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ANDREW EZERGAILlS·, professor ol HlS· cory at ltha~a Collcg·e~ is tht a'llthor of T.b~ 1917 Rtruoluticm irr Latvia ( Ease European Monographs.VI II, 1974) and co~d~cor of Tbe &/tic PrMJirues of R.ussw betwtr~n the 1905 ,,Jd 191 7, RRolutions (BohJau v~crlag, K:OJn, 1983). He hu also publislu~d widely in academic journals on Rus~n Revolutionary,

Latvian. Soviet, ~nd C-ommunist topics.

Th~

&st Europ.ean Monographs c-omprise schola.dy books on the history and civilil;ation of Eastern Europe. They are published m me belief that these studies contribut·e· subsuntiaUy co the know1edge of the arca.and serve t·Ostimu1a.t e scholarsh!p and research.

THE LATVIAN IMPACT ON THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION THE FIRST PHASE: SEPTDmER 1917 to APRIL 1918 Andrew Ezergailis

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNNERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK 1983

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, NO. CXLN

Copyright© 1983 by Andrew Eurgailb library of Congress Card Catalog Number 83..8()4 77 ISBN 0--88·33.035-X Printed in the United States ·o f America

DEDICATION

I dedicate lhls book to Jinis Ezergallis (1898}, my father, who Uved and foiJ&ht throiJ&h the events described in it.

CONTENTS List ofIllustrations List of Tables List o{Maps

GLOSSARY

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION PART I. BOLSHEVIKS, IN LATVIA Owpter 1

THE CAUSES OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOWTION IN LA TVlA

11

Chapter 11

LATV.IA AFTER THE FALL OF RICA

33

Owpter/1/

THE ELECTIONS IN LA'IVIA Chapter IV THE lSKOLA.T REPUBLIC

68 91

PART U. LA1VIANS AND LENIN Chapter V

LATVIANS AND LENIN JN THE AUTUMN OF 1917

169

P'ART JU. LA1VIANS IN RUSSIA Chapter VI

THE LAlVIAN BOlSHEVIKS IN PETROGRAD BEfORE THE STRELKI Chapter VII PETROGRAD AFrER THE INSURRECTION Clulpter YO/ THE LA1V1AN STRELKI ARRNAL IN PETROGRAD Chapter JX

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SMOLNY BAITAUON

249 260

270

283

Chapter X

ntE 6th TUKUMS .REGIMENT IN PETROGRAD

301

Chapter XI

THE STRELKJ IN EARLY 1918: FIRST BATILES, RETREAT. DEMOBILIZATION

343

NOTES

J.70

INDEX

411

UST OF ILW STRATIONS

I. 2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

Plitical ideologies. includlng fascism' have found inspiration mhis works. Rainis' relationship' to Bolshevism, though not dbect, was more than coincidental. Nepth·e PortTayal of' Latvian Landed Peasantry -Up1s and I woe.

The Latvian ·popU!lation at large was ~nprepared for the Bolshevik assault on the Latvian Janded peasantry in 1'9'17, and one may ass\lme they did not take tbe· Bo1sheviks very seriously on tbe matter. ne .Uqui~ dation of the peasant farms that was the critical plank in the Bolshevik land program. of 1'9 ] 7 was in no direct sense anticipated in So.cial Demo~ cratic programs before that year. In fact there was no reason fo1 people u.noonnected with the party to belie·ve that any conflict between the landedl peasantry and the Party existed or was in the offmg. We do 1 .however, fwd .anticipants of the conflict in Jiterature most directly expressed mthe works of Andrejs Upits and Arveds Svibe. Arvils Swbe (1888-19'59), the future dean of latvian historiography i wrote two novels in the· period betwe·en the revolutions: How Dobuls Went to V'zs;t the ~G1ey Baron {Ki Dobuls' brau,ca pie pe/1kil barona p,fesos} 1911. and Jnteligenti, 1912. Though ne~ther work is considered to have literary distinctio,n, they contain aceJ'ibic portrayals ~of Latvia's oo·untr.Y· side in general and La.tvia's ~anded peasantzy in particular. S\ibe himself wrote about the Dobub. work: 1(1

.t

: ... J

pvtru; prototyp'es for the ttory I .used my father and mother. The. conflict between the two social spheres and intellectual per· mculons, I wa.r able to pomtt}" ottly in' black ,and w.hite, tdealizinl /IS

the_ -~~~

Dobuls and ridtculin:g proprietor K uJids. R,ega,dless

how muuscule

Will

the story ~s littrl11)' merit, at the time it had an

Tlte Causes of the Bolshevik Revolution·

29

undeniable soc.ial function, because [or the rust time in literahae I intr.oduced the farmhand and his antagonist tire·grey baron, which was a name given. by people thenuelves, The story had a great 3UC· cess in leftist circles . . . "JSt The following is Sme's description ,o f peasant quarters in Riga: "Yes, in this place trade goes on day and night- a mucous stream of dirt flows forever here in the name of patriotic wheeling-dealing; everything here is bought and sold-jluh and .soul: milky cows and sturdy horses are p.urcllased, farm lulnd's are bought for days, weeks.,. month3; behind closed doors the fleslz of women is bought for one hour, two ... and the butcher palms the shanks of CIJ/t./e for sale with his dirty fingers: 'how much meat will I get out of it?' but the gr;ey barons ogle the on·coming women with camal stares: ~how much p./easur.e will 1 get tonight? P32 In lnteligenti the negativism in the portrayaJ of the g~ey barons. is equally venomous.. The antagonist of the novel t~el!ls his friend of his dismissal from grey baron Ku.ik.isi) homestead:

'"-At the tim.e when Pf1Pt1 Ku;lkis gave me the book and in place of salary filled up my b~g with curses~-! fhook off the mJinure of the. grey baroru from my feet, broke off a sapling to get myself a walking stick, and' taok offwilh hopeJ for a vagrant's lunch. The mud of the 1'009 stuck to my .boots·. the sack of books and unde,... wear made by shoulders sore, and the ~pider legs of fog crawled b.ehind ,m y col/Qrand soaked me to the skin. Got to Riga to my

comrades where I stayed in bed with pneumonia .for three weeks. n.1S Lat·er the

novel~s

hero receives a teacherts certificate, and then he has an opportunity to return to the bailiwick of tbe grey barons o.nce more. Visiting a grey baron's homestead, he makes, these observatioJls: From every corner of the buildings there Jmiled three

fatten~.

geasy sisten: hoaperity, Comfort, and WeD-being. "What else is there for the·fanner to desJreJI' the antagonist queries

THE L.ATVIAN IMPACT

30

HUo tout 1114n otll!n lllt ll l lru~tu jolltCl~ba, bu~tu mClll ~~ tollla~. lon>f ftmtf ft~tltl, tf &u~ua btofe's but a ~~realistic,-,. zeroing in on the hatdships of coun1ry life. Up"its" tetralogy Robetnieki (The Boundary People) is on the ~on.e hand a Bildung81'Cman of the youn,ger son Jinis Robe1Jljeks, the one d·estined t~o be educated and depart from the farmstead , on the otllet hand it is a work in the tradition of realism saturated with pain~ hatred, lacerations, and humiliation. In UpTts• depiction there is nothing pastoral or romantic, by the time he is through , tber·e isn,t ,even fresh air in latvia'·s ·countryside. Here are just a f~w quotations from Upits' masterwork, as they may per-

tam to the themes of our ooncem. At the beginning of the novel Jaunie ,avoti (The New Springs), Jinis and Martini Robemieki see a pair ofboo~ts st jcking out from behind a bush;

To Tanis they appear familiar. Then like a .cold' shiver, or a spray ~of icy water the notion rushes through ~ .. No- the sou.l shouts-it C'IJIUU)f bel Dare no.t bel The drunk is not our father . . . Old Robetnieks, elder of the ,church, steellulrd ascetic, peerless un~ blemhhed exemplar, would not sleep like a romnwn drunk and a vagabond . .. .

Under him he [ee/3 the foundatio,n give~ on whtch rested the unlimited admiratio~n toward! the father and the patriarchal order. The shattering of the granite foundations lmS Dudib,le. The ancient edifice of truths and convictions was smashed. The hundreds of ropes that twisted and wove together the mem· bers of the family were stTet,ched' out like thread! of Un·en. testing their strength. ,and strumming acro·ss them, ran the coarse· finger of

destiny.

THE LATVIAN IMPAct

32

s up his attitude towards the land and his falllUy Martin! a Utt Ie Iat er Swn :

They are all guilty in our fate, father, father's father and his father's father. They all were glued t~ this plot of land, they c~rried this load without bitterness or dzsgust . . . they were collapsmg Under the weight of the burden, but they did not hate it. Do you remem. ber our grandfather how he wasted away from labor in consumption. A load of wood fell on .his father- he was pulled from under it half dead with a broken ribcage. All our grandmothers have died young or in middle age. The end of our mother is not far of[. And we have their lukewarm cowardly blood. That is why we stick to this piece of lond. It gobbles up a man in twenty years. Janis interjects:

I shall quote the great words to you: Homeland. Latvia. Forefathers. The Latvian peasants love the comer of land that has been worked by their ancestors. They love their homeland. Martin! cuts him off:

As a piece of rock loves the swamp in which it soaks. 35 The discussion of the causes of the Bolshevik Revolution in Latvia was subdivided into four clusters. They were the 1905 Revolution and the impact it had created on the consciousness of Latvians the role of the Latvian Social Democratic Party as organizers of the re~lution and pro· lectors of the reYOlutionary ethos, the unsettlement that the war brought about. in Latvia, and the role literature played in furthering revolutionary cons.ctousness. Each one of these factors could be broken down for more · . . detailed study and so me, especta11Y m the literary area could be topics ' worthy of monographic scrutiny.

CRAPTER 2 LATVIA AFTER TKE FALL OF RICA

In the

d~qJ

woods muddy 1101dien wt'Tt digging pils mid building log huts halfwtd~tgrou.nd, coverillg tile roof$ with din tmd branchn- f« winter qtUUtt!n. AU through this lxlck coul'llry 1101dfen swanned. Each patch of form Will full of tutfllerylimben and hones, sqll.lldrons of ca'fllllry bivouacJced under and in the sullen downpour thin curls of blue smoke mounted

tr-.

straight up Into the cold, quiet air. 1 Jolm Reed

Although in Latvia the Bolshevik takeover of power dld not happen the way it did In Russia (Petrograd), we can stW observe after the fall of .Rip two different phases of government in Latvia. The nm phase was clwacterized by extreme pluralism of administrative forms (the emphasis Is on the word forms), ooexistence of trlllitlonal, elected, and re\Olution· ary oouncils with crisscrossing authorities, that lasted to about November 8. And the seoond, lasting until the German occupation February 21, 1918, that oould be called the period of Soviet power, when the authority descended upon the Jskolat at the center and locally to the oorresponding SOviets. In a real sense the power in Latvia was already in the hands of Bolsheviks before November, but this power was exercised through the

33

34

THE LATVIAN IMPAC1'

forms both soviet and traditional. And there is another difference between these two periods. During the fust phase political opposition against the Bolsheviks, though in minority, continued to exist in some councils and the opposition press was still vigorous, while in the lskolat period aU political opposition and its press was suppressed. During the ftrst phase the governmental situation bordered on anarchy, each town and pagasts was left to fend for itself, in the second, signs of bureaucratization and over centralization began to show. Administration of Vidzeme to Nove111ber, 1917 By the summer of 1917 the administrative order in Vidzeme had become a very complicated one, several organs claiming authority over Vidzeme's, by extension also Latvia's, affairs. The highest and most complicated, though perhaps not the most powerful organ in Vidzeme, was the Vidzeme Provisional Land Council. It had the most highly developed committee system and its mode of operation was parliamentary. From a strictly administrative point of view it was able to tackle aU problems that came to them, but it suffered from two political deficiencies: ftrst, it was provisional, meaning that it was not an elected council; and second it was internally split between the liberals and the Bolsheviks. Though the two factions could agree on the small admini· strative matters, on the big que1tions of the day , the agrarian and national question, the Council was incapable of acting in unison. Until the elections of the Vidzeme Land Council, that were held on the very day of German advance, August 20, the two forces within the Council were about equally split with the Bolsheviks on decisive votes able to command a one or two vote majority .2 In the elections the Bolsheviks won a 63% landslide, giving them an 8 vote edge, two or three of which represented Mensheviks. Though after the election Bolsheviks commanded the Council itself, in the administrative structure, the committees, until the fmal dissolution of the Council, there continued to work numerous non-Bolsheviks, especially Mensheviks. Among the Bolsheviks in Latvia there were considerable groups which believed that it was the Vidzeme Land Council rather than the Soviets through which they should pro· claim power. This appeared to be an especially enticing alternative after October 10, when the non-Bolsheviks, with the exception of the

35

A group of Latvian Strelki d · pEayblg a banner: Long Live the lntema io~md

THE LATVIAN IMPAct 36

C cil breaking the relations with the BolshelliL_ Menshe'Yiks, lert th e· , ·o~ ', ~~ . . . .. . 0 .ver tile NationalitY question. • • _ .. 11 Go -mm.ent•s link With Vldzeme was the ProYlnct'.,.a The Pro vts10 n~ ve . _ _ 111 . th rc.twhile ao~mors came to be caJled after the Mar""Comou.ssar, as e e~~... o . • _ . ·•dJJ - . - Th. n.. ,ioional Go-vernment appoznted _the Ca.mmusar but Revolution. e .no,~ . .. ·- . d "th consultations with the LatVIans. After an embttte1 ~ lt was one wt _ ~~.. p 0 emocrats tue e Uberals and the Social mvisional squabble b~e tween th, . . ~ . Government in May appo-inted Dr. A. Pnedkalns. a Soct~ Democrat as ,r;·d c()·mm~.:!c-~r "llftd K• Ultnanis; a LJberal as VJce-Comnmsar• vl zeme ~ cu.11 Though the BoJsheviks have never cJaimed ~edkalns ~one of theirs~ in the disputes between the Bolsheviks and Liberals durmg 1917,. he con~ sistently took the Bolshevik side. The powers of the Commissar in the context of 1917 were basically administrative/fmanciaJ rather than political. He appears to have been an important figure in preventing the com.plaints from non-Bolsheviks, Latvian and German, from reaching Petro.grad.. Jnasmuch as the office of the Commissar~ though basJca!Jy under Bolshevik control, was. C-onnected with the Pro,visional Govern. 1nent and further yet to the tradition of the office of the prerevolution~ ary Governor,. tbe Comm'issartate was the first that the lskolat eliminated in November. (See Chapter 4~) The ~German dominated traditional landrat alw nominally continued to' exist until January 19 1S, ,, but its seat was in Tart u Estonia t· and its effect ~on Latvia as far as one can tell wa:s non..exlstent. To be sure the German portion of Latvia's population continued to consult it until the very end ... The next administrative level betow the Provincial in Latvia were the four Districts: Riga (which was pretty much taken over by the German forces) Vabniera, Cisis. and. Valka. The Cornrnissariat·s for the Districts were also in Jaw appo.inted by ·the Provincial Government, upon the recommendation of tne Pfiovincial Commissar . But mas much, as in mid· April 1917, when the sele(tiOn process began there was no, r·eal Com· missar in Vidzeme ~ the selection was done by the Bo1sheviks from the Riga SoViet, and it appears that the Provisional Government ne~er ~exer· c~ed irts prerogative·..The Dis.trict Commissars chosen were - K.roders fot Riga, F. ~il~rijs for Cisis~ V. lansons for Valmiera, and T. Liventals fot Valka DlStncts. They all, with. the exception ~of Livent:i!s who was a Menshevik ·internationalist, Vlefe Bolsheviks. With the exceptio~ of KiodeJs I

-.

.

I

1

1

J.

JArvia After the. Fall ofRig4

37

who Jost his position due to Gertnan takeover of ·the Distl'ict~ they continued in their jobs tmtil November, when the lskolat dissolved the of5 fices. The District Commissariats were co nflrmed in theh positions by the District Provisional Land Councils. Since the commissars we1 e Bolsheviks. all of their immediate aids were aJso Bolsheviks.' While the initiating forces for the organization of the Vidzeme. Provisional Land Council were liberaJ.s,' the 01pnizat1on ~of the Provisional Land Councils in the Districts were .in the hands of the Bolsheviks. In aU but Clsis Pro·Yisionat Land CouncilJ when they were· selected, the majorides belonged to the BoJsheviks. In ·cesis the Bolsheviks, lacking majority in the founding, Congress, did not get the oontroJ of the Land Council and consequently C!sis had no Pro visional Land CounciJ.8 In the elections of the District land Councils, that we1e schedule-d for August 27, but in reality due to the disruptions caused by the tetreat took place at wrlo us tim,es, the Do lsheWc:s won majorities in all District Land Councils. (See Table 1.) Ln addition to all of the e]e-eted Councils there were also the Soviets. Among them , the most important ones weJe the Riga Soviet and the lsk.Olastfel (die Executive Committee of the Latvian StreUd Soviet), both of which had nationwide influence. As the consequence of the instructions from. the V Latvian SD Congress in July about t tvee weeks before t be fan of Riga the First lskolat (the Executive Committee of Latvia~s Soviet) was elected., which w-u to serve as the roof organization and coordmate Lat\lia's Soviets. Ewntua.Uy in November all po·wer in Lat\'ia descend~ed into the hands of this Soviet, but that is a subject of a separate chapter. The only counterforce against the Bolshe\'iks. in Latvia which the Bolsheviks to some degree respected was the lskosol {the Executive Committee of the XII Army Soviet) which until November was. ,oontroUed by the Mensheviks, but in no real sense did the Iskosol interfere in the intemaJ life of the Latrians. But how powerful was it? Even its mfiuen~ insid·e of tbe army is hjgh.ly questionable as the foUowing vignette from John Reed's,observ.ation shows:

Comrade .soldier!

The Vanden• Soviet or Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has arranged for Thursday t September 29, at 4 o'clock in the park,

a MEETING.. Tavarlsch Peters, of the· Central 'Committee· of the

..

TABLE I

w

Elections of C&is, Valka, and Valmlen District• Land Councils Party Affiliation in the Council Date of Elections

s •

!"

I \

I'

\

I a I

I s I

i

\ I

g

\ ~ \

Q \ J

The FrontUne After the Fall of Rlp (Sept. 1917-Feb . 19 18)

0


«mq democracy. Thtough these Soviets. La! via's prolellriat will dictm lis will over I.Juvia's future. Titc Soviels alone can SU3ranlco full democracy of the parllnmcntnry councils and prepare the cleclions of the Constil uent Assembly ... .' 0 KirklinJ' senlirnents app«r 10 ha.-e been !he sentiments of the great majonty at t.he Congress. The consensus and expectation was tltJt it 1m tncumbent upon lhe soviets to take over power in l.at,il at the fUll opportunity, whc basic difficulty in which the Lat\ian Bolsheviks found themselves was that, by t he fall of I 917, they were very experienced in governmentif not politics as well-and, like Karklin~, who had worked in the Land Council since its inception, they knew how much it took to set up a committee system and on administrative struct ure. TI1c ensuing argu. rnent, it seems, concerned the volue of the administrative structure that the Vid~cme L:md Council had created. K""arklin! fought to the last for his position, and in the final statement, he relied on a resolution from the v Party Congress which had stated that both organs must work in tan· dem- the lskolat deciding the official line." The vote went against Karklinf. In a close vote, the orthodox Leninist won: 12 for, 3 against, and 10 abstentions.54 The resolution was a simple document: more like a statement congrat ul:lling the Pctrograd government than one asserting power in Latvia. TI1at

124

TH · LA1VlAN rMPACT

in itself may indicate certain co.m pronds.ing attempts wil]tin the oonfttence~ an auempl to avoid a split. TI·tcre wos no doubt th:~l the smiel rower~ without coalitions, ·must be su,pportcd lo the m~ximum, The important part of the statement read: "'Power undivided must be in the hands of the working peop1t themselves- in the Sovb~t of D'cputi.es.•• utvia 1s 'Yorkers, ~ldier5, and Landless Peasant Soviet of Deputies, Jiqurdating the o!d ad. ministraHve forms, taking over power in ut via, is scnd~ng friend~· greetings to the revolutionary Soviet Go,vcrnment (~he PeopJes· Connnissars) and the Centra] Soviet Exc·cutivc eommiHee :~od promises with all its might and means to stlpport it in its difficllil st rll ggJc. ss The resolution ends with an optimistic saiula!jon to the internatioml IevoluUon to follow. \Vhat happened (hereafter is '"Ct:Y difficult to reconstruct. for to 31arge degr,ee the :wctivities of the Jskola.t were at variance with the debates al tilt o,vember 8/9 conference and the accepted r,csoJution. 0. Karklinl re· s:fgned the chairmanship~ prcsumabJy in protest against 'the decisions of the conference, but he did not leave the Isk,olat. He continued to be one of jts cllicf spokesmen t~ntil the end. The :resolution spoke of lbe Jskol::J:Cs takeover of power? but the only m~in o~rgans of administr::Uioo that were taken o~vC'r in toto were the Commissa nates o,f Vidzemc ~nd I he four districts. The Vidzemet the district Land Council, and the clly councils were allowed to continue. To be sure, there was a new relalioJl· ship established betw.cen the lskolat and these so-called "parUamenttuy'~ oouncjls- the Jskolat consider,cd them as mere .adtninistrative' C)'.tensions of Hself-bLJt fr.om the outside, thls new relationship may not have been ,obvious. UnUI the December ~ 6/18 Congress, ·the bas.ic thru~m I he Jskol:~t was to take complete controJ of the purse strings of Latvb. Whether 01 not there was a bJueprint anticipating tbc dismissal of 1l1t parJiamentary councils cannot be ascertained from the available eviden~. But even then, aflcr the DeceJnbcr Congress. fitting th,c n1odcrate temper of the Latvian [skolat BoJsheviks, they wanted to keep U1e cornmiUee

or

structure intact .

The lskolat Republic

125

The second historically important decision at the November 8/9 session was to continue, accelerate, and systematize the confiscation of baronial estates. A special committee, consisting of Rozins, Vilks, Eglitis, Efcrts, and Ser~.ants, was selected to revic•11 the situation, gather up all materials pertaining to the baronial estates, and work out a plan of confiscation of the estates and other properties.56 The third major decision that was loudly proclaimed at the time, but had little immediate consequence, was a resolution to organize the Red Guards in imitation of the civilian militia detachments in Pctrograd. The Red Guards in latvia were to be the army of the people that would take over the defense of the country after the demobilization of the old army .., The Red Guards ne,•er fully caught on in latvia, although detachments were established in most localities.58 To replenish lskolat's membership, Rozins, Draudins, Serening of the day when the general session of the soviet ended (No\'ember 9) lskolat met and started to plan the transition of power. TI1e meeting was attended by Rozins-Azis , Kriimins, Draudins, Seri:lnts, Uicis, Vilks, Mengele, Udaks, and Efcrts. The nine-person board in this session made the following decisions;

1. Elected the Presidium: Chaim1an: Roz.ins·Azis; Vicc.Chairmcn: Kriimin§ and Scr2ants; Secretariat: Vilks, Mengele, Draudins; and Treasurer: Smidts. 2. Upon Draudins' suggestion, an Information Bureau was organized that would care for lskolat's publicity.

126

TliE LATVIA IMPAC1

3. A s.ahuy of 250 rubles w::Js set for pern1nncnt members of the Prtil· dium and the propagandists. 60 4. Draudinl was entrusted with setting up the plans for the or,!r.i. :zation of the Red Guards. 5. To coordinate the activities with the Revolutionary W:u Committe~• GaUis was delc,gatcd to Ccsis and Valmiera. and Krumin~ lo V~l . 6. The L:~kcover of the Commissari3,(S was planned. The board d~dd~J 'to create a liquidaUon. committee consisting of members: I o from the ]skolat, two from rhe Vidzcmc L1nd Cmmcil~ and o : neutral.61 7. TI1e Iskolafs Agrarian Cotnmrucc was asked to consult with all ctJr. rent nnd previous n.grarian committees and kn wlcdgcablc personsa preparation for the working out of the plan of conf1scat ion. 8. They decided to establish communications with Latgale. It w1' noted that Latgale soviet recently had become Bolshevik. m3kin~

n,rc

communications possible. 9. 1l1e \\'ork schedule of the Jskoiat was to be as foUows : PresiJiUIIl meetings ev,cry day til noon~ ruu Jskobt every Satu:rday ot ~:00 P. 1,62 ll w.JS one thing to claim supreme power in L:Jt via, but it was qui~ :~not her to establish it. Although the Jskolat did not encounter any mljor force of res-istance, the transfer of power was not automatic. On the fir$! day of ,-.,·orkJ the lskolat disco\·ered that power will come to them on]f through rigorous and persistent work. As the old administrative app:ua~us was liquidated. more and more duties began to pile up on the rskol3t's shoulde~. AJI of a sudden tile rsko~at became tesponsib]e for evc·rytlliiJl : ponce. ~oou:ns, se:hoob, welfare of soldiers' widows~ and sanBalion. ftc. 1l1e highest priority was. to obtain money to meet the salary dem~nd~ not onJy of the lskolat's own apparatus but the whole administratht, police and educational structure. Inasmuch as the Bolsheviks had committed themselves to a gradwl takeover. eschewing the use of weapons~ they found the process mucb slower than frrst anticipated. Deadlines became expandable and nothin~­ as the fskoJat's minutes show- seems to have pro· Jutlonuy tribu~Js In each district sepantely." But In 1 sense, re•olutlonary justice existed before the establishmrnl

The lskolar Republic

'

131

of courts: in the press we rmd occasional mention that persons have been arrested or detained by some local soviet or lskolat itself for theft, making of somogonk, disobedience of lskolat's decrees. 19 On December I, the lskolat elected an inv.::stigatory committee to look into those cases that later would be given to the Revolutionary Tribunal for judgment.M The first case tried by a revolutionary court is noted in the Iskolat's Presidium meeting of December 8. reports about three men who h•ve been sent to us by Ope Workers, Soldiers, and landless Pea;ant Soviet for having agit·.ted against the Soviets and for spreading gossip. After exomin· ing the case, it was learned th3t altogether five had been arrested but two, having confessed, were tried by a Revolutionary Court and assessed 100 rubles each.81 Toma~evics

As time passed, lskol•t's attitude towards political opposition began to stiffen. The attitude towards the Pea>ant Union party during tltis early period w3s condemnatory without necess•rily zeroing in on any individual or issue. The Uberals had withdrawn from the common forums with the Bolsheviks, and so there was no room for specific conflicts. The three important anti-Bolshevik newspapers, Lidums. IAika viisris. and Srriidnieku n••ize, the organs of the Peasant Union, latvian Soldiers' National Union, and the latvian Mensheviks, respectively , continued to come out. Tlte first stricti)' political attack came against V. Bastjanis. a Menshevik, who having been elected on the joint Socialdemocratic ticket, was still active in Nov.::mber in the Vidzcme J...•nd Council, making vociferous anti· Bolshevik, speeches. For his recalcitrance, he was depriv.::d of his party membership and removed from the l.a.nd Council.82 The big move against the political opposition came on December 5 when Lltlums and Lalka viisris were closed.83 The furor that was created by the closing of the two newspapers perhaps prolonged the life of Striidniek11 al•ize. It was closed on January 20, 1918. On December 22, it was decided to liquidate the Temporory National Council, which up to that date had been the nucleus of opposition against the Bolsheviks.84 From that time on, there was little in terms of organized political opposition left in latvia. In some ways, the latvian Bolshevik opposition was safer in Russia , in Petrograd and Moscow (for at least during the initial months of Bolshevik power),

J3~

TH ; LATVIJ\N J'MPACT

the cn:.os 1lum! wns J;rc:Hl!r. Bul even inside Russia. hko1at•.s lons rrn occ:Jsionolfy re::tchcd ~hem . The editors of LiJums. after its d osing, trJ velcd to MoSCO\\.' and sl orted :J new newspapcr- Gaf:m1a. As soon as

lskolat he~rd :~hou r it, they lele;gr phcd the Moscow Soviet and :1skco lht;m to liqtJidate Gaisma. which was prompll}' done.85 Krumios. reporting. M the Second Con ress of So\ids. summed up lht! Jsk1lut"s activitjes in its early phase thus: Tiac October RcvolutiOI1 1 which the lskolat supported rrom th firsL moment, suddenly changed the circumst3nccs of Lill via's So vier of Worken, Soldiers and L1.ndless Peasants- it became the org3n power. Thous.:Jnds of tasks suddenly confront the Soviet~ n1e masses of peo~1l,e were mo\-cd by a ~ew energy~ wm and self moUvatton . . . . The main questions before the 1skolat we1e questions or power und agrarian an·airs.... The CommiS:iariM of the Provisional GGvern. menl wns liqujdatcd. \Vc took many measu-res to improve the conditio" of the workers: we sohed workers~ problems as they :uo~ Jn conjuncHon with dcmobiUzation in a pra,ctical manner. AJso the judiciary question is on the agenda, and every da}r we had to pass on such questions as the protests f stewards of estates whom the landless peasants had arre-sted, ot black markeleers. Tite landftss peasants ohvays came to us. and nol only the landless peasanls; all drrsscs, came to us- the merchants and the entc:rprcncurs etc.-they 100 were obligated to come to us for clarification of poUcy. OuT activities, q\Jite nat urally could not be without misunderstandings with one or .~:mod1er administrative organ, such as for exnmp!e the City Council of Valka, wltich ltod pass-ed a reso]ution not lo sur· render its police funds to the lskolat. \Vii hin U1c lskolal the ~question arose to disperse the VaJka Co,uncH since it no longer w3S

or

suppor[cd by the majority or the city's inhabilant s~ Finally the question was postponed for the next Latvia's Soviet to decide. SimilarJy misunderstanding nJso arose about 'the shutlirlg dm"m of LidiiNIS. A storm was cteated by the Peasant Union Party and 1he atiunal Blo·c/16 which demanded that we r~eturn the Lidums typo· gmph}' within 48 hours. That of coucsc did not happen. 37

TI1e Seoond Congress ,o f latvia•s Soviets. Brh'ais Strelnfeks called it ..Lll \ia 's \Vorkers" Padiarnenr." The panyts central o1gan Oiw named it

Tile lskolot Republic

133

"Latvijas Saeima." The Congress was the biggest Latvian Bolshevik gathering after November. Tite purposes for this Congress were multiple: sym. bolic, ideological. and practical. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks wanted to dramati ze the accession of so1ict power with this Congress and to in· 1igoratc the revolutionary "masses," as the Bolsheviks were wont to say; on the other ha nd, they hoped to bolster their legitimacy and to systema. tize the new government. Bril'tlir srri!lnieks explained the need for the Congress as follows:

I

I

The lskolat's present membership felt that the tasks before them are of high responsibility and therefore lskolat cannot and should not Jet wit hout full participation and help of the working people. Therefore the Executive Committee felt the moment to be right to obtain a vote of confidence from Latvia's workers.I!! The party in its pronouncement put it thus: This moment demands an extraordinary amount of energy and power of will. The Congress must unleash the maximum of energy, systematize lskolat's work and to anticipate future development. The Congress can no longer be just a passer of resolutions-the decisions of the Congress will have the force of laws . ...The Con· gress will need to pay especially close attention to the selection of the new Soviet.a• TI1e Congress met on December 16 in V:Umiera in a meeting hall that was overOowing. About 287 Latvian Bolsheviks were in attendance .90 TI1e reporter noted: The hall, which was of considerable size, was so full that it was impossible to carry on the business of the Congress. TI1creforc by 3 unanimous vote it was decided to move the Congress to the local church. Tile reporter continues:

The workers in closed ranks, accompanied by an orchestra playing "With Batt lecrics o n Lips You Died" carrying red banners and

134

TUE LATVIA ' IMP,\Cl sUe:!mers that prodtlimed : All 'Power to the Soviets, Workers. ol tl•c WoTfd Unit~C'. mawched on to 't hat temple in which sbvcry :Jnd s-:r. vility had been preached in the nan'le of Cl1rist •91 The Congress was ~opened by Rozin~·Azis~

The only goven1mcnt of working people is tttat of Latvia"'s Workers. Soldiers. und Landless Peasant Deputies and its executive powerthe Soviet Government+ The foundation for Uus go,rcrnn1ent will b~ laid by this Congress . This is the only and the highest org~n or power which has the :right to de,t ennine the fot~c of lat via -th ~ is Latvia's Constituent Assembly· w:hose tJsk is to, fashion our life and our system.92 The audience rose to commemorate the fallen revolutionary commdes: the orchestra played a d~rge . To the Presidium were selected : Rozin§,-AlJs~ 0. Ki rklin!. Rauze (aD from the Latvian SD CC), Viks.ne (from cesis Soviet). J. Z3kis from Valka Soviet), Aliens (from ulskorad 12',)~ and Bruncnieks (from thr Strelki). [n the secretariat entered Kreslins, Jan.els A. Anskins, and R. K:ii'rklin,. Congratulatory speeches wer·e deUwted by Krumins (latvkm SD CC), J. Peter~ (Ail-Rus$inn Work~ers, Soldiers. and Peasant So'lwiet of Deputles), M:ukuss (The Sovi~et of Deputies of the Northern Resion), O.Kirklim (Lal,rian SD fraction from the Vitbeme Land Council), AHe11s (XII Arm)' Soviet). Sa Ina (Dlt\iaii Petrograd BoJsheviks), Ba.uze (L.at vian losc0'.\ Bobhcviks), an unjc]cntHicd delegat~e fro:m Latgale~ Brunncnlcks (Tarlu), Reinsons (Iskolastrel)~ Slrautin! (Valmiera Teachers Association '"Pnr gress'"), Viksnird (the Latvian SD StreJki organization). Samsons (lint· bali workers), Zadn§ (l1izbergu pagasts)~ ~nd Mednis (XII Arm)' A\'i:lr o Division}.93 TJrae only non·Bo!shevik at the Congr·ess delivering congrt:Huiadotls was RudeVics f1om the Lat\ian Mensheviks. He noted that lhe protet:ubL Jaad split into severaJ factions. but insisted that the goa1 of all was the s3me. 1

We are for the convocation of the Constituent A.ssembl.}~ . This slogan is wriUen on our oom.mon banner and as yet it is not erased.

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Congratubtory telegrams were sent to Lenin. Trotsky, Stutk . tht: ( rJun of Peoples' Commiss:us. and the Pravda. 95 Report s were ociJ\Cl ·d rom ,lskola' by Krumin ; from 1he Valk4'1,, Va,]micm. and C'CsJs Dist rid Wor~en. Soldicn. and L1ndlcss Peasonl Soviets of Deputies by LkJ 3k..,~ l m n. :unnicks, respectively~ lskor::td by AIJ~ns; lskoborsc'.r by Marku • M...~JJ~­ trcl by Rcinsons ~and from Lltgalc by Vikmin~ and Znoti11S. 96 In the debate of the reports, the only critical remarks nb ut the acfi· "'Wcs of bkolum were dc~i'ICrcd by Mcnsl~cvik RudeviL.'S who argued ttut Jskolat erred iJI failing to participate!' .~n tbc Brcsr-Utov.s_k pc.Jcc nl.'•l')ti· alions. thus allowing the bourgeois parties to gain momenr um in tlwt respect : Similarly the bkolat has acted [ynmnic:~Uy .tn mutters of frL!cdom. by clo·sing duwn Lidums and Laika vestis, bc·causc sociaUsrs shouM not ac:t thnt way. Soda1dcmocr;Jts must defend the freedom of the pres . The lskolnt wants to struggle with the opposilion b)' fir~t lying up their hands. It is a djshonorable struggle. (WI1is-tles, :wd hr is prevented from continuing.J 97 Mc!in~

rose lo

dcHv~r

a scaring indictment of the Mensheviks:

Mcnshc\riks get ncn'Ous when we call them counter-rC\'Oiution· aries. Everyone who struggles against du~ revolution, we cnU counter· re\'Olutiomnies . .. . n le MensJU~\ik press publislu~s Hcs aboUI out heroes .... We must deprive the bo·urgeoisie or cveJy weapon \\.'il.h whkh they Oght lhc r \'Olution. Classes that h3\' outlived tlrrJr time must depan rrom the arena. 93

As Rude\~cs. representing 311 insignificant group, ltaS spoken up without (actual basis and is onJy creating obstruction. rhus interfering with the Oow of the proceedings at the Congre-ss, ahe Congre~ ht!s decldcclto take away hi:s right to spe:11k.'"

The Jskolat Republic

137

Rud~;vics. il ftcr h.:JVing wriuen a note of p.rotc~t., lef1. H>D TI~c Coagr~s.s

reoognize:d the work of ~he bkolat •u proper and tbe report was accepted whh oruy one negative ·vote. for the remainder of the Congress? tbc following agenda was covei~u :

The Soviet Government and its tasks. l11rc agrarian quest ion. The farm hands question. Demobj] izatio n. S. l11e Red GuaJds. 6. Latvia"s a~lonorny and the constituent assembly. 1. 2. 3. 4.

The ··New .,, fsko,lat ~ December 18 (o 'February 22 The lskolat that crnergcd from the 1Congrcss imigor:~led. body~

W3S

indeed a new and an

Js th.c party had ~expecled. [n ~n respc·cts-ideotoglcal~

patitic:d, and admi_nistracivc- thc lskolal was lightened up . The one O\"erwh1!lming decision made al che ,Congress was th:lt it must be the so\'icls iillld nothing but the soviets that shaH rule O\~~r Vidmme. The Vidleme unJ Council along with all of the committees., as weD as nU town coun· c-1] • would n~d to go. 1l1ere was to be r1o political compromise. The who1c appar:Hw of the Lskolat was s')'stcmo.UzedJ dhidcd into dcp:ut~ mtrus-burNmcratized. The free wheeling council (that the [skolat was b~for" I he Congres.-s) took on the ilppearan~ of a government. Only se\'en memb ·rs of the n ~w [skolat carried over rrom the body that was elected on Ju~)"' 30 •. but most of them were from that pool of people who were aclhe in the lskola1 from ovember 9 to December 16 1(sce table 9). The (ruci:~ l sessio~n of the lskolal that divided the functions of the m~111bcr· 5hiJ'I took place on December 22 . In the Presidium were elected Rozin!· A11s lchairman): 0. Knrklin§ and Gailis {vice-cbajrman,); ·l etint Toma· Se\'ics. :wnd. Z3kis (comprising lhe secre'lariat); and Smidts and K. K~wHn! Ureasurers). Tile cx.e.cmive cmnmittce itself was dJjvf.ded into the foUowing functions: 1

Rozins ·Azis-Cha i una n 0. .Karklin~ ~AdministraHvc

D~rector

138

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Gallis- Director of labor Vilks-Oir

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t tune •.nd bter, the lsl:obt appeared like the perpetrotor of choos and \10ience, and yet it secnu thai much more harm would ha•-e been kin!: ad•':tni>~C of a fOYourable opponunny to talk wnh you in veater detail.

11te gener:~l political situation causes me greot anxloty. 11te Petro· IV•d Sovier and rhe Bolsheviks btve declared war on the go•,mment. But rhe go•-ernmenr has an ar01y, and Is preparing tysrcmoticolly. (Kertnsky at Cenoral Headquaners is obviously enrering into an understanding-a bminnslike understanding- with the Kornilovites to we troops to put down the Bolsheviks.) And what are we doing? We :l!e only p.1sslna resolutions. We are losing time. We set "dates" (October 20,the Congress of So•icts -Is it not ridiculous to put it off so long? Is It not ridiculous to rely on rhot?). The Bolsheviks are nor condur· \\ 1ilc things arc being s-ettled. organise sucJ~ a bloc immediately in your plliL.'C. organise the publicaUon of leaflets (tmd out what you c1Mn do about them technically as woJI as in lhe mattcJ of tr::m rortin~ I hem into Russia). 1l1e11 each propag.unda group for work ln the rural areas should consist of not less thnn two persons-one rrom ahe Bolsheviks and one from the left Socialist·Re\'olutionarics. Tl1 c Socio Iisl ~R.e ml ut ion ary '~trade mark., is still ·po ptdar among ,;llagc folk amd you must make the most of your good fortune (you havr.= some Left Socialist-RcvolutJonaries) to effect a bloc of the Bolsheviks and Left SociaHst~Revolurionarics under this .. wn1c mark'• in lhc countryside, a bloc of peasants and workers :1nd not of peasants and capitalists. 5 It seems to me lhal in order to prepare people's millds properly

we musl im111edi:rtely circulate the foUowing slogan: transfer power now to the Petrogrnd So·viet wllkll willtrausfar if to the ~congress Soviets. Wh>r should we Lol~erntc three more weeks of wat ~nd Ken: ns_k y"s "'' Kornilo vi tc pre pa.mt ions~~? Jtopagamla in f:nour of thts slogan by th~ Bolsheviks and Lcfr Socm1ist-Re\ulutionaries in FinJand can do nothing but good .

or

6

Since you are vested with •'powern in Finland, you have to do one more \rcry important 'though in itself modcsl job- organise Eh~ Hlce~ uansport of literature from Sweden. Without tills all talk of an u l111te rrmliona I" is an ·e mpty pltrasc. Tilis can be done, flrst. by creatitllfotd •1th the IO\'ernment of Kerensky,at others, II wu che 1nny tlw ~ ..,tlln& for the insurrection. At times, the insunecllon wu nttdtd to oltfrnd the revolucion in RUS$1a and sta'-e off Kercnsky's surrender of Red

192

TilE LATVIAN IMP,\CT

Petrograd. but at Others. he argued that II was the Russian p3rty's respan. sibitity 10 the international, especially the German , socialist n101~mtnl . On October I, he wrote a leller to his party functionaries of Moscow and Pcuograd in which he even amicipalcs a bloodless coup: If power cannot be oclticved without Insurrection, we mUSI rc11ort ro iiiSl'"ecrioll or o11ce. II may very well be that right now power can be achieved without insurrection. for example , if Moscow Soviet were to take power al once, immediately, and proclaim i!Self (together with the Petrograd Soviet) the sovernment. Victory In Mosoow is guaranteed, and there is no need to fight. l'ctrograd can wail. The government cannot do onyll1ing to S3\'C itself: it w1D surrender . ... II is not necessary to "begin" with Petrogrod. If Moscow "begins" without any blood being shed. h will certainly be suppone.1raordlnary Conference of Latvian Bolsheviks met in Valka to which Lenin delegated Antonov-Ovseienko to coordinate the uprising and to get the Latvians to send some regiments of the Strelki to Pctrograd.45 While the preparation was going on in the provinces, Lenin, in the cen· ter, continued to fight off what he called "strike breakers.'' On October 16, another Russian party CC meet lng met in which Lenin had to fight to reaffirm the decision of October 10. On October 17, he writes the scorching "Leiter to Comrades" that come into the possession of Pcterss, in which Lenin painstakingly analyses the arguments of his critics. On Cktober 18, Lenin writes "Leiter to Bolshevik Party Members" which is 3nother broadside against Zinovicv and Kamenicv. On October 19, he writes a "Letter to the Central Committee of the RSDLP(B)" in which bt QSks for the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kameniev from the party. On October 24, he writes a "Lcucr to Central Committee Members" in which be reaffirms his resolve for Immediate forceful assumption of power: It would be a disaster, or a sheer formality, to await the wavering \Ole of October 25. The people have the right and are in duty bound

to decide such questions not by a vote, but by force; in critical mo· ments of rc\'Oiution, the people have the right and are in duty bound to ghoc directions to their representatives, c\'C some value if their am/tors ltod been ffpttwmatil'ef of rite An11y-' Wild appbuse . 'Om th~y do 1101 rrprtslfl1 t/1< :soldi•nl' Shl>kins his f~-.: the Congress! The Army is not with them!' The haD rocked with dJcering.ln the first moments of the seS!ioo. stunned by the rapidity of events, startled by the sound of cannoo, the delegates had hesitated. Fot an hour hammer-blow afier ham!lltr· blow had fallen from that tribune, welding them together but b1dtnct =ms 10 Sug· ,:til , rlul rhc ssilors were "''Y important In wuppin' up tht cmrcrs on 0.1#r ~S. 8UI , from the point of \YW of establlshlnt power, ""'Y lilllt ..u >C\"'rnplished on !he 25th. Slill, u the sarm rime. we must recogniu tJul tht sailors. In the long run. wcr! soft Bolshc>~ks-one may :usume tJut Ltnln ,.'Ould soy thor they were pure Russlons. The oon•,rsarion that Ltnin hod with A. L Sheinman, chainn:~~~ of the executive commiuee of the Helsinki Soviet of Deputies of the Army, Navy, ond workers of Fin· bnd on October 27 may be taken as a mlcrocosmlcnl statement of the wloolc rciDIIonshlp. Are you authorised to speok on behalf of the Regional Army and Nt')' Commit tee? or oourse. I am. Can )'OU the grc:nest possible number or destroyers and other nrthrps to Petrograd at on::e? Ltt me all the Tsenuob:!lt Cluirman, beause this is a purely n.a•'ll malltr. What's new in Petrosrad? Thtre u • rtport that Kcrensky's troops have mo•"d up and uken Gatchin•. and since a p:trt of the Pttrosrad troops are tired. it is 1mpcratlve th3t we h3\, the !lrongest reinforcements as soon :IS possible. Anything else? Instead of the 'anything else· I expected you to ~y you were ocody to set out and fight. so

mo•,

ha•,

n1e con•'trAtlon actually tumed out 10 be a bh beuer for Lenin than the ~ scltcted abo•'C indicates. but it does not falsify the relationship. !Set ~I.IU.ov'• suten~tnt on p. J 74 of this chapter.) In fact,u we th:!ll see

bra Ill thiS Sludy, thf s:tilors turned inlo one of the major liabolities/pb·

pc. IIICIOfUIIOnary Petrograd (see pp. 286-288). T1ot L:ohiln Bolsheviks and the Insurrection in Petropad Tht L:otvbn Bolshevik drive for power proceeded much more smoothly ohan h dld for lenin In Russia, having its base of operutlons away from the

198

THE LATVIAN IMPACT

center, the focus of3ttention. Nor did the L1tvian party intem1llly hnt tht di.Uions and fwures that were to be found in the Russl~n p3rty. The l>t· \ian party was in de facto power by June 1917 ,and the elections of August/ September 1917 made power official, from the p3rliamentary point of view, de jure. Much before the soviets in the enpitnl cities of Russia, by slim majorities, went over to the Bolsheviks, the electorate of l..'lllia in •II of the Provincial Districts and most of the city councils had elected Bol· sheviks by solid majorities (see chapter fll). So the Lot vian call for insur. rection and lhe taking of power in Petrograd mUSt be interpreted in a much different light lhan Ltnln's call for an insurrection coming from F'ltlland. Ltnin was still out of power, wanting to get in; the Lat\ian Bolsht\iks were in lhe =t of power; they only wanted to make assurances thot thrit gains not be destroyed by some "Kerensky plot" in Pctrograd or a "Komi!· ovite march" into Vidzcmc before the revolutionary sit uation matured in Russia. We oould begin to document the Latvian llolshe,ik dr!VIl for power from the L1tvian SD XIII Conference in April 1917, through May I 7 resolution of the Strelki Soviet, and the V L1t vian SO Party Cong_rcss In July, and on through the July 27 proelamation:O:>mrades/ workns. aud so/dim! Rm~­ /urio/lary Dmrocracyl In the IJJ!ter document, the plan wu layed out to reorganize the Latvian Sttelld rtgiments into a rerolutlonary armed for«. 11te L1tvian porty took an Important step towards expanding their innuence on July II, when the so-cruled Ltftist Bloc was org:tnized. The pur· pose of this bloc was to unify the llolshcvik forces In the XII Army. C\~nt· uaUy looking towards the unseating of the Mensheviks and SR in the ISO· sol (the executive committee oi the XII Army Soviet of Soldiers' Depu· ties)." This Bolshevik march towards power in L1tvia the author hu aJ. ready documented, in part,ln lu book, 1917 Ret'OIIItiou (11/AII'iD and in lhe previous chapters of this study. Therefore, in this chapter, it remains to show how the L1tvian Bolshel!iks began to deal with the "international" obligation. ideologically ,Incumbent upon them. Let us begin at about the same time when Ltnin began to urge his com· rodes to take power in Pctrogrod. Lenin's epistle of September 12. "The Bolsheviks must take Power." was written after he had received the news about the llolshe-'ks obtaining a majority in the Petrogrod So-'et on Augus:t 31. In this letter, Ltnln renewed the slogan: "All power to the 5o,;ets"-a slogan which the L1tvian party had never dropped. 11te L:u· ,;an reaction to Bolshevik success in Petrograd came much quicker than

LJ:triam ai/J Lenin

199

did Lt·nin '~. On th e very d'ly of the passage of the Dol hcvik role in the PIy troops as well as for t he purposes of doing the preparatory •vork, it is necessary to organize a committee. 54

From the point of .;ew of the argument of this study, Ribe's mcssagtil indeed remarkable, for not only does it prove conclusively the existence or regional planning and the existence of the Latvian "underground railroad." but also . in tenns of dating it. shows that the Lal vians again were ahead or the Russian comrades by some good three weeks. Tite Military Re•-olution· ary Committee gets organized in Pctrograd only on October 9.55 From the beginning of September, almost all L.1tvian pan y and Strelki committees went on record as supporting a takeover of power and urging immediate action in Petrograd. The Latvian approach to the insurrection. the same as Lenin's, was strictly military in nature. This was not to bean insurrection fought on the barricades by ardent re•'Olutionaries, but one achie\'Cd by massive military checkmate. In the following letter to 1he Regional Committee of the Army, Navy, and Workers in Finland,ofwhicb Smilga was the chairman, sent two days after Lenin's letter to Smilga (per· haps intended as a reenforcement on Smilga), lskol3strel wrote: The l7.kolastrel has become enraged concerning the latest direct· ives by the counterre ..olutionary anti-people government of Kerensl)', ordering troops faithful to the revolution out of Finland. Tite Latvian regiment!, who have proven their faith in re111IU· lion not just once, promise to you, dear comrades, their help and participation in defense or honor and dignity. Be assured that we, the Latvian Strelki, are with you, completely with you! Upon lite first call from the Petrograd So.;et of Workers and Soldiers deputies, we shall dispatch a military force and toget· her with the Proletariat of all Russia and the garrison will defend the conquests of the revolution against the attacks by counterrevolution· ary Kercnsky, Konovalov and Co.56

J.otJ•ians and Lenin

201

The HI c·eical choJces for Lenin and the Bolsheviks' since Lhe spring 0 r 1911. had undergcn1c a certnmn evolution. In the spring,. ~he cltolces wc.r~e bet,vetn the taking of power tJlfO,ugh the soviets or in the streets on the b:.rrica Lies. In Lhe sum rner of 1917, the Latvian Bolsheviks~ for their O\vn purposes, cltangcd lhe1r tacHes, They espied the possibility of coming lo power by elections, but Uull basically was a Latvian intemaJ tactic. On oc~aoon, the Latv.itm !Bolsheviks did ·vi.ew the Constituent Assembly as 1he \-ehicle th~l would bring o.bout socmlism in the whole of Russia. But by early faU, it must have become dear to the Latvians that the issue Inside Russb could not be decided by peaceful means, and, therefore. among 1hcnt, 3S with Lenin , the Iine emerges that the power in the capita] or t h.e t!mpire must be decided by 3 military force. To meet th_is tacLjcaJ goaJt ru1 lnternational obligation., the Latvians inUiarted the oo·nwrsio:n of the l.al· '.ian Strrelk.i into a oonsciO·US revoJulionary speaihcad. Discipline became a posilivt '>VOrd ror them again~b,ut this lime it came under the name of 'tC\'Qiution:uy discipfinc:• Pan of this plan to conwrt the latvian Strelkl into a re,'Oiufio·nary "nst "" was to form, ~out of the Strelki regi111entsl a full am1}' corps lhat would be a compl,etely self-sufficient, ndlitary form:~tion with ::1 full complement of supPQrt ser-vices~ artillery, cavahy ~and aviation 1

. t s.51 oonllngen In addition to the resolutions and prono,u:ncements issued by Lenin, Srnilga ... :ntd oeher Bolsheviks in F~nJand and the Latvian Bolsheviks in Lat, \ia urftb regard to the :necessity for insurrection t there 'ne numerou.s other p:e es of evidenc-e that indicate the exist,e ncc of regional p1ann~ng. TI1c m:Jjor C'•'ents •hnt display the exis-tence of this coordJnaUon, the lip of the

iceberg. so to

speak~ we:lie:

1. A similarity in the arguments jushfyirlg 'lbc insurrection~ 2. The shaping of the Strclki into a IC\'O)uUonary fo1ce ~ 3. • achlmson•s transfer to Vidzemc fliom Petrograd; 4. The Congress of So\iels from the . ortbern Region organi:zed by Smilr-J on October U ·l2 ; S. Time Conference of Bolshevik Mi~ i tar.y Organization of the Northern Fronl, October l.S - 16~ in Cesis. 6. Antonov-Ovscicnko's nlission to Valka, Octuber 16.

The impression o.nc gets is that while the1e was d1visivcness i11 Petrogracl,, in 1ne region :uoMd P'etrograd-certainly in Latvia-thcr~c was a relcntle.s.s

pressuring tO\\·ards the solution of the issue or power in the center. i ne eisary, an inrasioo of Petrograd. \Vithout exaggeration. we can s..1y th3t tht Bolshe,iks in th~ region around Pctrogradi during this prcp3ratorr st~ge, dispbytd intentjons similnr to those of Lenin. \\'hcther this was :1 result of a coordin~ned plan or spontaneity is not tJHlt important so long as the outl"'me \\"aS the S3me:. Justificario,n ,o f the In urredio:n

One way U1 which p3 raiJclism ~ if not a lockstep coopera(ion .. ber ....·~en Lenin and the l..at \ian Bolsheviks c:~n be documented is on the le\-el of argumentation lhat was ad\-anc d by the Lonians for tJtc neccssi[y or fn· surrection. As the Lat \!ian Bolsheviks prepared for the deepening of the rc\-olution~ they used three types of argument: (a) that the coming of the socialist order was ~~inevitable·,; (b) that jt was ~~desirable~';( lh:u it ,.,.Js ··necess.:~ry"'' in the sense that they J1ad the only viable ahcrnathre, and 'that jf support was not forthcoming from d1e populace, greatlmnn would rcsuh. The Latvian Bolsheviks used a~ three arguments. buf they were cspecin!Jy prone 'to use· tfle third-that of "necessity." The argument of '-'necessity'' hinged on the pro,position that the Bofs. he\'iks aJonc were able to provide security, and that any ol her altemat i.\\."'S! most emphatically that of the PtovisionaJ Government, were likely to lead only to general anarchy and overall deterioration of life. The ofr.held assumption was that conditions were so bad that a generar and complete reorgani7~Uon of society alone could correct m~rtters. Jn other words, the Bolsheviks were using the same arguments for the deepening or I he, rcvolu· tioo as ·,ven~ us·cd by those desiring to stop the Bolsheviks. H was frequrnl · ly argued tiuH the workers' control of factories and banks was no·t so much needed to fulflll socialist justice as il wouJd be a way of avoiding economic collapse. The resolution on Political Situation and rile Tasks nf the Prolclariat accepted at the V Party Congress in July outlined Ehe logic of the argu. mcnt ~ rne first two paragraphs of the resolution portrayed the prcsenr situation as hcadin~ for an unavoidable crisis, then went on to :1rgue that compromise-s lcadin.g lo cooperation with (be bourseoilS liberals or sodal· ists wou rd' lead only to funher deacrioution. V3rious dangers were ptHl· rayed as imminent, :.rtd 1he proletariat was e'ximrted to p.rcparc for the

203 lfPIO:J~hLn~

final balUc in wJtich lJ1ey wouJd .need to deliver the decisive b:~>w. llte logic of th~ argument stro,~· to gh:e the Bolsheviks dae appc:arlfl·~ .,y holding (he defcnsi ve posit ion. On this occasion, the plan was not so r;nuch 10 broaden frc·cdorns as ·to defend those secured thus far lby the Je-mocrali~ for·ces. Paragnph (3) read as follows: 1

Compromjsc.s Jogicaily Jead to the bu:ryin,g of the revoJutio!l. ~soc­ ialist ministers are incapable of canying out truly democratic policies~ but Instead change themsc·lvcs into acti'vc or passive supporH~rs or the bourgeois majority's policies. The· petit-bourgeois socialists ate inc:tpable of ·emUng the imperialist war, and end up as the supporters of Russian, Engljsh .• ;md French capitaLists and the fulfillers of the tsarist ~mbezzHng treaties. TI11~ bourgoo~ is socialist bJoc is no·t only lncapabl·e of realizing the task~ of tlte r~volution but, having r·cnou:nced re,nl111tionary menns1 they e;-en he·lp to deepen severely rhe impending :industrial, .financial, and food crises. ..\lld rsragraph (4}:

The anli·de·mocratic and chamvinistk policie-s of the coalition miD~ i~tO' inescapJbJy sharpen the dass cleavages and pro\JO,kc the broadest rnass movelllents which ~xpr.c:!'ssed themselves :in the JuJy J. and 4 remonstrances in Pctrograd. The suppression of that rno\'Cment through the means .or rorce~, tbe aru:1.ounoement of di·cta·toJ.Tship, the r~nuncia rion of

civil IJberUes tesUfy that a counter revolutionary L'tlUtsc has beg.un. The petit bourgeois socia]ist groups-Soda[ Revolulroll:J.ries, Peoples' Socialists, Social Democ-rats-defetnsists, the Dund :md others open]y cro·ss ·O·ver to the counter nntolutionary side.

The conduslon '"·as dr~n,rn that aU power should go b'3J the sGvietsJ U1at 11e:~nUe-5s suu~.gle agai11st the Provisional Government should be ca~rried 011,1nJ one shou[d oppose therefore "* ~ ..the dispe!l'sing of revohJ1tionary r~pmtnLS lnd the persecution of the revohJt,~onary army~ .. ~ :uss Th~ rollowir-.g is an example or arguments for the need ~o.f re\roluUon as t~ ap~-3red in a fower Lal vi::m party organization in which many or 'lhe r··r~iousl)f men t joncdl themes arc summed up :

TE 1E LATVr A ·' IMP'ACT

204 One of the latest fcuits of this policy

\YOIS

the o.bandoJilrnenl

or

Rign and devastation of .a new 'region+ .... ~n,.~ fina] ,nctory• o\tr U1e revolution is obtained a;nd a. total coUap~e irS approachins wjth gianl stc·ps. The tragedy of Russia•s rc,•ol~tion reaches its apex. Russia"s BonaparUst·.Komilov s.urr;enders "strategic points• (read: Rig:1) fot :polHieal 1{re:td: rountcrrc\tO]uUonary) vcuso~s. The army ls fuU of Ko:milo'\YS like thaL So is 'th·e rear. Tnerefore w•a are de.m:~nding; 1101 ~only the surrendet to a people"'s triliumal of Kor1ilHov, Ka[e-dm, the black trows or the St:ue. Duma Guchkov and Pur:lshkc\ich ~nd others~ bm atlso of 'lhe oo1.mterrevolution ones firom aU organii:Jt lon~ and h.eadq,uarters~ etc. Th.e Chief of Starf must be immrdiau~l}' driven away. The army must have denmciatical\y eJected le,aderslup. we roust revoke the disorganizing •,.uscipline• in lhe army ~ that oruy muiU pUes the mobs of des,e rte.rs. In the army democratic: re rolu· tio;r~a:ry di~cipline is n,eeded. To obtain t!a_3.L. an newspapers and p311Y pro·pagandists mus! be ad mined .i nto the army. The death penal£)r must be re\'Oked as a tool. ·that has failed t·o tpevform its task. The proletuiat a'lld the landless peasants na"-e a large task ahe.Jd of them : they must assure state power.. Econo mtc conapse is .arproacb.ing with g,iant steps. AI of that pro·ves 'the correctncss. ·of ~~~ foundations of the :r:el'olutionary social democracy. Htmgcr i) sulk· ifllg 'the shacks and ham lets. The war d·evou rs e\oery mb.h,g.. Desp.lir and disaffection is spr~eading. life calls us lowards anew r~n-nlution.~' 1

On the eve of the uprl~ilt:lg, Jiojs Zicmdis-BerzmJ~ wriling from Pr:ITCJ>. gad~ summed up the tbemes for the necessity of takeover of pow,er in an al1icle entitled "iStruggle Against A:narchy.n He begins by saying 1lu.1 new.; of ~ spreading an arcby are comi n,g in. fro:m aB parts ,o f Russia: re \\1('t oft~~ peasantryJ confiscation of lands, burning ·Of landlord bui1dings, lOoting of caU)e Iu!iotr. tmd rlrm tlw n't1ttr of tlw SolltHo~um I -... IOJI OC'CW lrce. r.mn Soldo too much credence 10 the words of Uos. whtle l iomnJo•-rr lhnce of th< Cong~ess beause h< thinks of the woe of pown from the point of view of ~trc>&rad alone. The Sl&lllfie>nC't of tht Nonh· trn Conftrencc was tO coordrnl!e for= in the "hole rtlion. that it X· compluhed. For c:comple, IUbinowteh f:rils to note thlt 11 thiS Concms • tht Ut\1:1n delegate, for the lim ti'll< In • pubbc forum, offtred 40.000 mtn to come ond help out the ins...rection.19 The deltaates returning to lhcu ~nnstituencles knew what the situotlon wu in the region, and from there nn. they bcsan to organize ond prepare th~ir resuuttes. On October IS, full her pions for the region were compocted ut the conference of the KSDSP (b) Military orgonit-1llon in CCsis. which lubinowlch, ~ue to his 'U 3 stnse th>t It .,,..Hr· ""itd ., short notice Jnd rnltht ho•-r hod somethln& to do with the ''ht:rd 011 ' "' ·" •• Ltnm •nd hb closest oids were moving Into the horne sltclch. ltn, h~d >n obstssiun >bout ho ving o surplus or power Ot Ihe point or ~'•oshe >etlan (his reoding of Clouscwitz might h3\-e h•d sometlung to do

I

r I

I



, •

~

d

r j, If

I

90

with it )~

anc..l when he hc:t rd rhal the Baltic sailor did not rome r the numbers that he bad anticipated, he senr out Ant~oov·O\-stitn' ol:~ Valko ·to reach for the l.a( vians. whu h~ cJ been plc!dl'!ing their sup rc the U\to pr,cccding mouths. On the o ther hand't 1he ..Lnviln c.3nr ':t have bce.n in Lenin s pbns aU along. The situation. as it might ha\· looked from th~ tnslLie lo the plll:.fn or tbc u:prisiflg ~ may be gleaned from Anto AOV·O\'SCicnko's mi!IT oirs. fll tells of a co•n·crs~l ion with Lcnmn. on about October 14/ 1",in whl· b gj v~.:s :l report o n the a,niJnblc forces in the area suHoundin Ptu; l The first to speak as Lenin :

'Can you not send the wh lc flccl

inlo P~t n>~rau;·

o. First the watenvays are not suited for it , coond, the b~ shj;s fcor submarine nnc..l torpec.Jo boa~ s. 1\ml fimJI~y the ~ulors w·ou•J ,.,!

want to leave the front.' 'But 1thcy should understand tl1ar the rcrolutiora 1 in t:r~llct dllltu in Pet rograd tlHU1 in tJle ~1J:tic sc~ .,'

'TI1ey JJe not so clear about 1hat.' {Wha I co.n we th~n do?' 'Two three torpedo buats can be sent into cro. ::md a det:tthmeclof sailors from Viborg gathered up. Altogcl her three thous3Ild ntert' 'Too .little ' Lenin said discontented and worried. 'And how is i1 a the North em Front?" LAccording to the reports of their rep:rcsentali\'ts there is WI}' ~ atmosphere and here wi~ bo u 1 question Latvians 3 re meant] , ~nd w? can expect great deal of he1'p from them against the troop~ from other fronts. But to find out fo·r sure one would need to go thm oneself." [ 1

Then go without hesitation ! 91 Briefly thereafter. Antonov-Ovseienko is having a convcrs-arion \\ith Dybenko. the inspired Bolshevik from the Battic fleet, and in 1h:11 coo· vcrsation we fmd out more about the Bolshevik djffi culries in g~Hin! forces from Finland : Dybenko: We would leave our stups to a man, if we know th:u Pwograd won'[ make it .. ~ . But we don,t have th3't impre~sion . We don.•t

r

I \

223 believe 1n I he pow,er of Kerensky .... \V~ iU'B going ro st:1mp them oaJtL Shouldn,.r th·e 5000 workers,, 150J)00 men in the garris.on, and the Krons1adtcrs to boot be able to do it. \'I.e ha\'c heard liute from the front. \Vho after KornUov \., ould dare to go against Peuograd. To be exact. if i( ca·me d~own to the last struggle, ""e would sink the tlecl to bar the way of the Germans to show unHy. 92

rn or her words, the sailors are supporting the Bolsheviks, but they are not 1ton eager to so 'to P~tr,ograd. wl1er·e Lenin want,cd ·them to be. Later oo n U1 c even in~. An to no ~t tc Us of his con venation with l..cni n t~o Sv-~rd~o 'r~ m

who g.3 \'C bim t hcsc d i rc ctives: 1m Ccsi.s at the present our Conference is going on. [He mecans the COJlference ·Of Bolshe\~k MUitary Organilarions of the Northern frotH]. You know the line of our Ce,IUral Conunittee. Hold 1hem to it. The task is merely practicaJ. The more troops to be had for Petrograd the be~ lcr •93

u. from the conversation with Lenin. An(onov-Ovseicnko·s mission was to a~~crtain

the general sitmuion in the Northc~n Front and to S~ee how ~he t.:H\13JlS cou!d be used for stopping front-Jine troops from c01ning to Petro~ grad then s,·erdlov uJilmistakobly asks him co get I he latvian SttciJd inlo Peuogr:nJ. As we shaJl sec, both assjgnments were discussed •n lh.e Valka mt?c t ing. Jn the eve 1i1 ing of October 16, Antone v-Ovse ienk~o rea d1es Valka where he ru~eu with ·the Utt\ian p:nty and Strelki politic;allcadcrshlp in 3P extra· ordinary and secrel L"onrercnc·c of the UtlJi:m CC. Strelki guards were posted on the streets &nld around lhe· house in Valka \ h.crc the ~oon.fercnoc met~ Anrooov writes; t

The Party Confcrenc..c was in progress when .l arrived the partici· pants. were full of youthfuJ vivacity and .mature decisiveness. Out of tum I wJs given the floor. 1 made a short • compressed i3 ddress wit h. tile follow1J1g concluding words; '\Ve are going tow~uds an uprising, for the estabHslunent or the Soviet powcJ. In this a gr·eat responsi· b1lity Hes on the oorthcrn Front ..... t During a break, there is 3 matte r-ef-fact conversation with the 1e~ding, cadres who want to k'Row the specific details. In silence :md

224

1111 L\T\'1 ~.Jlii'IL1

"'' " rre~t anent ion t ~cy Iuten to the dltWII-etl lliJIJTAp "' rl 111 detarl. Wlt;rr can one d••' Tirerr ~ener~l•urnnut .. n'I'U:1i(f!!! uursrhc) '''be defcn~~rs of Pctrot.rJd. We ornirdcrt~.t Gtr.:llll» Ires of the coumcrremlurl•m. ns mJnr force. O"r cou'J •ur tts.~ get the l.ahiln Suelkr to nullh to 11ttrO{J..J to lo,lpthc~ nut durmg the b3llln llrey ha\\' become ""~rd ~h tbt sm Corps. If 1he u t \1JJU wrll pull nut, ~ .. llr< Srhcruru ftk: a lll>thlng thM can sl!lf> them). The front will be ·~atcJ ... rbtt!l"' cnuuo n is rccommendccl. llnl, In view of Ill)' preu wing. rhcy r•omiled 10 prtp210COIIIJ .,r Latvian regiments for Pctrcollr3d within one wccl, ••. We ha•'l' to dismiss the Commander of tilt II Lal\un Bn;z!e I t h>l\' ~ c:ornm:mder. 3 Jood frs:hter who b dose ru Ul, \'.xx~s-~ we dr311 chOQSC. 1\'c d1all inltntd>atcly send th< I •nd J. Rtp:.::i to C.tr.10rd1nM). ('uofnn:apt sed 3 rcsulutiun, tbe fm3l p~ugraph of "ltlch rc.d as (ollo~n!fl Alii...,.. 0•100icnLo menrloos were carried out. That >ery night, rhe porticip3nls of Ihe E>troordlnary ConfU"e"'" on Pe1ro;n.l p•: lhcm ~ br~arhlnJt speU.lime co stifle • (c..• C.flo,>l mnd lht liiSI sp>rl: IU)' lgi\Ut II .•• ,[>'!')" Sttp now needs to be doubly oonsidcrtd, we muse use oU our m·: .1d1Lms.o n, representing rhe Left ist JUoc; Fr. ~·hukus~ rqm: ~c nl lfl1! 1lu;1 So\•Jct of XU Army \,Vork~ers ~ J. Carin!. J. Jak~obson. and '-; Til:bs. rcrrescntrng the lskoJastccJ; K. KauJins, represenHng ·rhc Val· rniecJ SLH tel ~ aotJ rcprc:sentati\·cs from tJu: Soviets of Ci-sb. Volka, :md TJJW. t .rrm< hecJruCth~ chairman aruJ J-= r. Markuss l•is l1Siistant.' 06 ~brikus~ ~ m 1 .t\L>""cmh~:r I in Orimir SlriVr~leks, published :m art icle ~x 4 pbmJn 2 1he cri ~w·n ic~ of '[he Mi~ it a r}t Re vo Jul ionary Com 1nhtcc. 14

AI the mmncnl . ju the Couu:niuee are tcp:rcsemeo nine o.rgani7.Jilon)., many regiments, and divisions. Regiments and dhis ions ~ IJ)nn~ le3mct.l about che cst~blishmetl'f ·or tile Milil~ry Rc\tlhU'ion~ J T)' (~ummj[fCC , SSoHCh out C:Ofllacts a.nd .inform I!JS that they wiU fl\J. low the t.fircr:tl vth ur 1he ,Commir tee and carr}' out aU of irs on.fers. . . . :.fJ ny pcoo plc re undc•ur ,3 bu ut the course of act ion :tnd wlu t to do and ..:onstatnl)' ~rc reQuesting of our commiss3rs the caiUng or mC'ctlngi and tallies . ~ . . Consequently the MH.uary R~e\'Ul ut[una ry

O,mm utc c b rn (O nst an~ nc-1ion. Our peo[Jlc are workin8 from 8 In tht mo rnin J un11.l ~ .J at night. wil h~)IJt food and rest . for 1hcr!! is so much Ill do . All Ito ug.h .rhe Cormn iu~ e \\'as organh~cd ord}' a couple of d::r ys :~go ; i1 ~ range of a cli vi·t ies is very broad. Tlu~ Comm ~~ t c-e needs lv pronounce on C\·erychin~! Soltl icts arc approaching the ted plln by the German Gener:ll Sttff, and the L:at\ilns mip.t be merd massil.. uoop support,the 30.000 l.o11ian Strclld would not have bee1 a problem; but with so few loyal trOOP". th< mthtary rould not •fforJ to sprud thtm out too tlun. Th• Ruagn mUilary dtd not fully know what the J.at,ilns wrr• up to, but theil .:norance or the L:at.Un toctlcal mo•'H mi&llt have immoblhted thtm niOrt th>n if they h•d •ctually kno~·n what was aoing on. Gentr>l lutt· fo•1>h. ry ordm.'" 11re tubst.lm)' ~hhtou}' Or~nintit Orprut:>llln Omuu puhhj))u on ~nnolllltat rn Old tr \\ten the Uohhcvik ~tnu 1\tcn hC\1k/S. H. urm:. To ~enh: I he qu I iun, sptiU' C< n~rcss of t h l" X II i\ rm}~ Sn\'lCI uf De put tc\ Is called for ~· ,"tmbcr l ~. Mc:nlwhilc. hku~ •1 11rHh itself Jtvtd..!cl : I he .Uolshc\'iks l\' an CC 1 ; t h ~ 1cnshc\-rk/S. IL Bloc makes h s hc~uquart · r ~ in • \"JI J. •n [t •,\JS llOC o( the most !Si 'nifu:ant defeats ·t hal ·t he mlli·8ulshcviks in lhl!' xn Arrrw fC,:IIH'll suUcr~d ill lhc Odobcr d=·~·s . Otl u nabcr l s! ~J 1umson be. omt:s the· chail man 0 r l skoSf.~l.

o. ober _,.

\\\JS

Gencr!jl htlcln vkh not itac~ L "ncral Chcnnisuv that the Rr.;\ulut i011ary Cmnrniuce has entrusted the L1t \i:Jn Sue!. 1

.\ll ~hhl:Jl}' i:J \\1fh ~orne unspecified ass ignment.~~ Q:;ob~r ~9.

Th dcput>' chairm~n uf hkosol. Tumarkiu. not• •~s tl1c MJdquJncrs f the 13th Corps l keep roiJm lod; 3ml lu omotJ\'cs out of rndt u the l..atVJan~. 1 :-? The 6tb and 7th Suelki Rc ,imeot arrt\'C in Valmic-rJ. Some Cossack croup a~r.: rmJcrt.llo le:.nte a tram in Valmicra. 1.tJums. pubUshcd in Val ka, \VI h cs: 'fhe second 1c ., o Iut iou is an J.

.om phshed

r:J Cl' at Ieast

in PC'( rograd .,

Rumors circulate m V ~ka thJt the tvian Strelki are on th(i way to the city. The Committee lu Sa \:OC the Fatherland ant1 1tte rtmlution ~y th_at the S t rclki will bt: pre \"Cntcd from rtltcrin ' 1he

O:tobtr 31.

:i[''

• J. IJO

The Rc\ lui ion:1ry \\'ar Commit tee issues the ftltowin~ -~a"nJin) decree lO the oookdcaler Ruplinis. iu Ccsis . ·rn JCCOfUJfl~ wuh the tlccision ·n f the mmiurc, you are i·nronJ!lecJ thai ·the sale of n~~ sr3pers LU/un1s and l.oika ri!stbi 1 forbjdc.Jcn .' 13 ~

th1e1 dJle

Ctner•l Blro.lll'l11lm :o:rthern Ftonl rrrorts IO Gmrul lkirh.,nrn Jt hu.Jqu:utrr> 1hlt 11 r) unJ'OSlrhk Hl :w:nJ 1he I 7th (.-o:;

0:.:'"'"

to Prru>rad :u :uuicrrot~ bc;l- nf the utr•uoa old: t..t•-un Strtlkr. \\-Ill>, ms he rep.ms. 3tc rcmf)rni the w~••'t :\11 Ar.;; ("IJ~ I..JI. I.Jtr$h~~lt f'lb tiU Jul.~-tO bhh(hl i I'Olt \ln XO

~rmu'r"' (r~t~ll

I

II i

TI•e l.1t\1311 rcser'" rt):irnent IIJiulned in T•rtu, uru11:1.

IA~CS utmmJnd ot I he \11)" :tnd tt.oures .:onllol of the rari1112Js.'" (~r.· th.t lhres up between the 1..21 •un suiJ1ers Jnd htl$ht\11. f'lll ul llkot •lo.!· IJIItrhc telrt:r.rhriU rn Prtrc·rud ,~,.,.·, ""'lrn;:. In Tutu •nd f'>l.u• the• -.urk. but In \'o~ll.a, unJa tV. pn

""h

''' J.l.,•sul.tht the Lat\'lan Suelkl'• rcglments art

dtsu:t~:>r•t•nt.



I I

Jan·i:ntaml l.miu

241

~'""'"'"' S·\1.

bln Workers'. S!l!Jieu' anu l..:lndfeSj l'cas:uus' Soviet of O.:put ics. resumes full opera· uous, whk h h~d ceoscd ~ ftcr the fall of Ri(:a.

:-~wmbcr f4. fS.

The Special Con~tress of thr XII Almy Soldiers' So•iet uf l'ltruurs meets. 1l11cc lly 311 of 111)' pre· dM'~lrt who ha\T wtlu en about the rcmlution to emulon the triumph 1olthr U.>lsh~•iks 111 Lenin'& rob~CIII'c," "' I lind rhh statement drsturbing ;nd. rcrhaps. even rcpul•iw. I J..now that rh~ Solictldcol)lnes wuuld not ~".lnt to aolmit tu clements of syn~rctowment. one person 'ould vccy easily s.!ntuutc for ~noth(r, and the)• did. The L:ot•ian JUIIY was a \'tr)' good Nmrlc subality. continucty at the base, but cno:onst~ncy at the top. As 1 f!ll\ltr of iasence cluring the tutumn. Wnh rc~Urrd to Lenin's lrader>hip. we can n!l: the qurMiom Tol· noy nistd concerning the leadership of Napoleon. I how many wmnumds lh.u Lenin p•'t during the autumn of 1917 were actually carrlell llUt? At tl-.t t - and p13ce th3t he g;I•'C them? Once th< SoVICI re~lmr bei!Jn 10 ~~ruu.."totru, it is J difierent m3ttcr. CenJrnlr. thr "rruulftttlon" dod not om:s ~t the time (one is not e•"tn sure ~bhq hne tnw•rJs tl·t (olllllltucnt JUlI*c•1k hne un the h>•L> of wh1d1 lhr dJ II mwl be noted lh>tlhr IAI\IJns.lhru.,P. S:u~• ~the Commm.u t>l JJhll' wum, rcmlutiun•IY tribunals, aboh~hmg tanks 111 101-tety, ami hqulu•ung the old lcg;tl l)llem.'" Thh IS 1101 the plal'C 10 lOri 0\11 how much or lhr>e ·~WHOn· Ulned ptinciples drrived fro m Lenin , how murh hn111 Ma1x, illld how m,,h from StuCI.a 's own Wlll1118> and C)(ptrrence , 1 hal SIUCI.a's own and Lot•un re•oluuon;uy expertenn problrm '" lhc SoWle••" Rc•oluiM•n. 1~1 no ll~ll tn lite West on the orrgms .nd c•nluu.:>n (If the S.l\ltl lcrJI S)'llS o ,.JIIlftl Ul dtfUIUIJ tht \l.ht>lt lt\IWC or tht So\1h«Unl conccancd I h• clcnnnlnn or th< N~l••nahl) qurslllln. Lenin, dut 10 Ius "Ruuian" ort~ln C" an inltn'.> l>uuh•l IUcbhsl. hr "" ''~"f) tr llo>llht\1k al lr;ul by lumKII f,t e.W.:,js hiJ< lu rlucld•lr, u no Ruul>n cnuld, an 1rnrnr1an1 tnccrnalilliUI:;i u. rt•l cH f~11$hr.1k idrolnJl.l'. 1\lulr Ihe f(uuun p.lrl)' 1111\ld fur Klf-tl le•Jenlup 3tthe end uf\hrJ,, rhrrc IHtt J~O memhtu, .n the cad nl J\pnl. 700: 31 the l>cpnmr1•' June. I O· I'Jl~>IUI) t\Crll> •• r l'clW)'IJJ IJpNl unrn'• rcrurn. lboUI 100 UII:J:o llohlre•tls .nJ >twr.l hundred uthen .. cnl 111 the rinbnd SUI••n ~.n • tuuup. I" utruncJ thrrnS Jl trc sut••n's c"'· bttr lc.:w cntttf re\olutionJry jw;tlc. ·.=4 In 1lle au umn. J pre-war onfidan t of L nin. J1nis Beum!·Lemtlu :u: ...._rl in Pctropad and immL:JiJcefy heCJrne JLlh borh in 1he .o\ll·R~ ;;w and l...a t nrm r~rt ic:s _::s IJ hinti . h~ _cnt>5. o ul of r~ns~ uf vision. :mor her l.al ,;Jn '"ir h 3 sin· is cr future pu· i hi appeJr:m ·e in CDrfy auwmn J9J7. His nJm~ "'as Jcka s Pc ""r >- P~ ens ~vas :J m~mb ·r of the ul\ian SDCC.efe'"'t{Jintl~

257

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J Clruh :s l'et cr ~ Jui)· f~f'lrrcs~. who all I![ I he alt or RI~.:J i LHtJ not M:ij' um!h;r l.hc Genu:.n Ll' ur:nkHJ JS Ju] IIUI1)' CJ[hcr CC members bul rullc. wed the Hilr,Mlin .11trny to lake commJnd nf the lat VIJJII part)" in Vu.ltene. F• r wlmU.:\s:l :putf'ltl~. :.t~bout mum h be ron: rlu: brt~LLrrcctjon. l1clerss UcquL·rntly rtr:~~ \·d. N ru Pdrogr:uJ ' l teu~. inc:~ he! spok...- :uglJsh. hr wa\ bcfuended hy four •.:.ono bsuc pro.IJobJu:Vlk Arru.:nc;m journalists- John Rt~c t.l: Jn!i wi'fc. IAulit Br}'ant ; ,\Jben :Rh)·s Willi~m ; 3nc.l B~tl!. ic llt.:a L)' . Mucl1 uf rthl!! n~ws llu1 ..\rnCrlr:;J lrarncd abuut the re\l'Uiution WaS, h> IDIJrlt: dcgr~aid I would like to meet him. and Mr. \\'ilhams promised to bring him t o ,!inner I he next nigh I. They 'arne. h wa~ the ri1st 1m1c vf rniiiiY limc>. ami they opened many windows on the Rcmluuon to me that otherwise ha\'e bee n closed. 21 John Reed c;JU!!lll a glimpse of Pcterss on 1hc morning o f October :!5 in front of the Marinskii Palacc.tuking ca re of some rearrested ministmthat guards h;sd released O\'Cffitght , lacking o rder s. 'I though t you bagged all those gen tlemen last night,' said I. pemt· mgtotltem. 'Oh.' he answered, with the expression nf a disappointed small boy. ' l11ose damn fools let most oi them go again before we m~dc . ds .... •23 upourman The deCJ5i\'C step that brought Pctcrss into the activities for which he as known in history occurred on December 7, 1917. when he w~s selected to allend the organizational meeting of the All-Russian Extraordinary Com· missio n for the St ruggle with Counterrevolution and Sabotage, presided over by Felix Dzerzhinski. 2? Another Latvian who at tended the meeting headed by D7.er7.hinski w~1 K. l't'tcrsons, chairman of l7.kolastrcl, "the young, clean-faced soldier, Wlth Oashing eyes." as Jolm Reed described him at the tim e of the rcpon from Latvi~n S!.telki at the s~cond Congress of Sovie ts o n October 25. After th~ Congress. K. PCtcrwm entered the Petrograd Mi lita ry Revolutionary Commillee and did r.ot return to work in lskolastrel. 30 K. Gallas was another Lat vian who became a member of the Petrograd M:l11 ary Rc·;olutionary Committee and the reafter continued to wo rk in the cent ral state apparatus.31 The fir~t unit tA the l.;Jl'tian Strelki arrived in Pctrograd ''" !>:ovember 25. Theil presence in the city. of course, overshadowed the activities of the Latvian Bolshc ·.iks, in part documented in this chapter, but frorn wfut ha~ been said here. it seem~ reaso 11~ble to conclude th~t the Strelld ~,-·

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ro •hl· huiun .,r lite pruhl~m · I t• (lll ~:rw rile Jk 1l: I :md s:-U; , hrr :al. ~ l~inillg or. 'Lh.·•J t•JrtPn c.·. ~h r it·~ •md ~.to de tfO)' c le Jl.. 1. tin [J 3i bm ~n • t h · t:..1H~ of t.hs rd :. ~r n1 · he cnmmenT w n tl· 0. 1. hc\tl c: Jl~ U) In ~n101~c •ru •r HI 1h • c:.r • th:ll If ,., s lhc 1 u r I t .. rh.lt ~· ~ Oh ~~ Irt.• ~u~rH l)f :1 ppleeJ.. 11•e prnl ~rm • 1 l:nh 1l, (.r ,J p ml pr thlcm il'r \!t II th forr th. I \'C:I C (,• fl• th fio nh'J' • r 1h tw h LH •.uu ·rrd·.um Rc·-imt:n . mon~ 1he" 1, t:ou f fn~c- .. tu J,;, rtu I,, tm p( lht~ JUt• L~ hu of the W1 r:r 1ul ' . rlescri hHlt pi ~,'1' ~·ur ,,,1 . he h"l c rh. I. I \1illl\ "tt " d m rht P'l= I. r .rt·m. 111 lu ~ \,:d •cul.u h H lie ~ut. hUt • .. '"'rlC' 1 1 the fil r:t T!·.'1 IJ;u:k::: 4 • ihrnJ; rhr· l!~•rU, J ~h.:. lr: nu~tnh•r prtE 1he c\Tn1 in I I re:.l·tar• r lh f,••trJ · w•·h.· nor ... m.1shcJ. 1 'J rd

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pbc•- m mom 7~ an Smoln~f. \ "Luhnur lllt.·h J cnm h l ms.c.~lf ·•Pt1.C:ucd. In brier w ut.h. ·t~·un ~)·if'•~ h, n ~~ "' ~.. rh. 1f 1h" m.au •r. t ·m~• .JSkc1J whe~l1cr ehr L:JhiJH S•rd· 1 ~ »U J ·omc ir1 au1nl' llw J'L•trurr·,LJ pu.!I!IJrl.tl.

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''" I8·rnan detail. Wlt h I'Ctcrsons ludfns ll.took '""'"to ShUt down some burzhui newspaper •. , . Tire flf.rck ffundrtdl 2U Jlilln~hrg a wine storehouse. on efc\'CR·II1311 detail Wl> c:oii..J olll. The to Is pllloging in the d ry o~afn. We were on thr ~ltrr oil nit\111. Wr wcr~ o n the watch . rcooly tn ~o nutun the !lrWs at o rnontlutd , I "" Ot••lnuumt olllto rccunn~ulcr 1hc sai.Jo,s· qwntrs ;md rhrar dhp•ill,.•n

' ..rn ftll ·nd two lornt \l.IO nllemtn ;and th:« c;,cl,. "'' ''"'' u.:,ur•ro the lorf) 0">1. lilr11n. cumnund1nr the L1t•:lll nrlcmcn, ~bnJ)enLo ""~ l ~nt orlln the tJt 11111 uur IIO l1ll< ht> had ••II be sho: to l:inj:.:om romr•• ll} now ;l!lth< mrn wtrt 3">Lt. Tl~OWer took over .. . at Lenin's initi:ttlve,thc Ali·Russi:m Extra. o~thn~try C\Jmmission \\.'35 Slo!t up to U(':tl with coumene\'olutiou. $.I

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Afttf the U3ns.ilion of the l~ovcmrnelll to Moscow, the Strclki conuecth>n ..; ,h th< Chckn is directly acknuwlcd~cd : "The l.;ttvi3n riOcmen had su!liccnt wrnk cuttrding rhe buildings and carrying out special assignments fur the All· Russian Central Executtve Committ ee and the Ch the contte bvmg the Smoln) lnslitute behlnd tlltm. At et)'ht o'clock, • team of rw'\l>d worker. mad< 1 thomugh check tbt tS..rs and locomotires." Under the CO\'fr darkness. 1.rfo11 ••• ..-tu.sk' .:mtl. f~n ~1n1c. P'' ri1:1p mynpicall). llrl! l.nlt .. ntr I)( 1t"' Ru smn t. ll". Tilt UOII •HU 'itan, non-Uolshc;\1k ~oplc r rhc rmput .~l1~~1.111~· thu~e of 111\.! \\'t>~lnn rc~Jou, htg.m h~ de,.rlop !I diJfe1rnt ~rs~:· U\'C' dun11g mhe ..:otsr-,~ of 1he year. D. · nnd·sunnner. the non-Rus 1 ns . ~uno n~: IJlcm nunr dciimul} 1l.: U.c \Jl n Uln:rals. he ,an 1o ·co (also, per h ::~ps myoph; Uy) dr~ fonhronill' Cun'ltU urn I J\:,~mhly. no1 so mul·h in 1h~ ligln of orJ.:or :md attdom f':u lht,;l! R&JS"iilll Sl•n:allsl and uh~ral \."001p triO IS J jd ). but n thcr ~a R:.:sSIJ II c \pttdicn1 to suprrcss the na& .iunaJ rights, 'Ch u.s ~I o the C:l\.il nghts.cu· ~he n1 n·Ru ~b ra people • The big topic of tlisc ussion :.~mons che Lw. r. Su ;a luu dm.l liberals m the fhlJ or 19 I 7 ''las t h~ conH!ning of :1 s~pmtt Lat\Url c . nstillH:nt ..,~~crobi)·. 3 .Uy lhe lime ehr Ll l[ \i:m su~J iti l.ft f~,r Pt:'lr\l~;.rtL thou ~h lhe} \Verc r.>.~llter ' eU insu i:Hed from non-Bob.lJt\lkormh n. t hty a:o uld no1 lhl\,'C ..: ap:tl fr 1n 1 ahs.orbin~ St..mu~ ~~~~~of 1Im I~ ~ral m1 ~onism :~~ains1 rh A II -Rus ino Cons2im tJcol t\ ssemttl}'. rnfJiin~Sl r" the la1 HJO Uhcnls, lt mml h..: mcorJo nl'd th::u once rhr: Strdki be:, n \lu.· bau le \ 1th the f,m5.fil ucn s..:mbly. 1h ')' did rJ5 L' m umso n h: ~;t1!1· d"-rrm I he St:rcU.:1 at11\lli~s at the T.1unda P...ilice.

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304

TilE LA TV IAN IMP,\CT

The Latvian Bolsheviks. in their ruminations about the Constituent AJ. scmbly during the course of 1917 , hit upon an idea that Lenin ~ppears to have found very useful in December 1917.1110 ~rriculator of rhis idtl •11 not any of the popular l.:n vian IJolshe,ik activists or theoriSIS. but a dentin - Pauls Daugc, :r close friend of Srutka. The crucial definition of Oaugt's idea come in April 19 17 at the XIII L:n,ian SO Conference in MO>."'w, ;tnSically thr ~ posicion of !he Peoples' Comrniu;ars al Ihe lim or oot~ Sumelhing wt· plcJ~Jinll}' familiar reeked f1om the L.-uvian b:~Ualton lhJC 'gu:ud~d~ lhe Const~uumt ·~.:mb~y. That was cspr:: i~ Uy nouc~:.bl~ ln arrls the C\'CiflinJ! WhCtl rhe l:n_ VtaUJi W~U~ rJj (1Cr ing tf.C rub lie . rnbrO~ifA R111ssi~ll ~ they ~asked ' 1he dcm m U:JlUr!'i w cJispers&;:. bearing do~n upo.n thoM" 'l h:H taniccl . rn ahout J half ~In fmur, rhcy cleared t! Ul tht 1=~ rc.le n~ lock td ~ ~ 1c l!IIJ 1~. antJ J1n :. ch aln . for m:tt ion po 1il.ioned lhtm· ~CI'-'t'S a·fon,g the fence of the garden. 111CS~o; bol.she\1~ gwrd~ "md[y reminded us of th t~ri~r gcndOJmmcs .. The BiolshL:vik~ w:mi t·u r,rablish their GJ; nua rm erie· corps f ro1n 1hes~ L:u vtms. •God o lilly know~ whether the uu:i,:ms i!i~mlltakc on lhi~ s.ham~fu~ usk:~0 Meanwhile~ lome

sailors had also arrh-ed. llt!'lping tJme l:nviliiiS 'to cl::11 tht )'ord. By ~hr hmc onl~er wns. rc:norcd ~ ~he shon Pcuugrad wimer dJ) was mo"rng into darkness. That w-:11s the tirst. ;.JI1d one must also S2}' tbt must d~11m nCJl i c. con rron tat ion l hat mhr.; Lat \'i m St rclki had with the Con~ ~~it uc11 f As.sc mb ly. Or1 Nu11~ 7. u 1\h~r . 'ovcmbcf eS, T~mdda PaJ~cc conriJ1ued to be the focal poim or Petro~zad~ Lh.oush not readlir1g the imensity' of ancntio.n tbal. it rec:~h-~ on 'o,"emb~c 28. Ul\ian Strelki oontinoed to he presC'nt 3t lhe ~1Jrc, bLJ' they were f.requenU)• intermix~d wnh otl1e1 troops, perhaps m tak~ tl1e attc liun a\vJ.y from lhc Latvi.ms. On November 30, Pt:uogruddi.ii lo1 plcaJed with the Stn:llti to~ remain honest: 1

f!:t6tlr TuA tmts Rr~illlt'/11

~ IS

SJiuuuon to l..tn ians! .•. You \\ill hJ\'t 10. ~s u b s.•ld.-'~u:ud' ~~~~ (-.•ruhiUtnl Assembly. An honor.~ble tuk! You wdl pcost )'OUr· 1thts atound the old \\"uucr Pab"", 1\htre our lirs1 ~'Otnmon sp:uk ,., llbtn• >~Ill ~note. You will t3l:e posuoons 21 che rrnunccs 2nd tuiS of che auduonum. where the f:~~e ofche l3rgest stare uf nor so l•p; J~ '"" be dendcd. The forest of your baronets"'" @lint a· r~unJ chc nluiiUtuded embodimenr of Russia Joke a chick fence. Y11uo dul) wolf ask you to bar the path co eVIl, you need 10 do rhar bt< lUSC you urt c:~llcd flolsheviks. Yn u hnvc the right 10 rcm•lurha~ , hut r;•mnln honest. We do not wao11 to pcrsuudc ynu nuuu1 what Is uuth nnd \\'h:u I~ f'uncy, we know that your f:IIIC)' Is ~ ullclcss uncJ therd'ure honc)l. To your honest conscience we Cllllltl l rile only unsure 11131 wr have left. the honor of the Cu1111il uenl Autmhly. You nn hone>! I)• tHsbdte\'e in itS rea It)•. but ynu wdlgh-e to it the •ri\>11Unll) nr fulfilhnj! llS duty to lf,e bnd. i\nd all of loonrst Rus· Ill dl bt fr•ltfulto )Uu.»

tw l!k'rt ~bbre\lltrd "oll••mbe• 29 ~n bq;:~n. c..·entl modunc IUM >ICJC poutd the budding.,. From lhlace or tht Smoln)'. hetrnrun~ ub bnwry S. will b• cocrgotic:tlly stopped by annrd forrc. (~J Comrades :tnd Citittns. lo)'11 to the authouty of the Work· mea's and SoiJras Solictwc~n the squ.uc columns 31 the rntranct). biJl h could not have known :thoul th~ uerVc!unq..rJ un the re:ody und nn :unplc supply of ~trcnadcs at hJod,or >homthe·•·«c of plannin~ th:u h~d gone into preparin~ for January 5. 11ac Smolny lmitilutc w:as prcp:lrrd to withst:md 31l oulfl£ht ~U.:!I, 4 During the night 11f January 3. the Smolny St rs in ~111;' roodiness all night. II was possible that the enemies o( tht mol!r tion may try somtthing.34 Addniorml ammunition ond handgrenades were passed out to mh rofll.l of :he bomlion.l' ·

l

I

.r 319

••

'

f. •





l

lhll rnomlll! on tb~ J ouul. but JlNple on ~~~mare UlllllUliiV r..... On 'lri•Lu. stores •nJ ttlti.:ts art closed. Some struccars ;t!C l00\10!! akmr che '1/r\'\Lu f'loI.~ 11 "~~ J!.lnt l.lteimi l'l•I>Jl•B f1~m m ~r.s:nblcd document iuued by the El. In •asc the uodcr 1s nut''''""'· rhr) mu.r br Ju:an::·Jr; •llt>ltd.•\ unrol oe.ut•occ rnu•r be •ru~rrtJ m l1M .. ,:t. .;: ;·1 •• --jo!

Itt .,,,. t "'"'r oJrm.. nsllallnJt wot~CIUJ'J'C~t.lhry mu•l "" ;~·ll' 1ht Int. rlut they :trr t'tunr \.'Umr:a~r• u.J.. , :ate: •d&r.; :..:.ur.: t~ & \.IIIli ~fttiiiOC>n, lht toWld ...r .IIOUtm;t mthc ~.tnnr uf l.Jtemu wu Clllnlrm>Ous. O.yuntll. rt>\>l..,rs. ulkJ, nrl~· h.. ~um, ~nd h~nd~rtnau< the .lemCIII•IIahliS. \h.l.tnc cuns were mu~lly set up on roofs and In h1dJen nests bthind ft~~umc that thorc v.~s rno>rc thJn un< C\lldun of de· fut>t, l11e loUow'"ll IS a tloscripthm or \\h>llup 11Cntd to • ~rnur tlut b)' Ukm~ a teL, usual rome seems w ha•-e ev·Jded the Iiili line ol chock · poin11 toward lh< p.tlau. lnsthc' · ·in tra!lnii'l~tl tJ&·r:c. ~1 'l1 ts o the lay ~ • ·, n~ of he dtm n

;n ~hit

tir:: g uup~~: wJu.:h Iried to 3Ntr ~u1 ool'~~d. The matd~trs l ~;ntJ ulu pJh' • · · ~ •tretchrd out nfle b•uch . . . Th.:n rnur• llh\ ..•. Th< ~•.WI) toldlr~ lun~cd towmh the stlR\bt.Jburrrs and urred with t heir ICct I he led n.~, 1111 wludr WAI \\ fllltll. •\II l'o wcr lU the Constil ucnt AJ.\cmbl) • ~hue kill< splutchcs of blood J!lo1illlt the whfrc Stluw ..•• We drol't alunf! the Ut einy m the dirwlnro of the firin1. Alt~! 1\ltotchnu. wt came suddenly upon • ~rour nf Red GuardsJOJ!rlots, btandidung omino~ ~uns. nlt)' rushed about,town>or.l!nll Ull< •nother,thcir fxts nuJJOOters to Prd:"'' Shub's sutc~nu oppr to ~ tn"tement by Trotsky. cited urller. Th• 010!1 cxphctt 4 •.•«r•Jlllou nr I.Jtt,i:an Stt!p:> II and the ,\11-lf So•irts?' Aftcr hl•~rtiri­ •~d an ahnmath'C answer from the J.;muns, Lcnan lnformnfth:JI$Cmble.J that 'the Strelki, who will b< on ~tuard lruide of lhc TJ:::i!J P•lalll power." The llifficuhy was rltar SR influence wos slronjt jn Siberia. and Ihey rcco~otl%cu the IJolshcvi.k need of 11te grnln for 11tc cupilals as wtU. Snow woltc$: On January 13th. • delel:'Jtion from the Regional Sc11itl rw:htd Petooarad wtlh • shipn~m ofg.rain fmm Omsk. Tirey informed Ltnil pti>On.'llly th.11 I JJOO arlo•ds of 8'"'" rernJincd In Omsk. ~lilt tht Omsk mlwaymen refused ro drspotclo 11. Lr the Finnfllt ,'tloSt which was parr oftl!! l'~trll~rnd/KronsWdt naval dcfenS< syst~m . Thrs wus an eMremrl)' d3n~lt'­ ous. pcr hups even suicid~l. mission. ll)• thot tim e, the GtrrnJn nal)' "15 durnluont In the Balt ic . and the Finnish Red Guards o n hmd w~re Jolin! &round rou: the Finnish territory ncar the fort was dominated by r!:t 11111te~. 1 he Runion land and n•\31 forces hnd simply abandoned the fort. It ~~~~ tlus trtad•~roussituation iato which rhe reglJnent wu ordered.~ by t'ommarnbnt Sudrabs. 525 mtn ~ft •b l'ewhof and ()nni1\llll ~ lire rcguntnr ( 5~5 rntn ) rltplllcd fnr tht (orl . lllr d rJ th.11 in this ,..,ry e3rJy stare of the Cml W.u. tbt ~­ ""' \>trc su~ful-llw sUttcss. howc>'t'r, w:u Cl>mplercly crasel ir tht German utfensl\c in mid -Ftbrulr) 1918.

l

I

'"I}

Tire f)cfrut of Kairdin·~ Forces

AI the bcrinnlnu of December i\luman Kafedm'slntcnHon In $tJXIr3lt " ' 1 the Don Cm. Ill •ell"->! ftorn the XII Army Bofshe,,k or'-'no7..lllrnandtr fort he opor.nions against K•~don. On !Xcembrr 9, rhe lskobsrrd totbldtrtd Anron">·OI'S Rn , a hlndr3nc• d•wiOJottl that uthoritoth.. So.'ier studltS on rhe Lat.Un Slrtll:i bOlb

pound""'" '"

note rl~l tire port)' leo.Jers!Up prtp>rell rite the~ •'C'fY tltoroUJhly before the m3$S :wnnbly of rhe rt~~mtnr wu alkd •~ 'NI C on the IUUC of rhc dcp:lrtll'e. 1lU$ lime. tho""' IOn>C distoentiiC op1010ns •ot~ •oi«d, rbc 35Sl'mbly m-crwhdmm,ly supported rhe orJ" to deport. 1>. 1\olnmi, a porty member Since 1904,o U..bhc\lk, wos rl:Uris. JW.wns ViC>tras pur in dl:r~J:t of the opr..rrun ~insr rlrt Pol7111S 1tni111 os his Comrn...,.r. The lnili.tl acrK>n >p insr rhc l'olcs tO'ly . Jlc dOWets haw uurlied that the L11\'iilns putsued the 1\>hsh u~ro. dll!''l>'"' thttn. but the 1'1:r$1on that Vle~clls ~1\'CS tiS in his IC)~~ •:~·.,.. tttms more 101Nohl< Ac.x.r..lin; I~> hun, un the serond day ~rter lk\Wo< of Mopchov, "the l..mi>n rtgimcnlll rommtlltcS eJIIro ~n :as· o::-':1 1.'\1 ~u.ed a r~luuon. that, wnh the fteeing of the tillfroad.the uUit .... , not unanhdp>ttd, but when it cam•. Its for« ond •pero was • IUtpt l\c· On th• first doy , the Gorman fore.. ntO\ttl foi'Wilrd 15 kilumetcrs tndt>ntho )f:((HId • the pc rfOIMtmCC WilS repeated:·• f!~ccpt 'JOt JOJnO rC!lr•

l~rd lklrmhhes.tht l~ussoan Army was not ill 1 rsltion to fight.

he •'tlnllngtncy ol rho Ccrm:m orftn~l\'t h•d bt:~rlety o f P>rt) •nd Suelki conunittetl whc> had ;msed tUOiutions u to "'hat tht rlsbt tluna to do fot tht Str«:cmbe!r 7. 1917:

Th · t ·•ian St relki •\il't \lr 1 '-'J'utic\ ~. >mrJ~r d : J • that in the iTUtl\'~l~ c f cht• r~\l1luti '' , it i5 m mbtor '(() t rFaOtl~ a l-"J l \i..m '\rdk 1 l'~lrps 2. th~' th" t•ln~th•ll of tb~ ,ur" fi1US1 h-= rr imlnh· iln\J h:t~l llll:!M to pm· Ill h! an'-1 d[•lrn.t Et..•\ul w ~ u . ilfHI J. ~h ' the -.. rp:\ W\U t'l'lltlil lh h~1~hc.:~t d1~t~ nnl~ ·r •l "''O J'\ m•t '"'"rr ,,tf •~w.·.mls sutwn.J' $ rut:~lc:, hut ' ·•II ,,h ' J>'..; ,~ ;,~nd nn 1 h .. p~tS.ll i1H1 ot the d,.~ 3tn~1~ . 14

fn •Strcl~i in Ear~"· 1918

I

(

359

01 U\;ct-mbcr \7, t h cunun ndcr ~, r the armed r..::cs~ K ril~' nko . sign· td tiP rJcr aP{UO\ mg the formatton of a tvi:m corps. VacJctis was ap· i')lntcd t:nmmandcr of the corp~ . The ~orp was \4.) hJV' t wo dj\1'Sinns. ~·Lth Cin~~t y . aruBcry, an 1 air on ~ Cofmati ns aua~b~Ll lo it . The urg.:~nt­ n ltloal Y:ork pm~e~J..: ~ Ufl:.\~ ~; L:.t vj.m sol (e~I..-.J "" p. JS6t. ll1~ lmpnrt>nl dernomooll~tr rnululu~l~lll ~rtl met l!'lln and dmdcd

• .tu loqu•bte tl"' tal\uot Slt .nd d If • ''"' horh'"'"'~" of tl>e>e trtuntMlns.•r Muuluv's sukkbl order ,..s te> oluu~l. uon!klcriJI• Ihe ..:r•.:c 1:a: l!z t..u' ~ .an rt~m1eot~ 4.:0ntrnue!d tu yl\e tu tf1r St1\1d '"'trnmtt~r, u t.l;..~':f' ctrr, con>oderlng lhc numenc~llon of men, 11 ,.., dluolrQUI. Ounq It< wrck or dcnooboh/311011, only 700 Ultll lht , U~lllll) Rey•mml't 151~ "'"'' Uf"JR I lora '""',1 marched slnp,IOJI lhlllllj•h Ilor rmlp,., 11\dltlJ...,h, ""td e1 nor-=us Rwwn untiS. Tu be noted tntbt cb2tt G ll~t com rm.c '"'''"""'such .s the In. Jrd. md rh~ ~th dw dd OO! P thr•>ll;!h the J!udonJ t.>pelot:IU of the ou a umtbt pno:mut ''""" th.ll dod. ~ 6th RJI (:ll:t! '"or \o\un.Jtn lou•· lhty omr.J h.m: btrn~on tlO< Rl1• front"'"'· Pllltd the Bobhe•J\k re50lution of ~1>)1 17. 1917, fnu;ht ,, M,,. J.;.t'"P· •lr .• • . ..., . ... · w unwn lh~ (,crm>n o ffcn\lve In All£"'' I? 11, ~nd IUltd 9L Ptrcrnt lr

"'"'II'! 11

tht tltctroo uf the Cumtituent i\s$tmbl) Thou;h IOmt 01 ,~ 01~1~11 rlltt) of lnduuri.:lltown• in RU..U. •k>•rt lfi1h rtf~ It tulw t.ulth>rr~ on. Lat \Un four"''"'"' loSI thnr ptllt Latvun """'·nu•) Rll\\uns JOrn·

in5 thtlr rurik1. but thtrt ~rc nu st>ti>trts ••~ll>bk •• "' """' nuny nun· U\~nutl\td 111tht unlls. The urly months of 1918 wtrt '~I)· c:unftmnJ ft•rrht ul\un Slnlkr. but by April of th•l year. in 1p11c o! It all,tht r(11mmlU. ~25, Experiences in nn lskol~ t jnll arc described In rather &rCQt detail by Andrle\'S Niedra in Talllas umlcr·c'/a armlrrUf, Vol. I. Rig•.

&:

I92J, pp. 47·126.

13. ,,. rnalft SOUIOCS fo r tho inform>tion on un;an< In the Smolny In· llltute are V, Donch·Bruic\1eh, .\'a Baniklr f'OU4klr, MOIO)w, 1931. P. ~blko\•, 7.Dplstl/ lommdanta .lfuskor'Skor'O Aunrltl. Mo..,.,w, 1961. A. Larctns, "1..31\JU urk''Jll mclnirku rfslttril. I'· 739. 71. l.oll'i/as 1\nmtmisrlskii Partija OJ..rnbrn Rcmluclj:i 1917. p. 344. 72. Ciclcns. IAikm~lrt,lfllluff, Vnl. 1. Srockholm, 1961. pp.446-1-17. 73. /.utoju Stran/t-ku l'c$/llf~. pp. 617-618. 74, I A1>1llltrt'lnwk1. Septtonber 4 Acrortlingto Krastinl,the idnof the Comnussar was dedded upon by the V PJny Cong,ess in July,>nd it "as 0. Kiirkhn! who selected Nachimson os the man for the JOb.l.Dtridu strfbm·Au o·csrurc, 134. 75. IAII'i/as l:mninistiskli Partija OJ.tobra /(c'"Jiucljii. 1917, p. 28=. Doo~raphical fnformo11on about 1\'Jchirmon Is 111 he fo und in /.otrir$11 Ncmlucftmane D.Jrbtilitkt. Rlpa. 1958, pp. 119·12J: N.Kundrotjm.Dtd: 111111"' sirrls, RJ):l. 1962. IAI>'ijos PSR Ma:il l:'ttet4/tlfltdt/D. Vol. II. p. 612. I..DII'irt strclnicAu ot'srurt, p. 5S7. V. 1. Ltnon, Ctoriogr3phy this confcrene< is nor ••"" mtntoonrd, the Bolshe•ik leaders in Piet :· reprinted in IAIIju stri'lnick11 r•i!sture, pp. 698·700. 109. Melgunov reports thai at the time of insurrection, Latvian Strelki. us individuals. were lilt rutin& through Pskov to Peuograd, p. 192. In 1..11· \~an

sources, there is no evidence that a move of that nature low:ards Ptl·

rograd W:IS :l foot. 110. Melj!unov, pp. 164·65. I 11. A. Drizulis, It: /. /,culm wr R.t·r"'/ucioniirii /,tlll•ija. Riga, 1980, p.

122. I 12. Ibid .. p. 124. ll 3. Tcodors Kaufelds, Siikla IIC'ileg, Riga, 1979 . p. 217. 114. Lidums. October 25,1917. liS. l.otvijas Kumwristiskii Portija Oktobra R.e>'()/ucijii, /917, p. 34. 116. Bfil'ais strclnieks. October 3 1, 1917. 117. Latv]ustri!lnieiL7 pp. 9l-~ 38 an.d 207-224. l49. J. V ~lks . ·~K~ nica pie \'3:ras la1 \'ijas strad nleki ."~ h1 J. Biczais ( ed .) l~S.

us.

1

Gn1sr

i'ffli ptJ5tiule. Ri~.

19S 1. p. 4,1.

1111 LATV IAN l~IPACf

396 \ 'Oft"> fO Orapfu Ill

famow. of tht L:ll\1~11 ncwsPJJ""tS in Pcuograd ~>Pna­ hur;:as ,,.,:,·. 186.:!-1865, one llut is ron~tdcrcJ Jn rmporunt mrltslace• the de\tlnpment or Ut\i:m llltion~l •VfUJsjonoks. "Sirsnij;s bijl unln• smolds," Lot•iju I(!' CK I'Jttl}ll Vcstwcs lmtniits.Par Lcrinu, ~. 19$7, p. 129. 10. V, Sterns. E. Sondodts, Olaobm Cnmlt. RJp, 1977. pp. 21·22. II . \1. UcU-Sudrabs. -Tild.>n::is ar VbdlmTru llrt\r." PJr LmJJW. P· '11 . Dnbrnl. pp. 1~·135. Esptcb0)' - P. !Vupnlko•s. "Ltnuuski Pn•'lll un re\Oiuaonui ku5iiba 1..11\ip." Par Ottobm u:rtl/IJ, RJp, 1967. p. 52. 1:. L Dribw. "KSDS(b) P PS orpnlacrJu l.r•lclu r.ljons "I'Nmttqs" Oktobra re•'Oiiieij•s ~I>•'OI>n:u un norlsts l•cki," l..ot•ij>s hi' CK P•nc121 \t;;stures lnsliriiu, PJr OAtobnt u:nmr, RlJ>. 1967, pp. I. l11C

moll

161·10.

IJ.

OrlbinJ. "Prvmrrejs" cinii, pp. 167·70. i\bo sec h. R:nnieks. "Rt'Oiuci)Js dlono.s Pctr!!r•dii," Cniu r•tet7 pnsoul~. lllgu. 1957, pp. 23-39.

\WS m Clr#ptcr VI



1~.

397

Norm~n

E. S:lui,Sailors in Raolt, U\\rtncc,K:anw.I97S, p. ~19. IS. Dribinl, KSDS(b) P Petrogndu or~nrucrjas b111elu rajons uProllltftll" • • • •p. I S4. 16 DribrnJ, pp. 167-70. 17. V. Danlds, Ra/ OctobD, N.,.. York. IS. DribinJ.p. 179. Also ''Promcttjs"rmJ, pp. 200.:!0~. 19. Dubinl, p. 173. 20. C3isjonoks, pp. 130-131. 21. I'.Daiirve.PiittrisStut'ka. Rrga, l957,pp. 115·16. 22. Ibid. , pp. 118·19 . 23, Smllga's role in July and in October Is featurl'd In works by Rab· lnoS~lth and S:lul. 11oe longest blographic:~l sketch Is to be found in Deiteli S SR I OA tlabrskoi Rcl'olutsiL 24 · Slldrabs-Uicis has left a g~eu deal of lrtmture about hu own octi· •urn both In La • . . d ' t>Jan and m Russun. Especi1lly to be noted are "lubkoe : • Petroatad: lz dnemika •gitaora," f'rolttlnMll moluruilt, 1913 • . · s. PP. 102-1 16. "11. olctilbrskikh ..,spomwnu" &binskfi r.zbodlii. ~~m~r I, 1927. p. 3. Orcrit:lrdniirr cd that dHring lh~ \·~ry early days uf llsJH~\ik power, a L1Hun Tellers, an editor of Pt uugradas t71lu, ,.. s in chrugc of jntcriogration of his profc~slonal coJicagucs frorn l'olill 1\'uruda and Trudoa·ok J/rHil /.idurus. Nov~mbcr I~] 7.

P'. Malk1.1v. Rc"'min{sccrrcrs l{ a Ft:reullill Commandonl ( Jm~(lw). pp. 67.(, . 11tcrc :ne n urn r lUS honk in r:ngHdJ I hal clc~cribr I!us pen •d I.

jn Pt:tr ·~ :.1d ~ among them arc 1he mnrc \"'lublt Prtrim Sorotin. /,carrs from a l~ussiutr !Ji11ry ( cw York, J9~4 ~ Ami.iuJna Tyrku\~·ml lhams. Frum l.i1JCrf)' 10 flrest-Lito\tsk (lnnd m, 1919): L Bryam,J\ItrronofMc'UJl1" (New York . 19~ 3); J\laxim Gorl·y ~ Untlml~{•• Thoughtr (L\~w York. J96 ): De sic rl~ally. R~ Jleort of f ot In v.hro and ho.. many umes the oflictrs of the 6th Rcgtmcnt ...-c< rbceJ wrdrt atrcn. The correct ll!lswn u that u v.-u only on«. and it oc· .-urreJ Ul V•Jnuer2 8 J Viaetu. "l.;rt\1elu stre thJI

BcrL.r c.tntmucJ to k;a.l tht ret= until mtJ-bnu.at} 1918. 2nd tll:ll unl} then did Bcrkks ltlq Cot f"l::!lt.l.

t tht ttt:oment mcl\'td to G>1tmao• Sttttt amund tilt r.u~~ ol hnulr) 1918. SudDbs, J'P. 140·141. AJ u tlrrulun~ tbt "'S:.h'1\JU sutnu Abdemij>. LrtrrfJin:u onstltutii," IAnfu r~'Ob.Jrion!irais srrt'ln/rkt, I, p. 2 51 ; J. Urh·k3lns. "Atmlnu r•r 19 17·1918.;;••" IArrju mvluclmrlirulssr""'"''ks, 1. p. 297. 16. 17. Ill. i ll.

\'rJU.Y w Clurptt·t IX '

-IOJ

L.·u·ceru, p. 'l_6"l . j,.9. 1\;timin!~ p. 363. 30. Rcetl archiYc:s, bms Am IOWl 1urntd o•~r thrtt sacb of J:Oid 10 J, s.-"Jc for saft-kttp:nJ. P. BCuml "Vndirp~ otmirus; L.l960. pp. 32·

lb. 4

1'. O.uge. 1\r/rt•ijas sat1•rnmt1 sapulrr 1111 pn>lerarFJta u:dmrms, MoiCOw • 1917. Also 1'. D•uge, "S;ll\-crsmcs £apul~c till Lmija," Sod>I· dtmokrirs, Nu\Cmbcr 2. 4, and 7. 1917. S. P. O."'c. "Kotkruiau lkhrcdudno•o sobrtniu," /:avulll Mmk. Sort'/• rcbod,fkh i soldmk/kh dcrutaJQr, No. ~3!, Dc«m>lnl.i m rJS \iltu:tci,'"

l.ut>iu ,..,.,luclaniirois stri'lnltks. Vt>l. I. Mu..:ow, 1934, p. 265. 34. P. Pli"sums. "Mihu lirbls draugs uu sknl31r(js." Lal\1j3s ~p CK \'i'st uocs Instil uts, Pur l .rnimt. Rlga , 195 7, p. I00. J5 . l.ataiu rnf'llu.fl'c,nlirais stri!luick.f. \'oJ. I. p. 165. 36. Vrdrrmii : m n. January 6. 1918. 37. Vladirnit llonch-Urufc•ich. Na [Jocl'iJ..i: /'ovukh. Muscow. 1931. p. "7 •J • JS. lhld., pp. 234-235. 39. Dl •id Shub. /.cmir. Pcn~uin Dooks,l967.p.321. -10. lk~lly,p. 416. 41. Dc/o 1\ 'orotla. Janu;uy 7, 1918. TI>c shooting on the sll-ek, Ja n wry 6 . 7;Petrogra.d· g:o(' Ekho. J:mu:tr)' 8;1\'oJii l'cxllrmii CllD.s, J:mu:~ry JJ. lly. pp. 414-415 . 44.

45. •6. 438. 47.

11\lliams, p. 198. B""u y. p . 426. Hubert I'Jync. Til
, 1970, p. 153. 6S. Snow, pp. 220 t ac positions~,. dt~ho rully rttold in Kalmbu, pp. 397·99. 29. Tomon... p. 172. 3.() Ibid., p. 16Z. 31. U/J'}U urr"ktdu ~-. • · ns. n. Tonarus. p 168. 33 Vlcttll< (19::). pp. J9Z-96. H. IJ1t't/U sur"1nidu ACt

410

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