Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco (Language Policy, 35) 3031515935, 9783031515934

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Language Policy

Mohammed Errihani

Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco

Language Policy Volume 35

Series Editors Joseph Lo Bianco , University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia Terrence G. Wiley, Professor Emeritus, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA Editorial Board Members Claire Kramsch, University of California, Berkeley, USA Georges Lüdi, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland Normand Labrie, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Anne Pakir, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore Guadalupe Valdes, Stanford University, California, USA

The last half century has witnessed an explosive shift in language diversity involving a rapid spread of global languages and an associated threat to small languages. The diffusion of global languages, the stampede towards English, the counter-pressures in the form of ethnic efforts to reverse or slow the process, the continued determination of nation-states to assert national identity through language, and, in an opposite direction, the greater tolerance shown to multilingualism and the increasing concern for language rights, all these are working to make the study of the nature and possibilities of language policy and planning a field of swift growth. The series publishes empirical studies of general language policy or of language education policy, or monographs dealing with the theory and general nature of the field. We welcome detailed accounts of language policy-making - who is involved, what is done, how it develops, why it is attempted. We will publish research dealing with the development of policy under different conditions and the effect of implementation. We will be interested in accounts of policy development by governments and governmental agencies, by large international companies, foundations, and organizations, as well as the efforts of groups attempting to resist or modify governmental policies. We are interested in work that explores new sites of language policy development, new approaches to its analysis and effects, and while critique is important we are also interested in documentation of its intentions and practices, including historical examinations and contemporary analyses. We will also consider empirical studies that are relevant to policy of a general nature, e.g. the local effects of the developing European policy of starting language teaching earlier, issues to do with global languages, language and power and resistance, developments in post-colonial settings, de-colonial thinking and practice, all the way to programmatic issues such as the numbers of hours of instruction needed to achieve competence, selection and training of language teachers, the language effects of the Internet. Other possible topics include the legal basis for language policy, the role of social identity in policy development, the influence of political ideology on language policy, the role of economic factors, policy as a reflection of social change. The series is intended for scholars in the field of language policy and others interested in the topic, including sociolinguists, educational and applied linguists, language planners, language educators, sociologists, political scientists, and comparative educationalists. Book proposals for this series may be submitted to the Publishing Editor: Marianna Georgouli, Publishing Editor, Springer, Van Godewijckstraat 30, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands Email: [email protected] All proposals and manuscripts submitted to the Series will undergo at least two rounds of external peer review. This series is indexed in Scopus.

Mohammed Errihani

Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco

Mohammed Errihani Department of English, Rm 216 Purdue University Northwest Hammond, IN, USA

ISSN 1571-5361     ISSN 2452-1027 (electronic) Language Policy ISBN 978-3-031-51593-4    ISBN 978-3-031-51594-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51594-1 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

To Hannah, Youssef, and Agnes

Series Editor’s Foreword

Language Policy Book Series: Our Aims and Approach Recent decades have witnessed a rapid expansion of interest in language policy studies as transcultural connections deepen and expand all across the globe. Whether it is to facilitate more democratic forms of participation, or to respond to demands for increased educational opportunity from marginalized communities, or to better understand the technologization of communication, language policy, and planning has come to the fore as a practice and a field of study. In all parts of the world, the push for language policy is a reflection of such rapid and deep globalization, undertaken by governments to facilitate or diversify trade, to design and deliver multilingual public services, to teach less commonly taught languages, and to revitalize endangered languages. There is also interest in forms of language policy to bolster new and more inclusive kinds of language-based and literate citizenship. Real-world language developments have pushed scholars to generate new theory on language policy and to explore new empirical accounts of language policy processes. At the heart of these endeavors is the search for the resolution of communication problems between ethnic groups, nations, individuals, authorities and citizens, and educators and learners. Key research concerns have been the rapid spread of global languages, especially English and more recently Chinese, and the economic, social, and identity repercussions that follow, linked to concerns about the accelerating threat to the vitality of small languages across the world. Other topics that have attracted research attention have been persisting communication inequalities, the changing language situation in different parts of the world, and how language and literacy abilities affect social opportunity, employment, and identity. In the very recent past, language diversity itself has been a popular field of study, to explore particular ways to classify and understand multilingualism, the fate of particular groups of languages or individual languages, and questions of literacy, script, and orthography. In this complex landscape of language change, efforts of sub-national and national groups to reverse or slow language shift have dominated concerns of policymakers as well as scholars. While there is a discernible trend vii

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Series Editor’s Foreword

toward greater openness to multilingualism and increasing concern for language rights, we can also note the continued determination of nation states to assert a singular identity through language, sometimes through repressive measures. For all these reasons, systematic, careful, and critical study of the nature and possibilities of language policy and planning is a topic of growing global significance. In response to this dynamic environment of change and complexity, this series publishes empirical research of general language policy in diverse domains, such as education, or monographs dealing with the theory and general nature of the field. We welcome detailed accounts of language policymaking which explore the key actors, their modes of conceiving their activity, and the perspective of scholars reflecting on the processes and outcomes of policy. Our series aims to understand how language policy develops, why it is attempted, and how it is critiqued, defended, and elaborated or changed. We are interested in publishing research dealing with the development of policy under different conditions and the effect of its implementation. We are interested in accounts of policy undertaken by governments, but also by non-governmental bodies and international corporations, foundations, and the like, as well as the efforts of groups attempting to resist or modify governmental policies. We will also consider empirical studies that are relevant to policy of a general nature, for example the local effects of transnational policy influence, such as the United Nations, the European Union, or regional bodies in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. We encourage proposals dealing with practical questions of when to commence language teaching, the numbers of hours of instruction needed to achieve set levels of competence, selection, and training of language teachers, the language effects of the Internet, issues of program design and innovation. Other possible topics include non-education domains such as legal and health interpreting; community-and family-based language planning, and language policy from bottom-up advocacy; and language change that arises from traditional forms of power alongside influence and modeling of alternatives to established forms of communication. Contemporary language policy studies can examine the legal basis for language policy, the role of social identity in policy development, the influence of political ideology on language policy formulation, and the role of economic factors in success or failure of language plans or studies of policy as a reflection of social change. We do not wish to limit or define the limits of what language policy research can encompass, and our primary interest is to solicit serious book-length examinations, whether the format is for a single-authored or multi-authored volume or a coherent edited work with multiple contributors. The series is intended for scholars in the field of language policy and others interested in the topic, including sociolinguists, educational and applied linguists, language planners, language educators, sociologists, political scientists, and com-

Series Editor’s Foreword

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parative educationalists. We welcome your submissions or an enquiry from you about ideas for work in our series that opens new directions for the field of language policy. AM, University of Melbourne   Joseph Lo Bianco Melbourne, Australia Arizona State University  Terrence G. Wiley Tempe, USA

Preface

This book was written to fill a void. The educational system in Morocco has been undergoing an unprecedented crisis, for which there is no apparent solution on the horizon despite the various policies and reforms offered by successive governments in the last two decades to address it. The goal of this book has been to investigate this crisis, discuss the underlying factors that have led to it, and then propose some answers and possible solutions to resuscitate this important sector. Much has been written about the underperformance of the education sector in the MENA region, including Morocco, by specialists as well as by government and non-government agencies and organizations. However, the Moroccan condition is usually lumped with the rest of the MENA states although Morocco’s situation and circumstances are rather unique due to its historical, cultural, and linguistical make­up. Furthermore, there is virtually no single work that is exclusively devoted to the educational difficulties and struggles in Morocco and in particular the connection between language and the educational crisis that the country has been undergoing in recent decades. This book therefore comes to fill this vacuum by making the claim that the language problem is at the heart of the predicament of the educational system of Morocco. Every chapter in the book examines the various factors that are contributing to this educational crisis, and the prominent role that language plays in these factors. In addition to investigating these various factors, the book also proposes some possible short- and long-term solutions that could ultimately help resurrect this vital system. The relevance of this book lies in its timely discussion of a topic that is current and still unfolding as many of the issues, reforms, and policies under discussion in the book continue to play out on the sociolinguistic scene and as a result continue to occupy and affect the majority of Moroccans’ day-to-day lives. The current and constant developments and changes that continue to be made to the educational system in an effort to rescue it from total collapse have therefore represented some of the main challenges during the time it took to write this book. The unfolding of educational reforms and policies in the course of researching and writing meant constant revisions and updates in an effort to keep the book fresh and up to date. xi

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Preface

Still, the ultimate goal of this work remains to offer a compelling portrait of the disparate educational experiences of Moroccan students along economic and sociolinguistic lines. In particular, it aims to reveal the critical role played by language in determining access to a good education, social justice, and economic mobility. At the same time, this work aims to inspire readers, policymakers, and decision-makers to take action to bring about genuine change to the educational system so as to make it more inclusive and equitable for all, not just for those who have access to the language of power in Morocco.   Mohammed Errihani

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deep gratitude and appreciation for the support and guidance I received from the following: • Fulbright and MACECE Morocco for the Fulbright Scholar Award, which allowed me to conduct research while teaching at Chouaib Doukkali University in El Jadida, Morocco during the 2018–2019 academic year. • My wonderful students and colleagues from Chouaib Doukkali University in El Jadida, the International University of Rabat, Mohammed V University in Rabat, Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fez, and Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane for their support and contributions (in direct and indirect ways) to this work. • Officials from the Ministry of Education and IRCAM for sharing their expertise and for their assistance in opening many doors. • The average Moroccans on the street (as well as in homes, cafes, and trains) for their invaluable and insightful points of view about the topic of this book. • And my family and friends for their unconditional love and support during the research and writing of this book.

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Contents

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I ntroduction: The Language Problem in Morocco ������������������������������    1 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    8

2

 he Arabization Policy and Its Effect on Education����������������������������    9 T 2.1 Arabizing North Africa ��������������������������������������������������������������������    9 2.2 A House Divided������������������������������������������������������������������������������   15 2.3 The French–Arabic Dichotomy��������������������������������������������������������   18 2.4 Arabization and Nationalism������������������������������������������������������������   20 2.5 Is It the End of Arabization? ������������������������������������������������������������   21 2.6 Diglossia and Triglossia in Morocco������������������������������������������������   22 2.7 Conclusions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   24 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   25

3

 he Economics of Language in Education��������������������������������������������   27 T 3.1 The Economics of Education������������������������������������������������������������   27 3.2 The Economics of Language������������������������������������������������������������   29 3.3 The Role of Language in the Educational Crisis������������������������������   32 3.3.1 Privatization of Education and the Disintegration of the Public School��������������������������������������������������������������   33 3.3.2 Shadow Education and the Effects of Private Tutoring��������   35 3.3.3 Inadequate Teacher Selection�����������������������������������������������   36 3.3.4 Teaching Pedagogy and the Marketization of Education��������������������������������������������������������������������������   38 3.3.5 Lack of Investment in the Education Sector ������������������������   41 3.3.6 The Language of Instruction Conundrum����������������������������   42 3.4 Language: The Prime Culprit…��������������������������������������������������������   43 3.5 But It May Not Be All Doom and Gloom����������������������������������������   44 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   45

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Contents

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 ducation and Language Reforms ��������������������������������������������������������   47 E 4.1 Education in Morocco During the Protectorate: The Strategy of Divide and Rule������������������������������������������������������   47 4.2 Language Reforms in the 1999 National Charter of Education and Training����������������������������������������������������������������   50 4.3 The National Education Emergency Plan: Najah Program 2009–2012 ��������������������������������������������������������������   56 4.4 Arab Spring Reforms������������������������������������������������������������������������   58 4.5 The Strategic Vision of Reform 2015–2030: For a School of Equity, Quality, and Advancement��������������������������   59 4.6 Le Conseil National des Langues et de la Culture Marocaine (The National Council of Moroccan Languages and Culture)��������������������������������������������������������������������   61 4.7 Conclusions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   62 4.7.1 Educational Institutions��������������������������������������������������������   64 4.7.2 Educational and Social Reform Initiatives����������������������������   64 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   65

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 ocial Justice and the Language Factor������������������������������������������������   67 S 5.1 Social Justice in Education ��������������������������������������������������������������   67 5.2 The Language Factor������������������������������������������������������������������������   68 5.3 The Private School and Social Injustice�������������������������������������������   71 5.4 French Is the Key������������������������������������������������������������������������������   74 5.5 Linguistic Justice������������������������������������������������������������������������������   75 5.6 Can Social Justice Be Realized Through Language?�����������������������   76 5.7 Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   77 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   78

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 he Mother-Tongue Debate��������������������������������������������������������������������   81 T 6.1 The Controversy of Mother-Tongue Education��������������������������������   81 6.2 Attitudes Towards Mother Tongue Education����������������������������������   86 6.3 A Potential Success of Mother Tongue Education on the Horizon����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   89 6.4 Main Arguments in Favor and Against Mother-Tongue Education����������������������������������������������������������������   92 6.4.1 Arguments in Favor of Mother-Tongue Use in Education ������������������������������������������������������������������   92 6.4.2 Arguments Against the Use of the Mother Tongue in Education ������������������������������������������������������������   93 6.5 Possible Solutions and Recommendations���������������������������������������   94 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   96

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 anguage as a Democratizing Force������������������������������������������������������   99 L 7.1 Language, Power, and Elite Closure ������������������������������������������������   99 7.1.1 Elite Closure and the Berber Proto-Elite������������������������������  104 7.1.2 Democratizing Education Through English��������������������������  105 7.2 Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  110 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  111

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 anguage Attitudes towards Official Status of Berber������������������������  113 L 8.1 Background ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  113 8.2 Berber������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  116 8.3 Measuring Language Attitudes ��������������������������������������������������������  118 8.4 Findings and Discussion ������������������������������������������������������������������  120 8.4.1 Arabic������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  120 8.4.2 Darija (Colloquial Arabic)����������������������������������������������������  121 8.4.3 French ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  121 8.4.4 Berber������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  122 8.5 Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  126 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  128

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Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  131 9.1 Causes and Consequences of the Educational Crisis������������������������  131 9.2 Conclusions and Recommendations ������������������������������������������������  137 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  139

About the Author

Mohammed Errihani is Professor of Linguistics in the Department of English and World Languages and the founding director of the ESL program at Purdue University Northwest. He has previously taught at the University of Illinois at Chicago and at Al-Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco. He is also a former Senior English Language Fellow at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, and a Fulbright Scholar at Chouaib Doukkali University in El Jadida, Morocco. Mohammed Errihani holds a bachelor’s degree and a Master of Advanced Studies (DEA) in English from the University of Fez, a master’s degree in Applied Linguistics, and a PhD in English and Rhetoric from the University of Illinois at Chicago. He has presented and published on language policy in Morocco and language teaching and learning and continues to research and write especially on language policy in education in Morocco and the United States.  

Purdue University Northwest, Hammond, IN, USA

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Chapter 1

Introduction: The Language Problem in Morocco

La politique linguistique a pour finalité d’assurer la gestion de la diversité langagière selon une vision stratégique qui prend en charge à la fois les langues nationales et les langues étrangères en leur assignant un statut et des fonctions spécifiques. Idéalement, l’élaboration de cette politique prend en compte en amont les données du macro-environnement, à savoir les données politiques, économiques, légales, socioculturelles, scientifiques et techniques, et les données particulières de la situation linguistique locale. Ahmed Boukous

Education is the domain where language policies tend to have the most impact in that they can potentially affect the future of whole generations, whether such policies are designed in good faith to serve those on the receiving end or simply made to serve the interests of those in power (Liddicoat, 2013; Recinto, 2006; Schiffman, 1996; Tollefson, 2013). Language-in-education policies which are developed to address language problems in multilingual settings is a complex phenomenon as “language-in-education” could refer to a host of issues: language as a medium of instruction, or the teaching and learning of an official language or a minority language, or the acquisition of an additional (foreign or second) language. Regardless, it is through schooling that language policies tend to be elaborated, implemented, and their goals ultimately achieved and as a result tend to carry the most weight in terms of shaping the future of members of a society. Moroccan society has been plagued by a language problem, and the educational system has been in a crisis mode as a result despite the various policies and reforms initiatives introduced by the government in the last four decades to fix it. In fact, the Moroccan system of education has been in a state of flux and volatility since its independence in 1956, but in recent decades this crisis has been magnified further by the language problem. The main issue has continued to revolve primarily around the language of instruction, although the teaching and acquisition of a minority language has proven to be another thorn in the side of the educational system in recent years. Morocco is a multilingual and multicultural setting, and its sociolinguistic map is marked by several languages and language varieties that are alive and vibrant with roles, functions, and domains that sometimes vary at times and at other times © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Errihani, Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco, Language Policy 35, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51594-1_1

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1  Introduction: The Language Problem in Morocco

converge depending local variables (Grandguillaume, 1991; Pennell, 2000). But this so-called multilingual blessing seems to have turned into a curse that successive governments have struggled to use to the advantage of the educational system despite efforts to improve, develop and address gaps and disparities caused by language in the first place. These governments have especially failed to make the Moroccan educational system less dependent on the French system – a topic that will be addressed in more detail in the chapters that follow. In the meantime, the educational sector continues to perform poorly due to ineffective and unrealistic language-in-education policies. Many such policies reveal a lack of political will and commitment to invest in human capital, and as a result educational reforms and policies introduced by one government are often halted or discontinued by the next government, which ends up failing the average Moroccan student and leads to the disintegration of a whole system of education. The growth of the educational sector in Morocco continues to be measured quantitatively by the increase in the number of students attending elementary, secondary and tertiary institutions1; however, such growth has not necessarily been accompanied by growth in quality: teachers, school funding, and student performance are all areas that continue to suffer and lag behind when compared to the educational systems in other developing nations, including those in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (PIRLS, 2016). The topic of the poor performance of the educational system in Morocco is not new; it has been addressed extensively in the past, albeit mainly in the form of short articles and papers in Arabic and French (PIRLS, 2016; Saadani, 2017; UNICEF, 2021). However more recently, two important works in English have partially tackled this issue (Boutieri, 2016; Alaoui & Springborg, 2021). In her book titled, Learning in Morocco, language politics and the abandoned educational dream, Boutieri argues that the post-independence educational language policies as well as the neoliberal discourse and governance have failed to guarantee the dream of a decent education, grow the economy and promote the values of democracy. Her book focuses mainly on the public high school in Morocco, which she investigates by taking the reader on a journey of discovery through the voices and daily lived experiences of her subjects during the time she spent listening, watching and living among them. A more recent work edited by Alaoui and Springboard, The political economy of education in the Arab World, on the other hand, focuses on the educational crisis in the MENA region, with an important part of it devoted to Morocco. The book’s main argument revolves around the relationship between education and lack of democratic values in the MENA region, in particular the effects of education on the social and political values and behaviors of the educated and how regimes in the region tend to manipulate the education sector to promote values of obedience and respect for authority as a way to maintain their hold on power. This is achieved

 For a more complete account on the number of students in Moroccan schools, see the Ministry of National Education, Preschool and Sports’ website: www.men.gov.ma 1

1  Introduction: The Language Problem in Morocco

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through teaching methods and curricula that promote rote learning and lack of critical thinking as means to indoctrinate students and influence their political values and co-opt them through public sector jobs and other handouts (Alaoui & Springboard, 2021). While these two works blame the poor performance of education in MENA, and Morocco in particular, on the neoliberal discourse, poor governance, and lack of democratic values, the present book takes a different direction by proposing that language is essentially at the heart of the educational crisis in Morocco; language is the principal culprit for the current state of affairs in the education sector of Morocco. Admittedly, the educational crisis can be linked to economic and socio-political outcomes, including widening socio-economic gaps and unequal access to economic resources, especially in terms of access to the job market, and lack of exposure to democratic values and ideals; however, the book contends that it is precisely language that has led to the current educational crisis; it is also language that has reproduced two major socio-economic classes of students in Morocco: those who have access to the languages of power and who are therefore socio-economically positioned to progress and be in charge, and those who are denied such access and are destined to a lower socio-economic standing  – all because of access to the “right” language. In their discussion of the underperformance of the education sector in the MENA region, Alaoui and Springboard (2021) provide an enlightening account of the ills of education in this region, which fittingly applies to the Moroccan case: inadequate commitment to STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering, and math); lagging literacy rates, especially among females; absence of Arab universities from lists of the world’s top 300; poor preparation for and inadequate linkages with labor markets; negligible economic returns from education; and lack of preparation to exercise rights and responsibilities of citizenship.…Arab educational systems are viewed as being underfinanced or suffering from misallocation of funding, or both, most notably away from primary and toward tertiary education and away from teachers and toward administrators; as having inadequate, overcrowded facilities; as being overly centralized and resistant to stakeholder participation, especially by teachers, parents, and potential private sector employers; as being insufficiently student-focused in methods of teaching and learning, partly as a result of poorly trained teachers; and as preferencing religion and social studies while devaluing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. The systemic, contextual factor that has received the most attention in explaining underperformance is that of economic inequality, which appears to have more pernicious effects in the Arab world than in most other, if not all, emerging regions. (p. 2)

Most of these issues that are believed to have caused the deterioration of the education sector in MENA are somewhat applicable to the Moroccan context. However, while most countries in the MENA have opted for an Arabic-English or Arabic-­ French education, Morocco has consistently vacillated between two languages and has recently added a third one to the mix, which has only made matters worse for the education of the average Moroccan. That is why the language issue is believed to be primarily responsible for the current educational crisis in the country. Boutieri (2016) contends that “Moroccan public schools also face a number of structural impediments: overcrowded classrooms, inadequate facilities, an outdated

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curriculum and method of instruction, and differential access to education in relation to location, class and gender” (p. 9). Still, the factors that account for students’ poor performance, according to Boutieri, center especially around access to preschool, the quality and conditions of learning, as well as the quality of student and teacher support, and finally the family socio-cultural dynamics. However, from the government’s perspective, the growth of education has often been understood in terms of the expansion infrastructure and human resources, a view that is often translated into building more brick-and-mortar schools and increasing the number of students in rural areas while the source of the educational crisis continues to be glossed over. The results on the ground continue to prove that such an approach is no longer tenable. More resources ought to be directed towards attracting motivated and competent teachers, investing in teacher training and in effective teaching methodologies as a way to improve the quality of learning and student achievement instead of focusing on increasing the number of school buildings. These days, no one can deny that the Moroccan educational system is undergoing a crisis, and the deep cynicism and alarm over the possibility of reform continue to play out on the ground among students, parents, as well as politicians, even though the latter group can be considered primarily responsible for the demise of the educational project in Morocco. The gap between policy and practice continues to mark all educational reforms, and “policymakers, while paying lip-service to equality and opportunity, usually represent the interests of dominant groups, and thus adopt policies designed to further those interests, often at the expense of ethnolinguistic minorities” (Tollefson & Tsui, 2004, p. 286). Education is the area where tangible results of language policy and implementation can be seen. But the government of Morocco has so far been unable to resolve several educational issues that are primarily socio-political in nature, namely the controversy surrounding the linguistic medium of instruction, an area that this book judges to be the main culprit for Morocco’s dysfunctional system of education. According to reports from the World Bank and PIRLS (2022), over 59% of Moroccan children at the age of 9 are unable to read at grade level, and language problem is the principal reason. Such an alarming number becomes clear when one realizes that Moroccan children, regardless of their home language, are introduced to literacy in a language that is not their mother tongue: Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). As such, language holds the prime responsibility for the educational crisis in Morocco as it continues to be subjected to the ideological and political whims of government politicians and policymakers at the expense of the Moroccan children and their future. Therefore, unless the root of the educational crisis in Morocco, namely the language problem, is treated with the urgency and honesty it deserves, and unless the interests of the students are deemed above all other political interests, it is unlikely that any reforms that future governments decide to roll out will have any positive effect on the educational system. The goal of this book is to examine and discuss the root causes of the educational crisis in Morocco and the factors that have contributed to it and then propose some feasible and practical solutions to revive the educational sector so that Moroccan education and education in Morocco is again a viable option for Moroccan children.

1  Introduction: The Language Problem in Morocco

5

The research methodology adopted for this book was based on an ethnographic approach where data was collected through long-term fieldwork in two public and two private universities in El Jadida, Fez, Ifrane, and Rabat, Morocco. The data also consisted of interviews and discussions with stakeholders ranging from students to parents to instructors to policy architects to ministry of education officials. There was also a great deal of data collected through participant observation while teaching in a public university through a Fulbright Scholar grant and while, living in and visiting various parts of Morocco between 2018 and 2022. The goal of this research was to investigate the role that language plays in the current state of affairs in the education sector in Morocco and to offer a compelling portrait of the disparate educational experiences of students along sociolinguistic lines in twenty-first century Morocco, and in particular the role that language can play in guaranteeing social and economic capital to some while robbing the majority without access to the language of power of social justice, equity, and economic mobility. This ethnographic work thus aims to demonstrate the flagrant inequities that manifest themselves as a result of access to the language of power in the educational system and at the same time to inspire readers and policymakers to action to bring about changes to the educational system to make it more inclusive and equitable. In addition to an introduction and a conclusion where the main argument of the book is introduced, reiterated, and highlighted, there are seven chapters each dealing with one area of language-in-education policy that has a direct bearing on the state of education in Morocco. Chapter 2 titled The Arabization Policy and its Effect on Education examines the policy of Arabization and how it has deeply influenced the educational system in Morocco. This policy, which was introduced and promoted by the Istiqlal Party (Party of Independence) on the eve of Morocco’s independence in 1956, called for the introduction of Arabic as the sole language of instruction in the school system at the expense of French, a move that was seen as necessary to the building of the Moroccan nation state. Arabization was also seen as a unifying force and a means to vindicate Arabic, restore its lost prestige, and highlight its worth and value to all Moroccans at this important juncture of Moroccan history. The French language never went away, however, and the controversy about the role of Arabic in Moroccan society as a whole and in the educational system in particular continues to this day. One of the most obvious effects of this policy has been its failure to ensure social justice in education to all Moroccans. After several educational reforms, it has become clear that Arabization has shortchanged the masses who were forced to study all school subjects in Arabic while the elite, including those who proposed Arabization, managed to bypass the policy by studying in French-medium schools in Morocco or in French speaking countries, which continues to provide them with the economic and cultural capital needed to be successful in Morocco. Chapter 3 titled The Economics of Language in Education examines the role national and foreign language(s) play in the education of the Moroccan student. In particular, it addresses the extent to which the economics of language is to blame for the current educational crisis in Morocco. Language has become such an important

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commodity made available only to those who can afford it, while those who are unable to have access to it are left to struggle in the public school. The chapter also discusses the slow demise of the public school and how the burgeoning private schools (which rely heavily on French as a medium of instruction) are contributing to this situation and indirectly contributing to the crumbling of the educational dream of so many. Chapter 4 titled Education and Language Reforms analyzes and critiques the different language reform initiatives launched by the state of Morocco over the years in an effort to improve the conditions of education in the country. The chapter focuses on the proposed linguistic changes contained in the educational reforms of the last two decades in particular since the introduction of the 1999 National Charter of Education (Charter) in Morocco and discusses the extent to which these reforms have yielded any results on the ground. This chapter also addresses more recent reforms concerning the various government institutions set up by Morocco to address educational matters, mainly those institutions with linguistic missions. In particular, it investigates the creation of the new “Conseil National des Langues et de la Culture Marocaine” (National Council of Languages and Moroccan Culture), a body tasked with overseeing previously independent institutions, such as IRCAM, Mohammed VI Academy of Arabic, the institution in charge of Hassaniya dialect and other dialects in Morocco, a special body in charge of developing and preserving Morocco’s cultural heritage, and a special body in charge of developing the use of foreign language and translation. The creation of several official bodies in charge of various aspects of the education sector is yet to yield any concrete and effective results on the ground as the gap between policy and implementation continues to be the order of the day. Chapter 5 titled Social Justice and the Language Factor explores the connection between language and social justice within the Moroccan system of education and the extent to which this sector can guarantee justice, equality, and equity to every student in Morocco. In particular, it examines how language-in-education policies and reforms have impacted the lives of a large segment of Moroccan students in the last four decades, notably following the policy of Arabization which came to reverse Morocco’s long-standing policy of bilingual education (ArabicFrench) and instead impose Arabic as the sole medium of instruction for all school subjects at the primary and secondary level. This chapter also discusses how access to the language of power and prestige translates into access to the job market, thus creating not only academic but economic disparities and social injustice, which affect mainly the poor and underprivileged. The chapter closes by proposing ways that language can end these academic and economic inequities and guarantee a school where every student has equal access to educational resources and opportunities. Chapter 6 titled The Mother-Tongue Debate This chapter aims to address the recent and hotly debated topic of mother tongue education in Moroccan preschool, which suggests allowing students to be welcomed to school in their mother tongues,

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namely in Moroccan Arabic (Darija) and Berber (Tamazight/Amazigh2). The chapter discusses the controversy that such a proposition has provoked, examines both sides of the debate, and suggests some possible ways mother tongue education can become part of the educational system in Morocco. One of the main propositions of the chapter is that mother tongue education should be adopted as an educational strategy because it is a basic human right and a proven method for improving literacy and critical thinking skills, which are easily transferrable to the other linguistic mediums of instruction used in elementary school. The chapter also examines the major roles that Standard Arabic has played on the Moroccan linguistic scene since independence, most relevant of which was its role in keeping the mother tongues sidelined and relegated to second class status. The chapter closes by highlighting how this second-class status has begun to change in the last decade thanks to changes in attitudes towards the mother tongues in Morocco. Chapter 7 titled, Language as a Democratizing Force mainly discusses the role that language plays in the allocation of power and resources in a competitive language market and the implications of such a phenomenon on the Moroccan educational system. The French-educated elite continue to maintain their power and privileges while limiting the masses’ access to the language of power and the socioeconomic opportunities that come with such access. English is becoming more and more important on the educational scene in Morocco as it is thought to have a chance at democratizing and leveling the linguistic playing field within the educational system in Morocco as it is seen as a neutral language that does not carry any colonial overtones, which cannot be said of the French language. For the masses especially, it is hoped that English would soon replace French and thus provide an equal opportunity for success for all, regardless of their socio-economic status. For the time being, however, the Moroccan state has opted for French to continue to be the foreign language of choice, thus maintaining the status-quo and confirming the power of French and its continuous hegemony over the Moroccan sociolinguistic scene. But are the grassroots likely to overturn such a top-down decision and give a chance to English and to the masses? Chapter 8 titled, Language Attitudes towards Official Status of Berber aims to shed light on whether attitudes towards the Berber language in Morocco have evolved or stayed the same two decades after this language was first recognized and later made official by the state of Morocco in 2001 and 2011 respectively. In particular, the chapter investigates whether the officialization of Berber has in any way affected these attitudes and whether Moroccans are open to yet another language entering the educational scene. The methodology for collecting data and the  While “Amazigh” and “Tamazight” are recognized as more appropriate by many, “Berber” is still widely used and accepted in scholarly circles. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity and to avoid confusion, the term “Berber” is used throughout this work to refer to the language and the people. “Tamazight,” on the other hand, is used to identify the variety of Berber used in Morocco’s Middle Atlas region. 2

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conclusions reached as a result are based on research conducted in Morocco in 2018 and 2019 using various methods: participant observation, public comments collected from newspaper articles and social media outlets dealing with the Berber question, and a survey of 180 respondents. Two decades after the initial recognition of Berber and the call for its inclusion in the educational system, and a decade after it gained official status in Morocco, attitudes towards this language appear to have generally become more positive, especially following its officialization in 2011. However, although there appears to be widespread agreement that Berber represents an essential component of Moroccan identity and heritage, the majority of Moroccans continue to oppose its inclusion in the educational system and do so based on practical grounds, citing its lack of instrumental value to guarantee employment and upward mobility, the saturation of the linguistic scene in Morocco, and the politicization of this language policy.

References Alaoui, H., & Springborg, R. (2021). The political economy of education in the Arab world. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boutieri, C. (2016). Learning in Morocco, language politics and the abandoned educational dream. Indiana University Press. Grandguillaume, G. (1991). Arabisation et langues maternelles dans le contexte national au Maghreb. I.J.S.L., 87, 45–55. Liddicoat, A. J. (2013). Language-in-education policies: The discursive construction of intercultural relations. Short Run Press LTD. National Charter of Education and Training. (1999). https://www.men.gov.ma/Fr/Pages/CNEF.aspx Pennell, C. R. (2000). Morocco since 1830: A history. New York University Press. PIRLS. (2016). Report on Morocco. http://pirls2016.org/wp-­content/uploads/encyclopedia-­pirls/ downloadcenter/3.%20Country%20Chapters/Morocco.pdf. Ricento, T. (2006). An introduction to language policy: Theory and method. Blackwell. Saadani, Y. (2017). La crise de l’école marocaine n’est pas une fatalité. https://medias24.com/ youssef-­saadani-­la-­crise-­de-­l-­ecole-­marocaine-­n-­est-­pas-­une-­fatalite-­3809.html Schiffman, H. F. (1996). Linguistic culture and language policy. Routledge. Tollefson, W. J. (2013). Language policies in education: Critical issues. Routledge. Tollefson, J.  W., & Tsui, A.  B. (Eds.). (2004). Medium of instruction policies: Which agenda? Whose agenda? Language Problems and Language Planning, 29(1), 94–95. https://doi. org/10.1075/lplp.29.1.11osb Unicef. (2021). https://www.unicef.org/morocco/ar/‫­ب منا�سبة‬-‫­التربوية‬-‫­ال�أطر‬-‫­�إالى‬-‫­م فتوحة‬-‫رساالة‬-  ­‫ق صص‬/‫­الجديدة‬-‫­الدرا�سية‬-‫ ال�سنة‬accessed 4 August 2022 World Bank. (2022). https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/feature/2020/10/27/a-­case-­for­building-­a-­stronger-­education-­system-­in-­the-­post-­covid-­19-­era

Chapter 2

The Arabization Policy and Its Effect on Education

Je considère que ceux qui ne cessent d’appeler à l’arabisation ne sont pas encore libérées car leur esprit est encore bourré d’infériorité […] Le fait que je parle la langue française – et j’aurais aimé parler d’autres langues  – ne signifie pas que je suis encore sous le Protectorat des Français. Feu King Hassan II

2.1 Arabizing North Africa The Arabic language arrived in North Africa from the East (Arabia) during the Arabo-Islamic expansions (conquests) –‫ال َف ْت ُح ال ْإس َل ِم ُّي‬ – of the seventh and eighth centuries. At that time, North Africa was a region primarily inhabited by the Berbers (Amazigh people), the indigenous people of North Africa, who spoke several varieties of the Berber language. The Arabo-Islamic conquest of North Africa contributed to the establishment of a large empire that extended from Arabia to the Iberian Peninsula and southern Europe. Arabic became not only the default administrative lingua franca of the Islamic empire during this period, but it was also a symbol of political power and a religious tool used for the purpose of converting non-Muslims in the newly conquered lands. With time, and in addition to its administrative and religious roles, the Arabic language was bound to assume the essential function of education, a role that was cut short on the eve of the 1912 French Protectorate in Morocco. The arrival of the French on Moroccan soil resulted in the French language being imposed on Morocco as the official language of administration and education at the expense of Arabic. It is precisely this event that marks the birth of the language policy called Arabization, which was enacted shortly after Morocco’s independence in 1956. Arabization is a linguistic, political, and ideological policy that the state of Morocco instituted across education and administration following its independence from France, and precisely with the 1962 Moroccan constitution (Boukous, 2018, p. 97), and has been the de jure policy of the Moroccan state ever since. The aim of © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Errihani, Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco, Language Policy 35, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51594-1_2

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this policy was to impose Arabic as the sole national language, hence replacing French as the language of administration and education in the country, a move which was essential now that Morocco had become a fully independent nation and no longer under the tutelage of France and its educational system; it was also a fundamental policy in building a newly independent and sovereign nation-state. Some have argued that the aim of such a policy goes beyond simply imposing Arabic as the sole national language at the expense of French in Morocco; such a move was also seen as being carried out at the expense of the Berber language which became further marginalized by the newly independent state and its new language policy of instituting Arabic as the only official language of the country (Assid, 2000; Elbiad, 1991, Zouhir, 2014). For the state, the policy of Arabization was seen as a necessary mission of the Nationalist Movement – led by the Istiqlal Party – which viewed Arabic as part and parcel of its ideological orientation of uniting the country. At this critical time, the ideology of One Language-One Nation, which had been proclaimed by many polities to be the glue that holds a nation together and thus a necessary course of action to achieve unity in the process of nation building, was very appealing to the nationalists of Morocco during this period. They, therefore, rallied behind Arabic at the expense of all other languages in Morocco and made it the unifying force on which to build the foundations of the newly independent nation. Equally important as well was the fact that the nationalists saw this move as politically necessary to vindicate and exonerate the Arabic language and culture from the damage done to them by French colonialist forces during the Protectorate. During the French Protectorate in Morocco (1912–1956), French had been imposed as the language of education and government at the expense of Arabic,1 and Berber2 the two main languages of Morocco prior to this period. The French justified this move by declaring Arabic and Berber unfit for their so-called “mission civilisatrice”3 (civilizing mission) of a country and a people that they argued needed to not only be modernized but civilized as well (Wagner, 1993). Thus, the French

 The term “Arabic” is rather confusing to the average person in that it can include any one of the three varieties often discussed in scholarly works: Classical Arabic, Modern Standard (MSA) Arabic, and Moroccan Arabic (Commonly known as Darija). However, from the perspective of Moroccans, there are only two varieties of Arabic: Darija, the spoken variety considered the mother tongue of all Moroccans of Arab ethnicity, and Fussha Arabic, the formal written Arabic, which could be considered a combination of Classical and MSA. This variety is not the mother tongue of anyone in Morocco or in the Arab world, although it continues to be the variety used in schooling and formal settings. 2  The term “Berber” is used as a generic term to refer to any of the three main varieties found in Morocco: Tashelhit in the south, Tamazight in the Middle Atlas, and Tarifit in the north of Morocco. Some Berber activists might object to the use of “Berber” and prefer the use of “Amazigh” or “Tamazight;” however, in scholarly circles the majority tend to accept the term “Berber” and consider it not to have any negative connotations. Furthermore, the choice of “Berber” is also done to help those unfamiliar with appellations related to Amazigh, such as Tamazight, Imazighen, etc. avoid confusion. 3  All translations in Arabic and French are the author’s. 1

2.1  Arabizing North Africa

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language became the so-called civilizing force behind this ideology, and its status as being a language with more social, cultural, and economic capital than Arabic is a conviction that has remained ingrained in the psyche of most Moroccans to this day, especially the French-educated Moroccan elite (Ennaji, 2010; Versteegh, 2014). But before examining the policy of Arabization and its effects on the educational sector in Morocco, it is important to contextualize this policy and trace its origins by providing a short historical context of the educational system and the roles played by the languages in Morocco before, during and after the Protectorate. The pre-Protectorate system of education in Morocco can be described as a traditional system based on Arabo-Islamic education mediated through Classical Arabic (Redouane, 1998). This system was mainly based on the teaching and learning of Islamic and legal sciences grounded in the Sunni Maliki School jurisprudence, as well as on the grammar and philology of Classical Arabic. Prior to the existence of Al Qarawiyyin University in Fez, which would later become the host of this traditional system of education, mosques in the cities and zawiyas in the countryside used to be the locales where Moroccans were introduced to this traditional system of education, a system which came to be known as “traditional education” (Atta‫؟‬lim Al-assil /‫)التعلمي ال�أصيل‬, a system which continues to maintain its presence on the Moroccan educational scene in one form or another till today. During the Protectorate, this system functioned side by side with a French system set up by the French for French citizens and expats as well. Such a system included the non-Muslims living in Morocco, including Moroccan Jews. A crucial goal of any colonial system is to rely on a local educated elite to serve as the intermediary between the colonizer and the colonized, and the French made sure they set up two schools, one in Fez and one in Rabat, to reproduce an educated elite in Arabic and French to serve in that role. Furthermore, as a means to pursuing a divide-and-rule policy in Morocco, and to guarantee the weakening of the role played by traditional education and Classical Arabic, the French set up the College d’Azrou in the Middle Atlas Mountains where a Berber elite were given a French education so as to serve on the side of the French (Benhlal, 2005). Furthermore, Lyautey, the French general-resident in Morocco during the Protectorate, created Franco-Berber schools that recruited students from Berber populations only, who would later attend the College of Azrou, where instruction was in French, and where Islamic materials were rigidly excluded from the curricula (Pennell, 2000). In an attempt to counter any impact of Arabization on the system of education in Morocco, the College of Azrou, under the tutelage of the French, was also intent on producing Berber administrators with a good command of French, but not of Arabic, a strategy that would later come to be known as the divide-and-rule colonial policy. Unfortunately for the French Residency officials, by trying to separate the Arabs and Berbers, they unwittingly fanned the flames of Moroccan nationalism, which would eventually lead to the end of the French Protectorate and the independence of Morocco in 1956. Prior to the 1930s, however, one cannot talk of any meaningful language planning in Morocco, as language policy was not managed by any centralized institution. The languages spoken in Morocco until the early twentieth century, Darija

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and Berber with its three main varieties, were mostly complementary and served different functions in different regions of the country. Language management could be described as spontaneous (‫ )عفوية‬and far from organized. It was not until after independence with the emergence of a number of centralized institutions in Morocco, such as schools, radio, and television, that the central government had a reason to become officially involved in their management, especially regarding the linguistic medium used to transmit the official message of the state (M. Elmedlaoui, personal communication, May 20, 2011). In post-independence Morocco, the traditional system of education continued to exist side by side with a modernized system run by Morocco’s Ministry of Education, which consisted of a traditional Arabo-Islamic education and a bilingual education where both French and Arabic were used as mediums of instruction. The traditional system continued to focus on the teaching of Islamic subjects and the study of the Arabic language, or what is known among Moroccans as Fussha Arabic (‫)العربية الفصحى‬, a modernized form of Classical Arabic often referred to as Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in scholarly circles. According to Morocco’s Ministry of Education, the new system, which was being modernized through the introduction of foreign languages into its core curriculum, primarily aims at preserving the Moroccan identity and protecting the moral values and principles of Moroccan society (www.men.gov.ma). A few decades after Morocco’s independence, the state decided to intervene in this system in order to reorganize and codify it “to meet the new developments of the country” (National Charter for Education and Training, 1999, Section 88, p. 41). In 1999, this reform was made official in the form of the Charter. Contrary to the current system of education, which consists of the typical pre-­ school, elementary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education, until a few years ago the traditional system of education in Morocco generally consisted of: • Lemsid (Qur’anic school), which is the equivalent of kindergarten. The focus of these institutions is to introduce children to the basics of reading, writing, math as well as memorization of short verses of the Qur’an through a mixture of Darija and MSA. • Mederssa/Medrassa (Zawiya in rural areas) is the equivalent of the primary school and focuses on teaching math, reading, Islamic Education, and civics. Memorization of the Qur’an typically continues through elementary school. • Atta‫؟‬lim Athanawi Al-assil (Traditional Secondary Education) is the equivalent of middle and high school combined and is marked by the teaching of Islamic thought and philosophy, ethics, science, and history and geography and foreign languages. Graduates of this system would generally continue their studies at Al Qarawiyyin University (‫ )جامعة القرويني‬in Fez or one of its post-independence faculties, such as the faculty of Islamic Jurisprudence in Fez or Agadir where learning is grounded in Islamic studies through the medium of MSA. Upon graduation, the alumnae of this system go on to become religious scholars (Oulama), imams, civil servants, and teachers of Islamic education, law, and Arabic studies (http:// www.uaq.ma).

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Benhlal (2005) provides an enlightening account of the role that this group of graduate elites of this traditional system play in Moroccan society and how their social and ideological standing influences the moral, spiritual, and political attitudes and views of Moroccans in general. He argues that their influence is seen as a main reason behind the support of traditional education and its main pillars, Islam and Arabic by a large number of Moroccans, especially those who represent lower- and middle-class society of Morocco: Font partie de cette élite tous ceux qui, une fois leurs études supérieures achevées, en majorité citadins, deviennent des ‘alim-s’ (docteurs) et jouissent de l’influence morale qui légitime toute action politique. Érudits et guides spirituels, les ‘alim-s’ occupent les fonctions prestigieuses de juge, de prédicateur, de guide de la prière dans les grandes mosquées du pays, de professeurs, de consultants juridiques et de conseillers du prince. Ils forment une aristocratie de savoir dont la présence dans toutes les manifestations importantes de la vie sociale et politique leur confère autorité et influence sure l’opinion. Ils sont les gardiens vigilants de l’intime union de la vie morale et intellectuelle et de la vie religieuse et civile… Nous avons vu, à travers le système de transmission du savoir et de l’éthique sociale au Maroc du XIXe siècle comment était formée intellectuellement l’élite du pays. Ce n’est ni la pédagogie, ni le contenu, ni l’autonomie de cet enseignement qui lui donnent ses caractères spécifiques, mais sa fonction sociale. L’enseignement de la mosquée -université, abstrait, formaliste, dogmatique, est en complet accord avec la structure sociale. La structure de la culture reproduit celle de l’élite et de la société marocaine : fiqh, cultures des ‘alim-s, belles-lettres, culture du Makhzen, mysticisme, culture du peuple. Mais son fort impact dans la société marocaine en fait le garant de l’intégration de la tradition marocaine. (p. 35) (This elite includes all those who, once their higher education is completed, the majority of whom are city dwellers, become “alim-s” (doctors) and enjoy the moral influence that legitimizes all political action. Scholars and spiritual guides, ‘alim-s’ occupy the prestigious functions of judge, preacher, imams in the great mosques of the country, professors, legal consultants and advisers to the prince. They form an aristocracy of knowledge whose presence in all important manifestations of social and political life gives them authority and influence on public opinion. They are the vigilant guardians of the intimate union of moral and intellectual life and of religious and civil life… We have seen, through the system of transmission of knowledge and social ethics in nineteenth-century Morocco, how the country's elite was formed intellectually. It is not the pedagogy, the content, or the autonomy of this teaching that gives it its specific characteristics, but rather its social function. The teaching of the mosque-university, abstract, formal, dogmatic, is in complete accord with the social structure. The structure of this culture reproduces that of the elite and of Moroccan society: fiqh, cultures of ‘alim-s’, arts, culture of the Makhzen, mysticism, and the culture of the people. But its strong impact in Moroccan society makes it the guarantor of the integration of the Moroccan tradition). (p. 35)

On the eve of Morocco’s independence, the state was intent on cutting all ties with French institutions and building new ones that could reflect Moroccan cultural identity and individual character as a way to mark a complete break from French influence and subordination. This attitude manifested itself not only in the area of education but also in administration. However, the after-effects for these two public sectors were mixed. According to Fernandez et al. (2013), Toute la planification linguistique a été organisée à partir de [l’Article 3 de la Constitution de 1961], et s’est concentrée sur l’arabisation de l’enseignement et du secteur public entre les années 1960 et la fin du vingtième siècle. Elle a entrainé des résultats variés

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2  The Arabization Policy and Its Effect on Education selon les secteurs. En matière d’éducation publique, les enseignements primaire et secondaire ont été complètement arabisés, parvenant à une arabisation complète à la fin des années 1980. A l’inverse, l’arabisation de l’administration publique a été très peu prise en charge par les autorités, ce qui a conduit à des résultats très différents selon les ministères et les secteurs publics. On trouve ainsi des secteurs plutôt arabisés comme le ministère de l’agriculture ou celui de la justice, des secteurs plus ou moins bilingues comme le secteur touristique, et des secteurs peu arabisés comme le secteur économique. (pp. 19–20) (All language planning was based on article 3 of the constitution of 1961 and focused on Arabizing education and the public sector between the 1960s and the end of the 20th century. The results of this planning varied by sector. In terms of public education, primary and secondary education were completely Arabized by the end of the 1980s. On the contrary, Arabization of public administration was not supported by the authorities, which led to very different results for the ministries and the public sectors. Thus, while some sectors such as the ministry of agriculture or justice were more or less Arabized, other sectors such as tourism were relatively bilingual, and other sectors were much less Arabized, such as the economic sector). (pp. 19–20)

The process of Arabization has therefore seen more success at the level of the educational sector than its counterpart, the administration sector, and the hope was once the process of Arabizing education is complete, Arabizing the administration would be a naturally seamless and smooth process, which has not been the case. Furthermore, the priority of Arabizing the system of education in Morocco took precedence over other sectors because it had specific goals that could be summed up in four main principles: Education was to be (1) generalized, (2) unified, (3) Arabized, and (4) Moroccan-ized. Arabizing education was also seen as a more urgent undertaking that needed to set the tone first and foremost for the break-up with French hegemony and the signaling of the new nation-state intent on building a truly independent country with new and autonomous and self-determining institutions. Unfortunately, such a lofty goal has continued to be a tantalizing yet elusive vision and aspiration for every government that came to power since Morocco’s independence. Generalizing education in Morocco has been anything but a simple process, for this process continues to be met by many challenges, especially in rural Morocco where illiteracy among women and girls continues to be alarmingly high, even when compared to the illiteracy rates of Morocco’s North African neighbors. For examples, only 68.5% of Moroccans are literate compared to Morocco’s neighbor to the east, Algeria, which boasts a population that’s 80.5% literate (World by Map, 2018), so one can only wonder what has gone wrong with Morocco’s post-­ independence educational dream. Such high levels of illiteracy are often blamed on poverty and social inequality, a socio-economic phenomenon characterized by increasing gaps between the rich and the poor and between rural and urban Morocco (OXFAM, 2011; OECD, 2018). But what interests us here is whether the policy of Arabization bears any responsibility for these low literacy rates and the resulting socio-economic gaps between social classes in Morocco. In other words, is the medium of instruction a culprit or a contributing factor to these low literacy rates in a country where young children are required to start their education in a language other than their mother tongues?

2.2  A House Divided

15

All children in Morocco are welcomed to school and taught to read and write in MSA, which might just as well be a foreign language when one compares it to Berber and to some extent to Darija. This is especially significant for speakers of Berber, many of whom do not even speak Darija, especially those in rural areas of the country (See Chap. 6 for a more detailed account of mother tongue education in Morocco and its effect on education and literacy). According to Zakoura Foundation (Zakoura, n.d.), the only non-governmental network of schools in rural Morocco that uses Moroccan Arabic and Berber as mediums of instruction in pre-school and elementary education, Arabization is partly to blame for low literacy and high drop-out rates among children, and in particular among girls. Still, proponents of Arabization disagree with Zakoura’s approach to use the mother tongue in its classrooms and accuse it of lowering standards and even causing division and discord among Moroccan ethnic groups when Arabic was supposed to be the unifying force of all ethnicities. Thus, the goal to generalize education and use Arabic as a unifying force in post-­ independent Morocco seems to have failed despite the government’s many educational reform attempts and promises for more funding for the educational sector. This is especially the case in rural areas, where literacy rates continue to plateau despite the addition of new schools in remote areas. This in turn continues to feed the debate on who is to blame for the current state of Moroccan education and what effective approach to adopt in order to save the educational system from total collapse.

2.2 A House Divided The Moroccan population in general agrees that the educational system is in crisis, but it continues to be divided into two main camps with regards to the best course of action to follow when it comes to reforming and revitalizing the Moroccan school (Boukous, 2018; Elbiad, 1991). While some propose an Arabic – French bilingual approach as a solution, with French being maintained as the medium of instruction for scientific subjects, opponents continue to insist on eradicating the French language from the school curriculum and replacing it by the exclusive use of Arabic. Proponents of bilingualism and the maintenance of French in the school system tacitly claim that Arabic is a language that is incapable of competing in the fields of science, technology, and finance and therefore cannot keep up with the developments of the twenty-first century. They further argue that the failure of the Arabic language to prove effective in the Moroccan educational system is due to the fact that previous educational reforms never paid attention to reforming the Arabic language itself even though its “lexicon and structure haven’t evolved since the pre-­Islamic period” (Ahmed Assid, quoted in Le Monde 2/19/2016). For this group, Arabic is mostly associated with traditional thinking and mindsets as opposed to French which is often associated with modernity and socio-economic development.

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Those opposed to Morocco’s reliance on French in the school curriculum claim that the Arabic language should replace French in all the sectors of the educational system and insist that it should be used as a medium of instruction of all subjects, including scientific subjects. They further insist on the sacred link between Arabic with Islam as another reason why Arabic should be promoted and protected, and making it the medium of instruction of all subjects is the obvious way to achieve such a goal. In addition, they argue that Morocco is a Muslim nation that ought to be proud of its cultural and linguistic heritage, of which the Arabic language constitutes the most essential component. As such, adopting Arabic as the sole medium of instruction in the school system will not only enhance its importance as the custodian of Moroccan ethos and cultural values but will also be the most effective means of marking the end of Morocco’s subservience to the French  – both in terms of language and ideology. It is important to underline here that the same arguments have repeatedly been offered by those who champion Arabization since independence. It is equally important to note that the policy of Arabization gradually came into effect in the 1970s, and Arabic did eventually replace French as a medium of instruction of all science subjects at the primary and then the secondary levels by the end of the 1980s. It is also a well-known fact that this was more of a political move sanctioned by the late King Hassan II, who decided that it was politically safer for maintaining his hold on power to express his support for the Arabization policy championed by the conservative Istiqlal Party and the Islamists at the expense of the liberal and left-­leaning Moroccan intellectual elite, who were less enthusiastic about Arabization and more in favor of maintaining French as part of a bilingual education in Morocco (Assid, 2020). The Arabization process of the educational system, however, was limited to primary and secondary education where all scientific subjects, which used to be taught in French, had to be taught in Arabic. In other words, this Arabization process of the school curriculum was halted at the secondary level of education and was not able to reach the tertiary level and. As a result, students who studied scientific subjects in Arabic in elementary and secondary schools were forced to switch to French if they were to pursue scientific majors at the university level. The outcome of this policy has been nothing short of catastrophic for this student population. The immediate result was a dramatic increase in the drop-out rates of high school graduates from the science tracks because of their inability to continue their studies in French. Another immediate outcome was the increase in the number of students who chose to switch majors and seek refuge in the humanities, especially in departments of English and other majors that use Arabic as a medium of instruction (Bouziane & Rguibi, 2018). Although this topic is beyond the scope of this book, suffice it to say that a large number of these students have not fared any better in the humanities either, and the outcome is not hard to imagine…. Boutieri (2016) aptly points out that the inflexibility of the policy of Arabization and its politicization have done a lot of damage to students who have gone through the public-school system and have

2.2  A House Divided

17

come out incapable of competing in the job market, which requires competence in the French language. One could therefore safely assume that Arabization has played a major role in the unemployment of a large segment of Moroccan society: the youth, who have either dropped out of school altogether or have graduated and still been unable to break into the job market. Arabization is a complicated term fraught with peril in that the kind of Arabic that is the basis of the Arabization ideology is not as clear cut as might be assumed as there are several varieties of Arabic used in Morocco, which makes one wonder about the variety of Arabic the policy of Arabization is based on. Is it Classical Arabic (al-lugha al ‘arabiya al-fussha, “the eloquent Arabic Language”), the language of the Qur’an and a large body of literary and religious texts? Is it Moroccan Colloquial Arabic (Darija), which is the native tongue of all Moroccans of Arab ancestry? Or is it Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), a type of adapted, modernized, neoclassical Arabic used especially in mass education and the media? Even though the variety of Arabic meant to be the official language is not specified, it is assumed to be a hybrid of Classical Arabic and the so-called Modern Standard Arabic. Darija, on the other hand, is not a written language/variety, nor is it acknowledged in the constitution or in any public forum because of its low status compared to the other two varieties. Like Darija, Berber, with its different varieties, is also unacknowledged as a potential medium of instruction although it is the mother tongue of about 40% of the Moroccan population, a number that is not easy to estimate, especially in urban settings (Boukous, 2018). Berber and Darija, which are primarily oral languages, are the mother tongues of all Moroccans, but not Modern Standard Arabic or Classical Arabic, which are formal written varieties generally used in official situations. This shows that the differences between the written and oral forms of the Arabic language in Morocco are vast, so much so that Darija might just as well be considered a foreign language to those who don’t speak it, including Arabic speakers in the Middle East and the Gulf (For a detailed account of the differences between varieties of Arabic in Morocco, see Boukous, 2018; Errihani, 2008; Versteegh, 2014). At this juncture, it is important to note that the classical division of Arabic into three distinct varieties is an approach that has largely been accepted among researchers and scholars of Morocco and the MENA region although most Moroccans will only talk of two varieties: Darija and Fussha, (Moroccan Arabic and Fussha Arabic (‫))العربية الفصحى‬ – the latter being an amalgam of so-called classical and modern standard Arabic. This distinction is essential when one is conducting and reporting on ethnographic research in the region. In other words, MENA Scholars, and North Africa in particular, might talk of three varieties of Arabic. However, for the natives of this region, there exist only two: Darija and Fussha. Therefore, the term “Arabic” used throughout this work refers to the Fussha variety unless explicitly stated otherwise.

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2.3 The French–Arabic Dichotomy One might ask, “How did French come to be thought of as the dominant language on the Moroccan linguistic scene?” French has no official status in Morocco, primarily because of its controversial legacy of colonialism; it is not acknowledged or mentioned in the constitution, but again, neither was Berber until 2011 when it was suddenly made official. Nonetheless, the state of Morocco has unofficially considered French to be the language of business, finance, science, and technology, which makes it the country’s de facto language of power and upward mobility. It is viewed as the language of modernity and progress, the language of competition in a free world market. Bourdieu’s (1984) claim that it is the labor market that regulates the value of any linguistic variety seems very pertinent in the Moroccan context. Arabic may be the de jure language in Morocco, but it is by no means the language of power and prestige. That title is reserved for French, and Arabic comes in second place. French is seen as a necessary tool used to “maintain data bases, technical expertise, textbooks, teachers and communication with nearby Europe. This is the final irony. The nation cannot function with the national language alone” (Berdichevsky, 2004, p. 239). In an increasingly competitive world economy, the Arabic language seems to lack currency; it is deemed delimited and needs the help of French in order for the government to continue to function in the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, French remains a controversial language because of its legacy of colonialism and because of the competition it has presented to Arabic, especially in the view of the nationalists and the Islamists, and that is primarily why many political groups, namely the Istiqlal Party (Independence Party) and the Islamists represented mainly by the PDJ (Justice and Development Party), continue to insist on the exclusive use of Arabic in all social, economic and cultural sectors. But the reality on the ground points to a different direction: Moroccans are embracing the French language like never before. One has only to turn on a local television channel to realize the importance of French in Morocco. The exclusive use of Arabic in public domains has turned out to be a lost cause, and the Moroccan media has made peace with bilingualism, borrowing, and code-switching (French and Darija mainly), which underlines the power that the French language continues to yield on the Moroccan linguistic scene despite these oppositions. Dell Hymes (1997) makes an illuminating comment on the broad and unquestionable use of power and dominance of language in his observation on Haeri’s article (1997) on “The Reproduction of Symbolic Capital” (1997): One may need to go beyond single terms, such as “power,” to a cluster of terms, such as “authority,” “competence,” “performance,” “identification,” “advantage,” and perhaps “pleasure” or “gratification,” tracing those which are relevant ethnographically. (p. 809)

According to Hymes, the term power needs to be used with caution since this power can be manifested in different forms and in different contexts. In the case of

2.3  The French–Arabic Dichotomy

19

Morocco, the power of French is more related to competence, performance, identification, advantage, and gratification. In other words, all of these terms that Hymes has identified as manifestations of powers are very pertinent to French and those who are proficient in it. Being proficient in French means being competent and able to perform in this language regardless of the context as well as being able identify with the language and its culture, which gives one an edge over others who do not possess such competence and is also a means of social and economic gratification. In other words, linguistic capital in this case in the form of a language of power, such as French, easily translates into cultural and economic capital. Because of its experience with colonialism, the labor market in Morocco has become segmented. Standard Arabic is a required tool in the public sector, the market controlled by the state, but Morocco’s private sector as a whole not only requires French but more importantly technical and scientific skills, which can only be acquired through French. Thus, in addition to its being Morocco’s most important tool for access to the international global market, French is also the medium of communication with the outside world. It is the language of so-called modernity, opportunity, and openness towards the West and is what makes Morocco and its culture uniquely distinct from other Arab countries in the Middle East, especially. French is incontestably viewed as the language of the upper echelons of Moroccan society. And like Darija, the French language spoken in Morocco is also marked by extensive code-switching and borrowing, a phenomenon that carries no stigma but is rather indicative of a certain level of education and social status. In fact, French is generally accepted to be the preferred means of communication among upper class members, a large majority of educated women, and business people. It is also the preferred method of written communication and has increasingly become a necessary tool for anyone looking to compete on the job market. Without competence in the French language, one is clearly condemned to eternal low-paying jobs, especially jobs in the public sector. Everyone in Morocco has come to realize this reality and has made peace with it, including state television, which has started allowing bilingualism and code switching on its programs, something that was unthinkable a decade ago. Parents with young children will generally speak French to their children and prefer to pay exorbitant amounts of money to send their children to French schools or schools that emphasize French in their system because of the common belief that these institutions provide a much better education and would eventually prepare their children and help guarantee a better future for them. Good quality seems to have become associated with almost anything that is French, and despite the continuous calls for the protection of Arabic (Arabization) by proponents of this policy, the state seems to have come to the realization that a return to a bilingual approach that adopts French for teaching scientific subjects is inevitable, thus tacitly acknowledging the failure of the policy of Arabization.

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2.4 Arabization and Nationalism Language policies are inherently nationalistic, and modern nationalism tends to equate unity and progress with monolingualism and homogeneity (Breton, 1978; May, 2006). This is because the association between language and nation or nationality is a very strong and emotional one: Language represents an essential part of one’s identity and character  – regional, social or national  – and any attempt at imposing one language or a variety of a language on the population of a nation, especially by an external force, is bound to result in conflict and strife. In keeping with “textbook” practices of invasions where one nation decides to invade a sovereign nation (The Norman Conquest of 1066, the Soviet Union in 1945, etc.), the French immediately imposed their language on the countries they conquered in Africa in the early twentieth century, including in Morocco, as a first step to take control of political, economic, and educational institutions in hopes of creating a new elite steeped in French values and ideals that would be kinder and friendlier to their colonial policies. The effects of such a policy of “divide and rule” continue to be felt all over Africa to this day and have indirectly continued to sow divisions within African nations, many of which remain deeply attached, if not subservient to, their previous colonizers. Therefore, promoting Arabic as the sole language of Morocco after independence from France in 1956 was a necessary nationalistic ideal that the leading nationalist (Istiqlal) party espoused and felt necessary in order to free the country from the shackles of colonial ideologies and build the foundations of a new nation-­ state. In an effort to do away with the remnants of colonialism, including the French language, and to unite the country linguistically and culturally, Morocco adopted the one language-one nation slogan as a springboard for its nation-building project, hence the imposition of Arabic as the sole national and official language in the country, which gained popularity especially among the nationalists at the time. Nationalists at the time viewed this policy as a vital tool for revamping the Moroccan national identity and building the political and cultural foundations of the newly independent nation. Such a view has now proven to be a myth and probably a major cause of the decline of the Moroccan system of education, especially in the last two decades (Speech by King Mohammed VI, August 20, 2013). Currently, the one language-one nation ideology has proven problematic, especially in a country like Morocco, a multilingual and multicultural country where several languages and language varieties are alive and well. In fact, the reality of the sociolinguistic situation in Morocco is rather too complex to be limited to one or even two languages. Currently, this sociolinguistic scene is characterized by at least three languages that are in direct competition: Arabic, with its different varieties (Fussha and Darija4), Berber with its three main varieties (Tarifit in the North, Tamazight in the Middle Atlas, and Tashelhit in the South, in addition to a newly  Darija consists of several regional varieties, the most distinguished of which is Hassaniya in the south. 4

2.5  Is It the End of Arabization?

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standardized form of Berber that is becoming more present in the schools and the media), and French. Spanish is still alive in the northern parts of Morocco, especially among the old generation who experienced Spanish colonialism, and English as a foreign language is on the rise because of Morocco’s emerging market economy and the widespread availability of Anglo-Saxon culture and technology, which are often made accessible through the English language. The one language-one nation ideology might have rallied Moroccans around the Arabic language as a unifying force against the French following independence; however, this ideology no longer has currency, and Moroccans are becoming more pragmatic in terms of the acquisition of languages that have an instrumental value and would allow them to compete on the job market.

2.5 Is It the End of Arabization? Moroccan language policy has historically been characterized by inconsistency and ambivalence (Miller, 2006), a phenomenon that seems to be the hallmark of the 1999 Charter’s articles that deal directly with questions of language planning in Morocco. On the one hand, the Charter insists on the importance of acquiring foreign languages, while at the same time it stresses the importance of promoting and strengthening Arabic at all levels of the educational system. Granted, this is nothing new; in fact, this has always been the official discourse of politicians and language planners in Morocco: Arabization first, and openness towards adopting foreign languages second, although the resources that should go towards the promotion Arabization first have usually been diverted to the study and promotion of foreign languages, namely French. This is one of the main reasons why the Arabization process failed in primary and secondary education and failed to be generalized in tertiary education. Still, despite the misleading rhetoric that characterizes the official government discourse, one thing remains certain: because of the prestige and status that French holds in Morocco, it is expected that it will continue to enjoy total supremacy at least in the near future in higher education’s fields of science and technology. In fact, one could argue that Arabization has had its day on the linguistic scene in Morocco, especially in light of the recent report of the CSEFRS (2021) (Superior Council of Education, Training and Scientific Research), which was ratified by the Ministry of Education and then approved by the King of Morocco. As a result, and going forward, the doors have been opened to foreign languages to take on the challenge of educational reform in Morocco, whether it is French, English, or both. As pointed out earlier, Moroccans themselves remain ambivalent about the role of French in the Moroccan cultural and educational scenes (Errihani, 2008). Although French is seen as an extension of political and cultural imperialism, it remains indispensable in Morocco because of the prestige, cultural, economic and social capital it holds. Moroccans generally understand the need to learn French despite the hostility they might display towards the political and cultural values it

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may represent (Talimat, 2015). More importantly, the linguistic scene in Morocco continues to be marked by diglossia and triglossia, factors that are directly linked to attitudes and beliefs about the importance of one language over the other, and so far French continues to come out as the winner.

2.6 Diglossia and Triglossia in Morocco There are two kinds of diglossia that characterize the linguistic situation in Morocco: a traditional stable diglossia (Ferguson, 1959) marked by two distinct varieties of the same language, each of which serves different roles. The High variety (H) is in this case Modern Standard Arabic (or Classical Arabic), or what Moroccans refer to as “Fussha,” which is the formal literary variety used in formal, and high-status contexts and as such is considered the more prestigious variety. The low variety (L), in this case Darija, the colloquial variety of Arabic spoken in Morocco, is used as an oral variety of Arabic for wider and everyday communication, in more intimate social contexts, among family members and friends, and as such is considered to have lower status. Darija is generally considered vulgar when used outside intimate and informal settings, just like Romance languages used to be at some point in comparison with Latin. It is considered improper to use Darija in formal settings, just as it is considered improper to use Fussha in more intimate and informal situations, which does correspond to the typical definition of a diglossic relationship that characterizes the H and the L varieties of the same language. Youssi (1995) adds another variety to the mix of Arabic varieties that exist in Morocco, which he calls Middle Moroccan Arabic (MMA), a sort of formal Darija that borrows heavily from Fussha and is used in semi-formal settings and the media. Youssi argues that this third variety creates a triglossic situation in Morocco where the MMA variety assumes a median, not a High or a Low function. While this might be true to some extent from a scholarly perspective, arguing for a triglossic situation by including a third variety that Moroccans themselves do not recognize seems to be a bit of a fanciful approach, at least as far as the average Moroccan’s perception of the existing varieties of Arabic in the country goes. Yet, another type of diglossia that characterizes the linguistic scene in Morocco, one generally referred to as “Broad Diglossia” (Fasold, 1984, p. 165), is one elaborated by Fishman (1967) (quoted in Spolsky, 2004). Fishman’s extension of diglossia involves “two unrelated languages similarly [sharing] linguistic functions” (Spolsky, 2004, p. 134), in this case Arabic (Fussha) and French. According to this definition, Arabic and French are two distinct languages, but share the same roles in the linguistic market. But their diglossic relationship means that one of the two varieties enjoys a higher status than the other; in this case French seems to have more prestige and stature in Moroccan society due to its association with the modern, the intellectual and economic capital in Morocco. On the other hand, the role of Fussha is seen as more traditional and is associated with the lower middle classes of Morocco, hence its L status within this diglossic relationship.

2.6  Diglossia and Triglossia in Morocco

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Another type of diglossia that characterizes the linguistic landscape in Morocco, but which is hardly discussed in the literature, concerns the relationship between Fussha and Berber. Unlike the diglossic relationship involving Fussha and French, Fussha and Berber are two unrelated languages, but they serve different functions, with Berber restricted to interactions in the home and more intimate settings, while Fussha serves as the language of education used especially in more formal and literary settings. Boukous (1995) rightly argues that one of the reasons Berber has survived all these centuries despite being marginalized is its diglossic relationship to Arabic. In other words, education has been available to the Berbers of Morocco mostly in Arabic (although there are some Berbers who have benefited from a French education), since Berber has been primarily an oral language whose usage has been restricted to more private and intimate domains. Thus, while Fussha has assumed the role of the H variety, Berber has served as the L variety by virtue of its informal functions. Can diglossia increase the likelihood of language conflict as argued by Beer (1985)? Not necessarily in the case of Morocco, which is not only a bilingual country but a multilingual one if one takes into account all the languages and language varieties used on the Moroccan linguistic scene. Furthermore, because of the widespread respect and admiration that Fussha enjoys among all Moroccans due to its religious status, Moroccans in general, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic background, would not argue against the high status that it enjoys, compared to Darija and Berber. In other words, the majority of Moroccans, both Arab and Berber, acknowledge the high status of Fussha compared to their mother tongues because of its connection to Islam, a bond that represents a much stronger and deeper unifying force between Morocco’s Arabs and Berbers. The Moroccan linguistic scene is, therefore, characterized by different types of diglossia and triglossia, and it appears that the Classical – Dialectal diglossia has become a triglossia with the addition of French, where Fussha serves a particular purpose for situations where neither of the other two alternatives is appropriate (Marley, 2004, p. 339) or possible. Thus, another type of triglossia that one can talk about involves Darija, Fussha, and French, with Darija being the low variety, Fussha as the Median variety, and French as the High variety. The diglossia / triglossia effect appears to have far-reaching implications for language planning and language learning in Morocco because it is intimately connected with language status and therefore serves neither the Arabization process, nor the use of mother tongues (Darija and Berber) in education. The H varieties, Fussha and French, are revered and seen as having more cultural and economic capital than the L varieties, Darija and Berber. Because of their low status, the mother tongues continue to be viewed as dialects with no instrumental value and therefore not worthy of being used as mediums of instruction, which greatly complicates the task of adopting mother tongues in the educational system that many activists have recently been calling for (Actes du colloque international sur l’education, 2013).

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2.7 Conclusions The failure of the Arabization policy can briefly be seen as the result of several factors among which one can cite the following: • The socio-economic and cultural capital associated with French at the expense of Arabic, • The instrumental value of French in the job market, • The contradictory and insincere behavior of policymakers and political leaders who seem intent on instituting Arabization for the masses while continuing to seek a French education for their children by sending them to French speaking countries or private French schools in Morocco, • While proponents of bilingualism might be driven by practical considerations, advocates of Arabization seem to be driven mainly by their religious obligation to vouch for Arabic even if deep down they may be aware of its non-instrumental value in the Moroccan job market, • The nature of Arabic itself (Redouane, 1998): the kind of Arabic to be taught and used as a medium of instruction might just as well be a foreign language to all Moroccans who either speak Darija (Moroccan Arabic) or one of the Berber varieties as their native tongues. Put differently, the exclusion of mother tongues from the educational system forces the system to use Fussha as a medium of instruction from the first day of a child’s schooling. Granted, the Fussha used will typically be peppered by Darija words and expressions, at times for the sake of getting the point across and at other times because the instructor is not proficient in Fussha and find themselves obliged to code-switch between the two varieties. Regardless, the point remains that children are forced to struggle in acquiring literacy in a language with which they are not familiar from the first day of school. The result is later translated in poor performance and at best a delayed literacy and what Saadani (2017) calls “l’accumulation des lacunes des élèves” (the accumulation of students’ gaps and deficits) that could easily be avoided through the introduction of the mother tongue in education (see Chap. 6 on the controversy surrounding this topic). Assid (1 February 2019) provides an enlightening solution to the Arabization conundrum by suggesting that “Arabic should be used as a medium for teaching history, geography, and civics, but the sciences should be taught through a foreign language capable of keeping up with the explosion of information in the world every second, especially in physics, mathematics, engineering, and medicine. Therefore, it would be impossible to teach Moroccan students using the Arabic medium because… Arabic is not a language of scientific research.” Assid appears to argue that the proponents of Arabic have made it the language of religion, conservatism, and tradition, and as a result it cannot assume a different role and be used in science. He further suggests that Arabic should first be developed as a language for modern times, which is not easy given that it has always been thought of as a sacred language to be protected from outside influences, which made it stagnant and unable to evolve with the times.

References

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Arabization might have succeeded if it had managed to completely rid the educational system of French and thus provide an equal playing field for students of all social backgrounds. That is not what happened. The neo-colonial and neo-liberal orientations of a portion of Moroccan society chose to remain subservient to the French and opted for a French education for their children, thus creating the first fissure in the Arabization project. This fissure expanded and created a deeper gap between those who were able to afford a French education and the rest. Those who opted for a French or French-medium education happened to be those in positions of power in the newly independent state, which guaranteed that French would continue to enjoy a position of power and prestige in Moroccan society, thus condemning those who are not able to afford a French or French-medium education to the lowest ranks of the socio-economic ladder. To explain this phenomenon, Boutieri (2016) aptly argues that the nationalists and royalists in Morocco continue to play an important role in maintaining and even promoting the policy of Arabization as a mission to protect the so-called “sacredness” of Arabic while at the same time reinforcing the linkage between the sacredness of the language and the monarchy – a process which links language to religion in an attempt to promote political legitimacy and the state’s moral authority (Errihani, 2020).

References Assid, A. (2000). Al-Amazighiyah fi khitab al-Islam al-siyasi (Berber in Islamic political discourse). Imprimerie Najah Aljadida. Assid, A. (2019, February 1). Open letter to the Minister of education. www.hespress.ma Assid, A. (2020). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFVjZMq4JEI Beer, W.  R. (1985). Toward a theory of linguistic mobilization. In W.  Beer & J.  Jacob (Eds.), Language policy and national unity (pp. 216–235). Rowman and Allanheld. Benhlal, M. (2005). Le college d’Azrou: la formation d’une elite berbère civile et militaire au Maroc (1927–1959). Karthala. Berdichevsky, N. (2004). Nations, language and citizenship. McFarland. Boukous, A. (1995). La langue berbère: maintien et changement. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 112(1), 9–28. Boukous, A. (2018). Essais de politique et d’aménagement linguistiques. IRCAM. Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Harvard University Press. Boutieri, C. (2016). Learning in Morocco, language politics and the abandoned educational dream. Indiana University Press. Bouziane, A., & Rguibi, S. (2018). The role of Arabization and French in the science students’ shift to university literary streams in Morocco. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332259412 Breton, A. (1978). Nationalism and language policies. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 11(4), 656–668. CSEFRS. (2021). Rapports. https://www.csefrs.ma/etudes-­et-­publications/rapports/?lang=fr&wpv-­ categorie-­de-­publication=0&wpv_view_count=3179&wpv-­categorie-­de-­publication=0& wpv_paged=4 Elbiad, M. (1991). The role of some population sectors in the progress of Arabization in Morocco. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 87, 27–44.

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Ennaji, M. (2010). Multiculturalism, gender and political participation in Morocco. Sage, 57(1), 46–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/2F0392192110374247 Errihani, M. (2008). Language attitudes and language use in Morocco: Effects of attitudes on “Berber Language Policy”. The Journal of North African Studies, 13(4), 411–428. https://doi. org/10.1080/13629380701800492 Errihani, M. (2020). Learning in Morocco: Language, politics, and the abandoned educational dream. In C.  Boutieri (Ed.), Mediterranean politics. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.108 0/13629395.2020.1725287 Fasold, R. (1984). The sociolinguistics of society. Blackwell. Ferguson, C. (1959). Diglossia. Word, 15, 325–340. Fernandez, et al. (2013). Panorama. In Evolution des pratiques et représentations langagières dans le Maroc du vingt-et-unième siècle (pp. 15–59). L’Harmattan. Hymes, D. (1997). Comments on Niloofar Haeri’s ‘The reproduction of symbolic capital: Language, state, and class in Egypt’. Current Anthropology, 38(5), 795–816. Marley, D. (2004). Language attitudes in Morocco following recent changes in language policy. Language Policy, 3, 25–46. May, S. (2006). Language policy and minority rights. In T. Ricento (Ed.), Introduction to language policy (pp. 255–272). Blackwell. Miller, S. (2006, November 18–21). MESA conference. National Charter of Education and Training. (1999). https://www.men.gov.ma/Fr/Pages/CNEF.aspx OECD. (2018). Results from PISA 2018. https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2018_ CN_MAR.pdf OXFAM International. (2011). Morocco: The future is equal. https://www.oxfam.org/en/ what-­we-­do/countries/morocco Pennell, C. R. (2000). Morocco since 1830: A history. New York University Press. Redouane, R. (1998). Arabization in the Moroccan educational system: Problems and prospects. Language, Culture, and Curriculum, 11(2), 195–203. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 07908319808666550 Saadani, Y. (2017). La crise de l’école marocaine n’est pas une fatalité. https://medias24.com/ youssef-saadani-lacrise-de-l-ecole-marocaine-n-est-pas-une-fatalite-3809.html Spolsky, B. (2004). Language policy. Cambridge University Press. Talimat, A. (2015). Sou ‫؟‬alu lughat attadris laysa maghlutan (The language of instruction question is not an erroneous one). http://www.hespress.com/writers/261932.html Versteegh, K. (2014). The Arabic language. Edinburgh University Press. Wagner, D. (1993). Literacy, culture, and development: Becoming literate in Morocco. Cambridge University Press. World by Map. (2018). Literacy rates. http://world.bymap.org/LiteracyRates.html Youssi, A. (1995). The Moroccan triglossia: Facts and implications. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 112, 29–43. Zakoura Foundation. (2013). Actes du colloque international sur l’education. Casablanca. Zakoura Foundation. (n.d.). http://fondationzakoura.org Zouhir, A. (2014). Language policy and state in Morocco: The status of Berber. Digest of Middle East Studies, 23(1), 37–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12039

Chapter 3

The Economics of Language in Education

Whereas the holders of educationally uncertified cultural capital can always be required to prove themselves, because they are only what they do, merely a by- product of their own cultural production, the holders of titles of cultural nobility – like the titular members of an aristocracy, whose ‘being’, defined by their fidelity to a lineage, an estate, a race, a past, a fatherland or a tradition, is irreducible to any ‘doing’; to any know-how or function – only have to be what they are, because all their practices derive their value from their authors, being the affirmation and perpetuation of the essence by virtue of which they are performed. Phillipe Bourdieu

3.1 The Economics of Education Education is an investment in human capital in the sense that its costs, yields, and future benefits can be measured and calculated through human productivity and economic growth for the polity and higher earnings for the individual. Thus, the human element becomes an essential component in which every educational system ought to invest if it is to expect a return on its investment. In so doing, education becomes a crucial source of increased productivity and progress at the intellectual as well as the socio-economic levels (Bouhari & Soussi, 2017; Ibourk, 2016; Robinson & Vaizey, 1966). In the end it is the human capital, the sum total of knowledge and skills accumulated as a result of education, which justifies investment and expenditures on education. But this can only be achieved when such expenditures can guarantee free access to education to every member of society, regardless of their socio-economic status or geographic location (Fig. 3.1). The unprecedented growth of the economies of several developing countries in recent decades, including Morocco, is evidence of the crucial impact that investment in education and human capital in particular can have on economic development. It is primarily the emergence of a middle class thanks to the availability of education that has contributed to the extraordinary economic progress that we are witnessing around the world today. In other words, education is what creates the © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Errihani, Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco, Language Policy 35, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51594-1_3

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Fig. 3.1  A private school in Fez, Morocco. (Picture taken by author in May 2021)

basis of economic development and progress, and as such investment in this sector is justified and sensible (Johnes & Johnes, 2004). This view of investment in human capital is based on the neoliberal idea of education as an investment which eventually yields returns to the individual and to the state in terms of pay, productivity and growth (Gillies, 2015; Holborow, 2018). Such interpretation, which views education mainly in economic terms, considers education, and language in particular, “a human capital and a marketable asset” that can potentially increase employability for the individual and economic development for the state. In this case, education becomes more of an investment rather than consumption (Gillies, 2015). Those opposed to this neoliberal view of education as an investment argue that such a reductionist view seems to take the humanity out of the individual and goes as far as to “shift responsibility for employment outcomes from the social to the individual” (Holborow, 2018, p. 520) who becomes a mere object in the labor market. Regardless, Gillies contends that the returns on education investment are both personal and social. The individual is rewarded financially, and the economy as a whole is boosted by individuals with advanced human capital. The education system and its quality [therefore] becomes an extremely important focus for state investment. (3)

Human capital is formed, nurtured, and fostered through the educational system at a very early age, typically during pre-school and elementary education. But in many developing countries, including Morocco, investing in education is more than just a social or economic issue; it is rather a political issue; it is about creating access to precious knowledge that is limited to the few who can afford it and benefit from it. Alaoui and Springborg (2021) boldly contend that “if there is a solution to the chronic underperformance of Arab educational systems, that solution must engage

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underlying political and economic problems first – not simply technical and pedagogical issues regarding the practice of instruction,” (p. 239) although one can argue that the instructional piece can be just as crucial. Such a condemnation of the political systems in the Arab World for the ills of their educational systems is rather refreshing as most researchers (especially at the local level) in the field tend to stay away from putting the blame squarely on any country’s political system to make sure they are not immediately silenced. In Morocco, investment in human capital for the purpose of economic development is explained and supported in terms of numbers, namely through the expansion of infrastructure and the increase in the number of schools and students. In other words, the outcome of investment is justified by the number of students and the buildings built to house them although little is invested in educational content, pedagogical approaches, or teacher recruitment. For instance, despite the rhetoric that accompanies every educational reform for the need to be open to acquiring foreign languages in Morocco, little concrete investment is made in foreign language teaching and learning with the goal to benefit those who need it most: public school students who have undergone the damaging effects of Arabization.1 Thus, investing in human capital means more than just providing classroom space for all; it also means guaranteeing equity, social justice, and an even access to resources for all.

3.2 The Economics of Language The “Economics of Language” is the study of the determinants and consequences of language proficiency using the methodology and tools of economics (Chiswick, 2008, p.  3). It is therefore closely connected to the economics of education and human capital in the sense that acquired language skills can also yield economic advantages and benefits. Language skills are therefore a form of human capital which is the result of investment done in anticipation of productivity and future benefits for the individual and society as a whole (Grin, 1994; Chiswick, 2008; Ginsburgh & Weber, 2011). Chiswick argues that language is a human capital not just because it entails investment and benefits but more importantly because it is “productive, costly, and embodied in the person” (p. 4). Being proficient in the language of the labor market makes one productive in terms employment and consumption although such proficiency comes at a cost, but this cost has subsequent economic benefits in that it turns into a human capital that is “embodied in the person.” The economics of language education is connected to the concept of human capital investment in the sense that the costs and benefits of investing in language

 See Chap. 2 for a detailed discussion of the effects of Arabization on public education in Morocco.

1

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learning can be analyzed to justify allocation of resources to the language that yields the most returns on investment for the individual and most importantly for the state (Ginsburg & Weber, 2018). But investing in language can also include “protection and promotion of minority languages, the teaching of national languages and/or languages of wider communication in education systems, the choice of language regimes for international or supra-national organizations, and the integration of immigrants” (Grin & Vaillancourt, 2015, p.  119). Accordingly, the economics of language goes beyond human capital investment and becomes an important component of language-in-education policy that investigates language issues from a wide range of angles, not just the economic. Grin (2016) suggests that “any policy choice, including in language education, will tend to make some groups better off and others worse off” (p. 8). How does this statement apply to the Moroccan context? In the case of Morocco, promoting and allocating resources to a specific language, in this case “Arabic,” is explicitly stated in all official documents and discourses. However, when it comes to investment in foreign languages, to say that the state’s official discourse is ambiguous and subtle is an understatement, for the foreign language assumed to be worthy of investment for its high economic returns is never explicitly mentioned in any official capacity, although everyone knows which one it is. The only repetitive quote that one comes across in all official documents and discourses is stated in the 1999 Charter, which continues to be the main source of educational directives and reforms: Le système d’éducation assure à tous la maîtrise orale et écrite de la langue arabe, langue officielle du pays et, complémentairement, s’ouvre à l’utilisation des langues étrangères les plus largement utilisées dans le monde. (Charter, p. 6) The educational system guarantees oral and written proficiency in the Arabic language, the country’s official language, to all, and is additionally open to the use of the most widely used foreign languages in the world. (Charter, p. 6)

The “Arabic” to which the Charter refers is assumed to be Fussha and could only be Fussha since Darija has no official status in the country. Furthermore, one can also assume that being “open to the most widely used foreign languages in the world” remains a deliberately and even calculatedly ambiguous statement meant to avoid the polemic among supporters and opponents of the de facto foreign language of choice in Morocco. In fact, these “foreign languages” could be English, Spanish, or even Chinese, although everyone is fully aware that the favored foreign language in Morocco is French, a language that is expected to continue to exercise its ascendency on the linguistic scene in Morocco thanks to the powerful French-speaking and French-leaning elite who are intent on maintaining their economic and cultural capital through elite closure (Myers-Scotton, 1993). The impact of language on economic outcomes is a salient phenomenon in the Moroccan context, and the language in question that is directly linked to economic advantages and benefits is French. Being proficient in French, as discussed later on in this chapter, goes beyond linguistic competency alone and involves socio-cultural determinants such as class and economic capital, or what Bourdieu (1984, 1991) terms linguistic habitus. This habitus entails not just proficiency in the language but

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also the ability to maneuver and operate in different socio-cultural contexts where French is the desirable mode of communication. Hence, the definition of linguistic proficiency in this context goes beyond simple effective communication using a certain linguistic medium and includes a linguistic capital that confers more socio-­ economic and cultural value on the speaker within the linguistic market and extends to the job market as well. Proficiency in the dominant language entails not only socio-economic capital but also productivity in the labor market, in the sense that a person who is proficient in the target language is also productive in an economic sense (Chiswick, 2008). Thus, the effects of language on national development are crucial for any polity, especially one characterized by multiple languages in direct competition, such as in Morocco. Such linguistic diversity might be a blessing in a multi-linguistic and multi-cultural setting as it entails the celebration of inclusivity and cultural diversity; however, in economic terms it could be a potential challenge to economic development due to lack of economic efficiency and the negative impact such a situation might have on policies that will typically favor one language and one group at the expense of another. In other words, multilingual polities with more than one recognized official language always find it challenging to strike a balance between minority and majority languages. The result is that de jure and de facto linguistic policies become the order of the day in such situations where the impact of language on social, political and economic outcomes necessitate that the state choose a language that is economically salient, even when that particular language is not an official language and many never be acknowledged in any official capacity or in any official document. That is the case of French in Morocco. Economic efficiency is the poison of linguistic diversity, according to Ginsburgh and Webber (2011) who pose the following question, “how many languages do we need?” and go on to argue that inefficiencies can result from the usage of too many languages, a view that is not always celebrated by proponents of linguistic diversity. The clash between efficiency and emotional attachment is also unavoidable in multilingual polities where various ethnic and linguistic groups live side by side. Bretton (1976) confirms this view: Language may be the most explosive issue universally and over time. This is mainly because language alone, unlike all other concerns associated with nationalism and ethnocentrism, is so closely tied to the individual self. This clearly indicates the emotional aspects of linguistic environments and the reluctance of peoples to be deprived from their native language, even if their leaders understand that today’s globalized world may struggle to ‘support’ too many languages. A delicate balance in the space of monetary and psychological costs and benefits has to be found between efficiency and emotion. (Quoted in Ginsburgh & Weber, 2011, pp. 2–3)

This balance between “efficiency and emotion” is easier said than done, though, especially when the emotional attachment is to a language that has little utility in the job market. Thus, the concept of “costs and benefits” seems to favor a language of power and economic opportunities, which is French in Morocco, even if it is a

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language that continues to alienate and disenfranchise a large portion of the population. One is therefore bound to ask, “What happens to social justice when access to the language of power and economic opportunities is not available to the populace but only to the few who already possess the socio-economic capital to afford such access?” A good education, which is often made possible by the medium of instruction perceived to yield the most returns, has become cost-prohibitive for many in Morocco. As such, language bears the brunt of the blame for the educational crisis that the country is experiencing.

3.3 The Role of Language in the Educational Crisis According to a 2021 report by the “Instance nationale d’évaluation d’éducation, de formation et de recherche scientifique” at the Conseil Supérieur de L’éducation, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique, titled “Le métier de l’enseignant au Maroc,” L’école publique marocaine traverse une « crise de l’apprentissage ». Les évaluations qui recourent à des tests standardisés, qu’elles soient nationales (PNEA) ou internationales, telle que TIMSS, PIRLS et PISA, confirment le faible niveau des acquis et des compétences d’une part non négligeable des élèves dans les écoles, essentiellement au niveau de l’enseignement fondamental. The Moroccan public school is experiencing a “learning crisis.” The evaluations which rely on standardized tests, whether national (PNEA) or international, such as TIMSS, PIRLS, and PISA, confirm the weak level of a sizeable number of students’ acquisitions and competencies, in particular at the level of elementary education.

The fact that the Moroccan educational system is going through a crisis is no secret; it is generally an accepted fact by everyone in Morocco, from the average person to educators and government officials. And as stated above, language is at the heart of this crisis. Lack of access to the language of power due to language policies that have favored the powerful seems to have resulted in the majority of Moroccan children falling behind in comparison with their peers from other multilingual polities. Over 50% of Moroccan children at the age of 9 are unable to read at grade level, and language is the principal culprit (PIRLS, 2016). In addition to the language factor, there are other elements that in one way or another also add to the crisis of the educational system of Morocco: essential among these factors one can cite the privatization of education and the disintegration of the public school, the widespread reliance on shadow education in the form of supplementary private tutoring, the inadequate teacher selection process, outdated pedagogy, the lack of stakeholders’ involvement, the lack of investment, the gap between education and employment, and the language of instruction conundrum, which remains the prime culprit in the educational crisis that the Moroccan school continues to experience.

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3.3.1 Privatization of Education and the Disintegration of the Public School Liberalizing the job market and encouraging the privatization of the educational sector has resulted in a bourgeoning of non-regulated private schools across the country, which in turn has resulted in the ghettoization of education as a whole in the sense that those who continue to attend public schools are perceived in a negative light. This process has also resulted in the public-school educators abandoning their primary assignments and seeking the private schools to supplement and in many cases to double and triple their salaries despite the government’s attempt to crack down on this practice (Fig. 3.2). Whether it is an elementary school, a secondary school, or a university, the private school is without a doubt a primary reason and a key trigger of the crisis in the educational system in Morocco. The contribution of the private school to education in Morocco was initially meant to alleviate the pressure on the public school and provide an avenue for those students who were not successful in public school to

Fig. 3.2  An apartment building turned private school in Fez, Morocco. (Picture taken by author in June 2022) The image above is that of an apartment building turned into a private school, a concrete example of the mushrooming effect of private schools thanks to their quick return on investment. In other words, apartment buildings are being turned into private schools because the process is seamless, and the profits are immediate due to increased demand. This phenomenon is indicative not only of increased demand for private school education but also of lack of government regulation and oversight

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join a private school instead of dropping out of school altogether. That role of the private school has changed dramatically in the last two decades, a phenomenon that was spurred mostly by the policy of Arabization. Arabizing education in Morocco has resulted in a public-school flight due to lower standards and higher rates of dropouts. Therefore, private schools experienced an increase in demand as they were less regulated than public schools, and the immediate outcome was a surge in new private schools from pre-school to universities in Morocco in the 1990s, a phenomenon that continues to gain momentum to this day. And with the push towards liberalizing the economy in Morocco during the last decade of the twentieth century, the private school became an attractive investment opportunity for anyone with money to invest, regardless of their educational background or expertise in the educational sector. In other words, an investor can simply hire a school principal as long as the latter has a background in education, and the rest of the enterprise is seamless. The ultimate irony of the educational crisis spurred by the private school in Morocco is that private school owners can be individuals who did not even graduate from high school as long as they have the funds to build the school and hire administrative and teaching staff to run the day-to-day operations of the school. With the booming of the private school business, there continues to be a dire need for instructors, and public institutions were not able to hold on to their own instructors, who were able to turn a part time private teaching engagement into full time employment. There are too many examples to cite that prove that the majority of public university professors, for example, teach more than the equivalent of a full-time load in private institutions while holding on to their full-time status in public universities, which they might visit to teach one or two classes. During my own investigation of the public/private school debacle in 2019, I discovered cases of full-time professors in public universities in Morocco being allowed to be on campus one semester per year where they would be in charge of their teaching load and that of another professor’s in exchange for being off campus for the rest of the year to teach or work in another country where they have established residence. In other scenarios, some professors would teach all their assigned courses (typically a two-­ course load) in one day per week at the public university so that they can spend the rest of the week teaching elsewhere in private schools. In other cases, some high school and university instructors took advantage of early retirement packages and abandoned their public-school assignments to either set up their own private schools or to join private schools that cater mostly to those who can afford to pay. Ironically, the very same private school use these qualified instructors as selling points to attract more students away from the public school, and the parent seem to oblige. What this shows is a complete disregard for the welfare of the students and their success by the instructors, many of whom have committed their time and energy to the private school and turned their back on the public school which pays their salaries. These instructors, who teach one day a week or one semester a year at their public schools, have fully embraced the private schools as a means to complement their government school salaries. The school administration as well as the state

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therefore are just as guilty for allowing or turning a blind eye to such practices in the first place, which hurt the public-school student and public education as a whole. Therefore, when the Minister of Higher Education in Morocco states that 49.4% of public university students do not complete their university studies (January 4, 2022), understanding the causes behind such high drop-out rates should come as no surprise: the unrestrained growth of the private school and its role in the disintegration of the public school should not go unnoticed.

3.3.2 Shadow Education and the Effects of Private Tutoring Shadow education in the form of private supplementary tutoring is a growing phenomenon in Morocco, as it is in many other parts of the world. However, reliable data on the percentage of students who receive this type of tutoring and the effect of this phenomenon on student performance is difficult to come across as it is an unregulated sector that does not undergo any form of government oversight. Regardless, it is almost impossible to find any parents who are unwilling to pay for private tutoring, especially when the tutor is the same school teacher that the student has. Many public-school teachers rent a private space and other use their own homes to provide private tutoring to their own students. This practice becomes unethical when it pressures students and their families to make unnecessary sacrifices to pay the same school teacher for supplementary tutoring, whether the student needs tutoring or not. Another form of private tutoring is more organized in that it takes place as an after-school activity in a private school setting by teachers who are not the students’ own school teachers. This type of supplementary tutoring tends to be more expensive and is typically geared towards students who are/whose parents are interested in admission to a selective (usually private) STEM institution. Again, not much is known about the effect of this type of tutoring on the students’ achievement and academic performance. But one thing is certain: Besides being “une form de privatization de l’education publique au maroc” (a form of privatizing public education in Morocco) according to Tazi, tutoring in any form creates and perpetuates social inequalities among students. The practice of supplementary tutoring, therefore, has clear implications for the educational system as it is another contributor to the educational crisis in Morocco that continues to be ignored by the state and educational policymakers. Private tutoring – whatever form it takes – may have some positive effects in that it provides underpaid and young teachers and even university students and recent graduates with additional income, but this practice can also be seen in a negative light in that it affects quality and in many cases equity. Parents who are able to pay for such services do so willingly to pave the way for a better education and access to better schools which can eventually lead to good employment and economic mobility. However, a large number of parents find themselves unable to afford private tutoring and will have to choose between either providing for their families or

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continuing to send their children to the public school and hoping for the best. In the meantime, achievement gaps between those who can afford private tutoring and those who cannot grow wider, and social inequalities are exacerbated further (Bray, 1999), hence contributing the crisis of the educational system and delaying any possibility of effective and efficient school reforms.

3.3.3 Inadequate Teacher Selection Another contributing factor to the educational crisis in Morocco is the flawed process by which teachers are selected to teach in the public school despite the government’s claims to the contrary. In fact, the discrepancy between the unrealistic and idealistic statements published in official documents and the actual educational practices on the ground point to a clear disconnect between rhetoric and practice. For example, with regards to teacher selection and recruitment, article 133 of the Charter opens by stating that: L’engagement des enseignants vis-à-vis de la présente charte nécessite de leur part la considération de l’enseignement comme un choix assumé, une vocation affirmée et non comme un métier ordinaire. Il nécessite aussi une motivation puissante, des conditions d’exercice appropriées et un statut équitable, adéquat à leur profession. (Teachers’ engagement vis-à-vis the present charter requires them to consider the profession of teaching as an assumed choice, an affirmed vocation, and not an ordinary job. It also requires strong motivation, appropriate work conditions, and an equitable status which is adequate to their profession).

Yet, a 2021 study by the Instance Nationale d’Évaluation auprès du Conseil Supérieur de l’Éducation, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique, has found that the opposite is exactly what is happening when it comes to recruiting teachers. Through various interviews and focus groups with current teachers, school administrators, inspectors (teachers’ supervisors), the report makes it clear that teacher recruitment in Morocco is characterized by the absence of a pre-selection process, which opens the door to anyone with a university degree to apply for a job in the teaching profession, regardless of their qualifications and competencies. According PISA, Les systèmes éducatifs les plus performants, selon le classement international PISA, ont mis en place des processus de sélection très stricts. Les futurs enseignants sont généralement recrutés parmi les 30% meilleurs élèves du lycée. En Finlande et en Corée du Sud, qui se distinguent dans les classements de PISA, les candidats admis font respectivement partie des 10% et 5% d’élèves ayant obtenu les meilleurs résultats à l’issue de leur scolarité secondaire. (“Instance nationale d’évaluation et d’éducation, de formation et de recherche scientifique” at the Conseil Supérieur de L’education, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique, titled “Le metiér de l’enseignant au maroc”) (According to PISA’s international classification, the most performing educational systems have put in place rigorous selection processes. Future teachers are generally recruited among 30% of the best high school students. In Finland and South Korea, two countries that place high on the PISA classification, selected candidates are respectively 10% and 5% of students who have received the best grades during their high school education).

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The approach adopted in Morocco for recruiting teachers is far from what PISA outlines. Below are some direct quotes from some of the stakeholders, which stand in stark contrast to the assertions expressed in the Charter and are thus very telling of the process of teacher selection in Morocco. Je me suis dirigé vers ce métier par nécessité. Après l’obtention de ma licence en économie, j’ai chômé pendant une année. L’enseignement était la première opportunité qui s’est présentée à moi ; je l’ai saisie (entretien avec un enseignant au primaire). (I chose this job out of necessity. After graduating with a Bachelor’s degree in economics, I was unemployed for a year. Teaching was the first opportunity to present itself, and I took it). (interview with a primary school teacher) J’ai intégré le Centre de formation des instituteurs en 2001. Mes conditions sociales étaient difficiles; mon père est décédé. Il fallait trouver du travail et un revenu stable le plus rapidement possible. (entretien avec un enseignant au secondaire qualifiant). (I joined the Teachers’ Training Center in 2001. My socio-economic conditions were difficult; my father had passed away, and it was necessary for me to find work and a stable revenue as soon as possible). (interview with a high school teacher) Ce métier est aussi le plus convenable pour une femme au Maroc. Je travaille une demijournée et j’ai le temps pour m’occuper de mes enfants et de ma famille. En plus des vacances scolaires... (entretien avec une enseignante du secondaire) (This job is the most convenient for a woman in Morocco. I work half a day, and I have the time to look after my children and my family…In addition to the school vacations). (interview with a female high school teacher) La valeur ajoutée des études universitaires sur le profil des enseignants  – stagiaires admis au Centre est très faible. Les candidats admis arrivent avec des déficits importants, y compris dans leurs disciplines de formation. (entretien avec un directeur de CRMEF) (The added value of university studies on a teacher-in-training’s profile is very poor. Candidates admitted to the Center arrive with important deficits, including in their own disciplines). (interview with a director of CRMEF – Center for teacher training) La répartition des classes, en début d’année, est un moment de forte tension entre le directeur et les enseignants. Pratiquement personne ne veut prendre en charge l’enseignement en français. Et globalement le niveau des enseignants de cette matière est faible et se détériore d’année en année. (Focus-group avec des directeurs d’établissement). (Class scheduling at the beginning of the year is a moment filled with tensions between the school principal and the teachers. Practically no one wants to be in charge of teaching in French. And generally, the teachers’ level in this subject is poor and worsens year after year). (Focus-group of school principals) La suppression de la présélection est une grosse erreur. Avant, on exigeait des moyennes de 14 et 15 au bac pour se présenter aux concours, cela permettait la sélection dans un vivier de qualité. Aujourd’hui, on recrute parmi les moyens et très faibles. (focus-group avec des inspecteurs pédagogiques). (Putting an end to pre-selection is a grave error. Before, grades of 14 and 15 out of 20 were required before one can sit for the exam, which allowed for a selection from a pool of quality candidates. Today, we recruit average and below average candidates). (Focus group with pedagogy supervisors) La réalité est que le recrutement est régi par une logique quantitative. On a besoin d’un certain nombre d’enseignants alors il faut les recruter. Très souvent, on retient des candidats avec un niveau très faible pour se conformer au quota fixé. (focus-groups avec des inspecteurs pédagogiques) (The truth is that teacher recruitment is governed by a quantitative logic. We need a certain number of teachers; therefore, we must recruit them. Very often, we hire candidates with a very poor level in order to conform to the fixed quota). (Focus group with pedagogy supervisors)

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3  The Economics of Language in Education Source: Instance Nationale d’Évaluation auprès du Conseil Supérieur de l’Éducation, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique. “Le metiér de l’enseignant au maroc: A l’aune de la comparaison internationale.

Thus, those who join the teaching profession generally do so because of lack of a better alternative. As stated above, the most performing systems of education are the ones that have strict selection processes for their teachers. Only top-performing students are selected to become school teachers. But contrary to educational systems that have proven to be successful in recruiting outstanding future teachers among top performing university students (Finland, Korea, Japan, Singapore), the Moroccan educational system attracts the weakest and least competent graduates because it is the by-default type of profession for any graduate who is unable to secure employment upon graduating. In other words, unqualified and mediocre graduates tend to become teachers by default (Saadani, 2017). Saadani (2017) further claims that the educational system is also plagued by the spirit of laxity and irresponsibility among teachers who often put the blame squarely on the students for not being adequately prepared in earlier grades, which has resulted in what he terms an “educational gap accumulation.” Still, Saadani maintains that despite the deplorable state of education in Morocco, there can be hope if the state is serious about attracting top performing students towards the teaching profession and providing them with adequate training. He adds that the other solution to rescue the educational system from total collapse can happen through a massive return to the public school instead of opting for the private school. In fact, a private school exodus did take place during the COVID-19 pandemic when every private school decided to continue charging the same the tuition fees even though no in-person classes were taking place for over a year. Such an event might provide a glimpse of the shaky grounds on which these private institutions are standing, and it is very likely that other unexpected events might change the fate of the private school and result in a return en-masse to the public school.

3.3.4 Teaching Pedagogy and the Marketization of Education Teaching methodologies in Moroccan schools in general play another major role in the deterioration of the education sector in Morocco for their heavy reliance on rote learning, canonical texts, and lack of critical thinking. This factor seems to be the result of lack of effective teacher training and preparation programs, a dearth of continuous professional development opportunities, in addition to the hold that Islamists continue to have on elementary and secondary education in particular (Assid, 2019). Students continue to be encouraged to learn materials by heart and are required to reproduce the same material in tests and quizzes. Such approaches to learning tend to discourage critical and analytical thinking since critiquing and questioning canonical texts could be perceived as critiquing authority, whether it’s a textbook, a teacher, or a system as a whole. The result is that the same teaching approaches are

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reproduced in classrooms across the educational system, from preschool to higher education, as many of the students who were socialized in such a system end up reproducing it in their own classrooms when they become teachers. Thus, education becomes a means of indoctrination and a way to promote values of obedience and respect for authority rather than stimulate, knowledge, civic engagement, democratic values, and critical thinking skills that lead to questioning authority, regardless of what form it takes (Alaoui & Springborg, 2021). The culture of rote learning in Morocco is deeply engrained in the Moroccan psyche through language: the key word, “hfed” (which literally means “to memorize) is what a Moroccan student does when studying, whether it is doing homework or studying for a quiz or test. At a very early age, students internalize that to study is to “hfed” (memorize), a practice to which generations of Moroccans have been introduced in Qur’anic schools where every pupil is required to memorize verses from the Koran, and where their success is typically judged by the number of verses they are able to learn by heart. Such a practice is typically carried over into elementary schools where the subjects of Islamic education and Arabic language and literature rely on memorizing the Qur’an and Arabic poetry. Such a tradition becomes normalized and expected at every level of the educational system, a practice that by all measures stands in stark contrast to current effective educational practices (Benesch, 1993, 1999; Canagarajah, 2004; Freire, 1970) This practice is also present in higher education where learning consists mainly of teacher-fronted classrooms where lecturing continues to be the preferred mode of delivering content. This approach is reminiscent of Paolo Freire’s Banking concept of education (1970), a teaching approach that conceives of the student as a passive recipient of the teacher’s knowledge with no opportunities for questioning or critiquing that knowledge. According to this approach, instead of being a process of inquiry, knowledge becomes a commodity and a gift to be bestowed on the learners by those who view themselves as proprietors of this knowledge, hence negating any knowledge those learners might bring to the learning process. In other words, the teachers’ existence becomes justified by the ignorance they project onto the learners, and because of the passive role assigned to them, these learners are deprived of the chance to develop any critical thinking abilities (p. 72). Teaching and learning consist of acts of cognition that take place through dialogue (Benesch, 1999). Both learners and teachers become critical co-investigators in dialogue with each other, a process Freire refers to as problem-posing education. In this process, “no one teaches another, nor is anyone self-taught. Men teach each other, mediated by the world, by the cognizable objects which in banking education are ‘owned’ by the teacher” (80). Knowledge is therefore not simply spoon-fed, but it is reinvented and co-constructed through dialogic processes in which teacher and student are engaged. This system of indoctrination is based on ideas that might be decades old, but they continue to have currency in the Moroccan system of education. Therefore, it was no surprise when a large number of students at a public university interviewed for this project responded to the question: “what is your goal from a university education?” The answer was an overwhelming: “to gain knowledge.” This shows that a

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university education is still perceived as a worthwhile endeavor for many students in public schools, whose goal from attending university is personal and intellectual growth apart from any reference to employment as an ultimate goal. This is quite significant, for it might indicate that public university students might not consider their education tied to a market value and therefore might not intentionally consider the importance of preparing themselves for life after higher education. The same question posed to students from two private universities yielded opposite answers. Contrary to students in the public university, tuition-paying students in private institutions conceive of their education as having more of a market value than just intellectual significance. As such, their answers indicated that their main goal from a university education was to “land a good-paying job.” One could therefore conclude that the idea of knowledge transfer from the “proprietor” of this knowledge – the teacher – to the “passive consumer” – the student – seems to be normalized and deeply ingrained in the Moroccan public education sector, one that produces students with acquired knowledge who are nonetheless incapable of breaking into the job market. This situation contributes not only to the educational crisis Morocco is undergoing but to the employment of a large portion of graduates in Morocco. Therefore, the notion of the value of a university education being mainly an intellectual pursuit, which continues to be held by many students in public universities, is proving to be also a costly pursuit for both graduates and the educational system. This so-called marketization of higher education might be scorned by some, yet such critics are often removed from the reality of the university graduate predicament in Morocco and therefore cannot appreciate or grasp the significance of having a university degree and yet not being able to break into the workforce. Therefore, a balance ought to be struck between pursuing knowledge in higher education and also acquiring the skills required by the job market. Multiple World Bank reports on public education in the MENA reconfirm that Morocco’s education system does not promote development and economic growth because it fails to provide students with the necessary skills to be able to become productive members of their society (https://pubdocs.worldbank.org; https:// datatopics.worldbank.com). The gap between education and job demands continues to be a major challenge, and the “mismatches between field of study and occupational demand, and inadequate “soft skills” (Lopez-Acevedo et  al., 2021) have pushed the government to promote practical skills through technical and vocational education institutions as a quick method to prepare students to enter the job market. Despite the increasing number of students who attend technical and vocational schools, drop-out rates and unemployment among the young population of Morocco continue to be a challenge. Even institutions of higher education, both public and private, are struggling to equip students with the soft skills necessary to integrate the job market. The hard skills they acquire are often insufficient and untransferable to actual jobs, which creates gaps between labor market demand and the skills supplied by the education sector. Nowhere is this more evident than in the public university where many students continue to believe that the ultimate goal of an education is to gain knowledge,

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not realizing that specific skills needed by employers are just as essential for a meaningful and consequential education.

3.3.5 Lack of Investment in the Education Sector The Moroccan government’s expenditure on education represents 6.8% of its GDP (World Bank, 2020). But it is important to understand the manner in which this spending is done. Morocco’s answer to its educational crisis continues to be expanding infrastructure by building more schools, hiring and training more teachers, and investing in pre-schooling. In a speech to the Moroccan parliament in October 2022, Morocco’s finance and economy minister announced an increase of 10% to Morocco’s expenditure on education for the year 2023, most of it going towards school buildings and new recruits. Thus, the government has been investing heavily in physical buildings to house students and provide employment for new teachers instead of investing in human capital. By prioritizing quantity over quality, there are immediate and concrete results (the brick-and-mortar schools) although the quality of teaching and learning continue to suffer. Lack on investment is noticeable especially in areas such as teacher professional development and training as well as student counseling, which is almost non-­ existent even in the most prestigious schools. Interviews with teachers in many schools across the country have revealed that professional development is a personal endeavor that is not supported by the schools or the government. Even higher education instructors are hardly ever granted funding for professional development or provided with continuing education opportunities, except at one semi-private higher education institution that will provide certain incentives such as sabbaticals and funding for presenters at international conferences. Furthermore, learning disorders, such as dyslexia, are generally not acknowledged or addressed even when diagnosed due to lack of resources to assign therapists, speech therapists and counselors to public and even private schools. Such lack of resources leaves the instructor alone to struggle with not only teaching but also addressing other emotional and social issues for which they have no training. Thus, the expansion of education in Morocco has been accompanied by lack of financial, and most importantly human resources, which has led the government to rely on private associations that lack rigor in terms of quality, qualifications, and training of the instructors they recruit (Saadani, 2017). The outcome is not hard to imagine: weak and incompetent instructors will only yield poor outcomes, which will accumulate year after year. This phenomenon of accumulation of poor performance at every level of the educational system (l’accumulation des lacunes des élèves) seems to be a direct outcome of the policy of l’école de la réussite (school of success), a policy meant to promote instead of holding back even the weakest of students from progressing to the next level. On paper,

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3  The Economics of Language in Education Between 2000 and 2016, the gross enrolment rate in primary education jumped from 85 to 98 percent, in lower secondary education from 60 to 88, and in upper secondary education from 37 to 66 percent… Although the education sector has expanded over the past two decades, this has not resulted in improvements in learning, illustrated by weak results in national and international student learning assessments (TIMSS, 2015; PISA, 2019; World Bank, 2020)

However, in reality, Moroccan students’ learning outcomes continue to lag behind others’ in the MENA region although Morocco spends over a significant amount of its budget on education. In other words, the policy of l’école de la réussite means that in order for the government to substantiate the success of its education policies, standards have to be lowered to allow success en-masse (Saadani, 2017), a phenomenon that hurts more than helps the educational system in the short and long terms.

3.3.6 The Language of Instruction Conundrum This is a topic that has given rise to a great deal of controversy in Moroccan society during the past two decades and is discussed in more detail in Chap. 5. Moroccan pupils are welcomed to their first school experience in a language that might just as well be called a foreign language: Modern Standard Arabic, a language that no one in the Arab world speaks as a first language. It is true that MSA used in elementary schools can be an amalgam of Darija and MSA, but it is nonetheless not the mother tongue of either students of Arab or Berber descent. But since both Darija and Berber are not written languages, the Arabic variety that students are exposed to in elementary school is the only medium of literacy and written communication, and the lingua franca used across the Arab world (Fernandez et al., 2013). The fact that Moroccan Arabic and Berber varieties are not acknowledged as mother tongues worthy of being used as mediums of instruction sets up Moroccan students on a challenging path to acquiring literacy skills equal to those acquired by peers from other language backgrounds. One can just imagine if a Spanish-speaking pupil were to start his or her first day of school being taught in Portuguese. The two languages are certainly related because of their history, but they are not mutually intelligible, which is the case for Moroccan Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic. Berber, on the other hand, is a completely different language, although some Berber children might be bilingual in one Berber variety and Moroccan Arabic. According to UNESCO, mother tongue education is especially key to increasing the speed of learning and avoiding knowledge gaps, a crucial issue that continues to challenge all educational reforms proposed by successive governments. Put differently, this language issue represents the root cause of all educational woes in Morocco. Yet, no government reform has been able to address it because of its complicated socio-political and economic implications.

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3.4 Language: The Prime Culprit… 49.4% of university students in Morocco do not graduate with a degree. This is the news that the Minister of Higher Education shared with the Moroccan parliament on Tuesday, January 4, 2022. He also added that 35% of high school graduates with a scientific or technical high school diploma do not pursue these specializations at the university because of their lack of competence in French. It is worth noting here that scientific and technical subjects have all been Arabized in secondary education, but Arabization has never been reached the university level, and as a result these subjects have continued to be taught exclusively in French. What this means is that students who have studied scientific subjects in Arabic throughout their secondary education all of a sudden find themselves obliged to pursue these same subjects in French, a requirement that very few of them are able to accomplish. This forces them to change majors and embark on a new major where French is not the medium of instruction instead of dropping out of university altogether, which immediately puts them at a disadvantage academically, compared to their peers who have opted for such majors out of conviction and not because it is a last resort. The outcome is not too difficult to imagine: failing classes and eventually dropping out of university altogether in most cases. This is the main reason for the high drop-out rate at the university level, a situation that ultimately condemns these students to low-paying jobs as they are not able to integrate a market economy that places a high value on technical and scientific expertise through the French medium. In fact, according to the minister of higher education, even those students who manage to graduate from open access universities (public universities, in other words) find themselves unequipped with the needed soft skills and linguistic skills (French) to be able to compete in the job market. Another reason for the high drop-out rate is the highly selective and elitist system of higher education where most prestigious institutions are only accessible after “les classes préparatoires” (College Preparatory Schools) and the remaining schools will admit only top performing students through a rigorous selective process. The majority of students, however, have no option but open-access public schools where they are sentenced to low standards, unmotivated instructors, scarce resources, and the lowest prospects of employment upon graduating  – that is if they persist. These conditions constitute some of the main reasons why the dropout rates in higher education are a worrisome trend that continues to persist despite the higher education reforms presented in the last two decades. Still, even the most prestigious schools produce mainly graduates with engineering, business, and medical degrees. While such degrees and competencies are still enough to secure employment, they are not enough to meet the national development goals which require competencies in new technologies, communication, environment sciences, and finance.

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3.5 But It May Not Be All Doom and Gloom While these educational issues continue to pose real challenges and impediments to the Moroccan economy and its development, they cannot be considered the only culprits. Previous generations received a good education despite some of the obstacles mentioned above, so the educational crisis seems to be the result of much deeper problems than just structural inadequacies. The COVID-19 pandemic has certainly proved that a revival of the public school is possible, at least for the middle class, as many were no longer able to afford private school tuition. The pandemic also showed the ugly face of privatizing a sector that the government now considers vital for Morocco’s development, yet it goes unregulated and free to set its own rules. Again, the call for a new Moroccan school of equity, equality and development as promoted by the “Strategic Vision for Education 2015-2030” might remain nothing but ink on paper if the government does not take the necessary steps to regulate the private school sector. In other words, there would be no “school of equity, equality and development” if the government is unable to seriously pledge its support for the public school through investment in human capital instead of school buildings. Saadani (2017) offers the following hopeful scenario: La crise de l’école marocaine n’est pas une fatalité. Il est possible d’en sortir définitivement en mettant en oeuvre les trois solutions radicales présentées précédemment : i) attirer les meilleurs étudiants vers les métiers de l’enseignement et leur assurer une formation d’excellence ii) mettre en place un système de paliers de compétences et iii) appuyer les enseignants par des fonctions de coach et d’orthopédagogue. Le succès de la réforme pourra se mesurer au changement de perception des familles à l’égard de l’école publique, de la défiance à la confiance. Si un mouvement massif de retour vers les écoles publiques se produit, notamment au sein de la classe moyenne, alors, le Maroc aura réalisé son miracle éducatif en rebâtissant une école fondée sur la qualité et la mixité sociale. (p. 5) (The crisis of the Moroccan school is not inevitable. It is possible to get out of it once and for all by implementing the three radical solutions presented above: (i) attracting the best students to teaching professions and providing them with excellent training, (ii) creating a system of skill levels and (iii) supporting teachers by introducing school counselors and therapists. The success of the reform can be measured by the change in families’ perception of public schools, from mistrust to trust. If a massive movement back to public schools occurs, especially among the middle class, then Morocco will have achieved its educational miracle by rebuilding a school based on quality and social diversity). (p. 5)

Thus, a good-faith support for public education that could lead to an en-masse return to the public school would be a first step in dealing with the educational crisis in Morocco.

References

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References Alaoui, H., & Springborg, R. (2021). The political economy of education in the Arab World. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Assid, A. (2019, February 1). Open letter to the Minister of education. www.hespress.ma Benesch, S. (1993). Critical thinking: A learning process for democracy. TESOL Quarterly, 27(3), 545–547. Benesch, S. (1999). Thinking critically, thinking dialogically. TESOL Quarterly, 33(3), 573–579. Bouhari, M., & Soussi, M. (2017). About relationship between education, investment and growth: Identification and causality for 5 MENA countries. Business and Economics Journal, 8(2), 296. https://doi.org/10.4172/2151-­6219.1000296 Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Harvard University Press. Bray, M. (1999). The shadow education system: Private tutoring and its implications for planners. In Fundamentals of educational planning 61. UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). Bretton, H. (1976). Political science, language, and politics. In W.  O’Barr & J.  O’Barr (Eds.), Language and politics. Mouton. Canagarajah, S. (2004). Subversive identities, pedagogical safe houses, and critical learning. In B.  Norton & K.  Toohey (Eds.), Critical pedagogies and language learning (pp.  116–137). Cambridge University Press. Chiswick, B. R. (2008). The economics of language: An introduction and overview (IZA discussion paper no. 3568). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1155862 Fernandez, et al. (2013). Panorama. In Evolution des pratiques et représentations langagières dans le Maroc du vingt-et-unième siècle (pp. 15–59). L’Harmattan. Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. Continuum. Gillies, D. (2015). Human capital theory in education. In M. Peters (Ed.), Encyclopedia of educational philosophy and theory. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­981-­287-­532-­7254-­1 Ginsburgh, V., & Weber, S. (2011). How many languages do we need? The economics of linguistic diversity. Princeton University Press. Ginsburgh, V., & Weber, S. (2018). The economics of language: ECARES working paper. www. ecares.org Grin, F. (1994). The Economics of language: Match or mismatch? International Political Science Review/Revue Internationale de Science Politique, 15(1), 25–42. Grin, F. (2016). The economics of language education. In T.  McCarty & S.  May (Eds.), Language policy and political issues in education (pp.  111–122). Springer. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-­3-­319-­02344-­1 Grin, F., & Vaillancourt, F. (2015). The Economics of language policy: An introduction to evaluation work. In F. M. Hult & D. C. Johnson (Eds.), Research methods in language policy and planning (pp. 118–129). John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Holborow, M. (2018). Language skills as human capital? Challenging the neoliberal frame. Language and Intercultural Communication, 18(5), 520–532. https://doi.org/10.1080/1470847 7.2018.1501846 Ibourk, A. (2016, May). Learning achievement in Morocco: A status assessment. https://www. policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/OCPPC-­PB1614vEn_1.pdf Johnes, G., & Johnes, J. (Eds.). (2004). International handbook on the economics of education. Edward Elgar Publishing.

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Lopez-Acevedo, G., Betcherman, G., Khellaf, A., & Molini, V. (2021). Morocco’s jobs landscape: Identifying constraints to an inclusive labor market. In International development in focus. World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-­1-­4648-­1678-­9 Myers-Scotton, C. (1993). Elite closure as a powerful language strategy: The African case. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 103, 149–163. PIRLS. (2016). Report on Morocco. http://pirls2016.org/wp-­content/uploads/encyclopediapirls/ downloadcenter/3.%20Country%20Chapters/Morocco.pdf Robinson, E. A. G., & Vaizey, J. E. (1966). The economics of education. Macmillan Press Ltd. Saadani, Y. (2017). La crise de l’école marocaine n’est pas une fatalité. https://medias24.com/ youssef-­saadani-­lacrise-­de-­l-­ecole-­marocaine-­n-­est-­pas-­une-­fatalite-­3809.html World Bank. (2020). Morocco: Skills development for employment. The role of technical and vocational education and training. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ en/919151593565793405/pdf/Morocco-­Skills-­Development-­for-­Employment-­The-­Role-­of-­ Technical-­and-­Vocational-­Education-­and-­Training.pdf

Chapter 4

Education and Language Reforms

Education must provide the opportunities for self-fulfillment; it can at best provide a rich and challenging environment for the individual to explore, in his own way. Noam Chomsky

4.1 Education in Morocco During the Protectorate: The Strategy of Divide and Rule Prior to the 1912 Protectorate, which effectively made Morocco a French colony, education in Morocco could be described as traditional and generally based on Arabo-Islamic learning mediated through Classical Arabic (Redouane, 1998). The focus of this system was mainly on the teaching and learning of Islamic and legal sciences based on the Sunni, Maliki School of jurisprudence, as well as on the grammar and philology of Classical Arabic. Before the existence of Al Qarawiyyin University, which would later become the host of this traditional system of education, mosques in the cities and zawiyas1 in the countryside were the settings of this traditional education, a system that came to be known as “the authentic traditional education” (Atta‫؟‬lim Al-assil -‫)التعلمي ا ألصيل‬, a system which remains alive on the Moroccan educational scene in one form or another until today. With the French assuming control of Morocco as part of the 1912 Treaty of Fez, they also automatically assumed control over its educational system, and as a result education became a source of contact and conflict between colonizer and colonized. For the French, the educational system became the social space and platform where their colonizing forces attempted to exert their control over the kind of education their new subjects were supposed to receive – in particular, whether it should be assimilationist or designed to preserve cultural traditions. The French’s approach to what they initially saw as the appropriate education Moroccans ought to receive was

 A zawiya is a North African term that refers mainly to a Sufi religious school in the countryside.

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anti-assimilationist: their goal was to maintain tradition on the one hand, but more importantly not to open the doors to French and European education and thought, which did not sit well with the Moroccan elite who were hungry for a so-called French and European education (Segalla, 2006). A crucial goal of any colonial system is to rely on a local educated elite to serve as the intermediary between the colonizer and colonized, and during the Protectorate, the French set up two schools, one if Fez and one in Rabat, to reproduce an educated elite in Arabic and French to serve in that role. This system functioned side by side with a French system set up by the French for French citizens, Moroccan Jews, and other foreigners living in Morocco at that time. As explained later, the French also set up a Berber college in Azrou where the goal was to create a Berber elite that could be coopted to help them achieve control over “Bled Siba.”2 The French were intent on maintaining traditional education practices for the Arab population while also putting in place a secular and non-Arabized education for the Berbers. In so doing, they pursued what is generally referred to as a policy of divide-and-rule through the so-called “Berber Decree” (Dahir Albarbary) of 1930, a decree that recognized Berber customary law in lieu of the Muslim Sharia law, a clear attempt to create a rift between the Berbers of the mountains and the Arabs of the plains along ethnolinguistic lines (Wyrtzen, 2011, 2016). In so doing, the French were also keen on underscoring the non-Arabic and non-Muslim identity of the Berbers. The French went as far as attempting to prove that Berbers were racially Aryan in order to prove to the Berbers that they were superior vis-à-vis the Arabs. The culmination of the divide-and-rule project was the Franco-Berber “Collège Berbère d’Azrou” (The Berber College of Azrou), an institution built with the goal of creating a non-Arab Berber elite infused by French ideology. There was hope of using this new Berber elite as collaborationist intermediaries between the French and the Berber populations as well as a means to stop the Arabization process of the Berbers in the mountains, which the French saw as a disease intent on destroying Berber identity (Benhlal, 2005; Hoffman, 2008). At the Collège Berbère d’Azrou, instruction was strictly carried out in French, and Islamic materials were rigidly excluded from the curriculum (Pennell, 2000). But what the French did not realize at the time was that in attempting to halt the Arabization of Morocco by channeling Berber Education through a non-Muslim, non-Arabic tradition, they were effectively fanning the flames of Moroccan resistance and nationalism, which would become more organized and more effective soon after. In other words, through the so-called “Berber Decree” and the policy of divide and rule, the French tried to use ethnic and linguistic identities of the Arabs and Berbers to undercut any possible sense of national unity. However, the outcome of this tactic was the opposite of what the French had intended: it was ironically this decree that gave birth to organized

 Bled Siba (or Blad Essiba) refers to the parts that used to be lawless in pre-colonial and colonial Morocco. Bled El Makhzen is the opposite and refers to the parts of Morocco that used to be under the strict control of the Moroccan state. 2

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resistance to colonialist forces and effectively heralded the beginning of nationalist resistance to French occupation and soon after Morocco’s independence. French education policy in the early years of the Protectorate was anti-­ assimilationist in the sense that the French were against the idea of making a French education available to Moroccans for two reasons: to honor the 1912 agreement to maintain Arabo-Islamic education, on the one hand, and to make sure that Moroccans did not have access to the French lycées, which were reserved for the French and other foreigners living in Morocco. Furthermore, opening these institutions to Moroccans would eventually have allowed Moroccan students access to universities in France. In other words, allowing Moroccan students access to higher education in France was seen as a dangerous move as it would result in exposing these students to French democratic values that were effectively dodged if not violated in French colonies. The French were concerned that these Moroccan students would eventually return to their countries armed with such values that would overthrow their rule and control of Morocco. Still, after the 1930s, the French had to allow a limited number of Moroccans into French schools, although the number of students who were able to graduate with a high school diploma was very limited (only 4 passed the Baccalaureat exam in 1933). The majority of students continued to have access only to an Arabo-­ Islamic education and were able to pursue their university studies only at Al Quarawiyyin University in Fez while the French were hard at work developing their Berber project of recruiting and educating a Berber elite at the Berber College of Azrou. Thus, it is worth noting here that the only real educational reform(s), called Plans de Réformes, during this period came as a direct result of the Berber Decree in 1934. The French policy of divide and rule resulted in the birth of organized resistance to such policies, and as a result, demands were made to make Islamic and Arabic education available to all Moroccans, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic origin. This assumed that all Moroccans were Muslims who needed an education delivered in the medium of Islam: Arabic. Berber was never considered a language to be taught in schools and was therefore overlooked from the beginning of educational reforms in Morocco, an attitude that largely continues to persist to this day. Ever since the independence of Morocco, the educational system has undergone several substantive reforms as part of building the foundations of a new independent nation state, but these reforms were generally concerned with the same themes, including the importance of strengthening the teaching of Arabic, generalizing education, and making it compulsory, as well as building more schools and making them accessible and available to Moroccans in remote parts of the country. This chapter, however, focuses mainly on reforms introduced at the end of the twentieth century, with special emphasis on the role of language in schooling, starting with the 1999 National Charter of Education and Training (Charter), followed by the National Education Emergency Support Program 2009–2012 (Emergency Plan), and culminating with the Strategic Vision for Education 2015–2030 (Strategic Vision). The 1999 National Charter of Education and Training remains the principal educational blueprint and main reference for all educational reforms in the last

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two decades. The two that followed were meant to accelerate the implementation of the various educational propositions introduced in the Charter, expand its mandates, and address its lacunes. The last two reform initiatives also came to address more pressing issues that surfaced as a result of the 2011 Constitution directives, which called for the creation of new educational institutions tasked with assessing the performance and progress of the educational system as a whole.

4.2 Language Reforms in the 1999 National Charter of Education and Training The decade following the emergence of the 1999 Moroccan National Charter of Education and Training and Training (Charter) was labelled the National Decade of Education since education has been regarded as a critical priority for the government and the country as a whole, second only to national integrity. To that effect, articles 20 and 21 of the charter state that the government has “pledged all the resources necessary to reform and develop the education sector in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century” (Charter: Articles 20 and 21). The 1999 Charter is a comprehensive and large-scale project that came to address every aspect of the educational system by proposing detailed plans for new reforms at all levels. It has also laid down stages and phases for implementing all the reforms and improvements put forward in this document. The charter has more global goals for the entire system of education, including, among other things, making elementary and secondary education mandatory for all Moroccan students through the age of fifteen, setting up new guidelines for required courses and exit exams for each level of the educational system, as well as proposing different languages for teaching all school subjects, starting from elementary school through high school and university. In terms of the Charter’s linguistic orientations, one of its most significant goals has been to once again underscore the importance of strengthening the teaching of Arabic (both spoken and written) and encourage its use in all different domains of Moroccan society, including in science and technology, a goal that should, according to the Charter, constitute in effect a “national enterprise.” The Charter also reiterates that the Arabic language is mandatory for all Moroccan students in all educational institutions, both public and private. This statement seems to be a clear admonition to any private institution that has opted to use French or English only as its medium of instruction at the expense of Arabic. The message here is that every educational institution in Morocco is required to teach the Arabic language to all its students, regardless of whether French or English is used as its principal medium of instruction. Such a warning was understood to be directed mainly to French schools, a legacy of Morocco’s colonial past, which have continued to use the French curriculum and now attract the children of the rich and the powerful in the country as these schools serve as a gateway to universities and “grandes écoles” in France. The requirement

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of teaching Arabic was also meant for private Moroccan schools that have been mushrooming in recent years as alternatives to the deteriorating quality of education offered in public schools, which use French as a selling point to lure more students from the public schools. The Charter’s obsession with the importance of teaching and learning Arabic reflects the continuous dismissive attitude towards the Berber language and culture, an attitude that eventually came to be condemned by Berber elites and activists who began to protest against the marginalization of their language by nationalists and policymakers who have continued to regard it as inconsequential in the educational system. Assid (2000) accused the charter of being a vehicle for pan-Arabist and Islamist views meant to propagate “narrow nationalist ideologies.” At this juncture, it is worth noting that one of the most significant changes to the educational system in terms of linguistic requirements came just a few years after the introduction of the Charter when the Berber language was officially recognized as an integral part of the linguistic and cultural make up of Morocco in 2001. The official recognition of Berber was immediately followed by its inclusion in the fabric of the educational system in 2003 as a required subject of study for all Moroccan students, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic background (Errihani, 2006). Another recurring linguistic theme in the Charter is the requirement that Moroccans be open and receptive to other world languages, especially those deemed “instrumental” in today’s global economy. The Charter does not specify which foreign languages, however, a typical approach that the government has always espoused when discussing the importance of foreign languages in Morocco’s education sector. However, French is generally assumed to be the country’s de facto second language, although it is never mentioned in this Charter or in any government official document for that matter. English is not mentioned either, although the state is understood to have decided to promote its teaching and learning at the secondary and tertiary levels of education given its recent global range and influence. The Charter also proposed the introduction of two foreign languages in elementary school, the first starting in the second grade and the second at the fifth-grade level. Again, the Charter does not mention any foreign language by name. It appears that the unwillingness to admit that Morocco is a multilingual country where local as well as foreign languages are alive and in daily competition can be explained by the strong hold that the policy of Arabization still has on the minds of pan-Arabist language planners, so much so that to mention any other language in an official document besides Arabic is tantamount to linguistic apostasy. Two decades after the introduction of these linguistic proposals, elementary education remains confined to Arabic only and then French starting in the third grade in the public school, a linguistic policy that has been in place since Morocco’s independence. Private schools, however, are able to offer French starting in preschool as a marketing tool to attract more students. Once again, the gap between rhetorical discourse of government officials and policymakers and implementation on the ground continues to be wide apart. In other words, theory and practice do not always coincide. The fact that the Charter proposed two foreign languages in addition to Modern Standard Arabic (Fussha), which might just as well be another foreign language for all Moroccan

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children, especially those of Berber background, remained just a theory, a proposal that has yet to see the light because of its lack of realism and foresight on many fronts. To put the Charter’s linguistic propositions for elementary education in perspective, one must first consider their feasibility and practicality. According to the Charter’s propositions, students in the first 5 years of primary education would be introduced to four languages with three different scripts: Fussha Arabic, French, English, and more recently Berber. The assumption is that pupils will first be introduced to Fussha, which is a new language with a new script for all Moroccans, despite being related to Moroccan Arabic Vernacular,3 (Darija). Then in the third, fourth and fifth grades, students would also be introduced to two different foreign languages, which are assumed to be French and English. Furthermore, and as of 2001 – 2 years after the emergence of the Charter, the Berber language and culture were officially recognized by decree as essential components of Moroccan identity, a move that was followed in 2003 by a new language policy that made Berber a mandatory language for all school children. This language policy was expected to be generalized across all primary and secondary schools in the nation by the year 2011; however, the implementation of this policy has so far not yielded the desired outcome. On a closer look at this new policy, one will immediately realize that the de jure Moroccan system of education now requires elementary school children to learn four different languages (Fussha, Berber, and two foreign languages) with three different writing systems: Arabic, Latin, and Tifinagh4 – the adopted script for Berber. Although children have been found to have an unmatched aptitude to acquire new languages at an early age (Chomsky, 2006; Clark, 2003), introducing them to four different languages with three distinct writing systems, while simultaneously stressing the importance of strengthening the Arabic medium, seems to be an over-­ zealous and unrealistic goal to achieve on many levels: in terms of planning, pedagogy, human resources, teacher training, etc. The Charter constantly reiterates that acquiring a solid foundation in the Arabic language should be the goal of primary education, and one can only wonder how such an over-zealous goal can be achieved when students are supposed to be introduced to three additional languages in the first 4 years of their schooling. The significance of the charter in relation to the language policy of teaching Berber to all Moroccan students is of paramount importance. Firstly, the charter does not reserve much space to the Berber language, except in two out of 177 articles (articles 115 and 116). The Charter does not call for the teaching of Berber either since the “Berber” language policy did not emerge until 2001. Thus, while the Berber language is the main focus of the 2001 “Berber” language policy, the Charter refers to it only in passing by declaring that the educational system ought to be more  Moroccan Arabic Vernacular (Darija) is an oral language only.  Tifinagh, adopted and adapted by IRCAM as a script for Berber, is a script that has no resemblance to Latin or Arabic. It is a script that apparently was used by the Berbers 5000 years ago. Berber activists opted for this script for the teaching of Berber instead of the Arabic or Latin as a political solution to a linguistic problem. 3 4

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“receptive and open towards Berber,” which does not sit well with Berber activists or anyone who believes in the importance of preserving and maintaining Berber through its teaching, especially after it has been accorded full recognition by the highest power in the country in 2001. To illustrate their grievances against this charter, Berber activists usually quote the contents of articles 115 and 116 of the charter. In the section titled “Ouverture sur le Tamazight (Berber)” (openness towards Berber), the charter alludes to Berber only as a vehicle that could potentially help in the acquisition of Arabic, a declaration that infuriated many Berber activists, especially those working in IRCAM. On the other hand, this proposition does implicitly state that the role the mother tongues can play in the Moroccan linguistic scene is to simply aid in the learning process of the standard language, Fussha (see the Chap. 6 on “The Mother-Tongue Debate”) Les autorités pédagogiques régionales pourront, dans le cadre de la proportion curriculaire laissée à leur initiative, choisir l’utilisation de la langue Amazigh ou tout dialecte local dans le but de faciliter l’apprentissage de la langue officielle au préscolaire et au premier cycle de l’école primaire... Il sera créé, auprès de certaines universités à partir de la rentrée universitaire 2000–2001, des structures de recherche et de développement linguistique et culturel Amazigh, ainsi que de formation des formateurs et de développement des programmes et curricula scolaires. (Regional educational authorities could, within the curriculum proportion left up to their initiative, choose to use the Amazigh (Berber) language or any local dialect with the goal of facilitating the acquisition of the official language in pre-school and the first cycle of primary school. Beginning in the 2000–2001 academic year, certain universities will create research structures for Amazigh (Berber) language and culture, in addition to centers for teacher training and for developing school programs and curricula). (National Charter of Education and Training, articles 115, 116)

Many Berber activists accuse this charter, and article 115 in particular, of its patronizing tone and insensitivity towards the Berber language and its speakers, and they no longer wish to see their language being trampled on and disrespected to the point that its role is to be simply subservient to Arabic, nothing more than a steppingstone for pre-school and elementary students to acquire Arabic. They argue that such a demeaning role assigned to Berber clearly aims at assimilating and homogenizing rural Berber children in particular, who may be exclusively Berberophones. The goal of this clause in the charter, according to Berber activists, is not to be “open towards Berber,” as the charter stipulates; it is to remind anyone who might have any aspirations as to the promotion of Berber that this language is not worthy of teaching and could never be on equal footing with Arabic (L.  Ounaim, personal communication, December 11, 2005). Article 116 is the only other article in the charter that directly addresses the Berber language. Contrary to the policy of teaching Berber, which insists on introducing the Berber language at the first year of elementary education and then progressively generalizing it up to the secondary and tertiary levels, the 1999 Charter proposes the creation of research centers with the aim of encouraging research on the Berber language and culture in Moroccan universities, without necessarily encouraging the teaching of the Berber language. Interestingly enough, the same

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idea has been suggested by several moderate Berber intellectuals (M. Ennaji, personal communication, December 15, 2005; M. Elmedlaoui, personal communication, May 20, 2011), who believe that the best way to maintain and promote Berber is by first launching university research centers specializing in the study and research of the Berber language and culture, thus encouraging both undergraduate and graduate students to engage in research in this field as a first step in the process of preparing the groundwork and infrastructure for the future study and maintenance of the Berber language and culture. By the year 2006, however, only one institution of higher learning, the University of Fez, through its department of English, had taken such initiative and introduced two Berber undergraduate courses, one as a required course, and the other one as an elective. The required course used English as a medium for studying the Berber language and culture, and the elective course was an introduction to the Berber language. Both courses were started by two university professors, both of whom were Berber and spoke Berber and were therefore hoping to make a difference in the way their language is viewed, especially in a city like Fez (see the Chap. 8 on Language attitudes). In recent years, Al Akhawayn University also launched an initiative to teach Berber, a project that was started by one of the two professors from the University of Fez, who was retained by the university for a number of years to teach Berber. However, with his departure, the teaching of Berber at Al Akhawayn University came to an end, and the university was not inclined to continue the course. As far as the relationship of the Charter to the policy of teaching Berber is concerned, articles 115 and 116 indicate that the 1999 Charter stands in stark contrast to the 2001 language policy that gives full recognition to the Berber language and goes as far as to require it as a mandatory school subject to be taught to every Moroccan student, whether the student is of Arab or Berber descent. While the Charter proposes that the Berber language could be used as a vehicle for acquiring Arabic, the “Berber” language policy recognizes the Berber language as an essential component of Moroccan identity that every Moroccan should cherish and maintain by making sure that it is taught to all school-aged students. What the Charter and the “Berber” language policy seem to have in common, however, is the delay that characterizes the implementation of many of their propositions, usually because of lack or human and financial resources, lack of accountability, in addition to political wrangling between different factions that compose the government and its institutions. One major difference between previous language policies that stressed the exclusive use of Arabic and the 1999 Charter is that the latter for the first time seems to suggest that scientific and technological subjects in higher education may be taught either in Arabic or in a foreign language. This in itself is an implicit admission that the policy Arabization has failed to eliminate French from the linguistic scene in Morocco. In other words, the idea behind this change in rhetoric and policy is that Arabic has never been able to replace French as a medium of instruction of science and technology in higher education, and at this point the state seems to have finally made peace with this reality, albeit indirectly, since “French” continues to be absent from all official government documents as the foreign language par-excellence in Morocco.

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Still, despite this discreet acknowledgement of the ascendency of French in higher education, it is not meant as a final submission since the Charter also proposes the progressive introduction of Arabic as a medium of instruction of scientific and technological subjects in higher education too, which only makes the official message more confusing and bewildering to the average person. Put differently, the Charter clearly underscores the importance of using foreign languages as mediums of instruction for scientific and technological subjects in the tertiary level; at the same time, it also calls for the gradual introduction of Arabic as a medium of instruction in higher education. The Charter insists on the introduction of a foreign language as a means “offrant la meilleure performance scientifique et la plus grande facilité de communication” (that offers the best scientific performance and the most ease in communication” (National Charter of Education, article 114). This foreign language is not named in the Charter but can only be assumed to be French, which is nothing new here. If this foreign language were to be English, then higher education in Morocco would be going towards a completely different orientation, one that seems to be gaining more momentum recently, especially among public school students (See the Chap. 8 on language attitudes for more details). The fact that the Charter calls for the introduction of Arabic at the tertiary level in addition to maintaining French or introducing English – which is left very vague and ambiguous – aims at fulfilling a promise to all those students who were negatively affected by the process of Arabization in secondary school only to find themselves required to learn or relearn French to be able to function at the university (See the Chap. 2 on Arabization). Still, one wonders if this talk about strengthening the role of Arabic in higher education is nothing short of a face-saving measure, a way of paying lip service to the initial policy of Arabization and appeasing the Islamists and Nationalists without openly admitting the failure of this language policy. Such empty rhetoric becomes all the more evident since introducing Arabic in higher education for teaching science and technology remains but an empty statement, for it is yet to materialize two decades after the emergence of the Charter. Moroccan language policy has historically been characterized by ambivalence (Miller, 2006), and this ambivalence seems to be the hallmark of the Charter’s articles that deal directly with questions of language planning. On the one hand, the Charter insists on the importance of acquiring foreign languages, while at the same time it stresses the importance of promoting and strengthening Arabic at all levels of the educational system, a discourse that continues to this day. Granted, this is nothing new; in fact, this has always been the official discourse of language planners in Morocco: Arabization first, and openness towards foreign languages second, although the resources that should go to Arabization first are also shared by foreign languages. This is one of the main reasons why the Arabization process failed in primary and secondary education and was never generalized in tertiary education. In other words, Arabization seems to have failed not because of the Arabic language: there is nothing inherently unhelpful about Arabic as a language: any language that’s promoted and provided with the necessary resources is capable of advancing education, science, and culture (Hamoudi, 2019). Still, despite the misleading rhetoric that characterizes the official government discourse, one thing

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remains certain: because of the prestige and status that French holds in Morocco, it is expected that the French language will continue to enjoy total supremacy in the field of science and technology in higher education, at least in the foreseeable future. In fact, one could argue that Arabization has had its day on the linguistic scene in Morocco, especially in light of the recent report by the Superior Council of Education, Training and Scientific Research, which ratified the switch to French as a medium of instruction for scientific subjects (CSEFRS, 2020). As a result, the doors have been opened to foreign languages to take on the challenge of educational reform in Morocco, especially in higher education. Moroccans themselves seem to have become more ambivalent about the role of French in the Moroccan cultural and educational scenes. Although French continues to be seen as an extension of political and cultural imperialism, it nonetheless remains indispensable in Morocco because of the prestige, cultural, and socio-­ economic capital it continues to hold in Morocco. Moroccans generally understand the need to learn French despite their hostility towards the political and cultural values it may represent (Talimat, 2015). Such antagonism, coupled with a need to learn French might change, however, if and when English assumes a more leading role in the education sector in Morocco, a process that is slowly beginning to gain steam, especially in higher education. According to a BBC report (9 September 2013), the new role and status that English is gaining as measured by the number of Moroccans who now speak it as a second language or have a working knowledge and use it on a regular basis does not depend on nostalgic or sentimental attitudes towards the British or the Americans. It is rather the result of the practical demands of a globalized world where English plays a leading role. However, contrary to speaking French, being able to function in English effectively in the Moroccan public sphere does not carry any prestige or cultural capital, although this could change in the coming decades as English gains more acceptance and widespread use, thus possibly becoming not only a useful language but also a language of dominance and economic capital in Morocco. But for the present time, French continues to rule.

4.3 The National Education Emergency Plan: Najah Program 2009–2012 The National Charter of Education and Training launched in 1999 was a roadmap for what was termed a “decade of education.” Unfortunately, the grand and ambitious objectives and visions of this Charter seem to have gone unrealized mainly due to lack of funding and coordination. In fact, the reforms identified in this charter have only yielded poor and disappointing results: the adult literacy rates, especially among females, have remained static, the male-to-female education ratios continue to be a challenge, the graduation rates are dismal, and the linguistic reforms proposed in the Charter are yet to be put into practice. As a result of the low evaluations

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from external agencies such as the World Bank, the Moroccan government came up with yet another educational reform plan, conveniently called the National Education Emergency Plan, Najah 2009–2012 (the Arabic term, Najah, stands for success). “The implicit aim of this program is to help Morocco make significant strides toward meeting some of its UN Millennium Development Goals by 2015” (PIRLS, 2011). The National Education Emergency Plan (Emergency Plan) was designed by the Moroccan Government with the support of its development partners, including the African Development Bank (ADB) Group. The funding agencies of this 4-year program meant for it to support the efforts of the Moroccan Government in skills development and poverty reduction under the National Human Development Initiative (NHDI), as well as the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 2015. According to the World Bank, the stated goals of this program, which is under the direct supervision of Ministry of Education, consisted of several reform outcomes: 1. Reform of the education and training system so that it can meet development needs, 2. Compulsory schooling up until the age of 15, 3. Promotion of initiative and excellence in qualifying secondary and higher education 4. Completion of decentralization, and 5. Rational management of resources and introduction of a culture of results-based management. This program was subsidized by two successive funds of EUR 37 million and EUR 38 million in 2009 and 2010 respectively, which helped increase funding to the education sector as a means to generalize elementary education and increase adult literacy rates. But its overall objective was to provide support for the implementation of the reforms resulting from the 1999 Charter by ultimately consolidating gains had been achieved and making necessary adjustments to improve the quality of teaching and performance of the education system as a whole. This Emergency plan, however, did not propose any new reforms to the linguistic situation in the Moroccan school, and in this respect there seems to be no difference between the Charter and the Emergency Program. Nonetheless, despite the lack of any tangible realizations of these two reform programs, the Moroccan Ministry of Education’s latest report of 2011 continues to paint an unrealistically glamorous picture of the state of education, and in particular higher education, in Morocco (Enssup, 2011). That is, until the King of Morocco spoke. In an unexpected turn of events, the King of Morocco’s speech of August 20, 2013, came to deconstruct this rosy picture, as the reality on the ground pointed to no substantial gains or accomplishments in the state of education in Morocco despite the increased funding and the empty rhetoric that characterized every official report coming out of the Ministry of Education’s headquarters. The King of Morocco seems to have felt the need to interfere for the first time since he ascended the Throne by openly criticizing the

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current government’s handling of the education sector in Morocco and indirectly holding it responsible for the lackluster results on the ground. The outcome of the “non-existent” reforms therefore led the King to call for the immediate and total overhaul of the educational system (King Mohammed VI, August 20, 2013). He then proceeded to nominate one of his advisers to head the newly created Conseil Supérieur de l’éducation, de la formation et de la recherche scientifique (Higher Council for Education, Training and Scientific Research), a body charged with identifying the ills of the educational system and providing regular reports and recommendations on how to fix them. The result has been the publication titled “La Vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030: pour une école de l’équité, de la qualité et de la promotion” (The Strategic vision of reform 2015–2030: For a school of equity, quality, and advancement), which might be considered the third attempt at reforming the educational system of Morocco.

4.4  Arab Spring Reforms Morocco was largely spared the violence and chaos that characterized many of the 2011 so-called Arab Spring movements in the MENA region (the Moroccan version was called Movement du 20 Fevrier (Movement of 20th of February). These protests and demonstrations were generally met by violent responses from the authorities of many countries in the region, but in Morocco they were met by a new constitution that consisted of several amendments, including another educational reform in the form of the Strategic Vision of Reform 2015–2030 and a National Council of Moroccan Languages and Culture. There were demonstrations in Morocco, but they were generally peaceful, and the government of Morocco acted immediately by addressing some of the demands of the demonstrators as a means to quell any potential disturbance to the status quo. The most concrete response came in the form of a new and revised constitution that gave official recognition to the Berber language and made an official language in addition to Arabic. However, a closer look at article 5 of the new constitution reveals that such a recognition does not put Berber on equal footing with Arabic, which “demeure” (remains) THE official language, which “the state works to protect, develop, and promote its use.” On the other hand, « l’amazighe [Berber] constitue une langue officielle de l’État, en tant que patrimoine commun à tous les Marocains sans exception » (Berber constitutes an official language of the State, as a common heritage for all Moroccans without exception) (Constitution du Maroc, 2011). Another direct outcome of the 2011 20 February Movement and the new constitution was yet another reform in that resulted in the creation of a new government institution tasked with overseeing the education system and advising the government on issues related to this sector: Il est créé un Conseil national des langues et de la culture marocaine, chargé notamment de la protection et du développement des langues arabe et amazighe et des diverses ­expressions

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culturelles marocaines, qui constituent un patrimoine authentique et une source d’inspiration contemporaine. (A National Council of Moroccan Languages and Culture is created and is responsible in particular for the protection and development of the Arabic and Amazigh languages as well as the various Moroccan cultural expressions, which constitute an authentic heritage and a source of contemporary inspiration.)

4.5 The Strategic Vision of Reform 2015–2030: For a School of Equity, Quality, and Advancement The role that this newly created institution plays within the education system of Morocco is defined as follows: Le Conseil Supérieur de l’Education, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique est une instance consultative indépendante instituée par l’article 168 de la Constitution, chargée d’émettre son avis sur toutes les politiques publiques et les questions d’intérêt national concernant l’éducation, la formation et la recherche scientifique. https://www.csefrs.ma/ le-­conseil/presentation-­du-­conseil/le-­conseil/?lang=fr (The Higher Council for Education, Training and Scientific Research is an independent consultative body established by article 168 of the Constitution in charge of proposing views on all public policies and questions of national interest with regards to education, training, and scientific research.)

Indeed, this consultative institution remains an independent body in charge of conducting research and evaluating the various educational initiatives and submitting its reports to the Ministry of Education and other stakeholders, including the public, for review and hopefully application. One of the Council’s most important reports with regards to the 1999 Charter came out in December 2014: “Rapport Analytique: La mise en oeuvre de la charte nationale d’education et de formation 2000–2013  – Acquis, deficits et defis” (Analytical Report: The implementation of the Charter of Education and Training 2000–2013 – Achievements, deficits, and challenges). This report is an evaluation of the achievements, but mostly the failures in implementing the policies and proposals contained in the 1999 Charter. Another crucial report that focused on language use in Morocco was released in 2018 by the same institution provided a useful data related the languages found in Morocco and the percentages of Moroccans who use them. First household language Darija (Colloquial Arabic) Tashelhit (Southern Berber) Tamazight (Middle Atlas Berber) Tarifit (Northern Berber) Hassania (Southern Arabic Dialect) Arabic (assumed to be MSA)

Urban setting 86% 6.0% 2.7% 2.1% 1.7% 0.1%

Rural setting 64.5% 22.6% 7.6% 4.7 0.5% –

Both settings 79.1% 11.4% 4.2% 3.0% 1.3% 0.1%

60 First household language French Other Total

4  Education and Language Reforms Urban setting 1.3% 0.1% 100%

Rural setting – – 100%

Both settings 0.9% 0.0% 100%

Source: INE-CSEFRS, ENME (2018)

The information above is crucial for resource allocation as well as policies to promote and maintain the multilingual characteristics of Morocco. These numbers are also important in showing the linguistic-based socio-economic gaps that characterize the country. In particular, it indicates the percentage of the Moroccan elite who speak French yet amass all the socio-economic capital and power in the country thanks to the value of the French language in the language market. The numbers also show the contradiction of the government as far as allocating significant resources to promote Arabic, a language that is spoken only by 0.1 of the population and therefore cannot be considered a “household language,” despite what the de jure language policy of Morocco might suggest. One therefore should not be surprised that the educational crisis in Morocco is the result of the “household” languages not being assigned a role in the educational system and not being utilized to as mediums of instruction although they are the languages used by the majority of Moroccans on a day-to-day basis (See the Chap. 6 on mother-tongue education). The question that one cannot help asking is: what has led to this catastrophic state of the educational system in Morocco? The linguistic medium (aka as the policy of Arabization) appears to have played a leading role in this debacle. Prior to the implementation of the policy of using Arabic to teach scientific subjects at the elementary and secondary levels in the 1980s and 1990s, the educational system in Morocco in general produced high school students who were able to function in a minimum of two languages, and those who chose scientific and technological majors at the university level were equipped with the linguistic tools (i.e. French) to succeed in their education and eventually compete in the job market. Currently, and because of the failed Arabization policy, students who have gone through the Moroccan public-school system have been set up for failure at the tertiary level if they chose to specialize in science or technology. This is because these subjects are taught in Arabic in primary and secondary schools but are taught in French at the university level, a medium in which these students have minimal proficiency. Worse even, 35% of students who graduate from high school with a science or technology Baccalaureate (high school diploma) find themselves having to opt for the humanities at public universities with open enrollment. The end result is easy to imagine: the dropout rate of university students in Morocco is 49.4, according to a recent report by the Moroccan Minister of Higher Education (4 January 2022).

4.6  Le Conseil National des Langues et de la Culture Marocaine....

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The aftereffect has been a consistent decline in the level of education of Moroccans who have opted for public education at the tertiary level. Therefore, to say that the employment prospects for a Moroccan who graduates from a public university in Morocco are dim is an understatement. This situation has given rise to a mushrooming of private elementary and secondary institutions that claim to use foreign languages for instruction as a means of providing equal opportunities to Moroccans who are unable to afford the exorbitant fees charged by the private French or American schools (See the Chap. 3). Yet, as discussed in Chap. 3, by providing French as a bait, the private school model in Morocco targets the new middle-­ class population that is no longer satisfied with the public school and who are willing to pay for a supposedly decent education that their children are not able to receive in the public school.

4.6 Le Conseil National des Langues et de la Culture Marocaine (The National Council of Moroccan Languages and Culture) In addition to officially recognizing the Berber language as an official language alongside Arabic, the Moroccan Constitution of 2011 also called for the creation of a National Council of Moroccan Languages and Culture. This institution was created by Royal Decree # 1.20.34 published on March 30, 2020, and it officially adopted by the government as Bill #04-16, later to be approved by the two chambers of the Moroccan parliament. According to Mohamed El Aaraj (22 July 2019), Morocco’s Minister of Culture and Communication, the National Council of Moroccan Languages and Culture is an independent constitutional institution charged with providing strategic guidelines vis-à-vis language and culture policy. In particular, this council will be responsible for the promotion and maintenance of the two official languages, Arabic and Berber, as well as the various dialects of Morocco, notably Hassania, the variety of Arabic spoken in the southern parts of the country. Additionally, the council will be tasked with promoting the learning and mastery of the most widely used foreign languages. One should note the reference to the “widely used foreign languages,” here again, without specifying which ones, a typical approach of how the official discourse of the state refers to French first and English second. However, the creation of this council is expected to result in minimizing the role that IRCAM has played on the linguistic scene in Morocco in the last two decades, in particular with regards to the promotion of the Berber language and culture. Such a resolution has been met with opposition and discontent, especially from Berber activists, who see such initiative as the final nail in the Berber language and culture’s coffin.

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4.7 Conclusions According to bill 51-17 discussed in Morocco’s parliament on April 2, 2019, the educational crisis that Morocco is undergoing is not the result of the various reform experiments introduced since independence. Rather, the main reason for this crisis is that educational planning and reform projects were adopted from various foreign educational systems that may contradict each other and also clash with the country’s culture and unique identity. With this recognition, politicians and educational experts in Morocco still continue to call for the strengthening of the role of Arabic on the educational scene, the promotion of Berber by expanding its role in education, as well as opening up to foreign languages, a rhetoric that has characterized every official discourse on educational reform, which only adds more confusion and delays to any possible implementation of the proposed reforms. One might also add another major hurdle that stands in the way of any possible successful reform of the education sector in Morocco, and this one is purely political: lack of continuity from one government to another. Building up on gains achieved by previous governments is generally nonexistent. Every new government wants to propose and leave its stamp on new reform projects and will therefore often start by discrediting previous plans and gains in the education sector in favor of policies that serve its political interests and orientations. This is why most successive governments seem to be more concerned with building infrastructure, something that is palpable in the short term, in lieu of comprehensive reforms that address the heart of the educational crisis. Educational reforms in Morocco therefore seem to be more concerned with expanding education than upgrading the quality of education. Educational reforms have mainly focused on building physical infrastructure, making regular attempts at making education compulsory, and generalizing education and making it accessible and available in remote parts of the country. By prioritizing quantity over quality, such focus yields immediate results although the quality of teaching and student learning outcomes continue to suffer. In fact, traditional teaching methodologies have continued to encourage rote learning and absolute respect for the information and knowledge that students are spoon fed by their teachers, which greatly reduces any opportunity for critical and analytical thinking. The focus of state education in Morocco therefore seems to be more on economic productivity at the expense of “social and political values and behaviors” (Diwan, 2021, p. 15). According to Diwan’s investigation of education in the Arab world, there is a larger focus on teaching the values of obedience and respect for authority and less on promoting civic engagement and critical thinking skills that are meant to question authority, regardless of what form it takes. As such, education becomes a tool for indoctrination and state propaganda rather than a means to build a civic society founded on values of democracy and social justice. Engaging in comprehensive reform, albeit initially done in good faith, is typically a rare if not an impossible task for any polity to undertake due to limited resources and political interests that often inextricably surface during the

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implementation process, a reality that often results in discontinuing such a process or abandoning it altogether (Ruiz, 1984; Schiffman, 1996). This is something that has become too familiar in the Moroccan context with every new government. Appointed technocrats typically have little to no training or background in the education sector and will typically bring in new programs and initiatives and discontinue whatever programs or initiatives are in progress or had been launched by their predecessors for the purpose of gaining more political clout. A good case in point is the va-et-vient approach that has characterized higher education reform in Morocco. Moroccan higher education has for a long time followed the higher education model of the United States: Bachelor, Master, and Ph.D. That is until a new government in the 2000s opted to follow the French model, generally called: License, Master, Doctorat (LMD). In spring 2019, A meeting was held in Marrakesh to unveil a new reform initiative for higher education, a top-down decision (according to many interviewees who attended the said meeting). The new reform proposed doing away with the French system (LMD) and returning to the American system, which was in effect rolled out in fall 2021 despite opposition from many educational experts. According to official government sources, the new reform will consider the first year an exploratory year meant “to provide students with better options instead of locking them into a major,” which in the past usually translated in a high rate of dropouts (over 16% before the end of the first year). Still, in an unexpected move, the newly elected government decided to suspend the launch of the same Bachelor program that had been rolled out after just one semester and return to the LMD program. One is left wondering how such important decisions can be made and immediately reversed in the span of 2 years. This is proof of the top-down chaotic and haphazard approach to decision-making that plagues the education sector and continues to delay any effective and meaningful reform to the educational system. My interviews with highly placed individuals in the educational system of Morocco yielded some unexpected reasons for the change: the newly appointed Minister of Higher Education seems to have had some (personal) disagreements with ministers from the previous government and decided to discontinue their project and return to the French model instead. The average person in Morocco typically does not understand these constant reforms introduced by each incoming government because the political rhetoric used to justify discontinuing a program and adopting a new one often seems to be very convincing and in good faith. But again, what one should realize by now is that when it comes to educational reform, the gap between government rhetoric and practices on the ground remains wide apart (Kohstall, 2020), and the victim of these so-called reforms is the student and the system of education. One recent change that has been welcomed by the average Moroccan, however, is that the policy of Arabization, which is responsible for marginalizing a large portion of Morocco’s poor while allowing the rich and powerful to sidestep the policy by enrolling their children in French or French-medium schools (See the Chap. 2 on Arabization), has been discontinued at the secondary education level. It seems that new government officials in the Moroccan Ministry of Education have finally

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recognized that the linguistic medium – Arabic – is one of the major reasons for the failure of higher education in Morocco. According to these officials, the reason for this failure is because the Arabization process was discontinued at the secondary education level and never managed to break into the university system. As a result, a return to French as the medium of instruction for scientific subjects has explicitly been approved in secondary education to provide a seamless transition from high school to university. Educational reforms, especially those that address language issues in Morocco, are generally top-down affairs that recycle similar ideas from previous reform attempts, including keywords and phrases, such as vision, promotion, urgence, development, strengthening Arabic, openness onto foreign languages, etc.” Regardless, the outcome remains the same: not much is achieved on the ground during any one government term. Therefore, it has become a tradition to create new government institutions and task them with the same charges that other recent institutions, albeit with different names, were assigned. This has become the state’s approach to dealing with the sluggish and ineffective way of implementing educational laws that have already been passed by the parliament. As an illustration, below is a list of newly created government organisms tasked with reforming the educational system in the country:

4.7.1 Educational Institutions 1. National Council of Languages and Moroccan Culture (Conseil national des langues et de la culture marocaine) 2. Higher Concil of Education, Training and Scientific Research (Conseil Supérieur de L’éducation, de la formation et de la recherche scientifique) 3. Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM – L’Institue Royal de la Culture Amazighe) 4. Mohammed VI Academy of the Arabic Language (L’Académie Mohammed VI de la Langue Arabe)

4.7.2 Educational and Social Reform Initiatives 1. The 1999 National Charter of Education and Training 2. The National Education Emergency Plan: Najah Program 2009–2012 3. Strategic Vision for Education 2015–2030 4. National Human Development Initiative, (an initiative launched in 2005 by King Mohammed VI, with the goal of “shrinking major socio-economic deficits, promoting the economic integration of the most deprived and thus preserving their dignity.” (NHDI, 2005)

References

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5. Decree n° 1-19-121 on 12 September 2019 to implement the official status of Berber and integrate it in the educational system.5 6. The New Development Model (Nouveau Modèle de Développement6 (NMD, 2021) What is hard to miss about the last initiative (The New Development Model) is that it consisted of a commission whose mandate as a consultative body was to investigate and review the socio-economic state of the country and come up with new guidelines for a new development model for the country as a whole. The committee’s report was presented to the King on May 25, 2021; however, although the report devotes an important portion to education, “Strategic Choice 1: Quality Education for All” on page 104, the absence of Berber from the New Development Model report is glaringly evident, which has dismayed a large portion of the country: the Berbers, who continue to be the disenfranchised group per-excellence amid all these proposed reforms.

References Assid, A. (2000). Al-Amazighiyah fi khitab al-Islam al-siyasi (Berber in Islamic political discourse). Imprimerie Najah Aljadida. BBC. (2019). http://www.bbc.com/news/business-­24017596 Benhlal, M. (2005). Le college d’Azrou: La formation d’une élite berbère civile et militaire au Maroc (1927–1959). Karthala. Berber Decree/Dahir berbère. (1930, May 16). http://www.unesco.org/culture/fr/indigenous/Dvd/ pj/IMAZIGHEN/DAHIR%20BERBERE.pdf Chomsky, N. (2006). Language and the mind. Cambridge University Press. Clark, E. (2003). First language acquisition. Cambridge University Press. CSEFRS. (2015). Strategic vision for education 2015–2030. https://www.csefrs.ma/le-­conseil/ presentation-­du-­conseil/le-­conseil/?lang=fr CSEFRS. (2020). https://www.csefrs.ma/publications/lenseignement-­superieur-­au-­maroc-­ efficacite-­et-­efficience-­du-­systeme-­universitaire-­a-­acces-­regule/?lang=fr Diwan, I. (2021). Democracy and education. In H. Alaoui & R. Springborg (Eds.), The political economy of education in the Arab world (pp. 15–40). Lynne Rienner Publishers. El Araj, M. (2019). https://www.maroc.ma/fr/actualites/le-­conseil-­national-­des-­langues-­et-­de-­la-­ culture-­marocaine-­cnlcm-­proposera-­les Ennsup. (2011). https://www.enssup.gov.ma/en/publications/categories/BILAN%20DES%20 RÉALISATIONS Errihani, M. (2006). Language policy in Morocco: Problems and prospects of teaching Tamazight. The Journal of North African Studies, 11(2), 143–154. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13629380600704803

 The law that made Berber an official language in the 2011 constitution has never been implemented and continues to be a subject of debate and controversy in parliament to this day. This latest initiative is meant to investigate the challenges, the priorities, and the means to achieve the expected changes by 2035. 6  This latest initiative is meant to investigate the challenges, the priorities, and the means to achieve the expected changes by 2035. 5

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Errihani, M. (2008). Language attitudes and language use in Morocco: Effects of attitudes on “Berber Language Policy”. The Journal of North African Studies, 13(4), 411–428. https://doi. org/10.1080/13629380701800492 Hamoudi, A. (2019, August 30). Interview by Wail Bourchachen. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=hKrOxgyxgJo Hoffman, E. K. (2008). Purity and contamination: Language ideologies in French colonial native policy in Morocco. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 50(3), 724–752. Kingdom of Morocco: Ministry of National Education. (1999). Charte Nationale d’Education et de Formation (National Charter of Education and Training and Training and Formation). Kohstall, F. (2020). University reforms in Egypt and Morocco. In H.  Alaoui & R.  Springborg (Eds.), The political economy of education in the Arab world (pp.  67–86). Lynne Rienner Publishers. Miller, S. (2006, November 18–21). MESA conference. Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur, de la formation des cadres et de la recherche scientifique. (2007). English language guidelines for secondary schools: Common core, first year, and second year baccalaureate. Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur, de la Formation des Cadres et de la recherche scientifique. (2008). Pour un nouveau soufflé de la réforme: Presentation du programme Najah 2009–2012. National Charter of Education and Training. (1999). https://www.men.gov.ma/Fr/Pages/CNEF.aspx NHDI (National Human Development Initiative). (2005). http://www.indh.ma/en/ NMD (National Model of Development). (2021). https://www.csmd.ma/documents/Rapport_ General.pdf Official Journal of Morocco. http://www.sgg.gov.ma/Portals/1/lois/Loi_CNLCM_Ar.pdf?ver= 2020-­06-­24-­130051-­497 Pennell, C. R. (2000). Morocco since 1830: A history. New York University Press. PIRLS. (2011). http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/pirls2011/downloads/P11_IR_Chapter1.pdf PIRLS. (2016). Report on Morocco. http://pirls2016.org/wp-­content/uploads/encyclopedia-­pirls/ downloadcenter/3.%20Country%20Chapters/Morocco.pdf Redouane, R. (1998). Arabization in the Moroccan educational system: Problems and prospects. Language, Culture and Curriculum, 11(2), 195–203. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 07908319808666550 Royaume du Maroc. La Constitution (Edition 2011). http://www.sgg.gov.ma/Portals/0/constitution/ constitution_2011_Fr.pdf Ruiz, R. (1984). Orientations in language planning. NABE, 7, 15–29. Schiffman, H. F. (1996). Linguistic culture and language policy. Routledge. Segalla, D. S. (2006). French colonial education and elite Moroccan Muslim resistance, from the Treaty of Fes to the Berber Dahir. The Journal of North African Studies, 11(1), 85–106. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13629380500409925 Talimat, A. (2015). Sou ‫؟‬alu lughat attadris laysa maghlutan (The language of instruction question is not an erroneous one). http://www.hespress.com/writers/261932.html USAID. (2015). Reading for success: Small scale experimentation (RFS-SSE). https://www.usaid. gov/morocco/fact-­sheets/reading-­success-­small-­scale-­experimentation-­rfs-­sse Wyrtzen, J. (2011). Colonial state-building and the negotiation of Arab and Berber identity in Protectorate Morocco. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 43(2), 227–249. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743811000043 Wyrtzen, J. (2016). Making Morocco: Colonial intervention and the politics of identity. Cornell University Press.

Chapter 5

Social Justice and the Language Factor

Education is a human right and a public good that can be fully realized only through the provision of free, equitable, inclusive, quality public education. The growing commercialization and privatization in and of the sector is the greatest threat to the universal right to education. Education International

5.1 Social Justice in Education Social justice in education is not easy to define in practical terms although it is a concept that is hard to argue against. A social justice orientation might include “democratic education, critical pedagogy, multiculturalism, poststructuralism, feminism, queer theory, anti-oppressive education, cultural studies, postcolonialism, globalization, and critical race theory” (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, pp. 8–9). However, the type of social justice in education we are concerned with in this chapter consists of a model based on equal and equitable access to educational resources and opportunities for all students regardless of their socio-economic standing as a way of guaranteeing academic success and self-realization. In particular, we are interested in equal and equitable access to language as an important resource and a means to achieve equity and social justice in the context of education. Social injustice in education, on the other hand, arises when factors such as wealth, race, or gender, along with access to resources determine the kind of education an individual is able to receive. When an individual is denied access to the language of power that can open the doors to economic well-being simply because he or she happens to come from an underprivileged segment of society, that is a type of social injustice that will have long term effects on access to not only education but also to adequate healthcare, employment, housing, etc. Therefore, a society that does not guarantee its citizens equal access to adequate educational resources and opportunities not only impacts the individual negatively but harms the socio-­ economic and cultural foundation of that society in the long term (OECD, 2012). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Errihani, Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco, Language Policy 35, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51594-1_5

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It is said that education is the great equalizer! Such a common aphorism implies that education ensures social justice to all students by guaranteeing equality, equity, and fairness. It also implies that all schools are guaranteed equal funding resources, and students are treated equitably and are provided access to qualified and effective teachers and opportunities for success and self-realization. The truth is that such a common view cannot hold true in any educational context characterized by unequal and unbalanced educational systems built on a distinction between well-funded schools and poorly funded ones – as is the case in countries such as the US, for example – or between private vs public schools – as is the case in Morocco (See Chap. 3 for a detailed account on the private and public-school debacle in Morocco). The state has a role to play in ensuring social justice for all its citizens, a goal that can be largely achieved through education. In turn, the role of a good education is to provide all students with equal opportunities and chances to succeed and compete, thus ensuring equity and social justice for all. Having access to the same school resources and opportunities removes the likelihood of some relying on inherited wealth and connections or other cultural advantages to achieve success (Smith, 2018). Thus, education can play an important role in reducing poverty and inequality and promoting social mobility if everyone provided with the same opportunities and an even playing field regardless of their race, gender, or social status. Unfortunately, this remain but unattainable ideals that educational systems from around the world continue to strive for but are yet to achieve. A good education is indeed supposed to guarantee equity and social justice which would eventually result in equal opportunities for success and self-­realization. However, the reality is that when factors such as wealth and privilege will often determine the kind of education one is able to receive, then the poor and underprivileged are automatically robbed of any possible justice. Students from less privileged backgrounds who are not able to receive an education on par with those who come from more affluent backgrounds are negatively impacted for the rest of their lives: they rarely graduate or complete their education, which affects their income and socio-economic status and contributes to widening the socio-economic gap between the rich and the poor, whether the educational context is a developed or developing country.

5.2 The Language Factor In many parts of the world, social justice in education can be achieved through the availability of equal access to linguistic resources, namely the language of power and economic opportunity. In Morocco, the official discourse continues to claim that the goal of national education is to guarantee a school of equity, equality, and social justice (Charter, 1999), but the language policy that Arabized the educational system did anything but provide an even playing field for all Moroccans. It was a policy that was enforced on the poor and the public school only. Those who were able to afford an alternative in the form of a French-medium education were not

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affected by the policy. As a result, the socio-economic gap between those who managed to circumvent the Arabization policy and those who experienced it has widened and contributed to the current deplorable state of education in Morocco. The government’s recent call for a return to an Arabic  – French bilingual education starting at the primary school appears to be an attempt to close this gap and more importantly an admission of the failure of the Arabization policy. Language is a crucial factor in the process of education because it mediates all the learning that takes place in the classroom. However, this medium cannot be considered neutral as it will typically reflect the ideologies and socio-political orientations of language policy architects and the elite that hold the most power in society. In Morocco, the elite and powerful segment of society consists of those who have received an education through the medium of French by attending French schools either in Morocco, in France, or in another French-speaking country. Those are the ones who typically return home to control both the private and public / government sectors; they are the elite and technocrats that make the top-down decisions that affect the grassroots, and this trend applies to education and language policy and planning especially. Language is a pre-requisite for social justice because it not only mediates education but also allows access to and participation in socio-political life. Sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists have long demonstrated the critical relationship that exists between language, social action and change and how language is not just a biological phenomenon or a neutral means of communication but a social experience and experiment that belongs to the individual and the community (Austin, 1962; Avineri et al., 2019; Bourdieu, 1991; Fairclough, 1995). On the other hand, language can be a tool that creates and maintains social divisions and inequities and guarantees power and social status, for through language individuals are able to display their dominance and power over others, a power that can be displayed not only through a particular language choice but also through dialect and accent. Social injustice and inequity can therefore be the result of these hierarchical social structures caused by restricted access to the language of power and prestige. This is why access to the dominant language in a multilingual community is crucial for all members of society and for an education system that aims to guarantee equity and social justice to all regardless of socioeconomic status. The power of language lies in its ability to classify people into social categories by means of their everyday linguistic practices and discourses. In Morocco, the language(s) one speaks or is competent in is what marks that person’s socio-cultural standing; as such, language inevitably assumes a certain cachet that bestows privileges as well as economic advantages on its speakers. This is exactly the case for Moroccans who are competent in French, a language that entails cultural and socio-­ economic capital, which only goes to confirm that the instrumental value of a language is what primarily determines its value on the linguistic scene (Bourdieu, 1991). In Morocco, both French and Arabic tend to symbolize power and economic opportunity at the expense of Berber; however, competence in French – more so than in Arabic – seems to open the doors for mobility and economic growth. That is why a language shift away from Berber is an inevitable consequence that

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unfortunately contributes to the gradual loss of the Berber language among Berber communities in Morocco. Likewise, there is an increasing realization that Arabic cannot compete with French when it comes to job market requirements; consequently, Moroccan society in general is turning its back on Arabic and looking towards foreign languages, namely French, followed by English, despite the pledged support for Arabization that continues to characterize official discourse in Morocco. French plays a fundamental role in guaranteeing access to the job market in Morocco as it continues its strong presence and influence in the business, finance, science, and technology sectors, which makes it the de-facto language of power and upward mobility. Moroccan society also perceives French as the language of modernity and progress, the language of competition in the global market, from which a large portion of Moroccans is deprived due to lack of access to French. This means that French continues to be the dominant language on the Moroccan linguistic scene not only thanks to its symbolic and cultural capital but more importantly because of its socio-economic capital. This awareness has led to an unrelenting and rapid language shift away from Arabic, albeit not with the same consequences as that of the Berber language shift. The language shift towards French is especially noticeable among the rising Moroccan middle class and the new bourgeoisie. Upon visiting any playground or shopping mall in any middle-class part of the country, one will immediately be struck by the amount of French used by parents to communicate with their children. This is also the case when one visits the home of young couples with children. Addressing children in French and expecting the children to respond in the same way is becoming standard among young working parents. In discussing this phenomenon with these parents, one hears the same typical answers, which basically indicate that their goal is to prepare their children to be successful in preschool as their goal is to send them to one that uses French as the medium of instruction. Communicating in French is also a means for climbing the social class ladder that is accessible only to those who are able to demonstrate that they belong. And French seems to be the key. For upper class Moroccans, French is becoming their mother tongue because it is the first language their parents use to speak to them, a phenomenon that is becoming more and more noticeable and even acceptable in Moroccan society. This language shift towards French is a clear indication of the economic and cultural capital as well as the instrumental value that the French language continues to conjure up in the minds of Moroccans in general. It also exposes the injustice to which a large portion of Moroccans continue to be subjected as a result of the Arabization process that forced them and their children to study all subjects in Arabic only to find out that Arabic alone has not equipped them with the required linguistic tools to break into the Moroccan job market, especially in the private sector. The shift is also indicative of the bitter awareness of the of the importance of French for socio-economic mobility, which has pushed most Moroccans, including the economically disadvantaged, to send their children to expensive private schools in the hopes that they can gain the linguistic skills there to be able to compete with those who come from more privileged backgrounds.

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But in their attempt to secure a better education and future for their children, whether they can afford it or not, some parents seem to be indirectly encouraging an unregulated sector that is intent on profiteering from their situation. In other words, some Moroccan parents seem to be caught up in a vicious cycle from which there is no way out. On the one hand, they realize that the private school is sucking the life out of them in exchange for hope that their children will be able to receive a decent education that prepares them for the future. At the same time, they feel hopeless and out of options since they realize that sending their children to the public school is tantamount to condemning them to a future of failure and misery. The irony is that by opting for the first choice and sending their children to the private school, they are inadvertently contributing to the growth and expansion of a massive monstrosity that is intent on profiteering from their condition and unintentionally making the likelihood of reforming the public school an impossible task.

5.3 The Private School and Social Injustice Mills and Lupton contend (2017) that Recent international neoliberal policy trends including marketisation of education, the increased blurring of the public and private as private sector practices and providers are welcomed in to state education provision (Ball, 2013 & Hogan, 2014), and diversification of education offers in efforts to provide choice for ‘consumers’ of education (Mills et al., 2014), have been positioned as being particularly problematic and inequitable, but the long-­ standing nature of inequalities cannot be ignored. (pp. 415–6)

The marketization of education can be explained by the unprecedented growth of the private education sector as well as shadow education in the form of private supplemental tutoring in many parts of the world, not only in developing countries, but also in advanced economies, such as South Korea. Morocco is one such context where private education is thriving, a phenomenon that continues to be sanctioned by the state without much oversight or regulation. According to Morocco’s Ministry of Education, the number of students attending private schools in the 2019–2020 academic year reached 1.105,182,00 which constitutes 17.65% of the overall student population of Morocco. This number dropped by 240,000 students in the 2020–2021 academic year when these students moved back to the public school as a result of the COVID-19 and the refusal of parents to pay tuition during school closings. Whether the trend of returning to the public school will continue in future years remains to be seen, but the private school owners continue to feel emboldened by lack of government regulation and oversight of the private education sector and demand payment even during school holidays. A case in point is when parents were required to pay for the month of July 2022 when students had typically finished their final exams and schools were closed for the summer holidays. Such unlawful practices are pushing the parents of many students to opt for a return to the free

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public school hoping that government rhetoric about reforming and improving the public school will come true. According to a 2020 report by Education International, the global union federation of teachers’ unions, has accused Morocco of commercializing the educational sector through its privatization, thereby creating an unbalanced structure within Moroccan society and violating the principle of human right access to education. In this report, Khadija Abdous (2020) states that the Moroccan government continues to support the privatization of education through various incentives, which has encouraged companies to take control of private schools and turn them into for-­ profit commercial projects, a trend that continues at all levels of the private education sector, from pre-school through higher education. Thus, the private school at every educational level has become the incarnation of social injustice in education in Morocco. It is a business enterprise whose main objective is material gains, and education is just the means to that end. Using its platform to provide an educational opportunity to the underprivileged to benefit from their educational offerings is not its priority, nor is it part of its objectives. The fate of those who cannot afford the private school is a public school with poor resources and unmotivated and incompetent instructors, especially when it comes to teaching French or in French. According to a 2017 study conducted by IPSE (Indicateurs de Prestation de Services en Education) and reported by the Observatoire National du Développement Humain (ONDH), a large majority of primary school teachers do not possess adequate competencies to fulfill their teaching mission. For instance, 0% (zero percent) of the teachers of French evaluated showed any evidence of a high degree of competence in French, an indicator that proves that the teachers assigned to teach French in the public school are not competent themselves in the language. This problem seems to be directly connected to the non-selective nature of the public school, especially at the pre-school and primary school level. In addition, lack of competence in French of the instructors is also at the source of the massive failure of the public school in general. At the university level, the unprepared students, who have gone through the public school system, suddenly find themselves required to pursue their courses in French and end up failing, dropping out or in the best scenarios switching majors and colleges. That is what the policy of Arabization has done to the public school and its students. Access to the French language seems to be at the heart of the success of the private school in Morocco, and this starts at the pre-school level. Therefore, such a realization puts parents in a position where they cannot afford to sacrifice the future of their children by sending them to the public school. And the private school seems to be thriving on this reality starting even at the level of daycare centers (la crèche). The private school has become mighty and ruthless thanks to lack of central regulation and lax oversight from regional educational academies to the point that they are able to extend the academic year to extract another month of dues as what happened during the summer of 2022. Parents have not been able to win such a fight because of the highly unregulated system of private schools with the government

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standing on the sidelines despite the official decree and Law 06.00 organizing private education in Morocco.1 In fact, the organizing principles of private education remain but ink on paper. For instance, Section 3 part 12 or the organizing principles state that the director of the private institution has the required educational qualifications to run a private school, including a minimum of 3 years as an educator. But since such supervision is delegated to regional educational “academies,” which are mainly in charge of supervising public education, private school directors with minimal qualifications in education will typically own the private school. In other cases, a businessman will own the school but will hire a “director” to run the school. Part 13 of Law 06.00 also insists that at least 80% of the teaching staff should have full time status, a goal that is impossible for any private institution to attain since the goal of the private school is profit first. As such, private school rely heavily on adjunct instructors, most of whom are public school teachers, who are paid by the hour. The ones who are hired with full time status are typically those who were not able to find a full-time position in the public school and had to seek the private school as a last resort. In short, almost every principle in Law 00.06 is violated because it is simply impossible for any private institution to implement and remain solvent at the same time. The education private sector has become so competitive in Morocco because of the unstoppable growth of new schools that continue to crop up day in and day out. It is therefore only natural that competition heats up among these private schools to be able to attract the largest number of paying students. As a result, some private schools have had to distinguish themselves from the “other” private schools by raising their tuition rates and becoming more selective in their admission criteria in order to limit access only to the children of the elite and thus carve a niche for the rich and powerful to have their children educated together. To give the impression that they are elitist, some of these schools create waiting lists as a business strategy to maximize their return, and the parents seem to eat it all up. Social injustice in this case does not affect only the poor who cannot afford the private school but also middle-income families who cannot compete with the wealthy who are willing to buy elitism and distinctiveness at any price. Such distinctiveness does not necessarily translate into improved quality of teaching. In order to maximize profit, private schools hire the least qualified individuals to teach because they cost less. The private high school and university might have access to well-trained and experienced part time instructors, who are ironically employed by the public school in a full-time capacity. However, preschools typically hire individuals with minimum qualifications, including a high school diploma in most cases, the ability to know basic French, and the willingness to baby-sit. Saadani (2017) comments on this phenomenon further by stating that:  For more information, see https://www.men.gov.ma/ar/Documents/loi06.00.pdf

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5  Social Justice and the Language Factor Le Maroc a en effet récemment décidé de généraliser l’enseignement préscolaire dont sont exclus 50% des enfants âgés de 4 et 5 ans. Bien que très louable, cette politique de massification s’est opérée avec des ressources budgétaires très insuffisantes, ce qui a conduit l’Etat à déléguer l’enseignement préscolaire à des associations faiblement dotées en moyens, et nettement moins exigeantes en matière de recrutement et de formation des ressources humaines. (p. 2) Morocco has in fact recently decided to generalize preschool education, which excludes 50% of children aged 4 and 5. Albeit commendable, this policy of massification was put in place with insufficient budgetary resources, which has led the state to delegate preschool teaching to private associations with few resources and little rigor in terms of recruitment and training of human resources. (p. 2)

Thus, hiring unqualified individuals to teach is a phenomenon that starts very early in the educational system in Morocco and continues through primary education, which is the time when the student gains the most important foundational and basic skills and concepts that serves them later in life. According to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, early learning is a foundational principle for professional knowledge and competencies, and missing out on a building such a solid foundation during early childhood education has long-lasting effects on the social and psychological growth of the child (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine), hence robbing around 50% of Moroccan children of fair access to a solid education during their first years of schooling.

5.4 French Is the Key While Standard Arabic might be an important tool in the public sector, which is the market controlled by the state, the private sector requires not only French, but also technical and scientific skills which can only be acquired through French. This clearly puts those who are not proficient enough in French at a disadvantage simply because of the difficulty of early access to French either because they could not afford the private school or the French schools, or because they went through a public school that did not teach French adequately. As a result, their access to the labor market becomes difficult due to their lack of competence in the desired medium that regulates and controls the job market. Still, one’s ability to speak French does not automatically open the doors to the workforce in Morocco. One needs more than just proficiency in French to break into the job market and the socio-cultural privileges and benefits that come with it. In Bourdieu’s terms (Bourdieu, 1984, 1991), one has to be endowed with linguistic habitus, a sub-set of dispositions that enable speakers of French to perform effectively in different contexts or as Bourdieu calls them, “markets,” which in turn makes them more desirable to the labor market. According to Bourdieu, such a socially structured habitus creates different classes of people speaking with different linguistic products, and those with the right linguistic capital will have the practical competence to maneuver within that market by producing the linguistic

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utterances that have the most cash value. In other words, competence in the language of power involves more than just linguistic proficiency; it involves the ability to understand the culture and ethos of the market and behave accordingly to show that one belongs. The socially-structured habitus prevents those who were not socialized in French – those who did not inherit that cultural capital – to all of a sudden gain total access to such a market, thus creating clearly defined social classes based on linguistic practices that disqualify those who are not proficient and socialized in French from such a market. In other words, those who attempt to break into this well-­ guarded community through the ‘euphemization of linguistic expression, or self-­ censorship’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 55) will never be able to compete with those who have been socialized in French and the cultural capital it entails from an early age thanks to their socio-economic standing and the cultural capital it bestowed on them. Social class thus plays a critical role in making a good education available to the privileged from an early age. Put differently, the educational system reproduces the cultural divisions of society, and anyone who happens to be born in the wrong social class in Morocco is likely to have very limited access to the same educational opportunities available to the elite. One can therefore argue that social justice in education cannot exist in a stratified society built on social distinction (Bourdieu 1984). Furthermore, a society characterized by a system that allows and even encourages unequal types of education to its members, where one segment can guarantee a good education to its offspring because they can afford to pay for it, while the “others” remain at the mercy of government handouts, is a society where social justice can never be achieved. An education system that does not strive for educational equity by guaranteeing that every individual is able to receive the same educational opportunities and resources needed to develop their full academic potential, regardless of their standing on the social ladder, is a system that will produce individuals who are destined to the lowest-paying jobs and the lowest ranks of their society for that matter. In Morocco the cultural and socio-economic capital associated with linguistic capital creates inequality and discriminates against the poor and disadvantaged. Like social class, language becomes an experience that people define verbally and actively through everyday practices. As such, French remains a powerful language that continues to create social distinction and haunts the imagination of every Moroccan. Being socialized in French is tantamount to possessing a cultural, and socio-economic capital, or in Bourdieu’s terms, distinction: ‘a certain quality of bearing and manners, most often considered innate’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 65) which provide access to the job market and at the same time endorses social injustice.

5.5 Linguistic Justice Systematic disparities between segments of the population in Morocco aligned with socioeconomic status, gender, and ethnicity to a lesser degree, tend to make access to educational resources and opportunities a luxury for those at the lower end of the

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socioeconomic ladder. These inequalities that characterize Moroccan society are accentuated by language. It is in fact access to the language of power, French, which is responsible for creating not only socioeconomic disparities but also linguistic inequality that prevents otherwise promising students from receiving an education that promotes their linguistic and cognitive development and at the same time reduces economic inequities. Language is at the heart of the socioeconomic divide in Moroccan society, a phenomenon rooted in a French colonialist system that stigmatized the local languages, namely Moroccan Arabic and Berber, and promoted the French language as superior to the local languages and as the sole course for Morocco to become more developped and modern. As is the case in post-colonial settings, such colonialist ideology was later adopted by a neo-colonial class of elites after Morocco’s independence. As a result, the new elite that ascended power and government in the newly independent state were the product of a French educational system that continues to run and control the labor market to this day. These colonialist ideologies took the form of institutionalized linguistic discrimination against Arabic and Berber and contributed to deepening the gap between the elite and the disenfranchised, between those who have access to a French education and those who have been forced to undergo the process of Arabization. The fact that French is used by those in power automatically confers prestige and power on this language and on its speakers by default through the process of “prestige transfer.” Put differently, those who speak French or have received a French education in Morocco tend to hold more power and prestige, and this prestige is transferred to the language itself, which makes it a more desirable and much-sought-­ after cultural and socio-economic capital. At the same time, this process results in devaluing Arabic and the mother tongues, Darija and Berber, a topic that is examined in more detail in Chap. 6. Therefore, as long as access to French is limited and, in many cases, not made available to those who are not able to afford it, one cannot talk of a system of education which is able to guarantee linguistic justice or social justice to its by treating all its members equality by providing equal opportunities and resources. Language is a mirror of social reality; it is a tool that allows access to socio-political life, which makes “linguistic rights a prerequisite for human rights” (Nee et al., 2021). Therefore, guaranteeing access to the language of power through the educational system is a human right and a form of social justice that should be guaranteed to everyone, not just those who are willing and able to pay for it.

5.6 Can Social Justice Be Realized Through Language? In his discussion of the “language gap” Johnson (2019) argues that schools are “ill-­ equipped to support students from culturally, linguistically, and economically diverse backgrounds. To remedy this situation, scholars, policymakers, educators,

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and other community stakeholders must back programs that are grounded in socially just pedagogies.” He goes on to highlight the importance of heightening awareness of linguistic strengths on a broader social level by starting with small acts that promote a language and social justice stance… [through] discussions with peers and colleagues, publishing” editorial articles, conducting original research, mentoring students from low-income backgrounds, or teaching with a focus on students’ strengths – not weaknesses. Regardless of how it happens, every time notions of linguistic deficits are challenged, we all move forward. (p. 103)

Thus, real commitment to social justice means eliminating the “language gap” that exists between those who have access to a French-medium or bilingual education and those who have been subjected to the Arabization process by • ensuring that languages are forms of human capital and that the learning of languages is an investment…” (Breton, 1978, p. 662). Therefore, providing an even playing field in terms of access to the language of power and “leaving no child behind” is a prerequisite to a society that strives for equity and social justice. In the case of Morocco, this means a return to bilingual education where students are taught in both Arabic and French. This would still not be enough to wipe out inequities in terms of providing equal access to language; therefore, a mass return to public school education is essential. However, this can only be achieved if appropriate human and capital resources are allocated to the public school. At the same time, the private school ought to be regulated and forced to follow the same rules and regulations imposed on the public school, especially in terms of the number of hours devoted to teaching French and in French. • Foregrounding social justice in teacher training and teacher education programs that enhance teachers’ French language skills and that empower teaching practices that promote an education as a dialogical process, in which students and teachers share their experiences in a nonhierarchical manner (Freire, 1970). • Using language as a tool to promote a social justice vision where education is meant to enhance democratic values that focus on civic engagement, social responsibility, and critical thinking (Diwan, 2021). • Promoting public education and making it a world where everyone can realize their full potential by connecting it to the job market, investing in its human capital and not just in buildings. • And most importantly, promoting a vision of democracy that translates into linguistic, sociopolitical, and eventually economic justice and wellbeing for all, not just for the privileged few (Hytten & Bettez, 2011).

5.7 Conclusion Language is an essential component of the quest for social and linguistic justice because in the same way it can guarantee certain advantages and privileges to some, it has the ability to also deprive others from those same advantages and privileges.

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The fact that a large segment of the student population in Morocco does not have access to the French language – the language of power and economic opportunity – means that a significant number of the youth are not able to reach their full academic and personal potential. This lack of access can be blamed primarily on language policies that have favored the wealthy and powerful and left those without economic means or options stuck in a public education where they were subjected to an Arabization policy that robbed them of any potential to compete for the linguistic resources necessary to achieve academic and economic success. Language is a primary cause for the educational crisis in Morocco because it is subjected to the ideological and political whims of government politicians and policymakers at the expense of Moroccan children and their future, especially those born into underprivileged socioeconomic conditions. Language has therefore become an indicator of social class, for those who have access to the language of power have gained access to a job market that brings with it socioeconomic capital and mobility while the “others” are destined to unemployment or low-paying public sector jobs if they are lucky. If over 50% of Moroccan children at the age of 9 are unable to read at grade level and 15- to 20-year-old children are not employed or in school (World Bank, 2020), it is primarily because of how language is managed in the educational system. The government’s solution to this problem has been to expand the number of technical and vocational education and training schools to absorb this high number of at-risk students. While this approach to solving the high drop-out and unemployment problems among the youth in Morocco is laudable, the reality is that such “trade” schools have also indirectly widened the gap between social classes by creating a new segment of second-class youth who are stigmatized by society for “low achievement” and in many instances condemned to blue color jobs at best. In order to guarantee social justice and equality among all students, regardless of their socioeconomic status, public education should be the foundation of Morocco’s twenty-first century society where all students are allowed equal access to educational tools to realize their potential and become productive citizens of their society. This goal can only be achieved when students are guaranteed equality, equity, and fairness in terms of access to educational opportunities and resources, and a good place to start would be equal access to the language of power, French.

References Abdous, K. (2020). Privatization of education in Morocco. l’Internationale de l’Education. https:// www.ei-­ie.org/index.php/en/author/1426:khadija-­abdous Austin, J. (1962). How to do things with language. Clarendon Press. Avineri, N., Graham, L. R., Johnson, E. J., Conley, R., & Rosa, J. (Eds.). (2019). Language and social justice in practice. Routledge. Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Harvard University Press.

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Breton, A. (1978). Nationalism and language policies. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 11(4), 656–668. Diwan, I. (2021). Democracy and education. In H. Alaoui & R. Springborg (Eds.), The political economy of education in the Arab world (pp. 15–40). Lynne Rienner Publishers. Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language. Longman. Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. Continuum. Hytten, K., & Bettez, S.  C. (2011). Understanding education for social justice. Educational Foundations. Winter-Spring. Johnson, J. (2019). A critical interrogation of the language gap. In N.  Avineri et  al. (Eds.), Language and social justice in practice (pp. 97–106). Routledge. Law No. 06.00. (2020). Official Journal of Morocco: Basic organizing principles of private education. https://www.men.gov.ma/ar/Documents/loi06.00.pdf Mills, F. B., & Lupton, R. (2017). Towards social justice in education: Contradictions and dilemmas. Journal of Education Policy, 32(4), 414–431. https://doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2016.1276218 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (n.d.). https://nap.nationalacademies.org/resource/19401/ProfKnowCompFINAL.pdf National Charter of Education and Training. (1999). https://www.men.gov.ma/Fr/Pages/CNEF.aspx Nee, J., Macfarlane, S.  G., Sheares, A. & Rustagi, I. (2021). Advancing social justice through linguistic justice: Strategies for building equity fluent NLP technology. In Equity and access in algorithms, mechanisms, and optimization (pp. 1–9). https://doi.org/10.1145/3465416.3483301. Observatoire National du Développement Humain (ONDH). (2017). Enquête sur les indicateurs de prestation de services en éducation. http://www.ondh.ma/fr/publications/ enquete-­sur-­les-­indicateurs-­de-­prestation-­de-­services-­en-­education-­ipse-­au-­maroc OECD. (2012). Equity and quality in education: Supporting disadvantaged students and schools. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264130852-­en. Saadani, Y. (2017). La crise de l’école marocaine n’est pas une fatalité. https://medias24.com/ youssef-­saadani-­la-­crise-­de-­l-­ecole-­marocaine-­n-­est-­pas-­une-­fatalite-­3809.html Smith, E. (2018). Key issues in education and social justice. Sage. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine. (n.d.). Child development and early learning: A foundation for professional knowledge and competencies. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/resource/19401/ProfKnowCompFINAL.pdf World Bank. (2020). Morocco: Skills development for employment. The role of technical and vocational education and training. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ en/919151593565793405/pdf/Morocco-­Skills-­Development-­for-­Employment-­The-­Role-­of-­ Technical-­and-­Vocational-­Education-­and-­Training.pdf

Chapter 6

The Mother-Tongue Debate

Arriver à cinq ou six ans dans une école et y être accueilli dans une langue que sa mère ne lui a pas apprise est pour un enfant une violence intolérable. Être confronté à des mots écrits qui ne correspondent à rien dans son intelligence est pour un élève la promesse de ne jamais apprendre à lire. Alain Bentolila

6.1 The Controversy of Mother-Tongue Education In October 2013, the International Symposium on Education: Road to Success was held in Casablanca, Morocco. The goal of the symposium was to identify the problems that have led to the Moroccan education crisis and propose some concrete solutions and ways to deal with them. A major outcome of the conference was the recommendation that mother tongues, Darija (Moroccan Arabic) and Berber (Tamazight), be adopted as mediums of instruction at the pre-school and possibly the first years of elementary education. A state of mixed emotional frenzy ensued, and the media seems to have played a major role in fueling the debate surrounding the use of mother tongues in the educational system in Morocco, a proposition that had been inconceivable till then because of the role that Arabic (MSA) has played on the educational scene since Morocco’s independence in 1956. The significance of such a symposium lies in the fact that it brought the topic of mother tongue education to the surface for the first time in the history of Morocco. In other words, this was the first time Moroccan television and other media channels reported on the serious and scholarly discussions surrounding the importance of using the children’s mother tongue as a medium of instruction in their early years of schooling. This is significant because despite the controversy surrounding such a proposal, for the first time Moroccans have started to seriously contemplate the possibility that there might be some competition for Classical and Modern Standard Arabic, something that is not easily digested by most because of the status and

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religious significance that Arabic holds in the psyche of every Moroccan if not every Muslim of Arab descent. First, a short clarification concerning the various types of Arabic used in Morocco is in order, especially from the point of view of those who use these languages or language varieties on a daily basis: Moroccans. The classical division of Arabic into three distinct varieties is an approach that has largely been accepted by scholars of Morocco and MENA. However, Moroccans and the Moroccan state have never adopted this division. For them, there are only two varieties: Darija (Moroccan Colloquial Arabic) and Fussha Arabic (‫)الفصحى العربية‬, which might be thought of as an amalgam of the so-called Classical and Modern Standard Arabic. Such a distinction is crucial to be aware of for anyone conducting and reporting on ethnographic research in the region (Boutieri, 2016). Therefore, this work will only refer to two varieties: Fussha and Darija since this is the only division which makes sense to Moroccans. Darija and Berber (with its different varieties) are the two main languages spoken as mother tongues by every Moroccan. However, upon entering the classroom for the first time in their lives, children are welcomed in a different form of Arabic, which might just as well be a foreign language (Bentolila, 2010, 2013): Fussha. Some will argue that school-teachers in Morocco usually use a mix of Darija and Fussha throughout a child’s early years of schooling, but this does not take away from the fact that the children’s mother tongue is not acknowledged in any form. Instead, it is perceived as having an instrumental value only in so far as it can be used to aid in the acquisition of Fussha, the dominant language of education in the preschool and elementary school. In other words, the mother tongue’s usefulness lies in the fact that it can be used as a medium to assimilate the child into the dominant language, which no one speaks in Morocco, at the expense of the social and cultural identity carried through the linguistic medium acquired at home. Until the last decade, Darija’s relationship to Fussha was similar to the relationship that characterized Latin and its various dialects during the Renaissance period. Compared to Latin, the dialects, or vernaculars, at the time were considered unrefined, limited, and incapable of expressing complex and abstract ideas, qualities that were reserved to Latin. Latin, on the other hand, was the language of knowledge and a large corpus of literature and philosophy as well as a lingua franca that allowed people from various parts of Europe to communicate with each other. Interestingly enough, this is the exact relationship that has characterized the connection between Fussha and Darija. To this day, most Moroccans still view Darija as an unpolished, if not a corrupt, form of Arabic that is acceptable only for communication in the home and in intimate settings as it is perceived to be incapable of conveying abstract thoughts and intellectual concepts. In addition, Darija is an oral variety only, an appellation which confirms its low status compared to the other variety of Arabic. More recently, however, social media has been the first catalyst of a possible change in attitudes towards Darija. For the first time, Darija has become the main form of written communication among Moroccans on social media platforms, driven mostly by the effects of Arabization on social media users. The majority of Moroccans who went through Arabization came out of the educational system unable to communicate effectively in French; therefore, those who use social media

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generally feel more comfortable not communicating in French and instead use Darija as a medium of reading and writing. This phenomenon is not only the result of lack of proficiency in French but also because Fussha is typically reserved for formal contexts and settings; it is not used for informal and personal communication purposes on social media platforms. Until recently, this new trend of writing in Darija used to be done for humorous effects in more personal communications and would mostly consist of one word or phrase here and there. However, with the advent of social media and the need to communicate more in writing, the majority of Moroccans have found themselves more at ease using a non-standardized form of writing Darija, which has contributed to lifting the negative attitudes towards writing in Darija that existed before social media. The result is that the use of French has dwindled with the increase in use of Darija for informal communication purposes. The same attitude towards Darija has changed in other media, including television and advertising. Advertisers have realized that the quickest and most effective way to reach their target audiences is through the use of a language with which the average Moroccan can identify and understand, and most importantly towards which they feel an emotional connection. Thus, thanks to the advent of social media, the roles and functions of Darija have begun to evolve with the positive changes in attitudes towards the language itself. Still, social media and advertising cannot be considered platforms for serious formal and intellectual communication, which are still the exclusive realm of Fussha and French. Berber is not included in this discussion because Darija and Fussha are closely related, for they are characterized by a diglossic relationship (Ferguson, 1959). This is not the case for Berber and its varieties, which is both the mother tongue of a large portion of the Moroccan population and a considered a minority language in Morocco, which is not the case for Darija. Furthermore, the recent history of both language shows that Berber and Fussha share no linguistic similarities, at least as far back as 5000  BCE, although both Berber and Fussha are descendants of the Afroasiatic family of languages. Furthermore, until recently, Berber was an oral language until it adopted the Tifinagh script in the early 2000s, a political decision that has cost the policy of teaching it to all Moroccans dearly and has derailed its growth and expansion (Errihani, 2006, 2015; Erraji, 2022). Secondly, most Berber children grow up bilingual, speaking Berber and Darija, especially in urban settings. For the few who grow up in remote rural areas of Morocco, they would be most negatively affected for not knowing Darija by the time they start school. This is because the likelihood of being assigned a teacher who speaks Berber, in particular the students’ Berber variety, is very slim to non-existent. In other words, it would be almost impossible for any assigned teacher to welcome these students in their home language variety since most teachers assigned to teach in remote Berber areas are not necessarily Berber or speak the variety of the location to which they are assigned. Thus, the current policy that does not acknowledge the use of the mother language in education means that Berber children in remote areas who do not know Darija are condemned to failure from their first day of school  – more so than their Darija-­ speaking peers.

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Children of Berber descent are therefore at a disadvantage because of their inability to be taught in their mother tongue, more so than Darija speakers. Other factors that have complicated the Berber situation even further consist of the new script debacle and the different geographical varieties, which IRCAM is attempting to standardize. Because of these issues, learning Darija is becoming a necessity for Berber children in order for them not to be completely left behind, hence the language shift from Berber to Darija that characterizes the linguistic situation in Morocco, which has turned Darija into even more dominant, especially among urban Berbers. And if mother tongue education were to be adopted in Morocco, Darija would most likely become the default medium of instruction in the country, an unfortunate but familiar and universal phenomenon in multilinguistic settings where the minority or indigenous children are forced to adopt the language of the majority group (Ball, 2011; Skutnab-Kangas, 1999; Tollefson & Tsui, 2004). May (2006) puts such phenomenon of a minority language in perspective when he argues that if majority languages are consistently constructed as languages of ‘wider communication’ while minority languages are viewed as (merely) carriers of ‘tradition’ or ‘historical identity,’ as was the case in early LP, it is not hard to see what might become of the latter. Minority languages will inevitably come to be viewed as delimited, perhaps even actively unhelpful languages – not only by others, but also often by the speakers of minority languages themselves. This helps to explain why speakers of minority languages have increasingly dispensed with their first language(s) in favor of speaking a majority language – a process of language shift or replacement that is a prominent concern of current sociolinguistic analysis. (p. 257)

At the present time, the Moroccan Ministry of Education is attempting to reverse this trend by collaborating with private NGOs who are tasked with hiring and training local Berber instructors to teach preschool in their regions as a way to encourage the project of generalizing mother tongue education at the preschool level in the entire country through the use of Darija and Berber. However, like all new policies, it is one thing to propose and plan language policies; it is a completely different matter when it comes to implementing language policies on the ground (Ricento, 2006; Ruiz, 1984; Schiffman, 1996; Spolsky, 2004). Mother tongue education might only have surfaced as a controversial topic on the Moroccan linguistic scene in recent years as a result of the educational crisis; however, this is a subject that has enjoyed widespread attention in international multilingual settings since UNESCO highlighted the right to education in one’s mother tongue as a human right during the middle of the twentieth century: All languages, even the so-called primitive ones, are capable of becoming media of school teaching; some perhaps merely as a bridge to a second language, while others may be used at all levels of education. But while this is true linguistically, there are many other factors – social, political, economic, and practical – which impede the development of these languages, or even the employment of certain languages already well suited to be used in education. Some of these difficulties may be promptly overcome (e.g., orthography); others (social or political), at best, may take longer…. We have, then, over one-half of the world’s population is illiterate and that a large proportion of the children of schoolage are not in school or are learning through a tongue which is not their own. (UNESCO, 1953, p. 6)

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Since then, UNESCO has continuously and consistently emphasized the states’ obligation to “recognize the importance of mother tongue instruction in early childhood and the first years of primary school” (UNESCO, 2008, p.  4). And because the mother tongue is a cultural and social heritage, it remains is a valuable legacy handed down to be preserved and maintained, and there is no better way to do so than through education. Tollefson and Tsui (2004) argue that medium of instruction policies must also be seen as discursive practices that result from wider social perspectives that justify mother-tongue education as a means to guarantee social justice and equality of opportunity. Such an approach reflects the inevitable connection between pedagogy and politics, where a state might use mother tongue education as a means to pacify a minority group by recognizing their language and including it in the school curriculum as a symbolic means to placate activists demands for language rights on behalf of their ethnic groups (e.g., Quechua in Peru and Berber in Morocco). Tollefson and Tsui (2004) go on to highlight this gap between policy and practice when it comes to mother tongue recognition and education: “policymakers, while paying lip-service to equality and opportunity, usually represent the interests of dominant groups, and thus adopt policies designed to further those interests, often at the expense of ethnolinguistic minorities” (p. 286). This is because several polities view the mother tongue as having little intrinsic value, especially in terms of its inability to lead to economic mobility, and therefore view it simply as an instrument that can help in the acquisition of the majority language (Skutnabb-­Kangas, 1999). Having such a role assigned to the mother tongue stigmatizes its speakers and robs it of any possibility of social justice. Such “dichotomization of ‘majority’ languages as key features of social mobility and economic development and ‘minority’ languages as identity ‘carriers’ propagates negative and essentialized views of ‘minority’ language users” (Bouchard & Glasgow, 2019, p. 10). Along the same line, Johnson (2019) argues that, while making access to the language of instruction essential and is a way to guarantee not only equity and social justice but also academic success, valuing and integrating students’ home languages and cultural experiences in the school curriculum is just as important to empower them and help them value their cultural and linguistic heritage, thereby helping maintain their language instead of leading them to completely assimilate to the dominant language. (p. 106)

Johnson argues that this form of social justice does more harm than good in that it encourages assimilation to the dominant language at the expense of the mother tongue, which devalues the latter and encourages future language planning initiatives to continue to be produce language policies that are more assimilationist in nature. Thus, social justice in education does not mean only teaching the dominant language to speakers of minority languages; it rather means empowering them by making their languages worthy of being included in the school curriculum. One could also argue that while access to the language of power is essential and is a way to guarantee equity, academic success, and potential access to the job market in a multilingual setting, valuing and integrating students’ home languages and cultural experiences during their early years of schooling is just as important.

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6.2 Attitudes Towards Mother Tongue Education In his introduction to Multilingualism in India, Debi Prasanna Pattanayak (1990) provides a comprehensive and succinct definition of the mother tongue, its significance, and effects on children’s development: Mother tongue is the expression of primary identity and of group solidarity. One is identified with a linguistic, ethnic, religious or a cultural group through one's mother tongue. It is the language of early concept formation and the language through which the environment gets a habitat and a name. The designation or nominal function of language, which names objects, events and stages, is a crucial function on which the superstructure of further learning is built. The early socialisation function, identity function and psychic function are rooted in the mother tongue. Myths and symbols, systems of beliefs and practices are transmitted naturally through the mother tongue so that living and learning become a seamless process. Mother tongue anchors the child to culture, the loss of which results in the loss of intellectual and aesthetic creativity and results in intellectual impoverishment, emotional sterility and cultural perception blind spot. (p. ix)

This definition captures the essence the mother tongue and how it is an essential part of children’s social and cultural identity as well as the first medium through which they become socialized to the world around them. Research on mother-tongue education continues to prove that children who learn in their mother tongue are successful in school because it enhances cognitive and intellectual development and helps in the transition to learning in a different language by building on prior knowledge (Ball, 2011; UNESCO, 2003). Therefore, it is crucial that the functional use of the mother tongue not remain confined only to the home and to in-group communication while the dominant language is assigned the function of medium of education. Such a choice increases the socio-economic gaps between the majority and the minority languages as well as their speakers. In other words, when a dominant language is recognized as the language of education or of business, science, and technology, such a recognition automatically comes with advantages and privileges for those who speak that language at the expense of those who speak the minority language, which in most cases are mother tongues. Oftentimes, however, in order for a minority language or a mother tongue to be accepted and used as a medium of instruction in the school system, attitudes towards it must be positive, but attitudes towards a language and its speakers are not easy to change. But mandating the teaching of the language in question might be a first step into changing its status and attitudes towards it (Skutnab-Kangas, 1999), a feat that is not easy for any language policy to achieve. In the case of Morocco, in order to generalize the use of the mother tongue medium through preschool, attitudes towards the mother tongues of the country would need to change first, which is no easy task for policy makers and the government to do, given the low status mother tongues have occupied in the Moroccan imagination for a very long time. Until the last two decades, and especially thanks to the emergence of social media, Moroccans in general tended to feel uncomfortable and reluctant to even consider the idea that mother tongues can be used in education, be it Darija or Berber. Some have argued

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that this attitude is most likely a colonialist state of mind that has been inherited from the French and continues to this day, albeit in a weakened form (Pattanayak, 1986). In order for the government to call for the inclusion of the mother tongue in the school curriculum, a clear rationale for its use would first need to be clearly articulated and communicated to the parents and educators, who would expectedly be suspicious of the project at first. The policy makers would need to clearly define the goal and outcome of adopting the mother tongues in the educational system: Is it going to be used for literacy purposes only in order to facilitate the acquisition of Fussha, or would the goal be to standardize the mother tongues and assign them larger roles in the educational system? These questions remain unanswered, and the Ministry of Education’s stance towards this issue remains vague and hence a source of confusion and uncertainty among the average Moroccan. Mother tongue education represents a central controversy in the field of language policy in education, mainly because of the low status of the mother tongues and the script issue as is the case in Morocco. Advocates of mother tongue education insist that children ought to be welcomed to school in their mother tongue(s), the language they brought with them from home (Ball, 2011; Bentolila, 2010, 2013; Spolsky, 2004; Tollefson & Tsui, 2004). While this approach has its advantages, it also consists of so many difficulties and impracticalities. In Morocco’s urban settings, this might not be an issue since most children and teachers speak Darija as a mother tongue. The issue becomes complicated in rural parts of the country where teachers assigned to schools most likely won’t know the home language of their students, especially when the varieties in question are Berber regional varieties. Also, while Darija can easily be written using the Arabic script, Berber’s adopted script, Tifinagh, is not widespread even among speakers of Berber, including the teachers themselves (Errihani, 2006). Any plan to adopt the mother tongues in education will therefore have its supporters and detractors. While the mother tongues are considered by some as barriers against upward mobility, they are for others the only key to equality of opportunity. Supporters of the mother tongues see them as the most powerful means for maintaining, revitalizing, and developing a whole language and a culture that would otherwise be condemned to loss (Tollefson & Tsui, 2004). Furthermore, including mother tongues in the educational system can offer equal opportunities and an equal voice for political involvement and democratization, as well as access to knowledge that is often monopolized by the elites (Pattanayak, 1986). On the other hand, those who are opposed to the adoption of the mother tongues in education do so based on the assumption that these languages are backward, unrefined, and incapable of competing on the linguistic and economic market. Conservative supporters of the use of Fussha in education feel that the mother tongues represent unnecessary competition to the Arabic language in both its forms and might eventually contribute to its demise just like what happened to Latin in terms of its relationship to its “vulgar” dialects. Additionally, Darija and Berber are viewed as limited in resources and therefore unable to express abstract ideas or the range of thought embodied in the standardized and modernized Fussha. To the

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average Moroccan, the mother tongues continue to be viewed as inferior languages (or dialects) compared to Fussha and French and should therefore continue to be confined to oral communication in intimate and informal domains or settings but not the school setting. Such arguments are not new and are directly the result of the diglossic phenomenon that characterizes the Moroccan linguistic scene. There are at least two types of diglossia that characterize the linguistic scene in Morocco: what could be termed the Ferguson (1959) type and the Fishman (1978) type. The first consists of the classic two distinct varieties of the same language: an H variety and an L variety. The H variety (Classical/Modern Standard Arabic: Fussha) and the Low variety (Darija) have clear yet uneven functions, where the “H” variety is the prestige written variety used in official and formal discourse, education, mass media and is also the written and at times the spoken lingua franca in the Arab World. The “L” variety is the oral variety used mostly for oral communication purposes in the home and in more intimate domains and thus carries no prestige. To extend this definition of diglossia beyond Ferguson’s original designation to the second type would include French, a foreign language that enjoys greater social prestige in terms of its functions within Moroccan society  – greater than Fussha, which in this case becomes the “L” variety while French assumes the “H” title even though the two are distinct languages and not varieties of the same language as defined by the Ferguson type of diglossia. One could also argue that the multilingual nature of the Moroccan linguistic scene is marked by triglossia where three languages compete for power and prestige, and where French comes on top, followed by Fussha, and then the mother tongue Darija, (or Berber in some instances). Youssi (1995) adds another variety to the mix of Arabic varieties and calls it Middle Moroccan Arabic (MMA), a sort of formal Darija that borrows heavily from Fussha and is used in semi-formal settings and the media. Youssi argues that this third variety is the one used by teachers in elementary schools, especially and is a medium that therefore creates a triglossic situation in Morocco where it assumes a median, not a High or a Low function. However, this attempt at adding a third variety of Arabic to the linguistic scene might have some traction with linguists but not necessarily with the average Moroccan who might see it as far-fetched. If we consider Darija a language and not simply a dialect of Arabic, then it seems that what Youssi calls Middle Moroccan Arabic is simply a more formal Darija used in more formal settings, such as education and TV interviews, for instance, and nothing more. Spolsky (2004) argues that the “language practices in diglossia are usually associated with clear beliefs in the superiority of the H language and most language management reflects this” (p. 134). And Moroccan language policy and planning has been functioning on this broad assumption since the country’s independence in 1956. The effects of diglossia in Morocco therefore do not help the case of mother tongue education because of the low status associated with Darija in comparison with Fussha. The Berber language has an even lower status than Darija because of its association with rural Morocco, although attitudes towards it have been changing since it became an official language in 2011 (See Chap. 8 for more on this topic).

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Nonetheless, the linguistic reality of Morocco is characterized by a patchwork of languages and language varieties sometimes used individually and other times together as part of the codeswitching phenomenon that can take place between the main languages spoken in Morocco: Darija and French, Berber and Darija, and at times all three languages. Finally, if the project of adopting the mother tongues in teaching at the preschool and elementary school levels in Morocco were to be adopted, a few issues would first need to be addressed immediately after communicating a clear rationale for such a choice to those who are to be affected by the policy. First, the case for the positive effects of the medium of instruction on academic achievement must be made clear and communicated to all stakeholders so that the educational benefits of mother tongue education are fully understood by all involved, especially the parents. Secondly, in the absence of a clear strategy for linking the mother tongues with Fussha, the poor performance of children might be publicized as the failure of mother tongue instruction. Therefore, a clear strategy for linking the two varieties would need to be worked out prior to implementing the policy of adopting the mother tongues in early education. Another variable that would need to be addressed is the issue of standardization of the mother tongues. Some might argue for the necessity of standardizing the mother tongues so as to officially replace Fussha in early education. However, while the process of standardizing Darija and Berber might have its rewards, it might also create a distance between the mother tongue in question and the taught mother tongue in the classroom. Such a process would most likely count as a major variable in the measurement of scholastic attainment, while at the same time proving counter-intuitive in terms of promoting diversity and multilingualism, something that represents a point of pride for Morocco’s exceptionalism.

6.3 A Potential Success of Mother Tongue Education on the Horizon Like many newly independent nations in Africa, Morocco had to deal with questions of language and identity after the departure of the French colonial powers in 1956. But unlike most African nations who had many competing ethnic groups and languages that led them to ironically settle for the language of the colonizer as their unifying mode of expression, Morocco adopted “Arabic,” a language that has served as a unifying force between Arabs and Berbers because of its religious symbolism and significance. But this same “Arabic” that was meant to also replace French in education through a policy of Arabization has been the source of an educational crisis that the country continues to struggle with. Moroccan students are failing because of the Arabic that was imposed on them as a medium of instruction, even though it is not the Arabic they learn at home. Thus, the failure of Moroccan students when it comes

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to literacy performance (PIRLS, 2016) is not haphazard but is the result of a muddled system of education at the preschool and elementary levels. Children come to school speaking their mother tongues, be it Darija or Berber, only to be faced with a different language and asked to learn to read words that are may be foreign to them when compared with the words they learned in their homes. It is this approach to early education, in particular the use of the linguistic medium in preschool, which has been blamed for the educational crisis that continues to plague the Moroccan system of education despite the many educational reforms that have come and gone. The linguistic solution to this educational fiasco has finally been recognized by the Moroccan Ministry of Education, albeit without any fanfare, and has resulted in partnerships that the Ministry is attempting to establish with private organizations, such as Zakoura Foundation, to expand the use of mother tongues in preschool as a way to begin fixing the literacy issues among school children in the country. This is a crucial and well-intentioned attempt by the state to finally transition the educational system from one that is elitist for not recognizing the value of mother tongues for educational purposes to a system that slowly recognizes the value of the home language as a means to transition from home language to school language. Spolsky (2004) poses a very interesting question in this regard: “Might it not be better to work on improving the system as a whole rather than debating the medium of instruction?” (p. 131). A large portion of Moroccans (based on data collected as part of this book project) contend that the debate around whether the mother tongue or Fussha should be the medium of teaching is the wrong debate and tends to take the attention away from the real problem, which is the educational system as a whole. Many Moroccans are reluctant to listen to any proposal that includes incremental steps to dealing with the educational crisis, such as the adoption of mother tongues in education as a first step into the process, and argue that politicians (policy makers) are simply trying to divert the attention from meaningful reforms. This shows the lack of faith that the average Moroccan has developed vis-à-vis the politicians who make promises which they rarely fulfill, especially when it comes to fixing the education sector. To say that convincing the populace to listen to the mother tongue initiative is going to be a challenge is therefore an understatement. Proponents of the use of the mother tongue for educational purposes at the preschool and elementary education (including scholars and NGOs, such as Zakoura Foundation) are not shy about expressing their stand against Fussha Fussha as the medium of instruction in preschool and elementary education. They are also vocal about expressing their disillusionment of the role of the Conseil (Conseil Supérieur de l’Education, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique) and, like a large majority of Moroccans, believe that a top-down decision (meaning the King’s) has to be made to once and for all settle the teaching medium debate (N.  Ayouch, personal communication, June 28, 2015). The Conseil is believed to be a puppet and make-believe institution whose role is to give the impression that all segments of Moroccan society are involved in the decisionmaking process, but the truth is that the medium of instruction is still controlled by two camps who are unwilling to compromise: Arabists and Islamists vs. secularists and supporters of French.

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Some of the proposed solutions by proponents of the mother tongue as a medium of instruction consisted of two proposals: 1. To get rid of diglossia by creating a standardized form of Moroccan Arabic / Darija that includes some aspects of Fussha and that could be adopted as the official “Arabic” of Morocco. This new variety could be used for teaching as well as for formal and social interactions, just like the informal and formal varieties of English and French, for instance. However, the reality on the ground shows that this form of Arabic, which had been previously proposed by Youssi (1995), already exists, albeit in a non-­ standardized form. In fact, it is this variety that is generally used, especially in elementary education, for communicative purposes. Therefore, adding another standardized variety of Arabic to the already saturated linguistic field cannot be expected to solve the medium of instruction problem. Furthermore, such a standardized form would still remain an L variety in relation to the H variety of Fussha, a phenomenon not easy to simply eliminate given the existence of more than one variety of Arabic in Morocco. 2. To institute English as the language of instruction starting in elementary school instead of adopting four different languages at this level (as proposed by the Charter: Arabic (Fussha), French, Berber, and English) (See Chap. 4 on language reforms). Here, the Gulf countries are typically cited as examples to emulate in language planning. The problem with this proposal is that it assumes that English as a medium of instruction is successful in the Gulf. It is not, except perhaps in schools attended by non-Arabic speaking students who come from diverse language backgrounds, in which case English is used as a lingua franca to teach them. Arabic-speaking students from Gulf countries are not taught exclusively through the English medium. In fact, the majority graduate from high school with minimal English language skills and will often need English language training before they are admitted into academic program at the university. Thus, both proposals by proponents of the mother tongue seem unrealistic if not overzealous because they fail to provide a realistic and feasible solution. Still, progress is being made in this area, mainly through NGOs, such as Zakoura Foundation, which was recognized by the Moroccan Minister of Education for its leadership in providing preschool education in the mother tongue mainly in rural parts of the country in June 2022. One of the main reasons for its success in rural Morocco has been its ability to recruit local instructors who guarantee that pupils receive a preschool education in their mother tongue, which is “a crucial element in the pupils’ linguistic and cognitive development”: l’un des critères et gage de réussite du programme de préscolaire de la Fondation Zakoura réside dans le recrutement local de ses éducatrices qui garantit l’accueil des enfants dans leur langue maternelle – élément déterminant pour l’adaptation et le développement cognitif linguistique de l’enfant. En tant que créatrice d’emploi, la Fondation veille aussi aux formations, initiales et continues, des éducatrices via la Zakoura Academy afin de les accompagner au mieux dans leur mission éducative quotidienne. (­https://www.fondationzakoura.org/actualites/331)

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6  The Mother-Tongue Debate One of the criteria that gauges the success of the Zakoura Foundation preschool program lies in its recruitment of local instructors who guarantee that pupils are welcomed in their mother tongue  – a crucial element in the pupils’ linguistic and cognitive development. Being a source of employment, the foundation makes sure that instructors receive initial and continuous training through the Zakoura Academy in order to assist them as much as possible in their daily educational mission. (https://www.fondationzakoura.org/ actualites/331)

The result of these successes is that this non-government organization has so far reached 1374 schools where over 43,000 pupils have benefited from a preschool education in their mother tongue, a feat that has pushed the Ministry of Education to partner with this organization and provide financial support to benefit its initiatives, a collaboration that could be replicated successfully with other rigorous non-­ government agencies serious about finding practical and achievable solutions to the educational system. In other words, this collaborative initiative between the government and an educational NGO seems to be a promising step in dealing with the preschool education and mother tongue conundrum since many such initiatives had not been as successful in the past. Thus, it seems that contrary to Saadani’s (2017) assertion that the government’s failure to generalize preschool education is the result of delegating preschool teaching to private organizations with little rigor and few resources in terms of recruiting and training their teachers, this recent collaboration is able to yield some positive results on the ground.

6.4 Main Arguments in Favor and Against Mother-Tongue Education 6.4.1 Arguments in Favor of Mother-Tongue Use in Education The benefits of being educated in one’s mother tongue are hard to argue against. Besides the cultural and emotional attachments that everyone feels towards their mother tongue, long term personal and academic achievement can also be directly linked to skills and aptitudes developed during the early years of education in which the mother tongue plays a major role. Other benefits and arguments in favor of mother tongue education consist of the following: • It is a basic human right: learning through the mother tongue medium is a right to which every child is entitled. • Denying mother tongue education to a minority group such as the Berbers is a violation of their basic human rights. • It is a form of social and linguistic justice. • It is more inclusive in the sense that it eventually ends up allowing everyone equal and democratic political participation and access to resources. • It makes knowledge and information decentralized and available to everyone, thus freeing it from the hold of the elites.

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• It is part of one’s social identity: A mother tongue is the expression of the primary identity of a human being. It is the language through which a person perceives the surrounding world and through which initial concept formation takes place. (Pattanayak, 1986, p. 7)

• Being educated in a language other than one’s mother tongue compromises the child’s education from a very early age. • The mother tongue eases the transition from home language to school language (this applies especially for speakers of Darija) but allows speakers of a minority language, such as Berber, to develop literacy skills in their mother tongue, skills which are later transferrable to other languages. Abstract concepts, literacy, and critical thinking skills learned in the mother tongue are transferrable to other languages and educational fields as it is often difficult to explain such concepts in a second language. • It is an excellent example of scaffolding and progressing from the familiar to the new and the unfamiliar. • It is an essential ingredient in language maintenance and preservation. • Self-esteem tends to be higher towards the child’s home language and culture, which helps the child have a positive attitude towards school and learning in general. • Parents are able to assist with homework, especially in contexts where the parents are not literate in the dominant school language. • Finally, instruction in a language other than the mother tongue at the preschool level is tantamount to Cultural genocide in the sense that not acknowledging the mother tongue or minority language is the fastest way leading to language death, and with language death a whole culture eventually dies (Skutnabb-­Kangas, 1999).

6.4.2 Arguments Against the Use of the Mother Tongue in Education • Mother tongue education is economically costly and can be a waste of resources that are typically scarce in underdeveloped settings. • Multilingual countries are generally underdeveloped and economically challenged compared to monolingual countries (Ferguson, 1959; Fishman, 1978). • Dearth of human resources who are qualified to teach in the mother tongue – a reality proven by the language policy that calls for the teaching of Berber in Moroccan schools. • Social and economic mobility is achieved by learning and using the language of power, not the mother tongue. • The mother tongue or minority language can be an obstacle to social mobility and progress and can amount to “ghettoization.”

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• Mother tongues may have a sentimental value as carriers of social and cultural identity, but they have no instrumental value compared to the dominant / majority language to acquire an education and eventually socio-economic mobility. • Schools are generally ill-equipped to support students from culturally, linguistically, and economically diverse backgrounds. • Lack of reading materials in the mother tongue to use in the classroom, which means that the mother tongue can only be used orally, unless the Arabic script is adopted for both Darija and Berber. • Adopting the mother tongues in education would be counterintuitive in that they would lead to the demise of Fussha, just like what happened to Latin.

6.5 Possible Solutions and Recommendations While mother tongue education rights might have some appeal in other world multilingual contexts, in a context where Arabic is revered for its religious symbolism and for representing the ultimate linguistic authority of the Qur’an, the proposition of adopting the mother tongue for educational purposes instead of Fussha can only be expected to be challenging, but it is not impossible. This is something that was almost unthinkable during the height of Arabization, a time when Fussha reigned supreme in elementary and secondary education. However, due to the extent of the crisis mode that the educational system seems to be undergoing, attitudes towards the use of the mother tongues in early education seem to be changing. As a result, if the state and language policy planners adopt a pragmatic and feasible approach to solving the educational crisis in Morocco, Fussha might no longer be able to keep mother tongue education out of the linguistic and educational market in Morocco. Therefore, while acknowledging the benefits of mother tongue education for preschool children and their long-term success and being mindful of the logistical difficulties of implementing such policy, it is essential to develop a short- and long-term plan in place for its implementation. The goal should be to include Darija and Berber in the fabric of early education as a means to increase literacy and improve learning outcomes and at the same time empower the home languages and cultures. However, if the mother tongues are not to be standardized, the ultimate goal should be to use the mother tongues only in early education and gradually transition to Fussha and another foreign language by the end of elementary school. Introducing Darija and Berber and maintaining and promoting Fussha and another foreign language as mediums of instruction in the educational system as a whole should not necessarily result in rejecting the mother tongues, especially for a country that prides itself on the richness of its diversity, plurality, and multilinguistic profile. Another important proposition is to teach Darija and Berber using the Arabic script to facilitate the children’s transition to literacy in Fussha. Including any other script, such as Tifinagh for Berber, would result in one step forward and

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two steps back for Berber children. The adoption of Tifinagh as the official script for Berber was a purely political choice that never took into consideration the negative effects it would have on the implementation of the teaching of Berber. In fact, it could be argued that Tifinagh is the main reason for the failure of implementing the teaching of Berber, a project that was supposed to achieve its generalization goal by 2010 (Errihani, 2006).

Source: hespress.ma

Using the Arabic script for children whose mother tongue is Darija should make the transition to Fussha smooth and seamless. For children whose mother tongue is Berber, the transition is expected to be slower, albeit most Berber children are bilingual from a very early age in Berber and Darija and can therefore be expected to be able to acquire literacy skills through the Arabic script by the end of elementary school. According to Chkayri and Mgharfaoui (2018), two leading proponents of mother tongue education in Morocco, all schooling at the elementary level is already done through the mother tongue, be it Darija or Berber, but while an NGO such as Zakoura Foundation, for instance, acknowledges and encourages the use of the mother tongues in pre-school and primary education, the Moroccan system of education is reluctant to make such an admission for fear of backlash (A.  Chkayri, personal communication, July 12, 2016). Chkayri argued that the main objective of early education is to get students to pass the “chahada” (to graduate from elementary school), which requires the ability to read at grade level and complete basic writing tasks in Fussha. Consequenlty, developing literacy through the mother tongue in preschool and early elementary education can translate into building students’ confidence and persistence. To achieve such an objective, students ought to be welcomed to school in the language they learned at home, and the Arabic script should be used to successfully transition from speaking and writing in the mother tongue to at least completing basic writing tasks in Fussha by the end of elementary education. This will ensure that students are not robbed of their right to a fair and rewarding education and will level the playing field for all students in Morocco from a very early age.

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References Ball, J. (2011). Mother tongue-based bilingual education in the early years. UNESCO. Bentolila, A. (2010). Quels choix linguistiques? http://www.cdeville.fr/article-­alain-­bentolila-­ quels-­choix-­linguistiques-­52148727.html Bentolila, A. (2013, October 13–14). La politique linguistique, en finir avec les faux semblants. Colloque International sur l’Education. Casablanca. Bouchard, J., & Glasgow, G. P. (2019). Agency in language policy and planning: Critical inquiries. Routledge. Boutieri, C. (2016). Learning in Morocco, language politics and the abandoned educational dream. Indiana University Press. Chekayri, A., & Mgharfaoui, K. (2018). Réflexions sur le lexique et l’enseignement de l’arabe marocain. Centre de la promotion du darija. Erraji, M. (2022). ‫( حصيةل ضعيفة تسم ورش تعممي تعلمي اللغة ا ألمازيغية يف املدارس املغربية‬Poor outcomes of generalizing the teaching of the Amazigh language in Moroccan schools). https://www.hespress.com/­-‫­ضعيفة‬-‫حصيةل‬ 1025760­-‫­ا‬-‫­اللغة‬-‫­تدريس‬-‫­تعممي‬-‫­ورش‬-‫تسم‬.html Errihani, M. (2006). Language policy in Morocco: Problems and prospects of teaching Tamazight. The Journal of North African Studies, 11(2), 143–154. Errihani, M. (2015). Language and social distinction: Speaking Darija with the right accent. The Journal of North African Studies, 21(5), 741–764. https://doi.org/10.1080/1362938 7.2016.1212706 Ferguson, C. (1959). Diglossia. Word, 15, 325–340. Fishman, J. (1978). Preface. In J. Fishman (Ed.), Advances in the study of societal multilingualism. Mouton. Johnson, J. (2019). A critical interrogation of the language gap. In N.  Avineri et  al. (Eds.), Language and social justice in practice (pp. 97–106). Routledge. May, S. (2006). Language policy and minority rights. In T. Ricento (Ed.), An introduction to language policy: Theory and method (pp. 255–271). Blackwell. Pattanayak, D. P. (1986). Educational use of mother tongue. In B. Spolsky (Ed.), Language and education in multilingual settings. Multilingual Matters Avon: England Ltd. Pattanayak, D. P. (1990). Multilingualism in India. Multilingual Matters. PIRLS. (2016). The Kingdom of Morocco. http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/pirls2016/international-­ results/wp-­content/uploads/encyclopedia-­pirls/downloadcenter/3.%20Country%20Chapters/ Morocco.pdf Ricento, T. (2006). An introduction to language policy: Theory and method. Blackwell. Ruiz, R. (1984). Orientations in language planning. NABE, 7, Winter. Saadani, Y. (2017). La crise de l’école marocaine n’est pas une fatalité. https://medias24.com/ youssef-­saadani-­la-­crise-­de-­l-­ecole-­marocaine-­n-­est-­pas-­une-­fatalite-­3809.html Schiffman, H. F. (1996). Linguistic culture and language policy. Routledge. Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1999). Education of minorities. In J. Fishman (Ed.), Handbook of language and ethnic identity (pp. 42–59). Oxford University Press. Spolsky, B. (2004). Language policy. Cambridge University Press. Tollefson, J.  W., & Tsui, A.  B. (2004). Medium of instruction policies: Which agenda? Whose agenda? Language Problems and Language Planning, 29(1), 94–95. https://doi.org/10.1075/ lplp.29.1.11osb UNESCO. (1953). The use of the vernacular languages in education. Monographs on Foundations of Education (p. 8). UNESCO. UNESCO. (2003). Education in a multilingual world: UNESCO education position paper https:// unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000129728

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UNESCO. (2008). Mother tongue instruction in early childhood education: A selected bibliography. UNESCO. Youssi, A. (1995). The Moroccan triglossia: Facts and implications. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 112, 29–43.

Chapter 7

Language as a Democratizing Force

English is the least localized of all the languages in the world today. Spoken almost everywhere in the world to some degree, and tied to no particular social, political, economic or religious system, or to a specific racial or cultural group, English belongs to everyone or to no one, or it at least is quite often regarded as having this property. Ronald Wardhaugh

7.1 Language, Power, and Elite Closure Language is not just an instrument of communication; it is also a tool that guarantees power and social status and a way through which individuals are able to transmit cultural and ideological values as well as display their linguistic competence and dominance over “others.” In multilingual settings, one language tends to hold more power and prestige over other languages and thus plays an important role in the distribution of power and prestige and the allocation of resources to those who speak it while denying such privileges to those who speak minority languages or languages of “lesser value” (Wright, 2004). Milroy (2007) Contends that “prestige is conferred on language varieties by speakers, and speakers tend to confer prestige on usages that are considered to be those of the higher social classes” (p. 137). The elite and dominant group in a multilingual community will typically speak the dominant language and use the power rewards it confers on them to create and support language policies that maintain their hold on power and socioeconomic advantages through what Myers-Scotton (1993) calls “elite closure.” In so doing, they effectively prevent non-elites from access to the dominant language and the resources to gain social, cultural, and economic capital. Thus, language is not just an instrument or a means to accomplish a task; it is also a means of establishing power relations. Fairclough (2015) argues that The picture of language … is exclusively task-oriented: using language effectively, for effects such as conveying meaning…language use – discourse – is not just a matter of per-

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Errihani, Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco, Language Policy 35, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51594-1_7

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forming tasks, it is also a matter of expressing and constituting and reproducing social identities and social relations, including crucially relations of power. (p. 232)

In other words, language is more than simply “doing things with words” (Austin, 1962) and more than just accomplishing undertakings. Besides being a biological phenomenon and a means to “do things,” it is also a social phenomenon that belongs to the individual and to the community and is therefore a tool for social interaction, and as such it can be affected by different social contexts, conventions, and norms of behavior. Such socio-linguistic interactions can reveal a great deal about the social dynamics that mark the relationship between the speakers, which are usually characterized by power relations and undercurrents. In addition to the power relations that exist between individuals, the association of language with power and authority can also be displayed in a political context where a political institution (such as a state) has the power and authority to put certain language policies in place in a top-down fashion. According to Spolsky (2004), “The implementation of language policy requires power… once the central power is removed, the only forces keeping the former imperial language in place come from language practices and beliefs” (p. 40). Such beliefs are triggered by the long-term effects that a language policy can leave on a community to the point that members of that community develop strong attitudes towards the language, especially if that language is accompanied with symbolic and socioeconomic privileges. Paulston and Heidemann (2006) confirm that the major linguistic consequence of prolonged contact with a language of power – typically a European language – is a language shift towards that language for economic and social prestige. Such phenomena create a class of elite groups who are intent on preserving their exclusive access to the language of power and all the privileges that come through this linguistic choice while maintaining elite closure as a way to keep non-elites from access to such rewards. This “is accomplished when the elite successfully employ official language policies and their own non-formalized language usage patterns to limit access of nonelite groups to political positions and socioeconomic advancement” (Myers-Scotton, 1993, p. 149). In the case of Morocco, this phenomenon is applicable especially to the Berber minority, a topic discussed further down in this chapter. In the multilingual setting of Morocco, the dynamics of socio-political and economic relations are bound to be affected by power and status relationships among different ethno-linguistic groups and languages. The fact that there are several languages and dialects on the linguistic scene of Morocco makes competition and status allocation unavoidable. As such, the status of each language derives primarily from the function it serves within Moroccan society. In addition to the utility of a language and its instrumental value in guaranteeing power and upward mobility, which are usually the result of widely accepted perceptions by members of society, being equipped with the language with the most currency and perceived rewards in society directly translates into conferring status and prestige on the speaker of that language.

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The linguistic market in Morocco is characterized by several languages as well as geographical and social language variations that serve different functions. The system of education, on the other hand, is generally limited to Fussha (the so-called Modern Standard Arabic) and French as mediums of instruction. One of four foreign languages (English, Spanish, Italian and German) is taught a few hours a week in high school, although most student opt for English. As discussed in Chap. 6, the mother languages, Darija (Moroccan Arabic) and Berber (Tamazight) have no official place in the school curriculum yet, although there are calls to include them in preschool as a way to improve students’ literacy and minimize the large number of student dropouts. French, a language that is not recognized in the National Charter of Education and Training (1999) or in any other official document as the foreign language of choice in Morocco, is the language perceived to hold the most power that translates into cultural and socio-economic capital. Furthermore, those in positions of power in government and the private sector are typically French-educated and tend to use French as their preferred mode of communication, especially in the private sector. Thus, the fact that French is used by those in power automatically confers prestige and power on this language and on its speakers through the process of “prestige transfer.” Put differently, those who speak French or have received a French education in Morocco automatically hold a higher socio-economic status, and this cachet is inevitably transferred to the language itself, which makes it a more desirable and much-sought-after means of cultural and socio-economic capital and upward mobility. Unfortunately, this same process tends to result in devaluing Arabic and the mother tongues, a subject examined in more detail in Chap. 6. The fact that French is not acknowledged in any official capacity despite being the most powerful and prestigious language in Morocco reveals the obvious contradictions that characterize the Moroccan official discourse vis-à-vis the language issue in Moroccan society and the ambivalence that has historically marked Moroccan language policy (Miller, 2006). This confusing ambivalence seems to be the hallmark of the Charter’s articles that deal directly with questions of language planning in particular. For instance, on the one hand, the Charter insists on the importance of being open to and acquiring foreign languages, while at the same time stressing the importance of promoting and strengthening Arabic at all levels of the educational system (Errihani, 2006, 2016). Moroccans themselves are ambivalent about the role of French in the Moroccan cultural and educational scenes. Although French is seen as an extension of political and cultural imperialism to which the country was subjected between 1912 and 1956, it remains indispensable in Morocco because of its instrumental value in facilitating access to technology, science, and international markets as well as because of the prestige and rewards it bestows on its speakers. Moroccans generally understand the need to learn French despite their hostility to the political and cultural values it may represent (Talimat, 2015), although such antagonism coupled with a need to learn French might change if and when English assumes a more leading role in the education sector in Morocco.

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On the other hand, the new role and status that English continues to gain at the present time as measured by the number of Moroccans who now speak it as a second language or have a working knowledge of it and use it on a regular basis does not depend on nostalgic or sentimental attitudes towards the British or the Americans. It is rather the result of the practical demands of a globalized world economy where English plays a leading role. However, contrary to speaking French, being able to function in English effectively in the Moroccan public sphere does not carry any prestige or cultural capital, although this might change in the coming decades as English gains more acceptance and widespread use, thus becoming not only a useful language but also a language of dominance and economic capital in Morocco. But for the present time, French continues to “rule.” This goes to confirm critical language theorists’ argument that a language can be a hegemonic force vis-à-vis less powerful (minority) languages, and the language in question here is usually a dominant European language in a multilingual setting, most likely a former colony, which facilitates its monopoly of the international linguistic market and also precipitates its so-called destructive effect on other local languages. This hegemonic scheme amounts to linguistic and cultural genocide, according to several leading critical linguists (Phillipson, 2006; Skutnab-Kangas, 1999, 2006). In comparison to French and its hegemonic control of the linguistic market in Morocco, Fussha is generally considered second in terms of status and importance in Moroccan society. However, its association with the process of Arabization has left a bad taste in the average Moroccan’s mouth. In other words, the language policy that Arabized the educational system in the 1980s seems to have left a bad impression on the minds of those who underwent this process, which essentially shortchanged the poor and disadvantaged who could not bypass it. While those who could afford French and French-medium schools were not affected, the masses saw their chances of learning and using the default language of power and employability in the country disappear. The outcome of the Arabization policy, which failed and failed the masses, is the current educational crisis that has resulted in poor high unemployment, low literacy skills, and high dropout rates, issues that constitute the nucleus of the educational crisis that the country continues to struggle with. The Arabization policy meant that Fussha gained unprecedented power on the sociolinguistic scene thanks primarily to its association with Classical Arabic and its religious significance as the language of the Qur’an and daily prayers as well as an extensive body of literary and philosophical texts. Classical Arabic is not a spoken language, and its status is not tied to social class per se; it is rather indicative of a high level of religious and literary scholarship, which does not necessarily translate into higher social status lead to upward mobility. Fussha, on the other hand, functions as a secular form of Classical Arabic and serves as the language of literacy, mass education, and communication among the entire Arab world. Like Classical Arabic, fluency and competence in Fussha do not lead to a higher socio-­ economic class. One salient comparison to make at this juncture is that while Standard English and Received Pronunciation, for instance, can be acquired by an individual simply by virtue of belonging to a certain class in Britain, in the case of Arabic, belonging to a certain class has no bearing on the Arabic one speaks (Haeri,

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2003). In Morocco, the higher people’s social status is, the less likely they are to be fluent in any Arabic variety, except the mother tongue, Darija. As discussed in Chap. 2, Scholars on Arabic tend to divide it into three distinct varieties: Classical Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic, and Vernacular Arabic (Darija in Morocco). Among these three varieties of Arabic in Morocco, Classical Arabic is considered to be the most prestigious according to this division because of its association with the Qur’an, and because of what it symbolizes to Arabs and Muslims around the world as the language of truth (Haeri, 2003; Suleiman, 1994). It is also viewed as an example of linguistic perfection because it is believed to have undergone little lexical or syntactical changes for centuries even though it has been confined only to liturgical practices over many centuries. In other words, while Arabic vernaculars derived from Classical Arabic have undergone significant change due to their contact with other languages (eastern, western as well as indigenous), Classical Arabic has remained relatively intact although its function as a medium of daily communication has ceased for centuries. Although Classical Arabic is not the mother tongue of any Arabic speaker, it has not died in the same way Latin or Sanskrit has, nor is it expected to die anytime soon. It has actually been well preserved instead of being replaced by its vernaculars, as was the case with Latin, thanks to its use in daily prayers and its diglossic relationship with the vernacular and to some extent with its modernized equivalent, the so-called Modern Standard Arabic, which in a way have preserved it from extinction. But it is important to reiterate that from the point of view of Moroccans (as well as Arabs from other parts of the world) the so-called Classical Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic are known as one language: Fussha. In other words, there exist only two varieties of Arabic: Fussha (Modern Standard Arabic) and Darija (Moroccan Vernacular Arabic) or Al ‫؟‬amiya – ‫ العامية‬in the Middle East region. As far as the mother tongues, Darija and Berber, are concerned, their status depends on their function within Moroccan society, which is that of carriers of sociocultural identities and the languages of the home and intimate settings, which in turn makes them less instrumental in terms of acquiring a formal education or employment. Socio-economic status can also be attached to one Darija variety over another, and among all the varieties of Darija spoken around the country, the variety spoken in the city of Fez is considered the most prestigious due to its association with the socio-economic power and dominance that its speakers enjoy at the national level (Hachimi, 2012; Errihani, 2015). On the other hand, Berber, with its three main varieties, seems to be on the lower end of the social stratum, and this is due to its association with what urban Moroccans continue to refer to as rural and illiterate Morocco, although such attitudes seem to be gradually changing since the officialization of Berber in 2011 (See Chap. 8). Therefore, while the variety of Arabic spoken in Fez allows its members access to economic and political advantages, speakers of Berber and other stigmatized varieties of Arabic (‫؟‬roubiya: rural Arabic) are often denied these advantages simply by virtue of speaking the wrong language, the wrong variety, or with the wrong accent (Errihani, 2015; Hachimi, 2012; Sadiqi, 2003). The prestige of the Darija spoken in Fez, or rather by people originally from Fez since many of them have “fled” the city of Fez towards Casablanca in search of

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more economic mobility, is reminiscent of the prestige that speakers of French commands in Morocco. Thus, being competent in French and speaking Darija with a Fessi (from Fez) accent puts one at the top of the social ladder in Moroccan society and confers on them prestige and power, which allows them access to cultural and economic advantages typically denied to the others (‫؟‬roubiya).

7.1.1 Elite Closure and the Berber Proto-Elite Maintaining elite closure by those who speak the dominant and powerful language is typically subtle and understated although it is tantamount to gatekeeping, the practice of limiting access and participation in activities that yield certain educational and socio-economic advantages and rewards to people who speak certain languages or varieties as a way to keep non-elites from creating competition for the elite. As mentioned above, such a practice can be achieved indirectly through language policies created and enforced by the elite to serve their self-interests first and foremost or in a more subtle way where the dominant class can exercise power through what Fairclough (2015) calls consent or coercion. Faircough argues that this can be achieved through the elite either forcing the non-elites to agree with their opinions and practices or convince them that agreeing to such institutional practices would be in their best interest too. Such a practice is typically successful until the non-elites give birth to an elite class from within that usually achieves power through education and ends up using their minority, ethnic, or linguistic rights as a platform to demand equal rights and access to the benefits and rewards that the elite has long monopolized. In other words, the elite closure phenomenon begins to change once urban and educated members of the non-elite group begin to mobilize and challenge the status quo. In the case of Morocco, this applies more to the Berber ethnic proto-elite since they are able to use their “Berberness” as a platform to demand recognition and equal access to linguistic resources. The dominant group, in this case Moroccans of Arab heritage who have access to the French language, are presented as non-ethnic, which legitimizes their monopoly of power and resources (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1999). Beer (1985) enhances this theory by stating that it is the presence of a perceived inequality of social status, and unequal access to economic rewards or political power due to language use which is crucial for the politicization of language use and its degeneration into conflict…In a climate of economic and social transformation brought on by urbanization and industrialization, aspiring ethnic elites, finding their avenues of social mobility blocked, will turn to minority languages for symbols of protest. One then witnesses the politicization of the linguistic cleavage as language becomes an emotionally charged vehicle for perceptions of alienation, discrimination, and prejudice. (pp. 3–4)

This proto-elite in this case are the intellectuals who have achieved upward mobility through restricted access to the language(s) of power and who all of a sudden feel that their upward mobility is too limited and therefore limiting their access to all the

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privileges and socioeconomic capital available to the “non-ethnic” elite. As a result, they use their ethnicity and minority language as tools to access even more privileges by turning into the spokespersons who are tasked with articulating the consciousness of their ethnic group. Fishman et al. (1985) confirms this approach to ethno-linguistic mobilization for the purpose of gaining access to power and privileges that the proto-elite feel is their right to tap into: A disappointed ethnic proto-elite redirects its energies and redefines its goals: its members become the defenders of the defenseless, the mobilizers of the unmobilized, the unifiers of the disunited and the authenticators of the tradition that was being lost, has been lost or might be lost. A disappointed proto-elite turns inward and in finding its own roots it revives them. In so doing, it may revive B as a language, B-ness as an authentic experience, and the B-and B-ness link as sacred responsibility, of drive, motivation and commitment. Thus, just when some are proclaiming the death of B, others may be heralding its revival and, indeed its eternity. More usually, however, the above goals may be unattainable and only symbolic snippets of them are implemented. (p. 65)

That is why the Berber language became the symbol of protest used by aspiring educated Berber elites, and its recognition, officialization, and teaching to all Moroccans became the platform used to demand justice and equal rights for the Berber ethnic minority, for their language, and culture. The question is whether such mobilization has helped improve the status of the Berber language in Morocco or not. The answer is a definitive yes, for after two decades of militancy and mobilization by Berber activists, the Berber language was given official status in the 2011 revised Moroccan Constitution. Prior to this official recognition, Berber was included in the fabric of the educational system in 2003 when it became a required language that everyone was required to study. Although the plan to introduce Berber to all Moroccan students continues to be met with resistance from politicians and the majority of Moroccans, including many Berbers themselves (Errihani, 2006, 2008), one could argue that the Berber language and culture question in Morocco has indeed progressed and evolved more than any other time before the year 2001. This year was a significant milestone in the history of the Berber language and culture as they were officially recognized by the King of Morocco as essential components of the makeup of Morocco, an act that was followed by the establishment of IRCAM – Institut Royal Pour la Culture Amazigh – (Royal Institute for Amazigh (Berber) Culture), the launch of Berber in Moroccan schools in 2003, and the officialization of Berber in the Moroccan Constitution in 2011.

7.1.2 Democratizing Education Through English English might be the most dominant language globally, but it has yet to achieve that status in Morocco. French continues to dominate education, the private sector, as well as many government institutions. However, the spread of English is steadily gaining momentum across the above institutions, and many are learning English in

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private language schools and social media platforms, especially YouTube. In a way, power inequalities have become less acute with the advent of the internet, which has become a democratizing force in terms of access to the language of global power, English, not French. In other words, the internet and in particular the various social media platforms readily available to everyone, who has an internet connection, have become a democratizing force that allows access to English regardless of one’s income or social class standing. The culture of speaking at least one foreign language in addition to the mother tongues is expected of all educated Moroccans to the point where education and socio-cultural capital can depend to a large extent on one’s ability to function in at least one foreign language. The validation of the importance of mastering foreign languages came in 1999 in the form of the National Charter of Education. Article 100 of the Charter stresses the “renforcement et perfectionnement de l’enseignement de la langue arabe, diversification des langues d’enseignement des sciences et des technologies, et ouverture sur le Tamazight” (Strengthening and improving the teaching of Arabic, diversifying the languages for teaching science and technology, and openness to Tamazight.) What is new, however, is the push to diversify the languages used for teaching science and technology, although the foreign language(s) to be adopted for teaching these subjects remains shrouded in mystery and ambiguity. The implicit message in the Charter is the attempt to revert to French and possibly English at a future time as the mediums for teaching these subjects, something that Arabic has not been able to accomplish at the tertiary level. The Charter even goes further as to suggest that French may not be the only language used in science and technology, and the implication here is that English might be either taking over or at least added as another language for teaching scientific and technical subjects at the university level. These “foreign language” mysteries have been unraveled with recent elected governments that came to power after the failure of the Islamist and pan-Arabist party, the Party of Justice and Development, to maintain its hold on power in government. In fact, French has openly become the medium of instruction for science and technology at the university level, and English is being gradually introduced as another medium of instruction. What concerns us here in particular is the role that English might have to play in a linguistic scene that has always been dominated by Arabic and French. The move to promote the teaching and learning of English both as a language and as a means of delivering content in tertiary education has already been in place since the 1995 inauguration of Alakhawayn University, the first Moroccan institution to adopt English as its medium of instruction. At this point, whatever the case may be, there seems to be an implicit recognition that the policy of Arabization has failed, and that a return to bilingualism and possibly trilingualism in the near future is a necessary course of action to guarantee that in the global village, Morocco is not left behind (King Mohammed VI’s speech, August 20, 2013). Furthermore, there are many educators and leaders in the private sector who have been calling for strengthening and promoting the teaching of English at the expense of French because of English’s global reach, which French seems to lack. In the fall

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of 2013 alone, two major conferences have been organized for this specific purpose. The first one took place in Casablanca in October 2013: Colloque International sur l’Education: Le Chemin de la Reussite 4–5 Octobre 2013 (International Symposium on Education: Road to Success, 4–5 October 2013). The other conference took place in Rabat and was more specific and forthright about its orientation, which is evident from its title: “Strengthening the Position of English in Morocco for Development, 21 December 2013.” The program for this conference stated that The Conference hopes to provide what is perhaps the first opportunity to engage and listen to language experts, businesspeople, service industry actors, decision makers, education officials and members of the public as they debate and make their cases about the foreign languages they would want to adopt and use as they trade and communicate with the rest of the world.

Therefore, all indications on the ground point to a potential change in the foreign language situation in Morocco, with possibly the inclusion of English as crucial player in the educational sector to assist in the reform of the nation’s school system. Like French, English holds no official status, but unlike French, it is a neutral language that carries no imperialistic undertones. Currently, Moroccan students are introduced to English in the 9th grade of secondary education, although the Charter states that English would be introduced in primary education, which has not happened yet. In private schools, however, English is being introduced much earlier, although there seems to be no consensus among the private school sector as to what grade to introduce students to this language or how many hours of instruction a week students should receive, as the whole private sector remains largely unregulated. The high demand for English has been welcomed news although the older French-educated elite may not be so welcoming of such news as it may herald a possible end to French hegemony of the linguistic scene and the possible end to elite closure. The masses who/whose children have suffered the effects of Arabization and lack of access to French are very receptive not only to the spread of English in Morocco but to the potential replacement of French by English. The case for replacing French by English as a democratic approach to language access has a lot of traction among students in both public and private schools and seems to be a generational issue. The old French-educated generation, especially the elite among them, might still resist such a shift; however, their children are clearly in favor of English. This assertion is supported by results from a survey conducted by the author in three universities in Morocco in 2018 and 2019. Two of the universities were private and one was public. Responses to two questions in particular were rather revealing with regards to the important role that French continues to occupy in the Moroccan consciousness. Below are two questions from the survey that reveal how the importance of French is waning even among students attending private French-medium schools. The first question asks students to simply state the official language or languages in Morocco, while the second question is more specific in terms of the language students think should be used as the main medium of instruction for

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scientific subjects (For a more detailed discussion of the survey results and their implications, see Chap. 8). In response to the first question about the official language or languages in Morocco, a total of 25% of respondents indicated that French was an official language in Morocco, in addition to Arabic. The fact that such a large number of educated individuals believe that French is an official language in Morocco is indicative of the power that this language exercises on the linguistic landscape and the education sector in Morocco. One can only wonder what the average Moroccans’ response to this question would have been when 25% of educated Moroccans assume that French is an official language in Morocco. Secondly, this assumption corroborates the discrepancy that exists between de jure and de facto language policies of Morocco. For political and ideological reasons, the Moroccan government may not acknowledge French in any official capacity and would not admit that this language represents an important linguistic and cultural medium inherited from the French that continues to operate in all sectors of the day-to-day personal and professional activities of Moroccans. However, people’s linguistic and cultural beliefs and practices will always represent the linguistic practices on the ground, which will typically contradict any official discourse or policies advanced by the state (Schiffman, 1996). With regards to the second question about the respondents preferred medium of instruction for scientific subjects, English was the overwhelming first choice among students from the public university while respondents who attended private universities (one of which was English-medium and one French-medium) were almost equally divided in their choice between French and English. The fact that respondents were asked to check only one box forced them to choose one answer based on their beliefs and experiences with languages and the functions and status they occupy in Morocco. What is worth noting here is that not one student checked the “Arabic” box, which clearly shows that Moroccans seem to have become aware of the limited potential of Arabic when it comes to serving as a medium of instruction, future employability and upward mobility compared to foreign languages. This also clearly indicates the traumatizing effect that the policy of Arabization has left in Morocco. Those who opted for with Arabic with French for teaching scientific subjects consisted of 20% of the respondents while 70% of the respondents chose Arabic with English. One could argue that the choice of Arabic in addition to another foreign language was more of an emotional than pragmatic choice because of the connection that the Arabic language represents to Islam and Arabic culture. The overall conclusion reached from the part of the survey that addressed the medium of instruction issue is that positive attitude that respondents have towards English, regardless of their social status (attending public vs private school). What is important to point out, however, is that while the masses see in English a sort of savior and an opportunity for employability and equal access to economic benefits, the upper classes see it as an additional tool that can help maintain if not solidify their status and hold on power, and give them more of an edge in the job market. Put differently, for those who already speak French, adding another useful language to their linguistic reportoire “is also a matter of expressing and

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reproducing social identities and social relations, including crucially relations of power” (Fairclough, 2015, p. 232). Moroccans from humbler backgrounds realize that power lies with those who are proficient in French, so choosing to study and excel in English is an attempt to break free from the domination of the French-speaking elite. Through English, the quest for empowerment becomes a possibility, and excelling in the global language of power seems to give hope to the millions who have been robbed of a decent education caused by a failed language policy that they were subjected to. But for the time being, the struggle for power through linguistic practices will continue regardless, as long as French continues to enjoy institutional support, and the elite are able to find ways to maintain and reproduce their grip over institutional power. The debate over which language is best suited to take on the role of the first foreign language and language of education in Morocco continues to occupy every Moroccan’s mind as the government continues to send ambiguous messages about the importance of being open to “foreign languages.” The 1999 National Charter of Education and the 2009 Emergency Program have been attempts to come to the rescue through by proposing several reforms to the system of education as a whole, including the introduction of “another foreign language” – for the teaching of science and technology – on an already saturated linguistic scene. Again, this “foreign language” is never named in any official document, including the Charter. The question on everyone’s mind is: which foreign language is it going to be: French, which represents continuity, or English, which provides access to international communication and economic development and more importantly a level playing field? All indications point to a possible language shift towards English in addition to maintaining French as a medium of instruction of scientific subjects, all at the expense of Fussha. What remains to be seen are the steps the government will take to guarantee the success of the new venture of maintaining French and adding English, especially after the failures of recent policies meant to salvage the Moroccan educational system from total ruin. Language is deeply intertwined with power struggles and power relations where the unspoken and subtle goal of speakers of the language of power is to maintain that power and the prestige and rewards it provides through elite closure while limiting access to such privileges for the “others” who are constantly in search of ways to free themselves from such linguistic and economic domination. Fairclough (2015) comments on this ongoing internal battle, which he terms the battle of “consciousness” and “emancipation,” by suggesting that the first step in achieving this freedom from domination by the elite is to help increase consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, because consciousness is the first step towards emancipation. That consciousness of language in particular is a significant element of this ‘first step’ follows from the way domination works in modern society: it works, as I have been arguing increasingly, through ‘consent’ rather than ‘coercion’, through ideology, and through language. (p. 229)

Becoming conscious and aware of the domination that the elite exercise on the non-­ elite is the first step into demanding freedom from such domination, according to

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Fairclough. There is hope among those victimized by the Arabization policy that adopting English as a medium of instruction, and not simply a subject to be studied, could eventually be that force that provides freedom from the shackles of French domination.

7.2 Conclusion Politicians and language planners in Morocco may not agree on many things, but when it comes to the state of the educational system, everyone seems to agree that the system is dysfunctional and needs a total overhaul, especially in terms of the linguistic tools used as mediums of instruction in primary, secondary, and tertiary education. The debate over the language best suited to take on the role of the first foreign language and medium of teaching scientific subjects in Moroccan schools continues to be in full force these days. The policy of Arabization, which is seen by many as the main reason for the current educational crisis in Morocco, has failed to replace French by Arabic as the linguistic medium of science and technology in tertiary education and as a result has produced students who are unable to function in any foreign language upon graduation. All the educational reforms introduced since 1999 have been attempts that came to the rescue through the proposals of several reforms to the system of education as a whole, including the proposal to introduce yet another foreign language on an already saturated linguistic scene, a language assumed to be English although it is never mentioned in any of these documents. Thus, unless the issue of foreign languages and in particular the linguistic medium to adopt for teaching scientific subjects is confronted and addressed openly and honestly, including naming the foreign languages being proposed, it would be hard to predict a way out of this educational conundrum. At the present time, French has been openly selected as the first foreign language and medium of instruction of scientific subjects. But in the midst of this chaotic educational atmosphere, English continues to gain ground on the linguistic scene in Morocco, and Moroccan officials continue to insist that it should be introduced as a subject as early as middle school. Increasing the teaching of English in Morocco can be an indication that points to a future shift in Morocco’s language education policy from a focus on French-only to English as a medium of teaching scientific and technological subjects, mainly at the tertiary level. At least, that is the project that the 2015–2030 Strategic Vision of Educational Reform (CSEFRS, 2015) has recently unveiled. How the state will unroll this project in the coming years is anybody’s guess. But the hope is that English will sooner be that force that finally democratizes the educational system and levels the playing field for all.

References

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References Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Harvard University Press. Beer, W.  R. (1985). Toward a theory of linguistic mobilization. In W.  Beer & J.  Jacob (Eds.), Language policy and national unity (pp. 216–235). Rowman and Allanheld. CSEFRS. (2015). https://www.csefrs.ma/publications/vision-­strategique-­de-­la-­reforme/?lang=fr Errihani, M. (2006). Language policy in Morocco: Problems and prospects of teaching Tamazight. The Journal of North African Studies, 11(2), 143–154. Errihani, M. (2008). Language attitudes and language use in Morocco: Effects of attitudes on “Berber language policy”. The Journal of North African Studies, 13(4), 411–428. https://doi. org/10.1080/13629380701800492 Errihani, M. (2015). Language and social distinction: Speaking Darija with the right accent. The Journal of North African Studies, 21(5), 741–764. https://doi.org/10.1080/1362938 7.2016.1212706 Errihani, M. (2016). English education policy and practice in Morocco. In R. Kirkpatrick (Ed.), English language education policy in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 115–131). Springer International Publishing AG. Fairclough, N. (2015). Language and power. Routledge. Fishman, J. A., et al. (1985). The rise and fall of ethnic revival. Mouton. Hachimi, A. (2012). The urban and urbane: Identities, language ideologies, and Arabic dialects in Morocco. Language in Society, 41, 321–341. Haeri, N. (2003). Sacred language, ordinary people: Dilemmas of culture and politics in Egypt. Palgrave. Miller, S. (2006, November 18–21). MESA Conference. Boston, MA. Milroy, J. (2007). The ideology of the standard language. In C. Llamas, L. Mullany, & P. Stockwell (Eds.), The Routledge companion to sociolinguistics (pp. 133–139). Routledge. Myers-Scotton, C. (1993). Elite closure as a powerful language strategy: The African case. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 103, 149–163. National Charter of Education and Training. (1999). https://www.men.gov.ma/Fr/Pages/CNEF.aspx Paulston, C. B., & Heidemann, K. (2006). Language policies and the education of linguistic minorities. In T. Ricento (Ed.), Introduction to language policy (pp. 292–310). Blackwell. Phillipson, R. (2006). Language policies and the education of linguistic minorities. In T. Ricento (Ed.), Introduction to language policy (pp. 292–310). Blackwell. Sadiqi, F. (2003). Women, gender and language in Morocco. Brill. Schiffman, H. F. (1996). Linguistic culture and language policy. Routledge. Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1999). Education of minorities. In J. Fishman (Ed.), Handbook of language and ethnic identity (pp. 42–55). Oxford University Press. Skutnab-Kangas, T. (2006). Language policy and linguistic imperialism. In T.  Ricento (Ed.), Introduction to language policy (pp. 273–291). Blackwell. Spolsky, B. (2004). Language policy. Cambridge University Press. Suleiman, Y. (1994). Arabic sociolinguistics: Issues and perspectives. Curzon. Talimat, A. (2015). Sou ‫؟‬alu lughat attadris laysa maghlutan. The language of instruction question is not an erroneous one. http://www.hespress.com/writers/261932.html. Wright, S. (2004). Language policy and language planning: From nationalism to globalism. Palgrave.

Chapter 8

Language Attitudes towards Official Status of Berber

Progress is impossible without change; and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything. George Bernard Shaw

8.1 Background The goal of language policies has always been to find objective solutions to language problems, especially in multilingual settings. According to Gazzola et  al. (2023), this early goal of language planning tended to exclude “sociopolitical variables … and critical social theory” (p.  15), which emphasized power relations embedded in language policies and the role such policies play in creating injustice and inequality towards linguistic minorities. Still, whenever a language problem exists within a polity, the state is required to eventually develop a language policy to address it no matter how long it is ignored (Fishman, 1973; Schiffman, 1996; Spolsky, 2004; Garett, 2010). Developing a language policy and implementing it, however, are two different endeavors because the potential for implementing any language policy requires a certain congruity between the policy itself and people’s attitudes, beliefs, and the resulting practices. In order for a language policy to succeed, it cannot go counter to these existing socio-cultural factors. In other words, in order for a language policy to be effective, a change in the status of the language is necessary; more importantly, a change in attitudes and perceptions vis-à-vis the language, its culture, and its speakers is warranted. Such a change is not simple to accomplish as it requires a genuine commitment from the state and policy makers to act in good faith by using all the resources available to bring about such a change. But an important question to ask is how easy or feasible it is to change people’s attitudes towards a language when we know that attitudes tend to be “deeply embedded in the human mind and are rather pervasive and resistant to change” (Palviainen & Huhta, 2015, p. 192).

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The answer is not so simple because even if the state and policy makers were serious about changing the status of a language, changing people’s attitudes towards a language is no easy feat. This is because attitudes towards a language are based on ideological and oftentimes subjective, emotional, and irrational considerations rather than intellectual ones supported by factual and objective factors. Schiffman (1996) and Spolsky and Shohamy (2000) argue that people’s beliefs and practices must first change before a language policy is to succeed. But one could also argue that practices and beliefs and attitudes cannot change or be changed simultaneously. Put differently, before a change in linguistic practices can occur, language ideology, including people’s beliefs, perceptions, and stereotypes towards the language and its speakers, ought to change first. Still, any talk of changing people’s attitudes and beliefs towards a language is not something that happens overnight but can take time and a lot of good faith. Essential steps that can lead to such a change in the status of a language and attitudes towards it would require several measures, including the promotion of the language in question by giving it official status and including it in the educational system and the media. But as the case of the Berber language in Morocco shows, promoting this language through all the various methods listed above in an attempt to raise its status and change attitudes towards it can take time to yield concrete results because the implementation process can be met by several obstacles, from early during the planning stages and all the way through implementation. Most decisive among these obstacles is resistance born out of people’s negative attitudes towards the language in question. Attitudes towards the language often extend to the speakers of that language themselves because these attitudes are dominated by ideological positions that are based on the supposed existence of a standard, more desirable and powerful language. Such a language is one that is viewed as having a higher status and more prestigious, just like its speakers, and therefore acquires more admiration and approval. Milroy (2007) argues that “prestige is conferred on language varieties by speakers, and speakers tend to confer prestige on usages that are considered to be those of the higher social classes” (p. 137). In other words, prestige is often closely connected with the powerful group that speaks the language and by extension is assigned to the group’s language. Likewise, a language or language variety can be viewed negatively simply because its speakers happen to be part of a speech community that belongs to a lower social class with less power, which makes its language appear sub-standard and inferior to the so-called standard and prestigious variety spoken by the powerful group. The stigma attached to the language variety is therefore automatically transferred to the group that speaks that variety even though from a linguistic point of view there is nothing inherently positive or negative about a language or a language variety (Arnove, 2008; Labov, 2006; Pinker, 2007). Language attitudes are not only connected to the concept of prestige and social attractiveness (Garrett, 2007); they are also associated with competence, instrumental, and practical benchmarks. Nowhere is this more noticeable than in the case of

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Morocco, a lively multilingual setting where the linguistic situation is quite multifaceted and complex, for it consists of several languages and language varieties in contact and in competition in everyday interactions. Fussha, Darija, Berber, French, and Spanish are all languages that mark the linguistic scene where each of them tends to occupy important positions and functions. As such, it is only natural that these languages generate different and often conflicting attitudes depending on their domains and status within the linguistic landscape of the country and people’s beliefs and practices (Boukous, 2008; Chakrani, 2013; Marley, 2004; Schiffman, 1996). This chapter focuses on Berber mainly, however, and the main question that it seeks to answer is whether attitudes towards the Berber language have evolved or remained the same as a result of the recognition and officialization of the Berber language and its inclusion in the Moroccan Constitution. This question assumes that attitudes towards Berber were negative before it gained its official status in 2011, which was confirmed by the findings of a study conducted by the author a few years after the initial recognition of the Berber language and culture by the King of Morocco in October 2001, a recognition which was followed by the establishment of IRCAM (Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture) and the introduction of Berber in schools in 2003 (Errihani, 2008). But why is the question of attitudes towards the Berber language important to investigate? Given the theme of this book, which consists of studying the interplay between language, power, and the economics of education, studying attitudes towards Berber becomes an important factor in shedding light on the power that the Berber language might have gained as a result of its officialization and the extent to which such recognition has changed the power dynamics on the linguistic scene in Morocco, especially in terms of its relation to the other languages traditionally assumed to have more power in regulating the country’s linguistic market. Another crucial reason for studying this problem has to do with the implementation of the teaching of Berber in all Moroccan schools and whether attitudes to such an attempt have evolved and become more accepting of this initiative. Initially, the language policy that called for the teaching of Berber to all school-aged children was expected to be generalized across all educational institutions by the year 2011. This has not happened due to resistance from the institutions in charge of the implementation process, namely the regional academies and many of the schools themselves. But this wasn’t the only reason; other reasons for the difficulty in implementing this policy consist of lack of human resources – qualified teachers of Berber in particular – resistance from the Pan-Arabists in the country, namely the parties of Istiqlal and PJD, the introduction of a foreign script (Tifinagh) for standardizing and teaching Berber, and most importantly the mandatory nature of this policy. Such resistance from several directions seems to have played a role in people’s attitudes towards this policy being initially negative and at best indifferent when they were not directly affected by the policy. One, therefore, wonders if the official status that Berber has gained in 2011 has contributed to more positive attitudes towards this venture.

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But before going any further in our discussion of language attitudes towards the Berber language and the extent to which they have remained stable or evolved in the course of the last two decades following the recognition, teaching, and officialization of this language as a means of promoting it and raising its status, a brief overview of this language, its current status, and function within the Moroccan linguistic landscape is warranted.

8.2 Berber Berber, the language of communities native to North Africa and some parts of West Africa is the mother tongue of about 30–40% of Morocco’s population, although an exact number is hard to come by (Boukous, 2018). The Berber language (aka the Amazigh language or Tamazight) consists of several varieties, but the three main ones are: Tarifit (Riffiya) in the Rif Mountains region, Tashelhit (Soussia) in Southern Morocco and Tamazight (Shelha) in the Middle Atlas region of Morocco. As one of two mother tongues in Morocco, Berber functions as the language of daily communication and interactions among members of the Berber community across Morocco, both in rural and urban settings. However, it is worth pointing out that most Berbers are bilingual in Berber and Darija, especially those living in urban areas of Morocco. Because of its role as the mother tongue of a minority group, it is considered a less powerful and less prestigious language when compared to other in more powerful languages on the Moroccan linguistic scene, namely French and Fussha. Given this status, Berber may be considered an important language culturally and linguistically within its community, but is remains a comparatively less important language on the linguistic market because of its domain and functions. In other words, Berber carries more symbolic weight than it does in concrete or practical terms, according to Boukous (2018, p. 107). Although Berber has been spoken in Morocco for thousands of years, it wasn’t officially recognized as part of Morocco’s linguistic and cultural heritage until 2001. This recognition came about as a result of years of continuous demands made by Berber activists who used language as the main platform to demand official recognition of their linguistic, ethnic, and cultural legacies in Morocco. Initially, this recognition was primarily manifested in a top-down language policy that required all school children to learn the Berber language, regardless of their linguistic or ethnic background. The mandatory nature of this language policy that recognizes Berber by requiring everyone to learn it has given rise to a great deal of antagonism and ill-will towards the language itself, the government, the Berber activists, and IRCAM (Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh), the institution established by the King of Morocco in 2001 to advise and promote the Berber language and culture. A 2008 study on language attitudes towards Berber, particularly towards the language policy that makes learning Berber mandatory for all school-aged students, found that the majority of Moroccans were opposed to the policy (Errihani, 2008), particularly its compulsory nature.

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It is important to point out at this juncture that IRCAM has working on standardizing the Berber varieties into one standard Berber language that could be taught in schools and used in all media platforms. Still, such an objective continues to be delayed and is currently far from being realized because of the wide discrepancies between the Berber varieties and the resistance that continues to plague every initiative to promote Berber. The extent to which these three main varieties are intelligible continues to be a source of controversy, even among Berber activists and researchers involved in the standardization efforts. The official discourse out of IRCAM is that the three varieties of Berber are mutually intelligible dialects of the same Berber language, which might be true when considering the concept of a dialect continuum. However, the average Berber speaker will admit that the three varieties can be quite distinct from each other, especially Tashelhit and Tarifit due to the geographical distance between the two regions where they are spoken. The mutual intelligibility of the three main dialects of Berber seems to be overstated for the sake of gaining support for standardization. But the case of Berber varieties is no different from other cases characterized by a linear dialect continuum or varying degrees of mutual intelligibility along their geographical locations. But while speakers of the central variety (Tamazight) in the Middle Atlas Mountains region of Morocco may be able to somewhat understand the Northern variety (Tarifit) and the southern variety (Tashelhit) by virtue of being positioned in the center of the continuum, speakers of the Tarifit and Tashelhit variety are not able to understand each other because their varieties are not mutually intelligible. Thus, based on the concept of mutual intelligibility, Tarifit and Tashelhit cannot be considered two varieties of the same language but two different languages in the same way Italian and French are. The insistence of IRCAM on the intelligibility of the three varieties, however, seems to be politically motivated since the case for standardizing all three varieties is based on the argument that they are mutually intelligible and can be called a language instead of dialects. Referring to the Berber language as a cluster of dialects instead of a language would potentially reinforce negative attitudes towards this language. It would also be a hurdle to the promotion and revitalization of the Berber language, which would complicate the task of introducing it in the school system. In other words, allowing three more languages onto an already linguistically saturated scene would translate into more resistance on the part of the government, the Ministry of Education, and the public. Such a potential step would present a new set of challenges to the educational system, which has been weathered by the policy of Arabization, and would therefore provide ammunition to non-Berber speakers to voice their opposition to the addition of other languages to an already deteriorating school system. To standardize these oral varieties into one that is intelligible across all regions of Morocco meant adopting an alphabet as the first step in the process, and the only viable choices were the Arabic script or the Latin (French) script. However, Berber activists were unable to agree: the French camp called for the Latin script while more conservative Berber activists opted for the Arabic script. Since a compromise could not be reached, it was agreed that a 5000-year-old script called Tifinagh, could

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be revived and adapted to serve as the script for Berber (Ameur, 1994). The argument in favor of using this script for the standardized form of Berber was both a compromise among the two warring Berber factions and was also meant to give the impression that there is only one variety of Berber that is intelligible across the country, a claim that is easily rejected by speakers of the Berber varieties themselves. The choice and introduction of the Tifinagh alphabet for the teaching of Berber in schools continues to be controversial as both teachers and students have to learn it, almost simultaneously, which seems to be slowing – if not harming – the implementation of the policy of teaching Berber to all school children. It appears that the choice of Tifinagh was nothing but a political solution to a linguistic problem and is proof that internal strife and warring ideologies within IRCAM and among Berber activists have taken precedence over the interests of the students, the grass roots, as well as the success of this language policy. Choosing a foreign script as a new alphabet for the Berber language has so far had a negative effect on the attitudes of the average parents towards the teaching of Berber because they generally feel that their children are being used as pawns in the IRCAM game. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the venture to implement the language policy of teaching Berber to all Moroccan children is lagging behind and continues to encounter obstacles from the policy makers, the government, and many teachers as well (Errihani, 2016).

8.3 Measuring Language Attitudes Language attitudes may be important factors in any successful implementation of a language policy, but they are extremely difficult to measure as they tend to be primarily veiled positions and evaluative reactions that reflect people’s opinions and stereotypes towards language varieties (Garrett, 2007; Dragojevic, 2018). Fasold (1984) argues that “An attitude is an internal state of readiness, rather than an observable response” (p. 147), which makes any attempt at recognizing and interpreting attitudes towards language rather tricky and at times problematic. Therefore, no single methodology is proven to be able to reveal language attitudes effectively and accurately. To investigate and postulate a more accurate picture of Moroccans’ attitudes towards the Berber language two decades after it was recognized by the state of Morocco, several approaches were adopted in investigating this problem and collecting data for it, which took place mainly between 2018 and 2020. The collection of data included participant observation, public comments on newspaper articles and social media platforms dealing with the Berber question, a survey of 180 students from three universities across the country, in addition to years spent following and studying the development of Berber-related language issues in Morocco. Thus, an attempt to develop an accurate picture of the attitudes of Moroccans towards the Berber language and to what extent they have evolved in the last two decades necessitated the use of various methods, including quantitative and qualitative, to generate as complete a picture of these attitudes as possible.

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The participant observation methods for collecting data meant living in Morocco for a year and several consecutive summers during the last two decades. It also consisted of traveling around the country and meeting with all types of stakeholders, from students, to teachers, to administrators, to government officials and policy makers, to the average person in a coffee shop or a “grand taxi.” Such meetings with a representative sample of the Moroccan population have yielded a wealth of information on the topic that made the evaluation of attitudes towards the Berber language possible. Secondly, reading online sources, especially online newspaper articles on the Berber issue, and more importantly reading the comments sections where people tend to feel uninhibited about voicing their anonymous opinions provided a wealth of information about the attitudes of the majority of Moroccans about the Berber language, its officialization, and its inclusion in the fabric of the Moroccan educational system. Thirdly, a survey questionnaire was used to collect data for this project from university students. The approach used in this questionnaire was meant as an indirect method to elicit attitudes towards Berber mainly, although some questions in the survey may refer to other languages. Including questions that deal with other issues besides the Berber issues was done on purpose to limit acquiescence bias and thus not affect the validity of the research. These questions on non-Berber matters on the survey were also meant to illicit how familiar the average youth in Morocco are with current and controversial sociolinguistic issues and whether such issues represent any significance in their lives, something that could potentially be useful to educationalists and language policy makers, who are busy developing language policies and educational reforms to “benefit” these very students. The survey, which was anonymous, was administered to students from three different universities, one was public and two were private. The choice of students from three different universities was meant to capture the largest portion of educated youth who would be most concerned and affected by the roles of the various languages on their personal, academic, and soon-to-be professional lives. Hence, such a representative sample would most likely be willing to articulate their attitudes towards the Berber language as well as the other languages in Morocco. This mixed method approach can therefore ensure a methodological triangulation that would enhance the validity and credibility of the findings with regards to Moroccan’s attitudes towards Berber. The survey consisted of five questions only (see the list of survey questions at the end of this chapter under “notes”). And since the subject of “Berber” could have been perceived as a controversial topic to many, the subjects were told that the anonymous survey would consist of only 5 questions “about language issues in Morocco for a book project.”1 The inclusion of a question that deals with the medium

 Below are the questions used in the survey: Anonymous Questionnaire about language issues in Morocco for a book project 1. I am  Male □  Female □     Arab □  Berber  □ Both □  Not sure □

1

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of instruction was meant as a distractor although it also provided insight on which languages are considered more instrumental on the Moroccan educational scene.

8.4 Findings and Discussion Upon reviewing the findings, one is immediately struck by the consensus among respondents as to the perceived status, prestige, and instrumental value of each of the four main languages in Morocco:

8.4.1 Arabic Arabic (by which is meant Fussha, which is the medium of instruction in Moroccan schools): Perceived competence and intelligence tend to be attributed to anyone who is able to competently use Fussha, especially in conversation. Although this variety is not used in daily conversations except in formal occasions, such as when delivering speeches, it does command a high level of stature and respect for those who are able to use it competently when called upon. This is due to the fact that very few Moroccans are able to do so with ease because of the diglossia and code-­ switching phenomena that characterize the linguistic scene in Morocco, and which tend to present a significant language interference that most Moroccans are unable to overcome. In other words, using one language to communicate without relying on another language  – hence code-switching  – tends to be the norm, especially among educated Moroccans. 2. The official language(s) (‫ )تغلال وأ ةاغلال ةيمسرال‬in Morocco is/are: ______________________ 3. Check one box: The language that should be used as a medium of instruction for scientific subjects in high schools and universities is  (a) □ Arabic  (b) □ French  (c) □ English  (d) □ Arabic and French  (e) □ Arabic and English   Please justify your choice: 4. Every student should be required to learn Berber (the Amazigh language) starting from elementary school.  (a) □ Yes  (b) □ No   Please justify your choice: 5. Children should start school by being taught in their mother tongue (Darija or Berber)  (a) □ Yes  (b) □ No   Please justify your choice:

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8.4.2 Darija (Colloquial Arabic) Darija (Colloquial Arabic): Darija is marked by its perceived utilitarian function as a medium of daily communication among the majority of Moroccans; otherwise, it is stigmatized in comparison to Fussha. One surprising finding with regards to Darija is that close to 20% of respondents to the survey question about the official language(s) in Morocco thought that it was the official language of Morocco. The only explanation one can put forth to justify such a response is that the word Arabic remains quite ambiguous in Morocco as it can refer to more than just one language variety.

8.4.3 French French: there is no doubt that French continues to enjoy this perceived prestige and high status not only because of the power wielded by those who speak / use it, but also for being viewed as having a fundamental value in guaranteeing sociocultural and economic mobility. However, the findings also show that Moroccans are generally divided when it comes to expressing their attitudes towards French. Those who are generally from the upper classes tend to view the French language in Morocco favorably, first because they are most likely proficient in it, and secondly because they realize the advantages and capital it confers on them. Middle and lower-class groups, on the other hand, generally tend to express antagonistic views towards French and by extension the elite who use it regularly. And because they are typically not very proficient in French, this group tends to opt for Arabic and English as the two languages that ought to be encouraged and promoted as the languages of government, business, and education. This goes to show the farreaching effect of Arabization on those who couldn’t afford a French education, and who in the end have become painfully aware not just of how disadvantaged they are as a result but also of how large the gap that exists between them and upward mobility has become. Another interesting finding from the survey questionnaire is that around 25% of respondents indicated that French is an official language alongside Arabic. What this indicates is that for the average person, who is not well-versed in government language policies, the most widely used languages in Morocco are indeed Arabic and French and therefore must be both official languages too. This makes sense because French is indeed a de facto official language; still, the government never acknowledges that French has any status in the country although every educational reform, including the 1999 National Charter of Education, the 2009 Emergency Program, and the 2015 Strategic Vision Horizon 2015–2030, insists on the importance of being open to foreign language learning.

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8.4.4 Berber The findings and the analysis of the data collected for this project have shown that attitudes towards Berber have generally become more positive, particularly as a result of the official status it gained in 2011. Those opposed to the teaching of Berber to all Moroccans do it mainly on practical grounds, often stating that while Berber is an important component of the Moroccan identity and heritage, it lacks the instrumental value to guarantee employment and economic mobility. The small minority of respondents that were in favor of teaching and learning Berber did so on the grounds that this language constitutes part of the Moroccan multilingual and multicultural identity, and as such it should be preserved and maintained by teaching it to future generations. How respondents identified themselves (whether Arab or Berber) didn’t seem to have an effect on their answers to the questions about the need to teach / learn Berber. The perceived stigma attached to Berber in terms of social attractiveness and economic mobility and the fact that it might still be connected with folklore and rural Morocco in the Moroccan psyche seem to be attitudes that have abated thanks to its newly acquired official status. Even on online platforms discourse, where people tend to be more forthcoming and less inhibited or concerned about voicing their opinions, there is a general acceptance of Berber as an integral part of Moroccan identity, albeit it continues to be viewed as rather superfluous to teach for several reasons – first due to the saturated linguistic scene in Morocco, and secondly and more importantly because it is seen as impractical when it comes to education, international communication, and employment, at least at the present time. One of the respondents observed, “We should not be required to learn Berber because we are not going to use it in our studies. It’s necessary to learn other languages that can make our lives easier.” Another respondent expressed a similar concern by stating that, “The main purpose of the education system is to prepare students for the job market, and most companies are international, so we need to study subjects in a language that most of the world speaks.” Here, both respondents seem to be concerned about the benefit of acquiring another language: as an educational tool and as a means to guarantee employment and economic mobility, none of which can be guaranteed by learning Berber, according to these subjects. If “Attitudes towards language are often the reflection of attitudes towards members of various ethnic groups” (Fasold, 1984, p. 148), then the tangible change in attitudes towards the Berber language during the last decade in particular seems to translate into more positive attitudes towards speakers of Berber in the public sphere. What appears to have played a role in this change is the widespread presence of Berber in the media, and particularly on television. One can also conclude that the official status assigned to Berber in the 2011 constitution, which reiterates that Berber is a major component of Moroccan identity and culture, has played a major role in promoting positive attitudes towards the Berber language and its speakers, although the officialization hasn’t truly resulted in more concrete steps that put into

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practice all constituents of the law that made Berber official, at least according to Berber activists. To gain a sense of the urgency of Berber issues, one only has to listen to Ahmed Assid, the most vocal Berber activist in Morocco, express this feeling in almost every interview or speech he delivers, especially on his YouTube channel (Assid, 2021). The slow pace of implementing the officialization of the Berber language seems to indicate that the official status that it gained in 2011 was not necessarily done in good faith but appears to have been more of a symbolic gesture meant to placate the Berber activists who had been calling for such recognition for decades. The symbolic nature of this officialization (Ruiz, 1984; Shiffman, 1996; Spolsky, 2004) is clearly felt not only in the sluggish implementation but even in the way the so-called official status of the Berber language is articulated in the revised constitution of 2011. Upon closely reading article 5 of the text of the revised constitution adopted by referendum on July 1, 2011, one cannot help but notice the peculiar choice of words used to differentiate between the official status of Arabic and that of Berber. Article 5 opens as follows: “Arabic remains the official language of the State. The State works to protect and develop the Arabic language, and promote its use. In the same way, the Amazigh language (Berber) constitutes an official language of the State, as it is a shared heritage of all Moroccans without exceptions” (Constitution du Maroc, 2011) (translation and emphasis are the author’s). The use of the two keywords – remains and the – to refer to the official status of Arabic is significant and intriguing, to say the least, in that it appears to set the official status of Arabic apart from that of Berber. The fact that Arabic remains indicates that the addition of Berber as yet another official language will neither affect nor alter the weight and influence of the Arabic language on the Moroccan linguistic scene. The use of the definite article to refer to Arabic seems to imply that there is only one official language in the land. In other words, there is “the official language” – Arabic – and then there is “an official language,” – Berber – and the distinction between the definite and indefinite articles should not go unnoticed here. This does support the argument that the underlying goal of most language policies tends to be symbolic at best (Ruiz, 1984; Shiffman, 1996; Spolsky, 2004). In other words, the goal of recognizing a minority language or instituting it as a national or official language could be nothing more than a symbolic act often seen as politically necessary. In the case of Berber, such symbolic recognition and officialization still seemed to have played a positive role in elevating the status of Berber from a simple oral cluster of dialects spoken across the country to a recognized language with an important role to play. However, while the overt aspects of recognizing and officializing a language might be motivated by high ideals, the covert policies typically show ulterior motivations which are not necessarily obvious to the average person. For now, the wait goes on for the day when the officialization of Berber can actually be “officially” implemented across all government institutions especially.

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Knowing that language attitudes towards Berber continue to influence and shape the educational and political landscape in Morocco, one still needs to ask two crucial questions: 1. Does literacy and the level of education play a role in attitudes towards Berber? 2. Does religion play a role in shaping attitudes towards Berber? The answers to both questions seem to be in the affirmative, for on close analysis of the respondents’ attitudes towards Berber, it is clear that literacy and religion play a large part in determining one’s attitude towards the Berber language. The more educated and secular respondents tend to be, the more open and receptive they are to Berber and its promulgation through teaching/learning. On the other hand, the more religious and less educated respondents are, the less enthusiastic and welcoming they are towards officializing and promoting Berber since it would constitute competition for Arabic, which they consider to be superior to any other language since they believe it to be the archetype of linguistic purity thanks to its connection to the sacred revered Qur’an (Haeri, 2003; Suleiman, 1994). It is also worth noting that with regards to question 1, every respondent was definitive in determining their ethnic background: Arab or Berber. The “Not sure” option was not checked by anyone, as everyone seems to have been socialized by the educational system, and particularly by the type of Moroccan history taught in schools, which tends to put less emphasis on the phenomenon of mingling and intermarriage between Moroccans of Arab and Berber descent for the last 15 centuries; instead, the history of Morocco that students which Moroccan students learn in school tends to focus mainly on the Arabs and Muslims and their accomplishments and triumphs in Arabizing and Islamizing North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula (Laroui, 1977; Pennell, 2000; Rogan, 2009) and avoid any mention of ideas that might contradict or at least present a different view on this topic (Exploring such a topic further is worthwhile, but it is beyond the scope of this work). In answer to the second question of the survey about the official language(s) of Morocco, less than 50% of respondents included Berber. Everyone included Arabic or Darija, but what was surprising is that 20% included Darija as an official language. This shows the confusion that still persists among Moroccans as to the function and status of Arabic varieties in Morocco, and the educational system is partly to blame for such a confusion. The same situation also applies to the Berber language which was not included as an official language by a significant number of respondents (almost half), who chose Arabic only as the official language: the fact that Berber is also official may not be as well-publicized as presumed, which might negatively affect the promotion and maintenance of the Berber language. 25% chose Arabic and French as official languages of Morocco, which is a significant percentage that is indicative of the de facto official status that French continues to occupy, hence its continuous and uninterrupted influence on the sociolinguistic scene in Morocco.

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Question 3 might not have any direct bearing on the question of language attitudes towards Berber, but it was a sort of distractor question used to illicit how students view the medium of instruction they deem most practical. Another goal was to see if any respondents would include Berber as part of their comments. None did. It was interesting to see that 70% of the respondents opted for Arabic and English as combined mediums of instruction, while only 20% opted for Arabic and French. The choice of which foreign language would best complement Arabic as a medium of instruction was overwhelmingly in favor of English, from respondents in both public and private schools. The reasons behind such choices might be different, however. While public school students see English as a democratizing force and a savior from French hegemony in the education and employment sectors, students in the private schools see in English another useful tool they can add to their already rich linguistic repertoire, which would make them more marketable upon graduation. Question 4 askes respondents if students “should be required to learn Berber (the Amazigh language) starting from elementary school.” The response was heavily against such a proposal. 95% said no. The failure of the language policy which calls for the mandatory inclusion of Berber in the fabric of the educational system starting at the elementary school level continues to be opposed by the majority of Moroccans, and this answer is a clear reflection of such a position. The main reason for opposing this initiative is its mandatory nature, for it requires all children to learn Berber, regardless of their ethnic and linguistic background, an effort to which most Moroccans are opposed. Even speakers of Berber in rural areas of Morocco are opposed this requirement, for many argue that their children already speak Berber and therefore would rather have them learn a foreign language to be able to compete for better education and employment opportunities. The last question in the survey asks if school “children should start school by being taught in the mother tongue (Darija or Berber). The responses were equally split in half – 50% of the respondents agreed, and the other 50% disagreed. The justifications provided were rather enlightening in the sense that several indicated that the domain of the mother tongues should remain limited to the home and informal settings. Others, on the other hand, stated that Darija and Berber were simply oral languages that could not be taken seriously in a school setting and should therefore not be included as mediums of instruction. Such views are indicative of the negative attitudes that Moroccans continue to hold against the mother tongues, especially when comparing them to the languages used for literacy in Morocco: Fussha and French. This equally shows the long and arduous road ahead of the educational system if it were to standardize the mother tongues and include them as mediums of instruction during the early years of children’s schooling. Attitudes will need to evolve in this regard, and awareness of the value of welcoming students to school in their home language will need to be made more prevalent if people’s beliefs and attitudes towards the utility and usefulness of the mother tongues in enhancing literacy and academic success is to be embraced by the average Moroccan.

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8.5 Conclusion Language attitudes are not easy to capture or measure because they are based on emotional and ideological considerations, which are deeply entrenched in the human psyche. Through a mixed-methods approach to gathering and analyzing data that consisted of quantitative and qualitative methods, including a survey questionnaire, participant observation while living on site, and studying how various media outlets have dealt with the Berber issue in Morocco, this chapter has attempted to examine and understand the attitudes of Moroccans towards the Berber language a decade after it has become an official language and two decades after it had been recognized by the State as essential components of Moroccan identity and cultural heritage. This chapter came to reevaluate an earlier study by the author, which attempted to study attitudes of Moroccans towards Berber (Errihani, 2008). This earlier study, which was conducted soon after Berber was recognized and included in the Moroccan educational system, revealed that the majority of Moroccans were opposed to Berber and its inclusion in the educational system both as a language and as a subject. Such attitudes indicated that the prospects of Berber becoming an official language on equal footing with Arabic was never envisaged. Furthermore, this earlier research found that the majority of Moroccans were against the promotion of Berber because they felt that it would create friction and antagonism between the Arabs and Berbers of Morocco, thus opting for the status quo which at least guaranteed social and political stability – something Moroccans have continued to cherish in the midst of the unrest that the MENA region has experienced in the last two decades in particular. The 2008 study also showed that Moroccans generally felt that it was their religious obligation to defend the Arabic language, arguing in favor of its utility and importance in uniting all Moroccans because of its association with their shared Muslim heritage, which they continue to see as a factor that trumps all other sociolinguistic and political issues that might divide Arabs and Berbers. In other words, they believed that it as their duty to speak in support of the Arabic language even while they implicitly might be in favor of being educated or having their children educated in French for more economic reasons. Such “conflicting discourses transcend the individual and become part of a larger government discourse that openly pledges its support for Arabic, while implicitly adopting French as the language of the future and modernity” (Errihani, 2008, p. 18). However, two decades after the initial recognition of Berber and the call for its inclusion in the educational system, and a decade after it gained official status in Morocco, attitudes towards this language appear to have generally become more positive, especially as a result of its officialization in the revised 2011 constitution. Still, although most respondents agree that Berber represents an essential component of Moroccan identity and heritage, they continue to oppose its teaching to all Moroccans and do so mainly on practical grounds, citing the saturation of the linguistic scene in Morocco, the lack of the instrumental value of Berber to guarantee employment and upward mobility, and the politicization of this language policy,

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which the state continues to support publicly but is reluctant to fully implement. In fact, one could argue that the government’s failure to implement a language policy that it instituted two decades ago might have contributed to, if not fueled, the negative attitudes Moroccans continue to hold towards the inclusion of Berber in the educational system because they continue to view such initiative as a useless political tool that the government is using to appease Berber activists and the Berber proto-elite in particular. Baker (2006) argues that the instrumental value of language is what determines its socio-economic importance on the linguistic scene, more so than its integrative value; still, this integrative orientation of Berber into Moroccan society seems to have nevertheless evolved and improved with its officialization, which marks a positive transformation compared to attitudes towards this language prior to 2011. In other words, the Berber language and culture’s marginalization and exclusion from the public sphere in Morocco has become less pronounced with the officialization that followed the recognition of the Berber language and culture as essential components of Moroccan identity. Nonetheless, the instrumental orientation of Berber continues to engender negative attitudes to the point that even Berber speakers themselves seem to be shifting towards Arabic and French as these languages symbolize power and economic opportunity for their children. Such language shift towards majority languages does not bode well for the Berber language and its speakers, something that minority language rights advocates (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1999; Phillipson, 2000) will continue to battle against, but unfortunately to no avail when economic conditions play a more forceful role in language shift (Fishman, 2001). Nonetheless, based on the various methods used to collect data and the findings these data yielded, the study undertaken to investigate whether attitudes towards Berber have changed as a result of its recognition and inclusion in the constitution as an official language have confirmed that people’s attitudes seem to be shifting in positive direction vis-à-vis Berber. The Berber language is becoming more widely accepted as part of the cultural and sociolinguistic make-up of Morocco thanks to the power it gained from its inclusion in the Moroccan constitution in particular. However, opposition to its inclusion in the fabric of the educational system seems to have remained unchanged. Besides the mandatory nature of the policy of that requires every child to learn Berber, it is mainly the instrumental value of the language and the saturation of the linguistic landscape in Morocco which remain the primary reasons behind such resistance. These unfavorable attitudes towards the inclusion of Berber in the educational system can be blamed for the delay and lack of seriousness in implementing a language policy that the state put in place two decades ago with the goal of generalizing it by 2011. In fact, even with improved attitudes towards the Berber language and culture, widespread resistance to its inclusion in the educational system remains in place, as politicians in particular continue to find ways to delay and postpone implementing this law. In a sense, it appears that the public’s unfavorable attitudes towards the educational benefits of Berber provide politicians and language policy architects with the needed ammunition to continue to stall the implementation process of this policy. Given these considerations, generalizing the teaching of Berber in all Moroccans schools is a project

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that might never be completed unless another national or regional crisis surfaces, and the government finds itself forced to address it – just like it did when it gave Berber official status on the eve of the so-called Arab Spring.

References Ameur, M. (1994). Diversité des transcriptions : pour une notation usuelle et normalisée de la langue berbère. Etudes et Documents Berbères, 11, 25–28. Arnove, A. (2008). The essential Chomsky. The New Press. Assid, A. (2021). Ahmed Assid official page: https://www.youtube.com/channel/ UCHLKCyfceG8wBNWUiAGzxWA Baker, C. (2006). Psycho-sociological analysis in language policy. In T. Ricento (Ed.), Introduction to language policy (pp. 210–228). Blackwell. Boukous, A. (2008). Globalization and sociolinguistic stratification in North Africa: The case of Morocco. In C. B. Vigouroux & S. S. Mufwene (Eds.), Globalization and language vitality: Perspectives from Africa (pp. 126–144). Continuum. Boukous, A. (2018). Essais de politique et d’aménagement linguistiques. IRCAM. Chakrani, B. (2013). The impact of the ideology of modernity on language attitudes in Morocco. The Journal of North African Studies, 18(3), 431–442. Constitution du Maroc. (2011). https://www.maroc.ma/fr/content/constitution-­0 Dragojevic, M. (2018). Language attitudes. In H.  Giles & J.  Harwood (Eds.), Oxford research encyclopedia of intergroup communication (pp. 179–192). Oxford University Press. Errihani, M. (2008). Language attitudes and language use in Morocco: Effects of attitudes on “Berber language policy”. The Journal of North African Studies, 13(4), 411–428. https://doi. org/10.1080/13629380701800492 Errihani, M. (2016). Language and social distinction: Speaking Darija with the right accent. The Journal of North African Studies, 21(5), 741–764. https://doi.org/10.1080/1362938 7.2016.1212706 Fasold, R. (1984). The sociolinguistics of society. Blackwell. Fishman, J. (1973). Language modernization and planning. Language in Society, 2(1), 23–43. Fishman, J. (Ed.). (2001). Can threatened languages be saved? Multilingual Matters. Garrett, P. (2007). Language attitudes. In C.  Llamas, L.  Mullany, & P.  Stockwell (Eds.), The Routledge companion to sociolinguistics (pp. 116–121). Routledge. Garrett, P. (2010). Attitudes to language. Cambridge University Press. Gazzola, M., et al. (2023). Epistemological and theoretical foundations in language policy and planning. Palgrave. Haeri, N. (2003). Sacred language, ordinary people: Dilemmas of culture and politics in Egypt. Palgrave. Labov, W. (2006). The social stratification of English in New York City. Cambridge University Press. Laroui, A. (1977). The history of the Maghrib: An interpretive essay (R.  Manheim, Trans.). Princeton University Press. Marley, C. (2004). Language attitudes in Morocco following recent changes in language policy. Language Policy, 3, 25–46. Milroy, J. (2007). The ideology of the standard language. In C. Llamas, L. Mullany, & P. Stockwell (Eds.), The Routledge companion to sociolinguistics (pp. 133–139). Routledge. Palviainen, A., & Huhta, A. (2015). Investigating relationships between language attitudes and policy issues. In M. Hult & D. C. Johnson (Eds.), Research methods in language policy and planning: A practical guide (pp. 192–204). Wiley. Pennell, C. R. (2000). Morocco since 1830: A history. New York University Press.

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Phillipson, R. (2000). Rights to language: Equity, power, and education. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. Pinker, S. (2007). The language instinct. First Harper Perennial. Rogan, E. (2009). The Arabs: A history. Basic Books. Ruiz, R. (1984). Orientations in language planning. NABE, 7, 15–29. Schiffman, H. F. (1996). Linguistic culture and language policy. Routledge. Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1999). Education of minorities. In J. Fishman (Ed.), Handbook of language and ethnic identity (pp. 42–55). Oxford University Press. Spolsky, B. (2004). Language policy. Cambridge University Press. Spolsky, B., & Shohamy, E. (2000). Language practice, language ideology, and language policy. In R.  Lambert & E.  Shohamy (Eds.), Language policy and pedagogy: Essays in honor of A. Ronald Walton (pp. 1–42). J. Benjamins. Suleiman, Y. (1994). Arabic sociolinguistics: Issues and perspectives. Curzon.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

When schools receive the same funding and are not segregated based on who can pay more, students of lower socioeconomic backgrounds will get to study with rich students who will think twice before screwing them over when they are adults. Michael Moore

9.1 Causes and Consequences of the Educational Crisis Boukous (2018) contends that Moroccan language policy – particularly language-­ in-­education-policy – is characterized by incoherence and ambivalence, which contributes to the creation of two conflicting educational structures resulting in inequality in terms of access to educational resources (p. 105). Such inequality is the result of the linguistic medium used for instruction: the Arabic medium at best produces civil servants, while the French medium produces elites and future leaders. Such an educational system has become a major contributor to the wide gap between the rich and poor, between those who have access to a French education and the others, a serious challenge that the state has not been able to resolve despite the various educational reforms it has introduced over the years. Everyone, from students, parents, and teachers to government officials, agrees that the educational system in Morocco is therefore undergoing a serious crisis. The factors that have contributed to this situation are social, economic, and most importantly political factors which consist of language policies that advocated for school reforms that ended up failing students, mainly those that come from underprivileged backgrounds. Essential among these reforms was the policy of Arabization, which the state justified as a necessary course to guarantee social justice and equality and achieve unity after a long legacy of French colonialism. However, the policy of Arabizing the educational system only created more social injustice and further perpetuated inequities in access to educational resources. Arabization has become known especially for having shortchanged the Moroccan masses who needed access to French proficiency to be able to graduate and compete in the job market like their © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Errihani, Language, Power, and the Economics of Education in Morocco, Language Policy 35, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51594-1_9

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more fortunate peers who were able to bypass the Arabization policy simply because they happened to come from well-to-do social circles. The policy to Arabize the Moroccan linguistic ecology has clearly failed to achieve its stated objectives of making Arabic the most dominant language at the expense of French and the mother tongues. On the contrary, the reality on the ground and recent government decision have made sure that hat French will continue to play a leading rule in education. Likewise, the mother tongues have also been garnering a tremendous amount of support and promotion from intellectuals and NGOs to be endorsed as mediums of instruction in early schooling, a process that has already been set in motion through private organizations and NGOs. Another language policy that seems to have added to the confusion in an already muddled sociolinguistic scene in Morocco is the requirement to teach Berber to all Moroccan students, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic backgrounds, starting in primary school. This policy was introduced in 2003 and was expected to be generalized across all educational levels by the 2010-2011 academic year. But like in most language policies, the implementation phase has faced a great deal of resistance from several components of Moroccan society, including from those for whom the policy was developed (Alalou, 2023; El Aissati et al., 2011, Ennaji, 2014; Errihani, 2006, 2016; Zouhir, 2014). Needless to say, this policy has also failed, and the likelihood of its being resuscitated is a process that continues to encounter obstacles of all kinds, not only from politicians and policy makers but also from average Moroccans, who do not see in the Berber language any instrumental potential, especially when compared with the other languages on the Moroccan sociolinguistic landscape. Schiffman (1996) reminds us that for a language policy to be effective, people’s beliefs, attitudes, and practices vis à vis the language in question must change or at least evolve in a positive direction. This is actually the case for Berber: people’s attitudes seem to be shifting towards a positive direction after the officialization of this language in 2011. Nowadays, Berber is becoming more widely accepted as part of the cultural and sociolinguistic make-up of Morocco. However, opposition to its inclusion in the fabric of the educational system seems to have remained unchanged. The instrumental value of the language and the saturation of the linguistic landscape in Morocco are thought to be behind such resistance. And such resistance seems to be a major factor behind the delay and lack of seriousness in implementing a language policy that the state put in place two decades ago with much fanfare as a tribute to the indigenous people of North Africa and as a recognition that the Berber language and culture represent an essential component of Moroccan identity. In fact, even with improved attitudes towards the Berber language and culture, there is still widespread resistance to the policy of including Berber in the educational system, and the politicians in particular continue to find ways to delay and postpone any laws that call for this inclusion. And it seems that the public’s unfavorable attitudes towards the educational benefits of Berber provide them with the needed ammunition to continue to stall the implementation process of this policy. In fact, any move to implement this policy might never see the light unless another crisis surfaces, and the government finds itself obliged to address it, just like it did

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during the so-called Arab Spring events when the Moroccan state found itself forced to pre-emptively introduce reforms, including giving official status to Berber, to stall and eventually prevent any possible protests that could have led to destabilizing the state. This resistance and the current state of the educational system have recently prompted the Moroccan state to audaciously turn its focus away from the teaching of Berber to the open promotion of literacy in Arabic and French. In his speech to parliament, the Minister of national education, preschool, and sports presented his new initiatives for the 2022–2023 academic school year: Pour ce qui est du primaire, trois rituels quotidiens seront introduits dans toutes les classes pour accompagner et renforcer le niveau des apprentissages : un rituel de lecture de 10 minutes quotidiennement en début de cours d’arabe et de français. (Benmoussa, 2022) Concerning primary school, three daily rituals shall be introduced in all classes as means to reinforce the level of learning: a reading ritual of 10 minutes of Arabic and French at the beginning of every class. (Benmoussa, 2022)

What catches the eye here is that for the first time a government official openly refers to the adopted “foreign language” by name: French. But such a move did not go unnoticed by Berber activists, although all they can do at this time is to continue to campaign and call for the implementation of a language policy that was made official more than a decade ago and was expected to be given the same institutional support that Arabic has always enjoyed. In short, the future of the Berber language policy in Morocco is grim, given the overall state of the educational system and in particular the open declaration that French and Arabic are openly being named the official languages of elementary education. In addition to these two failed language policies, the economics of language and the marketization of education represent yet another crucial factor in the deterioration of the educational system in Morocco. Education, and language in particular, has become a human capital and a marketable asset that is considered to be able to potentially increase employability for the individual and economic development for the state. As such, the impact of language on economic outcomes and the importance of investment in human capital assume that investment in education and foreign language education is essential for any labor market to increase individual capital, productivity, and ultimately economic growth. Accordingly, the role of language in the Moroccan educational crisis becomes crucial in the sense that the concept of “costs and benefits” seems to favor a language of power and economic opportunities, which is French, even if it is a language that continues to alienate and disenfranchise a large portion of the population. One therefore wonders how social justice can be promoted in the school system when access to the language of power and economic opportunities is not available to the populace but only to the few who already possess the socio-economic capital to afford such access. A good education, which is often made possible by the medium of instruction perceived to yield the most returns, has become cost-prohibitive for many in Morocco. As such, language bears the brunt of the blame for the educational crisis that the country is experiencing, a crisis exacerbated by the proliferation of private schools, shadow education,

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and the gap between education and employment, which is mainly the result of lack of access to the linguistic tools required by the labor market. Thus, the principal argument of this book is that language is at the heart of the educational crisis in Morocco. Lack of access to the language of power due to language policies that have favored the powerful seems to have resulted in the majority of Moroccan children falling behind in comparison with their peers in the MENA region as well as in similar multilingual polities. Over 50% of Moroccan children at the age of 9 have been found unable to read at grade level (World Bank, 2020), and language is the main cause. Thus, language holds the prime responsibility for the educational crisis in Morocco because it is subjected to the ideological and political orientations of government politicians, policy-makers, and elites who are more intent on enforcing elite closure by effectively preventing non-elites from access to the dominant language and its socioeconomic advantages and resources so as to maintain their hold on the power and resources that come with such access at the expense of Moroccan children and their future. Language, therefore, plays a crucial role in the distribution of power and influence in an already competitive and saturated linguistic scene in Morocco, which carries with it several implications for the Moroccan educational system as well as the job market and its requirements. The French-educated elite continue to maintain their power and privileges while limiting the masses’ access to the language of power and the socioeconomic opportunities that come with such access. The Moroccan state’s various educational reforms and language policies have not succeeded in changing the status quo as the institutions that are in charge of these initiatives are led by French-oriented officials, policy makers, and elites who are keen on maintaining the current linguistic status quo, where French plays a vital role in determining people’s future livelihoods. French is the language of the intelligentsia and social distinction; it is the language of flexing socio-economic muscles. That is why many in Morocco still equate it with the elite and as a result feel a certain disdain towards this language and to a certain extent its speakers. This is especially the feeling of those who had gone through the Arabized system of education and as a result feel that they had been shortchanged by a system that forced the Arabization policy on the poor and disadvantaged who had no other options available to them. This policy seems to have failed the masses and created a chasm between them and the elite who managed to bypass Arabization altogether, hence the feeling of resentment against the elites and their “French.” The question on everyone’s mind in Morocco these days is whether there is a chance for English to be promoted and recognized as the foreign language par-­ excellence in Morocco in the near future, a move that many believe has a chance to eventually bring about positive reforms to the educational system in Morocco by leveling the playing field for all social classes. The advantage of English is that it is seen as a neutral language that does not represent an extension of political and cultural colonialism, nor is it necessarily connected with any particular social class in Morocco, and its inclusion as a medium of instruction might turn out to be the catalyst for an environment where every Moroccan has a fighting chance to use his/her proficiency in English to secure employment and upward mobility.

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Therefore, the argument for adopting English as a foreign language and as a medium of instruction seems to have high currency and strategic relevance given the various domains where it has assumed supremacy: international business and finance, science and technology, tourism, diplomacy, higher education, research publications and conferences, etc. And the fact that the new government in Morocco seems to be in favor of introducing English as a medium of instruction for certain subjects in higher education – in addition to French – might be a positive step in that direction (although no concrete steps have been taken to do so yet). English is thought to have a chance at democratizing the linguistic scene and the educational system as a whole by providing equal access to resources and the job market in Morocco as it is seen as a language that does not carry any colonial overtones or social distinction, contrary to French. For the masses especially, it is hoped that English would eventually replace French and thus provide a level playing field for all Moroccans, regardless of their socio-economic status. For the time being, however, the state has opted for French to continue to be the foreign language of choice, thus maintaining the status-quo and confirming the power of French and its continued hegemony over the Moroccan sociolinguistic scene, while insisting that the educational system is also open to developing English as a medium of instruction, especially in higher education. The question is whether such declarations are done in good faith to democratize education by allowing the average Moroccan an equal chance for a decent education and access to the job market or whether it is simply a symbolic gesture and a mechanism whereby the state is attempting to manage a linguistic problem that could potentially turn into a sociopolitical conflict. Unfortunately, history has taught us that the underlying goals of most language policies tend to be symbolic in nature and are only introduced when they are seen as politically necessary (Spolsky & Shohamy, 2000). In other words, language policies are top-down decisions that are made not for the purpose of guaranteeing human and linguistic rights but on political grounds and thus will always reflect the values of those in power (Paulston, 1994; Ruiz, 1984). Still, if we have learned anything in the past two decades about language policy and planning in Morocco, it would be that the gap between theory and practice, between rhetoric and implementation of policies on the ground, continues to be a bitter pill that the poor and disadvantaged have to swallow. In other words, the educational reforms and policies of successive governments continue to be ineffective, thus robbing the masses of any aspirations for a better education and a better future. Regardless, one point that is worth reiterating at this juncture is that English continues to be viewed positively by the majority of Moroccans, regardless of their social class. But while the masses see in it a savior and an opportunity for access to the job market and its economic benefits, the upper classes see it as simply an additional linguistic tool that can help maintain if not solidify their economic hold and social status by providing them with a more competitive profile in both the local and global market. In other words, for the elite who already master French, adding yet another language to their linguistic repertoire is seen as “a matter of expressing and constituting and reproducing social identities and social relations, including crucially relations of power” (Fairclough, 2015, p. 232). For the masses, however, the

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preference is to see English replace French as the first foreign language in Morocco or at least be one of two choices available to all. Finally, the role that language plays in the educational crisis in Morocco is also thought to be due to the unrealistic expectations of the system to produce bilingual (Arabic and French) students by the end of high school (Dahbi, 2006) when the educational system was undergoing the Arabization process. Such a goal can only be accomplished when access to educational resources (qualified language teachers, adequate textbooks, access to technology, etc.) are made available to all from starting from the early years of schooling. This is something that the government keeps peddling but is yet to see the light for obvious reasons: lack of human capital, scarce resources, and inadequate funding. The intellectual elite in the country believe that another serious problem that came to complicate the educational sector and divert the attention of the policymakers from solving the current educational crisis is the addition of yet another script to the mix of scripts that elementary school children are required to learn. In addition to the Arabic and Latin scripts, Tifinagh, the Berber script, is yet another script to which elementary school children are introduced early in their schooling. Therefore, for these school children to acquire literacy skills in three foreign languages (Fussha, Berber, and French) with three different scripts (Arabic, Latin, and Tifinagh) during the first few years of schooling is not only unrealistic and anti-pedagogical but is also certain to lead to school abandonment and delayed literacy if not school failure altogether. Thus, as a first step into reforming the educational system might be to start at the elementary school level by focusing on developing children’s literacy skills in one language and one script before introducing another one with another script. This would be a simple and realistic step that could bring about positive outcomes that could translate into the future success of a whole system. Graduates of the Moroccan school system are unable to function in two languages (Arabic and French) at this time, let alone three or four, assuming that the 1999 Charter implements its recommendation of introducing a new foreign language in elementary school, a proposal that clearly underscores the disconnect between the government rhetoric and the reality on the ground. An important point worth mentioning at this juncture is that the Moroccan students who have gone through the Arabization process are by no means competent in Arabic either. In other words, a major reason for the failure of the public educational system in Morocco is that it produces graduates who are not proficient in any language despite the fact that the country is often referred to as bilingual or multilingual because of the various languages and language varieties that characterize its linguistic ecology. This justifies the insistence of all educational reforms and public discourse on the necessity to develop students’ abilities in mastering the Arabic language. In other words, such discourse is a tacit admission that an educational system that promotes the Arabic language consistently is still not able to produce students who can speak and write fluently in Arabic. Why is that the case? The answer is simple: the Arabic that is used and promoted in the educational system is not the native language of any Moroccan student; it is not the Arabic that

9.2  Conclusions and Recommendations

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children bring with them to the classroom on their first day of school. The Arabic variety in which students are welcomed on their first day of school might just as well be a foreign language. This situation is complicated further when the Arabic (Fussha) that students begin learning in school remains a school subject and a medium of instruction that is not used outside school, except in writing or in formal settings. In other words, Fussha is not spoken outside the classroom; it is not even spoken by the classroom teachers, who typically use a mix of Fussha and Darija to deliver content and communicate with the students. Therefore, one wonders how any student can be expected to acquire a new language without ever having the opportunity to practice it outside the classroom, a practice that is antithetical to all language learning theories and approaches. And therein lies the language problem in Morocco.

9.2 Conclusions and Recommendations The questions that need answers are whether it is possible to go back to a system of a public school that worked a few decades ago, or whether there might be a new model that Morocco should consider? Instead of going back to a system that might have worked, one should focus on the present and look forward to the future and think up a system of education that is simple, feasible, fair, and most importantly supported by evidence-based practices in the field. Presently, the fact remains that there is a crisis in education in Morocco, and this work has attempted to examine and discuss the major issues that continue to plague this educational system. What follows are possible recommendations for solutions that could potentially represent a turning point in the state of education in Morocco if they are seriously considered. Some of these recommendations are obvious and need no further elaboration; others are followed by brief explanations: • Any future reforms should consist of small-scale attempts that are feasible and can be easily accomplished within a short time. • To ensure continuity, successive governments should be required not to discontinue any educational programs launched by their predecessors. Instead, every new government should be required to continue the educational programs and projects introduced by the previous government. To ensure this is the case, education officials and leaders should be retained and not depart with the departing government. To this end, education officials and policymakers should preferably be apolitical so that their main focus would be on improving and promoting education instead of serving the short-term interests and personal agendas of political leaders. • Students should be welcomed in their mother tongues during the first year(s) of their schooling in order to develop strong literacy skills from an early age instead of struggling to develop these skills in a language (or languages) that is foreign to them.

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• Invest in preschool education by hiring qualified instructors and providing them with the necessary support and training. One way to guarantee the success of preschool education is to include it as part of primary education, and promote the status of preschool teachers to government teachers with the same requirements and benefits as elementary school teachers. This would ensure that preschools and elementary schools have qualified teachers who do not join the profession as a last resort. • Promote and invest in public education and do away with the private school model. This may sound like a controversial recommendation, but the reality is that the private school in Morocco is a new business model that is generally intent on profiteering more so than on contributing to the education and well-­ being of Moroccan students. • Focus on teaching principles of civic engagement, democracy, and critical thinking skills that encourage questioning authority in order to produce students who are not easy targets to extremist discourse, regardless of its source. This is the only means to move away from a school culture that promotes rote learning and values of obedience, propaganda, and indoctrination. • Build a school of equality, equity, and inclusion for everyone. The only way to achieve this type of school is to strive for schools that are equal in terms of funding, resources, and the type of education students are able to receive, regardless of whether they are able to pay for such an education or not. This means that education, especially primary and secondary, ought to be free and accessible, regardless of what type of school which is offering this education. • Connect the material taught in school to job market demands: Low return on education is a phenomenon that continues to plague students in Morocco and the MENA region. We should not forget that the Arab Spring was the direct outcome of lack of employment, not lack of education: education in the MENA region produces students with diplomas only, not students who can break into the workforce. Therefore, schools need to deliver knowledge as well as the skills that needed by job market as well. • Linguistic choices, especially in terms of which foreign language(s) to include in the educational system, should be based on pragmatic considerations not emotional or political ones. The languages that are essential globally are the ones that need to be taught in schools, starting with the foreign language that has the most global reach and influence. • All stakeholders ought to be included in the decision-making process when it comes to language choices, not just the policymakers. No language policy will succeed when the grassroots, who are on the receiving end of the policy, are not involved in the decision-making process. • Select the top-performing high school graduates to enter teacher-preparation centers or teaching majors at the university level. This means that majoring in the humanities in particular should not continue be a last resort for high school graduates or the result of an open-enrollment practice. Once the above reforms are implemented at the primary and secondary level, the selective process at the university level should become more streamlined and less stringent assuming

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that the educational system would be producing more competent high school graduates who are academically prepared to take on university-level work. Hire the best graduates for the teaching profession and provide incentives and resources to guarantee their success in their profession. Provide economic incentives and continuous training for in-service teachers. Abolish high stakes exams, such as the Baccalaureate exam, and create continuous assessment tools that are not based on rote learning. Be bold and introduce these reforms incrementally but systematically with short and long-term deadlines and outcomes.

Finally, to reform the educational sector, all other institutions must first be reformed (Diwan, 2021) in the country, not just educational institutions. Educational reforms may be easier to craft, but their application and implementation will typically not materialize or succeed unless other institutions, especially state institutions that are linked to the educational sector, are also reformed first. To reform an educational system requires good faith and the commitment of the government as well as other stakeholders to work together for the public good and for the advancement of the future of the country, which in the case of Morocco relies heavily on its young and vibrant human capital.

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