Russian Diaspora: Culture, Identity, and Language Change 9781934078457, 9781934078440

Citation preview

Russian Diaspora

Contributions to the Sociology of Language 99

Editor

Joshua A. Fishman

De Gruyter Mouton

Russian Diaspora Culture, Identity, and Language Change

by

Ludmila Isurin

De Gruyter Mouton

ISBN 978-1-934078-44-0 e-ISBN 978-1-934078-45-7 ISSN 1861-0676 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Isurin, Ludmila. Russian diaspora : culture, identity, and language change / by Ludmila Isurin. p. cm. ⫺ (Contributions to the sociology of language ; 99.) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-934078-44-0 (alk. paper) 1. Linguistic minorities. 2. Language maintenance. 3. Code switching (Linguistics) 4. Immigrants ⫺ Russia (Federation) 5. Language and culture. I. Title. P119.315.I88 2011 305.891171⫺dc22 2011003937

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ” 2011 Walter de Gruyter, Inc., New York Cover image: sculpies/shutterstock Typesetting: RoyalStandard, Hong Kong Printing: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ⬁ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

To my husband Sasha

Acknowledgements I am greatly indebted to all the participants in this study who shared their time and life stories with me; to my husband Sasha whose mixed RussianJewish identity inspired me to write this book and whose support and understanding have helped me throughout the entire process; to my daughter Polly who had her senior prom, last day of high school, and the first gallery opening during my travel overseas; to Lena Osipova, Natasha Lvovich, Peter Zheromskiy, Vera Annenkova, Ira Issurin and Lena Karpelson for their assistance in finding the participants in the US and Israel; to Helena and Jacob Kaul, Polish immigrants and long-time friends, for hosting me in their house in Israel; to my friend and colleague, Kees de Bot, who inspired me to keep a travel diary and who encouraged me with this project all these years; and to the Institute of Technology (The Technion) in Israel and the University of Hamburg in Germany for hosting me as a guest researcher during my travel. Also I would like to extend my gratitude to those people who were involved in the final stages of this publication. My thanks go to Carrie Shipers for her careful proofreading of the entire manuscript; to Dr. Joshua Fishman for his enthusiastic welcome of my work and thoughtful comments on its original version; to Marcia Schwartz and Wolfgang Konwitschny, wonderful editors at De Gruyter, for their kind and patient guidance throughout the entire publication process; and to the memory of Cathleen Petree, an extraordinary colleague at De Gruyter who did not live to see this book published but who was the very first person to bring it to life.

Preface . . . A crisp spring afternoon . . . My mother and I are in our sunlit St. Petersburg apartment. She is standing on a stool and hanging the freshly washed drapes at the window while I pretend to be working on a school assignment to avoid the boring chore of helping her with the spring cleaning. – Mom, what would you do if I said I was marrying a Jew? – My mother’s hands froze in the air with the drape that she was about to hang. – A Jew. . . ? You have no Jewish friends! Why are you asking this? I hope you do not mean it. . . . 5 years later I married my Jewish husband. In early 1990 I left Russia with him and our five-month-old daughter.

Whenever I open a new book I always think of the author and his reasons for writing on a particular topic. I believe that our academic interests are a continuation of our personal interests and that a dispassionate approach to the academic subject is just the way in which we transform our passion into a scholarly activity. I have been nourishing the idea of this book for years: thinking of it, discussing it with my colleagues and my husband, and dreaming of a day when I finally could work on it. When the opportunity arose and I had a chance to fulfill my dream I felt excited and a bit scared. I began on a long journey of exploring my own roots and rediscovering my own past. The questions that I am focusing on in this book are the questions that I have been asking myself for the last 20 years of my two immigrations and throughout my entire life on three continents. How has my self-perception changed over the 20 years that I have spent outside of Russia? How did my perception of my host countries and their cultures change over time? How did those cultures change me? Did I close the circle and come to peace with Russia? Do I feel that I belong where I am now? As a linguist, I always have been interested in the way our first language changes under the influence of a second language and how linguistic measures could be explored to see the much deeper change in our thinking. Why do I struggle for words that no longer seem accessible and why do I monitor myself in the way I use a phrase expressing belonging in Russian? In search of these

x

Preface

and other answers and in the attempt to see myself as one of the multimillions of the Russian Diaspora I launched a project that culminated with this book. The quest for answers set me on a di‰cult journey of meeting the Russian Diaspora on three continents: USA, Israel, and Germany. More than 170 people briefly walked through my life leaving behind unforgettable marks through their stories, personalities, and the commonalities they share as Russians. A year and a half later I still go over the incredible amount of data collected during my trips. I read the interview transcripts and hear the voices, often choked with tears, and clearly picture some faces that forever are carved into my memory. I want the reader to see human lives and hear the stories behind the dry numbers that as a scholar I will be presenting in this book. I faced a challenge of combining di¤erent writing styles, genres, and analyses in this book while keeping my immigrant voice and my personal experiences out of the discussion as much as possible. In order to detach myself from the subject of my research I kept a travel diary where I reflected on my personal recollections and voiced my reactions, impressions and concerns. One day selected entries from my diary may be added to the numerous autobiographical memoirs written by other immigrant writers. For this research the diary served its purpose and helped me to separate my immigrant life and experiences from those of my participants. Clearly my study does not rely in any way on my personal experience, but my interest in culture, identity and language retention and acquisition is personal as well as professional. I have lived in Russia, Israel, and America, and have made frequent, prolonged trips to Germany. I am an ethnic Russian married to a Jewish Russian. Arguably, my experience – living in the cultures that I study – has helped me to provide what Geertz calls ‘‘thick description’’ of the ethnographic, social and linguistic phenomena that are at the heart of my book.

Table of contents Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii ix 1

1. Russian immigration: The third wave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Who were they? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Why did they leave? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. How did they leave? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 4 6 7 9 12 15 17

2. Theoretical framework and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Acculturation Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1. Acculturation framework (Berry 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2. Acculturation framework: Adapted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.4. Antecedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.5. Psychological acculturation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.6. Acculturation consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.7. Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20 20 21 22 25 26 27 28 29 30

3. ‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Socio-demographic background of the participants . . . . . . . 3.4.1. Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2. Sex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3. Nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.4. Marital status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.5. Place of origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.6. Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32 32 33 33 33 34 35 35 36 36 37

xii

Table of contents

3.5. Reasons for emigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1. Economic and political crash of the 1990s . . . . . . . . 3.5.2. Political system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.3. Anti-Semitism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.4. Ethnic conflicts and saving sons from army service . . 3.5.5. For the sake of a better future for the children . . . . . 3.5.6. ‘‘Mass madness’’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6. Reasons for choosing their host country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7. Length of immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8. Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9. Hardships in immigration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.1. Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.2. Finding and/or not losing a job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.3. Adaptation to the new country. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.4. Loss of familiar networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.5. Making the decision to leave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9.6. Nostalgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10. Success in immigration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11. Integration into the host society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12. Looking back at the decision to emigrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39 40 40 41 41 42 42 42 46 46 48 48 49 49 50 51 51 52 53 53 54

4. Culture: Change of the cultural perception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. Culture as an interdisciplinary project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. Acculturation Framework: Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1. Internal antecedents: Russian culture . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2. External antecedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3. Traditional antecedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4. Acculturation process and consequences . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. Initial perception of the host culture/society . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1. US. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2. Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. Change in the perception of host culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1. US. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2. Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5. Host cultures/societies: Collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other’’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56 56 56 58 59 61 63 63 64 64 67 69 71 72 73 76 78

Table of contents

xiii

4.5.1. US: Societal level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2. US: Interpersonal level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.3. Israel: Societal level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.4. Israel: Interpersonal level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.5. Germany: Societal level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.6. Germany: Interpersonal level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.7. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nostalgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Socio-linguistic factors and comfort in the new country . . . . Russian community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79 81 82 85 87 88 89 91 93 95 101

5. Culture: Individualism versus collectivism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1. Friendship in Russian culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2. Collectivism versus individualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3. Linguistic relativity and individualism versus collectivism . . 5.4. Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1. Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2. Participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3. Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.4. Research hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.5. Data analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1. Pronoun use across groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2. Pro-drop analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3. Lexical analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

103 103 103 105 107 110 110 111 114 115 116 117 117 121 122 123 126

4.6. 4.7. 4.8. 4.9.

6. In search of ‘‘self ’’: Self-identification and identity transformation among Russian immigrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1. Theoretical approaches to the study of identity . . . . . . . . . . 6.2. Acculturation Framework: The study of identity. . . . . . . . . . 6.3. Traditional antecedents: ‘‘O‰cial’’ identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4. Internal antecedents: Ethnic discrimination and social stigma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5. Identity transformation: Process and consequences of acculturation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

129 129 130 132 134 135 139

xiv

Table of contents

6.6.

6.7. 6.8.

6.9.

6.10.

6.5.1. Discrimination and identity shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.2. Religion and identity shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.3. Partners and identity shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.4. Place of identification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Identity transformation: Analysis of narratives . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.1. US: Identity transformation. Jewish immigrants . . . . 6.6.2. US: Identity transformation. Russian immigrants . . . 6.6.3. Israel: Identity transformation. Jewish immigrants . . . 6.6.4. Israel: Identity transformation. Russian immigrants . . . 6.6.5. Germany: Identity transformation. Jewish immigrants 6.6.6. Germany: Identity transformation. Russian immigrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Russian immigration and the perception of the term ‘‘Russian’’ among immigrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8.1. US. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8.2. Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8.3. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . External antecedents: What did we learn about the host countries?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9.1. US. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9.2. Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9.3. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7. Sense of belonging. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1. Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2. Findings: Surveys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1. Citizenship vs. visits to Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2. Citizenship vs. sense of home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3. Linguistic measure of ‘‘belonging’’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.4. Sense of home vs. age at immigration, length of immigration, and ethnicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.5. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3. Findings: Interview narratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1. Feeling like an outsider in the host country . . . . . . . 7.3.2. Sense of belonging in the host country . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.3. Sense of non-belonging in the host country. . . . . . . . 7.3.4. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

141 142 142 143 144 145 146 147 150 151 155 155 157 157 158 159 160 160 161 161 162 168 168 169 172 172 175 177 179 182 183 184 184 185 188

Table of contents

xv

7.4. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5. Feeling like an outsider during visits to Russia . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.1. Sense of belonging on visits to Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.2. Sense of non-belonging on visits to Russia. . . . . . . . . 7.5.3. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6. Hurt feelings towards Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6.1. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7. General discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

189 191 192 193 195 196 199 200

8. Language change and language maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1. First language maintenance/attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.1. Socio-linguistic factors in L1 attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2. Acculturation Framework: Language maintenance/attrition . . 8.3. Research question and data analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4. Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.1. L2 acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.2. First language attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.3. Metalinguistic awareness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.4. First Language maintenance: Generational view . . . . 8.5. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

204 204 205 206 207 209 209 209 211 213 215 218

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

223 225 231

Introduction This book is the culmination of a comprehensive interdisciplinary study of Russian immigration to three countries, i.e., the United States, Israel and Germany. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 and its consequent liberalization resulted in the biggest flood of Russian immigration to the West since the early 20th century. This last wave traditionally has been named the third wave of Soviet/Russian immigration and includes those immigrants who left Russia before (the late 1980s) and immediately following the collapse of the USSR (the early 1990s). Despite the scholarly interest in Russian immigration during the last two decades there are relatively few publications on the topic. Most of the work is focused on strictly Jewish immigration or casts the immigrant community as ‘‘Russian,’’ ignoring the reality of two distinct ethnic groups, Russian Jews and ethnic Russians. Russian Diaspora examines two distinct ethnic groups, relies on empirical data based on sizable groups in three countries, looks into three elements of acculturation (culture, identity, and language), and engages qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. Of the 214 people who participated in the present study, 174 are Russian immigrants who had resided in the United States, Germany, or Israel between ten and thirty years. Two tasks were o¤ered to the participants: a survey and a semistructured interview. The purpose of the book is to look at the process of transformation in the three components that are key issues in immigration studies: cultural adaptation, identity shift, and first language change. All three elements are studied within the Acculturation Framework. In addition to o¤ering a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, the book adopts sociological, anthropological, socio-linguistic and psycholinguistic methods of analysis. The book follows a consistent structure devoting one or two chapters to each of the three key components: one explores the issue through the Acculturation Framework, the other complements the findings by adding a small study conducted within the scope of the present research or by elaborating on a particular concept. The book opens with an overview of Russian immigration in the 20th century, focusing primarily on the most recent wave. It provides a profile of Russian immigrants, the major reasons for their departure, and an explanation of the technicalities accompanying the complex process of obtaining permission to leave Russia/the USSR. In addition, it clarifies

2

Introduction

the scope and content of Russian immigration in the United States, Israel, and Germany (Chapter 1). Then the theoretical framework and the methodology of the study are discussed in the next chapter. As mentioned above, all three components central to this research, i.e., culture, identity and language, are studied within the Acculturation Framework, which was adopted from cross-cultural psychology and adapted in order to meet the goals of this project. After the reader becomes familiar with the history of the recent Russian immigration and the research questions posed by this study he turns to the background information on the participants in this project. The discussion of the socio-demographic information on the immigrants is followed by an analysis of their narratives that pinpoints the reasons behind their immigration and for their choice of a particular host country. The chapter also discusses the major hardships, problems with integration, and success in finding employment among Russian immigrants in three countries (Chapter 3). The chapter on the change in cultural perception opens with a discussion of the concept of culture as defined in the four pertinent languages, i.e., Russian, English, German, and Hebrew. Then it analyzes the results of the qualitative analysis of narratives related to the immigrants’ original perception of the host culture and the way they view it now. A comparison of the host cultures with the native one allowed me to draw on the collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other,’’ i.e., American, Israeli, and German cultures, through the eyes of Russian immigrants at the societal and interpersonal levels. This leads to a discussion of the role of nostalgia and immigrants’ need for the Russian community in their respective host countries (Chapter 4). The next chapter expands on a question raised in the preceding one: Why do Russian immigrants miss the Russian concept of friendship abroad? It reports the findings of a psycholinguistic study conducted within the framework of the individualism/collectivism paradigm adopted from cross-cultural psychology. Two groups of United States participants, i.e., those well integrated and those poorly integrated into American society and culture are compared against two groups of Russian and American monolinguals who served as control groups. Linguistic measures of the individualism/collectivism construct (personal pronouns, pro-drop, and lexical measures) were used as dependent variables while integration and employment success were independent variables (Chapter 5). The chapter on identity transformation addresses a few questions. It looks into ‘‘o‰cial identity’’ as it was imposed by the Soviet system,

Introduction

3

discrimination and stigma, and the process of identity shift among Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants. An analysis of the administered surveys and narratives identifies those trends common to immigrants in all three countries and those that are distinct to each. Moreover, the immigrants’ attitude towards being referred to by the collective name ‘‘Russian’’ is explored in this chapter (Chapter 6). The discussion of identity transformation among Russian immigrants moves further into the immigrant’s sense of home and belonging. This chapter relies on the surveys and interview narratives to explore the following factors that may be responsible for the individual’s sense of home: citizenship, language fluency, ethnicity and age. It is illustrated further by the linguistic measure of belonging, i.e., the way Russian immigrants use the possessive pronoun ‘‘our’’ in their daily discourse. The analysis of the immigrants’ self-perception of an outsider, both in the host country and back in Russia and an examination of the immigrants’ relationship to their native country conclude the chapter (Chapter 7). The book’s final chapter deals with a socio-linguistic approach to language change and retention which looks at the immigrants’ socio-linguistic background information, language fluency, attitudes toward language maintenance and bilingualism. The analysis is conducted in three steps, i.e., language proficiency and its change, metalinguistic awareness of the language change and attitudes toward an accent, and the generational view on language maintenance. The discussion section illustrates the way in which language change, as a critical component of any immigration study, can be explored within the Acculturation Framework (Chapter 8). Since the book’s structure and contents allow each chapter to stand as a separate study exploring a particular topic, the integrity of the book will not su¤er if the reader chooses to bypass any chapter that is beyond his range of interests.

Chapter 1 Russian immigration: The third wave ‘‘We all become internal immigrants well before we leave our country. . . .’’ (From a conversation with a Greek immigrant in the US)

Introduction The collapse of the USSR in 1991 has shaken the world and brought about numerous sociopolitical changes both inside the former Soviet Union and to the rest of the world. The fall of the giant super empire marked the end of an era. In years to come historians will continue to write books and articles about the seventy years of the Soviet totalitarian regime and its subsequent collapse. They will bring in new perspectives, explanations, and interpretations of the event. The collective memory of the communist epoch will be formed in the Russian nation. Because we lack su‰cient historical distance and emotional detachment from those times it is hard to make an objective judgment about the long-term impact of those years on Russians as a nation, nor is it easy to assess the significance of the fall itself. Whether contemporary Russians view the collapse as the beginning of a more progressive future for their country or as the worst geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, we will leave it up to time to decide. What remains undeniable is that there was a huge positive outcome in shattering the very foundation of the USSR: the once tightly sealed borders of the totalitarian superpower opened up. Thousands of Russian citizens had the chance to travel and see the world beyond the Iron Curtain, and thousands chose to immigrate. Those years marked the end of the third and last wave of Soviet immigration. However, in order to understand better the history of Russian immigration I will take the reader into those times when the USSR seemed as unbreakable and impenetrable as ever. There were three successive waves of Russian/Soviet immigration. The word ‘‘wave’’ and ‘‘Russian’’ will refer here to immigrants from the former USSR, both of Russian and non-Russian ethnicity. The precise census information on immigration from the former USSR is either unavailable or not entirely reliable. Thus I will refer to those numbers that can be found in numerous publications on Russian immigration in the West.

Introduction

5

However, those works focus predominantly on Russian Jewish immigration and their numbers can be inconclusive. The communist revolution of 1917 and the creation of the first communist country destroyed the very foundation of the Old Russian Empire. Many people enthusiastically embraced the communist slogan ‘‘We will build a new society on the ruins of the old one.’’ Others felt pain, fear and hatred. Their ‘‘beloved Motherland’’ was in grave danger and they felt helpless, disillusioned and often crushed. This led to a huge exodus when thousands of people loyal to the old regime left their country with the hope of coming back to Russia when the revolution and the chaos created thereby were over. Russian e´migre´s of the first wave cherished the naı¨ve belief that their exile was a temporary measure and that belief was passed on to their descendants. The recent powerful and emotionally charged documentary, Russians Deprived of Russia (Chavchavadze 2004) shows an interview with an elderly second generation Russian immigrant in Paris who proudly refuses to become a French citizen and remains the last o‰cial citizen of the nonexistent Russian Empire. This little episode portrays what many Russians believe was a typical e´migre´ of those postrevolutionary times: idealistic, naı¨ve, well educated and filled with pain and love for the country that he left. Many immigrants of the first wave could not tolerate the emotional pain of separation from their land and later returned to Russia. Upon arrival they either were executed by the Soviets or were locked up for years if not forever in labor camps. That was the end of the so-called first wave of immigration. The first wave of Russian immigration settled predominantly in Europe with the original locus in Paris. There was also a relatively big community in Germany. Among other major routes of that wave were the US, Latin America, Manchuria (Harbin), Australia, and Palestine. Many first-wavers later resettled in the US but the European community remained sizable. According to the US Department of Justice (Chiswick 1997: 235), almost a million immigrants came to the US from Russia starting with a few years prior to the revolution and until the dark years of Stalin’s rule in the 1930s. However, Glad (1999: 403) refers to a much smaller number of 103,322 (1917–1939) as the US statistics on immigration. In the late 1920s the door to immigration from the USSR slowly was closing and the entire country was submerged into the dark years of terror, fear, and seclusion. During Stalin’s years and until the early 1970s there was virtually no immigration from the USSR. The US received between 5,000 (Chiswick 1997: 235) and 18,400 (Glad 1999: 403) immigrants in those years while Palestine altogether became home to 52,350 Russian immigrants from

6

Russian immigration: The third wave

1917 to 1947 (Glad 1999: 403). The last figure includes the second wave immigrants. The second wave of immigration is not as easily identifiable. Some scholars include resettled first wavers and their descendents, while others limit it to those Soviet citizens who were caught up in the crossfire of WWII, went through POW camps or camps for displaced people and chose not to go back to the USSR when the war was over. If they returned, those people would be put in jail or sent to the labor camps. Therefore many preferred to stay in the West. The statistics on the second wave of immigration are quite scattered and contradictory. It is important to notice that the first two waves of Russian immigration were not predominantly Jewish. People of Jewish ethnicity were part of those early immigrants but being Jewish was not a prerequisite to emigrate from the USSR. That will change for the third and last wave of Soviet immigration. The situation within the USSR from the late 1920s till early 1970 resembled a closed box that was hard to penetrate from the outside or escape from the inside. Soviet people had virtually no freedom to travel or even obtain permission to leave the country. On those rare occasions when they submitted a request to go abroad as tourists they were supposed to go through an endless application process and numerous communist party and KGB committees. Being Jewish or having a Jewish relative, having had parents or grandparents in a Nazi camp or just living in the Nazi-occupied territory during the WWII would deny the person permission to travel. Not being a member of the communist party or having had contact with anyone in the West most likely would make him unreliable in the eyes of the Soviet authorities and preclude him from getting a tourist visa. For ordinary Russian people the very thought of immigration was inconceivable. People who openly showed their dislike of the communist regime could easily end up in a mental institution. According to Soviet propaganda, a sane person would never want to leave the ‘‘best’’ country in the world. Yet, in the early 1970s and then in the late 1980–early 1990s more than a million Russians emigrated. That was the third and last wave of Soviet immigration. In order for us to understand the legal mechanism behind the third wave immigration and the reason why it was predominantly Jewish we need to get a closer look at who those people were and why and how they left the USSR during those years. 1.1. Who were they? The third wave of immigration usually dates back to the early 1970s when Brezhnev’s administration eased emigration restrictions for Jews. In 1948

1.2.

Why did they leave?

7

the state of Israel was founded and the Law of Return was adopted. According to this law, all Jews who can prove their Jewish origin (i.e., having a Jewish mother), have a right to return to their homeland of Israel. That was the exit door from the USSR. In case of inter-ethnic marriages, non-Jewish relatives were granted permission to emigrate as well. In the absence of any other legitimate way to leave the country, Jewish immigration represented almost an exclusive channel through which people could escape in those years. The Soviet totalitarian system secured the borders to such an extent that occasional marriages to foreigners, non-return while on a trip abroad or any other imaginable ways to escape were close to impossible. Thus the third wave of Russian immigration was predominantly Jewish with a certain injection of non-Jewish family members. Many Soviet Jews were married to non-Jews. The recent cohorts show almost 70% of Soviet Jews were married to non-Jews (Tolts 2003). To many people in West Europe and the US it remains unclear why Russian Jews represent a separate ethnic rather than a religious group. The latter was pointed out by Andrews (1998) and Remenninck (2007) in the most recent comprehensive publication on Jewish immigration. Indeed, one has to understand the bizarre, to say the least, system where people were given their formal identity at birth and had to carry their own ‘‘Yellow Star’’ for the rest of their lives. Judaism was considered an ethnicity/nationality and Jews were ostracized as the most persecuted group in Soviet Russia. We will be coming back to this in the following chapters.

1.2. Why did they leave? The question of why Russian Jews wanted to emigrate is essential for understanding many issues discussed later in the book. Throughout the entire post-revolutionary history of the USSR, Russian Jews represented the most intellectually influential and politically persecuted group. From the infamous pogroms at the turn of the 20th century to Stalin’s purges in the 1930s and later in the 1950s, from anti-Semitism at the o‰cial level to pure anti-Jewish hatred at the domestic level, many Russian Jews had lived with mixed feelings of loving the country, hating their fate, and fearing for the future of their children. In the Russian Empire Jews were not allowed to live in major Russian cities. This led to numerous Jewish settlements, predominantly in the south, i.e., Byelorussia and Ukraine. Jews were precluded from getting into universities or attaining certain professions. Many leaders of the communist revolution were, in fact,

8

Russian immigration: The third wave

Jews who sincerely believed in creating a new life for the country and themselves. In 1934 Stalin made a decision that was supposed to solve the Jewish issue in the USSR: an autonomous Jewish Republic was created in Siberia along the Chinese border. Just a few thousand Jews decided to relocate there. Altogether that was a failed attempt to solve the Jewish problem in the USSR. After the communist revolution Jews were allowed to move into major cities. Getting into a university was now o‰cially open to Jews but the Soviets had a hidden quota for certain minorities, including the Jewish population, which made it hard, if not impossible in some cases, for Russian Jews to get opportunities equal to those of ethnic Russians. Landing a better job, getting a postgraduate degree, or making it to the top echelons of the political leadership was either extremely di‰cult or altogether impossible. Being married to a Jew would automatically place a non-Jewish spouse in the same category. Nevertheless it remained clear to anyone in the USSR that Jews represented one of the most educated and professionally successful groups known as intelligentsia, a social class that is historically unique to Russia. Yet the open and hidden antiSemitism, fear of a new wave of pogroms, and uncertainty about the economic and political future of the country were troubling thoughts for Russian Jews. Also many were unwilling to stay in the communist country when there were other alternatives available. Some Jews were driven by Zionist feelings to return once and forever to the land that they could claim as theirs. All this made thousands of Russian Jews take an often uneasy step in applying for emigration from the USSR. Soviet Jews were one of a few ethnic groups that could use a legitimate reason to leave the country which was justified in the eyes of the Soviet authorities. Many Russians, burdened with economic hardships, lack of basic freedoms, and deprived of an opportunity to escape the much-hated regime, were looking at the third wave of emigration with a heavy mix of envy, sadness, and deeply rooted anti-Semitism. This can be illustrated through a joke of the 1980s: ‘‘Jews screwed up the country by organizing the communist revolution and now they are leaving while we have to sort out all this mess. . . .’’ In addition to purely political reasons, many people of the third wave were driven out of the collapsing USSR by economic forces. With the fall of the USSR and the subsequent transition to a free market economy came hyperinflation and a series of political and economic crises in the 1990s, culminating in the financial crash of 1998. By mid-1993 between 39% and 49% of Russians were living below the poverty line. This instability and bleak outcome prompted a large new

1.3.

How did they leave?

9

wave of both political and economic emigration from Russia. A notable part of the 1991–2001 immigration wave consisted of scientists and engineers, who, faced with extremely poor job market at home, left to pursue their careers abroad, which created a strong brain drain e¤ect for Russia. According to the National Science Foundation there were 20,000 Russian scientists working in the United States in 2003 and Russian software engineers were responsible for 30% of Microsoft’s products in 2002 (Wikipedia 2008).

1.3. How did they leave? As mentioned above, the o‰cial reason for Russian Jews to emigrate was to claim their wish to return to their own land, that is, Israel. In May 1947 Soviet leaders made a statement supporting the right of Jews in Palestine to have their own state. A year later the state of Israel o‰cially was founded. The Law of Return became an o‰cial institution allowing Jews scattered all over the world to return to their newly formed homeland. However, despite their initial support of creating the state of Israel, the Soviet leaders did not plan on taking any steps in accepting the immigration rights of their own Jews. Moreover, the diplomatic relations between the two countries went through ups and downs for two decades after the foundation of the Israeli state and diplomatic ties were severed in 1967 after the Six Day War. Subsequently, the Dutch Embassy in Moscow represented an Israeli o‰ce until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. During the Soviet times, Jewish emigration from the USSR was almost nonexistent due to deliberate Soviet measures to prevent such a ‘‘shameful’’ event from taking place. After all, who would ever want to leave such an exemplary state as the USSR? The Soviets did not want the world to see thousands of people willing to flee the country, nor did they want to lose the enormous amount of brain power represented by the Jewish population. According to Glad (1999: 375), only 19 persons were permitted to immigrate to Israel in late 1950s, and about 3000 Soviet Jews arrived in Israel between 1951 and 1970 (Chiswick 1997: 235). There was a quite limited and very temporary reprieve for Jewish emigration from the USSR in the 1970s but then the door successfully closed until the mid-to-late 1980s. One has to understand that whatever statistics on the actual volume of Soviet immigration are cited in various publications, they may not be reflective of the actual number of people who applied for an exit visa. The risk of not getting permission was high and

10

Russian immigration: The third wave

the consequences of being denied immigration were exceptionally grave. People who were refused a visa were called ‘‘refusniks,’’ and their fate was extremely unfortunate. Upon being refused immigration, most people would lose their jobs without a possibility of getting any decent position in the future. In order to survive, many had to take up unqualified jobs like working night shifts, guarding stores and warehouses, loading goods at train stations or cleaning o‰ces. But the consequences of getting a refusal were not limited to a fall on the social ladder. There were much more serious outcomes. Refusniks became an extremely vulnerable group and were susceptible to all sorts of Soviet persecutions starting with eavesdropping on their phone conversations, watching their contacts, and ending with simply putting them in jail or a mental institution. Soviet authorities were always on guard when matters involved people of Jewish background. They took all possible measures to prevent them from getting too high in their professional standing or exercising the relatively limited freedoms that ethnic Russians still had. Some prominent Soviet Jews became known as ‘‘prisoners of Zion’’ and their active role in seeking human rights for Jews in the USSR can be compared with that of civil rights activists in the US. Thus people were rightly cautious about initiating the whole process of emigration. The stakes involved were very high: the chance of being denied a visa was significant and the prospect of continuing your life as a ‘‘refusnik’’ in the Soviet State was grim. However, in the mid-to-late 1980s and especially after the collapse of the USSR the situation with immigration relatively eased. That was the time of massive immigration from the USSR, which also is known as the third wave. More than a million Russian Jews have settled in Israel since then, thousands came to the US and later, thousands found a new home in Germany. However, the path of immigration was not easy or straightforward during those years. In order to understand better the content of this book it is essential to understand how and why Russian people came to a certain country where they eventually settled. Many people in the West have an oversimplified view of how the immigrants choose a host country as well as how they technically get admitted there. The flow of Soviet immigration in 1970s–1980s worked like this: Soviet Jews could apply for an exit visa after they got an o‰cial invitation from a relative or one who was presumably a relative in Israel. Since the o‰cial destination for all Jews allegedly was Israel the potential immigrants had to show their intention of going to their newly acquired native land. After the application was submitted the potential immigrant had to go through a nerve-wracking waiting period. If the permission to emigrate was

1.3.

How did they leave?

11

granted the next step for immigrants was to have their Soviet passports revoked. That was the condition under which a person could leave the country. People could not emigrate from the USSR while still carrying the red hammer and sickle Soviet passport. This process involved a substantial fee paid by the immigrant. Without any document identifying them as belonging to a country or group, people had to wait till the day of their immigration with only an exit visa on their hands – the only documented proof that they still existed. The next step was to collect their personal belongings bearing in mind that they could not take more that $100 per person in cash and a few pieces of jewelry. Frisking at the security post, taking diapers o¤ the babies or having women go through a gynecological examination guaranteed that no ‘‘national treasures’’ ever would be taken out of the country, neither in luggage nor in bodily orifices. ‘‘Treasures’’ included old photographs (meaning that people could not keep the memory of their ancestry through those pictures), books (anything published before 1956), coins, silverware and any old things that were passed from generation to generation in their family. Ironically, almost 20 years after the fall of the USSR most of those rules still remain in e¤ect. The transit post for Russian immigrants was Vienna. In Vienna they were met by the representatives of two Jewish organizations: SOHNUT (Israel) and HIASS (US). Immigrants were encouraged to continue on to Israel but if they showed no interest in returning to their ‘‘historical motherland,’’ as it was called by Russian Jews, they were automatically referred to HIASS for further assistance with relocation to the US. The process of getting all the documents necessary for entering the US was lengthy; sometimes it took a waiting period of up to 6–8 months. Italy (Ostia, outside of Rome) provided another transit post for those immigrants who were getting a visa to the US. Large masses of Russian immigrants applied for settling in the US while the number of applicants for immigration to Israel was much smaller and often less enthusiastic. We have to understand that Russian Jewry has been well acculturated and assimilated into Russian society. Many did not speak Yiddish or observe any Jewish holidays. They did not share the Zionist feelings of the forefathers who fought for the creation of the Jewish state, nor were they willing to go to a country where the culture, climate, national security, and economic development were not as appealing as those in the US. Also, many Russian Jews had non-Jewish spouses, which further complicated the situation and in most cases led them to decide against Israel. Of Russian Jews asked in 1981 whether they would emigrate if they could go

12

Russian immigration: The third wave

only to Israel, just 18.7% said yes (Glad 1999: 411). In 1989 alone 12,900 Russians came to Israel while 3 times more Russian Jews chose the US as their final destination, i.e., 39,600 (Paltiel et al. 1997: 288). The Israeli government did not like the way the Jewish exodus from the USSR was taking place. Clearly, the young Israeli state situated in the midst of the hostile Arab world and constantly engaged in military conflicts needed more people to strengthen its population. For years the Israeli leaders had been trying to negotiate with the US government to divert the immigration from the USSR to Israel by closing the American door to Jewish immigration. In 1982 the Israeli Cabinet pressed the US administration to deny refugee status to Soviet Jews in the US. The American side rejected the proposal but later, under pressure from a strong Jewish lobby, a compromise was reached: a quota of 50,000 immigrants per year was established. This measure seemed not to be enough to the Israeli government and after a few additional attempts to change the immigration pattern, US president George H. Bush gave in. An agreement was reached that only those immigrants who have direct family members in the US could qualify for immigrant status in the US. The rest were supposed to go to Israel. The transit posts in Vienna and Italy were closed and by early 1990 Israel became the only port open to Soviet Jews. Many people who were either in the process of getting exit documents or were planning to apply panicked. They were facing a hard choice of either staying in the country with a crumbling economy, increasing instability and rising anti-Semitism or taking a chance and leaving for Israel. In other words, to many immigrants of the 1990s Israel was not a free choice but rather a place that was perceived as better than the USSR or as a temporary stop on the way to the US. This book explores social, anthropological and linguistic issues in Russian immigrants pertinent to three major countries that gave shelter to Russian immigrants, i.e., Israel, the US, and Germany. Therefore we will look briefly at the way immigration to those three countries was taking place. For a broader sociological and socio-ethnographic take on the immigration/integration of Russian Jews, I would refer the reader to the recent comprehensive publication by Remennick (2007).

1.4. Israel In 1990 Jewish emigration from the USSR reached its peak: 213,042, with 181,759 coming directly to Israel (Glad 1999: 375). By 1995 over a million

1.4.

Israel

13

Russian immigrants had settled in Israel. Upon their arrival at the BenGurion airport in Tel-Aviv all newcomers automatically become Israeli citizens. I will remind the reader that all Russian immigrants before the collapse of the USSR and right after it had to have their Soviet citizenship revoked. Israel was the only country that unconditionally recognized the immigrant as a citizen, without the five-year waiting period required in the United States. That was one of the fundamental di¤erences between immigration to Israel and immigration to the US and Germany. Psychologically, it was a comforting thought that one could quickly acquire an o‰cial document in exchange for an exit visa from the USSR. To some immigrants the Israeli passport served as a sign of acquiring a sense of home after a somewhat ‘‘homeless’’ journey from the USSR. Russian immigrants of later years could retain their Russian citizenship and most of them maintained dual citizenship. Given the small size of the country, this huge influx of Russian immigrants made itself clearly visible. In Haifa, the third largest city in Israel, every third person is a Russian speaker. Some cities have a much denser Russian population. The chances of dialing a wrong number and having a Russian speaker answering the phone are high. Nowadays a traveler coming to Israel easily can see signs of the massive Russian presence in every aspect of Israeli life: Russian-language newspapers and TV channels; Russian delis, video and book stores; Russian schools and kindergartens; Russian beauty salons and travel agencies; the Russian language spoken in the streets of Israeli cities and on university campuses. Back in 1990, such long-anticipated and initially welcomed arrival of new immigrants was a mixed blessing for the State of Israel. The country based on immigration and which had strong mechanisms for absorbing and integrating newcomers was not prepared for the enormity of the recent immigration from the USSR. A poll conducted in 1990 showed that 60% of Russian immigrants were unemployed (Glad 1999: 412). Understandably, Israel could not accommodate professionally a huge number of musicians and doctors: music and medicine were among traditional Jewish professions in Russia. In addition to the pure lack of decent housing and adequate jobs for the new immigrants, Israeli society did not expect the new aliya (Hebrew for ‘‘accent to Israel’’) to be so large, so ‘‘un-Jewish’’, in their view, and so ungrateful to be in Israel. Neither did Israelis expect that the new immigration would bring so many Gentile family members. Indeed, most Russian Jews of that third wave were not driven to Israel by any strong Zionist feelings. Rather, for many of them Israel was the only route of

14

Russian immigration: The third wave

escape from the USSR. It was not a matter of where they came to, it was more about what they fled. The economic hardships, the necessary downgrading in social and professional standing and pure cultural di¤erences further complicated the initial disconnect between the host society and the new immigrant population. I should mention that in all previous waves of immigration, Israeli society expected the newcomers to quickly ‘‘absorb,’’ that is, to acquire a new language and make it the main linguistic domain of communication with children, to adopt new cultural values, and quickly to dissociate themselves from their past. Russian immigrants were not in a hurry to give up their cultural and linguistic heritage. Some scholars (Siegel 1998: xxi) called for reconsideration of the word ‘‘klita’’ (absorption) that is essential to the principles on which the country was created, rightly pointing out that more than a million people cannot be absorbed by a small country such as Israel. In any immigrant based society there is an element of alienation experienced by the previous large groups with the same ethnic background or those who came in big numbers before the current immigration (see Erdmans 1995). Not surprisingly, every new wave of immigrants in Israel is greeted with a degree of scorn by those who came to Israel before (‘‘vatikim,’’ old timers). The Russian immigration was not an exception. When the Russian migrants of the last wave came to Israel they were confronted by two earlier groups, i.e., those who came from Russia in the 1970s and the large group of Moroccans. To Russian oldtimers who aspired to Zionist feelings, Russians of the 1990s wave were viewed as people who came for economic reasons and had little appreciation of their newly found land. On the other hand, to the Moroccan aliya that came before the Russians and who had been viewed by Jews of the European descent (Ashkinazi) as inferior lower class Sephardi (people of Arab Jewish origin), the arrival of the large group of newcomers provided a chance to place themselves, at least temporarily, at the top of the hierarchy. Many Moroccan immigrants happily would brag about having a Russian college educated woman working as a maid in their house while the mainstream Israeli newspapers published ‘‘touching’’ stories about Russian professors literally sweeping the streets. Di‰culties in successfully absorbing large numbers of immigrants became evident in the early 1990s. The wave of immigration visibly decreased and later virtually stopped. Throughout the 1990s remaining family members were still coming to Israel. There was a growing discomfort among people of mixed descent (e.g., those with a Jewish father and without the Jewish mother required by Jewish law) or non-Jewish spouses,

1.5.

United States

15

as they were not recognized as equal citizens in Israel. The latter served as a strong incentive for many Jews still remaining in Russia not to choose Israel as their host country. However, the raging ethnic conflicts in the disintegrated former Soviet Union and worsened economic conditions after the collapse made the Israeli instability and economic hardships look less grave to those immigrants who literally were running for lives. Yet, after the peak in the early 1990s the immigration flow to Israel was relatively small. Within the first few years of immigration a number of immigrants either returned to Russia or tried to move on to other countries, including the United States. However, the latter was not as easy to achieve as it may have looked from Russia: being an Israeli citizen did not grant you permission to apply for immigrant status in the US or later in Germany. The actual number of people who left Israel after immigration is not available. People did not announce their intentions of not returning so as to avoid the repayment of the subsidy that all new immigrants receive from the Israeli government. Regardless of all the initial hardships of settling in Israel and the cultural di¤erences that many still find di‰cult to embrace, the one-time biggest immigrant group, Russian Jews, have managed to find their place in the vibrant Israeli society.

1.5. United States In the last two-to-three decades, Russian immigration to the United States has not been as massive as it was to Israel. The US immigration laws are stricter than they are in Israel and they have become even more restrictive after the 1989 agreement between the US and Israel that the former would close its door to Soviet immigrants. Technically, only direct relatives of an American citizen can claim their right to immigrate. However, in addition to this channel, the US has a quota on immigration for di¤erent countries, which means that people can draw a lucky lottery ticket and get permission for permanent residency (known as the Green Card). Also, immigration based on employment and marriage criteria is present in the United States. Thus, Russian immigration to the US, the way it was shaped in the last two decades of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century, is not necessarily Jewish immigration as it was in the 1970s. However, the major source of current immigration in the US remains Jewish. In the 1970s 38,961 immigrants from the USSR settled in the United States. The number was much higher in the next decade when 186,252 Russian immigrants arrived between 1981 and 1993 (Chiswick

16

Russian immigration: The third wave

1997: 235). However, it is clear that even the combined number of immigrants to the US from the 1970s and 1980–1990s does not come close to over million immigrants who claimed Israel as their host country. Neither does the grand size of the United States make the Russian population as visible as in Israel. It is worth noting that according to recent information from the US Census Bureau, the Russian language is among the five most spoken foreign languages in the US. The biggest Russian community in the US was established in New York City’s borough of Brooklyn with the main street of Brighton Beach. The place also has become known as Little Odessa. Other major American cities that hosted Russian immigrants included Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia, Miami, San Francisco, Washington, DC, Los Angeles, Boston, the New Jersey area, and Houston. New York has attracted the majority of Russians (a quarter of the million from the second and third waves had settled there by the mid-1990s). The undeniable advantages of a big cultural center, its intrinsic immigrants’ vibe, its big Jewish presence and a large Russian community established there in the 1970s have become the major reasons for Russian immigrants to choose New York over other cities. However, many immigrants chose other destinations or happened to move to other American cities due to employment opportunities. Houston became one such city. After the USSR disintegrated and the relationship between the two countries was going through a warm-up stage, NASA and the Russian Space Center signed a few long-term contracts that provided a good professional opportunity for hundreds of Russian engineers and scientists. In general, Russian immigration to the US followed a much smoother path and the relatively small influx into the American mainstream did not pose a big problem for society at large. Those immigrants who came with a refugee status received decent financial and educational aid, while those who were qualified for immigrant status were granted legal status and employment opportunities. The major di¤erence between the immigration in Israel (and later, Germany), and the US is that the American system does not downgrade the immigrant’s employment standing based on the educational/professional qualifications that people bring with them into a new country. The specialist who proves to be competitive on the US employment market does not need to go through lengthy certification and re-qualification processes, as is required in the other two countries (see Remennick 2007). Most immigrants are eligible for US citizenship 5 years after their arrival as refugees/immigrants or 3 years after they join

1.6.

Germany

17

their American spouse. On the whole, Americans are very tolerant of immigrants. Also, Russian immigration in the US has not reached the critical mass that could have led to adverse attitudes from the majority of the non-immigrant population.

1.6. Germany At the time of massive immigration from the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s Israel and the USA remained the only o‰cial ports of call open to the Soviet people. After the major influx of immigrants to both countries practically stopped at the end of two decades there was a belief that those Russian Jews who intended to emigrate had already done so. Indeed, the collapse of the USSR and the high hopes for a better political and economic future that were boosted by Yeltsin’s victory during the military coup in 1991 encouraged many people to embrace the volatile, yet exciting, situation in Russia. However, the euphoria of those first months and years after the collapse did not last long. Russia steadily was descending into the darkest times of its economic turmoil, criminal lawlessness, and ethnic conflicts. People were not getting their paychecks for months, the stores were empty, criminals ruled the streets and markets, and the government could not satisfy the basic needs of its people or secure their safety. On the wake of those turbulent times and as a result of its own attempt to redefine itself Germany opened its door to immigration from Russia. Two groups of population became eligible for immigration: Jews and ethnic Germans. The latter obtained legal rights for immigration to Germany much earlier and deserves a separate study outside the scope of this book. To many people, both in Russia and in Europe, it remained unclear, first, why Germany allowed a massive Jewish immigration from the former USSR and, second, why Jews would go to Germany given the atrocities of the Holocaust still vivid in their collective memory. To answer the first question we need to go back in history to the pre-WWII time. Germany had a thriving Jewish community of 500,000 before the war and could account for only 15,000 Jews after the war (Remennick 2007). Many fled the country while the Nazis were gaining power, were exterminated in the concentration camps, or emigrated to Palestine right after the war. Over the next few decades Germany as a nation was going through a painful process of suppressing the terrible memories of the past, reliving the horror of those events and trying to reconcile the collective guilt passed on to the

18

Russian immigration: The third wave

younger generation of Germans. As a result, there were strong voices on the political scene calling for bringing back the Jewish community that was virtually destroyed in the second half of the 20th century. This move translated into an agreement reached between German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Heinz Galinski, the head of the Central Jewish Council in Germany. The agreement stated that Russian Jews could claim their right to immigrate to Germany. I will reiterate that in 1990 the largest wave of immigrants was still moving towards Israel and it would take a few years before Russian immigrants became disillusioned about Israel as the ultimate destination. The Israeli government openly was displeased that Germany made its country easily available for Jews to immigrate, just as they had been negative about open immigration to the US in the 1980s. In their view, no Jew should be viewed as a refugee and granted the status thereof as long as the State of Israel exists. However, Israel could do little to prevent Russian Jews from choosing a country to which to go. What kept many Russian Jews from immigrating to Germany was a strong sense of negativity in the general attitude of Russian Jews towards Germany. However, the situation quickly changed and about 37,000 Russian immigrants went to Germany between 1991 and 1996 (Glad 1999: 416). Part of the reason was that the economic and political situation in Russia had deteriorated to such an extent that people who had not considered immigration a few years before were ready to make the major move of their life. The information coming from Germany was encouraging as well. Financial support given by the German government was more generous than in Israel, the cultural and climate aspects of the country were more appealing, and the immigrants’ children were not facing mandatory military service the way they would in Israel. All those incentives were strong enough and in the absence of a better choice, many Russian Jews still remaining in the former USSR seriously considered Germany as a gateway to their new life. Most immigrants embraced Germany and found the economic comfort provided by the government hard to resist. When asked whether they would advise their friends and relatives to come to the country, 78% of those in Germany said yes and only 17% in Israel gave the same answer (Glad 1999: 417). However, the strong financial support available in Germany also has defined the population category that immigrated there. Many were elderly people or people approaching the retirement age. With little or no time left for professional self-fulfillment these people were seeking an economically stable environment where they could spend their

1.6.

Germany

19

golden years. Some left their grown-up children back in Russia or had them go to Israel or the US. This has shaped the immigration profile in Germany. As mentioned above, the German social system provides much support to the newcomers but also creates numerous hurdles in the way of their professional success. We have to remember that Germany has to handle numerous internal problems caused by the process of reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the integration of ethnic Germans from other countries as well as a large group of Turkish immigrants. Also, the employment market is not as big as in the US and the economic problems of the last decade, such as unemployment, started showing first in Europe before they hit the US market. Thus, realization of professional potential is often an arduous task for a new immigrant. Specialists need to go through certification and re-qualification processes in order to compete with their German counterparts. All these problems adversely a¤ect individuals who are ambitious and professionally driven. In the last decade Russian Jewish immigration to Germany almost stopped: there were strict regulations introduced by the German government and there were not many people in Russia who would still consider immigration to Germany. The economic situation in Russia had much improved over the years of Putin’s rule, the rise of nationalism had helped Russians in regaining pride in their country and belief in its better future, and anti-Semitism had disappeared, at least, from the o‰cial scene of life. All this gradually has stopped the second biggest exodus from the USSR. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century safely we can say that the Russian population has somewhat stabilized in their migration intentions and existence in their respective spaces in the main land, that is Russia, and in three largest countries of the Diaspora, i.e., Israel, the US, and Germany.

Chapter 2 Theoretical framework and methodology Introduction The present study looks at transformational processes occurring in three domains, cultural perception, self-identification, and first language retention, which are central to any immigrant group regardless of their linguistic or cultural background. The research questions that I pursue in this work relate to the above three components of the immigrants’ acculturation process. First, we need to understand how immigrants perceive the host culture and society and the way they reconstruct the ‘‘cultural other.’’ Even in a case where the person migrates between two countries with a linguistic and cultural background often viewed as similar (e.g., the US and Canada), he may experience cultural shock and go through a di‰cult period of adaptation. The change in the immigrants’ perception of the new culture or the persistent reluctance to accept the di¤erences between the native culture and the new one may a¤ect the acculturation process and the ultimate success of the person’s integration into the receptive society. Many immigrants tend to stay within the closed boundaries of their own communities; however, the reasons behind such isolationism rarely are analyzed. This topic usually is explored within the realm of sociology, psychology, and anthropology. Second, the life-changing phenomenon of immigration inevitably leads to certain uprootedness. Indeed, the person is removed from the familiar setting of his native country which may have stigmatized his ethnic group (such as Jews in Russia) or where, on the contrary, he felt like part of the majority (such as ethnic Russians in Russia). In this work, I particularly am interested in identity transformation among Soviet immigrants of Jewish and Russian ethnicity and I look at this transformation through the prism of three di¤erent countries. Moreover, the identity transformation is studied from a few angles, i.e., the individual’s self-identification as it is presented to others, the shift from the ‘‘o‰cial identity’’ specified on the Soviet passport, the immigrant’s internal perception of his ‘‘self ’’ and the ultimate sense of home and belonging. The study of identity transformation usually falls into the fields of sociology, cross-cultural psychology, and socio-linguistics.

2.1.

Acculturation Theory

21

Third, through the process of adaptation to the new country and the extensive exposure to the new language, immigrants are susceptible to experiencing first language transformation. Language change, like a change in cultural perception and identity negotiation, is a dynamic process that should be viewed as the immigrant’s progression from a point ‘‘A’’ to a point ‘‘B’’ in his life journey rather than as a flaw in his linguistic performance. Sociolinguists and psycholinguists usually look into the issue of non-pathological first language change. This study takes the sociolinguistic stand on first language change and explores the attitude toward language maintenance among the three groups of participants. Not only do I attempt to include language change as a major component in this work, I will use linguistic measures in the analyses of cultural adaptation and identity transformation in order to shed additional light on the above topics. In sum, we have three key elements, i.e., culture, identity, and language, which this book sets out to explore in three sample groups of Russian immigrants residing in di¤erent host cultures. It is clear that in order to find the right approach to analyzing the above issues we have to look for a broad interdisciplinary framework or, at least, find a framework that is capable of stretching its boundaries to incorporate new elements. Crosscultural psychology o¤ers such a framework, the Acculturation Theory. In this research I am adopting the acculturation framework that goes back to the original acculturation theory.

2.1. Acculturation Theory Throughout the 20th century social scientists looked into the processes accompanying the adaptation of new immigrants to their host country, predominantly newcomers to America. The best known research on immigrants’ adaptation that goes back to the early 20th century usually is associated with an outstanding sociologist and one of the ‘‘melting pot’’ theorists of his time, Robert Park (Padilla and Perez 2003). His threestage model – contact, accommodation, and assimilation – illustrated the process of the immigrant’s adjustment to the new country following immigration. The process was viewed as progressive and irreversible. Two decades later another group of social scientists, anthropologists (Redfield et al. 1936), joined the ranks of scholars looking into the phenomenon of assimilation. Having expanded Park’s model they built a

22

Theoretical framework and methodology

new construct, acculturation, in order to elaborate on what was earlier known as accommodation. Their definition of acculturation is as follows: Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having di¤erent cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups. . . . Under this definition acculturation is to be distinguished from culture change, of which it is but one aspect, and assimilation, which is at times a phase of acculturation. It is also to be di¤erentiated from di¤usion, which while occurring in all instances of acculturation, is not only a phenomenon which frequently takes place without the occurrence of the types of contact between peoples specified in the definition above, but also constitutes only one aspect of the process of acculturation. (Redfield et al. 1936: 149–152, as cited in Berry 1990)

The most important contribution of those scholars to our understanding of the acculturation process was that they showed the possibility of one or both cultures exhibiting a change in their patterns due to prolonged contact. It took another 20 years before scientists representing the Social Science Research Council added an important psychological element to the theory of acculturation. But it was not until Teske and Nelson (1974) that the acculturation approach acquired a complete psychological perspective. Cross-cultural psychologists look at the acculturation phenomenon from a di¤erent angle by focusing on the individual as well as the group that undergo changes in material traits, behavior patterns, norms, and values due to contact with the host culture. However, the most wellknown model of acculturation framework was developed by Berry (1980). He further expanded on the acculturation construct by identifying four possible directions the adaptation process can take, i.e., assimilation, integration, rejection, and deculturation. In his later work, Berry (1990) labels the latter two outcomes slightly di¤erently, calling them separation and marginalization. In addition to exemplifying each of those outcomes he lays out a straightforward model whose cornerstone is continuous contact between the two cultures. First, we will look at the model as Berry proposed it and then I will show how it will be adjusted to the present research. 2.1.1. Acculturation framework (Berry 1990) Berry’s model of acculturation can be viewed as multi-dimensional.

2.1.

Acculturation Theory

23

Figure 2.1. Berry’s model (1990)1

Two key elements, the population and the individual level, are located horizontally, while the vertical level represents the major elements of the acculturation process: antecedents, processes and consequences. The distinction between the population and individual level is essential for studies in cross-cultural psychology and this is one of the central di¤erences between anthropological and psychological studies on acculturation. Going back to Berry’s model, we can see that each of the horizontal and vertical sub-components expands into additional elements. For example, antecedents involve internal, external, and traditional; the process applies to cultural change, acculturation itself, and psychological acculturation; and consequences can be at the societal or individual level. By the same token, external antecedents and changes at the cultural/societal level may influence the psychological acculturation of the individual. As complex as it may sound, the model makes much sense when we take a hypothetical example to illustrate it. This is how Berry demonstrates the work of his model:

1. Copyright permission to reproduce the model is obtained from John Berry.

24

Theoretical framework and methodology . . . we may take first an immigrant moving to set up a new life in another country; this would be an example of acculturation, since external culture contact is involved, followed by both cultural and individual changes. First, the decision to emigrate is often based upon some prior contact, knowledge, and influence. Perhaps, other individuals, even members of one’s own family have already settled in the new country, and this has led to some changes in one’s home culture. Perhaps the foreign language is being taught in the schools, new industries are being established, and the mass media are showing the way of life in the new country. On immigration to the new country, there can be some dramatic and sometimes overwhelming contact experiences followed by psychological reactions: di¤erences in climate, language, work habits, religion and dress, for example, can all challenge the immigrant, and some response is required. These cultural di¤erences may be accepted, interpreted, or denied, and the individual may ride with them or be run over by them. (Berry 1990: 205)

The Acculturation Theory and the Model derived thereof have sustained much criticism in the recent years. Critics point to the methodological weaknesses such as the use of questionnaires and self-evaluations, the unreliability of numerical scales, and the oversimplification of the very terminology used by scholars within these inter-group approaches (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004). Massive interest in the recently emerged poststructuralism approach in social sciences further has turned scholars away from socio-psychological methods in the study of acculturation. Being fully aware of the limitations of the proposed framework I nevertheless o¤er it as the most visually representative model that is capable of incorporating all three entities within the scope of this research, i.e., language, culture, and identity. In this work, the proposed framework will serve to illustrate and outline the observed changes rather than draw any causal links or search for global answers. In addition, I base my research on a belief that the nature of all three entities in question as well as any change observed in my corpus is dynamic in nature. Therefore the framework will help us see the change at the point of time registered in the data while leaving open the possibility of new developments in the future. I will bring in ethnographic, sociological, socio-linguistic, and psycholinguistic perspectives to the study of Russian immigration within the Acculturation Framework. I also should acknowledge that the focus of my analysis is on the individual level and the relatively small size of the groups does not allow us to study the Russian population in Diaspora in general. To illustrate this point through the model I suggest the following reinterpretation of Berry’s example cited above. If we represent the above example schematically and

2.1.

Acculturation Theory

25

stay at the individual rather than the population level as may be seen in the above model, we can say that the reasons that motivated the person to leave his native land fall into internal antecedents. Here we may look into the actual reasons for immigration as well as the societal pressures that probably were exerted on the individual in his decision-making process. The person’s awareness of another country’s culture as well as his perception of that culture prior to immigration may be of interest here. Also, the inherent features of the native culture must be studied in order to see what cultural di‰culties the immigrant is likely to experience in the host country. The external antecedent is immigration itself and the subsequent ongoing contact with the host culture. Here we can look at those critical cultural and social elements that may be drastically di¤erent from the native culture and analyze the person’s adaptation to the new culture and society while keeping those di¤erences in mind. As Berry points out, the contact may produce a cultural shock followed by a psychological reaction on the immigrant’s part. This process will be called psychological acculturation. The produced change in the individual’s perception of the host country, the view formed about the ‘‘cultural other’’, self-perception and self-identification and attitude toward language maintenance in immigration are viewed as the change itself or ‘‘changed psychological characteristics of individual,’’ according to Berry’s model. The model makes a point of di¤erentiating the process (acculturation), dynamic in its nature, from the state (changed characteristics). In the next section we will look at how this model can be adopted to studying the complexity and interconnection of three key elements central to immigration: culture, identity, and language. Then we will look at those variables and analyses that Berry proposes and see how those can be adopted by this study. 2.1.2. Acculturation framework: Adapted As I mentioned earlier, the relatively small size of the immigrant groups in this study does not allow us to make any far-reaching conclusions about the almost two million Russian immigrants of the third wave residing all over the world. However, it is su‰ciently large enough to give us insight into what immigration is like for people from the former USSR in three major recipient countries. Therefore I will be focusing on the individual level of the Acculturation Framework and will attempt to incorporate all three key elements of the study: culture, identity, and language. Having cut o¤ the population layer in the model we can adjust it as follows (Figure 2.2):

26

Theoretical framework and methodology

Figure 2.2. Acculturation framework: Adapted

Clearly, the model looks simplified and slightly changed compared with the original version. It can be interpreted as follows. 2.1.3. Antecedents All the participants in this study made a decision to emigrate and did emigrate at some point in the last few decades. We have to focus on the internal antecedents here in order to see what drove them out of their native land (Russia). For example, what was the political and economic situation in the individual’s native country at the time of immigration (anti-Semitism, the economic crash of the 1990s, the collapse of the USSR, etc.)? Was immigration to the host country a desired choice or a forced alternative? Did the individual retain the citizenship of his native country or was he forced to give it up upon immigration? The latter may result in faster alienation from the country of birth and, consequently, unhealed wounds created thereby. It is crucial to this study to see how the individual felt about his ‘‘self ’’ while living in Russia. Conversely, his o‰cial identification and self-identification from those times are important to understand. Also we have to look at the essential di¤erences between the Russian culture and the host culture. In this work, I will look specifically at the cross-cultural dimension widely explored by psychologists and rarely touched on by linguists: the continuum on which individualism and collectivism represent the extreme ends. We also will look into the key

2.1.

Acculturation Theory

27

lexical concepts that pertain to Russian culture and evidently are missed by the immigrants in this study. The external antecedents will be the initial and continuous firsthand contact with the host country. Here we should look at a variety of factors involved in the contact. First, it is important to know what major elements of the host country are di¤erent from the original culture. Then we need to see whether the host country provides a welcoming environment for the ethnic groups in question. Second, we need to know how long the contact lasts. In other words, we need to look into the length of emigration as an important variable. Also, we need to look into possible social factors accounting for the attitude toward foreign accents and first-language maintenance in general. Finally, we have to understand the socioeconomic situation in the host country in order to estimate positive or negative outcomes of the individual’s acculturation. As for the traditional antecedents, here we need to revisit the relevant background information of the participants, such as age, education, nationality, place of origin, et cetera. 2.1.4. Psychological acculturation Having identified the reasons why and how the person left the USSR/ Russia and having looked at the initial contact with the host country we can move on to the acculturation process or what Berry specifies as ‘‘psychological acculturation’’ in our case. In the absence of a longitudinal study and having had to rely on cross-sectional analysis we may see how the acculturation process works. A cross-sectional analysis can indeed supplement or replace the longitudinal one if the antecedents, both external and internal, have not changed. Given the volatile situation in Russia prior to the collapse of the USSR and soon thereafter as well as the changing economic and political climate in all three host countries it becomes almost impossible to conduct any quantitative analysis that would produce reliable results. Needless to say, the immigrant population changed as well, with the majority of the most determined ones leaving in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the rest picking up much later and only due to the exacerbated economic and political situation in Russia. In other words, the process of psychological acculturation becomes hard to measure quantitatively and here we will rely heavily on the qualitative analysis. Before we move on to consequences of acculturation, it is important to say that psychological acculturation a¤ects all three components involved in this study: culture, identity, and language. It is through the long,

28

Theoretical framework and methodology

dynamic, and often traumatic process of changes and transformations that we arrive at what looks like a stable state that Berry (1990) called ‘‘changed psychological characteristics of individual.’’ 2.1.5. Acculturation consequences The acculturation model as Berry described it implies three essential elements: contact, process and change. First, there needs to be contact or interaction between cultures that is continuous and firsthand; this rules out short-term accidental contact, as well as di¤usion of single cultural practices over long distances. Second, the result is some change in the cultural or psychological phenomena among the people in contact, usually continuing for generations down the line. Third, taking these two aspects together, we can distinguish between a process and a state: there is activity during and after contact that is dynamic, and there is a result of the process that may be relatively stable; this outcome may include not only changes to existing phenomena, but also some novel e¤ects generated by the process of cultural interaction. (Berry 1990: 206)

As the above citation suggests, it was crucial for Berry’s acculturation framework to distinguish between the process and consequences of acculturation and to emphasize the dynamic nature of the process and the relative stability of the consequences of acculturation. I would argue that the stability of consequences might be quite relative indeed. The consequences that we observe at a certain point in this study may not remain stable some time thereafter. In other words, when the participant reports in his questionnaire that he is reluctant to admit his Jewish identity, we may wonder whether he will feel the same way a year later. To preserve the terminology widely used and accepted by cross-cultural psychologists I still will acknowledge the fluidity of the term ‘‘state’’ that traditionally is contrasted with ‘‘process.’’ We have to agree that both process and state are dynamic in their nature. When we di¤erentiate between the two we mostly emphasize the rate and pace of change rather than maintain that one phenomenon is unchanged and stable compared with the other. Having acknowledged this, we should specify which consequences of the acculturation process could be found in this research. In terms of culture, we could see how the individual changes his perception of the foreign culture and how he perceives the ‘‘cultural other.’’ For the identity aspect, we could see how di¤erently the person feels about his ‘‘self ’’ and how his self-identification as presented to others has changed

2.1.

Acculturation Theory

29

over time. When it comes to language, we may gain a better understanding of how native language is maintained and how Russian immigrants are motivated to pass it on to the next generations. However, the three key elements of this research are intertwined tightly and a change in one component observed in the study can provide insight into the observed transformation of the other. 2.1.6. Variables If we go back to the Acculturation Model originally proposed by Berry we can see that most of the variables easily can be applied to the current research. I will list a few variables proposed by Berry (1990: 207–208) and show how each of them relates to the present study. (a) Purpose: Why is the contact taking place? This variable is important for any immigration study. We need to understand why people make such a life-changing decision and leave the comfort of their native land. (b) Length: How long has the contact been taking place? Indeed, the length of residence in the host country is an important variable in order to study all three phenomena in question. (c) Cultural qualities of the dominant group: Does the dominant group possess cultural qualities that may meet specific needs or improve the quality of life of the acculturating group? This variable easily translates into the socioeconomic situation in the recipient country and social support and job opportunities that it can o¤er the newcomers. Also, this variable applies to those cultural elements that may clash with the cultural expectations of the newcomers. (d) Cultural qualities of the minority (immigrant) group: Do certain aspects of the traditional culture a¤ect the acculturation process? Here we need to understand which crucial elements of Russian culture may be important for immigrants and what may become an obstacle in their successful integration into a society that does not place the same value on those qualities. (e) Population size: How many are there? Is the population vital (sustaining or increasing in number) or declining? The socio-demographic information on current immigration to the host country is needed in order to understand the scale of the immigration in question. (f ) Location: Is the group in its traditional location or displaced to some new environment? Although under ‘‘displacement’’ Berry means reservations or refugee camps, I took the liberty of reinterpreting this

30

Theoretical framework and methodology

parameter. In this work, we will focus on the cultural and climatic environment as a possible factor in the individual’s adaptation to the new culture. (g) Permanence: Is the newcomers’ group here to stay? In this work, we explore the question of regret that the participants might have about their immigration decision and the choice of a particular country. As we can see from the above list, most of the variables proposed by Berry easily could be applied to the present research. The major di¤erence between this research project and those that were conducted under the banner of the Acculturation Framework is in its much wider interdisciplinary approach and the goals sought through the application of the framework. My focus is not limited to cultural adaptation in this study. I look at identity transformation, which easily falls into the psychological acculturation model. Moreover, I bring in the linguistic aspect as a tool and a topic of this research. As one of the three key elements of this work, language change becomes central to the ongoing process of acculturation in immigrant groups. As a linguist, I am interested in using linguistic means and analyses that add an additional angle to the conventionality of the acculturation studies. In addition, cross-cultural studies of acculturation have moved significantly towards quantitative correlational analyses. This trend was seen both as an advantage (Berry 1990) and a flaw (Padilla and Perez 2003). I believe that the right mix of quantitative and qualitative analyses strengthens the study and allows the reader to look beyond the numbers, as informative as they may be. 2.2. Methodology Out of 214 participants in the study, 154 Russian immigrants from the former USSR provided the major data for the analyses: 50 in the USA, 52 in Israel and 52 in Germany. The additional small scale study discussed in Chapter 5 involved another 60 participants, 20 of whom were Russian immigrants in the US. The socio-demographic background of the main body of the participants is given in the next chapter. There were two sets of tasks used in the experimental design: survey questions and a semi-structured interview. The standard questionnaire used in language attrition studies was adopted to accommodate additional questions on culture and identity.2 Altogether there were 72 questions 2. The author is indebted to Dr. Monika Schmid for the original questionnaire.

2.2.

Methodology

31

representing open-ended questions, multiple-choice questions, and yes/no questions. The questions in the semi-structured interview targeted culture perception, identity transformation, and sense of belonging as well as basic issues related to immigration. There were 18 questions in the interview and the order of questions remained unchanged. The purpose of the interview was to elicit narratives on those complex issues that could be hard to understand if I were relying only on simple answers in the questionnaire. I traveled to all the places where the participants reside (i.e., Houston, TX, Columbus, OH, and the New York City area in the US; Haifa, Maalot, and Hadera in Israel; Hamburg in Germany) and interviewed each participant individually. All participants in the US and Israel were recruited through my personal contacts or the university (Technion, Israel) and through university contacts in Germany (University of Hamburg). First, the questionnaire was o¤ered. Then the interview was conducted. The interview lasted between 7 and 25 minutes depending on the individual’s willingness to elaborate on the o¤ered topics. The interviews were recorded digitally, transcribed and later de-segmented for the analyses. The questionnaires and interviews provide most of the data used in this study. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are used in this work. The analyses of the surveys provided the numerical quantifiable data while the interview excerpts o¤ered the data for the content analysis. The results of the qualitative analyses illustrate the findings registered in the surveys or stand as the main type of analysis for a particular question.

Chapter 3 ‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia: Background information on Russian immigrants ‘‘It was not a question of choice. I did not leave FOR a di¤erent place; it was all about WHERE I did not want to stay. I wanted to leave Russia and did not care where I went. . . .’’ (Excerpt from an interview with a three-time immigrant in the US)

Immigration is an extremely traumatic event that involves uprooting the person from his homeland and replanting him in foreign soil. Metaphorically speaking, it is a person’s second birth, with lingering grief for the past life and the e¤ort to make the first steps in the unknown territory of the new life. Rarely does immigration come as a result of pure wanderlust or a person’s desire to see the world. With mass immigration, such as the exodus the world has witnessed from Russia over the last two decades, the possibility of such a mundane explanation is almost inconceivable. This chapter will show the socio-demographic data on the participants and will discuss the major reasons behind immigration from the former USSR and choosing a particular country. We also will see the results of the analysis of the immigrant’s success in immigration and self-reported integration level. The findings come from the combined analyses of the survey and the interview narratives.

3.1. US Columbus, Ohio, currently is home to about 3,000 Russian immigrants. Most of the people living in the city are employed professionally. Three people from Columbus were interviewed for the study. Twenty participants came from the Houston area. Houston hosts about 30,000 Russian immigrants. The vibrant economic situation, relatively low cost of living, and the presence of a big Russian community have been attractive to Russian professionals who either came to Houston directly or later relocated due to the employment opportunities. Twenty-seven participants came from the biggest Russian community in the Big Apple. Almost half the Russian immigrants of the third wave who resettled to the US live in

3.2.

Israel

33

New York (350,000). The most popular Russian destination there is the borough of Brooklyn. The street of Brighton Beach and the surrounding area became known as Little Odessa, named after the Ukrainian city of Odessa where most of the first settlers in that wave came from. New York attracted Russians due to its economic and cultural opportunities, its huge Russian presence, and its resemblance to the European idea of the big city that many Russian immigrants find appealing. Compared with Russian participants from Columbus and Houston where the majority were highly professional people, immigrants from New York represented all walks of life, from college professors and writers to mechanics and caregivers. All participants in this group were recruited through my personal contacts.

3.2. Israel Most of the participants in the Israeli group reside in the country’s third largest city, Haifa, which is located in the northern part of Israel. Situated on Mount Carmel by the Mediterranean Sea, Haifa hosts the largest Russian community in Israel. In this study, 28 participants came from Haifa, 2 from Maloot (a small city near the Lebanon border) and 12 from the town of Hadera, located between Haifa and Tel-Aviv. As in the US group, all participants in this group were recruited through my old personal contacts or through the university network. The Israeli Institute of Technology, the Technion, hosted me as a guest researcher during my stay in Israel.

3.3. Germany All 52 participants in the German group come from the city of Hamburg. Having no personal contacts in Germany I had to rely on the help of local assistants and university colleagues in recruiting participants for this study. The University of Hamburg and its Center of Studies on Multilingualism hosted me as a guest researcher during my stay in Germany.

3.4. Socio-demographic background of the participants The following analysis was based on the socio-linguistic questionnaire that all participants had to fill out prior to the interview. The questionnaire

34

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

consisted of 72 questions and two thirds of them targeted linguistic and identity-related issues. Thus the present section looks only at the sociodemographic aspects of the immigrants’ background that are essential to understanding the major themes of this work. 3.4.1. Age Only those people who were at least 16 years old at the time of immigration and who spent no less than 10 years in the host country were qualified for participation in the study. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Russian immigration to Germany started much later in time and predominantly attracted elderly immigrants due to obvious social and economic comforts that the German society o¤ered Jewish immigrants. Table 3.1. Age Group/age (%)

1960–1969

1950–1959

1940–1949

6

26

40

24

4

Israel

11.5

26

38.5

17

6

Germany

27

26

15.4

21

11.5

US

1970–1979

1930–1939

As Table 3.1 illustrates, the elderly group in Germany was allowed to be somewhat bigger than in the two other countries (11.5% compared with 4% in the US and 6% in Israel), and in a few instances the length of residency in Germany was as low as 8 years. The age distribution across the three groups was as follows: all three groups had an equal percentage of people in their late 30s–40s (born 1960–1969) and a relatively equal number of those who were in their 60s (born 1940–1949). Both the American and the Israeli groups had the highest number of people in their late 40s–50s (born 1950–1959), 40% and 38.5%, respectively. In contrast, the German group had a smaller percentage of 50-year-olds and a much bigger group of the 30-year-olds. Again, the distribution of age across the three groups reflects the dynamics of immigration to all three countries where Israel and the US shared a similar pattern while Germany did not take in as many people who were at the peak of their professional age at the time of immigration. Those either had gone to the US and Israel at the time of the collapse of the USSR or chose to stay in Russia.

3.4.

35

Socio-demographic background of the participants

3.4.2. Sex Across all three groups there were more females than males. This can be explained by the fact that women are much easier to recruit for a study where an interview is required while men take such a request with a grain of skepticism and often are reluctant to talk about their immigration experience (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2. Sex Group/Sex (%)

Male

Female

US

36

64

Israel

42.3

57.7

Germany

38.5

61.5

3.4.3. Nationality In this book we will return to nationality as a major component in identity formation and will take a close look at how the o‰cial identity/nationality imposed by the society may form and transform the person’s view of himself (see Chapters 6 and 7). For the purposes of this brief analysis it will su‰ce to say that the question on nationality as it was listed on the Soviet passport was important in order to get a rough idea of how many people in each group were listed as Jewish at the moment of their immigration. Recall that the third wave of Soviet/Russian immigration was almost exclusively Jewish or, at least, that Jewish background was a prerequisite for the application process when the person wanted to leave the USSR.

Table 3.3. Nationality Group/Nationality (%)

Russian

Jewish

Other

US

50

46

4

Israel

14

82

4

Germany

34.6

61.5

3.8

36

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

According to the analysis of the questionnaire (Table 3.3), the US group shows slightly more Russians than Jews (50% vs. 46%), while the German group had almost twice as many Jews as Russians (61.5% and 34.6%, respectively). I need to mention here that ethnic Germans who represent another big immigrant group in Germany were excluded from this research. It is not surprising to find the overwhelming majority of Jews in the Israeli group (82%). However, I would caution the reader from drawing any conclusions from this. A closer analysis of the narratives will reveal immigrants’ attempt to disguise their non-Jewish identity in Israel (see Chapter 6). Here we rely on the person’s answer on the questionnaire without having any way of checking the reliability of those answers. Also, we need to remember that both the US and Germany took in people who moved there for professional and educational purposes. This will be elaborated on later in this chapter when we discuss the reasons why people chose one country over another. However, Israel remains almost exclusively a country of Jewish immigration. There were a few people of other nationalities (e.g., Ukrainian, Belorussian) who left the USSR as Jewish spouses. 3.4.4. Marital status As Table 3.4 illustrates, the majority of the participants in all three groups were married and had children. The higher percentage of single people for the German group (7.7% compared with 2% for the US and Israel) could be explained by the higher percentage of younger people in that group (see Table 3.1). Table 3.4. Marital status Group/status (%)

married

divorced

widowed

w/partner

single

children (yes)

US

60

14

2

4

2

92

Israel

85

5

3

2

2

96.2

Germany

67.3

3.8

5

7.7

82.7

11.5

3.4.5. Place of origin In order to make the demographic information more complete we need to look at the places of origin, i.e., the places where the participants in this study came from (Table 3.5).

3.4.

37

Socio-demographic background of the participants

Table 3.5. Place of origin Group/place

Moscow/St. Petersburg

Ukraine

Other

US

44

13.5

20

Israel

25

30.8

44.2

Germany

38.5

19.2

44.2

The two biggest cities in the former USSR, Moscow and St. Petersburg, were represented highly by the US and German groups (44% and 38.5%, respectively) while Israel had the lowest percentage of people from those two cities. As Remennick (2007) noticed, many immigrants from Moscow and St. Petersburg who originally came to Israel later relocated to the US. As Tables 3.5 illustrates, the Israeli group had the highest percentage of former residents of Ukraine (30.8% compared with 13.5% and 19.2% for the US and Germany). We should remember that historically the biggest Jewish communities were located in the territory of Ukraine. Because the majority of the Israeli group claimed their nationality as Jewish, it is not surprising to find such a high percentage of Jewish immigrants coming from Ukraine. 3.4.6. Education As mentioned in the previous chapter, the educational level of the Russian immigration is high and all three countries show an overwhelming percentage of college-educated people. Here I have to clarify how the educational level of the participants was assessed. The Soviet/Russian educational system di¤ers from the one found in Western Europe, the US, or Israel. Most Soviet universities required 5 years to graduate and depending on the country of resettlement this would be accepted as the equivalent of a Master’s or Bachelor’s degree. Even within the same host country the assessment criteria would depend on the year of the immigrant’s arrival. For example, the initial big wave of immigration to Israel brought an astounding number of college-educated people whose educational level was translated as a Master’s degree. However, Israeli society soon realized that they couldn’t employ that many people according to their professional and educational qualifications. Thus starting with the early 1990s new immigrants would be given an equivalent of the Bachelors degree for the same 5 years of university education. Ironically, people who

38

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

graduated from the same university would be ranked di¤erently depending on the year of their arrival in Israel. Moreover, the assessment of the post-graduate degree also would vary from country to country. While Israel would accept the Soviet degree of ‘‘kandidat nauk’’ as the Doctoral degree (Ph.D.), US academia would value it at the Master’s level. In order to avoid any unnecessary complications in the present analysis, the criteria on which the educational background was evaluated was as follows: people who only had a high school certificate were placed in the self-evident category of high school graduates. Those who graduated from 4 year colleges (‘‘technikum,’’ in Russian) were listed as undergraduate degree holders and those who had 5–6 years of university/institute education were grouped as graduate degree holders. In addition, postgraduate degrees that can be equivalent to the Ph.D. degree (‘‘kandidat nauk,’’ ‘‘doctor nauk,’’ in Russian) were set apart as a separate category irrespective of their further translation on the host markets. The questionnaire o¤ered a separate question on whether the participants had any further education in the host country, which included both academic and professional education (excluding language courses). For the purposes of the present discussion it is su‰cient to give the raw percentage of the participants in each group that received any kind of additional education. Table 3.6. Education Group/ Education (%) US Israel Germany

Post-grad

Graduate

Undergraduate

High school

Education in the host country

6

74

16

4

42

15

64

19.2

2

50

75

17.3

2

48.1

5.8

Table 3.6 summarizes the information on the educational background of the participants. The majority of people were college educated: 74% (US), 64% (Israel), and 75% (Germany) had 5–6 years of college education; 16% (US), 19.2% (Israel), and 17.3% (Germany) had 3–4 years of college education; and only 4%, 2%, and 2%, respectively, did not pursue academic education past high school. Table 3.6 also shows that there were 6% (US), 15% (Israel), and 5% (Germany) of people with a postgraduate degree. Here I need to clarify the much higher number for the Israeli group. Israel has accepted a big number of Russian scientists and many of them went

3.5.

Reasons for emigration

39

through a special ‘‘absorption’’ program based on the university campuses. As I said earlier, the Institute of Technology (Technion) where I used to work before my second immigration to the US hosted me as a guest researcher when I collected the data for this project. When I arrived in Israel with the first wave of the last mass immigration in early 1990 and almost instantly got a university job it was quite rare for Russian immigrants to be part of the Israeli academic community. Seventeen years later things definitely have changed. I was amazed at the ease with which I could recruit participants simply by looking through the university directory for Russian names or by walking into the department of Physics or Biomedical Engineering and hearing the Russian language. People joked that the Department of Mathematics was almost exclusively Russian speaking until they all left for the US. In other words, at some point I had to limit myself to recruiting university-based people in order not to confound the data. Even so we see a much higher percentage for that group. In contrast, when I arrived in Germany and decided to use the same tactics I realized that the situation was quite di¤erent there. The Russian names that I did find in the faculty directory of the University of Hamburg turned out to be the names of Russian citizens working on joint projects rather than recent immigrants. So we have to be careful in interpreting this particular skewing e¤ect for the Israeli group. Going back to Table 3.6, we can see that the percentage of people who got additional education in the host countries was relatively high, i.e., 42% (US), 50% (Israel), and 48.1% (Germany). The number is smaller for the US and we can o¤er two possible explanations. Among the three countries that became the focus of the present book, the US provides the least social support to new immigrants; neither does it require immigrants to go through additional professional training to be qualified for equal employment opportunities on the American market.

3.5. Reasons for emigration For any individual the initial decision to leave the homeland with the possibility of never returning is as challenging as the subsequent resettlement into a new country. Rarely do people decide on such things overnight without carefully weighing all their options. We can look at immigration as the final resort that the person chooses when he does not see a better alternative for his life in the native country. The very first question that I asked during the interview was about the reason why people left the

40

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

former USSR. The analysis of a variety of di¤erent answers revealed a few common trends. 3.5.1. Economic and political crash of the 1990s The majority of the participants referred to the collapse of the USSR, the resulting chaos and political and economic instability. Many used the metaphorical expression ‘‘dead end’’ to describe the situation in the disintegrating USSR at the time they decided to emigrate. Had the economic situation been more stable and the future looked less bleak many people probably would have stayed. Predictably, out of the three groups, there were more people in the German group who o¤ered this as a reason for immigration, because the majority of Russian immigrants to Germany left Russia a few years after the disintegration of the USSR. An immigrant in the Israeli group recounts this in the following way: ‘‘I left for the same reason as everyone else, I guess. I started worrying about how to feed my children. At work they gave me a paycheck every other month. I got scared. Winter was coming, it was cold. The children could have gotten sick – I needed warm clothes. You need money to buy it all. Before, everything was fine – I had a job, they paid, it was enough . . . When it changed I got scared. . . .’’ (Israel: L, female, 49 years old)

3.5.2. Political system However, some immigrants had much deeper-rooted reasons to leave and the chaos of the 1990s could have been the last snowflake that eventually caused an avalanche. We have to remember that mass immigration began in 1990 when the doors from the USSR slowly were opened for Jewish immigrants. The much-hated communist totalitarian system drove thousands out of the country when the opportunity arose. One of the participants, a Russian writer living in the outskirts of New York, said: ‘‘I left the USSR for many reasons. . . . The most significant one was that I did not believe in any changes. I did not want to live under despotism. I did not want to die the way my mother did – as a person who is not free to speak her mind. . . . I could no longer live under the power of the people who were foreign to me. I felt like my life there was over . . . So I left. . . .’’ (US: O., female, 49 years old)

3.5.

Reasons for emigration

41

3.5.3. Anti-Semitism Predominantly the participants in the Israeli group reported anti-Semitism as a reason for immigration. Either anti-Semitism itself or a strong sense of being Jewish and as such having a need to live in their own land were noted as the major reasons for immigration. It should be noted that the Russian immigration of the 1970s was known as the ‘‘Zionist immigration’’ because people came to Israel due to strong Zionist beliefs; many had been persecuted by Soviet authorities for attempting to exercise their civil rights as Jews. Undeniably, the last wave did have people who had a strong drive to emigrate in order to return to their ‘‘historical Motherland’’ as many Russian Jews called Israel. However, it is hard to underestimate the disastrous economic situation of the 1990s as a strong incentive to emigrate for a large number of people. The excerpt below serves as an illustration of the combination of these two factors. ‘‘Our entire family decided to immigrate to Israel. Because we felt that we are Jewish and that our Motherland is here. Also the economic situation was hard and there was a sense that there was no future there [in Russia].’’ (Israel: L, female, 36 years old)

3.5.4. Ethnic conflicts and saving sons from army service Another reason mentioned by immigrants in all three groups was the escalating ethnic conflicts and regional wars that resulted from the collapse of the USSR. The former Soviet republics obtained independence or were fighting for it and many people were caught in the crossfire of someone’s wars. Also, those Russians and Jews who happened to be living in the territory of the former republics were under a double sword of injustice after the USSR disintegrated. The local majority did not accept them, nor could they easily come to Russia and start their life anew. ‘‘It was a di‰cult time. I lived in Estonia. Estonia decided to become independent. That was the time when everyone was deciding what belongs to him. I was born in Estonia but I realized that it never was mine and definitely never will be mine. I knew that there must be a place that I can call mine. I started having strong Zionist feelings. . . .’’ (Israel: O., female, 54 years old)

The raging war in Chechnya and the volatile political and military instability in other former Soviet regions provided justification for many Russian

42

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

Jews to choose immigration in order to spare their sons from serving in the army. Understandably it applied to the US and German groups since there is mandatory army service for men and women in Israel. However, even in the Israeli group there was one participant who voiced the same concern: ‘‘I have two boys, they were growing up. There was the possibility of army service. . . . The Soviet army, it’s not clear what it is when you are there: whom should you fight: others or those who are inside. . . .’’ (Israel: A., male, 56 years old.)

3.5.5. For the sake of a better future for the children Many participants expressed their concerns for the future of their children as their major reason for leaving. The concerns included the devastating long-lasting e¤ects of Chernobyl (the nuclear reactor that catastrophically defaulted in the early 1980s and polluted many areas in the south of the USSR with life-threatening radiation) and a natural hope to give a better life and more opportunities to their children. 3.5.6. ‘‘Mass madness’’ The next reason may strike the reader as something immature when it comes to such a life-changing decision as immigration. Some people admitted that they left because all their friends were leaving or because there was something ‘‘infectious’’ about the ‘‘immigration epidemic.’’ When asked why he left, a participant in the Israeli group said that one morning he woke up and the phone was not ringing, meaning that all his friends had left. This is an illustration of the powerful e¤ect that any mass immigration can produce on ordinary people who never may have had any strong motivation or justified reason to leave their native land but who were swept away by the hurricane of mass exodus. 3.6. Reasons for choosing their host country Having looked at the major reasons that drove immigrants out of their home country, we need a better understanding of why they chose the US, Israel, or Germany as their final destination. I already have outlined the larger pattern of immigration paths in Chapter 1. Here I summarize the results of the questionnaires where the participants were asked why they happened to come to that particular country.

3.6.

Reasons for choosing their host country

43

Table 3.7. Reasons for choosing the host country (%) Reason

US

Israel

1

Opportunities for professional self-realization

18

4.2

2

2

Educational

0

5.9

3

Family reunion

4

Marriage

5

4 30

Germany

4.2

5.9

4

0

0

Felt right to be there (wanted to be)

14

0

3.9

6

Incidentally (lottery, came for a visit, it happened so)

10

4.2

3.9

7

Economic (earn money, wait till Russia gets stabilized)

8

0

0

8

I knew the language

2

0

5.9

9

Saving son from the army

2

0

2

10

No other alternative

0

35.4

27.5

11

Unbearable situation in Russia

0

8.3

5.9

12

The easiest path

0

6.3

13.7

13

Zionism

0

20.0

0

14

Freedom, better life for myself and my family

8

8.3

7.8

15

Everybody was leaving

0

8.3

0

16

Cultural and geographical aspects

0

0

15.7

The reasons for choosing a particular country for immigration varied across the groups (Table 3.7). The only answer that was shared equally by all three groups (8%, 8.3%, and 7.8% for the US, Israel, and Germany, respectively) was that people were looking for freedom and a better life for themselves and their children. It hardly is surprising to find this answer among the major motives behind such a life-changing decision as immigration. It also was not surprising that 20% of the immigrants who chose Israel as their final destination were driven by the Zionist belief that all Jews should live in their own land. If we look at each group separately we find the following trends that may be more specific to each individual host country. Of the participants in the US group, 30% reported ‘‘family reunion’’ as their reason for choosing America. I should remind the reader that starting in late 1989 immigration to the US was allowed only to those Russians who already

44

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

had extended family there and that ‘‘family reunion’’ served as the o‰cial purpose of such moves. As I said earlier, any Russian Jew who wanted to emigrate from the USSR was supposed to provide the authorities with an o‰cial invitation to reunite with his family, whether it was a fabricated document from a nonexistent relative in Israel or proof of a real relative in Israel or the US. However, only 4.2% of the Israeli participants mentioned family reunion as the major reason for coming to the country. Instead, 35.4% of the Israeli participants (the biggest number in the entire list) said that there was no other alternative at the time. The US virtually closed its doors to Russian immigration and Germany had not yet started its immigration process. As one of the immigrants in the Israeli group said, ‘‘Honestly, I do not understand people who had enough of everything and came here. I simply do not understand them. I came here because I had nothing to eat. . . .’’ (Israel: L., female, 49 years old). The absence of an alternative can be found as the major reason in the German group too (27.5%). But here we have to be careful in interpreting this number. Many participants in the German group added that they could not immigrate to America because of the strict immigration rules while Israel did not appeal to them for a number of reasons. Some had non-Jewish spouses who would complicate their life in Israel. Others did not like the hot climate or had received negative information about economic hardships in Israel. In other words, the lack of an alternative for those two groups should be viewed as two di¤erent phenomena. In one case we witness the mass exodus from Russia and the path is diverted to only one possible destination, i.e., Israel. In another, we see people who were facing a choice of Israel and Germany and chose Germany, claiming that no other choices appealed to them. Understandably, those who were saving their sons from serving in the Soviet army during the war in Chechnya would not consider Israel a safe heaven. Another reason, i.e., the unbearable situation in Russia, may strike the reader as something that should have been – and was indeed – mentioned earlier in this chapter. The hard economic situation in the native land should serve as a plausible reason for leaving the country rather than for choosing the place to emigrate to. However, I would argue that 8.3% of the Israelis and 5.9% of the Germans in this study could have come to the new country as an escape. Conversely, the choice of host country was less important than the reason behind the move. Among other reasons for immigration into a particular country, we can see that opportunities for professional self-realization attracted 18% of the American immigrants and the cultural and geographical appeal of

3.6.

Reasons for choosing their host country

45

a Central European country decided the choice for a large number of German immigrants (15.7%). Table 3.7 also shows that some people got into the country incidentally, e.g., coming for a visit and staying there or winning a lucky Green Card in the lottery. Of the Israeli and German participants, 6.3% and 13.7%, respectively, admitted that they chose the easiest path to emigrate while 8.3% of the Israelis said that they came to Israel because everybody was gathering there. This refers to the earlier discussion of the possible e¤ect of mass immigration on the individual who had no strong objectives in making a move but was swept away by the crowd. The US group shows that some people came during the hard economic times in Russia with the sole purpose of making some money and going back. At the time of this study a few of those ‘‘temporary workers’’ had been in the country for as long as 15 years and were not planning to leave. Of the US and German groups, 14% and 3.9%, respectively, said that they always had wanted to live in those countries and that it felt right to be there. I will remind the reader that a high percentage of Israelis admitted strong Zionist feelings and a desire to live in their own land, which can correspond to the ‘‘feeling right to be there’’ answer for the other two groups. To review, we can see that the choice of host country was not an easy one for many participants in this study. Their integration, acculturation, and later success in the host country can be proof of the right choice even if it was not perceived as such upon immigration. However, we have to keep in mind that for a large number of the Israeli and German immigrants in this study the choice of their final destination was decided by the lack of any alternative (Israeli group) or the lack of a more appealing alternative (German group). Two male participants in the US group had gone through multiple immigration routes. One went to Israel in 1990 because it was the only alternative path open at that time and six years later moved to the US. With his Russian citizenship revoked, he held Israeli and American citizenship at the time of the study. Another moved to Canada from Israel and later immigrated to the US. By the time of this study he was a holder of four passports, i.e., Russian, Israeli, Canadian, and American. When asked why he had to make so many moves in order to settle down in the US he said: ‘‘It was not a question of choice. I did not leave FOR a di¤erent place; it was all about WHERE I did not want to stay. I wanted to leave Russia and did not care where I went. If I stayed longer I could have gone straight to the US or if I waited even longer I could have tried Germany or some other place. . . .’’ (US: M, male, 38 years old)

46

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

3.7. Length of immigration As mentioned earlier, one of the criteria for participation in this study was the length of immigration, which was supposed to be no less than 10 years. Table 3.8 shows that the majority of people in the US and Israel groups (60% and 75%, respectively) spent between 15 and 20 years in the host country. The immigration to Germany started much later and the majority of people in that group (57.7%) had spent 10–15 years in the country by the time of the study. The dynamics of Russian immigration over the last two to three decades is reflected in the demographics of these three groups. The size of the groups does not allow us to make any major conclusions but there is enough data to provide a microscopic view of Russian immigration in general. We can see more people coming to Israel than the US in the early 1990s (see 15–20 years of residency) and then Germany picks up and accepts most immigrants in the mid-to-late 1990s (10–15 years of residency) with some still going to the US and Israel (24% and 11.5%, respectively). I have to acknowledge that the obvious outnumbering of recent immigrants (8–10 years) in the German group is because the requirement for the residence length for that group was lowered due to the insu‰cient number of earlier immigrants available for the study. In order to counterbalance the other two groups, a few comparable participants were added to the US and Israeli groups.

Table 3.8. Length of immigration Group/years (%)

25–30

20–25

15–20

10–15

8–10

US

6

6

60

24

4

Israel

9.6

2

75

11.5

2

Germany

0

0

28.8

57.7

13.5

3.8. Employment In order to understand the reasons why a person may feel better integrated or more successful in immigration, it is important to look at a number of di¤erent factors, among them professional success. Remember that most of the Russian immigrants in the last wave as well as immigrants in this study were college educated. In other words, it will be natural to expect

3.8.

Employment

47

professional success to play a role in how the person evaluates his success in immigration in general. The assessment of employment success was based on a comparison of the position the person had in Russia and the position he occupies now or used to occupy before retirement in the host country. The participants provided this information on the questionnaire. If the level of professional employment did not change (e.g., the person was an engineer in Russia and he is an engineer now), or re-qualification did not result in professional downgrading (e.g., the person was a schoolteacher in Russia and now she is a librarian), then the participants were grouped in the ‘‘same’’ category. In the case of downgrading (e.g., an engineer works as a taxi driver) or professional improvement (e.g., a schoolteacher becomes a college professor), the participants were placed in the ‘‘worse’’ and ‘‘better’’ categories, respectively. People who never worked in the country because they were qualified for retirement and those who came to the host country as teenagers and did not have a job in Russia were excluded from the analysis. Table 3.9 illustrates the results.

Table 3.9. Employment success Group/job (%)

Same

Better

Worse

US

70.4

14.8

14.8

Israel

57.8

8

Germany

38

13.8

33 48.3

According to Table 3.9, the highest percentage of people who maintained the same professional status comes from the US (70.4%), while the highest percentage of people who downgraded their occupation is found in Germany (48.3%), with Israel coming next (33%). The latter supports the analysis o¤ered by Remennick (2007) who indicated that both in Israel and Germany immigrants often downgrade their professional standing while in the US there are more opportunities for them to maintain their original professional status. However, the results of the present analysis showed that both Germany and the US seem to have o¤ered slightly more opportunities for the immigrants in this study to upgrade their status (13.8% and 14.8%, respectively).

48

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

3.9. Hardships in immigration Regardless of the country of immigration, most immigrants go through a di‰cult process of resettling in the new land. In order to understand better how people are integrated into the new society and what helps them to regain a sense of belonging, we need to analyze the biggest problems they encountered in their host countries in the first years of their immigration. The following results come from the content analysis of the interview narratives where one of the questions targeted hardships in immigration. We will look at the common trends mentioned by all three groups. 3.9.1. Language Participants in all three groups reported learning the foreign language and gaining a level of mastery that would bring a better understanding of the people surrounding the immigrant in the new country as one of the major obstacles that they had to overcome. Not knowing the language makes the person helpless and diminishes his chances of landing a better job. Most Russian immigrants came to their host countries with a basic knowledge of English or German (see Chapter 8). However, to most people in the study, the knowledge was not su‰cient to survive in immigration or the idealized expectations of what the desired level should be were overwhelmingly high. The latter is illustrated by a German participant: ‘‘It was hard to overcome this in myself. I really wanted to speak German like a native speaker, so that nobody would be able to detect me as a foreigner. So it was hard to overcome it in myself and settle for a certain level that I knew I could attain in the language.’’ (Germany: J., female, 31 years old)

As another person admits, the proficiency level does not matter, since ‘‘there is a psychological perestroika that happens when one has to speak it 24 hours a day’’ (US: V., female, 57 years old) In the Israeli group, one of the participants reported a problem with English rather than Hebrew as the major di‰culty in his immigration. ‘‘When I came here I did not realize that Israel is a very small country and it is basically built on English. All the information and all literature, I mean professional literature, is available only in English. I thought that in order for me to succeed as an engineer I needed to learn the language of the country, that is, Hebrew. However, it turns out that you need to know English, not at the native level but at a relatively high level of proficiency.’’ (Israel: O. male, 44 years old)

3.9.

Hardships in immigration

49

3.9.2. Finding and/or not losing a job Understandably, professional success is one of the essential factors that account for a person’s ultimate integration into the host country. Similar concerns about finding themselves unemployed or professionally downgraded in the new country were reported by the immigrants in all three groups. The problem with employment relates not just to finding a job that would provide a living, rather most people admitted that they wanted to get a professional job according to their qualifications and prior social standing in the USSR. As the information on employment downgrading in this chapter suggests, not everyone had a smooth path to professional success. For the majority of the Israelis and Germans who reported employment problems, the major concern was finding a professional job, while a few US participants shared that their biggest fear was losing a job. Some immigrants accept their employment situation stoically and even find solace in comparing their situation with that of the first wavers: ‘‘Our goal was to give our children an education. So we took up any jobs, we did not think about our own careers. Because at this age we realized from the very beginning that we would not make that career. But the downgrading of the social status was painful. I cannot say our status was very high there, just simple engineers. . . . Although I always had such a comparison in my mind: those Russian nobles, the aristocracy who left for France all took up any jobs, did they not? (Israel: S., female, 61 years old)

3.9.3. Adaptation to the new country Most of the immigrants underwent a traumatic process of severing ties with their native land and getting used to a new environment where people not only spoke a di¤erent language but often shared di¤erent values and traditions. Participants in all three groups found adaptation to the host country problematic. The word ‘‘mentality’’ as referring to people living in the new host country was used repeatedly to describe the core issue in the adaptation process. ‘‘Adaptation was hard . . . Getting used to how people interact, their attitudes to each other, whom they consider friends and whom they do not. . . . It’s a totally di¤erent manner of communication, even a di¤erent way of maintaining a conversation. . . . It’s almost like a di¤erent planet, not just a country with di¤erent interests but a di¤erent way of being. . . .’’ (US: V., female, 34 years old)

50

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

A few participants in the US group admitted that they had idealized America before immigration and it caused certain readjustments to the reality that they encountered. Some admitted experiencing a cultural shock, whether it was the absence of the European type ‘‘city life’’ in Houston or the Middle Eastern culture of Israel. A few young immigrants in the German group sadly admitted that they would always be outsiders in Germany or would never break through the wall separating them from mainstream Germany (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7 for further discussion). 3.9.4. Loss of familiar networks Among the important things that most immigrants lose over the course of immigration are the familiar networks of family, friends, and other social support groups. For Russians, raised in a collectivist culture where friendship is highly valued, the loss of friends is perceived as one of the gravest consequences of immigration. Many Russian immigrants were leaving behind their families and the troubling reports of the coup and the economic crash of the 1990s made many fear the worst: the return of the Iron Curtain that would separate them forever from their loved ones. Regardless of the big Russian presences in countries like Israel, finding new friends in the community does not come easy either. ‘‘We came here alone; our parents on both sides stayed behind. Most of our friends happened to immigrate to other places, not where we would have liked to have them. The biggest problem is that unfortunately immigration has changed many people. I have made my own selection and communicate only with those who have been tested by time and hardships . . . So only the strongest and the most reliable stayed as our friends. . . .’’ (Israel: Z., female, 52 years old)

A few participants metaphorically expressed the lack of communication and social interaction in the early stages of immigration as ‘‘a phone not ringing.’’ ‘‘Our Hebrew teacher told us that the most di‰cult thing would be to speak Hebrew over the phone. But I was not afraid because I knew English and soon enough I got a job in the Technion [University]. So they gave me a desk with a phone. The most awful thing was that the phone did not ring. . . .’’ (Israel: M., male, 69 years old)

With time immigrants establish new networks and many find new friends. However, to many Russians in this study, it is essential to find close

3.9.

Hardships in immigration

51

friends within the Russian community. The size of the community can guarantee more chances of finding people who share the same values and beliefs among other immigrants. The three-time immigrant described it based on his personal experience. ‘‘I think the most comfortable environment is in Israel because it has the biggest number of immigrants from the former USSR. So out of the three foreign countries it has the widest infrastructure supporting the community, like printed material in Russian, TV channels, familiar Russian food, etc. . . .’’ (US: M., male, 44 years old)

We may expect that mostly older people depend on old friendships and are more reluctant to find new ones. However, there were a few testimonies about loneliness during the teenage years among young German immigrants. As one of them recalls, ‘‘To experience loneliness at the age of 16 is the hardest part. My parents had to deal with their own problems and one does not want to talk much to parents at that age. I got into a German high school, there were no other immigrants. My peers did not accept me, I felt rejected.’’ (L., female, 27 years old)

3.9.5. Making the decision to leave If we remember why and how most Russian immigrants were leaving the collapsing USSR we would not be surprised that some admitted that the most di‰cult choice in immigration was deciding to leave Russia. Indeed, the decision to leave the native land with the possibility of never returning requires courage and often involves much internal struggle. Once people make this hard choice the rest does not seem as di‰cult. To some, the lack of any particular problems in the resettlement resulted from their long-time dream of leaving the country. A few former refusniks in the US and Israel groups said that they were in a state of euphoria as soon as they literally escaped the country after years of fighting for their right to emigrate. 3.9.6. Nostalgia Leaving the native land and missing it in the years to follow is quite natural for any immigrant. For Russians, the phenomenon of nostalgia has acquired a special meaning and often is ascribed to the list of essential national traits. Somewhat idealized stories of Russian immigrants of the first wave who could not stay away from their beloved Motherland and

52

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

later returned just to be executed or jailed by the Soviet authorities made many believe that any Russian would feel nostalgic about Russia once he left the country for good. In the next chapter (Chapter 4) we will look at the reactions of immigrants when they were asked about nostalgia. This will be important for us to investigate in order to understand the complexity involved in the ‘‘sense of belonging’’ that any person needs to establish or reestablish in his life (Chapter 7). For the purposes of this section, I simply will mention that a few people did refer to nostalgia as the most di‰cult thing to overcome in the first years of immigration. This was better put into words by a Russian author living in the suburbs of the great New York and writing books for a Russian audience. ‘‘The most di‰cult part of my immigration is that I am a writer. And all my Russian people live in a di¤erent world. . . . It is very, very di‰cult to continue doing what I am best at – to write. This is my big personal tragedy.’’ (US: O., female, 49 years old)

3.10. Success in immigration One of the questions that participants had to answer concerned their success in immigration. The answers consisted of ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no.’’ The results of the analysis of this question are presented in Table 3.10. Table 3.10. Success in immigration Group/success (%)

yes

perhaps

do not know

no

US

30

36

22

12

Israel

36.5

38.5

17.3

7.7

Germany

17.3

36.5

19.2

26.9

As is seen in the table, the highest percentage of people who consider their immigration story a success comes from Israel (36.5%), the next is from the US (30%), and the least successful group is from Germany (17.3%). If we go to the other extreme of the continuum on the response scale we can see that the highest percentage of people who admitted that they did not succeed in immigration is German (26.9%). If we remember that there were more people who downgraded their social standing in the German

3.11.

53

Integration into the host society

group then we can suggest that ultimate success in immigration may rely heavily on professional success. This is what one of the participants in the German group said about his employment odyssey: ‘‘I wanted to live better and hoped that with my profession and my ability to work hard I could achieve something. . . . There, in the USSR I used to feel that I was in charge of my life. Here I come and they o¤er me di¤erent training courses. . . . I am telling them that I am a mechanical engineer. . . . All the newspapers, the radio and the Internet are saying that there is a lack of mechanical engineers in Germany. But they simply ‘spat’ me out and said that I need to forget it. So I did and now at the age of fifty-six I am a locksmith whom nobody wants to hire because I lack locksmith experience.’’ (Germany: A., male, 56 years old)

3.11. Integration into the host society The question on integration seems the easiest to look at and analyze. The answer was supposed to be either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no.’’ However, during data collection it was observed that people who live in the Russian-speaking community and often speak poorly or do not speak the language of the host country answered the question on integration positively. It led me to suspect that some immigrants may understand the level of comfort in which they are living in the country as integration into the society and culture of that country. Therefore I would refrain from commenting on the results presented in Table 3.11. Table 3.11. Integration into the host society Group/integration (%)

yes

no

US

68

32

Israel

76.9

23.1

Germany

67.3

32.7

3.12. Looking back at the decision to emigrate One of the questions o¤ered in the questionnaire was on the immigrants’ view of the decision to leave. The results are summarized in Table 3.12.

54

‘‘Prodigal children’’ of Mother Russia

Table 3.12. Was the decision to emigrate right? Group/decision (%)

Yes

US

87.8

Israel

82

Germany

88.2

Yes, but would go to another country 2 12 9.8

No, would have been to stay in Russia 8.2 6 5.9

The overwhelming majority in all three groups said that they do not regret the decision to emigrate and come to the country where they reside at the moment. A relatively big number of people in Israel and Germany (12% and 9.8%, respectively) said that they would not change their mind about immigration but would go to a di¤erent country. As they further indicated in their answers, the US remains a much more desired option for those people. However, for the Israelis Germany also became a country of alternative choice if they had had the option at the time. During the interview some immigrants in the Israeli group admitted that Israel was the only alternative available at the time and they would rather have gone to the US, but then they added that they have no regrets about the forced choice and like living where they are now. The only participant in the US group (the writer I mentioned above) said that she would rather have stayed in Europe because it is closer to Russia. Regardless of the country that the immigrants happened to be in, whether it was the place of their dreams or the only escape route available, there was a relatively similar percentage of people who regret ever leaving Russia. Conclusion This chapter extensively covered most of the background factors involved in the acculturation process. The results of the analysis based on the surveys and narratives showed the socio-demographic profile of the population that served as participants in this study. In addition to basic background information we looked at the driving force behind the immigration decision and the choice of a new country. Here we could see the devastating economic and political situation in the former USSR, rising antiSemitism and lack of freedoms as the major reasons why the participants chose to leave their native land. On the other hand, the choice of host country does not look as straightforward and simple. The intricate politi-

Conclusion

55

cal situation and the subsequent agreement between the US and Israeli governments did not leave much of an alternative for many Russian immigrants to choose a country; their migration route was diverted to Israel. Then we looked at the immigration hardships and employment paths identified by each group and discussed the data on the self-reported level of integration and success. The findings suggest that immigrants in the US achieved the best employment realization while the worst downgrading took place in Germany. The majority of people in all three countries consider their immigration story a success and do not regret the initial decision to emigrate. We will be returning to this information as the book progresses.

Chapter 4 Culture: Change of the cultural perception ‘‘Сжилась. Нет, не прижилась. Сжилась . . .’’ – ‘‘I have lived into it . . . Not gotten used to it, no. Gotten lived into it. . . .’’ (Excerpt from an interview with a Russian immigrant in Israel)

Introduction In order for us to understand why immigrants – and Russian immigrants in particular – find it di‰cult to adjust to the new cultural environment in their host countries we need to understand a few things. First, we should look into the essential di¤erences between the respective cultures, and, second, find possible reasons why in some instances di¤erences tend to create a lingering e¤ect of cultural shock and why in other instances they easily are embraced by immigrants. As Berry pointed out, ‘‘these cultural di¤erences may be accepted, interpreted, or denied, and the individual may ride with them or be run over by them’’ (Berry 1990: 205). The research question that I pursue in this chapter concerns the immigrant’s perception of the host culture and its transformation over time. A comparison of the host and native cultures will allow me to draw on the collective portraits of American, Israeli, and German cultures at the societal and interpersonal levels through the eyes of Russian immigrants. I also raise the issue of nostalgia and the role of the Russian community for the immigrants in this study. In this chapter we will revisit the Acculturation Model and see how the phenomenon of Culture and its perception fits into it; then we will outline the main directions of the analysis as it applies to the present study. But first I briefly will outline the broad and complex concept of culture as it will be viewed in this study.

4.1. Culture as an interdisciplinary project Numerous disciplines have undertaken the study of culture using their own methodological approaches and frameworks and unavoidably cross-

4.1.

Culture as an interdisciplinary project

57

ing the boundaries of their own disciplines. Culture, as the central focus of anthropology, is no longer a theme confined within that field. Both the humanities (e.g., history, literary theory, linguistics, and philosophy) and the social sciences (e.g., anthropology, sociology, and psychology) have contributed to our understanding of culture, cultural norms and human behavior. Sarangi (2009) points out the broad interdisciplinary nature of the culture concept and shows how it was defined and redefined over time and throughout changes in theoretical approaches. Indeed, the present study is an example of an interdisciplinary approach to inquiry into the complex concept of cultural perception by newcomers. The interrelationship between the individual and the society – both in the native land and in the host country – is a crucial aspect of culture. The construction of the ‘‘cultural other’’ from the viewpoint of the observer is another aspect of cultural studies. The deep psychological and linguistic e¤ect that contact with a new culture may bring is yet another way to look at culture. In other words, by combining anthropological, social, psychological, and linguistic approaches to the analysis of the transformation in the perception of a new culture we are conforming to the dynamic nature of cultural studies rather than departing from the major scholarship. The study of culture raises another concern: how objective is an observer/researcher, what reference points is he using in the interpretation of the findings, and how deeply is he submerged into any of the cultures in his study? No matter how much the researcher is distanced from the focus of his study, there is always a possibility of his preexisting cultural knowledge interfering with the interpretation of research findings. In this study the above concern is addressed in the following way. First, I adopt Geertz’s (1973) notion of ‘‘thick description.’’ Although my study does not rely in any way on my personal experience or knowledge of the four cultures in question, living in the cultures that I study has helped me to provide what Geertz (1973) calls ‘‘thick description’’ of the ethnographic, social and linguistic phenomena that are central to this book. Second, by allowing my participants to voice their perspectives on the native and host cultures, I remove myself from the forefront of the discussion. Finally, in order not to inflate the size of this chapter by the discussion of all components pertinent to the culture concept I resort to a definition of culture in the target languages and taken from the same source. But first we should look at the Acculturation Framework and see how it will be applied to the analysis of the transformation of cultural perception in Russian immigrants.

58

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

4.2. Acculturation Framework: Culture Figure 4.1 illustrates how the Acculturation Model can be adjusted to accommodate the phenomenon of cultural adaptation among the immigrants in this study.

Figure 4.1. Acculturation Framework: Culture perception

The internal antecedents will relate to those essential cultural features that the immigrants were exposed to in their native country and, as a result, might be missing upon immigration. In contrast, the external antecedents will concern the specific cultural elements that immigrants might have encountered in their respective host countries. Under the rubric of traditional antecedents we will look at the individual factors that may a¤ect the process of acculturation and assimilation, such as age and secondlanguage proficiency. The psychological process of acculturation will be viewed through the process of changing the initial perception of the host culture over the years of immigration. Under the rubric of consequences

4.2.

Acculturation Framework: Culture

59

we will look at the change in the perception of the host culture as well as the essential di¤erences that the immigrants see between their native culture/society and the host one. This will lead to a discussion of nostalgia and the immigrants’ need of the Russian community. We also will discuss the level of comfort that the individual achieved in the host culture and correlate it with the three factors, i.e., age, second-language proficiency, and ethnicity. 4.2.1. Internal antecedents: Russian culture Before we move any further we need to establish a reference point for what our target population may consider ‘‘culture.’’ First, we will look at the Russian definition of culture since the focus of this chapter is the acculturation and assimilation of Russian immigrants. Then we will look at the definition of culture in the three other languages in question: English, Hebrew, and German. The definitions are taken from the same source, Wikipedia (2008). I should acknowledge that the complexity and breadth of the concept of culture couldn’t be studied solely based on an encyclopedic entry, especially one found in the public domain. We easily may run into the danger of oversimplifying the concept. However, the scope of this work does not allow me to elaborate on the cultural details exhibited by each respective country. Rather, we will be looking at the details and discuss the contrasts revealed by the data gathered in the present research. Thus I give a brief description and comparison of the cultures in question as external and internal antecedents of the acculturation process, based on the corresponding entries in the same encyclopedic source. Russian

Культура (лат. cultura, от корня colere – « возделывать », другой вариант: ‘‘cultus’’ – поклонение, почитание, культ) – обобщающее понятие для форм жизнедеятельности человека, созданных и создаваемых нами в процессе развития. В повседневной бытовой практике под культурой понимается 1. возделывание, обработка, улучшение, совершенствование – культурное растение, физическая культура, культуризм, культиватор и т.д.; 2. воспитание, образование, соблюдение нравственных норм, общепринятых правил, этикета – культурный человек, культура речи, некультурное поведение и т.д.; 3. искусство, творчество – дом культуры, художественная культура, колледж культуры и т.д. . . . Культура – это нравственные, моральные и материальные ценности, умения, знания, обычаи, традиции.

60

Culture: Change of the cultural perception (‘From the Latin cultura stemming from colere, meaning ‘‘to cultivate.’’ Another variant is ‘‘cultus’’ – worship, respect, cult – a generalized concept representing forms of human activity that have been established or are being established in the process of our development. In everyday practice, culture is understood as 1. Cultivation, processing, improvement – a cultured plant, sport, bodybuilding, cultivator, etc. 2. Upbringing, education, moral values, rules of behavior, etiquette – a cultured person, culture of speech, uncultured behavior, etc. 3. Art, creativity – House of culture, artistic culture, College of Culture, etc. . . . Culture is moral and material values, skills, knowledge, customs, and traditions.’)

Assuming that the corresponding definitions of the concept of culture are written by native speakers of the target countries and aimed at the audience in those countries, we can say that each definition should add an interpretation of the concept that is specific to the culture in question. Keeping this in mind, we can look first at the Russian concept of culture. The basic definition is not much di¤erent from the others that will be discussed below. However, there is an interpretation of the concept as it is applied in everyday life. Here we can see three di¤erent entries that can be translated roughly into physical cultivation, education, and what can be called ‘‘high culture.’’ Education would expand into formal education as well as upbringing and etiquette. The Russian term ‘‘kulturnyi chelovek’’ (cultured person) does not necessarily have the same meaning as in the Western cultures. It can apply to an individual who has good manners of behavior and who may lack academic education. But oftentimes it also describes a person who has a good knowledge of and interest in the so-called ‘‘high culture.’’ The latter constitutes the third entry of the Russian definition of culture and is, indeed, highly valued by Russians. Beginning in the 19th century Russian society developed a unique social group called ‘‘intelligentsia’’ that defined the idea of a ‘‘cultured person’’ for generations of Russians. The definition of the Russian ‘‘intelligent’’ should not be confused with the English cognate ‘‘intelligent’’ that constitutes just part of the Russian concept. The definition of ‘‘intelligentsia’’ is as follows: … умный, понимающий, знающий, мыслящий – социальная группа лиц, профессионально занимающихся умственным – преимущественно сложным и творческим – трудом, развитием и распространением образования и культуры и отличающихся высотой духовно-нравственных устремлений, обостренным чувством долга и чести (Wikipedia 2008)

4.2.

Acculturation Framework: Culture

61

(. . . intelligent, understanding, knowledgeable, thinking – a social group of people who are professionally engaged in mental – preferably complex and creative – work, the development and spreading of education and culture and who have a high level of distinctive moral and spiritual [‘‘soul’’] aspirations and a sharp sense of responsibility and honor.)

As the above definition indicates, intelligentsia represents a complex phenomenon of which ‘‘being cultured’’ is one of the fundamental elements. However, personal and moral qualities of a very high standard complement the portrait of a Russian intelligent. From the above definition we may expect Russian immigrants who had belonged to the class of intelligentsia to look for corresponding elements of culture embodied in the environment as well as the people living in the new land. The expectations may involve finding a ‘‘high culture’’ in terms of theaters, museums, art exhibitions, architecture, shared interest in literature, and etiquette. They also may involve the idea of meeting people belonging to the nonexistent class of intelligentsia in the host country. The absence of the same level of values in the host society may create a cultural shock and hinder the integration process in general. This may be especially hard to accept for people coming from big metropolitan cities that o¤ered easier access to the above cultural elements. 4.2.2. External antecedents Having identified the essential elements of Russian culture we will move on to see how di¤erent a host culture may be based on the definition of ‘‘culture’’ from the same source of Wikipedia (2008). Below are an English definition of culture as well as the English translation of the Hebrew and German definitions. – English Culture (from the Latin cultura stemming from colere, meaning ‘‘to cultivate’’) generally refers to patterns of human activity and the symbolic structures that give such activities significance and importance. Cultures can be understood as systems of symbols and meanings that even their creators contest, that lack fixed boundaries, that are constantly in flux, and that interact and compete with one another. Culture can be defined as all the ways of life including art, beliefs, and institutions of a population that are passed down from generation to generation. Culture has been called ‘‘the way of life for an entire society.’’ As such, it includes codes of manners, dress, language, religion, rituals, games, norms of behavior such as law and morality, and systems of belief as well as the art.’’

62

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

– German Kultur (von lat. cultura) ist im weitesten Sinne alles, was der Mensch selbst gestaltend hervorbringt, im Unterschied zu der von ihm nicht gescha¤enen und nicht vera¨nderten Natur. Kulturleistungen sind alle formenden Umgestaltungen eines gegebenen Materials, wie in der Technik, der Bildende Kunst, aber auch geistiger Gebilde wie etwa im Recht, in der Moral, der Religion, der Wirtschaft und der Wissenschaft. (‘Culture [from Latin cultura] in the broadest sense is everything that humans have created themselves, in contrast to nature, which is not created or altered by humans. Cultural achievements are all shaping transformations of a given material, as in technology, the fine arts, but also mental constructs as for example in law, ethics, religion, economics, and science.’) – Hebrew .‫ האמונות ותפיסות העולם כפי שהן באות לידי ביטוי בהתנהגותם של בני האדם‬,‫תרבות היא מכלול הערכים‬ ‫ בין השאר‬,‫אבני היסוד של התרבות הן‬

(‘Culture is a generality [collection] of the values, the beliefs, and perspectives [literally, world views] as they are expressed in the behavior of human beings. The foundational elements of culture are, among many, symbols, texts and myths.’) If we look at the above definitions we can see the unarguable similarity in the basic principles outlined by all three. However, it also is clear that di¤erences emerge in the way those principles are described in each language and as such, are targeting di¤erent linguistic audiences. Regardless of the slight di¤erences between each of the three definitions, it is clear that none of them has an entry on a ‘‘cultured’’ person or gives special attention to high culture. Therefore we can conclude that the Russian view of culture, as it is reflected in the definition itself, is di¤erent and may become a factor in the person’s adaptation to any society that does not share the same understanding, perception and appreciation of culture. Yet it would be incorrect to assume that the absence of any distinct cultural features in the definition itself would make the three host countries similar. Neither should we dismiss the possibility of losing the linguistic flavor due to translation. I showed only one way of looking at cultural di¤erences and examining possible integration/acculturation consequences created thereby. The United States, Germany and Israel

4.2.

Acculturation Framework: Culture

63

represent three di¤erent countries and each has a distinct economic, social, and cultural environment. I should not do an injustice to any of these countries by oversimplifying their complex cultural climate. Here I will mention only that the three countries in question drastically di¤er from each other and, in turn, all three are di¤erent from the native country of the immigrants. Therefore, by comparing the perception of the host country recorded among immigrants in each group we will arrive at collective portraits of the target cultures that will contribute to a better understanding of the host cultures viewed through the eyes of the immigrant groups coming from the same background. As the English definition suggests, the phenomenon of culture lacks clear boundaries between the elements of which it is composed and as such people representing it and those who come in contact with it negotiate it on a daily basis. Through studying the dynamic change in the individual’s perception of culture we can gain insight into those cultural traits that promote or hinder the process of the immigrant’s psychological acculturation in the host country. 4.2.3. Traditional antecedents The previous chapter gives a broad socio-demographic picture of the immigrants participating in the present study. Here I will limit myself to mentioning only the three factors that were chosen for analysis of cultural adaptation. First is the age factor. It is clear that depending on the age at which the person comes into a new country his adaptation may take di¤erent routes. The more life experience and connections with the past the person has the more di‰cult it may be for him to accept the new country. Second, both integration and acculturation may depend heavily on the level of second-language proficiency that the individual achieves in the host country. Conversely, better knowledge of the host language allows a better understanding and appreciation of a new culture. Finally this book looks at ethnicity as a factor in the acculturation process. 4.2.4. Acculturation process and consequences Having discussed all three sets of antecedents, we need to see how the consequences of acculturation can be analyzed on the basis of the above antecedents. First we need to look at the process of psychological acculturation. In this section, the latter is viewed through the initial perception of culture that changes over the period of immigration. The change in the perception, the level of the individual’s comfort in the host culture as well the immigrants’ need for the Russian-speaking community will be viewed as acculturation consequences.

64

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

4.3. Initial perception of the host culture/society What follows in this section is an analysis of the immigrants’ original perception of the host country prior to immigration or right upon immigration and their current view of their new country. It is important to know how the initial picture of the host country has changed in the minds of the newcomers and whether the produced change a¤ected the individual’s integration into the society. Would the cultural shock be produced by a move from more positive imagery to a more realistic and often negative reality? Or would any initial disappointments be overcome and facilitate the acculturation and integration process? The qualitative analysis based on the narratives will help us answer these questions. 4.3.1. US The analysis of narratives gathered from the US-based Russian immigrants produced an almost uniform picture of the original idealization of America. At least half the participants in this group directly reported that they had some sort of idealized picture of America prior to their immigration. – Idealization The majority of immigrants in the US group came to America either before the collapse of the USSR or right after it. The lack of available information about the world outside the Iron Curtain led many Russians to rely on the images and pictures formed through reading the Western – and American, in particular – literature, occasionally listening to the heavily jammed radio station ‘‘Voice of America’’ or through watching those rare Hollywood movies that were filtered carefully through Soviet censorship. As a result, the picture of a beautiful, often mysterious, economically prosperous country with freedoms and unlimited opportunities was formed among more than half the participants in this group. The US often was viewed in bright colors as a fairy tale country that was the best place in the world. It was a ‘‘forbidden fruit’’ that promised people a beautiful life where hardships often were overlooked. One of the participants describes her euphoric impression upon arrival in the US: ‘‘We came to one America and then moved to another. . . . We lived near Washington, DC, there is a Fairfax county there – a very neat place, almost like a showcase. I remember, there was a very friendly unemployed guy who was hanging out by the garbage bins. Those bins were so clean; it was like a

4.3.

Initial perception of the host culture/society

65

fairy tale place. . . . And the first thought that crossed my mind when I got out of the car when they pulled over at the hotel was: Even the dirt looks di¤erent here, it is a red soil, not as black as in Russia. . . .’’ (US: O., female, 52 years old)

A well-described exaggerated image of the idealized America is depicted in the following excerpt: ‘‘My perception of America was based on the photo exhibition that took place during Carter’s years. Americans came, they struck me as people. . . . They were young, beautiful smiling people with white teeth. I felt as though they were aliens, because they all wore red overalls and spoke a language that I could not understand and they were incredibly smiling. . . . And along was passing an ugly gray crowd, which was a hostile cold animal herd. . . . I was only 13 at that time but I promised myself that one day I would leave for America. . . .’’ (US: O., female, 49 years old)

Another participant adds to the above portrait: ‘‘It [the image] was based on the magazine America and our own dreams. It seemed that all was bright and glamorous and filled with beautiful people who were dressed in beautiful clothes and drove huge cars. . . .’’ (US: V., female, 55 years old)

– Powerful and dangerous The exaggerated image of the mysterious and beautiful country was supported by the lack of any reliable or firsthand information and further boosted by Soviet propaganda that depicted America as an aggressive country where the rich exploited the poor, the whites persecuted the blacks, and crime endangered people’s lives in the big cities. In the late 1980s there were not many people in Russia who sincerely believed any information they were fed by Soviet media sources. Having no trust in the government and no access to the world outside the USSR, most educated Russians learned how to read between the lines of the o‰cial information and often turned it upside down in an attempt to get to the seeds of truth. An image of a mysterious, powerful, and somewhat dangerous country was created in the minds of immigrants. As one of the participants puts it, ‘‘I saw it as very attractive, scary, and dangerous country which o¤ered lots of opportunities’’ (US: L., female, 50 years old). Another immigrant in this study explains the transformation between the two images, i.e., the propaganda-based one and the idealized one.

66

Culture: Change of the cultural perception ‘‘I imagined America in two di¤erent ways. First . . . before I met real Americans, it was based on the Soviet propaganda, that is here . . . here are either millionaires or beggars in the streets, that you cannot go outside because of a horrible criminal situation, that the government is corrupted on all levels, that political reporters are murdered and there is shooting in the streets. . . . Well, but at the same time people live in big houses . . . or in the dumpsters. And then I met young Americans and they opened my eyes – they told me a lot and showed me some pictures and magazines. I realized that my prior image was far from the truth. And I came up with a much more idealized idea of America based on those stories and the movies that they started showing in the 1980s.’’ (US: I., female, 40 years old)

– Urbanization like in Europe The biggest misconception about America was that Russian immigrants viewed it as another European country with a clear-cut divide between an urban and rural setting. The movies showing urban scenes and famous skyscrapers, pictures of New York City and Los Angeles’s Hollywood leaked somehow into the otherwise tightly closed Soviet society and created those images. This is what a respondent recalls in her interview: ‘‘For me America began with New York and smoothly transformed into Los Angeles. I could never imagine that there are so many small cities in the States. And in general the American society, its mentality, and economy are defined by these small cities that are located somewhere between New York and Los Angeles.’’ (US: V., female, 35 years old)

Realization that the ‘‘urban’’ image does not meet the reality brought a feeling of shock to some people. ‘‘I had a total shock . . . I could not imagine what the ‘one-story America’ is about. I never thought of this, it seemed to me that it will be a city with familiar-looking tall buildings, familiar streets with pedestrians. . . .’’ (US: E., female, 45 years old)

Needless to say, none of the New York-based participants expressed similar reactions to the lack of urbanization in America. To review, most of the immigrants in the US group had an idealized view of America as a dream country where beautiful people lead a prosperous life in beautiful houses. Even the Soviet propaganda that heavily

4.3.

Initial perception of the host culture/society

67

bombarded Russian people with negative messages about their major adversary could not disillusion people who remained adamant in their belief in the existence of a fairy tale place called America. Also, the vision of the country was somewhat approximated to the more familiar European cultural norm with a clear-cut divide between a city and a suburb. Later in this chapter we will see how some of the above misconceptions were destroyed and whether it produced much disappointment for the immigrants. 4.3.2. Israel Before we move on to discussing the results of the Israeli group I have to acknowledge that in the late 1980s–early 1990s – the time of the mass immigration from the USSR – the information regarding Israel was almost nonexistent in the former USSR. The diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR were severed, people could not travel to the country and correspondence with family members who had gone there earlier was scarce and irregular. This resulted in virtually no firsthand information about Israel. – No picture in mind The Soviet propaganda depicted Israel as a big aggressor and a ruthless occupier of the Palestinian lands. On a daily basis Soviet viewers and readers were exposed to military scenes of violence in disputed territories such as the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The lack of information on which people could form their initial expectation of the country is clear from the responses recorded in the Israeli group. Fifteen people said that they had no idea about the country prior to their immigration. Lack of information was a mixed blessing for many immigrants. This is what one of them recalls: ‘‘I knew so little about Israel. I had little idea of what it is. I think it helped me to make a decision. . . . If I had known more about Israel, the decision could have been di¤erent. . . . I was shocked during a 2.5-hour drive from the airport. . . . I was looking out of the window and was asking myself: What is this? That was shock . . . then, 19 years ago in 1991’’ (Israel: V., female, 48 years old)

Another immigrant filled in the information gap with her own picture of Israel.

68

Culture: Change of the cultural perception ‘‘How did I see it? It was almost like taking a bunch of Jews whom I knew in Lithuania, this is how I saw people here. I had little idea. I did not know that there is a desert here, I did not know that Jews are so di¤erent here and that cultures are di¤erent. I was not prepared for all this.’’ (Israel: R., female, 47 years old)

However, the majority of the participants in this group did have a vague expectation of what they would find in Israel upon arrival. – Vague picture of the terrain We cannot assume that college-educated immigrants in this group did not have a rough idea where Israel is located geographically. However, the absence of any photos or movie scenes giving a peek from the inside created a vague image of a hot country filled with the bright colors of a blue sky, yellow sand, and a blue sea. There was a vision of bananas and fruits; some did see a desert that had almost a Biblical sense about it. Listening to such interviews it is hard to remain untouched by the power of people’s desire to escape their native land and embark on an immigration path full of unknown things, even when the path leads to a place that is not clearly defined in the person’s mind. – Western civilized country The idea of finding a developed Western country with all the attributes pertaining to the image thereof was formed among many immigrants to Israel. Despite its geographical location in the heart of the Middle East and its clearly distinct terrain, Russian immigrants somehow expected to find a country that would look more European. ‘‘I thought that Israel was a more cultured country. More cultured and less Middle Eastern,’’ said one of the participants (Israel: R., female, 53 years old). Another immigrant thought that ‘‘it would be more of a Westernized country, a country with a Western and not Middle Eastern mentality.’’ (Israel: A., male, 56 years old)

As a result of the dominating Western image, some people reported that they expected it to be much cleaner and better organized. Israelis were thought to be more punctual and reliable. Interpersonal relationships were expected to be di¤erent as well.

4.3.

Initial perception of the host culture/society

69

– Jewish country In addition to an image of Western civilization, many immigrants admitted that they thought of it as a Jewish state in the first place. The idea of returning to their own land was comforting to many Jewish immigrants from the former USSR. That land, or as it is known to many, ‘‘holy land,’’ was envisioned as a happy place where all Jews would gather to love each other and be ‘‘brothers’’ in the words of one of the immigrants. Also, there was an expectation that all Israeli Jews would be similar to those well-educated and cultured people that most of the Russian Jewish immigrants belonged to in the USSR. ‘‘I saw Israel absolutely di¤erently. . . . In my mind Israel was . . . well, in the USSR they knew that Jews are intelligentsia, that it’s the top of the society, that it’s doctors, scholars, lawyers, and teachers. And I thought that here the society is going to be the same: developed, intelligent, and cultured. . . .’’ (Israel: M., male, 48 years old)

As the above excerpt shows, the majority of Russian immigrants to Israel were not driven by Zionist ideas, nor did they think of Judaism and Zionism as cornerstones on which the country was founded. In their view, the Jewish state would be characterized by a set of values that pertained to the large Jewish community in the former USSR, that is a secular, highly-educated and professionally-employed population having those clearly distinct Russian traits that classify a person as ‘‘cultured.’’ To summarize, the participants in the Israeli group had little or no information about the country of their destination prior to arrival. The vague picture of the exotic terrain mixed with an image of a Western country was complemented further with a view of the Jewish State where all Jews are brothers. All this is well captured in a quote from one of the interviews where the participant noted that she imagined Israel as a ‘‘distant, unfamiliar, Jewish, and heroic’’ place (Israel: I., female, 50 years old). 4.3.3. Germany I will remind the reader that immigration to Germany started much later compared to the other two countries and primarily was caused by the economic crisis of the 1990s in Russia. People who had not had any intention to leave prior to the crisis eventually left the collapsing USSR for

70

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

Germany. After the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 and the fall of the Iron Curtain many Russians finally could go abroad and see the world that had been hidden from them for so many years. Therefore a few participants in this group had traveled and visited Germany before they relocated there. Others could get some information from media sources. One would expect that under such circumstances people would have a more or less clear idea about the country that they chose to immigrate to. – No picture in mind Surprisingly, the majority of people in this group reported that they had no idea what Germany was like. Moreover, the decision to immigrate to Germany was no longer viewed as a one-way trip to most immigrants in this group. In case they did not like the new country they could return to their familiar native environment. Recall, this was not the situation with the majority of Russian immigrants coming to the US and Israel in the late 1980s–to-early 1990s. As one of the German participants puts it in her own words, ‘‘I never thought much about what kind of country it would be. I thought that I would go back if I did not like it’’ (Germany: M., female, 39 years old). Or as another person from the same age group added, ‘‘I cannot say that I do not like Germany or was disappointed in it. But I cannot say that I am ready to live here for the rest of my life and that I would not probably change a place of residence or would not be ready to go back to Russia. . . .’’ (Germany: O., female, 32 years old)

As you can see from the above excerpts, the lack of prior information about the host country or the absence of a clear image of Germany in their minds would not probably lead to a cultural shock or the sense of entrapment that immigrants in the Israeli or US groups could experience. The possibility of returning to the native land and having no need to burn bridges upon immigration may eventually a¤ect the way people view their host country. – Democratic European country Many people in this group expected to find exactly what they did – an economically-developed, well-organized, democratic country located in the heart of Europe. Its relative proximity to Russia, geographically,

4.4.

Change in the perception of host culture

71

historically and culturally, did not leave much room for misconceptions among immigrants, despite the initial lack of information or interest in learning more about the place of relocation. Germany was not as mysterious as Israel or as idealized as America. Clearly, it was a European country with all the attributes with which Russian immigrants were well familiar. However, there were obvious elements of idealization in the initial perception of the country. – Idealized picture Idealization of the future must be quite normal for immigrants when they make the tough decision to leave their native land. Immigrants in the German group were not an exception. Some idealized their expectations based on a stereotyped opinion about Germans as the nation that values order, punctuality, and cleanliness above all. ‘‘Zhvanetzky [a popular Russian standup comedian] once said that if you want to know Germany just go to a pharmacy and spend the night there. So I came to Germany. . . .’’ (Germany: B., male, 51 years old)

Others based their idealization on what they knew about the cultural achievements of Germans throughout history. As one immigrant says, she ‘‘saw Germany as the cultural capital of Europe, which is philosophers, writers, poets, musicians. . .’’ (Germany: N., female, 38 years old). Some visualized it based on pastoral pictures familiar from books as a country with ‘‘small houses, blond German women in baby blue dresses and aprons. . .’’ (Germany: J., female, 31 years old). Idealization also involved an unrealistically naı¨ve expectation that life in Germany is easy and almost carefree. To sum up, the initial perception of German culture was based on prior exposure to it through travel or through a broader accessibility of media sources. The cultural, historical and geographical proximity of Germany to Russia left few chances for any big surprises.

4.4. Change in the perception of host culture One of the consequences of psychological acculturation discussed in this chapter is the new perception of the culture that the immigrants acquired

72

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

through the process of getting to know their host country and adapting to the new cultural norms that they have encountered. In this section we will look at the clear trends that were identified in each group of participants. 4.4.1. US Despite much idealization in their initial take on the US most immigrants in this group reported certain elements of disillusionment but acknowledged their gratitude for and appreciation of living in America. Life in the US turned out not to be as easy and fabulous as it looked at first, Americans are no longer idealized as highly professional, and the economy is not as strong as it looked. Also it was reported that there are many poor people there, the bureaucracy is surprisingly robust, there is no abundance of goods and that the absence of a car in cities like Houston makes a person feel like a second class citizen. At the same time a somewhat negative picture that partly had been instilled by the Soviet propaganda was not realized either. The country is no longer viewed as dangerous, it is found to be clean (contrary to the Soviet picture of plastic and paper trash lying everywhere in the streets), and not all capitalists are seen as fat, as was depicted in Soviet cartoons. The initial shock of finding suburban-looking cities was overcome and resulted in a greater appreciation of the lifestyle in relatively small cities. ‘‘I appreciate this lifestyle now, in comparison with a big metropolis where I was born and grew up. So I think in those years I got an idea that this is what provides for the best life. Then I came here and have lived in those small cities and I came to appreciate this lifestyle in America given the Internet and cyber connection with the rest of the world. . . .’’ (US: V., female, 35 years old)

However, to some immigrants this cultural feature still remains an obstacle in their adaptation process. For example, a few participants from Houston acknowledged their desire to move from a ‘‘provincial and religious’’ region to a more urban setting like San Francisco, while one described his adjustment to American culture through a change in his perception of a regular American fence: ‘‘When I was leaving for America I thought: Wow! I am going to America! Then we came to Houston and I felt as though we came to a village, not a city, after Leningrad. There are some small houses. Now I have a house and there is a fence around it. And this fence is grey, not painted. Now I think it is

4.4.

Change in the perception of host culture

73

O.K. But first when I came I thought: My goodness, in any Russian village they would paint a fence in red, green, or blue. . . . And here the fence is really weird. . . . Now I find it all very comfortable. . . . I have children, one came here when he was 12. He is in Chicago now because he says that he wants to live in a CITY. . . .’’ (US: B., male, 56 years old)

Most people admitted that their present view of the country, as di¤erent as it may be from the original, is very positive and optimistic and that they are happy to be there. Further adjustment to the culture also overcomes the first negative impression, as is seen in the excerpt from a New York immigrant below: ‘‘It was di‰cult to get used to Brooklyn and what I saw on Brighton Beach. It was the most di‰cult impression. I remember I was scared to go outside, I felt depressed. It was ugly . . . I think that everything related to your dream and improvement of your life must be aesthetically appealing. At any rate, all dreams are always beautiful and are related to beautiful things. It was hard for me to imagine that a wonderful future could be as ugly as the street of Brighton Beach itself. I am not even saying what is there in that street. . . .’’ (US: N., female, 51 years old)

When asked what changed in her perception of Brooklyn and Brighton Beach, N. said that nothing has changed and that it was she who has changed. The latter demonstrates how immigrants adjust to the environment in the host country by changing their own perception of and attitude toward it. 4.4.2. Israel Compared with the US group, the Israeli participants had much less information about Israel prior to immigration. Moreover, there was an obvious reluctance in discussing their present view on the country in this group. Reading the interview excerpts related to the current perception of their host country what stands out as a remarkable feature is people’s overprotective attitude towards the country that they consider their new home. The obvious reluctance to elaborate on their changed perception of the country, whether it is positive or negative, and the acceptance of things the way they are, as the person would accept unconditionally his child or family, suggest a few things. First, there is no reason to doubt that the sense of belonging is strong among the Israeli immigrants. We will see the evidence of this in Chapter 7. Second, as mentioned in Chapter

74

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

3, Israel was chosen by 35.4% of the participants as the only alternative available at the time. Finally, we should not dismiss the possibility that participants could feel overprotective of their new home while discussing it with a non-Jewish researcher who left Israel for the US (note: many participants in this group directly asked me a question about my ethnicity). In response to the question about the change in their perception of Israel with time, many participants simply said that they consider it their country and their home and as such they accept it with all its flaws. ‘‘We have gotten used to something, settled down, have grown into something. Children grew up here and they love this country. Whether we want to or not, we begin loving it too,’’ said one of them (Israel: Z., female, 47 years old). Another immigrant who came to Israel 27 years ago brushed o¤ the question, ‘‘Your question sounds like if I love my mother and father. Of course, it’s like day and night, what I thought of it then and how I see it now. It’s my reality; you cannot compare a dream with the reality. . . .’’ (Israel: M., male, 71 years old)

One participant used a linguistic means to express her current attitude toward Israel. The Russian verb ‘‘zhit’’ (to live) can form derivatives by using di¤erent prefixes in the reflexive form, e.g., ‘‘szhit’sja’’ (to get lived in) and ‘‘prizhit’sja’’ (to get used to). ‘‘I have lived into it . . . Not gotten used to it, no. Gotten lived into it . . . I think of it as a family. There are some things that we can do and change . . . But there are some . . . You know, there is a wonderful phrase . . . ‘It makes no sense to fight the ocean.’ This is the country that I chose and it is the way it is. I found my place here. . . .’’ (Israel: O., female, 53 years old)

The above attitude indeed can be considered a healthy defense mechanism that helps a person in his adjustment to the new reality of immigration. One of the respondents described it in the following way: ‘‘How has my perception changed? It’s very simple. One day . . . I realized that this is my home and stopped comparing it. When you stop comparing it with the place you came from you look at Israel di¤erently. Now I look at it as my home.’’ (Israel: R., female, 59 years old)

4.4.

Change in the perception of host culture

75

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, most of the immigrants who came to Israel in the early 1990s chose a di‰cult path of no return. Indeed, with their Soviet citizenship revoked, no property or money left and having no alternative for immigration, there was no other choice but to get all their strength together and make the best of their lives. ‘‘There was a strong intention not to look back – there was no place to return to. . . . An economic crash happened in Russia at that time, all collapsed there. . . . There was no place to return to. We could not have bought an apartment there. In other words, there was no place to go back to and we had to go forward very fast, this time without looking back. . . .’’ (Israel: L., female, 36 years old)

Nevertheless, many people could provide their present take on Israel and its culture in more detail. First, the Western image got destroyed after years spent in the country. People who had a preconception of the ‘‘European type’’ of country had to accept Israel’s characteristic Middle Eastern nature. At the same time, some admit that the country became more civilized and cultured over the years and ascribe the change to the influence of the mass immigration from Russia. Second, the idealistic notion of the ‘‘Jewish brotherhood’’ shattered against the tough reality and caused certain disappointments among immigrants. Not necessarily all Israeli Jews turned out to be very intelligent. As in any country, there is a mix of people of di¤erent intellectual levels – a simple fact that many Russian Jews found di‰cult to accept given the wellestablished reputation of Russian Jews as a big part of the intelligentsia in Russia. Moreover, Russian immigrants were not prepared to find numerous ethnic groups among Israeli Jews and some, like Moroccans, were reported to be especially hostile towards Russian immigrants (see Chapter 1). As one of the participants described it in her interview, ‘‘I was happy that this is the Jewish country and I wanted to see it like this. It turned out that this is more of an Israeli than Jewish country, that there are people from di¤erent countries and of di¤erent intellectual levels here. It turned out that we have little in common with so-called Eastern Jews, like Ethiopians or Moroccans. . . . I thought that all Jews are brothers and we all are a family. Here it turned out that it’s far from that. . . .’’ (Israel: I., female, 48 years old)

Expectations did not clash with reality for some immigrants who chose to stay in the seclusion of their Russian-speaking professional circles, which are not rare in Israel. As one of the participants admitted, ‘‘Nothing

76

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

has changed in my view of the country because I tried not to leave the boundaries of the university lab’’ (Israel: O., male, 48 years old). As in the US group, there were a few people who commented on the worsened economic and political situation in the country that, in their view, changed their perception of Israel in a more negative direction. Others noticed that people are less friendly and are much tougher now, or that the entire Israeli culture has moved more towards individualism. ‘‘They say that individualism is high in America. It gets to the extent that even if you are friends with someone you have to make arrangements ahead of time if you want to visit the person. On the other hand, all doors are open in Russia; there was no such a thing as ‘privacy,’ as we call it. . . . I think we do not even have such a word in Russian. There is such a word in Hebrew. . . . Well, Israel was somewhere in between Russia and America in this respect. I think it is moving now more towards America than Russia. Yes, individualism. . . .’’ (Israel: B., male, 47 years old)

To summarize, the change in the perception of Israeli culture among participants can be described as a movement from a hypothetical point having a zero value (no information available) in the past to a certain value in the present. The idea of Israel as a Western country or a country where all Jews are brothers was as unrealistic and not rooted in reality as an ignorant belief that that there is no desert in the country. Those unsubstantiated images were destroyed by closer contact with the country. The vision of the country became more realistic and almost unconditional acceptance of the place reflects both rational and emotional feelings that immigrants might have about their new home. 4.4.3. Germany Reading through the excerpts in this group of participants, it becomes clear that German immigrants did not experience a cultural shock or big disappointments in their host country the way some Israeli and American immigrants did. It also is obvious that the older participants who came for economic reasons and heavily rely on the social support provided by the German government expressed their somewhat changed view of the country through the prism of diminished economic assistance. They still see Germany as a stable country where people are socially protected and life is peaceful. They openly praise Germany for what it has done for them but at the same time express disapproval of the German immigration

4.4.

Change in the perception of host culture

77

policy that, in their view, allowed in too many immigrants from other countries. The latter is quite surprising given the immigrants’ status of participants in this group. The younger participants who do not rely on or qualify for the government-subsidized programs also mentioned that their view of the country has changed and they see life as having gotten worse, both socially and economically, but it does not become the focal point of their narratives. On the contrary, they talk about a certain disillusionment concerning stereotypes that they preconceived in their minds upon immigration. Life turns out to be far from easy and involves struggle, people were less friendly, and a thriving bureaucracy destroys a stereotypical image of German order. However, some immigrants got to know Germans better and see them as not much di¤erent from Russians: ‘‘they are just better protected and are more peaceful than Russians’’ (Germany: I., female, 45 years old). Or as another immigrant noticed, ‘‘You have to live here to overwrite the wrong idea that neighbors do not know each other here and that nobody would help you – this is all nonsense! Germans are absolutely not like this. They are all di¤erent, like us, like people everywhere. . . .’’ (Germany: N., female, 54 years old)

If we remember the pastoral picture of German women in neat blue dresses, this is how the picture has changed in the words of the same immigrant. ‘‘Now I see a German woman as goal oriented, someone who knows what she wants. Two children, a husband in addition, but the career is what matters. I think people are very goal oriented here.’’ (Germany: J., female, 31 years old)

There were a few remarks about culture in the Russian sense of ‘‘high culture.’’ One participant said that culture is much higher in Germany than in Russia while another commented on the high aesthetic feeling that characterizes Germans and which served as the strongest incentive for her to choose Germany as the country of immigration. Then she sadly noticed that she ‘‘still believe[s] that aesthetic aspects are highly developed among people in this country but now [she] see[s] that they are more superfluous’’ (Germany: N., female, 38 years old). Also, a few participants stressed the individualistic nature of the society and the absence of the Russian concept of friendship. As one of the immigrants said,

78

Culture: Change of the cultural perception ‘‘In the Russian society we were raised in the atmosphere of a big collective. We were supposed to be friends and help each other without looking for any personal benefit. Here they try to teach this concept in a very naı¨ve childish way by putting together psychologically incompatible people in ‘Teamarbeiten’ [teamwork] and set a common goal for them. . . . They have no concept of what we know as friendship.’’ (Germany: I., female, 43 years old)

Another interesting observation pertinent to the scope of this book concerned the German language and how it was perceived as a reflection of the cultural norm. ‘‘The language is absolutely di¤erent. It’s like a file cabinet where one takes a phrase, cliche´, set expression out and then puts it back there and locks the cabinet. The same applies to people. When they come across something new or unusual they do not know in which folder to put it or whether one can clip it with a paper clip and put it into that file cabinet. . . .’’ (Germany: L., female, 46 years old)

What strikes me as di¤erent in this group of immigrants is that their attitude toward Germany and perception of German culture are devoid of any emotional charge, neither positive nor negative. This sets it apart from the other two groups. A few older people said that they like the country because it gave them such wonderful shelter but nobody openly claimed it as home in the interview. Only one immigrant (T., male, 36 years old) said that he found his second Motherland there. To sum up, immigrants in this group had more realistic expectations of the new host country than in the other two groups, yet they went through their own change in how they viewed the country. The major aspects of the initial perception were retained, that is the European democratic essence of the stable, well-developed and highly suitable for life country. The major disillusionment concerned nuances of the German reality rather than any principal aspects that could have been misconstrued by immigrants upon their immigration. 4.5. Host cultures/societies: Collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other’’ Now we will look at how Russian immigrants view the major di¤erences between Russian culture and society and their host cultures. Through discussing those di¤erences we will be able to construct a collective portrait of the ‘‘cultural other.’’ The collective pictures of the host culture will add

4.5.

Host cultures/societies: Collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other’’

79

to the above discussion of the changed perception of the host countries among immigrants. Through the analyses of those features that immigrants perceive as negative in their host countries we may reconstruct those cultural components that are essential, still valued and probably missed by immigrants in their new environments. Before we proceed to discussing the host cultures as they are viewed by immigrants I would like to acknowledge a question often asked by immigrants in this study: What culture and society do you want me to compare it with: Soviet or Russian? Most of the immigrants in this study left Russia either before or right after the collapse of the USSR. They grew up and lived most of their adult lives in the communist country. Most of the people left because they no longer wanted to remain in the system that they hated so much. Therefore when talking about their native land they often referred to those aspects of life that could be considered political rather than cultural. However, it becomes extremely hard to di¤erentiate between the two or separate them. Rather we have to admit that both cultural traditions and historical events contribute to the formation of culture. If a person has spent his life in a country where politics often marred culture and cultural constructs provided the foundation for the political system it is di‰cult to see them separately. The analysis of narratives in the immigrant groups revealed two levels at which the participants di¤erentiated Russian culture from the host one, that is the societal level and the individual or interpersonal level. In addition, di¤erences were specified as either superior or inferior in one or another culture. It may be problematic for the reader to agree with the somewhat arbitrary classification of positive versus negative features in this analysis. For example, friendliness may be seen universally as a positive feature and rudeness as a negative one. However, the observation that people are either distant from each other or reserved in their behavior does not have in itself any negative connotation. To insure the accuracy of these judgments, three Russian native speakers, blind to the goal of the analysis, went over the list of features and marked positive versus negative features based on Russian cultural norms. 4.5.1. US: Societal level American society was viewed as more superior than the Soviet one by all but one participant. The following features repeatedly were named as superior and inferior:

80

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

Positive features – freedom – lawfulness – privacy – respect of the individual and his rights – social and economic protection – tolerance of cultural di¤erences Negative features – individualism – aggression in foreign policy The order in which the features are listed above reflects the frequency of their occurrence in the narratives. Freedom and democracy were praised highly by participants who had not had a chance to experience those values in their native country. Russian immigrants may understand the concept of freedom more broadly than do Americans. To Russian participants in this study, freedom means not only the freedom of speech, but as a few pointed out, freedom of thinking, economic freedom, and freedom of movement. The latter truly can be appreciated by people who had little opportunity to travel outside the USSR or even relocate within the country. Lawfulness or law enforcement was another feature that immigrants appreciate in their new country. This may especially be important for those who left Russia in the mid-1990s, years that were known as a time of corruption, unlawfulness, and crime in the former USSR. The next feature, mentioned both in the societal and individual comparisons, refers to the way the society protects the private property of its citizens – a feature that successfully was destroyed by 70 years of communism in Russia. Next, immigrants mentioned the respect with which the country treats its own citizens. Having come from a country where human life clearly was devalued and people were treated with much negativity and lack of any respect by the authorities, the basic respect that the American society shows to its citizens and the way a person is raised are highly appreciated by Russian immigrants. As one of the participants who spent 30 years in America said: ‘‘. . . It is all about the human being in America. The person is respected from the time he is a baby. The individuality is respected; the person has a right to have his own opinion. . . . There is no such a thing in America as ‘Who are you to feel that you can talk!’’’ (US: V., female, 55 years old)

4.5.

Host cultures/societies: Collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other’’

81

Social and economic security is a feature that any immigrant, as a representative of a socially vulnerable group, must appreciate in his new country. It is not surprising that at least one participant mentioned it in the interview. The last one on the list of positive features is tolerance of cultural features. Here is an excerpt clarifying the point: ‘‘I think American society is more open [tolerant] and adaptable to people and their lifestyles that may be di¤erent from theirs. I think people are more open to the possibility of a di¤erent lifestyle here.’’ (US: V., female, 35 years old)

One participant who demonstrated much dissatisfaction with her life in America and pledged love for Russia named aggression as a negative feature. The concept of individualism, on the other hand, is a recurring theme in the narratives and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 4.5.2. US: Interpersonal level Another list of features deals with the interpersonal relations that immigrants found di¤erent in American culture. Positive features – polite – well-mannered (cultured) – friendly – honest – kind – warm – active – open – do not invade privacy – altruistic Negative features – no real friendship – less open in interaction – cold – not passionate – distant – not well rounded (primitive)

82 – – – – – –

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

naı¨ve (too trusting) poor taste in clothes hypocritical (fake smiles) no appreciation of high culture pragmatic invest less time and e¤ort in interpersonal relations

The above long list of qualities mentioned by the participants indicate that the cultural di¤erences are more sensed at the interpersonal than the societal level and relate to the everyday life in the host country. Some of the features are contradictory, e.g., a participant may see Americans as warm while another may say that they are colder than Russians, meaning that they are devoid of Russian passion. The same occurs with openness: ‘‘openness’’ in the positive sense relates to American friendliness while the lack thereof is seen in Americans’ reluctance to have the heart-to-heart conversations that are important in Russian culture. Also, friendliness, associated with the well-known American smiles, is seen both as an asset and a flaw. The person who mentioned hypocrisy as a cultural feature referred to the same smiles that other participants found appealing in Americans. The positive collective portrait of an American is that of a polite, well-mannered, friendly, smiling, warm and kind person. He does not pry into other people’s lives, minds his own business, does not touch what is not his, actively participates in the matters of his country and is capable of giving back to society. At the same time, the negative portrait is that of a person incapable of having real friends or investing in deep relationships, someone who holds back in communication, who is cold, hypocritical, not well rounded (not ‘‘cultured’’) or well dressed, who has little appreciation of high culture and bases his actions on pragmatic goals. A few participants reported similarities rather than di¤erences between the two cultures and pointed out social and educational factors that should be considered when making such comparisons. To conclude, when analyzing narratives in this group of participants we may predict that Russian immigrants to the US may miss the level of friendship that is di¤erent in two cultures. Also, immigrants representing the class of Russian intelligentsia may find it di‰cult to find people who would have the same level of appreciation of high culture among Americans whom they meet in their everyday life. 4.5.3. Israel: Societal level When discussing the Israeli culture and society the participants repeatedly commented on the huge gaps that exist between di¤erent social classes and

4.5.

Host cultures/societies: Collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other’’

83

groups in Israel that make it hard for them to talk about the society at large. Many downgraded their professional status upon immigration. ‘‘You can talk about the society that you see. . . . In Russia we were in the circles of academic and technical intelligentsia, mostly Jewish. Here we went straight to the very bottom of the society, so I cannot compare Soviet and Israeli societies. You can only compare relevant classes and we could not do this. . . .’’ (Israel: B., male, 69 years old)

The negative attitude of Russian immigrants toward Israeli culture has been mentioned by Remennick (2007) who provided an explanation similar to the one cited above. In addition, several immigrants openly admitted that they do not know Israeli society because they stay in the Russian-speaking community. As paradoxical as it may sound, after almost 20 years in Israel, an immigrant comments: ‘‘Well, I do not know Israeli society because I do not know the language. I was educated in Russian society; I lived there and continue living there. I like Russian TV. I continue living the life I had there, with the only di¤erence – I live this life in Israel.’’ (Israel: F., male, 60 years old)

However, the majority of participants could o¤er their opinion about Israeli culture and society. Below are characteristic features of Israeli society that were mentioned by immigrants. As with the US group, the order reflects the frequency that the features occurred in the narratives: Positive features – freedom – high value of human life – open – advanced – democratic – friendly – positive – not violent (more peaceful) – stable – opportunities for self-expression – honest – safe for Jews

84

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

Negative features – primitive – Middle-Eastern – isolationist (outsiders are not welcome) – discrimination – mentality of a small country – low educational level – antagonistic – ‘‘high culture’’ is low – no solidarity among people (only get together in wars) – hazing in the army As in the US group, Russian immigrants in Israel appreciate the freedom they found in their new home. Along with openness, it topped the list of positive features. Also, human life is valued highly in Israel and albeit crime occurs, violence is rare. The society is seen as more advanced, democratic, and friendly. Despite its volatile political situation and military instability Russian immigrants view Israel as more stable than the USSR. A few immigrants see a great advantage of living in Israel because it gives them a sense of security that, in their view, Jews can find only in their own state. However, there was a rather long list of negative features to describe the society and culture. The society has clear Middle Eastern features that continue to clash with the immigrants’ expectations of a more Western country. In their view, Israel is more primitive and has few educated and cultured people. The concept of high culture is scaled lower there, too. Compared to Russia and its imperial ambitions, they see Israel as a small country exhibiting the complexes of a small nation. In addition, diverse ethnic groups living in Israel create a sense of disparity and a lack of solidarity among people. As one immigrant mentioned, only in wars do people get together as a nation but lately even that unifying factor has weakened. The society is seen as antagonistic, impolite, and showing discrimination towards newcomers or immigrants of a particular ethnic background. 4.5.4. Israel: Interpersonal level Before we discuss the interpersonal features reported by this group, I have to remind the reader that the Israeli group is di¤erent from the other two groups in the level of their expectations of Israeli culture. Both American and German immigrants based their idea and initial perception of the host

4.5.

Host cultures/societies: Collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other’’

85

culture on stereotypes that were borrowed from reading books, watching movies or just rejecting the images instilled by Soviet propaganda. Immigrants to the US and Germany had no reason to expect to find people exactly like them in those two countries. However, many Jewish immigrants who grew up among other Jews – often highly educated people – had a misconception that Jews are all the same and that in Israel they would find people similar to what they were used to, with the only di¤erence that those people would be speaking a di¤erent language. ‘‘For people who came here with the expectation of finding Jews like in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev, to see all Israel intelligent and rational – for those people, apparently, it was a big disappointment.’’ (Israel: V., female, 48 years old)

In other words, the disappointment in the culture may be partly explained by wrong expectations based on the naı¨ve idea that all Jews are alike. To return to the results of this analysis, a few participants suggested that the mentality is absolutely di¤erent in Israel but failed to elaborate on what they meant by mentality. As is the case in society in general, a few immigrants said that they feel comfortable living among their own (Jewish) people, as culturally diverse as they might be. Note that nobody in the other two groups expressed their sense of belonging in this way. Below are the lists of major interpersonal features that the immigrants in this group o¤ered to characterize Israelis. Positive features – open – friendly – warm – proud to be Jewish – independent – determined Negative features – loose manners – impolite – low education – laid-back – low culture – rude (but not violent) – chutzpa (extreme rudeness)

86

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

– – – – – – –

education and ‘‘culture’’ do not go together nervous interaction bad driving lack of self-control untrustworthy invest less in interpersonal communication poor taste in clothes

Cultural di¤erences at the interpersonal level reported by the Israeli group show the features that immigrants highly value in Israelis and those that they may find di‰cult to make peace with. The positive portrait of the Israeli is that of an open, warm, friendly person who is proud to be a Jew. At the same time this person exhibits bad manners, can deceive others easily, and can be extremely rude (but not violent!). His erratic behavior creates a nervous atmosphere in the streets and on the roads. A few immigrants remarked that chutzpa (borrowed from Hebrew) can be witnessed among educated people, which was quite rare for Russian culture. This led to the remark that education and culture can be mutually exclusive in Israel. Like American immigrants, participants in this group indicated that the level of interpersonal communication among Israelis is di¤erent and that they invest little in personal relationships. Like their American counterparts, immigrants in this group commented on ‘‘poor taste in clothes’’ among Israelis. The latter is an important cultural trait for Russians, i.e., people pay more attention to the way they are dressed than is common in the West. This could be observed clearly by Westerners visiting big Russian cities in recent years. To sum up, the Israeli immigrants value the free democratic spirit of the country as well as Israelis’ friendliness and warmth. They also value the sense of security that Israel o¤ers to Jews. However, the reported Israeli rudeness and low level of etiquette along with the somewhat lower cultural level may take Russian immigrants out of their comfort zone. I should mention that none of the participants in this group mentioned friendship or lack thereof as a cultural feature characterizing Israelis. Thus we cannot make the same prediction as we did for the US group that immigrants in this group would miss the concept of friendship. The omission also could be explained by the sheer size of the Russian community in Israel and its relative closeness. Russians in Israel might have fewer reasons to miss friendship: often their old friends from Russia also had moved to Israel and/or they easily acquired new friends from the big immigrant population in Israel. What becomes evident in both groups, i.e., the US and Israel, is that Russian immigrants may long for what they

4.5.

Host cultures/societies: Collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other’’

87

had known as ‘‘high culture’’ and ‘‘highly cultured’’ (read: intelligentsia) people while living in their respective host countries. 4.5.5. Germany: Societal level Now we will examine the responses gathered from the Russian immigrants in Germany. As in the above analyses, the immigrants’ take on the host culture and society is broken down into descriptions of the societal and the interpersonal features. Positive features – lawful (less crime, law is enforced and respected) – order/regulation – freedom – high cultural level – society does not intrude into private life Negative/neutral features – mono-national – prejudiced against newcomers – self-centered – school education is low The analysis of the narratives gathered among Russian immigrants in Germany adds to the findings from the other two groups: immigrants from the former USSR highly appreciate those values that they lacked in the native country, i.e., freedom and lawfulness are among them. German participants stressed lawfulness as one of the major features even more. There is no reason to doubt that the law is enforced and respected in Germany as much as in the US: recall, the US participants praised the lawfulness of American society as well. However, German law enforcement may be viewed as a more remarkable and praiseworthy feature to immigrants who came to the country in the middle 1990s. As you remember, unlawfulness, corruption, crime, and an economic crash marked the post-Soviet reality in those years and forced thousands of Russians to immigrate to Germany. What sets this group apart from the other two is that they see the host culture as higher than the Russian. By culture I mean here the Russian concept of ‘‘high culture.’’ Also, like their Israeli counterparts, the participants in this group commented on the society’s prejudices against newcomers. However, the respondent retreated by saying:

88

Culture: Change of the cultural perception ‘‘When they get used to the immigrant, like in my example, they see him as almost equal to them. But first prejudice and caution . . . Anyway, we understand that we are not at home here. . . .’’ (Germany: Y., male, 61 years old)

4.5.6. Germany: Interpersonal level At the interpersonal level the following features were reported: Positive features – uninhibited – polite – self-respectful – respect others – orderly – responsible – organized – do not pry – kind – tolerant – etiquette and manners are high – aesthetically more developed – independent – plan their life Negative features – closed – reserved – distant – cold – calculating – indi¤erent to others As is seen from the lists above, Russian immigrants in Germany see many more positive than negative features in Germans. Based on the immigrants’ narratives, the collective portrait of a German, as they see him, would be of a kind, polite independent person who is uninhibited in his behavior. This person has a high sense of self-respect and knows how to respect others. Above all, this person is praised for his ability to organize and plan his life and to be orderly in life matters. The important virtue for

4.5.

Host cultures/societies: Collective portraits of the ‘‘cultural other’’

89

Russians is the high level of etiquette, manners and appreciation of high culture that they see in Germans. At the same time, the negative portrait would depict a very reserved person who is distant, closed and indi¤erent. He is seen as a calculating person who may conflict with the Russian irrationality. It is interesting to notice that at least one participant likened East Germans to Russians. ‘‘East Germans, despite that they are Germans, are pretty much like people who grew up in Russia. So I may say that the social and political system, not just the nationality, leaves a trace on the individual.’’ (Germany: E., female, 33 years old)

To sum up, based on the analysis of this group we may anticipate that immigrants could miss friends and warm close relationships with people. However, it is unlikely that Russians in this group would report on high culture as an element that they miss in Germany. The country that culturally and historically is not as distant from Russia undoubtedly o¤ers su‰cient exposure to the familiar high culture 4.5.7. Summary In this section, the group analyses show collective views of three cultures, i.e., American, Israeli, and German, and reconstruct the ‘‘cultural other.’’ Caution should be exercised in order not to stereotype the cultures, oversimplify the picture or make any far-reaching claims. The attempt here was to look at the three cultures and societies in question, as di¤erent as they may be, through the eyes of 154 Russian immigrants residing in those countries. Given the same cultural and educational background but di¤erent cultural settings, those immigrants might give us an insider’s look at the respective cultures and show what particular traits are valued or despised by Russian immigrants. As I mentioned before, the collective portraits of the host cultures or the ‘‘cultural other’’ are not treated separately, rather they add to the analysis of the change of perception of those cultures. Through the analysis of culture perception and its change we could see how immigrants gradually overcome the major clashes between their initial perception of the culture and their current attitude toward it. Thus, I am not trying to dispute the evidence that immigrants adjusted to their new environments through the collective portraits of the host cultures that are reported in this section. On the contrary, the generalized picture of the respective cultures through the eyes of real people may give us a deeper insight into the acculturation process. Not only may we see what

90

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

people embrace in their new settings but also what they find di‰cult to accept. If we look at all three groups it is clear that regardless of their initial perception of the host cultures the immigrants came to appreciate the same values in their new homes, that is, the values of which they were deprived in the USSR. Among them are freedom, democracy, and lawfulness. They also embrace people’s friendliness, openness, and kindness. Coming from a society where high culture was highly valued many participants in the American and Israeli groups feel a lack of the same level of appreciation in those countries. Furthermore, the Israeli participants have a problem with accepting negative features such as rudeness and loose manners that, according to their accounts, also can be encountered at higher societal levels in Israel. Remennick (2007) provides a few legitimate reasons why Russian immigrants may feel alienated from Israeli culture. According to her, their background in a predominantly white environment with little racial or ethnic diversity did not prepare them well for the reality of the Israeli melting pot. Second they were found to be prejudiced against Israeli minorities: 30% expressed a negative attitude towards Moroccan immigrants, 40% towards Ethiopians, and over 80% towards Arabs. Finally, as a new immigrant group to Israel they found themselves on the lower tiers of the Israeli structure and formed their opinion about Israeli culture based on the culture to which they were exposed, i.e., the culture of Jews coming from Muslim Arab countries. If all this holds true for this group then we could expect the same level of alienation among German and American immigrants. Remember that German participants downgraded their professional standing even more than the Israeli group and might have been competing for jobs along with other German immigrants, such as Turks and Arabs. By the same token, American immigrants might have commented negatively on the diverse culture of the US, which is an even bigger melting pot than Israel. Israel absorbs immigrants of di¤erent ethnic and cultural backgrounds given that they claim the major factor uniting them as a nation, which is their Jewish roots. America does not have a single unifying criterion on which it grants immigrant status to the individual. Arguably, the negative features that Israeli immigrants ascribe to their host culture could not be explained simply by the factors suggested by Remennick (2007). As the results of the analyses in this section indicate, the other two groups, i.e., American and German, do not reveal such negative features in their take on their new cultural environment.

4.6.

91

Nostalgia

4.6. Nostalgia The next question raised in this chapter concerns nostalgia or a feeling of missing the past. Nostalgia is a very familiar concept in Russian culture. Partly poeticized in literature and music, partly based on tragic examples of Russian immigrants of the first wave (see Chapter 1), nostalgia has become one of the inherent feelings that often are ascribed to Russians. Boym (2001) gives an anecdotal example of how nostalgia was seriously viewed as a contagious decease: ‘‘The French doctor Jourdan Le Cointe suggested in his book written during the French Revolution of 1789 that nostalgia had to be cured by inciting pain and terror. As scientific evidence he o¤ered an account of drastic treatment of nostalgia successfully undertaken by Russians. In 1733 the Russian army was stricken by nostalgia just as it ventured into Germany, the situation becoming dire enough that the general was compelled to come up with a radical treatment of the nostalgic virus. He threatened that ‘the first to fall sick will be buried alive.’ This was a kind of literalization of the metaphor, as life in the foreign country seemed like death. This punishment was reported carried out on two or three occasions, which happily cured the Russian army of complaints of nostalgia. (No wonder longing became such an important part of the Russian national identity).’’ (p. 5)

One of the yes/no questions in the socio-linguistic questionnaire concerned nostalgia, i.e., whether the person ever misses Russia and if he does he was supposed to specify what exactly he misses. Not everyone provided an answer for the latter but all answered the question on nostalgia itself. Table 4.1 summarizes group results. As is seen in the table the highest number of people missing their home country is in the German group and the lowest is in Israel, while the US group was split almost evenly, 51% to 49%. Table 4.1. Nostalgia I Country/Nostalgia (%)

Yes

No

US

51

49

Israel

40

59.6

Germany

60.8

39.2

92

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

Another analysis was performed on the specific things that Russian immigrants miss in their new host countries. Table 4.2 summarizes the results. As before, they are placed in chronological order reflecting the frequency of their occurrence in the participants’ responses. It is not surprising that the notion of friendship and friends topped the list for all three groups. Remember, we made a prediction that the Russian concept of friendship would be missed at least in two groups, i.e., Germany and the US. It was suggested that the Israeli participants might be missing their friends less due to the big Russian presence in Israel and the fact that many of their old friends might have moved to Israel too. However, we cannot draw the conclusion that Israeli Russians miss their friends as much as the other two groups given the much smaller percentage of people reporting nostalgia in that group in the first place. Table 4.2. Nostalgia II US

Israel

Germany

Friends

Friends

Friends

Past/youth

Hometown

Hometown

Family/relatives

Russian nature

Family

Hometown

Family

Past

Russian nature

European culture

Russia in general

Russian language

Past/youth

Motherland

Cultural artifacts (dacha)

Mentality

Russian language

City life

All

Traditions and holidays

Russian lifestyle

Food Music and movies Carefree Soviet time

The concept of friendship and its vitality within Russian culture will be discussed more in Chapter 5. Here I will limit myself to citing a German immigrant: ‘‘I think it is not right to use the word ‘friend’ talking about Germans, ‘acquaintance’ would sound better. They can and often do help and give advice but they still keep their distance. It’s hard to explain, it is easier to feel during the communication. . . .’’ (Germany: I., female, 45 years old)

4.7.

Socio-linguistic factors and comfort in the new country

93

Among other things shared by all three groups were native cities, family, and a past that often was referred to as youth/childhood or work that the person had in his previous life. Russian nature took third place for the Israeli group and fifth for American immigrants. Immigrants in the US (Houston, in particular) reported that they miss the city lifestyle. The Israeli immigrants miss the European culture and mentality while German immigrants who fully enjoy the European lifestyle admitted missing the Motherland and Russia in general. Two groups, American and German, long for the Russian language as a means of communication as well as the language that they can hear in the street while understandably the Israeli group did not mention the lack of Russian in their present life. One of the American participants captured the concept of longing for Russia in the following: ‘‘No, it’s not nostalgia for Russia, it’s what it represents: myself, my family, my youth, the language, my love for Russian word, literature. . . .’’ (US: N., female, 51 years old).

4.7. Socio-linguistic factors and comfort in the new country Now we will turn to a few socio-linguistic factors that may contribute to the level of comfort the individual has in the new cultural environment. The participants were asked to identify in which culture they feel more comfortable, i.e., Russian, host, or both. These data were analyzed against the factor of age, ethnicity and proficiency in the language of the new country. Language proficiency was evaluated through the participants’ self-report and may not provide the most accurate measure. At the same time, Marian, Blumenfeld and Kaushanskaya (2007) found that self-reported ratings of language proficiency correlated with behavioral performance. The participants were supposed to assess their language proficiency on a scale of six choices (very good, good, O.K., pretty bad, bad, and nonexistent). The first two were grouped in the category of ‘‘good’’ and the last four in the category of ‘‘poor.’’ Table 4.3 summarizes the results based on this analysis.

94

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

Table 4.3. Language proficiency vs. comfort in the new culture Group/level of comfort (%)

Proficiency level in L2

More comfort in host culture

Equal in both

More comfort in Russian culture

US

Good (52) Poor (48)

23.1 16.7

46.2 29.2

30.7 54.2

Israel

Good (52) Poor (48)

15.4 0

38.5 20.8

46.2 79.2

Germany

Good (38.5) Poor (61.5)

15 6.3

30 9.4

55 84.4

The majority of American and Israeli immigrants admitted that their skills in the second language are good (52% for both), while the majority of German immigrants still struggle with German (61.5%). As can be expected, there were more people with good language proficiency than poor language skills who claimed more comfort in their new culture. However, those who find the new culture more comfortable still represent the minority. The majority of people seem to lean towards their native culture or feel equally comfortable in both. Undeniably, the poor language skills are correlated positively with the individual’s desire to stay within their native culture. The trend is especially prominent for the Israeli and German groups where 79.2% and 84.4%, respectively, reported their comfort only in Russian culture. Table 4.4. Age vs. comfort in the new culture Group/level of comfort (%)

Age: older (55 & up); younger (32–45)

More comfort in host culture

Equal in both

More comfort in Russian culture

US

Older younger

17.4 25

30.4 33.3

47.8 41.7

Israel

Older younger

0 11

23.5 55.6

76.5 33.3

Germany

Older younger

0 30.4

95.2 60.9

4.8 8.7

4.8.

Russian community

95

The identical trend was identified in the analysis of age as a factor (Table 4.4). The older participants in all three countries feel more comfortable staying in the Russian cultural environment, the pattern featuring more strongly in the Israeli and German groups (76.5% and 95.2%, respectively), whereas the US group shows an almost equal split between the two age groups feeling more comfortable in Russian culture or equally comfortable in both. At the same time, the US group had a higher percentage of younger people who find more comfort in American culture (25% vs. 11% and 8.7% for Israel and Germany, respectively). When the data on the level of comfort in the host culture were broken down in terms of ethnicity the following results were found (Table 4.5). The majority of participants of both Jewish and non-Jewish ethnicity still lean more toward Russian culture and the numbers are much higher for Jewish participants in the German group. On the other hand, more nonJewish than Jewish participants feel more comfort in all three host cultures. Despite the relatively low numbers in that category in general we can identify an emerging trend of non-Jewish immigrants showing a better adaptation to the new cultural environment than do their Jewish counterparts. The trend may look even more puzzling if we consider the Israeli case where non-Jewish immigrants are allegedly under a double-edged sword of societal pressure, i.e., as newcomers from Russia and as nonJews in the Jewish state (see Chapter 6 for more details). Table 4.5. Ethnicity vs. comfort in the host culture Group/ preference (%)

Ethnicity

More comfort in host culture

Equal in both

More comfort in Russian culture

US

Jews Non-Jews

11 25

36 25

53 50

Israel

Jews Non-Jews

7 11

32 11

61 78

Germany

Jews Non-Jews

6 15

9 30

85 55

4.8. Russian community Having discussed the change in the perception of culture, the current view of the major cultural di¤erences between Russia and the respective coun-

96

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

tries, socio-linguistic factors that may account for the level of comfort that immigrants have in one culture versus another and having identified what and why immigrants miss in their host countries, we will move on to the next issue in this chapter – the role of the Russian community for Russian immigrants. Close ties with the community representing their home culture may serve as a safe harbor and a means of survival for many immigrants. Some may need and rely on it more than others and some simply may have more access to it. The majority of immigrants in this study reside in places with relatively large Russian communities. Only 3 immigrants come from Columbus, Ohio (US), where the Russian population is rather small. Conversely, the lack of need for the community does not necessarily translate into the lack of community per se. First we will look at the results of the questionnaire and then analyze the narratives. The questionnaire asked participants to specify the proportion of Russianspeaking friends that they have in their social network. The results are presented in Table 4.6. People representing the host country are hypothetically labeled ‘‘native’’ speakers in this Table (e.g., English speakers, Hebrew speakers, and German speakers). Table 4.6. Friends (%) Friends/group (%)

US

Israel

Germany

Only Russian speakers

14

15.7

21.2

More Russian speakers

58

60.8

59.6

Equal

16

11.8

7.7

More natives

12

9.8

11.5

Only natives

0

2

0

As the results in Table 4.6 indicate, all three groups have a high percentage of friends from the Russian-speaking environment. The combined results for ‘‘only Russian speakers’’ and ‘‘more Russian speakers’’ produced even higher numbers, i.e., 72% for the US, 76.5% for Israel, and the highest, 80.8%, for Germany. The analysis of narratives gives us insight into why the Russian-speaking community and communication with people from the same cultural background remain important for Russian immigrants. One of the questions in the interview related to the individual’s connection with the Russian community. It should be acknowledged that oftentimes a question about the ‘‘Russian community’’ was corrected by

4.8.

Russian community

97

immigrants who preferred to call it a ‘‘Russian-speaking community’’ (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). This suggests that that there is a certain level of sensitivity when Russian immigrants are generalized as Russians. The following excerpt illustrates this: ‘‘. . . No, I feel no need in this now . . . because . . . I would like again to stress that you are talking about the Russian community. I would mildly put it as the Russian-speaking community. I would probably love to be with the Russian community but not with the Russian-speaking community that I see here. . . .’’ (US: S., male, 62 years old)

The results of the content analysis of the narratives are presented as follows. First, we will identify the general trends shared by all three groups. Then we will look for any trends that may be specific to one group only. Finally, we will look at those narratives, albeit they are in the minority, in which participants expressed no interest or need in staying with the community. As before, the interview excerpts will illustrate the findings. Common trends – shared past, culture, language – shared mentality – insu‰cient knowledge of the host language – age factor – comfort zone – need to pass culture and language on to children In all three groups immigrants reported almost identical feelings of being part of Russian culture and as such having a need to be with those people who can identify and share the same values, interests, and the desired level of communication. ‘‘I am Jewish by nationality but a person of Russian culture. How can I ever not maintain ties with the Russian-speaking people – which would be equal to taking me away from the culture? I think in Russian, I understand in Russian, my associations are Russian. . . . I think it’s the greatest culture in the world.’’ (Israel: A., male, 56 years old)

However, many participants pointed out that those shared values are not decisive factors in their choice of a circle of friends in immigration and in the end all depends on the human qualities, the common level of interests, and compatibility.

98

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

In all three groups, the participants admitted language problems that prevent them from having an equal level of communication with the natives in the host country. Language problems varied from no language at all to language that is not fluent enough to express complex intellectual matters. I will present the detailed socio-linguistic analysis on language maintenance later in the book (see Chapter 8). The inability to maintain the same level of intellectual communication with the natives made the Russian community the only alternative for the individual. A Russianspeaking writer in America takes the linguistic problem in communication to a metaphorical extreme: ‘‘Regretfully, my English is only colloquial. I do not read in it, because it would require much e¤ort and won’t give me any pleasure. For me language is not just the air in which I live but also the only source of pleasure.’’ (US: O., female, 49 years old)

Some people said that it’s easier and more comfortable for them to be in a group of Russian-speaking friends. Others came to the country at an age at which they feel it is too late to adjust to the new culture or acquire friends from a di¤erent cultural and linguistic background. A few added that they feel it is important to maintain Russian outside their families in order to provide more exposure to Russian culture and the Russian language to their children. In addition to the trends that were common to all three groups there were a few clearly identified reasons that were specific to one or two groups. They are listed below. Trends specific to the group(s) – rejection, then acceptance (US, Germany) – community is unavoidable (Israel) – unavailability, then acceptance (Israel) In both the German and American groups there were a few participants who admitted their initial desire to disconnect themselves from any contacts with the community. Later they reversed their decision but the reasons di¤ered for each group. An immigrant in Houston tells a story of how he deliberately rejected any exposure to Russian in his early years of immigration:

4.8.

Russian community

99

‘‘It was a period of rejection when I had a fixed idea that I would be able to speak English with no accent. Of course I could not; I realized that pretty fast. . . . Yet I refused to watch Russian movies, I did not listen to. . . . Many people, who came later, watch the Russian TV; listen to the music and their language advances very slowly. I could not a¤ord this. I was alone and had to support my child. So my goal was to stand on my feet very well and not to rely on anyone. . . . Now it’s di¤erent, I have Russian communication.’’ (US: M., male, 47 years old)

If the above example illustrates the individual’s naı¨ve belief in preserving a strictly English medium in his immediate surroundings so that he could bring his English up to the almost unattainable accent-free level, the story of an immigrant from Germany shows a totally di¤erent reason behind the eventual acceptance of the Russian community. ‘‘It has become more important over the last 12 years. Before I believed that with all my determination and desire to integrate I would. Then Russian communication would not be important. Now I have realized that I would never feel at home among Germans. There are not that many Germans who could be your friend and accept you. . . . The Russian community is very important now.’’ (Germany: R., male, 56 years old)

It was not surprising to find a repetitive theme in the Israeli group where the importance of or the very connection with the Russian community is never questioned and is viewed as the natural and practically unavoidable medium of existence. The enormous Russian presence (over a million people) in the relatively small country makes it unimaginable to live in Israel and not encounter Russians. As a result, the tight Russian community becomes virtually unavoidable to many immigrants. Also, the majority came with their families and old friends that closed the circle even tighter. The following excerpt illustrates this: ‘‘I simply never left the community. I have many friends who came here with me, plus my neighbors. . . . There are many Russians at work. I never had a chance to think whether it is important or not to me. This is simply my life. We live in a Russian neighborhood. I have practically never left this circle of communication. It’s all in Russian: at the store, in the medical center. There are Russian doctors there. I would say the opposite: I would love to speak Hebrew in the family; it would have improved my Hebrew. But my children do not want to! So we speak Russian.’’ (Israel: L., female, 55 years old)

100

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

Another tendency observed in the Israeli group concerned those Russian immigrants who came to Israel in the 1970s when there was no sizable Russian population there. They lived in the Hebrew-speaking environment with little chance to maintain their Russian for almost twenty years. Some admitted that they were forgetting the language. When a big wave of immigrants came from the former USSR in the early 1990s few oldtimers embraced the newcomers; those who did reported their gratitude at having a second chance to live in the familiar Russian culture. ‘‘It is important to me. I feel sorry for many immigrants because there are many decent people here whom I would like to help and I have managed to help some of them, because people helped me before. . . . I see, see, see a place for myself in all this. . . . I should not be distant from those who speak Russian. . . .’’ (Israel: M., male, 71 years old)

Despite the overwhelming majority of people who keep close ties to the community there were a few immigrants in each group who admitted no need or desire for such ties with their past. Among the Israeli participants there was a recurring answer that it is not crucial for them to be part of the community but it becomes natural and unavoidable that they are enclosed in it. In the German group, there were at least two non-Jewish immigrants who had strong feelings against any association with the Russian community. One immigrant in that group expressed feelings similar to an American participant cited earlier in this section: ‘‘First, if I want to have Russian communication I have lots of opportunities to do it directly with Russia, like my family and friends who live there. Well, the Russian-speaking population is quite specific here. Their lifestyle and interests are foreign to me. . . .’’ (Germany: D., male, 36 years old)

Another German immigrant disassociates herself from the Russian community in the attempt to become better integrated. Recall, there was another example in that group when a person’s failed attempt to integrate brought him back to his home culture. ‘‘. . . I am afraid of this attraction force. . . . There are many Russians here and they all boil in that Russian pot. It’s all so closed, tightly closed from the outside world. I want to live a full life . . . like the rest of the people, like Germans do. I want to be fully integrated.’’ (Germany: A., male, 37 years old)

4.9.

Discussion

101

To sum up, a need to maintain their cultural values and traditions is felt strongly by the majority of immigrants in all three groups. In some cases the desire to establish close ties with the community is determined by the individual’s longing for the familiar cultural values; in others it is caused by the lack of su‰cient fluency in the second language that would allow them to embrace the host culture fully. The Israeli example demonstrates how a person literally can be engulfed by the native community and have little chance to escape it.

4.9. Discussion This chapter started by showing how the Acculturation Framework could be reinterpreted when it applies to the issue of the culture construct in this book. Now we will take a look at it in the light of the findings discussed. First, let us revisit the antecedents’ level in that model. We have discussed the major components of the definition of culture as Russians view it (i.e., internal antecedents). Then we moved on to see how the same concept is defined in three other languages central to the study (i.e., external antecedents). Having identified a possible mismatch between the Russian perception of culture and that of the other three countries we discussed what constitutes the major di¤erence in the Russian take on culture. Finally we moved to the bottom level of the model, acculturation consequences. Under that rubric we looked at the changed perception of the host culture as well as the level of appreciation or rejection of key cultural elements in the immigrants’ host country. This further contributed to our understanding of the ‘‘cultural other’’ (external antecedent) reconstructed by Russian immigrants and showed how immigrants adjust to their new cultural environments and what obstacles in accepting the new culture they have experienced. Having identified major cultural di¤erences we were able to make predictions of what immigrants might be missing in their new cultural environments. This led to the discussion of nostalgia, the need for the Russian community and the level of comfort that the immigrants experience in their respective cultures. The latter was analyzed against three factors, age, ethnicity and proficiency in the second language (traditional antecedents). What have we found? The results of numerous analyses and discussions in this chapter indicate that through the lengthy process of acculturation immigrants’ initial perception of the host culture changed and became more realistic and reflective of the new cultural environment to which

102

Culture: Change of the cultural perception

they are exposed. The time spent in the host country led to the reevaluation of the native cultural norms and values as contrasted with those that the immigrants found in their new country. Participants in all three groups were unified in their appreciation of those values that they lacked in the USSR, i.e., freedom and democracy at the societal level. In the same vein, at the interpersonal level they value people’s friendliness and openness along with other traits that may be specific to a particular culture. Undoubtedly, the above features played a positive role in the individual’s adaptation to the new country. However, the content analysis of cultural features that Russian immigrants found inferior to their expectations showed that, for example, immigrants in the US and Germany see people as distant and not capable of friendship in the Russian sense of the word. Israeli immigrants, in turn, despise the rudeness and loose manners that they see in the Israeli culture. Both Israeli and American participants reported the insu‰cient level of appreciation of high culture in their respective societies. Based on the above analyses we made a prediction that Russian immigrants in Germany and America may miss close friendship that is a central element of Russian culture, while American and Israeli groups may long for the same appreciation or availability of high culture. The analysis of the nostalgia part of this research partially supported the predictions. Among those people who admitted missing Russia, friendship was mentioned more often than other items. Next, the measure of comfort in the host country was analyzed against the factor of age, ethnicity and language proficiency. Predictably, younger immigrants and those with better skills in the second language tend to lean more towards the host culture. In addition, more non-Jewish participants feel comfort in the host cultures than do their Jewish counterparts. At the group level, the majority showed a need for the Russian cultural environment found in immigrant communities. As the findings indicate, cultural adaptation and acculturation are complex, lengthy and uneven processes with a combination of di¤erent factors playing a role. By comparing three groups of Russian immigrants residing in three di¤erent cultural and social environments we could reconstruct the ‘‘cultural other,’’ i.e., the host cultures, through the eyes of the immigrants coming from the same cultural background. Likewise, by looking at those three distinct cultural settings we could understand and identify possible reasons for a cultural clash between Russian immigrants and their respective host countries. Yet, another approach to understanding such di¤erence is through the prism of the individualism versus collectivism cross-cultural construct that is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 5 Culture: Individualism versus collectivism ‘‘Among many memories from my childhood and early adolescence I have one that stands out vividly: my mother keeps calling me an ‘individualist’ whenever she is angry with me. I could not understand why the word sounded almost dirty coming out of her mouth. It took me years to understand that there is nothing bad about being an individualist . . . as long as you do not stay in the collectivist culture.’’ (Excerpt from a travel diary)

Introduction In the previous chapter we have encountered a few instances in which Russian immigrants commented on the individualist nature of their host cultures or expressed disappointment that people in their new host countries do not share the same value of friendship as Russians do. This chapter opens up a discussion of those vital cultural values that may help us understand better a psychological conflict that many Russians go through in immigration. I will limit myself to focusing on Russian and American cultures only. The chapter starts with a look into the concepts of friend/friendship as they are viewed by the two cultures. This will lead to a broader discussion of cultural di¤erences in light of the individualism/ collectivism construct. Finally, I will report on findings from a study that was conducted within the above framework.

5.1. Friendship in Russian culture The most prominent scholar to look into the fundamental di¤erence between culturally vital concepts in a few languages was Anna Wierzbicka. In her book Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words (1997), she explores the concept of friendship in di¤erent cultures, American and Russian among them. She raises a legitimate question: is friendship a human universal? Through analyzing the semantics of the word ‘‘friend’’ as it is interpreted and perceived across cultures she shows that it would be wrong to look for counterparts of the English word ‘‘friend’’ in other languages. Each language would embody a somewhat di¤erent concept in the word ‘‘friend/friendship.’’ The di¤erences are rooted in the cultural

104

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

and historical specificity of the societies that created those words. One of the examples of cultural di¤erences that she gives concerns a number of friends that an American or other English speaker can claim. As she says, there is nothing wrong with the author whom she cites in her book using the phrase ‘‘over forty friends’’ in the context of someone losing that many friends to AIDS. The same would be inconceivable for a Russian speaker. The word ‘‘friend’’ is never overused by Russians and usually is reserved for a few very close people that the person carries throughout his life with much care and appreciation. Close in-group relations are central to Russian culture. A good friend may be favored over family in di‰cult times. The phrase ‘‘We cannot choose our family but we can choose our friends’’ literally applies to Russians and the way they build their friendships. The need for a small reliable group of friends was strengthened during Soviet times when any misstep or lack of vigilance could lead to potentially fatal confrontations with the authorities. Russians lived their lives in a tightly closed society and good friends represented one of the few escapes they had. Only a very small group of people could provide the level of trust that a Russian person needed during Soviet times. In the absence of telephones in many apartments, an unannounced visit by a friend was always a great joy. People would sit and talk for hours in tiny kitchens over a cup of tea or a bottle of vodka. Those small kitchens became a symbol of heart-to-heart conversations. Only close friends would be invited to the kitchen while more formal gatherings would take place in the living area of the apartment. Speaking about the need for such intimate and safe harbors, Bratus (1997) elaborates on the importance of those kitchen spaces for friendly interaction during Soviet times: ‘‘. . . people were forced to restrict their goal-directed behaviors to illusionary compensations. ‘Free activity’ was limited to the space of their narrow kitchens in panel houses (people named these panel apartment houses after Khruschev, who was the initiator of separate family dwellings as an alternative to the communal way of living). The kitchens were thought by intellectuals to be the only place where the closest friends expressed themselves freely and did not hide their views’’ (p. 208).

In our early years in America my husband and I almost bought a house that had a kitchen that reminded me of those warm Russian ‘‘nests of friendship.’’ Noise from the nearby highway and the lack of a sizable property no longer mattered: the house had the right kitchen! However, it would be wrong to assume that such close friendships resulted from the human need for a safety net during rough political times. On the contrary,

5.2.

Collectivism versus individualism

105

we have to look at this type of friendship as a vital element of Russian culture. Yet another perspective on these cultural di¤erences can be o¤ered through a highly popular construct that has been used by crosscultural psychologists for the last two to three decades. 5.2. Collectivism versus individualism In his highly influential work, Culture’s Consequences, Hofstede (1984) di¤erentiated cultures according to the so-called ‘‘individualism index,’’ which is composed of various components, i.e., power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, et cetera. Based on those criteria, cultures with a high index of individualism are considered individualist, while cultures with a low index of individualism are viewed as collectivist. In turn, collectivist cultures are perceived as the opposites of individualist cultures by some scholars Hofstede (1984, 2001) or as separate dimensions that can coexist within one self (Schwartz 1990; Triandis 1995; Triandis and Gelfand 1998). On the individual level, the distinction lies in the selfperception that people exhibit in a particular culture. In other words, individualism and collectivism measures reflect the extent to which the self-construal relies on a bigger social group. Thus, the more unique and independent the self is, the more individualist behavior a person may exhibit. On the contrary, the more he relies on in-group norms the more collectivist his self-construal may be. Traditionally, Western cultures have been viewed as individualist, with the US having the highest index of individualism (Hofstede 1984, 2001), while Eastern cultures, including Russia, fall into the category of collectivist cultures. According to Triandis (2001), who is considered the father of this approach, ‘‘No construct has had a greater impact on contemporary cross-cultural psychology than individualism and collectivism. . . . Students of culture have used it to understand, explain, and predict cultural similarities and di¤erences across a wide variety of human behavior’’ (p. 35).

He emphasizes the importance of the construct in understanding the way culture, as a system of shared meanings, has an impact on perception and behavior. A closer look at the construct helps us understand why Russian immigrants in this study (see Chapter 4) were surprised and pleased at American friendliness and people’s smiles. The core of the individualism and collectivism construct lies in the relationship that people have with

106

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

their in-group and out-group members. Since collectivism is defined by close reliance on in-group relationships, people in those cultures are more likely to be indi¤erent or even hostile towards strangers, that is, out-group members. Therefore, smiling at strangers in the street or in the store would be considered inappropriate. On the other hand, in an individualist society a person does not rely on a restricted in-group; rather he creates numerous in-groups and easily moves between them or totally abandons them in order to create new ones. In this case, looking at a stranger with a friendly smile would be a behavioral norm: any stranger can be viewed as a potential in-group member, no matter how fluid the relationship might be. By the same token, when the individual has just a few carefully selected people as friends, that would be characteristic of collectivist cultures which rely strongly on in-group relationships. Individualists, freely moving around numerous in-groups, would have a somewhat di¤erent take on friendship, so the above-mentioned phrase ‘‘forty friends’’ no longer sounds odd to the reader. To demonstrate the cultural di¤erence between individualist America and collectivist Russia we can take the educational system as an example. In Russia, students enter school and stay with the same group of classmates until they graduate from high school. Only if the person moves to a di¤erent part of town may he break away from the firmly established group. Ten or twelve years of schooling with the same group of students solidifies the in-group relationship. Oftentimes, as in my personal case, classmates stay in contact and have annual reunions decades after graduation. The same would apply to a college system where students are assigned to a group that goes to the same lectures and sits in the same classrooms throughout their entire academic career. It often leads to a quite secluded college life where students do not know many other people outside their group. On the other hand, the American educational system aims at giving each student numerous opportunities to meet more and more people. Class bodies are rotated on a yearly basis, which often separates good friends but brings in new ones. Also, the physical campuses of elementary, middle, and high schools are located in di¤erent parts of town, which creates an additional influx of new population. By the time the student graduates from high school he knows his entire grade, which easily can amount to 300 or more people. The same pattern continues in college. It is not rare at the beginning of the semester to walk into a class of 50 and find students sitting quietly and not talking to each other: they simply do not know each other. As we can see, the individualism and collectivism perspective sheds additional light on cultural adaptations that Russian immigrants go

5.3.

Linguistic relativity and individualism versus collectivism

107

through in their host countries. Yet it would be misleading to assume that the cross-cultural distinction along the individualism and collectivism divide makes all people coming from a collectivist culture collectivists and all people coming from an individualist background individualists. Moreover, as I mentioned above, each person is believed to shift between his collective and individual ‘‘self ’’ depending on the situation and context, while some people can show more individualist or collectivist traits. Triandis (2001) points out that within-culture analyses show that individualism and collectivism are not opposites and must be conceived as multidimensional constructs. Conversely, only cross-cultural comparisons may demonstrate the di¤erence between the two, while individual variation in within-culture analyses may obscure the picture. Triandis also notices that in each society individualism is high among the upper class and professionals, migrants or those who have been most exposed to US media. This finding is highly relevant to the design of the study reported on in this chapter and we will return to it later. In the meantime, I will elaborate on the above construct and show how it fits into the larger framework of Linguistic Relativity.

5.3. Linguistic relativity and individualism versus collectivism The individualism and collectivism construct logically falls into the much bigger and no less controversial framework of Linguistic Relativity. This decade has seen a surge of renewed interest in the hypothesis. Crosscultural psychologists, socio-psychologists, anthropologists, and linguists look into the hypothesis and bring in their own perspectives and supporting evidence. The common issue, however, remains the same and goes back to one of the most contemporary scholars of the 20th century, Benjamin Whorf (1956), who formulated the hypothesis of interconnection between language, culture, and cognition. According to Whorf, the language that we speak may influence our thought and the way we view the world or vice versa, the culture in which we were raised can influence our thought. As a result, a change in our cognition may be reflected in the language. On the other hand, if, according to the Whorfian view, the culture in which we were raised defines the language that we speak and shapes our thought, are we the final product of the interplay between the three factors? Or can our cognition and the way we think of ourselves and view the world change if the language or the culture changes? This question brings about a totally other view of the above hypothesis. A

108

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

narrower approach to the Whorfian hypothesis led to the investigation of cultures and languages that represent those cultures. This brings us back to the individualism and collectivism construct. In this section, for the clarity of the discussion I will refer to languages representing individualist cultures as individualist, and languages representing collectivist cultures as collectivist. However, we have to be cautious about labeling languages in such a definitive way. Languages, like human beings, are extremely complex entities and scientists are still at the infancy stage in their e¤orts to gain insight into the path connecting our thought and its linguistic realization. Going back to the construct of individualism and collectivism, imagine a bilingual and bicultural individual whose native language and culture are collectivist while the language and the culture in his host country are individualist, or the other way around. Would his self-construal be influenced by a shift to another end of the socio-cultural continuum or would he be able to navigate safely between the two selves? Some researchers found that bilingual speakers can access both a private and a collective self since private and collective self-cognitions are stored in di¤erent cognitive locations and that the retrieval of private and collective selfcognitions increases when they are primed with a congruent language (Trafimow et al. 1997). It was supported further by other studies (Kemmelmeier and Yang-Ming Cheng 2004; Ross et al. 2002). The latter also suggested that language priming had a stronger e¤ect for women than men. Working in the same vein, Hong et al. (2000) presented a new approach to culture and cognition and their coexistence in ‘‘multicultural minds.’’ Their approach focuses on the stimulus in the present culture rather than on the language spoken by the individual, which allows a bilingual to switch frames in his cognition as a response to culturally loaded stimuli. According to Hong et al., the individual shifts between interpretive frames rooted in di¤erent cultures in response to cues in the social environment. There was another approach to the idea of a collective versus private self coexisting within the same individual, with the culture and language being constant (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Gardner et al. 1999). The only interest that those two studies present for our discussion is that they used a group pronoun ‘‘we’’ and a private pronoun ‘‘I’’ to prime a collective or a private self, respectively. Yet another trend within this area of research deals with finding individualist/collectivist correlates in the languages, e.g., the use of pronouns, pro-drop parameter, et cetera (Muhlhausler and Harre 1990; Pillsbury 1998; Brewer and Gardner 1996; Kashima and Kashima 1998).

5.3.

Linguistic relativity and individualism versus collectivism

109

Those studies showed that speakers of collectivist languages used more group than private pronouns, i.e., ‘‘We’’ versus ‘‘I.’’ Also, it was found that languages allowing for pro-drop, i.e., a drop of the subject from the grammatical surface of the sentence, come from collectivist cultures. As a linguist, I particularly was interested to see whether the reported above findings would hold true for Russian spoken by Russian-English bilinguals in the US. If we look into the methodological approaches taken by the above studies there are clear similarities in the way they were designed. The above experimental studies used self-description questionnaires (Trafimow et al. 1997; Ross et al. 2002; Kemmelmeier and Yan-Ming Cheng 2004) to test the e¤ect of language priming on the bilingual’s self-construal or cultural icons (Hong et al. 2000) to prime a corresponding cognitive frame. In addition, the participants in the above studies were ChineseEnglish bilinguals, with Chinese being a collectivist language and English an individualist one. Another study exploring the language e¤ect on memory retrieval in bilinguals (Marian and Kaushanskaya 2004) is relevant to the study reported on in this chapter and needs to be addressed in more detail. The participants in Marian’s study were Russian-English bilinguals residing in the US. Russian/English bilinguals represent a case of another two contrasting cultural and linguistic schemas, i.e., Russian as collectivist and English as individualist. The di¤erence between the above study and those discussed earlier in this section is that in Marian’s study, language was used as a prime to retrieve autobiographical narratives reflecting either individualist or collectivist memories. In their study, Russian primed more collectivist memories and English more individualist memories. The study provided support for the previous body of research by showing that the language of prime is congruent with the retrieved memory, regardless of the language of encoding or the main agent in the narratives. In my research, I partially will adopt Marian’s approach to the data analysis. However, I will look at the phenomenon of individualist and collectivist languages and their gradual change in the incongruent host culture from a di¤erent perspective. I do not argue with the above studies that suggest that language is a prime of the self-construal pattern or memory retrieval. Instead, I suggest that the current social environment and a new culture, rather than the nature of the language per se, may result in the ‘‘collectivist’’ language becoming the means of conveying individualist memories. Also, as I mentioned earlier, individualism and collectivism was found to vary in within-culture analyses depending on the social and

110

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

professional standing of the individual. Consequently, we can expect a professionally successful and better-integrated immigrant living in the individualist culture to show more traits of individualism, while a poorlyintegrated immigrant living in the same cultural environment would not exhibit those features. In order to test this hypothesis I conducted an additional small-scale study that is reported on in the next sections of the chapter. I am taking a psycho-linguistic approach to explore the individualism and collectivism construct. 5.4. Study 5.4.1. Objective The goal of this study was to find a possible correlation between the move to a new culture, i.e., from the collectivist to the individualist, and the shift in the immigrant’s cognition. In turn, the way the individual uses his native language to narrate on autobiographical memories is believed to reflect the above change in his psychological cultural mindset. In other words, if we take the example of Russian immigrants living in the US we can make the following assumptions. First, Russian immigrants represent a collectivist Russian culture. Second, their move to the US was a shift to the opposite extreme of the construct, i.e., individualism. Third, after a significantly long period of stay in the highly individualist culture their behavioral pattern as well as linguistic performance in Russian may show new traits that would be more characteristic of the new host culture rather than the culture of the native land. Finally, acculturation and integration level as well as professional success may play an important role in how fast those changes will occur. The present small-scale study should be viewed as an addition to the bigger project on cultural perception and its change discussed in the previous chapter. In order to test the hypothesis outlined in this section I needed a study well controlled for the integration and success variable. We should take a group of highly successful and well-integrated Russian immigrants in the US and contrast it with a group of poorly- or notintegrated Russian immigrants, given that they all come from a similar socio-economic and demographic background. Then we need to have two control groups, i.e., Russian monolinguals in Russia and English-speaking monolinguals in the US. The Russian monolingual group was controlled for the educational level, which was kept constant across all three groups: all Russian-speaking participants were college educated or had the

5.4.

Study

111

equivalent of a college education. The English monolingual group provided linguistic data for the comparative analysis. Why did we need an additional source of data for this study? The data collection reported on in the rest of this book had the goal of sampling participants in such a way that they would give a realistic reflection of the bigger picture of the Russian Diaspora. In other words, the US immigrant group did not have a su‰cient number of people who could serve as a group of highly successful immigrants. That would have interfered with the major goal of the project and distorted the findings. However, a small group of poorly-integrated immigrants was selected from the bigger pool of participants. The next section will report on the participant selection and their background. 5.4.2. Participants Altogether 70 participants took part in the study, i.e., 20 monolingual Russians, 20 monolingual English-speaking Americans, and 30 RussianEnglish bilinguals. The first two groups will be called the Russian and English monolingual groups, respectively, and the third group will be referred to as bilingual. In turn, the experimental bilingual group consists of two separate subgroups, i.e., a group of integrated and a group of non-integrated immigrants who will be referred to as Bilinguals I and Bilinguals II, respectively. Russian monolinguals The pool of Russian monolinguals was recruited in St. Petersburg, Russia. Altogether 20 Russian monolinguals provided the data for this study. The age of the participants varied from 27 to 57. There were an equal number of males and females in this group (10M, 10F). The nature of the experimental study required that all participants in the Russian monolingual group be at least 12–13 years old at the time of the collapse of the USSR. All participants held a college degree or its combined equivalent. English-speaking monolinguals English speaking monolinguals were American undergraduate/graduate students born to English-speaking parents. The age in that group varied from 20 to 31. There were 8 male and 12 female participants in this group. They were recruited from the pool of the Ohio State University students and given course credit for participation. The questionnaire for this group had just a few questions concerning education, age, and gender. As I

112

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

mentioned earlier, we need to have the data elicited from monolingual English speakers to contrast it with Russian narratives. The English data presumably will serve as an example of the ‘‘individualist’’ discourse. Russian-English bilinguals There were two subgroups within the group of Russian-English bilinguals: a group of successful and/or well-integrated Russian immigrants and a group of poorly- or non-integrated immigrants. The first group was recruited from Russian immigrants residing in the Northeastern and Midwestern parts of the US for as long as 6–31 years, with only two participants being in the US for less than 10 years and 8 for more than 20. There were 9 male and 11 female participants. The age range in this group was from 30 to 76, with the majority (15) being 40–61 years old. The experimental design of the study required the participants in this group to have come to the US as adults and be well integrated into American society. The data on those who answered a question on integration negatively were discarded from the analysis. Another requirement for this group was professional success in the US, which is believed to be correlated positively with the integration factor. There were 2 medical doctors, 4 engineers, 6 college professors/instructors, and a scientist among the participants. The questionnaire administered prior to the experiment targeted di¤erent socio-linguistic factors, including age of arrival in the US, number of years spent in the US, occupation, amount of daily exposure to Russian, language of social interaction, nostalgia about Russian culture, et cetera. More than half the participants reported only 10% or less of daily time when they speak Russian and only 3 participants had 50% of daily communication in Russian. Six participants speak only English at home. Half the participants reported a predominantly Englishspeaking environment as their social network. Table 5.1 presents sociolinguistic information on this group. The second subgroup of Russian-English bilinguals was identified among the major pool of US participants in this project. Those people who answered the question on integration into American society negatively were asked to provide additional data that later were extracted for the present analysis. Altogether, 10 people were grouped as poorly integrated immigrants. All but one participant came from the New York area and only two out of 10 were employed professionally. All participants were in the age range of 44–65, 6 were employed as caregivers (mostly for elderly Russian immigrants). The amount of daily exposure

5.4.

Study

113

Table 5.1. Bilinguals I: Socio-linguistic information on integrated/successful immigrants N

Age Gender Length L1 daily Lg at Friends Nostalgia Occupation (Y/N) (M/F) in US exposure home (R/E) (R/E) (years) (%)

1 57

M

16

10

E

E

Y

Doctor

2 55

F

13

50

R

R

Y

Engineer

3 32

F

12

Less 10

E

E

Y

Animation specialist

4 60

M

14

30

R

R

Y

Engineer

5 30

F

9

10

E

E

Y

Lecturer

6 51

M

13

50

R

E/R

Y

Professor

7 59

F

26

10

R

E

Y

College director

8 76

F

24

30

R

R

Y

Professor

9 53

M

6

10

R

E

N

Scientist

10 58

M

31

30

R

E

Y

Computer instructor

11 53

F

26

Less 10

E

E

Y

Translator

12 40

M

17

20

R

E

Y

Doctor

13 33

F

12

50

E/R

E

Y

Shop associate

14 45

M

15

10

R

E/R

N

Professor

15 48

F

21

20

E

E

N

Consultant

16 47

F

14

40

R

E/R

Y

Real estate

17 48

F

15

20

R

R

N

Information specialist

18 61

M

26

10

R

R

Y

Engineer

19 38

F

15

10

E

E/R

Y

Ph.D. candidate, instructor

20 60

M

27

10

R

R

N

Engineer

114

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

Table 5.2. Bilinguals II: Socio-linguistic information on non-integrated and/or unsuccessful immigrants N

Age Gender Length L1 daily Lg at Friends Nostalgia Occupation (Y/N) (M/F) in US exposure home (R/E) (R/E) (years) (%)

1 62

M

17

80

R

R

Y

Engineer

2 57

F

10

50

R

R

Y

Caregiver

3 44

M

15

50

R

R

Y

Assistant mechanic

4 45

M

15

80

R

R

N

Driver

5 47

F

12

10

R/E

R

N

Computer designer

6 62

F

12

80

R

R

Y

Caregiver

7 59

F

12

80

R

R

Y

Caregiver

8 65

F

16

20

R

R

Y

Caregiver

9 56

F

15

50

R

R

Y

Caregiver

10 62

F

16

50

R

R

Y

Caregiver

to Russian is much higher in this group: 50–80% for the majority of participants. The language of interaction at home as well as the social network in the US remains exclusively Russian. Table 5.2 gives sociolinguistic information on this subgroup. Note that both groups, regardless of their integration and success level in the US, reported nostalgia, with only 25% of the first group and 20% of the second group answering the question on nostalgia negatively. However, a closer look at this question revealed that the majority in the first group mostly misses ‘‘high culture’’ and deep meaningful interaction with friends, while the second group reported missing friends, family, and nature. Most likely the reason why high culture is not mentioned by any participants in the latter group is because they reside in New York City, which is one of the world’s biggest cultural centers. 5.4.3. Procedure All participants were interviewed individually. English monolinguals and non-integrated bilinguals (Bilinguals II) were interviewed face-to-face by

5.4.

Study

115

the researcher while integrated bilinguals (Bilinguals I) and a Russian monolingual group were interviewed over the phone. English monolinguals were interviewed in English while the rest of the participants were interviewed in Russian. The narratives were recorded and later transcribed. Prior to the interview, the participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire (English group and Bilinguals II) or answer the questions from a questionnaire (Russian monolinguals and Bilinguals I) over the phone. Those answers later were integrated into the analysis. The nature of the questionnaires is described in the above section. The general procedure for the non-integrated bilinguals (Bilinguals II) was consistent with that described in Chapter 2. After the data on immigration and identity were elicited those participants were asked additional questions pertaining to the present small-scale study. The narrative data elicited on the questions related to this study was saved in separate digital files and later added to the data elicited from the above three groups. All participants in this study were asked to narrate on a few topics, i.e., their last Christmas/New Year celebration, last birthday celebration, and last vacation. After a narration on a particular topic was elicited, a similar question referring to a childhood memory was asked, e.g., after a question on the last Christmas/New Year celebration the participant was asked to talk about a Christmas/New Year celebration in his childhood. The order in which topics were o¤ered remained constant for all groups. 5.4.4. Research hypothesis In my research, I do not use a priming technique where language is a major variable. Rather the language for a bilingual group is kept constant, i.e., Russian. The present study asks a few research questions: 1. Does the collectivist language of bilinguals become more individualist due to intensive exposure to the individualist culture and language? In order to answer this question the participants in the bilingual group should be well integrated into the US culture/society and perceive themselves as part of it. This group needs to be contrasted with the group of poorly- or non-integrated bilinguals. In turn, both groups should be compared with the two monolingual groups. The linguistic measures of collectivism and individualism will be private and group pronouns as well as the grammatical category of pro-drop. 2. If the events in the autobiographical memories were encoded in Russian, a collectivist language, and took place in the Russian collectivist culture, will the narration on those events be more collectivist

116

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

in its nature compared to the narration on the recent events that happened in American individualist culture? In other words, it is hypothesized that the bilinguals could produce more individualist memories from their individualist present and more collectivist memories from the past. However, it should be acknowledged that the proximity of retrieval instances of two memories of the same event, i.e., one from the present followed by another from the past, might confound the results. 3. Can a shift to a more individualist self-construal be detected in the presence of other salient linguistic measures, such as key cultural words and their collocates? To sum up, the main hypothesis of the study is that the current social environment, rather than the nature of the language per se, may result in the ‘‘collectivist’’ language becoming the means of conveying individualist memories. Thus the Russian language in the autobiographical memories of well-integrated Russian-English bilinguals could show fewer elements of collectivism than in the group of Russian monolinguals and poorlyintegrated immigrants, although it still may have fewer individualist elements than in the English monolingual group. If the evidence supports this hypothesis then it can be suggested that the observed change in the language reflects a cognitive shift in bilinguals’ self-construal. 5.4.5. Data analysis The present study partially adopted the methodological approach used in Marian’s (2004) study. Two dependent variables that supposedly measure individualism/collectivism were used for the analysis, i.e., the proportion of individual pronouns and the proportion of group pronouns. Individual pronouns were defined as first person singular pronouns: I, me, my, mine. Group pronouns were defined as all first-person plural pronouns: We, us, our, and ours. Russian equivalents of these pronouns were identified in the data elicited from all three groups of Russian participants. The proportion of individual or group pronouns was computed out of the total number of words in narratives produced by the individual participant. This was broken down further into the ratio of pronouns in the ‘‘present’’ and ‘‘past’’ memories. In addition to the methodology used in Marian’s (2004) study, I added a pro-drop factor for the analysis. Pro-drop cases are viewed as characteristic of collectivist languages (Kashima and Kashima 1998). Although Russian is not a typical pro-drop language and shows constraints on where pro-drop can occur, it nevertheless allows for

5.5.

Results

117

pro-drop. For example, the sentence ‘‘prishli, poeli i legli spat’ ’’ (came, ate, and went to sleep) would be correct grammatically and the corresponding referents (group pronouns ‘‘we’’ or ‘‘they’’) easily could be recovered based on the inflected verb ending and the context. English, on the other hand, is a non-pro-drop language. The omission of a personal pronoun at the beginning of an English sentence is allowed but only in the instances of colloquial usage (informal questions and answers) and in imperatives. Subject omission in English is also a matter of discourse pragmatics. In this study, pro-drop instances were defined as those cases where the subject of the sentence is dropped from the surface of the grammatical sentence and the referent could be recovered from the verb inflections. The proportion of those cases was computed out of the total number of clauses in a narrative, present and past combined, produced by the individual participant. In this analysis, clause was defined as a production unit containing maximally but not minimally one verb. The definition of clause was adopted from Broersma et al. (2009). I should acknowledge that the analysis of pronouns was done first as they appear in the narratives. Then pro-drop instances were analyzed individually and corresponding referents were recovered based on the verbal inflection. Then first person pronouns (I or We), decoded from pro-drop cases, were added to the total of private and group pronouns used by each individual speaker. In addition, the narratives were analyzed for words representing culturally important concepts. A brief analysis of those words and their collocates as an additional linguistic measure pertaining to the individualism/collectivism construct will conclude the analysis section. The findings from this study will be presented in the following way. First, the results of the cross-group analysis on pronoun use will be given. Second, an analysis of pro-drop factor will be shown. An analysis of other linguistic measures will conclude the results part of the paper. 5.5. Results 5.5.1. Pronoun use across groups A total of 420 narratives were analyzed; 300 were in Russian and 120 in English. The combined total of words produced by each group was as follows: 8,250 (BL I), 5,929 (BL II), 5,270 (RU), and 10,730 (EN). Figure 5.1 demonstrates the results of the first analysis where the ratio of

118

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

Figure 5.1. Pronouns across groups

private and group pronouns was calculated out of the total number of words produced by each group. Clearly, the English-speakers outperform all three Russian groups in the number of private pronouns (7.6% compared with 4.2% for BLI, 4.38% for BLII, and 4.12% for RU) as well as in a much higher ratio between the private and group pronouns (2.6 times higher). The next step was to decode pro-drop cases, recover the hypothetical referent based on the verbal inflection and add first person pronouns (both private and group) to the analysis. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the results of the analysis. As seen in the chart, the resulting di¤erence between private and group pronouns almost disappears for the Russian monolingual group (4.67% for private vs. 4.16% for group) while the di¤erence between the two categories slightly sharpens for bilingual groups. However, the results of the statistical analysis (one-way ANOVA followed by post-hoc, Tukey) showed that the English monolinguals significantly di¤ered from both bilingual groups: F (3, 66) ¼ 0.67, p < 0.001 in the use of private pronouns while there was no significant di¤erence in the use of group pronouns among the four groups. The biggest di¤erence, albeit slightly too small to be significant, was between the English and Russian monolingual groups, with Russian monolinguals slightly outperforming English speakers (p ¼ 0.07) in the use of group pronouns.

5.5.

Results

119

Figure 5.2. Pronouns across groups (pro-drop decoded)

Then pronouns were analyzed separately for recent and past memories, with pro-drop decoded and hypothetical referents added to the total number of pronouns used by the individual speaker in the narratives on present and past events. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the results of this analysis. As the chart shows, private pronouns dominate for the two bilingual groups and English monolinguals. However, the Russian monolinguals show more group pronouns in narrating on recent events. The results of the statistical analysis (one-way ANOVA followed by post-hoc, Tukey) further supported this observation. While English speakers significantly outperformed all three groups of Russian speakers in the use of private pronouns, there was no di¤erence between English monolinguals and Russian-English bilinguals in the use of group pronouns: F (3, 65) ¼ 0.749, p ¼ 0.81 for BLI and p ¼ 0.398 for BLII. However, there was a significant di¤erence between the Russian and English monolinguals: p < 0.001. A separate analysis of the narratives referring to past memories was performed. Figure 5.4 shows the results. The analysis of narratives on past memories produced significant e¤ects in the use of private pronouns between English monolinguals and two groups of Russian speakers, i.e., BLII and Russian monolinguals:

120

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

Figure 5.3. Pronouns in recent memories

Figure 5.4. Pronouns in past memories

5.5.

Results

121

Figure 5.5. Pro-drop analysis

F (3, 65) ¼ 0.749, p < 0.05, while there was no di¤erence between the BLI group and English monolinguals. The use of group pronouns showed no significant di¤erences for any four of the groups. Additional analysis on pronoun use did not find any e¤ect for the length of residence in the US or the amount of daily exposure to Russian in the bilingual group. 5.5.2. Pro-drop analysis The analysis of Russian monolingual and Russian-English bilingual narratives revealed numerous instances of dropping the agent from the grammatical surface of the sentence. The proportion of pro-drop cases was calculated out of the total number of clauses produced by each individual participant. Figure 5.5 shows the total ratio of pro-drop for each group of Russian speakers. As the chart indicates, Russian monolinguals produce twice as many pro-drop cases than integrated bilinguals (12.36% vs. 6.17%), while the di¤erence between monolinguals and the second group of bilinguals is about 1%. However, the statistical analysis showed that the first bilingual group just slightly missed significance: F (1, 47) ¼ 0.202, p ¼ 0.093. There was no significant di¤erence between the second group of bilinguals and monolinguals. An additional analysis of the pro-drop ratio related to the

122

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

length of residence in America was performed. The group of integrated bilinguals was broken down into two groups: those who spent not more than 17 years in the US and those who spent between 20 and 31 years in the US. All participants in the group of non-integrated bilinguals spent not more than 17 years in the US. No statistically significant di¤erence was found among the three groups of participants, showing that the length of residence in the L2 country may not be a factor by itself. Then both groups of bilingual participants were combined and pro-drop was analyzed against the factor of daily exposure to L1. There were three groups formed: those who have 10% and less of daily exposure to Russian, those who have 20%–50%, and those with the highest level of L1 daily use, 80% or more. The significant e¤ect was found between the group with the least amount of daily exposure to L1 (10% or less) and the highest amount of exposure to L1 (80% or more): F (1, 48) ¼ 0.479, p < 0.05. 5.5.3. Lexical analysis The narratives elicited from Russian monolingual and bilingual groups were analyzed further for distinctive lexical measures of individualism/ collectivism. The most obvious word frequently used by both groups was ‘‘friends’’ and its noun derivatives (e.g., drug, podruga, druzja – male/ female friend, friends). Then all collocations of the word ‘‘friends’’ that can be indicative of individualism/collectivism were added to the analysis. First, it was the adjective ‘‘close’’ that occurred as a collocate of ‘‘friends’’ as in ‘‘close friends’’; then the noun ‘‘circle,’’ as in ‘‘circle of friends,’’ the word ‘‘company’’ as in ‘‘company of friends,’’ and the word ‘‘family’’ and its derivatives. The results of this analysis are given in Table 5.3. Table 5.3. Lexical measures of individualism/collectivism Group/lexical measure (%)

Russian monolinguals

Bilinguals I

Bilinguals II

Circle (круг)

0.5

0.1

0.1

Company (компания)

0.1

0.1

0.2

Close (близкие)

0.2

0.1

0

Friend(s) (друг/друзья)

0.6

0.4

0.5

Family (семья)

0.6

0.3

0.3

5.6.

Discussion

123

As can be seen from the table, the theme of friends and friendship is reflected in a slightly higher rate of the use of the corresponding lexical labels by monolinguals than by integrated bilinguals. However, the collocate ‘‘circle’’ (as in ‘‘circle of friends’’) is used twice as often by monolinguals than the two bilingual groups. The word ‘‘close’’ (as in ‘‘close friends’’) is used five times as often by monolinguals than by bilinguals. The statistical analysis could not be performed due to the extremely low rate of occurrence of these words in the narratives of individual participants.

5.6. Discussion The interplay of a bilingual’s two languages in his self-construal can be studied from di¤erent perspectives. Language priming techniques can be used to see how a bilingual’s self-perception changes due to the linguistic framework in which he assesses himself (Trafimow et al. 1997; Kemmelmeier and Yang-Ming Cheng 2004; Ross et al. 2002), or how the linguistic stimuli prime autobiographical memories in one or another of the bilingual’s languages (Marian and Kaushanskaya 2004), or how non-linguistic stimuli pertaining to a social environment can switch cognitive frames in a bilingual (Hong et al. 2000). The present study is di¤erent from all the above studies in that it did not attempt to access two languages in a bilingual. Instead, it kept the language constant to see whether the collectivist nature of the language can change under the influence of the individualist culture and language. In this way, the findings in the present study do not contradict those in the earlier works but add a new perspective on how a bilingual’s self-construal can be viewed. The analysis of narratives related to recent and past events produced a few interesting results. In the narratives on recent events that took place in the American individualist society and culture, the ratio of private pronouns in the discourse of Russian-English bilinguals did not match that of the English speakers. However, we can see that it tends to increase compared with monolinguals. As to the group pronouns in recent memories, there was no di¤erence between English speakers and Russian-English bilinguals while Russian and English monolinguals did di¤er significantly. We may suggest that Russian bilinguals show a clear trend of using more private and fewer group pronouns narrating on their recent autobiographical memories. The separate analysis of the past narratives

124

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

revealed a significant di¤erence in the use of private pronouns between English and Russian monolinguals. But there was no di¤erence between the English group and both groups of Russian-English bilinguals. This further supports the above finding. The within-group analysis of private and group pronouns produced by bilinguals did not show an e¤ect for the length of residence in the US or the amount of daily exposure to Russian. The latter may suggest that transfer from English where the use of private pronouns is more frequent than in the Russian discourse is not evident in the results of this study. The present finding is also in line with the evidence found in another study on Russian-English bilinguals (Isurin 2007) where the bilingual participants showed a clear trend of self-focus in their narratives while monolinguals were more group oriented in their discourse. Another possible explanation of this finding would be consistent with Triandis’s (2001) suggestion that in each society individualism is higher among the upper class and professionals. Roytburd and Friedlander (2008) later discussed this through the prism of a di¤erentiation hypothesis. In their study, they administered a test on acculturation using a di¤erentiation measure to a group of Jewish immigrants from the USSR in the US. The results showed that the participants reporting a greater I-position (i.e., a more individualist approach to self in relation to others) were more acculturated to American culture and less acculturated to Russian culture. As speculative as it may sound, we may suggest that the group of very successful immigrants in this study who reported their high integration into American society and culture also could rate high on the individualist measure. Since the group of highly integrated and professionally successful immigrants in this study does come from the Russian class of intelligentsia we may suspect that their level of individualism was much higher than that of an average Russian. However, there is no way to know this for sure: only a longitudinal study of 25–30 years could provide the data for such comparative analysis. Also, the monolingual group of Russians represents the Russian class of intelligentsia as well. Their educational and professional background is comparable with that of the bilinguals. Therefore the cross-sectional study reported on in this chapter leaves no other explanation of the finding other than the e¤ect of American individualist culture on the change of self-construal in Russian immigrants. However, we should treat these findings carefully and refrain from making any farreaching conclusions due to the small scale of this study and the lack of su‰cient background knowledge from prior studies.

5.6.

Discussion

125

To sum up, bilinguals (integrated ones, in particular) demonstrate a clear trend of producing self-oriented narratives and talk about groups in their environment much less than monolinguals. Thus we can suggest that the first hypothesis outlined in this chapter finds partial support. Indeed, Russian, as a ‘‘collectivist language,’’ shows obvious traces of individualism in the increased instances of private pronouns and decreased instances of group pronouns. At the same time, we cannot rule out the possible e¤ect of cross-linguistic transfer from English (see Jarvis and Pavlenko 2008 for more details). However, there was no significant e¤ect for the amount of daily exposure to English as well as the length of residence in the US registered in this study. The only explanation we can provide is that exposure to the individualist culture can lead to a more self-oriented construal in Russian-English bilinguals residing in the US. Moreover, this study did not find narratives on past memories encoded in the collectivist culture to be more collectivist in their nature. On the contrary, the use of private pronouns in past narratives was comparable with that in the group of English monolinguals. This leads to a suggestion that both past and present memories in integrated bilinguals are more selforiented than those of their Russian counterparts or of poorly-integrated Russian-English bilinguals. Another linguistic measure of collectivism and individualism is the presence of the grammatical feature known as pro-drop. To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies where the presence or disappearance of pro-drop in the bilingual discourse are examined within the framework of collectivism and individualism. The only report on pro-drop’s relevance to the field of collectivism and individualism was done by Kashima and Kashima (1998), who viewed pro-drop as a characteristic feature of collectivist languages. In this study, I took this notion a step further and decided to look at how pro-drop instances di¤er among the three groups of Russian speakers. Although there was no statistically significant e¤ect found among the three groups of speakers, the group of integrated bilinguals just slightly missed significance. In addition, the pro-drop was analyzed against the factor of exposure to L1 and residence in the US. No e¤ect was found for the length of residence while there was a significant e¤ect registered for the amount of daily exposure to Russian. Participants with the highest amount of exposure to L1 showed much more instances of using pro-drop than those who had 10% or less of daily contact with L1. This brings up the issue of cross-linguistic transfer as a possible explanation of the finding. Indeed, insu‰cient exposure to L1 in

126

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

the L2 environment means increased exposure to L2, i.e., English. Since English does not allow for pro-drop, Russian-English bilinguals could transfer this syntactic constraint to Russian. In this case, pro-drop clearly falls out of the collectivism and individualism framework and should be studied as part of language change. Another research question that I set forth at the beginning of the study was to look into the frequency of culturally salient concepts that could be attributed to the collectivist culture, such as the concept ‘‘friends’’ and the concept ‘‘family’’ as well as their collocates. This analysis was performed on the data gathered from the three groups of Russian speakers. The relatively low rate of occurrence of these concepts in the participants’ discourse did not allow for a statistical analysis. Evidently, friendship remains equally important for Russians regardless of where they live, i.e., in the Diaspora or in the Metropolis. However, it is obvious that the change in collocates surrounding this word indicates that Russian-English bilinguals break away from the traditional Russian view of friendship as a small circle of close friends. For example, Russian monolinguals used the word ‘‘circle,’’ which truly can be considered a very group-oriented and inclusive concept, five times more often than both groups of bilinguals. Also, they used the adjective ‘‘close’’ (collocate of ‘‘friend’’) twice as often as bilinguals. The word ‘‘family’’ and its derivatives also were used twice as often than in the case of bilinguals. If we think about a shift from ‘‘a circle of close friends’’ in the monolingual discourse to ‘‘friends’’ in the bilingual discourse we easily can see how Wierzbicka’s (1997) quote about ‘‘forty friends’’ acquires a new meaning. Bilinguals raised in a collectivist country and residing in an individualist culture may shift towards more self-oriented and out of group experience that is reflected in their language.

Conclusion To summarize, the findings reported in this chapter provide partial support to the hypotheses outlined at the outset of the study. Bilinguals tend to be more self-oriented in their narratives and to use fewer group pronouns and more private pronouns when narrating on autobiographical memories. Also, the study revealed that the collectivist language in bilinguals’ narratives becomes less pro-drop than the language of monolinguals. This is an important factor that should be considered by future

Conclusion

127

studies on individualism and collectivism measures in bilinguals. A tendency to have much fewer instances of a null subject in the sentence can be seen as a sign of cognitive change as well as an indication of language transfer from the language which does not allow for pro-drop to the one that does. Thus I believe that in order to find a more accurate measure of individualism and collectivism, pro-drop instances should be considered in the analysis of personal/group pronouns. When hypothetical referents recovered from the pro-drop cases were added to the analysis it became clear that the di¤erence between the monolingual’s use of private/ group pronouns almost disappeared while bilinguals’ narratives remained more self-oriented. However, we have to be cautious in drawing conclusions about this particular finding. The results of the pro-drop analysis indicated that the amount of daily exposure to L1 is an important variable in studying pro-drop disappearance. It can be studied better within the L1 attrition framework. As for collectivism and individualism, more research is necessary in order to see whether pro-drop and its gradual change in the bilingual discourse indeed can be viewed as a characteristic feature of the construct. In the meantime, I showed a way of using pro-drop case in retrieving null subjects/pronouns in bilingual narratives in order to get a more accurate count of the pronouns. The further results of the study showed that the lexical measures of individualism and collectivism also could be sought in those linguistic elements and their collocations that are distinctive to cultural scripts. The narratives elicited from the participants in this study showed a striking di¤erence in the use of the word ‘‘friends’’ and its collocates. Friendship is one of the most important characteristics of Russian culture. Russians often can be more friends than family oriented in making their life choices and setting their priorities. The questionnaires administered to the group of bilinguals revealed that the majority named intimate friendship as one of the elements of Russian culture that they have been missing in the US. Moreover, there is a conceptual di¤erence between the Russian word ‘‘drug’’ and its English equivalent ‘‘friend.’’ The Russian word ‘‘drug’’ usually refers to those few intimate people whom a person carefully picks as his soul mates and confidants and often keeps as such throughout his life. On the contrary, the English concept of ‘‘friend’’ is often more superficial and can apply to numerous people with whom we work or socialize. Thus it is interesting to notice that bilinguals shift to using the word ‘‘friend’’ more often without the customary collocates such as ‘‘close’’ and ‘‘circle’’ that would characterize the tight group-oriented collectivist

128

Culture: Individualism versus collectivism

culture of their former motherland. The study of those key cultural concepts seems to add a new angle to the collectivism and individualism construct. The main hypothesis of the study, that the current social environment, rather than the nature of the language per se, may result in the ‘‘collectivist’’ language becoming the means of conveying individualist memories, found support in the results of the present study. The analysis of pronoun use and pro-drop cases, as well as the analysis of other linguist measures of individualism and collectivism provided evidence for a possible cognitive shift towards individualism in Russian-English bilinguals’ selfconstrual. This study calls for future research on those bilingual groups whose linguistic and cultural backgrounds lie on the opposite ends of the individualism and collectivism continuum.

Chapter 6 In search of ‘‘self ’’: Self-identification and identity transformation among Russian immigrants ‘‘My self-perception has changed. I no longer need to think about myself as a person who lived there. I no longer need to feel di¤erent.’’ (Excerpt from an interview with a Russian immigrant in the US)

Introduction In this chapter we will turn to the next major component of the study, that is, identity transformation and self-identification among Russian immigrants. After reading the existing literature on Russian immigration I was struck by the fact that prior studies either refer to immigrants from the former USSR as Russians (Kishinevsky 2004; Zilberg 2001) while making clear that they examine the Jewish population or generalize them as Jews. Andrews (1998) acknowledges the dominant Jewish nature of Russian immigration and chooses the name ‘‘Soviet immigrants’’ to refer to his respondents. The work of Lewin-Epstein et al. (1997) was the first comprehensive volume on Russian Jewish immigrants residing on three continents. The contributors to the volume took a sociological stand on the issue of Russian immigration. Ten years later Remennick (2007) published her socio-ethnographic work under the almost identical title Russian Jews on Three Continents. However, she added a new component of identity to her study. The author does acknowledge the presence of non-Jewish immigrants in the predominantly Jewish immigration but refrains from discussing the question of the self-identification of the nonJewish Russian population in the Diaspora. Other studies touching on the identity of immigrants from the former USSR are concerned with the problem of Jewish identity from the sociological perspective (Roytburd and Friedlander 2008; Gitelman and Ro’i 2007). It would be a disservice to thousands of Russian immigrants of non-Jewish origin who left the USSR along with their Jewish family members or came to their new countries to seek educational and professional opportunities if we ignore their presence and do not look into the question of their self-identification. In this respect, the present research is unique among numerous studies on Russian immigration and takes the discussion of identity a step further

130

In search of ‘‘self ’’

by looking at two distinct groups within the Russian Diaspora, i.e., Russian Jews and ethnic Russians. In Chapter 1, I showed how identity/ nationality was imposed on the individual at birth and how the communist system stripped its citizens of a healthy way of negotiating their own identity. This chapter will look into the results of the survey where the participants were asked identity-related questions and will further illustrate the process of self-identification and identity transformation among Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants. The research question that I pose here concerns the change in self-identification as it is presented to others and perceived internally by Russian Jews and ethnic Russians. We will look into a shift from the ‘‘o‰cial identity’’ on the individual’s passport and explore possible reasons for such a shift. Among possible factors in identity transformation we will consider stigmatization, religion, and partners’ nationality. Also, we will see how Russian immigrants view the generalized name ‘‘Russian’’ as it is used for the entire Russian Diaspora. But first we need to understand how the complex phenomenon of identity usually is studied.

6.1. Theoretical approaches to the study of identity The question of the individual’s self-identification and identity transformation in immigration has been investigated from di¤erent angles. One of them is a psychoanalytical approach that goes back to the father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. In his highly poetic yet informative work, Akhtar (1999) looks at identity transformation through the prism of the individual’s life prior, upon, and after immigration. He suggests that the following four interconnected tracks should be considered. In his own words, ‘‘These tracks . . . involve the dimensions of drives and a¤ects (from love to hate to ambivalence), interpersonal and psychic space (from near or far to optimal distance), temporality (from yesterday to today), and social a‰liations and mutuality (from yours or mine to ours)’’ (p.78).

As fascinating and entertaining as the work is, it aims to provide insight into identity problems to practitioners dealing with clinical intervention rather than to scholars conducting empirical research. Another approach to the study of identity lies in the post-structuaralist school of thought and interactional sociolinguistics. Although they have

6.1.

Theoretical approaches to the study of identity

131

di¤erent methodologies for exploring the concept of identity, both share an element of language as a means of signaling or conveying selfidentification. Pavlenko and Blackledge (2004) give an extensive overview of current methodological and theoretical approaches to the study of identity in multilingual contexts. I would refer the reader to their work for more detailed information related to the linguistic aspect of identity studies. Since the present chapter is not taking a major stand on language as the essential element in the process of identity transformation or negotiation I will move on to the next theoretical perspective on identity that will be crucial to our discussion. The socio-psychological approach to the study of identity draws on Tajfel’s (1974, 1981) theory of social identity and Berry’s (1980) theory of acculturation. We already have discussed Berry’s model at great length. I also acknowledged the limitations of this approach and major points of criticism (see Chapter 2). Here I would add that the socio-psychological method of the study of identity largely is based on drawing correlations between variables involved in the analysis and often is viewed as being too static and not able to consider factors such as motivation or individual di¤erences in the process of acculturation (Padilla and Perez 2003). On the other hand, social identity theory maintains that individual behavior reflects an individual’s larger societal units and that people think, feel, and act as members of collective groups, institutions, and cultures. In other words, an individual’s identity is tied inextricably to the social group that they represent. According to Padilla and Perez, social identity theory is built on a few important concepts: individuals are motivated to keep a positive self-concept, this self-concept comes from the identity of the individual within the group, and people build their favorable social identity by comparing their group in a positive way against an out-group. The process of social identity thus allows for group members to construct their identity in a way that feels right, while alienating those from outside groups. To extend this further, Brewer (1991) suggests that self-identification is guided by two core human motives: the need to be unique and the need to belong. Social identity gives the individual a chance to feel included, belonging and also di¤erentiated. An important element of the theory of social identity is concerned with social stigma, since negative stigmatization of the individual or a group (i.e., ethnic, religious, social, or racial) will a¤ect the process of self-identification among these individuals. We need to bear this in mind while discussing the results of the present study. Given certain limitations of the sociopsychological method in the study of identity, Padilla and Perez (2003)

132

In search of ‘‘self ’’

call for integration of the three major components into the conceptual framework of acculturation: social cognition, social identity, and social stigma. As the authors put it, ‘‘Within their new social context, newcomers form perceptions regarding expectations that members of the dominant group have of them. Perceptions are likely to a¤ect the process of redefining their identity and whether and to what extent they choose acculturation and membership in the host culture. . . . The social identities that they bring with them and the identities they develop in the new environment influence social cognitions that in turn guide their behavior. . . .’’ (p. 50).

We will consider this important re-conceptualization of the Acculturation Framework in the next section.

6.2. Acculturation Framework: The study of identity Bearing in mind very important suggestions by Padilla and Perez (2003), the Acculturation Model can be re-conceptualized and adjusted to the study of identity in the following way (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1. Acculturation Framework revisited

6.2.

Acculturation Framework: The study of identity

133

As in Chapter 4 on the change in perception of culture we should look at the individual characteristics of the person, e.g., his age, education, place of origin, et cetera (traditional antecedents). Here it is important to look at the individual’s ‘‘o‰cial’’ identity stated on his Soviet passport. I would remind the reader that o‰cial identification was imposed on all Soviet citizens at birth. This type of forced di¤erentiation was simultaneously a reason for many people not to negotiate their identity in a healthy way and a means of stigmatization of ethnic minority groups by the Soviet authoritative power. Such stigma at the o‰cial and everyday level would fall into the realm of internal antecedents. In order not to repeat the information that already has been discussed at great length (see Chapter 1), I will focus on the data gathered through interviews and surveys in this study. I will allow my participants to voice their concerns related to ethnic discrimination and their firsthand experience of anti-Semitism in Russia. The analysis of surveys and interviews will illustrate how immigrants in this study perceived themselves versus others prior to and/or upon their immigration. The question of the social identity that they formed prior to their immigration will lead to the discussion of their current selfidentification. We will look closely at any particular trends identified in each of the three groups and o¤er possible explanations of why and how Russian immigrants change their self-perception. Through the analysis of acculturation consequences, i.e., change in self-identification and attitude toward being viewed as ‘‘Russians,’’ we will be able to look into the host societies and their attitude toward newcomers (external antecedents). Again, I would like to emphasize the complexity of the identity issue and the obvious limitations of the o¤ered framework in explaining causal links. Moreover, I refrain from making such definitive links. I will stress again that the framework serves to provide a visual representation of the scope of this investigation and unify the three entities that became the major focus of the book. The visual representation may look too oversimplified to reflect the multifaceted complexity of the concept but hopefully it will help in guiding the reader through our discussion. In the following sections, I will report the results of the analyses and illustrate them through the interview excerpts. First, narratives related to the question of anti-Semitism and ethnic discrimination will be analyzed. Second, I will look at the part of the interview concerning a change in selfidentification. Third, the results of the survey will be analyzed quantitatively and illustrated through relevant excerpts from the narratives. Finally, the question of the generalized reference to the immigration from the USSR as ‘‘Russian’’ will be discussed.

134

In search of ‘‘self ’’

6.3. Traditional antecedents: ‘‘O‰cial’’ identity In Chapter 3, I gave a detailed overview of the background information on the three groups of participants, e.g., education, age, gender, marital status, employment, et cetera. To avoid repetition, here I will focus only on those items in the survey that directly pertain to the question of identity. I will remind the reader that self-reports indicate that there were slightly more Russians than Jews in the US group and twice as many Jews as Russians in the German group. The majority of participants in the Israeli group reported Jewish as the nationality listed on their Soviet passport (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1. Nationality Group/Nationality (%)

Russian

Jewish

Other

US

50

46

4

Israel

14

82

4

Germany

34.6

61.5

3.8

The o‰cial identity does not necessarily shape the perception that the individual develops about his ‘‘self.’’ As the analysis of narratives showed there was not always a match between the person’s self-perception prior to his immigration and the nationality listed on his passport. However, in most instances it was the nationality that created a dead end in the process of negotiating the identity. The individual perceived his ‘‘self ’’ as di¤erent from the others based on a single line on his Soviet passport. Things become even more complex if the o‰cial identity stands for an ethnic group that is stigmatized negatively by the majority, which was the Jewish situation in Russia. Research on social stigma (Go¤man 1963; Padilla and Perez 2003) shows that individuals, especially those who are stigmatized by the majority, try to control the attitudes and reactions of other people by manipulating the amount of information they reveal about themselves. In other words, people may hide their identity in order to avoid negative societal pressures. We should keep this in mind while interpreting the results of the analyses based on self-reported data in this chapter.

6.4.

Internal antecedents: Ethnic discrimination and social stigma

135

6.4. Internal antecedents: Ethnic discrimination and social stigma The participants were asked to describe and evaluate the level of ethnic discrimination they experienced while living in the former USSR. The majority of Jewish informants reported that if they ever experienced antiSemitism it was mostly at the domestic level and the Soviet system did not directly target or persecute Jews. The majority of the Jewish participants admitted to personal cases of discrimination and the percentage of such responses was about the same for all three groups (Table 6.2). Table 6.2. Prior discrimination Group/ Answer (%)

Yes (experienced discrimination)

No (did not experience discrimination)

US

61.5

38.5

Israel

63.6

36.4

Germany

63.2

36.8

The next step in the analysis of narratives was to identify the common trends in the described discrimination. First, most people were confronted with strong hostility towards them as Jews in their childhood and school years. This is how one of the participants recalls an incident from her early childhood: ‘‘I was 5 years old. My friend and I were playing with a doll. Then the girl took the doll away from me and started yelling at me ‘Zhidovka, Zhidovka!’ [a derogative name for a Jew]. I ran in tears to my mom saying that I am not Zhidovka and that it’s my grandmother who is Zhidovka. . . .’’ (Israel: M., female, 48 years old)

This kind of traumatic childhood experience had a lingering e¤ect for many Jews and led them to hide their true identity or feel ashamed of it. As another immigrant recalls, ‘‘I knew that it was bad to be Jewish and that I had to hide it. My mother spoke Yiddish to my grandmother and often she had to speak loud because my grandmother did not hear well. I used to run to the opposite side of the street so that nobody would guess that I was with them. I felt ashamed. . . .’’ (US: E., female, 45 years old)

136

In search of ‘‘self ’’

The next stage where most people reported discrimination – albeit less hostile and open – was when they entered college. It was a well-known fact that all Soviet universities and colleges had a certain quota for the admission of minority students. Jews su¤ered the most as one of the minority groups. Many schools and/or professions virtually were closed to them and in many parts of the country (e.g., Ukraine) the situation was aggravated to such an extent that Jews were forced to leave their native towns and apply to colleges elsewhere in the country. St. Petersburg (Leningrad) and Moscow often became a relative refuge for Jewish students fleeing anti-Semitism in their native towns. However, it would be incorrect to assume that there was no anti-Semitism in those two central cities. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, it was only after the revolution that Jews were allowed to leave their settlements and move into big cities. The process of resettlement was not easy or straightforward and this resulted in a much lower presence of the Jewish population in those cities. Also, communists protected the image of the USSR as the most ‘‘humane’’ society in the world and the deceptive visibility of ‘‘justice’’ and ‘‘equality’’ was observed more in the center than in the periphery of the country. By the time people graduated from college they learned how to maneuver in order not to deal with possible ethnic discrimination. Through reading and analyzing the narratives what may be seen as surprising is the sense of normalcy that such testimonies try to convey. One of the participants denied any discrimination against herself and illustrated it with the following statement: ‘‘Of course I knew my own place and I knew that I had to work three times harder [than Russians], I knew that I should not open my mouth and say ‘no.’ So I never felt discriminated against.’’ (Germany: R., female, 63 years old)

Many other immigrants reported the same sense of awareness of the limitations that they had to accept living in the USSR. It often held them back from taking steps that could have exposed them to discrimination, such as trying to get into prestigious universities or advancing their careers beyond what was possible for Jews. But it also protected them from possible acts of anti-Semitism that they would have experienced otherwise. Therefore we should treat very carefully the interviews where the individual claims to have experienced no ethnic discrimination in the former USSR, and we should not consider a person’s ‘‘luck’’ in escaping the fate of others as a success story. There were a few participants who

6.4.

Internal antecedents: Ethnic discrimination and social stigma

137

admitted that they were really lucky not to have to deal with antiSemitism. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in the USSR anti-Semitic sentiments could rise from two di¤erent sources: the person’s o‰cial identity on his passport and Semitic facial features or a Jewish name. In the case of conflicting information, e.g., a Jewish name and a Russian nationality, anti-Semitic sentiments reportedly could become even stronger: ‘‘My maiden name was Freedman Yelena Iosifovna [not real name] and my nationality was listed as Russian. I think it caused even more hatred among people, because you cannot be Russian with such a name and I was. . . . They thought it was a bigger crime than if I had been simply Jewish. . . .’’ (Germany: L., female, 40 years old)

A few immigrants in this study addressed the issue of physical appearance as it is related to potential discrimination. The following two excerpts illustrate opposite outcomes that immigrants link to their appearances: ‘‘I experienced anti-Semitism all the time. The thing is that I have a very Semitic appearance, so I experienced it. . . .’’ (Germany: T., female, 43 years old) ‘‘No, I never experienced anti-Semitism. With my appearance, name and nationality [Russian] listed on my passport – nobody ever guessed that I was Jewish, only my Jewish friends knew that.’’ (Germany: M., female, 30 years old)

This brings up the next question: how does negative stigmatization of the ethnic group at the o‰cial or domestic levels a¤ect the sense of identity? I already have illustrated that people learned survival strategies in order to protect themselves from possible discrimination. Another outcome of such stigmatization can lead to the individual’s perception of himself as a member of a minority group, a ‘‘second-class’’ citizen, or someone who has to carry a complex of self-deficiency throughout his life. In this case the individual may not be a¤ected directly by anti-Semitism but his belonging to a group that is viewed as an unwelcome minority makes him feel vulnerable and unprotected. The following excerpt illustrates this point: ‘‘I felt like a minority person in the USSR. There was a sense of vulnerability, I felt unprotected. I always felt that people could hurt or insult me. . . .’’ (Israel: Y., male, 37 years old)

138

In search of ‘‘self ’’

The analyses of narratives also revealed that immigrants coming from former republics (other than Byelorussia and Ukraine) did not experience any discrimination as Jews. On the contrary, Russians were viewed as occupiers and attracted much hatred from the local population and, in a way, detracted attention from the Jewish presence there. In other words, it would be incorrect to assume that Russians, as a majority ethnic group in the USSR, would not have their own problems of becoming a stigmatized minority. Those Russians who come from former Soviet republics were often under a double burden of negative attitudes, i.e., as a minority ethnic group and as representatives of the ‘‘occupying forces.’’ As two of the Jewish participants put it in their own words, ‘‘There were no problems with anti-Semitism in Baku [Azerbajdzhan]. They treated Russians worse than Jews. Because Jews were closer to them, they were victims, while Russians were a Big Brother. . . .’’ (Israel: Y., male, 54 years old) ‘‘If I were Russian . . . I lived in Kaunas [Lithuania] and it has always been a nationalistic city. This somehow detracted Lithuanians’ hatred towards Russians.’’ (Israel: B., male, 47 years old)

There was only one participant of Russian ethnicity (German group) coming from the former republic of Latvia. She did not elaborate on the type of discrimination that she experienced but complained that she would never get Latvian citizenship despite the fact that she was born there. The rest of the Russian immigrants of non-Jewish background did not report any instances of discrimination based on their ethnicity. However, there were a few participants in each group who blamed Jews themselves for the negative attitude that other people had towards them. One of the American participants, an ethnic Russian married to a Jew, said the following: ‘‘I do not want my daughter to ever be called ‘Zhidovka’ [derogative name for a Jew]. You can call her Jewish. I do not want them to insult her. The biggest conflict between my Jewish friends and me was that I could not understand why they felt insulted when they were called Jews. They ARE Jews! Why do they hate themselves so much that when being called a Jew they allow themselves to get hurt by this? What’s wrong with our entire generation that the word ‘Jew’ sounds like an insult! I am against this.’’ (US: O., female, 50 years old)

6.5.

Identity transformation: Process and consequences of acculturation

139

6.5. Identity transformation: Process and consequences of acculturation Now I will turn to the analysis of narratives and surveys related to the process of identity transformation in Russian immigrants. Through this analysis I will demonstrate the major trends identified in the data and will attempt to show the role of the host societies in the identity shift. In other words, the discussion of so-called external antecedents will follow in the next section. Table 6.1 showed the results of the survey question on the individual’s o‰cial identity/nationality as it was listed on the Soviet passport. It would be wrong to claim that an o‰cial identity per se is a mechanism strong enough to establish the initial self-identification of the individual prior to his immigration. However, as I suggested and illustrated above, oftentimes this o‰cial way of di¤erentiating people based on their nationality served as a permanent mark that shaped one’s life, cognition, and subsequent behavior. Moreover, the information gathered through surveys presents the only quantifiable data. On the other hand, the analysis of narratives will illustrate the way people perceived themselves in Russia and how their self-perception changed after immigration. But first we will turn to the results of the analysis of the survey question concerning the individual’s self-identification at the present time. In order to have a starting point for the analysis the o‰cial identity was contrasted against the response on present self-identification. The question in the survey was formulated in the following way: How would you identify yourself now if asked by an American, Israeli, and a German, respectively? In contrast, the question in the interview targeted the individual’s perception of his ‘‘self ’’ and the way it had changed after his immigration. The combination of those two sources of information was intended to show self-identification from two di¤erent angles, i.e., from the perspective of the individual’s self-perception and the way he feels comfortable being viewed by others in the new environment. As in the case of o‰cial identity, the reaction to the interview question did not always reflect the answer in the survey. For example, the individual might want to identify himself as Russian while feeling a strong connection with his Jewish roots and vice versa. Here I need to acknowledge a possible pitfall of any analysis involving self-reported information. As discussed earlier in this chapter, stigmatized individuals, such as Jews from the former USSR, can be sensitive to information that may increase the likelihood of negative reactions from others in their new host cultures. As a result, they

140

In search of ‘‘self ’’

may tend to manipulate the information that they reveal, such as by masking their true identities or nationalities. Any research relying on selfreported data faces a similar challenge of uncovering the truth while assuming that participants were sincere in their responses. While collecting the data in Israel I came across a case where the informant, whom I had known for years, indicated that her nationality always had been Jewish although I was well aware of her non-Jewish nationality, which caused her some initial problems upon immigration to Israel. However, we need to work from the assumption that the information provided by the participants is trustworthy and reliable. Table 6.3 summarizes the results of the analysis. Arrows indicate the direction of shift from the o‰cial identity to the present self-identification that the individual is likely to o¤er to members of his new host society. Table 6.3. Self-identification: shift from the ‘‘o‰cial’’ identity Group/ Identity (%)

Jewish ! Russian ! Russian ! Jewish ! Jewish ! Russian ! Jewish Russian Jewish Russian Other Jewish split

US

34.8

80

16

47.8

17.4

Israel

71

57

43

14.3

7

Germany 28

89

11

59.4

2

8.7 10 3.8

When looking at the numbers in the above chart we have to remember that they reflect the level of comfort in the way the individual wants to be perceived by others rather than his actual self-perception. It is not surprising that the percentage of people who had their nationality as Jewish and now want to be perceived as Jewish is remarkably high in Israel (71%). Israel also showed the highest percentage of people who identify themselves as Jews despite their Russian nationality (43%). On the other hand, the majority of people with a Jewish background in the German group prefer to be viewed as Russians (59.4%). As to Russians who retained their o‰cial identity as self-identification, the number is highest in Germany (89%) followed by the US (80%). There were a few participants in each group who reported an even split in their present self-identification: those immigrants want to be viewed as Russian Jews or Jews with Russian roots. In addition, there were a few people who perceive themselves as Israeli, American, New Yorker, et cetera.

6.5.

141

Identity transformation: Process and consequences of acculturation

6.5.1. Discrimination and identity shift If we go back to the discussion of anti-Semitism as a potential factor in the subsequent identity shift, we may predict that people who had experienced the burden of discrimination prior to immigration would choose to change their self-identification in order to protect themselves from possible negative reactions in the new country. The data presented in Table 6.3 were analyzed against the factor of discrimination. The results are shown in Table 6.4 Table 6.4. Discrimination as a factor in identity shift Russian ! Jewish

Jewish ! Russian

Yes

No

Yes

US

3.8

3.8

23

Israel

2.3

2.3

Germany

0

2.6

Group/shift (%)

4.5 29

No 3.8 2.3 21

There is no di¤erence for the shift from Russian to Jewish identification for all three groups. However, the opposite shift, i.e., from being o‰cially marked as Jewish to presenting the new ‘‘self ’’ as Russian shows much higher numbers for two groups, the US and Germany, and no di¤erence for Israel. In other words, as I suggested above, the personal experience of being discriminated against as a member of a minority group (Jewish) may play a role in the subsequent shift to the non-stigmatized identity (Russian). Such a shift has a higher likelihood in those environments where the said minority still remains a minority group. As Table 6.4 demonstrates, there was no di¤erence for the factor of prior discrimination among the Israeli participants. We also should notice that the above suggestion is more supported by the finding for the US group than for the German one. The latter showed an almost equal split between people who experienced anti-Semitism and those who did not in their shift to Russian identity. To sum up, discrimination that the individual experienced prior to his immigration may influence his identity transformation towards the non-stigmatized one but this factor should not be viewed separately from other interfering variables. We will return to this discussion later in the section on external antecedents of the acculturation process.

142

In search of ‘‘self ’’

6.5.2. Religion and identity shift The next step in the analysis was to look at the possible role of religion in identity transformation. Russian immigration of the last wave generally is viewed as predominantly secular. The USSR was a society where atheism was the only faith that people had a right to observe. Religious services were strictly limited, church was separated from the state, and churchgoers easily could become victims of persecution. The situation for Jews was much harder. Raging anti-Semitism and the negative image of Israel in the Soviet mass media oftentimes led to confrontations between the police and Jews on the premises of local synagogues. Table 6.5 shows the results of the survey question concerning religion and immigrants’ attendance of religious services at the present time. Table 6.5. Self-identification and religion Group/ religion (%)

Russians

Jews

never

sometimes

regularly

never

sometimes

regularly

US

13

83.8

3.2

25

66.7

8.3

Israel

80

20

0

0

97

3

Germany

41.7

44

14

20

70

10

The number of people, both Russian and Jews in their present selfidentification, who attend religious services regularly is relatively low in all three groups. It is not surprising that Israel has no Russians attending church on a regular basis. On the other hand, we can see that the US has the highest percentage of Russians occasionally attending church (83.8%). The overwhelming majority of people in the Israeli group who identify as Jews attend synagogues at least occasionally (97%). We can suggest that religion does not play a direct role in the present self-identification of Russian immigrants who remain predominantly secular in their new host environments. Yet we also can suggest that Israel provides a much higher incentive for Jews to be observant while the US creates a more comfortable environment for Russians to attend church services. 6.5.3. Partners and identity shift Another angle from which to look at the process of identity transformation is through the possible role of partners. The majority of participants

6.5.

143

Identity transformation: Process and consequences of acculturation

emigrated with either Jewish or Russian spouses. Table 6.6 shows the distribution of partners’ nationality across the three groups. Table 6.6. Self-identification and partners’ nationality Group/partners (%)

Russian

Jewish

Russian

Jewish

US

34.5

34.5

Israel

40

50

Germany

19.4

54.8

Jewish

Russian

66

33

100

0

70

20

The question on the partner’s nationality was analyzed against the results of the individual’s self-identification. In the Israeli group, 100% of participants identifying themselves as Jews reported having a Jewish partner, while the corresponding numbers for the US and Germany were lower (66% and 70%, respectively). On the other hand, those who lean towards a Russian identity had an equal split between Russian and Jewish partners for the US group (34.5% each), slightly more Jewish than Russian partners for Israel (50% vs. 40%) and predominantly Jewish partners for the German group (54.4% vs. 19.4%). A closer look at the data revealed that those individuals who shifted from Jewish to Russian self-identification had Russian partners in 50% of instances for the US group, 40% for the Israeli group, and only 15.8% for the German group. Based on the data gathered in this study, we may suggest the following: Immigrants with strong Jewish identification tend to be married to Jewish partners, while those who identify themselves as Russian do not show any preference. However, in cases in which the individual shifted from Jewish to Russian selfidentification at least two groups indicated the possible role of partners. I would refrain from making any assertive conclusions on this part. First, we do not know whether the choice of Russian partners was determined by the initial lack of strong Jewish identification on the part of the individual or whether the partner contributed to the registered identity transformation. 6.5.4. Place of identification Another question that was analyzed concerns the place of identification that the immigrant usually o¤ers when asked by a member of the host

144

In search of ‘‘self ’’

society. From the observational data and my personal experience I have noticed that there is no consistency in the way Russians usually identify the place of their origin. Table 6.7 summarizes the results of the analysis. Table 6.7. Place of identification Group/place (%)

USSR

Russia

City

Russia/city

Other

US

2

64

6

8

Israel

7.7

32.7

9.6

5.8

38.

Germany

9.6

28.8

15.4

15.4

30.8

8

As Table 6.7 shows, the overwhelming majority of the participants in all three groups choose not to identify themselves with the name of the country that they emigrated from (USSR) and refer to it by the more traditional name reflecting the current political status of the country (Russia). In those cases where immigrants come from former Soviet republics they choose the name of the republic as the place of identification. Immigrants coming from the two biggest Russian cities, i.e., Moscow and St. Petersburg, tend to identify the city’s name or a combination of the city’s name and the country’s name as their place of origin (e.g., St. Petersburg, Russia). The latter can be viewed as a way of di¤erentiating oneself from the majority of other immigrants coming from the peripheral or less ‘‘prestigious’’ parts of the former USSR. The information on place of identification presented here has only an indirect interest to our discussion of identity transformation among Russian immigrants.

6.6. Identity transformation: Analysis of narratives In this section we will look at the results of the analysis of narratives gathered through individual interviews. The participants were asked to describe how they identified themselves prior to immigration and at the present time. If they reported any changes in their self-perception they were asked to explain why the shift occurred. First, I will present the results for each group and then discuss common trends registered in all three groups. The information on ethnic Russian and Jewish participants will be given separately for each of the three groups.

6.6.

Identity transformation: Analysis of narratives

145

6.6.1. US: Identity transformation. Jewish immigrants There were a few common trends identified in the narratives gathered among US-based Russian immigrants of Jewish background. – Comfort of being ‘‘self ’’ without feeling Jewish Participants who reported experiencing a sense of comfort about their nationality linked it to the fact that they no longer are afraid that people might hurt them on the basis of their ethnicity. Most admitted to a feeling of shame that they had had in Russia as Jews and a reluctance to present themselves as Jews prior to immigration. Now they may not have strong sentiments about their Jewish ‘‘self ’’ but they feel free to be what they are. As one of the immigrants described, ‘‘My self-perception has changed. I no longer need to think about myself as a person who lived there. I no longer need to feel di¤erent.’’ (US: N., female, 51 years old)

Another immigrant finds similar comfort in losing the sense of ‘‘being di¤erent,’’ as it is described in the following statement: ‘‘I am Russian for everyone here. So if I used to feel that I was di¤erent there, not Russian, it has changed: I am Russian here and it feels absolutely di¤erent. . . . I am no longer afraid to get hurt by people here. . . .’’ (US: B., male, 56 years old)

– Comfort in being Jewish but cautious about revealing it Several immigrants said that they feel fine about being Jewish but prefer not to reveal it to strangers unless it is necessary or they are asked directly about their nationality. None of them ever experienced any incidents of discrimination as Jews in the United States but they either are aware of certain prejudices existing in the society or carry a heavy memory of anti-Semitism from their Soviet past. This is how one of the participants explains it: ‘‘I always felt like a Jew living in the USSR because I was constantly reminded of that. Now I do not feel like this. But there is a Soviet Jewish sense of danger in discussing your nationality. So if I am asked here I tell people, if they don’t ask me I prefer not to bring it up. I do not know why. . . . Maybe it’s subconscious, I just feel that anti-Semitism is present here, although I have not experienced it myself. . . .’’ (US: M., male, 47 years old)

146

In search of ‘‘self ’’

A few participants shifted their self-identification from Jewish to Russian due to re-conceptualization of the term ‘‘nationality.’’ Since Jews in America are considered a religious rather than ethnic group and these immigrants are secular they admit that feeling Jewish no longer fits their profile. – No opposition – no need to feel Jewish Another interesting trend concerns those immigrants who linked their prior self-perception as Jews with the need to oppose hostility and discrimination or di¤erentiate themselves as ‘‘others.’’ The present environment where the element of hostility towards Jews is removed does not require the individual to di¤erentiate himself as ‘‘other.’’ ‘‘I feel like a person from Russia rather than a Jew because the need to oppose and resist hostility disappeared and it reduced the level of my Jewish selfidentification. I no longer need to oppose anyone. . . . I feel more Russian, especially when I do not have to be ashamed of where I come from.’’ (US: M., male, 44 years old)

A two-time immigrant who confessed that he lost the sense of pride in being Jewish after his first immigration in Israel adds to the above statement. ‘‘I considered myself Jewish and was proud of this. The more they humiliated me the more I felt pride in di¤erentiating myself from them. Now I see no reason to be proud of it. (US: S., male, 62 years old)

Later the same immigrant described his current self-perception as a person who is suspended in between: ‘‘When asked by Americans I say that I am Russian. But I cannot say that I am Russian, American, or Jewish. I do not feel that nationality is enough for self-identification. I know Russian history very well, I like Russian people, I know those people very well. I like Americans too but I do not know their history well, so I cannot relate myself to anyone. . . .’’ (US: S., male, 62 years old)

6.6.2. US: Identity transformation. Russian immigrants The American group had the highest number of ethnic Russians compared with the two other groups. All Russian participants reported that they retain the same sense of self-identification as Russians, some stated their

6.6.

Identity transformation: Analysis of narratives

147

pride in being Russian, and a few added that they think about their nationality and self-identification much more in immigration than before. The majority shared the same feeling of being outsiders on their trips to Russia. Several participants reported that they miss having a community that consisted of ethnic Russians in their new country. This is an excerpt from an interview with an ethnic Russian writer married to a Jew: ‘‘I miss Russians. People of a di¤erent nationality surround me here. [Q: You mean, Americans?] No, I mean Russian-speaking Jews. They are di¤erent. All my Russian friends are irrational, there is no logic in their behavior, they never choose a straight path, they are always lost somewhere, and they are unpredictable. So I miss this Russian spirit.’’ (US: O., female, 49 years old)

6.6.3. Israel: Identity transformation. Jewish immigrants In the Israeli group, there was an overwhelming number of people who reported Jewish as their o‰cial nationality and as it was shown above, the majority identify themselves as Jews. It was not surprising to find that for the majority of respondents Israel became home, brought a sense of comfort in feeling Jewish, increased their Jewish self-identification, and made them feel proud of the country. – Jewish self-perception increased Most immigrants who reported an increased sense of being Jewish after their immigration to Israel attributed it to more exposure to Jewish traditions that most of them did not have the chance to observe in Russia. At the same time they stressed their secular nature and denied any role of religion in their identity transformation. This is how one of the immigrants describes it: ‘‘My Jewish self-perception has increased here, my roots got stronger. . . . Here you have a broad open access to Judaism, Torah, Jewish traditions and all this has reinforced my roots.’’ (Israel: Y., male, 37 years old)

Or as another immigrant added, ‘‘In my childhood it was just a line on my passport. Here I understood that it’s all di¤erent: this is about people and traditions. . . . I cannot say that we observe all the traditions but we light candles and it turns out that now we have two New Year celebrations here.’’ (Israel: L., female, 36 years old)

148

In search of ‘‘self ’’

– Pride in being Israeli Other immigrants admitted to feeling more Israeli than Jewish now. They admired the progress the country has made in a short period of time and admitted much pride in being citizens of Israel. For some Jewish immigrants Israel brought a liberating sense of freedom in being like everyone else and eliminated the need to di¤erentiate themselves as ‘‘others.’’ This is how one participant describes his fast transformation upon immigration: ‘‘It changed two days after I came to Israel. I stopped feeling Jewish. I always felt like a Jew in Russia. Here I forgot about it on my second day. I feel like an Israeli. . . . I no longer feel that I am di¤erent here.’’ (Israel: L., male, 41 years old)

Another participant adds that she feels like a ‘‘proud Israeli’’: ‘‘When I go somewhere I am not afraid to say that I am from Israel and that I am Jewish. I think if I go back to Russia I would hide that I am Jewish but I never hide that I am an Israeli. I never emphasized that I am Jewish in Russia. In other words I could not say proudly that I was Jewish. I was embarrassed to say it. It was not that I was such a Jew that I needed to say this loudly but I simply could not do this and had to hide that I was Jewish. . . .’’ (Israel: R., female, 49 years old)

Many other respondents repeated the same sentiments of pride that they feel as citizens of their new country. The following episode recalled by one of the immigrants illustrates the comfort of being citizens of the country rather than members of an ethnic minority: ‘‘I remember once my wife and I went into a pub in Cologne, Germany. My wife has very Semitic features. So we entered the place and a few drunk Germans stood up to confront us. One stared at us and asked: ‘ju¨disch [Jewish]?’ I immediately responded: ‘If you understand English we are not ju¨disch, we are Israeli citizens.’ ’’ (Israel: M., male, 71 years old)

– Sense of belonging The above trend of feeling more Israeli than Jewish is related closely to the sense of belonging that many participants reported. We will discuss the concept of home and belonging in the next chapter (Chapter 7). Here I would mention that many Israeli participants explicitly emphasized that their new host country is home now and that they feel much comfort in fitting in.

6.6.

Identity transformation: Analysis of narratives

149

– Dissociation from Jewish identity There was a small number of participants who reported their diminished sense of being or wanting to be Jewish after years of immigration in Israel. The majority of them referred to the fact that Israel is a melting pot of immigrants of di¤erent backgrounds and many Russian immigrants do not want to associate themselves with someone who exhibits cultural and behavioral traits that do not fit into the range of acceptable norms. This is how one immigrant confessed to a sense of regret that he often feels as a Jew: ‘‘Yes, my self-perception has changed. I often regret that I belong to this nationality. I see how people behave and I feel ashamed of a person who has Jewish blood in his veins.’’ (Israel: M., male, 48 years old)

– Comfort of feeling Jewish and discomfort of being viewed as Russian Other participants reported much comfort in feeling Jewish but admitted that they do not like the way the Israeli society looks down at them as ‘‘Russians.’’ The biggest controversy surrounding the name ‘‘Russian’’ as it is applied almost exclusively to immigrants from the former USSR was observed among Israeli immigrants. We will discuss this later in this chapter. Here I would only cite one of the participants who complained about being viewed as Russian while he perceives himself as Jewish: ‘‘If we say it with a grain of humor: we all became Russians here and we were Jewish there. I feel comfortable. But anyway, we are Russians here, we all became Russians here. . . .’’ (Israel: F., male, 60 years old)

Another participant illustrates this dichotomy created by the overgeneralized term ‘‘Russian’’ in the following way: ‘‘When they treat us badly because we are Russians I feel Russian. When ethnic Russians treat us badly or say something bad about Israel I feel Jewish. If you are Jewish you can say bad things about Israel but if you belong to a di¤erent nationality you have no right to do so. If you do not like it here – go back to Russia.’’ (Israel: R., female, 53 years old)

This brings up the next question: how do Russian immigrants of nonJewish ethnicity deal with the process of self-identification in the country where they become an ethnic minority?

150

In search of ‘‘self ’’

6.6.4. Israel: Identity transformation. Russian immigrants As I have already mentioned in Chapter 1, the last wave of immigration to Israel has brought over a million Russian Jews and many of them came with their non-Jewish partners and family members. There is no exact number of non-Jewish Russian immigrants in the o‰cial Israeli data. Some converted to Judaism in order to provide a more comfortable existence for their children and many retain their nationality as ‘‘Russian’’ or ‘‘not clear’’ on their domestic Israeli passports. The issue of non-Jewish immigrants in the recent immigration from Russia is quite sensitive and brings about many debates in the Israeli mass media, political life, and at the domestic level. Regrettably, only 13% of participants in my Israeli corpus were non-Jewish. I had to use my personal connections to identify those individuals and encourage them to talk openly about their life as non-Jews in Israel. Two of those participants reported no problems with talking openly about their non-Jewish nationality with Israelis (note: one of them is a housewife who has never worked in Israel) and the rest shared the same concern of masking their true identity. – Masking the true identity Since the narratives coming from this group of participants support the same trend I will illustrate it by citing some of their testimonies. One of the participants is half-Jewish but had ‘‘Russian’’ as the nationality listed on her passport. Prior to her immigration she identified herself as Jewish. When the USSR collapsed and Estonia – the place where she was born – gained independence she faced the problem of whether to stay in Estonia without the chance of being recognized as an Estonian citizen or to leave. She set out on a long journey of rediscovering her true ‘‘self ’’ and Israel provided this opportunity for her. However, being Jewish on the father’s side does not qualify her to be accepted o‰cially as Jewish in Israel. When asked whether she can openly talk about this in Israel she answered negatively and added: ‘‘I can talk about this only with my Jewish husband. We got married, we found a way to do it outside of Israel. People tried to force me to do ‘giur’ [o‰cial conversion to Judaism]; I did not do it because I do not like any kind of pressure. We have no children; otherwise we would have left Israel. My relatives who had been in Israel for 20 years by the time I immigrated warned me that as a non-Jew I would have to face only three problems here: getting married, having a child, and dying. Now I am facing the last. My husband and I often talk about this: we will be resting in di¤erent cemeteries. This is a major concern for my husband.’’ (Israel: O., female, 53 years old)

6.6.

Identity transformation: Analysis of narratives

151

Another narrative illustrates the way social stigma can make the individual manipulate the information that she wants to share with others: ‘‘There are places where I prefer not to talk about this. It’s not that I feel that it’s a flaw but I never know how another person will react to this and I do not want to feel deficient or get hurt. I do not want to take on the responsibility of how another person will react, so I prefer not to talk about this.’’ (Israel: L., female, 34 years old)

Yet another Russian participant ascribes her reluctance to reveal her true identity to her personal problems rather than possible hostility from the society: ‘‘No, I cannot talk openly about this. . . . I think it’s my personal problem. I know people who talk about it and nothing bad happens to them but I cannot. It’s me who feels more uncomfortable about it than the society does. . . . So I always remember that I am Russian but I feel Israeli now.’’ (Israel: L., female, 46 years old)

6.6.5. Germany: Identity transformation. Jewish immigrants The analysis of narratives gathered among Russian immigrants in Germany revealed some trends overlapping with the Israeli group and some with the American group. I will remind the reader that immigration to Germany opened after the majority of Russian Jews who wanted to emigrate had left Russia for Israel or the US. Those who immigrated to Germany did not have a strong incentive to leave Russia before or right after the collapse of the USSR. In other words, they did not choose Israel as a country that was still open for Russian Jews at the time of their lifechanging decision to emigrate from Russia. From feeling less Jewish to feeling more Russian the Jewish immigrants in this group showed the following patterns of identity transformation. – Jewish self-perception decreased Jewish immigrants who reported feeling less Jewish revealed a reason similar to that registered in the above two groups. According to their testimonies, the Jewish environment with which they associated themselves in Russia, that is, highly intellectual and professionally driven people, has changed. Most Jews left for the US and Israel while Germany opened its doors to immigration much later and mostly attracted elderly people who were seeking social and financial stability in the view of the economic crisis in Russia in the 1990s. This is how one of the participants describes it:

152

In search of ‘‘self ’’

‘‘It’s a very interesting phenomenon. When I lived in Russia I was interested in Jewish culture and even tried to learn the language. But I lost that Jewish identity after I came here. So I would rather identify myself as Russian than as a Jewish person here. In Russia I had the need to belong to a group of people like me, that is those who share my views and have the same level of intelligence. Those were Jews. Here I can find it more easily among Russian people. The thing is that those who left for Israel and America were people driven by their desire to emigrate and succeed. The immigration to Germany consisted of those people who did not manage to emigrate elsewhere and many came here just for the sake of material comfort. So I think there are fewer intelligent and professionally driven people among Jewish immigrants here.’’ (Germany: E., female, 33 years old)

– Initial self-identity as a Jew was not strong One of the reasons why Jewish self-identification has weakened over the time of immigration may be because the individual did not have a strong identification as a Jew in the first place. Among the Jewish participants in this group, 23% reported a relatively weak Jewish identification during their life in Russia. Many believe that a person needs to have his roots firmly established in childhood in order to carry the same sense of identity throughout his life. The illustration comes from one of the excerpts: ‘‘I feel Russian because I have little Jewish in me, just the nationality. So my Jewish side has never woken up, it is sleeping as it used to. We are members of the synagogue here in Hamburg, but I am as far from it as I was in Russia.’’ (Germany, L., male, 71 years old)

– From being ashamed to be a Jew to embracing the Jewish identity A few immigrants said that they are happy to embrace their Jewish identity after a lifetime of feeling ashamed of being an o‰cially ostracized Jew. However, as in the Israeli group, they emphasized their strictly secular interest in Judaism and Jewish culture. This is how one immigrant describes his identity transformation: ‘‘I felt deficient in Russia. I did not want to be Jewish; I wanted to be Russian like everyone else. I was ashamed of my Jewish relatives and Jewish traditions. I wanted them to bake Easter cakes and go to church. Like all normal people. But it did not happen. Now I feel more Jewish because I started reading and learning more. I went to a synagogue. I know more now. Now I feel like a German Jew.’’ (Germany: A., male, 70 years old)

6.6.

Identity transformation: Analysis of narratives

153

– Comfort in being Jewish but cautious about revealing it As in the American group, there were participants who expressed caution in revealing their Jewish identity in front of Germans. Some immigrants are aware of prejudices against Jews and prefer not to bring it up; others exercise extra caution in protecting the feelings of the locals. The latter is illustrated through the following excerpt: ‘‘Here I experience a certain split. When I go to a synagogue and find myself among people from the former USSR and local Jews I feel Jewish. Only here I started feeling Jewish. But there are very old women in my building and I do not want to scare them with the word ‘Jew.’ They still feel guilt about the horrible thing that was done to Jews and they think that all Germany is to blame, so they are afraid of this word and I never tell them who I am.’’ (Germany: A., female, 67 years old)

– Feeling Russian due to being viewed as Russian There is a finding opposite to that in the Israeli corpus. The Israeli participants feel a disconnect between their self-perception as Jews and the societal view of them as Russians. Jewish immigrants in the German group claim to feel Russian since their new country views them as Russians. However, those immigrants who o¤ered such explanation of their identity shift did not have a strong Jewish identification prior to their immigration. ‘‘I think I felt more Russian than Jewish since I am Jewish only by my nationality. I taught Russian folk music and Russian folk musical instruments, how could I feel Jewish? Here they do not di¤erentiate; they call us all Russians. So I feel Russian. They do not guess that we are all di¤erent here. If they had asked me I would have said that I am Jewish but they never do.’’ (Germany: A., male, 61 years old)

From other interviews I found that some immigrants do not want to be viewed as Russians because it places them in the same category as socalled ethnic Germans from Russia. Reportedly there is much animosity in Russian Jewish immigration towards Russian German immigration. The latter are viewed as provincial, less educated and not sophisticated by Russians of the Jewish ancestry. We will discuss this later in this chapter. – Identity crisis in young immigrants As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the German corpus had more people of the younger generation than the other two groups; 27% of the German

154

In search of ‘‘self ’’

participants were in their late 20s-to-early 30s at the time of the study. While interviewing those immigrants I noticed that they were very interested in discussing the identity part and often showed much passion in exploring their own ‘‘self.’’ Eventually I decided to devote a separate discussion to the problems that those young people are experiencing. Instead of putting together individual excerpts I chose to illustrate this with two immigrants’ stories. Lena [the name has been changed] was 16 years old when her parents emigrated from St. Petersburg, Russia, to Germany. The hardest challenge for her was to overcome the sense of loneliness that she felt in a predominantly German school where in the absence of any other immigrants her German peers rejected her and made her feel like an outsider. Now looking back at her parents’ decision to emigrate she concludes that children should be removed from their native land at a much younger age. Otherwise they become people without a home. As she bitterly added, she never would feel at home in Russia, nor will Germany ever become her country. This led to her contemplation of her own identity: ‘‘When I lived in Russia I could say exactly who I was – I was Russian. I did not even realize that I was Jewish because we lived in St. Petersburg, my parents lost any touch with their culture, and all Jewish things were virtually banned in that country. So I never had a chance to establish a Jewish identity. On the other hand, I am surrounded by Russian Jews here in Germany and I feel more connected with them than with the other group of Russians, that is ethnic Germans from Russia. At the same time, I have been living in Germany for 12 years now, I had a German boyfriend, I have no problem fitting in with German society but I do not feel that I ever will become German. Intuitively I am still ashamed of my Jewish nationality. Then again I am proud to be Jewish – this is such an absurdity.’’ (Germany: L., female, 27 years old)

Another young woman, Tanya [the name has been changed] also was 16 when she emigrated with her parents from the same city of St. Petersburg. While living in Russia she knew that she was Jewish but was too young to understand why she needed to be di¤erent if she did not have any idea of those people, their culture, language, and traditions. This is how she explains her identity transformation: ‘‘It is strange that I feel both ways. I started feeling more Jewish and I no longer feel embarrassed to be Jewish or talk about this. At the same time I started feeling more Russian because I realize that the only Jewish part that I have is my parents. So when people ask me I say that I am Russian.’’ (Germany: N., female, 31 years old)

6.7.

Summary

155

Very much like Lena, this immigrant regrets that her parents emigrated at the wrong time. She wishes she could have stayed longer in Russia in order to graduate from high school and college there, build a good network of friends and establish a much stronger Russian identity so that now, on her visits to Russia, she would not feel like an outsider there. As she bitterly added, Germany would never become her country. 6.6.6. Germany: Identity transformation. Russian immigrants As for Russian immigrants of non-Jewish background, most of them reported much pride in being Russian and an increased awareness of their roots and a few admitted feeling less connected with Russia. – Feeling more strongly about Russian roots One of the participants refers to her individualistic nature that did not fit Russian culture (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of individualism versus collectivism). Now she reports a much stronger sense of her Russian identity: ‘‘When you live there as a Russian it becomes part of your everyday life and you do not think much about it. Here you are pushed in a certain framework where you are trying to identify your ‘self.’ This leads to a stronger feeling of being Russian. I speak German fluently and I am quite successful but I am also Russian.’’ (Germany: Y., female, 31 years old)

Another Russian participant emphasizes the sense of pride that she has as a Russian person: ‘‘I am very happy to be Russian. Here I am developing more and more interest in Russian history and language. . . . I do not feel like hiding it. On the contrary, I feel proud to be Russian; this is some sort of self-awareness of being part of the nation.’’ (Germany: N., female, 38 years old)

6.7. Summary The analysis of identity-related narratives gathered in all three groups revealed a few overlapping and a few unique trends in identity transformation among Russian immigrants. First, let us look at the Jewish population in this study.

156

In search of ‘‘self ’’

All Jewish participants reported a liberating sense of being what they want to be and the comfort of being Jewish, if they so choose, without feeling ashamed of their nationality. However, that was the only trend shared by all three groups. The next overlapping tendency concerns only the US and Germany where Jewish participants admitted that they feel comfortable feeling Jewish but are cautious about revealing it to members of the host society. No incidents of anti-Semitism were reported but the immigrants claimed that they still could feel its presence. Both American and German groups had immigrants whose Jewish self-identification has weakened over the years of immigration. In the US, participants linked it to the nonexistent need to oppose hostility from the majority group, while in Germany they admitted an initially low Jewish self-identification prior to immigration. As for Israel, that was the only group where immigrants showed a dominant trend of reinforced Jewish self-identification. In addition, only the Israeli group revealed much pride that immigrants feel about being part of the country. Many choose to identify themselves as Israelis rather than Jews. Also the Israeli participants reported a comfort of belonging and they see Israel as their home. An interesting – albeit opposite – trend was observed in the Israeli and German groups. Israelis do not like to be viewed as Russians because it clashes with their Jewish self-perception while in Germany many immigrants find comfort in being viewed as Russians and explain their shift to Russian self-identification as a result of such public attitudes. Now we will turn to Russian immigrants of non-Jewish background. Here we can see much similarity between the US and Germany where Russians not only retain their Russian self-identification but also feel more strongly about their roots and nationality. Many claimed that the question of identity and self-perception emerged strongly after their immigration. The situation with Russians in Israel is strikingly di¤erent: Russian immigrants in Israel admitted problems with revealing their true identities. Their self-perception remains Russian or shifts towards Israeli. We will discuss all these tendencies in more detail later in this chapter. So far we have looked at how the individual wants to be viewed by others and how the internal perception of his ‘‘self ’’ has changed over the years of immigration. The next question in this chapter concerns the individual’s reaction towards the public view of him as a member of the Russian immigration.

6.8.

Russian immigration and the perception of the term

157

6.8. Russian immigration and the perception of the term ‘‘Russian’’ among immigrants To many people in the West the very question that I raise in this section presents no problem. After all, all immigrants from the former USSR are viewed as Russians, whether they are ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, ethnic Germans, Georgians, et cetera. The generalized name ‘‘Russian’’ usually is applied to anyone coming from the former USSR. However, there is some discontent among Russian immigrants about which name should be applied to the group to which the individual belongs. Who should be called what in the big body of the Russian Diaspora? In search of the answer to this question I asked the participants to elaborate on this concept and say what they personally think about this debate. This section will look at the results of the analysis of narratives related to this question. Immigrants in all three groups reacted di¤erently to the question, i.e., positively, strongly negatively, and neutrally. However, a close look at the narratives revealed di¤erent reasons behind such reactions. Moreover, those reasons were specific to each of the three groups. Therefore I will illustrate each set of findings separately. 6.8.1. US The participants in the American group predominantly showed either a positive or neutral attitude to the generalized name ‘‘Russian’’ as it is applied to immigration from the former USSR. Those who sided with the American view of this immigration as Russian agreed that the Russian language, culture, and shared background unite people regardless of their nationality. This is an excerpt from a response by a Jewish immigrant: This is the right generalization. Eventually we have made it: we, Jews, have become Russians, we have assimilated. This is an interesting twist and I agree with this.’’ (US: N., female, 51 years old)

Those participants who find such a generalization unacceptable insist that ‘‘Russian-speaking’’ immigration is a better term. Some ethnic Russians feel strongly against a generalization that puts them in the same category as Jews and other minority groups from the former USSR. As one of the participants expressed it in a strongly nationalistic manner,

158

In search of ‘‘self ’’

‘‘I hate when they talk about the ‘Russian Mafia.’ There are Freedmans [typical Jewish last name] so-called Russians there. It’s not fair. If Americans ask me I always point out that it’s a Jewish, not a Russian, Mafia.’’ (US: L., female, 57 years old)

The above excerpt shows that even in the immigration setting, antiSemitic feelings can be strong among non-Jewish Russians. A Jewish immigrant o¤ered her own perspective on the poor choice of the term describing this immigration: ‘‘I do not want to be called Russian. I tell Americans that I came from Russia and I speak Russian but I am Jewish.’’ (US: M., female, 42 years old)

The participants with a strong negative stand on this issue took this debate even further by suggesting that not only people from di¤erent former republics should be identified separately but also that a distinction should be made between those who came from big central cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev, and the rest of the country. 6.8.2. Israel In the Israeli group the attitude to the name ‘‘Russian’’ was rooted more in the negative social stigma attached to the entire Russian immigration of the last two decades than in the need to separate Russian non-Jewish immigrants from Jewish ones. Compared with other two groups, Russian immigrants in Israel have a justified sense of entitlement to belong to the country and not to be ostracized as second class citizens. The o‰cial term for a Jew claiming his right to return to his historical land is not an immigrant but an ‘‘ale/alya’’ [ascender]. It is understandable why many immigrants feel sad about being viewed as another minority group in the country that was supposed to become their ‘‘historical Motherland’’ [a term used among Soviet Jews]. Through reading the narratives collected in that group, it is clear that the question was quite painful to the participants and their reactions varied from mixed feelings of pride and resentment to indi¤erence with a grain of frustration. In the following excerpt, the immigrant views such di¤erentiation as an attempt to put newcomers in another ghetto: ‘‘I feel bad about this, very bad. We have a separation, a clear separation, and di¤erentiation again. This separation generalizes us as the nation [Russian] that we do not belong to. It pushes us into some kind of a ghetto. It used to be a Jewish ghetto; here we have a Russian ghetto.’’ (Israel: S., female, 47 years old)

6.8.

Russian immigration and the perception of the term

159

However, there were a few participants who admitted that their reaction to such a generalization depends on the context: they expressed pride in being ‘‘Russians’’ if Israelis say good things about Russians and resentment when they face a negative attitude. It is interesting to note that a few ‘‘vatikim’’ [old-timers] who came to Israel in the 1970s and technically represent a di¤erent ‘‘aliya’’ [immigration], mostly based on strong Zionist feelings, expressed concerns about the negative attitude existing in the Israeli society towards Russian immigration. Yet they promptly noted that they personally never are labeled as ‘‘Russian’’ there. This suggests a clear separation between two sub-waves within the same last wave of Russian immigration in Israel. The following two excerpts illustrate this point: ‘‘Nobody calls me this [Russian]. This is what they say about immigrants of the 1990s. Sometimes I feel angry, especially if bad things are added to the name and I defend Russian immigrants. But generally it does not bother me.’’ (Israel: R., female, 59 years old) ‘‘I understand Israelis. This ‘aliya’ [immigration] is di¤erent from the one in the 1970s. Their worldview is di¤erent; they came here for a di¤erent reason. As to the name Russian, there are many Russians here who are not Jews. [Q: What is your attitude to this?] This is a problem. The country is too small and it was founded for Jews. This is important for me. It is important for me that a person who came here did so because he wanted to come here, not because he was running away from a bad life there. If a person came here to escape he will never treat this country like his home. This country is still young and is still fighting for its existence.’’ (Israel: A., female, 52 years old)

6.8.3. Germany The analysis of narratives coming from the German group showed that most of the participants do not have a need to di¤erentiate between Russians and Jews when the generalized name ‘‘Russian’’ is applied to the recent immigration. However, the majority expressed strong negative sentiments about including ethnic Germans from Russia in the same category of Russians. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, ethnic Germans are viewed as people of a lower social and educational class by Russian and Jewish immigrants in Germany. As one of the immigrants puts it in his own words, ‘‘I think this is not right. People who came here with Jewish immigration have a di¤erent mentality from those who came here as ethnic Germans from Russia.’’ (Germany: I., male, 51 years old)

160

In search of ‘‘self ’’

Some immigrants clarified my question and said that the German mass media never put those two separate categories together and that ‘‘Aussiedler’’ [German term for a person who resettles] stands apart from a Jewish immigrant from Russia. However, there were some immigrants who agreed with the above generalization by saying that the same language, culture and background qualifies everyone to be viewed as Russian. One immigrant o¤ered a humorous episode to illustrate the similar mentality shared by ethnic Germans and Jewish/Russian immigrants: ‘‘I have two neighbors: one is German and another – a Russian German from Kazakhstan. Someone stole a bike from my yard. I share the story with the Russian German and he says, ‘Of course, the fence is too low.’ I tell my German neighbor this story and he sympathizes with me, ‘What a pity!’ You see, the Russian German does not even think that stealing is bad, his concern is about the height of the fence that allowed this to happen! But the local German got sincerely upset.’’ (Germany: H., male, 65 years old)

To sum up, the immigrants in this study are split in their attitude to the generalized name ‘‘Russian’’ as it is applied to the entire Russian immigration but their arguments di¤er across groups. In the US and Germany people seem to be sensitive to including ethnic groups that either do not qualify to be called Russians or are not appealing enough to share the same category with other immigrants. At the same time, the Israeli respondents have strong feelings about the negative stigma attached to the name by Israeli society. Jewish immigrants who claimed their right of return to the Jewish State perceive such stigmatization as unfair. 6.9. External antecedents: What did we learn about the host countries? As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, we will look at external antecedents through the results of the analysis of the narratives. This will eliminate subjectivity and bias in o¤ering an interpretation of the role of the host society, its attitude toward newcomers, and the possible stigmatization of the immigrant group in the transformation of the individual’s selfperception. As in previous sections, we will take a separate look at each of the three countries that became a focus of the investigation. 6.9.1. US Based on the analyses of narratives and surveys the US provides a healthy ground for immigrants of Jewish and Russian ethnicity to feel comfortable

6.9.

External antecedents: What did we learn about the host countries?

161

about their inner ‘‘selves.’’ Immigrants feel liberated from the need to di¤erentiate themselves as ‘‘others’’; Jewish immigrants stop feeling ashamed of their nationality, and ethnic Russians can reinforce their sense of identity. Moreover, the societal view of the entire immigration from the former USSR as Russian does not carry any negative stigma. However, the immigrants’ reluctance to discuss their Jewish nationality among Americans suggests two things. First, there may be hidden prejudices against Jews in the society. Second, Jewish immigrants may carry the heavy baggage of discrimination from their life in the former USSR and that could lead to a lack of trust in any society where they happen to be a minority group. Nobody reported any instances of discrimination based on their nationality/ethnicity. So I would speculate that either of those two factors, or a combination of both, could result in such attitudes. 6.9.2. Israel Israeli society proves to reinforce the Jewish self-perception in immigrants. It provides a sense of home and instills a sense of pride in the country in Jewish immigrants. At the same time its religion-based laws pertaining to marriage, birth, and death favor only those immigrants who are Jewish on their mother’s side. This creates problems for Jewish immigrants who come from mixed marriages and are not recognized as Jews in Israel and to non-Jewish members of the immigrant’s family. Such stigmatization at the o‰cial level results in the individual’s attempt to mask his true identity. Having liberated Jews from the need of hiding their identity and feeling ashamed to be Jewish Israel does not provide the same environment for non-Jewish immigrants. In addition, a choice of labeling each new wave of immigration by the name of the country that the immigrants represent seems to clash strongly with the individual’s need to be accepted fully by the majority as an equal member of the nation. Israel is the only country where Jews are not an ethnic minority. 6.9.3. Germany Based on the analyses presented above, Germany has a few similarities to the US. First, it provides a comfortable environment for Jewish immigrants to feel good about their Jewish nationality. Second, it resonates well with ethnic Russians who develop more interest in their identity and much pride in being Russian. Finally, like the US it still may have hidden elements of prejudices against Jews that make some immigrants feel reluctant to reveal their Jewish nationality. Likewise, Germany does not seem to have any negative stigma attached to the generalized term ‘‘Russian

162

In search of ‘‘self ’’

immigration.’’ Moreover, the term is not applied to all immigrants from the former USSR at the o‰cial level. To summarize, the societal attitudes toward Russian immigrants as they were revealed through the analyses of narratives and surveys in this study vary across the three countries. Those attitudes could be di¤erent towards people of Jewish and Russian ethnicity. Depending on the individual’s nationality and the strength of his initial self-identification one country could provide a better environment for identity transformation or reinforcement than another. The role of the host country in the process of the immigrant’s re-conceptualization of his ‘‘self’’ is important indeed. However, it should be considered along with numerous other factors, such as internal and traditional antecedents, that we have discussed above. In the next section we will attempt to tie up all the loose ends and look at the broad picture of identity transformation in Russian immigrants as it was presented in this study.

6.10. Discussion The results of the numerous analyses presented in this chapter testify to the changing and dynamic nature of the individual’s self-perception upon his immigration. We could see the way the immigrants were forced into a certain identity frame in their native country, how ethnic discrimination and social stigma contributed to their self-di¤erentiation and how this past experience along with the new environment and its accompanying social factors could change the way the individual wants to be viewed by others and how he perceives his ‘‘self.’’ In this section, I will illustrate the major findings through the Acculturation Framework. Immigrants participating in this study represented the same social and educational class of people in the former USSR. The major di¤erence was in their o‰cial nationality that listed them either as Jewish or Russian on their Soviet passports. This single line in the passport, also known as ‘‘pyataya grafa’’ [fifth line], created the major divide between the Russian majority and the Jewish minority. In this chapter we specifically looked at those two separate groups of people in order to understand how their self-perception transforms and what may contribute to the resulting change. In other words, traditional antecedents in this chapter are focused on the o‰cial nationality as a demarcation line separating these two groups of people. The boundaries defined by the o‰cial ‘‘identity’’ in the USSR were not as straightforward. Oftentimes people of mixed

6.10.

Discussion

163

Jewish-Russian origin could be listed as either Russian or Jewish. Being listed as Russian but having Semitic features could expose the individual to the same level of discrimination, at least at the domestic level, as a person listed as Jewish. However, in this study I relied on the o‰cial reference of nationality as the point of departure for the analysis and kept in mind the potential limitations of such an approach. When we look at these two groups of participants, one representing the majority and another the stigmatized minority, we need to understand better how negative stigmatization worked and whether it personally a¤ected the individual and/or contributed to the change in his selfperception and cognition. This brought about the question of antiSemitism in Russia that falls into the category of internal antecedents. Through the analysis of narratives we saw how most of the Jewish participants experienced discrimination. Personal testimonies illustrated how social and ethnic stigmatization gradually changed from openly hostile on the part of their peers in their childhood years to semi-o‰cial obstacles in the college years to the almost invisible level of restrictions that Jews experienced throughout their professional careers. Many fully were aware of such limitations, which, in turn, protected them from facing obvious acts of injustice but inevitably held them back in their personal and professional development. Now if we go to the social environment in the host countries (external antecedents) we can hypothesize how each of those countries could contribute to a change in the individual’s perception of his ‘‘self.’’ Israel, as the only Jewish State, is the country where Jews are a majority. Conversely, we can expect that Jewish participants would develop a stronger sense of belonging and strengthen their Jewish self-identification more in Israel than in the other two countries. At the same time, we could expect that Jewish immigrants resettling into another country where they would remain an ethnic minority might have a subconscious fear of revealing their Jewish identity, no matter how liberal the new society is. This was suggested by the findings coming from the survey and further supported through the analysis of narratives. The percentage of immigrants who retained their o‰cial Jewish identity as a way to be viewed by others as well as the percentage of those who shifted towards being viewed as Jewish was much higher in Israel than in the other two groups. There was no di¤erence for the factor of prior discrimination to either shift among the Israeli respondents. At the same time, more people with prior experiences of discrimination reported a shift towards being viewed as Russians, both in Germany and the US. Another way to connect the

164

In search of ‘‘self ’’

three levels of antecedents in trying to explain an observed shift in selfidentification is through looking at the potential role of religion and partners in the identity transformation. The majority of participants admitted their secular nature and lack of interest in observing religious traditions. The possible role of religion in the process of identity transformation can be viewed through the prism of the above antecedents. For example, it can be illustrated in the following way. The individual’s nonreligious orientation in the negotiation of his identity can be viewed as a traditional antecedent. The social environment in Russia where religion was banned is an internal antecedent. Easy access to religious services or the lack thereof along with the societal attitude towards the individual’s a‰liation with a particular religion can be considered external antecedents. Now if we look at the possible factor of religion in the change of self-identification we can see that secular immigrants coming from a strictly atheist society show little interest in regular participation in religious services across all three groups. However, the percentage of those who identify themselves as Jewish and attend synagogue at least occasionally is much higher in Israel; likewise, the large majority of those who identify themselves as Russians attend church in the US. We can suggest that Israel as a society with the dominant religion of Judaism and the US as a predominantly Christian society where religion plays a more prominent role than in Germany provide better environments for people to turn to religion more often. Conversely, religion per se might not be a factor in the identity shift; rather it could be viewed as a possible consequence of transformation in the individual’s self-perception. The same could be said about the role of partners. It was found that a strong Jewish identification of the individual was correlated with the presence of a Jewish partner while a shift towards Russian selfidentification was more likely to happen in cases where a partner was Russian. This held true at least for two groups, i.e., the American and the Israeli. In general, the highest percentage of people who shifted from Jewish to Russian self-identification was found among German participants and the highest percentage of people who underwent the shift in the opposite direction was registered in the Israeli group. However, those numbers reflect the way the individual prefers to be viewed by others and is not indicative of the actual change in the perception of his ‘‘self.’’ Therefore, the process and consequences of identity transformation, as part of the acculturation process in general, were analyzed closely through narratives related to the identity questions. The following trends were identified across groups. All three groups showed an increased level of

6.10.

Discussion

165

comfort that immigrants feel about their Jewish identity. This level of comfort translated into di¤erent outcomes for the three groups. In the US more immigrants lost any need to feel di¤erent or Jewish because the hostility of the environment where they were a stigmatized group was removed upon their immigration or because Jewish is not viewed as an ethnicity in the new country. In Germany a strong shift towards Russian self-identification was related to a few factors. First, Jewish identification among those immigrants initially was relatively low. Then many explained a shift as the result of the attitude of the host society that views them as Russian. Finally, some exercise a certain caution in revealing their true identity given the gruesome role that Germany played in the mass extermination of Jews in WWII. The latter resonates with the American group, in which several participants expressed the same concern about their reluctance to discuss their ethnicity with Americans. This allowed us to suggest that both Germany and the US present a less inviting social environment than Israel for the Jewish immigrant. However, a separate look at the role of the societal perception of immigrants in the individual’s self-identification showed that Israel, among the three countries involved in this study, exercises the most negatively stigmatized perception of new immigrants from Russia. The participants’ desire to be viewed as part of the Jewish majority clashes with another di¤erentiation, this time as ‘‘Russian,’’ that they have to face in Israel. In Germany participants showed the opposite reaction to the generalized perception of the entire immigration from the former USSR as Russian. Partly they embrace this o‰cially-imposed identification as a chance to re-negotiate their identity towards a more Russian ‘‘self.’’ Yet they feel a need to separate their ‘‘self’’ from the ‘‘unappealing’’ company of ‘‘other’’ Russians in Germany, namely ethnic Germans who represent a second source of current immigration influx from Russia to Germany. A similar attitude was observed among American immigrants of ethnic Russian background who feel a need to preserve the purity of the name ‘‘Russian’’ as strictly used for ethnic Russians. As for ethnic Russians, another group in the study of identity transformation, they seem to retain their original self-identification in the US and Germany. These two countries provide a good ground for ethnic Russians to reinforce their Russian identity, instill more pride in being Russian, and promote a stronger interest in their Russian roots. The data gathered in Israel show a more complex picture. While Russian immigrants of non-Jewish background perceive themselves as Russian they go through a process of dividing their identity into a public and private

166

In search of ‘‘self ’’

one. They perceive themselves as Russian Israelis, yet they have to mask their true Russian identity and not reveal it. The example of Russian immigration to Israel illustrates an interesting phenomenon: a negatively stigmatized minority, that is Russian Jews, becomes a majority in Israel, albeit stigmatized as ‘‘Russian,’’ and ethnic Russians, a former majority in the USSR, turns into a stigmatized minority. In the light of the research on social stigma the analysis of narratives illustrated opposite processes that are two sides of the same coin. Throughout the narratives we saw how Jews were ashamed to be Jews in Russia and how they had to manipulate the information that they revealed to ‘‘others,’’ that is, Russians. Then we witnessed how ethnic Russians are manipulating the information about their identity in the attempt not to reveal their true ‘‘self’’ to ‘‘others,’’ that is, Jews in Israel. Going back to the theoretical framework employed in this study we can see how social identity, social cognition, and social stigma define the process of identity transformation in the acculturation process of immigrants. The social identities that most of the Russian immigrants brought into the new countries largely had been built on the basis of their ties to a certain social or ethnic group and in the attempt to alienate themselves from the group of ‘‘others.’’ We saw how social stigma played a role not only in the initial identity formation but also in the subsequent process of identity transformation in the host country. In the new social contexts the immigrants formed their perceptions of the expectations that the members of the host societies have of them, whether those expectations were false or well grounded. We looked at the role of the social environment in the process of identity negotiation among immigrants. The resulting change in self-identification and self-perception, the reasons behind and the behaviors surrounding the change, can be viewed as social cognitions. As Padilla and Perez (2003) stressed, ‘‘the social identities that they bring with them and the identities they develop in the new environment influence social cognitions that in turn guide their behavior. . . .’’ (p. 50). As the findings discussed in this chapter demonstrated, the inclusion of the three major components, i.e., social identity, social stigma, and social cognition, in the acculturation framework is essential for our deeper understanding of the mechanisms underlying the acculturation process. In this chapter we looked at the process of identity transformation among Russian Jews and ethnic Russians in the immigration setting. I demonstrated how the complex phenomenon of self-identification can be viewed through the Acculturation Framework. We looked at identity transformation from four angles. First, we discussed the possible role of

6.10.

Discussion

167

‘‘o‰cial’’ identity and social discrimination in the subsequent change of the individual’s perception of his ‘‘self.’’ Second we examined a shift in the immigrant’s self-identification as it is presented to ‘‘others.’’ Then we looked closely at the change in the individual’s self-perception after his immigration. Finally, the question of the societal attitude towards Russian immigration shed additional light on the role of the host countries as well as the individual’s need to di¤erentiate his ‘‘self ’’ in the process of identity negotiation. The dynamic nature of identity transformation and negotiation and the relatively small scope of the study do not allow us to make far-reaching conclusions. However, the findings outline the major trends in identity shifts among Russian immigrants residing on three di¤erent continents. We suggested possible reasons for a change in the individual’s self-perception upon immigration. The next chapter will look at another acculturation consequence, i.e., the individual’s ultimate sense of belonging.

Chapter 7 Sense of belonging ‘‘If we feel like outsiders here, in Israel, we will feel like this everywhere.’’ (Excerpt from an interview with a Russian immigrant in Israel)

Introduction In the previous chapter we looked at the dynamics of identity transformation among Russian immigrants in three countries. The concepts of selfperception versus perception by others as well as numerous factors that may be at the interplay of identity negotiation have been discussed at great length. We have brought up the question of comfort that the individual feels in identifying himself one way or another. The feeling of comfort further translates into a sense of belonging, whether we talk about a group or society in general – these two internal factors become intertwined in the complex process of the individual’s search for his self and the place that he identifies as his home. The latter is the main topic of this chapter. Immigration and uprootedness are concepts that often are viewed as two sides of the same coin. The individual does not leave his native land without a good reason; likewise, leaving the native country does not necessarily entail the immediate replanting of roots in the new soil of the host country. Sociologists and socio-linguists often look at integration and acculturation as the most valid measures of the individual’s success in the new environment. The question that I raise in this chapter concerns the sense of belonging that immigrants experience both in their host countries and on their visits back to Russia. This can be related closely to the general question of cultural adaptation or identity transformation that we have discussed before. By isolating the seemingly simple question of ‘‘home’’ I do not intend to take it out of the complex context of the acculturation process, nor do I want to undermine its importance for the present research. The decision to look closely at this particular matter came as a result of my own thinking about the concept of home and its transformational force over the years of immigration. In this study, I introduced questions targeting the concept of ‘‘belonging’’ both in the survey and the interviews. Inadvertently, these questions turned out to be

7.1.

Home

169

the most painful and brought some to tears. The unexpectedly strong emotional reaction among Russian immigrants to this particular question further legitimized the need to explore this question in a separate chapter. The term ‘‘home’’ or rather ‘‘feeling of home’’ can be emotionally charged and not easy to analyze quantitatively. However, I attempt to explore the concept of ‘‘home’’ and ‘‘belonging’’ by looking at di¤erent factors, i.e., sociological, socio-linguistic and linguistic. The following questions will seek answers through the combined analyses of surveys and interviews: Does the frequency of visits to the ‘‘old home’’ depend on factors such as retained versus revoked citizenship? Do immigrants refer to either of the two countries as their home and how can this be analyzed against the factors of age, length of residency, ethnicity and citizenship? How do immigrants identify the reasons for feeling comfort or discomfort in either of their two ‘‘homes’’? Can a linguistic measure of belonging tell us more about the way immigrants define their home? Finally, do immigrants have hurt feelings towards their former country and how is the complex relationship with Russia reflected in their acculturation process? Before we turn to these questions, we need to address the question of home. 7.1. Home Demuth (2000) discusses key factors that should be considered in any immigration study, the concept of home being among them. She di¤erentiates between ‘‘home’’ as a technical term that may describe any place where the individual has lived a few years and the more complex phenomenon, the feeling of ‘‘home.’’ She further maintains that the term often is charged emotionally and should be treated with care. Nobody questions the importance of home and a stable home environment for the mental health of any individual. The person’s need to ‘‘feel rooted,’’ as Demuth reminds us, has a long historical development for European nations that moved away from a nomadic existence centuries ago. By settling down the people developed links to the defined geographic area of land in which they feel ‘rooted.’ With it came the feeling of having a sanctuary and retreat in one’s home: ‘my home is my castle.’ The development would be such that the place where a person grew up, with all connections and connotations, would be a part of the overall makeup of the person’s identity: cultural links belong to this as much as the somewhat less easy to grapple question of emotional link to the territory. (Demuth 2000: 25)

170

Sense of belonging

If we translate this statement to the migration situation, according to Demuth, the power of the emotional link to ‘‘home’’ will influence the individual’s decision to leave the place and, at least in part, explain ‘‘the problems occurring when [a person is] cut or uprooted from the place a person has strong emotional links to’’ (Demuth 2000: 25). The author suggests a few factors that may contribute to the general sense of uprootedness in immigrants. First, we should consider the age at which the individual left the homeland. The younger the person was upon immigration the higher the likelihood that he will adjust to the new place and acquire a new sense of home. The period of detachment from the native home is another factor that should be considered along with the age factor. However, Demuth goes further and discusses the very important factor of voluntary versus forced migration and its e¤ect on the subsequent feelings of the immigrant towards his native land. Having placed it in the framework of push-pull factors in the decision-making process she illustrates a few scenarios where the individual’s migration would be shaped di¤erently depending on how strongly he felt the need to leave the native country (push factor) versus his desire to move to a new country due to its high appeal (pull factor). Although we already have discussed in previous chapters the reasons behind the immigration decisions for Russian immigrants, I would like to point out an important element that has not been explored yet. I believe that the question of citizenship often is overlooked in studies on immigration. While the issue of having one versus two passports can be a mundane matter for some people, it acquires a more complex meaning in the case of Russian immigrants. Recall that the majority of Russian immigrants who left prior to or immediately after the collapse of the USSR had to go through the humiliating process of having their citizenship revoked. In the view of Demuth’s (2000) push-pull framework, the sheer absence of Russian citizenship could factor into the individual’s strong sense of alienation from the native country and losing the sense of home related to the native land. However, the complex process of immigration not only takes the individual away from his native land and home but sets him on a long journey of discovering a place that will become his home, both in physical and emotional terms. Ideally, any sense of detachment from the native home should be compensated for by the newly developed links to the new home. Immigrants often can be torn between two homes to which they feel they belong; these two homes, the one they left and the one that they acquired, are in constant competition for adequate space in their hearts and minds. Akhtar (1999) looks at the individual’s journey between the

7.1.

Home

171

two lands through the lens of psychoanalysis. He describes two extreme outcomes of the process of negotiating the sense of belonging, ethnocentric withdrawal and counterphobic assimilation: Ethnocentric withdrawal involves clinging to an idealized view of one’s earlier culture. Such individuals eat only their ethnic food and associate only with homoethnic groups. Their residences, replete with artifacts from ‘back home,’ take on a shrine-like quality. They become more nationalistic toward their country of origin than they were while living in it. To buttress such secondary nationalism, they often forge unlikely alliances and develop new prejudices. Counterphobic assimilation is, in contrast, a caricature of the practicing subphase toddler. Intoxicated by the widening horizons of the experiential world, these individuals totally renounce their original culture. . . . (Akhtar 1999: 87–88)

On the other hand, Boym (2001) brings in a component of intimacy associated with the term ‘‘home’’ when talking about the feeling of loss and nostalgia among immigrants: When we are at home, we don’t need to talk about it. ‘To be at home’ – byt’ doma [Russian] – is a slightly ungrammatical expression in many languages. We just know how to say it in our native tongue. To feel at home is to know that things are in their places and so are you; it is a state of mind that doesn’t depend on an actual location. The object of longing, then, is not really a place called home but this sense of intimacy with the world; it is not the past in general, but that imaginary moment when we had time and did not know the temptation of nostalgia. (Boym 2001: 251)

Whatever perspective we take on the complex phenomenon of ‘‘home’’ and ‘‘belonging,’’ there are no precise measures to quantify the pain of loss associated with migration, nor are there any universals describing home. Each individual perceives it di¤erently and each will have his own reasons and ways to define ‘‘home,’’ often by defying his past or by transferring the old familiar concept into the foreign environment. It may be challenging, if not impossible, to analyze the concept of belonging based on empirical data. Yet in the rest of this chapter I attempt to look deeper into the possible factors contributing to the alienation of immigrants from their native country as well as their desire to belong to or feeling of alienation from the new one. I partially will adopt Demuth’s (2000) pullpush framework in analyzing this phenomenon. As before, we will look first at the data gathered through surveys and then allow the participants to voice their opinions.

172

Sense of belonging

7.2. Findings: Surveys 7.2.1. Citizenship vs. visits to Russia As I indicated above, the person’s relationship with his own country can be tarnished forever by the power of the ‘‘push’’ factor that forced him to leave and by the circumstances surrounding the departure itself. The majority of Russian immigrants in the 1970s to 1990s were stripped of their Soviet passports and left their native land on exit visas. In other words, for weeks and often for months they remained citizens of no country. Here I would like to clarify a di¤erence between an individual’s voluntary decision to feel cosmopolitan and express his freedom by not having ties with any country in the world and having the decision imposed on him by the authorities. Those who went through the bizarre process of having to pay a high fee for their citizenship to be revoked against their will could retain negative attitudes forever toward the place they once called their home. Not accidentally did I choose to look into citizenship as a possible factor in the immigrants’ alienation from Russia and the establishment of stronger ties with the new country. Table 7.1 illustrates the citizenship breakdown across all three groups of participants. Those participants who reported having only Russian citizenship or the citizenship of a former Soviet republic are listed under the ‘‘Russian’’ and ‘‘other’’ categories, respectively. Those who only have the local citizenship, i.e., American, Israeli, or German, are in the group of ‘‘local’’ citizenship. Dual citizenship is self-explanatory and includes those who have both Russian and local passports. Not surprisingly, the highest number of immigrants retaining Russian citizenship or the citizenship of a former Soviet republic and having it as their only citizenship comes from Germany (40.5%). Remember that immigration to Germany started much later and according to the new post-Soviet law people could preserve their Russian citizenship upon immigration. Also, many Russian immigrants in Germany admitted their reluctance to apply for German citizenship due to purely pragmatic considerations: as German citizens they would not be qualified for the substantial government assistance they currently enjoy. In other words, only 28.9% of German immigrants have German passports. This explanation probably would not work for the US group where 16% of the participants still live on their Russian passports due to the extremely lengthy bureaucratic process of getting US citizenship. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, only immi-

7.2.

Findings: Surveys

173

grants’ close relatives such as parents, spouses and minor children can expedite the process of getting permanent residency – and, subsequently, American citizenship – in a speedy manner. The highest percentage of people having dual citizenship comes from the US (36%). None of the Israeli participants carry the Russian passport as the only document showing their alliance with a country. The highest number of people having only local citizenship again comes from Israel. As I discussed in previous chapters, all legal immigrants to Israel receive proof of their Israeli citizenship upon arrival in the Ben-Gurion airport. The majority of the participants in that group, like the majority of Russian immigrants to Israel in general, arrived in 1990–1991, during the years when the Soviet government still enforced the denouncement of citizenship for those who wanted to leave the country. In addition, only 7.7% of the Israeli participants came to Israel during the time when they were allowed to retain their Russian citizenship. Table 7.1. Citizenship by country Group/Citizenship (%)

Russian

Local

Dual

US

16

42

36

Israel Germany

Other 6

0

92.3

7.7

0

27

28.9

30.8

13.5

The next question that I raise here concerns a possible correlation between the individual’s citizenship and his contact with Russia. Is there a possible connection between Russian citizenship and the frequency of the individual’s visits to Russia? Table 7.2 gives the combined results for all three groups, while Tables 7.3–7.5 illustrate the breakdown across the three groups. Table 7.2. Visits to Russia/citizenship (combined) Visits/citizenship (%)

Total

Russian

never

22.7

8.6

rarely

57.8

14.6

regularly

19.5

20

Local

Dual

Other

5.7

8.6

55.1

24.7

5.6

23.3

46.7

77

10

174

Sense of belonging

As you can see in Table 7.2, the overwhelming majority of people having only the citizenship of their new host country prefer not to go back to Russia (77%) or go very rarely (55.1%). Those who have dual citizenship are more likely to go back to Russia on a regular basis (46.7%). Here it should be noted that Russia remains a country where an entrance visa is required for all foreign visitors. The process of getting such a visa is often lengthy and costly. This may be one of the factors that contribute to the frequency of visits. The same general pattern is observed in the US and German groups where the likelihood of not going to Russia or visiting rarely correlates with the absence of Russian citizenship (see Tables 7.3 and 7.5). However, the Israeli case is di¤erent, i.e., the absolute majority of the immigrants in that group hold Israeli citizenship only. The Israeli immigrants show the lowest percentage of those who regularly go to Russia. When we take a closer look at the percentage of people whose Soviet citizenship was revoked, it is not surprising to see that the Israeli group has the highest number, i.e., 75% vs. 24% in the US and 2% in Germany. Thus we can suggest that not only the absence of citizenship but also, and most likely, the reasons behind the absence explain the individual’s unwillingness to maintain contact with the former motherland.

Table 7.3. Visits to Russia/citizenship (US) Visits/citizenship (%)

Total

Russian

US

Dual

never

22

27.3

72.7

0

rarely

58

13.8

44.8

38

regularly

20

70

10

0

Other 0 3.4 10

Table 7.4. Visits to Russia/citizenship (Israel) Visits/citizenship (%)

Total

Russian

never

36.5

0

rarely

53.8

0

7.7

0

regularly

Israeli

Dual

Other

94.7

5.3

0

92.9

7.1

0

0

0

100

7.2.

Findings: Surveys

175

Table 7.5. Visits to Russia/citizenship (Germany) Visits/citizenship (%) never

Total 9.6

Russian 0

German 60

Dual

Other

0

rarely

60

29

32.3

29

regularly

30.8

31.3

12.5

43.8

40 9.7 12.5

When the data on the frequency of visits to Russia were broken down into two categories, Jewish and non-Jewish participants, it was noticed that non-Jewish participants in all three groups go back to Russia on a more regular basis than their Jewish counterparts and the di¤erence is much bigger for the US and Israeli groups (Table 7.6). The latter can be explained by three possible reasons. First, Germany is located much closer to Russia compared with the other two countries. Second, the majority of German immigrants still retain their Russian citizenship. Finally, the German participants did not have much animosity towards their former country and mostly had left it because of the economic and political instability accompanying the collapse of the USSR.

Table 7.6. Visits to Russia vs. ethnicity Group/visits (%)

Ethnicity

Never

Rarely

Regularly

US

Jews Non-Jews

22 19

70 8

8 59

Israel

Jews Non-Jews

37 33

58 44

5 23

Germany

Jews Non-Jews

13 5

62 60

25 35

7.2.2. Citizenship vs. sense of home Another way to look at the phenomenon of revoked citizenship is through the prism of the individual’s sense of home. The participants were asked to identify their home out of a few possible places, e.g., Russia, the new host country, both Russia and the new country, or anywhere in the world. The

176

Sense of belonging

latter would mean that the individual no longer has any strong attachment to any particular location where he has lived or lives currently. Table 7.7 summarizes the results of the three groups.

Table 7.7. Home (by the country) Group/home (%)

Host country

Russia

Both

Anywhere

US

64

2

14

20

Israel

76.9

5.8

9.6

7.7

Germany

68.6

5.9

19.6

5.9

As we can see, the majority of people in all three countries identify their new land as their home, with Israel having the highest percentage (76.9%). An insignificantly small number of people still feel that Russia is their home (the lowest percentage comes from the US group where only one person is connected strongly to Russia). It is interesting to note that almost the same number of people among German (19.6%) and American (20%) immigrants feel that both Russia and Germany are their homes (German group) or feel at home anywhere in the world (US group). The latter can be illustrated by the story of one of the immigrants in the US group. M. (44 years old) was among the first immigrants in the 1990 wave. Like all other people leaving the USSR at that time, he had his Soviet citizenship revoked. He first went to Israel, then moved to Canada and finally settled down in the US. His professional occupation required him to go to Russia on frequent business trips. This justified a purely pragmatic decision to apply for Russian citizenship (note the irony: former Russian citizens who were forced to pay a high fee for their Soviet citizenship to be revoked now need to pay another high fee to get the citizenship back). At the time when this study was conducted M. held 4 citizenships (Russian, American, Israeli, and Canadian) and indicated that he feels at home anywhere in the world he lives as long as it is not his native country of Russia. The next step in the analysis was to contrast the data on the ‘‘sense of home’’ against the factor of revoked citizenship. Only the data on those people whose citizenship was revoked was included in the analysis. Table 7.8 summarizes the results.

7.2.

Findings: Surveys

177

Table 7.8. Citizenship revoked/sense of home Group/home (%)

Host country

Russia

Both

Anywhere

US

91.7

0

0

8.3

Israel

76.9

7.7

7.7

7.7

Germany

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

As mentioned earlier in this section, there was only one German participant whose Soviet citizenship was revoked. As a result, Germany was excluded from this analysis. The findings on the Israeli group do not change from the previous analysis: most of the Israeli immigrants came to Israel without their Soviet/Russian citizenship. As a result, we do not see a change in how people feel about home (cf. Table 7.7). However, the number of people in the US group who claim America as their home drastically increases when we isolate the factor of revoked citizenship, e.g., 64% for the entire group versus 91.7% among those who were forced to give up their Russian citizenship. The latter suggests that there is a connection between the individual’s sense of belonging and the factor of citizenship revoked by their native land. I believe that the role of an o‰cial passport should not be underestimated in immigration studies. The citizenship acquired in the new country will not necessarily a¤ect the individual’s sense of internal attachment to that country. However, the humiliating process of taking the passport of the native land away from the individual may tarnish forever his relationship with the country that he once knew as his only home. 7.2.3. Linguistic measure of ‘‘belonging’’ In order to explore further the question of ‘‘belonging,’’ I looked at the linguistic measure and analyzed it against the empirical data on home and citizenship that we discussed above. In Russian, possession is expressed through the grammatical construction ‘‘u nas est’’ (preposition ‘‘u’’ – ‘‘at’’ in English – followed by the genitive form of the personal pronoun ‘‘nas’’ – ‘‘we’’ in English – and the verbal predicate ‘‘est’’ – ‘‘there is’’ in English). This construction is translated in English as ‘‘we have.’’ Although Russian has the equivalent of the verb ‘‘have,’’ oftentimes it would be grammatically incorrect to use it in order to express possession. One can argue that the grammatical construction expressing

178

Sense of belonging

possession does not translate easily into a linguistic measure of belonging. When we say in English ‘‘We have democracy in the US,’’ it may not necessarily mean that the speaker has strong ties to America. However, through my personal observations over the last 20 years and plentiful anecdotal evidence that I gathered through informal interactions with Russian immigrants I found it legitimate to include this measure in the analysis. The question that I raise here is whether Russian immigrants feel comfortable in extending this grammatical form when talking about Russia and/or their new country or whether its use is limited to those immediate environments to which the immigrant can relate. In other words, would the Russian immigrant residing in the US, Germany and Israel still say ‘‘u nas v Rossii est’’ (in Russia we have. . .), would he easily use this construction referring to his new country (‘‘U nas v Amerike est ’’ – In America we have) or would it only be used in the context of their immediate environment, as in ‘‘u nas doma est’’ (at home we have), or ‘‘u nas na rabote est’’ (at work we have). The participants were asked to identify all instances where they use this grammatical construction. Table 7.9 illustrates the results for all three groups.

Table 7.9. Linguistic measure of belonging Lexical measure (%)/group

Host country

Russia

Both

Neither

US

36.5

8

6

Israel

86.5

1.9

1.9

9.6

Germany

38.5

15.4

13.5

32.7

48

As we can see, the majority of the Israeli participants (86.5%) feel comfortable using this grammatical construction referring to their new country as their home. In contrast, only 36.5% of American and 38.5% of German immigrants do the same. Moreover, 48% of American and 32.7% of German participants refrain from using it in reference to either of their two ‘‘homes’’ and restrict its use to talking about their family, home, work, and the city in which they live. Table 7.10 illustrates the breakdown of numbers on ‘‘belonging’’ to the new country in light of citizenship, sense of home, and the use of the above grammatical construction.

7.2.

Findings: Surveys

179

Table 7.10. Linguistic measure of belonging, citizenship, and sense of home Group/sense of home, citizenship (%)

Sense of home

Citizenship

US

94.7

63.2

Israel

81.8

88.6

Germany

88.9

30

The analysis was based on those participants who indicated their new country as the place they comfortably include in the category described by the above grammatical construction ‘‘u nas est.’’ The data on those who use this construction referring to Russia, both Russia and the new country, or neither of the two were excluded from the analysis. These data were contrasted against the data on the ‘‘sense of home’’ (whether people indicated their new country as their only home) and their citizenship (whether they hold only the citizenship of the new country). As seen in Table 7.10, the overwhelming majority of people who are comfortable using the grammatical construction of belonging in reference to the new country also feel that the new country is their home, e.g., 94.7% in the US, 81.8% in Israel, and 88.9% in Germany. These numbers are much higher than the average numbers for each group (cf. Table 7.7). The majority of American and Israeli participants in that category are a‰liated o‰cially only with their new countries, i.e., 63.2% of American and 88.6% of Israeli participants hold only the citizenships of their new countries. This does not hold true for Germany where only 30% of immigrants carry German passports. 7.2.4. Sense of home vs. age at immigration, length of immigration, and ethnicity As Demuth (2000) suggested, the individual sense of home and general feeling of uprootedness depend on a few factors. We need to consider the individual’s age upon immigration and the length of his stay in the host country. The general assumption would be that a younger age and a longer residence in the new land would a¤ect positively the immigrant’s sense of attachment to the new place. In accordance with the above prediction the following analyzes were performed. First, comparable categories of younger and older participants were selected in each group. I will remind the reader that there was an age requirement for participa-

180

Sense of belonging

tion in the study. The respondents were supposed to be at least 15 years old upon their immigration and were not supposed to be older than 75 years at the time the study was conducted. Primarily these criteria were established for the study on cultural adaptation (Chapter 4). The relatively equal groups of 15 to 30-year-olds were selected for the ‘‘younger group’’ and 40 to 66-year-olds for the ‘‘older group.’’ Then the results for the participants’ sense of home (see Table 7.7) were contrasted against those groups. Only those responses where the person considered his new country as his only home were considered in this analysis. Table 7.11 summarizes the results. Table 7.11. Sense of home in the host country/age upon immigration Country/age upon immigration (%)

Younger

Older

US

80

50

Israel

84

75

Germany

48

82

The predictions held true for the US group where there is a noticeable trend of having a stronger sense of home among immigrants who arrived at a younger age. The di¤erence was not large for the Israeli group where we already have noticed a much stronger sense of home than in the other two groups in general. The puzzling results were observed in the German group where a trend opposite our expectations was found: the older participants overwhelmingly admitted that Germany is the only home that they have and the younger participants refrained from such a claim. I can o¤er the following explanation. As I have mentioned earlier, Russian immigrants in Germany enjoy the most social support among all three groups. The older people depend on it and consider it the biggest incentive and asset in their move to Germany. The younger people are not qualified and/or do not need this social safety net and are discovering their place in the new country without overestimating the sense of social security that Germany provides. From the testimonies on self-identification discussed in Chapter 6, it is clear that many young Russian immigrants in Germany struggle to accept their new country as the ultimate choice or the place where they feel internal comfort.

7.2.

Findings: Surveys

181

The next analysis looks at the length of immigration as a factor in the development of the sense of home. Two comparable categories of participants were selected in each group, i.e., ‘‘short-timers’’ and ‘‘long-timers.’’ Short-timers were those who spent 7–13 years in the country and longtimers were expected to have been there between 18 and 36 years. A di¤erent criterion was applied to German ‘‘old-timers,’’ where participants with 15–17 years in the country were selected. Recall that immigration to Germany started much later and there were no people who had spent more than 17 years there at the time of the study. The participants’ sense of home (Table 7.7) was used as another variable and the analysis followed the same steps as discussed above. Table 7.12 illustrates the findings. Table 7.12. Sense of home in the host country/length of immigration Country/length of immigration (%)

Short-timers

Long-timers

US

43

100

Israel

71

86

Germany

67

53

As before, we see a predicted trend for the American group where the immigrants with a long period of residence unanimously admitted that America is their only home. The relatively low percentage for the shorttimers (43%) is not surprising either. The majority of people in that category did not have their US citizenship and still were facing much uncertainty about their future in the country. Also, I should acknowledge that the inclusion of immigrants with 18 years of residence in the group of old-timers in the Israeli category may have skewed the results. Those immigrants come from the major wave of immigration in the early 1990s and can be considered the most dissatisfied with many aspects of their adaptation process and disenfranchised by the Israeli society. The few people who came in the late 1970s and early 1980s unanimously reported Israel as their home. However, the insu‰cient number of respondents in the category of those who arrived much earlier required the inclusion of immigrants from the 1990s. Thus the trend observed for the Israeli group does support our predictions but is not as remarkable as that for the

182

Sense of belonging

American group. As far as Germany goes, here we are in for another surprise. Long-timers are less likely to think of Germany as their home than short-timers. In the absence of any supporting evidence, I can o¤er a similar explanation concerning the social privileges that short-timers are still enjoying and praising, while long-timers are facing the hard reality of surviving immigration on their own resources. Through my numerous interactions with the participants in this group I understood that the social support that the government gives to new immigrants is viewed as the biggest advantage of coming to Germany. When the data on the sense of home were broken down into two categories, Jewish and non-Jewish participants, two interesting trends were observed. Jewish participants overwhelmingly choose their host countries as the place that they identify as their only home while there are more non-Jewish participants in each group who consider both Russia and the new land as their homes. Also there are more non-Jewish participants who feel cosmopolitan and admit comfort of feeling at home anywhere in the world (Table 7.13). Table 7.13. Ethnicity vs. sense of home Group/home (%)

Ethnicity

Host country

US

Jews Non-Jews

88 42

Israel

Jews Non-Jews

Germany

Jews Non-Jews

Russia

Both

Anywhere

0 4

0 27

12 23

86 44

5 11

2 33

7 12

77 55

10 0

10 35

3 10

7.2.5. Summary The analyses of surveys looked into possible connections between the individual’s sense of belonging and the factor of o‰cial citizenship that would solidify his alliance with one country or another. The following trends were revealed. First, there is a negative correlation between new citizenship and the frequency of visits to Russia. People who only have the citizenship of their new country tend not to go back to Russia. Second, as I suggested, not only the absence of Russian citizenship but also the reasons behind it contribute to the individual’s unwillingness to maintain

7.3.

Findings: Interview narratives

183

contact with the native land and facilitate the development of stronger ties with the new home. In other words, the percentage of people who feel at home in their new country is higher among those whose Russian citizenship was revoked. Third, we looked at the way the linguistic measure of belonging can be added to the analyses. Only Israeli participants showed an overwhelming tendency to apply the linguistic construction to their new home, whereas German and American immigrants feel cautious using it in reference to either of their ‘‘homes.’’ Finally, we looked at the linguistic measure of belonging in the light of other two factors, i.e., sense of home and citizenship. The great majority of people who are comfortable using the grammatical construction of belonging in reference to the new country also feel that the new country is their home and they retain the sole citizenship of that country. The additional set of analyses looked into three social factors that may account for the process of acquiring the sense of home and overcoming the feeling of uprootedness, i.e., age upon immigration, length of residency in the host country, and ethnicity. In accordance with Demuth’s (2000) predictions, we found that individuals who left Russia at a young age are more likely to develop a strong sense of home than those who started their immigration at an older age. Also, a longer residence in the host country contributes to more comfort in considering the new place as home. The supporting evidence came from two groups, i.e., Israel and the US. The opposite findings on both factors were found in the German group. I suggested the generous social support provided for older new immigrants by the German government as a possible explanation for this phenomenon. The additional analysis of the ethnicity factor suggested that Jewish participants tend to favor their new countries as the only home that they have much more strongly than do their non-Jewish counterparts while non-Jewish participants – albeit while leaning towards their new homes – tend to feel more cosmopolitan or equally comfortable with the concept of two homes, i.e., Russia and their host country. By the same token, there were many more immigrants among non-Jews who visit Russia on a regular basis and more Jews who prefer never to go back. 7.3. Findings: Interview narratives In this section we will look at the interview questions targeting the concept of home. Here I raise the following questions: Do immigrants feel ‘‘nonbelonging’’ in their new country? Do they feel like outsiders on their visits to Russia? Do they have any hurt feelings towards Russia?

184

Sense of belonging

7.3.1. Feeling like an outsider in the host country The question ‘‘Do you ever feel like an outsider in your new country?’’ elicited Yes/No answers that were elaborated on in the interview. This allowed me to quantify the answers and then analyze the narratives. Table 7.14 summarizes the quantifiable answers on belonging. Table 7.14. Feeling like an outsider in the host country Country (%)

YES

NO

NO (but used to feel it)

US

36

62

2

Israel

53

27

20

Germany

71

21

8

As the results show, only the American group reveals a clear trend of not feeling alienated from the host country, with 62% of respondents saying that they never feel or never have felt that they are outsiders in the US. Surprisingly, the majority of the German and Israeli participants admitted that they feel that they do not belong in the country (71% and 53%, respectively). This finding becomes even more puzzling if we compare these results with those reported in Table 7.7. The overwhelming majority of the participants in the Israeli group consider Israel their home (76.9%). In contrast, the US group revealed the smallest percentage of respondents among the three groups who consider the US their home (64%) and at the same time feel strongly that they belong there. This dichotomy – immigrants calling the place home but not feeling as though they belong there – needs deeper analysis. We will return to this question later. 7.3.2. Sense of belonging in the host country First, we will look into those interviews where participants reported no sense of alienation from their host countries. Such responses mostly were brief and the participants did not o¤er much explanation. However, it was observed that many Israeli participants (20%) admitted feeling comfortable and having a sense of belonging but noticed that it used to be di¤erent. For the majority of people in that category the change was internal rather than external. Phrases such as ‘‘I made myself feel belonging,’’ ‘‘It was my internal decision,’’ and ‘‘I forbade myself to feel like an outsider,’’ are common for those narratives. In her own words, an Israeli

7.3.

Findings: Interview narratives

185

participant expressed a need to feel she belonged to the country founded for and by Jews in the following way: ‘‘I try not to think about this. . . . An outsider? Did we ever belong there? I do not think that we are outsiders here. If I think of us as outsiders here, then we will be outsiders everywhere. . . .’’ (Israel: T., female, 51 years old)

It is worth noticing that there were two participants in the US and one in the Israeli group who reported no sense of alienation from the country but admitted that they do not feel belonging either. As an American participant expressed it, ‘‘I cannot say that I feel like an outsider – I felt like an outsider in the USSR – but here I often feel that I look at everything from the outside: What is happening here? What do they do? How do they do it?’’ (US: S., male, 62 years old)

A few American respondents linked their level of comfort in the US with the fact that it’s an immigrant country; this stands in stark contrast to the responses solicited from German immigrants who admitted that one needs to be born in that country in order to feel belonging. Similar reactions regarding the attitudes towards immigrants were recorded in the Israeli group. This brings us to the next question: why do immigrants feel like outsiders in their respective countries? 7.3.3. Sense of non-belonging in the host country Through the content analysis of narratives elicited on this question trends common to all or at least two groups and distinct to each were identified. Here we will look at the major reasons for people feeling like outsiders in their new countries. What strikes me as interesting is that the participants would refer to the same factors of alienation in all three countries. However, the number of people listing it as a problem di¤ers across the groups. For example, the majority of American and German immigrants reported language problems and the inability to speak in an accent-free way as the major reason behind their sense of non-belonging, while there was only one immigrant in the Israeli group who sided with those two groups on this issue. On the other hand, the majority of Israeli immigrants reported their sense of being an outsider due to a cultural clash with Israeli society and

186

Sense of belonging

the mentality of Israelis. In her own words, one of the immigrants explains the lack of ‘‘high culture’’ as the reason for such disconnect. ‘‘. . . I feel like an outsider not when I come across rudeness and bad behavior, not when someone says: ‘Go back to your Russia,’ but when I go to a theater performance and see such a low provincial level of art’’ – and later adds ‘‘– but things have changed or probably my understanding has changed.’’ (Israel: D., female, 49 years old)

Isolationism, an avoidance tendency discussed in Chapter 4, also features in the narratives on belonging. ‘‘Yes, I feel like an outsider but not that much . . . I have no Israeli friends, I avoid contact with them, and this allows me not to feel that foreign. . . .’’ (R., female, 53 years old). Internal and external conflict with the cultural norms in Israel along with the general attitude towards Russian immigration was reported as the major factors in the immigrants’ sense of alienation. From painful confessions that ‘‘they [Israelis] did not accept this Russian aliya [immigration]’’ to phrases like ‘‘They call us names, they call us Russians here!’’ the majority of the Israeli immigrants testify to their sense of non-belonging. If the Israeli culture and an allegedly negative attitude to new immigrants alienate the Israeli participants, the American Jewish respondents admitted to their sense of non-belonging due to their Jewish ethnicity. After 30 years in America, one respondent describes his feeling of nonbelonging in the following way: ‘‘Even now there are situations where we feel that we do not belong. But these feelings are not new to my wife and me. We never felt belonging in Russia either. . . . We grew up in Odessa, which was a very Jewish city. . . . Yet we knew that we are Jewish and that we do not belong there. Stalin was somewhat right: ‘cosmopolitans without a motherland.’’’ (US: Y., male, 59 years old)

Clearly, the American ‘‘melting pot’’ does not have the Jewish population as a major ingredient. The lack of su‰cient exposure to Jewish traditions and culture may be considered a factor in the Jewish immigrants’ sense of non-belonging. This makes the following excerpt quite surprising: ‘‘Did I ever feel like an outsider? Yes, in a synagogue. Only once I stepped into a synagogue here and immediately felt like an outsider. Why? Jewishness for me. . . . I would probably feel the same way in a Catholic church. Honestly, I did not feel like this in a Catholic church. First, I know French culture very well and Catholicism is familiar to me. Second, when you are not familiar

7.3.

Findings: Interview narratives

187

with something you perceive it di¤erently. But here you ask yourself so many questions: How do I relate to all this? And there is always pain and internal discomfort associated with this question. This all made me feel totally foreign there. . . .’’ (US: N., female, 51 years old)

The sense of non-belonging may originate from the person’s selfperception as the ‘‘other’’ or the societal attitude towards the ‘‘others.’’ The former is illustrated by two examples. First, a Russian, non-Jewish immigrant in Israel admits to the discomfort of having to hide her true identity: ‘‘I feel like an outsider, it has to do with my Russian ethnicity. I never felt any open hatred or negativity but I put much e¤ort into hiding my nationality.’’ (Israel: L., female, 47 years old)

Second, similar confessions came from a few German participants who admitted their reluctance to expose their Jewish ethnicity or who even denied their Jewish ethnicity in the attempt to explain why they feel foreign among other Russian Jewish immigrants in Germany. ‘‘I always feel like an outsider. I think it comes from the fact that my mentality is di¤erent. I am Jewish only by my passport but my culture and mentality are Russian, I have always lived among Russians.’’ (Germany: M., male, 76 years old)

One of the American respondents, originally from Belorussia, views himself as neither Russian nor Jewish and o¤ers the following explanation of his alienation: ‘‘I always feel like an outsider. I do not feel that I am viewed as a Jew because I am not religious. They see me as a Russian. But I link myself to Russians only at 50%. So being a Jew in this situation might have made life psychologically a bit easier.’’ (US: S., male, 44 years old)

The societal pressure against the ‘‘others’’ – even at the level of ‘‘perceived’’ pressure – is a factor in numerous testimonies coming from the German group. The general tone of narratives solicited in that group suggests that the majority of people in the category of ‘‘outsiders’’ see Germany as the country where one needs to be born in order to belong. The recurring theme of ‘‘I am not German’’ shows that the sense of belonging is not

188

Sense of belonging

negotiated among immigrants who believe that it comes with birth. As one of the participants noticed, ‘‘They are very nice people but I feel an invisible wall separating us. Those who are on the other side of the wall, they feel comfortable; they have no need for us. We, on the other hand, are too proud to impose ourselves. So they do not want it and we are too proud. . . .’’ (Germany: I., female, 43 years old)

All three groups, though to a di¤erent degree, pointed out the mentality of the local population as a reason for not having a sense of belonging. The German participants added lack of friends among Germans as the illustration of these drastic di¤erences in the mindsets. Another common factor contributing to the immigrants’ sense of alienation concerns the reported uprootedness and the lack of shared history and common knowledge of culture. The American and German immigrants referred to the lack of deep knowledge of history and culture as the major reason for feeling like outsiders. In contrast, the Israeli immigrants feel that the mandatory military service in the Israeli army provides a means for being accepted by society. The majority of respondents in that group came to Israel at an age when they were not qualified to serve in the army. A few immigrants who came at a young age proudly admitted that they do not feel like outsiders because they went through army service. In accordance with our earlier discussion of the role of citizenship in the individual’s sense of home, a German participant reported that he stopped feeling like an outsider as soon as he got his German passport. 7.3.4. Summary To summarize, the results of the analysis of narratives revealed a few noticeable trends. First, the majority of American participants did not report any sense of alienation from their host country, while the opposite trend was observed in the other two groups. In other words, the majority of German and Israeli participants said that they feel like outsiders in their new countries. In addition, a number of the Israeli respondents reported an initial sense of alienation that they eventually overcame. A few participants in the Israeli group explained the change in the perception of their new home and their place in it as a conscious decision on their part. There were no such reports in the other two groups. Second, the major reasons for feeling like an outsider di¤ered across the groups or were not reported at the same rate. The only major theme that

7.4.

Discussion

189

united all three groups and was expressed by approximately the same number of participants in each group concerned the lack of a shared past and shared cultural and historical knowledge between the immigrants and the local population. However, for the Israeli group this further translated into the lack of military experience in the Israeli army that is perceived as a unifying force in the society. Insu‰cient skills in the foreign language were reported by German and American immigrants as a reason for not fitting into the respective societies. Although a di¤erence in the mentality of the local people was reported by the category of ‘‘outsiders’’ in all three countries, the biggest disconnect between the host culture and the culture of immigrants was reported in Israel. Finally, the question of identity was intertwined tightly with the general sense of belonging. Here we clearly see di¤erent trends for Jewish and non-Jewish participants. The Jewish immigrants in Israel rebel against the Israelis’ perception of them as Russians. In America, Jewish immigrants admit to never having a sense of belonging due to their ethnicity and accept it as a given. In Germany, a general sense of never becoming a German in order to feel belonging is further aggravated by some discomfort at having to hide their Jewish identity. The same holds true for Russian non-Jewish immigrants in Israel, and at least one Belorussian immigrant in the US. The latter was caught between being perceived as either Jewish or Russian in the city of New York, which has the biggest population of both groups in the United States.

7.4. Discussion So far we have looked at the immigrants’ sense of home and sense of belonging in their host country. Before we move on to analyzing their complex relationship with the native country it would be wise to answer a few questions that emerged in previous sections. Namely, why do immigrants think of their new host country as home and at the same time feel alienated from it? Why do Jewish immigrants feel like outsiders even in the country that was built for them? Going back to Demuth’s (2000) definition of home, it is clear that all human beings need to have a ‘‘sanctuary,’’ a place that they call home. This place can have geographic and emotional links for the individual and such links become stronger with time. This connection with the place is crucial for the psychological health of the individual. It would be extremely unsettling to discover that after 20 years of residing in the

190

Sense of belonging

new land the immigrants still perceive their native country as the only home they have. So the trend identified in all three groups supports our expectations: the majority of immigrants in all three countries overwhelmingly chose their new countries as the place they consider their home. Moreover, it was not surprising to find Israeli respondents leading on this measure. Throughout this book we have been talking about Jewish immigrants, the discrimination that they su¤ered in Russia and their oftentimes strong desire to leave for a better place. Thus, coming to Israel, the only Jewish state in the world, should create an anticipated outcome of ‘‘homecoming.’’ Since the majority of immigrants in that group left the USSR at a time when their Soviet citizenship had to be revoked, there was no di¤erence in the responses on the sense of home when the measure of citizenship was considered. At the same time it drastically changed the picture for the American respondents who increasingly voted for America as their home when the measure of revoked citizenship was included. The latter analysis was not performed on the German group where there was only one participant with revoked citizenship. Moreover, the separate analysis of the linguistic measure of belonging and its reported use by the immigrants showed that the majority of the Israeli respondents feel comfortable applying it to their new country while the majority of German and American participants refrain from using it in reference to their new homes. The next step in the analysis was to find whether immigrants feel like outsiders in their respective countries. In other words, the question on the sense of belonging was asked in the interview directly. Here the results showed that both German and Israeli immigrants strongly feel nonbelonging in their new countries while the American participants demonstrated the opposite trend. What we have is, on the one hand, the strong tendency among Israeli respondents to perceive Israel as their home and feel comfortable defining it as such linguistically and, on the other hand, a strong tendency to be in dissonance with Israeli society and to feel alienated from it at di¤erent levels. The dichotomy between the perception of home and feeling like an outsider can be understood better if we remember the findings reported in Chapter 4. Israeli immigrants did show a noticeable tendency to experience a clash with the Israeli culture. Recall, compared with the other two groups, the collective portrait of the ‘‘cultural other’’ in the Israeli group had the longest list of negative features. If we further remember the results on identity transformation (Chapter 6) it may become clearer that many Jewish immigrants still experience a problem associating themselves with the majority population due to a reportedly negative societal attitude towards Russian immigra-

7.5.

Feeling like an outsider during visits to Russia

191

tion in general. As I already have mentioned, Israel, among the three countries involved in this study, exercises the most negatively stigmatized perception of new immigrants from Russia. The participants’ desire to be viewed as part of the Jewish majority clashes with another di¤erentiation as ‘‘Russian.’’ Also, I would like to go back to the results reported for the immigrants’ reasons for choosing a particular country (Chapter 3). A large number of people in the Israeli group chose Israel as the only alternative available at the time of their immigration. In other words, using Demuth’s (2000) ‘‘pull-push’’ factor we can say that for the majority of the Israeli participants the power of the ‘‘push factor’’ much exceeded the power of the ‘‘pull factor’’ and may have shaped their immigration pattern and attitude toward the new home. In combination with the strong cultural di¤erences and the negative societal pressures towards new immigrants, Russian immigrants in Israel could develop a strong sense of rejection and non-belonging in the country that they still consider their home. As one Israeli participant noticed, ‘‘if we feel like outsiders here, we will feel like this everywhere.’’ I will continue this statement by saying that if Jewish immigrants refused to perceive Israel as their home they probably would have a hard time finding another place that they equally could view as ‘‘home.’’ 7.5. Feeling like an outsider during visits to Russia Having looked at the immigrants’ sense of belonging in their new countries and identified a few trends, it is worth exploring in depth the relationship between immigrants and their native country, i.e., Russia. I would like to remind the reader that a large number of the Israeli participants made a conscious decision to never go back to Russia. While it is di‰cult to identify the reasons or draw any conclusions about this, I would like to include an excerpt from an interview with one of those immigrants: ‘‘No, I never went back. I can explain why if you want. I am afraid. I am afraid to be disappointed in what I have done. If only I knew that I could . . . If I had an alternative to go back to I would. But the USSR ceased to exist, I cannot return to my native Estonia.’’ (Israel: O., female, 53 years old)

However, this interview stands in contrast with another one where the participant admitted that only going back to Russia brought about the realization that her motherland is Israel (note: only immigrants in Israel

192

Sense of belonging

used the high register word ‘‘motherland’’ in reference to their new home). Also, another immigrant ironically added that ‘‘in order to appreciate Israel one needs to leave it and come back’’ (Israel: V., male, 62 years old). When asked a question about the experience of ‘‘returning to Russia’’ another Israeli immigrant corrected me by saying that she returns to Israel but goes back to Russia. The sensitivity to the very wording of this question may add to the previous discussion of the strong sense of home that Russian immigrants in Israel feel despite the dominant feeling of not belonging there. Now we will look at the responses to a question of non-belonging, this time asked about Russia: Do you feel like an outsider on your visits to Russia? As in the previous analysis, the question elicited Yes/No answers that allowed me to quantify the results first and then illustrate them through the content analysis of the narratives. Table 7.15. Sense of non-belonging on visits to Russia Country/response (%)

YES

NO

US

71

29

Israel

52

48

Germany

80

20

As Table 7.15 illustrates, in all three groups the majority of participants who visit Russia admitted discomfort and feeling like an outsider on their visits. However, the Israeli group was split almost equally, with 48% of the respondents showing much enthusiasm about visiting Russia. In order to understand what contributes to one feeling or another, a separate analysis of narratives for each group was performed. 7.5.1. Sense of belonging on visits to Russia The group of respondents who reported no sense of alienation towards Russia was relatively small for the US and Germany but accounted for almost half the Israeli immigrants. Ideally, immigrants should retain a warm feeling about their native country and a desire to maintain close ties with it. Therefore we need to look first into those narratives where people identify themselves with Russia and reportedly never feel like outsiders on their visits. I should mention that the majority of people who answered the above question negatively still reported some contradic-

7.5.

Feeling like an outsider during visits to Russia

193

tory feelings, like admitting their own changes, or sadly stating that they never felt belonging even when they lived there and thus maintaining that their feelings have not changed. Moreover, most of the respondents said that they spend time with their family and friends in Russia, which provides a big sense of comfort. Or they report that the stay in Russia on those visits is relatively short and does not create any sense of animosity toward the environment. Some added that the realization that they do not need to live in Russia any more makes their visits cheerful and the return to their new homes more natural. It is interesting to notice that many people in all three groups, whether they felt like outsiders in Russia or not, mentioned the phrase ‘‘u nas/u vas,’’ the linguistic measure discussed above, as an example of their mixed feelings. According to one participant, only on such visits did he realize that the use of this simple phrase identifies him with the new country and sets his friends in Russia in a di¤erent category of ‘‘others.’’ The large number of Israeli respondents in the category of ‘‘non-outsiders’’ becomes self-explanatory when we look at the immigrants’ narratives. The same pull towards high culture and nostalgia about the familiar landscapes, nature, and climate that were discussed in Chapter 4 may account for many more people in the Israeli group embracing their trips back to Russia. Also, recall that the overwhelming majority of the Israeli immigrants still feel like outsiders in Israel. As one of the participants puts it in her own words, ‘‘We went there and I was happy that I was born in that country. I felt so good that I could show my son the place where he was born, to have him meet people whom I grew up, lived and went to school with. We visited Moscow and saw beautiful cities. I felt at home there. In other words, I felt like I was returning home.’’ (Israel: Z., female, 52 years old)

7.5.2. Sense of non-belonging on visits to Russia Now we will look at the main reasons for the immigrants’ sense of discomfort on their trips to Russia. Across all three groups, the participants admitted that they feel comfortable only among their friends and family but also noticed that their friends have changed too. Based on the analysis, Russian immigrants tend to show more intolerance to the behavioral traits exposed by Russians in Russia, like notorious rudeness, lack of friendliness and smiles, and the violation of privacy. Many feel insecure and reported being on alert most of the visit. This can be explained by the spread of crime in Russia during the troubling 1990s and the psychological baggage

194

Sense of belonging

of a KGB pursuit and persecution inherited by most people who grew up in the USSR. The recurring theme in those narratives is the obvious change that the country has gone through and the immigrants’ inability to relate to places and people that have changed so much. While some immigrants acknowledge that they have changed too, there is an expressed need to come back to something familiar that they left behind. This is voiced by an American immigrant in the following excerpt: ‘‘It was a total shock. I had to process all my past; it was a journey into my internal world. I think it happened because so many years have passed. Those were the years when we had to become someone else. . . . On the other hand, they have changed too. . . . The third factor is that they always feel that we are traitors and that we left the nest instead of helping them with building whatever they were building there. This is not just a feeling of distance, this is hostility.’’ (US: N., female, 51 years old)

It is interesting to notice a clear separation between ‘‘we’’ and ‘‘they’’ in the above excerpt. This linguistic di¤erentiation adds to our discussion of immigration perceived by the individual from within and outside, with a demarcation line drawn between ‘‘we’’ (immigrants) and ‘‘they’’ (Russians in Russia). The perception of the ‘‘self ’’ is often based on viewing it through the larger group of immigrants and contrasting it with that of non-immigrants, the ‘‘others.’’ The process of seeing herself as an outside observer rather than a participant is illustrated further by another excerpt where the respondent compares her feelings with watching a movie: ‘‘I watched a movie where I acted . . . It was all unreal but it was also so familiar . . . I talked to people and they understood me but I was happy to check on my American passport once in a while. I was happy that I was coming back to America. I did not want to live in that country. Just listening to how people interact, how they talk on the phone, how a police o‰cer talks, how people were taught false smiles that disappear the moment you turn around. I did not feel that people were happy there. No, I do not have any sense of rejection, hurt feelings, or anger. . . .’’ (US: V., female, 55 years old)

The immigrants also observed the change in the Russian language, which has undergone a dramatic transformation over the last two decades (see Lunde and Roesen [2006] for further information). This change in the native language spoken by ‘‘others’’ and not present in their own discourse seems to be troubling to some immigrants. As one of the American participants who has spent 30 years in immigration elaborates:

7.5.

Feeling like an outsider during visits to Russia

195

‘‘This is already not the country that we knew and not the one that you could even consider leaving. This is a country that we absolutely do not know. The language has changed. There are new dialects, new phrases. There are new Russian words in addition to American words. This is all so weird to us. The country has become more distant, not closer.’’ (US: Y., male, 59 years old)

The similar language theme occurs all over again in the narratives. From the comments about the Russian language in Russia to their recollections of being surprised to hear everyone speaking Russian (not incidentally, such reports were recorded only in the American and German groups, not among Israeli participants), from reporting the di‰culty of speaking only in Russian and not being able to switch into their second language to feeling an unexplained need to speak their second language in Russia, from numerous stories about people noticing the perceived immigrants’ accent to discussions of the use of the phrase expressing belonging – these narratives exemplify the crucial role language plays in our daily life and provides additional support for why language use and language change among immigrants needs to be considered in the acculturation process (see Chapter 8). I will limit myself to presenting one excerpt in which the individual recalls his language-related experience: ‘‘I am really an outsider there. I always make an e¤ort not to say something in Hebrew, not because I am afraid of something, because people will not understand me. Here I do not speak Hebrew in the company of Russian friends. But there I switch to Hebrew all the time. I do not know why and I feel that it’s so hard for me to speak Russian there.’’ (Israel: V., male, 45 years old)

Without going into the details of psycholinguistic studies on codeswitching I will mention that it has been found that among immigrants a switch to a foreign language can be related to the powerful defense mechanism that protects and distances the individual from the vulnerable and painful events or circumstances in his life (Santiago-Rivera and Altarriba 2002). 7.5.3. Summary As the above analyses demonstrated, the overwhelming majority of American and German participants report discomfort and feeling like outsiders on their trips to Russia. In Israel, there was an almost equal split between those who had a sense of alienation and those who did not. Most

196

Sense of belonging

of the participants agreed that being among friends and family is still comforting while interacting with the outside world brings about feelings of discomfort, alienation and fear. Many admitted a sense of relief at not having to stay in Russia. The feelings of non-belonging were attributed to the changes that happened in the country, to the people there, and themselves. The combination of the above factors seems to provide little ground for reconciliation. In addition, many immigrants reported language problems, both in their discourse and with the much-changed Russian language in Russia, as a reason for feeling foreign in their native country.

7.6. Hurt feelings towards Russia Within Demuth’s (2000) push-pull framework, the power of the push factor can shape the individual’s attitude towards his native country as well as the general path of his acculturation process. The stronger an individual’s desire to leave, the more alienation from his native country and the bigger need to establish stronger links with the new home he may develop. This could lead to a never-subsiding emotional pain, the inability to close the door on the past or a strained relationship with the former land. In order to explore the reasons for the immigrants’ uncomfortable sense of non-belonging in Russia, the question about possible hurt feelings towards Russia was introduced in the interview. As above, the Yes/No responses elaborated on in the narratives allowed me to quantify the results and then analyze them qualitatively. Table 7.16 summarizes the results for this question. Table 7.16. Hurt feelings towards Russia Group/answer (%)

YES

NO

US

29

71

Israel

27

73

Germany

47

53

Clearly, the majority of respondents in all three groups reported no hurt feelings towards Russia. The percentage of positive responses to the question is noticeably higher for the German group. The closer look at

7.6.

Hurt feelings towards Russia

197

the narratives revealed that the German participants associate hurt feelings with the high level of frustration that they feel about the collapse of the USSR. Most of the immigrants in the other two groups left before or shortly after the disintegration of the USSR, while the majority of the German participants never had intended to leave the country before the turbulent times of the 1990s. High praise for the almost ideal past and the great country where they lived is heard in these narratives. The extremely simplified and emotionally charged take on the situation was expressed by one respondent: ‘‘I have no negative feelings towards the country. I just feel sorry for the Empire that had been building itself for over a thousand years and then an alcoholic leader [Boris Yeltsin] comes and destroys it all, throwing millions of people overboard.’’ (Germany: A., male, 50 years old)

If German immigrants and a few later arrivals to Israel report their hurt feelings not about Russia per se but about the painful process of having the familiar world collapse in front of their eyes, those in the US and Israel tend to claim they do not feel any negativity towards Russia as a country or Russian people in general, yet they express a strong sense of hatred towards the Soviet communist system. ‘‘No, I do not have hurt feelings towards Russia. I remember Russia as a great country with great people. But I hate the system that tried – and succeeded to a great extent – to break and destroy my life.’’ (US: S., male, 62 years old)

A German immigrant goes as far as comparing the life of Russian people in the USSR with the life of Germans under the Third Reich: ‘‘I can relate to those Germans who had to live under Hitler. It’s the same dictatorship: a horrible, unspeakable ideology that brainwashed everyone and turned them into those idiots who would throw themselves under a tank or save a cow from a burning barn at the cost of their own lives. . . .’’ (Germany: A., male, 69 years old)

The memories of anti-Semitism, the Chernobyl disaster and the way it was not revealed to people by the Soviet authorities, the meaningless war in Afghanistan that took the lives of thousands of Russian soldiers and an ethnic war in Chechnya that destroyed the house of one of the participants – all these stories are individual and unique as they are

198

Sense of belonging

narrated by Russian immigrants in this study but all are connected by the same theme of non-reconciliation between the Soviet past and Russia’s present, on one side, and numerous ‘‘children’’ of Mother Russia spread all over the world, on the other. The pain of uprootedness may not be caused by any clearly identified single source; rather it results from the very fact that the individual was forced to leave his native land. Understandably, the question concerning ‘‘hurt feelings’’ turned out to be the most emotionally charged question and brought a few people to tears. Many admitted that they still feel pain from leaving their Motherland behind or not contributing professionally to the Russian society. As a participant in the German group expressed it very passionately: ‘‘It hurts that I was forced to leave. It hurts a lot! I always feel it despite my very comfortable life here. I envy Germans who are proud of their country, live in it and do not try to leave it. The best that a person can have is to live where he was born, where his Motherland is. Live comfortably, work, go somewhere with a sense of pride that you are from Russia. . . .’’ (Germany: Y., male, 51 years old)

Many people openly regret that the best years of their lives were spent in the USSR or report pain at the realization that their parents’ lives had been forever wasted in that country. ‘‘I can’t understand why parents have to live such a life. My father was a professor at the Institute of the Academy of Science all his life and he left the country poor. He has to live on the little money that Israel is giving him. Russia has started paying retirement to those who immigrated but it has not gotten yet to those people whose citizenship was revoked. He is 85 already. . . .’’ (Israel: V., female, 60 years old)

However, a few younger participants try to see their relationship with Russia in a more positive light and express gratitude to the major force that pushed them out of their native land and allowed them to start a new life in a new place. As a young Israeli immigrant pointed out, the hardships and abnormalities of the Soviet system caused Russians to develop strong survival skills: ‘‘I realized that since childhood we were limited in our capabilities of doing anything or becoming someone. On the other hand, it allowed us to develop a strong sense of resistance and survival. A sense of survival where locals would not survive. . . . It showed mostly in the army. I was in the combat units and I

7.6.

Hurt feelings towards Russia

199

saw a di¤erence between immigrants from the USSR and local guys. As a rule, Russians did not break anywhere while locals did. It was not because of the immigration. We lived in very tough conditions and we got used to surviving. . . . We are better adapted to survival and it helps us here.’’ (Israel: Y., male, 37 years old)

No matter how strong the immigrants’ sense of hatred or pain associated with their native land may be, we should remember that the majority of immigrants in all three groups reported no such feelings towards Russia. Most people value the education that they received in Russia and the culture that they were exposed to, maintain warm memories of their youth and Russian people, talk tenderly about Russia as their Motherland or admit that they would always blame only themselves for whatever happened in their lives. Surprisingly, even the memories of anti-Semitism and discrimination seem to fade away when the question of ‘‘hurt feelings towards Russia’’ is brought up. A few immigrants clearly linked antiSemitism with the Soviet system, having forgotten that the first Jewish settlements were introduced in Russia at the end of the 18th century, the first pogroms took place at the end of the 19th century, and the resulting flood of the first Jewish immigration from Russia to the United States and Palestine happened at the turn of the last century. 7.6.1. Summary To sum up, the overwhelming majority of participants in the American and Israeli groups reported no hurt feelings towards Russia or clearly separated Russia – the country that they still love – from the USSR – the system that they hate and hold accountable for all the misfortunes in the country and their personal lives. Although the results for the German group show that the majority of people feel the same way as in the other two groups, the split between those who answered the question positively and those who did not was not as sharp as for the Israeli and American immigrants. Moreover, the German participants admitted the sadness and frustration associated with the collapse of the USSR that forced them to leave the country. For the majority of people the hurt feelings towards Russia are associated with having wasted their best years there, the regrets that their parents’ generation never could be compensated for such waste, and the general feeling of uprootedness. However, those people who hold no grudge against their native land admitted that they always think of Russia and Russian people in a very warm way.

200

Sense of belonging

7.7. General discussion When Americans ask me about my origin and then add the inevitable question: Do you go home often? I feel puzzled about why my home is automatically assumed to be the place that no longer feels like home or why Americans still think that first-generation immigrants should have some ‘‘other’’ home. . . . When I went back to Israel to collect the data for this study I wondered why the city of Haifa where I spent six years of my first immigration and that undeniably was my home at that time no longer had the emotional comfort of home. The questions of home and sense of belonging were introduced into this study partly because of my personal experience. However, later they were chosen for analysis due to the very strong emotional charge that they elicited from the participants. The dry numbers, the dispassionate analyses and the selected excerpts from the narratives discussed in this chapter do not convey the emotional power of long pauses caused by the individual’s struggle to fight tears, shaking voices, and interviews abruptly ended as a result of sudden, uncontrollable distress. Having distanced myself from the observed scenes I feel justified in isolating the question of belonging as a quantifiable measure that adds to the previously reported findings on identity shift, change in the cultural perception, and acculturation in general. I started this chapter by defining the seemingly simple concept of home and discussing the importance of having a strong bond between the individual and the place where he finds comfort and feels belonging. Demuth’s (2000) push-pull framework was adopted partially for the analysis. According to this framework, the push factor would account for the individual’s forced desire to leave his native land and the pull factor would account for the power of the initial appeal of the host country in the decision-making process. Thus, both factors would contribute to the feelings of alienation or belonging in relation to the host country as well as the native land and might shape the entire scenario of the acculturation process. The initial set of analyses was based on the survey questions. Particularly, a question on citizenship was selected as a main variable against which the measures of home and belonging were analyzed. The concept of citizenship can simultaneously be a push and a pull factor. If the individual’s sole citizenship is that of the host country it may indicate a strong pull factor: his connection with the new land is solidified, which is documented by his new passport. On the other hand, if we look deeper into the reasons why Russian immigrants do not hold dual citizenship or do

7.7.

General discussion

201

not have their Russian passports in the first place it becomes clear that many immigrants of the late 1980s and early 1990s were forced to give up their Russian citizenship upon their departure. Having the citizenship of the native country revoked by the authorities may become a strong push factor for the individual’s future relationship with the native country and may facilitate the process of getting a new sense of home in the new country. The results of the analyses supported this prediction. The negative correlation between the presence of new citizenship as the only one that the individual holds and the frequency of his visits to Russia was identified. When we looked at the results of the question concerning the sense of home, this trend became even stronger, i.e., those people whose Russian citizenship was revoked feel a much stronger identification with their new country as their home. Moreover, people who feel comfortable defining their belonging to the new country linguistically tend to hold the sole citizenship of the country that they overwhelmingly consider their home. In accordance with Demuth’s (2000) prediction, the age upon immigration and the length of residency in the new country contribute to the pull factor and the establishment of stronger ties with the new country. The supporting evidence came from two groups, the United States and Israel, while the German group showed the opposite trend. The generous financial support that elderly recent immigrants receive from the German government was o¤ered as a possible explanation. Then we looked deeper into the push-pull factor, i.e., the individual’s sense of belonging in his new country. Contrary to our expectations, the general trend of feeling at home did not correlate positively with the sense of belonging. The majority of German and Israeli immigrants showed a steady trend of feeling alienated to some extent from their new homes and only American respondents revealed a positive trend. This finding illustrates the complex process of acculturation where simple linear relationships often cannot explain the interplay of numerous factors. How can we interpret this dichotomy? Can a person identify himself with a home where he still feels like an outsider? I argue that such a dichotomy is not only a frequently occurring phenomenon but may be an inevitable result of the acculturation process. We often find ourselves totally misplaced at family gatherings in our own homes. This does not prevent us from thinking of the place where such gatherings take place as our home. The individual’s need to have a sense of home is crucial for his mental and emotional health and for his normal functioning in society. For immigrants it becomes even more crucial since it provides a strong sense of stability when the entire world around them and their own lives suddenly

202

Sense of belonging

and often irreversibly changes. Having established a strong sense of home the individual’s next goal in the acculturation process is the development of an equally strong sense of belonging. If this sense of belonging is not established after decades of immigration we may look into internal and external antecedents, i.e., the individual’s need to feel accepted and the possible clash between the individual’s and the host cultures. This can be illustrated by the example of the Israeli group, which showed the highest percentage of people who consider Israel their home and in which more than half of the participants admit feeling like outsiders in Israel. The lack of the initial appeal of Israel as the country of immigration (weak pull factor), a strong desire for Jewish immigrants not to be ‘‘others’’ as they were in Russia (strong push factor), cultural clashes and reportedly negative attitudes towards Russian immigration in Israel may account for the above dichotomy. The need to feel that Israel is the home becomes extremely important for Russian Jewish immigrants. However, for immigrants to acquire the sense of belonging, more e¤orts on their part and that of society at large are needed. The question of two homes that the individual may drift between – the old native one and the new host country – fits into the push-pull framework. The strong pull towards the new home may increase the power of the push away from the homeland. The immigrant may find discomfort in being back in the ‘‘old home.’’ Thus we may expect that the stronger bond with the new home will correlate with more discomfort in the old one and the other way around. If we look at the trends identified in this chapter we can see that they logically fit into this framework. If we compare the US and Israeli groups we can see that the American participants showed a much higher percentage of people feeling like outsiders on trips to Russia while they also showed the highest percentage of those who feel comfortable in the United States. The strong pull towards the new home decreased the power of the pull towards Russia. The opposite trend was registered for the Israeli group. However, the German example can illustrate a situation where the push factor works in both directions and leaves the individual somewhere in between by taking him out of his comfort zones in either of his home places. The majority of German participants reported feeling like outsiders both in Germany and in Russia. When the participants were asked about any hurt feelings that they may have towards Russia almost half the German immigrants gave a‰rmative answers. There were relatively small groups of people in the US and Israel that fell into the same category. In other words, we may suggest that the strong push factor against the

7.7.

General discussion

203

former country may originate from the high level of frustration that German immigrants feel in relation to Russia and to the collapsed USSR in particular. We also should remember that there was a high percentage of immigrants in that group who chose Germany as the only alternative available: immigration to the US was closed to them and Israel did not present an appealing choice. Conversely, the pull factor was not strong enough for these immigrants to acquire a sense of internal comfort in the foreign land. On the other hand, the power of the push factor did not leave room for that missing sense of comfort on their visits to the native land. In this chapter we have discussed the immigrants’ level of comfort and sense of belonging in both countries within the push-pull framework. However, I should acknowledge that this comfort zone or sense of belonging should not be confused with the immigrants’ preference for native vs. host cultures within their new homes. If we go back to Chapter 4, we can see that the majority of people in all three countries tend to feel more at ease in Russian culture or equally comfortable in both. The trend is stronger among older immigrants and those whose second-language proficiency is poor (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Thus the findings in this chapter do not contradict the results reported on the immigrants’ adaptation to the new culture. Rather they complement those findings and show a complex picture of the individual’s journey between the two homes and between his past and present. A person can feel at home in his new country but still long for the cultural elements that he left behind. His visits back to Russia often make him feel like an outsider in the old familiar – but much changed – environment and he happily returns to his new home, only to find more comfort in the Russian immigrant community.

Chapter 8 Language change and language maintenance ‘‘[In Russia] I always make an e¤ort not to say something in Hebrew, not because I am afraid of something, [but because] people will not understand me. Here I do not speak Hebrew in the company of Russian friends. But there I switch to Hebrew all the time. I do not know why and I feel that it’s so hard for me to speak Russian there.’’ (Excerpt from an interview with a Russian immigrant in Israel)

Introduction Not to speak your own mother tongue. To live with sounds, logics, that are separated from the nocturnal memory of the body, from the sweet-sour sleep of childhood. To carry within yourself like a secret crypt or like a handicapped child – loved and useless – that language of once-upon-a-time that fades and won’t make up its mind to leave you ever. You learn to use another instrument, like expressing yourself in algebra or on the violin. You can become a virtuoso in this new artifice that provides you with a new body, just as false, sublimated – some would say sublime. You have the impression that the new language is your resurrection: a new skin, a new sex. But the illusion is torn apart when you listen to yourself – on a recorded tape, for example – and the melody of your own voice comes back to you in a bizarre way, from nowhere, closer to the grumble of the past than to the [linguistic] code of today. . . . Thus, between two languages, your element is silence. (Kristeva 1988, as cited in Akhtar 1999: 99)

The powerful and emotionally-charged quote above captures one of the most challenging and often daunting tasks that any individual faces upon moving to a new country, mastering the new language while trying to maintain the native language. Conversely, any immigrant living outside his native land not only goes through a psychological adaptation to the new culture or reassessment of his own self-perception, but he also is facing another challenge – losing su‰cient contact with the mother tongue. This leads to inevitable language attrition or loss as they are named in literature. Language attrition or language maintenance becomes an essential component of any acculturation process and it takes a central place in this study. Usually language attrition refers to those instances where a clear sign of or tendency toward language deterioration is present.

8.1.

First language maintenance/attrition

205

At the same time, language maintenance implies the individual’s or group’s e¤ort in preserving the language. The two terms are not mutually exclusive and will be used interchangeably. In this chapter we briefly will discuss the field of first language attrition as it applies to the current study and look into those factors that conventionally are recognized as important for first language (L1) maintenance. Then we will revisit the Acculturation Framework in order to see how the linguistic component of the individual’s behavior fits into the model. After the discussion of the research methods and data analysis we will take a close look at the findings.

8.1. First language maintenance/attrition The field of first language maintenance and attrition has grown exponentially over the last few decades (for further references, see Schmid 2004 and Schmid et al. 2004). We can identify the following directions and points of interest in the field in general. The major divide is along the lines of sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics. The former is concerned with the social factors contributing to the decline of the linguistic phenomenon in question, both at the group and societal levels. The latter focuses on the individual and the intrinsic metalinguistic, cognitive and psychological factors that are involved in the process of first language attrition. In this chapter, I am taking the socio-linguistic approach to the data analysis; thus I will not delve into a discussion of the psycholinguistic research and it will su‰ce to say that oftentimes it becomes di‰cult to separate the purely socio-linguistic variables from the psycholinguistic ones. The socio-linguistic studies on L1 attrition can be broken down further into those where the relationship between the multilingual society and the minority language group is explored in terms of endangerment or shift (Bourhis 2001) and those that focus on individual groups of speakers whose native language is di¤erent from that of the host country. The latter predominantly is concerned with the attrition process per se. Although this study does not look into the process of language shift at the societal level, it is relevant to mention that Bourhis (2001) discusses di¤erent models of acculturation that can be applied to speakers of multilingual societies. Falling well into Berry’s (1990) model of acculturation, the projected paths include integrationist, assimilationist, separatist and marginalizationist strategies. Among various factors contributing to the choice of an acculturation path, stigmatization of the group by the majority in the

206

Language change and language maintenance

host country as well as the actual or perceived lack of prestige in speaking the native language and insu‰cient motivation to maintain it for pragmatic reasons are mentioned in prior research (Fase et al. 1992; Klatter-Former and Kroon 1997). Clearly, language maintenance and language attitudes become inseparable components of the acculturation process. The studies of individual linguistic populations in non-native countries take a di¤erent socio-linguistic approach and mostly focus on looking into various reasons for attrition/maintenance in a particular group of speakers. Substantial knowledge has been acquired in the field over the last few decades. Instead of giving a detailed review of the numerous works published on the topic I will discuss those findings that are relevant to this project. But first I would like to mention a work that has served as a powerful inspirational force for this study. In 1997 Dutch Overseas (Klatter-Folmer and Kroon), a comprehensive volume on Dutch maintenance and loss, came out. The contributing authors discussed the common and distinct issues concerning the immigrant language, Dutch, spoken in Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Indonesia, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States. The grandiose scale of the project and its unifying focus on the same language triggered my initial idea of conducting a similar, albeit smaller, study on Russian spoken in the United States, Israel and Germany. The intriguing finding across most of the contributions in the volume concerned the rapid speed with which Dutch communities and the motivation to speak Dutch were dwindling. The second generation of Dutch speakers tends to abandon the native language almost altogether and switches to the language of the host country as the major means of communication. The question of maintaining the language for the sake of children, language and social networking and attitudes toward bilingualism became relevant to the present research. However, first we need to identify those socio-linguistic factors that have played or may play a role in the process of first language maintenance and attrition. 8.1.1. Socio-linguistic factors in L1 attrition The signs of non-pathological language loss already are registered in the first generation of speakers. However, there is no consensus in the literature about the concept of ‘‘attrition’’ in general. While some consider any temporary problems in L1 accessibility as signs of language loss, others would expect a permanent change to indicate such loss (Montrul 2008).

8.2.

Acculturation Framework: Language maintenance/attrition

207

In this research the major focus was on the immigrants’ perception of the native language change and their motivation to maintain it for future generations. Therefore, in this section we will look only at those sociolinguistic factors that might be crucial for second language acquisition and first language retention in immigration. Usually a few factors are considered in studies on first language attrition. First, the amount of contact with L1 remains a crucial indicator of the attrition process (Jaspaert and Kroon 1989; de Bot et al. 1991; Isurin 2000, 2007). However, Kopke and Schmid (2004) suggest that there is no direct way to measure the contact or find an ultimate socio-linguistic or psychological reason why the person has limited exposure to his native language. As in this study, the only available measures usually come from self-reported data. At the same time, as I already mentioned in Chapter 4, Marian et al. (2007) found that self-reported ratings of language proficiency correlated with behavioral performance. Second, age of the participant at the time of immigration becomes a factor in L1 retention or loss. The younger participants with fewer years spent in the native country become more susceptible to L1 attrition (Kaufman and Aono¤ 1991; Isurin 2000; Montrul 2008). Third, length of residency in the L2 environment may seem like a good predictor of the attrition process. On the contrary, as Kopke and Schmid (2004) point out, the majority of studies did not find a reliable e¤ect of time on the attrition process and some have suggested that the time factor only plays a role when there is little or no contact with the native language. Among other factors, education and literacy in the native language play a role. However, the latter are not relevant to the present study where the overwhelming majority of participants were college educated and just a few immigrants had a high school diploma as the highest academic degree. Among other factors, the emotional link to the native language and its role in the individual’s construction and negotiation of his own identity remain important criteria to consider. To sum up, considering the controversy surrounding some of the above factors and the modest goal of the present research, this study will look into only four factors as the most crucial socio-linguistic variables, i.e., age, L1 contact, ethnicity, and length of stay in the host country.

8.2. Acculturation Framework: Language maintenance/attrition Language is an inseparable component of the cultural makeup and identity formation in the individual. In most instances, migration involves a

208

Language change and language maintenance

Figure 8.1. Acculturation Framework: Language maintenance/attrition

clash between the individual’s native language and the language spoken in the host country. Thus the acculturation process greatly is influenced by the immigrant’s ability to acquire an adequate level of proficiency in the host language while maintaining, rejecting, or losing his native language. In this section we return to the Acculturation Model that serves as the framework for studying Culture, Identity, and Language in this book. To the best of my knowledge, no prior study on first language attrition has employed the Acculturation Model as the explanatory and demonstrative research tool. Figure 8.1 illustrates how the model can be adapted to the study of language attrition/maintenance. At the antecedents’ level we will be looking at the process of the L1 (Russian) contact with the L2 (English, Hebrew, or German). The contact between internal and external antecedents taking place over the period of immigration brings inevitable results, known here as acculturation consequences. The change in the proficiency level (both L1 and L2), motivation to maintain L1 and pass it on to the next generations, the perception of bilingualism and the level of comfort in either language will be discussed here under the rubric of acculturation consequences. The registered changes will be analyzed through the prism of age, language proficiency,

8.3.

Research question and data analysis

209

ethnicity (traditional antecedents) and the length of immigration (external antecedent).

8.3. Research question and data analysis The research questions that I pose in this chapter are as follows: Do Russian immigrants show a uniform tendency to maintain the Russian language for themselves and future generations or is the tendency di¤erent for all three countries? How is the Russian language important for the immigrants and their cultural heritage? In light of the above questions the data analysis will be performed in three steps. First we will examine the self-reported evaluations of L1 and L2 proficiency prior to immigration and at the time the study was conducted. These data will be viewed through the prism of the three sociolinguistic factors discussed above, i.e., age, L1 contact and residency. Then we will look at the data on the individual’s metalinguistic awareness about the language change, attitude toward accents in L2, the perception of bilingualism and the level of comfort in either of the two languages. Finally, we will appraise the data on language maintenance for the sake of the future generations as it is viewed by the participants in this study. Here an additional factor of ethnicity will be added to the analyses. All analyses are based on the data gathered through the surveys. 8.4. Findings 8.4.1. L2 acquisition First, we will look at how the proficiency in L2 changed over the time of immigration. The data on self-reported language skills prior to immigration and at the time of the study are shown in Table 8.1. Table 8.1. L2 proficiency Group/level (%)

Before immigration

At the present time

good

O.K.

bad/no lg.

good

O.K.

bad

18

12

70

52

38

10

Israel

0

2

98

52

29

19

Germany

6

4

90

38

50

12

US

210

Language change and language maintenance

As we have discussed before, the majority of immigrants to Israel did not know much about the country. It is not surprising to find that they did not know Hebrew either. English and German were taught in Soviet schools and colleges as mandatory foreign languages but the quality of teaching was not high and the focus was on translation. Those skills were not adequate to the demands of the reality that the immigrants encountered in their new countries. However, as we can see from Table 8.1, the proficiency level in L2 at the time of the study has increased noticeably for all three groups, with Israel showing the biggest number of people who assess their language proficiency as poor (19%). When broken down by age, the results follow our expectations with all three groups, i.e., participants who arrived at a younger age (before the age of 30) report much better knowledge of the L2 than those who came in their mid-40s and later. However, the number of older participants with poor language skills is much higher in Israel (66%).

Table 8.2. L2 proficiency vs. age of immigration Group/age (%)

Younger

Older

good

O.K.

Bad

good

O.K.

bad

US

71

25

4

25

60

15

Israel

89

11

0

17

17

66

Germany

81

19

0

10

65

25

When the factor of immigration length was considered only the percentage of American short-timers reporting their skills in English as ‘‘good’’ was drastically smaller than for long-timers while those short-timers who assessed their English at the ‘‘O.K.’’ level far outnumbered their counterparts in the group of long-timers (Table 8.3). This is a trend we would predict for any immigrant group going through the acculturation process where mastering the language of the host country becomes an important predictor of their ultimate integration. However, the trend is reversed for the German group where reportedly there are more successful L2 learners among short-timers. Here I need to acknowledge that contrary to the US

8.4.

Findings

211

and Israeli groups, the German group did not have people who had resided for a really long time in the country, which could skew the results. With regard to Israel, we can see that 42% of the short-timers still claim that their Hebrew is bad. A possible explanation can be found in the much bigger exposure to Russian in Israel, which ultimately replaces the need to learn the language of the host country. Table 8.3. L2 proficiency vs. residency in the host country Group/age (%)

Short-timers good

O.K.

US

21

71

Israel

41

Germany

57

Long-timers bad

good

O.K.

bad

8

72

28

0

17

42

57

35

8

43

0

53

20

27

8.4.2. First language attrition Now we will look at the data coming from the self-assessment of the Russian language among immigrants. Table 8.4 illustrates the results for all three groups. It is rather predictable that all the immigrants in the Israeli group assessed their proficiency in Russian as ‘‘very good’’ and ‘‘good’’ while the American and German participants had only 74% and 71% of those reports, respectively. Table 8.4. L1 proficiency Group/level (%)

Very good

Good

O.K.

Bad

US

40

34

22

4

Israel

94

6

0

0

Germany

44

27

29

0

The analyses of age and immigration factors did not reveal any interesting trends and will not be reported here. Instead, we will look at the factor of L1 contact that may be responsible for the much better retention of native language skills.

212

Language change and language maintenance

Table 8.5. Amount of daily contact with L1 Group/ contact (%)

0

Less than 10%

20–30%

50–80%

More than 80%

US

0

58

36

0

6

Israel

0

8

36

31

25

Germany

6

8

15

34

37

As we can see from Table 8.5 both the Israeli and German groups have a much higher exposure to Russian than the US group. Only 6% of American participants reported over 80% of daily time was spent in a Russian-speaking environment and the majority (58%) have less than 10% of daily contact with Russian. This may explain the lower percentage of participants reporting their Russian skills as ‘‘very good’’ in this group (Table 8.4). In contrast, 56% of the Israeli and 71% of the German immigrants spend at least half of their daily time in the Russian medium. If we remember the previous discussion on social networking in the host country (Table 4.6) it is clear that the majority of Russian immigrants have Russian-speaking friends regardless of the amount of daily contact with L1. The analysis of the frequency of contact with L1 showed that all three groups predominantly have daily contact with the native language and most of the participants maintain Russian as the language of communication with their partners, with only 11% in the US and Germany and 4% in Israel speaking mostly in the L2 with their partners (Table 8.6). This further indicates a high amount of daily exposure to Russian in the first generation of immigrants. Table 8.6. Frequency of contact with L1 and language with partners Group/ contact (%)

Frequency of contacts with L1

Language with partners

Daily

Weekly/ monthly

More or only in L1

US

98

2

85

4

11

Israel

96

4

83

13

4

Germany

92

8

89

0

Equal

More or only in L2

11 (only L2)

8.4.

Findings

213

In addition, Table 8.7 illustrates the role of Russian-speaking media in the lives of the immigrants. Table 8.7. Exposure to the Russian language media Group/media (%)

Music

Radio

Print

TV/movies

US

92

61

98

96

Israel

96

80

92

96

Germany

92

76

94

98

The overwhelming majority shows much exposure to Russian-language media, with only radio playing a slightly smaller role for Russian immigrants. However, I should acknowledge that the question was formulated in such a way that it was not possible to measure the amount of exposure to each media-related element. For example, a person who sees one Russian movie a year and someone who watches only Russian-language cable channels both would answer the question positively. Therefore I would not overestimate the above results and limit myself to saying that the majority of Russian immigrants do not lose contact with the language delivered through various forms of Russian-language media. 8.4.3. Metalinguistic awareness The next step in the analysis was to see whether the participants perceive a change in the level of their Russian proficiency, which is known as metalinguistic awareness. Table 8.8. Metalinguistic awareness: Language change, preference and bilingualism Group/criteria (%)

L1 change

No preference

Bilingual? – Yes

US

53

47

45

Israel

50

40

45

Germany

52

27

35

As Table 8.8 indicates, at least half the participants in each group admitted that their Russian got worse over the years of immigration. The

214

Language change and language maintenance

majority of immigrants still prefer communication in Russian and this number is much higher for the German group where only 27% of people reported no preference in language use. This makes it less surprising to learn that there were fewer people in the German group who consider themselves bilingual. The concept of bilingualism and its definition is not straightforward and deserves a separate discussion beyond the scope of this research. It is worth noting that some immigrants were puzzled by the question and hesitant to consider themselves bilingual because reportedly their skills in the second language are worse than in Russian or simply because they are not fluent in reading the language (the latter especially concerned Hebrew). Another approach to examining the level of metalinguistic awareness is by looking at the level of comfort that the individual experiences while speaking the native language in the country where this language is foreign and, as a result, might be stigmatized or might be rejected by the immigrant as a strong emotional link with the past. The latter is illustrated by a note left on the survey by one of the participants: ‘‘In Russian I am not always sure that I can express myself correctly. It does not reflect my growth. In Russian I have to carry the culture, the behaviors and the mentality that I am not willing to embrace anymore. In Russian I feel torn and ambiguous which is unpleasant.’’ (US: N., female, 51 years old)

However, the majority of immigrants responded positively to that question, with the Israeli group showing the highest score (Table 8.9). Table 8.9. Metalinguistic awareness: Attitude to accents, comfort in speaking Russian Group/criteria (%)

Comfort in speaking L1

Positive attitude toward accent

US

67

65

Israel

78

78

Germany

65

40

Concerning the question of the individual’s attitude toward another Russian immigrant speaking the L2 with a heavy Russian accent, the same Israeli group was more supportive and positive in its attitude (Table 8.9). On the contrary, the German group showed a more negative attitude, with the majority of people saying that it bothers them to hear heavilyaccented speech among Russian immigrants.

8.4.

Findings

215

When we look at the breakdown of the data by ethnicity we see that there are slightly more Jews than non-Jews in the US and Germany who retain a positive attitude toward accents and the reverse is true for the Israeli group. Also there are more people of the non-Jewish origin in the US and Israel who find more comfort in speaking Russian while the opposite finding was registered among the German participants (Table 8.10). Table 8.10. Ethnicity vs. language attitude Group/ preference (%)

Ethnicity

Russian preferred

No preference

Positive attitude toward accent

US

Jews Non-Jews

39 52

52 43

70 61

Israel

Jews Non-Jews

56 71

40 29

79 83

Germany

Jews Non-Jews

72 56

22 39

61 56

8.4.4. First Language maintenance: Generational view Now we will look at the participants’ attitude toward language maintenance across the generational span. In order not to skew the results, the following analysis on children’s language was based only on those participants who immigrated with children under the age of 13 or whose children were born in the host country (N ¼ 40 in the US, N ¼ 42 in Israel and N ¼ 23 in Germany). The rationale behind this criterion was to eliminate the participants who came with older or adult children and who may not have the same level of concern about their children’s Russian. Table 8.11. Importance of maintaining the Russian language Group/ attitude (%)

Importance of maintaining

Regret if children have no Russian

Russian lessons for children

yourself

children

much

no

yes

US

57

57

31

10

31

Israel

74

57

54

4

28

Germany

65

17

67

0

45

216

Language change and language maintenance

When asked about the importance of maintaining Russian the majority of participants in all three groups answered positively, with the highest percentage being in Israel and the lowest in the US (Table 8.11). However, when a similar question was asked about the children, only 17% of the German participants said that they find it very important that their children maintain Russian while 57% of the immigrants in the other two groups voiced their great concern. In contrast, there were noticeably more people in Germany than in the other two groups who admitted that they greatly would regret if their children did not speak Russian (cf. 31% in the US vs. 67% in Germany). Moreover, a higher percentage of German immigrants sent their children to Russian classes in Germany. According to the survey, they also tend to correct their children’s Russian much more often than the parents in the other two groups. In addition, all three groups showed that they do not provide much encouragement for their children to speak Russian (Table 8.12). Table 8.12. Attitude toward children’s Russian Group/attitude (%)

Encourage to maintain

Correct the language

US

27

26

Israel

26

28

Germany

32

64

The data on language maintenance along the ethnicity line showed a consistent trend across all three groups: non-Jews put more value on maintaining Russian for themselves and for their children than do their Jewish counterparts (Table 8.13). Table 8.13. Ethnicity vs. language maintenance Group/attitude (%)

Ethnicity

Importance of maintaining Russian For yourself

For children

US

Jews Non-Jews

50 78

52 71

Israel

Jews Non-Jews

72 86

59 67

Germany

Jews Non-Jews

65 78

7 25

8.4.

Findings

217

When the data on the parent-child and child-parent interaction was analyzed, the results were consistent with the prior findings on the second generation or generation ‘‘1.5’’ (those children who were not born in the host country but arrived at a young age). As Table 8.14 indicates, the parents in all three groups tend to speak only Russian or more Russian with the children while the percentage of interaction in the opposite direction shows a steady decrease in Russian-language use. About one third of all children prefer to communicate with their parents in the language of their new country. Table 8.14. Interaction with children Group/ language (%)

Interaction

More or only Russian

Equal (L1 and L2)

More or only L2

US

Parent – child Child – parent

71 62

12 2

17 36

Israel

Parent – child Child – parent

76 68

10 2

14 30

Germany

Parent – child Child – parent

91 68

4 5

5 27

When asked about communication with grandchildren (in case participants had them) the picture remains similar to the above trend but does not show any further decrease in language maintenance (Table 8.15). Here we need to acknowledge that the communication between grandparents and grandchildren in this research does not reflect the third generation of Russian immigrants. On the contrary, the same children could be viewed as grandchildren or children, depending on the relationship between the participant and the child. Table 8.15. Interaction with grandchildren Group/ language (%)

Interaction

More or only Russian

Equal (L1 and L2)

More or only L2

US

Adult – child Child – adult

80 45

0 33

20 (only L2) 22 (only L2)

Israel

Adult – child Child – adult

67 69

13 23

20 8 (only L2)

Germany

Adult – child Child – adult

94 83

6 6

0 11

218

Language change and language maintenance

8.5. Discussion The acculturation process is a multifaceted phenomenon indeed. Not only does it involve transformational changes in the individual’s perception of the host culture and the re-evaluation of his ‘‘self ’’ in the new environment, it leads to change in the essential means of the immigrant’s communication with this environment – the two languages that come into play, i.e., the native language and the language of the host country. The individual begins the endless and often daunting journey of mastering the new means of communication while holding on to the language of his birth, childhood, favorite books, best friends and often much of the life that has been left behind. In the 21st century bilingualism is becoming a cultural norm for most European countries and remains the reality of immigrant-based societies such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. However, I would draw a line between those cases where a person exercises the free choice to become bilingual in his native country and those cases where the choice is forced on the person by the circumstances of his immigration. Then learning the new language becomes a necessity and a survival tactic rather than an enjoyable intellectual endeavor. The pure thrill of learning a new language often may turn into a daily chore that needs to be done in order for the immigrant to succeed professionally and function adequately in the new society. This sense of ‘‘adequacy’’ may never come to the immigrant, thus causing frustration and hindering the progress of acculturation. At the same time, the perceived changes in the native language and the realization that the second generation may never retain the language of the parents bring about the other side of bilingualism, i.e., first language loss or attrition. In this chapter we analyzed the results of the survey targeting the linguistic questions and looked at the trends shaped in each of the three groups of immigrants. Now I will attempt to bring life to the charts and numbers illustrated above and show how the process of becoming bilingual in the immigration setting fits into the Acculturation Framework. For the majority of Russian immigrants in all three groups, learning the new language in the host country posed an equal challenge. The problem seemed to be bigger for the Israeli group where almost no one knew Hebrew before immigration. Despite the mandatory foreign language classes in Soviet schools and colleges, German and American participants did not have su‰cient knowledge of the respective languages either. Therefore we can suggest that all three groups started the linguistic

8.5.

Discussion

219

journey at the same zero point. Ten to thirty years later the majority of immigrants in all three groups assess their L2 proficiency as good or satisfactory. When the above acculturation consequence, proficiency in the foreign language, was analyzed against two socio-linguistic factors, age and length of immigration, the following results were found. The individual’s age upon immigration (traditional antecedent) factored into the ultimate L2 proficiency for the majority of participants, where younger immigrants were more successful in mastering their foreign languages. However, Israel showed a much higher percentage of older learners with a poor proficiency level in Hebrew. The same trend persisted for the Israeli group when the factor of immigration was considered. Almost half the Israeli immigrants who had stayed in the country 10–13 years reported poor knowledge of Hebrew. At the same time, 27% of the German oldtimers still struggle with the language. How would we explain such drastically di¤erent results for the Israeli and German groups? Why do Russian immigrants who came to Israel in their 40s or stayed in the country for 10–13 years still claim that their Hebrew is at a very low level of proficiency? Here I can o¤er two possible explanations. On the one hand, the large size of the Russian community in Israel and the wide exposure to the Russian language, especially in the areas densely populated with Russian immigrants, could limit the access to or eliminate the need for Hebrew. As was discussed in previous chapters, immigrants can live comfortably in the confines of their own Russian-speaking community without seeking any outside contacts or feeling a need for such contacts. On the other hand, Hebrew’s script presents more challenges than English or German to Russian immigrants. Remember that the directionality of the script (right to left) and the consonantal alphabet that makes many written words ambiguous pose more di‰culty for learners who come from a di¤erent linguistic background. Many participants complained that they are not fluent in reading and writing Hebrew and therefore consider their language skills inadequate. This could account for much lower self-assessment results in the Israeli group. As to the German group, we can suggest that a number of recent arrivals came mostly for professional reasons while the old-timers represent the group of those immigrants who escaped the collapsing USSR but were not willing or well prepared to embrace the new reality. Having looked into the dynamics of the L2 acquisition in immigration we moved on to the next acculturation consequence, i.e., a change in the native language and the way the picture of the individual’s contact with the Russian language unfolds. It became clear that the first-generation immigrants still have much exposure to their native tongue in immigra-

220

Language change and language maintenance

tion. Most of the participants have daily contact with Russian, both actively and passively, and the majority have Russian-speaking partners. However, the di¤erence across groups lies in the amount of such contact, which ultimately may a¤ect the further development of the attrition/ retention pattern. The majority of American immigrants showed less than 10% of daily exposure to Russian while more than half the immigrants in the other two groups still function in a predominantly Russian-speaking environment. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the amount of daily exposure to the native language may be a good predictor of the ultimate L1 retention and attrition. Therefore it was not surprising that less than half the immigrants in the American group assessed their Russianlanguage proficiency as ‘‘very good’’ at the time of the study, while almost everyone in the Israeli group still ranks their Russian knowledge highly. The next step in the analysis was to explore the level of metalinguistic awareness in Russian immigrants that is viewed here as another imminent consequence of the acculturation process. Based on the earlier reported findings concerning the self-assessed proficiency in L1 we could expect that more American participants would testify to any changes in their Russian. Instead, half the immigrants in each group reported such changes. The majority of immigrants across all three groups still prefer to speak Russian, with many more people feeling this way in Germany. Also, there were fewer people in Germany who perceive themselves as bilinguals. In general, the majority of Russian immigrants in all three groups still struggle with the concept of bilingualism in regard to their own linguistic skills. When the question of language preference was approached from a di¤erent angle and the element of emotional comfort in speaking either language was addressed the percentage of responses in favor of Russian drastically rose for all three groups, with the Israeli group having the highest score. Conversely, the ability to fluently speak both languages in the immigration setting does not linearly translate into an equal level of comfort attached to both languages. From our previous discussion of the cultural adaptation among Russian immigrants (Chapter 4) we have learned that the participants in this study show much need for maintaining close ties with the Russian community in their respective countries. The above testimony to the comfort of speaking the native language, which ultimately is possible only within the boundaries of such communities, contributes to the previous findings. Thus it was not unexpected to find that the majority of Russian immigrants in Israel and the US have a positive attitude toward a heavy Russian accent that they may hear in the streets of their new host countries. However, the German immigrants showed the opposite trend, with

8.5.

Discussion

221

the majority of people admitting an uneasy feeling in the presence of another Russian immigrant speaking poor L2, while Israeli immigrants largely reported that they have no negative attitudes toward such accents. The Israeli attitude toward the Russian language that they speak and toward the accent they hear is not di‰cult to explain if we remember the huge number of Russians living in Israel and, consequently, the scope of the Russian language spoken almost everywhere, but the Germans’ reaction is not as simple to interpret. Based on the findings discussed in Chapters 6–7, we can suggest that for Russian immigrants in Germany the question of ‘‘non-belonging’’ heavily relies on the collective belief that one needs to be born German in order to feel accepted in Germany and that their German always will retain traces of a Russian accent that will prevent their integration into German society. In other words, they may be much harsher in the judgment of their own bilingualism and show more negativity towards a heavy Russian accent. Another way to look at the first language retention and change as an acculturation consequence is through the generational prism. As the prior scholarship on L1 attrition indicates, the disappearance of the native language as the primary and/or preferred means of communication is registered as early as in the second generation of immigrants. Therefore the questions targeting the interaction between parents and children and grandparents and grandchildren were introduced into the research. The observed trends do indicate a shift toward second-language use and preference among the immigrants’ children. As the parents and grandparents predominantly communicate with the children in Russian, the percentage of the similar linguistic mode among children noticeably drops across all three groups, especially for the German parents-children category. This is illustrated further through the frequency of correcting their children’s Russian and the level of regret that parents feel about their children losing the Russian language, which were the highest in the German group. One would expect that these findings would translate further into German parents placing the highest level of importance on Russian maintenance for their children. In contrast, only a few parents stated that they find such language maintenance for the second generation important. The dichotomy between the German immigrants’ attempt to retain Russian in their communication with children and their obvious acceptance of its devaluation for the second generation can be explained on the basis of prior findings in this research. As I mentioned above, the attitude towards accent-free German as a promise of being accepted by the society at large as well as the general belief that no immigrant fully

222

Language change and language maintenance

can fit into German society may contribute to the parents’ conviction that the eventual acculturation of their children in Germany should come at the price of rejecting the need for the Russian language. A separate analysis of the ethnicity factor showed that the Russian participants of non-Jewish origin show a stronger need for the Russian language and put a higher value on its importance for their children. This may suggest a tight connection that exists in any immigrant community where the language, ethnicity, culture, and sense of identity are intertwined. To conclude, the dynamics of language acquisition, interaction, maintenance, and loss reflect one more aspect of the acculturation process among Russian immigrants. By including the linguistic component in the scope of this study I attempted to show the critical importance of considering language change and language maintenance as a cornerstone in immigration studies. Language is the crucial element of cultural makeup and identity formation. For immigrants the interplay of the two languages in the often painful path towards bilingualism becomes intertwined closely with their cultural adaptation and the transformation in their selfperception. The comfort of home and sense of belonging – as elusive as it may be – can be associated closely with the native language for some and with the complete rejection of that language by others. The parents’ attitude toward the importance of first language maintenance for their children is not as straightforward and cannot be explained easily based on the analyses of standard socio-linguistic factors. When we place the language theme in the bigger picture of the acculturation process we can draw on numerous pieces spread all over the complex puzzle of immigration in order to find answers and most likely to pose new questions. Language change and language maintenance become intrinsic components of the acculturation process among immigrants.

Conclusion This book began with a brief history of Russian immigration over the last hundred years. This helped us create a microscopic view of the current immigration wave from the former USSR which is the focus of the present study. The three groups of respondents recruited in the major recipient countries, i.e., the US, Israel and Germany, provided the data for the analyses of the acculturation process among Russian immigrants. The three major domains of the acculturation process and central issues in immigration research – cultural adaptation, identity transformation, and language change – became the focal points of this book. In order to unify all three within the same framework, the Acculturation Model has been adapted to the goals of the study. Each chapter reporting on the findings in a separate domain of this project concluded with a discussion of the results through the prism of the Acculturation Model. I am not going to repeat the major findings and their interpretation in the concluding part of the book. Instead, we will attempt to connect the dots and look at all three transformational processes as inseparable constituents of the immigrants’ acculturation. The first theme of the present investigation concerned a change in the cultural perception, the immigrants’ need for the Russian-speaking community and their perception of the ‘‘cultural other.’’ Although we have reported a generally positive change, with immigrants accepting a more realistic cultural environment in the host countries, a few alarming trends were identified. The Russian immigrants in Israel seem to struggle with embracing Israeli cultural norms even after their 20 years of residence in the country. By the same token, the immigrants in the US and Germany perceive their new host cultures as cold, distant and devoid of the ‘‘real’’ concept of friendship. All three groups overwhelmingly choose Russian culture as the most comforting environment. When the measure of second language proficiency was introduced into the analysis we found that the level of proficiency correlates with the level of comfort in the host culture. An additional study conducted within the individualism/collectivism construct showed that professional success and integration greatly contribute to the immigrant’s shift towards new cognitions in the host country. The latter was found through the psycholinguistic analysis of narratives for the use of linguistic elements, including words related to friendship. Clearly, in the very first part of the book, i.e., the culture domain, we could see how language use and language proficiency factor into the analysis and become an integral part of our discussion of cultural adaptation.

224

Conclusion

Having identified the major cultural clashes experienced by Russian immigrants in the three respective cultures we moved on to the complex question of identity transformation and a shift in self perception. Here we looked at two separate ethnic groups within the body of Russian immigration – Russian Jews and ethnic Russians. Through the prism of social identity theory and social stigma a few trends were identified. We looked into the reasons behind the individual’s shift in identifying himself one way or another to ‘‘others’’ while going through an internal search of his ‘‘self.’’ In addition to clear social factors accounting for the behavior, cultural and linguistic themes emerged in the interviews. The initial rejection of the Israeli cultural norms as ‘‘foreign’’ or ‘‘Middle Eastern’’ partly accounted for immigrants’ sense of non-belonging or feeling less Jewish in Israel. This could translate further into a high motivation to maintain Russian and pass it on to the next generation. At the same time, many Russian immigrants in Germany do not see an opportunity to integrate into German society due to cultural, ethnic, and linguistic reasons. For them, the much cherished Russian language remains a strong social and emotional marker of their identity but is perceived as less necessary for their children’s generation. As before, we clearly can see the three themes central to this study are intertwined tightly. When we looked separately into first language maintenance, the interconnection of all three components of the acculturation process came into sight again. The much higher negativity towards accents among the German participants could be explained based on the prior discussion of their self-identification and sense of belonging. In contrast, the noticeably low level of self-reported fluency in Hebrew among those immigrants who came in their 40s or stayed only for 10–13 years easily can fit into the earlier finding on the immigrants’ rejection of numerous cultural norms in Israel. The persistent reluctance to adapt to the new cultural environment and the societal stigmatization of the newcomers can result in the stronger maintenance of the native language and often inadequate level of proficiency in the new language. Without the prior analysis of a change in the cultural perception, self identification and sense of belonging, we would not be able to make the above suggestion. In summary, by incorporating the three key elements of the acculturation process, Culture, Identity and Language, this book has demonstrated their focal place in immigration studies, the inseparable nature of these phenomena, and the complementary role that each of these components plays in our deeper understanding of the mechanisms underlying the complex process of acculturation.

References Akhtar, S. 1999 Andrews, D. 1998 Berry, J. 1980

Berry, J. 1990

Bourhis, R. Y. 2001

Immigration and identity. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. Sociocultural perspectives on language change in diaspora: Soviet immigrants in the United States. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Acculturation as varieties of adaptation. In A. M. Padilla (ed.), Acculturation: Theory, models and some new findings, 9–25. Boulder, CO: Westview. Psychology of acculturation. In Nebraska symposium on motivation 1989: Cross-cultural perspectives, 201–234. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Acculturation, language maintenance and language shift. In J. Klatter-Filmer & P. Van Avermaet (eds.), Theories on maintenance and loss of minority languages, 5–37. Mu¨nster: Waxmann. De Bot, K., Gommans, P. & Rossing, C. 1991 L1 loss in an L2 environment: Dutch immigrants in France. In: H. Seliger & R. Vago (eds.), First language attrition, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University press, 87–98. Boym, S. 2001 The future of nostalgia. New York: Basic Books. Bratus, B. 1997 Alcoholism in Russia: The enemy within. In D. Halpern & A. Voiskounsky (eds.), States of mind: American and post-Soviet perspectives on contemporary issues in psychology, 198–212. New York: Oxford University Press. Brewer, M. 1991 The social self: On being the same and di¤erent at the same time. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24. 163–172. Brewer, M. & W. Gardner 1996 Who is this ‘‘we’’?: Levels of collective identity and self-representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71. 83–93. Broersma, M., Isurin, L., de Bot, K., Butlena, S. 2009 Triggered code-switching: Evidence from Dutch-English and Russian-English data. In: L. Isurin, D. Winford, & K. de Bot (eds.), Multidisciplinary approaches to code-switching, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 103–129. Chavchavadze, Y. 2004 Russians deprived of Russia [DVD].

226

References

Chiswick, B. 1997

Demuth, A. 2000

Erdmans, M. 1995

Soviet Jews in the United States: Language and labor market: Adjustment revisited. In N. Lewin-Epstein, Y. Ro’i & P. Ritterband (eds.), Russian Jews on three continents: Migration and resettlement, 233–260. London: Frank Cass. Some conceptual thoughts on migration research. In B. Agozino (ed.), Theoretical and methodological issues in migration research: Interdisciplinary, intergenerational and international perspectives, 21–59. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Immigrants and ethnics: Conflict and identity in Chicago Polonia. The Sociological Quarterly 36(1). 175–195. Fase, W., J. Koen & S. Kroon 1992 Maintenance and loss of minority languages: Introductory remarks. In F. Williem, K. Jaspaert & S. Kroon (eds.), Maintenance and loss of minority languages, 3–13. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Feldman, E. 2003 Russkii Israiil: Mezhdu dvuh polusov [Russian Israel: Between the Two Poles]. Moscow: Market DS. Gardner, W., S. Gabriel & A. Lee 1999 ‘‘I’’ value freedom, but ‘‘We’’ value relationships: Self-construal priming mirrors cultural di¤erences in judgment. Psychological Science 10(4). 321–326. Geertz, C. 1973 The interpretation of culture. New York: Basic Books. Gitelman, Z. & Y. Ro’I (eds.). 2007 Revolution, repression, and revival: The Soviet Jewish experience. Lanhan, PA: Rowman & Littlefield. Glad, J. 1999 Russia abroad: Writers, history, politics. Washington, DC: Hermitage & Birchbark Press. Go¤man, E. 1963 Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Englewood Cli¤s, NJ: Prentice Hall. Hofstede, G. 1984 Culture’s Consequences. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Hofstede, G. 2001 Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations, 2nd edn. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Hong, Y., M. Morris, C. Chiu & V. Benet-Martinez 2000 Multicultural minds: A dynamic constructivist approach to culture and cognition. American Psychologist 55. 709–720.

References Isurin, L. 2000 Isurin, L. 2007

227

‘‘Deserted island’’ or a child’s first language forgetting. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition 3(2). 151–166.

Teachers’ language: The e¤ects of L1 attrition. The Modern Language Journal 91(3). 357–372. Jarvis, S. & A. Pavlenko 2008 Crosslinguistic influence in language and cognition. New York: Routledge. Jaspaert, K. & S. Kroon 1989 Social determinants of language loss. I.T.L: Review of Applied Linguistics 83–84. 75–98. Jaspaert, K., S. Kroon & R. van Hout 1986 Points of reference in first language loss. In K. Weltens, K. de Bot & T. van Els (eds.), Language attrition in progress, 37–49. Dordrecht: Foris. Kashima, E. & Y. Kashima 1998 Culture and language: The case of cultural dimensions in personal pronoun use. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 29. 461–486. Kaufman, D. & M. Arono¤ 1991 Morphological disintegration and reconstruction in first language attrition. In H. Seliger & R. Vago (eds.), First language attrition, 175–189. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kemmelmeier, M. & B. Yan-Ming Cheng 2004 Language and self-construal priming: A replication and extension in a Hong Kong sample. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 35(6). 705–712. Kishinevsky, V. 2004 Russian Immigrants in the United States: Adaptation to American Culture. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. Klatter-Folmer, J. & S. Kroon (eds.). 1997 Dutch overseas. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. Kopke, B. & M. Schmid 2004 Language attrition: The next phase. In M. Schmid, B. Kopke, M. Keijzer & L. Weilemar (eds.), First language attrition: Interdisciplinary perspectives on methodological issues, 1–47. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Lewin-Epstein, N., Ro’I, Y., & Ritterband, P. (eds.) 1997 Russian Jews on three continents. London: Frank Cass. Lunde, I. & T. Roesen (eds.). 2006 Landslide of the norm: Language culture in post-Soviet Russia. University of Bergen: IKRR. Marian, V., H. Blumenfeld & M. Kaushanskaya 2007 The Language Experience and Proficiency Questionnaire (LEAP-Q): Assessing language profiles in bilinguals and multi-

228

References

linguals. Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research 50. 940–967. Marian, V. & M. Kaushanskaya 2004 Self-construal and emotion in bicultural bilinguals. Journal of Memory and Language 51. 190–201. Montrul, S. 2008 Incomplete acquisition in bilinguals: Re-examining the age factor. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Mulhausler, P. & R. Harre 1990 Pronouns and people: The linguistic construction of social and personal identity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Padilla, A. & W. Perez 2003 Acculturation, social identity, and social cognition: A new perspective. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Science 25(1). 35–55. Paltiel, A., E. Sabatello & D. Tal 1997 Immigrants from the former USSR in Israel in the 1990s: Demographic characteristics and socio-economic absorption. In N. Lewin-Epstein, Y. Ro’i & P. Ritterband (eds.), Russian Jews on three continents: Migration and resettlement, 284–321. London: Frank Cass. Pavlenko, A. & A. Blackledge 2004 Introduction: New theoretical approaches to the study of negotiation of identities in multilingual contexts. In A. Pavlenko & A. Blackledge (eds.), Negotiation of identities in multilingual contexts, 1–33. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Pillsbury, G. 1998 First-person singular and plural strategies for managing ego- and sociocentrism in four basketball teams. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 26. 450–478. Redfield, R., R. Linton & M. Herskovits 1936 Memorandum for the study of acculturation. American Anthropologist 38. 149–152. Remennick, L. 2007 Russian Jews on three continents: Identity, integration, and conflict. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Ross, M., W. Q. E. Xun & A. Wilson 2002 Language and the bicultural self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28(8). 1040–1050. Roytburd, L. & M. Friedlander 2008 Predictors of Soviet Jewish refugees’ acculturation: Di¤erentiation of self and acculturative stress. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 14(1). 67–74. Santiago-Rivera, A. & J. Altarriba 2002 The role of language in therapy with the Spanish-English bilingual client. Professional Psychology: Research & Practice 33(1). 30–38.

References Sarangi, S. 2009 Schmid, M. 2004

229

Culture. In G. Senft, J.-O. Ostman & J. Verschueren (eds.), Culture and language use, 81–104. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Language attrition research: An annotated bibliography. In M. Schmid, B. Kopke, M. Keijzer & L. Weilemar (eds.), First language attrition: Interdisciplinary perspectives on methodological issues, 317–349. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Schmid, M., Kopke, B., Keijzer, M. & Weilemar, L. (eds.) 2004 First language attrition: Interdisciplinary perspectives on methodological issues. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Siegel, D. 1997 The great immigration: Russian Jews in Israel. New York: Berghahn Books. Schwartz, S. 1990 Individualism-Collectivism. Critique and Proposed Refinements. Journal of cross-cultural psychology 21(2). 139–157. Tejfel, H. 1974 Social identity and intergroup behavior. Social Science Information 13. 65–93. Tejfel, H. 1981 Human groups and social categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Teske, R. & B. Nelson 1974 Acculturation and assimilation: A clarification. American Ethnologist 17. 218–235. Tolts, M. 2003 Demography of the Jews in the former Soviet Union: Yesterday and today. In Z. Gitelman (ed.), Jewish life after the USSR, 173–208. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Trafimow, D., E. Silverman, R. M.-T. Fan & J. S. F. Law 1997 The e¤ects of language and priming on the relative accessibility of the private self and the collective self. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology 28. 107–123. Triandis, H. 1989 The self and social behavior in di¤erent cultural contexts. Psychological Review 96. 506–520. Triandis, H. 1995 Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Triandis, H. 1990 Cross-cultural studies of individualism and collectivism. In Nebraska symposium on motivation 1989: Cross-cultural perspectives; 41–134. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

230

References

Triandis, H. 2001

Individualism and collectivism: Past, present, and future. In D. Matsumoto (ed.), The handbook of culture and psychology, 35– 50. New York: Oxford University Press. Triandis, H. & Gelfand, M. 1998 Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74. 118–128. Whorf, B. 1956 The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. In J. Carroll (ed.), Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, 134–159. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press. (Original work published 1939). Wierzbicka, A. 1997 Understanding cultures through their key words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese. New York: Oxford University Press. Zilberg, N. 2001 Why change culture? A trilemma confronting Russian Intelligentsia in Israel. In: A. Hare & G. Kressel (eds.), Israel as Central stage. Westport, CN: Bergin & Garvey, 89–102.

Index accent, attitudes toward 3, 27, 99, 185, 195, 209, 214–215, 220–222, 224 acculturation – consequences of 22–23, 27–28, 58– 59, 62–63, 71–78, 101–102, 133, 139–143, 164–167, 208–222 – factors a¤ecting – age at time of immigration 3, 27, 34, 58–59, 63, 93–95, 97–98, 101– 102, 132–133, 169–170, 179–180, 183, 201, 207–211, 219 – ethnicity 3, 59, 63, 93, 95, 101– 102, 145, 169, 175, 179, 182–191, 207–209, 215–216, 222 – integration 2, 20, 22, 32, 45, 46, 48, 49, 53–55, 63, 64, 99–100, 110–125, 166, 210, 221, 223–224 – L1 contact (exposure) 112–114, 121–122, 124, 125–127, 204, 207– 209, 211–213, 219–220 – L2 proficiency 48, 58–59, 63, 93– 94, 101–102, 203, 207–211, 219– 222, 223–224 – length of immigration 27, 29, 46, 113–114, 121–122, 124, 125, 169, 179–182, 183, 201, 207–211, 219 – partners’ nationality 130, 142– 143, 164, 212, 220 – religion 13, 142, 147, 164 – process of 20–30, 54, 58–59, 61, 63– 71, 89–90, 101–102, 131–133, 139– 143, 164–167, 168–169, 195, 196– 199, 200–203, 204–222, 223–224 – psychological 22–28, 30, 58, 63–71 Acculturation Framework 1–2, 3, 21– 30, 57–63, 101–102, 132–133, 162– 167, 205, 207–209, 218–222, 223 – adaptation of 2, 21, 24–31, 223 – antecedents – external 23–27, 58–63, 101, 133, 160–177, 202, 208–209

– internal 23–27, 58–61, 101, 133, 135–138, 163–167, 202, 208–209 – traditional 23, 26–27, 58, 63, 101– 102, 133–134, 163–164, 208–209, 219–221 – and culture 1, 2, 24–31, 57–63, 101– 102, 223–224 – and language maintenance/ attrition 1, 2, 3, 24–31, 205, 207– 222, 223–224 – and study of identity 1, 2, 24–31, 131–144, 162–167, 223–224 Acculturation Model 22–24, 28, 29– 30, 56, 58–59, 132–133, 208–209, 223 Akhtar, S. 130, 170–171, 204 alternative (lack of for immigration) 26, 42–45, 54–55, 74–75, 191, 203 anti-Semitism – in Germany 156 – in Russia 7–8, 12, 19, 26, 41, 54, 133, 135–138, 141–142, 145–146, 163, 197, 199 – in US 156, 158 army, service in – Israeli 42, 84, 188–189, 198–199 – Russian 41–42, 43, 44 assimilation 21–22, 58–59, 171, 205 Berry, J. 22–25, 27–28, 29–30, 56, 131, 205 bilingualism 3, 218–222 – attitudes toward 3, 206, 208–209, 213–214 Chiswick, B. 5, 9, 15–16 citizenship 26, 138, 169–170, 172–175, 177, 182–183, 188, 190, 200–201 – dual 13, 172–175, 200 – German 172–175, 178–179, 188 – Israeli 13, 45, 172–175, 178–182

232

Index

– Russian 13, 172–175, 182 – and revoking of 13, 45, 75, 169– 170, 172–177, 183, 190, 198, 200– 201 – US 16–17, 45, 172–175, 178–179, 181 collectivism (see individualism) 2, 26, 50, 102, 103–128, 155, 223 – bilingualism and change in selfconstrual 3, 108–128 – lexical measures of 2, 27, 108–128 – and pro-drop 2, 108–109, 115– 119, 121–122, 125–128 – and pronoun use 2, 108–109, 115– 121, 123–128 community, Russian-speaking 2, 50– 51, 53, 56, 59, 63, 95–101, 219–220, 223 – in Germany 98–99, 100–101 – in Israel 33, 75, 83, 86, 99–100, 219 – in US 16, 32–33, 98–99 cultural adaptation 1, 21, 30, 58–102, 106–107, 168, 180, 220, 222, 223– 224 ‘‘cultural other’’, concept of (see host culture) 2, 20, 25, 28, 78–90, 100– 101, 190 cultural perception, change in 2, 20, 21, 110, 56–102, 200, 223–224 cultural shock 20, 25, 50, 56, 61, 64, 70, 76 culture, definitions of – in English 61, 101–102 – in German 62, 101–102 – in Hebrew 62, 101–102 – in Russian 59–61, 101–102 culture, ‘‘high’’ 60–61, 62, 77, 82, 84, 87, 89, 90, 102, 114, 186, 193 Demuth, A. 169–170, 171, 179, 183, 189, 191, 196, 200, 201 discrimination, ethnic 3, 84, 133, 135– 138, 141, 145–146, 161–163, 167 education, level of 27, 37–39, 110– 111, 133, 134 employment 2, 29, 46–47, 49, 55

– in Germany 19, 52–53, 55, 91 – in Israel 13–14, 83 – in US 15–16, 32, 39, 55 – professional downgrading 14, 16, 19, 47, 49, 52–53, 55, 83, 91 friendship, Russian concept of 2, 50– 51, 76, 77–78, 82, 92, 102, 103–107, 122–123, 126, 127–128, 223 Geertz, C. x, 57 Hofstede, G. 105 home, sense of 3, 13, 20, 161, 170, 175–192, 200–203 Hong, Y., M. Morris, C. Chiu & V. Benet Martinez 108, 109, 123 host country – adaptation to 1, 20–30, 49–50, 58– 102, 106, 168, 180, 181, 203, 220, 222, 223 – alienation from 3, 90, 171, 184–191, 193–196, 200–203 – integration into society of 2, 20, 22, 32, 45, 46, 48, 49, 53–55, 63, 64, 99– 100, 110–125, 166, 210, 221, 223–224 – length of residence in 27, 29, 34, 46, 113–114, 121–125, 169, 179, 181, 183, 201, 207–211 – level of comfort in 53, 59, 63, 93–95, 101–102, 168–169, 183, 184–185, 200–203, 223 – reason for choosing 2, 10–19, 43–45, 54–55 – sense of belonging 148, 184–185, 189–191, 200–203 – and lexical measures of 177–179 host culture – as ‘‘cultural other’’ (see ‘‘cultural other’’) 79–90 – in Germany 87–89 – in Israel 82–87 – in US 79–82 – change in perception of 72–78 – in Germany 76–78 – in Israel 73–76 – in US 72–73

Index – initial perception of 64–67 – in Germany 69–71 – in Israel 64–67 – in US 64–67 identity, Jewish 3, 20, 28, 35–36, 129– 130, 139–141, 145–156, 161–167 identity, ‘‘o‰cial’’ 2, 20, 35, 130, 133– 134, 137, 139–141, 167 identity, Russian 20, 130, 133, 139– 141, 145–156, 161–167 identity shift (see identity transformation) 1, 3, 20, 130, 139–143, 153, 156, 163–167, 200, 224 identity transformation (see identity shift) 2–3, 20–21, 30–31, 129–167, 223–224 – and partners’ nationality 130, 142– 143, 150, 161, 164 – and religion 3, 20, 130–131, 142, 147, 164 – and stigma/stimatization 3, 20, 130– 138, 139, 141, 151, 158, 160–167, 191, 205, 214, 224 – study of 130–132 individualism (see collectivism) 2, 26, 76, 80, 81, 103–128, 155, 223 – bilingualism and change in selfconstrual 3, 108–128 – lexical measures of 2, 27, 108–128 – and pro-drop 2, 108–109, 115– 119, 121–122, 125–128 – and pronoun use 2, 108–109, 115– 121, 123–128 intelligentsia 8, 60–61, 69, 75, 82, 87, 93, 124 Kashima, E. & Y. Kashima 108, 116, 125 Kemmelmeier, M. & B. Yan-Ming Cheng 108, 109, 123 language acquisition x, 207, 209–211, 219, 222 language attrition (see language maintenance) 30, 127, 204–222

233

language change ix, 1, 3, 21, 30, 126, 195, 204–222 – changes in cognition related to 107– 128 – metalinguistic awareness of 3, 209, 213–215, 220 – relationship to Acculturation Framework 1, 2, 3, 25–27, 30, 205, 207– 209, 218–222 language fluency/proficiency – L1 fluency 3, 207–209, 211–215, 219–222 – L2 fluency 48, 58–59, 63, 93–94, 101–102, 203, 207–211, 219–222, 223–224 language maintenance (see language attrition) 98, 204–222 – attitudes toward 3, 21, 25, 27 – generational view of 3, 215–222 language priming 108–109, 115, 123 language retention x, 3, 20, 207, 211, 220–221 languages, collectivist (see languages, individualist) 108–110, 115–116, 125–128 – and pro-drop 2, 108–109, 115–119, 121–122, 125–128 – and pronoun use 2, 108–109, 115– 121, 123–128 languages, individualist (see languages, collectivist) 108–110, 115–116, 125– 128 – and pro-drop 2, 108–109, 115–119, 121–122, 125–128 – and pronoun use 2, 108–109, 115– 121, 123–128 lexical measures – of belonging 169, 177–179, 183, 190 – of collectivism 2, 27, 110–128 – of individualism 2, 27, 110–128 linguistic relativity 107–110 Marian, V. 93, 109, 116, 123, 207 motherland, concept of – Israel 11, 41, 158, 191–192

234

Index

– Russia 5, 51–52, 92–93, 186, 198– 199 nationality 7, 27, 35–36, 37, 130, 134, 137, 139–140, 145–163, 187 native country, relationship to 3, 51– 52, 79, 168–203 nostalgia 2, 51–52, 56, 59, 91–93, 101, 102, 112–114, 171, 193 Padilla, A. & Perez, W. 21, 30, 131– 132, 134, 166 refugee status 12, 16–17, 18, 29–30 refusnik 10, 51 Remennick, L. 12, 16, 17, 37, 47, 83, 90, 129 Ross, M., W. Q. E. Xun & A. Wilson 108, 109, 123 Russia – feelings toward 183, 191–203 – and sense of belonging 168–169, 182, 186, 192–193, 200–203 – visits to 168–169, 172–175, 182–183, 191–196, 200–203 ‘‘Russian’’ – attitudes toward being viewed as 3, 130, 133, 149, 165–166 – perception of term among immigrants – in Germany 159–160 – in Israel 158–159 – in US 157–158 Russian community, in host country 16, 32–33, 56, 83, 86, 95–102, 147, 203, 219 – need for 2, 50–51, 58, 63, 95–102, 220, 223 Russian concept of friendship (see friendship, Russian concept of ) Russian Diaspora x, 1, 19, 24, 111, 126, 129–130, 157 Russian immigration – first wave 5–6, 49, 51–52, 91 – second wave 6, 16 – third wave 1, 4–19, 25, 32–33, 35,

39, 41, 46, 100, 142, 150, 159, 181– 182, 223 Russian political system 2, 7, 40, 79, 89, 130, 135, 197–199 Russians, ethnic 1, 8, 10, 20, 130, 138, 144, 146–147, 150–151, 155, 157, 160–162, 165–167, 224 Schmid, M. 30, 204, 207 self-identification 20, 25, 26, 129–167, 180, 224 – as presented to others 20, 28–29, 130, 139–140, 155–156, 163–167 – in Germany 153 – in Israel 149–151 – in US 145 – change in 28, 130, 132–133, 139– 156, 163–167 – in Germany 151–156 – in Israel 147–151, 156 – in US 145–146, 156 – relationship to ‘‘o‰cial’’ identity 20, 26, 132–134, 139–140, 162–167 – in Germany 151–155 – in Israel 147–151 – in US 145–147 – and stigma/stigmatization 131–132, 141, 156, 159–167 Trafimow, D., E. Silverman, R. M.-T. Fan & J. S. F. Law 108, 109, 123 Triandis, H. 105, 107, 124 USSR, collapse of 1, 4, 8–10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 26, 27, 34, 40, 41, 51, 64, 69– 70, 79, 111, 150, 151, 170, 175, 197, 199, 203 visa, exit 9–13, 172 Whorf, B. 107–108 Wierzbicka, A. 103–104, 126 Zionist beliefs/feelings 8, 10, 11, 13– 14, 41, 43, 45, 69, 159