Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991 303068217X, 9783030682170

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Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991 Edited by Jeroen K. Joly Tim Haesebrouck

Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991

Jeroen K. Joly  •  Tim Haesebrouck Editors

Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991

Editors Jeroen K. Joly Ghent Institute for International Studies Ghent University Ghent, Belgium

Tim Haesebrouck Ghent Institute for International Studies Ghent University Ghent, Belgium

ISBN 978-3-030-68217-0    ISBN 978-3-030-68218-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Anahita, Jos, and Lore

Foreword

The field of Foreign Policy Analysis, by definition, studies changes in foreign policy. Why does a state actor behave the way it does at time T, and why does it behave differently at time T+1? To employ the language of research methods, then, we are interested in the variation in the dependent variable, often conceived of as foreign policy processes and outputs. To capture the reasons behind that variation, we apply distinct explanatory frameworks and employ various methodologies. In doing so, we seek to explain and understand why, how, and under what conditions, we observe the changes that we do in the foreign policy decision-making processes, and outputs, of state actors. The variation takes on different meanings, of course, depending on our inquiry. Sometimes we are interested in explaining the content of policy: why is it cooperative or conflictual? Why did the actor initiate or escalate a conflict, or why did it sign a peace agreement? Other times, we are interested in its intensity: why is the policy committed and extreme, or why is it watered-down and ambiguous? Most research studies focus on foreign policy events, as well as what foreign policy scholars call “occasions for decision,” to account for such incremental variations in foreign policy. Foreign Policy Analysis is not limited to investigating the day-to-day machinations of international affairs, however. Equally important is the study of trends. To what extent do we observe long-term patterns in a state’s foreign policy decision-making and outputs? Capturing these trends enables us to take a more comprehensive look at how states act in international politics. Naturally, observing the trends also involves punctuating the inflection points—in other words, identifying the shifts. Indeed, to vii

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what extent are these trends sensitive to endogenous or exogenous political, economic, or social shocks? Trends, or long-term patterns of making and implementing policy, make state behavior more predictable and the international system less uncertain. Understanding when and why foreign policy shifts occur, therefore, strengthens our ability to explain the present and make clearer projections about the future. Together, the long-term transformations and the short-term adjustments tell us about the change in the foreign policy of a state. The present volume takes on this bold mission to investigate foreign policy change across Europe in the post-Cold War period. As systemic constraints generated by the post-war great power rivalry took a back seat after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the locus of foreign policy decisions moved much closer to where the decision-makers themselves are. Fast forward some 30 years, we are now dealing with the aftershocks of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the eurozone currency crisis, the Arab Spring, and a visibly more hawkish Russia on Europe’s doorstep in Ukraine. How have European foreign policies responded to these developments? Through a meticulously designed comparative approach, each chapter in this book takes a closer look at whether and how these developments among others have impacted the national foreign policies of European states in the context of security and defense, development aid, relations with the European Union as well as other bilateral partnerships, and niche diplomacy. One reason why “valid generalizations are still few and theory has been slow to emerge,” according to Jakob Gustavsson, is “that the relevant set of explanatory factors varies greatly depending on the type of foreign policy that is to be explained.”1 By keeping the issue domains uniform across their case studies, the authors help the reader to discern just what kind of factors, or which levels of analysis more broadly, provide stronger explanations for foreign policy change. In addition to adopting comparable issue domains across each chapter, the book also smartly adopts a common theoretical typology of foreign policy change, developed by Charles Hermann. The empirical coverage of the chapters as well as their common theoretical framework together facilitates our ability to study European foreign policy in comparative perspective. For instance, readers will note that orientation change— namely, the substantive transformation of a country’s foreign policy 1  Jakob Gustavsson (1999). “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” Cooperation and Conflict, 34(1): 91.

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direction—tends to take place especially for smaller countries that used to be “security consumers” during the Cold War, but quickly became “security providers” in the post-Cold War period (e.g., Poland and Italy). Similarly, for some countries, their Mediterranean identity remains a fundamental pillar of their national foreign policy regardless of the Cold War context (e.g., Italy and Spain). In sum, the book’s empirical and theoretical strategies make it a one-stop shop for taking a bird’s-eye view at European foreign policy over the last three decades. The book therefore contributes to the Foreign Policy Analysis subfield in three important ways. First, it offers the most rigorous and up-to-date account of foreign policy change in Europe in the post-Cold War era. It is set to easily become a reference book for scholars and students of Foreign Policy Analysis interested in Europe. Second, it is the first book-length project to comparatively investigate foreign policy change through a common theoretical framework. As each chapter provides an analysis of the domestic and international factors that drive and inhibit foreign policy change at distinct levels (i.e., change in orientation, goals, programs, or simple adjustments in behavior), the book provides a holistic account of foreign policy across Europe. Third and most importantly, the book offers several avenues for future research on foreign policy change. Based on the book’s theoretical framework and its conclusions, how can we make sense of European foreign policies in the decades to come? We are in a new era of foreign policy change. The long-standing international alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) do not seem to be as robust as we assume them to be. Indeed, elites and masses alike are openly questioning the costs, utility, and meaning of participating in these agreements. Populism is no longer on the rise anymore—it comfortably sits at the government seat across many established democracies. The kind of “out with the old” mantra that populist leaders adopt to portray their disenchantment with the establishment inevitably spills over to the foreign policy domain. Leaders such as Donald Trump in the United States, Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil actively dismantle the pillars of their countries’ foreign policies. Indeed, the rise of populism has impacted virtually every European democracy covered in this book, from Germany’s AfD to Poland’s Law and Justice to the United Kingdom’s late UKIP. To what extent do populist movements incur changes in foreign policy? Are these mostly adjustment changes, or do we see changes in orientation as well? Similarly, how much of an impact will the coronavirus, Brexit, or the

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Trump presidency in the United States have on European foreign policy? Do they have an independent effect on the foreign policies of these democracies, or are there other international and domestic factors that act as inhibitors (or accelerators) of change? The insights of this book will shed important light on these questions, and generate many others, for all those interested in foreign policy change in Europe and beyond. Chicago, IL, USA Sibel Oktay

Contents

1 Introduction: Foreign Policy Change  1 Tim Haesebrouck and Jeroen K. Joly 2 Belgian Foreign Policy: In Foro Interno, Inferno? 21 Jeroen K. Joly and Tim Haesebrouck 3 Czech Foreign Policy After the Velvet Revolution 49 Zdeněk Kříž, Martin Chovančík, and Odřich Krpec 4 Danish Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in the Post-Cold War Period 73 Henrik Larsen 5 Finnish Foreign Policy: Pragmatic Adjustment to a Changing World Order 99 Tapio Raunio 6 French Foreign Policy: Make France Great Again?127 Friederike Richter and Martial Foucault 7 German Foreign Policy155 Patrick A. Mello

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8 Italian Foreign Policy: Still the Days Seem the Same?179 Fabrizio Coticchia and Valerio Vignoli 9 Dutch Foreign Policy: Staying the Course Amid a Changing World205 Niels van Willigen 10 Polish Foreign Policy: From ‘Go To’ Player to Territorial Defender233 Laura Chappell 11 Spanish Foreign Policy: Navigating Global Shifts and Domestic Crises259 Eduard Soler i Lecha and Esther Barbé 12 British Foreign Policy Since the End of the Cold War285 Andrew M. Dorman 13 Conclusion: Grasping Foreign Policy Change311 Klaus Brummer and Kai Oppermann Index333

Notes on Contributors

Esther  Barbé  is Professor of International Relations at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Senior Researcher Associate at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), and Director of the Observatory of European Foreign Policy. Her research areas focus on Spanish Foreign Policy, European Foreign Policy, Euro-Mediterranean Relations, International Security, Power Transition, and Normative Contestation in Multilateral Institutions. Her work has been published among other journals in International Affairs, European Journal of Public Policy, Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of Common Market Studies, and Mediterranean Politics. Klaus Brummer  holds the chair of International Relations at the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Germany. He served as co-editor-in-­ chief of the journal Foreign Policy Analysis (2018–2020) and was president of the Foreign Policy Analysis section of the International Studies Association (2015–2016). His research interests include leadership profiling, domestic drivers of foreign policy, and foreign policy making in nonWestern contexts. He has published in peer-reviewed journals such as British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Government and Opposition, International Affairs, International Studies Review, and Journal of European Public Policy, and is co-editor of Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America (2015) and Foreign Policy as Public Policy? (2019). Laura Chappell  is Senior Lecturer in European Politics at the University of Surrey. Her research focuses on the Common Security and Defence xiii

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Policy (CSDP) encompassing European strategic culture, the Battlegroup concept, defense capability development, EU military operations, Gender and the EEAS as well as Polish security and defense policies. She has published a number of articles, book chapters, and books on these areas. She is co-editor of European Security. Martin  Chovančík  is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Masaryk University, Czech Republic. His recent projects and publications deal with the internal security of the Czech Republic and its external threat mitigation strategy (developing an applied Methodology of Prediction, Early Warning, and Prevention of Threats from Regional Armed Conflict to the Internal Security of the CR—VI20172020094), the arms trade and arms industrial policies in Central Europe (particularly Czechia and Slovakia, published in Comparative Strategy and Routledge edited monograph), international sanctions (namely EU use and signaling— MUNI/23/1113/2018), and arms trade from Europe. Fabrizio  Coticchia is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Genoa. He received a PhD in Political Systems and Institutional Change from the IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies. He has been Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute (2014–2015) and research fellow in international relations at the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (2009–2014). His fields of research are foreign policy analysis, contemporary warfare, strategic narratives, political parties and foreign policy, Italian and European defense policy, and development cooperation. He teaches postgraduate courses on foreign politics analysis, comparative politics, and security studies. He provides pre-deployment courses and seminars for Italian military and security forces. Among his books: Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call It War with P.  Ignazi and G.  Giacomello (Palgrave 2012); The Transformation of Italian Armed Forces in Comparative Perspective with F.N. Moro ( 2016); and Italian Foreign Policy during Matteo Renzi’s Government: A Domestically Focused Outsider and the World with J. Davidson (2019). His articles have appeared, among others, in Foreign Policy Analysis, Government and Opposition, International Relations, Mediterranean Politics, Armed Forces & Society, and European Security. Andrew M. Dorman  is a research associate in the Office of the Dean of Humanities, University of Pretoria, South Africa, editor of the Chatham House/Oxford University Press journal International Affairs, and

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Professor of International Security at King’s College London. His research interests focus on the interaction of policy and strategy, utilizing the case studies of British defense and security policy and European Security. He has held grants with the ESRC, British Academy, Leverhulme Trust, Ministry of Defense, and US Army War College. Martial Foucault  is Full Professor of Political Science at Sciences Po in Paris and Chair of the CEVIPOF (a CNRS-affiliated research center in political science). Before joining Sciences Po in 2013, he was Associate Professor at the University of Montreal, Director of the European Union Centre of Excellence (University of Montreal/McGill University) and Research Fellow in 2005/2006 at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (Italy). His research agenda covers political economy, political behavior, political psychology and methods. His work has been published in a variety of journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, PNAS, the British Journal of Political Science, Political Psychology, and others. Tim  Haesebrouck is a post-doctoral researcher at Ghent University, Belgium. He finished his PhD on European military operations in 2016. His research interests include military intervention, defense burden sharing, and foreign policy analysis. His work has been published in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Foreign Policy Analysis, Journal of European Public Policy, and European Political Science Review. Jeroen  K.  Joly is Lecturer in Geopolitics at Saint-Louis University Brussels and Associated Researcher at Ghent University. His research focuses on the domestic influences on and policy responsiveness in foreign and aid policy making, with particular attention to the role of news media and political parties. Additionally, his work also looks at the role personality and leadership play in politics, especially among decision-makers. He has been a longstanding and active member of both the Belgian and the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), and his work has been published in Political Communication, Cooperation and Conflict, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Acta Politica. Zdeněk Kříž  is Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Masaryk University, specialized in the history of armed conflicts, international security organizations, German and Czech security policies, and civil-military relations. In 2006–2010 he participated as co-investigator in the German PRIF project “The Image of the

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Democratic Soldier in European Comparison”. He was also lead investigator in national projects funded by the Czech Science Foundation (NATO Adaptation, Armed Conflicts after the Cold War) and by the Czech Academy of Sciences (Civil military relations in the Czech Republic). In 2010 and 2011, he was part of the Czech Defense Minister’s expert team producing the “White Paper on the Defense of the Czech Republic 2011”. His recent projects and publications deal with the internal security of the Czech Republic and its external threat mitigation strategy. Odr ̌ich Krpec  is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. His field is economic history and international political economy. He focuses on economic policies in semi-peripheries and on projection of power into trade and development policies. Besides the economic dimension of foreign policy of central European countries, he works on projects dealing with Chinese economic expansion into Central Europe and with comparison of developmental policies of Central Europe and Latin America. He believes that economic, social, and political development of Central and Eastern Europe in the last three decades is a fascinating field of study, which has much to offer to contemporary academic discussions. Henrik Larsen  is Professor MSO and holds the Jean Monnet Chair in European Foreign and Security Policy Integration in the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. He has published Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (1997), ESDP and the Nordic Countries (with N. Græger and H. Ojanen, 2002), Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU: the Case of Denmark (2005), Gaps in European Foreign Policy: the Role of Concepts in European Studies (2017), and Teorier om dansk udenrigspolitik efter den kolde krig (Theories about Danish Foreign Policy after the Cold War) (2017). Patrick A. Mello  is Visiting Scholar at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany. His research focuses on international security, foreign policy analysis, and qualitative research methods, especially fuzzy-set QCA, on which his book Qualitative Comparative Analysis: An Introduction to Research Design and Application is forthcoming with Georgetown University Press. He is also the author of Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), has coedited a special issue of the British Journal of Politics and International

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Relations on parliaments in security policy, and is co-­editing the Routledge Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis Methods. His articles have appeared in leading journals such as the European Journal of International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Journal of International Relations and Development, Contemporary Security Policy, and West European Politics. Sibel Oktay  is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Springfield. She studies the interactions between domestic political institutions, political behavior, leadership, and international outcomes. Her publications appear in the European Journal of Political Research, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, and the Journal of European Public Policy, among others. She is the author of the forthcoming book, Governing Abroad: Coalition Politics and Foreign Policy in Europe (University of Michigan Press). Kai  Oppermann  is Professor of Politics at the Chemnitz University of Technology. He has previously held positions at the University of Sussex, King’s College London and the University of Cologne. His research interests focus on comparative foreign policy analysis, foreign policy failures, and the domestic contestation of (German and British) foreign policy and European integration. His research has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as European Journal of International Relations, Journal of European Public Policy, West European Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Journal of International Relations and Development, and International Relations. He is an associate editor of the Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis and serves as co-editor of the journal German Politics. Tapio Raunio  is Professor of Political Science at Tampere University. His research interests cover legislatures and political parties, the European Union, semi-presidentialism, and the Finnish political system. His recent publications include two special issues co-edited with Wolfgang Wagner, Challenging Executive Dominance: Legislatures and Foreign Affairs (West European Politics, 2017), and Political Parties and Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy Analysis, 2020), and the book Semi-­Presidential Policy-Making in Europe: Executive Coordination and Political Leadership (2020, coauthored with Thomas Sedelius). His publications have appeared in the European Journal of Political Research, Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, Party Politics, and Scandinavian Political Studies.

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Friederike  Richter is a research associate at the Universität der Bundeswehr München, and a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (CEVIPOF). She is also a teaching assistant at the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po, Paris), and a research fellow at the Chaire Économie de Défense. Her research focuses on policy agendas. She is particularly interested in how security and defense issues become and remain a government priority in Europe. Before starting her Ph.D., she worked for the European Commission and a public affairs consultancy in Brussels. Eduard Soler i Lecha  is a senior research fellow at CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs) and part-time lecturer at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, IBEI, and Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University. Since 2013, he leads the El Hiwar project on Euro-Arab diplomacy at the College of Europe (Bruges), and between 2016 and 2019, he was the scientific coordinator of MENARA, a European project on geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2010, he was seconded as an advisor to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Direction General for the Mediterranean, the Maghreb, and the Middle East). His areas of expertise are geopolitics of the MENA region, foresight, EuroMediterranean relations, Turkey, and Spanish foreign policy. He is a member of the Observatory of European Foreign Policy, FIMAM (the Spanish network of researchers working on Arab and Muslim studies), EuroMeSCo and the advisory boards of Mediterranean Politics and IEMed’s Mediterranean Yearbook. Niels  van Willigen  is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University. He holds a PhD from Leiden University. His research interests focus on foreign policy analysis, security studies (more in particular peace operations, arms control, and European security), and international organizations. His research articles have appeared in (among others) European Journal of International Relations, International Peacekeeping, and East European Politics. He published a monograph Peacebuilding and International Administration with Routledge. He received a NATO/EAPC Fellowship for a research project on European security and defense and is the principal applicant of the Jean Monnet Network RENPET (Reconceptualising European Power in an Age of Turmoil).

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Valerio Vignoli  is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Social and Political Science of the University of Milan. In 2020, he completed his PhD in “Political Studies” at NASP (Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies), University of Milan, with a dissertation on the party politics of military interventions in Italy. His research articles have been published in various top-ranked journals, including West European Politics and Government & Opposition. His fields or research are Foreign Policy Analysis, International Relations, Italian politics, and quantitative methods.

Abbreviations

CFSP CSDP DAC EI2 EUFOR EUNAVFOR EUTM FCMA FRONTEX IFOR IMF ISAF ISIS KFOR LDC MDG MINUSMA NORDEFCO OSCE PESCO SDG SFIR SFOR UNDP UNICEF UNIFIL

Common Foreign and Security Policy Common Security and Defense Policy Development Assistance Committee European Intervention Initiative European Union Force European Union Naval Force European Union Training Mission Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance European Border and Coast Guard Agency Implementation Force International Monetary Funds International Security Assistance Force Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Kosovo Force Least Developed Countries Millennium Development Goals United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Nordic Defense Cooperation Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Structured Cooperation Sustainable Development Goals Stabilization Force Iraq Stabilization Force United Nations Development Program United Nations International Children’s Fund United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon xxi

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ABBREVIATIONS

UNPO UNPROFOR WTO

UN peacekeeping operations United Nations Protection Force World Trade Organization

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2

Belgium’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) Belgium’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System) Czech Republic’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) Czech Republic’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System) Denmark’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) Denmark’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System) Finland’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) Finland’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

34 38 56 60 84 87 108 110

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List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 11.2

France’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: SIPRI, 2019b) France’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System) The complementarity of defense policy and ODA (1995–2018) (We use data from 1995 onward only since the completeness of the data set on Common Reporting Standard (CRS) commitments has improved from 70% in 1995 to over 90% in 2000 and nearly 100% in 2003). (Source: IISS, The Military Balance) Germany’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) Germany’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System) Italy’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) Italy’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System) The Netherlands’ annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). Source: World Bank The Netherlands’ annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System Poland’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). Source: World Bank Poland’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System Spain’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) Spain’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

135 139

140 167 170 185 188 216 220 243 246 266 269

  List of Figures 

Fig. 12.1 The UK’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) Fig. 12.2 The UK’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 7.1 Table 8.1 Table 9.1 Table 10.1 Table 11.1 Table 12.1

Overview of types of change 16 Overview of types of drivers and inhibitors of change at the international and domestic level 17 Overview of foreign policy changes in Belgium since 1990 42 Overview of foreign policy changes in Czech Republic since 1990 67 Overview of foreign policy changes in Denmark since 1990 94 Overview of foreign policy changes in Finland since 1990 120 Overview of foreign policy changes in France since 1990 148 Overview of foreign policy changes in Germany since 1990 174 Overview of foreign policy changes in Italy since 1990 199 Overview of foreign policy changes in The Netherlands since 1990227 Overview of foreign policy changes in Poland since 1990 255 Overview of foreign policy changes in Spain since 1990 277 Overview of foreign policy changes in the United Kingdom since 1990 308

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Foreign Policy Change Tim Haesebrouck and Jeroen K. Joly

1   Introduction In 2020, the world has been witnessing many rapid and invasive changes, and seems to be changing further ever more rapidly in ways that seemed only imaginable in movies. Perspectives on how to deal with these changes and how one’s country should position itself in the world cause much and heated discussions both internationally and at home. While some argue that it is ever more important to engage actively with the rest of the world, others would urge for protectionist or isolationist measures that limit the interactions beyond the own frontiers. The foreign policies of countries are often considered as a function of their (military and economic) power, their interests or their ‘role’ on the international scene. These are generally considered as fairly stable. Yet, in the past decades, we have witnessed a striking number of countries enacting important changes to their foreign policy. After a brief

T. Haesebrouck (*) • J. K. Joly Ghent Institute for International Studies, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_1

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period in which Russia embraced Western-style reforms and cooperated with the West on the main international issues following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, under Putin, Russia and the West are again headed for confrontation rather than cooperation. After decades of retrenchment and isolation, China has become very actively engaged with large parts of the world—not only with its regional partners, but also with the West and, more recently, with large parts of the African continent. Under the presidency of Donald Trump, the US acted as an unpredictable and, according to many observers, unreliable partner, rescinding previously made engagements and renouncing multilateralism altogether. At the time of writing, two weeks after the 2020 elections, president-elect Joe Biden has already made clear that he intends to reverse some of the decisions of the Trump administration. So, while these major powers are trying to shape the world or position themselves to their advantage, how is this affecting non-major powers? Moreover, with many countries currently experiencing the second wave of the coronavirus pandemic, it is still too soon to tell if and how this will affect the balance of power on the international scene. In this book, we investigate how European countries have adapted to these types of changes. The general goal of this book is to further our understanding of foreign policy change. More specifically, this book has two main objectives. First, it aims to advance our understanding of the phenomenon of foreign policy change by providing an answer to three interrelated questions: (1) what is foreign policy change; (2) what are the different categories of foreign policy change and (3) how common are these different types of change? Second, this book aims to identify the most important drivers and inhibitors of foreign policy change. In line with the twofold objective of the book project, this introductory chapter discusses past scholarship on foreign policy change to arrive at a comprehensive definition of this phenomenon, provides an overview of which types of foreign policy change have been subjected to academic scrutiny over the last two decades and identifies potential drivers and inhibitors of change.1 It concludes with the common structure and outline of the empirical chapters. 1  The first three sections of this chapter provide an updated and more comprehensive version of a literature review published as Haesebrouck T and Joly J. (2020) Foreign Policy Change: From Policy Adjustments to Fundamental Reorientations. Political Studies Review. Copyright © 2020, Sage Publications. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929920918783

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2   Defining and Conceptualizing Foreign Policy Change A good definition of foreign policy change first requires a definition of foreign policy (Gustavsson, 1999, p. 75). This definition needs to be clear on the difference between domestic and foreign policy (Beach, 2012, p.  12). Many domestic policies, like tax or environmental regulations, have an external impact. In this volume, we focus on policies that are explicitly directed toward foreign entities. In his seminal work on foreign policy change, Hermann (1990, p. 5) offers a definition that meets this criterion: foreign policy “is a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed towards entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdiction”. However, as argued by Goldmann (1982), foreign policy not only refers to a line of action an agent explicitly declares to follow—for example, in official documents or speeches—but can also refer to a non-verbalized line of action. Patterns of foreign policy behavior can change significantly without (or prior to) the adoption of a formal program (Holsti, 2016, p.  114). In consequence, our volume requires a definition that includes both behavioral patterns and plans and programs. Morin and Paquin (2018, p.  3) offer such a definition of foreign policy: “a set of actions or rules governing the actions of an independent political authority deployed in the international environment”. A problem, however, with this definition is that it does not exclude ad hoc actions or idiosyncratic deviations from a course of action. Rather than limiting ourselves to examining specific foreign policy decisions, our focus on foreign policy change requires us to only look at “broad trends of behavior” (Beach, 2012, p. 3). Therefore, a necessary addition to our definition of foreign policy is that it only includes “practices that are repeated so often that they are taken for granted” (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 4). Foreign policy can, thus, be defined as the broad trends of behavior, or set of rules governing such behavior, that is adopted by authoritative foreign policymakers and is directed toward entities outside their jurisdiction. This definition focuses on actions that are explicitly directed toward external actors and includes both patterns of behavior and government programs and strategies. Foreign policy can refer to the accumulation of very specific decisions, like signing international treaties or committing troops to multinational operations, or to more broad strategic choices,

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such as adopting a new security strategy (Beasley et  al., 2012, p.  4). Moreover, it is not limited to security or defense policy including, inter alia, humanitarian and development aid, foreign economic policy and multilateral diplomacy. Foreign policy is, thus, defined as a pattern of behavior that is repeated more than a restricted number of times and is characterized by a degree of continuity. In consequence, we can define change as the replacement of this pattern with a new pattern. Given that foreign policy is constantly subjected to minor adjustments and modifications, scholarship focuses on fundamental changes in foreign policies (Hermann, 1990, p. 5). The literature on foreign policy change distinguishes different levels of change. Rosati (1994, p. 236) offers a categorization that includes four levels of change: intensification, refinement, reform and restructuring. The differences between these levels are quantitative in nature rather than qualitative, ranging from little or no change, over minor and moderate changes to major changes. The most influential categorization of foreign policy change to date has been suggested by Hermann (1990, p.  5), who differentiates between four gradations of change that are based on qualitative rather than quantitative differences. The first level of change is adjustment change: quantitative changes in the level of efforts that do not change the goals or methods of a policy. The second level is program change, which refers to changes in the methods but not the goals of a foreign policy. The third level is goal change, which implies a change of purpose of a foreign policy. The fourth and most fundamental form of change pertains to the redirection of the actor’s entire orientation toward world affairs, involving a simultaneous shift in many policies. Other conceptualizations generally focus on the most fundamental form of foreign policy change. Holsti’s (2016) concept of foreign policy restructuring, for example, closely resembles Hermann’s (1990) fourth category: simultaneous change in many geographical and functional sectors or the total pattern of a state’s external relations. Volgy and Schwarz (1991, pp.  616–617) also focus on foreign policy restructuring, which they define as “a comprehensive change in the foreign policy orientation of a nation, over a brief period of time, as manifested through major behavioral changes encompassing a broad range of activities in the nation’s interactions with other actors in international politics”. The edited book of Rosati et al. (1994), however, indicates that wholesale alterations of a country’s foreign relations are very rare. Rather, the book’s conclusions

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suggest that different levels of change can occur and the scope of change can be limited to specific areas or sectors (Hagan & Rosati, 1994, p. 267). Moreover, in the concluding chapter of their volume, it is argued that many adjustments are not dramatic departures from previous policies. Instead, the authors conclude that gradual and incremental changes can have the most profound implications for a state’s overall international orientation (Hagan & Rosati, 1994, p. 268). Ashbee and Hurst (2020) explicitly depart from earlier conceptualizations of foreign policy change by introducing the concept of transformational change. Transformational change rests on four structural shifts: a paradigm shift (or shift in ideas), a shift in interests, a shift in institutions and a shift in logic of actions, which lays the basis for specific actions. The concept of transformational change, thus, does not only include behavioral change but also considers a change in ideas and interests as defining elements of foreign policy change. However, in line with earlier work on foreign policy change, we consider ideational changes and changes in interests as causes of change, rather than as definitional elements. More specifically, we define foreign policy change as follows: Foreign policy change is the replacement of a continuous pattern of action towards external actors or the rules guiding such actions with a new continuous pattern or rules that pursue different goals and/or use different methods. The latter can be the result of a dramatic break with the past or cumulative effect of smaller changes. Foreign policy change can be limited to a specific foreign policy issue or a bilateral relation, more extensively involving a broader foreign policy domain like security or aid policy, or pertain to a simultaneous change across different foreign policy domains and relations, amounting to a fundamental redirection of the actor’s entire orientation towards world affairs.

3   Studying Foreign Policy Change In line with earlier conceptualizations, our definition of foreign policy change suggests that this concept encompasses a broad range of empirical phenomena that vary on three qualitative dimensions. First, it can refer to changes in the goals of a foreign policy, the means used to pursue these goals or both. Second, the extensiveness of foreign policy change can vary substantially, ranging from a change in a country’s policy toward one specific foreign policy issue or in only one sector to a simultaneous shift in many foreign policies. Finally, foreign policy change can also involve a

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dramatic break with past behavior or the cumulative effect of incremental changes. Over the last two decades, an increasing number of empirical studies have examined foreign policy change. While changes in goals and methods of foreign policies have been equally covered in the literature, studies have generally focused on changes in specific foreign policy issues rather than looking at more extensive changes in the patterns of the external relations of states. A majority of studies on foreign policy change have focused on dramatic changes in single foreign policy issues. The most studied case of foreign policy change is Israel’s decision to negotiate and adopt the Oslo accords of August 1993 (Barnett, 1999; Rynhold, 2007; Ziv, 2011; Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014). Blavoukos (2019), for example, recently used the Oslo Accords to demonstrate the value of Kingdon’s multiple streams approach, conceptualizing foreign policy as the intersection of problem, policy and politics. The adoption of the Oslo accords was clearly a dramatic break with Israel’s past actions toward the Palestinian territories and involved a change in goals and methods. Although incredibly important for the state of Israel, this was a decision on one specific foreign policy issue rather than a complete restructuring of its foreign policy. Numerable other dramatic changes in relatively narrow foreign policy issues have been subjected to academic scrutiny. Kesgin (2019), for example, examines another dramatic shift in Israel’s foreign policy: prime minister Ariel Sharon’s 2003 decision to withdraw from Gaza. Walsh (2006), in turn, focuses on the UK’s decision to no longer exclusively rely on NATO for multilateral crisis management and establish a strong EU role in military crisis management by signing the Saint-Malo declaration. Although the author mentions several minor changes in the UK’s policy toward crisis management, the signing of the treaty can be considered a dramatic break with the past on one specific foreign policy issue. Likewise, Lee (2012) examines the dramatic change in Japan’s foreign policy toward the specific issue of East Asian financial regionalism at the end of 1997. Kaarbo (2017), in turn, examines two such dramatic changes on relatively narrow foreign policy issues; Japan’s adoption of the norm of trade liberalization on the issue of rice import and the Turkish decision to ban the death penalty during accession negotiations with the EU, while Kursani (2017) examines the decision of Montenegro and Macedonia to recognize Kosovo after it failed to do so on past occasions. A number of studies adopt a comparative research design and compare cases of change with similar cases of non-change. In a book-length study,

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Welch (2005, p. 40) compares the military intervention of Argentina in the Falklands, the US decision to escalate the Vietnam War, the US decision to withdraw from the latter war and the 1988 free trade agreement between the US and Canada with similar cases without foreign policy change. Lantis (2020) applies a similar comparative research design and examines the pattern of change and continuity in the US’ policy toward the Syrian civil war. Cohen and Rapport (2020), then again, examine the conditions under which a surprising rapid advancement in an adversary’s nuclear capabilities results in policy change. Specifically, they compare the Truman administration’s decision to authorize major policy changes after the 1949 Soviet nuclear test with the Johnson administration’s decision to continue their extant policy after the 1967 Chinese thermonuclear explosion. Next to studies that focus on rather dramatic changes, there are also a few studies that have examined more incremental changes in specific foreign policy issues. Doeser (2011), for example, examines how Denmark’s government ended its so-called footnote policy toward NATO in favor of a more active approach toward the alliance in 1988. In a subsequent study with Eidenfalk, they discuss the decision to further implement the change in Danish policy toward the US: the decision to participate with a warship to monitor UN sanctions against Iraq in 1990 (Doeser & Eidenfalk, 2013). Both events seem part of the same incremental process of foreign policy change that resulted in Denmark taking a more active position in NATO.2 Peltner (2017) examines how the threshold for conducting a humanitarian intervention was downscaled throughout the 1990s in the UK, which also constitutes a more incremental process of foreign policy change. Lastly, the study of Dukalskis (2017), which examines how Sudan, Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa changed their respective positions toward the International Criminal Court (ICC) between 1999 and 2014, also mainly includes cases of incremental change. Next to these studies on dramatic and incremental shifts in specific foreign policy issues, a number of studies examined such changes in bilateral relations or in broader foreign policy categories. Kleistra and Mayer (2001), for example, focus on the change in Dutch policy toward Suriname, following the 1982 coup in that country, while Bashirov (2019) 2  Doeser and Eidenfalk (2013) also discuss the decision of Australia’s government to abandon its hands-off approach toward the Solomon Islands by deciding on a military intervention, which constitutes a clearer break with its past behavior.

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identifies some major shifts in US policy toward Azerbaijan between 1990 and 2019. Yang (2010), in turn, looks at US foreign policy toward China and compares a major turning point during the Bush administration with one during the Clinton administration. Breuning (2013) focuses on change in a broader foreign policy category: development aid. More specifically, she examines the failure of Belgian State Secretary Moreels to incite a major change in Belgium’s development policy in the second half of the 1990s. Likewise, Haesebrouck (2020) examines the evolution of Belgium’s defense policy after the end of the Cold War. Several recent publications have examined foreign policy change over a longer timeframe. Haugom (2019), for example, examines how Turkish foreign policy has changed after Erdogan became president in 2014. His analysis shows that there have been significant changes in Turkish foreign policy, resulting “in a strong focus on national security, an assertive style in policy implementation, a preference for transaction-based relations, and a quest for more strategic autonomy” (Haugom, 2019, p. 206). However, compared to earlier periods, these features of Turkish foreign policy represent both change and continuity and do not represent a change in Turkey’s overall orientation. A special issue edited by Hill and Hurst (2020a, p. 143, 2020b) examines whether or not US president Trump’s foreign policy represents “a radical change from or rupture with those of his immediate and near predecessors”. In their contribution to this special issue, Ashbee and Hurst (2020) conclude that there are clear indications of foreign policy transformation under the Trump administration, but also that “transformation develops differentially and incrementally, evolving in different areas at different times and at different speeds” (Hill & Hurst, 2020a, p. 145). Other contributions to the special issue confirm the incremental and differentiated nature of foreign policy change. For example, the analysis of Kitchen (2020) suggests that the US’ grand strategy has changed in the post-Cold War era, with a structural trend toward less active hegemonic management that started during the Obama administration and continued during the Trump presidency. Likewise, Deyermond (2020) concludes the Trump administration’s policy on democratic practices in Russia constitutes a clear break with the policies pursued by previous administrations. In contrast, on the issue of counterterrorism, Biegon and Watts (2020, p. 48) suggest that Trump has “not departed from the counterterrorism “playbook” he inherited from his predecessor”. Another relevant conclusion of the special issue is that the most fundamental changes in US foreign policy

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under Trump have been ideational (Hill & Hurst, 2020a; Hagan & Rosati, 1994). However, these ideational changes might later result in ‘material’ changes in foreign policy behavior, providing further reasons to expect change to be incremental and only observable over a long term. To sum up, the literature on foreign policy change of the last two decades mainly focused on changes in specific foreign policy issues rather than looking at more extensive changes in the patterns of the external relations of states. Recent scholarship did not find examples of Hermann’s fourth and most fundamental form of foreign policy change, and neither were changes in broader foreign policy categories, like defense or development aid uncovered, or did scholars establish simultaneous changes across several foreign policy issues. This might simply be a consequence of the fact that foreign policy change is a rare phenomenon and simultaneous changes toward different foreign policy issues are even more uncommon (Welch, 2005, p.  40; Volgy & Schwarz, 1994, p.  38; Rosati, 1994). However, it could also be an artifact of the research design and focus of most recent publications. Scholarship has mainly selected cases of foreign policy change that were very clear and involved a major break with the past, without trying to link different cases together to establish broader patterns. Given that fundamental foreign policy change can be the cumulative result of a large number of incremental changes, scholarship might have failed to uncover a large number of foreign policy changes. Hence, this book looks at the different types of foreign policy change described by Hermann (1990) in 11 European countries over a long period of time and across a wide range of foreign policy issues. This allows us to identify the changes in specific policy domains, like defense, development assistance or trade, as well as broader and more fundamental changes and reorientations over a longer period of time. Moreover, each chapter describes the mechanisms driving these changes both at the domestic and international level, as well as the dynamics preventing major changes.

4   Explaining Foreign Policy Change Scholarship has suggested a wide range of plausible explanations for foreign policy change, located at different levels of analysis: the international level, the domestic level and individual decision-makers. While each of these levels of analysis includes a number of drivers, numerous inhibitors are also located at each level (Volgy & Schwarz, 1994). Foreign policy

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change can, therefore, be expected to result from a complex interplay between drivers and barriers at different levels of analysis. 4.1  International Level Given that foreign policy is explicitly directed toward foreign entities, many of the drivers and inhibitors of foreign policy change are located outside the boundaries of the jurisdiction of foreign policy decision-­ makers. First of all, foreign policy change can be expected to be influenced by systemic conditions (Hagan & Rosati, 1994, p. 270; Gustavsson, 1999, p. 83). As suggested by neorealist theories, systemic factors constrain the foreign policy options of states. Volgy and Schwarz (1994, p.  32), for example, argue that bipolar systems will restrict the flexibility of states to change their foreign policy, while conditions of multipolarity enhance this flexibility. Systemic changes, in turn, can lead to a “re-conceptualization of security threats and challenges, a re-prioritization of foreign policy objectives, and the emergence of new means of actions and foreign policy options” (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014, p.  488; Rynhold, 2007, p. 424). Kitchen (2020) analysis of the US’ grand strategies during the post-Cold War period confirms this assertion by demonstrating that the changes in US grand strategy during the Obama and Trump administrations can be attributed to shifts in the international system, which has become less permissive for the direct application of American power. The position of states within the global system can also have an impact on foreign policy change. States that are satisfied with the status quo are less likely to start major changes in their foreign policy (Volgy & Schwarz, 1994, p.  31). Biegon and Watts (2020), for example, refer to the US’ dominant position in the international order to explain the continuity in its counterterrorism policy. More specifically, they argue that counterterrorism has continued to perform two key functions during the Trump administration: “defending the reproduction of open-door access to overseas markets, resources, and labour and, by extension, entrenching US structural power in international relations” (Biegon & Watts, 2020, p. 38). Skidmore (1994, p. 50), in turn, argues that powerful states will be less responsive to international change than mid-level powers, because the former can more easily manage the costs of resisting external incentives for change. Skidmore (1994, p. 56) expects middle powers and small states to have a strong incentive to quickly adjust to international changes.

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However, they are also expected to lack the capacity and will to fully adjust their foreign policies. Rosati (1994, p. 230) argues that several international level constraints increase the tendency of foreign policy continuity: past agreements, commitments and commercial relationships all reinforce a government’s resistance to change. Moreover, foreign policy is constrained by international regimes, law and norms. However, research suggests that the latter can also contribute to foreign policy change. A special issue edited by Brazys et al. (2017) indicates that international norms can be the primary reason for foreign policy change, or can be instrumentalized by domestic political actors that want to change their countries’ foreign policy. Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014, p. 489), in turn, suggest two ways in which international organizations can incite foreign policy change. First of all, participation in international organizations can incite foreign policy change through processes of socialization. Second, the foreign policies of states that aspire membership in international organizations can change because the latter often requires meeting a number of conditions. In a similar vein, Volgy and Schwarz (1994, p. 35) argue that states can change their foreign policy orientation to participate in regional integration efforts. Next to these more structural conditions, international events are also invoked as major potential drivers of foreign policy change. Hermann (1990) expects most foreign policy changes to result from some change or initiative in the external environment of states. An important source of foreign policy change is external shocks, which are “large events in terms of visibility and immediate impact on the recipient” (Hermann, 1990, p. 12). Lee (2012, p. 739) suggests that dramatic foreign policy changes generally occur under conditions of crisis-led (or policy failure-led) uncertainty. Likewise, Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014, p.  489) argue that foreign policy changes might be a consequence of the interactions between states. Such interactions can conflict and consequently create crises, which in turn, open windows of opportunity for foreign policy change. Welch (2005) argues that foreign policy change is most likely when a policy fails its objectives either repeatedly or catastrophically, or when leaders become convinced it will fail in the near future. Walsh (2006, pp. 492–493) argues that policy failures provide decision-makers with an incentive to consider alternative policy options.

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4.2  Domestic and Individual Level Factors International-level explanations cannot, by themselves, fully account for the pattern of foreign policy change and continuity. Instead, the latter requires the absence of a large number of domestic constraints. Moreover, research suggests that domestic-level drivers can incite change even when international-level incentives are relatively minor. First, domestic-level factors can keep states from reforming their foreign policies. As argued by Hagan & Rosati (1994, p. 271), “opponents of change often occupy political positions in the policymaking process within the government and throughout society, and can block and resist initiatives flowing from either changed international circumstances or domestic political realignment”. Skidmore (1994, p. 52) draws attention to the varying domestic constraints that cause substantial differences in the responsiveness of states to the demands for policy adjustment. More specifically, his model suggests that states with dispersed authority and a lack of autonomy from societal influences will be less responsive to the need for policy adjustment than centralized states. Likewise, Volgy and Schwarz (1994, p. 29) argue that foreign policy restructuring will be easier in centrist than in pluralistic and democratic political systems. The study of Haugom (2019) confirms the latter argument by demonstrating that the concentration of power in the hands of President Erdogan following the transition from a parliamentary to a “strong” presidential system facilitated foreign policy change in Turkey. A number of authors draw attention to the importance of bureaucratic constraints. Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014, p. 489), for example, suggest that the specific characteristics of policymaking processes are important determinants of foreign policy change. More specifically, they suggest that foreign policy change will be less frequent in highly bureaucratic states with democratic regimes than in autocratic regimes with a minimal policymaking role for the bureaucracy. Several chapters in the edited volume of Rosati et al. (1994, p. 271) stress bureaucratic incrementalism as an important source of foreign policy continuity. Welch (2005, p. 33), in turn, derives from organization theory that the day-to-day functioning of organizations contributes to foreign policy stability. Not only are organizations heavily scripted, resource pressures generally make it difficult for organizations to keep up with inputs and demands. In consequence, there will be more stability in organizations charged with responding to the international environment than there will be in the environment itself.

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Moreover, inertia will be reinforced by the fact that different organizations and branches of government have different priorities and perspectives. This corresponds to the argument of Volgy and Schwarz (1994, p.  27), who contend that bureaucrats tend to offer policymakers with competing views and interests, which leaders can rarely balance to fundamentally restructure a state’s foreign policy. Examining change in foreign aid policies across several OECD countries, Joly and Richter (2019) show that there is more resistance to change in countries with heavier bureaucracies. In addition, within democratic regimes, their framework suggests that change is more likely in cases of strong, single-party, governments with a prime minister dominating decision-­making. This is in line with Tsebelis’ veto player theory, which argues that the number of veto players in a specific polity, along with their preferences and incentives, determines the conditions for change. Oppermann and Brummer (2019) have recently demonstrated the value of veto player theory in FPA by examining Germany’s foreign deployment of armed forces. Kaarbo (2017), in turn, suggests that coalition governments are not incapable of foreign policy change, but may be prone to significant delays in responsiveness to international norms due to the constraints of junior coalition partners. However, change can also be driven or facilitated by political developments at the domestic level. First of all, a change of government can constitute an important source or contributing factor for change. Peltner (2017), for example, shows that the promotion of an ethical foreign policy by the new Labour government in 1997 gave state sovereignty a less decisive role in cases of massive human rights violations. Likewise, Walsh (2006) concludes that the electoral victory of new Labour government was essential for the UK’s decision to establish a strong EU role in military crisis management by signing the Saint-Malo declaration. Rynhold (2007, p.  433) shows how the electoral victory of left-wing parties was a vital precondition for the Oslo accords. However, he also draws attention to the cultural shift toward post-materialism that led to the rise of the Liberal Left in Israel, which caused a change within the political left in Israel that made the Oslo accords possible. Hagan and Rosati (1994, p. 270), more generally, conclude that foreign policy changes can result from domestic political realignments: shifts in the basic distribution of power and influence among contending elites. Likewise, Hermann proposes domestic restructuring as an important source of foreign policy change: the politically relevant segment of society

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whose support a regime needs to govern can become an agent of change (Hermann, 1990, p.  12). Walsh (2006) agrees with this assertion and argues that policy failures will only lead to change if there exists a policy option that does not decrease the net support from important constituents of domestic decision-makers. Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014, pp.  487–488) draw attention to three categories of advocacy groups that can support an alternative foreign policy course: adherents to an alternative political culture, socio-economic groups with alternative preferences, and public opinion and policy entrepreneurs. The latter are generally “political figures with special skills, vision and/or leadership capacity, who manage to overcome the inertia of previous foreign policy action”. Change initiated by policy entrepreneurs closely corresponds to Hermann’s category of leader-driven change and bureaucratic advocacy. The former occurs when an authoritative decision-­ maker imposes his own vision on the basic redirection of foreign policy, the latter when a group within the government becomes an advocate of redirection. The study of Lantis (2020) on the US’ policy toward the Syrian civil war confirms that advocacy coalitions are important for explaining foreign policy change. More specifically, Lantis (2020) develops an advocacy coalition framework model that focuses on long-term competition among rival groups of governmental actors and predicts that foreign policy change depends on whether coalitions favoring continuity or coalitions favoring change prevail in this competition. Finally, cognitive, individual-level, factors might also explain (the absence of) foreign policy change. Sources of change need to be perceived by individual policymakers and trigger alterations in their beliefs to have an impact on foreign policy (Gustavsson, 1999, p. 83). In this connection, several studies have shown the impact of leadership characteristics on change, such as cognitive openness and complexity (Yang, 2010; Ziv, 2011). Kesgin (2019), in turn, suggests that leaders can experience fundamental but temporary changes in their personality, which facilitates uncharacteristic foreign policy behavior. More specifically, his study provides convincing evidence that Sharon’s decision to withdraw from Gaza can be explained by temporary changes in Israel’s former prime minister’s leadership traits. Lastly, Cohen and Rapport (2020) draw attention to the impact of a policymakers’ prior engagement with a specific policy. More specifically, their case study of the US’ reaction to nuclear surprises (cf. supra) demonstrates that leaders who were less involved in the

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policymaking processes relevant to the surprise will tend to attribute blame to domestic institutions and favor significant change.

5   Conclusions and Book Structure Over the last decades, an increasing number of studies have examined foreign policy change. However, most scholars have focused on specific foreign policy decisions and reversals of specific policies in single countries. Moreover, research has arrived at a large number of potential explanations for foreign policy change, with studies continuously raising new explanatory conditions for specific instances of change. In consequence, little effort has been made to test or falsify such explanations in a comparative way. The present volume aims to further our understanding of foreign policy change by bridging these gaps in the literature. Specifically, the main overarching goal of this book is to gain a better insight into the drivers and inhibitors of change. Through a comparative analysis of different types of change in foreign policy across a wide variety of countries and over a long period of time, we aim to identify patterns in the decision-­ making and foreign policy behavior of those countries. First, our volume examines and compares foreign policy changes in the post-Cold War Period across 11 EU member states, including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK. We focus on change in EU member states during the post-Cold War period to ensure that our cases share a sufficient number of similarities to allow for coherent cross-case conclusions (e.g. democracies, confronted with the same external shocks …). We selected a representative sample of countries within this area of homogeneity, including small and large states, Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western EU members, new and old EU member states, and neutral states and NATO members. Structurally comparing instances of change across these 11 countries allows to draw more generalizable conclusions on the vital determinants of foreign policy change. While our comparative design requires variance on these characteristics, we limited the geographical scope to a region in which all countries are subject to a similar decisional environment. Despite important differences in the security environment of the selected countries (e.g. the proximity to Russia), they all operate in a very similar operational environment with a number of important policies delegated to the EU level. Identifying dramatic as well as incremental changes across different policy domains requires examining a longer

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timeframe. Therefore, this volume focuses on the nearly three decades that have passed since the end of the Cold War, which allows for analyses within a coherent systemic paradigm. Second, the present volume uses a comprehensive definition of foreign policy change that includes changes in methods and in goals, incremental and dramatic breaks with past behavior and comprehensive as well as more narrow changes (cf. supra). To capture changes in the general foreign policy orientation of the studied countries, as well as changes in more narrow domains or on specific issues, each country chapter is divided into six subsections: (1) an introduction, (2) general foreign policy orientation, (3) defense and security policy, (4) aid policy, (5) bilateral, multilateral and niche diplomacy and (6) conclusions. While we fully acknowledge the increasing internationalization of previously exclusive domestic policies, like migration, energy and climate, we do not include them here as subsections for two main reasons. First, for practical reasons, we simply cannot focus on every aspect of international politics that affects a country’s foreign policy. Second, and related, while these policies are nowadays almost inseparable from the international level, we believe that they are still less intertwined than the ‘classic’ subdivisions of foreign policies. Moreover, each country chapter has room to address what is commonly referred to as ‘niche diplomacy’, where such issues can briefly be addressed. Third, in order to draw coherent conclusions on the dynamics of foreign policy change across our 11 countries, each of the different country chapters will discuss the relevant drivers and constraints for the different instances of foreign policy change, before reflecting in a more structured way on these factors in the conclusions. More specifically, the conclusion of each chapter fills in Table 1.1, in which specific instances of change are linked to Hermann’s categories of change and the potential drivers and inhibitors of change.

Table 1.1  Overview of types of change Instance change Adjustment change Program change Goal change International orientation change

Drivers and inhibitors

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The literature section above discusses a large number of potentially relevant factors driving foreign policy change, from which the country chapters draw to explain instances of change. At the international level, systemic changes in the division of power (e.g. the end of bipolarity, the end of the Cold War), international norms and accession and participation in international organizations can be relevant sources of change. Next to these structural conditions, change can also be incited by international events, such as international crises, policy failures or a change of behavior of a major ally or rival, or by more minor changes in the international environment. Foreign policy continuity can, in turn, be imposed by prior engagements in international organizations, international norms or a state’s weak position in the international system. Potential sources at the domestic level are changes in a state’s government, especially if the ideological composition of the government changes significantly, efforts from policy entrepreneurs or changes in societal demands on the executive. Potential inhibitors are reluctant coalition partners, institutional veto-points and bureaucratic constraints. Table 1.2 summarizes these potential explanatory factors for foreign policy change. Hence, these different decisions have determined the overall structure of the book, consisting of country chapters and an analytical conclusion, as well as the chapter structure, in which different subfields of foreign policy are addressed across the different timeframes. While the concluding chapter tries to discern a pattern of the drivers and inhibitors of change across the different countries and timeframes, the book structure also allows each reader to focus on the issue of their own preference or to focus on a limited number of countries, and draw their own conclusions. Table 1.2  Overview of types of drivers and inhibitors of change at the international and domestic level

Drivers and sources

Inhibitors

International level

Domestic level

• Systemic changes • International norms • International organizations • External events • Behavior changes allies or rivals • International organizations • International norms • Position in international system

• Leadership/regime change • Policy entrepreneurs • Societal demands/pressures

• Coalition politics • Institutional veto players • Bureaucratic constraints

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Haesebrouck, T. (2020). Belgium: The Reliable Free Rider. International Politics. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-­020-­00221-­z Hagan, J.  D., & Rosati, J.  A. (1994). Emerging Issues in Research on Foreign Policy Restructuring. In J.  A. Rosati, J.  D. Hagan, & M.  W. Sampson III (Eds.), Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change. University of South Carolina Press. Haugom, L. (2019). Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erdogan: A Change in International Orientation? Comparative Strategy, 38(3), 206–223. Hermann, C.  F. (1990). Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 34(1), 3–21. Hill, M., & Hurst, S. (2020a). The Trump Administration: Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy. Global Affairs, 6(1), 143–147. Hill, M., & Hurst, S. (2020b). The Trump Presidency: Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy. Global Affairs, 6(1), 1–3. Holsti, K. (2016). Restructuring Foreign Policy: A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy Theory. In K.  Holsti (Ed.), Kalevi Holsti: A Pioneer in International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, History of International Order, and Security Studies (pp. 103–119). Springer. Joly, J.  K., & Richter, F. (2019). Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Foreign Policy. In K. Brummer, S. Harnisch, K. Oppermann, et al. (Eds.), Foreign Policy as Public Policy? Promises and Pitfalls. Manchester University Press. Kaarbo, J. (2017). Coalition Politics, International Norms, and Foreign Policy: Multiparty Decision-Making Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. International Politics, 54(6), 669–682. Kesgin, B. (2019). Uncharacteristic Foreign Policy Behavior: Sharon’s Decision to Withdraw from Gaza. International area Studies Review, 22(1), 76–92. Kitchen, N. (2020). Why American Grand Strategy Has Changed: International Constraint, Generational Shift, and the Return of Realism. Global Affairs, 6(1), 87–104. Kleistra, Y., & Mayer, I. (2001). Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs: Modelling Policy and Organizational Change. Cooperation and Conflict, 36(4), 381–414. Kursani, S. (2017). Foreign Policy Coordination Vis-a-Vis the International Norm of Sovereignty: Macedonia’s and Montenegro’s Recognition of Kosovo. International Politics, 54(6), 729–744. Lantis, J.  S. (2020). Advocacy Coalitions and Foreign Policy Change: Understanding US Responses to the Syrian Civil War. Journal of Global Security Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa016 Lee, Y. W. (2012). Synthesis and Reformulation of Foreign Policy Change: Japan and East Asian Financial Regionalism. Review of International Studies, 38(4), 785–807. Morin, J.-F., & Paquin, J. (2018). Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Oppermann, K., & Brummer, K. (2019). Veto Player Approaches in Public Policy and Foreign Policy. In K. Brummer, S. Harnisch, K. Oppermann, et al. (Eds.), Foreign Policy as Public Policy? Promises and Pitfalls (pp. 91–113). Manchester University Press. Peltner, A. (2017). Competing Norms and Foreign Policy Change: Humanitarian Intervention and British Foreign Policy. International Politics, 54(6), 745–759. Rosati, J.  A. (1994). Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring: The Politics of Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy. In J. A. Rosati, J. D. Hagan, & M.  W. Sampson III (Eds.), Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change (pp. 221–261). University of South Carolina Press. Rosati, J.  A., Hagan, J.  D., & Sampson, M.  W., III. (1994). Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change. University of South Carolina Press. Rynhold, J. (2007). Cultural Shift and Foreign Policy Change: Israel and the Making of the Oslo Accords. Cooperation and Conflict, 42(4), 419–440. Skidmore, D. (1994). Explaining State Responses to International Change: The Structural Sources of Foreign Policy Rigidity and Change. In J.  A. Rosati, J. D. Hagan, & M. W. Sampson III (Eds.), Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change (pp.  43–64). University of South Carolina Press. Volgy, T.  J., & Schwarz, J.  E. (1991). Does Politics Stop at the Water’s Edge? Domestic Political Factors and Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Cases of Great Britain, France, and West Germany. The Journal of Politics, 53(3), 615–643. Volgy, T. J., & Schwarz, J. E. (1994). Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad Webs of Restraint. In J. A. Rosati, J. D. Hagan, & M. W. Sampson III (Eds.), Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change (pp. 22–42). Walsh, J. I. (2006). Policy Failure and Policy Change: British Security Policy After the Cold War. Comparative Political Studies, 39(4), 490–518. Welch, D. (2005). Painful Choices A Theory of Foreign Policy Change. Princeton University Press. Yang, Y. E. (2010). Leaders’ Conceptual Complexity and Foreign Policy Change: Comparing the Bill Clinton and George W.  Bush Foreign Policies Toward China. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(4), 415–446. Ziv, G. (2011). Cognitive Structure and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Decision to Talk to the PLO. International Relations, 25(4), 426–454.

CHAPTER 2

Belgian Foreign Policy: In Foro Interno, Inferno? Jeroen K. Joly and Tim Haesebrouck

1   Introduction Belgium is a small country with a strong economy, at the crossroads between France, Germany and England. As a consequence, it has historically been the background of numerous armed battles between the great powers. Hence, after being involved in two World Wars, the failing ‘neutrality policy’ was replaced by a growing political consensus that Belgium’s best security guarantees would be obtained through multilateralism, by supporting international cooperation, mainly through NATO and the EC/EU. Belgium, thus, became—and remained—one of the most active proponents of the newly developed supranational institutions after World War II. Membership to these institutions is widely supported in Belgian society and barely contested by the main, traditional and political parties.

J. K. Joly (*) • T. Haesebrouck Ghent Institute for International Studies, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_2

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In his attempt at identifying the “constants” in Belgium’s foreign policy, Thuysbaert (1995, pp. 39–42) emphasizes Belgium’s strong interdependence with its direct neighbors, due to its geographic conditions, enabling a fluent communication and strong ties with them, on the one hand, but also causing its specific security problems. As a consequence, Belgium has developed a sharp regional sensitivity and an outspoken preference for consensus, in line with its strategic interests. Although Belgium’s security problems are no longer focused on its direct neighbors, most of these factors, identified as constants, remain, as evidenced by the apprehension surrounding the economic impact of Brexit. Given Belgium’s high dependency on collective security, it has been a loyal ally to NATO and aligned with American interests throughout most of its recent history—with the exception of the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Moreover, part of this seemingly unconditional alignment is, to a large degree, a consequence of domestic politics, which was dominated by the (Flemish) Christian Democratic Party since 1945. As a consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1999), Belgium has a tradition of negotiating its governments’ composition and program among several political parties, also including policy positions and preferences from opposition parties and civil society. Belgium often uses this experience, as well as its own mixed cultural background as a partly Latin and partly Germanic country, to adopt the role of negotiator or broker in international institutions, especially in the EU. Like most West-European countries, Belgium has an export-oriented economy. Belgium has several international ports, including the port of Antwerp, which is one of the main gates to Europe. Belgium is, therefore, a strong proponent of free trade, open and oriented toward exploring new markets and trade opportunities. Unsurprisingly, most of its biggest trade partners are other members of the European Union, most notably its neighbors. Belgium’s top trading partners in volumes of exported goods in 2019 were Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom—The United States completes the top five (Belgian Foreign Trade Agency, 2020). Another main priority of Belgian foreign policy is the defense of human rights and civil liberties. The advocated approach is to maintain good relations with all countries to preserve a potential influence and keep a direct communication line. The freeze in the relations with the DR Congo

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during the second Verhofstadt government (2003–2007) is, in this light, rather the exception than the rule, especially given Belgium’s traditional regional focus on Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region, due to its former colonial ties.

2   General Foreign Policy Orientation 2.1  Adjusting to a New External and Internal Environment During the 1990s 2.1.1 Institutional Changes of the 1990s Since the 1970s, institutional reforms have increasingly become an integral part of Belgian politics, with strong centrifugal forces and demands for regionalization in the Flemish North and an almost equal resistance in the francophone South and Brussels. These institutional changes have not only affected the domestic distribution of political power and policy competences, but also strongly impacted foreign policymaking. Initially, the foreign affairs administration (FPS Foreign Affairs) was very reluctant to embrace the new institutional changes and adapt to this new reality (Coolsaet, 2014). Consecutive State Reforms have not only caused the delegation of powers to the regions and communities,1 but also instigated the creation of new institutions and government agencies. The Belgian regions and communities have created different structures to accommodate their political and policy needs. This shift in competences from the federal/national level to the federated entities not only generated procedural changes but, inevitably, also substantive ones. In Belgium, the delegation of powers to regions and communities is uniquely based on two principles, which distinguishes Belgium from other federal states: the ‘in foro interno, in foro externo’ principle and the absence of a ‘hierarchy of norms’ principle. While the former refers to the notion that regions are responsible for international relations in matters that fall under their domestic competences, the latter indicates that policies and rules at the regional level cannot be overruled by federal policies or regulation. This also implies that regions can make international 1  In 1993, Belgium changed from a unitary to a federal state structure, consisting of three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels), mainly dealing with territorial issues like mobility, energy and environment, and three communities (Flemish, French and German), in charge of issues “dependent on the individual”, like culture, language and education.

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agreements with third party countries and regions. As a consequence, there is a great need for coordination among the different entities to ensure the overall coherence of Belgium’s foreign policy. Specifically, which competences are we talking about? Most importantly, Belgian regions are now in charge of their own international trade policies, including weapons sales, as well as cultural policies and a number of environmental policies. Furthermore, although official development assistance (ODA) was originally also supposed to be regionalized, this regionalization never materialized due to the overwhelming opposition, including from within the administration and civil society. 2.1.2 Looking for Belgium’s National Interest Like for most countries, the 1990s were a period of adjustment to a new reality. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR as the main threat to European security meant the disappearance of one of the main foci of Belgium’s foreign policy. Moreover, the end of the Cold War also removed the need to support Western-oriented countries with dubious human rights reputations, like Zaire, in the global fight against communism. With the Burundian civil war, the Rwandese genocide and its spillovers into regional conflict in Zaire, involving most of its neighboring countries throughout the 1990s, Belgium seemed to disengage from the Great Lakes Region and was, thus, losing one of the main axes of its foreign policy. The only major axis of Belgium’s foreign policy in which important advances were being made, was the European project, where the European Economic Community had evolved toward an increasingly integrated and deepening European Union, following the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. During the 1990s, Belgium mainly refocused on its traditional strong economic diplomacy (Coolsaet, 2004), a trend observed across numerous Western countries, involving greater emphasis on bilateral diplomacy. Despite this regained focus, Belgium was rather inefficient and uncompetitive in generating new trade opportunities and improving its trade balance. This was, in no small part, due to the new institutional environment and the lack of coordination between the newly created institutions and agencies. Following the 1993 state reform and regionalization, the regions had now become the central actor in promoting Belgian export and in attracting outside investments. Only a limited number of competencies and policy instruments in expert promotion, alongside multilateral

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trade negotiations and EU common market arrangements, remained at the federal level (Coolsaet, 2004, p. 62). 2.2  Ethical Foreign Policy in the Early 2000s In 1999, the Christian-democratic CVP (now CD&V) suffered an important electoral defeat, which sent them to the opposition after being in Government since 1947, following the “dioxine affair”, a political crisis involving the contamination of feedstock. The first Verhofstadt government (1999–2003), a coalition of Social-Democrats, Liberals and Greens, actively pushed for a new, ethical, type of foreign policy. Louis Michel, the francophone liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) embodied this ethical/moral foreign policy, which he defined as serving the simple purpose of “building a more humane world”, without moralizing (Michel, 2003, pp. 10–11). Ethical foreign policy focuses on human rights as a main axis of foreign policy abroad, and on democratization of foreign policy at home, which consists of finding the “right balance between public debate, parliamentary control and efficacy of diplomatic action” (Michel, 2003, p. 15). In 2000, Le Monde coined this new turn “Belgium’s diplomatic awakening”, after Belgium’s vocal (and legal) opposition to the UK’s release of former Chilean dictator Pinochet, MFA Michel’s condemnation of the participation of Jörg Haider’s FPÖ in the Austrian government, Prime Minister Verhofstadt’s recognition of Belgium’s responsibility in the Rwandese genocide and through the creation of the Lumumba committee investigating Belgium’s role into the murder of the first Congolese PM in 1961. However, it is Belgium’s active diplomacy toward Central Africa, in particular, that constituted an innovation (Van de Velden, 2002). It is exactly this pro-activeness, some might call zeal, that departs from Belgium’s traditionally more discrete diplomacy (Rosoux, 2002, p. 25). While Michel was very vocal in expressing strong and moral opinions, observers also noted that the policy itself—the emphasis on economic diplomacy, promotion of further EU integration—had not really undergone any dramatic changes, but was actually characterized by continuity (Van de Velden, 2002). The most notable difference between Michel and his three socialist predecessors, many observers agreed, was one of style, rather than of substance. In fact, this ethical turn did not come overnight and was an upcoming trend in Belgian foreign policy that had already been set in motion in the early 1990s when Belgium broke ties with the

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Zairian Mobutu regime because of human rights offenses, when Belgium increased its moral commitment in its Africa policies under Vandenbroucke, and when Belgium was the first country to sign the anti-personnel mines under Derycke (Van de Velden, 2002). Michel’s most important achievement, despite the actual continuity in Belgian foreign policies, is that his vocal and confrontational style now drew the world’s attention to these issues, to Belgium and, of course, to Michel himself. This high ethical standard, and the visibility that comes with it, was believed to have increased Belgium’s diplomatic weight during this period. The most significant—and controversial—measure during this period of moral foreign policy was the extension of the “law of universal jurisdiction” for Belgian courts, often referred to as the ‘genocide law’. Originally introduced in 1993 and extended in 1999, it allowed individuals who are accused of War crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide to be judged by Belgian courts, even without an explicit link to Belgium and regardless of any immunity status. This meant that even sitting leaders of foreign countries could be the subject of an international arrest warrant issued by Belgium. Moreover, any alleged victim could file a complaint as civil party at the examining magistrate, which would immediately start criminal proceedings (Wouters & Panken, 2002). After a number of successful cases related to the Rwandese genocide in 2001, the succession of charges against World leaders in office at the time, like Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat and George Bush jr. in the early 2000s caused for great irritation among— and pressure from—the American allies, and the law was consecutively amended in 2003 and practically stripped from its power. The outspoken ethical nature of Belgium’s foreign policy also imposed high moral standards in its own policies. In 2002, MFA Michel was the driving force behind a weapons deal of heavy machine guns between FN Herstal and Nepal. The procurement was obtained after Germany had previously refused a similar deal to manufacturers Heckler & Koch and eventually led to the resignation of Green Vice-Prime Minister Aelvoet and heavy criticism toward ‘ethical’ MFA Michel and his active role in the arms deal. Belgium engaged militarily in Afghanistan after the attacks of 9/11 and as part of the War on Terror. They have remained active in Afghanistan to some degree until this day, almost 20 years later. However, and in line with this moral foreign policy, Belgium strongly opposed the War in Iraq, siding with its French and German allies, advocating for the continuation of

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UN weapons inspections and arguing that war in Iraq was not unavoidable. This put a heavy strain on the relationship between Belgium and its long-time ally that would only really be restored when President Obama took office. 2.3  Foreign Policy in the 2010s: From One Crisis to Another Around 2010, it became clear that the general framework guiding Belgium’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War—the UN as reference for international action and a focus on the EU for defense and security—no longer corresponded to the changes and challenges that had occurred in the international environment. Despite the general feeling that a reassessment was needed, such effort was, however, never realized (Coolsaet, 2016). Instead of establishing a new strategy on how to engage with the world, Belgium, as well as numerous other European countries, started to focus inward, on Europe itself and its borders. In part, this was due to the consecutive major crises that occurred in and around Europe. First, the European debt crises hitting several—mostly Southern—European countries from 2009 onward, followed by a series of popular anti-government uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East south of Europe’s borders in 2011. As a consequence of these crises, the EU, including Belgium, faced an immigration crisis in 2015. Belgium dealt with these crises in its traditional role as pro-European broker, advocating that member countries share the burden proportionally, in function of their own capabilities, both when it comes to helping out fellow Eurozone members in financial distress and when they are overwhelmed by incoming refugees and migrants. Finally, Belgium’s complex foreign policymaking architecture, with competences not only divided between ministries but also across different levels of government, also become the source of a small crisis at the end of 2016 when the Walloon Parliament refused to ratify the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada. Indeed, since trade is a regional competence, the five parliaments of all federated entities also needed to ratify the treaty in addition to the federal parliament. The “southern”2 refusal caused a brief but intense crisis and 2  The Parliaments of the Walloon and Brussels Regions, and of the French and German Communities had refused to ratify CETA, while the Flemish and federal parliament had already ratified the agreement.

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Belgium was internationally heavily criticized (see e.g. The Economist, 2016; Wall Street Journal, 2016)—though in some cases also praised (EU Observer, 2016; e.g. Greenpeace European Unit, 2016)—for the fact that a small region within a small country was able to hijack a major trade deal between the EU and a promising trade partner. Similarly, at the Paris Conference on Climate Change in 2015, Belgium sent a delegation of six ministers, but without an internal agreement on the Belgian position.

3   Defense and Security Policy 3.1  End of the Cold War Till 9/11 Belgium was one of the first countries to start reforming its armed forces to the strategic environment that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Biscop, 2013; Dumoulin, 2009, p. 363). In 1992, defense minister Leo Delcroix launched the largest restructuring of Belgian armed forces since World War II. The main objective of the Belgian armed forces changed from contributing to deterring Soviet aggression to managing the more diffuse risks that emerged from the numerous conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (Dumoulin, 1992, p.  30; Ministerie van Landsverdediging, 1994, pp. 13–14). The changed security environment required transforming a Belgian military that was mainly focused on territorial defense into a military that was capable of participating in crisis response operations (Ministerie van Landsverdediging, 1994, pp. 35–37). In this connection, Belgium was the first European country to abolish conscription after the end of the Cold War (Sauer, 2015, p. 50). However, the main rationale behind the restructuring of the armed forces seemed the “cashing-in of the peace dividend”, not adopting the Belgian army to the new international environment (Biscop, 2013, p. 34). The plan Delcroix aimed to reduce the number of military manpower from 80,000 to 40,000 and froze the defense budget till 1997 (Struys, 2002). These budget constraints left the Belgian armed forces in relatively poor shape at the end of the twentieth century (Houben, 2004, p. 40). Moreover, the defense budget became very unbalanced. Whereas Belgium allocated 50% of its defense budget to personnel, 25% to operating costs and yet another 25% to investments at the end of the Cold War, by the year 2000, Belgium only invested 14% of its defense budget in new equipment, while 59% went to personnel and 26% to operating costs (Sauer, 2015).

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After the end of the Cold War, Belgian troops were deployed in an increasing number of peace and security operations (Liégeois & Glume, 2008). In the beginning of the 1990s, Belgium made substantial contributions to several UN peacekeeping operations (Coolsaet, 2014, p. 526). This constituted a clear policy reversal compared to the Cold War period, in which it hardly ever participated in UN operations. While only 5 Belgian officers were deployed in UNPOs in 1990, Belgium contributed almost 1500 troops to various peacekeeping operations by the end of 1993 (Liégeois & Glume, 2008). An important reason for this policy change was the revival of UN peacekeeping activities after the end of the Cold War and the belief in a new world order, which could be based on International Law and multilateral cooperation. Belgium traditionally considers such an international order, which it can support by participating in UN peacekeeping operations, as strongly in its national interest (Liégeois & Glume, 2008, pp. 114–116). Moreover, Belgium was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1991 and 1992, which forced it to play a more active role in UN peacekeeping operations (Houben, 2004, p. 48). The bulk of the Belgian Blue Helmets were deployed in (ex-)Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. Belgian peacekeepers were not involved in the most dramatic episodes of the former two conflicts (Liégeois & Glume, 2008, p. 117). The UNAMIR operation in Rwanda, however, constitutes one of the darkest episodes in Belgium’s national history (Houben, 2004, p. 51). In April 1994, the assassination of 10 Belgian paratroopers, along with 12 nationals, caused the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent, which was the backbone of the UN operation. The withdrawal of the Belgian troops contributed to the rapid escalation of the security situation, causing a genocide in which over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus are estimated to have been killed by extremist Hutus. In 1998, a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee investigating Belgium’s role in the events surrounding the Rwandese genocide drew a number of conclusions that had two major implications for Belgian troop deployments (Liégeois & Glume, 2008). First, the report stipulated that Belgium should no longer deploy troops in one of its former colonies.3 Second, the report provided a number of principles for future participation in peacekeeping operations which, according to Liégeois and Glume (2008, p. 119), “implicitly ruled out to 3  However, in the 2000s, Belgium did participate in two EU-led operations in Congo (EUFOR Artemis and EUFOR Congo), and participated with a C-130 transport plane in the UN-led MONUC operation in Congo.

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take part in UN peacekeeping operations in the future”. Belgian participation in peacekeeping operations dropped to the previous Cold War level. Belgium continued to participate in military operations throughout the 1990s, but these were mainly deployed under the aegis of NATO rather than the UN. The geographic location of Belgium’s military activity also shifted in the mid-1990s. While the largest portion of Belgian externally deployed troops was active in Africa until the mid-1990s, Europe became the main destination by the end of the 1990s. Both trends cannot just be attributed to a lack of opportunity. In spite of strong Belgian support for the peace process in Congo, Belgium did not make a substantial military contribution to the MONUC-operation that was deployed in 1999 (Houben, 2004, p. 53). Belgium became one of the strongest supporters of a European defense policy after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Biscop, 2013, p. 33). A number of memoranda issued in the course of 1990 made clear that Belgium wanted the European Community to develop a security policy with a defense component (Coolsaet, 2014, p.  529). There was no unanimity on the extent to which such a European defense policy should be able to operate autonomously from NATO. The official government position during the conference of Maastricht (1992) was that the West European Union should become the military instrument of the European Union (Coolsaet, 2014, p.  581). However, its foreign affairs minister, the Christen-­ Democrat Eyskens, argued that the WEU could only be used if NATO did not want to become engaged (Coolsaet, 2014, p. 530). More generally, Belgium unambiguously supported a common European defense policy throughout the 1990s. In its 1994 Defense White Book, the development of the West European Union as the military branch of the European Union and the European pillar within NATO was mentioned as the first of five guiding principles of Belgium’s security and defense policy (Ministerie van Landsverdediging, 1994, p.  28). Belgian support for European defense cooperation fits well with its traditional support for multilateralism in general and European integration in particular. However, there is also a pragmatic dimension to this support: closer cooperation with European countries is also considered as a way of maintaining relevant capabilities when faced with budget constraints (Biscop, 2015; Ministerie van Landsverdediging, 1994, p. 28).

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3.2   The 2000s: Focus on European Defense and Transatlantic Discord In May 2000, defense minister Flahaut presented “The Strategic Plan for Modernizing the Belgian armed forces” (Flahaut, 2000). This document, which “can be considered the first real long-term strategic plan since World War II” (Struys, 2002, p. 32), aimed to “adapt the Belgian armed forces to the expected security environment of 2015” (Sauer, 2015, p. 31). The two main tasks of the armed forces were contributing to the collective defense of NATO-territory and participation in crisis response operations (Flahaut, 2000). Both tasks require well-equipped, deployable and sustainable forces, which entail substantial investments in personnel and equipment. The defense plan unfroze the defense budget and aimed to increase investment in equipment. However, the plan was watered down on several occasions because of budget cuts (Sauer, 2015, p. 31). Throughout the 2000s, the Belgian defense budget declined from 1.37 % of GDP in 2000 to 1.09% in 2011 (Biscop, 2011, p. 2). To maintain relevant capabilities, Belgium actively cooperated with partner countries. The naval cooperation with the Netherlands, officially launched in 1996, is the most far-reaching example of how Belgium maintains capabilities in a cost-effective manner by pooling capabilities with partners (Biscop, 2015). Although Belgium and the Netherlands can still autonomously decide on deploying naval capabilities, they are fully dependent on each other for training and the maintenance of their vessels. Belgium also promoted cooperation at the EU level by launching the Ghent Initiative for pooling and sharing of capabilities when it held the EU presidency in 2010 (Biscop, 2013, p. 38). Belgium univocally supported the development of an autonomous European defense capacity under Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt (Biscop, 2013, p. 37). The “Strategic Plan” maintained that NATO would remain the cornerstone of Belgium’s military security, but also stated that the European dimension within NATO should be reinforced to serve as a counterweight to possible American hegemony (Flahaut, 2000, p.  18). The strong position of the Verhofstadt government sometimes led to strong tensions with the US, especially during the 2003 intervention in Iraq (Coolsaet, 2014, p. 584). Prime Minister Verhofstadt joined Germany and France in their opposition to the Iraq War, which Belgium considered a threat to the rules-based international system. The United States reacted

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vehemently to the Belgian opposition and questioned whether Belgium could still be considered a US ally (Coolsaet, 2014, p. 584). Three days after the start of the US invasion, Verhofstadt invited Germany, France and Luxembourg for a mini-summit on defense. One of the key proposals of this summit was the creation of an EU headquarters for operations, which would provide the EU with its own planning and operational capacities and, thus, result in greater autonomy from NATO. The summit also paved the way for the European Security Strategy. The United States considered the summit as yet another attempt to create an alternative to NATO, dismissively referring to it as a “summit of chocolate makers” (Menon, 2004, p. 639). The tensions between the US and Belgium eased quickly after the abolishment of the so-called genocide law (cf. supra), and especially once it became clear that the US would need its European allies to help them clean up the messes created in Iraq and Afghanistan. Belgium continued to support the idea of a strong common European defense policy, but the discourse of the governments of Christian-Democratic prime ministers Leterme and Van Rompuy was more careful and emphasized the need to strike “a balance between NATO and the EU” (Biscop, 2013, p. 37; Coolsaet, 2014, p. 589). The pattern of Belgian military deployment changed throughout the 2000s (Haesebrouck, 2020). Mainly because of Belgium’s significant contribution to the NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, Europe accounted for the bulk of deployed Belgian forces in the beginning of the 2000s (Liégeois & Glume, 2008, p. 115). Gradually, Central Asia and the Middle East became the main destination of Belgium’s externally deployed forces. Not only were the operations in the Balkans gradually reduced, but Belgium also made significant contributions to two new operations. In early 2003, Belgium started participating in NATO’s ISAF operation, in which it provided force protection for Kabul airport, among others. Three years later, Belgium decided to contribute a task force composed of mine clearance units, medicals and engineers to the reinforced UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. Belgium’s return to UN peacekeeping was only possible because its main European allies, France and Germany, also participated in the operation. Moreover, the requirements of the report of the 1998 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee were met because of the creation of a Strategic Military Cell, which supervised the operation within the UNDPKO in New  York and the deployment of a force protection unit that ensured the safety of Belgian forces (Liégeois & Glume, 2008, p. 130).

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Finally, it is probably no coincidence that Belgium’s return to peacekeeping occurred “simultaneously with its 2007–2008 Security Council membership” (Liégeois & Glume, 2008, p. 114). As a strong supporter of the EU’s common security and defense policy, Belgium also participated in all operations conducted under its aegis till it declined to participate in EUFOR RCA in 2014. Given the small scale of these operations, they only accounted for a minor portion of Belgium’s externally deployed forces. Belgium actively rallied for support to launch two CSDP-missions in its former colony Congo (EUFOR Artemis and EUFOR Congo) and unsuccessfully lobbied for a new CSDP operation in Eastern Congo in 2008 (Nasra, 2011, p. 172, Pohl, 2014, p. 204). In contrast to the UN, the CSDP clearly was an acceptable framework for Belgian military engagement in its former colonies, despite prior commitments to avoid military presence in its former colonies (cf. supra). 3.3  The 2010s: Return to Normalcy in Times of Budgetary Constraints The coalition agreements of the governments led by socialist prime minister Di Rupo (2011–2014) and the liberal prime minister Michel (2014–2019) state that Belgium wants to be a responsible partner of its allies, aiming to be able to participate in operations. Moreover, both agreements expressed support for European defense. The coalition agreement of the Michel I government did put more emphasis on the importance of NATO for Belgian defense. Belgium’s defense budget continued to decline in the last decade, to just over 0.9% of its GDP in 2018 (see Fig. 2.1). Together with Spain and Luxembourg, Belgium is one of the NATO members spending proportionally the least on its defense. Moreover, the bulk of the defense budget (78% in 2016) covers personnel costs, leaving little budget for investments in equipment (Vandeput, 2016, p.  81). The coalition agreement of Michel I stated that future Belgian participation in foreign operations should not be jeopardized by a lack of investments. In the 2016, Defense minister Vandeput presented a new strategic plan, which aimed to increase Belgian military spending to 1.3% of its GDP by 2030 (Vandeput, 2016, p. 72). However, the first increase in the defense budget was scheduled for 2020, in which Belgium spends 1.1% of its GDP on defense (compared to 0.9% in 2019). Between 2010 and 2020, the number of Belgian troops active in operations has been significantly lower than in previous decades (Haesebrouck,

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Fig. 2.1  Belgium’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank)

2020). According to the IISS military balance, over a thousand Belgian troops were deployed beyond NATO territory in 2009. In 2015, this number dropped below 200 to increase again to 290 in 2019 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, 2016, 2019). This evolution is mainly accounted for by the ending of three of Belgium’s main military engagements of the 2000s: the KFOR-operation in Kosovo (2010), the UNFIL-operation in Lebanon (2014) and the ISAF-operation in Afghanistan (2014). Belgium did take on several noticeable new military engagements (Haesebrouck, 2020). In 2018, it decided to contribute over 100 troops to the UNPO in Mali: MINUSMA. It is probably no coincidence that this new Belgian engagement in a UN peacekeeping operation again coincides with Belgium’s non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council in 2019–2020. In 2011, Belgian F16 fighting falcons made a significant contribution to the military intervention in Libya, for which it was praised by the then US secretary of defense Gates for being one of the countries that punched above its weight. In September 2014, the Belgian

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government deployed six F16 fighter jets in the fight against IS in Iraq. It ended its contribution to the air operations on 30 June 2015 for budgetary reasons (Fonck et al., 2019). Budget constraints were also one of the reasons for the drop in military engagements. Financial considerations played an important role in Belgium’s decision not to contribute to EUFOR RCA. In June 2016, Belgian F16s were redeployed in the coalition against IS. In contrast to the first Belgian deployment, the fighter jets also participated in operations over Syria. According to Coolsaet (2016, p. 19), this participation in an operation on ambiguous international legal grounds and without a UN-mandate constitutes a break with its prior post-Cold War military policy.

4   Development Cooperation Policy Belgium is traditionally considered as one of the more “generous” aid donors, ranking as the tenth largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in relative terms (% of its GNI) and sixteenth in absolute numbers in 2018 (OECD, 2020a). Traditionally, Belgian aid focuses on Africa, with particular attention to its former colonies who consistently rank among its top five recipients. Despite the legal commitment to spend 0.7% of its GNI on ODA, this target was never actually reached. After an increased investment in foreign aid in the 2000s, Belgium’s ODA has fallen back during the past decade, as a consequence of general budgetary efforts. 4.1  Belgian Aid in the 1990s: All About White Elephants? The early 1990s was a period in which a number of concurring evolutions culminated into a drastically changing aid environment. First, the end of the Cold War brought instability and insecurity, especially in Africa, whereby aid would increasingly become perceived as a potential instrument to “bring peace and stability to developing regions and to protect European borders from floods of immigrants” (Holvoet & Renard, 2002, p.  9). Second, the idea had started to gain ground that development is more than just economic growth, and rather a process that aims at improving the human potential and individual options without exhausting the available natural resources, but in a sustainable way (Develtere & Michel, 2008, p. 38).

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Belgian development cooperation received a major blow when instability grew in the region of its primary focus: the Great Lakes of Africa. While Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi accounted for nearly half of the Belgian aid in 1989, by 1994 all cooperation programs with these three countries had been stopped (Develtere & Michel, 2008, p. 48). The political instability and the ensuing genocide (Rwanda), civil war (Burundi) and regional war (Zaire) forced a major rethinking and re-evaluation of the Belgian aid policies and development cooperation in general. While the Belgian aid administration was adjusting to the new external realities of the post-Cold War era, it is an internal event that will end up characterizing this period. In 1995, a series of articles in the Flemish newspaper “De Morgen” and a subsequent book by Douglas De Coninck (1996) caused great controversy among the Belgian development community for what is known as the ‘white elephant’ scandal. The journalist’s research revealed a number of development projects that were funded to accommodate Belgian entrepreneurial interests, rather than local development needs. Although the projects that were highlighted to demonstrate the abuses had been financed through other administrations, the Belgian Administration for Development Cooperation (BADC) had acquired a poor reputation over time and, thus, received all of the blame and criticism (Develtere & Michel, 2008, p. 48; Holvoet & Renard, 2002, p. 8). A parliamentary committee was set up to examine the goals, policies and procedures of the BADC, resulting in two major reforms—a substantive and a procedural one. Substantively, Belgium adopted its first Law on International Cooperation in 1999, laying down the goals, priorities and basic principles of Belgian development cooperation. This Law would ensure the continuity across governments in terms of the coherence and geographic concentration of Belgian aid. Among its main goals, Belgian cooperation would aim for sustainable human development through the fight against poverty and discrimination, the respect of human dignity and the rule of law, and through the principles of good governance (Develtere & Michel, 2008, p. 53). Hence, the focus of aid would now be more on political and civil rights, and away from its traditional socio-economic focus, reflected in the “untying” of aid procurement (Holvoet & Renard, 2002, p. 8), effectively causing a shift in the determinants and motives of different types of aid (Joly, 2014). Procedurally, the BADC was split and restructured into the Directorate-­ General for Development Cooperation (DGDC—now DGD) and the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC—now ENABEL). DGDC became

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fully integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was now in charge of preparing the strategies and programs, as well as for the coordination of non-governmental cooperation and managing multilateral cooperation. The BTC, an independent limited liability company, became responsible for implementing governmental cooperation programs in the field (Develtere & Michel, 2008, p. 49; Holvoet & Renard, 2002, p. 31). The combination of domestic reforms and the changing development environment, thus, resulted in a major overhaul in both the means and the goals of Belgian aid policies as a result of the 1999 reforms. 4.2  The 2000s: Increasing Aid Effectiveness In 2000, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set out what aid should realize through eight specific targets to achieve by 2015. The MDGs pushed Belgium to increase its aid efforts, make them more efficient and collaborate with other donors (Develtere & Michel, 2008, p. 39). In 2005, Belgium then played an active role in drafting the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, basically indicating how aid should be delivered and managed. Donors are committed to coordinating and harmonizing their procedures and share information to measure results in full transparency (OECD, 2005). One of the main goals of the Paris Declaration was to reduce fragmentation—that is, many donors granting small amounts to many different sectors in numerous countries—which undermines aid effectiveness (Molenaers, 2015, p. 44). This explicit goal and the international concern would turn out to be a key contributing element undermining the will and rational for regionalization of Belgian aid. On 16 October 2000, a political agreement—the Lambermont agreement—was reached for a new, fifth, state reform, resulting in the Law of 13 July 2001. Included in the initial agreement was the regionalization of development assistance from 2004 onward. Quickly, however, resistance grew among some of the government parties—notably the Greens—as well as among domestic and international stakeholders, like the OECD (2005). A transfer of competences from the federal to the regional level would heavily increase the administrative weight and entail a fragmentation of the available resources at the expense of the recipient countries. Resistance from the field grew to such an extent that the political will to implement the regionalization faded, and it became clear by the late 2000s that the transfer of competence from the federal to the regional level

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would not happen. Although there exists a legal framework allowing Belgian regions to engage in development cooperation, the federal level has remained in charge of at least 90% of the total aid budget (Joly, 2013, p. 65). Moreover, the aforementioned 1999 reform of the BADC increased the grip of the DGDC and BTC at the federal level (Vanhee & Hondeghem, 2011, p.  10), further preventing the regionalization of development policies. 4.3  The 2010s: Focusing on LDCs and Fragile Situations In 1970, Belgium committed itself to the UN recommendation of spending 0.7% of its gross national income (GNI) on development assistance. In 2002, the Program Law legally bound Belgium to spend this 0.7% norm by 2010. While nearing this number in 2010, the target has, however, never actually been reached. In fact, closer inspection of Fig. 2.2 reveals that, after a steady increase in the 2000s, budget cuts following the

Fig. 2.2  Belgium’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

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financial and debt crises have severely decreased the proportion of its GNI that Belgium spends on aid since 2010 down to 0.42% in 2019 (OECD, 2020a). In its 2015 Peer Review, the OECD urged Belgium to reverse the decline in the total aid volume (OECD, 2015). In its government agreement, the latest De Croo government (led by former Minister of Development Cooperation De Croo) pledged a growth path toward 0.7% by 2030. In 2010, the OECD had observed that “Belgium’s development co-­ operation ha[d] gained new momentum […] driven by international commitments and a process of self-reflection” (OECD, 2011). For over a decade, several Peer Reviews have, however, emphasized the need for a clear strategic framework with clear priorities that guide aid across the multitude of actors at different government levels in order to achieve greater policy coherence and reduce transaction costs (OECD, 2005, 2011, 2015, 2020b). In this regard, Belgium has made a number of small, but significant changes to increase the coherence and effectiveness of its aid policies. In 2013, a new federal law on Belgian cooperation and humanitarian aid was passed, increasing the development policy coherence. As a consequence of the different reforms, and in an effort to increase aid effectiveness, Belgium reduced its partner countries from 25 to 18 in 2004 and further down to 14 in 2015, focusing on the least developed countries (LDCs) and fragile states (Molenaers, 2015). Of the current 14 partner countries, 11 are LDCs and 8 are fragile states. In 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replaced the MDGs, vastly expanding the aid agenda for 2030 from traditional development goals like poverty reduction and human rights to include transnational objectives, like climate change, regional stability and international security (Molenaers, 2015, p. 43). Within these goals, Belgium opted to spend aid to the poorest people in the poorest countries (Molenaers, 2015, p. 46). The next immediate challenge will be to assess the longer-­ term consequences of the COVID-19 crisis on these countries and evaluate how the Belgian Development Cooperation should address these.

5   Multi- and Bilateral Diplomacy After the end of World War II, Belgium sought to guarantee its security and to participate in high-level World politics through multilateral institutions, politically and economically through European integration and in

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terms of security through NATO. Hence, the European Union remains one of the most important focal points of Belgian foreign policy. The Belgian population and politicians are, generally, highly favorable toward the European Union. Despite the relative rise of Eurosceptic parties, especially in Flanders, with parties like the nationalist N-VA and the extreme-­ right Vlaams Belang, Belgians are generally positive about the advantages of EU membership. Moreover, the rise in Eurosceptic parties—and even the government participation of NV-A between 2014 and 2018—has not affected the official government agenda nor its policies in and toward Europe all that much (Dandoy & Joly, 2018, p. 42). The second focal point, NATO, entails maintaining close relationships with the United States. As detailed in the sections above, although the importance of this relationship has not altered over time, the ties between the two countries suffered under the Bush administrations (2001–2008), and particularly before and during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as a consequence of the Belgian opposition, alongside France and Germany. Despite small improvements during Bush’s second term, the relationship only really improved after Obama’s election. Under the Trump administration, despite important disagreements, divergences and gaffes (e.g. Trump describing Brussels as a “hellhole”), the two countries have been able to maintain a relatively good and functional relationship. This is certainly not to say that the recent victory of Joe Biden in the Presidential elections of 2020 was not anxiously anticipated and welcomed with great relief. Finally, Belgium often profiles itself as an important broker in the Great Lakes Region, which it still considers as its privileged domain, and which is still perceived as part of its national interest. The three former colonies (The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi) systematically rank among the top five recipients of Belgian foreign aid. On one hand, this is part of a larger effort to concentrate aid efforts on the least developed countries and fragile states yet, on the other, this also aims to consolidate Belgium’s position as an important and influential political actor in the region. Post-genocide relations between Belgium and Rwanda have markedly improved after the speech by Prime Minister Verhofstadt in 2000, officially apologizing for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, this way not being able to prevent the genocide. Relationships with Zaire and later with the DRC have been a bit more shaky, characterized by a number of alternating changes in both the objectives and the means of the policy and diplomacy. In the early 1990s, when

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Mobutu Sese-Seko was no longer useful in the fight against communism, support to a regime with such a bad human rights record had become increasingly embarrassing. Hence, Belgium steadily withdrew its support, urging for political reform. After the Rwandan genocide had spilled over into a regional war in Eastern Congo and a Congolese civil war, Belgium almost completely disengaged by the second half of the 1990s (Vlassenroot & Hoebeke, 2011). This was an important change for Belgium, for whom Zaire/Congo had always been one of the prime focal points of its foreign policy. With the new ethical foreign policy of the first Verhofstadt government in 1999, and particularly after the death of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 2001, Belgium tried to renew its former leading position as a broker during the peace negotiations between 2003 and 2006 (Vlassenroot & Hoebeke, 2011). The policies toward Congo, now DRC, again changed after Karel De Gucht became Minister of Foreign Affairs, replacing Louis Michel, who became European Commissioner in 2004. De Gucht was significantly more critical in his approach, aiming for good governance in Congo and criticizing the widespread corruption among the elite that hindered any progress in Congo (Vlassenroot & Hoebeke, 2011). This attitude and some of the sharp comments made by De Gucht, although appreciated by Congolese opponents of the Kabila regime, deteriorated the relations between Belgium and the DRC by 2008–2009. De Gucht’s confrontational approach was not appreciated by everyone in the government, particularly the francophones who advocated a more diplomatic approach to dealing with Congo, making even foreign policy a ‘communitarized’ issue. It was only in 2008–2009, after De Gucht had become European Commissioner that the relationship between Congo and Belgium normalized under the new government of Van Rompuy. Perhaps one of the reasons was the increasing presence of other international players who were less critical and demanding, like China or even France. Belgium needed to reverse its approach and restore its relationship with Congo or it would risk becoming irrelevant in the region. As Vlassenroot and Hoebeke (2011) point out, Belgium realizes that it does not, by itself, have the political weight to have an impact on the region. Hence, it tries to actively involve the EU (and UN) where Belgium tries to remain the main agenda-­ setter. In trying to identify Belgium’s national interest and true motives for its presence in Central Africa, Coolsaet (2000) argues that it cannot be the marginalized (indirect) economic interests, but concludes that it has to

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be the ethical motivation and the political—and historic—responsibility not to let Central Africa glide toward instability and chaos.

6   Conclusion It is clear that Belgium’s consecutive institutional reforms have heavily affected the nature of its policymaking, and even the content of its policies. As a permanent work in progress, the Belgian administrations have constantly had to adjust to new realities—not only externally but also internally. The francophone opposition to CETA in 2016 shows how the internal Belgian foreign policymaking architecture can hinder not only Belgian politics but even EU politics, and this despite extensive existing internal coordination mechanisms. There are no signs that this will somehow improve and that internal divergences will diminish or have less impact. When we look at specific policies, summarized in Table 2.1, we observe major changes in almost every aspect of Belgium’s foreign policy. In terms of general foreign policy and diplomacy, we have the emergence and Table 2.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in Belgium since 1990 Instance change Adjustment change

Program change

Goal change

International orientation change

Drivers and inhibitors

Relations with Zaire/Congo in the • Systemic change: end of the late 1990s Cold War • External event: collapse of the government and regional conflict Declining contributions to UNPOs • External event: failure in Rwanda Extending operations against ISIS •  Behavior change in allies to Syria ODA reforms of 1999 •  Societal demands/pressures •  Domestic coalition politics Defense policy: main objective • Systemic change: end of the changed from collective defense to Cold War management of risks • Domestic constrains: Budget considerations Ethical diplomacy (1999–2003) •  Domestic coalition politics – –

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disappearance of ethical diplomacy between 1999 and 2004. Here, although the means and the approach were altered significantly, many observers noted that the main interests and goals had not been altered all that much. Moreover, this reorientation was relatively limited in time, as well as in terms of achievements. Belgium’s defense policy underwent a major restructuring after the end of the Cold War. More specifically, the main objective of Belgium’s armed forces changed from contributing to collective defense against the threats that emanated from the Soviet Union to managing more diffuse risks that emerged from the numerous conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Next to the changes in the international system caused by the implosion of the Soviet Union, budget considerations and a desire to cash in the peace dividend were a major driver of the restructuring of Belgium’s armed forces. While budget considerations were an important driver of a number of decisions, such as the abolishment of conscription, they were also a major inhibitor of adopting Belgium’s armed forces to the new strategic environment. Throughout the entire post-Cold War period, Belgium aimed to be a reliable partner in international security by contributing to military operations. However, following the tragedy in Rwanda, Belgium mainly deployed its armed forces through other international frameworks than the UN.  Last, there was a change in Belgium’s policy toward the fight against ISIS. At the outset of the operation, it only contributed to operations in Iraq. However, after a number of major allies (the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France) also started participating in operations in Syria, Belgium also extended its military mission to Syrian territory. Belgian development cooperation underwent drastic changes, both in terms of means and ends. The Belgian aid administration was completely overhauled and reformed following the heavily mediatized white elephants scandal. The goals of Belgian development cooperation were assessed and converted into law, changing the main objective of the Belgian policies— that is, sustainable human development. Yet, the law of 1999 also delineated how the Belgian policies needed to achieve their goals through poverty reduction, respect for the rule of law and the principles of good governance. Belgian relations with two of its traditionally important partners also underwent heavy changes. First, the Belgian refusal to support the US in its military endeavor in Iraq in 2003 put a heavy strain on the relations between both countries. This relationship was only fully normalized after President Obama took office and altered his foreign policies—or at least

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the style, adopting a more concerted and multilateral type of leadership. Hence, it could be argued that this was only a temporary change in an otherwise very stable alliance. Second, the relation with Zaire had already begun to deteriorate in the early 1990s. Regional and local events and evolutions brought Belgium to almost completely disengage from Congo. Despite a renewed interest and activism under the first Verhofstadt government, relations again deteriorated under MFA De Gucht who was more critical and demanding toward the Congolese leadership. While the relationship improved under Van Rompuy in 2009, it seems unlikely that this relationship will ever regain the pre-1990s intensity.

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CHAPTER 3

Czech Foreign Policy After the Velvet Revolution Zdeněk Krí̌ ž, Martin Chovančík, and Odřich Krpec

1   Introduction After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, Czech foreign policy has been influenced by four competing political perspectives: Atlanticism, Internationalism, Europeanism, and Autonomism (Drulák, 2006; Kořan, 2012). The Atlanticist tradition stresses the primacy of NATO and favors close ties with the US over the further development of a common EU foreign and security policy. In contrast, the Europeanist tradition considers deeper European integration and the further enlargement of the EU as vital national interests. This tradition supports efforts toward the federalization of the EU and deeper European cooperation on foreign and security policy. Internationalism stresses the importance of active participation in international organizations. Lastly, the Autonomist tradition focuses more on defending the Czech Republic’s national interests, which are considered to be different from the interests of the other EU member states. This chapter argues that the coexistence of, and competition between, these four traditions determine the direction of Czech foreign

Z. Kr ̌íž (*) • M. Chovančík • O. Krpec Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_3

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policy. More specifically, the chapter first examines the evolution of the Czech Republic’s foreign policy from a predominantly Western orientation toward a more pragmatic foreign policy. Subsequently, it discusses the major changes in Czechia’s security and defense policy, foreign aid policy, bilateral relations, policy toward the EU, multilateral and niche diplomacy, after which the conclusions summarize the major findings and refer them back to the general framework of this edited volume.

2   General Foreign Policy Orientation 2.1  International Orientation Change After the Velvet Revolution The only instance of a clear international orientation change in Czechoslovak/Czech foreign policy took place after the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Instead of continuing to follow Moscow’s will, Czechoslovak political elites aimed to conduct an autonomous foreign policy that promoted multilateral and cooperative approaches, mainly in the OSCE framework and the Visegrad group. This period was characterized by intensifying diplomatic relations with Western countries, negotiating the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, developing stronger regional relations, and transforming the diplomatic corps. (Kor ̌an, 2012, pp.  31–36). In addition, President Havel raised the issue of human rights in China and invited the Dalai Lama to Czechoslovakia (Fürst & Pleschová, 2010, p.  1366). Furthermore, Czechoslovakia also contributed to the operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq in 1990–1991 (Princ, 2017; Tomek, 2019, pp. 185–187). The change in Czechoslovakia’s international orientation was driven by a combination of internal and external drivers: the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and political reform across the Eastern bloc. Strikingly, until 1991, both the Soviet Union and the West had actually constituted inhibitors of rapid international orientation change, as some senior Western leaders did not want to jeopardize Soviet “Perestroika”. Two domestic drivers were particularly important for the international orientation change of Czech foreign policy. First, the Velvet Revolution resulted in the replacement of political leaders who had supported a Marxist-Leninist orientation and were closely aligned with Moscow. Although the incoming political leadership, which was recruited mainly

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from dissidents, had diverging views on Czechoslovakia’s place and role in Europe after 1990, they were unified in the ambition of shedding Soviet influence and “returning to Europe” (Wallat, 2001/2002, pp.  15–16). The bureaucratic apparatus of the foreign ministry experienced a parallel replacement of diplomats aligned with the former regime, hereby removing potential bureaucratic inhibitors of the key international orientation change. However, the objective of “returning to Europe” was temporarily hindered by the internal problems related to the dissolution of the federation. A second significant domestic driver of foreign policy change was the economic shift that transformed the country from a Marxist-style planned economy to a market economy. After 1996, this economic shift required a reorientation of the country’s external economic policy to meet European rules and procedures. This resulted in the dramatic liberalization of foreign trade and the gradual, yet fundamental, liberalization of capital flows and, ultimately, in unprecedented levels of foreign capital in the national economy. The privatization of industry and services was swift and broadly supported (Nolke & Vliegenthart, 2009, p. 670). This radical economic development, from one of the most strictly planned socialist economies to a market economy open to foreign capital, continued even after the social-­ democratic left government took over in 1998, which is clear proof of continuous support for economic transformation (Žídek, 2006). EU integration is generally considered as the key external driver for this development. 2.2   Western Orientation of the Czech Republic Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, membership to NATO and the EU became the main goal of the Czech Republic (Wallat, 2001/2002, p.  20). The objective of NATO and EU membership was clearly set out in the government program of the second Klaus government of 1996 (Government Program, 1996). Although Klaus did voice criticism against European integration, this goal was supported by his ODS party. European integration was broadly supported across Czech society. The collapse of Yugoslavia and subsequent conflicts provided important external incentives for pursuing European integration, while the moral authority and support of Václav Havel and Lech Walesa served as a further important driver for pursuing negotiations with Western leaders.

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Following the financial crisis in 1997, the policy of promoting a stronger role of the national capital in the banking sector was abandoned. When the center-right government of Václav Klaus lost to Miloš Zeman’s social democrats (1998–2002), the strongly pro-EU government finished the privatization of the economy and opened it up to foreign capital (Žídek, 2006, pp.  206, 211). The social-democratic government that came to power in 1998 was rhetorically strongly Europeanist and focused on finalizing EU accession in 2004, but also devoted attention to cooperation in the OSCE and the Visegrad group. At the same time, the massive inflow of foreign capital investments into the Czech economy resulted in rapid economic growth and economic convergence with the EU’s core economies. The period from the mid-1990s to 2008 is characterized by open and more proactive support for NATO operations, strong support for the Europeanist tradition, and EU integration and fluctuating support for Atlanticist policies. In this period, the Czech Republic was so strongly oriented toward the West that both Russia and China were almost completely absent in Czech foreign policy. After 2008 and the European handling of the financial crisis, the Europeanist tradition became less influential in favor of a more nationalist approach to foreign policy. Less activity can be identified across defense, aid, human rights promotion, as well as EU integration efforts. 2.3  The Adjustment of the Czech Republic’s Western Orientation The election of President Zeman in 2013 marked an important change in Czechia’s foreign policy. While diligently pro-European when he served as prime minister, as a presidential candidate his policy toward the EU shifted. The success of his populist campaign was attributed to the growing Euroscepticism stemming from the prolonged financial crisis (Č ervinková & Kulhavá, 2013). After a political crisis discredited the right-wing government of Prime Minister Nečas (Civic democrats), the President took advantage of the situation and kept the caretaker cabinet of Jiří Rusnok in power for six months. This government followed the president’s foreign policy priorities, as did foreign minister of Sobotka’s social-­ democratic government: Lubomír Zaorálek (2014–2017). The foreign policy under minister Zaorálek, which was influenced by the ideological input of his deputy Petr Drulák, shifted toward a foreign

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policy of assertive pragmatism and promoting Czech interests toward key non-Western actors (Zeman, 2016). This resulted in an adjustment of Czech foreign policy toward Russia and China, but also toward other actors like Azerbaijan and Israel. This adjustment manifested itself in two forms. First, when the international community took on a negative stance toward these actors, the Czech Republic took on an allegedly pragmatic free rider position, exemplified by attempts to remove all items important to Czech trade from the Russia sanctions’ blacklist. The second manifestation of this policy was the more proactive foreign policy engagement with these actors in order to bolster economic benefits to Czech trade in the form of market access for Czech exports and foreign direct investment from these countries. This change was mainly driven by influential interest groups that pursued economic activities in these non-Western countries and liberal-left criticism on an overly Atlanticist (i.e. pro-US) foreign policy (Turcsányi, 2014; Karásková et al., 2018; 2020). However, this foreign policy change has so far been inhibited by internal criticism by the center-­ right parties, both because it constitutes a departure from traditional values and because it was unable to produce practical results in actually gaining market access for purportedly Czech enterprises.

3   Defense and Security Policy 3.1  Threat Perception The most significant change in Czechia’s threat perceptions took place after the Velvet Revolution, when the West ceased to be portrayed as an enemy and threat toward Czech interests. The end of the Cold War and regime change in Czechoslovakia were the most important drivers. After 1993, all National Security Strategies (NSS) mentioned the small likelihood of direct military aggression against the territory of the Czech Republic. The main security threats identified in the Czech NSSs were of a mixed or non-military nature. The 1999 NSS, for example, mentions (1) natural catastrophes and disasters, industrial accidents and environmental emergencies, and the spread of epidemics; (2) disruption and abuse of standard economic relationships and risks to computer networks due to the beginning of the year 2000; (3) individual acts of terrorism and organized crime on an extraordinary scale; (4) massive migration waves; (5) acts of violence by a foreign power against persons located on the territory of the Czech Republic; (6) imperilment of the fundaments of democratic

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governance abroad with negative consequences for the international security environment; (7) large-scale and serious sabotage; (8) threat of aggression and military attack. Most subsequent NSSs made a similar assessment of the main threats to Czechia’s security, with only minor changes in emphasis. Through the examined period, three significant adjustments can be identified in the perceived threats to Czech security. First, the 2003 NSS started to heavily emphasize international terrorism and extremism. The drivers of this change were the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the decision of the Czech government to show its solidarity with the US and NATO. However, this change was always constrained by the fact that the Czech Republic has never been directly affected by international terrorism. The prioritization of international terrorism as a security threat for the Czech Republic after 9/11, which has no empirical basis, is mainly a consequence of the fact that Czech security documents take over security threat assessments of NATO security strategies. The second key adjustment came as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis, the Syrian civil war, and the refugee/migration crisis that followed this war. It was reflected in the 2015 NSS. Among the security threats, the first place is occupied by Russia’s effort to revise the existing security arrangement in Europe. Regarding that, two essential features of the 2015 NSS should be mentioned. First, although Russia is not directly referred to as a revisionist force, the NSS clearly refers to Russia when discussing revisionist forces. Second, Russian activities are labeled as hybrid war which became a popular buzzword in the Czech security discussion (Eberle & Daniel, 2019). With regard to the migration crisis, threats stemming from migration are continuously mentioned in all Czech security strategies. Yet after the start of the civil war in Syria, these threats were given much greater attention in the public discussion (Procházka et al., 2015). This is particularly striking, given that the Czech Republic did not directly experience the negative aspects of the 2015–2016 refugee/migration crisis, in stark contrast to the crisis that followed the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. 3.2  Defense Policy and Military Sector Transformation The fall of the communist regime also brought a fundamental change in defense policy, resulting in a profound military transformation, the withdrawal of Soviet forces (finalized in 1991), society-wide demilitarization,

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and the formation of a new and independent defense policy that was not oriented toward waging war against NATO. The Czechoslovakian defense policy, which was based on the idea of autonomy in defense, named no specific adversaries and aimed at building capabilities tailored toward defending Czechoslovakia from an unlikely attack from all directions. The most relevant drivers for this change were the transformation of Czechoslovakian society toward democracy, which included a fundamental change in civil-military relations, the adoption of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 1990, the decision to participate in crisis management operations, and the desire of the Czechoslovakian society to consume the peace dividend. During this period, defense expenditures were significantly reduced from approximately 4 percent of GDP in 1989 to 2.5 percent of GDP by 1992. Surprisingly, the military elite, which was inherited from the communist regime, did not openly oppose such a transformation (Tomek, 2019, pp.  154–155, 176–212; Kr ̌íž, 2010, 2012). Significant change in the Czech Republic’s defense policy took place after 1993. There was a political discussion on whether the country should invest in an autonomous defense policy or should seek external security guarantees and aim for NATO membership. The drivers for a profound “Atlantisation” of Czechia’s defense policy were the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the instability in Russia. Consequently, foreign policy orientation toward NATO and strong Atlanticism brought about a significant transformation of the entire defense sector, without entirely abandoning all-purpose territorial defense forces. Military reforms required a first round of major procurements, which reflected the issues associated with changing foreign policy: mixing legacy Soviet equipment with new Western military hardware. The military transformation was externally driven by NATO structures and internally by branches of the military facing extinction in connection with the end of service life of soviet type equipment. It was mildly inhibited by the desire of Czech society to consume the “peace dividend” and demilitarize. As Fig. 3.1 demonstrates, the defense budget fluctuated around 2 percent of GDP in the late 1990s (Tůma et al., 2009, pp. 34–49). Following NATO’s extensive involvement in crisis management after the end of the Cold War, a change in Czech defense policy followed in 2003 and the Czech Republic aimed to build capacities for expeditionary deployments at the expense of capacities for all-purpose territorial defense. Foreign policy ambitions in this field, driven both by alliance

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Fig. 3.1  Czech Republic’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank)

commitments and security challenges, were mostly inhibited by a societal demand to reduce defense spending and a disappearing perception of military threats to the territory of the Czech Republic (Tůma et  al., 2009, pp. 50–58). Figure 3.1 shows that the defense budget continued to decrease throughout the Post-Cold War period, from very high figures down to 2.5 percent of GDP in the 1990s and to 2 percent at the beginning of the 2000s, maintained exclusively to meet NATO requirements during and immediately after accession. After Czechia became a member of NATO and the EU, defense expenditures kept decreasing annually to a low of 0.96 percent of GDP in 2014 before increasing again to 1.11 percent in 2018. Against the background of the free riding discussion in NATO and current acquisition plans in the Czech Republic, defense expenditures have increased to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2019, and there are plans to raise Czech military expenditures to 1.4 percent of GDP in the near future. It is, however, highly unlikely that Czechia will comply with NATO’s 2

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percent target soon. There are three important long-term inhibitors for increasing defense expenditures: the interference of the political cycle with the budgetary cycle, the inferior quality of defense ministers in comparison with the finance ministers, and the many changes of government (Pernica, 2016). Until the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, Czech armed forces were being transformed into an expeditionary force. The armed forces abolished mandatory military service in 2005 and specialized in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense (Military Strategy, 2008, p. 7). This specialization partly reflected the perceived threats emanating from international terrorism and partly stemmed from a utilitarian approach of attaining excellence in niche capabilities. The most recent change in Czech defense policy, which took place in 2015, aimed to refocus Czech’s military capacity on collective defense against a highly capable adversary, without neglecting crisis management (Defense Strategy, 2017, pp. 11–12). 3.3  Military Operations After the Velvet Revolution, active participation in crisis management operations became a key part of Czechoslovak and, later, Czech foreign policy. Czechoslovakia became an active contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. Political leadership, as well as the general public, supported involvement in global security. Military contributions consisted of military observers in Africa, as well as a sizeable contribution of 500 military personnel to UNPROFOR, the UN operation in former Yugoslavia (Tůma et al., 2009, p. 106). After 1993, the Czech Republic became a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping. In the latter half of the 90s, UN peacekeeping was abandoned in favor of NATO crisis management operations (Tůma, 2006, pp. 29–30). This change was a consequence of the more Atlanticist orientation of Czech foreign policy and was aimed at meeting the requirements for NATO membership. Participation in NATO operations was driven by the need not to be considered a free rider, as well as by a desire to support Western values in stabilizing crisis regions (Urbanovská, 2016). The Czech Republic contributed to Balkan security and reconstruction under the NATO umbrella, with significant participation in IFOR, SFOR, SFORII, KFOR, and other Balkan operations. The Balkans ceased to be the most important theater when the US and NATO engaged in Afghanistan. The Czech Republic joined Operation Enduring Freedom, ISAF, and Resolute Support, in spite of facing no

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direct threats from Afghanistan. The Czech Republic started participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2002. In 2004, the Czech special forces started participating in Operation Enduring Freedom, and from 2005, the Czech forces operated in the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Faizabad. From 2008 till early 2013, the Czech Republic ran its own PRT in the Lógar province. The intensive deployment in Afghanistan contributed to the increased level of military training of the Czech army, resulting in enhanced interoperability with allied armies and boosted the relations with the US. The Czech army in this period focused on the acquisition of capacities to conduct counterinsurgency operations and neglected investing capabilities tailored to collective defense (Hynek & Eichler, 2010; Stejskal, 2009). At present, Czech military personnel takes part in Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan with 345 troops and KFOR in Kosovo with 10 troops. Further deployment within NATO includes the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics with 55 troops stationed in Latvia and Baltic Air Policing. Outside of NATO, the Czech Republic makes minor contributions to EUNAVFOR in Somalia, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia, EUTM Mali, MINUSMA, MFO in the Sinai, UNDOF in Israel, and training operations in Iraq. In EUTM in Mali, the Czech Republic has been participating since 2013 with more than 70 personnel in close cooperation with French, Spanish, Malian, and German soldiers. The Czech contingent focuses on training Malian soldiers, protecting Koulikoro Training Center escorting convoys, and patrolling. Since June 2020, the Czech Republic has been leading the mission providing command capacities.

4   Development Cooperation Policy Prior to 1989, Czechoslovakia was very active in the pro-socialist developing world by providing material assistance (food, medicine, tools, education as well as military materiel), technical assistance, or scholarships to study in Czechoslovakia (Jelínek, 2004). After the Velvet Revolution, aid policy became utterly discredited as a form of active foreign policy due to its previously ideological nature. This situation continued until the Czech accession to the OECD in 1995, which was accompanied by a proclaimed adherence to international foreign aid engagements in line with UN and OECD principles. The criteria for the provision of aid, which were supported across the political spectrum, were based on the economic and social situation in the target country (Hlavičková, 2008). However, this

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did not result in development aid being directed toward the poorest countries. Aid was dispersed between more than 40 countries in mostly isolated projects throughout the 1990s. This changed with the adoption of the 2002 Foreign Development Aid Concept, when Czech development aid was reoriented to support the Millennium Development Goals and concentrated toward 20 priority countries. This change was further bolstered by the establishment of a Development agency and Czech accession to the EU in 2004 (Exnerová, 2008). There was also a noticeable change in the goals of Czech development policy after the adoption of the 2008 aid program. Next to territorial and needs-based priorities in the sectors of migration, industrial support, education, medicine, agriculture, and sustainable development, aid was reframed as a direct tool of democracy support. This process was finalized by the 2010 development and humanitarian aid act, which in effect finalized the transformation of Czech foreign aid. The territorial and sectoral priorities of the new 2010–2017 Development Aid Concept reflected foreign policy priorities to a lesser degree while not departing from traditionally established partnerships. Foreign aid was significantly impacted by the 2008 financial crisis, resulting in a more nationalist approach and reduced appetite for active foreign policy with a financial aid element (Horký, 2010). As a result, and in spite of Czechia’s participation in a multitude of multilateral development aid platforms, the Czech Republic has fallen short of the commitment it made in 2010 plan to spend 0.17 percent of its GNI on development aid and its 2015 commitment of spending 0.33 percent of GNI on aid, as evidenced in Fig. 3.2. The most recent 2017 Development Assistance Strategy of the Czech Republic for 2018–2030 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017) reorganized priorities in line with global trends and more closely reflected the pragmatic approaches that were present in Czech foreign policy. Development aid has been separated from humanitarian aid as well as from transformation assistance—where Czech ambitions were to import know-how from its own societal post-communist transformation. While seemingly indicative of a return to more internationalist values and foreign policy goals, the financial allocation reveals much more modest ambitions with only 9 million EUR dedicated to humanitarian and 3  million EUR dedicated to transformation assistance, respectively.

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Fig. 3.2  Czech Republic’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

5   Bilateral Relations Three relationships stand out as special since the international orientation change of the early 1990s. Regionally, the key partners in the neighborhood are Germany and Slovakia, and globally the USA. Since the dissolution of the federation, relations with Slovakia have been constant on all foreign policy issues and no notable change can be observed. However, there have been changes in the relationship with Germany and the US, as well as attempts to establish such relations with Russia and China. 5.1  The Czech-German Relationship Relations with Germany have changed significantly over the examined period. After the Velvet Revolution, Czechoslovakia stopped considering Germany to be a threat to its borders, although certain reservations remained within Czech society (Handl, 2008, pp.  71–72). The 1992

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Czechoslovakian-German Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation is indicative of the starting partnership, which was driven by the Czechoslovakian Internationalists. Nevertheless, greater progress was inhibited by residual elite concerns on controversial episodes in the two countries’ mutual history, like the Munich Agreement, the expulsion of Germans, and restitution demands by deported German nationals with Czechoslovakian citizenship. The far right and far left stirred these sentiments in both countries, and progress was not aided by the lack of importance laid upon these controversial issues in both countries. While Germany is a crucial partner to the Czech Republic, Germany only considers the Czech Republic as a second- or third-tier partner (Krpec & Hodulák, 2019). In consequence, it was up to the Czech Republic to take the initiative. The initial Internationalist and later Atlanticist Czech foreign policy of the 1990s diverted attention from the potentially damaging issues in the German-Czech Relationship to the more pressing issues of accession into NATO and EU. The result was delayed progress until the signing of the German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations in 1997 and their Future Development. This put to rest the mutual historical grievances that could potentially disrupt active mutual engagement and eased further intensive economic engagement. Czech scholarship regularly refers to this event as the quintessential shift in bilateral relations with Germany opening a new chapter. This is more justified when considering the longer historical context (Germany and Germans as a threat to the independence of Czech/Czechoslovakian State), but this policy did not constitute a break with the Internationalist and Europeanist reality of Czech policy in the late 1990s. Germany never stopped being a primary focus for Czech foreign policy and, with the further opening and intertwining of the economies, this relationship has undoubtedly contributed to further foreign policy convergence on the path to NATO and the EU, processes in which Germany was a prime supporter of Czech progress. Germany remains a clear regional pivotal partner and retains an impact on the formation of Czech foreign policy despite disagreements over issues of migration or the Eurozone (Urbanovská, 2017). 5.2  Building a Strategic Partnership with the US Efforts to build a special relationship with the US must be understood against the backdrop of the overall foreign policy goal of rebuilding an

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independent foreign and security policy after the end of the Cold War. The openness and outreach of the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s positioned the US as the most prominent security partner in the region. US support for NATO enlargement and capital inflows into the Czech economy further reinforced the Atlanticist shift in Czech foreign policy. The center-left coalition that came to power at the end of the 1990s inhibited further Atlantization. This was especially the case after the 1999 air strikes against Serbia during the Kosovo war, which was only hesitantly supported by the Zeman government and accompanied by a passionate societal debate. While President Havel was in favor of the operation, the Speaker of the House (and future president) Klaus was strongly opposed. Further rapprochement with the US was hindered by the 2003 invasion in Iraq which was opposed across the political spectrum and society. During the presidency of George W. Bush, there was also heated public debate on a ballistic missile defense shield in the Czech Republic. The Czech government supported the project in order to strengthen the security relations with the US, but the project aggravated negative public sentiment toward the US (Dančák & Suchý, 2007). The problem ceased to exist after the Obama administration changed course on the missile shield. Despite renewed attempts to attain a special status in the US, the US-Czech relations currently fall short of this benchmark. The relationship is defined by the many asymmetries between both actors. The US pivot to Asia and attention to Europe’s eastern and southern flanks further decreases the attractiveness of further developing the relationship for the US. 5.3  Failed Attempts to Develop Relationships with Non-Western Powers After the election of president Zeman in 2013, and with Zaorálek as minister of foreign affairs, there was an attempt to diversify the group of strategic partners and develop relationships with non-Western powers, most importantly China and Russia. The underlying rationale was that nonideological, pragmatic political relations could help exploit the economic benefits of cooperation with these powers. However, deepening relations with Russia, and President Putin in particular, by president Zeman found little support among most domestic actors, especially after the Ukraine crisis (Kratochvil & Riháčková, 2015). The development of the relationship with China, which even in the 1990s was interested in maintaining trade relations with Czechoslovakia/

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Czechia (Fürst & Pleschová, 2010, p. 1366), was much more significant. The goal was to raise export to China, limit the trade deficit, and attract investments by Chinese firms. These were expected to diversify foreign investments in the Czech Republic and make the economy less dependent on West European multinational corporations. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the Czech Republic has invested in intensive contacts with Chinese representatives, which contrasts starkly with the almost absence of relations and harsh criticism of the Chinese communist regime up until 2009. President Zeman was very active during his 2014 visit to China, where he claimed that a restart of the relations between the Czech Republic and China was possible, as Czechia was no longer under the influence of the EU and US and is now promoting its own national interests (Šebok & Karásková, 2020). He was the only head of state of an EU member state that attended the 2015 military parade in Beijing, which was rewarded by a visit of President Xi to Prague in 2016. During this visit, China announced 8–10 billion USD of investments in the next few years. The Chinese private investment company CEFC acquired a diverse portfolio of shares in Czech firms, Czech real estate, and even in a football club between 2015 and 2017. However, this company turned out to be a fraudulent Ponzi scheme. In an attempt to save its reputation, the Chinese state-owned bank CITIC took over CEFC’s portfolio in Czechia and paid its debts to local companies. Together with the failure of expanding its trade with China, the absence of notable economic benefits led the Czech Republic to, again, adopt a more critical tone in its bilateral relation with China (CCTV, 2014; CGTN, 2016; Veselovský, 2016; CTK, 2020). Since 2019, there is a diplomatic crisis between Czechia and China (Hutt & Turcsányi, 2020). This was triggered by the revocation of a partnership agreement between Prague and Beijing after Beijing refused to renegotiate the document that covertly claimed that Prague supported the One China Policy (CTK, 2019).

6   EU, Multilateral, and Niche Diplomacy 6.1  Relations with the European Union In 1996, the Czech Republic set out to achieve membership in the European Union. This was a fundamental international orientation change that was based on a consensus across the whole political spectrum (Fiala et al., 2018, pp. 196–197). Even in the moments of transition of power

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between governments with different political orientations, there was remarkable stability in the agenda of EU accession. After accession, the European Union was perceived as the key multilateral institution for the Czech Republic (Skulínek, 2020). In the period around the accession year 2004, Czechia was a strong supporter of the common market and considered the free movement of production factors as a key priority. Another important topic was the request to be as fully involved as possible in the common agricultural policy. Surprisingly, interest in maximizing the inflow of EU structural funds was much less articulate (Government of the Czech Republic, 2013). The Czech goal to remove trade barriers that still existed among EU members during the Czech EU presidency in 2009 was in line with the previous Czech priorities (Kaniok & Smekal, 2010). The Czech Presidency also served as a tool for reestablishing the partnership with Eastern Europe, which was missing among Czech priorities until the mid-2000s (Weiss, 2011). Much of this changed in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial Crisis. The promotion of national economic interests became a much more pronounced goal, especially under the right-wing government of Petr Nečas (2010–2013), but also under the following governments of Rusnok (caretaker), Sobotka (social democrats), and Babiš (centrist). The EU was increasingly criticized for its inefficient, overly complex, and unnecessarily ambitious economic integration (Government of the Czech Republic, 2013). Even though the Czech Republic meets most of the Maastricht criteria, there is no political support for the adoption of the Euro. Furthermore, the Czech Republic has also become a free rider in its exchange rate policy as it intervened in order to devaluate its currency. Following the financial crisis, the EU was criticized by right-wing parties as a progressive leftist and elitist cosmopolitan project, threatening the traditional Czech way of life and culture, while attempting to unfairly apply EU wide solutions to the financial and debt crisis of the EU’s Southern member states. The traditional left argued that, although some groups of Czech society indeed benefited from the Europeanization of the economy and society, large groups were left behind (Beneš & Braun, 2011; Havlík & Hloušek, 2017; Kaniok & Havlík, 2016). The migration crisis accelerated these developments. Together with the demographic characteristics of the Czech Republic (ethnically homogenous white society, with a high level of income equality and little experience with different cultures), the migration crisis created room for populist

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political subjects and fiercely criticized any EU attempts to deal with the issue (Havlík, 2019). The centrist ANO party, while moderately pro-­ European when in Sobotka’s (Social democrats) coalition government, co-opted some Autonomist, EU skeptic, and culturally conservative elements of the programs of more radical parties. However, this is predominantly a domestic act, while within the EU, premier Babiš and the ANO government act as dedicated Europeanists. 6.2  Human Rights Agenda After the fall of communism, Czech foreign policy—driven by full-scale societal transformation toward democracy and the rule of law—placed human rights issues at its very core. Activity in the internationalist agenda was mainly incited by key Czech personalities, NGOs, and a somewhat idealistic internationalist shift in the bureaucratic apparatus itself. The focus on human rights in foreign policy, which did not belong to its leading agenda, remained practically unchanged throughout Czech accession process to both NATO and the EU. After the center-right Nečas government fell in 2013, public discussion on the continued centrality of human rights in Czech foreign policy opened for the first time. The left-wing criticism is perhaps best represented by Petr Drulák. The long-term head of the Institute of International Relations, deputy foreign minister, and adviser to foreign affairs minister Zaorálek invested great efforts into contesting president Havel’s legacy of human rights support in foreign policy. It was criticized in three respects: an overwhelming focus solely on first-generation human rights; an overly confrontational and assertive approach; which was not always fit for purpose; and a reservation of admonishment almost exclusively for states opposed to the US, something Drulák referred to as “human-rights Atlanticism” or the “fake universalism” of Havel’s era (Drulák, 2014). The debate of intellectuals (Přibáň & Bělohradský, 2015) launched by this criticism influenced foreign policy formulation but fell short of relegating the human rights agenda to its fringes. Most recent evaluations of the agenda in Czech foreign policy state that “the thematic and territorial priorities of the human rights foreign policy of the Czech Republic have not undergone any significant redefinition” (Bílková, 2016).

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7   Conclusion The Velvet Revolution and the end of the Cold War provided the Czech Republic with unique opportunities to shape its new independent foreign policy. A drastic international orientation change was clearly desired and represents the most fundamental change of Czech foreign policy to date. The key tenets of the newly independent foreign policy did not, however, remain unaltered. More importantly, their change can predominantly be traced back to domestic level sources and drivers—especially those of key personalities involved in the foreign policy processes (including those of presidents) and, save for the latest attempted turns post-2013, a lack of domestic inhibitors. While this chapter clearly identifies a host of international drivers of change, they may rather be perceived as shifts in underlying conditions necessitating reaction but not necessarily of the change that was adopted. Allowing for a counterfactual exercise, the absence of Václav Havel, Václav Klaus, or Miloš Zeman during the pivotal moments of necessitated change to Czech foreign policy, while considering the lack of inhibitors on the domestic level, would likely have produced somewhat, but not significantly, different foreign policy goals and outcomes. Czech foreign policy has experienced two groups of crucial international orientation changes after the independence of the Czech Republic. Table 3.1 provides an overview of all types of foreign policy changes since 1991. The first international orientation change constituted the development of an independent foreign policy; which set the path toward a reorientation of all accompanying policies in defense, aid, and human rights; and shifted the national stance in multiple bilateral relations. The second orientation change was the dramatic liberalization and opening of the Czech economy to foreign capital. Both orientation changes materialized during the 1990s and were altered by many other minor changes and adjustments toward NATO and EU membership, and more recently, toward a more pragmatic foreign policy. Even this latest adjustment must however be perceived as just that, an adjustment which was inhibited from becoming a major change and due to subsequent developments, is unlikely to significantly alter Czech foreign policy orientation in the near future. The most important goal change of modern Czech foreign policy is the 1996 domestically driven decision to reorient foreign policy of “returning to Europe” from the internationalist path to one directed squarely at NATO and the EU. The change was accompanied by similar sectoral decisions in foreign aid after joining the OECD in 1995. A search for

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Table 3.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in Czech Republic since 1990

Adjustment change

Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

Development closer relations with Germany (1996–1997)

• Drivers: policy entrepreneurs and societal demands • Inhibitor: history Czech-German relations • Driven by international events (terrorist attacks 9/11) and demands of allies (the US/NATO) • Drivers: international events (the global financial crisis) and resulting societal demands • International events: Ukraine crisis

Security strategy prioritizes terrorism, accompanied by more activity in out-of-area operations (2003) Decrease in foreign aid and more pragmatic targeting (2010 and 2017)

Program change

Goal change

International orientation change

Russia added as top security threat to National security strategies (yet not by name) (2015) Shift for UN peace operations to NATO peace operations in 1990s

• Drivers: international events (Balkan crisis) and international organizations (NATO) • International norms and policy entrepreneurs

Shift in aid policy shift to make it an active part of the foreign policy toolkit and align it with the MDGs (2002) and adding democracy promotion as goal of development policy (2008) Focus defense policy on territorial defense • Ukraine crisis instead of expeditionary activity (2015) Start of active pursuance of NATO and • I mpact international EU membership (1994–1996) organizations (EU and NATO) Post- Velvet Revolution system-wide • Systemic change: end of orientation change toward the West the Cold War (including defense, aid policy, and bilateral relations) (1990) Pursuit of economic opening and • International integration (1993) organizations, most importantly the EU

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inhibitors, in this case, points to the international level rather than domestic ones as opportunities for enlargement and early membership were previously unclear. The most recently discussed possibility of a goal change concerns the centrality and utility of the human rights agenda in the currently more pragmatically oriented foreign policy of the government. Program change in Czech foreign policy has only been identified in the post-2014 reorganization and introduction of methods to counter aggression and insecurity on Europe’s eastern flank. It is almost exclusively sectoral and reactive to mainly international drivers in the case of defense and security (such as the key transformations in the defense sector or its deployments) or coupled with domestic drivers in the case of foreign aid and human rights policies. In all three cases, the external drivers provided impetus and incentive and were met with little domestic debate or inhibition close to a cross-party agreement, thus creating lasting policies. Finally, foreign policy adjustment is the most common form of change, often driven domestically and influenced by both economic and security conditions.

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CHAPTER 4

Danish Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in the Post-Cold War Period Henrik Larsen

1   General Foreign Policy Orientation Denmark is a small state which also includes the Faroes and Greenland as part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Foreign Trade constitutes a significant part of the GDP—approx. 35% in 1990 rising to 55% in 2016. While the status as a small state had been a central part of the self-­ understanding in Danish foreign policy during the Cold War, the term small state has been used less after the fall of the Wall. If there is one term that has been used to characterize Danish foreign policy after the Cold War, it is the term activism (see below). During the Cold War Danish foreign policy had mostly been a subject of consensus in the Danish Parliament—with the notable exception of the so-called footnote period 1982–1988 (see below). After the fall of the Wall there was a high degree of consensus on the main tenets of Danish foreign policy among the parties that alternated in government—including on the role of NATO and the EU.  No party has ever gained an

H. Larsen (*) University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_4

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absolute majority in parliament, and governments are mostly coalition governments. There is a comparatively high involvement of parliament in foreign policy. The constitution states that the government is responsible for conducting foreign policy, but also that it has to consult with parliament before any major foreign policy decision (§ 19,3  in the constitution). With regard to supranational cooperation, particularly relevant in relation to the EU, powers may be delegated to international authorities provided that it is supported by a 5/6 majority in the Parliament (Folketing). If such a majority is not obtained, such a delegation of powers can only be approved by a referendum (§ 20  in the constitution). This clause was the background for the five referenda on the EU after the Cold War (1992, 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2015). According to the dominant discourse of Danish foreign policy during the Cold War, Danish foreign policy was based on four functionally separate cornerstones: the European Community (EC; now EU), NATO, the UN, and Nordic Cooperation. The EC was about ‘market policy’, NATO about security, and the UN about promoting universal values and development. Nordic Cooperation was a strong identity base for Denmark where values and global foreign policy issues were discussed. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; now OSCE), which also included the Eastern European countries, was later added to the original four cornerstones formulated by Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup in 1965. The point was that each cornerstone fulfilled particular functions that could not and should not be merged with each other (Due-Nielsen & Petersen, 1995; Hækkerup, 1965; Larsen, 2011, p. 94). Foreign policy debates did not question the four cornerstones understanding; critical debates discussed the issue of whether concrete policies respected this understanding. The dominance of this discourse led to a compartmentalization of Danish foreign policy between distinct fora and institutions, the boundaries of which could not easily be crossed (this section draws on Larsen, 2020). 1.1  Danish Foreign Policy After the Cold War1 After the end of the Cold War, the importance of the EU cornerstone in Danish foreign policy has grown significantly. In the post-Cold War period, the functions of the four cornerstones have been understood as 1

 This section draws on Larsen (2020).

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coming together in the EU (Larsen, 2005). After the Cold War, the EU could and should deal with economics, politics, security (if not at the expense of NATO), and the promotion and protection of values. Danish participation in the EU was in the dominant discourse, adhered to by the majority of the parliamentary parties and the political elite, articulated as the key forum for Danish foreign policy. The involvement in the making of EU foreign policy was crucial. However, this does not mean that the language of the dominant discourse used in relation to the EU has been one which presents the EU in cultural and mythical terms—as is often the case in, for example, France and Germany. The dominant discourse on the EU is an instrumental discourse, and it has been and still is dominant in Danish foreign policy today. Proponents of the dominant discourse have also articulated the EU as a ‘project of peace’, and thus, it approached a cultural and mythical conception of Europe at times (Larsen, 2000). For example, the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in the period 2001–2009, called the EU ‘the greatest peacekeeping project in history’ (Rasmussen, 2007). Even so, the main weight in arguments within this discourse is on the instrumental value of the EU for Denmark and the other member states. Within the dominant foreign policy discourse, the transatlantic link to the US is also constructed as crucial. Former Defense Minister Claus Hjort Frederiksen wrote that ‘NATO remains the cornerstone of Danish security policy and the Danish Government is committed to maintaining Denmark’s status as a core member of the Alliance’ (Frederiksen, 2018, p. 34). The way in which the dominant discourse reads the stronger post-Cold War role for the EU and the continued importance of the US are as interlinked parts of an all-embracing Euro-Atlantic structure. However, the dominant discourse does not give equal weight to the Atlantic and the European components of this structure, for while the crucial role of the Atlantic structures is stressed in relation to hard security in order to protect common values, the EU is described as ‘the cornerstone of Danish foreign policy’ (see, e.g. Knudsen, 2014, p.  18), the same of which is not said about the US. This is a considerable change from the four cornerstones understanding during the Cold War where the EU (or the EC as it was then) was only one of the four cornerstones, with the Nordic setting, the UN, and NATO being equally important. In the dominant Danish discourse during the Cold War, the UN was the centerpiece of a rule-based international order. This discourse carried through into the first decade of the post-Cold War era where the UN was

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finally seen as coming to the fore and being able to fulfill its potential (Jakobsen & Kjærsgaard, 2017). The UN became a central scene for the Danish doctrine of ‘active internationalism’. From 1995, however, there was a downturn in Danish contributions and general focus on the UN (Jakobsen & Kjærsgaard, 2017). Denmark has also been less concerned with UN legitimation than the other Nordic countries. According to Wivel (2018, p. 9), Denmark emphasized the ‘unipolar’ in the unipolar international order, whereas the other Nordic states emphasized the ‘order’ element. At the same time, the UN continued to be the important umbrella for international order and for the development of norms and principles in Danish foreign policy discourse. The Nordic cornerstone, one of the four cornerstones in Danish foreign policy discourse during the Cold War, can no longer be found in a strong form in official general accounts of Danish foreign policy. The Atlantic/NATO context and the EU in particular have crowded out the Nordic context in Danish foreign policy identity. This movement was already identifiable shortly after the end of the Cold War (Wæver, 1992). 1.2  Activism2 The term ‘activism’ or activist foreign policy has been one of the main themes, if not the main theme, in the study of Danish foreign policy after the Cold War (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017). Since ‘active internationalism’ was first articulated in speech by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-­ Jensen in 1989, successive Danish governments have formulated their foreign policy projects with reference to how it was active in a different way than their predecessors’. After the ‘active internationalism’ of the Poul Schlüter government in the period 1989–1993, the project of the Poul Nyrup Rasmussen government became ‘engaged internationalism’, only to become ‘international activism’ or ‘an offensive foreign policy’ in 2001 under the Anders Fogh Rasmussen government. In this context, a significant break was constituted by the change of discourse from active internationalism/engaged internationalism to international activism with the Anders Fogh Rasmussen government in 2001. An offensive foreign policy should take clear stances and engage directly in the defining questions of international politics and security. As Rynning (2003) has

2

 This section draws on Larsen (2020).

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pointed out, Denmark was now articulated as a strategic actor who should take a clear and active side in the defining conflicts in world politics. This was different from the previous activism which was aimed at mitigating these conflicts without taking sides (Rynning, 2003). The Anders Fogh Rasmussen government presented the previous Danish governments’ stances as unclear and as having avoided hard and principled choice; they had not broken with the historical Danish ‘adaptation policy’ and the spirit of 1864 (Denmark’s defeat to Austria and Prussia) (Larsen, 2009). In an article in Berlingske Tidende in 2003, Anders Fogh Rasmussen wrote about ‘[…] the small state complexes and the passive adaptation theory that have dominated thinking about Danish foreign and security policy for generations’, going on to state: ‘There is an unspoken expectation of sorts that Denmark should adapt humbly, willingly, and passively to what the dominant European great powers say’ (Rasmussen, 2003). Policies that could be seen as flowing from the Danish understanding of activism before Anders Fogh Rasmussen was the participation in UN operations in the former Yugoslavia. However, NATO was the forum that most clearly saw Danish independent initiatives (Ringsmose & Rynning, 2017). In addition, there was also the active diplomacy vis-à-vis the independence and empowerment of the Baltic states and the ‘active multilateralism’ in international organizations. The increased Danish contributions to peace, stability, and the environment (the so-called MIFRESTA3) could also be seen as an expression of activism, along with the increase in Danish development aid to 1% of GDP in 1992, which was maintained throughout the 1990s. Within the EU, Denmark was strongly promoting a comprehensive enlargement of the EU and was actively pursuing policies within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Larsen, 2000). After 2001, many of these policies, such as the strong support for EU enlargement (which culminated successfully with the EU enlargement in 2004), have continued. However, as mentioned earlier, contributions to UN military operations have decreased further, and there have been tendencies toward a less active line in the UN in other fields as well (Jakobsen & Kjærsgaard, 2017). The contributions to the Iraq War and its aftermath, the war in Afghanistan and the operations in Iraq and Syria (2013/2014–) could be seen as enabled by the new understanding of activism where acting as a strategic actor became a central part. The 3

 An environmental aid program which existed from 1993 to 2002.

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participation in the military operation in Libya (2011) fitted less obviously into a strategic narrative, but it was (initially) widely supported in the Danish Parliament for humanitarian reasons, which was more in line with the version of activism that was dominant before 2001. 1.3  General Changes in Danish Foreign Policy After the Cold War—Drivers and Inhibitors The pattern outlined above has largely characterized Danish foreign policy after the Cold War: a more active foreign policy,4 also militarily, support for a stronger and broader role of the EU on the international scene and a decline in Nordic cooperation. This was accompanied by a stronger emphasis on the role of NATO and the US. Drawing on Hermann’s (1990) terminology, Denmark’s foreign policy orientation after the Cold War was not fundamentally changed. Denmark was still a member of the same international organizations as during the Cold War period even if their relative importance had changed since the four cornerstones understanding dominant during the Cold War. Also, Denmark’s most important bilateral partners remained the same even if their relative importance may have been altered (see below): the US, the UK, Germany, and the Nordic countries. The Danish political system and its dominant political parties were also largely the same. In terms of the foreign policy goals in Danish foreign policy, the question of continuity or change is more complex. Branner has argued that Danish foreign policy tradition throughout the twentieth century has consisted of two elements: adaptation and activism. Adaptation addressed Denmark’s basic problem of survival after the country was reduced by one-third after the defeat to the uniting Germany in 1864. The activism component was often suppressed by the international circumstances. But when it has been possible to pursue an active line in Danish foreign policy, this has been done. The active foreign policy has been aimed at affecting the international order—replacing the anarchic international system with one based on international law, justice, and equality as in domestic politics. This is not a surprising line for a small state (Branner, 2013, pp. 141–142; Larsen, 2017, p. 156). During the Cold War, there were many examples of Denmark pursuing an active line, such as within the CSCE process 4  Inspired by Pedersen og Ringsmose, activism is here understood as policies that go beyond the bare necessities and are voluntary rather imposed (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017).

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(Branner, 2013, p. 138). On the basis of this analysis, Branner does not see the Danish foreign policy activism as a new element in Danish foreign policy, but as continuity with respect to the tradition. The substantial aims of the more active Danish foreign policy line after the Cold War were unchanged from the Cold War (affecting the international order toward a situation more based on international law, justice, and equality). The increased role of military means after the Cold War was a change of means, not of goals (and there had already been substantial use of military means for peacekeeping during the Cold War). Branner therefore concludes, drawing on Hermann’s terminology, that there has been a program change rather than a change in goals after the end of the Cold War (Branner, 2013, p. 154). However, the policy line after 2001 has been much more debated in terms of whether there was a change and, if so, the depth of this change (the central point is the interpretation of the participation in the 2003 Iraq War, but the Danish policy leading up to the war is part of the debate). Branner sees the increased use of military means without a direct mandate from the UN as a derogation from the tradition: the more accentuated use of military means and explicit furthering of values do not aim at furthering a more rule-bound international order along with the activist part of the foreign tradition, but rather to support the US in its endeavors (Branner, 2013, pp. 148–151). The change of government in 2001, in other words, led to a change of a significant goal in Danish foreign activism. In line with this, it can be argued that Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001–2009) expressed a change of goals: Denmark should become a strategic actor who gave clear support, if necessary by military means, on the side of the good in international conflicts (Rynning, 2003). This was a break with what the Prime Minister saw as the Danish foreign policy tradition (Farbøl, 2011). Larsen has also suggested that there might be much more profound changes at play than just a change of goals. The Danish dominant discourse has traditionally presented Denmark as an anti-power state. Denmark should rely on diplomatic means and not engage in the power politics of the great powers (Hansen, 2002). One clear expression of this was the extensive Danish participation in peacekeeping operations during the Cold War which was seen as a contrast to the power politics of the great powers. The more extensive use of military means beyond peacekeeping and its motivation, particularly post-2001, could therefore be seen as a change in Danish state identity (Larsen, 2017, pp. 181–182).

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Against the arguments for a more profound change post 2001, Pedersen argues that foreign policy post 2001 was still within the tradition of activism (what he calls internationalism) (Pedersen, 2015, p. 38). The difference was that before 2001 Danish foreign policy goals were promoted through international organizations whereas after Danish goals were also promoted outside international organizations. However, Pedersen also sees a change from the binary adaptation-activism tradition where security and norm promotion are separate issues. After 2001, norm promotion and furthering of security are integrated (as in the attempt to project liberal values in Iraq and Afghanistan which was also meant to further security). But for Pedersen there is no absolute change in 2001, as this tendency could be detected already after 1989 (Pedersen, 2015, pp. 38–42). What were the drivers and inhibitors of foreign policy change from the end of the Cold War? The big systemic changes in and around 1989 were essential to understand the changes in Danish foreign policy. The new geopolitical situation meant that threats toward Denmark seemed very remote. With the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and its former members applying for membership of EU and NATO, Denmark found itself in the historically unique situation of being surrounded by allies and organizational partners. A report from an official Defense Commission published 1997 concluded that the time of alert for a possible armed attack on Denmark was about ten years. At the same time, norms for cooperation changed in Europe as did the roles of the organizations. The EU and the CSCE/OSCE acquired a much more central political role as an anchor for developments in Europe. The new international environment was perceived as permissive by Danish decision-makers and the parties in the Folketing. In fact, there seemed to be very few inhibitors on a more active international role for Denmark from the end of the Cold War until 2001. Elements at many levels worked for a more active role in terms of leadership, parliamentary support, public opinion, and the foreign policy bureaucracy. First of all, from the mid-1980s, there was a desire within the Liberal Party to break with what was seen as the dominant Social Democrat/ Social Liberal thinking in Danish foreign policy during the Cold War and their so-called footnote policy. In their foreign policy project, Denmark should support the Western world and the fight for freedom, democracy, and human rights without reservations. The Liberal Party Chairman Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was foreign minister in the coalition governments

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1982–1993, and thus also at the time of the big international changes in 1989. Thus, the Liberal Party with its new foreign policy project came to define Denmark’s reactions at the end of the Cold War. Denmark should contribute to shaping international politics with the US through its support for democracy, freedom, and human rights, if necessary with military means. Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen made clear that he wanted to distance himself from what he saw as the cautious small state policy of his predecessors (Petersen, 2009, pp.  155–164). The Liberal Party and Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen could be seen as policy entrepreneurs who contributed new ideas. Second, the Social Liberal/ Social Democrat coalition governments 1993–2001, which succeeded the Liberal/Conservative government, to a large extent, continued the same foreign policy line as its predecessor. Petersen attributes this continuity to the Social Democrats’ wish to distance themselves from their footnote policy in the 1980s which was seen as a problem for their credibility (Petersen, 2009, p.  82). However, Branner notes that Danish foreign policy from the fall of the Berlin wall was very much in line with the activist component of the Danish foreign policy tradition—to a large extent defined by the Social Liberal and Social Democratic parties (Branner, 2013). There was little, if any, contradiction between the foreign policy of the Liberal/Conservative government with its strong focus on an active line in international organizations and the tradition of replacing the anarchic international system with one based on international law, justice, and equality. Promotion of human rights, good governance, and so on was a natural extension of this. Third, and as an extension of the previous point, there was an almost complete consensus on this policy line in parliament until 2001 and among the population as far as military operations were concerned. Danish participation in military operations was strongly supported in opinion polls. This was the case also when the operations went beyond peacekeeping. The change in the form of participation in the 2003 Iraq War was politically controversial and involved more inhibitors. The international context was one in which the US President Bush stated after 9/11 that ‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’. The question of participation in the Iraq War was hugely controversial within Europe, with the EU deeply split on the issue. An extensive report on why Denmark went into war in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq concluded that the Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was a central policy entrepreneur in the Danish decision to take part in the war. In bilateral meetings with the American

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administration in the years before the war, including with President Bush, the Danish Prime Minister made clear that Denmark was willing to take part in a possible attack on Iraq to disarm Saddam Hussein. These meetings only involved a very narrow circle of high-ranking civil servants (who may then also be seen as policy entrepreneurs). The Folketing was not involved until very late in the process (Mariager & Wivel, 2019). The Prime Minister’s consent to support the war could be understood with reference to ideational development within the Liberal Party since the mid-1980s to the effect that Denmark should take clear stances and side firmly with the West. He expressed this very clearly in statements before the conflict, and the controversial character of the issue may have strengthened his resolve to take a clear stance. In addition, Fogh Rasmussen had a very good personal relationship with President Bush. The Folketing was split on the question of the participation in the war in Iraq, and the vote to participate was only passed with a slim majority (the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, and the Danish People’s Party). Although the bill was passed, the government decided to reduce the planned Danish military contribution to a minimum (a submarine) seemingly affected by the substantial opposition in the parliament. The substantial opposition thus worked as an inhibitor on the scale of the military contribution. The Social Liberals party and the Social Democrats party were strongly opposed to the Danish participation in the Iraq War, as they doubted the US American motives and felt that the possibilities of the UN and IEA had not been exhausted. However, both parties later supported a mandate for the deployment of Danish forces in Iraq as part of an international stabilization force (in order to get the opposition’s acceptance, the government gave up on its ambition for Danish leadership as part of the stabilization force). However, with the exception of the participation in the Iraq War, there was broad support for participating in American-led military operations. There was broad support for the military deployments in Afghanistan, and the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals also supported the deployment of Danish forces to the troublesome Helmand process in Afghanistan. The joint program for the Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party, and the Social Liberals before the 2011 general election spoke about a stronger emphasis on the UN and less on ‘military adventures’ (Socialdemokraterne, Socialistisk Folkeparti og Det Radikale Venstre, 2011). However, Social Democratic Prime Minister Thorning-­ Smith offered close to unconditional support when the US aired ideas

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about eliminating Syrian chemical weapons in 2013. In 2014, the Social Democrat/Social Liberal government sent Danish military personnel to Northern Iraq to fight ISIL.  In its reasons for the support, it referred, among other things, to the necessity to throw its weight in the fight against the absolute evil which was ISIL (Simony & Wantzin, 2019). The deployment was supported by a large majority in the Folketing and extended several times under subsequent governments, also to include Syria when necessary (only the Socialist People’s Party and the Red/Green Alliance voted against). What is striking is the continuity in the support for American-led military operations from an overwhelming majority in the Folketing (even if they are less controversial in terms of international law than Iraq). Signs are that the agenda which was set by Prime Minister Rasmussen 2001–2009 extended beyond his premiership (Farbøl, 2011). The discourse on the necessity of acting as a strategic actor on the side of the US, also for moral reasons, appears to have gained ground in the majority of the Danish Parliamentary parties and in the central ministries as a dominant framework of meaning.

2   Defense and Security Policy During the Cold War, Denmark was a member of NATO but a member with reservations. Denmark did not formally allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory during periods of peace and crisis (but only during times of war). However, until the late 1960s, Denmark de facto accepted the possible presence of nuclear weapons on the US air base in Thule, Greenland. Danish defense expenditures were low compared to those of other NATO members; the relatively limited US criticism of this may have been due to the US’s presence in Greenland which was part of the US’ forward defense. Denmark could take advantage of the socalled Greenland card. During the footnote period 1982–1988, a majority in the Danish Parliament voted for parliamentary motions which opposed the deployment of the INF-missiles in Europe and other aspects of the nuclear policies of the alliance. After the Cold War (detectable already from 1988), Denmark became markedly more supportive of the role of the US and NATO in European security. Denmark provided a proportionately very high number of forces to the UN operations in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and took part in the bombings under the aegis of NATO in Kosovo in 1999 and the following deployment of NATO ground forces there. Generally speaking, however, the relative share of UN military missions

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went down from the late 1990s (Jakobsen and Kjærsgaard, 2017) when military engagements in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan constituted the overwhelming part of Danish deployments (officially all under UN mandates). Danish forces have also been deployed in Estonia under NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. Denmark’s defense after the end of the Cold War has, to a large extent, been restructured into providing forces for internal military operations as a consequence of the absence of territorial threats to Denmark. Denmark’s defense expenditures after the Cold War were low compared to other EU members, falling to approx. 1.2% of its GDP in 2015 (see Fig.  4.1). However, at the 2018 defense agreement, it was decided that Danish defense expenditures in the period 2018–2023 would rise to 1.5% of GDP after intense US pressure. This is the first time since the Cold War that Danish defense expenditures have been put up markedly (Forsvarsministeriet, 2018).

Fig. 4.1  Denmark’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank)

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The changes in Danish defense policy (security policy has been dealt with above) after the Cold War could be seen as goal changes, as the focus changed from territorial defense to participation in international operations (Forsvarsministeriet, 2009). The gradual but steady decline in defense expenditures as part of GDP during the post-Cold War must be seen as an adjustment change, as a result of the decline in the territorial threat after the Cold War. When the decline was reversed in 2018, this was also an adjustment change but a change with a symbolic significance, given the trend since the end of the Cold War. The driver of this change was the US pressure under the Trump administration and, to a lesser extent, the more aggressive Russian behavior. When the US administration under President Trump and the NATO secretariat put pressure on Copenhagen to increase its defense expenditures, the Danish response was that Denmark provided a high proportion of the forces deployed in difficult military operations (Jyllands-Posten, 2018)—but to no avail. It was the percentage of GDP that mattered for the Trump administration, and the Danish international activities were no longer a strong currency. Given the central role of the US in Danish security and foreign policy, Denmark adapted to US demands and landed on the same percentage as Germany, a decision accepted by the mainstream political parties. The persistent American pressures were widely seen as impossible to resist.

3   Development Cooperation Policy Danish development aid was instigated through pressures from alliance partners during the Cold War. But it also had a more active dimension; it was a way of raising Danish prestige in international affairs, initially through concentrating the efforts within the UN development agencies. The domestic background was the idea that Denmark was a good society and ought to help those in the world who were worse off. The idea of a good society was closely linked to Nordic welfare state thinking. Denmark and the Nordic societies were seen as possessing a cohesion from which others could learn (Larsen, 2005, p. 128). Toward the end of the Cold War, Danish aid to the Third World was among the highest in the world in proportionate terms; it was one of the few countries that provided the UN recommended goal of 0.7% of GNI. Danish aid continued to increase after the Cold War reaching more than 1% of the Danish GNI in 1992—making it one of the world’s leaders in proportionate terms. Moreover, the aim was to spend an extra 0.5% of

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GNI on environmental projects abroad. Danish development aid stayed at that level until 2001. The main goals of development aid were laid out in the government white papers A World in Development (Danida, 1994) and Partnership 2000 (Danida, 2000). Poverty reduction was restated as the general aim (originally formulated in a law from 1971) with gender equality, environment, and democratization as three cross-cutting concerns. Also, sustainable development was linked to the idea of partnership; development had to involve a process of cooperation with developing countries rather than being imposed through donor-driven projects. The aid closely followed OECD guidelines. Aid was focused on 21 stable low-income partnership countries (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018, pp. 143–145; Larsen, 2005; Chap. 6). The 1990s was a relatively stable period in Danish development aid, and the change of government in 1993 did not lead to a change in funding or policies. The change to a Liberal-Conservative government in November 2001 brought a change in funding and policies. The overall aid budget was cut to 0.83% of GNI (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018, pp. 144–145). Moreover, at the beginning of the 2010s, the government decided to freeze the amount of aid given (15.2  bil. DKK), which would mean a decreasing percentage of GDP over time. The reason given for the reduction in the development budget was that extra money was needed to fulfill the needs of Danish society. The government attributed less importance to Danish development aid in the general context of Danish external relations. Bilateral aid was phased out for three of the priority countries and general security concerns played a bigger role, as fragile states such as Afghanistan received more development aid to support Denmark’s military endeavors and to prevent potential breeding grounds for terrorism and piracy (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018, pp. 144–145). The new Social Democrat-led government which came into power in 2011 increased the budget to maintain development aid at 0.83% of GNI.  Although the government’s stated aim was to bring development funding back to 1% of GNI, no concrete initiatives were taken to this effect. A government white paper stressed the importance of human rights and green growth and contained steps toward mobilizing private capital (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018, pp. 147–148, 150). With the change to a Liberal-led government in 2015 cuts were made to 0.7% of GNI in accordance with its promises made before (see Fig. 4.2). This was i.a. implemented through a reduction in the number of priority countries from 21 to 14. The government’s 2017 White paper The World

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Fig. 4.2  Denmark’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

2030 had broad parliamentary support and introduced important new elements: first of all, development aid and humanitarian relief should be better integrated  (Danida, 2017). The primary purpose of that was that refugees should stay in their neighborhood (and not come to Denmark). Bilateral aid has been reduced over the last decade whereas humanitarian relief has gone up. The reduction in bilateral aid was, to a large extent, due to the costs of the increased number of refugees in 2015–2016, which has been financed from the aid budget. Second, there was an emphasis on engaging private capital and enhancing the prospects for Danish companies in development processes. Third, there was change away from a narrow focus on low-income countries. Taken together, this was a movement away from development as a goal of aid in itself toward development as a tool for preventing immigration and for enhancing prospects for Danish Business. Bilateral aid has been reduced over the last decade whereas humanitarian relief has gone up. The reduction in bilateral aid is, to a large

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extent, due to the costs of the increased number of refugees in 2015–2016, financed from the aid budget (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018, pp. 148–153). The Social Democratic government, which took over in June 2019 has pledged to continue at the 0.7% level. It has also pledged to increase the focus on emergency aid in the areas where refugees arrive, even if poverty reduction is still seen as the general aim of development aid (Holt, 2018). The change in Danish development policy from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period appears to be linear, as the tendencies from the period immediately preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall Cold War were reinforced. The goals were very similar, only the financial means were increased. In this sense it was an adjustment change. Having said that, the increase of aid to 1% of GNI was seen as an important symbolic milestone in Danish domestic politics, which perhaps qualifies the label adjustment change (Jakobsen, 2019, p. 156). Also, Denmark took on a much more active role in international organizations in this field. On this basis, the lowering of aid from 1% in the first decade of the millennium could be seen as more than just an adjustment change, as it also had a symbolic character. In fact, the lowering of aid with reference to the needs of domestic society expressed a relative devaluation of aid, which changed the status of aid in Danish external affairs. This may be seen as a more fundamental change. However, in facing criticism from the opposition, the government stressed that Denmark would still be one of the most significant contributors in relative terms, that its status as a provider of aid mattered. In any case, there was a goal change, as the aim of stabilizing fragile states where Denmark was militarily involved was a change from solely focusing on the eradication of poverty. The 2011–2015 Social Democratic-led government’s slight increase in aid could be seen as an adjustment change. Although the stated plan to increase aid to the symbolically important 1% was significant, it never gained any traction. There were also elements of goal change, such as a larger focus on the private sector. The changes under the 2015–2019 Liberal Government were more profound. The lowering of aid to 0.7% was significant in that Denmark was now adhering to the UN’s official goal—but no more than that. Also, using development means to help refugees in Denmark rather than on aid and helping Danish business was a significant change of goals, which challenged the historical motivation for Danish development aid altogether.

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The 2019 Social Democratic government looked set to continue the same line. What were the drivers of the changes? The changes were, at a general level, a reflection of broader international trends and norms. The Danish aid policy in the first decade after the Cold War followed the principles set out by the OECD’s development committee and the UN.  The later change toward a larger focus on stabilizing fragile states and helping refugees in their neighborhood is also part of an international trend where development policy is more closely linked to foreign and security policy and immigration policy. But there were also some specific Danish conditions (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018, pp.  158–159). There was broad support for higher Danish development aid across governments in the first decade of the millennium and no apparent bureaucratic constraints. Jakobsen has pointed to the existence of resourceful policy communities in this field, which contributed to creating a consensus among the main political parties (Jakobsen, 2019). There was also very broad support for development aid in opinion polls including for the level of 1% of GNI (Information, 1997). The change in the period 2001–2011 was very much driven by the central role of the Danish People’s Party in the Liberal-Conservative government’s parliamentary majority. The party was not part of the hitherto dominant policy community (Jakobsen, 2019) and wanted more means allocated to Danish welfare. The allocation of development aid toward fragile states fitted well with the government’s military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this sense, 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror was an important international source of change. The opposition’s criticism of this move possibly had more to do with the reduction in the budget, than the substance (Jakobsen, 2019, p. 159). The further reduction in aid from 2015, which looks set to continue at the time of writing, was also facilitated by the Danish People’s Party being part of the governmental majority. Opinion polls also showed lower support for development aid than in the period before (Danida, 2012, p. 3). At a deeper level it was also an indication that the center-right was satisfied with Denmark’s position as one of the few countries in the world that allocated 0.7% (Jakobsen, 2019). That the 2019 Social Democratic government has taken the same line can be seen as part of its strategy to regain votes from the Danish People’s Party, as it had also been the case with its policy in the field of immigration. As far as the new goals were concerned,

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there was broad support for these among the parties in parliament which points to a broadly based change of goals.

4   Bilateral Relations In the wake of the Cold War a number of bilateral relations were strengthened. First of all, the relationship with the US was strengthened. President Clinton got nothing less than a rock star reception when he visited Copenhagen in 1997. These relations were intensified after 2001, but peaked during the Fogh Rasmussen premiership 2001–2009. Although Denmark has been critical toward many of President Trump’s policies (if less so than many other European countries), it still works to maintain a strong bilateral relationship. The relationship with the states from the former Eastern bloc reached a totally different level, in particular with Baltic states (before the Cold War there were none). Denmark was the champion of a ‘big bang’ EU enlargement which also included the Baltic states. Collaboration in the military field was also strong with the Baltic states and Poland. Bilateral cooperation with the UK had been close during the Cold War, not least within the EU. There was close cooperation between the Danish and the British forces in Afghanistan (2001–2014), Iraq (2003–2007), and Estonia (2018–) where the Danish forces were under British command. Although the UK is and will remain an important bilateral partner, there has clearly been a reduction in the political weight of the UK in Danish foreign policy (particularly after Brexit) and a stronger role of Germany and France (the bilateral relationship with Germany, Denmark’s biggest neighbor, has always been crucial). In addition, there has been increasing military cooperation with France, not least in Northern Iraq and Syria and in relation to the French European Intervention Initiative (EII). Of all the changes in the relationships, the ones with the former Communist states constituted the most profound changes, made possible by the breakdown of the bipolar structures. The other changes were mainly adjustment changes (doing more of the same), although that does not mean that they were unimportant. The drivers of the changes were the ones identified in the general section above.

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5   Multilateral and Niche Diplomacy The role of the EU (or the EC as it then was) in Danish foreign policy underwent a very significant change with the fall of the Wall—a tendency that was also detectable from the second part of the 1980s. During the Cold War, the EC was seen as one of the four cornerstones in Danish foreign policy—with a mainly economic focus. After the Cold War, the role of the EU was considerably strengthened. The many other functions (values, security, identity) which had previously been taken care of through one of the distinct cornerstones (UN, NATO, Nordic cooperation) were now seen as coming together in the EU. The EU was presented as the ‘point of departure for Danish international influence’ and the significant role of the EU in politics and security was accepted and praised. Having said that, the enthusiastic line toward the EU did not mean that Danish politicians had turned federalist. Moreover, the political elites’ more enthusiastic line toward the EU was knocked back when the Maastricht Treaty was turned down by the Danish population in a referendum in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty got thumbs-up in a referendum one year later—but conditional on four Danish opt-outs from EU policies—opt-­ outs which have been there ever since. From 1995 until recently, all governments have conducted Danish policy toward Europe with respect for the opt-outs while also stating that they were against Danish best interests. Referenda in 2000 and 2015 have turned down the governments’ propositions to lift the opt-outs on participation in the Euro and on full participation in Justice and Home Affairs. A significant change occurred in 2018 when the Social Democrats renounced their former position with reference to repeated polls, which showed that there was no majority for changes in the status quo. The 2019 Social Democrat government is the first government that does not aim to lift Denmark’s opt-outs. The change in the Danish policy toward Europe after the Cold War was profound, as the EU went from being an economic organization to being the central political organization in Europe. This fundamental change changed Danish ambitions for the EU profoundly. The main driver in the change was the big changes in Europe toward the end of the Cold War where the EU was widely seen as the new political anchor in Europe. This was reflected in the dominant political discourse in Denmark. The special Danish twist was that the EU still played an instrumental role for Denmark, although the aim was to place Denmark as close as possible to the core. It is the dominance of this discourse that is behind the continuity in Danish

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European policy. However, there were domestic constraints on this line from a discourse which saw the EU as restricted, economic interstate cooperation. This discourse (through the Danish People’s Party’s adherence to it) had pushed the Social Democratic government toward accepting the four opt-outs. This was a significant goal change. However, the fundamental understanding of the EU remained the same. As far as the UN is concerned, Denmark strongly supported and actively contributed to a much-increased role for the UN in the wake of the Cold War, i.a. through extensive participation in peace support operations (during the Cold War, it only took part in peace support operations) and development aid. But signs were that Danish contributions to the UN started to decline from the late 1990s after the initial enthusiasm (Andersen, 2019). Denmark participated less in UN operations than in the 1990s and showed less enthusiasm for the UN in general with the exception of climate policy. The new military operations took place under the aegis of NATO, the US, and the coalition against ISIS where the legal UN mandate for the operations was less explicit. (Article 51 in the UN charter). However, in the 2019–2020 Foreign and Security Strategy, a stronger focus on rules and international organizations could be detected with reference to the threat to these structures from i.a. the US (The Danish Government, 2018). The changes in the policy after the Cold War could be seen as a partly adjustment change and a partly program change. The UN had been important in Danish foreign policy during the Cold War as the framework for the international order. The Danish policy immediately after the Cold War was about providing more means (adjustment change) and support for UN military operations, which went further than peacekeeping (program change). The downgrading of the UN from the late 1990s could therefore also be seen as both adjustment change and program change. What appears to be an upgrading of the UN with the 2019–2020 Strategy and the 2019 government’s stronger focus on the climate issue seems likely to be either an adjustment change or a program change. The main driver of change after the Cold War was the systemic changes, which made room for a much-increased role for the UN in the international order. But there was also broad enthusiasm for an increased Danish role in the UN, including the military engagements. According to Branner, the increased support for the UN was in line with the Danish foreign policy tradition (Branner, 2013). The initial steps were taken in the Danish Foreign Ministry under Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen as part of

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the new ‘active internationalism’ doctrine. The change toward the end of the 1990s was driven by Danish disappointment with the record of the UN, but probably also the parallel move toward acting as a strategic actor. The recent change toward a greater focus on the UN appeared to be a reaction to the policies of the Trump administration, which put in doubt the US support for the liberal, institutional order. After the Cold War, the role of Nordic cooperation in Danish foreign policy has diminished, even if the importance of the Nordic dimension in Danish foreign policy very much depends on the issue area (Olesen, 2017). Nordic cooperation today is most prominent in the field of practical/economic aid policy where there is substantial informal cooperation (which peaked in the 1980–1990s). To a lesser extent, there is diplomatic cooperation—in particular, between embassies in third countries. Nevertheless, this is constrained by the Nordic differences regarding membership of NATO and the EU. Even so, there are recent tendencies toward more cooperation in the military field, not least linked to Russia’s more assertive policy line (Olesen, 2017). This is a fundamental change, considering the role of Nordic cooperation in Danish foreign policy during the Cold War. The recent increased cooperation in the military field may be an important change, but will probably amount to a program change rather than a more fundamental change, as the main military endeavors will take place within NATO.

6   Conclusion The analysis in this chapter has shown that there were many degrees of change in Danish foreign policy after the Cold War, sometimes within the same policy areas. Drawing on Hermann’s typology, some changes were adjustment changes whereas others contained elements of change in international orienteering (to the extent that the latter category makes sense within a discrete policy area. Here it is used to characterize a fundamental change). However, in three out of the four policy areas examined goal change was found to be the most appropriate category of change. The characterization of the change in the general orientation of Danish foreign policy is (even) more complex, as it is not obvious what aspects of Danish foreign behavior should be decisive in the definition of the general orientation. As I have hinted at above, this is a point of controversy in the literature. There have been changes in a number of areas compared with the Cold War: the Danish self-understanding as a small state, the approach

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to the EU and the US, the use of military means in foreign policy and the link to Danish foreign policy identity, aid policy, and a decline in the importance of Nordic Cooperation. There is also a dominant discourse to the effect that Danish foreign policy should be active. The four cornerstones discourse, dominant during the Cold War, has disappeared. Even so, Denmark is still part of the same international organizations as it was during the Cold War. These changes involve changes in all of Hermann’s four categories (which is why the general orientation is not included in Table  4.1), but probably not enough to qualify as a general change in Denmark’s entire orientation toward world affairs. As far as the drivers of change are concerned, there are numerous drivers at both the international and the domestic levels. Not surprisingly, the systemic changes at the international level seemed to have played a very considerable role in the immediate aftermath of 1989. The same is the case after 2001 and 2014 (but seemingly not 2008 to the same extent). But it is also the case that there is a specific Danish twist to it, which means

Table 4.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in Denmark since 1990

Adjustment change

Program change Goal change

Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

Bilateral relations (relations with former communist states profound change, relations with the US program change) –

• International changes, permissive domestic environment, changes of government, leadership change, policy entrepreneurs

Defense and security

Aid policy

International orientation change

Multilateral and niche diplomacy (UN closer to adjustment change) –

– • International changes, broad domestic support, change in foreign policy ideas, changes of government, leadership change, policy entrepreneurs • International changes/norms, broad domestic support, changes of government, leadership change • International changes, change in elite foreign policy ideas, changes of government –

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that systemic changes have not always been translated into Danish foreign policy in a predictable way. Drivers at the domestic level have always played a significant role (a possible exception being the 2018–2023 increase in defense expenditures).

References Andersen, L. (2019). The UN: A Forgotten Cornerstone in Danish Foreign Policy. In K.  Fischer & H.  Mouritzen (Eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Review 2019 (pp. 99–130). Danish Institute for International Studies. Branner, H. (2013). Denmark Between Venus and Mars: How Great a Change in Danish Foreign Policy? In N. Hvidt & H. Mouritzen (Eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2013. DIIS. Danida. (1994). A World in Development (En verden i udvikling  – strategi for udviklingspolitik mod år 2000). Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danida. (2000). Danmarks udviklingspolitik  – partnerskab. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danida. (2012). The Right to a Better Life. Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danida. (2017). The World 2030. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danish Government. (2018). Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019–2020. Retrieved May 7, 2019, from https://www.dsn.gob.es/sites/dsn/files/2018_ Denmark%20Foreign%20and%20security%20policy%20strategy%20 2019-­2020.pdf Due-Nielsen, C., & Petersen, N. (1995). Adaptation & Activism. The Foreign Policy of Denmark 1967–1993. Jurist- og Økononomforbundets forlag. Engberg-Pedersen, L., & Fejerskov, A. M. (2018). The Transformation of Danish Aid. In K. Fischer & H. Mouritzen (Eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Review 2018 (pp. 138–162). Danish Institute for International Studies. Farbøl, R. (2011). Kunsten at lægge historien til rette: Anders Fogh Rasmussen og opgøret med den danske udenrigspolitiske tradition in Temp - tidsskrift for historie, 3, 65–90. Forsvarsministeriet. (2009). Forsvarsforlig 2010–2014. Forsvarsministeriet. (2018). Ny aftale for forsvaret 2018–2023. Retrieved September 25, 2019, from https://fmn.dk/nyheder/Pages/ny-­aftale-­for-­ forsvaret-­2018-­2023.aspx Frederiksen, C.  H. (2018). The Role of Denmark in a More Complex Security Environment. In K.  Fischer & H.  Mouritzen (Eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Review 2018 (pp. 32–44). Danish Institute for International Studies. Hansen, L. (2002). Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe. In L. Hansen & O. Wæver (Eds.), European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States (pp. 20–49). Routledge. Hækkerup, P. (1965). Danmarks udenrigspolitik. Fremad.

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Hermann, C. (1990). Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 34(1), 3–21. Holt, L. (2018, February 6). Socialdemokratiet cementerer koblingen mellem udlændingepolitik og udviklingsbistand. Globalnyt. Retrieved September 20, 2019, from https://globalnyt.dk/content/socialdemokratiet-cementererkoblingen-mellem-udlaendingepolitik-og-udviklingsbistand Information. (1997, November 18). Døgnets nyheder. Information. Retrieved September 22, 2019, from https://www.information.dk/1997/11/ doegnets-­nyheder-­9 Jakobsen, P. V. (2019). Policy-fællesskaber, standard- og krisestyringsprocedurer: det oversete institutionelle grundlag for den brede opbakning til Danmarks aktivistiske udenrigspolitik. Politica, 51(2), 139–167. Jakobsen, P. V., & Kjærsgaard, K. (2017). Den danske FN-aktivismes storhed og fald 1945–2016. Politica, 49(4), 377–400. Jyllands-Posten. (2018). Løkke ved NATO topmøde: Trump kan kun blive klogere. Retrieved August 22, 2019, from https://jyllandsposten-­posten.dk/international/ECE10746956/loekke-­ved-­natotopmoede-­trump kan kun blive klogere/ Knudsen, U. (2014). The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2013. In N.  Hvidt & H.  Mouritzen (Eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2014 (pp. 11–23). Danish Institute of International Studies. Larsen, H. (2000). Danish CFSP Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: Continuity or Change? Cooperation and Conflict, 35(4), 37–63. Larsen, H. (2005). Analysing Small State Foreign Policy in the EU: The Case of Denmark. Palgrave Macmillan. Larsen, H. (2009). Danish Foreign Policy and the Balance Between the Brussels and Washington After 2001. Cooperation and Conflict, 44(2), 209–230. Larsen, H. (2011). Denmark: A Committed Member with Opt-Outs. In C. Hill & R.  Wong (Eds.), National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization? (pp. 93–109). Routledge. Larsen, H. (2017). Teorier om dansk udenrigspolitik efter den kolde krig. Hans Reitzel. Larsen, H. (2020). Foreign Policy  – New Directions in a Changing World? In P. M. Christiansen, J. Elklit, & P. Nedergaard (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics. Oxford University Press. Mariager, R. & Wivel, A. (2019). Hvorfor gik Danmark i Krig? Uvildig udredning for Danmarks militære engagement i Kosovo, Afghanistan og Irak. No named publisher. Olesen, M. R. (2017). Aktivismen med de nordiske brødre: forsigtig spiren efter lang tids tørke? Politica, 49(4), 358–376. Pedersen, R.  B. (2015). Tilkoblings- og afkoblingsstrategier i dansk udenrigs udenrigspolitik. Politik, 18(4), 37–45.

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Pedersen, R.  B., & Ringsmose, J. (2017). Aktivisme i dansk udenrigspolitik: Norden, FN, NATO og EU. Politica, 49(4), 339–357. Petersen, N. (2009). Kampen om den kolde krig i dansk politik og forskning. Historisk Tidsskrift, 109(1), 154–204. Rasmussen, A. F. (2003, March 26). Hvad kan det nytte? Berlingske Tidende. Rasmussen, A. F. (2007). A Look into Europe’s Chrystal Ball. Retrieved February 1, 2019, from http://www.stm.dk/_p_5373.html Ringsmose, J., & Rynning, S. (2017). Rutsjebane: udsving og udfordringer i Danmarks NATO aktivisme. Politica, 49(4), 401–425. Rynning, S. (2003). Denmark as a Strategic Actor: Danish Security After 11 September 2001. In P. Carlsen & H. Mouritzen (Eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003 (pp. 23–46). Danish Institute of International Affairs. Simony, M., & Wantzin, L. (2019). Dansk udenrigspolitik om bekæmpelsen af Islamisk Stat. Master thesis, Department of Political Science, Copenhagen University. Submitted 29 March 2019. Socialdemokraterne, Socialistisk Folkeparti og Det Radikale Venstre. (2011, September). En aktiv og ansvarlig udenrigspolitik. Wæver, O. (1992). Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe After the Cold War. International Affairs, 68(1), 77–10. Wivel, A. (2018). Forerunner, Follower, Exceptionalist or Bridge Builder? Mapping Nordicness in Danish Foreign Policy. Global Affairs. Retrieved February 1, 2018, from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.108 0/23340460.2018.1557016

CHAPTER 5

Finnish Foreign Policy: Pragmatic Adjustment to a Changing World Order Tapio Raunio

1   Introduction For centuries, Finland has been a small ‘borderland’ between east and west, as part of Sweden, as part of Russia, and then from 1917 on, as an independent state trying to find its position between east and west. This geopolitical context and limited freedom of maneuver has shaped Finnish identity and foreign policy and has contributed to a pragmatic approach toward international politics (Tiilikainen, 1998, 2006; Joenniemi, 2002; Alapuro, 2004; Browning & Lehti, 2007; Browning, 2008; Rainio-Niemi, 2014). In the Cold War era, Finnish foreign policy was very much driven by a policy of neutrality, which culminated in 1975 when Finland hosted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the long reign of President Urho Kekkonen (1956–1981), foreign policy was personally identified with the president, who was more or less visibly supported by the political elites within the Soviet Union. Political debate and contestation on foreign policy were rare during this era of

T. Raunio (*) Tampere University, Tampere, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_5

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“compulsory consensus” that placed a premium on maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union (Arter, 1987). The close economic and political ties with the Soviet Union were consolidated in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed in 1948. The FCMA treaty constituted limitations to Finnish armed forces and prohibited military cooperation with any country hostile to the Soviet Union. The Cold War period, thus, entailed a delicate balancing act for Finland, with priority to good relations with the Soviet Union reconciled with democratic political institutions at home and integration into Western markets. While the direct interference of the Soviet leadership in Finnish politics has often been exaggerated, the Finnish political elite was nevertheless always forced to anticipate reactions from Moscow, and this set firm limits on Finland’s cooperation with Western European and Nordic countries.1 And, as will be seen throughout this chapter, the preferences of the eastern neighbor continue to be highly relevant for Finland’s foreign and security policy. Another important tenet of Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War was the importance accorded to international institutions and particularly the United Nations (UN). Here the Nordic identity of Finland was emphasized, with Finland together with the other Nordic countries contributing around 25% of the personnel in UN peacekeeping operations. The Nordic nations developed a reputation as peacebuilders, with peacekeeping a key component of ‘Nordicness’ or the ‘Nordic model’. Peacekeeping and the UN framework mattered also in terms of self-­ perception and national identity. As Finland was not able to participate in European integration or in security cooperation with the ‘west’, peacekeeping offered an avenue for participation in international politics. The first Finnish peacekeepers were dispatched to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Suez in 1956, and since then around 45,000 Finns have served abroad in peacekeeping duties.2

1  The term ‘Finlandization’ was coined to denote ‘adaptive acquiescence’, whereby a weaker power endures infringements by a larger power in order to protect its key interests. For Finland, these were independence, democracy, and integration into Western markets. (Mouritzen, 1988; see Forsberg & Pesu, 2016). 2  Puolustusministeriö, Suomalainen rauhanturvaaminen 60 vuotta, 5.2.2016 (http:// www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/suomalainen_rauhantur vaaminen_60_ vuotta.7658.news).

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2   General Foreign Policy Orientation The end of the Cold War was thus certainly a ‘critical juncture’ or game-­ changer for Finland. And Finland did not hesitate when the window of opportunity opened. FCMA was abolished in 1991, in 1992 Finland applied for European Community (EC) membership, in 1994 Finland entered the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and in 1995 Finland joined the European Union (EU). Although Finland remains militarily non-aligned, in this new, post-Cold War era neutrality has given way to active participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP) of the EU and to close ties with NATO. While the EU has undoubtedly become Finland’s main reference group, Nordic countries have also taken steps toward further defense cooperation, with bilateral links to Sweden particularly important for Finland. But how much has Finnish foreign policy actually changed? Has there been a genuine change or is it more the case of pursuing old objectives in a new environment? This chapter answers these questions through the framework of three overlapping basic orientations or schools of thought that have been identified in Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy (e.g. Haukkala, 2012; Haukkala & Vaahtoranta, 2016; Pesu, 2017b; Juntunen, 2018). These orientations are necessarily overlapping and should certainly not be treated as mutually exclusive categories. For example, all three orientations can appear simultaneously in actual foreign policy or in the thinking of a particular politician. The first is small state realism, where state survival and security are paramount concerns. Small countries such as Finland should thus stay out of harm’s way in a world where great powers and their military strength dominate. Yet bilateral ties with Russia are seen as important in safeguarding national interests. The second is liberalism (or Euro-Atlanticism), which stresses the role of international organizations and rules. Multilateral cooperation and active diplomacy are beneficial for both small states and for the stability of the international community. According to the more ‘Atlanticist’ argument, deeper security integration with the west would also help distancing Finland from her eastern neighbor. The third policy line is globalism, which views the current world order as unfair and urges Finland to use the multilateral European and global institutions for emphasizing softer or ‘Nordic’ values such as solidarity, gender equality, or development aid. Globalists also stress a broader definition of security that

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encompasses human rights, environmental concerns, immigration, and other non-military dimensions. While Atlanticism was not an option before the 1990s, otherwise the basic orientations or principles were definitely present also during the Cold War—and continue to characterize Finnish foreign policy thinking today. Before proceeding to the policy questions structuring this chapter, it is essential to introduce the ‘domestic politics’ side of Finnish foreign and security policy. Here the 1990s were also a turning point, with the fall of the Soviet Union and EU membership acting as catalysts for constitutional change from the early 1990s onward. The new constitution, which entered into force in 2000, completed a period of far-reaching constitutional reform that curtailed presidential powers and brought the Finnish political system closer to a normal parliamentary democracy.3 Leadership by presidents has been replaced with leadership by oversized coalition governments that typically bring together parties across the ideological spectrum (Karvonen et  al., 2016). Under the old constitutional regime, foreign policy was the exclusive domain of the president, and hence the new constitution has for the first time granted the government and the unicameral parliament Eduskunta genuine authority in Finland’s external affairs. According to Section 93 of the constitution, the government is responsible for EU policy with foreign policy leadership shared between the president and the government. Despite occasional conflicts between the president and the cabinet, overall foreign policy co-leadership has functioned rather smoothly (Raunio, 2012; Raunio & Sedelius, 2020). Inside the Eduskunta, the Foreign Affairs Committee has displayed active ownership of foreign policy questions. It considers EU issues pertaining to foreign and security policy, while according to section 97 of the constitution, the committee ‘shall receive from the Government, upon request and when otherwise necessary, reports of matters pertaining to foreign and security policy’. Finally, all international obligations and commitments with legislative or budgetary implications must be approved by Eduskunta. Research indicates that the Eduskunta also uses actively its new-won powers, with the Foreign Affairs Committee not only insisting on government fulfilling its reporting obligations but also requesting further information from the cabinet. Ex ante mechanisms are crucial, with the committee receiving information from the government and hearing 3  The Constitution of Finland, 11 June, 1999 (731/1999). An English translation is available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf.

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ministers ahead of EU or international meetings. However, the decision-­ making culture in foreign policy, and particularly in security questions, continues to be guided by the search for broad partisan consensus (Raunio, 2016).

3   Defense and Security Policy In the Cold War era of ‘compulsory consensus’, there was essentially no debate about defense and security policy. Any dissenting voices found themselves quickly marginalized, and the official line of neutrality and close ties to the Soviet Union enjoyed virtually unanimous approval among both politicians and the broader public. In the post-Cold War period the situation is very different indeed: with the shadow of the eastern neighbor no longer constraining Finnish decision-makers to the same extent as before, there have been genuine security policy choices on the agenda that have also produced party-political and public contestation. These security and defense policy debates have focused on four interrelated questions: NATO, crisis management, CFSP/CSDP, and Russia. This section focuses on the first two questions, with ties to Russia and the stronger role of the EU context explored, respectively, in sections five and six of this chapter. Both Russian preferences and the gradual development of the EU’s security dimension are directly linked to the question of NATO membership. In addition to PfP cooperation since 1994, Finland is a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council since 1997 and an advanced partner in NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP) program since 2014. The programs of the Finnish governments formed since the mid-1990s, as well as the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports (see below), consistently specify that while Finland remains military non-aligned, cooperation with NATO is beneficial for both sides. These official documents also underline interoperability between Finnish armed forces and NATO so that Finland can participate in various NATO exercises and operations. It is customary in Finland to state that while NATO membership is not currently on the agenda, it is an option that needs to be left open should circumstances change. At least until now, Moscow has made it perfectly clear that it would not welcome Finland joining NATO, and Russia’s reactions to Finland’s potential membership application would be difficult to predict (Giles & Eskola, 2009; Bergquist et  al., 2016). Perhaps more important are the domestic constraints, with both public opinion and

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political parties against NATO membership. In fact, public opinion on the question has remained remarkably stable since the late 1980s, with support less than 30%, reaching its peaks after the Georgian war in 2008 and Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Of the Eduskunta parties, only the conservative National Coalition is in favor of membership since 2006 and even it does not campaign actively on the issue. Comparing the electorates of the parties, we can observe a clear left-right divide. Support for NATO membership is strongest in the National Coalition and the Swedish People’s Party, which represents the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority, while it is essentially below 30% in all the other parties, and even below 10% in the Left Alliance, the most left-wing party in the parliament. In addition, a survey from 2004 to 2008 by the Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI) asked respondents about support for NATO-led crisis management operations. It was strongest among voters of National Coalition and Swedish People’s Party and lowest among Left Alliance supporters. (Raunio, 2018, pp. 163–164). Analyzing Eduskunta debates on NATO since the mid-1990s, Särkkä (2019) nonetheless argues that political parties have, over time, become more pragmatic or positive toward NATO, with strong opposition only found among the Left Alliance MPs, and she concludes that MPs are thus more supportive of NATO than the electorate. This ‘Atlanticist’ dimension impacts directly on Finland’s role in the development of EU’s security and military capacity and in international crisis management. For advocates of NATO membership and of developing closer links with the ‘west’, the EU route provides a channel for Finland to contribute to European security integration and to practice far-reaching cooperation with NATO.  Those more in favor of retaining neutrality, on the other hand, argue that through active partnership Finland is merely entering NATO through the backdoor. These same arguments have manifested themselves in debates concerning crisis management, where the 1990s ushered in a new era: peacekeeping has been replaced with crisis management, the number and diversity of operations have increased significantly, and the UN is no longer the only actor in the scene, with particularly the EU and NATO carrying out missions. The Nordic countries responded by amending their peacekeeping laws so that their troops could both use force beyond self-defense and participate in missions led by NATO, EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Vesa, 2007; Jakobsen, 2006).

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Changes to Finnish peacekeeping legislation, enacted incrementally from the mid-1990s onward, reflect the domestic constitutional reforms, the changing security context, and specifically the development of CSDP (Tiilikainen, 2008; Palosaari, 2011). Until the mid-1990s, the legislation was based on two leading principles—the necessity of a UN or OSCE mandate and the impossibility of peace enforcement as Finnish soldiers were allowed to use force only for self-defense. An amendment from 1995 created the right to ‘extended peacekeeping’, implying the possibility for more extensive use of force.4 Five years later, another amendment increased the compatibility of Finnish legislation with the EU treaties which, since 1999, have entitled the EU to carry out all types of crisis management operations. The prohibition to participate in peace enforcement was abolished, and according to the same amendment, Finland can participate in humanitarian operations or in the protection of such operations at the request of UN organizations or agencies.5 The most recent significant change was introduced in 2006, with the title of the new law explicitly referring to ‘crisis management’ instead of ‘peacekeeping’. The government argued that ‘military crisis management’ describes the EU’s tasks more accurately than ‘peacekeeping’ and that the reform was needed in order for Finland to participate fully in crisis management operations led by UN, EU, or NATO and in EU’s battlegroups. Since 2006, Finnish troops can be assigned to all types of crisis management operations, even to missions lacking the mandate of the UN Security Council.6 In terms of the domestic politics of crisis management, the government is the key actor, negotiating operations abroad and planning Finnish participation. However, the president, as the commander-in-chief of the defense forces, has the final say about troop deployment, but the presidents have not contested the decisions. Essentially, the Eduskunta and specifically its Foreign Affairs Committee are heard before the issue is decided in the cabinet, and the parliament receives regular reports on the operations, for example, in the form of biannual crisis management overviews.

4  Laki Suomen osallistumisesta Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien ja Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyöjärjestön päätökseen perustuvaan rauhanturvaamistoimintaan (1565/95). 5  Rauhanturvaamislaki (750/2000). 6  Laki sotilaallisesta kriisinhallinnasta (211/2006)/The Act on Military Crisis Management (211/2006) (http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2006/en20060211.pdf).

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Public support for crisis management operations remains solid, at least in part because so far the number of Finnish troops sent abroad has been low and their tasks have mainly related to the ‘peacekeeping’ or civilian side of the missions.7 For example, in Finnish National Election Study (FNES) surveys carried out at the time of the 2007, 2011, and 2015 Eduskunta elections, comfortable majorities in every party—except the Finns Party in 2011—agreed with the statement that Finland’s participation in international crisis management is a positive thing. Yet, there was party-political contestation, especially in the 1990s. There was clear consistency in party positions irrespective of government-opposition dynamics. The National Coalition and the Swedish People’s Party were the strongest supporters of the legal reforms, with Social Democrats also backing the proposals. The most vehement dissent was expressed by the Left Alliance which criticized the moves toward peace enforcement and crisis management and the relaxation of the requirement for UN or OSCE mandate. The Left Alliance in several instances also argued against the intrusion of NATO into peacekeeping operations. In opposition from 1995 to 2003, the Centre Party attacked the reforms and defended traditional forms of peacekeeping, but the party line changed when it became the leading cabinet party after the 2003 elections, with Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen justifying the 2006 reforms with the need to adapt to the EU’s expanding military dimension. Also, the Christian Democrats, the Finns Party, and occasionally the Greens, were against the abolishment of the requirement for a UN mandate, with the Greens, in particular, advocating a pro-active role for Finland in civilian crisis management. Decisions to participate in individual operations have produced less contestation. The notable exceptions were the NATO-led missions which sparked lively debates characterized by concerns about the nature of the operations, the safety of Finnish personnel, and the move away from UN mandate toward peace enforcement. This applied especially to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with considerable unease among MPs about the whole operation and the situation in Afghanistan (Salonius-Pasternak, 2010). Participation in Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 7  The number of crisis management personnel, excluding rotation personnel and personnel in training, must not exceed 2000. In recent years the number of personnel has dropped and stabilized at around 400–500, largely because the operations have become more expensive. See Findicator, International military crisis management, http://www.findikaattori. fi/en/100.

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1999 also inspired intensive debates, not least on account of NATO bombing Yugoslavia ahead of the operation (Forsberg, 2000). Operations carried out by the UN or EU generally enjoy cross-party consensus. The exception has been the Finns Party, which has stressed credible national defense, and much of its criticism of the operations was based on their costs. The Left Alliance is the only party represented in the Eduskunta that has consistently criticized those operations moving away from UN mandates and traditional peacekeeping. Overall, crisis management has become less politicized, with broader backing for stronger international engagement in crisis management and for EU-led operations in particular (Raunio, 2018). While both NATO and crisis management have produced party-­political differences, the ‘official’ national foreign policy line continues to be based on deliberately constructed partisan consensus, particularly regarding security and defense matters. Here, a key role is performed by the ‘grand strategy’ document, titled since 1995 the Government Security and Defence Policy Report and published roughly every four years or once per electoral term (Limnéll, 2008; Pesu, 2017a). The report is based on a broad conception of security and provides an overall framework for subsequent foreign and security policy decision-making. The first reports were produced in the 1970s and 1980s by parliamentary defense committees where parties were represented based on their share of Eduskunta seats. Since 1995, the government has produced the reports, but the process is closely monitored by a parliamentary working group that brings together representatives from all Eduskunta parties, opposition included. Inside the government, the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the president, oversees the drafting of the report. The reports have largely followed the same structure, with analysis of the security policy environment, not least in the neighboring areas, followed by various topical matters from crisis management to NATO, Nordic defense cooperation, and cybersecurity, with the exact issues covered obviously depending on real-world developments. Finland’s non-­ aligned status and credibility of national defense are ever-present in the discussions,8 with broad cross-party and also public support behind the 8  Also, when discussing various security policy issues, the political debates often center around the implications for Finland’s international position and defense capability. For example, parliamentary debates on crisis management have often focused on the effects the operations will have on either the defense forces or on Finland’s ‘non-aligned’ status, not so much

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defense budget (Fig.  5.1), arms purchases, and the conscript army.9 Nonetheless, the left-right cleavage does often structure the discussions, with center-left parties emphasizing a more comprehensive or broader approach to foreign affairs, including human rights and development policy, while center-right parties are more against cuts to defense spending and more supportive of developing closer links with NATO—ideological differences which were already visible even during the Cold War era (Joenniemi, 1978). Here we must remember that the fragmented party system, with no party, as a rule, winning more than 20–25% of the votes

Fig. 5.1  Finland’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank) on the actual operations (Koivula & Sipilä, 2011). The same applied to the long process of Finland joining the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty in November 2011 (Pesu, 2017a). Both Rieker (2004) and Wivel (2014) make the broader point about Finland seeing international operations as a way for improving its defense capabilities. 9  The reports are available at http://www.defmin.fi/julkaisut_ja_asiakirjat/suomen_turvallisuus-_ja_puolustuspoliittiset_selonteot. Only the Green League is against compulsory military service, arguing instead in favor of a more selective model such as those used in Germany and Sweden.

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in elections, and the tradition of forming broad, cross-bloc coalition cabinets also facilitate consensual governance and ideological convergence between political parties.

4   Development Cooperation Policy Development policy has overall remained a low salience issue, but it clearly mattered during the Cold War era in terms of Finland’s international identity. Working together with the Nordic countries, Finland pledged its support to the development policy goals of the UN from the 1960s onward, although its aid levels have remained consistently below that given by the other Nordics. Finland has contributed much of its aid through multilateral UN channels, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), but since the 1990s, the EU framework has obviously become increasingly important. During the Cold War the debates concerned mainly the balance between bilateral versus multilateral aid and the choice of the recipient countries,10 while since the 1990s, the limited debates have focused more on levels and types of aid. In terms of Finland’s profile in development aid, some long-term features can be identified: a holistic approach underlining the links between various aspects of development, eradication of poverty, involvement of civil society actors, and a strong emphasis on education, reducing inequalities, sustainable development, and the role of women in developing countries (Koponen & Siitonen, 2006; Koponen et al., 2012; Siitonen, 2017). Aid levels have primarily been explained by the domestic financial context. In times of trouble, such as during the severe recession of the early 1990s, aid plummeted, while periods of economic growth have seen more money allocated to development projects (Fig. 5.2). Following the 2015 elections, the new center-right coalition that included the Finns Party cut annual official Finnish aid by around 30% (the government also made cuts to crisis management budget). At the same time aid was more explicitly tied to business and export interests, particularly through Finnfund (Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation), a state-owned development finance company that provides long-term risk capital for private projects in developing countries. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 10  Long-term partner countries include Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Vietnam, and Zambia.

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Fig. 5.2  Finland’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) criticized these developments in its peer review. It recommended that Finland reverses the decline of official development aid, including to least-­ developed countries, while stating explicitly that Finland should keep “its focus on poverty and untied aid as it increasingly makes investments linked to Finnish businesses” (OECD, 2017). In Finland, many politicians, primarily from the leftist parties, expressed strong concerns about Finland drifting away from its traditional Nordic reference group and how the cuts would influence Finland’s image. The government responded by referring to the poor economic situation and underlined the long-term goal of 0.7% of GDP for development aid (Ojanen & Raunio, 2018b, p. 414). Critics have also argued that the ‘private turn’ and prioritizing Finnish business interests undermines the core objectives of development policy. Beyond such questions aid policy is not subject to any major domestic party-­ political contestation. The political left and especially the Greens are more

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willing to increase aid levels and are more critical of the ‘private turn’, but only the Finns Party is strongly critical of aid.11

5   Bilateral Relations Relations with her eastern neighbor are always a top priority for Finland.12 The Cold War period constituted a balancing act, with close and friendly ties with Kremlin co-existing alongside Finland’s economic integration with Western Europe. The Soviet Union has been succeeded by Russia, but the same balancing act remains. Moscow continues to set constraints on Finland’s security policy choices, while Finland carefully follows developments in Russia. In the new EU context, however, the main question is finding a proper balance between bilateral ties with Russia and the EU’s common policies toward Russia. That specific question is addressed in the next section of this chapter. At this stage it is sufficient to point out the obvious: apart from influencing Finland’s security policy decisions, Russia is economically a major trading partner,13 with also an increasing number of Russians living in Finland nowadays. Various official documents, such as the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports, government programs, or presidential speeches consistently emphasize the importance of maintaining good bilateral relations with Russia, both for economic and security reasons. In addition to stressing the need for conciliation and international diplomacy, EU included, at least until now Finland has tended to underline the role of bilateral ties when skies grow darker. As explained in the next section, 11  Reflecting the consensual practices in foreign policy decision-making, the Development Policy Committee, first established in 1979, monitors and evaluates and issues statements on Finnish development policy, focusing particularly on enhancing policy coherence. It brings together representatives of political parties, NGOs engaged in development cooperation, the relevant ministries, the business community, researchers, the agricultural sector, and trade unions. 12  Addressing the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington in September 2007, the Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies remarked that “Finland is privileged to be located in one of the safest corners of the world. However, given our geographical location, the three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia”. The speech, titled ‘Finland: similar yet different’, is available at https://www.defmin.fi/en/ topical/speeches/minister_of_defence_jyri_hakamies_at_csis_in_washington.3335. news?663_o=10. 13  See figures by Finnish Customs available at https://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_ kotimaankauppa_en.html, and https://tulli.fi/en/statistics.

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this applies particularly to developments since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Relations with Russia are thus active and at the highest level based on regular talks between the respective presidents. The underlying rationale—that applied already during the Cold War—for the meetings seems to be to avoid further escalation of tensions between Russia and the ‘west’ and to tie Russia into the international community, developments that would also serve Finland’s economic and security policy interests. Here, a notable difference is found when compared with the Baltic countries and the other Nordics that have essentially not held bilateral meetings with Putin in recent years. Overall, Finnish politicians and other security policy stakeholders still talk in rather cautious tones about Russia, with actual direct critique or defections from the ‘official line’ quite limited. This partisan consensus is facilitated by the institutional arrangements for relations with Russia. As the president is the main actor vis-à-vis Russia, the political parties do not adopt policies or issue statements that would contradict the president’s positions. Here we must remember that for a lot of Finns the president is the guarantor of national security that has historically handled negotiations with Soviet/Russian leaders. However, particularly following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014, Finnish politicians have started to ‘call a spade a spade’, accusing Russia more directly of breaking international laws and of creating instability. Government Security and Defence Policy Reports, comments by presidents, ministers, and other stakeholders, as well as public and media discourse, do pay attention to increasing Russian assertiveness and rivalry in the neighboring areas, not least in the Baltic Sea region, with air space violations, new hybrid threat scenarios, and of course the continuing conflict in Ukraine (Siddi, 2017; Pesu, 2017a, pp. 91–95). The Nordic countries have traditionally functioned as an essential reference group for Finland. Arguably, a small country like Finland needs cooperation and institutional backing not only for material or practical reasons, but also for building actorness in international relations. The Nordic connection has made Finland more easily recognizable and increased its credibility and reliability in international relations from the 1950s onwards. Membership in the Nordic Council (1955) meant that Finland could cooperate even with Nordic NATO members, while Nordic cooperation featured prominently in the UN, peacekeeping included. Through its Nordic identity, Finnish foreign policy is often associated with ‘Nordic’ values such as internationalism, peace, disarmament,

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cooperation, human rights, ecologically sound development, gender issues, and solidarity with the Third World. However, Finland has also been ready to abandon the Nordic reference group when needed, and Nordicness can sometimes also be a burden, as became evident in the failed campaign for a seat in the UN Security Council in 2012. A report on the reasons for the failure was commissioned from the International Peace Institute (IPI), and the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE reported the findings with the telling title of “US think tank: Not everyone cares for the Nordic ‘know-it-all’ attitude”.14 According to the report “The core values which the Nordics stand for … like human rights, the rule of law, the responsibility to protect, etcetera, is (sic) not necessarily that popular amongst the majority of the membership in the United Nations. And this is paired with a perception that the Nordics consider themselves to be morally superior, that there is a ‘besserwisser’, condescending attitude toward others based on the values and ideological issues”.15 Nordic security and defense cooperation have intensified since the turn of the millennium (Forsberg, 2013; Brommesson, 2018). This cooperation with the Nordics is viewed almost exclusively in positive terms, both among the political elites and the broader public. An ABDI poll from November 2017 shows this very clearly. When asked which factors improve Finland’s security, the order was as follows: participation in Nordic defense cooperation (83%), participation in the EU’s common defense (70%), EU membership (62%), increasing international economic interaction (52%), participation in international crisis management (51%), military non-­ alignment (46%), and possible NATO membership (29%). In these annual polls, the question about Finland’s military cooperation with the Nordic countries has been asked since 2012, and public support for Nordic cooperation has been consistently high.16 14  http://yle.fi/uutiset/us_think_tank_not_ever yone_cares_for_the_nordic_ know-it-all_attitude/6571358. 15  Taking stock, moving forward. Report to the Foreign Ministry of Finland on the 2012 Elections to the United Nations Security Council”, April 2013. International Peace Institute, https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/130406-UNSC_Elections_Report_Final.pdf. However, the Nordic Image was probably not the main reason for not getting the Security Council seat (Seppä & Tervo, 2020). 16  ABDI polls are available at https://www.defmin.fi/en/tasks_and_activities/media_ and_communications/the_advisory_board_for_defence_information_abdi/bulletins_and_ reports.

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Examining the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports and the related parliamentary debates since the mid-1990s shows, in turn, the broad partisan consensus behind Nordic links. In the first reports from the 1990s, Nordic cooperation was primarily referred to in the context of crisis management, although it was also seen important in terms of regional stability in northern Europe and the Baltic area. Since then, practical arrangements and treaties come up repeatedly, such as Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), established in 2009 to bring together the various forms of Nordic cooperation under one structure. The most far-­ reaching ones are with Sweden, where cooperation is said to extend beyond peacetime.17 Cost-effectiveness and practicality seem to be the main drivers of cooperation, not least in the form of arms purchases and training sessions, but Russia’s aggressive foreign policy plays a role as well. Moreover, Nordicness is more broadly seen as a starting point for international cooperation and identity in world politics. For example, the 2009 report concluded that “because their societies are so similar, the Nordic countries have common goals in several issues that are central to security, such as climate change and working together in a globalizing world. […] The Nordic countries have the possibility to bring up jointly agreed goals and advance them also in other forums, such as the UN, EU, OSCE and NATO”.18 The more recent debates emphasize bilateral ties with Sweden. A clear political will to deepen security cooperation with Sweden is expressed and the ‘historical, special relationship’ between the two countries is often repeated. The other Nordic countries are hardly mentioned individually, with the exception of Norway in the 2009 report (as a result of a 2008 report between Finland, Norway, and Sweden on deepening security cooperation between the three countries) and the Icelandic Air Policing exercise, which divided opinions as many saw it taking Finland uncomfortably close to NATO. This closeness to Sweden results quite simply from the basic understanding that Denmark, Iceland, and Norway are NATO members. There is also quite widespread frustration regarding the lack of concrete contents in Nordic cooperation and particularly regarding bilateral links with Sweden, with at least some mistrust among Finnish 17   Recent agreements and memoranda are available at https://www.defmin.fi/ ajankohtaista/kansainvaliset_sopimukset. 18  Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka 2009. Valtioneuvoston selonteko, VNS 11/2009VNS 11/2009, 56.

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decision-­makers that can be traced back to Sweden applying for EC membership in 1990 without consulting Finland (Juntunen & Pesu, 2018). Several pro-­NATO politicians in turn question whether a defense alliance with Sweden would offer any real value for Finland. Potential NATO membership application is in the debates nonetheless strongly linked to Sweden’s choices, with Finland arguably only joining NATO together with Sweden (Ojanen & Raunio, 2018b).

6   EU, Multilateral, and Niche Diplomacy The UN framework was highly valued in Finland during the Cold War, with Finland, together with the other Nordic countries, promoting peacekeeping, conciliation, and disarmament while stressing the importance of development aid. Since the early 1990s the status of the United Nations in national discourse and actual foreign policy has declined, but the same priorities still characterize Finland’s behavior in the UN. Finland continues to stress peace mediation and conflict prevention in line with a famous speech given by President Kekkonen in the UN General Assembly in 1961: “We see ourselves as physicians rather than judges; it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn. It is rather to diagnose and to try to cure”.19 Finland has also continued to emphasize global solidarity and development aid, for example through the Millennium Development Goals. In that context, Finland has paid special attention to education and the role of women in developing countries (Vesa, 2012). In terms of political preferences, the left-leaning parties tend to be more supportive of the UN, but the basic approach toward the United Nations and Finland’s priorities therein have not been seriously challenged at any point. The EU has replaced the UN and the Nordics as Finland’s primary reference group. When the Cold War had ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland wasted no time in seizing the opportunity to become fully engaged in European integration. Once the membership application was made in spring 1992, a broad majority of the national decision-­making 19  Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien yleiskokouksen kolmas erityisistunto sekä kuudestoista istuntokausi ja sen jatkoistunto. Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministeriön julkaisuja 1962, pp. 165–166. The most famous Finnish ‘physician’ is undoubtedly Martti Ahtisaari, a longstanding diplomat who also served as the Finnish president from 1994 to 2000. After the presidency, he founded the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and in 2008, Ahtisaari was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to Namibian independence, Serbia’s withdrawal from Kosovo, and the autonomy for Aceh in Indonesia.

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elite—government, parliamentary majority, trade unions and employers’ organizations, main political parties, the president, most of the media— emerged in favor of EU membership. Finland joined the EU from the beginning of 1995, following a membership referendum held in October 1994 in which 57% voted in favor of entering the Union. Economic factors were strongly emphasized in the membership debates. Finland is heavily dependent on trade, and the demise of the communist bloc increased trade dependence on the EU countries. The heavy recession of the early 1990s further convinced the industry and the trade unions about the importance of joining the Union. In addition to any lessons learned from history and the Cold War, the rather uncertain political situation in Russia brought security concerns to the fore. While security policy considerations were downplayed during the referendum campaign, there is no doubt that the security dimension was a key factor behind the decision of both the elite and the voters to support EU membership. Moreover, there was a broader cultural argument about (re-)joining the West. While the pro-EU camp argued that by joining the Union Finland would merely be maintaining or consolidating its place among west European countries, there is little doubt that especially among foreign observers the ‘Western’ identity of Finland had been far less clear. Indeed, the significance of EU membership for Finland should not be underestimated, for it clearly constituted a key element in the “process of wholesale re-identification on the international stage” (Arter, 1995, 2000, p. 691). Finland’s integration policy has typically been characterized as flexible and constructive. According to the political elite, national interests can be best pursued through active and constructive participation in EU decision-­ making. Underlying this stance is a conviction that strong and efficient European institutions and common rules can best protect the rights and interests of smaller member states, as intergovernmental processes tend to favor the larger countries. Pragmatism and adaptability, behavioral traits influenced by Cold War experiences, are arguably the leading qualities of Finnish EU policy. Finland is the only Nordic country that belongs to the eurozone, with the single currency adopted without much political contestation. Finland has also consistently emphasized the unity of the EU, not least in foreign and security policy. The outbreak of the euro crisis and the rise of the Eurosceptical Finns Party have brought about contestation over Europe, but overall both the parties and the public opinion remain supportive of integration. In fact, public opinion has become more

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supportive of the EU (Raunio & Tiilikainen, 2003; Raunio & Saari, 2017; Ojanen & Raunio, 2018a). Many voices questioned whether a neutral country with a long border with Russia could contribute meaningfully to European security integration. Calming such doubts is probably one of the reasons why Finland has actively supported the development of CFSP/CSDP (Jokela, 2011; Palosaari, 2011, 2016). In the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996–1997, Finland and Sweden formulated an initiative according to which the EU should create a military crisis management capacity. The focus on crisis management was understandable: not only does Finland have a long-standing reputation for active participation in peacekeeping operations, crisis management also offered a way to make a positive contribution to CSDP when NATO membership is not an option. Finland has also subsequently contributed actively to the EU operations and to the Battle Group. Finnish decision-makers underlined the security-enhancing impact of EU membership, not least vis-à-vis Russia. Finland has often seen itself as a bridge-builder between EU and Russia (until 2004 Finland was the only EU country that shared a border with Russia), but whether this perception is shared throughout the member state capitals or in Brussels is another matter. Finland was also promoting the importance of the Arctic, including through the Northern Dimension initiative launched in 1998. A fundamental worry from the beginning had been that Finland could be entangled in the problems between the EU and Russia, should their relations deteriorate and should Finland have to choose sides in case the EU could not act with a single voice toward Russia. Not even the first years of EU membership were problem-free, as the Chechen wars in 1994 and 1999, the latter during Finland’s first EU presidency, showed. During its second EU presidency in 2006, Finland did not manage to secure the commencement of negotiations on a new agreement (‘postPartnership and Cooperation Agreement’) with Russia. When EU actions were seen to fail, Finland engaged itself in ‘damage control’ of some kind through more active bilateral relations (Haukkala & Ojanen, 2011, pp. 157–159). This applies to the whole period under observation: when EU’s common policies have been at odds with Finland’s interests toward Russia, or perhaps when there are question marks about the cohesion of the EU and Finland’s position, bilateralism is valued more than during harmonious times.

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The annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine have certainly brought to the fore the ‘special relationship’ with Russia and the question about the proper balance between bilateral and EU policies. Given the close economic ties with Russia, the sanctions imposed by the EU and the Russian countermeasures are hitting Finland particularly hard. Nonetheless, Finland has supported the EU line, with the government and President Sauli Niinistö underlining that there is no other option. Again, the importance of bilateral ties has been highlighted, with particularly President Niinistö meeting President Putin on a regular basis. Finland has also tried to preserve the unity of the EU for fear of having to take sides. In 2015, Finnish politicians complained about the EU countries leaving Finland alone with hard choices in the decision concerning the participation of Russians that are on the EU’s sanction list in an OSCE parliamentary meeting in Helsinki.20 Overall, as already argued in the previous section, Finland has sought to bind Russia into international and European cooperation as further decline into authoritarianism and potential isolation would surely make Russia a more unpredictable actor in world politics. This has applied also to the post-2014 context where Finland has underlined the importance of upholding cooperation with Russia, not least through institutions such as the Council of Europe or the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (Siddi, 2017, pp. 150–156). Adapting to a planned common EU defense policy has proven rather unproblematic. However, inserting a mutual assistance clause in what was originally called the Constitutional Treaty caused Finland and the other four ex-neutral member states headache. They proposed a watered-down version of the clause in which the member states “may request aid”, leaving out the obligation of aid and assistance altogether (Ojanen, 2008, p. 61). This was not acceptable to the other member states and the mutual defense commitment prevailed, but the policy of the Union “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States” (article 42:2 Lisbon Treaty). Afterward, Finnish decision-makers have underlined their commitment to the mutual assistance clause. However, the legislative changes enabling the defense forces to receive and give military assistance (outside the realm of crisis 20  Helsingin Sanomat, 6 July 2015, “Niinistö: Suomi jätettiin yksin Venäjä-ratkaisun kanssa”, http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/a1436145697408?ref=hs-art.artikkeli; Hufvudstadsbladet, 7 July 2015, “Niinistö: Finland satt i en rävsax”, http://hbl.fi/nyheter/2015-07-07-762030/ niinisto-finland-satt-i-en-ravsax.

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management) were not introduced before 2017. As was already referred to earlier in this chapter, the further development of CFSP/CSDP enjoys broad support among the political parties. The Finns Party tends to be more critical, prioritizing national defense, while the Left Alliance has shown more hesitation in developing the military dimension of European integration. Since the early 1990s relations with the United States have also become more important. In this context, an interesting detail concerns the purchase of American Hornet fighter jets in 1992, less than a year after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Decision-makers did their best to deny any ‘political’ motives behind the purchase, referring instead to the price and technical capability of the plane (Pesu, 2017a, pp.  29–31). Apart from bilateral meetings between the respective presidents or other senior political figures and links with NATO, Finland has even twice hosted a summit between the American and Russian presidents, in 1997 and more recently in 2018 the controversial meeting between Putin and Trump. Whatever the impact of the latter summit on Finland’s foreign policy image, it nonetheless presents continuity in the sense of Finland emphasizing efforts aimed at reducing tensions between ‘east’ and ‘west’.

7   Conclusions Referring to the typology of foreign policy change of Hermann (1990) introduced in the introductory chapter of this volume, the main driver of changes has been the external context of Finnish foreign policy that has altered quite fundamentally from the Cold War period to the current era (see Table 5.1 for an overview of all changes). The EU is now undoubtedly the main reference group (international orientation change); Finland has edged closer to NATO (goal change), and Finland contributes actively to various crisis management missions (goal change). In a nutshell, Finland is simply much more present in international politics than before. Foreign policy has also become more ‘parliamentarized’ (program change). Decision-makers face considerably less external constraints, and this has opened the door for domestic public debates and party-political contestation about foreign and security policy. Yet we can detect strong elements of continuity. Relations with the eastern neighbor remain highly salient for Finland, in terms of both security policy and trade. Regular bilateral ties with Moscow are maintained while Finland feels more comfortable when the EU manages to avoid

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Table 5.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in Finland since 1990 Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

Adjustment change

Redefined role of Nordic cooperation toward closer security ties

Program change

From presidential leadership to more parliamentarized foreign policy decision-making

Goal change

• Drivers: end of the Cold War, political will to deepen relations in security and defense, EU now the main reference group (handling many of the issues previously more on the agenda of Nordic cooperation) • Drivers: end of the Cold War and broad elite consensus in favor of reducing presidential powers (following the excesses of presidential rule under President Kekkonen) • Drivers: EU membership (and the development of the CFSP) and the end of the Cold War

Amending peacekeeping legislation to enable participation in all kinds of military operations Moving closer to NATO • Drivers: end of the Cold War and EU (without applying for actual membership membership) • Inhibitors: close ties with Russia, hesitant public opinion and political parties (due to tradition of non-alignment) EU becomes the main • Drivers: end of the Cold War and reference group economic importance of Western (EU) markets

International orientation change

internal splits vis-à-vis Russia. Nordic cooperation is very much intact, particularly in the form of bilateral agreements with Sweden (adjustment change), while in the context of UN, aid policy, and also CFSP / CSDP, Finland continues to emphasize ‘soft’ Nordic values such as conflict mediation, gender issues, and disarmament. In his historical account of the Finnish strategic culture, Heikka (2005) also underlines continuity, where Finland defends an anti-hegemonic security order in Europe, and through integration with the ‘West’ (EU and NATO) seeks to contain or transform the Soviet Union/Russia. Returning thus to the three orientations in Finnish foreign policy outlined in the introductory section of this chapter, we can observe that small state realism, where state survival and security are the key concerns, are behind many of the choices made since the early 1990s—from EU membership to active role in CFSP/CSDP, advances in Nordic security

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cooperation, to active ties with Russia and the high support shown for territorial defense and the conscript army. At the same time, these choices also fit the liberal interpretation of Finnish foreign policy, with the end of the Cold War enabling Finland to both participate in and to actively promote the role of multilateral European and global organizations, not least in terms of conflict-resolution. Atlanticism manifests itself primarily through partnership with NATO, but public opinion remains solidly against actual NATO membership. The third policy line of globalism is also very much present and becomes more prominent under left-leaning governments and/or presidents, such as during the presidency of Tarja Halonen (2000–2012). When these orientations have clashed, small state realism and concerns about security have arguably come on top. While there is now a genuine choice in foreign and security policy, the consensual approach prevails. The 1990s saw even quite heated debates within and between political parties over changes to crisis management legislation and developing closer links with NATO, but since then contestation has subsided, and there is overall broad partisan consensus regarding major foreign and security policy choices. Here, a key role is performed by the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports as well as the dual leadership between the president and the government. Underlining the Finnish appreciation of consensus is the belief that such a small country is vulnerable if it shows internal differences of views, especially when dealing with Russia. To conclude, this chapter has, thus, produced evidence of both continuity and change. The Finnish approach has been characterized by pragmatism, with foreign policy decision-makers adjusting to the post-Cold War era through deeper integration with EU and NATO while prioritizing good relations with Moscow. Concerns about national security, regional stability, and being left alone and vulnerable may not always be publicly aired, but they lie behind Finland’s choices since the early 1990s.

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Palosaari, T. (2016). From ‘Thin’ to ‘Thick’ Foreign Policy Europeanization: Common Foreign and Security Policy and Finland. European Foreign Affairs Review, 21(4), 579–599. Pesu, M. (2017a). Koskiveneellä kohti valtavirtaa: Suomen puolustuspolitiikka kylmän sodan lopusta 2010-luvun kiristyneeseen turvallisuusympäristöön. Puolustusministeriön julkaisuja 1/2017. Pesu, M. (2017b). Kun pienvaltiorealismin hegemonia murtui: suomalaiset ulkopoliittiset koulukunnat kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alussa. Politiikka, 59(4), 280–297. Rainio-Niemi, J. (2014). The Ideological Cold War: The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland. Routledge. Raunio, T. (2012). Semi-Presidentialism and European Integration: Lessons from Finland for Constitutional Design. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(4), 567–584. Raunio, T. (2016). Refusing to be Sidelined: The Engagement of the Finnish Eduskunta in Foreign Affairs. Scandinavian Political Studies, 39(4), 312–332. Raunio, T. (2018). Parliament as an Arena for Politicisation: The Finnish Eduskunta and Crisis Management Operations. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(1), 158–174. Raunio, T., & Saari, J. (Eds.). (2017). Reunalla vai ytimessä? Suomen EU-politiikan muutos ja jatkuvuus. Gaudeamus. Raunio, T., & Sedelius, T. (2020). Semi-Presidential Policy-Making in Europe: Executive Coordination and Political Leadership. Palgrave Macmillan. Raunio, T., & Tiilikainen, T. (2003). Finland in the European Union. Frank Cass. Rieker, P. (2004). Europeanization of Nordic Security. The European Union and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States. Cooperation and Conflict, 39(4), 369–392. Salonius-Pasternak, C. (2010). Kriisinhallinnan Rajamailla: Kansanedustajat varauksellisia Afganistanin operaation nykytilanteesta. Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper 64. Särkkä, I. (2019). Nato-retoriikka Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisessa keskustelussa. Helsingin yliopisto, Valtiotieteellisen tiedekunnan julaksiuja 121 (2019). Seppä, T., & Tervo, A. (2020). Kokoaan suurempi? Suomen ja Luxemburgin turvallisuusneuvostokampanjat. Politiikka, 62(3), 295–307. Siddi, M. (2017). National Identities and Foreign Policy in the European Union: The Russia Policy of Germany, Poland and Finland. Rowman & Littlefield. Siitonen, L. (2017). Regional and Sub-Regional Effects on Development Policies: The Benelux and the Nordic Countries Compared. Regions & Cohesion, 7(2), 34–69. Tiilikainen, T. (1998). Europe and Finland: Defining the Political Identity of Finland in Western Europe. Ashgate.

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Tiilikainen, T. (2006). Finland—An EU Member with a Small State Identity. Journal of European Integration, 28(1), 73–87. Tiilikainen, T. (2008). Toward an Active Participation in Foreign Policy—The Role of the Finnish Parliament in International Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. In M.  O’Brien, R.  Stapenhurst, & N.  Johnston (Eds.), Parliaments as Peacebuilders in Conflict-Afflicted Countries (pp.  213–223). The World Bank. Vesa, U. (2007). Continuity and Change in the Finnish Debate on Peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping, 14(4), 524–537. Vesa, U. (2012). Finland in the United Nations: Consistent and Credible Constructivism. Finnish Foreign Policy Papers 2, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Wivel, A. (2014). Birds of a Feather Flying Apart? Explaining Nordic Dissonance in the (Post-) Unipolar World. In A.-S. Dahl & P. Järvenpää (Eds.), Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-Unipolar World (pp. 79–92). Routledge.

CHAPTER 6

French Foreign Policy: Make France Great Again? Friederike Richter and Martial Foucault

1   Introduction The French foreign policy has a peculiar status within French institutions since the beginning of the French Fifth Republic (1958). Indeed, despite the existence of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the President keeps a tight control of the content of France’s foreign policy under what is commonly called the “domaine réservé”. With 161 embassies serving its bilateral relations, 15 permanent representations to multilateral bodies and 89 consulates-­general and consulates in 2019, France ranks third in the world in terms of its representation and international activity (Lowy, 2019). The aim of this extensive diplomatic network is to protect French interests, and to maintain France’s international standing. This includes promoting peace, security and human rights; supporting international development; F. Richter (*) Universität der Bundeswehr München, Neubiberg, Germany Sciences Po, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] M. Foucault Sciences Po, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_6

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stimulating French ideas and businesses on the international scene; and providing security and administrative services for France’s nationals abroad. While the fundamental goals of French foreign policy evolved relatively little over the past thirty years, France reset its priorities and restructured its foreign policy tools after the end of the Cold War and with the rise of new regional powers in a context of increasing threats. It thus inter alia moved to a professional army, adopted a comprehensive approach to foreign, security and defense policy, and continued to build up numerous strategic and defense partnerships, at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral level. There are multiple reasons for those shifts, including political, strategic, operational and economic ones. The aim of this chapter is to analyze foreign policy change in France since 1990. First, we describe the broad trends in French foreign policy over the past thirty years. Second, we closely examine two foreign policy domains, defense and official development assistance (ODA), and explain why France introduced a comprehensive approach to foreign policymaking. Third, we illustrate how French governments started to use a combination of bi-, mini- and multilateral forms of cooperation to effectively and legitimately advance their foreign policy goals, and thus maintain France’s international standing. To conclude, we identify the main drivers of stability and change in French foreign policy.

2   General Foreign Policy Orientation In this first section, we describe the broad trends in French foreign policy and unveil its fundamental policy orientations since 1990. After having shown how France defines its place on the international scene, we outline its main priorities and explain how—and why—they changed over the past thirty years. We then closely examine how France adapted its foreign policy instruments to match its international ambitions in the post-Cold War era. 2.1  The Role of France on the International Scene: Trends and Challenges “All my life, I’ve had a certain idea of France […] France is only France when she is ranked first […] France cannot be France without greatness”1 1  Original text: “Toute ma vie, je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France […] la France n’est réellement elle-même qu’au premier rang […] la France ne peut être la France sans la grandeur”.

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(de Gaulle, 1954: 1). The first few paragraphs of General Charles de Gaulle’s memoirs show well how the former president perceived France’s role in the aftermath of the Second World War: France had to have an eminent and exceptional destiny in international relations. It therefore needed an assertive and fully independent foreign policy, which de Gaulle decided to anchor in an autonomous nuclear deterrent in the 1960s (Friedländer & Barnavi, 1985; Vaïsse, 1998), a tool that is still key to French foreign policy today (Lefebvre, 2019; Vaïsse, 2018). While France continues to aim for some kind of grandeur in world politics, its vow for non-alignment and full strategic autonomy slowly eroded over time (Pannier, 2017; Pannier & Schmitt, 2021; Schmitt, 2020a). The 2008 French foreign policy white paper, which is the first of its kind, illustrates this trend very well. It identifies five priorities for France’s external action until 2020: (1) to safeguard the security of France and French nationals, and to defend and promote national interests abroad; (2) to build a strong, democratic and efficient Europe, together with its partners; (3) to act in favor of peace, security and human rights; (4) to contribute to the sustainable development of the planet and (5) to ensure the presence of French ideas, language and culture abroad while preserving cultural diversity in the world (MEAE, 2008: 8). Those priorities show that French foreign policy kept being ambitious on paper, but also suggest the need for a more comprehensive approach to foreign policy and increased levels of cooperation in the post-Cold War era, in particular within Europe. This is fully in line with Balzacq’s (2019) argument that France moved from a grand strategy of grandeur to a grand strategy of “liberal engagement”. There are multiple, interconnected reasons for this shift, including political, strategic, operational and economic ones. Political realities—First, French foreign policy faced different political realities in the post-Cold War period. Being halfway between domestic and international politics, it became increasingly conditioned by domestic factors. Two periods of divided government (“cohabitation”)—1993 to 1995 and 1997 to 2002—have thus weakened France’s diplomatic tool, given that the government tried not to project those domestic tensions onto the international scene (Charillon, 2002). In addition, there have been heated debates on the relevance and efficiency of defense expenditures, due to the so-called peace dividends in the 1990s (Quinet, 1997), significant cost overruns for French military operations in the 2000s (Malizard & Droff, 2018) and budgetary constraints following the 2008

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economic crisis. Public opinion, often considered to be less relevant in foreign, security and defense policy, thus turned out to be a “permissive democratic constraint” (La Balme, 2002), able to condition and shape international politics. Strategic realities—In addition to those new domestic realities, the post-Cold War period has shown that international security can no longer be reduced to separate categories (economic, humanitarian, military etc.) (Buzan, 1991). From a strategic point of view, this change required increased levels of cooperation, both at the domestic and at the international level (i.e. between different ministries and agencies, as well as between governments, regional/international organizations etc.). France realized that its autonomy—in particular in the defense sector—was shrinking in a growing number of domains due to budgetary constraints (MinArm, 2017), and that it could no longer meet its foreign policy goals on its own (Pannier & Schmitt, 2019). It thus reprioritized its agenda, focusing on certain issues and regions (MinArm, 2008; MinArm, 2017), and built up numerous partnerships, at the bi-, mini- and multilateral level (Faure, 2019), with the aim to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of its foreign policy actions (Morel & Richter, 2019). Operational realities—Moreover, France faced new operational realities. Following the end of the Cold War, it launched and participated in an increasing number of civilian missions and military operations. Those operations and missions, during which France frequently took the lead role, were mostly conducted in distant regions and often lasted longer than initially anticipated (Zajec, 2018), in particular after 9/11. For precisely this reason, France—just like many other European states—moved from conscription to a professional army in 1996, with smaller, more rapidly deployable forces for operations outside of France (Irondelle, 2011a; Mérand et al., 2011). This operational restructuring led to a reduction of military personnel, as well as a rationalization of equipment entailing some adjustments for the armaments industry. Economic realities—This rationalization, however, also had financial reasons. Due to scarce public resources, the post-Cold War period has been characterized by political debates on the relevance and the efficiency of public spending, in particular in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy (Sinnassamy, 2004). Often considered to be less productive in economic terms, those expenditures are more easily cut, especially in times of economic downturns. Consequently, France experiences a growing gap between its international ambitions and the budget it is able to

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devote to foreign policy matters (Foucault, 2012; Irondelle, 2011b; Smith, 2013). This trend has been accelerated with the 2008 economic crisis, and is likely to persist given the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. For precisely this reason, burden-sharing became a crucial decision-making tool, both at the domestic (e.g. between different ministries, agencies etc.) and at the international level (e.g. within coalitions, international organizations etc.). While most of the aforementioned foreign policy changes are exogenous (i.e. they are inter alia linked to the end of the Cold War, the 2008 economic crisis, and focusing events such as 9/11), others have been endogenous to the policymaking process. 2.2  Matching Ambitions and Tools Over Time Given those new political, strategic, operational and economic realities, France adapted some of its foreign policy tools to maintain its rank and strategic autonomy on the international scene. Those tools include a comprehensive approach to foreign policy and closer cooperation at the domestic and the international level, as well as the maintenance of the nuclear component at a strictly necessary level and the use of intelligence as a proper decision-making tool. France, thus, mainly experienced an incremental pattern of policy change. 2.2.1

 ools of International Grandeur: A Comprehensive Approach T to Foreign Policy and (Inter)national Cooperation One of the main evolutions in French foreign policy over the past three decades is the introduction of a comprehensive approach to foreign, security and defense issues. During the Cold War, civilian missions and military operations have often been separated. From the 1990s, France and its closest partners concluded that it was ineffective to conceive a military operation without any accompanying or follow-up civilian action, such as development assistance or economic aid. The distinction between security and defense disappeared after the election of President Nicolas Sarkozy who urged the launch of the 2008 defense white paper given that the French defense doctrine had not been updated since 1994. A new concept, hence, emerged in the French foreign policy arena, namely “national security”, which combines foreign, security, defense and economic policy (MinArm, 2008). The latter was considered to be more adequate to face

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the foreign policy challenges of the 2000s, in particular following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Those conceptual changes imply that the different components of French foreign policy are complements, rather than substitutes. For precisely this reason, France opted for closer cooperation, at the domestic and at the international level. French foreign policy is, thus, increasingly interministerial, including not only the Quai d’Orsay but also the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the Armed Forces, as well as the ministries in charge of national education, finance and transport, for example. It is also increasingly international. In recent years, France explicitly encourages the combination of different forms of cooperation (MinArm, 2017), in particular within Europe, to address transnational threats through humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction and security stabilization, for example. 2.2.2 Tools of Strategic Autonomy: Deterrence and Intelligence In addition, France also made changes to its main tools of strategic autonomy, namely nuclear deterrence and intelligence. Although the nuclear component is France’s ultimate guarantee of security and national independence, it is nowadays maintained at a strictly necessary level only (MinArm, 2008; MinArm, 2017). This is not only due to the international outrage caused by a series of French nuclear tests in 1995–1996, that is just before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was to be signed but also to changing conditions of strategic autonomy in the post-Cold War period. Given that the threats against France’s vital interests are increasingly blurred and distant, France can no longer solely rely on nuclear deterrence. The articulation of conventional and nuclear means, hence, evolved after 1990 (MinArm, 1994), with conventional weapons gaining once again a much more central role in French foreign and defense policy since the mid-1990s (for a more detailed analysis, see Brustlein, 2017; Tertrais, 2017). Strategic autonomy, however, is not only based on nuclear deterrence. It also implies that French authorities maintain their freedom of action which, in turn, means that foreign policy engagements should not be automatic. This is guaranteed through an ambitious nuclear simulation program that has been developed in the 1990s as well as via intelligence assets. During the Cold War, intelligence was used to prepare for a potential conflict escalation; since the end of the Cold War, however, and in particular following 9/11, intelligence is considered to be a proper decision-­ making tool to anticipate, prevent, dissuade, protect and

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intervene (MinArm, 2008; MinArm, 2013; MinArm, 2017). Article L. 811-1 of the French Intelligence Act of 24 July 2015, thus, highlights that intelligence is a public policy contributing to defense, national security and the promotion of France’s fundamental interests (AN and Sénat, 2015). Bilateral relations between intelligence services, hence, became a key vault of French security (Oudet, 2018).

3   Defense and Security Policy Defense plays a central role in France’s foreign policy. Until the end of the 1980s, the French defense model was rather stable: defense was a political priority, based on a permissive public consensus, and received a significant share of the government budget. After having shown how the main threats to France’s national security evolved since the end of the Cold War, we examine the reprioritization of national interests, in particular in light of budgetary constraints. Based on this analysis, we elucidate how France tried to match its ambitions, tools and means since 1990. 3.1  Threat Perception and Defense Goals France published several white papers and strategic reviews on defense and national security in the past three decades (MinArm, 1994; MinArm, 2008; MinArm, 2013; MinArm, 2017). Those documents do not only determine its role on the international scene, but also focus on trends in the international system, the evolution of risks and threats to French national security and the impact that those changes are likely to have on France’s foreign policy priorities (Michaud & Tremblay, 2006). The white papers and reviews, which are an important exercise of strategic foresight, highlight that the post-Cold War period is more unpredictable and that risks are more diffuse, divers and volatile due to an acceleration of tempo, technological progress and changing alliances. These tendencies have been reinforced by 9/11 and the 2008 economic crisis. From 1989 to the early 2000s, France focused on the stakes of the immediate post-Cold War era: its main defense goals were to avoid the destabilization of Europe, to move toward L’Europe de la défense—without challenging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—and to be able to intervene outside of France’s borders, in particular in the Gulf and Europe. Given that the number of military interventions was rapidly increasing (Schmitt, 2020b), the strategic documents underline the

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importance of collective action, mainly to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of French foreign policy actions. From 2001 onward, France’s threat perceptions shifted again. Priority is currently given to the fight against proliferation and terrorism, with a massive re-engagement of the French armed forces. France has been involved in many military interventions in the twenty-first century, some of which were launched by occasional and non-conventional coalitions (e.g. Afghanistan and Libya). The fight against terrorism has forced France to reinforce its presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, where regional stability is threatened by Daesh. The logic of such a troop deployment is to prevent the diffusion of the terrorist threat in France but also to assist Sahelian countries (i.e. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) in developing their own counter-terrorist capacities. France also reinforced its military presence at home, in particular since 2015, to tackle the risk of terror attacks on national soil (Zajec, 2018). These developments, in turn, point to a new threat to French national security, namely the uncertainty around the reliability of formerly close allies and partners (MinArm, 2017). 3.2  The Reprioritization of National Interests Due to changing threat perceptions, France reprioritized its national interests in the early 1990s (MinArm, 1994). Those interests are now divided into: • vital interests (i.e. interests that are linked to the survival of the nation and hence the first duty and responsibility of the state; they are intentionally not further specified); • strategic interests (i.e. interests that are meant to ensure France’s contribution to European and international security) and • interests that correspond to France’s international responsibility and standing in the world. This reprioritization of national interests, which was also underlined by the 2008 and the 2013 white papers, as well as the 2017 strategic review, was—and is—necessary because of changing risks and threats to France’s national security, but also due to budgetary constraints. Indeed, the post-­ Cold War period was characterized by significant cuts in French military spending (Irondelle, 2011b), illustrated by Fig. 6.1, reaching only 2.3% of

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Fig. 6.1  France’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: SIPRI, 2019b)

GDP in 2018 (as compared to an average of 3.7% of GDP in the 1980s).2 This overall downward trend has slightly been damped following 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in France in 2015 and 2016. 3.3  Matching Ambitions, Tools and Means Over Time To meet those interests with limited means in times of budgetary constraints, France adapted its defense system, based on strategic autonomy, nuclear deterrence and conscription since the 1960s (Rynning & Schmitt, 2018). It reorganized its army model, optimized the articulation of conventional and nuclear tools, reformed its procurement and arms export 2  The SIPRI database continues to include the expenses for the Gendarmerie in the French defense budget. While the Gendarmerie remains part of the French armed forces, it has been attached to the French Ministry of the Interior since 2009. If one takes this shift into account, France spends less than NATO’s spending target of 2% of GDP on its defense sector (cf. NATO’s annual compendium of economic data for more detailed information).

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policies and opted for different forms of defense cooperation. Those changes were mainly induced by the lessons of Gulf War I, the pressure to resist the peace dividends and the need to build a new security system in Europe. 3.3.1 Recruitment and Armament Policies at the National Level The professionalization of the French armed forces is undoubtedly the most important and visible change in France’s defense policy since the end of the Cold War. Although France initially aimed for the retention of conscription (MinArm, 1994), it turned out to be inadequate for dealing with the strategic and operational challenges of the 1990s, in particular in terms of deployments. Under Jacques Chirac’s presidency, France thus moved from a mixed (1991–1997) to a professional army (from 1997 onward), with increased force projection capabilities. While French foreign policymakers still work toward versatility and sufficiency of numbers in all three armies (MinArm, 2008; MinArm, 2013), the professionalization has substantially reduced troop sizes, from 553,000 armed forces in 1990 to 307,000 in 2018 (IISS, 2019). Besides changing the recruitment procedures for its armed forces, France also adapted its armaments policy which ensures that the latter are well equipped. Between 1960 and 1985, the French defense industry was present on all niche equipment, but this is no longer the case. The peace dividends in the 1990s, budgetary tensions between 2002 and 2007 and the 2008 economic crisis put severe strains on the industry. In addition, the French defense industry is increasingly subject to efficiency requirements and legislative constraints—including annual initial finance laws and pluriannual programming laws—which are hardly ever respected (Belin et  al., 2019; Sinnassamy, 2004). Due to constantly increasing program costs, an insufficient national market and new international competitors (MinArm, 1994), exports became a new strategy and an essential component of French defense policy, to expand the domestic production series and, thus, reduce unit costs (MinArm, 2008; MinArm, 2013; MinArm, 2017). This, in turn, explains why France accounts for a significant part of the overall volume of arms transfers of European Union (EU) member states (SIPRI, 2019a). In 2019, for the first time in its contemporary history, France ranked third among the main arms exporters in the world, behind the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).

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3.3.2 International Cooperation Given the pressure put on human and material resources, military cooperation became an important tool of defense diplomacy over the past thirty years. France thus pursued its defense policy at the bi-, mini- and multilateral level, to train its armed forces together with its partners, to pool resources for the co-construction of new equipment and to engage in multilateral missions and operations, under the flag of the EU, NATO or the United Nations (UN). Training and Co-construction—Training and exercises have become crucial to test, evaluate and improve the readiness and interoperability of multinational forces. France, hence, increasingly emphasizes common education and training programs to enhance cohesion, not only at the bilateral level (e.g. with Germany in the framework of the Franco-German Brigade and the UK under the Lancaster House Treaties) but also at the multilateral level (e.g. with NATO allies). Given the transformation of the arms industry, France additionally started to seek out strategic partners to ensure the maintenance of its national industry, leading to a proliferation of different forms of cooperation (Béraud-Sudreau, 2017; Faure, 2019), in particular within Europe (e.g. the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2)). Deployments—Since 1990, France has, on average, deployed troops to twenty-one theaters per year.3 It has several strategically located overseas military bases to enable its armed forces to rapidly intervene abroad. France deploys troops unilaterally—to its overseas military bases in Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and the United Arab Emirates and in the context of French missions and operations—as well as multilaterally, in particular through the EU, NATO and the UN (Schmitt, 2020b; Tenenbaum et  al., 2020). Since 2008, France also explicitly emphasizes the need to associate appropriate regional partners, such as the African Union, to further increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of the interventions (MinArm, 2008; MinArm, 2017) and to avoid an additional overstretch of its armed forces. The military operation that consumes the largest share of French soldiers since 2014 is located in the Sahel: under UN mandate, operation Barkhane4 has been adapted in 2020 to bring support to the G5 Sahel joint force, along with European partners.  Authors’ calculation based on IISS (2019) data.  In 2019, the French military support in the Sahel corresponded to 5100 French military personnel being deployed, 75 cooperation officers being present, more than 7000 G5 Sahel 3 4

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4   Development Cooperation Policy Although defense is at the heart of French foreign policy, France has also consistently been one of the world’s top four donors (Cumming, 2016). The next section, therefore, examines the evolution of French ODA. First, we highlight the role of aid within French foreign policy. We then outline the most important recipients, as well as the types of aid they receive. This allows us to show that ODA and defense policy are increasingly complementary, in particular in Africa and in the Middle East. 4.1  Foreign Aid: A Complement or Substitute to French Defense? France is frequently identified as the country whose ODA is most oriented toward the promotion of its foreign policy goals (Quinn & Simon, 2006). This is reflected in the budget, illustrated by Fig.  6.2, which shows an overall increase in ODA since 9/11.5 In spite of this recent upward trend, the French budget has not reached the UN target of spending 0.7% of its GNI on development aid yet. Once elected in 2017, President Macron committed to increasing France’s ODA to 0.55% of GNI by 2022 (Voituriez et al., 2017), against 0.38% over 2012–2016. Despite the budgetary costs associated with the COVID pandemic, the foreign policy in terms of development assistance has not been revised downward yet. Contrary to French defense policy, ODA did not have a general framework to guide it for a long time (Lancaster, 1999). In the post-Cold War period, however, France adopted a comprehensive approach to major security issues which may, depending on the circumstances, have a military, police, judicial and a development aid component, for example (MEAE, 2008; MinArm, 2008). Figure 6.3 compares annual percentage changes in troop deployment and ODA per region, showing that French development aid and defense policy are particularly complementary in Africa and the Middle East.

soldiers having received training, and almost 750 training or combat support activities having been carried out. 5  The OECD defines ODA as “government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries”. This means that loans and credits for military purposes are excluded, and that aid may be provided bilaterally or be channeled through a multilateral agency.

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Fig. 6.2  France’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

Given that aid, thus, became a full-fledged component of France’s foreign policy, there was need for a doctrine to make sure that ODA would effectively contribute to France’s major foreign policy objectives (namely, foster a balanced globalization, strengthen peace and security by reducing poverty and underdevelopment, support France’s strategy of influence abroad (MEAE, 2008)). In times of budget constraints, this implied giving priority to certain states and regions—in particular, those whose fragility could affect French national security. 4.2  The Changing Doctrines From 1960 to 1990, France has projected its post-war reconstruction model in a conflictual period of national independence. As reported by Jacquemot (2011: 48), “the preoccupations that took center stage during

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Fig. 6.3  The complementarity of defense policy and ODA (1995–2018) (We use data from 1995 onward only since the completeness of the data set on Common Reporting Standard (CRS) commitments has improved from 70% in 1995 to over 90% in 2000 and nearly 100% in 2003). (Source: IISS, The Military Balance)

the years 1960–1985 were human capital, basic health care, education for all, and, uniquely French, the promotion of identity and cultural diversity within a francophone context”. After this rich period of investment, in particular in Africa, France decided to align itself, in 1993, with the “doctrine of Abidjan” (also called the “Balladur doctrine”) whose outcome may be summarized by a liberal thought confirmed by the “Washington consensus”. The devaluation of the CFA franc and structural adjustments were the consequences of a new liberal doctrine. In addition, from 2000 to 2008, ODA policy has turned from the poorest countries to countries whose economic development must be accompanied by institutional reforms to make aid more efficient. In sum, three regions emerged as key priorities in terms of ODA. First, Africa and

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the Mediterranean (with a focus on development to manage migration flows, support economic growth and strengthen the rule of law); second, countries or regions whose internal situation is a factor of tensions or conflicts (by definition, this list is evolving but has included Afghanistan); third, countries that are major actors in regulating globalization and hence a priority for France’s strategy of influence (MEAE, 2008). Nevertheless, the OECD (2018) recently outlined that the real geographical allocation of France’s bilateral aid does not reflect those official priorities. In practice, French ODA is particularly focused on bilateral assistance to francophone Africa (Cumming, 2001), with France having been the largest single donor to the continent for much of the 1990s (Lancaster, 1999). In addition, it is largely allocated to middle-income— rather than low-income—countries, with the top recipients featuring Morocco, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Egypt and South Africa in 2015–2016 (OECD, 2018: 55). After the economic turmoil in 2008, the Sarkozy administration did not give high political priority to development, and once the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries process (initiated in 1996) began to wind down, the overall aid total fell markedly (cf. Fig.  6.2). In 2012, the Hollande administration renewed the development approach in stating that aid for economic development would be tied to political criteria and posing democracy as a prerequisite for development rather than its goal. The government pointed out that France’s 2013 budget did not make any further cut in development spending, and that 10% of proceeds from the new financial transactions tax have been specifically earmarked for development in Africa (Melly & Darracq, 2013). The French aid policy is institutionalized through the French Agency for Development whose agenda has changed radically over the last years with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Paris Agreement on climate change and France’s goal of increasing its ODA.

5   Bilateral Relations After having analyzed stability and change within French defense policy and development assistance, the next two sections focus on France’s bilateral relations and its role within international organizations, such as the EU, NATO and the UN.  Cooperation in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy is by no means natural: it is a political choice that has to be beneficial—in one way or another—for all contributing states. For

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precisely this reason, agreements and relationships may change over time, depending on the priority given to certain issues and regions. Since France has a large diplomatic network, we only look at its most important partnerships and how they changed over time. 5.1  A Fatigue of Multilateralism? While French foreign policy is strongly enshrined in multilateral frameworks, France also has a particularly dense diplomatic network which continues to be an important instrument of influence on the international scene. In times when multilateral action is increasingly criticized for its ineffectiveness (Lafont, 2017; Moreau, 2004), those bilateral relations take on a new importance. France thus reinvested in its special relationships, in particular with its European partners and the US, it updated old and concluded new agreements with several African countries, and built numerous strategic and defense partnerships, in particular in Asia and the Middle East. At the same time, contestations driven by China, the US and Russia against the multilateralism system force France to adapt and reinforce its ambitions in a world exposed to both increasing transnational threats and decreasing rules of multilateral action. The French doctrine in multilateralism has evolved from a “small” actor in the world to an “expected leading” actor in Europe. Security, misinformation, electoral surveillance, environmental threats, trade war and technological divides are many challenges able to modify perspectives on multilateralism. As France can no longer impose its views on all those issues, its new policy approach to multilateralism consists in taking leadership in Europe, based on high-level interactions, and developing multiple bilateral or minilateral cooperations with other countries. 5.2  Bilateral and Minilateral Agreements: Main Partners and Goals Europe—Over the past thirty years, France further developed its special relationships within Europe. Franco-British cooperation, for example, strongly increased in the post-Cold War period (Pannier, 2020), in particular due to the common experience in Bosnia (1990s), Afghanistan (2000s) and Libya (2010s). It led to the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010, with the support of Sarkozy, who put the Franco-British couple before the Franco-German one during his mandate (Lefebvre,

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2019). Franco-German cooperation, in turn, became a key driver for foreign policy cooperation, especially since the UK decided to leave the EU (Deschaux-Dutard, 2019). In 2019, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel signed the Aachen Treaty, thereby renewing Franco-German cooperation, or more recently in May 2020 succeeded in launching the European recovery plan. France also has close relationships with Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, especially on industrial defense issues. Those bilateral agreements are meant to open up to other members of the EU (e.g. in the context of PESCO or the EI2), with a focus on the co-development of military capabilities (MinArm, 2013; MinArm, 2017). In addition to those special relationships, France concluded bilateral agreements with the new Central and Eastern European democracies (MinArm, 1994), and aimed for a continuous foreign policy engagement with Russia. The 1994 defense white papers thus underlined that Russia was a factor of uncertainty, but not a risk or a threat. Under Chirac, there was consequently still a proactive Franco-Russian relationship. Russia’s shift toward a more coercive foreign policy since the late 2000s, however, put Moscow at odds with France’s normative goals for international relations, thereby burdening the bilateral relationship (Cadier, 2018; Lefebvre, 2019). Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, France accepted sanctions against Russia (via the EU) and participated in operations in the Baltics (via NATO) to reassure its allies in the face of a hypothetical Russian invasion. Americas—France cooperates with the US which is, to a certain extent, omnipresent in French foreign policy (Charillon, 2005). Although all presidents of the 5th Republic have sought a privileged Franco-American relationship, this has not always been very easy. American and French foreign policy preferences diverged on various issues since 1990, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, Rwanda, Iraq, Afghanistan and NATO.  Hubert Védrine summarized this distress, highlighting that the US and France were “friends, allies, [but] not aligned”.6 Even Sarkozy, who aimed for turning the page of the Iraq crisis (Lefebvre, 2019), did not fully follow US foreign policy: while he deployed troops to Afghanistan in 2008 (at a very modest level), he firmly opposed the possibility of Turkey entering the EU (Bozo, 2016). France nonetheless developed rather close operational ties with the US from the 1990s onward, in particular during Gulf War I but also in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. This also holds true for 6

 Original text: “Amis, alliés, pas alignés”.

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counterterrorism and intelligence, notably after 9/11 and in the fight against ISIS. Africa—France has a significant number of special relationships with African countries, in particular with its former colonies (often labelized as Françafrique). Those partnerships, which had to be updated from a legal point of view given that they dated from the 1960s (MinArm, 1994; MinArm, 2008) and were increasingly criticized both in France and Africa, not least because of France’s controversial role in the Rwandan genocide, mainly include aid programs, commercial activities, military support and cultural impact. The reform process of this second generation of cooperation agreements is incremental (Chafer et al., 2020; Rafidinarivo, 2019; Recchia, 2020), and includes new partnerships with countries such as Nigeria and South Africa (MinArm, 2013). Franco-African relations, thus, started to normalize in the post-Cold War period, with military support points being gradually reduced from eight to four (Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Senegal). Those support points, however, still facilitate rapid military deployments. At the request of the Malian and the Central African Republic government, for example, France launched the operations Serval and Sangais in 2013. Even though the two operations brought the French back into their former posture of security guarantor in the region, they both aimed for empowering local armed forces via a multilateral approach. Asia—Under Chirac, Asia reverted to be a focus of French foreign policy. Given the economic dynamic of the region, the 2008 defense white paper outlined the importance of bilateral cooperation with Asian countries (MinArm, 2008). France nowadays has extensive political and economic partnerships with several Asian countries, such as China and India; it also established relations of confidence with Japan and South Korea, for example, and began to cooperate with several countries in South East Asia (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam). Since France does not have the means to be militarily present or to have an economic/cultural influence in the region, it additionally makes use of multilateral instances, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting, to have an impact in Asia. Given the rising military assertion of China and growing tensions between Washington and Beijing, France published a new (defense) strategy to preserve stability in the Indo-Pacific in 2019 (MinArm, 2019). Middle East—More recently, France also increased its presence and the number of defense agreements in the Middle East, mainly for strategic reasons. It strengthened its ties with Israel and diversified its relations with the Gulf States, without giving up its support for the Palestinians. France

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inter alia concluded bilateral agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, opened a joint base in Abu Dhabi, and closely cooperated with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The countries of the Middle East account for 40% of French arms sales, making the region a non-negligible buyer of French military equipment (SIPRI, 2019a).

6   EU, Multilateral, and Niche Diplomacy Since the end of the Cold War, France looks for the best partnerships and instruments to multiply its power. This includes the aforementioned bilateral relationships, but also multilateral cooperation, in particular within the EU, NATO and the UN. 6.1  The Central Role of Multilateralism for France France is a founding member of several multilateral organizations and alliances, including the UN, NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community/EU, and the OECD. As a charter member of the UN, France holds one of the five permanent seats in the UN Security Council and consequently has, together with China, Russia, the UK and the US, the right to veto decisions put to the Council. France is also a member of the International Organization of the Francophonie, the G7, the WTO and the Union for the Mediterranean. Hence, during the Cold War, multilateralism was France’s privileged form of cooperation. The 1994 defense white paper underlined that France opposes alliances out of circumstances (MinArm, 1994). This approach, however, started to change with the 2008 foreign policy white paper which claimed that France had to look for more pragmatic and flexible partnerships (MEAE, 2008). This includes the aforementioned bilateral agreements, but also reinforced cooperation with more than two partners, outside of formal treaties. In line with the 2003 European Security Strategy, France thus started to aim for effective multilateral action. 6.2  Multilateral Agreements: Main Partners and Goals EU—Generally speaking, the EU is France’s main vector of influence in the realm of foreign policy (Kessler, 1999; Macron, 2020). European construction has, thus, been a priority over the past thirty years. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, in which EU member states agreed on the Common

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Foreign and Security Policy—with the long-term objective of creating L’Europe de la Défense—consequently lived up to French foreign policy ambitions and was a real success for François Mitterrand’s external action (Lefebvre, 2019). While several French defense white papers outlined that a European defense white paper seemed natural (MinArm, 2008; MinArm, 2013), recent years have shown a shift from multi- to mini- and bilateral forms of cooperation, such as the EI2. This implies that France currently gives priority to pragmatic partnerships with allies having the political will and military ability to assume their responsibilities on the international scene (MinArm, 2017). NATO—Although the EU continues to be France’s first partner in foreign policy cooperation, France’s return to NATO in 2009 was a significant change in its foreign policy strategy. Due to NATO’s growing role in post-Cold War conflicts, France was increasingly involved in the Alliance’s actions, without, however, being able to influence the command bodies. Starting in 1994, France thus began a pragmatic rapprochement with NATO: while Chirac was willing to abandon the dogma of non-­integration, the relationship fully normalized under Sarkozy. Whereas de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO in 1967 to be autonomous and increase French influence on the international scene, Sarkozy decided to reintegrate certain bodies, such as the Military Committee, in 2007 to achieve those very same goals, maintaining, however, France’s nuclear independence and freedom of action (Ostermann, 2018). He thereby opted for a strategy of influence within NATO. In spite of this reintegration, France still prefers to go European whenever possible. In 2011, for example, French policymakers were rather reluctant to have NATO engaged in the military intervention in Libya to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Pannier and Schmitt (2021), thus, point out that France would have preferred to materialize the 2010 Lancaster House agreements, but eventually agreed to give NATO the operational control of the mission because most of its partners wanted the Alliance to be involved. UN—While de Gaulle mocked the UN by calling it “the thing”, France became more involved in multilateralism from the 1970s onward, contributing to official development assistance and peacekeeping operations. Since the mid-1990s, however, French troops have been primarily deployed to EU and NATO missions. This being said, France’s strategic documents continue to highlight that the UN has to be strengthened, given that it is the only organization being universal in its composition and global in its mandate (MinArm, 2017). As a member of the P5, France,

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thus, tends to look for UN approval of any military operation, ideally combined with the green light from a regional organization to further legitimize the intervention. In addition, France is also the only EU member state that is a permanent member of the UN Security Council since the UK left the EU in February 2020.

7   Conclusions The aim of this chapter was to analyze foreign policy change in France since 1990. After having described the broad trends in French foreign policy over the past thirty years, we closely examined France’s defense sector and ODA, and explained why policymakers introduced a comprehensive approach to foreign policy. We then illustrated how French governments started to use a combination of bi-, mini- and multilateral forms of cooperation to effectively and legitimately advance their goals, and thus maintain France’s rank on the international scene. While we have shown that the overall goals of French foreign policy evolved relatively little over the past thirty years (cf. Utley, 2000), we also highlighted that France adapted its priorities and restructured its foreign policy tools following the end of the Cold War (cf. Gregory, 2000). France developed a comprehensive approach to foreign policy, integrating various instruments and tools, and built up numerous strategic and defense partnerships. Some of these changes have been dramatic (such as the professionalization of the armed forces in 1996—not foreseen by the 1994 defense white paper—or the U-turn in bilateral relations with Russia); others, however, have been incremental (e.g. the shift from formal, multilateral agreements to more informal, minilateral forms of cooperation, in particular within the EU). We argued that there are multiple reasons for those shifts, including political, strategic, operational and economic ones. Table 6.1, which is based on Hermann’s (1990: 5) categorization of foreign policy change, gives an overview of the general pattern of foreign policy change in France since 1990, based on a few examples already mentioned in this chapter. It shows that French foreign policy is mainly characterized by three different types of change: (1) adjustment changes, that is, shifts that do not really change France’s foreign policy goals or methods; (2) program changes, that is, modifications in the methods but not the goals of foreign policy and (3) goal changes, that is, shifts in the purpose of French foreign policy (cf. the introduction of this volume for a more detailed discussion on Hermann’s typology). Table 6.1 also suggests

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Table 6.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in France since 1990 Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

Adjustment change

Central role of arms exports

• Increasing program costs and peace dividends/ budgetary constraints

Program change

Shifts in the type of ODA (from bi- to multilateral aid)

Goal change

International orientation change

• Strategic challenges and legitimization of foreign policy Professionalization of the armed forces, • Strategic and operational in line with the introduction of the challenges concept of national security – –

that France did not redirect its orientation toward world affairs since the end of the Cold War which, in turn, would have involved a simultaneous shift in several policies. Although defense remained at the heart of French foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, France had to adapt its defense policy, based on strategic autonomy, nuclear deterrence and conscription since the 1960s. It thus moved from conscription to a professional army, optimized the articulation of conventional and nuclear means, reformed its procurement and arms export policies, and opted for different forms of defense cooperation. We argued that those shifts were necessary to tackle the strategic and operational challenges of the post-Cold War era while also dealing with exponentially increasing program costs of military equipment in times of budgetary constraints. We also underlined that the distinction between security and defense disappeared with the 2008 defense white paper, and argued that the subsequent shift to “national security”—which combines foreign, security, defense and economic policy—illustrates well that the different components of French foreign policy, including defense and ODA, are nowadays thought of as complements rather than substitutes. France’s foreign policy thus turned out to be increasingly interministerial, involving the Quai d’Orsay, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the Armed Forces as well as the ministries in charge of education, finance and transport, for example. Due to economic constraints, priority is, however, given to

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certain regions. Based on data from the IISS and the OECD, we showed that French troop deployment and development aid started to play hand in hand, in particular in Africa and the Middle East. Yet, increased levels of cooperation are not limited to the domestic level only. Besides maintaining special relationships with Germany and the UK, for instance, France also updated old partnerships—in particular with African countries—and started to seek out new, strategic partners, mainly in Asia and the Middle East. It reintegrated certain bodies of NATO and reconsidered cooperating with some of its partners, such as Russia, for example. More recently, France also aims at systematically associating appropriate regional partners, mainly to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of its foreign policy action but also to avoid any additional overstretch of its forces. While France is committed to multilateralism, recent years have shown that French policymakers also operate unilaterally, if necessary, in particular in Africa (Erforth, 2020; Tardy, 2020). Overall, French foreign policy has been characterized by stability, as well as slight adjustments, in a world where diplomacy is more and more economically anchored and less and less militarily supported. These changes converge toward the ambition to make France great again in a context where new global actors do compete with the expected leadership of successive French executives. France currently still maintains its leading role in the defense domain within the EU, with some new challenges since the Brits decided to leave the EU. Indeed, uncertainties remain about the ability of the EU to achieve strategic autonomy without the UK, a central goal of the 2016 EU Global Strategy (Giegerich, 2019).

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CHAPTER 7

German Foreign Policy Patrick A. Mello

1   General Foreign Policy Orientation With 83 million inhabitants, Germany has the largest population in Europe. It also comprises the continents’ strongest economy, and the fourth largest economy worldwide, as of 2020. If there is one overarching principle of German foreign policy, then it is multilateralism. Germany’s foreign policy is guided traditionally by a strong orientation toward the European Union (EU) and European integration, embodied among others in its close partnership with France. At the same time, Germany places great value on its transatlantic partnership with the United States, Canada, and the country’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Historically, this twofold foreign policy orientation—both toward North America and Europe—has served German interests: It anchored the country in “the West” under the US security umbrella, which was vital during the Cold War, and it allowed the re-socialization of the Federal Republic of Germany as a committed European and “good citizen” of the

P. A. Mello (*) University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_7

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international community of states, after Nazi Germany’s defeat in the Second World War and the atrocity of the Holocaust.1 As a parliamentary democracy with a strong representation of the Länder (states) at the federal level of government, Germany’s political system is “clearly consensual”, as Lijphart (1999, p. 249) concluded in his comparative assessment of democratic institutions. Among others, the consensus orientation shows in the politics of “grand coalitions”, where governments are often formed between the two largest parties: the center-­ right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), including their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Between 2005 and 2020, three out of four cabinets under Chancellor Angela Merkel were coalition governments between conservatives and social democrats. The exception was the coalition government between conservatives (CDU/CSU) and liberals (FDP) during Merkel’s second cabinet (2009–2013).2 While Germany witnessed high unemployment rates during the 1990s up until the early 2000s, following the unification of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, it has experienced a sustained economic upturn and almost no unemployment during the past decade. The improvement of economic indicators has partly been ascribed to reforms in the labor market (Hartz-Reformen), which were implemented between 2003 and 2005 under social democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and which have remained controversial since then, particularly among his own party, the SPD.3 As export “world champion” with industries that are oriented primarily toward selling abroad (with the automobile and related industries taking a primary position), Germany is a strong supporter of free trade and the institutional frameworks of the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time, Germany is seeking to establish multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements with its international partners.

1  For earlier assessments of German foreign policy following the country’s unification, see, among others, Hellmann (1996), Harnisch (2001), Peters (2001), Geis (2013), and Harnisch (2013). 2  Traditionally, the liberals were considered the junior government partner for both of the catch-all parties. Between 1969 and 1982, the liberals governed together with the social democrats and then continued in government as coalition partner for the conservatives until 1998, with whom they had also been in various governments before 1969. 3  Among others, the reforms in the labor market lead to increases in loan work and low-­ paying jobs, also through cutting unemployment benefits.

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With the end of the Cold War, Germany successfully regained its full sovereignty as part of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” (Zwei-Plus-Vier-Vertrag). The “Two-plus-Four” Treaty, negotiated between the victors of the Second World War (United States, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom) and the two German states also prompted the question of whether Germany would revisit its foreign policy priorities in the future.4 As indicated above, during the Cold War, Germany had taken a transatlanticist and pro-European stance on most foreign policy issues. This served Germany’s interests as it helped to rebuild economic relations and political trust with its international partners. While the conservative Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949–1963) firmly rooted Germany’s foreign policy in the West, it was the social democrat Willy Brandt, first as Foreign Minister (1966–1969) and then as Chancellor (1969–1974), who together with his adviser Egon Bahr pioneered a new approach to Eastern Europe, particularly toward the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union. The motto was “Change through Rapprochement” (Wandel durch Annäherung). Whereas Germany’s foreign policy toward the GDR and other Warsaw Pact states had previously been in a conflictual stalemate, Brandt’s Ostpolitik paved the way for a new relationship with Germany’s Eastern neighbors. In the three decades since its unification in 1990, Germany has had only three Chancellors (Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel, who governed with varying coalition partners), another indicator of continuity rather than change. As the Chancellor under whom Germany reunited, Helmut Kohl personifies the shift from the “Bonn Republic” of Western Germany to a larger, unified Germany with Berlin as its capital. This change prompted international observers to express their anxiety about Germany returning to great power status in the center of Europe, cautioning against geopolitical instability due to the reemergence of Germany (Krauthammer, 1990; Mearsheimer, 1990). Mindful of these fears, particularly among its neighbors, successive German governments emphasized continuity in German foreign policy priorities, underlining the importance of multilateralism, international law, civilian modes of conflict resolution, and democracy and human rights.5 As will be discussed in the following  On this central document for Germany’s international status, see Weidenfeld (2007).  For an account of the continuities and changes in German foreign policy since the foundation of first German nation-state under Bismarck in 1871, see Hellmann et al. (2007). 4 5

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s­ections, these priorities did not preclude foreign policy change, but change occurred rather incrementally, and often as a result of external pressure and foreign expectations that Germany ought to assume more leadership in international affairs. Traditionally, foreign policy, and especially security policy, was conceived as the exclusive domain of the executive, and thereby the chancellery and the foreign office. Formally, as the head of government, the German Chancellor holds the Richtlinienkompetenz, which means that the general contours of executive policy are shaped by the Chancellor of the day, allowing an overruling of individual ministries. In practice, several Foreign Ministers, a post traditionally taken by the junior coalition partner (Oppermann & Brummer, 2020), have been able to carve out their own profile. This applies particularly to the Liberal Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1982–1992) and the Green Joschka Fischer (1998–2005).6 Today, a multiplicity of actors both within and outside of the government affect the conduct of foreign policy, influence foreign policy goals, and shape the foreign policy agenda. Apart from the chancellery and the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and development, this also includes parliamentary committees, other political actors, and individuals, groups, and organizations outside of government, including organized interests, non-­ government organizations, and the like. All of these actors play roles in what constitutes German “foreign policy”. Notably, in 2014, the then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier initiated a project called “Review 2014 Außenpolitik Weiter Denken”, which was conceived as a public deliberation and stock-taking exercise on German foreign policy priorities and the country’s longer-term strategic outlook. The initiative spanned over three phases, starting with focused questions posed to almost 60 international authors—the results of which were openly shared on a dedicated website—and evolving into public deliberations and events held across Germany, before concluding with internal (non-public) deliberations in the Foreign Office. The unifying theme in many contributions, also in speeches by President Joachim Gauck and the then Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, now Head of the European Commission, was that Germany ought to show greater foreign policy engagement and shoulder more responsibilities among the 6  Since 2005, the Foreign Ministry has seen various changes at the top, with the current President Frank-Walter Steinmeier as longest-serving Foreign Minister (2005–2009 and 2013–2017).

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international community, especially when it comes to conflict prevention (cf. Bendiek, 2015). Germany is actively engaged in many international organizations, including the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Nations. While Germany is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, successive governments have articulated the policy goal of reforming the Security Council, also in the hope of attaining a permanent seat for Germany and like-minded countries such as India and Brazil. Germany has on five occasions assumed a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and the country is currently on a sixth term that started in January 2019 (to end in January 2021). During its Presidency of the Security Council in July 2020, the German Foreign Office under Minister Heiko Maas placed thematic emphases on the coronavirus pandemic and COVID-19 as a threat to global security, climate change, human rights, as well as conflict resolution and prevention and the fight against sexual violence in conflict zones.7

2   Defense and Security Policy Since its foundation in 1949 and throughout much of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany has shown features of an ideal-typical “civilian power”, emphasizing multilateral diplomacy, a rules-based international order, and reluctance in using military force in international politics (Maull, 1990, 2007). Against this backdrop, German unification prompted the question of whether this change would also affect the country’s foreign policy orientation and its role as a civilian power. Would Germany again strive for great power status, as some observers expected (Mearsheimer, 1990; Krauthammer, 1990)? In sum, the three decades since unification are characterized by overwhelming foreign policy continuity in terms of Germany’s general orientation in international politics. The country remains steadfastly supportive of the European Union and its institutions, committed to NATO and the United Nations, and it has neither begun to expand its military nor to develop a nuclear deterrent of its own—contrary to what some commentators expected.

7  See Germany’s permanent mission to the United Nations: https://new-york-un.diplo. de/ (last accessed September 18, 2020).

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Quite to the contrary, after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011, the conservative-liberal government under Chancellor Merkel decided to invoke a nuclear moratorium and eventually to entirely abandon the use of nuclear energy. For Germany, this was an astounding policy reversal because, contrary to the red-green predecessor government of social democrats and greens, both the conservatives and the liberals had long supported the civilian use of nuclear energy and the government had just prolonged the use of nuclear reactors in October 2010 for some eight to fourteen years—half a year before Fukushima happened and this policy was overturned. That being said, incremental change has indeed occurred, particularly in the area of military deployments and the country’s increased participation in multilateral military missions (these are detailed in the next section), which has led scholars to engage in repeated stock-taking of Germany’s security policy and its alleged role as a “civilian power” (Geis, 2013; Mello, 2019b; Harnisch, 2001). Due to its culture of “sowohl-als-­ auch” (“as well as”), Germany’s foreign policy has also been characterized as a policy of “consistent ambivalence” (Junk & Daase, 2013, p. 148). This ambivalence shows, for instance, in Germany’s longtime involvement in Afghanistan (Brummer & Fröhlich, 2011), where successive governments and defense ministers for a long time refused to acknowledge the fact that this was, in part, a war-fighting mission. Rather than engage in public debate and deliberation about policy goals as support for the Afghanistan missions decreased over time, political actors attempted to shield these military deployments from the public and to shift mandate renewals away from electoral campaigns (Lagassé & Mello, 2018). A significant area of change concerns the structure of the armed forces. While the Bundeswehr still comprised about 460,000 military personnel in 1990, this number has been reduced to some 180,000 in 2020. Besides the numerical reduction of the armed forces, a major change was the permanent suspension of compulsory military service in 2011. This decision abolished what had long been regarded by political actors as a central pillar in the institutional framework of the Bundeswehr. The context in which this change occurred was the wake of the global financial crisis of 2009, when the German federal budget faced severe financial constraints, calling for cuts across the board (Kinkartz, 2010). The suspension of compulsory military service was initiated by Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (2009–2011), who saw this as a means to reduce the defense budget and also to meet recommendations from an ad hoc parliamentary

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commission that had advised a significant reduction in the active personnel of the Bundeswehr. In addition to the numerical reduction of troops and the abolishment of the draft, the armed forces were also sequentially restructured to achieve a greater readiness for military deployments as part of NATO or EU operations. However, an area of continuous concern remains the issue of operational readiness of the armed forces. While details are considered classified information, the public part of the 2020 report of the Ministry of Defense lists operational readiness for helicopters as below 40% and highlights “severe needs for improvement” in various branches of the armed forces (BMVg, 2020, p. 4). Finally, change is also observable in the evolution of Germany’s security doctrine. In 2016, the government published a White Book on security policy and the future of the armed forces (Bundesregierung, 2016). Among others, this document places renewed emphasis on territorial defense and alliance operations in that context. This was remarkable, since some earlier documents had not even mentioned territorial defense any longer. But in the light of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the violent conflict in Eastern Ukraine, territorial defense made a forceful return to the agenda. At the same time, German highlights the “Framework Nations Concepts” (FNC) as an institutional framework for multinational military operations where Germany can act as a lead nation in cooperation with its NATO and EU allies and other partner countries. 2.1  Military Deployments The German constitution (Grundgesetz) places substantial constraints on any involvement of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) in military operations abroad. This meant that throughout much of the Cold War, Germany was pursuing mostly “checkbook diplomacy” through financial contributions rather than sending the military abroad on conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions. Solving a state of constitutional ambiguity, in 1994, the constitutional court passed a ruling on German involvement in military operations, in line with a conception of the Bundeswehr as a “parliamentary army”. Henceforth, all major military deployments were required to be placed before parliament for an up or down vote. In 2005, the practice was further institutionalized with a formal deployment law that specifies under which conditions parliament has to be consulted and which criteria the government needs to meet in its mandates for military missions. This has

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led observers to characterize the Bundestag as an “exceptionally powerful and active parliament in controlling the deployment of armed forces” (Wagner, 2017, p.  60). Indeed, when placed in comparison to other democracies, Germany is among the countries where parliament has the strongest position in decision-making on security policy (Peters & Wagner, 2014; Mello & Peters, 2017). However, it should not be noted that, unlike for instance in the United Kingdom, the powers of parliament do not necessarily show in a veto against deployments (e.g. the British House of Commons’ veto against involvement in Syria in 2013), but rather in the anticipation of parliamentary preferences by the executive and a formulation of deployment mandates that reflects these preferences. Hence, to date, all votes on military deployments have passed the Bundestag. Yet, often the consensual nature of policymaking shows in the formulation of mandates, where operational restrictions are imposed to reflect the preferences of the respective parties involved. In 1990, just weeks before the ratification of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” (Zwei-Plus-Vier-Vertrag), the Persian Gulf War broke out, with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invading neighboring Kuwait. For the German government this prompted the question of whether Germany should partake in a multilateral military coalition under US leadership, whether such a participation should involve a military role, and, crucially, whether such an involvement would be in line with the constitutional restrictions imposed by the Grundgesetz. Eventually, doubting the constitutionality of military involvement, the conservative-­ liberal government under Helmut Kohl opted for classic “checkbook diplomacy” by shouldering the brunt of the financial burden for the operation, together with Japan, but staying away from any military involvement.8 The next foreign policy crises after German unification came with the wars of Yugoslav succession (cf. Melčić, 2007). This time, the Kohl government suggested German involvement and in June 1995, the Bundestag voted in favor of participating in the multinational peacekeeping force UNPROFOR in Bosnia Hercegovina, after a controversial parliamentary debate (386 out of 655 MPs voted in favor of the deployment).9 Several  On German involvement in the Persian Gulf War, see Inacker (1991) and Hellmann (1997).  The voting on UNPROFOR mostly followed party lines, with nearly all MPs from the governing conservative-liberal coalition (CDU/CSU and FDP) in favor and the majority of the MPs from opposition parties voting against military deployment (SPD, Greens, and the far-left PDS). For an account of German party politics over military intervention in Bosnia, see Rathbun (2004, Ch. 4). 8 9

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factors contributed to this policy change toward a more active role of the armed forces. While center-right parties emphasized Germany’s international responsibility and its alliance obligations as a NATO member, center-­ left parties rather highlighted the humanitarian dimension and military intervention as a last resort to stop human rights violations. While the UNPROFOR mission constituted the first armed operation of German soldiers since the Second World War—and hence was of significant symbolic importance—military involvement was limited to reconnaissance with Tornado aircraft, transportation, and medical support functions, explicitly excluding a combat role.10 In hindsight, the UNPROFOR mission paved the way for a new role for the armed forces. It was the first operation after the ruling of the constitutional court in 1994, which had enabled the Bundeswehr to take part in multilateral military operations if certain preconditions were met (most importantly requiring a UN mandate, parliamentary approval, and a multilateral institutional framework like NATO or the EU). Even more contested was Germany’s involvement in NATO’s “Operation Allied Force” in the Kosovo province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in March 1999. Parliamentary debates centered on the question of the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian military intervention without a UN mandate (Henrikson, 2000; Franck, 1999; Rudolf, 2000). However, a political majority argued that in order to prevent further human rights violations against Kosovar Albanians at the hand of Serbian forces, Western governments had to step in, despite a lockdown in the UN Security Council over the matter. Notably, the government proposal on military involvement over Kosovo eventually received an overwhelming majority in the Bundestag (500 out of 580 voting in favor), even though the Kosovo War has remained the most controversial use of force in the history of NATO.  For Germany, the initial decisions on Kosovo came during the last days of the Kohl government, as when NATO issued “activation orders” in October 1998, which constituted the first step toward air strikes. The governing conservative-liberal coalition had initially been hesitant to support military action, but eventually adopted the NATO position that intervention was legitimate, despite the absence 10  Before its involvement in UNPROFOR, the Bundeswehr had already assumed limited roles in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Somalia, but these had not been voted upon in parliament as they preceded the constitutional ruling of 1994. A timeline of Bundeswehr operations between 1990 and 2018 is given in Mello (2019b).

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of a UN mandate. Notably, this position was adopted also by the red-­ green successor government under Chancellor Schröder. Germany decided to participate militarily, with Tornado fighter jets. Yet, their use was restricted to reconnaissance and support flights. Naturally, this provoked the question of whether Germany should still be considered a “civilian power” or whether the country was undergoing a process of “normalization” to becoming a regular middle power (Geis, 2013; Harnisch & Maull, 2001). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 prompted the red-green German government under Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to send the military abroad, for a second time within two years since the Kosovo conflict. The parliamentary debate over participation in the US-led “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa became a highly contested issue that nearly tore the red-green governing coalition apart. Eventually, Chancellor Schröder was able to win a parliamentary vote on the issue because he combined the substantive question with a vote of confidence (Lagassé & Mello, 2018). By contrast, the involvement in the ISAF mission was much less controversial. Together, the Afghanistan missions became the largest and most cost-intensive military engagements in the history of the Federal Republic, with estimated costs of 8.8 billion Euros just for ISAF alone (Thiels, 2015; Brummer & Fröhlich, 2011). The next foreign policy crisis followed shortly after the decisions on Afghanistan, when it became clear over the course of 2002 that the United States under George W. Bush was set to invade Saddam Hussein’s Iraq under the pretext of weapons of mass destruction. Chancellor Schröder used the opportunity to distance himself from the highly popular US policy on Iraq at an early stage, also in the light of federal elections in the Fall of 2002. Notably, at the time, Angela Merkel, as conservative opposition leader, published an op-ed in the Washington Post titled “Schroeder Doesn’t Speak for All Germans” in which she did not expressly support the Iraq war but argued, among others, that “the danger from Iraq is not fictitious but real” (Merkel, 2003). The last major foreign policy crisis occurred over the conflict in Libya in 2011. During the vote in the UN Security Council, Germany abstained, siding with China and Russia, rather than its Western NATO allies. This prompted observers to proclaim a major rupture among NATO members, and particularly between the US, France, and the UK on the one hand, and Germany on the other. In hindsight, it became clear that German

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skepticism about the Libyan intervention and regional security was not entirely unfounded, but publicly the case went down as “Libya fiasco” in German foreign policy and was interpreted as a sign of weakness and undecidedness in times of crisis (Oppermann & Spencer, 2016). Since then, Germany has participated in a host of other military operations—notably in Mali alongside France, and also in Syria as part of the coalition against ISIS (“Counter Daesh”). As of 2020, the armed forces are involved in seven operations in Africa, from observing a ceasefire in West Sahara (MINURSO), EUTM and MINUSMA in Mali, UNAMID and UNMISS in Sudan and South Sudan to an observer mission in Yemen (UNMHA), and a naval mission off the Horn of Africa (ATALANTA). These missions differ in their scope and the kinds of tasks involved, but they resonate broadly with the aims of supporting the fight against transnational terrorism, fostering the development of democratic institutions, and securing trade routes, as essential goals outlined in the 2016 White Book on security policy (Bundesregierung, 2016). The involvement against Daesh is particularly noteworthy, as the ad hoc coalition against Daesh does not formally involve an organizational framework and parts of it can be deemed difficult to reconcile with traditional interpretations of German constitutional restrictions (Mello, 2019a, p. 44). Nonetheless, there was also continuity in the policy, as Germany participated with Tornado bomber aircraft, yet these were not used for combat operations but limited to reconnaissance functions. Again, this marked a typical German approach of “sowohl-als-auch”—striking a balance between military participation and abstaining from more robust military operations. Why did Germany decide to participate in the coalition operation against Daesh? Clearly, European solidarity and particularly solidarity with France after terrorist attacks on the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and elsewhere played an important role in the public deliberations and parliamentary debates on the issue. At the same time, the German government again put restrictions in place to limit its military involvement, and it did not immediately join the anti-Daesh coalition but only followed at a later stage.11

 For a comparative assessment of the anti-Daesh coalition, see Haesebrouck (2018).

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2.2  Defense Spending In recent years, the German defense budget has witnessed steady increases in absolute terms. These resonate with the political aim of reaching the “two percent goal” of defense spending in relation to economic strength (measured in gross domestic product), in line with the declaration passed by member states at NATO Summit in Wales. According to the Wales Summit Declaration, issued on September 5, 2014, member states pledged “to move toward the 2% guideline within a decade”.12 Since the election of US President Donald Trump and his vocal calls for increased defense spending among NATO allies the topic has been on the agenda and been the source of controversy among the governing coalition among conservatives and social democrats. Arguably, the Wales declaration is often shortened to “two percent” in public discourse, without mentioning that the goal is to be reached “within a decade”. However, while the German government has repeatedly decided to increase the defense budget, it is unrealistic to expect the country to reach the two percent goal in the coming years. The debate about the federal budget for 2020 also indicates that defense spending may rather decrease in the medium- to long-term, also due to a weaker economic situation and other, more pressing investment needs in infrastructure and other areas, particularly in the light of the coronavirus pandemic and its economic impact. While in 2014 the overall budget for defense amounted to € 32.4 billion, it reached € 37 billion in 2017 and was further increased to € 43.2 billion in 2019 and to € 44.9 billion for 2020.13 The increases in the defense budget were politically justified mainly in reference to the requirements of investing to maintain the status quo. This was especially urgent due to the low operational readiness of the Bundeswehr (see earlier discussion above). At the same time, international crises provided for a context within which it was easier to justify extended spending on defense (e.g. Russian annexation of Crimea, Trump’s repeated threat of withdrawing from NATO, and so forth).

12  See https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (last accessed September 21, 2020). 13  For detailed figures, see the documentation by the Ministry of Defence: https://www. bmvg.de/de/themen/verteidigungshaushalt (last accessed September 21, 2020).

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However, when placed in relation to the size of the German economy (in gross domestic product), then the budget has remained stable at about 1.2% since 2007 (SIPRI, 2019). Expressed as a share of the overall federal budget, defense spending has hovered steadily around 10% of total spending since the mid-1990s, which constitutes the second largest position in the federal budget, after social spending that usually amounts to about 50% of the budget (BMF, 2015, p. 215). When placed in comparison to other countries, Germany’s relative military expenditure more or less equals that of Western European and NATO member countries like Denmark, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and also Canada. That said, relative defense spending remains considerably below the allotted share for defense in France (2.3%), the United Kingdom (1.8%), and the United States (3.2%), as the major military powers within NATO (figures for 2019, SIPRI, 2019). Figure 7.1 summarizes defense expenditures for Germany.

Fig. 7.1  Germany’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank)

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3   Development Cooperation Policy Foreign and development aid entails a plethora of programs and policies, which also exceed the domain of competence of the ministry of economic cooperation and development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ), which is typically associated with development policy. Indeed, many policy areas are under the domain of other ministries, including trade policy (ministry for economic affairs), debt policy and financial programs (ministry of finance), or global environmental policy (ministry for the environment), to name just a few areas (Nuscheler, 2007). Development policy has witnessed important changes in previous decades. While the policy field has traditionally been associated with donations to developing countries, a much more encompassing conception conceives of the field as “global structural development” (globale Strukturpolitik), a term that first made it into government policy under the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in 1998, who proposed that global structural development should strive to improve the economic, social, ecological and political conditions in developing countries (Messner, 2011, p. 414). The concept continues to inform the official self-­conception of German development aid as a field, and the BMZ ministry in particular (Grävingholt, 2016, p. 40). What is striking about the development field is that public expectations do not match the conditions under which the field operates. Most of the OECD countries, including Germany, remain far below the official goal of spending 0.7% of GDP for Official Development Aid. This means that there are substantially fewer expenses in the area of development than in other policy areas, including defense. Since 2015, as the “refugee crisis” reached Europe and Germany, new demands have been formulated for development assistance—both from inside and outside of government. Accordingly, some corners expect development aid to address and solve the root causes of refugee flights in people’s countries of origin. But as Grävingholt notes in his review of German development aid, such demands are unrealistic and will likely lead to renewed disappointment (2016, p. 42). Over time, German development aid shifted from an individual project orientation toward emphasis being placed on major partner countries in particular regions. This was seen as an effort to concentrate the limited funds for development aid on those countries where the prospects for effective aid are most promising. However, this kind of priority setting had

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also been criticized, for instance with regard to Latin America where funds were allocated toward small- and medium-sized countries like El Salvador and Peru (and others), when the economic and environmental impact of development aid could have been more substantial in countries like Mexico and Brazil (cf. Messner, 2011, p.  419). In 2018, the top ten recipient countries of German development aid were Indonesia, Syria, Colombia, China, Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and India (BMZ, 2020). Apart from a large group of 39 states that were conceived as development aid general “partner countries”, the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation works with four groups of countries, placing emphasis either on political reforms, economic transformation, the protection of the global commons, and addressing the structural causes of conflict and violence. German relative spending on Official Development Assistance (ODA) has steadily decreased between 1990 and 1998 but has increased since, with strong growth since 2014. While in 1990 the country spent 0.42% of its GDP on ODA, the relative share dropped to 0.26% in 1998. Since then, the share has increased, reaching 0.42% in 2014 and 0.67% in 2017 (OECD, 2019). Despite these increases, Germany is thus barely meeting the UN goal of spending 0.7% of GDP on development aid. In comparative terms, German spending on foreign aid is between the Netherlands (0.60%) and the United Kingdom (0.70%), while Denmark (0.74%), Norway (1.0%), and Sweden (1.0%) traditionally have comparatively higher shares of ODA (OECD, 2019). Figure  7.2 summarizes data on Official Development Aid for Germany.

4   Bilateral Relations As the largest EU member state, with a heavily export-oriented economy, and nine neighboring countries, Germany is embedded in a close net of bilateral relations.14 As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Germany’s foreign policy is traditionally both European and transatlantic in its orientation. Based on these two poles, the two most important bilateral partners for Germany are the US and France. The US remains important as NATO partner and security guarantor. In 2019, the US was also the top destination for German exports, followed by France and China. Germany’s 14  For accounts of Germany’s bilateral relations with its most important partner countries, see the respective chapters in Schmidt et al. (2007) and Jäger et al. (2011).

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Fig. 7.2  Germany’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

eastern neighbor, Poland, has become increasingly important, and the economies of the two countries are closely interlinked. In 2019, Poland ranked sixth in foreign trade with Germany (exports and imports combined). The United States has been of historical importance during the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 and throughout the Cold War. However, the amiable and close relations between Germany and the United States have seen their ups and downs, especially in the last two decades with the controversial Iraq War and NSA surveillance initiated during the Bush years (and continued throughout Obama’s terms) and Trump’s erratic tariffs against key industries, hostility toward international organizations and multilateral cooperation, and his accusations that Germany as NATO ally was not spending enough on defense. Consequently, a recent opinion poll by the Pew Research Center, published in March 2020, concluded that there is “a wide divergence in views of bilateral

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relations and security policy between the publics of both countries” (Poushter & Mordecai, 2020). The relationship with France has been of equal historical importance to Germany. From its foundation, the Federal Republic sought to establish amiable and trusting relations with France. This was achieved mainly through the early institutions of what became the European Union, but also political, economic, and cultural exchange between the two countries. As the former “motor” of the European Union, especially during the times of Giscard D’Estaing and Schmidt and also with Mitterrand and Kohl, relations have somewhat cooled in recent years, particularly between Macron and Merkel, as it became evident that governments in both countries had diverging interests within Europe and beyond. While relations with Russia have been traditionally close, particularly among Eastern Germans, in recent years these have been overshadowed by the Russian violation of international law with the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine; cyber operations against the Bundestag, which have been linked back to Russian state agencies, and in 2020, the poisoning of opposition politician Aleksei Nawalny and his subsequent treatment in a Berlin hospital. This has also impacted upon economic relations, as the construction of the controversial “Nord Stream 2” pipeline that runs directly through the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany has been put on hold, also because of US sanctions. The Nawalny poisoning has caused a number of politicians from the governing coalition to call for a moratorium on the pipeline project. Relations with China are of considerable economic significance to Germany, as China is considered Germany’s overall most important trading partner with a volume of nearly 200 billion Euros (export and imports combined, as of 2019). However, despite strong economic relations, fundamental differences remain with regard to matters of international law, human rights, and individual freedoms. Most recently, this has become evident again with China’s violent stance against protestors in Hong Kong, its assertive policy in the Indo-Pacific region, and its uncompromising position on Taiwan, which the reigning Communist Party continues to see as part of mainland China.15 15  German concerns about the developments in Hong Kong and elsewhere where most recently expressed during Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Berlin in September 2020: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/china-node/ maas-wang/2380352 (last accessed September 21, 2020).

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Finally, Germany has a special relationship with Israel, due to the systematic genocide of six million Jews in Europe under the reign of the National Socialists (1933–1945). Against this backdrop, Chancellor Angela Merkel pronounced Israel’s existence and security to be Germany’s “historical responsibility” and, as such, to be in the German national interest (Staatsraison).16 Merkel’s comments made observers question whether this prompted a policy change toward Israel. However, as others noted, while the formulation may have been new, its substance was firmly in line with previous policy and thus another marker of continuity rather than change.

5   EU, Multilateral, and Niche Diplomacy Since its foundation in 1949, the Federal Republic has been championing the European idea and supported the strengthening of EU institutions. With the election of Ursula von der Leyen as President of the European Commission in 2019, it is the second time since the 1960s and Walter Hallstein that a German leads the European institutions (then the European Economic Community, EEC). For a long time, German identification with Europe has been reflected in generally positive attitudes toward the EU among the public. However, with the rise of populist parties across Europe and elsewhere, Euroscepticism has also reached Germany. This coincided with the Eurozone crisis and the subsequent emergence of the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD), which was founded initially on a Eurosceptic platform that was mainly directed at the economic policies of the EU, before turning toward the far right and openly xenophobic positions. In 2017, the AfD gained 12.6% of the votes at the federal election, which made her the third largest party in the Bundestag, after the CDU and the SPD. Yet, the electoral gains of the populists should not imply that Germans have become Eurosceptic at large. Clearly, a majority of voters elected parties that support European institutions and further European integration. Germany has been a dedicated member of the UN since its accession to the organization in 1973. Since the 1990s, it has been official government policy to seek a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, either through 16  See Merkel’s speech before the Knesset, on March 18, 2008, in Jerusalem: https:// www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-dr-angela-­­ merkel-796170 (last accessed September 5, 2020).

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a restructuring of the existing council or through the accession of several new permanent members, including Japan, India, Brazil, and Germany. These initiatives came to naught and officially ended in 2005 when the UN General Assembly did not reach a qualified majority in favor of a reform of the Security Council. Since these failed attempts at reforming the council, Germany has placed its emphasis on attaining a non-permanent seat in the Security Council. In January 2019, Germany took a seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, which has been the sixth time that Germany took on the two-year non-permanent position over the course of its membership in the UN. The German government has placed the issues of conflict prevention and conflict management on its agenda for its two-year term in the Security Council. As mentioned in earlier sections, successive governments have carved out unique areas of niche diplomacy for Germany. This started with the Ostpolitik under Chancellor Willy Brandt, which was a clear departure from the transatlantic instincts that still held sway during the early years of the Federal Republic. More recently, Germany took a leading role in negotiating the Iran nuclear deal that had been sealed under President Obama in 2015 and scrapped by President Trump, during the early days of his Administration. However, the German government expressly stated that it would aim to preserve the agreement.

6   Conclusions Across the areas considered in this chapter, Germany’s foreign policy since 1990 has been characterized by continuity rather than change. This is not to imply that there has been no change but, for the most part, the changes have been incremental adjustments rather than abrupt policy turns. This also mirrors earlier analyses of German foreign policy since unification (Rittberger & Wagner, 2001; Hellmann et al., 2007; Harnisch, 2013). To be fair, whether one detects continuity or change sometimes remains in the eyes of the beholder. For instance, during the government of Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer, many declarations clearly differed (and were intended to differ) from the Conservative-­ Liberal government under Chancellor Kohl. In his rhetoric, Schröder clearly took a more assertive foreign policy position than his predecessor. However, at the same time, Fischer emphasized continuity and

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self-­ restriction as guiding principles for the Red-Green government (Peters, 2001). Like other Western democracies, Germany’s domestic politics are undergoing changes—most of all in the party system, which has shifted from a system of “two-and-a-half” parties (Conservatives, Social Democrats, and Liberals) until the 1990s, to a Bundestag that currently holds six parties (the former parties plus The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), The Left (Die Linke), and the far-right Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland). This new party system means that government formation has become more complicated, as witnessed after the general elections of 2017, where the process to establish a new government took an unprecedented 171  days, including failed talks between Conservatives, Greens, and Liberals. Ultimately, these changes in the party system may also affect the conduct of foreign policy—though it is too early to make predictions about potential future changes. Table 7.1 summarizes foreign policy in Germany between 1990 and 2020, using the typology introduced by Hermann (1990). While there has been no case of “international orientation change” during the observed time period, there have been instances of “adjustment change”, “program change”, and “goal change” The most pronounced cases are from the Table 7.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in Germany since 1990

Adjustment change

Program change

Goal change

Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

Adaption of rules of engagement in military operations (especially in Afghanistan) Renewed emphasis on territorial defense in 2016 More encompassing conception of development policy (global structural development) Increased friction with Russia

• Changing security environment and allies’ expectations • External event: annexation of Crimea • Government ideology: coalition of Social Democrats and Greens • Foreign policy behavior of Russia • Systemic change: end of the Cold War • Domestic constraints: budget considerations NA

Restructuring armed forces toward active participation in multinational operations

International NA orientation change

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security realm, where Germany has repeatedly adjusted its position and reinterpreted its role in international affairs. This happened in the 1990s in the face of atrocities during the Yugoslav wars, where the new red-green government had to redefine German policy in a way to reconcile a pacifist and “civilian” impetus with humanitarian crises in the country’s near abroad. This constituted a goal change where Germany’s role among the international community, and specifically the role of its armed forces, was redefined toward a more engaged position. Likewise, Germany adjusted its policy throughout the course of the Afghanistan war, by reducing the scope of its aims and, simultaneously, accepting a more robust military involvement and rules of engagement for its armed forces. This also showed in the government’s decision to become involved in Syria in the coalition effort against Daesh, despite the fact that the operation was not based on a UN mandate and occurred outside of established organizational frameworks like the EU or NATO. Arguably, these changes were mainly driven by external factors such as shifts in the international system and Germany’s security environment since the end of the Cold War, its increased economic and political importance, as well as raised expectations of key allies and international partners.

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Maull, H. W. (2007). Deutschland als Zivilmacht. In S. Schmidt, G. Hellmann, & R. Wolf (Eds.), Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik (pp. 73–84). Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5–56. Melčić, D. (2007). Der Jugoslawien-Krieg: Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Konsequenzen. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Mello, P. A. (2019a). National Restrictions in Multinational Military Operations: A Conceptual Framework. Contemporary Security Policy, 40(1), 38–55. Mello, P. A. (2019b). Von der Bonner zur Berliner Republik: Die “Zivilmacht” Deutschland im Spiegel parlamentarischer Debatten zu Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr, 1990 bis 2018. In K. Brummer & F. Kießling (Eds.), Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik? Bundesdeutsche außenpolitische Rollen vor und nach 1989 aus politik- und geschichtswissenschaftlichen Perspektiven (pp. 295–316). Nomos. Mello, P. A., & Peters, D. (2017). Parlamente in der Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik: Parlamentarische Kontrolle von Streitkräfteeinsätzen im Licht der Forschung. Sicherheit und Frieden, 35(2), 53–59. Merkel, A. (2003, February 20). Schroeder Doesn’t Speak for All Germans. The Washington Post. Messner, D. (2011). Entwicklungspolitik als globale Strukturpolitik. In T. Jäger, A.  Höse, & K.  Oppermann (Eds.), Deutsche Außenpolitik (pp.  414–442). VS Verlag. Nuscheler, F. (2007). Entwicklungspolitik. In S.  Schmidt, G.  Hellmann, & R. Wolf (Eds.), Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik (pp. 672–683). Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. OECD. (2019). OECD Data, Net ODA. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Oppermann, K., & Brummer, K. (2020). Who Gets What in Foreign Affairs? Explaining the Allocation of Foreign Ministries in Coalition Governments. Government and Opposition, 55(2), 241–259. Oppermann, K., & Spencer, A. (2016). Telling Stories of Failure: Narrative Constructions of Foreign Policy Fiascos. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(5), 685–701. Peters, D. (2001). The Debate About a New German Foreign Policy after Unification. In V. Rittberger (Ed.), German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies (pp. 11–33). Manchester University Press. Peters, D., & Wagner, W. (2014). Executive Privilege or Parliamentary Proviso? Exploring the Sources of Parliamentary War Powers. Armed Forces & Society, 40(2), 310–331. Poushter, J., & Mordecai, M. (2020). Americans and Germans Differ in Their View of Each Other and the World. Pew Research Center.

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Rathbun, B. C. (2004). Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans. Cornell University Press. Rittberger, V., & Wagner, W. (2001). German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories Meet Reality. In V.  Rittberger (Ed.), German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies (pp.  299–325). Manchester University Press. Rudolf, P. (2000). Germany and the Kosovo Conflict. In P. Martin & M. R. Brawley (Eds.), Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War (pp. 131–143). Palgrave. Schmidt, S., Hellmann, G., & Wolf, R. (2007). Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. SIPRI. (2019). Military Expenditure Database. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Thiels, C. (2015). Die Kosten des Krieges: Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Afghanistan. Tagesschau.de. Wagner, W. (2017). The Bundestag as a Champion of Parliamentary Control of Military Missions. Sicherheit und Frieden, 35(2), 60–65. Weidenfeld, W. (2007). Der “Zwei-plus-Vier”-Vertrag. In S.  Schmidt, G.  Hellmann, & R.  Wolf (Eds.), Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik (pp. 112–124). Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

CHAPTER 8

Italian Foreign Policy: Still the Days Seem the Same? Fabrizio Coticchia and Valerio Vignoli

1   Introduction Italian foreign and defense policy changed considerably after the end of the bipolar era (Croci, 2007; Brighi, 2013; Coticchia & Moro, 2015; Isernia & Longo, 2017). Italy started to be an “international peacekeeper”, sending its armed forces in all the major crises that occurred in recent decades (Ignazi et al., 2012). In addition, a large bipartisan consensus supported such a shift (Coticchia & Vignoli, 2018). However, after two decades of substantial continuity, another relevant change occurred. In 2015, the Italian White Paper identified the “Enlarged Mediterranean” as the fundamental strategic area for protecting national interests. In January 2018, the parliament approved new operations in the Sahel and

F. Coticchia University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy e-mail: [email protected] V. Vignoli (*) University of Milan, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_8

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Northern Africa. Even the new Italian “populist” government (2018–2019) confirmed the “relocation of troops” from Afghanistan and Iraq to Libya and Niger (Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2019). Also, development cooperation, trade, and diplomatic efforts greatly focused on this region. Finally, after the war in Libya, Italian decision-makers became much more prudent regarding the military involvement in multinational operations. The aim of this chapter is to assess such foreign policy evolutions, investigating the drivers of change. It examines the dynamics of change to understand why and how Italy re-oriented its foreign policy focus and what have been the most pivotal moments in such re-orientation. In line with the introduction of the book, it adopts an analytical framework combining international (e.g., external shocks as financial crisis or regional conflicts, the evolution of security environment with emerging threats, and the interaction with other states and regional and international organizations) and domestic levels (political fragmentation, stunning evolution of the party system, role of leaders, organizational and bureaucratic factors, etc.). Thanks to secondary and primary sources (interviews, official documents, parliamentary proceedings, and participant observation1), the chapter contributes to the current debate on Italian foreign policy change. This chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of Italy’s general foreign policy orientation and the main debates regarding its post-Cold War evolution. Subsequently, we examine changes in the areas of defense and security policy, aid, and bilateral and multilateral relations, devoting specific attention to the EU. Drivers and inhibitors of such alterations are identified. In the conclusion we summarize the main patterns of foreign policy change and continuity in Italy, underlining which domestic and external factors fostered them.

2   General Foreign Policy Orientation The analysis of the main trends in Italy’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War allows assessing whether (or not) there were fundamental “foreign policy re-orientations” in the last decades. How and to what extent has Italy modified its role—as a “Middle power”, as “Least of the great 1  One of the authors has been involved as “expert” in meetings and workshops aimed at preparing the draft of both the latest Ministero della Difesa (2015) and the reform (law n.125 2014) of the development cooperation.

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powers”, or as “Largest of the smaller powers (Santoro, 1992; Andreatta, 2008)? What has been the evolution of perceived interests, goals, priorities, and status in the global arena? What have been the preferred means used by Italy in the global scenario? First of all, we can identify an “overall orientation” change (Hermann, 1990) that has transformed Italy’s international role and activities. Such change affected goals and methods adopted in Italian foreign policy. After the collapse of the bipolar era, as illustrated by official documents such as the “Nuovo Modello Difesa” (1991) and the involvement in military operations abroad (Iraq, Somalia, Balkans), Italy became a “security provider” rather than a “security consumer” (Walston, 2007). After decades of actual absence of a truly autonomous defense policy,2 Italy started to provide its military contribution to regional and international security, assuming the—brand new—role of an “international peacekeeper” (Giacomello & Verbeek, 2011; Ignazi et al., 2012). As affirmed constantly in official documents,3 Italian armed forces became “the main instrument of Italian foreign policy”.4 This drastic change raised the Italian “profile in European affairs, in transatlantic relations and in various arenas of the globe” (Brighi, 2013, p. 6). Since 1989, Italy’s armed forces have participated in more operations than in the previous 40 years (Coticchia, 2014). While the redirection of Italian foreign and defense policy did not alter the reference to the traditional three “circles” of the Italian international policy—Atlantic, European, and Mediterranean—the type of Italian contribution and the national aims and interests evolved considerably. The metaphor of the “three circles” illustrates the framework within which Italian foreign policy has been examined across time. The vital alliance with the US and the NATO membership (first circle), the relationship with the EU and European countries (second circle), and the connection with local actors within the Mediterranean scenario (third circle), represent the indisputable cornerstones of post-Second World War Italian foreign policy. Thus, 2  See on this point Ignazi et al. (2012). The limited military operations undertaken during the Cold War (e.g., Lebanon) were exceptions that did not escape from the strict bipolar constraints. For a detailed analysis see Calossi et al. (2013). 3  On official documents see—among others—the above-mentioned “Nuovo Modello di Difesa” (1991), “Nuove Forze per un Nuovo Secolo” (2001); and “Libro Bianco” (2002, 2015). 4  Speech by the then President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, quoted in Coticchia and Moro (2015, p. 16).

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the debate in the literature was based on the different degree of importance devoted by each government to a circle, as well as the specific foreign and defense policy initiatives undertaken. The external shock of the end of the Cold War, along with the alteration of the structure of the international system and the vanishing of (domestic and global) bipolar constraints to Italy, as well as the collapse of the so-called First Republic and the transformation of the Italian party system5 are unanimously considered by the literature as the main drivers of the above-mentioned re-orientation of Italian foreign policy in the 1990s. After 1989, far from the Cold War logic and its limitations, Italy started to act as a “normal” security actor, providing its contribution abroad. If the basic shift of Italian international role was essentially represented by a brand-new national military activism (which was then never abandoned), the following years have not been marked by the same degree of policy change. In fact, the reforms (in the field of defense but also in development aid, participation in regional and international organization) and the transformation of the Italian foreign policy have been incremental, gradually modifying structures and goals in conformity with the needs required by the new international role adopted by Italy and its “power projection”. In other words, after the paradigm change occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, Italy did not “re-orient” its foreign policy toward world affairs in the following decades (2001–2010; 2011–2019). Rather, Rome just modified the level of international military efforts (especially in the new century), promoting regional and global stability along with its allies (mainly the United States). By connecting such gradual transformation with the above-mentioned literature on continuity and discontinuity in the post-bipolar Italian foreign policy, we can affirm that—despite differences in style (Walston, 2007) and in the “privileged circle” (i.e., more pro-EU for the center-left, and more pro-US for the center-right) in Italian international policy—no basic shift or redirection occurred after the beginning of the 1990s. Relatedly, also the so-called recent Italian strategic re-orientation toward the Mediterranean, which was clearly emphasized by the Ministero della Difesa (2015), as well as by the decision to enhance security and

5   On the evolution of Italian party system, see, among others, D’Alimonte and Bartolini (1997).

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development policy toward the “enlarged Mediterranean”,6 cannot be considered as an international orientation change.

3   Defense and Security Policy As stated before, since the end of the Cold War, Italy has deeply transformed its defense and security policy, starting to deploy troops around the world in several military operations: from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency and air strikes (Ignazi et  al., 2012; Carati & Locatelli, 2017; Coticchia, 2018). At the same time, Italian defense has been significantly modified through several reforms that suspended conscription and revised the whole composition, structure, and tasks of the Italian armed forces (Coticchia & Moro, 2015). This section assesses such transformation. Two main findings should be emphasized. First, the paradigm change occurred to the Italian defense after 1990: because of the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of its constraints, the static military approach that has featured Italian defense in the Cold War was quickly abandoned at the beginning of the 1990s. The military operations abroad—with an average of 8000 soldiers deployed on the grounds from Africa to Central Asia (Coticchia, 2018)—represent the best proxy of the new power projection capabilities adopted by Italy. The official goals of Italian defense have been altered: from the protection of its borders from a supposed invasion during the Cold War to the contribution to regional and international stability (Ministero della Difesa 1991, 2002, 2015). The military tools employed to support such power projection capabilities were renewed, guaranteeing mobility within a process of considerable digitalization of forces (Coticchia & Moro, 2015). Second, if such change at the very beginning of the 1990s was a considerable shift, having altered defense purposes and means adopted by Italy in the global stage, what happened in the following decades represents rather a process of mudding through. Indeed, by examining the expected results highlighted in the new Defense Model, it is possible to assess the degree of evolution of Italian post-bipolar defense, illustrating the transformation of threat perceptions, priorities, operations, reforms, and force structure. Starting from threat perception, the Italian doctrine has deserved specific attention to non-military threats (such as regional instability, 6

 Interview with the then Minister of Defense Roberta Pinotti, Genova, May 2018.

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terrorism, transnational organized crime), in line with a “multidimensional view” on security,7 that has shaped all of the EU and NATO strategic documents in recent decades (ESS, 2003; NATO, 2010; EUGS, 2016). Italy has “downloaded” from multilateral organizations, such a multidimensional perspective on security, emulating also approaches and procedures (Coticchia & Moro, 2015). On the whole, there has been no dramatic shift or huge discontinuity in the kind of threats identified by the post-Cold War Italian documents, despite the evolution of international and regional contexts. For instance, Locatelli et al. (2016) stress the (predictably) growing attention devoted to terrorism and cyberattacks in the new century. However, the authors—who reveal the continuity also of the “purposes” of Italian armed forces—highlight how “the lack of resources” was emphasized by Italian doctrine as the main danger. Indeed, notwithstanding the pleas repeated in every official document, the Italian defense budget remained below the threshold—requested by NATO—of 2% of GDP spending. Figure  8.1 illustrates how Italy’s proportional military expenditure in the post-Cold War era steadily declined and gravitated consistently below the average of the other EU countries.8 Relatedly, the Italian budget has been constantly “unbalanced” because of the excessive expenses for the personnel (usually around 60–70%), never reaching the goal expressed in doctrines and in policy proposals. Indeed, despite several specific reforms (e.g., the Monti reform and the Ministerial Directive 2013) aimed at reducing such percentage, the overall disproportion—which left limited resources to investments operating costs as training—has never been modified, with severe consequences to the “employability” of the whole military instrument (Coticchia, 2018). Extra funds related to the “missions abroad” have represented for years the main source that guaranteed an adequate level of training and skills for the troops employed abroad. Thus, the involvement in operations also allowed sustaining in economic terms the process of transformation. The “partisan obstacles” by armed forces against the reforms aimed at addressing those asymmetries were considered as the crucial determinant—along with the “limited political willingness and capabilities of the Ministers”—to explain the policy failures of Italian defense in reaching his 7  As stated by the Ministero della Difesa (2002), the New Italian Defense Model should have been adapted specifically to address those new “multidimensional threats” to national security. 8  For a different perspective see the analyses provided by Osservatorio Milex.

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Fig. 8.1  Italy’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank)

goals on the unbalanced budget.9 Exactly the same obstacles hindered other two main expected goals of the process of transformation of armed forces: interoperability among services and the reorganization of the force structure (quantitative reductions of personnel, Ministero della Difesa, 2015). On the one hand, the dozens of operations (humanitarian, peacekeeping air strikes, counterinsurgency, etc.) undertaken by Italian soldiers illustrate the greater skills and mobility acquired by the forces, as well as their quick deployability (e.g. as testified by missions in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Libya), also thanks to advanced platforms that sustained such efforts (Nones & Marrone, 2011). Moreover, the conscription was suspended

9  Authors’ interview with an anonymous high-ranking official at the Ministry of Defense, April 2019.

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(2001), conforming with the all-volunteer model planned at the beginning of the 1990s.10 However, on the other hand, the process of transformation of the Italian defense moved very slowly regarding the reorganization of force structure and interoperability among services. The planned reduction of forces did not occur at the speed requested, with a structure that was affected by an inefficient ratio between a significant number of high-­ ranking (old) marescialli and ufficiali and the rest of the troops.11 Also, the reforms aimed at fostering interoperability among services, avoiding an incredible list of duplication (in procurement, training, etc.), “miserably failed”.12 Even the most recent Ministero della Difesa (2015), in the words of the Minister who designed it, “did not reach the expected results in terms of interoperability”.13 Finally, Italy was able to adopt a new “comprehensive law” on military missions (Ronzitti, 2017) only at the end of December 2016, establishing a clear procedure of parliamentary oversight and authorization of operations abroad (as requested since January 1991 when MPs debated the Italian involvement in the “Desert Storm”).14 In sum, the Italian post-Cold War Defense was featured by a stunning paradigm change that occurred at the very beginning of the 1990s when an “external shock”—that is, the end of the Cold War—created the conditions for “goal change” (Hermann, 1990) in terms of aims, tools, and discourses. As examined above, such transformation mainly attained the “operational dimension” (i.e., the deployment of troops, enhancing the power projection capabilities, etc.) while a process of muddling through has gradually institutionalized the new paradigm (also thanks to a 10  Alongside, other reforms were adopted (e.g., Law 25/1997 modified the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Carabinieri became the fourth service, etc.). 11   For a detailed analysis with the figure related to such (failed attempt) see: IV Commissione, “I temi dell’attività parlamentare nella XVII legislatura”, 2018. 12  Authors’ interview with an anonymous high-ranking official at the Ministry of Defense, April 2019. 13   Authors’ interview with the then Minister of Defense Roberta Pinotti, Genova, May 2018. 14  For decades Italy did not have an established procedure, and thus the parliament played a marginal role in controlling the executive on missions abroad (as well as on other defense and security issues, like procurement. Such limited parliamentary oversight allowed a huge autonomy for the Italian governments, which did not incur in transaction and audience costs in front of a public opinion almost constantly against military operations abroad (Battistelli et al., 2012). Moreover, the narrative of the “peace missions” granted a superficial bipartisan support, avoiding political contestation (Ignazi et al., 2012; Coticchia and Catanzaro 2017).

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considerable autonomy granted to the executives) toward the New Defense Model. However, the aims of interoperability among services, restructuring of force composition, and transformation of the unbalanced defense budget have never been fully reached, due to “internal resistances”15 and “lack of political willingness”16 in a context of financial scarcity. If bureaucratic constraints, veto players, and the absence of policy entrepreneurs represent the explaining factors of the gradual and slow phase of implementation of defense reforms, the transformation of the international system of the bipolar era, the search for eternal prestige, thanks to the deployment of forces abroad, and the emulation (of norms, procedures, approaches) from allies and multilateral actors can be considered the main drivers of policy change of Italian defense. The intervening role of domestic factors (like national strategic culture, coalition politics, and institutional features) also deserves specific attention to understand the evolution of Italian defense policy.

4   Development Cooperation Policy Both the Italian public debate and academic literature have generally underestimated—if not totally ignored—Italian development aid policy. However, the transformations that occurred in this field in terms of regional priorities, methods, political reforms, budget, and types of projects (and programs) deserve to be investigated. The new Law on development cooperation (law n.125/2014), which had been anticipated for decades (Carbone, 2007), introduced relevant novelties in comparison to the previous comprehensive law on development aid (law n.19/1987), which was drafted during the Cold War. By looking at the evolution of development aid policy, four main elements should be emphasized. First, as illustrated by Fig.  8.2, the Italian Official Development Assistance (ODA) never reached the long-standing United Nations (and European Union) target of the 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI). In the middle of the 1990s, the overall amount of funds was extremely limited, with a minimum of 0.11 in 1997. In the 1990s, between scandals and economic crisis, the funds for aid collapsed, while in the 15   Authors’ interview with an anonymous Director of an Italian defense journal, September 2018. 16  Authors’ interview with an anonymous high-ranking official at the Ministry of Defense, April 2019.

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Fig. 8.2  Italy’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

2000s, especially thanks to the emergence of decentralized development cooperation, a (small) recovery occurred.17 In the new century, due to the financial crisis (especially between 2008 and 2012), Italy’s funds sharply decreased and only after 2013 Italy’s ODA began to grow again, both in terms of volume and as a percentage of GDP, moving from 0.14% in 2012 to the ODA/GNI ratio of 0.3% in 2017.18 However, for the first time since 2012, the ODA declined (by more than 20%) again in 2018, reaching 0.23%.19 In other words, despite pledges, advocacy, and promises, Italy did not significantly alter the amount of money devoted to development  Authors’ interview with the Director of Agency for Peacebuilding, 4 September 2019.  It is worth noticing that a considerable percentage of that percentage was devoted to the expenses related to the (domestic) management of refugees. The post-2017 decrease of funds is related to the sharp reduction of expenses attaining at the management of migrants and refugees. 19  See Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, Documento di economia e finanza 2019. Programma di stabilità dell’Italia, 9 April 2019. 17 18

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cooperation. Foreign aid was rarely—if ever—connected to the Italian foreign policy agenda. The 2014 reforms, despite the novelties introduced, did not modify the public discourse on foreign policy in Italy, which has traditionally relegated development aid at the margin of the debate. Second, after almost 30  years, Italy finally approved the reform of development cooperation in 2014. As suggested by Venturi (2019), the new law 125/2014 altered the Italian system of development cooperation, changing the governance, reinforcing monitoring and evaluation mechanism, and enhancing transparency and the role of the private actors. Indeed, the reforms created the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), a specialized agency for development in conformity with many other European countries. Moreover, changes also occurred at the level of symbols and discourses: Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs was renamed as the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation” (MAECI). The enhanced role of private sector can be considered one of the biggest novelties of the reforms adopted in 2014. It represented a considerable change because most actors of the Italian development cooperation have constantly fiercely contrasted—for ideological reasons—the involvement of private companies on the ground. However, despite such innovations, the reform did not introduce “significant changes of policy and strategies” adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of aid and development cooperation.20 Also, in terms of adopted tools, the “logic of the open calls” was not altered, while “bilateral cooperation was still based (infra) on the form of projects (rather than programs or multi-stakeholder partnerships)”.21 Third, as reported by the literature (Fossati, 1999; Venturi, 2019), in the past decades Rome suffered from the lack of a proper national development strategy, without clear geographic or thematic priorities, thus “affecting for years the overall level of effectiveness of the Italian aid”.22 In the absence of geographic selectivity, most decisions on aid occurred without coordination, fostering the influence of manifold players. Gradually, Italy focused its attention toward areas such as the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. However, Italy has recently devoted growing attention to African countries: from the government led by Enrico Letta (2013–2014) onward, Africa became a priority for Italian  Authors’ interview with the Director of Agency for Peacebuilding, 4 September 2019.  Authors’ interview with the former President of Oxfam Italy, 6 September 2019. 22  Ibid. 20 21

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foreign affairs and development cooperation (Venturi, 2019). The latest strategic document “Cooperazione internazionale per lo sviluppo documento triennale di programmazione e di indirizzo 2019–2021” (Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione, 2018) planned to devote 50% of Italy’s entire ODA to Africa. As said, for the overall Italian strategic reorientation toward the Enlarged Mediterranean, the instability in the region and its challenges (first of all migration flows) were largely considered the main drivers behind such change (Venturi, 2019). Fourth, in terms of types of aid, issues, and tools, project-type interventions have generally accounted the majority of aid (more than country programmable aid, debt relief, humanitarian and food aid). Moreover, since the 1990s, Italy has crafted decentralized development cooperation as a specific trait of development aid. Indeed, Italian local actors (regions, municipalities, etc.) played a very significant role, both in terms of economic contribution and the effective involvement of thousands of local entities that created long-term relationship, moving from the “gemellaggi” (twinning) to actual network of territories. In the new century, Italy strongly contributed to the global initiative to cancel (or to reduce) external debt repayments for heavily indebted poor countries (Venturi, 2019). As for geography, Italy did not select for years specific thematic priorities. Gradually, by examining official documents, and collecting views of experts, we can identify some crucial areas, such as “agriculture and food security, health, and capacity building”.23 More in details, the goals the country pursued through this development aid have been constantly related—as stressed by the recent annual documents (2016, 2017, and 2018) provided by the Italian agency to the fight against poverty and hunger. From a cross-time perspective, it is worth noticing how the protection of environment improved its relevance in the Italian development aid. The strategic document “Cooperazione internazionale per lo sviluppo documento triennale di programmazione e di indirizzo 2019–2021” (Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione, 2018) estimates the following strategic sectors for Italy’s ODA: 21% humanitarian aid, 20% governance and rights, 10% agriculture. The same document stresses how Italy’s development policy shares the Agenda 2030’s (UN, 2015) five priorities: people, planet, partnership, prosperity, and peace. Finally, concerning the types of aid granted over time, bilateral ODA has been enhanced in recent years. For instance, in 2018, almost half  Authors’ interview with the former President of Oxfam Italy, 6 September 2019.

23

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(48.3%) of Italy’s total ODA was provided bilaterally (OECD, 2018). Furthermore, it is worth pointing out the relevance of the EU framework for the Italian multilateral aid. On the whole, the multilateral dimension has always been a vital reference for Italian documents and strategies in the field of development aid. For instance, the UN sustainable goals and the Agenda 2030, the 2000 Cotonou agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, provided important guidelines and set relevant standards. However, apart from the adoption of “technical improvements” (especially after the birth of the AICS), scholars emphasized the actual “marginal influence”24 played by international actors such as the OECD-DAC toward Italian development aid, stressing the limiting and “passive”25 role played by Rome in affecting the multilateral framework. In sum, Italian development cooperation changed after the 2014 reform, which altered the governance and introduced important novelties—but not radical changes—in terms of approaches (e.g. the crucial role of private actors) and structures (the Agency). Political actors and stakeholders, along with culture and expertise collected across decades of programs and projects on the ground, represent significant drivers for explaining the evolution of Italian development aid, in a context marked for years by the lack of geographic and thematic selectivity. At the same time, the transformation of regional scenario and the mounting challenges (e.g. migration) influenced a re-orientation of Italian aid, in line with the overall foreign and defense policy. The following years will allow to better assess the impact of the 2014 reform on Italian aid and development cooperation.

5   Multilateralism Since the end of the Second World War, the concept of multilateralism has been at the forefront of the Italian foreign policy agenda. In fact, Italy has consistently pursued a strategy of solid engagement in multilateral institutions at the regional (EU and NATO) and global level (UN). Structural factors related to the vulnerable strategic position of the country in the international system and norm-based ideas shared among the political elites initially underpinned the multilateralist choice (Ratti, 2011). Notwithstanding a larger margin of maneuver, after the Cold War, Italy  Authors’ interview with the Director of Agency for Peacebuilding, 4 September 2019.  Authors’ interview with the former President of Oxfam Italy, 6 September 2019.

24 25

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substantially confirmed this strategy. However, differences in the emphasis on multilateralism between center-left and center-right executives emerged (Andreatta, 2008; Brighi, 2013; Carbone, 2007). Divergence was evident in the case of the relationship with the EU, with the center-left coalition being more instinctively Europhile than their center-right counterparts. The 2011 debt crisis seems to have further eroded the already declining support for the European integration process among public opinion and elites. But the effects of this process on foreign policy are still to be observed. The European Union is arguably the most relevant multilateral institution in which Italy takes part. Italian policymakers strongly supported the European integration process from its very inception in the fifties. As much as the entrance in NATO, the European choice was perceived as an opportunity to increase the country’s status in the world (Matarazzo, 2011). Furthermore, Italian foreign policymakers believed that cooperation with more advanced European states such as Germany and France would be beneficial for economic development (Bindi, 2011). The decision to take an active role in the first step of the integration process was taken by the then ruling Christian democratic party, Democrazia Cristiana. However, after initial criticism, in the seventies, the communist party (Partito Comunista Italiano) embraced Italy’s participation in the European Community as well (Matarazzo, 2011; Bindi, 2011). Such a strong consensus at the elite level translated also into widespread public support for the European project as well in a “permissive consensus” on this issue. As said, in Italy, the end of the Cold War almost coincided with the collapse of the existing party system. Starting from 1994, party competition structured around the alternation between a center-left and a center-right coalition, the latter invariably led by Berlusconi (D’Alimonte & Bartolini, 1997). As suggested, among scholars and experts, there is a wide and unsettled debate on the existence of substantial differences between the two coalitions in their foreign policy approach. The matter of disagreement concerns the balancing between Europeanism (support for the EU integration process and agreement with major partners in Europe) and Atlanticism (the relationship with the United States). A wide number of scholars underline how the center-right has pursued a more confrontational approach in Europe than its center-left counterparts (Andreatta, 2008; Brighi, 2013; Carbone, 2007). Undeniably, during Berlusconi’s governments, a few squabbles between Italy and its

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European partners occurred. In its second and longest experience as prime minister (2001–2006), the most notable one concerned the support for the Iraq War, deteriorating the relationship with France and Germany. Other sources of disagreement regarded the withdrawal from the European Airbus consortium and the opposition to the establishment of a common arrest warrant. During Berlusconi’s last experience as Prime Minister (2008–2011), Italy’s strict laws on immigration and, especially, the debt crisis provoked rifts with EU institutions and a number of fellow member states. In contrast, the same scholars highlight how center-left governments have tried to present Italy as a reliable and diligent partner in Europe. In this sense, the first center-left government (1996–1998), led by the future President of the EU Commission Romano Prodi, made enormous efforts to bring the country into the common currency in the first wave, through extensive privatizations and containment of public expenditure. As Matarazzo (2011) points out, the presence in the center-right coalition of the populist and Eurosceptic Lega Nord surely had an impact in differentiating between the two coalitions. To the contrary, other scholars underline a general continuity in Italy’s engagement with the EU, in spite of the color of the government (Croci, 2008; Walston, 2007). They claim that differences concerned more Berlusconi’s unconventional diplomatic style and rhetoric than substance. They also argue that Italy adopted a broadly pro-European stance, irrespective of the color of the parties in power. Within this debate, we take a middle-ground position. On the one hand, a difference in terms of policy paradigm between center-right and center-left existed. As Quaglia and Radaelli (2007) argue, the largest gap between the two coalitions consisted in the interpretation of the EU as a vincolo esterno (external constraint). While the center-left employed this rhetoric to implement reforms in a stagnant domestic economic system, the center-right adopted a more nationalist stance, rejecting such stimuli and delaying reforms. On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that Italy’s deep engagement in the European Union was never questioned, even during Berlusconi’s government. For instance, Italy was consistently one of the most loyal voters in the European Council, with rare instances of dissenting votes (Hagemann & Franchino, 2016). Furthermore, center-­ left and center-right cabinets alike displayed a tendency to punch below the weight within the EU (Carbone & Quaglia, 2011). To sum up, the degree of change was limited across these years, with parties in

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government and Berlusconi’s diplomatic style accounting for a variation in terms of approach. The 2011 debt crisis has had evident consequences for the perception of the EU in Italy among public opinion and, consequently, political elites. Austerity measures imposed by Brussels as a way to reduce public debt further accelerated the already ongoing decline of popular support for the EU. In 2018, with only 35% of respondents having a positive image of the EU, Italy was placed among the countries with the lowest level of popular support for the integration process (Eurobarometer Autumn, 2018). From 2011, the party system seems to have gradually adjusted to the changing popular mood on the issue. Movimento 5 Stelle, a new populist party adopting a critical approach toward the EU, emerged as a protagonist in the political competition. Turning into a far-right and sovereigntist party, Lega Nord raised its Eurosceptic profile. These developments led to an increase in the salience and conflict on this issue within Italian domestic political debate (Giannetti et al., 2017). However, rising skepticism among public opinion and within the party system had only minor consequences on the overall Italian relationship with the EU institutions and the other member states. This is mainly due to the fact that Eurosceptic parties were not part of successive Italian executives’ right after the 2011 debt crisis. In fact, the legislature was concluded by a non-partisan government aimed at re-establishing trust in Italy among European circles headed by Mario Monti, a former EU Commissioner. After 2013 elections, a series of cabinets centered on the Europhile Partito Democratico formed. Matteo Renzi was the Prime Minister in the longest of these ones (2014–2016). Portraying himself as a charismatic leader and as an outsider to establishment politics, he embarked in a series of harsh battles with the EU institutions on austerity, immigration, and banks (Coticchia & Davidson, 2019). However, such confrontational approach was instrumental in gaining popularity at home, rather than marking a breakaway from the past. After the March 2018 elections, the populist and Eurosceptic Movimento 5 Stelle and Lega Nord joined forces to form a new executive. This government was supposed to bring about change in Italy’s relationship with the EU. While Movimento 5 Stelle had an ambiguous and instrumental position on Europe (Bressanelli & De Candia, 2019), Lega Nord in the past even launched a campaign advocating Italy’s exit from the common currency. However, this coalition cabinet broke after little more than a year, thereby causing only a very short period of Italian isolation in Europe.

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Interestingly, commitment to European Union was a fundamental point in the agreement between the two parties composing the current government, Movimento 5 Stelle and Partito Democratico. In sum, even after the dramatic 2011 debt crisis, stability in Italy’s commitment to the European integration process prevailed over change. The steady decrease in support for the EU among public and electorate has not translated in a substantial foreign policy change. Italian commitment to the UN and NATO was even less subjected to oscillations. With regard to the UN, Italy has provided a significant contribution in terms of the overall budget of the organization and personnel deployed in the UN peacekeeping missions. Partially because of the rising debt and the 2011 financial crisis, the required share of UN budget funded by Rome dramatically decreased in these years, moving from 5 to 3%. Nevertheless, in 2019, Italy is still the sixth largest contributor to the UN budget, behind United States, China, Japan, Germany, and France.26 Italian presence in the UN peacekeeping missions significantly grew over the years. The UNIFIL operation in Lebanon was a turning point, making Italy the largest European contributor to UN missions.27 A minor conflict at the end of the nineties concerned a proposal of reform of the UN Security Council under which Italy feared of being demoted in its status within the organization (Fulci, 1999).28 Such concern was shared by all the major political parties. As far as NATO is concerned, Italy actively participated in a number of missions, including operations Allied Force and Allied Harbor (1999) in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan (2001–2014).

6   Bilateralism In a sort of parallel way to the engagement in multilateral institutions, Italian foreign policy has developed a series of bilateral relationships with specific countries outside Europe. Undoubtedly, since the end of Second World War, the partnership with the United States has represented the most enduring and solid one. Mainly generated by mutual security concerns, it resisted the test of time and the abrupt change in the structure of 26  Authors’ elaboration on the basis on official reports of member states’ contribution to UN regular budget (1995–2019). 27  Data from the website of UN peacekeeping operations. 28  A group of states called “Uniting for Consensus” (UFC) successfully opposed the reform that aimed to expand the UN Security Council. Italy, which led the UFC, specifically contrasted the German aspiration of becoming a new permanent member of the Council.

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the international system deriving from the end of the Cold War. As said, Atlanticism is still one of three key circles of Italian foreign policy (Craig Nation, 2011; Davidson, 2011). Beside the transatlantic alliance, Italy has kept solid relationships with strategic partners in the European integration process (Germany and France) and other non-European countries—in particular in the region of Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA)— which provide indispensable energy supplies. Italy’s relationship with the United States is the only one that appropriately deserves the adjective of “special”. In the aftermath of the Second World War, three reasons pushed Italian foreign policymakers to seek the help of Washington: awareness of being in a weak strategic position in Europe, need to establish political and social stability in a country in turmoil, and seek to achieve the goal of European integration (Nuti, 2003). Cold War dynamics further reinforced the alliance, as Italy found itself at the border between the Eastern and the Western block. Moreover, influence in the country was motivated by the presence of the largest communist party in Europe. Two examples demonstrate the closeness of Italy to the United States: the decisions of deploying the IRBM missiles in 1958 (the first European country to do so) and the cruise missiles in 1983 (Nuti, 2003). Predictably, the relationship was imbalanced in favor of the strongest power, which exercised a disproportionate influence not only in Italian domestic politics but also in foreign policy. For instance, the transatlantic partnership acted as a constraint in Italy’s pursuit of strategic bilateral ties in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Such tension was at the basis of the most famous crisis between Italy and the United States, which occurred at the military base of Sigonella in 1985, with military forces of the two countries finding themselves face to face as a consequence of a disagreement on how to deal with a group of hijackers affiliated to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The end of the Cold War did not substantially affect the Italian relationship with the United States. Even more so, the transformation of the communist party into a more moderate social democratic party paved the way for a substantial elite consensus on Italy’s relationship with the American ally. Nevertheless, as said, scholars divided on whether the two coalitions produced a different approach to foreign policy, striking a different balance between Atlanticism and Europeanism. On the one hand, some scholars point out how Berlusconi’s governments have emphasized the transatlantic relationship in an unprecedented way, marking a change in Italian foreign policy (Andreatta, 2008; Carbone, 2007). Such

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argument is often drawn on the basis of his unwavering support for American president George W. Bush and the so-called Global War on Terror, first in Afghanistan and subsequently in Iraq. On the other hand, other scholars point out remarkable similarities between the two coalitions and overall continuity in the relationship with Washington (Croci, 2005; Davidson, 2011). They raise two major arguments against a presumed “Americanization” of Italian foreign policy under Berlusconi. First, under a center-left government, Italy actively participated to the NATO operation against Kosovo in 1999. The then Prime Minister and former communist Massimo D’Alema’s need to demonstrate his own Atlanticist credentials is widely regarded as a key driver of this decision (Davidson, 2011). Second, center-left parties supported the intervention in Afghanistan and financed the renewal of missions Enduring Freedom and ISAF when in power. To sum up, during the so-called Second Republic, continuity in the Italian relationship with the United States has been extraordinary. It also overcame some diplomatic incidents such as the tragedy of the US airplane falling on a cable car on Mount Cermis (1998), the kidnapping of the Islamic preacher Abu Omar on Italian soil by the CIA (2003), and the accidental killing of the Italian secret agent Nicola Calipari in Iraq by an American soldier (2005). Besides the transatlantic alliance, Italy has managed to cultivate bilateral ties with other countries throughout the years. From the end of the Second World War, Germany and France have been the most obvious partners. Across the last three decades, they ranked first and second for both Italian imports and exports, respectively.29 Energy policy was often a key driver in developing ties with other non-European countries (Coticchia et al., 2011). Without substantial reserves of oil and gas, Italy is forced to be highly dependent from imports. The main Italian energetic company, Ente Nazionali Idrocarburi (ENI), has been a pivotal actor in shaping Italian foreign policy (Coticchia et al., 2011). After the end of the Cold War, relationships with Russia and Libya were particularly tight. Russia is one of the first suppliers of these commodities, and a consistent part of Libyan production is exported to Italy. Former prime minister Berlusconi also played a key role, developing personal ties with Russian president Vladimir Putin and Libyan dictator Gaddafi, two leaders with little

29  Data from the World Bank. https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ ITA/Year/2017/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/by-country

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democratic credentials. Berlusconi has often expressed admiration for Putin and once defined Gaddafi as a “friend”. However, it is worth underlining how center-left coalition governments also contributed to strengthening these strategic partnerships. Ties with Russia and Libya provoked tensions abroad and occasional embarrassment at home. Among Western states, Italy’s position toward Putin’s Russia has persistently been a moderate one, both in the cases of the war in Georgia (2008) and in the sanctions following the unlawful invasion of Crimea (2013) (Carbone, 2009; Coticchia & Davidson, 2019). In the case of Libya, the multilateral decision to intervene in the 2011 civil war against the Gaddafi regime was initially met with skepticism by Berlusconi’s government (Croci & Valigi, 2013). To sum up, Italy has showed a remarkably strong continuity in the “special” relationship with the United States. The transatlantic alliance has remained solid, irrespectively of structural factors and domestic factors alike. France and Germany were also two solid partners throughout the years. The constant need to secure energy supplies has been a major driver to strengthen ties with other countries outside Western Europe and, in particular, in the Middle East and Northern African (MENA) region. To some extent, after the end of the Cold War, Berlusconi’s preference for personal relationships with fellow leaders has further emphasized the importance of bilateralism over multilateralism. This was especially true for the relationship with the United States and with some key energy suppliers such as Russia and Libya. With a growing American disinterest for Europe and a more dispersed distribution of power in the international system, Italy as a middle power is likely to have increasing space to cultivate bilateral ties. The recent agreement with China to work on the so-­ called Belt and Road Initiative may be sign of such a trend (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2019).

7   Conclusions As properly underlined by Isernia and Longo (2017), there is a surprising lack of cumulative analyses in the literature on Italian foreign and defense policy. Santoro complained about the study of Italian foreign policy as a “mysterious field of research” (1991, p. 20). In line with Brighi (2013), there is a lack of integrative frameworks of analysis on foreign policy that properly allows understanding how Italy has responded to the changes that occurred in the international system after the end of the bipolar era. This chapter aims to fill these gaps, investigating the interaction between

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domestic and international factors on Italian foreign policy. In particular— as summarized by Table 8.1—it explores how different political elites and leaders have responded to external pressures, assessing variation and commonalities in their approaches. In general terms, the end of the Cold War has brought a major change in Italian foreign policy. Reacting to such an abrupt shift in the structure of the international environment, Italy has begun to pursue a more assertive foreign policy, in order to increase its own prestige and status as a middle power (Giacomello & Verbeek, 2011). This transformation of posture was particularly evident in the sphere of security policy, as Italian troops were increasingly involved in military operations abroad, turning the country from being “a security consumer” to a “security provider”. Table 8.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in Italy since 1990

Adjustment change

Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

Relationship with the European Union (“Europeanism”) and with United States (“Atlanticism”) (1991–2019)

• Driver(s): Berlusconi’s preference for bilateral ties (1991–2011), Lega Nord in the center-right cabinets (1991–2019), growing skepticism for the EU among public opinion (2011–2019) • Inhibitors: consolidated bilateral and multilateral ties, bureaucracies • Driver(s): decrease in financial resources for diplomacy and defense, changes in the strategic doctrine, unrest in Libya and consequent augment of immigration • Driver(s): societal demands from NGOs, bureaucracies, domestic politics

Priority given to the “Enlarged Mediterranean” over other areas (2011–2019) Program change

Goal change

International orientation change

Establishment of a specific institution and procedure for development aid (2011–2019) Involvement in military operations abroad (1990–)

Italy became “a ‘security provider’ (rather than a security consumer”) (1990–)

• Driver(s): burden-sharing pressure, increase in peace and security operations, quest for international prestige • Inhibitors: financial crisis, pacifist public opinion and national strategic culture • Driver(s): end of Cold War, burden-sharing pressures, and end of the “First Republic” party system

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On the one hand, Italy’s remarkable involvement in peace and security operations was made possible by the flourishing of military interventions other than war, set up by international organizations (UN, NATO, and the EU) and/or the United States. On the other hand, a broad domestic consensus in terms of political parties, bureaucracies, and interest groups supported this development in Italian security policy. Between 1990 and 2008, the extent of change has been much more limited concerning the balancing act between Europeanism, meant as support for the European integration process, and Atlanticism, that is, the “special” relationship with the United States. Employing Hermann’s (1990) categorization, we could define it as an “adjustment change”, through which only the intensity of the commitment toward these loadstars of Italian foreign policy is pursued change. The color of the coalitions alternating in government accounts for this modest variation, with the center-right preferring Atlanticism over Europeanism and the center-left vice versa (Carbone, 2007; Brighi, 2013). Following the 9/11 terrorist attack, Berlusconi’s support for US-led “war on terror” highlighted such differences as Italy distanced itself from Germany and France to follow the American ally. Furthermore, his personal relationships with non-­ democratic leaders, such as Putin and Gaddafi, further underlined his preferences for a bilateral approach to foreign policy. However, as said, such divergences have to be analyzed as a change in the intensity of commitment to multilateralism and bilateralism rather than a choice of one against the other. The 2011 debt crisis has considerably shaped Italian policymakers’ approach to foreign policy. Together with the failure of the intervention in Libya, concerns about public expenditure slightly decreased Italy’s willingness to provide military resources and troops for peace and security operations outside areas of strategic interests. In fact, Italian security and defense policy has given the utmost priority for the Mediterranean and Northern Africa in the last years, while partially sidelining efforts in other regions. The austerity measures imposed on Italy to reduce its public debt have further increased feelings of discontent among public opinion and political parties alike for the European integration process. This sentiment has turned into open confrontation with EU institutions with the appointment of the charismatic Matteo Renzi as prime minister in 2014 (Coticchia & Davidson, 2019) and magnified to increase under the recent full populist government. Nevertheless, similarly to the loyalty with the United

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States, support for the European Union has remained a guiding principle of Italian foreign policy. As said, after the 2018 elections, the rise to power of a coalition of two populist parties, Movimento 5 Stelle and Lega Nord, was supposed to bring substantial changes to Italian foreign policy. Given that such cabinet lasted little more than a year, it is hard to assess its impact on this policy area. On the one hand, Italy ended up being more isolated in Europe, and significant tensions with other member states such as France and Germany emerged. On the other hand, these parties reneged on their contestation of a number of military operations such as the ones in Afghanistan and Lebanon, confirming Italian commitment to global security and multilateral tradition. To sum up, even such a dramatic (albeit short-lived) earthquake in the domestic politics arena did not significantly shake the pillars of Italy’s foreign policy.

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Carbone, M. (2009). Italy in the European Union, Between Prodi and Berlusconi. The International Spectator, 44(3), 97–115. Carbone, M., & Quaglia, L. (2011). Italy and the EU: Seeking Visibility, Fearing Exclusion. In M. Carbone (Ed.), Italy in the Post-Cold War Order: Adaptation, Bipartisanship, Visibility (pp. 161–178). Lexington. Catanzaro, A., & Coticchia, F. (2017). Al di là dell’arcobaleno: i movimenti pacifisti italiani tra ideologie e contro narrazioni strategiche. Vita e pensiero. Ceccorulli, M., & Coticchia, F. (2019). I’ll take two. Migration, terrorism, and the Italian military engagement in Niger and Libya. Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 25(2), 174–196. Coticchia, F. (2014). La guerra che non c’era: Opinione pubblica e interventi militari dall’Afghanistan alla Libia. Milano: EGEA. Coticchia, F. (2018). Italy. In H.  Mayer & M.  Weiss (Eds.), The Handbook of European Defense Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford University Press. Coticchia, F., & Davidson, J.  W. (2019). Italian Foreign Policy During Matteo Renzi’s Government: A Domestically Focused Outsider and the World. Lexington. Coticchia, F., Giacomello, G., & Sartori, N. (2011). Securing Italy’s Energy Supply and Private Oil Companies. In G.  Giacomello & B.  Verbeek (Eds.), Italy’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power (pp. 175–195). Lexington. Coticchia, F., & Moro, F. N. (2015). The Transformation of Italian Armed Forces in Comparative Perspective: Adapt, Improvise, Overcome? Routledge. Coticchia, F., & Vignoli, V. (2018). Italian Political Parties and Military Operations: An Empirical Analysis on Voting Patterns. Government and Opposition, 55(3), 1–18. Craig Nation, R. (2011). Intra-Alliance Politics: Italian-American relations 1946–2010. In G. Giacomello & B. Verbeek (Eds.), Italy’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power (pp. 29–54). Lexington. Croci, O. (2005). Much ado about little: The foreign policy of the second Berlusconi Government. Modern Italy, 10(1), 59–74. Croci, O. (2007). Italian Foreign Policy After the End of the Cold War: The Issue of Continuity and Change in Italian–US Relations. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 9(2), 117–131. Croci, O. (2008). Not a Zero-Sum Game: Atlanticism and Europeanism in Italian Foreign Policy. The International Spectator, 43(4), 137–155. Croci, O., & Valigi, M. (2013). Continuity and Change in Italian Foreign Policy: The Case of the International Intervention in Libya. Contemporary Italian Politics, 5(1), 38–54. D’Alimonte, R., & Bartolini, S. (1997). ‘Electoral Transition’ and Party System Change in Italy. West European Politics, 20(1), 110–134.

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Davidson, J. W. (2011). Italy and the US: Prestige, Peace, and the Transatlantic Balance. In M. Carbone (Ed.), Italy in the Post-Cold War Order: Adaptation, Bipartisanship, Visibility. Lexington. ESS. (2003). A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy. Council of the European Union. EUGS. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, European External Action Service. European Commission. (2018). Standard Eurobarometer 90. Fossati, F. (1999). Economia e politica estera in Italia. L’evoluzione negli anni novanta. Franco Angeli. Fulci, F.  P. (1999). Italy and the Reform of the UN Security Council. The International Spectator, 34(2), 7–16. Giacomello, G., & Verbeek, B. (Eds.). (2011). Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-­ First Century: The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power. Lexington Books. Giannetti, D., Pedrazzani, A., & Pinto, L. (2017). Party System Change in Italy: Politicising the EU and the Rise of Eccentric Parties. South European Society and Politics, 22(1), 21–42. Hagemann, S., & Franchino, F. (2016). Transparency vs Efficiency? A Study of Negotiations in the Council of the European Union. European Union Politics, 17(3), 408–428. Hermann, C.  F. (1990). Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 34(1), 3–21. Ignazi, P., Giacomello, G., & Coticchia, F. (2012). Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call It War. Palgrave Macmillan. Il Sole 24 Ore. (2019, March 23). Italia-Cina: cosa c’è negli accordi sulla Via della Seta. Dossier per 20 milioni potenziali. https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/ notizie/2019-­03-­23/via-­seta-­italia-­e-­cina-­firmano-­memorandum-­113732. shtml?uuid=ABDPgGhB&refresh_ce=1 Isernia, P., & Longo, F. (2017). The Italian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Continuities. Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 47(2), 107–124. Locatelli, A., Moro, F. N., & Coticchia, F. (2016). Renew or Reload? Continuity and Change in Italian Defence Policy. EUI Working Papers Series. Matarazzo, R. (2011). In Search of the North Star: Italy’s Post-Cold War European Policy. In G. Giacomello & B. Verbeek (Eds.), Italy’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power (pp.  55–70). Lexington. Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione. (2018). Cooperazione internazionale per lo sviluppo. Documento triennale di programmazione e di indirizzo 2019-2021.

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Ministero della Difesa. (1991). Nuovo modello di difesa. Ministero della Difesa. (2001). Nuove forze per un nuovo secolo. Ministero della Difesa. (2002). Libro bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa. Ministero della Difesa. (2015). Libro bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa. NATO. (2010). NATO Strategic Concept 2010: Active Engagement, Modern Defense. Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon. Nones, M., & Marrone, A. (2011). La transformazione delle forze armate: il programma forza nec. Edizioni Nuova Cultura. Nuti, L. (2003). The Role of the US in Italy’s Foreign Policy. The international spectator, 38(1), 91–101. OECD. (2018). Development Co-Operation to Leave No One Behind: A Snapshot of DAC Member Approaches. Development Co-Operation Report. Quaglia, L., & Radaelli, C. M. (2007). Italian Politics and the European Union: A Tale of Two Research Designs. West European Politics, 30(4), 924–943. Ratti, L. (2011). Italy as a Multilateral Actor: The Inescapable Destiny of a Middle Power. In M.  Carbone (Ed.), Italy in the Post-Cold War Order: Adaptation, Bipartisanship, Visibility (pp. 123–140). Lexington. Ronzitti, N. (2017). La legge italiana sulle missioni internazionali. Rivista di diritto internazionale, 100(2), 474–495. Santoro, C. M. (1992). La politica estera di una media potenza: l’Italia dall’Unità ad oggi. Il Mulino. Venturi, B. (2019). The Trouble with Italy’s Development Cooperation. IAI Commentaries. https://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/trouble-­italys-­develop­ment-­cooperation Walston, J. (2007). Italian Foreign Policy in the ‘Second Republic’. Changes of Form and Substance. Modern Italy, 12(1), 91–104.

CHAPTER 9

Dutch Foreign Policy: Staying the Course Amid a Changing World Niels van Willigen

1   Introduction Being a European middle power that relies on collective security and collective defense, and with an economy that primarily depends on international trade, the Netherlands has a foreign policy that is historically characterized by an approach that aims to balance trade interests, security interests, and idealism. Voorhoeve (1979) famously characterized Dutch foreign policy as being historically determined by the three traditions of ‘maritime commercialism’, ‘internationalist idealism’, and ‘neutralist abstentionalism’. With regard to the latter, a clear ‘international orientation change’ (Hermann, 1990) took place when neutrality was abandoned in 1949  in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) The author thanks the editors, Tim Haesebrouck and Jeroen Joly, and Theo Brinkel, Oda van Cranenburgh and Frank de Zwart for commenting on earlier drafts of this chapter. N. van Willigen (*) Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_9

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membership. The Netherlands strongly aligned its security policy with the United States (US)-led Western bloc. In the course of time, several ‘adjustment changes’, ‘program changes’ and ‘goal changes’ (Hermann, 1990) took place that modified the other two traditions, but to a certain extent ‘maritime commercialism’ and ‘internationalist idealism’ are still relevant components of the general Dutch foreign policy orientation. Both traditions are part of a more general liberal internationalist foreign policy approach, in which Dutch national interests are primarily linked to free trade, collective security, multilateralism, and a well-functioning international legal order. The Netherlands is firmly committed to multilateralism, which is considered to be the best way to advance its trade and security interests. The Netherlands is committed to European institutions, but also to the transatlantic security community and NATO. More in general, the Netherlands developed a broad multilateralist profile by stressing the importance of the United Nations (UN) and other global institutions. That profile matches well with its outspoken policy to promote the international legal order. The Netherlands is one of the few countries that has a clause in its constitution (article 90) that obliges the government to promote the international legal order (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2018).1 The Netherlands hosts almost 40 international governmental organizations (IGOs), most of them being located in the Hague, and no less than 8 of these being legal institutions (Government of The Netherlands, 2020). The active promotion of human rights and its relatively large footprint in development aid are two other characteristics of Dutch foreign policy that point toward internationalist idealism. However, economic interests are never far away. Not only in the narrow sense that the establishment of international organizations stimulates the local economy by providing jobs, but also in the broader sense that the Netherlands is very dependent on international cooperation for economic growth. The Netherlands is the seventh largest export economy in the world, and it scores structurally high on the Global Competitiveness Index (OEC, 2020).2 Economic diplomacy (the use of diplomatic instruments 1  To be precise: until 1983 the constitution referred in article 58 to ‘the king’ as being responsible for promoting the international legal order. From 1983 onward, the new article 90 refers to the ‘government’ instead of the king. 2  In 2019, The Netherlands scored as the fourth most competitive economy in the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum.

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to promote commercial interests abroad) is an important component of Dutch foreign policy. The Netherlands also forms a large hub for international trade and its economic dependence on international trade makes it a strong supporter of established institutions that promote economic cooperation, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and new institutions that offer additional trade opportunities, like the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Dutch trade interests are served by international stability as well. Therefore, Dutch foreign policies that promote multilateralism and the international rule of law should be explained by its economic, political, and security interests as well; and not by international idealism alone. In the remainder of this chapter, I will offer an overview of how Dutch foreign policy evolved since 1990; with 1990, 2001, and 2010 as years that delineate the timeframes. There is much continuity over the last 30 years, but internal and external developments have also caused bigger and smaller foreign policy changes. Section two elaborates on how the general foreign policy orientation changed. Like its neighboring countries, the Netherlands had to adjust its foreign policy to the post-Cold War world, to deal with the consequences of 9/11, and to find its way in a world increasingly determined by geopolitical pressures after 2010. The chapter proceeds with analyzing Dutch foreign policy in relation to four themes: defense and security policy, aid policy, bilateral relations, and EU, multilateral diplomacy and niche diplomacy. In the conclusion, I present the main drivers of changes in Dutch foreign policy and reflect on the extent to which the last 30 years were characterized by continuity and change.

2   General Foreign Policy Orientation 2.1  National Interests and Liberal Internationalism in the 1990s Like all European countries, the Netherlands had to adapt its foreign policy to the post-Cold War setting. In 1994, the then new minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van Mierlo (1994–1998) initiated a general re-­ evaluation (herijking) of Dutch foreign policy. Van Mierlo was one of the founders of the progressive liberal party Democrats ’66 (D66). His re-­evaluation was meant to modernize Dutch foreign policy and help the government to find a new role for the Netherlands in the world. It led to

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a white paper in 1995: De Herijking van het Buitenlands Beleid (the Re-evaluation of Foreign Policy) in which a more integrated foreign policy organization was proposed. First, the white paper called for more cooperation between the ministry of foreign affairs and other ministries, which led to the establishment of the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking, HGIS) in 1997 (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1997–1998). Second, the integration of the policy departments for development aid and the policy departments responsible for other foreign policies within the ministry of foreign affairs was called for. And third, the white paper proposed to integrate regional directorates in the ministry that would work closely together with the thematic directorates. In the end, the re-evaluation was triggered by the organizational aspects of Dutch foreign policy-making (Hellema, 2009, p. 325). In spite of the systemic shock of the end of the Cold War, the white paper led to a program change but not to an international orientation change or goal change. The liberal internationalist approach remained leading and was summarized in the white paper as a foreign policy being built on ‘peace, freedom, and prosperity’ (Tweede Kamer der Staten-­ Generaal, 1994–1995, p.  11). That being said, there was a short-lived adjustment change that consisted of more emphasis on European cooperation during Van Mierlo’s term in office. The two preceding foreign ministers (Hans Van den Broek (1982–1993), member of Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and Pieter Kooijmans (also CDA) (1993–1994)), had been much more Atlanticist than Van Mierlo. Van Mierlo put emphasis on European cooperation, both multilaterally in the EU and bilaterally with European neighbors (Hellema, 2009, pp. 324–330). However, Van Mierlo’s successor, Jozias van Aartsen (1998–2002), was again more Atlanticist, which also characterizes his political party, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). What did survive was Van Mierlo’s pragmatic approach toward European integration, which can be considered as a program change. Traditionally, the Netherlands had always emphasized the importance of supranationalism and even federalism in European integration in order to prevent a dictate of France, Germany, or the other large European states. During the Dutch chairmanship of the EU in 1995, which ended with the Treaty of Amsterdam, Dutch policy became more flexible and pragmatic (Hellema, 2009, p. 328). This was for a large part due to the diplomatic disaster of ‘black Monday’; on Monday 30 September 1995, the ambitious Dutch plan to

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establish a European political community failed to get support from the other EU members and went down into history as one of the biggest Dutch diplomatic blunders. The pragmatic Dutch approach toward European integration fits into the more general re-orientation of Dutch foreign policy on the national interest (program change). The post-Cold War environment prompted a rethinking of what the Dutch national interest entailed. Consequently, in development aid policy of the 1990s, the national interest was explicitly mentioned as an important guiding principle. The same goes for the decision-­making process regarding military interventions after the dramatic ending of the Srebrenica mission (see section three). The national interest was primarily interpreted through the frame of the Netherlands as a middle power. This self-classification dates back to 1942 and has been leading ever since (Hellema, 2009; Sweijs & Pronk, 2019). The Dutch foreign policy community likes to emphasize that the Netherlands ranks high (often top ten, or—depending on the topic—even top five) on different kinds of policy areas, such as development aid, trade, participation in peace operations, and so on. By positioning itself as a middle power (or more specifically as the smallest of the large European countries, rather than the largest of the small powers), the Netherlands presents itself as a credible partner to both larger and smaller countries. Although the self-­ image of a middle power existed before the 1990s, the demise of the bipolar world order created more policy space to actually further develop this role. Next to its focus on the national interest, the Netherlands also developed a larger normative component in its foreign policy in the 1990s (which is an adjustment change). Linking into the widespread optimistic expectation of the 1990s that the end of the Cold War would make it possible to establish a new world order based on democracy, free markets, and collective security, the Netherlands increased its liberal internationalist profile. This included a preparedness to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and collective attempts to restore international peace and security. A good example of the latter is the UN Security Council sanctioned operation Desert Storm (1991), during which the Netherlands provided naval forces. Another example is the Dutch military participation in NATO operation Allied Force in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. However, this air campaign was not based on a UN Security Council resolution and that provided the Netherlands with a dilemma; how could it reconcile its

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participation in a military operation without UN Security Council approval with its policy of promoting the international legal order? Like the other NATO countries, the government argued that although there was no unambiguous UN mandate, it was nonetheless legitimate to undertake military action against the Serbian forces of President Slobodan Milosevic, because Milosevic continuously refused to implement prior UN Security Council Resolutions. The dilemma of the Kosovo war prompted the Dutch government to organize international seminars in 1999 and 2000 with the aim to develop criteria on the basis of which NATO countries could decide to start a humanitarian intervention. This was followed by the Canadian initiative to establish the International Commission on Humanitarian Intervention and State sovereignty, which would give birth to the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2010–2011). The normative component of Dutch foreign policy is also reflected in other developments. For example, the Netherlands supported and regularly played an important role in the coming about of arms control or disarmament initiatives, such as the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (1996), the anti-personnel landmine treaty (1997), and the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports (1998). In the same spirit of liberal internationalism, the development of the Hague as host city for international organizations got an impulse with, for example, the establishment of the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in 1993 and the creation of the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 1997. In the process, the branding was broadened from ‘legal capital of the world’ to the Hague as ‘city of peace and justice’. Also, in 2000, the maintenance or promotion of the international legal order was included in the Dutch constitution as one of the three tasks of the Dutch armed forces. Before this constitutional revision, the only task mentioned for the armed forces had been the protection of the interests of the state. In 2000 that was explicitly broadened in article 97 and thus strengthened the already existing obligation of the government as mentioned in article 90 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2018). 2.2  Increasing Global Uncertainty in the 2000s All this continued into the twenty-first century, but 9/11 led to a larger focus on security concerns (adjustment change), more in particular on international terrorism. Concretely, the Netherlands participated in the

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‘war on terror’ and supported the American military operation in Afghanistan politically and militarily (cf. section 3). Obviously, the post-9/11 Dutch foreign policy was not completely determined by the war on terror. Following the debate on humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and the controversial nature of the Iraq war, the 2000s saw further development of a normative dimension in Dutch foreign policy. First, the Netherlands positioned itself as a strong proponent of the R2P. Among others it played an active role in the UN negotiations in 2005 that led to the adoption of R2P as a norm during the World Summit in the same year and kept promoting it (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2010–2011). Second, in 2002, the Hague opened its gates to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC was politically contested, because the founding members failed to win the support of several large states, including China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the US.  Therefore, by accepting the ICCs headquarters in the Hague, the Netherlands accepted the risk of future political conflict with those states in return for strengthening the multilateral order. Another important development in the 2000s was the accelerating European integration: the adoption of the euro in 2002, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, Europeanized Dutch foreign policy. The Netherlands was a strong promotor of the European economic and monetary union with a single currency, and it also supported the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, European integration also met domestic resistance. In 2004, the Dutch population voted down the European constitution and populist political parties on the left, and right of the political spectrum became increasingly successful in mobilizing voters on an anti-EU (or at least EU-critical) platform. Also, the Netherlands did not become less Atlanticist. The government coalitions in the 2000s were led by Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and both he and his party, the CDA, cherished the Atlanticist tradition. The same goes for the liberal-­ conservative VVD, which was a coalition partner in all but one of the Balkenende cabinets in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Hence, the Netherlands increasingly followed a two-track approach in which the traditional Atlantic reflex went hand in hand with more foreign policy coordination and cooperation at the EU level.

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2.3  Keeping Track of Rapid Global Changes in the 2010s In 2010, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) published a report titled: ‘Attached to the World. On the anchoring and strategy of Dutch foreign policy’ (Knapen et al., 2011). The title refers to the observation that few countries are economically, politically, and socially as dependent on the outside world as the Netherlands. This dependence came with great advantages. Economically, for example, the Netherlands benefitted greatly from globalization. The trade volume and the trade surplus of the Netherlands grew significantly since the 1990s (CEIC, 2020). Also, the trade balance as a percentage of GDB is  high (The Global Economy, 2020). However, dependence on the world economy also meant that the financial crisis of 2008 gave a serious blow to the economy, leading to budget cuts on defense and development aid and a decrease in the number of Dutch diplomatic posts. A second important theme in the report was that political and social changes would force the Netherlands to rethink its foreign policy. One of the important ‘changing conditions of foreign policy’ was the blurring lines between foreign and domestic politics. This process received momentum after the Cold War and has been referred to in the literature as the domestication of foreign policy, the growing importance of domestic factors in determining Dutch foreign policy (Verbeek & Van der Vleuten, 2008). Another changing condition the report refers to is the increasing hybridity of international politics; the traditional world of nation-states had been joined by a world of networks in which non-state actors have gained prominence. The return of geopolitics and the increased pressure on the multilateral system in the 2010s only further complicated this picture. Amid the rapid global changes and the financial crisis, the first government of Mark Rutte (2010–2012) formulated four themes that would guide Dutch foreign policy: international stability and security, energy and raw materials security, promotion of the international legal order, and promotion of Dutch economic interests (Rijksoverheid, 2010). The more pro-active economic diplomacy was a program change that had an impact on aid policies as well (see below). In the process, embassies got a larger responsibility for undertaking economic diplomacy. The focus on these four themes was more or less continued in the governments of Rutte II (2012–2017) and Rutte III (2017–2021). The most important development was a general adjustment change that was related to the end of the

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financial crisis and the European debt crisis, and the international political challenges that the Netherlands was facing. Especially as of 2017, the preceding budget cuts were partly reversed. That was facilitated by the recovering Dutch economy (from 2014 onward, the economy grew after two years of shrinking) and by the need to address challenges such as Russian assertiveness, a deteriorating Transatlantic relationship, Brexit, and the European migration crisis. After years of budget cuts, more money was reserved for increasing the number of diplomatic posts (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2018a), investments in defense, and increased development aid.

3   Defense and Security Policy Dutch defense and security policy are traditionally very much orientated toward the transatlantic relationship and the Netherlands’ European neighbors. That being said, it should be mentioned that the Kingdom of the Netherlands also borders Venezuela and several Caribbean islands. After all, the Kingdom includes Aruba, Curacao, and Sint Maarten as constituent countries, and Bonaire, Saba, and Sint Eustatius are part of the Netherlands as special municipalities. This link with the Caribbean means that events such as the political crisis which emerged in Venezuela in 2018 directly affect Dutch interests. The Netherlands is responsible for the foreign and defense policy of the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom, as a result of which there is a permanent Dutch military presence. However, the major part of Dutch foreign policy is organized around the interests of the European part of the Kingdom and that is what this section will focus on. 3.1  Crisis Management in the 1990s After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Netherlands remained a strong supporter of NATO, but at the same time, the Dutch started to work pragmatically toward European foreign and security cooperation as well. The Netherlands increasingly found that the EU should be able to also act as a political actor on the world stage, adding a stronger diplomatic dimension to its large economic influence. In particular crisis management and operations at the lower end of the spectrum of violence were thought of as potential tasks for the EU. A key condition remained that European foreign and security cooperation should not undermine NATO in any way. This is reflected in a repetitive emphasis on the importance of Article 5 of

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the NATO treaty. Moreover, Dutch defense procurement was and remained mainly US-focused, as evidenced by the procurement of American Apache helicopters in the 1990s instead of the European Tiger helicopters. In the 1990s, the Netherlands fundamentally reformed its armed forces. Although the government communicated in the defense white paper of 1991 that conscription would be preserved for the time being, it also acknowledged that there was an increased demand for crisis operations (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1990–1991). In order to meet these demands, in the course of the 1990s, the military was transformed from primarily being a deterrent force to prevent Soviet aggression, to an expeditionary force capable of conducting military interventions far beyond its own borders. Although not formally abolished, conscription effectively ended in 1994 when no new conscripts were summoned. New expeditionary units, such as the Air Mobile Brigade, were created. Territorial defense remained an important task of the armed forces, but as mentioned above, in 2000 the armed forces were constitutionally tasked to assist in maintaining or promoting the international legal order as well. That was actually a codification of already existing practice. After all, Dutch armed forces had already participated significantly in UN peacekeeping operations and NATO-led crisis management operations throughout the 1990s. In that respect, the Dutch participation in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) needs special mentioning. From 1993 to 1995, Dutch troops were mandated by the UN to protect the enclave. In July 1995, however, Srebrenica was overrun by Serbian forces, and over 8000 men and boys were murdered in what was qualified as a genocide by the International Court of Justice in 2007. Srebrenica had a strong impact on the Dutch decision-making process regarding military interventions. It resulted in a parliamentary inquiry that scrutinized the decision-making process, and in 2002, the second coalition government of Prime Minister Wim Kok (Labour Party, PvdA) was disbanded after the Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies had published its report on the Srebrenica mission. The report held the Serbian forces responsible for the genocide, but strongly criticized the decision-making process that led to the Dutch deployment of troops (Nederlands Instituut Voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 2002). After Srebrenica, substantial Dutch participation in UN peacekeeping was limited to one mission only, the UNMEE mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea from 2000 to 2002. It was only in 2014 that the Dutch

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government decided to send a significant number of troops to participate in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (see below). More importantly, Srebrenica had influential consequences for the decision-making process. In the same constitutional amendment that explicitly mentioned maintaining or promoting the international legal order as a task for the armed forces, a new article 100 was included which obliged the government to involve parliament more in the decision-making process (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2018). Also, in 1995, an Assessment Framework was created that includes criteria that the government must take into account when deciding to send troops abroad. The new procedures had their effect, because even in the case of a relatively ‘safe mission’ like the UNMEE mission, parliament was much more involved and also emphasized themes like force protection. The military reforms were only partially driven by the aim to create armed forces suitable for participating in crisis management operations. Equally important (or perhaps even more important) was that reforms made it possible to implement significant budget cuts. There was a widespread feeling that the end of the Cold War made it possible to cash in on the peace dividend. In other words, money that was first used to maintain Cold War level armed forces could now be reallocated to health care, education, and other policy areas. This was not unique for the Netherlands; almost all NATO countries (including the USA) cut their defense budgets in the 1990s. The result was that Dutch defense expenses fell below the NATO norm of 2 percent of GDP in the 1990s, as illustrated in Fig. 9.1. 3.2  The 2000s: the War on Terror and Stabilization Missions The defense white paper of 2000 set out the course for the next ten years. Whereas the 1991 white paper still very much echoed the Cold War, the 2000 white paper acknowledged that the world had changed and that it had become less predictable. Two large security challenges mentioned were intra-state conflict and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Also, the negative effects of globalization were mentioned, including the facilitation of organized crime. Obviously, 9/11 made the white paper outdated; it had only mentioned terrorism twice. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror strongly influenced Dutch security and defense policy. Although the budget cuts on defense continued, 9/11 led to relatively large deployments of Dutch armed forces. The Netherlands

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Fig. 9.1  The Netherlands’ annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). Source: World Bank

participated with several missions in NATO’s International Stability and Assistance Force (ISAF), the largest contribution being a task force of 1200 troops making it the lead nation in the province of Uruzgan from 2006 to 2010. In addition, it also deployed Apache attack helicopters, F-16’s, a Provincial Reconstruction Team, and a battalion of the marine corps. The Netherlands led a regional headquarters and together with Germany commanded ISAF for half a year from February 2003 onward (Ministerie van Defensie, 2020). The Netherlands also joined US-led multilateral initiatives associated with the war on terror, such as the Container Security Initiative (2002) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (2003). When the EU initiated a counter-terrorism strategy after the Madrid bombings of 2004, the Netherlands delivered the first EU coordinator on terrorism. Regarding Iraq, the situation was more complex, because the US-invasion was very controversial, and at the time of the Iraq invasion, the Netherlands was in the middle of government coalition negotiations.

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In March 2003, the government (led by Balkenende) provided political support for the US-led invasion in spite of the absence of a clear mandate of the UN Security Council. It was explicitly stated that this support would be political only and that the government would not make an active military contribution due to lack of broad support in public and in parliament. However, this did not preclude providing host-nation support allowing US troops and equipment to use Dutch territory for logistics (Jockel & Massie, 2017). Further, once the UN Security Council called on UN member states to contribute to the ‘stability and security in Iraq’, the Netherlands decided to provide troops for the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR). Another important development in the 2000s was the blurring between different components of foreign policy. The stabilization mission in Afghanistan gave birth to the concept of Diplomacy, Defense and Development (3D), also referred to as the comprehensive approach. The idea was to use a whole of government approach in complex stabilization missions to increase the chances of success. It also had to send the message to the Dutch public that participation in ISAF was not primarily about fighting, but focused on reconstruction and development. The 3D approach gave an impulse to inter- and intra-ministerial cooperation. Different parts of the foreign policy machinery had to cooperate more closely than before. This was also the case with new challenges that arose in the 2000s such as organized crime and piracy. Since 2009 the Netherlands participated in EU and NATO missions to deter pirates active in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean and thus harming the free flow of trade. In those missions the ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs worked closely together with the Ministry of Justice. 3.3  The 2010s: the Return of Geopolitics Uncertainty and unpredictability in the international system further increased in the 2010s. The annual strategic monitors consistently pointed toward a shift from a multilateral to a multipolar order and to less predictability (Sweijs & Pronk, 2020). Against that background, and for the very first time, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an international security strategy in 2013 (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012–2013). It identified three strategic interests: territorial defense, a well-functioning international legal order, and economic security. One of the focal points was to increase European responsibility for reaching these

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objectives. The strategy recognized that the world was changing in the direction of a more multipolar world order and that Europe should be careful not to be outplayed by the US and China (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012–2013). This was even more emphasized in the subsequent integrated international security strategy (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2018b). At the same time, the Netherlands continued to rely on its liberal internationalist profile as was, for example, evidenced by the three policy priorities which the Netherlands pursued when it occupied a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2018: strengthening peace operations, addressing the root causes of conflict, and accountability. The 2010s saw many crises that affected security, including the Arab revolutions and the subsequent political instability at the EU’s borders, regime change and an air campaign in Libya, an unfolding civil war in Syria, civil war and intervention in Mali, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the refugee crisis, several terrorist attacks in Europe, and the rise and decline of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. Dutch foreign policy was affected by these events and developments. Especially the shooting down of MH17 over Ukraine in 2014 (193 Dutch citizens died) was an event with deep impact. It seriously deteriorated the relationship with Russia, because of the lack of cooperation by the Kremlin with the Joint Investigative Team. Moreover, the disclosure by the Dutch military intelligence service in 2018 that Russia had been caught in a spy operation against the OPCW in the Hague did not help to improve relations either. As far as military operations are concerned, the Netherlands was active in Syria and Iraq as part of the anti-IS coalition. Concretely the Dutch contribution consisted of the deployment of F16’s and training missions for the Iraqi armed forces. The Netherlands was also active in diplomatic efforts to fight terrorism. For example, the Dutch government was one of the leading nations in setting up the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). It was also an active player in the Nuclear Security Summits; it hosted the third summit in 2014. A more substantial Dutch military presence was offered to MINUSMA. With 450 troops,the Netherlands was the largest troops contributing European country. It mainly deployed these troops to assist the UN with intelligence gathering and processing. The mission took place from 2014 to 2019 and was the first substantial UN peacekeeping mission since UNMEE. However, it has seriously worn out the operational capacity of the Dutch armed forces. In 2018 the Netherlands Court of Audit

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issued a critical report in which it concluded that it addressed the discrepancy between that ‘what the armed forces can do and what the defense organization expects of them’ (Rekenkamer, 2018). In other words, the decades of budget cuts on defense had weakened the armed forces on a structural basis. That being said, the coalition agreement of 2017 (Rutte III) for the first time agreed to increase the defense budget again (Rijksoverheid, 2017). Not only because of the above-mentioned security challenges and lack of operational capacity, but also because of increasing US pressure to meet NATO’s two percent norm.

4   Development Cooperation Policy Traditionally, the Netherlands has a strongly developed aid policy, or ‘development cooperation policy’ as it is officially called. Since 1973 the Netherlands has generally complied with the UN standard to spend at least 0.7 percent of BNP to development aid. At times, it even spent over one percent of BNP (Hellema, 2009: 222, 304, 342). Its large footprint in development cooperation made the Netherlands an influential actor in multilateral fora with development on their agenda’s such as the UN and the World Bank. At the same time, the largest share of Dutch development aid is channeled through bilateral relations with developing countries. 4.1   Toward the Sector-Wide Approach in the 1990s A decreased development budget is the first remarkable foreign policy change in the era 1990–2000 (cf. Fig. 9.2). The reason for this decrease was twofold: general governmental budget cuts and the allocation of development funds to non-traditional development aid (Hellema, 2009, p. 342; Hoebink, 2010, p. 29). Development cooperation is traditionally coordinated in the ministry of foreign affairs and in particular by the minister of development cooperation (which is a ministerial post without portfolio since 1965). With the introduction of HGIS in 1997, and thus the merging of development aid and diplomacy, development cooperation became more political. Especially under minister Jan Pronk (1989–1998, PvdA), development cooperation was used as a tool to influence political developments in developing countries (Nekkers & Malcontent, 1999, pp.  218–219). Initially, Pronk’s development policy echoed the general optimism of the immediate post-Cold War world. Development aid was seen as an opportunity to help countries democratize and prevent

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Fig. 9.2  The Netherlands’ annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System

violations of human rights. The optimism ended against the background of violent conflicts in, among other places, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan. The resulting policy focused therefore very much on conflict areas and humanitarian assistance (Hoebink, 1999). Also, during the 1990s development cooperation became more based on macro-economic approaches. Instead of delivering aid via relatively small-scale projects, emphasis was put on supporting national budgets of the partner countries. This more hands-off approach had to be combined with due attention for good governance and ownership by the developing country (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1995–1996). The argument was that development cooperation would become more effective. The policy change had been preceded by critical reports on project-based development cooperation by the policy evaluation unit of the ministry of foreign affairs. However, when Pronk presented his plans for a more macro-economic approach, he was criticized as well; the fear was that it

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would become more difficult to assess the effectiveness of development cooperation (Giebels, 1995). 4.2  The 2000s: Macro-Economic Approaches and Less Partner Countries Pronk’s successor, Eveline Herfkens (1998–2002, PvdA), focused on a macro-economic approach, also called the sector-wide approach. She strongly emphasized ownership and good governance, especially in relation to the macro-economic policies of the partner countries. However, different from Pronk, she embraced the private sector and connected to the neoliberal policies of the World Bank and IMF (Development Policy Review Network, 2008). Also, Herfkens allowed a larger number of civil society organizations to co-finance development projects and thus get government funding. Traditionally, this had been the privilege of four Dutch organizations (connected to the societal pillars in Dutch society) (Kaleidos Research, 2012). Further, the minister decreased the number of countries with which the Netherlands had a development cooperation relationship. The political approach of Pronk had been motivated by having political access to as many countries as possible and that had resulted in over 150 partner countries (Hoebink, 1999; Hoebink, 2010). Following Herfkens policies, the number of partner countries was further decreased to 36 under Herfkens’ successor Agnes van Ardenne (2002–2007, CDA). She emphasized the importance of reciprocity and societal responsibility in development cooperation. In other words, in order to be effective, all actors involved (donor governments, aid recipients, civil society organizations, businesses, IGOs) had to honor their obligations within the aid relationship. Dutch policy objectives were connected to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals and made sustainable poverty reduction the most important objective (Development Policy Review Network, 2008). There was also much attention for conflict areas and the role of development aid in the above-mentioned 3D approach. Herfkens’ successor, Bert Koenders (2007–2010), continued with the emphasis on the responsibility of the actors involved in development cooperation. Koenders considered development cooperation not only as an act of solidarity, but also as an activity that is in the interest of the developed world to pursue. For Koenders, development cooperation was a multiplier for economic growth; aid can contribute to economic growth but not replace it. In that light, he also emphasized that unjust social

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structures and unequal power relations limit the prospect of development and therefore pleaded in favor of a more just international economic order. He also focused more on fragile states (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2007). A final important development was the decrease of the share of tied aid in the bilateral relationships. From the 1950s onward, much of the bilateral development aid was obliged to be spent in the Netherlands (Hellema, 2009, pp.  221, 222). Tied aid decreased a bit in the 1970s (Hellema, 2009, p. 261) but remained dominant. Herfkens (1998–2002) was responsible for a significant decrease. This continued under Koenders, who acted in accordance with international developments as illustrated by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) in which tied aid was internationally condemned (Koch, 2009). 4.3  The 2010s: Smaller Budget and Shift of Focus In 2010, the WRR published a report on Dutch development aid: Minder Pretentie, Meer Ambitie. Ontwikkelingshulp die Verschil Maakt (Less Pretension, More Ambition. Development Aid that makes a Difference) (WRR, 2010). The report formed the basis for several changes in development cooperation in the 2010s. At the same time, some earlier trends continued. For example, there was a further reduction of tied aid; by 2017, most tied aid had been abolished (Tweede Kamer der Staten-­ Generaal, 2018–2019). Also, the number of bilateral partners decreased again in order to increase aid effectiveness. Further, the budget declined; as of 2013 (and for the first time in 40 years), the Netherlands fell below the 0.7 percent BNP criterion (cf. Fig. 9.2). Although it was agreed in the coalition government agreement of 2017 that the percentage should increase again toward 0.7 percent, the target date was set for 2030. The decreased budget can be explained by the global and European economic crisis, but also by the different priorities of the Rutte governments. Instead of aid, emphasis was increasingly put on investments and trade and the involvement of Dutch companies. This is also why the minister of development cooperation was replaced with a minister for foreign trade and development cooperation in 2012 and why the budget for development cooperation was integrated with the budget for international trade in 2014. In general, it can be concluded that the role of trade and businesses in the development sector increased. This was also recognized by the development cooperation policy white paper in 2018, which got

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the title ‘investment in perspective’ (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2018c). A second major change was a shift of focus. Since the 1960s, South Asian and sub-Sahara African countries were well represented in the list of countries that received development aid. In the 2010s attention was increasingly given to conflict areas in the European neighborhood. As such, development cooperation became strongly linked to general foreign policy objectives such as the security issues identified in the international security strategy of 2013 and the integrated security strategy of 2018. Examples of instable regions that got more attention are West Africa / Sahel, Horn of Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East. Third, ODA was increasingly used for non-traditional ODA expenses. In particular, a connection was made between peace and crisis management operations and development cooperation. A new International Budget was created in 2014 that used ODA funds (as well as a part of the Defense budget) for security-related development projects. Also, expenses related to migration and emergency aid were booked on the development cooperation budget, for example, funding policies that are aimed to take away the causes of migration and funding regional refugee camps. Also, geographical areas that suffer from the consequences of climate change received increased attention (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2018c). Finally, what also changed is the share of development aid that goes via multilateral organizations. Although in general the Netherlands remained firmly committed to multilateralism, and also committed itself to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, aid through multinational channels (for example the UNDP) became relatively less important. It resulted among others in decreasing budgets for international development agencies (Inspectie Onderzoek en Beleidsevaluatie, 2017).

5   Bilateral Relations The most important bilateral relations of the Netherlands are connected to its security and trade interests. The Netherlands traditionally has strong bilateral relations with its direct neighbors, including Germany, Belgium, and the UK. Further, the US is an important non-European partner. Not surprisingly, these countries are also the most important trading partners of The Netherlands and/or are important for Dutch security. Between 1990 and 2020, there have been no fundamental foreign policy changes in the bilateral relations of the Netherlands. However, there were

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adjustment changes when it comes to several bilateral strategic partnerships. These partnerships have been concluded with the three neighboring countries and the US, Luxembourg, France, and Norway. There were several moments of intensification of cooperation in order to bring down costs and/or to respond to a changing security landscape. First, the long-standing cooperation between the navies of the Netherlands and Belgium was intensified. That cooperation already started in 1948 and was intensified in 1975 with the establishment of the Admiralty Benelux (AB), an integrated command structure to be used in case of war. In 1996, cooperation in the AB was extended to peacetime as well. The reasons for the intensification are mainly cost-effectiveness and the overlapping geographical area of operations. Second, since 1995, Germany and the Netherlands have an integrated German-Dutch army corps (based in Munster, Germany). In 2019 the bilateral strategic partnership was further intensified when the Netherlands and Germany signed a declaration of intent in which cooperation in new areas, such as cyber defense, hybrid threats, and interoperability, is proposed (Ministerie van Defensie, 2019). Third, since 1972, the Netherlands has a joined amphibious force with the UK. The United Kingdom/Netherlands amphibious force (UK/NL AF) consists of units from the Dutch and British marine corps. In 2017, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to increase their security cooperation and since then a yearly action plan is guiding common policies (Ministerie van Defensie, 2019). Fourth, there is extensive bilateral security cooperation with the USA. At the request of the US, the Netherlands and the US prepared for an intensification of this cooperation by signing a framework treaty for military cooperation. Moreover, there is close cooperation on procurement. The Dutch armed forces have adopted major US weapon systems, including the F16 (to be replaced by the F35), Chinook and Apache helicopters, Patriot air defense systems, and the Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Further, intelligence cooperation was intensified with the 2018 MoU on sharing information from space. Finally, there is limited (as compared to the cases above) bilateral defense cooperation with Luxembourg, Norway, and France. In 2018, The Netherlands signed an MoU with Luxembourg on cooperation on UAVs, and Norway has been hosting the Joint Arctic Training of the Dutch Marine Corps for decades. Cooperation with France is also limited, but several initiatives were taken in the 2010s to further develop this cooperation, like the 2019 multilateral statement of intent to

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increase naval interoperability between the Dutch, French, and Belgium navies (Ministerie van Defensie, 2019).

6   EU, Multilateral, and Niche Diplomacy As explained in the section on the general foreign policy orientation, the EU is very important for Dutch foreign policy. At the same time, Dutch support for the EU has become less self-evident since the new millennium. The EU constitution was voted down by the population in 2004, and in 2016, a referendum also advised negatively on the EU’s stabilization and association agreement with Ukraine. At the same time, a large majority of the Dutch population continues to support membership of the EU and the euro; it has increased from 70 percent in 2015 to 78 percent in 2018 (Eurobarometer, 2013–2018). Also, the Dutch government continued to work toward deeper integration, as evidenced by, for example, the Lisbon Treaty, the measures taken during the Eurozone crisis (such as the stability fund and the banking union), participation in Permanent and Structural Cooperation (PESCO), and participation in the European  Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). However, the continued support for ever-­ closer union has also caused a popular backlash. Populist parties that are vehemently against further European integration and are actually in favor of NEXIT have gained momentum in the 2000s and 2010s. The multilateral order seems to be under pressure, but the Netherlands continues to strongly support it. There have been only a few cases of new multilateral initiatives or policies that were not supported by the Netherlands since 1990. Dutch multilateral diplomacy is not limited to the formal international institutions, but also extends to alternative institutional processes and settings. It participated for example in the international coalition of like-minded states and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that led to the Ottawa convention banning anti-personnel mines in 1997. Similarly, it was participating in the initiatives that led to the cluster munitions convention in 2008 and the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2017 (although it did not become party to the latter treaty). As these examples illustrate, Dutch multilateral diplomacy is characterized by creating coalitions of like-minded states (minilateralism), whether inside or outside formal institutions. Especially within the EU, minilateralism is considered to be important; the Netherlands cooperates much with its bilateral strategic partners within multilateral initiatives such as NATO’s Enhance Forward Presence or NATO’s Very High Readiness

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Task Force. In that respect, Brexit led to a loss of a natural ally within the EU.  In reaction, the Netherlands has aimed to build new coalitions, as evidenced by for example the New Hanseatic League. The WRR concluded in 2010 that the Netherlands does not have substantial areas of niche diplomacy. Based on Evans and Grant (1991), niche diplomacy was defined as a focus on a few specific areas of foreign policy with a concentration of means (Knapen et  al., 2011, p.  50). The WRR argued that water and climate, food and sustainability, and promotion of the international legal order could be potential niches for Dutch diplomacy. However, according to the WRR’s definition, that was not the case in 2010 and it did not change afterward. Instead, Dutch foreign policy remained very broad, covering a wide variety of themes and all geographic areas that were deemed relevant. That is not to say that there are no foreign policy preferences, but a true niche diplomacy demands more focus and a concentration of means.

7   Conclusions There have been many continuities in Dutch foreign policy since 1990, including a commitment to multilateralism, the promotion of free trade, support for European integration, the promotion of the international legal order, and an Atlanticist orientation in which NATO is considered to be the cornerstone of Dutch security. None of these foreign policy orientations have fundamentality changed as the result of the end of the Cold War, 9/11, the financial crisis, or the return of geopolitics on the European continent. Therefore, in the last 30 years, there were no ‘international orientation changes’ as defined by Hermann (1990). At the same time, there are several developments to be noted that were influential enough to change Dutch foreign policy to a larger or smaller degree and that involved goal changes, adjustment changes, or program changes. An overview of the most important changes is provided in Table 9.1. The general pattern of foreign policy change since the 1990s is a continued and deeper commitment to the global and regional multilateral institutions as well as the intensification of bilateral ties, both within Europe and outside (in particular the US). Dutch foreign policy supported European integration and given the scope and impact of the expanding and deepening EU, this can be seen as an instance of goal change. At the same time the Netherlands became more Eurosceptic, as evidenced by the rejection by referendum of the EU constitution in 2004,

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Table 9.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in The Netherlands since 1990 Instance change Adjustment change

Program change

Goal change

International orientation change

Drivers and inhibitors

Decreasing defense budget  End of Cold War •  (since 1991) •  Domestic politics Increasing defense budget (since • International pressure (NATO 2017) guideline and changing security situation) Hosting new international • The Hague as ‘legal capital of institutions (including HCNM, the world’ ICTY and ICC) Normative foreign policy •  End of the Cold War •  Demand for crisis management More focus on security •  9/11 •  International instability Integration foreign policy and •  End of Cold War development aid (Re-evaluation • Need for interdepartmental and HGIS) cooperation More emphasis on the national •  End of the Cold War interest within the liberal internationalist approach Decreasing the number of •  Budgetary constraints diplomatic posts (since 2008) Increasing the number of •  Recovering economy. diplomatic posts (since 2018) • Increasing international challenges Pro-active economic diplomacy •  Financial crisis • Stronger orientation on the national interest Reformed policy on participation •  Srebrenica mission in military interventions Pragmatic approach toward •  Black Monday European integration •  Domestic Euroscepticism Increased focus on European • End of Cold War, European integration integration process. •  Domestic politics Reforming armed forces •  End of Cold War • Demand for crisis management NA NA

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the rise of anti-EU populist political parties, and the ‘no vote’ in the Ukraine referendum. The most important change regarding security and defense concerned the reform of the armed forces from being primarily a deterrence force to an expeditionary force. It involved the abolishment of military conscription and the creation of a professional armed force capable to carry out expeditionary operations within the context of NATO, UN, EU, and/or ad hoc arrangements was an important change in the security domain. Changes in development cooperation were characterized by a decreasing number of partner countries, a connection to the UN MDGs and SDGs, more focus on trade rather than aid, and a decreasing budget. Finally, existing bilateral security relations were strengthened and expanded. The drivers of all these changes are to be found on the international, domestic, and individual levels.

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gegeven antwoorden. No. 3027. Retrieved November 24, 2020, from https:// zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-­tk-­20182019-­3027.html Verbeek, B., & van der Vleuten, A. (2008). The Domesticization of the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands (1989–2007): The Paradoxical Result of Europeanization and Internationalization. Acta Politica, 43(2–3), 357–377. Voorhoeve, J. J. C. (1979). Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy. Martinus Nijhoff. WRR. (2010). Minder pretentie, meer ambitie. Ontwikkelingshulp die het verschil maakt. Amsterdam University Press.

CHAPTER 10

Polish Foreign Policy: From ‘Go To’ Player to Territorial Defender Laura Chappell

1   Introduction The period from 1990 to 2019 has marked a significant shift in Poland’s position on the European continent. From a country under Russian tutelage during the Cold War, Poland has ‘returned to Europe’, joining both the EU (2004) and NATO (1999), and has gone from a ‘security consumer’ to a ‘security provider’ (Longhurst & Zaborowski, 2007). Moreover, as the sixth largest EU member state, with the greatest military capabilities of the Central and East European countries, Poland has a significant contribution to make both politically and in defense terms. However, Poland’s geographical position, sandwiched between Germany and Russia, has shaped the country’s approach to security, not least its threat perceptions, its relations with these two neighbors, and its Atlanticism. As this chapter will demonstrate, while the core of Poland’s foreign and security policy has remained focused on Poland’s territorial

L. Chappell (*) University of Surrey, Guildford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_10

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integrity as sacrosanct, how this has been operationalized by Poland’s policy-­making elites has fluctuated, particularly regarding program and adjustment changes. This not only relates to shifts in government, but also to external drivers, not least the behavior of Poland’s neighbor Russia. Taking the analytical framework presented in the introduction to this edited collection, this chapter will investigate the sources and depth of change in Poland’s foreign policy including multilateral and bilateral relations, aid policy, foreign policy orientation and security and defense policy. Hence the main research question is: What are the key drivers shaping continuity and change in Polish foreign policy post 1989? Using secondary source literature, primary documentation and insights gained from interviews with Polish security and defense elites conducted by the author from 2006 to 2018, it highlights that up until 2013, Poland consistently supported (whether politically or militarily) international interventions, whether in a NATO, EU or US-led context and that Poland was considered a ‘go to’ player in European defense (Whitney, 2008, p. 24). However, the state of the Polish armed forces, which required substantial investment, followed by the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and a change in government to the Law and Justice party in 2015, have resulted in incremental changes in how Poland approaches its security and the reallocation of resources to territorial defense. Although the importance of territorial defense is not new, Poland has become more inward-looking in defense terms and has once again looked to the US to solve its geopolitical predicament at a time when the US cannot always be considered as a consistently reliable partner. This chapter will however highlight that the foundational elements of Poland’s foreign and security policy remain unchanged, hence indicating changes are found largely in how policies are designed, actioned or prioritized.

2   General Foreign Policy Orientation Poland’s foreign policy orientation is set against the country’s historical background as a victim of Realpolitik, heroic defeat and betrayal by its allies. Poland’s central European geographical location meant that it had been surrounded by competing great powers (Russia, Austro-Hungary and Prussia). From 1795 until the end of the First World War, Poland disappeared from the European map, to reappear as an independent country in the inter-war period before being conquered and divided again in 1939 between Nazi Germany and the USSR. The failure of Poland’s allies

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to re-establish it led to a collective trauma and the feeling of ‘betrayal’ as symbolized by the Yalta agreement in 1945 (Chappell, 2017). Hence upon acquiring its independence at the end of the Cold War, Polish territory became sacrosanct. In this way, all elements of Polish foreign policy serve the purpose of ensuring the country’s territorial integrity and security. As will be highlighted, first this involved the country’s ‘return to Europe’, through joining the EU and NATO, reflecting that Poland was a European country. The latter highlighted Poland’s Atlanticist orientations as the US, which underwrites NATO’s Article 5 guarantee, is the only country able to protect Poland’s territorial integrity. This desire to join the EU and NATO was also set against Poland’s skepticism of multilateral organizations, especially the UN as Poland has been the victim of the failure of such bodies (Chappell, 2012). Additionally, Poland will pro-actively use force where necessary, to protect not only Poland (with territorial defense being key) but also to serve as a reliable ally. This latter point connects to Poland’s betrayal at Yalta, where Poland was placed in the Russian sphere of influence (Osica, 2004, p. 305). Hence, Poland would not betray its own allies. This also shapes another component of Poland’s foreign policy: Poland needs to be included in decisions affecting its interests. Hence, Poland’s political elites would be fully involved in shaping the country’s present and future (Chappell, 2012, p.  41). Finally, Poland’s geographical location meant that the country’s eastern border (which was subsequently to become the eastern border of both NATO and the EU) was critically important, to avoid becoming a buffer state. Thus, Poland should become a bridge between east and west (see Zaborowski and Longhurst, 2003, p. 1020). Indeed, this represented an area in which Poland could make a unique contribution to the EU and NATO. Finally, Poland should support self-determination efforts in other countries, particularly as Poland’s own independence was bound up with that of its region. In the early 1990s, this involved normalizing the country’s relations with Germany and Russia, although the latter has proven more difficult as will be demonstrated below. These nine elements (Atlanticist, skeptical multilateralist (with the exception of the EU and NATO), pro-EU, a focus on regional security and territorial defense, pro-active regarding the use of force, nothing about us without us, being a reliable ally, acting as a bridge between east and west, and supporting countries’ self-determination) form the foundations of Polish foreign and security policy. Poland’s Atlanticist orientation,

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joining the EU and NATO, territorial defense and self-determination of other countries, were all highlighted in the 1992 Principles of Poland’s Security Policy (Kuźniar, 2001). However, how these elements have been interpreted, how they have been applied and the balance between them has fluctuated. Partly this concerns the Polish response to external events (e.g. the war on terror or the Russian invasion of Ukraine), and partly it relates to changes in government within Poland, particularly the Law and Justice government’s response to the Ukraine crisis and its Eurosceptic stance. From 1990 to 1999, Poland’s main focus was on its return to Europe and thus pursuing the path of EU and NATO membership, the latter of which was achieved in 1999. These cemented the country’s economic, political and defense transformation, underpinning its overall security. However, once achieved, Poland was expected to go from a security consumer to a security provider (Longhurst & Zaborowski, 2007). From 1999 to 2008, Poland became pro-active in using force outside of its region, underscored by its focus on being a reliable ally, particularly to the US and to a lesser extent the EU, and being included in decisions affecting its security interests. During this period Poland’s Atlanticism became more pragmatic, due to the fallout over Iraq, while it became more pro-active in respect to the EU’s CSDP. Poland’s relations with Russia also eased gradually as the more provocative right-wing Law and Justice led government of 2005–2006 was replaced by a centrist Civic Platform led government, who was more pro-EU and pro-Germany. However, overall, differences were located in style rather than substance (Longhurst, 2008). The post-2008 period has marked more substantial changes. Prior to 2014, Poland co-initiated the Eastern Dimension as part of the European Neighborhood Policy with Sweden and increased its participation and shaping of the EU’s CSDP, while Poland’s pragmatic Atlanticism was maintained through concerns regarding both the US and NATO’s willingness to provide for Polish security. However, all this began to change in 2014 following the Russian annexation of Ukraine. Even before this, Poland had begun to focus more on its own security and less on ‘eagerly sending Polish forces to the world’s antipodes’, as highlighted by Poland’s then President (Komorowski, 2013). Hence, the country’s defense budget should prioritize the modernization of the Polish armed forces, rather than deploying Poland’s armed forces within international out-of-area operations. With a Law and Justice government being installed in the following year, this process continued, underscoring a prioritization of regional security and territorial defense over being a reliable ally. It also

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marked a change in how Poland dealt with Russia, Germany and the EU.  Finally, Poland went from a pragmatic Atlanticist to a fortified Atlanticist, consisting of a desire to strengthen the relationship with the US even further. These processes will be outlined in more detail in the following sections.

3   Defense and Security Policy 3.1  Political Underpinnings At the beginning of the 1990s, Poland was still a member of the Warsaw Pact (disbanded in 1991), and Soviet troops were stationed in Poland. Moreover, the Russians were in control of the Presidency and defense and internal security ministries until 1990. Thus, during the first few years of the 1990s, Poland’s elites considered various options through which to pursue the country’s defense and security policy. These included creating a regional sub-grouping, neutrality, creating a security grouping around the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe or some form of attachment to Russia. The creation of a regional sub-grouping was the most prominent and had been promoted by the émigré Kultura journal, which was founded in 1946 and based in Paris. Building on this President Wałęsa formed the idea of NATO-bis which would create a form of collective security within central Europe although Minister of Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed this (Kuźniar, 2001, p. 45). However, following the resolution of Poland’s border with Germany and fully free elections in January 1992 (won by the Centre-­ Right under Jan Olszewski), the NATO option became prominent. The government lasted just six months, however, they strengthened this option which has been a mainstay of Polish defense policy. The first few years after the end of the Cold War saw other elements of Polish defense policy cemented. The inviolability of Poland’s borders, the importance of self-determination, the strategic goal of EU (and NATO) membership, the significance of US troops in Europe and willingness to participate in multinational armed forces were all mentioned within the Principles of Poland’s Security Policy and Poland’s Security Policy and Defense Strategy, which were both released in November 1992 (Kuźniar, 2001, p. 554). It is important to note that joining the EU related to providing security in the context of economic prosperity rather than defense, while joining NATO, was considered critical for the country’s territorial

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defense, underscoring the importance of regional security and a threat perception centered on Russia. Poland joined NATO in 1999, thus achieving the country’s key post-­ Cold War security ambition. It also reflected Poland’s continued emphasis on its territorial security rather than on the emerging new threats. Indeed the 2000 Defense Strategy highlighted that conventional war could not be excluded (Ministry of National Defence, 2000, p.  5; Chappell, 2012). Hence for Polish policy-makers, new and old security thinking was seen in parallel with the former failing to undermine more traditional security concerns (see Zaborowski and Longhurst, 2003, p. 1025). Indeed, Poland did not consider itself to be as threatened by the proliferation of WMD and international terrorism as some of its allies (interviews with Polish policy-makers 2006; Chappell, 2012), although there was a gradual recognition of these new threats as highlighted in Poland’s 2009 Defense Strategy (Ministry of National Defence, 2009, p.  5). Hence, Poland’s threat perceptions continued to be focused on Russia, including ‘Russian authoritarianism, the instability and unpredictability of developments in Russia, Russian behavior regarding democracy in Ukraine’ and concerns about Russia’s use of its energy policy as a weapon against its neighbors, including Ukraine and Georgia (Chappell, 2012, p. 79; Interviews with Polish officials, 2007). However, these threats were seen in respect to concerns regarding Poland’s energy security, with Poland seeking to diversify its energy suppliers. The first Civic Platform Government (2007–2011), led by Donald Tusk, took a pragmatic approach toward Russia, with the setting up of the Joint Commission on Difficult Issues (2007), highlighting an attempt to normalize relations. This was to change with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This underscored that Poland’s threat perceptions had reflected the reality of the country’s geopolitical situation as Russia once again became a direct military threat, rather than this being couched in terms of energy security. Indeed, Poland’s National Security Strategy (NSS) (2014, pp. 18–20), published in the same year, highlighted ‘there is a risk of regional and local conflicts which could engage the country indirectly or directly’, while also recognizing the undermining of the credibility of disarmament agreements, authoritarian states who disregard international law, international terrorism and organized crime and cybersecurity. The National Security Strategy (2014, p. 21) underscored the importance of US commitment to European security and the negative impact of Russia’s resurgent position.

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Both the Polish Foreign Policy Strategy (FPS) 2017–2019 and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2020) created under the Law and Justice government articulate an even stronger stance regarding Russia. The former document highlights that Russia ‘is a revisionist power willing to resort to military means to achieve its goals. Russia disregards the most fundamental tenets of internal law such as territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and renunciation of the use of force’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 2). This is not only set up in connection with Ukraine, but also regarding Russian intervention in Syria, which the FPS likens to ‘a proxy war with the West’, and ‘as a manifestation of Russia’s willingness to force the international community to accept its policy of faits accomplis’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p.  6). The National Security Strategy (NSS) also highlights ‘the neo-imperial policy’ of Russia which inter alia relates to hybrid activities, including cyberattacks and disinformation as well as outlining Russia’s use of ‘large scale military exercises based on scenarios assuming a conflict with the NATO member states (..) and even the use of nuclear weapons’ (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2020, p. 6). The Law and Justice government is also highly critical of its predecessor, stating in the Defense Concept, that ‘scale of threats resulting from Russian aggressive policy had not been adequately assessed in the past’ and that ‘the number one priority was the necessity of adequately preparing Poland to defend its own territory’ (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, p. 6). Hence, despite the threat of Russia being a mainstay of Poland’s threat perceptions, how this has manifested (from energy security to a direct military threat) and how Russia has been dealt with have differed between administrations. Indeed, the Minister of National Defense Antoni Macierewicz considers that this is the first time in the third republic that Poland is ‘creating prospects for effective defense’ (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, p. 7), indicating that Poland’s role as a territorial defender has become a priority. The deteriorating security situation in Ukraine led Poland to take several steps in line with reorienting its defense policy to focus on territorial defense. The first related to consolidating ‘NATO’s defensive function’, particularly in connection to the eastern border of the alliance (National Security Strategy, 2014, p. 28). This encompasses the US’ military presence in eastern Europe, with this being considered ‘key to maintaining NATO’s collective defense and deterrence capabilities’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p.  7; see also National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2020). Second was to concentrate on modernizing

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the Polish armed forces rather than on sending troops to operations overseas, a trend that had begun prior to the Russian annexation of Crimea but which rapidly gained importance. Third was to reconfigure the Polish armed forces. These elements will be explored below. 3.2  Operations While Poland’s threat perceptions were focused on its region, this did not prevent the country from participating in out-of-area operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the EU, and US coalitions of the willing. With a focus on being a reliable ally, underpinning a pro-active approach to using force, Poland deployed an increasing number of troops. Of primary importance were Poland’s NATO deployments, beginning in 1996 with a contribution to IFOR, followed by SFOR in 1997, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it was the country’s deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq that underscored Poland’s commitment to the US, particularly as Poland had few immediate security interests there. However, as will be highlighted, Poland’s Iraq participation did not bring about the rewards that had been expected. This had little impact on Poland’s increasing contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan which went from 1100 in 2007 to 2560 armed force personal in 2011 (NATO 2007; NATO, 2011). Poland’s commitment to NATO had an impact on its troop contributions, particularly to the UN. In 2009 Poland withdrew its military unit in UN operations in the Golan Heights, Lebanon and Chad, which enabled the country ‘to quickly respond to NATO’s call for support in Afghanistan’ (Sikorski, 2011a, p. 12; Interview with a Polish Official, 2009). However, Poland’s Afghanistan experience, and the lack of success of the operation, also brought about a reassessment regarding using military operations as a way of transforming the country’s defense capabilities (Doeser, 2018, p. 460). Hence after the end of the Afghan operation, Poland’s participation in crisis management operations decreased. This included Poland’s non-­ participation militarily in NATO’s Libya operation, although the country politically supported the UN Resolution underpinning it. This was due to Poland’s lack of security interests in Libya, combined with the country’s military participation in Afghanistan and finally the fact that Poland would be taking over the EU presidency on 1 January 2011 and thus Poland’s non-participation could facilitate mediation efforts (Dylla, 2011; Spiegel International, 2011). This indicated a change in Poland’s

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previous approach of supporting operations on the African Continent irrespective of any direct security interests (see below). While Poland’s Atlanticism became more circumspect after Iraq, this underwent change following events in Ukraine. Poland not only hosts NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, but also contributes to the Canadian-led battalion battlegroup in Latvia as well as sending a military unit to Romania as part of NATO’s tailored forward presence. It has also led NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission (2 January to April 2019) and participates in Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 operating in the Baltic Sea. Hence, Poland is actively providing security on NATO’s border, while also demonstrating itself to be a reliable ally and Atlanticist. Thus, deploying force in the NATO area is seen as critically important. Nonetheless, these two elements have also ensured Poland’s support to the US anti-­ ISIS campaign in Syria, although Poland originally declined to contribute militarily when the US first requested Polish participation in 2014, due partly to the Ukrainian situation (Doeser, 2018, p.  462). Nonetheless, Poland’s policy-makers desire for stronger US security guarantees including having US troops stationed in the country, ensured the country’s military participation (Doeser, 2018, p. 463). Poland’s reliable ally approach has also been in evidence regarding the country’s contributions to the EU’s CSDP, a policy which Poland has increasingly supported since its accession in 2004, so long as it complements rather than duplicates NATO. This has included contributions to CSDP military operations in Africa, including EUFOR Congo (2006) and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (2008), despite the lack of security interests. The reason for this is demonstrated in the idea of the shadow of future negotiation. Poland contributes to operations which are not in its immediate security interests, and then when there is an operation which is required in its neighborhood, other countries would support Poland (interview with a policy-maker, 2010), although it not clear what would happen if such promises do not materialize. However, Poland has continued to participate, albeit to a lesser extent, since 2014. This includes to EUFOR Central African Republic (2014–2015), the EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic since 2018 (two personnel), and to Operation Sophia (120 armed force personnel). Nonetheless, the overall trajectory of Polish participation and leadership in CSDP has declined under the Law and Justice government, which reflects their Euroscepticism combined with the importance of Atlanticism.

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3.3  Defense Capabilities and Defense Spending Poland’s armed forces have gradually transformed in response to the changing security environment. From a large conscript army, lacking modern equipment and underpinned by a focus on territorial defense in the 1990s, Poland has moved toward a professionalized armed force. This began with the six-year modernization program (2001–2006) with the aim of reducing Poland’s armed forces to 150,000 of which 50% would be professional soldiers (Chappell, 2012, p. 101). Poland’s commitment to a professionalized armed force was further articulated in the 2007 security strategy and finally conscription was abandoned in 2009. The Polish armed forces were further reduced to 100,000 professional soldiers and 20,000  in the National Reserve Forces (Ministry of National Defence, 2009, p.  1). However, this included two armies: the operational army which was capable of being deployed outside of Poland and a support army which would primarily operate within the country (Chappell, 2012, pp.  101–102). Hence, Poland’s focus on territorial defense still underpinned its defense thinking. Reducing the number of armed force personnel, while professionalizing the armed force was supported by Poland’s commitment to maintain a defense budget at 1.95% GDP (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012a, p. 14). Indeed, Poland’s defense budget has fluctuated between 1.8% and 2% GDP from the late 1990s to present (see Fig. 10.1). Thus, NATO’s 2% GDP defense spending requirement is seen as ensuring the organization’s ‘unity and credibility’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 8). Poland also plans to increase its defense spending to 2.5% GDP by 2024, due to the security situation (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2020, p. 18). Nevertheless, Poland’s armed forces were still reliant on equipment from the Soviet era. Hence, the modernization of the Polish armed forces became a predominant concern (Komorowski, 2013). The priorities for technical modernization were identified in 2011–2012, including an increased investment in the Polish defense industry and research (Ministry of National Defence, 2013, p. 20). However, modernization became particularly pertinent following Russian actions in Ukraine. The original aim was to ensure that Poland has ‘efficient, mobile and inter-operational’ armed forces and that its forces are interoperable, particularly within the context of EU and NATO (Ministry of National Defence, 2013, p. 37; 60). Areas for modernization included the national air defense system, encompassing missile defense, develop information systems connected to

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Fig. 10.1  Poland’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). Source: World Bank

network centric capabilities, the computerization of combat and support systems and the increase in mobility of land forces (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2014, p. 45). When Law and Justice came to power in 2015, they focused on building capabilities to ensure ‘effective deterrence’, so that Poland could strengthen its NATO role in the organization’s activities in the East and defend its own territory including ‘fending off irregular hostile military attacks’ (Ministry of Defence, 2017, p.  13). Hence, Poland’s ability to participate in overseas operations, while still relevant, was of secondary concern. Attention has been focused on systems which better protect Polish territory such as anti-access and area denial systems, (A2/AD), missile defense systems, long-range precision weapons, fifth generation combat aircraft, new armored vehicles and cyber capabilities (Ministry of Defence, 2017, pp. 36–37; 50). Poland’s Defense Concept also outlined the five armed forces services: Land, Navy, Air force, Special Operations and Territorial Defense. The latter two of these are new, with territorial

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defense including short-term military training for volunteers. Overall Poland’s armed forces will increase to above 200,000 personnel (Ministry of Defence, 2017, p. 53). As part of strengthening Poland’s defense capabilities, the 2017 FPS highlighted that Poland must participate in the recent EU defense capability initiatives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p.  11). However, this masks Poland’s more skeptical attitude. From a country which actively supported and pushed forward CSDP initiatives, including a proposal for a permanent operational headquarters during its EU Presidency in 2011, pushing forward pooling and sharing and restarting discussions on transforming the EU Battlegroup Concept, it has taken a backseat which is particularly noticeable since the reinvigoration of CSDP in 2016. Several defense capability initiatives have been introduced with the aim of making the EU more militarily capable and strategically autonomous. However, Poland has not been either a ‘go to’ player (Whitney, 2008, p. 24) or a leader but rather a skeptical participant, particularly in relation to Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense (PESCO), which Poland has signed up to despite its reservations. For Poland any move which has the potential to compete with NATO and the US diminishes its security.

4   Development Cooperation Policy Post-Cold War, Poland has transitioned from an aid recipient to an aid donor. Although foreign aid was provided by Poland during the Communist era, Poland did not have a sovereign foreign policy, with development assistance reflecting the priorities of the USSR (Szent-Iványi & Tétényi, 2013, pp. 820–821). Thus, development aid within the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) was shaped by ideology with aid policy reflecting socialist goals and thus supporting socialist countries (Lightfoot, 2010, p. 332; Szent-Iványi & Tétényi, 2013, p. 821). The end of Communism saw a dramatic increase in poverty and thus domestic transformation was prioritized over development assistance, with Poland becoming a net recipient of aid (Lightfoot, 2010, p.  332). The Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE) program, for example, was set up by the then EC in 1989, to support both countries transitioning to democracies and was subsequently rolled out to all central and eastern European pre-accession countries (CEECs). It included economic and infrastructural assistance and expertise to the

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CEECs (European Parliament, 1998). Specific to development capacity building, the UN also provided programs to the CEECs. However, Poland was expected to adopt and implement the EU’s acquis communitaire. This meant Poland had to implement the European Consensus on Development, with a focus on poverty reduction in low-­ income and least-developed countries, and adopting policies relating to relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (Lightfoot, 2010, p. 333). Finally, Poland was meant to abide by an EU agreement on development financing which stipulated that CEECs should ‘strive to achieve’ 0.17% GNI to Official Development Assistance by 2010 rising to 0.33% by 2015 (Lightfoot, 2010, p. 337). Nonetheless, development policy was not a priority in accession negotiations. Although Poland had to abide by the acquis following accession, development policy falls under foreign policy, and thus consists of recommendations rather than obligations. Indeed, despite not going into recession, Poland reduced its aid contribution, with this falling in 2008 from 0.10 to 0.08 GNI, which constituted the lowest aid figure in the last three years (Concord, 2009, pp. 7, 43), highlighting that aid policy was a low priority. While the EU’s focus for poverty reduction was listed in Poland’s objectives for their ODA (Lightfoot, 2010, p. 339), there were other priorities, some of which relate back to Poland’s overall foreign policy orientation post-Cold War. These included democracy promotion, the rule of law and regional security, where Poland has a knowledge advantage. Moreover Lightfoot (2010, p. 339) highlights that ‘while the European Consensus on Development provides an impetus with ACP states’, this does not mean that EU member states need to have an African focus. Indeed, as Lightfoot (2010, p.  340) further emphasizes, ‘for some states, such as Poland, it was very clear that they regarded the ability to decide geographical and strategic decision in this area as a fundamental element of their foreign policy’, underscoring the importance of Poland’s sovereignty. Reflecting on Poland’s development aid spending (see Fig. 10.2), this rose from 0.01% GNI in 2003, to 0.05% in 2004, and to 0.07% in 2005 (OECD, 2019). As Szent-Iványi and Tétényi (2013, p. 823) underscore regarding the CEECs, ‘part of this increase can be reasonably attributed to the capacity building programs’, which focused on ODA delivery mechanisms, bilateral ODA and reporting ODA statistics. This rise in ODA was followed by spending of between 0.08 and 0.10 GNI per year between 2006 and 2015, highlighting that spending was rather static (OECD, 2019). However, in 2016, this jumped to 0.15 GNI, with 0.13 and 0.14

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Fig. 10.2  Poland’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System

GNI being spent in 2017 and 2018, respectively (OECD, 2019). Nonetheless this is far below either the 0.17% or the 0.33% targets, let alone the 0.7% EU and UN target for Overseas Development Assistance. Regarding bilateral aid partners, part of Poland’s focus is within its region. As Lightfoot (2010, p.  341) notes, ‘the CEECs are seeking to influence EU development policy to fit their own foreign policy priorities’, including using development cooperation ‘to achieve broader foreign and security policy aims’. This was reflected in the eastern dimension which was a policy initiated by Sweden and Poland, and became part of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2009. The Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012–2015 specifically mentions the six eastern partnership countries as priorities for Polish bilateral aid who will receive 60% of the funds (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b, p.  8). Hence, ‘Poland wants to foster changes that ensure long-term and stable functioning of democratic systems, respect for human rights and support for

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political transformation’ so that these countries can be brought ‘closer to the European Union’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b, pp. 5–6). This highlights Poland’s emphasis on supporting democracy in these countries to underpin their self-determination. Poland’s focus in this region however narrows in the 2016–2020 program to four countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova), which is based on need as well as ‘cohesion with EU measures and security’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 9). Hence this list includes those eastern partnership countries which have been invaded by Russia, have close relations with Russia (e.g. whether in whole or in part as underscored by the frozen conflict in Transnistria) and where Polish minorities also reside (primarily Ukraine and Belarus). However, Poland has been increasingly involved in areas beyond its immediate geographical security interests and historical connections. This included the addition of Tanzania as a priority in 2007 (Lightfoot, 2010, p. 340), and Afghanistan, where Poland has participated in ISAF, although by the 2016–2020 program, Afghanistan had ceased to be a bilateral partner (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 10). Hence this reflects Poland’s increasing and decreasing involvement in the country. Part of Poland’s focus for its bilateral development partners relates to its experience and emphasis on democratic transition as the country makes clear in its 2012–2015 program with respect to North Africa and the Palestinian Authority (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b, p.  6). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are added to the list as ‘under-aided countries’ according to the OECD DAC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b, p.  6). Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012a, p. 6) highlights that ‘priority countries from East Africa, Asia and the Middle East were selected mainly on account of their very high poverty levels’, in addition to ‘Poland’s commitment as an EU member ‘to increasing the value of aid provided to Africa and Sub-­ Saharan countries’. By 2016, however, the number of countries had narrowed with just eight countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Lebanon, Myanmar, Palestine, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda) listed as priorities outside of eastern Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 10), some of which are not LDCs. Indeed, Lebanon is included due to the influx of Syrian refugees, which also reflects Poland’s increasing security activities there. A significant part of Poland’s aid budget (between 75% and 83%) goes to multilateral institutions (Szent-Iványi et al., 2019, pp. 64–65; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p.  43), and includes contributions to the EU development cooperation budget, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the United Nations. As highlighted by the Polish

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Ministry for Foreign Affairs (n.d.), ‘Poland is only starting to gain experience in providing assistance to other countries, which is why transferring development funds to specialized international institutions allows us to take advantage of their organizational and logistic potential, and thus increase the effectiveness of our aid’. Indeed, the EU receives 90% of this type of aid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 43). For Poland, its multilateral cooperation guarantees that the country reaches its development objectives, supports the implementation of the sustainable development goals and ensures that Poland is seen as a ‘reliable and trustworthy partner’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, pp. 43–44). This highlights that Poland’s own conception of itself as a reliable ally permeates development, cooperation as well as security and defense. Poland’s aims and objectives for its aid policy can be found in its multiannual development cooperation programs (2012–2015, 2016–2020). As highlighted, Poland’s objectives in its 2012–2015 program include ‘promoting and consolidating democracy and respect for human rights, helping create modern and efficient state institutions, promoting their sustainable social and economic development, undertaking actions which contribute to reducing poverty and improving the health conditions of the population’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b, p. 2). However, the program also goes onto highlight the benefits for Poland including raising awareness of developing countries in Poland, enhancing Polish foreign policy and meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Thus, partly development is about raising Poland’s profile in the international community (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b, p. 3). The 2012–2015 program focuses on two thematic areas: democracy and human rights, and political and economic transformation, further underscoring Poland’s experience in these fields. Indeed, democratization and transformation activities take up around 70% of the budget allocated to the Eastern Partnership countries and 60% in Africa, Asia and Middle East (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b, p.  9). Regarding thematic priorities, the 2016–2020 program is similar with areas including good governance, democracy and human rights, human capital, entrepreneurship and private sector, sustainable agriculture and rural development and environmental protection listed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 9). Interestingly poverty reduction is not mentioned explicitly in the list, although it is highlighted in the summaries of the support to be given to each country, underscoring that Poland has focused in on areas where it has expertise rather than on EU priorities.

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In summary, aid policy has low political significance and visibility in Poland, emphasizing that Poland has gone from a net recipient to a ‘reluctant donor’ (Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2014, p.  1268; Szent-Iványi & Tétényi, 2013, p. 828). In general, Poland prioritizes its neighborhood, countries where it has other security and defense interests, and issues where it has expertise, particularly regarding democracy promotion. While neither bilateral partners nor issue areas have fundamentally changed between the different Polish governments, the number of partners between the Civic Platform and Law and Justice governments has decreased, as have the number of areas. This indicates a narrowing of focus, although budget wise this has remained broadly the same. Furthermore, Poland’s key attitudes and norms underpinning its security and defense policy, including supporting self-determination of other countries, the desire to be seen as a reliable ally and the emphasis on regional security can be identified within the country’s ODA.  While Poland’s ODA has risen in line with its ability to provide such support, the role it plays is in line with the rest of its foreign policy.

5   Bilateral Relations As an Atlanticist, Poland’s most important bilateral relationship is with the US. However, Polish Atlanticism has gone through adjustments. Although the US also deserted Poland at Yalta, the US had been key in supporting the Solidarity movement and Polish independence. Fundamentally, however, was the realization that only the US had the ability to protect Polish security. This idea of Poland as an American protectee (Chappell, 2012) has led Poland to cement this relationship through joining NATO and subsequently to strengthen ties with the US including seeking separate US security guarantees, as well as purchasing US-made military equipment. However, Poland’s desire to strengthen ties with the US has not always resulted in expected gains, as seen with Iraq. Poland’s support for the US coalition of the willing was rewarded with the country being given control of one of the Iraqi zones (Chappell, 2012). While demonstrating Polish Atlanticism, its desire to be a reliable ally and its pro-active approach to the use of force, some of the assumed benefits were not forthcoming. As outlined by Melamed (2005, p. 10), ‘expectations—many of them of them overly optimistic—ranged from loosened visa restrictions on Polish citizens, economic investment opportunities for Polish companies and international recognition of Poland as a regional power enjoying a “special

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relationship” with the US’. Poland has also been critical of NATO, as highlighted by the then-Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz (2003, p.  11), whom accused the US of undermining ‘NATO’s traditional capacities and credibility as a defense alliance’ through using it as a toolbox (Chappell, 2012, p. 93). While as highlighted above, this had no impact on Polish engagement in Afghanistan, the country’s policy-makers became more pragmatic in their relations with the US.  As the then Foreign Minister Sikorski (2011a, pp. 12–13) emphasized, ‘we supported the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we also know how to look after our own interests’. Hence there was a more realistic assessment of Polish-US relations under the Civic Platform government, which was reflected in ensuring that Poland received benefits in return for being a reliable ally, including US investment in modernizing the Polish armed forces as underpinned in the declaration on strategic cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland. This more pragmatic Atlanticism was developing in parallel with concerns that the US was losing interest in central and eastern Europe, particularly after the Georgian war in 2008. This resulted in a letter sent from senior East European politicians and intellectuals to the Obama Administration in 2009 underscoring that these countries should be consulted first prior to US taking action, highlighting the sentiment of ‘nothing about us without us’. These concerns can be seen in respect to the missile defense shield, which Poland had been participating in. This was cancelled under the Obama Administration and was communicated on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland via a telephone call after the US press had already published the story (Chappell, 2010, p. 12). It thus received a negative reaction from Polish policy-makers. Poland was however offered the right of first refusal to host SM-3 missiles, which included the symbolic placing of US troops in Poland to set up the missiles. Since the decision to develop NATO’s own missile defense system, close Polish-US cooperation includes participating in developing the system, developing a national air defense system, US support for the Polish armed forces involved in international operations and the presence of the US air force in Poland (Ministry of National Defence, 2013, p.  47; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). These concerns about a US disengagement from Europe have been a focus of European countries more generally since Donald Trump became President. While there were concerns about a possible rapprochement between the US and Russia at the beginning of Trump’s presidency, this

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has not materialized. Although US unpredictability has been one of the catalysts behind the EU’s desire for strategic autonomy, Poland has not reacted with as much concern and has sought to strengthen bilateral relations with the US, thus seeking to further reinforce its Atlanticism. Indeed, US troop presence in Central and Eastern Europe, including in Poland has increased under Trump (Buras & Janning, 2018, p.  10). Hence for Poland, any loosening of its transatlantic bonds is counter to its security interests, which is why it is pushing back against increased European sovereignty, while advocating for a permanent rather than rotating US presence on Polish soil (Buras & Janning, 2018, p. 12; 17). While this may be counter to the NATO-Russian Founding Act, Poland has stated that it will only inform NATO of talks with the US over this element (Buras & Janning, 2018, p. 18). This focus on a US bilateral security guarantee with permanently stationed US troops at its core, risks undermining Poland’s position in NATO, which is a new departure for Polish security. Hence, Poland’s Atlanticism has returned to its more traditional fortified variant as it seeks to strengthen the transatlantic bond as far as possible, highlighting that Polish policy-makers seem to have forgotten the lessons of Iraq. Poland’s relations with Germany and the UK should be briefly highlighted. Germany was Poland’s primary champion for EU and NATO membership, and has consistently been one of Poland’s most important European partners. However, German-Polish relations partly hinge on who is in government. During the first Law and Justice government, several anti-German problems were articulated including the Baltic pipeline project being likened to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Lech Kaczynski’s failure to attend the 2006 Weimar Triangle summit, reportedly because of comments made against him in a German newspaper although Polish policy-­makers stated he was unwell, and demanding the Nice voting formula, which would increase Poland’s vote share, due to the country’s war dead (Chappell, 2012, p. 9). Conversely, under Civic Platform, the relationship was less contentious. Indeed, as Sikorski (2011b) pointed out in a speech, ‘I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity’. This call for more German leadership demonstrated strengthened ties between the two countries. However, the second Law and Justice government, which came to power in 2015, has reversed this. Now the UK is seen as Poland’s primary partner, and they have ‘rejected Germany’s role as a key power’ in the EU (Buras & Janning, 2018, p. 4). Regarding the UK, this relationship has become particularly pertinent following the UK’s decision to leave the EU. This concerns the rights of

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Poles living, working and studying in the UK, and the trading relationship post-Brexit. The UK’s decision to leave is also not beneficial for Poland in respect to CSDP, as both countries are Atlanticists, with an emphasis on ensuring that CSDP complements NATO and that relations between CSDP and NATO are strengthened. Hence, Poland has lost an ally in the EU. Nonetheless, Poland has sought to increase ties with the UK, as evidenced by the Treaty on Security and Defense Cooperation between the two countries, agreed in Warsaw in 2017.

6   Multilateral and Niche Diplomacy Poland is a skeptical multilateralist. However, this has not prevented Poland from engaging with the UN, including having a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (1996–1997 and 2018–2019). As highlighted, Poland withdrew its personnel from UN operations in 2009. However, the FPS stated that Poland would participate in UN peacekeeping operations, emphasizing human rights, the country’s standing and solidarity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 22). Thus, Poland’s UN activities are used to increase its status and international credibility on the world stage rather than as a symbol of its multilateralism. Polish policy-makers are instead more focused on the EU and NATO. In respect to the former, Poland’s general approach has moved from an aspiring EU member, to a new member state with a broadly pro-EU attitude, toward a more skeptical European. The Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012–2016 document clearly states that pursuing ‘deeper European integration, both economic and political is important (…). Hopefully, the European Union will eventually become a political union’, while stating that this should not equate to a superstate (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012a, p. 8). Poland has also been a supporter of further EU enlargement and has played a leadership role both within the European Neighbourhood Policy and within the development of the CSDP. However, a shift has taken place since the second Law and Justice government came to power in 2015. While the narrative of the first Law and Justice government was likewise Eurosceptic, the country actively engaged with the EU. However, since 2014, Poland has been challenging some of the EU’s key values and has been highly critical of the organization. This has resulted in an increasingly difficult relationship, as the EU has ruled against steps taken by the Polish government to retire Polish judges. Poland has also resisted participating in any EU refugee resettlement

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scheme, following the arrival of Syrian refugees. From a Polish perspective, they are already taking in people from Ukraine and so are playing their part (interview with an official, Warsaw, 2018). More broadly, moves are being made against ‘gender’ and ‘LGBT’ ideology. Local municipalities in Poland have been declaring themselves as ‘LGBT free zones’, which has resulted in the European Commission rejecting giving grants to six Polish towns under the twinning scheme. Moreover, Poland will withdraw from the Istanbul Convention which aims at tackling violence against women, and the Law and Justice government has made moves to significantly tighten restrictions on abortion, resulting in mass protest. Indeed, the 2020 National Security Strategy states that Poland will ‘promote the development and protection of traditional family values’ (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2020, p. 28). There has also been more general criticism of interference in member states’ democratic affairs. The FPS highlights the potential for ‘rising popular discontent in ever more Member States’, and criticizes the EU for trying to ‘resolve the Union’s troubles by strengthening EU bodies at the expense of Member States prerogatives and democratic procedures’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p.  3). The document also underscores the dangers of a multi-speed Europe and ‘different categories of membership which would weaken the EU’s cohesion’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 13; 21). In this respect, ‘nothing about us, without us’ is core to Poland’s desire for an inclusive EU, without losing their sovereignty. The more conflictual relationship with the EU is in marked contrast to Poland’s desire to work with NATO, which is seen as the ‘bedrock of Polish and European security’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 7). Poland has always emphasized the importance of Article five and collective defense vis-à-vis crisis management, particularly in ensuring that Article five is credible, as underscored by the country’s approach during the discussions surrounding NATO’s 2010 strategic concept. Hence, Poland has been fully supportive of the decisions taken at the Welsh (2014) and Warsaw (2016) NATO summits in response to the situation in Ukraine. The 2017 FPS highlights that this has ensured that ‘the Alliance regained its ability to deliver its primary function: collective defense’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 7), although as previously underlined Poland has prioritized its relationship with the US over NATO. Finally, Poland is a member of sub-regional organizations including the Weimar Triangle (formed of Poland, Germany and France), and the Visegrád Group (comprising Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland).

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The former has been used in the context of CSDP, with Germany, France and Poland forming a Weimar Triangle Battlegroup. However, this trilateral organization has been sidelined since the second Law and Justice government came to power. The Visegrád Group is more prominent and has enabled these four countries to ‘speak with one voice’ where their interests intertwine, with meetings occurring prior to European council meetings to ensure that they ‘pursue an effective foreign policy’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012a, p. 19). Particular areas of cooperation incorporate energy policy and CSDP, including creating a Visegrád Battlegroup.

7   Conclusion The nine elements of Polish foreign and security policy identified earlier in this chapter (Atlanticist, skeptical multilateralist, pro-EU, a focus on regional security and territorial defense, pro-active regarding the use of force, nothing about us without us, being a reliable ally, acting as a bridge between east and west, and supporting countries’ self-determination) have for the most part shown remarkable continuity. This is despite dramatic changes in the international and regional security environment, and changes in government. Main changes in Poland’s foreign policy are summarized in Table  10.1. The greatest change to Poland’s foreign policy relates to its approach toward the EU from a pro-EU position toward a skeptical European, reflecting a goal change. This is particularly noticeable when it comes to key EU norms (such as the rule of law), and CSDP where Poland had punched above its weight, showing the potential to be a leader. It is also reflected in Poland’s relations with Germany which have worsened since the Law and Justice government came into power in 2015. Second, Poland’s focus on territorial defense, at the expense of out-of-­ area operations, highlights that the country’s pro-activeness regarding the use of force now relates to protecting Polish territory. However, the country will participate in some out-of-area operations when demonstrating its ability to be a reliable ally, particularly in the context of US operations. The rationale behind a focus to modernize Poland’s armed forces and an increase in defense spending also reflect this change. Prior to the Ukraine crisis, the focus on modernization was partly in the context of interoperability, to ensure Poland could participate in EU and NATO-led operations. Post Ukraine, the rationale is now to ensure Poland can protect firstly its own territorial integrity and secondly the NATO area. The change in government has certainly acted as a motor for this change in

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Table 10.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in Poland since 1990

Adjustment change

Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

Small increase in ODA

• Increased ability to provide ODA, due to rise in wealth and joining the EU • Turn toward pragmatic Atlanticism: the Iraq war. • Return to fortified Atlanticist: the Ukraine crisis and change in government •  The Ukraine crisis •  Change of government

Fluctuations in Atlanticism: from a fortified to a pragmatic form of Atlanticism and back again

Slight downgrading of the importance of NATO in favor of relations with the US (2014) The professionalization of the armed forces Increase in defense spending

Prioritization of the modernization of the Polish armed forces over out-of-area operations Changing approach to Russia Program change

Goal change

International orientation change

• Systemic changes after the end of the Cold War • Systemic changes to the international system, 9/11, and the Ukraine crisis • Increased interoperability of Poland’s armed forces • Resurgent Russian threat (from 2014) •  Change of government •  The Ukraine crisis •  The Ukraine crisis

Increased focus on territorial defense, rather than on expeditionary operations German-Polish relations: from    Change of government • primary European partner toward a more anti-German position From pro-EU to skeptical    Change of government • European • International events including the Ukraine crisis, the refugee crisis NA NA

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thinking. Hence, a renewed focus on territorial defense, indicating a change at the program level has resulted in incremental changes to ensure that Poland is able to operationalize this. Finally, Poland’s Atlanticism has shown alterations. While it continues to be a central feature, it has fluctuated between its fortified and pragmatic variants. Certainly, the crisis in Ukraine has seen this bounce back to the former as only the US can act as Poland’s security guarantor. This adjustment relates to how Poland can best ensure that the US remains committed to the security of the region. What is obvious from looking at where change has occurred is that regional security events, combined with whom is in government, are key. Hence, it is not just about whether a change in the security environment occurs, but how policy-makers react to them. While the core elements of Polish foreign and security policy have remained consistent, their relative importance and the interpretation of them have shifted depending on how serious the crisis is and who is in power. Russian intervention in Georgia, for example, did not have as much impact on Polish security and defense policy, as its incursions in Ukraine. The re-focusing on Polish Atlanticism also brings about the question of whether the country’s experience with the US post-Iraq will be repeated. Finally, nothing about us without us, being a reliable ally, acting as a bridge between east and west, and supporting countries’ self-­determination have seen little in the way of change, beyond whom is considered to be a key ally (fluctuating between Germany and the UK, and the extent of the US relationship). The importance of the eastern partnership countries as well as self-determination is evident in Poland’s development policy. Overall the lessons of Poland’s troubled past have been integrated into its foreign and security policy. Whether faced with regional or international security threats, or changes in government, Poland has continued with the same broad foreign and security orientation since its ‘return to Europe’ following the end of the Cold War.

References Buras, P., & Janning, J. (2018, December). Divided at the Centre: Germany, Poland and the Troubles of the Trump Era. European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief. Chappell, L (2010). Poland’s Shifting Security and Defence Roles: Implications for the European Security and Defence Policy. Contemporary Security Policy, 31(2), 225–248.

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Chappell, L. (2012). Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Converging Security and Defence Perspectives in an Enlarged EU. Palgrave Macmillan. Chappell, L. (2017). Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy: Potential Leader? In T. Hashimoto & M. Rhimes (Eds.), Reviewing 10 Years of Accession (pp. 205–224). Brill Publishers. Cimoszewicz, W. (2003). Keynote Address. In P. Kowiewski & P. Krzeczunowicz (Eds.), Poland in the World. Challenges, Achievements, Threats (pp.  9–17). Stefan Batory Foundation. Concord. (2009). Lighten the Load In a Time of Crisis, European Aid Has Never Been More Important. Report Aidwatch 2009. Doeser, F. (2018). Historical Experiences, Strategic Culture, and Strategic Behavior: Poland in the Anti-ISIS Coalition. Defence Studies, 18(4), 454–473. Dylla, D. (2011, June 3). Poland, Libya and NATO. Atlantic Council. European Parliament. (1998). The PHARE Programme and the Enlargement of the European Union. European Parliament Briefing No. 33. Komorowski, B. (2013). No more far-off military missions. Warsaw, 15 Aug. Retrieved June 23, 2021 from: https://www.prezydent.pl/en/president-­ komorowski/news/art,485,president-no-more-far-off-military-missions.html Kuźniar, R. (2001). Poland’s Security Policy 1989–2000. Scholar Publishing House. Lightfoot, S. (2010). The Europeanisation of International Development Policies: The Case of Central and Eastern European States. Europe-Asia Studies, 62(2), 329–350. Lightfoot, S., & Szent-Iványi, B. (2014). Reluctant Donors? The Europeanization of International Development Policies in the New Member States. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(6), 1257–1272. Longhurst, K. (2008). All Change? Polish Foreign and Security Policy after the Elections. Politique étrangère, 2008(1), 147–158. Longhurst, K., & Zaborowski, M. (2007). The New Atlanticist Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities. Blackwell. Melamed, M. (2005). Polish-American Relations in the Aftermath of War in Iraq. The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 5(2), 7–21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2012a). Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012–2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2012b). Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012–2015. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2015). Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme for 2016–2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2017). Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Multilateral Assistance. Retrieved November 17, 2020, from https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Multilateral,assistance,196.html Ministry of National Defence. (2000). The National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland.

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CHAPTER 11

Spanish Foreign Policy: Navigating Global Shifts and Domestic Crises Eduard Soler i Lecha and Esther Barbé

1   Introduction There is a general consensus in the literature on contemporary Spain that three processes have changed the whole country as well as its foreign policy: democratization, Europeanization and the modernization of its society (see, among others, Mesa, 1988; Gillespie et al., 1995; Barbé, 1999; Kennedy, 2000; Torreblanca, 2001; Powell, 2001; Closa, 2001; Piedrafita et  al., 2007, Morata & Mateo González, 2007, Pereira, 2010; Garcia Cantalapiedra & Pacheco Pardo, 2014). This chapter acknowledges the

This chapter falls within the Observatory of European Foreign Policy research project (2017 SGR 693) funded by the Catalan Agency for Management of University and Research Grants (AGAUR) and within MEDRESET, a project funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Program for Research and Innovation under grant agreement no 693055.

E. Soler i Lecha (*) • E. Barbé Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_11

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importance of these three drivers and contributes to the existing literature by broadening the catalogue of drivers of change. It assesses the effects of three major international factors (the end of the Cold War, September 11 and the global financial crisis) as well as more recent domestic transformations. In the last decade, Spain has undergone a multifaceted crisis: economic (global uncertainties were amplified by the debt crisis and the bursting of the housing bubble), political (rejection of corruption and privileges of mainstream parties, the eruption of the indignados movement in 2011 and the subsequent erosion of Spain’s imperfect bipartisan system) and territorial (facing the challenge of a persistent pro-­ independence movement in Catalonia since 2012). In 2020, the health crisis was added to the list. The rapid spread of COVID-19 has so far amplified the three pre-existing crises. This chapter assesses the intensity and direction of change in general foreign policy orientation, defense and security policy, aid policy, bilateral relations with a selected group of countries—in this case France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Morocco and Venezuela—and Spain’s commitment to multilateral frameworks. The chapter sheds light on processes and dynamics that are shared by other countries studied in this book, but it will also highlight some peculiarities of the Spanish case. Although the book focuses on change, it also points out the areas where continuity prevails, either due to the strength of political consensus or to bureaucratic and diplomatic inertias.

2   General Foreign Policy Orientation: Ambition, Priorities and Leadership With the return of democracy in the late seventies, the main goal of Spanish foreign policy was the normalization or rehabilitation of the county in the international community (Barbé, 1990). After a constituent period that laid the basis for a renewed and modernized international identity, scholars have pointed at the consolidation of a basic consensus around European integration as a priority and multilateralism as a principle for Spain’s foreign policy (del Arenal, 2008). To a large extent, this consensus was aimed at turning the page of Francoist foreign policy, which was held responsible for Spain’s isolation and economic and political backwardness (Morán, 1980). One aspect where we can observe a significant continuity among Spanish governments, and a broad consensus among

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political parties, experts and pundits, is that Spain is considered to be a “middle power”. Politicians and academics have used this concept to describe Spain’s current and potential international role. For instance, Celestino del Arenal (2011: 231) described Spain under the Felipe González government as “a middle power, with a strong normative character, with a significant role in international affairs and the willingness to project itself globally and particularly in Latin America and the Mediterranean”. Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean constitute the regional priorities of Spanish foreign policy. This is conceptualized as Spain’s triangle of priorities, in which Europe occupies the top of the triangle dominating and determining the relationship with the other two regional priorities (Barbé, 2011). In the relationship with Latin America and the Mediterranean, there was an effort to update the conceptual toolbox in order to illustrate change vis-à-vis Francoist foreign policy. When referring to the links with Latin America, the traditional concept of Hispanidad (Spanishness) was replaced by the idea of building an ibero-american community that also embraced Portugal and Brazil. The concept of Africanismo, associated with Spain late colonial ambitions, was also removed from the official narrative. The so-called traditional friendship with the Arab peoples (Algora Weber, 2010) was replaced by the idea of promoting cooperation in the Mediterranean (Barbé et  al., 2007; Hernando de Larramendi, 2009; Soler i Lecha & Morillas, 2020; Vaquer i Fanés, 2014). The conceptualization of Spain as a middle power and the triangle of priorities have been uncontested. Nevertheless, the way in which Spanish foreign policy was framed underwent some changes. For instance, under Aznar’s conservative governments, the goal was to be recognized as a global actor, for which Spain needed to increase its presence in areas that had been neglected before, such as the Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa (Piqué, 2001). In that period, Aznar aspired to join the G-8 and aimed to be recognized as the best European ally of the US. Aznar and his inner circle considered Atlanticism as the best way to upgrade Spain’s international status. The terrorist attacks of September 11 presented a unique opportunity to reach out to the US and demonstrate Spain’s alignment with Washington’s priorities and policies. Aznar also followed a more aggressive strategy in European politics, particularly in the negotiation of voting rights in the Nice Treaty, in which Spain joined forces with Poland.

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These two choices moved Spain away from the EU’s core and resulted in a deterioration of its relations with France and Germany. After winning the 2004 elections, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero invoked the idea of a “return to Europe” (Presidencia del Gobierno, 2004). Neither Rodríguez Zapatero nor his ministers renounced the idea of acting and being recognized as a middle power. Interestingly, the first words of the prime minister in his 2006 state of the nation speech were: “we are a middle power within the European Union and the eighth industrial power in the world” (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2006). The rest of the speech stressed Spain’s capacity to integrate new citizens, progress in gender policies or Spain’s contribution to peace through multilateralism and combatting inequality through cooperation. This was a clear attempt to demarcate differences with the domestic and international policies of his predecessor, or, to put it differently, an attempt to “de-Aznarise” Spanish foreign policy (González del Miño, 2007). In the early 2010s, Spain’s international ambitions suffered a serious blow due to the convergence of political, economic and territorial crises. Austerity cuts, corruption scandals, the rise of anti-establishment political forces, the fragmentation of the Spanish parliament and the secessionist movement in Catalonia forced successive Spanish governments to downgrade their recent international aspirations and redirect their energies to domestic politics. The appointment of the conservative leader, Mariano Rajoy, in December 2011 intensified this trend as the new prime minister showed little appetite for foreign policy issues. In what has become a catchphrase in Spanish foreign policy, he decided to follow the advice once given to Aznar by a member of his party: “menos Siria y más Soria” [Less Syria and more Soria].1 That is: cut down on international projection to devote more efforts to domestic affairs. The downscaling of Spain’s international ambitions did not go unnoticed, and many analysts wondered whether Spain was punching below its weight. Charles Powell, director of the Madrid-based think tank Real Instituto Elcano, admitted that “the economic and financial crisis has encouraged political elites to reconsider Spain’s external commitments and allegiances”, which “has undermined Spain’s overall prestige and 1  Soria is the least populated province of Spain and is commonly used as a metaphor for rural Spain. The idea of “menos Siria and más Soria” is attributed to Jesús Posada, former president of the region of Castille and Leon and then Spanish parliamentarian, himself born in Soria.

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credibility” (Powell, 2012: 23). Ignacio Molina, working for the same organization, reflected a similar concern regarding Spain’s influence in the EU. He stated that “If Spain ever punched above its weight in Brussels, it now does the very opposite” and considered that “after years of slow de-­ Europeanisation (…) Spain must not only put the integration process back at the heart of its national project, but it must also dare to co-lead it” (Molina, 2013: 9). In 2018, Pedro Sánchez, the leader of the Socialist Party, became prime minister after a motion of no confidence against Rajoy. In January 2020, after several months of political instability and two elections, Sánchez announced the creation of the first coalition government since Spain’s transition back to democracy. Unlike most of its predecessors, Sánchez speaks foreign languages and has shown an interest in foreign policy matters from the very beginning of his term as prime minister. In principle, this creates favorable conditions for a “presidentialized” foreign policy, yet domestic tensions could impede Sánchez to invest time and energy in the external front. In terms of priorities, one of the novelties is the increased interest in Africa, which was reflected in the coalition agreement (PSOE and Unidas Podemos Coalición Progresista, 2019). Yet, there is also a lot of continuity, as reflected in the speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Foreign Affairs minister Arancha González Laya. She described Spain as a “nodal country” which is “firmly anchored in the EU and a proud member of the community of countries of Ibero-­ America and the Caribbean, with a clear Atlantic vocation and capacity of influence in the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean” (González Laya, 2020).

3   Defense and Security Policy: Terrorism, Alliances and Military Industry In contrast to most EU countries, terrorism has had a long-lasting impact on Spanish domestic and foreign policies. For several decades, Spain suffered from terrorist attacks by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), a Basque secessionist organization created in 1959 and dissolved in May 2018, responsible for the death of more than 800 people, among which 343 civilians. More recently, the country was the target of two major jihadist attacks: the 2004 Madrid train bombings (193 killed) and the 2017 Barcelona attacks (16 killed). The terrorist threat has had important

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consequences for Spain’s foreign policy: it conditioned the relationship with other countries dependent on whether they were perceived as indispensable allies in the fight against those threats. The best-known case is that of cooperation France in the fight against ETA, which suffered some ups and downs (Morán, 1997). This bilateral cooperation with Spain’s northern neighbor was reinforced by the shared fight against the jihadi threat, which also became a key aspect of Spain-Morocco relations. Yet, terrorism has also worsened relations with more reluctant partners. This is the case for Belgium, whose courts refused the extradition of ETA members on several occasions, and Venezuela, which once was a popular safe haven for members of this organization. The September 11 attacks were a game changer. Spain, who perceived that it had been talking to deaf ears when urging for a more robust European and international cooperation in this field, understood that it was the right moment to vindicate its position. At the EU level, Spain took advantage of the fact that it held the EU presidency to upload its priorities into the common agenda. This strategy was very visible in the preparations of the European Council of Seville, which included an annexed declaration on the fight against terrorism as part of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). At the global level, the government led by José María Aznar understood that the fight against terrorism could be a launching pad for closer relations with Washington. Aznar became an enthusiastic supporter of the global war against terrorism, and this paved the way for one of the most divisive foreign policy decisions in Spain’s contemporary history: support of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. A second driver for change was Spain’s participation in security organizations. While there was always broad social and political consensus on Spain’s participation in the European Union, NATO has been far more contentious. It was one of the few issues where political parties could not reach a consensus during Spain’s transition to democracy. During the seventies and eighties, large segments of Spain’s left were opposed to NATO membership. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the issue was no longer an object of major public debates, partly due to the end of the Cold War. Even Podemos is no longer advocating for Spain’s exit from the alliance, while arguing that there should be a gradual strengthening of the EU’s defense capabilities. The participation in peacekeeping operations, particularly in the framework of the UN, has been backed across the political spectrum and is considered as a channel to modernize and even democratize the Spanish

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armed forces (Labatut, 1993; Navajas, 2014; Serra, 2010; Soler i Lecha et al., 2006). Spain’s first contributed to a UN operation in 1989, when it participated with a contingent in the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). The participation of Spanish forces in Iraq in 2003 was far more controversial. The country witnessed massive anti-war protest movements, and the opposition was very vocal in criticizing Aznar’s decision to support the US-led invasion of Iraq without a UN mandate. The year 2004 was one of those rare occasions in which foreign policy became a major issue in a general election (Aixalà, 2005; Barreñada et  al., 2004; Sahagún, 2005). Together with the impact of the Madrid train bombings, Aznar’s alignment with Washington against the will of the majority of the Spanish population was a key driver of the victory of the then-relatively unknown Rodríguez Zapatero. One of the first decisions of Zapatero’s government was the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Iraq. This unilateral and rapid movement was consistent with the will of the population but intensified the breach of foreign policy consensus among mainstream parties and temporally damaged relations with the US. Aznar’s support to the Iraq war, in combination with the financial and human cost of the military operation (Spain was not militarily involved in the first phase of the war but deployed troops as part of a “peace-keeping” international division) resulted in an increased social oversight on the deployment of military missions abroad. Spanish governments have been required to better justify the need of such deployments, providing a greater say to Parliament (Arteaga, 2011: 937). In 2020, Spain was participating in 17 operations in 4 different continents under different formats: mostly UN, NATO and EU missions but also in the ad hoc international coalition in Iraq against the self-proclaimed Islamic State as well as bilateral missions with France in the Sahel. Yet, the largest contingent was deployed in UNIFIL’s mission in Lebanon (610 men and women in 2020). The third main driver of change is defense expenditures, and related to it, the role of Spain’s military industry. On this front, there are some elements of continuity. First and foremost, Spain’s defense budget is consistently lower than that of other members of the EU and NATO, despite the US’ insistence that all NATO members should reach the 2% budgetary threshold and several unmet promises by Spanish ministers to do so (see Fig. 11.1). The impact of austerity cuts has been lower in this area when compared to other budget lines, such as development aid. On this, there are no noticeable differences between socialist and conservative

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Fig. 11.1  Spain’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank)

governments, and this is mainly due to the nature of some defense contracts, as well as the fact that a significant part of the budget corresponds to fixed costs (salaries, maintenance, etc.). Another continuity is the prominent role of the Spanish defense industry. Once more, both socialist and conservative governments seem to agree on the priority given to the internationalization of this sector as part of the effort to promote Spain’s industry and create jobs. One area of significant change is the increased social debate and popular scrutiny on the morality of some arms exports. The most relevant example concerns military contracts with Saudi Arabia, mainly as a result of the humanitarian disaster caused by the Saudi involvement in the war in Yemen. This has led some local and international NGOs to put pressure on the Spanish government to halt Spain’s exports to Saudi Arabia, particularly after the intensifications of bombings and casualties in the summer of 2018. The announcement in September 2018 by the Spanish Ministry of Defense to cancel the sale of 400 laser-guided bombs to Saudi

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Arabia by the government represented a major turning point. Yet, the ministry was forced to backtrack due to strong pressure by the Saudi government, who threatened to cancel other contracts, by the military industry and by local and regional politicians afraid that this could imply job destruction in their constituencies. The level of controversy and public debate around that decision was unprecedented. In Spain, several academics and activists had been denouncing Spain’s arms exports to countries at war or repressing fundamental freedoms for years (Fisas Armengol, 1995; Ortega & Calvo Rufanges 2014), but have had little impact on the foreign policymaking. In contrast, the 2018 controversy on Saudi Arabia, even if arms sale critics were ultimately unsuccessful, showed that the scope of actors able to shape foreign policy decisions has widened and that social movements and advocacy groups have become more influential.

4   Development Cooperation Policy: Institutional Changes, Ideological Biases, Budget Cuts and Migrations Diplomacy Compared to other countries in Western Europe, Spain is a newcomer when it comes to official development aid (ODA). Although Spain created the Fund for Aid and Development (FAD) in 1976, until 1981 Spain was still a recipient of international aid. In 1987, the government established the guiding principles for Spanish development cooperation. One year later, it created the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) (Olivié & Pérez, 2019b; Sotillo, 2014). The role of Spanish civil society was key in creating domestic pressure for more generous international cooperation programs from the very beginning. Another peculiarity of Spanish development assistance is the major role played by local and regional governments. As explained by Aitor Pérez (2018), in relative terms, Spain is the most decentralized actor when it comes to ODA, with one-third of bilateral cooperation being spent by sub-state governments. This has allowed some regions or cities to identify their own thematic or geographical priorities. Two examples are Andalusia’s focus on Morocco (Desrues & Moreno Nieto, 2007) or, at the local level, the support provided by Barcelona’s municipality to Proactiva Open Arms, a rescue and first aid NGO operating in the Mediterranean. Spain’s cooperation policy also has some differences with other major donors when it comes to its regional priorities. The central position of

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Latin America in the list of priorities and the cooperation record of NGOs and local and regional governments is one of the elements explaining why those funds devoted to medium-income countries are particularly high despite encouragement of the UN to focus on low-income ones (Intermon Oxfam, 2019: 71). Yet, more recently, sub-Saharan Africa has become more prominent. Moreover, based on recent budgetary evolutions, Iliana Olivié and Pérez (2019a) have concluded that Spain’s aid and development policy is less Latin American, more African and far more Europeanized than typically described. There is a scholarly debate on Spanish development policy between scholars who that aid is guided by the preservation of linkages with former colonies and economic interests might guide Spanish aid (Tezanos, 2008) and scholars who suggest that “inertia, herd behavior, and a lack of specialization are the determining factors” (Olivié & Pérez, 2019b: 133). Together with those peculiarities, it is also important to identify the similarities with the other EU members. Development aid is not an exception to the broader process of Europeanisation of Spanish external action (Sanahuja, 2012). Much like other international actors, Spain considers its aid policy as one of the components of the country’s international projection and as part of its external action, particularly after the victory of the Socialist government in the 2004 elections. Since then, the official denomination of the Foreign Affairs Ministry has incorporated the cooperation component. In addition, there have been several institutional and policy developments trying to develop an integrated approach and the so-called all of the government or all of the country approach. This is the case of the National Pact against Poverty, which was endorsed in 2007 by the government, the opposition and NGOs (Sotillo, 2014), or the 2012 launch of the Masar program that followed after Arab Spring (Michou et al., 2014). The 2015 External Action Strategy of the Foreign Affairs Ministry also detailed that ODA aimed at contributing to attain Spain’s foreign policy goals such as projecting Spain as an advanced democracy or strengthening Spain’s international influence, especially in Europe, Latin America, the Mediterranean Basin and before world powers (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 2015: 76). The economic and financial crisis and the austerity policies that followed had a major impact on Spanish international aid. Spain was not an exception, as other EU countries, particularly in Southern Europe, followed a similar trend. However, in the case of Spain the impact was particularly strong. This was partly due to the severity of the economic crisis

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in Spain, but also due to specific domestic political dynamics. With the victory of the socialist party in the 2004 elections, the government led by Zapatero had decided to significantly augment the resources devoted to development aid. This was consistent with its general efforts to differentiate its foreign policy with that of Aznar and to better connect with the demands of Spain’s civil society, which had been putting pressure on national, regional and local governments since the 1990s to make further progress toward the goal of reaching the 0.7 ODA/GNI ratio. In consequence, Spain moved from 0.24% to 0.46% between 2004 and 2009, as shown in Fig.  11.2. However, Spain’s ODA rapidly decreased after the global financial crisis. By 2012, after the budget cuts implemented in 2010, Spain’s development aid represented only 0.16%. This downward trend continued during the governments led by the Popular Party. By 2015, when Spain was already announcing that the crisis was over and that it was growing quicker than most economies in the eurozone, ODA

Fig. 11.2  Spain’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

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reached its lowest point, with only 0.12%. During this period, top governmental figures, like Foreign Affairs Minister José Manuel García-Margallo, presented those cuts as a painful sacrifice, arguing that the alternative was even worse, suggesting that the government had to choose between cutting ODA or cutting health and retirement benefits (Agencias, 2012). The change of government, after the motion of no confidence against Rajoy, did not result in an increase in ODA. This was partly due to the impossibility of approving a national budget (in fact, the rejected budget proposal of 2019 foresaw a 19% increase) and two successive elections that put governmental initiatives on hold (Gutiérrez, 2019). In consequence, Spain’s development policy was characterized as a comatose policy (Fanjul, 2019). The agreement to form a leftist coalition government in Spain, which took office in January 2020, may finally revert this trend. The Socialist Party and Unidas Podemos set the ambitious goal of reaching a 0.5 ODA/GNI ratio by the end the 2019–2023 term (PSOE and Unidas Podemos Coalición Progresista, 2019). Whereas the dire economic impact of COVID-19 could compromise this goal, Spain has been one of the EU member states that have most vocally asked for a generous support to its southern neighbors in the fight against the pandemic. For instance, Sánchez co-signed the letter with other international leaders asking for a debt relief and stimulus packages for Africa (Ahmed et  al., 2020). Madrid also led other governments, regional organizations and financial institutions to plead for a joint response to counter the COVID-19 crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean (Abellán, 2020). Next to the economic crisis and governmental changes, Spanish development policy has also been impacted by a new focus on migration (Tezanos & Gutierrez, 2016). This development can be traced back to the period 2006–2008, when there was a surge of irregular arrivals by boat to the Canary Islands (almost 60,000 people in three years). This situation not only prompted Spain to ask for greater involvement of the EU, and specifically FRONTEX, in the Atlantic Ocean and boosted police and maritime cooperation with Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. It also translated into an increase in Spain’s development assistance to the countries of origin or transit of irregular migrants. For instance, in its first-ever Africa Plan (2006–2008), the Spanish government announced the opening of new Technical Cooperation Offices in Cape Verde and Mali and expressed the willingness to launch co-development projects in Gambia, Nigeria and, again, Mali. In this process, Spain developed what has been

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referred as a new form of “migration diplomacy” (Pinyol i Jiménez, 2009; Senge, 2018) and which has been presented by governmental officials but also by some experts as a best practice to be emulated by other EU member states (Fine & Torreblanca, 2019).

5   Bilateral Relations: European Alliances, Neighborhood Relations and Domestic Politicization The three traditional priorities of Spain’s foreign policy, Europe, the Mediterranean and Latin America, have been translated into a dual strategy. On the one hand, Spain has actively favored multilateral cooperation frameworks at a regional or interregional level (see next section). On the other hand, it has entertained privileged bilateral relations with key countries in each of those regions. While multilateral commitments tend to generate wide political consensus in Spanish foreign policy, bilateral relations are a fertile ground for political confrontation, especially relations with non-EU countries. In the EU, Spain has consistently pursued a strategy of developing preferential relations with the big member states, particularly with France and Germany. Bilateral government summits became the main platform in which ministers discuss and promote new initiatives for bilateral cooperation in areas that may include education, transport, anti-terrorism or energy. Equally important, European and international affairs are also discussed in these meetings. Through these summits, Spain has not only sought to upgrade bilateral relations but to project itself as a major EU actor (Mestres, 2014). Even before these summits, Spain had cultivated preferential relations with France and Germany. In the late 1980s, the excellent personal connection between Helmut Kohl and Felipe González was seen as one of the elements that allowed Spain to upload its own priorities to the European agenda and reinforce Madrid’s image as a committed and constructive partner in the post-Cold War period. As with many other foreign policy issues, bilateral relations were also affected by Aznar’s disruptive choices. The privileged relations with the US and its allies in Europe (mainly the UK) moved Spain away from Paris and Berlin. It is worth noting that in an interview in the Washington Post, Aznar argued that since the 1800s, “Spain’s decision-making in foreign policy has been subordinate to France, which is no longer the case. Some

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are happy, others are not. I’m happy for Spain to be making its own decisions. All of a sudden we find ourselves at the forefront” (Boustany, 2004). In sharp contrast with Aznar’s policies, one of the main mottoes of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s foreign policy was to “bring Spain back to the EU’s core”. This implied mending ties with Berlin and, above all, Paris. This strategy bore some fruit, and French support was key to including Spain as one of the permanent guest invitees to the G-20. From 2011 onward, Spain’s relations with Paris and Berlin, but also with the rest of the EU member states, were overtaken by the need to gather their support in the face of the economic crisis and the secessionist challenge in Catalonia. In contrast, the relationship with the United Kingdom has been less institutionalized, despite the density of bilateral relations at all levels between both countries: tourism, financial sector or foreign residents. The relationship has been often captured by the unresolved territorial conflict over Gibraltar. On this front, Brexit is a game changer. Since the United Kingdom took the decision to leave the EU, Spain understood that the situation had changed and that it would now benefit from a more privileged position. Thus, it occasionally threatened to veto the UK-EU agreements if Spain’s positions on Gibraltar were not taken into consideration and obtained some victories such as when in February 2019 a negotiation document of the EU referred to Gibraltar as a “colony of the British crown”.2 Gibraltar is not Spain’s only territorial dispute. Differences with Morocco regarding the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla—two cities on the North African coast—as well as regarding some islets and rocks have been a major concern for Spain. In order to diffuse the risk of a major crisis erupting with its southern neighbor, Spain combined two different and complementary strategies. On the one hand, Madrid has tried to Europeanize these disputes so that if Rabat were to adopt a confrontational or threatening attitude, the target would not be Spain but the whole of the European Union (Gillespie, 2000; Vaquer i Fanés, 2003). On the other hand, Spain tried to increase bilateral trade and investment and also upgraded institutionalized political dialogue through regular summits. As Miguel Hernando de Larramendi (2009:40) argues, by buffering their 2  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 Council of the European Union Interinstitutional File: 2018/0390(COD). Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/38044/ st05960-en19.pdf.

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joint interests and establishing an institutionalized political dialogue, Spain aimed at limiting “the scope of bilateral tensions and encapsulate the crisis that periodically stirred these relations”. This policy might not have been able to prevent bilateral tensions, but has contributed to the prevention of the escalation of tensions. For instance, tensions reached a peak in 2002, when Morocco and Spain were about to enter a military conflict over the sovereignty of an inhabited islet (Perejil/Leila) but the two countries were able to redress the situation and even intensified their cooperation on areas such as migration and terrorism soon after. It is around migration that we can observe one of the peculiarities of Spain’s policies toward Morocco: domestic politicization. This has been one of the areas where the two main political parties have openly criticized each other’s foreign policy strategies (Fernández Molina, 2009). The fragmentation of Spain’s political system caused by its political, economic and territorial crises has added two additional elements of complexity to Spain’s relationship with Morocco. The first one is the sudden emergence of VOX, a radical right-wing populist party that has borrowed Trump’s rhetoric on walls, invasions and nationalism. The second novelty is Podemos. This party, in government since January 2020, has been attached to the Saharawi cause and political discourses or gestures by its members can easily provoke fuming reactions of Rabat. Finally, in Latin America, it is less easy to identify which bilateral relation matters the most. Spain has tried to cultivate good relations with all the countries in the region, and above all, it has sought to promote all sorts of regional and interregional platforms (Ayuso, 2014). One of the distinct characteristics of Spanish policies toward Latin American is the key role played in bilateral relations by major Spanish companies. The resulting economic interests, together with what Madrid perceives to be an insufficient interest of (or even inadequate policies by) the EU, is one of the reasons why there has been a relative return to bilateralism in EU-Latin American relations (Sanahuja, 2013: 51–52). Latin America has become one of the main areas for the internationalization of Spanish companies, including many examples from the financial sector, energy, insurance or civil construction. In some cases, these companies benefited from the use of tied aid to developing countries. Hereby, the presence of those companies has helped to increase the role and influence of Spain in Latin America, sometimes in competition with other EU member states. On some occasions, this has created tensions with Latin American governments, specifically when Spanish companies have been

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targeted by national policies or legislation. An example of this is the expropriation of Repsol oil subsidiary YPF in Argentina by Fernández de Kirchner’s government. Spanish companies such as Telefónica, the telecoms group, and BBVA, Spain’s second-largest bank, are also present in Venezuela. Relations with this country have also become part of domestic politics in Spain, with an unprecedented intensity. Relations with Venezuela were already strained in the Aznar period, when the Venezuelan authorities accused the Spanish government of having supported the 2002 coup attempt against Hugo Chávez. By 2004, when the Socialist Party won the elections, foreign affairs minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos also accused the previous government of backing the putschists. This stirred a harsh debate in the Spanish parliament (Egurbide, 2012). A similar dynamic has been reproduced since 2019, but with even more intensity. Although the Sánchez government was one of the first to recognize Guaidó as a legitimate President, the attempts to reach out to Maduro’s government and some gestures, such as the President’s reference to Guaidó as the leader of the opposition, infuriated the right-wing parties in Spain. Right-wing parties blamed the Socialist government for being too soft toward the Maduro government and local and regional leaders became vocal in supporting the opposition in Venezuela to an extent that some of their actions were seen as contradicting Spain’s foreign policy line. The tone has been even harsher against the junior partner of the coalition, Unidas Podemos, who is accused by its political rivals of being complicit with the Venezuelan regime and its repressive tactics.

6   Militant Multilateralism: Needs and Aspirations Spain’s indisputable commitment to multilateral initiatives is the result of two elements. The first is Spain’s self-perception as a middle power with global interests. Spain assumes that it does not have the capacities to defend its national interests on its own. Therefore, it feels better protected through international norms and institutions and perceives the European Union as the optimal pathway to promote its interests and values. A second, equally, important factor is the impact of Spain’s traumatic history of the nineteenth and twentieth century, epitomized in the loss in 1898 of its last colonial possessions in America and the Pacific, which prompted an intense intellectual discussion about the reasons for Spain’s decline and how to revert it.

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Spain has been a pro-active member in the UN institutions, being elected a non-permanent member in the UNSC on five occasions and a member of the Council of Human Rights twice. Spain is also the tenth largest contributor to the UN budget and eleventh largest contributor to the Peace Operations budget. The effects of the economic crisis, particularly after Spain’s abrupt U-turn in 2011 to introduce draconian austerity measures, have also impacted some voluntary contributions to UN initiatives. However, the impact of the economic crisis was relatively small, especially compared to its cuts in ODA. Keeping the middle power narrative, Spain has become more active and has developed several niche diplomacy initiatives (Cooper, 1997). In the last 15 years, Spain has developed a profile as a liberal solidarist actor in the UN, which is well appreciated by NGOs in the field of Human Rights. In this area, Spanish diplomacy is clearly marked by domestic assertive transformations regarding women’s rights during Rodríguez Zapatero’s term and LGBT rights. Spain has been assertive in regard to gender equality on issues such as Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the Human Rights Council, even as more and more voices reject this liberal solidarist orientation. Pedro Sánchez addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2019 defining the Spanish foreign policy as multilateralist and feminist, stressing Spanish efforts to implement Agenda 2030 and its readiness to join the group of countries leading the fight against climate change (Presidencia del Gobierno, 2019). An example of this commitment was Madrid’s willingness to replace Santiago de Chile as the host for the COP25 climate negotiations in November 2019. The two issues that have been the most relevant for Spain both reflect its domestic context: gender equality and the fight against terrorism. The fight for gender equality is mainly but not exclusively supported by progressive voices. For instance, under a Popular Party government, as a non-­ permanent member of the UNSC, Spain was one of the driving forces for the adoption of Resolution 2242 on Women, Peace and Security (Barbé, 2016). As explained in the previous sections, the fight against terrorism has been a main concern in Spain for decades. One of Spain’s contributions to the multilateral debate has been its insistence to take the role of victims of terrorism into consideration, thus mirroring the major social and political role that victims of ETA and jihadi terrorism have had in domestic debates. One of the priorities during its 2015–2016 mandate as a non-permanent member of the UNSC was to give a voice to the victims in the fight against

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terrorism. Together with Afghanistan, in 2019, Spain launched the Group of Friends of Victims of Terrorism in the UN. While the issue of victims seems to generate broad consensus, there are other dimensions of the international fight against terrorism that have been far more divisive. As said before, Aznar supported the Bush administration in its war on terror and the war in Iraq. Spain’s stance was relevant as it occupied one of the non-permanent seats in the UNSC and, through that position, worked with the US and the UK to convince some reluctant countries, particularly focusing on Latin American. Unsurprisingly, Rodriguez Zapatero also reached out to the multilateral framework to mark a contrast with the policies of his predecessor. For instance, he joined forces with Erdogan’s Turkey to propose the launch of the Alliance of Civilizations. Two years later, this initiative was integrated into the UN system, has been joined by 146 states and organizations and supported by leading personalities, such as Desmond Tutu or Mohamed Khatami. Spain’s militant multilateralism is not only projected through Spain’s active involvement in the UN but also through the development of the EU’s foreign and security policy. One of the first international decisions of the first democratic government was the application for membership to the EEC (July 1977) and the accession into the Council of Europe (November 1977), and Spanish governments perceived the country as a “medium size power anchored in Europe” (Barbé, 2011: 134) and one that has successfully Europeanized its foreign policy priorities (Barbé, 2011; Torreblanca, 2001). The end of the Cold War dynamics, coupled with globalization, gave Spain additional arguments to persuade its European partners that the time had come to pay more attention to Europe’s Southern flank and to Latin America, as an emerging global partner, and in both domains, Spain became a driving force of interregional cooperation.

7   Conclusions: Four Layers of Change There are several elements of continuity in Spanish foreign policy, such as the priority given to European integration, Latin America and the Mediterranean, the active involvement in multilateral frameworks and the concern for unresolved bilateral disputes with Morocco and the United Kingdom. Next to them, there are four drivers of change of Spanish foreign policy in the last three decades (see Table 11.1 for an overview). The first are long-term transformations that started in the seventies and that

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Table 11.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in Spain since 1990 Instance change Adjustment change

Program change

Drivers and inhibitors

Bilateral relations with •   Leadership change: Aznar (1996–2004) France and Germany  Behavior change in allies •  •  International event: economic crisis •  Inhibitor: EU integration dynamics Bilateral relations with • Leadership change: Aznar (1996–2004) the UK •  International event: Brexit Bilateral relations with • Leadership change: Aznar (1996–2004) Morocco •  A more assertive Moroccan policy • Domestic constraints: fragmentation of the political system • External events: massive arrivals of irregular migrants Bilateral relations with •  Leadership changes (right vs. left) Venezuela and Cuba •  Domestic constraints: politicization Refinement of the •  International event: September 11 anti-terrorist policy • Domestic events: terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and Barcelona (2017); dissolution of ETA (2018) •  Societal pressures: the role of victims Participation in •  Systemic change: end of the Cold War international peace • International events: September 11 and operations conflict outbreaks in the Balkans,MENA and Sahel • Participation in international organizations • Domestic change: modernization and democratization of the Spanish armed forces Transparency or arms •  Societal demand (peace activists) exports • Inhibitor: societal demand (workers from the defense industry) • Inhibitor: institutional veto players (mainstream parties) (continued)

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Table 11.1 (continued)

Goal change

Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

ODA becomes a foreign policy tool

• International organizations: UN, EU, DAC (OCDE) •  International norms: 0.7 goal • External change: migration flows and COVID-19 •  Societal demand: NGOs • Leadership change (left-wing governments) •  Inhibitor: economic crisis •  International event: September 11 • Leadership change: Aznar (1996–2004) • Inhibitor: bureaucratic constraints and political and societal opposition • Change of behavior of partners (Morocco) • Societal demand: Spanish nationalism and Catalan secessionism NA

Atlanticist turn (1996–2004)

Defense of territorial integrity

International NA orientation change

significantly changed the country as a whole as well as its foreign policy priorities and decision-making process. The most relevant transformation is the democratization of the country in the seventies, along with the accession of the country to the European Union in the eighties and the modernization of Spanish society. The second driver of change concerns domestic political change. Elections have sometimes had a major impact on Spanish foreign policy. As a result of government changes, there are significant differences in the way Spain has been facing some foreign policy issues. The effects are stronger in highly polarizing or sensitive topics such as bilateral relations with the US, sovereignty disputes with Morocco and the United Kingdom (Gibraltar) or relations with Latin American countries like Venezuela. Despite repeated calls to recuperate a foreign policy consensus, this is an area where politicization is apparent and, what is more, where some decisions are meant to mark a rupture with the policies of preceding governments and undo the way taken by political rivals. The decision of the Aznar government in 2003 to support the US invasion of Iraq is the one

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that had the most profound impact and, therefore, the one that generated the strongest reactions. The third driver of change relates to major changes at the global level that have altered the political or economic global system. In the case of Spain, the end of the Cold War implied a relaxation of the domestic political debate on NATO and opened opportunities for Spain to convince the EU institutions and member states to devote more attention to other priorities such as the Mediterranean and Latin America. September 11 had a profound impact. It empowered Aznar’s government to deploy a more assertive policy, and Spain was able to transfer its priorities and concerns at the EU and multilateral level. The effects of the global economic crisis were immediately felt through drastic budget cuts that undermined previous progress in aid and, to a lesser extent, in defense matters too. Yet, contrary to other countries studied in this volume, Spain did not only face an economic crisis but rather a multifaceted crisis. This is the fourth driver of change. Spain’s economic travails coexisted with a profound political crisis and also a territorial one with its epicenter in Catalonia. The accumulation of mutually reinforcing crises drastically changed Spain’s political party system, forced succeeding governments to devote most of their attention to domestic politics and further polarized the Spanish political arena, foreign policy not being an exception. Thus, the capacity of Spain to overcome those crises and heal the wounds of acute political confrontation is a key factor to take into account when foreseeing which kind of international player Spain aims to become and which its priorities will be.

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CHAPTER 12

British Foreign Policy Since the End of the Cold War Andrew M. Dorman

1   Introduction The UK finds itself in a difficult and somewhat of an unusual position. Like many states, it faces the problems of increasing challenges to its current position, major divisions at home and the impact of the coronavirus on its’ economy. In the background remains the long-term integrity of the United Kingdom with the Scottish National Party (SNP) calling for a further referendum on Scottish independence just over five years after the previous referendum (Carrell, 2019) while in the Irish Republic there has been a surge in support for Sinn Fein raising the issue of a united Ireland once again (Beesley, 2020). What makes the UK’s situation unusual is that in the midst of these challenges it has also decided to leave the EU and set out on an unclear and risky new path. What this means for the future direction of British foreign and security policy is unclear and the government has announced

A. M. Dorman (*) King’s College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_12

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a major review of foreign, aid, defense and security policies in what they claim will be the most fundamental review so far (Chuter, 2019). The reality behind this rhetoric remains to be seen. Nevertheless, in examining British foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, the decision to leave the EU looks like it might be a significant turning point in the UK’s history. This chapter follows the prescribed format with its requisite six sections. It should be noted that not all the timelines—end of the Cold War to 9/11, 9/11 to the 2008 financial crisis and 2008 onward—entirely work for the British example, and in some sections, other factors have proven to be more significant in defining different periods. Moreover, the scale of damage that the coronavirus has had on its economy remains to be seen and looks likely to represent a game-changing moment both for the UK and for the rest of the world.

2   General Foreign Policy Orientation In many respects, the central tenets of foreign policy have been largely consistent for centuries. Geography and an island mentality have played a major part in shaping both Britain’s history, its’ identity and how it has approached the world. As a relatively small but densely populated island nation on the north-west edge of the European mainland, the defense of the UK has long been dominated by control of the waters and from the twentieth century air around its shores. Moreover, its dependence on trade to help fund the import of food and raw materials to sustain itself has meant that the UK has consistently been concerned with the ability to maintain the free movement of trade to and from the UK within the context of a relatively stable and balance of power on the European mainland. For the UK, a peaceful and stable Europe has allowed it to engage in trade with Europe but also more importantly beyond Europe. Britain’s geographical position has meant that, with the exception of the Channel Islands in the Second World War, it has not been successfully invaded and occupied since the days of William the Conqueror. Its’ early industrialization and the successful development of the Royal Navy meant that by the mid-nineteenth century it became the dominant maritime power. This allowed the British Empire to continue to expand so that by 1920 it covered almost a quarter of the world’s landmass. The legacy of this can be seen in the 13 Dependent Territories scattered across the globe that remain part of the United Kingdom, its membership of the

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Commonwealth, the multiplicity of alliances and partnerships that remain extant and its position as one of the five permanent members of the UN Nations Security Council. It can also be seen in the retention of the Gurkhas within the British Army long after Nepal’s independence. Along with France, it also means that the UK has retained global responsibilities and pretentions evident, for example, in its military operations in support of the government in Sierra Leone in 2000 to fight the Revolutionary United Front and the assistance it also gave in combatting the Ebola outbreak in 2014 (Dorman, 2009; Ross et al. 2017). Moreover, this has an economic dimension with the City acting as the world’s de facto financial capital and London being the center of the maritime insurance market. However, the twentieth century also witnessed quite profound changes to the UK, its relative situation and its conduct of its foreign, defense and now national security policies. Over the course of two world wars the UK saw its position of global dominance come to an end. After the First World War, it willingly accepted its loss of naval primacy through the Washington Conference. By the end of the Second World War, the UK had surrendered naval dominance to the US and was left in a financial position which was at best precarious. It faces a similar financial predicament following the Covid-19 crisis. Since 1945, the conventional narrative has been one of the UK’s relative decline (Bernstein, 2004), and it is was this decline that drove both Labour and Conservative governments to seek membership of the EU’s earlier incarnation the European Economic Community as an outlet for its products. In this view, the recent decision to leave the European Union can be seen as a desire to return to its imperialist past, and this partially explains the likes of Nigel Farage looking to return to some form of 1950s Neverland. Who or what is the United Kingdom has also changed over time. Even its’ current name—the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is less than a century old reflecting the independence of the Irish Republic from the rest of the UK. At one level it is four separate nations, each with their own identity, that have come together each with a distinct political relationship to the largest nation—England. Yet, this identity is more than four nations. There are also strong regional and cultural identities within the nations, be that Welsh and English-speaking parts of Wales, Protestant and Catholic Northern Ireland or the rivalry between Lancashire and Yorkshire to name but a few. Over the centuries, the UK, as it is

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currently named, has witnessed successive waves of immigration and emigration. Historically this immigration was mainly from the European mainland as various diasporas moved to the United Kingdom either to escape persecution on the European mainland or in search of work. More recently, these waves of immigration have become more global, particularly from states that were previously part of the British Empire. At the same time, the UK has also seen a succession of different groups leave for other states, be that North America, Australia and so forth. As a consequence, what might be construed as a British identity has consistently changed over time. Instead, various politicians have tended to speak of an identity more in terms of values such as democracy and free speech which tends to imply that such libertarian values are somehow innately British. In reality the UK has become a stasis power—a state that has consistently sought to maintain the existing power structures and balance in the international system—while also recognizing that these will inevitably change over time to the detriment of the UK. Far from being in decline, the British economy has continued to grow over time and relative prosperity increased. Instead, what it continues to see is a number of larger countries slowly passing it in terms of overall wealth and it now resides somewhere between fifth and seventh in economic power. 2.1  From the End of the Cold War to 9/11 In many respects, the Cold War suited the UK. With two competing blocs, it was able to exert significant influence in the Western capitalist bloc through its close relationship with the US and positions of influence on the UN Security Council, within NATO and so forth. The end of the Cold War threatened to change this, especially with a number of analysts arguing that the 1990s would be the Asian decade. The hoped-for ‘End of History’ moment and the move toward globalization looked like it might further relegate the UK’s relative position. However, the emerging Liberal World Order played to the UK’s strengths and, in particular, the role of London in partnership with New York as the world’s core financial markets. In this, the advent of the worldwide web proved really advantageous and the UK’s positioning as a hub for the majority of the transatlantic undersea cables proved key. As mentioned in a subsequent section, the so-called special relationship between the UK and US in defense and intelligence relations developed a third arm—a financial inter-connectiveness second to none.

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At the same time, the issue of Europe became a steadily increasing issue in British politics and particularly the politics of the Conservative Party (Bale, 2016). The creation of the Single Market in many ways was everything the likes of Margaret Thatcher and those on the right of the Conservative Party could have wanted. The opening up of the EU’s internal market proved especially advantageous to the UK as a whole and, in particular, the financial sector. Other sectors also benefitted. Britain provided a base for the construction of Japanese designed cars aimed at the European market with companies such as Nissan, Toyota and Mitsubishi all setting up car plants in the UK. However, other sectors and some parts of the country did not benefit, particularly those areas in the process of deindustrializing such as Scotland, South Wales and the North of England. Other sectors found that having to open themselves up to the rest of Europe had a devastating effect on their industries. For example, the fishing industry was confronted with the opening up of British waters to other European fishing fleets. At the same time the opening up of the internal market was matched with a further shift of power to the European institutions and further moves toward political union. The latter did not sit well in the UK with relatively few embracing the European dream of some form of United States of Europe. In passing the Maastricht Treaty, the Major government found the Conservative Party split with a number of MPs voting against. In the immediate years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, British foreign policy sought to maintain Britain’s position in a variety of international organizations ranging from the United Nations and NATO to the IMF and the Western European Union (see alliances section). For example, the Major government managed to impose British leadership of NATO’s new Allied Rapid Reaction Corps ahead of Germany. It also found itself drawn into the consequences of the end of the Cold War. The British government initially sought to keep out of the impact of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, once the EU failed and the UN was left to pick up the pieces the UK initially deployed a token battalion to support the distribution of food and medicine. This gradually escalated and eventually the UK played a prominent part in the separation of BosniaHercegovina from Serbia in 1995. In 1999, the new Labour government under Blair’s leadership played a leading part in the Kosovo War which led to Kosovo also becoming separate from Serbia. Thus, the first decade of the 1990s proved quite advantageous once the UK had worked its way through the recession. For all its’ emphasis on

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NATO, the UK found that its military was more suited to the post-Cold War than most. Having abandoned conscription during the Cold War it was able to deploy its armed forces in a variety of contexts ranging from a major land and air contribution to the 1991 Gulf War in which a British division formed a key part of the US ‘left hook’ to peacekeeping operations ranging from Namibia to Cambodia and closer to home in the Balkans as a consequence of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the civil war that followed. Moreover, the creation of the Single Market and the increasing globalization suited core British economic interests and the United Kingdom was able to grow considerably. The relative dour recession years of the Major Government (1990–1997) was replaced by New Labour which appeared far more positive, far more international and far more at ease with itself. 2.2  From 9/11 to the Financial Crisis 9/11 had a considerable impact on British foreign, and more particularly security, policy. The attack on America included the highest loss of British life to a single terrorist incident since the attack on the King David Hotel in 1946. In many ways, the attack on the US and its values also represented an attack on Britain’s own values and in the immediate aftermath, the UK’s security relationship with the US deepened further. Britain helped push through NATO’s 12 September 2001 decision to invoke Article V and recognize the attack as an attack on all NATO members and then provided significant specialist capabilities in support of the initial attack on Afghanistan that led to the Taliban leaving Afghanistan temporarily. Under Blair, the British also participated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq having initially persuaded a skeptical US administration to go down the UN Weapon Inspector route. Not only did these two conflicts draw the UK much closer to the United States (see subsequent section), but it also encouraged the British government to reach out and (re-)invest in a number of non-European relationships. At least initially, significant attempts were made to court Vladimir Putin, old partnerships received renewed attention, as the UK found itself once again working alongside the likes of Australia and New Zealand and it was noticeable that the 2003 Defence White Paper mentioned a second special relationship. But there were some

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other surprises, for example, considerable attention was given to Japan while far-less attention was given the BRICS. At the same time, Blair’s initial enthusiasm for a more capable Europe, typified by the St. Malo Agreement, the Helsinki Declarations and the development of the EU Battlegroup concept soon waned, as progress appeared to be too slow. Rather NATO, and the mechanism of Berlin plus, was emphasized and the British government increasingly blocked moves toward passing further control from national governments to Brussels. For example, it repeatedly blocked proposals for an EU Operational Headquarters. That said, the UK initially pushed for the development of the European Defence Agency as a means of centralizing investment within fewer core states. The UK was also highly supportive of successive waves of NATO enlargement. More widely, British foreign policy continued to seek to develop and foster relations within the Global South, particularly with regard to Africa, where the Department for International Development (see Aid section) was particularly active. However, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with the UK’s ongoing role within the EU tended to absorb most of the capacity of Whitehall and the attentions of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. 2.3  From the Financial Crisis to Today By the time of the financial crisis, Gordon Brown had replaced Blair as prime minister. The impact of the sub-prime mortgage collapse was particularly felt by the United Kingdom’s banking sector which found itself exposed. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the British government felt forced to underwrite Britain’s banking sector and provide significant financial support through the part nationalization of a number of banks. Although this massively inflated the size of national debt it prevented further banks from going bankrupt. In the wake of the financial crisis, the incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government’s principal focus was on the growing current account deficit and maintaining Britain’s credit rating as a means to try and minimize the burden of debt interest. As a result, they implemented a major program of austerity as part of the 2010 CSR. For foreign policy, the official line was that there would be no strategic shrinkage in Britain’s global engagement. The reality was somewhat different, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office along with the Ministry of Defence

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were subject to significant cuts to their planned budget. Interestingly, the budget for the Department for International Development (see Sect. 3) was one of the few to be protected and aid funding increased reaching the UN target of 0.7% of GDP, as part of David Cameron’s policy of trying to make the Conservative Party appear more caring. Nevertheless, the new Foreign Secretary, Hague, sought to broaden the UK’s engagement, particularly with the so-called BRICS nations by undertaking a redistribution of posts and resources within the FCO away from Europe. As Prime Minister, Cameron put a considerable amount of effort into trying to cultivate Britain’s trading relations with China and India in particular, although neither became a significant market for British goods compared to Europe and North America. The government also sought to circumvent moves toward increasing Europe’s defense capabilities outside of NATO by developing its defense and security relationship with France. In 2010, Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy signed the London Declaration which put new vigor into this bilateral relationship which had fallen into abeyance after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. One consequence of this was the Anglo-French lead to the international involvement in Libya and the overthrow of the regime of Colonel Gaddafi. On the world stage the UK lost a number of important positions within various international organizations such as the UN and IMF. Support for the US decision to draw a line in the sand over the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime was undermined by a parliamentary vote against military action and Britain’s military credibility looked to have been further undermined. The subsequent Russian seizure of Ukraine raised further question marks about Britain’s credibility as one of the two security guarantors of Ukraine’s borders. In the subsequent mobilization of a Western response, the UK voice was noticeably absent as Obama led the US response while France and Germany led the response of Europe. More significantly, the subsequent use of a nerve agent by Russia against Sergei Skripal in 2018 in Salisbury further highlighted the relative isolation of the UK. Unlike 9/11, NATO did not make an Article V declaration, and the UK wisely did not seek to obtain support at this level. Instead, its close partners condemned the Russian action and imposed some sanctions. Perhaps the most significant foreign policy outcome for the UK resulted from Cameron’s decision to hold a referendum on the UK’s continuing membership of the EU. In response to demands from the SNP, he had earlier agreed to a referendum on Scotland’s continued membership of the

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United Kingdom, which resulted in a narrow majority of Scots electing to remain as part of the United Kingdom. As a way of appeasing an increasingly vociferous anti-EU group within his own party Cameron pledged to hold a referendum in the 2015 Conservative Party Manifesto. In the subsequent referendum, Cameron was defeated by a narrow majority with the UK voting to leave the EU. This led to Cameron’s immediate resignation and later his replacement, Theresa May, also resigned following repeated failures to get her proposed deal with the EU passed by parliament. Her successor, Boris Johnson, finally managed to get a revised deal agreed by Parliament in December 2019 and the UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020. In practice, little has changed so far because the agreed initial transitory period has left the UK abiding by all existing EU law but without a say in its subsequent development. How the UK-EU’s relationship will develop in the future still remains the subject of negotiation at the time of writing. To help set out what a British foreign policy might look like after the UK left the EU, May developed the strap line ‘Global Britain’ which Johnson has also used. What this means in practice is quite unclear. Under Johnson’s leadership, the UK has embarked on an integrated review of defense, foreign and aid policies. Where this will take Britain remains unclear.

3   Defence and Security Policy Since the end of the Second World War successive British governments identified the Soviet Union as the principal threat to Western Europe. As a result, they adopted a three-part strategy. First, they sought to bring the West European states in a collective defense arrangement, signing the Dunkirk Treaty with France in 1947, then enlarging this in 1948 by the inclusion of the Benelux countries and Italy into what eventually became the Western European Union. The second part was to tie the United States into the defense of Europe via the formation of NATO in 1949. As a consequence, since 1945 successive governments have consistently emphasized the United Kingdom’s close relationship with the United States which at times has been problematic domestically. The third part reflects the British experience of the Battle of France in May 1940 when the British elected not to send additional fighter squadrons to France. From this experience, the lesson was taken that, ultimately,

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no state will commit suicide for another. As a direct consequence, successive British governments concluded that the only way it could deter the Soviet Union was to develop and maintain its own nuclear capability. As a result, one of the first major post-war decisions of the Attlee government was to go ahead with developing an independent nuclear capability. Initially, a manned bomber force equipped with freefall nuclear weapons was developed. Following the repeal of the Mahon Act, the British elected to acquire Polaris submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from America. These, in turn, were replaced by Trident D5 SLBMs mounted on a new generation of submarine ordered during the Cold War but which entered service in the first decade after the Cold War. 3.1  From the End of the Cold War to 9/11 Immediately after the Cold War Britain made significant defense reductions, as evidenced in Fig.  12.1. The first defense review, ‘Options for Change’, published in 1990, essentially retained the same mix of overall capabilities but reduced the overall size of Britain’s forces. As a consequence, a good deal of older equipment was scrapped, and the UK continued to maintain relatively balanced forces. Some capabilities were lost, noticeably its tactical nuclear weapons and long-range surface to air missiles. However, the British armed forces initially required less adaptation than many of their European counterparts. National Service had been brought to an end in the early 1960s, and Britain already possessed armed forces that had already been fully professionalized. Moreover, the Britishled reforms to NATO’s Northern Army Group concept of operations appeared to suggest the British were more in tune with what was referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs. Further reductions followed in the 1994 ‘Frontline First: the Defence Costs Study’ (MOD, 1994). In this review there were two major decisions. First, there was an emphasis on joinery involving the creation of a Permanent Joint Headquarters, the development of the Joint Rapid Deployment Force consisting of its early intervention capabilities and a new Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre to help engage in new thinking about warfare. Second, it withdrew from a joint nuclear program with France to deliver a future air-launched system, and the UK chose to become the only permanent member of the UN Security Council with a single nuclear delivery system.

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Fig. 12.1  The UK’s annual proportional defense spending (% of GDP) compared to average European spending (1990–2018). (Source: World Bank)

In practice, the subsequent 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) would provide the rationale for ongoing changes to Britain’s armed forces (MOD, 1998). Drawing on its experiences from the 1991 Gulf War, the various commitments to the UN Balkan mission and the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland, the 1998 SDR adopted an expeditionary focus for Britain’s military with the assumption being that such deployments were likely to be some form of a repeat of the 1991 Gulf War or further deployments to the Balkans. In the immediate aftermath of the SDR, Britain’s armed forces found themselves committed to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo in 1999. Subsequently, the British military was deployed to Sierra Leone in May 2000, initially as part of services-assisted evacuation that ultimately became a larger mission in which British forces supported those of the Sierra Leone Government and UN in bringing an end to the civil war. The Sierra Leone operation became the template that the UK put forward for what subsequently became the EU Battlegroup model.

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3.2  From 9/11 to the Financial Crisis 9/11 had a profound effect on the defense dimension in four ways. First, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and operations elsewhere raised the profile of British Special Forces both within government and among the UK’s allies. As a direct consequence, they received a major uplift in their influence, funding and a significant expansion in their numbers and capabilities. Second, with the appointment of Geoff Hoon as Defense Secretary in 1999, those promoting defense transformation and the adoption of a British variant of Network Centric Warfare dubbed Networked Enabled Capability received significant support. The 2002 defense review ‘SDR: A New Chapter’ and the 2003–2004 ‘Delivering Security in a Changing world’ (MOD, 2002, 2003, 2004) embraced these new concepts in a way that the 1998 SDR had not and were based on the defense planning assumptions of Britain becoming involved in a series of small and medium small-scale operations that would require a speedy deployment, a short conventional phase and then the rapid reconstitution of British forces ready for their next deployment. As a consequence, the armed forces were again reconfigured. Third, both 9/11 and the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq led to a focus away from NATO and Britain’s European partners back toward the Five Eyes intelligence community together with Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Estonia. Thus, the Anglo-French initiatives that led to the Helsinki Agreement and the EU Battlegroup concept were not fully developed by the British and were left to the EU to manage and develop. Fourth, despite the planning assumptions of quick short wars in the defense reviews, in practice, Britain’s armed forces found themselves in two long drawn-out counter-insurgency campaigns. As a consequence, Britain’s conventional capabilities were allowed to atrophy as the requirements of fighting counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan took preference. In addition, a number of acquisition programs were also affected. 3.3  From the Financial Crisis to Today In 2008, the then Labour government, under the leadership of Gordon Brown, released the United Kingdom’s first National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2008). This document was produced by the Cabinet

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Office with little consultation with the other departments of state. It outlined a series of threats and challenges to the United Kingdom and little else. It was quickly replaced by a second version in 2009 which did involve cross-governmental consultation. Yet again, the document identified threats and challenges, but once again it failed to articulate any real measures to meet these issues other than to emphasize the importance of the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. As a direct result of this confusion and the failure of the British armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the idea that a ‘strategic vacuum’ existed in government policymaking emerged in 2009 (Cornish & Dorman, 2009). In opposition, the Conservatives had debated whether to change the British national security-making process. As part of its’ agreement to form a government, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition formed in 2010 announced the creation of a National Security Council, a new post of National Security Advisor and the development of a classified national risk register. The government also sought to ensure that future governments would regularly review defense and security policy by committing the government to undertake a defense and security review in every parliament. At the time, it was unclear whether this would be accompanied by a regular review of the UK’s National Security Strategy. In practice, the coalition government published the third National Security Strategy and an accompanying Strategic Defence and Security Review within a day of each other in 2010, and in 2015, the Conservative government produced a single publication combining the two (Cabinet Office, 2015). Theresa May’s decision to call for an early general election in 2017 has unpicked the fixed-term parliament act and the question has now emerged as to when the next defense and security review will be. Should it be in 2020 and thus follow the rolling five-year program of its immediate predecessors or should the new government produce a new NSS and SDSR in recognition of the UK’s changed circumstances brought about by Brexit? In their election manifesto, the Conservatives gave no indication when the next review would be undertaken. In contrast, the Labour Party called for a defense and a defense review but omitted to say whether there would also be a new NSS. The underlying conclusions of the 2010 NSS, SDSR and accompanying CSR were that the UK’s financial situation was precarious and that the country needed to embark on a major program of austerity in order to put the nation’s finances on a more secure footing. They also concluded that, with the withdrawal of British forces from Afghanistan planned for 2014

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(Cabinet Office, 2010: 15), there would be no major defense challenges to the United Kingdom in the immediate short term and that it could make cuts to the defense budget and use the next decade to reconfigure the UK’s armed forces to the challenges envisaged for 2020 and beyond. By the time of the 2015 NSS/SDSR review, the international landscape had changed quite significantly. Rather than having a decade to reconfigure its defense capabilities, the United Kingdom, like many of its European counterparts, was now confronted with a series of immediate challenges. The revised national risk assessment register identified both Russia and terrorism as immediate threats to the United Kingdom. The government pledged, therefore, to increase defense spending a little and, more importantly, committed to a number of defense programs based on the assumption of efficiency savings and utilization of funding within the ten-year program set aside to cover cost overruns. At its’ heart, the 2015 NSS/ SDSR re-emphasized the importance of NATO as a counterweight to Russia and as a central pillar of British defense and security policy. The review also stressed the United Kingdom’s global role and the importance of preserving the international liberal order. The 2017–2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR) followed on from the 2017 general election. Initially conceived as a minor update that would be financially neutral, the review struggled to come to terms with an over-heated defense program that also had to confront implementing the 2015 NSS/SDSR and the impact of the fall of the pound following the 2016 referendum to leave the EU. The review again repeated the various security challenges confronting the UK and its allies but did little more to really address them—the impact of Brexit simply consumed all the government’s bandwidth. As a result, the Defense Secretary, Gavin Williamson, argued that the defense element of the review should be dealt with separately under a Modernizing Defence Programme (MDP). This did little to rectify the problem, and instead, a temporary one-year fudge was agreed whereby defense received some additional funding and a number of programs were further delayed. With the replacement of May by Johnson and his subsequent success in the Autumn 2019 general election, he announced that a new defense and security review would be undertaken that would go further than any previous review.

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4   Development Cooperation Policy For Britain’s aid policy the three timeframes do not really apply. Rather the more definitive timelines run from the end of the Cold War to the election of New Labour under Tony Blair in 1997 which led to the creation of the Department for International Development (DfID). The next change was the formation of a coalition government in 2010 and the commitment to meeting the 0.7% of GDP target for aid, as shown in Fig. 12.2. This has become a leitmotif for successive governments and only now, under Boris Johnson, is this being seriously questioned as part of his integrated defense and security review. 4.1  From the End of the Cold War to New Labour Prior to New Labour’s election in 1997, aid policy had come under the auspices of the Overseas Development Administration which was overseen

Fig. 12.2  The UK’s annual proportional ODA spending (% of total GNI) compared to average DAC spending (1990–2017). (Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System)

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by the FCO.  In general, aid policy tended to provide support to Commonwealth nations. During this period, the relative spending on aid was relatively small and at times quite controversial with links made to a number of arms sales. In other words, aid was seen as a lever to gain economic advantage. For example, the ‘Pergau Dam affair’ involved the provision of £238m of aid money to Malaysia against the advice of civil servants in what, at the time, was Britain’s largest aid project. A subsequent High Court ruling in 1994 declared the payment illegal and the resulting scandal encouraged the then Major government to clean up its act on aid policy. That said, the financially constrained time of the early 1990s meant that the aid budget was generally kept at a relatively modest level in comparison to that which would follow under the subsequent Labour governments. 4.2  From New Labour to the Coalition Government Under New Labour the Overseas Development Administration was made a new department of state—the Department for International Development. In its charter, the department was given the mission of alleviating world poverty and not the support of British foreign policy, something which would cause much angst within government. In her first speech as head of DfID, Clare Short declared that the government supported the target of halving world poverty by 2015. At times, this set DfID at odds with British foreign policy, as it pursued its longer anti-poverty agenda in safer parts of the world. For example, there was a reluctance within DfID to invest in Afghanistan while fighting was still ongoing given its remit to invest aid funding where they could maximize poverty relief. In fact, in 2006 DfID, all but left Afghanistan just as the NATO mission expanded to the whole of the country under the command of a British general. It has also been seen to be controversial where DfID has provided aid to countries, who at the same time were engaging in major defense spending. The example most frequently cited was India which continued to receive funding despite having its own space program. It was noticeable that the issue of aid was an area in which Blair and Brown were in agreement and the first minister of DFID was given a fairly free hand to grow the new department. In the subsequent 13  years of New Labour government, DFID saw its budget rise substantially.

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Unusually, DFID did not grow substantially as a department of state. Instead, its’ modus operandi was generally to contract out aid by the use of consultants and by the distribution of aid spending to charities and international bodies to provide practical support. Partially as a consequence, Britain is home to some of the world’s leading charities such as Oxfam and Save the Children. This approach also reinforced the image that DfID was not acting in the national interest, and there were no camera images of food sacks with the Union Jack on them unlike USAid and the European Union. 4.3  From the 2010 Coalition Government to Today As leader of the Conservative Party David Cameron sought to put a more human, liberal face of his party. As part of this, he committed the party and subsequent coalition government to reach the 0.7% target for aid spending. In fact, this together with the 2% commitment to defense spending has been the consistent strapline of successive Conservative governments since 2015. It was noticeable that during the 2010 Spending Review this was one of the few areas of government spending, along with health and education, that was protected from major cutbacks that followed the imposition of austerity following the 2008 financial crisis. As a result, the United Kingdom remains one of the world’s largest providers of aid. Cameron’s successor continued this policy and the 0.7% and 2% strap line is perhaps most associated with her. In response to calls from within the Conservative Party to reform the UK’s £14.6bn aid budget, Johnson has returned DfID to the FCO, and the future aid policy is unclear.

5   Bilateral Relations Since the Second World War the US has consistently been the United Kingdom’s principal bilateral partner with an unusually close defense, intelligence and financial relationship. While the literature on the so-called special relationship and its’ relative merits is quite significant, a number of elements have remained consistent. First, the militaries of both states have an unusually close relationship. Second, there is a deep intelligence relationship with both states being part of the ‘Five Eyes’ community along with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Third, both states have a very close nuclear relationship. While much of the focus has been on the UK’s dependence on the US for the provision of a delivery system, few note that

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the interlinking is so deep that they share a common pool of Trident submarine-launched missiles. Fourth, in finance, both nations have a very close relationship. Both the London and New York Stock Exchanges are heavily interconnected as are many of the world’s global banks which are based in either London or New York. Lastly, they have significant cultural links partly assisted by the possession of a broadly common language. 5.1  From the End of the Cold War to 9/11 In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the British Prime Minister partly cajoled the US administration into confronting Saddam Hussein. The subsequent 1991 Gulf War saw the UK’s military forces play a significant supporting role to the US-led coalition, and it was a British division that was included in the decisive US flanking corps move rather than any of the US’s other partners. Nevertheless, within the British government, there was a real concern that the end of the Cold War might encourage the US administration of George H W Bush to favor other partners as the economic dimension took precedence over the security relationship. This situation was exacerbated by the Major government’s support for the re-election of George H W Bush. The incoming Clinton administration took exception to this support and there was a marked cooling in the relationship between the two heads of government. Moreover, they differed in their view over the fracturing of Yugoslavia and the British elected not to contribute to the US-led UN mission in Somalia. That said, the intelligence, defense and economic closeness largely remained in place, and the IT revolution brought the two stock exchanges closer together. Moreover, a succession of mergers in a number of sectors ranging from defense to finance reinforced the global nature of many of the large multi-national companies based in the US and the UK and interconnectivity. Having fallen out to a degree with the incoming Clinton administration, the Major government sought to develop the UK-French nuclear partnership quietly in the background. There was discussion about the development of a joint missile as a replacement for the existing air-launched systems that both countries had along with a number of other programs. There were also attempts by Major to repair the broken relationship with the US but this did not really fully repair itself until Major was replaced by the newly elected Tony Blair in 1997. Blair and Clinton had a particularly close relationship and ideologically saw things in quite a

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similar way. At the same time, Blair also sought to resurrect the floundering Anglo-French defense talks. In 1998 France and the United Kingdom signed the St. Malo Declaration which paved the way for the development of a European security and defense policy. Both worked closely together to try and bring a resolution to the Kosovo situation which eventually resulted in NATO engaging in a military campaign to persuade the Serbs to withdraw from Kosovo. In many respects, Blair’s first term as Prime Minister witnessed a renewing of a number of bilateral and multilateral partnerships. 5.2  From 9/11 to the Financial Crisis In many respects this period marked a highpoint in the so-called special relationship. Both 9/11 and the financial crisis highlighted the depth of the relationship at both the individual and the institutional levels. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the ‘special relationship’ deepened with a particularly close dynamic between Blair and George W Bush. Blair was Bush’s guest at the January 2002 State of the Union address and received the applause of Congress when Bush paid tribute to him. More significantly, at the April 2002 meeting at Bush’s residence at Crawford, Texas, the issue of Iraq was discussed, and over the following six months, it appeared that Blair had successfully managed to persuade Bush to follow the UN route with regard to Saddam Hussain and weapons of mass destruction, rather than a more independent route favored by the likes of Don Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. However, following a UN Security Council resolution and the deployment of weapons’ inspectors back to Iraq, the degree of compliance by the Iraqi regime became debated, and support for the US policy fractured with Britain supporting the United States while France Germany and Russia opposed the action. The subsequent invasion of Iraq in March 2003, which included a British division and significant air component, resulted in, among other things, a distancing in the Anglo-French defense relationship and a focus on the UK’s relationship with the US.  The 2003–2004 defense review ‘Delivering Security in a changing world’ adopted, as one of its planning assumptions, that the UK would not engage in any large-scale military operation without the involvement of the United States (MOD, 2003). Unfortunately for the UK, the hoped-for quick wars in Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be somewhat different. Instead, the British armed

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forces found themselves over-committed to two wars that exceeded their planning assumptions. In Iraq, the UK took responsibility for the southeast sector in and around Basra. Initially this seemed to be going far better than the US sector. However, the UK was unable to bring sufficient resources to bear to help turnaround the situation while public opinion at home grew increasingly hostile, as casualties mounted and no weapons of mass destruction were found. In a bid to leave Iraq without losing face, the Blair government proposed to lead the expansion of the NATO mission in Afghanistan to cover the entire country. Unfortunately, the UK was unable to withdraw sizeable force from Iraq and instead found itself engaging in two significant operations without the resources to sustain them. In the end, the British effectively admitted defeat in Iraq and pulled out much to the consternation of their American allies who were in the midst of surging forces into Iraq in a bid to help regain control. In Afghanistan, the US similarly had to bail out the British, and the credibility of British forces in the eyes of their American partners took a significant battering. 5.3  From the Financial Crisis to Today The 2008 financial crisis, that first began in America and spread, highlighted how interconnected Britain’s leading banks were with their US counterparts and how closely intertwined the respective nations’ financial markets were. As a consequence, the British government announced a series of bank bailouts that significantly raised the level of government debt and would ultimately lead to the 2010 Coalition government embarking on an austerity budget. At the same time, the UK’s withdrawal from initially Iraq and subsequently Afghanistan leaving the US still engaged in both conflicts caused significant damage to Anglo-American defense relations. This was made worse when the British House of Commons voted against military action against Syria over the use of chemical weapons. In a signal of US concern, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, spoke of France as America’s oldest ally. At the NATO Summit in Wales the following year, David Cameron sought to reassure the US government. He helped push through a commitment by the NATO allies to commit to spend 2% of GDP on defense. The UK also committed to the air campaign against Islamic State with a comprehensive vote in favor. This led to an improvement in the special relationship with the Obama administration. The subsequent election of Donald Trump has again raised questions. At

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the official desk officer level, relations remain close and the defense and intelligence relationship remains almost uniquely close. That said, there is some doubt within US official circles concerning the willingness of the British political class to take action. At the leader level, there has been friction. Leaks of the British Ambassadors’ cables home led to Trump demanding that the ambassador be replaced and, at times, Trump has also suggested that Nigel Farage be appointed to the post. The situation has been smoothed over but there is little doubt that the UK is finding the Trump administration difficult to work with. In 2010, the new coalition government sought to re-energize AngloFrench defense relations. Partly this was seen as ideological. In being opposed to further moves toward the EU developing its defense capabilities, the British government wanted to detach France. However, it was also practical. Both countries have comparable capabilities and a history of using military force. Their interests overlapped and both nations signed the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010 bringing both countries together in a number of defense areas, including the sharing of nuclear facilities as a mechanism to share the defense burden. While the level of subsequent cooperation has varied by area, the impetus behind it remains ongoing even with a change of leadership on both sides.

6   EU, Multilateral and Niche Diplomacy In terms of EU, multilateral and niche diplomacy, it is hard to know where to begin as far as the UK is concerned. Its’ two main partnerships until January 2020 have been the EU, which it has now left and NATO.  In addition, the Five Eyes intelligence partnership has quietly deepened throughout the post-Cold War period. Britain’s involvement with the Commonwealth continues to play an important role. The UK’s position as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council has meant that the UK had continued to play an active role within the UN. Other organizations which it is involved in include the G-7/8 and G-20 groups of nations, The Five Power Defence Arrangement in which the UK, Australia and New Zealand underwrite the defense of Malaysia and Singapore also continues and has deepened.

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6.1  From the End of the Cold War to 9/11 The UK has long sought to develop a web of alliances and partnerships to help secure its defense and economic prosperity. Its relationship with the EU and its various earlier incarnations has always been difficult. For successive British governments, the focus has been on economics, and they have not shared in the European dream of greater political union. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the Conservative Party began to fracture over the issue. In response to the Maastricht Treaty, a group of Conservative MPs rebelled against the Major-led Conservative government and temporarily lost the Conservative whip. In 1993, the European Research Group was formed and would start to cause problems for successive Tory leaders. Initially, the UK sought to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism by getting the pound to shadow the other currencies. However, this proved untenable and on Black Wednesday, the UK was forced to abandon this plan by the financial markets and ultimately opted out of the Euro. The irony for the UK was that with the creation of the Single Market the UK had achieved everything that successive generations of politicians in favor of EU membership had campaigned for. Further deepening of the social and political union was not something that had really been considered or wanted. Even the subsequent Blair government, while more sympathetic to some of the social dimensions, particularly with regard to workers’ rights, was reluctant to advocate any further deepening of the union and, thus, the UK stood out as the largest opponent of this. In the immediate post-Cold War world, the British government was active in ensuring that NATO remained in operation despite the fact that the reason for its creation—fear of the Soviet Union—no longer existed. Tying the US to the preservation of peace and security in Europe remained a key goal especially following the reunification of Germany. The UK managed to retain its influence through the position of a number of key positions within the organization, most notably Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and command of the new Allied Command Europe rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The UK supported the US case for the enlargement of NATO to the East and viewed these new members as potential allies in the internal politics of the organization and ongoing Franco-German demands for greater European autonomy. During the Kosovo War, the Blair government proved instrumental in moving the alliance forward and protecting its credibility by pushing for a potential ground offensive.

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6.2  From 9/11 to the Financial Crisis In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and especially after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Blair government’s support and engagement with the European Union diminished. The 2003 joint initiative with France to develop EU-wide Battle Groups represents the last attempt at getting the EU members to invest in their defense capabilities. After that, the British focus shifted toward closer alignment with the United States and the process of defense transformation. 6.3  From the Financial Crisis to Today The coalition government that came to power in 2010 was divided over the EU. On the one hand, the larger Conservative Party was split with an increasingly stronger and more vocal anti-EU group; on the other hand, the Liberal Democrats were fully supportive of the EU.  As mentioned above, to placate the anti-EU elements within his own party, Prime Minister Cameron looked to engage in more bilateral and multilateral partnerships with Britain’s European partners. The antagonism toward the EU within the Conservative Party remained a running sore for David Cameron, and in the wake of the successful Scottish referendum in which Scotland voted to remain part of the UK, Cameron decided to confront his opponents within the party. In a surprise to many, including the likes of Nigel Farage, the British electorate voted to leave the EU. In the three and a half years since the vote, the United Kingdom and the EU have sought to negotiate the manner of the UK’s departure from the EU. This still remains unclear what the eventual outcome will be. The renewed emphasis on defense relations has already been mentioned, added to this was the drive to develop additional networks with partners who were members of either or both the EU and NATO.  For example, the UK put a good deal of effort into cultivating the Nordic Group. Britain’s relations with Sweden deepened, helped by the acquisition of Hagglunds by BAE Systems. At the same time, in developing the Joint Expeditionary Force, the UK sought to draw in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Estonia. Interestingly, the first three became unofficial members of the Five Eyes community receiving far greater intelligence sharing than some of their NATO counterparts. Within NATO, the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan led to a renewed focus on NATO.  By the time of the 2015 National Security

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Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, NATO was once again center stage in Britain’s defense and security outlook (Cabinet Office, 2015). In the diplomacy surrounding the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, the United Kingdom, as one of the guarantors of Ukraine, found itself isolated as the US on the one hand and France and Germany on the other led the diplomatic response.

7   Conclusions In many respects, British foreign policy has remained consistent for centuries, as shown in Table 12.1. Its’ basic goals of a peaceful and stable Europe and the ability to trade globally have remained the same. Moreover, its’ mechanisms for achieving these goals, the role of an intricate web of alliances and partnerships, both formal and informal, has remained a constant. The consistent challenge for British foreign policy has been that, as a stasis power, it has been largely opposed to any change. It has not set out a grand vision for the way ahead of goals for where it would like to be, rather successive governments have recognized that the UK has been unduly favored and thus their goals have largely been about managing relative, rather than absolute, decline. Their success in doing this has been varied, and it is clear that, at times, the over-exuberance of prime ministers has put the United Kingdom in a difficult position vis-à-vis partners and opponents.

Table 12.1  Overview of foreign policy changes in the United Kingdom since 1990

Adjustment change Program change

Goal change

International orientation change

Instance change

Drivers and inhibitors

Refocus on global engagement 9/11 Rise of international development spending and creation of DfID Brexit

End of the Cold War Re-emphasis on Five Eyes security community Political leadership of successive prime ministers from Blair to May Societal/political demands, the rise of UKIP and the response of the within the Conservative Party

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Where British foreign policy heads in the future is unclear. The current Johnson administration has not yet negotiated its future relationship with the European Union while its wider vision for the United Kingdom has the strap line ‘Global Britain’, but there is little detail on what this actually means. Adding to this will be the consequences of the coronavirus which also remain unclear.

References Bale, T. (2016). The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron. Polity Press. Beesley, A. (2020). What Is Driving Sinn Fein’s Electoral Surge in Ireland? The Financial Times, February 10. https://www.ft.com/content/6449024a-4c1911ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5 Bernstein, G. L. (2004). The Myth of Decline: The Rise of Britain Since 1945. Pimlico. Cabinet Office. (2008). ‘The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world’, Cm.7,291. TSO. Cabinet Office. (2010). ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review’, Cm.7,948. TSO. Cabinet Office. (2015). ‘National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom’, Cm.9,161. TSO. Carrell, S. (2019). Sturgeon Demands Sottish Independence Referendum Powers After SNP Landslide. The Guardian, December 13. https://www.theguardian. com/politics/2019/dec/13/nicola-sturgeon-to-demand-powers-for-scottishindependence-referendum Chuter, A. (2019). UK Government to Launch ‘radical assessment’ of Britain’s Place in the World. Defense News, December 19. https://www.defensenews. com/global/europe/2019/12/19/uk-government-to-launch-radical-assessmentof-britains-place-in-the-world/ Cornish, P.  N., & Dorman, A.  M. (2009). Blair’s Wars and Brown’s Budgets: From Strategic Defence Review to Strategic Decay in Less than a Decade. International Affairs, 85(2), 247–261. Dorman, A.  M. (2009). Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone. Ashgate. MOD. (1994). Frontline First: The Defence Costs Study. HMSO. MOD. (1998). ‘The Strategic Defence Review’, Cm.3,999. TSO. MOD. (2002). ‘The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter’, Cm.5,566. TSO. MOD. (2003). ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper’, Cm.6,041. TSO. MOD. (2004). ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities’, Cm.6,269. TSO. Ross, E., Honwana Welch, G., & Angelides, P. (2017). Sierra Leone’s Response to the Ebola Outbreak: Management Strategies and Key Responder Experiences. Chatham House Paper.

CHAPTER 13

Conclusion: Grasping Foreign Policy Change Klaus Brummer and Kai Oppermann

1   Introduction Foreign policy change is as ubiquitous as it is hard to grasp. It is therefore hardly surprising that the literature offers a broad array of suggestions in terms of both the conceptualization of foreign policy change and its drivers and, albeit to a lesser extent, inhibitors. Turning first to the issue of conceptualization, on the one hand, there seems to be broad agreement in the scholarly literature that there is not just one monolithic type of foreign policy change but that differentiation is required. On the other hand, specific analytical constructs that seek to capture foreign policy change differ not only in terms of how they label the phenomenon under examination but also with respect to its scope. Regarding terminology, the literature refers to “change” (Gustavsson, 1999; Welch, 2005), “redirection” (Hermann, 1990), or “restructuring” (Rosati et al., 1994), among other things. Concerning the scope of the analytical constructs, some scholars

K. Brummer (*) Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany e-mail: [email protected] K. Oppermann Chemnitz University of Technology, Chemnitz, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7_13

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seek to capture all kinds of foreign policy change ranging from minor to major, while others zoom in only on the most far-reaching types of changes. For instance, Hermann (1990) covers the entire range by distinguishing between adjustment change, program change, goal change, and international orientation change (see also Rosati, 1994; Gustavsson, 1999). Conversely, Holsti (1982) focuses only on the most far-reaching kind of foreign policy change (“restructuring”) and introduces four different types of the latter, in form of isolation, self-reliance, dependence, and non-alignment diversification. Regarding possible drivers and inhibitors of change, it is fair to say that the former have received considerably more attention than the latter. That is, the ambition usually is to explain change rather than stability. In many instances, the latter is explained by default in the sense of the absence of drivers of change. Yet there are some exceptions, such as the works by Goldmann (1988) on “stabilizers” and Kleistra and Mayer (2001) on “barriers” which explicitly seek to conceptualize both change and stability. Regarding drivers of change, there seems to be a shared understanding in most studies that incidents of foreign policy change cannot be reduced to a single driver. Rather, the literature locates drivers and triggers of change on all of Waltz’ three levels of analysis, or “images,” pertaining to the international system, the domestic level, and the level of individual leaders (Waltz, 1959). More often than not, the identified independent and/or intervening variables are interwoven in rather complex multi-level models that seek to account for foreign policy change. In short, the literature on foreign policy change poses at least as many questions as it provides answers. Against this background, this edited volume pursues two interrelated objectives: first, it seeks to expand our understanding and enhance our grasp of foreign policy change. Key aspects in this regard are the categorization of change; the temporal distribution of episodes of change; and the frequency/commonality in which different types of change occur. Second, this volume seeks to identify not only the drivers of foreign policy change but also possible inhibitors of such processes. More specifically, rather than limiting itself to individual episodes of either major or more incremental redirections in a specific domain of a country’s foreign policy, this volume (a) identifies different types of foreign policy change (ranging from “small” to “big”); (b) examines changes within individual policy areas as well as, on the aggregate level, in a country’s general foreign policy orientation; and (c) takes on a

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comparative perspective by examining episodes of foreign policy change, or the latter’s absence, in almost a dozen countries. In the remainder of this concluding chapter, we first discuss key lessons and insights that can be drawn from the empirical chapters with respect to the volume’s two main objectives. Building on those insights, the subsequent section suggests several avenues for future research. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion.

2   Insights on Foreign Policy Change The key analytical goals of this edited volume pertain to getting a firmer understanding of (a) the concept of foreign policy change and (b) the drivers and inhibitors of this phenomenon. In this section, we draw general conclusions with respect to some of the foremost aspects and dimensions of foreign policy change, that is, types of change (Sect. 2.1), the temporal dimension of change (Sect. 2.2), and drivers and inhibitors of change (Sect. 2.3) that have been discussed in the individual country chapters. 2.1  Adjusting Types of Change The contributions to this edited volume show that all four of Hermann’s types of foreign policy change have occurred in Europe after the end of the Cold War. As expected, the less extensive types in form of adjustment change and program change have happened much more frequently than the more extensive types pertaining to goal change and international orientation change. However, instances of the latter have been identified as well. For example, Italy has evolved from a “security consumer” to a “security provider” (see the chapter by Coticcia and Vignoli in this volume). The Czech Republic has seen a “drastic redirection” of its foreign policy that took shape in the early 1990s (see the chapter by Kr ̌íž et al. in this volume). Finnish foreign policy has changed “quite fundamentally,” moving from a policy of neutrality and an era of “compulsory consensus” during the Cold War to a policy of active participation in Western institutions, in particular, the EU.  However, Finland can perhaps best be described as a case of “incomplete” international orientation change, with NATO membership not currently on the agenda and strong domestic contestation around its security policy (see the chapter by Raunio in this volume). Moreover, the case of Poland exemplifies the difficulties in

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arriving at common judgments about what counts as international orientation change. While Poland’s “return to Europe” and its move from “security consumer” to “security provider” suggest similarities to the cases of the Czech Republic and Italy, these changes are not seen as amounting to an international orientation change in the Polish case (see the chapter by Chappell in this volume). The other countries covered in this volume all display only less extensive forms of foreign policy change. The chapters on Germany, France, and the UK, in particular, give a strong sense that the overall pattern is one of foreign policy continuity with only incremental change. In all three cases, the continuities extend beyond the countries’ international orientation and also cover their foreign policy goals. French foreign policy, for example, has been marked by “an incremental pattern” of change, whereas its “overall goals [have] evolved relatively little” (see the chapter by Richter and Foucault in this volume). In the German case, “overwhelming foreign policy continuity” outweighs “incremental adjustments” (see the chapter by Mello in this volume). Although Brexit creates profound uncertainties going forward, the post-Cold War picture of the UK’s foreign policy goals and means up to now is also one of stability and consistency (see the chapter by Dorman in this volume). While goal changes have indeed occurred in other countries under study, for example, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands, foreign policy change clearly becomes rarer the more far-­ reaching it gets. In sum, the chapters to this volume display considerable qualitative differences across European countries with respect to the depth and extent of the foreign policy changes that they have undergone during the last 30  years. The puzzle, then, is how to account for the observed cross-­ country variation. It is perhaps unsurprising that all cases of international orientation changes have been directly traced back to the “external shock” (see the chapter by Coticcia and Vignoli in this volume) of the end of the Cold War. After all, the end of bipolarity represents a structural change of the international system that fundamentally alters the environment in which states conduct their foreign policies. What is less obvious, however, is why this system change has not led to similarly far-reaching foreign policy change in other European countries. In other words, given that all states covered in this volume are European states and therefore share a relatively similar foreign policy environment, changes in the structure of the international system are not well-placed to explain the observed variation in the extent of foreign policy change that these states have

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experienced. While some European states, above all the post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, will have been more directly affected by the end of the Cold War than other European states, it is still the case that this variation must primarily be explained either by non-structural factors on the international-level or by domestic-level factors. We will return to this issue in our discussion of drivers and inhibitors of change below. Moreover, the contributions to the volume also point to cross-country differences in terms of the quantity of foreign policy changes in different areas of foreign policy, specifically security and defense policy, foreign aid policy, and bi- and multilateral relations. This relates not only to whether one or more of these foreign policy fields have undergone change at all, but also whether there have been one or more changes of the same or different types (which adds a qualitative dimension) within a specific policy domain during the period under study. While it is difficult to generalize across the country chapters at this policy-specific level, the contributions to the volume point to numerous changes within the different foreign policy areas, both across and within the specified time periods. Only a few chapters have suggested that there have been changes in a country’s general foreign policy orientation, however, which could be understood as equaling Hermann’s international orientation change. One of the analytical challenges that emerges in this context concerns the relationship between changes at the level of specific foreign policy fields and changes in a country’s overall foreign policy orientation. In particular, this speaks to the question of when cumulative changes in specific domains amount to a broader change in foreign policy orientation. 2.2  The Temporal Dimension of Change This edited volume examines foreign policy in the post-Cold War period ranging from 1991 until 2019. This period has been divided into three “subperiods” covering: the end of the Cold War until the 9/11 attacks (1991–2001); subsequent developments until the European debt crisis (2001–2010); and developments since then (2010–2019). The two landmark events that have been selected to demarcate the different phases—9/11 and the European debt crisis—have certainly impacted the foreign policies in the countries under examination. The 9/11 attacks led to alterations particularly in the realm of security and defense, most notably in form of the expansion and intensification of foreign deployments of

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the armed forces. To some extent it also affected the realm of aid policy by forging closer links between military operations abroad and the allocation of aid to the countries in which a country’s military has been active, as has been suggested, for example, for the Netherlands (see the chapter by van Willigen in this volume). In turn, the debt crisis and the ensuing politics of austerity in most countries curtailed the funds available for defense procurements and the transformation of the military more broadly as well as for foreign aid. In some instances, it also had broader implications in that it led to a downscaling of a country’s international ambitions together with a refocusing on domestic projects, as most vividly exemplified by “menos Siria y más Soria” [Less Syria and more Soria] in the case of Spain (see the chapter by Barbé and Soler i Lecha in this volume). However, the discussions suggest that the initial landmark event in form of the end of the Cold War exerted an even more fundamental impact on European countries’ foreign policies than either 9/11 or the debt crisis. Most obviously, this holds true for countries from  the former “Communist bloc” such as the Czech Republic and Poland for whom the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up altogether new pathways for foreign policy (see the chapters by Kříž et al. and Chappell in this volume). In addition, most Western European countries have also been affected by the end of the Cold War—not least through the deepening of the European integration process to which the Treaty of Maastricht added a political dimension in the early 1990s. This has had implications for all countries covered in this volume, pertaining to all policy areas under examination. For instance, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP; initially: European Security and Defense Policy) has become the key framework for military engagements abroad for non-aligned countries such as Finland for whom NATO membership (at least for the time being) is still not  an option (see the contribution by Raunio in this volume) or for Belgium for which CSDP presents a more acceptable framework to engage with its former colonies than the United Nations (see the contribution by Joly and Haesebrouck in this volume). In addition, the EU has led to changes in countries’ aid policy (e.g., increased multilateralization), and it has also been an important driver for the creation or maintenance of “minilateral” formats such as the Visegrad group or the New Hanseatic League. Still, while 9/11, the debt crisis, and particularly the end of the Cold War have clearly triggered foreign policy changes, the chapters point to an array of additional instances of foreign policy change which cannot be

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associated with one of those events. For example, France suffered budgetary restrictions for the larger part of the 2000s, thus already prior to the debt crisis, which in turn left their mark on the country’s defense industry and, by implication, its defense policy (see the chapter by Richter and Foucault in this volume). In turn, for Poland, the Russian invasion in Ukraine in 2014 represents a critical event which has arguably exerted a much more fundamental impact on the country’s foreign, security, and defense policy than either 9/11 or the debt crisis (see the chapter by Chappell in this volume). The decision to leave the European Union is likely to have a similar fundamental effect on the future of British foreign policy (see the chapter by Dorman in this volume). 2.3  Drivers and Inhibitors In terms of the specific drivers of foreign policy change, the country chapters highlight many of the “usual suspects” concerning both international-­ level and domestic-level factors. The former pertain for instance to changes in the international system ushered in by the end of the Cold War or to external shocks such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 or the global financial crisis and the ensuing European debt crisis. The latter relate to the role of changes in the composition and ideological orientation of governments, societal pressures and demands, political failures and scandals, or the role of individual decision-makers, among other things. One of the patterns that emerge from many country chapters is that international and domestic drivers interact in triggering foreign policy change. This may play out in at least three different ways. First, international developments can create a permissive environment that enables domestic actors to initiate change. This can be seen, for example, in Denmark where the end of the Cold War made it possible for the Liberal Party to pursue its pre-existing agenda of a more active foreign policy (see the chapter by Larsen in this volume). Similarly, in Spain, the 9/11 terrorist attacks empowered Prime Minister Aznar and his government to pursue a more assertive anti-terrorism policy, at both the EU level and globally (see the chapter by Barbé and Soler i Lecha in this volume). Taking up Waltz’s (1959, pp. 231–233) distinction between “permissive” and “efficient” causes, international factors are the “permissive causes” and domestic factors the “efficient causes” of foreign policy change in these examples. Second, international factors can contribute to broader domestic changes, working together to produce foreign policy change. Examples

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are how the end of the Cold War became a catalyst of constitutional change in Finland, reshaping the division of competences in Finnish foreign policymaking (see the chapter by Raunio in this volume), and how it played a part in the transformation of the Italian party system, leading to Italy’s international orientation change in the 1990s. The dynamic here is more like a “causal chain” that runs from international drivers through a restructuring of the domestic-political arena to foreign policy change. Third, international pressures can be refracted by domestic politics to trigger foreign policy change. Cases in point are how the 2008 global financial crisis put pressure on the foreign aid budgets of several countries and how this made governments, for example, in the Czech Republic (see the chapter by Kr ̌íž et  al. in this volume) and Italy (see the chapter by Coticcia and Vignoli in this volume) implement policy changes, albeit with national twists. In these examples, domestic politics works mainly as an “intervening variable” between international causes of foreign policy change and the national shapes these changes take. What receives considerably less attention throughout the volume than the drivers of foreign policy change are the inhibitors of foreign policy change. This seems to reflect that the analytical deck is heavily stacked against the latter. For one thing, it is probably fair to say that change tends to attract more scholarly interest than the absence of change. For another, it is more straightforward to explore why something has happened than why something has not happened. While observations of foreign policy change are an obvious starting point to look for the drivers of that change, observations of foreign policy continuity can be due just as well to the absence of drivers for change than to inhibitors of change. Just like the relational view on power only recognizes power when it is used (see Lukes, 1974), inhibitors of foreign policy change come in sight mainly if such change is attempted but fails. This, however, tends to obscure the view on structural inhibitors of change that prevent changes to be sought in the first place. Methodologically, this bias against the study of the inhibitors of foreign policy change might be addressed by the greater use of counterfactuals in FPA (Lebow, 2018). Theoretically, veto player approaches in public policy can be useful to explain the capacity for foreign policy change across political systems and identify underlying domestic impediments to change (Oppermann & Brummer, 2018). Insofar as the contributions to the volume have identified inhibitors of foreign policy change, they have—in contrast to the drivers of

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change—been primarily located on the domestic-political level.1 For instance, the chapters point to consensus-seeking, bureaucratic inertia, budgetary constraints, and obstacles emanating from public opinion or a country’s strategic culture more broadly. The picture that emerges here is one in which international incentives and pressures suggest change, which is, however, held back by inhibiting factors on the domestic level. This dynamic is familiar from neoclassical realist works that show how domestic politics can intervene to prevent adequate state responses to changes in the international system (see, e.g., Schweller, 2004). Regarding both drivers and inhibitors, it is important to note, though, that none of the above-mentioned factors either necessarily leads to foreign policy change in case of the drivers or categorically precludes foreign policy change in case of the inhibitors. For instance, the discussion on Finland suggests that changes in the composition of government do by no means automatically lead to alterations in the country’s security policy due to efforts in seeking consensus across all parties nor that consensus-­seeking necessarily leads to stasis (see the chapter by Raunio in this volume). As already alluded to above, the main rationale underpinning the selection of the countries under examination was a quest for “homogeneity” in terms of the international decision-making environment within which they have been operating. While not all of the 11 countries have been EU members throughout the time period under examination, they certainly have all been located in the same geographical region. By extension, they have been facing similar systemic constraints and drivers of change. At the same time, the country chapters bring to the fore highly varied patterns of foreign policy change in terms of both quality (depth) and quantity (frequency) during the last three decades. Since the systemic influences have been very similar, the aforementioned variation must be attributed, in the main, to non-structural international- and domestic-level factors. Non-structural international drivers of foreign policy change are located in-between the unit and structural levels, on the interaction level of analysis (Wendt, 1999, pp. 145–150). The focus here is on international factors that cannot be deduced from the macro-structure of the international system, but speak to specific relationships, interdependencies, and vulnerabilities of particular states in the international system. Broadly speaking, the 1  An exception to this pattern is the Finnish case, in which Russian opposition has been shown to inhibit domestic debate about joining NATO (see the chapter by Raunio in this volume).

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country chapters identify two types of such non-structural international drivers that can have a differential impact on states in the same structural environment. The first type refers to international events that have particular repercussions for specific states. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this was the 2014 shooting down of flight MH17 over Ukraine and how it contributed to change in Dutch foreign policy (see the chapter by van Willigen in this volume). Another case in point is the particular impact of Brexit as a “game changer” for Spanish foreign policy, not least in the context of the Gibraltar issue (see the chapter by Barbé and Soler i Lecha in this volume). The second type covers a state’s particular, positive or negative, bilateral and multilateral relationships. For example, changes in the behavior of important NATO allies have been identified as drivers of foreign policy change both in the Czech Republic (see the chapter by Kříž et  al. in this volume) and in Belgium (see the chapter by Joly and Haesebrouck in this volume). Similarly, the behavior of Russia, in particular the 2008 war against Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, features as an important driver of change in both Polish (see the chapter by Chappell in this volume) and Czech (see the chapter by Kříž et al. in this volume) foreign policy, given the centrality of Russia for the two countries’ security environment. As for domestic-level factors, what is most notable is that the country chapters point to some drivers (as well as inhibitors) of foreign policy change which have hitherto received scant if any systematic attention in the field. Those are the specific role of leaders as change agents; financial issues; and failures or scandals. First, the chapters feature numerous episodes in which individual decision-­ makers (typically heads of governments or foreign ministers) have acted as “policy entrepreneurs,” thereby proving instrumental for changing their country’s foreign policy. To give but three examples: in the case of Spain, Prime Minister Aznar was crucial for moving the country’s foreign policy closer to the United States and the United Kingdom at the expense of its relations with France and Germany—a development which Aznar’s successor Zapatero deliberately tried to undo (see the chapter by Barbé and Soler i Lecha in this volume). In Italy, Prime Minister Berlusconi was responsible for a downgrading of multilateral institutions and a corresponding upgrading of bilateral relations, which better suited his preference for personal relationships with other leaders (see the chapter by Coticcia and Vignoli in this volume). Finally, on the level of foreign ministers, Louis Michel was crucial in formulating an “ethical foreign policy”

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for Belgium. While its impact on the substance of the country’s foreign policy remains a matter of debate, Michel’s ethical foreign policy at the very least led to changes in the style of the Belgium’s foreign policy (see the chapter by Joly and Haesebrouck in this volume). In any case, emphasizing the role of individuals in the realm of foreign policy should not come as a particular surprise since decision-makers are at the very core of the entire field of Foreign Policy Analysis (Hudson, 2005). Hence, they are also typically listed as one of the potential drivers of foreign policy change in the literature. However, more often than not, leader-­ specific variables are incorporated into multifaceted models of foreign policy change (e.g., Hermann, 1990; Gustavsson, 1999). As a result, those models render it all but impossible to ascertain potential independent effects of the idiosyncratic features and characteristics of leaders on foreign policy change. What is more, while acknowledging the importance of leaders in general terms, for instance with respect to cognition, perception, or risk propensity (e.g., Welch, 2005), the models tend to be rather vague as to what exactly it is about the leaders that is of consequence for explaining foreign policy change. By extension, the models offer little insight into how those characteristics can be empirically ascertained, and thus “measured,” in the first place. This state of the literature is mirrored in the analytical framework of this volume which relegates individual-level factors to an appendage in the discussion of domestic factors, limiting them to the cognitive dimension in terms of decision-makers’ perception of their environment from which an impetus of change can emerge. Having said that, the country chapters suggest that leaders can have a much more fundamental impact on foreign policy change. This relates not only to the initiation of change based on the perception of their environment but also, and arguably as fundamentally, to the substance of change (incl. its depth and extent), as well as the way foreign policy change is implemented in the domestic-political arena. We will return to this discussion of a more leader-oriented framework for grasping foreign policy change below. More broadly speaking, this focus on individual decision-makers serves as a useful reminder that drivers of foreign policy change can be ideational as well as material. While the large majority of drivers of change that come up in the country chapters refer to international-level or domestic-level material factors, for example the end of the Cold War or austerity, it is important to note that such aspects do not determine foreign policy change. Rather, they only work as drivers of change insofar as they come

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to be interpreted as requiring or enabling change. In fact, material and non-material factors will often be closely entwined in driving foreign policy change. For example, many contributions highlight the role of changing threat perceptions which have both a material (e.g., military capabilities) and a non-material (e.g., perceived intentions) dimension (Walt, 1987). Second, budgetary or financial issues have featured prominently in virtually every contribution to this volume. This is contrary to much of the scholarship on foreign policy change where such aspects are hardly discussed at all (e.g., Hermann, 1990; Gustavsson, 1999). Yet the country chapters in this volume suggest that they do play a key role. Importantly, budgetary issues can serve as both driver and inhibitor of change. Budgetary increases tend to expand a country’s room of maneuver and should therefore be seen primarily as a driver or enabler of foreign policy change. For instance, in the Netherlands, budgetary increases since 2017 have opened up new opportunities in the realms of defense procurement and development aid, thereby broadening the country’s range of international options and, by extension, paving the way for possible changes in its foreign policy (see the chapter by van Willigen in this volume). Conversely, tighter budgets—resulting for instance from an economic downturn or from deliberate political decisions such as to cash in on the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War—can cut both ways. On the one hand, they can trigger policy changes, for instance by requiring adjustments (i.e., reductions) in the number of recipients of foreign aid or, as has been reported in the case of France, a more general reprioritization of national interests (see the chapter by Richter and Foucault in this volume). On the other hand, budgetary constraints can lead to policy continuity, for instance when a lack of funding prevents structural transformations of the military, in turn limiting the extent to which a country can alter its security and defense policy, as has been shown, for example, for the Czech Republic (see the chapter by Kr ̌íž et al. in this volume). A similar problem has been identified for the Italian case where a lack of funding has impacted the transformation of the military in terms of interoperability and the reorganization of the force structure. Italy found a creative way out of this problem, however, at least with respect to its military deployments, by allocating “extra funds” for such operations which otherwise could not have been financed out of the regular defense budget (see the chapter by Coticchia and Vignoli in this volume). Moreover, it should be noted that budgetary changes can be indicators and results of foreign policy change as well as drivers or inhibitors of

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change. Such changes in foreign policy budgets may reflect changing foreign policy priorities and be the means through which decision-makers intend to implement foreign policy change. Along these lines, many contributions have flagged up budgetary changes as important components of foreign policy change, not least in their discussions of foreign aid. In fact, sometimes changes to foreign policy budgets, by all intents and purposes, are the foreign policy change decision-makers wanted to implement. This can be seen in the Finnish case, where a drastic cut in the development aid budget was the cornerstone of a policy shift initiated by an incoming center-­right coalition (see the chapter by Raunio in this volume). Finally, a number of chapters highlight the role of foreign policy failures in triggering foreign policy change. Insofar as such failures, perceived or real, become politicized or scandalized in domestic-political debate, they exert political pressure on foreign policymakers to be seen to initiate change (see Kruck et al., 2018). This has been demonstrated, most notably, for the Netherlands, which, among other things, initiated institutional changes with respect to military deployments abroad in response to Srebrenica. Also in the Netherlands, the diplomatic failure to generate support for ambitious plans for a European political community in 1995 led to a more pragmatic approach toward European integration, and critical reports on certain development projects motivated a re-think in Dutch aid policy (see the chapter by van Willigen in this volume). Interestingly, other contributions to this volume similarly point to aid policy as a field in which policy changes can be traced back to failures. For instance, in Belgium, the “white elephant scandal” pertaining to ill-­ conceived development projects led to both substantive (adoption of the first law on international cooperation) and organizational (restructuring of the bureaucracy in charge of aid programs) changes in aid policy (see the chapter by Joly and Haesebrouck in this volume). Similar developments are reported for the United Kingdom with the “Pergau Dam affair” (see the chapter by Dorman in this volume). In Italy, alleged failings in aid projects contributed to a sharp decrease in ODA and led to institutional adjustments by setting up an Agency for Development Cooperation in order to increase monitoring and oversight (see the chapter by Coticchia and Vignoli in this volume). These examples suggest that aid policy might be particularly prone to policy changes that originate in the politicization, or indeed scandalization, of inefficient uses of resources, mismanagement, and corruption.

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The second area of foreign policy for which the contributions have identified multiple cases of failure-induced change concerns military interventions. These extend beyond the aforementioned case of Srebrenica in Dutch foreign policy and include, for example, the withdrawal of Belgian troops from UNAMIR in Rwanda, which led to a parliamentary inquiry that drew up a list of principles for future military deployments and ultimately resulted in redirecting Belgium’s engagement in international military missions from the UN to NATO (see the chapter by Joly and Haesebrouck in this volume). In Spain, the fallout over the 2003 Iraq war not only contributed to a change in government but also led to greater parliamentary scrutiny of military deployments (see the chapter by Barbé and Soler i Lecha in this volume). The failures of the British armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, in turn, contributed to the decision to establish a National Security Council and a National Security Advisor (see the chapter by Dorman in this volume). As a final case in point, Poland’s Iraq experience, at least for a time, muted its Atlanticism, and the disappointing results of its military engagement in Afghanistan led to a reassessment of Poland’s participation in crisis management operations (see the chapter by Chappell in this volume). Given the often high domestic salience of decisions about the use of military force, foreign deployments of armed forces that come to be seen as failures, in particular involving losses of life, will likely become highly politicized in domestic politics, resulting in strong political pressures for foreign policy change.

3   Avenues for Future Research The insights and findings from the empirical chapters of this volume presented in the previous section point to several avenues—both conceptual and empirical—for future research. Specifically, they concern the classification of specific episodes of foreign policy change; typologies of the drivers (and inhibitors) of foreign policy change; the interaction between different drivers and the promise of a leader-oriented perspective; moving beyond state-centrism in analyzing foreign policy change; a theoretical dialogue with approaches in public policy; and exploring the drivers and inhibitors of foreign policy change in non-Western settings. First, the chapters of this edited volume have illustrated that placing specific episodes of foreign policy change within Hermann’s typology (or within any other of the available alternatives for that matter) is quite challenging. By definition, there is no clear “cut-off” between Hermann’s four

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“graduated levels” of change, which can be seen as representing a continuum ranging from very little to far-reaching policy adjustments. The boundaries between the different types of change are fluent. Against this background, Hermann himself conceded that “reliable empirical differentiation is not always easy” (Hermann, 1990, p. 6). In addition, the chapter authors have employed several other descriptors of change, such as “transformations,” “paradigm changes,” “adaptations,” or “reprioritizations,” whose connection to Hermann’s categories remains open. Therefore, future efforts in typologizing foreign policy change should come up with a set of more concise indicators (as well as measures of those indicators) for the different types of change so that categorizations of empirical episodes can build on firmer conceptual foundations. Such efforts would also have to grapple with the following two questions which evolve around the distinctions between words and deeds, as well as style and substance. That is, can we already speak of foreign policy change when countries alter their policies in writing (e.g., by adapting strategy documents) or must there be observable empirical implications of such declarations on the behavioral level in order to qualify as change? Similarly, when countries or leaders change the style of their policies or rhetoric, does this already qualify as change or must there be accompanying changes in the actual substance of policies? Second, the country chapters have identified a wide—and quite bewildering—range of drivers of foreign policy change. What emerges is a long “laundry list” of possibly relevant factors which limits the scope for cross-­ country comparisons and theory-guided analysis. Future research should therefore work toward typologies of such drivers which reduce empirical complexity and enable more general insights into the conditions under which they are more or less powerful. For this purpose, it might be useful to complement the levels of analysis that have guided the contributions to this volume with two further dimensions. For example, as already mentioned above, international and domestic drivers of change can be material and ideational. Moreover, they can be structural or agency-centered. Thinking about the drivers of foreign policy change along these three dimensions—levels of analysis, material/ideational, and  structure/ agency—might offer a first cut at systematizing our knowledge about the causes of foreign policy change. Third, in terms of the three levels of analysis more specifically, the interaction of, and causal connection between, factors on the international, domestic, and individual levels remains an open question. In a sense, many

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conceptual frameworks of foreign policy change resemble neoclassical realism: they highlight international stimuli that have to be filtered through intervening factors located on the domestic or individual level in order to produce a specific outcome, that is, foreign policy change. However, which specific intervening variable (or variables and their interaction) is of relevance in which specific situation remains an open question, both in the conceptual literature on foreign policy change and in the empirical chapters of this volume. One possible alternative way of approaching foreign policy change would be to put individual leaders front and center. As indicated above, somewhat surprisingly the idiosyncratic features and characteristics of leaders have received limited attention in the literature on foreign policy change. At the same time, any decision to redirect a country’s foreign policy (or to continue course for that matter) is necessarily be taken by individuals, rather than by abstract “domestic institutions” or the even more abstract “international system.” Similarly, while opening up certain ways of action and foreclosing others, the effects which emanate from domestic institutions and the international system do not determine specific foreign policy decisions. Instead, leaders have to apperceive as well as navigate the domestic and international opportunities and constraints, and they do apperceive and navigate them differently. The chapters contained in this edited volume offer ample illustrations for this. A leader-oriented framework for foreign policy change puts individual decision-makers in the center of the analysis without ignoring domestic or international factors, though the latter become meaningful only “through the eyes” of the leaders. One possibility for such a framework conceptualizes foreign policy change as a result of the interplay of leaders’ beliefs and leadership traits. Leaders’ beliefs are key for diagnosing situations (e.g., international developments) which may not only point to the need for change but also prescribe the substantive direction which such change should take. Building on this diagnosis, leaders’ traits offer insights into how they go about implementing change in the domestic-political arena, for instance with respect to how they will handle constraints (such as veto players) that will almost inevitably arise in any process of foreign policy change. In terms of conceptual tools, Operational Code Analysis can be employed to ascertain leaders’ beliefs, and Leadership Trait Analysis offers itself to establishing leaders’ traits (for details, see Brummer, 2019). Fourth, research should move beyond its current state-centric perspective which explores foreign policy change more or less exclusively for state

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actors. Earlier research has already shown that membership in international organizations can trigger foreign policy change (e.g., Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014). In this volume, the case of Italy, for example, identifies the “downloading” of norms and procedures from international organizations as a driver of change (see the chapter by Coticcia and Vignoli in this volume). In addition, though, international organizations have become foreign policy actors in their own right. The European Union offers the most notable but by no means sole example. This development raises a host of conceptual questions, such as: is foreign policy change in international organizations driven, or impeded, by the same factors that drive or impede foreign policy change in states? When the foreign policy of an international organization changes, to what extent do the foreign policies of its member states (have to) change as well, and vice versa? Who are the key change agents: bureaucrats working for the organization or member states who seek to “upload” their policy preferences to the organization? Do “minilateral” formats within international organizations (such as the New Hanseatic League within the European Union) render foreign policy change more or less likely? Future research on foreign policy change should seek answers to those questions. Fifth, future research into foreign policy change can benefit from a closer dialogue with theoretical approaches in public policy. In fact, questions of policy change and stability are never far from the surface in many of these approaches (see the contributions in Brummer et  al., 2019). Notable examples include the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which emphasizes the role of shared beliefs between the members of broad coalitions of policy advocates in producing long-term policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007); the Multiple Streams Approach which theorizes how the “coupling” of policy problems, policy proposals and politics can create windows of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to initiate change (Kingdon, 1995); Punctuated Equilibrium Theory which expects patterns of long-term stability and incremental change, interspersed with large and sudden policy shifts (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993); Veto Player approaches which explain policy stability and change as the result of more or less restrictive veto player constellations (Tsebelis, 2002); historical institutionalist arguments about “path dependencies” (Pierson, 2000); and scholarship that explores the dynamics of policy diffusion (Shipan & Volden, 2008), learning and transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000) in producing policy change. While not without theoretical and empirical challenges, integrating findings of these and other public policy approaches on

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the patterns, mechanisms, drivers, and constraints of policy change into the study of foreign policy change holds considerable promise. Finally, future theory-driven research should systematically explore similarities and differences in the drivers and inhibitors of foreign policy change across different decision-making environments. Like most of the existing works on foreign policy change, this volume also examines this phenomenon for Western countries. While not overplaying the differences between Western and non-Western countries (or the similarities between the countries within the respective groups  for that matter), many non-­ Western countries do operate in at times very different decision-making environments. Moreover, states exhibit often significant differences in terms of political stability, state strength, state capacity, and so forth (Brummer, 2021). Against this background, it would be worthwhile exploring whether the international, domestic, and individual factors that have been identified in this volume play out differently in non-Western decision-making environments and whether non-Western settings feature alternative drivers and inhibitors of foreign policy change (for instance, transnational ones) in the first place.

4   Conclusion Grasping foreign policy change remains a theoretical and empirical challenge. It continues to be “work in progress.” We have started this concluding chapter with the observation that existing scholarship poses numerous questions. This edited volume has tackled many of them. More specifically, the country chapters provide an intriguing inventory of foreign policy changes in 11 European countries since the end of the Cold War and point to a diverse range of international, domestic, and individual-­ level drivers—and, to a lesser extent, inhibitors—of these changes. At the same time, the contributions focus attention on existing limitations in the state of the field, in particular regarding the empirical classification of specific cases of foreign policy change and the theoretical understanding of how different drivers—and inhibitors—of change on different levels of analysis interact to produce foreign policy change or stability. If anything, the volume puts the finger on the difficulties in analyzing foreign policy change, but also signposts promising avenues for future research. In other words, it shows how complex, but also how rewarding and relevant research into foreign policy change is.

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In the current international context, sustaining—and reinvigorating— this research agenda seems particularly important. While the post-Cold War international structure has long increased most states’ leeway for foreign policy change, one can point to a number of more recent international and domestic developments that seem to make such change even more pertinent. Internationally, these include power realignments and the rise of new power centers, the crisis of global governance, the increasing salience of non-state actors, and “new” or non-traditional foreign policy issues, such as climate change and global health, as well as the worldwide spread of new technologies. Domestically, points in case are widespread patterns of political dealignment and realignment, the rise of populism, the politicization of foreign policy, and the diversification of foreign policy actors, to name but a few. For European states specifically, the rapid succession of multiple crises of European integration and in Europe’s immediate neighborhood over the last decade—just to mention the Euro crisis, Ukraine, Syria, the refugee crisis, and Brexit—only reinforces the sense that the parameters of foreign policy are in constant flux. Looking back, it may well be that Covid-19 and its impact, for example, on national financial resources, the cohesion or polarization of societies, the priorities of governments, the international image and reputation of countries as well as the worldview of decision-makers will stand out as another major driver of foreign policy change, on a par with previous “critical junctures” in the post-Cold War era, such as 9/11 or the global financial crisis. Be that as it may, understanding foreign policy change is set to remain a key part of understanding foreign policy more broadly.

References Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. University of Chicago Press. Blavoukos, S., & Bourantonis, D. (2014). Identifying Parameters of Foreign Policy Change: An Eclectic Approach. Cooperation and Conflict, 49(4), 483–500. Brummer, K. (2019, June). Role Entrepreneurs: Leaders, National Role Conceptions, and Foreign Policy Redirection. Paper presented at the 6th European Workshops in International Studies (EWIS). Brummer, K. (2021). Advancing Foreign Policy Analysis by Studying Leaders from the Global South. International Affairs, 972), 405–421.

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Brummer, K., Harnisch, S., Oppermann, K., & Panke, D. (2019). Foreign Policy as Public Policy? Exploring Promises and Pitfalls of Public Policy Approaches for Foreign Policy Analysis. Manchester University Press. Dolowitz, D. P., & Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making. Governance, 13(1), 5–24. Goldmann, K. (1988). Change and Stability in Foreign Policy. The Problems and Possibilities of Détente. Harvester Wheatsleaf. Gustavsson, J. (1999). How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change? Cooperation and Conflict, 34(1), 73–95. Hermann, C.  F. (1990). Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 34(1), 3–21. Holsti, K.  J. (1982). Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World. George Allen & Unwin. Hudson, V.  M. (2005). Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), 1–30. Kingdon, J.  W. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd ed.). Longman. Kleistra, Y., & Mayer, I. (2001). Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs. Modelling Policy and Organizational Change. Cooperation and Conflict, 36(4), 381–414. Kruck, A., Oppermann, K., & Spencer, A. (Eds.). (2018). Political Mistakes and Policy Failures in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan. Lebow, R.  N. (2018). Counterfactuals in Foreign Policy Analysis. In C.  Thies (Ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis (Vol. 1, pp. 259–273). Oxford University Press. Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A Radical View. Palgrave Macmillan. Oppermann, K., & Brummer, K. (2018). Veto player approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis. In C. Thies (Ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis (Vol. 2, pp. 807–824). Oxford University Press. Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251–267. Rosati, J.  A. (1994). Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring: The Politics of Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy. In J. A. Rosati, J. D. Hagan, & M.  W. Sampson III (Eds.), Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change (pp. 221–261). University of South Carolina Press. Rosati, J.  A., Hagan, J.  D., & Sampson, M.  W., III. (1994). Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change. University of South Carolina Press. Sabatier, P., & Weible, C. (2007). The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications. In P.  Sabatier & C.  Weible (Eds.), Theories of the Policy Process (pp. 189–222). Westview Press. Schweller, Randall L. (2004). Unanswered Threats. A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing. International Security, 29(2), 159–201.

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Shipan, C.  R., & Volden, C. (2008). The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion. American Journal of Political Science, 52(4), 840–857. Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. Walt, S. M. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University. Waltz, K. N. (1959). Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis. Columbia University Press. Welch, D. A. (2005). Painful Choices. A Theory of Foreign Policy Change. Princeton University Press. Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press.

Index1

A Adjustment change, 4, 16, 42, 67, 85, 88, 92, 94, 120, 148, 174, 199, 200, 208–210, 212, 227, 255, 277, 312, 313 Afghanistan, 26, 32, 34, 57, 58, 77, 80–82, 84, 86, 89, 90, 106, 134, 141, 160, 164, 169, 174, 175, 180, 185, 195, 197, 201, 211, 217, 240, 247, 250, 276, 290, 291, 296, 297, 300, 303, 304, 307, 324 African Union, 137 Argentina, 7, 274 Australia, 7n2, 288, 290, 301, 305 Aznar, José María, 261, 262, 264, 265, 269, 271, 272, 274, 276–279, 317, 320 B Babiš, Andrej, 64, 65 Bahrain, 145

Balkenende, Jan Peter, 211 Baltic, 58, 77, 90, 112, 114, 171, 241, 251 Barents, 118 Belarus, 247 Belt and Road, 198 Berlusconi, Silvio, 192–194, 196–200, 320 Blair, Tony, 299, 302 Bosnia, 32, 58, 143, 162, 162n9, 214, 240, 289 Brazil, ix, 159, 169, 173, 261 Breuning, Marijke A., 8 Brexit, ix, 90, 213, 226, 252, 272, 277, 297, 298, 308, 314, 320, 329 Brown, Gordon, 291, 296 Burundi, 36, 40 Bush, George W., 8, 26, 40, 62, 81, 164, 170, 197, 276, 302, 303 C Cambodia, 163n10, 290 Cameron, David, 292, 301, 304, 307

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. K. Joly, T. Haesebrouck (eds.), Foreign Policy Change in Europe Since 1991, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68218-7

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334 

INDEX

Cameroon, 141 Catalonia, 260, 262, 272, 279 Central African Republic, 144, 241 CFSP, see Common Foreign and Security Policy Chad, 134, 240 China, 2, 8, 41, 50, 52, 53, 60, 62, 63, 144, 145, 164, 169, 171, 195, 198, 207, 211, 218, 292 Chirac, Jacques, 136 Cimoszewicz, Wlodzimierz, 250 Clinton, William Jefferson, 8, 62, 90, 302 Colombia, 169 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 77, 101, 103, 117, 119, 120, 145–146, 211 Common security and defense policy (CSDP), xiv, 33, 103, 105, 117, 119, 120, 236, 241, 244, 252, 254, 316 Congo, DRC, 29n3, 30, 33, 40–42, 44, 241 COVID-19, 39, 131, 159, 260, 270, 278, 287, 329 Crimea, 112, 118, 161, 166, 171, 174, 198, 218, 234, 238, 240, 308, 320 CSDP, see Common security and defense policy Cyber security cyber, 107, 171, 184, 224, 238, 239, 243 D D’Alema, Massimo, 197 Desert Storm, 50, 186, 209 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 35, 109 Djibouti, 137, 144

E Eduskunta, 102, 104–107 Egypt, 141, 169 Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe, 76, 80, 92 El Salvador, 169 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, ix, 8, 12, 276 Estonia, 84, 90, 296, 307 Ethiopia, 109n10, 214, 247 EU Battlegroup, 244, 291, 295, 296 Euro crisis, 116 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), 270 European Intervention Initiative (EI2), 137 European Union Force (EUFOR), 29n3, 33, 35, 58, 241 European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), 58 European Union Training Mission (EUTM), 58, 165 F Financial crisis, 52, 59, 63, 64, 67, 160, 180, 188, 195, 199, 212, 226, 260, 262, 268, 291, 301, 304, 317, 329 Fischer, Joschka, 158, 173 Four cornerstone, 74, 75, 78 Fragile states, 39, 40, 86, 88, 89, 222 Frederiksen, Claus Hjort, 75 Fukushima, 160 G Gabon, 137, 144 Gaddafi, Muammar, 197, 198, 200 Gambia, 270 García-Margallo, José Manuel, 270 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 158 Georgia, 198, 238, 247, 256, 320

 INDEX 

Gibraltar, 272, 278, 320 Goal change, 4, 66, 88, 92, 93, 119, 174, 186, 208, 226, 254, 308, 312, 313 González, Felipe, 261, 271 G7, 145 G-20, 272, 305 Gustavsson, J., viii, viiin1, 3, 10, 14, 311, 321, 322 Guttenberg, Karl-Theodor zu, 160 H Halonen, Tarja, 121 Havel, Václav, 51, 66 Herfkens, Eveline, 221 Hermann, Charles, viii, 3, 4, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 78, 119, 147, 181, 186, 205, 226, 311, 315, 321, 322, 324 I Implementation Force (IFOR), 57, 240 India, 144, 159, 169, 173, 211, 292, 300 Indonesia, 115n19, 144, 169 International Monetary Funds (IMF), 221, 289, 292 International orientation change, 50–51, 60, 63, 66, 119, 174, 183, 205, 208, 308, 312, 313, 315, 318 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 32, 34, 57, 106, 164, 195, 197, 216, 217, 240, 247 Islamic State, 218, 265, 304 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 42, 43, 92, 144, 165, 241 Israel, 6, 13, 14, 53, 58, 144, 172 Ivory Coast Côte d’Ivoire, 137, 144

335

J Japan, 6, 144, 162, 173, 195, 291 Johnson, Boris, 293, 299 K Kaczynski, Lech, 251 Kekkonen, Urho, 99 Kenya, 7, 109n10, 247 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 34, 57, 58, 106 Klaus, Václav, 52, 66 Koenders, Bert, 221 Kohl, Helmut, 157, 162, 163, 171, 173, 271 Kok, Wim, 214 Kosovo, 6, 32, 34, 58, 62, 81, 83, 106, 115n19, 143, 163, 164, 195, 197, 209, 289, 295, 303, 306 Kuwait, 145, 162 Kyrgyzstan, 247 L Laya, Arancha González, 263 Least developed countries (LDC), 39, 40, 245 Lebanon, 32, 34, 169, 181n2, 185, 195, 201, 240, 247, 265 Libya, 34, 78, 134, 146, 164, 180, 185, 197–200, 218, 240, 292 Lisbon Treaty, 118, 211, 225 M Maastricht Treaty, 91, 145, 306 Macierewicz, Antoni, 239 Malaysia, 144, 300, 305 Mali, 34, 58, 134, 144, 165, 215, 218, 270 May, Theresa, 293, 297 Merkel, Angela, 156, 164, 172

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INDEX

Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 37, 59, 115, 221, 248 Minilateralism minilateral, 128, 142–145, 147, 316, 327 Moldova, 247 Monti, Mario, 194 Moratinos, Miguel Ángel, 274 Morocco, 141, 260, 264, 267, 270, 272, 273, 276–278 Myanmar, 247 N Namibia, 290 Nečas, Petr, 52, 65 Nepal, 26, 109n10, 287 New Zealand, 290, 301, 305 Niger, 134, 180 Nigeria, 144, 270 Nordic cooperation, 78, 91, 93, 112–114, 120 Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), 114 Northern Ireland, 287, 295 Norway, 114, 169, 224, 296, 307 Nuclear, 7, 14, 57, 83, 129, 131, 132, 135, 146, 148, 159, 160, 173, 210, 225, 239, 294, 301, 302, 305 O Obama, Barack H., 8, 10, 27, 40, 43, 62, 170, 173, 250, 292, 304 Olszewski, Jan, 237 Operation Barkhane, 137 Operation Enduring Freedom, 57, 164 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 50, 52, 74, 80, 104, 105, 114, 118, 210

P Pakistan, 211 Palestine, 196, 247 Paris Declaration, 37, 222 Peace dividend, 28, 43, 55, 215 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 137, 225, 244 Peru, 169 Prodi, Romano, 193 Program change, 4, 68, 79, 92–94, 119, 174, 208, 209, 212, 308, 312, 313 Pronk, Jan, 219 Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, 327 Q Qatar, 145 R Rajoy, Mariano, 262 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 75–77, 79, 81 Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup, 76 Rosati, Jerel A., 4, 5, 9–13, 311 Rusnok, Jiří, 52, 64 Russia, viii, 2, 8, 15, 52–55, 60, 62, 67, 93, 99, 101, 103, 111, 111n12, 112, 114, 116–118, 120, 121, 145, 147, 149, 164, 171, 174, 197, 198, 211, 218, 233–239, 247, 250, 255, 292, 298, 303, 308, 320 Rutte, Mark, 212 Rwanda, 7, 29, 36, 40, 42, 43, 220, 324 S Sahel, 137, 137n4, 179, 223, 265, 277

 INDEX 

St Malo Agreement, 291 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 131 Saudi Arabia, 145, 266 Sauli Niinistö, 118 Schlüter, Poul, 76 Schröder, Gerhard, 156, 157, 164, 173 Senegal, 137, 144, 247, 270 Serbia, 62, 115n19, 289 Stabilization Force (SFOR), 57, 240 Stabilization Force Iraq (SFIR), 217 Sierra Leone, 287, 295 Sikorski, Radosław, 240, 250, 251 Singapore, 144, 305 Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, 237 Sobotka, Bohuslav, 52, 64, 65 Somalia, 29, 58, 163n10, 181, 220, 302 South Africa, 7, 141, 144 South Korea, 144 Srebrenica, 209, 214, 227, 323, 324 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 158, 158n6 Sudan, 7, 165, 220 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), 39, 223 Sweden, 99, 101, 108n9, 114, 117, 120, 169, 236, 246, 307 Syria, 35, 42, 43, 54, 77, 83, 90, 162, 165, 169, 175, 218, 239, 241, 262, 304, 316, 329 T Taiwan, 171 Tajikistan, 247 Tanzania, 109n10, 247 Thorning-Smith, Helle, 82 Transnistria, 247 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), 100, 101

337

Trump, Donald, ix, 2, 8, 10, 40, 85, 90, 93, 119, 166, 170, 173, 250, 273, 304 Turkey, ix, xviii, 8, 12, 143, 276 Tusk, Donald, 238 U Uganda, 247 Ukraine, viii, 54, 62, 67, 104, 112, 118, 161, 171, 218, 225, 228, 236, 238, 239, 241, 242, 247, 253–256, 292, 308, 317, 320, 329 United Arab Emirates, 137, 145 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 109, 223 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 195, 265 United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 109 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA), 34, 58, 165, 215, 218 UN peacekeeping operations (UNPO), 29, 30, 34, 57, 100, 195n27, 209, 214, 252 United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 57, 162, 162n9, 163, 163n10, 214 V van Mierlo, Hans, 207 Van Rompuy, Herman, 32, 41, 44 Venezuela, 213, 260, 264, 274, 277, 278 Verhofstadt, 31, 32, 40, 41, 44 Veto Player, 327 Vietnam, 7, 109n10, 144

338 

INDEX

Visegrad, 50, 52, 253, 254, 316 von der Leyen, Ursula, 158, 172

Y Yemen, 165, 266

W Walesa, Lech, 51, 237 Welch, D., 7, 9, 11, 12, 311, 321 World Trade Organization (WTO), 145, 156, 207

Z Zaorálek, Lubomír, 52, 62, 65 Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez, 262, 265, 272, 275 Zeman, Miloš, 52, 66