Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans: Continual Diaspora (Language Policy, 31) 3031137973, 9783031137976

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Language Policy

Svetlana Paichadze

Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans Continual Diaspora

Language Policy Volume 31

Series Editors Joseph Lo Bianco , University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia Terrence G. Wiley, Professor Emeritus, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA Editorial Board Members Claire Kramsch, University of California, Berkeley, USA Georges Lüdi, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland Normand Labrie, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Anne Pakir, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore Guadalupe Valdes, Stanford University, California, USA

The last half century has witnessed an explosive shift in language diversity involving a rapid spread of global languages and an associated threat to small languages. The diffusion of global languages, the stampede towards English, the counter-pressures in the form of ethnic efforts to reverse or slow the process, the continued determination of nation-states to assert national identity through language, and, in an opposite direction, the greater tolerance shown to multilingualism and the increasing concern for language rights, all these are working to make the study of the nature and possibilities of language policy and planning a field of swift growth. The series will publish empirical studies of general language policy or of language education policy, or monographs dealing with the theory and general nature of the field. We welcome detailed accounts of language policy-making - who is involved, what is done, how it develops, why it is attempted. We will publish research dealing with the development of policy under different conditions and the effect of implementation. We will be interested in accounts of policy development by governments and governmental agencies, by large international companies, foundations, and organizations, as well as the efforts of groups attempting to resist or modify governmental policies. We will also consider empirical studies that are relevant to policy of a general nature, e.g. the local effects of the developing European policy of starting language teaching earlier, the numbers of hours of instruction needed to achieve competence, selection and training of language teachers, the language effects of the Internet. Other possible topics include the legal basis for language policy, the role of social identity in policy development, the influence of political ideology on language policy, the role of economic factors, policy as a reflection of social change. The series is intended for scholars in the field of language policy and others interested in the topic, including sociolinguists, educational and applied linguists, language planners, language educators, sociologists, political scientists, and comparative educationalists. Book proposals for this series may be submitted to the Publishing Editor: Natalie Rieborn, Publishing Editor, Springer, Van Godewijckstraat 30, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands Email: [email protected] All proposals and manuscripts submitted to the Series will undergo at least two rounds of external peer review. This series is indexed in Scopus.

Svetlana Paichadze

Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans Continual Diaspora

Svetlana Paichadze Research Faculty of Media and Communication Hokkaido University Sapporo, Japan

ISSN 1571-5361 ISSN 2452-1027 (electronic) Language Policy ISBN 978-3-031-13797-6 ISBN 978-3-031-13798-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Series Editor’s Foreword

Language Policy Book Series: Our Aims and Approach Recent decades have witnessed a rapid expansion of interest in language policy studies as transcultural connections deepen and expand all across the globe. Whether it is to facilitate more democratic forms of participation, or to respond to demands for increased educational opportunity from marginalised communities, or to better understand the technologization of communication, language policy and planning has come to the fore as a practice and a field of study. In all parts of the world the push for language policy is a reflection of such rapid and deep globalisation, undertaken by governments to facilitate or diversify trade, to design and deliver multilingual public services, to teach less-commonly taught languages and to revitalise endangered languages. There is also interest in forms of language policy to bolster new and more inclusive kinds of language based and literate citizenship. Real world language developments have pushed scholars to generate new theory on language policy and to explore new empirical accounts of language policy processes. At the heart of these endeavours is the search for the resolution of communication problems between ethnic groups, nations, individuals, authorities and citizens, educators, and learners. Key research concerns have been the rapid spread of global languages, especially English and more recently Chinese, and the economic, social and identity repercussions that follow, linked to concerns about the accelerating threat to the vitality of small languages across the world. Other topics that have attracted research attention have been persisting communication inequalities, the changing language situation in different parts of the world, and how language and literacy abilities affect social opportunity, employment and identity. In the very recent past, language diversity itself has been a popular field of study, to explore particular ways to classify and understand multilingualism, the fate of particular groups of languages or individual languages, and questions of literacy, script, and orthography. In this complex landscape of language change efforts of

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Series Editor’s Foreword

sub-national groups and national to reverse or slow language shift have dominated concerns of policymakers as well as scholars. While there is a discernible trend towards greater openness to multilingualism and increasing concern for language rights, we can also note the continued determination of nation states to assert a singular identity through language, sometimes through repressive measures. For all these reasons, systematic, careful and critical study of the nature and possibilities of language policy and planning is a topic of growing global significance. In response to this dynamic environment of change and complexity, this series publishes empirical research of general language policy in diverse domains, such as education, or monographs dealing with the theory and general nature of the field. We welcome detailed accounts of language policy-making which explore the key actors, their modes of conceiving their activity and the perspective of scholars reflecting on the processes and outcomes of policy. Our series aims to understand how language policy develops, why it is attempted, and how it is critiqued, defended and elaborated or changed. We are interested in publishing research dealing with the development of policy under different conditions and the effect of its implementation. We are interested in accounts of policy undertaken by governments but also by non- governmental bodies, by international corporations, foundations and the like, as well as the efforts of groups attempting to resist or modify governmental policies. We will also consider empirical studies that are relevant to policy of a general nature, for example the local effects of transnational policy influence, such as the United Nations, the European Union, or regional bodies in Africa, Asia and the Americas. We encourage proposals dealing with practical questions of when to commence language teaching, the numbers of hours of instruction needed to achieve set levels of competence, selection and training of language teachers, the language effects of the Internet, and issues of program design and innovation. Other possible topics include non-education domains such as legal and health interpreting; community and family based language planning, and language policy from bottom-up advocacy; and language change that arises from traditional forms of power alongside influence and modelling of alternatives to established forms of communication. Contemporary language policy studies can examine the legal basis for language policy, the role of social identity in policy development, the influence of political ideology on language policy formulation, and the role of economic factors in success or failure of language plans or studies of policy as a reflection of social change. We do not wish to limit or define the limits of what language policy research can encompass, and our primary interest is to solicit serious book-length examinations, whether the format is for a single-authored or multi-authored volume or a coherent edited work with multiple contributors. The series is intended for scholars in the field of language policy and others interested in the topic, including sociolinguists, educational and applied linguists,

Series Editor’s Foreword

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language planners, language educators, sociologists, political scientists, and comparative educationalists. We welcome your submissions or an enquiry from you about ideas for work in our series that opens new directions for the field of language policy. University of Melbourne Parkville, VIC, Australia

Joseph Lo Bianco

Arizona State University Tempe, AZ, USA

Terrence G. Wiley

Foreword

Sakhalin lies on the outermost edges of national memories. In narratives of Russian history, it is the furthest frontier of Siberia – the ‘Wild East’ – remembered (if at all) mainly for its dark past as one of the Russian Empire’s most feared penal settlements. In Japanese national narratives, Karafuto (Sakhalin) is the forgotten colony – a place which was briefly claimed by Japan as part of the nation – but is often neglected in debates about Japanese colonialism and legacies. Despite the pioneering work of John Stephan in the 1970s, little was written in English about the multiple colonizations of Sakhalin until a recent revival of interest in the island, illustrated by the work of scholars like Steven Ivings, Jonathan Bull, and the author of the present book – Svetlana Paichadze. But the history of Sakhalin, as Dr. Paichadze makes clear in this volume, is a fascinating one. Until the mid-nineteenth century, it was a meeting place of many indigenous peoples. The Nivkh, Ainu, and Uilta people lived on the island and also traveled extensively to neighboring regions. Sakhalin Ainu crossed the Soya Straits to visit and trade with Hokkaido Ainu; Nivkh lived on both sides of the Tartar Strait, which separates Sakhalin from the Asian mainland, and maintained close trading links to the surrounding peoples of Asia’s northeastern seaboard. From the seventeenth century onward, the indigenous people of Sakhalin also traded with, and sometimes paid tribute to, the Chinese empire via Manchu officials and merchants. But with the rise of global imperialism in the nineteenth century, the island became a settler colony whose history illustrates a very important but insufficiently studied facet of global imperialism. Unlike countries such as Australia and New Zealand – where a single initial wave of colonial settlement paved the way to a continuous history of modern nation building – Sakhalin experienced the discontinuity of repeated waves of conquest, with settlers from one colonial power departing en masse as settlers from another arrived. The first gradual arrival of colonizers from Russia and Japan in the early to mid-nineteenth century – when the island was assigned to the joint control of the two nations under the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda – was disrupted by the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg, under which Japan

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handed full control of the island to Russia. Following the signing of this treaty, most Japanese settlers departed, while people from all over the Russian Empire moved in. Japan’s 1905 victory in the Russo-Japanese War resulted in another rupture: Japan claimed control of the southern half of the island below the 50th parallel, and almost all the Russians who had settled there moved to the north of the island or to the Russian mainland. Japan’s participation in the Siberian Intervention, following the Russian Revolution of 1917, led to further shifts of population, with Japan briefly occupying the whole of the island from 1920 to 1925. Between 1925 and 1945, Sakhalin was again divided along the 50th parallel – the Soviet Union controlling the north and the Japanese Empire the south. Finally, in 1945, the USSR seized control of the entire island, and almost all the Japanese residents, as well as most Sakhalin Ainu, left for Japan: but not quite all, as we shall see from the fascinating personal stories retold in this book. Svetlana Paichadze’s research vividly highlights the fact that Sakhalin’s colonial history was even more complex than this bald chronology of events would suggest. The settlers who came to Sakhalin from the Russian Empire, and later from the Soviet Union and from the post-Soviet Russian Federation, were not necessarily Russians. They included Poles, Ukrainians, and many others. Similarly, under Japanese rule, migrants to Sakhalin included a large number of Koreans, many of whom were brought there to work in the island’s coalmines as part of Japan’s wartime mobilization schemes. This story of repeated waves of human movement means that, in a sense, the history of Sakhalin spills out beyond the shores of the island itself. Those who departed carried their memories with them, creating communities in Japan, Korea, Russia, and beyond whose identities have been shaped by their experience of life in Sakhalin. Meanwhile, beneath these repeated waves of change, there were also continuities. The indigenous peoples of the island experienced drastic population declines as a result of imported diseases and environmental disruption, but Nivkh, Uilta, and a small number of Ainu descendants continue to live on the island, and when political control of Sakhalin changed hands, there were always some settlers from earlier waves of migration who chose to stay on under foreign rule, or who stayed because their circumstances made it impossible for them to leave. Yet these “remainers” experienced a culture shock akin to those experienced by people who migrate to distant countries. They found themselves suddenly surrounded by a foreign language and unfamiliar political systems and ways of life. This book explores the diverse ways in which they responded to and navigated these disorienting changes. During the Cold War era, Japanese and Koreans who remained in Sakhalin were largely confined within the boundaries of the Soviet Union (though some Koreans were able to travel to and work in North Korea), but as Cold War tensions faded, cross-border movement became easier, and in recent decades, some have returned to Japan or Korea, often bringing family members with them. But this “return” itself creates new challenges. These migrants are “returning” to ancestral homelands which, at best, they barely remember, or which (in many cases) are almost entirely foreign to them. How do they negotiate the challenges of being migrants in an alien “homeland”?

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Exploring Sakhalin’s history particularly through the lens of education, Svetlana Paichadze sheds new light on the multicultural complexities of Sakhalin’s society, past and present. In the context of a diverse and shifting population, education was a crucial issue. Schools had to be built for new waves of settlers, and educational programs devised to meet their needs. The education system also had to find ways to accommodate the “remainers.” Dr. Paichadze’s research examines how the Japanese and Russian/Soviet rulers of Sakhalin sought to deal with the cultural complexities of the island in their educational and cultural policies. Equally importantly, she shows how these policies affected the everyday experiences of people from diverse social and cultural backgrounds, who lived their lives across constantly shifting borders. Dr. Paichadze draws not only on years of research in Japanese and Russian archives but also on her deep engagement with the community of recent migrants from Sakhalin to Japan, many of whom have settled in or around the city of Sapporo. Her work allows us to hear their remarkable stories of survival and adaptation in their own words. The stories of these “continual migrants” are not only fascinating in their own right but they also encourage us to rethink the migration process, which is too often seen as a simple one-way movement from homeland to foreign nation. The history of the Sakhalin migrants reminds us of the importance of understanding and meeting the needs of those whose lives are shaped by repeated border crossing and repeated shifts in the location of national frontiers. In an age when border controls are once again tightening in many places, and when there are alarming signs of an emerging New Cold War, the story of Sakhalin’s minorities and migrants provides a particularly powerful reminder of the human costs of political and military conflicts. This history helps us to see the human complexities behind the crude ideological labels of “friend” and “enemy,” “citizen” and “alien.” The new insights offered here into Sakhalin’s history, and into the lives of the island’s multicultural and multilingual “continual migrants,” are also insights into the quiet ways in which cross-border communication and networking can become a counterforce against the barriers and enmities of hot and cold wars. The Australian National University Canberra, ACT, Australia

Tessa Morris-Suzuki

Notes on Transliteration

This book is based on a wide range of source materials in Russian, Japanese, Korean, and English. I have tried to be consistent, although the plurality of transliteration systems in documents ranging across four languages means there are inevitably some inconsistencies. However, I have used the following conventions in each language: Russian: I have used BGN/PCGN Romanization of Russian. The name Kryukov is frequently spelled Kriukov in English, but I have used a “y” for consistency. Japanese: For Japanese words, macrons are used to indicate long vowel sounds. They are omitted in the text for familiar words and place names that commonly appear without macrons in English, for example, Hokkaido. However, when words like Hokkaido are used in Romanized Japanese (such as in a book title), it has the macron: Hokkaidō. Korean: The National Institution of Korean Language system has been used, except where the original language of the cited text gives an alternative spelling. For the names, I used the spelling chosen by their holders. If the spelling is not known, I used the most common spelling of these names. This book uses the Japanese and Korean order for people’s names: family name followed by given name, and citations from other works where the English order is followed. Russian and other names follow the order of given name followed by family name.

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Acknowledgments

I have been involved in the investigation of various issues relating to the education of returnees’ children in Japan for many years. I am working at the Russian School in Sapporo and CaSA (Child Assist Sapporo Association) on Japan’s northernmost island of Hokkaido. These children and the life stories of their families are the true inspiration for this book. Without them, this book could not have existed. To truly understand their stories, we must go back over a century and a half to describe the macro processes by which they came to be living, first in Karafuto and then in Japan and South Korea. Shared borders in the Far East have been a source of conflict, but they have also precipitated migration and created multicultural, multilingual families. The focus of this book is the lives and experiences of these ordinary people living on the Russo-Japanese border, rather than the grand themes of diplomacy, international politics, or economic relationships. The interviewees from Japan, Korea, and Russia are too numerous to list individually, but I want to thank them for telling me about their lives and allowing me to use their life stories in this volume. Above all, I am very grateful to them. I would also like to thank the teachers at the Russian school in Sapporo and the staff of CaSA NPO for their invaluable work with the children at the school. Also, I am very thankful to Alexander Kim, Tatyana Kobrina, and Jаnna Ten (Jeong Yeong Sun) for introducing me to their schools in South Korea and allowing me to interview them. I have been researching the educational issues, language, and identity of returnees since 2011, with colleagues from Hokkaido University. The book was written within three projects funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science: “The Role of Returnees from Sakhalin in Multiculturalism in Hokkaido,” “Between Repatriation and Returning Home (1950–1970)” (led by Hyun Mooam), and “Education, Language and Identity of young generation of returnees in Ansan.” This funding enabled me to do extensive fieldwork in Sakhalin, Japan, and South Korea. Also, I am grateful to Miyashita Masatoshi, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, David Wolff, Philip Seaton, Tonai Yuzuru, Nakayama Taishō, Jonathan Bull, Minami Makoto, Fujino Yōhei, Jeffry Gayman, Tominari Ayako, Lee Jun Young, and Georgy Buntilov for their advice on my research, participation in the events, and helping with fieldwork. I xv

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Acknowledgments

owe special thanks to members of many joint projects and my co-researchers Hyun Mooam and Yulia Din for introducing me to Sakhalin Korean diaspora research and jointly doing fieldwork and writing many papers and a book together. Also, I am very thankful to Gotō Haruki for our joint fieldwork and the beautiful photos he took, some of which grace this book. Many people have contributed to the project. For assistance in arranging contacts and retrieval of documents, I have to thank the Hokkaidō Chūgoku Kikokusha Shien Kōryū Sentā (Hokkaido Center for the Support of and Friendship with Chinese Returnees), Nihon Saharin dōhō kōryū kyōkai (the Japan Association for Friendship with Compatriots from Sakhalin), Hokkaido Association Aiming to Solve the “Comfort Women” Problem of the Japanese Army, Saharin Nihon jin kai (Association for Sakhalin Japanese), KIN (Korean International Network), Koryo-saram Association in the Republic of Korea, and Koryoin Center Mir. I would especially like to thank Kōgo Yoichi, Hiromi Saito, Kim Shi Gan, Shirohata Masayuki, Ekaterina Suda, Lee Eun Young, and Kim Seung Loyk. Also, I am grateful to Ashleigh Dollin and John Ryan for all their support with the English edition and proofreading of the text. At Springer, I would like to thank Helen van der Stelt and Aarthi Padmanaban for their support throughout the production process. I also thank Joseph Lo Bianco for introducing me to the fascinating Language Policy series and the two anonymous referees whose close reading of the initial proposal and constructive comments helped us create, I hope, a much stronger book. Finally, I would like to thank my family. First, my parents Larisa Kozhevnikova and Sergey Paichadze, who instilled in me a love and interest for the Far East. Also, to my husband Carlos Gonzalo Alvarez Jerez and daughters Alexandra Hebe Alvarez Paichadze and Anastasia Renee Alvarez Paichadze for their understanding, patience, and assistance in the process of collecting materials and writing this book.

Abstract

This book is a volume comprising eight chapters that provide a diverse study of the Japanese and Korean diaspora of Sakhalin. Primarily, the monograph explores the issues of education, the use of languages, and the formation of self-identification of the Japanese and Korean diasporas of Sakhalin for a 100 years, from the time they moved to the island until their “return” to historical homelands: Japan or South Korea. During this time, their language environment and language of education changed four times, and the Japanese and Korean of Sakhalin continued to be a linguistic and ethnic minority. The present book focuses on these four events: (1) history of migration to Sakhalin/Karafuto, and Japanese society and Korean community on Karafuto; (2) repatriation, migration, and the left-behind population after the end of the Second World War; (3) the new wave of repatriation and movement of the population between the 1950s and 1970s; and (4) modern repatriation to Japan and South Korea and formation of a new ethnic community.

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Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Theoretical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Immigration, Repatriation, and Migration Studies . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Diaspora Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Ethnic Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4 Identity and Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.5 School Education and Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Method of Research and Book Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part I 2

1 1 3 3 6 8 10 11 12 14

From the Joint Control to the Border on the Island

Sakhalin Under Control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 From Joint to Russian Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 From St. Petersburg Treaty to the Russo-Japanese War . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Movement of the Population and Ethnic Composition of the Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Policy for Migrants in the Russian Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 First Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 After Russo-Japanese War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Movement of the Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Schools Between 1906 and 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Sakhalin After the Russian Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 New Wave of Colonization and Migration of the Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Ethnic Policy in Soviet Sakhalin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Schools in Soviet Sakhalin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 19 20 20 23 24 25 25 26 27 27 28 30

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Contents

2.5 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Sakhalin/Karafuto Under Control of the Japanese Empire . . . . . . . . 3.1 Migration Policy and Migration of the Population to Karafuto . . . . 3.2 North Sakhalin under Japanese Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Schools in North Sakhalin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Forced Mobilization of Koreans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Minority Policy and Interaction Between Different Groups of Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Pre-war Japanese Korean Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Schools and Minority Education in Karafuto . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Conclusion of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part II 4

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Postwar Population Movements

Coexistence, Repatriation, and Those Left Behind (1945-End of the 1950s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Repatriation of the Japanese Population and the New Ethnic Composition of the Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 Repatriation and Left-Behind People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 Interethnic Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Ethnic Policy and Coexistence of Japanese, Korean, and Russian Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Ethnic Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Japanese, Korean, and Russian Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Annual Reports on Schools: Sources that Reflect Social Processes Taking Place on Sakhalin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Socio-economic Situation and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Ethnic Composition of the Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Repatriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Interviews with the Post-war Young Generation About their Life, Language Use, and School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Reasons to Stay in Sakhalin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 Language in Family Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Socio-economic Situation, Education, and Language at School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Conclusion of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57 57 57 58 60 60 61 64 65 66 67 67 67 68 69 72 73 73 74

Contents

5

From the End of the 1950s to the End of the 1980s: New Wave of Migration of the Population and the Closure of Korean Schools in Sakhalin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The New Wave of Repatriation to Japan and Departure to the DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Position of Korean in Japan and Korean School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Life After Return to Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Relation with the Korean Community in Japan . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Relation with the Russian Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 The Closure of Korean Schools on Sakhalin and Russification of the Japanese and Korean Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 Change of the Soviet Language Policy and Closure of the Korean Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 Language and Identity of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans After 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Conclusion of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part III 6

xxi

75 75 79 82 82 84 86 86 90 91 92 93 93

Contemporary Repatriation

Contemporary Repatriation to Japan and South Korea: Formation of New Diasporas (New Life as Migrants) . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Life After Returning to Japan and South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Migration and Multicultural Policies in Japan and South Korea . . . 6.2.1 Ethnic Return Migrants as Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Multicultural Policy in Japan and South Korea . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Policy for Returnees from Sakhalin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Language Usage and Identity After the Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Language Usage and Identity After the Return of the First Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 The Language Usage and Identity of Second and Third Generation Returnees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Conclusion of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97 97 97 98 99 101 104 104 106 108 108 109 109

xxii

7

8

Contents

Education, Language, and Identity of the Young Generation of Returnees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Russian Immigration to Japan and Russian Education . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 History of Russian Immigration and Russian Education in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2 Russian Community, Russian School, and NPOs Support in Sapporo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.3 The Ethnic Background of Children at the Russian School in Sapporo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Russian Immigration to Korea and Russian Education . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 Russian Speaking Community and Russian Schools in Ansan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Identity and Language of Young Returnees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Identity and Language of Young Returnees in Sapporo . . . 7.3.2 The Young Generation of Returnees in Ansan . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 In Their Own Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 History Through the Lens of the Human Being, or Man in History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 The Limitation of the Study and Possibility for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Summary: Some Thoughts About Diversity, Identity, and Multiculturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

111 111 111 113 114 117 119 122 122 123 124 126 127 127 128 129 131 132 134 134 135 136

Appendix (Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2

School in Chinnai (Krasnogorsk) 1943. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) (A copy of the photo was obtained from Kabaren (All Japan Federation of Karafuto) for an exhibition at the Sakhalin Regional Museum , where it is currently on deposit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Japanese class in Chinnai 1943. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) (A copy of the photo was obtained from Kabaren (All Japan Federation of Karafuto) for an exhibition at the Sakhalin Regional Museum , where it is currently on deposit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sport festival and military training in Japanese school, Shisuka 1938. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) (A copy of the photo was obtained from Kabaren (All Japan Federation of Karafuto) for an exhibition at the Sakhalin Regional Museum , where it is currently on deposit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Japanese school in 1947. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Korean school in 1947. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Korean teachers training school, 1952. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Place of work after return to Japan. (Photo credit: Gotō Haruki) . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . Russian books and textbooks brought to Japan. (Photo credit: Gotō Haruki) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Korean textbook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

47

50 62 62 65 85 85 89

Student of Saturday School in Sapporo. (Photo credit: Gotō Haruki) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 “Russian Academy” in Ansan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

xxiii

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

Schools and number of students for the 1946–47 academic year (GIASO, F. 54. Op. 1. D. 238. L. 160–161) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

Education level and language of the second generation of returnees (1950s–1960s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

Ethnic background of children at the Russian school in Sapporo .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . Citizenship of children in the “Russian Academy” in Ansan . . . . . Ethnic composition of the families of the “Russian Academy” in Ansan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-identification of children in the “Russian School” in Ansan . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . A chronology of Sakhalin/Karafuto . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . Interview with returnees 1990s used in this book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interview with second generation of returnees return in 1950s–1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethnicity and Identity of Young Returnees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115 121 122 124 137 139 140 140

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Keywords Repatriation · Migration studies · Diaspora studies · Ethnic identity · Identity · Language · School education

1.1

Historical Context

Sakhalin Island is a border territory between Russia and Japan. The island is separated from the continental mainland of Russia’s far east by the Nevelskoy Strait (Tartary Strait) and from Japan’s northernmost island of Hokkaido by the Sōya Strait (La Pérouse Strait). Ainu inhabited Sakhalin in the south, and Nivkhs, Tungus-speaking peoples of the Ulta (Oroks), and Evenks who migrated from the mainland inhabited the north. The island remained in the orbit of Chinese influence for a long time. The people living there paid tribute to China, but the legal status of those lands was not officially fixed. The Japanese and Russians appeared on the island in the seventeenth century. The Russians called the island “Sakhalin,” most likely from the Manchu name of the Amur River, Sagalien Ula, which means “Rocks of the Black River.” This hydronym, printed on the map, was mistakenly attributed to Sakhalin, and later editions of maps used this as the island’s name. The Japanese called the island Karafuto. This name, most likely, is of Ainu origin, “ka-mui-kara-puto-ya-mosir,” which means “land of the god of the river mouth.” From the mid seventeenth century to 1855, Russia and Japan had an informal presence there. On January 26 (February 7), 1855, Russia and Japan signed the Shimoda Treaty, declaring the Kuril Islands to the north of Iturup Island as Russian territory and the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, and the Lesser Kuril Range as Japanese territory. Sakhalin continued to be a joint, indivisible possession of the two countries. From 1855 to 1875, both countries mutually controlled the whole island. After the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, which the Japanese Empire and Russian Empire signed in 1875, Japan ceded to Russia the part of Sakhalin Island it then owned in exchange for the group of the Kuril Islands owned by Russia. Consequently, Sakhalin Island became Russian territory and the entire Kuril archipelago Japanese territory. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3_1

1

2

1

Introduction

In 1857 Russia established a penal colony on Sakhalin. Then, in 1869 the Russian administration attempted to resettle peasants there. Unfortunately, the process of voluntary resettlement was interrupted as soon as it began. This interruption was in coherence with the fact that in 1869 Sakhalin was declared a place of convict labor and exile. Political exile led to the emergence of a Polish ethnic community on the island. Koreans have been arriving on Sakhalin via the Russian route since the 1860s, but their population was very small. After the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), the Sothern part of Sakhalin became a territory of the Japanese Empire. Japan controlled the island below the fiftieth parallel as a settler colony (and from 1943 to 1945 as the prefecture called Karafuto). After the Russian Revolution and subsequent civil war, northern Sakhalin ultimately became governed by the USSR. Briefly, Japan had effective control of the whole island during the occupation of Northern Karafuto from 1920 to 1925. During the Soviet period, Sakhalin was actively settled by migrants from Mainland Russia and other republics of the USSR. In Karafuto active settlement began from the 1920s and the formation of a multiethnic society took place with the migration of Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese to the south of the island. This relocation was voluntary, although carried out by the Japanese government intentionally. In 1938, after the beginning of the Pacific War, the labor mobilization of the Korean population in the Japanese Empire began, including labor in the coal mines of Karafuto. At its peak, the population of Karafuto reached around 400,000 people. The significant difference of Karafuto from other Japanese colonies was that Japanese people in colonies such as Taiwan or Korea, what could be called ‘exploitation and investment-type colonies,’ were primarily white-collar workers. However, Sakhalin was a ‘Japanese settlement colony,’ so Japanese who worked there were engaged in farming, forestry, and fisheries; in other words, they were general laborers (Miki, 2012, pp. 87–89). Therefore, Japanese and Koreans who moved to Sakhalin were usually poor people looking for a better life in a new land. In terms of social class, Japanese and Koreans in Sakhalin were close to each other. Therefore, intermarriage between Koreans and Japanese was easier on socio-economic grounds (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015). After the end of the Second World War in the Far East and the transition of power throughout Sakhalin to the USSR, the island’s ethnic composition had changed. For four years, Japanese, Koreans, and Russians in Sakhalin had been living side by side. However, gradual repatriation (1946–1949) of the Japanese population resulted in an almost complete disappearance of the Japanese in Sakhalin (Nakayama, 2019, p. 224). The exceptions were specialists working in essential industries, prisoners of war, and Japanese who had family ties to the Koreans (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015). The Korean population of Sakhalin, unlike the Japanese, were not able to repatriate. After the war, Japan stopped counting them as its nationals, and the Soviet Union needed working hands. At the same time, the Korean Peninsula was divided into zones of influence, and the Allies were considering the problem of Sakhalin Koreans to be too far from their jurisdiction. The Korean War aggravated the situation, and

1.2

Theoretical Context

3

Sakhalin Koreans could only see their homeland again 50 years later, after the end of the war. At the same time, the Korean diaspora was formed on Sakhalin (Din, 2015a, pp. 180–181). The Korean diaspora had absorbed most of the Japanese community, which happened due to marriages between Japanese and Koreans and the adoption of Japanese children by Korean families. One more significant factor was that after the end of repatriation in 1949, Japanese children began to attend Korean schools. However, after the signing of the “Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956,” Sakhalin Japanese and their Korean family members could leave for Japan. This repatriation occurred between 1957 and 1959. This group of repatriates, led by Park No Hak and Lee Hi Bal, founded the “Association for the Return of Sakhalin Koreans in Japan” and had a significant influence on the repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans (Hyun, 2013, pp. 134–135). In addition, from 1960 to 1970, a small group of Japanese and their Korean families returned to Japan. Contemporary repatriation started in the 1990s. It became possible due to the work of various public organizations in Japan, South Korea, and Russia. This situation sparked a significant shift in political relations between the countries and became a huge event in the lives of ordinary people. However, a long time spent in another country often results in repatriates becoming immigrants in their historic homeland. In contemporary historiography, researchers commonly use the name Karafuto when referring to the Japanese period of rule in South Sakhalin. In this book, I use the name Sakhalin when referring to the entire island and Karafuto when referring to its southern part during Japanese rule.

1.2

Theoretical Context

This book is devoted to several issues related to migration, diaspora studies, language, identity, and education. First, it focuses on the migration process between Japan, Russia, and the Korean Peninsula. It provides a detailed analysis of life, language use, and school education issues, and the formation of the identity of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans.

1.2.1

Immigration, Repatriation, and Migration Studies

Literally, immigration means migration from one country to another for permanent residence. The movement of large numbers of people has occurred since ancient times and played a considerable role in shaping the demographic composition of the world’s population. Overall, pre-modern empires were comfortable with the movement of people. The concept of immigration was born with the emergence of the

4

1 Introduction

nation-state, which necessitated monitoring citizens’ rights and duties (Richard, 2002, p. 1). Industrialization and the substantial labor movements it generated led to the development of mechanisms to control immigrant and emigrant populations. After the Second World War, in many countries, it became necessary to attract workers from abroad. An increase in migrant populations solved labor shortages. However, immigrants often faced risks due to their weak legal and labor market positions, limited social rights, discrimination, and cultural and linguistic differences. It was then that the first programs of adaptation to the host society began to appear. Primarily it included programs for study of the country’s official language. At first, such programs were only for adults, but then they also appeared for children. In some countries, such as Australia, this was the first step towards multiculturalism (Lo Bianco, 2016, p. 17). Since migration was mainly associated with economic processes; for an extended period when researchers talked about immigrants, they essentially meant economic migration, i.e., researchers understood migrants as people who moved to other countries for specific financial purposes. In today’s world, there are many new forms of economic immigration, such as the “pendulum” immigration of workers in which workers regularly move backwards and forwards between two places. Changes in the forms of migration have led to the need to expand the scope of migration studies. The category of migrants began to include political migrants and refugees. Moreover, they began to be studied as a historical or political phenomenon and in terms of their experience of living in a new society. After the Second World War, Japan took an approach that differed from other countries. In 1952 the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act prohibited laborers coming from abroad. For a long time, Japan did not accept economic immigrants. Labor shortages were solved by foreign direct investment in Asia and the modernization of industrial processes within Japan. During the early 1990s, however, the Asian economic crisis and demographic crisis in Japan made attracting labor from abroad necessary. According to Peach (2003), another factor was higher educational levels of Japanese youth, who did not want to do dirty, difficult, and dangerous work (Peach, 2003, p. 21). In many countries in the west, immigrants’ rights, including language rights, have been widely discussed. Japan has begun to open its doors to immigration but is doing so very carefully by officially saying that there is no immigration in the country. To avoid linguistic problems and issues of cultural adaptation, Japan changed the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act to allow the entry of the descendants of Japanese emigrés from different countries to work in the Japanese economy. This policy change led to a large influx of people of Japanese heritage from Latin America. Japanese descendants from Latin America may have Japanese names and faces, but most do not speak Japanese, and they have a completely different cultural background. Inherently, they are immigrants or, using the terminology of Tsuda Takeyuki (2009), ethnic return migrants (Tsuda, 2009, p. 1). However, the absence of economic migration does not mean there was no population migration between Japan and other countries. These were mainly returnees.

1.2

Theoretical Context

5

Can we also view returnees as migrants? Repatriation is a complex phenomenon with one of the critical parts being the migration of the population. In this book, I use the term migration in the broad sense of this word. First, migration was a process that took place within the Japanese empire. This process also influenced post-war repatriation or return migration. The nature of the pre-war movement of the population greatly depended on whether migration was voluntary, encouraged, organized, or forced. However, sometimes, such distinctions may not be easy to make. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki (2010) argues, “Coercion comes in many forms and degrees, and a wide range of pressures and attractions provide the motive force behind migrations” (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p. 38). For example, to support the development of Manmo (territories including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and North China), Japan organized a campaign for farmworkers. Then Japanese women Tairiku no hanayome were sent to the continent. These women were ethnic Japanese, but some of them could not return to Japan after the war. Women who married Chinese (zanryū fūjin) and Japanese orphans adopted by Chinese families (zanryū koji) were forced to live in China for several decades and essentially became “Chinese” having been abandoned by their homeland (Zhang, 2011, pp. 41–42). In the context of migration between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, following Japan’s annexation of the peninsula in 1910, we can see multiple forms of migration. After Japan annexed the Korean peninsula, many Koreans moved to Japan as laborers. They had various experiences, ranging from the achievement of relatively high status by voluntary migration to the brutalities suffered by migrants within the forced labor system that peaked during the war. In search of a better life or by the state’s decision, they moved not only to Japan proper but also to Karafuto and Manchuria. Intermarriage between Japanese women and Korean men before, during, and after the war was not unusual, and particularly was common in Japan proper and Karafuto. After the war, Japanese women were forced to live in South Korea. This included women who married Koreans in Korea before the war and those in Japan who had to returned to Korea with their husbands (Morita, 1964, p. 819). In the case of Karafuto (Sakhalin), immediately after the war, Japanese wives of Korean husbands could not repatriate with their families. They received this opportunity only after the signing of the Soviet Japanese Joint Declaration in 1956. It becomes evident that there is a sliding scale of grey between “voluntary” and “forced” migration rather than a neat distinction between these categories. As with migration, we can apply the categories of voluntary encouraged and forced repatriation or return migration. According to Tsuda (2009), return migration is the return of diasporic people to the country of their ethnic origin. He argues that these people include the first-generation diasporic peoples who move back to their homeland. Another type of ethnic return migration refers to later-generation descendants of diasporic peoples who “return” to their countries of ancestral origin after living outside their ethnic homelands for generations (Tsuda, 2009, p. 1). Although Tsuda’s case study covers Japanese Brazilians who returned to Japan as economic migrants from the 1980s, former Japanese colonies are an ideal case study for examining these different forms of return migration. Tsuji Teruyuki argues that to

6

1 Introduction

understand the specificity and diversity of post-war repatriates deeply, we should apply the concept of return migration to them (Tsuji, 2013, p. 375). In migration studies in Japan, one can also see changes in recent times. In the early 2000s the main topic was the Japanese who left for Latin America and their descendants who returned to their historical homeland. In recent years, the scope of migration research has expanded, including the problems of post-colonial migrations (Araragi, 2013). Also, one must be mindful of the experiences of migrants without migration (Brubaker, 2005, p. 3). As Nakayama Taishō argues, “For the people of Karafuto at the end of the war, it was as if they had crossed a border. They had stayed still, but the border had passed beneath their feet” (Nakayama, 2015, p. 19). At the same time, Nakayama says that “The criteria for left-behind Japanese (zanryūsha) is limited to the presence or absence of residual experience and does not include those born after the end of the repatriation of 1949, and the criteria for Japanese is family register, not ethnicity. Furthermore, the remaining Japanese are not overseas ethnic groups or diasporas. This distinction is because it is a one-generation existence with no support for regeneration. As an entity, there was almost no collectiveness during the Cold War. In other words, the residual Japanese are nothing more than a research idea set” (Nakayama, 2020, p. 25). However, if you classify zanryūsha as migrants, along with the unconditional differences of the experiences of generations, we can see migrants of both the first and subsequent generations, including generation 1.5 (Rambaut, 2004, p. 1167). For Rambaut, the classic 1.5 generation comprises pre-adolescent, primary-school-age children who have learned (or began to learn) to read and write in their mother tongue at schools abroad but have completed their education mainly in the host country. The country of residence, culture, and the primary language of communication and education for the children changed around zanryūsha. Thus, we can say that according to their living conditions, left-behind people or zanryūsha are also a type of migrant. To summarize, I can say that after the Second World War, border shifts precipitated an exodus of former settlers going back to their historical homeland. Still, in this environment, new migrants and diasporas of left-behind people were also born.

1.2.2

Diaspora Studies

Contemporary societies are far from social and ethnocultural homogeneity. Many of them include local communities of ethnically distinctive peoples, often for a very long period, which are to some extent aware of their internal similarities and differences in cultural practices, religious beliefs, and sometimes in anthropological phenotype and language from the surrounding majority. Often, such communities have their own specific internal social organisation allowing them to maintain their own identity and, at the same time, continue, to some extent, successful interaction with the surrounding society. Such ethnocultural communities that reside outside the habitat of their home society are often called diasporas.

1.2

Theoretical Context

7

The meaning of diaspora is “scattering” or “spreading,” this is a word of Greek origin, initially used in a unique sense to name the Jews who were forced to settle outside the Kingdom of Judah after the destruction of Jerusalem in the sixth century BC by Nebuchadnezzar, and then later, as a result of the Roman conquest. Diasporas turned out to be the product of mass or individual, voluntary or forced migrations at different times, which is especially characteristic of the last 150 years. By the end of the twentieth century, about 125 million people lived outside their states. This number increases yearly by an average of two to four million. Today the term diaspora is quite widespread and means “an ethnos or part of an ethnos living outside their historical homeland or the territory of the ethnic massif, retaining the idea of the unity of origin and not wanting to lose stable group characteristics that noticeably distinguish them from the rest of the population of the host country, . . . obeying the order adopted in it.” When we talk today about the problems of ethnic communities in each region, we are also primarily talking about ethnic groups that can be characterized as diasporas.(Valdman & Paichadze, 2019, p. 224). Due to the peculiarities of their history, diasporas have accumulated a tremendous adaptive experience, including that of preserving their own identity in the face of competition with a different ethnic environment. Within them, the process of intercultural interaction is incredibly intense. Diasporas sometimes have a more pronounced ethnic identity, especially when faced with cultural misunderstanding and manifestations of practical discrimination. The diaspora itself is created and maintained as a kind of integrity precisely through exceptional symbolic communication, the essential element of which is self-knowledge. However, as Roger Brubaker argues, the recent term “diaspora” has been used in various branches of science and within multiple senses of the word. He insists that a diaspora should have the following three characteristics: Notwithstanding the dispersion in semantic and conceptual space, one can identify three core elements that remain widely understood as constitutive of diaspora. The first is dispersion in space; the second is the orientation to a ‘homeland’, and the third is boundary maintenance. Some subset or combination of these, variously weighted, underlies most definitions and discussions of the phenomenon. Considering the changing significance accorded to these elements, and the various ways in which they have been interpreted provides leverage for a more analytical appraisal of the ‘diaspora’ (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5).

From these three points, can we say that the Koreans and Japanese of Sakhalin are a diaspora? There is debate about Sakhalin Koreans between leading researchers. In their research, Anatoly Kuzin and Bok Zi Kou emphasize that the Koreans of Sakhalin are not a diaspora. They use the term Korean ethnic community. Park Seung Ui does not define it but uses the word diaspora in his book. Yulia Din, analyzing various theories of diasporas, says that Sakhalin Koreans are a diaspora since they belong to a specific ethnic group and have the numbers necessary to reproduce the cultural and behavioral aspects that separate them from other groups and orient them to their homeland (Din, 2015b, pp. 228–233). About the Japanese population remaining on Sakhalin, Nakayama (2019) says that the Japanese of Sakhalin did not form a “Japanese diaspora.” Reasons for this include their small number, geographical dispersion, and the fact that the Japanese

8

1 Introduction

belonged to families where the heads were Koreans. In belonging to Korean families, we can say that the Japanese were included in the Korean diaspora (Nakayama, 2019, p. 222). Of course, compared with the Koreans left behind on Sakhalin, the Japanese community was small and, if not absorbed, then strongly influenced by the Korean diaspora. This situation is mainly due to the gender factor as many women who remained on Sakhalin married Korean men. However, at the same time, as we can see from interviews, the Japanese knew about each other one way or another. Not everybody hid that they were Japanese. In the Soviet Union, domestic passport (sort of ID card), citizenship and ethnicity were listed separately. Many Japanese wrote their ethnicity as “Japanese.” In addition, they always had a desire to repatriate, and the image of their homeland was always present. That is to say, they were “home-oriented.” Therefore, when in the late 1980s the movement for repatriation arose, they quickly found each other and created an “Association of Japanese on Sakhalin.” In this book, I define the Koreans of Sakhalin as a diaspora, as many of them are “forced or otherwise traumatic dispersed” (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5) due to their forced resettlement to Sakhalin by the Japanese Empire. Also, they are “ethnic communities divided by state frontiers” and “that segment of a people living outside the homeland” (King & Melvin, 1999) due to post-war redistribution of borders and the Cold War. They are oriented to a “real or imagined ‘homeland’ as an authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty” (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). And one way or another, they maintained the boundary, “involving the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-a`vis a host society” (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). About the Japanese, since they could not wholly distance themselves from the Koreans after the war and were included in the Korean diaspora, I can say that they are an ethnic group with some diaspora characteristics (although Brubaker asks not to make adjectives from the word diaspora). However, because “Karafuto had always been a borderland, a meetings place of people” (Morris-Suzuki, 2001, p. 658), complete “diasporization” is not possible there. Almost all groups have multilayered identity.

1.2.3

Ethnic Identity

The formation and development of each ethnic community occurred through many complementary mechanisms, among which, perhaps, the leading role is played by ethnic self-awareness or ethnic identity. In the collective and individual consciousness, the community stands out from its environment, finds its place among other groups, and legitimizes its priorities and qualitative uniqueness. All this in a concentrated form finds its expression in a particular ethnocultural identity, the preservation of which becomes an essential condition for the continued existence of an ethnic community. Many kinds of research discuss identity. For example, Jan Blommaert (2005, p. 203) defines identity as “Who are you and what are you?” James Gee (2000, p. 1)

1.2

Theoretical Context

9

also says that identity primarily defines “Who am I?” Bonny Norton (2000) defines identity as a demonstration of human understanding of the world. Some researchers emphasize the multilayered character of identity (Leontovich, 2017). Sakhalin Japanese and Korean have a complex Japanese Korean Russian identity and speak more than one language. Igor Saveliev (2015), using the terminology of Hall (1993), defines Sakhalin Korean identity as “fragmentation of identity.” He argues that “the case of Sakhalin Koreans serves as evidence that the subject, previously experienced as having a unified and stable identity, is becoming fragmented; composed, not of a single, but several, sometimes contradictory or unresolved identities” (Saveliev, 2015, p. 176). In “The Making and Unmaking of Karafuto Identity,” Tessa Morris-Suzuki analyses the identity of colonial settlers in Karafuto by examining a film, Northern Lights (Hokkyoku ko), and a short story entitled ‘Chōsen Yaki.’ Morris-Suzuki uses the story in comparison with the film to demonstrate the nature of the convoluted identities of the people in Karafuto in conflicting narratives of homeland, nation, and progress. I agree that Sakhalin identity has been subject to various influences (Russification, Japanization, Sovietization, and Koreanization of the Sakhalin Japanese, etc.), but its core elements such as “borderland/ meeting place of people,” which Morris-Suzuki refers to as a pre-colonization one, has always remained the basis of Sakhalin identity and what is more, when Sakhalinians are moving to Japan or South Korea, they bring this identity and pattern of behavior with them. In this book, I will focus primarily on ethnic identity. I define ethnic identity as a type of social identity in which a person becomes aware of belonging to an ethnic community. Ethnic identity, like any other, is a complex construct formed from various components: cultural, communicative, emotional, etc. I argue that ethnic identity can be multi-component or multilayered, and a person with such identity can switch from one component to another in a particular situation. Multilayered identity is not always unstable and contradictory. The presence or absence of traumatic experiences, such as discrimination based on ethnicity, can lead to suppression (concealment) of specific components of ethnic identity. For the first generation of immigrants or colonized people, forming a multilayered identity is usually more traumatic than for other generations. Many ideological attitudes they face provoke discrimination and incite traumatic experiences. Some examples include the Japanization of Koreans in the colonial period, the Koreanization of the Japanese and simultaneous Sovietization of the population left behind after the war, Russification after 1963, and the need to live within a state that postulates itself as mono-national after moving to their historical homeland. For Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, creation of their identity depended on many things: the period of moving to Sakhalin or return to their historical homeland, their age at the time of the move, experience in the community and society, etc. The identities of first-generation Japanese and Koreans in Karafuto were created under circumstances that differed from those on the Korean peninsula or in Japan proper under the rule of the Japanese Empire. Intercommunication between the Japanese and Koreans was influenced by the changing “borderlines” of Sakhalin, the fate of migrants, and closer socio-economic grounds in the “Japanese settlement

10

1 Introduction

colony.” For example, there were many more Japanese Korean intermarriages in Sakhalin than in Japan proper or on the Korean Peninsula. After the Second World War, the impossibility of repatriation and the long residence among Russians and other nationalities on Sakhalin also influenced the culture and identity of Sakhalin Koreans and Japanese. The influence of the Russian language and culture became especially strong after the closure of Korean schools in 1963. Then, having such a multilayered identity, they moved to their historical homeland through repatriation policies organized within a framework rooted in the nation-state and life in Japanese or South Korean host societies. After returning to their historical homelands, Japanese, Korean, and Russian cultural elements continued to be present in their everyday lives. Here, on the one hand, there is a revival of parts of the identity that have been forgotten. On the other, there is an awareness of one’s otherness and transethnicity. Thus, for more than a 100 years, Japanese and Koreans of Sakhalin grew up and lived in a multicultural and multilingual environment. Moreover, this environment was not constant. The dominant language and culture changed several times. In this book, using the example of Japanese and Koreans from Sakhalin, I will consider what factors influenced the formation of their multilayered identity. Specifically, I will focus on the awareness of ethnic origin, the influence of families and school education, and the use of language.

1.2.4

Identity and Language

One of the crucial topics of migrant and diaspora research is children’s language use and learning. Language is an important component of identity. It is a tool to connect to the community to which we belong and receive information about cultural components. Language teaching is a critical task for any ethnic community. However, the loss of language does not always lead to the loss of ethnic identity. Kawakami Ikuo (2013) argues that children’s language awareness and identity formation develop in interaction with others and social relationships with their families. Kawakami defines the “process of becoming themself” as building oneself in social relations with “others.” According to Kawakami, both monolingual and bilingual children have the same “process of becoming themselves.” They are both conscious of others and themselves in the expansion of the “spatial axis” and “time axis,” but bilinguals add a “language axis” to this process. In other words, “Through multiple languages that can be seen on the language axis, they will form themselves by being conscious of others and being conscious of themselves” (Kawakami, 2013, p. 32). Kawakami’s concept that children form their identities by gaining experience in “interaction with others” and “connections with others” is consistent with this study. However, I argue that there are no language-based differences between monolingual and bilingual children. Even for monolingual children, the language axis is vital for the following reasons. Any child can move between social institutions such as homes, schools,

1.2

Theoretical Context

11

and extracurricular activities and connect with others to become socialized and grow their self-identity. To communicate with others, we need “symbols” that both “I” and “others” can understand. Various communication symbols exist in human society, but according to Mikhail Bakhtin, words play a significant role in social communication (Voloshinov, 1986, pp. 11–13). Especially for children, as Lev Vigotsky states, they acquire communication symbols in social interaction (Vygotsky, 2006, pp. 110–111). In this respect, monolingual and bilingual children are similar. However, for monolinguals, the primary communication symbols are the same language, even if there are differences in communication styles within each social system. On the other hand, for bilingual or multilingual children, each social institution, such as home, school and so on, in which children are participating, has different languages and cultural environments. For this reason, one will learn ethnic values, customs, traditions, etc., that differ within each environment, and the exchanges there are done with different “symbols.” This situation means that children usually need to learn more than one language. However, if the same language can convey different ethnic values, there is less need to learn a new language. Some migrants experience an almost complete disappearance of one of their languages from communication and school education which can last for decades. However, they still maintain a strong ethnic identity regardless. In the case of Sakhalin repatriates, for example, when they move to Japan, the Korean language is hardly used, although Korean words remain to denote cultural realities, but many Korean traditions are transmitted to the younger generation in Russian. However, Korean identity is strong among all generations of returnees. After returning to their historical homelands, Japanese, Korean, and Russian cultural elements continue to be present in their everyday lives. This book will discuss such characteristics of Sakhalin returnees who have a Japanese, Korean, and Russian triple identity.

1.2.5

School Education and Language

School education was critical in consolidating and extending multilayered identities and language abilities for the Japanese and Koreans in Sakhalin. School has always played a significant role in the general and language socialization of children. Schools disseminate norms, customs, and ideologies, providing individuals with the skills and habits necessary for participating within their societies. Before the Second World War, Japanese and Korean children went to Japanese schools and studied the Japanese language. Japanese and Koreans born in the 1930s and early 1940s first attended Japanese schools, so they could speak both Korean and Japanese. Those who were born in the 1940s started their studies at Japanese schools. However, in 1949 after the repatriation of the central part of the Japanese population these schools were closed. In their place, Russian and Korean schools were opened. Korean children and many children from Japanese-Korean families

12

1 Introduction

went to Korean schools. The erosion of the Korean community would have been more substantial, and therefore its impact on the Japanese minority would have been weaker if only Russian schools had been available. However, Korean schools opened, and the Japanese children adopted by Koreans attended them too. They started to learn or improve their Korean, and using their Korean names became useful. For Japanese who were born in the 1940s, the Korean language prevails. After the war, these people had to live among Russians and other nationalities of the USSR, so they also spoke Russian. Primarily, children from Korean families and Japanese children adopted by Koreans studied at Korean schools (until 1963), and they are bilingual or trilingual. However, children from Japanese, Japanese-Russian, and Korean-Russian families studied at Russian schools. Their primary language was Russian, as the language of school education, but their parents used Korean or Japanese for communication in the family. Japanese or Korean was a passive language for this category of left-behind people, but it proved easy for them to learn after they moved to Japan or South Korea. After the closure of Korean schools in 1963, all children began to study at Russian schools, and gradually the Korean and Japanese languages were lost. Ethnic Korean and Japanese born in the 1960s and 1970s (second and third generation) are Russian native speakers. Some of them have a passive knowledge of Korean. After repatriation or return migration to Japan or South Korea, all generations must use Japanese or Korean languages. In my observation, many returnees continue to use all languages, and often their ethnicity and place of repatriation do not correspond to their primary language. For example, Koreans use Japanese in Ansan (South Korea) or Japanese use Korean in Sapporo (Japan). The youngest generation is children who were born in Russia and were Russian monolingual. After they moved with their parents to Japan or South Korea, they had to go to Japanese or South Korean schools, and many of them studied in Russian Saturday school or received Russian education in other forms. Between them, we can see Russian and Japanese or Russian and Korean bilinguals.

1.3

Method of Research and Book Structure

This book uses a cross-disciplinary approach based on the analysis of governmental and regional documents. It analyzes the language and education policy and formation of schools in the Japanese Empire, Soviet Union, Japan, and South Korea. At the same time, this book is based on participant observation and extensive interviews with different generations of Sakhalin returnees and those left behind in Japan, South Korea, and Russia. In 2006, I started working with children of returnees at the Russian Saturday School in Sapporo and then in 2008 at the CaSA (Child-assist Sapporo Association). The Russian school is a volunteer organization and is open to all who share the school’s two-fold mission: to preserve Russian language skills and culture and educate a younger generation of Russian and Japanese bilinguals. CaSA is an organization that supports children of foreigners in Japan and the development

1.3

Method of Research and Book Structure

13

of international education. Most of my data is from my work experience at this school and this organization. By working with these children and meeting their parents and grandparents, I have come to understand this group’s social and linguistic characteristics and the value of their historical experience. Later, from 2013 to 2015, together with Hyun Mooam and Gotō Haruki, we collected the life stories of ten Japanese-Korean families, which have been published in Japanese (2016), and Korean (2019) (Hyun & Paichadze 2016). Also, from 2018 to 2019, I visited two recently opened Russian schools in Ansan, talked with teachers and parents, and did a questionnaire with children. A distinctive feature of Ansan schools is that almost all students are ethnic Koreans by origin. There were both groups of ethnic Koreans in Ansan: Koryo-saram1 and Koreans from Sakhalin. The research in Ansan was only recently started, so I do not have as much data about the young generation there as I do in Sapporo. Based on participant observation and extensive interviews with different generations of Sakhalin returnees, this book explores language, identity, adaptation to host societies, and educational issues of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans in various historical periods and geographical points. The book is divided into three parts with two chapters each. The first part of the book provides a historical overview of pre-war Sakhalin and Karafuto, relating to the opening of schools and language policy development in both parts of the island: North Sakhalin and Karafuto. In chapters three and four of the second part of the book, I discuss the situation in Sakhalin from the Second World War to the 1980s and in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. In chapter five of the last part of the book, I analyze the life of each generation of ethnic return migrants in their respective host societies. Finally, in chapter six, I focus on the background of ethnic return migrants from the perspective of the young generation of returnees and clarify their education issues, language, and identity. This book attempts to explore the history of Sakhalin/Karafuto and migration processes between Russia, Japan, and the states in the Korean peninsula. In the book, I will try to re-examine the historical processes in this region through the lens of mesohistory (formation of the school system) and microhistory (stories of ordinary people living in the area). I argue that from the time they moved to Karafuto until today, the Japanese and Koreans of Karafuto/Sakhalin are still migrants. During the Cold War, there was “diasporization” due to the lack of freedom of movement between USSR, Japan, and countries in the Korean peninsula. However, because of the special conditions of Sakhalin, both ethnic groups have a multilayered identity. Through the Japanese and Koreans of Karafuto, I try to show, that identity is not a constant; it is in the process of change, and it can be multilayered. Such identity does not always have to be fragmented or contradictory. The combination of the different components of identity can be harmonious. Language is an essential 1

Koryo-saram or Koryoin is another branch of the Russian Korean diaspora. They migrated from the north of the Korean peninsula to the Russian Far East between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century. In 1937 the Soviet government deported them as “politically unreliable Korean population” from the border with the Japanese Empire to the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan

14

1

Introduction

part of identity, but it does not always play a decisive role in its formation. Language can match the identity, or it can be used only as a means of communication or in education. The relationship between language and identity can take various forms that are shaped by multiple factors. The main objective of multicultural policies is to guarantee the rights to choose who one wants to be, to move freely between different positions (layers of identity), and to select the language of communication and learning.

References Araragi, S. (Ed.). (2013). Teikoku-igo no hito no idō – posutokoroniarizumu to gurōbarizumu no kōsaku-ten. Benseishuppan. Blommaert, J. (2005). Discourse: A critical introduction. Cambridge University Press. Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), 1–19. Din, Y. (2015a). Dreams of returning to the homeland. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 177–194). Routledge. Din, Y. (2015b). Koreyskaya diaspora Sakhalina: problema repatriatsii i integratsiya v sovetskoye i rossiyskoye obshchestvo. Ministerstvo kul'tury Sakhalinskoy oblasti. Gee, J. P. (2000). Identity as an analytic lens for research of education. Review of Research in Education, 25, 99–125. Hyun, M. (2013). Korian nettowāku: media, idō no rekishi to kūkan. Hokkaidō Daigaku Shuppankai. Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2015). Multi-layered identities of returnees in their ‘historical homeland’: Returnees from Sakhalin. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 195–211). Routledge. Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2016). Saharin zanryū: nikkanro hyaku nen ni wataru kazoku no monogatari. Kōbunken. Kawakami, I. (2013). “Idō suru kodomo” gaku e muketa shiza: Imin no kodomo wa dono yōni katarareta ka. In I. Kawakami (Ed.), Idō suru kodomo to iu kioku to chikara (pp. 1–42). Kuroshio shuppan. King, C., & Melvin, N. (1999). ‘Diaspora politics’. International Security, 24(3), 108–138. Leontovich, O. A. (2017). A Mirror in which everyone displays their image: Identity construction in discourse. Russian Journal of Linguistics, 21(1), 247–259. Lo Bianco, J. (2016). Multicultural education in the Australian context: An historical overview. In J. L. Bianco & A. Bal (Eds.), Learning from difference: Comparative accounts of multicultural education (pp. 15–33). Springer. Miki, M. (2012). Ijū-gata shokuminchi Karafuto no keisei. Hanawa shobō. Morita, Y. (1964). Chōsen shūsen no kiroku: Beiso ryōgun no shinchū to nihonjin no hikiage. Gannandō. Morris-Suzuki, T. (2001). Northern lights: The making and unmaking of Karafuto identity. The Journal of Asian Studies, 60(3), 645–671. Morris-Suzuki, T. (2010). Borderline Japan: Foreigners and frontier controls in the postwar era. Cambridge University Press. Nakayama, T. (2015). Japanese society on Karafuto. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 19–41). Routledge. Nakayama, T. (2019). Yapontsy na Sakhaline: formirovaniye i raspad yaponskogo soobshchestva pereselentsev na Karafuto. In S. S. Paichadze & I. A. Valdman (Eds.), Rossiya i strany ATR: migratsionnyye protsessy i problemy mezhkul’turnoy kommunikatsii. Aziya v Rossii (pp. 201–224). Novosibirsk.

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Nakayama, T. (2020). Gendai higashiajia ni oite toransunashonaru wo tou koto no igi. Imin kenkyū nenpō, 26, 19–27. Norton, B. (2000). Identity and language learning: Gender, ethnicity and educational change. Person Education. Peach, C. (2003). Nihon, yōroppa, kita amerika keizai seichō-ki to imin seisaku ni kansuru hikaku. In N. Iwasaki et al. (Eds.), Kaigai ni okeru nihonjin, Nihon no naka no gaikokujin. Kyoto. Rambaut, R. (2004). Ages, life stages, and generational cohorts: Decomposing the immigrant first and second generations in the United States. The International Migration Review, 38, 1160–1205. Richard, G. (2002). Introduction. In G. Richard (Ed.), Imin no ichimannen shi: jinkō idō, harukanaru minzoku no tabi. Tōkyō. Saveliev, I. (2015). Trapped in the contested borderland: Sakhalin Koreans, wartime displacement and identity. In C. de Matos & M. Caprio (Eds.), Japan as the occupier and the occupied. Palgrave Macmillan. Tsuda, T. (2009). Introduction. In T. Tsuda (Ed.), Diasporic homecomings, ethnic return migration in comparative perspective. Stanford University Press. Tsuji, T. (2013). Sengo hikiage to iu ‘hōhō’: kikan imin kenkyū e no shiza. In T. Shimamura (Ed.), Hikiagesha no sengo: sensō ga umidasu shakai (Vol. II). Tōkyō. Valdman, I., & Paichadze, S. (2019). Diaspory, deportatsii i repatriatsii v geopolitike i obshchestvennom soznanii sovremennogo obshchestva. In S. S. Paichadze & I. A. Valdman (Eds.), Rossiya i strany ATR: migratsionnyye protsessy i problemy mezhkul’turnoy kommunikatsii. Aziya v Rossii (pp. 420–432). Novosibirsk. Voloshinov, V. N. (1986). Marxism and the philosophy of language. Harvard University Press. Vygotsky, L. (2006). Kigō toshite no bunka – hattatsu shinri-gaku to geijutsu shinri-gaku (sōsho nijusseiki Roshia bunka-shi saikō). Suiseisha. Zhang, L. (2011). Chūgoku zanryū koji no shakaigaku: Nihon to Chūgoku wo ikiru sansedai no raifusutōrī. Seiyusha.

Part I

From the Joint Control to the Border on the Island

Chapter 2

Sakhalin Under Control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union

Keywords Redistribution of borders · Secure the population on the island · Penal colony · Russo-Japanese war · First schools · Russian Revolution and Civil war · Soviet ethnic policy · Schools for minorities

2.1

From Joint to Russian Control

This book focuses on the Japanese and Korean populations of Southern Sakhalin (Karafuto). However, to understand the interaction between these ethnic groups in post-war Sakhalin and the formation of their multilayered identity, it is necessary to consider the island’s history as a whole. I will do this through the prism of studying migration processes and the organization of education. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues: “movements across the areas which were to be divided by the modern borders between Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan and Russia had continued for centuries before the borders themselves were drawn” (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p. 4–5). The redistribution of borders in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which was intensified by internal political changes of each state, resulted in both voluntary and forced migration of the population to neighboring regions. However, such distinctions were often not easy to make: “Coercion comes in many forms and degrees, and a wide range of pressures and attractions provide the motive force behind migrations” (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p. 33). Migration, in its turn, led to the formation of ethnic communities and diasporas in the territories of neighbouring countries and these processes continue today. Furthermore, the diasporas formed at that time are returning to metropole in one form or another. For Russia and Japan, the development of Sakhalin had both a geostrategic (securing land for themselves, possibly more for Russia than Japan) and an economic nature (perhaps more for Japan). Each country not only organized migration, but one of the main tasks for both countries was to secure the population on the island and create its “own people.” School is a place where children’s identification is forming. The establishment of schools in Sakhalin was one of the ways to create local people and reduce the outflow of the population from the island. Therefore, both the Russian and Japanese © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3_2

19

20

2 Sakhalin Under Control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union

sides attached great importance to the management of schools on Sakhalin/ Karafuto. Schools were opened within a specific state ideology framework and were supposed to guide such ideology. In the first and second chapters of this book, I will look at migration processes to Sakhalin/ Karafuto and the organization of schools on both sides of the island. As I wrote, from 1855 to 1875 Japan and Russia jointly managed Sakhalin. The main Japanese population was made up of fishermen, many of whom migrated back and forth between Hokkaido and Sakhalin. In 1869 the Russian administration attempted to resettle peasants on Sakhalin. Unfortunately, this step failed. The process of voluntary resettlement was interrupted as soon as it began. This experience coincides with the fact that in 1869 Sakhalin was declared a place of convict labor and exile.

2.2 2.2.1

From St. Petersburg Treaty to the Russo-Japanese War Movement of the Population and Ethnic Composition of the Island

In 1875 the Treaty of St Petersburg was signed. Russia allowed the ethnic Japanese population to stay. However, the consequences of the treaty were particularly severe for Karafuto Ainu, who were forced to choose between Japanese or Russian nationality; those Ainu who decided to be Japanese were forcibly relocated to Hokkaido (Seaton, 2015, p. 127). It can be assumed that the colonial policy in Hokkaido influenced the relocation of Karafuto Ainu. In Hokkaido, the policy of Ainu assimilation implemented from the Meiji Period (1868–1912) was vital to Japan’s territorial claims over their lands. In other words, assimilating the Ainu and making them Japanese was effectively a way for the Japanese state to claim Ainu lands as part of Japan. The Russian Empire policy toward the indigenous peoples was different to Japanese policy. It was contradictory. On the one hand, there was a decree of Peter I, “Edict of the Daurian and Nerchinskie voivods,” which forbade forced baptism, the sale of alcoholic beverages, and trade for personal enrichment and enslavement of the local population. The general trend of official policy was to interfere as little as possible in the affairs of “foreigners” (inorodtsy) and to manage them based on customary law. On the other hand, the existence of this decree indicates that people on the ground acted differently. In addition, beginning in the late eighteenth century, the ideas of the Enlightenment started to influence attitudes toward indigenous peoples, and Russia was no exception. The concept of the need for progress and development to be carried by the natives became part of Tsarist and then Soviet policy towards indigenous peoples. On Sakhalin, even without a decisive government intervention into the lives of the indigenous people, the Russian influence on the Gilyaks (Nivkhs), who shared a neighborhood with convict labor, was to

2.2

From St. Petersburg Treaty to the Russo-Japanese War

21

hire them as warders and force them to look for fugitive convicts, i.e. Russification was happening in its worst form. Russian writer Anton Chekhov,1 during his journey, said that he does not think it is necessary to russify the Gilyaks, but if it cannot be avoided, it should be done on the basis of their needs, admitting them to hospital for treatment etc. (Chekhov, 2009, pp. 196–197). Settlement of Sakhalin by Russian people began in the 1850s. This settlement was due to the geostrategic political considerations of the Russian government. In the late 1860s, the Far Eastern administration attempted to organize the free settlement on the island. A group of immigrant peasants who expressed a desire to move permanently to the Amur were invited to Sakhalin. However, the Russian Empire administration lost interest in free colonization of the island even before the experiment began. As a result, the settlers who were brought to South Sakhalin in the fall of 1860 were immediately left to their own devices. As noted above, in 1869, convict labor became the primary means of settling in Sakhalin (Vysokov, 2003, pp. 28–29). The exile population in Sakhalin varied from one or two thousand in 1875 to somewhere over 20,000 in 1904 (Stephan, 1971, p. 68). During the period of Sakhalin penal servitude, 30,000 to 40,000 people were exiled on the island. It was mainly criminals who were sentenced to convict labor and exile in Sakhalin. Politically involved people, although few and sporadic, also relocated there (the envy of the period, about 60 people) (Vysokov, 2003, pp. 28–29). Exiles fell into three general classes: convict labor convicts, convict settlers, and peasants who were formerly exiled (Stephan, 1971, p. 68). An All-Russian Population Census taken in January 1897 showed that there were 28,113 people in 5500 households on Sakhalin, 74.4% of which were those who had been exiled. The census data showed a significant predominance of Slavs in the national structure of society on Sakhalin. Russians on Sakhalin at this time numbered 18,316 or 65.2%, local aborigines were 4304 or 15.3% of population of the island. However, it should be mentioned that in this period the ethnonym Russian was not limited to Russians proper but also to those Slavs who professed Orthodoxy. Therefore, Ukrainians and Belarusians were quite often recorded as Russians. The number of Nivkhs who lived on the shore of the Tatar Strait was 1969. The number of Ainu who occupied the southern third of the island was 1443. Oroks and Evenks, who were registered as Tunguska people, were 892, Japanese were 224, Chinese were 143, and Koreans, who lived in the southern part of the island, were 64. Among non-orthodox Slavic nationalities, Poles were first, accounting for 1669 people (5.9%). Tatars were also numerous (1515), followed by Germans (271), Armenians (162), Georgians (146), Latvians (133), and Jews (32). There were 37 females for every 100 men which demonstrates the disproportionate gender ratio of the population (Sheglov, 2019, p. 46). 1

Anton Pavlovich Chekhov (1860–1904), famous Russian playwright and short-story writer. In 1890, Chekhov undertook a journey by train, horse-drawn carriage, and river steamer to the Russian Far East and the katorga, or penal colony, on Sakhalin. During the few months of this journey, he interacted with people, learned their life stories and reasons for exile, and gathered a wealth of material for his notes. Over the next 5 years, Chekhov wrote the book Sakhalin Island.

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According to historian John Stephan, nationally, among the convicts, “about 60 per cent of the exiles were Russian, followed by White Russians (10 per cent), Ukrainians (10 per cent), Poles (5 per cent), Tatars (5 per cent) and a sprinkling of Latvians, Estonians, and Germans (7 per cent)” (Stephan, 1971, p. 68). Anatoly Kuzin, in his research about Sakhalin Korean, mentions that Koreans were also among the exiled convicts in Sakhalin (Kuzin, 2019, p. 192). There were also Poles among the political prisoners: “It now appears that there were about 50 political exiles in Sakhalin between 1884 and 1906. Among these were 17 members of the Polish Proletariat Party and Edmund Płoski, who led the ‘1887 Incident’ (a plot against the life of Tsar Alexander III” (Stephan, 1971, p. 72). The most famous Polish Proletariat Party member was Bronislaw Piłsudski, who researched the Ainu and Nivh people. While on Sakhalin in 1891, he met another famous Polish political prisoner Edmund Płoski. Chekhov, passing through a place called Popovskie Yurty, wrote that “The settlers themselves call their village Warsaw since there are many Catholics in it” (Chekhov, 2009, p. 227). In 1896, a Catholic Church was consecrated in Sakhalin (Sakhalinskiy Kalendar’, 1898, p. 34). Koreans and Chinese in Sakhalin were part of the mainland migration. In the Far East of the mainland, the Chinese were working on constructing Far Eastern cities and railways. The practice of Chinese mass resettlements for work, as used in the gold mines, was applied. Compared to hiring workers from the European part of Russia, the apparent economic benefit from the employment of Chinese workers was the main reason for the massive involvement of the Chinese in the Far East labor market (Druzyaka, 2019, p. 149). Although Korean settlers of that period were also employed by the mines, they mostly worked in agriculture, which was convenient for the Russian authorities development process of the Far Eastern lands. Koreans and Chinese were also arriving from Primorye (Maritime Region) to North Sakhalin. Here we need to focus on the migration of Koreans on the mainland since this branch of Korean migrants will intersect throughout history with those that came to Sakhalin through Japan. This part of the Korean diaspora migrated from the north of the Korean peninsula in the mid-nineteenth century. For them, the Russian Far East was simply land to which they were fleeing to escape from hunger and feudal taxes and to find a better life (Hyun, 2013, pp.77–78). However, after the signing of the Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) treaties, the Primorye fell under the sovereignty of the Russian Empire, and Chinese and Korean immigrants were thus included in state policy as subjects of administrative management as “foreign nationals.” After the RussoJapanese War (1904–1905), and especially after the annexation of Korea by Japan, there was a large number of Korean political migrants who fled to the Russian Empire and organized their national liberation movement there. Although the Korean diaspora supported the Bolshevik revolution and there were many in the Russian Far East who stood for Korean independence from Japan, in September 1937 the Soviet government began deporting the “politically unreliable Korean population” from the border with the Japanese Empire to the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Thus, the ethnic map of Korean residence changed: the Far

2.2

From St. Petersburg Treaty to the Russo-Japanese War

23

Eastern Korean diaspora shrank, and the formation of new Korean diasporas in Kazakhstan and other republics in Central Asia commenced. After the end of the Second World War, representatives from the new Korean Diaspora came to Sakhalin to work in Korean schools. However, let us return to the resettlement of Koreans to Sakhalin at the end of the nineteenth century. As we saw above, according to the first general census of Russia, in 1897, there were 67 Koreans in Sakhalin. Of these, 66 people lived in the Korsakov district and one person in the Aleksandrovsky district. 63 people were born in Korea, and 54 people had Korean citizenship. One person was literate in Russian, and two people were literate in other languages. There were five married people. There was one person between 10–19 years old, 20 people between 20–29 years old, 18 people between 30–39 years old, 25 people between 40–49 years old, two people between 50–59 years old, and one person 60 years and older. By employment, they were distributed as follows: nine people were farmers, 53 people were fishermen and hunters, one person worked in clothing manufacturing, and one was unemployed. Three people served punishment for criminal offences (Kuzin, 2019, p. 192). As we can see, there were few married people and no children.

2.2.2

Policy for Migrants in the Russian Far East

In the Far East, state border regulations became a question of concern after the signing of the Treaty of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860). In one respect, the Russian state was interested in settling and developing the Far Eastern lands. Therefore, the region had to remain in the unconditional administrative and legal jurisdiction of the Russian Empire. Аfter the signing of the Aigun and Peking treaties, Primorye became a territory of the Russian Empire, and Chinese and Korean immigrants were thus included in state policy as “foreign nationals.” Despite various stages in the domestic policy towards migrants from nearby countries, the Russian Empire had a profound interest in its new neighbors. Subsequently, after Russia had secured its position on the Pacific coast in the middle of the nineteenth century, a protectorate on the Liaodong Peninsula was established, and the Chinese Eastern Railway was constructed. This period can be named as the period of “open borders.” Since the 1870s, the policy of the Russian state regarding Asian migrants changed. The need for development of the region, the proximity to their respective countries of descent, and an increasing migration flow had led to the strengthening of control policies. As a result of this, the preferential settlement of foreigners was abolished in 1882. Starting from the 1890s, migration policy began to have a restrictive and protective nature. Since 1892, the law prohibited the acquisition of lands in the Primorye and Amur regions by foreigners (Druzyaka, 2019, p. 144).

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2.2.3

Sakhalin Under Control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union

First Schools

As mentioned earlier, the Japanese population was mostly made up of fishermen, many of whom migrated back and forth between Hokkaido and Sakhalin. Therefore, there were no Japanese schools on Sakhalin during this period. The first schools on the island appeared during the period of convict labor. Both men and women were exiled to Sakhalin for penal servitude, with some coming with their families and others establishing relationships there. Chekhov describes the forms of marriage and cohabitation of exiles and emphasizes the shortage of women and the early marriages associated with this. He also talks about children, both born on Sakhalin and brought there: “Children, that is, ages from 0 to 15 years old, also give a high figure of 24.9%. It is small compared to similar Russian figures. Still, it is high for an exiled colony, where family life is in such unfavourable conditions” (Chekhov, 2009, p. 289). Chekhov also emphasizes that “the most needed and most pleasant people on Sakhalin are children. The exiles themselves understand this well and value it dearly.” Since children lived with their parents during the period of convict labor, schools also appeared. When Chekhov visited Sakhalin, there were five schools. In 1889–1890 they trained 222 people: 144 boys and 78 girls, 44 people for each school. Chekhov himself arrived during summer vacation, so he did not see the inner life of the school. However, he describes it from the stories of those living there: Sakhalin schools are poor, furnished miserably, their existence is not necessary, and their situation is extremely uncertain since no one knows whether they will exist or not. They are run by one of the officials in the office of the governor of the island, an educated young man, but this is a king who reigns but does not rule since, in essence, the chiefs of districts are in charge of the schools, the wardens of the prison, on whom the choice and appointment of teachers depend. The teachers in schools are exiles who were not teachers in their homeland. People are little familiar with the matter and without any preparation. They receive 10 rubles for their labour. The administration finds it impossible to pay more for a month and does not invite a free person because this would have to pay at least 25 rubles. Obviously, teaching in schools is considered unimportant since the oversees from the exiles who often bear indefinite responsibilities and are only running errands for officials, receive 40 or even 50 rubles per month (Chekhov, 2009, p. 338).

As seen above, school education on Sakhalin had miserable features since it was inextricably linked with the prison life of the island: the students were children of convicts. The Sakhalin Calendar provides data from 1897 on 28 schools in the Aleksandrovsky (13 schools), Tymovsky (9 schools), and Korsakov (6 schools) districts. It also says that not all children are covered by education. So, for example, in the Alexandrovsky district, out of 920 school-age boys, only 189 were enrolled, and out of 936 school-age girls, only 116 were enrolled (Sakhalinskiy Kalendar’, 1897, pp. 76–77). This document also writes that a school for the children of officials who served in Sakhalin was opened. In the Sakhalinskiy Kalendar’ of 1898, we see that there was a school at the Aleksandrovsky post and one for the children of officials. There were

2.3

After Russo-Japanese War

25

12–15 children of both sexes attending school (Sakhalinskiy Kalendar’, 1898, p. 159). The absence of secondary educational institutions for the families of Sakhalin officials continued after the Russo-Japanese War and caused great difficulties for their families. Governor-General Valuev refers to this issue in his report of the Sakhalin Region in 1908. He states that due to a lack of access to education, the families of officials often lived on the mainland, which, of course, did not lead to the strengthening of educated cadres on the island (Lim, 1999, 15). Before the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian authorities tried to improve the level of education on Sakhalin and increase the number of schools, but the process was rather slow. The Russo-Japanese War further aggrieved the situation.

2.3 2.3.1

After Russo-Japanese War Movement of the Population

In the summer of 1905, Japanese troops occupied Sakhalin. On August 23 (September 5) 1905, a peace treaty was signed between Russia and Japan in Portsmouth, resulting in Russia ceding the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan. The border passed along the fiftieth parallel. The contracting parties agreed not to build any military installations on Sakhalin or the adjacent islands and not to interfere with free navigation in the La Perouse and Tatar straits. At the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, the Japanese side, which obtained concessions from Russia in South Sakhalin, put forward a demand to abolish convict labor in the northern half of the island or to take measures to prevent escape to the southern half. The Russian side at the negotiations in Portsmouth, while stressing that the preservation or abolition of convict labor in northern Sakhalin was an internal matter for Russia, assumed that it would not become a source of concern for its neighbours. On April 10 (23) 1906, the Council of Ministers of Russia decided to abolish convict labor and exile in Sakhalin. After Japan’s occupation of the southern part of the island, Japan gave Russian citizens the right to either sell real estate, leave their country, or stay on the island. An overwhelming majority of the Russian population left South Sakhalin for the mainland. Most people also left Northern Sakhalin while it was under Japanese occupation for a short period. In December 1905, only 7500 people remained on the island’s northern part (5500 Russians and 2000 Nivkhs and Uilta). After the abolition of convict labor, the Russian government attempted to interest people in resettlement to Northern Sakhalin. However, the migration policy continued to be in the nature of agrarian resettlement. In 1908, the island was declared open for free settlement. In 1914, those who moved to Sakhalin and those employed there were exempted from military service. Nonetheless, the population in the northern part of the island grew extremely slowly, from 8000 in 1908 to 9000 in 1917 (Vysokov, 2003, pp. 39–40).

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2.3.2

2

Sakhalin Under Control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union

Schools Between 1906 and 1917

Despite the absence of convict labor, the history of its presence impacted the fate of children of the island for a long time. From 1906 to 1917, the Russian government and the Far Eastern administration attempted to restore schools and organize the educational process to achieve practical scholarly and educational impacts on the younger generation. But still, the problem existed in which schools did not contribute to the successful development of the school system. Mostly, the full coverage of Sakhalin children with primary education was affected. This issue can be attributed to a lack of funds, the indifference of the parents of the children, and turnover of the teaching staff. By January 1 1915, 86.5% of school-aged children on Sakhalin did not study, while in the whole of Siberia it was 63.7%, and throughout Russia 49% (Lim, 1999, p. 34, p. 39). Although there were no Japanese or Korean schools on Sakhalin in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, they existed in the mainland Far East. A considerable part of Japanese immigrants came to the Russian Far East for a long time with their families. The first school was opened in Vladivostok, inside a Buddhist shrine on Semenovskaya street. In 1894 classes for children of primary school age began there. The school was maintained on donations from the parents of those children. From March 1902, the fees for maintaining the school were included in the costs of the Urajio kyoryūmin-kai(Vladivostok [Japanese] Residents’ Association).The school had two teachers who taught 50 children. During the RussoJapanese war, the school was closed (Morgun, 1996, p.139). After the RussoJapanese war, particularly from 1907, an increase in the number of immigrants in Vladivostok made it necessary to open a school for Japanese children. A Japanese elementary school was reopened on September 2, 1907. In late 1908, the Japanese consulate petitioned the Governor-General of the Primorskiy Region for permission to open a school under Russian jurisdiction. On February 16, 1912, the Council of Ministers granted the permission to open two schools for foreign children in Russia: a German school in Odessa and a Japanese school in Vladivostok. According to a note by the Ministry of Public Education addressed to the Governor-General of the Priamursk region on June 27, 1913, the school was allowed to teach all subjects in Japanese except the Russian language, history, and geography of Russia which were to be taught in Russian. In 1911, the school had 100 students who were taught in accordance with the Japanese elementary school curriculum. The school also had a supplementary Russian language course. After receiving permission from the Russian authorities to act as a legal entity, the school acquired its premises using funds donated by Japanese residents of Vladivostok. The number of students increased year by year, and 165 children were studying at the school by 1915. However, following the end of the Siberian intervention and the departure of most of the Japanese population from the Russian Far East, the Japanese school was closed (Morgun, 1996, p.140). On the mainland of the Far East, for example, in Primorye, many Korean children studied in Russian schools organized in their settlements (Nasekin, 1904,

2.4

Sakhalin After the Russian Revolution

27

pp. 23–30). Korean schools established in the pre-revolutionary period can be divided into three types: “private schools” maintained at the expense of the Korean population; “ministerial schools” established by the Ministry of National Education; and missionary schools operated by the Holy Synod. Only “private” schools taught in two languages, Russian and Korean, and these were the most in-demand schools in areas with large Korean populations. Mainly boys studied in schools. However, in 1907 in the village of Blagoslovennoe, the Ministry of Education opened a school to teach Korean girls. In 1909, 40 female students studied at this school (Priamurskiye vedomosti, 1895). From 1907, many Korean schools with Korean as the language of instruction were opened in Primorye. Mostly they were opened with donations from residents (Hyun, 2013, p. 98). There were no schools on Sakhalin in this period due to the Korean population’s small size and seasonal migration.

2.4 2.4.1

Sakhalin After the Russian Revolution New Wave of Colonization and Migration of the Population

In 1925, Soviet power was established on Sakhalin. Between 1925 and 1929 there was an extensive discussion in the Soviet government about whether the island’s colonization should be agrarian or industrial. This discussion was influenced by such factors as an unfinished period of economic reconstruction after the civil war, the presence of other more extensive natural resources on Russian territory, geographical remoteness from central industrial areas, and the lack of scientifically substantiated information about the economic potential of the island. However, in the end, the point of view about the necessity of industrial colonisation prevailed. Here, too, the problem of settlement arose in the first place (Shcheglov, 2019, p. 77). In April 1925, while Japanese troops were still present, Soviet troops, workers of the Soviet authorities, and militia came to Sakhalin. In addition, educational and medical workers were sent to the island. During 1925–1928, 54 teachers came to Sakhalin. Then the agricultural migration of the population, which was supposed to create a base for industrial colonization, began. However, until 1929 the migration was relatively slow. From 1929, the Soviet state began the industrial colonization of the island: the development of oil, coal, forestry, and fish resources for which many workers were required. The island’s population and the region’s settlement proceeded in a two-stage order: working peasants from the Amur region and Transbaikaliе went to Sakhalin, and settlers from the central provinces came to the Amur region and Transbaikalie (Shcheglov, 2019, p. 77). In 1929, over 3000 people came to the island. Moreover, the state provided them various benefits, cash loans, travel fees, and the migrant peasants received livestock, seeds, and allotments of land. However, not everybody settled here. There was a category of migrant workers who left the island

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Sakhalin Under Control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union

called obratniki (reverse people). Regardless, up to two-thirds of those who arrived remained to “develop” Sakhalin (Lim, 1999, p. 65; Shcheglov, 2019, p. 86). In 1929 about 900 Koreans were living in the Sakhalin district. The Rybnovsky district was the only one in Northern Sakhalin where Koreans lived compactly. Therefore, based on a decision of the Soviet government in August 1925, it was there that the first local national sovet (council) was formed (Kuzin, 2019, p. 195).

2.4.2

Ethnic Policy in Soviet Sakhalin

Ethnic policy in Soviet Sakhalin was a reflection of national policy in the USSR. The periods of pre-Second World War policy can be divided into several stages. From 1918 to 1923, it was the policy of criticizing the National Chauvinism of Tsarist Russia and publication of the “Decree on self-determination of Nation.” From 1923 to the mid-1930s, the period of korenizatsiya2 established a policy to create national personnel and elites within the Soviet ideology. The next period from the mid-1930s (especially from 1937) was the period of political repression, which also affected national areas. This period started with ethnic deportations, followed by the active introduction of Russian in the Republics and ethnic regions. In general, I agree with political historian Terry Martin’s opinion that the ethnic policy from 1922 to the Great Purge of Stalin in 1937 was an “affirmative action Empire” policy which supported the languages and ethnic identity of all ethnicities of the USSR to curb national movements. The approach of the Second World War forced the abandonment of this fairly liberal position and led to the establishment of a repressive regime against various ethnic groups (Martin, 2001, pp. 15–23). On Sakhalin, the ethnic policy had its peculiarities. Here it was primarily a policy toward indigenous peoples as well as Korean migrants from the mainland. In theory, the policy should have educated and Sovietized ethnic minorities, giving them the right to study in their native language. Minorities in Sakhalin, on the one hand, were subjected to the “policy for small indigenous peoples” (Nivkhi, Ulta, Evenki, etc.). In contrast, others were subjected to ethnic policy in general (the Korean migrants). At the same time, both groups, along with the local “Russian” population, were subject to an alphabetisation policy and minimal understanding of “healthy lifestyles” (mainly hygiene and vaccinations). One of the problems of Northern Sakhalin was the scattering of settlements, which complicated the organisation of life on the island. The unification policy and the establishment of “large indigenous settlements” led to the destruction of traditional life, such as the abandonment of summer residences (Podpechnikov, 1995, p. 211). The unification into collective farms (kolkhozes) caused a more damaging effect.

Korenizatsiya means “indigenisation,” or literally “putting down roots.” It was an early policy of the Soviet Union for the integration of non-Russian nationalities into the governments of their specific soviet republics. 2

2.4

Sakhalin After the Russian Revolution

29

Teaching in one’s native language was one of the tasks of ethnic policy of the time. So-called Kultbaza,3 including schools, hospitals, and other cultural institutions, were built for indigenous peoples. The indigenous peoples of Sakhalin have no alphabet, so it was necessary to create a written language for them to learn. In addition, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues, one of the features of Soviet policy that distinguished it from Japan, Canada, Australia, and other countries was the deliberate formation of an intellectual elite among minorities. In 1925 this process was facilitated by the opening of the Department of Languages of the Peoples of the North at Leningrad University (Morris-Suzuki, 2000, p. 118). As shown below, the conscious formation of migrant ethnic intellectual elites also took place, as faculties teaching in Chinese and Korean were opened in Vladivostok. Although in the case of migrants, the availability of written language and their greater involvement in the region’s political life was different from the situation of indigenous minorities. The political purges of the mid-1930s also affected Sakhalin, including its ethnic minorities. The main accusation both indigenous peoples and Korean migrants faced was the suspicion that they were spying for Japan. In 1932 on North Sakhalin, all foreigners were re-registered and given passports. The situation was complicated with the Korean population, numbering 3200. Many came illegally, lived without any registration, or claimed to be “Korean citizens.” This activity enabled them to obtain Japanese passports, sometimes without registering them, which was undesirable for Soviet authorities (Kuzin, 2019, p. 196). As Kuzin argues, the registration process ended in March 1934, and all activities were carried out under the slogan: “Let us clear Sakhalin from class-alien and parasitic elements.” Passports valid for 1 year were issued to those working on Japanese concessions, including Koreans. Passport registration prompted Koreans on a mass scale to apply for Soviet citizenship and made it possible to identify those who had Japanese citizenship. All those without passports were to be fired from their jobs, removed from the island, and their property confiscated and sold. A letter circulated by the Dalkrai Executive Committee on February 17 1934 lists the following rules to be established for those who did not register Soviet citizenship: 1. Korean nationals and their children who had arrived within the borders of the former Russian Empire before 1910 were recognized as citizens of the USSR. 2. All Koreans who had presented documents indicating that they were Japanese nationals were issued uniform residence permits for foreigners. 3. Koreans who claimed to be foreign nationals but did not submit the appropriate documents were issued residence permits but were obliged to appear for

3

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet North-East, in accordance with the concept of the cultural revolution, created a network of kultbases and mobile “red yurts, tents and yarangs” to educate the local population and the rising generation. The construction of cultural bases and other issues of national policy were handled by a state organization, the Committee of the North at the All-Union Central Executive Committee of the USSR, which was established in 1924.

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Sakhalin Under Control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union

re-registration at the OGPU (State Political Administration) within a specified period (Kuzin, 2019, p. 197). In 1937, 293 Korean families numbering 1155 people were deported to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, because they were suspected of spying for Japan. The Korean population in North Sakhalin practically disappeared. At the same time, during the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, the slightest suspicion of pro-Japanese sentiment could be enough to condemn a Nivkh person to “disappear”; as B. Grant writes, in his ethnography studies, “it was exceptional to find someone who did not have relatives who disappeared in the 1930s” (Grant, 1995, p. 101). This purges continued on Sakhalin after the war; according to data by historical demographer V. Podpechnikov, who compiled a list of repressed indigenous individuals in North and South Sakhalin, 156 Indigenous people (most of them Nivkh and Uilta) were repressed between 1930–1940 (Podpechnikov, 1999, pp. 99–123).

2.4.3

Schools in Soviet Sakhalin

After Northern Sakhalin returned to the USSR, Soviet schools began to open there. In June 1925, the Sakhalin Revolutionary Committee determined which tasks to prioritize for the establishment of schools. It was necessary to reform schools according to the unified system established in the USSR and to separate schools from the church. The main problem of Sakhalin and its difference from central Russia was that on Sakhalin the settlements were sparsely populated, scattered at a great distance from each other, and communication between them was complicated. In these conditions, the only solution was to have schools with small numbers of students. In 1925 the following schools were opened; “Russian schools of the first cycle in rural areas (21); non-Russian schools for Tungus (2), and for Korean (1). In the city, a second-stage school (1) and first-stage school (1)” (Lim, 1999, p. 65). To implement this program, two urgent issues had to be solved: determining the qualifications of already available teachers and the construction of school buildings. The first issue was addressed with teacher training courses on July 10 1925. At the same time, a list of those admitted to the position of school workers was approved. Also, sending teaching staff to Sakhalin was urgently raised by the Sakhalin administration. From the mid-1930s onwards the number of schools and students gradually increased. In the 1932–1933 school year, there were 78 elementary schools (9028 students) and seven junior high schools (1689 students), making a total of 85 schools (10,717 students). In the 1935–1936 school year, there were 62 elementary schools (5073 students), 23 junior high schools (6846 students), and three high schools (1979 students). In the 1939–1940 academic year, the total number of the students had increased to 18,169. The process of constructing school buildings faced the most challenging conditions. In July 1933, only 20 to 23% of 85 schools had a unique school building. The rest were located in adapted premises

2.4

Sakhalin After the Russian Revolution

31

(residential barracks, warehouses, etc.). The existing school buildings were overloaded, and schools had to work in two shifts (Lim, 1999, p. 77). Although the topic of this book does not explore issues of indigenous peoples’ education, it is necessary to mention the organization of indigenous education to describe the educational policies of the time. One of the main problems in educating indigenous children by the Soviet authorities was the reluctance of parents to send their children to school voluntarily. The second problem was that the indigenous population was scattered over vast distances. The “Northern minorities” lived in dwarf camps of 2 to 15 households and were spread all over Northern Sakhalin. The 1920 Soviet Northern Peoples School Program attempted to create local curricula rich in local Northern studies material. Initially, the intention was to begin instruction in the native language. However, it became clear that this was impossible, and teachers had to teach indigenous children Russian literacy. The 1925 program offered 3 years of instruction which would gradually introduce “North people” into their familiar world, then into school life, and out into the world outside of their nomad camp or their region, through the medium of the Russian language. Later, the Soviet Union began to prepare textbooks for indigenous schools based on local material. Prominent specialists led by professor Bogoraz were involved in this work. They designed a primer textbook for the Northern minorities in the 1927–1928 school year named “Our North.” Other textbooks were written with the peoples of the North in mind and their own languages (Lim, 1999, p. 95). In the 1933–1934 school year in Sakhalin, they began to use Evenki and Nivkh language textbooks in Native schools and taught children in their native language. By the 1930s, Northern Sakhalin had a Kultbaza in Nogliki with a boarding school (internat). In the village of Vereshchagino, there were two junior-high non-Russian schools, one with a boarding school and one without, where indigenous and Russian children studied together. In the town of Pilevo, there were two elementary non-Russian boarding schools where only indigenous children studied. In Viski and Vihtu, there were three non-Russian schools (two with a boarding school and one without). After four grades of the non-Russian boarding school, children went to Russian junior high schools (seven-year schools). The schools prepared students to send them to Leningrad to study in the Institute of the Peoples of the North. In 1932 four students and in 1933 11 students went to Leningrad (Lim, 1999, p. 100). As remember Chukchi writer Yuriy Rytkheu: Russian teachers were the creators of the written languages of the small ethnicities of the North. Most of them were true educators. Cultural administrators then replaced them. They developed an attitude toward the “small peoples” of the North as unintelligent children of nature (Rytkheu, 1990, p. 166).

Regardless of the benefits of education for indigenous students, they faced the problem of separation from their families as they were sent to boarding schools: Life has shown, however, that the prolonged upbringing of children away from their families harms the preparation of students for life, leads to a weakening of the bond between children

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2 Sakhalin Under Control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union and parents, a loss of customs and love for the traditional trades of the peoples of the North (Podpechnikov, 1995, p. 224).

Similar practices continued after the war when Uilta children living in South Sakhalin were sent to boarding schools. This experience left them with a complicated feeling about the school (Case LK, Paichadze interview, 2019). The departure to Leningrad and the positive process of forming ethnic intellectual elites also led to a break away from native customs and traditions (Morris-Suzuki, 2000, p.119). The opening of Korean schools on Sakhalin was directly related to the processes taking place on the mainland of the Russian Far East. By October 1922, 150,000 Koreans lived in the Russian Far East, of whom 105,600 (70.4%) lived in the Primor’e (Kulinich, 2016, p. 43). On April 4 1925, the Korean Commission held a meeting under the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee. Having discussed the situation of Korean schools in the region, it decided to work out measures to improve the education of the Korean population. The authorities’ decision was accepted at a meeting held by secretaries of province committees of RKP(b) and chairpersons of executive committees of the Far Eastern region in Khabarovsk on August 6 1923. There they discussed the necessity of lifting the cultural level of ethnic minorities. At the same time, missionary schools were closed. Other types of pre-revolution schools were supposed to be transformed into “labor schools,” considering ethnic features of the Korean population and teaching some subjects in the Korean language. In addition, special attention in the educational process was paid to introducing the Russian language in Korean schools. The growing necessity for special technical knowledge led to the arrangement of Russian language instruction in Korean schools to assist Korean school graduates in entering special technical and other Russian educational institutions (Bae & Fedirko, 2017, p. 42). Gradually, all subjects in higher-education Korean schools were taught in Russian. In first-stage schools, Russian was introduced as a separate discipline. The volume of knowledge received by students at Korean elementary schools was significantly less than in Russian schools. The problem of pedagogical personnel for Korean schools was challenging to solve. Even in the pre-revolutionary schools, there was a shortage of teachers teaching in two languages (Russian and Korean). This number declined to a catastrophically low number after the end of the Civil War and the purges of unreliable people from the field of education. Teachers in Korean ethnic schools had often trained in Korea, China, or Japan (Bae & Fedirko, 2017, p. 42). To solve this problem, in 1925–1926, the Nikolsk-Ussuriysky Pedagogical College and several other faculties, including the Vladivostok State University, provided teacher training for national Korean schools. The Korean (International) Pedagogical Institute in Vladivostok started work on November 4 1931. In the very beginning, the institute was preparing teachers for Korean and Chinese schools. Education was organized in such a way as to equalize as much as possible the students from ethnic schools. The first year was taught in their native language. From the second year, the number of subjects taught in Russian gradually increased. Thus, students retained bilingualism and

2.4

Sakhalin After the Russian Revolution

33

learned how to teach the school program in two languages (Malyavina, 2016, p. 198). In the 1933–1934 academic year, the Chinese section was closed, and the institute became an exclusively “Korean pedagogical” Institute. It operated a socioeconomic, mathematics, and chemistry department, and an evening teacher’s institute comprising physics, mathematics, history, and literature departments. In 1925 in Russian Far East were 154 elementary schools, of which only 48 were in school buildings. Until the early 1930s, there were no funds for new schools, and the population didn’t have the financial recourse to build their own. Only after the mass adult literacy campaign had begun did the material and technical condition of the schools improve somewhat. The authorities noted: “Concerning textbooks and teaching materials for ethnic minority schools, the situation is bad, the old textbooks in ethnic languages are unsuitable for use in spirit and content, and there are no new ones yet” (Bae & Fedirko, 2017, p. 43). New textbooks had to correspond with Soviet ideology. They were in short supply in all schools and needed to be translated into the mother tongue of the ethnic schools. On April 4 1925, at the meeting of the Korean Commission of the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee, measures to improve the education of the Korean population were worked out. They stipulated 25,000 rubles for publishing textbooks and teaching literature in the 1925–1926 school year. In addition to textbooks for children, textbooks for adults were published, such as “Down with Illiteracy” and “Mother’s ABC” (Bae & Fedirko, 2017, p. 43). There was still the issue of financing both teacher labor and school maintenance. For example, in 1924, out of 119 teachers, 52 were maintained at the expense of the parents of Korean children (Vasilchenko, 2010, p. 6). Although not all problems relating to the development of Korean ethnic schools were solved promptly and quickly, the number of Korean schools in the Soviet Far East began to grow rapidly, and the range of educational institutions available to the Korean population also expanded. In 1927 there were 172 Korean schools in the region, educating 18,510 children (Bae & Fedirko, 2017, p. 43). From 1932–1933 there were already 283 Korean schools in the area, with 966 teachers educating 25,843 children (Bae & Fedirko, 2017, p. 43). Koreans in Sakhalin lived compactly in the villages of Naumovka and Kef. These villages were united into the Naumovka Village Council. Two hundred and fourteen Koreans were living on the council territory. There was a Korean School where 29 children were studying in their native language (Kuzin, 2019, p. 195). According to the all-union school census, in 1927, there was one ethnic Korean school for 30 students in the Sakhalin district, located in the village of Kef, Rybnovsk district. A year later, a second school opened in Okha with 76 students, or 39% of school-age children, while the figure was 89% among Russians. The teaching was conducted in the native language (Korean), and Russian was introduced as a compulsory subject in the second year of schooling. The duration of studies was 5 years in the first-grade schools and 6 years in the second grade. In the town of Aleksandrovsk, there was a Korean evening school for adult populations who were provided with literacy classes and individual study groups conducted by so-called “liquidators” (Kuzin, 2010, p. 3).

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Teachers who finished Higher Education on the mainland came to Sakhalin to teach (Lim, 1999, p. 4). In 1934, a Korean technical school (FZU) for 180 children opened in Okha on Sakhalin. It was one of the best model schools in the area (Bae & Fedirko, 2017, p. 43). The repression of indigenous peoples and the mass deportation of the Korean population from the mainland Far East and Sakhalin led to the closure of ethnic schools or their switch to Russian as the language of instruction.

2.5

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined the history of Sakhalin under the Russian Empire and then the rule of the USSR. Even after signing the first Russo-Japanese treaty, the free migration of people between the mainland and Sakhalin and Hokkaido and Sakhalin existed but gradually began to be replaced by organized and sometimes forced migration. On the one hand, the entrenchment of a population on Sakhalin should have confirmed that the island belonged to Russia or Japan. Attempts by the Russian Empire to create an agricultural colony on the island were unsuccessful; the lands were far from central Russia, travel was difficult, and the land was not suitable for farming. The government then forcibly settled the island, turning it into a place of penal servitude and exile. Despite the government’s efforts, convicts did not stay on the island after their exile had concluded, and the general atmosphere on the island was rather gloomy. Officials coming to Sakhalin also sensed the temporary nature of their stay. They were not eager to establish themselves on the island or do anything to improve the situation there. Although it was being established, the school system lacked adequate funding, and there were no high schools for officials. Thus, the idea of educating a younger generation that would help to create the local population on the island failed. From 1905 to 1925, there was what John Stephan calls “a period of turbulence” (Stephan, 1971, pp. 85–108). Relatively large groups of people moved in and out of the island but never gained a foothold. The industrial colonization, which Japan actively pursued on North Sakhalin (see chapter three) was continued after the Soviet rule and led to an improvement in the population’s settling down on North Sakhalin. In the 1920s and 1930s, an educational system was organized for the Russian and Korean migrant populations. Schools were also established for the indigenous peoples. However, the repressions of the mid-1930s had a tragic effect on both indigenous peoples and migrants, especially on the Korean community. The Japanese-Korean families discussed in the following chapters were formed on South Sakhalin, but after 1945 they would live in a system that was also developed in the North. Therefore, a study of migration processes on the island as a whole and the formation of the educational system is also necessary to better understand the formation of their multilayered self-identity.

References

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References Bae, S., & Fedirko, O. (2017). Osobennosti stanovleniya natsional’noy koreyskoy shkoly na Dal’nem Vostoke v 1920-1930. Gramota, 3-77-1, 41–44. Chekhov, A. (2009). Ostrov Sakhalin. Eksmo. Druzyaka, A. (2019). Regulirovaniye kitayskoy migratsii na Dal’nem Vostoke Rossii – Istoricheskiy opyt i problemy sovremennogo sostoyaniya. In S. S. Paichadze & I. A. Valdman (Eds.), Rossiya i strany ATR: Migratsionnyye protsessy i problemy mezhkul’turnoy kommunikatsii. Aziya v Rossii (pp. 141–166). Novosibirsk. Grant, B. (1995). In the soviet house of culture: A century of Perestroikas. Princeton University Press. Hyun, M. (2013). Korian nettowāku: Media, idō no rekishi to kūkan. Hokkaidō Daigaku Shuppankai. Kulinich, N. (2016). Koreytsy v sostave gorodskogo naseleniya Dal’nego Vostoka Rossii v pervyye gody Sovetskoy vlasti. Osnovnyye tendentsii gosudarstvennogo i obshchestvennogo razvitiya Rossii: Istoriya i sovremennost, 1, 43–51. Kuzin, A. (2010). Sakhalinskie Koreitsy iz istrorii Natsionalnoi shkoly. (1925–2000). Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, 13(4), 3–8. Kuzin, A. (2019). Koreyskaya emigratsiya na ostrov Sakhalin i yeyo tragizm (vtoraya polovina XIX v. – 1937 g). In S. S. Paichadze & I. A. Valdman (Eds.), Rossiya i strany ATR: Migratsionnyye protsessy i problemy mezhkul’turnoy kommunikatsii. Aziya v Rossii (pp. 191–200). Novosibirsk. Lim, S. (1999). Istoriya razvitiya shkol’noy sistemy na Sakhaline (1855–1945). MGPU. Malyavina, L. (2016). Koreyskiy (Internatsional’nyy) pedagogicheskiy institut vo Vladivostoke: ot sozdaniya do vyseleniya (1931–1937). Nauchnyy dialog, 3(51), 195–208. Martin, T. (2001). The affirmative action empire: Nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939. Cornell University Press. Morgun, Z. (1996). Yaponskaya diaspora vo Vladivostoke: stranitsy istorii. Acta Slavica Iaponica, 14, 136–156. Morris-Suzuki, T. (2000). Henkyō kara nagameru. Misuzu shobō. Morris-Suzuki, T. (2010). Borderline Japan. Cambridge University Press. Nasekin, N. (1904). Koreytsy Priamurskogo kraya. Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo prosveshcheniya. SSSLII, 23(30). Podpechnikov, V. L. (1995). Poselok Uil’-Ykh. Istoricheskiye chteniya. Trudy gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Sakhalinskogo oblasti (1995–1) (pp. 207–230). Gosudarstvennyy arkhiv Sakhalinskoy oblasti. Podpechnikov, V. L. (1999). Spisok repressirovannykh iz chisla korennykh narodov Sakhalina i drugikh narodov severa. Krayevedcheskiy byulleten, Sakhalinskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet, 1, 99–123. Rytkheu, Y. S. (1990). Istoricheskiye chteniya. Trudy gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Sakhalinskogo oblasti (1995–1) (pp. 166–168). Gosudarstvennyy arkhiv Sakhalinskoy oblasti. Seaton, P. (2015). Memories beyond borders: Karafuto sites of memory in Hokkaido. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 119–140). Routledge. Shcheglov, V. (2019). Opyt Sakhalinskih pereseleniy (1853–2002). Ministerstvo kul’tury i arhivnogo dela Sakhalinskoy oblasti. Stephan, J. (1971). Sakhalin. Clarendon Press. Vasilchenko, O. (2010). Koreytsy na sovetskom Dal’nem Vostoke (1923–1937). Uchenyye zapiski Komsomol’skogo-na-Amure gosudarstvennogo tekhnicheskogo universitea, 1-2, 4–7. Vysokov, M. (2003). Ekonomika Sakhalina do okonchaniya Vtoroj mirovoi voiny. In Z. Bok & M. Vysokov (Eds.), Ekonomika Sakhalina. Sakhalinskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo.

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Documents Priamurskiye vedomosti. 1895, № 58–59. Kirillov A. Koreytsy sela Blagoslovennogo. Istorikoetnograficheskiy ocherk. Sakhalinskiy Kalendar’. (1897). Tipographiya ostrova Sakhalin. Sakhalinskiy Kalendar’. (1898). Tipographiya ostrova Sakhalin.

Interview Case LK, Interview Paichadze, 2019, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

Chapter 3

Sakhalin/Karafuto Under Control of the Japanese Empire

Keywords Japanese settlement colony · Occupation of the North Sakhalin · Voluntary migration and forced mobilization · Pre-war interethnic marriages · Minority policy and education

3.1

Migration Policy and Migration of the Population to Karafuto

After the Russo-Japanese War, South Sakhalin became a new colonial territory of Japan. Initially, the Japanese formed the “civil administration” of Karafuto, which in reality was the military administration that governed the island. However, from 1907, the newly formed Governorate of Karafuto (Karafuto-chō) took control of the island. Karafuto was a new territory and its residents, including the Japanese, had no right to vote or participate in politics. It was officially included in the Japanese Empire as a prefecture in 1943. First, the colonial government had planned to promote the development of the island through agricultural settlement. However, it faced issues when agricultural resources were exhausted. The agricultural settlement and development were not successful because it was impossible to produce rice in Karafuto. Farmers worked as seasonal forestry and fishery laborers or produced other cash crops to earn money to buy rice, a staple food for Japanese and Koreans (Nakayama, 2015, p. 23). As Nakayama Taishō shows: the first industry that developed in Karafuto was fisheries because of the coast on both sides. Karafuto had large fish stocks, especially herring and trout. “Forestry also flourished on Karafuto. Paper manufacturing in Europe was severely affected by the First World War, and this helped paper manufacturing in Karafuto develop rapidly. Then, following the devastating 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, the Tokyo area required vast amounts of timber for reconstruction, much of which was supplied by Karafuto” (Nakayama, 2015, p. 23). Furthermore, the coal mining industry was developed in the latter half of the 1930s. The first rush of immigrants was from 1908 to 1914; they were primarily farmers, and it was a period of free migration. However, “the number of incoming farmers remained low until a revival in 1928 which continued for ten years” (Stephan, 1971, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3_3

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p. 115). From 1926 onwards, the migration policy changed, and the migration process became organized, leading to great resettlement from 1928 to 1936 (Karafuto-chō-shi, 574–575): The Karafuto Office made strenuous efforts to attract colonists. It distributed twenty to twenty-five acres of land to each arriving family. Full ownership rights were granted after five years, provided that 60 per cent of the area was under cultivation. In addition, the immigrants enjoyed regular cash subsidies, complete tax exemption for three years, free tools, and technical advice from the local agricultural research station (Stephan, 1971, p. 115).

Most of the migrants were from the northern regions of Japan, Hokkaido, and Tohoku. One difference between Karafuto and the other Japanese colonies was that the local population was small. As described by Japanese ethnographer Miki Masafumi, Karafuto differed considerably from other Japanese colonies in that the Japanese population formed the majority. Another significant difference was that Japanese people in colonies such as Taiwan or Korea, what could be called ‘exploitation- and investment-type colonies,’ were primarily white-collar workers. However, Sakhalin was a ‘Japanese settlement colony,’ so the Japanese who worked there were engaged in farming, forestry, and fisheries; in other words, they were general labourers. About 200 people made up the European population of Karafuto, which the Karafuto governorate classified under one category, “citizens of the Russian Empire.” However, after Poland’s independence, Poles were given Polish citizenship and classified as “Poles.” Additionally, because of the disintegration of the Russian Empire, most of its remaining citizens were classified as “former citizens of the Russian Empire.” There were also Europeans who came from Japan proper (Stephan, 1971, p. 86, p. 114; Nakayama, 2019, p. 206; Fedorchuk, 2015). The Asian population included Chinese who, unlike Koreans, were not subjects of the Japanese Empire and had the status of “foreigners.” Like the Koreans, a few dozen Chinese were employed by Russians and lived there long before Japan annexed the region. In the mid-1920s, there were 1500 Chinese workers employed in civil engineering during the summer season alone. However, after the end of the 1920s, only 100 to 200 Chinese were trading in Karafuto (Nakayama, 2019, 232–233). The largest migrant group in Karafuto was the Koreans, most of whom moved there after forced mobilisation in 1938. Even before that, however, several thousand people were living on the island. According to Miki Masafumi, many Korean immigrants arrived in Sakhalin before the forced mobilization of laborers from Colonial Korea: 4387 Koreans were living in Karafuto in December 1926 (Miki, 2012, p. 267). Alongside the Koreans who came from Korea to engage in simple physical labor, some immigrants arrived from Northern Sakhalin and the maritime province of Primorye. The number of single Korean men was very high. Then, in the early 1930s, the female Korean population increased indicating a period of relatively free migration (migration with families). In 1933 there were 4787 people, of whom 3215 were men and 1572 were women (Karafuto-chō, 1933, p. 35). Despite most Koreans being manual laborers, some of them achieved high socio-economic status.

3.2

North Sakhalin under Japanese Control

39

There were entrepreneurs and managers of farms, dormitories for forestry workers or brothels. Others were engineers and worked in factories. A couple of Koreans were elected as town councillors (Nakayama, 2015, p. 32). At the end of the Second World War, the Karafuto population reached 400,000 people. Among them, 23,000 were Koreans.

3.2

North Sakhalin under Japanese Control

During the Russian Civil War (1918–1922), Japan occupied the territory of Northern Sakhalin. Between 1920 and 1925, Japan carried out industrial colonization of Sakhalin, primarily associated with the development of oil wells. Industrial colonization provided an opportunity to earn a living and attracted workers from adjacent regions. This environment led to an active movement of the population. According to the Japanese census, in February of 1923 the total population of North Sakhalin was 17,926 people. Among them were 6800 Russians, 5017 Japanese, 1535 Koreans, 1836 Chinese, and 2738 Indigenous population (Takeno, 2013, p. 35). In 1922, the largest ethnic group in Aleksandrovsk, the main town of northern Sakhalin, was Japanese; they accounted for about 70% of the total population. Primarily they were engaged in commerce (32%) and manual labour (23%). The second largest group was Russians. Most of them engaged in primary industry, manual labor or commerce. Koreans and Chinese living there were manual laborers. The gender balance of Russians was close to even in every occupation, they were mainly those who had lived in Sakhalin with their families. In both the Japanese and Korean populations, females were around one-fourth of the total. However, the gender balance in the Chinese population was very different from other groups. There were only nine Chinese females out of 427 Chinese. Some of the Japanese and Koreans were migrants who had come with their families, while most Chinese migrated without their families. Aleksandrovsk was a place of temporary work or business for Chinese because they were foreigners there. On the other hand, some Japanese and Koreans expected to settle in the city for business reasons under the protection of the empire. However, in rural areas or across the whole of northern Sakhalin the situation was different. For example, in Aleksandrovsk district (the rural areas around Aleksandrovsk city) 43% were Russians, while Japanese accounted for about one-fourth. Koreans and Chinese accounted for less than 10% (Nakayama, 2019, p. 27–28). Assessments of the national policy of the Japanese administration on Sakhalin are quite contradictory. On the one hand, both Japanese and Russian scholars refer to the Japanization of North Sakhalin and the attraction of large numbers of Japanese, Korean, and Chinese labor for work in the oil companies (Oil Concessions), especially before 1923. As I said, Russian scholars have an opinion about the negative attitude held by the Japanese towards the Russian population in Northern Sakhalin. Perhaps this opinion is based on the report of V. Y. Aboltin, the man who “took over” Sakhalin from the Japanese and compiled the first report on North Sakhalin (Aboltin, 1928). His report is quite detailed about

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the situation in North Sakhalin but is certainly pessimistic about the Japanese administration. However, Japanese researcher Takeno Manabu, analyzing the employment data on North Sakhalin, shows that the Russian population continued to engage in trade and other activities. That is, one cannot speak of any outright discrimination and exclusion from commercial activities (Takeno, 2013). Researcher of the Russian Far East Vladimir Datsyshen also suggests that the Japanese authorities supported the Russian population living in Northern Sakhalin. This situation is especially evident in the organization of Russian schools in the northern part of the island (Datsyshen, 2014; GAKH, F.R-58. Op.2. D. 1. L. 134). It seems that the Japanese government’s position was twofold: on the one hand, it was necessary to increase the number of non-Russians to confirm its land claims. On the other hand, Japanese authorities were interested in anti-Bolshevik Russians and sought their support. Attitudes towards the different ethnic groups living there were the same as in the territory of the Japanese Empire. Beginning in 1923, relations between the USSR and Japan gradually improved, leading to the signing of a convention on the basic principles of relations between the two countries in Beijing in 1925. As a result of this treaty, Northern Sakhalin passed to the Soviet Union. After that, a significant part of the Japanese population and Russians who did not accept the Soviet system started to leave. Most of the Russians leaving were part of the intelligentsia, including doctors, teachers, and so forth. Part of the Korean population also left North Sakhalin. Takeno gives the following figures for those who left: 2548 people were repatriated from North Sakhalin in May 1925, of which 1740 were Japanese, 733 were Koreans, and 75 were Russians. Of the Japanese, 980 people were repatriated to mainland Japan and 760 to Karafuto. Among the Koreans, 330 moved to Karafuto, 220 to the Korean Peninsula, and among the Russians, 35 of them moved to mainland Japan and 40 to South Sakhalin. 1120 people out of 2548 people, or 44.3%, chose South Karafuto as their place of settlement after repatriation (Takeno, 2013, p. 46). However, since Japanese oil and coal concessions continued to operate on North Sakhalin under the treaty (Sheglov, 2019, pp. 71–72; Stephan, 1971, p. 136), the Japanese population continued to live on the island. Part of the Korean and Chinese population also continued to work there. According to the 1926 all-Union census, Sakhalin had “6528 Russians, 1145 Ukrainians, 198 Belarusians, 55 Volga peoples, 39 Caucasian peoples, 543 other nationalities, 294 Siberian and Far Eastern peoples, and 1867 Sakhalin indigenous peoples.” In addition, the following number of foreign nationals resided there: 757 Chinese, 487 Koreans, and 244 Japanese (Sheglov, 2019, p. 76).

3.2.1

Schools in North Sakhalin

Beginning with Stephan, many researchers speak of the Japanization of Northern Sakhalin and the transition of the educational system to the Japanese language (Stephan, 1971, pp. 104–105; Kostanov, 2008, p. 402; Hara, 1995, pp. 77–79).

3.3

Forced Mobilization of Koreans

41

As Vladimir Datsyshen argues, the Japanese occupation paid attention to the development of public education in the Sakhalin territory under their control. By the beginning of the Japanese occupation, there were 13 colleges, 30 teachers, and 544 students. On 24 January 1921, Aleksandrovsk Real School was reopened on Sakhalin. It had five teachers and 17 students. Most teachers in the Real School were Russian advisers to the Japanese Military-Administrative Department. In 1923, the Japanese opened several lower elementary schools, which introduced free education. By the time North Sakhalin became part of the USSR, there were 24 schools with 46 teachers and 900 students. The Military Administrative Department of Sakhalin ordered the textbooks for the Russian schools through the Japanese Expeditionary Army in Vladivostok. They ordered 2365 copies of textbooks covering 35 subjects. However, only 1853 copies of 22 subjects were received from Vladivostok. During the occupation, Russian children on Northern Sakhalin received school supplies, shoes, and clothing as gifts collected through the media, schools, and public organizations of Southern Sakhalin. For example, in South Sakhalin, the newspapers Minami Karafuto Nichi-Nichi Shimbun and Minami Karafuto Minyu Shimbun organized gifts for Russian schoolchildren in the spring of 1921. Additionally, students at Karafuto elementary schools in the towns of Ōtomari (Ōdomari) and Funami delivered 2050 packages to Russian schoolchildren, “with various things necessary for studies and, in addition, several pairs of stockings and gloves” (Datsyshen, 2014, pp. 193–209).

3.3

Forced Mobilization of Koreans

After the National mobilization law of 1938, forced mobilization of Koreans to Sakhalin began. Korean diaspora history researcher Yulia Din stresses that Karafuto had its own characteristics, and here the Japanese authorities often preferred voluntary recruitment through acquaintances and relatives (Din, 2015, p. 63). Researchers of the Korean diaspora Bok Zi Kou and Park Seung Ui on Sakhalin distinguish the following stages of forced migration: The first (September 1939 to February 1942) are the years of recruitment, a time of semi-forced mobilization by Japanese entrepreneurs. The second (February 1942 to September 1944) may be described as state-organized recruitment. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japan began to experience an acute shortage of labor in the steel industry. The third period of forced mobilization existed from September 1944 to August 1945. It was the most tragic period in the fate of the Koreans, which may be called labor duty. Japan found itself in a dire situation in the Pacific war. In February 1944, the government issued a People’s Labour Service Order. In fulfilment of that order, a total mobilization was carried out. In addition, during the second half of 1944, when military operations in the Pacific intensified, Japan resorted to another recruitment drive. On 11 August 1944, the Japanese government transferred around 10,000 Sakhalin miners from Karafuto to mines in Ibaraki and

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Kyushu (Bok, 1993, pp. 38–44; Park, 2019, pp. 42–43). Among them were 3000 Koreans (Din, 2015, p. 67). Of course, even during the period of semi-forced mobilization, conditions were challenging enough. Din quotes the following interview: I came in 1943 through recruitment. They [Japanese authorities] were choosing and signing everyone up for recruitment. From our family, they were to take my elder brother, but he was married. So, the family decided that I had to go. I was going first by steamboat and then by train, to the mine in Krasnogorsk. We worked 12 hours a day, without days off, food was given out on coupons. You could eat it all at once or stretch it out. They did not give any money. They put it on the bankbook. We did not try to escape. If they had caught us, they could even put us “behind the barbed wire”, the conditions there were much worse (Din, 2015, p. 64).

“To put prisoners behind barbed wire” implied the Takobeya system. It used prisoners to build roads, fell timber, work in mines, and other convict labor. It began in Hokkaido in the nineteenth century, using Japanese prisoners, and was used throughout Japan and the colonies, including Karafuto, during the Second World War. The main contingent was Korean and Chinese laborers who were put there for the slightest offence and sometimes without committing any crime. Their working conditions were exorbitant, and they had no human rights (Bok, 1993, pp. 46–52; Kilsang & Katayama, 2001). The forcible mobilization of the population to Karafuto, including re-mobilization in Kyushu, combined with the impossibility of repatriation, led to the problem of separated families, where children and parents, husbands and wives were forcibly separated and could only be reunited 50 years after the end of the war. Many families are still searching for their relatives.

3.4

Minority Policy and Interaction Between Different Groups of Population

Just as in the northern part of the island, the authorities divided minority policy into policies towards indigenous peoples and migrants of foreign origin, most of whom were Koreans in Karafuto. The indigenous population in Karafuto was less than 2000, three quarters of whom were Ainu. Many Karafuto Ainu displaced to Hokkaido in 1875 died there, although some returned to Karafuto after 1905. Ainu, who did not choose Japanese citizenship in 1875, continued to live on Karafuto. According to data from the Karafuto-chō in 1932, 1475 Ainu lived on Karafuto (Karafuto-chō, 1933, p. 35). In 1933 all Karafuto Ainu received Japanese citizenship (Karafuto-chō, 1942, p. 411). In the 1941 census, their number was 1272. There is an indication that, traditionally, the Ainu were presented in the records as indigenous (dojin), but since they received Japanese Family Registration (koseki) in 1933, from 1939, they were included in the category of Japanese (naichijin), with the addendum ‘former Ainu’ enclosed in brackets (Karafuto-chō, 1941, p. 19). Karafuto was inhabited by

3.4

Minority Policy and Interaction Between Different Groups of Population

43

approximately 100 Nivkh and 300 Uilta people (Karafuto-chō, 1933, pp. 335–336), and the Japanese government established measures for these groups. Otasu, or Otasu no mori, a settlement for the indigenous population, was created in 1926, near Shisuka (present-day Poronaysk). It was the designated place of residence for the Orok (Uilta), Gilyak (Nivkh), Thunder (Ulchi), Kirin (Evenki), and Yakut, who had been gathered there. Japanese policy concerning the Koreans on Karafuto was linked to what was happening in the Korean peninsula and Japan proper. In the colonial period and especially during the Second World War, Japan enforced assimilation policies based on colonial racism, which claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of the same racial group and that Koreans were in a subordinate position in the hierarchy of the Japanese empire. Under the slogan, nissen ittai (Japan and Korea as One), the Japanese language was to be exclusively used in media and schools, and Koreans had to change their names to Japanese (Lee, 2013, p. 46). Regarding other migrants, for example, Russians or Poles, the policy was rather indifferent. There were no special supportive measures, nor can we say that there was overt discrimination. This situation can be explained by the fact that there were very few of them, and many of them were citizens of other states, unlike the Koreans, who had special civil status (shinmin) within the Japanese empire.

3.4.1

Pre-war Japanese Korean Families

Despite discrimination against the Korean population on Sakhalin, Korean and Japanese interactions differed from those experienced in the Korean peninsula or Japan proper. This interaction between the Japanese and Koreans began before the war and continued after it. Both Koreans and many Japanese who moved to Sakhalin were usually poor people looking for a better life in a new land. In terms of social class, Japanese and Koreans in Sakhalin were close to each other. In other words, despite the problems between the Japanese and Koreans, the interactions between them were easier on socio-economic grounds. Therefore, intermarriage between Koreans and Japanese and the adoption of children existed before the war. Nakayama argues that the number of Korean Japanese couples before 1945 is estimated to be several hundred (Nakayama, 2015, p. 32). Japanese writer and critic Yoshitake Teruko (Yoshitake, 2005, p. 410, p. 428), in her book about Japanese women who remained in Sakhalin after 1945, mentions the following cases: “Yamamoto Mie was born in 1936; from the age of one, she was living in Shiritori (Karafuto); her father was Korean.” “Banyama Teruko was born in 1937 in Tottori. Her Korean father was born in 1911; her Japanese mother was born in 1918. The father worked at a mine in Kyushu and somehow met her mother, who was born in Tottori. When Banyama Teruko was two years old, they moved to Sakhalin.” Both examples are of people who got married inside Japan and then moved to Karafuto. But there are also examples of marriage in Karafuto: “Nedzu

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Misao came to Karafuto in 1932 to help her sister, who had given birth to a child. When they were living in Yokunai, a town in Karafuto, her sister recommended a potential partner to her sister with the comment, ‘Though he is Korean, he’s a good man’. The following year, when she turned 19, Misao married this Korean man, who was 15 years older than her” (Yoshitake, 2005, p. 114). Russian author Konstantin Gaponenko, in his book Mizuho Village, in the chapter “The Japanese Sato’s Sons-in-Law and their Short Happiness,” gives a detailed account of the story of the Koreans Natsukawa Masao and Matsushita Jiro and the Japanese women Honda Misako and her sister Honda Miyoko, who married before the war. Gaponenko says that it was genuine happiness for a Korean to find a wife and a home; for Japanese girls, although it was preferable to marry Japanese, the Japanese male population, especially in the villages, was so small that marriages with Koreans were not uncommon: The rural community looked at such marriages more than condescendingly. And if anyone looked unkindly at the Koreans, they had to bow harder and endure in silence (Gaponenko, 2012, p. 59).

Such examples from the literature about Karafuto are reflected in the many interviews I conducted with Japanese and Korean residents in Sakhalin and repatriates in Hokkaido. For example, Tn. recalls his parents (Korean father and Japanese mother) who married before the war: My father had come to Hokkaido from Korea as a worker when he was 14 years old. In Hokkaido, he met my mother, but then the mother and her parents moved to Sakhalin. Later, the father was recruited with 16 other workers to go to Sakhalin. They got married in Sakhalin in 1936 or 1937, after which I was born (Tn 2 case, Paichadze interview, Hyun & Paichadze 2015, pp. 201-202).

Or O remembers about her grandmothers and grandfather: One of my grandmothers was from a wealthy Japanese family and fell in love with a Korean working for her parents as a chauffeur in her youth. The feelings were mutual, but for neither social nor national reasons, they could not be approved. So, they decided to run away to Sakhalin and start a family there. They had four children, the youngest of whom was my mother (O case, Paichadze interview).

It should be noted that marriages were mainly between Japanese women and Korean men. Little is known about the reverse during this period. However, the families of these people, including Korean families, did not approve of such marriages (Naga, 2001). In addition, there was a shortage of Japanese men and an overabundance of Korean men. Besides marriages, there were also adoptions, primarily by Koreans of Japanese children. The most common reason for placing children in foster care was economic hardship in Japanese families with many children. For example, S was adopted by a Japanese-Korean family before the war: My mother moved with my older sister from Biei (a town in Hokkaido) to Sakhalin. My father worked in the mines. When my mother was pregnant with me, one day, he left and didn't come home ever again. My mother found it very difficult economically when I was born, so she gave me up to her Korean acquaintances, who had no children. My birth mother lived

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near us. She and especially my sister often came to visit us (S case, Paichadze interview, 2014, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, pp. 65-66).

Adoptive parents of S came to Karafuto from Japan, they spoke Japanese at home, and until the war ended, she had no idea they were Korean.

3.4.2

Schools and Minority Education in Karafuto

The first Karafuto school appeared almost immediately after the settlers moved onto the island. According to Sophia Lim, this is due to several reasons, such as the general Japanese attitude towards education, the introduction of compulsory primary education, the parents’ desire, and the aim of colonizing the island and educating their personnel. Between August and October 1906, authorities opened three Ordinary (elementary) schools in Ōtomari (Ōdomari.212 students and four teachers), Toyohara (20 students and two teachers), Maoka (97 students and three teachers). However, the inhabitants of rural fishing villages were in dire need of schools for their children, often using their own money to open private schools like the Terakoyа1 (Lim, 1999, pp. 42–43). Ikeda Yuko, a Japanese researcher on the school system in Karafuto, gives the following data on primary schools. Between 1908 and 1912, the number of public (prefectural) schools remained the same, with three schools, but student numbers increased from 1492 to 1808. The number of private schools increased from 20 in 1908 to 68 in 1912. The number of students in these schools rose from 618 (1908) to 3105 (1912) (Ikeda, 2016, p. 6). As we can see from her data, the total number of primary school students and private primary schools increased. Ikeda shows that between 1910 and 1911, there was a heated debate in society about how secondary education should be in Karafuto. In 1910 the following opinion was expressed by a group of the “pro-education” people: Based on the recognition that there were few parents who would allow their children to go on to higher education in the country after graduation from school, and that “the adoption of a junior high school system is something that we would like to see implemented, but it will take many more years to achieve.” Тhe report stated that education in fisheries, mining, agriculture and forestry should be provided as a “temporary measure” until then (Ikeda, 2016, p. 6).

In 1911 a debate broke out between supporters of general education schools who argued that if general education schools were opened, their graduates could then go to the interior and continue their studies. On the other hand, special schools in Karafuto were still very underdeveloped, meaning graduates would not be able to

1 Terakoya were temple schools or private elementary schools that taught reading and writing to the children of Japanese commoners during the Edo period.

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find work. Opponents of this theory argued that it was vocational education that was necessary for Karafuto’s development: It is necessary to have agriculture and forestry schools with pulp entrepreneurship in mind and fishery schools to support key industries. The graduates of junior high schools were superior to those of industrial schools in general talent, but in one specialty, they are worth. . . (Ikeda, 2016, p. 6–7).

In 1912 the first Junior High school (gymnasium) in Karafuto was opened in Ōtomari(Ōdomari). In April 1925, a secondary school was opened in Toyohara, and in 1927 in Maoka. In 1920 the Educational Reform in Karafuto made all primary schools municipal and established a single public elementary school system funded by the local government. The authorities officially stated that this reform aimed to advance the colonization of the island better. In 1920, there were 22 schools with 267 teachers and 12,471 children. In 1935, there were 210 schools with 10,406 teachers and 43,495 students. In 1915, a private school Girls [Junior] high school was opened. In 1925 this school was reorganized into Municipal Girls High School. Then, schools of this type appeared in Toyohara, Maoka, and Tomariuru. Finally, in 1930, the colonization process led to a sharp increase in the population on the west coast and a female high school was established in Shisuka. Gradually secondary and vocational education also began to develop in Karafuto (Lim, 1999, p. 57) (Fig. 3.1). Just as in the North, one of the main aims of the schools in Karafuto was to educate their personnel and secure people on the island. The schools were also supposed to be transmitters of general state ideology. Thus, they fostered a sense of

Fig. 3.1 School in Chinnai (Krasnogorsk) 1943. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) (A copy of the photo was obtained from Kabaren (All Japan Federation of Karafuto) for an exhibition at the Sakhalin Regional Museum, where it is currently on deposit)

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belonging to Karafuto on the one hand and “love for the Japanese empire” on the other. These attitudes were extended to indigenous and migrant children as well. Sometimes, fostering a love for the Japanese empire had the opposite effect, and reinforced children’s Karafutoness. Nakayama (2015, p. 37) also argues that “educators on Karafuto faced ideological and cultural issues. As the number of children born in Karafuto who felt Karafuto to be ‘home’ increased, teachers had to teach them the meanings of Karafuto and Karafutoan identity, which had to be in harmony with broader Japanese nationalism and imperialism.” As an example Nakayama citied the sentiments of one student from this period: When one of my father’s friends died, those who knew him said it was a pity that he had come to such a place and died. But for those of us born in Karafuto, it is not a place for migrant labourers or a place people drifted to: it is home. It is not a pity but our desire to work here and to die here (Nakayama, 2015, p. 37).

Ikeda (2019, p. 44) gives the example of school trips for girls from Toyohara High School to Japan proper, to develop their love for the motherland and inspire the unity of citizens of the Japanese Empire. However, through their interactions with the “people of the motherland” on the trip, the students experienced the hierarchy of the people of naichi (Japan proper) and gaichi (Colonies), and the distance between themselves and the “people of the motherland” who perceived them as “backward.” As a result, rather than a spirit of love for the motherland Japan, they developed their patriotism for warm Karafuto (Fig. 3.2).

Fig. 3.2 Japanese class in Chinnai 1943. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) (A copy of the photo was obtained from Kabaren (All Japan Federation of Karafuto) for an exhibition at the Sakhalin Regional Museum, where it is currently on deposit)

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The organization of education for different ethnic minorities was varied. As I said above, Karafuto had around 2000 indigenous people. Apart from the Ainu, approximately 100 Nivkh and 300 Uilta people (Karafuto-chō, 1933, pp. 335–336) and other small groups, such as the Evenks and Yakuts, inhabited Karafuto. Тhe Japanese government established measures for these groups. At the previously mentioned indigenous settlement, Otasu, a dojin gakkō, or school for the indigenous population, was built (Tanaka & Geeldanu, 1978, pp. 39–43). These schools provided education in the Japanese language and Japanese values to indigenous children. The Ainu also attended dojin gakkō, but then, with the acquisition of Japanese family registration in 1933 (koseki), they started attending regular Japanese schools. Regarding the Korean population, as I said above, under the slogan, nissen ittai, the Japanese language was exclusively used in media and schools. Moreover, the primary purpose of education is to foster loyal people, cultivate one nation, and spread the national language, Japanese. In the Korean peninsula, the first Korean Education Ordinance was promulgated on 24 August 1911, after the annexation of Korea. There were the Ordinary schools (elementary schools), High schools (Junior high schools), Girls (Junior) High schools, and some training courses. Until recently, there was no evidence of ordinary schools for the Korean population in Karafuto. However, Korean scholar Lee Jun Young (2019), in his study of the Korean society in Karafuto, found mention in the Karafuto Shinbun newspaper about the establishment of a Korean private primary schools in Tokonbozawaoku, a compact settlement of Koreans near Hondo, in 1927. The school was founded by Park Byung Il.2 Besides Tokonbozawaoku, he wanted to establish a colony in Asanai. One of his ideas was to organize a compact settlement for the scattered Koreans of South Sakhalin, where they would receive land, live and work. In a newspaper article, we can read that Park Byung Il applied for an organized school located in a place with good ventilation and sunshine in the highlands among farms. The school building and offices occupied about 100 tsubo.3 The teachers for this school were to be invited from Korea. In 1927 the school had eight students, with the estimated number of them 50. The teaching methods were designed for students in a regular school, but the focus was on Japanese in teaching the official language (kokugo) (Karafuto Nichi nichi shinbun, 13.02.1927). However, such schools were the exception rather than the rule. Тhe most significant difference between Korea and Karafuto was that in Karafuto (as in Japan

2

Park Byung Il (1 July 1878 -?), born in Gwangju-gun, Gyeonggi-do. He was also known as Park Yong Hwan and Park Kyo Hwan. Park Byeong Il ran a department store and financial business in Jeonno, Gyeongsongbu, but failed in business and moved to Vladivostok in 1917. He later succeeded in business by running a company and became an influential figure in a village in the Korean village of Sinhan, near Vladivostok. He began working as a secret agent for the Japanese administration during the Japanese Siberian intervention (1918–1922). In 1921 he was appointed the vice-president of Association of Korean people in Vladivostok. Japanese troops withdrew from Siberia in December 1922, and due to threats to his person, he emigrated to North Sakhalin on 25 January 1923 and then to Honto on South Sakhalin in 1924. 3 One tsubo of 3.306 m2.

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proper) there were no different schools for Korean and Japanese children who thus studied together. Below, let’s see what the school environment was like and how Korean children felt in Japanese schools: At the time, I went to a Japanese school because there was no Korean school, and my name was also Japanese – Yasuda. It was very difficult because all the lessons were conducted in Japanese. Also, we studied together with Japanese children, and they constantly humiliated us by calling us “chosen nippa” (Korean salad made from fresh vegetables) (Park, 2019, p. 49).

On the other hand, here is a different example of a school memory (Km case): My parents did not speak Japanese, but we came from Japan to Sakhalin, so my brothers and I spoke Japanese. We had no problems at school. But some children did not speak at all, and of course, they had problems (Km case, Paichadze and Hyun interview).

For many Koreans born in the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese is their only language of literacy (see Chap. 5). It is also the language of their childhood and school socialization. Here I want to give an example of what happened in Ansan (South Korea) in 2013. It was my first visit to Gohyang maeul (or Kohyang maul), an area where returnees from Sakhalin live (for details, see Chap. 5). I was with my children, who were then attending a Japanese primary school. Repatriate P, a first-generation ethnic Korean we were to interview, said she spoke only Korean and some Russian, but no Japanese. During our lunch together, which included both Koreans and Russians, we communicated in those two languages. Then my children switched and started speaking Japanese amongst themselves. Much to our surprise, P suddenly started talking to them in Japanese too, asking them about school and telling them that she had also gone to Japanese school until the third grade. I repeated my question in Japanese about whether P spoke the Japanese language. She immediately switched to Russian and said that she didn’t. So, we can assume that Japanese was a language of communication for her as a child, so when she heard “children’s Japanese” she started speaking (Paichadze, observation, Ansan, 2013). In addition to language influence, Korean children were also influenced by Japanese ideology in Japanese schools. For example, Japanese photographer and publicist Katayama Michio introduces the following interview with Korean Jung (Ten) Tae Sik about his childhood in Karafuto (Fig. 3.3): My dream was to go to a military training course. All boys at that time dreamt of this. We now realize that this was all because of propaganda about Japanese militarism... If you think about it now, we Koreans were brought up as Japanese. And no one asked that question. I don't think my mother knew I wanted to go to military training. She couldn't even imagine that her child wanted to fight for Japan. At the time, I thought it was great to be Japanese. Every morning at eight o'clock, the lights flashed three times. No one had a watch. I went to school with an aluminium lunch box. My favourite subjects were math and physical education. I remember in physical education, we used to have sumo competitions. I didn't like history. There we went through Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Korean War . . .

Katayama writes that even this boy who was excellent in his studies was not interested in Korean history class. Also, he wrote about the boy’s mother’s feelings: “His mother was happy for her maturing son day by day. But there were only four or

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Fig. 3.3 Sport festival and military training in Japanese school, Shisuka 1938. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum) (A copy of the photo was obtained from Kabaren (All Japan Federation of Karafuto) for an exhibition at the Sakhalin Regional Museum, where it is currently on deposit)

five Korean children in the whole school, and the rest were Japanese. Japanese teachers taught from Japanese textbooks. She was proud of her son, who was as good as the Japanese children in his studies, but at the same time, she was worried that her child might lose his national identity” (Katayama, 2019, p. 495). Discrimination of Korean children in Japanese schools and the influence of the Japanese ideology on them is an indisputable fact. However, we cannot say that all contacts between Korean and Japanese were only negative. Din also argues that “respect and even some reverence for Japanese education can be found among all respondents who are from the first-generation of Sakhalin Koreans.” Those Koreans who studied in Japanese schools speak out on this matter with extreme respect, often giving the highest appreciation specifically to the knowledge they received in Japanese schools and gymnasiums” (Din, 2021, p. 72). There are many aspects of cultural memory. Of course, the Japanese culture and language were dominant: Korean children went to Japanese schools and spoke Japanese in everyday life. Some Korean children in Japanese schools had problems related to their ethnic origin and their Japanese language level. However, many

3.5

Conclusion of the Chapter

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Sakhalin Koreans warmly remembered their school years. They successfully completed Japanese school and used the Japanese language, both in everyday life and their job. After the war, Korean children moved from Japanese to Korean schools. S recalls that after the closure of Japanese schools, half of her class transferred to Korean schools. There were Korean children and children from Japanese-Korean families (S case, Paichadze interview, 2014, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p. 68). However, even for Korean children, such a transition was not always painless. Din also argues that there were comments that demonstrated resentment if they had the experience of exclusion from a Japanese school, as can be seen from this interviewee’s response: “We studied in a Japanese school, and after the war... Korean schools were opened. So, the teacher came in and said: all Koreans leave the classroom, now you will study elsewhere. And we left. . .” (Din, 2021, p. 72). We can see the same example in Yoshitake’s book (2005, p. 141).

Despite the positive and negative aspects of cultural memory from this period, it should be noted that in the pre-war period, despite the interaction between Japanese and Korean populations, there was not the large-scale impact of the Korean language and culture to the Japanese. However, the situation changed dramatically after the war.

3.5

Conclusion of the Chapter

In this chapter, we looked at Japan’s settlement strategy and migration policy in Karafuto. After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan’s objectives there shifted from strategic to economic. As in the case of Russia/USSR, the initial colonization of the island was agrarian in nature, but due to the difficulties of agricultural production, and especially the inability to grow rice, colonization took on an industrial character and coal, forestry, and fishing industries began to develop on the island. Industrial colonization improved the population inflow to the island in the 1920s, but these processes peaked during organized migration from the late 1920s to the mid-1930s. The pre-war and war situation led to the forced migration of the Korean population to the island. Aside from the Japanese being the majority population of Karafuto, many different ethnic groups, including indigenous people and migrants, also lived there. Education on Sakhalin, apart from sharing common aims with the Japanese Empire’s education, such as the spread of the Japanese language and ideology, aimed to anchor the inhabitants on the island and create their Karafuto identity. Despite the policy of Japanization, the close social and economic background of all migrants led to quite active intercommunication between the ethnic majority and minorities on the island, including the formation of multicultural families. The deterioration of the world’s political situation and the economic situation in Japan

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during the war led to changes in this part of the island as well. In the Russian part of the island the Korean population disappeared entirely because of repression and deportations, while in Karafuto the forcible mobilization resulted in its increase. The approach of war also impacted Sakhalin’s indigenous population, both in the North and the South, where they were both used as and suspected of being spies. In such a situation, Sakhalin met with the war between the USSR and Japan from August to September 1945.

References Aboltin, V. Y. (1928). Ostrov sokrovishch. Knizhnoe delo. Bok, Z. (1993). Koreitsy na Sakhaline. Sakhalinskii tsentr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii. Datsyshen, V. (2014). Russko-yaponskiye otnosheniya na Severnom Sakhaline v period yaponskoy okkupatsii (1920–1925). Yaponiya. Ezhegodnik, 43, 193–209. Din, Y. (2015). Koreyskaya diaspora Sakhalina: problema repatriatsii i integratsiya v sovetskoye i rossiyskoye obshchestvo. Ministerstvo kul'tury Sakhalinskoy oblasti. Din, Y. (2021). Japan and Japanese in memory of Sakhalin Koreans. In G. Buntilov & S. Paichadze (Eds.), Russia and its East Asian neighbors: Regions and people beyond borders (pp. 69–77). Hokkaido University. Fedorchuk, S. (2015). Russkie na Karafuto. Institut obrazovaniya Sakhalinskoy oblasti. Gaponenko, K. (2012). Tragediya derevni Mizuho. Yuzhno Sakhalinskaya tipografia. Hara, T. (1995). Pōtsumasu jōyaku kara nisso kion jōyaku e – Kita Saharin wo megutte. In T. Hara & T. Togawa (Eds.), Kō-za Surabu no sekai. Tōkyō. Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2015). Multi-layered identities of returnees in their ‘historical homeland’: Returnees from Sakhalin. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 195–211). Routledge. Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2016). Saharin zanryū: nikkanro hyaku nen ni wataru kazoku no monogatari. Kōbunken. Ikeda, Y. (2016). Karafuto saisho no chūgakkō sōsetsu ― Nakagawa Kojūrō no yakuwari ni chakumoku shite. Shakai shisutemu kenkyū, 33, 1–26. Ikeda, Y. (2019). Karafuto-chō Toyohara kōtō jogakkō no shūgakuryokō:1940-nen no ‘seichi sanpai’ wo chūshin ni. Tōkaidaigaku kokusai bunka gakubu kiyō dai, 12, 31–47. Katayama, M. (2019). Oduvanchiki v merzloi zemle. In: S. S. Paichadze, & I. A. Valdman (Eds.), Rossiya i strany ATR: migratsionnyye protsessy i problemy mezhkul’turnoy kommunikatsii. Aziya v Rossii (pp. 477–503). NGTU. Kilsang (Nam, H.), & Katayama, M. (2001). Saharin monogatari – kunan no jinsei o tadotta Chōsen hito-tachi no shōgen. Garivuā sōsho. Kostanov, A. (2008). Yaponskaya okkupatsiya Severnogo Sakhalina. Aprel’ 1920 – May 1925. In M. Vysokov et al. (Eds.), Istoriya Sakhalina i Kuril’skikh ostrovov s drevneyshikh vremen do nachala XXI stoletiya (pp. 396–403). Yuzhno-Sakhalinskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo. Lee, J. (2019). Joseoninui Galahuto(sahallin) ijuwa sahoe hyeongseong. A study on Korean migration to Sakhalin and social formation. (PhD thesis). Hanyang University. Lee, S. (2013). Multicultural education and language ideology in South Korea. Working Papers in Educational Linguistics, 28(1), 43–60. Lim, S. (1999). Istoriya razvitiya shkol’noy sistemy na Sakhaline (1855–1945). MGPU. Miki, M. (2012). Ijū-gata shokuminchi Karafuto no keisei. Hanawa shobō. Naga, S. (2001). Nihon to nihonjin ni fukai kankei ga aru baba tānya no monogatari. Bungeishunjū.

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Nakayama, T. (2015). Japanese society on Karafuto. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 19–41). Routledge. Nakayama, T. (2019). Yapontsy na Sakhaline: formirovaniye i raspad yaponskogo soobshchestva pereselentsev na Karafuto. In S. S. Paichadze & I. A. Valdman (Eds.), Rossiya i strany ATR: Migratsionnyye protsessy i problemy mezhkul’turnoy kommunikatsii. Aziya v Rossii (pp. 201–224). NGTU. Park, S. (2019). Sakhalinskie koreitsy v poiskax identifikatsii. Pero. Sheglov, V. (2019). Opyt Sakhalinskih pereseleniy (1853–2002). Ministerstvo kul’tury i arhivnogo dela Sakhalinskoy oblasti. Stephan, J. (1971). Sakhalin. Clarendon Press. Takeno, M. (2013). Hoshō senryō ka kitakarafuto ni okeru nihonjin no katsudō (1920–1925). Keizaigaku kenkyū, 62(3), 31–48. Tanaka, R., & Geeldanu, D. (1978). Geeldanu – aru hoppō shōsū minzoku no dorama. Gendai-shi no shuppan-kai. Yoshitake, T. (2005). Okizari – Saharin zanryū nihon josei tachi no rokujū nen. Kairyūsha.

Documents GAHK. (State Archive of Khabarovsk Region) F.R-58. Op.2. D. 1. L. 134. Karafuto-chō. Karafuto-chō tōkei-sho. Shōwa16-nen. (1941). Toyohara: Karafuto-chō. Karafuto-chō. Karafuto Yōran. Shōwa 8-nen. (1933). Toyohara: Karafuto-chō. Karafuto-chō. Karafuto Yōran Shōwa 17-nen. (1942). Toyohara: Karafuto-chō. Karafuto Nichi nichi shinbun, February 13, 1927.

Interviews Case Km, Interview Hyun and Paichadze, Inchon 2013. Case O, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2015. Case S, Interview Paichadze, Ebetsu 2015. Case Tn, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2012.

Part II

Postwar Population Movements

Chapter 4

Coexistence, Repatriation, and Those Left Behind (1945-End of the 1950s)

Keywords Repatriation · Left-behind people · After-war Soviet minority policy · Post-war interethnic marriages · Japanese · Korean and Russian Schools · Language in family interactions

4.1

Repatriation of the Japanese Population and the New Ethnic Composition of the Island

On August 9 1945, the Soviet Union, which had abandoned the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact to join the war against Japan, invaded Karafuto. The evacuation of Karafuto began on August 13 1945, two days after the Soviet army crossed the fiftieth parallel. Until the cessation of evacuations on August 23, about 77,000 children, women, and elderly residents evacuated to Hokkaido. Then the evacuation was halted, and those who had not had time to evacuate were returned to their former homes. The planned repatriation of the Japanese population and the repopulation of the island by Soviet inhabitants began thereafter (Nakayama, 2015, p. 28).

4.1.1

Repatriation and Left-Behind People

On November 19, 1946, the USSR and USA reached an agreement regarding the repatriation of Japanese. From December 1946 to July 1949, 279,356 Japanese civilians and soldiers were repatriated from Karafuto (Nakayama, 2015, p. 28). On September 23 1945, the Civil Administration was formed on Sakhalin. Karafuto Prefecture and other Japanese administrative organisations were maintained, and Soviet authorities gave instructions to these organizations for implementing the administration of south Sakhalin. Until January 1946, the Governor of Karafuto, Toshio Otsu, was placed under the supervision of the Soviet authorities (Tonai, 2015, p. 85). In February 1946, the Soviet government declared that it had taken control of southern Sakhalin and established southern Sakhalin Oblast.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3_4

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After the transition of power of Sakhalin to the USSR, the island’s ethnic composition had changed. For four years, Japanese, Koreans, and Russians in Sakhalin had been living side by side. However, gradual repatriation (1946–1949) of Japanese people resulted in the disappearance of the main part of the Japanese population. The exceptions were specialists working in essential industries, prisoners of war, and those Japanese who had family ties to the Koreans. The 23,000 Koreans, unlike the Japanese, were not able to repatriate. After the war, Japan stopped counting them as its nationals, and the Soviet Union needed working hands. At the same time, the Korean Peninsula was divided into zones of influence, and the Allies were considering the problem of Sakhalin Koreans to be too far from their jurisdiction. The Korean War aggravated the situation, and Sakhalin Koreans could only see their homeland again 50 years later, after the Cold War. At the same time, a Korean diaspora was formed on Sakhalin. Most of the Japanese community had been absorbed by the Korean diaspora, which happened due to marriages between Japanese and Koreans and Korean families’ adopting Japanese children. Also, there were various indigenous peoples who lived on Sakhalin: Ainu, Nivkh, Uilta, and other small groups. After the last redistribution of borders between Japan and the USSR in 1945, the Ainu, despite their desire to stay, were moved to Hokkaido, and the Uilta and Nivkh, even if they wanted to leave, were left behind on Sakhalin. At the same time, new migrants began to come to the island. First were Russians and representatives of other republics of the USSR, mainly from areas destroyed during the Second World War. Also, during this period representatives of the Korean diaspora from Central Asia and Kazakhstan came to Sakhalin. The main task of these people was to work in Korean schools, which began to open at the end of 1945. In addition, since the end of the 1940s, workers from China and North Korea have been coming to Sakhalin. Finally, those who refused to return to North Korea remained on Sakhalin and became part of the Korean diaspora. Thus, between 1945 and 1949, Japanese, Koreans, Russians, and representatives of many other nationalities lived on the island.

4.1.2

Interethnic Marriage

Following the arrival of Soviet troops and settlers, the process of interaction with the Russian population (and populations from other Soviet republics) began. However, this interaction was less intensive than that between the remaining Japanese and Koreans. Despite the discrimination against Koreans, which had existed before the war, both Koreans and Japanese had some important commonalities: until the end of the war, they were subjects of the same state; and many Koreans spoke Japanese. After the war, Koreans were liberated, and the Japanese were defeated and repatriated from Sakhalin, thus making the Korean community the largest minority group in Sakhalin. The social dynamic on the island also changed, with the position of

4.1

Repatriation of the Japanese Population and the New Ethnic Composition. . .

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Koreans becoming higher than the Japanese. These social changes also affected the private sphere, including family relations. However, both Koreans and Japanese had many important commonalities. In other words, despite the problems between the two, post-war Sakhalin was a place where a multicultural living space of Japanese and Koreans was forming. For these reasons, the interactions between the communities had existed before the war intensified even further. The number of post-war marriages far exceeds that of pre-war marriages. After the Second World War, the Japanese, most of them women and children, who remained in Sakhalin did so for many different reasons. The presence of single women and single-mother families, with a small number of Japanese men, led to marriages between Japanese women and Korean men and the adoption of Japanese children by Korean parents. These marriages inevitably started the formation of multicultural families (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, p. 202). Often, the formation of Korean-Japanese families is explained as forced marriage (coercion). On some occasions, parents feared Soviet soldiers would sexually abuse their daughters unless they were married (Yoshitake, 2005, p. 42). Other Japanese women were intimidated by Korean men. Angry at their treatment before the war, some Koreans threatened to disclose a woman’s Japanese origin or write a denunciation accusing her of anti-Soviet activities and espionage. Yoshitake recounts the case of Tagami Shigekо, who was told that her family would be sent to Cherman (the prison) unless she married a Korean man who was 8 years older than her (Yoshitake, 2005, pp. 65–68). On the other hand, marriage between Korean men and Japanese women had a deep-rooted image of being families created by Korean men who had been forcibly mobilized but wanted to return to their country and, to realize their desire, they married Japanese women (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, p. 199). Also, we can see a case when Japanese parents, thinking about the economic situation after returning to Japan, decided to leave their daughters in Sakhalin and marry them to Korean men (Gaponenko, 2012, p. 139; Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, pp. 158–159). In the post-war chaos, factors like the above led to forced marriages; however, not all marriages were out of fear. From the examples given by Yoshitake Teruko (2005, p. 67, p. 404) and the stories told by my interviewees, love and mutual benefit also led to marriage in many cases. For example, A, talking about her mother and stepfather: I was hospitalized, and we consequently remained in Sakhalin. To feed and treat me, my mother got a job in a dining hall. There she met Choe, a Korean worker forcibly brought to Sakhalin, who could not return home after the war. Choe started helping her and took care of me, voluntarily giving money for her treatment. After a while, in 1947, they got married, and I had a Korean stepfather. I could not remember my Japanese father, so I felt as if my stepfather was my real father. My parents had seven children, and I helped to take care of my younger stepsiblings (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, p. 207).

One more factor that undoubtedly accelerated the need to marry was poverty. This issue was a factor before the war, but it was even more difficult for women and children to survive in the post-war situation. Many Japanese men died in the war, and

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some of them returned to Japan without their families. Most of the women who were left behind needed help in raising their children. It was primarily an economic necessity. On the other hand, the Koreans who lived in Sakhalin were mostly workers (laborers). They had left their families in Korea or were single; for this reason, many of them sought relationships with Japanese women (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, pp. 204). There were also cases of mutual benefit. For example, a single father and a single mother would form a family for their children’s survival. Through these unions, we can also see another way to create multicultural families: the adoption of children. Child adoption by Korean families existed before and after the war. In Sakhalin, we can see three forms of adoption of children. The first form was adopting children from the first marriage by Korean fathers (and sometimes by mothers). The second form was the adoption of a child abandoned by their biological parents. In this form of adoption, there were cases when contact with the biological parent continued (pre-war cases) and when it was stopped entirely. The third form was not a full adoption: it consisted only of sending a child to work at another house (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, pp. 204–205). In the first two cases, the child received a Korean name and the surname of the adoptive parent and usually went to a Korean school. The school strengthened the “Korean identity” of the Japanese children, which was already developed in their families. School has always played a significant role in the general and language socialization of children. Schools disseminate norms, customs, and ideologies, providing individuals with the skills and habits necessary for participating within their societies. After the repatriation of the main part of the Japanese population, Japanese schools were closed. In their place, Russian and Korean schools were opened. The later attracting many children from Korean-Japanese families (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, p. 205).

4.2 4.2.1

Ethnic Policy and Coexistence of Japanese, Korean, and Russian Schools Ethnic Policy

The Soviet national policy on Sakhalin at that time was aimed at supporting national minorities. Describing the system of public education of South Sakhalin by the Japanese administration, the Civil Administration emphasized that, “There were no schools of national minorities (for the Korean or the Ainu)” (Istoricheskie chteniya, 1994, p. 139). However, despite criticism from all national minorities under Japanese rule, ethnic minority schools were open only to the Korean population. These schools opened at the end of 1945 and existed until 1963. One of the reasons why other ethnic schools were not opened is that the number of students was small in each

4.2

Ethnic Policy and Coexistence of Japanese, Korean, and Russian Schools

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village or town. Amano Naoki (2012) argues that it was a particular policy to support the Korean people. According to Amano, in the general Soviet situation inherited by the explicit Russian-centrism that began before the war toward the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union were to exceptionally develop “Particular philanthropic policies” in the latter half of the 1940s. Amano explains that this “philanthropical policy” was based on principles of the “affirmative action empire” (Amano, 2012, pp. 132–135, see also Chap. 2) of the Soviet Union. As I explained in Chap. 2, according to Terry Martin (Martin, 2001), affirmative action is a policy that has existed since the Soviet Union was formed in 1922 to the Great Purge of Stalin in 1937. It supported the language, ethnic identity, and so on of each Soviet nation. One of the purposes of these policies was to curb national movements. Martin’s research ended in the pre-war era, but as Amano points out, this “particular philanthropical policy” still existed in Sakhalin even after the war. However, this was not an exceptional policy in Sakhalin, but a policy implemented in new Soviet-controlled areas, for example, in the Baltic republics. In any case, the Soviet administration supported the initiative of the Korean population, and Korean schools on Sakhalin were opened.

4.2.2

Japanese, Korean, and Russian Schools

Korean schools began to open at the end of 1945 (Istoricheskie chteniya, 1994, p. 156), and in 1946 the Soviet Civil administration (Sakhalin Government of this period) issued the order to increase their number (Istoricheskie chteniya, 1994, pp. 156–157). However, the administration did not neglect the regular operation of Japanese schools because it understood that for the everyday life of the Japanese population, Japanese schools had to be stable as well. The Civil Administration of Southern Sakhalin attached great importance to the opening of schools, so from November 2, seven Russian schools began to work in various cities of Southern Sakhalin. In Toyohara, the largest secondary school with capacity for 250 students was opened (Istoricheskie chteniya, 1994, p. 49). On September 9, 1945, the Civil Administration of Southern Sakhalin issued a directive to the Acting Governor of Southern Sakhalin, Otsu Toshio, on restoring Japanese schools. This directive states that, despite the previous instructions of the administration, many schools still did not work, fuel for the schools was not provided, the salaries of teachers at some schools had not been paid, and schools had not been prepared for the winter. The directive ordered the Acting Governor to take immediate measures to restore the schools (Istoricheskie chteniya, 1994, p. 48). On July 1 1946, there were 349 Japanese schools in South Sakhalin with 60,301 students (Fig. 4.1). In addition, the first Korean schools were opened at the end of 1945. The motivation for opening Korean schools was similar in Japan and Sakhalin. The first generation of Koreans who, during the colonial period, studied in Japanese schools began to create Korean schools to teach their children the Korean language

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Fig. 4.1 Japanese school in 1947. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum)

Fig. 4.2 Korean school in 1947. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum)

and culture (Song, 2012, p. 57). Initially, the creation of the schools was based on the idea of “preparing for the return to home.” Sakhalin Koreans shared this idea and began to apply it to regional authorities (Istoricheskie chteniya, 1994, p. 157) (Fig. 4.2). All schools, including Japanese, were under the authority of the Public Education Department of the Civil Administration. In Japanese schools, curricula were adjusted by removing subjects such as geography and history. The Public Education

4.2

Ethnic Policy and Coexistence of Japanese, Korean, and Russian Schools

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Table 4.1 Schools and number of students for the 1946–47 academic year (GIASO, F. 54. Op. 1. D. 238. L. 160–161) Schools Number of Russian schools in North Sakhalin Number of students at the Russian schools in North Sakhalin Number of Russian schools in South Sakhalin Number of students at the Russian schools in South Sakhalin Number of Japanese and Korean schools Number of students at the Japanese and Korean schools Total number of schools Total number of students

September 1, 1946 115 18,013 149 14,755 324 62,111 588 94,879

July 1, 1947 112 15,789 165 20,775 270 29,472 547 66,036

Department organized special seminars for Japanese teachers (GIASO, F.143. Op.7. D.3.L.13) (Table 4.1). As mentioned above, Korean schools on Sakhalin were opened on the initiative of the Korean population but were created as public schools. The Civil Administration of Southern Sakhalin, at the end of 1945, had already taken action to open them. To see the dynamics, we can consider the number of schools opened and attendance figures for each district. In the 1945–1946 academic year, Korean primary schools were in the following cities: in Honto (Nevelsk), with one school with 151 students; in Toyohara (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), with one school with 183 students at the beginning of the school year and 196 at the end; in Ochiai (Dolinsk), with two schools with 390 students at the beginning of the school year and 280 at the end; in Shiritoru (Makarov), with two schools with 465 students at the beginning of the school year and 376 at the end (of these students, 348 transferred to the next class, and 28 had to repeat the school year); in Shisuka (Poronaysk), there were four schools with 56 students at the beginning of the school year and 104 at the end; and in Lesogorsk district, with four schools with 296 students at the beginning of the school year and 288 at the end. The schools at this stage offered additional Korean language lessons for Korean children studying general subjects in Japanese schools. In the 1948–1949 academic year, there were 62 Korean primary schools and 12 seven-year schools in Sakhalin. Subsequently, the network of schools developed and increased to a maximum in 1950. In this year, the total number of Korean schools reached 87 (50 primary schools and 37 seven-year schools), and the number of students was 7000. The increase in number of students was primarily due to the transfer of students from Japanese schools and the arrival of children from north Korea. The schools’ increase was also related to the closing of Japanese schools and an increasing Korean population. If in 1945 there were about 24,000 Koreans, then in 1959 (according to the first post-war census), their number increased to almost 43,000 people. In addition to a traditionally high birth rate, the Korean diaspora grew by other groups of the Korean ethnic population who arrived on the islands. In the second half of the 1940s, a group of “workers from north Korea” (about 11,500 people) and “mainland Koreans” (about 2000 people) joined the number of Koreans in the Sakhalin Oblast (Din & Paichadze, 2018, p. 81).

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The transfer of Korean schools from the Japanese to the Soviet education system began in January 1947. Russian was taught weekly for 12 hours for grades 1–3 and 2–3 hours a day for grades 7–8. In the initial period, teachers in Korean schools were mainly low-skilled and unfamiliar with the Soviet educational system because they had previously studied in Japanese schools. People from North Korea who had arrived for recruitment in 1946–1949 sometimes also worked in the schools. To replace a significant part of these teachers and in connection with the expansion of the network of Korean schools, the Sakhalin regional authorities hired Soviet Koreans from Central Asia. However, since among the Koreans from Central Asia there were many descendants of fighters for the independence of Korea from Japan, it was difficult for these people to understand the specifics of Sakhalin, mainly why children speak and read in Japanese. This dynamic led to many conflicts, both between students and teachers and teachers and parents. During the post-war stage, when there was hope for repatriation, their main goal was to develop the native language by Korean children. Then, when it became clear that repatriation of the Korean population was impossible, the language became a way to preserve national identity. Korean schools were opened by an “initiative from below,” but they were also part of the Soviet system. One task for the Korean teachers from mainland Russia and the Republics of Central Asia was Sovietization the local Korean population. However, despite the negative aspect of ideological control over schools, the positive side of these processes should be acknowledged. Children could continue or start their education in their native language in schools for which there was economic support from the state. In 1949, after the repatriation of the main part of the Japanese population, Japanese schools were closed. Some of the children from Japanese and Korean families went to Russian schools, but many children from Korean-Japanese families or Japanese children who Koreans adopted attended Korean schools. Therefore, school played an important role in socialization as well as consolidating language and identity. Education in Korean schools for Japanese children was not hassle-free. They faced problems of discrimination, and their main problem was a lack of understanding of the Korean language. However, many Japanese children finished Korean school and mastered the language, improving their position in the Korean community (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, p. 205) (Fig. 4.3).

4.3

Annual Reports on Schools: Sources that Reflect Social Processes Taking Place on Sakhalin

А school is a mini model of society. The study of documents related to schools gives us an idea of what was happening on Sakhalin during that period in general. All types of schools, Russian, Korean, and Japanese, generated annual reports in Russian on their work (GIASO F.143). These documents indicate in detail numeric

4.3

Annual Reports on Schools: Sources that Reflect Social Processes. . .

65

Fig. 4.3 Korean teachers training school, 1952. (Photo credit: Sakhalin Regional Museum)

data for the following areas: classes, students in each class, boys and girls in each class, children left in the same class for the second year, the results of transfer exams, children transferred to the next class, children who completed their studies or were sent to retake exams. In the post-war period, all schools were opened in Japanese school buildings. Japanese schools wоrked in the morning, Russian and Korean in the afternoon, or the contrary. The school reports indicate the number of students and teachers involved in the first (morning) and second (afternoon) shifts, as well as the school territory, the number of classrooms and laboratories in physics, chemistry and biology, the number of tables, chairs and textbooks. In addition to such sufficient and detailed information on the state of each school, in these documents, we can see information on the socio-economic situation and ethnic composition of the schools.

4.3.1

Socio-economic Situation and Education

The difficult post-war socio-economic situation had an impact on the education of children. Education itself was free, but a lack of clothing and footwear and the need to help parents with work led to children being forced to leave their schools. Many interviews with people who attended school at that time confirm this situation. The annual reports from the schools also highlight all the above problems by referring to a lack of schools, textbooks, and teaching materials. In addition, each report has a special column titled “Reasons for leaving school.” Here we see the following reasons: distance to school, the need to help parents, work in kolkhozes or

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at fabric factories, lack of clothing and shoes, long-term illness or death of a student, and repatriation (GIASO, F.143. Op. 4. D.6. L. 65). Schools did not just list the problems in the reports. The department of public education tried to take measures to improve the situation and provide at least some assistance to the students. Therefore, they created the “Fond Vseobucha” (Fund for education for all), which offered economic aid to students from low-income families. The “Fond Vseobucha” (GIASO, F. 143. Op. 1. D. 43. L7, Paichadze 2019, p. 252) was extended to all types of schools. Several interviews confirm this.

4.3.2

Ethnic Composition of the Schools

Sakhalin has always been a multi-ethnic region. As already noted, under Japanese rule, Koreans, Chinese, Ainu, Nivhs, Oroks (Uilta), Russians, and Poles lived there. After the end of the war, with the beginning of migration of people from various regions of the Soviet Union, this ethnic composition became even more diverse. The situation is shown in detail in annual reports of all schools under a column designated as “Native language (the language that the student considers his own), write down all languages, do not combine into others” (GIASO, F.143. Op. 4, D. 6. L.74). The composition of Japanese schools is almost always of the same ethnic background. However, from the documents, we can see the beginning of an awakening of national self-identification among the Koreans. For example, in the Japanese high school report of Morotsu (Kamenka) village in Lesogorsk region, in the column “native language” it is written: 201 Japanese, seven Koreans. In the same area at a school of Erkunai report records 54 Japanese and nine Koreans (GIASO, F. 143. Op. 4. D. 6. L. 53, 55). Based on what is written in the column “Native language” in Korean schools, only Koreans were trained. There were no other declared languages. However, based on interviews, many of the Japanese went to Korean schools after the Japanese schools closed. Of the 14 interviewed, 11 had Korean first and last names and spoke Korean fluently. They all graduated from Korean schools. But many of them did not say that they were Japanese because of the post-war “reverse discrimination.” The main reason why Japanese children went to Korean schools was that many of them were fully or half (more often by their father) adopted by Koreans. In addition, it should be noted that both children of Koreans who arrived during Japanese rule and those of North Korean workers who actively moved to Sakhalin after 1948 studied in Korean schools. The ethnic composition of Russian schools was quite variegated. There you can see representatives of almost all Union republics, the indigenous peoples of Sakhalin, Chinese, Poles, Germans, Czechs, and Finns. And since 1949, Koreans and Japanese also studied there (GIASO. F. 143. Op. 4. D. 42. L. 111, 112, 128, 283, Paichadze 2019, p. 253).

Interviews with the Post-war Young Generation About their Life,. . .

4.4

4.3.3

67

Repatriation

Repatriation processes are also reflected in the school’s annual reports. The term “repatriation” is contained in the aforementioned column “Reasons for leaving school.” In the case of Japanese schools, the words used are repatriation to Japan or repatriation to Hokkaido (GIASO, F.143. Op. 4 D34 (29). L. 4). In the case of Korean schools, both terms “returns to Korea” and “return to North Korea” are used in annual reports (GIASO, F.143. Op. 4. D 16. L. 27, Paichadze, 2019, p. 254). However, since repatriation to the southern part of the Korean Peninsula was not possible, it has the same meaning. Most likely, the documents refer to the repatriation of North Koreans who came to work since 1948 and whose children studied with the local Koreans who lived there.

4.4 4.4.1

Interviews with the Post-war Young Generation About their Life, Language Use, and School Reasons to Stay in Sakhalin

In the case of children from pure Korean families, their parents had no choice in staying or returning. After the war, there was a period of waiting for repatriation. Many of them detail in their memoirs how Koreans with small children walked for kilometers to reach the port to wait for a ship for repatriation to Korea. As there were no ships, they had to return. People from Japanese and Japanese-Korean families tell the following about the reasons why their families stayed. N Case (Japanese, Adopted by Russian-Jewish Family After the War) My father died in the war. We had a farm in Sakhalin. When the Russians came, they did not let my grandmother and mother repatriate. Why? Because there was no one who could manage the farm. Then my grandmother and mother were moved a long way away, beyond Uglegorsk(Esutoru)), so that they could work in agriculture. I was left alone. They left me with a Japanese family. But the last boat left with all the Japanese, and I was left completely alone. There were some Russian families, but in fact, they didn’t want me. I was alone. I remember this time vaguely. In storms and snow, I could not light the fire in the stove because I was so small. There was no wood, no potatoes, nothing. Yes, there was a time like this. I did not cut my hair or take a bath. All my hair was matted. I spent one year like this. My mother and grandmother were in Uglegorsk, but the authorities didn’t let them go. In fact, my mother and grandmother wanted to pick me up and go to Japan, but it was impossible. Then I was adopted by a Jewish family and was taken away to Ukraine. I met my mother again when I was 16 years old and went back to Sakhalin (Case N, Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2015, p. 217).

F Case (Japanese Family) They [my parents] were living in the Korsakov district and had an opportunity to leave on the repatriation ship, but it was a very difficult situation. Mom told me that my older brother

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had broken his leg, had an open fracture, and could not move. He was very sick and had a fever; they could not repatriate. This is what my parents told me. . . . In 1953, when my parents moved to Poronaisk, they already had a big family with lots of kids. My father had to go to work to feed his family, and to get a job he had to take Soviet citizenship. So, my parents became Soviets. . . . Dad went to work immediately in a paper factory. They still could have left Poronaisk, but they already had Soviet citizenship. Japanese did not accept Soviet citizens. Only those who had Japanese citizenship were repatriated (F case, Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2015, p. 216).

A Case (Japanese, Adopted by Korean Stepfather After the War) I was born in April 1944. In 1944, [the U.S. Navy controlled the Soya Strait between Karafuto and Hokkaido making] the transportation of coal from Karafuto was impossible, so my father went to work in Kyushu. After a while, my mother and I joined him, but a few months before the war ended, my mother decided to return home, to Karafuto, with me. My parents never saw each other again. Soon afterwards, Soviet troops occupied the southern part of Sakhalin. Soviet troops were stationed in our house, and we were moved to the barracks. When repatriation to Japan became possible, my mum with me as a little baby tried to find my uncle and reach the port for repatriation. However, on the way, I fell ill and had to be hospitalized. Then my mother married a Korean man, and I had a Korean stepfather (A case, Paichadze and Hyun interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, p. 207).

S Case (Japanese, Adopted by Korean Family Before the War) My own family lived next to us, and they often came to visit. Especially often, my older sister came . . . When the Soviet troops entered Sakhalin, and the evacuation to Hokkaido began, my sister also came running and began to call me with her. On the one hand, I was afraid of strict adoptive parents. On the other, although the parents were strict, I was brought up as an only daughter. I had my own mattress (futon) and my own plate (chawan). The family of my own mother had seven children, and everyone slept side by side. I thought that I could not stand such a life. And I refused to go. Later, when the repatriation began, since our stepfather was Korean, we could not leave (S case, Paichadze interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, pp. 66–67).

4.4.2

Language in Family Interactions

F Case (Japanese Family) We had a large family, and my mother worked at home. Therefore, she could understand Russian, but not so well. She spoke to us, half in Japanese and half in Russian. The older children answered in Japanese because they had been to a Japanese school and understood it well, but we (the younger brothers) went to a Russian school. My father spoke in Russian to us. So, I understood what my parents said in Japanese, but I could not speak it well (F case, Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2015, p. 219).

4.4

Interviews with the Post-war Young Generation About their Life,. . .

69

A Case (Japanese, Adopted by Korean Stepfather After the War) After I went to school, my mother stopped speaking Japanese to me. My stepfather told me the same Korean fairy tales every evening so that I could learn the language (A case, Paichadze and Hyun interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p.105).

S Case (Japanese, Adopted Before the War by Korean Family) My stepfather was Korean, but we always spoke Japanese at home. However, later, when I transferred to a Korean school, the school told us to speak Korean at home to make using Korean at school easier and we switched to Korean (S case, Paichadze interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p. 69).

4.4.3

Socio-economic Situation, Education, and Language at School

In the USSR, secondary education was compulsory, so all children had to go to school regardless of ethnicity. K Case (Japanese-KoreanFamily) I worked as a helper for a family by helping with the housework. The owners were very strict, and there was a lot of work, but this was the place where I ate bread and butter for the first time, so I did not want to return to my home. I didn’t go to school until the neighbours told the school that “this little Korean girl” wasn’t studying. Then at the age of ten, I went to a Korean school. I worked for а family as a helper, but despite this, the school bought me a uniform dress and felt boots (K case, Paichadze and Hyun interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, p. 205).

This information confirms what we saw in the above documents: when families did not have the opportunity to buy clothes, the schools helped financially. However, regardless sometimes children left school. Tn 1 Case (Japanese-Korean Family) To go to school, I needed a uniform, but there was no money to buy it, so I didn’t go to school until I was 10. Then I studied until fourth grade, and in the fifth grade, I had to go to the city and rent an apartment, but my family did not have the money for this. So, as a result, I didn’t study much (Tn 1 case, Paichadze interview).

Yo Case (Korean Family) My sisters went to a Korean school, but then my father died, and my mother raised six children by herself. The sisters had to stop going to school and went to work at the age of 14 (Yo case, Paichadze and Hyun interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p. 191).

Analyzing documents and interviews reveals that the economic situation in post-war Sakhalin was rather tricky, and there were many low-income families. Another

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problem might be the parents’ lack of knowledge of the Russian language, and potential unawareness of assistance. Many in their interviews say that they were forced to go to work at the age of 14. Officially, it was forbidden to work at this age, but the parents and children themselves lied about their age and got jobs. At the workplace, they knew that they were still children and helped as much as they could. Girls were often given away to marriage at a very early age which was also forbidden, but parents lied about their daughters’ age, saying they were older. In the post-war confusion with documents, this was not a difficult task. For Example, S (Japanese Adopted by a Japanese-Korean Family) Recalls The Korean school was only up to the 7th grade (secondary school), then it was necessary to study at the Russian school. I had classmates who went on to study, but primarily boys went to work, and girls were married. They were usually married to Koreans, much older in age since they were believed to be rich since they earned a lot working in the mines during the war. After the war, there was a boom in such marriages. I got married at 15, to a man 11 years older than me (S case, Paichadze interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, pp. 70–71).

Now let us see what the teaching and learning of the language was like in Russian and Korean schools. Below is how N. Furihata (Japanese family) recalls his admission to the Russian school: In 1949 I was already seven years old, I had to go to school. By this time, Keiko [older sister] had finished the first grade and moved on to the second but did not have time to finish it (in a Japanese school). In September, Keiko and I entered the first grade of a Russian school. They put Keiko and me at the same desk. At first, sitting at a desk in the lesson, we did not understand anything about what to do, what the teachers were saying. We just sat and watched what other students were doing. Observing what Keiko was doing, I did the same. She was older than me and understood everything better. Gradually, we began to understand the Russian language better and speak and write among our peers - other students. In childhood, everything is quickly mastered, remembered and “grasped on the fly” (Osanai, 2019, pp. 458–459).

Sometimes, after leaving a Japanese school, children went to a Korean one and then to a Russian school. Tn 2 Case (Japanese-Korean Family), Who Was Born in 1941, Recounted When I was eleven, I went to a Russian school. Prior to that, I studied for half a year in a Japanese school. Then the Japanese school closed, and I went to a Korean one. At the Korean school, I studied for a week and then quit because the teacher hit me with a pointer on the head for talking in Japanese. When my father (who was Korean) learned of this, he went to the school and said something to the teacher. Then he said to me, ‘do not go there anymore.’ My father was working in the woods, and I went with him. In 1951, a Russian school opened, and I went there. We had a teacher from Stalingrad, Nina Vladimirovna. After school, she went from house to house and taught her students Russian. Thanks to her, we learned Russian. I studied in my village up to Grade 4 and then went to Shakhtyorsk (Tōro), where I finished Grade 5. But I had to work because the family situation was difficult. I was 14 years old, and I worked by chopping wood (Tn 2 case, Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2015, p. 218).

When children went to Korean schools, it marked the beginning of life within the Korean community for them. They received a Korean name and learned the Korean

4.4

Interviews with the Post-war Young Generation About their Life,. . .

71

language. For example, S (Japanese adopted by a Japanese-Korean family) recalls: After entering the Korean school, it was necessary to use Korean names. Usually, Japanese names [characters] were simply read in Korean, but my name was composed of three characters, not two characters [as is common in Korean]. Therefore, I took one character from my sister’s name and made a new name but did not respond for a long time when that name was called at school. When I went to Korean school, I didn’t know a single word of Korean, but I didn’t like to lose, so I studied with all my might. In three years, I learned Korean and graduated from high school with excellent grades. We had excellent teachers. They taught both Korean and other subjects in Korean, but they themselves never studied in Korean, so, of course, it was very difficult for them. When I was in my final grade, Koreans from mainland Russia came to teach. Together with their arrival, Russian language lessons began, but I could only learn the ABC book (S case, Paichadze interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p. 67).

A Case (Japanese, Adopted by Korean Stepfather After the War) When I went to the Korean school, I noticed that all the children speak both Korean and Japanese well, only I do not really speak either language. Because of this, I repeated the first grade. Besides, at that time, teachers from the mainland came, and they called me “Japanese dog”, I still cannot forget that. At that time, I did not understand the difference between Koreans and Japanese. When I told my stepfather about this, he reassured me and said that they were speaking in the sense of “learn Korean better”... Because of this frustration, I decided to become a teacher. I studied Korean and had excellent grades, even wrote poetry in Korean, so I was praised. The only thing that was hard for me was Russian. Because of this, I had to stay again for the second year. Therefore, in total, I studied for nine years. I entered the Korean department of the teacher training school, but a year later the Korean schools were closed, and I had to leave my studies (A case, Paichadze and Hyun interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p. 105).

As we have seen, after the war, the use and teaching of Japanese virtually disappeared. If they used the language, it was mainly with parents who did not speak Russian or Korean. However, there were cases when parents (primarily mothers) taught their children the language at home as much as possible, listened to the then banned Japanese radio together and spoke only Japanese, even if the children went to Korean schools (H1, H2 case, Hyun and Paichadze interview). I want to end this section with the story of Yo, an ethnic Korean who was born in 1944 and lost her sight at the age of five. Koreans born at the end or after the war do not have such perfect command of Japanese, but she is fluent in Korean, Japanese, and Russian, and reads books for blind people in all languages. Her uncle was married to a Japanese woman, her older sisters went to a Japanese school, so they spoke Korean and Japanese at home. After the closure of the Japanese school, the sisters went to the Korean school, Yo wanted to study, but because of poor eyesight, they did not take her to the school. The whole story of her life is published in Hyun and Paichadze (2016). Here I will give only an excerpt of her Japanese language training: All the children around went to school, and I was left alone. This was noticed by a Japanese teacher who lived next door. He told me, come, I will teach you, so I started to learn. The teacher had a gramophone and Japanese records. When he left for Japan in 1957, he left it

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4 Coexistence, Repatriation, and Those Left Behind (1945-End of the 1950s) all to me. I listened to records so as not to forget Japanese (Yo case, Paichadze and Hyun interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p. 189).

Thus, in such, albeit rare cases, teaching the Japanese language was carried out even after the closure of Japanese schools.

4.5

Conclusion of the Chapter

In this chapter, I examined post-war language and ethnic minority policy on Sakhalin, and the situation at Japanese, Russian, and Korean schools. After the repatriation of the main part of the Japanese population, Japanese schools were closed. For four years on Sakhalin, there was a unique situation of joint work between Japanese, Korean, and Russian schools. A generally challenging economic environment influenced the situation with education. The multilingualism of the population also complicated this issue. However, the authorities tried to supply schooling to as much of the population as possible. This policy was within the framework of the ideology of that time and as far as economic resources allowed. Also, I have examined the formation of transnational identities and language use of returnees from Sakhalin, such as those born before or during the war fit the definition of ‘generation 1.5’ in Rambaut’s classification of immigrant generations (Rambaut, 2004: 1167). As I said in the introduction of this book, for Rambaut, the classic 1.5 generation comprises pre-adolescent, primary-school-age children who have learned (or began to learn) to read and write in their mother tongue at schools abroad but have completed their education mainly in the host country. In general, this is what happened to the Japanese and Korean children who remained in Sakhalin. They had been to a Japanese school, but they went to Korean or Russian secondary schools after the war and completed their education there. Those who were born between 1940 and 1945 were too young to study in Japanese schools. They started their education in Russian or Korean. They can be defined as secondgeneration migrants, for whom the language used for family interaction and school were different, especially Japanese or Japanese-Korean children. For those who went to Russian schools, the period of their Russification and mastering of the Russian language began. Korean children who went to Korean schools were taught in Korean using the rules and customs of the Korean community. Korean schools were Soviet schools, so classes were conducted following Soviet ideology, but they played an important role in socialization and consolidating language and identity for Korean children. The erosion of the Korean community would have been more substantial, and therefore its impact on the Japanese minority would have been weaker if only Russian schools had been available. Japanese children adopted by Koreans started to learn or improve their Korean, and using their Korean names became useful. Education in Korean schools was not without problems. The interviewees talked about discrimination issues in schools and how their main issue was a lack of understanding of the Korean language. However, many of them finished Korean

References

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school and mastered the language. This situation improved their position and increased their contacts within the Korean community.

References Amano, N. (2012). Kobetsu-teki ai minshu shugi no teikoku sengo soren no saharin chōsenjin tōji 1945–1949. In H. Imanishi (Ed.), Hokutōajia no koriande wa diasupora Saharin Karafuto o chūshin ni (pp. 122–147). Otaru shōka daigaku shuppan-kai. Din, Y., & Paichadze, S. (2018). Natsional’naye shkoly dlya yaponskogo i koreyskogo naseleniya Yuzhnogo Sakhalina Kuril’skikh ostrovov poslevoyennyy period (1945–1963). Bulletin of the Sakhalin Museum, 25, 76–82. Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2015). Multi-layered identities of returnees in their ‘historical homeland’: Returnees from Sakhalin. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 195–211). Routledge. Gaponenko, K. (2012). Tragediya derevni Mizuho. Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya tipografia. Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2016). Saharin zanryū: nikkanro hyaku nen ni wataru kazoku no monogatari. Kōbunken. Istoricheskie chteniya: Trudy Gosudarstvennogo arhiva Sakhalinskoy oblasti. (1994). 2. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Sakhlinskoy oblasti. Martin, T. (2001). The affirmative action empire: Nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939. Cornell University Press. Nakayama, T. (2015). Japanese society on Karafuto. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 19–41). Routledge. Osanai, M. (2019). Istoria i pamyat. In S. S. Paichadze & I. A. Valdman (Eds.), Rossiya i strany ATR: migratsionnyye protsessy i problemy mezhkul’turnoy kommunikatsii. Aziya v Rossii (pp. 449–476). NGTU. Paichadze, S. (2015). Language, identity and educational issues of ‘repatriates’ from Sakhalin. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo- Japanese border (pp. 212–232). Routledge. Paichadze, S. (2019). Formirovaniye natsional'noy samoidentifikatsii na poslevoyennom Sakhaline. In S. S. Paichadze & I. A. Valdman (Eds.), Rossiya i strany ATR: migratsionnyye protsessy i problemy mezhkul'turnoy kommunikatsii. Aziya v Rossii (pp. 241–256). NGTU. Rambaut, R. (2004). Ages, Life Stages, and Generational Cohorts: Decomposing the Immigrant First and Second Generations in the United States. The International Migration Review, 38, 1160–1205. Song, K. (2012). Chōsen gakko. Iwanami shoten. Tonai, Y. (2015). Soviet rule in south Sakhalin and Japanese community 1945–1949. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 80–100). Routledge. Yoshitake, T. (2005). Okizari - Saharin zanryū nihon josei tachi no rokujū nen. Kairyūsha.

Documents State archive of Sakhalinskaya Oblast’ GIASO. GIASO F. R-53. Op. 25. D. 2629. L. 59. GIASO F. 54. Op. 1. D. 238. L. 160–161. GIASO F. 143. Op. 1. D. 43. L. 7.

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GIASO F. 143. Op. 4. D. 6. L. 53, 55. GIASO F. 143. Op. 4. D.6. L. 65. GIASO F. 143. Op. 4. D. 6. L. 73. GIASO F. 143. Op. 4. D. 16. L. 27. GIASO F. 143. Op. 4. D34 (29), L. 4. GIASO F. 143. Op. 4. D. 42. L. 111, 112, 128, 283. GIASO F. 143. Op. 7 D. 3. L.13. GIASO F.-R. 171. Op.1 D.24. L.77a.

Interviews Case A, Interview Paichadz and Hyun, Hakodate 2013. Case H1, H2, Interview Hyun and Paichadze, Sapporo 2014, Ansan 2014. Case F, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2011. Case K, Interview Paichadze and Hyun, Sapporo 2013. Case S, Interview Paichadze, Ebetsu 2015. Case Tn1, Tn 2, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2012. Case Yo, Interview Paichadze and Hyun, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 2014.

Chapter 5

From the End of the 1950s to the End of the 1980s: New Wave of Migration of the Population and the Closure of Korean Schools in Sakhalin

Keywords Late collective repatriation · Individual repatriation · Moving to North Korea · Life after return · Ethnic Koreans in Japan · Korean schools in Japan · Closure of Korean Schools in Sakhalin · Russification

5.1

The New Wave of Repatriation to Japan and Departure to the DPRK

We can distinguish several waves of movement of the Japanese and Korean population of Sakhalin between 1950 and 1970. Here it is necessary to distinguish two waves of repatriation during this period. First, there was repatriation to Japan, the late wave of collective repatriation to Japan from 1957 to 1959 and the second wave of individual (family) repatriation in the 1960s and 1970s, peaking in 1965. In contrast to the post-war repatriation, when the target was exclusively Japanese, in the 1950s to 1970s, there was the repatriation of Japanese-Korean families. Therefore, it can be said that it was a movement of part of the Korean population. From 1957 to 1959, under the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, some Japanese could return to Japan. This repatriation included Japanese women with their Korean husbands’ children, and a small number of other family members. According to the Sakhalin branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the number repatriated from Sakhalin between 1957 and 1960 was 2294. Among them were 592 adult Japanese (133 males, 459 females), 442 adult Koreans (419 males, 23 females), and 1260 children (GIASO, F. 53. O. 7. D. 181. L. 49–51). This wave of repatriation is known because of the activities of Park No Hak and Lee Hi Bal leaders of the movement for the repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans (Hyun, 2013, pp. 135–136). After moving to Japan with their Japanese wives, they created an organization named Karafuto Kikan Zainichi Kankokujin Kai (Association of Koreans in Japan for Repatriation from Sakhalin). They started to send petitions to both the South Korean and Japanese governments demanding a solution to the problem of Koreans left behind in Sakhalin. From their activities, it can be said that some of the repatriates at this time had a very strong Korean identity. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3_5

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From the End of the 1950s to the End of the 1980s: New Wave of. . .

Between 1960 and 1976, individual (family) repatriation from the USSR to Japan was organized. The first important characteristic of people in this category is that they were not a “group of repatriates.” These were people who applied for individual repatriation to Japan. To leave the USSR, they needed an exit visa. They lived in different places in Sakhalin, and they requested and obtained permission to leave at different times. So, before leaving, they did not form an united group. For entry into Japan, they also needed a document permitting it. To obtain one, it was necessary to confirm their family record and have the consent of their relatives to be their guarantors. After they moved to Japan, they mostly lived with their relatives, who were their guarantors, and many of these returnees were not connected. According to Russian researcher V. Podpechnikov (2003), in 1964–1966, 382 Japanese and Koreans left Sakhalin for Japan: 19 people in 1964, 362 people in 1965, and one person in 1966. Among them were 60 Japanese, 109 Koreans, and 213 children (Podpechnikov, 2003, p. 259). However, the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kōseishō) gives the following data. Between 1960 and 1993 the total number of returnees from Sakhalin were 110 people, among them 88 women and 22 men (Kōseishō, 1996). The difference between the Russian and Japanese sources is evident. The Russian statistics counted both Japanese and Koreans, with children listed in a separate category. The Japanese statistics counted only the Japanese and did not count people of Korean nationality or children, including those who wеre born to JapaneseKorean marriages. The Japanese documents reveal a prevalence of Japanese women. For example, in 1965, there were 50 women and 10 men who returned. The marital status of the returnees is unknown, but nine men and women have the same last name, so it may be assumed that they are spouses. Comparing this and Podpechnikov’s data, and when cross-referenced with my interview data, it can be concluded that the other women were married to Koreans. In both Russian and Japanese statistics, the most significant number of individual repatriates was recorded in 1965. Nakayama Taishō (2019) argues that 1965 was a peak, after which the Japanese government kept repatriation to a minimum. His explanation regarding the large number of returnees in 1965 is that this year was when many letters requesting repatriation were sent to the Japanese Embassy and both the Japanese and the Soviet Red Cross (Nakayama, 2019, p. 171, p. 195). However, it can be assumed that political events triggered this peak of repatriation; in October 1964 L.I. Brezhnev came to power in the USSR, and in November of the same year, Eisaku Sato became prime minister in Japan. The large number of permissions granted for individual repatriation in 1965, together with permission to visit graves on Sakhalin in the same year, perhaps were ‘political cards’ demonstrating the continuation of favorable Soviet-Japanese relations, despite a change in leadership for both countries (Paichadze, 2020, p. 140). About conducting individual repatriation rather than collective, Nakayama argues that the Japanese government had a plan for collective repatriation. Still, the Soviet government rejected this because it might give the image internationally that responsibility for the remaining Japanese was the USSR’s (Nakayama, 2019, pp. 174–175). The Soviet side was most likely opposed to collective repatriation. Many diasporas

5.1

The New Wave of Repatriation to Japan and Departure to the DPRK

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existed in the Soviet Union, such Germans, Greeks and especially Jews, who during the 1960s and 1970s were fighting for an opportunity to leave the USSR. The repatriation had been political in its nature and a movement critical of the policies of the USSR. I can assume that stopping political movements was the reason that the USSR avoided mass repatriation, as it provided an opportunity to reveal large numbers of people opposed to the system. The Japanese side also did not want collective repatriation. For example, they did not pay any ‘repatriation benefits’ to returnees in the 1960s, suggesting a difference between collective repatriation in the 1950s and individual repatriation in the 1960s. Furthermore, demands for repatriation among the Korean population of Sakhalin had already begun by the end of the 1950s in Japan and South Korea (Hyun, 2013, pp. 135–137). Collective repatriation and a crowd of people waiting for repatriation could lead to further demands. Consequently, a plan for individual return that did not attract the international community’s attention was perhaps most convenient for both Soviet and Japanese sides. Thus, we examined the repatriation of Japanese and Japanese-Korean families. The situation with repatriation of the Korean population was much more complicated. As Hyun Mooam describes the situation, “Although the main responsibility for their fate lies with the colonial rule of Japan, the post-war division of Korea and the Cold War made a solution to this problem depend on the conflict of interests of Japan, South Korea, the USSR and the DPRK” (Hyun, 2013, p. 128). During the Cold War, South Korea and the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations. Therefore, the Japanese government and public organizations in Japan were faced with the need to become intermediaries to promote political changes in the relations between these two states. However, this did not happen. Japan and South Korea, even before the conclusion of the “Basic Treaty on Relations between Japan and South Korea” in 1965, perfectly understood the importance of the problem of repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans. Nonetheless, this problem did not become the subject of discussion in the negotiations between these countries. South Korea feared that this issue might disrupt talks, and Japan believed there was no need to raise it since South Korea had not done so either (Hyun, 2013, pp. 143–144). After Japan and South Korea signed the agreement in 1965, the countries began negotiations on the repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans. However, the understanding of the problem of repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans was different between the two states. The main point of controversy was the place of repatriation. For Japan, the Koreans of Sakhalin were citizens of the “third state,” so they had to repatriate to the territory of their country. The Koreans, who were members of Japanese families, were not repatriated but just moved with their families as “passing cargo” that was not supposed to interfere with the repatriation of the Japanese people. After moving to Japan, Koreans unlike Japanese did not receive any repatriation fees or compensation (Hyun, 2013, p. 134). South Korea was not economically ready to accept many such repatriates. In addition, South Korea was afraid of the political unreliability of Koreans who came from a socialist country. Therefore, they wanted the Koreans of Sakhalin to first

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5 From the End of the 1950s to the End of the 1980s: New Wave of. . .

repatriate to Japan and then decide where they wanted to live (Hyun, 2013, p. 142). For the USSR, the problem of relations with the DPRK and the South Korean state’s “no legitimacy” influenced the negotiation process. In addition, control over the leaving population and the availability of exit visas slowed down the process of paperwork (Hyun, 2013, p. 150). For the DPRK (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) the return of compatriots to their territories was a matter of competition between the two systems (Hyun, 2013, pp. 138–140). This competition also influenced the repatriation of the Koreans of Sakhalin. As a result, mass repatriation was not possible until the end of the 1980s. In the 1970s, only a few people were able to repatriate individually (Hyun, 2013, pp. 152–153). As already mentioned, Sakhalin Koreans mainly came from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula and sought to repatriate to the Republic of Korea. However, during this period, a part of the Sakhalin Korean population also left for the DPRK. This departure took place both from the territory of Sakhalin itself and from the territory of Japan. As mentioned above, after the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, all former residents of the colonies lost their Japanese citizenship. As the territory ceded to another state, residents of Sakhalin had the right to apply for the restoration of citizenship. However, being on USSR land, they could not do this physically. Thus, the Japanese and Koreans who remained on Sakhalin became stateless. In 1952, the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a decree on accepting Koreans into USSR citizenship in a simplified manner, and massive work began on their adoption of citizenship. In addition, in the early 1950s, a DPRK embassy appeared in the Far East (Nakhodka), which began to actively promote the acquisition of citizenship and travel to North Korea. By 1956, 658 people had acquired citizenship of the DPRK. By 1962, 11,475 former Japanese nationals had acquired DPRK citizenship. There were also cases of renunciation of USSR citizenship in favor of DPRK citizenship (Din, 2015, pp. 147–148). Only some of those who received this citizenship left for North Korea. Yulia Din mentions two main reasons for leaving, which can be seen from her interview. The first is the belief in the imminent unification of Korea and the ability to go home. The second is the difficulty of entering Institutes or Universities after graduating from Korean schools. The North Korean government promised to provide an opportunity to study in higher education institutions. In my interviews, people also said that their classmates left to study or work in North Korea. During this period, the Japanese also received North Korean citizenship, as they planned to leave with their families. In addition to voluntary departure, there was an incident of forced sending to the DPRK. In 1976, there was the issue of those who had received exit visas from the Soviet Union but did not receive entry visas from Japan, thus making repatriation impossible. For example, the “four from Nakhodka” who were sent back from Nakhodka (the place where there was the Japanese Consulate) to Sakhalin after their exit visas from the USSR expired in June 1976. As there were no guarantees that South Korea would accept them, Japan did not issue the four entry permits. On July 3, South Korea finally announced that it was ready to accept them, and Japan issued an entry permit. However, by this time, it was already too late as their exit

5.2

Position of Korean in Japan and Korean School

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visas had expired. The families who protested after the incident and demanded repatriation, respectively, in 1977 and 1978, were sent by Soviet law enforcement agencies not to their homeland in South Korea but forcibly to North Korea (Hyun, 2013, p. 154; Din, 2015, p.173). One of the families was Japanese-Korean and relatives of this Japanese woman who left with her husband repatriated to Japan in the late 1990s, and now live in Hokkaido. Moving to North Korea from Japan, known as kikoku jigyō (returning home project), was a Japanese government policy to send Japanese Koreans from Japan to North Korea. Under this policy, from 1950 to 1984, 93,340 people, including 6839 Japanese, were ‘repatriated’ to North Korea (Takasaki & Park, 2005, p. 49). Some Japanese-Korean families from Sakhalin, who returned to Japan as “Japanese,” were then sent to North Korea as “Koreans.” In the case of the interviewee above, the family remained in Japan because one of their sons was reluctant to ‘repatriate.’ However, documents held by the Japan-Sakhalin Association clearly indicate these cases of families of repatriates from Sakhalin who were sent to North Korea as Koreans (Nihon Saharin Kyōkai, 2018). It can be assumed that migration of Korean males from Sakhalin and their inability to adapt to life in Japan or return to South Korea led to their decisions to move to North Korea (Paichadze, 2020, p. 136).

5.2

Position of Korean in Japan and Korean School

Before seeing how Japanese/ Korean families from Sakhalin were associated with the Korean community and schools, let us consider this community. Koreans came to the territory of Japan proper in the same way as they did to Sakhalin. They moved here voluntarily, mainly to look for work, and were also taken out by force to work in the mines, the latter increasing in number sharply at the end of the war when Japan needed workers. After the war in Japan, there were more than two million Koreans. In 1946, there were 1.4 million who returned to Korea, leaving 600,000 Koreans in Japan who, for various reasons, decided not to repatriate. Issues of Korean legal status “were low on the list for the occupation priorities and in any case were seen as a temporary problem since it was assumed that they would all go home soon” (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p. 60). However, SCAP’s official position was that “every person who on the day before [Japan surrender] had been a Japanese national remained a Japanese national, until by some overt step, he manifested an intention to adopt another nationality” (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p. 60). As Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues, defining Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan as Japanese nationals suited SCAP’s interest rather well. Because “if they had been defined as aliens, they would not have been subject to Japanese taxes or court proceedings, a situation which would have reduced government revenue and made the task of maintaining law and order more onerous” (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p. 60). However “the Japanese government had no intention of treating former colonial subjects as Japanese with access to the expanded civil rights being introduced by the SCAP democratization programme.” Therefore, for example, the new election law

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which gave Japanese women the right to vote for the first time, stripping the same right from Koreans and Taiwanese.1 The division of the Korean peninsula into zones of Soviet and American influence, and the formation of two separate Korean regimes that were not sufficiently stable at the time, all made the Korean position in Japan quite vulnerable. In response to this situation, various Korean community groups quickly appeared in Japan. Established immediately after Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the largest and most powerful of these, the league of Korean Residence in Japan, “sought to act as a kind of ‘provisional government’ for Koreans in Japan keeping order within the Korean community while representing its interest to the wider world. During the early stage of the occupation the Korean league often cooperated with occupation forces and assisting them in crime prevention. But as time went on the increasing left-wing political stance of the league lead to growing conflict with SCAP as well as alienating some more conservative members of the Korean community” (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p. 62). A little later, both the Japanese government and the allied forces took a course to remove the Korean population in Japan. In 1947 Japanese government had introduce the Alien Registration Law, which stripped the citizenship from all former citizens of the Empire of Japan who were not ethnic Japanese. This ordinance required all foreigners, except occupation forces, their families, and employees, to carry registration cards. The Nationality Act (1950, 1952, 1984) confirmed this position. Under the constitution the Japanese people were no longer ‘subjects’ (shinmin) but ‘nationals’ (kokumin). Their status was no longer seen as bestowed by the emperor but rather founded upon natural human rights. However, this extension of the political basis of citizenship coincided with a restriction of its geographic basis. Former colonial subjects from Korea and Taiwan, even those who were permanent residents in Japan, lost their Japanese citizenship and right to vote in Japanese elections (Morris-Suzuki, 2015, p. 190). The new, postwar Nationality Act of 1950 (revised in 1952 and 1984) continues to be based on the principle of Jus sanguinis – a principle of nationality law by which citizenship is not determined by place of birth but by having one or both parents who are citizens of the state. As Morris-Suzuki explained, when the alien registration system was introduced in 1947, Japanese officials inscribed the word Chōsen in the space for nationality on the cards to Korean residents. However, when new certificates were issued in 1950, the South Korean government protested, insisting that the correct term was Taikan Minkoku. The South Korean regime of Yi Seung-Man claimed all Koreans as its nationals, and indeed the 1950 registration revelated that well over 90 percent of the Koreans registered came from the southern half of Korea. However many Koreans in Japan themselves were not enthusiastic about the description of their national identity. They were opposed to division of their

1

Until 1945 adult male colonial subjects living in Japan had the right to vote in Japanese elections (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p. 60).

5.2

Position of Korean in Japan and Korean School

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country and saw the newly created South Korean government as having little legitimacy. During the second registration therefore Koreans in Japan were given a choice they could fill in the space of ‘nationality’ with the word Chōsen or with the word Taikan Minkoku or Kankoku. Out of 535,236 Koreans who registered in the early part of 1950, 92% used Chōsen: a word which defied them with a single united Korea rather then linking them specifically to the new regime in the South (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, pp. 93–94).

In this way, the Korean community in Japan became divided by powerful invisible barriers separating those with Chōsen registration (Chōsen seki) from those with Kankoku registration (Kankoku seki). This distinction caused endless misunderstanding particularly when it was mistranslated into English as “North Korean” versus “South Korean.” Over time the balance between the two groups shifted, and by the end of the Korean War the percentage choosing Chōsen registration had fallen to 76%. Тoday they are greatly outnumbered by those with Kankoku registration. However, the division remains and increasingly came to be reinforced by different sets of rights and different sense of group belonging (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, pp. 93–94). In 1965, diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea were normalized, and one of the signed agreements was the “Japan-Korea Legal Status Agreement.” It states that “Korean peninsula natives who have been living in Japan since the 15th of August 1945” can obtain “permanent residence under the agreement” (kyoutei eijusha) if they apply within 5 years after the signing of this agreement. Then, according to the Immigration Control Act, enacted in 1981, even those who did not obtain permanent residence under the Japan-Korea Legal Status Agreement will be allowed “Special Permanent Residence” (tokubetu eijusha) status if they apply. After that, the central turning point was the “Special Immigration Control Act” enacted in 1991. With this special immigration law, the status of residence of both groups of Japanese and Korean were finally unified, and they were granted the status of “special permanent residence” (tokubetsu eijusha). Of course, this greatly improved the position of Koreans in Japan, but they continue to have no right to vote, and the Japanese government can cancel the status of special permanent residence. The first generation of Japanese Koreans began to establish Korean schools to teach the Korean language and culture to their children who attended Japanese schools during the colonial era and have never learned the Korean language and culture (Song, 2012, pp. 57–58). This project began just after the war and the primary livelihood was uncertain, Koreans living in Japan made every effort to build schools. Within a year, Korean schools, called “ethnic schools,” had 525 elementary schools, four intermediate schools, and 12 youth schools, with 44,000 students and teachers. The process of a rapid growth of the schools was precisely the beginning of Korean ethnic education in Japan, but, basically, the idea behind the start was “preparation for returning to the homeland.” However, early ethnic schools were subject to crackdowns by the Allied Forces Command and the Japanese government. The Koreans in Japan who countered the crackdown led to the “Hanshin Educational Struggle,” from April 23 to 26 1948. As a result of the Hanshin Educational Struggle that lasted in Osaka and Kobe and caused many accidents, including the death of a junior high school boy

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shot by Japanese police, the proliferation of ethnic schools was recognized. However, in October of the following year, the Japanese government issued a closure order for ethnic schools, and most were closed. These early ethnic education movements were hit hard (Song, 2012, pp. 58–59). Since the 1950s, North Korea began to support Korean schools economically, and the bulk of Korean schools were opened with this support. Now 98 Korean Schools (Chōsen gakkō, Choson hakkyo) are sponsored by North Korea and operated by Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan). However, they are not recognized as regular foreign schools. On the opposite side, six Kankoku gakkō, the Korean schools sponsored by South Korea and operated by Mindan (Republic of Korean Residents Union in Japan), are recognized as foreign schools. Those who came from Sakhalin in 1950–1960, whom I interviewed, all studied in Chōsen gakkō.2

5.3

Life After Return to Japan

As mentioned above, repatriation after 1960 was permitted at the personal request of the returnees, but the possibility of their return depended on their relatives. In Japanese documents, their names and addresses were indicated and their familial relationship with the repatriate. After returning to Japan, the place of residence and standard of living also depended on relatives. However, little is known about the everyday lives or how these repatriates adapted into Japanese society. This lack of knowledge is mainly because many people from the first generation have died, and interviews with the second or third generations are challenging as they were very young at the time of repatriation. From the small number of interviews which I conducted, it is possible to say that among returnees from Japanese/Korean families, there were two main ways of adapting to Japanese society: becoming “pure Japanese” or joining the Zainichi Koreans (Koreans who continued living in Japan after the Second World War).

5.3.1

Relation with the Korean Community in Japan

Over the past few years, I have conducted several interviews with people who came to Japan from Sakhalin between the 1950s and 1970s. As mentioned earlier, finding these people is problematic because they are not connected via membership in an organization. Some of them were found through the Zainichi Korean network. Others were contacted via the Japan-Sakhalin Association or members of the

2

Also in some public schools in Japan existed classes of language and cultural heritage education for Zainichi Koreans (Minzoku gakkyū).

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Life After Return to Japan

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Table 5.1 Education level and language of the second generation of returnees (1950s–1960s) Year of return 1958

Place of residence in Japan Sapporo

1965

Sapporo

1965

Obihiro

1965

Hakodate

1976

Tokyo

Family ethnic composition Japanese/ Korean Japanese Japanese/ Korean Japanese/ Korean (?) Japanese/ Korean

Level and language of Education Middle School (Japanese), High School (Korean) Middle School (Russian, Japanese), High school (Japanese) Middle School (Russian, Japanese), High School (Korean) Middle School (Russian, Japanese), High School ( ) Middle School (Russian, Japanese), High School ( )

Chinese Returnees Center. In addition, people were interviewed on Sakhalin whose relatives left for Japan in the 1950s to 1970s (Table 5.1). As we can see from the table, all interviewees when they lived in Sakhalin studied in Russian schools rather than Korean ones. This background contrasts with the Japanese of the same generation, who returned after 1990 and mostly graduated from Korean schools. In the case of Japanese families, the lack of choice was evident after the war. For Korean families, there was also no option after 1963, when the Korean schools were closed. However, what reason did Koreans have for choosing a Russian school before 1963? When I directly asked the returnees about the reasons behind their school choice, some of them answered that a Korean school did not exist in their area. However, in Tomari, where interviewee B lived, there was a Korean school, but he did not go there. After the Second World War, the main reason for opening Korean schools on Sakhalin was to study the Korean language and create national identity among the young generation in preparation for their presumed life after repatriation in Korea. I can assume, that the families that chose not to send their children to Korean schools might indicate that repatriation to Korea was not expected. Furthermore, there were cases when studying in a Korean school became a reason not to repatriate to Japan. For example, interviewee E said that her family returned to Japan, but she stayed in Sakhalin because she studied at the Korean school, where anti-Japanese sentiments were very strong, and there were rumors that Koreans were being killed in Japan. She was afraid of these stories and decided to stay in Sakhalin (Paichadze, 2020, p. 141). One part of the returnees to Japan decided to connect with the Korean community. As can be seen from the following testimony, Koreans from Sakhalin joined the Korean community in Japan, including through marriage. For example: Yo (Korean) Testified After their return to Japan, my uncle [Korean] and my aunt [Japanese] lived in Miyagi prefecture. Later their daughter married a local [Japanese] Korean (Paichadze and Hyun interview, Paichadze, 2020, p. 136).

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Sometimes, at first, there were attempts to adapt to their lives as Japanese, but for some reason, they changed their mind. We can see this through D’s (JapaneseKorean family) testimony: I was three years old when we moved to Japan. I remember only a very big ship. Then we went to Furano, where my mother’s family was living. We just lived as an usual Japanese family. I knew that my father was Korean because my grandfather said to me: ‘I don’t like Koreans, but your father is a good man.’ Then one day, my father decided that all of his children had to go to a Korean school in Sapporo. We had to move and start our studies there. We didn’t understand why he did this, and it was very difficult for us because we didn’t speak Korean. After several years, I understood his motive. [. . .] He wanted to move to North Korea (Case D, Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2020, p. 136).

In J’s Case (Japanese-Korean Family) We went to Japan in 1965. I was 15 years old. We went to Obihiro, where my mother’s family lived. My family started living in a house for post-war repatriates, but because we were very poor, my older brother and I were sent to work. I worked in my uncle’s house for some food. It was hard work in the fields, and I got very poor food, and when I decided to go to school, I got kicked out of my uncle’s house. I returned to my parents’ house, but there was no money there. So, I started to work early in the morning – before going to school. I got up at 5am and went from house to house and sold milk, then I sold newspapers. When I was at school, I wanted to sleep. I understood only English and mathematics because I did not know Japanese. I could not enter a Japanese high school and was sent to Sendai to a Korean school, but I did not understand Korean either . . . (Case D, Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2020, p. 142).

Those who went to Korean schools mastered the language and contacted Koreans in Japan. Some also found marriage partners among the Korean community in Japan. As mentioned above, when I was looking for contacts with returnees during this period, representatives of the Korean community helped me (Fig. 5.1).

5.3.2

Relation with the Russian Language

The life histories of two interviewees, who are Japanese returnees from Sakhalin, illustrate some of the critical points of the preceding discussion: their experiences upon returning to Japan, the difficulties they faced integrating into Japanese society, and their struggles to survive daily in Japan. NT’s Case (15 Years Old at the Time of Repatriation, Japanese Family) I certainly don’t think I’m Russian. But unlike my parents, I never said to return to Japan, I always said to go to Japan. I was 15 years old when my parents decided to repatriate, I don’t know exactly why they did not repatriated but it was related to my father’s work. When I arrived in Japan, I could not read or write in Japanese, so I went to elementary school instead of high school. I was the oldest in the class, but I don’t remember any rejection. On the contrary, then many had an interest in Russian culture so they asked me to sing Russian songs. I learned to read Japanese normally after graduating from school when I went to work in a bookstore. I met Russians after leaving Sakhalin at the Olympics (Winter Olympics

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Life After Return to Japan

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Fig. 5.1 Place of work after return to Japan. (Photo credit: Gotō Haruki)

Fig. 5.2 Russian books and textbooks brought to Japan. (Photo credit: Gotō Haruki)

in Sapporo 1972), where I worked as an interpreter. I wanted to talk to them freely, but we were not allowed to communicate. I could visit Sakhalin after perestroika when the borders were opened . . . (Case NT, Paichadze interview).

G’s Case (15 Years Old at the Time of Repatriation, Japanese-Korean Family) (Fig. 5.2) We returned in 1965 and started to live in a small village near Hakodate. I didn’t understand Japanese well, and because I studied at a Russian school, I could neither read nor write in Japanese. But the hardest part was not that I could not read and write, but the fact that

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everyone accused me of being ‘red’. Even teachers accused me of this, and any problem ended with these accusations. Then we moved to Hakodate. I was an athlete and looked older than my years, so I was constantly being watched by the police. Whatever I did – whether I bought a camera or went to learn Russian in the Japanese-Russian association – the police came to our house to check me. It was very hard, and I decided to forget that I knew Russian and had lived in Russia. As an athlete, I obtained entry via recommendation to a high school in Sapporo, but my parents did not have any money, so I decided to work instead. My brother chose a different path and went to Tokyo. In Tokyo, it was easier with the Russian language [because it is far from the Russian border]; my brother traveled several times to Moscow, and then in the 1990s with our mother to Sakhalin (Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2020, pp. 141–142).

Of course, there were significantly more returnees in the 1950s–1970s than the cases presented here, and some of those who moved may have lost contact with both Korean and Russian languages and cultures. For example, in the case of T, who lives in Tokyo: I moved to Japan when I was ten years old (1976). Before that, I studied at a Russian school, but I did not speak Russian at all after moving, and now I don’t remember anything . . . My father is Korean, he never hid it, but we did not have any particular contact with Koreans in Japan . . . Perhaps the only thing left of Korean culture is cuisine . . . When I buy kimchi, I always do it in Korean town. In Tokyo . . . (Case T, Paichadze interview).

I could contact this person only because one of the repatriates who returned after the 1990s was a friend of her mother and knew their address in Tokyo. However, as already mentioned, there are many people from this wave of repatriation with whom it is almost impossible to establish contact.

5.4

5.4.1

The Closure of Korean Schools on Sakhalin and Russification of the Japanese and Korean Population Change of the Soviet Language Policy and Closure of the Korean Schools

In general, after the death of Stalin, the liberalisation of domestic politics began. In national politics, it was also initially announced that it was returning to “MarxistLeninist principles” and the strengthening of the national party elites (Kaziyev, 2014, p. 56) began. However, the main goal of Khrushchev, who came to power in 1956, was the erasure of territorial boundaries between the republics and the formation of a “united Soviet people.” During this period, Crimea was transferred to Ukraine and part of the Kazakh lands to Uzbekistan (Kaziyev, 2014, p. 57). The formation of the Soviet people was to take place through the construction of a single language, Russian. This policy included the language of instruction for children (Russian or the language of the republic), which parents could choose for themselves. Although a forced transition to Russian was not issued, since studying in

5.4

The Closure of Korean Schools on Sakhalin and Russification of. . .

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Russian provided more opportunities for studying at University and future career opportunities, it was suggested that many parents would choose Russian as the language of instruction. The reaction to this law was not unambiguous. For example, in June of the same year, Latvia and Azerbaijan went into conflict with the Union leadership. They adopted resolutions on civil servants’ compulsory study of Azerbaijani and Latvian languages, with the mandatory subsequent passing of exams (Kaziyev, 2014, p. 57). Concerning education in the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) in April 1959, a similar law was issued. “On strengthening the connection between school and life and on the further development of the public education system in the RSFSR,” in article 15, was written as follows: To establish that education at school is conducted in the native language of students. Give parents the right to decide the language of instruction at school for their children. In schools in which instruction is conducted in the language of the autonomous republic, autonomous region or national district, the study of the Russian language is carried out at the request of students, just as in Russian schools, students can learn the language of the autonomous republic, autonomous region, or national district at their request.

This law led to changes in policy in the national regions. On Sakhalin in 1962, the Regional Department of Public Education appealed to the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR with a proposal to transfer the Korean schools of the Sakhalin Region into the Russian language of instruction. The ministry recommended that this issue be resolved in the Sakhalin region. As a result, in 1963, by the decision of the Sakhalin Regional Executive Committee, Korean schools were reorganized into Russian schools (Kostanov & Poddubnaya, 1994, p. 18). The liquidation of Korean schools was an initiative of the Sakhalin Regional Department of Public Education (Oblono). The department considered it a natural phenomenon to reduce the network of Korean schools since children of Korean nationality, being surrounded by Russian children, were fluent in the Russian language, and their parents were asking for them to be transferred to Russian schools. For example, three-quarters of Koreans, whose parents were citizens of the USSR, studied in Russian schools, and only 952 students from the citizens of the USSR studied in Korean schools (GIASO, F. R-53. O. 25. D. 2629. L. 59). The reasons that Oblono cited in support of his claim were: 1. The presence of weak teaching staff with poor knowledge of the native Korean language. 2. Several subjects in all secondary and eight-year Korean schools were taught in Russian or “broken Korean-Russian” (mixed) languages. As a result, the materials were difficult to understand for the students, and their level of knowledge and academic performances decreased (academic performance in the first half of the 1962–1963 academic year in Korean schools was 87.8%, which was below the regional average). In some Korean schools, the number of students failing in their native language was higher than in Russian. 3. Progress in individual subjects taught in Russian was higher than in subjects taught in their native language.

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4. Students in Korean schools were not provided with quality textbooks. Most textbooks were outdated and did not meet the program requirements; therefore, textbooks from Russian schools were often used in schools. Textbooks in grades 8–10 were not translated into Korean at all. 5. Each edition of textbooks in Korean were associated with the significant expenditure of public funds. Since they were rarely published, they quickly became outdated, and the regional book organizations wrote them off as unusable. 6. Korean schools did not have unique curricula in subjects other than the Russian and Korean languages but used the general programs of Russian general education schools. The Russian language and literature programs were drawn up based on the normative programs of the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR for non-Russian schools. 7. Korean schools were provided with all printed visual aids, and library stock mainly in Russian. Office work was also conducted only in Russian. So, in one of the libraries of Korean schools, out of 5000 books, only 300 were in Korean and were translated Korean editions of Russian literature, “Young Guard,” “Chapaev,” “Mother.” The books in Korean were not popular. 8. All extracurricular activities in Korean schools were conducted in Russian; Russian teachers worked as class teachers in several schools. 9. The possibility of translation into the Russian language of instruction was studied and discussed in 10 secondary, eight 8-year and three Korean primary schools. All pedagogical collectives were in favor of translation into Russian. 10. Most parents of students, citizens of the USSR and the DPRK, favored Russian as the language of instruction. Some DPRK citizens opposed this decision, but their objections were not considered sufficient grounds for preserving Korean schools (GIASO F.-R.53 O.25. D. 2629. L. 60–63, Din & Paichadze, 2018, p. 81) (Fig. 5.3). Despite ambiguous attitudes in the Korean diaspora to the closure of Korean schools, some people even suffered from their disagreement with the policy of the Sakhalin administration, some agreed that this was a necessary and logical step. It is worth recognizing that the closure of Korean schools, among other reasons, became an important incentive for the final integration of the Koreans of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into Soviet society. On Sakhalin, after 1963, all Korean and Japanese children were moved to Russian schools and switched their learning language to Russian because of the closure of Korean schools. From this period, the process of Russification of Sakhalin Koreans and Japanese began. Assessments of the transition to education in Russian by the Korean diaspora of Sakhalin were ambiguous. On the one hand, this led to the younger generation’s loss of their ethnic language and a loss of contact between generations. On the other hand, at a time when repatriation was not possible, studying in Russian gave them a chance to join the Russian-speaking society, which thus expanded the possibilities of internal migration and the chances of getting a higher education (Din & Paichadze, 2018, p. 81).

5.4

The Closure of Korean Schools on Sakhalin and Russification of. . .

Fig. 5.3 Korean textbook

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5.4.2

From the End of the 1950s to the End of the 1980s: New Wave of. . .

Language and Identity of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans After 1963

Technically, the generation which was born in Russia between 1960 and 1980 are third generation immigrants. A characteristic of third generation immigrants is that they have typically lost the language of their country of origin. The 1.5 and second generations (in Sakhalin’s case, people who was born in the late 1930s) are bilinguals or host country native speakers. Often, they speak to their children (the third generation) in the host country’s language. The children go to school, where the host country language is fixed and developed. For the third generation, communication with their grandparents is the only contact with the language of their country of origin. This condition occurred with the descendants of the Japanese and Koreans in Sakhalin. However, the situation was more complicated because the language of education was changed to Russian. S’s Children’s Case (Japanese-Korean Family) Before the children went to school, we spoke Korean at home, but Korean schools were closed at the time of entering school, and the children went to a Russian school. The school requested that if it is possible, please speak Russian at home. The situation with the Russian language was the same as with my Korean when I went to a Korean school. I worked, so I could speak Russian, but to help children in their studies and not lose contact with them, I read books and magazines [in Russian] that they borrowed from the library. I was very interested, but the children read faster than me, so they often returned the books to the library before I finished reading (Case S, Paichadze interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p. 79).

L’s Case (Third Generation, Korean Family) My parents [generation 1.5] talked to each other in Korean. They spoke worse in Russian because they only completed primary school in Russian. But they spoke to us in Russian. I was the youngest in the family, so I spent a lot of time with one of my grandmothers. She spoke to me in Korean dialect. But I did not understand my other grandparents. They were offended, and I did not know why I did not understand them (Case L, Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2015, p. 219).

Some of the interviewees said that one part of the family spoke in the family’s language (Korean), another part spoke in the language of the prior-host country (Japanese), and another spoke the host country’s language (Russian). They maintained Japanese and Korean cultural elements in food, customs, daily life, and interpersonal relationships. However, family members in the Soviet-born generation are native speakers of Russian and consider Russia to be their motherland. For many of them, Sakhalin is still their home even after they moved to their historical homeland. For example, from my interview with L about her experience after moving to Japan with her Japanese/Korean husband:

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Conclusion of the Chapter

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• Where do you feel at home? • At home? In Sakhalin, probably because there everything is familiar. It’s where I was born and have friends and colleagues. • Are you used to life here in Japan already? • Well, used to it, yes, but what can we do? To tell the truth, of course, I would like to go to Sakhalin, but we stay because of the children. If we had no children, we probably would have rushed back (Case L, Paichadze interview, Paichadze, 2015, 221). M’s Case (Japanese-Korean Family) Before school, I spent a lot of time with my Korean grandmother, who only spoke Korean, so I spoke Korean well. But then I went to school, and at school and home, they began to speak Russian, so now I don’t speak Korean, but I understand well what they say. My Japanese grandmother lived far away, so I rarely saw her. She usually spoke to me in both Korean and Russian. At that time, I could not distinguish who was Japanese and who was Korean. When my mother decided to repatriate to Japan, I regretted that my grandmother was not taught me to speak Japanese. The Russian language means a lot to me, I really like to read Pushkin, reading in Korean or Japanese, I cannot feel what I feel when I read in Russian. I think and feel in Russian, in this sense, I identify myself as Russian. However, Russian culture is brought from outside, from the environment. Korean culture is something that was passed on to me through blood, through upbringing at home, customs, in this sense, I am certainly a Korean. Japanese culture slept in me for a long time, after my mother moved to Japan, it woke up, and now this is what I have the most interest in (Paichadze interview, Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, pp. 116–117).

From the interview, we see that after the closure of Korean schools, the Russification of the Korean-speaking population began and Russian became a mother tongue for many of them. However, these people did not become Russian. Their ethnic identity included Japanese, Korean, and Russian elements.

5.5

Conclusion of the Chapter

For both Japan and the USSR, repatriation of the Japanese population in the late 1950s and early 1970s was exclusively a repatriation of Japanese people. However, this was a group of people with complex identities who were speakers of several languages. The first generation of immigrants faced the choice of assimilation into the Japanese society or integration into the Korean diaspora. For the second generation, the problem was even more complicated; although they had Japanese-Korean ethnic roots, many of them were native speakers of the Russian language and had Russian mentality. However, the political situation of that time did not allow them to either return to the USSR or continue to use the Russian language in Japan. Some of them managed to use the Russian language and travel to Russia as adults, others have lost their Russian language. Japanese society in general and Japanese schools during this period were not ready to accept foreigners, especially when it came to immigrants who returned as

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Japanese as there was a misconception that they “cannot have problems with the Japanese language and culture.” This concept ignored that regardless of being Japanese, they may have a different culture, and their mother tongue may not be Japanese, but Russian or Korean. This chapter considered the situations after the repatriation of Japanese-Korean families in Japan and Sakhalin since the 1960s. The language policy of the USSR started in the late 1950s and remained unchanged until the mid-1980s. On Sakhalin, a combination of these policies and local conditions led to the closure of Korean schools, resulting in the Russification of Japanese and Koreans living on the island and the loss of their native languages. However, in terms of self-identification, many people still have Korean and Japanese self-identification. We can talk about Sakhalinization, that is, the formation of a multi-level self-identification during this period. The late 1980s to 1990s brought with them a surge of national identity. Schools teaching Korean and Japanese as foreign languages began to open on Sakhalin. Faculties of Japanese and Korean languages opened at Sakhalin University, where there are many students from these ethnic groups. Simultaneously with this, modern repatriation to their historical homeland of Japan and South Korea began. I will talk about what happens after repatriation in the following two chapters.

References Din, Y. (2015). Koreyskaya diaspora Sakhalina: problema repatriatsii i integratsiya v sovetskoye i rossiyskoye obshchestvo. Ministerstvo kul'tury Sakhalinskoy oblasti. Din, Y., & Paichadze, S. (2018). Natsional’naye shkoly dlya yaponskogo i koreyskogo naseleniya Yuzhnogo Sakhalina Kuril'skikh ostrovov poslevoyennyy period (1945–1963). Bulletin of the Sakhalin Museum, 25, 76–82. Hyun, M. (2013). Korian nettowāku: media, idō no rekishi to kūkan. Hokkaidō Daigaku Shuppankai. Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2016). Saharin zanryū: nikkanro hyaku nen ni wataru kazoku no monogatari. Kōbunken. Kaziyev, S. (2014). Natsional’naya politika i Mezhetnicheskie otnosheniya v Kazakhstane v poststalinskiy period (1953–1964). Oriental Studies, 7(4), 56–61. Kostanov, A., & Poddubnaya, I. (1994). Koreyskiye shkoly na Sakhaline: istoricheskiy opyt i sovremennost. Arkhivnyy otdel administratsii Sakhalinskoy oblasti, Sakhalinskiy tsentr dokumentatsii noveyshey istorii. Morris-Suzuki, T. (2010). Borderline Japan: Foreigners and frontier controls in the postwar era. Cambridge University Press. Morris-Suzuki, T. (2015). Re-inventing Japan. Routledge. Nakayama, T. (2019). Saharin zanryū nihonjin to sengo nihon: Karafuto jūmin no kyōkai chiiki-shi. Kokusai shoin. Nihon Saharin Kyōkai (2018). Nihon Saharin kyōkai shozō ‘kojin fairu ichiji kikoku-sha’(Japan Sakhalin Association’s collection “Individual files/temporary returnees”). Japan-Sakhalin Association unpublished document Paichadze, S. (2015). Language, identity and educational issues of ‘repatriates’ from Sakhalin. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo- Japanese border (pp. 212–232). Routledge.

References

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Paichadze, S. (2020). Invisible migrants from Sakhalin in the 1960s. A new page in Japanese migration studies. In A. Ogawa & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), New frontiers in Japanese studies. Routledge. Podpechnikov, V. L. (2003). O repatriatsii yaponskogo naseleniya s territorii Yuzhnogo Sakhalina i Kuril’skih ostrovov. Vestnik Sakhalinskogo muzeya, 10, 257–260. Song, K. (2012). Chōsen gakko. Iwanami shoten. Takasaki, S., & Park, C. (2005). Kikoku undō to wa nani datta no ka. Heibonsha.

Documents State archive of Sakhalinskaya Oblast. GIASO, F. 53. O. 7. D. 181. L. 49–51. Kōseishō (1996) Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. Kōseishō shakai engo-kyoku. Karafuto oyobi kyūsoren hondo kara no eijū kikoku-sha meibo no sōfu ni tsuite (kokumin nenkin ni kakaru tokurei sochi). Shaen ichi-chō dai 164-gō.

Interviews Returnees of 1950s–1970s Case D, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2016. Case G, Interview Paichadze, Hakodate 2018. Case J, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2016, Obihiro 2017. Case NT, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2016. Case T, Interview Paichadze, Tokyo 2017.

Returnees of 1990s and people who still live in Sakhalin Case L, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2012. Case M, Interview Paichadze, Sapporo 2015. Case S, Interview Paichadze, Ebetsu 2015. Case Yo, Interview Paichadze and Hyun, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 2014.

Part III

Contemporary Repatriation

Chapter 6

Contemporary Repatriation to Japan and South Korea: Formation of New Diasporas (New Life as Migrants)

Keywords Historical homeland · Ethnic return migrants · Migration and multicultural policies · Contemporary repatriation policy · Language usage · Identity after return

6.1

Life After Returning to Japan and South Korea

Since the late 1980s, the repatriation movement intensified on Sakhalin, and in the early 1990s, repatriation to Japan and South Korea began. This period was the end of the Cold War when various agreements between states became possible. The USSR (Russian Federation) and South Korea restored their political relationship. South Korea also finally reached an agreement with Japan on responsibility for the repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans. Both Japan and South Korea had the economic potential to accommodate returnees. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s economic and social situation deteriorated. Especially in Sakhalin, on Russia’s far eastern periphery, many plants and factories closed, leading to the degradation of urban infrastructure and unemployment. Many houses no longer had central heating or hot water. These factors were decisive, especially for the second and third generation of Sakhalin returnees to move to their historical homeland. In this part of the book, I will consider the features of the policies of the host states and the life of the Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans after contemporary repatriation from 1990 onwards.

6.2

Migration and Multicultural Policies in Japan and South Korea

As mentioned above, contemporary repatriation was exclusively a problem of the post-war settlement between South Korea, Japan, and Russia for a long time. However, different groups of ethnic migrants within Japanese and Korean societies have faced many similar problems, including adaptation issues in the host society © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3_6

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and a younger generation that needed to deal with educational issues. These complications occurred because of a lack of multicultural policies in both Japan and South Korea. However, even though these people are descendants of Japanese or Koreans, most of them do not speak the native languages of their ancestors’ countries. They have completely different cultural backgrounds and multi-layered ethnic identities. Below I will clarify the specialty and commonality of migration and multicultural policies in Japan and South Korea.

6.2.1

Ethnic Return Migrants as Workers

Many countries have the experience of the process of repatriation of their ethnic population. Tsuda (2009a) calls these people ethnic return migrants. According to his definition, ethnic return migration is the return of diasporic people to the country of their ethnic origin. Tsuda divided return migrants into two groups: first-generation diasporic peoples who move back to their homeland and ethnic return migrants. Ethnic return migrants refer to later-generation descendants of diasporic peoples who “return” to their countries of ancestral origin after living outside their ethnic homelands for generations (Tsuda, 2009b, p. 1). As Tsuda argues, East Asian countries have invited back their descendants mainly for economic purposes, unlike their European counterparts: “Japan and South Korea have imported large numbers of ethnic return migrants in response to acute unskilled labour shortages caused by decades of economic prosperity coupled with low fertility rates” (Tsuda, 2009a, p. 28). During the 1990s, amidst the Asian economic crisis and a demographic crisis in Japan and South Korea, both countries began to open their doors to immigration while officially claiming there was no immigration into their countries. To avoid linguistic problems and issues of cultural adaptation among immigrants, Japan and South Korea allowed overseas descendants of the Korean and Japanese diaspora to work in their “historical homelands” (Tsuda, 2009b; Song, 2009). Many ethnic return migrants in both Japan and South Korea belong to the third or even fourth generation. Therefore, despite the motivations of the host countries, it is not possible to avoid problems associated with language, culture, and education, and the returnees face various obstacles in their adaptation to the host society. Economically motivated ethnic migrants are mainly engaged in simple physical labor and usually live in concentrated areas in industrial cities. As a result of such concentration, the development of their own society of migrants takes place. Lack of fluency in the host country’s language and a lack of adaptation programs strengthen the selfsufficiency of the migrant’s society, which in turn makes it possible to live with minimal contact with the linguistic and cultural majority. Ota is an example of a Japanese city with a significant presence of a migrant society (Onai, 2003). A South Korean example of such a city is Ansan, which has received the largest number of labor migrants (including ethnic Koreans from the former Soviet Union) in the country.

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It should also be noted that, despite similar processes in the Japanese and Korean policies of accepting ethnic migrants, South Korea has a particular attitude towards the diaspora, which differs from that held by Japan. In Korea, the diaspora played an essential role in the struggle for independence, thus becoming the community where Korean nationalism was formed. Ch. Song notes this peculiarity concerning Chinese Koreans (Song, 2009, p. 389). The same can be said for Russian-speaking Koreans.1

6.2.2

Multicultural Policy in Japan and South Korea

Both South Korea and Japan position themselves as mono-ethnic countries,2 with a unity of language, culture, and ethnicity. In both countries, although for different reasons, this approach is related to their colonial past. The discourse that nation, ethnicity, culture, and language are assumed to be the same (Sugimoto, 2012; Lee, 2013, p. 45) forcibly includes ethnic return migrants into the “Japanese or Korean culture and identity frame” without acknowledging their cultural diversity. As I said in the previous chapter, a legal basis was constructed in Japan by the Japanese constitution which declared that Japanese people were no longer ‘subjects’ (shinmin), but ‘nationals.’ However, this extension of the political basis of citizenship coincided with a restriction of its geographic basis and former colonial subjects from Korea and Taiwan lost their Japanese citizenship. The postwar Nationality Act of 1950 (revised in 1952 and 1984) continues to be based on Jus sanguinis – a principle of nationality law by which citizenship is not determined by place of birth but by having one or both parents who are citizens of the state. The post-war discourse of Nihonjinron was based on the philosophy of the uniqueness of Japan, Japanese people, and Japanese culture. This discourse “flourished and continued to dominate in both popular and academic debates over the six decades since the Second World War. While variegate assertions comprise the field, they share the premise that the Japanese, living in the Japanese archipelago, are ethnically and culturally uniform. In other words, the Japanese nation (N), Japanese ethnicity (E) and Japanese culture (C) are assumed to be the same, forming an N ¼ E ¼ C equation” (Sugimoto, 2012, p. 453). Nihonjinron discourse, on the one hand, excluded from the Japanese nation those people who were living in Japan but were not Japanese by ethnicity or culture, primarily the Korean-Japanese or Taiwanese-Japanese. On the other hand, this 1 For example, on the ground floor of the building for “Nomo,” organization of assistance for Koryo-saram settlers (jamir.or.kr), there is a permanent exhibition, “Resettlement of Koryo-saram and the struggle for Korean independence.” It is dedicated to the fighters for independence in the Russian Far East. 2 Although the official policy in South Korea is multiculturalism and Japan has a policy called “Multicultural coexistence,” those policies are deficient in many ways and return migrants in both countries also face similar problems due to a lack of multicultural policies.

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discourse forcibly included those of Japanese ethnic background into the ‘Japanese culture and identity frame’ without reference to their cultural diversity. In 1993 Japan changed the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act to allow the entry of the overseas descendants of Japanese to work in Japan. This change led to a large influx of people of Japanese heritage from Brazil and other Latin American countries (Paichadze, 2015, p. 214). The amendment to the law for migrants in 1993 is essentially based on the same principle of ethnicity, language, and culture: by thinking they are no different from the majority Japanese, the government facilitates ethnic Japanese’s entry into the country. It must be noted that in Japan, generally, the term multiculturalism is not used, but “multicultural coexistence.” However, it is criticized by all minorities, because it calls for coexistence before recognizing the specific rights of ethnic minorities. The number of foreign residents living in Japan is not considerable, but it is increasing every year. In 2013 the number was 2.06 million, but in 2020 the number exceeded 2.89 million (MOJ, 2018). Therefore, the number of students requiring Japanese language instruction in Japanese public schools has also rapidly increased. However, as already mentioned, in Japan, officially, there are no ‘immigrants’ (imin): people are either Japanese or ‘foreign residents’, and there is no official encouragement of permanent settlement or integration into Japanese society. This situation leads to a lack of practical support for immigrants (‘foreign residents’) at the state level. These problems are compounded in Japan by the educational system. Language learning and education are significant problems for immigrants’ children in Japan. Foreign children can attend Japanese schools freely, but it is not compulsory, the schools are not required to make special educational provisions, and officially there are no classes of Japanese as a Second Language (JSL). Even in areas densely populated by foreigners, Japanese language teaching is taught by volunteers in NGOs, not by schoolteachers. In Korea, during the Second World War, Japan enforced assimilation policies based on colonial racism, which claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of the same racial group and that Koreans were in a subordinate position in the hierarchy of the Japanese Empire. Under the slogan nissen ittai (Japan and Korea as One), the Japanese language was to be exclusively used in the media and in schools, and Koreans had to change their names to Japanese (Lee, 2013, p. 46). After the Second World War, in response to these assimilationist policies, the need to assert the distinctiveness of Koreans as part of one nation and one ethnicity became a pressing concern among Korean nationalists. As Lee Si Won argues, Chae Ho Sin adopts the concept of nation as “an organic body formed out of the spirit of a people descended through a single pure bloodline.” A leading writer and scholar during the colonial era, Lee Gwan Su, took up this rhetoric by claiming that a nation should be built on the three basic elements of bloodline, personality, and culture, and that “Koreans are without a doubt a unitary nation in blood and culture.” As Lee Si Won sums up, “the national identity in Korea encompasses ‘territorial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities’” (Lee, 2013, p. 46).

6.3

Policy for Returnees from Sakhalin

101

The entry of large numbers of ethnic Korean immigrants should not have violated this concept. However, despite the common ethnicity, culture, and in the case of Koreans from the CIS countries, the linguistic component is very different from the host majority. As a result, within South Korea, a need arose for a specific multicultural policy. Given the growing needs of students with multicultural backgrounds within the “Korean nation,” in 2006, the South Korean Ministry of Education developed the Educational Support Plan for Children from Multicultural Families. From the outset, this plan provides the definitions of “multiculturalism” and “multicultural family” (Lee, 2013, p. 52). Usually, this term refers to a family of Korean, foreigner, and their children. The implication is that the foreign parent (usually the mother) does not speak Korean well, affecting school performance. Lee Si Won notes that this narrow definition of a “multicultural family” potentially excludes North Korean refugees, returning Koreans from overseas, and many other groups that may have different origins. Although she notes that the main two groups are “children from international marriages and children of migrant workers living in Korea,” she also argues that the multicultural education policy does not target majority Korean-born nationals of Korean ethnicity, but it assumes that multicultural education, or special care, is only needed for minority students (Lee, 2013, p. 52). Representatives of organizations that support the Russian-speaking Korean diaspora agree with this by emphasizing the lack of such support for ethnic Koreans.

6.3

Policy for Returnees from Sakhalin3

Contemporary repatriation to Japan and South Korea, which started in the 1990s, became possible due to the work of various public organizations in Japan, South Korea, and Russia. This change sparked a significant shift in political relations between the countries and became a huge event in the lives of ordinary people. In Japan, the support policy for Japanese abandoned in China started in the 1980s, then in 1994, the China Returnees Support Act (Chūgoku zanryū hōjin-tō no enkatsuna kikoku no sokushin oyobi eijū kikoku-go no jiritsu no shien ni kansuru hōritsu) was enacted. It was officially called the Act to Support the Independence of Permanent Residents after Returning Home and the Promotion of the Smooth Return of Japanese Left Behind in China and Other Regions. Japanese returnees from Sakhalin had been included in the ‘Other Regions’. After the China Returnees Support Act of 1994, the Japanese government implemented a policy that allowed disabled returnees to return with their immediate families via a government-funded program.

3 The part of comparative analysis between Japan and South Korea repatriation systems will be published in Svetalana Paichadze (2022) Japanese and Korean Return Migrants in Sapporo (Japan) and Ansan (South Korea), Transnational Korea in the 20th and 21st Centuries, eds.by Joanne Cho, Robert Lee & Sang Hwan, London: Routledge.

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It became possible to bring one adult child (and their family) on the condition that the person would take care of his/her parents. The opportunity to come with their families led to the start of repatriation from Sakhalin. On the other hand, in South Korea, the return of permanent residents of Sakhalin Koreans started in 2000. Before that, in 1989, the Red Cross in both Korea and Japan inaugurated the Sakhalin Koreans Support Consortium as a joint project, and from that time regular visits to the homeland were realized. In the Japan-South Korea summit meeting of 1993, the problem of the Sakhalin Koreans was discussed, and progress was made toward finding solutions. Japan promised financial support for the repatriation of the first generation of Sakhalin Koreans, and South Korea allocated land to construct a facility to aid this process. A special apartment complex, known as Gohyang maeul (Kohyang maul), literally ‘home village,’ was built on the outskirts of Ansan. In the case of Sakhalin Koreans, permission to repatriate was given only to the first generation (born before August 1945) of returnees, resulting in new instances of families being separated between generations (Hyun & Paichadze, 2015, pp. 206–207). In addition, it should be noted that on April 30, 2020, South Korea passed a law allowing second-generation repatriation if their first-generation parents reside in South Korea. Moving is possible for one son or daughter and his family. The law came into force in January 2021. This law is like the law passed in Japan in 1994, therefore, the study of the problems that the younger generation of Sakhalin repatriates in Japan face is relevant for South Korea (Sahallin dongpo, 2020). Below, I will consider how the Japanese government created the policy and implemented the support system for repatriates. In 1984, the Japanese government opened a returnee support center in Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture. This center was created for returnees from China and other countries and provided basic intensive Japanese language and lifestyle training to help returnees adapt to Japanese society.4 Returnees were admitted here for 4 months (then, from 2005 for 6 months), underwent training and various procedures, such as restoring family registration and obtaining citizenship. In addition, primary centers for repatriates were established in six major cities in Japan. After training in such centers, returnees usually settled in the prefectures where their relatives lived. Returnees who settled in each region received classes in the Japanese language, employment, and lifestyle advice. Places where such support was provided were called secondary repatriation centers, and there were three such centers. However, to organize their daily lives in Japan and not be marginalized, returnees needed to be enrolled in continuous Japanese language learning, life counselling, and employment assistance. For these purposes, centers of the third level were established. Since 2009, the number of returnees has gradually decreased, and primary and secondary level centers have mostly closed. The main problems were the ageing of the first generation and issues with the education and employment of the second and third generations. In this regard, the

4

Tokorozawa Center was closed in 2017.

6.3

Policy for Returnees from Sakhalin

103

role of the third-level centers increased. In Hokkaido, where repatriates from Sakhalin mainly live, the issues mentioned above have been dealt with by the Hokkaido Returnees Support Center. In addition, public organizations deal with the problems of repatriates. The Japan-Sakhalin Association is engaged in helping the first generation with health problems, such as finding hospitals, providing translators, etc. This association also organizes one-time trips to Japan for those Sakhalin Japanese and their relatives who continue to live on Sakhalin. Other organizations in Sapporo, such as Kodomo Nihongo Kurabu (Japanese Language Club for Children) or CaSA NPO (Child-assist Sapporo Association), help returnee children with educational issues. The first generation of Japanese returnees from Sakhalin can receive a special pension only if they can prove that they were involuntarily left behind on Sakhalin after the Second World War. However, very often, this fact is difficult to demonstrate. Many repatriates receive no special pension. Instead, they receive livelihood protection from the government. In Japan, there is no determinate place for the residence of the returnees. Choice of location for living is relatively free. Many of the returnees from Sakhalin who are coming to Japan have chosen Hokkaido because of the climate and geographical proximity to Sakhalin. Many returnees live in Sapporo, the largest city in Hokkaido. In March of 2014, there were 82 households comprising 276 people (of which 40 households and 168 people were in the Sapporo area) (Paichadze, 2015, p. 224). Hokkaido doesn’t have a big industrial complex like in Ansan prefecture (South Korea), and therefore, returnees from Sakhalin have no contact with other migrant workers. Even when other ethnic returnees live in Hokkaido, such as repatriates from China, interactions between different ethnic return migrants are complicated, because they come from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. All returnees are native speakers of the Russian language, and thus they become part of the Russian-speaking community in Sapporo. The community is not big, with about 300 residents with Russian citizenship. There is no Russian infrastructure there. There are only the Russian consulate and the Russian Saturday school that organizes some events, where all members can interact. In South Korea, after apartments of Gohyang maeul had been built in Ansan, more than 1000 Sakhalin Koreans were settled there in 2000. The government processed the repatriation of Koreans from Sakhalin, and the right for repatriation was granted to everyone born before August 15, 1945. Then in 2008, permission to settle in Korea was given to couples in which only one member is from the first generation. Sakhalin returnees live on a monthly subsidy of about 400,000 won. Also, once every 2 years, they can go to Sakhalin at public expense. In South Korea, there is no special law to support permanent returnees other than repatriation. Specific legislation was often discussed to broaden the support for permanent returnees from Sakhalin, but they were all canceled due to the indifference of the political world and public opinion. However, in February 2014, a policy to support returnees from Sakhalin was passed in the South Chungcheong Province, and the local government began Korean language training and interpretation services (Hyun, 2016, p. 286).

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Returnees from Sakhalin also live in other places, but the majority lives in one specific location, Gohyang maeul in Ansan. Ansan is a city of workers, with many immigrants living there. The population of Russian-speaking ethnic Koreans (Koryo-saram) who came there as migrants or workers and their families is about 17,000 people. They have their “Russian World,” which comprises infrastructure in the Russian language, such as shops, restaurants, agencies, and schools. The repatriates from Sakhalin actively use this infrastructure (Paichadze, 2021, p. 30).

6.4

Language Usage and Identity After the Return

Return migrants in both countries also face similar problems due to a lack of multicultural policies. The position of both Japan and South Korea as mono-ethnic countries forcibly includes ethnic return migrants into the “Japanese or Korean culture and identity frame” without acknowledgment of their cultural diversity. Many ethnic return migrants in both Japan and South Korea belong to the third or even fourth generation. Therefore, despite plans by the host countries, it is not possible to avoid problems associated with language, culture, and education, and the returnees face various obstacles in their adaptation to the host society. Below I consider issues of each generation of Sakhalin returnees in Japan and South Korea.

6.4.1

Language Usage and Identity After the Return of the First Generation

In Japan and South Korea, the first generation of Sakhalin zanryūsha (“people left behind”) are allowed to return to their historical homeland under the state program. In South Korea, the first generation is defined as those born before August 15, 1945. In Japan, the definition is more flexible, as it also includes those born or conceived in 1945. However, it should be noted that there is a large age difference within the first generation of Japanese and Korean zanryūsha. Among the people born in the first two decades of the twentieth century, who arrived in Sakhalin voluntarily or were brought there by force, many died before repatriation could begin. А small number of first-generation zanryūsha returned to their homeland, and sought to reunite with their family members, particularly siblings. Based on Tsuda’s definition, we can identify such people as the first generation of diasporic people who moved back to their homeland. At the same time, some members of the first generation who were born in Sakhalin “returned” to a place where they had never lived, and we can define this return process as “ethnic return migration.” This difference in perception of repatriation is the same for both Japanese and Koreans.

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Language Usage and Identity After the Return

105

This generation has no major issues adapting to their host societies. Although they note that the language and lifestyle of Korean or Japanese societies are different from those of Sakhalin, they can speak the language and understand the traditions. Due to their age, first-generation returnees do not seek employment and are not facing any major problems in their daily lives. They consider financial assistance from the government as a compensation for their difficult life and hard work on Sakhalin. In South Korea, repatriates were not permitted to work and could only live on government subsidies. In Japan, they were not prohibited from working, but most do not work due to their old age or health conditions. Because of the Internet, the returnees do not feel cut off from Russia and can communicate with their families who live on Sakhalin (Sakuma, 2020). Many returnees who went to Japan settled in Hokkaido. The proximity of Hokkaido to Sakhalin allows them to visit relatives on Sakhalin or invite them to Hokkaido. Many families use the program of “short-term return” (short visit to Japan) which allows their relatives who still live in Sakhalin to visit them in Japan. The first generation of Sakhalin Koreans has the right to travel to Sakhalin with financial assistance once every 2 years, and they use it to visit their children and grandchildren who live there. One of the major issues faced by first-generation Sakhalin repatriates is related to places of burial. In South Korea, Sakhalin Koreans are buried in the National MangHyang Cemetery, built in 1976 by the Korean Government per request of the Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (National Mang-Hyang Cemetery). This cemetery is for Koreans who died in foreign lands. In Japan, the problem of burials was not resolved until 2016, when a common cemetery (Kyōdō bosho) and a memorial complex were built by the initiative of the Japan-Sakhalin Association using donations from individuals and organizations. However, the separation of families between the countries still leaves the situation with burials uncertain for both the first-generation returnees and their children. As discussed in parts one and two of this book, representatives of first-generation Sakhalin returnees have a complex ethnic identity. It depends on the historical period of moving to Sakhalin, their age at the time of migration, experiences at school, ethnic community, and society. However, their identities were influenced by different circumstances compared to those on the Korean peninsula or in Japan proper, as Japanese and Koreans in Sakhalin had closer social and economic ties. The impossibility of repatriation after the war and long-term residence among Russians and other nationalities on Sakhalin also influenced the culture and identity of Sakhalin Koreans and Japanese. After returning to their historical homelands, these people continue to incorporate Japanese, Korean and Russian cultural elements into their everyday lives. All the aforementioned factors also affected their level of language proficiency. Sakhalin Koreans who were forcibly moved to Karafuto after 1938 did not speak Japanese. By contrast, those who came there before 1938 or were born in the 1930s and early 1940s, generally spoke both languages, because many of them attended Japanese schools. Koreans and Japanese who were born in the 1940s started their studies at Japanese schools, and, when Japanese schools were closed, went directly

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to Korean schools. As a result, these people are more proficient in Korean than Japanese. There were also many Japanese women born in the 1920s who had family ties to Koreans. After the war, they joined the Korean community and started learning the Korean language. They also had to live among the Russians and other nationalities of the USSR, so they speak Russian as well. In my observation, many returnees continue to use all languages, and often their ethnicity and place of repatriation do not correspond to their primary language. For example, repatriate O is an ethnic Korean who was born in the 1930s, graduated from a Japanese school, and now lives in Ansan. Her daughter-in-law was asking me about the Bible in Japanese: “Because my mother-in-law is thinking about becoming a Christian, she wants to read the Bible, but the language she really understands, and feels is Japanese.” Repatriate T is an ethnic Japanese who was born in the 1940s and adopted by a Korean stepfather. She graduated from a Korean school and now lives in Hokkaido. When she read a chapter about her family in a Japanese book, she said she was grateful. She read it once again in Korean when the translated version was published and told me about her excitement: “I read it and cried. Finally, I could understand and feel all the details.” I discovered many similar cases during my interaction with repatriates both in Japan and South Korea.

6.4.2

The Language Usage and Identity of Second and Third Generation Returnees

The second and third generation of Sakhalin Koreans and Japanese live in Ansan and Hokkaido, respectively. The second-generation returnees can move to Japan via a government-funded program as immediate family members of first-generation returnees. However, only one descendant and their family can return under this program. Other family members can visit Japan at their own expense. The second and third generation returnees can obtain permanent residence and do not tend to come to Japan for temporary work. Among them, many have received secondary or higher vocational education and are qualified to work as electricians, nurses or kindergarten teachers. Such people usually work in Russia for 20 years and move to Japan mid-career, but they often find themselves unable to work in their field of professional training. Many of them are from small towns in Sakhalin and cannot return to well-paid jobs in Russia, but they also do not want to work unskilled jobs in Japan. For this reason, they are unemployed and continue to live on government financial assistance or find a job but quit afterwards. They have almost no opportunity to work in their chosen profession and lose their professional skills as a result. Furthermore, government assistance can undermine their motivation to find a job. People who received higher education, such as doctors or lawyers, sometimes decide to return to Russia if they cannot find a job (Paichadze, 2015, p. 228). In many cases first-generation repatriates have more than one child, and their children must decide

6.4

Language Usage and Identity After the Return

107

whether to stay in Sakhalin or move to Japan like other economically motivated ethnic return migrants. Those returnees who have moved to Japan do not have the opportunity to engage in their professional field; instead, they often work in factories and engage in strenuous physical labor. In such a situation, it is not possible for them to study the Japanese language, and their integration into Japanese society is also difficult. Returnees who moved to Japan as economically motivated ethnic return migrants have many similarities with the second generation of returnees in South Korea. In the case of South Korea, the repatriation program is significantly different. Until 2020, the second generation could not repatriate, but many came to Ansan as economic migrants. There, the second generation mostly does temporary work, and finding a job as a professional is usually not expected. The exception is those who graduated from Korean language departments in Russia or studied in South Korea. Such people can find a job in their professional area, such as education. People who receive higher education, such as doctors or lawyers, generally do not move to South Korea. One of the professional niches that is also relevant for Japan is business, particularly in the car and fishing industries. Ethnic Koreans engage in this type of work in both South Korea and Japan. Considering the linguistic capabilities and self-identification of the second and third generations, there is also a significant age difference within the generations. In this regard, people of the second generation born in the middle of the 1940s do not differ from the first generation. Those who were born in the 1950s graduated either from Korean or Russian schools. In most cases, children from Korean families and Japanese children adopted by Koreans studied at Korean schools. These people are Korean and Russian bilinguals particularly fluent in Korean. By contrast, children from Japanese, Japanese-Russian and Korean-Russian families studied at Russian schools. Their primary language is Russian, as it was the language of their school education, but their parents used Korean or Japanese as the language of communication in the family. Japanese or Korean is a passive language for this category of returnees, but it proved easy for them to learn after they moved to Japan or South Korea. As discussed in chapter five, starting with 1963 all children began to study at Russian schools, and gradually their Korean and Japanese language skills were lost. Korean and Japanese returnees born in the 1960s and 1970s are Russian native speakers, and learning the Japanese or Korean language, particularly reading and writing, is more difficult for them than for the older generations. These languages are indeed challenging to learn, and the communication style is different in comparison to Russian. However, it can be argued that the attitude towards integration into the host society creates a greater barrier to acquiring language skills than the inherent difficulties of learning the language and culture. Although the returnees take Japanese or Korean classes, they do not have an opportunity to develop their language skills further due to lack of interaction with the people in their host societies.

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Contemporary Repatriation to Japan and South Korea: Formation of. . .

Conclusion of the Chapter

This chapter analyzed the general and specific aspects of contemporary repatriation policies in Japan and South Korea. It explored the situation of Russian-speaking Japanese and Korean returnees in the places of their greatest concentration, Sapporo (Japan) and Ansan (South Korea). For a long time, the main problem for the Koreans and Japanese who were left behind in Sakhalin was related to their return to their historical homeland. Since the late 1990s, this problem has gradually been resolved. However, the host societies in Japan and South Korea were not ready to accept returnees with multi-layered identities and linguistic issues. Living for many years in another country led to changes in their language, culture, and identity. For returnees and return migrants from Sakhalin, moving to their homelands through a special state repatriation program certainly provided many advantages. However, after returning and adapting to the host country, they shared many commonalities with other ethnic migrants, such as language issues, education problems for the children, and the problem of deskilling. Ethnocentrism behind the policies in Japan and South Korea has led to problems connected to adaptation to the new society. Repatriation is a very complex process. It is not just a physical return of people to the place of former residence, nor is it just a one-way transfer from one culture to another. Returnees still live in two (or more) cultures, use two (or more) languages, and cross the border between them every day, but the poor infrastructure for accepting them has led the returnees to become an at risk or marginalized group. A better understanding of the issues affecting returnees and the development of appropriate risk management will lead to the increased likelihood of successful integration of repatriates into the host society, while also allowing them to preserve their multiculturalism and multilingualism. If such steps can be taken, then returnees can become valuable human capital and an intercultural bridge between Russia, Japan, and South Korea.

References Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2015). Multi-layered identities of returnees in their ‘historical homeland’: Returnees from Sakhalin. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/Sakhalin (pp. 195–211). Routledge. Hyun, M. (2016). “Han’nichi” to “kenkan” no dō jidai-shi nashonarizumu no kyōkai o koete. Bensei shuppan. Lee, S. (2013). Multicultural education and language ideology in South Korea. Working Papers in Educational Linguistics, 28(1), 43–60. Onai T. (ed.). (2003). Zainichi burajirujin kyōiku to hoiku - gumma ken ōta ōizumi chiku o jirei toshite. Akashi shoten. Paichadze, S. (2015). Language, identity and educational issues of ‘repatriates’ from Sakhalin. In S. Paichadze & P. A. Seaton (Eds.), Voices from the shifting Russo-Japanese border: Karafuto/ Sakhalin (pp. 195–211). Routledge.

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Paichadze, S. (2021). The ‘Russian language world’ in South Korea. Ethnic Koreans in Ansan. In G. Buntilov & S. Paichadze (Eds.), Russia and its East Asian neighbors: Regions and people beyond borders (pp. 23–36). Hokkaido University. Paichadze, S. (2022). Japanese and Korean return migrants in Sapporo (Japan) and Ansan (South Korea). In J. Cho, R. Lee, & S. Hwan (Eds.), Transnational Korea in the 20th and 21st centuries (forthcoming). Routledge. Sakuma, S. (2020). Kommunikatsiya i ispol’zovaniye media starshim pokoleniyem sakhalinskikh repatriantov v Yaponii. Bibliosfera, 2020(1), 46–55. Song, C. (2009). Brothers only in name. In T. Tsuda (Ed.), Diasporic homecomings. Ethnic return migration in comparative perspective (pp. 281–304). Stanford University Press. Sugimoto, Y. (2012). Kyosei: Japan’s cosmopolitanism. In Handbook of cosmopolitanism studies (pp. 452–462). Routledge. Tsuda, T. (2009a). Ethnic return migration: A global phenomenon. In T. Tsuda (Ed.), Diasporic homecomings. Ethnic return migration in comparative perspective (pp. 21–43). Stanford University Press. Tsuda, T. (2009b). Global inequities and diasporic return. Japanese Brazilian encounters with the ethnic homeland. In T. Tsuda (Ed.), Diasporic homecomings. Ethnic return migration in comparative perspective (pp. 227–259). Stanford University Press. Tsuda, T. (2009c). Introduction. In T. Tsuda (Ed.), Diasporic homecomings, ethnic return migration in comparative perspective. Stanford University Press.

Internet Sources China Returnees Support Act. (1994). Chūgoku zanryū hōjin-tō no enkatsuna kikoku no sokushin oyobi eijū kikoku-go no jiritsu no shien ni kansuru hōritsu (Act to Support the Independence of Permanent Residents after Returning Home and the Promotion of the Smooth Return of Japanese Left Behind in China and Other Regions) [online]. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/ elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?openerCode¼1&lawId¼406AC1000000030_201 51001_424AC0000000063. Accessed 21 October 2019. Kyōdō bosho. Returnees Cemetery in Japan. https://sites.google.com/view/nposaha? fbclid¼IwAR26kCoyTNm6u9H2fo47nu9bH39rdyR6QGvhFLRHfho5DCbH7P4eD1gJj8. MOJ (2018). Ministry of Justice of Japan website: Statistics on foreign nationals registered in Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001269620.pdf. Accessed 24 September 2020. Sahallin dongpo jiwone kwanhan teugbyeolbeob. (Special Act on Assistance to Sakhalin Koreans). http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId¼PRC_I2Z0E0P3B0W3O1F7I5U8D1 A8A2U9Y2. Accessed 9 July 2020. National Mang-Hyang Cemetery. http://www.nmhc.go.kr/eng. Accessed 9 July 2020.

Interview Interview Paichadze, at Russian School Nomo and “Russian Academy” in Ansan. September 2018.

Chapter 7

Education, Language, and Identity of the Young Generation of Returnees

Keywords Migration from Russia · Russian-speaking community · Russian schools · Support of the young generation of returnees · Identity and language of young returnees · Self-identification

7.1

Russian Immigration to Japan and Russian Education

After repatriation, people who have lived on Sakhalin for a long time as Japanese or Koreans become part of the Russian-speaking community. This is especially true for the third and fourth generations. Many repatriates want their children not to forget the Russian language and culture. Therefore, in various forms, children receive education in Russian, and now their education also relates to Russian schools. In this part of the book, I will consider children’s education in such Russian schools and the children’s attitudes towards learning, language, and self-identification. Before turning to contemporary education in Russian in Japan and South Korea, I will consider the history of schools in these countries.

7.1.1

History of Russian Immigration and Russian Education in Japan

Until the mid-nineteenth century, contacts between Japan and Russia were episodic, almost random. In 1854, the mission of General Putyatin began negotiations with the Tokugawa Shogunate, which concluded on January 26, 1855, with the signing of the Shimoda Treaty that established trade and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Following the establishment of relations, Russian culture began to spread into Japan. The Russian Orthodox mission played an essential role in this process. It imported and published Russian books as well as began opening Russian schools. These schools were designed for Japanese children and sometimes for adults, too. In

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3_7

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the 1870s, in a three-year Elementary school in Hakodate, there were up to 80 students (Paichadze, 1995, p. 137). After the Bolshevik Revolution, people from the Russian upper-middle-class started to emigrate to various countries in Europe and Asia. Compared with other countries, there were a small number of emigres to Japan. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on September 1, 1926, there were 2356 Russian refugees in Japan (including the colonies of Taiwan and Korea) (Kurata, 1998, p.35). From the 1920s, the idea of creating Russian schools emerged among Russian immigrants. The First School was established in Yokohama. It was a ‘Russian middle school,’ and it existed from 1920 until the Kanto Earthquake in 1923. The objectives of the school were: (1) to give the children practical knowledge that they could use after the expulsion of the Bolsheviks and their return to Russia; (2) to provide knowledge that would guarantee them a peaceful existence as emigres. The number of students at the school was around 20 (Kurata, 1998, pp. 37–39). In 1929 the first Russian school opened in Tokyo in the Kanda district inside the Holy Resurrection Cathedral (Nicolai-dō). However, the school existed only for two years and was closed in 1931 because of disagreements between the pro-Soviet Archbishop Sergii and the parents of the children who went to the school (Kurata, 1998, p. 40). In 1933 Russkaya Vysshaya Nachal’naya shkola im A.S. Pushkina (Nikolai-dō Pushkin School) was opened. According to Vanovsky (1933, p. 1), at that time, a big problem for the Russian community was the loss of the Russian language among Russian children. Therefore, the opening of the school created high expectations within the Russian community. The school aimed to promote the ‘Russian national character’ and keep alive the Russian language and moral values of the Russian immigrants. In 1933, the school had 16 children, and in 1937 there were 22 children. The school existed at least until the summer of 1944 (Sawada, 2007, pp. 120–221). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, most Russians left Japan. Some returned to the USSR, while others moved to the United States of America or Australia. In 1985 there were only 322 Russians with permanent residence status in Japan (NikiporecTakigawa, 2007, p. 75). During the Cold War, there was only the Embassy School for the children of diplomatic mission members. The bursting of the economic bubble in the early 1990s and the demographic situation in Japan led to a change in the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. At the same time, Perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Russians to leave freely, and the difficult economic situation in Russia pushed many people to move abroad. The Russian-speaking diaspora is not very large in the changing Japanese society, but it is gradually growing. During the first decade of the twenty-first century the number of Russians who lived and worked in Japan permanently increased almost 30-fold. For example, in 1985, 322 Russians lived permanently in Japan. With citizenship of the USSR, in 1995, this number grew to 2169 people (NikiporecTakigawa, 2007, p. 193). With Russian citizenship, and as of December 2018, the number of registered Russian citizens was 8987 (MOJ, 2018).

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From 1990 the increasing numbers of Russian citizens in Japan led to the start of schooling and distance learning at the Embassy School for all Russian children. Later, schools set up by Russian communities started appearing in various districts of Japan. One of the oldest is the Russian school in Sapporo.

7.1.2

Russian Community, Russian School, and NPOs Support in Sapporo

Sapporo has relatively few foreign residents. The number of foreigners in Japan increased after the government changed the law on immigration in 1990. In Sapporo, it fluctuated around 10,000 people in the past few years, although in 2019 it grew to 15,000 and is expected to grow again due to new programs to attract foreign workers. Most foreigners are Chinese (5118), Koreans from North and South Korea (2830), Vietnamese (1608), Taiwanese (616), and Americans (612). In February 2020, 313 Russians lived in Sapporo. These numbers, however, are limited to registered foreign residents and do not include several significant categories, such as those with dual Russian-Japanese nationality and those of Russian heritage who have acquired Japanese citizenship. One notable group of long-term Russian heritage residents are returnees from Sakhalin. As I said above, in March of 2010, there were 68 households of returnees comprising 173 people (25 households and 91 people were in the Sapporo area). Wherever a significant enough number of immigrants share a desire to preserve their culture, we would expect local educational initiatives. The formation of a large Russian community in Sapporo led to the necessity to educate children in their heritage language and thus the organization of a school. The Russian school in Sapporo was founded in December 2001 on the initiative of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Sapporo. In the early days of the school, lessons were held in the building of the Russian Consulate (until March 2006). From April 2006 to February 2010, lessons were held in one of the community centers in Sapporo. From March 2010, classes have been held in classrooms at Hokkaido University, and students at the university have been involved in helping the school in its educational work. The school is a volunteer organization and is open to all who share the school’s two-fold mission: to preserve Russian language skills and culture, and to educate a younger generation of Russian-Japanese bilinguals. The core subjects of the school’s curriculum include Russian for preschool children, Russian as a first language (writing, reading, and Russian literature), Russian as a second language, world and Russian history, and science for elementary school children. Along with these core subjects, there were two support teachers for English (until 2017) and art classes. Approximately 40–50 children attend the school and almost all the children of the Russian school attend full-time Japanese schools.

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Fig. 7.1 Student of Saturday School in Sapporo. (Photo credit: Gotō Haruki)

From April 2008, the school has worked with the Non-Governmental Organisation CaSA (Child-assist Sapporo Association), which provides Japanese language support and promotes multicultural understanding. CaSA offers support to schoolchildren who have come from abroad. It helps them to cope with difficulties and tries to enhance their studying experience in Japan. Both the Russian school in Sapporo and CaSA are run voluntarily and do not have any official support from either the Japanese or Russian governments (Fig. 7.1).

7.1.3

The Ethnic Background of Children at the Russian School in Sapporo

The students at the Russian school in Sapporo are children of Russian families, families of Russian speaking citizens from other CIS and Baltic countries, returnee families, and international families (Russian-Japanese or Russian with other foreign nationals). There are also children of Japanese families who lived for some time in Russia. As we can see in Table 7.1, in 2014, of the children attending the Russian school, 16 were from Russian families, 12 were from Russian-Japanese families, two were from Russian and other nationality families, and two were Japanese. Furthermore, five were from other ethnic groups, such as the Russian-speaking residents of the CIS and Baltic countries or ethnic Koreans from Sakhalin and continental Russia (this group is different from the Japanese-Korean mixed families of returnees). In subsequent years, in the Russian school in Sapporo, both the number of children and the ratio of groups of different ethnic origins changed. In 2016, 46 students studied at the school, of which 11 were repatriates, 15 were Russians,

Grade Kindergarten 1 2 4 6 9 11 RSL Total %

Number of the children 11 6 8 7 5 5 7 4 53 100.0%

Returnees 2 1 0 2 2 3 6 0 16 30.2%

Russians 4 4 3 3 1 0 1 0 16 30.2%

Table 7.1 Ethnic background of children at the Russian school in Sapporo Russians/Japanese 3 1 3 1 0 1 0 3 12 22.6%

Russians/ Another ethnicity 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 3.8%

Another ethnicity 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 9.4%

Japanese 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 38%

7.1 Russian Immigration to Japan and Russian Education 115

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15 were from Russian-Japanese families, two were from families with Russian and representatives of other nationalities, one child was from a family where both parents were of a different nationality, and two children were of Japanese nationality. In December 2019, 40 students were studying at the school, of which five were repatriates, seven were Russians, 16 were from Russian-Japanese families, six were from families with Russians and representatives of other nationalities, five were from families where both parents are of different nationality, and one child was of Japanese nationality. Also, during the 20-year history of the school, there have been students from Mongolia, from an American-Japanese family, Brazilian and Russian-German family, etc. In all these cases, the parents commanded a high level of the Russian language, so they wanted their children to learn Russian as well. With 16 students in 2014, returnees wеre representing one of the largest groups of children in the school. Although their number subsequently decreased, they continued to make up a significant part of the students studying at the school. Many Russian-speaking families in Sapporo are long-term residents who have lived in Japan for more than ten years. Most of the children at the Russian school have lived in Japan for a long time, and many of them came in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the children were born in Japan or were brought when they were very young, so they speak Japanese from early childhood, go to Japanese kindergartens or schools, and therefore have no problems adapting to Japanese society. Many of the children who have arrived from 2004 to 2013 are children of returnees. Actual and planned years of residence affect the desire to integrate into the host society and school choice for the children. For long-term residents, integration into Japanese society, especially for their children, is important. Another reason has to do with a feature of the Japanese education system: international students (Ryūgakusei waku) or returnees (Hikiagesha waku) need a high-level knowledge of the Japanese language for specially reserved entrance slots into university and further learning. For this reason, parents who want their children to attend Japanese universities prefer to send them to full-time Japanese schools (Paichadze & Din, 2014, p. 110). Because almost all children of the Russian school in Sapporo attend full-time Japanese schools, which requires specific knowledge of the Japanese language, all children in the school are bilingual. According to their age, there are balanced bilinguals, where the two languages developed at the same high level, or dominant bilinguals, where one of the languages dominates over the other. There are also some cases of double limited bilingualism, where both languages have not developed enough according to the child’s age. The Russian school, in cooperation with CaSA, does everything possible to resolve such cases.

7.2

7.2

Russian Immigration to Korea and Russian Education

117

Russian Immigration to Korea and Russian Education

The Russian community in Korea has a long history. The first Russians visited the country in the second half of the nineteenth century, following the opening of Korea by Foreign Powers in 1876. Diplomats Karl Weber, Alexey Shpeyer, and Dmitriy Dmitrievskiy, the architect Afanasy Seredin-Sabatin, military attachés Dmitriy Putyata, and Dmitriy Khmelev, the engineer Sergey Remnev, the teacher of Russian language Nikolay Birukov, and Father Chrysanth and other members of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Seoul were the first Russians who initiated the relationship between Russia and Korea. Furthermore, many of them were also instrumental in the pursuit of Russia’s policies in the Far East (Paichadze & Din, 2014, p. 101). In this first stage of relations between the two countries, the Russian community in Korea was small and consisted mainly of Russian government officials. The first Russian school operated in Korea from 1898 to 1904. Nikolay Birukov taught young Koreans the Russian language and other disciplines. Even though this school was not in operation for long, it played an essential role in the developing Russo-Korean relationship. Russia, defeated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, ceded its imperial dominance to Japan, and the school ceased operations around this time. In the colonial period, relations between Korea and the USSR were minimal. This was because until 1945, Korea, as a colony of the Japanese Empire, heavily controlled Russian immigration. For a long time, the only Russians in Korea were members of the Orthodox Mission, who preferred to stay in Korea after the events of the October Revolution in 1917, and this Mission certainly did not have any support either from the Soviet or Japanese governments. Concerning the education of Russian-speaking children, today, the only known information is about a school in the refugee camp in Wonsan (now the territory of the DPRK). The history of the emergence of Russians from the Far East is directly related to neighboring countries. As Japanese historian Y. Kurata shows, after the Russian revolution of 1917 and during the subsequent Civil War, two and a half million Russians emigrated abroad. The Russian emigration of 1922 from Vladivostok to Wonsan was the largest in the territory of the Japanese Empire, which included Korea. On November 6, 1922, the number of refugees was over 9000. The refugees lived in two camps, and since there were many children among them, in December 1922, classes began in Camp No. 2 and in January 1923 in Camp No. 1. Refugees built the school building. At first, the number of schoolchildren was about 200 people, but it increased to 336 people. School education included primary and secondary. The school was closed on July 25, 1923, because by the end of July 1923, the camp was to be closed, and most of the refugees moved to Harbin (Kurata, 2001). In 1945, after the fall of the Japanese Empire, Korea achieved independence and was divided into two parts – The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). But the Russian relationship with South Korea was restricted due to the Cold War.

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The increase of Russian migration in South Korea started after the normalization of diplomatic relationships in 1990 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Social, political, and economic crises in the newly formed Russian Federation affected all social groups and intensified migratory trends in Russia and the CIS in general. Currently, many foreigners live in South Korea, whose number has been growing over the years. In 2014 there were about 1.7 million foreign residents, which is approximately 3.57% of the total population of the Republic of Korea. By December 2019, their total increased to 2.5 million people (of them foreigners with long-term registration were 1.2 million people, ethnic Koreans with citizenship of another state 459,996 people, and short-term stayers 792,853 people) (Chuipguk-oeguk, 2019, p. 2). In 2019 in South Korea there were 350,053 people with Russian citizenship, of which 61,427 are long-term residents of the Republic of Korea. Of those, 26,190 are ethnic Koreans (Chuipguk-oeguk, 2019, p. 15). A large Russian-speaking diaspora may also include migrants from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: 95,634 persons (34,638 long-term stayers) and 56,011 persons (15,222 long-term stayers respectively (Chuipguk-oeguk, 2019, p. 15). There are 5185 ethnic Koreans with Kazakh citizenship and 11,681 with Uzbek citizenship in South Korea (Chuipguk-oeguk, 2019, p. 15). The majority of ethnic Russian-speaking Koreans in the territory of South Korea are descendants of Soviet Koreans who lived in the Far East since the second half of the nineteenth century and were deported by the Soviet government to Central Asia in 1937 (mainly to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). For the most part, they are bearers of Russian language and therefore also belong to the Russian-speaking diaspora in South Korea. The need for Russian education has led to the opening of schools with Russian as the language of instruction and Russian programs. The first Russian school TriLC, which began operating in 2010 in Seoul, closed in 2015. Since 2018, in Seoul and its satellite cities (Ansan, Dongtan, Daegu, Incheon), several schools have been established and are in operation. For example, Russian House in Seoul, AppleTree in Dongtan, New Way Academy in Seoul (it also has branches in Incheon and Daegu), Noane, ROC, and Russian Academy in Ansan. All these schools do not have official school status, they are registered as an “educational institution” and are self-supporting, existing on the contributions of parents. The cost of training one student per month is on average 400–500 US dollars, which is three to four times cheaper than English or American international schools in South Korea (Paichadze & Din, 2014, p. 110). In September 2017, in the city of Busan, a Private Educational Institution, “Russian Gymnasium in Busan” was opened. This school provides an opportunity to study Russian educational programs in full-time and distance formats in the Republic of Korea (Paichadze, interview 2020). Because of the Covid-19 global pandemic, some schools were closed—for example, the Russian Academy in Ansan, where I conducted interviews in 2018 and 2019.

7.2

Russian Immigration to Korea and Russian Education

7.2.1

119

Russian Speaking Community and Russian Schools in Ansan

The city of Ansan is in Gyeonggi Province, about an hour’s drive from Seoul. The population of Gyeonggi Province is 13.2 million people, of which 418,072 are foreigners, which is the largest number of foreigners in South Korea. Ansan is a city with many factories that attracts immigrant workers. Due to its high population of immigrant workers, even before the active relocation of Russian-speaking Koreans began, Ansan formed as a multicultural zone. Within this world of migrants, there is a society of ethnic return migrants, the big part of which is Koreans from China. Recently, particularly after the change in Korean legislation, it has become easier for ethnic migrants to obtain visas, making it possible to stay in Korea longer. This caused an influx of ethnic Koreans from mainland Russia and the countries of Central Asia. The population of Russian-speaking ethnic Koreans there is about 17,000 people. Many of them have lost the Korean language, which makes it more difficult to adapt to Korean society, and at the same time, leads to the creation of their own Russian-speaking world. Ansan has many Russian shops, cafes, and other facilities, including four Russian schools and a Russian kindergarten. There are also two non-profit organizations supporting Russian-speaking Koreans and providing them with Korean language classes and other services. Despite the presence of other industrial centers, most Russian-speaking Koreans relocate to Ansan as their starting point because there is a developed support system in Russian. Thus, it can be said that Ansan is an adaptation zone or a transit zone (Paichadze, 2021, p.31). As I mentioned before most of the returnees from Sakhalin also live in Gohyang maeul (“home village”), an area built in the territory of Ansan. The repatriates are native speakers of the Russian language and carriers of Russian culture. Therefore, Ansan is a place where various branches of the Russian-speaking Korean diaspora meet. It can be said that Koreans from mainland Russia and the countries of Central Asia are the main “creators of the Russian world” in Ansan. This is due to their numbers and the recent opportunity to obtain a visa, which gives them the right to stay long-term in South Korea. At the same time, a lack of fluency in the Korean language does not provide them with the right to obtain Korean citizenship. Therefore, they do not feel wholly settled and must consider a possible return to the country of exodus. The first generation of Sakhalin repatriates, due to their age and better ability of the Korean language, are not the “creators of the Russian world” per se, but its passive users – for instance, they go shopping at Russian shops. The second and third generations of Sakhalin Koreans are in an intermediate position (Paichadze, 2021, p. 31). As can be seen from interviews I conducted at two of the Russian schools in Ansan which admit approximately 20 families of “Russian-speaking Koreans,” four to five are families of Sakhalin Koreans. It can be said that they are active users of “the Russian world” in Ansan. Moreover, it can be assumed that the presence of people in this Russian-speaking space in Ansan will continue to be observed in the

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future. Especially, as mentioned previously, after the introduction of the new law of repatriation of the second generation, an increase in representatives of young generations living in Ansan is possible. After a certain period following their initial resettlement, ethnic return migrants can move from Ansan to other places. This may mean re-migration within South Korea, moving to a third country or returning to their homeland (Paichadze, 2021, p. 31). There are many organizations in Ansan that help ethnic Koreans from the mainland of Russia and the CIS countries. I was able to visit two organizations involved in supporting Russian-speaking Koreans, “Nomo” and “Mir.” These organizations are engaged in helping conflicts and problems at work, offering advice on legal issues, emergency translations at home or during medical treatment, and organizing after-school groups for children of working parents. In addition, both organizations are involved in teaching Korean language to adults and children, as well as helping the latter in mastering the school curriculum in Korean schools (Koryo-saram Association). In May 2020, the “Koryo-saram Association in the Republic of Korea” was formed. Unlike the two organizations mentioned above, which representatives of South Korea founded, Koryo-saram themselves directly formed “Koryo-saram Association” (Koryo-saram Association). The goals and objectives of this association are to create a dialogue with the government and public organizations of the Republic of Korea on the adaptation of Koreans from the post-Soviet space to their historical homeland. According to the organization’s charter, “any ethnic Korean from the post-Soviet space living in the Republic of Korea can become its member.” That is, the Koreans of Sakhalin fall into this category. However, since Sakhalin Koreans do not identify themselves with Koryo-saram, many do not feel that they belong to this organization and believe that the organization would be better called, for example, the Association of Russian Koreans (Koryo-saram Association). The law, passed on April 30, 2020, allowing the second generation and the family of one of their descendants to move, if their parents are representatives of the first generation and live in South Korea, could lead to the resettlement of the younger generation from Sakhalin. In this regard, we can assume the emergence of new problems caused by adaptation to life in the host society of South Korea. This, in turn, will lead to the need for new forms of support. In September 2019, there were four Russian schools in Ansan. As already mentioned, all of them are not officially recognized as schools, rather they are registered as “educational institutions.” Nonetheless, all of them are run as fulltime schools and are teaching per the Russian education program. Both parents and teachers at these schools emphasize that the need for these schools is dictated primarily by the unpreparedness of the Korean education system for accepting children of foreigners and the difficulty of adapting Russian-speaking Koreans to local schools. The Russian school in Sapporo is a Saturday school organized by volunteers, but the Russian schools in Ansan (and in South Korea as a whole) are private schools that run every day. One reason for opening full-time Russian schools is that ethnic Koreans do not know how long they will be living in South Korea. The

7.2

Russian Immigration to Korea and Russian Education

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second critical feature of the Korean education system, which is absent in Japan, is that Korean universities have a special education policy for foreigners. Students with a foreign school diploma, foreign citizenship, and limited Korean language skills can enroll in any university (Paichadze & Din, 2014, pp. 110–111). Therefore, parents have preferred full-time foreign schools, such as the Russian schools in Ansan. However, Russian schools are private, so not all parents can afford them. The people who come to South Korea to earn money send their children to Korean schools because they are free (Paichadze interview 2018, 2019). It must be mentioned that at the beginning of 2021, an initiative group was approved to promote the project “Creation of a bilingual Korean-Russian school in Gyeonggi Province.” This group included both Koreans from the mainland and Sakhalin Koreans. Creating such a school should help children adapt more smoothly to South Korean society while preserving their native language and multi-layered identity (Fig. 7.2). In a survey regarding future place of residence conducted at the school called “Russian Academy” in September 2019, five teenage respondents mentioned Russia, one mentioned Russia or Kazakhstan, seven said they would stay in South Korea (Seoul), four expressed the desire to move to another country, and eight replied that they did not know (Table 7.2). There are more children from Russia than from other countries of the former Soviet Union, but in aggregate, the number of children from Central Asia and Kazakhstan exceeds the number of children from Russia. Kazakhstan is the leader among the Central Asian countries (Table 7.3).

Fig. 7.2 “Russian Academy” in Ansan Table 7.2 Citizenship of children in the “Russian Academy” in Ansan Year 2019

Respondents 25

Russia 10

Uzbekistan 6

Kazakhstan 7

Turkmenistan 1

N/A 1

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Table 7.3 Ethnic composition of the families of the “Russian Academy” in Ansan Year 2019

Respondents 25

Korean 8

Russian 0

Russian/Korean 12

Russian/Other 1

Other 4

According to the survey, there are no children from ethnically homogeneous Russian families. This factor distinguishes Russian schools in Ansan from Russian schools in Seoul and Busan. In Seoul and Busan there are ethnically Russian children, children from the CIS, and Russian Korean international families in both schools.

7.3

Identity and Language of Young Returnees

What do children think about their identity, languages, and adaptation to life in the host society? Below I will present some of the data obtained during a survey at the Sapporo Saturday school and the Ansan everyday school.

7.3.1

Identity and Language of Young Returnees in Sapporo

The following is the results from a survey of 12 students at the Russian school in Sapporo, eight from Japanese-Korean families and four from Japanese-Russian families.1 Regarding a question on family traditions and customs (food culture, religious ceremonies, celebrations, etc.), six out of the eight Japanese-Korean families answered “Korean and Russian,” and two answered “Korean.” Interestingly, none answered “Japanese.” All four respondents from the Japanese-Russian families answered “Russian.” Many of Sakhalin returnees are bilingual or trilingual. The common language for the three generations is Russian. In the case of the third generation, if they arrived in Japan at kindergarten or elementary school age, often they end up communicating with their siblings in Japanese. However, when there is only one child in a family, they typically use Russian with family members (Paichadze, 2018, p. 55). To examine what the third generation of Sakhalin returnees think about the reason for studying each of the languages, I asked them the following questions: “What

1

My interview, at Sapporo Saturday Russian School, has some of the interview results published in Svetlana Paichadze (2018), Saharin kikoku-sha no wakai sedai no jiko aidentiti to gengo shiyō gakushū ni kansuru kōsatsu. Imin kenkyū nenpō 24, 45–63. Also, in English this data and the part of comparative analysis between Sapporo and Ansan schools will be published in Svetalana Paichadze (2022) Japanese and Korean Return Migrants in Sapporo (Japan) and Ansan (South Korea), Transnational Korea in the 20th and 21st Centuries, eds.by Joanne Cho, Robert Lee & Sang Hwan, London: Routledge.

7.3

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does each of the languages mean to you?” and “Why do you need to study each of the languages?” The answers I received were as follows. Four people responded that Russian is a language to communicate with relatives in Russia, while two said that Russian is a language for everyday life. Three said it is a language for future job opportunities or study and one for life in Russia. We can see that the Russian language for them is a tool for communication with their families and getting a “better job” in the future. Regarding the Japanese language, five people responded that it is a language for communication with Japanese (and other foreigners in Japan), and seven said for “life in Japan.” From these answers, it is clear that Japanese is a language of communication in Japanese society and a condition for living in Japan. The responses were similar, regardless of whether respondents identified themselves as Japanese or not. Regarding the Korean language, I asked only returnees from Japanese-Korean families. Six out of the eight replied that “it does not have much to do with myself. I don’t want to study it.” Five of these six identified themselves as Koreans (“Japanese-Korean,” “Korean-Russian,” or “Japanese-Korean-Russian”). The remaining two respondents identified themselves as “Japanese-Korean-Russian,” but one of them replied, “I would like to study Korean if I go to study in South Korea, but I do not need it much if I live in Japan.” This person had experience studying the Korean language, and there was a time when she thought about studying in South Korea. One other respondent replied, “I want to study Korean,” but the main reason was not related to ethnicity but to a desire “to communicate with [someone] in Korean.” These responses suggest that, even if one possesses a Korean identity, one does not feel the need to learn the Korean language unless one needs to communicate in Korean. There is no need to use the Korean language at home because the values that construct the basis of their identity were acquired in Russian. Also, there are no opportunities for using the Korean language in Japanese society. Hence, there is no motivation for learning it to use as a communication tool outside of the home (Paichadze, 2018, p. 57, Paichadze, 2022).

7.3.2

The Young Generation of Returnees in Ansan

Below I present the results of a survey of 25 children in one of the Russian schools of Ansan in 2019.2 There are ten children from Russia and 14 from other countries of the former Soviet Union (six from Uzbekistan, seven from Kazakhstan, one from Turkmenistan, and one without a reply). According to the survey, there are no children from ethnically homogeneous Russian families. All children were from ethnic Korean or ethic Korean-Russian families.

2

Interview (questionnaire) with the students, conducted at Russian Academy Ansan, in September 2019. Some of the interview results have been published in Svetlana Paichadze (2021).

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Table 7.4 Self-identification of children in the “Russian School” in Ansan Year 2019

Respondents 25

Korean 13

Russian 1

Russian/Korean 8

Russian/Other 0

Other 3

23 out of the 25 children consider themselves “Koreans” or “Russian-Koreans.” I also asked them if they are learning or want to learn Korean. There were several variations of responses, but all of them can be divided into two groups. The first group comprises those who are thinking about living in South Korea, and for them, the Korean language is vital. The second group is made up of students who are thinking about returning to Russia, their country of birth, or moving to another country. They believe that South Korea is a place of temporary stay and do not see the need to learn the Korean language. In Russian schools in Ansan, almost no one directly connects their self-identification as a Korean with the Korean language (Paichadze, 2021, p. 33) (Table 7.4). Responses about the Russian language demonstrate that, for the younger generation of ethnic Koreans, Russian remains the main language of communication even after moving to South Korea. It still plays a leading role in their daily life. As was already mentioned, all the interviewed children are taught in Russian every day. In addition, Russian is the language of communication in their families. Furthermore, many of them have not lived in South Korea for that long. Longer time spent living and studying at Korean schools could change the situation (Paichadze, 2021, p. 33).

7.4

In Their Own Words

In this section, I would like to quote the responses of the children of repatriates from Japanese-Korean-Russian families living in Sapporo. These words most clearly reflect the idea of their ethnic self-identification. 「I am Korean!」 This was expressed when the children of Hokkaido Korean School and “Russian School” were rehearsing in the same room at an event called the Northeast Asian Festival. A Sakhalin returnee girl dressed in a Russian national costume drew the attention of students at the Korean school. A friend who saw that said, “Korean folk costume looks better on you,” and she replied laughing: “I know, I look like them (students from the Korean school) because I’m Korean.” Other students who heard it started to respond loudly in Japanese and Russian “me too,” “and me” (Hyun & Paichadze, 2016, p. 12). From this case, when children who cannot speak Korean at all but clearly state that they are Koreans, it can be seen that linguistic abilities and ethnic identity do not necessarily coincide with each other. N*: “When I lived in Russia, my mother went to Japan and told me some interesting stories and brought back delicious food from there. I thought Japan was wonderful, and I was proud that I have Japanese blood. Now [after returning to Japan], I think I am Russian. Someday I

7.4

In Their Own Words

125

might change my opinion. When I become fluent in Japanese, I may also start loving Japan with all my heart.” R*: “When I was in Russia, I felt that I am a little different from my classmates. I didn't know what was different. After coming to Japan, I started to think strongly that I am Russian. But this is because I am among Japanese people. Because (Japanese and Russians) have different characters.” M*: “(In Russia) I felt special, and I was proud to have Japanese blood because there were a lot of Korean children around me. But when I came to Japan, everything was new to me, and it was hard to get used to it. When I went to elementary school, I could only say “Konnichiwa.” Russian and Japanese cultures are exactly the opposite, and I had clashes with friends many times. I am Japanese, Korean, and Russian. I am using my identities differently depending on the place. My parents say, “Live as a Japanese. Not as a person who came from Russia, but as a Japanese who can speak Russian,” and I think this kind of a way of living is also possible.” F*: “I'm Russian. I've never thought about myself as Japanese. Language is a method of communication, a tool for transmitting and receiving information. “I live” when I speak Russian. I use Japanese when I need to do so.” N*: “I don't think I'm Japanese. Russian is my mother tongue. I'm very happy that I know Russian language since I was a child. But because I can speak Japanese, I can live and work in Japan. It was very difficult to get to this point, but it is great to know two languages.” Y*: “Russian is my mother tongue. But I don't have even a drop of Russian blood. I have Japanese blood, but the customs and traditions of my family are Korean. From food to celebrations, everything is done in Korean style. I am Korean.” O*: “I'm a Russian Korean. It does not mean that I've never thought of myself as Japanese. When I am with my Japanese friends, sometimes, I think of myself as Japanese. My mother tongues are Russian and Japanese.” K*: “There is Korean and Japanese blood flowing in me, but I have never thought that I am Korean. I am both Japanese and Russian. I think languages are made for connecting people.” V*: “I am Korean and Japanese. My husband is Korean (Uzbekistan Korean). For him and me, the Russian language is our mother tongue, and we speak Russian at home. With our children (the fourth generations of returnees born in Japan) we also speak in Russian. Our children are attending Japanese kindergarten and elementary school every day, but on Saturdays, they attend “Russian school.” A*: “I am polyhedral. Depending on the angle and the light, a different side of me can be seen” (Paichadze, interview 2012–2018; Paichadze, 2018, p. 58).

From the above quotes with the third generation of Sakhalin returnees, we can see that their self-identity is not fixed, but fluid. The perception is like an example suggested by Tsuda (2009, p. 2 43) of Brazilians and Americans of Japanese descent. Even though they were perceiving themselves as Japanese before the “return,” as research collaborators N, R, and M notice after the “return,” they find themselves in the situation of “I can’t speak Japanese,” “I can’t understand Japanese culture,” and they feel that “I’m not Japanese.” However, such self-consciousness is also not fixed. For example, N expects that when his Japanese language skills improve and he will be able to deepen his understanding of Japanese culture, then his self-perception might change. Also, though ethnic background, self-identity and language are linked, we can see that they are not identical. Although K has Japanese and Korean roots, he replied that he is Japanese and Russian. O feels himself Russian Korean, even though he has no Russian roots. F also, regardless of having Japanese ethnic background, recognizes

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himself as Russian. Ethnicity is the first step in building one’s self-identity, but then through various experiences each person finds their own answer to the question of “Who am I?”. For them, Russian and Japanese are communication tools used respectively to a situation. It is clear from N’s response that Japanese language is “a key” to Japanese culture and lifestyle. From the cases of O, Y, and V we can see that the perception of a mother tongue and self-identity are not connected directly. For example, O feels himself as “Russian Korean,” but he says that his mother tongues are “Russian and Japanese,” and Y clearly states, “My mother tongue is Russian, but I am not Russian” (Paichadze, 2018, p.59).

7.5

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter explored the issue of self-identification and language used by the younger generation of Russian-speaking returnees who were raised in a multicultural and multilingual environment. From the data presented in this chapter, we can state that all adolescents and young people are aware of their multiple ethnic identities. In this sense, the young generation of Russian-speaking returnees is multilayered and transnational. Perception of one’s own ethnic identity is diverse, changeable, and situational. This perception is constructed under the influence of the family, community, Russian school, and the host society. The rejection of some part of one’s ethnicity happens usually due to some traumatic experience. However, many young people have a conscious attitude towards this experience, so they allow the situation to change in the future. Language certainly has an impact on the formation of self-identity, but for them it is primarily a means of communication and is not always directly linked to perceptions of ethnicity. Even if ethnic identity, citizenship, and the strongest language do not coincide, many young migrants do not necessarily feel uncomfortable. The multi-ethnic character of the Russian-speaking community, where migrants bring the already existing model of multicultural and multilingual society and develop it, is one reason for their flexibility of thinking. In Japan, another reason may be that the present is a period of maturing and coming out into Japanese society for children with foreign roots who were born and/or raised here. This group is quite visible but not yet large enough to be blurred. Moreover, modern means of communication enable young people to communicate despite regional distance within the country. The challenge for the future is to see how the mindset of this younger generation will change in the long term as they grow in their host society.

References

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References Hyun, M., & Paichadze, S. (2016). Saharin zanryū: nikkanro hyaku nen ni wataru kazoku no monogatari. Kōbunken. Kurata, Y. (1998). Futatsu no taisenkan no bōmei roshia shaka : zaikeihan rosiajin gakkō to zaikeihan bōmei roshiajin shakai. Roshia-shi kenkyū, 62, 34–47. Kurata, Y. (2001). Russkiye bezhentsy v portu Vonsan. In Rossiyskiye sootechestvenniki v AziatskoTikhookeanskom Regione. Perspektivy sotrudnichestva. Materialy tret'yey mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii. DVFGU. Nikiporec-Takigawa, G. (2007). Russkaya diaspora v Yaponii. Istoriya, problem sushastvovaniya y sohranenie russkogo yazyka. Acta Lingustica, 1–2, 75–83. Paichadze, S. A. (1995). Russkaya kniva v stranax Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskogo regiona. SPSTL. Paichadze, S., & Din, Y. (2014). A comparison of general and specific features of Russian schools in Sapporo and Seoul. The Journal of International Media, Communication, and Tourism Studies, 18, 91–114. Paichadze, S. (2018). Saharin kikoku-sha no wakai sedai no jiko aidentiti to gengo shiyō gakushū ni kansuru kōsatsu. Imin kenkyū nenpō, 24, 45–63. Paichadze, S. (2021). The ‘Russian language world’ in South Korea. Ethnic Koreans in Ansan. In G. Buntilov & S. Paichadze (Eds.), Russia and its East Asian neighbors: Regions and people beyond borders (pp. 23–36). Hokkaido University. Paichadze, S. (2022). Japanese and Korean return migrants in Sapporo (Japan) and Ansan (South Korea). In J. Cho, R. Lee, & S. Hwan (Eds.), Transnational Korea in the 20th and 21st centuries (forthcoming). Routledge. Sawada, K. (2007). Hakkei Roshiajin to Nihonbunka. Seibunsha. Tsuda, T. (2009). Global inequities and diasporic return. Japanese Brazilian encounters with the ethnic homeland. In T. Tsuda (Ed.), Diasporic homecomings. Ethnic return migration in comparative perspective (pp. 227–259). Stanford University Press. Vanovsky, A. (1933). Stranichka o russkoi shkole v Tokio. Unpublished manuscript.

Internet Sources Chulipguk oegugin jeongchaek tonggyewolbo. (2019). South Korea Ministry of Justice. Statistics on Immigration and Foreigners Policy. December 2019. http://viewer.moj.go.kr/skin/doc.html? rs¼/result/bbs/227&fn¼temp_1581918117248100. Accessed 20 October 2021. Koryeo-saram Association in the Republic of Korea. Official website of the organisation. http:// koryosaram.org/. Accessed 20 July 2020. MOJ. (2018). Japan Ministry of Justice website: Statistics on registered foreign nationals for December 2018. http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html. Accessed 21 June 2019.

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Interviews Case A*, D*, F*, K *, L*, M *, Nr*, O*, R*, V*, Y*. Between 2012 and 2018. Interview and Observation at Russian School in Sapporo. Paichadze. Interview with director Alexander Kim and vice-director Tatyana Kobrina of the “Russian Academy”, 2018, 2019, Ansan. Interview with director of the “Russian college busan” Janna Ten, online 2020. Questionnaire at “Russian Academy Ansan”, September 2019.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

Keywords Human being in the history · Multilayered identity · Language · Multicultural and multilingual policy · Right of choice This chapter is the conclusion of this book. Here, I will try to reflect on the outcomes of the research question I applied to my investigation. This book focuses on Japanese and Koreans’ self-identification, language, and education on Sakhalin for a period of more than a 100 years, in a complex environment of wars, border changes, and improving and deteriorating relations between the states. The first chapter examined Sakhalin history from 1855 to 1945, looking at the Russian Empire and then the USSR settlement and migration policy and the changing of minority and education policy in the Northern part of the island. The Russian Empire tried to populate the island and create its own population on Sakhalin, but these attempts were not very successful. After the Russian Revolution and with industrial colonization, many people moved and settled on North Sakhalin. In the 1920s and 1930s, an educational system was organized for the Russian majority and Korean migrant populations, along with schools for the indigenous peoples. However, the repressions of the mid-1930s had a tragic effect on both indigenous peoples and migrants, especially on the Korean community. The Japanese-Korean families discussed in the following chapters were formed on Karafuto, but after 1945 they would live in a system developed in the northern part of the island. In the second chapter, I looked at Japan’s settlement strategy and migration policy in Karafuto. Aside from the Japanese being the majority population of Karafuto, many different ethnic groups, including indigenous peoples and migrants, also lived there. After the Japanese, the migrant population was dominated by the Koreans who voluntarily or were forcibly moved to Karafuto. Education on Sakhalin, apart from common aims shared with the Japanese Empire’s education, such as the spread of the Japanese language and ideology, aimed to anchor the inhabitants on the island and create their Karafuto identity. Despite the policy of Japanisation and various forms of discrimination against non-Japanese migrants, the close social and economic background of all migrants led to quite active intercommunication between them, including the formation of multicultural families. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3_8

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Conclusions

In the third and fourth chapters, I examined post-war language and ethnic minority policy on Sakhalin, and the situation at Japanese, Russian, and Korean schools. For 4 years on Sakhalin, there was a unique situation of joint work between Japanese, Korean, and Russian schools. A generally challenging economic environment influenced the educational situation. The multilingualism of the population also complicated this issue. However, the authorities tried to supply schooling to as much of the population as possible. This policy was within the framework of the ideology of that time and as far as economic resources allowed. In this period, the formation of transnational identities and language use of returnees from Sakhalin continued. Left behind in Sakhalin, Japanese and Korean children studied in Japanese schools then went to Korean or Russian schools to complete their education. Younger generations started their education in Russian or Korean schools. For those who went to Russian schools, their Russification and mastering of the Russian language began. Korean children who went to Korean schools were taught in Korean, using the rules and customs of the Korean community. There were discrimination issues in the Korean schools, with their main issue being a lack of understanding of the Korean language. However, many of our interviewees finished Korean school and mastered the language. This situation improved their position and increased their contacts within the Korean community. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, several significant events occurred in the lives of Koreans and Japanese on Sakhalin. The first was the repatriation of some Japanese-Korean families from Sakhalin to Japan and their attempted adaptation to Japanese society and the education of Russian-speaking children in Japanese and Korean schools. The second was the closure of Korean schools on Sakhalin. Many of those who moved to Japan lost their Russian (and sometimes Korean), while others managed to retain their language or became members of the Korean community. Those who remained gradually became native speakers of Russian and lost the Korean language. Both continued to have a multilayered ethnic identity, but the Cold War period and the inability to move freely between their “homelands” certainly harmed their selfawareness and self-actualisation. In the last chapters, five and six, I analyzed the general and specific aspects of contemporary repatriation policies in Japan and South Korea and explored the situation of Russian-speaking Japanese and Korean returnees in both countries. For a long time, the main problem for the Koreans and Japanese who were left behind in Sakhalin was returning to their historical homeland. Since the late 1990s, this problem has gradually been resolved. However, the host societies in Japan and South Korea were not ready to accept returnees with multilayered identities and linguistic issues. For returnees and return migrants from Sakhalin, moving to their homelands through a special state repatriation program certainly provided many advantages. However, after returning and adapting to the host country, they shared many commonalities with other migrants, such as language issues, education problems for the children, and the problem of deskilling. This chapter explored the issue of identity and language used by the younger generation of Russian-speaking returnees raised in a multicultural and multilingual environment. From the data presented in this chapter, we can state the following. All

8.1

History Through the Lens of the Human Being, or Man in History

131

adolescents and young people are aware of their multiple ethnic identities. In this sense, the young generation of Russian-speaking returnees is multilayered and transnational. Perception of one’s own ethnic identity is diverse, changeable, and situational. This perception is constructed under the influence of the family, community, Russian school, and the host society. The rejection of some part of one’s ethnicity happens usually due to some traumatic experience. However, many young people have a conscious attitude towards this experience, allowing the situation to change in the future. Language certainly impacts the formation of self-identity, but for them it is primarily a means of communication and is not always directly linked to perceptions of ethnicity. Even if ethnic identity, citizenship, and the strongest language do not coincide, many young migrants do not necessarily feel uncomfortable. This chapter offers me a chance a discuss the strengths and limitations of my book and the contribution of my study to the field of multilingual education. There are several areas of knowledge: (1) History and specifically, the person in history and the importance of the lens of microhistory to see the historical process; (2) Identity and language, especially the existence of multilayered identity and the spectrum of multilingualism, the flexibility of identity, identity as a process, and language as a tool for study and communication; (3) Education of migrants and minorities: schools are vehicles for state ideology and a place of local identity formation while at the same time being a place of personal contact for the individual.

8.1

History Through the Lens of the Human Being, or Man in History

Throughout the book, I talk about the history of Sakhalin and the related history of Russia, Japan, and the countries of the Korean Peninsula. However, above all, this book is about the history of particular people. This history may differ from official concepts of historical presentation. Working with multilingual children today or studying the processes of contemporary multiculturalism, we should know at least the history of the child’s family, or the history of their ethnic community, the historical condition where this formed, and why they moved. Therefore, when I was talking about the identity, language, and educational problems of the Japanese and Koreans of Sakhalin, I also spoke about the region’s history in which they were formed. The study of a person should not be taken out of their historical and social context. To understand what is happening to a specific individual, we must also see the macro context in which that person was formed. However, at the same time, my task was to see history through the individual and hear in my interviews what is silent in the official sources. This kind of presentation was necessary, first and foremost, for the people I write about, but it was also important for me. I am a historian by professional training. My university education took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the very notion of historical scholarship in the USSR

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and Russia changed before our eyes. In that distant period, we were fascinated by the ideas of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, Phillipe Ariès, and others. The main thing I have learned from that period is that history is a science about human beings. It uses facts, of course, but they are facts of human life. The historian’s task is to try to understand the people who witnessed these or those facts, later imprinted in their minds along with other ideas, to be able to interpret these facts (Lucien Febvre). And that in historical research, we should place more trust in the second category of witnesses – the unwitting witnesses (Mark Bloch). Of course, ordinary people’s accounts also have inaccuracies and biases, but they are less likely to contain deliberate lies used for political purposes. A combination of analysis of official documents, historiography and, along with them, eyewitness accounts should give us a complete picture of what happened. When it comes to the history of the Middle Ages, we must read sources that, in one way or another, reflect the lives of ordinary people, but history close to our time provides a unique opportunity to interview witnesses to historical events. Later, I became involved in multicultural and bilingual education. I thought it was essential to combine practical and theoretical knowledge by working with multicultural children and simultaneously studying theory. I tried to understand the background to the events in my students’ families and not deviate from the principle of trusting unwitting witnesses. This book is one attempt to put together my principles as a researcher.

8.2

Identity

As I said in the introduction, a lot of work has been written on what identity is. For the most part, researchers define identity as “Who are you and what are you?” i.e., for an individual, identity is first and foremost a definition of “Who am I?” Identity demonstrates a person’s understanding of the world and their relationship to it. This book was primarily concerned with ethnic identity. I define ethnic identity as a type of social identification that makes a person aware of belonging to an ethnic community. Ethnic identity, like any other forms of identity, is a complex construct formed of various components: cultural, communicative, emotional, etc. In this book, with the example of Japanese-Korean Russian-speaking families, I examined what factors influence the formation of such components. Specifically, I analyzed the awareness of one’s ethnicity, the influence of parents and the environment on identity formation, and language use. I wanted to show that self-identity is primarily a process, not a constant. Psychologists often insist that identity must be formed by adulthood while at the same time advocating for continuous self-development. In this book, I wanted to show that identity is in constant change. It can be multilayered and, under favorable conditions, a multilayered identity need not be fragmented or contradictory. Ethnic identity does not always equal national identification. You may consider yourself a citizen of one country but ethnically feel that you belong to a group that is

8.2

Identity

133

not titular in that country (or reside in another country). Similarly, you may consider yourself a member of a diaspora or a specific ethnic group, but your identity may be multiple and related to other groups as well. The same can be said of the link between language and identity. Just when I was writing the conclusion to my book, I attended a conference on bilingualism. The main topic was the Russian language abroad, and there were speakers from different countries, from which it was clear how different the concept of “Russian” is in all countries. I was particularly impressed by a definition offered by Marina Niznik from Israel, who said that repatriates in Israel often use the expression attributed to the poet Joseph Brodsky “My homeland is the Russian language” (Niznik, 2021). Russia may not be their homeland, they may not be ethnic Russians, but the Russian language is an integral part of them, through which they are connected to the entire Russian-speaking world. The same can be seen in the example of returnees in Japan and South Korea. At the same time, as we have seen with third-generation Japanese-Korean families and their attitudes towards the Korean language and Korean ethnic identity, the language may be lost, but the ethnic identity remains quite strong. Language is an essential part of identity, but it is not the only or decisive one. Language can be equal to the identity, or it can only be a means of communicating with certain people or a language of learning and receiving information. The relationship between language and identity can be very different, even among siblings. When raising or teaching bilingual and multicultural children, we should always be aware of this possible variation. Bilingualism, like identity, is in a constant process of development. Moreover, bilingualism is not the highest point of language proficiency. It is a spectrum with many points. Every person can be at a certain point on the spectrum. Parents and teachers must be careful about semilingualism and semi-education, but otherwise variability is not a problem. And another important point is that language for a diaspora, an ethnic community, or a country reviving independence and in need of language revitalisation and language for an individual are different things. Imperial nationalism that forbids minorities to speak their language is a terribly destructive and tragic thing, leading to the loss of the language of the individual and the entire ethnic community and sometimes the nation. However, the nationalism of a resurgent nation can be just as destructive and violent. Denial inclusion in a community, the possibility of being a member of it (i.e. having an appropriate identity without knowing the language), and taunts from parents and teachers can lead to rejection of a given ethnic identity. For anyone, especially a child or teenager, language is connected to specific people and filled with a particular meaning, more than a national idea. If this is the language you speak to a friend, received your first declaration of love, or heard the lullaby your parents sung to you, this language will always play an essential role in your individual identity (including the language one). Teachers and policymakers should always keep this in mind when introducing language into education.

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Conclusions

Education

This book reveals a historical picture of circumstances surrounding the education of minorities for nearly 100 years by examining the history of the schools and the stories of the people who studied there. On the one hand, schools are agents of a particular ideology, organizations that play a role in shaping national, local or group ethnic identity. At the same time, it is also a place where children form their social bonds, where multilingual children also often acquire language skills and many cultural components. Studying the different forms of schooling and their pros and cons should help organize a modern bilingual and multicultural education. Sakhalin is a small island, but there were many different school systems on this small piece of land: for example, the Russian Empire, which attempted to Russify the population, the existence of private national schools for the Korean population, and the Soviet educational system, which introduced ethnic schools with education in the native language for the first 15 years of its existence. This educational system was stopped entirely during the period of repression and partially resumed after the Second World War. Nearby was the Japanese empire, which pursued assimilationist policies towards the Korean population and tried to establish special schools for the indigenous peoples (with teaching in Japanese) but did not close schools for the Russians in Northern Sakhalin. In both these cases, of course, the policy on nationality was consistent with the general ideology of the state. After the war, Sakhalin had an unique situation with Russian, Korean, and Japanese schools. The repatriation of the population to Japan in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in many children previously educated in Russian schools going to Japanese or Korean schools in Japan. Finally, with modern repatriation and migration, Japanese and Koreans from Sakhalin (and the mainland) learn new forms of education in Japan and in South Korea, attending both local schools and schools in Russian.

8.4

The Limitation of the Study and Possibility for Further Research

There are certain limitations of my study. One of the main points was the impossibility of a long-term study in South Korea, especially in Ansan, which was planned for 2020–2021 but was disrupted by the pandemic. However, I hope that I will have the opportunity to trace the changes in the repatriate community since the secondgeneration repatriation law of 2021. Also, over the past 2 years, some Russian schools in South Korea have closed, but a new project has emerged to open a Russian-Korean bilingual school. This new project is a joint venture between Koryo Saram and Sakhalin Koreans. The opening of such a school is certainly interesting for both practitioners and scholars of bilingualism. I think it will attract

8.5

Summary: Some Thoughts About Diversity, Identity, and Multiculturalism

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scholars from different countries who deal with various aspects of bilingualism. I also started a survey of Japanese and Korean descendants living in Sakhalin. I would like to know more about their lives and attitudes towards a possible move to Japan or South Korea. Another thing I did not include to this book is the identity and language issues of the children whose parents decide not to move to Japan or South Korea. I think this area is the next step of my research. Also, in the book I did not focus on the practical side of teaching, such as the organization of lessons in schools, teaching methods, etc. This field is another area for possible further research. And I hope that my book will be of interest to specialists in different fields of multiculturalism, and we can do further research together.

8.5

Summary: Some Thoughts About Diversity, Identity, and Multiculturalism

In this last section, I would like to offer some thoughts on my research. On the one hand, it is a study of the history and current state of a particular group of people living and migrating between Korean Peninsula, Japan, and Russia. However, I decided to publish this study not as a historical or ethnographic study but specifically in a series on language policy and multicultural education. I try to do this because Japan and South Korea are currently searching for a form of multicultural and multilingual policy, and this study could help see where this policy should be directed. When considering the different situations (Japan has a population recognized as indigenous) and the different policies (South Korea recognizes itself as a multicultural state), there are similarities in the approach to multiculturalism in these countries. Both countries try to implement multiculturalism or multicultural coexistence policy. However, what is a multicultural policy? According to M. Gordon (1988), multiculturalism generally has two models: the liberal model and the corporatist. In the liberal model, the state maintains equal opportunity in culturally neutral public spaces. People have the individual right to practice their religion and use language and customs in their private sphere. In the corporatist model of multiculturalism, a state provides active support to enable ethnic groups to maintain their culture, language use, and teaching, etc., (Gordon, 1988, pp. 157–166; MorrisSuzuki, 1998, p. 195). As Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1998) argues “Proposals for a multicultural Japan often combine aspects of both models” (Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 195). A similar approach exists in South Korea. For example, both countries have recently opened many private schools where migrant children are taught in their language. Regarding the implementation of rights in the public sphere, South Korea has advanced considerably; in Japan, there is an ongoing debate about the implementation of voting rights at the local level. In South Korea, such rights exist for permanent foreign residents. Debate continues in both countries over the promotion

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8

Conclusions

of the language and culture of foreigners at the national level. In both countries, the focus is on adaptation in the host society, above all support for learning the language and customs of the country. However, it seems to me that focusing only on such an approach eventually leads to assimilation, just in softer ways (Lee, 2013, p.52). Perhaps this is due to the particularity of migrants, many of whom are “returning diasporas,” and the presence of a group of “children of mixed marriages.” Both groups have a part of identity which is linked to the culture and language of the host society, but this is only one part of it. The state, as well as ethnic groups themselves, often enclose minorities/themselves within certain limits. However, as we have seen in the history of the Japanese and Koreans of Sakhalin, the notion of a minority can be changed. At the same time, some communities can be a minority to some people, and a majority to others or the position of an ethnic group in the social ladder within a country can be changed depending on the political or economic situation in the world. Therefore, as I have shown in this book, the identity of particular people can be multiple and multi-layered and change depending on both the above factors and personal circumstances. In other words, a person can have different positions of their identification in one situation or another. And here, I agree with Tessa Morris Suzuki, who argues that “to be able to move easily between a range of identity positions, in which we can use our culture resource to the full, is perhaps one of the most essential of human rights.” Recognizing this right is one of the vital tasks of multicultural and multilingual policies.

References Gordon, М. (1988). The scope of sociology. Oxford University Press. Lee, S. (2013). Multicultural education and language ideology in South Korea. Working Papers in Educational Linguistics, 28(1), 43–60. Morris-Suzuki, T. (1998). Re-inventing Japan: Time space nation. Routledge. Niznik, M. (2021). Teaching Russian as a home language in Israel – After 30 years. In: Formation of educational systems and creation of teaching materials for bilingual children. International symposium, Sapporo, 24 October 2021.

Appendix (Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4)

Table 1 A chronology of Sakhalin/Karafuto Year 1689

1855 1858 1860 1867–1868 1869 1875 1875–1876 1879 1884 1890 1904–1905 1905 1905 1907 1910

Events The Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 was the first treaty between the Tsardom of Russia and the Qing dynasty of China. Тhe relationship and border between the two states is defined. Treaty of Shimoda: establishment of relations between Russia and Japan. Sakhalin/Karafuto under joint Russian/Japanese control Treaty of Aigun: establishment of the border with China in the Russian Far East Treaty of Peking: parts of Outer Manchuria are ceded to Russia The Meiji Restoration: the end of Shogunate rule in Japan The Tsar declares Sakhalin to be a penal colony Treaty of St Petersburg: Sakhalin becomes Russian territory, the Kurils become Japanese territory. Forced relocation of Karafuto Ainu to Hokkaido (arrive in Tsuishikari in 1876) Oil is discovered on Sakhalin Foundation of the Priamur Governor-Generalship A.P. Chekhov’s tour to Sakhalin (Sakhalin Island published in 1895) Russo-Japanese War The Treaty of Portsmouth formally ended the 1904–1905 RussoJapanese War. Transferring South Sakhalin to Japan A treaty between Japan and Korea, making Korea a Japanese protectorate. Governorship of Karafuto is established Annexation of the Korean peninsula by Japan

Mentioned in –

Introduction, Chap. 2 Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Introduction, Chap. 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 2 – Chapter 2 Chapters 2 and 3 Chapter 2 Chapters 2 and 3 Chapter 3 Introduction, Chap. 2 (continued)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3

137

138

Appendix (Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4)

Table 1 (continued) Year 1917

Events February and October Russian Revolution

1918–1922

Civil War in Russia

1920s

Rapid increase in the population of Japanese and Koreans in Karafuto Occupation of northern Sakhalin by Japan Forced relocation of ethnic Koreans from the Russian Far East to Central Asia Koreans mobilized in the wake of the 1938 National Mobilization Law Soviet Japanese Neutrality Pact Karafuto incorporated into ‘Japan proper’ as a prefecture 9–23 August: evacuation of Japanese from Karafuto (halted by attacks on three ships on 22 August) 10–24 August: The Soviet Army occupies Karafuto End of Second World War: Sakhalin Island under Soviet control 23 September: establishment of the Civil Administration January: Karafuto prefectural government dissolved 2 February: Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya oblast’ (south Sakhalin and Kurils) established as part of Khabarovkii krai 2 January: south Sakhalin and Kuril Islands merge with north Sakhalin to become Sakhalinskaya oblast’ 19 November: USSR and USA reach an agreement on the repatriation of Japanese from Soviet-held areas Period of repatriation of Japanese population The New Constitution of Japan Period of hope of the repatriation for Korean population 8 September. Treaty of San Francisco. Treaty of Peace with Japan re-established peaceful relations between Japan and the Allied Powers. Was not signed by USSR and China. The Korean War Death of Stalin: Khrushchev takes power Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration The last collective repatriation (repatriation of Japanese–Korean families) from Sakhalin to Japan Establishment of the “Sakhalin Korean Return Society in Japan” Individual (Family) Repatriation of Japanese–Korean families from Sakhalin to Japan Kikoku ji gyou “Return project” for Koreans living in Japan to North Korea. Closure of the Korean schools on Sakhalin Signing of a basic treaty on Japan-Korea relations Expulsions of Koreans from Sakhalin to North Korea

1920–1925 1937 1938–1939 1941 1943 1945 1945 1945 1945 1946

1947 1946 1946–1949 1947 1946–1950 1951

1950–1953 1953 1956 1957–1959 1958 1960–1976 1959–1984 1963 1965 1977

Mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3 Chapters 2 and 3 Chapter 3 Chapter 3 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 – Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Chapter 4

– Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 4 –

Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 (continued)

Appendix (Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4)

139

Table 1 (continued) Year 1989

Events Establishment of the organization “Society for the Assistance to the Repatriation of Compatriots Interned on Sakhalin.” Establishment of a “Community Organization of Separated Families of Sakhalin Koreans” on Sakhalin Establishment of a “Society for Assistance to Compatriots of Karafuto (Sakhalin) for Temporary Return to Homeland.” Establishment of a “Sakhalin Japanese Society” in Sakhalin. 30 September. Establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea The break-up of the Soviet Union Japan promises financial support for the repatriation of the first generation of Sakhalin Koreans. South Korea allocates land for construction of the facility. ChinaReturnees Support Act (Japan): modern repatriation from Sakhalin begins. Sakhalin Korean elders settle in a new building apartment. New Repatriation Law in South Korea

1989 1989 1989 1990 1991 1993

1994 2000 2020

Mentioned in Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6

Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6

Table 2 Interview with returnees 1990s used in this book

1

Case F

Year of birth 1954

2

Tn 2

1946

2005

3

N

1941

2004

4

Tn 1

1942

2005

5

A

1944

2000

6

K

1944

2009

7 8

Km P

1934 1936

2007 2009

9

Yo

1944

10

H1

1936

Non repatriate 2000

11

H2

1946

2000

12

S

1935

1996

Year of repatriation 2010

Interview Year/place/ language 2011/Sapporo/ Rus 2012/ Sapporo/Rus. 2012/ Sapporo/Rus. 2012/Sapporo/ Rus. 2013/ Hakodate/Jp 2013/Sapporo/ Rus/Kor 2013/Inchon/Jp 2013/Ansan/ Kor./Rus. 2014/Yuzh. Sakh/ Rus./JP. 2014/ Sapporo/Jp 2014/Ansan/Jp, Rus. 2015/Ebetsu/ яп.

Birth parents

Stepparents

Father

Mother

Father

Jp

Jp

Spouse Rus

Kor

Jp

Kor

Jp

Jp

Kor.

Jp.

Jp.

Jp.

.

Jp.

Jp.

Kor.

Kor. Kor.

Kor. Kor.

Kor. Kor.

Kor.

Kor.

Kor.

Kor.

Jp.

Kor.

Kor.

Jp.

Kor.

Jp.

Jp.

Rus.

Kor.

Mother

Rus. Jp/ Kor. Kor.

Jp.

Kor.

(continued)

140

Appendix (Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4)

Table 2 (continued)

13

Case M

Year of birth 1966

14

L

1973

Year of repatriation Non repatriate 2004

15

O

1971

2005

16

LK

1945

Non repatriate

Interview Year/place/ language 2015/ Sapporo/ Rus 2012/ Sapporo/ Rus. 2015/Sapporo/ Rus. 2019/Yuzhno Sakhalinsk/ Rus.

Birth parents

Stepparents

Father

Mother

Father

Kor

Jp

Kor

Kor

Kor

Jp

Uilta

Mother

Spouse Kor Jp/Kor

Kor

Uilta

Table 3 Interview with second generation of returnees return in 1950s–1970s Year of return 1958

Place of residence in Japan Sapporo

Place of interview Sapporo

Interviewed generation 2

1965

Sapporo

Sapporo

2

1965

Obihiro

2

1965

Hakodate

Sapporo/ Obihiro Hakodate

2

1976

Tokyo

Tokyo

2

Family Japanese/ Korean Japanese Japanese/ Korean Japanese/ Korean Japanese/ Korean

Level and language of education Middle School (Jp), High School (Kor) Middle school (Rus, Jp), High school (Jp) Middle School (Rus, Jp), High School (Kor) Middle School (Rus, Jp) Middle School (Rus, Jp)

Table 4 Ethnicity and Identity of Young Returnees

K O L D M N F A

Ethnic composition of the family Japanese/Korean Japanese/Korean Japanese/Korean Japanese/Korean Japanese/Korean Japanese/Russian Japanese/Russian Japanese/Korean

Traditions, daily life costumes Korean/Russian Korean/Russian Korean/Russian Korean/Russian Korean/Japanese Russian Russian Korean

Y

Japanese/Korean

Korean/Russian

R N V

Japanese/Russian Japanese/Russian Japanese/Korean

Russian Russian Korean/Russian

Self-ethic identification Japanese/Russian Korean/Russian Korean/Japanese Korean/Japanese Japanese/Korean Russian Russian Korean/ Japanese/Russian Korean/ Japanese/Russian Russian Russian Korean/Japanese

Index

A Agricultural development, 37 Agricultural settlement, 37 Agriculture, 22, 45, 46, 67 Ainu Karafuto Ainu, 20, 42, 137 Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinskiy, 23, 24 All Japan Federation of Karafuto, 46, 47, 50 Ansan, 12, 13, 49, 98, 101–104, 106–108, 118–124, 134, 139 Association of Korean Residents of Japan Repatriated from Sakhalin, 75 Australia, 4, 29, 112 Azerbaijan, 87 B Bilingualism, 32, 116, 133–135 See also Multilingualism; Semilingualism Borders:borderlands, 1, 6, 8, 9, 19, 22, 23, 25, 29, 58, 85, 86, 108, 129, 137 Brazil, 100 C Chekhov A., 21, 22, 24, 137 Child Assist Sapporo Association (CaSA), 12, 103, 114, 116 China, 1, 5, 19, 32, 58, 101–103, 119, 137–139 See also Manchuria and Mammo Citizenship Japanese 224; Russian/USSR, DPRK, 77 See also Passports Civil Administration of Sakhalin, see Government

Coal, 2, 27, 37, 40, 51, 68 Cold War, 6, 8, 13, 58, 61, 77, 97, 112, 117, 130 Collective farms (kolkhozes), 28 Colonialism, post-colonialism, 6 Colonies ‘exploitation- and investment-type, 2 ‘immigration-type’, 2, 38 ‘Japanese settlement colony’, 2, 37, 38 penal colony, 2 Commerce, 39 D Diaspora, 3, 6–8, 10, 19, 22, 23, 41, 58, 63, 76, 88, 91, 97–108, 112, 118, 119, 133, 136 Diplomacy embassies, 112 Discrimination, 4, 7, 9, 40, 43, 50, 58, 64, 66, 72, 129, 130 E Employment, 22, 23, 40, 102, 105 Espionage, 59 Ethnicity, 6, 8, 9, 12, 28, 31, 69, 99–101, 106, 115, 123, 126, 131, 132, 140 F Families husbands, 5, 42, 79 intermarriages, 5 marriages, 24, 44, 59, 60 orphans, 5

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Paichadze, Identity, Language and Education of Sakhalin Japanese and Koreans, Language Policy 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13798-3

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142 Farming, see Agriculture Fiftieth parallel, 2, 25 Fisheries/fishing, 2, 38, 45, 46, 51, 107 G Gender, 8, 21, 39 Government Allied Forces Command, 81 Civil Administration of Sakhalin, 57, 61, 63 Governor-General Karafuto Governor, 38 Governor-General of the Primorskiy Region, 26 of Karafuto (Karafuto-chō), 37, 57 Graves, 76 I Identity by generation of, 9 repatriate’s colonial, 77 Karafutoan identity, 47 multilayered identities, 197 national identity, 83, 100 transnational identities, 72 Ideology, 11, 20, 28, 33, 46, 49–51, 60, 72, 129–131, 134 Indigenous people, 20, 28–30, 34, 40, 42, 48, 51, 58, 66, 129, 134 See also Ainu; Nivkh (Gilyak); Uilta Industry, 2, 37, 39, 41, 46, 51, 58, 107 Interviews, 8, 12, 13, 32, 42, 44, 45, 49, 51, 65–72, 76, 78, 82–86, 90, 91, 118, 119, 121, 123, 125, 131, 132, 139, 140 K Kabaren, see All Japan Federation of Karafuto Kazakhstan, 22, 23, 30, 58, 118, 121, 123 Khabarovsk, 32 Khrushchev, N., 86, 137 Korean War, 2, 49, 58, 81, 138 Korsakov (Ōdomari), 23, 24, 67 L Labour/labourers forced labour, 5, 24, 39, 41, 98 La Pérouse Straits (Sōya Straits), 1 Latvia, 87

Index M Manchuria and Manmo, 5 Maoka, 45, 46 Meiji period, 20 Memories, 49–51 Migration emigration forced migration, 117 generational, 6, 12 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Japan) 1952/1990, 4, 100 return migration, 5, 12, 98 See also Repatriation Mining, 37, 45 See also Coal Minorities, 12, 28, 29, 31–33, 42–51, 58, 60, 72, 100, 101, 129–131, 133, 134, 136 Multiculturalism, 4, 99–101, 108, 131, 135–136 Multilingualism bilingualism, 32, 116, 133–135 semilingualism, 133 N Naichi (inner Japan, Japan proper), 47 Nationality, 10, 12, 20, 21, 28, 40, 58, 76, 79–81, 87, 99, 105, 106, 113, 114, 116, 134 National Mobilization Law, 41, 138 Nation; nationalism, 9, 28, 47, 48, 61, 99–101, 133 Nivkh (Gilyak), 30, 31, 43, 48, 58 Northern Karafuto/Sakhalin, 2 O Occupation American occupation of Japan, 2, 138 Japanese occupation of Northern Karafuto, 2 Soviet occupation of Karafuto, 2 Ōdomari, see Korsakov (Ōdomari) P Passport registration, 29 Passports, 8, 29 Pension, 103 Perestroikas, 85, 112 Poland, 38 Poles, 21, 22, 38, 43, 66

Index Population of Karafuto, 2, 20, 38, 51, 57, 129 of North Sakhalin, 39 of Sakhalin, 2, 7, 19, 21, 34, 39, 75, 77, 78, 136 Priamurie (Priamur Region), 26, 137 Primorye (Maritime Region), 22, 23, 26, 27, 38 Prisoners of war, 2, 58 Purges, 28, 30, 32, 61 R Red Cross, 76, 102 Repatriation Agreement on Repatriation, 57 (see also Migration) China Returnees Support Act 1994, 101, 139 issues affecting ‘repatriates’, 108 of Koreans, 10, 12, 67, 75, 77, 88, 92, 103, 130 repatriate groups, 3, 134 returnees, 5, 12, 76, 77, 82, 97, 101–103, 105, 106, 108, 130, 139 Russian Civil War 1918–22, 39 See also Siberian Intervention Russian revolution, 2, 27–34, 117, 129, 138 Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), 2, 20–27, 37, 51, 117, 137 S Sakhalin Oblast, 1–3, 5, 7–13, 19–34, 37–52, 57–69, 72, 75–92, 97, 101–108, 111, 113, 114, 119–122, 124, 125, 129–131, 134, 135, 137–139 Sapporo, 12, 13, 83–86, 101, 103, 108, 113–116, 120, 122–124, 139, 140 See also Child Assist Sapporo Association (CaSA); Schools Schools in Karafuto, 45, 46, 48 for Koreans, 30, 32, 49, 63, 72, 83 Russian Schools in Japan, 61–65, 72, 130 Russian Schools in Korean, 61–65, 72, 130 in Russia/Sakhalin, 19, 63, 83 Second World War, 2, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 23, 28, 39, 42, 43, 58, 59, 82, 83, 99, 100, 103, 134, 138 Semi-lingualism, 133 See also Bilingualism; Multilingualism Seoul, 117–119, 121, 122 Settlers, 2, 6, 9, 21, 22, 27, 45, 58 See also Colony

143 Shakhtyorsk (Tōro), 70 See also Fisheries/fishing Siberian intervention (1918-1922), 26, 39, 48 See also Russian Civil War Sovietization, 9, 64 Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration 1956, 3, 75, 138 Sōya Straits, see La Pérouse Straits (Sōya Straits) Stalin, J., 28, 61, 86, 137 Straits of Tartary, 1 T Tokorozawa Center for Returnees, 102 Toyohara, 45–47, 61, 63 See also Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Treaties Convention Embodying Basic Rules of the Relations between Japan and the USSR 1925, 2 Shimoda Treaty 1855, 111 Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact 1941, 138 Treaty of Aigun 1858, 23, 137 Treaty of Peking 1860, 137 Treaty of Portsmouth 1905, 25, 137 Treaty of Saint Petersburg 1875, 1, 20, 137 U Uglegorsk (Esutoru), 67 Uilta, 25, 30, 32, 43, 48, 58, 66, 140 Ukraine, 67, 86 Unemployment, 97 United States of America, 112 Uzbekistan, 86, 118, 121, 123, 125 V Vladivostok, 26, 29, 32, 41, 48, 117 W White Russians, 22 Wives, 5, 42, 44, 75 See also Graves Y Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 63, 140