real sense did the Iskosol interfere in the internal life o f the Latvians. But how powerful was it? Even its in­ fluence inside o f the army Is highly questionable as the following vignette from John Reed's observation shows: Comrade soldier! The Venden* Soviet o f Workmen's and Soldiers* Deputies has arranged for Thursday, September 29, at 4 o'clock in the park, a MEETING. Tavarisch Peters, o f the Central Committee o f the •Cēsis

TABLEI Elections o f d a is , Valka, and Valmiera District* Land Councils Dirty Affiliation in the Council Date o f Elections Cēsis D istrict

Valka D istrict

Valm iera D istrict

Number Elected

LSD

Party Affiliation in the Presidium

Peasant Union

Others

LSD

Peasant Union

2

Sept. 17 O ct. 15

39

25 64%

12 31%

2 5%

4

Aug. 27 Sept. 10

45

31 69%

13 29%

1 2%

3

1

Aug. 27 Sept. 10

36

27 75%

8 22%

1 3%

5

2

Date o f Dissolution

Other

January 1918

1

January 12,1918

December 20,1917

Latvia A fte r th e Fall o f Riga

39

Lettish Social Democratic Party will speak on *The Democratic Congress and th e Crises o f Bower.’ The hkosol man was sputtering, ‘That meeting is forbidden * he cried. ‘The com m andant has forbidden it!’ The other man spat, T h e com­ m andant is a dam n bourgeois,’ he remarked stolidly. ‘This Peters is a Bolshevik,* argued our friend. ‘Meetings are n o t allowed in the zone o f war. That is th e rule. The lskoaol has forbidden this m eet­ ing.* But the soldier only grinned maliciously. T h e lskoaol too is bourgeois, he answered and turned away.10 Not only did the speech by Peters take place as scheduled, Reed also gave us a description o f Nachimson and Petersons, w ith whom he happened to drive in th e same am bulance, in action, distributing Bolshevik literature to the troops. We had abroad also about half a to n o f Bolshevik papers-S o ld a t and Rabotchie Put—to distribute along the front. No passes were neces­ sary, for nobody dared stop such a powerful personage. . . . When­ ever we passed a group o f soldiers Patersons, threw o u t a bundle o f papers; he held a pile on his lap, and doled them o u t one by one to passersby. Thousands o f papers, w ith th e reactionary program o f th e new coalition governm ent-suppression o f the Soviets, iron dis­ cipline in th e arm y, war to th e u tm o st.. ,u Countryside. From th e beginning o f March tw o sim ultaneous revolutions were developing in Latvia’s countryside: th e one was econom ic, th at looked forward to th e establishm ent o f socialist agriculture in Latvia, and the second sodal/politicai th a t was to elevate the Latvian landless peasants to th e position o f prom inence. Both o f these revolutions were led by th e Bolsheviks. A t first th e Riga Soviet and the Iskolastrel were th e agencies that prom oted th e transform ation, b u t later after th e fall o f Riga especially after November th e leadership was taken over by th e Iskolat. In 1917, as opposed to 1905, there was hardly any w anton destruction o f th e baronial estates, b u t m ore o r less orderly transfer o f property to the communal management o f th e estates. The big “surprise” o f th e 1917 revolution was th e Bolshevik prom oted hatred among th e Latvian peasan­ try: th e landless peasants against th e landed ones. While in 1905 there had been one nation fighting th e German baronial caste, in 1917 Latvians were a divided people. Though th e properties o f th e landed peasants, th e so called “grey barons” were n o t taken over in 1917, th e Bolshevik program

40

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

did anticipate th eir takeover. One aspect o f th e conflict am ong the Latvian peasants in 1917 expressed itself in th e struggle over th e administrative organs o f th e pagasts. The traditional adm inistrative organ o f th e pagasts was the elected pagasts council, generally controlled b y th e w ealthier landed peasants. During th e earlier part o f th e year m uch o f th e struggle th at took place was over th e control o f th e council, b u t from m id-sum mer and on the struggle could take place betw een th e council and th e soviet o f landleai peasants. U ltim ately it was th e soviets th a t to o k over th e control of pagasts b u t th a t in a full and decisive w ay did n o t happen before early 1918. The pow er struggle in th e pagasts occurred in y et different ways. In som e pagasts th e contention revolved around th e food com m ittees. These com m ittees had originated during th e w ar and th e Provisional Govern­ m ent continued to consider them useful. O n A pril 11 a decree entrusted to th e food com m ittees, am ong o th er functions, to m ake sure th at fertile lands n o t be left unplow ed. In case th e ow ner refuses to sow th e fields, th e unsown fields shall b e placed a t th e disposal o f the local com m ittees o n food supply, which m ay ren t it, a t a fair price to local landow ners for the forth­ com ing h a rv e s te r organize the sowing them selves.12 In th e pagasts where th e food com m ittees had com e under the control o f th e landless peasants th ey were used as agencies o f confiscation of grains from th e baronial estates as w ell as th e Latvian landed peasantry. On occasion th e food com m ittees w ere also used as th e agencies that to o k over th e baronial estates. In 1917 th ere also cam e in to existence th e so called agrarian com m ittees which in som e pagasts attained a high degree o f activism and served sim ilar functions as th e fo o d com m ittees. Then th ere w ere also revolutionary com m ittees th a t in som e pagasts played a ro le. These com m ittees were organized a fte r N ovem ber, and they w ere used in places w here th e local landless peasants lacked organization. T he revolutionary com m ittees usually w ould b e organized b y people o u tsid e o f th e pagasts and participation o f soldiers in these committees seem s to have been high.12 D uring th e final m o n th s o f th e Iskolat Repub­ lic th ere also cam e in to existence Red G uard d etachm ents in im itation of th e civilian m ilitary tro o p s in P etrograd.

Latvia A fte r th e Pali o f Riga

41

The levels o f activities and o f activism o f the landless peasants differed from pagasts to pagasts. The availability o f “outside” advice from towns appears to have been a frequent factor in raising the consciousness o f the landless peasantry. In the rise o f the landless peasant activism an especially large role is assigned by Soviet historians to soldiers, especially the Streiki but also returnees from other units o f the Russian Army.14 The opposition to the Bolshevik inspired landless peasants was feeble and confused and it weakened as the w inter approached. During the course o f th e year there were two attem pts to organize the anti-Social Democrat forces in Latvia’s countryside. The major one was the estab­ lishment o f the Peasant Union Party which put up a liberal-revolutionary program. Numerically it showed a phenomenal growth, but the 2S0OO members th at the Party claimed in August were soft and were n o t enough to stop th e Social Democrats/Bolsheviks. For exam ple, one o f the Party organizers knew to relate th at in the pagasts in which there were eighty members, in an election only seventeen voted for the Party.19 It also must be noted th at th e Peasant Union Party was not w ithout supporters among the landless peasants, and in some areas th e Social Democrats appeared even to be worried about the support th at the landless peasants gave to the Peasant Union Party. The second attem pt to organize the proprietors was made by the Land ftoprietors* League which held a provincial congress on July 21-22. The membership o f this organization overlapped with the Peasant Union Party, b u t while th e latter regarded itself as a political party th at did not exdude a revolutionary wing; th e form er thought o f itself as a class organization and included some who thought the Peasant Union to be to o radical. In o th er w ords, it accepted the challenge o f the landless peasants to engage in a struggle. In th e provincial election the Land Proprietors supported th e Peasant U nion, and they saw th eir function m ostly in term s o f stemming th e Social Dem ocratic tide in the pagasts. There is very little inform ation available about th e success o f this group, but it has left a record o f its resolutions th a t were adopted in th eir Provincial Congress which indicates perhaps b etter than anything th e concerns th at th e pro­ prietary peasantry had in 1917. A partial translation o f the resolutions follows: The Congress recognizes as desirable: l) T o have th e Food M inistry and th e Provincial Food Com m ittee change th e food

42

THE LATVIAN IMPACT rations so that each person receives 40 lbs o f rye and 25 lbs of barley per m onth while th e other products be issued in accordance with the am ounts set by th e Food C om m ittee; 2 ) To leave for seed 4 puds (1 pud * 1 6 380 kilograms) o f rye» 4 puds o f barley» and 5 puds o f oats per 1 pūrvieta (1 pūrvieta * .34 desiatins); 3) To leave under the management o f th e household: a . th e necessary seed; b. the allotted provisions for th e household (in farms where there is shortage o f rye an equal am ount o f barley m ust be sub* stituted); c. the whole harvest o f o ats and fodder (the surplus of rye and barley must be turned over to th e Food Com m ittee receiv­ ing immediate paym ent; but if the C om m ittee lacks m oney than the surplus is registered b u t left in th e pro p rieto r's sto ra g e ;... 6) The local land proprietors’ deputies m ust participate in the distribution» registration» and storage o f th e harvest and control o f the storage must occur in accordance w ith th e directive issued by the Provisional Council o f Land P roprietors; 7 ) Hard prices for agricultural produce must be determ ined» taking production cost into consideration; 8 ) For produce appropriated o n th e basis of hard prices» farms must be supplied w ith necessary goods in accord* ance with peacetime p rices;. . . 10) th e requisition o f hay must be determined on the basis o f th e yearly harvest—3 puds from each desiatm.1*

The second resolution th at was adopted was concerned w ith social issues in th e pagasts. It was subm itted by Pastor A. N iedra. . . . 2) When selling food products, th e m aterial conditions o f the buyer must be considered, and produce m ust b e sold at cost to the farm hands. 3) The Congress o f th e Land Proprietors* recognizes that economic and social conditions o f th e landless peasantry must be hastily improved and therefore asks th e C ouncil o f Land Pro­ prietors to work out a definite recom m endation o n th e question, to be presented at th e next congress. The Pagasts Councils must levy for the current year a special voluntary ta x o n th e p roprietors5 kopeks from each ruble. H alf o f th e revenue m ust b e turned over to the Provisional Land Council, b u t th e o th e r h a lf to th e Fhgasts Council.17

Latvia A fte r th e Fatl o f Riga

43

How much “ damage** did the radicalized landless peasants do during the course o f 1917? For the answer one can only deal with impressions and repeat th e accounts one rinds in the press th at, accurate as they may be, may not be typical for the whole country. To be sure, there was more rhetoric than substance on all sides, but in saying this one must not under* rate the seriousness o f the program th at the landless peasants were intend* ing to impose, or hold the concerns o f the proprietary peasants merely ideological o r foolish. The “ danger to th e barons** was real enough, and in 1917 they had very little appeal in a legal sense and hardly any friends in the social sense, and regardless o f w hat the barons would have done they would have been held suspect, hi the press o f 1917, libérai and Social Democratic, they were held responsible as a group for having cooperated with the punitive expeditions in 1906/07.1# The barons could not but take seriously an announcement such as th e one issued by the Streiki Soviet o f Deputies that the demands o f the landless peasants would be backed up with armed forces.19 Even the Provisional Government was not likely to inter­ fere on behalf o f th e barons, and even if it had wanted to its efforts would m ost likely have remained futile. On several occasions the barons petitioned Petrograd to come to their aid but nothing came o f H.30 The Vidzeme Land Council, consisting o f Latvians alone, was not likely to do much for th e barons. There was only one consideration th at set lim its on th e revolutionary activities against the barons: a general fear o f starva­ tion. This point was frequently made in the press, and it is evident from explicit statem ents by th e Vidzeme governor and actions o f the Vidzeme Land Council. In a speech th at Governor Priedkalns made before the Vidzeme Land Council on June 16, he generally supported the movement o f th e landless peasants, b u t he was very strict in emphasizing the need for an orderly takeover o f the estates. “Whatever the movement signifies,** he said, “ ft must n o t destroy productive capability. Hunger seriously threatens us. And ft threatens th e attainm ents o f the revolution. There­ fore, th e d u ty o f all societal organizations is to find a solution, to make sure th at no destruction takes place, and th at the yield o f the harvest does not decrease but assure th at ft increases.** The cause for the agrarian movement Priedkalns understood to be th e abnormal conditions under which th e farm hands in th e estates had to work. He did not disapprove of th e m ovem ent, and in fact he said th at to date the movement had not

44

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

endangered th e productive capabilities o f th e estates. He recommended th a t th e V idzem e Land C ouncil establish a hierarchy o f agrarian com* m ittees o n th e pagasts» district» and provincial levels th a t would coor­ d in ate th e m ovem ent, avoid local im provisations, and tak e th e matter o u t o f th e hands o f th e food com m ittees.31 On th e long range basis the barons could tak e little com fort from th e governor's speech, which in substance did n o t contradict th e Social D em ocrat program . On the short range basis, how ever, th e governor's speech w as in strum ental in slowing th e agrarian m ovem ent dow n, and, as far as th e governor him self was concerned, th e a ttitu d e articulated in th e speech incurred him a con­ dem nation by th e P arty 's left wing. A num ber o f com plaints b y barons o r th e ir stew ards reached the V idzem e Land C ouncil and its Agrarian C om m ittee, w hich waa given th e pow er to adjudicate m atters arising fro m th e revolution in the country-side. The C om m ittee's a ttitu d e w as sim ilar to th a t o f th e governor since num erous Soda! D em ocrats sat o n it. F irst, it is notew orthy that th e C om m ittee heard th ese cases at all an d , second, th a t it did not pan indiscrim inate judgm ents. In fa c t, th e ir len ien cy tow ards th e barons aroused th e ire o f th e P arty 's left w ing w hich o n several occasions passed a vote o f censure b o th o f th e A grarian C om m ittee and o f th e Vidzeme Land C ouncil.32 O n Ju ly 22 th e A grarian C om m ittee heard fourteen com plaints. The com plaints involved tw o ty p e s o f cases: in five cases th e co n tro l o f th e estates was th e issue an d th e rem ainder concerned a dem and o f sharecroppers to change th e ir co n tra cts from paym ent in kind to cash. In th e first category o f cases tw o w ere adjudged in favor o f the confiscators, in an o th er tw o th e estates w ere left in jo in t co n tro l o f the local com m ittees and th e b aro n s; th e fifth case w as adjudged in favor o f th e b aro n , holding th e actio n s o f th e landless p easants unwarranted. In th e second category o f cases, th e A grarian C om m ittee decided to change th e size o f th e sharecroppers* share fro m Id to 3d o f th e harvest.39 A fter th e O ctober uprising th e dispossession o f th e baronial estates becam e th e official p o licy o f th e Isk o lat. H ie Soviet h isto rian Draudini a p tly sum m ed up th e change in th e p o sitio n o f th e estate ow ners from sum m er to la te au tu m n ;

The land decree in the unoccupied part o f Latvia sanctioned the great work, the organized takeover o f baronial estates, that

Latvia A fte r th e Faä o f Riga

45

was accomplished during th e summer b y the Soviets o f Landless Peasantry o r th e Food Com m ittees. Now» after the victory o f the O ctober R evolution, it was th e w ork o f th e state.9* The “damage” to th e proprietory peasants or the grey barons is more difficult to assess. Many o f th e fears o f th e proprietory peasants did not materialize in 1917 w hich is n o t to say th at they were groundless. Al­ though there were no m ajor violent encounters between the tw o groups there were enough little incidents to keep th e tension up and enough rumors to feed suspicions and fears. First o f all, th e rhetoric that em anated from th e Social Dem ocratic press and speakers had a great deal to do w ith the tensions and th e crisis m ood in the countryside. In pam phlets and countless articles th e landless peasants were urged to take up the struggle against th e proprietary peasants. The grey barons were likened to th e black ones in harboring plots o f counter revolution and schemes o f exploitation. They were accused o f spreading hostile rum ors and o f having helped alongside w ith th e German barons in planning the suppression o f th e Revolution o f 1905. The proprietors were n o t threatened directly by m urder, b u t th e possibility o f use o f force in th e transition to socialism was repeatedly upheld. Some exam ples o f the rhetoric th at was distributed to th e peasantry follow : In th e th ick bloody m ist th e new social order is b o m , in whose foundations there is th e principle o f equally distributed labor. Under th e heavy blow s o f workingmen th e foundation o f th e old ro tten w orld is shattered.39 Com rades! during th e revolutionary upheaval you m ust secure your rights to land, your sovereignty over land, w hich y ou can accom plish only through action and united force.36 Com rades, farm hands! All o f us will rem em ber th e slaughter o f 1905/06 w hich was staged by th e ow ners o f baronages. The same now is prom ised b y th e grey b a ro n s.. . The new spapers o f 1917 contain reports th a t w ould m ake us believe th at th e o ral rh eto ric was even m ore accusatory and m inatory. Occasional­ ly one encounters rep o rts o f direct personal th reats to th e proprietors. Bodily th reats to th e barons w ere perhaps a com m on occurrence. Among

46

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

th e verbal threats we m ay perhaps Include th e disruptions o f pagasts assemblies, which especially during th e beginning phase o f the Revo­ lution were frequent occurrences. The actual m aterial damage to th e proprietary peasants probably did not am ount to to o m uch. In som e pagasts th ere w ere strikes, but they tended to be settled quickly. There is n o t one single report that would indicate th at any o f th e proprietary peasants* lands were appro­ priated, but th at was not anticipated as an initial step in th e Social Demo­ cratic program. The greatest direct econom ic th reat to the landless peasants were the activities o f th e food com m ittees in those pagasts in which they had come under th e landless peasant control. The following case may be atypical, but th e fear th at similar incidents could occur anywhere seems to have been prevalent am ong the proprietors. The report comes from Skulbergu pagasts near th e tow n o f Mazsalaca, The article first o f all explains th at the food situation in the area as a whole is not critical; yet the w riter com plains th a t th e local food committee is behaving as if "starvation were upon th e m ” The food com m ittee, the reporter w rote, even went around th e pagasts, expropriating grain that was intended for seed. The situation in th e neighboring pagasts, accord­ ing to the article, was even worse because th e food com m ittee there, with the help o f soldiers from Mazsalaca, had confiscated b u tter from the co­ operative dairy and had locked up a retired soldier who had protested against the doings o f the com m ittee. The same com m ittee, the writer reports, had taken two cows and a calf from a passerby who was taking th e animals home from th e m arket. A nother passerby had been dis­ possessed o f a bucket o f b u tter. "As th e consequence o f this,** the writer goes on, "th e supply o f m ilk to th e cooperative dairy immediately ceased and consequently a shortage o f m ilk products developed in the town. To calm the townspeople, th e members o f th e food com m ittee are saying that the cows o f . . . th e farm ers, . . will be taken aw ay and given to tbs people willing to mūk them and supply th e m ilk to th e dairy, a threat that there is no reason to doubt,” 2* TWelve days later th e same w riter reported an additional catalogue o f complaints, saying th at there have occurred th efts, robberies and illegal collections o f grain. The article claim ed th a t m uch o f th e grain went into vodka production, w hich, according to th e w riter, brought in ninety-da rubles per pud (1 6 3 8 kg.) while th e food com m ittee was collecting the grain for only 2.70 rubles per pud.2*

Latvia A fte r th e F all o f Riga

47

As the events o f 1917 unfolded, it appeared that the real threat to Latvia’s peasantry was n o t their m utual hostilities but rather in the roam­ ing and deserting bands o f soldiers who descended upon Latvia’s country­ side after th e fall o f Riga. These bands had no ideological point to make, and they made little distinction between the landless or proprietary peasantry or for th a t m atter between the Latvians and Germans.

The Devastation after the Retreat The greatest challenge to authority after the fail o f Riga in Latvia was the chaotic condition o f the XII Army. All observers o f the situation in Latvia agree th at th e Army was in a state o f disintegration and useless for any m ilitary purpose. After th e fall o f Riga in September Vidzeme was visited by no other than John Reed, and he has left some memorable passages about the condition o f Vidzeme in early autum n 1917. As the train was approach­ ing Valka Reed observed: Soldiers began to thicken, at all stations, in bam s, and farmhouses far seen; gigantic bearded men in dun coats, boots peaked caps or shaggy shapkis, alm ost always w ith a touch o f red somewhere about them . Patrols o f Cossacks rode along the toads deep in black mud. Military trains, all box cars with masses o f men on top, clanked past with broken echos o f mass-singing.90 At Vendcn (CSsis), beyond which no trains go, we disembarked in a swirling m ob o f soldiers going hom e. A sentry at the door was tired o f examining passes and just motioned us wearily through.91 T represent,’ said Tum arkin, *the cooks o f the 26th Division. We haven’t any m ore wood—the soldiers want us to tear down the farmhouses to m ake fires for cooking their meals.’. . . The horses o f cavalry were dying o f hunger. No h a y . . .tears welled up In his eyes: he had seen his ow n h o n e fall down in the ro ad .. . * To th e great sweep o f the revolutionary music they tramped stiffly, arma swinging w ith the peculiar m otion o f the Russian infantry, heads throw n back, grey, gaunt faces strained and stern. A forest o f tall bayonets swayed above them , and they choked the narrow street—a torrent o f mud-colored humanity. The coats of several were in rags—some were walking in bare feet.39

TH E LATVIAN

48

^

Frontline before August 18,1917

Latvia After th e Fait o f Riga

The F rontline A fter the Fall o f Riga (Sept. 1917-Feb. 1918)

The Frontline After the Fal of Riga (Sept. I9i7-Fet>. 1918) ■ ■ ■ ■

50

THE LATVIAN IMPACT Whole acres o f cabbages were rotting yellow, untouched, né fields o f beets and carrots were washed o u t by the rain. Hie on«n* tatious country-houses stood roofless, burnt, the peasant home* steads had their windows smashed, and trade o f loot led ia d directions. And all over the silent country, waste and empty, only immense flocks o f rooks wheeled screaming in the rain, the th A hing mutter o f far-off battle sounded, and the only human life «at the hysterical life o f an army in battle.94

For the Latvian authorities, Bolshevik and others the Army became not only a burden challenging order but also a parasite that fed off da local population. There was no power, not even the Streiki, which could control the marauding, plundering bands o f soldiers. Nothing was afe in Latvia; not even poor houses, graves, o r church vaults. Numerous petitions and entreaties were sent to the government o Petrograd and the headquarters o f the army by a variety o f local and provincial offices, bin as it turned out the government, even after matât promises to investigate and to curtail the looting, was unable to do so. At the beginning o f September the Commissar o f Vidzeme, Priedkahs, sent the following communication to the Commander o f the XU Aimy indicating the extent o f the plunder : According to the news received by me th e retreat o f ow form is connected with numerous acts o f violence committed on thelod population by various units and groups o f stragglers in areas outside o f the battle line, violence th at does not have any purpose and whxft has completely ruined the local farming and left many inhabitant not only without food but even w ithout shelter. There has oocunad the burning o f pagasts adm inistrative buildings, schools and ik homes o f peasants; pagasts and court records have been destroyed; cattle, horses, movables, grain, and cattle feed has been confitcated; inhabitants have been forced o u t o f their homes, but beam* o f the inaccessibility o f transportation and dire conditions is Russia's interior, the government does n o t allow the emeus* » move to the inner gubernias o f Russia. People are condemned » ruination in th e tru e meaning o f th e w orld. According to a repos* by the Refqgee Aid C om m ittee, peasant hom esteads are frequedlf

Latvia A fte r th e Fail o f Riga

SI

burned for no other reason than to justify the taking o f cattle. Aside from th e above illegal incidents, some army units carry out wide requisitions w ithout any general order from headquarters. The occurrence o f such actions not only within the battle lines but also behind th e lines in the vicinity o f Cēsis, Valmiera, and Valka not only destroys the material existence o f the inhabitants but also creates a general mood o f depression in the whole Latvian population, who during the war have made greater sacrifices than m any other peoples o f Russia.39 The plunder began after the fall o f Riga when the troops began to re* treat along th e whole Vidzeme front. The German attack began on August 20 when the Kaiser’s troops crossed Daugava to the Southeast o f Riga, thus threatening to cut o ff the retreat routes from the Riga front. Riga fell on August 21. The plunder, however, did not take on any serious proportions before August 23. It seems understandable that the troops while in retreat would engage in plunder, but in this case the plunder and looting did not stop even after th e front line had stabilized. The most intense destruction appears to have ended in about two weeks after the retreat, but from then on the disorders spread northward up to the Estonian border, although in the more remote areas, away from the main roads and where there were no troops stationed, it perhaps never reached the scale o f an epidem ic. The plunder is frequently attributed to the disorganized and de­ moralized Russian troops w ho, having no other purpose, exercised their natural instincts. In other accounts the impression is given that the damage was done b y deserters. The first category is difficult to evaluate because the word dem oralized can have various meanings, but the damage attri­ buted to th e second category seems exaggerated considering the size o f the destruction. A reading o f th e contem porary accounts tells us that the biggest damage was done by troops quartered in an area, and th at in the main there was no problem in identifying the units or frequently even the individuals engaging in plunder. The initial wave o f destruction th at released the process appears to have originated in th e confused m inds o f lower echelon commanders. Lacking orders from headquarters, th ey apparently considered it their duty to order their troops to do w hat had been done in previous cases o f retreat: to cany o u t a "scorched earth " policy.

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

52

John Reed has left us a statem ent b y an officer abo u t th e retreat: In th e rout the army h ad n 't th e least idea w hat to do. The staff com pletely lost its head, as it did at T am opol. F or three days ft disappeared, leaving only general orders to re treat, and scattered along the roads, each officer for him self.36 There was panic. . . . An officer show ed to m e th e w ritten orders from the staff-sim ply this—*Go n o rth and tu rn to th e le f t/57 The usual explanation offered by soldiers and officers when asked to justify their action had been th a t if th e goods w eren 't destroyed or taken along the Germans would get them . Once th e plunder was initiated by **welkneaning" officers, th e arm y and the Provisional Governm ent lacked the mechanism to arrest it. In searching for the causes o f th e looting in V idzem e, Reed encountered a Latvian that gave him this rather com plicated answ er: *Why did the Russian soldiers loot?* he repeated thoughtfully. He him self a L ett. ‘Well, o f course th ere w ere th e crim inal elementi that every army has, and then there w ere th e hungry m en. Consider­ ing the general disorganization it is rem arkable th ey loot so little. Then you m ust understand th at th e Russian soldiers have always been taught th at on a retreat it is a p atrio tic d u ty to drive out the civilian population and destroy everything to prevent it falling into the enemy’s hands. But th e m ost im p o rtan t reason is that the Russians were suspicious o f th e L ettish p o p u latio n , w hich they thought were Germ anophile and th e reactionary officers encourage this resentm ent.36 Later during O ecem ber/January as th e food supplies fo r th e array be* came scarcer y et, the m otives for looting becom e m ore existential: immed­ iate satisfaction o f hunger. The local population was helpless since th ere w ere no m ilitia avafl* able to handle the problem o n th a t scale. E ventually th e array itself organized some units th a t w ere designed to p ro te c t th e local people, but even th at did little to halt th e devastation. It is understandable th a t trader those circumstances it was difficult to catch th e lo o te rs, b u t frequently

Latvia A fter th e Fail o f Riga

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when they were identified, it was o f little help because the machinery o f courts in the arm y had come to a standstill; and even when stolen goods were identified, it was next to impossible to have them returned, th e jails were reported to have been overfilled w ith suspects; and any additional accusations were therefore treated lackadaisically, if they were not ignored com pletely. In the press o f the day th e looting was widely reported and discussed. Perhaps the m ost reliable reports were by the various District Commissars that were sent to th e Provincial arm y and state officials. The following quotations are excerpts from these reports. . . .M any hom es, which only a few days ago were inhabited, have been vacated, window panes broken and th e windowframes them ­ selves and doors to rn o u t o f hinges. In th e abandoned hom es, soldiers have frequently been quartered, and they have stuffed the broken windows w ith straw . The houses located closer to roads have com pletely changed th eir appearance. The roofs have been to m dow n, th e beam s alone rem ain. The roofs o f some houses have fallen dow n and rest o n th e foundations because th e tim ber from th e walls has been ripped o u t and used as firew ood. Some tim ber has been used fo r m aking trenches. In churches th e doors are wide open. The plaster Is smashed up and th e autum nal rains continue th e w ork o f devastation. The church in Leburga pagasts is com pletely w recked. The clo th o n th e altar has been to m and the soldiers have tak en p art o f it aw ay. The church books have been destroyed. The organ is broken and its pipes are scattered on th e floor and som e taken aw ay. O nly infrequently can one see a fan n er hauling h ay o r harvesting rye. F requently one encounters refugees w ith wagons fu ll o f belongings and ch ild ren . . . .I n m any places th e crops are still soaking in th e fields. A rm y horses are grazing in fields o f ry e, w h eat, and b a r l e y . . . . In those pagasts th a t have been under enem y o ccu p atio n th e sight o f devastation is hard to describe. A deadly silence surro u n d s one everyw here, in teriu p ted only b y th e cawing o f crow s and th e ra ttlin g o f arm y w agons. The hom esteads o f peasants have b een b u rn e d , b u t fro m th e baronial residences o n ly sm okestacks rem ain. T he sam e fate h as befallen school buildings, th e offices o f th e pagasts ad m in istratio n an d com m unal c e n te rs ....19

54

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

The next series o f excerpts come from a report sent to the AH-Rauho Central Executive Committee of the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet of Deputies about the conditions in Rigs district. In the pagasts surveyed the nature o f the destruction is pretty much the same. The inhabitants are complaining that they are made to leave their homes by force.. . . [In Leburgs pagasts] die inhabitants had their hay taken away under the pretext of reqai. sitions. Neither receipts nor any compensation was given for the requisitioned goods. What could not be taken away, the soldien upon leaving burned down, trampled or destroyed in some other manner. . . . (In Vidriču pagasts] a farmer had his horse taken. When the culprit was found the army officials did nothing to hate the horse returned. The local inhabitants, upon hearing about m order o f evacuation, went to the closest headquarters for an ex­ planation where they were told that there is an order to that effect. When the officials were asked to show the order, they answered after a wait o f two hours that there was no special order but only a telegram, which, however, was not shown. In Bierinu pagasts the safe is smashed up, the treasury robbed, and archives strewn about. The treasury o f the Savings and Lose Society is robbed—two safes crushed. The money has been taken but the Freedom Bonds thrown in the mud. The building of the choral society has been looted. The scene o f destruction is stutter­ ing: furniture is smashed, the stage destroyed, the walls and die floors are messed up, and the piano from the second floor has beeo carried down and dumped in aditch. In the pagasts center the poorhouse has been robbed. An invalid, a veteran o f the battle of Port Arthur, without a leg, two deranged persons, and an old womaa without legs had their blankets and bread taken. The inhabitants have fled because they are afraid o f the soldiers' patrols. The poor have been left without h elp .. . [In Nītaure pagasts].. . the inside o f the Lutheran Church h messed up, ripped apart and strewn around. The organ pipes «* ripped o u t, and the soldiers are wandering around in the woods piping on them . The same reportedly had also happened in tin Orthodox church. In Nītaure church the vaults, where in the pm

Latvia A fte r th e Fall o f Riga

55

ages the nobility buried their dead, have been hammered open. The vaults were broken in search o f jewelry o f the ancient families. Pieces o f th e sarcophagi, o f bones, and corroded clothing are strewn around.. . . h i Platmale pagasts th e inhabitants flee when, walking along the road, they see a soldier, to make sure th a t they do not become his victim s.. . .T he inhabitants m aintain th at all o f the damage is done by small bands o f deserters th at roam through the forests and on the ro a d s.. . . The soldiers are roaming from one farm to the next hunting chickens and piglets, shooting those th at still remain. The inhabitants are forced to stay inside their homes to avoid being hit by stray bullets. If someone tries to protect his possessions and animals, then he is simply beaten up o r killed.40 The looted goods were dispensed w ith in three ways: they were con* named (or destroyed); th ey appeared in th e local m arkets where they were converted into quick cash; or they were sent o u t o f Latvia by wagon, train o r m ail. In spite o f frequent com plaints, th e arm y authorities did nothing to stop the flow o f wealth out o f Latvia. The local post office o f Cēsis for a few days refused to accept packages containing obviously stolen goods, b u t th e m ilitary ordered It to resume regular service.41 The army occasionally inspected packages sent o ut, b u t it was reported that it was interested only in checking on the outflow o f state property showing no concern for th e lo o t from private sources even when a package would contain item s recognized as stolen, such as a church candelabrum .42 Some o f th e loot th e soldiers unloaded in th e local m arkets such as hi Cēsis described by R eed: Every day th e open m arketplace was thronged w ith soldiers, and w ith the few peasants who still rem ained In th e surrounding country. The peasants had cabbages, apples, cheese and som e home-made d o th to sell; and th e soldiers had lo o t—chiefly worn silver w atches like th e peasants c a n y , w ith here and there a ring. The wide cobbled place was thick w ith moving masses o f dun-colored soldiers, o ften in rags, som etim es w ithout boo ts. Bits o f leather capable o f being made in to a shoe-sole brought fifty roubles; alum inum shaving dishes were highly priced. I saw a broken suspender bid in fo r ten roubles.49

56

TH E LATVIAN IMPACT

A lo t o f th e lo o t fro m L atvia, as R eed o b serv ed , w as carried o u t: A n endless succession o f tru c k s a n d w agon-trains w ent b y , cavalry w ith long lances an d rifles slung crossw ise o n th e ir backs, squads of in fan try straggling along, single soldiers. O ne drove a co w ,o n which he had hung his rifle an d a sack o f ca rro ts. T here w ere wounded m en , w ith arm s tie d in b lo o d y rags. M any w ere b arefo o t in the cold o o ze. A lm ost all bore u p o n th e ir uniform s som ew here a spot o f red; an d everyone seem ed to have a new spaper in his pocket or hit hand,4* In reference to th e o u tflo w o f goods, U dum s w ro te th a t th e laxity with w hich th e arm y regarded it depressed an d dem oralized th e population o f V alka and th a t in th e eyes o f th e people th ese goings o n compromised needed confidence in th e governm ent an d th e arm y com m and.44 It is d ifficult to assess th e e x te n t o f th e dam age d u e to plunder because the line betw een plunder and w ar dam age is h ard to d raw . Assessments of the dam age w ere m ade b u t as fa r as co u ld b e determ in ed th e d ata were new brought to g eth er. We d o , how ever, have th e assessm ents from some individual pagasts: in Eight pagasts alo n e th e dam age w as estimated to be one m illion rubles i44 in M az-Straupe th e estim ate was h alf a million rubles,*7 in V asbergu pagasts 7 7 ,0 0 0 i44 in S kulbergu pagasts (from August 5 0 to O ctober 5 ) 13,000 rubles.49 F o r th e w hole o f V idzem e, using a rule o f th u m b , assum ing th a t all 2 3 9 pagasts o f V idzem e o n th e average lost approxim ately 100,000 rubles e a c h , th e n th e dam age would come to about tw enty-five m illion rubles. As tim e w ent o n an d th e arm y co n tin u ed to d isin teg rate, availability o f food decreased, th e d estru ctio n seem s to have changed its character som ew hat; it to o k o n th e featu res o f p u rp o sefu l, su rrep titio u s, wedplanned robberies, som etim es in a fo rm o f a raid o n som e households. T he N orthern regions o f Latvia nev er su ffered as m u ch as those doter to th e fro n t lin e , b u t n o area w as safe. As early as S eptem ber 28 rep o rted from Latvia’s n o rth ern m o st region o f R ūjiena th a t plunder had becom e a freq u en t occurrence. D uring th e la te fall th e attackers were reported to have becom e m ore selective an d purp o siv e, and at the same tim e m ore vicious, n o t q u ite as q u ick to b u m th e plundered homes but m ore ready to kill. T hey w ere m ore lik ely to com e b y n ig h t. In an internie*

L atvia A fte r th e F a il o f R ig a

SI

A Latvian Streiki Unit after the Fall of R ip in Nītaure

58

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

in the late fall, the police chief of Valmiera summed up the problem as follows: If immediately after the fall of Riga the retreating army units

damaged fields, orchards, fences, and forms, then beginning with the middle of October the situation has become even more horrible and lives of people are threatened. From the middle of October to the middle of November there have been 15 murders* Militia and judiciary personnel are unable to investigate all of the murders and take care of the corpses. The murdering is done in the most horrifying way, such as has not been heard of in our land. Whole families were murdered and entire households were wiped out. Neither the aged nor the young are spared. Murders take place on the highways and subsidiary routes—in full daylight, in the rail­ road yards, and while the victim is sleeping in his bed.30 The following description of a late period of the Iskolat Republic comes from Rūjiena; Lately in Rūjiena robberies have greatly increased, they have become dally occurrences* In Diriki household in th e absence o f the master, three armed soldiers rode up, entered th e house and began to search through dressers and closets for m oney. The wom en, panicked, just looked on. When the m aster arrived he was ordered liands up,* and his watch was taken. Afterwards th e robbers m ounted their horses, fired in the air, and left.31 The same issue o f th e newspaper also notes th a t there is frequent theft o f grains, sheep, and other anim als. By 1918, during the late Iskolat R epublic, th e press reported less violence, b u t it is impossible to say w hether th is reflects th e true picture In th e countryside. For one, there were few er new spapers to w rite about the events, the Iskolat having closed m ost o f th e non-Bolshevik periodicals. On the other hand, th e people m ight have becom e m ore watchful sod developed techniques to restrict th e dam age. Som e credit also may belong to the Iskolat, which through its energized soviets o f landless peasants, th e new managers o f estates, an d th e Red G uard detachm ents, might haw

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Inhibited th e w antonness o f th e hungry soldiers. The lakolat, »t*™«gh weak in th e face o f th e vicissitudes created by the w ar, was after all the first Latvian governm ent, one th at was determ ined to impose law and order and was w atchful o f th e squandering o f Latvia’s resources. In view o f th e destruction and confusion in Vidzeme, it should not be surprising th a t people w ould begin to search for extrem e solutions: the m ajority o p ted for th e on e offered by the Bolsheviks. The liberals began to th in k th a t th ey could escape th e debacle by internationalizing the Latvian question and establishing an independent Latvia. O thers, even Latvians, hoped th a t th e Germ ans would take over as quickly as pot* sible. Reed found th is sentim ent expressed by th e ow ner o f an inn: It was an old L ettish peasant wom an w ho brought us te a , and leered at us o u t o f h er bleary eyes, rubbing her hands and babbling Ger­ m an. *You are foreigners,* she said, *gk>ry to God.’ T hese Russians are d irty folks, and th ey do n o t pay.* She leaned and hoarsely w hispered, ‘O h if th e G erm ans w ould only hurry. We respectable folk all w ant th e Germ ans to com e here!*0 During th e au tu m n , new spapers reported th a t a petition was circulated among Latvian peasants asking fo r Germ an annexation o f Vidzem e. How many signers these petitio n ers found we do n o t know : th e num ber could not have been large. P astor A. N iedra to o was presented w ith the p etitio n , as he tells us in his m em oirs, b u t in spite o f his Germ anophile leanings he refused to sign it and advised o th ers to do likewise.53 The Bolshevik P arty W hether th e fall o f Riga helped o r hindered th e Bolsheviks is n o t so easy to answ er. O n th e face o f i t, th e Bolsheviks, as th eir new spapers at th e tim e , and Soviet historians since, have claim ed, felt th a t th e re­ treat was devastating fo r th e ir organization. It is tru e th a t th e V P arty Congress had w orked o u t a p lan , a rath er flexible plan, b u t nevertheless a plan fo r a tak eo v er o f L atvia. T he plan anticipated a gradual, th a t is Tegal** takeover o f pow er w hich w as to give th em co n tro l o f th e Soviets and elected p rovincial, d is tric t, and to w n councils.

60

TH E LATVIAN IMPACT

Just before th e fall o f Riga tw o things happened th a t advanced these Bolsheviks aim s: on July 30 h k o la t, th e Soviet o f L atvia's Soviets, was created, on August 13 th e Bolsheviks scored a victory in th e Riga Council elections, obtaining 41% o f votes o r 49 seats in th e 120-person council. Especially valuable to th e Bolsheviks w as th e co n tro l o f th e Streiki soviets. A fter the V P arty Congress steps w ere tak en to "p u rity " the Streiki units, ridding them o f non-Bolshevik o fficers, and subjecting the units to tighter Party control. The plan w as to shape th e u n its in to a revolutionary avant garde. The German assault dashed some o f these Bolshevik plans, but on balance it does not seem th at th ey lost q u ite as m uch as th e y have claimed. It is tru e th at Red Riga was lo st, th e center from w hich m uch o f the Bolshevik effort had em anated was no m ore, b u t th ere w ere other pro­ vincial tow ns, especially Valm iera th a t, under th e circum stances, sub­ stituted well. The chaos o f th e retreat had scattered S treiki formations all over Vidzeme and it to o k them several w eeks to regroup. The Central Committee o f the Party split u p , w ith one h a lf rem aining in Riga to start underground w ork behind th e German lines, and th e o th e r h alf moving out w ith th e retreating arm y. To be su re, th e com m unications network was badly dam aged, b u t th e retreat was far from being a debacle from the fo rty 's point o f view. The opposition parties suffered equally, perhaps even m ore than the Bolsheviks, because th ey were n o t accustom ed to confusion as the Bol­ sheviks through their underground experience w ere. T he Iskolat was in shambles, after th e retreat, b u t th e local Soviets o u tsid e o f th e battlefield region continued undisturbed and perhaps even gained b y th eir associ­ ations w ith th e Streiki who after th e re tre a t w ere b illeted all over Vid­ zeme. The Iskolastrel continued to be th e firm est Bolshevik stronghold, and as far as th e rank and file Streiki w ere co n cern ed , th is is no evi­ dence to think th at they in any way had slackened in th e ir support o f the Bolsheviks. The fo rty , though having lo st th e Riga org an izatio n , never­ theless remained on course. The absence o f th e m ore established leaden gave a chance for new er cadres to excel, w hich in th e tong ru n , from the Bolshevik point o f view, m ust b e considered a positive ste p . The Bolsheviks continued to score electo ral victories afte r the fall o f Riga. On th e very day o f th e fall o f Riga th e elec tio n fo r th e permanent Vidzeme Land Council was held in w hich th e B olsheviks registered t

Latvia A fter th e Faß o f Riga

61

resounding victory. The time was true of the elections to the District Land Council that followed in August and September. In a sense during the early months of autumn until November, while the Iskolat was recovering, the Bolsheviks, if anything, were stronger in the elected organs than in the Soviets (see Table 1). Among all of the Latvian political parties, the Bolsheviks were the only ones for whom the German assault was not only a setback but also an opportunity. According to one report, the Bolsheviks in Riga had in­ formation of an imminent attack as early as August 14.M They began to meet to consider that contingency, and they were ready when the artillry barrage began on August 19. The Bolsheviks took the position that they would stay put, and there should be no more refugees. As various government agencies began to leave the city, the Bolsheviks appointed replacements from their ranks as caretakers of the offices during the crises. The top Bolshevik organs—the CC, the Riga Soviet, and Riga Party Committee—met every three hours to evaluate the situation. The Bolshe­ viks appointed a replacement for the Provincial Commissar and sent out their emissaries to all militia departments.55 Whether this mattered much or not is difficult to evaluate, but in effect during the transition period the Bolsheviks were in charge of Riga, even in a more direct way than they were before the attack. Before leaving, the Bolsheviks forced the Vidzeme Commissar to accept the election results of the Riga Council of the week before, and they even managed to call the Council in session, though briefly.56 Seven of the CC members were to stay behind, but eight left and continued organizational work in unoccupied Vidzeme.57 The Cina of August 20, carried the following announcement: Difficulties and horror surrounds you. On the streets there are horrible sights. But be calm -face down th e danger! There is devas­ tation all over. Latvia will not disappear even if th e h o n o r intensi­ fies. Do n o t leave th e d ty ! Do not leave your fields! All social, revolutionary, and Party offices m ust stay p u t. And so m ust th e inhabitants! That is th e decision o f th e Latvian S D * Similar resolutions and announcem ents were issued by num erous oth er Bolshevik agencies in Riga and V idzem e.

62

THE LATVIAN IMPACT The logic o f this “stay put** policy was explained in an article rigned by Feterss and Pflffts, two CC members. Riga is abandoned by the Russian Army. But Latvia’s working people and revolutionaries should not follow them . We know too well the life o f refugees, the dark and b itter autum nal days on the roadside. And it is even more dangerous for the revolutionary democracy to abandon Latvia, because by doing so we surrender Latvia to reactionaries, Latvian and foreign. That is a sellout to the counter revolution.99

In the view o f the Bolsheviks, Riga was not taken by the Germans but had been abandoned to them by an international cabal, punished for having become red. There is no doubt that the imperialist war is continued for one purpose alone, to defeat the revolution. The imperialists are not so stupid as to believe that there still may be a ’final victory.*9 The theme was put more pithily in the Maliena Party conference: the bourgeois hated red L atvia-a treason is organized. They do not fear the Germans, but the revolution.91 The belief that a treason had occurred was a widely held view that lohn Reed also encountered on his trip to Vidzeme. An officer confided to him: Between us, we all think th at there was treason in the fall of Riga. Of course we were terribly outweighed by th e German artillery, and the army was to m by all sorts o f bad feelings between men and officers. But even th e n . . .Y ou remember a t th e Moscow Conference when General Kornilov said, *Must we lose Riga to awaken the country to a sense o f its peril?9 “Well, th e retreat from Riga began at the same tim e as the Kornilov attem p t.’0 In a sense the Provisional Government abetted this claim o f conspiracy and confirmed it kt the minds o f th e Latvian Bolsheviks by closing dona

Latvia A fte r the Fall o f Riga

63

the two main Bolshevik newspapers, Cirta and Brīvais strēlnieks. As it turned out this action was a useless gesture on Kerensky’s part because replacements, Mūsu cina (Our Struggle) and Latvju strēlnieks prom ptly sprang into existence. Latvju strēlnieks wrote in its first issue: Russia is on the eve o f the final and decisive struggle between counterrevolutionary classes-nobility and capitalists-and the revo­ lutionary working people.69 In sum , the Bolshevik attitude towards the retreat was dialectical: After every attack the bourgeoisie become poorer by one hope, while th e proletariat has become richer by one experience.64 Jēkabs Peterss appears to be the chief spokesman for th e Latvian CC after the fall o f Riga, and to some degree it was his newly gained prom in­ ence in the Party th at brought him to th e attention o f the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. When, in O ctober, Peterss is called for duties in the C apital, the chief spokesmen became Krümins and K ârklini, later also R oziniÄzis. There were about 14,208 Latvian Bolsheviks on the Russian side after the fall o f Riga; 4708 in Latvia and 9500 in Russia. The P arty in Latvia consisted o f th e following territorial organizations: V idiena w ith 866 m em bers, M aliena, 728, Rūjiena-Valka w ith 380 m em bers, th e Streiki o r War organization w ith 1508 m em bers, and th e trench diggers organization w ith 263 m em bers.66 The Party held three conferences: The XIV C onference, Septem ber 23/24, th e unnum bered Extraordinary C onference, O ctober 15/16 w hen the Latvian Party was alerted b y Lenin’s em issary Antonov-Ovseyenko about the forthcom ing events in Petrograd, and th e XV C onference, December 14-16. The date for th e first conference after th e fall o f Riga was set for Septem ber 10, b u t since an insufficient num ber o f delegates arrived, only a m eeting-at-large was held66 and th e C onference itself was p o st­ poned for tw o w eeks. By Septem ber 2 4 Peterss was able to say ab o u t th e most crucial, organizational problem o f th e P arty :

64

THE LATVIAN IMPACT A fter the fall o f Riga our activities were severely disrupted, there were no com m unications w ith the organization, and connectai* w ith Petrograd were feeble. Now everything is more or less in order**

During th e early period the main problem th at preoccupied the Bel* shevik leadership w ere: com m unications, b o th w ithin Latvia and with Russia; elections, especially those o f th e C onstituent Assembly; and pie. paratjons for the takeover o f power. At the Septem ber Conference, w. fleeting the basic organizational concern, resolutions were passed on the following topics: 1. Concerning the Activities o f the CC. 2. Concerning activities o f th e local organizations. 3 . On agitation and propaganda. 4. On local governm ent.

5. On war organization. 6. On farm hand unions. 7. On war and peace. In Septem ber the Latvian Bolsheviks were still flexible about the tactics o f gaining power. The V P arty Congress had layed out altenute routes: coming to power through the Soviets, and b y means o f elected councils, and so In Septem ber th e Bolsheviks a t th e Conference still very m uch emphasized the tw o-tactics approach: The conference em phasizes th at th e elected councils will be able to perform their new tasks only if th ey will be com pletely demo­ cratic and only after dem ocracy w ill be carried o u t In the whole state. Therefore th e task o f th e elected councils is to struggle for com plete dem ocratization, by placing all pow er in th e hands of dem ocracy, In local governm ent and in th e state.** R is n o t d e a r w hat w as th e purpose fo r th e calling o f th e extraordift* ary conference for m id O ctober. The announcem ent fo r it when first published on O ctober 6 , looked prosaic, w ith nothing extraordinary in th e announced agenda. W hether b y coincidence o r design, th e conference

Latvia A fte r th e Fail o f Riga

65

became extraordinary indeed because it was used as a link between Petro­ grad and th e XU Army th eatre, th e Streiki being an im portant factor for the takeover o f pow er in Petrograd. This conference was a high m om ent not only In th e history o f Latvia but o f all Russia as well. Further dis­ cussion o f this conference is to be fouad in Chapter V. The XV LSD Conference in December had yet another face. This was the first conference after th e Bolsheviks had m ore or less come into power. At th e tim e o f th is conference th e Bolsheviks were th e Party o f the Governm ent, and the resolutions fully reflect this attitu d e. The reso­ lution on th e Present S ituation notes th at th e Parliam entary order has been outlived, and th a t at th is tim e it can no longer reflect th e will o f the people. Our task at th e present m om ent is to struggle against th e counter­ revolution and a t th e same tim e energetically continue to convert all m eans o f p roduction and distribution to socialist foundations.49 In the resolution o n R evolutionary War, am ong o th er points, the Party promised to “give active aid to th e proletariat o f all countries in th eir struggle against th e bourgeoisie."10 The new a ttitu d e was m ost clearly reflected in th e resolutions on Latvia's A utonom y and Latvia's C onstituent A ssem bly , tw o contentious issues th at exacerbated th e relations am ong Latvians during 1917. The Liberals w anted a free, autonom ous Latvia w ithin a federated state o f Russia's nationalities. (In la te autum n o f 1917 th ey began to w ork tow ards the concept o f an independent Latvian sta te .)11 The Bolsheviks, o n th e other hand, all along strove fo r an autonom ous socialist republic72 th a t would act and live in harm o n y w ith a socialist revolutionary R ussia, ultim ately th e w orld. T he k ey paragraph in th e resolution p u t it th u s:

The task o f the revolutionary workers' democracy,. . . is to pro­ claim a dictatorship in Latvia, tying it together most firmly with the soviets o f Russia, because only after the victory of the latter (that is after the revolution in Western Europe has ignited), can we reach a united, undivided Latvia. Therefore, the Conference cannot consider Latvia as a federated part o f Russia, because that would be against the natural progress

66

THE LATVIAN IMPACT and th e aims o f working class dem ocracy. The Conference desires th e autonom y o f a united Latvia (Kw. zeme, Vidzeme, and Latgale), w hich is based on democratic cen­

tralism , th at is th e kind o f o rd er, which does n o t depart from the fram ework o f Russia's proletarian dictatorship and yet at the tm tim e ensures the broadest se if determ ination fo r Latvia's worken' dem ocracy.n The Bolsheviks at th e Conference were as negative towards the aspintions o f th e liberals on the nationality question as they were on the question o f Latvia's C onstituent Assem bly. By th e autum n o f 1917, the Liberals, seeing the shakiness o f Russia's state, came to the conclusion that Latvia may need to move into the direction o f independence, and is an im portam step tow ards it, Latvia's ow n C onstituent Assembly would need to be called. Up to about early Decem ber, th e Bolsheviks had en­ gaged in a dialectical subterfuge on th e question, and they even attended a specially convoked conference discussing th e question. The bade dif­ ference between the liberals and the Bolsheviks on this question was that the form er hoped to have the C onstituent assembly perform as a marker o f a parliamentary constitution, while th e latter thought o f it as the ultim ate legitimizer o f socialist power. At th e XV Conference the Bol­ sheviks rejected both variants: The demand for self-determ ination was a progressive, revolutionary demand only at the tim e o f bourgeois governm ent, directed again* imperialism for the liberation o f small nations and establishment o f democratism. But now , when th e bourgeoisie is toppled, Latviet Constituent Assembly for the purpose o f self determination h directed against the governm ent o f the proletariat and signifies the non-recognition o f proletarian dem ocratism . The limits o f Latvia's autonom y, considering the above, mu* not be determined by a C onstituent assembly because that would mean recognition o f a coalition and the toppling o f the proletarian dictatorship, b u t by the highest organ o f Latvia's workers* democracy -th e Congress o f Latvia’s W orkers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasant Deputies. And its dictatorship has already been recognized by the m ajority o f the inhabitants.*

Latvia A fte r th e F all o f R iga

67

T he C o n feren ce also r a te d to a d d fiv e n ew m em bers to th e C C : F . R ozw i-A zis, K . S e rž a n ts, J . V Ü ks, E . Z a n d re ite rs, a n d J . M ežin i.75 * *

*

As Jo h n R eed w as d e p a rtin g fro m w arw orn L atv ia, h e h a s le ft us th is final v ig n ette fro m h is rid e b ac k to P e tro g ra d : W e w ere p ack ed in to th e tra in to o tig h t to m o v e. In co m p a rtm e n ts m ean t fo r six p eo p le tw elv e w ere jam m ed in , an d th e re w as su ch a cro w d in th e aisles th a t n o o n e c o u ld p ass. O n th e ro o f o f th e ca r a h u n d re d so ld iers sta m p e d th e ir fe e t an d sang songs in th e freezin g n ig h t In sid e all th e w in d o w s w ere s h u t, ev ery b o d y sm o k e d , th e re w as u n iv ersal c o n v e rsa tio n . A t V alk g a y R ed C ross n u rses a n d y o u n g o ffic ers clim bed in a t th e w in d o w s, w ith c a n d y , b o ttle s o f v o d k a , ch eese, sausages, and all th e m a te ria ls fo r a fe a s t. B y m iracle th e y w edged th em selves am o n g u s a n d b eg a n to m ak e m e rry . T h e y th e y grew am o ro u s kissing a n d fo n d lin g each o th e r . In o u r c o m p a rtm e n t tw o co u p les fe ll t o em b ra cin g , a n d h a lf ly in g u p o n th e se a ts. S o m eb o d y p u lled th e b la c k sh ad e o v e r th e lig h ts; a n o th e r sh u t th e d o o r. It w as a d e b a u c h , w ith th e re st o f u s lo o k in g o n .76

CHAPTER 3 ELECTIONS IN LATVIA

In 1917 there were four major elections in Lativa: th e Riga Council (Dome) elections on August 13; those o f th e Vidzem e Land Council on August 20; the councils o f four Vidzeme districts (R iga, Cēsis, Valmiera, and Valka) that were scheduled to begin on August 27 (but which, in most places, occurred at a later d ate), and o f th e All-Russian Constituent Assembly, occurring at various times during m id-Novem ber. In addition, to be noted were elections o f some o f th e larger tow ns o f Vidzeme. Demo­ cracy on the pagasts level is treated elsewhere in th is book. The goal o f the elections had been to stabilize the administrative structure o f Latvia, ending its provisionally, b u t com ing so late in the year, they fell short o f the goal and expectations o f those who desired stability. There were two major developm ents th at underminded the elections. First, the German offensive interfered w ith the election-Rip was occupied one week after the elections o f Riga D om e-and the elections o f the Vidzeme Land Council in th e battlefield region did not take place because the offensive was in progress at th e tim e the polk opened on August 20. Second, the Bolsheviks were winning these élections, and they basically wanted to use them as vehicles to pow er, the estab­ lishment o f a dictatorship o f the proletariat, rather than stabilizing partis* m entary administrative structure.

The Latvian Political Parties From the very beginning o f the revolution, in preparation for tl* forthcoming elections, num erous political parties sprouted up, especial

68

Elections in Latvia

59

In Riga. In the countryside, however, it came to pass that only two parties, the Bolshevik arid the Peasant Union, contested for dominance. 1. The Latvian Social Democratic (Bolshevik) party was the most power­ ful and successful one, winner o f all o f the major and almost all o f the minor elections. In 1917 the Latvian SD was under Bolshevik leadership and in a position to exact loyalty, not only from the party membership but also from thousands o f other Latvians. In August 1917, the party had m em bers,-but that in itself was not indicative o f its strength. The party's major newspaper Was Gna (The Struggle), founded in 1904, which by 1917 had considerable underground experience. In March 1917, (Sha was legalized in Petrograd under the editorship o f P. Stučka. In May, -was transferred to Riga, but soon after the fall o f Riga (on September.28); i t was banned by the provisional government. During the final months o f Kerensky’s regime, Mūsu Cīna (Our Struggle) replaced it, but on November 7 , the party organ resumed its original title o f Cīna. In addition, the party also published Sociāldemokrāts in Moscow, Petrogrādos (īna (Petrograd Struggle), Ziņotājs (The Bulletin) until May in Riga, and Laukstrādnieku cbm (The Farmhand's Struggle). The party also controlled Brīvais strēlnieks (The Free Streiki), the newspaper o f the Iskolastrel (the executive committee o f the Streiki Soviet), and tw o regional papers Valmieras apriņķa ziņotājs (The Bulletin o f Valmiera D istrict) stud Cent A vise (The Cesis News), small circulation newspapers, carriers o f official announcements. The party's program was a very long and complicated m atter which, in general; followed the Russian Leninist example, but on some crucially Latvian issues, there were significant variations. The agrarian development in Latvia was judged to be on a higher plane, where bourgeois bifurcation— into masters and servants—had occurred, and, consequently, the Latvian Bolsheviks looked forward to a more or less immediate reorganization o f Latvia into agricultural com m unes.1 On the nationality question, though in general th ey were for self determ ination, they did not consider it a prudent alternative to separate from revolutionary Russia, and they were vociferous in contesting th e plans o f Latvian liberāls for Latvia's autonom y and independence.* 2. The party w ith the largest m embership, but paradoxically not the strongest, was the Peasant Union. Founded in April 1917, b y mid J u ly ,

it had 20,000 members with chapters in most of Latvia's pagasts. It vw a party of a broad political spectrum—from agrarian socialists to advo­ cates of free enterprise-and as such, in elections outside of Riga, it tended to absorb all non-Marxist parties within its fold. The chief leadenhip of the party consisted of Kārlis Ulmanis (an agronomist who, after 190S, had received some intellectual and political schooling in America), who was the pragmatist and organizer; and Miķelis Valters (the intellectual/ ideologue), who entered the party from the direction of radical peasant socialism. Lldunu, the country's main liberal newspaper, became the organ of the union. In Riga, Baltijas vēstnesis also supported the party. In the Riga Dome elections, the Peasant Union did not enter an inde­ pendent slate, but participated in a bloc with other liberal parties. In the countryside, the party was the chief contender against Bol­ shevism. The main features of its program were distribution of land to landless peasants, Latvia's autonomy, enactment of broadbased welfare, cultural and educational programs.3 3. The Latvian Socialdemocratic Menshevik party was a creation of 1917. Although the Menshevik/Bolshevik wings existed within the Latvian SD party since 1906, the party entered 1917 officially as a united party. The successful Bolshevik attempt to seize the leadership of the part)’ in the early weeks of the revolution presented the Mensheviks with a dilemma: should they break with the party and create a new organi­ zation or should they remain within the party and try to wrest the party's leadership away from the Bolsheviks. The Latvian Mensheviks were split on this issue-the larger number, especially those living in Latvia, remained in the party, a smaller part residing in Petrograd and some other Russian cities charged ahead to create its own apparatus and press. Only after the Bolshevik insurrection, occurring during the elections of the Constituent Assembly, did the two groups get together, but in all other elections, they were split with many Mensheviks participating on the Bolshevik tickets. The party issued Strādnieku avise (T he W orkers *G azette). The Latvian Menshevik program, to a high degree, paralleled the Russian Menshevik one: it supported revolutionary defensism and Latvia's autonomy.4* 4. The chances of the Latvian Socialist Revolution party at the beginning of the revolution appeared auspicious, but it was fated to remain an urban

E lections in L atvia

71

organization, ironically finding it difficult, unlike its counterpart in Russia, to establish roots in the countryside. As the year progressed, the party was losing its leadership to the Peasant Union. Darba tauta (The Working Peopie) was the party's newspaper. The party's main selling point was that it represented a non-Bolshevik socialist alternative. Land to the landless was its most often repeated demand. The SR criticized the Bolsheviks for their collectivism on the land question, but they chastised the Peasant Union for its emphasis on the land-holding farmers. On the nationality question, too, the SR en­ deavored to develop a centralist position between the Bolsheviks and the Peasant Union: the former they attacked for its centralism, but the latter for reliance on the provisional government. Consequently, perhaps partly because of the polemical position, by midsummer, the SR came closer to demanding Latvia's independence than any other party, even the National Democrats. The working people will not look for protection from central administrators and will not hesitate to call for an autonomous un­ divided Latvia with full self-determination and executive powers’

The SR entered the elections of the province and districts as a third party, but it lacked organization to make much difference in the outcome. The party made its best showing in Cēsis District.6 5. The Latvian United Democratic party was a curious experiment that, in serener days than those of 1917, might have had great success. In an odd way, it was a Marxist inspired party, which instead of organizing the proletariat, proposed to organize and speak for the petty bourgeoisie. It ran a vigorous and interesting campaign, not without intellectual dexterity. It published a hard-hitting newspaper Jaunais laiks ( The N ew Times) that for the summer months of 1917 is the best single source of information in regard to political life in Riga. 6 . The National Democratic Party started its operations In Moscow; it

published a highly influential newspaper D zim tenes atbalss (T he Father• lend Echo/ On the intellectual plane, the party and the paper played a very significant role in developing an ideology of Latvia's unity, inde­ pendence, and democracy; but on a strictly political level, it had limited

72

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

influence. During the summer of 1917, the party transferred a part of ht operations to Latvia and even began to publish a newspaper Brīvā Latviju (Free Latvia) in Cēsis, but as a political organization, it did not take root. In the autumn of 1917, the goals of the National Democratic party began to meige with the Peasant Union.7 7. The circumstances in Riga during the early months of the revolution spawned numerous other parties, most of which did participate in the Riga Dome elections, but due to the loss of Riga, they had no further influence in 1917, although some of them played a role during the period of Democratic Latvia. They were: a. The Latvian Peoplets Party, led by F. Veinbergs, the most con­ servative party in 1917, had a very limited influence. In its litera­ ture, it appealed to M.. .those who defend private property,church, freedom, and Latvian nationalism, those who desire to foster small landholders and the principles of private ownership of the land, and those who desire to save the economy from parasites and the popu­ lation from starvation.. .Long live Freedom, Ethnicity,and Faith!" b. The Latvian Republican party: the right wing of Latvian liberalism, in comparison to the Russian situation, represented the center of the Kadet party.9 c. Radical Democrats d. Independent Intellectuals e. Non-Socialist Revolutionaries.

In this connection, two other associations that played a political rok can be mentioned,a]though in a strict sense, they were not political parties: The Latvian Independence Association, a Riga based organization; and the Latvian Soldiers* National Association* The latter was the more im­ portant one because it continued to operate after the fall of Riga, and through its newspaper Laika vēstis (The News o f the Tim es) exerted aa influence on all elections in Vidzeme. The purpose of the association was to limit Bolshevik influence among the Latvian Streiki and to summon around it nationalistically-thinking Latvian soldiers and officers.

Elections in Latvia

73

How good were these elections in 1917? Inasmuch as the Bolsheviks won these elections» numerous questions have been raised since that time about their honesty. There have even been suggestions that these elections took place, as it were, in an atmosphere of tenor, ht the non-Bolshevik press of 1917, however, there is very little to substantiate the claims of dishonesty or terror. After the Vidzeme Land Council elections, there was some question raised by Peasant Union's Līdums about the distri­ bution of ballots and envelopes before the elections to homes, which made it possible to mark the ballot and seal the envelope before arriving at the polling station. According to the paper, this practice gave the Bolsheviks an opportunity to visit the homesteads and have the ballots marked. There were also some questions raised about the sending out of ballot slips with the number of the Bolshevik list on it. Not even with regard to the elections of the Constituent Assembly do any of the papers speak about any physical threats, but there were mentions of frequent interference with the distribution of non-Bolshevik literature, stopping the delivery of papers, and tearing down of posters and announcements.14 In the Riga elections, perhaps, there were more irregularities, but in that instance, the Bolsheviks had not been the only culprits. In terms of attendance, they, too, must be judged as reasonably good elections: In the Riga Dome and the Vidzeme Land Council elections, the attendance was in the 80% range. The worst attendance was for the Riga, Cēsis, Valmiera, and Valka district elections when due to the con­ fusion that the retreat introduced in Vidzeme, the attendance was down below 50% of the eligible voters. The Constituent Assembly election drew about 60%of the electorate. The Election o f the Riga Dome-August 13

The election for the Riga Dome (Council) was the first of the major elections in Latvia, and one must also say the most happy one-every party, no matter how small, felt optimistic, nobody had hadanyoocasion to taste the disappointments of defeat. The campaign, though it had its recriminations, was still a playful one. In retrospect, one can see very clearly the fissures and hatreds that were to divide the Latvian people, anticipating the Civil War to come, but lines delimiting these antagonists

74

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

had not hardened at the time of the election. For one» the Bolsheviks did not know how popular they were going to be. Riga was a multi­ national city, with large German, Jewish, and Russian minorities, which was a significant factor muting the strictly Latvian antagonisms. The election was for 120 councillors (domnieki) in the Riga Dome and thirteen lists were presented to the electorate: List No. 1. The Latvian Sodai Democratic W orkers*party (Bolshevik) ticket, as it was known at the time. It did include some prominent Latvian Mensheviks-intemationalists, who had not separated from the party and had ignored the en­ treaties of the Latvian Menshevik party to Join their ticket. list No. 2. The Lithuanian, Polish, Estonian N ational Démocratie th e . The Socialist bloc.

List No. 3.

The largest of blocs, that entered the elections with high hopes, consisted of the following: The Latvian SR, the Latvian Mensheviks, Non-Socialist Revolutionaries, Russian SR, the Russian Mensheviks, and the Jewish Bund. Although h obtained 18 seats is the new government, the organizers of the bloc were disappointed with the result,

list No. 4. List No. S. List No. 6 . List No. 7. List No. 8 .

The Russian National Socialist bloc. Kārlis Plēsums, a list consisting o f one candidate. The Latvian United Democrats. The Jewish United Socialist W orkers*party. The German Democratic p arty and German Electors! S odety. The Jewish National Dem ocratic party The Socialist Revolutionary M aximalists. The Latvian Republican party. The Latvian People*sparty. The Latvian Radical Labor bloc, which consisted of

List No. 9. List No. 10. List No. 11. List No. 12. List No. 13.

independent Intellectuals, National Democrats, The Peasant Union party, and Radical Democrats. Only 60 signatures were needed to get on the list, and approximately 1000 votes elected a councillor.

75

Elections in Latvia

After the vociferous campaign, when the smoke had cleared, the results were as shown in Table 2. TABLE2 List No. 1 received 60,654 List No. 2 received 8,142 List No. 3 received 21,881 list No. 4 received 6,069 List No. 5 received 60 List No. 6 received 10,773 List No. 7 received 1,059 List No. 8 received 20,697 List No. 9 received 6,958 List No. 10 received 37 List No. 11 received 1£49 List No. 12 received 1,520 List No. 13 received 5,144

votes electing 49 votes electing 7 votes electing 18 votes electing 5 votes electing » votes electing 9 votes electing 1 votes electing 19 votes electing 6

councillors or 41% councillors or 6% councillors or 15% councillors or 4% councillors or councillors or 7.5% councillor or 8% councillors or 16% councillors or 5%

votes electing 1 councillor or 8% votes electing 1 councillor or &% votes electing 4 councillors or 3%

Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, the elections came only one week before the beginning of the German offensive. The votes hadbeen hardly counted when the enemy, from the point of view of the Bolsheviks* counterrevolutionary forces, overran Riga. Although the Bolshevik ticket had not received a majority, it had a dear plurality, more than the total of the next three most popular tickets. The Bolsheviks were the dear winners, and everyone at the time considered them to be the victors. Considering the nationality and ideological disparity of the parties, there was no likelihood that a coalition could be put together to block the Bolsheviks from forming the Riga Dome. After the votes were counted, (Jna, in an article entitled “Red Riga,** proclaimed triumphantly: “The bourgeoisie of Riga have become small. They have shrunk. Our prediction was right: Riga will be a red dty, the dty of working people**(Gm Aug. 16). Pffteris. Stučka arrived from Petrograd to lead and organize the new Riga government, but before he unpacked, Riga was attacked, forcing Stučka to flee for his life. Before the Germans overran the dty, the Bolsheviks called the new Dome into session, and apparently a rump session (perhaps consisting of the Bolshevik faction alone) took place.

76

THELATVIANIM PACT

Summing up their thoughts about the fall of Riga, the Bolsheviks proclaimed: M Red Riga was betrayed!** This slogan was repeated fa numerous variations thereafter; in a way, becoming an important comer, stone in the ideological justification for takeover of power by insurectioa. ary means later in the autumn. It was proclaimed that the fate of red % awaits red Petrograd, bi this sense, the move against the provision! government, from the Bolshevik viewpoint, became a defensive maneuver, the savingof the revolution from an international conspiracy.** The Elections of the Vidzeme Land Counci

One week after the Riga Dome elections, the elections for the Vidzeme Provincial Land Council were scheduled to take place. And in most parts of Vidzeme, the elections actually did take place on August 20 as ex* pected, but in the city of Riga and the environs of the battle zone, the elections were ruined. In a sense, the election of the Vidzeme Land Council was considered much more serious business than the election of the Riga Dome; for the council, though representing only one of Latvia’s provinces due to German occupation of Kurzeme, would have served as a defacto government of Latvia. Apropos of the elections, līd u m s wrote on July 29: **On Avgust 20, we are to elect the Council which will be the real caretaker in the Laod of Latvia.*1* The council was to consist of 81 representatives elected by its five constituencies: Riga City sending 30; Riga District, ll;Cfsu District, 13; Valmiera District, 12; and Valka District, 15. The law sped* lied that all citizens have the right to vote with the exception of the insane, convicted criminals, monks, and nuns. After their success in Riga, the Bolsheviks were perhaps more eager thanany other party to get the election over with. G ha wrote: We have accomplished a lot and we have succeeded well. But we must continue our work, the Vidzeme Land Council must also become red. Latvia and its capital Riga will be red. On August 20, everybody to the polls!1* In the countryside of Latvia, that is, within the four Vidzeme districts, the election was relatively simple, for there basically only two parties

Elections in Latvia

77

competed: the Latvian SD (Bolsheviks and the Peasant Union). The Lat­ vian SR exerted some effort as a third party, but left no significant effect on the outcome. From Riga City itself, the 30 seats were challenged by eight parties. The Latvian SD (Bolsheviks), the Latvian People's Party, and the Lat­ vian United Democrats (lists nos. 1, 2 , and S) proposed separate dates unencumbered by associates, as they had done in the Riga Dome elec­ tions. The Latvian Socialist Revolutionaries (last no. 3), hoping to play a larger role in Latvia's countryside, also entered a separate slate, fore­ going their association with other socialists, as they had done In the previous elections. The peculiarity of the Bolshevik slate from Riga (also true to a lesser degree about the provincial ones as well) was that it over­ lapped a great deal with their list of the Riga Dome one. List no.4 was the Latvian Radical Labor group which consisted first and foremost of the Latvian Peasant Union, followed by the National Democrats, Radical Democrats, and Independent Intellectuals. From the Marxist point of view, this was not so much a bloc of labor parties as of the liberal bourgeoisie. Their election literature invited those to vote for them, who Relieved in Latvia*« autonomy,** "social reforms,** "women believing in equal rights,** "workers who want to better their lives,** “all Kurlanders desiring restoration of Kurzeme,** "all streiki who desire undivided Lat­ via,** and "all citizens who desired their own and Latvia's welfare."14 List no. 6 was proposed by the Riga People's Union, a multinational conglomerate consisting of all nationality groups with the exception of the Germans: the Union of Riga Landlords, the Latvian Republican party, the Russian National Democratic Union, the Jewish National Democratic party, the Lithuanian Committee, the Polish Committee, and the Estonian Society. Its platform included the following proposals: to support the provisional government, to carry out the decisions of the Constituent Assembly, to establish an income tax, to establish compulsory and free education and education in native languages, and medical care for all.15 List no. 7, the Latvian Mensheviks, were also in effect a coalition In which the Russian Mensheviks and the Jewish Bund joined forces. List no. 8 was known as the United Germans. Political life in the countryside, in the districts of Latvia, was less complicated: in each of the districts, only three tickets were proposed.

THELATVIANIM PACT

78

In Riga, Cēsis, and Valmiera districts» the voters had the choice amonj the Latvian SD (Bolsheviks), the Peasant Union party, and the Socials Revolutionaries. In Valka, the third ticket was proposed by the Latvian National Democrats and Independent Landless Peasants. A spokesman for the Peasant Union regarded this as a breach of agreement on the pan of the National Democrats because, according to the spokesman, the Peasant Union had agreed to join in a bloc with the National Démocratein Riga if the National Democrats would refrain from entering independent slates in the districts.16 On August 20, as the people of Riga and Vidzeme went to the polls, the German offensive was in full force. Although Riga's fail did not occur until the following day, August 21, it is not known whether any voting took place within the city on August 20. In the rest of Vidzeme (except for the pagasts within the battle area of the Riga District), the elections proceeded normally. Before the Vidzeme Land Council elections, it was speculated by Līdums that the Bolshevik strength was mainly in the cities. The Peasant Union liberals, reeling from the decisive defeat of their programs in the Riga election, wrote: In Riga the Bolsheviks have established themselves in the first position, followed by the Germans. Let that be a warning to aO agrarian folk and an incentive at the same time-to do everything, even in the last hour, to assure that they are victorious on August 20. The fate of Latvia is not to be decided by Riga but the forth* coming elections of the Provincial Land Council, which will take place in all of the land.17 But once the results came in, it turned out that the countryside had voted even more resoundinglyfor the Bolshevik slate than had Riga. In Valmiera District, out of 52548 valid votes cast, the distribution was as follows: Bolshevics 35583 67.7%

Peasant Union

15612 30%

Socialist Revolutionaries 1353 2 jS%

79

Elections in Latvia

Oui of 41745 valid votes in Cēsis District (14 pagasts not reporting due to war conditions):19 Bolsheviks 21093 51%

Peasant Union 16745 40%

Socialist Revolutionaries 3380 8%

In Valka District out of 60171 valid votes:30 Bolsheviks 37206 61 J8%

Peasant Union 21751 36.1%

National Democrats 1214 2%

Altogether, of the votes counted up to August 29, the Bolsheviks received 93884 votes or 63.4% and the Peasant Union 54108 votes or 46.5% of the total. The greatest disappointment was suffered by the third party candidates. But the Socialist Revolutionary results in Cēsis District showed that the main missing component in the elections of Latvia was a well organized non*Bo!shevik socialist opposition. From this viewpoint, the Bolshevik stratagem of keeping some of the main Latvian Mensheviks from joining the Latvian Menshevik party must be considered a successful one. TABLE NO. 3 COMPOSITION OF THEVIDZEME LANDCOUNCIL AUGUST 29" District of Cēsis The Peasant Union sent: 1. Vilis Skubini 2. Arvīds Bremers 3. Jinis Kalninl 4. Voldemārs Maldonls 5. Teodors Vankins

THE LATVIAN

so

The Socialist Revolutionaries sent: 1.

Antons KalninS

The Bolsheviks sent : 1. Fricis Süarajs 2 . Voldemārs Bastjānis-Menshevik/lntematkmalist 5 . Jinis Gulbis 4. Arvīds Zeibots 5. Otto Kārklinš 6. Augusts MieziŽ 7» Aleksandris Kalninl Valka District

The Feasant Union sent: 1. Feteris Siednieks

2. Feteris Peles 3. Otto Nonācs 4. Kārlis Gulbis 5. Kārlis Liepkalns 6 . Voldemārs Samuelis The Bolsheviks sent : 1. Teodors Liventāls

2. Andrejs Upits 3. Jānis Birkenfelds 4» KārlisGailis 5. Roberts Kārklinā 6 . Erasts Efferts 7. Jānis Bērzs 8 . Peters JurevicS 9. Augusts Bodnieks

81

Elections in Latvia

Valmiera District The Peasant Union sent: 1. Kārlis Ulmanis

2. Arturs Alberings 3. Augusts KalninS 4. Pēteris Eļglits, J. The Bolsheviks sent: 1. Jānis Gailis 2. Liens Fridrichsons 3. Voldemārs Dvoretskls 4. Elmārs Ratnieks 5. Jānis Ozols 6 . Edvārds Ozoliņi 7. Kārtis Seržants 8 . Rūdolfs Kirchenšteins As some of the elected members were behind the German lines in Riga» they were replaced by other members affiliated with the same party» A. UpTts and K. Ulmanis, for example, were replaced by Jānis Lipini and Rudolf Lide, The Vidzeme Council, as h functioned bow* ever, was somewhat larger than its elected membership, for it did cany forward several committees (Agrarian, Latvia's Autonomy, Juridical, Financial, Educational) that had been organized in the period before the elections. So in a certain sense, the Bolshevik victory at the poll was not quite as telling and immediate as it may appear. Even so, the liberal forces In the council, especially on the autonomy question of Latvia, felt frustrated; so on October 9, they bolted the council in protest, leav­ ing the Bolsheviks in full unchallenged power over the council. On Novem­ ber 16/17, the council deckled to admit nine members from the Riga District (S Bolsheviks, 3 Peasant Union, and 1 Socialist Résolutionary),a which did not mean much because it was no logger a multi-party organ. The only opposition that the Bolsheviks received in November was from

82

THELATVIANIM PACT

the half dozen Mensheviks who entered the council on Bolshevik slates. At times, the arguments with the Mensheviks could become quiteheated, but the Bolsheviks took care of that by recalling the credentials of the recalcitrant members, as it happened with V. BastjSnis.33 For awhile, the Bolsheviks considered the possibility, though it woutt have been against the Latvian SD V Party Congress advice, of prodaimini power in Latvia through the Vidzeme Land Council, but at the time ofawiets, it would have been too unorthodox, and so eventually the majorityof the partyopted for proclamation of power by the Iskolat. InDecember191? the Congress of Latvian Workers', Soldiers' and Landless Peasants Deputies ordered the Iskolat to eliminate the vestiges of the Vidzeme LandGouikS, transferring some of the functions to the control of the Iskolat, Ik activities of the Vidzeme Land Council, in spHe of some Menshevik pro­ tests, were ended by January 16,191S.*4 The Elections of Riga, CEsis, Valmiera, and Valka District Councils The district elections to elect the respective councils of Riga, Ciās. Valmiera, and Valka were scheduled for August 27, the Sunday after tk big Vidzeme Land Council elections, but due to the turbulence created by shifting of the front, in most places, it occurred at a later date—ifa all. Most disruptions occurred in the Riga and CEsis districts, but evenin Valmiera and Valka districts, which were not in the vicinity of the front, the élections on August 27 took place only in about 65%of pagasts.9 Consequently, alternate dates for the election were set. In CEsis District, the supplementary elections were scheduled for September 17, but even then, only 25 out of 60 polling places reported, which necessitated tk extension of the deadline to October 15.3* In Valmiera District, the supplementary elections were set for Septem­ ber 10, but 20 polling stations had not reported results by September#* In 35 out of 53 polling stations in the Valka District, elections occurred as scheduled on August 27. By September 6 , elections had not taken place in seven stations and, consequently, supplementary election was scheduled for September 10.3T

E lections in Latvia

83

The German assault affected the elections in two major ways; first« communications were disrupted, many newspapers that were issued in Riga—through which announcements to the pagasts could be sent-ceased to exist, and so it became very uncertain whether any announcement about rescheduling of elections reached the public; second, the retreat of the Russian troops signaled the beginning of widespread plundering and stealing in Latvia’s countryside, which made many people fearful of leaving home to cast a ballot. In all respects, the attendance was down, even in places that were unaffected by the front. Table 4 shows a de­ crease of voters in those polling places in Valka and Valmiera districts in which élections took place both on August 20 and August 27.® In Valmiera, the turnout was about 37% of the eligible electorate. The decrease in voters should not be ascribed to the war conditions alone; this was a lower level election and the voter interest simply might have been lower. It is to be noted that the decrease in voters for the Peasant Union party, supposedly representing the richer section of the peasantry, was higher than that of the Bolshevik ticket. One explanation was that the landed peasantry, fearing the plunder of their property, stayed home.29 (See Table 5)» In all respects, the Bolsheviks improved their advantage in Latvia, even though, due to the turnout, the election may not have been as representative as the one of the Vidzeme Land Council on August 20. The most dramatic change occurred in Cēsis District, where the Bolshe­ viks upped their percentage by 14 points, but relative improvement was also registered in Valka and Valmiera districts where the rise was 2%and 8%,respectively. The Bolshevik victories in Latvia’s administrative councils were important in themselves in the positive sense, but they were, in a negative sense, even more important; the elections almost totally excluded the non-Bolsheviks from decision-making in Latvia. Once the party decided to concentrate Latvia’s administration within the Iskolat, the district assemblies were important organs that helped in this takeover. The Elections of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly At the beginning of the revolution in March, all Latvian political parties and groupings expressed themselves in favor of a constituent

TABLE 4 PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS OF AUGUST 20 AND 27 IN SELECTED PLACES OF VALMIERA ANDVALKA DISTRICTS Total Votaa

Latvian SD Lift

P eu an t Union Liât

O then

The elections o f Vidzem e Land Council A ugust 20

76 540 (100%)

48 997 (6402% )

25 429 (3332% )

2114 (2.77%)

T he elections o f V alm iera and V alka

41 442(100% )

30 023 (72.45%)

10 329 (2492% )

1090 (2.63%)

D istrict C ouncils A ugust 27 F acto r o f D ecrease

IS

1.6

25

IS

E lections in Latvia

85

TABLE 5 RESULTS OF THE DISTRICTELECTIONS

Bolsheviks elected

Feasant Union elected

SR elected

National Democrats elected

Valmiera

Valka

Osis

18036 votes 27 Reps. 75%

11324 31 Reps. 68%

6975 25 Reps. 64%

5162 8 Reps. 21% 798 1 Rep. 3%

4970 13 Reps. 30%

—

3433 12 Reps. 31.5% 459 2 Reps. 4%

256 Rep. 1.5%

assembly—liberals» socialists and Bolsheviks.31 Opinions did differ on the function of the Constituent Assembly: one bask difference between the liberals and the Bolsheviks was that the former thought of the assembly as the ultimate establishes of democratic/parliamentary order» the latter in terms of a means to power as the final prodaimer of socialist order in Russia.31 It is reasonable to say that the Latvian Bolsheviks from the beginning thought of the Constituent Assembly more as a means» rather than an end» to a process. Though, in general, the Latvian liberals differed from the Bolsheviks on this question, as the summer of 1917 progressed, a group of the liberals» especially the national liberals» began to think of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly as the means» rather than the end, for the needs of Latvians. They argued that the Latvian voice, their needs and desires, would be drowned out man All Russian Constituent Assembly. This group began to argue for a Latvian constituent assembly as a sub­ stitute for the All Russian one. When the time of election came, they did agree to participate, but their consent was a conditional one: they thought

86

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

of it as forum from which to announce Latvia’s will for autonomy. A* other variation on this theme was the strategy of participating in the Russian Constituent Assembly elections, while really thinking of Latvia in terms of a federation with the Ukraine, rather than with Russia. Or the eve of the Constituent Assembly elections, in a lead article,Udum exclaimed: “Not to Petrograd but towards the Ukraine we must fix ov gaze.”33 Latvia was to send to the Constituent Assembly four deputies, aid three parties competed for those positions: the Bolsheviks, the Peasant Union, and the Latvian Mensheviks. Potentially, the Menshevik ticket could have been an important roadblock for the Bolsheviks, for finally, In the late fall, the Latvian Mensheviks were beginning to unify. Those Mensheviks who throughout the summer, for Metical*' reasons, wen dallying with the Bolsheviks, had had enough. Just before the fall of Rgi, the relationship between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Riga was at i breaking point, but, even more important, there was a falling out is Vidzeme. Emboldened by this development, the Menshevik party mi ready to propose its own ticket for the elections of the Constituât Assembly. V. BastjSnis, a Menshevik internationalist, who had beta elected to the Vidzeme Land Council on the Bolshevik ticket, agreed to head the Menshevik slate. For electioneering purposes, Strādnieku avīze was transferred to Vidzeme. But In the end, the effort proved too little and too late because the party had practically no organization to rely on.*4 The announced date for the elections of the Constituent Assembly was November 12, but when the elections were almost upon them, the Bolsheviks, who were in the control of the Vidzeme administration, pushed the date forward by another week. The reason given for the postponement was shortage of paper for the ballots and envelopes. The elections in Vidzeme took place at various times from November 18 to 21.* The Vidzeme voters had the choice of the following tickets:34 Peasant Union - Janis Goldman» Zigfrids Meirovics Arvīds Bremers Vasilijs Skubini Eduards Lawsons Ernests Bauers

Elections in L atvia

87

The Bolsheviks- Pēteris Stučka Fricis Rozīni Jānis Bērziņi Kārlis Pētersons Kārlis PeČaks Otto Kārklini The Mensheviks- Voldemārs Bastjānis Kārlis Ozoliņi , Klāvs Lorancs 1. Ritini As expected, the Bolsheviks won with 97 781 rotes to the Peasant Union’s 31 253, the Mensheviks receiving 7046. The victory margin was 71 -85%, the Peasant Union receiving 23%, which assured that the Bolshe­ viks would send three deputies for one of the Peasant Union. Latvia was represented at the hapless Constituent Assembly by P. Stučka, F. Rozini, Jānis Bērziņi, and Jānis GoIdmanis. A summary of the election results by districts is in Table 6 . TABLES RESULTS OF THE CONSTITUENTASSEMBLY ELECTIONS BY DISTRICT97 List No. 1 Peasant Union Valmiera

8 258

List No. 2 Mensheviks

list No. 3 Total Bolsheviks

1490 3.5%

32 556 769%

42314

19.5% Cēsis and 11 pagasts from Riga District

11 791 26.7%

2 650 6%

29 728 673%

44169

Valka

11204 22 .6%

2906 5S%

35 487 71.5%

49 597

Total

31 253 23%

7 046 5.1%

97781 136080 719%

THELATVIANIM PACT

88

The level of participation was not quite as high as in the Vidzeme Usd Council elections but considerably higher than in the district elections. In Valmiera District, out of 64 413 eligible voters, 42 372 or 66%voted. The Streiki voted within their units for tickets that were presented to the whole Northern Front so that, in a real sense, they did not participai« In a Latvian election. The only list that contained a considerable number of Latvian names was the Bolshevik one. Līdums urged the Streiki to vote for the Ukrainian ticket,3* but the Streiki overwhelmingly voted for the Bolshevik list that contained the following names:39 1. Lenin 2. Ikars Smilga 3. Semyon Nachimson 4. P. Stučka 5. V. A. Ovselenko 6 . N.l. Podvoiskii 7. S. P. Medvedev 8. E.M. Skalanskii. 9. A. C. Vasilev 10.A.LSedyakin 11. A. A. Sheiman 12. Jinis Vilks 13. P. A. Krasikov

14. Jānis Roze 15. R. F. Siverss 16. M.J. Sergejevs 17. D. I. Grazkins 18. N.D. Sabakin 19.V.L. Visockis 20.1.P. Glinski 21. A. 1. Grigoijevs 22 . K. A. GalUs 23. K. A. Pitersons 24. G.A.Merkins 25. E. I. Jurjevics

The importance of the Latvians in the Northern Front region is evident from the fact that three of the first four were Latvians, and altogether, the list contained eight Latvians and about thirteen. members of the Latvian SD. The results of the Streiki voting are to be seen in Tables 7 and 8 .

TABLE 7

RESULTS OF THE ELECTION OF THE CONSTITUENTASSEMBLY IN THE STRELKI REGIM ENTS40

8

«

.5

8£ ?a* J?! WS

1st Regiment 2571 2nd Regiment 2644 3rd Regiment 2888 4th Regiment 2880 Headquarters of Ist Brig. 644 5th Regiment 2785 6th Regiment 2597 7th Regiment 2618 8 th Regiment 2391 Headquarters of 2 nd Brig. 1113 Reserve Regiment 6055 Military MUitia Total

i 2210

2340 2690 2518 483 2326 2333 2521 2341 842 3526 286

3

£ >

1 - 1

%

e

^ .2 8

Jc o - ?S o” S 2 a* 2

23 16

4 4

6 11

8

9 28 24 27 4 9 39 9

29 422 24 416 205

N •

S «

n f itZ

Žz

S i

&

2120

95.9 97.6 97.5 97.9 89.7 95.7 96.8 95.4 98.9 94.9

'g 8 O

1

32 13 35 34 15 23 27 42 9 24 236 15

91

505

5 5 13 4 8

5 7 27

I

2 *3 ***

9 5 3

8

2283 2623 2456 433 2226 2258 2406 2316 785 3015 249

86

23 170

10

5 2 12 11 0 2

19

8SJ

87.7 950

a S'0. Ž2 i

®e* «o uz

11

11

4

15 7

8 2

0

9 5

7 29

2 11

6

4 3 55 0 114

16 3 12

135 4 245

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

TABU 8 ccpmbly e ie c h o n results

STRELKI REGIMENTS" IH the XU c!SL

^' *■

1

Hi 1

29422

i5 *-* O N cn

E U gibk v o te rs

386864

24416

N um b ers v o tin g

to CO c* 00

8l/l

U st

List No, 2

« o

\D

Ust No. 3

Ul O V*

to 4* 2 ON

00 tf*

è w lO |s>

to

|g

u> •J

o

NO Ī-1

List No. 4

List No. 5

on

*•» £ Ö

-

S

S

00

,o

4*V»

No. 1

&

** CO

%

Ust No. 6

List No. 7

CHAPTER4 THE ISKOLAT REPUBLIC The Iskolat, taking notice o f thefts, m b beriest murder, and violence perpetrated by marauding bands, deserters, and other out­ casts who are using the new freedoms for selfish purposes against peaceful citizens, is asking everyone to obey Soviet laws and decrees. The Iskolat announces that all perpetrators o f violence will receive the severest penalties. A ll who engage in pog­ rom s, regardless how small their part, shall be sw ept from the face o f this earth. I f violence w ill not cease, Iskolat will be forced to decree all perpetrators o f vio­ lence beyond the bounds o f law. Iskolat is asking all inhabitants to remain calm.

Ziņotājs. January 16.1918 The Iskolat Republic was the political/territorlal form that came into existence in Latvia during the autumn of 1917 and vanished with the German occupation of Latvia in February 1918. It was the first Latvian Bolshevik Republic, and. historiographically. it is significant to note that it had purely indigenous origins, anticipating, rather than following, the events in Petrograd in most respects. Iskolat was the Soviet of Latvia's Workers’, Soldiers', and Landless Peasant Deputies. It was Latvia's Soviet of Soviets, the highest organ in the chain of soviets. The Republic represented a development that should be of interest to a great variety of scholars concerned with the 1917/1920 upheaval in

91

92

THELATVIANIM PACT

Northeastern Europe: though the Iskolat Republic had some connections with the Council of Peoples' Commissars in Petrograd, it was an entity separate-if not independent-from it, and In all respects controlled Hi territory for the duration of its power more thoroughly than the Petro* grad Bolshevik government controlled its territory. In 1917/1918, there was no other Bolshevik republic within the boundaries of the erstwhile Russian Empire. From the Leninist ideological point of view, the Iskobt Republic represented the first concretion of the Bolshevik nationality policy: separate, yet united; independent, yet an essential part of the whole. A comparison of the Iskolat Republic to the state of affaira in Petrograd would show that the degree of Bolshevik control in Latvia was much fuller than it was for the Peoples Commissariate in Petrograd and that the essence of socialist construction was of a much more advanced variety. In saying this, J do not want to exaggerate the stability of the Iskolat Republic: the organization took place within the frontline region; there was mayhem, looting, threat of famine, and disorders of the greatest variety. It is only in comparison to the conditions in Petrograd that the situation in Vidzeme looks good. In part, the problems of the bkoht were simplified because in Latvia, practically speaking, there was no opposition to the Bolsheviks. The opposition that existed was in com­ plete disunity. In Latvia, there was no need for an insurrection: the problem was administrative-choosing the organ of highest authority. Indeed, there was perfect logic to argue that the Vidzeme Land CouncO should be the governing organ since the Bolsheviks had complete control of It, but once the choice fell on the Iskolat, the transition was relatively smooth. Though the experience of the Latvian Communist Republic, 1917/1918, was brief, historically, it was still a unique entity, whose importance is augmented by the Latvian Streiki performance for the Bolshevik cause in Russia. The history of the Iskolat Republic is also of the greatest significance to those historians who are interested in tracing the development of independent Latvia. Though the ideologues and politicians who fought for independent Latvia (and today continue to speak for it) were and are thorough anti-Bolsheviks, the evidence is incontestable that the Iskolat Republic was an important stage in the development of Latvia's Indepen­ dence, a conclusion that the historians of Latvia will have to accept sooner or later, and in spite of the fact that assigning a role to the Iskolat Republic

The Jskoktt Republic

93

will mean some diminution in the symbolic significance of November 18, 1918, the date that the anti-ßolshevik Latvians celebrate as the founding of the independent state of Latvia, and even in spite of the fact that the Soviets have used and will continue to use the issue for propagandistic purposes. The Iskolat Republic was precedent setting due to its being the first ethnic Latvian government. It mandated the use of the Latvian language in Latvia’s administration; it ended Russia’s influence in Latvia; all traditional administrative ties with Russia were severed; Russian as the language of instruction was eliminated from Latvian schools; the Landrat was liquidated; the Iskolat obtained the sequestration of Latgale from Vitebsk Gubemiia, making Latgale, at least in theory, part of the ad* ministratlve structure of Latvia. The Iskolat was also a pace setter in carrying out land reforms of Latvia. It proclaimed the confiscation of baronial latifundias; and during its tenure, almost all of these lutifundias were taken over and reorganized as communal properties administered by Latvian landless peasants* It is an understatement to say that the evaluation of the Iskolat in Latvian historiography is controversial—between the Soviet and nonSoviet historians, there is hardly a meeting ground on this point. In a sense, the non-Soviet historians even doubt the existence of the Iskolat Republic. They usually tend to make the following conclusions:4321 1. That the origin and existence of the Iskolat Republic is doubtful, at best shaky; 2. that it did not have a true legitimacy; 3. that its leadership consisted of riffraff; 4 . that its policy issued from cruelty and vengefulness, and its main executive tool was terror; 5» that the Iskolat Republic basically was an offshoot of the Bolshe­ viks in Petrograd, representing an alien group in Latvia;and 6* that it had no spirit of independence, tying its future to Russia. E. Anderson has written about the Iskolat Republic: Since those selected for the responsible positions were usually unprepared, unfit, and uneducated persons, whose only qualifi­ cation for the job was proletarian origins, the work of the Soviet was

THELATVIANIMPACT

94

quite chaotic and created disaffection among the people. The floundering leadership tried to suppress the disaffection with terror.1 In order to characterize Iskolat’s relationship to Russia, Anderson uses one of Iskolat's own statements that it had issued to the Central Powers: That Iskolat is the M only ruler and administrator in the whole unoccupied territory** (Three districts , E.A.) and has no desire to separate from Russia. And that it is convinced that small countries at the gateway of imperialist superstates are an empty illusion.2 A. Sildewas even less generous to the Iskolat: In comparison to the Tsarist period and the short period that began with the February Revolution, nothing in Latvia's legal status had changed and therefore it is wrong to say that during the period of Iskolat's activities, the sovereign power of Latvia had come to rest with the Latvian people, as Soviet legal and historical scholars now want to maintain.2 Soviet historians, for understandable reasons, take a dialectically opposite viewpoint, but surprisingly, though Latvia’s Academy of Science has published the minutes of Iskolat and Hs Presidium,4 the Soviet his­ torians have not written all that much about the Iskolat. For example, as yet there is no monographic study devoted to It. Outsiders can only guess the reasons for this reticence to write about one of the most glorious moments in Latvia’s Bolshevik history, but it may be because a full dis­ cussion of the Iskolat Republic would show the relationship between Russia and Latvia at that time to have been considerably different than political prudence of today would allow the historians to reveal. The major points that Soviet historians make about the Iskolat are the following:21 1. That the Iskolat Republic emanated from the Latvian SD decisions made at the V Party Congress; 2 . that it was the embodiment of the Bolshevik theory on nationalities;

The Iskolat Republic

95

3. that it was a revolutionary state in which the old was swept away and a new Soviet order instituted; 4. that it was a proletarian state in which the old classes were dele* gated to perdition;and 5. that it represented Latvia’s socialist revolution which arose from deep roots of the Latvian people, and thus its legitimacy was beyond question. According to one Soviet account, "Iskolat became the central organ of the whole unoccupied part of Latvia and, in essence, took on the functions of Latvia’s first government. The decrees of the Iskolat liquidated the organs of the toppled Provisional government in Vidzeme Guberniia and districts.** Professor Dga Apine, who has written quite extensively about the Iskolat, has this to say: . . . Iskolat quickly organized the takeover of power by local Soviets in all of the unoccupied parts of Latvia and successfully managed its economy, was resolving the agrarian and food questions, and organized schools and cultural life. Under difficult conditions wide masses became involved in creative work. The representatives of the working people in the Soviets went about like the real owners of their land. In taking over the functions of Land and City Coun­ cils, the commissariats of the districts, and other functions of the old order, Iskolat was careful to observe that transition be gradual, so that regular tasks, the supply of food relief for soldiers and refu­ gee families, etc. would not be interrupted.* [Through the Iskolat) the Latvian people actualized the right of self-determination and decided upon Latvia’s fate. The highest demand of the Latvian people was to have an autonomous Latvian Republic within the community of Soviet Russia. In fact Latvia was fashioned in accordance with national/territorial principle as an autonomous unit in Russia’s Federated Republic. It was the first national state in the history of Latvia's people, and it was granted to them by the Soviet power.7 On the question of Iskolat’s relationship to Russia, Apine has this dialectical explanation:

96

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

The system of Soviets that were established in the unoccupied part of Latvia after the October Revolution became part of Russia's soviet system. And that was not determined by any decree of a central organ, but it was Latvia's own sovereign wflL# The three basic conflicting issues between the Soviet and non-Soviet historians arc (!) the Iskolat’s relationship with the Petrograd govern­ ment; (2) the question of Iskolat’s sovereignty and effectiveness of con­ trol; and (3) the use of terror during the period of its power. In fairness to the two non-Soviet historians quoted above, it must be said that they wrote their works before the minutes of the Iskolat and in Presidium were published, but as long as they have not reopened the topic, one must say that the Soviet historians (though they tend to be for* mulistic and on some points engage in ideological overkill) have made a more thorough and subtle examination of the question. On the question of Iskolat’s ties to Russia, it is the opinion of this writer that both the non-Soviet and Soviet historians exaggerate the strength of them. The Soviet view, of course, is dialectical: that the Iskolat Republic was an example of national selfdetermination, thus independent and sovereign, and that it continued to be united with revo­ lutionary Russia without whose existence the miniscule socialist Iskolat state would have been crushed. It is true that it was incumbent on the iskolat to send deputies to the Congresses of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, but it is unclear whether there were to be any other real connections between the two soviets. No connections appear to have existed between the Iskolat and the Council of Peoples' Commissars. There is no record of any communication coming from the Peoples’ Commissars to the Iskolat, and there is only one known telegram of congratulatory nature from Iskolat to the Peoples' Commissars.9 Various requests were directed to Petrograd for food, arms, and funds, and promises were occasionally received from Petrograd; but except for some weapons, it Is not known that the Iskolat received anything from the capital. Iskolat’s minutes reveal frequent complaints about lack of communications with Petrograd. Petrograd certainly did nothing to stop the loot from Latvia flowing out to Russia. There is, of course, a very good reason why Petrograd did not come to help the budding new Com­ munist Republic in Latvia—it was not In the position to help anybody.

Tfie Iskolat Republic

97

The Council of Peoples* Commissars for the first dozen months tottered on a thin edge, hardly having control of its own membership and the closest environs of their headquarters. The Iskolat simply did not have any opportunity to draw on the "strength** of revolutionary Russia. From the point of view of power, the Peoples* Commissars needed help more than did the Iskolat. In comparing the importance and strengths of the two Bolshevik governments, it was the Iskolat, in association with Izkolastret and the War Revolutionary Committee in Vidzeme, that had the superior position and availability of resources, meager as those were. Iskolat, in conjunction with Iskolastrel, honored numerous entreaties from the Peoples* Commissars for armed soldiers. By January 1918, about three Streiki regiments had been sent to Russia to salvage the leaking ship of revolution. One of these regiments, and a special Smolny battalion, were stationed in Petrograd to insure the safety of the Peoples* Com­ missars themselves. Petrograd was not in a position to perform a similar service for the Iskolat. Informal communications between Petrograd and Latvia seem to be more frequent; one may even describe them as ongoing. Even Lenin himself frequently met with Latvian Bolsheviks, those who were working in the Petrograd apparatus and those who visited Petrograd, but these conversations always seem to have been regarding possibilities of sending more Latvian Streiki to help the revolution in Russia. Was the Iskolat imitative of the government in Petrograd? That some things would have been learned from Petrograd is certain: for example, the Decree on Courts of Law penned by P. Stučka was taken over by Iskolat, but it was more than direct borrowing-we can assume the Iskolat members guided themselves in their decisions by what they considered to be the radical revolutionary tradition, Paris Commune and other European revolutions. The Iskolat leadership, of course, were Leninists and therefore a similarity of decision-making in content and method was expected. For example, the Iskolat leadership acted from the principle that the old state machinery must be smashed down to Hs smallest detail—this kind of truth they, of course, could have learned from the Russians or they could have gotten It from a number of other sources, including Marx himself. Freshly arrived from the United States, Fr. Rozini articulated this point at the November 8 session of the Iskolat:

98

THELATVIANIM PACT One of the most important lessons that the revolutions of earlier times teach us is that the working class cannot conquer and usefor its benefit the state machine that has been built by the bourgeoisie. It is impossible to make a state proletarian by electing Social Demo­ crats as ministers.

Rozint goes on to explain that it is the soviets that would represent the new order of things. The minutes of the Iskolat do not give the impression of preoccupation with theory or doctrine. Given the premise that a new society has to be constructed, the Iskolat leadership proceeded to do so in a practical step by-step way, solving problems as they arose. They did not retreat fromthe premise that the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasants would be the new masters of the state. Basically, the Iskolat found little resis­ tance along the way. In drawing a distinction between Petrograd and Latvia, RozinS in the speech cited above said: The only trouble is that in Russia the Soviet Gowmment must be constructed from the top and it cannot be structured from below . . . . Because of that the decisions and decrees of the Soviet Govern­ ment in Petrograd are sabotaged. Apropos the same relationship, R. Salna, a delegate from Petrograd to the meeting of the Iskolat said: Without Latvia, Finland, and other revolutionary peripheral regions, Russia cannot accomplish what is needed to establish the government of working people.10 The point was made even more directly by KruminS at the Congress of Latvian Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasant Soviets of Deputies in December: “The Latvia’s SD has proven that it can take care of its own tasks and can give aid to Russia.” 11 To what degree the Iskolat actually obtained control over Latvia is a more problematical point to determine. There is no question that all the upper administrative organs (the Provincial and District commissariates

The Iskolat Republic

99

and the various elected Provincial and District Land Councils) were ab* sorbed by the Iskolat. The same can be said about all of the town ādmini* strative structures. To what degree the countryside, the pagasts, were taken over by the Iskolat is impossible to determine with certainty. The Iskolat’s control extended downwards through the local soviets, and, until the very end, reports from localities frequently indicated that landless peasant soviets in many pagasts were inoperative. Rozini* suggestion, in the statement above, that the soviets in Russia had to be constructed from above, whereas in Latvia, they arose spontaneously from below, may, in the main, be true, but does not cover all cases. The upper layers of soviets in the districts and towns and among the Streiki were well-established by November and continued to be active. In the pagasts among the landless peasants, the record seems to be very spotty. There is evidence that the landless peasants, on occasion, resisted the soviets, and, once established, there was no telling whether the soviet in the pagasts would continue to function. Organizers and propagandists from Iskolat and Iskolastrel were sent out to the countryside on an ongoing basis. The second line of control that the Iskolat used were Streiki units— but these were used only in cases of major resisence, if there was some armed or potentially armed resistance reported. To what degree the people In pagasts in which there were no functioning soviets felt compelled to obey the decrees of the Iskolat is contradictory-at least according to available evidence. Towards the end of the Republic, the Iskolat officials at the center complained bitterly on occasion about their inability to control the localities who were either ignoring the decrees or were engaging in wild improvisations. It seems that the decree on confis­ cation of baronial lands had universal acceptance, even if in some odd places the actual takeover had not been finished by the end of the Repub­ lic. Cases of looting, especially by armed soldiers, were frequently re­ ported up to the very end, and the Iskolat, even with the help of the Streiki, could not fully control this wantonness. In November, the Iskolat worked out a special decree on the creation of Red Guard detachments (which after demobilization would take over all security assignments); but from the very beginning, this policy was plagued with setbacks—they were missing weapons, trainers, and volun­ teers for the troops. With the help of the Streiki as trainers, numerous Red Guard units were organized, but the Iskolat fell far short of expectations and sufficiency in this regard.

100

THELATVIANIMPACT

The best indicator for the success of the Iskolat and the effectiveness of its control can be seen in its financial transactions. Though we do not have the Iskolat’s treasury records and we do not fully know what its income was and where they obtained all of their money, we can ted fron the minutes that its financial obligations were considerable and that ft was capable of meeting those obligations. For a three-month period ia 1918, the Iskolat’s budget was set at 2 256 454 rubles (Ziņotājs 19. feb.). Iskolat’s own apparatus grew to be of considerable size; they had to meet the payrolls of all Vidzeme’s administrative, educational, cultural, and judicial personnel. Caution was the guiding principle in Iskolat’s financial decisions. From the point of view of control, the takeover of Latgale is even more problematical. In no sense (and even the Soviet historians do not chin it) can it be said that Latgale was under the control of the Iskolat. la Latgale, things began to go favorably for the Bolsheviks with the Latgale Congress of Workers, Soldiers, and Feasant Soviets of Deputies that met on December 3 and 4, Bolshevik resolutions prevailed at this Congress, but in no sense could one say that the Bolsheviks came to control Latgale. It is true, however, that due to Bolshevik efforts, Petrograd allowed Lat­ gale to be sequestered from Vitebsk Gubernia and united with Latvia. A more thorough Bolshevik control no doubt would have emerged ia Latgale from the next Congress of Soviets that was scheduled to take place, but did not, in mid January 1918. The postponement, according to Soviet historians, was owing to the closeness of the front lines, but more likely had something to do with the balance of forces in Latgale. The new date for the Congress was February 17, which was just on the eve of ihe German assault.13 Was the Iskolat Republic a state of terror? It depends on what yow standard is. If one compares the Iskolat Republic with other periods of Communist rule in Latvia—the five months in 1919, the year of 1940» 41, and the Stalinist post World War II period—then the Iskolat Republk was not a state of terror. On the other hand, if one compares it to Switzer» land, Denmark, or the United States of today, then it certainly was i situation of coercion. By the time that the Iskolat Republic ceased to exist, there were no non-Bolshevik newspapers left, all having been closed by order of the Iskolat. The old system of courts was abolished, and new revolutionary tribunals were functioning in many localities. Numeroas

The Iskolat Republic

101

persons—those who resisted the decrees of the Iskolat—were arrested and incarcerated. The numbers of arrested over-reached the jail capacity in Latvia, necessitating various makeshift jailhouse arrangements. The rules of arrest that were frequently breached were as follows: 1) to arrest only when there is evidence for H; 2) materials must be submitted;and 3) those who have been sentenced in localities must also serve that sen­ tence in those localities.13 No one was executed during the period of the Republic. Though the bourgeoisie were considered class enemies, the concept of class criminality was not applied. A situation more approaching terror began with the German assault— when the order went out to take along all of the imprisoned. In groups of a hundred and more, the prisoners were driven across the frontier of Latvia into Russia. The confusion of the retreat gave many the oppor­ tunity to escape from imprisonment, but it is also known that near Pskov, some prisoners were shot. Some were apparently taken as far as Moscow and incarcerated in the jails of the capital.14 The exact number of those shot and who gave the orders to shoot them cannot be ascertained from the available evidence. Those murders were certainly connected with the Iskolat’s decision to ship the prisoners to Russia, though it may not have been directly involved in the shootings. The Origins and the Establishment of the Iskolat, July 29-30 To establish an upper house of the soviets, the Iskolat, was a Latvian SD party decision at the V Party Congress, meeting July 9-19. The guiding resolution read: Considering that the continuation of the Revolution, the con­ solidation of revolutionary conquests, and the further development of class struggle require unity of all revolutionary forces; that these revolutionary forces are only to be found among the masses of workers, soldiers and landless peasants, the Congress finds that it is urgently necessary to organise soviets of workers, soldiers and landless peasants and unite them all in one common organizationThe Latvian Soviet of Workers, Soldiers and Landless Peasants.13

102

THELATVIANIM PACT

This potty directive was acted upon expeditiously—in less than two weeks, on July 29/30, deputies from all Latvia’s major soviets were con* vened in Riga, forming Latvia's Soviet. In Soviet historiography, atm session is known as the First Congress of Latvia's Workers', Soldiers', and Landless Feasant Soviets of Deputies; but in a strict sense, it was the First Plenary session of Latvia's soviets. Sixty-nine delegates partid* pated: the Riga Soviet sent 27 participants, the largest contingent; the Streiki were represented by 8 ; Riga District by 10; CSsis District by 9; Valmiera District by 7; and Valka District by 8 . The assembly was over­ whelmingly Bolshevik and male. Only six Mensheviks from Riga and three women were among the reported delegates. From the debates at the Congress, it appears that two socialist revolutionaries were also present. It was logical for the system of soviets to be crowned by an upper house, as it were. This process was occurring everywhere in Russia, bat nowhere had it reached the “maturity” it had in Latvia: it was the only place where the Bolsheviks controlled the soviets on all levels. The (skolai represented the ultimate centralization of soviets in the nation. In effect, a government of the revolution, one may even say the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat, was being set up. It is also to be noted that the Latvian structure of soviets from the very first included within it the Soviets of Landless Peasants. In Russia, this process was completed only after October. There is no question that the Iskoiat was organized by the party, and once organized. It served as an extension—an administrative arm—of the party. It seems that from the very beginning, the Iskoiat was intended to perform the function of legitimizing socialist power and that, should the occasion arise for takeover of power, it would be done through the Iskoiat. The resolution defining the tasks of the Iskoiat made two main points: that the Iskoiat is needed to act as the chief defender of the interests of the proletariat and as the preparer of the coming socialist revolution. The most dispersed groups of revolutionary democracy must be prepared for that moment when all power will pass into the hands of the Workers, Soldiers, and the Landless Peasant Soviet, so that revolutionary democracy can consolidate the gains of the revo­ lution, to develop it further, and to break up all endeavors to restore the old order.16

The Iskolat Republic

103

But it would be misleading to say that the socialist revolution was the only concern at the Congress. The Congress supported the party’s program wholesale and it was backing the party’s ‘'two tactics” approach to power: through elections and through the soviets. Debate arose whether or not the Congress and Iskolat should support the party’s electoral platform and the lists of candidates. A. ApsFtis(who appears to have been one of the socialist revolutionaries there) noted that in supporting the social demo* cratic lists, they were making the soviet a purely social democratic organ, whereas socialist revolutionaries and non*party members, were also part of the soviet. The vote on the question was 43 for, 3 abstentions, that the Latvian SD electoral platform and lists be supported by the Iskolat.17 Concerning the advisability of promoting the party’s program in the forthcoming elections, an interesting debate arose in reference to the party’s agrarian program which was against the partitioning of baronial lands to the landless peasants, but required that the estates be held intact andoperated as communal properties. K. Ezeriņi noted that: if we shall enter the elections with the Party's agrarian platform we shall not get anywhere, because among the country people the chief demand is for “one’s own comer, one’s own piece of land.” If we promise anything else we shall return home without any votes to show. In the country the workers lack consciousness and therefore we must work out a platform that will be acceptable to them.19 J. Daniievskis rose to combat Ezeriņi* opportunism: We cannot reject our goals and demands, or to mask them in any way. Social Democracy is a specifically working class party. In our opinion, the elections of the Land Council are not just a mere economic struggle, but first and foremost a political struggle, in which the revolutionary working people must in the most dearcut manner distance themselves from the bourgeoisie and related parties... .Therefore our task in the elections is to educate and summon democratic forces around the revolutionary banner of struggle. Therefore we may not omit any demands, nor can our forty slogans be compromised. We would rather return home with­ out votes than retreat from our goals.19

104

THELATVIANIMPACT

Although the Bolsheviks in the Iskolat Congress were committed to the “two tactics** approach and took the electoral process—the possible victory in the parliamentary organs seriously—the whole debate at the Congress was tilted in the direction of the non-parliamentarian soviets and the expectation of takeover of power through the soviets. 0. Kirklint, who, ironically, will most vigorously disagree with the party majority ia November on the resolution to ditch the Vidzeme Land Council, had this to say (at the Iskolat Congress in July) about the role of the soviets: The Soviets are not a transitory phenomenon in Russia*s Revo­ lution, their future role is to crystallize as the organizations of the non-possessing classes, as the parliament of the non-possessing democracy. Through these Soviets, Latvia’s proletariat will dictate its will over Latvia’s future. The Soviets alone can guarantee faD democracy of the parliamentary councils and prepare the elections of the Constituent Assembly. . . .* Kârklini* sentiments appear to have been the sentiments of the great majority at the Congress. The consensus and expectation was that it was incumbent upon the soviets to take over power in Latvia at the first opportunity, when the threat from reaction had been eliminated. A question was raised about Iskolat’s relationship to the Riga Soviet, whidt had been the most powerful one in Latvia, extending its influence to all of Latvia and presuming to speak not only for the unoccupied part of Latvia but, when the occasion arose, also for the occupied one. Karklinf word on this appears to have been the determining one: ...Temporarily both Executive Committees shall exist, both fostering work in common, after that differentiation in functions shall take place and the main leadership shall pass to Latvia's Soviet.21 The Congress also passed two protest motions: one against the pro­ visional government for intending to pay salaries to the police officers of the previous regime,22 the other against the Agrarian Committee of the Vidzeme Land Council for sabotaging the will of the democractic mfWf The Congress invited the population to boycott its activities.22

The Jskolat R epublic

105

Finally, the Congress elected the Iskolat, a twenty-seven member executive board in whose hands, in the absence of the Congress, all de­ cision-making would rest. The Congress left no instructions concerning the internal organization of the Iskolat. The body was solidly Bolshevik, eight being members of the party’s CC. Five were Mensheviks. Thereafter, the activities of the Iskolat fall into three main periods: the organizational phase, July 31 to August 20, the fall of Riga; the waiting phase, August 20 to November 8 ; and the period of ascendancy, November 8 to February 22, 1918. Important milestones in the history of the Iskolat Republic were the November 8/9 session of the soviets plenum when the takeover of power commenced and the Second Congress of Latvia’s Soviets (Latvia's parliament as the Bolsheviks called it) on December 16-18 in Valmiera. The Organizational Phase—July 31 to August 20

The first item on the agenda at the first session of the Iskolat on July 31 was its own designation-the choice of name by which the world would know it. The choice was whether to call it Latvia’s or Vidzeme Soviet. Since Latgale was outside of the soviet's purview, it was argued by some that it would be improper to assume the name of Latvia. On the other hand, to call it the Vidzeme Soviet seemed too narrow. Finally, it was decided to call it Latvia’s Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasant Soviet—in the shortened form, Iskolat. The election of a seven-member Presidium followed next. Otto KIrklini was elected as the chairman; Fr. Unde and Kr. Eliass, as members at large; Kr. Smidts, A. Ribe, and E. Mengele comprised the secretariat; and J. Bērziņi (Andersons) became the treasurer. The plenum of the Iskolat was to meet once a week on Wednesdays at 2:00 P.M.; the Presidium was to hold daily sessions. Eliass was the only Menshevik in the Presidium and Mengele the only female.94 Mengele (as attested to by Krūmiņi at the Second Congress of Soviets), in the capacity of secretary, came to play a crucial role in the Iskolat, holding h together after the flight from Riga. The main hems on the agenda for the July 31 session were: committee set up and the establishment of communications with other soviets and committees in Latvia and elsewhere. From the very beginning it is clear that the Iskolat was budding a

106

THELATVIANIM PACT

parallel committee structure to the one of the Vidzeme Land Cbuncä while, at the same time, it engaged in a vigorous campaign for the forthcoming elections of the Vidzeme Council. On July 31, the Committee of Elections and Agitation was chosen, and on August 1, agrarian, school, juridical, and labor committees were agreed upon. The main commuai, cation links were established with the Riga Soviet and the hkolastiel. The personnel of the two committees was overlapping as it was (see table 9), but, in addition to that, special persons were appointed to sit in on the sessions of the two other executive committees.25 (See table 9). Within the Iskolat itself, it was felt that the new Latvia's soviet was a superfluous organization: there was no room at the top. The revolution had sprouted too many national level councils/organizations. By the time that Iskolat was established, it had to encroach on the territory of other councils. Krūmiņi, reporting to the Second Congress of Latvia's Soviets, the Valmiera Congress put it thus: Many of the tasks that were Iskolat’s were being performed by the Riga Soviet, and they were not quickly transferable to the Iskolat. Shortage of money and personnel already then stood at the cradle of this organization. Everyone remembers what the signifi­ cance of soviets under the Kerensky Government was, when they were allowed to discuss and to decide, but had no right to carry out a decision. Then the soviets were not revolutionary organs but rather clubs of agitation and propaganda. It is interesting to remem­ ber that then some comrades were becoming used to the situation. Even within the Iskolat itself resolutions were introduced asking the soviets only to have a controlling power over administrative organs and serve just as a central organiser of proletarian masses. It was behind the Riga Soviet and the Iskolastrel that the truly revo­ lutionary workers and soldiers stood, those helped the Iskolat during its infancy. From them Iskolat received solid help, financially and ideologically.25 Until the fall of Riga, there were four sessions of the full Iskolat and six meetings of the Presidium. The first meetings of the Iskolat and of the Presidium were devoted mostly to organizational tasks, but from then on, problems of an administrative nature began to be handled, and one gets

The Iskolat Republie

107

the feeling that the Iskolat was serious about gathering up all of the loose ends and lead Latvia towards a socialist republic as quickly as possible. In the approximately three-week period before the fall of Riga, the Iskolat became involved in an amazing array of questions and organized a wide network of communications. The activities in this fust phase, though overlapping, can be grouped under three categories: electoral campaign, Latvia's administration, and the Socialist Republic. Electoral campaign. That Iskolat’s support of the Bolshevik tickets would not be only nominal was seen from the August 1 session of the Presidium, when it was decided to hire a team of propagandists.*7 The first major public pronouncement of the Iskolat was also a document of advocacy of the Bolshevik program and ticket.3* Direct monetary sub­ sidies were also granted to the party for campaign purposes.39 All in all, the management of the elections took up a considerable part of the Iskolat’s debates in this period. The Apgūst 12 shooting incident on the streets of Riga between the Streiki and the troops of the ’’death battalion,” which was thought at the time to have connection with the Riga CHy Council elections on August 13 (though it was mostly for the Riga Soviet to handle) also involved the Iskolat deeply.30 Latvia^ administration. The Bolshevik controlled soviets had been involved in the political and administrative problems of Latvia from the very beginning in March, so it was not difficult (utilizing the already acquired experience) for the Iskolat to immediately establish itself as an organ concerned with Latvia at large, including Latgale. Whatever inter* nationalism the Latvian Bolsheviks possessed, they were also motivated by a strong sense of nationalism and ethnic pride. So, for example, antici­ pating the decree in December on the use of Latvian in Latvia’s admini­ stration, the minutes record a complaint by the Iskolat that the Riga electoral lists were sent out in the Russian language alone.31 Other examples of the Iskolat’s concern for Latvia’s administration were: 1. The Iskolat backed Iskolastrel’s decision to object to the Army’s intention to move the Latvian Streiki outside of Riga,31 which the Bolsheviks considered a counterrevolutionary move. 2. On August 3, the Iskolat passed a resolution to support Iskolastrel’s protest against the reinstitution of the death penalty. Two Iskolat representatives were delegated to the Iskolastrel’s Information

108

r a E L A T V IA N ^ TABLE 9

MEMBERSHIP OF ISKOLAT (July 30 to Februaiy 20.1918) Elected July 30

Active in Iskolat Sept. 10 to Nov. 8

Linde. Fr. DaniSevskis Menders (Menshevik) Vilumsone, Anna X Eferts X Ērglis Eiche Ribe X Mengele X Andersons (Berzins) Zeibots (Menshevik) Endrups Karklinl, O. X Kalninf, P. (Menshevik) Kurievics Vilks. H. Peterss X Kroders Smidts, K. X Eliass (Menshevik) Rocēns X JGrmainieks Ozols. K. Vilks, J. X Kauliņi, K. X Bērce Krūmiņi X Miezis Lidaks Jurovs

Elected Dec. 18

X X

X

Age

Membership fa other soviets

25 33 32 23 28 34 27

P RC Rnon-B P LP

31

C RLnon-B RC LC Rnon-B LRnon-B P C L L R non-B

26

P

42 23 39 33 45 43 25 31 57

X

X X X X

C 1

24 26 27 23 23 26

PCIL PC C PL P 1

fto iskolai Republic Elected luly 30

109

Active in Iskolet Elected Age Sept. 10 to Nov. 8 Dec. 18 Strazdiņi Krievini, A. Valdmanis, J. Sams, M. Katnini, A. Vigants Svilis Tiesnieks Ozols, J. Birzgals Zile Birkenfelds Zaķis Spalva Asare Zirnis Ozoliņi Oguls Lācis, A. Ptiišs Baltājs Radziņi Markuss Sudurs Ercums Beldaus Bajārs Zvejnieks JSkabsons Brünns Viksnini Samsons EgITtis, R.

27

Membenhip in other soviets

25

S R S non-B

25

L

23

X

X

36 32 23 24 23

S. SL S SL

23 26

PS

35 30

s

s SP

s 27

SP

27

s s

24

p

X

X X

s 26 32 36

PSC PS PS

THELATVIANIM PACT

110 Elected July 30

Active in Iskolat Sept. 10 to Nov. 8

Tomaievičs Karklinž, R. Added on Nov. 8 Rozinš (Āzis) Draudinl Seržants Gailis

Elected Age Dec. 18

X X X X Bauze Podnieks MežinS

Membeidilpin other soviet*

27 24

P

47 27 24 29

C 1 1C

22

LC C

23 31

PC

Zandreiters, E. 32 Jansons 30 Dombrovskis Gerke 51 Strauss

C -C entral Com m ittee o f th e Party I-Iskolastrel L -S o v iet o f Landless Feasants P—Member o f Party’s Regional Committee R —Riga Soviet

C P I

P*/skoht Republic TABLE 10

MEMBERSHIP OF LATVIAN SOVIET The Second Soviet December 18

Tfce First Soviet July 29

From the Streiki Üdiis, V.

Bninenieks, P. Jēkabsons Migla Lācis Strauss Gristole

Kaktiņi, P»

Karss, N. Rocēns,J. Ērglis Ribe,A.

Skuja, A. Beigs, K* From Riga Biche, R. $midts,E. Kalnini, fi. Krievinî,A. Kirkiini,0 .

Vilks, R Jūrmalnieks, J. Lācis, A. Smidts, K. Bērziņi, J. Zeibots, A. Kalnini, N. Menders, Fr. Kroders, J, Salins

Silfs

^fievskis,J.

THE LATVIAN

112

TABLE 10 (Continued) MEMBERSHIP OF LATVIA'S SOVIET The Firs! Soviet July 29

The Second Soviet December 18 From Riga

Skranda* K. Peterss,J. KalninI, P. Eliass, Kr. KrastinS Krūmiņi ViksninI Labuls Endrups Vilks, J. From Riga District šmidts, K. Spriga Zelmans Preiss Redlichs

Kalnini, V. Jirgensons Rozenbergs Peles Kalnini, M. filaubergs, V. Sams, M. ErzinI, K. Zalitis,J. Nicmane, Vera From Cesis District Vilumsone, A. Calvin!, E. Gailis, J.

Vilks, J. Gailis, K. Ozols, K,

The Iskolat Republic

113 TABLE 10 (Continued)

MEMBERSHIP OF LATVIA’S SOVIET The Second Soviet December 18

The First Soviet July 29

From Cēsis District Continued Vigants,J. Ozols, K. Kauliņi, K. Apsitis, A. Brandts, P. Namnieks, T.

Ozoliņi, A. Gerke, A. KSrklini, O. Viksne, B. Kalnini, A. Ustups, P. Mengels, A. Brandts, P. Silarajs Gerke, J. Jaunozolini Galvini, E. Avotiņi, P. Putens Dombrovskis Mezini From Valmiera District

Vilks, J. Lapini, R. Birzgals,P, Tiesnieks, V. Asare, Marta Ratnieks, E. Lide

Kauliņi, K. Seržants Ozoliņi Birzgals Ozols, J. Miezis, A. Simeons Jansons

THELATVIANIM Pacî

114

TABLE 10 (Continued) MEMBERSHIP OF LATVIA’S SOVIET The Second Soviet December IS

The First Soviet July 29 From Valmiera District Continued

Ratnieks Krievinš, A. LtepinS Mežgals Vārpa Janels Zirnis From Valka District Vevers, A. Birkenfelds, J. Jurevskis, P. KripSns, J. Kirchenfteins, R. Strazdiņš, K. Zile.J. BundzSns, Ed:

Rozinš Viliumsons Krūmiņš Surovskis Bauze Zeltiņš Rozits ZakJs Eferts Lidaks Viksninš Eglits Samsons Mangus Tomaševics Zīle

115

n u r Iskotat Republic

TABLE 10 (Continued) MEMBERSHIP OF LATVIA'S SOVIET The Second Soviet December 18

The First Soviet July 29 From XII Army Trench Diggers Soviet

Allens DiUe Beldaus Zvejnieks LapinS, K. lads, A. Brivuls, J. Gerbets, N. Pitakis

116

THELATVIANIM PACT

Committee that was established to collect information on counter* revolutionary moves in Latvia»39 3 . Upon learning that the Vidzeme Commissar had established i Land Commissiriate, the Iskolat decided to request seats on it.1 32* 4. Hie ongoing agrarian transformation in Latvia's countryside excited the Iskolat’s interest from the Erst session on. 5. The food question was another sizable item on the agenda.31 6. Brought to its attention, nothing appears to have been too snuB a matter for the Iskolat to become involved. For example, it «at decided to send a representative to Valka to inquire and, if possible, settle a labor dispute between management and workers in Streati insane asylum.36 All of these links of communication and administrative structure were cut short by the German attack on August 20. Socialist revolution. From the time of the V Party Congress in July, there seems to be no doubt in the minds of the Latvian Bolsheviks that Latvia was not only at the doorstep of socialist revolution but that b was already within it. They were so fearful of the possibility of a reaction against them coming from Kerensky, or some other dark force in Russia, that they never specifically or openly addressed this question; but their actions, it seems, spoke clearer than words. This question has been disr cussed In other chapters of the book; here, suffice it to note some inci* dents and decisions that would indicate this heightened attitude and confidence. 1. The Iskolat resolved to arrest journalist A. TupiitS who was servi#

in the Streiki units and was writing vitriolic anti-Bolshevik articles” 2. The Iskolat interceded in Iskoborsov’s (the executive committee of the soviet of the Northeast region) attempt to discuss the ques­ tion of confiscation of baronial estates with the Vidzeme Land Council. Chairman KSrklinf informed the iskoborsov that Iskolat is boycotting the Agrarian Land Committee and, therefore, it is improper for them to discuss the question with the Vidzeme Land Council. The Iskolat delegated Vilks to Pskov to explain the con­ fiscation policy to the Iskoborsov.38 3. In principle, the Iskolat was in favor of confiscation of estates.38

The Jskokt Republic

117

4. It fostered contacts with other revolutionary centers in Russia and planned to send its representative along with a delegation of Streiki to Petrograd to inform the capital of events in Latvia.40 5. The Iskolat condemned the Stockholm conference and called for a new International.41 August 20 to November? The German assault and the ensuing flight from Riga not only damaged the Iskolat, it almost destroyed it. Only because of the strength of the Bolshevik organization network in Vidzeme countryside was the Iskolat able to reassemble and carry on. At the Second Congress of Latvia's Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasants, December 16, Krūmiņi char­ acterized this period thus: On August 20*21 red Riga fell. Everyone knows how that affec* ted all Latvian democratic organizations. The situation was such that even the most cowardly counterrevolutionaries from the Peasant Union party were not afraid to raise their voices "in the name of the people.” The support of Riga's proletariat and of soldiers was lost. . . . Iskolastrel had to search for several weeks just to take a count of the scattered troops. Iskolat had lost threefold: the support of the regi­ ments was lost, and lost were financial support and leadership cadres. . . . This period, like a dark fiend, will remain in the memory of Latvia's proletariat. During this period the whole activity of the Iskolat was centered around comrade Mengcte, our secretary. With great difficulty the Iskolat was able to find a couple of propagan­ dists, Comrades Lācis and Viksna and later Samsons. The District Soviets.. .were incapacitated and Cēsis Soviet, owing to war condi­ tions, was completely paralysed. Herein we must search for the reasons why the Iskolat, during the Kornilov affair, could do no more than issue resolutions. Nobody took the Iskolat seriously. The military authorities ignored our certificates, and even the Iskosol did not recognize us. But regardless of all that-meetings were called and the Executive Committee was replenished with new members.43

HS

THELATVIANIM PACT

Alter the retreat, the first meeting of the Latvia's Soviet was to tike place in Valmiera, September 10, when the intention was to call a plenum of the whole soviet, but since only eleven members of the Iskolat and seventeen others arrived—not enough for a quorum—the meeting ms called an enlarged session of the Iskolat.49 Most of the distinguished Latvian Bolsheviks were missing at this meeting because they were ordered (some did it by choice) to stay back in Riga for underground work, in order to promote revolution on the German side. The flight also dimi* nated the little influence that Mensheviks had during the Iskolat’s Riga phase. The party, in general, and the Iskolat, in particular, during the autumn of 1917, was lead by relatively “new” men: Jēkabs Peterss.Olto KārktinS, J. Vilks, J. KrQminS, and K. Seržants. Although these ,4ncw" men had been party members before 1917, they made their name during the fall of 1917. The leaders who had distinguished themselves duringthe first half of the year, like J. Daniievskis and J. Lencmanis, had stayed behind. To help the “new” men on the Russian side, there was P. Stučka and J. Berzini-Ziemelis, but they were in Petrograd. At the very end of this period, F. RozinS-Azis, one of the true veterans of the Social Demo* cratlc movement in Latvia, arrived in Vidzeme from America. But his name is associated more with the next phase, the period of Iskolat’s ascendancy after November 7. During the next two months until November 7, the Iskolat held five sessions (September 10 and 22 , October 14 and IS, and November l).44 None of these meetings could, in any sense, be called sessions of the IskoJat, because none had a quorum, nor could they be called sessions of the Presidium since most elected Presidium members were absent, with the exception of Chairman Klrkinl and Secretary E. Mengele. The Bolshevik method of co-optation was the way in which the Iskolat replenished itself and even with that the Iskolat was barely holding its own through­ out this period. It basically performed the function of an overseer and a collector of information from localities, rather than one of revolutionary action. The feverish preparations for insurrection that we see within (he party itself and the Iskolastrel at this time were not seen within the Iskolat, although it was in full communication with the party CC. Even the session of November 1 did not reflect the insurrectionary spirit. After the elections on August 20, the Vidzeme Land Council had come under Bolshevik control and so, from the administrative viewpoint (even in a

The Iskolat Republic

119

truer sense than in Riga), Iskolat in Vidzeme was a superfluous orgāni* ration, After the liberals left the Vidzeme Land Council, there was no question that the Bolsheviks in Vidzeme were able to do pretty much what they wanted—they had the votes—and, consequently, some Bolshe­ viks considered the option of proclaiming state power through the Land Council, rather than the Soviets. So the Iskolat, decimated in member­ ship, with no sources of money, still in search of purpose, and while the issue of power was being decided, only minimally performed the originally intended functions. The most interesting aspect in the Iskolat’s minutes of this period are the reports from the localities, the assessments of revolutionary activities in the districts, towns, and pagasts. These reports were very guarded,and perhaps—ir view of the Bolshevik electoral success—too pessimistic. Break­ down of communications and shortage of personnel was a constant com­ plaint in these reports. (See Tables 9 & 10 for Iskolat activists of this period.) The Iskolat Republic—November 8 to December 18 The November 8/9 session was the most important one in the history of the Iskolat, because for all practical purposes, the decisions at this session determined the whole course of Iskolat’s activities to follow. The Bolshevik resolutions ceased to be mere theoretical formulations and began to have practical application. It was a watershed. From that time onward, we can begin to speak of the Iskolat Republic—Latvia’s first socialist government. What the Paris Commune is for France, the Iskolat Republic is for Latvia. On a certain level, nothing traumatic or abrupt happened on this date, and perhaps the participants did not even realize the momentousness of the event or its historical irreversibility at the time. The Bolsheviks invariably thought of their program as a concrete, practical plan of action. In the Iskolat's documents, this session is called a meeting of Latvia’s Soviet (with about twenty-five members being present), which, even for the circumstances, was hardly enough to make up a quorum. But regardless of what this meeting was-an ad hoc meeting of Latvia’s leading Bolsheviks or of a soviet-out of this session issued the structure and content of a socialist state—Latvia’s Commune. This session did not impart ultimate legitimacy-only a full Congress

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THELATVIANIM PACT

of Soviet Deputies from localities could do that, and it met on December 16*18, 1917. Some aspects of pre-November pluralism persisted onto Congress convened, which, in a way, eliminated all the vestiges of non­ soviet administrative forms, establishing a full dictatorship of the pro­ letariat. Gradualism and moderation are, perhaps, the words with which to best describe (at least in the initial stage) the policies of Latvia's commune. As noted elsewhere, there were no longer any significant anti-Bolslicvik forces left in Latvia, and the administrative structure of Latvia had been basically under their control since the summer of 1917. Reading the non-Bolshevflc press during the early weeks after November 9, one gets the feeling that there has not been any shift In power at all. In a sense, the non-Bolsheviks did not take the Bolshevik déclaration very seriously. There were no barricades to be stormed in November of 1917 in Vidzeme. The Latvian liberals had been almost literally chased fromthe sod of Latvia and had retreated to Petrograd where they had organized Latvia's Temporary National Councd. The Iskosol (the executive com­ mittee of the XII Army Soviet), the last non-Bolshevik holdout in Vid­ zeme was being Bolshevized by the Latvian Streiki and S. Nachimson during the very same early November days. Consequently, the situation was substantially different for Latvian Bolsheviks than It was for the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. In Latvia, the Bolsheviks had a surfeit of choicer by controlling all of the soviets, as well as all of the parliamentarian coundls, the Bolsheviks were put in the embarrassing position of making an insurrection against themselves. Although the Latvian Bolsheviks were quite aware that they had a defacto control of Latvia, they took the position that the fate of the revolution in Latvia was connected with that in Russia and that an in­ dependent Latvian socialist republic was a foolish dream because of the international realities. This Realistic" assessment was at the basis of the Latvian Bolshevic nationality policy and the reason why they refrained from publically declaring their power in Latvia until November. The so-called "insurrection" in Petrograd in October removed this obstacle. The Latvian Bolsheviks were finally free to move. An important moment at the November 8 session was the report of Otto KIifcliM, who had been a delegate to the Second All Russian Con­ gress of Soviets bi Petrograd. He gave an account of conditions in the

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capital. M Our task is to decide the question of power/* Kārklini stated.45 The meeting of November 8 began with reports from localities, the four districts of unoccupied Vidzeme-Valka, Cēsis, Valmiera, and Riga. The reporter from Valka noted that activism in their district was not of very high order. “Work there is impeded by large distances from the center___The influence of landless peasants on the life of the pagasts is minima).**46 The speaker from the Valmiera district noted that the landless peasants in his district were “wilting and exhausted.*' But, as pertaining to cities, the opposite is true: “Activity is very vigorous and the influence of Soviets on masses very high." “The baronial estates are surveyed anjl confiscated. The District Land Council is very active.**47 The minutes from the Cēsis district are very pithy: “The majority of pagasts are under the influence of the Soviets of landless peasants.** The Riga district reported that because of the frontline conditions prevailing there, the situation was dismal and that there was practically no orgāni* zation whatsoever.44 Alter a short debate on the reports from localities, the floor (having completed its agenda) was turned over to Fricis Rozini-Azis, a revolution­ ary veteran (and who had just returned from the United States). From this time onward until the end of the Republic, Rozini* name is closely associated with the Iskolat in that he served as its chairman during that period. In the address to the soviet on November 8 , Rozini made the following main points: that he had hurried back to “add his little muscle to the big job.** That he is only able to work as a theorist and herein is the question, whether in a time of deeds, a theorist has any role to play. The task of science is not to provide any unshakeable truths, but to formulate in a clear language what we all, more or less, clearly feel, what we suffer, and what we desire. In this way a scientific formula links us all in a chain, it binds together the souls of one class, and in that way it creates one general and dear con­ scious will and gives to the movement an unbreakable power. In this sense, theory, even at the most heated moment of struggle, has practical meaning.. . . One of the most significant truths which the earlier revolutions have left to us is that the working class cannot simply take over and use for its purposes the state machinery created by the

122

THE LATVIAN IMPACT bourgeoisie,. . .O nly th e Soviets can serve th e interests of the pro­ letariat. The sorrow Is only th at in Russia, th e Soviet government needs to be constructed from above and n o t from below as it wash Latvia in 1 9 0 5 ... .B ecause o f th a t, the decisions and laws of the Soviet Government are sabotaged. . . . In general, th e overarching task o f the m om ent is to break sabo­ tage most expeditiously and decisively. The cawing o f crows and the tears o f crocodiles about th e dangers o f civil war are out of place. A civil war in which the masses overpow er their suppressors and their lackeys is the only ju st and holy w ar.49

Next followed O tto K ārklini’ report about Petrograd, the Second AllRussian Congress o f Soviets, and post-insurrectionary conditions there. He noted that the capital was in “com plete order.** “Looting has been completely eliminated. The w orkers have organized an army of sboa 40,000 men (the Red Guards) to fight counterrevolution. On the workers' side, everything has been done to elim inate bloodshed.**50 The main item on the m eeting's agenda read : “The Future o f the Soviet in relation to the present m om ent (considering its relationship to the central power, local self-adm inistration, m ilitia, Commissariate agiarhi question, and the control o f industry).** Translated Into the vernacubr, the debate on this issue would decide th e question o f power in Latvia; but to understand the issue from the Latvian circum stances, it is important to note that the resolution is put as an am biguous question. In reality, there was no ambiguity in the minds o f th e Latvian Bolsheviks on the question o f power: the am biguity derived from an embarrassment of riches. How do you really go about declaring th e takeover o f power when, in essence, you already have power? This was the question that the Latvians had to decide upon. Otto KarklinS, who reported on the question, approached the problem thus: Analyzing the conditions in localities, we see th at the absence of industrial proletariat is very much felt. The m ost active element in the revolution are the Streiki. The movement o f the landless peasants is not very intensive. The task o f the revolutionary workers is to make the movement deeper thus gaining fu rth er accomplishments.

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Considering the above, next comes the puzzling (at least puzzling to those who have learned about the Bolshevik Revolution from Petrograd alone) statement: The power can be taken by either the Latvian Soviet of Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasants Deputies or by the Vidzeme Land Council. In view of this dual possibility (a question that could not arise for Petrograd Leninists), we can now understand the somewhat pessimistic tone that KirkUnS gave in the beginning of his report. He continues: We must weigh this question thoroughly, we must know whether we are sufficiently strong for a takeover of power and carrying out the urgent tasks. In order to rule, we must have an immense amount of creative forces.. . . Our task is to decide the question o f pow er,91 In the heated debate to follow, basically, two lines of argument were taken (neither being against the takeover of power as was the case in Petrograd): 1) the orthodox Leninist line, that all power must be taken by the soviets-defended by Vilks, Lacis, Seržants, Zaķis, and KrOmini; and 2) that power must remain within the Vidzeme Land Council—argued by Klrklmï himself, Draudinf, and Sams. A third alternative was taken by Eglits who thought that power must grow out of both organs/ 1 The basic difficulty in which the Latvian Bolsheviks found themselves was that, by the fall of 1917, they were very experienced in governmentif not politics as well—and, like KSrklinš, who had worked in the Land Council since its inception, they knew how much it took to set up a committee system and an administrative structure. The ensuing argu­ ment, it seems, concerned the value of the administrative structure that the Vidzeme Land Council had created. KārklinS fought to the last for his position, and in the final statement, he relied on a resolution from the V Party Congress which had stated that both organs must work In tan* dem—the Iskolat deciding the official line.0 The vote went against KārklinS. In a close vote, the orthodox Leninist won: 12 for, 3 against, and 10 abstentions.14 The resolution was a simple document: more like a statement congratu­ lating the Petrograd government than one asserting power in Latvia. That

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in itself may indicate certain compromising attempts within the confer, ence, an attempt to avoid a split. There was no doubt that the soviet power, without coalitions, must be supported to the maximum. The important part of the statement read; “Power undivided must be in the hands of the working people themselves-in the Soviet of Deputies.“ Latvia’s Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Pleasant Soviet of Deputies, liquidating the old adminlstrative forms, taking over power in Latvia, is sending friendly greetings to the revolutionary Soviet Government (the Peoples’ Commissars) and the Central Soviet Executive Committee and promises with all its might and means to support it in its difficult struggle.5* The resolution ends with an optimistic salutation to the internatM revolution to follow. What happened thereafter is very difficult to reconstruct, for to alarge degree the activities of the Iskolat were at variance with the debates at the November 8/9 conference and the accepted resolution. 0. Kiikltnl re­ signed the chairmanship, presumably in protest against the decisions of the conference, but he did not leave the Iskolat. He continued to be one of its chief spokesmen until the end. The resolution spoke of the Iskolat’s takeover of power, but the only main organs of administration that were taken over in toto were the Commissariates of Vidzeme andthe four districts. The Vidzeme, the district Land Council, and the city councils were allowed to continue. To be sure, there was a new relation­ ship established between the Iskolat and these so-called “parliamentary” councils-the Iskolat considered them as mere administrative extensions of itself—but from the outside, this new relationship may not have been obvious. Until the December 16/18 Congress, the basic thrust of the Iskolat was to take complete control of the purse strings of Latvia. Whether or not there was a blueprint anticipating the dismissal of the parliamentary councils cannot be ascertained from the available evidence. But even then, alter the December Congress, fitting the moderate temper of the Latvian Iskolat Bolsheviks, they wanted to keep the committee structure intact.

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The second historically important decision at the November 8/9 session was to continue, accelerate, and systematize the confiscation of baronial estates. A special committee, consisting of Rozīni, Vilks, Eglitis, Eferts, and Seržants, was selected to review the situation, gather up all materials pertaining to the baronial estates, and work out a plan of confiscation of the estates and other properties.* The third major decision that was loudly proclaimed at the time, but had little immediate consequence, was a resolution to organize the Red Guards in imitation of the civilian militia detachments in Petrograd. The Red Guards in Latvia were to be the army of the people that would take over the defense of the country after the demobilization of the old army.*7 The Red Guards never fully caught on in Latvia, although detach­ ments were established in most localities.* To replenish Iskolat’s membership, Rozini, Drauding, Seržants, Lidaks, and Gailis were voted on the roster. At this point, the Iskolat consisted of the following active members: Seržants, Mengele, Vflcsnini, Beidaus, Vilks, Krūmiņš, Lācis, RozinS-Äzis, Eferts, Ozoliņi, Smidts, Lidaks, Samsons, O. Kārklini, Draudinl, and Gailis. The membership in this period until the December Congress, judging from the minutes, was fluctuating-some disappear, others are added. Of the members elected at the July 29 Congress, still active were l)Mengele,2) Vilks, 3)Krūmini/ Kārklini, 4) Eferts, 5) Smidts, and 6 ) Vilumsone.** Others in attendance were: 7) Seržants, 8) Viksnins, 9) Beldaus, 10) Lācis, 11) Rozinl-Äzis, 12) Ozoliņi, 13) Lidaks, 14) Samsons, 16) Zvejnieks, 17) Draudinš, 18) Tomaševics, 19) Gailis, 20) Zariņi, 21) Valeskalns, 21) Svirksts, 22) Kalnini, 23) Jēkabsons, 24) Krēsliņa, 25) Mežinš, 26) Zaķis, 27) R. Kārk­ lini, 28) Strauss, 29) Manguss, and 30) Petersons. The very evening of the day when the general session of the soviet ended (November 9) Iskolat met and started to plan the transition of power. The meeting was attended by Rozini-Āzis, Krūmiņi, Draudinl, Seržants, Lācis, Vilks, Meņģele, Lidaks, and Eferts. The nine-person board in this session made the following decisions; 1. Elected the Presidium: Chairman: Rozini-Âzis; Vice-Chairmen:

Krūmiņi and Seržants; Secretariat: Vilks, Meņģele, Draudini; and Treasurer: Šmidts. 2. Upon Draudinf suggestion, an Information Bureau was organized that would care for Iskolat1!2 publicity.

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THELATVIANMPACî

3* A salary of 2S0 rubles was set for permanent members of theF%j. diumand the propagandists.40 4. Graudiņi was entrusted with setting up the plans for the oiptj. zationofthe Red Guards. 5. To coordinate the activities with the Revolutionary War Commitiet. Gailis was delegated to Cēsis and Valmiera, and KrGminS to Va&j. 6. The takeover of the Commissariats was planned. The board decided to create a liquidation committee consisting of five members: i«o from the Iskolat, two from the Vidzeme Land Council, and one neutral41 7. The lskolafs Agrarian Committee was asked to consult with allcur rent and previous agrarian committees and knowledgeable personsn preparation for the working out of the plan of confiscation. 8. They decided to establish communications with Latgale. It wu noted that Latgale soviet recently had become Bobhcvik, making communications possible. 9. The work schedule of the Iskolat was to be as follows: Presidium meetings every day at noon; full Iskolat every Saturday at 4:00 PAI.M It was one thing to claim supreme power in Latvia, but it was quite another to establish it. Although the Iskolat did not encounter any major force of resistance, the transfer of power was not automatic. On the first day of work, the Iskolat discovered that power will come to themonly through rigorous and persistent work. As the old administrative apparatus was liquidated, more and more duties began to pile up on the bkolat's shoulders. All of a sudden the bkotat became responsible for everything: police, courts, schools, welfare of soldiers* widows, and sanitation, etc Hie highest priority was to obtain money to meet the salary demands not only of the bkobt*s own apparatus but the whole administrativ police, and educational structure. Inasmuch as the Bolsheviks had committed themselves to a gradual takeover, eschewing the use of weapons, they found the process muck slower than first anticipated. Deadlines became expandable and nothing' as the Jskolafs minutes show-seems to have progressed as quickly as they had hoped. The problem was not the takeover itself, though occasionally they did encounter some recalcitrant administrator or council, but a takeover in a manner that would not disturb regular administrative routine,

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meaning the flow of cash into Iskolat's treasury. One complicating factor in the takeover of power was that the Latvians had some provincial offices in common with Estonians, and those were located in Tartu. At the November 11 session of the Iskolat, Krūmiņi reported on the progress of the takeover: The elected Commission [of transition] has met twice in order to clarify the technical side of the takeover of the Commissariats. When the representative from the Iskolat arrived in the Vidzeme Land Council, read the resolution and asked the Council to elect two of their representatives to the Commission, a big debate broke out, in which it was emphasised thit, when taking over the functions of the old institutions, no great disruptions should occur. The district Commissariats do not have any money to take over. The matter is a very complicated one at the Provincial Commissar level. All the committees in the commissariat are very undemo* cratic. To date, the Commissars have had a great number of respon* sibilities-such as providing for the refugees, soldiers* wives, etc. After the takeover, all of that will become a responsibility of the Land Council. The liquidation must be completed immediately. We must send them a definitive statement, setting forth the rules on the basis of which they must surrender their power.0 In Krūmiņi' statement, especially to be noted is the function that the Vidzeme Land Council was to play in the takeover. In a somewhat dis* jointed way, many of the problems of takeover are touched upon by Šmidts in a comment to Krūmiņi* report: What concerns the Riga District Commissariat, it is temporarily dependent on the Cēsis Commissar. To have the Vidzeme Land Council take over all those matters is not simple, for example, the Landrat collegium, the refugee aid, etc. We must cooperate with the Estonian Revolutionary Committee The next sentence in šmidts* comment about the Iskolat's relationship to the Vidzeme Land Council is especially interesting:

128

THELATVIANIM PACT Latvia’s Soviet has a large task in order to have Vidzeme Land Council take over all functions under its (Iskolat’s| control.

The relationship that is envisioned here is that Iskolat will control everçthing, but that the Vidzeme Land Council, through its admintoratm structure, will administer it.** Smidts continues: We must assume financial responsibilities. Commissars are re­ questing certificates, documents that would justify the lakeom, because they are worried that someday they may be held respon­ sible. The only monies that we, at the moment, could get are police funds. It is known that the mayor of Valka has approximately 5000 rubles, the one of Valmiera about 18000 rubles.65 Money came to be regarded as the crucial element in the control of power. The November 11 minutes records the following: Debate arose as to what to do should we run out of funds, which is foreseeable in the near future. If larger sums are not forthcoming in the near future, then the Land Council, with the takeover of power, will get into an embarrassing situation because it will not be able to satisfy the demands of the masses. It is possible that the latter may rise against us. Latvia’s Soviet must do the utmost to secure funds.66 On November 11 the following decisions concerning transition of power were made: 1. To publish the declaration concerning the takeover of Commit*

sariates. 2. To send deputies to the Estonian War Revolutionary Committee. 3. To notify the Central Executive Committee (in Petrograd) about Iskolat’s activities, requesting that all monies previously sent to the Commissariates be sent to Iskolat. 4. To request that all military staffs order railroad workers to obey the Iskolat. 5. To disperse all councils in Valka that are not supported by masses.

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6 . To have all police funds appropriated. Vilks and Viksnini, taking

along two representatives from the War Revolutionary Council, were deputized to go to the mayor of Valka and demand the sur­ render of police funds. The task of obtaining the police funds from the Valmiera treasury was entrusted to the Valmiera soviet. 7. To take steps to have the XU Army War Revolutionary Committee transferred to Valka.67 There appears to have been no trouble whatsoever about the take­ over of Commissariats-they surrendered their power without resistance and undue delays. In the November 15 session. KruminS reported that so far only Valka District Commissariat had been taken over and that the takeover of Vidzeme Commissariat was set for November 18. He also re­ ported that (and this is one of the examples of the problems that the Iskolat incurred by the takeover) by having taken over the Valka Com­ missariat, they had inherited a 1100 ruble debt for service workers* sal­ aries.68 The greatest difficulties the Iskolat encountered were with the city councils and mayors. But in due time, they, too, came around. By November 20 even the more recalcitrant city mayors seem to have been undercut, and the funds began to flow into Iskolat. Valmiera, being Bolshevized long before November, surrendered without any resistance.66 By November 20, the mayor of Cēsis, who at first had refused to surrender funds to Iskolat, began to buckle and 3000 out of 12000 rubles had al­ ready been turned over.70 By November 27, the recalcitrant mayor of Valka had also surrendered.71 On November 22, Iskolat’s budget was worked out and put at about 31JOOOrubles monthly. That amount was to be obtained from the Vid­ zeme districts, 10000 rubles a month from each.72 By the end of November, the Iskolat had obtained complete control over the Vidzeme administration and was in charge of distributing its considerable payroll. At the same time, it must be noted that the Iskolat Republic was not as yet a totally centralized state: numerous local needs were met by localities themselves—theoreticaUy, it was the local soviets that had the responsi­ bility. As the Bolshevik grip on Vidzeme*s administration began to tighten, so did their control over the political opposition. During the first couple of weeks after November 9, the opposition press hardly noticed (or

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THELATVIANIM PACT

perhaps they did not want to notice) that the Bolsheviks were taking over for good. To a certain degree, the non-Bolsheviks had made the transition of power easy for the Bolsheviks. Although some liberals were still active in some other subcommittees of the Vidzeme Land Council, they had left the Land Council itself in protest already in mid-October of 1917. Within the Vidzeme Land Council, the only non-Bolsheviks left were a couple of Mensheviks who had been elected on the Social Democratic ticket, but they comprised only a picayune minority with no chance of winning a vote. Within the next months, even they were excluded from all the public forums unless they decided to join in with the Bolsheviks«13 During November/December, the Mensheviks, especially those who had been elected on the same ticket with the Bolsheviks, were still given one chance to continue in the council, which the Liberalswere not. In the beginning, the use of force by the Iskolat was minimal, forone, perhaps because outside of the town militias, it did not have a force ofits own. The Iskolat had to rely on the Iskolastrel and the Streiki. To over­ come this deficiency, the November 9 session decided to organize Red Guards, which was a long-range project necessitating arms and training. Though Red Guard detachments, consisting of men and women, weit established in most pagasts and towns, their efficacy as a reliable force was not great. On November 20, the Iskolat began its largest undertaking: confis­ cation of baronial estates.1* By and large, the estate owners and their stewards submitted to the confiscation without much resistance-in cases of need, it was the Streiki who stood behind the Iskolat.15 On November 27, taking the Council of Peoples* Commissars decree on courts as a guide, the Iskolat decided to organize revolutionary courts and a tribunal in Latvia. Tomaievics and Eferts were elected to the steer­ ing committee. All district soviets were asked to carry out the decree of courts, and the Iskolat itself was to organize the Revolutionary Tribunal.11 To institutionalize the decree, Iskolat called ajoint meeting for December 3 in Valka to be attended by the juridical committees of Iskolastrel, Vidzeme Land Council, and representatives from Iskosol, Iskolat and district soviets.11 On December 4, the Iskolat decided to establish revo­ lutionary tribunals in each district separately.18 But in a sense, revolutionary justice existed before the establishment

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of courts: In the press we find occasional mention that persons have been arrested or detained by some local soviet or Iskolat itself for theft, making of somogonk, disobedience of Iskolat*s decrees.* On December 1, the Iskolat elected an investigatory committee to look into those cases that later would be given to the Revolutionary Tribunal for judgment.80 The first case tried by a revolutionary court is noted in the Iskolat*s Presidium meeting of December 8 . TomaSevics reports about three men who have been sent to us by Ope Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasant Soviet for having agitated against the Soviets and for spreading gossip. After examin­ ing the case, it was teamed that altogether five had been arrested but two, having confessed, were tried by a Revolutionary Court and assessed 100 rubles each.01 As time passed, Iskolat's attitude towards political opposition began to stiffen. The attitude towards the Peasant Union party during this early period was condemnatory without necessarily zeroing in on any individual or issue. The liberals had withdrawn from the common forums with the Bolsheviks, and so there was no room for specific conflicts. The three important anti-Bolshevik newspapers, Lidums, Laika rtstis, and Strādnieku avize, the organs of the Peasant Union, Latvian Soldiers* National Union, and the Latvian Mensheviks, respectively, continued to come out. The first strictly political attack came against V. Bastjānis, a Menshevik, who having been elected on the joint Socialdemocratic ticket, was still active in November in the Vidzeme Land Council, making vociferous antiBolshevik, speeches. For his recalcitrance, he was deprived of his party membership and removed from the Land Council.02 The big move against the political opposition came on December 5 when Līdums and Laika vēstis were closed.01 The furor that was created by the closing of the two newspapers perhaps prolonged the life of Strādnieku avise. It was closed on January 20, 1918. On December 22 , it was decided to liquidate the Temporary National Council, which up to that date had been the nucleus of opposition against the Bolsheviks.04 From that time on, there was little in terms of organized political opposition left in Latvia. In some ways, the Litvian Bolshevik opposition was safer in Russia, in Petrograd and Moscow (for at least during the initial months of Bolshevik power).

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the chaos there was greater. But even inside Russia t !skolat*s long arm occasionally reached them. The editors of L idu m s . after its closing, traveled to Moscow and started a new newspaper—Gaisma. As soon ai (skolat heard about it, they telegraphed the Moscow Soviet and asked them to liquidate Gaisma, which was promptly done.** Krūmiņš, reporting at the Second Congress of Soviets, summed up the Jskolat's activities in its early phase thus:

| I

The October Revolution, which the Iskolat supported from the first moment, suddenly changed the circumstances of Latvia’s Soviet of Workers, Soldiers and Landless Fea$ants-it became the organ of power. Thousands of tasks suddenly confront the Soviet. The masses of people were moved by a new energy, will and self motivation. . . . The main questions before the Iskolat were questions of power and agrarian affairs.. . . The Commissariat of the Provisional Govern­ ment was liquidated. Wc took many measures to improve the condition of the workers: we solved workers* problems as they arose in conjunction with demobilization in a practical manner. Also the judiciary question is on the agenda, and every day we had to pass on such questions as the protests of stewards of estates whom the landless peasants had arrested, or black marketeers. The landless peasants always came to us, and not only the landless peasants; all classes came to us—the merchants and the enterpreneurs etc.-they too were obligated to come to us for clarification of policy. Our activities, quite naturally, could not be without misunderstandings with one or another administrative organ, such as for example the City Council of Valka, which had passed a resolution not to sur­ render its police funds to the Iskolat. Within the Iskolat the question arose to disperse the Valka Council, since it no longer was supported by the majority of the city's inhabitants. Finally the question was postponed for the next Latvia’s Soviet to decide. Similarly misunderstanding also arose about the shutting down of Lidums. A storm was created by the Peasant Union Party and the National Bloc,w which demanded that we return the Lidums typo­ graphy within 48 hours. That of course did not happen.87 The Second Congress o f Latvia's Soviets. Brīvais Strēlnieks called it "Latvia’s Workers* Parliam ent." The party's central organ Cina named it

;

,

The h ko ktt Republic

133

“Latvijas Saeima/* The Congress was the biggest Latvian Bolshevik gather jng after November. The purposes for this Congress were multiple: sym­ bolic, ideological, and practical. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks wanted to dramatize the accession of soviet power with this Congress and to in­ vigorate the revolutionary "masses," as the Bolsheviks were wont to say; on the other hand, they hoped to bolster their legitimacy and to systema­ tize the new government. Brīvais strēlnieks explained the need for the Congress as follows: The Iskolat's present membership felt that the tasks before them arc of high responsibility and therefore Iskolat cannot and should not act without full participation and help of the working people. Therefore the Executive Committee felt the moment to be right to obtain a vote of confidence from Latvia's workers.* The party in its pronouncement put it thus: This moment demands an extraordinary amount of energy and power of will. The Congress must unleash the maximum of energy, systematize iskolat's work and to anticipate future development. The Congress can no longer be just a passer of resolutions-the decisions of the Congress will have the force of laws. . . .The Con­ gress will need to pay especially close attention to the selection of the new Soviet.* The Congress met on December 16 in Valmiera in a meeting hall that was overflowing. About 287 Latvian Bolsheviks were in attendance* The reporter noted: The hall, which was of considerable size, was so full that it was impossible to carry on the business of the Congress. Therefore by a unanimous vote it was decided to move the Congress to the local church. The reporter continues: The workers in closed ranks, accompanied by an orchestra playing "With Battlecries on Ups You Died" carrying red banners and

134

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

streamers that proclaimed: All Power to the Soviets» Workers of the World Unite» marched on to that temple in which slavery and ser­ vility had been preached in the name of Christ.91 The Congress was opened by Rozinš-Āzis: The only government of working people is that of Latvia's Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasant Deputies and its executive powerthe Soviet Government. The foundation for this government wilt be laid by this Congress. This is the only and the highest organ of power which has the right to determine the fate of Latvia-th is is Latvia's Constituent Assembly whose task is to fashion our life and our system.9* The audience rose to commemorate the fallen revolutionary comrades: the orchestra played a dirge. To the Presidium were selected: Rozinš-Āzis, 0. Kārklinš, Bauze (aQ from the Latvian SD CC), Viksne (from Cēsis Soviet), J. Zakis (from Valka Soviet), Allens (from “Iskorad 12**)» and Brunenieks (from the Streiki). In the secretariat entered Krēsliņš, Janels, A. Anskins, and R. Kārklinš. Congratulatory speeches were delivered by Krūmiņš (Latvian SD CC), J. Peterss (All-Russian Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Soviet of Deputies), Markuss (The Soviet of Deputies of the Northern Region), O.Karklini (Latvian SD fraction from the Vidzeme Land Council), AUens (XU Army Soviet), Salna (Latvian Petrograd Bolsheviks), Bauze (Latvian Moscow Bolsheviks), an unidentified delegate from Latgale, Brunnenieks (Tartu), Reinsons (Iskolastrel), Strautiņš (Valmiera Teachers Association "Pro­ gress**), Viksninš (the Latvian SD Streiki organization), Samsons (Lim­ baži workers). Zariņš (Līzbergu pagasts), and Mednis (XII Army Aviation Division).9* The only non-Bolshevik at the Congress delivering congratulations was Rudevics from the Latvian Mensheviks. He noted that the prolétariat had split into several factions, but insisted that the goal of all was tlic same. We am for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. This slogan is written on our common banner and as yet it is not erased.

Republic

135

fl* t # *

i

Valmiera Church, Tbe meeting place o f the Second C ongres o f Latvian Soviet Deputies

THELATVIANIM PACT

136

I would desire that the Congress choose a path that would unify all democratic forces. [Whistles]94 Congratulatory telegrams were sent to Lenin, Trotsky, Stučka, the Council of Peoples* Commissars, and the Pravda.9* Reports were delivered from Iskolat by Krūmiņi; from the Valka, Valmiera, and Cēsis District Workers. Soldiers, and Landless Peasant Soviets of Deputies by Lidaks; Zirnis, Namnieks, respectively; Iskorad by Aliens; Iskoborsevby Markuss; Iskolastrel by Reinson$;and from Latgale by Viksntn! and ZnotinL9* In the debate of the reports, the only critical remarks about the acti­ vities of Iskolat were delivered by Menshevik Rudevics who argued that Iskolat erred in failing to participate in the Brest-Litovsk peace negoti­ ations, thus allowing the bourgeois parties to gain momentum in that respect: Similarly the Iskolat has acted tyrannically in matters of freedom, by closing down Lidums and Laika vēstis, because socialists should not act that way, Socialdcmocrats must defend the freedom of the press. The Iskolat wants to struggle with the opposition by fust tying up their hands. It is a dishonorable struggle. [Whistles, andhe is prevented from continuing,] 97 Mežinl rose to deliver a searing indictment of the Mensheviks: Mensheviks get nervous when we call them counter-revolution­ aries. Everyone who struggles against the revolution, we call counter­ revolutionaries. . . . The Menshevik press publishes lies about our heroes.. . .We must deprive the bourgeoisie of every weapon with which they fight the revolution. Classes that lave outlived their time must depart from the arena.9* A motion was made to prohibit Rudevics to speak: As Rudevics. representing an insignificant group, has spoken up without factual basis and is only creating obstruction, thus interfering with the flow of the proceedings at the Congress, the Congress has decided to take away his right to speak.*9

The /skolai R ep u b lic

137

Rudevics, after having written a note of protest, left.“ 0 The Congress recognized the work of the Iskolat as proper and the report was accepted with only one negative vote. For the remainder of the Congress, the following agenda was covered: 1. The Soviet Government and its tasks.

2. The agrarian question. 3. The farm hands question. 4. Demobilization. 5. The Red Guards. 6. Latvia's autonomy and the constituent assembly. The “New ” Iskolat, December 18 tc February 22 The Iskolat that emerged from the Congress was indeed a new and an Invigorated body, as the party had expected. In all respects—ideological, political, and administrative-the Iskolat was tightened up. The one over* whelming decision made at the Congress was that it must be the soviets and nothing but the soviets that shall rule over Vidzeme, The Vidzeme Und Council along with all of the committees, as well as all town coun* dis, would need to go. There was to be no political compromise. The whole apparatus of the Iskolat was systematized, divided into depart* menis-bureaucratized. The free wheeling council (that the Iskolat was before the Congress) took on the appearance of a government. Only seven members of the new Iskolat carried over from the body that was elected on July 30, but most of them were from that pool of people who were active in the Iskolat from November 9 to December 16 (see table 9). The crucial session of the Iskolat that divided the functions of the member­ ship took place on December 22. In the Presidium were elected Rozini* Āzis (chairman); 0. KSrklini and Gailis (vice-chairman); Mežinft, Toma* levies, and Zakis (comprising the secretariat); and Smidts and K. Kauliņi (treasurers). The executive committee itself was divided into the following functions; Rozini-Āzis—Chairman 0 . Karklini-Administrative Director

138

THELATVIANIM PACT

Gailis-Director of Labor Vilks-Director of Agrarian Affairs Zakis-Director of Refugees' Affairs Tomalevics—Director of the Bureau of Justice Eferts—Director of Food Supplies Bauze—Director of Press VIrpa-Dircctor of Red Guards and Militia Jansons-Director of Trade and Industry R. Klrklini-Director of Finances Dombrovskis-Director of Management Seržants—Director of Propaganda Podnieks—Director of Transportation M. Vecrumba-Director of Sanitation. (First of all Dr. Priedkalns, the erstwhile Commissar of Vidzeme, was appointed to this po­ sition, but he declined.) Smidts-Director of Education Lācis—Director of Demobilization KrOmini—Editor of ZinotSjs Gerke-Director of Statistics MeZini-Secretary ViksninS, Vilumsone, Lidaks, Beldaus, JEkabsons, and Strauss were given no specific appointment.101 According to the accepted rules, the Presidium was to meet daily at 10:00 Aid.; the full soviet three times a week—Tuesdays, Thursdays,and Saturdays. In the same memorable session of December 22 that lasted from 5:00 P.M. until the early hours of the next morning, hkolat worked out the plan of the final takeover. According to the announcement, all of the following categories of administrative institutions were to be elimi­ nated: 1. All councils elected in accordance with parliamentary principles-

which included Vidzeme and district land councils, town councils, and pagasts councils. The deadline for the takeover of gubemii and district councils was the beginning of January, the pagasts councils immediately, if the landless peasant soviets were not in full control already. All the councils that would resist the takeover,

The Iskolat R ep u b lic

139

the announcement stated, would be called before revolutionary courts and punished with full severity of revolutionary justice. 2. AH other provincial, traditional, or appointed offices, such as the provincial administration, the Landrat Collegium, the Bureau of State Lands, the Inspectorate of Prisons, and all state and pro« vincial bureaus and offices concerned with finances and taxation. The majority of offices in this category were located in Tartu, Estonia, and for that purpose a special committee was chosen to travel to Tartu and effect the takeover. To what degree any of these offices were still functioning by this time cannot be ascertained, but the takeover was still rather a complicated matter because they had jurisdiction over Estonia as well, and the Latvians could not simply end them unilaterally.109 In this marathon session, we also see a toughening of stance towards the political opposition: Latvia's Temporary National Council, the one hope of Latvia's liberals, was decreed to be closed and all books taken over by the Eskolat. The resolution dosing the council read in port: Latvia's Temporary National Council came into existence at a time when the Peasant Union Party and other nationalist spokes­ men saw that in all cases and places when they raised their pro­ posal about creating a Latvian Rada, they were defeated and re­ mained a small minority. The Latvian National Council consists of those class representatives whose aim it is to unite all counter­ revolutionary nationalist chauvinist elements, those who in oppor­ tune moments are ready to oppose and rise against the Workers*, Soldiers', and Landless Peasant Deputies. Latvia’s National Council during all of its existence has lied about and thrown mud at the revolutionary avant garde—the Latvian streiki. It is an insignifi­ cant non-elected council of a minority, proclaiming itself as the representative of Latvian opinion, it misleads foreigners and is preparing an attack on Latvia's Soviet.109 Therefore, Iskolat concluded, the National Council Is terminated. The final takeover of the administrative network was accomplished during the early days of the new year, although the tying up of loose ends took them pretty much the whole month of January. The Anal settlement with the Vidzeme Land Council in the Iskolat was announced on January 16.100 Whether or not all of the matters were finished in

140

THELATVIANIM PACT

Tartu cannot be ascertained from the existing documents. A notation in the minutes of January 23 indicates that some aspects of the takeover there had not been completed.105 From the institutional point of view, the Bolshevik takeover simptj. lied the Vidzeme administration: in place of all of the offices and par­ liamentary councils that were still left from tsarist times and those that had grown up since the March Revolution, only the soviets were left. At the top of the ladder, there was the Iskolat which delegated authority to the district soviets (of Valka, Valmiera, Cēsis, and Riga), which, in turn, supervised the soviets of towns and pagasts. In practice, however,we find that towns and even pagasts frequently reported to the lskobt directly—to their consternation. In Vidzeme, there were also the Iskosot and Iskolastrel which in theory would be reporting to the Iskolat, bet which, in fact, acted independently of it, though with consultation. The district soviets were made up of deputies from towns and pagasts: each 1000 inhabitants sending one deputy, each pagasts sending at least one deputy. The town soviets consisted of one deputy per 100 inhabitants, and the pagasts soviets varied—depending on the size of the pagasts, from 12 to 22 members. The election law was stronger in regard to those cate­ gories of the population that were prohibited to vote as opposed those who were to participate. Among the prohibited categories were those inhabitants who did not recognize the soviet power; specifically named were the members of the Feasant Union party.106 As the flow of laws and directives in its Bulletin (Ziņotājs) indicates, the Iskolat in its short history showed a distinct tendency toward bureau­ cratization. In spite of the appearance of decentralization in the Repub­ lic's structure, the Iskolat Itself carried the greater burden. The lower soviets, especially those in the pagasts, were not always dependable; fre­ quently, they seemed to lack the will for sustained work. The Soviets of Landless Feasants In some pagasts tended to fall asunder due to a con­ flict between the farm hands and the tenant/sharecropper group. Yet, at times, to the consternation of the Iskolat leadership, the localities moved faster than the center in legislating new laws. For example, the localities faced with inflation were eager to develop price ceilings, a problem to which the kkotat was slow to react. The center considered this local independence anarchistic interference with a properly orchestrated revo­ lution.

»

The Jskolat Republic

141

The degree of control that the landless peasants exercised in Vidzeme pagasts is difficult to specify, for as yet we have no monographic studies on the question; but from circumstantial evidence and various reports to the Plenary session of the soviet, January 20/21 , we have reason to think that in the regions away from the front, it was almost complete. Agrarian question. The agrarian question preoccupied the Latvian Bolsheviks from the very beginning of the revolution. It was Stučka who laid down the basic ideological tenets on the problem and they were held steadily throughout 1917 without change.1*7 The accomplishment of the Iskolat in this regard was the translation of these precepts into practice. The basic tenets of the Latvian Bolshevik position (and in this they sub­ stantially differed from the Russian comrades) were these: 1. All land is to be nationalized and to become communal propertiesowned and cultivated communally. 2. The baronial, state, and church lands are to become properties of the community immediately. 3. The small landholders (meaning farmers of Latvian origin-the grey barons in Bolshevik parlance) temporarily would continue to work the lands as before. Under socialist control, their lands would also eventually become communal properties, but in the early stage of the revolution, the economic situation had not matured sufficiently for immediate transfer. It was the hope of the Bolsheviks that the Latvian small landholders would develop socialist consciousness voluntarily; but if not voluntarily, then the socialists would impose on them taxes and other tabor conditions, such as the eight-hour day, that would ultimately coerce the recalcitrant farmers to aban­ don the family proprietary farms. The agrarian movement in Latvia already began in the early summer of 1917. The first known confiscation was of Pukeles estate. May 1. By November 8 , perhaps as many as three dozen estates in Vidzeme had been confiscated.10* In Latvia, unlike in Russia, this agrarian movement was not “spontaneous”; it occurred under Bolshevik guidance and encourage­ ment. Though the Bolsheviks were always behind the movement, the confiscations were not done in a standardized way: sometimes it was the local food committee, at others the local landless peasant soviet, and yet

142

THELATVIANIM PACT

on other occasions, some ad hoc local group that carried it out. The motives for confiscations were various: frequently it occuned as a conxquence of a strike by local farm hands; on other occasions, it was the abandoned estates that were taken over; and yet on others, it seems that it was done as a revenge against the landlord for taking part in the sup­ pression of the 1905 Revolution. The estate owners were defense!« against this movement. Within Latvia, there was no possibility of appeal against the confiscations, and Petrograd was too far away to gist then much help. By early summer, the whole administrative apparatus of Vidzeme, Including the Commissariats of Vidzeme and the four districts, were under the control of Social Democrats who supported the confis­ cations.10* Even the Latvian liberals did not provide any great solace to the estate owners. Though the liberals clashed with the Bolsheviks inthe Vidzeme Land Council over the confiscations, they, too, wanted the estates taken away from the landlords. Unlike the Bolsheviks, the liberals would have wanted the confiscations to occur in a more orderly, more traditionally legalist manner and they wanted the lands to be partitioned and distributed to the landless peasants. The Iskolat in Us founding Con­ gress registered its dismay with the Agrarian Committee of the Vidzeme Land Council, where there was some liberal influence, by condemningh and asking for its liquidation (see p. 116 of this chapter). At the same Congress, the occasion arose for the assembled delegates to discuss the Bolshevik land program, and the Iskolat fully supported it. After November 9, Iskolat acted promptly in carrying out the party platform on the agrarian question and began systematizing the takeover of the estates. Although, during the four months of its existence, the Iskolat was basically concerned with the first part of the program-the confiscation of the baronial estates—the resolutions and discussion at the Iskolat sessions left no doubt that they intended eventually to act upon the whole program, including the confiscation of the Latvian fanner (grey baron) lands. The November 9 session of the Iskolat set up what could be called the Iskolat’s Agrarian Steering Committee, consisting of Rozini-Āzis. Vilks, Eglits, Eferts, and Seržants, which was charged with the responsibility for working out a comprehensive plan of confiscation.110 On November 11, Iskolat issued a preliminary statement to all district soviets to in­ form all Soviets of Landless Peasants that they must take control of all baronial estates.

The Iskolat R ep u b lic

143

That the estate owners are forbidden to sell anything belonging to the estates» and if there is any attempt to do so« the guilty must be arrested without hesitation* In those pagasts in which there are no Soviets of Landless Feasants» the overseeing of the estates must be done by the workers of those estates*111 The announcement also specified that all rents and other monies that had been previously paid to the estates must now be submitted to the treasury of the Vidzeme Land Council. Some time before November 16» the Iskolat sent out an appeal to all agronomists serving in the Streiki formations to come to Valka to help the Iskolat in assessment and confiscation of the estates. Altogether about fifty specialists from the units were engaged in this enterprise, which commenced on November 17.lts On November 20 « the Steering Com­ mittee presented their project of confiscation to the Iskolat, which after a few small changes was accepted. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this history-mak­ ingdocument defined the properties to be confiscated: !» All estates and the lands belonging to the estates are to be confis­ cated« regardless to whom they may belong—individuals or private associations (banks, communal associations, the crown, towns, church, bureaus, and nobiiity). 2. Similarly confiscated are all movables and immovables of the es­ tates as well as their investments and bonds, grain, fodder, and all the rest that is needed for the management of the estates. The owner keeps only those possessions (clothes, furniture, jewelry) which the Committee of Confiscation recognizes as unnecessary for the future management of the estates. The third paragraph defined the Bolshevik position towards the grey batons: 3. All other lands remain In the use of the previous owners, as long as they are fulfilling all regulations of land cultivation and of labor. The document contains another eleven paragraphs of implementing instructions.

144

THELATVIANIM PACT

The task of confiscation was assigned to the district soviets whichwen to organize committees of confiscation in each pagasts. These committeei were to consist of two persons from the pagasts Soviet of Landless Peasants and Agrarian Committee, and one from the District Soviet. Hie directive also urged that the committee of confiscation should involve the laborers of the estates and experts on agronomy and forestry inthe process. The management of the confiscated estates was to consist of representatives from the estate laborers, local agrarian committees, and the pagasts Soviet of Landless Peasants deputies.119 On December 8 , the Iskolat passed a supplementary decree demanding that all industrial properties belonging to the estates: factories, mills, workshops, and all other industrial enterprises are to be put under the control of the Vidzeme Land Council if they are found in the same pagasts as the estates. If the industrial enterprises are located in a different pagasts, then they are independent of the confiscated estates and continue as before, unless alienated by special decision of the court or decree of Isko­ lat. J. Vilks, reporting at the Second Congress of Latvian Soviets, summed up the Iskolat’s accomplishments in its first phase, and his speech also very clearly expresses the anti-private land, anti-grey-baron mood of the Latvian Bolsheviks, in general, and the delegates at the Congress, in parti­ cular: It is the landless peasants who, more than anyone, are interested in the resolution of the land question. After a thorough discussion, Iskolat published its decree on the confiscation of the estates etc. In practice we had to decide which lands to leave to their owners. We decided to confiscate all estates with all their movables. The owners of the small farms were to remain on their land and manage it in accordance with the demands of the community. If they failed to do so, their land too would become subject to confiscation* Wealso decided to confiscate all of the movables of the estates with the exception of the ones belonging to the tenants of the estates. Until all private wealth Is confiscated, we shall leave the renters as mana­ gers of the estates under our strictest control... .The whole system must be destroyed. We must have all the threads in our hand, the whole network of capital under our control, and then we will

The iskolat Republic

145

transform them Into communal possessions. Admittedly, we are trying to destroy all rights to land. Up to now there were no invest* ments made in land because all land belonged to separate individuals, and they endeavored to exploit it rather than develop it. Having taken power, we know that we will not be able to accomplish everything at once as we would wish, for we are short of resources. That is why. temporarily we have left all possessions in the control of the grey barons. That is why the tenants of the estates were left to manage the estates.11’ In the debate at the Congress, there were no dissenting voices raised against Vilks* report or the policy of the Iskolat, but speaker after speaker showed concern that the Latvian Landless Peasant was still strongly moti­ vated by proprietary instincts, by the “one’s own comer, one’s own piece of land** ideology. Gailis thought that the desire for private land would disappear once old-age insurance was assured to the peasants.11’ In general, the discussion at the Congress was more militant, more anti­ private property, than the policy followed by Iskolat. The second part of the agrarian question which the Congress of Soviets discussed was the setting of socialist standards for farm hand employment. These conditions were to be observed both by the management of the confiscated estates and the private fanners. The resolution specified the following: a. Eight-hour day; setting of a minimal salary; elimination of night and Sunday work and of overtime; insurance against accidents, illness, unemployment, maiming; maternity insurance; and securing of living quarters, following the principle that each worker's family should have its own apartment. b. Payment in kind has to be ended.117 The resolution also ordered the farm hands in each pagasts to organize a farm hand committee following the principle of labor organizations inthedties.118 Other more important policies connected with agrarian matters that vere initiated by the Iskolat was the establishment of unemployment bureaus in towns and districts. In some respects, it also moved towards pricecontrol, the setting of maximums. Maximum prices were set on fire

146

THELATVIANIM PACT

wood and building timber,119 but as yet not on foodstuffs. One pagws, in fact, to the consternation of the Iskolat, set its own price maximum on meats and dairy products.1*0 In demand for hard prices, as onall economic matters, the localities were always ahead of the center. Hard prices and salaries were a heated topic of discussion at the Valka Diana Soviet as they never were for the Iskolat itself. There is no doubt that the takeover of estates was a very popularpolicy and that the work progressed quickly. According to the reports at the soviets* plenary session, January 19/20, in Valka and Valmiera districts, the confiscation was finished, less so in Cesis district and even less inthe unoccupied pagasts of Riga. J. Vilks, who was one of the activists of the day, in his old age compiled the following table of the estates confiscated in 1917/18 in Latvia; TABLE 11 Number of Estates Confiscated Area in thouand hcchtais Valka Valmiera Cēsis

122 123 132

376.7 288.5 290.4

28 of the estates belonged to the crown, 5 to the dtles 47 to parishes 1 to a bank If Vilks’ figures are correct, then the confiscation had been 100%.ltt A less conspicuous, but equally significant, change that the agrarian revolution brought about was the new position of the farm hands vis-à-vis their employers. How the relationship was settled between the farm hands and the new estate managements within the Iskolat Republic, we do not know because the whole changeover occurred during the winter months, and therefore the new system did not receive a full test, but the shape of the new relationship can be seen from contracts between the management and farm hands of an estate that had already been con­ fiscated in the summer of 1917.

The Iskolat Republic

147

Conditions of tbe old contracts

Conditions of the new contracts

Labor fromdawn to dusk

8 hourday

WAGES 70 kopeks for each day worked. Provisions must be bought from the estate: rye 6 S kopeks per pud (1638 kg); grits, 1 ruble; fodder, 40 kopeks per pud. The maximum of the provisions: 60 puds of rye, 12 puds of grits; and 12 puds offodder.

300 rubles per year and all pro* visions free. The maximums of provisions: 70 puds of rye flour; IS puds of barley flour; 10 puds of fodder; 5 puds of salt; JS pura* vietas ( 3 7 ha) garden plot for potatoes; 2 assis (assis*9.718m3) firewood; 15 puds of grits; 3 pūravietas meadow and JS pura* vietas clover for fodder for 2 cows; 10 bags of hulled grain; straw and husks. Farm hands wife, if she works, receive 70 kopeks per day but without provisions. The wife must work if the estate manage* ment requests it. Every farm hand receives milk as needed 24 stops (stops 12 3 liters) a day for 20 kopeks a stops.

The agricultural revolution turned out to be more than just a takeover of estates; it committed Iskolat to economic planning. The newly com* munized estates needed supervision; and to turn them into productive enterprises, they needed supplies and resources that could not be pro* vided locally. From the documents of the Iskolat, we see that the level of economic thinking within it was not of a very high caliber, but never* theless, we And here the first tentative, groping steps of national plan* ning. Many estates were run down, livestock and grain reserves depleted or sold on the black market or plundered. Cattle feed was at dangerously low levels. In some respects, the Iskolat became a giant landlord that

THELATVIANIMp^j 148

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a «8%8M/w(naflie)is Peterson-1 speak for the Second Lettish Rifles. You have heardthe statements of two representatives of the Army committees; these statements would have some value i f th eir authors had been repre­ sentatives o f the A rm y- Wild applause. 'But they do not represent the soldien !*Shaking his fist. The Twelfth Army has been insisting for a long time upon the re-election of the Great Soviet and the Army Committee, but just as your own Tsay-ee-kah, our Committee refused to call a meeting of the representatives of the masses ontl the end of September, so that the reactionaries could elect theirowa false delegates to this Congress. 1 tell you now, the Lettish soldien have many times said, “No mote resolutions! No more talk! We want deeds-the Power must be In our hands!*' Let these impostor delegates leave the Congress! The Army is not with them!* The hall rocked with cheering. In the first moments of the session, stunned by the rapidity of events, startled by the sound of cannon, the delegates had hesitated. For an hour hammer-blow after hammerblow had fallen from that tribune, welding them together but beat* ing them down. Did they stand then alone? Was Russia risingagainst them? Was it true that the Army was marching on Petrograd? Thea this dear-eyed young soldier had spoken, and in a flash they knewit for the truth. . . . This was the voice of the soldiers-the stirringmil­ lions of uniformed workers and peasants were men Uke them, and their thoughts and feelings were the same ....* *

Latvians and Lento

197

Hie degree of support that the Baltic sailors supplied to Lenin’s cause is a matter of debate, and we may even agree, as the evidence seems to sug* gest, that the sailors were very important in wrapping up the centers on October 25. But, from the point of view of establishing power, very little was accomplished on the 25th. Still, at the same time, we must recognize that the sailors, in the long run, were soft Bolsheviks-one may assume that Lenin would say that they were pure Russians. The conversation that Lenin had with A. L. Sheinman, chairman of the executive committee of the Helsinki Soviet of Deputies of the Army, Navy, and workers of Fin« land on October 27 may be taken as a microcosmical statement of the whole relationship. Are you authorised to speak on behalf of the Regional Army and Navy Committee? Of course, I am. Can you move the greatest possible number of destroyers and other warships to Petrograd at once? Let me call the Tsentrobalt Chairman, because this is a purely naval matter. What's new in Petrograd? There is a report that Kerensky's troops have moved up and have taken Gatchina, and since a part of the Petrograd troops are tired, it is imperative that we have the strongest reinforcements as soon as possible. Anything else? Instead of the 'anything else* 1 expected you to say you were ready to set out and fight.90 The conversation actually turned out to be a bit better for Lenin than thepassage selected above indicates, but it does not falsify the relationship. (See Maikov's statement on p. 174 of this chapter.) In fact, as we shall see later in this study, the sailors turned into one of the major liabilities/pla* pies in revolutionary Petrograd (see pp. 286-288). The Latvian Bolsheviks and the Insurrection in Petrograd

The Latvian Bolshevik drive for power proceeded much more smoothly thanit did for Lenin in Russia, having its base of operations away from the

198

THELATVIANIMPACT

center, the focus of attention. Nor did the Latvian party internally hawthe divisions and fissures that were to be found in the Russian party. The Lat­ vian party was in de facto power by June 1917,and the elections of August/ September 1917 made power official, from the parliamentary point of view, de jure. Much before the soviets in the capital cities of Russia, by slim majorities, went over to the Bolsheviks, the electorate of Latviainall of the Provincial Districts and most of the city councils had elected Bol­ sheviks by solid majorities (see chapter 111). So the Latvian call for insur­ rection and the taking of power in Petrograd must be interpreted ina much different light than Lenin's call for an insurrection coming from Finland. Lenin was still out of power, wanting to get in; the Latvian Bolsheviks were in the seat of power; they only wanted to make assurances that their gains not be destroyed by some "Kerensky plot** in Petrograd or a "Komilovite march** into Vidzeme before the revolutionary situation maturedin Russia. We could begin to document the Latvian Bolshevik drive for power from the Latvian SD XIII Conference in April 1917, through May 17 resolution of the Streiki Soviet, and the V Latvian SD Party Congress in July, andon through the July 27 proclamation:Comrades! workers, and soldiers! Revo­ lutionary Democracy! In the latter document, the plan was layed out to reorganize the Latvian Streiki regiments into a revolutionary armed force. The Latvian party took an important step towards expanding their influ­ ence on July 11, when the so-called Leftist Bloc was organized. The pur­ pose of this bloc was to unify the Bolshevik forces in the XII Army, event­ ually looking towards the unseating of the Mensheviks and SR in the Iso­ sol (the executive committee of the XII Army Soviet of Soldiers* Depu­ ties).51 This Bolshevik march towards power in Latvia the author has al­ ready documented, in part, in his book, 1 9 1 7 R evolution In Latvia andin the previous chapters of this study. Therefore, in this chapter, it remains to show how the Latvian Bolsheviks began to deal with the 'International** obligation, ideologically, incumbent upon them. Let us begin at about the same time when Lenin began to urge his com­ rades to take power in Petrograd. Lenin's epistle of September 12, "The Bolsheviks must take Power," was written after he had received the news about the Bolsheviks obtaining a majority in the Petrograd Soviet on August 31. In this letter, Lenin renewed the slogan: "All power to the Soviets’’-» slogan which the Latvian party had never dropped. The Lat­ vian reaction to Bolshevik success in Petrograd came much quicker than

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did Unin's. On the very day of the passage of the Bolshevik vote in the Petrograd Soviet, August 31, the IskolastreJ dashed off the following resolution; The Executive Committee of the Latvian Streiki Soviet of Depu­ ties [IskolastrelJ t having become acquainted with the Petrograd Sov­ iet's resolution on the Provisional Government,joyfully congratulates the Petrograd Soviet and is in full support of your decision. We are happy that dear and uncompromisingly revolutionary class ideas now have become part of the Petrograd Soviet. Comrades, we promise to you our full support and are profoundly persuaded that (he Petrograd Soviet.having unfurled a truly revolutionary ban­ ner of struggle, will become the democratic avant garde of ail work­ ers, soldiers, and farmhands—that avant garde, that will lead us not along the path of compromises and shameful vacillation, but along apath of revolution towards socialism.52 OnSeptember 3, Iskolastrel follows up on the previous statement—makhg sure that their message is being understood—this time urging the Soviet totakepower; The Executive Committee of the Latvian Streiki Soviet of Depu­ ties in its September 3 session unanimously decided that the Execu­ tive Committee of the All-Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Soviet of Deputies must ensure the safety of the revolution, take all state power in its hands. We are promising undivided Latvian Streiki support.52 Whetheror not the Latvian party sent any messages to the All-Russian CCiinot known; no written missile or telegram is extant . To communicate wththe party might have been considered a conspiratorial matter, and therefore,it might have been done without leaving any traces. The couriers itag the Latvian network from Vidzeme to Petrograd were frequent. F. Mirktus,one of the conspirators on the Latvian side, in his recollections, «lbvs that it was Ribe who brought the news to the Latvian party about imoiiih before October 25, namely, that a Military Revolutionary Com* Kttetofthe XII Army needs to be organized.

200

THELATVIANIM PACT Unofficially the XII Army Military Revolutionary Committee wg composed approximately one month before the days of the October Revolution, when Com. Ribbe illegally arrived in Cēsis fromPetro­ grad and notified the Party Committee that, in order to maintÉi communications with Petrograd and with revolutionary miitsy troops as well as for the purposes of doing the preparatory work,it is necessary to organize a committee.94

From the point of view of the argument of this study, Ribe's messageis indeed remarkable, for not only does it prove conclusively the existenceof regional planning and the existence of the Latvian “underground railroad,N but also, in terms of dating it, shows that the Latvians again were aheadof the Russian comrades by some good three weeks. The Military Revolution­ ary Committee gets organized in Petrograd only on October 9.ss From the beginning of September, almost all Latvian party and Streiki committees went on record as supporting a takeover of power andurging immediate action in Petrograd. The Latvian approach to the insurrection, the same as Lenin's, was strictly military in nature. This was not tobe» insurrection fought on the barricades by ardent revolutionaries, but one achieved by massive military checkmate. In the following letter to the Regional Committee of the Army, Navy, and Workers in Finland,of which Smilga was the chairman, sent two days after Lenin's letter to Smilga(per­ haps intended as a «enforcement on Smilga), bkolastrel wrote: The Izkolastrel has become enraged concerning the latest direct­ ives by the counterrevolutionary anti-people government of Kerensky, ordering troops faithful to the revolution out of Finland. The Latvian regiments, who have proven their faith in revolu­ tion not just once, promise to you, dear comrades, their helpand participation in defense of honor and dignity. Be assured that we, the Latvian Streiki, are with you, completely with you! Upon the first call from the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers deputies, we shall dispatch a military force and toget­ her with the Proletariat of all Russia and the garrison will defend the conquests of the revolution against the attacks by counterrevolution­ ary Kerensky, Konovalov and Co.94

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The tactical choices for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, since the spring of 1917, had undergone a certain evolution* In the spring, the choices were between the taking of power through the soviets or in the streets on the barricades, in the summer of 1917, the Latvian Bolsheviks, for their own purposes, changed their tactics* They espied the possibility of coming to power by elections, but that basically was a Latvian internal tactic* On occasion, the Latvian Bolsheviks did view the Constituent Assembly as the vehicle that would bring about socialism in the whole of Russia. But by early fall, it must have become clear to the Latvians that the issue inside Russia could not be decided by peaceful means, and, therefore, among them, as with Lenin, the line emerges that the power in the capital of the empire must be decided by a military force. To meet this tactical goal, an international obligation, the Latvians initiated the conversion of the Lat­ vian Streiki into a conscious revolutionary spearhead. Discipline became a positive word for them again—but this time it came under the name of “revolutionary discipline.*' Fart of this plan to convert the Latvian Streiki into a revolutionary “fist” was to form, out of the Streiki regiments, a full army corps that would be a completely self-sufficient, military formation with a full complement of support services, artillery, cavalry, and aviation contingents.** In addition to the resolutions and pronouncements issued by Lenin, Smilga and other Bolsheviks in Finland and the Latvian Bolsheviks in Lat­ viawith regard to the necessity for insurrection, there are numerous other pieces of evidence that indicate the existence of regional planning. The major events that display the existence of this coordination, the tip of the keberg, so to speak, were: 1. Asimilarity in the arguments justifying the insurrection;

2. The shaping of the Streiki into a revolutionary force; 3. Nachimson's transfer to Vidzeme from Petrograd; 4. The Congress of Soviets from the Northern Region, organized by Smilga on October 1 1-12; 5. The Conference of Bolshevik Military Organization of the Northern Front, October 15-16, in Cēsis. 6. Antonov-Ovseienko’s mission to Valka, October 16. The impression one gets is that while there was divisiveness in Petrograd, h the region around Petrograd—certainly in Latvia—there was a relentless

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THELATVIANIMPACT

pressuring towardsthe solution of the issue of power in the center, if neatsary, an invasion of Petrograd. Without exaggeration, we can say that the Bolsheviks in the region around Petrograd, during this preparatory stage, displayed intentions similar to those of Lenin. Whether this was a result of a coordinated plan or spontaneity is not that Important so long as the out* come was the same. Justification of the Insurrection One way in which parallelism, if not a lockstep cooperation, between Lenin and the Latvian Bolsheviks can be documented is on the level of argumentation that was advanced by the Latvians for the necessity of in­ surrection. As the Latvian Bolsheviks prepared for the deepening of the revolution, they used three types of argument: (a) that the coming of the socialist order was 'Inevitable”; (b) that it was "desirable”;(c) that it was "necessary” in the sense that they had the only viable alternative, and that if support was not forthcoming from the populace, great harmwould result. The Latvian Bolsheviks used all three arguments, but they were especially prone to use the third—that of "necessity.” The argument of "necessity” hinged on the proposition that the Bols­ heviks alone were able to provide security, and that any other alternatives, most emphatically that of the Provisional Government, were likely to lead only to genera] anarchy and overall deterioration of life. The oft-held assumption was that conditions were so bad that a general and complete reorganization of society alone could correct matters. In other words, the Bolsheviks were using the same arguments for the deepening of the revolu­ tion as were used by those desiring to stop the Bolsheviks. It was frequent­ ly argued that the workers' control of factories and banks was not so much needed to fulfill socialist justice as it would be a way of avoiding economic collapse. The resolution on P olitical Situation an d th e Tasks o f th e Proletariat accepted at the V Party Congress in July outlined the logic of the argu­ ment: the first two paragraphs of the resolution portrayed the present situation as heading for an unavoidable crisis, then went on to argue that compromises leading to cooperation with the bourgeois liberals or social­ ists would lead only to further deterioration. Various dangers were port­ rayed as imminent, and the proletariat was exhorted to prepare for the

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approaching final battle in which they would need to deliver the decisive How. The logic of the argument strove to give the Bolsheviks the appear­ ance of holding the defensive position. On this occasion» the plan was not $o much to broaden freedoms as to defend those secured thus far by the democratic forces. Paragraph (3) read as follows: Compromises logically lead to the burying of the revolution. ‘Soc­ ialist ministers are incapable of carryingout truly democratic policies, but instead change themselves into active or passive supporters of the bourgeois majority’s policies. The petit-bourgeois socialists are incapable of ending the imperialist war, and end up as the supporters of Russian, English, and French capitalists and the fulfiileis of the tsarist embezzling treaties. The bourgeois socialist bloc Is not only Incapable of realizing the tasks of the revolution but, having renounced revolutionary means, they even help to deepen severely the impending industrial, financial, and food crises. Andparagraph(4): The anti-democratic and chauvinistic policies of the coalition min­ istry inescapably sharpen the class cleavages and provoke the broadest mass movements which expressed themselves in the July 3 and 4 remonstrances in Petrograd. The suppression of that movement through the means of force, the announcement of dictatorship, the renunciation of civil liberties testify that a counter revolutionary course has begun. The petit bourgeois socialist groups—Social Revo­ lutionaries, Peoples* Socialists, Social Democrats—defenslsts, the Bundand others openly cross over to the counter revolutionary side. Theconclusion was drawn that all power should go to the soviets, that arelentless struggle against the Provisional Government should be carried or.andone should oppose therefore M. . .the dispersing of revolutionary rqunenuand the persecution of the revolutionary army. . . . nSS The following is an example of arguments for the need of revolution as appeared in a lower Latvian party organization in which many of the pttiouslymentioned themes are summed up:

204

THELATVIANIMPACT One of the latest fruits of this policy was the abandonment of Riga and devastation of a new region. . . ."The final victory’ over the revolution is obtained and a total collapse is approaching with giant steps. The tragedy of Russia’s revolution reaches its apex. Rus­ sia’s Ronapartist-Kornilov surrenders ’strategic points’ (read: Riga) for political (read: counterrevolutionary) reasons. The army is full of Kornilovs like that. So is the rear. Therefore we are demanding: not only the surrender to a people’s tribunal of Kornilov, Kaledin, the black crows of the State, Duma, Guchkov and Purishkevichand others, but also of the counterrevolution ones from all organizations and headquarters, etc. The Chief of StalT must be immediately driven away. The army must have democratically elected leadership, we must revoke the disorganizing ’discipline* In the army, that only multiplies the mobs of deserters. In the army democratic revolu­ tionary discipline is needed. To obtain that, all newspapers and party propagandists must be admitted into the army. The death penalty must be revoked as a tool that has failed to perform its task. The proletariat and the landless peasants have a large task ahead of them: they must assure state power. Economic collapse is ap­ proaching with giant steps. All of that proves the correctnessof tk foundations of the revolutionary social democracy. Hunger is stalk­ ing the shacks and hamlets. The war devours everything. Despair and disaffection is spreading. Life calls us towards a newrevolution.91

On the eve of the uprising, JShis Ziemelis-Bērzinl, writing from Petro­ grad, summed up the themes for the necessity of takeover of power inm article entitled “Struggle Against Anarchy." He begins by saying that news of a spreading anarchy are coming in from all parts of Russia: revolt of the peasantry, confiscation of lands, burning of landlord buildings, lootingof cattle and forests; the disaffection of the cities caused by shortage of food, inflation, blackmarketing-sometimes leading to pogroms; the rising of whole regions against the central government—the Ukraine, Kuban, and Turkestan; intensification of labordisturbances; and the mutiny of soldiers, “If we survey it all," writes Bērziņi, “we realize that the situation is truly perilous. The revolution is in danger. A question, increasingly more troubled and disturbing, resounds from every direction: When will it all end? Will there ever be a solution to it?"

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bi searching for the causes of the anarchy. Bērziņi reduces themto one: "The sterility o f the revolution so far. *' And from there goes on to charact­ erisethe contradiction of the bourgeois resolution. From its fruits ye shall know thee. The barrenness of the resolutlion is an established fact. And that is what mainly explains the anarchy. Inthe concluding section of the article, Bērziņi offers a solution: The revolutionary Social Democracy stands for a different strug­ gle against anarchy, internal confusion, and pogroms. It asks for a complete change of policies and immediate, far-reaching, and pro­ found reforms. . . . For a radical struggle against anarchy, resolution can be made only by a government which is supported by revolutionary masses and revolutionary organizations.*0 TheShapingof the Streiki into a Revolutionary Force The seriousness and thoroughness with which the Latvian Bolsheviks prepared for the insurrection-the consummation of socialist power-can beseenwry clearly from the program they had workedout for the conver­ sionof the Latvian Streiki regiments into a revolutionary spearhead. The pbnisacompletely innovative one and peculiar to the Latvian party. There ns nothing like it in the whole erstwhile Russian Empire nor anything Ideeit anticipated in Lenin's writings. In fact, the organization of the Red Army that took place in 1918 largely follows the model of the Latvian Streiki. The history of the Streiki after 1917 Is a complicated one;but one of the reasons why the Streiki formations were preserved until the very endof the Civil War, in spite of some attempts of Russian Bolsheviks to disperse them, Is traceable to this Latvian party policy of mid-1917. Already during the summer, the Latvian Streiki began to assume a new tome in the minds of the Latvian Bolsheviks—the Streiki as a spearhead of the revolution. Some adumbration of this image b already to be noted at the VParty Congress July 9-19, but it emerged with clarity in the procla­ mationof July 29: Comrades Workers arid Soldiers! R evolutionary Demo* tfscy! This newtactic was reduced to one main theme—the need to educate

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THELATVIANMAH

the Streiki into a disciplined military force—and it meant: (1) that frnenjstation was out; (2) that soldiers* control of their officers wasout-iutrsl undesirable officers were to be voted out and replaced by electedones;(3j that committee control of officers« later to become commissar controlof officers was in; (4) that unquestioning obedience to orders was in. The first six paragraphsof the statement Comrades Workers andSotdimf were concerned with depicting the threats of counterrevolution andits devious and conspiratorial tactics: “The counter revolution exploits tie misfortunes of the South Western Army, misfortunes that were broqfc about by the Provisional Government's war policy and its compliance«Ah the international imperialist league.** From paragraph seven on the pro­ clamation, read as follows: Comrades Soldiers! The Latvian Streiki Soviet and the V Congress of the Latvi»Soc­ ial Democracy have resolved that in the present political andstmt* gical situation fraternization and the meeting o f soldiers o f the Go mon-Austrian army is not useful and therefore it is not permissâtt

That Is the decision. Nobody may break it. Revolutionary disdpfar demands that. The regimental and squad soviets must he sure the nobody disobeys this decision o f the Latvian Social Democracy mi the Latvian Streiki Soviet, which In this case corresponds withthe

resolve of the whole revolutionary democracy. Comrades Soldiers! We may not perm it, on our fron t, where the revolutionary • < ✓

Semyon Nachimson Comrades Soldiers! It is undeniable that in the regiments, among comrades, dark for* ces are slithering about, which are disrupting soldiers' solidarity, causing quarrels among comrades, behaving like criminals, disobey* hag the directives o f the soviets, improperly handling their weapons etc. Disrupting hooligans and criminals have no place ht the revolu­ tionary army. They are to be dismissed from the ranks. This deans* lag and airing job must occur with the participation and the know* ledge o f regimental and squad soviets. Disrupters and hooligans must

be turned over to the court. Comrades! Only when our ranks will be purged—w e, a united, disciplined, and

v&mnt force, wilt he able to stand up asm immovable rock against the counter revolution, and then the events o f the South-Western Front will run occur here. Comrades Soldiers! The revolution is In danger. The revolutionary democracy knows that. Specially elected soldiers, committees are being attached to all

commanding headquarters. All elected workers' and soldiers' organizations in the squads, régi­ ments, army, and in the rear must be strengthened.

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Comrades Soldiers! Consolidate around you r soviets! So that revolutionary discipline m ay bind yo u In an unbreakable unity / Never lower your giutdlFdfill you r revolutionary soldiers* d u ty even in the most difficult no­ m eniI Then the revolution w ill be invincible. Then nothing andso-

body will be able to suppress the workers» soldiers, and peasantsinia slavery.*1 This line of argument also predominated at the Fourth Congressofthe Latvian Streiki Soviet of Deputies that met from July 22 to August 2.The new tactical course had perhaps an unexpected side benefit: it tendedto confuse the critics of the Iskolastrel, as illustrated by W. S. Woytisskft reaction to this new line. Woytinski, as the Commissar of the XII Army, appointed by the Provisional Government, had arrived at the FourthCoo* gress with the intention of presenting the government’s case. He deliberated about the evils of fraternization and lack of discipline and exhortedthe delegates to believe in the Provisional Government, but was not prepared for the explanations offered by the Izkolastrel’s Bolsheviks. Petersonsvs the first to speak: “ . . . Doubts about the battle worthiness of the latvfca Streiki are wholly unfounded. Nowhere in the revolutionary RussianAm)' are there troops that stand as firm in their ranks as do the LatvianStreiki regiments. If the Germans attack, if Riga is threatened, Latvian Streiki will defend it to the last.” He also suggested that there should be more concern about the firmness of discipline in the upper ranks than inthe lower ones. Ribe's speech was similar, but he went into the historical rela­ tionships between the Germans and Latvians and concluded: *i amem­ phasizing, do not confuse the Bolsheviks in Petrograd with those in latvis. There is a huge difference. If the German imperialist forces flowoverthe present zone then they will get to Riga only over the bones of Latvians (Prolonged, noisy applause).**18 According to Jaunais laiks, Ribe had used the word Petrograd raibu than Riga, and had completed his speech with the following words: “Be behind our backs we are lied about, and there is even talk about dissolving our regiments. Then it could happen that the horrible moment arrivesred that over our bones the road is opened to the enemy; but then wewon’t be here any more, we will have given our lives on the altar of our fatherland, and history will pass a just judgment over us. In order to avoidthat.

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we are asking for an end to our persecution and defamation. We are asking for power, a strong centrai power.** These comments, it appears, left Woytinski with little to say. He prom* ised to settle several problems with the upper ranks of the command and to look into the rumormongering in Riga, apparently the cause of national hatreds in the city. He said that he was satisfied that the Latvian Streiki lud rowed to abide by the majority, and that he had listened with gratitade to the forthright, open, and firm answers which are so "immeasurably dear to the government.** On the following day, Woytinski visited Streiki intrenches and expressed satisfaction about what he had seen.43 In the proclamation Comrades Soldiers, and Workers! the words "revo­ lutionary discipline*' were left pretty much to one*s imagination, and the mechanism for its implementation was not outlined. The concept was de* fined with more clarity by the Fourth Congress of the Streiki Soviet of Deputies. First, if revolutionary discipline were to be obtained, counter* revolutionary officers would have to go ;secottd, special commissions would be elected serving as controlling agendas with the headquarters on all lewb of command from squads through regiments, brigades, and army; third, democratic military courts would be created consisting of officers and Streiki. The first two of these conditions were implemented in the Uvim regiments during September and October, but there is no informa­ tion about the third. During the few final weeks before the uprising, a more effective check yet was put into operatJon-the attachment of in­ dividual commissars to the headquarters, mostly for the upper level of anwnand, regiments and brigades, but it was also suggested for the com­ putes. As necessary for the full establishment of revolutionary discipline, dtecongress also demanded that the Provisional Government cease to fol­ iar the practice of the old regime in limiting the freedom of assembly, tord and of press; in arresting and searching revolutionary leaders; in threatening to dissolve revolutionary forces, such as the Latvian Streiki; Rpreventing communications between revolutionary armed forces by pro­ hibiting the appearances of revolutionary speakers and the distribution of revolutionary left-wing literature among the troops. The congress also invrçhed against the death penalty and demanded its recall "because the doth penalty docs not help establish an internal order but creates only aurchyand fraternal hatred.**44 Inreference to the purging of the regiments of counterrevolutionary ofWoytinski played into the hands of the Bolsheviks in one important

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respect. He. in effect .supported the concept of elected officers. Whenasked what to do with those officers who disregarded the soviets and who laded the confidence of the soldiers. Woytinski answered: “General Panki.ow present commander, says that full order can only exist among soldiets when the officers have full respect for the soldier's organizations. Those officers who ignore these organizations have no place among revolutionär regiments.“65 This answer, in effect, corresponded with the policy stated in the pronouncement Comrades Workers and Soldiers, and as furtherde* fined by the Fourth Streiki Congress, both discussed above. There was one particular question that throughout the summer bothered the Bolshevik leadership of the Streiki: the possibility that the Streiki units might be dissolved. The Iskolastrel leadership, on their part, repeat­ edly strove to check out the rumors with the upper echelons of command, but they were always assured that nothing of the sort was planned. InSov­ iet literature, however, the assumption is fully made that a plan to dissolve the Latvians was, indeed, worked out,66 but for proof they giveevidence that does not exactly bear out the claim, namely the formation of the “death" battalions and the movement of Cossack regiments into Rip. Sometimes, even the fall of Riga is said to have been part of the plot to dislodge the Bolsheviks from the army. One series of events, however, may give rise to the belief that anunder* mining of the Latvian Streiki regiments was underfoot: the numerousre­ ports indicating vicious anti-Latvian rumors among non-Latvian troops stationed in Riga. This was acknowledged by a Cossack representativea the Fourth Congress of the Streiki Soviet of Deputies, who admittedtint ugly rumors about the Latvians were rampant among the Cossacks: "When we came to Riga unbelievable rumors were circulated among us. But hav­ ing come here, we can see that they were lies, spread on purpose.^61Who­ ever the purpose for spreading these rumors might have been, they played into the hands of Bolsheviks who were continually looking for conter forces at work. The Bolsheviks were very unlikely to step back fromis explosive or tense situation, as Ribe’s statement at the congress mayindi­ cate: “The Cossacks should not listen to the rumormongering of the ‘darf people. If, because of the vicious slanders, national hatreds will arise.Ü after this demagogy any spilling of blood will occur, and if Latviansare persecuted on the streets of Riga, then it just may happen that the dOjOOO man Latvian Army will come to the aid of their families, and that die

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regiments will leave the front lines and what will happen then.”** These "ugly*' rumors seem to have had no noticeable effect on the events in Latvia. Even if there had been a plan to dissolve the Latvian regiments, the German attack certainly put an end to it. Did the new tactical course work? The performance of the Streiki during the defense of Riga, August 19-21, Is noteworthy. Was it the tradi­ tional Latvian enmity against the Germans, some latent residue of tarist war propaganda from 1914 that reawakened the fighting spirit of the Streiki, or was the new tactical education responsible for it? Observers of the day, military and civilian, testify that those Latvian units in the path of the advancing German forces gave an excellent performance.** German strategy in taking Riga was to cross Daugava some thiry kilometers south­ east of Riga, cutting off escape routes to the east and north of the city, and the Latvian effort was significant inasmuch as the Strelki's stand at Mazi Jugla slowed down the German spearhead, allowing Russian forces toescape from the threatened encirclement (see map on p. 48). After the fall of Riga, the Provisional Government made a belated effort to contain Bolshevik influence among the Streiki. Brīvais strēlnieks was closed on August 26. In retrospect, this gesture at this late hour must be judged a futile oner a new newspaper. Latvju strēlnieks. with an identical editorial policy, appeared two days after the closing of Bn vais strēlnieks.70 In the period immediately following the fall of Riga, the Iskolastrel understandably was in disarray; but after it had reassembled, it acted with decisiveness. The most significant development in ideological and tactical matters prior to the uprising was the preparatory work for the eventual purge of undesirable officers from the regiments. During the uprising it­ self. the Latvian Streiki performed a number of significant tasks in the XII Army region: they were deployed to occupy the more important stra­ tegic railroad centers in Latvia, blocking troops loyal to the Provisional Government from reaching Petrograd; one regiment was ordered to depart for Petrograd on October 24, but did not; the Bolsheviks from Izkolastrel were the largest component in the XII Army Revolutionary Committee that sprang into existence upon the eve of the uprising; and the Latvian contingent was important in the tumbling of Iskosol, especially in per­ forming agitational work among the Russian troops, and in armed demon­ strations outside the building where the crucial meetings of the Iskosol weretaking place.

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THE LATVIAN IMPACT

The performance of the Latvian Streiki during the uprising provedcor* rect the prediction of Bārda, one of the most seasoned Bolsheviks, whena the Fourth Congress of the Streiki Soviet of Deputies, he said: “Hew and shall remain the Social Democratic armed force.*' Fēlikss Cielens, in his memoirs, has left the following descriptionof\k Streiki as he saw them during the fall of 1917: The Latvian soldiers. . .did not appear tired with their inns hag' ing, or staggering. They marched alertly in formations, led by their proven officers and vibrantly sang their songs. Heartfelt, as earlier, they sang their national songs, and their steps rushed forward inn echoing, disciplined rhythm. The cavalry, who sat firmly in theiriri­ dié, appeared especially exalted and seemed ready at any momeotto break into gallop, to defend some illusory justice. I did not meet any Latvian deserters who might have left their units in order to satetheir skins, as did thousands upon thousands of Russian soldiers, whosin­ fully left the battlefield and dragged themselves to the villages. No, the Latvian Streiki did not feel tired at the end of 1917... .hen not psychic fatigue that made the Latvian Streiki go over to theBol­ shevik side. This was especially clearly demonstrated by theirmili­ tary activity and heroism in the next three years on all frontsoftk Russian civil war.72 What is one to make of the evidence brought forward by dēlēns? He himself seems to suggest that what he saw was the traditional enthusma of Latvian youngsters. To us, however, it seems that what Cielens reported having seen may be a reflection of a new post-revolutionary ethos, thecon­ sequence of Bolshevik design to hone the Streiki into a revolutionarystrike force. As the Russian Army was disintegrating, the Latvian Bolsheviks woe shaping the Streiki in the opposite direction. Instead of demobilization, which was the Russian Bolshevik line, a new kind of "nationalist" idea began to surface within the Iskolastrel in September: the reorganization of the Streiki regiments into a corps, a self-sufficient, military formadoa. At the beginning of the revolution, some Latvian military men nisei the possibility of organizing the Latvian Streiki into a corps, but at tlut time, the Bolsheviks considered it a nationalist/military stratagem, tb»

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unacceptable. In September, the plan was raised again, this time by the Bolsheviks. In the Iskolastrel session of September 29, there occurred the following debate: K. Petersons notes that there has been discussion about the Latvian Streiki corps already before, even in the time of the First Iskolastrel, and it is known what our attitude towards it was at the time. Now the conditions are different, and we can regard the problem differ* ently. Captain Ozols and Colonel Vācietis are in favor of it, and they think the formation of a corps would ease the Latvian situation. Commissar Woytinski and the Ministerof War, Berchovski, and otliers with whom Ozols and Vācietis have discussed the question, are also in favor of it. . . . Steinhards: Now there could be no question, even if we would sup* port the idea, that it would mean supporting militarism.73 All but one of the speakers expressed themselves In favor of the corps, but no final decision was taken at that session. Later in the year, Decem­ ber, actual steps were taken to organize a corps. (Apropos the corps also see p. 357).

Semyon Nachimson’s Arrival in Vidzeme The question is at whose bidding did Nachimson arrive in Vidzeme? On the formal level, the answer is clear enough. In a brief article in Latvju m ītnieks of September 4, it is reported that a delegation from Iskolastrel, having arrived in Petrograd, requested the military section of the Central Executive Committee to have Nachimson delegated to Vidzeme to be­ come a commissar of the Latvian Streiki regiments. The article reports that Nachimson was selected by the Riga Soviet which means the decision occurred before the fall of Riga on August 20.74 The request was made, latvju strēlnieks explained, because: after the heavy battles the Latvian Streiki especially feel a need for a Commissar in whom they could have full confidence. As the best candidate for the post, they consider Nachimson, who was himself bom in Kurzeme, knows the Latvian language, and is familiar with Latvian life and customs and whom we know from his previous work in the ranks of Latvian Social Democracy.73

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The request was signed by K. Pētersons and Faporshchik E.Ctmmennns. The newspaper concluded the report: **Wc are waiting for our Cbmmissar, but when will he arrive?" It took Nachimson almost twenty dayi to arrive in Vidzeme and assume his charge. Whatever took himthat long cannot be ascertained, but we know that soon after the Latvian reqiwt on September 6, Nachimson received 1000 rtibles for the purposesofthe Northern Front. As far as the invitation of Nachimson goes, that is about all of theca­ dence that we have available. On the day of Nachimson*» arrival inVidz­ eme, Sverdlov, one of Lenin's troubleshooters in the Russian CC, wrotei letter to the Russian party people in Cēsis in which they were informedof Nachimson'; arrival and advised on sundry matters: At the same time as we received your letter, we also hadaooivenation with Comrades from the Latvian CC. From what welow learned, the best solution would be to issue in Cēsis a newspaper Okopnaya nabad, which at one time already enjoyed some popu­ larity among the local soldiers. The newspaper O tklitipm di yoacm convert into a popular weekly. We are urging you to seek agree­ ment with the Latvian SD CC about all procedures and plans. Any conflict with them would be highly undesirable. Comrade Nadiinson, who has worked for us a long time, is leaving for Cēsis today. In any case, a united organization is desirable. We hope that youwd be successful in your work and properly fulfill your assignments.* Upon arrival Nachimson was appointed Commissar of the LatvianStrei­ ki regiments, and thereafter this charismatic, energetic, and inspiredttiobtionary earned an eternal place in the revolutionary history of Uni» through his activities and oratory. His hand was everywhere: he wrote articles and resolutions, orated and organized. As it turned out. Us itnb mission in Vidzeme was not to be a Commissar of the Streiki, but father to use his position with the Streiki to Bolshevize the soviet of the XII Army and its executive committee, Iskosol, in which Mensheviks andSR continued to prevail. One of the early activities in which Nachimsonen­ gaged was to expand the activities of the Leftist Bloc in the XII Amy. which began to be used as the lever to unseat the Mensheviks inthe fatolat. As long as the Iskosol continued to exercise control, with Us senin Valka, the crucial railroad center for passage to Petrograd, the mobld)

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of (he Latvian Streiki, especially their move to Petrograd, was restricted or at least entailed some danger. The ultimate victory over bkosol came on November 15, but it was already seriously damaged by October 28. The first shipment of Latvian Streiki left for Petrograd on November 23. The following Is a calendar of some of Nadtimson’s activities in Vidz* cme, as they have been noted in collections of documents and the press of the time. September 20. Nactiimson arrives in Cēsis. Swrdlov writes to Russian Comrades in Cēsis informing them of Nachimson'* arrival. Suggests that OkopnU m bat be published. Iskolastrei In its session of the date makes Nachimson Commissar of the Streiki regiments.7* September 27. Nachimson discusses the takeover of bkosol at the fekolastrel session. September 29. Urges Iskolastrei to send telegrams to Finland and the Petrograd Soviet concerning the government's plans to sent out révolu* tionary troops from Finland. The idea of the Latvian Streiki Corps is discussed. October 1. Nachimson speaks at a street rally in Cēsis. October 3. iskolastrei organizes instructional courses that would pre­ pare propagandists for the forthcoming elections of the Constituent Asiembly. Nachimson proposes that all Latvian and Russian regiments send five men to these classes. October 3. Pressured by the Leftist Bloc, the Little XII Army Soviel decides to call for the reelection of bkosol. Nachimson Is one of the chief spokesmen for the Leftist Bloc. The newly redccted lskosol was to meet on October 28. October 5. In executive session, Iskolastrei considers plans against a possible dispersement of the Latvian regiments. Iskolastrei accepts a resolution proposed by Nachimson that, should the regiments be sur­ rounded and punitive forces initiate action, the regiments would not lay down their arms but would fight to the last.71 The Soldiers* Assembly organized by the Leftist Bk>c meets inCēsis. Nachimson presents the major oration; assembly sends greetings to the Petrograd Soviet, approving of its decision to oppose the Provisional Government.79

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THELATVIANIM PACT

October 12. The Latvian SD XII Army Military organization meetsand makes up the list of candidates for the Constituent Assembly election in the Northern Front. Nachimson's name is placed second after Leon's. The conference decides to resume the publication of Okopniinabai Nachimson enters the editorial collective as a representative of the Litvian SD. He is given veto power over the material published "in those cases when the material to be published Is not in accordance withthe political line of the RSDWP or the Latvian SD." 80 October 13. Nachimson writes an article in Okopniinabat: "Long list the Defense of Revolutionary Petrograd." October 15. Nachimson Is elected to preside over the conference of RSDP Military organizations of the Northern Front. Delegates fromfor­ ces in Finland and the V Army are present. This is one of the highpoints of Nachimson's Activities in Vidzeme. October 17. Nachimson might have met with Antonov-Ovseienko.n October 18. The Military Revolutionary Committee of the XII Amy Region is organized. Nachimson enters it. representing the Leftist Bloc of the XII Army. October 20. In the extended plenum of Iskolastrel. Nachimson isof­ ficially sanctioned as Commissar of the Streiki regiments. Reports oa the "Present Situation." Enters into the committee to work out the final resolution of the conference.02 October 24. Nachimson and CarinS sign an order for the 5th Zemgak Regiment to prepare for departure to Petrograd. The departure does not take place.83 October 28-21. Nachimson spearheads the downfall of Iskosol. Leadsthe leftist forces at the Conference of the XII Army Soviet of Deputies, lie ends his oration with the words: ‘Towards left or the right—there isno longer a middle ground! . . .long applause that becomes an ovationre­ sounding through the auditorium and from the spectators in the bal­ cony." 84 The Congress closes about evenly split-245 support the Left­ ist Bloc and the same number the opposition. The non-Bolshevik part of the Iskosol establishes itself in Valka. A new Congress is called for November 14. November 7. Latvian Streiki march into Valka, taking the city under their control.

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November 14« Nachimson is elected to the chairmanship of Iskosol. November 24. Nachimson delivers the send-off oration to the Special Battalion of the Streiki departing from Valka to Petrograd» December 7. Nachimson writes to Iskolastrel in Cēsis that permission has been obtained to organize a Latvian revolutionary corps. “Let me express my deepest conviction once more that the Latvian red revolu­ tionary regiments, getting their own artillery and having uniiled into a powerful Latvian corps, will be that granite rock against which all counterrevolutionary obscurantist reactionary plans and endeavors will crumble/*85 Hie Conference of Bolshevik War Organizations in the Northern Front This was the first conference of Bolshevik representatives from all bran­ ches of the military: land and sea, located in the “area.” With the excep­ tion of Petrograd, the main trouble makers of the “rotten triangle,” the two outer wings got together to compare notes and establish communica­ tions. The ultimate aim of the confemece seems to have been to establish I network, for concerted action to be sure, but also one that would stay intact regardless of what may happen to other administrative structures in the area. The main link that was created was between the Baltic fleet and the XII Army. More than UjOOO Bolshevik members were represented at the Cēsis Conference: 9000 from forces in Fin!and,2000 from the V Army, and 2194 from the XII Army. Understandably, the Xll Army had the full­ est representation, sending 11 delegates, and of the nationalities, the Lat­ vians outweighed the rest. This was especially striking since Jānis Roze, from Finland, representing the Soviet of Soldiers, Workers, and Peasants of the Northern Region, was also a Latvian. To the Presidium were elected Nachimson,chairman; Roze and Vasiliev, vice-chairman; Vanags,secretary; Kiksand Sologubov, secretary's assistants. Vasiliev, Jurevics,and Sologubov comprised the Credentials Committee. Altogether, the conference was at­ tended by fourteen official delegates (2 from Finland, 1 from the V Army) and two unofficial ones from Yamberg, lacking full credentials. The first item on the agenda was the reports from localities which con­ tained much information about the growth of the Bolshevik movement, its problems and accomplishments, in the main military units of the area.

THELATVIANW PACî

218

The next item of discussion was the forthcoming Constituent AssemNj elections, and a Bolshevik ticket for the Northern Front containingtwentyfive names was decided upon. The slate was headed by Lenin and foilowd by Smilga, Nachimson,Stučka, and Antonov-Ovscicnko in the fifthposi­ tion. Of the first five spots, three were Latvians, and the list at largecon­ tained another eight Latvian names and several other Latvian SOput; members. Judging from the first names and patronymics, about five« the list were of Jewish origin (see the table on p. 88). On the organizational question, there was much discussion wHhrepri to the need for cooperation of the various sections of the military,«peaally between Finland and Latvia. Many questions were addressed tothe man from the V Army about the status of Bolshevik organization their and prospects for further "democratization" of the Army Soviet. Anex» tended discussion was devoted to a proposal to organize a networkof party bureaus on all levels of the military that would serve as astableconduit of communications, ensuring continuous flow of money and receiptof literature. Propaganda schools were also proposed as much needed vebfclcs for the growth of Bolshevism. The most important item on the agenda was the discussion on the"Pre­ sent Situation" which was stated by Nachimson. The main themeofkis talk, one that become the major point of discussion, was that the revoltlion in Petrograd was in danger of being betrayed by bourgeois/imperiafists. The recent events have shown that the bourgeoisie is promotiM the fall of Petrograd. The bourgeoisie of the whole world arestring as quickly as possible to conclude an anti-democratic peace. Ofp«’ zaiions have decided that regardless of risks, Petrograd must besswJ. The present military command will not save Petrograd, and therefore the Petrograd Soviet, in order to defend the city, established itsoua revolutionary military command. Roze echoed the theme: Riga was given up, and so was Oesel, and now the surrenderof Petrograd is prepared. We can not allow the enemy to enter fttrognd because that would mean the death blow to the revolution.... The bourgeoisie intends to lead the workers to utter exhaustion in order to destroy the revolution. . . .

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Th« forces in Finland are ready on a minute’s notice to come to the defense of Petrograd and to go out to the front, exchange them* selves for the front line troops. But, while they desire to keep us in the rear, fearing our ‘redness* and in our place to move in cossacks, we are not leaving our place. Com. Nachimson; The present moment is one of general conspiracy, threaded be­ tween Petrograd-London—Berlin. The total inactivity of the British fleet points towards that conclusion. The same is evident in the deci­ sions of the Minister of War, regarding loves for older years, and the nonrcplaccment of the troops at the front with those from the rear. The transfer of the capital to Moscow is undertaken for the purpose to destroy the will of the masses to defend Petrograd. The Provi­ sional Government wants to disperse the Constituent Assembly. The S.R. and the Mensheviks are conducting a vicious campaign against the Congress, because they anticipate the rise of Bolshevism in the capital. The strongest words, as reflected in the minutes, were delivered by sailor Sologubov: We must move from words to deeds, otherwise the struggle will fizzle out as it did in July 3-5. Hasty organization will lead to quick collapse. The sailors are in the highest stage of tension. Telegrams were sent to the RSDW (b)P CC, to the Central Committee of the party's War Organization in Petrograd, to the prisoners on hunger strikes in the Kresti Prison, and to Lenin. The telegram to the party’s CC read: The First Conference of Bolshevik War Organizations salutes you, dear comrades, and expresses their fullest consent and solidarity with tlie tactical line which you have taken on all internal and external questions. The telegram lo Lenin notified him that he had been placed at the head of the list of candidates from the Northern Front for the election of the

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THE LATVIAN IMPACT

Constituent Assembly and expressed the fullest confidence» himatthe defender of workers, soldiers and peasants. All telegrams were spiedby Nachimson and sailor Sologubov.*7 Antonov-Ovsienko Minion to Valka Alexander Rabinowich has posited a theory that the Bolshevikshadatended to commence the insurrection on November 11*12Tthe medjpf dates of the Northern Region's Congress of Soviets, which Rabmovidi claims, quoting Lācis, was to declare itself the government. But, dueio doubts and moderation among many key Bolsheviks, the plan didsot materialize. For the purposes here it is not necessary to cast doubt outlie thorough and brilliant analysis that Rabinowich has madeofthemoodof the Bolsheviks in Petrograd on the eve of the assumption of power(is fact, his study substantiates our thesis of the pussilianimity of the Routa party), but In regards to the Northern Congress of Soviets, he hupea too much credence to the words of LScis, while glossing over thenote subtle explanation of the other Latvian, Smilga, that he also quotes: declared that the congress *would in all likelihoodhueto assume a tremendously important role in the political life of ik country.' 'It is no secret to anyone,* he went on to assert, thudefensists of all varieties are conducting a furious campaign againstik All-Russian Congress of Soviets. . . [and] that if we passivelysuit the twentieth, there will be no congress. It is necessary to rebuffthe onslaught of the defensists, not only with words but with deeds.Tk crisis is growing with extraordinary speed. The current statuscmhit only for a few days. . . . In this moment the regional congresscat have enormous significance.88 Smilga

Although they had previously sent telegrams to each other, thiswastk first time that many of the Bolsheviks of the region got together andsat each other face to face. Smilga's statement is consistent with manyolhn statements coming from the Bolshevik quarters about the maturing exists and the need for defensive action, but at the same time, it is not a‘‘com­ mitting” statement, as to the time of the decisive action. On the onehand, he is saying that action is needed now, let's begin now, but on theotkt

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he sets no deadlines, and in that sense it is a truly Leninist statement. In a certain sense, if we are not fetishists about time, we can say that the in« surrection did begin with the Northern Congress. There Is an irrevokablc line of development, a higher order of intensity, that begins with the Northern Congress of Soviets: Lenin had come back on the 10th, and it was, perhaps, the Congress, more than anything else happening in Petrograd, that lured Lenin back at the time. The Northern Congress, first scheduled to meet in Finland, was changed to Petrograd, in fact, the Smolny Institute, the site of Lenin*s later triumphs. In a certain sense, we can say that the Congress was to show Petrograd that Bolsheviks had real support in the area of Petrograd; it was, hi fact, a dress rehearsal, an adumbration, of the “invasion” that Lenin had planned for the capital. Fromthis point of view, we can also see why it was so important for Lenin to push the resolution of October 10 through his recalcitrant “Russian” CC. Lenin did not want to have delegates from the “area,” many of them non«Russians, to have their spirits dampened. Rabinowitch faite to see the real importance of the Congress because he thinks of the issue of power from the point of view of Petrograd alone. The significance of the North« ern Conference was to coordinate forces in the whole region; that it ac­ complished. For example, Rabinowich fails to note that at this Congress, the Latvian delegate, for the first time in a public forum, offered 4OJD00 men to come and help out the insurrection.3® The delegates returning to their constituencies knew what the situation was in the region, and from there on. they began to organize and prepare their resources. On October 1$, further plans for the region were compacted at the conference of the RSDSP (b) Military organization in Cēsis, which Rabinowich, due to his concentration on Petrograd, fails to mention. Nor does he mention Lenin's emissaries that, after the Northern Conference, radiated out from Petro­ gradthroughout the area. One of the most crucial trips that took place was Antonov-Ovseienko's mission to Valka, where he met with the Latviao partyand Streiki representatives. One factor that might have played a role in Antonov's mission which, at least from Antonov-Ovseienko's own account, gives a sense that it was ar­ ranged at short notice and might have had something to do with the “head count,” as Lenin and his closest aids were moving into the home stretch. Lenin had an obsession about having a surplus of power at the point of decisive action (lus reading of Clausewitz might have had something to do

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with it);*0 and when he heard that the Baltic sailors did not comea g the numbers that he had anticipated, he sent out AntoiKwOvstfcntoto Valka to reach for the Latvians, who had been pledging their supportfa the two preceding months. On the other hand, the “Latvian aidMnķfct have been in Lenin's plans all along. The situation, as it might have looked from the inside to the pbnwn of the uprising, may be gleaned from Antonov-0weienko’s memoirs,lie tells of a conversation with Lenin, on about October 14/15, inwhichbe gives a report on the available forces in the area surrounding Peirogsal The first to speak is Lenin: 'Can you not send the whole fleet into Petrograd?' ‘No. First the waterways are not suited for it, second, the bigship fear submarines and torpedo boats. And finally the sailorswouldact want to leave the front.' *But they should understand that the revolution is ingreaterdago in Petrograd than in the Baltic sea.* They are not so clear about that.' 'What can we then do?* Two three torpedo boats can be sent into Neva, and a detachment of sailors from Viborg gathered up. Altogether three thousandmen.' Too little,* Lenin said discontented and worried. 'And how is itö the Northern Front?* 'According to the reports of their representatives there is verygood atmosphere (and here without question Latvians are meant], andwe can expect great deal of help from them against the troops fron other fronts. But to find out for sure one would need to go their oneself/ Then go without hesitation.*01 Briefly thereafter, Antonov-Ovseienko is having a conversation with Dybenko, the inspired Bolshevik from the Baltic fleet, and in that con­ versation, we find out more about the Bolshevik difficulties in gettirç forces from Finland : We would leave our ships to a man, if we know that Petro­ grad won't make it — . But we don't have that impression. Wedont D ybenko:

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believe in the power of Kerensky. . . .We are going to stamp them out. Shouldn't the 5000 workers, ISOjOOOmen in the garrison.and the Kronstadters to boot be able to do It. We have heard tittle from the front. Who after Kornilov would dare to go against Petrograd. To be exact, if it came down to the bat struggle, we would sink the fleet to bar the way of the Germans to show unity.*2 In other words, the sailors are supporting the Bolsheviks, but they are not too eager to go to Petrograd, where Lenin wanted them to be. Later on in the evening, Antonov tells of his conversation with Lenin to Sverdlov, who gave him these directives: In Cēsis at the present our Conference is going on. [He means the Conference of Bolshevik Military Organizations of the Northern Front ). You know the line of our Central Committee. Hold them to it. The task is merely practical. The more troops to be had for Petro­ grad the better.*9 If, from the conversation with Lenin, Antonov-Ovseienko's mission was to ascertain the general situation in the Northern Front and to see how the Latvians could be used for stopping front-line troops from coming to Petro­ grad, then Sverdlov unmistakably asks him to get the Latvian Streiki into Petrograd. As we shall see, both assignments were discussed at the Valka meeting. In the evening of October 16, Antonov-Ovseienko reaches Valka where he meets with the Latvian party and Streiki political leadership in an extra­ ordinary and secret conference of the Latvian CC. Streiki guards were post­ ed on the streets and around the house in Valka where the conference met. Antonov writes: The Party Conference was in progress when I arrived, the partici­ pants were full of youthful vivacity and mature decisiveness. Out of tum I was given the floor. I made a short, compressed address with the following concluding words: *We are going towards an uprising, for the establishment of the Soviet power. In this a great responsi­ bility lies on the Northern Front. . . . * During a break, there is a matter-of-fact conversation with the leading cadres who want to know the specific details. In silence and

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with great attention they listen to the directives of llichandfoo* it in detail. What can one do? Their general lurnmation wji:H’efei ourselves to be defenders of Petrograd. We consider the Germing lies of the counterrevolution, its main force. One could very get the Latvian Streiki to inarch to Petrograd to help the protonu. But during the battles they have become linked with the Sferiu Corps. If the Latvians will pull out, so will the Siberians (them nothing that can stop them).The front will be vacated.. .therefor: caution is recommended. But, in view of my pressuring, they promised to prepareacough of Latvian regiments for Petrograd within one week. . . . We have to dismiss the Commander of the tl Latvian Brigade.V< have a commander, a good fighter who is close to us.Vadetis-hia we shall choose. We shall immediately send the I and 3. Regmecti to C?sis and 6 . and 7. to Valka;and thus we will be closer toourgod. We shall set the specific dates of these troop movements. Satisfied. Heft." Vowing to support the insurrection, the Extraordinary Conferencepo sed a resolutk>nt the final paragraph of which read as follows: Entering into this struggle, the task of the Latvian proletariatisto unite most firmly with the workers of revolutionary Russia, not to separate themselves out of the struggles and victories of Rush's workers, and to consider, as its highest duty, by all possiblemeans, to support the proletariat's struggle for the transfer of powertothe Soviet of Workers, Soldiers, and Landless Peasant Deputies inIk revolutionary center (Petrograd, Moscow, etc.)." The Latvian accounts in all particulars substantiate Antonov-Ovseienko's memoir recollections. Since we do not have the schedule that the Latvia» and AntonowOvscienko agreed upon, we do not know how punctual the Latvians were in fulfilling the agreement, but the maneuvers that Antonov Ovseienko mentions were carried out. That very night, the participants of the Extraordinary Confereace kfi for their locations. Streiki regiments and party cells to carryout thedeev ' sions of the conference. In addition to the strategic and tactical deramu at the conference, one of the direct consequences of the meetaig with ;

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225

Antonov-Ovseicnko wai stepping up the organization or a multilevel itmcturc o f undercover military revolutionary committees: centrally, it would be prepared to take charge o f the whole XII Army territory, and in the regiments, it would fill out the structure. A nucleus of the XII Army Mill' tary Revolutionary Committee had already been in operation for the last three weeks (see p. 213). Whatever other controls the Bolsheviks had over the military command, they were superseded by this new surreptitious structure: in CSsb, the central XII Army Military Revolutionary Commit* tee was organized under the charge o f Kachimaon, tirini» and Markus, and in each regiment, a three-man committee was organized. By about October 19, this military revolutionary committee structure was ready. K. Poēma, a delegate from the 3rd Latvian Streiki regiment, tells about his return from Valka to Cēsis: A trip from Valka to Cēsis, that under normal traffic conditions would take only a few hours, took us a day and a half. In every sia* tron we changed to the first departing train. . . .We arrived in the Regiment at 2 after midnight. (Poēma informed his tarty Collective that very night | , and immediately a three man illegal Military Revo* lui binary Committee was set up. During the next few days we visited with streiki in the companies, conversing with them, and letting them understand that perhaps in the next few days they will have to come out with weapons against the present government.** The Latvian’s promise to send a couple of regiments to Petrograd did not materialize within the promised week. The Latvians were, perhaps, overhasty in making that promise. For one, the railroad was not under ful Bolshevik control, and for another. Valka, a point through which the Streiki would need to pass, was still under t he control of lskosol with an unknown number o f troops loyal to it. Yet, according to A. Rcders* account, on about October 24, the 5lh Zemgale Regiment received orders from the XII Army Militaiy Revolu­ tionary Committee In Cēsis to prepare for departure to Petrograd. Right there, during a break in a meeting,! received a signed order from the XII Army Revolutionary Committee's leadership, Nachimton and C arint to return to my regiment and keep it battle ready. so that k could at a moment's notice depart for fttrograd to help the aimed workers there.*7

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TIIE LAT\'IAXIM PACT

For some reason« (his extraordinary evidence has neither betnaiuiņt! or commented upon by any Soviet Latvian historian nor mentioned»tie memoirs of the higher Latvian Bolshevik leadership. On acertainIeveltie preparation of the regiment would be consistent with the Latvianproca to prepare two regiments for shipment to Petrograd as Antonov-Oroesk recollected. But why has this activity by the 5th Latvian Regimetnta ignored by historians and memoirists? An answer may be that theprepay lion of the regiment took place without full authorization of theLueo party. Perhaps it was some kind of a plot concocted by Antonov-Ovseiflto and Nachimson to sneak through a Latvian regiment to Petrograd.ihc£ the uprising there misfire. The surreptitious nature of the plan canbede­ tected from Rcdcrs’ own account : First of all I went to the Regimental Committee. We decided» call together a larger meeting of the Regimental Committee, tonisi we also invited company and command confidants (rotu unM i aktīvu]. I informed the assembly about five Revolutionary Cocmittcc's order to have our regiment ready. AU company and command representatives expressed theirbe­ lief that the news wUI be received by the streiki of the 5thRep ment with enthusiasm. And so it was. Apsils was confirmed as the Regimental Commissar. Although! was late at night, all party comrades-members of the Regimenal Committee-were ordered to go to their companies and commads and to call a meeting immediately, informing their party coranda beforehand.* A committee was selected, consisting of Apinis, Apsilis, and Reden.io go to Colonel Videtis, the commander of the regiment, to informta that the Revolutionary Committee had the highest authority and that a had ordered his regiment to prepare for departure to Petrograd. It is difficult to say what was in his mind, and how the Colond received the news. There was a moment*! silence. When weinquire! whether he wUI lead the regiment. Colonel Videtis calmlymidseri­ ously answered: *1 always have been and will continue to be toget- ' her with the ZemgalJans; wherever they go, I shall go.** ;

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Reders continues:

Soon thereafter we received the order from the Revolutionary Committee to depart for Valmiera« board the railroad cars, and be ready for departure to Petrograd. It was already in Valmiera (if I mistake not, on October 27) that we received the news that the Provisional Government had been top­ pled, that the state power has been transferred to the Workers, Sold­ iers, and Peasant Soviet of Deputies... .The Regiment did not need to depart for Petrograd.100 In other words, what we can say about Reders* account, which is wry believable, is that the 5th Regiment was partof a contingency plan,anadded measure of safety. Sending the Streiki to Petrograd around the 27th would have entailed some risks, but had anything failed In Petrograd, the Streiki would have been shipped through to the capital in spite of the hazards. According to T. Draudins, editor of Brīvais strēlnieks and participant at the Extraordinary Conference, Antonov-Ovseienko left Valka on afreight car for C5sfs where lie met Nachimson, The information about Antonov's and Nachimson’s meeting, though coming from a reliable source, has not been substantiated by any other source; thus, we must conclude that it did not take place.101 The Petrograd "Insurrection" in Vidzeme Manyaspects of Bolshevik ascendancy, if not takeover of power, in Lat­ viahaw been described in previous chapters; here it remains to show how theewnts that Lenin was brewing for Petrograd were reflected in Vidzeme. Was there a deadline for insurrection in Petrograd? That seems to be a question that many Western historians consider very significant, but one that so far has eluded a definite answer. Even Trotsky did not knowof a deadline. "The strategic plan underwent changes in the matter of dates abo " Trotsky wrote, "and that in two directions: the insurrection began earlier and ended later chan had been indicated.**100 Indicated by what? Trouky does not tell us, and it is most likely that he did not know. To a degree. Trotsky has the same biases regarding Petrograd as many his­ torians who, since his days, have followed his logic and constructed his­ tories fromthe information that he has provided.

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THI: LATVIAN IMPACT

Looking from the Latvian point of view, the final push for insurrectioe began with Antonov-Ovseienko's visit to Valka, which is to sayonorabou October 18, because it took that long for the Latvian organizers to retun to their stations. The Military Revolutionary Committee was set upb) that date, and the Latvian units were honeycombed with the “new"auarreel ionary Bolshevik structure. By the 20th. the Latvians were readyfor news from Petrograd. From the 2Sth on, the Military RevolutionaryCassmittee was in continuous session in C?sis and so was the editorial officeof Latvju strēlnieks in Valka. The Petrograd contacts had led themto bebew that the going would be tough in Petrograd, and that Latvians wouldneed to go there to help them in their struggle. Telegrams were slow to am* in Latvia since the government continued to control the local Pskov anJ Valka telegraph offices. The news via Tallin-Tartu finally reached Latvia, late on November 25, that the Provisional Government had fallen.** Re Latvians, especially the Sth Regiment, which was already under ordersto depart, received the news with relief. The “success*’ in Petrograd p# them a breathing spell, time to settle a few tactical mows, securing aOmiroad junctions, and exploding the Iskosol right there tn Latvia. In Latvia, the Bolshevik rhetoric became increasingly strident astheisdeterminate deadline for the insurrection was approaching. Though there were many resolutions and articles throughout the year anticipating the Bolshevik insurrection, and there were many in the last part of September and early part of October, only on October 21, is there an article written“On the Eve.“ We are standing on the eve of extremely important changes. The air is full of electricity and the first spark may ignite it. . . .Ever) step now needs to be doubly considered, we must use all our means, consolidate our organizations, to be ready for the moment to pan) the bourgeois challenge: Death to the Soviets!-which during the next few days they are preparing to do. We must gather all our força to have the Soviets take power into their hands. This taking and keeping of power will not occur without struggle. It will requireim­ mense forces, but th at h o u r on ly way ou t, there is no other exit. Lei us prepare for the imminent struggle!104 On the 25th, in Okopnii nabad. there is an article (most likely pennedby Nachimson)—“It Smells of Gunpowder."I#*

Ufvtaiti am i i. a tin

229

Injsimuh as the Bolsheviks in Latvia were In full control of the civilian sector before the push for power in Petrograd, the main activity during these days in Latvia was military In nature. We could say that a new phase of activities in Vidzeme began on October 18, when the Xlt Army Military Revolutionary Committee, a small unofficial body, was given a broader representation and firmer structure. In a certain sense, ihc XII Army Mili* nrv Revolutionary Committee became the **motor of Revolution** to use an Antonov-0 vseienko phrase. Although the XII Army Military Révolu« lioiiary Committer should have basically consisted of Russians, it was ah most purely a Latvian organization. Until October 26, it considered itself an tllegal and surreptitious body. It was composed of the following: J. KrSntinJ (PiUts). representing the Latvian $D CC; K. Gailis, representing Iskolat; A. G. Vasilicv, representing the Latvian SD Military Organization vi the XII Army; Nachimson, representing the Leftist Bloc; Fr. Markus, representing the Soviet of XJI Army Workers; J. Carinl, J. Jakobson, and N Tihbs. representing the Iskolastrcl; K. Kauliņi, representing the Val* mkra Soviet; and representatives from the Soviets of CSsfe. Valka, and Tutu, farm! became the chairman and Fr. Markuss his assistant,14* Markuss, on November 1 in Brim is strēlnieks, published an article ex« plainingthe activities of the Military Revolutionary Committee. At the moment, in the Committee are represented nine organi­ zations, many regiments, and divisions. Regiments and divisions, loving learned about the establishment of the Military Revolution­ ary Committee, search out contacts and inform us that they will fol­ low the directives of the Committee and carry out all of its orders. .. .Many people are unclear about the course of action and what to do and constantly are requesting of our commissars the calling of meetings and rallies., . .Consequently (lie Military Revolutionary Committee is in constant action. Our people are working from 8 in the morning until 2-3 at night, without food and rest, for there is so much to do. Although the Committee was organized only a couple ofdaysagu;itsrangeof activities is very broad. The Committee needs to pronounce on everything! Soldiers are approaching the Committee withall kinds of questions and are satisfied only when we have given theman answer. They do not believe in anything or listen to any­ body. For example, a soldier comes in with an order or some other paper in lus hand and tells us that the company, regiment or division

230

the Latvian oipjkt

is waiting for an answer, and that they will only then canyon order if the Military Revolutionary Committee wil tell thaniei;

In retrospect, the line of the Latvian victory over the XIIArrayttptj very clear and simple. There was simply no resistance. Wecaaaoi «Uti! certainty whether there were any anti-Roishcvik troops intheXIIAro region to start a Civil War against the Latvians. There wascertainlyrace eager to fight them. According to Melgunov, the whole structureoftit Russian military, especially at the top, was tom by contradictionsafterde Kornilov interlude: their inclination was to stayout of politics. TheHow* throughout the summer a bastion of anti-Bolshevism, on October25n in expectation of a new congress called for October 28 in Ch», fed* date, it emerged from the conference badly split : the old Socialist Rnob tionary, Menshevik fskoso! being able to control only 50%of thekb gates. The Congress ended with two Iskosols-a Bolshevikone inChtai the SR/Menshevik one in Valka. To resolve the split, a newCongress ofik XII Arm y Soviets was scheduled for November IS .1®*

In assessing the Latvianrole during the first week of the Bolsheviktoesection, one must be moderate inone's claims and keep the eventsis Frao> grad and the Northern Front in perspective. There was a direct iJmm linkage, between the XII Army region and Petrograd. We must recalltha Kerensky went as far as Pskov, gathered up some Cossack troops, letand to Gatchina, and threatened Petrograd. Nothing came of this venture,b« we must note the reasons for its failure. The troops promised to Keremky. which were to follow him to Gatchina, never arrived: and the reasoavbf they did not has a great deal to do with the Latvians making troublewith­ in the XII Army region. About the Latvian role we can say: 1. that the railroads out of Latvia were controlled indirectly byStreiki all along, beingquartered within striking distance of the key railroad junctions: 2. within the first week, the Streiki look direct control of CKsts, Val­ miera, and Tartustations; 3. Valka, being the seat of the XII Army Headquarters andof Iskosoi, was the problemfromthe Bolshevik point of view;and 4. the Russian military who were loyal to the Kerensky government were put on notice by the Latvians, and they feared sending troops

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231

to Petrograd lest they denude the junctures and open up the way for Latvians to Petrograd. It is to be recalled that until the early days of November, there were loyal troops available in Pskov, but they were not sent to Petrograd.109 Melgunov reports a conversation between Generals Dukbonin and Chere* misov in which this possibility of assault from the rear played a role: i did not for a minute think of moving the Third Finland Divi* sion and units of the Thirty-fifth Infantry Division to Petrograd after the events at Gatchina were over.. .but I made use of the emerging situation and of troop movements already in progress to carry out tasks of strategic significance.* Melgunovexplains: What Dukhonin meant, apparently, was that he wanted to count* eract the movement of Latvians in the Twelfth Army. According to General luzefovich, commander of the Twelfth Army, the Latvian units were carrying out an organized plan to seize power and take over the major railroad junctions. He believed that it was not com* pletely out of the question that this might be a cleverly elaborated plan by the German General Stiff, and the Latvians might be merely a blind tool in German hands.11* One can say, without exaggeration, that the Latvians had created, fromthe viewpoint of those who wanted to “save**Petrograd,a double-edged prob­ lem. They had inserted another factor into a situation that was difficult to begin with. Had the headquarters had massive troop support, the 301000 Latvian Streiki would not have been a problem: but with so few loyal troops, the military could not afford to spread them out too thin. The Russian military did not fully know what the Latvians were up to, but their ignorance of the Latvian tactical moves might have immobilized them more than if they had actually known what was going on. General luze* fovich, commander of the XII Army, notified General Cheremisov, com­ mander of the XII Front, on October 28: *'The Military Revolutionary Committee in CCsis is saying that it has given the Latvians some special assignment, but does not indicate—what.*'1,1

232

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

In time, this double-edged position was turned into a real Latvi»ad­ vantage in which the power moves were for the Latvians to call. Onthe other hand, it is not very clear how the Latvians would have gottentbe Streiki through to Petrograd had they been determined to send themat was promised to Antonov-Osveienko. Within the first two weeksbefore they secured Valka, the endeavor was uncalculablc, but most likelythey could not have made it without armed encounters. By some ruse, therepments might have sneaked through before October 26. The deputychair­ man of Iskosol, Tumarkin.scrt a telegram to the headquartersof the 13th Corps on October 29: “Make sure that there are no railroadcarsandloco­ motives in the vicinity of the Latvian 2nd Brigade. That is necessaryto make unauthorized transport of troops more difficult.“113 On November 5, when the Streiki wanted to leave Valmiera to occupy Valka,adistance of about 80 km., they had no trains available. So they walked.111 The following chronology is a summary of events occurringbeforeand after October 25, illustrating the Latvian Streiki activities inVidzemeand their relentless and fateful push towards Petrograd. September 25. As early as September 25, the XII Army MilitaryRevo­ lutionary Committee was organized. In Petrograd, the parallel bodya organized only on October 9. October 3. The Leftist Bloc of the XII Army, led by Naddnuon. forces Iskosol to call for new elections of Iskosol. This step led tothe splitting of the Iskosol on October 28 and Bolshevik takeoveronNo­ vember 18. October 5. bkolastrel, in a closed session, discusses an allegedpi» by Iskosol to dissolve the Latvian Streiki regiments. A resolution u passed saying that the Streiki will fight to the last if the regimentsne surrounded and punitive measures initiated. October 10. Bolsheviks in Petrograd opt for taking power. October 10-11. The regular Latvian SD Military organization inCess decides to renew the Russian language Okopnii nobat. Nichiraoo enters the editorial board, representing the Latvian SD CCwiih vno powers over articles pertaining to the political line of tbe RSDWPCT and the Latvian SDCC. October 11. The Congress ofthe Northern Soviet meetsin the Smolry Institute, Petrograd. The Streiki representative declaresthat tbe Litvuns stand behind Soviet power and promises 40JOOOmen to helptamp*!

I-

Cl

Baltie of Valka. November 7,1917

w

to

w

234

THELATVIANIM PACT

October 12. Nachimson, the Commissar of the Latvian Streiki,sends a dispatch to the Petrograd garrison and proletariat in which he reports that broad soldier masses are condemning the Iskosol for arousingsus­ picions among the soldiers about the home front. October 13. Nachimson writes an article in Okopnit nabat sayingthat the counterrevolutionaries have decided to surrender Petrograd toGer­ many. Calls for the defense of Petrograd and the revolution.114 October 15. Streiki hold a rally in a Cēsis church. Break the lockto get in. Topic of discussion: Constituent Assembly. Speakers: Cariai. Markus, and Vilks. October 15*16. The RSDWP Bolshevik War Organization of the Northern Front meets in Cēsis. Claims to represent 13,000 from the V.XII Arm­ ies, and the troops stationed in the Finnish area. Nachimson, elected chairman of the conference, gives the main report on the current stir a tb n . stating that Petrograd must be defended against imperialist at­ tacks. He also writes about the conference to Lenin. From25 delegates at the conference, 14 were Latvian SD representatives. October 16. Special Conference of the Latvian SD meets inValka.V. A. Antonov-0vseienko (as emissary from Lenin), arrives fromPetrograd and discusses plans for an uprising that were made at the October 10 meeting of the Bolshevik CC in Petrograd. Anlonov-0 vseienko gives specific instructions about deployment of forces in the rear oftheXQ Army and asks the party to prepare units to be sent to Petrogradif needed for its defense. The conference fully endorses the Bolshevik Central Committee's decision of October 10 and resolves that in tht course of preparing for the forthcoming struggle, the task of the Lat­ vian proletariat is to maintain the closest solidarity with the revolution­ ary workers in Petrograd and Moscow, and to hold as its duty every­ where with all power and means to support Russia's proletariat inthf struggle for the taking of power.*111 The conference also decidestopre­ pare two Streiki regiments for duty in Petrograd; to make an offer to Colonel J. Vācietis to become the commander of the Latvian Sttelki; to organize in each Latvian regiment an illegal Revolutionary WarCom­ mittee consisting of three members; to organize a Revolutionary W ar Committee for the XII Army legion. (See the entry under October IS.) October 18. An underground Revolutionary War Committee for the XII Army region is organized.

Colone) Jukums Vācietis in the Spring, 1917

THE LATVIAN^

236

Līdums is invaded and taken over by armed Streiki who leave printing a proclamation. October 19, The 3rd Latvian Streiki Regiment holds a rally in ik Kempu church. The chairman points out that “a church is a houseof people« in which tortured and suppressed men can gather freely iniA darity to struggle against that spiritual darkness in which peopk (if smothered for centuries/ Comrade Lukevičs remarks, ‘Until nowth| church has served the interests o f masters and exploiters. Let in re«* ber the times o f slavery when the pastor used the pulpit to anooing

Latvians and Lenin

2 37

punishments meted out by the masters. Let us remember the three years of war and the number of prayers delivered for the sake of Nicholas the Bloody. Therefore, can there by any charges of sacrilege if we are going to talk about the welfare of the people here.’116 October 20. An enlarged conference of Iskolastrei meets in CÊsts. Re* solves to support the taking of power by the Soviets. P. Barda declares: ’Let this be the last resolution because the time has come to go to work.'117 October 20 (?). The Revolutionary War Committee takes Colonel i. Vācietis into its confidence about the forthcoming events. He is rcported to have answered: “I have always been and shall confine to be at one with my troops; wherever they will go, I shall go.*lls October21. Latvju strēlnieks In a front page article, “On the Eve,” announces: ’Let’s be ready for the coming battle.* October24. Woytinsky sends a telegram to Iskolastrei saying that the formation of the Latvian Streiki Corps is allowed.119 October 25. Bolsheviks claim power in Petrograd. At the All-Russian Congress of the Soviet of Deputies in Petrograd, IskolastrePs representa­ tive K. Petersons challenges the report presented by Iskosol's representa­ tives Kuchin and Charash: ‘You have listened to the speeches of two delegates representing an Army Soviet, but these speeches would have had real value if the speakers had been true army representatives (stormy applause)... .They do not represent the soldiers. The Latvian Streikt repeatedly declared: No more resolutions! Power must be taken into ourhands. Let them go-thc army is not with them.*139 The editors of Latvju strēlnieks receive the news of the coup d’état inPetrograd. The paper publishes the news on the 26th. W. S. Woytinsky, the Commissar of the Northern Front, reports to Count Tolstoy in Petrograd, in a conversation over the direct line, that units for the defense of the revolution in Petrograd are being organized bythe Iskosol.121 October 26. The Revolutionary War Gommiltee of the XII Army re* gionlegalizes itself and publishes an announcement which begins: 'Among us there dare not be any traitors to the revolution, no soldier from the XIJ Army is permitted to be sent to Petrograd for the pur* poses of the shameful ’'calming of the people,*' that would be the mur­ der of our brothers.' The announcement also urges soldiers to remain

238

Tl IE LATVIAN IMPACT

united and to abstain from individual careless activities. It asks the tele« graph and railroad workers to disobey counterrevolutionary orders.11* Tire subsidiary Military Organizations on the regimental level also surface in Latvia. The XII Army War Organization Bureau publishes an announcement in Okopttava pntvda: ‘It has begun!. . . *‘Tire ice Iras cracked. . . .The river is alive. . . . Neither the revolutionary dreamers nor the counter* revolutionary provocateurs shall stop this majestically rushingstream.'111 Commissars are appointed to all XII Army Cdrps, divisions, and regt* meats. Iskosol issues a statement : ‘The last hour of the revolution has struck. A traitorous hand in Petrograd has started a civil war. . . .Com­ rades! In the dreaded moment of death you must fulfill your revolu­ tionary duty, you must save revolutionary Russia. . . . Do not act inde­ pendently, follow Iskosol. Only thus can we save ourselves. Let us ful­ fill our duty to the land, the fatherland, and to the revolution with honor.'m Screening of officers, in many cases leading to their temporary ar­ rest, begins in Latvian Regiments. Hie XII Army Military Revolutionary Committee orders the 1st and 3rd Latvian Streiki regiments to leave the fro n t lines and move toctus. The 6th and 7th Regiments are ordered to go to Valmiera. (circa) The 5 th Regiment ordered to prepare for departure to Petro­ grad. The 2nd and 4th Regiments were ordered to remain in their stations but be on the alert. October 27. The Committee to Save the Fatherland and the Revolu­ tion is founded in Valka. It calls the Revolutionary Committee inOtis false and conspiratorial and asks the latter's orders to be disregarded. The 1st and 3rd Regiments arrive in Cēsis without resistance. Rallies are held in the church of Cēsis. Lidums reports the people fed terrorized. Speakers defending the Provisional Government are ikm tolerated.125 October 28. (Circa) /Mika v?sth reports that in Cēsis there is a total Bolshevik dictatorship; printing shops are occupied by soldiers andcen sors. ‘Printers have been made to take an oath that nothing will be print ed without prior permission and signature. Guards have been posted a the doors of printers. An armed mob led by Maurins (Vatdavictis)biok
-1837, and (Autumaj7672. Sigurds Ziemelis, Leninisma Uzvara /atvijas Strādnieku Kusti*. Riga. 1977, pp. 232-234. For 1912, see Bruno Kalnins, Latvijas Sncittdemokrātijās SO gadi. Stockholm, 1956, p. 168. Abo A. Ezergailis, Jkt 19i 7 Revolution in Latvia. New York, 1974. p. 36. 5. Some of the testimonials of Russian revolutionary leaden are found in Latvju strēlnieku vestures komisija. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture. Vol. II, Maskava, 1928, pp. 778-782. 6. la tvju strēlnieks, October 11,1917. 7. The most detailed account of the Bolshevik difficulties in Petro­ grad is to be found in A. Rabinowich, Bolsheviks Come to Rawer, New York, 1976. Robert Daniel, The Red October, New York, 1967,pp. 165213. 8. V. 1. Lenm, 'The Present Situation in Russia and Tactics of the Workers' Party,” PartUniye izresiia. No. I, February 7 ,1906. as reprinted in Collected Works, 4th edition, Vol. tO. Moscow, 1962, p. 118. 9. S. P. Melgunov, The Bolshevik Seizure o f Rawer, Santa Barbara, 1 9 7 2 ,p. 4. 10. N. N. Sukhanov. The Russian Revolution. 1917, Vol. II, New Y ork, 1962, p .5 8 7 . 1 1. Pavel Maikov, Reminiscences o f a Kremlin Commandant, Moscow, 1964, pp. 67-68. 12. The most com plete volume that contains Lenin's statements about the Latvians is the Soviet published collection, Latvijas KP CK taigas vestures Instituts, V. /. Lenins par Revolucionāro kustību Latvija, Riga, 1969. 13. The two articles mentioned originally appeared in R rokteriif, September 13 and October 1 8 ,1 9 0 6 , respectively, and are reprinted from the 5th edition o f Lenin's works. Vol. I I , pp. 268-271 and Vol. 1 2 ,pp. 19-20. 14. The quotation is taken from an article "Guerrilla Warfare,” /Vok ta rti. September JO. 1906. Lenin. C ollected Works, 4th edition. Vol. II, pp. 217/118.

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15. J. Bērzins, “Pumās tikšanās ar Leninu" Latvijas KP CKPartijas vfdures institūts, Atminas par Vladimiru iljiču Lenhut, Riga, 1964. Bēr* jfr tdls us that Lenin was especially interested in the revolutionary move­ ment in Latvia and the activities of the Latvian party, pp. 74-83, Also see L Dribinl, "W. I. Lenin und die lettischen revolutionären Sozialdemo­ kraten in Petrograd (1905-1917), Wissenshaftliehe Zeitschrift der Unsrer* Stil Rostock, 1970, p. 66. 16. P. Dauge.P. Stučkas Dftve un Darbs, Riga, 1958, p. 246. 17. The literature on Lenin's participation at the IV Latvian SDCon* pns Is a very big one, but for the most informative source, see V. t. Lmms par revolucionāro kustibu Latvija, pp. 172*220. Also A. Ezergailis, We 1917 Revolution in Latvia. New York, 1974, pp. 29*32. 18. L. Dribinl, “Pēteris Stučka-Leninisko cuias ideju propagande* 1917, g." V. LeitSns and L. Dribinl (cds.) Oktobra Onu LiesmSs, Rip, 1977, p. 150. Also sec L. Dribini, “Pētera Stučkas Cīna par Latviefu Kvohicioniro Sociāldemokrātu apvienošanos ar Boļševiku Partiju 1905* 1907*. Revolūcijas laikā“ Latvijas PSR Zināmu Akadēmijas Vēstis, 1976, Nr. 10, pp. 8-18. 19. L. Drlbini, "Prometejs” cirto, Riga, 1972, p. 113. 20. The guard detachment of the dying Leninis described by Robert toync, The Life and Death o f Lenin, New York, 1964. Also see his The Life and Death o f Stalin, Numerous Latvians have left their recollections of Lenin, among them his servants. See Latvijas KPCKhrtijas Vestures Institūts, Par Leninu, Latvijas revolucionāru atmirtas, Riga, 1957, especi­ allythe Hems by Spēlmane, Berzina, Baltina, Cinovska, and Kuznlcova. 21. Latvju strēlnieku vēstures komisija,Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, Vol. I,part l , Moscow, 1928, p. V, 22. Alexander Rabinowich, Prehide to Revolution, Bloomington, J96S,pp, 171-84. 23. Norman E. Saul, Sailors in Revolt, Lawrence, 1978, p. 171. In fad. Smilga might have been the only non-Finnish contact, p. 257. 24. L Dribini, “Prometejs” CinS, Riga* 1972, p, 168. 25. Saul, p. 170. 26. Louise Bryant, Mirrors o f Moscow, New York, 1923, pp. 60-61. 27. “Letter to the Comrades“ is a lengthy polemic against the party members who considered Lenin's call for an uprising Imprudent. Lenin, Vol. 26, PP-195-215.

390

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

28. Lenin, VoI. 11, p. 1)8. From this viewpoint, Trotsky’s analysts of the “softness” of the Russian party is interesting. Leon Trotsky. The H istory o f th e Russian R c w lu tio n . Ann Arbor, 1957, pp. 14146. 29. Bessie Beatty, The R ed Heart o f Russia . New York, 1918, p. 137. 30. John Reed, Ten D ays th a t Shook th e World, New York, 1967,p. 78. 31. Dribinl, p. 169. Also L. Dnbins. “KSDS (b ) P Rétrogradas organi­ zācijas latviešu rajons “Prometejs” Oktobra revolūcijas sagatavošanas in norises laika,” Latvijs KP CK Partijs Vēstures Institutes, Par Oktobra Uz* vans, Riga, 1967, pp. 152*174. 32. Drtbinl, p. 169. 33. Melgunov, p. 5. 34. Lenin, Vol. 26, pp. 19*21. 35. Ibid., pp. 23*24. 36. Ibid., p. 27. 37. Ibid., p. 69. 38. Ibid., p. 141. 39. Ibid., pp. 180*81. 40. Ibid., p.187. 41. Protetarskaya Revolutsia. No. 10,1922, pp. 461 *62. 42. Lenin, Vo). 26, pp. 188*189. 43. R abochii P u t’, October 15 as cited in J. Kaimiņi, Latviefu strfr nieki cīna par O ktobra revolūcijas uzvaru. Riga, 1957, p. 297. See Rabino* wicirs evaluation of the conference, pp. 209,211. 44. Institut Istorii Partir pri CK CP Latvii, Komunlsticheskaia Partira Latvii v O ktiabrskoi R evohttskii 1911\ Dokumenti i materiāli, Riga, 1957, pp. 338*341. 45. W. Antonov-Ovsienko, Im Jahre Siebzehn , Berlin. 1959, pp. 213* 16. 46. Lenin, Vol. 26, p.235. 47. M. A. Petrov, “luzhnaia Baltika v dni Oktiabra,” V. F. Suüma, P en ii den novovo mira , Tallin, 1970, p. ) 16. 49. Reed, p. 92. 50. Protetarskaya Prevotuisia, No. 10, p. 456. 51. Latvijas Koministiskff Partija Oktobra R evotuciß, p. 536. 52. Ibid., p. 277. Reprinted from RobochiiPut*. October 3. 53. Ibid., p.279.

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54. latvju strēlnieku vēsture. Il» p. 409. 55. Rabinowtch,Bolsheviks Come to tow er, pp. 232-33.

56. Ibid.* p. 313. The communication was discussed at the Iskolastrel session of September 29 at which Nachimson in reference to the conflict io Finland noted: “ . . .if the Committee of a region begins to speak like that, then indeed the situation is scrious;but notes* that we will not be able to give any active support but certainly a moral one.” Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, p. 618. Finnish troops reciprocated the Latviansupport. See Kai­ miņi, p. 289. 57. The discussion of this topic was extended throughout the autumn of 1917. For example* see Latvju strēlnieku vēsture*pp. 617-18. 58. Guo, July 14.1917. 59. Latvijas Komunistiskā Partija Oktobra Revohtciß 1917, p. 281. 60. Mūsu cīna, October 24,1917. Reprinted in Latvijas Komunistiska Partija Oktobra Revolūcija 1917, pp. 355-359. 61. Cīna, July 28* 1917. Brtvais strēlnieks, July 29,1917. 62. Most of the Information about tire Woytinski episode comes from ffivah strēlnieks, July 29.1917. Also Jaunais laiks, July 28.1917. 63. Lidums, August 3,1917. About the credibility gapof the Streiki, see also Lidums, August 8*1917 andJaunais tasks, August 4 *1917. 64. Brīvais strēlnieks, August 5,1917. 65. Ibid.* July 29,1917. 66 . Kaimiņi claims that the lskosol, in conjuction with the Xll Army, had a plan worked out in the beginning of October for the disarming and dissolving of the regiment, but he does not even footnote this contention, p. 296, It is true, however, that many Streiki must have believed that a plan to dissolve them existed. Some units apparently went as far as deploy­ ing sentries to guard against and to observe the movement of Cossack troops. K. Subits in Latvju strēlnieku vēstures institūts. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, Vol. 11, p. 532. 67. Blāvais strēlnieks. July 26,1917. 68 . Ibid., July 27.1917. 69. For a contemporary account, see Ed. Vim “Pkktā latvteiu Zem­ gales pulka cīnās pie lkfkiles 19 un 20. augustā*“ Lidums, September I. Also Woytinskl's account in his memoirs 77ur Stormy Passage (New York. 1961), pp* 318. 319-323; 338-347. For a balanced historical discussion* Anderson's version is the best, Latvijas vēsture 1914-1920 (Stockholm. 1967). pp. 215-226.

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70. After the Bolshevik uprising Nachimson wrote a letter to the hkola&trc! claiming that he had found documentation that would showthe Provisional Government's plan to dissolve the Iskolastrel.but as far as it is known, these documents have never reached the hands of any historian, jjttvju strēlnieku vesture, p. 739. 71. Ijtt viļas Kom unistiskā Partija O ktobra R evotu ciß 1917, p. 344. 72. Ciclēns, Laikm etu Maiņā, Vol. 1, Stockholm, 1961, pp. 446-447. 73. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, pp. 617-618. 74. la tv ju strēlnieks, September 4. According to Krastinl, the ideaof the Commissar was decided upon by the V Party Congress in July,and it was O. Karktini who selected Nachimson as the man for the job. Latvieiu strēlnieku vesture, 134. 75. Latvijas K om m istiskā Partija Oktobra Rcvohtciß, J9J7, p. 282. Biographical information about Nachimson is to be found in Latvim Revolucionārie Darbinieki, Riga, 1958, pp. 119-124; N. Kondratjevs./)«/: mana sirds, Riga, 1962. Iju vijas PSR Maza Enciklopēdija, Vol. II. p. 612. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, p. 557. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 48, p. 500. Also entry in D eiteli SSSR i O ktiabrskoi RcvolutsiL 76. Latvijas Kom utdstiskSPartija Oktobra Revolūcijā, p. 302. 77. Latvieiu strēlnieku vēsture, p. 134. 78. Kaimiņi, p. 296. 79. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, p. 30. 80. Latvijas K om m unistiskf Partija Oktobra R cvohtciß, p. 332. 81. So it is claimed by T. Draudini, Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, p. 32. See p. 227 of this chapter. 82. Ibid., p.622. 83. A. Reders, “Atminas par 5. Zemgales latvieiu strēlnieku pulku,** Latvijas KP CK Vēstures instituts, 19J Zg. L atviß, Riga, 1957, pp. 263-64. 84. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, p. 699. 85. Ibid., p. 739. 86. Information about the conference is drawn from Kommunisticheskaya Partita Latvii b Oktiarbskoi Revohtcii, J917, pp. 455-463. Latvijas Komunistiska P artiß Oktobra Revolūcija, 191 7, pp. 338*341. 87. Though in Western historiography this conference is not even mentioned, the Bolshevik leaders in Petrograd considered it an important event, as can be noted by Sverdlov*s reference as recollected by AntonovOvseienko: “V Vendene kak rat nasha konferentsia,** V R evoluisii, Mos­ cow, I957,p. 134,

#>ra to Chapter V

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86. Alexander Rabinowich, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, pp. 20720S.

89. Trotsky attributes this otTer of 40JOOO men to Petersons, which jaiy or may not be right, Leon Trotsky, Vol. HI, pp. 82-83. Also see frimini'p*297. 90. Trotsky thought that Lenin, in his strategic planning, was like Sipoleon. “In deciding a problem of strategy he began by clothing the enemy with his own resolution and farsightedness” Vol. Ill, pp. 127-28. 91. Antonov-Ovscienko, p. 133. Also see Institut Marksiznu-Leninizmi pri Tsk KPCC, Vladimir llich Lenin bbgraftcheskaya chronika, Mos­ cow, 1973, p. 390. 92. Antonov-Ovscienko, p. 134. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid., pp. 215-16. 95. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, p. 695. 96. K. Poēma, “Mesti ir kauliņi,” Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, pp. 39899. 97. A. Rcdcrs, “Atminas par 5. Zemgales pulku ” 1917, Gads Latviß\ Riga, 1957, pp. 263-64. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. Ibid. Reders* may be off a little bit. 101. T. Draudin*, “Latvju strēlnieki 1917«g.f"Latvju strēlnieku vesture, p. 32, Even if the meeting between Nachimson and Antonov-Ovscienko did not take place, it is proper to assume that a meeting was planned and that a message from Petrograd was carried to Nachimson. Only with luck could Antonov-Ovscienko have traveled to Cēsis by freight train and be back in Petrograd on October 20th, as documents indicate he was. Aka* demiya Nauk SSR Institut Istorli, Petrogradskii voenno-Revolutsionnä komitei, Vol. 1(Moscow, 1966), p. 56. 102. Trotsky, p. 219. 103. Draudini.p.36. 104. Latvļu strēlnieks, October 21,1917, 105. Latvijas Komunistiska Partija Oktobra Revolūcijā, 1917, pp. 361• 63. 106. Latviešu strēlnieku vēsture, p. 140. Markus tells us that the nuc­ leus of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the XII Army was orgāni-

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THELATVIANIMPACT

zed a month ahead of October 25 but that it was expanded on the !8th. Markus, p. 409. 107. Bnvais strēbiieks, November 1,1917. 108. The literature on the Bolshevizatfonof the Iskosol is considerable, although as yet there is no monographic study on it. For an overview,set Brīvais strēlnieks, November 3,1917, “The XII Army Soviet,** reprinted in Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, pp. 698*700. 109. Melgunov reports that at the time of insurrection, Latvian Stidki, as individuals, were filtrating through Pskov to Petrograd, p. 192. In lat* vian sources, there is no evidence that a move of that nature towards Pet* rograd was afoot. 110. Melgunov, pp. 164*65. 111. A. DrTzulis, V, /. Lenins un Revolucionārē Latvija, Riga, 1980, p. 122,

112. Ibid., p. 124. 113. Teodors Kaufelds, Sekla nedeg, Riga, 1979. p. 217. 114. Lkiums, October 25,1917. 115. Latvijas Komunistisks Partija Oktobra RevotucijS, 1917, p. 34. 116. Bfhuis strēlnieks, October 31,1917. 117. Latvju strēlnieks. October 24.1917. 118. Kaimiņi, p. 303. Vācietis might have delivered this phraseon sev­ eral occasions, see Reders* version (p. 226 of this chapter). 119. This is perhaps a curious fact to be included in the chronology, but it may, indeed, indicate, as Kaimiņi argues, an attempt to “steal**away the Streiki from the Bolsheviks. Kaimiņi, p. 323. The idea of the Latvian Streiki Corps eventually became a Bolshevik obsession, but in the begin­ ning, it was promoted by Latvians of various political beliefs. See E. An­ dersons, Latvijas vēsture, Stockholm, 1967, p. 107. Woytinskfs telegram was reprinted in Latvju strēlnieks, October 24,1917. Eventually, the idea of the Corps was approved by tlae Bolshevik government in Petrograd, but it was not fully implemented: ht the Spring of 1918 only a Division was formed. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, pp. 617*18 and pp. 739*49. 120. Kaimiņi, p. 306. 121. Krasnii Archiv, Vol. 4. no. 23 (1927), p. 152. 122. Latvju strēlnieks, October 28,1917. 123. Latvijas KomuniskS Partija Oktobra Revohtciß, 1 9 i 7, p.365. 124. Lidums, October 27,1917. 125. Ibid., November 1,1917.

Sota to Chapter

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395

126. Līdums, November 3* 1917. 127. Ibid.* November 1,1917. 128. DrTzulis, p. 122. 129. Ibid., p. 124. 130. tüttms. October 31,1917. 131. Ibid.,November3.1917. 132. Krasnii Arhiv, Vol. 5, No. 24 (1927), p. 89. 133. Kaimin5,p.318. 134. Brīvais strêbiieks, November 1,1917. 135. Melgunov,p. 167. 136. Udums, November 9,1917. 137. Kaimiņi, pp. 333-34. 138. S. Ziemelis, Leninisms Uzurrā Latvijas Strādnieku KustibS, Riga, 1977, p.229. 139. Al the Latvian SD Xtll Party Conference meeting April 19 to 22 in Moscow, the Latvians had ample opportunity to discuss the April thesis, and although Lenin’s name was mentioned a few times, no lengthy discussion was in evidence. Ezergailis, pp. 58-76. 140. Lenin’s continued interest in the Latvians can be seen from Use amount of information that the newspapers under his control printed about the Latvians, especially in 1917. See P. Knipnikovs,“Leninsk3 ‘Pravda* un revolucionāri kustība Latvijā,” in Bar Oktobra uzvaru, pp. 42-61, 141. Ezergailis, p. 51. 142. Rabinowich,p. xxi. 143. Melgunov’s work perhaps discusses the attempts of Kerensky to organize resistance against the Bolsheviks most fully. Between October 25 and 31, he tells us that up to fifty troop transports started moving towards Petrograd, “and virtually none to help the Bolsheviks,” p. 121. 144. Ziemelis notes that a similar exemption from the general RSDWP platformwas not asked for by the Polish or Lithuanian parties, p. 74. 145. The pamphlet that Dauge wrote in the spring of 1917 was trans­ lated and published in Russian in December, Ezergailis, p. 76. 146. Dzēvpe, Pēteris Stučka. Riga, 1957, pp. 115-117. 147. Louise Bryant, p. 37. 148. See Stučka’s series of articles entitled “Politiskā brīvība,” reprint­ ed in P. Stučka. Rakstu izlase. Rigs, 1976, pp. 91*138 and 207-224. t49. i. Vilks, “Kā nāca pie varas Latvijas strīdnieki,” in J. Biezais (ed.) Grūst vecā pasaule, Riga, 1957, p, 41.

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THELATVIANIMPACT

A'ores to Chapter Vt 1. The roost famous of the Latvian newspapers in Petrograd is Peterburgas avīze, 1862-1865, one that is considered an important milestone in the development of Latvian national consciousness. 2. Feliks Ciclēns, Laikm etu maina, Stockholm, 1961. lie tells us that in 1906 in Petrograd there lived about lOjOOO Latvians, mostly factory workers, but also intellectuals, hundreds of students, and numerous refu­ gees hiding out from persecution in Baltia. The Latvian SD section in Petro­ grad at this time had, according to Cielcns, about 1000 members,divided into 100 groups, p. 260. 3. Dribinl gives 80,000 Latvians in Petrograd 1917, but the figure seems too low, for he appears to be counting only the refugees and eva­ cuees. Dribini, “P rom etejscina, Riga, 1972, p. 17. 4. 3. Heils, “Latvju KultOr-izglīlibas darbs Leningradas apgabali," Desmit gadi, Ziemel-Rietumu abgabala latvji Oktobra Revolūcijā. Lenin­ grad, 1927, p. 39. 5. According to Dribini, Prometejs at first was part of the Interxaion Trotskist organization. But already from 1915 on, Prometejs seems to have been with the Bolsheviks, pp. 25*37. Also see Makons, “Latvju lielinieku organizācijas darbiba 1917.1918. g. Rétrograda,“ Viktors, “Pro­ m eteja' rajons,“ and P. Kimens, “Latvju strādniecība Petrograd!. 1917.1918.gados," in D esm itgadi 6. Dribini, pp. 87,125. 7. Ibid., pp. 125*26. 8. Ibid.,p. 110. 9. D. Gaisjonoks, “Sirsnigs bija Lenina smaids,“ Latvijas KP CK fartijas Vēstures Institūts.Par Lenimi, Riga, 1957, p. 129. 10. V. Steins, E. Sondovičs, Oktobra Gvards. Riga, 1977, pp. 21*22. 11. M. Lāds-Sudrabs, “Tikianis ar VhdimTru 11t6u,“ Par Lenimt, p. 92. Dribinl, pp. 129*135. Especially see P. Krupnikovs, “Leniniskâ Pravda un revolucionārs kustība Latvijā,“ Par Oktobra uzvaru, Riga, 1967, p. 52. 12. L. Dribini, M KSDS(b) P Rétrogradas oiganizactjas latvieiu rajons “Prometejs“ Oktobra revolūcijas sagatavošanas un norises laiki,“ Latvijas KP CK Partijas Vēstures Institūts, Par Oktobru uzsaru, Riga, 1967, pp. 167-70. 13. Dribini. “Prometejs“ cih3, pp. 167*70. Also see K. Ratnieks, “Revolūcijas dienas Petrograds.“ Grūst vecā pasaule, Riga, 1957,pp. 23*39.

Sotes to Chapter VI

397

14.

Norman E. SavH,Sailon in R evolt, Lawrence, Kansas, 1978,p. 219. 1$. Dribinl, KSDS(b) P Petrogradas organizācijas lalvieSu rajons “Promctejs”. . . .p. 154. 16. Dribinl. pp. 167-70. 17. V. Daniels, R ed O ctober, New York. 18. Dribinl, p. 179. Also “Prom etejs"cinS, pp. 200-202. 19. Dribinl, p. 173. 20. Gaisjonoks, pp. 130-131. 21. ?X )zxttytJ>ëteris Stučka, Riga, 1957, pp. 115-16. 22. Ibid., pp. 118-19. 23. Smilga*s role in July and in October is featured in works by Rabinowich and Saul. The longest biographical sketch is to be found in Deitell SSSR i Oktiabrskoi RevotutsiL

24. Sudrabs-Lācis has left a great deal of literature about his own actirities, both in Latvian and in Russian. Especially to be noted are “lulskie dne v Petrograd: Iz dnevnika aģitatora” Proictonkaia rewlutsiia, 1923. oo. 5, pp. 102-116. "Iz oktiabrskikh vospominanii" Babinskn mbochii, November 1,1927, p. 3. Chezvkhainiie komissii po borbeckontrrevolub sei, Moscow, 1921. A brief biography of Lads can be found inCinitaji par Oktobri, Riga, 1967. Lenin at one time in October offered the position of Commissar of the Interior to lids, but he declined the post. "Martini Sudrabs-Licis,” in Latviešu Revolucionārie darbinieki, Riga, 1958, p. 149. 25. Bčrzini-Ziemelis was a member of both the Russian and the Lat* rian CC. S. Ziemelis, Jānis BērzinbZiemetis, Riga, 1971. In general out­ lines, BSrzinl-Ztetnelis* activities aredescribed on pp. 171-175. 26. Louise Bryant,Minors o f Moscow, New York, 1923, p. 61. 27. Bessie Beatty, The Red Hears o f Russia, New York, 1918. 28. John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World, New York, 1967. p.78. 29. Leonard D. Gerson. The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia, Philadel­ phia, 1972, p. 25. 30. A romantidzed version offttenon’s life is N. Kondratjevs, Biedrs Petersons, Riga, 1960. Also E. Stubaia, mKārlis Pitersons"in Latviešu revo­ lucionārie darbinieki, pp. 126-132. 31. Dribinl names numerous other Latvianswho, on lower party levels were active during 1917 in Petrograd, among them: E. PCtersons, J. Gipslis, J. Lepse, O. Dzenis, K. Ziednii, 0. STpols, V. AuzinS. R. Krumovičs, A. Josts, R. Legzdinl. Marta Josts, E. Bērzinl-Jandolovs. pp. 189-90. Lidums

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THELATVIANIMPACT

reported that during the very early days of Bolshevik power, a Latvian Tetters, an editor of Petrogrādas cīna, was in charge of interiogratfon of his professional colleagues from Valia Narodo and Trudovoic sIohl Lidums, November 1917. N a ta to Chapter VII

I. P. Maikov. Rem iniscences o f a Kremlin Commandant (Moscow), pp. 67*68. There are numerous hooks in English that describe this period in Petrograd, among them are the more voluble Pitrim Sorokin. Leerer from a Russian D iary (New York, 1924); Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams, From L iberty to B rcst-U tovsk (London, 1919); L. Bryant, Mirrors o f (New York, 1923); Maxim Gorky, U ntim ely Thoughts (New York, 196S); Bessie Beatty, R ed Heart o f Russia (New York, 1919); and Albert Rhys Williams, Journey in to th e R evolution Petrograd , 1917-1918 (Chicago, 1969). 2. Strādnieku avize, November 23,1917. 3. J. Peterss, “Vospominaniia o rabote v. VCHK v pcivii god revoliutsiC Protetankaia R evolitttsiia, 1924. Nr. 10,33, pp. 8*9. 4. Boris Sokolov, “Zashchita Vccrossiskovo Uchreditelnaw Sobran* ih rA rk h iv R u ssk o iR c w lu tsü , XIII (Berlin, 1924), pp. 5*70. 5. Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, Na Boevikh Postakh (Moscow. 1931), pp. 262-63. 6. Ibid., p. 333. 7. M. Bonch-Bruevich, From Tsarist General to R ed Arm y Com­ mander (Moscow, 1966), pp. 255-56. 8. Lidums. November 30,1917. 9. Beatty, pp. 330-34. 10. The most interesting discussion of the Kokoshkin and Shingarev murders is found in I. N. Steinberg’s in th e Workship o f th e Revolution (New York. 1953). pp. 74*83. 11. Strādnieku avize, December 23. This case was also discussed by Maxim Gorky in the December 21 issue of Novaia Zhizn, 1917. 'They’re drowning thieves/ 'Did they catch many?' ‘Three, they say/ 'They beat one, a youngster/ 'Killed him?*

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399

•What else did you expect?* They’ve got to beat them to death, otherwise they’ll make your life misery.. • •* •An impressive gray-haired mart, red-faced, and looking in some ways abutcher, says confidently : There are no courts now, that means we should try them by ourlehes. •. .* Ashabby man with sharp eyes asks: ’But wouldn’t that be too simple if we did it ourselves?' The gray-haired man answers lazily and without looking at him: The simplicr the better. It’s faster, that’s the main thing.’ 'Hey, he’s howling!’ The crowd became silent, straining to hear. From far away, from the riwr.a wild anguished cry is heard. Then Gorky goes on to discuss the problem of justice in Petrograd m general: Trials* by street mob have become a *way of life,' and we must keep in mind that everyone of these events increases in depth and extent the duD, morbid cruelty of the crowd. The worker Kostin tried to defend those who were being beaten; he, too, was killed. No doubt anyone who dates to protest against the street “trials” will be severely beaten. Do t have to say that ’mob trials* frighten no one and that street robberies and thievery are becoming more and more brazen? Gorky, pp. 110-13. 12. Gorky, pp. 101-02. 13. The fullest discussion of the condition of the non-Bolshevik press in the late fall 1917 is to be found in David Shub’s Lenin: A Biography (Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 311-12. 14. To follow through all of the closings and metamorphoses of Rus­ sian newspapers in Petrograd after October 25 would be a job worthy of a master's thesis. The Hoover limitation of War, Revolution and Peace is in possession of the following newspapers for the month of January 19IB which must be close to the full complement of non-Bolshevik papers: Novato Zhlzn. Nash viek. Petrogradskii echo, Utro Rosstt. Petrogradikii gobss. Novil vechemii chass all of which with some interruptions survived

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TlIKLATVIANIM PACT

the month. The following were of short duration, sometimes of onlyone issue: Delno naroda, D e b narodaia, D e b narodov, NovUden*, and Ierit» em it zw n . N otes to Chapter V lll

1. V. Antonov-Ovscienko. V revotutsii (Moscow, 1957). p. 135. 2. A. Débite, "Pie Lenina pčc padoma,*' Latvijas KPCKPartijas vfsturēs Instituts, Par Leninu, Latvijas revolucionāru atminas (Riga. 195?). p. 196. 3. K. Gailis, "Divas likšanas ar Leninu 1917.gada ''Lenins (Riga. 196$), pp. J06-i07. 4. Leon Trotsky, Lenin , Notes for a Biography (New York, 1971). p. 116. According to recollection of A. Mucenieks, it was R. Baure who car* ried from Lenin to Iskolastrcl requesting Streiki in Petrograd. A. Mucenieki, "Par 6. Tukuma latviešu strēlnieku pulku un Iskolastrēlu," 1917. gads U t • vijā Revolūcijas dalībnieku atminas (Riga, 1957), p. 234. According to another account, on about November 6. Egffls, as an emissary from the Military Revolutionary Committee arrived from Petrograd and met with the political leadership of the 6th Tukums Regiment. J. Laube, "Pirmais posmts." Latvju rcvolucbnSrais strēlnieks, Sējums I, p. 196. 5. A-skis. "Manas atminas par 6. Tukama latviešu strēlnieku pulku," Latvju strēlnieku vēstures komisija,Latvju strēlnieku rēsture, 2. dala (Mos­ cow'. 1928), p. 524. 6. Some accounts confuse the city which the 6th Regiment was to oc­ cupy-Valmiera or Ccsis. The most authoritative account gives Valmieia as the correct one. See J. Krastini (ed.), Latviešu strēlnieku vesture (Riga, 19/0). p. 143. Cēsis was secured by the 1st and 3rd Regiments. 7. Strādnieku avise, November 12,1917. Thereare conflicting accounts as to when and how many times the officers of the 6th Regiment were placed under arrest. The correct answer is that it was only once, and it oc­ curred in Valmiera. 8. i. Vācietis. "Latviešu strēlnieki un 12. Armijas lieliniecižešana," Lat­ vijas strēlnieku vēstures komisija, Ijatvju strēlnieku vēsture, 2. dala (Mos­ cow. 19281. pp. 260-266. Vācietis' role in the taking of Valka is also asses­ sed in V. Bērziņi, J. Ruberts, Pirmais virspavēlnieks, Riga. 1973, pp. 7576. Abo in U. Germanis. Oberst Vācietis und die lettischen Schützen im Weltkrieg und in der Oktoberrevolution, Stockholm, 1974. pp. 268-269.

Nom to Chapter VIII

401

Dine are various versions about the engagement of Vācietis as the military Inder of the Red Streiki. N. Tilibs, a member of the Iskolastrel and the Military Revolutionary Committee, tells us that Vācietis was invited lo the hkolastrel and later also to the Military Revolutionary Committee where the strategic plans for taking of Valka were laid out in a closed session. Tīlibs, “Bijušā Iskolastrčlieša atminas," Latvju strēlnieku vesture, p. 423, 9. Vācietis, p. 264. 10. According to this version, it was the political leadership of the regiment, recognizing its inexperience, that approached Vācietis for ad­ vice. J. Kaimiņš, Latviešu strēlnieki cirtā par Oktobra rewtueijas uzvaru (Riga, 1957), pp. 329-330. 11. A-skis, “Manas atminas par 6. Tukuma latviešu strēlnieku pulku," latvju strēlnieku vēstures komisija. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture (Moscow, 1928), pp. 524*526. J. Laube, "Pirmais posms," Latvju revolucionSrais strēlnieks (Moscow, 1935), 1 sējums, pp. 194-196. J. Roberts and A. Drl«dis, "Latviešu strēlnieku Oktobra revolūcijas sagatavošanas un norises posmā." J. Krastini, LatvieSu strēlnieku iēsture (Riga, 1970), p. 146. 12. Laube, p. 196. 13- A-skīs, p, 525. According to I. Ozoliņš, an officer of the regi­ ment, the officers joined the regiment in Strenči, some distance from Val­ ka. Interview with J, Ozoliņš, August 6.1978. In a way, Ozoliņš, is a more believable version than that of meeting up with the regiment on the streets of Valka. 14. Bfîvais strēlnieks, November 14. The following officers signed the document: K. Berkis, A. Ribbe, K. Peine, P. Sudrabs, Daibus.J. Richters, R. Kirchenšsteins, Blāķis, Markocs, Jansons, Brūce, Veide, Kaufeids, Cak* kels, Kārklts, Ansons, Rutkis, Muižnieks. Kristsons, Paegle, Udentinl, Mikits, Baumans, Zembergs, Krêslins. Bitgens, Jakobsons, 0. Dzintars, Kal­ niņi, Jaunzems, Lindaus, Vegšteins, A. Dzenis, Berchoics, Čablis, Daniels. Ruksis, J. Ozoliņš, Mednis, Graudiņš. Selionovs, Lācis, Vintergrīns. 0. Dzintars, a few days later, withdrew his signature from the list. Bfivais strēlnieks, November 14. In addition to the above, in the officer corps of the regiment must be included the three junior officers named in Ute text and three others that according to P. Sudrabs joined the regiment later: Stumbrs, Hcrcbergs. and Otenders. Strēlnieks, no. 28-33,1972, p. 142. 15. Interview with J. Ozoliņš, August 6.1978. P. Sudrabs version can be found in P. Sudrabs, "Mans pretraksts J. Ezergaiļa izteiktāmdomām par

402

TlIELATVIANIM PACT

6 . Tukuma Latviešu strēlnieku lomu 1917/18 4 . Petrogradî,’*5r/f!/iidU

Nr. 28*33, 1972. Sudrabs has in his possession a certificate issued to bun under Berkis* signature on December 3, 1917 in Petrograd. U. German», Tālu tālumā lielā plašumā (New York, 1977), p. 91. On the basis of that evidence, he wants to argue that Berkis continued to lead the regiment until midJanuary 1918, and that only then did Berkis leant for Finland. 16. Brīvais strēlnieks, November 22. 17. Kaimt*, p. 354. 18. h. Odris, “Lenins un latvielu strēlnieki,“ Bar Lenkšu, p. 159. 19. Laube, pp. 197*98. 20. In the minutes of the Congress of the Soviets of Latvian SweBu deputies, Cēsis, December 7 ,19|7, Jjttvieiu strēlnieku vēsture, 2 dila.p. 629. Also Brīvais strēlnieks, December 15. 21. i. Ozoliņ*. Interview August 6,1978. Sudrabs in his accountsin* sists that the regiment moved to Galcmaia Street around the middle of January 1918, Sudrabs, pp. 140*141. As is everything cbe in Sudrabs* account, this very simple matter of living quarters is also obfuscated. But in connection with this change of quarters, he lias a fantastic story to tell. See p. 333. 22. KalmlnS, p. 301. Accotding to Lakîns, the order to form the Special Battalion came through K. Rtersons. A. Laicēns, “Latvju strēl­ nieki Smolnā “ Latvju revolucionārais strēlnieks, 11spurns, p. 256. 23. Prof. E. Andersons misreads the evidence, suggesting that there was a shortage of volunteers and that there was difficulty in selecting the 320 men for the task. E. Andersons, Latvju vēsture, Stockholm, 1967.p. 257. There might have been some question of the regimental command not wanting to release that many men. See Laicēns, p. 256. 24. The preparatory steps for the odyssey to Petrograd have been described in numerous sources. Tne fullest account is by A. Laicēns, “Lit* viciu strēlnieki Smolni.“Al$oJ. Kilnini, “Zem sarkanā strēlnieku karoga," Latvijas PSR Zinātnu Akadēmija, Latviešu strēlnieki ciņa par Padomju varu 191 7-1920. gadā (Rīga, 1960), pp. 26*27. 25. Laicēns. pp. 259*260. 26. P. Berzin*. “Strēlnieku dienasgrāmata” Latvju revolucionāra strft nieks, Vol. 1, p. 262. 27. Laicēns, p. 261. Also see P. Apars, “Apvienotā strēlnieku rota Smotnas institūtā “ Latvjurevoluciomrais strēlnieks, I, p. 251 ;J. Brivkalns, “Atminas par 19!7*l9l8g.“ Latvju revolucionārais strēlnieks, I, p, 297.

Sotts to Chapter IX

403

28. Lateins, p. 261. 29. Kaimiņi, p- 363. 30. Reed archives, bms Am 1091 part 10k. 31. ?. Plīsums, “Mūsu lielais draugs un skolotājs,” Latvijas KP CK Partijas vēstures institūts, Far Leninu, I/nju revolucionāru atminas, Riga, 1957, p. 96. Plēsums claims that his living quartets were right opposite of Lrnta’s cabinet. Also see P. Bērziņi, p. 262. 32. LaicEns, p.262. 33. The Minutes of the Battalion's Mass Assembly, November 28, latvju revolucionārais strēlnieks. Vol. I, pp. 266-267. 34. Ibid. Also P. Berztai, p. 262. 3$. Minutes of tire Battalion’s Mass Assembly, December 2. Latvju revolucionārais strēlnieks. Vol. 1, p. 268. 36. Latvju rcwluck>nārah strēlnieks. Vol. I, pp. 268-269, 37. P. Bērziņi, p. 263. 38. J. Liepa, **K5mes sargājām Riču,” Far Laimu, p. 181. Notes to Chapter IX

1. The diary of P. Bērziņi as reprintedinLatvju revolucionārais strčl* meks, Moscow, 1934, Vol. I, p. 264. 2. Ibid., p. 265. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. The condition of a continuous alert through the early days of January is confirmed by P. Maikov, Reminiscences o f a Kremlin Com­ mandant, Moscow, 1965, pp. 77-78. 5. Lidums, December 3,1917. 6. Ibid., December 5,1917. 7. Bērziņi, p. 263. 8. Maikov, p. 108. J. Kataini remembers that PEtersons was wound­ ed with a pistol at close quarters when arrestinga director of a bank. “Zero Sarkani Strēlnieku Karoga,*' Latvijas PSR Zinātnu Akadēmija, Latviešu Strēlnieki Cirtā Par Padomju Vont, J917-1920. gadā., Riga. 1960, p. 27. According to Kaimiņi, Lenta heard about the wounding of PEtersonsand found a doctor for him. Latviešu Strēbiieki Cfnā par Oktobra Revolūcijas Uzvaru. Riga, 1957, p. 367. 9. A. Laicēns, “Latvju Strēlnieki SmotnI,” Latvju revolucionārais strēlnieks, Moscow, pp. 272-273. The sacking of alcohol storage places

404

THULATVIANIM PACT

was commented upon by all newspapers of the day, Russianand latviu, but perhaps the fullest enumeration of them would be found inload dienas lapa.

10. Lakens, p. 273. 11. Laicêns, pp. 275-276. The case is also retold In V. Bonch-Brue­ vich, Afa hoe w ich posiakh 1'evralskoi / Oktiabnkoi rcwlutai. Moscou. 1930, p. 324. 12. Maikov, pp. 107-112. 13. Bonch-Bruevich, pp. 39*90. Also in Kaimiņ!, pp. 36S-369. 14. Latvijas PSR Zinātnu Akadēmija, Latviešu strēlnieku vētturt 1915-1920, Riga, 1970, p. 153, 15. Leonard D. Gerson, The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia. Philadel­ phia. 1976, p. 18. 16. Gerson, p. 25. Also see J. Fetcrss, “Vospominania o rabote « VCIIK perviigod revoluysii.” Proletankaia revnliutsiia. No. 10. 17. Maikov, p. 67. 18. Ibid., p.134. 19. K. Kencbcrgs, “Kā mēs apsargājām Smolnu,“ Latvijas KP CK ftmijas Vēstures Instituts, ParLeninu. Riga. 1957, p. 107. 20. A. Lakens, “Lenin! runā ar latvicSu strēlniekiem,*’ Latvijas KP Ci Partijas Vēstures InstilCts, LeninS Latvijas Revolucionāru atmināt, Riga. 1969, pp. 118-119. 21. A. Feldmanis, “Divas runas,“ Par Leninu, Riga, 1957, p. 114. 22. Ibid., pp. 115-116. 23. Maikov, p. 118. According to Maikov, some members of the gov­ ernment who still had to stay behind were worried that by shipping away all of the Latvians they would remain without protection in the Smolny. 24. A. Žilinskis, **No Smolna uz Kremli,” latvicSu strēlnieki cmSpar Padomju varu 1917-1920. gadā, Riga, I960, pp. 30-31. 25. Bonch-Bruevich, p. 338. Kaimiņ!, p. 376. 26 Maikov, p. 121. 27. Bonch-Bruevich, pp. 330-331. Just before departure. BonchBruevich turned over three sacks of gold to J. Bale for safe-keeping. P, Berzin!. “Visdārgākās atminas,“ Lenins Latvijas revolucionāru atminas, p. 136. 29. Bonch-Bruevich, p. 342; Kaimiņ!. p. 378. 30. Žilinskis. pp. 31-33.

Nottsto ChapterX

u>

31 J. Bale, “9. latviešu strēlnieku pulka isavtsture * Latvjustrēlnieku i&tures komisija. Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, Vol. II, Moscow, 1928. p. $39. Notes to Chapter X

1. Trotsky, Lenin, New York, 1960, p. 111.

2. Trotsky,p. 112. 3. Uldis Gîrmanis, “Latvijas Satversmes sapulces projekts 1917g.,’* Ttrfi vērti, 1977, No. 61. Also I. Apinc, Latvijas Komunistiskās Partijas Nacionāls Politika, I917.g. oktobris-1920.g. janvāris, Riga, 1980, pp. 3236. 4. P. Dauge, Krievijas satverama sapulce un proletariāta uzdevums, Moscow, 1917. Also P. Dauge, M Satvcrsmes sapulce un Latvija,'* Sociāl­ demokrāts, November 2,4, and 7.1917. 5. P. Dauge, MKotkritiiu Uchreditelnouo sobraniia,” fzvestia Mask, Soveta rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov. No. 232, Deceml>er 1917. Die article was reported upon by Dzimtenes atbalss, December 23,1917. 6. Blīvais strēlnieks, December 16.1917. 7. Ibid., December 19 and 20.1917. 8. Ibid., December 23.1917. 9. Nash Vek, No. 1, December 30,1917. 10. Lidums, in its December 3 issue, claims that there were also num­ erous workers marching on the day. 11. Ibid., December 5,1917. 12. I. Gredzens, “Tanjas pils,’*Latvju revoludonāhtis strēlnieks, Mos­ cow. 193S, Vol. Il, pp. 300-307. 13. Lidums, December 3,1917. 14. Ibid.and Dzimtenes atbalss, December 3,1917. 15. Blīvais strēlnieks, December 23.1917. 16. James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher (cds.), The Bolshevik Revolution, Stanford, 1934, p. 359. 17. P. Sorokin, Leaves From A Russian Diary, Boston. 1950. 18. Dzimtenes atbalss, December2,1917. Lidums, December 3,1917. 19. V. Antonov-Ovseienko, Zapiski o grazhdanskot ivine. Vol. I, Mos­ cow, 1924, pp. 18-19. 20 . As rtpoted inLidums, December 3,1917. 21. The order to arrest tire cadets was signed by the whole Council of people's Commissars includingStučka. James Bunyan, p. 359.

Tl H: LATVIAN IMPACT

406

22. uary 9. 23 . 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

The fullest account of the murder is to be found in hash rrk, Jin 1918. Petropratiskii d itto i. November 30.1917. l.kJumi, December 3.1917. Ibid„December 5,1917. Striktnieku «vire, December 23,1917. Vechemii :w m , January 5,1918. Trotsky, Lenin, p. 112. B, Sokolov, "Zashchita Uchreditclnaw Sobraniuk." Arkhir Runkoi Revoliuisii, 1924. Ko. 13. pp. 50*54. 30. Bessie Beatty, The Rett Heart o f Russia, .Mew York, 1918. pp 411«412. 31. V echem iinon, January 4.1918. 32. Albert Rhys Williams, Journey into Revolution, Petropmd, /W7J9t8, Chicago, 1979. p. 195. 33. "Materiāli latvju strēlnieku apvienotās Smolnas rotas vēsturei,** tjitvju revolucionārais strēlnieks. Vol. I, Moscow, 1934, p. 265. 34. P. Plēsums, "Mimi lielais draugs un skolatājs." Latvijas KPCK Vestures Instil Gts, Pùr Leninu, Riga, 1957, p. 100. 35. tM tiiu mohick*narais strēlnieks. Vol. I, p. 265. 36. Vechemii s von. January 6.1918. 37. Vladimir Bonch*Bruicvich. Ab Bocrikh Postakh, Moscow. 1931. p. 237. 38. Ibid., pp. 234*235. 39. David Shub, Lenin. Penguin Books, 1967, p. 321. 40. Beatty, p. 416. 41. Delà A'aroda. January 7, 1918. The shooting on the streets of Prtiograd was covered at lenglit by all newspapers that still continued to come out :Sotaja Zhiihn, January 6,7; Afasft vek, January 6.7;Petrograd* snoe Ekho. January 8;/Vow Vechemii Chas, January JI. 42. Strādnieku avise, January 11,1918. 43. BeJtty.pp. 414-415. 44. Williams, p. 198. 45. Beatty, p.426. 46. Robert Payne, The L ift amt Death o f Lenin, New York, 1964. p. 438. 47.

Ibid.

.tyfts to Chapter X

407

48. Ibkl. Ihre is a great deal of disagreement about the ending of the *«sk>namong the eyewitness accounts as well as that of historians. 49. Shtib,p.320. 50. Payne,p.43l. $1. Alan Moorehead, The Russian Revolution, New York, 1958. pp. 267268. 52. Williams, p. 201. 53. O. H. Radkey, 77ie Sickle Under the Hammer, New York, 1963, p. 176. 54. For P. Sudrabs* view of his activities in Petrograd, see U. G?rnutth, Tālu tāluma lielā platumā. New York. N.Y., 1967, pp. 88-93. AI» “Pretraksts J. Ezergailim par 6. Tukuma pulku.** Strēlnieks, No. 28*33. 1972, pp. 139-145. 5$. K. Brititis, “Aina no Satversmes Sapulces padaSlaitas dienas." lAtvfu revolucionārais strēlnieks, p. 308. 56. E. Odris, "Lenins un latviešu strēlnieki."far Leninu. p. 163. 57. A-skis, "Manas atminas pat 6. Tukuma latv. strēlnieku pulku,*' latviu revolucionārais strēlnieks, p. 525. 58. Sudrabs, p. 140. 59. J. 22m, “Laimīgākie brīži mani mDJ2,~Par Lēnam, p. 147. 60. Russel E. Snow, The Bolsheviks in Sibena, 1917-1918, Teanek, NJ.. 1977, p. 13,24-25. 61. Ibid., p. 14. 62. Ibid., p. 220. 63. V. 1. Lenin,fb/hoe Sobranie Sochinnii, 5th ed., Vol. 50, Moscow, 1965, pp. 28,411. 64. Latvijas PSR Zinatnu Akadēmija, latrietu strēlnieku vēsture, Riga, 1970, p. 153. 65. Snow, pp. 220*221. 66. J. Laube, "Pirmais posmi»,*'Latviu revolucionārais strēlnieks, Vol. I, p. 200. Abo Latvietu strēlnieku vēsture, p. 153. 67. Latvietu strēlnieku vēsture, p. 153. 68. A*skis, p. 526. 69. B. Melnalksnis. "Uzvaras gaili," Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, p. 513. AI» Ibid., pp. 153,217. 70. E. Hermani», “Latviešustrēlnieki Archangela," ibid., pp. 439*442. 71. The fullest account of thisepisode is in A. Kronkalns, "6. Tukuma

THFLATVIANIM PACT

40Ä

p u lk i cīnās P c tro g ra JI pret ana rk īstiem un Inn fo rti ar snmu baltgvard* ieni.” fja tr ju revolucionārais strēlnieks, V ol, 2 , p p. 309*31972. L u iu m s, D ecem ber 5 ,1 9 1 7 . 73. iaroe* B unyaii, pp. 349*350.

74. As repotted m U dutm , December 5.1917. 75. A*skis, p. 526, 76. F. C’iln». "Lenins un Latviešu strēlnieki/4Par Ienirtu, pp. 164-65 77.

M elnalksnis, p. 5 1 4 .

78.

Ibid., pp. 515-17.

79. S0 81.

K ronkalns, pp, 313-14. Ih id .r p. J J ft. M elnalksnis, p p . 516*19,

iV o/« to Chapter XI t . There are num erous work* in English (hat discuss the origin *4 Russia's Civil W ar; am ong th em are W. ff. Chant ber 1m. The Ruistan Res"tutom 7 9 7 7 -/0 ’ / (N ew Y ork. 1935), pp. 373*88. A. Dcnikme. The W t Army (L o n d o n , 1930); DjvhJ F o otm an. O vit War in Russia (New York. 1962); George S tew art, 77ie White Armies o f Russia (New York. 193?); D im iity V, Lehovich, White Attains! Red. The U fc o f General Anton Dcntkln (N ew Y ork. J 9 7 4 ); Sergei Starikov and R oy Medvedev, R&tp Mintnuv and the Russian OvU War (N ew Y ork. 1978). 2. lit fa c t, th e railroad cars w ere already prepared for shipment. Lit* vju strēlnieku vēstures kom isija, Latvju strēlnieku vēsture (Moscow. 192$), Vol. 2. p. 757. 3. J. K aim iņi, üuviesussrtînieku cinS par Oktobra revolūcijas m m (Riga, 195?), pp. 3 7 9 4 0 , 4. !bid.r p. 381.

5. Ibid. 6

Ibid,

7. B. Tomtms, "Sarkanîs armijas primajaf rindî/* J. Knsiink (edj, L atoesu strflmku vēsture (Riga« 1970), pp. J56-57, Kaimiņi, pp.36243. Also see Latvju strēlnieku vēsture, p. 760, 8. J. O /o l/ars, **CeH uz kontrrevolūcijas F ro n ti." Brīuiis strēlnieks. No. 27, February 17,1918. 9 . Ibid.

M r s to Chapter X I

409

10. Tomanis, pp. 158*59. 11. Jukums Vicictis has left two independent accounts about the Ari­ khCorps and the battle against it. First time he wrote about it inhis lat­ rie» strēlnieku vēsturiskā nozime I (Pskov. 1922): 1004)9 and in “Laitju strēlniekupirmā kauja pilsoņu karS,” Latvju strēlnieku restore II (Moscow. 1928): 267-74. VSdetis was interested in the Polish Corps not only be­ cause he wasin charge of the operations against the Aales but also, perhaps, because Dowbor-Musnicki was his associate on the Riga front. 12. Denikin, p. 23. 13. VSdetis, 1922, pp. 2004)1. 14. Ibid., p.201. 15. Tomanis.p. 154. 16. iMtrfu strēlnieku vēsture, p. 759. 17. VSdetis. 1922. p.202. 18. Ibid., 1928, pp. 269-70. 19. Bfīvab strēlnieks. No. 29, February 20.1918. Also inLatvfu strēb nieku vēsture, pp. 762-63. 20- VSdetis, pp. 2054)6. 21. Tomanls,p. IS6. 72-

V Sdetis, p. 206.

73. 74. 75. 76. 395. 77. 28.

Ibid., p. 210. Tomanis.p. 161. Latvju strihieku vēsture, p. 727.

The alternative positions aie discussedby Kaiminis, p. 395.

Tomanis, p. 160. K. Žobits, **!1 7. Bauskas btvkiu strSnkku pulkadatas,'* Latvfu strēlnieku vēsture. Vol. 2, pp. 533-34. The retreat is also fully retold in Kaimiņa, pp. 397-99. 29. Tomanis, p. 172. 30. Ibid., p» 162. 31. Latvfu strēlnieku vēsture, p. 728. 3 2 . Tomanis. p. 168.

33. 34. 35. 36.

VScietls (1922). pp. 192-96. Latvju urēlnieku vēsture, p. 630. Ibid., p. 743. Ibid., p. 626.

410

THELATVIANIM PACT

37. Brīvais strēlnieks. No. 12, January 18,1918. One o f (he eariksf class to cleanse the ranks from disorganize!s appeared in reference to the 7th Regiment’s refusal to depart for the Don to fight Kaledin. Kaimiņi, pp. 379*80. 38. Brīvais strēlnieks, No. 29, February 28,1918. 39. ĪA tvju strēlnieku vēsture, pp. 626*37. 40. Ibid., p. 639. 41. Tomanis, p. 168. 42. Ibid., p. 170. 43. The table was put together from information found in P. Vitae, *’Latv)u strēlnieku vēsturiska loma,** Darba kalandars 1928. gadam. Re­ printed in Latvfu strēlnieku vēsture . Vol. 2, pp. 70649, and statistics found in Tomanis, pp. 37 and 170-74. 44. Tomanis, p. 180,

INDEX Ābols. 307.311 Baue«. Ernsts (1882-1926). $6 Agrarian Question, 43ff, 141-50, 319. ßautngart, Winfred. 370 Confiscation of Estates. 16. 93. 99. Baiizc, R. (1895-1942). HO. 114 125. 141ff, 163, 387; Committees. 134.138,154.166.375.400 44.116,126,142.379 Beatty, Bessi( 1886-1947). 2.179, ISO Albcrings. Arturs ( 1876-1934). 81 257, 265,323.328-9t331.390.397-’ Aliekseicv, M.V.,(1852-1918). 346. 98.406 Allens, N., (1892-1919). 115,134 Beika. Arvids, 371 Anarchists. Bleikman's Group. 301 Beidaus. N.. 109,115,125,138 Andersons.Edgar(1920-).93,94,371, Bērce, A. (1890*1921), 108 378-9.391,394,402 Bergs. Eižens (1892-1918), 181, 252 Anskins. Adolfs ( 1894-1938). 134 Bergs, K., J11 Antonov-Ovseienko, VA.( 1884-1938). Berkis, K (1884-1940), 274«*. 333. 88. 178. 182. 201, 218, 220, 2289, 337.402 232. 243,270-1,275,280.308,313, BêrzinS-Andersons, J. (1875-1934), 332. 338, 344, 346-7. 390, 392-3, 105.108,111,375 400,405; Mission to Valka. 220-27 Bērziņi. P.,281,284,285,298-9,318, Apa«, P.,402 402-3 Apme.l. (1928-),lv, 13,95,371.376, Bêrzinl-Ziemelis, J. (1881-1938), 87. 378 118, 177, 179, 204-5, 256,375.389 Apms,R.,226 Bērziņi, V.( 1935-), VI, 8.400 ApTts, A. (Apsesdēls) (1880-1932), Bērzs, Jānis (1887-1952), 80. Biezais, J. (1896- - , 383,395 103.113,226 E. Arājs, V. Bikelis, 181 BHmanii. Or. Alfred (1887-1948), 8 Archangelsk, 7,336 Birkenfelds, i. (1894-1967), 80. 109, Asare. M., 109.113 Avolinft, P„ 113 114,361 Birons, A.. 370 Birzgals. P.( 1874-1957). 109,113 Bajārs, A.. /1893-1937), 109 Baltâjs, 109 Blaubergs, V., 112 Bokalders, Jānis (M.M.), (1885-). 384 BaUia/BaUicProvinces. 172 , __ Baltic Germans, 15.16; Estate owners. Bolsheviks. 37,69,78,92,118ff. 126. Power, 36,39,43ff. 139 129, 172, 217, 379; Latvian, 59ff, Baltic Sailors, 171, 187. 197, 222-3. 74-76. 127, 164, 201. 304. 344; 250. 262-3, 285-8, 298, 315, 346, Central Committee, 61, 67, 223 351 ; Kronstadt. 181. 251, 287.326 Conferences, Xill, 178. 304, 383, Baltijas vēstnesis (The Baltia Courier). 395 XIV, 63.64 70,160 Bārda. P.(I887-I939), 212.231 XV, 63,64.66 Baron. Samuel II.. 243 Extraordinary, October 16, 63ff, Bâle. J. ( 1896-19221.404-5 223-5,234 Bastpnis, V. (1884-1979), 80,82,86 In Moscow, 87

411

4 i:

THELATVIANIM PACT

In Petfood. 15, 123, 179,220. Cheka, 265,301 22. 24911, 380 Latvians in. 7.15.20.21990 In Russia. 6. 12. 181, 184*5. 208 Chcrcirosnv, A.V.,Gcn..23l In Vidzeme. 33.37,61.92 Chernov, V., 313.315,316.329 In Pagasts, sec Pagasts and other Ciclêns. Fēlikss (Cinis) (1818496!) parties. 19,65.71.85 212.371.2,392,396 Compared with Russian, 208,241 Cimmermanis. Ed. (? -d. 1938). 214 Also see Latvian SI) Ctna (The Struggle). 61.63.69.75. “6. Bolshevism, 345.370 132.240.252 Causes of. 4.1 Iff, Civil War. 343*353 defined, I7lf, 26 Constituent Assembly. 6. 134. 261, Atheism, 159.386 284.302,337.341.364 Bonch-Bruevich. M. Gen. 262.333 Elections. 46,70.73.83ff Bonch-Bruevich, V. (1873.1955), 261* Latvian Con. ass.. 65.55.302 2.271.288-9,297-8,319*21,329*30, Dispersal of. 284*5. 304ff. 3!6ff. 371.398.404.406 331*32 Brains. K., 331,407 November 28.1917.307*16.337 Council of Peoples' Commmin, 5.6. Brants, P.( 1882*1942), 113 Bremers. A.. 79.86 92. 96. 97. 124, 255. 265-6. 263. Brest Litovsk. 348. Peace treaty, 136, 294*300.306,316.361 255.292 Czechoslovakia. 335 Briedis. J.. 273 Brīvais Strēlnieks (The Free Rifleman). Daniel, R.V., 252.388 63. 69.132,133.211,227.229.351 Uanilevskis. JSlijs (1884*1939). 103. Brīvi Latvija (Free Latvia). 72 108.111.118.375 Brīvkalns, J. ( 1862*1938), 402 Daugava, 211 Brîvuls. J.. 115 Dauge. P.(1869*1946). 165.177.30*. Brums. A.. 109 305.377.395.405 Brunenieks.P., 111.134 Deglava. A. (1909.). v. Bryant. Louise ( 1890-1936). 2, 179. Denikin, A. Gen.. 408-9 180.245.257-8.389,397*8 Dilk. A. (1896*1918). US Bund, 171 Dilbite. Andrejs(1889*1966), 271.400 Bundzins, Ed.. 114 Dolgorukov, PJ).. 314 . Dofmanfs, K.. 273.276 Carinl. Juris (1897*1922). 216, 225. Dombrovskis, Teodors (d. 1919), 110. 2-9 113.138 Cēsis. 37. 47, 72. 117, 156*7, 163, Don Cossacks. 344 195, 215*7,225.229,232,238,271. Dorpat, see Tartu 293,336. 346.354.400 DozTts. K. (1894*1939), 350,359 Bolsheviks in. 37.201,214 Dowbor-Musnicki. J. (1867*1937), 1. Conference. 217*21.223 343.348ff.409 District, 36. 37. 71. 76. 102, 136. Dmudinl,'Teodors (1890*1962). 44. 146.1534 377 ,10. 123. 125. 227. 374,383.392*3 Sections 38 68.73. 78. J27 Dribinl. L.. vi. 178, J8I. 250ff. 389* Cesu Avue (The Cēsis News), 69 90,396*7 Chamberlain. W.11., 408 DrXzuiis. Aleksandrs (1920* 1.401 Charash, 237 Dralle, J., 252

fo to

413

ßiAhontn, H.H. Gen. (1876*1917). Gatchina, 230*1 Ml 240 Gerbeis. N., 115 püntdorfs. E.(1904* ), 376 Ceiko, A. (1866*1919), 110,113,138 Dybenko, P.E. (1889*1938), 222, 262 Gerke, J„ 113 Dzelonis, see Zakis.Janis Gčrmanis, U. (1915 ). vi, 8, 376*7, D*Mhiiwki. F. (1877*1926). 258,290 400.402,405 D«nis. 0.(1896*1937), 2S2 Gcrmany/Gcrmans, 2. 59, 166, 170, D/ftve. P„ 395 231 Drimtcncs atbalss (The Fatherland Offensive, 6, 101, 164*5, 211, 262, Echo). 71.160 289,2934. 335,339*40,344.347, Dioreckis. V. (see Kauliņa, K.) 353*6 Occupation, 33.91 Eferts (Klusais), Ernests (1889*1927), Gcrson, LD., 397,404 SO, 108.114,125.130.137 Glinski, IJ*., 88 Ellhto, R.(1881*1954), 109,114,123, Guldmanis, JSnis (1875*1955). 86.87 J - 5. 142 Gorky, Maxim. 268,398 £•* 8» Grazktns, DJ. (1891*), 88 Eid«, Robert (1890*1941), 108, 111, Crcdzcns.J.. 310*11,405 J 1S , „ GrcitjSne, R„ vi, 373,377,383-4 Bsenstejn, Sergei. 264 Gristole. 111 thjss. kr.( 188y963). 105,108.112 Grigorjev, AJ„ 88 Endrups, Rudolfs (1878*1939). 10$. Grundmane.E.(1889*1931). 252 it112 v 320 Gulbis, K„80 Ercmeev, K„ Ērglis, J. ( 1883* ), 108,111 Harcavt, Sidney, 387 EstonU/Estonians, 127,128,166,17!, ||eUs.J..396 a v Helsinki, 170, 179. 181, 189, 196, Ezergailis, A. (1930*). 5.8,370.373, 250 3*6*7 383*4.388*9 Hercbcrgs, K..335 EiergailisJanis (1898* ). 386.401 Hermanis, E.. 336,407 Ezeriņi. 280 Ezeriņi, K„ 103,112 foo. Fort. 301.336,341*2 _ .. Iskoborsov, 116 Feidiranis, A. (1896*1938), 294,404 lskolasuel. 39. 107. 118, 140. 199, Fmland/Finns, 14. 98. 171. 179, 200,208,213ff.232.240,353,36l* 182, 188ff. 200, 215. 217*19. 250, 3.401 334,346.391 lskolat. 66. 105. 241,361,374. 382; Civil War. 6.301.342 lskolat Republic 5.6.13,58,59,91ff, Footman, David, 408 150,383*4 Friedrichsons, Liens. 81 Arrests. 100*1 Finances, 100.125,128,380 Gailis, Janis. 81.112 Confesses, lOlff, 106, 119, 124, Gailis, K. (1888*1960), 80. 88. 110, 132*7,145,152 112, 125,126,137*8,166,258,271, Iskosol. 120. 140. 196. 214*7, 229. 375,460 232,238*9,272,391,394 Gaisma (The light), 132,160 Gaisionoks. D„ 250.254-5.396 Jakobsons, J.. 109. Ill, 125.138,229 Galvins. E.(1889* ). 112,113 Janels, K„(1888*1943). 114,134

414

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

Jan sons, Vilis (1887-1918). 3fc, 110, 117, 183. 197(1,194.200 230 *1 113,138 305.357 Jaunā dienas Iap3(îhe New Daily Page) Kiev. 170 136,160 Kiks, 217 Jaunais laiks (The New Times). 71,208 Kimens. PM396 Jauno/olmi, 113 Kirchcnitcins. R. (1891493$). 8|t Jirgensons, I 12 114.273 Jukums. J.. 181 Kokoshkint Fyodor (1871491$). 267. Jurewes,P.,80, 217 313-4 Jurevskis, P., 114 Kondratjevs, N„ 397 Jurganis. h.. 253-4 Kornilov. L 0.(1870-1918). 62.117. Jurjevics. E. I., 8S 169. 173. 183. I85ff. 230.305,346 Jūrmalnieks.J ,(1891 193"), 108, 111 Krasikov, P. A.. SS Jurovs. 108 KiastinJ, K. (18924932). 112.3?5 KfasiinU.(18S0 > 372,4004 Kadcts.267.314.337,344 Krēsliņa, Lilija (18954960). 125.134 Kaimiņi. J. (1897-). 8, 390-1. 394 . Krēsliņi. J.( 1924-).«. 401-3,408-9 Kriewii, A.. 109.111,113 Kaktiņi, P.. 1II Knlrnko, K V.(1870-1918). 2*6. >46 Kaledin, A. (1&6M9I8). 1. 164,305,, Kripêns. J. ( 18.584%$). J14 344-47,410 Kinders.J.(18604958).36. IQ$,l!i Kalnini, Aleksandris. 80 159 Kalniņi, Augusts ( 1876-1940), 81 Kronkalns. A., 341.407 Kalnini, A., I0S, 109,113,125 Krūmiņi, Jānis (Pilāts) (IS94493lj, Kalnini. Bruno (Tangens) (1899 ). 62.63.98.106.105,112.114.116/i. 111.372 123. 125IT, 132, 134.136,138.151. Kalnini, J., 402 229. 375 Kalnini, J„ 79 Kriipnikoss, P„ vl, 395-6 Kalnini, K.,346,347 Kuchin, 237 Kalrnni, M., 112 Kurland or Courland, see Kurrcme Kalnini. N. (1894-1948), 111. 159 Kurievics, K„ 108 Kalnini. Pauls Dr. (18724945). 108 Kurzem». 3.213.249 III Kutler. M. 2S5.314 Kalnini. V., 112 Kamtniev, L. B.(l883*1936), 195,285 Libuis. 112 Kanonov, 316 Lacis, Alfreds (1882-1938). 109, 111. Kārklini. Otto (1883-1942). 63, 80. 115.117.123.125,138 97. 104. 105. I ll, 113. 116, 118, Ucis. J.( 18974 937), 350 120-25,134. J37.151.161.375,581 Līcis. M. (Sudrabs) (I88S-J958J. ITS. KSrklini, R. (1893-). 80. 110. 125, 181. 194. 220,250, 255.290,296-7 134.138 Lacis,0.(1896-1920). MI Karpovics. E. ( 1892- ). 381 Laicēns. A„ 277-8. 286-7, 292. 371. Karls. N., 111 402-4 Kaufeids. Teodors (1894- ). 394 Laika balss (The Voice of the Times). Kauliņi. Kārlis (1891-1968), 81. 108, 160 113.137-8,229. 375 Laika domas (The Thoughts of tbe Kerensky. Alexander (1881-).63.206. Times). 160

t I i I■ i

I rt I [

Inda

415

Lencmanis, Jinis (1881*1939), 118, 375 Lenin. V. 1., 88. 136,181,271,284, 288,299,316.327,334,340 and Latvians, 5, 169 passim, 176, 222,241-46,389 Plans of insurrection, 180.18lff Meets with Streiki. 291*300 Liberals, 34, 42. 142, 302, 328» 379 Lidaks, Otto (1891*1936). 108, 114, 125,136,138,1534 Lide, A.(1696*1941). 113 Lide.Rudoir.8l 8 Līdums, 56,70,76.86,131,132,136, Bolshevik vanguard, 12 passim, ! 5*17. 160,238ff. 308 205,225,397 Liepa, J„ 403 Sections, 68ff, 107 LeipinS, 114 Results, 38.7S, 79,84,85,87,89,90 Liepkalns, K„ 80 Minorities, 74,77 Linde, Fr.(189M961), 105,108.375 Independence, 65.66» 71,92.302 Uvemāls. T. ( 1882*1956), 36,80,161 Livonia, see Vidzeme, 3 finical parties, 17.68.72,302 Relationship with Russia. 95*97,117, Longwortlt. J. George (1929-), 372 120, 123, 150, 1711 191,315,359 Lorencs, Klāvs (1885* ),87 Soviets, 4,91,107,116 Lukevids, 236 See Iskolat Luters, Bobis J., 254 Latvians and Lenin, 169 passim Lvov, G. (1861*1925), 374 Latvian Peoples Party, 72 Latvians in Russian Revolution. 1.2,6 Makons.396 Latvian Soldiers National Association, Maldonis.V. (1870*1941), 79 Maliena, 63,386 Uuian SD. 2lff. 32.43,61,63,69. Maikov, P. (1887*1965). 174, 260*1, 279.284*5.288.291.295,388.398. 98,171,177,213,242,304 also see Bolsheviks*Mcnsheviks 4034 V Congress, 37, 59ff, 64. 82. 94. Mangulis, G., 354 101.116, 123, 202,205, 206,383 ManguŠs. K. (1885*1930). 114.125 Central Committee, 118. 214,229. March Revolution. 140 Markus, Ft. (1890*1938). 109, 134. 256.375 Latvian United Democrats, 71,77 199.229,393 Latvia’s Temporary National Council, Marx, Karl, 11.12,150,370 Marxism, 21,24,186 120,131,139.382 Latvju strēlnieks (The Latvian Rifle­ Mauriņi (Vaidavietis). 238 men) 63.211.213,228.237 Laube, J„ 273, 275. 325.400*1.407 Mednis. H., 134 LaukstrSdnieku c&ia (The Farmhands* Mednis, J., 307,309*11.337 Struggle). 69 Medvedev. Roy, 408 Laursons, td.(l8J6-).86 Medvedev, S.P., SS Leftist Bloc.214*5,.32 Meierovics. Z. ( 1887*1925), 86 Leitâns, V.. 339

UikJ vēstis (News of the Times), 72, 131,136,160,238ff landless peasantry, 39, 58, 132,1578,164 Smiet of, 102,140,162 Und Proprietors* League,4 Iff tapini, Jānis (1885• 1941 ), 81 Upini. K, (Mens) (1895*1941), 115 Upinl, R.( 1898* ), 113 Ushevich, M, M., 196 Ugale.3.93.100,105,126,378 Utvu/Latvians, 3, 16,9Iff, 107,150 Bohhcvik power, 4 , 14,33,119,137*

416

THF. LA TV IA N IMPACT

Melgunov. S.P.(1879-19561.173,182, 1905 Revolution, 4, 20, 23.24,170, 230-1,3SS. 394 176,278 Mekhnoshchin. 359 beginnings of. 20 Melnalksnis. 341,407.408 October Manifesto, 6 Menders. Fricis (1885-1971), 107.111 suppression of, 20ff, 25-2S MengeIt, Emīlija, 105. 108. 117, 138. compared with 1917,1517 176 125 Nolkens, Baron. 374 Mcngcls. A. (1896-1962). 113 Nonâcs, 0.(1880-1942). 80 Mensheviks. 23. 24. 33. 70. 77. 79. Northern Front. 223.230.277 82, 86, 102, 105, 118, 130, 134, Northern Region, 193.201 136, 153, 159. 214, 230, 322. 382, Soviet Congress of, 193,194,234. 385 232 Russian, 89, )83 Bolshevik War Organisation, 217-20 Metkins, G.A., 88 MeJgals, 114 Octobcr/November Uprising. 17,132, Medni. Jānis (1886-1937), 67, 110, 169, 170ff, 173, ISO, is:ft, 219. 1)3,125,136-8 227ff. 237-8,272 Micczkowski. Bogdan. vi JustiOcation of the Insurrection. 202* Miens, A. (1891-1938), 80, 108, 113 205 Migla, 111 Latvians in, 397 Military Revolutionary Committee, Oguls, 109 200,225.229,232,237,290 Okopnaja Pravda, 238 Millers. 0.« 252 Okopnii Nabad, 215-16.228.232 Milters, V„ 387 Omsk. 6.170 Minsk, 170,194 Order No. 1,171 Mogilev, 6.248,350-1.354 Ozoliņi, A., 113 Moorehead, Alan, 328,407 Ozoliņi, E. (1891-1967), 81. 109, Moscow. 165, 183. 185, 224, 342. 113,125,381 346.347.353.358,360,369 Ozoliņ*, J., 274,401-2 Government moves to, 294-300 Ozoliņi, K., 87 Latvians in. 131,132,259 Ozoliņi, 161 Mucenieks. A.. 400 Ozols. 288 Muraiov. M.. 357 Ozols, Jānis, 81.109,113 Mūsu cīna (Our Struggle), 63,69 Ozols, K., 108,112,113 Ozols. V. (1896-1942? ). 213 Nachimson, Scmjon (1885-1918). 39. Ozolzars, J., 347 88,120.195.201,207,213-19,227-Ozolzars, J.f 408 9.239.241.244,277,291-2 Namiêks. T.'( 1691-1943). 113, 136. Pagasts, 39(T, 46, 53ff, 99,144,152158-9 4.158 National Democratic Party. 71, 77ff Agrarian committees, 144 Nationality Question. 246 class war in, 40 self-determination. 95 Food committees, 40, 48, 158,5S5 NeibGts. Arnold (1889-1919). 318 Revolutionary Committees, 158 Nicniane, V.. 112 Page. Stanley, W„ v, 370,387 Niedra. A. (187M942). 41 ff, 59,Pamna,C. V„ 314 157-9, 166,* 371, 373, 374. 385 Paris, 170 Nikonov. D.. 320 P *nki, D., Genera), 210

Index fcyne, Robertf 327,389,406

417

Pskov» 116. 165» 230,240,262. 295, fcsintry, 39fif, 45 340,354,394 ibo see Landless Peasantry Purini. P., 346 The Peasant Union Party. 13.41, 69 Putens, 113 70.76ff. 131.132.140 PutUov Factory,2524 Prfiaks, Kārlis (1892-1941), 87 Pela. P.. 80 Rabinowich, A., 178,220*1.243,388* Pria, 112 9,391.393 Pdnh.K., 335 Radkey, O.H., 329,338 Pennes, A. (1873-1919), 375 Radziņi, A.. 109 Persons. Kārlis ( 1877-1926), 39. 87 Rajevskis. V., 3701 88. 125. 196, 208, 213-4, 236*7 Rainis, Jāna (Pliekiâns) (1865*1929), 258,290.359,402 25*28,372 Petersons, Jānis (1891-1918). 277 Ratnieks. E. (1885-1920), 81. 1)3. 280.284-6.403 114,396 Peterss. J. (1886-1938), 37. 39. 62 Ratnieks, K„ 370*1 63. 108. 112, 118, 133, 166, 180 Reders.A. (1892* >,2254,3924 196,256*8,261,265,290,318,375 Red Guards. 12, 58, 99, 122, 125, 380,398 130, 137, 1534. 159. 164, 174, Petrograd, 97, 170, 182, 183ff, 192 2524, 259, 260-1, 278*80. 285, 95, 227 , 237, 249, 267. 283-300 336,351,358.361 346,354,369 Redlichs.112 Soviet, 170,199 Reed, John (1887*1920), 2, 11, 33, Latvians in, 131, 213, 249ff. 264 47. 52,55,56.59.62.67.179.196, 396*7 245, 257*8. 270, 278*9, 370, 373, After the Insurrection, 260*69.3984 390.397 Suppression of press, 399 Reinsons, 134 Petrogradas clha (Petrograd Struggle) Rencbergs, K.. 292 69 Ribe, A. (Ribbe). 105,108,11), 199Petrov. M.A., 390 200,208 Püâts. sec Krumins Riflemen, see Streiki PUakis. 115 Riga, 76.170.176.210,250 PliekScns. Jinis.see Rainis fall of, 33.48.51,62,68.72.105ff, Plēsums, P.. 403,406 117.211.272.359 Podnieks. A. (1894*1938), 80. 110 new government of, 138 District, 36. 54.68.73,76,78,102, Podvoiskd, N.I. (188048). 88. 271 127,146 333.359 Elections, 73ff Poēma. K. (1898 1933). 225,393 Riga Council (Dome), 61.68 Ports, J.fl 887* ). 109 Riga Soviet. 39.61.104 Poland/Poles, 172 Ritini, 1., 87 Polish Corps. 6.343,348*53 Rizhskii Front (Riga Front). 160 Praixla, 178 RocSns, J.. 108,111 Priedkalns, A. (1873*1923). 36.43,50 Rodîshchev, F.I., 314,337 138.374 Rogatchov. 6,7.343.348*53 P n m eteit. 250,252ff, 276,397 Rostov, 6.7.343,345*7 Provisional Government, 36,203.209 Rotten Triangle, 171, 194, 201, 217 211,240,242.244.260 Rovio, Gustav, 189,190

418

T H i: LATVIAN IMPACT

Roze, Jānis, 88,181,217-20 Skalanxkii, E.M..88 Rotenbergs, 112 Skranda. K. (1888-1938), 112 Rozīni (Āzis), Fricis (1879-1919). 14, Skrastini, 161 1 63, 67, 97,98,99. 110, 114, 118. Skubini, V .(1876-1952),79,86 125,134,137,142,151,165 Skuja. A.. Ill \ Rozīt*. 114 Smidts, I*. (1891-193S), 111 R-SDWP. 183,245-6 Smidts. K.. 105, 108. 111,112,125. Central Committee, 193. 194, 195, 127,128.137-8 199,214.221 Smigla, Ikars (1892-1938), 88. Itf. Congresses/Conferences, 246 181-82, 186. 194, 196, 218, 220-1. Rudcvtčs, Ansis( 1890- ). 134-37. 382 250, 255.397 Rudner, H X . 310,312 Leiter to, 187-191 Rūjiena,63,152,354,385 Smotny. 174, 175, 241.268,27642. Rupaims. 239 279,313,316, 318.337.380 Ruperts, J., 400 Utsians in, 14,254 Russia/Russians, 12,92.95.117.170, Sinolny Battalion, see Streiki 205.314-15,390 Snow, Russell K.. 334-5.407 Revolut ion. 177 Socialdcm okrts. 69 Civil War. 2, 230, 255.273. 343-53. Sokolov. Boris. 261,398.407 343IT, 365,369 Solzhenitsin. Alexander. 15.371 Army. 33.47ff, 62,206 Sologubov, 217,220 Literature on, 408 Sondorovits, E.. 396 Sorokin. P.A. (1889-), 310, 312 Sabakin. N.D.. S8 Soviets. 13.104.120 St. Petersburg -sec Petrograd in Latvia, 4,34 Saliņi. K.. t il power compared. 14 Salna. R.( 1892-1942). 14.98.134 Petrograd. 128 Samsons. A.. 109. 114,117, 12S, 134 Soviet Government. 120 Sams, M.. (1892*1942), 109.112,123 je« Council of Peoples* CommaSaul.N., 178,181.251.389,397 sars Scluctder,G.I.. 311.313 Soviet historians, 5. 7. 8, 13. 93ff. Schwarz. Solomon, 243 241,276,347 Sedyakin. A.I.. 88 Spalva. A. (1895). 109 Scrgcjevs, MJ.. 88 Sériants. Kārlis (1883-1919). 67. 81. 110. 113. 118. 123. 125. 138. 142. Spekke. Arnold (1887-1972), 1 152 Sprcsilis, A. ( 1928- ). vi, 8.371 Shingarev. Andrei (1860*1918), 267, Spriga, 112 313-4 SR (Socialist Revolutionaries). 1,103, Shlikliter. A.G. (1868). 334 183,189.230,262,316,324,334 Shub. David. 321.327.399.406 SR Rewit, 1,342 Stecinieks, P.. 80 Latvian Party. 70,71,77ff. 376,352 S ide. Adolf* (1907-). 94, 371,378-9 Steinberg,!.,255,316,398 Silfs. Jānis (1891-1921), 111,375 Stcinhards. V. (1888-1944), 213,362 Silaxi)*. F.. 36.80.113.153 Steins, V., vi. 8,396 Sirmons. 113 Stewart, George. 408 Sttcrss. R.F. ( 1892-1918), 88.344 Strādnieku avfze (Workers' Gazette).

Index inarx

419

9th Regiment (Earlier Smolny BatialTO,86,131,322.386 lion), 300 $trau)5tis,V.,177 Stubina, A., 397 Seiumīts, J*. 370-1 Stuburina, E., 3S7 StraussJ*. 110, l U f 125,138 Stuburs, 335 Strautiņi, 134 Suwdini, K. (1890*1932), 109 Stučka, K.089Q-1937), 347 Streiki, 60,63,89,97.107,122,143, Stučka, Peters (186S-1932), 69, 75. 163. 169, 191, 194-5. 230ff, 291, »7, 97, 136, 177, 178, 181. 218, 245-6, 255-6, 275, 318, 338, 395, Discipline. 212,345,351 -2,359 x405 Soviet of (Also see Iskolastrcl), 43, Subits, K„ 391 60,208.224 Sudrabs, P. ( 1887*1978), 274ff, 330. !o Civil Wat, 4,342-69,343ff 332*3.336,338,341,401 -2 ln Petrograd. 65,97, 169,195, 231* Sukhonov, N,N.(1882), 173 32. 244,25741,260ff. 268,270-82. Sudurs, 109 327 Surovskts, 114 As a revolutionary force, 208 , 314. Svābc, Arvīds (1888*1959),25,28*31, 345,359 371-2 Corps, 212-3. 215, 217, 343. 357-9, Svcrdkïv, JJ4, (1885-1919), 171,194, 394 214*5,223,295,392 Division. 343,359,364-5.368 Svilis, 109 Retreat, Feb., 20.1918.3S3-S6 Svirksis,A.,125 In Moscow, 358,360 Demobilization, 356-65 Tallin. 170,228,251 1st Daugavghva Regiment, 270,350 Tartu, 127,229.240,272,355 2nd Riga Regiment, 238, 354-5,361 Taurida Palace, 175, 284, 305ff, 319 3rd Kurzeme Regiment, 236. 238, Ticsnieks.V. (1894*1918), 109,113 270.346*7,354 Tikin, J.(1895*),250 4th Vidzeme Regiment, 350,354 TUibs,(Tillibs), N.. 229,400 5th Zemgale Regiment, 225*7,238*9, Tocqueville, Alexis de, 17,372 354,391,392 Tomanis. B.A., 8, 347, 363,371,378, 6th Tukums Regiment, 56, 238-41. 408*10 262, 270ff, 281, 284, 289,30l42,TomaSevks. IvSns (1890*1937), 110, 318,343.363,400 114,12S, 130,131.137-8,154 and the Constituent Assembly, 301-Trotsky, Leon (1879-1940). 136,171, 227, 249.271-2,316,327,359,366, 33,327 3Q 0 A nn 4 0 6 Officers of, 401 TsereteUi, i.0.(1882-1960), 316 Demobilization, 363-4 Tsigankov. M.O., 287,333 in Finland, 335 Tumarkin, 232 in Petrograd, 301*42,345 Tupini. A. (1889-1952), 116 Morale in, 329,33642,401 XII Army, 3. 47ff, 65,90,129,196, Mission to Omsk, 334*5 208, 211, 216, 217, 225,229,230Transport of Gold, 335 32, 240, 272*3. 344, 357,382,394 in Archangelsk, 336 Smolny Battalion, 5,14.15,97,241, Also see lskosol 261-2,276*300,301,318,343 Tyrkova-Wiltiams, A., 398 Torosliina Latvian Regiment, 33S

420

THELATVIANIMPACT

f/dris,E„ 331.332,339*40,407-8 Vidzeme land Council, 13,33,44,41, Udris,V.( 1896), 111 79ff, 86, 91, 104, 106, 116. 123, Ukraine/Ukrainians, 3, 86. 171, 344, 126.127,130,143,379 350 Elections, 68,73,76fT Ulmanis, K. (1877-1942), 36,70,81. End of, 161,382 376 Viganls. J. (1892- ), 109.113 Upîts, A. (1877-1970), 18,25,31,32, Viksne. P. (1894-1938). 117, 134, 80.81.372 378,410 Uiitsky, M.S. (1873-1918), 271, 307, Vīksninl, Ernest (1891-1919), 109, 3*2 , 112,114,125,134.136 Uspenskii, 316 Vilks, Hermans (d. 1919). 108.111 Ustupa,P„ 113 Vilks, Jinis (1893-), 67,88,108,112, 113, 116, 118, 123, 125,137,142, Vācietis, Jukums (1873-1938), 7,213, 144-6,151,246,383.384,395 226, 234, 237, 240, 244, 272, 348, Vilumsone, A. (1894-), 108,112,125, 350-53,357,366,400.409 138 Vaļdmanis, J„ 109 VUumsons, 114 Vaļeskslns,P.(1899-),l25 Vinaver, MJ4„ 314 Valka, 67, 128, 132, 161, 166, 178, Virza,F.(Ldknis)(1883-l940).59l 201. 214. 216, 220-7, 229-30, 323, Visockis. V.L.,88 272,280,354-6.385 Vitebsk, 348 Oistnct, 36,76,102,136,146,153-4 Gebemiia,3,93.100,348 Elections, 38,68,73,781Î, 79 Votttovs, J„ 381 Valmiera. 58.118,128,133,135,159, 165, 227, 230, 232, 272ff, 354,400 Williams, Rhys, Albert (1883-1962), District, 33, 76,102.136, 146,152, 2, 257-8,278,318,328.398,4067 .274 Winter Palace, 173 Elections, 38,68,73,78fr Wittram, Reinhard, 8 Valmieras apriņķa ziņotājs (The Bui- Wovlinski, W.S. (1877-1960), 208-10, 237,391,394 Ietin of Valmiera 237.391.394 imiera District). District), 69 Valters, Miķelis (1874-1968), 70 Zaķis (Dzelonis), Jānis (1893*1919), Vanags. 280 109, 114, 123,125, 134,1378,161 VankinstT.,79 ZaJcmans, 281 Vārpa, See Zandreiters Zâlitis, J. (1874*1919), 112 Valilev, A.G., 88,217,229 Zamuels, V. (1872-1948), 80 Vechemii zvout 3)6 Zandreiters, E, Vārpa (1885*193$),67, Vecrumba, M., 138 110,114,138,375 Veitāns. V., 384 Zariņi, J., 125,134 VSvers À 114 Zcibots, Arvīds (1894*1934), 80,108, Veinbergs, Fricis (1844*1924), 72 Vidiena, 63 Vidzeme, 47, 68, 140,171,199,293 Zelmans, 112 government of, 33fT. 76,137*8 Zeltiņi, i., 114 plunder of. 3,47fT, 152,379*80 Z?ns, J., 407 Social conflicts, 3, 4, 39ff, 44, 45. ZheJezniakov, Anatoly, 263, 326,328 146*7,379 Zhemchuzhin, Boris, 178 Governor, 36, 50, 61, 27, 134,142 Ziediņi, K*. 252 Districts. 53.61 Ziedonis. Arvīds. 372

ntnclii. S. (1927-1980), vi, 2 4 2 , 377

U igurs,+•* Jyjjit fours,

2Jjf,J.(/SÔ5-194J)? J09,114 Ztk,J'‘a ļg in s k ttt n . , L 7 J , z y t - y , 4^4 fginskis,A.,29S,297-9,404

Zinoviev, G .Y. (1883-1936), 195 Ziņotājs (The Bulletin), 69, 9 \ tan

154

' JW*

awjs, /. (I894-J939), 1 0 9 ,1 ,4 ,1 3 6 . Znotini, 136 Zubits, K .,4 0 9 Zvejnieks, A*, 109, U S , Zwgzdini, J,, 253-4

m

The L atvian im p a c t on th e Bolshevik R evolu tion Is th e first full-scale stu d y o f th e relatio n sh ip in a W estern language. Since 1 9 1 6 . th e co g n o scen ti o f th e R ev o lu tio n have ask ed th e q u e stio n : "C o u ld L en in 's govern­ m e n t have sta y e d in p o w er in its early y ears w ith o u t th e L atvian S tre ik i g u ard in g it a n d fig h tin g fo r it? " T h e ro le o f th e L atv ian S tre ik i in sta b iliz ­ ing th e B olshevik g o v ern m en t w as w ell recog­ n ized in its d a y b y R ussian s a n d W estern ers alik e , a n d i t w as o n ly w h en W estern h isto ria n s o f th e R e v o lu tio n b eg a n to w rite th e ir w o rk s th a t th e S tre ik i w ere sh u n te d a sid e , p la c e d o n a d e a d e n e d tra c k a n d th e ir ro le in th e R evo­ lu tio n a n d th e C ivil W ar w as fo rg o tte n . E z e r­ gailis h as c o m p le te c o m m a n d o f th e L a tv ia n , R u ssian , a n d W estern so u rc e s a n d h a s p re se n t­ e d to u s a u n iq u e w o rk th a t w ill n o t o n ly illu ­ m in a te h id d e n recesses o f th e re v o lu tio n b u t w ill also b e a c h a lle n g e f o r th e W e ste rn h is ­ to ria n s w h o th o u g h t th e y k n e w e v e ry th in g a b o u t th e e v e n t.

"T h e w ord im pact in th e title o f th e w o rk ," w rites th e a u th o r, "h a s b een ch o sen advisedly: o n th e o n e h a n d , it is u sed to say th a t th e L atvian ro le in th e B olshevik R evolu­ tio n w as m o re th a n m o m en tary o r ac cid en tal an d o n th e o th e r, to avoid th e o th e r d an g er, o n e th a t som e have fa iled in to , o f claim ing th a t th e L atvians imade* th e revolution.**

Ja c k e t design b y G vido A ugusts