John of Salisbury: Metalogicon (Corpus Christianorum in Translation, 12) 9782503533988, 2503533981

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John of Salisbury Metalogicon

CORPVS CHRISTIANORVM IN TRANSLATION

12

CORPVS CHRISTIANORVM Continuatio Mediaeualis XCVIII

Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon EDIDit J. B. Hall

AVXILIATA K. S. B. KEATS-ROHAN

TURNHOUT

FHG

John of Salisbury Metalogicon

Translation and notes by J. B. Hall

Introduction by J. P. Haseldine

H

F

© 2013, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Printed on acid-free paper.

D/2013/0095/28 ISBN 978-2-503-53398-8

Table of Contents

Introduction 1. John of Salisbury i. Early life and education ii. In the service of Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury iii. The Becket years iv. Bishop of Chartres 2. Debates on the chronology of John of Salisbury’s early life  i. John’s student years and Metalogicon ii.10 ii. Between Paris and Canterbury, 1147-53 3. Works 4. Introduction to the text i. The trivium ii. The Organon iii. Synopsis of the Metalogicon. Book One Book Two Book Three Book Four 5. The Metalogicon and modern scholarship i. The Metalogicon and the history of thought ii. The Metalogicon and the history of education

33 34 43 47 52 53 55 64 65 69 71 73 77 77 84

Bibliography 1. Abbreviations 2. Select bibliography i. Editions of John of Salisbury’s works

92 92 93 93

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13 14 18 25 28 32

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ii. Bibliographies on John of Salisbury, in order of publication iii. Select secondary literature with particular attention to the Metalogicon

94 95

Translator’s Note

107

Metalogicon

111

The chapter headings of the books Book One Book Two Book Three Book Four

113 113 114 115 116

Prologue 

119

Book One 1. The calumny which wrenched from him a reply to his Cornificius 2. A description of his person with the name suppressed 3. When how and by whom he was educated 4. What became of his partners in error 5. The greatness of the men whom that household dares to disparage and why 6. On what intellectual bases he reposes 7. In praise of eloquence 8. That nature must be helped by experience and by practice  9. That the man who assails logic endeavours to rob men of their tongues 10. The signification of the word logic and that all arts except evil ones are to be cultivated 11. What art is and concerning types of intelligence and that they are to be cultivated by the arts 12. Why the arts are called liberal 13. Why grammar is so called 14. That although it [grammar] is not natural it imitates nature 15. That adjectives of secondary application are not appropriately conjoined with substantives of primary application as for instance patronymic horse

124

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124 127 128 131 135 137 139 141 144 144 146 148 149 150 153

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16. That adjectives of primary application are joined to substantives of secondary application 17. That in poetry also grammar imitates nature 18. What grammar teaches us to pursue and what to shun 19. That a knowledge of figures is exceedingly useful 20. In what matters the grammarian ought to be occupied 21. Of the great men who have found pleasure in grammar and that one can no more engage in philosophy without grammar than if one were deaf or mute 22. That he [Cornificius] defends his error by the authority of Seneca 23. The prerequisites for the exercise of philosophy and virtue and that grammar is the foundation of them 24. Concerning the practice of reading and lecturing and the customary manner of Bernard of Chartres and his followers 25. A short epilogue in praise of grammar Book Two  1. That logic is beneficial to the whole of philosophy because it pursues the truth 2. Of the Peripatetic school the birth of logic and its originators 3. That logic is to be studied first by philosophers and concerning the difference between demonstrative dialectical and sophistic reasoning 4. What dialectic is and why it is called dialectic 5. Of the subdivisions of dialectic and the goal of logicians  6. That all men seek logic but not all attain to it 7. That the jugglers of windy words must be untaught so as to know 8. That Aristotle would have checked them had they listened to him 9. That dialectic is ineffective if it is deprived of the support of other disciplines 10. On whose authority the preceding and the following observations are based

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158 161 162 165 167

169 171 172 173 178 180 180 181 182 184 185 187 189 192 194 196 198

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11. What dialectic is capable of on its own 12. In what things its exercise consists and what it uses as its instrument 13. How great the value is of the knowledge of probables and that things simply necessary do not easily become known 14. More of the same 15. What a dialectical proposition is and what a dialectical problem 16. That all other professors of this art yield pride of place to Aristotle 17. How badly it is taught and what opinions have been held by the moderns about genera and species 18. That later generations always change the opinions of earlier 19. In what respect teachers of this kind deserve no indulgence 20. The view of Aristotle concerning genera and species fortified by many arguments and by the testimony of many writings Book Three  1. How Porphyry and other books should be read 2. Concerning the utility of the Categoriae and the tools they furnish 3. What the conception is of predicaments and what the sober philosopher is contented with 4. What the conception is and the utility of the Periermeniarum (more correctly Periermenias) 5. In what the body of the art consists and concerning the utility of the Topica 6. Concerning the utility and the conception of the three books comprising the Topica 7. A short analysis of the fourth and fifth books 8. Concerning the heading of definition which is dealt with in the sixth book 9. Concerning the problem of the same and the different which is discussed in the seventh book and certain features common to the Topica

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202 202 204 206 207 209 211 215 216 217 237 237 240 243 248 256 260 264 267 268 272

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10. Concerning the utility of the eighth book Book Four  1. That the Analytica weighs types of argument 2. That this knowledge is universally useful and how it got this name 3. That the book is not so useful for developing verbal fluency 4. What the conception of the first book is 5. What the conception of the second book is 6. Concerning the difficulty of the Analytica posteriora and the reasons for it 7. Why Aristotle pre-eminently has earned the name of the philosopher 8. Of the function of demonstration what demonstration consists of and how and that sensation is the beginning of knowledge and how 9. What sensation is and how every type of philosophy derives strength from it by means of imagination 10. Concerning imagination and that it is from imagination that affections arise by which the soul is composed or disturbed and befouled 11. What imagination is and concerning opinion fallacy of opinion and sensation and the origin of fronesis which we call prudence 12. What prudence is what its matter what its parts and how knowledge comes from sensation 13. Concerning the difference between knowledge and wisdom what faith is 14. Concerning the relationship between fronesis and alitia and concerning the origin of fronesis and what reason is 15. Likewise what reason is and that the word reason is manifold and that reasons are everlasting 16. The distinction of multiplicity and that brute beasts do not possess reason although they seem to distinguish and how it comes about that man has been allotted reason according to the Hebrews

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275 287 287 288 288 289 290 292 293 294 295 297 298 300 301 301 302 303

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17. Concerning the function of reason and why the senses over which reason presides are in the head and what attendants Philology has 18. Concerning the difference between reason and understanding and what understanding is 19. What wisdom is and that it derives from sensation by means of grace 20. Concerning the cognitive faculty of soul its simplicity and its immortality according to Cicero 21. That in the preceding matter Aristotle has provided a seed-plot though not an adequate one for hypotheticals  22. Concerning sophistry and its utility 23. Concerning the Sophistici Elenchi 24. Concerning those who carp at Aristotle’s works 25. That Cornificius is cheaper than the gods’ clown Bromius and what Augustine and other philosophers have said in praise of logic 26. What policy is to be followed against him and against wilful pettifoggers 27. That Aristotle went astray in many matters but is eminent in logic 28. How logic is to be used 29. That the rashness of youth is to be curbed and why Mercury is married to Philology and what objects are especially to be sought after 30. That Philology has precedence over the other two and what form of examination of predicaments is to be followed in the discussion of reason and truth 31. What original reason is and concerning the various schools of philosophers 32. What is contrary to reason and that reason has many meanings and that reasons are eternal 33. That man does not have perfect reason and that what is true is expressed in manifold ways 34. How what is true receives its name what truth is and what is contrary to it 35. Likewise concerning truths and that we speak in one way of things existing in another of words in another again of truths and how

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306 307 308 309 311 312 313 315 315 316 317 318 319 320 322 324 325 326 328

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36. The difference between those things which truly are and those which seem to be according to the Platonists 37. That a thing is called true or false in one way in another an opinion another a locution and why locutions of this kind are called modal 38. Concerning the coherence of reason and truth and briefly what each is 39. Likewise concerning the same and that neither reason nor truth admits of contraries 40. The aim of the Peripatetics and all genuine philosophers and concerning the eight obstacles to understanding 41.  42. That visible proofs show that the world is subject to vanity and what the reason was for ending the book here  Indexes Index of Scriptural References Index of non-Biblical Sources Index of Names Index of Greek Words Index of Latin Words and Phrases

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331 333 335 336 337 340 341 345 347 350 362 367 368

Introduction

The Metalogicon is the work of one of the great polymaths of the twelfth-century renaissance. It is an educational treatise written by a man who was taught by some of the leading scholars of the day in the schools of Paris, then emerging as the dominant intellectual centre of Western Europe.1 It is the work not of a professional academic, however, but of an exceptionally talented representative of that majority of students who went on to careers in the rapidly expanding courts of churches and kings, the agents of that revolution in government and administration which set in motion what historians now routinely call the birth of modern Europe.2 John of Salisbury was a clerk, diplomat, legal expert, political theorist, historian and poet, who has even been credited, if controversially, with an original contribution to philosophy. The On the unique position of the early-twelfth-century Paris schools, and their relationship to the eventual development of the University, see the classic study S. C. Ferruolo, The Origins of the University: The schools of Paris and their critics, 1100-1215, Stanford, CA, 1985, I. P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University, c. 1100-1330, Cambridge, 2012, p. 8-17, 47-51, and the discussion and references below s. 5.ii and n. 189 (I am very grateful to Dr Wei for showing me proofs of sections of his book before publication). 2  The designation of the central middle ages as the period of the ‘birth’, ‘making’, ‘formation’ or ‘origin’ of Europe as a recognisable and continuous cultural, political and historical entity has become a commonplace of the historiography of the last twenty years. A recent example that epitomises this trend and also surveys the field is J. Le Goff, L'Europe est-elle née au Moyen Âge?, Paris, 2005 – and as The Birth of Europe, transl. J. Lloyd, Oxford, 2005, published as part of the international The Making of Europe series of which all volumes are published concurrently in five languages by five publishers (Beck, Blackwell, Critica, Laterza, le Seuil). 1 

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Introduction

Metalogicon, one of two treatises composed at the mid-point of a busy and varied career, makes a powerful argument for an educational system of real practical utility for society, one whose intellectual coherence and rigour should underpin political morality and rational governance. While John’s other major treatise, the Policraticus, has come to be widely accepted as one of the fundamental texts for the Western tradition of political thought, the Metalogicon, with its belief in the purpose of education both for the formation of the person and for the good of society, merits perhaps a more prominent place than it has often been accorded in another important tradition of European thought, a tradition of educational and pedagogical thought which includes Rousseau’s Emile and Newman’s The Idea of a University. John of Salisbury is, like them, a compelling writer whose commitment and vigour emerge clearly in this new translation of a work surely of great importance for anyone interested in both the past history and the universal values of education.

1.  John of Salisbury The first major study of John of Salisbury in modern scholarship was Carl Schaarschmidt’s biography of 1862.3 Not only was Schaarschmidt’s contribution to our understanding of John seminal but his views on important details of John’s life have continued to hold a place in more than one modern scholarly controversy.4 Since then there has been a sustained scholarly interest in C. Schaarschmidt, Johannes Saresberiensis nach Leben und Studien, Schriften und Philosophie, Leipzig, 1862; on earlier nineteenth-century contributions, see H. Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of Salisbury (Studies of the Warburg Institute, 17), London, 1950 – repr. with epilogue, 1968 – p. 1-2. 4  Schaarschmidt’s suggestion that John received part of his education at Chartres gave rise to a lengthy scholarly controversy which raised important questions about the academic landscape of the early twelfth century, while his argument that John entered Theobald of Canterbury’s service in 1147, directly after completing his education, has been vindicated by recent scholarship after years of controversy (Schaarschmidt, Johannes Saresberiensis, p. 21-3, 26-7; see below, s. 2 i-ii). 3 

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John’s life and works which has been prolific of a vast and still rapidly expanding corpus of research on many aspects of his education, career, thought and politics; in addition, critical editions of most of his works have now appeared.5 Building up a picture of John of Salisbury’s life and achievements has presented scholars with serious challenges for a number of reasons. The varied nature of his works, which embrace political thought, diplomacy, law, philosophy, theology, history and education, has meant that contributions have come from scholars of many disciplines, often in the context of specialist or technical debates. The reconstruction of the chronology of his life has been both complex and controversial; the many fascinating incidental details of his own life and the acute observations of his contemporaries and of important events which characterise his writing and make him so vivid a witness of the twelfth century are often undated and occasionally difficult or even impossible to reconcile with external evidence.6 John’s erudition, his range of reference, especially to the classics, his polymathic output and the extraordinary number of acquaintances he cultivated in scholarly, monastic, administrative, political and literary circles, have also meant that he has been at the heart of the important modern debates on medieval humanism and on the twelfth-century renaissance. Finally, the Metalogicon itself provides some critical yet difficult to assess evidence for the transmission of Aristotle’s logical works to the West, itself part of the longer story of the incorporation of Aristotelian ideas into Western thought which had profound consequences for the intellecual life of Europe. John is a central figure for our understanding of much about the political and intellectual culture of the twelfth century but his legacy remains a complex one. On the editions, see below s. 3 and the bibliography. It is surprising to be sometimes reminded of the range of events for which John is our earliest, most important or even only witness; Christopher Brooke, for example, when annotating his edition of John’s later letters (Letters, ii), was ‘stupefied’ by the number of events in the struggles between Frederick Barbarossa and the Lombard League, including the foundation of the city of Alessandria, for which John provides the only or earliest evidence: C. N. L. Brooke, ‘John of Salisbury and His World’, in WJS, p. 1-20, at p. 11-12; on the difficulties with the chronology of John’s life, see below, s. 2. 5 

6 

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Introduction

There is now a very considerable literature on John of Salisbury, and on the Metalogicon. Section 5, below, will discuss briefly a selection of important work relevant specifically to the Metalogicon and indicate some of the recent trends in scholarship. There have also been important periodic surveys of research on John of Salisbury generally and a number of detailed bibliographies are now available which the specialist student should consult. Heinrich Hohenleutner reviewed work done between 1948 and 1958; David Luscombe provided a more comprehensive account and bibliography for the years up to 1982, reprinted in 1994 with an additional note by Michael Wilks covering subsequent major contributions; Cary Nederman contributed a more detailed bibliography of works published between 1983 and 2004, while David Bloch’s recent study contains a substantial bibliography with particular reference to Aristotelianism and the Metalogicon.7 A number of landmark book-length studies have also appeared over the years. Clement C. J. Webb’s 1932 account offered an accessible and attractive introduction to John which was intended for a general readership but which was not provided with a scholarly apparatus.8 Two major works were Hans Liebeschütz’s seminal thesis, begun in Germany but finally published in 1950 in English as Mediaeval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of Salisbury, and Klaus Guth’s 1978 study of John’s cultural and political world and his circle of contacts.9 These studies, with their concern to establish the social, cultural and intellectual contexts for John’s life and works, and to explore the connections between thought and 7  H. Hohenleutner, ‘Johannes von Salisbury in der Literatur der letzten zehn Jahren’, Historisches Jahrbuch, 77 (1958), p. 493-500; D. E. Luscombe, ‘John of Salisbury in Recent Scholarship’, in WJS, p. 21-37, with a bibliography for 1953 to 1982 at p. 445-7; Wilks’s ‘Additional Note’ appears at p. 457-8 in the 1994 reprint; C. J. Nederman, John of Salisbury (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 288), Tempe, AZ, 2005, p. 87-95; D. Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science (Disputatio, 8), Turnhout, 2012 – I am very grateful to Dr Bloch for showing me a copy of his draft text in advance of publication. 8  C. C. J. Webb, John of Salisbury (Great Medieval Churchmen, 3), London, 1932. 9  Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism; K. Guth, Johannes von Salisbury (1115/20-1180): Studien zur Kirchen-, Kultur- und Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas in 12. Jahrhundert (Münchener Theologische Studien, Hist. Abt. 20), St. Ottilien, 1978.

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Introduction

action in his career, set him at the heart of the debates on the nature of medieval humanism, debates which in their broader form have been central to the historiography of medieval thought and of the now widely accepted idea of a twelfth-century renaissance.10 John came to be seen as a figure whose life in politics was a practical manifestation of his philosophical and ethical ideals, and who, as such, exemplified medieval humanism. The publication in 1984 of the proceedings of a major conference commemorating the octingentenary of John’s death brought together contributions from many of the leading scholars on a wide range of themes and represents another important milestone.11 Cary Nederman’s 2005 study of John, which set out to answer, within the framework of an account of his life and works, a number of unresolved questions, also takes forward the interest in the interaction between life and thought and presents John’s philosophy and his practical action in the world as evidence of a coherent intellectual and ethical perspective which is definitive of his humanism.12 10  The concept of a twelfth-century renaissance goes back to C. H. Haskins’s seminal The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Harvard, 1927, whose influence was underlined by the landmark volume from the 1977 commemorative conference, Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century – ed. R. L. Benson, G. Constable, Harvard – Oxford, 1982; the concept is now dominant in current understandings of the period and routinely surveyed in textbooks. The concept of medieval humanism, to which Haskins’s work was also an important contribution, goes back even further (see e.g. the discussion in Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism, p.  63-94); Richard Southern’s contributions were critical to the later debate: see R. W. Southern, Medieval Humanism and Other Essays, Oxford, 1970, and id., Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, 2 vols, Oxford, 1995, 2001; see also C. S. Jaeger, The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, Philadelphia, 1994, p. 278-91; for a recent discussion of the historiography, and the different theories of ‘literary’, ‘scholastic’ and ‘Christian’ humanism which have been proposed, see e.g. Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 41-43. 11  WJS; the conference was hosted in 1980 by the Dean and Chapter of Salisbury at Salisbury and Wells Theological College. 12  Nederman, John of Salisbury; the principal questions Nederman sets out to answer concern the dates of composition of John’s major works, his true attitudes to contemporary intellectual trends, his relations with Thomas Becket, his career after Becket’s death, and the connections between John’s intellectual contributions and his political activities (p. 2). For a rare opposing view of John’s practical ethics, see E. Türk, Nugae curialium: Le règne d’Henri II Plantagenêt (1154-1189) et l’éthique politique, Geneva – Paris, 1977.

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Introduction

The reconstruction of John’s life, particularly for the early years before 1153-4 when the evidence of his own letters begins, has been controversial in a number of particulars and for some details conclusive evidence is lacking. The following account attempts to reflect, as far as is possible, current scholarly consensus; accounts of the more complex controversies over the chronology and details of those periods of his life which have been the subject of particular debate are, for the sake of clarity, set out separately after the main account.

i. Early life and education John of Salisbury was born probably sometime between 1115 and 1120.13 The city from which he was to take his name was not the Salisbury of today but Old Salisbury, now more commonly known as Old Sarum, abandoned after the relocation of the cathedral to its present site in the early thirteenth century.14 John was one of at least four sons of a Salisbury woman, Gille, or Egidia, Peche.15 Gille was twice married; the identity of neither husband is known but both may have been dignitaries or canons of Salisbury cathedral. The two eldest brothers, Richard Peche (Peccator) and Robert fitz Gille, seem to have been sons of the first husband; 13  There is no evidence for the date of his birth beyond his own statement that he was ‘quite a young man’ (adulescens admodum) when he set out for his studies in France in 1136 (Metalogicon ii.10; see also below, s. 2.i), and the fact that his mother was still alive but evidently close to death in 1170 (Letters, ii, no. 304, p. 716-17), although as we do not know her age at any point this tells us even less. Schaarschmidt suggested 1110-20 ( Johannes Saresberiensis, p. 10), which would put him between 16 and 26 at the beginning of his time at the schools; all subsequent writers have adopted the now standard surmise of c. 1115-20. 14  John also says on one occasion that he was named ‘Parvus’ (‘Little’ or ‘Short’: Letters, ii, no. 212, p. 342-43 and n.1), but whether this was a family name or a nickname is uncertain and there is no further evidence for it (for further discussion, see Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 3). Old Sarum is only two miles from the town centre of present-day Salisbury; the cathedral on the present site was consecrated in 1220. 15  The following account of John’s family is based, except where noted otherwise, on F. Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury and His Brothers’, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 46 (1995), p. 95-109.

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Introduction

John and his younger brother Richard ‘of Salisbury’ were evidently sons of Gille’s second husband. A citizen of Exeter, Ranulf fitz Gille, may have been another brother.16 The brothers seem to have moved to Exeter for preferment at different times possibly from some time after 1138, and eventually the whole family appear to have settled and become established there by one of those conduits of patronage of which we have now only the vaguest hints. Barlow speculated that the elder brothers may possibly have been the sons of Richard fitz Serlo, prebendary ‘of Teignton’, the Devon prebend, close to Exeter, created by Henry I’s ‘collector of Devon’, Serlo, but granted to Salisbury to be held in the first instance by his son Richard.17 This might explain the family’s connection with Exeter. In any case Richard Peche is first recorded witnessing an actum as a canon of Exeter in 1143, and so under Bishop Robert I, de Warelwast; he may have served Robert as a clerk from shortly after his election to the see in 1138.18 He is last recorded in 1168. The other brothers all became established at Exeter thereafter. Robert fitz Gille occurs there from 1158/60, and was probably a canon by 1161/62; he became archdeacon of Totnes c. 1170 and evidently died in January 1186. Much more is known about Robert, who was married and had at least one son, held the title magister, and was a physician of some education, than about his elder brother; this is in part because, unlike Richard Peche, he evidently corresponded, and enjoyed warmer relations generally, with John.19 The family were thus clearly a well-established part of the Exeter Barlow also discusses the further complication of the evidence for two other Richards of Salisbury, both of whom were connected with Thomas Becket and to John and one of whom may have been a relative: Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury’, p. 96, n. 6 and id., Thomas Becket, London, 1986, p. 127, 302 n. 4. 17  The prebend was more extensive than just Teignton – see Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury’, p. 95. 18  The suggestion of 1138 is reasonable but purely speculative, but the secure evidence of 1143 puts the family’s earliest connection with Exeter in the episcopate of Robert I and not Robert II (1155-60) as Brooke initially suggested (Letters, i, p. xii-xiii); Robert II, however, was a former dean of Salisbury and none of Richard Peche’s younger brothers can be linked to Exeter before his episcopate, so he must certainly have influenced their careers. 19  For details of Robert’s career, see Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury’, p. 99-100; John’s letters to him, Letters, ii, nos. 145-8, p. 36-47. 16 

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Introduction

cathedral community by the beginning of the 1160s, and their mother was settled at Exeter by at least summer 1166.20 Neither of these elder brothers was evidently affected by the Becket dispute despite the close involvement of the two younger.21 More is known about John’s younger full brother, Richard of Salisbury. He is probably to be identified with the Richard of Salisbury who appears among Bishop Robert II of Exeter’s clerks c. 1156, and most likely also with the Richard canon of Exeter attested in 1160/61. He was close to John and to John’s great friend and correspondent Peter of Celle, with whom he himself also corresponded.22 In the 1160s, during the Becket dispute, he went into exile with John, although evidently also escaping local difficulties of his own.23 He returned to Exeter in November 1170 but by the spring of 1172 had become a canon of Merton.24 Of all the brothers, it is John himself of whom we know the least in these years. Indeed, beyond his own account of being sent for his education to a priest who taught him the Psalms but also tried to involve him as an assistant in necromancy,25 there is no evidence until he left for Paris and the schools.

Letters ii, no. 172, p. 128-29, 132-33; she was alive in November 1170 (Letters, ii, no. 304, p. 716-17), and may have died in December 1170 (Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury’, p. 96-7 and n. 7, 104). 21  On John’s involvement in the Becket dispute see below, s. 1.iii. 22  On Richard’s life, see Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury’, p. 101-108, and The Letters of Peter of Celle – ed. J. P. Haseldine (Oxford Medieval Texts), Oxford, 2001, p. 636 n. 1, and letters 163-8, 171-2 and 175, p. 636-51, 658-65, 670-73. Richard had apparently been in France, and received support of some sort from Peter of Celle in 1156/7 (Letters, i, no. 19, p. 31-32); on Peter of Celle, see below and n. 36. 23  Letters, ii, no. 136, p. 12-13. On John’s exile, which began in the winter of 116364, see below, s. 1.iii; Richard seems to have been with him in Reims by 1164 or 1165; John negotiated for his brother’s return to Exeter, probably in 1165, but this was short-lived and he was back in Reims by the latter half of 1166; like John he suffered sequestration of his incomes. 24  Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury’, p. 104-5; Letters of Peter of Celle, p. 658, n. 1. 25  Policraticus ii.28; Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 3-4, discusses the educational context of John’s home region, with reference to N. Orme, Education in the West of England 1066-1548, Exeter, 1976, and so offers suggestions as to the type of education which might have been available to him before he left for Paris. 20 

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John went to Paris in 1136 to begin what was to be roughly twelve years of study.26 This began with two years, between 1136 and 1138, studying dialectic (or logic) at the school on the Mont Sainte-Geneviève, firstly under Peter Abelard then under his successor Alberic of Paris, and finally under fellow Englishman Robert of Melun. Peter Abelard was of course not only reputed the greatest dialectician of his day but is perhaps the one figure of the early schools now widely acknowledged as having made an original contribution to Western thought.27 But John’s other teachers, although they did not escape his criticisms, were no mediocrities: Alberic made some important revisions to Abelard’s logic while Robert of Melun went on to become a distinguished theologian and bishop.28 After this, between 1138 and 1141, John 26  In Metalogicon ii.10 he described his education as having lasted a period of ‘roughly twelve years’ ( fere duodennium). This famous and much-debated account of his education is the principal evidence for this period of John’s life: the debates and possible alternative interpretations of this passage are discussed in detail below, s. 2.i. For broader discussions of John’s education and intellectual development see e.g. P. Riché, ‘Jean de Salisbury et le monde scolaire du XIIe siècle’, in WJS, p. 39-61, and Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 4-10. There is a very extensive literature on twelfth-century philosophy; for introductions, see below n. 134; the references which follow to those scholars named by John are to accessible summaries which also provide fuller bibliographies. 27  There is an extensive literature on Abelard; good introductions to his contribution to logic are D. E. Luscombe, Medieval Thought, Oxford, 1997, p. 47-56 and id., ‘Peter Abelard’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. P. Dronke, Cambridge, 1988, p.  279-307; Constant Mews’s contribution to Abelard studies is critical: for starting points and references see C. J. Mews, Abelard and His Legacy (Variorum Collected Studies, CS704), Aldershot, 2001, id., ‘Peter Abelard on Dialectic, Rhetoric and the Principles of Argument’, in Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100-1540, Essays in Honour of John O. Ward – ed. C. J. Mews, C. J. Nederman, R.M. Thomson (Disputatio, 2), Turnhout, 2003, p. 37-53; id., ‘Logic, rhetoric and the topics in the Middle Ages: Peter Abelard and Aristotelian tradition’, in Die Lektüre der Welt/Worlds of Reading: Zur Theorie, Geschichte und Soziolologie kultureller Praxis/On the Theory, History & Sociology of Cultural Practice. Festschrift für Walter Veit – ed. H. Heinze, C. Weller, Frankfurt, 2004, p. 33-44, and id., Abelard and Heloise, Oxford, 2005. For a recent bibliography of Abelard studies, see J.M. Ziolkowski, Letters of Peter Abelard: Beyond the personal, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 197-217. 28  On Alberic, see L.M. De Rijk, ‘Some new evidence on twelfth century Logic: Alberic and the School of Mont Ste Geneviève (Montani)’, Vivarium, 4 (1966), p. 1- 57; M.M. Tweedale, ‘Logic (i): From the late eleventh century to the time of

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studied grammar under another of the intellectual greats of the age, William of Conches.29 Logic and grammar were two of the three subjects of the basic arts course, the trivium, which was the starting point of a university education, and at some point in these years John had also studied the third subject, rhetoric, under the enormously influential teacher and prolific scholar Thierry of Chartres, although by his own account without much success.30 He also pursued some studies in the quadrivium, the next stage in the traditional curriculum, under a Hardwin the German, although which of its component subjects of geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy he studied, and to what extent, we do not know.31 In 1141 John took up the study of theology, alongside logic again, under the influential and later controversial theologian Gilbert de la Porrée. In 1142 Gilbert became bishop of Poitiers, and John continued his study of theology firstly with Robert Pullen,

Abelard’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. Dronke, p. 196226, at p. 225-26 (Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 7, identifies him with Alberic of Reims, Abelard’s accuser at the Council of Soissons, an identification rejected here by Tweedale); for John’s criticisms of him, Metalogicon ii.10. On Robert of Melun, later bishop of Hereford, see Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 37, p. 763-64; John criticised his school (Metalogicon iv.24), his part in the trial for heresy of Gilbert de la Porrée (Hist. Pont. viii), and later his involvement in the Becket controversy (Letters, ii, p. 126-7, 142-3, 156-7, 162-3, 172-5). 29  The suggestion that John was taught by William at Chartres rather than Paris has been widely debated, see below, s. 2.i; on William of Conches, see D. Elford, ‘William of Conches’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. Dronke, p.308-327, see also p. 456-57; Luscombe, Medieval Thought, p. 58-60, 241; P. Dronke, ‘William of Conches and the “New Aristotle”’, Studi Medievali, 3 ser., 43 (2002), p. 157-63. 30  On the trivium, and the curriculum at this early stage in the development of the schools, see below, s. 4.i and n. 129 (in Metalogicon ii.10 John does not present the subjects in the conventional order in which they later came to be studied: see below s. 4.i and 5.ii and n. 189). On Thierry of Chartres, see P. Dronke, ‘Thierry of Chartres’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. id., p. 358-85, see also p. 455. 31  The evidence for John’s knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of the quadrivium is discussed in Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 2-10; see also G. R. Evans, ‘John of Salisbury and Boethius on Arithmetic’, in WJS, p. 161-67. Keats-Rohan noted that John’s studies under both Thierry of Chartres and Hardwin can be dated no more closely than 1136-1141 (see below, s. 2.i and n. 90).

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who left in turn when he was made a cardinal in 1144/5, and finally under Simon of Poissy.32 In the same years he also revised the whole of the trivium and pursued further studies in the quadrivium under Richard l’Evêque, as well as taking more rhetoric under Peter Elias, an influential grammarian and rhetorician and pupil of Thierry of Chartres.33 John was by now earning his living by teaching the sons of the nobility, and received help and advice from another fellow countryman, the Aristotelian scholar Adam du Petit Pont, who also sent the future logician William of Soissons to study under him.34 John’s studies came to end in 1147; his movements and his official positions between then and 1153, when the evidence of his first letter collection makes things clearer, have been the subject, again, of considerable debate.35 Evidently in financial difficulty, John turned first to Peter of Celle, a friend of his student days now established as abbot of Montier-la-Celle, just outside Troyes, who evidently gave him employment as a clerk.36 The origins of this relationship, which was to be one of the most important in John’s On Gilbert de la Porrée (or ‘of Poitiers’), see J. Marenbon, ‘Gilbert of Poitiers’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. Dronke, p. 328-52, see also p. 449; his trial for heresy in 1148 was described by John in Hist. Pont. viii; on Robert Pullen, another compatriot and later the first English cardinal, see Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 45, p. 535-36; little is known of Simon of Poissy beyond what John tells us in the Metalogicon; he may be the Simon of Paris of Metalogicon i.5, later entrusted by Louis VII with a mission to Rome (Policraticus i.35: see Riché, ‘Jean de Salisbury et le monde scolaire’, p. 47). 33  On Richard l’Evêque, bishop of Avranches 1170-1182, see D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, Cambridge, 1969, p. 70-71; on Peter Elias, see A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. Dronke, p. 454. 34  On Adam du Petit Pont (or Parvipontanus), see A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. Dronke, p. 443; on William of Soissons, see K. Jacobi, ‘Logic (ii): The Later Twelfth century’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. Dronke, p. 227-51, at p. 232; C. J. Martin, ‘William’s Machine’, The Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), p. 564-72. Keats-Rohan suggested that John started teaching during the period 1138-1141, not later, although this has been disputed (see below, s. 2.i and n. 92). 35  On the debates over the chronology of this period of John’s life, see below, s. 2.ii. 36  Peter of Celle (c. 1115-83) was abbot of Montier-la-Celle (c. 1145-62) and SaintRémi, Reims (1162-81) and bishop of Chartres (1181-3): Letters of Peter of Celle – ed. Haseldine, p. xxviii-xxxiii; in later years he described John as ‘once our clerk’ 32 

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life both personally and for his future career, are unclear. Schaarschmidt suggested that Peter might possibly have been John’s pupil in Paris, a cautious speculation which was taken as a certainty by Liebeschütz although there is no firm evidence for it; as likely is Schaarschmidt’s alternative suggestion that they had been fellow students.37 John may have stayed at Provins at this time, at SaintAyoul (Saint Aigulf), a dependent priory of Montier-la-Celle.38 He also evidently benefited from some sort of help or patronage from Count Theobald II of Champagne; this is most likely to have come about through the mediation of Peter of Celle, who was close to the comital family.39 In 1147 John’s opportunity for (‘quondam clericus noster’): ibid. no. 97, p. 404-5; this period of employment must have been quite brief – see below, s. 2.ii and n. 106. 37  Schaarschmidt, Johannes Saresberiensis, p.  25-26, on the grounds that Peter was probably a little younger, and that he was of a good family, and that John had taught the sons of nobles (as he tells us in Metalogicon ii.10); cf. Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism, p. 113, and L. K. Barker, ‘Ecclesiology and the Twelfth-Century Church in the Letters of Peter of Celle’, M.A. diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1978, p. 7-11, questioning the possibility of a student-teacher relationship. Peter of Celle was evidently based at Saint-Martin-des-Champs, then just outside Paris, for a time in his youth (Letters of Peter of Celle, no. 150, p. 548-49). As Brooke noted (Letters, i, p. xvii), Peter also addressed John in some letters as ‘his master’ (‘magistro suo’/‘suo … magistro’): Letters of Peter of Celle, nos. 70 and 169, p. 322, 652; in the salutation to the latter Peter also refers to himself as John’s pupil (‘suus … discipulus’); affectionate salutations, however, in which recipients referred to one another as ‘his own’ etc. were common – Peter and John also addressed letters simply ‘suo suus’ (‘to his own, from his own’) – and magister was John’s title, so these addresses cannot be taken as definitive proof of specific professional relationships; on their relationship more generally, see also R. E. Pepin, ‘Amicitia Jocosa: Peter of Celle and John of Salisbury’, Florilegium, 5 (1983), p. 140-56, and J. P. Haseldine, ‘A Study of the Letters of Abbot Peter of La-Celle (c. 1115-1183)’, PhD. diss., University of Cambridge, 1991, p. 76-86; on epistolary salutations, see C.D. Lanham, Salutatio Formulas in Latin Letters to 1200: Syntax, Style and Theory, Eugene, OR, 2004. 38  He had certainly been there at some point before 1155 (Letters, i, no. 34, p. 62, n. 9), and later referred to time spent there together with Peter (Letters, i, no. 112, p. 184), although there is no way of knowing whether this was during their student years as Schaarschmidt also suggested ( Johannes Saresberiensis, p. 25-6); Barker, ‘Ecclesiology and the Twelfth-Century Church’, p. 7-11, examines the possibility of them having been together at Provins for some time from c. 1135/6. 39  Letters, ii, no. 209, p. 314-17; on Peter of Celle and the counts of Champagne, see Letters of Peter of Celle – ed. Haseldine, p. xxviii.

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advancement came, and, with the help of a testimonial from Bernard of Clairvaux, he entered the service of Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury.40

ii. In the service of Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury In his early years in Theobald’s service John travelled frequently to the papal Curia and seems, although not the only clerk to be sent on such missions, to have become established as Theobald’s chief expert on curial affairs.41 His own famous claim that by 1159 he had crossed the Alps ten times cannot be absolutely verified, but the Curia certainly dominated his life for a time and he was resident there for most of the years 1150-53.42 He also conducted business on behalf of others during these visits, including Peter of Celle, for whom he drafted and procured a bull in 1153.43 John was more permanently based in Canterbury from 1153/4, the date from which his first letter collection begins. Although he held no title in Theobald’s curia, he seems to have become, as Brooke has shown, Theobald’s ‘trusted confidant and secretary’, a personal adviser very close to the archbishop handling his most intimate affairs and the most sensitive and difficult business of the see.44 Bernard’s testimonial: Sancti Bernardi Opera – ed. J. Leclercq, H. Rochais, C. H. Talbot, 8 vols., Rome, 1957-77, viii, no. 361, p. 307-8; see also below, s. 2.ii. 41  Letters, i, p. xxiv, n. 1, xxx; on Theobald’s curia, see A. Saltman, Theobald Archbishop of Canterbury (University of London Historical Studies, 2), London, 1956, p. 165-77, and Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 14; a new edition of Theobald’s acta is in preparation for the series English Episcopal Acta, edited by Martin Brett and Christopher Brooke (see below, s. 2.ii and n. 102). 42  Giving rise to the theory that he had been a papal clerk during these years, only entering Theobald’s service later: see below, s. 2.ii. On the Alpine crossings, see Metalogicon iii. Prologue; Brooke (Letters, i, p. 253-6) has shown that only four visits can be absolutely proven in these years; they did not all take place when the Curia was resident in Rome – John himself mentions two visits to Apulia, one of which Brooke has verified. 43  See Metalogicon iii. Prologue: ‘on many occasions I have executed business in the Roman Curia for my masters and friends’. On the bull for Peter of Celle, which may have been one of a number, see Letters of Peter of Celle – ed. Haseldine, p. 312-13, 696-8. 44  Letters, i, p. xxiv, xxix. 40 

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John himself said that he was responsible for ‘ecclesiastical cases throughout the whole of Britain’ and ‘management of the household’ among other things.45 His position is reflected in his first letter collection, which comprises primarily letters written on the archbishop’s business. The collection also offers valuable evidence for a crucial period in the development of appeals to Rome and of the judge-delegate system in England, developments which were part of the dramatic Europe-wide growth in the political power and influence of the papacy in the twelfth century. Despite having had no formal legal education, John developed in these years into a legal expert. No doubt experience and necessity taught him much, but he may have learned canon law from the Bolognese legal master Vacarius who was in England from the 1140s and had connections with Canterbury.46 At some point between November 1155 and July 1156 John spent three months at the Curia of Pope Adrian IV, his fellow countryman and old friend Nicholas Breakspear, from whom he obtained for Henry II the grant of Ireland as a papal fee.47 At some point after his return to England, John found himself facing royal disfavour and contemplating exile, a threat which, in the event, did not materialise but may have provided him with an unpleasant foretaste of the king’s wrath. The exact reasons are uncertain, but John’s letters suggest that they were connected with his activities, possibly in Rome, on Theobald’s behalf, and most commentators have associated the episode with the

Metalogicon, Prologue. Policraticus viii.22; on John and the law, see Letters, i, p.  xix-xxiii; M Kerner, ‘Römisches und kirchliches Recht im Policraticus’, in WJS, p. 365-79, and id., ‘Johannes von Salisbury und das gelehrte Recht’, in Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law – ed. P. Landau, J. Mueller (Monumenta Iuris Canonici Subsidia, 10), Vatican City, 1997, p. 503-21; on Vacarius, see Southern, Scholastic Humanism, ii., p.  155-66, and J. Taliadoros, Law and Theology in Twelfth-Century England: The Works of Master Vacarius (c.  1115/20c. 1200) (Disputatio, 10), Turnout, 2006. 47  Metalogicon iv.42; Brooke wondered, although as no more than ‘an intriguing speculation’, whether John’s enigmatic statement in his letter 235 that had Adrian not died he would have made known to the world his affection for John may have been a hint at a promise of elevation to the cardinalate: Letters, i, p. 256. 45 

46 

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papal grant of Ireland, the terms of which displeased the king.48 As Theobald’s health deteriorated, from 1155 onwards, and he was ill for increasing periods, ever more responsibility fell on John; he complained in the final chapter of the Metalogicon that Theobald had made him ‘responsible for all the affairs of the church’.49 Nevertheless, it is testimony to his prolific energy that by 1159 he had completed both the Policraticus and the Metalogicon.50 Something is known of John’s official appointments and status in these years. He may have been a canon of Exeter by 1160-61, but the evidence is inconclusive.51 He also witnessed a papal judgedelegate decision together with the bishop of Exeter in 1155-60, but the evidence here for his status is again not definitive.52 What we do know is that he was a canon of Salisbury by 1163 and derived revenues from Salisbury, Norwich and Kent.53 He was certainly able to develop his links to Exeter: in 1160-61 he was involved in engineering the election to the see of Bartholomew, a former clerk 48  On this episode, often referred to as John’s ‘great disgrace’, see Letters, i, p. 257-58; G. Constable, ‘The Alleged Disgrace of John of Salisbury in 1159’, English Historical Review, 69 (1954), p. 67-76 (revising the traditional date of 1159 to 1156 and suggesting the Irish grant as the more plausible of the possible reasons); W.L Warren, Henry II, London, 1973, p.  194-96 (arguing that the request for the grant was driven by Canterbury not royal interests and that Henry II resented this), and Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 19-21, discussing the political context and the historical debate. 49  Metalogicon iv.42; the claim may have been exaggerated: Brooke noted that John’s phrasing recalls 2 Cor. xi.28 (Letters, i, p. xxix-xxx). On Theobald’s health, see Letters, i, p. xxxvii, and nos. 8, 111, 124; Saltman, Theobald, p. 74, 130-1. 50  On the dates of composition of the treatises, see below, s. 3 and n. 111 and 112. 51  In his letter no. 118 John asked Bartholomew, then archdeacon, later bishop, of Exeter, to convey his greetings to his brothers ‘in a wide sense’ (‘fraterni nominis sic appellatione dilatata’), which may, in accord with similar uses in other letters, mean the cathedral community (Letters, i, no. 118 and p. 195, n. 8). 52  The Cartulary of the Monastery of St. Frideswide at Oxford – ed. S.R. Wigram, 2 vols. (Oxford Historical Society, 28, 31), Oxford 1894, 1896, ii, p.  231-32, no. 989, dated 1155-60 on the basis of the witness of ‘R. Episcopo Oxonie’, emended to ‘Exonie’ by Wigram; these are Robert II’s dates, but the footnote calls him Warelwast, the name of his predecessor, Robert I; John attests as magister. 53  On the canonries, Letters, i, p. xiii, n. 1; Materials for the History of Thomas Becket – ed. J. C. Robertson, 7 vols. (Rolls Series), London, 1875-85, iii, p. 46; for the other revenues, see Letters, ii, nos. 136 (p. 12-13), 152 (p. 52-53), 159-60 (p. 73-77), 178 (p. 187-89) and 304 (p. 714-17).

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of Theobald and then archdeacon of Exeter.54 Bartholomew was to be one of John’s few reliable contacts with England during the Becket dispute, even if he was not free to act always as John would have liked, and it was to Exeter that John had planned to return if he had been able to obtain the king’s peace before the conclusion of the dispute.55

iii.  The Becket years Archbishop Theobald died in 1161 and was succeeded by Thomas Becket. Having entered Theobald’s Curia as a relatively junior clerk, John began the new episcopate as one of the most senior figures of Thomas’s, many of his colleagues having moved on to bishoprics and other positions. However, the nature of John’s personal relations with Becket (to whom he was to dedicate both the Policraticus and the Metalogicon) and his position in the household of the new archbishop, where, it has been argued, he may have been somewhat marginalised, have been much debated.56 The years 1161-63/4 fall between the close of his first and the opening of his second letter collections, and our evidence for this period of his life is comparatively limited. He was one of the delegation sent to collect Thomas’s pallium from the pope at Montpellier in July 1162, and was also composing his Life of Anselm of Canterbury for the canonisation process which Becket hoped to advance at Letters, i, no. 133, p. 244; Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury’, p. 97; see also Y. Hirata, ‘John of Salisbury and the Clergy of Exeter’, in ead., Collected Papers on John of Salisbury and his Correspondents, Japan, n.p., 1996, p. 157-81. 55  Letters, ii, no. 150; on John’s position in exile, see below, s. 1.iii and n. 59. 56  Brooke noted that John was ‘the only substantial figure from Theobald’s circle in [Herbert of Bosham’s] list of Becket’s eruditi’, (Letters, ii, pp. xxi-xxii; see Materials for the History of Thomas Becket, iii, p. 523-31), but, as Anne Duggan noted, John’s position was not that simple – the household did not comprise only the old guard; John was passed over for the chancellorship and was never as close to Thomas as he had been to Theobald (A. Duggan, ‘John of Salisbury and Thomas Becket’, in WJS, p. 427-38, at p. 428). For the context, literature, and an account of this period, see Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 15-17, 28-34 (also noting the lack of evidence for John’s activities during the archiepiscopal vacancy); on John’s relations with Thomas Becket, see also below, n. 59. 54 

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the Council of Tours in May 1163,57 but by this time the archbishop’s quarrel with the king was escalating and at the end of 1163 or the very beginning of 1164 John set out again for France to prepare the ground for the possible exile of Becket.58 The celebrated conflict between Thomas Becket and Henry II dominated AngloNorman politics for the rest of the decade, and was to dominate John’s life: his mission to France began a seven year exile. John travelled first to Paris in the guise of a scholar, but during the course of the year moved on to Saint-Rémi, Reims, where he was to spend most of the years of exile as the guest of Peter of Celle, now abbot of Saint-Rémi. John’s decision to settle apart from Thomas Becket, who was based first at Pontigny then, from the end of 1166, at Sainte-Colombe, Sens, has occasioned a good deal of debate over his relations with the archbishop, his attitude to Becket’s cause and his personal motives during the affair, and John did also seek his own settlement with the king in these years.59 Becket himself fled to France in October 1164, and thereafter John, along with Becket’s other supporters, was outlawed and his revenues sequestrated.60 From Reims John orchestrated his part of the diplomatic effort for Becket, aided no doubt by Peter of Celle’s position at the centre of an influential network of French ecclesiastics and nobles who could be, and were, mobilised

See below s. 3 and the bibliography. Perhaps between October 1163 and January 1164: Letters, ii, no.  136 and p. xxii-xxiii. 59  These events are traced in detail in Letters, ii, p. xix-xlvii, Barlow, Thomas Becket, p. 88-275, and The Correspondence of Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury 1162-1170 – ed. A. Duggan, 2 vols (Oxford Medieval Texts), Oxford, 2000, i, p. xxvii-lxviii; on John’s relations with Becket, see particularly J. McLoughlin, ‘The Language of Persecution: John of Salisbury and the Early Phase of the Becket Dispute’, in Persecution and Toleration – ed. W. J. Sheils (Studies in Church History, 21), Oxford, 1984, p. 73-87 (arguing for a change in John’s attitude after mid-1166 to a more wholehearted advocacy of Becket’s cause), Duggan, ‘John of Salisbury and Thomas Becket’, Y. Hirata, ‘John of Salisbury and Thomas Becket: the Making of a Martyr’, in ead., Collected Papers on John of Salisbury, p. 121-33, Barlow, Thomas Becket, p. 130-1, and Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 29-34. 60  Barlow, Thomas Becket, p. 125. 57  58 

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to support the exiles.61 John was among the clerks of Becket who met Henry II on 1 May 1166 at Angers as part of the diplomatic attempts to avert the escalation of the conflict as Becket prepared to excommunicate Henry; neither this nor John’s moves for his own reconciliation were advanced however.62 At the end of 1166 John of Oxford, one of Henry II’s chief representatives, secured the appointment of the first of a number of papal legations to negotiate a settlement; dealing with these legations and taking a leading part in co-ordinating the diplomatic response of the Becket party dominated John’s activities between 1167 and 1170. The first of the legations was unwelcome news for Becket’s party for it included Cardinal William of Pavia, a supporter, they believed, of Henry II, and the appointment of a legation in itself meant Alexander III declining to intervene personally. But the tide turned in 1167 with the collapse of Frederick Barbarossa’s campaign against Rome, when his army fell victim to an epidemic and he was forced into an ignominious retreat in disguise as the Lombard League rose against him. These are the critical events for which, in some cases, John is, surprisingly, the earliest or only witness,63 and he had evidently gathered much of his news about Italy during a pilgrimage to Saint-Gilles which he undertook in early 1168. Alexander’s own position was now far more secure; less dependent on courting support against Frederick, his attitude to Henry II hardened. The first legation fizzled out inconclusively and from 1168 legations more sympathetic to Becket were appointed. John’s letters for these years show intense diplomatic ac61  This, and his friendship for Peter, may have motivated his choice of location, if not his original decision to stay apart from Becket: see J. P. Haseldine, ‘Thomas Becket: Martyr, Saint – and Friend?’ in Belief and Culture in the Middle Ages – ed. R. Gameson, H. Leyser, Oxford, 2001, p. 305-17; on John’s pragmatic use of friendship and his friendship circle more generally, see J. McLoughlin, ‘Amicitia in Practice: John of Salisbury (c. 1120-1180) and his Circle’, in England in the Twelfth Century: Proceedings of the 1988 Harlaxton Symposium – ed. D. Williams, Woodbridge, 1990, p. 165-181. 62  Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 31-32, suggests that this meeting was the trigger for John’s change of attitude, and the hardening of his pro-Becket stance identified by McLoughlin (‘The Language of Persecution’). 63  See above, s. 1 and n. 6.

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tivity punctuated by meetings with legates and others building to a crescendo of attempts to bring the parties together in 1169-70, as well as continued negotiations on his own behalf and for his friends in England and involvements in Canterbury business.64 We know from eye-witness accounts in the letters that he was present at the meeting between Becket and the kings of England and France at La Ferté-Bernard on 1 and 2 July 1168; he met Henry again at Montmirail in January 1169 and the legates Gratian and Vivian at Vézelay in July of the same year on another pilgrimage made to coincide with political business.65 In July 1170, at Fréteval, Thomas and Henry reached agreement on Thomas’s return, an insecure peace at a moment of rising tension with Henry having had his son crowned in Thomas’s absence and Thomas threatening interdict. In November 1170 John returned to England, briefly visiting his mother in Exeter before returning to Canterbury. He was present in December when Becket’s attackers entered the cathedral, fleeing the scene of the murder but leaving a typically vivid account.66 John’s movements immediately after the murder are more difficult to trace; there was a period of danger and he seems to have headed for the safer territory of Exeter where his family were well established and his former colleague Bartholomew, in whose election to the see John had been instrumental and with whom he had corresponded while in exile, was still bishop.67 But the danger, while doubtless acutely felt,68 appears in retrospect to have Especially over the vacancy of the priorate of Christ Church, Canterbury, in 1167, and the monks’ application to Henry II for a licence to proceed to an election without Becket’s authority (Letters, ii, p. xxxvii-xxxviii). 65  Letters, ii, nos. 279, 288, 289, p. 602-9 and 636-59. 66  Letters, ii, no. 305, p. 724-39; John’s account was not the most detailed or authoritative, partly because he was absent from the final stages, but it became influential in promoting the case for Becket’s status as a martyr: see the discussion in Hirata, ‘John of Salisbury and Thomas Becket’, p. 123-24; on the different accounts, see Barlow, Thomas Becket, p. 238-50. 67  See above, s. 1.ii and n. 54, and Hirata, ‘John of Salisbury and the Clergy of Exeter’; for the final years of John’s life, see the discussion and references in Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 34-39. 68  See Letters, ii, no. 310, p. 754-61; Peter of Celle had feared him dead: Letters of Peter of Celle, no. 171, p. 658-63. 64 

31

Introduction

passed relatively quickly: Henry II’s reconciliation with the pope was agreed in May 1172, Becket canonised in March 1173, and his successor at Canterbury, Richard of Dover, elected in June 1173, although not consecrated until April 1174. John apparently moved between Exeter and Canterbury in these years, active once more as a legal expert. He witnessed judge-delegate decisions of both Bartholomew of Exeter and Richard of Canterbury in the years 1171-76 and himself acted as judge-delegate with Bartholomew. By May 1173 he was also treasurer of Exeter cathedral.69 It was also in these years that he wrote his Life of Thomas Becket, as an introduction to the collection of the archbishop’s correspondence which Alan of Tewkesbury was eventually to compile.70

iv. Bishop of Chartres John had survived the crisis but hardly risen to the heights he might have expected his career to be taking him in the early 1160s. On 22 July 1176, however, he received news that he had been elected bishop of Chartres. The election was instigated chiefly by William aux Blanches Mains, the brother of Count Henry the Liberal of Champagne, formerly archbishop of Sens and bishop-elect of Chartres, now archbishop of Reims, and one of Becket’s most powerful supporters throughout the dispute. Giving up Chartres after his election to Reims, William proposed to Louis VII that the see be given to John in honour of Becket’s memory.71 John was in Chartres the same year. Not much is known of his time 69  He also acted for Richard of Ilchester, bishop-elect of Winchester; for his activities in these years, see Barlow, ‘John of Salisbury’, p. 104. John and his brother Richard were evidently also able, at some time in the early 1170s, to make a gift, probably of land, to Saint-Rémi, in gratitude for Peter of Celle’s help during their exile (Letters of Peter of Celle, no. 174, p. 668-71, and see p. 670, n. 4). 70  See below s. 3, n. 118, and the bibliography. 71  On William aux Blanches Mains and his part in John’s election, see Letters of Peter of Celle, no. 102, p. 416-19 (see also p. 11, n. 4), and the account in Ralph de Diceto: Radulfi de Diceto Decani Lundoniensis Opera Historica – ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (Rolls Series), London, 1876, i, p. 410-13; on William, see also L. Falkenstein, ‘Guillaume aux Blanches Mains, archevêque de Reims et légat du siège apostolique (1176-1202)’, Revue d’histoire de l’église de France, 91 (2005), p. 5-25.

32

Introduction

there and he has been, perhaps unfairly, judged unsuccessful on the basis of three letters from Peter of Celle reporting complaints against him brought to Peter by dissatisfied plaintiffs, although in one of these letters Peter also says that he has heard good reports of the state of affairs at Chartres and these hardly constitute evidence on which to base a full judgement of John as bishop.72 The necrology of Chartres records a number of privileges and benefits he obtained for the church and its servants and lists his adornments of and gifts to the cathedral, including vestments, relics and his impressive collection of books which he left to the cathedral library.73 John died on 25 October 1180 and was buried in the abbey church of Notre-Dame-de-Josaphat in Chartres, where a carved sarcophagus remains.74

2.  Debates on the chronology of John of Salisbury’s early life Two periods of John of Salisbury’s life have given rise to particular controversy. The first of these is his student years (1136-47), 72  Letters of Peter of Celle, nos. 176-8, p. 674-81: in no. 176 Peter says that dissatisfied parties have come to him knowing of his long-standing friendship with John (i.e. appealing to his influence, not to any formal jurisdiction); the other two complain of delays in answering petitions, but no.  177 also refers to good news of John’s affairs. There are also some letters of Peter of Blois making complaints (Patrologia Latina, ccvii, nos. 70, 130, 158) which have been similarly interpreted – see Türk, Nugae curialium, p. 93-94, where John is portrayed as an ivory tower political thinker who, when in power, failed to live up his theoretical ideals of governance and became like any other prelate, again perhaps an unfair judgement given John’s career, and certainly an unrepresentative one (cf. e.g. the studies noted above, s. 1 and n. 9). 73  Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Chartres – ed. E. De Lépinois, L. Merlet, 3 vols, Chartres, 1862-65, iii, p. 201-2 (see also Gallia Christiana, viii, 1148-49); John’s known acta as bishop are listed in Letters, ii, p. 809-10; on the books see also Webb, John of Salisbury, p. 165-69, and id., ‘Note on Books Bequeathed by John of Salisbury to the Cathedral Library of Chartres’, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies, 1 (1943), p. 128-29; see also L. K. Barker, ‘MS Bodl. Canon. Pat. Lat. 131 and a lost Lactantius of John of Salisbury: Evidence in Search of a French Critic of Thomas Becket’, Albion, 22 (1990), p. 21-37. 74  Letters, ii, p. xlvii, n. 2.

33

Introduction

of which he gave an account in Metalogicon ii.10 which raises a number of chronological and other problems and on which there is still some disagreement. The second is the time between the end of his studies and his appointment as clerk to Theobald of Canterbury (1147-53), where the evidence of a number of different sources proved difficult to reconcile but on which consensus has been reached.

i.  John’s student years and Metalogicon ii.10 The chronology of John’s years as a student has been the subject of a prolonged scholarly debate notable both for its complexity and for its extension into the wider debates about the nature, or existence, of a ‘school’ of Chartres. In fact, when reduced to its essentials, this whole debate is much simpler than it can seem from the number and nature of the contributions. The problem essentially involves attempting to reconcile the account given by John of his student years in Metalogicon ii.10 with external evidence for the teachers he names. The clearest account of the debates was set out by Olga Weijers, and the latest and fullest reconstruction offered by Katharine Keats-Rohan.75 As Weijers pointed out, there are in fact two related problems here, firstly establishing the chronology of John’s time in France, and secondly the debate concerning the possibility of his having spent part of that time at Chartres, and the implications that this has been seen to have for our understanding of the place of the ‘school’ of Chartres in the intellectual history of the twelfth century.76 O. Weijers, ‘The Chronology of John of Salisbury’s Studies in France (Metalogicon, II.10)’, in WJS, p. 109-16; K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, ‘The Chronology of John of Salisbury’s Studies in France: a Reading of ii.10’, Studi Medievali, ser. iii., 28 (1987), p. 193-203; ead. ‘John of Salisbury and Education in Twelfth-Century Paris from the Account of his Metalogicon’, History of Universities, 6 (1987), p. 1-45. 76  The theory that John had studied at Oxford did not outlast the nineteenth century: see the refutation in H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, Oxford, 1895 – rev. ed. in 3 vols. – ed. F.M. Powicke, A.B. Emden, 1936, iii., p. 24, n. 1. There is a wider literature on Chartres as an intellectual centre, see below n. 94. 75 

34

Introduction

In fact, the debate revolves almost entirely around one phrase in Metalogicon ii.10, where John, in the process of giving an account of his education, speaks of himself as returning after a three-year period (reuersus itaque in fine triennii) to take up the study of logic and theology with Gilbert de la Porrée: where and how he spent this three-year period, and from where he returned, is the question. John’s account of his studies is presented as four distinct stages, or ‘phases’ as Weijers calls them.77 The first two of these phases present no problems chronologically: John says he spent a two-year period (biennium) studying dialectic under Abelard, Alberic of Paris and Robert of Melun, followed by (deinde) a three-year period (triennium) studying grammar under William of Conches. He then refers to a third and subsequent phase (introduced by postmodum) studying under Richard l’Evêque and Peter Elias (in this same section he also refers to some studies undertaken previously, at an unspecified earlier time). Finally, there is a fourth phase, when John said he returned after a three-year period to study logic and theology under Gilbert de la Porrée, Robert Pullen and Simon of Poissy in turn. Read as a straightforward chronological sequence, this would give two years of dialectic under Abelard, Alberic and Robert of Melun, then three years of grammar under William of Conches, followed by three years of various studies under Richard l’Evêque and Peter Elias, before returning (although from where is unclear) to study logic and theology with Gilbert de la Porrée and theology with Robert Pullen and Simon of Poissy. The problem is that this would mean John beginning his studies with Gilbert and Robert after 1144, two years after Gilbert is known to have left Paris and the same year in which Robert Pullen left. The date of 1136 for the beginning 77  In fact Weijers enumerates a fifth phase, beginning with the words ‘Sic fere duodennium…’, but this introduces not another phase but a summary of the whole twelve years spent in education and John’s account of his later visit to Paris to his old masters and companions. It was during this visit that John found, as he saw it, that the scholars had not advanced at all in their knowledge for all their efforts, and it is this, not autobiographical detail, which is the real point of the whole passage in Metalogicon ii.10 and in part John’s inspiration to write the treatise (see below, s. 4. iii, synopsis to Book ii).

35

Introduction

of John’s studies is secure – he tells us himself in this same passage that he began his studies the year after the death of Henry I. Brooke has also shown that John’s statement that he spent roughly twelve years studying must be accurate.78 Rather than take the text to be simply confused scholars have offered a number of explanations of it as a coherent but not straightforwardly chronological account which includes a digression from the main narrative. This digression is essentially the passage describing the so-called third phase, the time spent under Richard l’Evêque and Peter Elias. According to this interpretation, John spent two years at the Mont Sainte-Geneviève with Abelard, Alberic and Robert of Melun, followed by three years under William of Conches, followed directly by further study of logic and study of theology, beginning under Gilbert de la Porrée. Thus the ‘return’ was from the study of grammar under William of Conches to take up logic again and theology under Gilbert de la Porrée, and so the three years after which John returned refers to the three years under William of Conches, not the period under Richard l’Evêque and Peter Elias.79 Everything described in between the accounts of study under William of Conches and under Gilbert de la Porrée is the digression and describes additional study which took place simultaneously, or overlapped, with one or more of the other phases; it cannot be dated because if this passage is read as a digression then the term triennium which follows must refer not to this phase with Richard l’Evêque and Peter Elias, but back to the passage before the digression, and so to the time spent with William of Conches. Liebeschütz first worked out in full the digression theory, arguing that phases 3 and 4 were simultaneous, that is, after three years with William of Conches, John returned, in 1141, to study with Gilbert de la Porrée, and subsequently with Letters, i, p. xiv-xv: the preface to the Policraticus, datable to summer 1159 (see also below, n. 111), refers to twelve years spent in administration; this fits with ‘roughly’ (Hall’s transl. of fere in this volume) twelve years in education from 1136 (counting inclusively), putting the move from study to employment in 1147-8, a date later refined to 1147 (see below, s. 2.ii). 79  In other words, the triennium he refers to here is the same triennium as mentioned in phase two. 78 

36

Introduction

Robert Pullen and Simon of Poissy in turn, while at the same time, that is at some or all of the time between 1141 and 1146/7, pursuing the other studies under Richard l’Evêque and Peter Elias described in the ‘digression’.80 Liebeshütz’s arguments are also instructive in another sense. His explanation of the strange presentation of what he actually called ‘a kind of digression’ is based on reading John’s text as more than simply a carelessly inserted afterthought. He argues that the presentation, and the order in which the masters are named, results from two things. Firstly, that John’s main aim in this chapter is to ‘confirm from his own experience’ his belief, set out in the earlier chapters, that a basis in the other arts is a necessary foundation for a study of logic,81 and thus he only gives exact chronological statements for his initial studies in logic and grammar (and so here it is John’s statement that Gilbert de la Porrée taught him logic as well as theology which is important). Secondly, the references to the other studies are incorporated not strictly chronologically but by a type of associative reasoning which is paralleled in the Policraticus. Thus, for example, mention of William of Conches prompts John to recall Richard l’Evêque, with whom he later revised similar subjects; ‘relegi’ is then a keyword which prompts him to recall other rhetorical learning, leaving aside the chronological order. The ‘strange’ positioning of ‘reuersus’, relating not to the immediately preceding sentence but back to the passage before the digression, is not then anomalous but takes the narrative back to the (main) account of John’s studies of logic and 80  Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism, p. 111-13; R. L. Poole, who was primarily concerned to support Schaarschmidt’s thesis that John had studied under William of Conches in Chartres not Paris, mentioned John digressing, but not in the sense that Liebeschütz meant, and left the chronological question essentially unresolved (R.  L. Poole, ‘The Masters of the Schools at Paris and Chartres in John of Salisbury’s Time’, English Historical Review, 35 (1920), p. 321-42, reprinted in id., Studies in Chronology and History – ed. A. L. Poole, Oxford, 1934, p. 22347. There is also a related debate about where John’s private teaching fits into this schema: see Weijers, ‘The Chronology’, p. 112-3, and Keats-Rohan, ‘John of Salisbury and Education’, p. 15-17, where it is accorded a more important place in the argument (see below, and n. 90). 81  On this, an important argument in the Metalogicon, see below, s. 4. iii, synopsis to Book i.

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Introduction

grammar, and does so by a narrative method which is ‘completely in conformity with the structure of the Policraticus’.82 Whether or not one accepts this as a convincing explanation of John’s method of composition, it reminds us of an important wider fact: John was clearly not concerned here to preserve an exact chronology, or he would have set his text out explicitly in such a way. It may be that he did not recall every detail of the sequence (it is disturbingly easy for events even in the recent past to become conflated or set apart in memory), but it is more likely that it was simply not relevant to his main points, about the relationships between the various subjects of the trivium and his disillusioning experience on revisiting the schools in later years.83 The digression theory resolved the chronological problem, fitting all of the studies described in Metalogicon ii.10 into John’s known twelve years of study, but it also offered a solution to the question of the location of John’s studies and what he meant when he spoke of having ‘returned’. Schaarschmidt had suggested that John went to Chartres to study with William of Conches. Noting that it would have been implausible for him to have described the short walk from the Mont Sainte-Geneviève to the city of Paris as a return, he proposed Chartres as the most likely venue but did not incorporate this idea fully into the chronology as Liebeschütz was to do.84 R. L. Poole developed this idea, elaborating on and adding to the evident links to Chartres of John and his masters Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism, p. 111-113. The term ‘associative reasoning’ is Weijers’s (‘The Chronology’, p. 112) – Liebeschütz says ‘an association of ideas’; he also points out that we cannot expect John to have followed the curriculum strictly in the order which became established later in the more developed schools system and so we cannot use this as a basis for reconstructing the chronology (on the curriculum, see below, s. 4.i and n. 129 and s. 5.ii and n. 189). 83  This may also reflect contemporary cultural priorities with regard to the preservation of historical records: John was concerned with the chronological sequence of great events, as in his Hist. Pont., but this was clearly not considered important for biography or merely personal events: Peter Abelard’s Historia Calamitatum, for example, a personal history, gives scarcely any dates. 84  Schaarschmidt, Johannes Saresberiensis, p. 21-25, although Keats-Rohan noted that it was Petersen who first argued, in 1843, that ‘reuersus’ implied that John must have left the Mont Sainte-Geneviève in Paris between 1138 and 1141: C. Petersen, Johannis Saresberiensis Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum, nunc 82 

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Introduction

which Schaarschmidt had proposed.85 It was Liebeschütz who, by reading the digression as simultaneous specifically with the final phase, was able to propose a discrete Chartres period under William of Conches followed by a period under the various Paris masters named thereafter, and thus to reconcile a return to Paris from outside with the periods of study under the Parisian masters.86 The debate became more heated when R. W. Southern challenged this account, arguing that John had never gone to Chartres at all to study, and when he spoke of ‘returning’ he was referring to a return to the Mont Sainte-Geneviève, a suburb outside the city walls of Paris, where he had begun his studies under Abelard, from three years in the city proper studying under William of Conches.87 Southern was then able to suggest that John studied with the Paris masters mentioned after William and before Gilbert de la Porrée (that is, in Liebeschütz’s ‘digression’ and Weijers’s ‘phase three’) at the same time as he was studying (in Paris) with William of Conches, and before his ‘return’ to the Mont Sainte-Geneviève in 1141, although as Weijers pointed out, this chronology would mean taking ‘postmodum’ to mean something like ‘meanwhile’.88 Thus an outline chronology was agreed, whereby John went from William of Conches directly to Gilbert de la Porrée in 1141, but the question remained with which part the other studies (‘phase primum editus et commentariis instructus, Hamburg, 1843, p. 68-78, which I have not seen (Keats-Rohan, ‘The Chronology’, p. 193 and n. 3). 85  Poole, ‘The Masters of the Schools’; he also dismissed Schaarschmidt’s suggestion that John had spent part of the same three years in question at Provins, with Peter of Celle, and at Reims (ibid. p.  224-25). On John’s possible time at Provins, see above, s. 1.i and n. 38. 86  Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism, p. 111-13; the alternative would have been to suggest that some of those mentioned in the ‘digression’ were active at Chartres or that John came and went frequently between Paris and Chartres before returning definitively. 87  Southern, Medieval Humanism, p. 61-85, at p. 72-73 (the chapter, entitled ‘Humanism and the School of Chartres,’ being based on a 1965 paper to the Ecclesiastical History Society). Poole had in fact noted, apropos of Schaarschmidt’s arguments, that John never said explicitly that he returned ‘to Paris’, although he did not see this as invalidating the basic argument that John had studied at Chartres (Poole, ‘The Masters of the Schools’, p. 224-25). 88  Weijers, ‘The Chronology’, pp. 110-11.

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Introduction

3’) overlapped, and the implications of this for the possibility of John having studied at Chartres. This in turn is more relevant to the debates over the relative importance of Chartres as a centre of learning than the question of who taught John, which is not in question. It should also be noted that John of Salisbury himself never once mentions Chartres by name. The later and fuller reconstruction by Katharine Keats-Rohan proposed some critical refinements as well as further arguments against John having studied at Chartres.89 While she supported the outline chronology, including John’s beginning with Richard l’Evêque in 1141 (after his time with William of Conches, not simultaneously as Southern had suggested), she argued that John’s account of his teaching the sons of nobles and of his association with Adam du Petit Pont, does refer to the period 1138-1141, thus placing John, and therefore his master William of Conches, in Paris, not Chartres, in these years.90 This reconstruction, similarly to Liebeschütz’s, is based on reading the passage not as an autobiographical or strictly chronological account, but again as both exemplifying, and explicable in terms of, John’s arguments about education. For Keats-Rohan, John’s theory of knowledge and his critique of contemporary education are the key to understanding the passage, which functions as a ‘cautionary tale’ against the study of ungrounded and so useless logic and is thus intended primarily to back up the basic argument of the treatise with an account of John’s own personal experience.91 Thus, after describing his own early arrogance, arising from his study of logic not grounded in grammar, he introduces his move to William of Conches with the phrase ‘reuersus in me’ implying ‘I came to my senses’, that is to say he realised he needed a solid grounding in grammar to place his 89 

tion’.

Keats-Rohan, ‘The Chronology’, and ead. ‘John of Salisbury and Educa-

She also notes that the references to Hardwin the German and Thierry of Chartres cannot be dated more closely than 1136-1141. 91  For the connections drawn by scholars between John’s theory of knowledge and his educational theory, see below, s. 5.i; Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 3-19, is also concerned with this passage as evidence for John’s intellectual development rather than the chronology of his studies, although from a rather different perspective. 90 

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Introduction

logical studies on a sure footing. It is to this period that the phrase ‘interim legi plura’ applies, which, Keats-Rohan points out, with reference to i.24, can mean teaching as well as reading, although it also implies John’s broadening of his basis of study. ‘Postmodum’ then introduces the digression, a sequence which is not chronological but completes the accout of John’s grounding in the basics; ‘et quia’ is then resumptive, taking the reader back to the account of 1138-1141,92 and this account of his teaching then leads to the reference to William of Soissons and his errant logic, after which the passage from ‘extraxerunt’ restates how John had come to have to be teaching in the period 1138-1141 and shows how John himself was rescued by practical needs and by teaching from useless logic, and is thus also a re-statement of his criticism of misguided logic as exemplified by William of Soissons. The whole passage from ‘extraxerunt’ to ‘parui’ is thus read by Keats-Rohan as a ‘cautionary tale’ to the effect ‘“Look where dialectic can lead you”.’93 After this the much debated ‘reuersus’ marks a resumption of the main account from the end of the William of Conches period, and means a ‘return’ to dialectic, that is to John’s original course of study, having grounded himself in the basics after his false start in 1136-8; ‘reuersus’ is thus used not to describe a change of location but in a similar sense to the earlier ‘reuersus in me’, indicating an intellectual return. Finally, Keats-Rohan notes that this would constitute the only evidence for William of Conches teaching in Paris, but also examines the lack of evidence for either William or Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 9, n. 41 questions why this must refer back to 1138, arguing that the text could be read as resuming the narrative, at ‘et quia’, with Richard l’Evêque. 93  Keats-Rohan, ‘John of Salisbury and Education’, p. 17; in effect, KeatsRohan points out that the preceding digression (from ‘Postmodum’ to the end of the account of William of Soissons) is not simultaneous exclusively with any one of the ‘phases’ but refers back and forth, beginning still in chronologal sequence with Richard l’Evêque, whom he heard after William of Conches, then looking back to mention those with whom he had earlier studied the subjects which he revised with Richard (Hardewin the German and Thierry of Chartres), and then moving forward chronologically again to Peter Helias, whom he heard ‘at a later stage’ than Richard l’Evêque, before looking back again with his account of his own teaching (which had begun earlier) and of his association with Adam du Petit Pont and William of Soissons. 92 

41

Introduction

John’s other masters in this period, including Thierry of Chartres, being active teachers in Chartres. The debate over the existence of a ‘school of Chartres’, in the sense either of an intellectual centre of greater import than a simple cathedral school or of an intellectual outlook that was distinctively Chartrian, has continued. More circumstantial evidence for the plausibility of John having studied at Chartres has been advanced, and Southern himself modified his views, although not his scepticism for the greatest claims made for Chartres. Many, but not all, scholars settled on the middle ground that the cathedral of Chartres was associated with some important scholars whose influence was more extensive but whose teaching and writing was often, if not mostly, done elsewhere and whose intellectual perspectives were those common to the period.94 At the same time, it is notable that, while the debates over John’s account of his education from Liebeshütz onwards have become ever more refined, they have also, as we have seen, emphasised that John’s principal

94  There is an extensive literature on the ‘school of Chartres’ and the intellectual concerns of masters associated with Chartres going back to A. Clerval, Les Écoles de Chartres au Moyen-Age, Chartres, 1895; notable contributions include P. Dronke, ‘New Approaches to the School of Chartres’, Anuario de estudios medievales, 6 (1969), p. 117-40; Southern, Medieval Humanism, p. 61-85; J. Châtillon, ‘Les Ecoles de Chartres et de Saint-Victor’, in La scuola nell’occidente latino dell’alto medioevo (Atti delle Settimane de Studio, 19), Centro Italiano di studi sull’alto Medioevo, Spoleto, 1972, ii, p. 800-3; C. Burnett, ‘The Contents and Affiliation of the Scientific Manuscripts Written at, or Brought to, Chartres in the Time of John of Salisbury’, in WJS, p. 127-60; Keats-Rohan, ‘John of Salisbury and Education’, p. 8-12; W. Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology, and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy – ed. Dronke, p. 21-53; Southern, Scholastic Humanism, i, p. 58-101; J. Marenbon, ‘Humanism, Scholasticism and the School of Chartres’, International Journal of the Classical Tradition, 6 (2000), p.  569-77; E. Jeauneau, L’ âge d’or des Écoles de Chartres, Chartes, 1994, 2000, and the comments in J. Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150) An Introduction, 2nd. ed., London 1988, p. 116-17, M. Haren, Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century, London, 1985, 1992, p.  116, 222-23, Weijers, ‘The Chronology’, p. 115-16, and Luscombe, Medieval Thought, p. 56-60.

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intention in composing the passage was to present a picture of his intellectual development rather than a chronological account.95

ii. Between Paris and Canterbury, 1147-53 John’s time between the end of his studies and 1153, when the evidence of his first letter collection makes things clearer, has been almost equally contentious. The debate here has centred once again on the partial and apparently contradictory nature of John’s own references to his career, but also this time on the question of which parts of his Historia Pontificalis are eye-witness accounts and so the degree to which this narrative can be used to reconstruct his own movements. Schaarschmidt proposed that John spent ten years at the schools followed by two years in Peter of Celle’s service, before entering Theobald of Canterbury’s service in 1147 or 1148.96 In 1881 Pauli argued, on the basis of eye-witness passages describing Italian events in the Historia Pontificalis (first ascribed to John of Salisbury in 1873 by Giesebrecht), that John had been a papal clerk since at least the Council of Reims in 1148.97 This argument was countered by Gennrich in 1892 who suggested that John was at the Curia as Theobald’s representative not as a papal clerk, noting that John himself acknowledges that substantial parts of the Historia Pontificalis are based on information provided to him by others, including the account of the pope’s return to Italy after Reims.98 In two influential articles in the 1920s R.  L. Poole essentially elaborated Pauli’s interpretation, concluding that John 95 

s. 2.ii.

On the date of his departure from Paris at the end of his studies, see below

Schaarschmidt, Johannes Saresberiensis, p. 25-28; he reached this account firstly by emending duodennium in Metalogicon ii.10 to decennium, to accommodate the two years with Peter of Celle, a speculative emendation not subsequently accepted, and secondly by counting back the twelve years mentioned in Policraticus i.14 from its completion in 1159, which is uncontentious (see below, n. 111). 97  R. Pauli, ‘Über die kirchenpolitische Wirksamkeit des Iohannes Saresberiensis’, Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht, 16 (1881), p. 265-87; W. Giesebrecht, Arnold von Brescia (Sitzungsberichte der Münchner Academie), Munich, 1873, p. 122-54. 98  P. Gennrich, ‘Zur Chronologie des lebens Johanns von Salisbury’, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, 13 (1892), p. 544-51. 96 

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had been, between 1147/8 and 1154, a papal clerk in the service of Popes Eugenius III and Anastasius IV, and that only his later visits to Italy were undertaken in his capacity of Theobald’s representative.99 This reconstruction was successfully challenged by the independent researches of C. N. L. Brooke and A. Saltman in the 1950s. One critical piece of evidence for this reconstruction was the testimonial letter of Bernard of Clairvaux for John of Salisbury, which refers to John’s financial needs and asks Theobald to accept John quickly.100 This fits better John’s circumstances in 1147 than after some years as a papal clerk; also Bernard had died in 1153, so in 1154 John would have been presenting a seven-year-old testimonial containing an urgent request from a man who had died the previous year. On the grounds that Bernard stated that he was recommending by letter a man whom he had commended previously in person, and that Bernard, Theobald and John were all present at the Council of Reims in March 1148, Brooke gave this as the terminus post quem for John’s move to Canterbury.101 Saltman finally revised the date to 1147 on the evidence of Theobald’s charters, an edition of which made up a large part of his 1956 monograph on Theobald: specifically John was witness to a charter which must be dated before 24 Jan. 1148, thus ruling out the Council of Reims as the place of the crucial meeting and implying an earlier, unrecorded meeting between Theobald and Bernard when the personal commendation must have taken place.102 Brooke agreed with R. L. Poole, ‘John of Salisbury at the Papal Court’, and ‘The Early Correspondence of John of Salisbury’, in id., Studies in Chronology and History, p. 24858, 259-86, first published separately in English Historical Review, 38 (1923), p. 32130, and Proceedings of the British Academy, 11 (1924), p. 27-53, respectively, the first being revised for the 1934 re-publication. 100  See above, s. 1.i and n. 40. 101  Letters, i, p. xv, n. 3; cf. Hist. Pont. cc. vii, xv. 102  Saltman, Theobald, p. 169-75, and charter no. 147 at p. 369-70; this will be charter no. 204 in the forthcoming edition of Theobald’s acta edited by Martin Brett and Christopher Brooke in the series English Episcopal Acta, which will confirm a date before the Council of Reims (I am very grateful to Dr Martin Brett and Professor Christopher Brooke, and to Dr Philippa Hoskin, the series General Editor, for their personal communications about this forthcoming volume). Saltman also challenged Poole’s use of apparently eye-witness accounts of some Italian 99 

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Saltman’s dating;103 it is important to be clear about this evidence as the old account of the commendation taking place at Reims in 1148 is still often repeated in the literature. In fact, Theobald and Bernard were both in Paris in May 1147.104 Finally, Bernard’s reference in his testimonial letter to John as the ‘friend of his friends’, and John’s letter 33 thanking Peter of Celle for helping him return to his homeland, have been taken to indicate that Peter of Celle was the intermediary, and, although there is no evidence for Peter’s presence in Paris in May 1147, Bernard had been near Troyes, the location of Peter’s abbey, Montier-la-Celle, in April of that year, providing a possible occasion for the intervention.105 Thus the most likely reconstruction is that Bernard met Theobald in Paris in May 1147 and recommended John to him in person, most probably at the intervention of Peter of Celle, whom he may have events in the Historia Pontificalis as proof that John was continuously at the Curia in these years, suggesting that other passages describing events in England could equally be taken as eye-witness accounts. Indeed while Gennrich had pointed out that John’s account of the pope’s return to Italy after the Council of Reims in 1148 was based on the accounts of others, Saltman added that the account of Theobald’s return to England after the same Council could be read as eye-witness; this Council was suggested by Pauli as the first secure date for John’s employment as a papal clerk. The evidence of the Historia Pontificalis, then, can tell us no more than that John was both in Italy and England at different times in these years, and, while the presence of a Canterbury representative at the Curia might be more plausible than a papal clerk in England, this is not conclusive. 103  Letters, i. repr. with corr. 1986, p. 298. 104  Theobald was in Paris in May 1147, where he met Eugenius III on 25 May (Saltman, Theobald, p. 23-24); Bernard was there at some point between 20 April and 7 June (Bernard de Clairvaux, Commission d’histoire de l’Ordre de Cîteaux, 3, Paris, 1953, p. 606-9). Martin Brett’s draft itinerary of Theobald for the forthcoming English Episcopal Acta volume currently cites Saltman for Theobald’s presence in Paris, thus not challenging this as the likely occasion for the meeting with Bernard (personal communication from Professor Christopher Brooke; see above n. 102 on the forthcoming English Episcopal Acta volume). 105  Sancti Bernardi Opera, viii., p.  307-8, no.  361 (in fact, Bernard described John as ‘amicum meum et amicum amicorum meorum’ – ‘my friend and a friend of my friends’ – which is not quite the clear indication of personal distance sometimes suggested); Letters, i., p. 55-58; Bernard de Clairvaux, p. 607. The site of Montierla-Celle, now in an inner suburb, is approximately one and a half kilometres from the centre of the medieval city of Troyes; Peter of Celle, in any case, had established links with Clairvaux, which is only some 50 km. from Troyes (Letters of Peter of Celle – ed. Haseldine, p. xxiv-xxv).

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met the previous month; this allows time for John to have secured the written testimonial before leaving for Canterbury in mid to late 1147, the date given by Keats-Rohan for his departure from Paris.106 The other difficult aspect of John’s life at this time is the number and dates of his visits to the Curia. In the Prologue to Metalogicon iii, written by 1159, he stated that since leaving England he had crossed the Alps ten times, twice travelling as far as Apulia. Again, John’s own chronology is difficult to reconcile: he says that ‘almost twenty years’ had passed since he left the professors of logic, which would give c. 1139, sometime after he started with William of Conches; and he says his ten crossings took place ‘since first leaving England’, which would seem to indicate 1136, when he went to Paris, but comes in a passage bemoaning his preoccupations since leaving off study some twelve years earlier. Whatever the time span within which these travels have to be fitted, however, only a few of them can actually be verified, and we probably have to accept that both the twenty years and the ten crossings are figures of speech. Brooke has established what can be known of John’s travels in these years, which amounts to four certain visits and one possible visit to Italy; about any other visits we can only guess.107 John was at the Council of Reims in 1148, but as we have seen there is no evidence that he subsequently crossed the Alps with the pope, and some that he returned rather with Theobald to England. He crossed the Alps in c. 1149 and can be shown to have been at the Curia of Eugenius III when it was in Rome itself between November 1149 and February 1150, in Apulia in the summer of 1150, in Ferentino between November 1150 and summer 1151, and at Segni in the spring of 1152, and at the Curia of Ana106  On this reconstruction, see J. P. Haseldine, ‘Monastic Patronage and the Beginning of John of Salisbury’s Career, with a revised chronology for 1147-1148’, Monastic Research Bulletin, 18 (2012), p. 30-35; for the date by which John left Paris, Keats-Rohan, ‘John of Salisbury and Education’, p. 19. This dating leaves little time for John’s period in Peter of Celle’s employ, but there is in any case no evidence to suggest that this was prolonged. The chronology of this period of John’s life is also discussed in M. L. Arduini, ‘“Sola Ratione” in Giovanni di Salisbury’, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica, 89 (1997), p. 229-66. 107  Letters, i, pp. 253-6.

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stasius IV in Rome again in December 1153.108 This may represent continuous attendance at the Curia. He is known to have crossed the Alps again in early 1154 and in 1155 and was present at Adrian IV’s Curia in Benevento for a three-month period sometime between November 1155 and July 1156. A fourth known crossing of the Alps was in 1156 and a possible fifth between 1158 and early 1159.

3. Works John of Salisbury’s works comprise his two major treatises, the Policraticus – the great treatise on political theory and government upon which his reputation as a thinker has primarily rested109 – and the Metalogicon; two poems, the Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum (or Entheticus maior) and the Entheticus ad Policraticum (or Entheticus minor, a shorter version which stands as a preface to the Policraticus); two collections of letters, representing the periods 1153-61 and 1163-80; the Historia Pontificalis, his history largely of the papal court in the years 1148-52, and two saints’ lives, the Vita Sancti Anselmi and the Vita Sancti Thomae The bull which John of Salisbury obtained for Peter of Celle at this time (see above, s. 1.ii and n. 43) was presented by Poole as the final proof that John had been a papal clerk (Poole, ‘John of Salisbury at the papal court’, p. 257), but as we have seen, John tells us that he conducted business independently for his friends while in Rome (Metalogicon iii, Prologue; see above, n. 43). 109  There is a very extensive literature on the Policraticus, which is far more than simply a treatise on government; for starting points, see Luscombe, ‘John of Salisbury in Recent Scholarship’, John of Salisbury. Policraticus (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) – ed. and trans. C. J. Nederman, Cambridge, 1990, with a partial English translation, and id. John of Salisbury, p. 51-62, which lists important recent contributions in the bibliography, p. 92-4; K.L. Forhan, ‘A Twelfth-Century “Bureaucrat” and the Life of the Mind: The Political Thought of John of Salisbury’, Proceedings of the PMR Conference, 10 (1985), p. 65-74, and ead. ‘A Twelfth-Century “Bureaucrat” and the Life of the Mind: John of Salisbury’s Policraticus’, PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1987; see also the bibliographies cited below; Luscombe provides a useful synopsis and appraisal in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 48, p. 704-10, at p. 706-7; on scholarly appraisals of the Metalogicon, see below, s. 5. 108 

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Becket.110 The Policraticus also mentions a book on ‘The Ends of Tyrants’ which was never written or is not extant. Both the Policraticus and the Metalogicon are known, on largely internal evidence, to have been completed by the autumn of 1159.111 More recently, there has been research into the stages of their composition and Nederman has proposed a timescale for the period over which John worked on the various parts of each, challenging the traditional assumption that both had been written in a very short period of time in the late 1150s. According to this revised dating John may have begun work on the Policraticus in late 1156 and on the Metalogicon before mid-1157, and have subsequently worked on both together or by turns until late 1159.112 Nederman also sees the two treatises as having ‘evolved in an organic relationship with each other, the ideas of the one helping 110  See R. Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540, Turnhout, 1997, 2001, p. 309-10, no. 872, which also lists spurious attributions. 111  R. L. Poole set out the evidence for the dates of completion of both treatises in 1924 (Poole, ‘The Early Correspondence’, p. 268-69 in the reprint in id., Studies in Chronology and History). The Policraticus was finished while the siege of Toulouse was in progress (Policraticus viii.25); this lasted from July to September 1159, with the news of its conclusion reaching England perhaps by October; it also speaks of Pope Adrian IV as being still alive (Policraticus viii.23): he died 31 August 1159, with news of the death perhaps reaching England in September. This points to the treatise being completed in August or September, when it was sent to Peter of Celle (see John’s letter 111, Letters, i, p. 180-82, known to Poole as no. 81 from the numeration of the earlier edns). The Metalogicon was completed a little later, when John had heard of the death of Adrian IV but believed that the siege of Toulouse was still in progress (Metalogicon iv.42), suggesting completion in October of 1159. These dates were based in part on Poole’s chronology of John’s early letters and his calculations as to when John would have been in England and when in Rome during 1159; Brooke emended and refined the chronology of the letters in many details and gave a more cautious dating for the completion of the Policraticus of July-September 1159 (noting additions made to it after the death of Adrian IV: Policraticus vii.21) and for the Metalogicon (and also for John’s letter 111) of autumn 1159 (Letters, i, p. xv, n. 1 and p. 180). 112  The contents, also, were not composed in the order in which they appear in the final versions of the treatises; see Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 21-28 with a tabular summary at p. 27, which also incorporates earlier scholarship, especially G. Miczka, Das Bild der Kirche bei Johannes von Salisbury, Bonn, 1970, p. 7, and M. Kerner, Johannes von Salisbury und die logische Struktur seines Policraticus, Wiesbaden, 1977, p. 114-19.

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to bolster the doctrines of the other’; this view is in a tradition of scholarship in which the two treatises have been seen as part of a coherent intellectual project, the Metalogicon setting out the philosophical and intellectual principles which underpin the Policraticus. Policraticus Book vii also includes a lengthy discussion of philosophy, including treatments of different schools of philosophy, of reason, of the limits of knowledge and of virtue as the end of philosophy, topics central to the Metalogicon.113 The Entheticus Maior, also traditionally dated to 1159, has similarly been shown to have had an earlier genesis, perhaps being begun as early as 1141, with the first two parts substantially complete by 1147 and the rest by no later than summer 1156, but with John continuing to revise it over many years.114 Poetry may have been less important to John: the Entheticus minor was conceived as an introduction to the Policraticus, and even their modern editor has suggested that the poems are lesser works.115 John’s contribution to historical writing, the Historia Pontificalis, written probably between 1164 and 1170, during his exile in France,116 is brief and apparently unfinished but rich in colour and detail and immensely valuable. John’s two letter collections are made up for the most part of the legal and business correspondence of the two successive archbishops of Canterbury whom he served, Theobald 113  Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism, p. 21, suggested that they were originally parts of a planned single work; this has subsequently been rejected but the intellectual coherence of the two has been amply demonstrated: see especially P. von Moos, Geschichte als Topik: Das rhetorische Exemplum von der Antike zur Neuzeit und die historiae im ‘Policraticus’ Johanns von Salisbury, Hildesheim, 1988, p. 238-309; see also M. Wilks, ‘John of Salisbury and the Tyranny of Nonsense’, in WJS, p. 263-86, at p. 272-73, and the discussion of both treatises in Ferruolo, The Origins of the University, p. 136-55. 114  See R. Thomson, ‘What is the Entheticus?’, in WJS, p. 294-95 (suggesting a terminus post quem of Jan. 1155 but with some parts possibly earlier and completion ‘almost certainly’ well before the completion of the Policraticus, but with revisions possibly up to 1176) and Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 10-11, 17-19 (proposing the earlier origin). 115  Stating that John, ‘well known as … one of the finest humanists of the twelfth century, was last and least also a poet’: John of Salisbury’s Entheticus Maior and Minor – ed. J. van Laarhoven, 3 vols. Leiden, 1987, i, p. ix, (emphasis in original). 116  Hist. Pont. p. xxiv-xxx; Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 75-79.

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and Thomas Becket, but also contain the personal correspondence which has contributed to his reputation as a classicist and humanist; they were probably put together by the early 1160s and in the early 1170s respectively, with some later additions.117 His two Lives are brief and have less of his personality in them; the Vita Sancti Anselmi, composed in the early 1160s, probably arose from his duties in Theobald’s curia, while the Vita Sancti Thomae Becket, composed in the early 1170s, was also part of a larger Canterbury project and was intended to preface a collection of Becket’s correspondence which John himself did not complete.118 The textual history of the Metalogicon is fully discussed in the introduction to the companion volume to this, and in the earlier publications of Barrie Hall and Katharine Keats-Rohan.119 The Metalogicon seems to have had a relatively limited transmission in the Middle Ages, with only eight extant manuscripts identified, mostly twelfth century and all but one of English provenance. This is considerably fewer than for the Policraticus. Furthermore, the first printed edition of the Metalogicon only appeared in 1610 (in Paris), compared to 1475 for the Policraticus. An annotated copy of the 1610 edition survives in the Bodleian Library, and another edition based on that of 1610 was published in Lyons in 1639, along with the Policraticus, but none of this attests to its

Letters, i., p. ix-xii; ii., p. ix-x and lviii-lxiii. See the bibliography below; on the Vita S. Anselmi, see also Y. Hirata, ‘St Anselm and Two Clerks of Thomas Becket’, in ead. Collected Papers on John of Salisbury, p. 135-55; on the Vita S. Thomae Becket, on John’s possible part in the early stages of the compilation of Alan of Tewkesbury’s collection of Becket correspondence, and on the connections between this and the compilation of his own later collection, see A. Duggan, Thomas Becket: A Textual History of his Letters, Oxford, 1980, p. 12-15 and 85-98, and The Correspondence of Thomas Becket – ed. Duggan, i. p. lxxx-ci. 119  J.  B. Hall, ‘Towards a Text of John of Salisbury’s “Metalogicon”’, Studi Medievali, 3rd ser. 24 (1983), p.  791-816; K.  S.  B. Keats-Rohan, ‘The Textual Tradition of John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon’, Revue d’ histoire des textes, 16 (1986), p.  229-82; Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon – ed. J.  B. Hall, auxiliata K.  S.  B. Keats-Rohan, Turnhout, 1991, p. v-xiii. See also the note at the end of the bibliography in this volume on recent unpublished work on the MSS. 117  118 

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great popularity.120 Keats-Rohan ascribed this to its rapid dating, owing to its concerns with educational issues immediate to the day and to the advent of new translations of Aristotle soon after its composition.121 Others, however, have advanced arguments for its wider influence on later writers, including Dante.122 The Metalogicon was included in the first modern edition of John’s works, by J. A. Giles, which appeared in 1848 and was re-printed in the Patrologia Latina (omitting the Historia Pontificalis, which was not recognised as John’s work until 1873).123 These later printed editions of the Metalogicon were deeply flawed, being dependent on the first edition and narrow in their manuscript base. C. C. J. Webb’s edition of 1929, while using more manuscripts, introduced yet more errors.124 The present translation is based on the new edition by Barrie Hall, assisted by Katharine Keats-Rohan, published in 1991, to which this volume is a companion.125 The earlier English translation, by D. D. McGarry, which was based on Webb’s edition, is discussed in the Translator’s Note below.126 Since the 1950s new critical editions of most of John’s other works have also appeared and are listed in the bibliography below. 120  Three of the English MSS and the one French are twelfth-century, one is late twelfth or early thirteenth, and of the remainder two fourteenth and one fifteenthcentury; on the early printed editions of John’s works, see also John of Salisbury’s Entheticus Maior and Minor – ed. van Laarhoven, i, p. 11-12, 76-79. 121  Keats-Rohan, ‘John of Salisbury and Education’, p. 1. 122  See e.g. M. Trovato, ‘The Semantic Value of Ingegno and Dante’s Ulysses in the Light of the Metalogicon’, Modern Philology, 84 (1986/7), p. 258-66. 123  Joannis Saresberiensis postea Episcopi Carnotensis, Opera Omnia – ed. J. A. Giles, 5 vols,. Oxford, 1848: vols i-ii: letters, iii-iv: Policraticus, v: Metalogicon, Entheticus major, the two Vitae and two poems now known to be spurious; Patrologia Latina, cxix, 1-1040. The Hist.Pont. was edited in the MGH as a continuation of Sigebert of Gembloux (ed. W. Arndt, MGH S.S. 20, p. 517-45, 1868; on the attribution to John, see above, s. 2.ii and n. 97). 124  On the relations of the earlier printed editions to one another and to the MSS, see Keats-Rohan, ‘The Textual Tradition’, p. 252-55; Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon – ed. Hall, auxiliata Keats-Rohan, p. xii-xiii. Webb also edited the Policraticus with the Entheticus ad Policraticum in 1909, and Poole the Historia Pontificalis in 1927. 125  Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon – ed. Hall, auxiliata Keats-Rohan. 126  The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury. A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium – trans. D. D. McGarry, Berkeley, 1955.

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4. Introduction to the text The Metalogicon has two principal aims. The first is to defend that part of the traditional educational curriculum known as the trivium, and within that especially the study of logic, as the only basis of a sound education. The second is to argue for the logical works of Aristotle – those works which came to be known collectively as the Organon – as the sole basis for the study of logic.127 It provides important evidence for the educational system of the mid-twelfth century, for the development of the schools in Paris, and for the reception of Aristotelian texts and ideas in the West. It has also been seen as exemplifying important aspects of medieval humanism and, as we have seen, has been part of wider debates about humanism and the twelfth-century renaissance. John of Salisbury has been seen variously over the years as an educational conservative, a consummate humanist, an avant-garde Aristotelian, and an original philosopher, and the Metalogicon as evidence of the first flowering of a fully Aristotelian logic in the West. In recent years important revisions have been proposed of these interpretations and new light shed on the Metalogicon as a witness to John’s educational and philosophical views, to his understanding of Aristotle, and to the reception of Aristotelian ideas in the West.128 This section has two specific aims. The first is to offer, for students or general readers with little or no background in medieval philosophy or education, a basic orientation in two areas central to understanding the concerns of the treatise: the educational curriculum which it set out to defend and the Aristotelian logic which it proposed as the basis of education. This is followed by a synopsis of the Metalogicon. This is intended as a guide to the structure and argument of John’s text for those coming to it through this translation for the first time. It is important to note that the synopsis presents John’s arguments; it does not evaluate or comment 127  Bloch suggests that John started out simply with a defence of the trivium and went on to propose ‘a new educational theory with a curriculum that is basically Aristotelian,’ (Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 85). 128  The Metalogicon is described as ‘avant-garde’ in Haren, Medieval Thought, p. 90, n.18; changing views on John and the Metalogicon are discussed below, s. 5.

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on his views or claims but is rather intended to assist the reader unfamiliar with the text to read it on its own terms before coming to, or while using, the extensive modern scholarly literature. Thus the interpretations of Aristotelian logic presented in the synopsis are John’s and do not reflect modern views or scholarly consensus about Aristotle, or critiques of John’s interpretations; nor, as we shall see, can they be taken as representative of medieval readings of Aristotle. These subjects are treated in the final section, which attempts to indicate, within the limitations of a brief introduction, some of the main contributions to scholarship on the Metalogicon of the last two centuries. The ‘Select Bibliography’ below will guide the general reader to a selection of important and recent contributions relevant to the Metalogicon; specialist students, and those interested in the wider literature on John of Salisbury, should refer to the more detailed bibliographies noted there.

i. The trivium The trivium, which is proposed in the Metalogicon as the sole basis for a good education, was derived from the classical Roman curriculum of the seven liberal arts. These comprised the three verbal arts of grammar, rhetoric and logic (or dialectic), known collectively as the trivium, and the four numerical arts of geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy, known collectively as the quadrivium, which together formed the basis of all education. During the Middle Ages the trivium came to dominate, being far more commonly studied than the quadrivium and for many students comprising the sum of their education; it also became established as the basis for the higher studies in law and theology. The organisation of these subjects into a formal, standardised curriculum, with law and theology as ‘higher faculties’, was a later development only coalescing fully in the thirteenth century with the emergence of the university. John’s account in the Metalogicon of the order in which he studied the various subjects has been used as evidence for the lack of a rigid curriculum at this early stage

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in the development of the schools of Paris.129 Within the trivium, logic, or dialectic, the formal study of argument, came to be seen not merely as a subject in its own right but as providing the key to all other branches of learning, including philosophy and theology. John of Salisbury himself saw logic as the foundation of all knowledge and as the key ancillary science which provided the method for resolving questions in all other fields of knowledge.130 In this he echoed views which, in various forms, were part of a common intellectual inheritance reaching back to Aristotle. An influential work from the previous generation, Hugh of Saint-Victor’s Didascalicon, written two decades earlier, had, for example, set out a schema of all human learning in which logic and the trivium occupied a fundamental place.131 This was in part, as we shall see, because of the way in which ancient and medieval philosophers conceived the relationship between language and knowledge of On the origins of this system, its derivation from the original (nine) ancient liberal arts, and its eventual division into trivium and quadrivium, see Haren, Medieval Thought, p. 67-68; for general accounts of developments in the twelfth century, see Ferruolo, The Origins of the University, p. 11-44, 279-315, and Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, p. 8-51; R.N. Swanson, The Twelfth-Century Renaissance, Manchester, 1999, p. 12-39, also provides a useful summary; for a more detailed account, see G. Leff, ‘The Trivium and the Three Philosophies’, in Universities in the Middle Ages, A History of the University in Europe, 1 – ed. H. de Ridder-Symoens, Cambridge, 1992, p.  307-36; an important recent contribution to the study of medieval education is M. Teeuwen, The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages (Études sur le vocabulaire intellectuel du Moyen Age, 10), Turnhout, 2003, the final volume of the CIVICIMA (Comité International du Vocabulaire des Institutions et de la Communication Intellectuelles au Moyen Age) series, presenting an overview of the findings of the previous volumes – on the liberal arts, see p. 364-66. On the evidence of the Metalogicon, see below, s. 5. ii and n. 189. 130  See e.g. Metalogicon i.11-12, ii.1-5 and ii.11-15; John’s title has also been understood to imply not only a defence of logic but a looking beyond logic as a narrow or self-contained discipline: see C. Burnett, ‘John of Salisbury and Aristotle’, Didascalia, 2 (1996), p. 19-32, at p. 21. 131  Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon de studio legendi. A critical text – ed. C. H. Buttimer (Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin, X), Washington DC, 1939, i. p. 11; see also The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor, A Medieval Guide to the Arts – transl. J. Taylor (Records of Western Civilisation), New York, 1961, p. 57-60. On the relationship of the Metalogicon to the tradition of schematic writing on the arts, see below, s. 5.ii. 129 

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the world. A working knowledge of the subjects of the trivium was also a practical necessity for those engaged in a range of literate professions, including law and administration, and provided the common intellectual culture of what we might now term the professional classes. In the Metalogicon, John defends the trivium as a practical system providing for the needs of a stable, well-ordered society.132

ii. The Organon The logical works of Aristotle comprise six treatises which, since the sixth century, had come to be known collectively as the Organon (‘Instrument’). These were the Categories, On Interpretation, the Topics, the Sophistic Refutations, the Prior Analytics and the Posterior Analytics, and are commonly referred to by the Latin titles by which they were known in the Middle Ages: Categoriae, De interpretatione (also more commonly referred to in medieval texts as Periermenias, or less correctly Periermeniarum), Topica, De sophisticis elenchis (or Elenchi), Analytica priora and Analytica posteriora. These also comprised almost all that was known of Aristotle’s oeuvre in the twelfth century.133 Furthermore, the Organon itself was only partly known in the West in the early Middle Ages. At the beginning of the twelfth century only the Categoriae, De interpretatione and the Isagoge, an introduction to the Categoriae by the third-century philosopher Porphyry, were available. These texts, which came to be referred to collectively as the ‘old logic’, survived in the Latin translations of the sixth-century scholar On language and theories of knowledge, see below s.  4.ii and n.  136; on John’s defence of the trivium, see especially below, synopsis to Book i, and s. 5.i. 133  There are far too many introductions to and analyses of the Organon to list here; a very concise introduction is provided in Haren, Medieval Thought, p. 13-16 (which sets the books in their conventional order with the Analytica before the Topica and De sophisticis elenchis; on the order in which John treats them, and his views on their relative importance, see below, synopses to Books iii and iv, and nn. 157, 158, 160 and 162); one of the most accessible accounts for newcomers is P.V. Spade, Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2: December 27, 2007; http://pvspade.com/Logic/ docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf. 132 

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Boethius, whose commentaries and treatises were also influential. By the middle of the twelfth century, the remaining works of the Organon, the so-called ‘new logic’, had come to be available in some form, although work on the texts and their translation was long to continue. A particularly important source of the new logic were the translations into Latin not directly from Greek but from Arabic versions of the texts by a number of western scholars active in areas, such as southern Italy, where contact with Islamic learning (which had a long tradition of engagement with Aristotelianism) was possible. The processes by which the books of the Organon were transmitted to the West and new translations made available, and the identification of the specific versions, translations or commentaries which different scholars could have known and used at different times, are complex problems which continue to be the subject of extensive scholarship. This is in turn important for our understanding of the history of the incorporation of Aristotelian ideas into Western thought, a development which engendered a profound shift in the intellectual life of Europe.134 Traditionally, Aristotelianism was held to have displaced the previous intellectual dominance of Platonism or Neoplatonism, of which the most influential Christian exponent was Augustine; now a more complex and nuanced picture of intellectual trends has emerged and continues to develop. A useful summary of the current state of research into the incorporation of Aristotelianism in the West can be found in Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 27-44; on Arabic sources, the work of Charles Burnett is critical: see e.g. his recent overview, ‘Arabic into Latin: The Reception of Arabic Philosophy into Western Europe’, in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy – ed. P. Adamson, R. C. Taylor, Cambridge, 2005, p. 370-404; good starting points for the history of thought in this period are The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the rediscovery of Aristotle to the disintegration of scholasticism, 1100-1600 – ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, Cambridge, 1982; M. Gibson, ‘Latin Commentaries on Logic before 1200’, Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, 24 (1982), p. 54-64, repr. in ead., ‘Artes’ and Bible in the Medieval West (Variorum Collected Studies, CS399), Aldershot, 1993, essay VIII (p. 55-64, retaining original pagination); A History of TwelfthCentury Western Philosophy – ed. Dronke; C. Mews, ‘Philosophy and Theology 1100-1150: The search for harmony’, in Le XIIe siècle: Mutations et renouveau en France dans la première moitié du XIIe siècle – ed. F. Gasparri, Paris, 1995, p. 159203; The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy – ed. R. Pasnau, C. van Dyke, vols i-ii, Cambridge, 2010; comprehensive overviews include the classic E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age, 2nd ed., Paris, 1962, Haren, Medieval Thought, and Luscombe, Medieval Thought. 134 

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The Metalogicon itself offers an important piece of evidence for this process, providing as it does the earliest reference to a complete Latin text of the Organon, although, as we shall see, its witness has not been uncontroversial. Furthermore, although John of Salisbury proclaimed the Organon to be the sole basis for a sound education, and purported to describe its contents, his account of it in the Metalogicon, and the relative importance which he accorded to its component works, differs substantially from what was to become the recognisable standard account of Aristotle’s logical thought, and this has given rise to extensive debates on John’s philosophical views, the nature of his Aristotelianism, and more recently the extent of his knowledge of the Organon. For students coming to the subject for the first time, a very brief account of the Organon itself is set out first, below; John’s presentation and understanding of the Organon has been the subject of much scholarship and will be considered separately in the next section.135 The first book of the Organon, the Categoriae, concerns the ways in which language relates to reality, or the ways in which words can refer to entities in the world. It is thus, strictly speaking, not a logical work, that is to say one dealing with the structure of arguments, but a metaphysical or philosophical one, dealing with the nature of reality and meaning. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s logical system, which is linguistic not mathematical in form, arose from attempts to provide a rigorous method for validating or falsifying linguistic propositions, themselves built up from the terms whose signification of the fundamental nature of entities is dealt with in the Categoriae. Thus while Aristotle’s logical system can stand independently as a method of analysis, it was, for Aristotle as for medieval thinkers, integrally connected to the philosophical concerns of the Categoriae. Thus the logical analysis of language See below, s. 5.i. In Metalogicon ii.20 John also refers to a new translation of the Analytica posteriora, as well as commenting on the translation of this work at iv.6; on the nature of this evidence for contemporary translations of the treatise, see the discussion and references in Burnett, ‘John of Salisbury and Aristotle’, p. 25-26 and Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 33-43; see also id., ‘John of Salisbury, “John” the Translator, and the Posterior Analytics’, Classica et Mediaevalia, 61 (2010), p. 267-91. 135 

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had an importance far beyond linguistics: logic was the tool to analyse language, language in turn was seen to reflect and determine perceptions of phenomena, both physical and metaphysical, and perceptions in turn were always held to relate in some way to the essential reality of those phenomena.136 Aristotle was not the only thinker to address these questions, and his work originated in part in attempts to challenge Plato’s account of the relation between language and reality, which was also influential in the Middle Ages. The Categoriae divides the things to which words can refer into ten fundamental categories. Words and statements can refer to ‘subjects’ and form ‘predicates’ (a ‘subject’ is that which a statement is about, while a ‘predicate’ is what a statement says about a subject). The first of the categories is usually translated ‘substance’ (or ‘essence’). Substances are fundamental entities, things that exist independently in themselves. Words which signify substances can, in Aristotle’s terms, be said (predicated) ‘of’ a subject and express what it is as a whole – its essence. The other nine categories constitute things which are in a sense attributes of things, and 136  A notion of the universal applicability of linguistic logic was thus integral to the origins of the system itself; as Haren pointed out, at the heart of the Aristotelian system of logic is an ‘intimate connection … between the method and the subject of philosophical discussion.’ (See Haren, Medieval Thought, p. 83) – Aristotelian logic was from its inception not simply a formal system of linguistic analysis but inherently metaphysical. For many modern philosophers (not only but perhaps most famously Bertrand Russell), Aristotle and other pre-modern thinkers confounded syntax and ontology, mistaking linguistic signification for ontological meaning. At the same time, the foundation of modern linguistics is Saussure’s argument that language is a system whose meaning derives from the relationships between its elements (individual words, sounds etc.), but that those elements themselves are arbitrary and that meaning arises from the differences between elements. Ancient and medieval theories of the relationships between language and reality were never so simplistic or crudely positivistic as criticisms from these perspectives can imply; language was also seen as a system of signification, but one whose elements were not arbitrary in the same way: meaning was always seen in some senses as inherent in words and sounds, and so truths beyond lingustics could be inferred from their relationships. There were many different formulations of the relationships between language, perception and reality, and of the ultimate origin of meaning and the limits and methods of inference, which went far beyond simple questions as to whether language reflected either thought or reality.

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which do not exist independently in themselves separately from subjects. They are ‘accidents’ and can be said, in Aristotle’s terms, to be ‘in’ subjects but not ‘of ’ them; they say something about the subject but do not signify its essential being or nature. These are quantity, quality, relation, location, time, posture, state, activity and passivity. For example, in the statement ‘Socrates is tired’, ‘Socrates’ refers to a substance (an individually existing phenomenon) while ‘tired’ is an accident, which can be present or not present in the subject at different times (Socrates could still be said to exist with or without the attribute of being tired at any given time), and can also be applied to other subjects. Any term (in any category) can be applied to one individual thing or to more than one, where different individual things share the same property. A term which applies to more than one individual thing is called a ‘universal’, that which applies to one individual entity, a ‘particular’ term. Thus, for example, in the statement ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘Socrates’ is a particular term, referring to one existing individual, and ‘man’ is a universal term which can be applied to many individuals. A universal term can refer to a ‘species’, comprising all of the individual things which share a property: ‘person’ is thus a species comprising all individual people. A species in turn can be part of a genus, comprising different species which share the same property: ‘animal’ can be a genus comprising the species ‘people’, ‘dogs’ etc. Any genus can in turn be a species of a larger genus, so ‘animal’ can be a species of a genus ‘living thing’ (which itself can also contain the species ‘plant’, which in turn is a genus containing individual plants), and so on until one reaches one of the ten categories which are genera only and cannot be species of other things – and as people, dogs, animals and living things are substances, these would all fall under the ultimate genus of substance. Thus a conceptual branching tree is formed with the ten categories at the top, and below them species which themselves contain further species (and with respect to which they are therefore themselves

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genera), and so forth until one comes to the many particular terms at the bottom of this tree.137 An important question arising from this, and one of the major philosophical questions of the period, is the sense in which these universals can be said to exist. If the name of an individual object or person indicates or refers to that unique individual or object, then to what does a generic or common term, which describes a group or class of individual things, refer? Thus, for example, the word ‘Socrates’ refers to an individual, but the generic term ‘man’ also refers to Socrates, but not to him alone. So, if ‘man’ does not exist individually in the way that ‘Socrates’ exists, as an individual phenomenon in time and space, in what sense can it be said to ‘exist’? There were two basic types of solution to this problem. The first, which goes back to Plato, was to argue that universal terms refer to real things which exist outside normal experience, invisibly or in heaven, as perfect forms or, to use the Platonic term, ‘ideas’. Thus, a perfect, ideal and eternal form of ‘man’ exists whose characteristics are shared by all individual men. This then explains our minds’ ability to recognise common features in individual objects and so to make sense of the world we experience. This type of theory is termed ‘realist’. The other type of explanation, which goes back to Aristotle, holds that universal terms do not reflect real universal or eternal phenomena but are names applied by the mind to express common features perceived to be held by separate individuals or objects. This type of theory is thus termed ‘nominalist’ and ascribes our ability to make sense of the world to an innate capacity in the mind to perceive relationships. However, most nominalist theories did not hold that universals were simply arbitrary artefacts of the mind; rather proponents engaged with 137  Individual substances at the ‘bottom’ of this tree, which each exist independently, are also termed ‘primary substances’, a later refinement to resolve confusions between universal and particular substances. In fact, the system was far more complex than described here, involving for example, in addition to genus, species and accident, technical definitions of ‘difference’ and ‘property’ in respect of terms: Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, p. 18-23, offers a very accessible orientation for newcomers. ‘Socrates’ was a common conventional example used in logical discussions.

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a range of sophisticated philosophical questions on the nature of existence and perception.138 This was a question which John of Salisbury discussed in some detail in the Metalogicon.139 A basic approach to argument is inherent in the Categoriae: while, for example, the statements ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘man is an animal’ are valid, the statements that ‘man is Socrates’, or that ‘animal is man’, are invalid not simply intuitively but because they confuse individual, species and genus.140 The rest of the Organon develops the system of logical argument fully, moving on from considerations of the fundamental properties of words to the grammatical relationships between words and then to the logical analysis of the nature and validity of linguistic propositions. De interpretatione is concerned with the ways in which terms (nouns and verbs) signify phenomena and the ways in which they are combined in propositions to carry meaning. Two different types of terms are described, universal and particular, and two types of simple proposition, affirmative and negative, and the different combinations resulting from these give four types of propositions: universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative 138  This is, of course, only to present in their most rudimentary outlines what were sophisticated and complex theories; a good basic introduction is Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, p. 27-30; for more detailed introductions to the various theories, see also Tweedale, ‘Logic (i): From the late eleventh century to the time of Abelard’; Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy, p. 131-39; Haren, Medieval Thought, p. 90-94. These debates can seem remote from modern thought where various forms of relativistic and existential philosophy have been influential and where there has been a growing interest in ideas and perceptions as rooted in social contexts, but they relate to the fundamental questions of the origin and creation of meaning in the world and no modern philosophical system has been able to dismiss them entirely however great the differences in their treatment. Recent proponents of new ontologies derived from relativity and quantum theory, for example, have regarded universals as so central to ontology as to require an adequate alternative theory (gauge theory) before they can be dismissed (e.g. T. Maudlin, The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford, 2007, p. 78-103, with particular reference to Aristotle and universals at p. 79-80). 139  See below, synopsis to Book ii and n.  156. (On the relationship between words and reality, see also i. 14-16.) 140  Thus in ‘man is Socrates’ the individual is predicated of the species, and in ‘animal is man’ the species is predicated of the genus (for other examples, see Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, p. 22-23).

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and particular negative.141 Finally problems of propositions relating to future events are discussed, thereby completing the treatment of the truth or falsity of individual propositions. The remaining works of the Organon concern the principles and methods of logical argument – with the ways in which propositions can be combined to produce conclusions. There are three types of logical reasoning: demonstrative, dialectic and sophistic. Demonstrative logic involves the demonstration of necessary truths, propositions that must always have been true and could not be otherwise under any circumstances. Dialectic logic involves determining probable truths, propositions which can be advanced as true according to human reason but which could be shown to be false. The first involves deductive reasoning, drawing conclusions about particular things from general laws, the second, inductive reasoning, inferring general laws or conclusions from the evidence of individual phenomena (or empirical premises). Sophistic or false reasoning is that which produces only fallacies.142 The Topica concerns dialectic reasoning, begining with the principles of dialectical argument and moving on to an extensive treatment of the construction of valid arguments and of argumentative techniques. A topic or ‘topos’ is a general basis for argument, a statement or source (literally a ‘place’) from which individual arguments can be constructed, by discovery or invention. While the Topica considers the principles of logical argument in a general and pragmatic sense, Aristotle’s fully systematic approach to logic is developed in the two books of the Analytica.143 141  Thus, to take a conventional example, the proposition ‘All men are white,’ is a universal affirmative, ‘No men are white,’ a universal negative, ‘Plato is white,’ a particular affirmative etc.; once again the system is far more complex than this and includes the theory of ‘contraries’ and ‘contradictories’, pairs of propositions relating to the same subjects and whether these exclude one another or when both can be true or both false at the same time, elaborated in the so-called ‘square of opposition’ which is applicable to syllogistic reasoning (Cf. Metalogicon i.15, ii.20, iii. 2, 4.). 142  This schema is set out at the beginning of the Topica. 143  The Topica is usually considerd an early work representing an earlier stage in the development of Aristotle’s logical thought; on John of Salisbury’s view of it as his most important logical work, and the implications of this for understanding the Metalogicon, see below, n. 160.

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The Analytica priora sets out the principle of the syllogism. A syllogism comprises three statements – two premises and a conclusion which is logically derived from them. An example of a syllogism at its simplest might be: 1. All humans are mortal; 2. all philosophers are human; 3. therefore all philosophers are mortal.144 Aristotle developed, in the Analytica priora, a detailed and systematic typology of syllogisms based firstly on the possible combinations of the positions in which the four basic types of proposition (universal affirmative, universal negative etc.) can appear in the syllogism (as major premise, minor premise or conclusion), and secondly on the different permutations arising from the placing of the middle term in the premises, which could be either subject or predicate in either premise, giving four combinations, the socalled ‘figures’. Finally, all the possible combinations of the different types of propositions and of the figures calculated together gave the ‘moods’ of the syllogism, which came to 256. Of these, fourteen were deemed valid, and these further divided into those which were obviously valid, and so stated necessary truths (the syllogisms of the first figure), and those which required further proof, and so stated probable truths (the syllogisms of the second, third and fourth figures). The final stage was the elaboration of a method for ‘reducing’ the latter to the former, by following rules of conversion, in order to arrive at demonstrations of necessary truths. This involved proving the syllogisms of the second, third and fourth figures by following rules for restating them as syllogisms of the first figure.145 The Analytica posteriora then deals speThe first premise is termed the ‘major premise’ and contains the ‘major term’, which becomes the predicate in the conclusion (here ‘mortal’); the second premise is termed the ‘minor premise’ and contains the ‘minor term’, which becomes the subject in the conclusion (here ‘philosophers’); the ‘middle term’ is that which appears in both premises but not in the conclusion (here ‘human’). 145  Again the most accessible orientation for newcomers is offered by Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, p. 23-27, which gives worked examples and details of the system of classification of syllogisms, which used letters and mnemonics, and also notes those aspects of the fully developed system which post-dated Aristotle himself. 144 

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cifically with the demonstration of necessary truths using these methods, that is to say with those syllogisms (known as apodeictical) in which the conclusions follow from premises which are certain and thus demonstrate necessary truth, or, as it is sometimes put in modern terms, produce scientific knowledge of an entity. Finally De sophisticis elenchis deals with the various types of fallacious argument.

iii.  Synopsis of the Metalogicon146 The Metalogicon proceeds from a general defence of the whole trivium as the foundation for knowledge of the truth (i.1-12), to detailed treatments of grammar (i.13-25) and logic (ii.1-iv. 23), and finally to a discussion of the nature of truth itself (iv.24-42). The structure of the work is determined by its underlying argument: knowledge of the truth is the supreme good, the foundation of practical virtue and the way to salvation; this knowledge is based on an inquiry into the nature of all things; this inquiry depends on logic, which in turn depends on grammar. The treatise thus moves from grammar, to logic, to knowledge, and culminates with the nature of truth.

A number of synopses or overviews of the contents of the Metalogicon have appeared in biographies of John and in introductions to medieval philosophy: see e.g. Schaarschmidt, Johannes Saresberiensis, p. 211-41; Webb, John of Salisbury, p. 75-99; M. Dal Pra, Giovanni di Salisbury (Storia Universale della Filosofia, 3), Milan, 1951, p. 22-25; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 48, p. 705; The Metalogicon – trans. McGarry, p. xxi-xxvii; C. H. Kneepkens, ‘John of Salisbury’, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages – ed. J. J. E. Gracia, T.B. Noone, Malden, MA., 2003, p. 392-96; Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 62-75. As noted above, the aim of the present synopsis is simply to set forth the order of John’s arguments; most attention is given to the general arguments which advance the main claims of the treatise rather than to the specifics of the many particular technical questions which are dealt with throughout and which would require a full commentary; discussions and critiques of John’s interpretations of Aristotle, and detailed studies of particular aspects of his logical and philosophical thought, are referenced in the next section (s. 5 i) and the bibliography. 146 

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Book One The first part of Book one (i.1-12) comprises a defence of the trivium as a whole against the attacks of a pseudonymous ‘Cornificius’, arguing, in effect, for the fundamental position of the trivium as the basis for all philosophy and ethics. John opens (i.1) with a general argument for the importance of ‘the formal teaching of eloquence’ (by which, as we shall see below, he means the liberal arts and especially the trivium) to philosophy, to individual salvation, and to the ordering of human society. It is by reason, a natural endowment, that man attains to virtue and thus to blessedness (or salvation), but reason in turn must be joined with ‘speech’ and ‘eloquence’, which, as he will go on to argue, are not natural facilities but must be taught.147 This arises from his practical, or what one might term ‘social’, concept of virtue. Blessedness, he argues, cannot exist outside society because of the nature of creation, which has ordained a mutual dependency between people, and whereby ‘all things are held together by mutual support’ (‘… omnia mutuis constant auxiliis’: i.1). Virtue is the key to blessedness. However, the formal study of eloquence is necessary because wisdom alone is not enough to attain virtue in this social or collective sense: this requires co-operation and communication, and so speech, in or147  As it is integral to his argument against ‘Cornificius’ (see below) that eloquence is not natural but must be taught, John in effect uses the terms ‘eloquence’ (eloquentia) and ‘speech’ (eloquium, uerbum) to mean the sciences of language embodied in and taught through the trivium, that is, the formal study of grammar, rhetoric and logic (on the quadrivium, see below n. 150; on rhetoric, see also below n. 151). This is also integral to his view of the nature of language and of education. He later (i.10) defines logic (citing Boethius) in a broad sense as encompassing the whole system of speech (that is, including grammar and rhetoric), contrasting this with the narrower definition of logic which he says is sometimes used (in fact its more familiar sense), as being concerned merely with the forms of argument, and he opens his subsequent discussion of grammar with the statement that grammar is part of logic, and that both form the ‘cradle of philosophy in its entirety’ (i.13) – thus the different elements of the trivium, grammar, rhetoric and logic, form an essential and inseparable unity and are in turn inseparable from philosophy itself. On John’s use of these terms, and his conception of the relationships between the subjects of the trivium, see also Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 68-71; Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 2-12.

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der to produce ‘shared knowledge’, which is the basis of virtuous human society. Speech and reason, in turn, are mutually necessary: it is through speech that reason can engender virtue in this sense, but speech, to achieve this, must be illumined by reason. The key to virtue, then, is the union of reason and speech, where speech means specifically the study of language.148 This opening is followed firstly by attacks on the persons of ‘Cornificius’ and his followers (i.2-5) and then by refutations of their arguments (i.6-12). The attacks on the Cornificians embrace their personalities, intellectual style and attitudes. They are portrayed as rejecting authority and pursuing novelty, as obsessed with abstract theory divorced from reality, and as pursuing irrelevant logical sophistries at the expense of useful knowledge. The account of their later careers (i.4) depicts them as charlatans pursuing vocations for which they lack the rudimentary training, or sinking into the vulgar pursuit of gain, but John’s account of those masters whom they attacked and temporarily displaced (i.5) suggests a serious upheaval in the schools.149 The arguments of the Cornificians, as presented by John, are twofold, firstly that eloquence cannot be taught but is a natural gift which one either possesses or lacks, and secondly that eloquence is, in any case, unrelated to philosophy and therefore useless, being concerned only 148  In effect, one might say that John is arguing that practical virtue (that which contributes to the moral ordering of society) needs a solid basis in knowledge, but that knowledge, if it is to be implemented effectively and contribute to the needs of human society, needs to be both formulated accurately and communicated clearly, and it is this which the formal study of the sciences of language make possible. Nederman, especially, has examined John’s concepts of society and association more broadly, identifying in particular their Ciceronian basis: see C. J. Nederman, ‘Nature, Sin and the Origins of Society: The Ciceronian Tradition in Medieval Political Thought’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 49 (1988), p. 3-26, at p. 11-19, and id., John of Salisbury, p. 69-71. 149  For which, however, there is no corroborative evidence. Various attempts have been made to identify ‘Cornificius’ with an individual, or to read him as a composite figure, and to identify the ‘Cornificians’ with particular groups or schools of thought: see below s.  5.ii and n.  192. Cornificius was the detractor of Virgil named in Donatus’ biography; on the use of this pseudonym elsewhere, see e.g. E. Tacchella, ‘Giovanni di Salisbury e i Cornificiani’, Sandalion, 3 (1980), p. 273-313, at p. 278.

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with words while philosophy is concerned with objects (i.6). It is this distinction which John refutes first, citing Cicero’s definition of eloquence as ‘the faculty of giving apt expression to thoughts which the mind desires to be set forth’, (i.7) and so as necessary to meaningful philosophical contemplation: in effect, words are not merely persuasive but give form to ideas. He next (i.8) refutes the argument that this faculty is natural and so unteachable by defining nature, in effect, as the source of the aptitude for skills but not the agent of their accomplishment, which requires art. He then returns to the question of the broader utility of eloquence. The Cornificians do not attack eloquence, only the need for it to be taught (i.9), but their real aim is therefore to attack logic because (i.10) logic includes eloquence – it is ‘the formal system of speech and argument’ and not simply ‘types of argument’ (what John calls its narrow sense), and so to attack eloquence is to attack logic (which is to say that the trivium is an integral whole from which logic is not separable). Logic in turn is essential to reason itself: logos in Greek means both speech (sermo) and reasoning (ratio), and John further widens the definition of logic to include ‘all utterance’. Thus, in effect, grammar and rhetoric are inseparable from logic, logic from reason, and reason from philosophy, and so to attack one part is to attack all. The Cornifician attacks on ‘eloquence’ are thus interpreted, using these definitions, as an attack on learning and knowledge itself. He then turns to the nature of art, discussing in some detail the relationships between nature, art, intelligence, reason and memory (i.11). He finally argues that the liberal arts are supreme among the arts because they provide the tools for solving the questions of all other fields of knowledge (i.12). Thus, having shown by stages that eloquence is essential to logic and to philosophy, and that it is not only an art (and so requires teaching) but the fundamental art, he makes, by these links, the case for the formal teaching of the whole trivium as the only basis for the pursuit of knowledge.150 150  John here includes the quadrivium with the trivium, but it is clear from the content and structure of the treatise that it is the trivium, culminating in logic, which he regards as the key to all knowledge (on John and the quadrivium, see also above and n. 31).

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Having established the utility of the trivium as a whole, John then goes on to consider the component arts of grammar (i.13-25) and logic (ii.1-iv.23), treating in each case their origins and nature, their contents, their usefulness, and how they should be taught. Grammar is defined as part of logic and as the foundation of all philosophy (i.13); its relationship to nature is discussed, its rules, including what sorts of truth and expression they cover (distinguishing for example between the grammatical accuracy and the truth value of statements), and the relations between rules and usage (i.14-17). He next discusses the content of grammar (i.18-20), giving an overview of the field including orthography, tropes and figures, metre and other technicalities (in these and later sections John’s aim is not to provide a comprehensive manual of the subject, and he treats some questions and topics at greater length than others, evidently reflecting his own interests). Next he comes to the utility of grammar (i.21-23), echoing the arguments of the first part of the book that grammar is the foundation of learning and so of philosophy and of virtue; finally he discusses how it should be taught, including here his famous account of the teaching of Bernard of Chartres (i.24) and concluding by praising the subject (i.25).151

151  On John’s stated intention not to provide a commentary on Aristotle, see below and n. 157 (on this and the selective nature of John’s discussions, cf. Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 115); on his approach to pedagogy, see below, s. 5.ii. John, of course, does not treat rhetoric, the other trivial art, separately, but he does later define probable (dialectical) logic as comprising rhetoric and dialectic (ii.3), and refers to the dialectician and the orator together as engaged in the same pursuit (e.g. iii.5, iv.8); on John and rhetoric, see J. J. Murphy, ‘Two Medieval Textbooks in Debate’, Journal of the American Forensic Asociation, 1 (1964), p. 1-6 – reprinted in id., Latin Rhetoric and Education in the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Variorum Collected Studies, CS827), Ashgate, 2005, as no. IV (retaining original pagination), which also questions whether rhetoric was taught formally in medieval universities before the fifteenth century; cf. J. O. Ward, ‘Rhetorical Theory and the Rise and Decline of Dictamen in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance’, Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric, 19 (2001), p. 175-223. On rhetoric more generally see the seminal J. J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance, Berkeley, CA, 1974, and now Rhetoric and Renewal – ed. Nederman, Thomson.

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Book Two Book two begins the treatment of logic, covering its origins and nature, its utility, and how it should be taught (the content of logic is reserved for more detailed treatment in the subsequent books). In the first part (ii.1-5) logic is again defended as the primary art because, in effect, it is the art of reason and alone distinguishes truth from falsity and is thus fundamental to all other arts and sciences and to virtue. The rules of the art originated with Aristotle (ii.2), and John explores in some detail its subdivisions, demonstrative, dialectical and sophistic logic, their relationship to invention and judgement, and the methods of definition, division and inference and other technical matters (ii.3-5).152 Next (ii.6-10) he turns to contemporary logicians, whom he criticises for teaching the subject too quickly and superficially without the foundation of grammar; this leads to useless logic which is turned in on itself, endlessly debating arid and minor points of logical theory instead of tackling useful philosophical problems. It is here, by way of an example drawn from personal experience, that John’s account of his own education, and his disappointment on returning to visit the Mont Sainte-Geneviève to find his former companions One of the main questions in the debates over the nature of John’s Aristotelianism concerns his views on probable and necessary truth and his apparent preference for dialectic over demonstrative logic. Here (especially at the end of ii.3 and the beginning of ii.4) John seems to express a preference for dialectic and for probable truth, while speaking with due respect for demonstration; later (ii.13-14) he argues that dialectic is more useful because necessary truth, with which demonstrative logic is concerned, can in effect only be known to God while probable truth is the province of human reason and so can advance useful knowledge and thus virtue. In Book iv, in two extended passages where he is not discussing the contents of the Organon directly, he argues that human reason is based on sense perception and so never absolutely certain (iv.9-20), and that human, as opposed to divine, knowledge is always limited (iv.30-41), again suggesting fundamental reservations about the capacity of human reason, and so logic, to attain to necessary truth. Such arguments, as well as John’s self-proclaimed Academic scepticism (see below, n. 179), and his preference for the Topica over the Analytica expressed in Books iii and iv (see below, n. 160), have been taken as part of the arguments for his belief in probable logic and by some for his divergence from Aristotelianism (see below s. 5.i and nn. 178 and 188). 152 

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still locked in unproductive debates, comes (ii.10).153 He then turns to useful logic (ii.11-15), which is concerned with formulating and answering questions of general application – its subject matter is not itself but the questions which arise from philosophy more generally; this includes natural philosophy (physics), moral philosophy (ethics) and rational philosophy (logic). The discussion of the utility of logic is also bound up with John’s views on the relative merits of demonstrative and dialectical logic: logic is useful because it concerns probable truths not necessary truths, which can be demonstrated but are in effect impossible to know (ii.13-14).154 Finally (ii.15) he discusses Aristotle’s distinction between dialectical propositions and dialectical problems, noting again as he does so that the only valid dialectical problems are those of practical value in advancing other fields of knowledge. The rest of the book turns again to the teaching of dialectic (ii.16-20). John’s essential point is that students should be taken through the subject in appropriate stages, in the proper sequence, in order to build up a solid grounding in the basics before tackling complex problems. He first (ii.16) stresses the primacy of Aristotle and introduces his concerns, which he goes on to develop at greater length in Book iii, about the mis-use of Porphyry’s Isagoge, which is given undue stress and authority by teachers when it should be used as no more than an introductory work to Aristotle. Next (ii.17-20), he discusses the problem of universals, in a passage that has been commented on frequently in discussions of philosophy, although it is introduced at this point in the argument to illustrate poor teaching and the ways in which students are presented with a mass of theories and ideas at an inappropriate stage in their education.155 He relates nine theories, three broadly nominalist and six realist (ii.17); these are treated in varying deSee also above, s. 2.i. See also above, n. 152; John also suggests (ii.13) that the usefulness of demonstration is largely limited to mathematics. 155  Indeed, at the end of the book (ii.20) John’s own conclusion to his discussion of universals is that it shows how ‘Porphyry is unreliably dealt with’ by teachers who take it as a licence to misinterpret Aristotle and to introduce novel or insubstantial claims; he returns to Porphyry in iii.1. 153 

154 

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grees of detail, but all are criticised, including the view ascribed to Abelard, his own first master. The book ends with an account of Aristotle’s solution to the problem of universals, which is proposed as the best and most authoritative (ii.20).156

Book Three Book three begins John’s detailed account of the subject matter of logic, which means, essentially, of the Organon.157 This is prefaced by a discussion of Porphyry’s Isagoge (iii.1), which John again stresses is to be taken only as an introduction to Aristotle for beginners, with its rudimentary and simplified definitions of genera and species serving only to introduce the idea of these to students at the earliest stages, and reiterating that it should not be taken as an authority on logic. John then comes to Aristotle, introducing the books of the Organon in the order in which they are to be ap-

It has been argued that John here does not describe Aristotle’s actual theory but produces his own original version: B. P. Hendley, ‘John of Salisbury and the Problem of Universals’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 8 (1970), p. 289-302; on contemporary theories of universals, including those described here by John, see above n. 138; on the debates over John’s contribution, as well as how his solution differed from Abelard’s, see below, s. 5.i. and n. 174. Abelard’s view is sometimes termed a form of conceptualism, lying between realism and nominalism, although Mews has questioned the appropriateness of this label: see Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 5-6 and n. 22; for Mews’s interpretation of Abelard, see also above, n.  27; see also Y. Iwakuma, ‘Twelfth-Century Nominales: The Posthumous School of Peter Abelard’, Vivarium, 30 (1992), p.  97-109, id., ‘“Vocales” or Early Nominalists’, Traditio, 47 (1992), p. 37-111, and id., ‘Influence’, in The Cambridge Companion to Abelard – ed. J. E. Brower, K. Gulfoy, Cambridge, 2004, p. 305-335. 157  This is an account of the contents and relative importance of the books of the Organon, and of their pedagogical application, rather than a commentary – indeed John states more than once that he is not commenting on the texts (see e.g. iii.7, iii.10, and iv.24, where he says that he had intended to commend not expound the disparaged works of Aristotle, and that he has spent time commending them). John’s account of the Organon, and his interpretations of the relative importance of its component books, is, as noted above, often very different from standard accounts; what follows attempts to summarise John’s views only; Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p.  92-186, presents a detailed analysis of John’s interpretation of the Organon (see also below, s. 5.i). 156 

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proached, from elementary to advanced.158 First comes the Categoriae (iii.2-3), which he characterises as an elementary work, which considers the meanings of words in isolation, but a fundamental one; he discusses its technical content at length, including the nature of signification and predication, and praises the work highly. Next comes De interpretatione (iii.4), on the usefulness of which John expresses some reservations. The work is, he says, superseded by contemporary teaching manuals, and deals, as he later explains (iii.6), only with truth and falsity, not with inference.159 The Topica is introduced next (iii.5-10) and moves us from the elementary or preparatory studies to the art of dialectic itself. The Topica, John says, sets out the entire foundation of logic, introducing in the first book the syllogism and the different forms of reasoning – demonstration, induction and sophistry – and other central matters (iii.5).160 John then runs through the other books of the Topica He describes the Categoriae as ‘elementary’ (elementarius, iii.2) in two related senses, as preliminary to the other works but also as dealing with the elements of reasoning (elementa rationum, iii.4); this second sense is then extended into a simile when the De interpretatione, coming next, is described as ‘syllabic’ (sillabicus) because it shows how these elements are assembled, much as letters are assembled to produce syllables (iii.4); both are preparatory works (preparatitia) in a literal sense with respect to to the Topica, which in John’s view contains the complete articulation of logic, and which is thus described, by the extension of the same simile, as ‘concerned with words’ (dictionalis, iii.6). 159  But he does accord it the respect it is due as the work of Aristotle, and it is here that John refers to Bernard of Chartres’s famous saying that moderns are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants. (John refers to the work as Periermeniarum: see above, s. 4.ii.) 160  In fact, the Topica does not treat the syllogism or demonstration in any detail; rather it sets out, in the first book, the demarcation of the subject into dialectic and demonstrative reasoning before proceeding to deal exclusively with the former; the syllogism and demonstrative reasoning are dealt with in the Analytica priora and posteriora. As noted above, the Topica is generally held to be an early work which considers the art of argument in general terms and is not normally accorded the significance in Aristotle’s thought that John gives it. On the implications of this for our understanding of John’s Aristotelianism, see above n. 152, Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 98-123, and the discussion below, s. 5.i; on the relatively low regard in which the Topica was held by John’s contemporaries, see Jacobi, ‘Logic (ii): The Later Twelfth Century’, p. 237. It is perhaps worth noting that John himself claims (iv.24) that he only feels the need to commend strongly the Topica and Categoriae as these are disparaged by his contemporaries, while the 158 

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(iii.6-9), discussing their contents in detail, including accidents, genera, properties, definition and difference, and once again going into particular technical problems in greater detail. He stresses throughout the utility of the work, coming finally to Topica viii which draws all of the preceding together and ‘constructs the processes of reasoning’, providing the key to logical analysis and elucidating the rules and procedures of the ‘craft’ of disputation (iii.10). This, for John, is the high point of the Organon.

Book Four The first part of Book four (iv.1-23) completes John’s account of the Organon, beginning with the Analytica priora (iv.1-5). This, John says, completes the art of logic, weighing the types of argument and thus complementing the earlier works, which concern invention, with a treatment of this branch of knowledge, which is more concerned with judgement (iv.1). However, although he commends it as useful, John nevertheless sees the Analytica priora essentially as an elaboration of what is covered more simply and accurately elsewhere in the Organon, complaining also that it is often obscure, muddled and unnecessarily complicated (iv.2-3), and he restricts himself to what is little more than a relatively brief list of its contents – types of propositions, terms and syllogisms, the figures and moods of the syllogism, the method of reduction etc. – along with some discussions of its limitations, for example in modals (iv.4-5). The Analytica posteriora is dealt with even more cursorily (iv.6): it concerns demonstration and so deals with necessary not probable truths, but is difficult, badly organised, textually corrupt and poorly translated.161 Rather than discuss demother works are generally accepted, and that this may in part explain his stress on these works. 161  See also S. Ebbesen, ‘The Prior Analytics in the Latin West: 12th-13th Centuries’, Vivarium, 48 (2010), p. 96-133; C. J. Martin, ‘“They had added not a single tiny proposition”: The Reception of the Prior Analytics in the First half of the Twelfth Century’, Vivarium, 48 (2010), p. 159-92; on the evidence of the Metalogicon for contemporary translations of the Analytica posteriora, see above n. 135. John refers to the Analytica priora simply as Analytica. On invention and judgement, see e.g. Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 77-81.

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onstration in detail, John simply states that it was his mastery of this which earned Aristotle the highest accolade as a philosopher, to be called ‘the philosopher’ (iv.7), but then proceeds mainly to consider its limitations (iv.8), concluding what purports to be an account of the Analytica posteriora with the observation that sense perception (‘corporeal sensation’) is fundamental to all knowledge of the world, including cognition of first principles, which seems to imply again John’s basic reservations about demonstrative logic.162 It is here that he breaks off his account of the Organon to pursue this through a discussion of the nature of knowledge and perception (iv.9-20).163 Having already noted (iv.8) that inductive reasoning infers general truths from particular facts and is thus based on the evidence of the senses, he continues with a detailed discussion of sensation as the basis of cognition, and how this engenders both memory and imagination, of which the latter is capable of abstraction, which in turn engenders both affections and opinion, which latter in turn gives rise to prudence, which is the origin of knowledge (iv.9-12). He then discusses the differences between knowledge, based on prudence and so ultimately on sensation, and wisdom, based on understanding, which, as certainty, is the province of the divine and to which humans can only attain by faith, not knowledge (iv.13). He next discusses the nature of reason (iv.14-17), which strives for greater truth while knowing that absolute certainty is impossible, and finally the relationships between Indeed, John here arguably contradicts the main purpose of the Analytica posteriora, to describe the derivation of necessary truth (see above n.  152 and Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 123-173). 163  One might have expected at this point further discussion of the Analytica posteriora before the account of the De sophisticis elenchis which concludes his account of the Organon; indeed Bloch notes that the chapters iv.9-21 are ‘… confusing; their connection with the Posterior Analytics and demonstration is at best peripheral’ (Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 131) – a problem which for Bloch is explicable by John’s fundamental belief in probabilism. For Bloch this results from a misunderstanding of Aristotle, for others, from John’s original synthesis of Aristotle with scepticism and Christian convictions on the limits of knowledge, also expressed in iv.30-41 (see above n. 152 and below, s. 5.i). The closing words to iv.20 (‘let us now return to our main theme,’) suggest that John regarded this section (in which he draws more on Chalcidius/Plato) as a digression from his account of the Organon. 162 

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reason, understanding, wisdom, grace and cognition (iv.18-20).164 The account of the Organon is then resumed with a brief note (iv.21) that Aristotle did not adequately discuss hypothetical syllogisms, and noting some later treatments of this, before concluding his account with a discussion of the De sophisticis elenchis (iv.2223). This deals with fallacy or invalid syllogisms and false types of argument, and John regards it as a most useful work for the young, who need to recognise, avoid and defend against such arguments. Having completed his account of the Organon, John then turns again to the uses and limitations of logic, beginning by recalling some of his reasons for writing the Metalogicon and justifying his need to have commended Aristotle as the basis of logic. This was necessary because there are those, personified by Cornificius, who disparage Aristotle, or disparage logic altogether, and others who are content with Boethius alone (iv.24-7). Aristotle, however, while supreme in logic is not so in ethics, and faith shows him to be in error in some matters (iv.27). There are therefore limitations to the applicability of Aristotelian logic, and this leads John back to his earlier theme that logic studied in isolation is useless: it is necessary to train young minds to develop verbal fluency but useless if not turned to serious, practical questions; these are the pursuit of goodness, truth and reason (iv.28-29). This then leads into a final section on the nature of truth and reason and on the limitations of human knowledge in which John explores the connections between logic, grace, faith, reason and truth (iv.30-41). This begins with a discussion of the nature of reason (iv.31-33), in which he distinguishes between divine reason, which is original reason, perfect and one with truth and the cause of all things, and human reason, which is imperfect and only seeks truth. He then moves on 164  In effect, John is arguing here that abstract knowledge and human reason are ultimately dependent on sense perception and thus pertain to the sphere of probable truth, which is the province of dialectic, and not of necessary truth; thus the areas of knowledge accessible to human reason by dialectic, and so probable truths, are conceived of in the broadest possible terms and the area of demonstrative logic and necessary truth greatly reduced. This is not, however, to argue that dialectic encompasses all truth, but rather to assert the limits of human reason by setting necessary truths beyond its scope (as Aristotle of course did not); he later goes on to argue, in effect, that reason and faith are in harmony (iv.30-41).

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to the nature of truth and of being and non-being (iv.34-37), before finally looking at the relationship between reason and truth and how and to what extent knowledge of the truth can be attained (iv.38-41): in God, reason and truth are one and the same, but in man only imperfect knowledge of the truth is possible, and reason can only attain to more certain, not to perfect, knowledge.165 In the closing chapter of the work (iv.42) the real world suddenly explodes before us as political disaster and private grief combine with anxious uncertainty and the pressure of work to force John to bring to an end his reflections. The reasons were real and pressing – his friend and fellow-countryman Pope Adrian IV had died and schism broken out in the papal Curia, while the health of his employer, Archbishop Theobald, had deteriorated rapidly, leaving John to shoulder more of the burden of administration – but this seems more than a conventional protestation. The sudden vivid intrusion on the reader’s sensibilities here of this astonishing flash of John’s feelings, just after we have been led to the highest realms of the quest for truth, brilliantly reinforces his theme of useful knowledge engaged with the world.

The implication of this is that human reason can only attain to probable truth, necessary truth being the province of divine reason and accessible to humans only through faith, and thus that useful logic comprises dialectic not demonstration (see above, n. 152). The use of logic to attain to probable truth is also here reconciled to faith: as human reason and seeking for truth are divinely sanctioned (i.1, iv.29), so reason and faith concern complementary aspects of knowledge – while faith is unchanging, the expression of faith is changing (iv.32), and so, by weighing probabilities, logic is not subjecting faith to human reason but approaching truth and expressing it in a divinely sanctioned way. The tension between faith and reason, and the problem of subjecting the divine to human reason, was a fundamental concern for medieval thinkers, most famously expressed by Saint Anselm’s characterisation of philosophy as ‘fides quaerens intellectum’ (‘faith seeking understanding’) – that is, that human reason illuminated, but was not necessary to establish, truths held by faith; this had also been at issue in the trials of John’s masters, Abelard and Gilbert de la Porrée. 165 

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5. The Metalogicon and modern scholarship The place of the Metalogicon as a unique document in the history of the schools, and more broadly of Western thought, has been acknowledged since the beginnings of modern critical scholarship, but the nature and importance of its evidence have been widely debated and views have changed considerably over the years.

i. The Metalogicon and the history of thought The traditional view of the Metalogicon was of a conservative defence of humanism or classicism against the rise of logic and new learning. Hastings Rashdall, in his great pioneering history of the European universities, presented John as a classicist and defender of ‘humane letters’, and the Metalogicon as a defence of grammar against the advance of logic, and views of this sort were to remain current until the 1960s.166 For Étienne Gilson John’s ‘charming’ (‘charmantes’) works perfectly epitomised the Chartrian humanism which was giving way before the advances of scholasticism.167 John’s championing of Aristotle as the supreme authority in logic was mostly seen as a simple case of setting ancient authority against new learning.168 Liebeschütz’s magisterial study, published in 1950, had, however, already proposed important re-evaluations of John’s life and work, and has been seminal for the modern debates on Rashdall, The Universities, i, p. 66-72, where the medieval study of grammar is equated with classics or humane letters; later variations of these views are discussed in Hendley, ‘John of Salisbury and the Problem of Universals’, p. 297 and n.12. As noted above, what follows is necessarily restricted to a selection of works which treat the Metalogicon itself in detail; for work on John of Salisbury generally, see the bibliographies listed below. 167  Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age, p. 274-7; while Gilson appreciated John’s concern with the limits of human knowledge, he saw this essentially as a humanist and ethical concern for wisdom guided by modesty rather than a philosophically rigorous position, and characterised John as a Ciceronian. John’s Ciceronianism and his ethics have both been the subject of more recent scholarship (see below and nn. 182 and 187). 168  John himself in the Metalogicon claimed not to oppose new approaches simply on the grounds that they were new (iii. Prologue). 166 

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medieval humanism and the many appreciations of John as the exemplary humanist of his day, even while both definitions of humanism and critiques of John’s thought have changed greatly.169 Revisions of John’s contribution to philosophy were to follow. Already in 1951 Mario Dal Pra had made a case for according John a limited place in the history of thought, seeing in his views on probability, the limits of knowledge and the ends of philosophy, if not a fully articulated philosophical doctrine, at all events a new and important stage in the incorporation of Aristotelian thought into the Western intellectual tradition, and one prescient ultimately of Ockham.170 At the same time the Metalogicon was also coming to be re-evaluated as advancing a progressive educational philosophy with a coherent intellectual foundation. As early as 1948 Daniel McGarry had proposed that John’s ‘general philosophy’ underlay his philosophy of education, which in turn underlay his ideas of pedagogy.171 In 1958 Mary B. Ryan advanced the view that the Metalogicon presented a detailed theory of literature in which the arts of the trivium were an interdependent, coherent whole, with the pursuit of eloquence co-ordinating the different

Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism; on medieval humanism, see above s. 1 and n. 10; see also G. W. Olsen, ‘John of Salisbury’s Humanism’, in Gli umanesimi medievali – ed. C. Leonardi, Florence, 1998, p. 447-68. 170  Dal Pra, Giovanni di Salisbury. Dal Pra still saw John’s philosophy as less thoroughly or rigorously articulated than his political thought, and the Policraticus as his greatest contribution, but he saw the Metalogicon as representing a specific, even if not immediately very influential, stage in the incorporation of Aristotelian ideas; he also discusses the near-unanimous earlier view, shared even by Schaarschmidt and Webb, of John’s works as philosophically unimportant (pp. 147-56). 171  D. D. McGarry, ‘Educational Theory in the Metalogicon of John of Salisbury’, Speculum, 23 (1948), p. 659-75. McGarry still saw John as a Chartrian, Christian humanist, but argued that his philosophical commitment to probable, as opposed to demonstrative, knowledge, and the role he accorded reason in discerning probable truths, was linked to his view of education as the inculcation of eloquence via the arts which in turn develops reason; see also the critique in B. P. Hendley, ‘A New Look at John of Salisbury’s Educational Theory’, in Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (SIEPM) Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987 – ed. M. Asztalos, J. E. Murdoch, I. Niiniluoto, 3 vols, Helsinki, 1990, ii., p. 502-11. 169 

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disciplines.172 In the late 1960s Brian Hendley developed this approach further, arguing that John’s view of the trivium arose from a coherent theory of knowledge and of nature as expressed in the Metalogicon, and that this theory of knowledge explains and underpins his educational philosophy.173 In 1970 Hendley also published his argument that John’s solution to the problem of universals was distinct from that of Aristotle, which John claimed to be describing, and constituted a genuinely original contribution to philosophy and one which was integrally related to his theories of knowledge and of nature and to his pedagogical ideas.174 Thus the treatise came to be seen as advancing a coherent theory of the arts and of knowledge and as an original and a creative response to the new knowledge which the full Latin text of the Organon represented. Detailed evaluations of John’s views on dialectic, on probable truth, and on the limits of human knowledge meant that by this time he was no longer being readily dismissed as a derivative or reactionary thinker but appreciated as a serious proponent of a theory or system of ‘probable logic’ (logica probabilis).175 By 1985 Michael Haren could state that John’s conception of logic ‘in its fullest Aristotelian terms’ was ‘avant-garde’ compared to the gradual absorption of the new works into the sylM. B. Ryan, ‘John of Salisbury on the Arts of Language in the Trivium’, PhD diss., Washington DC, 1958: I have not seen this thesis, which is discussed in Luscombe, ‘John of Salisbury in Recent Scholarship’, p. 25. 173  B. P. Hendley, ‘John of Salisbury’s Defense of the Trivium’, in Arts Libéraux et Philosophie au Moyen Age: actes de IVe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale.Université de Montréal, 1967, Montréal, Paris, 1969, p. 753-62, based on his unpublished 1967 Yale dissertation ‘Wisdom and Eloquence: A New Interpretation of the Metalogicon of John of Salisbury’; see also the discussion in Luscombe, ‘John of Salisbury in recent scholarship’, p. 25-26. 174  Hendley, ‘John of Salisbury and the Problem of Universals’. For Hendley, although, like Abelard, John referred to universals as ‘figmenta’, he understood this differently: universals were ‘fictions’ which could be used by reason to advance knowledge, but not mental representations of substantial likenesses (or direct representations of reality) as Aristotle held. For a counter-argument, see Wilks, ‘John of Salisbury and the Tyranny of Nonsense’, p. 264-69 (on universals, see also above n. 138 and 156). 175  See e.g. Keats-Rohan’s discussion in Ioannis Saresberiensis Policraticus, p. xixiii. 172 

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labus.176 However, increasing appreciation of John as an original rather than a derivative thinker, along with a growing number of detailed examinations of his ideas and his sources, has led to a more complex picture both of his treatment of Aristotelian ideas and of his humanism.177 Hendley’s argument for the originality of John’s solution to the problem of universals pointed out one example of a possibly important difference between John’s ideas and those of Aristotle which he claimed to be describing. In addition, John’s preference for probable logic, the very limited place which he accords demonstrative logic, and his championing of the Topica and marginalising of the Analytica priora and posteriora have, as we shall see, also been seen to raise questions about the nature of his Aristotelianism.178 John also declares himself, in the Prologue and elsewhere in the text, to be an Academic sceptic and follower of Cicero.179 Subsequently, scholars have sought to reconcile these positions, while taking into account also John’s impressive range of reference in Latin auctores both Christian and pagan, to produce a coherent intellectual portrait of John as philosopher and humanist. Peter von Moos, in his great study of John’s use of historical exempla in the Policraticus, examined in detail the intellectual links between the Policraticus and the Metalogicon, showing how John applied the principles of probable logic developed in the latter to

Haren, Medieval Thought, p. 90 and n. 18. With particular reference to the Metalogicon, see e.g. H.-B. Gerl, ‘Zum mittelalterlichen Spannungsfeld von Logik, Dialektik und Rhetorik: Die Programmatik des Metalogicon von Johannes von Salisbury’, Studia mediewistyczne, 22 (1983), p. 37-51; G. Dotto, Giovanni di Salisbury: La filosofia come sapienza, Assissi, 1986; A. Drew, ‘Language and Logic in John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon’, Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, 1986; for the many works on John’s writings more generally, see the bibliographies listed below. 178  See e.g. Hendley, ‘John of Salisbury’s Defense of the Trivium’, id., ‘A New Look at John of Salisbury’s Educational Theory’; see also above, nn. 152 and 160. 179  See i. Prologue, ii.13, ii.20, iii. Prologue; cf. Policraticus i. Prologue, ii. 22, vii. Prologue; on John’s scepticism, see also Nederman, John of Salisbury, p. 64-65; C. Grellard, ‘Jean de Salisbury. Un cas médiéval de scepticisme’, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 54 (2007), p. 16-40; Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 86-91. 176 

177 

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the rational analysis of his exempla in the former.180 Katharine Keats-Rohan, building to an extent on the ideas of Hendley and von Moos, argued that the Metalogicon articulates a ‘humanist manifesto’ in which John’s theory of knowledge is integral to his ethics and to his belief in the pursuit of useful knowledge with practical and moral application in the world. His defence of the trivium as the basis for reason, and so of philosophy, also rests on two humanist positions, expounded in Metalogicon i.24: firstly, that grammar, grounded in a wide reading in Latin auctores, is the basis of eloquence, and therefore of philosophy, and secondly, his ethical belief in moderation which reflects the Aristotelian doctrine of the Golden Mean and ‘explains’ (rather than merely illustrates) both John’s preference for probable as opposed to demonstrative logic and his attack on the contemporary educational values exemplified by the Cornificans, which are characterised by the opposite quality, nimiety – pursuing the extremes of excess or deficiency.181 Thus John’s work came to be seen as having an intellectual coherence, with his philosophy, his educational and pedagogical views and his understanding of practical ethics grounded in a genuine humanism. Cary Nederman has perhaps done more than any other scholar to advance such a view of John. Nederman has argued that the educational theory and the ‘entire project’ of the Metalogicon were founded on two critical Aristotelian principles: firstly, John’s theory of the acquisition of knowledge, which derives from Aristotle’s conception of knowledge as hexis and which explains his pedagogical ideas, including his belief in the value of rigorous training; secondly, the ethical principle of the Golden Mean, which is also in many ways the leitmotif of all of John’s works, which underpins his educational theory and his philosophical outlook – that is his scepticism and his belief

180  Von Moos, Geschichte als Topic, esp. p.  266-85 (some of these ideas had been published in abbreviated form four years earlier: id., ‘The Use of Exempla in the Policraticus of John of Salisbury’, in WJS, p. 207-261). 181  Keats-Rohan, ‘John of Salisbury and Education’, p. 1-6 (the Cornificians are excessive in their pursuit of pure logic, deficient in their study of grammar).

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in probable as opposed to demonstrative logic.182 This mutual relationship between abstract philosophy and practical ethics explains his educational theory but also gives a unity of purpose to all of his works, and it is the Metalogicon which is the key to understanding the philosophical and ethical principles underpinning John’s work as a whole, especially the Policraticus. As for John’s actual treatment of logic in the Metalogicon, his ‘exceptionally vast knowledge of Aristotle placed him on the cutting edge of contemporary scholarship’.183 Thus a number of scholars have contributed to a view of the Metalogicon as the work of a consummate humanist and as part of a coherent intellectual endeavour in which a genuine and original synthesis of Aristotelian logical principles, Ciceronian scepticism, and Augustinian and other Christian thought underlies a set of philosophical, educational and political ideals which are guided by coherent intellectual and ethical principles and which is part of a humanist project or outlook. An important part of this tradition, looking beyond the Metalogicon itself, has been the study of John’s life and career as exemplary of his philosophical and ethical ideals, taking this unity of thought and action to be in part definitive of his humanism.184 Subsequently a growing number of important and detailed analyses of particular aspects of John’s See C. J. Nederman, ‘Knowledge, Virtue and the Path to Wisdom: The unexamined Aristotelianism of John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon’, Mediaeval Studies, 51 (1989), p. 268-86 (‘entire project’ at p. 274), which argues that both the concept of hexis and the principle of the Golden Mean, which are fully expounded only in works unknown in the twelfth century, were derived from the Organon and intermediate sources; this also forms part of Nederman’s wider conception of a dual Aristotelian tradition (logical and ethical) in the Middle Ages. 183  Nederman, ‘Knowledge, Virtue and the Path to Wisdom’, p. 269; Nederman has also published extensively on Aristoteliansm in John of Salisbury’s other works and on John’s thought and intellectual influences more generally: see also id., ‘Nature, Sin and the Origins of Society’; the collected papers in id., Medieval Aristotelianism and Its Limits: Classical Traditions in Moral and Political Philosophy, 12th -15th Centuries, (Variorum Collected Studies, CS565), Ashgate, 1997, and the references in id. John of Salisbury, p. 88-95. 184  Notable examples include Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism, Guth, Johannes von Salisbury, J. McLoughlin, ‘John of Salisbury (c.  1120-1180): The Career and Attitudes of a Schoolman in Church Politics’, PhD diss., University College Dublin, 1988, and Nederman, John of Salisbury. 182 

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thought and philosophy have contributed to an increasingly nuanced and complex intellectual portrait of him as a philosopher and a humanist. The work of both Peter von Moos, on John’s use of historical exempla, and Janet Martin, on his choice and use of his sources, have challenged established views of John as a humanist and classicist and have contributed to the ongoing debate on the nature of medieval humanism.185 Charles Burnett has examined John’s connections with the groups of translators working on the newly discovered Aristotelian texts, suggesting that it is this milieu of courtly patronage and practical work, not that of the schools, which formed John’s outlook.186 John’s philosophical methods and ideas have come under closer scrutiny, with, for example, Stefan Seit’s study of indifference theory in the Metalogicon, and more work on John’s Academic scepticism and his use of Cicero.187 But perhaps the most fundamental reinterpretation is Von Moos, Geschichte als Topik, which examined John’s treatment of exempla as discrete narrative units susceptible to rational analysis and the ways in which they function in his construction of arguments, counters older views of medieval historiography making simplistically illustrative use of exempla but also demonstrates a conception of history fundamentally different from that of Renaissance historiography; Martin’s studies of John’s choice and treatment of his sources, his use of excerpts and florilegia, and his alterations to and invention of sources, challenged traditional views of his classical scholarship: see J. Martin, ‘John of Salisbury and the Classics’, Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1968, and ead., ‘John of Salisbury as Classical Scholar’, in WJS, p. 179-201 (also referencing her earlier publications). 186  Burnett, ‘John of Salisbury and Aristotle’. 187  S. Seit, ‘Die Orientierung des Denkens in der Unvermeidlichkeit der Sprache. Johannes’ von Salisbury ratio indifferentiae’, in Prudentia und Contemplatio: Ethik und Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Festschrift für Georg Wieland zum 65. Geburtstag – ed. J. Brachtendorf, Paderborn, 2002; Á. Escobar, ‘Duce natura … Reflexiones en torno a la recepción medieval de Cicerón a la luz de Juan de Salisbury’, in Convenit Selecta, 7. Cicero and the Middle Ages – ed. A. Fidora, J. P. Pastor, Frankfort a.M. – Barcelona, 2001, p. 15-26; Grellard, ‘Jean de Salisbury. Un cas médiéval de scepticisme’; L. Schébat, ‘Jean de Salisbury et Pétrarque: aspects et enjeux de leur jugement sur Cicéron’, Les cahiers de l’ humanisme, 3-4 (2003-4), p. 93-113; C. J. Nederman, ‘Beyond Stoicism and Aristotelianism: John of Salisbury’s Skepticism and Twelfth-Century Moral Philosophy’, in Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century – ed. I. P. Bejczy, R. G. Newhauser, Leiden, 2005, p. 175-195; Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 86-91, with particular reference to the Metalogicon but also referencing the wider literature on John and Cicero. 185 

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that of David Bloch, who argues that John’s presentation of the Organon, and specifically of the Analytica posteriora, is evidence that John possibly did not know the text of the Analytica posteriora and certainly did not understand it, and that it is this which explains why he regards it, and the concept of demonstrative logic (which is central to Aristotelian logic), as of very limited application, and why he presents the Topica as the greatest book of the Organon. Furthermore, the ideas about probable logic that John does expound were, Bloch argues, available from other sources and well-known, while demonstration was new and not fully understood. Thus John’s presentation reflects not an avant-garde or even original understanding of Aristotle but an out-of-date view reflecting the time of John’s own education when the Analytica posteriora had not been understood and interpreted sufficiently for it to be integrated into Western systems of logic; by contrast, by the time John was writing, contemporaries were engaged with the Analytica posteriora. Bloch thus questions not only John’s originality as a thinker but also his competence as a logician, offering thereby a notable alternative to the various views of John as producing a magisterial and original synthesis of Aristotelianism with scepticism and with Christian views on the limits of human knowledge.188 Thus our intellectual portrait of John of Salisbury, our appreciation of the aims and content of the Metalogicon, and our assessment of its value as historical evidence continue to develop and change with a still-growing body of scholarship, of which there has only been space here to note a selection of recent contributions.

ii. The Metalogicon and the history of education John of Salisbury was an eye witness to a critical formative period of the Paris schools, and the Metalogicon, as we have seen, 188  Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, esp. p. 83-186; see also Jacobi’s examination of the prevalent currents of thought in the schools which presents a reconstruction and positive evaluation of the tendencies criticised by John as ‘Cornifician’: Jacobi, ‘Logic (ii): The Later Twelfth century’.

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sheds some light on their institutional and educational developments.189 John also gives accounts of Paris masters, mostly his own teachers, in two passages (i.5 and ii.10), as well as a well-known account of the teaching of Bernard of Chartres (i.24), and these have been used in reconstructions of the personnel and the curriculum of the early schools, as well as giving rise to the famous debates over the ‘school of Chartres’ and its purported status as a rival intellectual centre to Paris in the early twelfth century.190 John’s accounts have also contributed to the study of intellectual and scholarly networks.191 His account of the Cornificians also offers some evidence of intellectual trends and of the sorts of careers which those educated at Paris could hope to pursue, although its invective nature makes this hard to evaluate. There have been a number of attempts to identify ‘Cornificius’ with an individual and the ‘Cornificians’ with a school. Whoever or whatever he was intended to represent, John’s text evidences two concerns – prejudice against academic learning from the outside, which he had 189  Ferruolo argued that the expansion in the numbers of schools and of masters active in the first half of the twelfth century ‘secured the educational preeminence of Paris and was the essential precondition for the eventual organization and development of a university,’ whose ‘formative years’ were from the 1150s to the early thirteenth century (Ferruolo, The Origins of the University, p. 24-5, 279); Wei sees the schools of the first half of the century, in institutional and curricular terms, as ‘essentially chaotic’, but, more cautiously, identifies key features of the twelfth-century schools which took on growing importance in the second half of the century and were to prove decisive in the emergence of stable institutions of learning (Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, p. 47, 50). Rashdall, The Universities, i, p. 66-67, had already noted the evidence of the Metalogicon for the lack of a rigid curriculum in the early twelfth century; see also W. W. Dickerson III, ‘Ethics and the seven liberal arts: another look at the liberal arts curriculum of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’, Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association, 16-17 (1996), p. 71-90; I have not yet seen E. Seward, ‘Unity through diversity: The educational model of the seven liberal arts in the twelfth century (Martianus Capella, Hugh of Saint-Victor, John of Salisbury, Bishop of Chartres, Boethius)’, PhD diss., Claremont Graduate University, 2005. 190  See e.g. Rashdall, The Universities, i, p.  66-72, 288-9; Ferruolo, The Origins of the University, p. 22-23; Riché, ‘Jean de Salisbury et le monde scolaire’; Southern, Scholastic Humanism i., p. 214-21, 230-3; Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, p. 16-17; on the ‘school of Chartres’, see above, n. 94. 191  See especially Guth, Johannes von Salisbury; Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p. 71, 89-90.

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encountered as a courtier, and which he mentions in the Prologue, and the promulgation of useless learning within, epitomised by ‘Cornificius’, whereby logic is used not to solve practical questions of use to society but is turned in on itself and used only to examine questions internal to the study of logic itself – so he may have been inspired by more widespread attitudes as much as by any individual scholar or school; indeed, ‘Cornificus’ has also been read as a composite figure.192 Finally, as discussed above, the Metalogicon provides critical, but again difficult, evidence for the timing of the reception of Latin translations of the Organon in the West.193 The Metalogicon is also notable among educational writings of its time for its interest in teaching methods. There was a long tradition in the medieval West of educational writing, but this was mostly intended to transmit and preserve the learning of antiquity and took the form primarily of either schemata of knowledge, setting out the relationships and divisions between all the different areas of learning, or compendia, offering convenient selections of the most important texts. Although the former were concerned with the order in which subjects should be learned, and the latter had obvious practical benefits for students, they were not otherwise concerned with teaching methods or the process of learning.194 The most famous example from the generation preceding John’s, Hugh of Saint-Victor’s Didascalicon, is more devotional than controversial or educational in tone, stressing the spiritual benefits of learning, and is in many respects similar to the common genre of ascent literature, guiding the soul in the pursuit of 192  See J. O. Ward, ‘The Date of the Commentary on Cicero’s “De Inventione” by Thierry of Chartres (ca. 1095-1160?) and the Cornifician Attack on the Liberal Arts’, Viator, 3 (1972), p. 219-73; Riché, ‘Jean de Salisbury et le monde scolaire’, p. 47-54; R. B. Tobin, ‘The Cornifician motif in John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon’, History of Education, 13 (1984), p.  1-6; Tacchella, ‘Giovanni di Salisbury e i Cornificiani’; Nederman, John of Salisbury, p.  65-8; Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 191-205; for a positive appraisal of the tendencies which John criticises as ‘Cornifician’, see Jacobi, ‘Logic (ii): The Later Twelfth century’. 193  See above, s. 4. ii and n. 135. 194  On schemata and compendia, see M. Gibson, ‘The Artes in the Eleventh Century’, in ead. ‘Artes’ and Bible, item I (paginated 121-6); on education more generally, see above, s. 4.i.

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perfection. It is also addressed primarily to the learner. The Metalogicon is different in two respects: firstly it is an argument for a specific approach to logic not a schematic overview, and secondly it is concerned with the aims of education and with pedagogy, and is directed as much to teachers as students.195 The Metalogicon does of course set out a programme of learning for logic, explaining the order in which the Organon is to be taught, but this is not simply a presentation of the ideal sequence of the acquisition of knowledge by a model student in the manner of the medieval schemata. There is also an appreciation of the process of learning itself.196 The Organon is presented from a pedagogical perspective, the first books, the Categoriae and De Interpretatione, being seen as preliminary stages to the full exposition of the art of logic in the Topica (iii.2-6).197 This approach is also evident in John’s treatment of Porphyry. While the Isagoge is by no means to be taken as an authority on logic it is nevertheless a valuable educational tool the purpose of which is to accustom young and untrained minds to the discipline of logic in a simplified form (iii.1, cf. ii.19). Good teaching, for John, means introducing ideas first in a simple form before moving on to more complex formulations (iii.1). More strikingly, the very verbosity, obscurity and use of logic to study problems interior to logical theory which is denounced so vehemently throughout the treatise is permitted to new learners as a useful exercise for the immature, a form of mental training in logical argument, provided that one remembers that such verbosity is an excess which must be purged off in 195  In his introduction to the English translation J. Taylor draws attention to controversial points made by implication in parts of the Didascalicon (The Didascalicon – transl. Taylor, pp. 7-28); in the Metalogicon the argument is explicit and determines the form of the work. 196  An interest in pedagogy was part of the ancient tradition of educational writing, and John drew here especially on Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria (c. AD 95); the later grammarians Donatus (C.4) and Priscian (C.6) were the other main influences on the medieval West; the medieval encyclopaedic tradition derived from Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae (C.5) and Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae (C.7). 197  See also above, synopsis to Book iii. and n. 158; cf. Jacobi, ‘Logic (ii): The Later Twelfth century’, p. 229 and n.18.

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more mature minds (iv.28-9). In other words, this is not a simple progression along the stepping stones of knowledge, adding subject to subject, but rather shows an understanding of the psychology of young minds.198 John is also concerned with practical teaching techniques, primarily in his description of the teaching of Bernard of Chartres and his followers (i.24).199 Here he advocates a method based on the basic principles of careful selection, repetition and memorisation. The teacher should introduce texts selectively, only bringing out uncomplicated aspects of them at first, and also breaking them down to show how they illustrate the different disciplines. The student should come to know the texts intimately through imitation and repetition, with daily programmes of exercises in composition, involving the imitation of set texts, and memory. Finally he introduces a number of minor points, like the injunction not to make the pupils laugh when dissecting texts for analysis, and stresses the ethical context of good teaching, in which the evening lecture (the declinatio) takes on the characteristics of the more contemplative monastic colloquium (the collatio).200 Above all the key is to fit the learning to the capacity (capacitas) of the learner.201 As we have seen, many scholars have understood John’s philosophy of education as integrally linked to his theory of knowledge in various ways, but some have also paid attention specifically to John’s ideas about pedagogy and educational practice.202 Daniel McGarry offered one of the first detailed discussions of John’s educational ideas, examining his sources, the relationship between his pedagogical ideas and his broader philosophy of education and theory of knowledge, and the teaching methods he One might note here also John’s distinction between lecturing, which involves communication between teacher and pupil, and reading in isolation (i.24). 199  John could not have known Bernard of Chartres, who taught at Chartres from 1114 and was chancellor there between 1119 and 1124, and who died before John arrived in France; on Bernard, see Southern, Scholastic Humanism i., p. 80-82. 200  On declinatio and collatio, see Teeuwen, The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life. 201  This is also counterpointed by his critical comments and parodies on poor teaching and false teachers (see i. 3, 4, 5, 8; ii. 6). 202  See above, s. 5.i. 198 

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advocates, drawing comparisons with modern pedagogical agendas.203 Brian Hendley has engaged with the same debate, although with perhaps more emphasis on the philosophical roots of John’s educational theory.204 Stephen Ferruolo saw the Metalogicon as primarily a pedagogical work, concerned to set out a blueprint for an educational system of real practical utility whose end was to provide an ethical training for those going into political life, and thus to serve the needs of society. This vision was set out in Policraticus vii, and in some sense Ferruolo almost seems to regard the Metalogicon as a practical counterpart to the Policraticus, describing the syllabus and pedagogical methods necessary to realise this vision.205 From such a perspective, John’s interest in the Organon could be construed as being more pedagogical than philosophical: it was its pedagogical utility that made it pre-eminent. Katharine Keats-Rohan argued that the ‘primary aim’ of the Metalogicon was to offer ‘a critique of the educational framework’ of the time, and, as we have seen, read the account of John’s education in Metalogicon ii.10 as a ‘cautionary tale’ of his falling victim to the attractions of superficially brilliant learning only to return to a more rigorous course of study.206 David Bloch sees John primarily as a utilitarian and competent teacher of the basics rather than a scholar engaged with advanced logic, which might again lead the reader to infer that his interest in the Organon was pedagogical rather than philosophical.207 Catherine Brown examined the Metalogicon in the context of a tension in medieval pedagogy more broadly between Augustinian exegesis, in which diverse opinions could be held to be true simultaneously, and Aristotelian dialectic, in which contradictory ideas had to be resolved one way McGarry, ‘Educational Theory in the Metalogicon of John of Salisbury’; McGarry sees in the Metalogicon expositions of what would now be recognised as ‘cognitive psychology’ and ‘student-centered learning’ (p. 667, 672-73). 204  See especially Hendley, ‘Wisdom and Eloquence’; id., ‘John of Salisbury’s Defense of the Trivium’, and id., ‘A New Look at John of Salisbury’s Educational Theory’, with a critique of McGarry’s ideas. 205  Ferruolo, Origins of the University, p. 135-56. 206  Keats-Rohan, ‘John of Salisbury and Education’, here p.  1, 6; see also above, s. 2.i. 207  Bloch, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science, p. 12-19. 203 

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or the other, concluding of John that he occupied an ambiguous or compromise position.208 Brian FitzGerald, more recently, has continued the evaluation of the Metalogicon in the context of the longer history of educational theory.209 Meanwhile, the Metalogicon has also been studied for the light it sheds more broadly on the culture of education and learning.210 Educational theory and teaching methods take up only a small part of the text of the Metalogicon yet they are integral to its arguments and to John’s view of the ethical purposes and social utility of good education. The treatise can therefore reasonably be regarded as having an important, if not necessarily a seminal, place in the tradition of pedagogical and educational thought in the West, as the Policraticus unquestionably has for political thought.211 Questions of the ethical and practical utility of education such as those broached by John have not appealed to modern academics perhaps as much as the study of the institutional history of the universities or the history of ideas. This may be in part because lecturers work in professional environments where the value of learning is accepted as self-evident, and in part because questioning the utility of that education is associated with their own experience of governmental attempts to control and regulate the profession. The social and economic value of education is however a perenC. Brown, Contrary Things: Exegesis, Dialectic, and the Poetics of Didacticism, Stanford, 1998; on the Augustinian exegetical dictum ‘diversi sed non adversi’ (‘they are different but not opposed’) see also e.g. J. de Ghellinck, Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle, Bruges, 1948, p. 472-99, 517-23; H. Silvestre, ‘Diversi sed non adversi’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 31 (1964), p. 124-32. 209  B.  D. FitzGerald, ‘Medieval theories of education: Hugh of St Victor and John of Salisbury’, Oxford Review of Education, 36 (2010), p. 575-88 – in a special issue of the Review focusing on political and philosophical theories of education from Plato to the late nineteenth century. 210  See especially P. Godman, ‘Opus consummatum, omnium artium … imago: From Bernard of Chartres to John of Hauvilla’, Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur, 124 (1995), p. 26-71; J. D. Cotts, ‘Monks and Clerks in Search of the Beata Schola: Peter of Celle’s Warning to John of Salisbury Reconsidered’, in Teaching and Learning in Northern Europe 1100-1200 – ed. S. Vaughn, J. Rubinstein (Studies in the Early Middle Ages, 8), Turnhout, 2006, p. 255-77. 211  On the Metalogicon’s possibly limited transmission in the Middle Ages, see above, s. 3 and nn. 121 and 122. 208 

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nial political debate. In the early twenty-first century, for example, most higher education systems in economically developed nations are confronting the development of systems designed to evaluate statistically the economic impact of academic research.212 There is also a wider literature on the role of the university, although this is generally developed without much historical perspective.213 John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon is the work of a committed defender of the values of education who was also a historian and a diplomat and administrator of wide practical experience and for whom rigorous education and the needs of government were integral to his view of society and political ethics. This makes the Metalogicon part of an important tradition of educational thought, a tradition which includes Rousseau’s Émile and Newman’s The Idea of a University and which, since the days of the young men of John’s generation coming to Paris to seek out the new opportunities of a university education, has promoted a vision of education working for the self-fulfilment of the individual and for the good of society. The increasing realisation of this vision in the extension over the centuries of a broad education to ever greater numbers of men and women has been one of the triumphs of civilisation. Julian Haseldine University of Hull

212  In the UK, for example, the Arts and Humanities Research Council has published, in response to government demands, defences of the economic impact of research in the arts and humanities (see Leading the World. The economic impact of UK arts and humanities research, Arts and Humanities Research Council, at http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/About/Policy/Documents/leadingtheworld.pdf, last accessed 08/06/12) and while the political considerations driving the modern agendas are different from the concerns of John of Salisbury, or of Rousseau or Newman, they are reflective of a current form of the perennial interaction between educational institutions and government. 213  For an example of an academic contribution to the debate on the utility of higher education see G. Graham, Universities: The recovery of an idea, Thorverton, 2002.

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1. Abbreviations Hist.Pont.

Letters

Metalogicon

Policraticus

WJS

Ioannis Saresberiensis Historia Pontificalis. John of Salisbury’s Memoirs of the Papal Court – ed. M. Chibnall (Nelson’s Medieval Texts), Edinburgh, 1956 – repr. (Oxford Medieval Texts), Oxford, 1986. The Letters of John of Salisbury, vol. 1 The Early Letters (1153-1161) – ed. W. J. Millor, H. E. Butler, C. N. L. Brooke (Nelson’s Medieval Texts), Edinburgh, 1955 – re-issued with corrigenda (Oxford Medieval Texts), Oxford, 1986; vol. 2, The Later Letters (1163-1180) – ed. W. J. Millor, C. N. L. Brooke (Oxford Medieval Texts), Oxford, 1979. Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon – ed. J. B. Hall auxiliata K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, 98), Turnhout, 1991. Policraticus siue de nugis curialium et uestigiis philosophorum – ed. C. C. J. Webb, 2 vols., Oxford, 1909; for Books i-iv, see Ioannis Saresberiensis Policraticus – ed. K.  S.  B. Keats-Rohan (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, 118), Turnhout, 1993. The World of John of Salisbury – ed. M. Wilks (Studies in Church History Subsidia, 3), Oxford, 1984 – repr. 1994 with additional bibliography.

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2.  Select bibliography This bibliography lists modern literature on John, and particularly on the Metalogicon, which we feel will be useful to the general reader. Before proceeding to it, however, we need to say a word or two about the sources which John himself draws on. For the classical authors presumed to have been on John’s reading-list we give no details of printed editions, but leave our readers to consult whichever one they have to hand; John after all was not using a printed edition. For the Bible we presume John used some precursor of what would become the Latin vulgate; JBH normally has the King James version at the back, or the forefront, of his mind. For late and medieval authors we continue to give references to J.-P. Migne’s Patrologia Latina, although we are aware that for many of the texts in question there are modern editions available: the knowledgeable will have found their way to Aristoteles Latinus, for which we chiefly have to thank the indefatigable L. Minio-Paluello, and Corpus Christianorum has already included many relevant authors in its series. The volume entitled Clavis Patrum Latinorum, now in a third edition (Steenbrugis 1995), lists editions of authors from Tertullian to Bede.

i. Editions of John of Salisbury’s works Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum (or maior), and Entheticus ad Policraticum (minor): John of Salisbury’s Entheticus Maior and Minor – ed. J. van Laarhoven, 3 vols (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelaters 17), Leiden, 1987.214 Historia Pontificalis: Ioannis Saresberiensis Historia Pontificalis. John of Salisbury’s Memoirs of the Papal Court – ed. and trans. M. Chibnall (Nelson’s Medieval Texts), Edinburgh, 1956 – re-issued (Oxford Medieval Texts), Oxford, 1986. 214  With English and Dutch translations; see vol. i., p. 35-47 for a discussion of the previous modern editions of the Entheticus maior, including five twentiethcentury editions made as part of dissertations for higher degrees and of which only one is published – R. E. Pepin, ‘The Entheticus of John of Salisbury: A Critical Text’, Traditio 31 (1975), p. 127-93.

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Letters: The Letters of John of Salisbury, vol. 1 The Early Letters (1153-1161) – ed. W.  J. Millor, H.  E. Butler, C.  N.  L. Brooke (Nelson’s Medieval Texts), Edinburgh, 1955, re-issued (Oxford Medieval Texts), Oxford, 1986; vol. 2, The Later Letters (1163-1180) – ed. W. J. Millor, C. N. L. Brooke (Oxford Medieval Texts), OUP, Oxford, 1979.215 Metalogicon: Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon – ed. J. B. Hall, auxiliata K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, 98), Turnhout, 1991. Policraticus: Policraticus siue de nugis curialium et uestigiis philosophorum – ed. C. C. J. Webb, 2 vols., Oxford, 1909; for books i-iv, see Ioannis Saresberiensis Policraticus – ed. K.  S.  B. Keats-Rohan (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, 118), Turnhout, 1993. A new edition of Policraticus books v-viii by J.  B. Hall is in preparation for Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis.216 Vita Sancti Anselmi: Joannis Saresberiensis postea Episcopi Carnotensis, Opera Omnia – ed. J. A. Giles, 5 vols., Oxford, 1848, vol v., p. 305-357; now see also Anselmo e Becket, due vite – ed. I. Biffi, Milan, 1990. Vita Sancti Thomae Becket: Materials for the History of Thomas Becket – ed. J. C. Robertson (Rolls Series, 67), London, 1875-85, vol. 2, p. 301-22; now see also Anselmo e Becket, due vite – ed. Biffi.217

ii. Bibliographies on John of Salisbury, in order of publication Hohenleutner, H., ‘Johannes von Salisbury in der Literatur der letzten zehn Jahren’, Historisches Jahrbuch, 77 (1958), p. 493-500, covering publications between 1948 and 1958. 215  The accompanying English translation in vol. i was begun by H. E. Butler and completed and revised by C. N. L. Brooke, who also translated the letters in vol. ii. 216  For a select English translation, see John of Salisbury, Policraticus: Of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers – ed. and trans. C. J. Nederman (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought), Cambridge, 1990. 217  For English translations of both Lives, see R. E. Pepin transl., Anselm and Becket: Two Canterbury Saints’ Lives by John of Salisbury, PIMS Medieval Sources in Translation 46, (Toronto, 2009), using Vita di sant’Anselmo d’Aosta, ed. I. Biffi (Milan, 1988) – a text based on Giles – for the Vita S. Anselmi and Robertson for the Vita S. Thomae Becket; see now also Vite di Anselmo d’Aosta, ed. and transl. I. Biffi, A. Granata, S. Malaspina, C. Marabelli and A. Tombolini (Milan, 2010), with Italian transl.

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Bibliography

Luscombe, D. E., ‘John of Salisbury in Recent Scholarship’, in The World of John of Salisbury – ed. M. Wilks (Studies in Church History Subsidia, 3), Oxford, 1984, repr. 1994, p. 21-37, with a bibliography covering publications between 1953 and 1982 at p. 445-7. Wilks, M., ‘Additional Note’, in The World of John of Salisbury – ed. M. Wilks (Studies in Church History Subsidia, 3), Oxford, 1984, repr. 1994, p. 457-8 in the 1994 reprint, covering publications between 1984 and 1994. Nederman, C. J., John of Salisbury (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 288), Tempe, AZ, 2005, p. 87-95. Bloch, D., John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science (Disputatio, 8), Turnhout, 2012, which includes an extensive bibliography.

iii.  Select secondary literature with particular attention to the Metalogicon Arduini, M.  L., ‘“Sola Ratione” in Giovanni di Salisbury’, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica, 89 (1997), p. 229-66. Barker, L.  K., ‘MS Bodl. Canon. Pat. Lat. 131 and a lost Lactantius of John of Salisbury: Evidence in Search of a French Critic of Thomas Becket’, Albion, 22 (1990), p. 21-37. Barlow, F., ‘John of Salisbury and His Brothers’, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 46 (1995), p. 95-109. Bellenguez, P., Un philosophe académicien du XIIe siècle: Jean de Salisbury, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée, Aire-sur-la-Lys, 1926. Berndt, R., ‘Das “consilium unicum” im Mittelalter. Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Skizze’, in Institution und Charisma: Festschrift für Gert Melville zum 65. Geburtstag – ed. F. J. Felten, A. Kehnel, S. Weinfurter, Cologne, 2009, p. 365-376. Bloch, D., ‘James of Venice and the Posterior Analytics’, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-âge Grec et Latin, 78 (2008), p. 37-50. —, ‘John of Salisbury, The Quadrivium and Demonstrative Science’, Classica et Mediaevalia, 60 (2009), p. 335-45. —, John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science (Disputatio, 8), Turnhout, 2012.

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Brown, C., Contrary Things: Exegesis, Dialectic, and the Poetics of Didacticism, Stanford, 1998. Burnett, C., ‘The Contents and Affiliation of the Scientific Manuscripts Written at, or Brought to, Chartres in the Time of John of Salisbury’, in The World of John of Salisbury – ed. M. Wilks (Studies in Church History Subsidia, 3), Oxford, 1984, repr. Oxford, 1994, p. 127-60. —, ‘John of Salisbury and Aristotle’, Didascalia, 2 (1996), p. 19-32. Cady, D., ‘Symbolic economies’, in Middle English – ed. P. Strohm (Oxford Twenty-First Century Approaches to Literature, 1), Oxford, 2007, p. 124-141. Constable, G., ‘The Alleged Disgrace of John of Salisbury in 1159’, English Historical Review, 69 (1954), p. 67-76. Cotts, J. D., ‘Monks and Clerks in Search of the Beata Schola: Peter of Celle’s Warning to John of Salisbury Reconsidered’, in Teaching and Learning in Northern Europe 1100-1200 – ed. S. Vaughn, J. Rubinstein, Turnhout, 2006, p. 255-77. Dafonte, C. R., Juan de Salisbury, Madrid, 1999. —, ‘Conocimiento y verdad en Juan de Salisbury’, in Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale, II. Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval: Actes du XIe congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002 – ed. M. C. Pacheco, J. F. Meirinhos (SIEPM: Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale, 11:2), Turnhout, 2006, p. 1053-1062. Dal Pra, M., Giovanni di Salisbury (Storia Universale della Filosofia, 3), Milan, 1951. Dickerson, W. W., III, ‘Ethics and the seven liberal arts: another look at the liberal arts curriculum of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’, Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association, 16-17 (1996), p. 71-90. Diez, M. B., ‘Tres clases de logica en Juan de Salisbury’, in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, – ed. J.  P. Beckmann, L. Honnefelder, G. Jüssen, W. Kluxen, B. Münxelhaus, G. Schrimpf, G. Wieland (Miscellanea Mediaevalis, 13.1), Berlin, 1981, p. 357-67.

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Dotto, G., ‘Logica ed etica in Giovanni de Salisbury’, Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Università di Perugia, 18 (1980), p. 7-33. —, Giovanni di Salisbury: La filosofia come sapienza, Assisi, 1986. Drew, A., ‘Language and Logic in John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon’, PhD diss., Cambridge, 1986. Dronke, P., ed., A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, Cambridge, 1988. Duggan, A., ‘John of Salisbury and Thomas Becket’, in The World of John of Salisbury, – ed. M. Wilks (Studies in Church History Subsidia, 3), Oxford, 1984, 1994, p. 427-38. Escobar, Á., ‘Duce natura … Reflexiones en torno a la recepción medieval de Cicerón a la luz de Juan de Salisbury’, in Cicero and the Middle Ages – ed. A. Fidora, J. P. Pastor (Convenit Selecta, 7), Frankfort a.M. – Barcelona, 2001, p. 15-26. Evans, G.  R., ‘John of Salisbury and Boethius on Arithmetic’, in The World of John of Sali 42. That visible proofs show that the world is subject to vanity and what the reason was for ending the book here

118

Prologue

IN THE AFFAIRS of men there is practically nothing, I believe, which is so perfected as not in some degree to be exposed to disparagement, since bad things are deservedly criticised, while good things are criticised out of envy.a In consequence I have resolved to bear the darts of my detractors as patiently as possible, especially since our parent nature, in accordance with God’s disposition, has brought us forth at such a time and in such a place and stationed us in the ranks of contemporaries so circumstanced that they prefer rather to carp at the actions of others than to take thought for their own, and put them in order or amend them. Just so, no one tries to probe within himself, no one, but he looks fixedly at the luggage on the back of the man who goes before him.b I might indeed in one way or another have evaded in silence the carping of schoolmen and those who profess the name of philosophy, but I could absolutely not avoid the teeth of my fellow-courtiers. To be obliging to all and harm no one used once to redound to a man’s credit, so that in the words of the comic writer one would without cause for envy find praise and friends well suited to one.c But nowadays even by doing this one rarely succeeds in quelling the hostility of one’s comrades in arms. The habit of being obliging is branded with the stigma of fawning, and Ovid, Epistulae ex Ponto 3.4.74 Persius 4.23, 24 c  Terence, Andria 62ff. and especially 66; 68 is quoted by Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2.2.13, then by Isidore, Etymologiae 2.9.11; see also p. 192 below. a 

b 

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harmlessness is regarded as a profession of impotence. The silent man is accused of lack of education, while the fluent speaker is grouped with the chatterboxes. The serious man is said to be lying in ambush, the less serious, because of his levity, is censured as a fool. One who pursues moderation in word and deed is regarded as eager for power. In fine, even if there is no quarrelling, it is scarcely possible for there to be no envy at court.a If, however, I had spent my whole life among my comrades in arms in dicing and hunting and the other idle pastimes of courtiers, they would by no means carp at my writings, precisely as I do not censure theirs. But yet it is of little consequence to me that my writing be judgedb by those who set great store by the judgement of mime-actors and players and who, like the most abject of slaves, are fearful lest Thais or Thraso,c Callirhoe or Bathyllusd should speak or think ill of them. If, however, those who profess philosophy hound one who is a friend of those who philosophise , they plainly do wrong, and make me an ill return for my friendly disposition. For even if I cannot imitate them, I am at all events resolved to bestow on them my affection, honour and respect. With the schoolmen I ought to have won favour already, for what they are or what they were I defend with all the advocacy at my command. If this proves a serviceable action on my part, I am entitled to thanks and recompense for the result: otherwise, if it does not, for my good intentions. Hence the epigram. You have achieved nothing, you say to me, and you have lost my case. You owe me all the more, Sextus, because I blushed.e I do not exclude better qualified champions from carrying out this service, but proclaim the warmth of my own devotion. Let those with superior gifts apply the finishing touches, and sway the judge in his official capacity to bring in a verdict for the logicians. For it was when their activities were being scathingly derided as futile, and my rival with almost daily abuse was challenging me in my modest reluctance, that I Policraticus 1.4ff. I Corinthians 4.3 c  Characters in Terence’s Eunuchus d  Persius 1.134 and 5.123 with the scholiast (Jahn 278 and 334); Juvenal 6.63 e  Martial 8.17.3-4 a 

b 

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finally took up the issue and determined to reply to the calumnies which he had manufactured, in the order in which they came to light. The consequence has been that I have been obliged to follow the order in which he pressed his charges, and in general to say nothing about more important matters until his objections were removed. For it was he who was at pains to make the points concerning which he intended the discourse to advance. My associates accordingly decided that I should dictate this particular reply without premeditation,a since there was neither the time nor the inclination to examine his views in detail or to polish the wording of my utterance. For I was scarcely able to spare from my necessary occupations more than the time allotted to refreshment and sleep, since at the command of my lord, whom I cannot fail, there devolves upon me the responsibility for ecclesiastical cases throughout the whole of Britain. In addition, responsibility for the management of the household, and the trifling avocations of the court, excluded study. Almost all of my attention was taken up by interruptions from friends. I think it right therefore that I should more readily be accorded indulgent understanding in the matter of this extempore statement. If there be anything expressed at all appropriately, let thanks be given to Him without whom man’s frailty can do nothing.b For my wits are too slow, and my memory too unreliable, for me to be able to take in the subtleties of the ancients or to retain for any length of time what I once took in. That my utterance is unpolished is proved by its very style. As it has undertaken the defence of logic, my book is entitled Metalogicon and, for the relief of the reader, I have taken the trouble to divide it into four books. As writers are wont to do, I have included a variety of matters, which each man will approve or disapprove at his discretion. What you read here is some of it good, some of it mediocre, but much of it bad: there is no other way, Avitus, in which a book is made.c So Martial, and so myself also, since I prefer to while away my time in this fashion rather Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 10.7.12-13 John 15.5 c  Martial 1.16

a 

b 

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than to hunt hares like Ganymede,a or stink of wine by night and by day.b Nor have I disdained to set forth the views of our modern scholars, whom in very many particulars I have no hesitation in preferring to the ancients. I hope indeed that the glory of those now alive will be honoured by posterity, since the noble intelligence, exact investigations, diligent study, wonderful memory, fruitful thought, command of expression and abundance of words which many of them display is a source of wonder to me. I have deliberately included a number of comments on moral issues, since my view is that everything which is read or written is valueless except in so far as it affords some support to the way we live. Any profession of philosophy whatsoever is valueless and deceitful if it does not manifest itself in the cultivation of virtue and the conduct of our lives. An Academic in matters which to the wise man are doubtful,c I do not swear that what I say is true but, be it true or false, I remain content with probability alone. You, as you please, may evaluate the whole and its parts, for I have consecrated you as judge of my writings, until I know that my outlay of effort is not wasted. Should this however prove to be the case, though I pray it may not, I shall, if this Alexis spurns me,d find another one and give preference over the philosopher to the first actor who appears. So that you may be more fully informed about my thinking, there are three things which are not only a source of apprehension to me, but which endanger the salvation or jeopardise the merits of most writers. They are ignorance of what is true, a misleading or impudent assertion of what is false, and an arrogant claim to know the truth. I know who it was who said: It is safer to hear the truth than to utter it.e For in hearing, humility is safeguarded, but in speaking, vainglory very often steals in. In all these matters I am aware of my error, for I labour under ignorance of the facts, I champion what is false on more occasions and to a greater extent Theodulus, Ecloga 78; Policraticus 1.4 Horace, Epistulae 1.19.11 c  See also pp. 225, 294 and 324 below; also Policraticus 7.2 d  Virgil, Eclogues 2.73 e  Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus 57.2 (Migne, PL 35.1790) a 

b 

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than I should, and for the most part, until such time as God rebuke and correct me, with arrogance and in vainglory I advance the truth itself. Wherefore I beseech my reader and hearer, with all the powers of entreaty at my command, to remember me in their prayers before the Most High, begging for me forgiveness of my former sins, watchfulness against sins in the future, the knowledge of what is true, the love of what is good, devotion to God, and that in heart and word and deed those things may be practised by us which are pleasing unto His divine will.

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1.  The calumny which wrenched from him a reply to his Cornificiusa Against the peerless gift bestowed by mother nature and by grace, this relentless disputant stirs up an ancient misrepresentation condemned by the judgement of our forebears and, seeking support for his ignorance from every quarter, he hopes that it will redound to his glory if he sees many people like himself, that is, ignorant: for it is characteristic of inflated pride to measure itself against others, exaggerating its own good qualities, if it has any, and disparaging those of others, and to regard the next man’s failure as its own success. It is universally agreed among those who are truly wise that nature, the most benign parent and governor of all things in order most due, raised up man among the rest of her animate creatures by the privilege of reason and marked him out by the use of speech, the intention of her gracious concern and considered ordinance being that man, weighed down and dragged to the depths as he was by the burden of his impure nature and the sluggishness of his body’s mass, might thus as it were be lifted up on wings and ascend to the heights and, by taking the direct route he was fortunate enough to know, outstrip all other creatures in gaining the prize of true blessedness. And so, while grace fructifies nature, reason labours sleeplessly in the observation and investigaa 

According to the ancient commentators Cornificius was an enemy of Virgil

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tion of things, shaking out the folds of nature’s garment and measuring the fruits and the powers of individual things, while the love of good, which is innate in all men, at the bidding of this natural desire pursues this alone or this above all else which is seen to be fittest for the securing of blessedness. But since it is not possible even to imagine a kind of blessedness which knows nothing of communion or exists outside society, anybody who attacks those things which help in cementing and fostering the bonds of human society (that uniquely distinctive brotherhood of the sons of nature, as one might call it) is seen to be blocking everybody’s path to the goal of blessedness and, by cutting off access to peace, to be stirring up nature’s flesh and blood to attack one another to the destruction of the world. This is to sow discord among brothersa and to furnish arms to those at peace,b in short, to establish anew a great chaos between God and men.c For in creation the Trinity, the one and true God, in order to bind the parts of the universe in a firm alliance and to keep charity alive, ordered them in such a way that one thing needed the help of another, and one made good the deficiency of another, every single one being as it were a member of every other one. All things if separated from one another are thus only half complete, but are made perfect when allied to others, since all things are held together by mutual support. In the quest to gain blessedness there is nothing more reliable or efficacious, nothing more directly advantageous, than virtue. For virtue is well-nigh the only and unique path to blessedness which grace has made ready. Those who become blessed without the merit of virtue do not reach the goal so much by their own progression as they are dragged to it. I consequently wonder (not adequately, for that is impossible) about the intention of the man who says that one does not need to study to acquire eloquence and asserts that, like sight to the man who is not blind, and hearing to the man who is not deaf, it comes by the free gift of nature to the man who is not mute, but the more fully if nature’s gift is strengthened by Proverbs 6.19 Virgil, Aeneid 1.150 c  Luke 16.26 a 

b 

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exercise, there being in his view no benefit bestowed by the study of the art of rhetoric, or less at all events than might be demanded in return for the labour of study. I wonder at this view since, just as eloquence not illumined by reason is not merely ill-considered but also blind, so too wisdom which does not profit by the use of speech is not only powerless but somehow crippled. For although inarticulate wisdom may from time to time be of some avail in supporting shared knowledge, it is only rarely and to a small extent that it contributes to the needs of human society. For reason, which is the parent, nurse and guardian of knowledge and the virtues, is made to conceive more frequently by speech, and through speech produces more numerous and more productive offspring; if the practice of utterance did not bring forth into the light the fruit of that conception and in its turn make known to men the results of judicious activity of the mind, reason would remain utterly barren or at best its yield would be small. This is that delightful and fruitful union of reason and speech which gave birth to so many glorious cities, brought together and made allies of so many kingdoms, and united and bound so many peoples in the bonds of charity, that whoever strives to put asunder what God has joined togethera for the common benefit of all would rightly be accounted the common enemy of all. The man who excludes the formal teaching of eloquence from a course of study in philosophy begrudges Mercury his Philologyb and tears him from her embrace: his attack may seem to be directed at eloquence alone, but in fact he roots up all liberal studies, assails every undertaking throughout the whole of philosophy, tears apart the bonds of human society and leaves no place for charity or for the reciprocal carrying out of obligations. If men be deprived of the endowment of the utterance they have been granted, they will become brute beasts,c and the very cities will seem like farmyards rather than gatherings of human beings united in the bonds of society so that by taking their share of responsibility and paying back friendship Matthew 19.6 Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii c  Cicero, De inuentione 1.2.2-3 and 1.4.5; Cicero, De officiis 1.16.50 a 

b 

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with friendship they may live according to the same principles of justice. Take away shared utterance, and what contract will be properly concluded? What authoritative control will there be in matters of belief or morals? How will men’s wishes be complied with or made known? It is not one city or even a few cities, therefore, but all cities simultaneously, and the whole of civic life, that our friend Cornificius attacks when he launches his ignorant and shameless assault on the formal study of eloquence.

2.  A description of his person with the name suppressed If I were not inhibited by respect for a Christian name, I would point out the actual man by his notorious name, and expose to public scrutiny the catalogue of his ugliness: swollen belly and swollen mind, lewd features, grasping hands, vain posturings, foul morals (spat upon by the whole neighbourhood), obscene lusts, misshapen body, base way of life and blackened reputation. But, remembering my profession and that brotherly communion which is in the Lord, I have felt that, while showing no mercy to his error, I ought to refrain from attacking him as a person. I therefore defer to God, sparing the nature which is from Him,a and assailing the vice which, in corrupting the nature which He engendered, is against Him. It is at all events right to attack views without disparaging persons, there being nothing worse than disparaging in person the author of a view or opinion because one does not agree with that view or opinion. It is far more praiseworthy sometimes to spare a false opinion (in so far as the error may be tolerated) for the sake of the man than to carp at the man for the sake of the opinion. Every single thing is to be assessed on the basis of its own evidence, and rewards are to be given in proportion to the deserts, but on condition that the mildness of clemency constrains severity. With such thoughts as these in mind, therefore, I have suppressed all indication of his notorious name lest I be felt not so much to have attended to the correcting of era 

Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 12.3

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ror as to have besmirched a hated individual. But, to tell the truth, nothing is less true, since I despise the individual and his view in equal degree, so far as a Christian may do so. Let him snore until midday, therefore, if that is what he wishes, let him gorge himself every day at public feasts to the point of intoxication,a and let him lie and wallow in filth that would not become even an Epicurean pig.b His opinion, however, which has been the ruin of many, I do oppose, for he has a multitude to give him credencec and, for all that this new Cornificius is a bigger fool than the old one was, yet he has a flock of mindless followers, made up especially of persons who, being inert and idle, seek the appearance rather than the reality of wisdom.

3.  When how and by whom he was educated I am not at all surprised that, hired at great expense and buffeting the air at great length, he has taught his credulous audiences to know nothing, since that was the way he himself was taught by his teachers; for he is not eloquent but merely wordy, for ever launching on the breeze the foliaged of words without the fruit of thoughts. But, while impartially censuring everybody else’s words, the man takes good care while arguing for his own view or against another’s never to come to close quarters, never to rely on reason, and never to venture to meet on the battlefield of written evidence.e He has conceived something exalted, something unknown to all wise men, in those swollen windbags he calls lungs, and this makes him disdain to respond to anybody or to give anybody a patient hearing. If you advance some proposition or other, he will meet you with taunts or laughter. If you wait for him to prove his own proposition a postponement is necessary and, when the day has come and gone, you will find yourself cheated of the Policraticus 8.7 Horace, Epistulae 1.4.16 c  Ovid, Heroides 6.102 d  Virgil, Aeneid 3.444ff. and 6.74f. e  Jerome, Epistulae 82.1 (Migne, PL 22.736) a 

b 

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fruits of your wait, since – and I quote him – he has no desire to share his pearls with other people’s swine.a In the meantime he fattens up his own audience with fables and other fatuities and, if what he promises is true, he will make those audiences eloquent without benefit of theory and philosophers without effort, taking a short cut. What he now passes on to his pupils is what he himself received from his teachers, and he instructs them as he himself was instructed. He will, then, make his pupils his equals in philosophy. Need I say more? Will they not thus be perfect, as the Gospel text has it: Every pupil is perfect if he be as his master is?b And it was at that time that Cornificius learned those things which he has saved up to teach now, things fit for the hearing of the blessed and, as the saying goes, for the ears of Jove,c when in the liberal disciplines the letter was naught and everywhere there was sought the spirit which, as people say, is hidden in the letter. What was all the rage at that time was demonstrating that Hyllus was begotten by Hercules,d that is to say, a strong argument begotten by a doughty and robust arguer, and that the powers of the five vowels represented the legal rights of kings,e and everything else in this same way. At that time the Cornifician school of philosophy held it to be an insoluble question whether the pig being led to market is held by the man or by the rope. Similarly, whether the man who has bought an entire cloak has bought the hood. A speech was utterly improper if it did not reverberate with the words proper and improper, proof and reason, while negative particles were multiplied and transposed by means of the positive and negative infinitives esse (to be) and non esse (not to be), so that one needed counters whenever one had to engage in debate, otherwise the force of affirmation and negation remained an unknown quantity. For generally speaking a double negative has the force of an affirmation, and likewise the force of a negation is strengthened by an uneven number, since a double negative generMatthew 7.6 Luke 6.40 c  Horace, Epistulae 1.19.43 d  For Hyllus the son of Hercules see Ovid, Heroides 9 and Metamorphoses 9.279 e  Ragewin (or Rahewin), Gesta Friderici imperatoris 3.47 a 

b 

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ally speaking cancels itself out and, according to the rule books, is equivalent to a contradiction. To be able to ascertain, therefore, whether he was at an even or an uneven point, the man being challenged used to follow the sensible policy of carrying down to the debate a collection of beans and peas – at least he did so if he was concerned actually to understand the matters which seemed to be involved in the question, for in practice a babble of words was usually sufficient to win the victory, and whoever could introduce a point from some source or other would win through to the goal of his proposition. Poets and historians were held in disrepute, and anyone who devoted himself to the labours of the ancients won a black mark, and was universally ridiculed as not merely slower than an Arcadian assa but duller than lead or stone. For everyone was obsessed by his own inventions or those of his teacher. But even this was not allowed for long, since the members of the audiences themselves within a short space of time were bundled on by the pressure of their fellows in error and, spurning what they had heard from their teachers, themselves hammered out and established new schools. Thus, all of a sudden, they turned into consummate philosophers,b the pupil who had arrived illiterate generally not dallying longer in the class than the short space of time it takes little chicks to grow feathers. Having thus spent an equal amount of time in class or nest respectively, the newly fledged masters and the newly fledged chicks alike then flew away. What was the teaching of those new teachers, who had spent more time asleep than awake in their scrutiny of philosophy, getting their education more easily than those who according to the fairy stories went to sleep on Parnassusc and suddenly emerged as poets, or more quickly than these who drank draughts of the gift of poesie at the Castalian fountain of the Musesd or those who after merely a glimpse of Phoebus earned the right to be enrolled in the company of the Muses themselves, not merely of their devotees? Did they teach something rough or uncultivated, something old-fashioned Persius 3.9 and the scholiast (Jahn 295) Juvenal 2.83 c  Persius, prologue 1ff. d  Persius in the same place; Ovid, Amores 1.15.36; Martial 4.14.1 and 12.3.13 a 

b 

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or obsolete? Just look. Novelty was introduced everywhere,a with innovations in grammar, changes in dialectic, rhetoric declared irrelevant, and the rules of previous teachers expelled from the very sanctuary of philosophyb to make way for the promulgation of new systems throughout the quadrivium. All they talked of was propriety and reason, the word proof resounded on everybody’s lips, and to give a name to an ass, or a man, or any of nature’s works, was tantamount to a crime, or at least exceedingly silly or inelegant and alien to the philosopher. It was thought impossible to say or do anything with propriety and in conformity with reason unless express mention of the words proper and reason were incorporated. Neither was it permitted for a proof to be adduced except after specification of the proof in question. To act in accordance with theory and about theory was all one. These characters will perhaps demonstrate that a poet will say nothing in verse unless he names his metre, and that a wood-worker cannot make a bench unless the words wood or bench are on his lips.c It is from such a milieu, then, that there comes this pother of verbiaged in which this unsavoury old man exults, insulting those who respect the writers of the handbooks because, while feigning to devote his attention to them, he has found in them nothing of use to him.

4.  What became of his partners in error The members of this school did, however, after time lost and fortunes wasted and hopes deceived or denied the consolation of the goal aimed at, find a wide variety of uses for themselves. Some of them entered religious houses as monks or secular clergy, and in a majority of cases corrected their mistakes, discovering from their own experience and passing on to others that all that they had learned was vanity of vanities and above all things vanity.e In a maRevelation 21.5 Macrobius, Commentarii in Ciceronis somnium Scipionis 1.12.18 c  Querolus 30.24 d  Persius 1.80 e  Ecclesiastes 1.2 and 12.8

a 

b 

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jority of cases, I say, because there were some who overweeningly and through long-established perversity persisted in their madness, preferring insanity to the faithful instruction offered by the humble to whom God gives grace:a having presumed to the proud rank of master, they blushed to assume the appearance of pupil. If you do not believe me, go into the religious houses, look into the characters of the brothers, and you will find there the pride of Moab,b and that powerfully directed, so that arrogancy drains away his strength. Benedict gives expression to the surprised complaint that it is somehow due to him that the wolf lies hidden underneath the lamb’s skin,c his contention at any rate being that the tonsure and the black robe are far removed from haughtiness. To put it more precisely, he attacks haughtiness because it does not harmonise with the tonsure and the monk’s vestments. There is contempt for the duly prescribed services, and under the semblance of philosophy there creeps in the spirit of beguiling pride. These things are well known, commonplace indeed in every order and every profession. Others of them, however, observing their own shortcomings as philosophers, set off for Salerno or Montpellier, became devotees of the medical men and suddenly, in a moment, burst out as medical men of the same calibre as they had been as philosophers. Back they came in a short while, packed with deceptive experiments, diligently putting into practice what they had learned. They make a show of Hippocrates or Galen, produce words never heard before, babbling their favourite aphorisms at every point, and shattering the minds of men with unheardof names, for all the world as though they had struck them with lightning. Because they braggingly promise everything, people believe they can do everything. What I have discovered, however, is that there are two precepts which they remember with considerable tenacity and which are found put into practice by them with considerable frequency. One comes from Hippocrates, though in him it tends towards another meaning: Where there is want, he James 4.6; I Peter 5.5 Jeremiah 48.29 c  Matthew 7.15 a 

b 

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says, there is no need to labour.a And in actual fact these characters regard it as unfitting, and no part of their responsibility, to bestow pains on the needy and those who will not or cannot pay the full fee for no more than wordsb from the medical man. The other precept is not indeed one which I remember from Hippocrates but an addition made by the canny practitioners: Collect your fee while the patient is in pain.c The most fitting moment to dun for payment is when the sick man is racked by pain, and the torments of the sufferer are working together with the greed of the healer. If the sick man recovers, his recovery is to be ascribed to the efforts of the medical man but, if he succumbs, the authority of the man who previously intimated this outcome to his close associates will be enhanced. When the medical man has told one person that the sick man will recover and another that the worst will happen, it is impossible that what he has quite deliberately forecast should not come about. If the sick man is going to escape, he is easily cured, except in so far as his safe recovery is hindered by the inexperience of the medical man. But if he is not, in the words of Sollius Sidonius, he is killed most conscientiously.d And this stands to reason, for the secret and hidden tunnels of nature will never be discovered by a man utterly ignorant of philosophy, who neither knows how to speak correctly nor how to understand correctly what is written or spoken, there being roughly as many tongues as there are branches of study and, in the auctores themselves, generally speaking, fully as much variety in their habitual way of expressing themselves as there is diversity of features in the composition of their bodies. There is a likeness between man and man, but even twins do not mirror one another in every particular. There is sometimes a conformity between voice and voice, but not even sisters, not even the Muses, if you like, have precisely the same modulation of voice. There is a consonance between voices but they are different, and this very difference, made equal in its proportions, is suited to produce harmony, and is somehow more Hippocrates, Aphorismi 2.16 Regimen sanitatis Salernitanum 5.103; Policraticus 5.10 c  Regimen sanitatis Salernitanum 10.27, 34; Policraticus 2.29 d  Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistulae 2.12.3; Policraticus 2.29 a 

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pleasing than if similarity were to produce identity. Tongues thus have their own peculiarities, and individuals their own mode of speech, and the man who is ignorant of this will be no more successful as a philosopher than if he were to place on the same footing as a human being the magpie which apes the words of human beings.a Some people similar to me, I well know, have put themselves in thrall to the trifles of the court, with the intention of using the patronage of great men to aim at wealth which they saw they did not deserve – and, however much their tongues may conceal the fact, they admitted as much in the judgement of their consciences. I say nothing of the ways of these people, for my Policraticus pursues those ways in detail, although unable fully to trace them all – for that is more than man’s strength can do. Others like Cornificius, however, have fallen away into the vulgar professions of the ordinary man, caring nothing for the teachings of philosophy, nothing for what she proclaims is to be sought or shunned, provided only that they make money, honestly if they are able but, if not, in any way whatsoever.b They lend money at interest,c by turns rounding up uneven sums and then, with manifold additions, making uneven what they had rounded up.d There is nothing which they regard as abject or foolish except the confinement of poverty, and it is wealth alone which they consider the fruit of wisdom. These words of the moralising poet form a refrain in their hearts, for all that they are unaware that the words are his, since they have no time for him: Money is queen and grants rank and beauty, and the rich man is adorned with persuasion and love.e It was from this quadrivium, as one might call it, a course which they at all events found indispensable, that there emerged those overnight philosophers who, along with Cornificius, have nothing but contempt not merely for our trivium but for our quadrivium in its every aspect. As I have said, they either, on the pretext of a call to religion, submerged themselves in religious Persius, prologue 9 Horace, Epistulae 1.1.65, 66 c  Suetonius, Caligula 41 d  Horace, Epistulae 1.6.34 e  Horace, Epistulae 1.6.37, 38 a 

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houses or, making a show of concern for philosophy and the general well-being, took themselves off to medicine or, under a cloak of high-mindedness which would lend them lustre and loftiness, piled into the houses of the nobility or, feigning the need to ply a trade when what they thirsted for was making money, were sucked down into the whirlpool of avarice in its many forms;a so much so indeed that, by comparison with these persons who thus progressed or, to tell the truth, regressed in philosophy, anyone in the throng of the untutored masses might well be thought a tiro when it came to malpractice.

5.  The greatness of the men whom that household dares to disparage and why Master Gilbert, at that time chancellor of Chartres and subsequently the venerable bishop of Poitiers, whether laughing at or grieving for the madness of that time, I know not which, on seeing those people flitting off to the pursuits above mentioned, used to guarantee that they would make skilled bakers, that skill being the only one in his part of the world, he declared, which regularly picked up all who were without other resources or training; for it is a skill which is very easily carried out, and provides support for other skills, above all among folk who seek bread rather than accomplishments. But there were other lovers of learning also who all set their faces against the deviants: Master Thierry, for instance, that most dedicated student of the arts, and likewise William of Conches, the best-endowed grammarian after Bernard of Chartres, and the Peripatetic of Le Pallet, who so completely robbed all his contemporaries of fame as logicians that he alone was believed to be on speaking terms with Aristotle. Not even all of them together, however, were able to resist the madmen; and thus, in resisting folly, they themselves became foolish, and for quite some time were held to be in error while they strove to counter it. But that inanity quickly vanished away, and by the diligent efforts of a 

Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia 9.4

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the aforementioned masters the arts returned, by what one might call the rights of restorationa regaining their old esteem and a grace and glory all the greater after their time of exile. Cornificius became envious and, thinking it shameful that an old man should be sent to school and that he should be revealed as old in years but a boy in understanding, began to find fault with what he despaired of being able to achieve. He disparaged the views of all of them for the reason that they all held views different from his own. Just so does the fox out of desperation find fault with the cherriesb and, as the country proverb has it, regards as useless what is denied it. As a consequence there came anger from that quarter, tears from this,c and from here that wrath which the house of Cornificius has conceived for the pupils of the wise men I have mentioned, exercising its teeth and breaking its jaw-tooth, as the proverb has it,d on their solidity. Shamelessly, but covertly because it cannot do so openly, that house also endeavours to darken those shining luminaries of France, the glory of Laon, the brothers and theologians Anselm and Ralph, of sweet and blessed memory,e scholars whom no one mauled with impunity, and a source of displeasure only to hereticsf and to those enveloped in the turpitude of sin. Of Alberic of Reimsg and Simon of Paris, on the other hand, they speak openlyh and without recourse to any proverb, not merely asserting that their followers are no philosophers but even refusing to admit that they are clerics and scarcely allowing them to rank as human beings, simply calling them or rather deriding them as Abraham’s oxen or Balaam’s asses,i or anything more taunting or

Justinian, Institutes 1.12.5, Digest 49.15.5 and Code 8.50.19 Abelard, Inuectiua in quendam ignarum dialectices (Cousin 1.695) c  Terence, Andria 126 d  Persius 1.115 e  Ecclesiasticus 45.1 f  Abelard, Historia calamitatum mearum 3, 4 g  Abelard, Historia calamitatum mearum 9f.; Bernard of Clairvaux, Epistulae 13 (Migne, PL 182.116) h  John 16.29 i  Genesis 21.27, Numbers 22, Isaiah 1.3 and II Peter 2.16; Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 126.11 (Migne, PL 37.1675) a 

b 

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abusive that can be said against them.a William of Champeaux is proved out of his own writings to have gone astray.b They scarcely spare even Master Hugh of St Victor, and then more on account of his religious habit than from any respect for his knowledge or learning; for they defer not to his person but to God in him. Robert Pullen,c whom all good men remember with affection, would, but for deference to the apostolic see which promoted him from doctor in the schools to chancellor, be called a helot.d And so that this household might with greater freedom indulge in the detraction of others, its father has outwardly donned the garb of religion – his inward garb will be known to and judged by the Lord – and courts the friendship of the Cistercians, the Cluniacs, the Premonstratensians, and other orders more renowned for their blitheness, so as to turn their authority to his self-advertisement. The detraction by his household I bear with equanimity, acknowledging that I had as teachers a number of the aforementioned men, and likewise heard lectures from the pupils of others of them, and learned from them the little that I know; for I, unlike Cornificius, am not self-taught, nor do I care much what ineptitudes he caws in the ears of his followers.e For he is an ingrate and of a perverse cast of mind who declines to acknowledge the teacher who has helped him to make progress. But enough of this; passing over the idiocies of his person, let us now confute the error embodied in his actual view.

6.  On what intellectual bases he reposes In his view, then – if a false opinion is to be called a view – one should not study the precepts laid down for the acquisition of eloquence, since eloquence is supplied or denied to all men by nature. If nature supplies it unbidden or voluntarily, hard work Macrobius, Saturnalia 7.3.2-6; Policraticus 7.25 and Epistulae 251 Abelard, Historia calamitatum mearum 2 c  Bernard of Clairvaux, Epistulae 205 and 362 (Migne, PL 182.372 and 563) d  Matthew 21.5 e  Persius 5.12 a 

b 

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and dedication are superfluous; but if she denies it, they are ineffective and futile. The most important propositionsa in general derive added strength from the consideration that each man can do as much as nature allows him to do, the consequence being that faithful narrators of a serious kind are agreed that Daedalus did not flyb – for nature had denied him wings – but escaped from the tyrant’s madness by means of a sudden sea voyage. A system of precepts, moreover, does not accomplish what it promises, and it is absolutely impossible for a man to become eloquent even by the most assiduous study of precepts. Practice in speaking and the exchange of utterance among members of a community is sufficient, and that man who frequently exercises the functions of a language is the one who above all has mastery of it. This is obviously the case with the Greeks and the Latins; the French and the British also bear witness to it. Among the Scythians and the Arabs, indeed everywhere, it is true that practice makes perfect.c Relentless toil overcomes all things,d and constant application in any skill whatsoever produces the consummate craftsman. Furthermore, even if the precepts laid down for eloquence were helpful, the labour involved is greater than the benefit, and the amount of effort expended will never be compensated for by an equal return on the outlay. The Greeks and the Hebrews have direct access to their languages without being troubled by precepts, and both the French and the British, and other peoples similarly, are first taught verbal communication in their nurse’s lap, not before a teacher’s chair. Grown men are regularly found echoing the language of their nurse, and sometimes cannot be weaned from what they had imbibed in tender years even by conscientious teaching. Individual peoples correctly and readily employ the language assigned to them by the ordinance of God’s decree, and emphatically do not wait in hope of a handbook of speech or precepts imparting eloquence. Finally, eloquence has nothing whatever to do with philosophy. For the former is confined to words, while the latter Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentaria 1 (Migne, PL 64.1051) Servius, In libros Vergilii commentarius Aeneidos 6.14 c  Cicero, De oratore 1.4.15 d  Virgil, Georgics 1.145-146 a 

b 

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desires, seeks and circles about the paths of wisdom, and on occasion, by dint of its efforts, effectively lays hands on it. Evidently, precepts imparting eloquence do not confer wisdom, or even the love of wisdom, and very often are of no use in attaining to it. For it is not words but objects that are sought by philosophy, or rather by the end of philosophy, which is wisdom. From these considerations, therefore, it is clear that precepts imparting eloquence are eliminated by philosophy from her activities.

7.  In praise of eloquence Such are the sentiments which are cawed, in its own form of words of course, by the silly house of Cornificius, a house which is generally felt to have contempt for the precepts relating to all parts of eloquence. As it testifies concerning itself, this house cannot simultaneously concern itself with the conjunction of genders, tenses and cases, and devote attention to the construction of thoughts. Very well then, let him speak incorrectly provided that his thoughts are true. It is obvious that the fellow will not agree, for he has lies on his lips and in his heart, and his speech is as false as his thoughts. What he says is that precepts relating to eloquence are superfluous, since it is by nature that eloquence is present or absent. My reply is that nothing could be more false. For eloquence is the faculty of giving apt expression to thoughts which the mind desires to be set forth.a What is hidden in the heart is somehow brought forth into the light and presented to the public by eloquence. The eloquent man is not anyone and everyone who speaks, or who somehow or other expresses what he wishes to express, but only the one who aptly sets forth the judgement of his mind. Aptness moreover calls for facility, so called after the word faculty (if I may follow my customary practice, a practice in which I take delight, of imitating the Stoics in that aspect of their philosophy which, in the interests of facilitating the comprehension of things, involves also the learned investigation of etymologies). That man, then, a 

Cicero, De oratore 1.6.21

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who possesses facility in aptly expressing his thoughts in words is an eloquent man. And the faculty of doing this is very rightly called eloquence, than which I cannot readily see anything more beneficial when put to use, more effective in the gaining of wealth, more reliable in the pursuit of influence, and more apt to the winning of glory. For there is nothing, or scarcely anything, which surpasses this endowment bestowed by nature and grace. Among things to be desired the first place belongs to virtue and wisdom (different words but perhaps not different substances, in the view of Victorinus)a but the second is claimed by eloquence, while the third goes to bodily blessings, and fourth and finally follow the esteem of one’s neighbours and material sufficiency which provides the opportunity for good deeds. This is the order followed by the moralising poet, who gave elegant expression to the desirable things that we should pray for, in order of priority: What greater blessing may a nurse pray for her sweet nursling than that he may be wise and able to express what he thinks, and that favour, renown and good health may be his in abundance and a tidy livelihood with purse unfailing?b If, therefore, it is because he employs reason and speech that man surpasses in worth the rest of animate creation, there can be nothing more beneficial in every respect and nothing more potent for acquiring high esteem than to outstrip those sharing the same nature and the same genus in that particular in which man alone overcomes the rest. And while eloquence is the glory and the adornment of every age, it is youth to which it lends most lustre, because tender years wheedle favour, as one might say, so as to ‘sell’ their talent. Those who flourish among their fellow citizens, those who enjoy the power of wealth, those who prevail in strength and are successful in every enterprise – who are they? They are the eloquent. We have Cicero’s authority for it that nothing is so incredible that it cannot by utterance be made probable, nothing so rough and unkempt that it does not through speech begin to shine and somehow become soft as if by

a  b 

On Cicero’s first book De inuentione Horace, Epistulae 1.4.8-11

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cultivation.a Consequently, the man who despises so great a boon is most clearly mad; the man, however, who cherishes – or rather pretends that he cherishes – but does not cultivate this blessing is all too negligent and comes very close to madness.

8.  That nature must be helped by experience and by practice But, it will be said, those destined at some time to have eloquence have it bestowed on them as a free gift by nature herself, whereas she denies it and for ever withdraws it from those destined not to have it; therefore it is clearly agreed that further effort is either futile or unnecessary. Wherefore then, ye most learned Cornificians, do you not possess expertise in all languages? Wherefore do you not know Hebrew at least,b that language which mother nature, so we are told, bestowed on the first men and maintained for humankind until unity was severed by wickedness and amid a babble of tongues there was brought down that pride which constructed a tower and endeavoured to ascend to heaven, not by virtue but by might? Wherefore do you not at nature’s prompting speak this language, a more natural one than the rest, so to say? To define nature is difficult,c but in the view of a number of scholars it is a sort of generative force implanted in all things which enables them to act and to be acted upon. It is called generative because each thing obtains it by reason of its generation and because it is the principle of each thing’s existence; for everything whatsoever derives from its components an aptitude for this or for that, whether components be reckoned under the heading of parts, or whether they join matter and form at the point of origin, as is the case with uncompounded things which admit no aggregation of parts; or whether the principle of composition forms part of the decree issued by the goodness of God alone. It is this principle which is the primal nature according to Plato who, as Victorinus Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum praef. 3 Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 16.11 c  Victorinus’ commentary on Cicero, De inuentione 1.24.34 a 

b 

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and many others attest,a proclaimed that the most certain nature of all things is the divine will, since it is from this source that created nature flows, and in whatever it does it has God as the author of the deed – unless, that is, the deed be one of corruption and sin in which nature degenerates from its author. Thus, the force implanted in each thing at its origin as the source of its action or aptitude is indeed nature, but created nature. Other definitions, however, found scattered in a diversity of authors are, I believe, for the most part to be understood as descriptions of created nature. Fire, for instance, the fashioner of crafts,b which advances along invisible paths to create visible objects, is indeed created but some thinkers, despite Aristotlec and Chalcidius,d deny that it is nature. The principle of motion, likewise, I do not think even Aristotle would deny had its autonomous beginning from God. As for Boethius,e I am sure that he would not deny that that which can act and be acted upon is created. The specific difference, moreover, which informs each single thing either stems from Him by whom all things were made or is nothing at all. There are other ways also in which nature is described, but whatever is posited which diverges from Plato’s view must either be removed from the number of things or be ascribed to the works of God. For the moment let us adopt the first definition, which seems best adapted to the needs of the point under discussion. So then, let that generative force implanted in things at their origin be potent and efficacious; assuredly, just as it may be marred or impeded by imperfection, so may it be restored or aided by support of various kinds. It is commonly said even by prattling children that someone has a natural aptitude for doing something when in fact he has been denied the use of that aptitude; for that which is capable of walking is sometimes unable to walk, and one who is by nature a biped is quite often in actuality unable to use one or both feet. Care, therefore, In his commentary on Cicero, De inuentione 1; Policraticus 2.12 Victorinus as in note c on p. 141; Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 1.11 (Migne, PL 176.748-749) and In Ecclesiasten homiliae 2 (Migne, PL 175.136) c  Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 1 d  Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 23 and 323 e  See p. 141 note c above a 

b 

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is not superfluous but is an aid to nature, making easier that which might possibly be done somehow or other. Socrates, so the story runs,a was by nature wanton and a womaniser – to use the word in the story – but by the correction of philosophy and the practice of virtue he checked and subdued his natural intemperance. It is said that Scaurus Rufus was a man of somewhat dull intellect but that by assiduous practice he eventually attained to such power as a speaker that he was actually called Cicero by the Allobrogan tribesmen.b If it were necessary to employ further examples, all of them would make it clear that diligence is not vain when nature is rather dull, and that there can never be too much care, as though it were superfluous, even if nature be more kindly disposed to some enterprise. Even though nature generally has the upper hand, with some tendency in the one direction or the other, still, just as it is easily damaged by neglect, so it very often becomes tractable when cared for and cultivated. The question has been asked whether it is through genius or by skill that a poem becomes worthy of praise.c For my part I do not see what application without a rich vein, nor genius which is untutored, can achieve; just so does the one thing call for the assistance of the other and enter into an amicable agreement. Nature is of avail, certainly, but either never or only rarely to the extent of gaining the heights without study; for nothing is so strong or so robust as not to be sapped by neglect, nothing so erect as not to be cast down by it; just as on the other hand a level of attainment, no matter how lowly, is raised and maintained by care and diligence. Therefore, if nature is propitious, she ought not to be disparaged but cultivated so as to be of ready assistance, but, if adverse, she requires cultivation all the more diligently for that, so that by the aid of virtue she may with greater felicity and greater glory become strong.

Cicero, De fato 5.10 Juvenal 7.213-214 c  Horace, Ars poetica 408-411; see below p. 228 a 

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9.  That the man who assails logic endeavours to rob men of their tongues

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But is there anyone who by the aid of nature has won the title of being held to be supremely eloquent in all languages, or even in just one language, without the effort of study? Certainly, if it is a good thing to be eloquent, it will be an even better thing to be supremely eloquent. For in this case the grades of comparison do not increase in the opposite direction to the good thing proposed, as happens in the case of someone termed disertus (skilled in speaking) or disertior (quite skilled in speaking), where the positive contains the idea of wisdom and eloquence, while wisdom decreases and the flow of eloquence dries up in proportion as the comparison increases; for such is the view of a number of grammarians. But for all that some of the arts which touch on and teach the virtue of eloquence have contact with nature, that art which is basically to our purpose cannot be known naturally, since it is not natural; for it is not the same in the case of all people. That art, therefore, which owes its existence principally to man, it is not sensible to demand of nature without man’s assistance. The house of Cornificius, however, brings no charges against eloquence, which is necessary to all and commended by all, but argues that the skills of those who promise eloquence are useless. Its views are thus designed not to render all men mute, which is neither possible nor expedient, but to destroy logic. For logic, they assert, is the deceitful profession of windbags, one which has wasted the talents of many and not only blocked the way to the study of philosophy but prevented all good enterprises from having a rational outcome.

10.  The signification of the word logic and that all arts except evil ones are to be cultivated So then, their aim and intention is now plainly revealed: they endeavour to subdue logic as they sweep with equal madness down

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all the paths of philosophy. However, since they had to make a start with some one of them, these heretics resolved to deal first with the one they deemed better known than the rest and more familiar to themselves. Let us join issue, therefore, and openly consider what is meant by the word logic. So, in the widest possible signification of the word, logic is the formal system of speech and argument.a For from time to time the force of the word is contracted and confined simply to types of argument. Whether therefore it imparts ways of argumentation or provides a guiding rule for all kinds of utterance, those who say that it is useless are unquestionably mad, since both its functions can be shown by faultlessly true reasoning to be absolutely necessary. It is from its Greek origin that the word derives its twofold signification,b since logos in Greek on one occasion means speech and on another reasoning. But extending its signification as widely as possible we may for the present assign to it the superintendence of all forms of utterance, so that at no point is it proved to be useless, for even in its more general mode it has in its totality been seen to be very useful and indeed necessary. For if the use of words is, as has often been said, necessary – and nobody denies this – the more compendiously it is taught, the more valuable and certainly the more reliable is the teaching. For it is folly to labour and to contend with protracted difficulties in a matter which can otherwise be disposed of with ease and rapidity. Such is generally the fate of the negligent, and of those who regard the wasting of time as of no consequence. The theoretical knowledge of all good enterprises is therefore to be welcomed and cultivated, and that with all the greater zeal because they derive their origin from nature, our most excellent parent, and proclaim their high birth by offering an easy and successful issue to our good enterprises. The reason why I am inclined to say that it is the theoretical knowledge of good enterprises that is to be cultivated is because I draw a distinction between it and that theoretical knowledge which is concerned with evil deeds, for example those of the soothsayers and other exponents of diabolia  b 

Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentaria (Migne, PL 64.1045) Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 1.12 (Migne, PL 176.750)

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cal science.a Since these have no part in our responsibilities they ought by decree of lovers of lawful wisdom to be outlawed from the whole of human society. Concerning these matters, however, I have spoken at greater length in my Policraticus.

11.  What art is and concerning types of intelligence and that they are to be cultivated by the arts

30

An art is a system which compendiously facilitates the doing of things which are by their nature possible. No system affords or promises the achievement of things which are impossible, but it offers a short cut to things which are possible instead of what one may term the roundabout route taken by nature, and, if I may so put it, engenders the control of things which are difficult. The Greeks in consequence call it a method, as being a compendious system to avoid the protracted and winding circuit followed by nature, to the end that what ought to be done may be done more correctly and more easily. For nature, despite her vigour, does not attain to the facility of art unless she be instructed; nevertheless she is the parent of all the arts and grants them reason as their nurse so that they may make progress and reach perfection. Initially she arouses the innate intelligence to take in certain things, and when it has done that it stores them up in what one may call the guardroom and treasury of the memory;b reason then with diligent study examines what has been taken in and merits, or has earned, commendation, and in accordance with the nature of each individual thing passes true and unimpaired judgement on it, unless perchance it err in some particular. These three things are sent on ahead by nature to form as it were the foundations and the instruments of all the arts. Intelligence, in the view of Isidore,c is a kind of force implanted in the mind by nature and self-sufficient in its strength. What seems to be expressed by this description is Policraticus 2.19 Cicero, De oratore 1.5.18 c  Not Isidore but Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 3.7 (Migne, PL 176.771)

a 

b 

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that nature implanted in the mind a kind of force which either is the primal motion of the soul or arouses the primal motion which the soul employs in the investigation of things. This is the reason why it is also said to be self-sufficient in its strength, for it does not expect assistance from anything previously existing, but precedes all forms of assistance and aids those that follow after; for investigation precedes the comprehension, evaluation and conservation of all things to be known. It thus stems from nature and is aided by study and by exercise, to the end that what was difficult on a first attempt may by constant practice be made easier and, when the rules for doing this have been grasped, become very easy indeed, unless it be impeded by the sloth of desuetude and negligence. The origin of all the arts is this: nature first established engenders the practice and exercise of study, then practice and exercise engender art, and art in its turn the capability now under discussion. Innate intelligence is thus self-sufficient in its strength, exercise derives strength from being used, and memory derives strength from both intelligence and exercise; it is from these three that reason herself also becomes strong and brings forth the arts, and this according to the capacity of the types of intelligence. As the aged Bernard of Chartres used to communicate to his audience at many a lecture, there are three types of intelligence, the high-flying, the lowly and the average. The high-flying intelligence recedes from what it has taken in with the same ease with which it took it in, and finds no rest in any dwelling. The lowly intelligence cannot be lifted up, and therefore knows no progress. But the average intelligence, because it both has a fixed dwelling and is capable of being lifted up, does not despair of making progress and is very well suited to the exercise of the philosopher. It was in this type of intelligence, I believe, that nature laid the foundations of the arts; for the practice of this type of intelligence is made strong by study. Study, in Cicero’s definition, is the constant and intense application of the mind, coupled with a powerful inclination, to the doing of something, while memory is what one might call the strong-box of the mind and the firm and faithful guard of what has been taken in, and reason is that force of mind which evaluates things presented to the senses or the mind and gives reliable arbitration in matters

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of preference; reason it was which, weighing the similarities and dissimilarities between things, finally established art as what one might call the finite knowledge of things not finite. An infinite number of nouns end in –a, and all of these she has defined by the feminine gender with the exception of those which it has distinguished by the firm attribution of their own proper signification. Species are infinite, but reason assigned them this finite qualification, that whatever has species present in it must also have genus. Numbers are infinite, but every number she has defined as either odd or even. One example will afford clear proof of what I am saying: the first debate was the product of chance; the practice of debate was enhanced by exercise; the form of debate, which is the art of that activity, was discovered by reason; and the cultivation of the art bestowed control of it. Because nature is the mother of the arts, disparagement of them results unjustly in injury to the parent. The intelligence must therefore be carefully cultivated under the control both of study and of relaxation, the former designed to give it strength, the latter encouragement. As a certain wise man,a to whom I am indebted for his words, well puts it: Intelligence starts with nature, is assisted by practice, is dulled by excess of toil, and is sharpened by controlled exercise. If intelligence is in good order and permissibly exercised, it will not only have sufficient capacity to assimilate the arts, but will find an appropriate and unimpeded approach to things which somehow by their nature are inaccessible, and will be absolutely reliable in learning and teaching whatever is needful or expedient.

12.  Why the arts are called liberal There are many kinds of arts, but those that present themselves first of all to the intelligence of the philosophical mind are the liberal arts.b All of these are confined within the systems either of the trivium or of the quadrivium and, in the times of our forea  b 

Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 3.7 Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2 praef. 4 and 2.3.19; Isidore, Etymologiae 1.2.1

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bears, who studied them diligently, possessed such efficacy, we are told, as to open up all manner of reading, lift up the intellect to all pursuits, and suffice to elucidate the difficulties in all questions which are susceptible of proof. No teacher was needed by those men as they opened books or answered questions, when the force of every locution was made plain to them by the system of the trivium and the secrets of nature in her every aspect were unfolded by the laws of the quadrivium. And so, just as the arts are so called because they confine (artant) by rules and precepts,a or after that quality which in Greek is termed ares and which strengthens the mind to perceive the ways of wisdom,b or after reason, called arso by the Greeks, to which they give nourishment and growth, just so the liberal arts are so called either because it was in them that the ancients took pains to have their children (liberos) educated, or because they seek to win liberty for a man so that, liberated from cares, he may have time for wisdom; and they do indeed very often liberate him from those cares in which wisdom declines to have a part; necessary cares too they often exclude, so that mental activity may pursue a less impeded path to philosophy.

13.  Why grammar is so called The first of all these arts is logic, at least that part of logic which is concerned with the first principles of speech, to give the word logic (as has already been said) its widest possible extension and not simply confine it to the science of debate. For the science of correct speech and correct writing, and the origin of all the liberal disciplines, is grammar.c Grammar is also the cradle of philosophy in its entirety and, so to say, the first nurse of every study involving letters; it is she who receives from the womb of nature all tender babes at the moment of birth, nurtures them in their Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2 praef. 4; Isidore, Etymologiae 1.1.2 and 1.5.2 Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2 praef. 4; Isidore, Etymologiae 1.1.2 and 1.5.2. They give the word as aretes, which by the time John uses it has become ares c  Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2 praef. 4; Isidore, Etymologiae 1.5.1 a 

b 

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infancy, promotes at every step their growth in the love of wisdom, and with a mother’s concern leads on and safeguards at every age the lover of wisdom. Accordingly it is after the first principles both of writing and of speech that grammar receives her name. For gramma is a letter or a line,a and literal comes from the fact that grammar teaches letters, the word letters being understood to refer both to the shapes given to single sounds and to the elements, that is, the sounds represented by the shapes. Alternatively, she may also be linear because just as the first dimension of a line is found in the increase of its magnitude, forming what one may call the matter of surface or body, so it is this discipline first which comes to the aid of those aspiring to advance in wisdom, instructing their tongue and introducing wisdom both through the ears and through the eyes, so that speech may thus proceed. For words introduced through the ear strike and arouse the intellect which, in Augustine’s words,b is a hand of the soul, so to say, being able to grasp things and take hold of objects. Letters on the other hand, that is to say shapes, are indicative first of sounds and then of the things which they place before the soul through the windows of the eyes; and often without sound they speak the words of those absent. This art, then, transmits the first principles of speech and instructs the judgement of eyes and ears, with the consequence that one can no more easily engage in philosophy without this art than can a man who has always been blind and deaf rise to eminence among philosophers.

14.  That although it [grammar] is not natural it imitates nature But, for all that this art answers to our needs, it is thought not to stem from nature, for natural things are the same among all men, whereas this art is not the same among all men. It was inCassiodorus, Institutiones 2.1.1; Isidore, Etymologiae 1.5.1; Macrobius, Commentarii in Ciceronis somnium Scipionis 1.5.7 b  Not Augustine: source unknown a 

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ferred above that nature is the mother of the arts, but this art, although deriving to some extent, or rather in very large part, from men’s disposition, nevertheless imitates nature,a and in part takes its origin from nature, endeavouring as far as it is able in all things to conform to nature. Consequently it was at nature’s bidding that among all men it restricted the number of vowels to five, at least as regards the basic sounds; for among many people the number of inflections is larger. Our friend Tenred,b however, a grammarian of greater knowledge than reputation, demonstrated that even in the basic sounds the number was larger. For on a close examination of the distinction between vowels, he says, there are seven. Among the consonants too nature has formed a variety of kinds of semivowels and mutes, and likewise single and double consonants, the distinctions between which are clearly discerned by anyone who watches the mouth as it modulates sounds in accordance with nature’s wondrous law, and who closely examines and evaluates the mouth’s potential. The primary meanings of nouns, too, and of other types of word, although evolved at man’s discretion,c are in a way subject to nature, which they imitate with probability to the extent of their capacity. For it was man who, in order to put into effect God’s dispensation and to institute verbal communication among men, first gave names to the things which existed previously, shaped by the hand of nature, who had composed and differentiated them from the four elements, or from matter and form, so that they might be presented to the senses of rational creatures and their diversity be marked by names, as it had been by distinctive characteristics. And thus it came about, as Boethius informs us,d that this thing is called man and that wood, and yet another thing stone, and likewise all substances have their own names as it were imprinted on them. But since substances differ in many ways, whether in point of quantity, or quality, or the various forms of their accidents, or again their comparative familiCicero, [Rhetorica ad Herennium] 3.22.36 See C.C.J. Webb in EHR 30 (1915) 658-660 c  Abelard, Dialectica (Ouvr. inéd. d’ Abélard 487 Cousin), Theologia Christiana 3 (Cousin 2.481; Migne, PL 178.1245) d  Commentarius 1 in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione 1.2 a 

b 

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arity and their contribution to being, words designed to denote this range of differences were invented, which could be attached to substantives and somehow depict their force and nature, in the same way as the differences between substances which I have mentioned are expressed by their individual characteristics. For just as accidents clothe and give form to substance, so, in what one may call a proportional ratio, do adjectives give form to substantives. And in order that what was instituted by reason may cohere more harmoniously with nature, just as the substance of each thing knows nothing of intensification or remission, so substantives do not advance to degrees of comparison, and neither do words denoting differences of substance, for all that they are adjectives, since they indicate a certain quality of substance. Likewise there are no comparative forms of words attached to substantives to indicate quantity, because quantity itself is not susceptible of more and less. In sum, just as the accident alone may be compared, but not every accident, so only adjectives relating to accidents, and then not all of them, have degrees of comparison. This imitation of nature is to be seen not only in nouns and adjectives, but also, if one considers the matter with some attention, in all other parts of speech. Because a substance presented to a sense or to reason cannot exist without the motion with which it moves in time as it does something or has something done to it, verbs were excogitated to designate the movements in time of that which does something or has something done to it. Consequently, because motion does not exist without time, neither could the verb exist without an additional signification of time.a And just as that motion is not always uniform but has many colours, so to say, when now one thing and now another acts or is acted upon in different ways on different occasions, so adverbs, like adjectives, came forward, to express the differences of time. One may note also the fact that certain verbs lack some tenses, desiderative verbs for example and inceptives lacking the preterite, since deliberation about good things to be done is not at once completed, and the beginnings of

a 

Boethius, Commentarius 1 in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione 1.3

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things do not attain to perfect accomplishment. Here, assuredly, we have an explicit trace of nature imprinted on human reason.

15.  That adjectives of secondary application are not appropriately conjoined with substantives of primary application as for instance patronymic horse Let our reasoning advance to the origin of secondary application, in which the dominant authority of nature is in evidence, although not so clearly. Accordingly, when names had for the first time been bestowed on things, as we have explained, the mind of the bestower, returning to itself, gave names to those names in order that by them the science of words might be advanced, with one man availing himself of their assistance in conveying his own understanding into the mind of another. That word therefore which declines through the cases and has no share in time was called nomen, being substantive if it signifies a substance or something considered as a substance, but adjective if it signifies something in respect of its form, so that by means of the adjective it is possible to express that which is inherent in a substance or something after its likeness. That word, on the other hand, which signifies temporal motion, but in terms of actual time, is called the verb, which is active if it signifies motion on the part of one acting, but passive if of one being acted upon. And so, mirroring words of primary application, there were instituted those which came forth at the secondary stage, so that, just as among the primary substantives and adjectives there are some which are said to be proper to single things, while others after their own fashion are common to a number of things, so among the secondary substantives and adjectives there are found some which are used of single things, and some which have general applicability. For that which is called nomen or enunciation is counted as substantive, while that called appellative or predicative is attached to the aforementioned and carries out the functions of the adjectival property which defines the quality of substantives. However, just as among the works of

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nature those objects which are present before the senses or the understanding as simple objects may be observed in more detail than those which are registered as compounds, just so in the case of adjectives of secondary application it is a task of greater difficulty to grasp their signification if they are not attached to the words to which they are naturally assigned. For the nature of substance is more solid than that of words, and accidents of substance which present themselves to the senses or the understanding are more familiar than accidents of words; so much so in fact that those who attach adjectives of secondary application to substantives of primary application either say nothing at all or talk the merest rubbish. For if a horse be called patronymic or shoes hypothetical, the combination is improper, for the business of understanding is impeded by the principal signification of the words, though not by any incoherence on the part of the accidents. For as regards gender, number and case, the adjective coheres adequately with the substantive, but the combination of the principal meanings is not merely a lie – if indeed it is a lie – but arrant nonsense even. Virgil is accused of unsuitability of expressiona for saying gramineo in campo (in the grassy plain) when he should have said graminoso in campo (in the grassy plain); assuredly he would have been more guilty and without doubt a much worse trifler had he said in campo categorico or patronomico (in the categorical or patronymic plain). The objection raised by those who base themselves solely on those accidents which are connected by likeness is demolished by the fact that not every consonant which is subjoined to a vowel makes a syllable. The consonants i and u, when so subjoined, no more succeed in making a syllable than adjectives of secondary application, when attached to substantives of primary application, succeed in producing a correct and regular locution. It is agreed that speakers may commit two sins, one if they lie, the other if they transgress a set mode of speech; and these persons are guilty of the latter at least. First and second person pronouns are not aptly conjoined with verbs, except to make a distinction or to imServius, In libros Vergilii commentarius Aeneidos 5.287; Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2.20.1, 4; Isidore, Etymologiae 1.34.4 a 

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part force, although the accidents of the words agree with them well enough. The notion of trifling utterance I do not here restrict to the meaning of saying the same thing repeatedly, as if one were perchance to attach to a substantive an adjective which is understood in it, for example the rational human being walks, but it is extended to every form of utterance in which a combination of words is unhelpful and somehow fails to achieve the fulfilment of its law. But a combination is not unhelpful, even though it may denote a falsehood, which it now reveals, now conceals. For the law of grammar does not prohibit lying, only the association of words from which a person skilled in the language derives no understanding. That the addition of secondaries to primaries is inappropriate is made clearer by the fact that, if the adjectives were replaced by others of equal value, for example, if a definition were put in the place of the naming word, the apposition of the equivalent term will not send any shudder through the mind, nor will the mind be fearful of hearing the adjective of secondary application. To give an instance, the proposition is predicative seems to be equivalent to asserting that it simply enunciates, that is, enunciates something without any qualification, or that it has a predicative term. If then we were to say the tunic is predicative, the understanding will be brought to a standstill because of the inappropriateness of the addition, and it will perhaps be quicker to accuse the propounder of ineptly conjoining words than to arraign him for a factual lie. But if he were to say tunic simply, that is, enunciate something which has no qualification or a predicative term, the hearer will at once assert a falsehood, and will not so quickly leap forward to censure an inept conjunction. The words predicative proposition at all events are understood to have a subject and a predicative term, but the words predicative syllogism signify that the syllogism is composed of predicatives. What the words predicative horse signify I have not discovered, but for the moment I believe that they signify nothing. For that which is not found anywhere, I do not believe exists anywhere.a There would be a similar misuse also if one should say equus ends in s (a horse ends a 

Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.586

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in e) or something similar. Likewise Cato sitting between the Janiculum and the Kalends of March repairs the gowns of the Roman people with the numbers four or six either is not speech, or, if it is, is more corrupt than any nonsensical speech. Speech of this kind is term stichiologus, that is, inverted speech, because the words combine against the laws of utterance. For stichos means a verse, from which we get the word distich, meaning a verse couplet. Since I have heard many people conferring and expressing various opinions on this particular point, I have no misgivings about reporting – and perhaps there will be no lack of pleasure in hearing – what I learned during a stay in Apulia from a Greek translator who knew Latin pretty well; for I should like to make him some return, if not for his help – yet these things do help somewhat – at all events for the goodwill which made him want to benefit his hearers. The first point in this view or opinion has already been stated, to the effect that the combination of adjectives of secondary application with substantives of primary application is inconsequential even according to the principles of grammar. For this apposition involves a certain concealed aphonia,a that is, a lack of consonance, or, to use Quintilian’s word, cacozugia,b that is, faulty conjunction, which we may not be able so easily to condemn on evident grounds, but which in itself displeases the hearer who is a grammarian. There are many such things which at once give offence, although the means of disproving them may not be directly to hand. This happens perhaps in cases the virtue or vice of which is clear-cut. Here, though grammar may exercise much restraint, it discovers unsuitability of expression and confutes it. For not only does it censure discordance of accidents in the conjunction of words, but it regards as absurd the addition of secondary invention in substantives of primary invention. The absurdity consists in the fact that in face of a conjunction of this kind the mind becomes deaf. But can any hearing rightly evaluate things to which it is deaf? Is not an utterance pointless which pours out into a deaf Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 8.1.4 (GLK 2.371) The word is not Quintilian’s. He talks (Institutio oratoria 8.6.73; cf. 8.3.56ff.) about cacozelia a 

b 

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ear? Accordingly, since understanding is, as it were, the ear of the soul, just as it is also its hand, it takes in absolutely nothing on receiving an utterance the absurdity of which precludes understanding. On occasion, however, a usage which for the time is irregular and infrequent is regarded as absurd, although it is not universally absurd, as for instance, mulier informis meaning a woman who is ill formed,a but not one utterly without form, and certain letters being designated mute, not because they have absolutely no sound but because they have very little sound by comparison with others. But this addition is utterly absurd, not just falsely or badly sounding in the ear of the hearer. For not all falsities are absurd, for all that the investigator of truth reproves and rejects them. Individual things too are called absurd, in accordance with the judgement of the faculties which investigate the quality of things said and done. Grammar holds as absurd an inappropriate combination of words, but does not aspire to pass judgement on the investigation of truth. Caesar in his book on analogy plays the grammarian and commands avoidance of whatever the educated listener may find absurd: As sailors shun a reef, he says, just so must an infrequent and irregular word be shunned.b Dialectic, however, accepts only that which is true or probable, and what it regards as absurd is whatever is far removed from the true or probable; it is not intent on reaching the goal of what is just, useful or honourable. These things are measured by political science, which is concerned with the goal of what is just, useful or honourable, and which shrinks from things far distant from justice and equity to an equal degree whether they be true or false. This will be found manifest in the other disciplines also; but for the moment let the explanation of our Greek translator proceed. A human being is rational: in the present state of affairs this combination is somehow necessary. A human being is able to laugh: this is probable. A human being is white: this combination is possible, but dubious, because it may be equally true and false. A human being is able to bray: this combination is impossible, so that it cannot possibly be true. None of a  b 

Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 1.3.10 (GLK 2.9) Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 1.10.4; Policraticus 8.10

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these combinations repels the grammarian, because in each of them he finds his requirements met. There is nothing in these things which he corrects or alters, but he cheerfully accepts all of them. The fourth combination is censured and confuted by the logician, because what is entrusted to him is the evaluation of truth and falsehood. In consequence he regards it as absurd to lend an ear to it. To the aforementioned combinations now add a fifth: a human being is predicative. This combination at all events the grammarian condemns as absurd, and he was prepared to admit a combination which was not only dubious, not only false, but even impossible. Why so? asks the Greek translator, if it is not because it does not comply with his rules. For he was for ever asserting that the combination of these adjectives with those substantives was inadmissible.

16.  That adjectives of primary application are joined to substantives of secondary application It is not, however, conversely impossible or inconsequent for adjectives of primary application to be attached to nouns of secondary application. For nature is bountiful, and to human need she makes a free gift of her abundance. As a consequence the properties of things flow over into words, as reason aspires to make modes of expression cognate with the things of which it speaks.a An expression is thus termed hard or soft, a verb rough or smooth, and a noun sweet or bitter, for all that these qualities properly belong to things, not to expressions. Very many other phenomena of this kind are also found, no one of which sounds wrong or is censured as false by a judge or listener of good faith. And although faith is a virtue in a rational creature only, an expression is called faithful, and likewise fraudulent, even if it be proved that the fraudulence is in the man, not in itself. For words which are, so to say, natural are regularly transferred to make good the lack of rational words, whereas the contrary transference of rational a 

Abelard, Theologia Christiana 3 (Cousin 2.481; Migne, PL 178.1245)

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I, 15-16

words to natural words is by no means so frequently exemplified in practice. On one occasion the transference is made out of necessity,a and on another for the sake of embellishment, but, as is well known among the learned, a transference which is not made for the sake of embellishment is not different from ambiguity. Words, therefore, which are necessarily transferred are fittingly applied to many things and, after the fashion of things said to be predicated as accidents, generally change their meaning from case to case, but no one criticises the combination as inappropriate. And although the improper, that is, transferred sense of a word may often thus prevail through force of usage over its proper sense, that is, the sense it had from its primary application, if the word happens to revert to its basic sense, there is either no absurdity, or not as much as we criticise when verbal adjectives are taken to signify the quality of things. This convertibility you may see prevailing through usage in the case of terms which confine one another by being mutually predicable, as in the case of species and definition and property. Likewise finite and infinite are added to nouns and verbs to designate their qualities, but, because these are taken from things, it does not jar at all if they return home, as though from a pilgrimage, to designate some convertible thing either finite or infinite. Similarly universal and particular, for all that it is in words that their appellation has full force – for they are borrowed from things and are not of secondary application – may without absurdity be conjoined as adjectives to names for things. Moreover, words which are taken from things may revert to things, but words devised to indicate the quality of words are not so fittingly or so frequently called upon to indicate the quality of things. For they seem to have something in common with those types of words which in Greek are called syncategoremata,b because, just as the signification of those words either derives from, or is assessed on the basis of, their adjuncts, so these words, when associated with expressions having a common origin with them, aptly stimulate the understanding, but when transferred a  b 

Cicero, De oratore 3.38.155; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 8.6.5, 6 Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 2.4.15 (GLK 2.54)

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elsewhere, as though bereft of their natural vigour, vanish away or have a jarring effect. For if one should say a patronymic horse, the hearer who is a grammarian will at once either reproach the speaker so that he remove the verbal fault, or, with great deference to the speaker, will quote the proverb used by the slave in the comic poet:a Good words, I beg you. This entreaty,b surely, is in some sense a criticism of a fault. For in asking for good words in place of these, one is undoubtedly not agreeing that these are good words. Otherwise one would more fitly say: Better words, I beg you. Assuredly, if someone were to look for mood or tense in a noun, or case and degrees of comparison in a verb, a grammarian will castigate him as a trifler; consequently I do not think that he would show patience to a pupil who talked of a patronymic horse. So closely confined by the limits of their nature are adjectives of secondary application that not only can they not wander away to words for things, but they cannot even withdraw any distance from the words to which they have been given. A proposition is correctly termed hypothetical and a noun patronymic; but if you interchange the words and talk of a hypothetical name and a patronymic proposition, you will in the judgement of a grammarian either say nothing, or speak absurdly. Furthermore, it is with usage that the supreme authority in the evaluation of speech reposes, and no expression which usage condemns will gain in strength if usage does not rehabilitate it. Hence the famous observation: Many words will be born again which are now dead, and those now esteemed will in turn die, if such be the wish of usage, which arbitrates and establishes laws and norms in matters of speech.c For just as at law it is said that custom is the best interpreter of laws,d so too the usage of those who speak correctly is the most potent interpreter of rules of speech. From which I think it follows that what is nowhere written and read, and nowhere heard coming from those who speak correctly, indeed everything of that kind, has either long been condemned by grammarians, or at Davus in Terence, Andria 204 Terence, Andria 43-44 c  Horace, Ars poetica 70-72; see also p. 255 d  Justinian, Digest 1.3.37 a 

b 

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least has not yet been approved by them. Neither, I believe, can all nouns of primary application be aptly transferred to all things, for all that they, as being more general, are more apt to the purposes of transference. But because it is frequently the case that something is found outside a rule, it will perhaps be possible to find a noun used somewhere in a different way from what has been stated; according to the proposition, however, it is usage which prevails. For even the interchange of things with words and of words with things, by means of which mutual contribution, so to say, they bestow their properties on one another, is more frequently effected by transferred expressions than by those promulgated by secondary application. The universality of a rule may perhaps be diminished by a particular case, but we are talking of usage. And so this power of transference, in ascribing to words what is proper to things and to things what is proper to words, engenders a certain indifference in speech, and this indifference, while assisting balanced minds by its brevity, confuses and brings down those lacking in discrimination and shuts off from them an understanding of the whole truth. For he who aspires to a knowledge of the truth needs must weigh up with a balanced mind the meaning even of a stammerer; for he too very often speaks the truth.

17.  That in poetry also grammar imitates nature In other respects also grammar imitates nature; for the precepts of poetry clearly express the nature of behaviour, and demand that the practitioner of the art follow nature. For nature first shapes us within to every condition of fortune: she delights us or impels us to anger or draws us down to the ground in deep sorrow and gives us pain; but afterwards she brings forth the emotions of the mind with the tongue as their interpreter.a The intention of these words is that the poet should not leave the steps of nature, but by deportment and gesture, and likewise by word, endeavour with all his might to cleave to her. If you wish me to weep, you must first a 

Horace, Ars poetica 108-111

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yourself grieve;a if you wish me to rejoice, you must first yourself rejoice; otherwise, if you give imperfect expression to the part assigned you, I shall either go to sleep or laugh.b In addition, account must be taken in poetry not only of metrical feet or quantities, but also of ages and places and times and other things which for present purposes do not need to be mentioned individually, since all issue forth from the workshop of nature. So closely attendant indeed is poetry on natural things that most scholars have denied that it is a species of grammar, asserting that it is an art in its own right and has no more to do with grammar than with rhetoric, although it has an affinity with both, because it shares precepts in common with both. Let those who wish wrangle about this matter, for the contention I advance is not this one, but rather – and I do not think it will offend anybody – that poetry is to be referred to grammar as to its mother and the nurse of its activity. And although neither grammar nor poetry is altogether natural but both for the largest part of their substance acknowledge man, who discovered them, as their author, nevertheless nature claims for herself some rights over both of them. Certainly, either grammar will take hold of poetry, or poetry will be eliminated from the number of the liberal disciplines.

18.  What grammar teaches us to pursue and what to shun It is traditional doctrine that grammar is the knowledge of writing and speaking correctly.c The point of correctly is that grammar should exclude faults, that is to say, should in writing follow orthography, and in speaking follow the authority of the art and of usage. Orthography,d that is, correct writing, consists in placing Horace, Ars poetica 102-103 Horace, Ars poetica 104-105 c  Isidore, Etymologiae 1.5.1. Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2.1.1 had previously defined it as ‘the skill of speaking finely (pulchre loquendi) derived from illustrious poets and auctores’ d  Isidore, Etymologiae 1.27. Cassiodorus, Institutiones, talks in various places about orthographia which for him included scribal accuracy a 

b 

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each letter in its proper place, not allowing it to usurp the function of another or abandon its own function. Speaking, on the other hand, is the interpretation of one’s understanding by means of articulated utterance based on letters. For the words they speak by nods and signsa take us away from the distinctive qualities of utterance. To speak correctly is to shun in speech the faults of solecism and barbarism. Barbarism is the corruption of a word which is not barbarous, that is, which is either Greek or Latin. For if in our utterance we use a barbarous word, that is not barbarism but barbarous speaking.b Solecism on the other hand is the corruption not of a word but of a construction,c when words are improperly joined together contrary to the laws of construction. It is produced in two ways,d either through the parts of the utterance itself or through the accidents of the parts: through the parts, if one is substituted for another, for example, a preposition for an adverb or the reverse, or if in the same part one type of word is substituted for another, for example a word of secondary application when a word of primary should have been employed; through the accidents, on the other hand, as in the case of the qualities, genders, cases, numbers and figures. Likewise also in metre there is found metaplasm,e which occurs in a single word when the laws of metre do not press so strictly, just as barbarism is confined to a single word in prose. By metaplasm is meant a sort of transformation or deformation, because it transforms or deforms a word away from its proper value. There are in addition schemata, by which are meant figures of speech or of thought, and these are produced by various conformations of words in the interests of adding beauty to the utterance. So then, barbarism and metaplasm are discovered in single words,f whereas solecism and schemata are produced not in single words but in the combination of a number of words. The grammarian must possess knowledge Ovid, Metamorphoses 4.63 Donatus, Ars grammatica 2.18 (GLK 4.392); Isidore, Etymologiae 1.32.2 c  Donatus, Ars grammatica 2.19 (GLK 4.393); Isidore, Etymologiae 1.33.1 d  Donatus, Ars grammatica 2.19 (GLK 4.393); Isidore, Etymologiae 1.33.3 e  Donatus, Ars grammatica 3.4 (GLK 4.395); Isidore, Etymologiae 1.35.1 f  Isidore, Etymologiae 1.35.7 a 

b 

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of each single one of the three components, art, fault and figure, otherwise he will not easily be able to derive support from art, or to shun faults, or to imitate the beauties of the auctores. If anyone ignorant of these components writes or speaks correctly, that is not to be ascribed to skill on his part, for the part of that excellence is played by mere chance. Art is thus in a manner of speaking a public thoroughfare, along which all have the right to go, to walk and to act, without censure and without being buffeted. Fault lies off all men’s road, and one who pursues his journey or his action in it will either come to a precipice or endure the calumny and the buffeting of those who interrupt him. Figure, however, holds the middle ground and, being to some extent remote from both art and fault, does not fall into the category of either the one or the other. All men thus follow art because it is enjoined upon them and shun fault because it is forbidden them, but some men employ figures because that is permitted them. For in between faults, that is, barbarism and solecism, and art, which is the excellence and the standard of speech, come metaplasm and schemata, that is, metaplasm if a deliberate mistake is made in a word, and schema if for a justifiable reason an error is perpetrated in a combination of words. On the testimony of Isidore,a figure is deliberate fault, and therefore this licence is allowed only to the auctores and to men like the auctores, that is, men of great erudition, who know the principles of what to say and what not to say. This licence they obtained and continue to obtain, as Cicero says,b by virtue of their great and divine blessings. The authority of persons whose every word and deed brings praise or takes away blame is by no means negligible, and it is vain to aspire to it unless one is a man who in his great blessings shows himself worthy of imitation. This certainly has been won by the authority of their other virtues that even the faults of predecessors are sweet and pleasant in the eyes of their posterity. It is for this reason that Augustine in the second book of his De ordine says:c Solecisms and barbarisms so-called, of Isidore, Etymologiae 1.35.7 Cicero, De officiis 1.41.148 c  Augustine, De ordine 2.4.13 (Migne, PL 32.1000-1001) a 

b 

164

I, 18-19

which the poets were inordinately fond, they preferred, changing the names, to refer to as schemata and metaplasms, rather than to shun what were obvious faults. But take them away from poetry, and I shall miss those sweetest of spices. Transfer them to the prose speech of the market-place, and who will not tell that speech to be off and hide itself in the theatre? Pile up a mass of these devices in one place, and the whole I shall disdain as bitter, decaying and rank. Therefore order, which controls things, will not allow them to be present everywhere nor absent everywhere, for by their introduction speech which would otherwise be dull and mean is lifted up and given lustre. This is what Augustine says, and from his commanding authority it is clear how necessary is the knowledge of these devices which have been granted to the more learned and which occupy well-nigh the whole breadth of written composition; the consequence being that a man who does not distinguish between proper and figurative utterance and likewise faulty utterance will rarely attain to a sure, and never to an easy, understanding of matters recorded in writing.

19.  That a knowledge of figures is exceedingly useful Grammar disposes also of tropes,a that is, modes of locution, as when for a justifiable cause a word is drawn from its proper signification to a signification not proper to it, in the case of metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche, for instance, and similar tropes which it would take too long to enumerate. After the manner of the schemata these tropes also are privileged, and the use of them is open only to the most erudite; as a result the law governing them is more strict, and does not allow them to wander too far away. For the traditional rule is that to extend figures is impermissible. If one is a studious imitator of the auctores in transferences and figures also, one must take care that the transference be not harsh nor the figure uncultivated. For the fairest virtue of speech

a 

Isidore, Etymologiae 1.37

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is clarity and ease of understanding,a and the justification for schemata is either necessity or adornment. For speech was introduced to set forth understanding, and figures were admitted to compensate by means of some benefit for what they contain which is at variance with art. A knowledge of these tropes is most necessary because, among all the things which hinder understanding, three above all are regularly singled out for reproach: they are schemata with the addition of oratorical tropes, sophisms which envelop the mind of the listener in a cloud of fallacies, and the diversity of reasons which exists previously in the mind of the speaker and, when understood, prepares the right way to understanding. For, as Hilary says,b understanding is to be derived from the causes of speaking; otherwise the Fathers will be wrangling even over the canonical scriptures, and even the evangelists will be at odds with one another, should a foolish judge look only at the surface of the words and not at the minds of the speakers. This certainly is the way of a perverse mind which disdains to make progress. Does not Solomon, not merely in the same book and on the same page, but even in consecutive lines, insist: Answer not a fool according to his folly lest thou be made like him; and: Answer a fool according to his folly lest he be wise in his own conceit?c And so the rules must be known, so that in the light of them it becomes clear what is correct in speaking and what outside the norm; for you will not correct what is wrong except against a rule, and no amount of enthusiasm will help you to avoid a precipice of which you have no knowledge. And among the rules I should say that there is scarcely anything more useful or more compendious than that part of the arts which, while marking the figures used by the auctores,d points out clearly the virtues and the vices of their utterance. Consequently I wonder why it is so much neglected by our contemporaries, since it possesses usefulness and compendiousness in the highest degree, and has been most thoroughly handled Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.6.41 Hilary, De trinitate 4.14 (Migne, PL 10.107); Book 3.2 below; Historia pontificalis 14 c  Proverbs 26.4, 5 d  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.5.1-54 a 

b 

166

I, 19-20

by practically all those who have written about this art. Donatus, Servius, Priscian, Isidore, Cassiodorus, our fellow-countryman Bede,a and very many others each individually deal with it, so that only through ignorance can it be unknown. Quintilian also teaches it,b praising it so highly indeed as to say that without it a grammarian has no entitlement to his professional name, and vainly aspires to knowledge of the art. The signification of words is to be investigated with considerable diligence, and careful attention directed to assessing the power of any given utterance in itself, and the power it derives from its adjuncts in a given context, so that the shadows of sophisms which cloud the truth may be dispelled. The reasoning behind the speech, on the other hand, must be weighed in the light of the circumstances of the speech, the quality of the speaker, the quality of the listeners, the place and the time, and other matters which in their various ways have to be given consideration by the careful investigator. Whoever diligently pursues these proposals, which are designed to counter the three impediments to understanding, will himself marvel at his progress in the understanding of things written and spoken, and will be seen to be worthy of the respect of others.

20.  In what matters the grammarian ought to be occupied The study of grammar is concerned with other matters also, not only giving consideration to the nature of letters, syllables and words,c but also taking note of metrical feet and syllabic accents, together with the shapes of those accents, so that one may know on which syllable a grave or acute or circumflex accent rests. In addition it separates units of sense by marks of punctuation, that is, figures which show the ending of a colon, a comma and a period; Donatus, Ars grammatica 3.5.6 (GLK 4.397ff.); Servius, Explanatio in artem Donati (GLK 4.447-448); Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 17.166ff. (GLK 3.192ff.); Isidore, Etymologiae 2.21; Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2.1.2 (Migne, PL 70.1153); Bede, De schematibus et tropis (Migne, PL 90.175ff.) b  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.5.7 c  Isidore, Etymologiae 1.17ff. a 

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in other words, where one should make a subdistinction, a medial distinction and a full distinction. Explaining the terms more fully we may equate the colon with a clause, the comma with a phrase and the period with a sentence which brings to a close the meaning of an utterance. Some scholars, however, in order to make the matter still clearer, state (whether rightly I leave them to decide) that the colon is where we generally say there is a point or an intake of breath, and the comma where we divide a verse, roughly at its mid-point, while the period is the place which brings the verse to a close when the utterance is fully complete.a There are also marks which distinguish modes of writing, which enable one to discover what they contain which is clear or obscure, certain or uncertain, and likewise many other features. This part of the art, however, has now largely fallen into disuse, so much so indeed that the keenest students of letters rightly complain, and almost grieve, that by the envy or negligence of our forebears a knack of the greatest utility and effectiveness both in remembering and in understanding subject-matter has died out completely; I mean of course the art of critical symbols.b No one should be surprised that those symbols had such power, when precentors also by dint of a few characters can indicate many differences of high and low voices. It is because of this fact that they term those characters the keys of music. If then those symbols contained so great a key to knowledge, it is matter for surprise that our forebears, for all their greater knowledge, did not appreciate that fact, or that the keys to so great a knowledge have been lost. Seneca guarantees that he will with the greatest ease teach the art of developing the memory,c and I could wish that that art had become known to me; but I have absolutely no recollection of his teaching it. Cicero in his rhetorical writings seems to have devoted attention to it,d but he is not of much help to the likes of me. There are extant, however, observations which we scarcely have sufficient ability to Isidore, Etymologiae 1.20 Isidore, Etymologiae 1.21 c  Not in any work of Seneca that now survives but in Cicero, De oratore 2.74.299 and De finibus 2.32.104 d  Cicero, [Rhetorica ad Herennium] 3.16.28ff. a 

b 

168

I, 20-21

learn, and less interest in learning. Nevertheless, we might derive very much profit from the rules of analogies, etymologies, glosses and differences, and from those rules which point out the faults of barbarism, solecism, and other features to be avoided, and which expound the reasons, based on licence and ornament, for metaplasm, schemata and tropes, explain prose rhythm, set forth the laws and elucidate the principles of quantitative versification, and enunciate the method to be followed in historical or fictional narrative. It anyone wishes to know the definitions and figures relevant to these kinds of writing, he should turn over the books written by the earlier grammarians, and, if he cannot have them all to hand, should see what there is worth knowing which he can cull from single sources. Not all of them are found useful in every respect, but each one of them is found useful in many respects; pretty widely available and praiseworthy for his careful brevity is Isidore, and, if it is not possible to obtain the whole of him, those seeking instruction in what to read will find very great profit in having at least this section of him by heart.

21.  Of the great men who have found pleasure in grammar and that one can no more engage in philosophy without grammar than if one were deaf or mute It is clear from this that grammar is not concerned with one thing only, but that it previously forms the mind to all things which can be taught by words, so that it can absorb them. Everyone should therefore contemplate the extent to which all other disciplines are indebted to it. Certain of our contemporaries think that it redounds to their own praise that they chatter without benefit of grammar, believing it to be useless and openly finding fault with it, their boast being that they have not spent time on it. Marcus Tullius, however, had no hatred for his son, from whom in his letters, as it appears, he used with great insistence to demand evidence of grammatical study.a Gaius Caesar published a 

Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.7.34

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books on analogy, knowing that without grammar no one could attain to philosophy, in which he was a great expert, nor to eloquence, in which he displayed great power. Quintilian so far commends grammar as to say that the practice of grammar and the love of reading is halted not after one’s time at school but at the end of one’s life.a For grammar teaches understanding and speaking, directs the accented modulation of speech, and at all points equips the voice itself, which we use in conformity with people and things. For there is one law laid down for pronunciation in lyric poetry, another in quantitative verse, and a third in prose, the first being melic, the second metrical, and the third significative. Melic law, however, has to do with music. Accordingly, the young Caesar poked fun at a certain party with the witty quip: If you’re reading, it’s a song; if you’re singing, it’s a bad rendering.b This is the point of Martianus in his De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii bringing on Grammar with a surgeon’s knife, a rod, and a box of medical salves.c With the knife Grammar clears away the defects of the mouth, and, in the course of her upbringing of the infants destined through her suckling, feeding and guidance to advance to the art of philosophy, scrapes their tongues, shaping them in utterance lest through barbarism and solecism they babble obscurely. With the rod she chastises them when they go wrong, and with the salve of probity and utility which flows from her she soothes the pains of the sufferers. She also makes the hand fit to write correctly, and sharpens the vision so that it cannot be blocked by the wall formed by letters in close array, or by a veil of manifold elaboration. She opens the ears, and renders them able to register voices both low and high, indeed voices of every pitch. If therefore Grammar affords so much utility, being the key to all that is written, and the mother and the judge of all utterance, who will keep her far from the threshold of philosophy except the man who regards the understanding of things spoken or written down as superfluous for the purposes of philosophy? Certainly, those Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.8.12 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.8.2 c  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 3.224 a 

b 

170

I, 21-22

persons who cast Grammar aside or disparage her make the blind and the deaf better suited to the study of philosophy than those on whom gracious nature has conferred, and for whom she ever maintains, the vigour of sense unexhausted.

22.  That he [Cornificius] defends his error by the authority of Seneca It is a great judge, however, on whom Cornificius relies for protection when he cites Seneca as the authority for his error. Now Seneca is quite properly commended by many people on two counts: he goes on at length in praise of virtue and in moral teaching, and he uses a clipped style of speecha which briefly and succinctly concentrates sententiae and glitters with verbal ornamentation, so that he cannot fail to please those who love either virtue or eloquence. Quintilian lauds Seneca’s wit but finds fault with his judgement,b declaring that he abounded in attractive faults, was more popular with juveniles than with mature scholars, and broke down matters of great weight into the most trifling aphorisms; as a consequence of which his books were described by one of the emperors as sand without lime.c With all due deference to Quintilian, I should say that among the pagan writers on morality there is not one, or only one or two, whose words or sententiae one may use with greater profit in every employment. To everything he has his own distinctive contribution to make. He is aware that the liberal disciplines do not make a man good.d For my part I agree with him, and hold this same view of other matters also. For knowledge puffeth up, but charity alone maketh a man good.e He gives less prominence to the arts, but without divorcing them from philosophical study; for not only philosophers are good men. The grammarian, he Jerome, In Ecclesiasten 3.18 (Migne, PL 23.1042) Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 10.1.125ff.; Policraticus 8.13 c  Suetonius, Caligula 53 d  Seneca, Epistulae morales 88.1-2 e  I Corinthians 8.1 a 

b 

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declares, is concerned with the well-being of utterance;a ranging more widely, he may concern himself with narrative writing; and at the furthest extent of his advance, he may concern himself with poetry. This is no insignificant contribution, but of the greatest value in shaping virtue, which makes a man good. Horace boasts that it was for the sake of virtue that he re-read Homer who, with more charm and more success than Chrysippus and Crantor, says what is noble and what ignoble, what useful and what useless.b That the poets are the cradle of philosophy is a commonplace. The view handed down from antiquity is that the liberal disciplines are so useful that whoever knows them fully can understand every book and every thing that has been written down, even if he has no teacher. As Quintilian comments,c these disciplines do no harm to those who pass through them, only to those who linger around them.

23.  The prerequisites for the exercise of philosophy and virtue and that grammar is the foundation of them Prerequisite for the exercise of philosophy and virtue in their every aspect are reading, learning, reflection and constant toil. Reading has as its subject-matter what is already recorded in writing, while learning for the most part concentrates on what is written down but from time to time advances to what is not written down but stored up in memory’s archives or given prominence in the understanding of the matter in question. Reflection extends even to what is unknown, often raising itself to the incomprehensible and exploring matters both revealed and concealed. The fourth, that is, constant toil, even if formed by existing knowledge and desirous of knowing more, nevertheless makes ready the path to understanding; for understanding is a boon to those who pursue it;d Seneca, Epistulae morales 88.3 Horace, Epistulae 1.2.3-4 c  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.7.35 d  Psalms 110.10 a 

b 

172

I, 22-24

and the heralds of truth, as it is written, announced the works of God and had understanding of His deeds.a The practice and cultivation of virtue, however, is naturally preceded by knowledge, for virtue does not run uncertainly or beat the air in the fight which it carries on with vice,b but it sees whither it aims and against what it draws its bow: it is not on a vague wild-goose chase armed with broken pots and mud.c Knowledge is the product of reading, learning and reflection. It is consequently agreed that grammar, which is the foundation and root of these activities, in an indefinable way sows its seed as it were in the furrows of nature, if grace precedes; and if grace is present also as nature’s fellow-worker, the seed grows into a sturdy crop of solid virtue, multiplying her increase so as to produce fruits of good works, from which stem the name and the actuality of good men. But only grace, which carries into effect good intentions and good works,d makes a man good, and it is grace above all other things which imparts to those to whom it is granted the ability to write and to speak correctly, and which furnishes them with various arts; and, when she is gracious enough to offer herself to those who need her, she ought not to be despised. For if she is despised, she justifiably withdraws, and the man who despises her is left with no place for complaint.

24.  Concerning the practice of reading and lecturing and the customary manner of Bernard of Chartres and his followers That man therefore who aspires to philosophy must set his hand to reading, learning and reflection, together with the exercise of good works, lest ever the Lord be wroth with him and there be taken away from him that which he seemed to have.e But because Psalms 64.9 not 63.10 I Corinthians 9.26 c  Persius 3.60, 61 d  Philippians 2.13 e  Matthew 25.29 a 

b 

173

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52

the verb legere is equivocal,a applying both to the activity of teacher and learner and to the occupation of one who studies writings on his own, we may call the former, that is, communication between teacher and taught, by Quintilian’s word praelectio, lecturing,b and reserve the simple word lectio, reading, for the latter, which abuts on reflective investigation. So then, on the authority of the same Quintilian,c the grammarian in his lectures will be required to cover even such minor matters as demanding to be told the parts of speech in a prose text and the distinctive characteristics of metrical feet which ought to be known in verse texts. He must unmask barbarisms and anomalies and features otherwise constructed in defiance of the laws of speech; not, however, so as to find fault with the poets, who because of metrical exigencies are forgiven to the extent of having their vices called virtues; for the praise of virtue is regularly forestalled by the boldness of compulsion, which can only at a cost be denied approval. He must point out metaplasm, schematism, oratorical tropes, and words which have many meanings, when these are present, as well as the different ways of saying this and that, and must with many a reminder fix them in the memory of his listeners. He must work systematically through the auctores and, without making the onlookers laugh, despoil them of the feathers which, like the little crow, they took from various disciplines and inserted in their own works to improve their colour.d The more the disciplines in which an individual is trained, and the more extensive his training in them, the more fully will he discern and the more clearly will he impart the elegance of the auctores. For those auctores, by means of diacrisis, which we may translate as imagery or vivid representation,e on taking up the raw material of a narrative or a plot or a fable, or any other theme whatsoever, adorned it with such store of learnHugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 3.7 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 2.5.4 c  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.8.13ff. d  Horace, Epistulae 1.3.18-20 e  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 6.2.32; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 5.524; Cassiodorus, Expositio Psalterii 30.11, 90.1, 125.4 (Migne, PL 70.210, 650, 925) a 

b 

174

I, 24

ing and such grace of construction and tastefulness that the finished product somehow seemed the very image of all the arts. For grammar and poetry infuse the work to their full extent, engrossing the whole surface of what is set forth. To this field, as it is regularly called, logic brings tints of proof, inserting its own modes of reasoning amid a sheen of gold, while rhetoric rivals the gleam of silver wherever persuasion or the lustre of eloquence is needed. Mathematics rides in the chariot of its quadrivium, and, following in the footsteps of the others, inweaves its own colours and charms in their manifold variety. Natural science, exploring the counsels of nature, brings from its store-room a multiplicity of lovely hues. But that branch of philosophy which rises above all the rest, I mean ethics, without which not even the name of philosopher subsists, surpasses all others in the grace of the loveliness which it confers. Turn over Virgil or Lucan, and in them, whatever may be the branch of philosophy which you profess, you will find a savour to season it. The fruits of lecturing on the auctores are, then, proportional to the capacity of the learner or the industry and diligence of the teacher. This was the method followed by Bernard of Chartres, the most abundant fount of literary knowledge in France in modern times, his practice in his lectures on the auctores being to show what was uncomplicated and mirrored the rule. He would set before his class the figures of grammar, the colours of rhetoric and the cavils of sophistry, showing in what respect a point in the text under discussion had reference to other disciplines, but without imparting all he knew in every lesson, dispensing rather a measure of his learning on each occasion as best suited the capacity of his audience. And because the splendour of an utterance derives either from its propriety, that is, when an adjective or a verb is elegantly joined to a substantive, or from transference, that is, when an expression is for a justifiable cause transferred to another signification, he took the opportunity of impressing this fact in the minds of his listeners. Again, because the memory is strengthened, and the intelligence sharpened, by exercise, he would urge his pupils to imitate what they heard, earnestly exhorting some, and dealing out canings and impositions to others. All of them were compelled each day to show up some-

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thing of what they had heard the day before, some of them more and some less; for among them the day after was the pupil of the day before. The evening lecture, called declinatio, was packed with such a wealth of grammar that if anyone spent a whole year attending those lectures, he would, unless he was on the dull side, have at his fingertips the principles of speech and writing, and possess a comprehensive knowledge of the signification of words in general use. But because no school and no day ought to be without religion, the subject-matter set forth was such as to build up faith and character, and by means of what was almost a kind of collatioa to inspire those gathered together to what was good. The final part of this evening lecture, or rather philosophical collatio, was stamped with the mark of loving reverence, commending the souls of the departed with the devout offering of the psalm which comes sixth in the penitential psalms, and by the Lord’s Prayer to our Redeemer. To those of the boys to whom preparatory exercisesb in the imitation of the prose writers or poets were assigned he detailed the poets or the prose writers and bade them follow closely in the steps of those writers, pointing out elegant combinations of words and prose clausulae. If any of them, however, had stitched on a patch from somebody else’s work to add lustre to his own,c he uncovered and censured the theft, but more often than not imposed no punishment. The boy thus censured, if his fault was one of inappropriate choice of words, he would by a modest concession command to rise up to a perfect reflection of the image of the auctores, thus bringing it about that one who imitated those who had gone before should himself be worthy of imitation by those who would come after. In his classes for beginners he would also teach and fix in the mind the virtues of economy, the praiseworthy qualities in fine themes and words, the right place for a spare, almost emaciated, form of expression, the moment when a copious style was commendable or excessive, and the point where all should be in moderation. He was at pains to recommend the rapid reading Benedict, Regula 42 Priscian, De figuris numerorum (GLK 3.405.11) c  Horace, Ars poetica 16; Matthew 9.16 a 

b 

176

I, 24

of historians and verse texts even to pupils who without any spur, as one might say, were put to flight, and with diligent insistence demanded from every boy something stored in his memory, as a daily obligation. What was unnecessary, however, he declared should be shunned, saying that what the illustrious auctores had penned was sufficient; for to follow up what some one even of the most contemptible of men has ever said is a sign either of complete masochism or of empty top-show, and it impedes and overwhelms minds which would be better off spending their time on other things. That which is better removed is so far not profitable as not even to be worth calling a good thing; for poring over every leaf and working through writings which do not even merit being read is as irrelevant as devoting labour to old wives’ tales. As Augustine says in his book De Ordine:a Would anyone endure one man being thought uneducated for not having heard of Daedalus’ flight, another a liar for having said that he flew, and a third for believing it, while the man who put the original question was not thought shameless? Or would he tolerate the experience which regularly moves me to commiserate with those friends of ours who are railed at for ignorance if they cannot give the name of Euryalus’ mother, while they themselves do not dare to call their questioners empty and inquisitive fools? Such are Augustine’s neat and true remarks. In consequence the ancients quite properly regarded it as one of the virtues of a grammarian not to know everything. And because in the whole programme of preliminary exercises given to those being educated there is nothing more serviceable than habituation to what must be done in accordance with art, the boys were accustomed daily to compose proses and verses and to exercise one another by means of mutual comparison, a form of exercise more valuable than any other for developing eloquence, and more commodious than any other for acquiring knowledge, one in fact which contributes very greatly to the enhancement of life, provided that such application is guided by charity and, as gains are made in the study of letters, there is no loss of humility. For the same man cannot serve the study of letters and the vices of the a 

Augustine, De ordine 2.12.37 (Migne, PL 32.1012-1013)

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flesh.a It was after the pattern of this master that my teachers in grammar, William of Conches and Richard named l’Evêque, a man of exemplary life who is now the archdeacon of Coutances, instructed their pupils for some time. Subsequently, however, when popular opinion did damage to the truth, and people preferred the semblance of philosophy to the reality, and the professors of the arts guaranteed their listeners that they would put across the whole of philosophy in less than three or even two years, William and Richard were overcome by the onrush of the ignorant horde and went into retirement. From that time on less time and care have been expended in the study of grammar. The result has been that those who profess all the arts, both liberal and practical, do not even know the first of them, without which it is pointless for one to move on to the rest. It may well be that other disciplines also contribute to proficiency in letters, but this one has the unique privilege of being said to make a man lettered. This proficiency is called litteratura by Romulus,b but litteratio by Varro;c and the man who professes or advocates it is termed litteratus. In antiquity, however, he was called litterator, as we see from the line of Catullus: You have a gift from Sulla the litterator.d From this it is demonstrable that the man who disparages grammar is not only not a litterator but does not even deserve to be called litteratus.

25.  A short epilogue in praise of grammar But because those boys of yesterday and the masters of today, who yesterday felt the teacher’s cane but today, all begowned, lecture from the master’s chair, argue that commendation of grammar proceeds from ignorance of the other arts, I hope they will listen patiently to what I find in praise of it in the Institutio oratoria, Jerome, Epistulae 125.11 (Migne, PL 22.1078); Policraticus 7.10 Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 3.229 c  Augustine, De ordine 2.12.35 (Migne, PL 32.1012); Isidore, Etymologiae 1.3.1 d  Catullus 14.9 cited from Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 3.229 a 

b 

178

I, 24-25

and, if they will, spare the grammarians who have done no wrong. What he [Quintilian] says then is:a No one should disdain the rudiments of grammar as being of small consequence. Not indeed that it requires much effort to distinguish consonants from vowels and then to separate the consonants themselves into semi-vowels and mutes, but those who approach the inner recesses of this sanctuary, as one may call it, will have revealed to them much subtle lore, which can not only sharpen the minds of children but also exercise the most elevated erudition and knowledge. Less tolerance is therefore owed to those who carp at this art as being insubstantial and unproductive. Unless this art has securely laid the foundations for the future orator, all that is built upon them will come crashing down. This then is the first of the liberal arts, an art needful to the young and a source of pleasure to the old, a delightful companion in solitude, and the only subject throughout the length and breadth of the curriculum which has less vain display than solid content.

a 

Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.4.6 then 1.4.5; also 1.3.18 and 1.4.1

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In the course of the preceding book I have I think adequately demonstrated that grammar is not without its utility, and that without grammar not only is perfect eloquence an impossibility, but there is no way open to those striving towards other branches of knowledge. Grammar must also be less rigorously interpreted, since it is not only subject and beholden to nature but also falls in with human inclinations. Even civil law also generally derives its vigour from its human constitution, and whatever is believed to promote the public well-being is equated with natural justice. However, we have not yet done with logic, since Cornificius, mangled though he be and to be mangled yet further, like a blind man groping his way along a solid wall, shamelessly assaults logic and even more shamelessly levels accusations against it. But the lover of truth at all events takes no pleasure in wrangling, and whoever delights in charity instinctively draws back from controversy. Whether grammar is or is not a part of logic I am not concerned to debate; for it is agreed that logic has to do with speech, indeed directs speech, even though it does not assess all the principles of speech. You who agree about the substance will form your own judgement about the name, and apply logic to all speech, or else confine it simply to an instance involving principles of speech. I have no apprehension about the verdict, since I trust both in the justice of my case and in the experience and integrity of my judge.

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Let us consider therefore whether logic is useful, and, despite the reluctance of my rival, measure its strength. In this undertaking my work is made less onerous by the greater readiness with which the hearer even without persuasion accords his support. For all vaunt themselves as logicians, not just those who have paid court to this branch of knowledge with some winning words, but those also who have not yet greeted logic even in passing.a

1.  That logic is beneficial to the whole of philosophy because it pursues the truth Closely to define the signification of the name, therefore, logic is the system of argument whereby the contemplation of wisdom in all its aspects is placed on a firm foundation.b For since wisdom is the first of all desirable objects,c and its fruit consists in the love of what is good and the cultivation of virtue, the mind must necessarily concern itself with the search for wisdom, and fully investigate individual things so as to be able to pass a clear and unbiased judgement about each single one of them. The mind, therefore, is engrossed in the search for truth, which, according to Cicero in the De officiis,d is the object of the primary virtue, called prudence. The three other virtues have useful and necessary functions attributed to them, but prudence is entirely bound up in the perception of truth and what one might call an adroitness in evaluating the truth. Moreover, the truth is fenced about by justice and protected by fortitude, while temperance governs the activities of the preceding virtues. From this it is clear that prudence is the root of all the virtues; and if prudence is cut away, the other virtues, like branches deprived of nature’s blessings, grow dry, wither away and perish. Will anyone embrace or cherish that which he knows not? But truth is the object of prudence and the source of the virSeneca, Epistulae morales 49.6 Cicero, De oratore 2.38.157 c  II Paralipomena 1.11-12; Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 1.1 d  Cicero, De officiis 1.5.15-17 a 

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tues; he who knows truth fully is wise, he who loves her is good, and blessed is the man who possesses her.a As a consequence, the most learned of our poets, pointing out the origin of the blessed life, says:b Happy the man who has been able to learn the causes of things, and has trampled under foot all fears, inexorable fate, and the din of insatiable Acheron. And another poet, more distinguished by his faith and his knowledge of the truth, writes:c Happy the man who has been able to see the clear fountain of goodness; happy he who has been able to loosen the bonds of heavy earth. As if they were to say, in other words but with the same sense: Happy the man on whom has been conferred the power of understanding things; for the more intimate his knowledge of what flows past in a moment, the greater the worthlessness of such transitory objects to a mind that is master of itself. No yoke of vices weighs down a man whom truth claims and draws forth from slavery into liberty.d For it is impossible for any man who with all his heart seeks and embraces truth to esteem and cultivate vanity.e

2.  Of the Peripatetic school the birth of logic and its originators 58

This is the origin of the Peripatetic school, which determined that the chief good of human existence lay in the knowledge of truth. The Peripatetics therefore investigated the natures of all things in order to know what in the universality of things was to be shunned as being evil, what despised as being not good, what sought as being simply good, what preferred as being a greater good, and what is allotted the appellation good or bad as the result of chance. So there came into existence the two divisions of philosophy, natural and moral, otherwise known as ethics and physics. But because inProverbs 3.18 Virgil, Georgics 2.490-492 c  Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae 3.12 metrum 1-4 d  John 8.32 e  Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 118.37 (Migne, PL 37.1531) a 

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experience in argumentation led many to draw discordant conclusions, Epicurus, for instance, who composed the world of atoms and void without God as creator, and the Stoics, who conceived of matter as coeternal with God and pronounced all sins to be equal, it was necessary to look for and make known a science which could draw distinctions between words and concepts and scatter the clouds of fallacy. This, according to Boethius in his second commentary on Porphyry,a is the beginning of systematic logic. For there was need of a science which could distinguish truth from falsehood and demonstrate what reasoning kept to the true path in disputation and what to a probable, what was reliable reasoning and what properly suspect; otherwise the efforts of the reasoner would not have been able to find the truth. And, although the Egyptian Parmenides passed his life on a rock in order to discover the principles of logic,b he had so many distinguished successors in his work that they have robbed him of almost all the credit for his discovery. Apuleius, Augustine and Isidore accordingly relate that the perfecting of philosophy stands to the credit of Plato,c who, to physics and ethics which Pythagoras and Socrates respectively had expounded fully, added logic, by which the causes of things and of behaviour could be discussed and the power of reasoning demonstrated. Plato did not, however, reduce logic to an exact technique, but experience and practice played the dominant role, being here as in other matters anterior to a set of precepts. It was Aristotle who finally discovered and handed down the rules of this art. He is the prince of the Peripatetics, praised by the practitioners of this art as its principal originator, and, while he shares other fields of study in common with their originators, he claims this one as his own of right, excluding the rest from its possession. I have written about him more fully elsewhere, but do not think I should here suppress By which he in fact means the Commentaria, the Dialogi being regarded as the first commentary b  Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 3.2 (Migne, PL 176.767) and 3.15 (Migne, PL 176. 775); Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 4.330; Walter Burley, De uita et moribus philosophorum 49 c  Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate 1.3.187; Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 8.4; Isidore, Etymologiae 2.24 a 

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what Quintilian says about him:a Why should I speak of Aristotle, whom I am uncertain whether to regard as more distinguished by his scientific knowledge or the quantity of his writings or his practised eloquence or the charm of his utterance or the penetrating perception of his discoveries or the sheer variety of his works?

3.  That logic is to be studied first by philosophers and concerning the difference between demonstrative dialectical and sophistic reasoning The Peripatetics then, observing that action may pass into habit and habit into technique, brought what had been vague and arbitrary under the control of fixed rules, excluding fictions, making good imperfections, cutting away superfluities, and in everything prescribing appropriate precepts. This therefore was the startingpoint and this the process by which was perfected the science of debate, which discloses the modes of disputation and the types of proof, prepares the way for those advancing in knowledge, and makes known what in an utterance is true or false or necessary or impossible, being later in time than other branches of philosophy but first in order of importance.b This science is to be studied first by those embarking on philosophy because it is the interpreter of words and thoughts without which no article of philosophy correctly advances into the light. But he who thinks that philosophy can be taught without logic would also banish from the cultivation of wisdom the reasoning aspects of all subjects; for logic presides over them too. To digress into myth, Fronesis,c the sister of Alitia, in the ancient view was by no means barren, but had a beautiful daughter joined to Mercury in chaste wedlock.d For prudence is the sister of truth, and through eloquence she makes fruitful and illumines the love of reason and science. This is what is meant by Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 10.1.83 Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 6.14 (Migne, PL 176.809) c  Theodulus, Ecloga 335 d  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.114

a 

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joining Philology to Mercury. Logic is so called because it has to do with reason, that is to say, it furnishes and weighs reasoning. Plato divided it into dialectic and rhetoric; but those who measure more deeply its effectiveness, assign to it a number of functions, subordinating to it demonstrative, dialectical and sophistic reasoning.a Demonstrative reasoning derives its vigour from strict principles and proceeds to the consequences of these principles, rejoicing in necessity and not much concerned with the view of individuals, but only with the inevitability of a view; it thus is appropriate to the philosophic majesty of exact teaching which is confirmed by its own authority, without the assent of the audience. Dialectical reasoning on the other hand is concerned with matters agreed by all or by the majority or by the wise, and of these matters either all or most or the best known and most probable or their consequences; comprised in dialectical reasoning are dialectic and rhetoric, for the dialectician and the orator, endeavouring to persuade, the one his opponent, the other the judge, do not think it matters much whether their arguments are true or false, so long as they have the semblance of truth. Sophistic reasoning, however, which is wisdom in appearance, not in reality,b affects the image of probability or necessity, not caring what is this or that, provided that the interlocutor is swathed in a cloud of unreal images and, as it were, shadows of deceit. Assuredly it is dialectic above the rest to which all men aspire but few in my judgement attain; and dialectic neither strives to achieve the authority of teachers nor is overwhelmed in the sea of civil affairs nor leads men astray by fallacy, but weighs the truth in a ready and tempered balance of probability.

4.  What dialectic is and why it is called dialectic In the view of Augustine,c dialectic is the science of correct debate; and this definition is to be understood in the full sense of Boethius, De differentiis topicis 4 (Migne, PL 64.1205ff.) Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi 1.164a.21 c  Augustine, [Principia dialecticae] 1 (Migne, PL 32.1409) a 

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the words – obviously so as to exclude from the category of dialecticians those who are aided by chance, without the benefit of technique. Similarly, that man is not a good dialectician who is quite unable to prove his intended point when it is true and can be proved. I say this with all due respect to the demonstrator and the sophist, neither of whom advances successfully towards the end aimed at by the dialectician, since the former does not possess probability and the latter turns his back on truth. But if each take the measure of his function, he is successful in his proof when he does not omit any of the contingents of his branch of study. To engage in dialectic is to prove or disprove by the test of reason some one of those matters which are debated or involve contradiction or are propounded in different ways. Whoever by technique makes one of these matters probable reaches the goal of dialectic.a This is the name given to it by its originator Aristotle, for the reason that in and through it debate turns on concepts. Grammar is about and in words, as Remi attests,b but dialectic about and in concepts. Grammar primarily examines the words used to express thoughts, dialectic the thoughts expressed in words; for the Greek lecton, as Isidore states,c means a concept. But whether it comes from the Greek lexis, meaning locution, as Quintilian is inclined to think in his preparatory exercises,d or from lecton, meaning concept, makes little difference, since to examine the force of a locution, and the truth and meaning of what is said, amounts to the same thing, or very nearly; for the force of a word is its meaning, and without meaning speech is idle and useless, I might almost say dead: just as the body is given life by the soul, so meaning somehow avails to give a kind of life to a word. The man who utters words without meaning is at any rate not speaking but beating the air.e

Translating Hall’s conjecture dialecticae not the transmitted reading dialectici (‘of the dialectician’) b  Remi of Auxerre, In artem Donati minorem 5 c  Isidore, Etymologiae 2.22 d  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 9.1.17 and 1.5.2 e  I Corinthians 9.26 a 

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5.  Of the subdivisions of dialectic and the goal of logicians But to return from species to genus, since certain general observations still seem to need to be made, the auctores divided logic into the science of invention and the science of judgement,a teaching that it was bound up entirely in divisions, definitions and conclusions; for logic is mistress of invention and judgement, and has, or rather makes, a craftsman skilled in drawing divisions, definitions and arguments. Logic, therefore, among all the other parts of philosophy, is distinguished by a double privilege, being invested with the honour due to the leading member, and carrying out the function of an effective instrument throughout the whole range of philosophy. For the natural scientist and the moralist make no advance in their assertions except by means of probative arguments borrowed from the logician. Not one of them defines or divides correctly unless the logician grants them the use of his technique; otherwise, their successes are the result not of science but of chance. For logic is based on reason, so that the very name reveals what progress in philosophy can be made by the man devoid of reason. One may indeed have the gift of clear thinking as a quality of soul, but unless one has the power to present a proposition according to reason, in the business of philosophy one comes to a halt before many an obstacle. Reason here is method, that is, a compendious system which formulates propositions and develops skill in handling them. The aforementioned disciplines associated with logic also involve these same techniques. For demonstration, dialectic and sophistry all consist in invention and judgement, and, despite differing in subject-matter or goal or mode of operation, they all alike draw divisions, definitions and conclusions, making use of their own distinctive methods of reasoning. The noun reason conveys a multiplicity of meanings, but here the function implied by the noun extends most widely, not being confined simply to that which is reason, but stretching out to include that also which only seems to be reason. To say nothing of its Cicero, Topica 2.6 with Boethius’ commentary (Migne, PL 64.1044ff.); Boethius, In Porphyrium commentariorum liber primus (Migne, PL 64.73ff.) a 

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other significations, this noun is used absolutely by grammarians of that which needs no attribute to make it intelligible, as in the case of God, unless perhaps for the sake of emphasis, as when we say Almighty God, to distinguish Him from idols, which have no power, or demons, which have very little. In this way reason is necessary or true, in contradistinction to reason which may be faulted by chance or by a lie. Here reason is, I think, whatever is adduced or may be adduced to establish opinion or to validate judgement; for opinion is for the most part in error, while judgement is always associated with the truth; that is if we use the words correctly, although in practice they are interchangeable. It is in this way, then, that sophistry also is rational and, for all her deceit, claims a place for herself among the branches of philosophy. For she adduces her own modes of reasoning, at one moment counterfeiting demonstration, at another feigning dialectic; nowhere does she declare herself openly, but everywhere puts on another’s clothes. For she is wisdom in appearance only,a and to establish an opinion she mostly adduces not what is true or probable, but what may be regarded as either. Yet from time to time she makes use of truth and probability also; for she is a dishonest quibbler, who often by means of tiny queries or other of her insidious tricks progresses from what is true and manifest to what is dubious and false. For she transforms herself into a minister of light,b and, after the manner of Neptune,c exposes to danger or ridicule anyone whom she leads away from the high-road. The philosopher, who employs demonstration, has truth for his business, while the dialectician, being content with probability, is busy with opinions; the sophist, however, is happy with no more than the semblance of probability. I could not easily say, therefore, that a knowledge of sophistry is useless, for it provides the mind with by no means negligible exercise, and is more effective in harming those unacquainted with affairs if it be unknown to them. For the one who knows is not deceived, and a man must blame himself if he is disinclined to a  Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 1.164a.21 with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.1009) b  II Corinthians 11.14 c  Cicero, De officiis 1.10.32

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avoid an eventuality which he has foreseen. But the man who does not embrace demonstration and dialectic is certainly no lover of the truth, and does not even seek to gain knowledge of what is probable. Of a surety, no one obtains virtue without truth, and he who disparages what is probable wins no approbation.

6.  That all men seek logic but not all attain to it From the above, therefore, it is clear that something great is promised by logic, which provides a store of invention and judgement, supplies the faculty of dividing, defining and proving, and is so important a part of philosophy that it runs through all its limbs like some breath of life. For all philosophy which is not geared to logic is lifeless. Deservedly, therefore, people come flocking to logic from all sides in such numbers that it alone keeps more men employed than all other workshops of that lady who orders men’s actions and words, and thoughts too undoubtedly, if they proceed correctly. The lady I mean is philosophy, without whom everything is tasteless and insipid, completely in error and displeasing to men of good character. All cry out to one another: Pox take the hindmost;a and the man who does not draw near to logic must live his life in a baseness which is unbroken and knows no end. Therefore, I too regard it as a source of shame, and of disgrace and danger, to be left behind.b For I should like to see the light which has been revealed to these heralds alone. I approach, and with humble supplication request earnestly that they teach me and, if it is possible, make me like themselves. They make lavish promises, but for the moment impose on me a Pythagorean silencec as regards the secrets of Minervad which they boast have been entrusted to them. They do however allow me, no, they command me, to chatter with them. For this is such persons’ form of Horace, Ars poetica 417 Horace, Ars poetica 417 c  Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 1.9 d  Ovid, Metamorphoses 2.749 and 755 a 

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disputation. At length, when after long association with them I am given a more kindly hearing, I press with greater emphasis, I hammer with greater urgency, and I entreat with greater emotion for the door of their art to be opened to me. We begin therefore with definition, and the logician teaches me to define in a few words whatever I want. He bids me set down first the genus of the subject concerned, and attach to it substantial differences, until they equal the convertibility of the proposition. For the highest things, because they lack genus, and the lowest things, because they lack differences, are not able to be defined. To them, however, is applied a description constructed from properties which are not found gathered together elsewhere. For without genus and without some substantial difference there can be no substantial definition of a subject proposed. And there you are! I have been fully taught the art of definition, and the logician bids me neatly define, or at least describe, any matter whatsoever proposed. We advance to the science of division, and I am instructed adequately to divide genus into species either by means of differences or by affirmation and negation. A whole integer is to be divided into the parts of which it is composed qua integer, a universal into its subjects, and a virtual into its potentialities. If a division of a word is to be made, either its significations or its moods must be enumerated. An accident I am taught to divide into its subjects, and am advised to make clear what things are susceptible of it; likewise a subject into its accidents, when it is possible to assign the diversity of its accidents, and an accident into its co-accidents, when they are shown to exceed and to be exceeded in proportion to the variety of subjects. Thus, with all brevity, I am instructed in two parts of this exercise. There remains the third, a more necessary part, if it can be had, and far more wordy, as it is taught, and that is the art of inference, which is of avail in confuting an adversary, or in demonstrating a truth in philosophy, whatever the listeners may feel. The precepts of this art are accordingly propounded in a few words, and I will set them out in even fewer, to save time and trouble. We must, then, to establish the credibility of the point under discussion, take great pains to advance some premiss from which that point may probably or necessarily be inferred; for example,

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genus vis-à-vis a positing of species, or that when one of two contraries is posited the remainder is eliminated. Thus do I advance, for I am a man of rather dull intellecta to whom conviction comes from listening –b though only rarely and with difficulty can I understand what I hear or read. Since, then, the rules are becoming known to me, I badger the more learned, who disdain ignorance of anything, to draw instances from texts and teach me the use of those rules. For it is no great matter for one who has the art of definition to run over the discoveries of others in definitions long since recorded. For if logic is definitive because it possesses some definitions, many other disciplines will be more definitive, because they abound in more definitions. The result is that those pure philosophers who pooh-pooh everything except logic, being as little acquainted with grammar as with natural science and ethics, take umbrage, and charge me with being malicious and stupid, a blockheadc or stone. What I have previously mentioned should have been enough to enable me to master the threefold faculty of their art. They also press me to pay the fee I promised. If I jib, asking in the words of the pagan poet: You call for your fee? Why, what do I know? they at once retort, in the words of that same poet:d It is the teacher who is proved to be at fault, then, when there is no quickening beat on the left side of the breast of the youth from Arcadia. Just so, they go on, everybody wants to know, but nobody wants to pay.e Fearing, therefore, to be stigmatised as an ingrate, I pay them back with learning for learning, and necessary learning for necessary learning. I convey to them a brief summary of rules, instructing them to acquire the use of those rules for themselves. And because I received three arts, useful ones moreover, I likewise teach three arts, even more useful. Let the first art then deal with soldiering and the second with medicine, while the third is to bring perfect mastery of civil law, decretals, and the whole of ethics. On every occasion, therefore, that you Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 13.25.21 Romans 10.17 c  Terence, Heautontimorumenos 877 d  Juvenal 7.158-160 e  Juvenal 7.157 a 

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have to join with an enemy, you must take careful precautions lest that enemy harm you at any point; and in the first conflict you must rise up to your full height against him and, yourself unscathed, inflict wound upon wound on him, until he either acknowledges you as victor, or, all unconscious, gives you the victory in the public estimation. In medicine you must above all diagnose the cause of the ailment, and heal and remove it; and thereafter restore and nurse the sick man with tonics and pick-me-ups for as long as it takes him to make a complete recovery. In your relations with your fellows, moreover, you must at every turn follow justice, make yourself lovable to all men, and, as the comic poet says: Without cause for envy find praise and friends well suited to you.a Need I say more? In all things clothe yourself in charity.b The use of these things is readily available to me, just as the practice of the aforementioned skills is readily available to them. They, therefore, are all the more wretched for not recognising their own wretchedness, as they deceive themselves, in their pursuit of truth bent on knowing nothing. For they do not seek the truth along the believer’s path of humility. Just so Pilate, on hearing mention of truth, asked what it was;c but, because he sought it in a state of unbelief, that proud listener turned aside from his instructor before he could be enlightened by the oracular power of the holy reply.

7.  That the jugglers of windy words must be untaught so as to know It is not, however, with the intention of assailing logic that I advance these contentions (for the knowledge of logic is delightful and fruitful), but to make clear that logic is not possessed by those persons who bellow at the cross-roadsd and teach in the highways, Terence, Andria 66 Colossians 3.12 and 14 c  John 18.38 d  Jerome, Epistulae 50.1 (Migne, PL 22.512) a 

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spending on this subject, which is all that they profess, not a mere ten or twenty years, but the whole of their lives. Even when old age sets in, enfeebling the body, blunting the sharp edge of the mind and checking all previous pleasures, it is logic alone which is on their lips and in their hands, leaving no room for any other form of study. These academics thus grow old amid childish things, poring over every syllable, no, every letter which is spoken or written, expressing doubts about everything, seeking always, but never attaining to knowledge;a and in the end they turn to empty utterance, not knowing what it is that they say or what it is about which they make affirmation.b They fashion new errors, and either do not know how to follow, or disdain to follow, the view of the ancients. They list the opinions of everybody, and in their poverty of judgement record and recall what has been spoken or written down by even the most worthless persons. They advance every proposition, because they do not know how to prefer the better ones. So great is the accumulation of opinions and objections that it can scarcely be known even to its own author. This was what happened to Didymus,c who wrote more than anybody: when he jibbed at a particular story as being fatuous, his own book was brought out which contained the story. But nowadays you will find many Didymuses, whose treatises are full of, no, packed with, logicians’ impedimenta of this kind. The word objections, moreover, is rightly used, because these people object to better studies, standing as they do in the way of progress. They do not even give an honest hearing to Aristotle, the only philosopher whom these jugglers of windy wordsd deign to recognise, when he says, with neatness and truth, that it is foolish to be discomfited when somebody or other advances ideas contrary to one’s own opinions.e It is related by Quintilian that a certain Timotheus, who was famous for his skill as a flute-player, used to demand twice as large a fee from those who had been taught by another as from those who II Timothy 3.7 I Timothy 1.6, 7 c  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.8.20 d  The word uentilatores is found in Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 10.7.11 e  Aristotle Topica 1.11 (104b.23) with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.917) a 

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came to him as absolute beginners.a For the labour is twice as great, the first task being to get rid of the faulty notions derived from the previous teacher, and the second firmly to inculcate what is true and right. Moreover, a man who already lays claim to the name of craftsman cannot easily find the humility to climb down to a lower level, although, unless he does so, he cannot make progress. Timotheus at all events had the right idea, for a pot will long retain the scent with which it was once impregnated when newly made, and every man when left to his own inclinations will run back to the game he tasted when first he emerged from the egg.b

8.  That Aristotle would have checked them had they listened to him There is, however, from time to time some benefit in this shortcoming: it consists in the fact that those who grow accustomed to such things, provided only that they are taught with moderation, develop a wide vocabulary, fluency of utterance, and a capacious memory. These are produced by this endless argument about everything, which also contributes a fourth benefit, subtlety of intelligence, a quality rendered useful by uninterrupted exercise. If, however, there is no moderation, all these qualities turn to their opposites. Subtlety is reft of its utility. As Seneca observes in the first book of his declamations,c there is nothing more loathsome than subtlety when there is nothing there except subtlety. And in a letter to Lucilius:d Nothing is sharper than a beard of grain; but what is it good for? Just such is the mind which frolics in subtlety, and nothing but subtlety, without a firm foundation in seriousness of purpose. It is this quality which in the Institutio oratoria is termed precocious, for it does not easily come to fruition.e In Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 2.3.3, 4 Horace, Epistulae 1.2.69, 70 c  Seneca the Elder, Controuersiae 1 praef. 21 d  Seneca the Younger (nephew of the elder Seneca), Epistulae morales 82.24 e  This sentence and the succeeding ones down to ‘…less and less admired.’ come from Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.3.3-5, who is taken over almost verbatim a 

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boys it is matter for praise, but in old men for contempt and censure. For it enables boys easily to do little things, when, carried on by their boldness, they at once reveal their capabilities, which, indeed, lie very close to hand. They string words together in sequence, and trot them out with gaze unabashed, not slowed down by any shyness. It is not much that they can do, but they do it quickly. Below the surface there is no genuine strength founded on roots struck deep. Just as seeds scattered on the ground shoot more quickly, and grasses, like ears of corn, grow yellow with empty heads before the harvest, so it is with intellects which aspire to subtlety or abundance without seriousness of purpose: they win favour when set against young years, but, when progress comes to a standstill, as it does thereafter, they are less and less admired. There was thus in Nisius Flavus, who, according to Seneca, used to declaim in Arellius’ school,a something beyond eloquence which enhanced his eloquence; in a boy, that is to say, who possessed eloquence; for his youth gave added attraction to his intellect. But not even abundance of words is for ever praiseworthy; for, as Sidonius observes,b there is no greater claim to fame in saying what one knows than in keeping silent about what one does not know. Cicero too is critical of words pointlessly uttered,c without benefit or pleasure to either the speaker or the listener. The words of the poet are entirely relevant here:d Poets desire either to help or to please, or to say what is simultaneously pleasing and of practical value. All the votes go to the poet who combines what is useful with what is charming. Loquaciousness too has its concomitant defects,e and a voluble tongue is of avail only when it is disposed to wisdom; for it is surrounded by moisture and quickly slips.f A little member it may be, but it fires the wheel of man’s nativity,g a  Not Nisius Flavus but Alfius Flavus, and not Arellius but Cestius (Seneca the Elder, Controuersiae 1.1.22) b  Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistulae 7.9.5 c  Cicero, [Rhetorica ad Herennium] 4.3.4; Cicero, De finibus 3.37 d  Horace, Ars poetica 333, 334 and 343 e  Proverbs 10.19 f  Persius 1.105 g  James 3.5, 6

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throws his life into confusion, and, unless checked by the curb of moderation, drives his whole being headlong. Is there, moreover, any point in storing up in the archives of the memory knowledge for which there is no use? Just as it is no part of one’s duty to dispute about mere trifles,a so it is silly and shows no discrimination to consign to memory knowledge which is brought forth without profit. Has anyone ever laid up treasure of useless leaves and ears of corn when the intention was to amass real wealth? Aristotle ought to have checked this immoderation on the part of those who identify indiscriminate volubility with the exercise of dialectic. And check them he would have, if they had listened to him. It is not necessary, he says,b to consider every problem and every proposition, but only those which occasion uncertainty to one of those people who are in need of reasoning, not of chastisement or common sense. For those who are uncertain whether it is right to reverence the gods and to honour one’s parents or not are in need of chastisement; and those who are uncertain whether snow is white or not are in need of common sense. Nor should one express uncertainty about things whose demonstration lies close to hand, or things whose demonstration lies very far away, for the former do not involve uncertainty, while the latter involve uncertainty far beyond the scope of the dialectical exercise. So Aristotle; but they, without taking heed of him, or rather in defiance of him, at all times and in all places debate equally about all things; it may be because they are equally knowledgeable about all things.

9.  That dialectic is ineffective if it is deprived of the support of other disciplines That eloquence is of no value without wisdom is a commonplace and a truism.c Consequently, it is clear that eloquence derives its value from wisdom. Therefore eloquence is valuable in proportion Horace, Epistulae 1.18.15; see p. 209 note b below Aristotle, Topica 1.11 (105a.2ff.) with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.917) c  Cicero, Orator 4.14 a 

b 

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to the tiny measure of wisdom which each man has acquired; if divorced from wisdom, eloquence is positively harmful. From this it is evident that dialectic, the readiest and the promptest of the handmaids of eloquence,a is of value to each man in accordance with the measure of his knowledge. It is of most value to the man who has knowledge of very many things, and of least value to the man who knows little. Just as the sword of Herculesb in the hand of a pygmy or a dwarf is ineffectual, but in the hand of Achilles or Hector fells all things like a thunderbolt,c so dialectic, if deprived of the vigour of other disciplines, is somehow maimed and largely useless, but if invigorated by the strength of those other disciplines is able to demolish all falsehood, and, to credit it with the bare minimum, is capable of debating all issues with probability. For it is no great achievement if, in the mouths of our contemporaries, it should revolve continuously about itself, turn about itself, explore its own hidden secrets, and involve itself simply with things which are of no value either at home or abroad, in the market-place or in the cloister, in court or in church, indeed anywhere except the schoolroom. For there the young, according to their capacity, which is slight, have much indulged them which in due course is eliminated by a more serious treatment of philosophy. When they reach years which are ripe for knowledge and for living, this treatment rejects not only childish words once indulgently countenanced, but very often whole books. This is what we are taught, under a cloud of poetic fancy, in the marriage of Mercury and Philology, which was contracted under the auspices of all the gods and is to be welcomed by men, to their advantage. For there Philology,d after ascending to the broad space of heaven and gaining the freedom of a purer state, is described as vomiting forth a store of books with which she was pregnant. It is very easy for each craftsman to speak about his craft; but to carry out the function of a craft in accordance with the craft is very difficult. Is there any medical man who does not talk often and at length Cicero, Partitiones oratoriae 23.78 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 6.1.36 c  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 8.6.71 d  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.136 a 

b 

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about elements, humours, temperaments, diseases, and the other matters pertaining to medicine? Yet the man who becomes well as a result of this talk might rather have fallen ill. Is there any moral philosopher who is not full of rules of conduct, as long as they remain on the tongue? But to give expression to those rules in real life is unquestionably much more difficult. Those engaged in practical handicrafts each of them talk easily of their crafts, but not one of them finds it so easy a matter to carry out the function of a mason or a potter.a It is the same with the rest. Just so it is very easy to talk about definition, proofs, genus, and the like; but to find those things in each branch of study in order to fulfil the function of the art is far more difficult. That man therefore who is burdened by a poverty of disciplines studied will not possess the wealth which dialectic promises and affords.

10.  On whose authority the preceding and the following observations are based

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When first as quite a young man I went abroad to study in France – it was the year after the illustrious king of the English, Henry, the Lion of Justice,b departed this life – I betook myself to the Peripatetic of Le Pallet, who at that time presided at Mont SainteGeneviève, a famous teacher and admired by all. There, at his feet, I received the first rudiments of this art, and, to the limited extent of my poor intellect, with all eagerness of mind snatched up every crumb that fell from his lips. After that, when he went away, all too hastily as it seemed to me, I attached myself to Master Alberic, who stood out among the rest as a dialectician of the highest renown, and was in point of fact a bitter opponent of the nominalist school. I thus spent almost two years at Mont SainteGeneviève, having as my teachers in this art Alberic and Master Robert of Melun (to give him the name he has won as a teacher in Translating Hall’s conjecture figulum in place of pugilem (‘a boxer’) which is pointless here b  Geoffrey of Monmouth, Historia regum Britanniae 7.3; Policraticus 6.18 a 

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the schools, for by birth he is an Englishman). The one of them, exact in every respect, found arguments to question at every turn, no surface, however polished, being in his eyes without roughness, nor any bullrush without knots,a as the saying goes. For there too he would point to a knot that needed untying. The other, however, was invariably ready with a reply, never declining a proposed subject in the interests of making an escape, but always opting for the other side of a contradiction, or, by determining that an utterance had manifold meanings, proving that there was no one response. The former therefore was subtle and expansive in his questioning, while the latter was penetrating, succinct and pertinent in his responses. Had these two sets of characteristics been united in some one individual in the measure in which they were found in those two men, it would certainly not be possible in our time to find a disputator of equal capability. For they were both men of acute intelligence and unremitting study; they would, I think, have attained to the highest eminence and distinction in the study of philosophy had they supported themselves on a broad foundation of literature, and had they followed in the footsteps of their predecessors to the same extent as they applauded their own discoveries. So much for the period during which I was attached to them. For subsequently one of them set out for Bologna and unlearned what he had taught; and then indeed came back and untaught it. Whether for the better must be assessed by those who heard him before and after. The other went on to advance in divine letters and won glory in an even more eminent branch of philosophy, with a name even more celebrated. Through my training for a full two years in the schools of these men I grew so accustomed to assigning topics and rules and other rudimentary elements in which the minds of boys are steeped, and in which the aforementioned teachers were most powerful and most ready, that I fancied I knew all these things as well as I did my own nails and fingers.b For I had unquestionably learnt, in my youthful buoyancy, to set a higher value on my knowledge than it was worth. I thought myself a rega  b 

Isidore, Etymologiae 17.9.97 Juvenal 7.231, 232

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ular little scholar, because I could give prompt answers in matters which I had heard. After that I came to my senses and took stock of my powers, and by the good offices of my teachers I purposely transferred to the grammarian from Conches, whose teaching I heard for three years. In the meantime I read a good deal, and shall never regret that period. Subsequently I attended classes by Richard named l’Evêque, a man of well-nigh universal expertise, wise but not immodest, learned but not voluble, true without conceit, and virtuous without any parade; all that I had heard from other scholars I revised with him, adding various matters relating to the quadrivium which had not been heard before, though I had up to a point previously heard Hardewin the German discoursing on the quadrivium. I also revised rhetoric which, along with various other subjects, I had picked up rather superficially from Master Thierry, and had hitherto only slightly understood. At a later stage I received fuller coverage of rhetoric from Peter Helias. And because I had undertaken to instruct the sons of nobles, who, when I was without support from friends and relations, provided me with subsistence – for God came to my aid in my poverty – the requirements of my duties and the demands of my young pupils forced me regularly to recall to mind what I had heard. As a consequence I came to be on close terms of friendship with Master Adam, a man of the most penetrating intellect and, whatever others may think, a man of wide reading, who devoted himself pre-eminently to Aristotle; I did not have him as a formal teacher, but he was kind enough to impart his knowledge to me, and to confide in me to a considerable degree, something which he did to no one else, or at most to a few pupils of other scholars; for he was thought to suffer from the affliction of envy. In the meantime William of Soissons, who later devised a siege-engine to storm the old fortress of logic, as his adherents claim, constructing unthinkable consequences and demolishing the sentiments of the ancients, learned the first elements of logic from me, and was finally transferred by me to the aforementioned teacher. It was with him perhaps that William learnt that the same thing exists after a contradiction,

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despite Aristotle’s objection,a for, when the same thing both is and is not, it is not necessary for it to be the same thing, and likewise, when something is, it is not necessary for it to be the same thing and not to be the same thing. For nothing emerges from a contradiction and it is impossible for a contradiction to emerge from something. In consequence I have not been forced by the impetus of my friend’s engine to believe that from one impossible thing come all impossible things. I was extricated from all this by straitened domestic circumstances and by the earnest requests of my associates and the advice of my friends that I should get to grips with my duties as a teacher. I duly complied. So then, returning at the end of the three-year period I came into contact with Master Gilbert, and heard him lecturing on logic and divinity; but all too soon he was taken away. He was succeeded by Robert Pullen, a man recommended alike by his life and his learning. After him I was taken up by Simon of Poissy, a reliable lecturer but rather dull as a disputant. These two men I had as my teachers in theology alone. In this way roughly twelve years elapsed during which I was occupied by a variety of studies. It thus seemed a pleasant idea to revisit the old comrades I had left behind, who were still detained by dialectic at Mont Sainte-Geneviève, and to compare notes with them about our old uncertainties, that by mutual comparison we might measure our respective progress. They were found the same as they had been, and in the same position; they seemed to me not to have advanced so much as a hand’s breadth. To the solution of long-standing problems they had not added even one tiny proposition. The goads with which they used to drive others now drove them. Certainly they had made progress – in just this one thing that, having unlearned moderation, they had thereby lost all modesty; so much so indeed that one might well despair of their recovery. I thus learned by experience, as may clearly be inferred, that, just as dialectic promotes other disciplines, so, if it remains on its own, it lies bloodless and barren and, if it does not conceive from some other source, it does not make pregnant the soul to bear the fruit of philosophy. a 

Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.4.57b.2-3

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11.  What dialectic is capable of on its own There is something, nevertheless, which dialectic promises and provides on its own, relying on the sole support of grammar. While not rising up to other matters, it resolves questions proposed about itself: such questions, for instance, as whether affirmation is enunciation, and whether a contradiction may exist simultaneously. But what this contributes to the needs of life, if it is not acting as a support to something else, must be for each man to judge. On the other hand, whether pleasure is good, whether virtue is to be preferred, whether the supreme good contains good conditions, and whether in need one should labour – such questions are rarely examined by the dialectician pure and simple. Yet it is on these questions that there turn the practical benefits to living, whether to gain blessedness or to gain security. Logic may well explain itself, but it was rather for other ends that it was invented. Therefore, much as the spirit of living creatures orders and invigorates them, controlling their humours and nursing them to animate life, but is born of those very humours, by its refinement and its vigour giving movement to the great massa and ordering it to itself, to the extent that it is not retarded by the harmful body, so logic takes its origin from other things, which it orders and moves, to the extent that it is not retarded by the harmful effects of inertia and ignorance. This is plain to those who know both the art of debate and other disciplines also.

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12.  In what things its exercise consists and what it uses as its instrument The exercise of dialectic is in evidence in all disciplines.b For its subject-matter it has the formulation of questions, but that formulation which is termed hypothesis, and which is involved in circumstances, it leaves to the orator. Circumstances, as enumera  b 

Virgil, Aeneid 6.726 and 731 Boethius, De differentiis topicis 4 (Migne, PL 64.1205ff.)

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ated by Boethius in the fourth book of his Topica, are: who, what, where, with what supports, why, how, and when. Thesis, however, which is a question freed from the constraints of the aforementioned circumstances, it claims for itself. What it is concerned with is more generalised speculation, and it is not strictly entitled to descend to particularities; if it ever happens that it does so, it makes use of another’s goods, as a guest might do. The instrument, however, which either form of dialectic employs in the service of its aim is speech. For that form of dialectic which sways a judge who is not one of the combatants employs continuous speech and, more frequently than the other, induction,a because it is addressed to a number of people and regularly seeks to win over the whole populace. This other form, however, employs intermittent speech and, more often than the first, syllogisms, because it hangs on the judgement of an adversary, and is directed to just one person. If it succeeds in convincing him, it achieves the end it aims at. It does not involve speech before the populace, or look for the arbitration of the law. Reason itself also, which is clothed in speech and moved by it as, with the support of utterance, it enters the soul through the ear, is likewise an instrument of dialectic. Indeed, it is reason which makes speech an instrument. For the virtue of speech is mind and sentiment, without which speech cannot have vigour or the power to move. So then, since the subject-matter of dialectic is questioning and its instrument reason and speech, the function of this art consists uniquely in making available the instrument and teaching the use of it. For other disciplines also join together in providing the subject-matter, since questions arise everywhere, although they are not to be answered everywhere.

a 

Cicero, De inuentione 1.31.51

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The three branches of philosophy,a therefore, natural, moral and rational, provide the subject-matter, for each of them sets forth its own questions. Ethics asks whether one should obey one’s parents rather than the laws, if the two perchance are in conflict. Physics asks whether the universe is eternal or perpetual or had a beginning and is in time destined to have an end, or whether it is none of these. Logic asks whether the same system applies to contraries, since their meanings are the same. Each of the branches thus asks its own questions, and, for all that they are fortified by their own principles, logic furnishes them all together with its own methods, that is, its compendious processes of reasoning. Logic is therefore of the greatest utility not only as a form of training but as a means of countering arguments and promoting study in accordance with philosophy. For a man who incorporates logical method in his plan can easily fashion arguments, and one who, knowing the opinions of many men, speaks on the basis of proofs drawn not from others’ experience but his own, can adroitly fashion counter-arguments, modifying whatever he feels not to have been well said; while he who pays attention to considerations of circumstances is in each single case more easily able to distinguish truth from falsehood, and is made better equipped to understand and to teach, as is required by the aim of the philosopher and demanded by his function. Since dialectic is of an enquiring nature, moreover, it controls the avenue to the principles of all methods. For each and every art has its own methods, which in figurative speech we may translate as approaches or avenues, enquiry is succeeded by discovery, and no one who fails to derive pleasure from the pursuit of enquiry sets hands on the fruits of knowledge. The methods sought after by demonstration, however, are necessary methods, which inculcate that inherence of things which it is imSeneca, Epistulae morales 89.9; Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate 1.3.187; Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 8.4; Policraticus 7.5 a 

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possible to dissolve.a What is necessary is that, quite simply, which it is impossible to be otherwise. However, because no one, or hardly any one, investigates to the full the powers of nature, and it is God alone who knows the number of things which are possible, judgement concerning things necessary is for the most part not only uncertain but even presumptuous. For who knows completely what is or is not possible? If she gave birth, she lay with someone or was violated – this assertion for many centuries was held to be necessary. Then finally in the fulness of time it was shown not to be necessary when the spotless Virgin gave birth. That which is simply necessary cannot in any way be otherwise, whereas that which is opined to be necessary may be changed. This very fact is demonstrated by Victorinus in his Rhetoricab as part of his explanation of the necessary, and he adds that corruption is a concomitant of birth, not necessarily but probably. Augustine too asserts that reasons which are necessary are sempiternal and cannot in any way be rendered void.c It is, however, an obvious truth that the reasons behind probables can be changed, unless those probables be necessary. From this it is clear how difficult of attainment is the goal of the demonstrator,d who always follows necessity and never departs from the principles of the truth which he professes. For if it is a great thing to discover the truth, which, as our Academic friends claim, lies hidden as it were at the bottom of a well,e how much natural vigour must be needed to penetrate not just the truth but the secrets of necessity itself? For the attribution of things which exist is easier than the attribution of things which are possible. In natural objects, therefore, by which I mean corporeal and mutable objects, the process of demonstration is very commonly found to waver, whereas in mathematical objects it grows in strength to fullest effect. For in the case of numbers, proportions, figures and Abelard, Ouvr. inéd. 242, 343, 346, 367 and 382 Cousin Pseudo-Marius Victorinus, Explanationes in rhetoricam (De inuentione) Ciceronis 1.29 c  Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus 83 46.2 (Migne, PL 40.30); see also p. 235 note d and p. 304 note a below d  Boethius, De differentiis topicis 1 (Migne, PL 64.1182) e  Cicero, Academica posteriora 1.12.44 a 

b 

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the like, whatever conclusions the process draws are true beyond all doubt and cannot be otherwise. Consequently no man who is unfamiliar with probables should aspire to the science of demonstration. The principles of demonstration, therefore, are necessary, whereas those of dialectic are probable. The dialectician will thus abstain from views held by no one,a lest he be thought a lunatic, and from views which are obvious, lest he seem to be groping in darkness,b and will concentrate simply on views known to all or to the majority or to the outstanding exponents of each one of the categories.

14.  More of the same

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So then, the principles of dialectic are probable,c just as the principles of demonstration are necessary. Anything which is both probable and necessary may appertain to both; otherwise it will appertain to just one of them. For the dialectician probability alone is sufficient. Hence Cicero’s words in the second book of the Tusculanae disputationes:d We who pursue probabilities and can make no advance beyond the likelihood which presents itself to us, are prepared to rebut without passion and to be rebutted without obstinacy. He also remarks in another passage:e Our Academy grants us this licence, that we may justifiably defend whatever probability presents itself to us. A probability is that which, even if only superficially, becomes known to a man possessed of judgement; when, that is, it becomes known in all cases and at all times, or is otherwise only in a very few cases or very infrequently. That which is always or very frequently thus, is either a probability or is thought to be so, even if it may be otherwise. And it is the more probable the more easily and the more certainly it becomes known Aristotle, Topica 1.11.105a.2ff.; also 1.100a.30, 1.100b.21ff.; also Boethius as in note d on p. 205 above b  Job 12.25 c  Boethius, as in note d on p. 205 above d  Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 2.2.5 e  Cicero, De officiis 3.4.20 a 

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to the man who has judgement. Some things, indeed, because they are so clearly illumined by the light of probability, are even held to be necessary, whereas others, because they are less commonly associated with opinion, are scarcely even counted as probables. If an opinion is tenuously held, it is infirmly based on an uncertain judgement, whereas, if it is strongly held, it passes into conviction and aspires to certain judgement. Should its strength continue to increase, so far that it can either advance no further or only a short distance, even though it falls short of knowledge, it is nevertheless equated with knowledge as far as the certainty of judgement is concerned. On the authority of Aristotle,a this is clearly the case in matters which become known only through sensation and may be otherwise. When the sun sets, it must remain unknown whether it still travels over the earth and is destined to return to our hemisphere, because then the sensation by which we had knowledge of its transit comes to a halt. Yet the belief that it travels on and will return is so strong that to a certain extent it seems to march in step with knowledge. But if sensation engenders knowledge of that which cannot be otherwise, for instance if one knew, because sight had taught one, that a line was long or a surface coloured, that knowledge does not vanish away when sight comes to a halt, because the facts must of necessity be so. Therefore that which is found separately in all or most members of a particular category, either must be determined to exist universally in all the members, or an instance must be given in which it is not so. By instance is meant the contraposing of something such as will impair the collective universality. An abundant knowledge of probables thus prepares an unimpeded way to every destination.

15.  What a dialectical proposition is and what a dialectical problem A dialectical proposition is that against which no instance, that is, no argument against the position, may be given since it is so in the a 

Aristotle, Topica 5.2.131b.19ff. with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.958)

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majority of cases.a The man who has such propositions, and any instances of positions there may be, in the forefront of his mind, will prove fluent against an adversary in every kind of controversy, and indeed, if he trains himself in the spirit of philosophy, he will enjoy no little success. For he is able to dispute with probability about every problem, in ethics, natural science, and logic. A dialectical problemb is a speculation which aims either at choice and avoidance, or at truth and knowledge, either on its own or in support of something else of this kind; concerning which either no opinion is held either way, or an opinion is indeed held, by the majority against the wise or the wise against the majority or within each of these groups by individuals against their fellows. The identity of the man responsible for this definition is made clear by the style, and the actual words betray the authorship of Aristotle. So too do the sentiments those words convey. For he did not count as a dialectical problem everything which comes within the confines of affirmation and negation, nor did he reckon that the man who practises the craft of logic should exercise himself in giving an airing to something which neither in itself nor by means of another component of the aforementioned disciplines is of practical value to anybody. For his words aiming at choice or avoidance, although regarded by some as referring simply to ethical questions, I take to refer also to questions of natural science. To logical questions, on the other hand, they either have no reference at all, or very little. For in ethics, virtue and vice and the like afford matter for choice or avoidance, and in natural science the same is true of health, sickness, causes, symptoms and the circumstances surrounding each individual case. However, questions directed towards knowledge and truth arise equally in all three disciplines. Whether pleasure should be chosen or not is an ethical speculation which is useful for its own sake. Whether the universe is eternal or not is a speculation of natural science which is of value in the quest for knowledge and truth, and, it may be, for other things besides; what I mean is that, when it becomes known that the universe is a  b 

Aristotle, Topica 8.2.157b.32 with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.997) Aristotle, Topica 1.11.104b.1 with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.916)

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created, we are led to venerate the author of so great a work, and, when it becomes known that it is transitory, it becomes worthless in the eyes of men of devout disposition, because in its entirety it is subject to vanity.a Whether one of two contradictory statements is always true or not is a speculation of logic, and to possess knowledge of this truth is of benefit elsewhere. Those persons therefore who constantly dispute about mere triflesb are not engaged in problems of dialectic, and they are as far removed from the subject-matter of the logical craftsman as they are from his function. For his subject-matter is the thesis or the proposition. A proposition is an opinion extraneous to some one of the things known in terms of philosophy,c for example, that all things are in a state of motion, as Heraclitus thought, or that being is one, according to Melissus. Nobody in his right mind will call into question a view held by nobody, or a view which is clear to all, or to those whose judgement holds sway.d For views of the latter kind do not admit of uncertainty, while those of the former will not be proposed by anybody. As a consequence I am disinclined to believe that any one of the liberal disciplines is of greater utility than that from which it is possible to advance easily and successfully to all parts of philosophy. For the man to whom probables become known is not found infirm in respect of any branch of knowledge.

16.  That all other professors of this art yield pride of place to Aristotle It is thus seen to be clear madness to disparage that discipline which instructs all others, and without benefit of which no one advances correctly in his philosophical investigations. A considerable number of philosophers have written about this discipline, men of the Romans 8.20 Horace, Epistulae 1.18.15; see also p. 196 note a above c  Aristotle, Topica 1.11.104b.19ff. with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.917) d  Aristotle, Topica 1.11.105a.3ff. with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.917) a 

b 

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acutest intelligence and highest dedication, all of whom, it is clear, are reproved by those who belittle this art. For to disparage a form of study is unquestionably to bring charges against its author. But one thing I do know, and that is that posterity will by no means give preference over those men to Cornificius. Aristotle, Apuleius, Cicero, Porphyry, Boethius and Augustine (to say nothing of Eudemus, Alexander, Theophrastus and other exponents of philosophy, who nevertheless are widely famed), all of them to their great glory raised high the banner of this art among other arts as it were in triumph. Each one of them, it may be granted, shines out because of his services, but all alike glory in the fact that they reverence the footsteps of Aristotle.a So much so indeed that he has by his pre-eminence, so to say, made his own that name which is common to all philosophers, being referred to by antonomasia, that is par excellence, as the philosopher.It was Aristotle, therefore, who reduced to an art the principles of probables, and, beginning as it were from the basic elements, carried them on to a perfect consummation of his objective. This is abundantly clear to those who examine and discuss his works. First of all he took from the hand of the grammarian significant words,b that is, uncombined utterances, and carefully expounded their differences and their potentialities, so that students might more easily move on to combined utterances and to the science of invention and judgement. But because Porphyry wrote a somehow more elementary book on this elementary book, it was the view of the ancients that he should be read first, before Aristotle. And rightly so, if Porphyry is rightly taught, by which I mean in such a way as not to shroud the students in darkness nor take up all their time. For it is not right that a man should spend his whole life in learning the five categories, so that no time is left him to advance to those matters for the sake of which he should first have been taught these. Since Porphyry’s book serves as an introduction to other matters, it is entitled Isagogae. Those persons consequently detract from this Isaiah 60.14; Statius, Thebaid 12.817 Boethius, In Porphyrium commentariorum liber primus (Migne, PL 64.71ff.) and In categorias Aristotelis liber primus (Migne, PL 64.159ff.) a 

b 

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title who so dwell on this book as not to leave a place for the principal matters, ignorance of which removes all reason for owing a debt of gratitude to this book for its services as an introduction.

17.  How badly it is taught and what opinions have been held by the moderns about genera and species Our contemporaries, however,a in order to show off their knowledge, teach their audiences in such a way as to be unintelligible to them, regarding each single letter of the alphabet as pregnant with the secrets of Minerva.b They thresh everything that has ever been said or invented by anyone and fork it into the ears of the young, with the result that, falling into the fault censured by Cicero, they are often less understood by reason of the quantity of their information than of its difficulty. It is indeed beneficial and of help to those advancing counter-arguments, as Aristotle observes,c to be familiar with the opinions of many scholars so that, when those opinions are in conflict with one another, whatever is felt not to have been well expressed may be rejected or modified. But the proper place for such things is not now, when what the beginners have a right to expect, as far as it is possible, is straightforward utterance and a brief and easy presentation of content. I will go further and say that, when the subject-matter is difficult, many of its particulars should be set forth more simply and more freely than its nature demands, for many things are learnt in years of youth which are eliminated by the later treatment of philosophy. The nature of universals, however, is set before the young by all teachers, who, contrary to the intention of the author, endeavour to unfold a most lofty matter and one which calls for greater investiga-

a  Abelard, Fragmentum Sangermanense de generibus et speciebus (Ouvr. inéd. d’Abélard 507-550 Cousin) b  Ovid, Metamorphoses 2.749 c  Aristotle, Topica 1.2.101a.30ff. John appears here to be using a different translation from that by Boethius (Migne, PL 64.911)

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tion. One teacher thus stops at sounds,a though this opinion has now well-nigh disappeared, along with Roscelin who espoused it. Another focuses on words,b misrepresenting as words whatever he recalls to have been written anywhere concerning universals. The Peripatetic of Le Pallet, my teacher Abelard, was discovered to have been of this opinion, and he left many, indeed he still has some, to follow and bear witness to this view. They are my friends, for all that they regularly so distort the captive letter that even a comparatively unfeeling heart might be moved to pity it. That one thing should be predicated of another they regard as monstrous, although it is Aristotle who is the author of this monstrosity, asserting very often, as he does, that one thing is predicated of another; and this is clear to his adherents, unless they dissemble. Another, again, concentrates on perceptions,c and declares that it is they only which are genera and species. Such thinkers grasp the opportunity offered them by Cicero and Boethius,d who cite Aristotle’s authority for thinking that it is perceptions which ought to be held to be, and be spoken of as, concepts. According to them, a concept is the cognition of each thing which is derived from a form previously perceived and which needs to be unravelled.e And elsewhere: A concept is a form of perception and a simple mental conception.f All that has been written is thus deflected so as to confine the universality of universals within perception or concept. Those however who are intent on things hold many different opinions.g This man, for instance, because all that is one is one in number, concludes that a universal either is one in number or else does not exist at all.h But, since it is impossible that essentials Anselm of Canterbury, Epistulae 2.35, 41 and 51 and De fide trin. (Migne, PL 158.1187, 1192, 1206, 259ff.); Abelard, Dial. 5, liber diuisionum et definitionum, Epistula ad Roscelinum; Policraticus 7.12 b  Boethius, Commentarius 2 in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione 5.11 c  Policraticus 7.12 d  Cicero, Topica 7.31; Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentariorum liber 3 (Migne, PL 64.1105ff.) e  Cicero, Topica 7.31 f  Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentariorum liber 3 (Migne, PL 64.1106ff.) g  Policraticus 7.12 h  Boethius, In Porphyrium commentariorum liber tertius (Migne, PL 64.110) a 

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should not exist, given the existence of things of which they are essentials, they once more draw the inference that, as regards essence, universals are to be identified with particulars. Following the lead of Walter of Mortagne, they thus divide things into aspects, stating that Plato, qua Plato, is an individual, qua man, a species, qua animal, a genus, but a subordinate one, and qua substance, a most general genus. This view has had a number of supporters, but for some time now no one has espoused it. Another scholar, emulating Plato and imitating Bernard of Chartres, posits ideas, declaring that nothing except ideas is genus or species. An idea, in Seneca’s definition, is the eternal exemplar of those things which are produced by nature.a And since universals are not subject to corruption, nor are they altered by the movements by which particulars are moved, where almost every moment one thing flows away and is replaced by another, it is with perfect propriety and truth that they are said to be universals. For single things are not deemed worthy to be designated by the word substantive, since they do not by any means stand still but rather flee away without waiting for an appellation. So much indeed do they vary in respect of qualities, times, places, and manifold properties, that their whole existence seems not a fixed position but a sort of changeable transition. In Boethius’ words,b however, the things which we say really exist are those which neither grow by addition nor are diminished by subtraction, but for ever guard themselves in reliance on the support derived from their nature. This support consists in qualities, quantities, relations, places, times, states, and whatever is found somehow or other united with bodies. When joined to bodies, these things do indeed seem to change, but in their nature they abide immutable. Just so, while individual things pass away, the species of things remain the same, precisely as the river in its flow remains the one we know, while its waters pass by; for its name remains the same also. Hence the observation made by Seneca, though it is not his own:c We descend, and we do not Seneca, Epistulae morales 58.19 Boethius, De institutione arithmetica 1.1 (Migne, PL 63.1080) c  Seneca, Epistulae morales 58.23 a 

b 

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descend, twice into the same river. These ideas, however, that is, these exemplary forms, are the primeval bases of all things, being subject neither to diminution nor to augmentation, but stable and perpetual, so that they cannot perish, though the whole of the corporeal world should pass away. The number of all things consists in these; and, as Augustine is seen to demonstrate in his book De libero arbitrio,a because these always exist, even if it should happen that temporal things perish, the number of things is neither diminished nor augmented. That which is promised by those who hold this view is assuredly great, and familiar to philosophers who contemplate more lofty matters. Yet, as Boethius and many other auctores attest,b it is completely at odds with the view of Aristotle, who himself opposes this view on a number of occasions, as is evident in his books. Bernard of Chartres and his audiences worked laboriously to reconcile Aristotle and Plato,c but they arrived too late, in my opinion, and gave themselves pointless trouble in attempting to make peace between dead men who had disagreed while alive for as long as it was given them. Again, another scholar, intent on giving expression to Aristotle, joins Gilbert, bishop of Poitiers, in attributing universality to native forms,d to which he toils to give shape. A native form is a copy of the original, existing not in the mind of God but inherent in created things. In Greek this is termed idos,e and it stands to the idea as a copy to its exemplar. In a perceptible thing it is perceptible, but the mind conceives it as imperceptible. In single things, moreover, it is particular, but in all things universal. There is also another scholar who, in company with Jocelin, bishop of Soissons, attributes universality to things gathered together into one, but withholds it

Augustine, De libero arbitrio 2.17 (Migne, PL 32.1265-1266) Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentarii 3 (Migne, PL 64.1106) c  As had Boethius before them: In Aristotelis librum de interpratione commentarii, editio secunda 2.3 d  Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaria in Boetii librum de trinitate (Migne, PL 64.1267) and Commentaria in Boetii librum de duabus naturis et una persona Christi (Migne, PL 64.1366) e  Seneca, Epistulae morales 58.20 a 

b 

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from single things.a When, however, he comes thereafter to interpret his authorities, he suffers the mortification of being unable in many places to endure the snarl of the wrathful letter. Then there is one who betakes himself to the reserves of neologism, not having sufficient competence in the Latin language. For, on hearing the words genus or species, he now declares that they are indeed to be understood as things of a universal kind, and now interprets them as modes (maneries)b of things. I have no idea in which of the auctores he found this noun and this distinction, unless perchance among the foreign words or idioms of modern scholars. And even there I do not see what it may signify, unless it be the accumulation of things, à la Jocelin, or a universal thing, though this is loth to be called a mode. For the word can refer to both, depending on its interpretation, since maneries may denote either the number of things or the state in which such a thing abides.c There are even those who direct their attention to the states of things, and pronounce them to be genera and species.

18.  That later generations always change the opinions of earlier It would take a long time, and not serve my purpose at all, were I to record the opinions, or the errors, entertained by individual thinkers, since, to use the words of the comic poet, there are pretty well as many views as there are people.d For the master who is willing to follow in the footsteps of his own teacher is a rarity, if indeed he exists at all: to make a name for himself, each man hammers out his own error; and it thus comes about that, while undertaking to correct his own teacher, he delivers himself up both to his pupils and to posterity, to be corrected or reproved. On the testimony of Boethius, In Porphyrium commentariorum liber secundus (Migne, PL 64.85); Abelard, De generibus et speciebus (Ouvr. inéd. d’ Abélard 523 Cousin) b  For this term see the De generibus et speciebus cited in note a above c  The De generibus et speciebus cited in note a above d  Terence, Phormio 454 a 

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For myself, I make no doubt that this rule applies to me too, that, in dissenting from others and professing my dissent in writing, I lay myself open to reproof from very many people. For one who speaks is judged by one man, or by just a few; but he who writes is the object of all men’s strictures, and exposes himself to the judgement of persons throughout the world and in every age. Not to be too hard on the teachers, I fancy that the majority of them dispute more often about the name than about the actual thing, though there is nothing less becoming to one who professes this art, since this mode of proceeding causes very great inconvenience to a man of serious purpose. As Aristotle says,a dialecticians of this kind should be altogether fearful of disputing about the name, unless it be impossible otherwise to dispute about the proposition. Certainly in articles over which there seems to be very great dissension people adopt one another’s interpretations, even though they may urge their ineptness. They thus in turn criticise one another’s wording but not the thought behind it.

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85

Granted then that I show indulgence to the opinions, in the matter of which even they themselves do not disagree, if their interpretations could be reciprocally subsumed, there yet remain a few particulars in which I think they merit no indulgence. First the fact that they place insupportable burdensb on the shoulders of their young listeners. Then the fact that in their teaching they abandon the proper sequence and take the very greatest care that each individual matter shall not remain in the place to which it has fitly been assigned.c If I may so express it, they read into the title the ultimate goal of the art, and Porphyry offers preliminary a  Aristotle, Topica 1.18.108a.34, not however in Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.922) b  Matthew 23.4 c  Horace, Ars poetica 92

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teaching on the import not only of the Topica but also of the Analytica and the Elenchi. Finally the fact that, combing in the wrong direction, as one might say, they proceed counter to the intention of the auctor, and, in order to make Aristotle more plain, teach either the opinion of Plato or an erroneous view which deviates equally wrongly from the opinions of both Aristotle and Plato. For all profess to teach Aristotle.

20.  The view of Aristotle concerning genera and species fortified by many arguments and by the testimony of many writings Aristotle, however, did not assert that genera and species exist, only that they are understood.a What is the point, therefore, of enquiring what genus is if it is accepted that it does not exist at all? For when something does not exist, it is foolish to ask what it is, or how large, or of what kind. Take substance away from each thing, and it is left with none of the other attributes. Therefore, if Aristotle is right in taking away their existence, it is idle effort for the investigation to go on to enquire into substance, quantity, quality or cause, since substance or quantity or quality cannot be attributed to that which is not, nor cause why that which is not is this or that, or so great, or of such a kind. Accordingly, we must either part company with Aristotle and concede that universals do exist, or we must counter opinions which associate universals with sounds, words, perceptible things, ideas, native forms and aggregations, since there is no doubt that each single one of these does exist. However, the man who determines that universals exist is opposed to Aristotle. There is no reason to be apprehensive lest the understanding which perceives them as separate from particulars be at fault, for all that they cannot exist separately from particulars. For the understanding at one time looks at a thing simply,b Boethius, In Porphyrium commentariorum liber primus (Migne, PL 64.8286); see also p. 226 note a below b  Aristotle, De interpretatione with Boethius’ commentaries a 

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for example when it looks at a man or a stone in isolation, and is in consequence a simple understanding; while at another time it advances gradually at its own pace, for example when it contemplates a man being white or a horse running; in which case it is said to be a composite understanding. Moreover, the simple understanding sometimes inspects a thing as it is, for instance if it should focus on Plato, and sometimes in another way, now by combining things which are uncombined, and now by separating things which cannot be separated. For a man who contemplates a goat-staga or a centaur thinks of a combination of man with beast or beast with man which is unknown to nature. That man on the other hand who thinks of a line or a surface apart from body, is simply with the eye of contemplation separating form from matter, for all that form cannot exist without matter. In this case, however, the understanding which separates does not conceive that form to be without matter – for that would be a composite understanding – but simply looks at the one without the other, for all that the one cannot exist without the other. This procedure does not impair the simplicity of the understanding, which is the more simple to the extent that it contemplates simpler things on their own without the admixture of others. There is no opposition here to nature, who, to make it possible for herself to be examined, has conferred on the understanding the capacity to separate things which are combined and to combine things which are separated. The understanding, however, which combines things which are separated is a futile one, whereas the understanding which separates is reliable, serving indeed as what one might almost call the workshop of all the arts. Things indeed have only one mode of existence, that one, I mean, which nature has conferred; but there is no one mode of understanding or signifying things. For although it is impossible for a man to exist who is not this man or another, it is nevertheless possible for a man to be understood and signified in such a way as not to be understood or signified to be this man or another. Accordingly, for the signification of uncombined things, the separating intellect may conceive of genera and species, although it would a 

Aristotle, De interpretatione 1.16a.16

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be a useless and futile labour to search diligently in the natural order for them apart from what is perceptible. For nothing such has been engendered by nature. But reason discovers them when it ponders in itself the likeness of substance which is found in different things, and, as Boethius observes,a defines the general concept which it forms on the basis of careful examination of the similarity between men in the terms an animal both rational and mortal. This concept certainly can only exist with reference to particular things. Thus, genera and species are not things alien from particular things in their actuality and their nature, but are what one might term mental images of things natural and actual reflected in the understanding, after the likeness of things actual, as though in the mirror of the native purity of the mind itself, mental images which the Greeks call notions (ennoiae)b or visions (yconoyphanae), that is to say, images of things which appear in the mind. For the mind, when what one might call the eye of its contemplation has been struck, finds in itself that which it defines. For the exemplar of the thing defined is in the mind, whereas the copy is in actual things. Just as when in grammar we say nouns which end thus are feminine or neuter,c we lay down a sort of general rule which is, as it were, the exemplar of many declinable words, while the copies are manifest in all words with that termination, so the mind conceives certain exemplars of which nature has fashioned copies which she presents to the senses. Those exemplars are thus thinkable indeed, being so to say the images and the outlines of things which exist, as Aristotle puts it; but should anyone attempt to apprehend them in an existence enjoyed separately from particular things, they slip away like dreams. For they are wonders,d and accessible to the understanding alone. The fact that universals are said to be essential to particulars is to be referred to the requirements of cognition and to the nature of particular things. This is Boethius, Commentariorum minorum in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione 1.5 and 1.2, and Commentariorum maiorum 2.5 b  Cicero, Topica 7.31 and Tusculanae disputationes 1.24.57 c  For example in Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 5.3 GLK 2.142ff. d  Pseudo-Boethius, Posteriorum analyticorum interpretatio 18 (Migne, PL 64.733): Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 1.22.83a.33 a 

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clearly seen in each individual thing. For things of a lower order can neither exist nor be understood without things of a higher. Man does not exist unless there be animal; and neither is man understood without animal being understood along with him, since man is an animal of such a kind. Just so Plato involves man, since Plato both is and is understood to be such a man or this man. However, while it is necessary for animal to exist in order that man may exist, it is not conversely the case that animal cannot exist or be understood unless man exist or be understood. For animal exists by reason of man, but not man by reason of animal. It is thus for the reason that such a thing requires such a thing but is not required by such a thing that, both as regards essence and as regards cognition, this thing is said to be essential to that. It is the same with individual things, which demand species and genera but are by no means demanded by them. For the individual thing will not have substance nor will it come within cognition unless there be species and genus, that is, unless there be or be known to be something of such and such a kind. Universals, however, are both said to be things, and, very generally, simply said to be; but we must not for this reason expect to find in them the mass of bodies or the fineness of spirits or the separate essence of particular things. For even matters which come under affirmation and negation are said to be things, and very often they are said to be truths, but yet they are not gathered together with substances or accidents, nor do they take the name of creator or creature. For, as is remarked by Ulger, the venerable bishop of Angers, in his Venalicium disciplinarum,a there ought to be free commerce in the exchange of words. Boundless goodness there is in the marketplace of the philosophers, and words are disposed of for nothing. Granted, therefore, that universals exist, or even, if this is what the persistent wish, that they are things, nevertheless, it will not for this reason be true that the number of things is increased or diminished according as universals are or are not in the number of things. Should one reckon up universals separately, one will find that they are indeed subject to number, but one in which the numa 

A work apparently not now extant

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ber of particular things is not aggregated. Just as heads are not counted together with colleges or corporations, or bodies with heads, just so universals are not added to particulars or particulars to universals with any increase of number. For number simply includes those things which are of the same kind and which nature has divided into single classes. Nothing, however, is universal except that which is found in particular things; despite that, however, many have looked for universals separately, but in the end not one of them has found anything in his hands, because nothing exists separately from particular things, except perhaps things like the true or probable significations of combined utterances. The fact that there are particular and corporeal copies of universals and incorporeals need not occasion disquiet, since every mode of action, in the words of Augustine, is incorporeal and imperceptible,a whereas the outcome of the action and the action by which it is achieved are for the most part perceptible. Therefore, that which the mind understands in a general sense and which appertains equally to many particular things, and that which the voice signifies in a general sense and which is equally true of many things, is without doubt a universal. But this too, the thing, I mean, which is understood and signified, must be interpreted without rigidity, so that we are by no means reduced to the confines of debate and the subtleties of the art of grammar, which, by its very nature, unless a special dispensation has been obtained, does not permit demonstrative terms to be unlimited. Nor does it allow relative terms to be vague, but restricts their signification by the delimitation of a person or his action or some other activity. A relative term is a term which signifies a thing as one concerning which speech or thought has preceded. Thus, when we say he is wise and happy who knows good things and honestly puts them into practice, the relative terms who and them, although not expressing a person, are in some way confined away from their infinity by the delimitation of the act of knowing. It is necessary, however, that there should be someone underlying the terms who both knows good things and puts them into practice and as a result is happy. a 

It is not known to which passage John refers

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That there should be nothing fixed and finite on which the relation falls does not happen without either a fault of language or a figure. Consequently, if a horse should be promised generally, and the one who contracts for the promise should say the horse which has been promised is either healthy or sick, since every horse is either healthy or sick, he is accused of talking nonsense, because that is not the horse which was promised him. I do not say is not because it does not exist, for even that which does not exist, the offspring of Arethusa,a for instance, is brought into the most binding of obligations, but because a species, that is, a distinct thing, does not touch the obligation of genus. When I say what is promised, what is signified, what is understood, and the like, something distinct is subject to the promise or the signification or the understanding,b if indeed the relation is a proper one. Relations in general terms do, however, occur, but these cannot be reduced to species without impairing the understanding of the truth: as, for instance, when we say the woman who saved condemned, the wood which provided the cause of death also provided the cause of life, and gentle Zephyr brings back the leaves which Boreas carries away. Just so in the cases I have mentioned I think that the relative terms are to be taken in such a way as not to descend to species, that is, to some definite thing which they distinguish, but remain on the level of genus. For example, that which is signified by this noun man is species, since man is signified and man is a species of animal. What is signified by this noun animal is genus; for animal is signified and animal is a genus of things. For the meaning of a word is that to which it descends, or that which the mind rationally conceives on hearing the word. And so he who hears this word man does not run through all men, since this is an infinite labour and exceeds his strength, nor does he stop at one man, since this is an imperfect procedure and has little to do with learning. Likewise he who defines animal as an animate substance endowed with feeling does not define some one animal, lest he laa 

Ovid, Metamorphoses 5.577ff. tells the story of Arethusa but there is no birth

b 

Translating Hall’s conjectural supplement aut intellectui

in it

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bour imperfectly, nor every animal, lest he labour to infinity. For the singular of these words does not simply signify or define something, but rather the kind of thing. For it is not simply this, but rather something of this kind. What Galen says in his Techne,a to the effect that medicine is the knowledge of what is healthy, what diseased, and what neither, is analogous. It is not, he says, the knowledge of all cases, since that would be an endless business, nor of certain cases, since this, in terms of science, would be imperfect, but rather of exemplary cases. Similarly Aristotle observes that genera and species in connection with substance determine quality.b They do not simply determine what, but, in a way, what kind of thing. Likewise in his Elenchi:c Man and every common noun do not signify a specific thing but a kind of thing in relation to something somehow or something of this kind. And shortly afterwards he says: It is clear that we must not concede that what is commonly predicated of all things is a specific this, but that it signifies a sort of thing or a relation to something or a particular size or something of such a kind.d Assuredly, it cannot be made clear by express signification what that is which is not a specific thing. From the standpoint of their nature things which exist have a definite end, and each individual thing is distinguished from the others by its own properties, yet very often the cognition of those same things is less finite and the conception of them somehow vague. No harm is done to them by the popular notion which is on pretty well everyone’s lips, to the effect that what appellatives signify is one thing and what they name quite another. Particular things are named, but universals are signified. Plainly, if one should look for a simple relation, which is generally the case, no harm is done to the preceding points. If on the other hand one seeks a distinction, it may perhaps not be clear what is distinguishing. It is laid down as a rule that demonstration produces the first cognition, and relation the second.e But cognition, when defining Galen (Galienus in John’s Latin), Ars medicinalis 2 (Kühn 1.30) Aristotle, Categoriae 5.3b.20; Boethius (Migne, PL 64.194) c  Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 22.178b.37ff. and 179a.8ff. d  Boethius (Migne, PL 64.1032) e  Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 12.4 (GLK 2.579) a 

b 

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a thing to itself, so far as it knows it, by what one might call its mental capacity, so confines it that neither the first nor the second cognition may advance, should the thing in question at all points present itself to the mind as infinite. For all knowledge or understanding possessed by creatures is finite.a It is only God, since He is infinite, whose knowledge is infinite; but He with absolute certainty defines things however infinite in accordance with His own end, which is infinite, and confines them by the knowledge and the wisdom of His immensity,b of which there is neither number nor end. We, however, advance according to our tiny human capacity, which claims not the first, nor the second, nor the third, no, not any title to knowledge of things which are infinite, except that they are unknown to the extent that they are infinite. Thus, every word which has demonstrative or relative signification is either not used sufficiently strictly or reposes on a subject which is certain and in its own way definite. Otherwise, words will be deprived of their proper function, since cognition requires that certitude be sought or held on to as the goal. Usurpation however is frequent, and there is regularly much use of impermissibles in the interests of convenience. Such use is consequently admitted not only to the sophistry of those who are content to growl about any matter, but also in order to fix an understanding of the truth in listeners of good faith. Every man loves himself.c Discuss this statement in accordance with the correct employment of relative words, and you will perhaps criticise it as incongruous and false. For not every man loves every man, nor is there an individual who is loved by every man, the consequence being that, whether the word every be taken collectively or distributively, the relative pronoun himself, which is subjoined, applies truthfully neither to the universality of individuals nor to some one of all men. It is therefore an unrestrained relation, and, as if it had obtained a dispensation from its law, it carries the conviction of a universal from the truth of particular cases. For since in individual cases it is true Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 12.19 Psalms 146.5 c  In the Latin, ‘ … of good faith, because (quia) every man … ’ a 

b 

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that each man loves himself, by a sort of distributive process it is also affirmed of the universality in general that every man loves himself. That is if the relation be taken in a less restrictive way, without the constraints of grammar enforcing either an inference of universality or the extraction of particular individuals one by one from the universality. Consequently, in the view of those who invariably insist on constraints and refinements, and in their discourses or lectures are unconcerned about the interests of good faith, this is rather a form of enunciation than the enunciation of a regular form. They make the same assertion also whenever there occurs a relation of the pronoun to the relative noun, because the pronoun, which is always either demonstrative or relative, plays the part of a proper noun;a if, that is, it correctly corresponds to the cause of first invention. For on occasion it is permitted to wander further afield. Thus when we say, if something is a man, that something is an animal, it is not so much the consequence of hypothetical utterance as a form of consequence in things expressed hypothetically. For that utterance is not related to man because of the constraints of debate, nor is there revealed elsewhere some definite thing to which it may refer. In consequence there is much importunity on the part of those who trouble the inexperienced or those of a more generous disposition, while themselves scolding without respite and persistently nagging, their toil being based on ignorance or impudence, or an eagerness to share another’s success. Therefore, just as cognition seeks for certitude, so demonstrative and relative terms, which engender either the first or the second cognition, repose on a fixed and definite subject, which they exhibit singly to the mind, if they are correctly employed. Granted, however, that appellatives signify some general state (for I take no delight in disputes, having long since professed myself an Academic in matters which to the wise man are doubtful),b although I can somehow dream what that state may be in which individual things are united and no one individual thing is, I am, nevertheless, not clear how it is to be reconciled with the view of Aristotle, a  b 

Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 12.3 (GLK 2.578) See also pp. 122, 294 and 324; also Policraticus 7.2

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who contends that universals do not exist.a The words incorporeal and insensible, moreover, which I have stated to be united with universals, are among them no more than privative, nor do they attribute to them any properties by which the nature of universals may be distinguished. For nothing incorporeal or insensible is universal. For whatever is incorporeal is either spirit or a property of body or spirit. If this does not apply to something universal, it evidently does not properly receive the name incorporeal. But what is incorporeal which is not a substance created by God or concrete with God? If, therefore, universals are incorporeal, they are either substances, bodies, that is, or spirits, or they are concrete with these, and by reason of their existence and what one may call their contact with substance, they are beholden to the Creator. Farewell, then, universals, or rather, death to universals, if they are not beholden to Him. By Him all things were made.b Certainly it is from Him that both the subjects of forms and the forms of subjects are what from their qualities or effects they are said to be, and that substance is substance, with quantity, quality, relation, location and time, possessing or doing or having something done to it; from Him as author through whom exists every substance, every property of substance and every part, and every composition of parts; it is from Him, moreover, that forms both substantial and accidental have their existence and their capacity to carry out their effects on their subjects. And so, that which is not beholden to Him is nothing at all; for although the Stoics posit matter as coeternal with God and declare that there was no beginning of form,c assuming three principles, matter, form and God, not indeed God the creator but God the conciliator of the aforementioned principles, and although certain others, who profess and affect to be philosophers but by no means fully attain to knowledge of the truth, falsely assert that there are yet more principles, there is but one principle of all things, from whom exists whatever is truly considered as something. For, as Augustine says,d God creSee p. 217 note a John 1.3 c  Seneca, Epistulae morales 65 d  Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 1.15 (Migne, PL 34.257) a 

b 

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ated matter already formed. Matter may indeed here and there be termed unformed, but it has never existed entirely without forms. It is investigation, therefore, not actuality, which reason serves, for the understanding pursues hyle, which is not unformed, nor indeed can it be or fully be understood to be unformed, by stripping away what one might call the layers of forms until it reveals its own nakedness, so to say, and its own inadequacy. For the power of reason somehow vanishes away in the vicinity of the principles of things. It is for this reason that Boethius, defining nature in his book Contra Eutychen et Nestorium,a says that it belongs to those things which, since they exist, can somehow be grasped by the understanding. Explaining the force of the defining term somehow, he says that this word is added out of consideration for God and matter, since human understanding fails in the examination of them. Matter, however, was created by God from nothing; and it is with matter that form is concrete, since it equally, and simultaneously, was created from nothing; with this qualification, that, just as priority of discrimination is left to form, so priority of existence is left to matter. For somehow form exists through matter, just as matter itself is distinguished through form. Form does not exist on its own, nor is matter separated without benefit of form. There will be chaos, or rather the sensible world will be nothing, if nature should compose the shapes of things without employing forms. That is the reference of Boethius’ remark in the first book De trinitate, to the effect that all being results from form.b This remark he confirms by subjoining examples. A statue, he says, is not called a statue after the bronze which is its matter, but after the form of Hector or Achilles which is imprinted on the bronze. Likewise bronze is not called bronze after the earth which is its matter, but after the forms which it has received from nature. Earth too is not called earth after the hyle which is its matter, but after the dryness and heaviness which are its forms. Everything therefore has its being or its quality or its quantity from form. But just as matter has the potentiality to be this or so large or of such a a  b 

Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 1 Boethius, De trinitate 2.152-153

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kind, so forms also have derived from their Creator their potentiality to make this particular thing, say an animal or a log, or to make it so large or of such a kind. But for all that science, which deals systematicallya with abstractions and by its subtlety disjoins things naturally conjoined, discusses these things by turns and apart from one another, in order to grasp the nature of composites the more surely and accurately, the fact remains that the one cannot exist without the other, for that would result in matter being unformed and form without subject being useless. Just so does the one thing call for the assistance of the other and enter into an amicable agreement.b Thus we are told that in the beginning there were created heaven and earth,c and then the ornaments of heaven and earth, and of the things which were placed between fire and water, those first foundations, as one might say, of the body of the world which were laid by God; and in this delineation of things mention is made of species. Not the species which logicians imagine to be not beholden to God, but the forms in which things first came forth into their being, and thereafter into the understanding of man. For this actual thing which is called heaven or earth is the effect of form. Likewise we read: The earth brought forth green grass,d and wood of such and such a kind, the intention of these words being to demonstrate that forms are concrete with matter, and that God is the creator both of the grass and of its greenness. For without Him was nothing made.e But, of a surety, whatsoever comes from one principle is one in number, and also good, nay, exceedingly good, since it comes from what is best. For God desired all things to be made like unto Himself,f according as the nature of each thing, as decreed by His divine disposition, had the capacity for goodness; and thus, with the approbation of God the creator of things, all the things which He had made were made exceedingly good. Therefore, if genera and species are not from Isidore, Etymologiae 2.24.14 Horace, Ars poetica 410-411; see above p. 143 c  Genesis 1 d  Genesis 1.12 with Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.12 (Migne, PL 34.273) e  John 1.3 f  Plato, Timaeus 29e in the translation by Chalcidius a 

b 

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God, they are nothing at all. But if each one of them is from Him, it is assuredly one thing, and likewise good. If something is one in number, however, it is at once particular. For the fact that certain persons talk of something as one, not because it is one in itself but because it unites many things, giving expression to the similarity between many things, does not detract from the present point. For that thing is neither immediately nor fully one, or it is simply particular. However similar to one another the works of God may be, they are all particular and distinct from one another, since that is what was ordained by Him who created all things in number to distinguish them,a and in weight to dignify their genus, and in measure to mark their fixed quantity, in all things reserving to Himself infinite authority. For all other things are finite. Every substance with its plurality of accidents is subject to number. Every accident and every form, likewise, is subject to number; not, however, through its participation in accidents or forms, but through the particularity of its subject. Similarly, it has its own weight, as a token of respect for the form, if it is a substance, or to mark the power of its effect, if it be form. It is for this reason that, among substances, we give preference to man over the brute beasts, out of respect for the form, since man is rational; and we give preference over colour to rationality, since it makes a thing rational. Measure, however, consists in the fact that everything is bounded by the fixed law of quantity, which means that no accident or form may exceed the subject, nor any subject exceed the measure of the accident or form. Colour, for instance, is spread throughout the whole of a body and is bounded by the limit of that body, while body is formed according to the quantity of colour, neither exceeding it nor falling short of it. Just so every accident is found totally in the totality of its subject if it belongs to its totality, and partially if it belongs partially, while every subject is coextensive with the limits of its accident. I have no fear about proclaiming this same truth of genera and species, indeed, though the world protest, I will declare it, that they either come from God or are

a 

Wisdom 11.21

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nothing at all. Dionysius the Areopagite also cries out with me,a asserting that the number by which all things are distinguished, the weight by which they are established, and the measure by which they are defined, are the image of God. For God is number without number, weight without weight, and measure without quantity.b In Him alone were created all things which were made in number, weight and measure. Hence Augustine’s remark:c The invisible differences of invisibles only He could weigh, who arranged all things in number, measure and weight, that is, in Himself, who is measure prefixing a limit to everything, and number giving species to everything, and weight drawing everything to stability, that is, bounding and shaping and regulating all things. In the works of six days, it is said, good things were created, each after its own kind, but yet no mention is made of the creation of universals. Nor indeed was there any need, if in essence they are united to particular things, or if Plato’s doctrine should hold good. Whence they might otherwise have their being, or when they began, I cannot recall reading anywhere. Therefore, in the view of Aristotle, universals are simply understood, while in the actuality of things there is nothing which is universal. For these figurative words have been bestowed in accordance with a mode of understanding, freely indeed and in systematic fashion. For everything which is man is this man or that man, that is, a particular thing. But since man may be understood in such a way that neither this man nor that, nor anything which is one in the particularity of its being, is understood, and since according to that understanding it is possible to debate about a subject thing, that is, to exemplify it in actuality, a thing which may be so understood, even though it be understood by nobody, is said to be universal because of the universality of the understanding. For things are similar to one another in form, and by deductive thinking about those things this very similarity of form is weighed by the undera  Dionysius Areopagita, De diuinis nominibus 4.4 (Migne, PG 3.697) in the translation by Johannes Scotus (Migne, PL 122.1130) b  Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 4.3, 4 and 5 (Migne, PL 34.299 and 300) c  The source of this remark eluded Webb as it eludes me. Cf. however Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 4.3.7 (Migne, PL 34.299)

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standing. Man is like man in that both are men, although they differ in their personal properties. Man differs from horse totally in species, that is, in the universal form of his nature, and, so to say, in his whole appearance, but he has this in common with a horse that both live and feel, that is, both are animals. Consequently, that particular in which men are united, being similar in the form of their nature and different in number alone, because, that is, this is one man and that another, is reckoned under the name of species. That on the other hand which is, as it were, an image common to different forms, is given the name of genus. Therefore, in the view of Aristotle,a genera and species are emphatically not something, but are in some way conceived as something, being what one might call certain figments of reason as it exercises itself with considerable subtlety in the investigation and science of things. And this it does dependably, since, as often as the need arises, it produces in things a clear example of its activity. Just so civil law is familiar with its figments, and there is no discipline which is ashamed to invent things which will enable its practice to advance, but rather each of them rejoices in the figments which are somehow peculiar to it. Farewell to species, declares Aristotle.b For they are monstrosities, or, according to the new translation, chirrupings, or, if they do exist, they have no relevance to reason. But although this may be our understanding of the Platonic ideas, yet, if account is taken of the equivocation by which entity or being is distinguished according to the diversity of subjects, we may not unreasonably talk in one way or another of species and genera. For reason persuades us to talk of the existence of things of which copies are seen in the particular things whose existence no one disputes. In talking of genera and species as the exemplars of particular things, however, we do not mean, as the sense of Plato’s doctrine intends, that there are exemplary forms which were fixed intelligibly in the divine mind before advancing into bodies;c rather that, if someone were to look for an example of the universal Aristotle, Categoriae 5.3b.20 Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 1.22.83a.33 c  Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 17.44 (GLK 3.135); Abelard, Introductio ad theologiam 1 (Cousin 2.14) and 2 (Cousin 2.109) a 

b 

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conception derived from hearing this name man, or an example of the definition conveyed by the words man is an animal which is rational and mortal, he at once has Plato or some other individual man pointed out to him, so that the reasoning behind the universal statement or definition may be given a solid foundation. They may also be called monstrosities (monstra) because they demonstrate (monstrant) individual things to one another, and are demonstrated by them. For the manifestation of things is now effected by things prior, and now by things posterior. Things which are more universal are also, quite simply, prior; for they are understood also in other things. But things which are particular are posterior. For the most part, however, things which are by nature prior and simply better known are less well known to us. For things which are more solid are more familiar to the senses, but things which are more subtle are further away from them. As Aristotle says,a since a point is prior to a line, it is also simply more evident. Just so a line is prior to a surface, a surface to a solid, and unity to number, since unity is the first principle of number. A letter also is prior to a syllable, and so on in other things. But our impression is sometimes contrary to this. For these things, that is, more posterior things, may be comprehended by any understanding, but those more prior things only by a subtle and abundant understanding. Consequently, although the assignment of posterior things is better accomplished by means of prior things, and the more correct procedure is to attempt this in every case, nevertheless, because of the impotence of the senses, it often happens under the constraint of necessity that prior things are explained by means of posterior. As, for instance, when a point is said to be the boundary of a line, and a line of a surface, and a surface of a solid; and likewise, unity is said to be the principle of number, a moment the principle of time, and an element the principle of speech. Genera and species are therefore the exemplars of particulars, but they are so more in the interests of teaching, if Aristotle is correct, than as a cause of existence. This monstrous contemplation of figments, if I may speak more boldly, proceeds as far as the a 

Aristotle, Topica 6.4.141b.5ff.

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airing of particular things; and although every substance consists of properties, the same accumulation of which is not found in any other thing, the work of the abstract understanding is to contemplate every thing in itself. For although Plato cannot exist without form and without place or time, reason looks at him simply as though naked, without regard for quantity and quality and other accidents, and names the individual. But even this is a figment occasioned simply by the needs of teaching, and one which calls for more subtle investigation. For nothing such is found in things; but such a thing is accurately understood. It may be that this is the reason for the observation in the Analytica, to the effect that Aristomenes is always intelligible, but Aristomenes does not always exist, because he is corruptible.a This thing indeed is uniquely individual which alone, according to some, may be predicated of a person. For Plato the son of Ariston is not an individual thing in terms of quantity, like an atom, nor in terms of solidity, like a diamond, and not even, they say, in terms of predication. For my own part, I have no strong views either for or against this opinion. For it does not seem to me to matter much, since I adopt that indifference to swapping words without which no one, I believe, can accurately reach the mind of the auctores. What is the harm if, just as genus is true from species, so this Plato who is perceptible to the senses be true from being the son of Ariston, if Plato is his only son? Just as man is an animal, so that man is Plato. In the view of some people, Aristotle seemed to have appreciated this when he said in his Analytica:b Of all the things which are, these things are such that in truth they are predicated universally of no other, for example, Cleon and Callias, and what is particular and perceptible to the senses, but other things may be predicated of them; for each of them is man and animal. Those things, however, are themselves predicated of other things, but other, prior things are not predicated of them. Other things, however, are themselves predicated of other things, and other things of them; as man of Callias, a  Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.33.47b.21ff. with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.677) b  Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.27.43a.25ff. with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.669)

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and animal of man. It is clear, therefore, that what is being said is that certain of the things which exist are born of none of them. For practically every one of the things which are perceptible to the senses is of such a kind as to be predicated of nothing except as regards accident. For we sometimes say that the white thing is Socrates, and the thing which is coming is Callias. To be sure this distribution seems inept unless it happens that a thing perceptible to the senses is predicated, but not of another, except as regards accident. For if it is predicated neither of itself nor of another as regards accident, there is no truth in the statement nor reason in the example. But if a thing perceptible to the senses cannot even be made subject, no one disputes that Aristotle is a liar or a trifler. And so here, as elsewhere also, he has carried out the task which befits the teacher of the liberal arts, acting the dim-wit, as the proverb runs, so as to be understood;a nor in the case of genera and species does he erect a difficulty which even the more learned cannot understand, let alone contrive to explain to others. From this dim-wittedness stem those remarks in the Topica:b All categories will either be species or individuals. For they are animals. For every single animal is either a species or an individual. In similar wise are those words of Boethius also:c Every species is its own genus. For every man is an animal, and all whiteness is colour. In accordance with this liberal definition, therefore, what prevents things perceptible to the senses from being either predicated or made subjects? Nor do I think that the auctores imposed this constraint on speech that it should be bound to just one signification amid all its combinations, but that they systematically spoke in such a way as at all points to subserve that understanding which is most appropriate and which reason demands should be adopted there above all others. This very thing, therefore, which is termed being predicated, derives from its adjuncts a number of modes of signification. It will, nevertheless, perhaps be able everywhere to designate some conjunction somehow, or some inherence. For when Cicero, De amicitia 5.19 Aristotle, Topica 6.6.144b.1ff. (Migne, PL 64.977) c  A reference which eluded Webb as it eludes me. Webb does however compare Boethius, In Porphyrium dialogus prior (Migne, PL 64.39) a 

b 

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utterance is said to be predicated of utterance, that implies a certain capacity for conjunction on the part of terms of true affirmation, and when utterance is said to be predicated of a thing, it is shown that such naming is appropriate to it. But the predication of a thing by a thing sometimes indicates that this is this, for example, Plato is a man, and sometimes that this participates in this, for example, subject participates in accident. Nor do I blush to admit that a thing is predicated of a thing in a proposition, even if the thing is not in the proposition, for I have in mind that a thing is signified by the predicated term of a true affirmation, through whose subject something is dealt with or something is signified. Consequently, I do not think that one should go against the letter, but make terms with it, and oblige it in admitting the indifference of the less restricted word; nor ought the reader or listener to snarl and snapa at every metaphor or use of what is believed to be an inapposite word. Habituate yourself, and you will bear what you badly bear;b he is plainly an ingrate, and of a disposition as impudent as it is imprudent, who reacts to every single word from the man who is teaching him and declines to obey him in anything. Let us therefore follow the figures of the auctores, and let us weigh each single word against the causes of an utterance. For it is from thence that a trustworthy understanding is to be derived. In addition, let the word for a thing have a wider extension, so that it may converge with the universals which, on the authority of Aristotle, are so understood in abstraction from particulars as yet not to have existence when particulars are withdrawn. For it is this, he says,c which is asserted by those people who say that genus is one in number. But that is done by those who posit forms alone, that is, ideas; and, as often as the occasion presents itself, he launches a vigorous attack on these people, along with their founder Plato. Consequently, although Plato has a great following among philosophers, counting both Augustined and a number of our conJerome, Epistulae 50.1 (Migne, PL 22.513) Ovid, Ars amatoria 2.647 c  Boethius, In Porphyrium commentariorum liber primus (Migne, PL 64.83) d  Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus 83 46.2 (Migne, PL 40.29ff.); see also p. 205 note c above and p. 304 note a below a 

b 

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temporaries as his champions in establishing the ideas, we by no means follow his doctrine in the contemplation of universals, for in this matter we profess Aristotle, the prince of the Peripatetics,a as the originator of the present view. The confession which Boethius makes in his second commentary on Porphyry,b that it is exceedingly difficult to adjudicate between the views of such great men, is indeed important; but one who embarks on the books of the Peripatetics must rather follow the view of Aristotle, perhaps not because it is more true, but simply because it is more suited to these disciplines. The people who seem to depart furthest from his view are those, on the one hand, who determine that genera and species are words or utterances, and those, on the other, who are divided between the aforementioned opinions concerning the investigation of things. All of these persons, indeed, in their childishness or stupidity wander further away than the Platonists from Aristotle, whose view they disdain to recognise. These remarks ought, I think, to be sufficient to show that Porphyry is unreliably dealt with, and beginners unhelpfully treated, by those who rehearse the opinions of all men about genera and species, and oppose all of them, with the intention finally of raising the banner of their own inventions, since this course is utterly at variance with the aim of the author, blunts the edge of the listeners’ intellect, and allows no place in the investigation to other points which it is equally necessary to know.

As he is called by Boethius, Commentarius 2 in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione 3.9 b  At the end of the first book (Migne, PL 64.86) a 

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Almost twenty years have now elapsed since the time when I was torn away from the workshops and wrestling ground of the professors of logic by straitened domestic circumstances and the advice of friends with whom I could not but comply. From that time on, to tell the honest truth, not even in passing have I so much as once touched the writings of the dialecticians which in the form of compendia or treatises or commentaries produce or maintain or modify knowledge. The reason is that in the meantime not merely different but even adverse preoccupations have so distracted me that I have scarcely had even an hour to spare for philosophy, and that, in a manner of speaking, a stolen hour. Since first leaving England I have on ten occasions crossed the Alpine ridges, and on two passed down the length of Apulia; on many occasions I have executed business in the Roman Curia for my masters and friends; and, as various cases have arisen, I have many times travelled around not only England but also France. Concern about the affairs of the household, the onset of worrying problems, and the demands of urgent business also contributed to prevent me from devoting attention to matters of scholarship. These considerations, I believe, provide me with an adequate excuse in such case as my reader shall find my expression lacking in precision or polish. My lack of verbal fluency or dullness of thought are to be ascribed partly to the above-mentioned causes, partly to time-

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wasting at court, and partly also to the underhand and shameless action of my adversary, whose relentless badgering has provoked me all unprepared and compelled me against my will to respond as best I am able. The words of the moralising poet thus have particular application to me:a Age takes away all things, including one’s wits; often as a boy I remember putting the long day’s sun to rest with song. But now those many songs are forgotten, and the voice itself has also fled from Moeris. Am I not therefore unfairly treated if I am expected to display the agility of youth, the enthusiasm of a mind in ferment, and a trustworthy memory, amid the great hurly-burly of affairs and at an age which is occupied exclusively with serious matters, except in so far as the seriousness is diminished or obliterated by the weakness of the flesh, or the neglectfulness of the spirit, or the wickedness which arises from these two through the promptings of sin? Undoubtedly the valour which anticipates its years wins approbation, but so too does the valour which still abides in declining age. Ascanius won renown by felling Numanus while still a boy,b and to Entellus’ claims to fame was added the victory he won as an old man in retirement over Dares the celebrated champion;c for it is a most glorious thing when nature is seen to give way to valour. I, however, although retired, and although safeguarded, did justice but take its course, by the privileges of both age and profession or rank, am somehow dragged out into the arena, and forced once again to enter the lists which I had abandoned and to which I had become unaccustomed. Harsh and dread terms are set before me, either to enter the conflict, which is not to my advantage, or, what is utterly ruinous, to concede and by a cowardly confession acquiesce in a falsehood. I have consequently preferred to reject cowardice, which alone, or above all else, is at variance with the intention of the philosopher. And because I have no supply of darts of my own, I employ those of all my friends without distinction. For I do not, in the manner of our contemporaries, neglect the equipment which is to be Virgil, Eclogues 9.51-54 Virgil, Aeneid 9.590ff. c  Virgil, Aeneid 5.362ff. a 

b 

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found at home, but lay hold on it with a familiarity all the greater for my knowing more certainly that it comes as the gift of trusty friends. For truth in things abides incorrupt, and that which is true in itself never vanishes away when attested by a new auctor. Will anyone who is not without taste or gratitude hold a proposition to be authentic because it was advanced by Coriscus or Brisso or Melissus, all of them alike unknown except to the extent that they are named by Aristotle by way of exemplification,a and reject that same proposition because it was put forward by Gilbert and Abelard and our friend Adam? I for one am not among those who hate the good things of their own times and begrudge the commendation of their contemporaries to posterity. Not one of our moderns, so far as I know, has asserted that contradiction does not exist,b or that it is impossible to move or to cross a stadium,c or that the earth moves because, in the view of Heraclitus,d all things happen to move; that Heraclitus who burns, as Martianus observes,e since he is wholly within the fire from which he contends that all things were originally composed. And these opinions advanced by the ancients have been accepted because they are ancient, while those of our contemporaries, although far more probable and reliable, are rejected because they are those of our contemporaries. Each man may say what he feels; for my part I consider that this attitude stems largely from envy, since each man thinks that whenever another receives some praise he himself suffers a commensurate loss. But I do not aspire to glory for myself, but for Him from whom comes whatever good there is in me or in others. I also desire honour for those who have given me that little which I know or opine (for I am an Academic); and I likewise do not blush to praise those who are the authors of my progress. For, as a  Coriscus: Diogenes Laertius, De clarorum philosophorum uitis, 3.46 and 61; Brisso (properly, Bryso): Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 1.9.75b.40ff.; Melissus: Aristotle, Topica 1.11.104b.22 and Sophistici elenchi 5.167b.13 b  As Antisthenes asserted according to Aristotle, Topica 1.11.104b.20 (Migne, PL 64.917) c  As Zeno asserted according to Aristotle, Topica 8.8.160b.8 (Migne, PL 64.1002) d  Recorded by Aristotle, Topica 1.11.104b.21 (Migne, PL 64.917) e  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.213

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Pliny says,a it is a praiseworthy characteristic of a good mind to acknowledge those through whom one has made progress. Those persons also, who now disparage this attitude on my part, will one day, if God so authorises, be praised as the authors of good things, for the glory of virtue awaits them, and, by the goodness of time, the envy of contemporaries will vanish away. So then, let my discourse advance, and in compendious form run over those matters which occur to a memory now grown old concerning the studies of my youth – for it was a joyous period that is thus brought back to mind – and, in the pleasure of renewed acquaintance, reflect upon the auctores who should be read above all others, and how they should be read. Whatever I may have omitted, however, or misrepresented, should be ascribed to forgetfulness, the passage of time, and the encroachments of business.

1.  How Porphyry and other books should be read My own personal view is that every book should be read in such a way that a knowledge of what is recorded in it be gained with all possible facility. One should not look for an opportunity to introduce difficulties, but rather, at all points, make the matter easy. This, I recall, was the course habitually followed by the Peripatetic of Le Pallet. It was as a result of this, I fancy, and I say it with all due respect to his adherents, that he inclined to a childish view of genera and species, preferring to instruct and advance his pupils in childish things rather than to be less than clear amid the weighty concerns of philosophy. He was most anxious to put into practice Augustine’s universal precept,b by which I mean that he served as the means to an understanding of things. Porphyry is accordingly to be read in such a way that the signification of the utterance under consideration be grasped and the meaning of the words superficially comprehended. In this way Porphyry will be an adequate introduction, being distinguished by ease and brevity. By way of a  b 

Pliny, Historia naturalis praef. 21 Augustine, De magistro (Migne, PL 32.1193)

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introduction, therefore, let it suffice to know that the word genus has many meanings,a in its first intention signifying the principle of generation, that is, the parent from whom or the place in which someone was born. So Polynices, when asked by Adrastus about his genus, replies, incorporating both aspects: My ancestors stem from Cadmus, and my land is Thebes dear to Mars.b From this the word is then transferred to signify that which is predicated of some one of the things which differ in species.c Likewise the word species has many meanings,d in its first intention signifying the form which consists in the features of limbs; consequently the word speciosus (beautiful) means the same as the word formosus.e From this, however, it is transferred to signify that which is predicated of some one of the things which differ in number. It is thus established that these are not words of secondary intention, but, while being of first intention, are by transference called to another signification; and this, happening as it does not in the interests of ornamentation but out of necessity, is tantamount to equivocation. Boethius attaches a third signification to this same word,f when he says that the substantial form of a species, for example humanity, is called the species of man. This species, however, he describes as subtle, and asserts that it was deliberately passed over by Porphyry in order not to slow down the minds of those receiving introductory instruction by an excess of weighty information. What, then, can be the intention of those who, contrary to the purpose of the auctor, throw in not only such weighty information but anything else that they can think up? Just this, I believe, that they should give the impression of knowing much and speaking well, when in fact what they have achieved is to be less understood. The same is to be done in the case of the words difference, property and accident. The significations of the words are to be set forth simply, that signification which accords with the proposiAs was taught by Porphyry in his Isagoge Statius, Thebaid 1.680 c  Porphyry in Boethius’ translation d  Boethius, In Porphyrium dialogus prior (Migne, PL 64.37ff.) e  Here Boethius corrects Marius Victorinus (Migne, PL 64.37) f  Boethius, In Porphyrium commentariorum liber tertius (Migne, PL 64.99) a 

b 

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tion is to be grasped by means of the most exact descriptions, and then should follow the divisions of each single word. Finally the differences between each single word and every other word are to be superficially assigned, as they occur; and your reading of Porphyry is complete. For the text is to be gently shaken, not harshly tortured like a captive until it give up what it did not take in. That master, on the other hand, is excessively severe and unyielding,a taking up what has not been laid down and reaping what has not been sown, who compels Porphyry to settle the debts of all the philosophers, and who is only satisfied if Porphyry’s little book teaches everything which is anywhere found written down. Surely truth is the friend of simplicity, and he who calls in what is not owed very often ceases to deserve to receive that which was owed. Whatever is indicated by the surface of the text should for now be revered as sacrosanct by the careful and sensible reader, until, through the teaching of another or through the revelation of the Lord, the truth become more fully and more intimately known to him. For what one man teaches with care and profit, another, with equal care and profit, unteaches. For the function of one who teaches correctly is, with due consideration for the time and the person, to dispense what he knows to be of benefit to each. Porphyry asserts that body is the genus of man, since it is also that of animal.b Aristotle, however, teaches the opposite of this,c clearing away the error of those who opine that genus is predicated of species in terms of something; for predication of species is not made in terms of something. From this it is clear that what is visible or sensible is not the genus of animal; for they are predicated in terms of something, that is, in terms of body not soul; wherefore, he says,d body will not be the genus of animal, because it is a part. For in no way is a part predicated of the whole; assuming, that is, that the locution is a proper one; for in figurative speech there is no restriction. Certainly, in the grammatical tradition there is a figurative manner of speech called synecdoche in which the word Luke 19.21 In his Isagoge c  Aristotle, Topica 4.5.126a.17ff. in Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL64.950) d  Aristotle, Topica 4.5.126a.28 (Migne, PL 64.950) a 

b 

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for a whole is attributed to a part and, similarly, the word for a part to a whole.a For a thing is often given the word for a more elevated or better known part of itself. Consequently, man, who consists of soul and body, and, as is attested by Cicero, Apuleius and, more importantly, Jerome and Augustine,b as well as many others both Christian and pagan, is no more body than he is soul, but somehow less, is in the general usage known by the word body, since that part of him is more in evidence and better known to the senses. But it is equally true, although accepted only by philosophers, that he is soul; yet it does not follow because of this that he is incorporeal, since, as Abelard used to say, negation is more powerful. Abelard was also wont to restrain the advance of figurative speech, since it is impermissible to extend figures which are themselves not accepted except when expediency demands. No genus, however, is predicated, figuratively or by transference, of species. For it is always and properly true of all of that thing of which it is genus. I may add that if something crops up not just in Porphyry but in any piece of writing which is rather difficult to understand, the reader or listener should not at once be put off, but should press on, for the auctores interpret one another, and each single piece of writing in turn throws light on others, with the result that he who reads a great deal finds little or nothing that is hidden from him.

2.  Concerning the utility of the Categoriae and the tools they furnish Aristotle’s book entitled Categoriae is an elementary one, and in a way captures the infancy of those advancing towards logic. For it deals with uncombined wordsc in respect of their signifying Donatus, Ars grammatica 3.6 (GLK 4.400) Cicero, De finibus 4.10.25 and 5.12.34; Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate 1.13; Jerome, Aduersus Iouinianum 2.10 (Migne, PL 23.299); Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 10.6 and Epistulae 3.4 (Migne, PL 33.65) c  Aristotle, Categoriae 2.1a.16 with Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis commentarius 1 (Migne, PL 64.168) a 

b 

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things, a subject which for the dialectician comes before all others. It begins with equivocals, univocals and derivatives,a since a knowledge of them is absolutely necessary for one who defines, divides and infers. For equivocation, if undetected, imports many errors, and hinders men in their business if one of them does not know in which direction another is directing his understanding. But once it has been made clear, as Aristotle says,b in how many ways a term may be expressed and with what reference it may be employed,c the interrogator will be thought ridiculous if he does not direct his argument to this reference. It is useful, moreover, both for avoiding false reasoning and for engaging in it. For if we know how many meanings a term has, we shall not be misled by false reasoning, but will know if the questioner is not directing his argument to the same reference, and in our own questions will be able to mislead on all occasions, if some of the many meanings are true and others false, unless the respondent also knows how many meanings there are. The knowledge of univocals and derivatives is also so necessary that these three, that is, equivocals, univocals and derivatives, are asserted by Isidore to be the tools of the Categoriae.d For whatsoever things are predicated are applied to their subjects either equivocally or univocally or derivatively. Equivocally if they are not applied in the same sense, univocally if they are, and derivatively if not in absolutely the same nor absolutely another, but with the understanding of the words lying near at hand in what one might call the neighbourhood, while the conformity of the word also remains. Thus, a man is called good from goodness, and brave from bravery,e so that from the very form of the words their understanding, which is somehow adjacent, may be inferred. Consequently, in the opinion of many, derivatives and things from which they are derived primarily have the same signification, but a different consignification. Bernard of Chartres used to say that albedo (whiteness) signifies an incorrupt virgin, albet Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis commentarius 1 (Migne, PL 64.163ff.) Aristotle, Topica 1.18.108a.24ff. (Migne, PL 64.922) c  Translating Hall’s conjecture ponatur for ponat d  Isidore, Etymologiae 2.26.2 e  Aristotle, Categoriae 1a.14 (Migne, PL 64.167) a 

b 

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(she is white) the same female entering the marriage chamber or lying on the marriage bed, but album (a white thing) the same female, but corrupted. He said this because, in his contention, albedo signifies the quality itself, simply and without any involvement of a subject, that is, a species of colour having the quality of penetrating the sight.a albet, however, primarily signifies the same quality, but admits the involvement of a person. For if one examines what it is that the word signifies in terms of substance, the quality of whiteness will occur to mind, but one will find the person in the accidents of the verb. album, however, signifies that same quality, but infused in and mingled with substance, and now somehow more corrupted. For in terms of substance the word itself signifies a subject of whiteness, and in terms of quality the colour of a white subject. Moreover, Bernard fancied that he was basing himself both on Aristotle and on the authority of many philosophers. For he says:b album signifies nothing but the quality of whiteness. He would also bring forward many considerations gathered together from every source by which he would endeavour to persuade that things are sometimes predicated unconditionally and sometimes attributively, and to this end he would assert that a knowledge of derivatives was very useful. This opinion has both its defenders and its assailants. In my view there is very little point in disputing in such matters with reference to a word, since the understanding of what is said has, I know, to be derived from the reasons for saying.c Nor do I consider that the aforementioned authority of Aristotle and others is so to be interpreted as to attract hither whatever is anywhere found said. For in Aristotle it is proved that motion is predicated of animal, wakefulness of biped, and so on in many cases.d Otherwise the examples adduced in the Analytica would not advance correctly, and, a point made Aristotle, Topica 3.5.119a.30 and 7.3.153a.38 (Migne, PL 64.939 and 990) Aristotle, Categoriae 5.3b.19 with Boethius, In categorias Aristotelis commentarius 1 (Migne, PL 64.194) c  Hilary, De trinitate 4.14 (Migne, PL 10.107); Book 1.19 above; Historia pontificalis 14 d  Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.9.30b.6 and 1.11.31b.28 (Migne, PL 64.649 and 651) a 

b 

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also by Aristotle,a if caecitas (blindness) and caecum esse (to be blind) were the same thing, they would be predicated of the same thing; but, as things are, a man is called caecus (blind), but emphatically not caecitas (blindness). One must not, therefore, allow the slight prompting of a word to do harm to the intention of the auctores, which is to be determined on the basis of the circumstances of the utterance. For not every utterance is always formed according to the same schema. Evidently, derivatives do not signify the same meaning as the things from which they are derived, nor does the mind descend to the same thing when these things are heard; nor do affirmations apply to the same things, being, for the most part, removed from one another, and followed by a contradiction. On occasion, however, they patiently put up with one another, and, being conjoined derivatively, they are predicated simultaneously of the same thing or of one another. For goodness is termed good, and unity one. It is, however, regular for these things to be followed by a contradiction, which, it is asserted, comes about rather because of consignification than of signification. This may indeed happen in such a way as to be conclusive; but whether quite truly must be for the experts to determine. Fact it is that those things which signify the same thing are followed by a contradiction because of consignification. For employment of the singular number does away with the plural of the same word: as for example, if something is a man (homo), that thing is not men (homines). It does not matter where dialectic comes from: where it is going, in the entirety of its intentions, is to unfold the power of words, and, from their predication, to gain expertise in evaluating and determining the truth. This is its business, whether it be dividing or defining or inferring or analysing what has been inferred. Derivatives thus in a certain way signify what sort of things come from certain things, whereas those things from which they are derived mark the things from which come what sort of things. For bravery ( fortitudo) signifies the thing from which someone is brave ( fortis), while brave signifies what sort of person one is beAristotle, Categoriae 10.12a.39ff. with Boethius, In categorias Aristotelis commentarius 4 (Migne, PL 64.271) a 

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cause of bravery. Consequently, the appellation bravery is employed not as indicating of whom, but from which: for it indicates the cause. Hence the statement of Gregory:a Angel (angelus) is the appellation of a function, not of a nature. For it is derived from a function, but a function of a person, and, as has been said, it signifies in a certain way what sort of thing carries out that function. After this pattern there are a number of cases, consul, for instance, being the appellation of a dignity, studious of a virtue, Platonic and Socratic of philosophical professions. They thus signify the aforementioned things. From this it is clear that signification, like predication, is used in manifold ways; but which way is the most familiar there is no mystery about deciding. It is because of this that just (iustus) and similar words are commonly stated in the auctores to signify or to predicate now a just man and now justice. The converse, however, either does not occur at all, or is found only very rarely; if indeed this particular case, of justice (iustitia) signifying or predicating a just man, is found anywhere. Boethius, however, in his work De trinitate states:b When I say God is just, I fancy I predicate a quality; but in fact I predicate a substance, or, to be precise, that substance which is above substance. My question is why should Boethius fancy he predicates a quality, if this appellation just could not predicate a quality. Such is the statement of Aristotle:c They signify a quality, as, for example, a white thing (album), or a quantity, as, for example, of two cubits’ length (bicubitum). Thus, precisely because they are bestowed by quality or quantity, so too they predicate the quality which the adjectives show to be present in the subjects. From time to time they are said to signify what sort of things, since, by their apposition, they show of what kind are the subjects. But these things, on a liberal interpretation, are not far removed from one another, for all that, when one hears the adjective white (albus), one understands a person in Gregory, Homiliae in Euangelia 34.8 (Migne, PL 76.1250) following Jerome, Contra Iohannem Hierosolymitanum 17 (Migne, PL 23.369) and Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 103.15 (Migne, PL 37.1348) b  Boethius, De trinitate 4.156 c  Aristotle, Categoriae 4.1b.28 and 29 with Boethius, In categorias Aristotelis commentarius 1 (Migne, PL 64.180) a 

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whom there is whiteness (albedo), but when the noun whiteness is used, one does not understand a person in whom there is such a colour, but rather the colour which makes something such. But it is that which the understanding apprehends on hearing a word which is its most familiar signification.

3.  What the conception is of predicaments and what the sober philosopher is contented with So then, because single things are predicated either equivocally or univocally or derivatively, if I may follow the rule of indifference, and because predication itself is a sort of matter for reasoning, there are first set down the tools consisting in predicaments which hinder or promote or provide the business of those working in accordance with the art. As for the multivocals and diversivocals added by Boethius,a they have more relevance to grammar. Multivocals occur when a number of words concur to give the meaning and the naming of the same thing: for example, ensis (sword), mucro (sword’s point), gladius (sword). Diversivocals are words which are different in meaning and sound: for example, homo (man), lapis (stone). The rule of indifference, which invariably has my approval, is commended by this book above all others, although, if one looks carefully, it is everywhere manifest. For it is concerned, now with things which signify, now with things signified, and by means of the appellations of one set of things affords instruction about another set of things. Some people say that this book, because it is elementary, is practically valueless, thinking that they have done enough to carry conviction that they are perfect in the skills of dialectic and demonstration if they have shown contempt for, or ignorance of, what Boethius in his first commentary on Porphyry lays down should be read first, before any part of the art is touched on.b My attitude is quite different, for I do not see how anyone can be a logician without this book, any more than he can a  b 

Boethius, In categorias Aristotelis commentarius 1 (Migne, PL 64.168) Boethius, In Porphyrium dialogus prior (Migne, PL 64.13)

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be literate without letters. For it is from this book that one sees clearly what in things is universal and what particular, what substance and what accident, and what in matter of utterance is expressed equivocally or univocally or derivatively. It is from this book that one derives knowledge of the signification of uncombined words, instruction in the way to carry out an investigation with absolute correctness, and access to the first, bright-shining path which leads to the perfection of knowledge. For to the Peripatetic discipline, which labours beyond all others in the investigation of truth, the following things seem sufficient for the attainment of a perfect knowledge of each thing: first of all, to know of something whether it exists; and then, to know what it is, of what kind, how large, in relation to what, where, when, how situated, and what is has, does and has done to it. The final matter for speculation is in individual things why thus, a speculation which comes close not only to the perfection of the angels but even to the prerogative of the divine majesty; for to Him alone is known the cause of all things, whose will is the primeval cause of all things, and who has been willing, to the extent that He has been willing, to reveal to individual men why it is so. For to know all things fully is the perfection of God,a to err in nothing the perfection of the angels, and the perfection of man, to have a good judgement in most things. And thus the heaped-up mass of knowledge is made firm in this twelvefold enquiry. The philosopher, indeed, is content in his investigations with the sober restraint of the elevenfold sequence, and, if he advances further, it is to grace that he in large part ascribes his advance. For grace opens unto them that knock,b and God reveals His will, which is the original cause of all things, to those who with all their heart seek after grace.c The logician, however, recognises ten elements as making up his system, and, when he has been fully enough trained in these, he proceeds in accordance with his intention to defeat his adversary in part of a contradiction. First set down, therefore, are these questions which Justinian, Code 1.17.2.13 Matthew 7.8 c  Deuteronomy 4.29; Jeremiah 29.13 a 

b 

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are termed natural questions, and which are in a certain way elementary, namely, what, how great, of what kind, and the rest. After that, when the dialectical athletes have been instructed in these questions, they shape a contradiction, and, dividing it in two in the lists, as the saying goes, endeavour to check the opposite part with the lances of their reasoning. For each man strives to sweep away what has been set up on another’s side. But, because the first enquiry is into natural things, in that enquiry first were shaped the ten predicaments, and words invented by which enquiry might be made into the things which first present themselves to the senses or to the intellect, such things as bodies or spirits, to determine what, of what kind, and how great they were, or, as the rest of the questions proceeded naturally, to make manifest each single one of those things. Consequently, whether in words or in things, predicaments is the term given to the ten kinds of predicables which may thus be applied to particular and individual substances, concerning which they indicate what they are, how great, of what kind, in relation to what, where, when, how situated, and what they have, do or have done to them. The first predicament thus consists in the things which, concerning some substance, indicate what it is, the second in the things which indicate how great it is, the third its relation, the fourth its kind, the fifth where, the sixth when, the seventh how situated, the eighth its having, the ninth its doing, and the tenth its having done to it. And these predicaments are thus multiplied because in the minds of the philosophers there was a particularly strong interest in the investigation of corporeals, no one or only a few thinkers before Zeno having formed a correct judgement concerning the soul or incorporeal spirits. For it is Zeno, as Jerome informs us,a who established the view that souls are immortal. And certainly, to be situated, and certain of the other predicaments, will scarcely be able aptly to be applied to spirits, since these predicaments, for their part, are pre-eminently applied to bodies. The first speculation, therefore, which is somehow natural to those engaged in natural philosophy, is concerned with the observation of suba 

Jerome, Commentarii in Danielem prophetam 1.2 (Migne, PL 25.495-496)

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stances, whereas the second is mathematical and imitates nature; as a consequence the ancients called the mathematician the ape of the natural philosophers.a For as the investigator of nature, in the case of Cleon or Callias, enquires what he is or of what kind or how great, so the mathematician, abstracting the substance, enquires what it is or of what kind or how great, and thereafter advances to further matters after the manner of the natural philosophers. But those who win esteem through the acuteness of the purer philosophy have long since accepted that there is no place for a second mathematics,b lest the labour of the philosopher continue to infinity and an enquiry which is always striving to reach the goal be always wandering. Certainly, one who has already been stripped completely cannot be denuded further; and, whether one should abstract form from matter or subtract matter from form, it will thereafter be superfluous labour either to clothe form in circumstances and properties which it does not admit or to despoil matter of circumstances and properties which it does not possess. Therefore, any further endeavour is no decree of nature but the figment of a mind oppressed by the subtleties of mathematics. For when the question what is whiteness is asked and the reply is a colour of such a kind, anything added to it to distinguish subsistence either smacks of the effect and is thus prejudicial to the substance, or else has the savour of potentiality which perhaps is not yet in operation. If, however, the enquiry should advance further and the questions be asked how great it is or where it is, one must have recourse to the byways of corporeals. It is for this reason, I believe, that fewer philosophers have traversed those byways, and they have been those who at all points equate the mathematician with the arbiter of nature, since they hold that these kinds of predicaments which are manifest in bodies and spirits are found also in other things. All genera and species of substances and qualities and other things, therefore, they place upon the first predicament, since the apposition of genus or species satisfies the Who these ‘ancients’ were is unclear; certainly Seneca, Epistulae morales 88.26ff., adduced by Webb, is not to the point b  Boethius, De institutione arithmetica. 1.1 (Migne, PL 63.1079ff.) a 

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first question, that is, makes clear what something is. The following matters are then disposed of according to the nature of the questions. This indeed seems to be at variance with Aristotle, who says:a It is clear that whatever is, at one time signifies substance, at another of what nature, but at another again some one of the other predicaments. For when, having posited man, one should say that he is man or animal, one both says what he is and signifies substance. But when, having posited white colour, one should say that what is posited is colour, one both says what it is and signifies of what kind. Thus, positing the length of one cubit, if one should say that it is size, one says what it is and signifies how great. And likewise in the others also. For each one of such things, whether the same or whether genus be said of the same, signifies what this thing is; but when it is said of another, it does not signify what it is but how great or of what kind or some one of the other predicaments. Here indeed the auctor does not seem to state that all genera are present in the same predicament, for all that they have the same mode of predication, or that nine genera of accidental things are not predicated of substances, or that they are predicated of subjects and of their contents in the same way. Isidore, Alcuin and certain other wise men assert that all other things are predicated of first substances,b and they construct a perfectly full sentence using the ten predicaments, as can be seen in the following example devised by them:c Augustine the great orator the son of that man standing in the temple today adorned with a headband is wearied by disputation. For the sentence is perfect and indicates the substance, quality and quantity of the subject, that is, the man concerned, along with all the other predicaments; though the illustration of quantity it gives is perhaps less than apt. Certainly, just as nature, the parent of all things, created primary substance informed by its accidents, so she also concreated with individual substances the individual accidents by which the primary suba  Aristotle, Categoriae 4.1b.25ff. with Boethius, In categorias Aristotelis commentarius 1 (Migne, PL 64.180) b  Isidore, Etymologiae 2.26.11; Alcuinus, De dialectica 3 (Migne, PL 101.954955) c  Isidore, Etymologiae 2.26.11

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stance is informed. Those things, however, which are understood in abstraction from individual things, such things as are defined as secondary substance, as has been said, are sorts of figments of the mind in accordance with probable reason. Moreover, just as in the case of substances these are termed primary which really are substances and by the individuality of their essence are subject to accidents, but those secondary which are validly conceived by the understanding as a result of the similarity of individual things, just so in a proportional ratio those quantities and qualities might be termed primary which are present in primary substances in relation to one object, and those quantities and qualitiesa secondary which are abstracted from individual things by reason of their likeness; and so on in the others. There is general agreement, as Isidore states,b that they are called categories because they cannot be recognised except from subjects. Consequently, predicaments also are rightly so called because they are dedicated, that is, devoted to the present things which are shown forth by nature’s ordinance. For to dedicate is to devote, in the terms of the Virgilian expression:c I will join her in abiding union and will dedicate her as your own. They are, moreover, so devoted to other things that they cannot be recognised without them. For, as has already been stated, if images of things should be turned over in the mind, the conception is worthless if an example of it cannot be found in a subject thing. For the totality of individual things is the story of nature, from which is removed whatever is never actually found in things. And since they are recognised from their subjects, predicaments, as Boethius states,d are of such a kind as their subjects may permit. Consequently, the power of predicaments, which is strong in the works of nature, vanishes away in the vicinity of God’s excellence. For words drawn thither are changed completely or are false; and, in addition to error, there is also manifold increase in Translating Hall’s conjectural supplement et qualitates. C.  N.  L. Brooke thought that this noun might be concealed in the words et sic in aliis (‘and so on in the others’) b  Isidore, Etymologiae 2.26.14 c  Virgil, Aeneid 1.73 d  Boethius, De trinitate 4 a 

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the labour of those who extend the force of predicaments to all things, and, passing beyond the boundaries of natural things, undermine the integrity of the art in not allowing its rules to be limited by their own genera. For every rule and every generalisation is suited to some genus, and if it takes the liberty of crossing the boundary of genus it is at once broken. Undoubtedly a knowledge of predicamental things and words is exceedingly useful, and the science of them is clearly set out by Aristotle.a All predicaments alike he describes and divides, showing which of them reach degrees of comparison, which are susceptible of contraries, which are contrary to which, and which are totally unacquainted with contrariety, and leaving to posterity a pattern by which a knowledge of the truth is attained with the utmost brevity. And because the manifold meanings of words regularly confine the understanding, he instructs us that, whenever a word is spoken, its every single nuance must be explored. Relevant in this connection is the fact that he has filled the book with opposites, with things which are said previously or simultaneously, with types of motion and with modes of to have (habere). For nothing is more beneficial to knowledge or to victory than to distinguish between things which are advanced with a multiplicity of meanings. Such multiplicity of meanings, it so happens, comes into existence and likewise is brought to an end by the passage of time and an inclination to acquiescence on the part of those who use the words. In Aristotle, for instance, a sharp knife (cultellus acutus) signifies being of an acute angle,b whereas now it seems rather to indicate the point of that which cuts easily; for thus we call a sword doubly acute because it cuts easily with either edge; although this too on a closer scrutiny is seen to come about through the acuteness of the angles; for a body is most acute when its surfaces converge in a most acute angle; for if the angle in which the surfaces converge be obtuse, the body also will be obtuse. To be in something (esse in aliquo) is used now with far more meanings than would have been the case

a  b 

In the Categoriae Aristotle, Topica 1.15.107a.17 (Migne, PL 64.920)

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in the time of Aristotle;a and words which then had some signification, now, it may be, have none. For many words will be born again which are now dead, and those now esteemed will in turn die, if such be the wish of usage, which arbitrates and establishes laws and norms in matters of speech.b Without doubt, however, those persons unteach rather than instruct, who read all things into this book and do not allow it to rest content with its brevity. Everything which may anywhere be said is piled up here by those who think ignorance of the truth less serious than a confession of such ignorance. Such persons came in for derisory remarks from our English Peripatetic Adam, whose footsteps are followed by many, although few admit as much, being hindered by envy; what Adam used to say was that he would have no hearers or only a very few if he were to teach dialectic as it ought to be taught, with simple words and straightforward sentiments. Adam was a close friend with whom I conversed constantly, shared books, and pretty well every day engaged in exercises on points as they emerged; but not for a single day was I his pupil. And yet I am grateful that through his teaching I learned a great deal, and with him as arbiter rejected a great deal of his teaching, having previously, with reason’s guidance, chosen a different path. Here, therefore, as indeed everywhere, I think that facility must be served. I have not given this foretaste of all these things with the intention that they should be mentioned everywhere, but lest things which ought to be mentioned somewhere should be mentioned nowhere. I have commended the book, and have done so without regrets, since the book is indeed deserving of commendation. If, however, I have commended it more than I should have done, let indulgence be made to the charity which with much earnestness draws the untutored and the reluctant towards the first elements of the art. Just so teachers on occasion give cakes to the boys, to coax them to want to learn the first elements.c And I commend the book with all the more vehemence because it is greatly disparaged by the maBoethius, In categorias Aristotelis commentarius 1 (Migne, PL 64.172) Horace, Ars poetica 70-72; see also p. 160 c  Horace, Sermones 1.1.25-26 a 

b 

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jority. For, as Aristotle says, all-out attack must be met with allout opposition.a

4.  What the conception is and the utility of the Periermeniarum (more correctly Periermenias)

116

The book entitled Periermeniarumb (or rather, Periermenias) is in a proportional ratio syllabic, as the Categoriae is elementary; for the elements of reasoning which the latter transmits in uncombined utterancesc are gathered together by the former and, thus comprised like a syllable, are drawn forth to signify that which is true and false. So subtle did the ancients hold this book to be that in its praise it was commonly said, so Isidore relates,d that Aristotle dipped his pen in his mind when he was composing the Periermenias. However, and I say this with due deference to all men, whatever is taught in this book, except the respect owed to the actual wording, can be provided by any teacher at all with greater brevity and clarity in those teaching manuals called Introductiones; and many teachers indeed do so provide. For there is scarcely anyone who does not teach precisely these matters, with the addition of others no less necessary. The reason for this is, quite simply, that knowledge of the art cannot be won without these matters. Teachers thus run through the definitions of noun, verb, speech, the kinds of speech, the powers of utterances and what they derive from quantity or quality, which of them are determinately true or false, which are equivalent to which, which agree or disagree with one another, which things predicated separately may be predicated conjointly or conversely and which not; likewise what the nature is of modals and what contradiction there is in particulars. It is in these clauses that the sum of this work consists above all, and it Aristotle, Topica 5.4.134a.3-4 (Migne, PL 64.961) This barbarism is found in Isidore, Etymologiae 2.27. The Periermenias is Aristotle’s De interpretatione c  Historia pontificalis 13.35 d  Isidore, Etymologiae 2.27.1, drawing on Cassiodorus, Institutiones 2.3.11. The ultimate source is Timaeus of Tauromenium. See Suidas s.v. Aristotle a 

b 

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involves not only subtlety of views but also considerable verbal difficulty. One must, however, be grateful on both counts, for its thought instructs and its words exercise. One should, moreover, show respect to the words of the auctores by both cultivating them and using them constantly, firstly because they manifest a sort of majesty derived from the great names of antiquity, and secondly because considerable loss is sustained in not knowing them, since they have very great power to impel or to withstand. Those ignorant of them indeed they snatch away like some whirlwind, and agitate them all fear-struck or bring them down; for the unheardof words of philosophers are claps of thunder.a And so, even though the sentiments of moderns and ancients be the same, more reverence is owed to antiquity. The Peripatetic of Le Pallet I recall saying – and what he says is, I think, true – that it would be easy for someone of our time to compose a book about this art which was not inferior to any of those composed by the ancients as regards its conception of truth or the elegance of its wording, but that it would be impossible, or at least exceedingly difficult, for it to win the favour accorded to authority. Yet it was precisely this, he asserted, that was to be attributed to those of our forebears who won intellectual distinction and who through the power of their wondrous faculty of invention left behind for posterity the fruits of their labours. Those things, therefore, on which many men spent their whole lives, exerting the greatest effort in the field of invention, can now be grasped easily and quickly by one individual. Nevertheless, our age enjoys the benefit of the age preceding, and often knows more than it, not indeed because our intelligence outstrips theirs, but because we depend on the strength of others and on the abundant learning of our ancestors. Bernard of Chartres used to say that we are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants so that we are able to see more and further than they, not indeed by reason of the sharpness of our own vision or the height of our bodies, but because we are lifted up on high and raised aloft by the greatness of giants.b With these words I will readily concur, bea  b 

Webb here refers to John 12.5 but this verse is not relevant Alexander Neckam, De naturis rerum 1.78

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cause the compilers of the text-books, even in their Introductiones,a impart the rudiments of the art and many articles of truth fully as well as the ancients, and, it may be, with greater profit. For who is content with what is taught even by Aristotle in the Periermeniarum? Who does not add material gathered together from other sources? For all collect the sum of the whole art and transmit it in easy language. The thoughts of the auctores they clothe as it were in everyday garb, which somehow is more cheerful when more clearly picked out by the weight of antiquity. The words of the auctores must therefore be learned by heart, above all those words which round out full sentences and can to advantage be transferred to many things;b for these words both preserve knowledge in its integrity and in addition, of themselves, possess very much efficacy both revealed and concealed.c There are, however, many particulars which, if uprooted from their context, make no sense, or at best very little sense, to the listener; such things as pretty well all the examples employed in the Analytica where letters are used in place of terms; valuable as these things are for teaching, they are useless when transferred elsewhere. The rules themselves also, while deriving the greatest vigour from the truth of their doctrine, have very little power when their wording is exchanged. For to say that one thing is in the whole of another or is not in the whole of another and that something is predicated universally of something or is removed from something is the same thing; but while the use of the one form of words is frequent, that of the other has all but lapsed, except in so far as it is admitted from time to time as it were by agreement. In Aristotle’s time perhaps the use of both was more regular, but nowadays the one is in vogue by preference to the other, since that is the wish of usage.d So too in the matter of what is termed contingent, there has been some reduction from the value which obtained in Aristotle. For nowadays contingent is by no John has in mind Abelard’s Dialectica: Analytica priora 2 and 3 and Topica and Analytica posteriora 1 (Ouvr. inéd. d’ Abélard 254, 305, 332, 366 and 440 Cousin) b  Cicero, De finibus 4.14.36 c  Jerome, Epistulae 53.2 (Migne, PL 22.541) d  Horace, Ars poetica 71 a 

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means comparable with possible; but that is what Aristotle seems to have held in his treatise on modals.a For although it is possible that the people of Ethiopia should be white, and that swans should be black in appearance, neither of these is, however, contingent. If anyone holds that these things are contingent because they are possible, let him proclaim this in public, without invoking the authority of Aristotle, and of a surety, since the usage advocated by the people is in opposition, he will either be thought to belong in the ranks of madmen or at all events to be less than sober. If we now move on to another meaning by which contingent is not indeed equated with possible but is circumscribed by it, since it is less, here too we shall see a reduction from the Aristotelian usage. For, as Aristotle says in the Analytica,b to be contingent, and the contingent, is that which, even if it does not exist of necessity but is merely proposed, makes nothing on that account impossible. This signification, however, while indeed taking away the necessary from the contingent, is nevertheless in other respects equivalent to the possible. Not even this signification, however, now obtains. For that Hobinellus should reign is not necessary, nor, if that be proposed, will anything on that account be impossible; but if you should say that it is contingent that Hobinellus should reign at Winchester, no one will readily give assent to you. It will become clearer how far that use has been effaced if I say that the aforementioned word now obtains in not one of the significations which Aristotle attributes to it. For he says:c We say that to be contingent is used in two ways, in the one referring to that which generally happens while there is an absence of necessity, for instance, that a man becomes white-haired or increases or diminishes, or in general that what is born is; for this does not involve continuous necessity because man does not always exist; for when he does exist, he exists either of necessity or as a general rule. In the other way it refers to the infinite which is possible both thus and not thus, for instance, that an animal walks or that while it walks an eartha  Aristotle, De interpretatione 12 and 13, especially 13.22a.15; Boethius, In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarii, editio secunda 5.12 b  Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.13.32a.18ff. (Migne, PL 64.651) c  Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.13.32b.4ff. (Migne, PL 64.652)

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quake occurs or indeed anything which happens as a result of chance. For it is not more natural that something should happen in this way rather than in the opposite way. But if we follow present-day usage, which arbitrates and establishes laws and norms in matters of speech, only that which sometimes happens is now termed contingent; otherwise neither because necessity is absent nor because possibility is present will it be termed contingent. It is clear, therefore, that usage is more potent than Aristotle in the matter of reducing the meanings of words or even annulling them altogether;a but the truth of things, not being established by man, is not overthrown by the will of man. And so, if possible, the wording of the arts should be retained along with the thought; but if not, provided that the thought remains, the wording may go; for to know the arts is not to turn over the wording of the writers but to know the power and the thoughts contained in the arts.

5.  In what the body of the art consists and concerning the utility of the Topica

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There have preceded the preparatory stages of the art, to which its framer and, as one might say, legislator decreed that the completely untutored tiro was not to be admitted in a state of irreverence and, as the proverb runs, with hands unwashed.b For just as in the military art preliminary instruction in the equipment with which soldiering is furnished precedes the art proper, so those who approach the cultivation of this high art are first confronted with certain elementary matters, the new recruits’ equipment, as one might call it, by familiarisation with which they may the more expeditiously advance to the actual body of the art, and the more profitably put into practice what they profess. These elementary matters are of the highest utility, and, if they may not quite properly be said to be about the art, they are quite truthfully said to be directed to the art; it does not, however, make much difference a  b 

Horace, Ars poetica 72 Justinian, Digest 1.2.1

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whether one speaks of them in this way rather than that. So then, the actual body, so to say, of the art, leaving aside the preliminaries, consists in three things, that is to say, a knowledge of the Topica, of the Analytica, and of the Elenchi; for when these are perfectly known, and habituation to them has been strengthened by use and by exercise, a store of invention and of judgement will aid both the demonstrator and the dialectician and the sophist in every branch of study. Among these three, however, knowledge of the Topica is the most necessary, especially to those who follow after probability, for this knowledge, although in the first instance furnishing invention, is also of no slight support to judgement. And although in the opinion of many it is principally of service to the dialectician and the orator,a I consider that it is of pretty well equal benefit to those who have to do with the weighty business of the demonstrator or the deceits and battles of the sophist. For all alike contribute to one another, and each man is the more ready in the branch of study he has set himself as he is better equipped in the branch which is neighbour and contiguous to it. Therefore, both analytics and sophistry benefit and profit the inventor, and likewise topics the judge; at the same time I will readily concede that each is dominant in its own set field, and the benefits conferred by its neighbour are accessory. So then, since the utility of the Topica is so manifest, I wonder why that book of Aristotle, along with others, was neglected by our ancestors for so long as to pass completely, or almost completely, into desuetude, whereas in our own time, at the impulse of minds diligent in study, it has been raised up from death, so to say, or at least aroused from slumber, to call back the wanderers and open up the path of truth to those seeking it. For neither in its formulation nor in its concepts is it so difficult as not to be intelligible to students, and its value is so great that it needs to be known above all the rest. For compared with other books taken from the Greeks in accordance with very narrow rules of translation, it is quite straightforward; with the qualification, however, that it is easy to recognise the style of its author, and that it is properly understood only by those who fola 

Boethius, De differentiis topicis 1 (Migne, PL 64.1182)

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low the principle of indifference, without which, as the Severitan translator from the Greek was wont to say, no one among us or among the Greeks has ever understood Aristotle. By the very number of the books, indeed, a kind of omen of perfection, as one might say, he has commended the value of his work, and in it has, in a manner of speaking, sown the seed of all the ideas which antiquity extended through many volumes. His every word, both in the matter of rules and in the examples, is of benefit not only to dialectic but to practically every form of study. Eight volumes comprise the work, and at every point its last word is better than what has preceded.a The first book puts down the raw materials of all the rest, as one might say, and lays a kind of foundation for the whole of logic. For it shows what is a syllogism,b what a demonstration and from what sources, what the principles of the arts and of the confidence which comes from them, what a dialectical syllogism and what a contentious, what the probable which the false reasoner or false writer does not follow; likewise, what a proposition and what a problem.c And since one must advance to the discussion of problems and the proving of positions,d he also adds the sources from which come problems, that is, the propositions which are called into question in accordance with the art, with due distinction made between the predicaments from whose nature flows the reason for questions. For he does not apply his forms to all the things into which enquiry may be made, since it is not the wise man’s task to enquire into all things, but only into those things which merit enquiry and, when known, make some contribution. For there is no profit in being troubled when somebody or other advances ideas contrary to generally held opinions or contemptibly makes enquiry into some contemptible matter or other. Since, then, the system of predicaments makes either greater or equal predications of subjects, he [Aristotle] demonstrates that the nature of dialectical problems is fourfold.e For his wish is – Matthew 12.45 Aristotle, Topica 1.1 (Migne, PL 64.909ff.) c  Aristotle, Topica 1.10 d  Aristotle, Topica 1.11 e  Aristotle, Topica 1.4, 5 and 6 a 

b 

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and it has to be said that this may be debated, as may all the other points – that when enquiry is made about the greater and the substantial, the enquiry is one of genus; if, however, there is a question about an equal and substantial, the enquiry is one of definition. But if there is doubt about a greater and accidental, the enquiry is into accident, whereas if of equal and accidental, into property. But because there is no answer to one who enquires what or how great or of what kind something is which is less than the subject, it is correctly shown that the less is not predicated and that there is no enquiry into the less. Aristotle’s teaching on the nature of genus or definition, accident or property, is thus far more beneficial than that of those who each compose many large volumes in order to expound Porphyry or the Categoriae. Let my soul not come into their counsel,a nor let any one of my friends use them as teachers. In addition, Aristotle states what induction is and when it is advantageous to use it,b and in how many ways an opposite may be expressed,c and how things having a multiple signification ought to be divided. For there are many advantages to be derived from knowing even this, that equivocation admits neither comparison nor the plural number, so as to collect together what is proposed separately. For voice and angle or knife are by no means said to be acute, or one of them more acute than another, although each single one is termed acute. This observation of words which have many meanings is also of benefit as leading to repeated consideration of the force of contraries arising from contraries; for if one of them is spoken equivocally or univocally with reference to many things, in similar fashion the remainder is also, either indeed in all or in the generality of cases. For since graue is the opposite of acute in matter of voice, but of light in matters of mass, it is clear that graue will be spoken equivocally with respect to different things. One who wishes to know what is under discussion must examine the force of the utterance, for if he does not know its force, there can be no reliable understanding of the words. This Genesis 49.6 Aristotle, Topica 1.12 c  Aristotle, Topica 1.15 a 

b 

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is the reference of Augustine’s observation – taken indeed from Aristotle,a for all have drawn from that fountain – that in every enunciation three things must be considered, the word, the expressible, and the thing.b The thing is that of which something is said, the expressible that which is said of something, and the word that by means of which this is said of that. It sometimes happens, however, that the word is the thing, when, for instance, the same word is taken to discuss itself, as in those cases which our teachers said were materially imposed,c for example, man is a noun, runs is a verb. But things, for the most part, and expressibles appertain to nature, whereas a word is dependent on the whim of men. For the examination of truth, therefore, it is necessary for the thing not to be completely withdrawn from knowledge, for the expressible to come together with the subject thing, that is, the thing under discussion, and for the word to be cognate with both, so that all occasion for rebuke be removed.

6.  Concerning the utility and the conception of the three books comprising the Topica

122

Just as the Categoriae is concerned with elements but the Periermeniarum with syllables, just so the Topica, in a manner of speaking, is concerned with words.d For although the Periermeniarum deals with the simple utterance, which, quite simply, is a word for what is true or false, it does not yet extend as far as the power of inferring, nor does it reach the area in which the activity of dialectic is principally concentrated. This book indeed is the first which explains forms of reasoning, setting out the system of local argumentatione and providing a first introduction to the combiNot Aristotle, as Webb notes, but Varro, De lingua Latina 237 Augustine, De dialectica 5 (Migne, PL 32.1411) c  Abelard, Ouvr. inéd. d’ Abélard 248 Cousin d  The Latin for ‘concerned with words’ is dictionalis. Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 2.14 GLK 2.53 discusses dictio. Relevant also is Boethius, In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarii, editio secunda 2.4 e  Boethius, De differentiis topicis 1 (Migne, PL 64.1173) a 

b 

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nations which follow. And just as, in the words of the moralist, each successive day is the pupil of the preceding one,a just so the first book serves as a teacher to the books that follow. Thus, the first reveals from what places come problems, while those following expound the source and the manner of proving problems, and explain which proposition is more or less susceptible of argument, and why.b I do not, however, rate this work so highly as to regard as superfluous the work of the moderns who, while indeed taking their origin and their strength from Aristotle, supplement his inventions with many additional reasons and with rules as firm as the earlier ones. For this, however, we are indebted to Aristotle, that, as he showed that the whole could be proved from the part, so he demonstrated that inference could be made from a double part or a triple or more. Likewise in others too. We are grateful for additions, therefore, not only to Themistius, Cicero, Apuleius and Boethius,c but also to the Peripatetic of Le Pallet and our other teachers, who were concerned to help us both by explaining old doctrines and by inventing new ones. Yet I do wonder why the Peripatetic of Le Pallet laid down so constricting a law in his judgement of hypotheticals as to consider that only those of them should be admitted whose consequent is enclosed in the antecedent or whose antecedent is destroyed if the consequent is demolished.d Arguments indeed he was ready to receive, but hypotheticals he rejected, except under the compulsion of manifest necessity. It may be for the reason that all men, as Boethius observes, wish to hold a necessary consequence.e They wish, quite simply, because this is what they profess, with the addition of a condition; certain hypotheticals, however, are admitted nonetheless, because of their evident probability, which is generally near neighbour to necessity. For just as probable arguments are enough for the dialectician, so too are probable consequences; but both lack the power Publilius Syrus 123 Aristotle, Topica 8.3 (Migne, PL 64.998 and 999) c  Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico I (Migne, PL 64.843) d  Abelard, Analytica posteriora 1 (Ouvr. inéd. d’ Abélard 441-442 Cousin) and 2 (446-447 Cousin) e  Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico 1 (Migne, PL 64.843) a 

b 

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of compulsion if necessity be absent; as, for example, if one should provide an instance demonstrating in what particular the contrary is valid. Aristotle, however, whether teaching how to prove or how to disprove what has been posited, pretty well everywhere posits consequences. And because from one thing many things follow, one must take care to ensure that from proof or from disproof many things come forth. For as Aristotle says:a Every man who has said anything whatsoever has in a manner of speaking said many things, for the reason that each thing of necessity has many consequents. For instance, he who has said that a man exists has also said that an animal exists and a being endowed with mind and a creature with two feet and an entity capable of thinking and studying. A reasonable problem, however, is one concerning which a rapid succession of good reasoning is formulated.b Thus, the whole of the second book is concerned with the accident, and, while it elegantly teaches the nature of accidents, the firmness of its reasoning and the attractiveness of its examples make it well suited for many purposes. And because it is only the accident which reaches degrees of comparison, the third book sets out the power of comparatives, and, pursuing further the nature of accidents, demonstrates according to rule what the rational basis is for choosing or rejecting, and, among actual objects to be chosen or rejected, which should respectively be given priority over the rest. From this it is clear how great is the benefit accruing to physics and ethics from this branch of study, since this small part of the subject is actively concerned with things to be sought and to be avoided and, in short, with all matters of comparison. Plainly this book may be widely commended, and it has been shamefully neglected by our forebears, for all that its manifest utility and verbal charm make it an attractive book, and one which is of the greatest service both to ethical and to physical science.

a  b 

Aristotle, Topica 2.5.112a.16ff. with Boethius’ translation (Migne, PL 64.928) Aristotle, Topica 5.1.129a.30-31 (Migne, PL 64.955)

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7.  A short analysis of the fourth and fifth books The fourth book engages in problems arising from genus, and it so teaches the coherence of genus and species both with one another and with other things that it is clear to all how much time we have lost through its being neglected by our teachers. There is, I believe, no need to dwell for any length of time on this subject for speculation, since much has been said above concerning the genera of things, and it is no part of my plan to write a commentary specifically on this work. This one point, however, I think should be added from Aristotle (for Porphyry, whom the young beginners follow, taught a different doctrine),a that, as genus is predicated univocally and not derivatively, so it is not predicated in a certain respect.b From this it is manifest that body is not the genus of animal. Aristotle’s words are:c One must consider whether in some cases genus is distributed in a certain respect; as for example if some animal should be said to be perceptible by the senses or visible. For an animal is perceptible by the senses, or visible, in a certain respect; for it is so in respect of body but not in respect of soul. Therefore, the genus of animal will not be perceptible by the senses or visible. Sometimes, however, people are unaware that they are also positing the whole for a part; for example, animal is a body which is perceptible by the senses. For in no wise is a part predicated of the whole. Therefore, body will not be the genus of animal, because it is a part. Quite simply, every genus is true of species and of individuals, without metaphor or figure. For it is never improperly predicated, since no attribution is more familiar than that of substance, which is judged most correctly in genus and species. Body, however, is used of man figuratively, that is to say, by synecdoche. From this it is clear that a man who because of the visibility of the one part is called body may likewise because of the worth of the other be called soul. The lesser philosophers, a  Porphyry, Isagoge 2a.20 (Commentarii in Ar. Gr. 4.4 and 29); Boethius, In Porphyrium commentariorum liber tertius (Migne, PL 64.102) b  Aristotle, Topica 4.6.127b.6 and 4.5.126a.18 (Migne, PL 64.952 and 950) c  Aristotle, Topica 4.5.126a.20ff. (Migne, PL 64.950)

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however, follow the popular opinion,a and they include Porphyry, whose regular practice was to bestow his approval only on that which is accessible to the senses. Plato, however, and both the Stoics and the Peripatetics make it clear that their view is that man is more correctly called soul than body. This is the view followed by Cicero in the De republica when he says:b You are not the man whom the external figure designates, but it is the mind of each man which is that man. The Doctors of the Church also, Augustine and the rest, held precisely that view.c Anyone who has doubts about this should read the Scriptures, which somehow attribute primacy in the individual person to the soul, and compare the body to a lodging or to clothing.d The fifth book also demonstrates most fully how many are the ways in which a property can be assigned and among them explains what is properly termed a property; in manifold ways it further shows when it is correctly predicated and when incorrectly assigned. This subject of speculation is most useful for proof and disproof, since property, properly so called, and that of which it is a property, encompass one another by mutual predication.

125

8.  Concerning the heading of definition which is dealt with in the sixth book Now the sixth book is about definition, and conveys the art of definition with such clarity that one who is fully conversant with this book need have no hesitation in constructing or dismantling definitions. The rule of definition which it teaches, however, is very constricting, and is one which no one or only a few persons fully master. Aristotle would consequently be distinguished above all other philosophers both by other contributions to systematic Cicero, De senectute 23.85 and De diuinatione 1.30.62 Cicero, De republica 6.24.26 (Somnium Scipionis 8.2) c  Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae 1.4 (Migne, PL 32.1313) d  ‘lodging’: II Corinthians 5.1ff. and II Peter 1.13-14; ‘clothing’: II Corinthians

a 

b 

5.2

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discourse and under the heading of definition if the clarity with which he argued for his own views matched the power with which he demolished the views of others. However, whereas he was stronger in destruction than in construction, most philosophers are stronger in asserting a position than in attacking one; for it is not possible for everyone to do everything,a and each man, if he waits for the outworking of grace, is distinguished by his own gift.b To say nothing about the Christians, Ovid is felicitous in composing poetry, Cicero in delivering speeches, Pythagoras in exploring nature, Socrates in laying down a code of conduct, Plato in carrying conviction on all matters, and Aristotle in providing for subtlety of discourse. It was from him that Marius Victorinus and Boethius, together with Cicero, took the first beginnings of their teaching, each one of them publishing a book on the subject of definition.c But while they extended the word definition to include no less than fifteen species,d subsuming under the word definition the modes of description, Aristotle was chiefly concerned with the definition of substance, which must so be put together from genus and substantial differences as to equal the proposition. When equal, a definition is correctly attributed, and involves the plainest of interpretations. Not only must the imposition of equivocation be removed, therefore, but the obscurity which characterises everything which is uncertain must also be shunned; for the definition which is given must be clear in order that other things may become known. Metaphorical uses must therefore be avoided, and everything which is not expressed in the proper sense; as for example, law is the measure or the reflection of things which are naturally just.e Expressions of this kind, says Aristotle, are worse than metaphor. For metaphor somehow Virgil, Eclogues 8.63 I Corinthians 7.7 c  Marius Victorinus, De diffinitione, a work attributed to Boethius (Migne, PL 64.891ff.); Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentariorum liber tertius (Migne, PL 64.1098) with its abbreviation in Isidore, Etymologiae 2.29; Cicero, Topica 5.26-7.32 d  The species are enumerated by Victorinus, Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentariorum liber tertius, and Isidore, Etymologiae, cited above e  Aristotle, Topica 6.2.140a.7ff. (Migne, PL 64.971) a 

b 

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makes known what the likeness signifies, since all who employ metaphor do so in respect of some likeness. That which is of this kind, however, makes nothing known; for neither does it contain a likeness in respect of which law is a measure or a reflection, nor is it a conventional expression. It is a lie, therefore, to say that law is in the proper sense a measure or a reflection, for a reflection is what is produced by imitation, and this is not present in law. If, on the other hand, the statement is not made in the proper sense, it is evident that it is obscure, and worse than any metaphorical statement. By known are to be understood things which become known to those whose intellect is in good order. Anything posited which is not one of the things which are simply better known, or better known to us, does not assist the definition.a It is necessary also that the definition should have the same number of cola, that is, members, as the thing defined;b for instance, if the question be what is speculative knowledge,c neither term, that is, speculative and knowledge, must be left in doubt. Moreover among the substantial definitions themselves nothing should be posited that would approximate to a state of being acted upon; for, as is laid down by Aristotle,d every state of being acted upon detracts from a substance proportionally to its increase. Difference, however, is not like this, for it seems rather to retain that of which it is a difference, and for a single thing to exist without a difference peculiar to it is, quite simply, impossible. For when there is not something capable of walking, there will not be man. We may simply state that any quality which alters a subject possessing it cannot be a difference of that subject. For all things of this kind detract from a substance in proportion as they are increased. Consequently, if any difference of this kind is attributed, it is wrongly so attributed. Quite simply, we are not changed in respect of differences. The result of this is that even Plato is criticised for including mortal among the definitions of animal.e For although mortal does not Aristotle, Topica 6.4.141a.26ff. (Migne, PL 64.973) Aristotle, Topica 6.11.148b.33 (Migne, PL 64.983) c  Aristotle, Topica 6.11.149a.9 (Migne, PL 64.984) d  Aristotle, Topica 6.6.145a.3ff. (Migne, PL 64.978) e  Aristotle, Topica 6.10.148a.15 and 16 (Migne, PL 64.982) a 

b 

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become more, nor is predicated more, since things of this kind are not susceptible of more and less, nevertheless, it is not a difference, signifying perhaps more correctly a state, and indicating the capacity for being acted upon, or rather, the necessity of being acted upon. This of course will readily carry conviction with the Christian who in the expectation of immortality believes not that our nature is corrupted but that the circumstances of our existence will be changed for the better. For our substance will be glorified, and without corruption will be removed from the necessity of being acted upon. The actual capacity for enduring being acted upon, moreover, will vanish away utterly when, with death swallowed up, mortal shall put on immortality,a and what is now corruptible shall take hold of incorruption. Nor is it matter for wonder that mortality is ascribed to the capacity for being acted upon, since even immortality, according to Aristotle, is to be termed a state of being acted upon. His words are:b Immortality seems to be a state of being acted upon by life and chance. That what he says is true will become clear if one grant that someone should, from being mortal, become immortal. For no one says that he assumes another life, but that some accidental property or state of being acted upon is generated additional to this same life. Therefore life is not the genus of immortality. At all events it emerges from this too that mortal and immortal are not species of things living, or differences, but rather indicate modes of living or circumstances of nature. There is indeed nothing evil in substance, for the best that belongs to each thing is mostly in its substance.c It is, however, difficult for anyone to define according to rule who does not possess a wide knowledge of things, since what is substantial is often uncertain, both because of the difficulty of things and ignorance of them, and also because of the ambiguity of words. There are, moreover, a number of things which, under nature’s compulsion, lack definitions peculiar to themselves:d principles, for instance, because no genera of principles meet the philosopher in his ascent, I Corinthians 15.53 Aristotle, Topica 4.5.126b.36ff. (Migne, PL 64.951) c  Aristotle, Topica 6.12.149b.37 (Migne, PL 64.985) d  Boethius, In categorias Aristotelis liber primus (Migne, PL 64.166) a 

b 

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there being no such genera, and individual things, because they are not separated from one another by substantial differences. At this juncture, however, descriptions take the place of definitions, and these gain in probability the nearer they approach the form of definitions; they do, however, enjoy greater freedom of manoeuvre than definitions. But to do whatever one pleases is easier than to do it well, since virtue stands always on an eminence.a When there is agreement about a definition, however, that definition is most effective in constructing and demolishing a proposition, since it becomes weak or gains in strength in parity with that proposition.

128

9.  Concerning the problem of the same and the different which is discussed in the seventh book and certain features common to the Topica The seventh book is also based on definitions, and discusses problems concerning the same and the different. There is a very great deal of friction in the discussion contained in this book, since the convergence of opposite lines of reasoning is matter for doubt. Moreover, the expressions different from something and the same as something both alike have a multiplicity of meanings, since both may apply in respect of genus, species and number.b But things which differ in respect of genus at once differ also in the following two. Those, on the contrary, which are the same in number, are immediately united also in the other respects. No doubt whatsoever attaches to that which is one in number and the same as something, for all men alike seem to call it the same;c indeed this is simply to be the same. Even this word, however, is generally assigned with a multiplicity of meanings. First in the strict sense, when what is the same in name and definition is assigned, for example, garment to a tunic and animal with two feet and capable of walking to a man. Secondly, when the same in property Ovid, Ars amatoria 2.537 Boethius, De trinitate 1.151 c  Aristotle, Topica 1.7.103a.23-103b.1 (Migne, PL 64.914-915) a 

b 

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is assigned, for example, capable of learning to a man, and that which by nature is carried upward to fire. Thirdly, when it is assigned from accident, for example, sitting or musical to Socrates. For all these things are designed to signify what is one in number. That what is now said is true one will learn from changes in appellation; for often, when commanding by name that one of a group of persons sitting be summoned, we make a change when, as happens, the person to whom we give the command does not understand it, and, on the assumption that he will understand better by reference to an accident, we instruct him to call to us the man sitting or disputing, evidently because we think that both by reference to the name and by reference to the accident we signify the same man. Therefore, the same, as has been said, may be divided in three ways. Consequently, a knowledge not only of definitions but also of genus, property and accident is necessary both for constructing and for demolishing those problems which are concerned with the same and the different; but for either task nothing is more useful than definition, since nothing is more effective or better known. It is in these seven volumes, because of the rich variety of their arguments, that the value of the Topica is with absolute correctness said to consist, the name Topica, according to Isidore,a being given because the volumes contain topoi, that is, passages which are the settings of arguments, the sources of thoughts and the origins of words. It is because it affords instruction in such passages that the subject itself is called topice. One who subjects this book to careful examination will discover that not only are the Topica of Cicero and Boethius drawn from these seven volumes, but also the work entitled De diuisione,b which from its economic use of words and elegance of thought has won unique popularity among those treatises of Boethius which appertain to logic. Not all passages, however, are, I think, included in this work, nor indeed could they have been, since I see even our moderns, by previous benefit of this work, daily teaching with greater clarity passages no less necessary. On these passages turns a  b 

Isidore, Etymologiae 2.29.16 Boethius, De diuisione (Migne, PL 64.875ff.)

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the matter of invention, which William of Champeaux of blessed memory, later bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne, defined, even if not perfectly, as the knowledge of finding the middle term and from it eliciting an argument. For when there is doubt about inherence, it is necessary to look for some middle term by whose intervention the extremes may be connected. Whether any subject of speculation is more subtle than this one, or more effective in producing results, I could not easily say. A middle term is necessary when the force of an inference turns on the terms;a for if it be placed between whole propositions,b being beholden rather to the combining of the parts than to the parts combined, the link provided by the middle term is not needed. In these matters, however, which derive their power of compulsion from terms or the parts of terms, the passage emanates from that condition which stands between that which is taken away from a conclusion and that which succeeds what is taken away; for consequents are proved by their antecedents. That which remains unmodified on either side, however, assumes neither the force of that which proves nor the certitude of that which is proved; and, just as it is from their signification that terms derive their designation as universal or particular, so it is the agreement or disagreement of significations that results in one term following from another or being incompatible with another; for unless the things that terms signify agree or disagree with one another there is no reason to look for friendly or hostile relations between terms. In individual cases, however, it is not always easy to determine the firmness of the bond between things or the degree of discord, and for this reason it is sometimes quite difficult to judge what is simply necessary or what more probable. That which most frequently is so is probable; that which is never otherwise, more probable; and that which it is not believed possible to be otherwise is given the designation of necessary. For the definition of things necessary and things possible rests with nature; for nature alone knows her own strength. The diamond

a  b 

Abelard, Topica (Ouvr. inéd. d’ Abélard 278, 325 and 328 Cousin) Abelard, Topica (Ouvr. inéd. d’ Abélard 407 Cousin)

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was long held to be indivisible,a since it feared the sharpness of neither iron nor steel; but eventually it was cut by lead and goat’s blood, and what previously had been thought impossible was seen to be easily achieved. The regular course of things must thus be carefully observed,b and the folds of nature’s garment somehow be shaken, so as to make clear the nature of things necessary and probable; for nothing is more beneficial as regards the knowledge of passages, nothing more amply engenders a knowledge of truth, and nothing makes a greater contribution to teaching or to persuading, affording as it does a praiseworthy command of all that is to be expressed in words.

10.  Concerning the utility of the eighth book It is the customary practice of all skilled craftsmen to make ready the tools of their craft before putting their skill to the test, in order that their attempt to practise their trade may not be frustrated by the lack of tools to hand. Thus, in the military sphere the commander first sees to the provision of weapons and other equipment for the soldiers; the mason first looks out not only the instruments but also the material on which he is to test himself and them; and the sailor stores up rudder, cables, oars, anchors and the rest of his nautical tackle, so that, relying on their support, he may more precisely carry out the object of his skill. In like manner the craftsman in the skill of reasoning and the drill-sergeantc of those who profess logic has thus in the course of the preceding books placed in his arena the equipment for disputation and the weapons, so to say, for his raw recruits, until such time as he has dealt with the signification of simple words, and also has revealed the nature of utterances and passages. After that, however, he shows how to handle the equipment, and somehow imparts to the rea  Pliny, Historia. naturalis 37.59, 60; also 20.2; Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 21.4; Isidore, Etymologiae 16.13.2. In none of these writers is there mention of lead b  Augustine, Contra Faustum 26.3 (Migne, PL 42.481) c  As Webb notes, the word campidoctor (‘drill-sergeant’) is a favourite of the military writer Vegetius in his Epitoma rei militaris

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cruits the technique of engagement, demonstrating, as if moving their limbs in conflict, the ways of propounding and responding, proving and evading, with precepts to give shape to that skill for the sake of which the rest has previously been imparted. If we may develop the proportional sequence of the earlier likeness, just as the Categoriae deals with elements, the Periermeniarum with syllables, and the previous books of the Topica with words, just so the eighth book of the Topica constructs the processes of reasoning, the elements of which and the passages exemplifying which have been shown in the preceding books. This book alone, therefore, is concerned with the precepts from which the art is put together, and, if had by heart in the memory and given regular exercise day by day, it makes a greater contribution to the science of disputation than practically all the books of dialectic which our predecessors in modern times have been accustomed to lecture on in their schools; for without this eighth book disputation proceeds not by art but by chance. However, for it to be of the greatest benefit, a knowledge of the others is necessary, for they, although only rarely offering an abundance of precepts, afford an instruction in things and words which is of the highest value. So then, because the exercise of dialectic involves a second person, the pairs of disputants which it brings forward, fortifying them with its processes of reasoning and its passages, it teaches to use its weapons, with words interlocked rather than hands, and instils them with so much craft as to make it clear that the precepts concerning the whole of eloquence are drawn and flow principally from this source, as from the fountain whence first they took their origin. For it is undoubtedly true, as Cicero and Quintilian aver,a that it was from this source that the authors of rhetorical textbooks derived not only assistance in their rhetorical writing but the first impulse to such writing; subsequently, however, it was expanded by the development of its own distinctive ordinances. The practice of dialectic in its entirety, therefore, is between the proponent and the respondent, since the one is judge of the other. Each of them attains Cicero, Orator 32.113ff. and De finibus 2.6.17; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 12.2.12f. and 3.1.1 a 

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to his respective goal if he omits none of the contingents and so pursues his aim as to exempt both himself and his utterance from censure. For the occasion for censure is not always the same,a the fault resting often with the proposition, and often with the person putting forward the proposition. As Aristotle says,b it is not in the power of one party only to bring a shared enterprise to a successful conclusion. For one who puts questions in a contentious way is a bad disputant,c and so is one who in responding does not concede what is evident or take up anything which the questioner wishes to enquire into. It is manifest also that the utterance in itself and the questioner are not to be censured in the same way. For nothing prohibits the utterance from being bad while the questioner, as happens, is disputing very well against the respondent. As for badtempered disputants, it is not perhaps possible at once to confront them with the kind of syllogisms one wishes but only with the kind that happens to be available. One who impedes the shared enterprise is a bad partner.d I am, however, unclear as to how one should level censure at the other or avoid his censure, whether one should instruct more informatively, or more subtly and narrowly. However, the task of the good questioner is to make the respondent say what is utterly improbable and quite at variance with what is necessitated by the thesis; and of the respondent to ensure that what is impossible or unthinkable be seen to result not from the questioner but from the thesis.e For initially to propose an inappropriate thesis and then not to adhere to the thesis proposed in accordance with its mood is perhaps a different fault. As for the proponent, though he may sometimes proceed towards induction, so that a universal be granted, or towards expansiveness of utterance, or so that his utterance may be clearer, in all things he regards as the chief excellence the concealment of his conclusion, his intention being that, when his utterance is completed by his con-

Aristotle, Topica 8.11.161a.16 (Migne, PL 64.1002 and 1003) Aristotle, Topica 8.11.161a.19ff. (Migne, PL 64.1003) c  Aristotle, Topica 8.11.161b.2ff. (Migne, PL 64.1003) d  Aristotle, Topica 8.11.161a.37 (Migne, PL 64.1003) e  Aristotle, Topica 8.4.159a.18ff. (Migne, PL 64.999) a 

b 

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clusion, the reason be to seek.a This is why, in the De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii,b dialectic bears in her hand a serpent and formulae, the former, which conceals the thesis, to bite the careless with its subtlety, the latter, embodying reason, to instruct the inexperienced or to confute the bad. Craft consists in the sequence and the manner in which a thesis is filled out, whether division be required, or definition, or inference, and it advances correctly from the previously acquired knowledge of passages, forms of argument, and other locutions by which are unfolded divisions and definitions. It is generally the case that passages for argumentation are common also to division and definition, but the power of the art is more vigorously in evidence in argumentation. In syllogisms proper it is also more forcible,c whether the syllogism be perfect in its completeness, or whether with its middle premiss removed it hasten the conclusion after the manner of an enthymeme.d In practice, therefore, it is better suited to the latter. Induction, on the other hand, is more gentle, whether with more measured step it advance from a plurality to one universal or particular, or whether with keener impetus it leap forward from one thing induced in the form of an example to one by inference.e This is the mode which is better suited to orators; but occasionally in the interests of adornment or explication it also benefits the dialectician; for it is more persuasive than pressing. Consequently, it was this type of argumentation that Socrates most frequently employed, as Cicero attests in his rhetorical works.f However, when a number of examples or single examples are adduced to prove something, they ought to be appropriate and instructive; the kind of examples provided by Homer, not Choerilus.g If they are taken over from the auctores, the Greek should make use of Homer, and Aristotle, Topica 8.1.155b.22ff. and 156a.14 and 15 (Migne, PL 64.993ff.) Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 4.328 c  Aristotle, Topica 1.12.105a.18ff. (Migne, PL 64.917ff.) d  ‘Enthymeme’ as understood not by Aristotle but by Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentariorum liber primus (Migne, PL 64.1050) e  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.24.68b (Migne, PL 64.709) f  Cicero, De inuentione 1.31.53 g  Aristotle, Topica 8.1.157a.14ff. (Migne, PL 64.996); Horace, Ars poetica 357 a 

b 

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the Latin of Virgil and Lucan. For familiar examples have more effect, while unknown ones do not impart credibility to what is doubtful. In the interests of concealing the thesis, or rather in order that each of the combatants may more easily attain his desired end, there is much value in a vulgar and straightforward manner of speaking, with each party,a that is, so concealing his art as not to be believed to possess it, or to possess it and not be inclined to use it. A parade of art is always suspect; whereas those, on the other hand, who advance along a simple path are more readily admitted. Above all, it behoves each party to know exactly what it is on which the combatants’ intention turns. If it is not made clear what the thesis is, argumentation is no easy matter; for the result is at best debate about the word, or, as often happens, no debate at all. For reasoning has no means of advance unless the understanding of the disputants is firmly based on some point. For there to be an encounter, the same path must necessarily be trodden. Therefore, there ought either to be one question, or a multiplicity must be distinguished according to its underlying principles. Hence Aristotle’s observation:b Since the respondent, if he does not understand, is permitted to say I do not understand, and does not necessarily have to admit or deny it if some utterance has a multiplicity of meanings, it is clear that right at the beginning one should not hesitate to say that one does not understand if what is said is not clear. For often some difficulty presents itself as a result of people’s granting propositions in response to questions not plainly put. Should a proposition, however, be known but expressed with manifold meanings, and should what is said be true or false in all respects, it must simply be granted or not granted. But should it be false in one respect and true in another, it must be signified that the utterance has a multiplicity of meanings and as a consequence is false in this respect but true in that. For it is uncertain whether a doubt which comes after the division went unperceived at the beginning also. If, however, a doubt was unforeseen, but posited a  For idiotismus (‘vulgar manner of speaking’) see Seneca the Elder, Controuersiae 7 praef. 5; the word ort(h)onoismus (‘straightforward manner of speaking’) is not recorded in ThLL b  Aristotle, Topica 8.7.160a.18ff. (Migne, PL 64.1001)

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with regard to the second part, one must say to the person who leads against the second part that it was not with regard to this but to the other of the parts that one granted the proposition; for when there exists a number of things which fall under the same noun or the same utterance, uncertainty occurs with comparative ease. But if the question is plain and simple, one must make either an affirmative or a negative response. For, as is recorded in A. Gellius,a a person who in such matters answers more or less than he is asked either does not know or affects not to know the line of correct disputation. For one who hinders his colleague either by an excess of words or by a twisted response is not merely a bad associate but manifestly shameless, above all if, while not having a contradictory instance, he admits the particulars but contradicts the universal; for to inhibit utterance without having a real or an apparent contradictory instance is to play the shameless.b If, therefore, when a thing is manifest in many cases, the universality of the proposition is not granted by one who has no contradictory instance, it is evident that he is without shame; unless, perhaps, he may be able to advance the counter-argument that the inference is not true. For if the consequent is false, it is obvious that it does not follow from true antecedents; for false never comes from true, because the pure body of truth neither bears nor nurtures falsehood.c It is not, however, sufficient to argue to the contrary, because many things contrary to men’s opinions are generally not resolved with ease, amid the struggling arguments on either side, with Zeno contending that movement and crossing the stadium are not contingent,d and Empedocles,e on the contrary, that all things are in motion.f The opinion of a few persons, however, especially when not confirmed by the strongest of reasoning, does not deAulus Gellius (John calls him ‘Agellius’), Noctes Atticae 16.2.1 Aristotle, Topica 8.10.160b.2ff. (Migne, PL 64.1001 and 1002) c  Aristotle, Topica 8.11.162a.8ff. and Analytica priora 2.2.53b.11ff. d  Aristotle, Topica 8.8.160b.6ff. (Migne, PL 64. 1001 and 1002) e  Not Empedocles (who comes in later: Aristotle, Topica 1.10.105b.16 (Migne, PL 64.918)) but Heraclitus: Aristotle, Topica 1.10.104b.21 and 22 (Migne, PL 64.917) f  Aristotle, Topica 8.9.160b.19 (Migne, PL 64.1002) a 

b 

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tract from an opinion equally well confirmed but held by more people. Accordingly, he who in such matters employs neither a negative instance nor contrary arguments is without shame,a shamelessness in disputation being a response which contravenes these methods and corrupts the syllogism. So on the side of the respondent; for in the case of the questioner shamelessness exists fully as much if, when it has been made clear what is granted, he makes silly use of a stock of little words to move to the contrary position, not accepting the meaning honestly intended but setting snares for syllablesb and disputing pointlessly about a word. And the shamelessness is worse to the extent that each party more keenly presses on in this way. There is, however, no shamelessness to blame when each party hinders the other from achieving his aim by using the means provided by his function to resist or to press forward honestly, for example, if one employs speed to bring pressure to bear on an opponent slow by nature or by habit, or uses the retarding effects of ponderousness to slow down someone innately sharp or sharpened by constant exercise; if one conceals one’s aim in order artfully to delude, while the other uncovers what is concealed in order sensibly to escape; and in this same way in very many cases. If falsehood seems to follow from truth, however,c even if it is not clear where the fallacy lies, it is agreed that the syllogism is sophistic, or another form of argumentation fallacious indeed and treacherous and not to be trusted. This, however, is better suited to contentious argument than to demonstration or the practice of dialectic; for a sophism is a contentious syllogism,d a philosopheme a demonstrational syllogism, and an argument a dialectical syllogism; while an aporism is a dialectical syllogism dealing with contradiction. A knowledge of all these is necessary, and in each single branch of study exercise in them is of great value. One must therefore become accustomed to disputation, and turn over in one’s memory the first beginnings, distinguishing things necessary and probable from their opposites and Aristotle, Topica 8.8.160b.10ff. (Migne, PL 64.1002) Jerome, Epistulae 57.6 (Migne, PL 22.572) c  Aristotle, Topica 8.11.162a.8ff. (Migne, PL 64.1004) d  Aristotle, Topica 8.11.162a.16f. (Migne, PL 64.1004) a 

b 

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from one another; and one must delve into the significations of words in order that by the possession of knowledge one utterance may easily pass over into a number of utterances, or a number of utterances be reduced to one. In arguing for or against universals greater care is necessary, for they more clearly exhibit progress or danger, the construction of syllogisms without universals being an impossibility.a Moreover, while brevity is an especial virtue in every utterance,b it works with greater effectiveness, is more gratefully received, and shines out more clearly in utterance addressed to a second person; longwindednesss, on the other hand, in every respect involves a greater loss. If a proposition cannot be hastened, a change to a new set of subjects, provided that these are deemed pertinent, may be used to clear away the delay; for, as Aristotle observes,c whoever puts questions to one utterance over a long space of time is a bad questioner; for if he does so when the respondent has answered what he has been asked, he is evidently either asking a multiplicity of questions or repeating the same ones. He is either acting childishly, therefore, or he does not have a syllogism; for every syllogism is constructed of few ingredients. If, however, he does so when the respondent has not answered what he has been asked, it is clear that he neither rebukes the respondent nor withdraws.d It sometimes happens, however, that questions are multiplied so as to provide an occasion for reproof and on all sides to elicit grounds for a just rebuke;e and for the most part this procedure is worthy of praise. From time to time, however, it betokens a deficiency, the thesis not being definite or there being no way forward for the person who repeats the same circuit, coursing through the same air,f constantly moving but never ada  b 

9.1.13

Aristotle, Topica 8.14.164a.10 and 11 (Migne, PL 64.1007 and 1008) As is the case with Thucydides according to Seneca the Elder, Controuersiae

Aristotle, Topica 8.2.158a.25ff. (Migne, PL 64.998) John, following Aristoteles Latinus, here gives quoniam non increpat uel recedit, with palam before quoniam to be supplied from above; Boethius gives si uero non respondeat, quid aut non increpat aut discedit, which correctly represents what Aristotle himself had said e  Cicero, De amicitia 16.59 f  Ovid, Metamorphoses 2.721 c 

d 

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vancing.a The blacksmith Hescelin at Conches, as Master William used to relate, was wont to follow the practice of those who in their disputations seek nothing definite, carrying on his smithing in the same way as these parties carry on their dialectic. For his habit was to wait for the end-product to be dictated not by skill but by chance. If, while turning over a molten mass of metal on his anvil and shaping it with the blows of his hammer, he happened to be asked what he was producing, he would make no definite response but mention many separate items, a knife, for instance, or a sickle, or a ploughshare or something else to which chance might draw the material; what he produced was not what he wished but what he could. And yet the last thing that the skilled craftsman should follow is chance, not the dictates of reason. A store of rational arguments must, accordingly, be amassed from every source for the construction or destruction of a thesis, so that the capability of pressing on and objecting may be developed. If an adversary be lacking, each man may find out on his own the identity, number and strength of the arguments which reinforce or assail a particular point in a question proposed; for in this way each man will easily become adept in attacking and counter-attacking, and, whether he may have to fightb or to persuade or to philosophise, being in possession of positive and negative instances he will either be victorious and come away with glory, or be defeated in a way which brings no discredit or shame to him. In antiquity it was the Romans’ strict practice in the military sphere for those who were to be trained in arms to become accustomed from their earliest years to mock warfare,c and, as they grew up, for their play to be constantly directed to that activity from which, in later years, when the state was in times of crisis, they would derive the felicity of a triumph. Each of them was familiar with the handling of weapons, and learned in advance at homed the appropriate ways in which to advance or to retreat, on foot or on horseback, and to strike, now with the edge, now with the point, of the sword. Just Terence, Eunuchus 913 Aristotle, Topica 8.5.159a.27, 30 and 33 (Migne, PL 64.999) c  Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris 1.4, 11 and 12 d  Cicero, De oratore 1.32.147 a 

b 

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so the logician must have the control of his weapons at the ready, that is, have to hand a knowledge of first principles, an abundance of demonstrables, and all the ways of constructing syllogisms and proceeding by induction. He must also evaluate the strengths of his adversary, since it is on this too that the outcome of the action regularly depends. For it does not rest with one party alone to bring a shared enterprise to a successful conclusion:a inexperience on the part of the questioner or teacher, and also, very commonly, slowness on the part of the listener, or the difficulty of the exercise, prevent one who acts in accordance with art from attaining his object. It is a large part of intelligence, says Palladius,b to assess the character of the man with whom one has dealings. In civil law also it is laid down that no one should be ignorant of the circumstances of the man with whom one enters into a contract.c Accordingly, a learned man must be handled in one way, but a man known to be uneducated in quite another, the learned man requiring to be plied with syllogistic reasoning, the uneducated with inductive.d For anyone to make progress, however, he must possess not only enthusiasm for the exercise but also an underlying vein of praiseworthy intelligence.e A good intelligence is one which readily assents to what is true and rejects what is false. This intelligence comes initially from nature, through the prompting of innate reason, and then with greater vigour derives strength from its striving after what is good and from its being regularly used. Such regular use reinforces exercise and engenders the faculty of testing and evaluating truth, and it does this with greater ease and expedition if it be confirmed by the compendious aid of the art and its precepts. But for all that the intelligence may, as it happens, profitably be exercised now by itself and now with another, there is greater profit in conjoint activity than in solitary cogitation. Iron is sharpened on iron,f and similarly the mind of Aristotle, Topica 8.11.161a.19ff. (Migne, PL 64.1003) Palladius, Agricultura 1.1 c  Justinian, Digest 50.17.19 d  Aristotle, Topica 8.14.164a.12 and 13 (Migne, PL 64.1008) e  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 6.2.3 f  Proverbs 27.17 a 

b 

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one engaged in conversation is, it so happens, more sharply and more effectively aroused at the voice of another; above all if he joins in talk with one who is wise or unassuming. Otherwise, the mouth of the fool which blurts out foolishnessa and the shameless man who knows not restraint do not so readily instruct as they pervert the minds of the young who seek by emulation to make themselves like others. They do not inform unto life, nor do they instruct unto knowledge, but they make foolish the soul and poison the tongue. So then, although nothing is more beneficial than mutual conference, one should not, for all that, engage in disputation with every man or exercise oneself against any one at all. For it needs must be, as Aristotle says,b that against some persons one’s utterance becomes debased. Against one who by every means tries to give the impression of avoiding defeat, it may be right by every means to try to construct a syllogism; but it is not seemly, because it does not behove one at once to take one’s stand against all comers; for necessarily the utterance must prove toilsome, since those who are practising are not able to refrain from wrangling disputation. One should not, however, dispute in all places and at all times and about any matter. For there are many things which do not admit of disputation, and there are things which surpass the reasoning of men and are consecrated to faith alone. There are also things which seem unworthy of the questioner and the respondent alike, and which prove that those who fight over such things have either taken leave of their senses or never had any. These are things the knowledge of which is not beneficial nor the ignorance harmful. To devote attention to these things does not so much prepare the advance towards philosophy as the retreat away from it, being indicative not of a mind making progress but of a mind falling away. Hence the elegant words of Ambrose:c I freely admit that I do not know what I do not know, or rather, what I should not benefit at all by knowing. The investigation of probables, however, from which comes well-nigh all human knowledge, is someProverbs 15.2 Aristotle, Topica 8.14.164b.9 (Migne, PL 64.1008) c  Ambrose, Hexaemeron 6.2.7 (Migne, PL 14.244) a 

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how derived from the fountain-head of the Topica, which, by discovering the conjunction of things and words, makes ready a store of rational arguments; if any man, therefore, be adequately instructed in these, he will recognise the truth of the Pythagoreana saying that on every matter it is possible to dispute with probability on both sides of the question. To discover truth itself as it really is belongs to the perfection of God or of His angels; and to that truth each man advances with a familiarity proportional to the eagerness with which he seeks what is true, the passion with which he cherishes it, the honesty with which he explores it, and the sweetness which delights him in the contemplation of it. These are the points which, in face of an importunate challenge, I have summarily excerpted and here repeated; not indeed that I have provided a full description of the value or the conception of the preceding books – for this is beyond my strength and foreign to my aim – but with the intention of showing that the headings set forth, and charged with being useless, are useful. My intention is the same in what follows also, namely, to meet the challenge of my rival rather than write commentaries on the arts which all men teach or learn. Let anyone who is not satisfied with this procedure show me a better one.

Seneca, Epistulae morales 88.43 ascribes this view to Protagoras not Pythagoras ; see also p. 321 note a below a 

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I am compelled to return to my theme after an intermission, having been obliged to give priority over it to more weighty matters. For advancing years, my status, the shape of my circumstances, to say nothing at present of urgent legal business and the burden of household affairs, required that I employ my time elsewhere. But the foolhardiness of my rival will not be still, and you whose wishes I must respect seek an expression of my views; with all possible brevity, therefore, I will run through the points which the time permits. If I may use Seneca’s words,a it would have been a pleasure to travel back to days of yore and to cast a glance over those better years, had not my mind been weighed down by bitter sadness occasioned partly by fear for the future and partly by other apprehensions. But since you have seen fit to act as judge in the conflict between Cornificius and myself, I descend, all against my will, I might even say dragged, to the sandy floor of this exercise ground. Let that suffice.

a 

Seneca the Elder, Controuersiae 1 praef. 1

287

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1.  That the Analytica weighs types of argument So then, the trainer of the Peripatetic school of thought, which toils harder than the rest in its search for the truth, being determined that his work should not be marred by incompleteness, gave it a rounded totality, knowing full well that the bringing to perfection of any art redounds to the praise and glory of its author. Accordingly, having provided for the equipment and practice of invention, he sat himself down in what one might call his forgea and set about hammering out a set of scales, as it were, by which he could with very great precision weigh types of argument. This is the Analytica, a book concerned principally with judgement, and to some extent serviceable also to invention. For all scholarly disciplines are interconnected, and each one of them derives its final perfection from others. There is scarcely one, if indeed there is one, which can reach the summit without the support of another. A few words will suffice to apprise you of my view of this work and make you fully cognisant of the opinion preferred by my judgement.

141

2.  That this knowledge is universally useful and how it got this name A knowledge of the Analytica is exceedingly useful, and anyone who professes logic but does not possess this knowledge is a fool. To explain the meaning of the word, what the Greeks term analytice we may translate as resolutoria;b but our interpretation will be more accessible if we talk of balanced utterance; for ana in Greek means aequale, and lexis means locutio. Analysis frequently arises when an utterance is not understood and we accordingly wish to break it down into one of equal value which is better known. Hence my translator, upon hearing an unknown word, above all Proverbs 27.21 Boethius, Commentariorum minorum in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione liber secundus 10 and Commentariorum maiorum liber quartus 10 a 

b 

288

IV, 1-3

a compound, would say analyse this of the word he wanted explained in equivalent terms. For this resolutio lends the utmost possible support to the intellect in the matter of understanding. However, although the knowledge of analysis is necessary, the actual book is not necessary to the same extent, since all that it contains is elsewhere transmitted in a simpler and more accurate form. In no other book, however, is it presented with greater truth or impact. Even the unwilling it coerces into belief, for it is a regular bully, and, attacking in a way reminiscent of Caesar,a it finds no joy in advancing except over a conquered adversary; consideration shown to a friend is of absolutely no consequence to it. This certainly comports well enough with the function of a judge, since integrity of judgement is regularly warped by affection or by hostility. However, confusion among the examples and the trajection of letters (inserted deliberately for the sake of brevity or to prevent the examples at any point from being accused of falsehood) have so muddled the book that much labour is needed to reach a point which can be made most simply; and often, in avoiding a downright lie, it is neither true nor false, or perhaps it does lie, if it is not misrepresented by the shameless.b

3.  That the book is not so useful for developing verbal fluency While the rules it inculcates are useful and necessary for the acquisition of knowledge, the book itself is well-nigh useless for the building up of diction, what we may call a stock of vocabulary. Diction is an adequate verbal facility in any language.c Knowledge therefore must be firmly based on memory, and very many words must be excerpted; for the philosopher must always be careful to concentrate on understanding words, and additionally must excerpt words which are conveniently transferred elsewhere and Lucan, Bellum ciuile 2.439ff. Aristotle, Topica 8.8.160b.3ff. (Migne, PL 64.1001) c  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 8.1 a 

b 

289

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which may quite frequently be in demand. The remainder are no more useful than leaves without fruit, and so are either trampled under foot or left on their parent tree. Those persons therefore who follow Aristotle in distorting names and words,a and by complex subtlety batter the intellects of others in order to show off their own, strike me as having chosen the worst part. Our fellowEnglishman Adam seems to me in his Ars disserendi to have been worse affected than anybody else by this particular vice; and I could wish that the sensible thoughts he uttered had been sensibly expressed. His friends and supporters may count this as a mark of cleverness, but most people take it to be the consequence of silliness or grudging on the part of a man whom they call conceited. For so closely did he represent Aristotle’s convoluted wording that the level-headed listener rightly reacts with the words: Can one call this anything but frothy and fluffy, like an old dried-up branch with a huge over-grown bark upon it?b Still, we must be grateful to the auctores, for we draw on them as sources and grow rich through the labours of others.

4.  What the conception of the first book is All that it is necessary to know, however, the book communicates most truly and exactly.c That is: what a proposition is, whether dialectical or demonstrative, universal, particular or indefinite; what a term is, whether predicate or subject; what a perfect or imperfect syllogism is; what being or not being in a whole is; what propositions may be adapted for use in syllogising and what not; or what obtains in the case of things which in the modern use are said to be of natural matter, whether proximate or remote. Having presented these,d it subjoins the demonstrations of the three figures, and, after defining both the extremes and the middle Boethius, De syllogismo categorico liber primus (Migne, PL 64.793) Persius 1.96-97 in Conington’s translation c  Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.1-3 d  Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.4-7 a 

b 

290

IV, 3-4

term, shows how many and what moods are produced in each of the figures from the combination of the extremes; in this it sowed the seed of the reasoning behind those moods which, according to Boethius,a were added by Theophrastus and Eudemus. After that,b having taken account of modals, it passes to the combinations which are necessary or possible, together with those which are concerned with inherence, in order to show what results from these in each of the figures. I am not saying that Aristotle himself has dealt adequately with modals in any place that I have read, except perhaps within the limits of his plan; but he has furnished an entirely trustworthy scientific basis for proceeding in the case of all of them. Commentators on Holy Scripture say that the theory of the moods is absolutely essential, and that the most careful attention must be paid to the mood, whether it be expressed or implicit. Thus, in the passage which reads: Whom you made perfect they have destroyed,c the mood is not expressed but it is understood as well as if deliberately added, as in the case: In hope he devours the tender lamb.d For the mood, as they say, is what one might call the middle state between terms. To be sure, although no one can list one by one all the moods after which modals are named, and this indeed is not required by the art, still schoolmasters debate this matter with the greatest profit, more profitably than Aristotle himself I may say, with all respect to the majority view. At all events it is my opinion that, whether modals are so called on account of a true mood or simply on account of the form, a knowledge of them is essential in very many passages of Scripture. In these cases, however, I think that usage has particular authority, since it is usage which intensifies or weakens, modifies or annuls the significations of utterances. This is clearly seen in the case of the contingent, which, employed in its widest extension as equivalent to the possible, in normal modern usage never passes beyond the classroom wall. The first book additionally shows how aptness Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico liber primus (Migne, PL 64.831) Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.8-26 c  Psalms 10.4 with Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos (Migne, PL 36.135) d  Source unknown a 

b 

291

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in syllogising is achieved:a it is not enough to know in theory how syllogisms are produced; one must also be able to produce them oneself. There follows the method of reducing syllogisms to the moods of the first figure;b and with this the conception of the first book comes to its close.

5.  What the conception of the second book is

144

The second book passes to the system of drawing inferences,c expressed in the form of a conclusion, and explains additionally how truth may be derived from falsehood by syllogism in the second and third figure, a matter which possibly escapes those who argue that nothing follows from a falsehood. The book next advances to circular syllogisms,d tracing them in all figures; then to the conversions of syllogisms in every figure. These first sections enable imperfect syllogisms to be restored to perfect, and the credibility of all alike to be made manifest. This is the shape of direct reasoning. Subjoined is the system of hypothesising which establishes a proposition by the necessity of an impossible or improbable outcome.e The reasoning is thus: if the conclusion be not accepted, and the opposite of the conclusion and the second of the points admitted be taken and arranged in the first figure, the opposite of one of the points admitted may be inferred. The book shows how this is done in every figure, proving that through an impossible outcome all moods are true. It also accurately shows how and in what figure a syllogism is constructed from opposite propositions.f It also adds the rule for petitio principii,g a matter of theory which is well suited both to the demonstrator and the dialectician, for all that the latter is satisfied with probability whereas the former accepts Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.27-44 Aristotle, Analytica priora 1.45, 46 c  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.1-4 d  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.4-10 e  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.11 f  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.12-15 g  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.16 a 

b 

292

IV, 4-6

only the truth. It is well suited furthermore if non-cause is posited as cause,a as for instance when someone complains that he has been led to an impossible conclusion not under the compulsion of nexus of argument but because a false premiss had been posited. There follows discussion of the reason for false conclusion,b counter-syllogism and refutation, of fallacy in thought, and of the conversion of the middle and the extreme terms, the utility of all of which can, however, be far more conveniently communicated. Next comes the technique for reducing an induction,c which it terms the rhetorical syllogism; likewise the technique for the example, with a section on deduction. It then explains what is an objection and what a probability,d and states what proposition is probable although there may be objections to it, that is to say, it may not always obtain; for example, mothers love, stepmothers hate. Also what a sign is and how an enthymeme is formed from probabilities and signs. Finally it deals with the matter of judging characters. This is a large chapter, but one which does not by any means fulfil what it faithfully promised, although it does to some extent contribute to that end. One thing I know, and that is that I have not seen anyone becoming a master at judging characters by the aid of this chapter.

6.  Concerning the difficulty of the Analytica posteriora and the reasons for it The knowledge contained in the Analytica Posteriora is subtle indeed and accessible to few minds; for this there are, it is clear, a number of reasons. First, it involves the art of demonstration, which by comparison with the other types of argument is difficult. Then, it was so rarely employed that it is now largely neglected, the practice of demonstration surviving vestigially among Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.17 Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.17-22 c  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.23-25 d  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.26, 27 a 

b 

293

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mathematicians alone, and among them confined for the most part to geometers alone – and geometry too is a discipline not much practised among us, except possibly in the Spanish area and the nearer parts of Africa. For the peoples there practise geometry above all the other disciplines for the sake of astronomy; similarly in Egypt and among a number of peoples in Arabia. Furthermore, the book in which the subject of demonstration is handled is far more disorganised than the rest, having suffered from the transposition of words, the trajection of letters and the unfamiliarity of the examples taken from different disciplines, and finally, a matter for which the author bears no responsibility, the book has been so badly corrupted by copyists that there are pretty well as many obstacles in it as there are chapters. We are well off indeed when the obstacles do not outnumber the chapters. As a consequence most people blame the translator for the difficulties, claiming that his translation of the book into Latin is inaccurate .

7.  Why Aristotle pre-eminently has earned the name of the philosopher Knowing how to demonstrate was a technique so highly revered by the Peripatetics that Aristotle, who surpassed almost all other philosophers in almost every respect, came as a consequence of his having imparted the skill of demonstration to win for himself the generic name of the philosopher by what amounted to the right of proprietorship. For it was because of demonstration, people say, that the name philosopher descended on him. If you do not believe me, listen to Burgundio of Pisa from whom I learnt this.a And since demonstration dispels the darkness of ignorance and by a certain prerogative of precognisance makes a man knowledgeable, it frequently leads the Academic school, which I profess to follow in matters which to the wise man are doubtful, from the gloom that envelops it into the light; and, just as in the Analytica priora he hammered out a set of scales to equip the judge, so in the a 

Anselm of Havelberg, Dialogi 2.1 (Migne, PL 188.1163)

294

IV, 6-8

Analytica posteriora Aristotle advances his devotee to the authority of a teacher. The sequence is elegant indeed, for one who can correctly carry out the function of a judge deserves to be elevated to the chair of a teacher.

8.  Of the function of demonstration what demonstration consists of and how and that sensation is the beginning of knowledge and how But who is sufficient for this discipline?a Assuredly, while an individual may become perfect in some part of it, no one has mastered it perfectly in many parts. For a previous knowledge of the principles of the various disciplines is essential, and from these principles must be inferred the necessary sequence of truths, by means of a chain of reasoning, and with some pricking of spurs,b so to say, lest any gap appear as if by default of necessity to damage the science of demonstration. Certainly, not every science is demonstrative, but only that one which consists of truths, primaries and immediates. For just as not every syllogism is demonstration, but every demonstration is syllogism, just so demonstration is inconvertibly encompassed by science. There precede, therefore, general mental conceptions, then come things known per se, and from these derives demonstration. In the matter of things known it is of consequence whether they are better known by nature or with respect to us, things closest to the senses being better known to us, whereas things more remote from the senses, that is universals, are simply and naturally better known. The path of the demonstrator, therefore, leads from the principles of the disciplines through immediate propositions, that is propositions that do not need to be proved, to his ultimate goal. And though this science is said to be of particular relevance to judgement, it nevertheless contributes substantially to invention. For it shows on what particulars demonstration is contingent, and how and when, and how particular a  b 

II Corinthians 2.16 Boethius, De syllogismo categorico 2 (Migne, PL 64.830)

295

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147

or general considerations are to be employed; for the sciences offer mutual support to one another. And since not every topic is suitable for the demonstrator, for instance a topic taken from an accident, because corruptible things simply do not involve demonstration or science, only necessary topics are claimed by demonstration, the rest being left to the dialectician and orator, who are satisfied with the construction of a syllogism closely approximating to the truth. The book also shows what syllogisms and propositions are to be used, and what weight is contributed to the proof or disproof of an argument by careful inspection of the quantity or quality of a proposition. In addition it shows what syllogism suits what question, and what figure is appropriate to a syllogism, establishing the science of demonstration just as if things proved to be so by certain reason are grasped by corporeal sensation. For general concepts derive their credibility from induction based on individual things. Only induction makes it possible to examine universals, since, as the book says,a abstract statements become known by means of induction. But induction is impossible for the insensate. For we have sensation of individual things, and it is impossible to derive knowledge of them either from universals without induction, or by means of induction without sensation. From sensation therefore comes memory;b from the frequently repeated memory of many things comes experience; and from experience we derive the ordered structure of science or art. From art, moreover, strengthened by practice and exercise, stems the faculty of carrying out what is to be done in accordance with art. And so corporeal sensation, which is the primary force or primary exercise of the soul, lays the first foundations of all the arts, and shapes that pre-existent cognition which not only opens up but makes a way for first principles.

a  b 

Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 1.18.81b.2ff. (Migne, PL 64.730) Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 2.19.100a.3ff. (Migne, PL 64.761)

296

IV, 8-9

9.  What sensation is and how every type of philosophy derives strength from it by means of imagination This is clear to the student who subjects each particular to careful inspection. For since sensation according to Aristotle is a natural power which reveals things,a cognition either does not exist at allb or else hardly exists if sensation is defective. If anyone joins the natural scientist in examining the works of nature, which are constituted of elements and matter and form, he takes the direction of his reasoning from the evidence of the senses. But if with the mathematician he abstracts figures or divides numbers, he sets before his eyes, which may be trusted, many examples of the distinct multitude or continuous extension of bodies. The philosopher too who exercises the rational faculty, being also dependent both on the natural scientist and on the mathematician, begins with things which derive strength from the testimony of the senses and contribute to knowledge of the intelligible and the incorporeal. Sensation, in the view of Chalcidius,c is an affection of the body which travels from certain things placed outside which buffet the body in various ways as far as the soul. Unless this affection possesses some violence, it neither reaches the soul nor takes the form of sensation. If the affection is pleasing because of its gentleness, it engenders pleasure, and, if it increases in strength, it is called joy; but, if by its bitterness it wounds, it occasions pain. Aristotle, however, asserts that sensation is rather a power of the soul than an affection of the body;d but it is by affections that this power is roused to form its judgement of things.e And, because it perceives things, it stores up in itself images of these things, and by retaining and frequently turning over these images it forms for itself as it were a treasury of memory. In the process of turning over the images of things, imagination comes to birth, and imagination not only remembers objects perceived but by its vigour Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 2.19.99b.35 (Migne, PL 64.760) Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 1.17.81a.38f. (Migne, PL 64.730) c  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 194 d  Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 2.19 (Migne, PL 64.760) e  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 193 a 

b 

297

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proceeds to make copies of them. The question has however been asked whether imagination differs from sensation by its nature or solely by its mode of perception. For I recall that there have been philosophers whose view has been that as the soul is incorporeal, simple and individual in substance, so it has one power which it employs in manifold ways according to the diverse nature of things.a It is their opinion, then, that this same power now experiences sensation, now remembers, now imagines, now discerns by investigation, and now pursues what it has investigated and gains understanding. But there are more philosophers who feel on the contrary that the soul is simple in quantity but composite in qualities, and that, as it is exposed to many affections, so it makes use of many powers. I could indeed easily believe that those powers are more numerous than their books record, since the soul, while it is absent from the Lord,b is thoroughly ignorant of its origin and scarcely recognises its strength.

10.  Concerning imagination and that it is from imagination that affections arise by which the soul is composed or disturbed and befouled 149

Imagination thus arises from the root of the senses through the kindling of memory, and by means of a sort of symplasis, which we may call conformatio (forming together),c looks not only on that which is present but also on that which is absent whether in place or in time. Hence the words:d So she sat, so she was adorned, so she spun the threads, and so the hair which fell about her neck became her. That imagination is capable of abstraction is hinted at by Virgil when Andromache confesses that by a form of recall she has abstracted the image of her son Astyanax:e All that is left Isidore, Differentiae 2.29 (Migne, PL 83.84) II Corinthians 5.6 c  Cicero, De oratore 2.87.357 d  Ovid, Fasti 2.771, 772 e  Virgil, Aeneid 3.489-491 a 

b 

298

IV, 9-10

me now of my dear son Astyanax is his image. His eyes, his hands, his features were just like yours, and he would now be growing to manhood, of an age with you. And because, as Plato says in the Respublica,a it is easy to attain to the secrets of nature by means of things which frequently befall, the soul conceives an image of things to come from the quality of the things of which it has sensation at present or had sensation at some time past. So, if it conceives a harsh affection,b fear arises concerning the future; hope on the other hand arises if the affection conceived is pleasing because useful or attractive. From this there is engendered also cupidity, a deadly disease and one which is very much adverse to the intention of philosophy. For it is impossible for anyone to devote his energies equally to cupidity and philosophy. The soul is blended of contraries, with hope of enjoyment producing pleasure,c but postponement, sadness and pain; if these grow strong, so as to disorder and disturb the soul, the result of the concussion is anger. To quell unlawful movements, therefore, the imagination produces caution, to shun things which are harmful; things, for example, from which come pain,d anger, cupidity, and their followers, envy, hate, slander, lechery and vanity, for instance. When the soul is too cautious,e it moves towards fear; when insufficiently cautious, towards rashness. In this way other things too come forth from sensation by means of imagination; love, for example, which labours hard to protect the body, to preserve what is useful, and to ensure its propagation .

Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 231 where there is reference to Plato, Respublica 6.509ff. b  Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 14.15 c  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 194 d  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 195 e  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 194 a 

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11.  What imagination is and concerning opinion fallacy of opinion and sensation and the origin of fronesis which we call prudence

150

Imagination therefore is the first movement of the soul struck from without, and by this movement a second judgement is carried out or the first returns by means of remembrance. The first judgement is active in sensation, pronouncing something to be white or black or hot or cold. The second belongs to the imagination, as when, passing judgement on something which is to come or is remote, it asserts on the basis of the retained image of things perceived that it is such or such. This judgement by sensation or imagination is termed opinion; and, if it judges things as they are, it is certain, but, if otherwise, untrustworthy. Opinion Aristotle asserts to be an affection of soul,a because images of things are imprinted on the soul while it is active. If one image, however, is imprinted instead of another, the opinion is termed fallacious or false because of the error by which it is deceived ( fallitur) in judgement. For the senses are very frequently deceived, not only in little children, at a time when reasoning is thought not to be employed, but also in advanced age. In his proof of this point Aristotle observesb that babies regard all adult males as fathers and all adult females as mothers, because their untrained sense is deceived and unable to bring to bear a firm judgement; while even the sharpest-sighted see a staff in water as broken. And because the soul is aware of the deception practised by the senses, it is exercised to grasp something reliable on which it can lean with confidence without going astray. From this exercise is born the virtue which the Greeks call fronesis and the Latins prudentia.

a  Aristotle, De interpretatione 1.16a.3 and 7 with Boethius’ commentaries; Historia pontificalis 13 b  Aristotle, Physica A.1.184b.12ff.; Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 206

300

IV, 11-13

12.  What prudence is what its matter what its parts and how knowledge comes from sensation Prudence, as Cicero says,a is a virtue of soul which is engrossed in the search for and examination of the truth and the perfect understanding of it. The matter in which this virtue is exercised is truth, whereas the remaining virtues have certain domestic responsibilities as their matter. So as not to be deceived on all sides, therefore, prudence directs its gaze to the future and shapes providence, or it recalls to mind past events and treasures them up in the memory,b or develops knowledge of present affairs, producing a species of astuteness or cleverness; or it extends itself equally in all directions and engenders circumspection. When it has attained to truth, however, it passes into a kind of knowledge. From this it is clear that, because imagination is the product of sensation, and opinion the product of both sensation and imagination, while from opinion derives prudence which grows strong and becomes knowledge, knowledge takes its origin in sensation. For, as has been stated,c many sensations or even one sensation produce a single memory, many memories an experience, many experiences a rule, and many rules an art; while an art produces a branch of study.

13.  Concerning the difference between knowledge and wisdom what faith is It was for this reason that our forebearsd referred prudence or knowledge to familiarity with temporal and sensible things, but understanding or wisdom to familiarity with spiritual things. The usual term in the human context is knowledge, in the divine, Cicero, De officiis 1.5.15ff. Cicero, De oratore 1.5.18 c  In chapter 9 above from Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 2.19 d  Cicero, De officiis 1.43.153; Augustine, De trinitate 12.15.25, 13.1.1 and 14.1.3 (Migne, PL 42.1012, 1013 and 1037); Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 178 a 

b 

301

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152

wisdom. Knowledge is so far dependent on sensation that there is no knowledge of things which are known by sensation when those things are withdrawn from sensation. This has been agreed since Aristotle.a There can however be reliable opinion, as when it is believed that the sun will return after night. Hence, because human things are transitory, there can only rarely be a certain judgement passed on them by opinion; but, if that which is not at all points certain be taken for certain, we move into the sphere of faith, which Aristotle defines as a strongly held opinion.b Both in human and in divine matters faith is most necessary, since without faith contracts could not be concluded nor any commerce conducted between men; while between God and men also there can be no commerce of merits and rewards if faith be removed. It is when it clings to true articles of religion that faith wins merit, being, as the Apostle declares,c the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. It stands midway between opinion and knowledge, since it strongly asserts a thing as certain, but does not through knowledge attain to certitude concerning it. Hence the observation of Master Hugh:d Faith is willing certitude concerning absent things, stationed above opinion but below knowledge. But here the word knowledge is used in a wider sense, being extended as far as the comprehension of things divine.

14.  Concerning the relationship between fronesis and alitia and concerning the origin of fronesis and what reason is And because truth is the matter of prudence,e for prudence toils to comprehend what is true, the ancientsf made up the story that Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 1.17.81a.38ff. (Migne, PL 64.730) Aristotle, Topica 4.5.126b.18 (Migne, PL 64.950) c  Hebrews 11.1 d  Hugh of St Victor, Summa sentententiarum 1.1 (Migne, PL 176.43), De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae dialogus (Migne, PL 176.35) and De sacramentis Christianae fidei 1.10.1 (Migne, PL 176.330) e  Chapter 12 above f  Theodulus, Ecloga 335; Book 2 chapter 3 above a 

b 

302

IV, 13-15

Fronesis and Alitia were sisters, because prudence is linked to truth by what one might call a divine kinship. This is why prudence, if she is perfect, cannot be kept from the sight of truth; but, because truth is not of men, what is true remains hidden, but is eagerly sought by our infirm condition. And indeed, in its search for the truth, that condition scarcely advances with accuracy, and in its comprehension is scarcely secure, because of the deceits practised by the senses and by opinions; for it recollects that it has been deceived and is capable of being deceived. It is concerned therefore that it should rejoice in a firm perception and undoubted judgement, which may be termed reason. For the assessment made by reason is firm and sure. Fronesis therefore gives birth to Philology,a while the love of what is true urges prudence to familiarity with things about which it wishes a pure and certain judgement to be passed. Philology, like philosophy, is an unassuming word, for, as it is easier to seek than to possess wisdom, so it is easier to love than to practise reason. For reason, that is, a pure firmness of judgement, belongs to few men.b

15.  Likewise what reason is and that the word reason is manifold and that reasons are everlasting Accordingly, the soul, buffeted by the sensesc and yet more strongly shaken by its concern to gain prudence, exerts itself, and, gathering its forces together, endeavours with greater intentness to elude the deceptions of the senses and of opinions. Indeed, by its intentness it sees more clearly, retains more firmly, and judges more soundly. And this power is what is termed reason.d For reason is a power of the spiritual nature which distinguishes between corporeal and incorporeal things, seeking to weigh them with firm and sound Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.114 Chapter 18 below ends with a similar sentiment; similar also is Chalcidius’ translation of Plato, Timaeus 51e c  Plato, Timaeus 44a with Chalcidius’ translation d  Augustine, [De spiritu et anima] 38 (Migne, PL 40.809) a 

b 

303

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judgement. Its judgement too is called reason, and those things also are called reasons concerning which reason alone judges, and which in their essence are divorced from the nature of things sensible and particular. These reasons Augustinea and many others pronounce to be everlasting. They are things over which from the beginning and without beginning has extended the sanction of the eternally decreed constitution and its ordered sequence as laid down by primal reason, which I shall certainly not err if I call the wisdom of God. Even amid truths themselves it is manifest that infinite things of this kind are to be found. The propositions that God is God, that the Father has a Son, and that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with both, may to some extent at least be enunciated, but they are true from eternity, confirmed by the divine judgement. This fact is clear not only in true things but in others also; for the ratio of two to three, and likewise of three to two, and very many things of this type, on the authority of Augustine, are everlasting. Should anyone find this absurd, let him read Augustine’s treatise De libero arbitrio,b and it will be agreed that it is so.

16.  The distinction of multiplicity and that brute beasts do not possess reason although they seem to distinguish and how it comes about that man has been allotted reason according to the Hebrews Cassiodorus in his book De anima employs the following definition:c By reason I mean a commendable movement of soul which by way of things conceded and known leads to something unknown, arriving at the secret of truth. Therefore both the power and the movement of the power are called reason. This movement Plato in his Respublicad declares to be a deliberative power of soul Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus 83 46.2 (Migne, PL 40.30 and 31), quoted above on p. 205 note c and p. 235 note d; see also Augustine, De trinitate 12.2.2 (Migne, PL 42.999) b  Augustine, De libero arbitrio 2.8 (Migne, PL 32.1252 and 1253) c  Cassiodorus, De anima 2 (Migne, PL 70.1284) d  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 230 and 233 a 

304

IV, 15-16

which with faithful judgement weighs the species of things and the causes of the species and assesses what is honourable or useful or to be sought or to be shunned. For brute beasts too in a way possess the power of discrimination by which they distinguish foods, evade snares, leap across precipices, and recognise their kith and kin; they do not however exercise reason, but are endowed with vigorous natural appetites and, while able to form images of many things, are by no means able to determine the causes of things. This arises, according to the Hebrews,a from the fact that, when in the beginning under God’s dispensation the rest of creation was formed, and, nurtured by heat and moisture, acquired a natural, animal and sensible spirit from which arise the appetite and the imagination which brute beasts possess, only man obtained the power to discriminate effectively and soundly; for, while breathing life into him, God willed that he be participant in the divine reason. Man’s spirit, since it is given by God and will return to God,b alone thinks on things divine, and is superior to the rest of animate kind in hardly any respect except this. For corporeal things are embraced not only by imagination but by sensation; in addition the shapes of corporeal things, and also their actual coherence and incoherence, are also in part known to sensation. For sensation sees a man, that is, a corporeal thing; it sees colours and movements, and the shapes of corporeal things at all events. It also sees that a man moves his hand, which is more than seeing a man moving, that is who moves, his hand. If anyone finds this surprising, let him take Augustine’s word for it.c But reason transcends all sensation, and introduces its judgement even into incorporeal and spiritual things. It contemplates all things below, and strains its gaze to the things above. The reasoning of the Hebrews agrees with Seneca’s definition,d although he intended something different. His words are: Reason is a particular part of the divine spirit buried deep in human bodies. This definition must either be taken Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 300 Ecclesiastes 12.7 c  Augustine, De libero arbitrio 2.3, 4 and 5 (Migne, PL 32.1245ff.) and De ciuitate Dei 11.27 d  Seneca, Epistulae morales 66.12 a 

b 

305

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in conjunction with the error of those pagans who opined that the soul of the world was dispersed among individual souls,a falsely asserting that it was identical with the Holy Spirit,b or it must be more loosely understood, with the word part taken to consist not in quantity but in quality (uirtute). For in order to give outline to the word, Seneca added quaedam (a particular). In a sense reason is indeed a divine virtue, but it is definitely not a part of Him who is of the most absolute simplicity.

155

17.  Concerning the function of reason and why the senses over which reason presides are in the head and what attendants Philology has Since therefore reason is ennobled by a divine origin and exercises its power on matters divine, the precept that it be cultivated above all things has been sanctioned by decree passed by the whole of philosophy. For reason checks disorderly movements and arranges all things according to the standard of goodness, so that there is nothing that fights against the divine ordinance. Whoever obeys reason will advance through and complete his span of life in felicity; but whoever rejects her, as Plato says in the Timaeus,c crawls maimed and halt along the path of life and finally together with his friend folly is summoned down to hell. Reason is concerned with both body and soul, and sets both in order. Whoever disparages both of them is maimed and infirm, and whoever disparages one of them is a cripple. Reason assesses the senses, which because of their habit of deceiving may be suspect; and therefore nature, most excellent parent of all, placed all the senses in the head, like a 

1.14

Plato, Timaeus 35a; Macrobius, Commentarii in Ciceronis somnium Scipionis

Abelard, De unitate et trinitate diuina (Stölzle 1, 2 and 8ff.), Theologia Christiana 1.5 (Cousin 2.378ff.), Introductio ad theologiam 1 (Cousin 2.48ff.) and 2 (Cousin 2.109ff.) and Ouvr. inéd. d’ Abélard 475 Cousin; Bernard of Clairvaux, De erroribus Abaelardi 4.10 (Migne, PL 182.1062) c  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 44c; the word mancum (‘halt’) is added by John b 

306

IV, 16-18

some senate in the Capitol of the soul, and made reason mistress, as it were, in the citadel of the head,a assigning her a seat midway between the chambers of imagination and memory so that she might, as from a watchtower, assess the judgements of the senses and the imagination. Therefore, because this very power, although divine, is tossed, one might say, on the winnowing-fan of the senses and the imagination, and because prudence seeks the untrammelled assessment of reason in her search for what is true, mother nature, to assist her, bore Philology, who is constantly accompanied by two attendants, Periergia (Industry) and Agrimnia (Sleeplessness).b It is Industry who encompasses the labour of work, Sleeplessness who with watchful diligence controls the exercise lest there be any excess; for love is not idle. Philology has an earthly and mortal origin, but, when she passes to things divine, a form of immortality makes her a god; for when prudence, which is of the earth and is the love of reason, rises to the secrets of truth incorrupt and things divine, it passes into wisdom and in a way is removed from the condition of mortal things.

18.  Concerning the difference between reason and understanding and what understanding is As Plato states in the Respublica,c understanding exceeds reason in the same proportion as reason transcends sensation. For understanding attains to the goal of reason’s search, entering on the laboursd begun by reason and laying up unto itself, as treasurese for wisdom, that which preparatory reason has acquired. Understanding is thus the supreme power of the spiritual nature, which, surveying things human and divine, contains in itself the causes of all reasons naturally perceptible to itself. For there are divine Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 231 Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.111ff. Agrimnia is a near miss for Agrypnia. It is a miss shared with Hugh of St Victor, Didascalicon 3.17 c  Plato, Respublica 7.533d; Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 231 d  John 4.38 e  Ecclesiasticus 4.21 a 

b 

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reasons which surpass all sensea both of men and of angels, and other reasons which, in accordance with the dispensation divinely decreed, become more or less known to some men. Understanding, Plato asserts,b is the possession of God alone and but a few men, that is, the elect.c

19.  What wisdom is and that it derives from sensation by means of grace

157

But wisdom follows understanding, because the divine things which understanding gathers from the matters discussed by reason have a pleasing taste, and fire souls possessed of understanding to the love of them. For wisdom, I think, derives its name (sapientia) from the fact that amid things divine it has the savour (sapor) of goodness.d Consequently the Fathers refer knowledge to active philosophy,e but wisdom to contemplative. From this it is clear that, if one retraces the preceding steps, one will see that even wisdom emanates from the spring of the senses, with the previous aid of grace. On the testimony of the Prophets, in which we rejoice, that very fear which is the beginning of wisdomf comes from the sense or imagined anticipation of punishment. Being apprehensive lest it receive a flogging, and mindful of Him who punishes, it avoids giving Him offence. By the sense or imagining of rewards also it is spurred to show obedience to Him who is able to punish and to bless. That man therefore who avoids giving offence practises dutiful respect, but it is through the experience of obedience that he acquires wisdom; for wisdom involves action. Should he become accustomed to the experience, the habit of doing what should be done begets fortitude. And to make his obediPhilippians 4.7 Plato, Timaeus 51e c  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 340 d  Isidore, Etymologiae 10.240 e  Augustine, De trinitate 12.14.22 and 12.15.25 (Migne, PL 42.1009 and 1012); Isidore, Differentiae 2.147 (Migne, PL 83.93) f  Psalms 110.10, Ecclesiasticus 1.16 a 

b 

308

IV, 18-20

ence rational,a which is most pleasing, there arises the counsel of deliberating about what has been done or is to be done. Deliberation is followed by understanding, which retains the better part in its bosom; for it is involved in things divine, the taste and love of which and the adherence to which is indeed true wisdom. But these stages are controlled not by nature but by grace, which from the fount of the senses at its discretion draws forth divers rivulets of knowledge; the unseen things of Godb it makes manifest to wisdom through the things which are done, and it shares what is made manifest in what may be called the unity of charity, making man one with God.

20.  Concerning the cognitive faculty of soul its simplicity and its immortality according to Cicero Consequently certain minor philosophers,c because there is a progression from the senses to knowledge, deny that there is any knowledge except of things which are perceived by the senses. How far this tenet is opposed to the aim of philosophy is clear. For it does away with the exercise by which reason seeks and retains in itself the notions of things which the Greeks call ennoiae;d and without this exercise there is no possibility for even the word reason to exist. It is, therefore, as Cicero observes in the Tusculanae disputationes,e a matter calling for high intelligence to summon the mind back from the senses and to abstract thought from the force of habit. For not even God himself as we understand Him can be understood in any other way except the mind be released and freed and separated from all mortal matter.f There is in the mind a certain single nature and force, which is segregated from these usual and well known natures; whatever that force may be, Romans 12.1 Romans 1.20 c  Cicero, De senectute 23.85 d  Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 1.24.57 e  Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 1.16.38 f  Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 1.27.66 a 

b 

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158

it is surely divine. The mind is not, however, able to see itself fully,a but, like the eye, so the mind sees others things while it does not see itself. It does not, however, see that which is very small, its form perhaps; yet even that also; but let us pass on. It certainly sees force, sagacity, memory, movement and swiftness. These things are great, divine, and everlasting. What the appearance of the mind is, or where it dwells, we should not even enquire. So, although one does not see the mind of man, any more than one sees God, nevertheless, just as God is recognised from His works, so the divine power of the mind is to be recognised from the memory of things, from invention, swiftness of movement, and every quality that has beauty.b As we learn about the mind, however, unless we are utterly stupid in matters of natural science, we cannot doubt that it is nothing admixed, nothing grown together, nothing linked or joined together, and nothing twofold. This being so, it assuredly cannot be separated, or divided, or plucked or dragged apart; therefore it cannot die.c This is what Cicero says in the Tusculanae disputationes in his attempt to demonstrate that the deliberative faculty, that is, reason, is divine, and that the souls of men are immortal. These observations on the affection of the senses, and the strength and greatness of the soul, are touched on with great brevity in order to confirm that, as Aristotle says,d skill or knowledge takes its origin from sensation. If anyone wished more extensively to discuss the strength of the soul, this complex subject would call for sharpness of intellect, a large memory and ample free time, as well as dedicated study, and would result in a number of very large volumes. Anybody wishing to explore in some detail the nature of the soul must read the writings not only of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and other ancient philosophers, but also of the Fathers, who gave expression to the truth in accordance with the faith. Both the Doctors of the church and after them Claudianuse and other more recent writers have written at length about the soul; and, Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 1.27.67 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 1.28.70 c  Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 1.29.71 d  Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 2.19.100a.6ff. (Migne, PL 64.761) e  Claudianus Mamertus, De statu animae a 

b 

310

IV, 20-21

if one is not able to work through them, one should at least read the Prenonphisicon, which provides an exhaustive discussion of the soul. I do not, however, rank this book above all others. But enough of that; let us now return to our main theme.

21.  That in the preceding matter Aristotle has provided a seedplot though not an adequate one for hypotheticals Dialectic and apodictic, which we call demonstration, are taught by the preceding matter, in which, however, little or nothing has been done about hypothetical syllogisms.a But a seed-plot has been provided by Aristotle, so that it is possible to advance thither also through the industry of others. For when the grounds of proof both of probable and of necessary propositions have been pointed out, it has been shown what follows probably or necessarily from what. As regards the proof of hypothetical syllogisms, this has particular bearing, I believe, on the proving of the consequence. Moreover Boethius statesb that the following remark of Aristotle in the Analytica has been taken as seminal for making new discoveries:c When the same thing both is and is not, it is not necessary for it to be the same. Boethius himself therefore and others besidesd have to some extent made good Aristotle’s shortcomings in this respect, but, as I see it, with shortcomings of their own. Thus in the case of hypothetical syllogisms it is shown what syllogisms are constructed in prior form by positing an antecedent and what in posterior by the invalidation of a consequent, what the figures or moods are which are formed of composite hypotheticals, what propositions are of equal and unequal mood,e and what the nature is of moods formed of disjunctive propositions.f It Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico liber primus (Migne, PL 64.831) Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico liber primus (Migne, PL 64.836) c  Aristotle, Analytica priora 2.4.57b.3, 4 (Migne, PL 64.691) d  Theophrastus and Eudemus, for instance: Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico liber primus (Migne, PL 64.831) e  Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico liber secundus (Migne, PL 64.859ff.) f  Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico liber secundus (Migne, PL 64.873ff.) a 

b 

311

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may perhaps be that Aristotle deliberately passed over this labour, since his book, despite the fact that he wrote most carefully, gives the impression of being difficult rather than useful. Had he carried out this labour in his usual fashion,a it is surely probable that the book would have been so difficult that only the Sibyl would have understood it.b I do not, however, think that he has here adequately covered the matter of hypotheticals, but the supplements of his scholars are very helpful, indeed indispensable.

22.  Concerning sophistry and its utility 160

Sophistry, it has been said, emulates both dialectic and demonstration, though its appearance is deceptive, since it strives more to achieve the semblance than the true quality of wisdom. Consequently Aristotle rightly subjoins it to the previous matters in order to prevent his devotee from being tripped up by the snares of this system. The resultant work is well worthy of Aristotle, and of more practical utility to the young than any other I could ever mention; for youth, although unable fully to win true wisdom in all things, nevertheless affects a reputation for wisdom, and is eager to have its glory judged worthy of the acclaim of others. It is precisely that which sophistry guarantees; for it is the semblance of wisdom, not the reality;c and the sophist in consequence is replete with seeming wisdom, not real wisdom. Sophistry counterfeits all disciplines, and, manifesting itself in their guise, spreads its traps for all men, bringing down the incautious. There will be no sense in anyone boasting of being a philosopher if he does not possess a knowledge of sophistry, for he will be unable to guard against a lie or to catch another in a lie. And this ability in each and every discipline is confined to the one who has knowledge of sophistry. Persons ignorant of sophistry, when tripped up by a  b 

work c 

Boethius, De syllogismo categorico liber primus (Migne, PL 64.793) Plautus, Pseudolus 25, 26; John would not have had direct knowledge of this Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 1.165a.21ff. (Migne, PL 64.1009)

312

IV, 21-23

their own fallacies or those of others, you may see behaving like so many Nicodemuses when they have been brought down, in their amazement exclaiming: Lord, how may these things be?a And there is nothing less seemly than this in a man who strives after glory or victory. Victory indeed is sought by the contentious, but glory by the sophist, and both are very well pleased to reach their goal through the midst of discussion and disputation. From this it follows that the practice of sophistry is most beneficial both for the development of style and for all philosophical investigation, provided that the fruit of this exercise be truth not verbosity. Only thus is sophistry the handmaiden of truth and wisdom; in any other circumstances she is an adulteress, betraying her lovers whom she blinds and exposes to error, leading them to the edge of the precipice. The words of Wisdom are:b He that speaketh sophistically, is hateful; but clearly more hateful is the man who lives sophistically; for an error in the way one speaks is less destructive than an error in the way one lives. Yet there is scarcely anyone who does not imitate the sophist in the way he lives, since those who are not good want to be thought good and stop at nothing to achieve this, while those who are good often seek to circumvent the judgements of others so as to be thought better than they really are. To behave thus in the way one lives is to play the sophist, if, that is to say, the deceiver is out to win glory for himself; for if the glory be God’s, and founded on knowledge, there may perhaps be some excuse for the behaviour.

23.  Concerning the Sophistici Elenchi Sophistry, accordingly, Aristotle introduces into the Peripatetic school, and, scattering the cloud of fallacies, shows how it is to be admitted or shunned. All of its strengths he sets out, and exhibits the instrument of which it makes use.c For just as the dialectician John 3.9 Ecclesiasticus 37.23 c  Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 1 a 

b 

313

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162

uses the elenchus, known to us as the refutatory syllogism, because it involves contradiction, so sophistry uses the sophistic elenchus, which is a purely imaginary syllogism, because it involves contradiction only in appearance, not in reality. It is in fact a fallacy, an insubstantial syllogism. Aristotle also subsumes types of disputationa so as to show how the sophist imitates now the man who demonstrates from principles, now the man who infers from probabilities, and now the man who argues from what does not seem probable: imitates, that is, the functions of demonstrator, dialectician, and false disputant; the sophist being, I repeat, one who practises disputation in a contentious way.b Aristotle adds the five goals of the sophist, who is concerned to reduce his adversary to contradiction, or falsehood, or paradox, or solecism, or silly nonsense.c It is enough for the trickster if he so much as seems to achieve this. To these points Aristotle subjoins the modes of argument contained in speech, for example, equivocation, ambiguity, synthesis, distribution, accent and figure of speech; likewise those outside speech, as in the form according to accident, the form in which the utterance is simple or not simple, a third according to ignorance of refutation, a fourth according to the consequent, a fifth according to the initial assumption, a sixth which is not positing the cause as the cause, and a seventh which is running a number of questions into one. In separate chapters he thus carefully explains how the proponent or the respondent ought to behave in these matters, and, like a first-rate field commander, instructs the one to launch an offensive and the other to defend his position.d Since therefore it is manifest from this what ought to be present and what absent, since the arguments concerning probabilities, which are all that man’s infirmity can comprehend, have been revealed, since the necessary combinations of reasoning have been demonstrated, the systematic processes of exposition have been explained and the hindrances presented by fallacies have been removed, it is clearer than daylight that the whole system of debate Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 2 Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 3 c  Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 4-15 d  Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 16ff. a 

b 

314

IV, 23-25

has in its every bound and every part been brought to perfect completion.

24.  Concerning those who carp at Aristotle’s works I cannot adequately say how much I wonder what kind of mentality those persons possess, if indeed they possess any, who carp at these works of Aristotle, which it had been my intention simply to commend, not to expound. Master Thierry, I remember, jokingly ascribed the Topica not to Aristotle but to Drogo of Troyes; but he still taught them from time to time. Various members of the audience of Master Robert of Melun falsely allege that this book is practically useless; others disparage the Categoriae. In consequence I have spent quite some time in commending them. As for the rest, they are commended by the judgement of all, and did not therefore, I felt, need anxious commendation. The objection is levelled, foolishly, against the Elenchi that they contain poetic verses;a but there is agreement that the distinctive character of one language cannot be translated precisely into that of another. I regard the Elenchi as preferable to the Analytica because they contribute fully as much to the programme of exercise, and, being easier to comprehend, promote eloquence.

25.  That Cornificius is cheaper than the gods’ clown Bromius and what Augustine and other philosophers have said in praise of logic And so, since the power of logic is so great, whoever attacks it as being foolish is himself an utter fool. At the marriage of Philology Pallas checked Bromius, who mockingly dubbed her a Marsian witch or poisoner, and with many words of praise for him made

a 

Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 4.166a.36ff.

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163

him one of the company of gods above.a In mythology Bromius is despised as the clown of the gods; with perfect justification our friend Cornificius, who calumniates logic, will be despised as the clown of the philosophers. Leaving aside Plato, Aristotle and Cicero who, according to our forebears, began philosophy and brought it to perfection, the Father Augustine, whom it is rash to oppose, lauds logic so highly that it could only be disparaged by persons devoid of sense and full of impudence. Augustine’s words, then, in the second book De ordine are:b When grammar had been perfected and organised, reason was admonished to seek out and attend to the actual power which engendered the art of grammar. For by definition, distribution and inference, reason had not only set grammar in order and given it organisation, but in addition had shielded it against every assault by falsehood. When, therefore, could reason move on to the construction of other things if it did not first, by distinguishing, indicating and separating, construct what one might call its own tools and instruments, thereby producing the skill of skills called dialectic, which teaches how to teach and how to learn? In dialectic reason shows herself, and reveals her identity, her aims and her capacities: she alone knows knowledge, and not only wishes but also is able to make men knowledgeable. What is Cornificius’ response to all this? Why, it is the response of every deficient mind, accustomed slothfully to snore when virtue calls: what he cannot achieve, he defames.

26.  What policy is to be followed against him and against wilful pettifoggers Against him, therefore, and against those who share his sloth (for he now has partners in error), let us follow the policy which Augustine in his firstc book Contra Academicos says he learnt from

Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 4.331ff. Augustine, De ordine 2.13 (Migne, PL 32.1013) c  In fact the third a 

b 

316

IV, 25-27

dialectic, after he had learnt much else from her. His words are:a She taught me that, when there is agreement about the thing under discussion, the actual words should not be matter for debate; whoever does debate them should be instructed if he acts out of inexperience, but abandoned if he acts out of malice; if he cannot be instructed, he should be told to do something else rather than waste time and effort in what is unnecessary; if he does not comply, he should be ignored. Her advice about captious and deceptive petty syllogisms is succinct. If inferences are based on false concessions, one must go back to the points conceded. If in a conclusion true and false are in conflict, one must accept the one of them which is intelligible and abandon what is inexplicable. If in some things the mood proves totally elusive, one should not seek to know it.

27.  That Aristotle went astray in many matters but is eminent in logic So much against Cornificius. Against those, however, who exclude the books of Aristotle which were particularly popular in antiquity and are content with Boethius and pretty well no one else, a great many points might be advanced. But there is no need, for the shortcomingsb of those who spend their time and talents on Boethius alone (with the result that they know practically nothing) are obvious to all, even to the extent of pity. I do not, however, assert that Aristotle’s thoughts or words are invariably excellent, regarding all that he wrote as sacrosanct. In many particulars indeed reason and the authority of the faith prevail to convict him of error. For he asserts that evil deeds may be committed not only by any student but even by God himself.c Again, he denies that the providence of God extends as far as the lunar region,d and, in Augustine, Contra Academicos 3.13.29 (Migne, PL 32.949) Psalms 138.16 with Hilary’s commentary (Migne, PL 9.809) c  Aristotle, Topica 4.5.126a.34 and 35 (Migne, PL 64.950) d  Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 250

a 

b 

317

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order to eliminate divination and the foreknowledge of things to come, he claims that the sublunar world is not governed by the decrees of divine providence, that angels are unable to offer help, and that demons possess no insight either into these things or into things to be. There are also many mistakes of his which can be found both in pagan and in Christian literature; but that he had an equal in logic is not recorded. He must consequently be taken not as a teacher of ethics but of debating, to the end that the young may be moved forward to weightier philosophical studies.

28.  How logic is to be used

165

But for all that this art is useful in so many respects, a student ignorant of other matters is not so much aided in philosophy by a grounding in logic as hindered by the wordiness and temerity derived from it. For logic on its own is practically useless, only then rising to eminence when it is illumined by the qualities of additional arts. But young years deserve greater indulgence,a and verbosity must be endured for a time in order that a store of eloquence may be built up. For young minds especially, like young bodies, must be developed and not allowed to waste away, the intention being that a comprehensive and substantial diet shall nourish and fill them out so as to build up strength, their excesses at this age, like those of the flesh, resulting from what one might call a fault in the process of their enlargement. This fault will be adequately boiled off and purged in the age that follows by the routines of toil, by weighty responsibilities, and by careful effort. As years and sense advance, therefore, the licence of verbosity must be checked, and the misbehaviour of sophistry (called eristic by Aristotle;b we may call it fraudulent and quibbling)c brought to a halt. This responsibility awaits him who lays claim to the title and Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 2.4.4ff. Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 11 c  Boethius, In topica Ciceronis commentariorum liber primus (Migne, PL 64.1045) a 

b 

318

IV, 27-29

function of teacher. But the effort of any teacher is useless unless it be constantly strengthened by practice and exercise – except perhaps when a natural disposition has become a fixed characteristic.a

29.  That the rashness of youth is to be curbed and why Mercury is married to Philology and what objects are especially to be sought after The exercises of the training schools, however, which are practised like a sort of game of philosophical wrestling, in the hope of advancement, are not to be given such free rein as to be allowed to continue into more mature years or more serious pursuits. Facetious trifling, tasteless and noisy verbosity, and likewise the frivolities of youth are to be removed along with the first down on the cheeks. To persist in these things is to refuse to be a philosopher and to join the ranks of the fools. If we may learn from fables, therefore, Mercury, the patron of eloquence, on reaching adolescence, at his mother’s exhortation at once married Philology, for the beard on his cheeks did not allow him any longer to gad about half naked,b wearing a short tunic, his shoulders covered but the rest of him not, except at the cost of much ridicule by Cipris. For Cipris, meaning blending,c gives vigour to those who derive their savour from the blending of wisdom with eloquence, but pours scorn on the folly of verbal fluency which is unarmed, uncovered, and inflated. The secret and most excellent nature of three things especially to be sought after is hidden from the awareness of man, whose many thoughts are weighed down by his earthly habitation.d These things are true goodness, truth unalloyed, and reason incorrupt and sure. Nevertheless, scenting, as it were, the sweetness of these things, human nature, over whose heart God

Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 8 proem. 28 Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 1.5 c  Mythographus Vaticanus 3 Class. auct. 3.250 Mai d  Wisdom 9.15 a 

b 

319

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has placed the eye, as we read in the book of the son of Sirac,a in order to show the great works He has wrought, that He may be praised in His goodness and glorified in His wondrous acts – perceiving the sweetness of these things, I repeat, human nature seeks to know the true, to grasp the good, and to cleave steadfastly to it so as not to suffer loss. This faculty of desire has been naturally implanted by God in man, although it cannot naturally avail without grace. This was why the myths of pagan antiquity invented three sisters, the daughters of Fronesis, called Philology, Philosophy and Philocalia. The lineage of Philosophy and Philocalia is pointed out by Augustine,b and that of Philology by Martianus,c but the family relationship of the three by Aesop.d Therefore, since human infirmity, although it dare not arrogantly promise itself true goodness, wisdom and reason, nevertheless aspires to them unceasingly, and continues in the love of them until by grace, through the exercise of love, it obtain the actual things which it desires. These affections are the offspring of Fronesis, because the savour which becomes sweet to human nature provokes it to seek the true good. For frono in Greek means I savour (sapio), and that rather represents the savour of the appetite than sapience, which is fixed in the contemplation of things divine. For that is called, not Fronesis, but Sophia.e

30.  That Philology has precedence over the other two and what form of examination of predicaments is to be followed in the discussion of reason and truth The first of these sisters is Philology, who reveals the nature, the power and the intentions of the others. For when many probables

Ecclesiasticus 17.7, 8 Augustine, Contra Academicos 2.3.7 (Migne, PL 32.922) c  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.114 d  John has in mind the passage of Augustine cited in note b above e  Cicero, De officiis 1.43.153 a 

b 

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present themselves on all sides (for, as Pythagoras says,a in practically every matter it is possible to argue to the contrary), she seeks certainty in things and with care and caution shuns errors. And just as it is a virtue to flee from vice,b and the beginning of wisdom to be free from folly, so she who guards against error naturally takes precedence over the two who bring virtues. To give the words of Juno, or, more correctly, Martianus:c Is there anyone who claims that he is unfamiliar with the toilful vigils of Philology and the pallor brought on by her unending lucubrations, Philology who with unheard-of plea compels even the gods in their repose to come to her? And a few lines before:d She first explores heaven, earth and sea, and all that in them is, she who, sleepless, with boundless toil probing mysteries, is able with learned care first to attend to all that was granted to the gods above first to know; nay, over us gods she ofttimes has jurisdiction, pressing us under duress to do her bidding, and what no power of the gods above may attempt she knows she can do against Jove’s will. For, as another poet greater than Martianus observes:e Relentless toil conquers all things. From what has preceded it is clear that a number of things contribute to produce perception, namely, the external obstacle struck by the spirit which is the agent of perception, and the spirit likewise which conveys the quality of the external obstacle to the knowledge of the soul. There are thus three contributories: the soul which perceives, the spirit by which it perceives, and the obstacle which it perceives outside. These, as I have said, arouse the deliberative force (above given the name of reason), which exercises its judgement (likewise named reason); and that judgement is sometimes true, sometimes probable. But reason is only true if it is sure and firm; for reason (ratio) is the noun for firmness: only that which is firm is said to be ratum. The great Augustine’s Not Pythagoras but Protagoras: Seneca, Epistulae morales 88.43; see p. 286 note a above b  Horace, Epistulae 1.1.41-42 c  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 1.37 d  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 1.22 e  Virgil, Georgics 1.145, 146, perhaps by way of the comedy Pamphilus 3.1 as Jahnke thought (Comoediae Horatianae tres 28 note) a 

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view thus was:a True reason belongs to God alone and to those whom He himself has allowed to possess certain knowledge and a firm judgement about things. The inspection of predicaments,b well-nigh the first path to be followed in philosophy, involves attention to the identity of anything which is proposed; likewise to the properties in which it differs from other things, and the ways in which it conforms to other things; then to the question whether there is a contrary to it and whether it is itself susceptible of contraries. When these matters are known, the thing is more accurately assigned and passes into knowledge. This at all events is the sequence which I have decided to imitate, because it is most convenient, even if I cannot express it as I could wish in the investigation of so important a subject. Nowhere can one with better justification enquire into the substance of reason and truth than in discussing the power of logic, which professes itself the knowledge of truth, as Augustine says;c and if only it could achieve what it promises. It is however agreed that logic is of the greatest utility, affording the systematic basis, the method and the opportunity for discovery and evaluation.

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31.  What original reason is and concerning the various schools of philosophers Just as in created things reason is a kind of spiritual force which explores the universe and pursues knowledge of both the corporeal and the intelligible, so there is a kind of original reason which by its power comprehends all things, both corporeal and intelligible, and fully and faithfully, that is, without any error, examines the nature and force of individual things. Without doubt I shall be equally correct, whether I call this original reason wisdom or a  The source of this reference escaped Webb as it escapes me: see however Plato, Timaeus 51e b  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 2.18.1 c  Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 8.4 and [De spiritu et anima] 37 (Migne, PL 40.808)

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the power of God and the firm basis of all things. In this reason subsist the nature, the cause, the development and the end of all things. This indeed is the sphere which Martianus,a shrouding it in poetic fiction, declares to be fashioned from all the elements, lacking nothing which is believed to be contained in any nature. In it are the sky in all its extent, the air, the seas and the different lands, the confines of Tartarus, cities, meeting-places with their actions and their fortunes, and the forms of all things which may be counted both in species and in genus. This sphere was thought to be a kind of image and idea of the universe. Whether the idea be single or plural is a question raised by Plato.b The truth is that if one focuses on the substance of knowledge or reason, the idea is single, but if on the plurality of things which reason contemplates by itself, the ideas are infinite. The Stoic, contemplating this pronoe (which we may call providence),c offers it his reverence, and declares that it is by its laws that all things are bound fast to necessity. Epicurus, on the contrary, with his eyes on the aptitudes of things, snuffs out pronoe and frees everything from the law of necessity. But the Peripatetic, fearing the precipice of error in both these directions, moves neither towards the paradoxes of the Stoics nor towards the sovereign beliefs of Epicurus,d but on the one hand joins the Stoic in proclaiming pronoe, without however imposing necessity on things, and on the other joins the Epicurean in freeing things from necessity, without however doing away with the truth of providence. He thus asserts that things in part are subject to necessity, and in part subject to the aptitudes of nature and to freedom of will. The Academic teeters and does not dare to define what is true in each single thing. This school, however, has three sub-divisions, containing those who profess that they know nothing at all and by their excessive caution have ceased to deserve the name of philosopher, and others who confess that they know only those things which are necessary and known of themselves, that is Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 1.68 Plato, Timaeus 31a c  Cicero, De natura deorum 1.8.18; Policraticus 7.1 and 2 d  ‘paradoxes’: Cicero, Academica priora 2.44.136 and De finibus 4.27.74; ‘sovereign beliefs’: Cicero, De finibus 2.7.20 a 

b 

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to say, things which cannot not be known. The third sub-division contains persons like myself, who do not rush headlong to form a view in matters which to the wise man are doubtful.a

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32.  What is contrary to reason and that reason has many meanings and that reasons are eternal And so, the first and true reason is the divine reason we have mentioned, which admits of no error at all. There is nothing we can imagine more opposed to reason than error; for the former establishes and confirms, while the latter by its slipperiness trips up and brings down. And just as the word sensus means now the power and now the act of feeling, and likewise imaginatio means now the power and now the act of imagining, so ratio means now the power and now the act and movement of a quality, while the plural rationes, additionally, is applied to things in which ratio sets its quality in a kind of motion. By such rationes I understand inherences in consequences, proportions in numbers, and the principles by which those things which are absolutely necessary are demonstrated. These rationes Augustine in many of his books, including the De ordine, the De libero arbitrio and the Hypognosticon, asserts to be immortal and everlasting.b The ratio of one to two, he says, and of two to four is absolutely true, and was no more true yesterday than it is today, nor will it be more true tomorrow or in a year’s time; even if the whole of this universe should come tumbling down, that ratio will remain true.c Likewise, if body exists, it is impossible for substance not to exist. All other things contemplated by the eye of divine reason are indeed true, but by reason of their changeability are not called rationes at all. Because of this partnership between truth and reason, some philosophers have held that what is once true is always true; and they feel they See also pp. 122, 225 and 294; also Policraticus 7.2 Augustine, De ordine 2.19.50 (Migne, PL 32.1018), De libero arbitrio 2.8.21 (Migne, PL 32.1252) and [Hypognosticon] 6.4.6 (Migne, PL 45.1660) c  Augustine, De ordine 2.19.50 a 

b 

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derive some support from the proof (ratio) advanced by Augustine to show that our faith and that of our forefathers is one and the same – although we rejoice in the partial fulfilment of what they waited to see fulfilled. Augustine’s words are:a The times may have changed, but the faith has not. We embrace the same truth as they did, but we proclaim it in ever-changing utterance.

33.  That man does not have perfect reason and that what is true is expressed in manifold ways The angels, whose nature is not slowed by a harmful body but clings more nearly to the purity of God,b possess the keen strength of uncorrupted reason, and, although they are not the equals of God in their examination of all things, they have been enriched by the privilege of possessing a reason which cannot be tripped up by any error. We human beings, however, weak as we are, and, both by reason of our natural condition and because of our sins, exposed to many errors – no, ensnared and brought down by many errors – have degenerated from the first and the second degrees of purity in our examination of things, that is, in the exercise of reason. Slipping and wobbling in uncertainty, we accordingly grasp what we are able, at one moment forming true opinions on the basis of reliable likenesses of things, at another, false ones, when vain images have deceived us. If a thing is comprehended as it really is, the opinion is true, and, if the matter is thus expressed in words, the utterance is true also. As a consequence various philosophersc have with probability concluded that the truth by which an opinion or an utterance is said to be true is what one might term a kind of middle state among the things outside which are examined in the light of reason. If reason is honestly based on those things in its examination, it is sure and unshaken by any error. And so a a  Augustine, In Ioannis euangelium tractatus 45.10.9 and Enarrationes in Psalmos 1.17 (Migne, PL 35.1722 and 36.596) b  Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 11.29 and 12.1; Virgil, Aeneid 6.731 c  These philosophers have not been identified

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locution which is designated true is called a modal locution after the mood it implies; likewise a true opinion after the mode of perception, and a true reason after the quality of its examination. Individual things are also called true – a true man, for instance, or true whiteness – as long as opinion, in thus perceiving them, is not deceived by any illusory image. Two things generally establish credence in the examination of things so that they may be called true, namely, the form of a substance, or the effect of the form. For a true man is one in whom there is true humanity, that is, humanity conscious of reason and of its capability of suffering. True whiteness, however, is that which makes white; true justice, that which makes just. If you do not believe me, lend an ear to the great Hilary,a who rises up on Gallic buskinb and is far removed from the reading of the simple .

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34.  How what is true receives its name what truth is and what is contrary to it If we may humour the Stoics,c who worry about verbal analysis and analogy, uerum comes from the Greek heron, which means firm and stable or certain and glorious. Hence the designation heroes for those who have won a firm and stable position from the company of the gods, with whom they were associated in ancient mythology. These demi-gods, as Martianus notes,d were called heroes because in the language of the ancients earth was termed hera, as a consequence of her firm stability. We, however, do not talk at all of demi-gods,e who do not exist, or of heroes, because of the pagan association, but, in the catholic expression, of the translation of the elect from the variability and the vanity of this world to the glory of true certainty and firm stability. From the confirmation Hilary, De trinitate 5.3, 14 (Migne, PL 10.131 and 137) Jerome, Epistulae 58.10 (Migne, PL 22.585) c  Augustine, Contra Cresconium 1.12.15 (Migne, PL 43.455) d  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.160 e  Augustine, De ciuitate Dei 10.21 a 

b 

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which they have won, we call those men saints; for sancire is to confirm, and sanctus is one who is confirmed in virtue and glory. That, assuredly, is to be removed from vanity and to dwell amid truth. Accordingly, this word uerum is a token of confirmation and denotes the stability of a thing on which reason may faithfully rely. Veritas is the word for firmness and stability. The fact that Latin uses the consonant V (u) in place of the Greek aspirate should not trouble us, since the Aeolic digamma has many affinities with this consonant.a And just as the power of sensation must have something on which it can stably rest if it is to exercise its movement profitably, so reason slips if it does not rest on a stable obstacle. Take away the light, and sight ceases; there is no hearing when sound ceases; smell and taste are inactive when there is a lack of scent and savour; touch is useless unless it impinges on something solid. One still says, though, that the darkness is seen, the silence heard, and the void touched, when it would be more truthful to say that these senses then feel nothing. In his De natura boni contra Manichaeos and Hypognosticon, as in many other of his writings,b Augustine demonstrates that not only these, but any privations whatsoever, are nothing. Aristotle, however, asserts that they are something,c since they not only deprive but also indefinably dispose the subject things towards themselves. So both sensation and reason call for something stable, lest in not grasping anything certain their effort be in vain. For when its intention acts in order to grasp and is rendered void, the sense labours in vain and is deceived by its own mistake. Hence, just as we have said that error is contrary to reason, so we declare that vanity is contrary to truth; for false and vain, although different words, somehow tend to the same signification. Furthermore, vanity and falsehood verge on nothingness, for that which is false is absolutely nothing, and does not fall within knowledge. As AuPriscian, Institutio grammaticae 1.20, 25 and 46 GLK 2.15, 19 and 35 Augustine, De natura boni contra Manichaeos 15, 16 (Migne, PL 42.556), [Hypognosticon] 1.4, 5 (Migne, PL 45.1616ff.), Confessiones 12.3ff., Enarrationes in Psalmos 7.19 and Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum 5.44 (Migne, PL 32.827ff., 36.109 and 45.1480 and 1481) c  Aristotle, Physica B.1.193b.20; Boethius, De diuisione (Migne, PL 64.883) a 

b 

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gustine in his Soliloquia and Contra Academicos and a number of other writings shows,a there was agreement among all the ancient thinkers,b and even among the Academics themselves, that no one can know falsehood. As he also proves in his Contra Academicos, there can be no knowledge of false things, since they do not exist at all. Where, however, some have translated: In the beginning earth was empty and void,c others have translated was nothing, and not ordered. So the true is opposed to the vain and the false (for they are the same) by the law of contrariety. I am not troubled if an existent thing is opposed to a non-existent, since this is manifest in utterable things which are opposed in a contradiction. For Aristotle demonstrates that one of them exists always, while the other of necessity does not exist.d Is not an existent thing a sign of a non-existent, as when redness is a sign of a clear sky or of a storm to come? For a red sky in the morning is a sign of rain, but in the evening of fair weather.e

35.  Likewise concerning truths and that we speak in one way of things existing in another of words in another again of truths and how All things, however, which are vain, to the extent that they are vain, are deceptive, and, when they have beguiled and deluded the mind with their falsehood, they disappear like apparitions. It is because of this disappearance of things evanescent that Ecclesiastes,f addressing the company of all who live in this world, proclaims that all things under the sun are vain, and he does so with such majestic utterance and such probability of thought a  Augustine, Soliloquia 2.11.20 (Migne, PL 32.894), Contra Academicos 3.3.5 and 3.4.10 (Migne, PL 32.936 and 939) and De trinitate 15.10.17 (Migne, PL 42.1070) b  Augustine, Contra Academicos 3.4.10 c  Genesis 1.2 d  Aristotle, De interpretatione 7.17b.26ff. e  Matthew 16.2, 3. John’s Latin takes the form of a hexameter verse, which may possibly be of his own making f  Ecclesiastes 1.14

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that his words travel to all nations and all languages, and enter into and shake the hearts of all those who have ears to hear. Plato also,a pointing out the difference between things which truly exist and things which only seem to exist, asserts that intelligible things have a true existence, fearing no disturbance from assaults or passions, no injury from any power, no loss brought about by time, but continuing always the same through the vigour of their condition.b So those things too, after the primal existence, appropriately have a real existence, that is, a firm and certain position expressed by the substantive verb esse (to be), if used in the strict sense. Temporal things, however, do indeed seem to exist, because they present the image of intelligible things; but things which pass with time, never abiding in the same position but disappearing like smoke, do not sufficiently merit designation by the substantive verb esse: as Plato says in the Timaeus, they flee and do not wait for a designation.c This true existence, however, he divided between the three things which he determined to be fundamental principles,d that is, God, matter and the idea; for these by their nature are immutable. God indeed is at all points immutable; but the remaining two, while in a certain way immobile, are in their operations changed by one another. For matter is arranged by the forms as they arrive,e and in a certain way rendered susceptible to movement; while the forms, likewise, are somehow changed by their contact with matter and, as Boethius says in his De institutione arithmetica,f pass into mutable inconstancy. The ideas, however, which he posits as the first essences after God, he says do not in themselves mingle with matter or have any movement allotted to them, but from them proceed natural forms,g that is, images of the models, and these nature has concreated with individual Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate 1.6.193 Boethius, De institutione arithmetica 1.1 c  Plato, Timaeus 49e in the translation of Chalcidius d  Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate 1.5.190 e  Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaria in Boetii librum de trinitate (Migne, PL 64.1274) f  Boethius, De institutione arithmetica 1.1 g  Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaria in Boetii librum de trinitate (Migne, PL 64.1267) a 

b 

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things. Hence these words of his in the De trinitate:a From these forms which are beyond matter come those forms which are in matter and which fashion body. Roughly this view has been put into verse by Bernard of Chartres, the most accomplished Platonist of our time: I do not say that a thing exists which, put together from two parts, contains form bound up with matter; but that thing I say exists which consists of one of those parts: the former the Greek calls the idea, the latter hyle (matter).b Although the Stoics believed that matter and the idea were coeternal with God, while others along with Epicurus who eliminates providence did away with the idea altogether, Bernard, together with those who hold the same philosophical position, asserted that neither was coeternal with God. For he concurred with those Fathers who, as Augustine testifies,c approve the view that God, who made all things from nothing, created the matter of all things. He agreed, however, that the idea is eternal, admitting the eternity of the providence in which God made all things together at one time, establishing in His own mind the totality of things destined to be in time or to abide in eternity. Coeternity, however, can only exist in things which do not surpass one another either in the nature of their majesty or the privilege of their power or the authority of their activity. And so it was the three persons alone, whose nature is one, whose power single, and whose activity inseparable, that he confessed to be coequal and coeternal; for in them is parity in every respect. The idea, however, because it does not rise to this parity but somehow is secondary in nature, as it were a sort of effect abiding within the mystery of God’s plan and needing no external cause, he was indeed bold enough to call eternal but denied that it was coeternal. As he says in his exposition of Porphyry,d the work of the divine mind is twofold, firstly, that which it creates from subject-matter or which is concreated with subject-matter, Boethius, De trinitate 2 Bernard could have got the term ‘hyle’ from Chalcidius, Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 123 and 268 c  Augustine, Confessiones 12.7, 8 and Contra aduersarium legis et prophetarum 1.8 (Migne, PL 32.828 and 829 and 42.609 and 610) d  I can offer no reference a 

b 

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and secondly, that which it makes of itself and contains within itself, needing no external support. The heavens certainly it made in its understanding from the beginning, and for their formation there it sought neither matter nor form from without. Elsewhere too Bernard says:a That for which the divine will alone was the beginning is not broken by time nor destroyed by length of years. Time dissolves whatsoever it brings into being, if not at once, then of necessity at some time, it is agreed. Therefore whoever grieves about such a condition manifestly possesses either very little reason or none at all. Certain persons, however, while conceding that truths exist from eternity, yet deny that they are eternal, saying that nothing is eternal except that which lives, because eternity, on the testimony of Augustine,b is a state of unending life. From this it is clear that the Platonists, like Solomon,c were convinced that all things under the sun are vain, and that only those things are true which do not disappear like phantoms but in their state of substance are certain and always the same.

36.  The difference between those things which truly are and those which seem to be according to the Platonists Whereas the word false is applied equally to an opinion, a locution and a thing, it is opinion, the victim of fallacy and deception, which is most correctly termed false, because it is itself deceived. A locution, however, is false because it signifies a false opinion, while a thing is termed false in respect of its effect, because it is perceived only by a vain and futile understanding. Just so in the field of medicine the words healthy or sick are applied now to animate beings, now to symptoms, and now to causes. Descending a little with the Peripatetics from Plato’s eminence, we say that those things are true or false which, to treat of the signification of complex utterance, are perceived by a sure or an empty mind; for the PeripatetAgain I can offer no reference Boethius rather in Consolatio philosophiae 5 prosa 6 c  Ecclesiastes 1.14 a 

b 

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ics, being men who keep philosophy more on the human level and do not, like the Platonists, in their minds surpass themselves and God,a but deal reasonably with men, fix truth or falsehood in that in which, as examination and comprehension reveal, the intellect is trustworthy or misleading. For if it comprehends that a thing is as it is, or is not as it is not, it has adopted a judgement which is certain and reliable; but if it opines that a thing is not when it is, or is when it is not, it is undoubtedly deceived and in error. The same is the case also in the matter of locutions. As for things, when they subject themselves to the intellect as they are, they are true, but when otherwise, vain and false. So the truth or falsehood both of opinions and of things is demonstrated by the mode of perception, that is, by the way in which they are perceived or perceive, but the truth or falsehood of locutions by the mode of signification. Consequently, since it is not possible for God to be deceived, it is agreed beyond all question that, the more reliable and certain His knowledge, the less He comprehends false things. He does, however, recognise that they are false, because that is true and cannot remain hidden from that truth which contemplates all things. For in the essence of God is primal truth, that is, certainty or stability or clarity, and from this is somehow derived whatever in things is faithfully said to be true. In that truth alone the coherence or lack of coherence of all things and all locutions abides in certainty. But man, however great he may be, merely aspires to certainty, because the love of truth is cognate with and innate in reason, and, as Martianus says,b together with Philology he prayerfully with his whole heart draws forth from things which do not exist that truth which does exist. This truth certainly comes forth from no other source than the divine wisdom, if some drop of it, liquefied by grace, pour itself in and illumine the mind of him who seeks and loves wisdom. This indeed is the virgin fountain from which Martianus asserts that truth is first sent and flows out.c For nothing truly becomes known except from the gushing waters of this II Corinthians 5.13 Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.206 c  Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 2.205 a 

b 

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spring; nor indeed does anything false flow from thence, for that fountain, which Martianus envelops in a cloud of poetic fiction, is a virgin and knows nothing of any corruption and falsehood.

37.  That a thing is called true or false in one way in another an opinion another a locution and why locutions of this kind are called modal The eye of divine singleness contemplates all things, so that neither the future escapes it nor the past slips away from it. It weighs the coherence and lack of coherence in things, and passes a sure and faithful judgement both on the things which are and on the things which are not. And those things which it saw from the beginning, since they do not pass away, are firm and are called true. These certainly are the thoughts of the Most High, the profundity of which no one is able to expound. These are the words which were uttered but once, yet as time advances they come forth into action in accordance with the decrees of the divine dispensation. Who would say that the mind of God is idle and has not from the beginning contemplated all things? If therefore truths are, as it were, certain thoughts of God, who except a presumptuous man would affirm that they pass away, or who would dare to assert that they have not always been in the mind of Him who from eternity arranged and had knowledge of all things? Does even He conceive new thoughts and, as we do, embark on new plans? But, for all that these things have been true from eternity, there is nothing which is said to be coeternal with the Creator; for, as we have said, nothing at all can rise to parity with Him, since the truth or the certainty of these things is His. Since everything is designated either creator or creature, the whole complex universe, on the authority of the Fathers, is somehow reduced to substances and the constituents of substances; it does not touch, at the prompting of any linguistic consideration, on the meanings of utterances. Those who introduced such a division had their eyes on the significations of simple terms. The truths, therefore, which exist in the mind

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of God, are indeed something, but they are not creatures because they have existed from eternity. For there can be no question but that certain things are sempiternal – unless perhaps that is the reference of the well-known passage in Ecclesiasticus which reads:a He that liveth for ever created all things together. For some people refer this passage both to the work which the Trinity wrought as it looked upon and ordered itself, and to the creation of primordial matter from which all things have been created or are concreated with created things in the same matter. But for them to exist, and to exist as if so pronounced to exist by a judgement which is firm and untouched, involves reference to the primal knowledge of reason. Existence for these things therefore is becoming known; for in human utterance also, to be pronounced or to be remembered is the same as to be. Of the One, Augustine says:b This is the Word, not that which ceases when uttered but that which remains when born. This distinction would somehow seem absurd unless words had existence through being uttered. But since to be and one and thing have manifold meanings, each individual must consider how he proposes to interpret the signification of the expressions. And so things, that is, the works of nature or of natural objects, together with thoughts, utterances, words and reasons – all these, I say, have their own individual mode of existence, and the quality of that existence determines how things faithfully expressed are to be interpreted. How they come, on careful examination of the signification of words, to be – or not to be – called true is no part of my contention, provided that true things are not absolutely nothing. False things, however, do not exist at any point, since they are absolutely nothing. Such were the definitions both of the pagan philosophers and of the Fathers of the catholic church. But for God to remember and to say is for Him to know; for His memEcclesiasticus 18.1 Webb could not find these words in Augustine and neither can I. The following passages in Augustine however are relevant: De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber 5.19; In Ioannis euangelium tractatus 14.3.7; Enarrationes in Psalmos 44.5; Sermones 28.5, 119.7, 187.3, 225.1; De fide et symbolo 3.3; De trinitate 9.7.12, 15.11.20, 12-16 and 22-26 (Migne, PL 34.227; 35.1506; 36.497; 38.184, 185, 675, 1002, 1096; 40.183; 42.967, 1072, 1073, 1075ff.); Fulgentius, Ad Monimum 3.7 (Migne, PL 65.204) a 

b 

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IV, 37-38

ory or His word or reasoning is His wisdom. Therefore, the Word with which His omnipotence speaks is one, but the words which He speaks are infinite. The beginning of Thy words is truth, he says,a because it is from the light inaccessible which God inhabitsb that He derives knowledge of all things. But this light is not in my view separate from God’s substance.

38.  Concerning the coherence of reason and truth and briefly what each is Let us now with all reverence contemplate the most delightful coherence of reason and truth, invoking the assistance of reason and truth; for without that assistance not only can they not be grasped, but they cannot even be reliably investigated. Reason, then, is a sort of mind’s eye,c or, on a wider definition, a sort of instrument by which the mind puts all its senses to work; the peculiar function of reason is to investigate and to grasp the truth. The contrary of this quality is weakness and impotence in investigating and comprehending the truth. Error however is contrary to that activity of investigating the truth which above we designated reason. In God this quality is simply perfect, in the angels as perfect as their nature allows, but in man it is either altogether or generally imperfect, although it may in some individual be temporarily perfect or perfect by comparison with things less perfect. Consequently it is not reason which he claims for himself, but the seeking after reason expressed by the word philology (for these words, philology, philosophy and philocalia, have been tempered by philosophical moderation). Reason however is by no means susceptible of contraries, because divine reason is an immutable substance, while the reason of angels and of men is not a substance.

Psalms 118.160 I Timothy 6.16 c  Claudianus Mamertus, De statu animae 1.27 a 

b 

335

178

Metalogicon

39.  Likewise concerning the same and that neither reason nor truth admits of contraries

179

Truth is the light of the mind and the raw material of reason. God looks upon truth universally, the angels particularly, but man, even at his most perfect, sees it only in small part; the more perfect he is, however, the more he seeks it. This is the solidity of certainty in which reason assesses with vigour. Take away light and solidity, and sight and touch will be cheated; and similarly in the case of other senses, if sound or scent or savour be removed. Likewise all sense of reason will be frustrate if truth be withdrawn. The opposite of truth, however, is vanity or falsity or emptiness; and emptiness in things, as philosophy demonstrates, is nothing. Consequently some thinkers have decided to change one letter and turn inane (emptiness) into inune, meaning that which is not one; but that which is not one is nothing. Primeval truth has its existence in the divine majesty; but there is another truth which consists in the reflection, that is, in the imitation, of divinity. For everything gains in truth in proportion to the fidelity of the image of God which it expresses; and the more it falls away from that image the greater its falsehood as it fades out of sight. It is surely thus that man has been made like unto vanity,a and his days pass away as a shadow. But there is no shadow unless the light of a bodyb be impeded by some obstacle; and what one may call darkness is brought on by the absence of light. So, when the light of truth has been removed, the darkness of error grows strong. But error deceives ( fallit); consequently the opposite of truth, because it deceives (a fallendo), is termed falsehood; for he who walks in darkness knows not whither he goes. The property of truth is to nurture and illumine and strengthen reason, just as the property of reason is to seek, overtake and embrace truth. For external light, as has been noted, nurtures vision, and a solid object strengthens touch. In God, however, these things are one, for His reason and

a  b 

Psalms 143.4 Matthew 6.22

336

IV, 39-40

the eternal Word says of itself: I am truth.a For He needs no support from another, since His reason illumines itself and His truth finds itself. Among created things, however, truth is one thing and reason another; for truth is what one may call the reflection of divinity which reason seeks and finds in things, reason being the quality or the activity of mind which is engrossed in the investigation of truth. But truth is not susceptible of contraries for the same cause as that which we set forth above in our discussion of reason.

40.  The aim of the Peripatetics and all genuine philosophers and concerning the eight obstacles to understanding If the aim of the Peripatetics is to cast off all vanity, recognise the truth in things, and with all their powers of reasoning seek, venerate and reverence the truth of God, their labour is not useless. Otherwise, their toil and effort are wasted. But because there are many things which impede understanding, namely, invincible ignoranceb of such things as the mystery of the Holy Trinity which cannot be explained by reason, the frailty of our condition, the shortness of life, the neglect of what is useful, profitless occupations, the conflict of probable opinions, sin which should be shrouded from light, and finally the sheer number, indeed, immensity of things open to investigation, the human heart is so overwhelmed that rarely can it attain to a knowledge of the truth. Of the eight obstacles which I have set forth, however, there is none in my opinion which so much hinders the knowledge of what is expedient as the sin which separates us from God and shuts off the fountain of truth, after which reason nevertheless continues to thirst. My heart, says the mind conscious of its sins,c has deserted me, and the light of my eyes itself is not with me. For unless a man John 14.6 Abelard, Ethica seu liber dictus scito teipsum 14 (Cousin 2.619) c  Psalms 37.11 a 

b 

337

180

Metalogicon

181

turn what he knows to the service of God, his knowledge works not with him but rather against him; for much knowledge is of no avail if that one thing be lackinga which above all is necessary and which reveals itself in the intelligence of created things. In the words of the holy Solomon, I proposed in my mind to seek and search out with wisdom concerning all things that are done under the sun.b This is the worst occupation that God has given to the sons of men. In this the pagan philosophers employed themselves, confining the truth of God in a lie, as the Apostle says,c and passing into the oblivion merited by their thoughts. Because they did not thank Him who bestowed on them good things, asserting that they themselves were wise, they have become fools. But curiosity about useless things is an idle inquisitiveness, and one which has engaged not only the Peripatetics but almost the whole world. Lucan dwells on this fault while advancing tentative causes for the tides of Ocean, when he summons the curious to seek for certainty within an unfathomable mystery. Seek, he says,d those of you whom earth’s travail incites. But while the mind is largely occupied by many things which have little to do with it, it wanders further away from itself, very often forgetting itself altogether; and there is no error more pernicious than this. For to know oneself, as Apollo says,e is well-nigh the height of wisdom. But of what avail is it for a man to know the nature of the elements or their compounds, to investigate scientifically the proportions of magnitude and multitude, to contemplate the conflict of the virtues and the vices, to pay close attention to the complexities of reasoning and to debate all questions with probability, and yet to be ignorant of himself? Will not that man be thought a fool, who moves from one alien lodging to another, and forgets where he should seek shelter in time of necessity? Certainly, an excess of idle curiosity and a neglect of self marks the man who admires what is alien and disregards what is his own. But the man who turns exLuke 10.42 Ecclesiastes 1.13 c  Romans 1.18, 21 and 24 d  Lucan, Bellum ciuile 1.417 e  Cicero, De finibus 5.16.44 a 

b 

338

IV, 40

ternal things to the benefit of life, recognising and reverencing the giver of those things and assessing the extent of his own imperfection, who with difficulty is able to comprehend but a few things and avails himself of passing things, with which he himself passes, only on sufferance and for but an hour, who controls, represses or extinguishes concupiscence, who strives by diligent study to refashion the image of God which sin corrupted, who devotes his every effort to carrying out the duties imposed by the virtues – he is the one whose practice of philosophy is the most genuine. There is sobriety in the enquiry of a man who first of all examines himself, and who explores inferior matters with diligence, considers equal matters without negligence, and contemplates superior matters with respect, not bursting in with unthinking audacity among matters which are beyond scrutiny. This man certainly is not proud of self; he has no desire for the assorted lumber of the world, except in so far as it is necessary or permitted; to his neighbour he shows charity, to the heavenly beings who stand always before the face of God he gives reverence and love; and he pays thanks, praise and glory for all his blessings to the majesty of God. Even if we did not labour under the weakness which weighs us down, the immensity of that majesty assuredly prevents us from knowing it fully, but we are not allowed to remain fully ignorant of it by reason of created things, all of which, as if bearing a kind of public testimony, praise the glory of the Creator. Hence Solomon’s words in Proverbs:a Lift not up thy eyes to riches which thou canst not have, because they shall make themselves wings like those of an eagle; and shall fly towards heaven. But, as Augustine remarks in his De ordine,b God is better known by not being known: if anyone who is ignorant of natural science, ethics and formal reasoning, or in thrall to desires and obsessed by impermanent things, or even, it may be, who is pure of life, and without formal education, believes firmly that he can find God through the power of the intellect by enquiry and discussion, he will unquestionably be as much in error as it is possible to be. Elsewhere a  b 

Proverbs 23.5 Augustine, De ordine 2.16.44 (Migne, PL 32.1015)

339

Metalogicon

also he says:a Ignorance of God is God’s truest wisdom. Likewise:b It is no little knowledge to know of God what God is not; for what He is, it is utterly impossible to know.

41. 

182

So then, since some things cannot be known because of their exalted dignity, and others because of the extent of their number or size, and yet others on account of their inconstancy and impermanence, what it is above all that should be pursued and is most profitable, we learn from Ecclesiasticus.c Seek not, he says, the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things that are stronger than thee. He thus restrains the rashness of those who with many words and no respect discuss the secrets of the divine Trinity and those things the sight of which is promised in the life eternal. It may seem that knowledge is extended by such discussion, but devotion is thereby unquestionably diminished. In unnecessary matters, he says,d be not over-curious, and in many of His works thou shalt not be inquisitive. For many have been tripped up by their suspicions, which have detained their understanding in vanity.e He also reproves the boldness of those who are concerned about all things and wish to explain all that is, whereas the authority of Solomon in Ecclesiastesf establishes that man cannot fully explain even the smallest thing under heaven, let alone the things which are in heaven or above it. But the matters on which the philosopher should exercise his intelligence are made clear by the son of Sirac:g But the things that God hath commanded thee, think on them always, and in many of His works be Augustine, Sermones 117.3.5 (Migne, PL 38.663) Augustine, De trinitate 8.2.3 (Migne, PL 42.948) and Epistulae 120.3.13 (Migne, PL 33.459) c  Ecclesiasticus 3.22 d  Ecclesiasticus 3.24 e  Ecclesiasticus 3.26 f  Ecclesiastes 8.17 g  Ecclesiasticus 3.22 a 

b 

340

IV, 40-42

not curious. Since knowledge flows from the root of the senses, which are often mistaken, and deluded infirmity knows not what is expedient, by the clemency of God a law has been given to reveal the knowledge of what is useful and to make clear how much we may know about God or how much it is expedient to seek. That law makes manifest God’s power in creation, His wisdom in ordinance, and His goodness in the preservation of things; but it is in man’s restoration by redemption that His blessings are most apparent. The will of God also is clearly set forth by that law, so that each man may know what it behoves him to do. And because human sense and human reason both frequently go astray, that law based in faith the first foundation for the understanding of truth. Hence Philo’s words in the book of Wisdom:a They that have faith in the Lord shall understand the truth, and they that are faithful in love shall rest in Him, for grace and peace is to the elect of God.b

42.  That visible proofs show that the world is subject to vanity and what the reason was for ending the book here Let this suffice. For it is a time now for weeping rather than writing; and a visible proof demonstrates to me that the whole world is subject to vanity.c We looked forward to peace, and lo! turmoil and tempest falling violently on Toulouse stir up the English and the French on all sides; and kings whom we saw on the most friendly terms assail one another without respite. In addition the death of our lord Pope Adrian, while causing consternation to all peoples and nations of the Christian faith, has moved our England, from which he came, to sharper grief and caused its tears to flow in greater profusion. His death has been bewept by all hona  Jerome testifies that Philo in the opinion of many was the author of the book of Wisdom (Migne, PL 28.1242); Augustine, Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum 4.123 (Migne, PL 45.1420) b  Wisdom 3.9 c  Ecclesiastes 3.19

341

183

Metalogicon

184

est men, but by none more than me.a For, although his mother and his brother still lived, he loved me with a closer affection than them. He even admitted in public and in private that he loved me above all mortal men. Such was the opinion that he had formed of me that, whenever the opportunity presented itself, he rejoiced to pour out his innermost thoughts in my presence; and, for all that he was pope, he delighted to have my company at his own table, making me share with him the same cup and plate, as he desired, and in spite of my reluctance. It was at my entreaty that he conceded and granted to our illustrious king, Henry the second, to possess Ireland by hereditary right, as his letters testify to this very day. For all islands are stated as of ancient right to belong to the church of Rome in accordance with the donation which Constantine established and endowed. Adrian also sent by me the gold ring adorned with a fine emerald with which was to be made the investiture of the right to rule Ireland; and that same ring by order is safeguarded in the public treasury. Were I inclined to catalogue all Adrian’s virtues, this one theme alone would fill a large volume. A deeper wound, however, has been inflicted on the minds of all men by the schism in the church which has come about as our faults demanded on the death of so great a father. Satan hath desired to have the church that he may sift it as wheat,b and, through the offices of a second traitor Judas, everywhere scatters bitterness and scandals. Wars worse than civil wars arise;c for these are between priests and brothers. Now is the judgement of the world,d and we must fear lest the havoc wrought by an ambitious traitor may bring down with it a part of the stars of heaven.e Woe to him through whom this scandal has come;f plainly it were better had he not been born. But, while I set forth the causes of public grief, on another side I am wracked by a more domestic Horace, Carmina 1.24.9 quoted by Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 7.18 GLK 2.302 b  Luke 22.31 c  Lucan, Bellum ciuile 1.1 d  John 12.31 e  Revelation 12.4 f  Matthew 18.7 and 26.24 a 

342

IV, 42

grief, a grief no lighter because of its bearing on me personally. My father and lord, and yours too, the venerable Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury, has fallen ill, and what we must expect and fear is all uncertain. No longer able to deal with business in his customary fashion he has imposed on me a heavy duty, nay, an insupportable burden, in making me responsible for all the affairs of the church. My spirit in consequence is everywhere troubled in me,a and I am not able to tell what torments I endure. In the midst of all these things, however, one counsel alone is left me, to make entreaty to God made man, the Son of the pure Virgin; as though asleep in the ship,b He must be aroused by the prayers of the faithful to calm the tempest in which the church is shipwrecked, and, as He foreknows to be expedient both for him and for us, in His mercy set my lord free from all infirmity of mind and of body. Let Him, I say, through whom kings reign and princes rule,c set over the universal church a worthy shepherd in whom He is well pleased, and defend our kings and princes from all adversity, making them watch over the flock entrusted to their charge, to the honour and glory of His name. With devout supplication I also entreat my reader and hearer that they intercede for me, a vain and wretched man, with the Son of the Virgin, who is the way, the truth and the life,d that, dispelling the darkness of ignorance and driving away the love of vanity, He may pour into me the light of His knowledge, and make me zealous in my pursuit and love of truth and in my devotion to it.

Psalms 142.4 Mark 4.36ff. c  Proverbs 8.15 d  John 14.6 a 

b 

343

INDEXES

Index of Scriptural References

Old Testament and Apocrypha Deuteronomy 4.29 Ecclesiastes 1.2 1.13 1.14 3.19 8.17 12.7 12.8 Ecclesiasticus 1.16 3.22 3.24 3.26 4.21 17.7, 8 18.1 37.23 45.1 Genesis 1 1.2

1.12 21.27 49.6

228 136 263

Isaiah 1.3 60.14

136 210

Jeremiah 29.13 48.29

249 132

249

131 338 328, 331 341 340 305 131

Job 308 340 340 340 307 320 334 313 136

228 328

347

12.25

206

Numbers 22

136

II Paralipomena 1.11-12

181

Proverbs 3.18 6.19 8.15 10.19

182 125 343 195

Index of Scriptural References

15.2 23.5 26.4, 5 27.17 27.21 Psalms 10.4 37.11 64.9 (not 63.10) 110.10

118.160 138.16 142.4 143.4 146.5

285 339 166 284 288

Wisdom 3.9 9.15 11.21

291 337 173 172, 308

335 317 343 336 224

341 319 229

New Testament Colossians 3.12, 14 I Corinthians 4.3 7.7 8.1 9.26 15.53 II Corinthians 2.16 5.1ff. 5.2 5.6 5.13 11.14 Hebrews 11.1 James 3.5, 6 4.6 John 1.3 3.9

192

120 269 171 173, 186 271

295 268 268 298 332 188

302

195 132

226, 228 313

348

4.38 8.32 12.5 12.31 14.6 15.5 16.29 18.38

307 182 257 342 337, 343 121 136 192

Luke 6.40 10.42 16.26 19.21 22.31

129 338 125 242 342

Mark 4.36ff.

343

Matthew 6.22 7.6 7.8 7.15 9.16 12.45 16.2, 3 18.7

336 129 249 132 176 262 328 342

Index of Scriptural References

I Peter 5.5

132

Romans 1.18 1.20 1.21 1.24 8.20 10.17 12.1

II Peter 1.13-14 2.16

268 136

I Timothy 1.6, 7 6.16

193 335

Philippians 2.13 4.7

173 308

II Timothy 3.7

193

Revelation 12.4 21.5

342 131

19.6 21.5 23.4 25.29 26.24

126 137 216 173 342

349

338 309 338 338 209 191 309

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Introductio ad theologiam 1 231, 306 2 231, 306 Inuectiua in quendam ignarum dialectices 136 Ouvrages inédits d’Abélard 242, 343, 346, 367 and 382 Cousin 205 248 Cousin 264 278, 325 and 328 Cousin 274 407 Cousin 274 475 Cousin 306 Theologia Christiana 1.5 306 3 151, 158

Abelard De generibus et speciebus 215 De unitate et trinitate diuina 306 Dialectica 151 Dialectica 2, analytica priora 2 258 3 258 Dialectica 3, topica 258, 274 Dialectica 4, analytica posteriora 1 258, 265 2 265 Dialectica 5, liber diuisionum et definitionum 212 Epistula ad Roscelinum 212 Ethica seu liber dictus scito teipsum 14 337 Fragmentum Sangermanense de generibus et speciebus 211 Historia calamitatum mearum (= Ep. 1) 2 137 3, 4 136 9f. 136

350

Adam du petit pont Ars disserendi

290

Alcuin De dialectica 3

252

Ambrose Hexaemeron 6.2.7

285

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Anselm of Canterbury De fide trinitatis Epistulae 2.35, 41, 51 Anselm of Havelberg Dialogi 2.1

Analytica posteriora 1.9 239 1.17 297, 302 1.18 296 1.22 219, 231 2.19 296, 297, 301, 310 Categoriae 2.1 243 4.1b 247, 252 5.3b 223, 231, 245 10.12a 246 De interpretatione 1 217, 218, 300 7.17b.26ff. 328 12, 13 259 Physica A.1.184b.12ff. 300 B.1.193b.20 327 Sophistici Elenchi 1 313 1.164a.21 185, 188 1.165a.2ff. 312 2 314 3 314 4.166a.36ff. 315 4-15 314 5.167b.13 239 11 318 16ff. 314 22.178b.37ff. and 179a.8ff. 223 Topica (Boethio interprete) 1.1 206, 262 1.2 211 1.4, 5, 6 262 1.7 272 1.10 262, 280 1.11 193, 196, 206, 208, 209, 239, 262 1.12 263, 278 1.15 254, 263 1.18 216, 244 2.5 266

212 212

294

Apuleius De interpretatione 265 De Platone et eius dogmate 1.3.187 183, 204 1.5.190 329 1.6.193 329 1.13 243 Aristotle Analytica priora 1.1-3 1.4-7 1.8-26 1.9 1.11 1.13 1.22 1.27 1.27-44 1.33 1.45, 46 2.1-4 2.2 2.4 2.4-10 2.11 2.12-15 2.16 2.17 2.17-22 2.23-25 2.24 2.26, 27

290 290 291 245 245 259 219 233 292 233 292 292 280 201, 311 292 292 292 292 293 293 293 278 293

351

Index of non-Biblical Sources

3.5 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.4 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.10 6.11 6.12 7.3 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.14

10.6 243 10.21 326 11.27 305 11.29 325 12.1 325 12.3 127 12.19 224 14.15 299 16.11 141 21.4 275 De dialectica 5 264 De diuersis quaestionibus 83 46.2 205, 235, 304 De fide et symbolo 3.3 334 De Genesi ad litteram 1.15 226 2.12 228 4.3.4, 5 230 4.3.7 230 De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber 5.19 334 De libero arbitrio 2.3, 4, 5 305 2.8 304, 324 2.17 214 De magistro 214 De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum 1.4 268 De natura boni 15, 16 327 De ordine 2.4.13 164 2.12.35 178 2.12.37 177 2.13 316 2.16.44 339 2.19.50 324 De spiritu et anima 37 322 38 303

245 242, 267, 271, 302, 317 267 266 207 256 269 232, 270 234, 270 270 270 271 245 278 208, 282 265 277 283 279 239, 280, 281, 289 280 280 277, 280, 281, 284 282, 284, 285

Augustine Confessiones 12.3ff. 327 12.7, 8 330 Contra Academicos 2.3.7 320 3.3.5 328 3.4.10 328 3.13.29 316, 317 Contra aduersarium legis et prophetarum 1.8 330 Contra Cresconium 1.12.15 326 Contra Faustum 26.3 275 De ciuitate Dei 8.4 183, 204, 322

352

Index of non-Biblical Sources

De trinitate 8.2.3 340 9.7.12 334 12.2.2 304 12.14.22 308 12.15.25 301, 308 13.1.1 301 14.1.3 301 15.10.17 328 15.11.20 334 15.12-16 334 15.22-26 334 Enarrationes in Psalmos 1.17 325 7.19 327 10.4 291 44.5 334 103.15 247 118.37 182 126.11 136 Epistulae 3.4 243 120.3.13 340 [Hypognosticon (more correctly Hypomnesticon)] 1.4, 5 327 6.4.6 324 In Ioannis euangelium tractatus 14.3.7 334 45.10.9 325 57.2 122 Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum 4.123 341 5.44 327 [Principia dialecticae] 1 185 5 264 Sermones 28.5 334 117.3.5 340 119.7 334 187.3 334 225.1 334

Soliloquia 2.11.20

328

Bede De schematibus et tropis

167

Benedict Regula 42

176

Bernard of Clairvaux De erroribus Abaelardi 4.10 Epistulae 13 205 362

306 136 137 137

Boethius Commentariorum minorum in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione libri duo 1.2 151, 219 1.3 152 1.5 219 2.10 288 Commentariorum maiorum in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione libri sex 2.3 214 2.4 264 2.5 219 3.9 236 4.10 288 5.11 212 5.12 259 Consolatio philosophiae 3.12 metrum 1-4 182 5 prosa 6 331 Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 1 142, 227 De differentiis topicis 1 205, 206, 261, 264

353

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Cassiodorus De anima 2 304 ExpositioPsalterii 30.11 174 90.1 174 125.4 174 Institutiones diuinarum et saecularium litterarum 2 praef. 4 148, 149 2.1.1 150,162 2.1.2 167 2.20.1, 4 154 2.2.13 119 2.3.11 256 2.3.12 265 2.3.19 148

3 265 4 185, 202 De diuisione 273, 327 De institutione arithmetica 1.1 213, 251, 329 De syllogismo categorico 1 290, 312 2 295 De syllogismo hypothetico 1 265, 291, 311 2 311 De trinitate 1.151 272 2 227, 330 4 247, 253 In categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor 1 210, 223, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 252,254, 271 4 246 In Porphyrium commentariorum libri quinque 1 183, 187, 210, 217, 226, 235 2 215 3 212, 241, 267 In Porphyrium dialogi duo 1 234, 241, 248 Interpretatio Aristotelis topicorum Passim In topica Ciceronis commentariorum libri quattuor 1 138, 145, 187, 265, 278, 318 3 212, 214, 269 [Posteriorum analyticorum interpretatio] 18 219

Catullus (cited from Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 3.229) 14.9 178 Chalcidius Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum 23 142 123 330 178 301 193 297 194 297,299 195 299 206 300 230 304 231 299, 307 233 304 250 317 268 330 300 305 323 142 340 308

Burley, Walter De uita et moribus philosophorum 49 183

354

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Cicero Academica priora 2.44.136 Academica posteriora 1.12.44 De amicitia 5.19 16.59 De diuinatione 1.30.62 De fato 5.10 De finibus 2.6.17 2.7.20 2.32.104 3.37 4.10.25 4.14.36 4.24.74 5.12.34 5.16.44 De inuentione 1 1.2.2-3 1.4.5 1.24.34 1.31.51 1.31.53 De natura deorum 1.8.18 De officiis 1.5.15-17 1.10.32 1.16.50 1.41.148 1.43.153 3.4.20 De oratore 1.4.15 1.5.18 1.6.21 1.32.147

2.38.157 181 2.74.299 168 2.87.357 298 3.38.155 159 De republica 6.24.26 268 De senectute 23.85 268, 309 Orator 4.14 196 32.113ff. 276 Paradoxa Stoicorum praef. 3 141 Partitiones oratoriae 23.78 197 [Rhetorica ad Herennium] 3.16.28ff. 168 3.22.36 151 4.3.4 195 Topica 2.6 187 5-7 269 7.31 212, 219 Tusculanae disputationes 1.16.38 309 1.24.57 219, 309 1.27. 66 309 1.27.67 310 1.28.70 310 1.29.71 310 2.2.5 206

323 205 234 282 268 143 276 323 168 195 243 258 323 243 338 140 126 126 141 203 278 323

Claudianus Mamertus De statu animae 1.27

181, 301 188 126 164 301, 320 206

310 335

Comoediae Horatianae tres (Jahnke) Pamphilus 3.1 321

138 146, 301 139 283

355

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Diogenes Laertius De clarorum philosophorum uitis 3.46, 61 239 Dionysius Areopagita (John wrote Dionisius Ariopagita) De diuinis nominibus 4.4 230 Donatus Ars grammatica 2.18 2.19 3.4 3.5.6 3.6 Fragmentum Sangermanense de generibus et speciebus see under Abelard Fulgentius Ad Monimum 3.7

163 163 163 167 243

Gilbert of Poitiers Commentaria in Boetii librum de trinitate

Gregory Homiliae in Euangelia 34.8

247

Hippocrates Aphorismi 2.16 Horace Ars poetica 16 70-72 71 72 92 102-103 104-105 108-111 333, 334 343 357 408-411 417 Carmina 1.24.9 Epistulae 1.1.41-42 1.1.65, 66 1.2.3-4 1.2.69, 70 1.3.18-20 1.4.8-11

Galen (in John’s spelling Galienus) Ars medicinalis 2 223

189 157 191 280

Geoffrey of Monmouth Historia regum Britanniae 7.3

214

Hilary De trinitate 4.14 5.3, 14 In Psalmos 138.16

334

Gellius, Aulus (in John always Agellius) Noctes Atticae 1.9 1.10.4 13.25.21 16.2.1

Commentaria in Boetii librum de duabus naturis et una persona Christi 

198

214, 329

356

166, 245 326 317

133

176 160, 255 258 260 216 162 162 161 195 195 278 143, 228 189 342 321 134 172 194 174 140

Index of non-Biblical Sources

1.4.16 1.6.34 1.6.37, 38 1.18.15 1.19.11 1.19.43 Sermones 1.1.25, 26

1.33.1 1.33.3 1.34.4 1.35.1 1.35.7 1.37 2.9.11 2.21 2.22 2.24 2.24.14 2.26.2 2.26.11 2.26.14 2.27 2.29 2.29.16 10.240 16.13.2 17.9.97

128 134 134 196, 209 122 129 255

Hugh of St Victor De sacramentis Christianae fidei 1.10.1 302 De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae dialogus 302 Didascalicon 1.1 181 1.11 142 1.12 145 3.2 183 3.7 146, 148, 174 3.15 183 3.17 307 6.14 184 In Ecclesiasten homiliae 2 142 Summa sententiarum 1.1 302 Isidore Differentiae 2.29 2.147 Etymologiae 1.1.2 1.2.1 1.3.1 1.5.1 1.5.2 1.17ff. 1.20 1.21 1.27 1.32.2

163 163 154 163 163, 164 165 119 167 186 183 228 244 252 253 256 269 273 308 275 199

Jerome Aduersus Iouinianum 2.10 243 Commentarii in Danielem prophetam 1.2 250 Contra Ioannem Hierosolymitanum 17 247 Epistulae 50.1 192, 235 53.2 258 57.6 281 58.10 326 82.1 128 125.11 178 In Ecclesiasten 3.18 171 In Salomonis libros praef. 341

298 308 149 148 178 149, 150, 162 149 167 168 168 162 163

Johannes Scotus Versio Dionysii Areopagitae de diuinis nominibus

357

230

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Lucan Bellum ciuile 1.1 1.417 2.439ff.

John of Salisbury Epistulae 251 137 Historia pontificalis 13 256, 300 14 166, 245 Policraticus 1.4 120 2.12 142 2.19 146 2.29 133 5.10 133 6.18 198 7.1, 2 323 7.2 122, 225, 324 7.5 204 7.10 178 7.25 137 8.7 128 8.10 157 8.13 171 Justinian, Corpus iuris ciuilis Code 1.17.2.13 8.50.19 Digest 1.2.1 1.3.37 49.15.5 50.17.19 Institutes 1.12.5

136

Juvenal 2.83 6.63 7.157 7.158-160 7.213-214 7.231, 232

130 120 191 191 143 199

342 338 289

Macrobius Commentarii in Ciceronis somnium Scipionis 1.5.7 150 1.12.18 131 1.14 306 Saturnalia 7.3.2-6 137 Martial 1.16 4.14.1 8.17.3-4 12.3.13

121 130 120 130

Martianus Capella De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 126 1.5 319 1.22 321 1.37 321 1.68 323 2.111ff. 307 2.114 184, 303, 320 2.136 197 2.160 326 2.205 332 2.206 332 2.213 239 3.224 170 3.229 178 4.328 278 4.330 183 4.331ff. 316 5.524 174

249 136 260 160 136 284

Mythographus Vaticanus 3

358

319

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Neckam, Alexander De naturis rerum 1.78 Ovid Amores 1.15.36 Ars amatoria 2.537 2.647 Epistulae ex Ponto 3.4.74 Fasti 2.771, 772 Heroides 6.102 9 Metamorphoses 1.586 2.721 2.749 2.755 4.63 5.577ff. 9.279

Plato Respublica 6.509ff. 7.533d ff. Timaeus 29e 31a 35a 44a 44c 49e 51e

257

130 272 235 119 298 128 129 155 282 189, 211 189 163 222 129

Palladius Agricultura 1.1

284

Persius Prol. 1ff. Prol. 9 1.80 1.96, 97 1.105 1.115 1.134 3.9 3.60, 61 4.23, 24 5.12 5.123

130 134 131 290 195 136 120 130 173 119 137 120

299 307 228 323 306 303 306 329 303, 308, 322

Plautus Pseudolus 25, 26

312

Pliny the elder Historia naturalis praef. 21 20.2 37.59, 60

240 275 275

Porphyry Isagoge 2a.20 Priscian De figuris numerorum Institutiones grammaticae 1.3.10 1.20 1.25 1.46 2.14 2.15 5.3 7.18 8.1.4 12.3 12.4 17.44 17.166ff.

359

241, 242 267

176 157 327 327 327 264 159 219 342 156 225 223 231 167

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Publilius Syrus Sententiae 123

265

Querolus 30.24

131

Quintilian Institutio oratoria 1.3.3-5 1.3.18 1.4.1 1.4.5 1.4.6 1.5.1-54 1.5.2 1.5.7 1.6.41 1.7.34 1.7.35 1.8.2 1.8.12 1.8.13ff. 1.8.20 2.3.3, 4 2.4.4ff. 2.5.4 2.18.1 3.1.1 6.1.36 6.2.3 6.2.32 8 proem. 28 8.1 8.3.56ff. 8.6.5, 6 8.6.71 8.6.73 9.1.17 10.1.83

10.1.125ff. 10.7.11 10.7.12-13 12.2.12f. Ragewin (or Rahewin) Gesta Friderici imperatoris 3.47

171 193 121 276

129

Regimen sanitatis Salernitanum (Daremberg and Saint-Marc) 5.103 133 10.27, 34 133

194 179 179 179 179 166 186 167 166 169 172 170 170 174 193 194 318 174 322 276 197 284 174 319 289 156 159 197 156 186 184

Remi of Auxerre In artem Donati minorem 5

186

Seneca the elder Controuersiae 1 praef. 1 1 praef. 21 1.1.22 7 praef. 5 9.1.13

287 194 195 279 282

Seneca the younger Epistulae morales 49.6 58.19 58.20 58.23 65 66.12 82.24 88.1-2 88.3 88.26ff. 88.43 89.9

360

181 213 214 213 226 305 194 171 172 251 286, 321 204

Index of non-Biblical Sources

Servius Explanatio in artem Donati 167 In libros Vergilii commentarius Aeneidos 5.287 154 6.14 138

Ulger Venalicium disciplinarum

220

Valerius Maximus Facta et dicta memorabilia 9.4

135

Sidonius Apollinaris Epistulae 2.12.3 7.9.5

Varro De lingua Latina 237

264

Vegetius Epitoma rei militaris 1.4, 11, 12

275 283

Statius Thebaid 1.680 12.817 Suetonius Caligula 41 53 Terence Andria 43-44 62 68 126 204 Eunuchus 913 Heautontimorumenos 877 Phormio 454 Theodulus Ecloga 78 335

133 195

241 210

Virgil Aeneid 1.73 1.150 3.444ff. 3.489-491 5.362ff. 6.74 f. 6.726 6.731 9.590ff. Eclogues 2.73 8.63 9.51-54 Georgics 1.145-146 2.490-492

134 171

160 119, 192 119 136 160 120 283 191

253 125 128 298 238 128 202 202, 325 238 122 269 238 138, 321 182

Victorinus, Marius De diffinitione 269 [Explanationes in rhetoricam (De inuentione) Ciceronis] 1.29 205 In Ciceronis librum 1 de inuentione 140, 141, 142

215

122 184, 302

361

Index of Names

see also under Ulger Anselm (of Laon) 136 Apollo 338 Apostle (Paul) 302, 338 Apuleius 183, 210, 243, 265 Apulia 156, 237 Arabia 294 Arabs 138 Arcadia 191 Arcadian 130 Archbishop of Canterbury 343 Arellius 195 Areopagite 230 Arethusa 222 Aristomenes 233 Ariston 233 Aristotelian 259 Aristotle (in the Latin invariably Aristotiles, not Aristoteles) 135, 142, 183, 184, 186, 193, 194, 196, 200, 201, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 219, 223, 225, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 252, 254, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 277, 279, 282, 285, 290, 291, 294, 295, 297, 300, 302, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 327, 328 Ascanius 238 Astyanax 298, 299

Abelard 212, 239, 243 see also under Le Pallet and Peripatetic Abraham 136 Academic, Academics 122, 205, 225, 239, 294, 323, 328 Academy 206 Achaean (Acheus) see under Greek 330 Acheron 182 Acheus see under Greek 330 Achilles 197, 227 Adam (du Petit Pont) 200, 239, 255, 290 Adrastus 241 Adrian (Pope) 341, 342 Aeolic 327 Aesop 320 Africa 294 A. Gellius (who for John is Agellius) 280 Agrimnia 307 Alberic (of Reims) 136, 198 Alcuin 252 Alexander (the philosopher) 210 Alexis 122 Alitia 184, 303 Allobrogan 143 Alpine 237 Ambrose 285 Andromache 298 Angers 220

362

Index of Names

Chrysippus 172 Cicero 140, 143, 147, 164, 168, 181, 195, 206, 210, 211, 212, 243, 265, 268 (in the Latin Marcus Tullius), 269, 273, 276 (in the Latin Marcus Tullius), 278, 301, 309, 310, 316 see also under Tullius Cipris 319 see also under Venus Cistercians 137 Claudianus (Mamertus) 310 Cleon 233, 251 Cluniacs 137 Conches 135, 178, 200, 283 Constantine (donation of) 342 Coriscus 239 Cornifician, Cornificians 129, 141 Cornificius 124, 127, 128, 129, 134, 136, 137, 139, 144, 171, 180, 210, 287, 316, 317 Coutances 178 Crantor 172 Curia 237

Augustine 150, 164, 165, 177, 183, 185, 206, 210, 214, 221, 226, 230, 235, 240, 243, 252, 264, 268, 304, 305, 316, 320, 321, 322, 324, 325, 327, 328, 330, 331, 334, 339 Avitus 121 Balaam 136 Bathyllus 120 Bede 167 Benedict 132 Bernard (of Chartres) 135, 147, 173, 175, 213, 214, 244, 245, 257, 330, 331 Boethius 142, 151, (another poet 182), 183, 203, 210, 212, 213, 219, 227, 234, 236, 241, 247, 248, 253, 266, 269, 273, 291, 311, 317, 329 Bologna 199 Boreas 222 Brisso 239 Britain 121 British 138 Bromius 315, 316 Burgundio (of Pisa) 294

Daedalus 138, 177 Dares 238 Didymus, Didymuses 193 Dionysius (the Areopagite) 230 Donatus 167 Drogo 315

Cadmus 241 Caesar 157, 169, 170, 289 Callias 233, 234, 251 Callirhoe (in John’s text Calliroe) 120 Canterbury 343 Capitol 307 Cassiodorus 167, 304 Castalian 130 Cato 156 Catullus 178 Chalcidius (in John’s text Calcidius) 142, 297 Châlons-sur-Marne 274 Champeaux 137, 274 Chartres 135, 147, 173, 175, 213, 214, 244, 257, 330 Choerilus (in John’s Latin Cherillus) 278 Christian, Christians 127, 128, 243, 269, 271, 318, 341

Ecclesiastes 328, 340 Ecclesiasticus 334, 340 Egypt 294 Egyptian 183 Empedocles 280 England 237, 341 English 198, 255, 341 Englishman 198, 290 Entellus 238 Epicurean 128 Epicurus 183, 323, 330 Ethiopia 259 Eudemus 210, 291, 311 Euryalus 177

363

Index of Names

Hercules 129, 197 Hescelin 283 Hibernia see under Ireland Hilary 166, 326 Hippocrates 132, 133 Hobinellus 259 Homer 172, 278 Horace (the moralising poet 140), 172, (the poet 195) Hugh (of St Victor) 137, 302 Hyllus (in the Latin Ylus) 129

l’Evêque 178, 200 see also under Richard Flavus 195 see also under Nisius France 136, 175, 198, 237 French 138, 341 Fronesis 184, 303, 320 Gaius 169 see also under Caesar Galen (in John’s spelling Galienus) 132, 223 Gallic 326 Ganymede 122 Gauslenus see under Jocelin Gauterus see under Walter Gellius see under A. Gellius, who for John becomes Agellius German (Hardewin the) 200 Gilbert (de la Porrée) 135, 201, 214, 239 see also under Poitiers Gospel 129 Grammar 170, 171 see also under Martianus and Philology Greek 145, 149, 156, 157, 158, 163, 186, 214, 262, 278, 288, 326, 327, 330 (in the Latin Acheus) Greeks 138, 146, 149, 219, 261, 262, 288, 300, 309 Gregory 247

Ireland (in the Latin Hibernia) 342 Isidore 146, 164, 167, 169, 183, 186, 244, 252, 256, 273 Janiculum 156 Jerome (Hieronymus) 243, 250 Jocelin (in the Latin Gauslenus) 214, 215 Jove 129, 321 Judas 342 Juno 321 Juvenal (the pagan poet 191) Kalends 156 Laon 136 Latin 156, 163, 215, 279, 294, 327 Latins 138, 300 Le Pallet (Palatinus) 135, 198, 212, 240, 257, 265 see also under Abelard and Peripatetic Lion of Justice (Henry I) 198 Lucan 175, 279, 338 Lucilius (the friend of Seneca) 194

Hardewin (the German) 200 Hebrew 141 Hebrews 138, 305 Hector 197, 227 Helias 200 see also under Peter Henry (I) 198 see also under Lion of Justice Henry (II) 342 Heraclitus 209, 239, 280

March 156 Marcus 169 see also under Cicero (268, 276) and Tullius Marius 269 see also under Victorinus Mars 241 Marsian 315

364

Index of Names

also philology 335 see also under Mercury Philosophy 320 Phoebus 130 Pilate 192 Pisa 294 Plato 142, 183, 185, 213, 214, 217, 218, 230, 231, 233, 235, 268, 269, 270, 299, 304, 306, 307, 308, 310, 316, 323, 329, 331 Platonic 231, 247 Platonist, Platonists 236, 330, 331, 332 Pliny the elder 240 Poissy 201 see also under Simon Poitiers 135, 214 Polynices 241 Porphyry 183, 210, 216, 236, 240, 241, 242, 243, 248, 263, 267, 268, 330 Premonstratensians 137 Priscian 167 Protagoras 321 Proverbs 339 Pullen 137, 201 see also under Robert Pythagoras 183, 269, 321 Pythagorean 189, 286

Martial 121 Martianus (Capella) 170, 239, 320, 321, 323, 326, 332, 333 Mauritania (Mortagne) 213 Melissus 209, 239 Melun 198, 315 Mercury 126, 184, 185, 197, 319 Minerva 189, 211 Moab 132 Moeris 238 Montpellier 132 Mont Sainte-Geneviève 198, 201 Mortagne (Mauritania) 213 Muses 130, 133 Naso see under Ovid Neptune 188 Nicodemuses 313 Nisius 195 see also under Flavus Numanus 238 Ocean 338 Ovid 269 Palladius 284 Pallas 315 see also under Minerva Paris 136 Parmenides 183 Parnassus 130 Periergia 307 Peripatetic (of Le Pallet) 135, 198, 212, 240, 257, 265 see also under Abelard and Le Pallet Peripatetic, Peripatetics 182, 183, 184, 236, 249, 255, 268, 288, 294, 313, 323, 331, 337, 338 Peter 200 see also under Helias Philo 341 Philocalia 320 also philocalia 335 Philology 126, 185, 197, 303, 306, 307, 315, 319, 320, 321, 332

Quintilian 156, 167, 170, 171, 172, 174, 179, 184, 186, 193, 276 Ralph (of Laon) 136 Reims 136 Remi (of Auxerre) 186 Richard (l’Evêque) 178, 200 Robert (of Melun) 198, 315 Robert (Pullen) 137, 201 Roman 156, 237 see also under Curia Romans 283 Rome 342 Romulus 178 Roscelin 212 Rufus 143 see also under Scaurus Salerno 132

365

Index of Names

Theophrastus 210, 291, 311 Thierry 135, 200, 315 Thraso 120 Timotheus 193, 194 Toulouse 341 Trinity 125, 334, 337 (Holy Trinity), 340 (divine Trinity) Troyes 315 Tullius 169 see also under Cicero (268, 276) and Marcus

Satan 342 Scaurus 143 see also under Rufus Scythians 138 Seneca (the elder) 194, 195, 287 Seneca (the younger) 168, 171, 194, 213, 305, 306 Servius 167 Severitan 262 Sextus 120 Sibyl 312 Sidonius 133, 195 see also under Sollius Simon (of Paris) 136 Simon (of Poissy) 201 Sirac 320, 340 Socrates 143, 183, 234, 269, 273, 278 Socratic 247 Soissons 200, 214 see also under Jocelin and William Sollius 133 see also under Sidonius Solomon 166, 331, 338, 340 Sophia 320 Spanish (the Latin adj. is Hiberus) 294 Stoic, Stoics 139, 183, 226, 268, 323, 326, 330 Sulla 178

Ulger 220 see also under Angers Varro 178 Victor, St 137 see also under Hugh Victorinus 140, 142, 205, 269 see also under Marius Virgil 154, 175, (the most learned of our poets 182), (the moralising poet 238), 279, 298, (another poet greater than Martianus 321) Virgilian 253 Virgin (Mary) 205, 343 Walter (of Mortagne in the Latin Gauterus de Mauritania) 213 William (of Champeaux) 137, 274 William (of Conches) 135, 178, 283 William (of Soissons) 200 Winchester 259 Wisdom 313, 341

Tartarus 323 Tenred 151 Terence (the comic poet 160, 215) Thais 120 Thebes 241 Themistius 265 Theobald 343 see Archbishop of Canterbury

Zeno 250, 280 Zephyr 222

366

Index of Greek Words

hera, heroes, heron 326 hyle 227, 330 idos 214 lecton 186 lexis 186, 288 logos 145 pronoe 323 stichiologus, stichos 156 symplasis 298 syncategoremata 159 topice 273 topoi 273 yconoyphanae 219

ana 288 analytice 288 aphonia 156 ares 149 arso 149 cacozelia 156 (note b) cacozygia 156 cola 270 diacrisis 174 ennoiae 219, 309 fronesis 300 see also under Fronesis frono 320 gramma 150

367

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

gladius 248 see also under ensis, mucro gramineo in campo, graminoso in campo 154 graue 263 habere 254 homines 246 homo 246, 248 i, u consonants 154 imaginatio 324 inane 336 see also inune in campo categorico, patronomico 154 inune 336 see also inane iustitia, iustus 347 lapis 248 lectio 174 legere 174 liberos 149 litteratio, litterator, litteratura, litteratus 178 locutio 288 maneries 215 monstra, monstrant 232 mucro 248 see also under ensis, gladius mulier informis 157 nomen 153

-a, nouns ending in 148 aequale 288 albedo 244, 245, 248 albet 244, 245 album 245, 247 albus 247 angelus 247 artant 149 auctor 239, 241, 252 auctores 133, 164, 165, 166, 174, 175, 176, 177, 187, 214, 215, 217, 233, 234, 235, 240, 243, 246, 247, 257, 258, 290 bicubitum 247 caecitas, caecum esse, caecus 246 collatio 176 conformatio 298 cultellus acutus 254 declinatio 176 disertior, disertus 144 ensis 248 see also under gladius, mucro equus 155 esse 129 (see also under non esse), 329 esse in aliquo 254 fallit, a fallendo 336 fallitur 300 formosus 241 see also under speciosus fortis, fortitudo 246

368

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

resolutoria 288 sancire, sanctus 327 sapientia, sapor 308 sapio 320 sensus 324 sententiae 171 speciosus 241 see also under formosus trivium 134, 148, 149 ueritas 327 uerum 326, 327 uirtute 306

non esse 129 see also under esse petitio principii 292 praelectio 174 prudentia 300 quadrivium 131, 134, 148, 149, 175, 200 quaedam (sc. pars) 306 ratio 321, 324, 325 rationes 324 ratum 321 resolutio 289

369