Harmonie und Realität: Beiträge zur Philosophie des späten Leibniz 3515116567, 9783515116565

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Thomas Leinkauf / Stephan Meier-Oeser (Hg.)

Harmonie und Realität Beiträge zur Philosophie des späten Leibniz

Philosophie Franz Steiner Verlag

Studia Leibnitiana – Sonderhefte 51

Harmonie und Realität

studia leibnitiana sonderhefte Im Auftrage der Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft e.V. herausgegeben von Herbert Breger, Wenchao Li, Heinrich Schepers und Wilhelm Totok In Verbindung mit Stefano di Bella, Francois Duchesneau, Michel Fichant, Emily Grosholz, Nicholas Jolley, Klaus Erich Kaehler, Eberhard Knobloch, Massimo Mugnai, Pauline Phemister, Hans Poser, Nicholas Rescher und Catherine Wilson Band 51

Thomas Leinkauf / Stephan Meier-Oeser (Hg.)

Harmonie und Realität Beiträge zur Philosophie des späten Leibniz

Franz Steiner Verlag

Gedruckt mit freundlicher Unterstützung der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2017 Satz: Claudia Rupp, Stuttgart Druck: Offsetdruck Bokor, Bad Tölz Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-11656-5 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-11665-7 (E-Book)

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS Vorwort .............................................................................................................

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Thomas Leinkauf Harmonie und Realität. Eine systematische Einleitung ...................................

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Stefano Di Bella Varieties of Phenomenalism, Levels of Reality: A Tentative Framework for a Controversial Issue ...........................................

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Brandon C. Look The Ideal and the Real in Leibniz’s Metaphysics ............................................

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Juan Antonio Nicolás Harmonie als Ordnung: Das letztendliche Meta-Prinzip der Leibnizschen Metaphysik .......................

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Stephan Meier-Oeser Leibniz’s Concept of Harmony between Soul and Body .................................

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Edward W. Glowienka The Unexamined World is Not Worth Creating: Leibniz on How Rational Minds Matter for Universal Harmony ....................

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Donald Rutherford Universal Harmony and the Unity of a World .................................................

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Paul Rateau Remarques sur l’article de Donald Rutherford : « Universal Harmony and the Unity of a World » ........................................... 117 Martha Brandt Bolton Harmony, Reality and the Temporal Unity of a Monad: 1695–1705 ............... 139 Andreas Blank Ontologie und Metaphilosophie in Leibniz’ Mühlenargument ........................ 161 Thomas Leinkauf The Vinculum Substantiale and the Impact of Metaphysics in Leibniz’ Late Philosophy ............................................................................. 179

VORWORT Die Fragestellung der in diesem Band vorgelegten Tagungsakten zum Problem ‚Harmonie und Realität bei Leibniz‘ mit Blick vor allem auf dessen philosophische Entwicklung nach den 1690er Jahren ging aus gemeinsamen Diskussionen des Verfassers dieser Zeilen mit Stephan Meier-Oeser hervor. Wir waren uns beide einig, dass nicht nur die Realitätsproblematik, wie es ja in jedem philosophischen Ansatz der Fall ist, sondern vor allem die Konfrontation des Realitätsproblems mit dem Harmonie-Begriff eine fundamentale Bedeutung im Denken von Leibniz eingenommen hat. Im Blick auf die jetzt hier vorgelegten, aus unserer Münsteraner Tagung hervorgegangenen Beiträge und auch im Blick auf die laufenden Diskussionen in der neueren Forschungsliteratur sehen wir uns in dieser Einschätzung bestärkt. Die aus den verschiedenen Beiträgen in kompetenter Form jeweils herausgearbeitete komplexe Sachlage, ist, das ist eigentlich das zentrale Signal, das von unseren Tagungsakten ausgehen könnte, nicht auf eine Leibniz-interne Betrachtung zu reduzieren, auch wenn Leibniz’ ‚Antworten‘ auf die Fragestellung des Verhältnisses von Realität und Harmonie in seinem Denken ab 1695 eine dramatische Verschärfung und vielleicht auch Radikalisierung bis hin zur Gleichsetzung beider Begriffe und Sachgehalte erreicht haben. Es öffnen sich vielmehr Perspektiven für eine weitergehende Diskussion, die dieses Verhältnis auch bei Spinoza, vor allem aber auch bei Autoren, die – vermittelt über Wolff und die Wolff-Schule – im wirkungsgeschichtlichen Lichtkegel von Leibniz’ Denken stehen, analysieren könnte, etwa gerade auch mit Blick auf Immanuel Kant’s Konzept von Realität oder auf Diskussion im Frühidealismus bei Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Ebenso leuchten die hier vorgelegten Ergebnisse auch philosophiehistorisch, begriffsgeschichtlich und in ihren allgemeinen geistesgeschichtlichen Implikationen ‚zurück‘ auf die Voraussetzungen von Leibniz’ Denken in verschiedenen Ausprägungen des spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Denkens, vor allem in Denkrichtungen, die unterschiedlich aber nachhaltig von antiken hellenistischen Wirklichkeitsdeutungen beeinflusst gewesen sind. Die Herausgeber danken der Fritz Thyssen-Stiftung für die großzügige Förderung der Tagung, der Friedrich Wilhelm Universität Münster für organisatorische Unterstützung, den Mitarbeitern der Leibniz-Forschungsstelle und Frau Uekötter für aktive kompetente Mitarbeit am Gelingen der Tagung vor Ort sowie den Hilfskräften der Forschungsstelle, Frau Manon Dutz und Anne-Sophie Naujok, für Mitarbeit an der Endredaktion der Texte. Ein zusätzlicher Dank geht an die Fritz Thyssen-Stiftung für die Förderung der Druckkosten und an das Herausgebergremium der Studia leibnitiana für die Aufnahme dieses Bandes in die Ergänzungsreihe dieser für Leibniz-Forschung so zentralen Fachzeitschrift. Münster, Dezember 2016

Thomas Leinkauf, Stephan Meier-Oeser

HARMONIE UND REALITÄT. EINE SYSTEMATISCHE EINLEITUNG* Thomas Leinkauf Es ist unbestreitbar, dass die Begriffe Harmonie und Realität im Denken von Leibniz eine bedeutende Rolle spielen – dies tun sie allerdings in je unterschiedlicher Gewichtung auch schon in der ganzen Geschichte des Denkens seit dem Mythologie-kritischen, kosmologischen Ansatz der Vorsokratiker. Hier kann es zwar nur um denjenigen semantischen Eintrag gehen, den Leibniz aus seinem spezifischen Denkansatz heraus im Blick auf diese beiden Grundbegriffe geleistet hat: Man ist dabei selbstverständlich bei Grundfragen nicht nur unseres heutigen Verständnisses von Leibniz, also bei der klassischen Debatte um Ontologismus vs. Phänomenalismus oder bei der Frage nach intensiven Größen und gradierter Wirklichkeitsauffassung (abgestufte Realitätsgrade im Verhältnis zu strukturellen Faktoren) oder beim Problem des Verhältnisses von Realität und Wahrheit. Es lohnt sich aber dennoch, den Sicht-Fokus hier etwas weiter einzustellen. In der lateinisch-scholastischen Tradition, in der sich Leibniz durch seine immense Lektüretätigkeit außerordentlich gut auskannte, stand ‚realitas‘ im Kernsinn zunächst eher für Wesen (essentia) oder Wesenhaftigkeit (essentialitas) als für „Existenz außerhalb der Ursache“, letzterer kam vielmehr das Adjektiv ‚realis‘ oder der Komplexausdruck ‚esse reale‘ zu1. Hier sollen zunächst einmal in einer ersten Annäherung der Begriff ‚Realität‘ als synonym für ‚Wirklichkeit‘ und ‚Harmonie‘ als synonym für ‚geordnete Zusammenstimmung von Verschiedenem‘ stehen – das, was die Sachhaltigkeit oder das Wesen dieser Wirklichkeit (res, ens singulare, esse existens) und ihrer Zusammenstimmung (harmonia, consistentia, convenientia) ausmacht, ist, im Unterschied zum bloßen (materialen, realen) Sein ‚in re‘, als intelligible oder formale Bestimmung zu den-

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Ich danke Stephan Meier-Oeser (Münster) und Thomas Micklich (Berlin) für kritische Lektüre und produktive Hinweise. Siehe J.-F. Courtine: „Realitas“, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, hrsg. v. Joachim Ritter und Karlfried Gründer, Bd. 8, Basel 1992, col. 178–185, hier col. 178. Courtine weist auf die grundsätzliche Differenz des scotistischen Realitas-Begriffs zum „modernen Begriff der Existenz“ hin: „Selbst die ultima realitas (in skotistischer Perspektive), d. h. der letzte charakteristische Zug, der aus einer ‚entitas quidditativa‘ eine ‚entitas ut haec‘ macht, also zur Individuation beiträgt, ist immer noch begrifflicher Natur und führt nicht das ‚esse existere‘ oder die Existenz mit sich“ (col. 180). Siehe F. Suárez: Disputationes metaphysicae, dist. XXXI, sectio 2, Opera omnia, Paris 1861, Vol. 26, pp. 229–232. Zur Sache mit Blick auf Leibniz siehe etwa A. Heinekamp: „Zu den Begriffen ‚realitas, perfectio, bonum metaphysicum‘ bei Leibniz“, in: Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa I, Wiesbaden 1968, pp. 207–222; auch Courtine, col. 182, der ebenfalls den Grundbezug von Leibniz zum scotistischen Realitätsverständnis herausstellt; D, Rutherford, Leibniz and the rational order of nature, Cambridge UP 1995, pp. 29–45.

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ken, d. h. als ideeller Gehalt in ratione/intellectu2. Grundsätzlich können sich Harmonie (= H) und Realität (= R) in verschiedener Weise aufeinander beziehen. Eine fundamentale Unterscheidung dieser möglichen Relation (= r) möchte ich an den Anfang stellen, da sie aus meiner Sicht tatsächlich ein Indikator für die basale Orientierung eines jeden Denkansatzes ist. Einmal [i] können sich H und R so zueinander verhalten, dass sozusagen zuerst – sachlich und/oder auch temporal – R ‚gegeben‘ ist und dann erst H hinzutritt und dadurch eine bestimmte Form des Seins von R, nämlich RH im Sinne von harmonischer Realität konstituiert [RrH {R→H} = RH]. Sein kann in dieser ontologischen Perspektive auch real oder wirklich sein, ohne harmonisch in einer bestimmten Weise geordnet zu sein, etwa, wie es die ursprungsmythologischen Vorstellungen insinuieren, in einem chaotischen Zustand der Urmaterie oder in der materiellen ‚Ursuppe‘ der sogenannten Planck-Ära in zeitgenössischer Deutung der Entstehung des Universums. Zum Selbstverständnis von [i] gehört allerdings auch, dass harmonisches, geordnetes Sein einen höherstufigen Realitätsgehalt besitzt, der sich aus der Sicht der klassischen Tradition des Denkens als Schönheit, Kosmos, Ordnung geltend gemacht hat3. In dieser Hinsicht, in der H als höherstufiges R zu denken ist, ist allerdings H auch zugleich als ‚eigentliches‘ oder ‚wahrhaftes‘ Sein, als ὂντως ὂν im Sinne Platons oder als verum/veraciter esse im Sinne des Augustinus4 zu denken. Zum anderen [ii] können sich aber R und H so zueinander verhalten, dass von R allererst und ausschließlich im Vollsinne gesprochen werden kann, wenn gilt R = H im Sinne einer unvorgreiflichen Synthese oder Identität. Es kann dann also Realität nur und ausschließlich unter den Bedingungen von Harmonie, d. h. der Zusammenstimmung, nicht der bloßen Koexistenz, von Verschiedenem geben. Philosophisch könnte also aus der Perspektive von [ii] erst dann von so etwas wie Realität gesprochen werden, wenn R nur und ausschließlich als H gegeben ist [RrH→R = H]. Hier ist H keine akzedierende oder superveniente, äußerliche ‚Form‘, die zu R hinzutretend – etwa nach dem Muster aller Kosmogonien seit Platons Timaios – dieses in eine bestimmte Modalität von Sein versetzt, die es zuvor nicht hatte: ἐϰ της ̑ ἀταξίας εἰς τάξιν ἤγαγε – er führte es (sc. das Sein) aus der Unordnung (= Nicht-Harmonie oder –H) in die Ordnung5. Sondern R ist als 2 3 4

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Siehe etwa die Definition von realitas im Lexicon philosophicum des Johannes Micraelius, 2. Auflage 1662, p. 1203, in dem sich noch die Formalitäten-Lehre der scotistischen Tradition spiegelt. Hierzu T. Leinkauf: „Schönheit als ‚splendor boni‘. Zur Bedeutung der Einheit im Begriff des Schönen“, in: Euphrantika II (2009), pp. 21–29. Vgl. Augustinus, De ordine I 7: „Certe enim amat Deus ordinem (…). Vere amat, ait ille, ab ipso manat“; II 49–51; De musica VI; De diversis quaestionibus q. 46: de ideis, n. 2; q. 78; hierzu und zum dahinterstehenden Verständnis von Zahl siehe A. Schmitt: „Zahl und Schönheit in Augustinus De musica, VI“, in: Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft, N. F. 16 (1990), pp. 221–237; allgemein zum Verhältnis Sein-Ordnung(Harmonie) vgl. H. Krings: Ordo. Philosophisch-historische Grundlegung einer abendländischen Idee (1941), Hamburg 1982, pp. 29–34. Als paradigmatisch für die Einschätzung des Mittelalters kann Albertus Magnus’ Aufreihung in der Summa de creaturis II, q. 81, 3 gelten, wo als Zeugen für die Quaestio: Utrum omnia sint ordinata Platon (Timaios 30 A), Aristoteles (Physica VIII 1, 252 a) und Augustinus (De natura boni, c. 3) angeführt werden. Platon, Timaios 30 A, siehe auch 28 A-29 A. Hierzu gehören alle schöpfungstheologischen Ansätze. Für Leibniz ist Harmonie bestimmt als „unitas in varietate“ („Elementa verae pietatis“

Harmonie und Realität. Eine systematische Einleitung

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R nichts anderes als H oder das Wesen bzw. die Wesensform von R ist selbst H. In dieser Perspektive hat ungeordnetes Sein keine Realität – wenn Sein und Realität zusammenfallen ist also, um es pointiert auszudrücken, ungeordnetes Sein kein Sein. Dieser letztere Fall, also [ii], scheint mir bei Leibniz gegeben zu sein – allerdings in Reinform erst als Resultat eines nachhaltigen Denkprozesses, ein Resultat, welches präzise und in aller wünschenswerter Komplexität seiner Konsequenzen erst in den 90er Jahren durch den Leipziger Philosophen herausgearbeitet wird, während der große Teil der Denkgeschichte von Platon bis hin zu den umfassenden Systemen des Rationalismus des 17. Jahrhunderts doch eher, sofern unter Realität auch das Wirklich-Sein im Sinne des materiell-sinnlichen Seins verstanden wird, dem Deutungstypus [i] zuzuordnen ist. Immer ist aber auch vor Leibniz die Sachhaltigkeit von x mit dem Wesen von x und d. h. zumindest mit seiner intelligiblen (formalen) Bestimmtheit gleichgesetzt worden, Realität also als Wesentlichkeit oder Essenzialität6. Selbst am scharfen Limes individuell-singulärer Wirklichkeit versuchte etwa die von Duns Scotus her kommende Denkschule das Sein dieses individuellen Seins, das ansonsten als existere, esse existens, esse existentiae, etc. aus dem definitorischen Zugriff des Begrifflichen ausgeschlossen war, vollständig zu essentialisieren oder zu verwesentlichen. Eine sachliche Antizipation von Leibniz’ Gleichung R = H sehe ich einerseits im spätantiken Gedanken des ‚mundus intelligibils‘ gegeben, der genetisch der tatsächlichen Realität des ‚mundus sensibilis‘, der quoad nos ersten Realität im Sinne des aristotelischen πϱότεϱον πϱὸς ἡμας ̑ (Physica A 1, 184 a-b; Analytica posteriora A 1, 71 a; 2, 72 a), vorgeschaltet wird. Dennoch ist auch hier immer zunächst das Sein erstrangig als Realität gesetzt und die Ordnung des Seins ein hinzutretendes Formprinzip, das nicht notwendig auch als H Bestand haben muss – die ganze Crux der Annahme eines ungeordneten, ungeformten Seins zeigt sich ja konsequent am Problem des Materie-Begriffs. Sofern angenommen wird, dass es ein materiales Substrat jeder Wirklichkeit gibt, das an und in sich selbst nicht Nichts ist (also: R = M), insofern kann R von sich aus, aus den Bedingungen des Materiellen heraus, zu Nicht-H, also zu Unordnung, Vielheit, Differenz, Andersheit etc., tendieren (dies gilt a fortiori, wenn wir annehmen, dass H nicht ohne Formen oder formale Konstituentien von Wirklichkeit auskommen kann), wovon der moderne zweite thermodynamische Hauptsatz mit seiner unvermeidlichen Entwicklung hin zu Indifferenz und Homogenität sowie zur Aufhebung aller Energieunterschiede nur ein weiteres, unseren heutigen Möglichkeiten näher stehendes wissenschaftliches Dokument ist. Andererseits erscheint die Grundgleichung R=H sachlich vorweggenommen im Denken des von Leibniz hoch geschätzten und intensiv rezipierten Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld7. Auch für Bisterfeld ist der Seinsbegriff radikal durch Relationalität

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1677/8; A VI, 4, 1358, 28), als derjenige Zustand, in welchem „multa ad quandam unitatem revocantur“ (ebd., 1359, 16), als „perfectio cogitabilitatis“ (ebd., Z. 15. 21f.). Siehe schon A. Maier: Kants Qualitätskategorien, Berlin 1930; die, wie auch in späteren Aufsätzen, immer wieder betonte, dass der Realitätsbegriff dem Begriffsfeld der essentia zugehörte. Hierzu siehe W. Kabitz: Die Philosophie des jungen Leibniz. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte seines Systems, Heidelberg 1909; zum komplexen Denkansatz Bisterfelds

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bestimmt, vom Sein Gottes bis zu den Existenzbedingungen individuellen Seins setzt er eine durchgehende, universal gültige Relationalität an: Existieren ist gleichbedeutend mit Konsistenz (Bisterfeld führt den Begriff der ‚consistentia‘ explizit in seine neue Ontologie ein), die jedes Sein als eine „entitas, qua ens est ad ens“ versteht8. Vollständige Relationalität, die durch Begriffe wie respectus, congruentia, convenientia, proportio, esse symbioticum, esse ad näher bestimmt ist, kennzeichnet die Struktur der Wirklichkeit. Etwas kann hier eigentlich nur Existenz besitzen, wenn es a priori in einer All-Relationalität zu jeglichem anderen Sein steht, deren absolute normative Vorgabe die innergöttliche (trinitarisch-perichoretische) Relationalität ist9. Zudem versteht auch Bisterfeld diese ad-/cum-Struktur als durch Harmonie bestimmt, auch er setzt also schon das Realitätsverständis [ii], das wir für Leibniz in Anspruch nehmen, vor [i] an10. Leibniz‘ Position hat also, wie jede ingeniöse philosophische Position, substantielle Voraussetzungen in der Tradition. Die grundständige Bedeutung von [i] kann man ganz gut an dem wohl wichtigsten kosmologischen Grundtext der philosophischen Tradition, dem Timaios Platons sehen11, auf den schon kurz hingewiesen worden ist: hier heißt es ganz eindeutig, dass das durch den Demiurgen im Blick auf die Ideen hervorgebrachte Sein erst aus einem nicht-organisierten in einen organisierten Status gebracht werden musste und dass die aktive Instanz, die das Sein in dieser Weise organisiert, als Seele zu bezeichnen sei, die selbst wiederum einer Intention und einem produktiven Akt des Demiurgen entspringt (siehe Timaios 28 A-30 B). Nun muss man, mit Blick auf das Spezifische des Denkens Platons und der ihm folgenden Tradition sagen, dass Realität – ein Begriff, den das Griechische ja nicht kennt – die substantielle oder wesentliche oder ‚eigentliche‘ Form von Sein meint, die Platon immer wieder als ὂντως ὂν bezeichnet hat, als „wahrhaft“ oder „wirklich“ Seiend (Phaidon 75 D, 78 C, 92 DE; Politeia 485 AB, 490 B: τ̑ῳ ὂντι ὂντως, 501 D, 509 B, 534 A; Timaios

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siehe M. Mugnai: „Der Begriff der Harmonie als metaphysische Grundlage der Kombinatorik und Logik bei Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld und Leibniz“, in: Studia Leibnitiana V, Wiesbaden 1973, pp. 43–73; T. Leinkauf: „Diversitas identitate compensata I“, in: Einheit, Natur, Geist. Beiträge zu metaphysischen Grundproblemen im Denken von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Berlin 2012, pp. 43–66. J. H. Bisterfeld: Philosophiae primae seminarium, ed. Adrian Heereboord, Leidae 1657, pp. 31–37. J. H. Bisterfeld: „Logica“, in: Bisterfeldius redivivus, Den Haag 1661, II, pp. 18–19: „Immeatio generalis est, qua omnes res, etiam inter se maxime distantes, saltem in aliquibus conveniunt. Huius radix est, primo, quod nihil in rerum natura sit tam absolutum, quin, intrinsecum ad aliud habeat respectum: Deinde, quod omnia entia secunda sint ex, per, et in primum. Sic omnes termini rem aliquam denotantes saltem in primo termino, ens, eiusque attributis conveniunt“. Es ist, wenn das ‚nihil‘ im umfassenden Sinne genommen wird, auch hier unmöglich, eine radikale Transzendenz des ersten Prinzips oder Gottes anzusetzen – es sei denn, man schlösse Gott aus der „rerum natura“ aus. Diese interessanten und für die Relational-Logik wie auch für die spekulative idealistische Dialektik von größter Bedeutung seienden Zusammenhänge kann ich hier leider nicht weiter ausführen. Vgl. zumindest Bisterfeld, Philosophiae primae seminarium, pp. 39–40 (collatio), pp. 91–94 (congruentia). Siehe T. Leinkauf / C. Steel (Hg.): Platons Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance, Leuven 2005.

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28 A)12. Diese gesteigerte Form von Sein ist nun nicht diejenige des sinnlich-phänomenalen Seins und eben auch nicht des harmonisch organisierten sinnlichen Seins. Die Welt als ein „sinnlich-erscheinender Gott“ (Timaios 92 C) und als „Lebewesen“ in Sinne eines komplexen Organismus, dessen Teile in einem geordneten, harmonisch-proportionierten Bezug zueinander stehen, ist nur schwaches Bild dieses tatsächlichen Seins, das für Platon und den Platonismus im Bereich des Intelligiblen anzusetzen ist. R ist dem Ideen-Bereich zuzuordnen und ebenso H, da die Ideen in einer ‚idealen‘, intelligiblen Relation zueinander stehen, die ewig, substantiell, gut und auch schön ist (hierzu vor allem Plotin V 8, 3–5). Plotin hat, nach Vorgaben im Denken des Mittelplatonismus (Alkinoos, Numenios), die Struktur dieser Realität als einer intelligiblen Welt in der Spätantike am schärfsten durchdacht (vgl. V 5, 8; V 8, 3–4; VI 7, 16–18) – und man kann sagen, dass er hier sachlich einige Aspekte des Leibniz‘schen Ansatzes antizipiert hat: die Relationen vollständig bestimmter idealer Seiender in einer ebenso vollständigen Ganzheit oder Totalität dieser Seienden zueinander gleichen im Kern den Relationen, die Monaden im späten Denkansatz von Leibniz zueinander aufweisen13. Es ist aber auch bei Plotin immer noch so, dass es eine sachlogische, in diesem Falle Prozeß- oder Hervorgangs-logische Differenz zwischen dem Sein und seiner durch den Geist/Intellekt konstituierten intelligiblen Struktur gibt. Es gibt im ersten Hervorgang ein noch unbestimmtes und daher natürlich auch ungeordnetes, nicht-harmonisches Sein im Sinne von R, das ‚dann erst‘ (das in Anführungszeichen gesetzte ‚dann erst‘ soll hier darauf hinweisen, dass für Plotin diese sach-logische Sequenz zeitfrei zu denken ist) durch das Sich-Zurückwenden des als Sein selbst hervorgegangenen Geistes in seinen Ursprung und Grund, in das Eine, zu RH wird. H tritt hier gleichsam ‚von außen‘ hinzu, ohne akzidentell zu sein, denn es tritt, wie Plotin sagt, in zeitfreier Sequenz hinzu, sodass R von RH und damit eben auch von H nicht zu trennen ist – außer für unser Denken, das versucht, sich diesen Prozeß der Seins- und Geistgenese klar zu machen (hierzu ist die zentrale Schift VI 7, insbesondere die Kapitel 15–18, zu lesen, aber etwa auch III 9, 1, 1–2214). Der Sache nach ist die durch die „Reflexion“ 12

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Vgl. Plotin II 4, 16, 2: τὰ ὂντα ϰυϱίως, ἃ δὴ λόγοι. Im Griechischen indizieren also ϰυϱίως und ὄντως intensive Realität oder gesteigertes Sein, sofern sie dem Ausdruck ‚Seiend‘ oder ‚Sein‘, ὄν, zugeordnet werden. Platon, Plotin und der Platonismus verstehen Natur als dasjenige, was durch die Allseele geordnet oder angeordnet ist, II, 2, 1, 39: ἡ γὰϱ φύσις τὸ ὑπὸ ψυχἣς τἣς πάσης ταχϑέν. So W. Beierwaltes: Denken des Einen. Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte, Frankfurt/M. 1985, pp. 38–72, zu Leibniz pp. 69–72. Siehe auch unten Anm. 16. Plotin unterscheidet hier im Ausgang von Platon Timaios 39 E (i) das ‚wesenhaft seiende Lebewesen‘ und (ii) den Geist, ‚der sieht‘, wobei er (i) als das ideale Gedachte oder den idealen Denkgegenstand bestimmt, d. h. als lebendige Einheit der Ideen oder geistige Welt, und (ii) als das aktive erfassende Denken, III 9, 1, 12–14: „Nichts hindert in der Folge mit Blick auf das ̑ Gesagte, dass beide Eins sind (ἓν εἰναι ἄμφω) und nur durch das Denken unterschieden werden, indem einfach eines das eine das Gedachte, das andere das Denken (als Akt) ist“. Der Geist (Denken) ist also eine Einheit der Relation aus Denken (Denkendem) und der idealen Einheit von RH (Gedachtem). Die Seele als organisierendes Weltprinzip ist dann diejenige Kraft, die diese ideale Realität in ihre Momente auseinander treten läßt oder in deren kosmisches Bild

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oder Zurück-Beugung des Geistes in das Eine als seinen Ursprung konstituierte Realität des Noetischen als einer absolut vollkommenen Ein-Vielheit ein ewiges Implikat des ursprünglich hervorgegangenen Seins15. Geht man jedoch von den dialektischen Analysen zur Struktur des Intellektes zu dem über, was Plotin zur Natur und zur komplexen Seinsform des Natürlichen als Kosmos sagt, dann ist es erst recht klar, dass wir hier die Sequenz von unserem Fall [i] vorfinden16. In der folgenden, vor allem christlich bestimmten Diskussion im lateinischen Raum wird sich die Sequenz R→RH als ‚klassisch‘ durchsetzen. Allerdings muss man nach Plotin und Augustinus die Sache ergänzen und damit komplexer ansetzen: [RH]→ R→RH, d. h. es gibt eine absolut ideale und daher auch harmonisch strukturierte Realität im Intellekt Gottes, den „mundus intelligibilis“ als, wie man dann sagte: „praeconceptus in mente/verbo Dei (unser eingeklammerter Term)“, dann gibt es eine geschaffene Realität als Wirklichkeit dieser Welt, die ab origine depotenziert ist (durch den Sündenfall des Menschen) – eine Depotenzierung, die sich physisch durch die Stellung der Materie, durch Zeitlichkeit (Entstehen und Vergehen), Begrenztheit etc. manifestiert, und dann schließlich eine durch komplexe Prozesse bewirkte gesteigerte Realität dieser depotenzierten Wirklichkeit, die aber – postlapsarisch – nicht zur Gleichung von R = H führt, sondern nur verschiedene Intensitäten von H in R zulässt. Die Restitution der beschädigten Realität in ihre ideale Urform ist nicht Sache eines immanenten, aus den Möglichkeiten von R bewirkten Tuns, sondern Resultat eines providentiellen, gnadenhaften Aktes aus der Transzendenz. Geht man also davon aus, dass das Verhältnis von R und H im Denken von Leibniz dem Typ [ii] zuzuordnen ist17 und dass für ihn Realität in einem strikten Sinne Harmonie ist (R = H) – und somit Nicht-Harmonie eben, wie auch das Hässliche, das Böse etc., keinen Realitätsstatus sui generis und folglich keine ontologische Substantialität aufweist –, dann muss nicht nur gelten: ‚alles, was ist, ist Ausdruck von H‘, sondern, da Leibniz die Augen vor den Vorkommnissen des Negativen, also des Bösen, Hässlichen, Ungeordneten, etc., nicht verschließt, vor allem auch: ‚alles, was für uns als nicht-H erscheint, ist, sofern es ‚ist‘, dennoch substantiell und an sich H oder eine Komponente von H‘ (es gibt kein Sein, das nicht Index von H ist)18. So kann Leibniz Realität wie folgt definieren: „Realitas complectitur

15 16 17

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differenziert, den „sinnlich erscheinenden Gott“ als Kosmos; auch III 9, 3, 6–7 zur Allseele, aus der unmittelbar das All selbst ‚folgt‘. Wenn man annimmt, dass das Sein mit R gleichzusetzen ist, so gilt: H ist ein Implikat von R oder R→RH. Hierzu siehe etwa III 8; II 9. So sieht es im Kern auch Heinekamp: „Zu den Begriffen ‚realitas‘, ‚perfectio‘ und ‚bonum metaphysicum‘“ (siehe Anm. 1), der hervorhebt, dass bei Leibniz „die Bedeutung des Begriffes realitas auf die Vollkommenheiten eingeschränkt“ [unser Typ (ii)] ist und eben nicht „die Vollkommenheit (…) auf die Realität zurückgeführt wird“ [unser Typ (i)] (p. 221). Diese Auffassung von R hat eine ontologisch-metaphysische und eine perzeptionslogisch-epistemologische Seite: Siehe GP II, 270: „quorum realitas sita est in percipientium secum ipsis (pro diversis temporibus) et cum caeteris percipientibus harmonia“. Siehe F. Piro: Varietas identitate compensata. Studio sulla formazione delle metafisica di Leibniz, Napoli 1990, bes. pp. 212–253; T. Leinkauf: „Diversitas identitate compensata. Ein Grundtheorem in Leibniz’ Denken und seine Voraussetzungen in der Frühen Neuzeit“, in: Studia Leibnitiana XXVIII,

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possibile excluso impossibili, positivum excluso negativo. Positivum autem rursus suos habet gradus, nam si completum sit, constituit substantiam, sin minus accidens; si absolutum sit constituit Deum, sin limitatum sit, creaturam“19. Gilt also strikt R = H, dann stellt sich dennoch die Frage, als was oder wie uns dieses R = H begegnet, oder auch: welche Arten oder Abstufungen von R = H es gibt? Gibt es in der Relation RrH, die eine Identität R = H zum Ausdruck bringt, dennoch eine Differenz zwischen den Instanzen vor und nach dem Gleichheitszeichen? Etwa so, dass die Relation r eine Ausdrucks- oder Entfaltungsrelation wäre, so dass H die Entfaltung von R oder, verschärft, das Phänomen von R wäre. Dann könnte auch gedacht werden, dass es Abstufungen von R im Verhältnis zur Intensität von H geben könnte oder dass es, umgekehrt, Abstufungen von H im Verhältnis zur gleichsam negativ wirkenden Intensität von R geben könnte (darauf deuten in der Ausdrucksweise von Leibniz Formulierungen wie ‚(ein)Mehr an Realität‘ [plus realitatis] hin, die je unmittelbar auch ihr Gegenteil, als ‚minus realitatis‘ implizieren, vgl. etwa A VI, 4, 388). So würde eine Abstufung in H z. B. bestimmt werden durch die Komplexität zwischen den Faktoren des Seins in R: das komplexere Sein, etwa das organische gegenüber dem anorganischen Sein, das sinnenhafte gegenüber dem rein vegetativen Sein etc., hätte einen höheren oder größeren Realitätsgrad von H in R, also +/-RH. Dann folgt aber, wie bei [i], ‚je mehr H, desto mehr R‘ oder RH (A VI, 4, 1359–1360). Eine strikte Identität von R und H im Sinne von [ii] kann so nicht wirklich konsistent gedacht werden. Andererseits kann, gerade auf Basis der wissenschaftlich gestützten Erfahrung von R, auch nicht geleugnet werden, dass es diese Abstufungen und Intensitäten von Realität gibt20. Auch Leibniz hat dies immer anerkannt und zu einem Teil seines systematischen Entwurfes gemacht. Die komplexe Struktur der Theorie des Verhältnisses der substantiellen Einheiten des Typs ‚unum per se‘ oder, darauf systematisch mit größerer Rigorosität aufbauend, des Typs ‚Monas‘ (Monade) untereinander erhält ihre Komplexität erst eigentlich, so könnte man sagen, durch die Integration von [i] in [ii]. Eine Integration, die einerseits nur epistemologisch (d. h. letztlich: innerhalb einer strikten Einheit oder Monas) und nicht ontologisch gelingen kann (da [i] nicht auf [ii] reduzierbar ist et viceversa) und die andererseits allerdings den Primat von [ii] gegenüber dem Modell der durch Differenz, Andersheit, Kompossibilität geprägten Intensitäten strikt bewahren muss, d. h. dass die Erfahrung der unterschiedlichen Formen von R als R zu einer „relativen“ Sache der Wahrnehmung, der Perzeption und der Erscheinung wird, der gegenüber an sich oder der Sache nach oder rigore metaphysico immer R = H Geltung hat – diese Differenz zwischen einer quoad nos-Perspektive und einem quoad rem-Sein zeigt sich ganz parallel auch in Leibniz‘ Auffassung, dass das Kontinuitätsprinzip quoad nos (oder im Bereich des Phänomenalen) nicht

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Wiesbaden 1996, pp. 58–83; sowie T. Leinkauf: „Diversitas identitate compensata. Ein Grundtheorem in Leibniz’ Denken und seine Voraussetzungen in der Frühen Neuzeit (II)“, in: Studia Leibnitiana XIX, Wiesbaden 1997, pp. 81–102. „De notionibus omnia quae cogitamus continentibus“ (1680/5); A VI, 4, 399, 3–8. Siehe T. Kisser / T. Leinkauf (Hg): Intensität und Realität, Berlin 2016; dort auch den Beitrag von Klaus Erich Kaehler zu Leibniz: „Die Gradualität des Realen und des Wissens bei Leibniz“, pp. 129–140.

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durchgängig gelten kann (da es sozusagen Lücken zwischen dem sachlogisch zu fordernden Kontinuum etwa einzelner Spezies von Lebewesen aus Gründen der universalen Kompossibilität und der Differenz möglicher Welten geben muss), dass es aber rigore metaphysico und quoad rem durchgängig in Anschlag zu bringen ist21. So fällt im systematischen Ansatz von Leibniz die philosophische Einsicht rigore metaphysico aus dem Zugriff der wissenschaftlichen – etwa naturtheoretischen, psychologischen, ethischen etc. – Erkenntnisse heraus. Man könnte unter dieser hermeneutischen Perspektive sagen: die Philosophie schaut immer auf eine Wirklichkeit im Sinne von R = H, die Wissenschaften und auch der empirischsensitive Zugriff auf dieselbe Wirklichkeit vollzieht sich aus der obliquen Perspektive RH und zwar unterschieden nach den kognitiven (perzeptiv-apperzeptiven) Möglichkeiten der Erfassung der Differenzen und Komplexitäten. Die Philosophie schaut, so könnte man sagen, durch die Differenzen von RH hindurch auf den Grund der Wirklichkeit als einen die Erfassungsmöglichkeiten unserer Sinnlichkeit, Propositionalität und Kalküls-Kompetenz übersteigenden Einheits-Grund, der R = H als die singuläre und absolute Entfaltung oder Entäußerung dieses Grundes erschließt. In diesem Sinne ist die Metaphysik von Leibniz radikal henologisch und theologisch fundiert – die in H notwendig implizierte Vielheit steht somit apriori unter dem Index der Einheit, während seine Physik, Psychologie, Mathematik, Jurisprudenz, Ethik usf. ebenso radikal Differenz-logisch begründet sind: sie alle bringen R unter dem Index von H als je unterschiedlich Manifestationen von EinVielheit zum Ausdruck. Dabei ist es eine der genuin Leibniz gehörenden und sich in seinem ganzen Denken, vor allem aber seiner späteren Philosophie ab 1695 immer stärker zum Ausdruck bringenden Einsichten, dass Vielheit, Differenz und Andersheit kein äußerliches Moment, kein Akzidens oder nicht-notwendiges Prädikat an der zugrundeliegenden Einheit des unum per se oder später der monas sind, sondern deren direkter ‚negativer‘ Selbstausdruck (zu diesem komplexen Selbstausdruck, der immer eine Synthese aus Einheit und Vielheit ist, gehört auch die monas dominans kreatürlicher lebendiger Einheiten, er ist als solcher aus Sicht der hier vorgelegten Deutung grundsätzlich harmonisch) – vielleicht erklärt sich hieraus, aus der strikten, systematisch geforderten Transzendenz des Einen im Neuplatonismus, seine mehrfach geäußerte Unzufriedenheit mit den Neuplatonikern und mit Plotin (wo er doch zu Platon ein durchgehend positives Verhältnis hat)22. Rigore metaphy21

22

Leibniz unterscheidet daher auch zwischen einem „ens reale“ und einem „ens apparens“, vgl. „Notiones generales“ (1683/5); A VI, 4, 555, 6–23, wobei konsequenterweise Realität nur demjenigen Seienden zukommen kann, das durch eine wahrhafte, substantielle Einheit bestimmt ist, also etwa durch eine Seele! Z. 19–20: „omnia corpora in quibus nulla inest Anima vel forma substantialis esse apparentia tantum“. Siehe A VI, 4, 479, 15–19: Plotin und die Neuplatoniker seiner Zeit (illorum temproum) waren „plane superstitionibus“ zugewandt – etwas, was Leibniz nie von Platon behaupten würde; ebd., 1947–1955 (Cudworth-Exzerpte); 2119, 24–2120, 1: „Plotinus ut Cartesius putabat, non posse creare Deum quam quod creavit“. Allgemein gilt von den späteren Platonikern, dass sie „Enthusiasmo Platonico infecti“ seien, vgl. A VI, 2, 137–138. In der späten Epistola ad Hanschium (25. Juli 1707), die eine Dissertatio philosophica de philosophia platonica enthält, allerdings anerkennt Leibniz, dass Plotin insbesondere den Gedanken reflektiert habe, dass jeder Intellekt oder Geist eine intelligible Welt in sich trage: „porro quaevis mens, ut recte Plotinus, quemdam

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sico gesprochen müsste die Position des Einen oder Gottes (der monas monadum) im System von Leibniz als diejenige des absolut Relationierenden gedacht werden, als das ‚=‘ in der Gleichung R = H oder, besser noch, als das Relationierende ‚r‘ in der Relation RrH. Absolute oder maximale Realität und absolute oder maximale Harmonie koinzidieren in Gott (siehe unten S. 22). Es ist schließlich kein Zufall, dass Leibniz etwa in der Sichtweise Hegels eine Position einnimmt, die ihn der Wesenslogik affin macht, also derjenigen Ausprägung der inneren Selbstentfaltung des Begrifflich-Idealen, die insbesondere die substantiellen Wechselverhältnisse zum Ausdruck bringt, die wesentliche wechselseitige Verknüpfung von Einheit und Vielheit oder Grund und Folge, Wesen und Erscheinung etc. Das Prinzip von Sein, das Eine, sei dies als Gott (im christlichen Sinne) gedacht oder philosophisch eben als erste Ursache und erstes Prinzip, ist schon in sich selbst absolute, ideale Vielheit (nicht nur im Sinne der trinitätslogischen ternarischen Struktur)23. Dieses in-sichkomplexe Eine ist die ontologische Grundform – Sein = Eines-Sein = (R = H). Alles, was ein wahrhaft Eines oder ein an sich Eines (unum per se) ist, ist in dieser Ontologie ein geschaffenes, gewolltes Bild des in-sich-Komplexen Einen – dass Leibniz diese in sich komplexen Einheiten als Monaden bezeichnet, darf nicht über diese Struktur hinwegtäuschen. Die strukturelle, nicht akzidentelle Koinzidenz von Realität und Harmonie führt zu einer Ontologie der Fülle, in welcher Sein als durch erfüllte, durchbestimmte und ganzheitliche Instanzen oder Seiende (entia) instantiiert zu denken ist, die Leibniz ontologisch als „estres completes“ (vgl. A VI, 3, 440; GP II, 42–43, 52–53 u. ö.), epistemisch als „notiones completae“ (vgl. Leibniz, Ge-

23

in se mundum intelligibilem continet, imo mea sententia et hunc ipsum sensibilem sibi repraesentat“ (Opera philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann, 1840, p. 445; Bezug ist vermutlich Plotin III 4, 3, 21 f.). Zu Leibniz-Platon vgl. T. Leinkauf: „Leibniz und Platon“, in: Zeitsprünge 13, 2009, pp. 23–45 [jetzt in: Einheit, Natur, Geist. Beiträge zu metaphysischen Grundprobleme im Denken von Leibniz, Berlin 2012, pp. 191–212]. Auch wenn Leibniz das erste (primum) Sein, also Gott, als „incomplexum“ bezeichnen kann, so etwa „De distinctionibus seu fundamentis divisionum“ (1682–96); A VI, 4, 1136, 18–19, so heißt dies nur, dass er dem ‚per accidens‘ ein ‚per se‘, dem ‚aggregatum‘ ein ‚unum per se‘, entgegensetzt (opponi), und besagt meiner Meinung nach nichts über die Binnenstruktur des primum selbst. Jedenfalls ist Gott nicht nur der Ursprung und die Ursache aller Realität, so etwa „De libertate, fato, gratia Dei“ (1686/7); ebd., 1596, 6–9, und somit vor allem Ursache der Identität R = H, d. h. der Tatsache, dass das Wirklich ist, was den höchsten Grad an kompossibler Sachhaltigkeit (realitas) besitzt, sondern er ist als ens necessarium zugleich „Eines der Zahl nach und Alles der Möglichkeit / dem Vermögen / der Kraft nach“ – „Ens necessarium esse Unum numero, et Omnia virtute, Specimen inventorum“ (1688?); ebd., 1618, 1–2, er ist „radix possibilitatis“ (ib., Z. 6) und – als göttlicher Intellekt oder Geist – die „regio idearum sive veritatum“ (ib., Z. 6). Es fällt zumindest schwer, in Leibniz‘ Stellungsnahmen zum göttlichen Sein und Wesen eine derjenigen Plotins vergleichbare Insistenz auf transzendente, absolute Einheit zu finden. Siehe auch „De ratione cur haec potius existant quam alia“ (1689); ebd., 1635, 14–16: in Gott ist die „realitas essentiarum, seu aeternarum veritatum“ anzusetzen. So etwa in „De veritatis realitate“ (August 1677); A VI, 4, 18–19, bes. 19, 6–7: „omnes realitates in Veritatibus aeternis nemine cogitante existentes, quandam inter se realem connexionem habebunt“. Ebd., Z. 17: Die wahre (absolute) Substanz (Gottes) ist „unbegrenzt“ (illimitata) und „enthält alle Realitäten in sich“ – „omnes in se continet realitates“; „Definitiones notionum“ (1677/86); A VI, 4, 36, 22–23: „Deus est Ens absolutum neque enim ulla datur realitas sive perfectio quae in Deo non sit“; „Elementa verae pietatis“ (1677/8); ebd., 1362.

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nerales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum 1686, § 74, A VI/3, 413; zitiert aus ed. F. Schupp, Hamburg 1993, p. 64.), logisch als vollständige Konjunktionen oder Konnexionen bezeichnet. Leibniz‘ Realitätsbegriff, der anschließend an die klassische Denktradition ‚real‘ nicht – wie heute oft üblich – ausschließlich als ‚wirklich‘ oder ‚existent‘ versteht (siehe oben S. 10–11)24 und damit das Verständnis von Realität in eine empiristische oder perzeptionslogische Richtung umbiegt, sondern vom Gedanken und Aspekt der Sachhaltigkeit oder des Wesens her betrachtet25, ist nicht reduzier24

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Natürlich verbindet auch Leibniz mit dem Gedanken der Realität eine mögliche Wirklichkeit im Sinne des esse existens und der positio realitatis, so wenn er, wie auch Spinoza, davon ausgeht, dass Existieren dem x, dem dieses zukommt, ein „Mehr“ an Realität verschafft, A VI, 4, 388, Apparat: „Existens est illud possibile quo posito plus ponitur realitatis“; siehe auch ebd., 557, 13–16; 568, 10–11: „existens est illa possibilium series quae plus involvit realitatis“; ebd., 631, 21–22, oder „Elementa verae pietatis“ (1677/8); ebd., 1362,20–1363,2; Randbemerkungen zur Ethica (1678); ebd., 1707, 18–19 zu prop. XI, scholium. Hier ist auch der systematische Ort für Leibniz’ Verständnis von Gradation oder Intensität als jeweiliger Ausdruck der Vollkommenheit eines Seienden, vgl. „An Herzog August“ (1685/7); A II, 1, 877, 25–26: „la perfection c’est le degré de realité“; „Catalogus notionum primarium“ (1685/88); A VI, 4, 636,14: „gradus realitatis seu perfectio“; „Definitiones: ens, possibile, existens“ (1687/96?); ebd., 867: „perfectius est quod plus habet realitatis vel Entitatis positivae“; „Definitiones, notiones, characteres“ (1687); ebd., 975, 11–12; „De probanda divina existentia“ (1678/9); ebd., 1390, 20: „perfectio, sive aliquis realitatis gradus“! Zum Zusammenhang von existentia, perfectio und realitas vgl. „Existentia, an sit perfectio“ (1677); ebd., 1354; „Elementa verae pietatis“ (1677/8); ebd., p. 1358: „perfectio est gradus seu quantitas realitatis“; „De affectibus“ (1679); ebd., 1428–1430; „Randbemerkungen zur Ethica“; ebd. 1736, 4–9. In De veritatibus primis (1680) gibt Leibniz eine Realdefinition der Existenz, ebd., 1443, 27–30: „hinc sequitur Existentiae definitionem realem in eo consistere, ut existat quod est maxime perfectum ex iis quae alioqui existere possent, seu quod plus involvit essentiae. Adeo ut natura sit possibilitatis sive essentiae exigere existentiam“. Das lateinische ‚realitas‘ steht bei Leibniz für ganz verschiedene Bereiche ein und wird häufig promiscue verwendet – angezeigt durch ein ‚seu‘ bzw. ‚sive‘ – zu essentia, perfectio, cogitabilitas, possibilitas siehe z. B. „De iis quae per se concipiuntur“ (September 1677); A VI, 4, 26, 1–2: „essentia seu realitas“; Z. 18: „nihil aliud enim realitas quam cogitabilitas“; Z. 20: „realitas seu cogitabilitas“; „Notationes generales“ (1683/5); ebd., 557, 6: „essentia seu realitas“; „Divisio terminorum“ (1683/5); ebd., 561, 4–5: „realitas vel essentia“; „De libertate et necessitate“ (1680/4); ebd., 1447, 19: „essentia seu realitas“; „Tabula notionum preaparanda“ (1685/6); ebd., 631, 21–22: „possibilitas seu realitas“ oder auch „Specimina calculi rationis“ (1686); ebd., 810, 12: „possibilis autem est terminus vel Ens vel Reale, ex quo nihil tale (sc. contradictorium) sequitur“; „De natura veritatis“ (1685/6); ebd., 1521, 10: „perfectio sive realitas“; „Nouveaux essais, Pièces préparatoires“; A VI, 6, 12, 12: „la realité (c’est à dire la possibilité de la chose)“. Nur was eine Wesensform und Sachhaltigkeit besitzt ist real und denkbar oder: alles, was wirklich gedacht werden kann (im Sinne präziser Unterscheidung und Bestimmung) ist – selbst wenn es nicht actu gedacht wird – etwas Reales. „Definitiones notionum“ (1677/86); ebd., 36, 22–23: „realitas sive perfectio“; „Definitiones: aliquid, nihil“ (1688/9); ebd., 931, 6: „perfectionem seu realitatem“. Auch ist Realität über den Terminus ‚res‘ mit ‚subjectum‘ und dem „ultimum subjectum“ verbunden (so „Enumeratio terminorum simpliciorum“ (1684/5); ebd., 388, 26), welches die Substanz ist, d. h. wenn jedes wahrhaft Eine eine Substanz ist als letzter Träger von Sachbestimmtheit, dann ist realitas auch synonym für Substantialität zu verstehen. Alle diese Bestimmungen konvergieren unübersehbar in der Vorstellung einer stabilen und genauen (daher auch definiten) Seinsform. Grundsätzlich opponiert Leibniz der Realität

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bar auf die schlechten Alternativen ‚metaphysisch-empiristisch‘ oder ‚phänomenologisch-ontologisch‘ etc. Vielmehr ist es so, dass das in sich komplex Sachhaltige oder Reale eben auch Resultat einer Phänomen-logischen Analyse quoad nos sein – πϱότεϱον πϱὸς ἡμα̑ς – kann, sofern das, was ein phainomenon zu eben diesem macht, ja nichts anderes als die im Erscheinen sich zur Erscheinung bringende Sachbestimmtheit ist (die sich für unser Denken als cogitabilitas zeigt26): „car les phenomenes mêmes sont des realités“ („Nouveaux Essais“, III, c. 6; A VI, 6, 309, 24–25; hierzu auch A, II,1, 391), d. h. sie haben ihre eigene Sachhaltigkeit und ihren eigenen H-Faktor. Der ontologische Unterschied kann im monadologischen Ansatz spätestens seit Mitte der 90er Jahre nur noch darin liegen, ob eine Sachhaltigkeit zur inneren Bestimmung der Monade und ihrer Attribute gehört (die alle an der gradualen Seins-Intensität partizipieren und keine Gattungsunterschiede aufweisen) oder zu der Bestimmtheit ihrer ‚äußeren‘ phänomenologischen ‚Wirklichkeit‘ gehört: Vollkommenheiten gehören dann ausschließlich zum Bereich der Monasintrinsischen Bestimmungen27, hier ist der ‚Ort‘ der Realität – der Bereich des Phänomenal-Körperlichen bleibt hier prekär (es besteht die Tendenz, ihn ebenso vollständig zu Essentialisieren, das zwingt aber zu einem hypertrophen Blickpunkt ‚e statu dei‘). Es scheint zu gelten: Wirklichkeit oder Existieren ist eine Funktion der Realität oder Sachhaltigkeit: ‚je mehr Realität, d. h. je mehr Vollkommenheit, in

26

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die bloße Erscheinung, das „apparens“, so etwa „Definitiones, notiones, characteres“ (1687); ebd., 874, 10–11 und verweist sie damit in den Bereich des Zugrundeliegenden, Wesentlichen und Einheitlichen. Ebenso grundsätzlich ist unter Realität auch das zu verstehen, was „unmittelbar für etwas erfordert ist“ („quod immediate requiritur ad aliquid“) und zwar so, dass dies exklusiv Geltung: nur dieses x wird (zum Sein von y) gefordert, nichts anderes, vgl. „De abstracto et concreto“ (1688); ebd., 990, 11–12. In einem engeren Sinne ist daher Realität auch dem Begrifflich-Konzeptuellen, der notionalitas, entgegengesetzt, siehe etwa „De distinctionibus seu fundamentis disctinctionum“ (1686–96?); ebd., 1140, 23: „praedicatio est vera vel falsa, realis vel notionalis, directa vel indirecta“; in einem weiteren Sinne ist sie, wie gesagt, die Sachbestimmtheit auch des Begrifflichen – „est autem et cogitatio quaedam realitas“ („Elementa verae pietatis“ 1677/8; ebd., 1359, 23) oder Phänomenalen oder Akzidentellen selbst (vor allem insofern diese durch H bestimmt sind). So ist etwas – im Leibnizschen Sinne – Mögliches (possibile) ein x, das eine bestimmte essentia, eine realitas oder eine Intelligibilität besitzt: „quod distincte intelligi potest“, so „De libertate et necessitate“ (1680/4); ebd., 1447, 19–20 – den Zusammenhang von realitas und distinctum/distincte esse stellt Leibniz auch an anderen Stellen her, vgl. „Revocatio qualitatum“ (1677?); ebd., 1962, 13: „quid realis et distincti“; „Nouveaux essais, pièces préparatoires“; A VI, 6, 8, 10–11: „la definition reelle fait connoitre la possibilité du defini“. In Grua S. 324 bringt Leibniz perfectio direkt mit realitas in substantiellen Zusammenhang: „perfectio est realitas pura seu quod in essentia est positivum atque absolutum“. Leibniz, „Elementa verae pietatis“ (1677/8); A VI, 4, 1360, 3–9: „est enim relatio quaedam unitas in multis. Et relationum species sunt, nexus et rationes rerum inter se, proportiones, proportionalitates. Ex quibus omnibus in dato objecto simul sumtis, resultat harmonia. Quoniam ergo quo plus relationum (quarum aggregatum harmonia est) in objecto cogitabili est, hoc plus realitatis sive quod idem est perfectionis est in cogitatione; ideo sequitur Harmoniam esse cogitabilium quatenus scilicet cogitabilia sunt, perfectionem“. Leibniz: „an Christian Wolff, 15. Mai 1715“ , in: Briefwechsel, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, Halle 1860, p. 172: „posses etiam dicere [sc. perfectionem] esse gradum essentiae, si essentia ex proprietatibus harmonicis aestimetur, quae ut sic dicam faciunt essentiae pondus et momentum“.

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x, desto eher wird x realisiert oder verwirklicht werden‘28 – dies ist gleichbedeutend mit der Aussage ‚je mehr an H, desto mehr an R‘. Dass Leibniz sozusagen seinen differenzierten Ansatz – kalkuliert – jenseits schlechter Alternativen sich ausbildender philosophischer Strömungen aufbaut, zeigt alleine schon seine Souveränität und Eigenständigkeit. Dass er zusätzlich Realität als etwas a priori Komplexes oder, besser, eben als in sich harmonisch (und d. h. in idealer komplexer Kompossibilität stehende) Einheit versteht, läßt in der hermeneutischen Rekonstruktion zwar viele Möglichkeiten eines Verständnisses seines Denkens auf produktive Weise offen, nicht jedoch das Grundaxiom, dass ein wirklich Seiendes ein wahrhaft Eines und ein wahrhaft Eines eine in sich komplexe, durchbestimmte und harmonische Vielheit ist (in dieser Hinsicht sind einfache Begriffe als Allgemeinbegriffe, sofern sie keine sachhaltige Ausdifferenziertheit repräsentieren, kein wirklich Seiendes). Realität als Harmonie, R = H, ist zusätzlich unter den Index der Intensität und der ontologischen Differenz gesetzt: wahrhafte Einheiten, also unitates per se als Substanzen, Monaden, Einheiten, sind in ontologisch höherem Maße durch R = H bestimmt als etwa Einheiten, die sich – in verschiedenster Weise – aus solchen Einheiten bilden, etwa die Form einer Einheit des Zusammenstimmens verschiedener Wahrnehmender oder Perzipierender29. Diese ist ontologisch nachgeordnet, wie ja auch die Denkbarkeit (cogitabilitas) dem Denkbaren (cogitabile), das selbst wieder auf Sachbestimmtheit und Wesentlichkeit (als Intelligibilität, des durch Denken Unterscheidbaren) hin geordnet ist, nachgeordnet ist – Monaden-logisch könnte sie nur eine Expression einer Monas, nennen wir sie M1, sein, die ihr (prästabiliertes) Pendant in den Expressionen von M2, M3, M4 … Mx besitzt. Nimmt man an, dass Harmonie eine stabile, proportionale Verbindung von Verschiedenem in eine Einheit ist (als diversitas identitate compensata), dann ist folglich Realität, sofern R = H gilt, immer ein bestimmtes Sein, dessen Einheit aus der Einheit von Verschiedenem besteht. Gegenüber dem rein begrifflichen Sein hält Leibniz an der Realität trans-konzeptuellen Seins fest30, die sich im Wesentlichen aus der re28 29

30

Leibniz: „De affectibus“ (1679); A VI, 4, 1428, 6–7: „Nam regula generalis est semper fieri id quod plus involvit realitatis, seu quod est perfectius“; ebd., 1429,15 und 1430,18: „perfectio est gradus realitatis“. Leibniz: „Brief an De Volder“ (30. Juni 1704); GP II, 270: „Imo rem accurate considerando dicendum est nihil in rebus esse nisi substantias simplices et in [!] his perceptionem atque appetitum; materiam autem et motum non tam substantias aut res quam percipientium phaenomena esse, quorum realitas sita est in percipientium secum ipsis (pro diversis temporibus) et cum caeteris percipientibus harmonia“, ebd. 281 (1706); schon in den „Nouveaux essais“ (1703/5), Livre II, c. 12; A VI, 6, 145, 17–22 wird festgehalten, dass die Realität des nichtsubstantiellen Seins ausschließlich „consiste (…) dans le fondement des perceptions ou des phenomenes des substances simples“, die des substantiellen Seins hingegen im absoluten Grund aller Dinge, in Gott, vgl. ebd., c. 13; 149, 26–27: „mais sa verité (sc. des rapports oder ordres zwischen den Possibilien und dem Existenten) est fondée en Dieu comme toutes les verités eternelles“. Auch die Verhältnisse (relations, proportions, coordinations) haben eine „realité dependent de l’Esprit, comme les verités“, aber eben gerade nicht vom Intellekt oder Geist der Menschen, sondern von der „supreme intelligence qui les determine tputes de tout temps“, so ebd., c. 30; 265,1–3. Zumindest an der Realität einzelner Substanzen, Einheiten und Monaden, siehe G. W. Leibniz: „Marii Nizolii de veris principiis“ (1670); A VI, 2, 427, 27–29: „Nominales sunt qui omnia

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ellen Möglichkeit einer Sache und d. h. aus einer präzisen, auf unterscheidbaren (distinkten) Sachgehalten basierenden Bestimmtheit ableitet31. Zur Bezeichnung und Bestimmung der in solcher komplexen Einheit integrierten Differenzen verwendet Leibniz ein Vokabular, das er ebenfalls aus der klassischen Tradition des Denkens entnimmt: concinnitas, similitudo, con(n)exio, congruentia, ordo, etc.32 Der höchste oder letzte Grund der Realität im Sinne des für Leibniz reklamierten Realitätsverständnisse des Typus R = H ist Gott, der durch seinen absoluten Denkakt, in welchem er die Ideen und ewigen Wahrheiten actu reflektiert, die ewige, beständige, kontinuierliche Garantie jeder von diesen Ideen und Wahrheiten abgeleiteten Realitäten ist. Hat die Verknüpfung eines begrifflichen antecedens und eines consequens im hypothetischen Urteil und Schluß (wenn x existiert, dann ist x notwendiger Weise so und so, „un être tel“) ihre Realität oder Sachhaltigkeit in der Verknüpfung (connexion, liaison) der (mentalen) Ideen, so kann wiederum die Fundierung dieser zweiten Verknüpfungsstufe (wenn die Verbindung der Ideen existiert, dann gilt: wenn x existiert, dann ist x notwendiger Weise so und so) nur in einem aktualen ewigen Denkakt liegen, der das Bestehen der Ideen und ihrer kompossiblen Verknüpfungen aus dem Bereich des Hypothetischen in denjenigen des Thetisch-Realen hebt (Gott ‚ist‘, die Ideen und ihre Verknüpfungen sind in ihm actu gegeben, die hypothetischen Urteile und Schlüsse erhalten ihre Sachhaltigkeit und Realität aus diesen, die kontingenten Dinge erhalten ihre Sachhaltigkeit und Existenz aus dem Setzungsakt Gottes)33. Dass quoad nos jeder Gottesbeweis

31

32 33

putant esse nuda nomina praeter substantias singulares, abstractorum igitur et universalium realitatem prorsus tollunt“; insbesondere 447,26–448,9. G. W. Leibniz: „Nouveaux essais“ (1703/5) III, c. 3; A VI, 6, 293, 27–31: „L’essence dans le fonds n’est autre chose que la possibilité de ce qu’on propose. Ce qu’on suppose possible est exprimé par la definition, mais cette definition n’est que nominal quand elle n’exprime point en même temps la possibilité, car alors on peut douter si cette definition exprime quelque chose de reel, c’est à dire de possible“. Hierzu siehe die in Anm. 12 genannten Arbeiten. Leibniz: „Nouveaux essais“ (1703/5), III, c. 11; A VI, 6, 447, 10–26. Die Vorgängigkeit der „veritez necessaire“ [= y] gegenüber der Existenz der kontingenten Seienden (estres contingens) [= z] ist zwar zu behaupten, zugleich jedoch ist die Vorgängigkeit der Existenz der „substance necessaire“ Gottes [= x] gegenüber den ewigen Wahrheiten zu behaupten, so dass wir eine ontologische Sequenz (die eine nicht-zeitliche, sachlogische Sequenz ist) der Art x → y → z erhalten. In y liegen aus der Sicht von Leibniz die „Quellen“ (sources) unserer aktualen Aussagen (propositions), des oben genannten hypothetischen Wahrheits-Typus: wenn z existiert, dann ist z so und so, d. h. ein bestimmtes, definites, distinktes und daher denkbares Sein (cogitabile), das eine eigene Realität zum Ausdruck bringt. Menschliches Denken, nennen wir es d, bezieht sich ursprünglich auf y als produktiven Quellgrund seiner propositionalen Wahrheiten. Die idées innés sind nicht schon per se axiomatisch oder propositional strukturiert, sondern wir bilden solche Axiomata (Satz vom Widerspruch, Satz von zureichenden Grund etc.) im Rückgriff auf in-komplexe, einfache Ideen, die ebenfalls ‚angeboren‘ sein müssen oder jedem Denkakt, diesen strukturierend, als Bedingung vorausgehen müssen; siehe hierzu Lucia Oliveris jetzt in Münster vorgelegte Dissertation Imagination and Harmony in Leibniz’s Philosophy of Language, in der unter neuer Bewertung der Bedeutung und der Sachhaltigkeit der Nouveaux essais vorgeschlagen wird, die idées innées als „constraints of thought“ zu verstehen. Entscheidenden ist, dass Leibniz die Sachhaltigkeit, also das Wesen (essence), die Möglichkeit (possibilité) oder die Realtität (realité) in der Existenz eines letzten Grundes fundiert, nicht in dem

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die Existenz sozusagen als Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit voraussetzen muss und somit nur ex hypothesei schließen kann –‚wenn Gott existiert, dann ist er das allervollkommenste Sein und Wesen und sein Sein und Wesen (nicht nur der Begriff davon) schließt notwendig das Existieren ein‘ –, ist letztlich genau darin begründet, dass quoad rem und unter der ganz anderen, nicht Existenz-logischen Voraussetzung R = H (in dem von uns oben angesetzten Sinne) gilt: aus Hmax folgt Rmax und Rmax impliziert notwendig Existenz34. Akzeptiert man die hier vorgelegte Deutung des Realitätsbegriffs, dann könnte man auch, stellt man sich in den Sichtpunkt der Philosophie und argumentiert ‚rigore metaphysico‘, folgende Interpretationsthese aufstellen: die metaphysische Kopräsenz Gottes zu aller Wirklichkeit (analog jener der absoluten, nicht abgeleiteten Kraft zu jeder abgeleiteten, eingeschränkten ‚empirisch-physikalischen‘ Kraft) manifestiert sich in der Einheits-stiftenden Kraft des „vinculum substantiale“, das alles x zu einer Einheit macht und, so könnte man hinzufügen, allen Einheiten Realität verleiht durch die Zusammenstimmung der ansonsten dispersiven Teilbestimmungen35. Diese komplexe Sachlage im Denken von Leibniz und die damit verbundenen ungelösten Probleme setzungs- und existenz-logischer sowie vor allem auch ontologischer Natur – etwa das Problem, dass mit der für die Entwicklung seit dem späteren Mittelalter typischen Homogenisierung des ontologischen Feldes keine strikte Transzendenz-Setzung mehr möglich wurde und die Differenz zwischen höchstem und niedrigstem Sein, zwischen Gott und Welt, zwischen erstem Prinzip und letztem Verursachten nur noch in der Intensität der Ausprägung gemeinsamer Faktoren bestehen konnte36 – bildet den systematischen Hintergrund, der die Fragestellung der Tagung motiviert hat und dem die vorliegenden Beiträge aus je verschiedener hermeneutischer Perspektive nachgehen.

34

35 36

Wesen oder der Substanz. Diese Existenz alleine ist durch den aktualen Denkvollzug und das damit verbundene Verwirklichen der Ideen und ihrer Verknüpfungen Garant der Existenz der Ideen und der von diesen abhängigen Denk-Akte und Seins-Akte. Siehe schon Anselm von Canterbury, Proslogion, c. 2 (p. 84 Schmitt); G. W. Leibniz; „Discours de métaphysique“ (1684/6), n. 1; A VI, 4, 1531; A II, 1, 434: „la métaphysique est la théologie naturelle, et le même Dieu qui est la source de tous les biens est aussi principe de toutes les connaissances. C’est parce que l’idée de Dieu renferme en elle l’Etre absolu (!), c’est à dire, ce qu’il y a de simple en nos pensées, dont tout ce que nous pensons prend son origine“. Zum Problem des „vinculum substantiale“ siehe den zweiten Teil meines Beitrags in diesem Band, unten S. 179–199. Siehe hierzu meine Bemerkungen zur Substantialisierung der Akzidentien und zur Akzidentalisierung der Substanzen in T. Leinkauf: „Der Ternar essentia-virtus-operatio und die Essentialisierung der Akzidentien“, in: Philosophie im Umbruch, hrsg. von Gyburg Radke-Uhlmann und Arbogast Schmitt, Stuttgart (Philosophie der Antike 12) 2009, pp. 131–153, bes. pp. 151– 153, und jetzt auch in der Einleitung zum ersten Band meines in Kürze erscheinenden Buches Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance 1350–1600, Hamburg 2016.

VARIETIES OF PHENOMENALISM, LEVELS OF REALITY: A TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE Stefano Di Bella INTRODUCTION In a pioneering paper for the treatment of ontological issues in analytical philosophy, R. Carnap advanced a distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal questions’ concerning existence1. The former have to do with the legitimacy of a whole conceptual framework. They typically concern the existence of types of objects, or better of ontological categories, as when one asks: “do external objects exist?” or “do numbers exist?”, “do properties exist?” According to Carnap, they are not liable to receive empirical answers: they bear on the extension of our universe of discourse, and essentially depend on our linguistic conventions. The latter, instead, concern the existence of objects (or also classes of objects) within a certain framework; as such, they can receive a definite answer. To this type belong questions like e. g. “do unicorns exist?”, or “did dinosaurs exist”? when posed and answered within the empirical framework of natural science. To which type does a question concerning the ‘existence of bodies’ belong? The answer seems a straigthforward one: to the external questions. Taking ‘bodies’ as synonimous with ‘physical objects’, indeed, it amounts to the famous question about the existence of the so-called ‘external world’: a question that emerges as central in modern philosophy, along with the controversial ‘epistemic turn’, since the irruption of Descartes’ ‘metaphysical’ doubt. The discussion about ‘phenomenalism’, indeed, and the concept of phenomenalism itself, at least in its modern fashion, arise within this problematic context. In Leibniz, however, the problem of the alleged ‘phenomenal status’ of bodies – and the concept of ‘phenomenon’ – assumes different meanings in different contexts. It is important to try to disentangle them, in order to better understand what is at stake when he advances – sometimes in problematic form, sometimes in more assertive terms – the view of a phenomenal status of bodies. I wish to distinguish, basically, two types of problems to which the Leibnizian reflection on phenomena tries to answer. Both can be well approached starting from his reaction to the Cartesian view; in both cases, however, the data of the Cartesian problem are essentially modified. The first type of problem, and the related range of meanings of ‘phenomenon’, are actually bound to the ‘externalist’ question about existence that was originally 1

See R. Carnap: “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”. in: Revue internationale de philosophie 4 (1950), 40–50.

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posed by the Cartesian doubt. Here also, however, the Cartesian question is modified in a significant way. Descartes, indeed, for his own part did not question the meaning of existence; apparently, he took it for granted when insinuating his radical doubt. Leibniz, instead, introduces an analysis of the concept of existence which replaces, to a large extent, the role of doubt itself in the development of a phenomenalist view. A quite different type of question, and the related different meanings assumed by phenomena in Leibniz’s thought, do not bear on the existence of bodies, but rather on their nature. Although radically questioning their very existence, Descartes and his followers held the nature of bodies, i. e. of extended things, for granted. Leibniz, on the contrary, focuses precisely on this problem. To this aspect the sense of ‘phenomenon’ is related, that is especially relevant when the controversial issue of corporeal substance is at stake. As I try to show, these two types of questions and the related solutions, while being intrinsically distinct, cross one another in different ways along Leibniz’s intellectual career and the different contexts he gets engaged. A methodological point is in order here. In the past two decades, to a large extent thanks also to the debate about corporeal substance, the awareness has much grown in the scholarship of the need of taking into account the diachronical dimension in the assessment of Leibniz’s views. This should not obscure the fact that the plurality of the – sometimes even conflicting – solutions and models does not simply range themselves along a chronological line of successive development, but form, at least in part and at least during the Hanoverian years, a set of options constantly present and available for Leibniz, though differently used in different contexts, where they appear alternatively or even as co-present. This is why I wish try to sketch here a very general map, though also pointing to some different applications of its elements in some different historical and textual contexts. In particular, in the first part of this paper I shall consider the elaboration – on the terrain of the Cartesian ‘externalist’ issue of existence, hence of the first type of analysis – of a ‘phenomenist-coherentist’ model for the physical world, and I shall briefly illustrate its different applications. In the second part I shall focus, armed with these distinctions, on some samples from Leibniz’s correspondence with B. de Volder and B. des Bosses, where the ‘phenomenist-coherentist’ model is explicitly endorsed, and I shall try to show how it is here exported from its original terrain and employed to answer the quite different problems posed by the complex inquiry into the nature of corporeal substances. Given the nature of this inquiry, I shall limit myself to quote some (sometimes well-known) texts belonging to the different periods of Leibniz’s reflection, without engaging myself in a full interpretative analysis, only to illustrate, in a roughly schematic way, what is relevant for the working out of the general map I am interested in.

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1. PHENOMENA I: THE EXISTENCE OF BODIES BETWEEN ‘METAPHYSICAL DOUBT’ AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE Cartesian Doubt and the Analysis of Existence: At the Origins of the Coherence Model Descartes’ metaphysical itinerary raised the issue of the existence of bodies. Descartes cast his hyperbolical doubt on their existence, while ultimately aiming at proving it. Leibniz takes a quite different stance: on the one hand, he seems to take the hyperbolic doubt not too seriously2. On the other hand, he is unsatisfied with its alleged solutions. He is ready to admit, indeed, that, contrary to Descartes’ view, the existence of bodies cannot be ultimately demonstrated ‘with metaphysical rigour’. His 1676 discussion with Foucher plays a seminal role for this attitude3. Leibniz’s typical strategy to deal with the Cartesian/epistemological problem of existence, indeed, is to neutralize it; in a sense, to radicalize it in order to finally dismiss it. To this aim, he develops and generalizes a standard solution to the dream doubt – something far from original, in itself – according to which waking experience can be distinguished from dreaming by its coherence4. But, a skeptic might insist, what about the possibility that our life is a unique and perfectly coherent dream5? It would be indistinguishable from reality, Leibniz quietly admits, but this would change nothing in terms of our life. Leibniz’s approach, however – aiming at showing that the problem of reality can be resolved in terms of coherence, entirely within the sphere of phenomena – 2 3

4 5

See his remarks on Descartes’ Principles, where he aligns himself with Gassendi’s criticism to Descartes’ hyperbolical doubt, seen as an affected rhetorical device (“Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum”, in: Principia I, 13; GP IV, 358). For the exchange with Foucher, see GP I, 363 and following. The relevance of this phenomenistic episode has been emphasized by R. M. Adams: Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, New York 1994, pp. 235–240, and recognized, but also circumscribed, by D. Garber: Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, New York 2009, pp. 268–279. Chapters 9 and 7, respectively, of Adam’s and Garber’s book, are devoted to the varieties of Leibnizian phenomenalisms. The solution was partly accepted by Descartes himself. Interestingly enough, the hypothesis of the ‘whole life as a dream’ is introduced by Leibniz on the basis of the metaphysical or theological idea of a reality ‘truer’ than ours – a suggestion not committed to the subjective point of view of Descartes’ attitude. The hypothesis is already envisaged in the Paris note that I am going to quote at length: “When we awaken from our dreams we find more consistency in the governing of bodies, but not in that of minds, i. e. in the best republic; and it can happen that when at some time we awaken even from the sleep of this life, we shall come into a more perfect world.” (A VI, 3, 511; Parkinson, 63) It can be found also in two other texts I consider below, the Definitiones and the De modo distinguendi. From the historical point of view, it is connected by Leibniz to the Platonic tradition: “And if a Platonic philosopher were to claim that our whole life is a unique, coherent dream, from which our soul will awake at the moment of death, perhaps one would not be able to refute her/him except through some a priori arguments” (“Definitiones cogitationesque”; A VI.3, 1397); and in the De modo distinguendi: “What if this whole short life, indeed, were only some long dream and we should awake at death, as Platonists seem to think? […] no reasonable person calls God a deceiver, if some short dream which is completely distinct and coherent is experienced in the mind.” (A VI, 4, 1502–1503).

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goes beyond a merely pragmatic consideration, relying on a simple distinction between theoretical and practical attitude. As I anticipated, Descartes had challenged the existence of bodies through his doubt, while leaving unquestioned the meaning of ‘existence’. Leibniz, on the contrary, attempts an analysis of the concept of existence, and in particular of the existence of physical objects. As a result, to exist for a physical object tends to be reduced to the fact of being perceived in a coherent way6; better, of being thus perceivable, or also of being so perceived from the point of view of an absolute Perceiver, God. This reply to the Cartesian problem in terms of a phenomenistic-coherentist account of existence had already been worked out by the end of Leibniz’s Paris stay, the same period as his discussion with Foucher. I quote here a bit at length a paradigmatic text from the Paris notes, in order to briefly illustrate the main aspects of this view: On due consideration, only this is certain: that we sense, and that we sense in a coherent way [nos sentire congruenter], and that some rule is observed by us in our sensing. For something to be sensed in a coherent way is for it to be sensed in such a way that a reason can be given for everything and everything can be predicted. This is what existence consists in – namely, in sensation that involves some certain laws. For otherwise, everything could be like dreams […]. Further, it is not necessary that a dream differs from waking experience by some intrinsic reality, but it is only necessary that they differ in form or in the order of the sensations.7

The idea that there is no intrinsic distinction between dreaming and waking experience, and the consequent appeal to to the order of perceptions as the only mark of reality, were old themes in the dialectics of the dream argument. What is more original, is Leibniz’s decision to give to this a quasi definitional value for existence, insofar as the perceptive ‘coherence’ tends to capture the sense of that elusive notion8. Therefore there is no reason why we should ask whether there exist certain bodies outside us, or whether space exists, and other things of this sort; for we do not explain adequately the terms that are involved here. Unless, that is, we say that we call a ‘body’ whatever is perceived in a consistent way, and say that ‘space’ is that which brings about that several perceptions cohere with each other at the same time […].9

At this stage, Leibniz’s phenomenalist approach is even open to a certain relativization of the notion of reality: real experience and dream experience are tentatively seen as different frameworks, each one presumably endowed with some internal coherence, to be compared one another in virtue of their respectively more or less local character. “Therefore the idea of space is recognised by this: namely, that it is 6

7 8 9

One should be careful here. Already in the Paris notes Leibniz, though moving towards phenomenalism, is eager to avoid a hasty identification of ‘esse’ and ‘percipi’: (a) not all that is perceived does exist, (b) nor conversely all that exists is perceived. Still, the reduction of existence to perception can be achieved, though reinforcing perception, in (a), by the requirement of (maximal) coherence, and by substituting actual perception, in (b), by the possible one. See “De mente, de universo, de Deo”: A VI.3, 464; G. H. R. Parkinson: Leibniz on Human Freedom, hrsg. v.K.Müller/W. Totok, (= Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 2), Wiesbaden 1970, pp. 7–9. “De veritatibus, de mente, de Deo, de universo”; A VI.3, 510–511; Parkinson, pp. 63–65. It does not entirely capture it, however, and this is why I say ‘quasi-definitional’. (see note 6). “De veritatibus, de mente, de Deo, de universo”; A VI, 3, 511.

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that by which we separate the place and, as it were, the world of dreams from our own. As this is so, it does not follow that there exists anything but sensation, and the cause of this sensation and of its consistency […].”10 In other drafts of the Paris notes Leibniz toys with this idea of ‘dream worlds’, seen as different phenomenal worlds ontologically on a par with ours, but spatio-temporally disconnected from it: a suggestion that he will abandon a bit later on behalf of his mature view of the opposition between the unique actual world and the plurality of the possible ones. Interestingly enough, whereas the Cartesian problem was somehow bound to envisage the possibility of solipsism11, here the existence (not of material things, but) of other perceivers is somehow taken for granted. Moreover, it bestows a new intersubjective dimension on the idea of phenomenal coherence: Further, it [existence] consists in the fact that several people sense the same, and sense what is coherent; and different minds sense themselves and their own effects. From this it follows that there is one and the same cause which causes our ones and others’ sensations. But it is not therefore necessary that we act on them or they act on us, but only that we sense what is consistent; and necessarily so, on account of the sameness of the cause.12

Although perception does not present any internal criterion to lead beyond itself, it is possible for Leibniz to infer the existence of a cause (or causes) of our phenomena through an a priori demonstration13. It is not possible, however, to prove that these causes are bodies: what comes to confirm the theoretical intractability of the Cartesian doubt14. In any event, this causal explanation of existence somehow limits its purely phenomenalist interpretation, insofar as it acknowledges the existence of something beyond our perception. It seems also that Leibniz means to confine that audacious interpretation to the understanding of the existence of bodies. Thus, in the same Paris note, he goes as far as to denying that ‘to be’ has a univocal sense when said of minds or of bodies, respectively: “Being itself is meant in a different way, when it is referred to bodies, and to our mind: we do sense or perceive that we

10 11 12 13 14

Ibidem. See on this: S. Di Bella: Phenomenon, Action and Coherence: Leibniz’s Way from the Mind’s Experience to a Real World, in: A. Pelletier (ed.), Leibniz and the aspects of reality. Studia leibnitiana, Sonderheft 45, Stuttgart 2016, pp. 23–40. Leibniz himself will deal explicitly elsewhere, e. g., in his De modo distinguendi, with the solipsistic hypothesis. As for his idea that I am ‘alone with God’, it has a different root, as I shall try to show. “De veritatibus, de mente, de Deo, de universo”; A VI, 3, 512. Certainly, coherent perception is the inferential basis for recognizing some cause of such perceptions, which does exist while not being directly perceived by us. But this is also a confirmation of the epistemic priority of minds over bodies – an aspect where Descartes’ and Leibniz’s evaluation does converge. It is bound to an anti-materialist concern which is fundamental for both, although it is often overlooked by contemporary interpreters in favor of a purely epistemological concern: “From this it is evident that so far is it from being the case that material things are more real than others, but that on the contrary one can always doubt of their existence; or rather, they do not differ materially, i. e. in their existence in themselves, from the existence of dreams, even though they differ in beauty.” (“De veritatibus, de mente, de Deo, de universo”; A VI, 3, 511; Parkinson, p. 65).

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exist; when we say that bodies exist, instead, we mean that thare are some coherent perceptions, which have some permanent particular cause.”15 Sometimes, the phenomenist approach combines with a sort of pragmatist attitude, according to which the true mark of existence is its relationship with action: those phenomena are real, indeed, that determine the observer to act, or better to strive to action. Thus, the draft of the first Hanoverian years known as De modo distinguendi inter phaenomena realia et imaginaria – maybe the most important text expressly devoted to these topics – presents the pragmatistic approach in a first version, but then it abandons it in favor of a classic exposition of the coherentist model as the true answer to the Cartesian challenge16. The combination of pragmatic attitude, verificationist flavour and coherence criterion will be a constant in Leibniz’s stance on this topic. In any event, the De modo distinguendi develops in a systematic and detailed manner all the aspects of the coherence model illustrated so far in the earlier draft from the Paris years17. Other Applications of the Coherence Model Let me now briefly consider some other problems and contexts, where the phenomenist-coherentist model is applied: a) The ‘Internal Usage’. The title of the De modo distinguendi reminds us that – besides the global challenge raised by the hyperbolical doubt – we are bound to the need of giving an account of the ordinary phenomena of delusive experience. That is to say, we should justify the possibility of accounting, from within a phenomenistic framework, for the distinction between ‘real phenomena’ and illusory phenomena (hallucinations, dreams etc.). But this was exactly the original usage of the coherence criterion, directly stemming from the traditional discussion (and alleged solution) to the dream argument. Illusory phenomena can be identified as circumscribed pieces of experience which are not in agreement with the rest of our subjective and intersubjective experience. In the light of my introductory remarks, this usage of the criterion of coherence can be considered as an empirical answer to an ‘internal’ question. As such, it is used in Leibniz’s tables of definitions, to distinguish among real and illusory phenomena. Only, Leibniz, when faced with the hyperbolical ‘global’ challenge (‘the whole life could be a unique coherent dream’) – hence with a typical ‘external’ question – opted for the undepassability of coherence itself as a general interpretation of existence, instead of looking, like Descartes, beyond the coherence criterion for some higher metaphysical assurance. b) Building a methodological-epistemological framework. In many drafts of the Eighties, Leibniz accepts Descartes’ approach in a purely methodological way, 15 16 17

Ibidem. See A VI, 4, 1499. The characters of the required coherence are further specified; lawlike pattern and the related predictivity are emphasized.

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in the sense of a foundational strategy for a systematic reconstruction of knowledge, where the Cogito is taken as the principle of factual (or empirical) truths. Several tables of definitions present a sort of double approach: one based on the articulation of intellectual principles, one on perception and the recognition of the phenomenological contents which present themselves to the mind. Thus, the intriguing draft Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae – besides of a metaphysical framework ruled by the principles of contradiction, reason etc. – sketches, under the heading of ‘Principles of physical certainty’, a phenomenal framework, taken as the systematic, self-contained whole of our empirical knowledge. The first paragraphs of the draft repropose the topic of coherence as an antidote to the ‘global’ doubt on the external world and as a criterion to discern ‘local’ deviations from ‘real’experience18. Then, the theme is further developed from the point of view of the justification of our empirical knowledge, where emphasis is laid on on the necessary connection of experience (the old theme of dreams as disconnected pieces, having no spatial relationship with the rest of experience) and on our predictive abilities: This space is common for all [perceived things], and we label ‘bodies’ those phenomena to which we can assign a position, like the stars. There is no body that is not conceived as located in this general space, at a given distance from any other. The phenomena that have no determinate position, indeed, like a rainbow or an image reflected by the water, are called ‘emphatica’ or mere appearances, although we can account for them on the basis of the actions of bodies […]. Moreover, the aggregate of all bodies which have their mutual relations of position is called ‘the world’, and in different times different states of the world follow one another. Each state, however, arises from the preceding one according to certain laws, whose inquiry is the task of the physicist; so that we can infer from the present phenomena the past and future ones for the practical needs of our life. One has progressed enough in the knowledge of nature if she/he is able to make successful predictions about the future states of the world.19

Beyond the effort of replying to skeptical worries, a view of a world of phenomena is sketched here, perfectly suited not only for our pragmatic needs, but also for the further development of scientific inquiry. There is continuity between the world of perception and the empirical world that is the object of the scientific inquiry. One can even recognize here some Kantian family-air. The criterion of existence for bodies, indeed, is their belonging to a common spatio-temporal framework; and 18

19

“The phenomena which are in agreement with the rest of phenomena are taken as true. Here one can understand what is meant by Body, Space, Time, World, Individual. On the basis of this principle we are able to distinguish between the dreams and what occurs to us when we are awake […].” (“Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae”; A VI, 4, 1396). Ibidem. The following lines insist again on the solution of the skeptical worries: “Thus, the objections raised by Skeptics against our observations are pointless. They can have their doubts about the truth of things, and they can call what we experience a dream, if they wish; it is enough that these alleged dreams agree with each other, maintain certain laws and hence make human prudence and predictions possible. Given all this, we are left with only a question of name. Such appearances, indeed, are called true by us, and I do not see, how they could be made truer, or even how one could wish them to be truer.” (A VI, 4, 1398).

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the coherence criterion is specified in the sense of the fundamental lawlikeness of phenomena. c) Illustrating the Metaphysical Self-closure of Substance. If the Definitiones above have shown the possible epistemological pay-off of the phenomenist-coherentist approach, in the Discourse of Metaphysics the same possibility of organizing our cognitive world in a systematic and satisfying way in purely phenomenal terms, hence though bracketing the problem of its absolute existential value, is metaphysically exploited to illustrate and make plausible the status of the soul/mind as a ‘world apart’. This reflection culminates with the well-known ‘fiction’ of the mind’s solitary existence ‘with God alone’20. But notice, this is not the outcome of a discussion on the Cartesian doubt and the related phenomenist solutions. It is, instead, a consequence derived from the causal closure of the individual substance, which has been established on independent logico- metaphysical grounds. In § 14 of the Discourse, indeed, where this view is introduced, the autonomous unfolding of phenomena is derived from the general theory of the individual substance based on the complete concept: “[…] it follows from what we have just said, that each substance is a world apart, independent of everything outside of itself except God. Thus all our phenomena, that is to say, all the things that can ever happen to us, are only the results of our own being.”21 Certainly, in this way the soul-like nature of the individual substance is assumed as something going without saying. And its causal autonomy is confirmed, in its turn, by the self-sufficiency of phenomena, while admitting the need for them to have at least one external cause – which might amount, in principle, simply to God himself. In any event, an important step is taken, insofar Leibniz more or less explicitly identifies the accidents of his individual substances with their perceptions, or phenomena: “our phenomena, that is to say, all the things that can ever happen to us”. Actually, Leibniz’s later commitment to metaphysical phenomenalism in the context of his monadological view will not add anything more to the content of this view already illustrated in the Discourse. Still, the problematic and argumentative context of its introduction will be different.

20 21

See “Discourse” § 32; A VI, 4, 1580–1. G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. by Leroy E. Loemker, second edition, Dortrecht 1989, p. 312. Anyway, the following lines confirm the salient features of the phenomenist approach we are familiar with: “And since these phenomena maintain a certain order which conforms to our nature or, so to speak, to the world which is within us, so that we are able to make observations that are useful for controlling our own conduct and justified by the success of future phenomena, with the result that we can often judge the future by the past without deceiving ourselves, this would be sufficient to enable us to say that these phenomena are true, without being put to the task of inquiring whether thay are outside of us and whether others perceive them also. Nevertheless it is true that the perceptions or expressions of all substances intercorrespond, so that each one, following with care the established reasons or laws which it has observed, meets with others who have done this also.” (ibidem).

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2. PHENOMENA II: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND THE NATURE OF BODY From the analysis of existence to the analysis of nature Admittedly, we know well that in the same texts of the so-called ‘middle years’ Leibniz contemplates the possibility of a more realistic view of bodies; and we know also that the opposite idea of their merely phenomenal status is often presented by him in this period only in a problematic form, as the first side of an alternative (‘either there is in bodies something over and above extension, or they are only phenomena, like the rainbow’): the other pole of the alternative being the ‘corporeal substance’, about which a lot of ink has been spilled. I do not intend here to enter into this debate. I will limit myself to circumscribing the sense of ‘phenomenon’ which is at stake in this context. In particular, I think that we should accurately distinguish the issue of reality/ phaenomenism, considered as a general one concerning ‘external’ existence, to be dealt within the context of a theory of knowledge, from a quite different (and specifically Leibnizian) doubt about the reality of bodies. Consider this passage, taken from an interesting draft of categorial anlysis from the mid-Eighties: We conceive of a real being as what does possess real attributes […]. We conceive, instead, merely apparent beings as dreams. There is an a posteriori sign for recognizing a real being: I mean, the mutual connection of all appearences; it is not a demonstrative sign, however […] I am still not able to prove that bodies are real beings; so that I do not venture to assert this. But this evaluation depends on the true concept of body.22

While the first part of the quotation reproposes the usage of the coherence criterion we are familiar with, the last line somehow conceals the crucial shift. In order to decide the issue of the existence of body, one should not analyze the notion of existence, but the concept of body. In other terms, the problem moves from the existence of bodies to their nature. In this context a new meaning of ‘phenomenon’ is central, which is also the relevant one for the question of ‘corporeal substance.’ In the spirit of my introductive distinction, one might see this as an ‘internal’ question – admittedly, a very peculiar one – insofar as it has nothing to do with a general analysis of existence or knowledge, but rather is a true ‘population question’ posed within a well defined framework – that of Leibnizian substance metaphysics. That is to say, the bodies’ claim for reality should not be evaluated trhough the critical assessment of our cognitive powers, or the clarification of the notion of existence, but by verifying the capacity of bodies to meet some specific metaphysical requirements. Hence, the solution depends on the conceptual analysis of body itself. Descartes and his followers questioned the existence of matter, but they claimed to have a ‘clear and distinct’ idea of its nature, forming the object of physical science. Some Cartesian thinkers, like Malebranche, although maintaining, and reinforcing, the priority of the knowledge of mind as far as its its existence was con22

“Definitiones”; A VI, 4, 307.

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cerned, went as far as to deny that we have any idea of the mind, comparable to the clear idea we do have of extension. Leibniz wants to challenge this view. In the Eighties – after his discoveries in dynamics that allowed him to go beyond Descartes’ physics – he uses conceptual analysis in order to dissolve the allegedly autonomous consistency of Cartesian extension, both on the ontological and the epistemological side. Thus, he challenges the alleged privilege accorded to the geometric notions connected with extension, in other terms to the so-called ‘primary qualities’23. This implies the assimilation of these qualities to the status of secondary qualities like colours, to which mechanical philosophy attributed a mind-dependent status. This strand of thought, notice, offers a powerful suggestion towards the idea of phenomenal knowledge as something ‘confused’. Interestingly enough, also the De modo distinguendi, after having extensively discussed the existence of bodies from the point of view of the Cartesian doubt concerning existence, and grounded their empirical reality as ‘real phenomena’, in the last lines raises again the question of their existence, and of their status as phenomena, from the quite different viewpoint of their problematic nature: As far as bodies are concerned, I can prove that not only light, heat, colour and kindred qualities, but even motion, figure and extension are mere appearances. And if there is something real [in them], this is only their active and passive force, in which the substance of bodies consists. And the bodies that have no substantial forms, are mere phenomena, or at least aggregate of true bodies.24

As is well known, the conceptual analysis of matter culminates with the problem of its composition, and the related requirement of unity, central for the issue of corporeal substance. And again to the lack of that fundamental requirement a different sense of ‘phenomenon’ is related. The new complexity in the meaning of ‘phenomenon’ is well attested by a remark in the important draft from the mid-Eighties Notationes Generales, where the case of the rainbow – the most common comparison used to insinuate the phenomenal view of bodies – is presented as the example of two distinct (though related) forms of ‘diminished reality’. As an ens per aggregationem, it possesses a merely derivative reality, drawn from its components; as an optical phenomenon made of colours, it is essentially related to our sensory perception25. Anyway, my concern here is not to explore this complexity in detail, but only to emphasize the most general difference of interests underlying Leibniz’s reflection on this topic. In every variety of the notion of ‘phenomenon’, indeed, some aspect of mind-dependence is contained. But in the varieties that are relevant for the discussion about the reality of corporeal substance, the element of mind-dependence is basically independent of the general epistemological concerns related to the Carte-

23 24 25

See Discourse § 12; A VI; 4, 1545. “De modo distinguendi”; A VI, 4, 1504. The last clause shows that Leibniz contemplates here a difference between the status of phenomena and that of aggregates. See “Notationes Generales”; A VI, 4, 555.

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sian problem about existence; it is bound, instead, to the problems issuing from the Leibnizian analysis of the nature of body. The coherence model, for its own part, was worked out essentially in relation with the first set of problems, and as a matter of fact it is not further employed in the context of the discussions on corporeal substance of the middle years. Still, it is clearly at disposal for giving an account of the reality of bodies in the case that the anti-realist alternative were to prevail. And it has been already used in the Discourse, in a more or less explicit way, and independently of the topic of the Cartesian doubt, to sketch the metaphysical view of a world of soul-like substances and of their agreement. But only later Leibniz, in the context of his monadological view, will rely on that model directly from within his discussions on the corporeal substance, and with the aim of fully generalizing its scope; hence, of construing his world doing explicitly without corporeal substances themselves. In the next sections I shall consider this move in the correspondences with de Volder and des Bosses. 3. LATE PHENOMENALISMS: THE DE VOLDER AND DES BOSSES CORRESPONDENCES The Phenomenalist Turn: “Percipientium phaenomena” In both cases the ‘phenomenalist turn’ comes only at a certain point in the discussion, and provokes a negative reaction in the interlocutors, who had, so far, discussed Leibniz’s view quite sympathetically or at least in a costructive spirit. The de Volder correspondence, indeed, presents us with an extremely complex discussion about the nature of substance, at the boundary between physics and metaphysics. The debate is commonly recognized as a decisive step for the explicit emergence of Leibniz’s monadological view. Within this context, Leibniz puts forward also his phenomenalist-coherentist account of bodies. The grounds for this move are fundamentally the same that motivated the phenomenist hypothesis in the earlier alternative from the Eighties: bodies are phenomena insofar as they lack true unity. Now, however, Leibniz has decided in favor of the phenomenalist interpretation of bodies. The new view already appeared in a paragraph of a January, 1704 letter, which was then deleted: And if anyone concedes to me that there is an infinity of perceivers, that there is a fixed law of the progression of the phenomena, that the phenomena of these different percipients agree with one other, and that there is a common reason for their existence and for the agreement in the thing that we call God, I neither posit anything else in things nor think that anything else should be posited […].26

26

Leibniz to de Volder, January 21, 1704; GP II, 264; G. W. Leibniz: The Leibniz-de Volder Correspondance, trans. by Paul Lodge, New Haven 2013, p. 291. Finally, this view is made explicit to de Volder in the letter of June, 1704 (GP II, 270).

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In the des Bosses correspondence, instead, the discussion is located right from the start on the monadological terrain. Still, des Bosses the Scholastic is interested in a Leibnizian-style reinterpretation of hylomorphism, which should take the reality of bodies in some way for granted. When des Bosses, however, puts forward his theory of corporeal substance, and at the same time engages Leibniz in the famous discussion concerning union and the ‘vinculum substantiale’, Leibniz makes it explicit that he is inclined towards a phenomenist account of the physical world of bodies. This view is presented here, like in the earlier writings of the Eighties, in a problematic form27. But now the phenomenal view enjoys of a favourable ‘presumption’. As in his earlier exchange with de Volder, Leibniz thinks that one can be satisfied, at least on the strictly philosophical level, with the phenomenist-coherentist account of the physical world. In any event, the phenomenist view Leibniz presents to his late interlocutors is essentially the same he had worked out in the Paris notes and in the De modo distinguendi. As we read above in the letter of January, 1704, indeed, what is real in bodies reduces to the multi-faceted coherence of our phenomena, that is to say to (a) the inner coherence of the perceptions of each perceiver, which unfold (b) according to a lawlike order; (c) the further intersubjective agreement of the many perceivers, which (d) can be explained by reference to a common cause, God. Constructivism and Phenomenalism: The Conflation Although the new phenomenalist turn in Leibniz’s late writings reproposes the contents of the coherentist view already sketched and illustrated some decades earlier, the underlying justification seems to be different, because the problematic context is different. In the late correspondences, the basic presupposal for the introduction of the phenomenist view is the positive metaphysical attribution of a mind-like (or soul-like) nature to the basic beings (simple substances, or monads). And this identification of the basic beings is determined, in its turn, by the difficulties concerning the nature and composition of bodies – hence, directly from within the discussions about corporeal substances and monads. Thus, Leibniz invites de Volder to consider, behind the bodies which interact at the dynamical level, the more fundamental level of soul-like substances, where forces are led back to perceptions and appetites. Also with des Bosses, he insists that the monadological/phenomenist account is able to provide us with the most 27

Interestingly enough, the realistic alternative, this time, would be nothing but the acceptance of the hypothesis of ‘vinculum’ – that is to say, of something metaphysically more robust than the mere agreement (‘consensus’) of perceptions: “If that substantial bond of monads were absent, then all bodies with all their qualities would be only well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror – in a word, continuous dreams that agree perfectly with one another; and in this alone would consist the reality of those phenomena […]. Therefore, if a body is a substance, it is the realization of phenomena going beyond their agreement.” Leibniz to des Bosses, February, 15, 1712; GP II, 435–6, G. W. Leibniz: The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondance, trans. by B. C. Look and D. Rutherford, New Haven 2007, p. 227.

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fundamental analysis of reality: “I regard the explanation of all phenomena solely through the perception of monads agreeing among themselves, with corporeal substances excluded, to be useful for a fundamental investigtion of things.”28 The general treatment of bodies as phaenomena, therefore, is introduced on the basis of an ontological consideration of what is ‘most basic’, quite independently of epistemological considerations concerning knowledge and existence. Perception is considered here essentially as an ontological property, the property of all basic beings. This is why, Leibniz can try to reassure de Volder, and protest that he maintains the reality of bodies, by relying on a constructivistic sense of phenomenon. According to this sense, we try to identify the basic ontological building blocks from which everything else is built up, and the reality of the resulting things is not eliminated, but simply derived from, or reduced to those basic beings. Thus the relationship between the soul-like true unities and their phenomena is presented in a way (or in a language) that might match well with an ‘aggregate view’ of phenomena: as if we were faced with a difference in levels, where the reality of the composite is not denied, but rather recognized as derivative with respect to the basic unities. I do not really do away with body, but reduce it to what it is. For I show that a corporeal mass that is believed to have something besides simple substances is not a substance but a phenomenon resulting from simple substances, which alone have unity and absolute reality.29

If ‘phenomenon’ should be taken in this way, then it seems that the Leibnizian issue of phenomenalism could be fruitfully compared – better than to the so-called ‘problem of the external world’ – to the quite different problem of the more or less reductionist account of the relation among the different layers into which the physical reality can be analyzed, with the related types of explanation. Or also, with the issue of the relationship between the ‘manifest image’, or everyday experience of world, and the view issuing from our best scientific explanation. There is more, however, in Leibniz’s view. Actually, we are faced with a sort of conflation between a kindred perspective – i. e., a reductionist account of the relationship between basic and derived reality (or explanation) – and the one which we would call properly phenomenistic – the latter being centered on the notion of perception and related epistemological issues. And this conflation (with the related, persistent ambiguity) is made possible exactly by the fact that the basic beings are souls, whose accidents are nothing but perceptions. “Consensus percipientium”: From Coherence to Harmony Also the earlier phenomenistic accounts, as we have seen, expressly assumed the intersubjective dimension of coherence, in the form of the agreement among an infinity of perceivers; still, the possibility of the solipsistic approach was consid-

28 29

Leibniz to des Bosses, June, 16, 1712; GP II, 450–451; Rutherford, p. 255. Leibniz to de Volder, January, 1705; GP II, 275; Lodge, p. 319.

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ered30. Now the reality of an infinity of perceivers is given right from the start with the fundamental metaphysical assumption of the infinite multiplicity of true unities, or monads. And in this metaphysical foundation of a stratified universe, the focus of attention somehow shifts from the internal coherence of a single subjective world (that was obviously central in the Cartesian minded approach) to the mutual agreement of the different images of world of the different monads, to form a unique inter-monadic ‘world’. The coherentist model is reinforced (and also somehow grounded) by the cognate, all-pervading metaphysical notion of ‘harmony’. While in the letters to de Volder we are left with the view of a sort of intersubjective foundation of the reality of physical world, which is not further justified, the theme of the divine foundation of the agreement (already well present in the Discourse) will be dealt with in the des Bosses correspondence. What is interesting for our concern is to see, how even this well-known Leibnizian motive is illustrated there in a purely phenomenistic language. Thus, Leibniz oberves that the perspectival nature of the phenomena of each monad would make their accordance problematic. This is why, one must rely on the ‘phenomenon of God’, in order to assess the true sense of the objective reality that belongs to our common world: If bodies are phenomena, and are judged by our appearances, they will not be real, since they will appear different to others. Thus, the reality of bodies, space, motion and time seems to consist in this: that they are the phenomena of God, that is, the object of his knowledge of vision. And the difference between the appearance of bodies with respect to us and their appearance with respect to God is in some way like the difference between a drawing in perspective and a ground plan. For whereas drawings in perspective differ according to the position of the viewer, a ground plan or geometrical representation is unique. God certainly sees things exactly such as they are according to geometrical truth, although likewise he also knows how each thing appears to every other, and thus he contains in himself eminently the other appearances.31

The deflationary role of the coherence model: a new application The coherentist model had been elaborated in the earlier years in relation with the Cartesian problem of existence – and played there a deflationary role with respect to it. Here, it is employed in a different context, referring rather to the problem of the corporeal nature. But the same deflationistic strategy is adopted, within the context of a markedly reductive interpretation of foundational analysis: […] I neither posit anything else in things nor think that anything else should be posited. I believe that all other positions and questions arise only from notions that are not analyzed well.

30

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The analogical argument that was used in the De modo distinguendi and similar texts to defeat solipsism (there is no reason to doubt the existence of other beings, given that there is no more reason for the existence of myself alone than for the existence of anyone else) is employed (admittedly, a bit elliptically) to establish the soul-like nature of the other ‘true unities’. See Leibniz to de Volder, June, 30, 1704; GP II, 270. GP II, 438, Rutherford, 233.

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And I will be surprised if anyone shows that anything else must be added. If we always had this in mind in the midst of our dispute, we would avoid much wrangling.32

Thus, the analysis aims now at showing that to look for something more in the nature of bodies (as, earlier, in their existence), over and above coherent perceptions, is not only superfluous, but actually makes no sense33. To this aim, the verificationist attitude underlying Leibniz’s strategy is emphasized. The ‘bounds of meaning’are no longer measured by the criterion of subjective certainty (‘I am certainly acquainted only with the immediate content of my perceptions’), but by the requirement of phenomena that need to be exhibited in order to substantiate and make sense of every statement of ours. It is necessary that these simple substances exist everywhere […]. Anything more beyond this in things is posited in vain and added without argument. For since everything ought to be deduced from the phenomena, by what evidence, I ask, will you prove that there is something real in them beyond these things or something substantial besides the substances from which appearances arise in themselves out of themselves? Whoever adds anything to these things will accomplish nothing, and will both work in vain in giving explanations and be thrown into inextricable difficulties.34

On this basis, further inquiries can (and should) be dismissed as pseudo-problems.35 External Questions, Again So far, I have tried to accurately distinguish the origin of the coherentist model in the (post-) Cartesian problem of the existence of bodies, from its application to the Leibnizian problem of their nature, and the related metaphysical view. But sometimes Leibniz does not hesitate, in the latter context, to reinforce its metaphysically 32 33

34 35

Leibniz to de Volder, January 21, 1704; GP II, 264; Lodge, p. 291. “You see how the matter is reduced to something simple when principles are reached that are clearly necessary and sufficient, so that it seems not only superfluous but inconsistent and inexplicable to add something else.” (Leibniz to de Volder, June, 30, 1704; GP II, 271; Lodge, p. 309). Leibniz to de Volder, January, 1705; GP II, 275; Lodge, pp. 319–321. “And in fact, to look for something beyond the phenomena here seems to me just as if someone were to deny that he was satisfied by the explanation provided for the phenomena of an image as if if there were some, I know what, essence of the image left to be explained. Arguments, in my opinion, cannot prove the existence of anything besides perceivers and perceptions (if you abstract their common cause), and the things that should be admitted in them. In a perceiver, these are the translations from perception to perception, with the same subject remaining; in perception, the harmony of perceivers. For the rest, we invent natures of things and wrestle with the chimeras of our minds as if with ghosts.” (Leibniz to de Volder, January, 19, 1705; GP II, 281 note; Lodge, p. 337). Interestingly enough, in a letter to de Volder such a deflationary approach is opposed to the hypothesis of a substantial union as something over and above harmony, which Leibniz will take into account in his correspondence with des Bosses. “In the schools they commonly seek things that are not so much ultramundane as utopian. […] whatever that metaphysical union is that the schools add over and above agreement, it is not a phenomenon and there is no notion of, or acquaintance with, it. Thus I could not have intended to explain it.” (Lodge, pp. 335–337).

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grounded phenomenistic view of bodies with the epistemologically-minded one, wich was typical of the former context. Thus, in one of his last letters to de Volder, reference is explicitly made to the fact that the certainty of existence properly extends only to perceptions: “Arguments in my opinion, cannot prove the existence of anything besides perceivers and perceptions (if you abstract their common cause), and the things that should be admitted in them. “And in the same letter Leibniz refers to the doubt of Academics – a topic that, as a matter of fact, was at the origin of his reflection on phenomenism, through his contact with Foucher: “And in this way, the Academics used to argue, not completely improperly […] against those things that are imagined to be outside of us, i. e. outside souls or simple substances[…].”36 Thus, Leibniz connects his (anti-Cartesian) criticism of the reality of extended bodies with the (Cartesian) theme of the doubt concerning their existence. Making sense of Truth in a phenomenistic Framework The connection of the phenomenistic-coherentist model with the topic of Cartesian doubt appears even more clearly in the des Bosses correspondence. In contrast to de Volder, des Bosses is sympathetic with Leibniz’s attempt at demolishing Cartesian extension. However, he is eager to preserve the existence of corporeal things. Therefore, he reacts negatively to Leibniz’s alternative and to the phenomenalist option, which he considers contrary to common sense. One argument he adopts goes in the opposite direction of the deflationary strategy often adopted by Leibniz. Leibniz, remember, from the self-sufficiecy of the phenomenist account drew the conclusion that the question about external existence is pointless. Des Bosses, on the contrary, argues that even a Cartesian like Malebranche, who held the reality of bodies as undemonstrable, by this very fact attested that the (admittedly, controversial) existence of bodies must be conceptually distinct from the existence of the related perceptions37. Therefore, the phenomenist stance would simply fail to capture the proper significance of the existence issue. Moreover, Des Bosses appealed to the notion of harmony in order to prove the existence of an external correlate of our perception38 – firstly, of our perception in general, then of our veridical perception39. Des Bosses relies here on the intuitive 36 37

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Leibniz to de Volder, January, 1705; GP II, 275–276; Lodge, pp. 319–321. Des Bosses to Leibniz, May, 20, 1712: “And this is so true that Malebranche, who denies that the existence of bodies can be demonstrated, does not himself seem to disavow body: or when he denies the former, he is not speaking of those phenomena that are as certain to us as anyone’s perception is to them. On the contrary, he clearly declares that he does not doubt that there are those bodies that he contends cannot be demonstrated.? I believe it to be well proved’ he says, ‘but badly demonstrated. I even believe it to be demonstrated, but supposing faith.’ Do you think that he is speaking of phenomena alone here?” (GP II, 441; Rutherford, pp. 237). “Speaking naturally there oght to be some object distinct from the perception itself that corresponds to the perception; otherwise there would be no harmony.” (Leibniz to des Bosses, May, 20, 1712; GP II, 442). “Although the harmony is preestablished, still, the very fact that there is harmony demands that there are things that happen outside the soul that correspond to the perceptions in the soul;

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notion of truth; a notion that Descartes himself had presupposed, when formulating his hyperbolical doubt concerning external reality. According to Descartes, in fact, truth or falsity do not belong to the immediate content of our perceptions, but to our judgement which relates them to an object existing outside us. The alternative that des Bosses insinuates would be to embrace the (absurd) view according to which all perceptions of ours are veridical.40 Leibniz’s reply confirms that he is trying to construe a sense of truth independent of the existence of an external object: the truth of our perception, indeed, simply requires the agreement with the perceptions of the other monads: It is true that the things that happen in the soul must agree with those hat happen outside the soul; but for this it is sufficient that those things that happen in one soul correspond both among themselves and with those things that happen in any other soul; and there is no need to posit something outside of all souls or monads. According to this hypothesis, when we say that Socrates is sitting, nothing more is signified than those things that we understand by ‘Socrates’ and ‘sitting’ are appearing to us and to others to whom it pertains.41

And from another well-known passage of a letter to des Bosses, we know that God would have not been a deceiver, even in the solipsistic hypothesis42. A Provisory Moral Although Leibniz replies to des Bosses by using some typical schemes of the post-Cartesian discussion, this chiefly happens because of his interlocutor’s solicitation. His denial of the reality of bodies, indeed, is not rooted chiefly in general concerns about existence or knowledge, but rather in his typical variety of combinatorial/reductive ontological analysis. Maybe, this could help to explain, why Leibniz is willing to reject the assimilation of his own phenomenalism, with its reasons, to Berkeley’s phenomenalism and its quite different reasons43. Nevertheless, he

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otherwise I should say that is enough for the truth of my perceptions or thoughts that my soul alone exists together with his perceptions. For my thoughts will be verified by phenomena that are within the soul. The truth of a proposition in which, for example, I affirm that Socrates is sitting, requires, besides the ordered series of perceptions existing in the soul, some reference to an object distinct from the perceptions themselves, a reference that cannot exist without the object itself. For a proposition is said to be true or false according to the existence of the corresponding thing” (Des Bosses to Leibniz, June, 12, 1712; GP II, 448; Rutherford, p. 251, modified). “In sum, either it must be said that our perceptions or thoughts are not be made true by mere phenomena, or, with the ancients, it will have to be said that everything that appears is true: for example, that the sun is a foot and half tall […].” (Ibidem). The allusion is to the theories of truth attributed to the ancient supporters of radical empiricism, like Protagoras or the Epicureans. Interestingly enough, the development of their views about knowledge was already tightly bound with the discussions on the dream argument and on skeptical doubts in general. Leibniz to des Bosses, June, 16, 1712; GP II, 451–452; Rutherford, p. 257. Leibniz to des Bosses, April, 29, 1715; GP II, 496. See Leibniz’s well-known judgement on ‘the man in Ireland who attacks the reality of bodies’ in his letter to des Bosses of March, 15, 1715 (GP II, 492). But the relationship between the

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does not fail to connect the two dimensions of his phenomenalism; moreover, the resulting view looks something deeper than a simple hierarchical distinction of layers of reality. Accordingly, the Leibnizian sense of phenomenon ‘bene fundatum’ should be distinguished from both a Berkelyan-style idealism on one hand, and a purely ‘constructivist’ sense of phenomenon as aggregate, endowed with a derived reality, on the other. Perhaps, some traits or the general spirit of his project could be rather compared with some relevant aspects of Kant’s later sense of ‘empirical realism’. Consider Leibniz’s will to construe an empirical world by using only phenomena as building blocks, and his way of pursuing this aim, by emphasizing the belonging to a common spatio-temporal framework, and to lawlike connection as requirements for reality. Still, in this phenomenal world the perceiving subject cannot play, of course, any transcendental lawgiving role. He can rely, however, on the divine Subject as lawgiver; we might say, according to Leibniz’s reference to the ‘divine phenomenon’, to the divine Perceiver, whose work is harmony.

views of the two philosophers would require, of course, a discussion that cannot be pursued here.

THE IDEAL AND THE REAL IN LEIBNIZ’S METAPHYSICS Brandon C. Look 1. INTRODUCTION For the past several decades, scholarly work on the metaphysics of Leibniz has tended to a few distinct and conflicting theses. Leibniz was long thought to have endorsed a strong form of ‘idealism’, according to which the only things that can be said to exist are mind-like, simple substances or monads. On this view, everything is grounded in and derives its reality from the ultimate simples of the world. As many scholars have shown, however, Leibniz also speaks as if there are, in addition to simple substances, corporeal or composite substances – or organisms – which are also endowed with reality in some wheigthy sense. While I will talk about those things, I want to connect this set of issues with the theme of the conference – namely, ‘harmony’ – as well as with a topic that I have been thinking about for the last few years, the role of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Leibniz’s ontology and the notion of the grounding of being. While some recent scholars have brought out the important Platonic themes in Leibniz’s metaphysics, there is more that can be said about Leibniz’s deep-seated Platonism and his consequent commitment to universal harmony, emanation, the grounding of being in God, and the reality of the world around us1. The position for which I wish to argue ultimately goes back to a way of reading Leibniz that was present in the early twentieth-century German interpretations2. What I wish to argue here is that we ought to recognize that, for Leibniz, universal harmony is a consequence of the grounding of all being in God; this grounding relation is not only in the sense that all being follows from the divine will but also that it follows from the divine intellect insofar as all points in the universe are expressions of the world that God could have3. And insofar as that is the case, then all being is grounded in the mind, a very classical notion of idealism. 1 2

3

The most prominent examples of this are C. Wilson: Leibniz’s Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study, Princeton 1989. and C. Mercer: Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development. Cambridge 2001. For example, E. Cassirer: Leibniz’ System in Seinen Wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen, Hildesheim 1962.[2. unveränderte Aufl.]; K. Fischer: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Heidelberg 1920; D. Mahnke: Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmethaphysik, Bad Cannstatt 1964; H. Schmalenbach: Leibniz, München 1921; M. Wundt: Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts, Tübingen 1939; und M. Wundt: Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, Tübingen 1945. In emphasizing these points, I mean to draw on some lessons about the intelligibility and rationality of the world from D. Rutherford: Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge 1995.

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2. IDEALISM AND REALISM IN LEIBNIZ’S METAPHYSICS Despite more than a century of outstanding Leibnizian scholarship, I confess that I am still drawn to the view set out by Russell4 – that Leibniz’s philosophy follows from a certain small group of axioms or core principles. I think that Russell’s presentation of Leibniz’s system is too simplistic, and it does not do justice to the important theological, political and juridical elements of Leibniz’s thought. But it’s not bad for a first approximation. First and most famously, there are ‘the two great principles of all our reasoning’: the Principle of Contradiction (PC) and the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). (Monadology §§ 31–32: GP VI, 612 / AG 2175) The PSR says that there is nothing for which there is not a reason why it is so and not otherwise; put differently, it says that there is for everything a reason or ground [ratio] of its being and being so and not otherwise. Further, as we know from the logical texts of the 1680s, Leibniz endorsed the in-esse account of truth – something that he drew from Aristotle and that seemed completely unproblematic – according to which, in any true proposition the subject or antecedent always contains the predicate or consequent6. And this account of truth leads Leibniz to the strong conclusion that each individual substance has a complete concept, from which one can deduce all truths about it past, present and future.7 Further, because all substances have complete individual concepts, the grounds of their activity are contained within them and, therefore, all substances are causally isolated. Nevertheless, they exist in harmony, and the mind and body, in particular, have a pre-established harmony that is the source of their ‘metaphysical’ union. A further axiom that becomes explicit in the correspondence with Arnauld, but which, I would argue, is present even earlier is the reciprocity of unity and being – something also inspired by Aristotle. As Leibniz says in his correspondence with Arnauld, ‘I hold this identical proposition, differentiated only the emphasis to be an axiom, namely, that what is not truly one being is not truly one being either.’ (A II, 2, 186 / GP II, 97 / AG 86) An important consequence of this view is that it shows that the then-modern Cartesian account of matter or body must be flawed. Leibniz’s argument is essentially the following: (i) if the essence of body is extension alone, then any body is infinitely divisible; (ii) if a body is infinitely divisible, then it lacks a principle of unity; (iii) if it lacks a principle of unity (that is, if it is not in itself one thing), then it cannot be said to be real or to really exist (that is, it cannot count as a genuine substance). On the other hand, if a body does have a principle of unity, then it can be a substance. Now, on Leibniz’s view, since the principle of unity of a genuine substance cannot be material, it must be formal. Thus, as he makes clear in the correspondence with Arnauld, we must admit souls or substantial forms in order to ground the being or reality of genuine substances. 4 5 6 7

B. Russell: A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London 1937. G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, ed. by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis 1989. [= AG]. See, for example, A VI, 4, 1644 / AG 31. This is stated explicitly in in First Truths (A VI, 4, 1646 / AG 32), Discourse on Metaphysics § 8 (A VI,4, 1540 / AG 41) and elsewhere.

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A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible being, since its notion includes everything that will happen to it, something which can be found neither in shape nor in motion …, but which can be found in a soul or substantial form, on the model of what is called me. These are the only thoroughly real beings, as was recognized by the ancients, and above all, by Plato, who clearly showed that matter alone is not sufficient to form a substance. (A II, 2, 121 / GP II, 76 / AG 79)

Leibniz thus moves his Aristotelian axioms to a Platonic conclusion: only soul or substantial form is thoroughly real; that is, the soul or form is that which grounds the phenomenal realm. This is a point that he makes quite clearly in a later letter to Arnauld: I hold that philosophy cannot be better reestablished and reduced to something precise, than by recognizing only substances or complete beings endowed with a true unity, together with the different states that succeed one another; everything else is only phenomena, abstractions, or relations. (A II, 2, 191 / GP II, 101 / AG 89)

Leibniz is thus able to move from a few logical and metaphysical commitments to a very sharp ontological distinction: on the one hand, there are true unities or substances; on the other hand, there are phenomena, abstractions and relations. While Leibniz is not always clear about the matter – and this has occasioned a great deal of scholarly strife – it can be said that the mind or soul or substantial form is by virtue of being a per se unity that which is real or that which grounds the reality of all other beings. Things that are not minds or things that do not have minds or forms can at best be said to possess a ‘unity by aggregation’; they are ‘mere aggregates’ and consigned to the realm of the phenomenal. Further, since the fundamental beings of Leibniz’s ontology either have minds or are minds, they also represent or the express the universe from their unique perspectives. As he writes to Arnauld: ‘there are as many true substances as there are expressions of the whole universe.’ (A II, 2, 187 / GP II, 98 / AG 87). This opposition between the real and the phenomenal, a true unity and an aggregate, is central to much of the recent discussion of Leibniz’s metaphysics8. And the issue of particularly heated scholarly debate is whether and to what extent there is a distinct development in Leibniz’s views about the nature of simple or individual substance after his rehabilitation of substantial forms in 1679. That there is disagreement among scholars is not surprising, for even if Leibniz’s core ontological commitments are constant from the 1680s onward, there is no doubt that he speaks in different ways over the course of the last three decades of his life. In the 1680s and early 1690s, for example, Leibniz addresses the issue of the mind-body relation 8

The main figures and works of this debate are, of course, R. M. Adams: Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, Oxford 1994; D. Garber: Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, New York 2009; G. Hartz: Leibniz’s Final System: Monads, Matter and Animals, London and New York 2007; Mercer (2001); P. Phemister: Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy, Dordrecht 2005; A. Robinet: Architectonique disjonctive, automates systémiques et idéalité transcendantale dans l’œuvre de G. W. Leibniz. Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie, Paris 1986. Rutherford (1995), and Wilson (1989). I offer a short overview of this debate and provide my own interpretation in B. C. Look: “Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Metametaphysics: Idealism, Realism, and the Nature of Substance.”, in: Philosophy Compass 5 (11) (2010), pp. 871–879.

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in terms understandable to Cartesians and Scholastics: he claims that the union of soul and body can be explained by his hypothesis of pre-established harmony (or concomitance); he also suggests that there is a unity and hence reality for corporeal substances by virtue of the presence of a soul or substantial form. Indeed, he seems to consider the fundamental elements of his metaphysics, the most real things, those individual substances that are embodied souls, composites of matter and form, in short ‘corporeal substances’. Nevertheless, by the mid-1690s Leibniz’s fundamental ontology does appear to be undergoing a real change. Consider the following passage from A New System of Nature (1695), Leibniz’s first major philosophical publication: There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things. We could call them metaphysical points: they have something vital, a kind of perception … Only metaphysical points or points of substance (constituted by forms or souls) are exact and real, and without them there would be nothing real, since without true unities there would be no multitude. (GP IV, 482–83 / AG 142)

The fundamental beings of Leibniz’s metaphysics are clearly souls or mind-like beings which are endowed with perception and which constitute centers of life and forces. By the time of the correspondence with De Volder, Leibniz makes the point even more clearly: [C]onsidering the matter carefully, we must say that there is nothing in things but simple substances, and in them, perception and appetition. Moreover, matter and motion are not substances or things as much as they are the phenomena of perceivers, the reality of which is situated in the harmony of the perceivers with themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers. (GP II, 270 / AG 181)

Leibniz’s position is not that the reality of the phenomena rests only in the harmony of the perceivers; for it is grounded in the existence of monads as well. Thus, Leibniz also says to De Volder: I don’t really eliminate body, but reduce [revoco] it to what it is. For I show that corporeal mass [massa], which is thought to have something over and above simple substances, is not a substance, but a phenomenon resulting from simple substances, which alone have unity and absolute reality. (GP II, 275 / AG 181)

The point is fairly clear here: simple substances, monads or minds, are the ultimately real things; everything else is ontologically dependent upon them. What about ‘corporeal substances’ – those beings that seem to exist in Leibniz’s ontology from the 1680s and early 1690s? In his later works, Leibniz speaks of such things as well. For example, consider his well-known five-fold ontological scheme from his letter to De Volder: I distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy or soul; (2) the matter, namely, the primary matter or primitive passive power; (3) the monad made up of these two things; (4) the mass [massa] or secondary matter, or the organic machine in which innumerable subordinate monads come together; and (5) the animal, that is, the corporeal substance, which the dominating monad makes into one machine. (GP II, 252 / AG 177)

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In the new language of monads, it is not immediately clear what this ‘corporeal substance’ is meant to be. It cannot simply be an Aristotelian composite of matter and form because secondary matter is here reconceived as the result of innumerable monads that are subordinate to one dominant monad. Rather, a corporeal substance is simply the composite of monads that is unified by the dominant monad or soul. Given Leibniz’s view that unity and reality are reciprocal, that something can only be real or something can only really and truly be when it constitutes a genuine unity, we can ask two questions, which are, of course, intimately related: Do corporeal substances exist? Do corporeal substances possess genuine unity per se? To the first question, we might say either that corporeal substances, such as animals, are indeed fundamental beings in Leibniz’s ontology or that whatever being or reality they possess is derivative of the simple substances or monads. If we say that corporeal substances or animals are fundamental beings in Leibniz’s ontology, then we are essentially saying that they can constitute unities per se – which is the point of the second question. But the terribly difficult issue here is explaining how or in what sense it is possible for the monads of a composite or corporeal substance to constitute a genuine unity per se. Ultimately, as I have argued elsewhere, a strong case can be made that Leibniz does not have the conceptual resources to explain how a dominant monad can unify its subordinate monads – if that ‘unity’ is to be stronger than the pre-established harmony that exists between all monads or substances experience9. That simple substances alone are the fundamental constituents in Leibniz’s ontology can be seen in the passages from the De Volder correspondence quoted above. Similarly, at the end of his career, Leibniz writes to Remond that ‘absolute reality rests only in the monads and their perceptions’ (GP III, 636 / L, p. 65910) and, in a text written for Remond but never sent, ‘I believe that the entire universe of creatures consists only in simple substances or monads and their collections [Assemblages].’ (GP III, 622) Now, even in Leibniz’s later philosophy, Leibniz speaks of animals or corporeal substances as if they were per se unities. One sees this, for example, in another passage from his correspondence with Remond, where Leibniz writes: ‘a true substance (such as an animal) is composed of an immaterial soul and an organic body, and it is the composite and these two thing that one calls unum per se.’ (GP III, 657) But there are obvious complications for this view that Leibniz addresses in the following passage from an unpublished text probably written sometime between 1708 and 1712 and now known as the Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason. A substance is either simple, such as a soul, which has no parts, or it is composite, such as an animal, which consists of a soul and an organic body. But an organic body, like every other body, is merely an aggregate of animals or other things which are living and therefore organic, or finally of small objects or masses; but these also are finally resolved into living things, from which it is evident that all bodies are finally resolved into living things, and that what, in the 9 10

I address this issue in B. C. Look: “On Monadic Domination in Leibniz’s Metaphysics.”, in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10 (3) (2002), pp. 379–399. G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. by Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd ed, Dordrecht 1969. [= L].

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Brandon C. Look analysis of substances, exist ultimately are simple substances – namely, souls, or, if you prefer a more general term, monads, which are without parts … And because an organic body, or any other body whatsoever, can again be resolved into substances endowed with organic bodies, it is evident that in the end there are simple substances alone, and that in them are the sources of all things and of the modifications that come to things. (C 13–14 / MP, p. 17511; emphasis added)

The organic body of an animal is like any other body and, consequently, it is ‘merely an aggregate’ of animals which is itself ‘resolvable’ into simple substances or monads. And the composite of soul and organic body is not a genuine unity and so cannot be counted among the fundamental existents of Leibniz’s ontology. If the composite of soul and organic body were to constitute a genuine unity, then this unity would have to be grounded in the relations among monads in that composite corporeal substance. Yet it is very difficult to understand what the relations of domination and subordination are and how they could guarantee a unity so that an organism would count as a per se unity. After all, one of the central tenets of Leibniz’s metaphysics is that all substances are causally isolated and exist in pre-established harmony with each other; and it becomes difficult to reconcile the causal isolation of substances on the one hand with the dominant monad’s act of unifying the monads that make up its body. Leibniz was very much aware of this problem, for it is was famously pointed out in very clear terms by René-Joseph de Tournemine, who stated explicitly that harmony is not unity. We can translate Tournemine’s criticism of the pre-established harmony of mind and body into the language of Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics in the following way: if monads are causally independent and in universal harmony, there is no way to distinguish clearly – and on a purely monadic level – between the quasi-causal relations that exist between all substances (universal harmony) and those that exist within substances (the pre-established harmony among monads in an organism). And this problem in turn is something that exercised Leibniz in the last years of his life. A deleted passage in a 1706 letter to Des Bosses makes this clear: ‘The union I find some difficulty explaining is that which joins the different simple substances or monads existing in our body with us, such that it makes one thing from them.’ (LDB, pp. 22–2312) Yet Leibniz does not resolve this difficulty in his correspondence with Des Bosses; indeed, the most natural reading of the correspondence leads to the conclusion that, although Leibniz considered accepting corporeal substances, he ultimately rejects them in favor of idealism13.

11 12 13

G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, eds. by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson. London 1995. [= MP] G. W. Leibniz: The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, ed. and trans. by Brandon C. Look and Donald Rutherford. New Haven 2007. [= LDB] See B. C. Look: Leibniz and the “Vinculum Substantiale” (= Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 30). Stuttgart 1999. and the editors’ introduction to (Leibniz 2007). B. C. Look and D. Rutherford: “Introduction”, in: LDB, pp. XIX–LXXIX.

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3. CAUSATION AND BEING The above sketch or something like it is familiar to all Leibniz scholars. And, for now, let this count as a first pass over this volume’s theme of ‘Reality.’ But what about the other theme: ‘Harmony’? The first thought that most students of philosophy have upon hearing ‘Harmony in Leibniz’ will have to do with the pre-established harmony of mind and body. The pre-established harmony of mind and body is, however, simply one part of Leibniz’s thesis of the universal harmony among all substances, which is, in turn, part of his general theory of causation. According to Leibniz’s view, there is no causal interaction among finite created substances; all finite created substances are in harmony with each other; all finite created substances express the universe from their unique perspective. There is also an important Platonic or neo-Platonic element in Leibniz’s account of causation; Leibniz’s thesis of universal and pre-established harmony is, therefore, importantly neo-Platonic14. In this section, I will sketch this out in some detail, and in the next section I will bring these results to bear on the question of the unity of composite substances and the reality of corporeal phenomena. As Leibniz makes clear in many, many texts, God necessarily exists, and because God alone necessarily exists God is the ground of the series of contingent beings in this world. (And he would have been the ground of the existence of any of the other possible but inferior worlds which he could have created but which, because of His goodness, chose not to create.) In other words, all being – all reality – is grounded in God; God is the reason for the world and all that is in it. According to Leibniz, God plays a crucial role in the mind-body relation as well, which is, like all putative causal relations, merely a relation of ‘metaphysical dependence’ and not ‘real dependence.’ Consider the following from the New Essays: [T]he soul keeps its perfections while representing the body; and although in involuntary actions the mind depends on the body (to put the matter accurately), in other actions the mind is independent and even makes the body depend upon it. But this dependence is only a metaphysical one, which consists in God’s taking account of one of them in regulating the other, or taking more account of one than of the other according to the inherent perfections of each; whereas real dependence would consist in an immediate influence which the dependent one would receive from the other. (A VI/6, 177; NE 177)15

Likewise, Leibniz writes the following in §§ 51–52 of the Monadology: But in simple substances the influence of one monad over another can only be ideal, and can only produce its effect through God’s intervention, when in the ideas of God a monad rightly demands that God take it into account in regulating the others from the beginning of things. For, since a created monad cannot have an internal physical influence upon another, this is the only way in which one can depend on another. (GP VI, 615/AG 219–220)

It is in this way that actions and passions among creatures are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons that require him to adjust 14 15

I distinguish the two because I see this more in Plotinus than in Plato. New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. By Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennet, Cambridge 1996 [= NE].

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the other to it; and consequently, what is active in some respects is passive from another point of view: active insofar as what is known distinctly in one serves to explain what happens in another; and passive insofar as the reason for what happens in one is found in what is known distinctly in another.” (GP VI, 615 / AG 219) To say that one substance is causally efficacious with respect to another is simply to say that there are reasons contained in the former that serve to explain the latter. These reasons are, of course, contained in the divine intellect, and since there is no actual influx or ‘real’ dependence, the causal dependence is merely ‘ideal.’ Whatever reality there is in the causal relation stems from God’s understanding and His will. For, again, according to Leibniz, God ‘regulates’ and ‘adjusts’ substances given certain facts about other individual substances. Leibniz also claims that God ‘operates immediately on all created things, continually producing them.’ (A VI,6, 222 / NE, p. 222)16 Several questions naturally arise at this point: What does it mean to speak of God’s regulation and adjustment of substances? And in what way does God operate immediately on all created things? Since Leibniz claims as a virtue of his theory that it is more fitting of an omnipotent and omniscient being that things do not need constant intervention, then what is God doing continually producing creatures? To answer these questions, we need to recognize that Leibniz endorses divine concurrentism. Strictly speaking, on Leibniz’s view, both finite created substances and God are causally efficacious. Finite substances are causally efficacious insofar as their actions are spontaneous, arising from an internal force that produces a series of perceptions and appetitions according to its unique law. God, for his part, both creates the finite substance, setting it and all its worldmates on their paths of unfolding and concurs in the actions of finite creatures. In his dispute with Lamy over pre-established harmony, Leibniz presents his view in the following way: In a way I agree … that God continually produces all that is real in created things. But I also hold that to do so he continually produces or conserves in us that energy or activity which according to me constitutes the nature of a substance, and the source of its modifications. And so I do not at all agree that God alone is active in substances, or is the sole cause of their changes, and I believe that this would make created things completely vain and useless. (GP IV, 588–9 / WF, p. 16317)

Here, then, is another anti-Cartesian point. It is not the case that God alone is causally active; rather, God concurs in the activity of finite substances insofar as he conserves the energy or force of substances. Leibniz’s endorsement of divine concurrence seems to be at odds with another commitment on his part, namely, with the thesis that God’s conservation of the world is his continual (re)creation of the world. In the Theodicy, for example, he writes the following: 16

17

N. b.: “La troisieme Ubieté est la repletive, qu’on attribue à Dieu, qui remplit tout l’Univers encore plus eminemment que les esprits ne sont dans les corps, car il opere immediatement sur toutes les creatures en les produisant continuellement, au lieu que les esprits finis n’y sauroient exercer aucune influence ou operation immediate.” (A VI, 6, 3–7) G. W. Leibniz: Leibniz’s “New System” and Associated Contemporary Texts, eds. by R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks. Oxford 1997. [= WF]

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[C]onservation by God consists in that perpetual immediate influence which the dependence of creatures demands. This dependence attaches not only to the substance but also to the action, and one can perhaps not explain it better than by saying, with theologians and philosophers in general, that it is a continued creation. (GP VI, 119 / H, p. 13918)

According to Malebranche, there is a problem with endorsing both divine concurrentism and continual creation because the thesis of conservation as continual creation entails the denial of the causal efficacy of finite created substances. After all, if God creates all finite substance anew at each moment with the appropriate mental and physical states, then they are causally inert19. The dual causal roles implied in Leibniz’s metaphysics can be explained by saying that finite creatures are causally active insofar as their individual states are grounded in their prior internal individual states, that is, the prior internal states provide the reasons for the successive states of the individual substance, and God is active immediately and at every moment through the process of continual creation. But in §§ 10–12 of the appendix to the Theodicy entitled Causa dei (‘The Case for God’), Leibniz offers the following explanation of the dual causal roles of God and his creatures: In acting, things depend upon God, since God concurs in the actions of things to the extent that something perfect is inherent in the actions, which certainly must emanate from God. But God’s concurrence (even his ordinary or non-miraculous concurrence) is at the same time both immediate and special. In fact, it is immediate because the effect depends on God not only because its cause arises from God, but also because God concurs no less nor more remotely in producing the same effect than in producing its cause. The concurrence is special because it is directed not only at the existence and the actions of the thing, but also at the manner and qualities of existing, insofar as something perfect is inherent in them, which always proceeds from God, the father, giver of light and everything that is good. (GP VI, 440)

In other words, God concurs in the actions of finite created substances to the extent that there is some kind of perfection in these actions, and this causal activity on the part of God is a consequence of the thesis of continual creation. But Leibniz takes the causal activity further in explaining how it is ‘special’: it is not just that God creates all things anew at each moment; God is causally efficacious also insofar as the nature of any finite created being has some degree of perfection within it. It is now beginning to look as though God is simply causally efficacious insofar as finite creatures have some positive quality; the finite creatures are causally ‘active’ insofar as they contribute to their limitations, privations, or negative qualities. As Leibniz writes to Morell in 1698, ‘the privative is nothing other than the limits, and there are limits everywhere in the creature … However, the creature is something more than the limits, for it received some perfection or virtue from God.’ (Grua I, 18 19

G. W. Leibniz: Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, trans. by E. M. Huggard. La Salle 1985. [= H] See C. Sleigh: “Leibniz and Malebranche on Causality”, in: J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Eds.): Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, Indianapolis 1990, pp. 161–93. and S. Lee: “Leibniz on Divine Concurrence”, in: The Philosophical Review 113 (2) 2004., pp. 203– 248, for exemplary discussions of this issue.

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126) In a similar vein, Leibniz asserts in an occasional piece for the Mémoires de Trévoux, ‘the perfection which is in the action of the creature comes from God, but … the limitations to be found there are a consequence of the original limitation and the preceding limitations that occurred in the creature.’ (GP VI, 348 / H, p. 390) When Leibniz claims that ‘God concurs in the actions of things to the extent that [quatenus] something perfect is inherent in the actions,’ he does so because he wishes to deny the thesis that God is in any way the author of sin in the world. This is, of course, his main thesis in the Theodicy. All limitations and all imperfections and any manner of sin are the result of the finite creatures. As is so often the case, Leibniz is here bringing several ideas together that do not seem to want to go together. On his view, God conserves the world through the process of continual creation; God concurs in the actions of finite creatures; and finite created substances are genuinely active. At the same time, God is cause of all perfections of and within his creatures, while they are responsible for their limitations. Moreover, the perfections of finite creatures flow from the nature of God, the emanative source of all that is good in the world, indeed, of all being. Two questions naturally arise at this point. First, what does it mean to say that all that is good emanates from God? And, second, in what sense do the limitations and imperfections of creatures arise from their own natures? Concerning this second question, there is, of course, an obvious answer: finite creatures are essentially limited – that is what it means to be both finite and a created being. But there is more to the answer. Created substances are limited by their perspective on the universe, and they are limited by the quality, clarity or perfection of their mental representations. God’s contribution to their nature, on the other hand, is necessarily that which is good and that which, in the realm of ideas and expressions of the universe, approximates the kind of perfect knowledge had solely by God. Yet, if God is engaged in a process of continual creation that is ‘special’ in the sense suggested above, that is, a process that is efficacious with respect not only to the being but the manner of creatures, then it would seem that God is still responsible for creaturely imperfection and limitation. In other words, if Leibniz believes in the thesis of divine concurrence and continual creation, then he would still seem to be making God the author of sin. We do not yet have a resolution to the obvious tension in his thought. There is, however, a way of addressing these questions and concerns, one which ultimately appeals to the neo-Platonist element in Leibniz’s thought mentioned earlier20. First, according to Leibniz, the imperfections of finite created substances arise not from any actual sin or evil in their natures, but simply from a lack of perfection or absence of positive quality that comes from God. As Leibniz writes in a text from 1695, ‘Before all sin, there was an original imperfection in all created things, an imperfection which arises from their limitation … There was no positive evil in created things at the beginning, but they always lacked many perfections.’ (Grua I, 365 / AG 114) In other words, the imperfection of creatures is ‘original’; they are limited by their very natures, as mentioned above. This limitation or imperfection, however, is not some kind of actual negative quality; rather, it is simply the 20

This is basically the position of Lee (2004).

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absence of perfection from God. But there is a second aspect to Leibniz’s account. It unites the notions of God’s continual creation, concurrence and emanation in an explanation of the limitations of finite beings, and it can be seen in § 388 of the Theodicy. Here Leibniz writes, Let us assume that the creature is produced anew at each instant; let us grant also that the instant excludes all priority of time, being indivisible; but let us point out that it does not exclude priority of nature, or what is called anteriority in signo rationis, and that this is sufficient. The production or action whereby God produces, is anterior by nature to the existence of the creature that is produced; the creature taken in itself, with its nature and its necessary properties, is anterior to its accidental affections and to its actions; and yet all these things are in being in the same moment. God produces the creature in conformity with the exigency of the preceding instants, according to the laws of his wisdom; and the creature operates in conformity with that nature which God conveys to it in creating it always. The limitations and imperfections arise therein through the nature of the subject, which sets bounds to God’s production; this is the consequence of the original imperfection of creatures. (G VI, 355–6 / H, pp. 357–8)

There is a lot going on this passage. First, it contains a reconciliation of his apparently conflicting metaphysical commitments. God creates each being at each moment anew, but he does so ‘in conformity with the exigency of the preceding instants’. In other words, each state of each being is determined by its preceding state. Now, this claim is similar to Leibniz’s thesis that the grounds for the action of any substance are contained within it; it is also related to Leibniz’s view from early in his career that, in metaphysical rigor, causes are ‘only concurrent requisites’. Yet it is God who is the productive cause of the being of these finite creatures and their states. It is in this sense, then, that Leibniz can reconcile the theses of continual creation and divine concurrence. But, more than this, we can see that insofar as God is said to produce creatures according to the laws of his wisdom, we have entered into the realm of final causes, according to which reasons are for particular ends. Further, whatever imperfection there is in a finite created substance is due to its original imperfection. Therefore, even if God brings into existence particular finite beings with their unique natures, it cannot be said that God is the author or sin or imperfection in the world. In the mere act of creation, those beings that are created are by their very nature limited and imperfect. If they were not, they would be infinite and perfect – they would be gods. Moreover, as already mentioned, each finite substance is created to express the universe from a particular point of view, and this particular point of view derives from the embodiment of that particular mind, which in turn brings about a certain degree of confusion in its perceptions. Therefore, it is impossible for God to have created a world that lacked imperfection. It is also, however, important to note that insofar as each created substance is created to express the universe from a particular point of view, mind or the mental or the ideal is somehow primary in Leibniz’s system21. 21

It is not the case that ‘expression’ always has to do with (mental) representation for Leibniz, but it seems clear that this is the case here, where all created substances have perceptions associated with their unique perspective of the universe. For the best account of this nature, see, of course, M. A. Kulstad: “Leibniz’s Conception of Expression.”, in: Studia Leibnitiana 9 (1977), pp. 55– 76.

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4. EMANATION, HARMONY AND REALITY What does this story about Leibniz’s account of causation have to do with topic of the ideal and the real and with the topic of harmony? First, this account can help us to see that the distinction between the ideal and the real is, in an important sense, no real distinction at all: the ideal is the real, and the real is the ideal. For, on Leibniz’s view, ultimately minds are the only true substances and their perceptions and appetitions are simply modifications of the substances. There must be universal harmony because of God’s continual creation of all substances (omnipotence), because of God’s emanation of all goodness (benevolence) and because of God’s expression of the entire universe from all possible perspectives (omniscience). At the same time, the mind and body – or, better, the dominant monad and the subordinate monads that together constitute the organic body of the dominant monad – are in pre-established harmony because the mind, in expressing confusedly and from a particular point of view the entire world through its body or subordinate monads, is the limitation of the divine perfections. But the simple substances – and even the living beings of which they are the center – are real because God’s emanative causal powers and his expression of the entire world. Consider the following from a supplementary study for his correspondence with Des Bosses: If bodies are phenomena, and are judged by our appearances, they will not be real, since they will appear differently to others. Thus, the reality of bodies, of space, motion and time seems to consist in this: that they are the phenomena of God, i. e., the object of his knowledge of vision. And the difference between the appearance of bodies with respect to us and their appearance with respect to God is in some way like the difference between a drawing in perspective and a ground plan. For whereas drawings in perspective differ according to the position of the viewer, a ground plan or geometrical representation is unique. God certainly sees things exactly such as they are according to geometrical truth, although likewise he also knows how each thing appears to every other, and thus he contains in himself eminently all the other appearances. (LDB, p. 231)

Here the reality of the phenomena is guaranteed by God because He contains them eminently; but the reality of the phenomena is also guaranteed by God because he produces all beings through emanation. We can see this strand of Leibniz’s thought in works from his earlier in his career as well. For example, it is perhaps expressed most clearly in § 14 of the Discourse on Metaphysics, where Leibniz writes the following: Now, first of all, it is very evident that created substances depend upon God, who preserves them and who even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts … [I]t follows from what we have just said, that each substance is like a world apart, independent of all other things, except for God; thus all our phenomena, that is, all the things that can ever happen to us, are only consequences of our being. And since these phenomena maintain a certain order in conformity with our nature or, so to speak, in conformity with the world which is in us, … this would be sufficient to enable us to say that these phenomena are true without bothering with whether they are outside us and whether others also perceive them. Nevertheless, it is very true that the perceptions or expressions of all substances mutually correspond in such a way that each one, carefully following certain reasons or laws it has observed, coincides with others doing the same … And God alone (from whom all individuals emanate continually and who sees the universe not only as they see it but also entirely differently from

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all of them) is the cause of this correspondence of their phenomena and makes that which is particular to one of them public to all of them; otherwise, there would be no interconnection. (A VI, 4, 1549–51 / AG 46–47)

In other words, the harmony of the world derives from God’s role as the emanative source of all being. And insofar as the God produces created substances just as we produce our own thoughts, it should be clear that the finite created substances are fundamentally mental or ideal. At other points in his career, Leibniz suggests a slightly different relation between God and harmony. Nevertheless, harmony and the ground of all being are intimately connected with mental properties or with the ideal. In 1676, for example, in one of the texts often referred to as De Summa Rerum, Leibniz writes the following: It seems that there is some centre of the entire universe, and some general infinite vortex; also some most perfect mind, or God. This mind, like a soul, exists as a whole in the whole body of the world; the existence of things is also due to this mind. It is the cause of itself. Existence is simply that which is the cause of consistent sensations. The reason of things [ratio rerum] is the aggregate of all the requisites of things. God is derived from God. The infinite whole is one. Particular minds exist, in sum, simply because the supreme being judges it harmonious that there should exist somewhere that which understands, or, is a kind of intellectual mirror or replica of the world. To exist is nothing other than to be harmonious; consistent sensations are the mark of existence. (A VI, 3, 474 / DSR, p. 2522)

The claim that ‘to exist is nothing other than to be harmonious’ need not imply any kind of idealism or priority of the mental. But certainly the claim that ‘consistent sensations are the mark of existence’ does do so, for it is only minds that can have these consistent sensations or perceptions. Moreover, Leibniz makes it quite clear here that harmony of a sort that antedates his theory of pre-established harmony per se is itself a desideratum of creation, and this harmony is grounded in the mental or ideal because God desires that there be an ‘intellectual mirror of the world’ [speculum intellectual Mundi]. Some thirteen years later, in a short memorandum titled Corpus est modus tantum entis, Leibniz makes his standard claim of the phenomenality of body and goes on to say the following: ‘The sign of truth is therefore coherence, but the cause is the will of God: the formal reason is that God perceives that something is the best or the most harmonious, that is that something is pleasing to God.’ (A VI, 4, 16–18) What is interesting here is that harmony is not a consequence of God’s role as an emanative cause, but it is an order or relation that the divine intellect perceives and that the divine will brings into existence. This still does not mean that the problem that Leibniz saw and expressed in his letter to Des Bosses – namely, that it is difficult to explain how monads can be unified – has been solved. In other words, the question of the real unity of a composite substance does still differ from the metaphysical union of mind and body or monads in a composite. But, as I suggested above, the story of the unique relation between a dominant monad and the monads that constitute its organic body can perhaps be explained by appeal to God’s causal role in the following way: each mind expresses 22

G. W. Leibniz: De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, 1675–76, ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson. New Haven 1992. [= DSR]

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the entire world from its unique perspective and with a certain degree of perfection, which is ultimately attributable to God; but insofar as each mind is finite, it is limited; and it is limited insofar as the monads of its body express the entire world more confusedly and from their own unique perspectives. More specifically, the being and perfection of all the created monads emanate from God, and their limitation and imperfection is their embodiment. The story will also have to involve Leibniz’s view that the dominant monad contains the reasons or causes for what happens in the subordinate monads; that is, one monad is dominant over others in an organism when the grounds for the actions – perceptions and appetitions – of the subordinate monads are somehow contained in it. But what is important to see here is not only that what is real is somehow always grounded in the mind, that is, in the ideal, but also that the harmony of all perceiving subjects flows from God, the emanative source of all being. 5. CONCLUSION: LEIBNIZ’S PLATONISM AND THE INTELLIGIBLE REALM When we say that the phenomena have reality because of harmony, we can mean that there is reality because of the coherence to the objects of perception of differing minds and, indeed, because God perceives the ordered relations between all things. But we can also see the neo-Platonic sense of harmony and reality as arising from God’s emanative causation of the entire world. The ens realissimum, the ens perfectissimum, is the emanative source of all being, all reality and all perfection. Being cannot but be in harmony, for it follows from God’s continual causal activity in the world. Finite created minds are real, of course, but they have a lower degree of reality because they are limited beings, limited by the fact that they express the universe from a particular point of view, which is in turn what it means for them to be embodied. Composite substances can also be said to be real in a metaphysically weighty sense because they are part of God’s continual recreation of the world. But, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, corporeal substances are not fundamental beings, for they are themselves grounded in the simple substances or monads. Indeed, even in Leibniz’s so-called ‘middle years’, while it looks as though corporeal substances are metaphysically basic, this is not quite so, for Leibniz’s rehabilitation of substantial forms has the consequence of giving priority in some sense to the mental or formal or ideal. Composite or corporeal substances certainly exist – or have reality – but at another level. What I would like to suggest, however, it that it is perhaps not quite right to say that whatever reality composite substances have is derivative of the reality of the simple substances. In another important sense, whatever reality they have is derivative of God, and the substances that constitute some composite are limitations of the reality of God. – In this paper, I have tried to sketch out an interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics that points to two conclusions: as mentioned earlier, for Leibniz the ideal is the real and the real is the ideal; and, further, it is divine emanation that grounds both harmony and reality in Leibniz’s metaphysics.

HARMONIE ALS ORDNUNG: DAS LETZTENDLICHE META-PRINZIP DER LEIBNIZSCHEN METAPHYSIK* Juan Antonio Nicolás 1. EINLEITUNG: HARMONIE UND ORDNUNG Leibniz benutzt die Vorstellung der „Harmonie“ in sehr verschiedenen Kontexten. Manchmal situiert er sie in einem ästhetischen Kontext und somit steht sie in Verbindung mit der Schönheit. An anderen Stellen erscheint sie in Verbindung mit ethischen Angelegenheiten und in diesem Fall ist ihr Referent die Freude. Auch erscheint sie auf herausragende Weise in der onto-theologischen Hypothese der prästabilierten Harmonie. Bis zu dem Punkt an dem Leibniz bestätigt, dass „Glückseeligkeit, Lust, Liebe, Vollkommenheit, Wesen, Krafft, Freiheit, Übereinstimmung, Ordnung und Schönheit an einander verbunden sind“1. Diese komplette Palette von Aspekten vereint die Vorstellung der Harmonie. Als Leibniz versucht diese Vorstellung zu definieren, greift er auf eine bestimmte Balance zwischen Diversität und Uniformität zurück, zwischen Vielfalt und Identität, wie es auch in Confessio philosophi2 oder in De felicitate3 geschieht. Ausgehend von diesem grundlegenden Standpunkt zwischen Uniformität und Diversität werden wir hier versuchen den Ort, den die Vorstellung der Harmonie innerhalb der Dynamik der Prinzipien der Vernunft einnimmt, zu analysieren. Dafür gehen wie zunächst kurz auf die Rekonstruktion der Architektonik der Prinzipien nach dem sphärischen-Achsen Modell der Interaktion unter ihnen und innerhalb des Rahmens der Metaphysik der systemischen Individualität ein. In diesem Rahmen tritt die Harmonie in zwei Momenten auf. Erstens als Vermittlerprinzip der Achse Uniformität-Diversität, und zweitens als grundlegendes Merkmal der Dynamik der Prinzipen der Vernunft, und zwar, der Ordnung. Wir wenden uns einer Analyse der Beziehung zwischen Harmonie und Ordnung zu, zwischen dem Prinzip der Harmonie und des allgemeinen Prinzips der Ordnung in Bezug auf das letztendliche Metaprinzip der Logik der leibnizschen Prinzipien.

* 1 2 3

Diese Arbeit ist im Rahmen des Forschungsprojektes „Leibniz auf Spanisch“ (www.leibniz.es) entstanden, welches durch das spanische Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Innovation finanziert wird. GP VII, 87. A VI, 3, 116. GP VII, 86–90.

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2. DAS SPHÄRISCHE-ACHSEN MODEL DER INTERAKTION ZWISCHEN PRINZIPIEN Die Leibnizsche Ontologie beinhaltet eine grundsätzliche Unterscheidung zwischen Phänomenen und Wirklichkeit, die die systemische Einheit dieser Ebene seines Denkens in Frage stellen kann. Das heißt also, dass diese beiden ontologischen Ebenen nicht radikal getrennt sind, und dass seine Prinzipien auch nicht völlig auf den einen oder den anderen Bereich begrenzt sind. Was Leibniz angeht ist, das „la multitude, l’étendue et la machine enveloppent et presupposent l’estre, l’unité, la substance et la force“4. Das, was phänomenisch ist und Objekt des rechnerischen Ausdrucks, hat die fundamentale Beziehung mit dem Hintergrund des Wirklichen, welcher dieses „beinhaltet und voraussetzt“. Und genau hier liegt die Wurzel einer gewissen Gemeinsamkeit oder zumindest einer Interaktion sowohl ontologisch als auch gnoseologisch. Keine dieser zwei Komponenten kann getrennt bestehen und sich auch nicht epistemologisch unabhängig machen, weil die Rechtfertigung der Prinzipien des Verständnis der Phänomene (zum Beispiel wissenschaftlich) nicht phänomenischer sonder metaphysischer Ordnung ist. Allerdings sind die metaphysischen Prinzipien auf der anderen Seite sinnlos, wenn sie nicht Prinzipien der Wirklichkeit sind (oder des Möglichen oder des Notwendigen). Somit können also sowohl der Leibniz des calculemus als auch der des principe vital als grundlegende Zutaten ein und desselben Systems verstanden werden und die Betonung einer dieser zwei Dimensionen stellt eine einseitige Interpretation seines Denkens dar. Um dem zu entgehen, muss das Problem der Überwindung der sichtbaren Trennung zwischen der Ebene der Phänomene (berechenbare Mechanismen) und der Ebene der Wirklichkeit (Substantialismus) in ihren umgewandelten Versionen als Funktionalismus und Vitalismus angegangen werden. Die Überwindung dieser Teilung bedeutet ebenfalls, die Spannung zwischen beiden beizubehalten, da es sich um zwei unumgängliche Elemente des Leibnizschen Denkens handelt. Um diese Aufgabe anzugehen wird ein Modell vorgeschlagen, welches nicht linear ist, und auch nicht der Metapher eines Netzes entspricht. Im ersten Fall (z. B. B. Russell) muss ein Prinzip (oder ein Komplex von Prinzipien) gewählt werden, von welchem sich alle anderen Prinzipien ableiten. Dieser Versuch ist in der Vergangenheit wiederholt gescheitert. Der zweite Fall (z. B. M. Serres) geht von dem Modell eines Netzes aus und stellt einen Fortschritt zum vorherigen dar, weil es die vielfältige Zugänglichkeit, welches das Denken Leibniz enthält, besser ausdrückt sowie die Vielfältigkeit der Beziehungen zwischen seinen „Knotenpunkten“. Allerdings mangelt es diesem Versuch an Sensibilität, um die verschiedenen Ebenen, die Beziehungen der Eingliederung oder der Übereinstimmung zwischen den Prinzipien und im Allgemeinen jegliche Hierarchie oder Unterscheidung der Reichweite zwischen den Prinzipien, die die Elemente des Netzes darstellen, auszudrücken. Nach diesem Modell befinden sich alle auf derselben Ebene, das Netz entfaltet sich also auf einer einzigen 4

A II, 2, 172.

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Ebene und somit kann es nur sehr schwer auf eine adäquate Art die Komplexität des Denken Leibniz ausdrücken. Deswegen schlagen wir ein sphärisches Modell vor, um das Denken Leibniz zu rekonstruieren. Dieses Modell besteht nicht nur aus einer Oberfläche der Sphäre, sondern auch durch sein Inneres, durch sein Volumen; es erlaubt eine größere Komplexität der Beziehungen zwischen den Elementen, welche es ausmachen, und es erhält die Möglichkeit vieler Zugänge zu diesem System. Außerdem trägt es zur Möglichkeit bei, die verschiedenen Ebenen, Übereinstimmungen und Beziehungen sehr verschiedener Arten, Einbeziehungen und Widersprüchen, relativer Distanzen und gegenseitiger Beeinflussungen zu unterscheiden. Gleichzeitig erlaubt es ebenfalls, dass diese ganze Komplexität einen Ort gemäß einer Struktur, einer Ordnung einnimmt, da sich nicht alles auf einer einzigen Ebene abspielt. Diese Gesamtheit der Interaktionen ist keiner chaotischen Art, sondern ergibt eine Ordnung, die diese Gesamtheit auf eine dynamische Art zusammenhält und welche für die Prinzipien, die Beziehungen und ihre logischen, epistemologischen, ontologischen und wissenschaftlichen Werte offen ist. Leibniz wiederholt seine Versuche die Prinzipien zu hierarchisieren und den Komponenten der Vernunft eine Strukturierung zu verleihen bis zum Überdruss. Um diese innere Struktur auszudrücken, wird die Vorstellung eine „kategorialen Achse“ vorgeschlagen. Eine „kategoriale Achse“ ist kein Prinzip, und auch keine Summe von Prinzipien. Es handelt sich vielmehr um einen ontologischen offenen Raum, welcher durch eine hohe Dichte von Prinzipien gebildet wird, die direkt miteinander verbunden sind, allerdings mit unterschiedlichen Entfernungen zueinander. Diese Achsen sind Konstellationen von Prinzipien, die sich um einen bestimmten kategorialen Raum gruppieren. Jede Achse bildet sich aus zwei Polen, welche sich aus zwei gegensätzlichen Vorstellungen formen und welche gleichzeitig durch diese Achse verbunden sind. Die Position eines jeden Prinzips im Hinblick auf seine Achse ist immer eine relative Position, sowohl im Bezug auf seine eigene Achse als auch auf die anderen. Auf diese Weise bildet sich gleichzeitig ein ontologischer und epistemologischer Raum, in welchem jedes Element (jedes Prinzip) einen bestimmten Platz in der Gesamtheit einnimmt und somit mit allen anderen verbunden ist, und zwar, in unterschiedlichen Graden (quantitativ oder qualitativ). Um jede Achse herum läuft eine Gesamtheit an Prinzipien zusammen, die interaktive Plätze einnehmen, und somit wird einem jeden konkreten Prinzip eine weite Polyvalenz verliehen. Weder die Zahl noch die Tragweite eines jeden Prinzips sind endgültig geschlossen, weil in einer dynamischen Gesamtheit die Beziehungen und die relativen Positionen wechseln. Aus dieser Perspektive heraus müssen die Leibnizschen Thesen verstanden werden, in denen es klein lineares einziges und erstes Prinzip gibt, sondern durch die man in ein System eintreten kann, und zwar durch jedes einzelne seiner Komponenten, die es bilden. Und durch jede einzelne dieser Komponenten kann man zu einer anderen zweiten gelangen sowie auch zu der Ganzheit des Systems. Jedoch darf diese nicht als eine anarchische oder chaotische Gesamtheit verstanden werden, welcher keine Ordnung oder Struktur zu Grunde liegt. Vielmehr muss sie

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als Gesamtheit von Elementen verstanden werde, welche strukturiert und geordnet sind, und in welcher eine Vielzahl von systematisierenden Rekonstruktionen möglich sind5. Auf diese Weise gelangen wir zu einer Überlegung hinsichtlich der Gesamtheit der Struktur „metaphysischer“ Art. Unter „metaphysisch“ soll in diesem Kontext die Ebene des Wissens verstanden werden, deren Funktion es ist, die verschiedenen Ebenen der Vernunft (die logische, ontologische, epistemologische, praktisch-ethische, politische, wissenschaftliche) auf eine kohärente, systematische und grundlegende Weise in Einklang zu bringen. So ist also das erste, grundlegendste und entscheidendste Merkmal dieser metaphysischen Struktur aus dieser Perspektive die Ordnung. Auch für diese „Ordnung“ schafft Leibniz ein „Prinzip“ einer sehr speziellen Art und Wertes. Die Analyse der Formulierung, Tragweite, Eigenschaften und Funktionen dieses Prinzips der Ordnung wird zu einem der Kernstücke dieser systematischen Rekonstruierung des Denken Leibniz. Diese Rekonstruierung weist auf ein Ideal der Vernunft hin, welches Leibniz nuanciert, indem er die Perspektive der Endlichkeit einbringt und zwar durch die Unterscheidung zwischen der menschlichen und der göttlichen Perspektive. Durch all dies bildet er eine innovative (manchmal exzessiv mit seinem historischen Moment brechende) Metaphysik, welche auf viele Arten charakterisiert worden ist und welche man als eine „Metaphysik der systemischen Individualität“ bezeichnen kann. 3. KATEGORIALE ACHSEN ALS STRUKTUR DES ONTOLOGISCHEN RAUMS Es können drei kategoriale Achsen formuliert werden, für welche eine ganze Wolke an Prinzipien entfaltet werden kann: die Achse Individualität-Systematizität, die Achse Uniformität-Diversität und die Achse Vitalität-Funktionalität. Diese erzeugen eine systematische Konstellation von Prinzipien in einem ontologischen „Raum“ von drei Dimensionen. Hier werden nur einige dieser fundamentalen Prinzipien erklärt, welche jede Achse bilden sowie ihre Formulierung durch Leibniz. Für eine detaillierte Analyse der Interpretation, Anwendung und Tragweite eines jeden dieser Prinzipien und seiner systemischen Beziehung zu dem Rest können andere Arbeiten konsultiert werden6. Wir konzentrieren uns hier auf das letzendliche Element, welches aus dieser Vielfalt der Achsen und Prinzipien einen einzigen Raum formt, ein System der onto-logischen Vernunft. Dieses vereinheitlichende Element ist der Schlüssel dieses kompletten wieder aufbauenden Modells des Metaphysik Leibniz. 5 6

B. Orio de Miguel: Leibniz. Crítica de la razón simbólica, Granada 2011. J. A. Nicolás: „Zwei Dimensionen der leibnizschen Ontologie: Vitalismus und Funktionalismus“, in J. A. Nicolás (Hrsg.): Leibniz und die Entstehung der Modernität, Stuttgart 2010, S. 57–69. Siehe auch J. A. Nicolás, „Ontologie der systemischen Individualität: hinsichtlich einer Systematisierung der Ontologie Leibniz“, in: H. Breger / J. Herbst / S. Erdner (Hrsg): Natur und Subjekt. IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover, 2012, S. 55–70.

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3.1 Die Achse Individualität-Systematizität Diese Achse bildet sich im Bereich der Kategorien der Individualität und der Systematizität, welche sowohl das Wesen der letztendlichen Bestandteile des Wirklichen als auch die Interaktionen zwischen ihnen bestimmen. Um diese Achse herum können das Prinzip der Individuation, das monadische Prinzip oder das Prinzip der Einheit, und das Prinzip der Verbindungen und das Prinzip des Ausdrucks angeordnet werden. – – – –

Das Prinzip der Individuation: „[…] omne individuum sua tota Entitate individuatur“7. Das monadische Prinzip oder das Prinzip der Einheit: „[…] ce qui n’est pas veritablement UN estre n’est pas non plus veritablement un ESTRE“8. Das Prinzip der Verbindungen: „[…] tout est lié“9. Das Prinzip des Ausdrucks: „Une chose exprime une autre, lors qu’il y a un rapport constant et reglé entre ce qui se peut dire de l’une et de l’autre“10.

Diese unvollständige Auflistung der Prinzipien muss an erster Stelle komplementiert werden und an zweiter Stelle muss eine Darstellung anderer Formulierungen dieser Prinzipien erfolgen. An dritter Stelle muss eine detaillierte Analyse eines jeden einzelnen erfolgen in Bezug auf seine Tragweite, Anwendungen und epistemologischen und ontologischen Rolle. Zuletzt muss eine Analyse eines jeden einzelnen unter Beachtung seiner Beziehung zu anderen Prinzipien erfolgen sowie seinem systemischen Ort im Hinblick auf die entsprechende Achse und den Rest der Achsen, das heißt, im ontologischen systematisch vereinheitlichten Raum. Der Umfang dieser Aufgabe überschreitet die Grenzen dieser Arbeit und wird auf einen anderen Zeitpunkt vertagt. Wir werden hier nicht weiter auf diese Themen eingehen. 3.2 Die Achse Uniformität-Diversität Um diese Achse herum gruppieren sich alle die Prinzipien, welche die Beziehung zwischen Uniformität und Diversität in der leibnizschen Ontologie regeln. Das grundlegende Merkmal dieser Achse ist es, dass Leibniz immer die Spannung zwischen diesen beiden Extremen hält. Auf der einen Seite ist die Tendenz Uniformität zu entdecken klar durch diesen Philosophen gekennzeichnet und dies bis hin zu dem Punkt, dass er ein Prinzip der Uniformität formuliert. Aber auf der anderen Seite beharrt er auch immer auf der Unbeugsamkeit der Verschiedenheit, der Diversität. Sicherlich haben diese beiden Prinzipien in jedem Kontext ungleiche Tragweiten und Anwendungen, aber eines dieser beiden in der Gesamtheit des Denken Leibniz’ zu bevorzugen, bis zu dem Extrem hin das andere bis zur ontologischen 7 8 9 10

„Jedes Individuum individuiert sich durch seine ganze Entität“ A VI, 1, 11. Auch A VI, 3, 147. A II, 2, 186. GP VI. A II, 2, 231.

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Irrelevanz zu reduzieren, ist, meiner Meinung nach, eine Verfälschung des grundlegenden Sinns des Denken Leibniz in diesem Punkt. Tatsächlich verfolgt Leibniz die Synthese dieser beiden in einem Prinzip der Harmonie, welches eben genau eine Balance zwischen diesen beiden Polen herstellt. Keines dieser drei Prinzipien verliert seine Spezifität in dem Endergebnis, welches die Wirklichkeit ist. –

Das Prinzip der Uniformität: „[…] mon grand principe des choses naturelles est celuy de Harlequin Empereur de la Lune, que c’est toujours et partout en toutes choses tout comme icy. C’est-à-dire que la nature est uniforme dans le fond des choses, quoyqu’il y ait de la varieté dans le plus et dans le moins et dans les degrés de perfection“11.

Um dieses Prinzip herum platzieren sich das Prinzip der Kontinuität und das Prinzip der Analogie12. Und dieses Gefüge von Prinzipien steht in direktem Zusammenhang mit dem Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung, welches allen Prinzipien zu Grunde liegt. –

Das Prinzip der Diversität: „nullamque uspiam dari (quod inter nova et majora axiomata mea est) perfectam similaritatem“13.

Schlussfolgernd drückt jede Monade eine Gesamtheit aus, allerdings aus einer bestimmten Perspektive. Die Weise, auf die dies geschieht, wird von Leibniz als „Prinzip des Ausdrucks“ formuliert14. Auf diese Art ist alles mit allem verbunden, allerdings auf unterschiedliche Weise. Jede Gesamtheit bildet ein Individuum, und jedes Individuum repräsentiert einen Standpunkt, der unumgänglich anders ist. Es gibt keine zwei gleichen Individuen, unter anderem, weil es keine zwei Individuen gibt, die den gleichen Standpunkt haben. Hierin ist die Dimension der Individualität enthalten, welche das unumgängliche Prinzip der Pluralität und der Differentialität repräsentiert. Dieses Prinzip stellt ein kritisches Gegengewicht zur letztendlichen Integration in eine undifferenzierte Gesamtheit dar. So eröffnet sich hier der Weg zu einer Ontologie der Individualität, welche als System der Individuen verstanden wird. In ihr ist nicht das Relevanteste, dass es im Gefüge etwas Gemeinsames gibt, sondern dass alle Individuen unterschiedlich sind. Dies ist das, was sie als solche ausmacht und das was dadurch das wertvollste im Rahmen dieser Metaphysik der Individualität ist. –

Das Prinzip der Harmonie: „Quid tandem armonía? Similitudo in varietate, seu diversitas identitate compensata“15.

In unserer Rekonstruierung erscheint zum ersten Mal ein Prinzip der Harmonie. Allerdings haben wir keine Textpassage finden können, in der Leibniz explizit von 11 12 13 14 15

GP III, 343. Auch GP III, 339 und GP VI, 546 (OFC 8, 517). B. Orio de Miguel 2011. „Es ergibt sich an keinem Ort eine perfekte Ähnlichkeit (und das ist eines meiner neuen Axiome und eines der wichtigsten)“, GP IV, 514. Auch GP VII, 563. A II, 2, 231. „[Harmonie ist] die Ähnlichkeit in der Vielfalt, das heißt, die durch die Identität kompensierte Diversität.“ A VI, 3, 116.

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einem Prinzip der Harmonie spricht. Aber der Sinn und die Funktionen dieses ist im Denken Leibniz sehr klar. In dem Kontext der Achse Uniformität-Diversität präsentiert sich die Vorstellung der Harmonie als letztendliches Gleichgewicht zwischen diesen beiden Polen, und welches die Wirklichkeit ausmacht. In einer anderen Formulierung des Konzepts der Harmonie versteht Leibniz dieses als „Einheit in der Vielfalt“16. Es gibt keine Auflösung der Uniformität in einer chaotischen Diversität und auch keine Verkleinerung der Diversität hin zu einer uniformen und undifferenzierten Einheit. In der Wirklichkeit gibt es eine wirkliche nicht verkleinerbare Diversität und eine explizite oder unterliegende Uniformität. Weder beseitigt das Prinzip der Harmonie diese beiden noch ersetzt es sie, sondern es will vielmehr das letztendliche Gleichgewicht ausdrücken, in welchem sich beide in der Wirklichkeit befinden. Dieses Gleichgewicht kann in quantitativen Termini (wie zum Beispiel mathematisch) ausgedrückt werden oder auch in qualitativen Termini (wie zum Beispiel durch die Freude). Das Befolgen von mathematischen Gesetzen seitens der Wirklichkeit ist ein solcher Ausdruck dieses Gleichgewichts. Die Leibnizsche Idee, dass „omnis felicitas harmonica sive pulcra est“17 ist ein weiterer nicht quantitativer Ausdruck dieses selben Prinzips. 3.3 Die Achse Vitalität-Funktionalität Diese Achse grenzt zwei Ebenen in der Ontologie Leibniz ein, deren Beziehung Gegenstand vieler Diskussionen war. Um es auf eine symbolische Art auszudrücken, repräsentieren die Pole dieser Achse den Leibniz des „calculemus“ und den Leibniz des „principe vital“18. Es handelt sich um zwei „Quellen“ und philosophische Traditionen, die im Denken Leibniz zusammenlaufen und eine eigentümliche Synthese bilden. Auf der einen Seite nimmt Leibniz die neuplatonische Tradition seit Plotin auf bis hin zu den Platonikern Cambridges und der kabbalistischen Tradition; auf der anderen Seite will Leibniz nicht auf die neue Art des Wissens, welche von Galileo initiiert wurde, verzichten, deren methodologischer Schlüssel der Gebrauch der Mathematik für die Analyse des Real-Phänomenischen ist. Somit werden bei Leibniz der Impuls der Mathematisierung des Wirklichen (moderne Wissenschaft) mit dem Impuls der Vitalisierung des Wirklichen (neuplatonische, kabbalistische und gnostische Tradition) zusammengefasst. Diese Doppeltendenz bilden die Pole dieser Achse; für jeden dieser Pole formuliert Leibniz spezifische Prinzipien. –

Das Prinzip der Vitalität: „[…] il faut juger qu’il y a de la vie et de la perception partout“19.

16 17 18

GP VII, 87. „Jedes Glück harmonisch oder schön ist“, A VI, 3. J. A. Nicolás: „Zwei Dimensionen der leibnizschen Ontologie: Vitalismus und Funktionalismus“, in: J. A. Nicolás (Hrsg.): Leibniz und die Entstehung der Modernität, Stuttgart 2010, S. 57–69. Auch J. A. Nicolás, „Dimensión vitalista de la ontología leibniziana“, in: J. A. Nicolás, y S. Toledo (eds.): Leibniz y las ciencias empíricas. Leibniz and the empirical Sciences, Granada 2011, S. 71–92. GP III, 343.

19

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Das Prinzip der Funktionalität: denken ist rechnen: „Quid autem aliud ratiocinatio quam notionum additio et subtractio est?“20.

Bis hier gibt es also ein Gefüge von Prinzipien, zu denen noch viele mehr hinzugefügt werden können und welche mit ihnen verbunden sind. So kann letztendlich eine „Wolke“ von Prinzipien entstehen, welche in der Lage sind die leibnizsche Ontologie zu tragen und ihr eine systemische Vereinheitlichung zu verleihen. Diese „Wolke“ ist in dem Sinne offen, als dass immer neue Prinzipien hinzugefügt werden können, neue Beziehungen, neue Strukturierungen, welche außerdem niemals definitiv sind. Es handelt sich um eine dynamische Ordnung oder Struktur der Vernunft mit ihrer Projektion in der Wirklichkeit21. 4. ARCHITEKTUR DER METAPHYSISCHEN DIMENSION DER VERNUNFT Durch die Analyse und die systemische Rekonstruierung der Dynamik der Prinzipien wurde ein Entwurf eines logischen Raumes erreicht, welcher keine reine Juxtaposition von Achsen und Prinzipien ist. Diese Gesamtheit, welche auf verschiedenen Arten organisierbar ist, ist ein Zusammenbau mit einer gewissen Einheit. Leibniz drückt auf klare Weise diesen Charakter eines jeden einzelnen der Prinzipien aus, welcher sie betrifft und untereinander verbindet: „Mea principia talia sunt, ut vix a se invicem divelli possint. Qui unum bene novit, omnia novit“22. Um herauszufinden und zu formulieren was es ist, das dieser Gesamtheit von Prinzipien eine Einheit verleiht, muss ein weiterer Schritt getan werden. Es handelt sich darum den letztendlichen Hintergrund der Wirklichkeit in einer ihrer Dimensionen zu erreichen. In diesem Fall handelt es sich um die logische Dimension der Vernunft, welche durch die Prinzipien bestimmt wird, und in deren letzter Instanz sich das „Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung“ finden lässt. Gerade wegen ihres letztendlichen und unhintergehbaren Charakters hat diese Ebene der Vernunft einen metaphysischen Charakter. Im Folgenden soll eine Analyse dieser Ebene der Vernunft vorgenommen werden, welches einem Angehen der Problematik der Architektur der Leibnizschen Metaphysik gleichkommt. Diese Ebene der Vernunft kann in drei Ebenen aufgeteilt werden und eine jede einzelne dieser erlangt einen eigenen Charakter und eine spezifische Struktur im Falle Leibniz. Die grundlegende Interaktion zwischen ihnen, welche sich in diesem Fall ergibt, bildet auf klare Weise ein onto-logisches „System“ der Vernunft. Die drei Ebenen sind folgende: die Logik der prinzipiellen Ordnung, die Gnoseologie des körperlichen Perspektivismus und die Ontologie der vitalen Vernunft. Die systemische Interaktion dieser Ebenen bildet die Metaphysik der systemischen 20 21 22

„Was ist die Vernunft, wenn nicht eine Summe und Substraktion von Vorstellungen?“ A VI, 3, 123. Cf. X. Zubiri: Estructura dinámica de la realidad, Madrid 1989. „Meine Prinzipien hängen zusammen, sodass sie nur schwer voneinander zu trennen sind. Wer eines von ihnen gut kennt, kennt sie alle“, GP II, 412.

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Individualität. Hier soll im Folgenden nur die erste dieser Ebenen untersucht werden. 5. DIE LOGIK DER PRINZIPIELLEN ORDNUNG Die logische Dimension der metaphysischen Ebene der Vernunft ist, wie bereits erwähnt wurde, durch das „Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung“ bestimmt. Dieses Prinzip hat eine systematisierende Funktion der kompletten Konstellation der genannten Prinzipien. Keines dieser ist von dem Rest isoliert, sondern ein jedes erlangt seinen Wert in dem Netz der Interaktionen, welches die Gesamtheit formt. Das Funktionieren dieser Wolke weist einen Charakter auf, der einer Ordnung folgt. Deswegen ist die Ordnung, welche durch ein „Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung“ ausgedrückt werden kann, das Ergebnis zu welchem man durch die Anwendung oder das Funktionieren aller anderen Prinzipien gelangen kann. Somit repräsentiert das „Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung“, um es mit einer geometrischen Metapher ausdrücken, nicht die Spitze einer Pyramide (von Prinzipien), sondern den Mörtel, welcher aus der Gesamtheit der Prinzipien ein zusammenhaltendes System formt. Leibniz verstößt bei vielen Gelegenheiten eine Idee, Interpretation oder ein Prinzip, „weil sie/es im Gegensatz zu dem Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung steht. Das heißt, dass die Idee dieses Prinzips eine Annahme enthält, die unter keinen Umständen angezweifelt werden darf. Es handelt sich nicht um ein erstes Prinzip im engeren Sinne, aus dem sich alle anderen folgern lassen. Vielmehr muss es als eine Art der Interaktion zwischen Elementen verstanden werden, als Endergebnis der Anordnung zwischen ihnen und welches der logischen letztendlichen und unhintergehbaren Ebene angehört, die die Dynamik des Denkens und der Wirklichkeit ausdrückt. Diese Dynamik richtet sich nach Gesetzen, welche ihrerseits auf viele verschiedene Arten rekonstruierbar sind. Diese komplette Dynamik der Prinzipien und der Dinge, die sie bestimmen, hält immer eine letztendliche Ordnung ein, die manchmal offenkundig und manchmal verborgen ist. Und umgekehrt: diese letztendliche Ordnung schlägt sich dynamisch in der Vielfalt der Prinzipien nieder, die Leibniz formuliert. Aber die Anwendung aller dieser läuft in dem Endergebnis einer Ordnung der Vernunft23 zusammen. In genau diesem Sinne hat das „Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung“ den gnoseologischen und ontologischen Wert eines Meta-Prinzips. Leibniz erwähnt dieses „Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung“ in diversen Kontexten, obwohl er es nie in seine Liste der fundamentalen Prinzipien miteinschließt. Diese Tatsache kann vielleicht damit erklärt werden, dass es für die Leibniz eine grundlegende und unbestreitbare Überzeugung darstellt in seiner Weise das Dasein der Welt und der Vernunft, nach der sie sich richtet, zu verstehen. Leibniz drückt den grundlegenden Charakter dieses Prinzips aus, als er die Gesamtheit der „primitiven freien Verordnungen“, die den Kern der Rationalität 23

K. E. Kaehler: Leibniz. Der methodische Zwiespalt der Metaphysik der Substanz, Hamburg 1979, S. 41.

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ausmachen, als „Gesetze der allgemeinen Ordnung“ bezeichnet. Diese Gesetze regieren die Logik des Möglichen und des Realen: „Je conçois qu’il y avoit une infinité de manieres posibles de créer le Monde, selon les differens desseins que Dieu pouvoit former; et que chaque monde posible depend de quelques desseins principaux ou fins de Dieu, qui luy sont propres, c'est-à-dire de quelques decrets libres primitifs (conçus sub ratione possibilitatis) ou Loix de l’ordre general de celuy des univers posibles au quel elles conviennent, et dont elles determinent la notion, aussi bien que les notions de toutes les substances individuelles qui doivent entrer dans ce même univers“24. Die Beziehung zwischen diesen Prinzipien und dem Rest der Prinzipien der Vernunft ist nicht einer deduktiven Art, sondern kann in Termini einer transzendentalen Beziehung verstanden werden, das heißt, als eine Kondition der Möglichkeit a priori der anderen25. Dieser Weg der Rechtfertigung des Prinzips der Ordnung wird nicht von Leibniz erklärt, der vielmehr in einigen Textpassagen auf den Weg a posteriori der Erfahrung der Ordnung hinzuweisen scheint. Prinzipien, die dem Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung nahe stehen sind das Prinzip des Ausdrucks, welches weiter oben im Zusammenhang mit dem Pol der Systematizität, als eine seiner konkreten Darstellungen, aufgeführt wurde, und das Prinzip der Harmonie, welches, wie ebenfalls weiter oben bereits erwähnt wurde, auch eine Funktion im Rahmen der Achse Diversität-Uniformität hat. In der vorherigen Textpassage drückt Leibniz den sowohl ontologischen als auch epistemologischen und logischen Wert des Meta-Prinzips der allgemeinen Ordnung aus. Wie gerade gezeigt wurde, handelt es sich nicht um ein einziges Prinzip, sondern vielmehr um eine effektive Eröffnung und Errichtung der Beziehung zwischen Prinzipien, welche mit einem Prinzip der Beziehung zwischen den Dingen übereinstimmt. Diese Dynamik der gegenseitigen Beziehung hat als gemeinsames Endergebnis eine Ordnung. Daher kann man sagen, dass das Ordnungsprinzip ein Meta-Prinzip ist, in dessen Ausführung sich die wirkliche Realisierung aller anderen Prinzipien vereinigt. Deshalb findet es sowohl in der Geometrie als auch in der Physik oder anderen Wissensgebieten Anwendung26. Und hier einige Charakteristika des „Prinzips der allgemeinen Ordnung“: 1. Einen dynamischen Charakter in seiner Formulierung und vor allem in allen seinen Inhalten, da es sich in vielen verschiedenen und konkreten Formen wiederspiegeln kann und außerdem muss auf unterschiedliche Wissensgebiete anwendbar sein, in denen man von ihm im strikten Sinne sprechen kann. 2. Eine Gültigkeit sowohl auf ontologischer als auch auf epistemologischer und logischer Ebene. 3. Auf der ontologischen Ebene hat diese Prinzip sowohl Gültigkeit auf der Ebene der Phänomene als auch auf der der Wirklichkeit. In beiden stellt es die letztendliche Voraussetzung für eine rationale Konzeption dar. Diese Annahme findet bei Leibniz keine rationale Begründung. 24 25 26

A II, 2, 73. Auch GP VI, 129–35. Cf. J. A. Nicolás: „Universalität des Prinzips vom zureichenden Grund“, in: Studia Leibnitiana XXII/1 (1990), S. 90–105. A VI, 4, 2032.

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4. Auf der epistemologischen Ebene stellt es die letztendliche Annahme des rationalen Wissens des Wirklichen dar. Auch auf dieser Ebene bleibt es ohne Beleg in dem gleichen von Leibniz festgelegten Rahmen. 5. Das Prinzip der Ordnung hat einen letztendlich kritischen Wert, sowohl auf ontologischer als auch auf epistemologischer Ebene. Angesichts der Gültigkeit und des Funktionierens der übrigen Prinzipien, die die Konzeption des Realen bestimmen, verwandelt sich das Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung für Leibniz in das letzendliche Kriterium der rationalen Entscheidung. In Verbindung mit der Vorstellung der Harmonie stellen wir fest, dass Leibniz häufig genau auf dieses Konzept zurückgreift, wenn er sich auf das Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung bezieht. Hier einige Textpassagen, in denen dieses Prinzip explizit wird: „l’obscurité dont je crois d’avoir tiré ce sujet, et qui choquent un Principe de l’ordre general que j’ay remarqué … principe qui est de grand usage dans les raisonnement, et que je ne trouve pas encor assés employé ny assés connu dans tout son étendue. Il a son origine de l’infini, il est absolument necessaire dans la Geometrie, mais il reussit encor dans la physique, par ce que la souveraine sagesse, qui est la source de toutes choses, agit en parfait geometre, et suivant une harmonie à laquelle rien ne se peut adjouter“27. Somit gelangen wir an die zweite Stelle, an der das Prinzip der Harmonie erscheint. Wenn es vorher in Verbindung mit der Achse Diversität-Uniformität auftauchte, erscheint es jetzt in Verbindung mit dem Prinzip der allgemeinen Ordnung. In der vorherigen Textpassage wird darauf verwiesen, dass das Prinzip der Ordnung in verschiedenen Bereichen des Wissens einen Wert erlangt, als Ergebnis dessen, dass die Aktion des obersten Wissens dort stattfindet, wo der Harmonie gefolgt wird und sie angestrebt wird. Das heißt, dass das Prinzip der Ordnung die Harmonie als grundlegenden Bestandteil beinhaltet. Die Ordnung produziert Harmonie und ist das Ergebnis der Suche nach dieser. Es ist die Ordnung als Harmonie. Hier müssen allerdings mindestens zwei Probleme dieses Ansatzes aufgezeigt werden: 1) Erstens, die Verbindung des Ganzen mit dem Teil, in diesem konkreten Kontext die universalen Harmonie. Der Standpunkt Leibniz diesbezüglich wird in De rerum originatione radicali deutlich: „De parte diximus quae turbata esse possit salva harmonia in toto“28. Leibniz stellt sich dem Einwand, dass einzelne Teile (Individuen, Kollektive) im Hinblick auf die Gesamtheit (das Ganze) außer Acht gelassen werden. Seine Antwort ist, dass individuelle Interessen ebenfalls beachtet werden müssen und zwar „salva armonia universali“29. Leibniz gibt somit der Perspektive des Ganzen Priorität zum Nachteil der Perspektive des Individuums. Dieses Merkmal ist in der deutschen Philosophie zur Tradition geworden bis hin zu Hegel und zum germanischen Geist, in dem es bis heute anwährt.

27 28 29

GP III, 52. Auch A II, 2, 505 und A I, 11, 767. „Die Unordnung eines Teils kann mit der Harmonie des Ganzen in Einklang gebracht werden“, GP VII, 307. „In der Weise wie es die universale Harmonie erlaubt“, ibid.

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Um seinen Standpunkt zu rechtfertigen greift Leibniz auf seine These des geringsten notwendigen Übel zurück sowie auf das Prinzip der ausreichenden Vernunft in seiner Version des Prinzips des Besten. Somit ist die Gesamtheit die bestmögliche und es kann deswegen auch schlussgefolgert werden, dass „afflictiones pro tempore malas, effectu bonas esse, cum sint viae compendiariae ad majorem perfectionem“30. Es gibt also eine Art „unsichtbare Hand“, die alles in eine harmonische Ordnung und in seinen wirklichen Zweck eingliedert. Dadurch wird folgendes Extrem ausdrücklich und kohärent erreicht: „Et licet verum sit, interdum quaedam rursus silvescere aut rursus destrui deprimique, hoc tamen ita accipiendum est, ut paulo ante afflictionem interpretati sumus, nempe hanc ipsam destructionem depressionemque prodesse ad consequendum aliquid majus, ita ut ipso quodammodo damno lucremur“31. Diese Überlegungen haben inakzeptable Konsequenzen genau in Bezug auf die Problematik, die von Leibniz in der Interpretation des Schmerzes und des Leidens erwähnt werden. Die eingeschränkteste berechnende Version der Vernunft durch Leibniz ist unzureichend im allgemeinen Rahmen der Theodizee32 und vor allem in Bezug auf das Problem des Übels. Leibniz hält die Metaphysik der Individualität in den Händen, welche die Monadologie darstellt, die Individualität müsste und sollte also eine viel relevanterer Rolle im Gleichgewicht zwischen dem Ganzen und den Teilen oder, besonders, zwischen dem Individuum und der Gesellschaft spielen. 2) Ein zweiter Aspekt leitet sich aus einer Textpassage einer der Anhänge der Theodizee ab, in welcher die Vorstellungen der Ordnung und der Harmonie erneut zusammen erscheinen. Dort steht folgendes geschrieben: „Summae Sapientiae divitias cum Paulo recurrendum est, quae utique passa non est, ut Deus vim ordini rerum naturisque sine lege mensuraque Internet, ut turbaretur harmonia universales, ut alia ab optima rerum series elligeretur“33. Einerseits gibt es eine Grenze, welche nicht einmal von Gott überschritten werden kann, und die genau alles das umfasst, was der Ordnung der Dinge entgegensteht. Oder anders ausgedrückt, das allgemeine Prinzip der Ordnung ist die unüberschreitbare Grenze der Vernunft, sowohl für Gott als natürlich auch für den Menschen. Und das ergibt sich eben genau hinsichtlich des Wissens, was bedeutet, dass der höchste Grad des Wissens das Wissen

30 31

32 33

„Der Kummer ein Übel für eine Zeit ist, aber sein Resultat etwas Gutes ist, da es die kürzesten Wege zur höchsten Perfektion sind“, ibid. „Und obwohl es wahr ist, dass manchmal einige Teile in einen wilden Status zurückfallen oder wieder zerstört oder ruiniert werden, muss dies jedoch akzeptiert werden, auf die Weise wie wir bereits den Schmerz interpretiert haben, d. h., dass diese Zerstörung und das Verderben dazu dienen ein höheres Gutes zu erlangen, und zwar so, dass wir auf irgendeine Art aus dem verursachten Schaden einen Nutzen ziehen können“ GP VII, 308. J. A. Nicolás: „Die rationalistische Reduktion des physischen Übels bei Leibniz“, in: W. Li / W. Schmidt-Biggemann (Hrsg.): 300 Jahre Essais de Théodicée – Rezeptiohn und Transformation (= Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa XXXVI) Stuttgart 2013, S. 137–70. „Das höchste Wissen, welches wahrscheinlich nicht erlaubt hat, dass Gott Gewalt in der Ordnung der Dinge und in ihrer Natur ohne Gesetz und Maßstäbe ausübt, und dass die universale Harmonie nicht gestört wird und eine Reihe von Dingen gewählt werden, die nicht dem Besten entsprechen“, GP VI, 457.

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der Ordnung ist, das Wissen eine tiefe oder oberflächliche Ordnung zu entdecken, welche den Dingen unterliegt. Wenn nun diese aktuelle Ordnung die bestmöglich ist und deswegen von Gott gewählt wurde, dann heißt das, dass es die einzige mögliche ist. Es kann keine anderen möglichen Ordnungen geben, da es aus der aktuellen Perspektive keine Ordnung als solche wäre. Somit gibt es also keine Distanz zwischen Gott und seinem Werk, welche nicht diese vernünftige Ordnung oder die „des höchsten Wissens“ ist. Aus der Perspektive des absoluten Wissens, welche das höchste Wissen repräsentiert, führt der eigene Standpunkt der Ordnung zur eigenen Grenze, das heißt, zu einem Verlust der Freiheit. Die Freiheit, die in der Wahl dieser Ordnung liegt, führt zu einer eigenen Begrenzung, was also paradox für das oberste Sein ist. Sobald die aktuelle Ordnung gewählt wird, ist es dem obersten Sein nicht möglich andere Ordnungen zu wählen, deren Gleichgewichte äquivalente sein könnten. Bis zu dieser Stelle hat uns dieses Konzept der Ordnung gebracht. In dieser letzten Passage, werden hier auf eine gewisse Weise Ordnung und Harmonie identifiziert. Die Ordnung zu zerstören oder gegen sie zu handeln, bedeutet die universale Harmonie zu zerstören. Deswegen kann also nicht nur die Ordnung als Harmonie bestätigt werden, sondern auch und vor allem, dass die Harmonie (in ihren vielen Ausdrucksweisen, sowohl quantitativ als auch qualitativ) als Ordnung verstanden werden kann.

LEIBNIZ’S CONCEPT OF HARMONY BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY Stephan Meier-Oeser 1. THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF HARMONY IN LEIBNIZ’S PHILOSOPHY The notion of harmony is one of those basic concepts that played a fundamental role at any time and in all areas of Leibniz’s thought. Leibniz himself was well aware about the pivotal importance of harmony for his philosophy when he declared in a letter to Electress Sophie: “My fundamental thoughts turn on two things, namely on unity and infinity”. How this at the same time highly abstract and very precise self-characterization is connected to the issue of harmony of soul and body becomes immediately clear when he goes on explaining: Souls are unities and bodies are multitudes, but infinite ones […] But unities, even though they are indivisible and without parts, nevertheless represent the multitudes, in much the same way as all the lines from the circumference are united in the centre of the circle … The admirable nature of the sentiment consists in this reunion of infinity in the unity1.

The reunion of multitude (body) and unity (soul) does not only constitute sensation, it is also the structural formula of harmony. Right from the start Leibniz defines harmony – in many variant formulations – as “unitas in multis”, where ‘unity’ can be replaced, inter alia, by the terms of simplicitas, similitudo, identitas or consensus and ‘multitude’ by the terms of varietas or diversitas etc. In general, however, harmony is given “cum multa ad quandam unitatem revocantur”, and it will be all the greater, the greater the multitude is that is brought to unity2. The greatest possible harmony, therefore, consists in an infinite multitude expressed in an indivisible unity, which precisely conforms to the concept of the monad as a representation of the entire universe in one metaphysical point. 1

2

Leibniz to Electress Sophie, 4. November 1696; A I, 13, 90: “Mes meditations fondamentals roulent sur deux choses, sçavoir sur l’unité et sur l’infini. Les ames sont des unités et les corps sont des multitudes, mais infinies. […] Mais les unités, quoyqu’elle soyent indivisibles et sans parties, ne laissent de representer les multitudes, à peu prés comme toutes les lignes de la circomference se reunissent dans le centre […]. Ce dans cette reunion que consiste la nature admirable de sentiment.” Quoted from The shorter Leibniz texts, transl. by Lloyd Strickland, London 2006, p. 79. “Elementa juris naturalis”; A VI, 1, 479: “Major harmonia est cum diversitas major est, et reducitur tamen ad identitatem (Nam non in identitate, sed varietate gradus esse possunt).” Cf. Vgl. Th. Leinkauf: “Diversitas identitate compensata. Ein Grundtheorem in Leibniz´ Denken und seine Voraussetzungen in der Frühen Neuzeit”, in: Studia leibnitiana XXVIII/1 (1996), pp. 58–83 and XXIX/1 (1997), pp. 81–102.

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Its metaphysical relevance is also manifest when harmony is identified with God’s existence3 or even with God himself4, or else with the “fatum seu harmonia rerum”, i. e. with the necessary order of things5. Harmony is the ultimate reason of volition (both human and divine) and therefore is the cause as well as the end of all things (“causa, seu finis rerum”)6. In this sense it is the ultima ratio of God’s creation and thus the very reason for which no further reason can be given. For what is the ultimate reason for divine will? – the divine intellect. What is the ultimate reason for the divine intellect? – the harmony of things. What is the ultimate reason for the harmony of things? – nothing7. From considerations like these it is apparent, Leibniz holds, “wie Glückseeligkeit, Lust, Liebe, Vollkommenheit, Wesen, Krafft, freyheit, übereinstimmung, ordnung und schöhnheit an einander verbunden, welches von wenigen recht angesehen wird”8. The terms listed here, comprising happiness, joy, love, perfection, nature, power, freedom, accordance, order, and beauty, make up a set of the most fundamental categories of theology, esthetics, ethics, physics, and metaphysics. Their secret connection “which only very few have rightly understood”, or rather the notion to which all these can be ultimately reduced, is, as Leibniz holds, the very concept of harmony, i. e. “die einigkeit in der vielheit” (unity in multitude). But also the fundamental notion of Leibniz’s epistemology and monadological metaphysics, the notion or rather the conceptual field of perception, representation and expression is characterized by the structure of harmony and thus itself provides an alternative expression for harmony. Perception is, as Leibniz frequently declares, nothing but the expression or representation of the many in one: “[…] perceptio nihil aliud [est], quam multorum in uno expressio”9; and the same also holds for cogitatio10. 3 4 5 6 7

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“Confessio philosophi” (= CP); A VI, 3, 129: “[…] existentiam Dei, seu harmoniam rerum […].” CP, 134. CP, 130. CP, 146. Leibniz to Magnus Wedderkopf, May (?) 1671; A II, 1, 117: “Quae ergo ultima ratio voluntatis divinae? intellectus divinus. Deus enim vult quae optima item harmonicotata intelligit eaque velut seligit ex numero omnium possibilium infinito. Quae ergo intellectus divini? harmonia rerum. Quae harmoniae rerum? nihil.” “Von der Glückseligkeit”, ca. 1697–98; GP VII, 87: “Nun die einigkeit in der vielheit ist nichts anders als die übereinstimmung, und weil eines zu diesem näher stimmet als zu jenem, so fließet daraus die ordnung, von welcher alle schöhnheit hehrkomt, und die Schönheit erwecket liebe. Darauß siehet man nun, wie Glückseeligkeit, Lust, Liebe, Vollkommenheit, Wesen, Krafft, freyheit, übereinstimmung, ordnung und schöhnheit an einander verbunden, welches von wenigen recht angesehen wird.” Leibniz to Des Bosses, 1706; GP II, 311. cf. Leibniz to Gottlieb Samuel Treuer, after 1. June 1708, LBr. 939 fol. 3: “[…] hoc ipsum est quod perceptionem appello, repraesentationem nempe multitudinis in uno seu in Monade.” Cf. Leibniz to Rudolph Christian Wagner, 4. June 1710; GP VII, 529: “[…] repraesentatio externi in interno, compositi in simplice, multitudinis in unitate, revera perceptionem constituit. At hoc sensu anima non tantum animalibus, sed et omnibus aliis percipientibus tribuetur.” Cf. “De conatu et motu, sensu et cogitatione”, 1671 (?); A VI, 2, 282: “Nihil aliud est cogitatio quam […] sensus plurium simul et unum in multis.”

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It is obvious that Leibniz right from the beginning assigns a philosophical dignity to the notion of harmony that could hardly be greater. The concept of harmony, therefore, has been already for quite a long time pivotal to his philosophical thought when Leibniz in the mid 90th introduces the term of ‘preestablished harmony’ (harmonie preétablie) which later became the label or, as it were, the trademark of his metaphysical system, which he, spelling out the notion of preestablished harmony on several occasions, also announces as „systeme de l’harmonie ou de la parfaite correspondance de l’ame et du corps“11. It is quite remarkable that a metaphysical system that ultimately results in reducing bodies to “well founded phenomena” presents itself initially and also later on as a system of harmony between soul and body. For at the first glance this characterization seems to imply some kind of symmetry between souls and bodies which, however, increasingly dissapears the deeper one gets into metaphysics. 2. LEIBNIZ’S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM AS SYSTEM OF PREESTABLISHED HARMONY It is common wisdom that the Système nouveau can be seen as the initial manifesto of Leibniz’s developed metaphysics, or at least of his system of preestablished harmony. With regard to its doctrinal content this is surely correct insofar as the core thesis of souls representing the entire universe through sequences of perceptions that correspond to the sequence of changes in the universe (and vice versa) is laid down here12. With regard to terminology, however, it is not correct. For the term “harmonie preétablie” is still absent in the text of his Système nouveau in which the word “harmony” occurs only once in a rather unspecific mode refering to the “harmonie de l’univers et de la perfection des ouvrages de Dieu.” The birth certificate of the notion of “preestablished harmony” does not date from June or July but rather from September 1695. Leibniz seemingly uses the syntagma “harmonie preétabli” 11

12

“Nouveaux Essais”; A VI, 6, 307: “[…] toutes les intelligences créées ont des corps organisés, dont la perfection repond à celle de l’intelligence, ou de l’esprit, qui est dans ce corps en vertu de l’harmonie préétablie […]”; ib. 473; cf. Leibniz to Lorenzo Magalotti, 6. September 1703; A I, 22, 571: “[…] mon Systeme de l’Harmonie preetablie, que j’employe a expliquer l’union de l’ame et du corps d’une maniere intelligible.” Leibniz to Henning Huthmann, 30. June 1703; A I, 22, 459: “Meam sententiam in quibusdam Eruditorum diariis explicui; nempe Harmoniam inter animam et corpus fuisse ab initio utriusque praestabilitam […]”; Leibniz to Gottlieb Samuel Treuer, [after 1. June 1708]; LBr 939, fol. 3: “Hinc etiam originem a priori vides meae sententiae de Harmonia inter animam et corpus praestabilita, cum unumquodque suae naturae leges hoc motibus illa perceptionibus seu motuum repraesentationibus sequatur, eaque ipso consentiant ambo inter se, in hoc ipsum initio adaptat a summo autore.”; cf. “Essais de Théodicée”; GP VI, 455: “[…] harmoniam inter corpus et animam ab initio a Deo praestabilitam […]”. Cf. “Système nouveau”; GP IV, 485: “[…] cette nature de l’ame estant representative de l’univers d’une maniere tres exacte (quoyque plus ou moins distincte), la suite des representations que l’ame se produit, répondra naturellement à la suite des changemens de l’univers même: comme en échange le corps a aussi esté accommodé à l’ame, pour les rencontres où elle est conçue comme agissante au dehors incorporeal.”

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for the first time in a letter to Basnage de Bauval dating from the second half of September13 and approximately at the same time in his reply to Foucher’s objection which, however, appeared in the Journal de Sçavans not earlier than on 2nd and 9th April 1696. In this “Eclaircissement du nouveau systeme” he notes that what usually is meant by “communication des substances” is nothing but the result of the “Harmonie preétablie s’il m’est permis d’employer ce mot, et nullement par une influence reelle, ou par une transmission de quelque espece ou qualité”14. Whereas the syntagma “preestablished harmony” later became the standard label under which Leibniz’s metaphysical system was known and discussed – only very seldom Leibniz speaks of “mon systeme des monades”15 – it was still absent in the text of the “System nouveau” with which that system was for the first time presented to the public. The variant titles, he gave to this text in the course of writing it, the final version of which reads “Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des Substances, aussi bien que de l’Union qu’il y a entre l’ame et le corps”16, therefore, rather announce the metaphysical problems his system is designed to solve than the solution itself. It clearly indicates the historical and doctrinal context in which his system is situated and the problem to which it responds. In order to adequately understand his system and his concept of harmony between body and soul it is helpful to take a look at the historical contexts and the competing metaphysical systems, i. e. the scholastic “systema influxus substantiae in substantiam” and the Cartesian “systema causarum occasionalium”, both of which Leibniz wants to overcome with his system of preestablished harmony17. For it will make clear that and how Leibniz’s metaphysics can be seen as a part of a larger conceptual move originating as 13 14

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17

Cf. A II, 3, 85, 17. “Eclaircissement du nouveau systeme”; GP IV, 496: “Il est vray qu’il y a, selon moy, des efforts dans toutes les substances; mais ces efforts ne sont proprement que dans la substance même; et ce qui s’ensuit dans les autres, n’est qu’en vertu d’une Harmonie preétablie s’il m’est permis d’employer ce mot, et nullement par une influence reelle, ou par une transmission de quelque espece ou qualité.”; cf. Leibniz to François Guillaume de L’Hospital, 30. September 1695; A III, 6, 505, 16. Cf. Leibniz to Joachim Bouvet, 28. July 1704; A I, 23 N. 422, p. 578: “J’espere de demonstrer ainsi mon systeme des monades, ou des substances simples qui constituent tout, et sans dependre les unes des autres s’accordent en vertu de l’harmonie que l’auteur commun a preétablie dans leur natures.” Leibniz to Antoine Verjus, June (?) 1706; LBr 105 fol. 52v: „[…] je croy d’y avoir demonstré, mon systeme des Monades et de l’Harmonie preestablie […].” First draft (LH 4, 2, 1a fol. 1–2) first version: “Système nouveau de la concomitance pour expliquer la communication des substances et l’union de l’ame et du corps” – First draft second version “Système nouveau pour expliquer la nature des substances, et leur communication entre elles, aussi bien que l’union de l’ame et le corps” Second draft (LH 4, 2, 1b fol. 3–4): “Essai d’une systeme nouveau pour expliquer la nature des substances et leur communication entre elles, aussi bien que l’union de l’ame avec le corps”. Cf. “Reponse aux reflexions contenues dans la seconde Edition du Dictionaire Critique de M. Bayle, article Rorarius, sur le systeme de l’Harmonie preétablie” (1702) GP IV, 554: “J’avois fait inserer dans le Journal des Sçavans de Paris […] quelques Essais sur un systeme nouveau, qui me paroissoient propres à expliquer l’union de l’ame et du corps, où au lieu de la voye de l’influence des Ecoles, et de la voye de l’assistence des Cartesiens, j’avois employé la voye de l’Harmonie preétablie.”

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a sequel of Descartes’s substance dualism, a move that is characterized by the substitution of physical causality by sign relations and the concept of representation. 3. THE MOVE FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNIZ Descartes’s metaphysical dualism of res cogitans and res extensa made such a clear cut distinction between the two kinds of substances that the scholastic attempt to solve the problem of how material things may act upon minds by recourse to a real influence based on the transition of forms and species has been ruled out right from the beginning. In order to effectively rule out scholastic species-theory which explained sensual perception (where the issue of how external material things could act upon minds is at stake) by recurring to an influx of species i. e. of cognitive images or likenesses of things, Descartes had to show that neither the assumption of likeness or similarity nor that of a physical causal relation was necessary for a reconstruction of sensual perception. This twofold challenge he achieved, first, by substituting the species through mechanical movements and, second, by replacing the physical causal relation through a sign relation. He declared: when the nerves which are in the feet are violently or more than usually moved, their movement, passing through the medulla of the spine to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain, as though in the foot […].18

Although there is some sort of mechanical or physical impulse passing from the foot to the brain, at the crucial point in the inmost parts of the brain, i. e. in the gland (glandula pinealis) as the body-mind interface this mouvement (motus) does not function as something that effects a mental reaction in a physical manner. The movement rather functions as a sign, so that the metaphysical gap between body and mind is not bridged over by a physical process (which would have been incompatible with Descartes’s dualism) but rather by a semiotic process. It is quite evident that Descartes’s explanation of how the mind is able to perceive external corporeal things, an explanation with which he attempted to rule out the scholastic theory of cognition, is, at least partly, constructed on the basis of scholastic sign theory with which he must have been acquainted since his days in La Flèche; for the “doctrina de signis” made up an essential part of the scholastic curriculum of logic.19 According to scholastic semiotics the triadic sign relation that connects (a) the sign with (b) its significate and (c) the sign recipient was founded in a dyadic relation between the sign and its significate or meaning. In principal there were three kinds of relation that may found a sign relation: 1) a similitude or likeness (in case of an image or icon – according to the modern terminology of 18

19

R. Descartes: Meditationes VI, 20, in: Œuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, Paris 1897–1910 (= AT) VII, 88: “[…] cum nervi, qui sunt in pede, vehementer et praeter consuetudinem moventur, ille eorum motus per spinae dorsi medullam ad intima cerebri pertingens ibi menti signum dat ad aliquid sentiendum, nempe dolorem tamquam in pede existentem.” (Italics mine). Cf. S. Meier-Oeser: Die Spur des Zeichens. Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit, Berlin and New York 1997.

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Ch. S. Peirce), 2) in a causal relation (index), and 3) in an arbitrary act of stipulation or iposition (symbol). In the present case where it is assumed that the corporeal movement is functioning as a sign for the mind to feel or perceive something i. e. to produce a certain feeling or perception, the meaning or signification of the sign can be founded neither in a similitude towards the feeling or the external object (for there can be no similitude between a mental act and a material extended object or a mechanical motion) nor in a physical causal relation (for there can be no such relation between res extensa and res cogitans). These two possibilities being ruled out, according to traditional scholastic sign theory only the arbitrary imposition remains as a possible foundation of the sign relation. And it is exactly that which provides the paradigmatic model for Descartes’s theory of perceptual knowledge of external things. The aptness of arbitrary linguistic signs to excite certain ideas in the hearer without any similarity between the sign (the word) and its meaning (the idea) provides the main argument against the similarity postulate of species-theory. In Le Monde he notes […] si des mots, qui ne signifient rien que par l’institution des hommes, suffisent pour nous faire concevoir des choses, avec lesquelles ils n’ont aucune ressemblance: pourquoy la Nature ne pourra-t’elle pas aussi avoir estably certain signe, qui nous fasse avoir les sentimens de la Lumiere, bien que ce signe n’ait rien en soy, qui soit semblable à ce sentiment?20

The movements in the sensorium signify the sensual idea of light or are signs that make us have the perception of light, but they do not represent the sensible idea of light. For it is rather “our mind that represents to us the idea of light whenever the action which signifies the light touches our eye” (“c’est nostre esprit tout de mesme, qui nous represente l’idée de la Lumiere, toutes les fois que l’action qui la signifie touche nostre oeil”)21. The recourse to the arbitrary signs of language is not by chance. For Descartes’s problem structurally conforms to a long discussed question in scholastic theory of language, to wit: how language comprehension was possible. For that material things were material while spiritual ones were spiritual was well known even before Descartes, so that one felt obliged to give an explanation of how the arbitrary material signs of vox or scriptura could convey their meaning, i. e. evoke a spiritual idea in the intellect of the sign recipient. In face of the fact that the linguistic expression, being a material accidens, cannot have the power to produce a mental concept in the intellect, some scholastic authors of that time held that the actual semeiosis or “the exercise of signification […] does not happen through some physical causality through which the spoken word would produce the cognition or a concept in the mind but rather through an, as it were, moral causality: Dicendum […] exercitium significationis vocis […] non fieri per aliquam causalitatem physicam, qua vox producat cognitionem, seu conceptum rei in mente, sed fit per quandam ex20 21

Descartes: Le monde; AT XI, 4; cf. Dioptrique, disc. 6; AT VI, 130, 14–16. Cf. Descartes: Le monde; AT XI, 4, 20–28: “Mais vous direz, peut-estre, que nos oreilles ne nous font veritablement sentir que le son des paroles, ny nos yeux que la contenance de celuy qui rit ou qui pleure, et que c’est nostre esprit, qui ayant retenu ce que signifient ces paroles et cette contenance, nous le represente en mesme temps. A cela je pourrois répondre que c’est nostre esprit tout de mesme, qui nous represente l’idée de la Lumiere, toutes les fois que l’action qui la signifie touche nostre oeil.” Cf. Notae in programma quoddam; AT VIII/2, 360–61.

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citationem, et causalitatem veluti moralem, qua vox moraliter excitat mentem auditoris, ut ad prolationem vocis, cuius significationem scit, statim eliciat rei significatae conceptum merito speciei impressae, quam praehabet22.

What Mastrius here in a quite common way calls “moral causality” (causalitas moralis)23 is described in other passages as “occasional” causation or excitation, and thus precisely in the terminology Descartes takes up, too, when he repeatedly uses instead of “signum dare” the phrase of “occasionem dare”24. There is, however, a rather intricate problem connected to this story: language was conceived of as a system of rememorative signs (signa rememorativa) which could only excitate concepts that were already habitually known by direct intuitive cognition. Thus the model of linguistic signification in Descartes has to explain exactly what according to common understanding is the necessary precondition for the functioning of any linguistic term: the immediate, at least not linguistically mediated knowledge of things. Hence the need of innate ideas in Descartes25. Descartes’s approach of explaining perception on the basis of a divinely instituted sign language was quite successful. The linguistic sign soon became paradigmatic for describing the mind – body relation. Just to give some examples: In England the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth adopted the model of a sign – governed “magicall union” of body and mind, and claimed that “Sense […] is but a kind of Speech, (if I may call it so) Nature as it were talking to us in the Sensible Objects without, by certain Motions as Signs from thence Communicated to the Brain”26. In Germany 22 23 24

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B. Mastrius / B. Bellutus, OFM: Disputationes in Organum Aristotelis, Venice 1644, cols. 262b–263a. The concept of causalitas moralis seemingly was developed first in the context of theological discussions on the effectiveness of the sacraments with regard to grace. See Meier-Oeser: Die Spur des Zeichens, p. 357. Cf. Descartes: Dioptrique, disc. 4; AT VI, 114, 1–11: “[…] l’aveugle […] touche quelques cors de son baston, il est certain que ces cors n’envoyent autre chose iusques a luy, sinon que, faisant mouvoir diversement son baston selon les diverses qualités qui sont en eux, ils meuvent par mesme moyent les nerfs de sa main, et ensuite les endroits de sont cerveau d’ou vienent ces nerfs; ce qui donne occasion a son ame de sentir tout autant de diverses qualités en ces cors, qu’il se trouve de varietés dans les mouvemens qui sont causés par eux en son cerveau.” (Italics mine). Cf. Notae in programma quoddam; AT VIII, 2, 360. Cf. Descartes: Notae in Programma quoddam; AT VIII, 2, 359: “Quippe nihil ab objectis externis ad mentem nostram per organa sensuum accedit, praeter motus quosdam corporeos […], sed ne quidem ipsi motus, nec figurae ex iis ortae, a nobis concipiuntur, quales in organis sensuum fiunt […]. Unde sequitur, ipsas motuum et figurarum ideas nobis esse innatas. Ac tanto magis innatae esse debent ideae doloris, colorum, sonorum, et similium, ut mens nostra possit, occasione quorundam motuum corporeorum, sibi eas exhibere; nullam enim similitudinem cum motibus corporeis habent.” R. Cudworth: A Treatise Concerning eternal and Immutable Morality, London 1731, p. 214; cf. ib. 215–216: “[…] as in Speech, when Men talk to one another, they do but make Certain Motions upon the Air, which cannot Impress their Thoughts upon one another in a Passive Manner; but it being first consented to and agreed upon, that such certain Sounds shall signify such Ideas and Cogitations, he that hears those Sounds in Discourse, doth not fixe his Thoughts upon the Sounds themselves, but presently Exerts from within himself [216] such Ideas and Cogitations as those Sounds by Consent signify, though there be no Similitude at all betwixt those Sounds and Thoughts. Just in the same manner Nature doth as it were talk to us in the Outward Objects

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Johannes Clauberg subscribed to this explanatory model27; and in France Geraud de Cordemoy in his Discours physique de la parole characterized the consideration of language as the “plus beau moyen de concevoir en quoy consiste veritablement l’union du corps et de l’ame”28. This mode of conceiving the relationship between physical and mental processes according to the paradigm of arbitrary signification is one – at least metaphorical – way to cope with the problem of the mediation of mind and matter without taking recourse to the assumption of a causal influence in the narrow sense. Corporeal motions do not cause a sensation or an idea, they rather are the occasion or the sign for the mind to produce that sensation or this idea on its own. Malebranche, however, drawing on 2 Corinth. 3, 5 (“Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, tamquam ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est”)29, harshly attacked this approach and critized the opinion of those “qui croyent, que nos ames ont la puissance de produire les idées des choses ausquelles elles veulent penser: qu’elles sont excitées à les produire par des impressions que les objects font sur le corps, quoique ces impressions ne soient pas des images semblables aux objets qui les causent”30. According to Malebranche the claim that the human mind has the power of “se représenter les objets” on a given occasion is just an expression of human hubris. Whereas for Descartes the sensory stimuli were “causes occasionelles” for an internal representative act produced by the human

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of Sense […] only by certain Local Motions from them, as it were dum Signs made in the Brain; It having Constituted and Appointed by Nature’s Law, that such Local Motions shall signify such Sensible Ideas and Phantasms, though there be no Similitude at all betwixt them […] as there is non Similitude betwixt many Words and Sounds, and the Thoughts which they signify.” Cf J. Clauberg: “Exercitationes de cognitione Dei et nostri”, in: Opera omnia philosophica, Amsterdam 1691, p. 753: “Ad rationem dubitandi allatam, quod inter corporis motus et animi cogitationes nulla sit affinitas, responderi potest, quod etiam inter conceptus nostros et vocabula quibus illos exprimimus nulla sit cognatio naturae; sed quod haec vocabula ad hos conceptus designandos inventa et adhibita sint, id totum ex arbitrio et beneplacito humano pendeat. Ita ergo etiam se res habet cum motibus nostri corporis et cogitationibus mentis, quae ex institutione et beneplacito Dei talem inter se nexum habent, qualem habere experimur.” G. de Cordemoy: “Discours physique de la parole” (1668), Œeuvres philosophiques, Œeuvres philosophiques, ed. P. Claire and F. Girbal, Paris 1968, p. 210: “[…] ce que je trouve de plus admirable en cela, c’est que cette extréme difference qu’il y a entre ces signes et nos pensées, en nous marquant celle qui est entre nôtre corps et nôtre ames, nous donne en même temps à connoître tout le secret de leur union. Au moins il me semble que cette étroite union, que la seule institution des hommes est capable de mettre entre certains mouvemens exterieurs, et nos pensées, est […] le plus beau moyen de concevoir en quoy consiste veritablement l’union du corps et de l’ame. Car enfin, si l’on conçoit que les hommes puissent par institution joindre certains mouvemens à certaines pensées, on ne doit pas avoir de peine à concevoir que l’Auteur de la nature, en formant un homme, unisse si bien quelque pensées de son ame à quelques mouvemens de son corps, que ces mouvemens ne puissent être excitez dans les corps, qu’aussi-tôt des pensées ne soient excitées en l’ame; et que reciproquement, dés que l’ame veut que le corps soit mû d’une certain façon, il le soit en même temps.” N. Malebranche: “De la recherche de la verité”, in: Œuvres complètes, ed. A. Robinet, Paris 1958–70, I, 439. Ib. I, 422.

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mind, Malebranche takes them as occasional causes for God’s activity in us: “nos sens ne sont que des causes occasionelles de l’action de Dieu en nous”31. His thesis that “nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu” does ultimately mean: “c’est Dieu qui agit en nous”32. Given that God’s intellect encloses the ideas of all things and that he is also present to the human soul, it is clear to Malebranche that the doctrine of the human mind’s seeing all things in God is “tres-conforme à la raison” because it corresponds to the “oeconomie de toute la nature”33. For if it is possible for God to produce in the mind the perception of all things just by a decision of his will, there is no reason to believe that he would use an additional mean for that purpose such as innate ideas34. This, of course, is a dangerous argument that can unintentionally pave the way for idealism, as already John Locke in his 1693 Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion has pointed out. Drawing on the principle of economy, too, he remarked: “[…] since God does all things by the most compendious ways, what need is there that God should make a sun that we might see its idea in him when he pleased to exhibit it, when this might as well be done without a real sun at all”35. George Berkeley’s argumentation against the existence of a material world is exactly following this way. For under the assumption that matter cannot act on mind so that perception has to be regarded as directly caused by God, the existence of physical things becomes superfluous. Any further assertion of their existence would imply nothing less than “that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless”36. Hence, the “doctrine of matter or corporeal substance” is not only without any explanatory value with regard to the phenomenal world, it is at the same time, by postulating a corporeal realm inaccessible to human knowledge, the “main pillar and support of scepticisms”37. The only real beings Berkeley is keeping up are God and the minds, i. e. the “thinking things”, whereas the so called external world, again massively drawing on the model of the linguistic sign, is nothing but a “visual language”38 in which God speaks to these thinking things–whereas for all the “unthinking things” holds: “Their esse is percipi”39. 31 32 33 34

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Ib., I, 146–147. Ib., I, 445. Ib., I, 438. Ib., I, 438: “Puis donc que Dieu peut faire voir aux esprits toutes choses, en voulant simplement qu’ils voient ce qui est au milieu d’eux-mêmes, c’est-à-dire ce qu’ils y a dans lui-même qui a rapport à ces choses et qui les représente, il n’y a pas d’apparence qu’il le fasse autrement; et qu’il produise pour cela autant d’infinitez de nombres infinis d’idées, qu’il y a d’esprits créez.” J. Locke: “Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion”, in: The Works, London 1823 (reprint Aalen 1963) IX, p. 221. G. Berkeley: “Principles of Human Knowledge” (Principles), in: The Works, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, London 1948–57, II, p. 49. Ib., II, p. 81; cf. II, pp. 78–79. G. Berkeley: “Alciphron”, in: The Works, III, p. 160, 14; p. 161, 11. G. Berkeley: “Principles”, in: The Works, II, p. 42: “The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it. […] This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinkings things which perceive them.”

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4. LEIBNIZ’ METAPHYSICS OF REPRESENTATION Leibniz’s metaphysics which can be regarded essentially as a metaphysics of representation40 is situated in the historical perspective of this conceptual move in early modern metaphysics which, resulting from the dualism problem in its sharpened cartesian form, is characterized by a dissolution of materiality and physical causality into the notions of sign and representation. On this background, Leibniz’s ‘new system’ presents itself as an attempt to solve the problems of the “communication of the substances” without resorting to the “miracle continuelle” of occasional causes. Leibniz was quite sure to actually have solved it when he told Johann Christoph Sturm in October 1697 that in his new system the “commercium animae et corporis ita lucide explicatum est, ut aenigma hoc nunc tandem solutum putem”41. The issue Leibniz faced in his Système nouveau was to explain “comment fait le corps passer quelque chose dans l'ame”, or in general “comment une substance peut communiquer avec une autre substance creée”42. Under the supposition of preestablished harmony, however, according to which “God first created each soul and other real unity in such a way that everything in it arises from its own depths, with a perfect spontaneity as regards itself –·i. e. with no causal input from anything else – and yet with a perfect conformity to things outside it”43, it finally turns out that there is no need for a “faire passer quelque chose dans l’ame”, nor for a “recevoir par quelque chose dehors”. Nothing has to be brought in or taken from outside. For the world is already in the perceiving substance which in itself already is “un monde entier”. Each monad does not only represent the entire universe but rather is in itself a representation of the universe from its particular point of view (“une representation de l’univers suivant sa point de veue”)44; or, to put it the other way round: Because each monad by its nature represents the universe any perceptual cognition is metaphysically grounded in the structure of the universe. The being of the world is not separable from its being represented by representing monads for the universe consists of nothing but harmonically representing monads. Within this metaphysical framework the function of the occasional causes to trigger the perceptions of the res cogitans in accordance with the changes in the res extensae is replaced by the representational nature or substance of the soul to which the law determining the sequence of its perceptions is inscribed45. Thus the

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Cf. P. Köhler: Der Begriff der Repräsentation bei Leibniz. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte seines Systems, Bern 1913; H. Jalabert: “La fonction explicative de la notion de ‘représentation’ dans l’ontologie de Leibniz”, in: Akten des Int. Leibniz-Kongresses, Hannover, 14.–19. Nov. 1966, Bd. 1 (= Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa, vol. 1, Wiesbaden 1968), p. 123– 38. Leibniz for J. Chr. Sturm, Oct. 1697; A II, 3, 393. “Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances” (= SN); GP IV, 483. Cf. ib. GP IV, 484. Leibniz to Jaquelot, 9. February 1704; GP III, 464–65. “Extrait du dictionnaire de M. Bayle, Art. Rorarius”; GP IV, 548: “Je […] conçois […] la loy de la suite des modifications d’une Ame […] comme une loy inscrite dans sa substance.”

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new system of preestablished harmony guarantees “que la suite des representations que l’ame se produit, répondra naturellement à la suite des changemens de l’univers même”46. An adequate description of the world has to be build upon the notion of representation which – being characterized by the same formal structure as harmony (i. e. multitudo in unitate) – marks the organizing center of Leibniz’s metaphysics of preestablished harmony. For, as he writes to Jaquelot, “the point about the representation of the universe in each monad once being established, the rest is nothing nothing but a consequence thereof.” (“[…] le point de la representation de l'univers dans chaque Monade estant establi, le rest n’est que consequences […]”)47. 4. 1 The corporeality of all cognition In a material world which in rigore metaphysico is constituted exclusively of representations or perceptions – or, more precisely: of an infinite multitude of infinitely complex sequences of harmonizing perceptions –, metaphysics and epistemology are inseparable from each other and mark only different perspectives on the very same. Thus the harmonic union of soul and body is reflected in Leibniz’s thesis of the corporeality of any cognition or thought of created beings (“Omnis creaturae cogitatio mea sententia involvit corpus”)48. Different from Descartes there cannot be, according to Leibniz, a pure intellection (pura intellectio) in the created world that would be entirely detached from any correspondence in the body or in imagination. Even if Leibniz conceeds to Malebranche that the true idea of a circle can be the object of an intellectus purus alone, this is connected with the assumption that there is no pure intellect except the divine. We, however, do not perceive the idea of a true circle but merely have a “cognitio caeca sive suppositiva” thereof49. Even if men may reflect on abstract objects that transcend imagination, they will by doing so always imagine corresponding signs. For no created intellect is so pure that it

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SN; GP IV, 485; cf. “Considérations sur la doctrine d’un esprit universel unique”; GP VI, 538: “[…] chaque ame […] contient dans son fonds un ordre repondant à celuy de l’univers même […]”. Leibniz to Jaquelot, 9. February 1704; GP III, 465; Cf. Leibniz to de Volder, June 1703; GP II, 253: “Doctrinam meam quomodo quodlibet corpus omnia alia exprimat, et quomodo quaelibet anima vel Entelechia exprimat et suum corpus et per ipsum alia omnia, videris pulchre perspexisse. Sed ubi ejus vim expenderis, nihil aliud dictum a me videbis, quod non inde consequatur.” “Ad schedam Hamaxariam”; LH IV, 3, 5c fol. 1r. “Aus und zu Malebranche, De la recherche de la verité”, 1686–1699 (?); A VI, 4, 1815: “Non puto ullam esse intellectionem puram, sine aliquo responsu in corpore. […] Non nisi intellectus purus verum circulum percipit. Puto nullam a nobis ideam percipi veri circuli, sed nos habere tantum ejus cognitionem caecam sive suppositivam.”

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would not be always accompanied by some imagination50, so that an intelligent creature which would have nothing but distinct ideas would be God51. The necessary connection of thinking with the sensual or imaginative and thus corporeal medium of signs has its metaphysical fundament in preestablished harmony. For it is an immediate consequence of the “admirable economy of nature” that all our abstract thoughts always have to be connected with sensible things52. This connection is so close that one may even say conversely, “si les traces sensibles n’etoient point requises, l’harmonie preetablie entre l’ame et le corps […] n’auroit point de lieu”53. At the same time this connection is so universal that angels, too, never exist without corporeal organs, and never are able to reason without signs54. 4. 2 corporeality as result of confused perception Within the framework of Leibniz’s system of preestablished harmony of body and soul the thesis of the corporeality of all thought is just the counterpart of the foundation of reality of all corporeal things in their being perceived, thought, and represented by monads. Thus, the principle that all thought is connected to corporeality (i. e. to confused perceptions and imagination) has its complement in the principle that body or corporeality in general is nothing but an epiphenomen or a result of confused perception. In the entire history of epistemology there is a close correlation between intellection and immateriality on the one hand and between materiality and indistinctness or confusion on the other. In Leibniz’s metaphysics of representation this correlation appears as identity, because materiality in rigore metaphysico is (or at least results from) indistinct or confused perception – which, of course, as Donald Rutherford has rightly pointed out, has nothing to do with misperception55. For confused perceptions are an integral part of the best of all possible worlds, and make up a good part of its wealth. Without them there would be no “mundus aspectabilis” or physical world nor could there be any created mon50

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“Extrait du Dictionnaire de M. Bayle article Rorarius […] avec mes remarques; GP IV, 541: “Quoyque l’homme raisonne sur des chose abstraites et qui surpassent l’imagination, il ne laisse pas d’avoir dans l’imagination des signes qui y repondent, comme sont les lettres et les characteres. Il n’y a jamais un entendement si pur qu’il ne soit point accompagné de quelque imagination.” “Théodicée”; GP VI,179: “Si elle [une Creature intelligente] n’avoit que pensées distinctes, ce seroit un Dieu […].” Cf. “Nouveaux essais” I, 1, § 5; A VI, 6, 77: “[…] c’est par une admirable Oeconomie de la nature, que nous ne saurions avoir des pensées abstraites, qui n’ayent point besoin de quelque chose de sensible, quand ce ne seroit que des caracteres tels que sont les figures des lettres et les sons, quoiqu’il n’y ait aucune connexion necessaire entre tels caracteres arbitraires, et telles pensées.” Ib. Cf. “Nouveaux essais” II, 21, § 73; A VI, 6, 212: “[…]je suis persuadé que les Anges et les Esprits crées ne sont jamais sans organes et jamais sans sensations, comme ils ne sauroient raisonner sans caracteres.” D. Rutherford: “Phenomenalism and the Reality of Body in Leibniz’s later Philosophy”, in: Studia Leibnitiana 22/1 (1990), p. 12–13 and 26–27.

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ads. For an intelligent being that would have nothing but distinct thoughts would be God. Just as, on the other hand, it is a fact for Leibniz, that: “Wherever there is a mixture of confused thoughts there are senses and matter“ (“Aussitost qu’il y a un melange de pensées confuses, voilà les sens, voilà la matiere”)56. 5. LEIBNIZ: REALIST OR IDEALIST? The above explanations may urge again the inveterate question of whether Leibniz in the end turns out to be either realist or rather idealist. In other papers of this conference it has been pointed out, and I agree, that Leibniz is advocating some kind of reductionism. Of course, it is not a materialist reductionism according to which the mind and mental phenomena are just an epiphenomenon of matter. What Leibniz advocates is rather an immaterialist reductionism according to which matter is just an epiphenomenon of … – well, of what, actually? At this point it is of crucial importance to be precise and not to say “of mind”. For that would make Leibniz a mental reductionist or an idealist in the style of Berkeley for whom besides God only minds or selfconsciously thinking intellectual things existed; which certainly is not the case for Leibniz. It is true that all actions and processes in the world can be ultimately reduced to perceptions and appetitions of simple substances or monads57; however, when we have to tell what is real for Leibniz, the protagonists of that story cannot be just minds or spiritual monads. The total population of monads is far more diverse and includes also, in infinite gradations, non–rational, inconscious or ‘nude’ monads. Even though their precise function within the framework of Leibniz’s metaphysics may not to be determined easily, it seems to have, in any case, something to do with the fact that, different from the traditional conception, the relation of soul and body in Leibniz is not a one–to–one relation but rather essentially a one–to–many relation, or (as we have seen in the beginning) a relation of unity to multitude implying that any multitude itself is the result of many unities. Thus, for monads to have a body is ultimately not simply reducible to their having confused perceptions; rather, for a certain monad x to sense bodies and to have a body is a matter of certain other monads being related to x’s perceptions in a certain – harmonic – way, a relation that would not exist if all monads were selfconscious spiritual monads. In that point Leibniz’s system significantly differs from Berkeley’s. If the minds or “thinking things” were eliminated from the Berkeley – world nothing but God would remain. In contrast thereto, in the Leibniz – universe an elimination of all spiritual monads would leave the corporeal world mostly unaffected as that what it was before: the infinite complex result of perceptions and appetitions of infinitely many monads, even though there would be no intelligent specators anymore who could notice the rational laws and beauty of that world. 56 57

“Théodicée” § 124; GP VI, 179. Leibniz to N. Remond, July 1714; GP III, 623: “Il n’y a point d’action des substances que les perceptions et les appetits, toutes les autres actions sont phenomenes comme tous les autres agissans.”

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Even though the issue of labeling a philosophical system according to a certain ‘ism’ is merely of second-rate importance, one may ask: provided that Leibniz is neither a materialist or realist58 nor an idealist in the common understanding – what is he and how to call him? Considering that it was no one else but Leibniz himself who coined the label of ‘idealism’ as opposed to ‘materialism’ (or, to be precise: of ‘idealist’ as opposed to ‘materialist’) and that he did so for no other reason than to claim that what is good in the contrary hypotheses of materialism and idealism (i. e. in Epicure and Plato) is reunited in his metaphysics of preestablished harmony59, it is quite likely that he, rather than approving the labels of idealist or realist, would have prefered the one given to him by Christian Wolff: “Harmonist”60.

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The two labelsof “realist” and “materialist” which, of course, cannot be identified in general are closely related in the present case insofar as the qualification of Leibniz as realist intends to ascribe to him the acceptance of a soul–independend existence of corporeal entities. “Reponse aux reflexions contenues dans la seconde Edition du Dictionnaire Critique de M. Bayle, article Rorarius, sur le systeme de l’Harmonie préétablie”; GP IV, 560: “l’Harmonie preétablie […] fait voir que ce qu’il y a de bon dans les hypotheses d’Epicure et de Platon, des plus grands Materialistes et des plus grands Idealistes, se reunit icy.” Christian Wolff in his Psychologia rationalis methodo scientifica pertractata (Frankfurt and Leipzig 1734, p. 562, § 627) explains: “Harmonista dicitur, qui systemate harmoniae praestabilitae utitur in explicando commercio inter animam atque corpus intercedente” – and holds: “[…] ideo Leibnitius quam maxime Harmonista dici debeat.”

THE UNEXAMINED WORLD IS NOT WORTH CREATING: LEIBNIZ ON HOW RATIONAL MINDS MATTER FOR UNIVERSAL HARMONY Edward W. Glowienka As is well known, Leibniz’s theory of creation turns on the idea that God, in his infinite wisdom and goodness, creates the best of all possible worlds. When further characterizing this optimal world, Leibniz turns to the idea of harmony; the optimal world is at the same time the most harmonious of possible worlds. Leibniz affirms the connection between worldly perfection and harmony throughout his writings. He writes in the Théodicée of 1710 that God’s “works are the most harmonious it is possible to conceive,”1 but he also writes in his much earlier account of creation, the Confessio Philosophi of 1672–3, that all minds – including the divine mind – delight in harmony2. To take one example from the intervening years, Leibniz remarks in De libertate et necessitate of 1680–4(?) that God’s knowledge of things not geometrically necessary follows from the harmony governing the created world3. Clearly for Leibniz, the choiceworthiness of the optimal world lies in its harboring the highest possible degree of harmony. What’s more, Leibniz insists that the harmony of the universe maximizes not just metaphysical perfection, but also moral perfection. That is, the best, most harmonious of all possible worlds is that which provides for the greatest happiness for creatures, most especially rational creatures. Leibniz writes in the Discours de métaphysique “that God, who always aims for the greatest perfection in general, will pay the greatest attention to minds and will give them the greatest perfection that universal harmony can allow, not only in general, but to each of them in particular.”4 In this paper, I want to revisit the longstanding question of the connection between the metaphysical and moral dimensions of Leibniz’s theory of universal harmony. How is it that the constitution of the optimal, most harmonious world guarantees the happiness of the beings which inhabit it? Viewed in one way, this question is 1 2 3 4

See, for example, “Essais de Théodicée”; GP VI, 137; quoted from Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Problem of Evil, trans. by E. M. Huggard, London 1952 [= T], p. 157. “Confessio Philosophi”; A VI, 3, 116; quoted from Confessio Philosophi:Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671–1678, ed. by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., New Haven 2005 [= CP], p. 29. A VI, 4, 1448. “que Dieu qui va toujours à la plus grande perfection en general, aura le plus de soin des esprits, et leur donnera non seulement en general, mais mêmes à chacun en particulier le plus de perfection que l’harmonie universelle sauroit permettre.” A VI, 4, 1586; quoted from G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, ed. by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis 1989, [= AG], p. 67.

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not so difficult. As early as the Elementa juris naturalis of 1669–71, Leibniz defines pleasure as the perception of harmony5. If one measures pleasure and happiness in terms of harmony, then it follows that the most harmonious possible world best leads to happiness. Yet there is, so it seems to me, a more integral way to view the relationship between the structure of the most harmonious universe and the well-being of rational creatures. To see this requires that we pay less attention to harmony’s aesthetic appeal and more attention to harmony’s role as a metaphysical principle. My claim is that Leibniz defines harmony in such a way that incorporeal, self-reflexive, rational minds are the foremost elements of creation, all else being directed to their flourishing. It is no mere coincidence that rational creatures find happiness in a maximally harmonious world; it is not the case that their happiness supervenes ex post facto upon the creation of an otherwise harmonious order. Rather, harmony, as Leibniz defines it, simply cannot be maximized in the absence of happy minds. Rational minds are necessary to maximizing harmony; they are the metaphysical building blocks of the best of all possible worlds. In them, Leibniz grounds the co-attaining of the world’s metaphysical and moral perfection. In Part I of what follows, I look to how the necessary existence of minds follows from Leibniz’s conception of universal harmony, focusing particularly on his Parisian writings from 1675–6 (De summa rerum). In Part II, I consider whether this interpretation of universal harmony is in accord with two features integral to Leibniz’s mature conception of the best possible world, viz. the theory of preestablished harmony and the principle of continuity. Throughout the paper, my goal is to show how Leibniz’s take on the world’s metaphysical harmony supports his claims regarding its moral perfection. I Universal harmony and the need for minds In Leibniz’s account of creation, harmony provides the metric by which God evaluates innumerable sets of possible beings, with an eye towards creating that world which best reflects his perfection. Leibniz accordingly defines harmony in terms of plenitude and simplicity, the former meant to reflect divine infinitude, the latter divine unity. Determining how Leibniz conceives of the relationship between plenitude and simplicity is thus the first task for any account of his theory of universal harmony, and on this issue interpretations fall into two main camps. The first – whose members include Nicholas Rescher6, Gregory Brown7, and more recently Markku Roinila8 – holds that harmony is not itself a unified criterion of perfection, 5 6 7 8

See, for example, A VI, 2, 484. N. Rescher: Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Nature, Dordrecht 1981, Ch. 1. G. Brown: “Compossibility, Harmony, and Perfection in Leibniz”, in: The Philosophical Review 96/2 (1987), pp. 173–203. M. Roinila: Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making. (= Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki, No. 16. 2007), Ch. 1.

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but rather a ratio between the two sub-criteria, viz. the variety of phenomena and the simplicity of the world, with simplicity being defined in terms of lawfulness and order. In Rescher’s terms, Leibniz puts forth a model of creation in which “two operative factors are opposed to one another and pull in opposite directions.”9 The criteria of variety and simplicity are said to be “conflict-admitting” and increase in inverse proportion to each other. The significance of the idea of harmony for Leibniz, then, is that it signals God’s wisdom in striking an optimal balance between these competing factors. The second camp – led by David Blumenfeld10 and Donald Rutherford11 – while of course not denying that Leibniz analyzes harmony in terms of the twin criteria of variety and simplicity, argues that Leibniz’s account of creation nonetheless contains a unified criterion of perfection. Harmony is seen not as the upshot of divergent, conflicting criteria, but rather a coherent criterion in its own right. In Rutherford’s view, Leibniz operates with a kind of summum bonum theory of creation, in which order does not conflict with, but rather leads to, variety and therefore maximizes perfection12. In this section, I will advance a version of the unified-criterion, non-conflict-admitting, interpretation. My novel gloss on this approach is to insist that we not look primarily to the relationship between maximal perfection and simple laws, but rather to the relationship between maximal perfection and simple beings. I take as my starting point for this interpretation the papers collected under the title De summa rerum, written in Paris in 1675–6. Though later texts flesh out Leibniz’s argument in important ways, De summa rerum is where Leibniz most clearly demonstrates 1) that simplicity and plenitude coincide perfectly in the case of incorporeal, self-reflexive beings and 2) that these beings are those through whom the harmony of the world is maximized. On my reading, Leibniz’s remarks on the nature of the mind provide the key for understanding harmony as a unified criterion of perfection. In turn, it is the centrality of minds in Leibniz’s account of creation that most clearly reveals the connection between the metaphysical and moral dimensions of Leibniz’s theory of harmony. In the De summa rerum papers Leibniz recasts – and to my judgment improves upon – his fundamental understanding of universal harmony13. Before writing these manuscripts, Leibniz had defined harmony as “identity compensated by diversity” or “diversity compensated by identity” and by various equivalent expressions14. 9 10 11 12 13

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Rescher, 10–11. D. Blumenfeld and D. Rutherford: “Perfection and Happiness in the Best Possible World,” in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. ed. by Nicholas Jolley, Cambridge 1995. Rutherford, Donald: Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, New York 1995, Ch. 2. Rutherford, 23–4. Here I assert that there is development in Leibniz’s thinking about harmony, but I cannot lay out a full case for this position. To state my position briefly, I am of the opinion that Leibniz’s conversations with Tschirnhaus and his study of Spinozism in Paris force him to recast his definition of harmony. For “identitatem diversitate compensatam/pensatem,” see A VI, 1, 474, 475, 477 For “diversitas identitate compensata” see A VI, 1, 484; A VI, 2, 283; A II, 1, 174. Leibniz also uses a

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In De summa rerum, though, Leibniz revises this definition in two key ways. The first is that he defines diversity, or plenitude, more precisely as the maximization of the quantity of essence. “After due consideration, I take as a principle the harmony of things: that is, that the greatest amount of essence that can exist, does exist.”15 Leibniz no longer measures harmony by the mere diversity or variety of a collection of things, but in a more determinate, quantifiable way according to the essence or perfection of things. Secondly, Leibniz recasts the relationship between plenitude and identity/ simplicity. Instead of presenting the maximization of essence as something which requires compensation in simplicity, Leibniz contends that such maximization of essence depends upon simple beings in the first place. (A) For out of infinitely many possibles, some are the simplest; but the simplest are those which provide the most. The reason for this is that there is no reason that limits the rest. Harmony is just this: a certain simplicity in multiplicity. Beauty and pleasure also consist in this. So for things to exist is the same as for them to be understood by God to be the best, i. e., the most harmonious.16

Though Leibniz’s defining harmony here as “simplicity in multiplicity” might appear yet another reiteration of “identity compensated by diversity,” with his remark that “the simplest are those which provide the most,” he suggests more than he had in earlier discussions of harmony, viz., he posits a mutual obtaining of simplicity and maximization. Simplicity and the maximization of essence are not – pace Rescher – two conflict-admitting criteria, but rather mutually-engendering aspects of a maximally harmonious order. Yet if we are to accept De summa rerum’s endorsement of the single criterion approach to Leibnizian harmony, Leibniz must prove that simplicity and the maximization of essence indeed coincide. This in turn requires that he identify the simple beings which “provide the most.” On the latter point, Leibniz in several passages indicates that his paradigm of simplicity is the self-reflexive activity of thinking beings. (B) The simplest thing is that which thinks that it thinks itself; and thinking is absolute when that which thinks itself is all things.17

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number of equivalent expressions to define harmony in his pre-Paris years. These include “similitudo in dissimilibus” (A II, 1, 98) and “unitas plurimorum” (A VI, 2, 283). “Recte expensis rebus, pro principio statuo, Harmoniam rerum, id est, ut quantum plurimum essentiae potest existat.” “De Summa Rerum”; A VI, 3, 472; quoted from De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, 1675–1676, trans. by G. H. R. Parkinson, New Haven 1992, [= DSR], p. 21. Cf. A VI, 3, 582. “Nam ex infinitis possibilibus sunt quaedam simplicissima, sed simplicissima quae plurimum praestant. Cuius rei ratio est, quia nulla est ratio quae ceatera determinet. Harmonia hoc ipsum est, simplicitas quaedam in multitudine. Et in eo consistit pulchritudo et voluptas. Itaque res existere idem est, quod a Deo intelligi optimas, sive maxime ἁρμονικάς.” A VI 3, 587–588, quoted from DSR, p. 113. “Simplicissimum est, id quo cogitat cogitare se ipsum; et cogitatio absoluta est, cum id quod cogitat se ipsum, omnia est.” A VI, 3, 518; quoted from DSR, p. 75.

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(C) The harmony of things requires that there should be in bodies beings which act on themselves. On the nature of a being that acts on itself: it acts by the simplest means, for in that there is harmony.18

That Leibniz would point to minds as paragons of simplicity is no real surprise; his earliest attempts to ground the motion of bodies in incorporeal principles likened minds to points19. What requires explanation at this point, then, is how minds, by the simple activity of acting on themselves, produce the maximization of essence which the principle of harmony requires. I am aware of three strategies Leibniz offers for answering this question. The first is to make self-reflexivity the ally of compossibility. If the self-reflexivity Leibniz locates in rational minds is meant to contrast with activity which hinders the existence and operations of other beings, then simple beings “provide for the most” negatively by non-interference: the less interference between beings, the greater the number of compossible entities which can exist in the world and the greater the potential for maximal essence. Leibniz uses this line of reasoning, for example, a decade later in § 36 of the Discours de métaphysique, noting that the perfections of rational beings “interfere with each other the least,” since one’s knowledge does not prevent others from advancing in knowledge20. The importance of non-interference notwithstanding, compossibility does not exhaust the significance of simplicity. Note that in passages B and C Leibniz describes simplicity not only as a relation of non-obstruction between beings, but also as a property of a single being, namely the ability to act on itself. Defining simplicity in this way allows Leibniz to argue that simplicity effects the maximization of essence in the world in a way compossibility alone does not. Simplicity involves compossibility but cannot be reduced to it. Key here is the maximization of essence. If the harmony of the universe required no more than the sheer variety of substances, and if simplicity meant no more than non-obstruction and compossibility, then little would need explaining; of course simple things produce the most variety, for it is the very compossbility with variety which makes them simple. The requirement that harmony maximize essence makes Leibniz’s story, by contrast, more complex. Leibniz provides two subtler strategies for explaining how minds maximize essence, ways which reveal more distinctly the contribution of rational beings to universal harmony. In De summa rerum, Leibniz suggests that self-reflexivity itself serves to maximize essence. He observes that minds are by their very nature – to put it roughly – essence amplifiers. They amplify essence in their ability to multiply their own knowledge – or, what is the same, their own essence and perfec18 19 20

“Exigit harmonia rerum, ut essent in corporibus quae agerent in se ipsa. De natura entis in se ipsum agentis. Agit per simplicissima; in eo enim est harmonia.” A VI, 3, 588; quoted from DSR, p. 113. See, for instance, the fourth and eighteenth praedemonstrabilia fundamenta of the Theoria motus abstracti (1670–71?), A VI, 2, 264, 266–7. “En effect les Esprits sont les substances les plus perfectionnables, et leur perfections ont cela de paticulier qu’elles s’entrempechent le moins, ou plustost qu’elles s’entraident, car les plus vertueux pourront seuls estre les plus parfaits amis.” A VI, 4, 1586, quoted from AG, p. 67.

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tion – through introspection. Relying on what appears to be a version of the KK principle – if one knows p, then one knows that one knows p – Leibniz speaks of the “tripling of reflection” [triplicationem reflexionis] which obtains when we think about our thinking then later recall this self-reflexive act. The following operation of the mind seems to me to be most wonderful: namely, when I think that I am thinking, and in the middle of my thinking I note that I am thinking about my thinking, and a little later I wonder at this tripling of reflection. Next I also notice that I am wondering and in some way I wonder at this wonder, and fixed in one contemplation I return more and more into myself, alternately as it were, and elevate my mind through my thoughts.21

This passage suggests that minds contribute more essence than non-rational beings not only because the former perform the highest kind of activity, thinking, but also because they can multiply what knowledge they have through contemplative introspection. This, I take it, is how we bridge Leibniz’s comment in passage C – “on the nature of a being that acts on itself: it acts by the simplest means, for in that there is harmony” – with his remark in passage A that God chooses the simplest means to achieve a maximal result. Self-reflexive beings are the engines, so to speak, of universal harmony because in their simple activity they multiply the sum total perfection in the world. What’s more, because self-reflexive beings amplify essence through action on themselves, minds can maximize their own essence without preventing other minds from doing the same. They offer, to recall Leibniz’s remark from passage B, “no reason that limits the rest.” Simple beings do admit a high degree of compossibility, in other words, but it is not their being compossible which chiefly serves to maximize essence. It is rather their ability to “elevate [their minds] through their thoughts.” One might doubt that what Leibniz describes as a “tripling of reflection” in fact amounts to a real increase in knowledge, instead seeing contemplation as a mere reiteration of knowledge already possessed. A possible, partial rejoinder to such skepticism can be found in Leibniz’s later works, particularly in Monadologie § 30 where Leibniz puts forth a third strategy for explaining how self-reflexive activity increases perfection. Here – and in a similar argument in the Nouveaux Essais22 – Leibniz claims that the mind’s ability to think itself is the condition upon which all metaphysical thought is based. By virtue of its ability to grasp necessary truths, the mind proceeds from immediate knowledge of itself to “think of being, of substance, of the simple and the composite, of the immaterial, and of God himself, by conceiving that that which is limited in us is limitless in him.”23 That is, the mind through 21

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“Operatio mentis maxime mira mihi illa videtur, cum cogito me cogitare, et inter cogitandum, hoc ipsum jam noto, quod de cogitatione mea cogitem, et paulo post miror hanc triplicationem reflexionis: mox et me mirari advert, et nescio quomodo miror ipsam admirationem, obtutuque defixus in uno, velut per vicem magis magisque in me redeo, et saepe cogitations ipse meas animum elevo.” A VI, 3, 516; quoted from DSR, p. 73. “Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain”; A VI, 5, 86; quoted from New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge 1996 [= NE], p. 86. “C’est aussi par la connoissance des verities necessaries et par leur abstractions, que nous sommes élevés aux Actes reflexifs, qui nous font penser à ce qui s’appelle Moy, et à considerer que cecy ou cela est en Nous: et c’est ainsi, qu’en pensant à nous, nous pensons à l’Etre, à la

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reflection grasps that it is (being), that it subsists (substance), that it holds together in unity diverse perceptions (simplicity and composition), and that such diversity in unity is only possible in an unextended being (immateriality). These thoughts in turn open the possibility of the idea of God, a simple, immaterial being who is all things and knows all things. Since, as Leibniz notes, “these reflective acts furnish the principle objects of our reasoning,”24 we see that the simple, self-reflexive activity of rational beings increases the quantity of essence in the world by making possible great increases in sum total knowledge. Combined, these three consequences of the self-reflexivity of rational minds – their non-interference with other beings, their contemplative capacities, and their capacity for metaphysical thought – allow minds to be the paradigm for how simplicity and plenitude coincide. Leibniz’s principle of harmony, therefore – as a unified criterion of perfection – mandates the creation of rational beings. We can thus explain the reasoning behind his claim in De summa rerum that “the harmony of things requires that there should be in bodies beings which act on themselves.”25 Without rational beings, the maximal harmony of the world could not obtain. This is how rational minds matter for universal harmony. From metaphysical to moral perfection To this point, I have argued for the centrality of rational minds to Leibniz’s vision of the best, most harmonious possible world, yet I have done so solely in metaphysical terms, i. e., by focusing on the substantial simplicity of minds and their ability to amplify essence. The connection between the metaphysical perfection of the world and its moral perfection remains to be made. In order to make this connection, let me remark briefly on what other consequences for creation Leibniz’s conception of harmony has. From what has been said thus far, we might be tempted to conclude that the principle of harmony mandates not merely the creation of rational minds, but the creation of infinitely many rational minds. Assuming the identity of indiscernables, each mind is unique in its quantity of perfection26. So, positing the existence of any given mind, m1, God finds that granting existence to a second mind, m2, both increases the overall perfection of the whole – since each mind has knowledge of itself, these selves are distinct, and thus the overall amount of essence in the world increases – and is not obstructed by the existence of m1. Similarly, positing the existence of m1 and m2, God finds it more harmonious to grant existence to a third mind, m3, and so on.

24 25 26

substance, au simple ou au compose, à la immaterial et à Dieu meme, en concevant que ce qui est borne en nous, est en luy sans bornes. Et ces Actes Reflexifs fournissent les objects principaux de nos raisonnemens.” GP VI, 612; quoted from AG, p. 217. Ibid. A VI, 3, 588; quoted from DSR, p. 113. See note 18, above. In De summa rerum, Leibniz treats the identity of indiscernibles in a tract entitled “Meditatio de principio individui,” A VI, 3, N. 67.

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At this point, two issues arise. The first is textual, for the scope of the claim that “there should be in bodies beings which act on themselves” is unclear. Is Leibniz arguing that in the most harmonious universe all bodies must have “beings which act on themselves” or only some bodies, insofar as the most harmonious universe could not entirely lack self-reflexive beings? Given the context surrounding the passage, Leibniz appears to limit self-reflexivity to at least sentient, if not rational, beings. So, we should read Leibniz as endorsing here only the more limited claim that the most harmonious world cannot lack rational beings27. But this conclusion only forces a second, more philosophical difficulty upon us. If, due to their simplicity, God could create infinitely many self-reflexive creatures, yet we have reason to suspect that not every creature in this (most harmonious) world is sentient, let alone rational, the question then becomes: why create anything other than rational beings in creation? Fortunately, Leibniz addresses this question, if only indirectly, in De summa rerum. We perceive many things in our mind, such as thinking or perceiving, perceiving oneself, perceiving oneself to be the same, perceiving pleasure and pain, perceiving time or duration. Pleasure seems to come from thinking of many things, or, from the transition to perfection. Happiness itself consists in the continual transition to greater perfection.28

Leibniz here observes that what I have described as the maximizing capability of self-reflexive beings is only fully exercised when said beings progressively add to their stores of knowledge. Minds maximize their essence, knowledge, and perfection when, in the simple activity of thinking themselves, they at the same time think multiple things, and ideally all things. Thus, in response to our question, the reason to include non-rational beings in creation is this: their creation adds to the overall harmony of the universe by increasing the number of entities which can be known to those rational beings which are created. To have the greatest possible harmony requires the creation of beings at various levels of perfection for cognizing minds to know. In fact – as Leibniz elsewhere argues on the basis of the principle of continuity – God creates beings at every level of perfection, leaving no gaps in nature, and effecting the greatest quantity of essence29. Moreover, universal harmony requires not only that the world contain a variety of objects to be known, but also that it be arranged in such a way that it is maximally 27

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It is of course evident in many texts that Leibniz believes that all bodies require an incorporeal, mind-like principle; it is likewise evident that he employs the principle of harmony in De summa rerum to justify the creation of innumerably many minds (See: A VI, 3, 473, 477). The issue here, however, is the creation not of minds in general, but of higher order (sentient and rational) minds. In what follows I shall speak only of rational beings, since I believe the primary question to be answered is what limits the creation of them. “Plura a nobis percipiuntur in Mente nostra, ut: cogitare seu percipere, percipere se ipsum, percipere se esse eundem; percipere voluptatem et dolorem. Percipere tempus seu durationem. Voluptas videtur venire ex plurium cogitatione, seu transitu ad perfectionem.” A VI, 3, 518; quoted from DSR, p. 76. Emphasis mine. See G. W. Leibniz – Hauptschriften zur der Grundlegung der Philosophie, ed. by E. Cassirer, trans. by A. Buchenau, Hamburg 1966 [= BC], Band II, p. 558. And Leibniz: Selections. Edited by Philip Weiner, New York 1951, [= W], pp. 186–7. Full citation at note 43, below. Also quoted in Rutherford, 30.

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intelligible. Since the beings most conducive to a harmonious world are rational minds, the most harmonious world must be one that is epistemically hospitable to them30. That is, the world must be suited to their examination and contemplation of it, for otherwise they could not perform their essential task of maximizing essence. An unintelligible and thus unexamined world would not be worth creating. Having established the fact that harmony requires a maximally intelligible world, we are now in position to spell out the connection between metaphysical and moral perfection. Since – according to Leibniz – happiness increases in proportion to knowledge, the universe which is maximally intelligible is ipso facto the one most suited to the happiness of rational beings. Hence, we can draw a line from Leibniz’s remarks on the constitution of the most harmonious universe to his assertion that this world at the same time affords maximal possible happiness. In short: harmony requires minds, who in turn require a maximally intelligible world to contemplate; the requirement of a maximally intelligible world guarantees opportunities for the happiness of rational creatures in that world. By way of the necessity of rational minds for universal harmony, therefore, we can see how the metaphysical and moral perfection of the created world coincide. The importance of intelligibility for the maximization of worldly perfection is something which has been stressed by Rutherford31. What I hope to have drawn out in this discussion is Leibniz’s argument for the necessity of rational beings, given his conception of harmony. For Leibniz, incorporeal, self-reflexive rational beings are the centerpieces, the sine qua non, of a maximally harmonious universe. It is not the sheer variety of beings which maximizes the quantity of essence in the world, but the fact that such variety is contemplated by, and redounded in, minds. The world’s intelligibility, in other words, contributes to its perfection by accommodating the intellectual and contemplative activities of rational agents. There is, to be sure, much theological significance to this idea. As Leibniz notes in Monadologie § 83, it is the ability of minds to recreate “schematic representations” [échantillons architectoniques] of the world in thought which renders them the images of God32. Given this theological perspective, it might seem odd for me to insist that minds, themselves substances, are the means to achieve God’s desire for harmony. In portraying minds as a means to some further desideratum, am I not compromising their theological and moral significance? Though I began in this section with God’s desire for harmony and came to the creation of rational minds as the 30

31 32

It is with regard to what I here call epistemic hospitability that the importance of simple laws for Leibniz’s theory of universal harmony becomes relevant. Explaining exactly what import Leibniz’s conception of harmony has for his depiction of the lawfulness and intelligibility of nature is beyond the scope of the present paper. Though we are not in agreement on all particulars, Blumenfeld, offers a promising approach to this issue. A complete picture of the epistemic hospitability of the most harmonious world would also take into account Leibniz’s position on the “two realms” of efficient and final causality. On Leibniz’s defense of final causes, see McDonough, Jeffrey K.: “Leibniz's Two Realms Revisited”, in: Nôus 42 (4): 673–696, 2008 and “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Laws of Optics.”, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3): 505–544, 2009. Rutherford, Ch. 2. GP VI, 621; quoted from AG, p. 223.

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means to it, I believe that in the end there is no problem here, for I take it as a mark of the sophistication of Leibniz’s position that these two ends – the creation of maximal harmony and the concern for rational creatures – cannot be separated. The best world is the most harmonious, is the most conducive to minds and their moral perfection. II I have pointed to De summa rerum as providing Leibniz’s basic understanding of universal harmony. I now wish to turn to the philosophy of the late Leibniz to see whether the interpretation of harmony I have outlined is consistent with Leibniz’s mature metaphysics. Specifically, I will consider the compatibility between Leibniz’s vision of universal harmony and two ideas which are given special prominence in his late writings: the theory of preestablished harmony and the principle of continuity. From universal harmony to preestablished harmony In the writings of the late Leibniz, the idea of harmony figures most prominently in the theory of preestablished harmony, which accounts for the causal relations between substances and between mind and body. In this section, I will take up two questions germane to Leibniz’s theory of preestablished harmony. The first concerns the connection between Leibniz’s notion of universal harmony and the thesis of preestablished harmony. By his own account, Leibniz’s commitment to preestablished harmony follows as a consequence of his more global belief in harmony as an architectonic principle. As he recounts in the Théodicée: “Being on other considerations already convinced of the principle of Harmony in general, I was in consequence convinced likewise of the preformation and the Preestablished Harmony of all things among themselves.”33 Leibniz’s assertion is that from a universal principle of harmony, one is led to a particular brand of inter-substantial harmony. While such a deduction from universal to particular certainly seems plausible, the truth is that Leibniz provides no direct argument for why an endorsement of harmony qua principle of creation necessarily entails harmony qua account of all causal relations. My first task in this section will be to show that the interpretation of harmony arrived at in our reading of De summa rerum provides the needed link between these two theses, Leibniz’s principle of harmony laying the groundwork for his endorsement of preestablished harmony. After having considered how the theory of preestablished harmony follows from Leibniz’s account of the world’s metaphysical perfection, I shall revisit in light of preestablished harmony the question of the world’s moral perfection. I wish to point out that the success and appeal of the theory of preestablished harmony owe in large part to its securing the maximal possible perfection and happiness 33

GP VI, 136; quoted from T, p. 157.

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for rational minds. That is, the hypothesis of preestablished harmony secures the connection between metaphysical and moral perfection that Leibniz’s conception of universal harmony demands. The theory of preestablished harmony is a combination of two hypotheses. The first, spontaneity, holds that each state of a created substance follows as a direct consequence of its preceding state, with direct here meaning that the effect obtains without the causal influence of another created substance. The second hypothesis, parallelism, holds that the states of all created substances agree with one another perfectly at each moment34. It is important to stress that preestablished harmony requires both of these hypotheses and does not merely posit parallelism, or correspondence, between substances. Though the idea of spontaneity does not have its origin in Leibniz’s concern for harmony – it can be traced more directly to Leibniz’s complete concept, superessentialist notion of individual substance35 – spontaneity is nonetheless needed to put the harmony, so to speak, in preestablished harmony. By Leibniz’s lights, parallelism alone cannot produce a maximally harmonious order. In what way does preestablished harmony require both parallelism and spontaneity? In combining these theses, I want to suggest, Leibniz preserves in his theory of preestablished harmony the same conceit regarding the co-implication of simplicity and maximization which we saw in his theory of universal harmony. Parallelism alone can guarantee that each substance expresses all others, where expression means that “there exists a constant and fixed relationship between what can be said of one [thing] and of the other.”36 Such mutual expression brings unity to a diverse set of substances and might therefore be deemed harmonious in a weak sense, but it does not itself fulfill Leibniz’s more concrete criterion of harmony. As we have seen, Leibniz’s conception of harmony requires that essence be maximized and additionally holds that such maximization occurs via the self-reflexive activity of simple beings. While not all substances within the preestablished order are self-reflexive, their spontaneity ensures that all beings are simple and mind-like in that they act on themselves or, more precisely, act from out of themselves. The parallelism between these simple substances allows them to contribute to the maximization of the quantity of essence in the cosmos. Each substance is a microcosm of the universe, expressing through its own power the activity of all other substances. In a February 1706 letter to Electress Sophie, Leibniz suggests that simple substances in preestablished harmony with one another amplify essence in a manner akin to what we saw in De summa rerum.

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In speaking of spontaneity and parallelism, I borrow the formulations of Mark Kulstad: “Causation and Preestablished Harmony in the Early Development of Leibniz’s Philosophy,” in: Causation in Early Modern Philosophy. ed. by Stephen Nadler, Pennsylvania 1993, pp. 96–97. See Generales Inquisitiones de Analysi Notionum et Veritatum, 1686. “Une chose exprime une autre (dans mon langage) lorsqu’il ya a un rapport constant et reglé entre ce qui se peut dire de l’une et de l’autre.” Leibniz to Arnauld 9 October 1687. A II, 2, 240; quoted from The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. by H. T. Mason, Manchester 1967 [= M], p. 144.

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The ability to amplify essence which rational beings achieve through their self-reflexive and contemplative activities is achieved – albeit in a less perfect way – by all creatures via their spontaneous expression of one another. Viewed in this way, the theory of preestablished harmony indeed appears to be the theory of causation which best accords with Leibniz’s conception of universal harmony. By focusing on the maximization of essence necessary for a truly harmonious order, Leibniz can cite God’s desire for a maximally harmonious order to privilege the theory of preestablished harmony over the theory of occasional causes, the latter which he himself acknowledges as the chief competing account of inter-substantial interaction. That is, insofar as occasionalism assigns no real causal efficacy to created beings – instead reducing creatures to being the passive loci for divine action38 – Leibniz can object that such an ordering contravenes God’s desire for harmony and attendant desire to maximize the quantity of essence in creation. In short, occasionalism fails to even bestow power on creation, let alone maximize it. Preestablished harmony, by contrast, fulfills God’s desire for harmony by maximizing essence via simple beings, each of which models to some extent the coincidence of simplicity and perfection of the divine essence.39 The foregoing considerations notwithstanding, the deduction of preestablished harmony from universal harmony to which Leibniz alludes in the Théodicée is not complete without a consideration of the relationship between preestablished harmony and the activity of rational beings. Since universal harmony seeks to maximize essence via simple beings, I would submit that the mirroring, or mutual expression, of substances amongst themselves – though it populates the world with simple beings – is of itself insufficient to furnish the maximal degree of harmony in the world. What is needed to complete the argument from universal harmony to preestablished harmony is the presence of rational, reflecting minds within the preestablished order of the world. We have already seen how rational beings, by cog37

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“Chaque Ame est un Monde en raccourci, representant les choses au dehors selon son point de vue, et confusement ou distinctement selon les organes qui l’accompagnent … Ainsi par les Ames comme par autant de miroirs l’auteur des choses a trouvé le moyen de multiplier l’univers meme ur ainsi dire.” Leibniz to Electress Sophie 6 February 1706. GP VII, 566–7, quoted from Leibniz and the Two Sophies: The Philosophical Correspondence, ed. and trans, by Lloyed Strickland, Toronto 2011 [= TS], p. 347. Cf. Monadologie §§ 56–8. Whether the occasionalist tradition in fact denies causal efficacy to finite creatures is a subtle and difficult question. Desmond Clarke lays out nicely the issues at stake and the positions of the principal figures. Leibniz, however, is of the opinion that occasionalism places exaggerated emphasis on creaturely dependence. See: D. Clarke: “Causal Powers and Occasionalism from Descartes to Malebranche”, in: Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, ed. by Gaukroger, Shuster, and Sutton, New York 2002), pp. 131–148. For a related account of why Leibniz prefers preestablished harmony to occasionalism, see D. Rutherford: “Natures, Laws, and Miracles: The Roots of Leibniz’s Critique of Occasionalism”, in: Causation in Early Modern Philosophy. ed. by Stephen Nadler. Pennsylvania 1993.

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nizing their world, add to its harmony. Preestablished harmony, I am here claiming, follows from universal harmony precisely because it is the order most conducive to real advances in knowledge and well-being. The question, then, is: in what way does preestablished harmony increase the world’s intelligibility? Recall Leibniz’s statement in De summa rerum that “the simplest thing is that which thinks that it thinks itself; and thinking is absolute when that which thinks itself is all things.”40 Of course, only God contains all perfections and only divine thought is absolute, but the system of preestablished harmony brings each rational being closer to this kind of absolute thinking than does any other causal hypothesis. Since each being expresses every other substance and event in the universe, each person can, by reflecting on him/herself, come to an awareness of the entire world. Though much of this awareness will be limited, consisting in obscure and confused ideas, at the very least we can say that preestablished harmony greatly increases the potential of our self-reflexive abilities. In many cases, of course, these potential gains in knowledge are actualized. The appeal, then, of preestablished harmony is that it makes knowledge more readily available to rational beings, which increases their essence and ultimately serves to increase their well-being. In the absence of simple, rational minds, such maximization of essence would not obtain. This is how rational minds matter not only for achieving universal harmony in general, but also for accounting for the choiceworthiness of preestablished harmony in particular, both from the metaphysical and moral points of view. Before concluding our discussion of preestablished harmony, let me note that Leibniz does provide an alternative, simpler argument for how preestablished harmony provides for the happiness of rational beings than the one I have laid out. This alternative argument relies not on the intelligibility of the world, but on the consolation provided by immortality. In the Système nouveau de la nature, for example, after commenting on the incorruptibility of all animals, he writes: However, rational souls follow much higher laws, and are exempt from anything that might make them lose the quality of being citizens of the society of minds; God has provided so well that no changes of matter can make them lose the moral qualities of personhood. And we can say that everything tends not only to the perfection of the universe in general, but also toward the perfection of these creatures in particular, creatures who are destined to such a degree of happiness that the universe finds itself benefitted by virtue of the divine goodness that is communicated to each, to the extent the supreme wisdom can allow.41

Here, Leibniz makes the case that because the preestablished harmony of mind and body locates the being of each thing in its primitive active force which (for lack 40 41

A VI, 3, 518; quoted from DSR, p. 75. For Latin text, see note 17, above “Cependant les Ames raisonnables suivent des loix bien plus relevées, et sont exemtes de tout ce qui leur pourroit faire perdre la qualité de citoyens de la societé des esprits, Dieu y ayant si bien pourveu, que tous les changemens de la matiere ne leur sҫauroient faire perdre les qualités morales de leur personalité. Et on peut dire que tout tend à la perfection non seulement de l’Univers en general, mais encore de ces creatures en particulier, qui sont destinées à un tel degré de Bonheur, que l’Univers s’y trouve interessé en vertu de la bonté divine qui se communique à un chacun autant que la souveraine Sagesse le peut permettre. GP IV, 481; quoted from AG, p. 141.

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of a better word) transcends the material realm, no physical change can corrupt or terminate a person’s life and moral status. Given the very real impact on happiness such consolation can have, this may seem a more direct way of accounting for how preestablished harmony serves the interest of rational minds than the account we have given. Should we depend so much, then, on Leibniz’s analysis of simplicity and maximization made in De summa rerum, penned relatively early in his career? While I would not want to deny the multitude of ways in which the created world might contribute to happiness, I nonetheless believe the connections we have drawn must be taken into account for two reasons. One, we have situated the benefits of preestablished harmony within Leibniz’s theory of universal harmony, showing how the happiness of minds follows as a consequence of God’s general desire for maximal harmony and that preestablished harmony is a means to this end. Two, we have seen that the existence and flourishing of rational minds is in fact a necessary prerequisite for maximizing harmony, not just an ex post facto, consolatory result of preestablished harmony. Harmony and continuity: compatible or competing? In the preceding sections, I have argued that both the metaphysical and moral perfection of the best possible world are accomplished by placing rational minds at the center of creation and designing all else for their sake. I have interpreted Leibniz’s conception of harmony and his theory of preestablished harmony as pointing directly to this fact. There is clear textual support for such an interpretation. Consider the following remark from the Specimen inventorum de admirandis naturae generalis arcanis of 1688(?): For as God himself is the King of Minds as well as the cause of things, and since he himself is a mind, he cultivates a special fellowship with them. In fact, since every single mind is an expression of the divine image … it is manifest that minds are the most important part of the universe, and everything has been established for their sake. In other words, in choosing the order of things, the greatest account was taken of minds and all things were so constructed that they would appear more beautiful the better they are understood … just as he sought the perfection of things, so he sought the happiness of minds.42

Leibniz here privileges the place of rational minds in unambiguous terms. Despite the existence of such passages, however, there is legitimate ambiguity regarding whether Leibniz can consistently hold such a view. In other words, it is unclear whether the interpretation of harmony I have outlined is truly consistent with the remainder of Leibniz’s late metaphysics. 42

“Est enim Deus ut causa rerum, ita Rex Mentium, et cum ipse mens sit, peculiarem cum illis societatem colit. Quin imo cum Mens unaquaeque sit diviniae imaginis expressio … manifestum est Mentes esse potissimam partem Universi, omniaque condita esse ipsarum causa, hoc est in eligendo ordine rerum maximam ipsarum habitam esse rationem, ita institutis omnibus ut tanto apparitura sint pulchriora, quanto magis intelligentur … quamadmodum perfectionem rerum, ita mentium felicitatem quaesitam esse.” A VI, 4, 1624; quoted from The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672–1686, edited by Richard T. W. Arthur, New Haven 2002, [= LC], p. 319.

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Particularly at issue is the principle of continuity. Though this principle is not original to Leibniz’s late metaphysics, it becomes especially apparent in Leibniz’s late writings that his commitment to continuity might rule out my interpretation of universal harmony. This is despite the fact that I showed in Part I how continuity could be used to support harmony, since harmony mandates the creation of creatures at every level of perfection for cognizing minds to know. The potential tension between these principles can be gleaned from a 1702 letter to Varignon, where Leibniz has the following to say about the consequences of the principle of continuity for creation: I think I have good reasons for believing that all the different classes of beings whose assemblage forms the universe are, in the ideas of God who knows distinctly their essential gradations, only like so many ordinates of the same curve whose unity does not allow us to place some other ordinates between two of them because that would be a mark of disorder and imperfection. Men are therefore related to animals, these to plants, and the latter directly to fossils … Now the Law of Continuity demands that when the essential determinations of one being approximate those of another, as a consequence, all the properties of the former should also gradually approximate those of the latter. Hence it is necessary that all the orders of natural beings form but a single chain in which different kinds like so many links clasp one another so firmly that it is impossible for the senses and imagination to fix the exact point where one begins or ends.43

Given that Leibniz here links the principle of continuity to the world’s perfection, the difficulty is this: on the one hand perfection implies continuity and the gradual transition between kinds of beings, yet on the other hand perfection implies harmony which, we have shown, posits a crucial and definite distinction between rational minds and the rest of creation. Which view more accurately reflects Leibniz’s considered view? It is tempting to favor the view which champions the distinctiveness of minds solely because of its theological value. Sections 83–86 of the Monadologie lay out the differences between minds and other ordinary souls, with the upshot that “the collection of all minds must make up the city of God, that is, the most perfect possible state under the most perfect of monarchs.”44 Still, while Leibniz is clearly committed to the idea that minds are the images of God, we should not settle the

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“Je pense donc avoir de bonnes raisons pour croire, que toutes les différentes classes des Etres, dont l’assemblage forme l’Univers, ne sont dans les idées de Dieu, qui connoit distinctement leurs gradations essentielles, que comme autant d’Ordonnées d’une même Courbe, dont l’union ne souffre pas qu’on en place d’autres entre deux, à cause que cela marqueroit de desordre et de l’imperfection. Les hommes tiennent donc aux animaux, ceux-ci aux plantes et celles-ci déréchef aux fossiles … Or puisque la loi de la Continuité exige, que, quand les déterminations essentielles d’un Etre se rapprochent de celles d’un autre, qu’aussi en conséquence toutes les proprieties du premier doivent s’approcher graduellement de celles du dernier, il est nécessaire, que tous les ordres des Etres naturels ne forment qu’une seule chaîne, dans laquelle les différentes classes, comme autant d’anneaux, tiennent si étroitement les unes aux autres, qu’il est impossible sens et à l’imagination de fixer précissement le point, où quelqu’une commence, ou finit.” BC II, p. 558; cf. W, p. 186–7. “l’assemblage de tous les Esprits doit composer le Cité de Dieu, c’est à dire le plus parfait état qui soit possible sous le plus parfait des Monarques.” GP VI, 621, quoted from AG, p. 224.

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question on this consideration alone, on pain of divorcing Leibniz the theologian committed to harmony from Leibniz the rationalist committed to continuity. Fortunately, I believe Leibniz leaves open a line of interpretation that does not force us to choose between the principle of continuity and the privileged status of rational beings. Note that in his remark to Varignon, Leibniz identifies as a necessary consequence of the principle of continuity that the senses and imagination be unable to mark the lines of demarcation between kinds of beings. He does not disqualify the intellect from being able to discern definite distinctions between classes of beings. Indeed it seems unlikely on other grounds that Leibniz ever would rule out the intellect’s drawing such distinctions. Consider: each individual substance in the Leibnizian cosmos differs essentially from all others, even if it is the case that spelling out this difference would require an infinite analysis. If the principle of continuity holds without compromising the intelligible distinctiveness of individual substances, I do not see why it would threaten real, fundamental distinctions between classes of beings. The plenitude of the world requires a chain of being with gradual transitions; while the discrete points of transition are not accessible to the senses or imagination, this does not entail the absence of conceptual distinctions. In fact, if the distinctions between beings were in principle unintelligible, this would threaten the very intelligibility of the world which both the principle of harmony and the principle of continuity are meant to ensure. Thus, my interpretation of Leibniz’s conception of harmony, which relies heavily on the distinctiveness of one kind of being, need not be seen as running afoul of Leibniz’s emphasis on the principle of continuity. As Leibniz writes to DeVolder on 30 June 1704, “the nature of things is uniform and our nature cannot differ infinitely from the other simple substances of which the whole world consists.”45 By positing an irreducible distinction between self-reflexive, contemplative minds and the remaining natural order, I do not believe we need posit the kind of infinite gap between our nature and other natures ruled out by the uniformity of nature. Indeed, we should find in nature beings which approach our level of perfection in myriad ways, some of which we may dub rational or cognitive. Nevertheless, Leibniz can maintain a definite and plausible distinction between self-reflexive, moral beings and the beings which approximate this level of perfection. Ultimately for our purposes, what is important in the relationship between the principles of continuity and harmony is not so much the mutual consistency between these two ideas as such, but the consequence this relationship has for Leibniz’s contention that the best possible world is at once metaphysically and morally optimal. I have argued in this paper that it is only in seeing the moral and intellectual perfection of rational minds as the very means of maximizing metaphysical perfection and harmony that Leibniz’s contention becomes clear. It is thus of crucial importance that the principle of continuity – which Leibniz aligns with metaphysical perfection – not conflict with the principle of harmony, which necessitates a world designed with regard to minds. 45

“… cum rerum natura sit uniformis nec ab aliis substantiis simplicibus ex quibus totum consistit Universum, nostra infinite differre possit.” GP II, 270, quoted from G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. by Leroy E. Loemker, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 537.

UNIVERSAL HARMONY AND THE UNITY OF A WORLD Donald Rutherford The concept of harmony appears early in Leibniz’s writings and remains one of the leading ideas that shape his philosophy1. Harmony, understood broadly as the intelligible ordering of a multiplicity of distinct beings, underlies Leibniz’s conception of the perfection of the world and of the divine intelligence that is the ground of that perfection2. As he writes in a 1715 letter to Christian Wolff, “Nothing is more regular than the divine intellect, which is the source of all rules, and produces the most regular, that is, the most perfect system of the world, the system that is as harmonious as possible.”3 To apprehend, as God does, the unity in multiplicity, the agreement in variety, is to perceive harmony – and this, Leibniz believes, is a motive for God to create harmony: “God, that is, the supreme mind, is endowed with perception, indeed to the greatest degree; otherwise he would not care about harmonies”4. No account of Leibniz’s philosophy, then, would be adequate if it did not assign a central place to the concept of harmony. Yet the interpretation of this concept is not without its challenges. The pervasiveness of the idea makes it difficult to know whether Leibniz has a single, unified theory of harmony, or whether his employment of the term is more opportunistic: harmony forms part of his answer to many philosophical questions, but all of these answers may not cohere tightly. At least four prominent doctrines employ the concept of harmony: the universal harmony 1

2

3 4

D. Mahnke: Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik, Halle, 1925; M. Mugnai: “Der Begriff der Harmonie als metaphysische Grundlage der Logik und Kombinatorik bei Johann Heinrich Bisterfed und Leibniz,” in: Studia Leibnitiana 5 (1973), pp. 43–73; T. Leinkauf: “‘Diversitas identitate compensata’: Ein Grundtheorem in Leibniz’ Denken und seine Voraussetzungen in der frühen Neuzeit,” Parts I and II, in: Studia Leibnitiana 28 (1996), pp. 58–83 and 29 (1997), pp. 81–102; M. R. Antognazza: “Immeatio and emperichoresis: the theological roots of harmony in Bisterfeld and Leibniz,” in: The young Leibniz and his philosophy (1646–76), ed. S. C. Brown, Dordrecht 1999. “Perfection is the harmony of things […] that is, the state of agreement or identity in variety [consensus vel identitas in varietate]” Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, Halle 1860 (repr. Hildesheim 1963) [= GLW], p. 172. and G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, tr. R. Ariew and D. Garber, Indianapolis 1989 [= AG], p. 233; for related earlier texts, see Confessio Philosophi (1672–73; A VI, 3, 122); Elementa Verae Pietatis, sive de Amore Dei super Omnia (1677–78; A VI, 4, 1358–60). Where a translation is quoted I have sometimes taken the liberty of modifying slightly. “Nihil est regularius intellectu Divino, qui fons est omnium regularum, et producit systema mundi regularissimum seu perfectissimum et quam maxime harmonicum.” (GLW, p. 171 / AG, p. 233) “Hinc pulchre etiam patet, Deum esse perceptione et quidem maxima praeditum seu mentem summam; alioqui non curaret Harmonias.” (GLW, p. 172 / AG, p. 234)

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of monads, the preestablished harmony of soul and body, the harmony of the natural kingdoms of efficient causes and final causes, and the harmony of the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace. Leibniz says little about how these different manifestations of harmony relate to each other. Do they unite in a single philosophical vision, a “harmony of harmonies” as it were? Or are they distinct Leibnizian experiments in how the concept of harmony can be employed in constructing philosophical theories? In earlier work, I argued on behalf of the first of these answers: that Leibniz’s theodicy requires that the different manifestations of harmony be united in a single most harmonious system5. Only such a system can supply a reason for God to create this world as the best of all possible worlds. On the account I defended, the universal harmony of monads is the foundation of this system, from which the other forms of harmony emerge. Thus, there is a way of unifying Leibniz’s system, and of finding greater harmony within it, than there would be if such a foundation were not available. My goal in this paper is not to revisit that interpretation, but to focus on the universal harmony of monads itself and to examine more closely its theoretical underpinnings. It is easy to be lulled into complacency by Leibniz’s vivid metaphors: monads are, as it were, “living mirrors,” “concentrated universes,” “worlds apart.” These images reinforce the idea that the harmony of monads involves some sort of divinely arranged correspondence among the contents of their perceptual states. But how exactly does this correspondence work? Does any agreement among monadic perceptions constitute a harmonious system in Leibniz’s view? Does the image of many mind-like substances viewing, as it were, the same film, or sharing the same dream, adequately capture the essence of Leibniz’s theory? I shall argue that Leibniz’s doctrine of universal harmony involves more than this – that the harmony in fact presupposes the thesis that monads belong to a common world and that this world is in the first place a universe of phenomena. Leibniz’s deepest insight, I believe, is that a plurality of isolated, mind-like substances can only lay claim to be members of the same world, and hence to satisfy the condition of universal harmony, to the extent that they bear relations to a single phenomenal universe. If this is correct, then, two conclusions follow: first, the concept of a phenomenal universe is explanatorily prior to that of a world of monads, and second, the universal harmony of monads involves more than just an agreement among the contents of their perceptions; it requires in addition that monads be related in the same world through the phenomena they represent. 1. THE UNIVERSAL HARMONY OF MONADS Leibniz’s most famous presentation of the doctrine of universal harmony is found in the Monadology:

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D. Rutherford: Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge 1995.

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56. This interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other, and each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe. 57. Just as the same city viewed from different directions appears entirely different and, as it were, multiplied perspectively, in just the same way it happens that, because of the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are, as it were, just as many different universes, which are, nevertheless, only perspectives on a single one, corresponding to the different points of view of each monad. 58. And this is the way of obtaining as much variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible, that is, it is the way of obtaining as much perfection as possible. 59. Moreover, this is the only hypothesis (which I dare say is demonstrated) that properly enhances God’s greatness. Mr. Bayle recognized this when, in his Dictionary (article “Rorarius”), he set out objections to it; indeed, he was tempted to believe that I ascribed too much to God, more than is possible. But he was unable to present any reason why this universal harmony, which results in every substance expressing exactly all the others through the relations it has to them, is impossible.6

Monadology, § 56 announces a key premise of Leibniz’s cosmology: within the actual world (and any possible world7) there is an interconnection or accommodation (“cette Liaison ou cet accommodement”) of all created things to each other. Succeeding sections appear to sketch an argument from the world-connection thesis to the thesis of universal harmony, stated in § 598. In describing this as an argument for universal harmony, I do not mean that Leibniz is offering a demonstration of the existence of the universal harmony of monads. Rather, I take the argument to elucidate the doctrine of universal harmony by showing which other propositions are presupposed by it. If I am correct, Leibniz’s position is that we understand the doctrine of universal harmony by understanding the world-connection thesis, and not vice versa. I return to this point in the next section of the paper. In §§ 56–59, Leibniz make several claims about the conditions of universal harmony. In § 59, he gives what seems a definitive statement of the doctrine: universal harmony results in “every substance expressing exactly all the others through the relations it has to them.” Our understanding of this statement is aided if we take Leibniz to be drawing on his technical definition of expression. In a wellknown passage from his letter to Arnauld of 9 October 1687, he writes: “One thing expresses another (in my terminology) when there exists a constant and regular [reglé] relation between what can be said of one and the other” (A II, 2, 240 / M, p. 144)9. Broadly speaking, any two objects or domains of objects express one 6 7 8 9

Subsequent citations of the Monadology are by section number, based on the text at GP VI, 607–23 and the translation at AG, p. 213–25. The extension to any possible world is supported by Theodicy, § 9 (GP VI, 107). See also Theodicy, § 360 (GP VI, 329). § 56 begins a new part of the Monadology, picking up the discussion of intersubstantial causation in §§ 49–52; §§ 53–55 are a parenthesis on God’s choice of the best. The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. and tr. H. T. Mason, Manchester 1967 [= M]. See also GP VII, 263; G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and tr. L. E. Loemker, 2nd ed., Dordrecht, 1969, [= L], p. 207; C 15; Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson; tr. Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson, London 1973 [= MP], p. 176. For a detailed

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another if there is a well-defined mapping, or functional relationship, between the two. In the present case we may take this to imply that universal harmony involves a relation of expression among the perceptions of all monads: a mapping that would in principle take us from a complete description of the contents of any one monad’s perceptual states to a complete description of the contents of the perceptual states of any other monad. A somewhat different description of universal harmony is given in § 57. There Leibniz employs his familiar image of perceivers who occupy different points of view on the same city, which is, as it were, “multiplied perspectivally.” By virtue of their independence from each other, monads, likewise, can be regarded as a multiplicity of “different universes.” Yet they are also, according to Leibniz, “only perspectives on a single [universe], corresponding to the different points of view of each monad”10. The interpretation of this statement turns on what we take the reference of the term ‘universe’ to be. It is natural to think of monads as comprising the universe; the collection of all created monads is the universe. Is this the universe on which each monad is said to have a perspective? That is, does each monad have a perspective on the universe of monads, of which it is a part? Such a reading has its attractions. Every monad expresses every other monad, by virtue of the correspondence among the contents of their perceptions. Thus, every monad is a “mirror” of other monads: it reflects the contents of their perceptions in its perceptions; and to this extent, every monad can be regarded as a perspective on the universe to which it belongs. Still, this reading is in one sense strained. Every monad is said to be a perspective on the same universe; yet every monad expresses all other monads, so each monad, it seems, is a “mirror” of a different set of monads: every monad other than itself. An obvious response to this worry is to stipulate that every monad also expresses itself in Leibniz’s sense, since the identity function maps the contents of its perceptions onto themselves. Thus, each monad expresses every monad in the universe and each may be said to be a perspective on the same universe: the universe consisting of all monads, including itself. Leibniz undoubtedly would be happy to accept this conclusion, but it is not, I think, the best reading of § 57. In Monadology, § 62, he states that “although each created monad represents the whole universe, it more distinctly represents the body which is particularly affected by it […]. And just as this body expresses the whole universe through the interconnection of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe by representing this body, which belongs to it in a particular way.” Here, the “whole universe” represented by a monad appears to be a universe of spatiotemporally related bodies. It is true that Leibniz employs a different term in this passage. Each body is said to express the whole universe through

10

analysis, see C. Swoyer: “Leibnizian Expression,” in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995), pp. 65–99. Cf. Discours de métaphysique, § 9 (A VI, 4, 1542); and Leibniz’s fifth letter to Clarke, § 91: “For God needs only to make a simple substance become once and from the beginning a representation of the universe according to its point of view, since from thence alone it follows that it will be so perpetually and that all simple substances will always have a harmony among themselves because they always represent the same universe” (GP VII, 412 / L, 711–12).

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the interconnection of all matter in the plenum, meaning there is a lawful relation between what can said about any one body and all other bodies. The monad, by contrast, is said to represent its body, and by virtue of the body’s expression of the universe, to represent the same universe. This terminological variation is immaterial. In letters to Arnauld, Leibniz goes back and forth between speaking of a substance’s expressing and representing the universe of bodies: “[W]hy could not God, who infinitely surpasses [mathematicians], originally create representative substances in such a way that they express by their own laws, in accordance with the natural change of their thoughts or representations, all that is to happen to every body […]” (A II 2, 244/M 147)11. In elaborating his definition of expression, Leibniz confirms the equivalence of the terms ‘express’ and ‘represent’ in the context of perception: Expression is common to all forms, and it is a genus of which natural perception, animal sensation and intellectual knowledge are species. In natural perception and in sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in substance which is endowed with a genuine unity. (A II, 2, 240 / M, p. 144)

There is reason to think, then, that the universe that monads express or represent, and on which each occupies a unique perspective, is in the first place as a universe of divisible matter: a plenum in which every part is spatially contiguous with, and causally connected to, every other part12. What are we to say about the ontological status of this universe? Leibniz’s considered position at the time of the Monadology precludes the possibility of an expressive relation between a perceiving substance and an independently existing material universe. According to his account, matter is a “phenomenon,” which has no reality over and above that of monads. Thus, to the extent that monads express the same universe, and this universe is a material plenum, it must be a universe of phenomena13. Yet the phenomena in question cannot be identified with the contents of any one monad’s perceptions. The same universe is represented in a different way by each monad, according to its point of view. In this respect, the phenomena themselves are analogous to the city on which each perceiver has a unique perspective; they are phenomena that are “multiplied perspectively” in each monad14. If the universe expressed by monads – a universe of phenomena – cannot be identified with the contents of any one monad’s perceptions, and does not corre11

12 13 14

“Now, states of the soul are naturally and essentially expressions of the corresponding states of the world, and particularly of the bodies which then belong to them; therefore, since the prick forms part of the state of the body at moment B, the representation or expression [la representation ou expression] of the prick, which is pain, will also form part of the state of the soul at moment B.” (A II, 2, 243 / M, p. 146). “Each soul will represent proximately the phenomena of its own organic body, but remotely those of others which act on its own body” (C, 14 / MP, p. 176). Cf. GP II, 253 / AG, p. 178. GP II, 270 / AG, p. 181; GP II, 444 / The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, ed. and tr. B. C. Look and D. Rutherford, New Haven 2007 [= LR], pp. 242–3. “Or quoyque tous expriment les mêmes phenomenes, ce n’est pas pour cela que leur expressions soyent parfaitement semblables, mais il suffit qu’elles soyent proportionelles, comme plusieurs spectateurs croyent voir la même chose, et s’entrentendent en effect, quoyque chacun voye et parle selon la mesure de sa veue” (Discours de métaphysique, § 14; A VI, 4, 1550).

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spond to a material world that exists independently of monads, what can it be? The most plausible answer is that the universe of phenomena expressed by monads is God’s representation of those phenomena. Where God represents phenomena archetypally, monads represent the same phenomena from a limited perspective, and in doing so express God’s phenomena. Considerable support for this claim can be found in Leibniz’s writings. One of his main examples of a relation of expression is the relation between a geometrical figure (e. g. a circle) and a planar projection of that figure (e. g. an ellipse)15. Similarly, there is a relation of expression between the ground plan of a building or a city and perspectival views of the same building or city. The latter is Leibniz’s favorite metaphor for a substance’s expression of the universe, so the crux of the proposal is that we should take this metaphor more literally than is usually done. What a monad expresses perspectivally is not an independently existing universe, but a universe of phenomena represented by God. Leibniz’s most explicit statement of this idea appears in notes written during his correspondence with Bartholomew Des Bosses: If bodies are phenomena and judged in accordance with how they appear to us, they will not be real since they will appear differently to different people. And so the reality of bodies, of space, of motion, and of time seem to consist in the fact that they are phenomena of God, that is, the object of his scientia visionis. And the distinction between the appearance bodies have with respect to us and with respect to God is, in a certain way, like that between a drawing in perspective [scenographiam] and a ground plan [ichnographiam]. For there are different drawings in perspective, depending upon the position of the viewer, while a ground plan or geometrical representation is unique16. (GP II, 438 / AG, p. 199)

To say that each monad expresses the universe, then, implies that each expresses differently an archetypal representation of the phenomena present to God. This lends support to the Leibnizian theme of monads existing “like a world apart [comme un Monde à part], independent of all other things, except for God”17. The world given to them – the universe they express – is a world that has its reality, to the extent that it has reality, in the mind of God18. All monads express the same universe, as a result of which there is an agreement among the contents of their perceptions, yet they 15 16

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Cf. his letter to Arnauld of 9 October 1687: “Une chose exprime une autre (dans mon langage) lorsqu’il y a un rapport constant et reglé entre ce qui se peut dire de l’une et de l’autre. C’est ainsi qu’une projection de perspective exprime son geometral” (A II, 2, 240). A marginal note in the Specimen inventorum employs the same terminology (A VI, 4, 1618). Cf. Theodicy, § 403: “L’operation des Automates spirituels, c’est à dire des Ames, n’est point mecanique, mais elle contient eminemment ce qu’il y a de beau dans la mecanique: les mouvemens, developées dans les corps, y étant concentrés par la representation, comme dans un monde idéal, qui exprime les loix du monde actuel et leur suites, avec cette difference du monde idéal parfait qui est en Dieu, que la pluspart des perceptions dans les autres ne sont que confuses” (GP VI, 356). Discours de métaphysique, § 14 (A VI, 4, 15 / AG, p. 47). Cf. GP III, 72 / Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts, tr. and ed. R. S. Woolhouse and R. Francks, New York, 1997 [=WF], p.132, and letters to Des Bosses of 15 February 1712 (GP II, 436 / LR, p. 227) and 26 May 1712 (GP II, 444 / LR, 242–3). Cf. Discours de métaphysique, § 28, whose heading reads: “Dieu seul est l’objet immediat de nos perceptions, qui existe hors de nous, et luy seul est nostre lumiere” (A VI.4, 1573).

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are related to each other only via their common expression of the phenomena represented in God. To this extent, each is, as it were, a world apart, a solipistic perceiver. The question before us is whether Leibniz envisions any more robust relation than this among monads. Does he uphold the idea, for example, that in representing a universe of phenomena, monads also engage with other monads – not just because there is an external coordination among their perceptions, but because the real world to which they belong is given to them in the phenomena? On this alternative to the solipistic interpretation, monads do not merely agree in their perceptions, “mirroring” the same universe of phenonena, they are related to one another in the universe that they express. In the next section, I shall explain how this might be so and why it should be seen as the basis of Leibniz’s doctrine of universal harmony. 2. WORLD CONNECTION AND UNIVERSAL HARMONY Leibniz says many things that support an interpretation of monads as essentially solipsistic: the isolated perceivers of a common, well-ordered dream that appears differently to each of them. Focusing just on the agreement or correspondence among monads’ perceptions, there seems to be no principled restriction on the content of those perceptions. Monads could all be perceiving any content from the vantage point of their unique perspectives and the condition of universal harmony would be satisfied. If this is the only relation monads have to each other, then they count as members of the same world in only the weakest sense. Even if their perceptions have a common ground in God’s representation of phenomena, monads themselves are metaphysically isolated from each other. They express the same universe, but they do not exist in the same universe. To read Leibniz in this way, I believe, is to miss a crucial dimension of his monadology, associated with what I have called the “world-connection thesis.” According to this thesis, any two things that belong to the same world condition each others’ existence: the natural properties of each are regulated with respect to those of the other, with the result that there is a causal order uniting the constituents of a world. As Leibniz writes in the Theodicy, “it must be known that all things are connected [tout est lié] in each one of the possible worlds. The universe, whatever it may be, is all of one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effect there to any distance whatsoever, even though this effect become less perceptible in proportion to the distance” (§ 9; GP VI, 107 / H, p. 128)19. It is notable that the example Leibniz uses to illustrate the connection thesis is a physical one: within the universe, any part of matter is responsive to the motion of every other part of matter. The thesis, though, is a completely general one. The existence of an order of connection is a necessary condition for any substances, including monads, to be members of the same world. To suppose that such an order were lacking would be to imagine a plurality of distinct existences that did not compose a single world. They would be merely a plurality of things. 19

Essays on Theodicy, tr. E. M. Huggard, LaSalle, 1985 [= H], p. 128.

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The world-connection thesis stands in prima facie tension with another fundamental Leibnizian doctrine: that no substance can have a real causal influence on any other. For this reason, Leibniz argues in the Monadology, the causal connection of substances can only be ideal: each “can only produce its effect through God’s intervention, when in the ideas of God a monad rightly demands that God take it into account in regulating the others from the beginning of things” (§ 51)20. In this way it is guaranteed that the “actions and passions among creatures are mutual” (§ 52). As Leibniz understands it, the mutual actions and passions of monads can be explained in terms of qualities of their perceptions: “The creature is said to act externally insofar as it is perfect, and to be acted upon by another, insofar as it is imperfect. Thus we attribute action to a monad insofar as it has distinct perceptions, and passion, insofar as it has confused perceptions” (§ 49). On this basis God regulates monads with respect to each other, establishing a relation of connection between them: God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons that require him to adjust the other to it; and consequently, what is active in some respects is passive from another point of view: active insofar as what is known distinctly in one serves to explain what happens in another; and passive insofar as the reason for what happens in one is found in what is known distinctly in another. (§ 52)

Based on what Leibniz says in § 52, some skepticism might be voiced about my claim that universal harmony presupposes the thesis that “all is connected.” In fact, it might seem that Leibniz’s explanation of the mutual causal dependence of monads presupposes that their perceptions are harmoniously ordered, for only in that way is it guaranteed that active and passive states are suitably correlated. This, I think, overstates the conclusion to be drawn from § 52. The connection, or mutual action and passion, of monads presupposes a correlation among their perceptions. In fact, there is a relation of expression between the monads’ states: a mapping that goes from the action, or increase in perfection, of one monad to the passion, or decrease in perfection of another. The harmony of monads involves relations of expression, but harmony itself is not a precondition of expression. Leibniz glosses harmony as an “agreement or identity in variety [consensus vel identitas in varietate]” (GLW, p. 172 / AG, p. 233). Harmony is realized when many things are ordered with respect to each other, such that they can be represented as one21. Expression is one way in which things can be ordered; hence it serves as a basis for harmony. But different instances of harmony can involve different ordering relations. The preestablished harmony of soul and body involves a relation of expression between states of the soul and states of the body. A similar correspondence exists among the states of monads: changes in one are correlated with changes in every other. However, in formulating the doctrine of universal harmony, Leibniz also conceives of monads as ordered in more complex ways than this. This is because the universal harmony of monads is, at bottom, a cosmological theory – an account of the organization of the world as a whole – which other examples of harmony are not.

20 21

Cf. Theodicy, § 66 (GP VI, 138–9). “Indeed, order, regulatity, and harmony come to the same thing” (GLW, p. 172 / AG, p. 233).

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The doctrine of the universal harmony of monads is premised on the idea that monads are ordered in such a way as to constitute a single world22. One possibility we have canvassed is that this might occur simply by virtue of the expressive relations among the contents of monads’ perceptions, with each representing a unique perspective on a universe of phenomena. In fact, Leibniz envisions a more elaborate form of order than this among monads, whereby they are related through a universe of phenomena, in which they themselves are represented as spatiotemporally ordered and causally connected. In support of this idea, consider again the wording of Monadology, § 56: This interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other, and each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe.

As a consequence of the connection of all things, each simple substance has relations that express all the others (“chaque substance simple a des rapports qui expriment toutes les autres”), making it a “perpetual living mirror” of the universe. What exactly is it for a monad to have relations that express all the others? Is Leibniz speaking here of a monad’s relations to other monads, relations founded on their representation of a common series of phenomena? If that were correct then the sentence could be rewritten as a conjunction: each monad has relations to other monads and those relations express all other monads. But that would be a curious way for Leibniz to speak. If the previous construal of universal harmony based on § 59 is correct, then the relation among monads is their mutual expression, through their representation of a common series of phenomena. That is, it is the monads themselves that express each other, not their relations. Intermonadic relations are relations of expression; those relations do not express other monads. Fortunately, a better reading of § 56 is available to us. On this reading, Leibniz’s statement that “each simple substance has relations” means that there are relations internal to each substance and that these intramonadic relations express the relations internal to every other substance. For Leibniz, these relations are relations to a universe of phenomena, which a monad stands in by virtue of representing itself as having relations to everything in that universe. He then infers that these relations express the relations that other monads have by virtue of their representations of the same phenomena. Evidence that this is Leibniz’s meaning is found in a passage from a draft of a 1702 letter for Pierre Bayle: I do not know if it is possible to explain the constitution of the soul any better than by saying (1) that it is a simple substance, or what I call a true unity; (2) that this unity nevertheless is expressive of a multitude, that is, bodies, and that it does so as well as is possible according to its point of view or relation [selon son point de veue ou rapport]; (3) and that therefore it expresses phenomena according to the metaphysico-mathematical laws of nature, that is, according to the order most befitting to intelligence or reason. From this it follows finally (4) that the soul is an imitation of God as far as possible for a created thing […]. God contains the universe eminently, and the soul or unity contains it actually, being a central mirror, though active and vital, 22

For an account of the conditions of worldhood, see J. Messina and D. Rutherford: “Leibniz on compossibility,” in: Philosophy Compass 4 (2009), pp. 962–77.

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Donald Rutherford so to speak. Indeed, we can say that each soul is a world apart, but that all these worlds agree, and represent the same phenomena to which they are related differently [sont representatif des même phenomenes differement rapportés]. And this is the most perfect way of multiplying beings as far as possible, and in the best way possible. (GP III, 72 / WF, 131–2; my emphasis)

Leibniz makes two critical points in this text: 1. Every soul, or simple substance, expresses a universe of phenomena, a multitude, or bodies (a universe that God also contains eminently). 2. Every soul, or simple substance, expresses this universe from a point of view, which is identified with the relation it has to the phenomena.

The first point confirms the interpretation defended in the previous section: the universe expressed by monads is a universe of material things, or phenomena, which is contained eminently in God. In expressing this universe, every monad is “an imitation of God as far as possible for a created thing.” In addition, Leibniz adds an important gloss on what it means for a monad to have a point of view on the universe. This requires that each have a relation to the phenomena. He does not say exactly what he means by this. Elsewhere, he emphasizes that monads are not literally located in space and that they are not real spatial constituents of bodies23. Consequently, the relation is not one in which the monad is physically related to material things. Rather, a monad is related to the phenomena by representing itself as part of that universe, which it does insofar as it represents itself as a living body, spatiotemporally and causally related to every other body. It is this body – the one the monad identifies as its own – which constitutes its point of view on, and relation to, the universe. Leibniz’s doctrine of the embodiment of monads – that no monad is ever without its own organic body – is crucial for understanding the world-connection thesis. The precise interpretation of the embodiment doctrine is controversial24. Minimally, it involves the claim that no created monad can fail to represent its existence as that of a body related to other bodies. Leibniz offers some of his clearest statements of this view in the Theodicy, linking it to his doctrine of confused perception: If [a mind] only had distinct thoughts it would be a God, its wisdom would be without bounds: that is one of the results of my meditations. As soon as there is a mixture of confused thoughts, there is sense, there is matter. For these confused thoughts come from the relation of all things one to the other by way of duration and extent. Thus it is that in my philosophy there is no ra-

23

24

“I regard the explanation of all phenomena solely through the perceptions of monads agreeing among themselves, with corporeal substance excluded, to be useful for a fundamental investigation of things. In this way of explaining things, space becomes the order of coexisting phenomena, as time is the order of successive phenomena, and there is no absolute or spatial nearness or distance between monads. To say that they are crowded together in a point or disseminated in space is to employ certain fictions of our mind when we willingly seek to imagine things that can only be understood” (GP II, 450–1 / LR, p. 255). Cf. GP II, 436 / LR, 227; GP VII, 503; and D. Rutherford: “Leibniz as Idealist,” in: Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4 (2008), pp. 141–90. For discussion, see D. Rutherford: Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, quoted in note 5, and the editors’ Introduction to LR.

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tional creature without some organic body, and there is no created spirit entirely detached from matter. (§ 124; GP VI, 179 / H, p. 198) [The modern Cartesians] say that God could have given to souls what thoughts he would, without making them depend upon any relation to bodies: by this means souls would be spared a great number of evils which only spring from the derangement of bodies […]. God cannot establish a system ill-connected and full of dissonances [un systeme mal lié et plein de dissonances]. The nature of souls is in part to represent bodies. (§ 130; GP VI, 183 / H, p. 202)25

One of the points Leibniz makes in these texts is that no finite creature enjoys the perfectly distinct cognition of God. There is always a mixture of confused thoughts, which he identifies with the inherent limitation, or primary matter, of a finite substance. But more than this is involved. The confused perceptions that are part of the content of any monad’s perceptions are also the basis of its relations to other things “by way of duration and extent,” i. e. spatiotemporal relations. And for this to be possible, a monad must in some sense have an organic body; it cannot exist “entirely detached from matter”26. Were this to happen, God would have created an “ill-connected” system, one full of dissonances – i. e. a disharmonious system. At this point, we have what we need to clarify the relation between the world-connection thesis and the doctrine of universal harmony. According to Leibniz, the universal harmony of monads involves each monad expressing a common universe from a unique point of view. I have shown that this condition is met by a monad’s being locatable in a universe of phenomena through its representation of itself as a living body that is causally connected to every other body. Within the universe, “tout est lié”: “the least movement extends its effect there to any distance whatsoever” (Theodicy, § 9, GP VI, 107). Since every monad represents itself as a part of the universe and as susceptible to the influence of other bodies on it, it follows that all is connected for monads as well: there are correlated patterns of activity and passivity among their states, by virtue of what they represent as the activity and passivity of their bodies. For Leibniz, this dependency is only “ideal,” a function of how God understands the relations among their respective perceptual states. Yet the correlation among their states is not a brute fact, or a consequence of universal harmony. Rather, universal harmony depends upon a conception of monads as belonging to the same world by way of the represented relations among their bodies. If monads did not represent themselves as embodied, they would lack

25 26

In the citations to the Theodicy that Leibniz included in a draft of the Monadology, he cites the first of these texts in Monadology, § 58 and the second in § 56, thus underscoring their relevance to the doctrine of universal harmony. See “Considerations sur les Principes de Vie, et sur les Natures Plastiques” Histoire des ouvrages des savant, May 1705: “I do not acknowledge entirely separated souls in the natural order or created spirits entirely detached from every body […]. God alone is above all matter, since he is its author; however, creatures free or freed of matter would at the same time be divorced from the universal connection [la liaison universelle], like deserters from the general order” (GP VI, 545–6 / L, p. 590). And Theodicy, § 200, GP VI, 235: “The best system of things will therefore not contain God; it will always be a system of bodies (that is, things arranged according to time and place) and of souls which represent and aware of bodies, and in accordance with which bodies are in great measure directed.” Cf. A VI.6, 155; GP II, 253 / AG, p. 178.

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a relation to the universe (a place in the “general order”) and thus a point of view on the phenomena, from which follows the universal harmony of monads. 3. THE UNITY OF THE WORLD The objection might be raised that I have not yet offered a significant alternative to the view that universal harmony is essentially an agreement among the perceptions of an infinity of “windowless” monads. In stressing that each monad represents itself as a body, spatiotemporally and causally related to every other body, I have added detail to that account, but I have not addressed the concern that if the created world is ultimately just a collection of solipsistic perceivers, then there is no meaningful sense in which those monads together make up one world – a world represented in their own perceptions. Leibniz himself draws attention to this worry when he writes to Des Bosses that, “monads in themselves do not have even a position [situm] with respect to each other – at least one that is real, which extends beyond the order of phenomena. Each is, as it were, a certain world apart, and they harmonize with each other through their phenomena, and not through any other intrinsic intercourse and connection [commercio nexuque]” (GP II, 444 / LR, pp. 241–3). In this section I aim to reply to this objection and to enrich the idea of universal harmony as a cosmological theory. To begin, it may be helpful to illustrate the range of interpretative options by way of a modern analogy. Suppose that a group of individuals is given access to the same sensory content. In the simplest case, they might all be watching the same film. They all have a unique point of view on the visual images, defined by the location of their bodies and, in a different way, by their cognitive and affective responses to the content. They might all be in the same room watching a large screen from different positions, or they might be simultaneously watching the same film on different screens. Either way, we have a simple model for monads expressing the same universe from distinct points of view. Obviously, Leibnizian monads are isolated in a way that our film viewers are not, but the central metaphor of distinct points of view on the same content is preserved. In fact, I believe, this is a poor analogy for what Leibniz has in mind. This is because in the analogy the film viewers are the passive recipients of content that has no relation to their own situation in the world. They are observing a represented world that is, if fictional, spatiotemporally and causally disconnected from their world. They are not in the film’s world and they have no means of influencing events within it. Consider now a different scenario of a group of individuals involved in a virtual reality game or a simulated world like “Second Life.” In this case, like the first, the individuals represent the same content from distinct points of view, but they do so as characters within the world they represent – characters who are spatiotemporally related to and causally affected by characters that other players of the same game represent as their characters. This is a more promising starting point for thinking about Leibniz’s theory of harmony. In the analogy, the players have a point of view in their common universe. They don’t just observe the universe as

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something distinct from them, in the way one watches a film; they are participants in that universe, subject to virtual analogues of all the circumstances that engage a human being. Again, there are disanalogies with Leibniz’s theory. In the first place, the virtual reality story takes for granted that the game players are flesh-and-blood people, who have real physical relations to each other. There is thus a clear contrast between the relations of these individuals in “real life” and in “virtual life.” But we can begin to close the gap. Suppose, first, that the content of the game becomes a real-time representation of the participants themselves. The individuals they interact with in the game are not fictional characters, but representations of people known to them, representations updated to reflect the current cognitive and emotional state of the person. Suppose, further, that the players are cut off from any present or future physical contact with each other. They take the people with whom they interact virtually to exist, and in some cases perhaps to be intimately related to them, but they have no way of connecting with them outside of their relations in the virtual world. With this iteration, we come close to Leibniz’s theory of universal harmony. Add the assumption that the participants in the virtual world have never had any direct contact with each other, and that each has been created by God so as to live within the virtual world, and we are essentially there. In and of themselves, the players are “like a world apart,” but they nonetheless connect with each other through the virtual world they inhabit. Among the lessons to be drawn from this analogy is that in these circumstances it is not implausible to think of the unity of the players’ “real world” – the world collectively comprised of them – as a function of their shared virtual world, for the latter is the only place in which they interact with other individuals whom they take to exist and who in fact do exist (though their reality is hidden in the virtual world). Assuming a player’s state in the virtual world reliably correlates with her state in the real world, then in interacting with her in the virtual world, I am, indirectly, interacting with her in “reality.” If, in the present scenario, her reality is that she represents herself as interacting with me in the virtual world as I represent myself as interacting with her, then the correlation is indeed reliable and we can be said to be members of the same world27. My claim that the players’ shared virtual world is the basis of the unity of the real world is strengthened if we think of those perceivers as having been created so as to be perceivers of the virtual world they share. There is nothing coincidental about their connection. Each is by nature a perceiver of that virtual world. God first conceives the plan of a virtual world and then creates perceivers who represent themselves as related in that world. This, I believe, is the correct way of understanding Leibniz’s doctrine of the universal harmony of monads. There is, first, in 27

One remaining disanalogy between the virtual world scenario and the monadology is that in the former there is a real physical connection between the players (data passing between their computers), which does not occur in the case of monads. Leibniz would be unmoved by this difference: whether the correlation among the players’ states was explained by their physical influence on one another or by God’s coordination of their states, the fact remains that the world in which they take themselves to exist in relation to other individuals is their shared virtual world.

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God the representation of a universe, then the creation of perceivers whose nature it is to represent themselves as existing in that universe. The perceivers are united in a world by virtue of the universe they represent, which is an essential fact about what they are28. Historically, Leibniz’s original conception of a world was that of a causally closed system of bodies, related in space and time29. Any theist will think of such a world as having been designed and created by God. Leibniz is no exception to this. He envisions God as forming a plan of the universe, but he devises a novel way for God to realize that plan. Because a material plenum cannot exist in its own right – it is not a per se unity or substance – the universe cannot be created as it is represented in God’s plan, that is, it cannot be created in extension. Instead, God creates the universe, in a “concentrated form,” by making it the common object of the perceptions of an infinity of perceiving substances, which thereby harmonize with each other. As Leibniz writes to Arnauld, “all created substances are a continual production of the same sovereign being in accordance with the same plans [desseins], and express the same universe or the same phenomena,” as a result of which “they agree exactly among themselves [elles s’entraccordent exactement]” (A II, 2, 81 / M, p. 64). On the interpretation I have been developing, God’s plan for a universe of phenomena comes first, and minds or mind-like substances are defined on the basis of that plan as “expressions” of it. One of Leibniz’s most intriguing statements of this view appears in a study from ca. 1681: Insofar as God relates the universe to some particular body, and regards the whole of it as if from this body, or what is the same thing, thinks of all the appearances or relations of things to this body considered as mobile, there results from this the substantial form or soul of this body, which is completed by a certain sensation and appetite. (A VI, 4, 1460 / LOC, p. 261)30

Another especially bold statement is found in Discours de métaphysique, § 14, whose heading reads: “God produces various substances according to the different views he has of the universe.” There Leibniz writes: […] created substances depend upon God, who preserves them and who even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts. For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and in all ways the general system of phenomena which he finds it good to produce in order to manifest his glory, and he views all the faces of the world in all ways possible, since there is no relation that escapes his omniscience. The result of each view of the universe, as seen from a certain position, is a substance which expresses the universe in conformity with this view, should God see fit to render his thought actual and to produce this substance. (A VI, 4, 1549–50 / AG, pp. 46–7) 28

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30

Cf. Leibniz’s comment to Arnauld: “Après cela je ne sçaurois deviner en quoy on puisse plus trouver la moindre ombre de difficulté, à moins que de nier que Dieu puisse créer des substances qui soyent d’abord faites en sorte, qu’il leur arrive en vertu de leur propre nature de s’accorder dans la suite avec les phenomenes de tous les autres” (A II, 2, 244). In a text dated by the Akademie editors to 1678–81, Leibniz writes: “the collection of all bodies that are understood to be in space, or which have a situation with respect to one another, is called a world, and for different times there are different states of the world; nonetheless, one of these arises from another according to certain definite laws” (A VI, 4, 1397). The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672–1686, ed. and tr. R. T. W. Arthur, New Haven 2001 [= LOC].

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Again, on this account, God’s plan, which represents a “general system of phenomena,” consisting of a universe of causally connected bodies, comes first and souls are created as powers of perception and appetite defined with respect to those phenomena. It follows that all and only those souls (or soul-like substances) that are defined with respect to the same plan of the universe can belong to the same world. The beauty of this account is that, in principle, it is neutral with respect to issues of fundamental ontology. If one favors a reading of Leibniz’s philosophy as committed to the existence of unitary corporeal substances, this can be accommodated. Starting with the plan of a universe of phenomena, God creates a soul for each organic body within the universe and thereby produces a world of corporeal substances. While Leibniz undoubtedly entertained this picture, there is evidence already in the Arnauld correspondence that he regarded the most basic relation of the soul, or form, to the matter of its body as one of expression rather than actualization (as would be the case on an Aristotelian reading). “The soul,” he tells Arnauld, is “the form of its body, because it is an expression of the phenomena of all other bodies in accordance with the relationship to its own” (A II, 2, 82 / M, pp. 65–6). On this rendering, the soul-body relationship is limited to the soul’s representation of itself as embodied (attributable to its primary matter, or capacity for confused perception), and to the soul’s external (expressive) relations to other substances that constitute the ground of the (secondary) matter of its body. A position like the one I have described is consistent with the standard reading of universal harmony as based on the mutual expression of monads, or the correspondence or agreement among the contents of their perceptions. Yet such a reading leaves out much of what is most interesting about Leibniz’s theory. As I have reconstructed the theory, the unity of the world of monads is explained by the unity of the universe of phenomena upon which God bases his plan for the world – a universe that is the “virtual world” within which monads represent themselves as existing and interacting. If this still seems to leave monads only notionally united in a world, we may note Leibniz’s claim that, in a sense, each monad is the universe that has been created by God: In the end my system comes down to this: each monad is the universe in concentrated form […]. In God the universe is not only concentrated, but perfectly expressed; but in each created monad there is distinctly expressed only one part, which is larger or smaller according as the soul is more or less excellent, and all the infinite remainder is only expressed confusedly. But in God there is not only this concentration of the universe, but also its source. He is the originating center from which all else emanates […]. (GP IV, 553 / WF, p. 106)31

If each monad is a concentrated version of the same universe, there can be no question of the unity of the world those monads comprise. They are united in that world not by virtue of external relations of expression, but by virtue of being instantiations of the same divine plan. A monad is, by nature, the spontaneous source of 31

Cf. his statement in his 1698 published reply to Bayle: “unities of substance [are] nothing other than different concentrations of the universe, which is represented in them in accordance with the different points of view which distinguish them” (“Eclaircissement des difficultés que Monsieur Bayle a trouvées dans le syteme nouveau de l’union de l’ame et du corps,” GP IV, 518 / WF, p. 80).

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representations of a universe of phenomena. If we ask to which world that monad belongs, the only answer we can give will refer to the universe of phenomena that it expresses from its unique point of view. Such an account lays bare the roots of Leibniz’s doctrine of universal harmony, which involves more than a simple agreement among the states of perceiving substances. “The marvel,” Leibniz writes, “is that the sovereign wisdom has found in representative substances a way to vary the same world at the same time to an infinite degree” (GP IV, 554 / WF, p. 107; my emphasis). The crux of the account is that in maximizing harmony God fixes on a way of multiplying the world in infinite ways, something that only makes sense if the world in question is a universe of phenomena. 4. CONCLUSION I have argued for answers to two closely related questions in Leibniz’s metaphysics: What is the basis of the universal harmony of monads? What is the basis of the unity of the world of monads? The idea that universal harmony itself is the ground of the unity of the world should be rejected. Since harmony, by definition, is the “unity in variety,” to pose the question of the unity of the world is, in effect, to pose the question of the harmony of the world. The one cannot be answered without answering the other. I have shown that Leibniz’s account of the universal harmony of monads proceeds via an account of the universal connection of monads, and that the latter depends upon monads’ representations of themselves as existing within a common spatiotemporal world of bodies. For this reason every monad must represent itself as a living body, related to every other body in the universe. Given its unique bodily point of view, each monad expresses this universe differently. The “ground plan” of the universe, and hence of the connection among monads, is a representation given to God alone, who contains all phenomena “eminently” (GP III, 72 / WF, p. 131). The account of monads as connected via their participation in a universe of phenomena, a “virtual world,” as it were, is the core of Leibniz’s doctrine of universal harmony. The “unity in variety” is the unity of the universe that a multiplicity of monads differentially express, locating themselves relative to other agents to whom they are causally connected. A natural response to this picture is that it supports only a weak notion of the unity of the world of monads. Whatever the details of their connection within the universe of phenomena, in the end the relations that unite monads are merely ideal: their expression of the same universe, within which God represents each as related to every other. Beyond this, monads exist “as in a world apart.” The weakness of the unity of the world of monads is consistent with the sharp distinction Leibniz draws between per se unities and aggregates, and with his intention to resist a conception of the world as having a substantial unity conferred by God or some lesser soul of the world32. Granting this, I have argued that the unity 32

Cf. “Considerations sur la doctrine d’un Esprit Universel Unique” (1702, GP VI, 529–38). To Des Bosses, Leibniz writes: “But by the term ‘world,’ I understand the entire series of things

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of the world of monads does not result merely because the perceptions of monads “harmonize,” or agree. The unity of the world is a consequence of the fact that each monad is created by God as a “concentrated world.” The individual nature of each monad is to be an expression of God’s plan for the world, and that plan is a representation of a universe of phenomena. God creates the actual world by realizing this plan – not extensively, as a spatiotemporal universe of bodies, but intensively, as a spatiotemporal universe represented within every monad. The upshot is that, although the external relations among monads are merely ideal and monads connect with one another only in a virtual world, they are united formally through being reproductions of the same plan, “generated, so to speak, by continual fulgurations” of God, “the primitive unity or first simple substance”33.

33

proceeding to eternity, that is, with respect to what is later or in the future, which is not a creature, but something infinite and like an aggregate” (GP II, 362 / LR, p. 113). Monadology, § 47 (GP VI, 614 / AG, p. 219).

REMARQUES SUR L’ARTICLE DE DONALD RUTHERFORD : « UNIVERSAL HARMONY AND THE UNITY OF A WORLD » Paul Rateau « Nostra Mens phaenomenon facit, divina Rem »1

I. LA THÈSE (UOP) La thèse principale que Donald Rutherford défend dans son article « Universal Harmony and the Unity of a World » est la suivante : la doctrine leibnizienne de l’harmonie universelle ne saurait reposer seulement sur l’accord entre les perceptions des monades créées, mais sur l’appartenance de chacune de ces monades au même et unique monde, qui est fondamentalement un univers phénoménal. Cette thèse a deux conséquences majeures. 1. Elle permet de déterminer l’origine de la compossibilité : font partie du même monde les substances qui ont rapport au même univers de phénomènes. 2. Elle montre que le plan divin d’un « univers de phénomènes » est logiquement antérieur aux monades qui en sont les expressions. En d’autres termes que « sur le plan de l’explication, le concept d’un univers phénoménal est premier par rapport à celui d’un monde de monades ». Dans la première section, Rutherford s’appuie sur le § 62 de la Monadologie pour identifier l’univers représenté par chaque monade à l’univers des corps reliés les uns aux autres dans l’espace et dans le temps, c’est-à-dire à un univers de matière, divisible et plein, « où chaque partie est spatialement contiguë et causalement connectée aux autres ». Or, si l’univers est entièrement matériel et si la matière est un phénomène, l’univers n’est rien d’autre qu’un univers de phénomènes. Ces phénomènes ne se réduisent donc pas aux contenus perceptifs des monades. Ils sont multipliés perspectivement par chacune, comme l’est la ville par chaque observateur qui la voit depuis un endroit particulier. Cet univers de phénomènes, bien que distinct des perceptions des monades, est incapable de subsister par lui-même. Il ne peut donc être qu’en Dieu. Les « phénomènes de Dieu » sont les représentations archétypales de ce que les monades expriment de leur point de vue limité. Rutherford trouve l’illustration la plus explicite de cette thèse dans un passage d’une esquisse préparatoire publiée par Gerhardt, en appendice de la lettre à des Bosses du 5 février 1712 (GP II, 438). Il en conclut que l’accord entre les perceptions des monades vient en réalité du fait qu’« elles ne sont liées les unes aux autres que par leur expression commune de phénomènes représentés en Dieu ». 1

C, 528.

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Pour éviter cependant l’« interprétation solipsiste » – selon laquelle les monades n’auraient en commun qu’un même rêve bien ordonné, mais apparaissant différemment à chacune –, Rutherford soutient, dans la deuxième section de son article, que l’accord des monades ne vient pas seulement de ce qu’elles expriment le même univers de phénomènes, mais encore de ce qu’elles existent et sont liées les unes aux autres dans ce même univers. Se fondant notamment sur le § 56 de la Monadologie2, il montre que la relation qu’a chaque monade aux phénomènes est aussi et en même temps une relation aux autres monades, en tant que celles-ci expriment, chacune à sa manière et de son point de vue, ces phénomènes. Autrement dit, il y a harmonie et liaison entre les monades par l’intermédiaire de ou via leur représentation du même univers phénoménal. Reste cependant à préciser ce qu’il faut entendre exactement par avoir une relation aux phénomènes (« having a relation to the phenomena »). Cette relation ne suppose pas, évidemment, que la monade soit située dans l’espace, mais qu’elle se représente elle-même comme faisant partie de cet univers, c’est-à-dire comme un corps vivant, lié causalement, dans l’espace et dans le temps à tous les autres corps. Pour Rutherford, « c’est ce corps – celui que la monade identifie comme le sien – qui constitue son point de vue sur et sa relation à l’univers ». La liaison des corps dans l’univers fait la liaison des monades, puisque c’est par leur corps que celles-ci se représentent dans l’univers. Par conséquent selon lui, si les monades ne se représentaient pas elles-mêmes comme incarnées, il leur manquerait une relation à l’univers (une place dans ‘l’ordre général’) et ainsi un point de vue sur les phénomènes, dont suit l’harmonie universelle des monades.

Comme tous les corps sont connectés les uns aux autres dans l’univers et comme les monades n’ont de relation à cet univers que par leur corps, c’est seulement par leur corps qu’elles s’harmonisent et s’entre-répondent. La doctrine de l’harmonie universelle dépend donc de la thèse de la connection universelle (« world-connection thesis »), et non l’inverse. Dans la troisième section, Rutherford répond plus directement à l’« interprétation solipsiste », en s’efforçant de montrer que l’harmonie universelle est une théorie cosmologique. Il critique l’analogie du film (où les spectateurs sont passifs) utilisée pour expliquer le rapport entre les monades percevantes et l’univers, et en propose une autre : celle d’individus engagés dans un jeu de réalité virtuelle tel que Second Life. De cette analogie, il tire la conclusion suivante : Il y a d’abord en Dieu la représentation d’un univers, puis la création d’êtres doués de perception (perceivers) dont la nature est de se représenter comme existants dans cet univers. Ces êtres doués de perception sont unis dans un monde par l’intermédiaire de l’univers qu’ils représentent […].

La création du monde s’explique alors comme suit. Dieu conçoit un plan d’univers. Cet univers est fait d’un système de corps – conception originelle de Leibniz, selon Rutherford. Comme la matière ne peut pas exister par elle-même, car elle n’a pas d’unité per se et n’est pas substantielle, cet univers ne peut être créé tel qu’il 2

Voir aussi lettre à Bayle, GP III, 72.

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est représenté dans le plan divin, c’est-à-dire en extension (extensively). Dieu le crée donc « intensivement » (intensively), sous une forme concentrée en chaque substance et en fait l’objet de sa perception. L’auteur trouve au § 14 du Discours de métaphysique une confirmation de son interprétation : […] le plan de Dieu, qui représente un ‘système général de phénomènes’, consistant en un univers de corps connectés causalement, est posé d’abord, puis sont créées des âmes comme puissances de perception et d’appétit définies par rapport à ces phénomènes. Il s’ensuit que toutes ces âmes (ou âmes pareilles à des substances) et seulement ces âmes qui sont définies par rapport au même plan d’univers peuvent appartenir au même monde.

L’unité de l’univers des monades vient, par conséquent, de l’unité de l’univers des phénomènes sur lequel Dieu se fonde pour créer le monde. Celui-ci n’est alors qu’un « monde virtuel » dans lequel les monades se représentent comme existantes et agissantes. Les monades ne sont donc pas unies dans le monde par des relations d’expression purement externes, mais dans la mesure où elles sont « des instanciations du même plan divin ». Une monade, écrit Rutherford, est, par nature, une source spontanée de représentations d’un univers de phénomènes. Si l’on demande à quel monde cette monade appartient, la seule réponse que l’on puisse donner renverra à l’univers de phénomènes qu’elle exprime de son point de vue unique. Une telle conclusion met au jour les fondements de la doctrine leibnizienne de l’harmonie universelle, qui implique davantage qu’un simple accord entre les états des substances percevantes.

II. REMARQUES GÉNÉRALES 1. Ordre logique et ordre métaphysique La thèse de Rutherford selon laquelle un « univers de phénomènes » est au fondement de l’harmonie des monades et la condition de possibilité de leur unité en un monde unique – thèse que l’on appelera UOP – est originale et brillante. Elle est cependant très déconcertante en ce qu’elle prétend attribuer au phénomène – dont la réalité ou, tout du moins, le fondement réel est toujours resté problématique chez Leibniz – un statut métaphysique plus fondamental qu’à la substance, qui est pourtant chez lui le seul être assurément véritable. UOP revient à expliquer ce qu’il y a de plus réel et de mieux établi dans les choses (les substances) par ce qu’il y a de moins consistant et de moins certain – car la certitude des phénomènes vient d’abord et principalement du sens3. N’est-ce pas une manière de faire dépendre l’être de l’apparaître, si l’on se rappelle que le phénomène est au sens propre ce qui est apparent, ce qui se montre, que cela soit réel ou imaginaire ? Si Leibniz est sans doute le premier philosophe à avoir élévé le phénomène au rang d’objet de connaissance digne de l’investigation scientifique4 (au lieu de le ravaler au statut de pure apparence, de fantôme ou de phantasme), il reste encore pour lui une 3 4

« Phaenomena autem sunt quae sensu certa sunt » (Specimen Hypotheseos demonstrativae, A VI, 3, 3). Cf. D. Schulthess : Leibniz et l’invention des phénomènes, Paris, 2009, p. 40 ; pp. 263–264.

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réalité dégradée, ontologiquement inférieure. Pour preuve : l’expression qui revient souvent sous sa plume à propos de choses qui ne sont pas de véritables êtres et dont il dit qu’elles sont seulement ou ne sont que des phénomènes5. Le phénomène conserve chez Leibniz un sens dépréciatif, car il se caractérise par une déficience ontologique doublée d’une déficience pour ainsi dire épistémologique, comme le montre l’exemple récurrent et paradigmatique de l’arc-en-ciel : L’arc-en-ciel est d’une réalité diminuée (imminutae) sous un double chef, car il est un être par l’agrégation de gouttes, et les qualités par lesquelles il est connu sont apparentes, ou tout du moins de ce genre de choses qui ont du rapport (respectivae) à nos sens6.

Il semble que Rutherford prenne à rebours le projet leibnizien : car la tâche que se donne le philosophe de Hanovre n’est pas de fonder, d’ordonner, d’unifier le monde des monades, mais bien plutôt de trouver le moyen de donner un fondement aux phénomènes et d’expliquer leur ordre. Seul le phénomène est pour lui vraiment problématique. Pourquoi ? Considérons ce qui est phénoménal : la matière, l’agrégat, le composé. Ces choses ont en commun de ne pas exister par soi, d’être dérivées, de dépendre et de résulter d’autre chose et, pour cette raison, doivent s’expliquer par une réalité plus fondamentale : le simple, l’un, la substance. Comment ce qui n’a pas d’unité propre, per se, pourrait-il donner une unité à l’univers ? Prétendre rendre raison du monde des monades en posant à sa base un univers phénoménal, c’est inverser l’ordre logique des raisons qui va de la condition au conditionné ou encore de la cause à l’effet, et l’ordre métaphysique qui va du simple au composé, ou encore de l’un au multiple. On objectera que défendre UOP ne contredit pas cet ordre logique ni cet ordre métaphysique, car UOP ne remet pas en cause la priorité ontologique et logique des monades sur les phénomènes, ni même le caractère dérivé de ceux-ci. Les monades ne dépendent pas des phénomènes quant à leur être ou à leur existence, mais seulement quant à leur capacité à former toutes ensemble un monde unique et cohérent. Reste cependant qu’une monade ne se distingue d’une autre que par la série de ses perceptions singulières, c’est-à-dire pour Leibniz par la loi propre de son développement interne, qui n’est qu’une variation de la loi générale qui règle l’univers7. Affirmer l’antériorité d’un système unique de phénomènes par rapport aux monades créées est donc bien en réalité faire dépendre les substances (dans leur individuation – donc dans leur être – et dans leur existence) des phénomènes et non l’inverse. On répliquera peut-être que ce système qui est, selon Rutherford, le fondement de l’unité de l’univers des monades et de leur harmonie n’a pas le même statut ontologique que les phénomènes perçus par les monades créées. Car il n’est autre que le plan divin de la création. Ce plan est comme l’ichnographie par rapport aux scénographies particulières et toutes différentes que réalisent les monades. Il a une 5 6 7

Voir, par exemple, De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis, A VI, 4-B, 1504 ; lettre à Bourguet GP III, 559, lettre à Bourguet du 20 mars 1714, GP III, 567, et lettre à Remond du 10 janvier 1714, GP III, 606. Notationes generales, A VI, 4-A, 555. Cf. « Reponse aux reflexions contenues dans la seconde Edition du Dictionnaire Critique de M. Bayle article Rorarius, sur le système de l’Harmonie preétablie », GP IV, 553–4.

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consistance ontologique plus forte que celle des perceptions monadiques évanouissantes, car il est en Dieu où il a le même statut que toutes les vérités et les essences. On fera alors la réponse suivante : personne ne nie que ce que chaque monade représente de son point de vue propre est le plan de l’univers, tel que Dieu l’a conçu dans son entendement. Mais pourquoi ce plan devrait-il être un phénomène? Pourquoi devrait-il prendre la forme d’un univers phénoménal et non, plutôt, celle d’un ordre purement intelligible, d’un système de raisons et de lois gouvernant des êtres réels ? L’image de l’ichnographie exprimée par des scénographies multiples suggère l’idée d’un invariant unique par rapport auquel des variations possibles peuvent être pensées. Mais une lecture trop littérale de cette comparaison est source d’erreur, dans la mesure où l’on sait bien que l’ichnographie suppose elle-même l’étendue, et par conséquent se situe déjà dans l’ordre phénoménal8. Autrement dit l’image (tirée de l’architecture) insinue que le modèle ou l’archétype du monde que les monades créées représentent est en fait lui-même phénoménal. Or Leibniz se sert aussi d’autres comparaisons, parmi lesquelles le rapport entre la ligne et son équation mathématique ou entre une suite de nombres et sa loi d’engendrement. Ce recours à des comparaisons variées est sans doute une manière pour lui de prévenir les lectures trop littérales, et de corriger les limites et les défauts d’une comparaison par l’emploi d’une autre. Le rapport qu’il y a entre le dessin d’une ligne ou d’une figure géométrique et son expression mathématique9 ne serait-il pas un modèle plus juste et plus adéquat pour décrire le rapport de nos phénomènes particuliers au plan divin de l’univers ? On sait non seulement qu’une même équation peut avoir plusieurs illustrations différentes, mais encore et surtout que par sa transformation il est possible d’obtenir des lignes et des figures variées. L’exemple le plus souvent évoqué par Leibniz est bien sûr celui de la transformation du cercle en ellipse, mais d’autres cas de transformation continue sont évidemment concevables. Là encore il faut cependant veiller à distinguer entre les figures géométriques telles qu’elles sont engendrées dans l’espace, les unes à partir des autres, et les pures relations mathématiques, abstraites de tout rapport à l’espace et à l’étendue, dont elles sont les illustrations ou les expressions. Si l’on suit cette dernière lecture, le plan divin n’est pas la représentation d’un monde de phénomènes supposant déjà un cadre spatio-temporel, comme l’ichnographie représente un objet par projection géométrale sur un plan à deux dimensions. Il est plutôt un ordre rationnel purement intelligible sans référence aucune à l’espace et au temps, comme l’équation mathématique décrit une ligne et rend raison de son comportement aussi irrégulier et complexe qu’il puisse être. Cette interprétation est confortée par l’idée d’un calcul divin à l’origine du monde, conformément à la célèbre déclaration de Leibniz : « Cum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet fit mundus »10.

8 9 10

Comme le remarque très justement D. Schulthess, op. cit., p. 71. Cf. Discours de métaphysique (abrév. DM), §6. Dialogus, A VI, 4-A, 22.

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2. Ordre intelligible et ordre sensible Rutherford part de la considération de ce que perçoivent les substances (un monde de corps, donc de phénomènes) pour déduire UOP. Or le § 14 du Discours de métaphysique, qui semble pourtant l’un des meilleurs soutiens de sa thèse, affirme que la différence entre la perception divine de l’univers et la perception qu’en ont les monades prises toutes ensemble n’est pas seulement dans le degré mais de nature : Dieu « voit l’univers non seulement comme ils [les individus] le voient, mais encore tout autrement qu’eux tous ». Leibniz ne dit pas que Dieu perçoit plus que toutes les substances réunies (selon un point de vue quantitatif), ni mieux qu’elles (selon un point de vue en quelque sorte qualitatif), mais comme elles (par la science de vision) et complètement différemment d’elles (sans doute par sa science de simple intelligence)11. Que veut-il signifier par tout autrement qu’eux tous ? Il vise certainement un mode de connaissance qui n’est pas réservé à Dieu (sinon il y aurait équivocité), mais qui seul est digne d’un entendement infiniment parfait. Un mode que nous pratiquons très peu car il est pour nous rare et difficile : l’intuition12. Seul Dieu a cette vue perçante, entièrement distincte et complète de l’univers. Or par cette vue, il ne voit pas les choses dans leur succession temporelle ni dans leur distribution spatiale, mais suivant un ordre de nature, c’est-à-dire selon des rapports logiques : […] M. Bayle sait fort bien que l’entendement divin n’a point besoin de temps pour voir la liaison des choses. Tous les raisonnemens sont eminemment en Dieu, et ils gardent un ordre entre eux dans son entendement, aussi bien que dans le nostre : mais chez luy ce n’est qu’un ordre et une priorité de nature, au lieu que chez nous il y a une priorité de temps13.

Dieu, en effet, « voit tout d’un coup toute la suite de cet univers, lorsqu’il le choisit », et il n’a donc « pas besoin de la liaison des effects avec les causes, pour prevoir ces effects. Mais sa sagesse luy faisant choisir une suite parfaitement bien liée, il ne peut manquer de voir une partie de la suite dans l’autre »14. La connaissance intuitive de Dieu de l’univers, dans sa totalité comme dans ses parties infiniment et actuellement divisées, ne saurait être la connaissance d’un système d’apparences existant dans l’espace et dans le temps, car elle va bien au-delà du niveau phénoménal. Un phénomène est ce qui apparaît à un sujet percevant. Pour cette raison, il est lié au sens15 et, plus encore, à la faculté d’imagination16, entendue comme pouvoir de recevoir des images et de penser par images – ce qui ne veut pas dire, bien entendu, que tous les phénomènes soient purement « imaginaires », ou se réduisent à des phantasmes ou des fantômes. Si donc le phénomène dépend de l’exercice de la phantasia17, il ne peut référer qu’à un mode de connaissance infé11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Voir infra, III. 3. Cf. Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis, A VI, 4-A, 588 ; DM §§24–5. Théodicée, §192, GP VI, 230 ; voir aussi §389. Théodicée, §360, GP VI, 329. Cf. A VI, 3, 3, cité supra (II. 1). Comme l’a bien montré D. Schulthess, pp. 55–6 et pp. 184–5. Cf. ibid. pp. 74–5. Leibniz écrit que le corps est « un être de raison ou plutôt d’imagination, un phenomene » (« Entretien de Philarete et d’Ariste », GP VI, 586).

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rieure, chez des êtres limités sujets à des perceptions pour une grande part confuses. Un univers de phénomènes est seulement ce que peut se représenter un être doué de sens et d’imagination, qui ne peut accéder qu’à un petit nombre d’intuitions. Mais ce mode de connaissance est très imparfait et, pour qui, comme Dieu, ne se limite pas à la représentation des choses par images mais s’élève à la pure intellection ou conception (des raisons, des lois, de l’ordre), toutes choses doivent être considérées de façon entièrement distincte et sans image, par l’entendement18. Ces purs rapports logiques que Dieu conçoit et qui décrivent des relations intemporelles et non spatiales, deviennent des rapports sensibles et imaginaires pour les monades créées qui se représentent les choses dans le temps et dans l’espace. Cet ordre logique, qui fait le plan de la création, devient alors l’ordre phénoménal et ce qui était parfaitement distinct pour Dieu devient confus dans la créature. Le rapport entre ces deux ordres est pensé en termes d’expression : le sensible exprime confusément l’intelligible, comme le montre l’exemple de la musique. Le plaisir que nous tirons de l’écoute d’une pièce de musique vient, selon Leibniz, de la perception des « convenances des nombres » et consiste « dans le compte dont nous ne nous appercevons pas, et que l’ame ne laisse pas de faire des battements ou vibrations des corps sonnans, qui se rencontrent par certains intervalles »19. La musique n’est autre qu’une « pratique cachée (exercitium occultum) de l’arithmétique », dans laquelle « l’esprit ne sait pas qu’il compte »20. Nous retrouvons ici l’idée d’un calcul. Et ce qui vaut pour la musique vaut aussi pour d’autres arts et pour d’autres sortes de plaisirs sensibles. Les plaisirs de la vue viennent de la perception des proportions, donc d’un ordre de rapports, et les plaisirs des autres sens « reviendront à quelque chose de semblable, quoique nous ne le puissions pas expliquer si distinctement »21. Dieu voit parfaitement ces rapports, ces convenances, 18

19 20 21

La vision béatifique, promise aux créatures qui aiment Dieu, s’apparente à cette connaissance parfaitement distincte, a priori et purement intellectuelle. Voici comment Leibniz la décrit dans le Systema theologicum : « Tum demum vero cum distincta nostra notitia erit, potabimus fontem rerum ac Deum a facie ad faciem intuebimur. Cum enim Deus sit ultima rerum ratio, ideo tunc utique videbimus Deum cum cognitio erit a priori, per causam causarum, quatenus demonstrationes nostrae neque hypothesibus indigebunt neque experimentis, et rationes rationum reddere poterimus usque ad primitivas veritates » (Examen religionis christianae, A VI, 4-C, 2452). Ajoutons que par la vision béatifique nous connaîtrons avec une certitude absolue s’il y a réellement des choses hors de nous. En cette vie, nous sommes réduits à nous fonder sur l’accord des apparences (qui ne donne qu’une certitude morale), « jusqu’à ce que quelque homme découvre à priori l’origine du monde que nous voyons, et qu’il puise dans le fonds de l’essence pour quoy les choses sont de la maniere qu’elles paroissent : car cela estant, il aura demonstré que ce qui nous paroist, est une realité, et qu’il est impossible que nous en soyons des-abusés jamais. Mais je croy que cela approcheroit fort de la vision béatifique, et qu’il est difficile d’y pretendre dans l’estat où nous sommes » (lettre à Foucher, 1675, A II, 1, 391). C’est, là encore, rappeler que les phénomènes (ce qui apparaît) doivent toujours être reconduits à des raisons plus fondamentales (le « fonds de l’essence »). Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce, §17, édition d’André Robinet, 1954 (5e édition : 2002), p. 61. A. Goldbach (17 avril 1712), Dutens III, 437. Voir aussi « Extrait du Dictionnaire de M. Bayle article Rorarius p. 2599 sqq. de l’Edition de l’an 1702 avec mes remarques », GP IV, 550–1. Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce, §17, p. 61.

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ces proportions, cette harmonie, que nous ne parvenons pas toujours à débrouiller et à dégager dans leur pureté, mais dont le plaisir sensible est l’indice certain22. Ce qui fait la « vérité » du sensible et la certitude du jugement fondé sur lui – et interdit de réduire la distinction entre l’intelligible et le sensible à la distinction entre le vrai et le faux. C’est pourquoi l’artiste qui trouve beau ou raté un tableau ne se trompe pas, même s’il est incapable de rendre raison de son jugement, sinon en disant qu’il y a un je ne sais quoi qui plaît ou qui choque. 3. L’« univers des phénomènes » : un intermédiaire inutile ? Si l’on pose en-deçà de l’ordre des phénomènes un ordre purement intelligible qui en est le fondement et la raison ultimes, alors cet univers de phénomènes supposé par UOP apparaît comme un niveau de réalité intermédiaire et subordonné, qui relève du sens et de l’imagination. Un niveau de réalité – entre cet ordre intelligible et les monades créées avec leurs perceptions et appétitions – dont Dieu n’a pas besoin pour créer et qui, de plus, pourrait bien être un doublon inutile sur le plan de l’explication. On se demande en effet si UOP ne complique pas vainement l’explication des rapports intermonadiques et ne renforce pas paradoxalement la thèse solipsiste – qu’elle prétend pourtant combattre ! –, en posant un monde archétypal de phénomènes à la base de l’harmonie universelle. Au lieu de penser une expression directe par chaque monade des contenus perceptifs de toutes les autres, UOP introduit un intermédiaire commun invariant (« l’univers des phénomènes ») que chaque monade exprime de son point de vue. Le rapport de chaque monade aux autres monades devient alors médiat : mes phénomènes particuliers n’expriment tes phénomènes que dans la mesure où nous exprimons tous deux le même univers phénoménal. Je n’ai donc de rapports aux autres et les autres n’ont de rapports à moi que via un moyen terme : le système des phénomènes auquel nous nous rapportons chacun individuellement et de manière singulière. L’entrexpression ou l’expression mutuelle des monades est la conséquence du principe de transitivité selon lequel deux choses qui en expriment une autre s’expriment entre elles23. On fera sur ce point deux remarques : 1. Loin de rapprocher les monades les unes des autres en les intégrant dans le même monde, il semble que UOP accentue encore l’isolement métaphysique de chacune et finalement conforte l’interprétation solipsiste, puisque chaque monade non seulement n’exerce aucun influence physique sur les autres, mais, dans son expression universelle, n’exprime pas véritablement les autres monades mais plutôt un univers virtuel partagé par tous. 2. L’expression mutuelle des monades s’explique aussi bien et peut-être mieux sans le recours à ce moyen terme qu’est « l’univers des phénomènes ». L’ajout de 22 23

« Donc, même si l’âme ne sent pas qu’elle compte, elle sent pourtant l’effet de ce compte insensible, c’est-à-dire l’agrément qui en résulte dans les consonances, le désagrément dans les dissonances » (A Goldbach, 17 avril 1712, Dutens III, 437 ; nous soulignons). « […] fieri etiam potest ut ea sese mutuo exprimant quae oriuntur ab eadem causa, exempli causa gestus et sermo » (Quid sit Idea, A VI, 4-B, 1371).

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ce niveau supplémentaire complique l’explication des rapports entre les monades parce qu’il introduit un redoublement inutile de l’expression. UOP implique en effet que les phénomènes de chaque monade ne soient en fait que des phénomènes de phénomènes – c’est-à-dire des phénomènes de ces phénomènes archétypaux – et que l’expression réciproque des monades (la représentation dans la monade A de ce qui se passe dans la monade B) revienne à des phénomènes (de A) de phénomènes (de B) de phénomènes (ce monde archétypal). Ce qui conduit à poser des phénomènes de troisième degré, dont on est en droit de s’interroger sur la consistance ontologique et la réalité. Le modèle de UOP est sophistiqué, mais, à la fin, on ne sait plus très bien ce qui est perçu ni quel degré de réalité peut bien encore avoir ce qui est perçu ! Pourquoi ne pas dire d’emblée et plus simplement que les phénomènes de chaque monade expriment directement l’activité de toutes les autres substances, sans passer par l’intermédiaire d’un « univers de phénomènes »? C’est ce que semble bien dire Leibniz lui-même au § 56 de la Monadologie : « Or cette liaison ou cet accommodement de toutes les choses créées à chacune et de chacune à toutes les autres, fait que chaque substance simple a des rapports qui expriment toutes les autres […] » (nous soulignons). Leibniz ne dit pas que chaque substance simple a des rapports qui expriment les rapports de toutes les autres substances simples, mais que les rapports de chaque substance simple expriment les autres substances elles-mêmes. L’expression mutuelle des monades A et B ne repose pas sur l’expression des rapports de la monade B par les rapports de la monade A et, réciproquement, des rapports de la monade A par les rapports de la monade B, mais sur l’expression immédiate des états de B dans A et, réciproquement, des états de A dans B. L’exigence de simplicité et le principe d’économie imposent de renoncer à une hypothèse (« l’univers des phénomènes »), s’il est montré, au mieux, qu’elle n’ajoute rien à l’explication et que l’on peut tout expliquer sans elle, au pire, qu’elle est insuffisante (puisqu’il faut poser, au niveau métaphysique, un niveau intelligible supérieur) et qu’elle rend finalement l’explication plus confuse. On répliquera peut-être que cet « univers des phénomènes » tel que posé par UOP a un avantage théorique : il permet d’éviter d’accréditer la thèse que nous vivons tous un rêve éveillé, en donnant une sorte d’objectivité aux phénomènes, qui ne sont pas seulement ce que je perçois, mais un système d’apparences valable pour tous et existant indépendamment de moi. On répondra 1) que Leibniz n’a pas besoin de supposer un tel univers phénoménal pour que les phénomènes soient bien fondés et même soient dits « vrais » ; 2) que la supposition de cet univers de phénomènes risque précisément de poser la question de la réalité et de la vérité de mes phénomènes par rapport à ces phénomènes « objectifs » – question qui n’a justement plus lieu d’être si l’on écarte cette supposition et que Leibniz règle d’ailleurs sans elle au § 14 du le Discours de métaphysique. Enfin, concernant le statut ontologique particulier de cet univers de phénomènes (qui les différencierait des phénomènes des monades), on ajoutera 3) qu’il ne suffit pas de dire que ces phénomènes archétypaux sont les « phénomènes de Dieu », qu’ils tirent leur réalité de Dieu pour que leur nature change et qu’ils cessent

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d’être ce qu’ils sont. Phénomènes de Dieu ou phénomènes des monades créées, il s’agit toujours de phénomènes. Que Dieu les pense ou les perçoive (de même qu’il perçoit, par sa science de vision, que je me représente actuellement un centaure ou une chimère) ne les rend pas plus réels, à moins de supposer une équivocité dans l’usage du terme de phénomène. Cette équivocité serait difficile à défendre chez un auteur partisan de l’univocité des notions, des principes et des vérités chez tous les esprits – qu’ils soient créés ou non. Mais pour savoir s’il y a ou non équivocité, encore faudrait-il s’entendre sur les termes que l’on utilise. Rutherford ne donne à aucun moment une définition de ce qu’est exactement un phénomène pour Leibniz ni ne s’interroge, d’ailleurs, sur le fait que l’expression « univers de phénomènes », sur laquelle repose pourtant toute sa démonstration, soit absente du corpus leibnizien. Or cette absence n’est pas sans raison, comme vont le prouver les pages qui suivent, en montrant l’incapacité fondamentale des phénomènes à fournir le plan d’un univers. III. DES PHÉNOMÈNES PEUVENT-ILS FORMER UN UNIVERS ? A ma connaissance, l’expression « univers de phénomènes » n’apparaît pas comme telle, sous la plume de Leibniz. Notre philosophe parle de « système général des phénomènes » au § 14 du Discours de métaphysique, ce qui n’est pas la même chose. Un système, en son sens général, désigne un ensemble de choses liées entre elles et ordonnées par des lois communes de sorte à former un tout cohérent24. Les phénomènes constituent un système dans la mesure où ils se produisent de manière réglée, selon un ordre et non de façon désordonnée et déliée comme dans les rêves. Leur connexion, leur congruence et la possibilité de les prévoir sont des indices de leur réalité et les distinguent des phénomènes dits « imaginaires »25. Mais dire qu’ils forment système – et donc qu’ils sont réels – n’est pas dire qu’ils sont le monde ni que le monde puisse s’y réduire, car le système qu’ils constituent fait partie du système du monde, c’est-à-dire de l’univers pris cette fois plus largement comme universitas creaturarum comprenant toutes les substances existantes avec tous leurs états, leurs événements et perceptions. Plus fondamentalement, la thèse selon laquelle l’univers des phénomènes serait d’abord pensé par Dieu, comme archétype, avant les monades, qui ne feraient que l’exprimer de leur point de vue particulier, semble aussi bien incompatible avec la conception leibnizienne du phénomène qu’avec celle qu’il se fait d’un monde.

24 25

Voir, par exemple, Specimen inventorum de admirandis naturae Generalis arcanis, A VI, 4-B, 1630. Cf. De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis, A VI, 4-B, 1500–2.

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1. Qu’est-ce qu’un phénomène ? La notion de phénomène est incontestablement une notion complexe chez Leibniz et admet, comme l’a montré D. Schulthess26, une certaine flexibilité. Le terme est rarement employé seul. Leibniz lui adjoint souvent un adjectif pour le qualifier et le préciser, comme si son sens était en lui-même trop flou et incertain. Il parle ainsi de phénomènes réels, vrais, bien fondés, congruents, consentants, imaginaires, ou encore de purs ou de simples phénomènes. Le phénomène apparaît comme un genre d’être qui comprend des espèces (ainsi la distinction entre phénomènes réels et imaginaires) et, à l’intérieur de chaque espèce, qui est susceptible de comporter différents degrés de réalité : un songe, la parhélie, un arc-en-ciel, un tas de pierres, un troupeau de moutons, une armée, une société, un corps organisé ne sont pas des phénomènes au même titre ni de la même manière. Ces phénomènes diffèrent les uns des autres : 1) par des caractéristiques propres (vivacité, multiplicité, congruence interne ou externe)27, 2) par leur cause et leur rapport au monde externe (puisqu’ils peuvent être des modifications du sujet percevant avec ou sans corrélat « objectif »), 3) par ce qui les compose et ce qui fait leur unité. Car leur unité, qui est dans tous les cas seulement accidentelle, ne repose pas forcément sur le même degré de connexion entre les éléments constituants ou les parties28, et se compose d’ingrédients qui peuvent être à leur tour soit des phénomènes soit des substances véritables. En dépit de ces différences – qui peuvent être considérables – d’un phénomène à l’autre, il semble que Leibniz considère la notion de phénomène à trois niveaux : a) épistémique, b) logique et c) ontologique. a) Conformément à la tradition, il emploie le terme de phénomène pour désigner l’apparence, c’est-à-dire ce qui apparaît à un sujet : « […] phaenomena sive apparitiones, quae in mente mea existunt »29. Les phénomènes, en tant qu’ils sont « des apparences véritables », sont alors confondus avec les « perceptions internes dans l’ame même [qui] luy arrivent par sa propre constitution originale […] »30. En ce sens, les phénomènes ne sont rien en dehors des substances percevantes31. Ils présupposent les substances qui les produisent par leur propre activité spontanée : « C’est qu’il faut donc dire que Dieu a creé d’abord l’ame, ou toute autre unité reelle de telle sorte, que tout luy doit naistre de son propre fonds, par une parfaite spontaneité à l’égard d’elle-même, et pourtant avec une parfaite conformité aux choses de dehors »32.

26 27 28 29 30 31 32

D. Schulthess, p. 98. Cf. De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis, A VI, 4-B, 1500–2. Sur cette connexion, plus ou moins forte et étroite, voir la lettre à Arnauld du 30 avril 1687 (A II, 2, 190). De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis, A VI 4-B, 1500. « Systeme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances […] », GP IV, 484. Cf. lettre à de Volder du 30 juin 1704 (GP II, 270). « Systeme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances […] », GP IV, 484 (nous soulignons).

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Même au § 14 du Discours de métaphysique, où le « système général des phénomènes » apparaît pour ainsi dire indépendant des substances – considérées comme des perspectives sur lui –, la référence à ce « système » s’efface bientôt dans le texte au profit de « tous nos phénomènes », expression qui devient explicitement synonyme de « tout ce qui nous peut jamais arriver ». Or Leibniz dit un peu plus loin, au même § : « rien ne nous peut arriver que des pensées et des perceptions ». L’équivalence est donc en toute rigueur la suivante : phénomènes = tous nos événements et accidents = toutes nos pensées et perceptions. L’indépendance du « système général des phénomènes », comme corrélat objectif de toutes nos perceptions, un instant suggérée, disparaît donc au fil du texte et ne réapparaît nulle part ailleurs dans le Discours. A ma connaissance, on n’en trouve pas trace dans d’autres écrits du philosophe. b) Le même § 14 énonce encore une caractéristique logique du phénomène : les phénomènes, parce qu’ils désignent « tout ce qui nous peut jamais arriver », sont des « prédicats ou événements » contenus dans l’idée ou la notion complète de la substance. Le rapport de la substance aux phénomènes est donc pensé sur le modèle du rapport logique du sujet à ses prédicats dans une proposition. Or on voit mal dans un contexte nominaliste comment des prédicats pourraient être conçus sans un sujet, indépendamment de lui et antérieurement à lui. Pas plus qu’un prédicat ne peut être en dehors d’un sujet, le phénomène ne peut être en dehors de la substance dans laquelle il existe, conformément au principe praedicatum inest subjecto. Poser des phénomènes antérieurement et indépendamment des substances créées revient à séparer le prédicat du sujet, à contredire le principe praedicatum inest subjecto, et à considérer que le prédicat (ce qui est dit du sujet) puisse être premier par rapport au sujet lui-même. Or il est évident que ce qui est dit de quelque chose suppose que ce quelque chose soit déjà posé. c) Enfin, sur le plan ontologique, le phénomène est pour Leibniz ce qui n’existe pas par soi, mais qui résulte ou suit des substances. Il en résulte au sens de la spontanéité, puisque les phénomènes dérivent du fonds des substances elles-mêmes, c’est-à-dire de leur propre nature, mais encore au sens de l’unum per accidens. Les choses matérielles et leurs mouvements ne sont que des phénomènes, écrit Leibniz, c’est-à-dire que « leur realité n’est que dans le consentement des apparences des Monades »33. Le fondement de l’harmonie n’est pas dans les phénomènes partagés par les substances, mais dans les substances elles-mêmes qui expriment ces phénomènes. Les phénomènes ne sont « consentants », réglés et bien fondés que parce qu’ils expriment un ordre plus fondamental qu’eux, un ordre dont ils procèdent : l’ordre effectivement réalisé par les substances créées (lui-même dérivé d’un ordre purement intelligible pensé par Dieu et que les substances instancient). Autrement dit, l’ordre des substances fait l’harmonie des phénomènes, et non l’inverse comme le soutient UOP. Comme l’explique Leibniz à Rémond34, la matière seconde n’est pas une substance, mais « un amas de plusieurs substances » et, par conséquent, « elle est ce qu’on appelle Unum per accidens, en un mot, un phenomene ». Métaphysiquement, 33 34

Lettre à Bourguet du 22 mars 1714 (GP III, 567). Lettre du 4 novembre 1715 (GP III, 657).

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le phénomène n’est rien en dehors de ce dont il est la réunion accidentelle. En tant qu’agrégat, il est seulement un être par convention, opinione, lege, nomôi, et non phusei, par nature, selon la distinction que Leibniz reprend à Démocrite35. Il n’a de réalité que pour autant que ses « composants » sont des êtres doués d’une véritable unité, c’est-à-dire sont des monades. L’unum per se qu’est la substance est premier par rapport à l’unum per accidens qu’est le phénomène. Ou encore : l’être est premier par rapport à la manière d’être, si l’on considère que « ce qui fait l’essence d’un estre par aggregation n’est qu’une maniere d’estre de ceux dont il est composé, par exemple, ce qui fait l’essence d’une armée n’est qu’une maniere d’estre des hommes qui la composent »36. Cette manière d’être – à laquelle se réduit finalement le phénomène – renvoie aux rapports qui régissent un ensemble de substances (par exemple des soldats) et déterminent leur organisation et leur action en vue d’une certaine fin (la bataille). A ces trois niveaux – épistémique, logique et ontologique –, qu’il s’agisse du rapport objet perçu/âme percevante, prédicat/sujet, ou être par agrégation/être réel par soi, le phénomène est toujours dérivé et dépendant de la ou des substances, non seulement dans sa production, mais encore dans sa constitution même, dans son essence. Il ne saurait donc servir de fondement à l’ordre intermonadique. Il est effet plutôt que cause, conséquence plutôt que condition. Sa dépendance est rappelée dans la Conversation sur la liberté et le destin, lorsque Leibniz parle de ces deux règnes « s’entrerépondant exactement », l’un des causes finales, l’autre des efficientes, dans un univers qui « soumet le monde materiel ou des corps à celuy des esprits et le physique au moral, le mecanisme à la metaphysique reelle, les notions abstraites aux complètes, les phenomenes ou résultats aux vrayes substances, qui ne sont que des unités et subsistent tousjours […] »37. 2. L’activité des substances Il paraît donc difficile de concevoir un « univers de phénomènes » sans les substances dont ils procèdent – ou indépendamment d’elles –, les phénomènes sans les sujets dont ils sont les perceptions et les prédicats. Que pourrait être et représenter cet univers sans les substances ? Il est impossible d’admettre l’existence de prédicats subsistant sans sujets, de manières d’être sans êtres, comme il est contradictoire de poser un apparaître sans un sujet auquel quelque chose apparaît. Le problème est celui d’un perçu sans percevant, mais encore celui d’un actum sans agens, et d’événements (tout ce qui arrive) sans sujets de ces événements (auxquels ce qui arrive arrive justement). La substance n’est pas seulement un point de vue sur un monde qui lui serait extérieur et qu’elle reflèterait passivement comme un miroir : le monde se réalise par elle, par sa spontanéité, car la substance est active, productrice d’effets et d’événements, c’est-à-dire source des phénomènes. 35 36 37

Lettre à Arnauld du 30 avril 1687 (A II, 2, 191) ; lettre à Bayle (1702), GP III, 69 ; lettre à de Volder (1703), GP II, 252. Lettre à Arnauld du 30 avril 1687 (A II, 2, 185). Grua, 486. Nous soulignons.

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Deux remarques s’imposent alors : 1. le phénomène s’explique par la substance et non l’inverse, de sorte qu’il ne peut servir, seul, à rendre raison de ce qui se passe réellement dans le monde, comme l’illustre l’exemple du mouvement. 2. Les comparaisons leibniziennes – la substance assimilée à un miroir, le monde comme une ville regardée de différents points de vue – doivent être considérées avec circonspection et non interprétées en un sens trop littéral. 1. La considération des phénomènes ne permet pas d’assigner avec certitude la cause réelle des changements qui arrivent dans le monde. Car les mêmes phénomènes peuvent être expliqués de plusieurs manières, exactement comme en astronomie différentes hypothèses sont possibles pour rendre raison du mouvement apparent des astres. Dans un système de trois corps (a, b, c) par exemple, le changement apparent de place de c (disons de 2 mètres vers la droite) peut s’expliquer aussi bien par la translation effective de c (a et b restant immobiles), que par la translation simultanée de a et de b (conservant exactement entre eux le même rapport) de 2 mètres vers la gauche, c demeurant au repos38. Il est donc impossible, sur la seule base des phénomènes, de déterminer laquelle des deux hypothèses est vraie et donc de savoir ce qui est réellement mû. En ajoutant un quatrième corps (d), on augmente encore le nombre des hypothèses explicatives possibles ; et il est évident que, à l’échelle de l’univers, ce nombre devient pour ainsi dire infini. Mais si l’on suppose que c en se déplaçant vers la droite rencontre d, il y a moyen de trancher parmi les hypothèses : car dans ce cas, « de la simple considération mathématique du changement de place (situs), on passe à une considération physique, à savoir à une action, puisqu’il s’en suivra une communication de mouvement, qui fera voir qu’une action doit être attribuée à c »39. On verra que c est en mouvement (et non a et b), parce que c agit sur d et lui transmet son mouvement. La conclusion est évidente : les phénomènes ne peuvent servir à expliquer l’ordre fondamental des choses et les rapports intersubstantiels. Ils ne sauraient être ce sur quoi Dieu se fonde (« the ground plan of the universe ») pour créer et ordonner les substances, car ils ne permettent pas de déterminer de façon univoque et certaine ce qui véritablement change et est changé, ce qui agit et ce qui pâtit. La seule façon de le savoir est d’envisager un autre niveau que celui, phénoménal, du changement de place (situs), et de s’élever à une réalité supra-géométrique : l’action produite par la force, elle-même rapportée à une substance. Il ne s’agit plus seulement de dire que les phénomènes dépendent, dans leur être et dans leur production, des substances, mais que le système qu’ils forment est tout simplement incapable de fournir un quelconque « plan » d’univers, comme l’affirme UOP. En effet, comment ce système pourrait-il fonder l’unité de « l’univers des monades » (selon l’expression de Rutherford), alors qu’il ne montre pas comment ces monades sont unies, c’est-à-dire de quelle manière elles sont connectées et interagissent ? 2. La comparaison de la substance avec le miroir est source de contresens. Leibniz invite à ne pas la prendre de façon littérale40, car elle est en un sens très imparfaite : assimilée à un simple reflet, la substance apparaît purement réceptive 38 39 40

Cf. Specimina de motus causa et de corporum qualitatibus, A VI, 4-C, 2017–8. Ibid., 2018. Il insiste en effet sur le caractère « vivant » et actif de la substance-miroir (par exemple : « Prin-

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et passive, alors qu’elle se définit essentiellement par l’action : « Il n’y a que les substances qui agissent et il n’y a point de substances qui n’agissent »41. L’image de la ville regardée depuis différents endroits, pour illustrer la relation des substances individuelles au monde, fait également difficulté. Elle semble pour une part inadéquate, dans la mesure où la substance est à la fois un point de vue particulier sur le tout du monde et une partie constituante de ce tout, alors que les points de vue sur la ville ne sont pas une partie de la ville. La ville est distincte des représentations qui en sont faites à partir des diverses situations de celui qu’en a celui qui la regarde selon les diverses situations où il se trouve. Comme on l’a dit, la comparaison suppose, de plus, une extériorité entre l’exprimé et l’exprimant incompatible avec la notion de substance et de monde, tels que Leibniz les conçoit. Car en faisant de l’expression un attribut essentiel de la substance, Leibniz inscrit dans sa nature la relation à autre chose qu’elle-même, à un « dehors ». Ce qui exclut d’emblée tout espèce de solipsisme, puisqu’il n’y a pas de substance (l’exprimant) sans tous ses prédicats, sans les rapports à toutes les autres substances, c’est-à-dire sans le monde (l’exprimé). Le rapport d’expression se complique donc, puisqu’il se double d’un rapport tout/partie : les substances ne se contentent pas de représenter et, pour certaines, de connaître l’univers, comme s’il était extérieur à elles et leur préexistait, elles le constituent. Elles ne reflètent pas seulement le monde, elles ne contiennent pas seulement un monde, elles sont le monde ou tout du moins dans le monde. L’exprimé (le tout) contient l’exprimant (les substances) et l’exprimant constitue l’exprimé lui-même, de sorte qu’il est impossible de penser l’un sans l’autre. Qu’est-ce alors que l’univers ? A la fois ce qui est représenté et ce qui représente, le reflet et le miroir : riche de ses représentations diverses (qui le multiplient), l’univers contient toutes les substances et tout ce qu’elles expriment, à savoir l’ensemble de leurs phénomènes. Il n’y a pas alors d’antériorité chronologique ni même de priorité logique des phénomènes sur le « monde des substances », parce que phénomènes et substances sont d’emblée compris de manière absolument indissociable. 3. Les « phénomènes de Dieu » : science de vision vs science de simple intelligence Ce qui a été dit jusque-là des phénomènes vaut-il également dans le cas de Dieu ? Ces « phénomènes de Dieu », dont parle Leibniz in GP II, 438 – et que Rutherford cite à l’appui de UOP –, ont-ils un statut particulier, sont-ils d’une essence qui empêcherait qu’on les considère de la même façon que les phénomènes des monades créées ? Rien n’indique une équivocité dans l’usage du terme. Par phénomène Leibniz entend bien ce qui « apparaît » à Dieu (par opposition à ce qui nous apparaît), ce qu’il voit (par sa science de vision), voire ce qu’il « sent »42. Du point de vue épisté-

41 42

cipes de la Nature et de la Grâce », §3 ; Monadologie, §56 ; lettre à Remond du 11 Fevrier 1715, GP III, 636). Lettre à Le Long (14 mars 1713), in: A. Robinet : Malebranche et Leibniz. Relations personnelles, Vrin, 1955, p. 423. Cf. « Cinquième écrit à Clarke », §87, GP VII, 411.

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mique, ce que Dieu perçoit se distinguerait-il cependant de ce que nous percevons, en tant que sa représentation serait l’archétype dont nos représentations sont les expressions limitées ? La comparaison architecturale de l’ichnographie exprimée par des scénographies diverses pourrait aller dans le sens de cette interprétation. Pourtant, en replaçant dans son contexte le passage évoqué (GP II, 438) et en le rapprochant d’autres de la correspondance avec des Bosses, une autre lecture se dessine. L’objet de l’échange entre Leibniz et des Bosses est connu : il s’agit de la possibilité d’expliquer le mystère eucharistique à partir des thèses monadologiques. La discussion conduit à s’interroger sur la nature du corps et à se demander s’il est un phénomène ou une substance – et ce que pourrait être alors cette substance composée. L’enjeu n’est pas seulement métaphysique. Sur le plan théologique, la question soulève une difficulté spécifique, liée au statut des apparences (pain et vin), lesquelles demeurent identiques après le miracle, une fois le pain et le vin « devenus » corps et sang du Christ. Le problème est le suivant : si le corps est phénomène et si ce phénomène diffère d’un sujet à l’autre, alors il n’aura aucune réalité en lui-même, de sorte que le miracle ne sera proprement rien, ni du point de vue substantiel ni du point de vue des apparences, car il ne s’accompagnera d’aucun changement réel ni visible dans la perception – le pain et le vin conservant exactement le même aspect qu’auparavant ! Pour sauvegarder la vérité du miracle, il faut poser qu’en dépit de l’absence de modification perceptible par les créatures finies que nous sommes, il y a bien un changement véritable dans les choses, changement que voient nécessairement Dieu, ainsi que les anges et bienheureux auxquels il donne le pouvoir de « voir les choses en vérité »43. Mais si les monades ne sont pas une partie substantielle des corps, et si les composés sont de purs phénomènes, il faudra dire que la substance des corps consiste en phénomènes véritables, que Dieu, lui, perçoit en eux par la science de vision, de même que les anges et les bienheureux, auxquels il est donné de voir les choses en vérité ; aussi doit-on dire que Dieu et les bienheureux perçoivent le corps du Christ là où nous apparaissent le pain et le vin44.

Ainsi, dans l’hypothèse où le corps n’est qu’un phénomène et où par conséquent l’eucharistie n’est pas une transsubstantiation (remplacement d’une substance par une autre), mais la substitution d’une apparence par une autre, il faut, pour que cette substitution ne soit pas purement illusoire45, qu’elle soit fondée, c’est-à-dire que le changement opéré, qui ne nous apparaît pas, soit néanmoins vrai et accessible à des esprits plus parfaits que nous. Ce que Leibniz appelle « phénomène de Dieu » est ce phénomène véritable, en l’absence de modification substantielle, qui garantit l’effectivité et la vérité du miracle. Mais il n’est en aucun cas la représentation objective (archétypale) que nous exprimerions de notre point de vue singulier et limité, puisque nos perceptions ne l’expriment pas justement, elles qui ne rendent pas compte du changement produit. Pour nous, c’est-à-dire selon nos apparences, rien ne se passe. Le hiatus entre les phénomènes de Dieu et nos phénomènes inter43 44 45

Lettre à des Bosses du 24 janvier 1713 (GP II, 474). Ibid. ; voir aussi la lettre à des Bosses du 23 août 1713 (GP II, 482). Et que la croyance en ce mystère ne soit absurde.

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dit de penser les premiers comme les modèles sur lesquels se fondent toujours les seconds. Seule la foi permet de combler cet écart entre ce qui m’apparaît et, non pas ce qui est, mais ce qui apparaît à Dieu et aux bienheureux – rappelons ici que la représentation en eux du corps et du sang du Christ qui succède à celle du pain et du vin est certes vraie, mais ne réfère pas plus que nos apparences à quelque chose de substantiel dans les choses. On objectera que le texte publié in GP II, 438 a une portée plus générale, qu’il dépasse le problème particulier de l’eucharistie, puisque Leibniz y affirme non seulement que les corps, mais encore que l’espace, le mouvement et le temps sont de tels « phénomènes de Dieu », et n’ont de réalité qu’en tant qu’ils sont perçus par lui. Cela permet-il d’identifier ces phénomènes à un système d’apparences préexistant aux monades, sur la base duquel celles-ci seraient créées et ordonnées ? Rien n’est moins sûr, comme le montrent les trois remarques suivantes. 1. Il faut garder à l’esprit que le passage considéré est entièrement placé sous le régime de la condition (« Si corpora sunt phaenomena […] »), et vise à déduire les conséquences de l’hypothèse du corps pris comme phénomène. Il convient donc de ne pas tirer de conclusions hâtives et générales qui vaudraient dans la seconde hypothèse, à savoir si les corps étaient des substances. Car si la nature du corps n’est pas purement phénoménale, mais qu’il est constitué d’une multitude de monades liées entre elles, sa réalité est alors parfaitement fondée, de façon pourrait-on dire « objective », sans qu’il soit besoin de se référer à ce que Dieu perçoit. Alors que dans la première hypothèse (le corps-phénomène), seules les apparences de Dieu garantissent que les corps ne sont pas de simples illusions des sens ou de l’imagination, et permettent de poser des phénomènes invariants et univoques au milieu des représentations changeantes et plurielles des créatures, dans la seconde (le corps-substance), la réduction du corps à un assemblage de monades suffit à assurer sa consistance ontologique et à établir l’existence de phénomènes « bien fondés » et « véritables » en eux-mêmes (et non parce qu’ils sont, par ailleurs, des représentations de Dieu). 2. On soulignera la prudence de Leibniz : « […] la réalité des corps, de l’espace, du mouvement et du temps semble (videtur) consister en ce qu’ils sont des phénomènes de Dieu […] »46. Cette prudence s’explique par le fait qu’il est toujours difficile de parler de phénomènes dans le cas de Dieu, en raison du caractère passif et imparfait lié à la notion d’apparence, généralement appliquée plutôt aux créatures47. On l’a dit : reste attachée au phénomène l’idée d’une réalité dépréciée, essentiellement inférieure à la chose (res). « Notre esprit fait le phénomène, l’esprit divin fait la chose »48. C’est pourquoi Leibniz insiste, dans le même passage, sur la différence entre ce qui nous apparaît et ce qui « apparaît » à Dieu. Si l’on met de côté l’aspect un peu étrange, sinon incongru, de l’expression « phénomènes de Dieu » (liée, selon nous, au contexte de la discussion sur l’eucharistie), que veut dire ici notre philosophe ? Il ne fait que rappeler des thèses qui lui sont chères et 46 47 48

Lettre à des Bosses, GP II, 438. Voir sur ce point G. Brown: « God’s Phenomena and the Pre-Established Harmony », in Studia Leibnitiana, XIX/2 (1987), p. 206. « Nostra Mens phaenomenon facit, divina Rem » (C, 528).

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qu’il a déjà maintes fois exprimées : à savoir, d’une part, que le mouvement et la figure – dont Descartes faisait les modes de l’étendue, attribut principal des corps – renferment « quelque chose d’imaginaire et d’apparent »49, et ne sont donc pas véritablement réels ; d’autre part, que l’espace et le temps n’ont aucune existence ni réalité en soi, car ils ne sont que l’ordre de coexistence et de succession des choses. Corps, mouvement, espace et temps ne sont rien d’autre que l’expression de modifications et de rapports dans et entre les monades. Au-delà de ce que montrent les phénomènes – l’étendue et ses modes, le changement de place, la situation respective des choses et leur durée –, Dieu voit des relations idéales entre les substances, c’est-à-dire, on l’a vu, des rapports fondamentalement logiques. Voilà ce qui est réel, voilà ce à quoi se réduisent, en dernière instance, tous les phénomènes – y compris ceux de Dieu : « Bien plus, Dieu ne voit pas seulement les monades singulières et les modifications de chacune d’elles, mais encore leurs relations, et c’est en cela que consiste la réalité des relations et des vérités »50. Nulle référence ici à un quelconque monde phénoménal archétypal. Ce n’est pas ce que perçoit Dieu (des phénomènes), mais ce qu’il conçoit dans son entendement (des relations et des ordres) qui est au fondement des choses, comme l’indiquait déjà Leibniz dans les Nouveaux Essais : « Les relations et les ordres ont quelque chose de l’etre de raison, quoiqu’ils ayent leur fondement dans les choses. Car on peut dire que leur realité, comme celle des verités eternelles, et des possibilités, vient de la supreme raison »51. 3. On rappelera enfin que Leibniz corrige, ou tout du moins précise l’expression « phénomènes de Dieu », en la rapprochant d’une autre qui permet d’en expliciter le sens : « [les corps, l’espace, le mouvement le temps] sont des phénomènes de Dieu, ou (seu) l’objet de la science de vision »52. La conjonction seu ne pose pas ici une alternative mais une équivalence qui permet d’identifier ces phénomènes divins au contenu de la science de vision. C’est encore ce que suggère la lettre du 24 janvier 1713, dans laquelle le philosophe affirme que si les corps ne sont que des phénomènes, alors leur « substance […] consiste en phénomènes véritables, que Dieu, lui, perçoit en eux par la science de vision […] »53. Ces phénomènes ne sont pas le plan à partir duquel le monde est créé : ils supposent au contraire ce plan déjà conçu (dans la science de simple intelligence) et même choisi, puisqu’ils font partie de cette science qui a pour objet les « choses actuelles » (Scientia Actualium), c’està-dire le « monde amené à l’existence », avec « tout ce qu’il y a en lui de passé, de présent et de futur »54. Ils sont à Dieu ce que la perception est aux substances créées, c’est-à-dire rien de plus que la vision complète de cet agrégat et de cette suite de toutes les choses finies qui constituent notre univers. Rappelons que, pour Leibniz, la science de vision se distingue de la science de simple intelligence (c’est-à-dire des possibles), en ce qu’elle contient, outre la 49 50 51 52 53 54

Lettre à Foucher du 23 mai 1687 (A II, 2, 202). Lettre à des Bosses, GP II, 438. Nouveaux Essais, livre II, chap. 25, §1 (A VI, 6, 227) ; voir aussi chap. 30, §4 (A VI, 6, 265). Lettre à des Bosses, GP II, 438. Lettre à des Bosses, GP II, 474. Causa Dei, §16, GP VI, 441. Voir aussi Théodicée, §40, GP VI, 124.

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connaissance de ce monde comme possible, « la connaissance réflexive par laquelle Dieu connaît son propre décret de l’amener à l’existence »55. La science de simple intelligence est donc logiquement antérieure à la science de vision, comme le possible précède l’actuel, l’entendement la volonté. En effet : alors que les possibles dépendent seulement de l’entendement, les actuels (actualia) dépendent non seulement de l’intelligence de Dieu (qui les considère comme possibles), mais encore de sa volonté (qui les choisit)56. La conclusion s’impose : le monde ne peut avoir été créé sur la base de la science de vision (et donc des phénomènes qu’elle contient), d’une part, parce que cette science, comme science des actuels, suppose que ce monde soit déjà amené à l’existence par la volonté de Dieu ; d’autre part, parce qu’elle ne considère qu’un seul monde (à la différence de la science de simple intelligence), alors que Leibniz soutient que le choix divin se fait à partir de la considération d’une infinité de possibles. Ainsi, affirmer que Dieu crée le monde en se fondant sur un système de phénomènes (les « phénomènes de Dieu »), c’est-à-dire sur sa science de vision, revient à poser que le monde existe avait que d’être (ce qui est contradictoire), et qu’il n’y a qu’un seul monde possible (ce qui détruit la liberté divine et la contingence). Seule la science de simple intelligence – qui n’envisage pas seulement ce monde, mais une infinité d’autres, avant tout décret concernant la création de l’un d’entre eux – peut fournir le « plan » de l’univers (et donc servir de base à sa création), comme de tous les autres univers possibles ; mais, répétons-le, elle porte sur des possibles qui n’existent pas en acte et sur leurs connexions57, et non sur des phénomènes. IV. CONCLUSION : UNITÉ ET COMPOSSIBILITÉ Le manque de réalité propre aux phénomènes, leur dépendance à l’égard des substances, leur incapacité à déterminer un ordre univoque et certain de relations entre elles, remettent en cause l’hypothèse d’un système d’apparences au fondement de l’harmonie universelle. Et cela quand bien même on identifierait ce système aux « phénomènes de Dieu ». Ceux-ci, qui font la science de vision, ne sauraient en effet avoir une antériorité chronologique ni logique par rapport au monde, mais présupposent au contraire son actualité. UOP semble donc difficile à soutenir, d’autant que son apport, sur le plan théorique, est contestable : non seulement parce que UOP introduit un intermédiaire inutile entre le niveau intelligible (l’ordre idéal des raisons) et le niveau sensible (les perceptions), mais encore parce qu’elle complique l’explication sans véritablement donner de solution à la question du fondement de l’unité du monde et au problème de la compossibilité. Rutherford estime que le consentement des monades, c’est-à-dire l’accord entre leurs contenus perceptifs, ne saurait suffire à faire l’unité du monde. Sur ce point il a raison. Cet accord n’est pas la cause de cette unité, mais son effet. Pour autant, l’unité du monde ne vient pas d’un univers phénoménal préexistant que les 55 56 57

Causa Dei, §16, GP VI, 441. Voir aussi Théodicée, §363, GP VI, 330. Causa Dei, §9, GP VI, 440. Cf. ibid. §8 et §14, GP VI, 440.

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substances partageraient, en l’exprimant chacune de son point de vue, mais de leurs relations idéales que Dieu conçoit avant de créer, et que les apparences expriment de façon sensible dans le cadre spatio-temporel. L’harmonie des phénomènes dérive de l’harmonie fondamentale et primitive des monades, et non l’inverse. En vérité, l’unité du monde devient problématique dès lors que, à l’instar de UOP, après avoir retiré les substances du « monde » (considéré d’abord et fondamentalement comme système de phénomènes), on cherche à les y réintroduire. Tel est l’effort entrepris par Rutherford dans la seconde section de son article. Effort inutile si l’on pose d’emblée que les substances sont dans le monde, et même qu’elles sont le monde, c’est-à-dire ce qu’il y a de véritablement réel en lui. Rappelons que Rutherford tire la conclusion de l’existence d’un univers de phénomènes en partant de ce que la substance perçoit, par l’intermédiaire de son corps : à savoir un univers de corps liés les uns aux autres dans l’espace et dans le temps, où il n’y a pas de vide, c’est-à-dire un monde matériel plein. Ce monde ne peut être que phénoménal, puisque la matière est un phénomène. On avouera que la démarche est curieuse, dans la mesure où l’auteur prétend fonder l’harmonie universelle sur tout autre chose que les perceptions des monades créées, et ne s’appuie pourtant que sur ce que ces perceptions révèlent. Et que révèlent-elles ? Des phénomènes et seulement des phénomènes. Elles ne sauraient rien livrer d’autre ! Le raisonnement repose donc sur un paralogisme, car il part de la perception pour conclure à l’existence d’un monde phénoménal distinct du contenu perceptif des substances. On passe subrepticement de la représentation à ce qui est. Or rien n’autorise un tel saut du plan épistémique (ce que perçoivent les monades) au plan métaphysique ou ontologique (la réalité de ce qui constitue le monde), puisque de l’un à l’autre la conséquence n’est pas forcément bonne (non valet consequentia). Il est certain que pour les monades, l’univers apparaît comme un « univers de corps liés dans l’espace et le temps », et donc comme un univers matériel. Mais l’on n’est nullement fondé à affirmer, sur la seule base des représentations monadiques, que le monde se réduit effectivement à la matière, par conséquent à un système de phénomènes. Surtout si les corps sont des substances ou des composés de substances, lesquelles sont toujours actives et productrices d’effets – ce qui fait que la matière est « pleine de vie ». Il est vrai que le corps est ce par quoi nous percevons le monde : il est au sens propre l’incarnation du point de vue et il ne nous donne à voir que des corps. Est-ce suffisant pour prouver que la réalité du monde n’est que corporelle ? Evidemment non. Aussi serait-il abusif de prétendre, en s’appuyant sur quelques passages58 qui définissent le monde comme un agrégat de corps, que la conception leibnizienne de l’univers est fondamentalement celle d’un système matériel. Leibniz dit expressément le contraire à de Volder en affirmant que tout l’univers consiste dans les substances simples59, et il indique à Clarke que, pour

58 59

Ces passages ne font que reprendre la définition traditionnelle du monde - comme ensemble de toute la matière -, héritée d’Aristote (De caelo, I, 9, 279a). Lettre à de Volder, GP II, 270 : « [aliis substantiis simplicibus] ex quibus totum consistit Universum ».

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lui, le monde est « tout l’univers des creatures materielles et immaterielles prises ensemble, depuis le commencement des choses […] »60. En définitive, seul le § 14 du Discours de métaphysique pourrait encore servir de soutien à UOP – soutien toutefois bien fragile compte tenu de ce qui précède. Mais dans ce paragraphe même apparaît l’insuffisance de la solution proposée au problème de la compossibilité, solution pourtant présentée comme l’un des acquis théoriques majeurs de UOP. En effet, le critère dégagé par Rutherford – appartiennent au même monde les substances qui expriment le même et unique univers de phénomènes – n’est en rien discriminant, puisque par définition toutes les substances y satisfont. Leibniz ne parle que d’un seul « système général des phénomènes » produit par Dieu pour manifester sa gloire, système dont les substances sont autant de représentations singulières possibles. Si donc Dieu choisit de créer certaines substances plutôt que d’autres, ce n’est pas parce que ces dernières seraient incompatibles avec le monde – elles sont toutes compatibles avec lui, puisque toutes l’expriment –, mais pour des raisons que UOP ne donne pas. Contrairement à ce qu’affirme Rutherford, UOP ne résout donc pas la question de l’origine de la compossibilité et de l’incompossibilité de certains possibles. Le § 14 semble constituer dans le corpus leibnizien un hapax. Leibniz n’y considère qu’un système général des phénomènes sans évoquer explicitement d’autres systèmes possibles. Par conséquent, le seul moyen d’obtenir des mondes différents semble être, à partir d’un unique et même plan général, de faire varier les points de vue sur lui, c’est-à-dire de choisir des substances différentes. Autrement dit, il suffisait à Dieu de faire advenir à l’existence d’autres perspectives sur les phénomènes que celles qu’il a finalement choisies, pour produire un autre monde que le nôtre. La différence d’un univers à l’autre ne serait pas dans l’exprimé (toujours identique), mais viendrait seulement de l’exprimant. Les mondes possibles ne seraient alors que les scénographies diverses de cette même ichnographie décrite par le « système général des phénomènes ». On objectera peut-être que rien n’empêche de considérer d’autres systèmes de phénomènes possibles, comme autant de plans différents susceptibles d’être instanciés par les substances. Cela impliquerait qu’il n’y a pas seulement une infinité de plans possibles, mais encore une infinité de manières différentes de réaliser chacun d’eux, selon les points de vue (substances) choisis. Une telle interprétation est-elle recevable ? Elle soulève deux difficultés, selon nous dirimantes : 1) elle n’est pas dans les textes, et notablement absente du Discours de métaphysique. 2) Elle mêle deux thèses de la création du monde par Dieu, historiquement incompatibles : l’une à partir d’un système général de phénomènes, l’autre à partir de la considération d’une infinité de mondes possibles. Cette dernière thèse prévaudra dans les textes postérieurs au Discours. Il ne s’agira plus de penser la production du monde à partir des substances-points-de-vue, mais, à l’inverse, de penser la production des substances à partir du monde, ou plus exactement à partir d’un monde possible, considéré comme une série particulière de créatures possibles. L’évolution théorique est considérable, car l’objet du choix divin change : il n’est plus de réaliser certaines 60

« Cinquième écrit à Clarke », § 59, GP VII, 406. Nous soulignons.

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perspectives – à l’exclusion d’autres pourtant également possibles – sur un système de phénomènes, il est de créer un univers déterminé, avec tout ce qu’il contient – les substances avec leurs accidents, leurs événements et leurs phénomènes –, au détriment d’une infinité d’autres univers possibles, comportant chacun les substances qui lui sont propres, avec leurs accidents, leurs événements et leurs phénomènes particuliers. La correspondance avec Arnauld et les textes qui lui sont contemporains témoignent de ce tournant majeur61. Leibniz insiste sur le fait qu’une substance individuelle est inséparable du monde dont elle fait partie, de sorte que la volonté particulière de Dieu qui la fait exister est comprise « virtuellement » dans celle, plus générale, qui porte sur le monde entier62. Chaque décret « particulier » reflète ou exprime le décret général de créer cet univers-là. Ou plutôt : il n’y a pas de tel décret particulier, si l’on entend par là une volonté détachée, qui ne concernerait qu’un individu et indépendante du reste, mais un seul et unique décret qui porte sur toute la série des choses. Comme le dira en 1707 Leibniz à Coste, Dieu ne règle pas les choses « par lambeaux et à baston rompu »63. Il ne faut donc pas croire que c’est parce que Dieu a décidé de créer cet Adam possible qu’il a décidé de tout ce qui s’ensuivait, mais, à l’inverse, que cette résolution de le créer, et avec lui toutes les autres choses particulières, sont une suite d’un décret qu’il prend à l’égard de tout l’univers64. Répétons-le : le choix de Dieu ne porte plus sur des substances possibles « instanciant » un unique système phénoménal (comme le suggèrait le § 14 du Discours), mais sur des mondes possibles65 en nombre infini, faits chacun « tout d’une pièce », où tout est lié de sorte qu’on ne saurait y changer la moindre chose sans faire un autre monde66 ; ce qui ne saurait arriver selon la conception défendue au § 14, où l’absence d’une substance, son remplacement par une autre ne modifient en rien le plan général de l’univers des phénomènes. Ici un exprimant peut manquer, l’exprimé restera inchangé. Là (après le Discours) un exprimant manque et l’exprimé n’est plus le même.

61 62 63 64 65 66

Pour une analyse de ce tournant, voir notre livre : La question du mal chez Leibniz. Fondements et élaboration de la Théodicée, Paris, 2008, en particulier pp. 290–304. Lettre au Landgrave Ernst de Hessen-Rheinfels du 12 avril 1686 (A II, 2, 18). Lettre à Coste du 19 décembre 1707 (GP III, 400). Cf. Remarques sur la lettre de M. Arnauld […], A II, 2, 47–48. Dont la première occurrence sous la plume de Leibniz figure, comme telle, dans le De libertate, fato, gratia Dei (début à hiver 1686/87 ?), A VI, 4-B, 1612 ; voir aussi la lettre à Arnauld du 14 juillet 1686 (A II, 2, 73). Cf. Théodicée, §9, GP VI, 107–8.

HARMONY, REALITY AND THE TEMPORAL UNITY OF A MONAD: 1695–1705 Martha Brandt Bolton 1 Leibniz writes in a very early work (1666) that harmony and discord “consist in the ratio [ratione] of identity to diversity, for harmony is unity in multiplicity.” (“Confessio”; A VI, 3, 122; Sleigh, pp. 43–4)1 The harmony in a possible world is a measure of the perfection of the world: “This harmony is the way of obtaining as much variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible, that is, obtaining as much perfection as possible.” (Monadologie [= Mon] § 56–58; GP VI, 616; AG, p. 220)2 The actual world has a pre-established harmony which is a mark of its maximal perfection. It is remarkable because all the states of a simple substance arise from its own depths, but in an order so finely coordinated with other substances that each simple substance continually expresses, from its unique point of view, everything that happens in the others3. Because all changes in a simple substance are due to its nature alone (with concurrence of God), the actions of one substance never interfere with those of another. Yet since their natures are dissimilar, it might seem that aims of their actions might sometimes conflict. This might, in a way, be possible since their natures are essentially representative; they might each represent a world in which the series of events diverges from that represented by the others, so that although they actually coexist, they represent things which are mutually inconsistent. The pre-established harmony that obtains in the actual world ensures against this sort of disorder. As Leibniz explains: The nature of every simple substance, soul, or true monad being such that its following state is a consequence of the preceding one, here now is the cause of the harmony found out. For God has only to make a simple substance be one and from the beginning a representation of the universe, according to its point of view: since from this alone it follows that it will be so perpetually, and that all simple substances will always have a harmony among themselves, 1

2 3

G. W. Leibniz: Confessio philosophi: Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671–1678, ed. and trans. Robert Sleigh with contributions from Brandon Look and James Stam, New Haven 2005. [= Confessio]; R. C. Sleigh: Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence, New Haven 1990 [= Sleigh]. G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, eds and trs. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis 1989 [= AG]. A ‘simple substance’ is immaterial. In his mature period, Leibniz recognizes corporeal substances which are constituted by infinitely many simple substances and derive their temporal unity from one simple substance that is dominant. Simple substances are also called ‘souls’ or ‘soul like entelechies’, ‘substantial forms’, and ‘monads’.

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Martha Brandt Bolton because they always represent the same universe. (Fifth letter to Clarke, n. 91; GP VII, 412; L, pp. 711–12, emphasis added)4

Simple substances harmonize in virtue of what they express, represent or, as Leibniz often says, perceive5. The universe which is perceived by all substances is corporeal. It exhibits unity in multiplicity for although the continuity of matter implies that the motion of any body is opposed by bodies around it, their opposition is resolved in accord with harmonious laws of motion. This does not indicate any conflict among perceivers. As Leibniz writes to Burcher De Volder in 1704: “[M]atter and motion are not so much substances or things as the phenomena of perceivers, the reality of which is located in the harmony of perceivers with themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers.” (To De Volder, 30 June 1704; A II, 270; Lodge, p. 307)6 The harmony internal to each actual simple substance and the harmony among all such substances are the source of the very reality of the corporeal world. In Leibniz’s thought, the notion of the reality of a thing is the notion of its possibility, intelligibility, and eligibility for creation. Possible things, as possibilities, are identified with essences in the understanding of God7. […] God is not only the source of existences, but also that of essences insofar as they are real that is, or the source of that which is real in possibility. This is because God’s understanding is the realm of […] the ideas on which [necessary truths] depend; without him there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only would nothing exist, but also nothing would be possible. (Mon § 43;GP VI,614; AG, p. 218)

The ‘reality’ of matter and motion refers to the intelligible account of their essences without regard for their existence, an account of what will exist if God chooses to create a world in which their possibility is realized. According to the letter to De Volder, the reality of matter and motion is founded on, caused and explained by, the collection of simple substances that co-exist in the actual world and the series of representative states of each taken individually. Simple substances thus have a unique kind of unity in diversity: “in a perceiver [there are] transitions from perception to perception with the same subject remain4 5

6 7

G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans. Leroy Loemker, 2nd Ed., Dordrecht 1976. [= L]. Expression is a relation by which Leibniz characterizes representation in general; all forms of cognition are expression relations between simple substances and the things they cognize; perception, in particular, is the expression in a simple substance of “what is divisible and material and dispersed into many entities” (To Arnauld, 9 October 1687; GP II,112; quoted from Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. and trans H. T. Mason, Manchester 1967 [= M], 144). G. W. Leibniz: Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence, ed. and trans. Paul Lodge, New Haven 2013. [= Lodge] “Essence is, at bottom, nothing other than the possibility of what is proposed. That which one supposes to be possible is expressed by the definition, but that definition is only nominal when it does not express, at the same time, the possibility of that which is proposed, because then one can doubt the definition expresses something real, that is to say, possible […]” (“Nouveaux Essais concernant l’entendement Humain” [= NE]; A VI, 6, 293; G. W. Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding, eds and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge, 1966. [= RB], p. 293. Also “Echantillons”; A VI, 6, 12; NE, p. 265.

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ing.” (To De Volder, 19 Jan 1706, Supplement 2; LBr 967, 92–3; Lodge, p. 337) The unity within a perciever is a specifically temporal notion of sameness in change8. How is this most basic harmony, the unity among disparate states of one substance realized in the constitution of a simple substance? This issue has been largely overshadowed in the secondary literature by the unity of spatial parts somehow brought about by spatially unextended monads, but temporal unity and identity are more fundamental9. To be clear, my aim is not to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of a monad at different times. The main project is to understand the ontological elements and relations by which a monad retains its unity in different states as Leibniz sees it. 2 Leibniz’s metaphysics of substance, act and change takes shape in the early period, roughly 1666 to 1688. That it is the office of a substance to act is an early and lasting conviction that Leibniz seems never to question. A demonstration tentatively dated 1668 states that: “Substance is being which subsists by itself. Being which subsists by itself is that which has a principle of action within itself.”10 Here, as in many other texts, Leibniz cites the scholastic dictum, actiones sunt supposita, in support of the latter claim. It is difficult to know exactly how to explicate his notion of supposition, but the gist seems to be that propositions which predicate acts of a subject are made true by the existence of substances, beings that subsist by themselves11. Created substances are agents, but also patients. They act only if there is something on which they act in which they produce a change and because a substance is a complete being, it needs nothing else to act upon. It acts on itself and thereby produces change in itself12. A study dated from 1683 to 1685 analyzes the metaphysical elements comprised in action and change. On this account, “change is an aggregate of two contradictory states. These must be understood to pertain to one thing […].” Yet nothing instantiates a contradiction.

8

9 10 11 12

Time, according to Leibniz, is the result of the same pair of unities that causes the pre-established harmony: the intra-substantial order of each substance’s states and the relations among the states of different substances by which they are ordered. See ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics’, GM, VII, 18; L, p. 666; A. Richard: “Leibniz’s Theory of Time” in: The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz, eds. K. Okruhlik and J. R. Brown, Dordrecht 1985, 263–314; M. Futch: Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Time and Space, Berlin 2008. S. Di Bella: The Science of the Individual: Leibniz’s Ontology of Individual Substance, Dordrecht 2005. is an outstanding exception to this trend. ‘On Transubstantiation’ (1688?), A VI,1, 508–12; L, p. 115. Leibniz’s famous theory that all true propositions are analytic in form does not preclude truth makers external to propositions. They include the ideas that exist in the understanding of God, in the case of necessary truths, and divine acts of will and creatures, for contingent truths. ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’, 8, 9, 14. [= DM] On the agent-patient theory of efficient causality, see NE, p. 169.

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Martha Brandt Bolton It is possible for a thing to remain the same, that is, to be changed if it follows from its nature that it has different successive states. Certainly I am said to be the same as before, because my substance involves [involvit] all my states past, present and future. It does not matter that in this way contradictory things are said of me. In fact, it is the nature of time that it is possible for contradictory things to in the same thing at different times. (“Notationes generales”; A VI, 4, 556)

What enables a substance to have mutually incompatible states is that its nature requires it and the nature of time allows it. A substance retains its nature at every moment it exists. As Leibniz envisages this, the substance brings in all it states at every moment, even though the occurrence of the states is dispersed in time. Like a snail which bears its house wherever goes, a substance carries its history at every moment at which it exists. Another study of the metaphysics of change is important background for the treatment of identity in change in our period, De realitate accidentium (1688). This is not the place for a careful analysis of this essay, but it is helpful to have the main lines of argument in view as a basis for understanding the issues at stake in a theory of sameness in change, as Leibniz sees them13. Accidents are one of the traditional five predicables, those a substance has which it can be without; e. g. assuming warmth is that in virtue of which things are warm, a pot of water can be said to have warmth and then not to have it. The essay addresses a question loosely derived from scholastic disputes over real accidents. Leibniz’s question is ‘whether accidents have some reality greater than that of modes and in what it consists.’ Two realist theories are considered: a real accident is either ‘a part of the reality of the substance’ or it ‘adds new reality to a substance’, i. e. the substance has a ‘two fold reality’, one substantial and the other accidental. On the former alternative, Socrates loses a part when he ceases to be warm, but nothing can remain strictly the same if it loses a part, Leibniz contends; so Socrates is as transient as his accidents. To reply that something of the substance always remains even though something else perishes is in effect to take up the two-fold reality theory. It confronts difficult questions: if real accidents are not parts of a substance, they inhere in a substance; but what is inherence? If it is a connection of accidents to a substance, how can an accident cease to exist without some change in the substance? But then the reality proper to the substance is divided into something that perishes and something that remains, contrary to the two-fold reality. Yet to deny reality to accidents and say they are nothing other than relations is of no avail, because a relation never changes unless by some change in its foundations, as Leibniz maintains. The study concludes with the well-known announcement of a provisional pragmatic nominalism. Leibniz will say, truly, that a substance is changed, that it has different predicates at different times. There is no need to raise the question whether in change, the reality of anything perishes or arises; and whether there are various realities in a substance, which are the foundations of its different predicates, although if it is raised, adjudication is difficult. It suffices to posit only substances as real things [res] and to assert truths about them. (“De realitate accidentium”; A VI, 4, 994; Mates, p. 171, slightly altered)14 13 14

See M. Massimo: ‘Leibniz on Substance and Changing Properties’ in: Dilaectica, 59 (2005), 503–516. B. Mates: Philosophy of Leibniz, Oxford 1986. [= Mates].

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A view on which accidents are modes is untarnished by this line of reasoning. Leibniz’s reluctance to endorse it is apparently due to metaphysical and religious reasons to posit real accidents, but it may also reflect some hesitation to embrace a theory of substance of the sort implied by a modal theory of accidents. I mean that accidents are transitory--one follows after another and some are actions. If the reality of the substance is shared by its accidents, this might seem to imply that the reality of a substance consists in transition; but then, what remains the same when its accidents change? So far we have been mapping the territory in which Leibniz’s account of the metaphysical make-up of a being that undergoes change must find a viable location. It is well known that the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) undertakes to explain the sense in which creatures can be said to act, and does so by explicating what an individual substances is. It defines an individual substance (agent) in terms of a concept that contains all predicates of the subject to which it is applied. Also well known, it is difficult to extract a perspicuous account of how the ontological correlate of a complete concept is internally constituted from this text15. However, a more forthcoming account of the ontological make-up of an individual substance is mentioned in marginal notes written already in 1676. It assimilates the essence, or nature, of a substance to a force identified with a law16. In 1695, Leibniz publicly announces that substances are constituted by forces in an article on theoretical dynamics17. After this, it is his standard account. Since forces are causes of change, this holds some promise of explaining the metaphysical constitution of the subject which undergoes change. 3 The article on theoretical dynamics maintains that physical force is implanted everywhere in bodies: “This force does not consist in a simple faculty, with which the schools seem to have been content, but is further endowed with conatus or nisus, attaining its full effect unless it is impeded by a contrary conatus.” (‘Specimen of Dynamics’, GM VI, 234; AG, p. 118). There is no polar opposition between 15

16

17

See R. C. Sleigh: Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence, New Haven 1990. Di Bella, Science of the Individual is a searching inquiry into the ontology of substances implicit in DM, arguing roughly that the doctrine that a substance contains a law of the series of its states is implied by the surrounding texts. The note reads partly as follows: “[…] it is necessary that what persists during this change is rather the essence of the soul, since it remains always the same. The essence of substance consists in the primitive force of acting, or in the law of the series of changes.” (marginal notes on one of Foucher’s critical exchanges with Malebranche (1676), A IV, 3, 326; L, p. 155). Prior to our period the law of the series of states of the substance is mentioned, but not linked to trans-temporal identity, in a letter to Arnauld (1690) (GP II, 136; quoted from M, p. 170) and Motum non esse absoltum quiddam (1689–90), A 6.4.1683. ‘On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance’; GP IV, 468–70; L, p. 432, published the previous year, advertises the relevance of force for the concept of substance without elaborating.

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being in potentia and being in actu. A force is a conatus, nisus, or striving toward a specific effect; it exists if and only if it is exerted; it will produce its full effect unless prevented, but even if impeded it always has some effect18. Several years later, Leibniz states that“[…]no impediment destroys an action completely.”19 Notice that the theory accords with the principle of continuity which prohibits abrupt transitions: “a leap from one state to an infinitely different one cannot be natural” (NE, pp. 56–57; RB, pp. 56–57)20 Whereas Aristotle takes the difference between power (potentiality) and act (the exercise of power) to be a difference in kind, Leibniz reduces it to a difference in degree. A power is always engaged in action in virtue of being a power (force). There is a similar continuity in the expenditure of power. This is because a power exists only if it is exerted. A power of the sort that is unimpeded continues to act and to attain its full effect; Leibniz calls this a ‘primitive force.’ If a force is impeded, it attains some portion of its full effect, so no impediment completely exhausts it. Just as a power never goes from inaction to action its action is never reduced to nothing. According to the article on dynamics, a proper understanding of physical force implies that bodies contain substances that are constituted by forces. Physical forces derive from substantial forces. The primary active force is said to belong to a substance which corresponds to the soul or substantial form of a body: “But, for that reason, it pertains only to general causes, which are insufficient to explain the phenomena.” By contrast, derived forces result ‘from a limitation of primitive force’; also called ‘efforts’ and conatus, they are said to be variable forces which cause changes of motion21. As for souls, or substantial forms: “Aristotle calls them first entelechies. I call them perhaps more intelligibly primary forces which contain not only actuality, or the mere fulfillment of a possibility, but also an originating activity.” (New System, Journal des savants, 23 (1695), pp. 294–300; WF, p. 12) The reference is to Aristotle’s De Anima which is faulted for saying that the soul is the form of a body which is ready to live – a bare inactive power. Aristotle is also charged with a second fault: “Force [if suitably defined] would divide into ‘entelechy’ and ‘effort’; for although Aristotle takes ‘entelechy’ so generally that it comprises all action and all effort, it seems to me more suitable to apply it to primary active forces, and ‘effort’ 18

19 20

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E. g. “[…] some actual action always follows from a power involving endeavor, although it is checked by the contrary endeavors of other powers. Secondary causes act if there is no positive impediment; indeed they will act, as I have said, even if it is present, although then they act less.” (To De Bossess 11 March 1706; GP II, 307; quoted from Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, eds. and trans. Brandon Look and Donald Rutherford, New Haven 2007, [= LR], p. 37). Also NE, p. 169. To De Bossess, 11 March 1706 GP II, 307; quoted from LR, p. 37. “By ‘force’ or ‘power’ I […] mean something mid way between power and action, something which involves an effort, an act, an entelechy – for force passes into action by itself so long as nothing prevents it. That is why I consider it to be what constitutes substances, since it is the principle of action, which is its characteristic feature.” (Draft of ‘New System’, GP IV, 472; quoted from Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Associated Texts, eds. and trans. R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Franks, Oxford, 1997. [= WF], p. 22. ‘Specimen of Dynamics’; GM VI, 234–54; AG, pp. 119–20.

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to derivative ones.” (NE. p. 169; RB, p. 169) That is, a tendency to do something, engage in an activity, is conflated with a tendency to produce particular effects. For his part, Leibniz enshrines the distinction in the division of primary and derived forces. Since all active forces are perpetually acting, this marks a difference in kinds of acting – engaging in a general activity by contrast with causing particular acts, or bringing about change. Correlative to active powers there are passive powers – not the mere capacity to resist change if called upon to do so, but a steady resistance with ‘more reality’.22 In ‘Specimen of Dynamics’ and many other texts, passive powers are illustrated by reference to matter. Primary passive power is exhibited by the impenetrability and (Keplerian) inertia which is the same in all material things; derived passive power varies according to the nisus (impetus) present in bodies which is a derivative of the substances – souls or substantial forms – bodies are said to contain23. Nouveaux Essais elicits Leibniz’s most detailed account of the constituents of substances: “Primary powers [sc. active and passive] are what make up the substances themselves; derivative powers … are merely ways of being [façon d’être] – and they must be derived from substances.” (NE, p. 379; RB, p. 379) On a more fine grained account: if there is a power, “there is always a particular disposition to action, and toward one action rather than another. And as well as the disposition there is an endeavour towards action – indeed there is an infinity of them in any subject at any given time, and these endeavours are never without some effect.” (NE, p. 110; RB, p. 110) A simple substance is a soul, or substantial form, with respect to a body, but in itself it is immaterial. It is simple in the sense of having no substances as parts, whereas a corporeal substance is composed of a soul which animates it and a body composed of endlessly many corporeal substances24. In view of this duality of kinds of substances, the abstract notion of a derived force is characterized in both physical and psychological terms: “Conatus is itself of two kinds – that of a simple or a composite thing. A simple thing is a percipient, and the conatus of the percipient is such as is also called appetite, in a thinking being will […] In a composite being or body, conatus is motive force; mechanics deals with this.” (‘New Method, etc.’ revisions dated 1697–98; A VI, 1, 286; L, p. 92) The nature of a simple substance is to perceive and act from appetites raised by what is perceived25. Its countervailing passive power is the confusion of the agent’s perspectival perception of the world: “[…] since all monads (except the primitive one) are subject to passions, they are not pure forces; they are the foundation not only of actions but of resistance and passivity, and their passions are found in their confused perceptions.” (To Remond, GP III, 636; L, p. 659)26 That is, a volition or appetite for some perceived impend22 23 24 25 26

NE, p. 169; a bare capacity to resist would be a privation of being, for Leibniz; resisting is more than this because it manifests power and, as he has it, “all being consists in a kind power” (GP VII, 87; L, p. 426). ‘Specimen of Dynamics’, GM VI, 234–54; AG, pp. 119–20. E. g. to De Volder, 20 June, 1703; GP II, 251–2; Lodge, p. 261–5. See e. g. NE 378, 63; to De Volder, January 1705?; Lodge, p. 319. Also to De Volder, January? 1705; GP II, 276; Lodge, p. 321; ‘Supplement to the Explanation

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ing good is held back by the confused perceptions present in the soul at the same time. From this abstract account of forces, we can extract some information about the elements in the constitution of a simple substance. Before turning to that, we should get clear about acts or states of a substance. An action produces a change in a substance, and a change comprises opposite states of the substance. I assume that an action lasts during the temporal interval which separates the opposite states that define the change. It is well known that Leibniz’ analysis of the labyrinth of the continuum leads him to conclude that no actual temporal interval can be composed of instantaneous, or temporally unextended, points. Instead, the interval between any two mutually incompatible states of the same thing is endlessly divided into (composed of) temporal parts, or moments, which have instants only as their respective endpoints. In this way, every moment is bounded by instants, but none is composed of instants27. Accordingly, when I speak of a ‘state’ or ‘act’ of a substance, I mean an act which takes a moment, a determinate period of time. But because every change of a substance contains changes and every act is a change, the momentary states (acts) of a substance can span an interval as small as you want. To return to the forces comprised by a simple substance, some of them are lasting. This is plainly true of primitive forces, which are the main constituents, natures, or essences of substances. They strive to carry on a program of action. Subsidiary forces are characterized in two ways. First, they are said to be derivative forces, ‘that which is momentary in action, but with a relation to the following state.’ i. e. efforts tied to a moment in which they have a particular effect. Although derivative forces are not instantaneous, they don’t last beyond a moment which may be as large or as small as one wants. Second, efforts are described as conatus, entities ‘tending toward action’ and subject to impediment28. So understood, efforts last because they are always impeded from having their full effect. Leibniz evidently thinks some psychological forces last for considerable periods: “This is how ideas and truths are innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies [habitudes], or natural potentialities, and not as actions; although these potentialities are always accompanied by some actions, often insensible ones, which respond to them.” (NE, p. 52; RB, p. 52)29 With regard to the insensible actions: “[…] we use the principle of contradiction, for instance, all the time without being explicitly aware of it.” (NE, p. 76; RB, p. 76) Even after an innate disposition causes the soul to explicitly think and affirm a certain truth, it may cause other thoughts of the same truth and it always has some influence on the thoughts formed by the soul30.

27

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of the New System, etc.’ (1694?); GP IV, 574, 6; WF, p. 140, p. 142; and Essais de Théodicée [= T], GP VI, 289; GP VI, 288–9; G. W. Leibniz: Theodicy, trans E. M. Huggard, London, 1951 [= H], p. 303. See e. g. to De Volder, 11 October 1705, GP II, 278–9; Lodge, p. 327; G. W. Leibniz: The Labyrinth of the Continuum, ed. and trans. Richard Arthur, New Haven, 2001, Introduction by Arthur, lxxiii-lxxxvii; S. Levy: “Leibniz on Mathematics and the Actual Infinite Division of Matter” in: Philosophical Review, 107 (1998), pp. 49–96. To De Volder, 30 June 1704; GP II, 269: Lodge, p. 305; also NE, p. 169. Also NE, p. 86. To be clear, innate ideas are not present in all simple substances. They are not tendencies to

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An effort can be defined, or individuated, by the effect it will produce if nothing impedes it. Given two things, one impedes the other, according to Leibniz, just in case considered in themselves, they would have incompatible consequences and, in fact, the consequence of the first does not result31. If one effort impedes another, it is not possible that both achieve their full effect at the same time, but it is possible that each attains some part of its effect. Indeed, in view of the fact that an active force always has some effect, it is certain that both attain something. It is difficult to say what rule governs the extent to which each advances its end32. But assuming there is such a rule, we may appeal to it to get a rough understanding of what it is for an effort to last for some period of time – it lasts just as long as the substance in which it is present continues to have at every successive moment effects which are values of the function given the simultaneous impediments to its action. This is because an effort constantly produces an action that advances its full effect as much as possible given the resistance it meets. In an attempt to be clear, we might say: (i) If F is an effort, then it is subject of a true conditional statement of the form: if F is in the presence of impediments in the ordered set {i1, i2, i3, …}, then F will produce effects in the ordered set {e1, e2, e3, …} – where the values of {i1, i2, i3, …} are all the impediments F will in fact encounter. (ii) F is present in a substance from time 1 to time 2 if and only if every momentary state of the substance that occurs between time 1 and time 2 contains an impediment, i, and an effect, e, such that e is the effect F will produce in the presence of i33. I have expressed the function in the form of an indicative conditional with an antecedent which lists particular conditions of impediment, but there are several texts in which changes, or the efforts which cause them, are said to be laws; e. g. at any given moment, “[…] there is an infinity of changes in the modifications of a soul, each of which is its own law […]” (Comments on Bayle Note L, WF,

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produce perceptions, but rather to produce thoughts which may have reference to perceptions but have propositional structure. To avoid complications, the efforts considered in the rest of this paper are limited to perceptual tendencies, tendencies arising from appetites stirred by acts of perception. They suffice for the temporal unity of all substances, including those capable of thought. “Si ex duobus per se spectatis, sequantur incompatibilia, id quod absolutely loquendo non sequetur dicetur impediri.” (“De Affectibus”; A VI, 4, 1429). Some texts suggest the rule may be that each effort achieves its full effect to the extent possible given that each of the others does, as well. Some passages in NE suggest that the progress each effort makes relative to others is a function of its distinctness relative to the others. A rule to the effect that the stronger effort prevails is too simple because it implies that a force can be impeded from having any effect. Jeff McDonough raised the question whether this is circular. I think it is not, assuming that the constitution of a simple substance determines the efforts it includes right from the start, that a force determines the effect it will produce if unimpeded, that the relations of impediment among forces contained in a substance at a moment are determined by the mutual order of perceptual tendencies, and that there is a function that determines the outcome when an effort of one sort is impeded by an effort of another sort, i. e. how much of its full effect is attained by each. I believe it is reasonable to think that Leibniz supposes these matters are determined by the nature of the substance.

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p. 101)34. Unlike the function specified above, a law is a generalization over all effects of the same effort and it has some sort of modal force. How can an effort be a law? It may be that Leibniz means that the effects produced by an effort under various conditions of impediment can be expressed by a general law with modal force that derives from the nature of the substance. I mean that although it would be possible that the effort not conform to this law, this would have to be caused by something external to the substance itself – and not by any of the created substances with which it co-exists. A primary force, by contrast, can be individuated by the general program of acting in which it tends to engage. It seems clear that, in principle, such a program can be defined by a general way of acting, or pattern of development, such as one finds in a species of living thing, or in the case of an individual simple substance, perceiving the world from a certain vantage point and acting to satisfy appetites for things perceived to be good.35 It might seem that the primary force can be traced by a series of concrete substantial states which conforms to the general formula of its activity. But a nisus is known by what it produces, and the effects of a primary force are less than fully determined. This can be understood by supposing the primary force is a necessary condition for the efficacious forces that jointly generate momentary states of the substance36. Several texts confirm this suggestion. According to NE, primary forces constitute the entire substance – they bring with them everything comprised in its constitution. Nouveaux Système identifies primary active force with an ‘originating activity’. Both texts suggest that primary force is the source of the means by which a substance sustains its natural activity37. According to another text, “The primitive force of bodies is indefinite in itself, but it results in secondary force, which is like a determination of primitive force.”38 This adds that primary force is to some extent indeterminate whereas secondary forces produce concrete acts which are its momentary determinants. All of these texts imply that primary force is presupposed by the collection of efforts which immediately produce the many simultaneous changes within a substance which add up to changes in the substance as a whole. A primary nisus can, then, be traced over time by a succession of concrete substantial acts that accords with its general program. But although primary forces and impedable efforts last over time, Leibniz does not maintain that they are the same at different times, as a substance is. This is apparently because they are incomplete. Primary force is an on-going activity which 34 35 36 37 38

Also ‘Letter from M. Leibniz to the Editor, etc.’, Histoire des ouvrage des savants, July 1698; WF, p. 84. NE, p. 63. R. Donald: ‘Leibniz on Spontaneity’ in: Leibniz and Freedom, eds. Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover, Oxford 2005, p. 165 takes primary force to be a necessary condition of the causal action of derivative forces but not a cause of action itself. This is suggested in A. Robert: Leibniz: Determinist, Idealist, Theist, New Haven 1994, 314– 45. ‘Reflections on the Advancement of True Metaphysics, etc.’, appendix to a letter to Bossuet, July 1694, in Correspondance de Bossuet, eds. C. Urbain and E. Leversque, (Paris, 1909), 6. 523–8; WF, p. 34.

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is not yet sustained by particular acts. Efforts are incomplete causes which produce effects in conjunction with their impediments; their effects are partial with respect to the states of the complete substance. De Ipse Natura stresses the contrast between the permanent and successive elements of a substance in context of an argument for the existence of physical forces. The argument is directed against Johan Sturm, an occasionalist who apparently denies that creatures are efficacious. Sturm admits nothing but a command of God as the cause of change in created things. Leibniz contends that God’s command is efficacious because he gives to creatures an efficacy, a ‘nature’ from which changes follow in accord with divine command. This nature is ‘a force for acting and being acted upon’, a nisus from which some result follows if nothing prevents it. Of course this is just what Sturm does not accept. So taking as his premise the undeniable fact that there is action, Leibniz argues: action implies a force for acting, and a power to act implies its exercise unless it is vacuous. So action exists if and only if acting power exists: Since, nevertheless, action [actio] and power [potentia] are different things, the former successive, the latter permanent [permanens], let us look then at action […]. To the extent that I have made the notion of action clear to myself, I believe that the widely received doctrine of philosophy, that actions pertain to supposita, follows from that notion and is grounded on it. (De Ipse Natura, 9 (1698); GP IV, 508; AG, p. 160, slightly altered)

Leibniz contends that actions presuppose permanent things, or forces. Moreover, actions pertain to supposita, i. e. substances which, as Sturm presumably agrees, remain the same over time. But, Leibniz argues, an actual thing cannot endure unless it contains something active and permanent: “[…] enduring things [durabilis] cannot be produced if no permanent [permanente] force can be imprinted on them by the divine power. Were that so, it would follow that no created substance, no soul would remain numerically the same.” (“On Nature Itself”, sec. 8; GP IV, 508; AG, p. 159–60, slightly altered) The passage just quoted allows a difference of permanent things from things that endure39. As I understand it, something persists just in case it continues to exist for some period of time, but it may not be a thing that undergoes change. The nature (primitive force) of a substance is permanent whereas the complete substance is not only permanent but also has mutually incompatible states. The account of substance based on forces suggests a substance is constituted by three sorts of elements: (i) a primitive force which is lasting (permanent); (ii) infinitely many efforts which although always producing effects, are lasting because their productivity is never entirely extinguished; (iii) a series of successive momentary states of the substance each of which is composed of infinitely many momentary effects of the efforts mentioned in (ii). In light of the 1688 study De 39

The terminology is obscured elsewhere in the article. Sturm is asked to explain “how it is possible that a thing itself can endure [duare], but the attribute in the thing which we call by the name ‘nature’ cannot be a durable thing [durabilia], since it is fitting that just as the words ‘let there be’ [fiat] leave something behind, indeed, the very thing that persists [persistentum], so should the […] word ‘blessing’ have left something behind in things, a fecundity or a nisus for producing their actions […]” (De Ipse Natura, 8; GP IV, 508; AG, p. 159 slightly altered).

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realitate accidentium, this raises the question whether the states that change are real accidents or, alternatively, mere modes. They are not real on the first account, according to which accidents are parts of the reality of the substance. But does the present account imply that a substance has two types of constituents: one that remains exactly the same (perhaps the primary power) and others which are different at different times (determinate states)? That might support the theory that the accidents add reality to the reality of the substance. Yet the continuity of force and action implicates all forces in action and change. The nature of a substance “requires and essentially involves progress or change.” (New System, Journal des savants, 23 (1695), 294–300; WF, p. 18) Rather than isolating the core of a substance from the succession of its accidents, Leibniz situates everything comprised in a substance in the arena of action. 4 During the period 1695 to 1705, Leibniz offers two different accounts of what constitutes the temporal unity of a substance. One is found in writings concerned with souls, or simple substances whose secondary forces are broadly psychological. These texts include part of the defense of the Nouveaux Système and many passages in Nouveaux Essais. This account explicates temporal unity on the basis of the working constitution of a simple substance. The other theory invokes the law of the series of states of a substance to account for its temporal unity. It is found in writings concerned primarily with the metaphysical ground of the physical forces which are needed for theoretical dynamics, as Leibniz contends. Most of these texts are letters to De Volder although the law is mentioned in other connections in several other texts. Because the former account is based on operational parts of a simple substance and we are seeking to understand how temporal unity is realized in the structure of a simple substance, I begin with it. Pierre Bayle challenges Leibniz to explain how a substance, which is simple and without parts, can be the cause of any change in its state, even granting that its state is an activity. In reply, he received an account of the operational apparatus comprised in an immaterial substance: […] the soul, even though simple, always has a feeling [sentiment] composed of several simultaneous perceptions; which for our purposes has the same effect as if it were composed of parts, like a machine. For, in conformity with a law of order which exists in perceptions as much as in movements, each preceding perception influences succeeding ones. […] [T]he perceptions which are simultaneously together in the same soul involve a truly infinite multitude of small indistinguishable feelings that will be developed in what follows, so one should not be astonished at the infinite variety of what emerges over time. (‘Letter from M. Leibniz, etc.’ Histoire des ouvrages des savants, July 1698, 392–42; WF, p. 84)

The soul is an ‘immaterial automaton’ comprising infinitely many perceptions at the same time which compose feelings tending toward further perception. I take sentiments to be appetites. Perceptions are said to last, develop and exert influence on subsequent perceptions.

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To be clear about terminology, ‘perception’ is notoriously ambiguous: it can mean either a mental modification which has (or represents) an intentional content or the intentional content a modification makes known, in some way, to a perceiver. As I understand Leibniz’s texts, ‘perception’ is typically used to stand for a modification, and it is used that way in this paper. A second ambiguity is abroad in the passage just quoted: perceptions are treated as events ordered in time and also as things lasting in time. But events do not continue to exist once they are over and they cannot occur a second time; otherwise, it would not be true that they are either simultaneous or successive. Yet in the passage just quoted, perceptions are said to develop and seemingly to last as they influence subsequent perceptions. The appearance of tension is easily resolved. It is not perceptions, i. e. perceptual acts, that last, but the efforts which cause them. To keep things straight, I call lasting efforts ‘perceptual tendencies’ and reserve ‘perception’ for momentary perceptual acts. To Locke, Leibniz offers more information about the functional constituents of a soul. Although perceptions are modifications of part-wise simple substances, perceptions are composed of other perceptions. Just as the body represented by an act of perception is composed of other bodies, so the perceptual act is composed of other such acts. The perception of a body is composed of perceptions of the parts of the body, and this is repeatedly endlessly40. Leibniz also explains that a perception is more distinguished than its parts, which are thus more confused. A more distinct perception represents a body which, from the perceiver’s point of view, contrasts with those around it more than with those within it41. It is composed of many comparatively confused perceptions representing parts of the body which are relatively alike, inconspicuous [peu relevés] and unordered; for example, when you distinctly perceive a tree outlined against the sky, you confusedly perceive the leaves which you can’t distinguish42. They “do not stand out enough for one to be aware of or to remember them but [they] manifest themselves through their inevitable consequences.” (NE, p. 112; RB, p. 112) Passages that speak of confused perceptions growing, developing, or eventually having significant effects suggest that a relatively distinct perception is the effect of a perceptual tendency which is, for the moment, relatively unimpeded, whereas the relatively confused perceptions it contains are due to perceptual tendencies which are currently held at bay by their number and mutual similarity. In Nouveaux Essais, the temporal unity of a simple substance is grounded on its confused perceptions:

40 41

42

See by the present author, ‘Leibniz’s Theory of Cognition’ in: Continuum Companion to Leibniz, ed. Brandon Look, London, 2011, pp. 136–158. Frege writes: “The more the internal contrasts within a thing fade into insignificance by comparison with the contrasts between it and its environment, the more natural it becomes for us to regard it as a distinct object.” Foundations of Arithmetic, p. 42; I am indebted to work of Michael Ayers for this quotation. “For our large perceptions and our appetites, which we are aware of, are composed of an infinity of minute perceptions and minute inclinations, of which one is not able to be aware.” To Remond (1715); GP III, 656.

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Martha Brandt Bolton These insensible perceptions also indicate [marque] and constitute the same individual who is characterized by traces which preserve [conservent] the preceding states of this individual, making the connection between them and its present state. This connection could be known by a superior mind when the same individual does not sense them, that is to say when the explicit memory of them is no longer there. (NE, p. 55; RB, p. 55, with alterations)

Confused perceptions are both epistemic marks of the substance’s existence at different times and, more important for the moment, the metaphysical basis of its numerical identity at different times. The metaphysical thesis is that a soul preserves vestiges of all its previous perceptual acts; as we know, vestiges are perceptual tendencies whose power is not exhausted by the acts of perception they have previously caused. They are part of the means by which a substance participates in an activity which requires it to perform dissimilar acts. As Leibniz explains in response to Bayle, unlike an indivisible material atom which can proceed to do nothing different than it did at the last instant (so to speak), a soul follow a program that requires varied a sequence of changes: Because [a soul or a mind] is a true substance or a complete being, and the source of its own actions, it, so to speak, it remembers (confusedly of course) all its preceding states, and is affected by them. It retains not only the direction, as does the atom, but also the law of changes of direction, or the law of curvature, which the atom cannot do. And whereas in the atom there is only one change, there is an infinity of changes in the modifications of a soul, each of which is its own law. (Comments on Bayle Note L, WF, p. 101)

To act spontaneously in accord with a program, a substance must meet at least two conditions: it must somehow contain the ‘law of changes’ which define the program it follows and it must keep a record of what it has done so far. Nowadays we might suppose the mnemonic trace of a perceptual act is produced by the act itself, but this is not how Leibniz sees it. Instead, a perceptual act is an effect of a pre-existing perceptual tendency which lasts after the act and has some influence on subsequent acts, thus playing a role like that of non-conscious memory43. More than this, Leibniz maintains that all the tendencies which cause perceptual acts of the soul are in the soul from its inception: An immaterial being cannot be stripped of all perception of its past existence. It retains impressions of everything which has previously happened to it, and it even has presentiments of everything which will happen to it; but these states of mind are mostly too minute to be distinguishable and for one to be aware of them, although they may perhaps grow some day. (NE, p. 239; RB, p. 239)

That the soul contains presentiments of everything it will do accounts for its spontaneity. Presentiments are anticipations of the actions a substance has yet to perform. They preserve the entire series of changes required for the substance to act in accord with its program, the ‘law of the curvature’ as Leibniz puts in44. Passages from Nouveaux Essais we have in view suggest the following account of what constitutes the identity of a soul at different times: the soul comprises 43 44

See NE, p. 114. ‘Comments on Bayle Note L’, WF, p. 101, quoted above. Also “But the substance itself, which is intrinsically complete and involves everything that will happen is also predetermined in the present state of the substance.” (To De Volder, 20 June 1703; GP II, 252; Lodge, p. 267).

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a totality composed of all its perceptual tendencies, or affective conatus, each of which is present in the soul from the outset and lasts as long as the soul exists. It remains the same by a principle of composition – no tendency is gained or lost. But although a substance’s trans-temporal identity is constituted by the collection of confused perceptual tendencies it contains, the primary force is necessary for their presence within the substance. It is because of the primitive force that the myriad perceptions that occur in the same substance have a functional unity; without an appropriate principal of selection and co-ordination, the efforts that co-exist in a substance would not produce effects which come together as acts of the substance as a whole45. Although the identity of a substance at different times is constituted by the forces it contains, none of these forces remains exactly the same. Instead, ‘everything that is active is in a state of transition [passage] or succession [suite], and I know of nothing in nature which is not so.’ (To Bayle, 1702; GP III, 65; WF, p. 126) In Notationes generalis, an early essay mentioned above in section 2, Leibniz argues that a substance can have mutually contradictory states because it always involves its entire history. The model of the unity of a substance we have in view satisfies this condition. The sweep of the career of a substance is always condensed in it because it always contains the entire collection of forces which generate its successive states. Every cause which has a part in this succession is present and acting in the substance, with greater or lesser effect, as long as the substance continues to exist. The following passage should be taken to refer to this history-enfolding feature of the constitution of a substance: “[…] within each substance there is a perfect bond between the future and the past, which is what creates the identity of the individual.” (NE, p. 114; RB, p. 114) The bond is not that between a chain of momentary causes and their momentary effects, as in a row of falling dominos46. It is rather that all states of the same substance the same cause, a collection of acting forces in varying relations of mutual impeding resulting in the variety of successive actions of the sort required by the natural activity of the substance. This model of temporal unity confirms the suggestion that accidents are modes and all the elements of a substance are continually in transition. In our period, Leibniz often characterizes modes as limits or variations of a permanent predicate or nature, as in this remark: “every modification is only a limitation – a figure, a limitation of that which is changed, derivative force a limitation of that which causes change [variantis].” (To DV, 30 June 1704; GP II, 270; Lodge, p. 307) The paradigmatic mode, for Leibniz, is figure: 45

46

A similar account is given several years later: “But the operation proper to the soul is perception, and the nexus of perceptions, according to which subsequent one are derived from the previous ones, forms the unity of the perceiver.” (Draft of letter to Des Bosses, 30 April, 1709, GP II, 327; LR, p. 129, note L2). L. Loeb: From Descartes to Hume, Ithaca, 1981, pp. 318–19 cites this passage as evidence that the bond among all states of a substance is that each state is at least a partial cause of all the others. Although all states of a substance are related in this way, this is does not do justice to the causal bond that constitutes the identity of a substance at different times according to the text from NE in question.

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Martha Brandt Bolton […] the modifications which can occur in a single subject naturally […] arise from limitations and variations of a real genus, i. e. of a constant and absolute inherent nature. For that is how philosophers distinguish the modes of an absolute being from that being itself; just as we know that size, shape and motion are obviously limitations and variations of corporeal natures. This is because it is clear how a limited extension yields shapes, and that changes occurring in it are nothing but motion. (NE, p. 66; RB, p. 66)47

The figure and motion of a finite quantity of extension change in accord with changes in the motions and arrangements of its parts. Modes vary the subject but add nothing real to it. It is not so different in the case of a simple substance on the present model: it changes as a result of alterations in the relations among the myriad efficacious tendencies which it contains as long as it exists. 5 The second account of temporal unity offered during our period is prominent in the letters to De Volder; the following two quotations from the same letter are typical: It is the fact that ‘the same law of the series, i. e. of the continual simple transition, persists that gives rise to our belief in the same subject of change, i. e., the monad. I say that the fact that there is a certain persisting law, which involves the future states of that which we conceive of as the same, is the very thing that constitutes the same substance. (To De Volder, 21 January 1704; GP II, 264; Lodge, p. 291)

Again: “For me, nothing is permanent in things except the law of the continued succession, which in individual things corresponds to the law that is in the whole universe.” (To De Volder, 21 January 1704; GP II, 263; Lodge, p. 289) It is not just that the law is a criterion for reidentifying a substance, but that the law is a constituent which establishes a substance as an enduring thing. The persistence of the law accounts for a substance’s remaining the same in change. It is difficult to understand how a law can be one of the basic elements in the constitution of a substance. We understand a law to be a general rule or prescription, an intelligible representation of what is to be done. Does Leibniz mean that an enduring thing is constituted by a law or, rather, by something which acts in accord with a law, as we suggested earlier? I will come to this shortly. How is a law supposed to model the unity among states of one substance? The law is, or at least is expressed by, a general rule for the transition from one state of a substance to its subsequent states. That is, every change in a simple substance is a relation between two states and the law expresses a respect in which all such changes are alike. The similarity relation has the metaphysical status Leibniz accords to all relations. They are founded partly in the understanding of God and partly in the intrinsic features of several actual things. Roughly put, by thinking of many distinct actual things together, God understands how they are related thereby 47

Also T, p. 395; GP VI, 351; H, p. 360. It is well known that Ockham holds a principle to the effect that accidents which are changed by nothing but locomotion are not real; see A. Marilyn McCord: Ockham, v. 1 ,Notre Dame, 1987, 281–85.

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giving them a sort of unity in his understanding48. Understood in this way, the law is not a metaphysically basic constituent of a substance, but something dependent on its basic elements and the understanding of God. But the remark that the law persists may suggest the law exists at different times and still remains exactly the same. This is not possible according to Leibniz’s theory of the temporal order of actual things. This is because things exist at different times only if they are intrinsically different: “[D]iversity in time or place brings with it differences in the states which are impressed upon things, and thus goes hand in hand with diversity of things. […] [I]t is by means of things that we must distinguish one time or place from another, rather than vice versa; for times and places are in themselves perfectly alike.” (NE, p. 230; RB, p. 230)49 Indeed, two states exist at different times only if they are mutually incompatible: “[E]xtension is the order of possible co-existences, just as time is the order of inconsistent but nevertheless connected possibilities.” (Réponse de M. Leibniz au reflexions, etc., Histoire critique de la République des lettres, 11 (1716), 78–114; WF, pp. 122–3)50 Inasmuch as the law remains the same and persists, it is located in time, but is rather an abstraction. Yet the law of the continuous series of states of a substance is said to constitute the unity of a substance in change, on the present theory. To be sure, a law is one thing which subsumes many different things. The logical – formal or epistemic – relation of a general law to its particular instances, or cases, is clear enough; but understood in this way, a law is a relation, as we said. What realizes the law in the constitutional make-up of a substance? In the absence of information about this, the law of the series account may serve as a criterion for the identity of a substance over time, but offers nothing, but offers nothing to show how it applies to the constitution of a substance that endures in change. In fact, there is more to the law of the series account. As we said, the law is portrayed as an element in the constitution of a substance. Leibniz maintains that laws find footing within substances through the incessant forces of which they are constituted: “[…] [B]y giving things laws [God] simultaneously gave them the force and striving to observe them, which the nature of entelechies consists in.” (To Bernoulli, 30 Sept, 1698; A III, 913; Lodge, p. 13) The thesis that every substance has a law unique to it is central to Leibniz’s theory of substantiality. It is cited as a necessary condition of the spontaneity, agency and individuality of a substance and the pre-established harmony among substances51. It is not surprising that this same law is necessary for the temporal unity of a substance, but on the present account, it is constitutive of this unity. Although texts like the letter to Bernoulli just quoted 48 49 50 51

M. Massimo: “Leibniz’s Theory of Relations” in: Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 28, Stuttgart 1992, chapter 7. Also Mugnai (1992), 49. Also ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics’; GM VII, 18; L, p. 666. See e. g. to Arnauld, 23 March 1690; GP II,136; M, p. 170; ‘Letter from M. Leibniz, etc.’, Histoire des ouvrages des savants, July 1698, 392–42; WF, p. 80; to Basnage, 3 January 1696; GP IV, 499; WF, p. 63; “Motus non esse absoltum quiddam” (1689–90); A VI, 4,1688; to De Volder, 3 April 1699; GP II, 171; Lodge, p. 75.

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say that creatures are given forces which execute laws with an external source, divine command, the following passage from De Ipse Natura assimilates the law and the nature of the substance: And so, we must add a soul or a form analogous to a soul, or a first entelechy, that is, a certain urge [nisus] or primitive force of acting, which itself is an inherent law, impressed by divine decree. (‘On Nature Itself’ 13; AG, p. 162–3)

This and at least one other passage identify the law of the substance with its primitive force52. The persisting law of the series of its states would thus seem to be nothing other than the very persisting force that constitutes a substance. Although the article just quoted refers to this as the ‘primary force of acting’, it appears to identify primitive force with both primary active and passive forces: “the very substance of things consists in the force of acting and being acted upon”; unless “a permanent force can be imprinted on things […] no created substance […] would remain numerically the same” (‘On Nature Itself’, sec. 8; GP VI, 508; AG, p. 159–60, partly quoted above) I assume, then, that the primitive force which is identified with the law of the series of states of a substance is both active and passive. In Leibniz’s view, a primitive force may have claim to be a law because it strives for a sort of action which is intelligible53. To be sure, a primitive force is the deputy of a divine command, but among creatures the force stands as the authority which establishes the law and enforces it. It is plain enough that primitive force persists only if it sustains the causal apparatus which generates momentary states of the substance. The same is true of the law identified with primitive force. It persists only if it brings along means which produce successive states which accord with the law. When the law is identified as the primitive force, the dichotomy between the one law and its many instances can be bridged if the apparatus implicit in the notion of a primitive force is brought to the fore. In fact, it is not mentioned in passages which offer the law of the series account of temporal unity. As a result, primitive force is presented as having the dual character of a law mentioned above – a similarity relation among many particular changes; but this does not explain the special unity of a subject of change. In the letters to De Volder, Leibniz appears to make some effort to explicate the persistence of primitive force as a law. He draws several analogies between a primitive force and the law of a mathematical series. The analogies are developed in the three following quotations taken from two consecutive letters. The following is the earliest of the three: You should, accordingly, conceive in the primitive tendencies that which must be recognized in the derivative. The situation is as it is with the laws of series, or the natures of curves, where the entire progression is fully contained [continentur] in the very beginning. (To De Volder 19 November, 1703; GP II, 258; Lodge, p. 279)

52 53

Also the marginal remark quoted in note 16 above; a few other texts come close; see excerpts from letters to De Volder quoted below in the text. See A. Robert, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, New Haven, 1994, 314–15.

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As stated, the analogy is this: (i) an initial segment of a curve and the initial moments of the primary force are alike in that each of them ‘contains the entire progression’. (I will number the points of analogy as means of referring to them.) This analogy is obscure from the start. It is far from clear that an initial part of a curve does contain the entire curve. A segment of a curve does not indicate how the curve continues beyond that limited part; in general, a segment is not a basis from which the entire curve can be inferred. Nor is it true that the entire curve can, in general, be superimposed on one of its segments. It is true, however, that if a curve conforms to a general law, then an initial segment of the curve partially instantiates this law (among others) and the law determines all points on the curve. If this is the property Leibniz wants to ascribe to the law of a curve, he states it badly, because read in this way, the text conflates the law of the curve with the series of points which are its value. If the claim in (i) is taken as first suggested above, it is false with regard to the mathematical law. If (i) is understood in the second way, the difference between the law and its values must be respected. The law contains all points on the curve inasmuch as they are values of the law. Yet this rendering hardly expresses the claim that a proper part of the curve ‘contains the entire progression.’ I conclude that the analogy suggested by (i) fails to illuminate Leibniz’s thought about the relation between a few momentary states of the primary force and the entire series of states of the same substance. According to the next letter: […] derivative force is the present state itself insofar as it tends toward a following state, just as everything in the present is pregnant with the future. But the persisting thing itself, insofar as it involves all cases, has primitive force, so that primitive force is like the law of a series, and derivative force is like a determination that designates some term in the series. (To De Volder, 21 January 1704; GP II, 263; Lodge, p. 287)

This point of analogy is: (ii) the law of a curve involves all terms of the series because all such terms are mathematically derived from the law; in a similar way, primitive force involves all states of the substance because all such states are caused by forces derived from the primitive one. This differs from (i) in that it articulates the difference between the mathematical law and the determinate values comprised in a series which conforms to the law; it stresses that the determinate values are caused by derivative forces. The causal determination of states by the force is analogous to the mathematical determination of points by the law of the curve. Later in the same letter: I do not say that a series is a succession, but a succession is a series, and that it has this in common with other series, namely, that the law of the series shows where it must reach by continuing its progression, i. e., that with the starting point and the law of progression given, the terms will be produced in order whether the order of priority is of nature only or also of time. (To De Volder, 21 January 1704, GP II, 263: Lodge, p. 289)

That is: (iii) the law taken with an initial part of the series logically determines all terms that come after it in the series; in a similar way, primitive force taken with a momentary state of the substance logically implies the determinate states of a substance in temporal order. Whereas (ii) stresses that primary force governs a series

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of effects which follow each other in time, (iii) stresses a logical property of laws of series, in general. The properties of the primitive force specified by (ii) and (iii) are clear enough: the primitive force is a law instantiated by the temporal order of states of the substance and these states are caused by forces contained in the substance. These conditions define a causally closed system of forces which generates all changes within the system in an order that accords with a general law. But Leibniz does not suppose that this is sufficient for a thing that remains the same in change. For instance, the corporeal universe is causally closed, but not a substance; it is not a subject that remains the same in change of its states54. More generally, the ‘law of continued succession’ in an individual substance “corresponds to the law that is in the whole universe” (To De Volder, 21 January 1704; GP II, 263; Lodge, p. 289, quoted above). But the universe is not a unitary subject of changing states. Unlike the universe, a substance is constituted by a primitive force in virtue of which it is one thing to which different states belong at different times. The crucial property of an enduring substance is named, that is, each state contains all states but hardly clarified, in analogy (i). Yet it is of paramount importance. According to Notationes generalis, a substance can have mutually contradictory states because it always “involves all [its] states past, present, and future”. Leibniz says again in 1703: “a natural organic machine [sc. a corporeal substance] […] always involves all past and present time. Indeed, this is the most certain nature of every substance.” (To De Volder, 20 June 1703; GP II, 251; Lodge, p. 261)55 We can see that a persisting law with the properties expressed in (i) through (iii) is necessary and sufficient for the trans-temporal unity of a substance on Leibniz’s analysis of a subject of change. Although it is logically adequate, it is hardly explicative. What is wanted is an account of how a persisting law is connected to the determinate states of a substance by means of its internal structure in such a way that every momentary state of the substance suffices for its entire career56. In the absence of this, the law of the series is a formulaic abstraction and the explanation of temporal unity based on it remains largely impenetrable. The requisite clarification is, however, provided by the account of the unity of a substance based on its confused perceptions. The texts in which the law of the series is invoked to account for trans-temporal unity are confined largely to letters to De Volder which situate it in context of a fairly narrow dispute57. What seems wanting 54 55 56 57

E. g. to De Volder, 21 January 1704. GP II, 263; Lodge, p. 289. Also see to De Volder, 19 January 1706; GP II, 282; Lodge, p. 333. Leibniz characterizes this in terms of the scholastic notion of eminent containment (To De Volder, 21 January 1704; GP II, 263; Lodge, p. 289). To my knowledge, there are very few places where the law of the substantial series is used specifically to explicate the trans-temporal identity of a substance, although it is frequently mentioned in other connections. There is admittedly room to differ over why the law is invoked in specific contexts. But I would say that trans-temporal identity is in view in the marginal note from 1685 (see above note 16), ‘Letter to the Editor, etc.’, GP IV, 518; WF, p. 80, T, p. 291; GP VI, 289–90 and arguably in the draft of a letter to Burnet (1699), GP III, 260–1; AG, pp. 289– 90; according to some scholars, it also appears in the fifth letter to Clarke, v. 87; GP VII, 411 and a draft of the letter to Des Bosses, 30 April 1709; GP II, 372; LR, p. 129.

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in them, presumably because not immediately relevant in the context, is provided by other texts from the same period. Leibniz’s letters point in the direction of the inner workings of immaterial substances on several occasions, e. g.: […] primitive forces can be nothing other than the internal strivings of simple substances, by which they pass from perception to perception by a certain law of their nature and at the same time agree with each other, representing the same phenomena of the universe in a different manner […]. (To De Volder, January 1705?; GP II, 275; Lodge, p. 319)

De Volder is told where to find the Nouveaux System and the published reply to Bayle where the immaterial automaton is explicated. Bayle himself sent De Volder a copy of his reply to Leibniz’s response along with Bayle’s comments on it. Nouveaux Essais was not published during the lifetime of either correspondent, but even without it, De Volder has access to several descriptions of the working parts of a simple substance58. The NE account is the model of a system which exemplifies the trio of properties in terms of which Leibniz purports to explain the law of the series of states of the same substance. It clearly exemplifies the key containment of all states in one. There is no need to belabor aspects of the law of the series account which might be explained on the basis of the model presented in Nouveaux Essais. They are outlined in the previous two sections. The explanation is complex. The basic conditions required for trans-temporal numerical sameness are more succinctly conveyed by the law of the series theory than the confused perception model. In effect, the latter lays out the elaborate mechanism which enables a simple substance always to act spontaneously. By contrast, the law of the series account is abstract but still logically adequate for trans-temporal unity, if properly understood. With the distinction between what is prior in nature and what is prior in knowledge in view, we might say that the law of the series account is prior in the first way and the NE account, in the second. This paper began with a question about how the most basic harmony exemplified in the actual world is metaphysically constructed; this is the harmony within perceivers themselves. Let me end with the conclusion toward which this study of temporal unity points. During the period in question, Leibniz maintains that the pre-established harmony among actual substances is achieved by an obvious device – each simple substance is one thing and its successive states represent the universe from its point of view. This is deceptively simple for at least two reasons. In the first place, a substance represents the universe because it perceives every body and motion in the corporeal realm. For this, it needs to contain infinitely many perceptions, each with infinitely many parts. Perceptions generate further perceptions because they rouse appetites in the form of efforts to attain things perceived 58

In the event, De Volder does not get far enough to ask about it. Bayle challenges Leibniz to explain how it is possible that a simple immaterial substance acts differently at different times, but De Volder balks at Leibniz’s argument that physical forces must be modes of a permanent essentially active nature, or entelechy. De Volder’s contention that what follows from the nature of a thing must always follow in the same way is meant as an objection to this argument. Leibniz replies, appropriately enough, with a general description of what follows from an individual nature, as he sees it, using the analogy with mathematical laws of series, quoted in text above.

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to be good59. The infinitely many appetites are for ends which are to some extent mutually incompatible; they cannot all be fully satisfied, so conflict occurs within a substance in the guise of the mutual impediment of perceptual tendencies. The impediments are continually resolved so that each perceptual tendency continually produces partial acts of the substance that have their place in the acts of the complete substance. In the second place, the series of states of a substance must be psychologically coherent as a necessary condition of their being incompatible states of one substance. The temporal unity of a substance consists in following a law, or general program ensuring the requisite coherence. This means that it always pursues the same end and always contains the full complement of perceptual appetitive tendencies which generate concrete actions that sustain its pursuit. Both of these considerations bring out the key importance of the rule of resolution of appetites for mutually incompatible ends, or the mutually impeding perceptual tendencies the substance comprises. Without the right rule for allocating the effects of mutually impeding tendencies, the actions of the complete substance would not execute its program, temporal unity would be lost, and the series of states of different substances would not represent the same universe.

59

Efficacious efforts, or what I call ‘perceptual tendencies’ are called ‘appetites’ by Leibniz: ‘The action of the internal principle which brings about the change r passage from one perception to another can be called appetition; it is true that the appetite cannot always completely reach the whole perception toward which it tends, but it always obtains something of it, and reaches new perceptions.’ (Mon § 15; GP VI, 609; AG, p. 215)

ONTOLOGIE UND METAPHILOSOPHIE IN LEIBNIZ’ MÜHLENARGUMENT* Andreas Blank 1. EINLEITUNG Das Mühlenargument in Monadologie § 17 stellt Leibniz’ Interpreten vor notorische Schwierigkeiten. Dies ist es, was Leibniz schreibt: Man muss im Übrigen eingestehen, dass die Perzeptionen und was davon abhängt, durch mechanische Gründe, d. h. durch Gestalten und durch Bewegungen unerklärbar ist. Wollte man vorgeben, dass es eine Maschine gäbe, deren Struktur Denken, Empfinden und Perzeptionen haben lässt, könnte man diese unter Bewahrung derselben Proportionen vergrößert begreifen, so dass man in sie wie in eine Mühle hineintreten könnte. Dies gesetzt, würde man beim Besuch im Innern nur einander stoßende Teile finden, niemals aber etwas, was eine Perzeption erklärt. So muss man sie in der einfachen Substanz und nicht in dem Zusammengesetzten oder in der Maschine suchen. Außerdem gibt es nur dieses, d. h. Perzeptionen und ihre Veränderungen, was man in der einfachen Substanz finden kann. Darin allein können alle inneren Handlungen der einfachen Substanz bestehen.1

Nicholas Rescher erläutert, dass „Leibniz hier versucht, die Idee eines rein mechanischen Modells geistiger Operationen durch einen lebhaften Hinweis darauf zu entkräften, dass nichts im Bereich der rein mechanischen Interaktionen […] vernünftigerweise als etwas betrachtet werden kann, was Denken entweder konstituiert oder hervorbringt.“2 Dennoch verlangt diese Passage nach weiteren Erläuterungen, und dies aus zwei Gründen: (1) Leibniz wechselt die Charakterisierung der Aktivität, die als unerklärbar durch die Interaktion von Teilen beschrieben wird: Ist es Perzeption oder ist es Denken und Wahrnehmen? Wie Leibniz in den zur selben Zeit entstandenen Prinzipien der Natur und der Gnade klar macht, schließen Perzeptionen Aktivitäten ein, denen reflexives Bewusstsein fehlt3. Im Gegensatz dazu sind Wahrnehmen und Denken mit höherstufigen geistigen Aktivitäten verbunden, welche andere geistige Aktivitäten zum Gegenstand haben4. Ist der Unter*

1

2 3 4

Der vorliegende Artikel ist eine überarbeitete Fassung meines auf Englisch erschienen Artikels „On Interpreting Leibniz’s Mill“, in: Interpretation. Ways of Thinking about the Sciences and the Arts, ed. by Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters, Pittsburgh 2010, S. 111–129. GP VI, 609. Übersetzung aus G. W. Leibniz: Monadologie und andere metaphysische Schriften. Discours de métaphysique. La monadologie. Principes de la nature et de la grace fondés en raison, hrsg. u. übers. v. U. J. Schneider, Hamburg 2002, S. 117. Wo nicht anders vermerkt, sind Übersetzungen im Folgenden meine eigenen. N. Rescher: What If? Thought Experimentation in Philosophy, New Brunswick, London 2005, S. 83. GP VI, 600. A VI, 2, 266; A VI, 2, 493; GP VII, 330.

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schied zwischen den Begriffen der Perzeption und des Denkens von Bedeutung für das Argument, das Leibniz im Sinn hat? (2) Leibniz macht nicht explizit, weshalb genau die Interaktion von Teilen nicht in der Lage sein soll, entweder Perzeption oder Denken und Wahrnehmen zu erklären. Um es anders auszudrücken: Worin genau besteht die Erklärungslücke, welche das Mühlenargument illustrieren soll? In beiden Hinsichten scheint die Passage aus der Monadologie nicht hinreichend bestimmt zu sein. Sicherlich gibt es einige Interpretationen des Arguments, die schon aufgrund des Wortlauts der Passage aus der Monadologie nicht sonderlich überzeugend sind. Einige der internen Schwierigkeiten dieser Interpretationen wurden mit bemerkenswerter Genauigkeit von Paul Lodge und Marc Bobro herausgestellt5, und ich werde auf diese Fragen hier nicht weiter eingehen. Vielmehr versuche ich, die Relevanz einiger kontextueller Überlegungen zu erkunden. Insbesondere möchte ich auf die mögliche Bedeutung des metaphilosophischen Kontexts des Mühlenarguments hervorheben. Mit „metaphilosophischem Kontext“ sollen Leibniz’ Auffassungen zur Natur philosophischer Begriffe, Aussagen und Argumente gemeint sein. Da diese Auffassungen nicht in der Monadologie selbst zur Sprache kommen, wird es nützlich sein, in Leibniz’ frühe Schriften zur Metaphysik zu blicken. Dies mag auf den ersten Blick wie ein unnötiger Umweg erscheinen. Es wird sich jedoch bald herausstellen, dass das Mühlenargument nicht nur in Hinblick auf metaphilosophische Überlegungen, sondern auch inhaltlich eng mit Leibniz’ frühen Überlegungen zur Metaphysik zusammen hängt. 2. DER UNMITTELBARE KONTEXT UND DIE KONTRAFAKTISCHE NATUR DES MÜHLENARGUMENTS Lodge und Bobro schlagen vor, das Mühlenargument mit Hilfe einiger der vorhergehenden Paragraphen der Monadologie zu kontextualisieren. Nach ihrer Lesart zeigt eine solche Strategie der textimmanenten Kontextualisierung, dass sich die Erklärungslücke, die das Argument illustrieren soll, auf Leibniz’ Begriff der Einheit bezieht. In Monadologie § 14 schreibt Leibniz: „Der vorübergehende Zustand, der in der Einheit oder in der einfachen Substanz eine Vielheit einhüllt und vorstellt, ist nichts anderes als das, was man die Perzeption nennt […].“6 Wie Lodge und Bobro bemerken, ist diese Charakterisierung der Perzeption als eine Definition zu verstehen; demzufolge ist der Punkt, den Leibniz hier macht, als ein begrifflicher Punkt zu verstehen. Lodge und Bobro heben auch hervor, dass Leibniz in Monadologie § 1 die Auffassung vertritt, dass nichts, was Teile besitzt, die Existenz einer Einheit erklären kann. In den Augen von Lodge und Bobro expliziert das Mühlenargument die Konsequenzen dieses Begriffs von Perzeption: Wenn Perzeption der Zustand eines Wesens ist, das Einheit besitzt, und ein Wesen, das Einheit besitzt, keine Teile besitzt, kann Perzeption kein Zustand eines Wesens sein, das Teile besitzt. Wenn 5 6

P. Lodge and M. Bobro: „Stepping Back Inside Leibniz’s Mill“, in: The Monist 81 (1998), S. 553–572. GP VI, 608.

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Leibniz jedes materielle System in Analogie zur Struktur einer Mühle versteht – als etwas, das Teile besitzt, die sich gegenseitig anstoßen – impliziert eine solche Beschreibung offensichtlich, dass jedes materielle System Teile besitzt. Wenn also Perzeption kein Zustand eines Wesen sein kann, das Teile besitzt, kann Perzeption kein Zustand eines materiellen Systems sein7. Den unmittelbaren Kontext des Mühlenarguments in dieser Weise zu verwenden, scheint mir sehr informativ zu sein, und ich stimme der Auffassung zu, dass der Begriff der Einheit den Schlüssel zum Verständnis der Passage enthält. Dennoch bleibt etwas an der Interpretation von Lodge und Bobro rätselhaft. Nach ihrer Lesart sagt uns das Mühlenargument nur etwas, was wir bereits wissen, sobald wir die Definition des Begriffs der Perzeption verstanden haben und die mechanistische Analyse der materiellen Welt teilen. Ich bin einverstanden damit, dass das Mühlenargument – in einem Sinn, der noch zu erläutern sein wird – uns etwas sagt, das wir bereits wissen. Dennoch erscheint es rätselhaft, dass Lodge und Bobro so wenig aus der kontrafaktischen Natur der Situation machen, die in Monadologie § 17 beschrieben wird. Weshalb bringt Leibniz seine Leser dazu, sich eine Situation vorzustellen, die nicht wirklich auftritt („Wollte man vorgeben … Dies gesetzt …“)? Paul Churchland charakterisiert das Mühlenargument als ein Gedankenexperiment8, und Rescher nimmt diese Charakterisierung auf9. Ein solches Verständnis des Arguments scheint hilfreich zu sein, denn die mögliche Situation, die Leibniz im Auge hat, ist nicht nur nicht tatsächlich realisiert sondern wohl auch physikalisch nicht realisierbar. Deshalb bringt Leibniz seine Leser nicht dazu, sich ein mögliches physikalisches Experiment vorzustellen, sondern eine Situation, die in dem Sinn möglich ist, dass sie denkbar ist und deshalb im besten Fall einen begrifflichen Punkt deutlich machen kann. Natürlich ist dies genau das, was Gedankenexperimente typischerweise leisten sollen. Wenn dies tatsächlich der Zweck der vorgestellten Situation des Mühlenarguments sein sollte, könnte es sein, dass Leibniz nicht nur die Absicht verfolgt hat, eine Implikation der Definition des Begriffs der Perzeption in Monadologie § 14 zu explizieren, sondern seine Auffassung in Bezug auf die Verbindungen zwischen den Begriffen der Perzeption, des Denkens und der Einheit durch eine zusätzliche Überlegung zu stützen. Rescher weist darauf hin, dass viele Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie die Aufgabe haben, eine allgemeine These zu widerlegen. Wie er vorschlägt ist die Generalisierung, die im Mühlenargument widerlegt werden soll, die These „Mechanische Vorgänge können Denken erklären“10. Nach seiner Auffassung werden solche generellen Thesen in Gedankenexperimenten durch eine Gruppe von Aussagen in Frage gestellt, die er als „aporetischen Komplex“ bezeichnet, und die durch die folgende formale Struktur gekennzeichnet ist: (1) As sind Bs (und müssen es sein). (2) Unter bestimmten Umständen X […] wird es ein A geben, das kein B ist. (3) Solange das Gegenteil nicht erwiesen ist, kann X der Fall sein. 7 8 9 10

Lodge and Bobro, S. 562–566. P. Churchland: The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul, Cambridge, MA, 1995, S. 191–192. Rescher, What if, S. 83–84. Ebd., S. 90.

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Andreas Blank (4) Es steht uns frei, anzunehmen, dass X tatsächlich der Fall ist. (5) As müssen nicht Bs sein.11

Rescher gibt den folgenden Kommentar: „Weil die Thesen (1)-(5) eine logisch inkonsistente Gruppe bilden, muss eine von ihnen aufgegeben werden. Und selbstverständlich wird der Proponent eines widerlegenden Gedankenexperiments automatisch davon ausgehen, dass dies (1) sein muss.“12 Jedoch weist Rescher darauf hin, dass „im Prinzip immer argumentiert werden kann, dass (3) das schwächste Glied ist – dass es einfach falsch sein kann, dass X tatsächlich der Fall sein kann, genau deshalb, weil (1) zutrifft.“13 Was uns davor zurückhält, (3) aufzugeben, ist die Tatsache, dass diese These „immer eingebettet sein wird in eine Vielzahl von Überzeugungen, die in diesem Kontext wirksam sind, […] und die auf unterschiedliche Weise in Hinblick auf ihre Plausibilität und ihre grundlegende Natur bewertet werden können.“14 Legt man die von Rescher vorgeschlagene Analyse der logischen Struktur von Gedankenexperimenten in der Philosophie zugrunde, stellt sich die Frage, welches die kontextuell relevanten Überzeugungen im Fall des Mühlenarguments sein könnten, und wie Leibniz diese Überzeugungen in Hinblick auf ihre Plausibilität und ihre grundlegende Natur bewertet. Im Fall der für das Mühlenargument wesentlichen Annahme, dass sich alle materiellen Systeme durch kontrafaktische Größenveränderungen als mechanische Systeme herausstellen würden, gehören zu den kontextuell relevanten Überzeugungen vermutlich die Prinzipien, die der mechanischen Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts zugrunde liegen, und die Leibniz akzeptiert, soweit es um die Erforschung der physikalischen Phänomene geht. Solche Annahmen lassen sich als theoretische Hypothesen charakterisieren. Doch sicher benötigt man keine Gedankenexperimente, um sich die Prinzipien der mechanischen Philosophie vor Augen zu führen. Sind deshalb für das Mühlenargument weitere kontextuell relevante Überzeugungen im Spiel, womöglich solche, die erst durch ein Gedankenexperiment klar zutage gefördert werden? Von Daniel Dennett stammt die einflussreiche Charakterisierung von Gedankenexperimenten in der Philosophie als „Intuitionspumpen“15 – als Hilfsmittel, Einsichten in begriffliche Strukturen zu geben, die unserem Denken zu Grunde liegen, ohne dass wir uns jedoch davon Rechenschaft ablegen. Was könnten die Intuitionen sein, die Leibniz in diesem speziellen Gedankenexperiment zu Tage fördern möchte? Wie ich vorschlagen möchte, werden Leibniz’ metaphilosophischen Auffassungen aus der Perspektive dieser Frage relevant für das Verständnis der Erklärungslücke, auf die uns das Mühlenargument aufmerksam machen will. Rescher argumentiert dafür, dass Leibniz’ Metaphysik nach einem Euklidischen Muster aufgebaut ist, beginnend mit einer Gruppe von miteinander verknüpften Definitionen und Axiomen, von denen dann der Rest der metaphysischen 11 12 13 14 15

Ebd. Ebd. Ebd. Ebd, S. 91. D. C. Dennett: „Intuition Pumps“, in: The Third Culture. Ed. by John Brockman, New York 1995, S. 181–197.

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Aussagen deduziert wird16. Doch wie sollte der erkenntnistheoretische Status von Leibniz’ Definitionen und Axiomen selbst verstanden werden? Eine Möglichkeit ist es, sie für rein hypothetische Stipulationen zu halten, wie es etwa Stuart Brown vorschlägt17. In der Tat verteidigt Leibniz an verschiedenen Stellen die Nützlichkeit einer hypothetisch-deduktiven Methodologie in der Metaphysik. Wie er erläutert, ist der Vorteil einer solchen Methode die Reduktion der Zahl der Aussagen, deren Beweis noch gegeben werden muss. Anders ausdrückt, wir erreichen durch eine solche Methode eine Situation, in der wir sagen können, dass falls die hypothetischen Prinzipien wahr sind, auch alle ihre Konsequenzen wahr sein müssen18. Auch weist er darauf hin, dass sich Hypothesen in Hinblick auf ihre erklärende Kraft bewerten lassen19. Erklärende Kraft und die Reduktion der Zahl der unbewiesenen Aussagen gehören sicher zu den Leistungen, aufgrund deren für Leibniz eine hypothetisch-deduktive Methode in der Metaphysik attraktiv sein kann. Hinzu kommt, dass zentrale Bestandteile seiner Metaphysik (wie die Theorie der absoluten Spontaneität der einfachen Substanzen und die Theorie der prästabilierten Harmonie zwischen den einfachen Substanzen) plausibel als rein hypothetische Axiome aufgefasst werden können. Dennoch, angenommen das Mühlenargument würde von rein hypothetischen Stipulationen ausgehen, dann bliebe es rätselhaft, weshalb Leibniz ein Gedankenexperiment verwendet, um zu seinem Ergebnis zu gelangen. Eher weist die Tatsache, dass er ein Gedankenexperiment verwendet, darauf hin, dass er nicht nur eine Konsequenz einer rein hypothetischen Definition des Begriffs der Perzeption ziehen will, sondern dass er auch kontextuell relevante Intuitionen in Bezug auf die Begriffe der Perzeption, des Denkens, und der Einheit in Spiel bringen möchte. Ein Blick in die metaphilosophischen Erwägungen, die in Leibniz’ früheren Schriften zur Metaphysik mit den Begriffen der Einheit und des Denkens verbunden sind, spricht dafür, dass einige der kontextuell relevanten Intuitionen in den Augen von Leibniz von nicht-hypothetischer Natur sind. 3. EINHEIT, DENKEN UND LEIBNIZ’ FRÜHE METAPHILOSOPHIE Hans Burkhardt und Wolfgang Degen haben hervorgehoben, dass Leibniz in den Nouveaux Essais die aristotelische Unterscheidung zwischen Teilen aufgreift, die „früher als“ das Ganze, und Teilen, die „später als“ das Ganze sind20. Im ersten Fall können Teile unabhängig vom Ganzen existieren; im zweiten Fall können Teile nicht unabhängig vom Ganzen existieren21. Die Anwendung der Unterscheidung, 16 17 18 19 20 21

N. Rescher: „Leibniz and the Concept of a System“, in: Studia Leibnitiana 13 (1981), S. 114– 122, hier: S. 117–118. S. Brown: Leibniz, Minneapolis 1984, S. 67–78. GP VII, 165; GP IV, 355; GP I, 381–382; A VI, 6, 5. GP IV, 486. H. Burkhardt and W. Degen: „Mereology in Leibniz’s Logic and Philosophy“, in: Topoi 9 (1990), S. 3–13, S. 7; A VI, 6, 157. Aristoteles: Metaphysik Z 1036 a 12–26; Metaphysik, Δ 1019 a 2–14.

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die Burkhardt und Degen im Sinn haben, stammt aus Leibniz’ philosophischer Theologie. Im Folgenden möchte ich jedoch vorschlagen, dass diese Unterscheidung ebenfalls relevant ist, um zu verstehen, in welchem Sinn in den Augen von Leibniz immaterielle Entitäten Einheit besitzen und in welchem Sinn dies für materielle Gegenstände nicht der Fall ist. Wie gleich deutlich werden wird, bestehen in den Augen von Leibniz bestehen materielle Objekte aus Teilen, die unabhängig vom Ganzen und voneinander existieren können; in scholastischer Terminologie ausgedrückt, bestehen aus „Teilen, die anderen Teilen äußerlich sind“ (partes extra partes). Im Gegensatz dazu sind einige Aktivitäten immaterieller Entitäten mit einander „verbunden“ (connexum) – eine Terminologie, die Leibniz ursprünglich einem juristischen Kontext entlehnt – und bilden deshalb eine echte Einheit. Leibniz’ technischer Begriff der Verbindung hat sowohl eine erkenntnistheoretische als auch eine ontologische Seite. In Bezug auf die erkenntnistheoretische Seite erläutert Leibniz: „Zwei Dinge sind verbunden, wenn das eine von ihnen nicht ohne das andere verstanden werden kann.“22 Demzufolge hat Verbindung etwas zu tun mit den Bedingungen, unter denen die Dinge verstanden werden können, die verbunden sind. Verbindung reduziert sich jedoch nicht auf eine solche erkenntnistheoretische Relation. Das wird deutlich, wenn Leibniz eine weitere Erläuterung gibt: „Verbindung ist die Notwendigkeit eines Dings für das andere; verbunden sind zwei Dinge, welche wechselseitig erforderlich für einander sind.“23 Der Sinn, in dem Dinge für einander erforderlich sind, wird klarer in der folgenden Definition: „Verbunden sind zwei Dinge, wenn die Existenz des einen in der Existenz des anderen involviert ist.“24 Demzufolge ist Verbindung in Leibniz’ technischem Sinn eine Relation der existentiellen Abhängigkeit: Zwei Dinge sind verbunden, wenn das eine nicht ohne das andere existieren kann, und umgekehrt. Sowohl die erkenntnistheoretische und die ontologische Seite des Begriffs der Verbindung werden zusammen gebracht in der folgenden Definition: „Verbunden sind zwei Dinge, welche wechselseitig Folgerungen oder Erfordernisse [requisita] füreinander sind.“25 Der logischen Relation des wechselseitigen Folgens entspricht hier die ontologische Relation des wechselseitigen füreinander Erforderlich-Sein. Auf der ontologischen Ebene versteht Leibniz „Erfordernisse“ als Voraussetzungen der Existenz von etwas: „[E]in Erfordernis ist etwas, von dem gilt, dass wenn es nicht gegeben ist, ein Ding nicht existiert.“26 Der naheliegende Grund für die Entsprechung zwischen dem erkenntnistheoretischen und dem ontologisch Sinn von Verbunden-Sein besteht wohl darin, dass ein Ding nicht ohne ein anderes Ding verstanden werden kann, und umgekehrt, genau dann wenn die Existenz des einen Dings für die Existenz des anderen Dings erforderlich ist, und umgekehrt. 22 23 24 25 26

A VI, 3, 515. A VI, 1, 102. A VI, 4, 2769. A VI, 1, 388. A VI, 2, 483. Für detaillierte Diskussionen von Leibniz’ Begriff des requisitum, siehe S. Di Bella: „Il ‚Requisitum‘ leibniziano come ‚pars‘ e come ‚ratio‘: tra inerenza e causalita.“, in: Lexicon Philosophicum 5 (1991), S. 129–152; S. Di Bella: „Leibniz’s Theory of Conditions: A Framework for Ontological Dependence.“, in: Leibniz Review 15 (2005), S. 67–93.

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Entscheidend für die Frage nach dem metaphilosophischen Status des Begriffs der Einheit ist nun, dass Leibniz der Auffassung ist, dass zwei Dinge, welche in der Verbindungs-Relation zueinander stehen, eine echte Einheit bilden: „Mehrere Dinge, die miteinander verbunden sind, sind ein einziges Individuum. Denn wenn A und B gegeben sind, würde, falls A nicht existieren würde, auch B nicht existieren, und umgekehrt.“27 Weshalb denkt Leibniz, dass die Verbindung-Relation auf Aktivitäten immaterieller Entitäten, aber nicht auf Bestandteile materieller Gegenstände zutrifft? Viele der einschlägigen Überlegungen werden in Leibniz’ frühen Schriften zur Metaphysik entwickelt and später teilweise in seine späte Metaphysik integriert. In diesem Abschnitt werde ich einige Passagen aus seinen frühen Schriften in Erwägung ziehen und im folgenden Abschnitt auf Passagen aus seinen späten Schriften zu sprechen kommen, die mit ihnen in Zusammenhang stehen. Beginnen wir damit, wie der frühe Leibniz die Natur der Materie analysiert. In der „Vorrede zu Nizolius“ schreibt er: „Die materia prima ist die Masse selbst, in der es nichts anderes gibt als Ausdehnung und Widerstandskraft oder Undurchdringlichkeit; sie besitzt Ausdehnung durch den Raum, die sie einnimmt; die Natur der Materie selbst besteht darin, etwas Festes und Undurchdringliches zu sein […].“28 Wie Leibniz erläutert, besteht Undurchdringlichkeit eines Gegenstandes „in der Tatsache dass, wenn ein anderer Gegenstand dieser Art ankommt, er entweder weichen muss oder beide Gegenstände zum Stillstand kommen müssen.“29 Was ist der Grund, der hinter einer solchen Auffassung der Natur der Materie steht? Sicherlich spielen Hypothesen eine wichtige Rolle in Leibniz’ früher Metaphysik. In einem Brief an Jakob Thomasius schreibt er: „[W]enn wir zeigen, dass keine weiteren Gegenstände über Geist, Materie, Raum und Bewegung hinaus notwendig sind, wird dies klarmachen, dass die Hypothesen derjenigen modernen Denker, die nur diese zur Erklärung der Phänomene verwenden, die besseren sind.“30 In seiner Sicht ist einer der Verdienste dieser Hypothesen, dass sie keine unnötigen Annahmen machen31. Doch sie haben auch ein weiteres Verdienst: „Es muss bemerkt werden, dass diejenigen Hypothesen besser sind, die klarer sind. Der menschliche Geist kann sich tatsächlich nichts anderes vorstellen als Geist, […] Raum, Materie, Bewegung und Dinge, welche aus den Beziehungen zwischen ihnen resultieren.“32 Demzufolge sind es auch die menschliche Vorstellungskraft und ihre Beschränkungen, welche die Hypothesen der mechanischen Philosophie vor alternativen Hypothesen bevorzugen. Auch geht Leibniz’ frühe Konzeption der Materie ihrerseits über bloße hypothetische Stipulationen hinaus. Dies ergibt sich daraus, dass Leibniz der Materie ihre grundlegenden Eigenschaften auf der Grundlage der Weise zuschreibt, in der seiner Auffassung nach alle Menschen Körper vom Raum unterscheiden: 27 28 29 30 31 32

A VI, 1, 120. A VI, 2, 435. Ebd. Für eine detaillierte Diskussion von Leibniz früher Analyse der Materie, siehe A. Blank: Leibniz: Metaphilosophy and Metaphysics, 1666–1686. München 2005, Kapitel 2. A II, 1, 34. Ebd. Ebd.

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Andreas Blank Was die Menschen einen Körper nennen, muss sorgfältig untersucht werden, denn eine klare und distinkte Idee davon gibt uns Zugang zu Beweisen. Erstens stimmen die Menschen darin überein, dass nur etwas, was als ausgedehnt gedacht wird, ein Körper genannt werden kann. […] Die Menschen nennen Raum etwas, von dem sie denken, dass es ausgedehnt ist, aber nichts weiter, weil es sonst nicht unveränderlich wäre. […] Dennoch sind Raum und Körper verschieden. Denn wir nehmen war, dass wir uns den Raum als denselben vorstellen, wenn Körper sich verändern, and dass wir uns einen Raum ohne einen Körper darin denken können. Die Wahrnehmung eines Gedankens ist dem Gedanken im selben Subjekt selbst unmittelbar, deshalb besteht keine Ursache zum Irrtum. Deshalb ist es wahr, dass wir uns den Raum als gleichbleibend denken, wenn Körper sich verändern und dass wir einen Raum ohne einen Körper darin denken können. Nun sind aber zwei Dinge verschieden, wenn das eine ohne das andere gedacht werden kann. Deshalb sind Raum und Körper verschieden.33

In dieser Passage wird die Theorie der Materie verbunden mit epistemischen Kriterien für die Unterscheidung zwischen Körper und Raum. Diese epistemischen Kriterien werden außerdem als etwas beschrieben, was allen Menschen gemeinsam ist. Um Missverständnisse zu vermeiden, erläutert Leibniz, dass sein Argument hier „von einer Idee in unserem Geist zur Wahrheit der Dinge fortschreitet.“34 Demzufolge ist seine Auffassung in Bezug auf Ausdehnung und Undurchdringlichkeit als Wesen der Materie verankert in dem, was er als unsere alltägliche Auffassung von Körpern versteht. Sie ist etwas, wovon er denkt, dass jede aufmerksame Person sie als etwas betrachten würde, was sie klar und deutlich versteht. Dies entspricht einer metaphilosophsichen Auffassung, die Leibniz in seiner „Vorrede zu Nizolius“ explizit zum Ausdruck bringt: Es ist sehr wahr, dass es nichts gibt, was nicht in alltäglichen Begriffen ausgedrückt werden könnte, nur benötigt man dann mehr Begriffe. Nizolius drängt deshalb zu Recht an verschiedenen Stellen darauf, dass etwas, was keine allgemeine Bezeichnung […] in der gewöhnlichen Sprache besitzt, als nicht mehr als eine Fiktion und als etwas Nutzloses zu betrachten. Denn Philosophen übertreffen gewöhnliche Menschen nicht immer darin, dass sie andere Dinge wahrnehmen, sondern dass sie sie in einer anderen Weise wahrnehmen, d. h. mit den Augen des Geistes, mit Reflexion und Aufmerksamkeit, und indem sie Dinge mit anderen Dingen vergleichen.35

Tatsächlich ist Leibniz der Auffassung, dass „die meisten dialektischen und metaphysischen Themen häufig in alltäglichen Reden, Schriften und Gedanken vorkommen und überall im täglichen Leben gebraucht werden. Deshalb haben die Menschen, geleitet durch dieses häufige Auftreten, sie mit spezifischen, allgemein verbreiteten und umfassenden Wörtern bezeichnet […].“36 Leibniz’ Überlegungen zum Begriff des Körpers stützen sich genau auf eine solche metaphilosophische Auffassung von der Natur metaphysischer Begriffe. Die Auffassung, dass Ausdehnung zu den wesentlichen Eigenschaften der Materie gehört, hat ihrerseits weitreichende Konsequenzen für die mereologische 33 34 35 36

A VI, 2, 304–305. A VI, 2, 306. A VI, 2, 413. A VI, 2, 415. Mehr zu dieser Auffassung von metaphysischen Begriffen und ihrem historischen Kontext, siehe A. Blank: „Dalgarno, Wilkins, Leibniz and the Descriptive Nature of Metaphysical Concepts“, in: Leibniz and the English Speaking World. Edited by Pauline Phemister and Stuart Brown Dordrecht 2007, S. 51–61.

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Struktur materieller Objekte. Er gibt die folgende Definition: „Ein ausgedehntes Ding [extensum] ein Kontinuum, dessen Teile koexistieren […].“37 In einer Fußnote erläutert er: „Ein Kontinuum ist ein Ganzes, dessen Teile in indefiniter Weise voneinander unterschieden werden können und eine Stellung in Bezug auf einander besitzen. In dieser Hinsicht unterscheidet es sich sowohl von einer Einheit als auch von einem intensiven Ganzen, wie der Potenz oder der Hitze.“38 Aufgrund der Differenz ihrer Position können die Teile eines materiellen Gegenstandes unabhängig voneinander verstanden werden und hängen in ihrer Existenz nicht voneinander ab. In anderen Worten: Aufgrund ihrer Ausdehnung besitzen materielle Gegenstände keine Einheit im Sinn einer Verbindung von Teilen. Aus diesem Grund charakterisiert Leibniz Ausdehnung als „das, was Teile besitzt, die anderen Teilen äußerlich sind [partes extra partes].“39 In Leibniz’ Augen hat das Denken eine vollkommen andere mereologische Struktur. Und auch hier gehen seine Überlegungen über einen rein hypothetischen Rahmen hinaus. Sicherlich spielen für den jungen Leibniz Hypothesen eine wichtige Rolle in der Philosophie des Geistes. So kündigt er aus einer hypothetischdeduktiven Perspektive den Plan an, „Elemente des Geistes zu schreiben, in der Art wie Euclid Elemente der Größe und Gestalt geschrieben hat, und wie Hobbes Elemente des Körpers oder der Bewegung.“40 Und er ist der Auffassung, dass Hobbes’ Metaphysik ein rein hypothetisches Unternehmen ist41. Tatsächlich versucht Leibniz in dieser Periode, eine Theorie des Geistes von spezifisch geometrischen Begriffen und Axiomen abzuleiten. So schlägt er vor, dass die Lehre der Punkte, Winkel, Momente und des conatus (im Sinne einer momentanen minimalen Bewegung innerhalb eines Punktes) den Schlüssel zur Erklärung der Natur des Denkens enthält42. In diesem Sinn ist seine These zu verstehen, dass „Geometrie, oder die Philosophie des Ortes, den Weg für die Philosophie der Bewegung oder des Körpers frei legt, und die Philosophie der Bewegung für die Wissenschaft vom Geist.“43 Diese Argumentationsrichtung führt Leibniz zu einer Auffassung des menschlichen Geistes, der zufolge die Aktivität des Geistes in einer minimalen Bewegung innerhalb eines Punktes besteht44. Dennoch leitet sich seine frühe Theorie des Geistes nicht nur von geometrischen Axiomen ab, sondern auch von der Analyse der Struktur geistiger Aktivitäten. Anders als es der Bezug auf Euclid und Hobbes erwarten ließe, verwendet Leibniz in dieser Periode nicht nur eine axiomatisch-deduktive Methode. Vielmehr betont er, wie wichtig es ist, Aufmerksamkeit auf etwas zu lenken, das – wenn auch in einer unreflektierten Weise – bereits bekannt ist. Während die geometrische Theorie des Geistes aus hypothetischen Annahmen abgeleitet ist, hat diese deskriptive Seite sei37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

A VI, 4, 391. A VI, 4, 390. A VI, 4, 1464–1465. A II, 1, 182. A VI, 1, 22. A II, 1, 181. A II, 1, 278. A II, 1, 181.

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ner Theorie des Geistes ihre Grundlage in Merkmalen unserer geistigen Aktivitäten, die in einer unmittelbaren, nicht-hypothetischen Weise zugänglich sind. Weil wir mit einigen strukturellen Merkmalen unserer geistigen Aktivitäten vertraut sind, bringt ein solches Vorgehen eine Auffassung des Geistes zum Vorschein, von der Leibniz denkt, dass sie – zumindest implizit – allen Menschen gemeinsam ist. Ein Aspekt dieser Auffassung der Struktur geistiger Aktivitäten kommt zum Ausdruck, wenn Leibniz den Unterschied zwischen Körper und Geist wie folgt beschreibt: Jeder Körper ist […] ein momentaner Geist, oder ein Geist, dem Gedächtnis fehlt, weil er seinen eigenen conatus und einen fremden, konträren conatus nicht länger als einen Moment bewahrt (zwei Faktoren sind für sinnliche Wahrnehmung und für Lust und Schmerz, ohne die es keine Wahrnehmung gibt, erforderlich: Aktion und Reaktion, oder der Vergleich und deshalb Harmonie): deshalb fehlt ihm Gedächtnis, es fehlt ihm ein Sinn für seine eigenen Handlungen und für sein eigenes Erleiden, es fehlt ihm Denken.45

Diese Passage vermittelt uns die folgende Vorstellung von geistigen Aktivitäten: Sinnliche Wahrnehmung setzt die Fähigkeit zum Vergleich zwischen einzelnen geistigen Aktivitäten voraus, die wiederum die Fähigkeit voraussetzt, die Erinnerung an geistige Aktivitäten im Gedächtnis aufzubewahren. Außerdem setzt sinnliche Wahrnehmung die Fähigkeit voraus, bestimmte Eindrücke als lustvoll oder schmerzhaft zu empfinden. Die Fähigkeiten, frühere geistige Aktivitäten im Gedächtnis aufzubewahren, sie zu vergleichen, und sie als angenehm oder schmerzhaft zu empfinden sind höherstufige geistige Aktivitäten – Aktivitäten, die das „Handeln und Leiden“ des Geistes zu ihrem Gegenstand haben. Und es ist diese Struktur selbstbezüglicher geistiger Operationen, die Leibniz im Sinn hat, wenn er von „Denken“ spricht. Tatsächlich beschreibt Leibniz in einem Text aus derselben Zeit Denkens als „selbstbezügliche Aktivität“ und zählt sinnliche Wahrnehmung zu dieser Art von Aktivität46. Eine ähnliche Beschreibung trifft auch auf Gedächtnis, Lust und Schmerz zu: „Jedes Ding, das auf sich selbst bezogen handelt, besitzt ein gewisses Maß an Gedächtnis (denn wir erinnern uns wenn wir wahrnehmen, dass wir wahrgenommen haben); und folglich besitzt es auch die Wahrnehmung der Harmonie oder Disharmonie, oder von Lust oder Schmerz, durch den Vergleich eines alten mit einem neuen sinnlichen Eindruck […].“47 Wie Leibniz argumentiert, ist die höherstufige Aktivität des Vergleichens zentral, um den Sinn zu verstehen, in dem der Geist eine Einheit bildet: Denken ist nichts anderes als der Sinn des Vergleichens, oder kürzer, der Sinn von Vielem zur gleichen Zeit, oder des Einem in Vielem. Es ist notwendig, dass in dem, was gedacht werden kann, es einen Grund gibt, weshalb es wahrgenommen wird, d. h. weshalb es existiert, und dies liegt nicht im Denken eines einzigen Dings, er liegt deshalb in einer Vielheit. Deshalb in allen. Deshalb im Geist, das heißt im Einen im Vielen. Deshalb in Harmonie, das heißt in der Einheit in einer Vielheit, oder in einer Vielfalt, die durch Identität ausgeglichen wird.48 45 46 47 48

A VI, 2, 266. A VI, 2, 493. A VI, 1, 483. A VI, 2, 282. Zum Hintergrund des in dieser Passage verwendeten Topos, siehe T. Leinkauf:

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Diese Passage deutet einen Grund an, weshalb Denken einen Vergleich geistiger Aktivitäten voraussetzt: eine geistige Aktivität, die nur ein einziges Merkmal der Welt repräsentiert, würde keine Erklärung dafür in sich tragen, weshalb Wahrnehmung entsteht. Der Kontrast zwischen der Vorstellung des Denkens eines einzigen Dings und dem Denken einer Vielheit deutet darauf hin, dass es Leibniz hier insbesondere um eine Erklärung der Komplexität des Inhalts unserer Wahrnehmungen geht. Aus diesem Grund müssen Wahrnehmungen durch die Verarbeitung einer Vielzahl von geistigen Aktivitäten entstehen, die selbst noch keine Wahrnehmungen sind. Dennoch stellt sich die Frage, welches Merkmal der höherstufigen geistigen Aktivitäten, die mit Wahrnehmung und Denken verbunden sind, für den Begriff der Einheit von Bedeutung ist. Da der Begriff von Einheit im Sinn der Verbindungs-Relation (verstanden als eine Relation der wechselseitigen existentiellen Abhängigkeit) schon in Leibniz’ frühen Schriften präsent ist, scheint es sinnvoll, danach zu fragen, ob die Verbindungs-Relation eine Rolle in seiner Auffassung von Wahrnehmen und Denken spielt. Zunächst ist es offensichtlich, dass nicht alles, was Leibniz über Wahrnehmen und Denken sagt, eine Beziehung der wechselseitigen existentiellen Abhängigkeit impliziert. So ist eine höherstufige geistige Aktivität, wie die Aktivität des Vergleichens anderer geistiger Aktivitäten, für seine Existenz von der Existenz der geistigen Aktivitäten abhängig, die sie zum Gegenstand hat. Doch die geistigen Aktivitäten, die verglichen werden, könnten existieren, ohne Gegenstand höherstufiger geistiger Operationen zu werden – in diesem Fall würden weder Wahrnehmung noch Denken auftreten. In dieser Hinsicht besteht also die für die Verbindungs-Relation kennzeichnende Wechselseitigkeit nicht. Dennoch gibt es wenigstens einen Aspekt von Wahrnehmung und Denken, der eine Relation der wechselseitigen existentiellen Abhängigkeit exemplifiziert. Dieser Aspekt betrifft die Struktur des schon erwähnten „Sinns für seine eigenen Handlungen und für sein eigenes Erleiden.“49 Die folgende Passage ist in dieser Hinsicht aufschlussreich: Denken ist der Grund von Veränderung zu sein, oder sich selbst zu verändern. Auch ist es der Grund von sich selbst zu sein. Denken kann nicht definiert werden, wie auch wahrnehmen, oder eher handeln. Und dennoch, wenn sie einmal gesetzt sind, werden sie in sich selbst reflektiert. Weil wir denken, wissen wir, dass wir wir selbst sind, weil wir handeln, wissen wir, dass es noch etwas anderes gibt.50

Leibniz’ Überlegung scheint die folgende zu sein: Wahrnehmung, Denken und Handeln sind ihrer Natur nach mit höherstufigen geistigen Operationen verbunden, durch die wir uns unserer Wahrnehmungen, Gedanken und Handlungen bewusst sind. Dadurch, dass wir uns unserer Wahrnehmungen und Gedanken bewusst sind, sind wir uns aber auch gleichzeitig unserer selbst bewusst (und auch der Dinge, die von unseren Handlungen vorausgesetzt werden). Hier tritt ein Bündel von Relationen existentieller Abhängigkeit auf: Das Bewusstsein von Wahrnehmung, Denken

49 50

„‚Diversitas identitate compensata‘. Ein Grundtheorem in Leibniz’ Denken und seine Voraussetzungen in der frühen Neuzeit“, in: Studia Leibnitiana 28 (1996), S. 58–83. A VI, 2, 266. A VI, 2, 282–283.

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und Handeln kann nicht unabhängig von der Existenz von Wahrnehmung, Denken und Handeln auftreten. Gleichzeitig treten unsere Wahrnehmungen, Gedanken und Handlungen nicht auf, ohne dass wir uns dessen bewusst sind („wenn sie einmal gesetzt sind, werden sie in sich selbst reflektiert“). Desweiteren hängt die Existenz von Selbstbewusstsein vom Bewusstsein unserer geistigen Aktivitäten ab („Weil wir denken, wissen wir, dass wir wir selbst sind“). Können Denken, Wahrnehmen und Handeln ohne Selbstbewusstsein auftreten? Leibniz scheint diese Möglichkeit auszuschließen, weil er eine wechselseitige existentielle Abhängigkeit zwischen dem Bewusstsein geistiger Aktivitäten und dem Selbstbewusstsein sieht: In unserem Geist gibt es eine Wahrnehmung oder einen Sinn von ihm selbst als einem Einzelding. Dies ist immer in uns, denn so oft wir ein Wort gebrauchen bemerken wir es unmittelbar. So oft wir wünschen, erkennen wir, dass wir unsere Gedanken wahrnehmen; d. h. wir erkennen, dass wir eine kurze Weile zuvor gedacht haben. Deshalb besteht intellektuelles Gedächtnis darin: nicht was wir wahrgenommen haben, sondern dass wir wahrgenommen haben – dass wir diejenigen sind, die eine sinnliche Empfindung hatten.51

Hier beschreibt Leibniz eine Erfahrung, von der er ausgeht, dass sie jede Person bei jeder ihrer sprachlichen Äußerungen, jedem ihrer Wünsche und jeder ihrer Wahrnehmungen macht – weiter von einem hypothetischer Methodologie könnte er gar nicht entfernt sein. Wir alle erfahren, dass unser Gebrauch sprachlicher Zeichen immer von der Erfahrung begleitet sind, dass wir es sind, die diese Zeichen gebrauchen, und dass etwas analoges für unsere Wünsche und Wahrnehmungen gilt: Wenn wir uns der Wahrnehmungen und Wünsche, die wir unmittelbar zuvor hatten, bewusst sind, sind wir uns bewusst, dass es unsere Wahrnehmungen und Wünsche sind. Die reflexive Struktur unseres Wahrnehmens, Denkens und Handelns bringt demzufolge ein Bündel von gleich drei miteinander in Zusammenhang stehenden Verbindungs-Relationen mit sich: (1) die wechselseitige existentielle Abhängigkeit zwischen Wahrnehmen, Denken und Handeln einerseits und dem Bewusstsein von Wahrnehmen, Denken und Handeln andererseits; (2) die wechselseitige existentielle Abhängigkeit zwischen dem Bewusstsein von Wahrnehmen, Denken und Handeln einerseits und dem Selbstbewusstsein andererseits; und (3) die wechselseitige existentielle Abhängigkeit zwischen Wahrnehmen, Denken und Handeln einerseits und dem Selbstbewusstsein andererseits. Tatsächlich verknüpft Leibniz die Frage, wie wir den Begriff der Einheit erfassen können, mit der reflexiven Struktur des Denkens: Ausdehnung ist ein Zustand, Denken eine Aktivität. […] Alles, was denkt, denkt etwas. Das einfachste Ding ist dasjenige, das denkt, dass es sich selbst denkt […]. Wir nehmen viele Dinge in unserem Geist wahr, wie Denken oder Wahrnehmen, sich selbst wahrnehmen, wahrnehmen, dass man selbst derselbe bleibt, das Wahrnehmen von Lust und Schmerz … Die Idee der Existenz und der Identität kommen nicht vom Körper, noch kommt die Idee der Einheit daher.52

51 52

A VI, 3, 509. A VI, 3, 518.

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Geht man davon aus, dass der Begriff der Einfachheit für Leibniz synonym mit dem Begriff der Einheit ist, dann weist diese Passage darauf hin, dass der Begriff der Einheit nicht aus der Analyse des Körpers, wohl aber aus der Analyse der reflexiven Struktur des Denkens erfasst werden kann. Wenn die reflexive Struktur des Denkens durch eben beschriebenen Relationen der wechselseitigen existentiellen Abhängigkeit charakterisiert ist, wird klar, in welchem Sinn die Analyse der Struktur des Denkens zu der Einsicht führt, dass Wahrnehmen, Denken und Handeln, das Bewusstsein von Wahrnehmen, Denken und Handeln, und das Selbstbewusstsein eine Einheit im Sinn der Relation der connexio bilden: Es sind Aktivitäten, die – im Gegensatz zu den Teilen eines Körpers – nicht außerhalb des Zusammenhangs eines Ganzen auftreten können. 4. METAPHILOSOPHIE UND DAS MÜHLENARGUMENT Nun sollte Leibniz’ frühe Unterscheidung zwischen dem ausgedehnten Körper, der sich aus Teilen zusammensetzt, die anderen Teilen äußerlich sind, und dem wahrnehmenden und denkenden Geist, dessen Aktivitäten miteinander zu einem Ganzen verbunden sind, das im aristotelischen Sinn früher als seine Teile ist, klar vor Augen stehen. Es sollte inzwischen auch klar geworden sein, dass diese Unterscheidung auf einer Analyse dessen beruht, was Leibniz für allgemein geteilte Überzeugungen in Bezug auf die Natur der Körper und die Struktur des Denkens hält. Kehren wir jetzt zurück zu der Frage, was dieser Hintergrund zum Verständnis des Mühlenarguments beitragen kann. Der Gebrauch der Mühle als ein Bild, das den Unterschied zwischen der Struktur aller materieller Systeme und der Struktur geistiger Aktivitäten erläutern soll, tritt relativ spät in Leibniz’ philosophischer Entwicklung auf. Zum ersten Mal tritt er in skizzenhafter Form in einem Brief an Pierre Bayle (1702?) und dann leicht modifiziert in der Vorrede zu den Nouveaux Essais (1704) auf. In der Vorrede zu den Nouveaux Essais argumentiert Leibniz: Was jetzt das Denken anbetrifft, so ist es sicher …, dass es keine begreifliche Modifikation der Materie, die in ihrem Wesen eingeschlossen läge und aus diesem erklärt werden könnte, sein kann, d. h. dass das empfindende oder denke Wesen keine Maschine wie eine Uhr oder eine Mühle ist, so dass sich Größen, Gestalten und Bewegungen vorstellen ließen, deren mechanische Verknüpfung etwas Denkendes, ja auch nur Empfindendes in einem Stoffe, in dem sonst nichts der Art wäre, hervorbrächte […].53

Es ist bemerkenswert, dass Leibniz in dieser Passage – anders als in der entsprechenden Passage aus der Monadologie – nicht behauptet, dass ein mechanisches System unfähig ist, Perzeptionen im allgemeinen hervorzubringen; er behauptet hier nur, dass es unfähig ist, Denken und sinnliche Wahrnehmung hervorzubringen – eine Auffassung, die auch in der Monadologie zum Ausdruck kommt. Wie in seinen frühen Jahren vertritt Leibniz auch in seiner späten Philosophie die Auffassung, dass Wahrnehmung wie Denken erst durch das Vorliegen höherstufiger 53

A VI, 6, 66–67. Übersetzung aus G. W. Leibniz: Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand. Übers. v. E. Cassirer, Hamburg 1996, S. 25–26.

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geistiger Aktivitäten, die er seit den 1680er-Jahren auch „Apperzeptionen“ nennt, entsteht. So schreibt er: „Sinnliche Wahrnehmung […] ist eine Perzeption, die etwas Distinktes enthält und mit Aufmerksamkeit [attentio] und Erinnerung [memoria] verbunden ist.“54 Doch weshalb genau sind materielle Systeme unfähig, eine Erklärung für das Auftreten von geistigen Aktivitäten zu geben, die höherstufige geistige Operationen einschließen? Die Mühlenpassage aus den Nouveaux Essais selbst gibt nicht viele Hinweise auf die Natur der Erklärungslücke, die das Gedankenexperiment offen legen will55. Doch in einer vorbereitenden Studie zu den Nouveaux Essais bemerkt Leibniz: „Eine materielle Masse, deren Teile ohne Perzeption sind, kann nicht eine Ganzes bilden, das denkt.“56 Merkwürdigerweise scheint Leibniz in dieser Bemerkung schon vorauszusetzen, was das Mühlenargument in der Monadologie zu zeigen versucht: nämlich, dass materielle Objekte und ihre Teile keine Perzeptionen besitzen. Dennoch ist die Bemerkung von Interesse, weil sie auf den Grund hinweist, weshalb materielle Systeme unfähig sind, Denken hervorzubringen: Denken, anders als materielle Systeme, bildet ein Ganzes. Dies ist ein nützlicher Ausgangspunkt, um die Version des Mühlenarguments aus dem Brief an Bayle in den Blick zu nehmen: [W]enn jemand so durchdringende Augen hätte, wie man es sich wünschte, um die kleinsten Teile in der Textur der Körper zu sehen, sehe ich nicht, dass man dadurch irgendeinen Fortschritt erzielt hätte, und man wird den Ursprung der Perzeption dort ebenso wenig finden wie man ihn jetzt in einer Uhr oder in den Teilen einer Maschine, die alle sichtbar sind, oder in einer Mühle, wo man inmitten der Räder herumlaufen kann: denn der Unterschied zwischen einer Mühle einer subtileren Maschine ist nur ein Unterschied des Mehr und Weniger. Man kann sich vorstellen, dass die Maschine die schönsten Dinge der Welt herstellte, doch nie dass sie dies apperzipiert [qu’elle s’apperçoive].57

Hier tritt die allgemeinere, auf Perzeption bezogene These auf, die auch aus der Monadologie vertraut ist. Sicherlich kann man sich an dieser Stelle wundern, weshalb die Unfähigkeit zur Apperzeption ein Argument für die Unfähigkeit zur Perzeption sein sollte. Auch erläutert Leibniz an dieser Stelle in keiner Weise, weshalb eine Maschine zur Apperzeption unfähig sein sollte. Wenn diese Passage jedoch in Verbindung mit der Bemerkung aus der vorbereitenden Studie zu den Nouveaux Essais gelesen wird, scheint es plausibel, dass Leibniz hier etwas im Sinn hat, das der in seinen frühen Schriften entwickelten Gedankenlinie folgt: Komplexe Maschinen sind unfähig dazu, Apperzeption hervorzubringen, weil geistige Aktivitäten, die durch höherstufige geistigen Aktivitäten entstehen, ein Ganzes bilden, das früher als seine Teile ist. Wenn die Einheit von geistigen Aktivitäten, die durch höherstufige geistige Aktivitäten entstehen, das ist, was Leibniz in den Mühlen-Passagen im 54 55 56 57

GP VII, 330. Zu dieser Passage, siehe M. Kulstad: Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflexion. Munich 1991, S. 31. Bei R. M. Adams: Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist. New York – Oxford 1994, S. 368–369, finden sich jedoch einige sehr interessante Bemerkungen zur Bedeutung von Leibniz’ Auffassung der Wunder für die Mühlen-Passage in den Nouveaux Essais. A VI, 6, 8. GP III, 68.

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Brief an Bayle im Sinn hat, dann hat die kontrafaktische Verbesserung unseres Sehvermögens – die hier der kontrafaktischen Veränderung der Größenverhältnisse in der Passage aus der Monadologie entspricht – genau die Funktion, die Gedankenexperimenten in der Philosophie oft zugeschrieben wird: eine allgemeine philosophische Annahme dadurch in Frage zu stellen, dass alltägliche begriffliche Intuitionen zum Vorschein gebracht werden, die ihr zuwider laufen. Wenn sie im Zusammenhang mit der Bemerkung aus der vorbereitenden Studie zu den Nouveaux Essais gelesen wird, gibt die Mühlen-Passage aus dem Brief an Bayle einen wichtigen Hinweise darauf, was Leibniz im Mühlenargument aus der Monadologie damit gemeint haben könnte, wenn er behauptet, dass Denken und Wahrnehmen durch das Arbeiten materieller Systeme nicht erklärt werden können. Es ist ein Argument, das zurück reicht in seine frühen Schriften zur Metaphysik und auf der Analyse unserer alltäglichen Auffassungen in Bezug auf die Natur der Körper und die Struktur der bewussten geistigen Aktivitäten beruht. Dennoch stellt die Monadologie (wie auch der Brief an Bayle) darüber auch die These auf, dass materielle Systeme auch Perzeptionen nicht erklären können. Auch die Charakterisierung, die Leibniz in Monadologie § 14 von Perzeptionen gibt, zeigt dass in seinen Augen auch die Perzeptionen von einfachen Substanzen, die keine Fähigkeit zu Apperzeption besitzen, Einheit aufweisen58. Beide These gehen über das hinaus, was unsere uns unsere Intuitionen in Bezug auf die Struktur bewusster geistiger Aktivitäten sagen können. Daraus ergeben sich zwei mit einander verknüpfte Probleme: Erstens, wie kann Leibniz seinen Begriff der Einheit von geistigen Aktivitäten, die Apperzeption voraussetzen, auf geistige Aktivitäten ausdehnen, die keine Apperzeption voraussetzen? Zweitens, wie kann Leibniz seinen Begriff der Einheit vom menschlichen Geist auf einfache Substanzen ausdehnen, von denen er denkt, dass sie Perzeptionen, aber keine Apperzeption besitzen? Ganz offensichtlich ist ein hohes Maß an hypothetischer Überlegung im Spiel, wenn Leibniz die Auffassung vertritt, dass auch die unbewussten Aktivitäten des menschlichen Geistes und anderer immaterieller Substanzen Teil einer Einheit in dem Sinn bilden, dass jede gegenwärtige Gesamtaktivität einer einfachen Substanz alle ihre vergangenen und zukünftigen Aktivitäten repräsentiert59. Die vollkommene Repräsentation aller vergangenen und zukünftigen Aktivitäten in der gegenwärtigen Gesamtaktivität einer einfachen Substanz exemplifiziert die connexio-Relation: Einerseits hängt die Existenz der gegenwärtigen Gesamtaktivität einer einfachen Substanz von der Existenz aller ihrer vergangener und zukünftiger Aktivitäten, denn sonst könnten alle ihre vergangene und zukünftigen Aktivitäten nicht in ihrem gegenwärtigen Gesamtzustand repräsentiert sein. Andererseits hängt aber auch die Existenz jeder vergangenen und zukünftigen Gesamtaktivität von der Existenz der gegenwärtigen Gesamtaktivität ab, denn aus der Perspektive dieser anderen Gesamtaktivitäten gehört die gegenwärtige Aktivität zu den vergangenen oder zukünftigen Aktivitäten gehört, 58 59

Siehe GP VII, 529. Siehe A VI, 6, 114. Zur These der vollkommenen Verbindung unter Perzeptionen als Hypothese, siehe E. Naert: Memoire et conscience de soi selon Leibniz, Paris 1961, S. 57–60; N. Jolley: Leibniz and Locke. A Study of the New Essays on Human Understanding, Oxford 1984, S. 137–141.

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die von ihnen repräsentiert werden. Aufgrund dieser Relation der wechselseitigen existentiellen Abhängigkeit zwischen Perzeptionen bilden auch die Aktivitäten der immateriellen Substanzen, denen die Fähigkeit zu Wahrnehmung und Denken fehlt, eine Einheit. Gleichzeitig ist die These, dass eine solche vollkommene Repräsentation besteht, offensichtlich eine Hypothese, die über alle alltäglichen Intuitionen hinausgeht. Dennoch spielen alltägliche Intuitionen möglicherweise in indirekter Weise auch hier eine Rolle. Diese Intuitionen haben mit dem Grund zu tun, weshalb Leibniz überhaupt den Begriff den Begriff der Einheit auf andere Entitäten als den wahrnehmenden und denkenden Geist ausdehnt. Dieser Grund hat unmittelbar mit unseren Intuitionen in Bezug auf die Natur des Körpers zu tun: Aus mehreren Teilen wird keine Entität zusammengesetzt, die wahrhaft eines ist, und jede Substanz ist unteilbar, und was Teile hat, ist nicht ein Seiendes, sondern nur ein Phänomen. Deshalb haben die antiken Philosophen zu Recht den Dingen, von denen sie sagten, dass sie ein unum per se bilden, substantielle Formen, wie Geist, Seele, oder erste Entelechie zugeschrieben, und haben bestritten, dass Materie an sich ein Seiendes ist.60

Wie wir gesehen haben, beruht die Auffassung, dass die Materie durch ihre ausgedehnten Teile keine wirkliche Einheit bildet in den Augen von Leibniz auf einer Analyse unserer alltäglichen Auffassung der Natur der Körper. Hier wird eine Implikation dieser Auffassung deutlich gemacht: Entweder wir müssten Körper als bloße Phänomene verstehen, die nichts wirklich Seiendes sind (was natürlich unserer alltäglichen Auffassung von der Realität der Körper widerspricht)61, oder wir müssten, um die Realität der Körper zu sichern, die Annahme machen, dass es in der Natur über den Bereich der vernünftigen und wahrnehmenden Seelen hinaus weitere Arten von immateriellen Substanzen gibt, die wahre Einheiten sind, welche die in der Lage sind, Ansammlungen von materiellen Teilen zu wahren Einheiten zu verbinden. Es ist aber genau die Relation der connexio, die nicht eine Relation zwischen Teilen sein kann, die eine solche Einheit gewährleistet: „[M]aterie ist in der Tat nichts, das Ganze ist nicht aus Teilen zusammengesetzt sondern verbunden [connexum].“62 Dies ist es, was Leibniz motiviert, den durch die Analyse der Strukturen des bewussten geistigen Lebens gewonnenen Begriff der Einheit (im Sinn der connexio) auf den Bereich der einfachen Substanzen zu übertragen, die kein Bewusstsein besitzen. Einfache Substanzen, die kein spezifisch psychisches Leben besitzen, müssen demzufolge eine Struktur besitzen, die eine Analogie zur Struktur der wahrnehmenden und denkenden Seelen aufweist. Es kann jedoch keine Struktur sein, deren Einheit mit der Rolle von höherstufigen geistigen Aktivitäten zusammenhängt. So kommt Leibniz zur Hypothese, dass die Relation der connexio, was unbewusste geistige Aktivitäten betrifft, in der vollkommenen Verbindung zwischen vergangenen, gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Aktivitäten besteht – eine Hypothese sicherlich, aber dennoch eine Hypothese, die einen Begriff der Einheit 60 61 62

A VI, 4, 627–628. Zur argumentativen Rolle eines reinen Phänemonalismus in Leibniz’s Philosophie, siehe A. Robinet: Architéctonique disjonctive, automates systémiques, et idéalité trancendentale dans l’oeuvre de G. W. Leibniz, Paris 1986. A VI, 4, 279.

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verwendet, der durch die Analyse unserer alltäglichen Auffassung unseres geistigen Lebens gewonnen wurde und durch die Analyse unserer alltäglichen Auffassung der Körper motiviert ist. 5. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Dieser Artikel hat versucht, den metaphilosophischen Kontext von Leibniz’ Analyse der Begriffe der Wahrnehmung, des Denkens und der Einheit in die Interpretation des Mühlenarguments mit einzubeziehen. Eine solche Strategie macht die Interpretation des Arguments sicher komplexer als eine Interpretation, die sich auf den unmittelbaren Kontext des Arguments konzentriert. Diese höhere Komplexität bringt jedoch zwei Vorteile mit sich. Erstens macht der metaphilosophische Kontext klar, dass Leibniz’ Begriff der Einheit keine rein hypothetische Stipulation ist. Vielmehr beruht er auf einer Analyse unserer alltäglichen Auffassung bewusster geistiger Aktivitäten. Ähnlich beruht Leibniz’ Auffassung, dass materielle Gegenstände keine Einheit besitzen, auf einer Analyse unserer alltäglichen Auffassung der Natur der Körper. In diesem Sinn ist der Kontrast zwischen geistigen Aktivitäten, die durch Einheit gekennzeichnet sind, und den Zuständen materieller Objekte, die durch ein Fehlen von Einheit gekennzeichnet sind, schon in Leibniz’ frühen Schriften zur Metaphysik angelegt. Der zweite Vorteil, den die Einbeziehung des metaphilosophischen Kontexts mit sich bringt, liegt darin, dass sie deutlich macht, dass die kontrafaktische Natur der Situation, die im Mühlenargument beschrieben wird, möglicherweise eine selbständige argumentative Rolle spielt. Das Mühlenargument funktioniert als Gedankenexperiment weil es einige kontextuell relevante Intuitionen zu Tage fördert – unsere Intuitionen in Bezug auf die Einheit von geistigen Aktivitäten wie Wahrnehmen und Denken, unsere Intuitionen in Bezug auf die fehlende Einheit von materiellen Gegenständen – und uns darauf hinweist, wie diese Intuitionen dazu beitragen, die Erklärungslücke zu verstehen, die sich zwischen der mereologischen Struktur materieller Gegenstände und der mereologischen Struktur geistiger Aktivität auftut. In dieser Weise illustriert der metaphilosophische Kontext des Mühlenarguments, wie sich hypothetische und nicht-hypothetische Elemente in Leibniz’ Metaphysik gegenseitig ergänzen.

THE VINCULUM SUBSTANTIALE AND THE IMPACT OF METAPHYSICS IN LEIBNIZ’ LATE PHILOSOPHY Thomas Leinkauf 1. Premises: (1) The general interest and concern of this paper is not the question and possible decision, whether the so called “late philosophy” of Leibniz is a systematical transformation of ontology into “phenomenology” or a different kind of monadological “realism” or whatever type of “metaphysics”1, my interest will instead be the more general question about the concept of unity and, with regard to the problem ‘reality-harmony’, its diverse levels and complexities in the period after the Système nouveau. (2) The following reflections should be inserted, then, into a much broader framework to get their full meaning, namely, in the discussion of the general development of early modern philosophy from the late medieval, espescially scotistic and nominalistic philosophy until the so called German Idealism (especially Schelling and Hegel). Something that I evidently cannot do here, but nonetheless I will tell you in short what I understand by broader framework. There are, in my view, two interconnected movements of thinking which could, in a rough and approximative way, be characterised as following: a movement A which is step by step developping a systematic argument with the intention and perspective to put all accidental determinations of a being/thing x as if they were substantial in themselves or essential determinations, parts of the ontological constitution or definition of a being/res x and so forth, and a parallel movement, let’s call it B, that is step by step developping a systematic argument that intends, in the contrary, to put all essential determinations as accidental to one substance. The former is what we will find in the 1

The actual discussion is very complicated, the results are all other then satisfying. The reason why this is so is mainly to be found in Leibniz‘s writings and in the fact, that before his death in 1716 Leibniz didn’t come to grips with the complexity and also the ambiguity of his “final philosophy”; unfortunately he didn’t realize his idea to publish a text that would work like a “clavis” for the understanding of his monadology, cfr. the Letter to Hugony, after November 1710, GP III, 680: “mon systeme entire”. See Richard M. Adams: Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, New York 1994; P. Phemister: Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity, and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy, Dordrecht 2005; G. Hartz: Leibniz’s final system: monads, matter and animals, London-New York 2007; Donald Rutherford, Brandon Look (Eds.): The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence (The Yale Leibniz), New Haven-London 2007, Introduction, particularly p. lxxii to the unsatisfying fact, that even the correspondence with Des Bosses gives no clear and precise results for the question about substantial unity; Dan Garber: Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, New York 2009.

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philosophy of Leibniz, the latter is what we will find in the philosophy of Spinoza, with forerunners for both, respectively in the Scotistic-nominalistic school for Leibniz, and, for Spinoza, in Giordano Bruno, later in the philosophy of identity that Schelling conceived between 1800 and 1804. In Leibniz the intention is, as a most rigid consequence of his theory of monads, to regard all phenomena as “essential” expressions of the self-expression of a monad: you cannot change even the smallest detail without having a totally new or “other” monad (ens omnimode determinatum, notio completa-structure)2. In Spinoza the intention is to declare every being, independently from its former ontological status as an attribut or modus of the one and only really being “substantia absoluta”. That is: being in the proper sense is only and exclusively a property of the substantia absoluta, all other being is, in itself, “nothing”. The A-system is, as a structure under the heading of the ‘one-many’, very close to the Plotinian concept of Nus (intellect), and it is connected, through the concept of individuality-singularity, with Scotism and nominalist thinking. The B-system instead is, as I see it, quite close to, if not identical with, what one could call a Parmenidean ontology, it is connected to the stream of monistic thinking from Parmenides, Plotinus, Giordano Bruno to Spinoza himself. In the A-system arrises necessarily the problem of how to justify philosophically the connection and identity between the one-many unities, in the B-system, to the contrary, arrises the problem of how to justify real diversity and difference. So far, just to give you a short-cut idea of where my interpretation of Leibniz’s vinculum-problem is “situated” or “located”. I will give you now, connected with a close reading of certain letters of the Des Bosses-correspondance, a short presentation of what I think is the background of the concept of “vinculum substantiale”, namely Leibniz’s complex theory of “unity” (in section 2.). In a second more ‘historical’ step (section 3.) then, I will introduce some texts from the metaphysical tradition to support my interpretation and to open, as far as possible, a horizon for a new discussion. At the end (section 4.) you will find a short valuation. 2. Leibniz’s philosophy is from its beginning on a systematic reflection on the fundamental problems that any philosophy post Cartesium had to come to grips with: to re-unify what Descartes had divided, that is: res extensa and res cogitans, a partes extra partes-structure (in nature and bodily being) on the one side and the unity of the mental realm, at least for human beings and their specific epistemological 2

Leibniz, Animadversiones in partem generalem principiorum Cartesianorum; GP IV, 364: “Non tantum enim aliis substantiis indigemus, sed multo magis accidentibus nostris. (…) substantia et accidens mutuo indigeant”. Discours de métaphysique, n. 13; A VI, 4, 1546: for notio completa and individual concept of an individuum. Cfr. to that problem Juan Antonio Nicolás: “Zwei Dimensionen der Leibnizschen Ontologie: Vitalismus und Funktionalismus”, in: J. A. Nicolás (Ed.): Leibniz und die Entstehung der Modernität, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 57–69, pp. 60– 61: “Jede Eigenschaft und jedes Merkmal, auch wenn es ‘das Kleinste’ ist, ist ontologisch determinierend und von daher essentiell”.

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conditions3, on the other side. This challenge is something Leibniz condivided with most of his contemporaneus colleagues in philosophy and also in the sciences in general. What makes his approach so singular is the insistance on a bundle of central ontological and metaphysical presuppositions he never was, in his quite long activity as a thinker, sincerely inclined to put into question (as you can imagine, I see these presuppositions in a Platonic context; see above Einleitung p. 10 f, 16 f and down note 29). These presuppositions are: (i) the “unitas metaphysica”, which is to be separated from other unities as “unitas arithmetica”, “unitas materialis”, “unitas aggregati” etc. The differentia specifica here is exactly the aprioristatus of metaphysical unity: it is “unum absolutum”, as God, “unitas pura”, as the monas, or “unum” or “ens per se”4. In this radical sense unity is unity before any multiplicity, before any difference, be it spatio-temporal, corporeal, in general: ontological difference, before any possible determination in propositional processes, before any conceptualization, etc.; (ii) the concept of order as a universal rational structure, which manifests itself in laws, in proportions, interdependences, interactions etc.5; the concept of order is introducing, so to say, plurality or multiplicity into the unity of (i), into the “prius” – oder “before”-structure. This traditional concept of a „mundus pulcher“, which was always, at least since Plato’s Timaeus, connected with a divin origin as an intentional, explicit setting of the worldstructure by a metaphysical agent (demiurgos, god) and with the concept of totality as unity of a non-enlargeable manifold, Leibniz is combining now with (iii) the thesis of an infinte – ad maius and ad minus – progressing or unfolding activity of powers or forces (potentiae, virtutes, vires). In this sense the monads are ontologically pure, independent, self-constitutive centers of activity understood as perceptio, apperceptio and appetitio (Monadology § 14)6.

With metaphysical unity, universal order and unconditioned force and dynamics we have the basic-criteria of Leibniz’ late philosophy: reality is nothing else than unity which is continuously unfolding its power or potential into complex unity-multiplicity-instances which represent always a definite “ordo rerum” or a “harmony” (see also Einleitung, p. 14–22 above). 3

4 5

6

For what follows cfr. A. Boehm: Le “Vinculum substantiale” chez Leibniz. Ses origines historiques, Paris 1938, 2nd ed. 1962; D. Rutherford: Leibniz and the rational order of nature, Cambridge 1995; B. Look: Leibniz and the vinculum substantiale, University of Kentucky 1997; B. Look: “The ties that bind: Leibniz, Tournemine and Des Bosses”, in: Herbert Breger (Ed.): Leibniz und Europa, Akten des VI. internationalen Leibniz-Kongreß, Hannover 1994, p. 443– 449; A. Cardoso: “Monade et vinculum substantiale”, in: Juan Antonio Nicolás (Ed.): Leibniz und die Entstehung der Modernität, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 215–222, esp. p. 220–221; S. Jenschke: “‘Nostra mens phaenomenon facit, divina rem’ – Bemerkungen zu einem bislang wenig beachteten Leibniztext (LH IV 8 BL. 56–57)“, in: Wenchao Li (Hg): Komma und Kathedrale. Tradition, Bedeutung und Herausforderung der Leibniz-Edition, Berlin 2012, 237–252. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (11. March 1706); GP II, 304–305. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (11. March 1706); GP II, 306–307: “nihil enim divinorum est ordinis expers”, that means: nature is always acting following “certas leges”; p. 307: overall and total interaction as a) representation, b) action-passion: “cum quaevis substantia totum quodammodo repraesentet universum, prout ad ipsam refertur, et quaevis pars materiae a quavis alia aliquid patiatur”. See D. Rutherford 1995, p. 26–35, 188–211. Leibniz, Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae, second edition 1685–1709; A VI, 1, 286: “Perceptio est expressio multorum in vere uno seu substantia simplice”.

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The concept of force Leibniz is holding is founded in the idea that all true und real being is not only a unity and a part of a complex order as totality, but also and in the same moment activity. Activity thought as spontaneous expression or better: self-expression of a unity x in a setting y (world), so that y is nothing else then x’s unfoulding or self-expression (I call that, in short, ‘y out of x’ [x → y]): “Chaque substance exprime l’univers tout entier à sa maniere”7. So every monad as a unum per se and as a “véritbale atome de la nature” or “élément”8, is, as a unity, a relation of the kind ‘y out of x’ [x → y]: the manifold or variety of forms, signs, structures, which constitutes a substantial unity (unum substantiale) is not something put together ex post or a posteriori, so that the unity is ontologically later than the many factors constituting it, but something unfolded or evolved (implictly or potentially or explicitly or actually), so that the unity is before (systematically, not temporally) the complexity (a priori). But every unity x is also that very y that is unfolded dynamilcally out of it, or better: all those y’s (y1, y2, y3, etc.) which are constituting the ‘being’ of x – and that is not only an “is” that functions in propositions as predicating or conceptually identifying – but as an “is” that is to be understood ontologically9. Multiplicity is at least twofold: it is what we could call the ‘interior’ multiplicity of a monad (unity) or it is also the multiplicity as ‘exterior’ multiplicity of aggregats, compounds, synthetic being. Only for the interior or internal multiplicity – which is not constituted through partes extra partes – it is true that all y’s are substantialy identical with the x which produces (unfolds) them. Consequently that reality coincides ontologically with harmony, if harmony, as I would propose it, is to be thought as ‘ordered multiplicity’ [see Introduction: R = H]).

7 8

9

Leibniz, To Arnauld, letter 16, ed. Finster 1997, p. 179. Leibniz, Monadology, art. 3. I agree with Cardoso, p. 216, that the definition of the Monad not only as “unum” or “unity”, but also as “élément des choses” and “simple”, has a close relation to Leibniz’s dynamic conception of being (not only of nature!). And I agree also, that “simple” is correlative to “composé/composed/compositum”, but I do not agree, that this is necessarly leading to a non-idealistic, vitalistic interpretation of Leibniz’s late philosophy. This would only be so, if one would, as I’m afraid that Cardoso does, restrict the meaning of unity to a numeric or abstract concept of unity. But Leibniz is evidently influenced by the highly developped concepts of unity of the platonic-neoplatonic and of the peripatetic tradition and is not to be subsumed under such limited understanding of unity. The ‘y out of x-structure’ is such an interpretation or understanding of the monad as an auto-expressive, complexe unity. I also do not agree to refer that kind of complexity to the background of alchemistic thinking, cfr. the reference to the book of M. Cariou: L’atomisme. Gassendi, Leibniz, Bergson et Lucrèce, Paris 1978, p. 123. It is evident, that following Leibniz’ suppositional logic, which is worked out precisely in his treatise Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum (1686), hrsg., übers. u. mit einem Kommentar vers. v. Franz Schupp, Hamburg 1993: the ‘x out of y-structure’ [the x -> y] is identical with x = y, because of the law of “inesse” (praedicatum inest subiecti), see for ‘inesse’ n. 4, Schupp, p. 30 and n. 16, p. 32; for ‘substituere/substitutio’ n. 21 , p. 36 and n. 79–83, p. 68. Ontologically the “out of” is indicating nonetheless an inner realm of the substance or monad. The y is in the x, or, the world w(x) is nothing else (non aliud) then the power (virtus, vis, force) of x realized – w(x) = y1, y2, y3, etc.

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That the monads are “repraesentationes phaenomenorum”10, as Leibniz wrote to Des Bosses, but also some 20 years before to Arnauld, just means that phaenomena are out of the monad (y out of x) – they are inner expressions of that monad. That monads can have perceptions just means that the precise sequence of perceptions – p1, p2, p3, p4 etc. – is something coming out of the monad and not from outside (not even stimulated or provoced, even if everyday thinking and meaning is inclined to see it such like). Reality can not be thought of as a setting of things, independent of the representational unity; reality itself, on the orther side, is for Leibniz nothing else then unity or unities with a different level and intensity of complexity11. The more unity a thing x has in itself, f. e. differenciated in degrees of intensity, the more “real” it is. If the unity (monad) x which is unfolding the world w(x) has more instances to unfold then the unity y, which is to unfold its own world w(y), than it is more real, because unity-x is more intense or effective then unity-y. A world which is “more real”, is also more perfect or harmonic: the most perfect or “the best” world is that world which represents most reality (under the condition of compossibility). If the relation to the instances is, in addition, active and not passive, the active monad A has more reality then the passive (not inactive) monad B. But Leibniz is insisting, against a pure phenomenalistic or transcendentalistic or subjectivistic position, on a “realitas phaenomeni” that is independent from the percipiens12. That means: that there is a possible (first) “percipiendum” or (then) “perceptum” that functions as “real” or as “reality”: “recte tuemur corpora esse res, nam et phaenomena sunt realia”13. But: if there wouldn’t be corporeal substances, corporeal being would diverge into mere phenomenality14. So even if all what there is, was and 10 11 12 13

14

GP II, 481; but also Leibniz to Arnauld, letter 24, in: Reinhard Finster (Ed.): Leibniz Briefwechsel mit Antoine Arnauld, Hamburg 1997, p. 317: “une substance dont la nature est d’estre representative”. The ontological precise unity is “indivisibile, ingenerabile et incorruptible”, as Leibniz just insisted in the famous letter-exchange with Antoine Arnauld, cfr. Letter Nr. 24; ed. Finster, p. 307, 327–329. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (21. April 1714); GP II, 485: “Inquisitione dignum est, quidnam excogitari possit, quod sit aptum ad realitatem phaenomenis extra [!!] percipientia conciliandam, seu quid constituat substantiam compositam” (my emphasis). Leibniz, To Des Bosses (15. March 1715); GP II, 492: Leibniz points additionally on the fact that we have to make a difference between ‘corpus est res’ and ‘corpus est substantia’, for the latter would be requested, as he says, a new principle of real unity – so we can conclude (modus ponendo tollens), that “res” is not “substantia” and therefore not a real unity. Important is also the letter from 19. August, GP II, 502, where Leibniz is quite clear about the fact that even if “corpora substantiae non essent, tamen omnes homines proni erunt ad iudicandum corpora esse substantias”. Cfr. also Leibniz, To Des Bosses (5. February 1712); GP II, 435: “Substantiae corporeae debent ergo habere aliquid reale praeter ingredientia; aut nihil supererat nisi Monades. Hoc reale superadditum est quod facit substantialitatem corporis” (my emphasis). This substantialitas corporis, produced by the active force of the vinculum, is what I will later connect to the concept of form or forma substantialis. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (29. May 1716); GP II, 517: “Ego puto, nisi dentur substantiae corporeae, corpora in phaenomena abire”; and just before in February 1712, p. 435: “si abesset illud monadum substantiale vinculum corpora omnia (…) nihil aliud forent quam phaenomena bene fundata”. It is evident that Leibniz here holds that the vinculum makes corporeal being “real”

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will be in a monad or substantial unity is part of the ‘y out of x’-structure [x → y], nevertheless there are different modes or degrees of reality, and a living or thinking monad is living and thinking in and with the fundamental differences between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ realm, between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’, between ‘reality’ and ‘dream’, between the ‘soul’ and the ‘thing outside’, asf. And that is true even if it produces or is setting forth, systematically seen, both factors or moments of that difference out of itself (the later so called view of the philosophical subject in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel). Reality is unity, but it is, in Leibniz’ view, an active unity, product of the spontaneity of being. Real phaenomena are phaenomena which have to be produced (represented, imagined) by human beings necessarily and are therefore also condivided or accepted as being such and such (f. e. a rainbow15) by others. Here the fact and the degeree of reality depends from the degree of the necessitating force, but it would never be possible, as Leibniz holds just in confrontation with the insisting questions of Antoine Arnauld, that we could use the predicat “unum” in speaking correctly about the rainbow or a crow of sheeps. If we would say: ‘this is one rainbow’ or ‘this rainbow is (a) one’, what we could do and what we do in ordinary common sense language, we would only talk about a “unitas phaenomeni” or a perceptual/conceptual unity. To have a real unity here would require that kind of unity that Leibniz calls with the scholastic tradition forma substantialis (this is important for our understanding of the vinculum substantiale)16. The mental perception and intellection is coming only to a unity of a phenomenon to which corresponds a, sit venia verbo, ‘vinculum notionale’. The reality Leibniz is supposing for corporeal being in itself, instead, is the result of the activity of the ‘vinculum substantiale’ which, ontologicaly dependent on God’s intentions, is called “phaenomenon Dei”. In a newly by Stephan Jenschke published, hitherto mostly unknown text, of Leibniz we find the interesting phrase: “nostra mens phaenomena facit, divina rem”17. To be able to think consistently about the world-structure or about a being that is part of such a world-structure and to reconstruct the “reality” of such a structure or being means exactly to refer the complexity of datas collected through experiences, experiments, anatomical acts, etc, to a respective unity and that unity (a) to the respective, epistemologically or ontologically more fundamental unity (b) and so on (c, d, …) up to the real unum per se (z), which is no more reducible to an other unity. The concept of a “monas dominatrix” is exactly the consequence of such a ontologically necessary reference-relation from lower degree-unities to higher degree-unities: it is impossible to have a “substantia composita” which is at the same moment an “unum per se” and not “per aggregatum”, if you don’t have in the same moment and ontologically prior a “monas dominatrix” (which is essentially connected with the concept of soul and living being18). And it is also impossible to

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or “substantial”, and that the mental perception of such corporeal beings as “bene fundata” is not to be identified with their ontological status as “real”! Leibniz, To Des Bosses (19. August 1715); GP II, 504: “vera phaenomena”. Leibniz, To Arnauld, letter 24; ed. Finster, p. 329; To Des Bosses (February 1712); GP II, 435. See Jenschke 2012 ; the text is LH IV, 8; Bl. 56–57. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (23. August 1713); GP II, 481; 21. April 1714; GP II, 486: presupposition or condition for every “substantia composite” is the presence of “monas dominatrix cum

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have unities per aggregationem if you don’t have at the same moment and ontologically prior a unitas substantialis or unum substantiale. It is before that background of different forms and modes of unity or “unum” that Leibniz is making also the difference between unity (unitas) and union (unio), the former regarding all a priori unities, the latter the unities which are the result or product of a process. A union is the combination or the putting together of different things (x,y) (x,z) (y,z), a union has therefore a compositional being. And Leibniz is, in addition, introducing the difference between “metaphysical union” and “real union”, the former, as Brandon Look has pointed out, regarding exclusively the union of mind/soul and body, the latter the union of “monads in a composite substance”19. The specific type of unity now which is represented by or constituted by the “vinculum substantiale” (as a unitas modalis or modificationis) is, in my opinion and this is also my main thesis, necessarily to be ‘located’ somewhere in that chain or row of statuses of unities with different degrees of reality20. That is explicitly indicated by phrases like: the vinculum substantiale is a „completum ex iis resultans“, that means: a whole, fully expressed “being”/“res”, resulting out of (y out

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corpore vivo organico”; 29. April 1715; GP II, 496: “monas dominans”, this kind of unity belongs to or is identical with “unum per se” as organic being (life). Look 1997, p. 93. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (21. April 1714); GP II, 486; one has to be aware that the term (Begriff) “vinculum” is, evidently, first and systematically introduced only in the De Bosses-discussion, but that the meaning and the systematical implication of the concept of vinculum was since the 1670s continuously present in Leibniz’s thinking, mostly expressend by the term “connexio”, see Notae plerumque metaphysicae (1677); A VI, 4, 1349,19: any two things have necessarily a connection – “nullae videntur dari res duae quae nullam inter se habeant connexionem”; De cogitationum analysi (1678–1680/1); ib., 2769,11: “connexa sunt quorum unius existentia involvitur in alterius existentia”; Calculus ratiocinator (1679); ib., 279,5–16: “imo materia revera nihil est, totum non componitur ex partibus sed connexum est (…), ergo revera existunt mentes et earum perceptiones (…) corpora sunt apparitions cohaerentes”. From such clearcut expressions the step is not too big to the basic structure of the Système nouveau! Characteristica verbalis (1679); A VI, 4, 335–336: “rerum extensarum multitudo constituit quondam coetum seu aggregatum cuius partes habent non tantum convenientiam sed et connexionem”, and, as a definition, “relatio rei ad rem (est) vel convenientiae, vel connexionis”; Divisio terminorum (1683/85); ib., 563,9–14 to the “connexio rerum” that holds in any “series rerum”, f. e. as the different statuses of a clock (horologium) in their causal dependence (prius-posterius); De mundo praesenti (1685/6); ib., 1506,12–19: “omne ens reale est unum per se aut Ens per accidens. Ens per se ut homo, Ens per accidens ut strues lignorum, machina, quod scilicet non sit unum nisi per aggregationem, nec alia in eo realis unio est, quam connexio vel contactus aut etiam concursus ad idem vel saltem convenientia a mente in unum colligente animadversa”. It is evident, that at the time of the Arnauld Correspondence and the Discours de métaphysique Leibniz was quite aware that in any “unum per accidens” or “per aggregationem” the real unity (realis unio) lies in what he calls “connexio” which is present in different modalities or intensities so to say: connexio-contactus-concursus ad idem-convenientia a mente animadversa; see Communicata ex disputationibus cum Fardella (1690); ib., 1667,16–18: another definition: a connection of things or instances is given if “unum sine alio perfecte intelligi non posse”, if we look to the citation above from De cogitationum analysi which says that being connected for two things A and B means that the existence of A involves the existence of B, we can see that for Leibniz ‘being connected’ is equivalent to a epistemological and ontological implication of the type ‘if A [exists, is thought] than B [exists, is thought]’.

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of x-structure) the forces/activities of prior unities like materia prima and forma substantialis (in Leibniz’s transformation of that classical scholastic Dyade: potentia passiva-potentia activa)21. The vinculum substantiale “what I am postulating” (quod urgeo) is, as Leibniz wrotes to Des Bosses in January 1716, the resulting unity out of the “potentiae” (forces) of the substantia composita which in itself is nothing else then a “medium inter substantiam et modificationem”, a “middle thing” between a real substance (monad) and the modifications of a substance. It is a “unum per se substantiatum” depending (dependentia naturalis, non logica) on pure unities as the monads22. So we have a chain of unities, a catena unitatum, so to say: (i) pure unity (monads), then (ii): composed-complex unities which all are “composite” and need a “realizans”, an active power/force to unify them, as or (ii,a) the unum per se as a “substantiatum” (mind/soul-body-unity), or (ii,b) the “substantiatum” (aggregative or composite unities), or (ii,c) the modifications, which are transgressing, changing unities (and not “modi” in the sense of a stable, unchanging, res durabilis, GP II, 515)23. The vinculum substantiale is not part of this chain in the sense of a genuine unity (i), but it is necessary, as “substantia unialis” [!!] or the realizans24, for the constitution of the part (ii a or ii b) of the chain, the substantiae compositae, which become unities just because of the effective presence of the vinculum: a vinculum substantiale, et non accidentale, so to say, “quod substantiam compositam facit” (GP II, 475). It is, as Leibniz puts it (GP II, 516), “naturaliter vinculum, non essentialiter”! In the last sense it would be, as a monad or unum per se, necessarily connected to the monads and their order; as “naturaliter vinculum (ens)”, it can exist without monads and vice versa. If the soul-body-union is ‘essentialiter’ or metaphysical, that would exclude, furthermore, ii b from the realm of the vinculum-activity. So, evidently: “Si abesset illud monadum substantiale vinculum, corpora omnia cum omnibus suis qualitatibus nihil aliud forent quam phaenomena bene fundata, ut iris aut imago in speculo” (GP II, 435). The vinculum, as the fundament or condition of a real unity of soul and body, of a monad and the corporeal expressions, of the unum per se and the partes extra partes-structure of physical being, is here also called “substantia unionalis”. To bring the composita of the substantia composita onto the level of real – not seemingly or phenomenal – unity, a force or activity is needed which in itself is something substantial. This unifying “force” is the vinculum substantiale25. 21 22 23 24

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Leibniz, To Des Bosses (13 January 1716); GP II, 511. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (20. September 1712); GP II, 458–459; 24. January 1713; GP II, 474. For ‘substantiae compositae’ see Leibniz, To Des Bosses (29. May 1716); GP II, 517. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (29, May 1716); GP II, 516: “Si realizans phaenomena praesupponeret alquid praeter monades [id est: praeter unitates simplices, puras etc.], jam compositum esset realizatum contra hypothesin. Quicquid existit praeter Monades et Monadum modificationes, realizantis phaenomena consectarium est”. Look, p. 58; Cardoso, p. 220. So I do not agree with Looks conclusion (?) that: “Ultimately, the vinculum substantiale is perhaps best viewed as a something-I-know-not-what that binds monads somehow-I-know-not. As such the concept of the vinculum substantiale serves only to identify a problem in Leibniz’s thought – the nature of the unity of composite sustances”, Look, p. 218. And I do agree with the insistance on the dynamic and constutive character of the vinculum in Cardoso, pp. 220–221:

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The vinculum substantiale is, as every substance, thought as an activity, or better: as an x that is active, and if ‘being active’ or sheer ‘actio’ is a “verum indicium substantiae” (see GP II, 511)26, this x is a substance or, at least, something substantial. If x is a “vinculum” – let me put it as: ‘active connexion’ – than it is, consequently, a “vinculum substantiale”. In his last letter to Des Bosses Leibniz is insinuating that the vinculum substantiale as this active principle is that what he is calling – taking over a genuine Aristotelian concept – Entelechia. The common criterium of vinculum substantiale is taken from the verb “realizare” in its form as participium activum: “realizans”27. The products of that acitivity, the composita as substantiata, are essential for the structure of the reality, for example: continuitas realis, quantitas continua, identitas animalis, etc. The real problem with the vinculum-concept is arrising if we are not discussing a being which is unitas per aggregationem, because then it would always be possible to go back, let’s say, to the Stoics or to Aristotle, and to introduce a purely natural, materialistic “bond”, that is putting together a manifold in a partes-extra-partes-structure (like the active force of the Stoics as dynamis synhetikê). The problem comes, if we are discussing a unum per se, which is nonetheless constituted – a “substantiatum” – out of non-material “parts”. We will need then another kind of active bond which is capable (i) to install a substantial unity out of other unities – as we just said – but not out of material particles, and (ii) of unities which are ontologically indipendent from those constitutive unities. Leibniz says: “independentia substantiae compositae ab ingredientibus, a quibus composita dicitur, etsi ex iis non sit aggregate” (GP II, 519). It is the effect of the vinculum substantiale, that a substantia composita really (vere, non apparenter) “remains numerically the same” (eandem numero manere), even if the ingredients allways are changing and are continously “in fluxu” (etsi ingredientia perpetuo mutentur et sint in continuo fluxu)28. The vinculum as active force constitutes an active unity of a being x, a unity which, as I see it, is the formal unity (of the Scholastics) or the Eidos (of Aristotle) or the Idea (of Plato), which has the power to maintain the forma against the permanent changing of the materia, the partes ingredientes (material elements, physical parts etc.). But, as Leibniz seems to see it, this formal unity, as the product of the active, unifying (unialis) presence of the vinculum substantiale, is different to a real monadic unity. It is that kind of unity we have to presuppose for all types of composed being – that is: for the quantitatively

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“le vinculum réalise les phénomènes”, “le vinculum n’est pas un nouveau type d’entité, ni ne renvoie au-dehors du suppôt, il est un principe et une opération réelle d’union”; “unionnel”, p. 221: “travail unionnel”. Leibniz, Principes de la nature et de la grace, §1: “la substance es tun être capable d’action”. Leibniz, To Des Bosses (29. May 1716); GP II, 519: Entelchia “differt a Monade, quia est realizans phaenomena”; before, regarding the vinculum, see GP II, 516. This ontological or, at least, natural scenario of vicissitudinal processes is quite close to what we can find in the later writings of Giordano Bruno, the Frankfurt-Triology (from 1590), in possession of Leibniz. See f. e. De immenso II, c. 7; Opera Latina I/1, p. 279; III, c. 6–7, pp. 362–371; De minimo II, c. 4, ; OL I/3, p. 199;IV, c. 1; p. 272. For the specific concept of vicissitudinal processes in nature in Bruno’s thinking see now T. Leinkauf: “Il concetto di ‘vicissitudine’ nella seconda metà del cinquecento. Louis Le Roy e Girodano Bruno”, in: Annuario filosofico 31 (2015), pp. 106–124.

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seen biggest part of what we call ‘reality’ in a common sense perspective, the res apparentes. The vinculum substantiale is different form the forma substantialis in so far as it constitutes the external form, so to say, of an x as a stable, steady, non contingent form (which has not to be a substance, a res viva, a living being, but could also be a technical, mechanical, artificial thing, f. e. the famous ship which remains or not remains the same, if you change all of its partes ingredientes, or, closer to Des Bosses interests: the bred which maintains its external form during transsubstantiation). 3. Having this quite complex concept of the vinculum substantiale, we could ask: is it sheer contingency that is has been developped by the late Leibniz, after the Système nouveau, the Specimen dynamicum, the Théodizee etc., because of the intelligent critiques and questions of his Jesuit friend Abraham Des Bosses – and therefore also essentially connected to the specific theological background of the starting point of the ‘theologus’ Des Bosses (transsubstantiatio), or is it a necessary concept that is completing his “system”, a concept he could have given also an other denomination? Seen from the function that the vinculum substantiale has to realize and to fulfill: to act as a unifying force which is working outside the monadic unity and constituting unities that have the status of ‘being real’ and to avoid a purely phenomalistic view on being and reality, one could say, and I will say, that it is a necessary concept indipendently from the specific naming or the specific tradition it was just developed earlier – that is, Leibniz could have used also f. e. connexio substantialis, or other expressions. But, still, the concept of vinculum was not only a property and terminological specifity of the Scholastics or the Jesuits it had also another specific history which could, and that is my next task, possibly also shed a brighter light on Leibniz’s position. Let me now present some passages, some “Lesefrüchte”, as we would say in German (florilegia), coming from a tradition of thinking with which Leibniz was quite familiar, and, as we can see in his reception of Plato, in an mostly affirmative sense. I mean the tradition of platonic thinking from Nicolaus Cusanus up to Francesco Patrizi and Giordano Bruno. But before getting to the texts we should also be aware that the Platonism of Leibniz is something different from the Platonism of the ‘Platonici’ of the 15th and 16th century, as, surely, also his Aristotelianism is different from the scholastic and neo-scholastic Aristotelianism29. This difference is not lying in the concept of unity and of the dynamism of the metaphysical realm – that are more the things Leibniz was interested in. The difference lies in the concept of reality and the hierarchical ontological structure constituting this reality. There is no hierarchy in the traditional sense in Leibniz’s monadology. But there is, so to say, a hierarchy of forces and potentialities/potentials – see the concept of ‘monas 29

See T. Leinkauf: “Leibniz und Platon“, in: Zeitsprünge. Forschungen zur Frühen Neuzeit 13 (2009), pp. 23–45. See for example Plotinus VI 9, 1, 40–43: πλεῖσται γὰρ δυνάμεις ἐν αὐτῃ (sc. der Seele), λογίζεσθαι, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἃ τῳ ἑνὶ ὥσπερ δεσμῳ συνέχεται.

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dominans’ or the idea of different forces like ‘vis originaria’ und ‘vis derivativa’ – in that sense he is nearer or mentally closer to Bruno as to Cusanus-Ficino-Patrizi30. To come to a better understanding of the type of that hierarchy in Leibniz we would have to confront Leibniz’s theory with the tradition of the concept of “intensity”, what I can not do here31. Out of any question, however, is the fact that, beneath the great influence that late-scholastic philosophy and theology or the neo-stoicism and neo-atomism had on the formation of Leibniz’s philosophy, his thinking is also standing in a direct line of thinking and arguing coming from thinkers like Nicholas of Cusa, Marsilio Ficino or Francesco Patrizi. In confrontation and interpretation of the texts of those and comparable thinkers Leibniz particularly focusses on the problem of the function of the soul – as individual soul or world soul – in the ontology of the world. And it is precisely in this context that we meet the concept of vinculum or bond (desmos) in those thinkers. Let us now look closer to my text examples: 3.1 Marsilio Ficino: Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum (1474), Lib. VI, c. 8–9 (1, pp. 245–248 Marcel; 2, pp. 170–176 Allen-Hankins) Discussing the problem (with reference to Plotinus IV 7, 3–8) that the body is originally or naturally a dispersed being (corpus natura sua dispersum) and is lacking substantial unity – we are close to the problem of ‘partes extra partes’ and the connecting force, the dynamis synhektikê of the Stoics – Ficino is arguing as follows: (i) c. 8; p. 245/170: “Corpus natura sua nullo modo posse firmiter in unitate consistere, tamen corpus quodlibet aliquo modo in suis partibus nectitur [the connection as product of the unifying function of the vinculum], cunctis in unam totius corporis copulam [the bond or vinculum] conspirantibus. Est igitur in corpore alquid ultra corporis naturam [the vinculum is as a substantial force not part of the partes extra partes-structure of the res extensa/corporea] quod ipsum unit, sisitit et continet [the activity of the vinculum]”. (ii) p. 246/172: “Vim autem huiusmodi copulantem [the concept of force] nos animam vel virtutem animae potiusquam illud copulatum asseverabimus. […]”.

This soul as a unifying force is to be concieved as “copula corporis intima vel substantia copulatrix”, I think we have here all the ‘partes ingredientes’ of the Leibnizian concept: we have connection, force, activity, bond, unity, as a result, and transcendence. A seemingly difference to Leibniz could be, that Ficino is here only treating the problem of the real unity of a body, not of “composed” being in the sense of Leibniz. But: the presence of the vis copulatrix, id est: the soul, makes the produced unity – the unitas coporis – to a composit unity. Therefore, as I see it, it 30 31

For Leibniz-Bruno see f. e. T. Leinkauf: “Einheit, innere Kraft und substantielle Form: Giordano Bruno und Leibniz”, in: La filosofia di Giordano Bruno, a cura di Eugenio Canone, Roma 2003, pp. 417–449. See now Thomas Kisser, Thomas Leinkauf (Eds.), Intensität und Realität, Berlin 2016.

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is comparable to Leibniz, beside the just presented factors or parts of the concept, that the soul is, compared to the body and to matter, an a priori unity with a status of trancendent, non-corporeal being, and that the unity of the body as the product, we could say the ‘substantiatum’, is itself not part of the body or non-corporeal. The unity of the body is, as we have it in Plato, Plotinus and all neoplatonic thinking, in the soul not in the body. The body is ‘body’ because of the unifying activity of the non-bodily, non-corporeal, non-material soul. These similarities are put, and it is not really surprising, another step forward, by the fact that Ficino is using also precisely the word “vinculum” to denominate the ‘vis copulatrix’ of the soul. Let’s look at my next evidence: (iii) c. 9, p. 248/176: “illud vero vinculum [sc. that unifies the body] libentius animam imo virtutem animae appellabimus”32.

Ficino uses, in the footsteps of the neoplatonic interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus33 and Plato’s light-metaphysics, the concept “vinculum” generally to indicate the complex, universal and omnipresent conneting/unifying power of a principle with regard to the “principiatum”, the explication or the product. It is the complex omnipresence of the princple – we could say, with Leibniz: of the monad or dominating monad – in the substratum of its activity34. As in Leibniz, the vinculum has a strong naturalistic implication – it is the force or, as the bond, the result of a force acting in being, in the physis, through the factors of spirit, light, heat – but it is, as we can see, more then that. It is a ontologically universal structure: if you see the ‘world’ as a multitude of particles, that, if they were not organized, ordered, put into stable forms, would desintegrate or dissipate immedeately in ‘non-being’, then that what makes a world to a world – an ordered “series rerum” – is that force produced by a unifying principle, the “world-soul” in Plato’s or Plotinus’ses sense. The scholastic credo was: “forma dat esse rei”, with Ficino we could say: “anima (the princple of forms and complex form-matter unities) dat esse rei”, and, in the consequence and closer to the individual things or beings: “vinculum dat esse rei”, id est: “dat rei 32 33

34

Ficino is for example adding, as other results or products of the vis copulatrix, the following phenomena: ‘coagulatio’, ‘vis magnetica’, ‘temperatio artis in horologio’, ‘luminositas’, things which are also coming close to Leibniz’s interests. Ficino: Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum, c. 52, in: Opera omnia, Basileae 1576, fol. 1463/ II, Z. 31–32: “per vincula haec occulta intellige complexionem hominis esse adeo temperatam coeloque persimilem, ut vix in ea elementalium excessus appareat”. The function of the vinculum here is evidently also connected to the body-soul-problem and of the elemental complexity of the human body. The effect of the vinculum is to hinder “excessus” of one or another element in the equilibrium of the mixtum compositum. Ficino: Liber de lumine, c. 11; Opera (note 33), fol. 981, Z. 9–13: “Quemadmodum spiritus noster animae vires ipsamque animam ad humores traducit & membra, atque sicut in nobis spiritus est animae corporisque nodus, ita lumen est vinculum universi. Sol enim & stella quaelibet lumen suum non per tenuissimam quasi lineam iaculantur, sed ex toto suo ambitu circumfundunt”. In the following Ficino is indicating his own commentary to the Timaeus, where he discussed his understanding of Plato’s anima mundi/universi, the “bond” (desmos) and the presence of the vis animae through spirits, light and heat. Ibid., c. 16, fol. 985, Z. 10–12: “Lumen in omnibus a Deo factis est quidam divinae claritatis splendor, atque (ut ita loquar) est Deus quasi seipsum finiens, & ad operum suorum capacitatem sese accommodans”.

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formam”. This is, at least, what also the vinculum substantiale in Leibniz is doing: to give a certain unity (unitas) to a composed x. 3.2 Francesco Patrizi: Nova de universis philosophia, Ferrariae 1591 (with four internal ‘books’: Panaugia, Panarchia, Pampsychia, Pancosmia) (iv) Panarchia, lib. XIII, fol. 28ra: “Et sicuti hoc verbum ‘Est’, nominum et verborum aliorum vinculum quasi est, ita ens vinculum erit formarum omnium et singularium quasi radix, e qua forma quaeque nascitur”.

Patrizi, the first to hold a position as professor for Platonic Philosophy at the Sapienza in Rome in the 1580ies and a dedicated reader of Ficino’s Theologia Platonica as, naturally, also of his commentaries on Plato, intensified after the orientation of thinkers as Marsilio Ficino, Nicoletto Vernia, Agostino Nifo and others to the patrimony of late antique thinking, the reading of late neoplatonic philosophy, especially the reading of Proklos and Damaskios. Concentrating primarily on the specific kind of dynamic ontology one can find in those thinkers, he construed a, as he called it (not without any proud and a consciousness of novelty): “nova de universis philosophia”35. This ‘nova philosophia’, written in the years between 1585–1590, published in Ferrara 1591, is a masterpiece of synthesis of late antique ontology and metaphysics, mediated through Ficino and his own reading, natural philosophy on the level of his own time (Telesio, Tycha Brahe, Fracastorio etc.) and renaissance anthropology36. The system, also the psychology which is part of the system, is quite close to what one can find (and what we just have seen in example) in Ficino. In our first example, taken out of his theory of principles, the Panarchia, Patrizi is using “vinculum” in the grammatical and logical sense of the copula – every proposition ‘s est p’ has a copula, connecting the two terms, the subject and the predicat (in different senses, naturally, that is grammatical [p is the grammatical predicat 35

36

For Patrizi and Damaskios see T. Leinkauf: “Die Rezeption des Damaskios im Denken des Francesco Patrizi”, in: Accademia 13 (2011), pp. 47–65; T. Leinkauf: “Francesco Patrizi”, in: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus from Antiquity to the Renaissance, Cambridge 2014, pp. 380–402. The concept of “vinculum” appears also in the natural philosophy of BernardinoTelesio, but on an ontologically lower level then the concept and reality of “forma”, see De rerum natura iuxta propria principia (1586) V, c. 4, ed. Luigi de Franco, Cosenza 1965–74, Vol. II, p. 224: “Itaque, quod dictum est, si [!] animalis corpus e partibus compositum sit, quae et specie et dictis facultatibus omnibus bene a se ipsis differant, nequaquam unum id ens et cuius universi una sit forma naturaque una, sed entia tot sibi ipsis colligate unitaque esse, quot eius sint partes, quae specie a reliquis dictisque differant facultatibus, statuendum necessario erit; singulisque propriae formae propriaeque dandae erunt naturae, veluti et entibus, summe e se ipsis dissidentibus, terrae, aquae coeloque ipsi, vinculis quibusdam sibi ipsis colligates vel vasi cuipiam inditis sibique ipsis immixtis”; c. 5; p. 236: “(…) animal non unum ens, sed e plurimis longeque a se ipsis dissidentibus rebus, veluti vinculis quibusdam sibi ipsis colligates, compositum est; nec e manifestis modo, sed e spiritu itidem, qui, quod nervoso, ut dictum est, inexsistit generi et summa donates est tenuitate, nusquam conspicuus fit”.

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of s], veritative [it is true that x], identifying [x is identical with x] ect.), then, transposing or enlarging this copula-function of ‘est’ into the function of ontological foundation: the being (ens) is “vinculum formarum”, that is, it is that instance, everywhere present, in which form is present and present as the principle or root of that form (or the fact, that x is/has a form). The result of our interpretation of vinculum in Ficino, that it could be understood (even if it is not explicitly said or written in the texts, as far as I know them) as “that which gives being through ‘to give/constitute/establish-a-form’”, we have here in an explicit uttering: Patrizi understands ‘being’ (ens) in a metaphysical sense as that what is the principle of all forms, but, interestingly, as a “vinculum”, he is not saying “principium”. If we look back to Ficino and his use of vinculum in that specific metaphyscial and ontological context as indicating: ‘ens’ is “vinculum formarum omnium” we could understand it as (a) that which is the identical present in all different forms, the forma qua forma, or (b) that which in a compositum of forma-materia is everywhere the principium formale which makes an x, an y, a z to a real being. However one will understand Patrizi’s phrase, it is, as I see it, evident that the introduction of vinculum is exceptional and only understandable if we look to texts like those of Ficino where we can see the extensional meaning of vinculum. Vinculum is something putting an extended realm of a material substrate into a unity of a formal structure – as, for Patrizi, the copula ‘est’ is putting the materia of a proposition in a formal, ordered unity, or the vinculum ‘being’ is putting the materia (multiplicity, partes extra partes) of the realm of physic/nature in a ordered unity of beings building up a mundus.Even if Patrizi is not stressing the concept ‘vinculum’ as a systematic terminus technicus in his writings, we can find here, nonetheless, all ingredients of the neoplatonic understanding of Plato’s desmos, Aristotle’s eidos and the stoic dynamis synthektikê – as we saw it in Ficino – but enlarged or made richer by taking late neoplatonic dialectic into account. For example the difference between authypostata and heterostata, that is: between things which have a being that is substantial and enduring, autopoetic and spontaneous in themselves, and things which have a non-substantial being, dependent on the active presence of an external force – with Leibniz we could say: unitates per se (monads, composite substances) and partes extra partes (aggregates, phaimonema). But before we will come to that differenciation, let us look to the next occurrence of ‘vinculum’ in Patrizi: (v) Pampsychia, lib. IV, fol. 56va-b: “Non ergo uti corpus est (sc. corpus ipse, mundus qua corpus), sibi sufficit. Ut servari ergo in sua essentia posset, superiore ac potentiore natura alia [!] opus habuit. Incorporea nimirum, quae tamen in ipsum non dedignaretur penetrare, ipsumque per singulas partes, & principes, & minus principes, & minutas etiam particulas contineret, uniret, vinciret [!]37, omnium esset vinculum indissolubile. Corpus namque omne, & mundanum

37

The verb ‘vincire’ as also the noun ‘vinculum’ appears again in the context fol. 56vb: “nisi adesset (sc. animus) corpori, ipsum non animaret. Si non animaret, vitam ei non praeberet. Si vivum ipsum non redderet, neutiquam moveret. Si non moveret, partes eius non uniret. Si non uniret, neque eas insimul vinciret. Si non vinciret, neque vinculum earum esset. Si vinculum earum non esset, sympathiam inter se, mundi partes non haberent”.Patrizi is explicitly combining the unification through “vincire” or being vinculum with the quality of being a mundus as kosmos and living animal, as the zôon in Plato’s Timaeus.

The Vinculum Substantiale and the Impact of Metaphysics in Leibniz’ Late Philosophy 193 etiam, sui natura est & divisile, & partile, & partes habet a se invicem solutiles, sparsiles. Si singula mundi partes spargerentur, nec mundus totus, nec partes eius consisterent” (my emphasis).

The “alia natura incorporea” needed by the nature of the body to be able to be (or: to exist), is, then, in fact the soul (as in Ficino and, as we will soon see, as in Bruno and, to put it much broader, in Francisco Suárez and other thinkers of the Jesuit tradition) or, better, the general psychic power that is the universal, overall diffused principle of animation, life and movement38. Patrizi is supporting this thesis by the late neoplatonic sharp ontological differenciation of ‘ta authypostata’ and ‘ta heterostata’ which he could find in his precise and acute reading of Proclus and Damascius. This distinction is – in a certain sense – an anticipation of Descartes’s distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, at least it confronts thinking with the fundamental problem of how you can say to sheer corporeal things that they are substances or natures or individuals with a precise, stable, identic determination39. (vi) Panarchia XVIII, fol.39 ra: “Entium a Deo productorum (…) alia esse per se subsistentia, & ut Graeci significantius dicerent, αὐθυπόστατα. Quae propria sua hyparxi, & essentia, propriisque viribus innixa, nullo egent alterius ullus adminiculo, ut sint [!], quam Deo productore, & creatore. (…) Haec autem sunt omnia incorpora, quae in mundo sunt Archetypo, Ideae, & unitates, essentiae, vitae, & intellectus, & etiam animae, quod suo loco [id est: Pampsychiae libro] demonstrabitur. Alia vero sunt his opposita: in alio, vel per aliud subsistentia, & aliena virtute [!] stantia, & in alio subsistentia, & existentia quae illi ἑτερόστατα appellarent”.

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Patrizi: Nove de universis philosophia, Pampsychia IV, fol. 56vb: “Mundi ergo corpus, ut mundi corpus esse, & esse perseveraret, animo opus habuit, qui ei iungeretur. Animus autem ipso sui esse, suaque presentia, tria efficit. Animat, vivificat, movet”. For the consequence of that neoplatonic distinction with regard to the theory of soul (and: human soul especially) in Patrizi see T. Leinkauf: “Zum Begriff des ‘Geistes’ in der Frühen Neuzeit. Überlegungen am Beispiel Francesco Patrizi da Chersos”, in: Platonism and Forms of Intelligence, ed.by John Dillon and Marie-Elise Zovko, Berlin 2008, pp. 159–178, esp. pp. 165–175. I referd there to the text of the unpublished De humana philosophia, in the essential parts published by Maria Muccillo, “Il ‘De humana philosophia’ di Francesco Patrizi da Cherso”, in: Miscellanea Bibilothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae, IV (1990), pp. 281–307. In the unfinished De humana philosophia (Bibl. Vat. Ms Barberiniano Greco 180) Patrizi says fol. 4r (Muccillo, p. 292): “Si quis haec seorsum singula septem poneret [sc. the constituents of human being, mens, ratio, anima, spiritus, calor, humor, corpus solidus] quomodo ex septem unam faceret hypostasin, unam hyparxin? (…) Animae igitur hoc munus relinquitur, proprium ipsius cuius et spiritus et calor, et humor, et solidum corpus est instrumentum. Anima spiritum caloremque secum in humorem seminum secum ferens, eum in varias effingit atque efformat partes (…) unum facit hominem”; fol. 15r (p. 300): “anima sensitiva hominis [sc. et intellectus] sese mutuo propter uniusque indigentiam diligunt, simulque unione substantiali [!] coniunguntur; qua perficitur existentia hominis” (my emphasis); fol. 17v (p.301): “ψυχοῖ enim sua presentia corpus, et totum, et singulas et omnes eius partes, et ἔμψυχον ὅλον ποιεῖ sua ψυχώσει. (…) Qua ἐμψυχία, καὶ ζωώσει καὶ ζωῆ corpus per singulas eius partes non solum συνέχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνίστησι, και´εἰδοποιεῖ καὶ μορφοῖ, καὶ κοσμεῖ. Dum vero id facit τὸ συναμφότερον constituit, quod vocant τὸ ζῶον, καὶ τὸ ζῶν”. It is not that Patrizi is really using the terminus ‘vinculum’ here, what he, as we have seen, did in his publiseh Nova de universis philosophia; but he uses – at least in the texts that Muccillo published – the verb “vincire” (what we will find in Bruno’s De vinculis in genere), cfr. fol. 71r (p. 304): “Tria haec, anima, calor, vita tam arcte vinciuntur, ut si unum ab corpore discedat, a reliquis duabus destituitur illico”.

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Patrizi is continuing then by demonstrating that all corporeal being is in itself nothing, a non ens – all what there could be called ‘being’ ore be qualified as an ‘subjectum’ or function as an ‘existent x’ in a proposition has this being only because of the presence of the constituting force of at least one x that is an authypostaton. Coming back to our vinculum-text from the theory of the soul, we find now, that Patrizi, to prepare the argument in Pampycha IV (our text v), is referring in Pampsychia II, fol. 51ra-b to the Panarchia XVIII and to the basic distinction of per se subsistentia and non per se subsistentia. The presupposition of the introduction of the ‘vinculum’, as a concept most probably taken from Plato and from Ficino, is in fact the consequence of the insufficientia corporis to exist, to have a form, to be a unity – and, as you have surely noticed – we are again very close to the problems Leibniz has had with his rigorous claim that “only strict unities” (unitates per se) have being. It is, in my opinion, also not without significance that the use of the concept or terminus ‘vinculum’ is in both, in Ficino and Patrizi, strictly combined to the problem of soul-body-unity. We will see that this is essentially the same case in our next author: even if he is seemingly extending the ontological realm of vincula, the ‘being a vinculum’ is inseparably connected to ‘being a soul’ or a non material, incorporeal active unity. 3.3 Girodano Bruno: “De vinculis in genere”, in: Opere magiche, a cura di Simonetta Bassi, Elisabetta Scaparrone, Nicoletta Tirinnanzi, Milano (Adelphi) 2000, pp. 411–584. In Brunos Italian and Latin work we have a kind of patchwork or a complex texture made out of different philosophical traditions. One part, one important and big part of that brouillon, is the presence of main thinkers of the platonic tradition as Plotinus (through the Ficino translation), Cusanus (through the Faber Stapulensis edition) and, finally, Ficino (through his Opera omnia in the Basel edition), who is a main point of reference since the earliest Paris writings. He knew also the work of Patrizi, at least the Discussiones peripateticae, but probably more. So what we have found in Ficino and Patrizi should be aspected to be present also in Bruno – and Leibniz, as we know, read Cusanus, Ficino, Patrizi and Bruno (he owned the Latin works of Bruno). Regarding our topic, the vinculum, I want to put your attention for a last tour de force only on one text of Bruno which is part of his so called ‘late philosophy’, the De vinculis in genere, written probably around 1588–1590 (contemporeanously to Patrizis Nova de universis philosophia)40. What we will find here is in fact the whole arsenal of arguments we just saw in Ficino and Patrizi, but we will find an important difference: we will have, in Bruno, an universalisation of 40

The concept of vinculum and its use is, however, not restricted to the De vinculis in genere, we can find it also in De magia naturali in the chapter called “De vinculis spirituum”, in: Opere magiche, Milano 2000, pp. 222–232, and in the same work, in the chapter on “analogia spirituum”, pp. 242–250.

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the vinculum-concept41. To say it with a look forward to Leibniz’s famous phrase “mundi in mundis”42, we have now, sit venia verbis, a kind of vincula in vinculis. The ontological structure of the world is a texture/composition of different particles/monads held together by omnipresent vincula. (vii) “De vinculis III”, art. XII, n. 74, in: Opere magiche, p. 520: “et tota rerum substantia, constitutio, et (…) hypostasis vinculum quoddam est”,

this statement of Bruno is embodied in an argumentative context which is pretty close to the Ficinian psychology and philosophy of love, that means it presupposes generally the whole world-concept (mundus) that Ficino has developped in his Commentary on the Symposion of Plato and in the Theologia Platonica (which we discussed before). Bruno’s ontology in his Latin texts is no less provocative then what he had already developped in his Italian writings (which brought him consequently at stake to be burned 1600). The ‘new’ ontological framework, coming, as I mentioned in my introduction, out of the Parmenidean tradition of a strong unitarian, monistic thinking (see part I the group B), is mainly determinated by the absolute presence of the One principle in the material substratum. Even if Bruno tried to minimize ontological hierarchies he was not really able to avoid them totally: so the presence of the One is mediated through several instances, an intellectus universalis, a world-soul and the universal connecting-force called love. Through these instances – I cannot discuss that here in toto – a structure, a “ratio universalis” is communicated to the substratum, the universe, the world, the intellectual beings43. The “magus” or the individuum that is full of heroic energies (furor divinus, furor heroicus), can, as a kind of “imago dei” and in a totally analougues way to god or to nature, “use” the vincula to manipulate or to determinate reality communicating them to specific objects. This communication – traditionally concieved f. e. as methexis, in-formatio, creatio, infusio etc., Bruno has for example fulgor, fluxus (see text xi)44 – is in the De vinculis of Bruno conceptualized via the activity of “vincire”, that is: “to bind / to tie”: (viii) De vinculis, proem., n. 1, p. 414: “Eum qui vincire debet necessarium est rerum quodammodo universalem rationem habere (…) atque ita ut de Protheo fingunt atque Acheloo, eandem licet subiectam materiam in varias formas atque figuras transmigrantem, ut continue ad vinciendum aliis atque aliis et nodorum utendum sit speciebus”45. 41

42 43 44 45

Remember that I put Bruno in the group of intellectuals and thinkers which step by step tried to transform traditional ontology and cosmology in a new system which is putting all being as accidental to only one “real” being, that is: the absolute One or – as in Spinoza then – the “substantia absoluta”, see Ethica I, definitio VI: “per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis (…)”; propositones VIII, XI Scholium, XIII. Leibniz: De mundo praesenti (1685/6), A VI, 4, 1510, 19–21. See my introduction to: Giordano Bruno: De la causa, principio, et uno, hrsg., übers. u. eingel. v. Thomas Leinkauf, Hamburg 2007, pp. lxix-cxiii. Bruno: De vinculis in genere II, art. II, p. 458: “nihil vincitur nisi aptissime praeparatum, quia fulgor ille non eodem rebus omnibus communicatur modo”. See Ficino: De amore V, c. 6; p. 188 Marcel. “Is is necessary for everyone who has to work/operate (on reality) using bonds/ties to have a certain universal theory (notion) of the things (…) and so as they are imagining on Proteus or Acheloos, that means to imagine a subjected materia transgressing in different forms and fig-

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Behind this theory of “magia” or of manipulative power in a more general sense (which is very well fitting to what Jean Bodin in the same time period developped with his concept of souverainity and what Machiavelli, whom Bruno has read with great admiration, wrote before on political power) stands the ontology we found in Ficino up to Patrizi46. You can easily see how the text of Bruno is perforated by citations of whole phrases taken from Ficinos Commentary on the Symposium or the Theologia Platonica etc. But his theory of vincula is richer, as is the use of the terms vincire, vinculum, vinciens etc. That’s why I speak of the structure as ‘vincula in vinculis’, a web or tissu composed or constituted by vincula. For that structure we have several key-phrases, one of them is the following: (ix) De vinculis I, art. IV, n. 5, p. 420: “Ex his quae vinciunt, plurima nimium vinciunt homines quam bruta”.

That means: the more complex and the more immaterial the binding principle is, the more extended and effective is his binding-capacity: (x) De vinculis I, art. XII, n. 13; pp. 428–430: “id quod absolute pulchrum et bonum et magnum et verum, absolute vincit affectum, intellectum, et omne”47.

The next key-phrase is indicating the general idea that the act of binding is a kind of metaphysical or transcendental communication on different ontological levels: higher to lower being, equal to equal etc. Bruno is taking up here, together with Ficino (and Patrizi), the model of hierarchy from Dionysius the Areopagite48: (xi) De vinculis III, art. XI, n. 73; pp. 508–510: “res in universo ita sunt ordinatae, ut in una quadam coordinatione consistunt, ita ut continuo quodam quasi fluxu ab omnibus progressio fieri possit ad omnia. Horum vero alia aliis immediate cohaerent (…) alia vero mediis quibusdam subordinantur, et in his media omnia pertransire oportet et penetrare quodammodo, ut a vinciente in vincibile vincula protendantur”.

We have here also the basic thesis – that we found before in Ficino and Patrizi – that there is no “situs” or “pars” for the soul in the body, that is: for the “vinciens” in the “vinciendum” (art. XV, n. 16; p. 434) and that, therefore, the “ratio vinciendi” is lying on both sides, the binding and the bound, the subjectum actionis and the objectum actionis, with the consequence that there is a universal relational structure in the whole realm of being, namely:

46 47 48

ures, in such a way that it is necessary, to be able to bind (ad vinciendum), to use continously always different and new forms of nods (speciebus nodorum)”. For the same argument see also I, art. XI, n. 12, p. 428: “vincire ergo novit, qui universi rationem habet, vel saltem rei particularis vinciendae naturam, dispositionem, inclinationem, habitum, usum, finem”. See my Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance 1350–1600, Hamburg 2017, Volume I the chapter on Politics. Ficino: Theologia Platonica XIV, c. 2; 2, pp. 250–254 Marcel to the problem of “quaerere, appetere”. Bruno: De vinculis in genere III, art. XII, n. 74; p. 520: “Hoc vinculo superiora provident inferioribus, inferiora convertuntur ad superiora, paria invicem associantur, universi tandem perfectio est secundum formae rationem”. For what regards Dionysius in that context see De divinis nominibus IV 15, p. 161 Suchla and my discussion in: “Marsilio Ficino e le Pseudo-Dionigi: ricezione e trasformazione”, in: Stéphane Toussaint, Christian Trottmann (Eds): Le Pseudo-Denys à la Renaissance, Paris 2014, pp. 127–142, esp. pp. 139–140.

The Vinculum Substantiale and the Impact of Metaphysics in Leibniz’ Late Philosophy 197 x (res quae vincit)

z (vinculum)

y (ea res quae vincitur)

The vinculum as the active medium is mediating in precisely such a way that not only x is effective on y but also vice versa y on x. All complex modes of binding are in a double-sense relational, both relata are active – we can take from that that Bruno has as his paradigm or model the basic-relation of love, so intensively discussed in the Ficino-school and so extensively cultivated on the Renaissance courts as “amor mutuus”49. The binding power in the vinculum is effective under three criteria: ordo (partium intervalla), modus (quantitas) and species (lineamenta, colores). The “dispositio” of the object is essential for the fitting activity of the “vis vinculi”, for example: the attractive power of an artefact (picture), which consists in its beauty (pulchritudo), is stronger or more effective if the individuum looking at it is well prepared (aptissime praeparatum) in the sense that it is educated, sensitive, rational, virtuous etc. The same his holding for the vis orationis or the vis moralis etc., Bruno speaks of “civiles effectus vinculorum”50. The highest level of differenciaton of binding activity is consequently situated in the human beings and in the realm of social activities, of moral interaction, intellectual synusiai and love: “the most powerful of all bonds is that of Venus and of Love, specified according to the genus” (vinculum omnium potissimum est Veneris, et secundum genus amoris”51 and: “there is one divine power present in all things; love itself, the father, the fountain and Amphitrite of the bonds” (divina vis quaedam est in rebus omnibus; amor ipse pater, fons, et Amphitrites est vinculorum)52. One could say: if (maior) reality is nothing else then a complex structure of bounds and ties (vincula in vinculis), and if (minor) all that what is really bound is at least a living, sensitive being, then (conclusion) the biggest quantitative and qualitative amount of vincula is to be found in the societas humana – as, for example, in Leibniz the center of gravitation of vincula is the dominant monad. 4. To sum up: we found a specific tradition of thinking – coming from the reception of Platonic and Neoplatonic thinking in the Renaissance – that introduced the concept of ‘vinculum’ in developping a concept of soul-body-relation close to the Timaeus 49

50

51 52

Bruno: De vinculis in genere III, n. 62; p. 492: “Diximus in his quae de naturali magia quemadmodum vincula omnia [!] tum ad amoris vinculum referantur, tum ab amoris vinculo pendeant, tum in amoris vinculo consistant”. Cfr. De magia naturali, De vinculis spirituum, n. 48; pp. 230–232, De analogia spirituum, n. 57; p. 244: “II. (= secundum) vinculum triplex est, quod requiritur tum in operante, tum in operato, tum in eo circa quem est operatio”. Bruno: De vinculis in genere I, art. XXI, n. 22; p. 440; see Ficino: De amore II, c. 8, p. 157 Marcel. The “vincula societatis” are something common in the 16th century debates, see also Juan Luis Vives: De ratione dicendi, Opera omnia 1780–82, Vol. II, p. 89: justice, iurisdiction and language are a “vinculum humanae consociationis”; De initiis, rectis et laudibus, Opera Vol. III, p. 14: “omnis enim doctrina harum ingenuarum, et humanrum artium, uno quodam societatis vinculo continetur”. Bruno: De vinculis in genere III, art. XVI, n. 78; p. 520. Bruno: De vinculis in genere III, art. XII, n. 74; p. 510.

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of Plato (δέσμος, Tim.31 C, 38 E, 41 B, 81 D53). The soul as active force is that binding power that ties the partes extra partes of the material substrat to different formal unities: bodies, organs, organisms, complex organisms, animals etc. And it does that via rational proportions, that is, mainly mathematical ratios. This specific function of the soul, it’s, so to say, onto-cosmological function, was then combined, from Ficino onwards up to Patrizi and Bruno, with the platonic theory of eros or love. Indipendently from the specific system of the different authors we discussed – and it would have been possible to add others like Giovanni Pico, Francesco Zorzi, Sebastiano Fox Morcillo, Juan Luis Vives – the basic signature of vinculum is its unifying potential or power. The constitutive ontological power to put into being and existence a mass of particles dissipating and in chaotic movement by giving it a form and a unity. That the intensity of the presence of that unifying power of the vincula has its highest level in human being and in the relation between human beings (affects, emotions, love, moral activities, intellectual discourses, politics) makes the concept of vinculum an essential part of the anthropology and the theory of the soul (De anima) in the 15th and 16th century54. It is evident, that the young Jesuit movement with its very intelligent protagonists, especially for example Francisco Suárez, has been influenced by that Renaissance discourses. We can find “vinculum” in the context of the Commentaries to the De anima or in the Disputationes and Tractatus on the topic of “soul” or, as “vinculum substantiale”, in the theological intricacies of “incarnatio” and “transsubstantiatio”55. Leibniz knew, 53

54

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Plato: Timaios 38 E: δεσμοῖς τε ἐμψύχοις σώματα δεθέντα ζῶα ἐγγεννήθη τό τε προσταχθὲν ἔμαθεν – ‘after the bodies, hold together by animated/en-souled bonds, became living beings (animals) and learned what was their duty (…)’. Plato is here making a difference between the one world-soul, as the universal bond of the whole world (universe), and the many bonds, we could say “vincula”, which are coming (emanating, developping) out of her and being therefore animated/en-souled (ἔμψuχοι). See for the vinculum sociale f. e. Juan Luis Vives: De disciplinis, Brügge 1531, I, lib. IV, c. 1; in: Opera omnia, Valencia 1782–1790, Repr. London 1964, Vol. VI, p. 152: “Humanae omnes societates duabus potissimum rebus vinciuntur ac continentur, justitia et sermone”; II, lib. I, c. 1; p. 245: “maxime enim expedit communem esse sermonem, qui quasi vinculum paratum est societati hominum”. Cf. Francisco Suárez: Disputationes metaphysicae, Paris 1614, Disp. XV: De causa formali substantiali, sect. 6, p. 328; Disp. XVIII: De causa proxima efficiente, sect. 10, p. 429: where Suárez is defining “causalitas” as a “vinculum inter causam & effectum”; cf. in the Commentaria ac disputationes in primam partem Divi Thomae, in: Opera omnia, Tomus III, Paris 1865, Tractatus primus, lib. III: De hominis creatione, c. 4, p. 189 the very interesting reference to the late-antique christian author Nemesios and his influential work De natura hominis, c. 1, where Nemesios is presenting his definition of human being as “animal quod utrumque naturam (sc. the non-corporeal and the corporeal nature) conjungeret” and, especially interesting, as “quoddam vinculum utriusque ut unum essent” (my emphasis). This is what also the Renaissance thinkers, as we know, took form the patristic tradition. To that Nemesius-text Suárez is saying the following: “quasi dicat (sc. Nemesius) hominem esse ligamen, et vinculum, et quasi nexum totius universi, et ideo convenientissime ultimo loco creatum esse”. So the universality of the human bond is connected, theologically, to his being the “epilogos” of the creation, the last, but all things in itself reflecting “creatum”. Suárez has also, for example, the “vinculum amoris” ib., lib. V, c. 3; p. 394, or the “vinculum morale”, c. 7, p. 414 with the socio-political imlication we have in Juan Luis Vives and others (see above note 37).

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we can say, all that or at least most of all that literature. His conceptual use of “vinculum substantiale” is surely a concession he made to the position of his friend Des Bosses, but his understanding of the general function of “vinculum” has to do with his own thoughts and with his own philosophical system. This understanding is concentrated on the unifying power of the vinculum and of the fact that it is a kind of “presence” of a unity of a higher level in a unity, constituted just throught that same presence, of a lower level.

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Hartmut Rudolph (Hg.) Leibniz und die Ökumene 2013. 314 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10309-1 Wenchao Li / Hartmut Rudolph (Hg.) „Leibniz“ in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus 2013. 309 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10308-4 Christian Leduc / Paul Rateau / Jean-Luc Solère (Hg.) Leibniz et Bayle : Confrontation et dialogue 2015. 452 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10638-2 Wenchao Li (Hg.) „Das Recht kann nicht ungerecht sein …“ Beiträge zu Leibniz' Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit 2015. 184 S. mit 3 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11212-3 Arnaud Pelletier (Hg.) Leibniz and the aspects of reality 2016. 149 S. mit 7 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11170-6 Arnaud Pelletier (Hg.) Leibniz’s experimental philosophy 2016. 257 S. mit 16 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11307-6 Wenchao Li / Simona Noreik (Hg.) Leibniz, Caroline und die Folgen der englischen Sukzession 2016. 136 S. mit 8 fbg. und 2 s/w-Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11383-0 Ansgar Lyssy Kausalität und Teleologie bei G. W. Leibniz 2016. 417 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11349-6 Edward W. Glowienka Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Harmony 2016. 124 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11482-0

In Leibniz’ Denken stehen das Verständnis von Realität und ein systematischer Begriff von harmonischer Komplexität in einem durchgehenden Spannungsverhältnis, dessen produktive Auflösung Leibniz insbesondere in seiner späten Philosophie ab Mitte der 1690er Jahre im Rahmen seiner neu konzipierten Theorie der Monaden zu erreichen suchte. Als „real“ kann

ISBN 978-3-515-11656-5

jetzt nur noch das gedacht werden, was irgendeinen Grad an Harmonie der es konstituierenden Momente aufweist. Dies hat Konsequenzen in Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Naturwissenschaft. International renommierte Leibnizforscher aus den USA und Europa legen in diesem Band Interpretationsansätze zu diesen Konsequenzen vor.

www.steiner-verlag.de Franz Steiner Verlag