Imperial America: American Foreign Policy Since 1898 0155408968, 9780155408968

Citation preview

Imperial America American Foreign Policy Since 1898

THE HARBRACE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

Imperial America American Foreign Policy Since 1898

Lloyd C. Gardner Rutgers University

Under the General Editorship of John Morton Blum, Yale University

HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC. New York Chicago San Francisco Atlanta

Frontispiece: 1904 Cartoon, The American Imperial Eagle by Joseph Keppler, The Granger Collection ©.1976 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ISBN: 0-15-540896-8 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 75-35326 Printed in the United States of America Copyrights and Acknowledgments Fa b e r a n d f a b e r l t d for a selection from "Burat Norton" in Four Quartets by T. S. Eliot, copyright, 1943, by T. S. Eliot, copyright, 1971, by Esme Valerie Eliot. Reprinted by permission of Faber and Faber, Ltd. HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC. f o r a

selection from "Burnt Norton" in Four Quartets by T. S. Eliot, copyright, 1943, by T. S. Eliot, copyright, 1971, by Esme Valerie Eliot. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. Page 289 constitutes a continuation of the copyright page.

Preface Time present and time past Are both perhaps present in time future, And time future contained in time past. If all time is eternally present All time is unredeemable. What might have been is an abstraction Remaining a perpetual possibility Only in a world of speculation. What might have been and what has been Point to one end, which is always present. T. S. Eliot "Burnt Norton"

Historians do debate the might-have-beens, sometimes with their protagonists and sometimes with each other. And if they are con­ sidering as controversial a subject as "Imperial America," the temp­ tation to indulge in a running argument with the past becomes all but irresistible. What is more important to a reader, however, is the historian's endeavor to draw distinctions and make connections. The most difficult of these concern relationships between descrip­ tion and analysis, explanation and justification, and exposition and interpretation. The historian resolves these often subtle tensions by reference to specific materials and with the aid of a general framework. But the reader is by no means obliged to accept the result as the final word on any subject. Indeed, if the dialogue between historian and reader fails to encourage serious debate, both will lose. This book focuses on the relationship between policymakers, their ideas, and their institutions. My premise is that history is not

v

a summary of statistical findings, however useful those may be as tools. Perceptions of reality may depend as much on a special (even mythical) view of the past as on current facts. It is the policymaker's task to seek some rational integration of the two that will do vio­ lence to neither and keep society intact. Thus a nation's leaders may decide a given issue purely in terms of ideology, but their de­ cision must be explainable in terms of practical advantage. For good or ill, this process helps to shape what is possible in the future. People interact with the past continuously; they are affected by it; and their perceptions of it change. This could hardly be other­ wise. History is taught in schools to make that interaction socially useful. Revolutionary societies are usually the most adamant about imposing limits on what is taught about the past. The old order's history is often not only unsuitable to the present, but a dangerous counterrevolutionary weapon. Teaching about the American Revo­ lution has not been an exception, but the liberal-democratic society that evolved from that revolution has managed better than its rivals to keep open the possibility of coming to terms with its past, a not unimportant accomplishment. Finally, this book is concerned with American leaders' percep­ tions of this nation's international role in the twentieth century, the origins of their views, and the way they have grappled with domestic social and political imperatives in an effort to make sense out of the world and to preserve what they believe to be essential institutions. In one sense, it is about the quest to make the world safe for democracy, but it is also about international competition and rivalry. I am indebted to several friends and scholars who read the manu­ script and pointed out where I was more than usually cryptic or just plain wrong. John Morton Blum of Yale University, the General Editor of this series, Diane Shaver Clemens of the University of California at Berkeley, George C. Herring of the University of Kentucky, Walter LaFeber of Cornell University, and Joan Hoff Wilson of Sacramento State College read the original draft and made perceptive comments, most of which I have tried to incorporate into the final version. I would also like to thank William J. Wisneski

of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, who kept after me to get the book written, and three super editors, Irene Pavitt, Alexandra Roosevelt, and Kay Reinhart Ziff, who took over from there. I alone am re­ sponsible, of course, for any and all errors as well as for the inter­ pretation. LLOYD C. GARDNER

To my students at Rutgers

Contents Preface

1

v

The Paradox of American Imperialism Notes 22 Bibliography

2

22

America Goes Abroad: 1898-1908

23

The Education of a Confirmed Protectionist The Decision to Intervene 26 The First American Protectorate 31 The Great China Dream 33 The Deus ex Machina that Failed 40 The Manchurian Meeting Place 45 Canal Zone Diplomacy 47 Notes 53 Bibliography

3

1

54

Progressivism, War, and Revolution: 1909-1919 57 The First Imperative 58 Troubled Waters in Mare Nostrum

63

24

Defining the Just and the Unjust 65 Mexico Has No Government 67 The China Consortiums 74 To Make the World Safe for Democracy Notes 89 Bibliography

4

82

90

Splendid Isolation, American Style: 1919-1931 A Difficult Decision 95 The Bolshevik Threat to Liberal Democracy Deutschland Über Alles 108 Mexico and South 111 China in Peril 113 Notes 120 Bibliography

5

121

Capitalism in Crisis: 1931-1941

123

Worlds in Collision 124 Inside Intranationalism: Cordell Hull's Fight for Multinationalism 128 The Illusion of Neutrality 132 What Makes Good Neighbors? 135 Showdown in the Far East 142 Dr. Win-the-War 150 And the War Came 152

xii

Notes 155 Bibliography

156

100

93

6

From Pearl Harbor to Panmunjon: 1941-1951 Ambiguity and the Big Three 159 Lend-Lease Diplomacy 167 Lend-Lease and Containment 174 The Truman Doctrines 178 Reparations and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe and Asia 186 The Agent Thesis and American Cold War Policy Korea 199 Notes 203 Bibliography

7

Liberation 210 Moral Rearmament 213 SEATO Succeeds Colonialism The Old World 229 The Inheritance 236 Just Around the Mulberry Bush

8

194

205

The Collective Security Empire: 1951-1961

Notes 242 Bibliography

157

220

240

243

America and the World Revolution: 1961-1976 245 Cuban Countdown 246 The New Legions 253 Two Weeks in October 257

207

Search and Destroy 265 The Disenchanted 269 273 2001 : A Nixon Odyssey Back to Beginnings 278 Notes 287 Bibliography Picture Credits Index

291

289

288

Imperial America American Foreign Policy Since 1898

The Paradox of American Imperialism

For more than three hundred years Americans have participated in the construction of an empire, drawn benefits from it, and sought to extend its influence. Yet until Vietnam, a majority of Americans g&ll understood imperialism to mean something Euro­ peans did to other people centuries ago. Confronted by critics of the war, the nation's leaders denied the accusation that the United States had become an empire. This country—as it had always been—was antiempire. The only issue in Southeast Asia was the survival of freedom. Our willingness to stay the course in Vietnam could well determine the outcome of the long struggle between two opposed ways of life—and thus the future of humankind.

*

W&ÎM'SMZ WMfä Wrped ID INSIST THAT NEW YORK" IS AW INTERNAT PROetEM ANP THAT IF TÖfieißN TROOPS COJ'T WITHDRAW (MMEPIATEUY AMERICAN TRÓOft WITT FORCE THEM O U T -

JUSTASSOOWAS THEY (SET BACK FROM WET/JAM, THAITAUP, JAPAN, TAIWAN, TAOS, 1HECOMSO, 6 UAWTANAMQ (SUATEMAtA, AUD SANTO D0MIN6O .

93 The American Dilemma, ca. 1965—a comment by Feiffer.

270

Bad news continued to come from Saigon. In the wake of the Tet "setback," during which Vietcong soldiers had even broken into the American Embassy compound, General Westmoreland had asked for two hundred thousand more troops. It did not help that Westmoreland was willing to assert that with these men he could run down the exhausted Vietcong and bring the war to a close,Johnson had heard that one before. To supply additional forces of that number, the president would have had to call up the reserves. And, what would have been equally unpopular, he would have had to ask for increased taxes. A split within the Democratic party had widened into a schism. The south supported the president, although it was thought ready to bolt in favor of a candidate who would promise a quick military victory instead of more computer body-counts. Even if he could hold the south (for how long?), Johnson had lost the "Kennedy" wing to the doves. Senator Eugene

94 Peace candidates in a sober mood at the funeral of Martin Luther King.

McCarthy's surprise showing in the New Hampshire primary and the threat of a Robert Kennedy candidacy left Johnson all but alone in the White House. He could not venture outside the presidential mansion without encountering protestors carrying placards denouncing him in obscene terms and touting Ho Chi Minh as the hero of the hour. The majority of Americans were puzzled and angry—puzzled that what they saw on television did not conform to official statements about the war and angry at everyone, pro­ testors and even themselves.

272

In a final effort to rally support, Johnson summoned a special council of experienced Cold Warriors to the White House. The re­ sults of the discussions among the Senior Advisory Group, as it be­ came known, convinced Johnson that he must begin to seek an end to the Vietnam War without further damage to American political and economic institutions. Of special concern to the hard-headed realists who met with the president in the White House was the cost of the war, the balance of payments, and the gold drain. For the first time since the Second World War, America's economic supremacy was being challenged. The nation's Free World "partners" had shucked ideological restraints in a free-for-all race for markets and investments wher­ ever they could be found. At the same time, European nations were refusing to accept the dollar in payment for American debts. Vietnam was not the sole cause of America's predicament; Ken­ nedy had expressed concern about the gold drain as early as 1963. A decline in exports coupled with increased imports, foreign aid spending, and foreign investments had brought about a 40 percent decline in gold reserves from post-Second World War holdings. Kennedy had given the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 top priority. "In May of 1962," he told a New Orleans audience, "we stand at a great dividing point. We must either trade or fade. We must either go backward or forward."26 It was no longer so easy to go forward with West Germany and Japan fully recovered from the war and competing successfully in the world marketplace. Nor was it a good time to take on the added burden of a war in Vietnam. Ex­ cluding military aid, the American trade balance slipped steadily from a high point in 1964 of $6.8 billion to $.6 billion in 1968. With the war, American goods became too high priced and, some­ times, unavailable. America's share of manufactured exports in world markets fell from 28.1 percent of the total in 1955 to 20.6 percent in 1968. These figures do not give the whole picture. For example, the re­ turn on American foreign investments had reached $5 billion a year, and other economic indicators demonstrated the continuing power of the nation's economy. But the United States was clearly

living beyond its means and doing serious long-run damage to its position in the world economy. Rather than make an unpopular war more unpopular, Johnson had attempted to fight a $150 billion conflict without increased taxes or even domestic wage-and-price controls. In effect, he wanted the rest of the world to pay a large share of the costs by accepting debased dollars for goods and ser­ vices. That worked for a while. Johnson was informed by the Senior Advisory Group that he could not give Westmoreland the troops he wanted because the United States could no longer afford to fight that kind of war in Asia. A few days later the president announced he would not be a candidate for reelection. C. Douglas Dillon, a member of the Senior Advisory Group, later testified that the postwar international mon­ etary system depended on a stable dollar. "Our continued inflation at home threatens that stability today. Without a stable dollar, world trade as we know it today would not be possible. . . . I can foresee . . . a worldwide recession or even a depression/'27

2001: A NIXON ODYSSEY The seriousness of the situation can perhaps be gauged by the con­ version of one of the most famous of the "firefighters"—Richard M. Nixon. Nixon owed his entire political career, both its ups and downs, to the Cold War. He achieved fame as the man who ferreted out Alger Hiss early in the great postwar witch hunt. As Eisen­ hower's vice president, Nixon was assigned to the general's lowest staff position in charge of pinning labels on the opposition. Nixon flourished in that role, however, and seemed to take pleasure in the knowledge that liberals hated him more than anybody else in American political life except for Senator Joseph McCarthy. Although Nixon preferred the domestic side of anticommunism, he was well known in the 1960s as a Vietnam "hawk." When he did begin to speak out, it was in the same vein as Arizona's Barry Goldwater. "Why Not Victory?" they asked. Nixon was an active lobbyist for bombing North Vietnam in 1965, citing the "immense mineral potential" of nearby Indonesia, "the region's richest hoard of natural resources," as a reason why Indochina could not be al-

273

274

lowed to fall under communist control. The American commitment, Nixon was happy to note later, had been “a vital factor in the turnaround in Indonesia. . . . It provided a shield behind which the anti-communist forces found the courage and capacity to stage their counter-coup [of October 1965]."28 Even as he was writing these words, however, Nixon had become concerned about the darker side of the war. After a humiliating de­ feat in the 1962 California gubernatorial race, Nixon had back­ tracked to New York City—home base of his enemies in the Re­ publican party. He made a "new" life for himself in a law firm spe­ cializing in international corporations and their problems. Whether he became a convert to the Establishment or simply saw an oppor­ tunity for one more go at the White House, Nixon began to address himself to a new audience. His articles had usually appeared in Reader’s Digest, but in 1967 he tried writing for Foreign Affairs, an elite marketplace for high-priced intellectual products. His "Asia After Vietnam" article gained him a measure of acceptance, if not affection, with Eastern liberal Republicans. The most interesting point he made was that the People's Republic of China could not remain isolated forever. When Robert Kennedy was assassinated, the Democrats lost the only candidate who might have succeeded in reuniting the party behind a peace platform. Nixon's nomination thus became worth something to the Republican party and to himself. During the cam­ paign Nixon said he had a plan for ending the Vietnam War, but since the Democratic nominee, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, wanted to talk about everything except Vietnam, Nixon never had to specify details. Actually he had no plan. An offer of free advice came from Roger Hilsman, now disillusioned about finding a George Washington among the generals in Saigon. De-Americanize the war, said Hilsman; turn the responsibility back to South Vietnam. Encourage an actively reformist government that would, on its own, make contacts with the enemy. It would take a year or two for the results to become clear. "And by that time, the situa­ tion would be sufficiently fuzzed-up and the American involvement sufficiently downgraded, that Washington could go decently

S fS X

95

The "new" Nixon edges out Hubert Humphrey in 1968.

to Geneva and negotiate a settlement with Hanoi and the NLF that would be a surrender in fact but not in crucial appearance."29 The South Vietnamese might even surprise everyone and win—but that was a long shot, and Nixon should not base policy on such an unlikely outcome. It was better to concentrate on prac­ tical matters, forgetting about falling dominos and other myths of the recent past. Variations of this scheme had been circulating for some time. Republican Senator George Aiken suggested that since America had never lost a war, we should declare a victory and come home. General James Gavin favored a "strategic enclave" posture as a prelude to a complete withdrawal at some unspecified date. Nixon's approach combined elements from all of these plans, but it was agonizingly slow. The president reduced American forces in twenty-five thousand-man increments, just enough, it seemed, to keep Nixon one speech ahead of the antiwar movement. Vietnamization, some said, was just an attempt to gain a "decent interval" between the withdrawal of American forces and the inevitable fall of Saigon. Nixon, too, may have believed this, but if so, he never

275

276

let on in public or (as far as is known) in private. On April 20, 1970, Secretary of State William Rogers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Vietnamization was working well and about on schedule. There was no need to expand the war into neighboring Cambodia or Laos,- indeed, if that happened it would be a confes­ sion of failure. The possibility of expansion had been discussed be­ cause of the recent North Vietnamese campaigns in Cambodia to protect their supply lines. Rogers was not the best source of information within the Nixon administration. Ten days later the president appeared on television to inform his countrymen of an "incursion" into Cambodian terri­ tory to destroy the enemy's potential for attacking South Vietnam. All the protests during the Johnson administration wore surpassed by the outburst that greeted this announcement. But a promise to remove all American troops from Cambodia within six weeks cooled things off again. Responsibility for the "incursion" plan probably belonged to Na­ tional Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. The most recent of a series of Cold War intellectuals to serve as resident-advisers in the White House, Kissinger had long felt that American policymakers missed too many opportunities to make their opponents react. The only way to create new options for yourself, he argued, was to get the other fellow reacting to your initiatives. Then the options would appear. But not in Cambodia. The domestic outcry was bad enough, but the operation proved only that the South Vietnamese still could not stand on their own. The long shot had been tried—and it fell short. Nixon and Kis­ singer were reformed gamblers in the summer of 1972, when the latter indicated to the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris that the United States would allow North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam after the cease-fire. To gain South Vietnam's acquiescence in this step, Nixon sent huge shipments of military hardware to Saigon, carried out a series of "brutalizing" air raids over North Vietnam, and assured the government of President Thieu of American support in the event that the North Vietnamese violated the truce.

96 After one last series of bombings, America gets out of Vietnam.

But no matter how the cease-fire document was presented to Thieu he knew that it meant America had given up on its selfassigned task in Southeast Asia. Senator Charles Percy visited Saigon in December 1972 while the document still lay unsigned on Thieu's desk. His message, like Kissinger's, was blunt: I expressed my view that continuing U.S. assistance to South Vietnam would be in jeopardy if Saigon refused to sign. I told him [Foreign Min­ ister Tran Van Lam] that the people of the United States would not ac­ cept a continuation of the war, and that in my judgment 99 percent of the American people supported President Nixon's efforts to end the war now through a negotiated settlem ent.30

Percy's first, and most important, stop had been Japan, where he found assurances that Japan and the United States were moving toward a new era of cooperation and interdependence. "American business and agriculture have one of the greatest opportunities in history for developing an entirely new market in Japan with the po­ tential of employing over one million American workers and

277

accounting for up to $10 billion in exports to Japan by 1976, the 200th anniversary of America's Independence."31

BACK TO BEGINNINGS

278

A post-Cold War view now predominated in the Nixon adminis­ tration. Senator Percy's reactions and findings were only typical of the newly developed consensus. "It is a time when a man who knows the world will be able to forge a whole new set of alli­ ances," Nixon told Garry Wills as he began his campaign for the presidency, "with America taking the lead in solving the big problems. We are now in a position to give the world all the good things that Britain offered in her Empire without any of the disad­ vantages of nineteenth-century colonialism."32 Much to the dismay of his former right-wing supporters—who thought he had learned all the wrong things during his six-year sojourn in Rocke­ feller country—Nixon set about dismantling the Cold War super­ structure immediately after assuming office. It had become evident that the Soviet Union, far from engaging in adventurist foreign pol­ icies, liked the world pretty much as it was, especially if it could purchase what it needed in the West. Moreover, the classic balance-of-power strategy, ignored during the many years of bipolar thinking and ideological supremacy, had a new appeal for Ameri­ can leaders. The Sino-Soviet split seemed to offer a marvelous opportunity to exploit the confusions and contradictions in the communist world. As the world got closer chronologically to 1984, it moved away from George Orwell's fictional 1984, which had depicted a future in which the bipolar structure and ideology dominated everywhere. With little fanfare, Nixon traveled to Berlin in 1969 to call for an end to Cold War tensions in the city. Two years later a four-power pact was signed. According to the agreement, guarantees of free access between West Berlin and West Germany were exchanged for assurances that West Berlin would never be incorporated into the Federal Republic. In a sense, Berlin had been "neutralized." With great fanfare, Nixon flew to Peking, walked on the Great Wall, and toasted Chairman Mao Tse-tung in the Great Banquet Hall. As a

97 Nixon in China: the Cold War becomes history.

result of that historic journey, Formosa was "neutralized." Two of the most dangerous Cold War issues thus passed into history. A Vietnamese truce agreement was not signed until after the 1972 election, in January 1973. Once again, pledges of reconcili­ ation and peaceful settlement were made. Kissinger had even talked about economic aid for the reconstruction of Vietnams. Even had there been no new outbreak of fighting, it is very doubtful that Kissinger could have redeemed any such pledge. Turning his energies to the problems of Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT), the national security adviser, now also secretary of state, had more than enough to do in that sphere. Concomitant with the new détente policy was a general tightening of economic policies pursued since the end of the Second World War. In August 1971, Nixon had announced that America had been competing with one hand tied behind its back. That would have to end. And unless the industrialized nations eased restrictions on American imports, the United States would have to retaliate.

279

"THM1K5 ALOX"

98 A caustic comment on the end in Vietnam.

280

In Japan these policies became known as "Nixon Shock/' but the biggest shock of all was about to explode: Watergate. Kissinger continued alone as Nixon became more and more absorbed in the desperate maneuvers that finally brought an end to his presidency. Kissinger's view of the world pictured the future in terms of an­ other historical analogy, different from the Munich or Pearl Harbor images favored during the Cold War. As he saw it, the world now resembled the structure of the pre-First World War era, when major powers confronted one another through client states not fully under their—or anyone's—control. And the modern revolu­ tionary, with his near-psychotic fixation on narrow questions and utopian dreams, was not unlike the Serbian patriot who had rushed forward to strike a blow for his fatherland's freedom and brought down the civilized world. The "structure of peace" Nixon and Kissinger had been building for four years suddenly seemed dangerously weak at almost every stress point. The 1973 Yom Kippur War not only threatened big

power confrontation, but the Arab oil boycott and the sudden appearance of an oil-producer's cartel (OPEC), which included countries from other parts of the world, weakened Western unity and undermined the economy of all the major industrial countries outside of the communist world. Triggered by the oil boycott, a world recession quickly deepened into the worst slump since the prolonged Great Depression of the 1930s. Gloomy assessments and dire predictions abounded, none more frightening than Secretary Kissinger's own dark pronounce­ ments about history repeating itself. For several years the United States had resisted efforts by the raw-materials producers to arrange among themselves, and between themselves and the industrial nations, special marketing agreements that would establish a rough parity between the prices they received and the prices paid for indus­ trial goods. Proposals of this nature were routinely dismissed in Washington as obnoxious restraints on trade, harmful to all con­ cerned. OPEC's success challenged that view, as well as America's presumed right to say what constituted a restraint on trade and what 99 The end of America's mission in Vietnam.

100 President Gerald Ford promises no retreats into "isola­ tionism."

282

defined economic fair play. Under this pressure, Kissinger agreed to explore the possibilities of a more regulated system of interna­ tional trade. Meanwhile, however, other industrial nations complained that the United States refused to take the lead in reflating the world economy out of narrow concern for the rate of domestic inflation. But all the once-magical Keynesian words had been uttered, and the economy no longer quickened to their charm. Kissinger and Gerald Ford, Nixon's successor, discovered a new world all about them— one that they would very much have preferred not to have found at all. Everything seemed topsy-turvy in this world.

Europe's southern frontier—Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Spain— was at odds with itself and threatened by revolutionary upheavals. Portugal (like Rhode Island almost two centuries before?) was already caught in the throes of such an upheaval and was regarded as a danger to all the rest. Moreover, Angola, Lisbon's former African colony, the oldest European stronghold in that continent, had be­ come the same sort of crisis area as the pre-First World War Balkans, complete with big-power intrigues and war alarms. The United States, using Cold War-style techniques and CIA methods, duly sent aid to "friendly" Angolan forces locked in combat with "pro-Rus­ sian" forces. Everything was confused about Angola, including a tacit Washington-Peking alliance to thwart Russian ambitions. And all this was happening at the same time that the full story of CIA involvement in assassination plots dating from Eisenhower's time finally became public. Ike's almost casual reference to Patrice Lumumba at a National Security Council meeting had led, like Henry II's remark about Becket, to a CIA scheme for "neutralizing" the untrustworthy Con­ golese leader. Unlike King Henry's men, the CIA operatives moved too slowly, and when they were finally ready, Lumumba was already dead—"neutralized" by other enemies. They were not too late in Chile, however, although the plan of action against Marxist Pres­ ident Salvador Allende was somewhat less direct. Vast sums of money were spent over a period of years to prevent an Allende election victory, and no avenues went unexplored for making things difficult for his government once Allende assumed power in 1970. "The CIA," stated a Senate report, "was instructed by President Nixon to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency." Included in these measures were ingenious manipulations of the media against Allende and even plans to kidnap the commander of the Chilean armed forces, General René Schneider. Finally, Ambas­ sador Edward Korry delivered a blunt warning to a former president of Chile that n o t a n u t or b o lt w ill be allow ed to reach C hile u n d er A llende. O nce A llende com es to pow er, w e sh all do all w ith in our pow er to condem n

283

101 The last frontier?

284

C h ile and th e C h ilean s to u tm o s t depriv atio n an d poverty, a policy de­ signed for a long tim e to com e to accelerate th e h ard features of a C o m ­ m u n is t so ciety in C h ile.33

Chile was "saved" for the Free World by Allende's overthrow and death in 1973, but it was too late to do much about South Vietnam and Cambodia, both of which "fell" to the Communists in the spring of 1975. Laos soon followed suit, albeit in less dramatic fashion. Confronted by the complete collapse of the South Vietnamese regime, Gerald Ford did not hesitate to ask Congress for yet another appropriation to shore up the crumbling defense system around Saigon. Politics played a large part in this unnecessary postscript to America's longest war, but Ford also met the most glaring ex­ amples of "exceptional" CIA behavior and wrongdoing with little more than promises to do better in the future. He still professed to see the greatest danger in America's future in talk of a new isola­ tionism. At Notre Dame University he said: "While we pursue a world in which there is unity and diversity, we must continue to support security against aggression and subversion. To do other­ wise would invite greater violence. We are counseled to withdraw from the world and go it alone. I have heard that song before. I am here to say I am not going to dance to it." Ford's efforts to blunt the current almost daily revelations of CIA involvement in a variety of illegal acts throughout the world and at home thus ended on a note of reaffirmation of American exceptionalism. He promised administrative changes, but added, "I wouldn't rule out necessary political activities by the United States if it in­ volves our security." Where did security end and empire begin? The course of American history from the Louisiana Purchase to the Truman Doctrine and beyond reflected the difficulty Americans had in drawing a dividing line. Their leaders would impose a liberal-democratic vision on the world, if only because they could not draw that line or feel secure at home until, as Wilson had put it, the world had been made safe for democracy. During the First World War Wilson promised Mex­ ican newspaper editors that the time would come when Mexico would be able to welcome foreign capital without fear. The old em-

285

pires would never dominate the world again: So soon as you can ad m it your ow n capital and th e capital of th e w orld to th e free use of the resources of M exico, it w ill be one of the m o st w onderfully prosperous co u n tries in th e w orld. A nd w h en you have th e foundations of established order, and th e w orld has com e to its senses again, w e shall, I hope, have th e very b est connections th a t w ill assure us all a p erm an en t cordiality and friendship.

In the Cold War that vision confronted its greatest challenge, which, American leaders insisted, emanated from the Kremlin. But while billions were spent on atomic weaponry, the only fighting that took place was in Korea, the Middle East, Cuba, Indochina. So great was the evil to be overcome, said the authors of NSC-68, that extraordinary measures were warranted—indeed compelled: O ur free society, confronted by a th re a t to its basic values, n atu rally w ill take such action, including th e use of m ilitary force, as m ay be re­ quired to p ro tect those values. T h e in te g rity of o u r sy stem w ill n o t be jeopardized by any m easures, covert or overt, v io len t or non-violent, w h ich serve th e purposes of fru stratin g th e K rem lin design, n o r does th e necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in ac­ tio n s as w ell as w ords forbid such m easures, provided only th a t th ey are appropriately calculated to th a t end and are n o t so excessive or m isdirected as to m ake us enem ies of th e people in stead of th e evil m e n w ho have enslaved th e m .34

286

Unfortunately, each new measure, whether it was the plan to assassinate Fidel Castro or the Phoenix Program for killing Vietcong political leaders, was always "appropriately calculated" and justified in the name of national security. Watergate awoke many to the danger that the "integrity of our system" was indeed linked to "national security," but not in the way supposed by the authors of NSC-68. If it was possible to carry out covert measures against the external enemy, why not against domestic op­ ponents—finally, against anyone on a list of White House enemies? And instead of "frustrating the Kremlin design," the process was making us enemies of ourselves. One has to look deep for the source of this madness, into our­ selves surely, but also into the empire we had built in the name of antiempire. "In the end," said Calhoun, "you put in the hands

of the Executive the power of conquering you." The bill of impeach­ ment drawn up by the House of Representatives against Richard Nixon read almost like a modern addition to the list of particulars lodged against George ID in the Declaration of Independence. It will be interesting indeed to see what follows and if the post-Watergate years prove finally whether Calhoun was right or wrong. N otes 1 Quoted in Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 640. 2 Quoted in J. P. Morray, The Second Revolution in Cuba (New York: Monthly Re­ view Press, 1962), p. 98. 3 Quoted in Chalmers Roberts, First Rough Draft (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 186. 4 William Appleman Williams, The United States, Cuba, and Castro (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), pp. 107-09. 5 Quoted in Morray, Second Revolution, p. 94. 8 Quoted in the N ew York Times, July 31, 1975, p. 11. 7 Quoted in Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counter-Revolution: The Foreign Pol­ icy of John F. Kennedy (New York: Viking Press, 1972), p. 14. 8 Quoted in Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough! (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 124. 9 Quoted in Ibid., p. 8. 10 Speech at San Francisco, September 18, 1967, in U.S., Department of State, Amer­ ican Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 17-24. 11 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 608-09. 12 Quoted in Ibid., p. 782. 13 Quoted in The Winds of Freedom: Selections from the Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, June 1961-A ugust 1962, ed. with an introduction by Ernest K. Lindley (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 148. 14 Quoted in Ibid., pp. 144—48. 15 Quoted in Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 381. 16Harold Macmillan, A t the End of the Day, 1961-1963 (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 193. 17 Public Papers of the Presidents, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), pp. 897-98. 18 Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 463. 19 Quoted in Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1968), p. 205. 20 Airgram to Washington, December 24, 1964, in The Pentagon Papers, N ew York Times edition (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 379. 21 Wicker, JFK and LBJ, p. 286.

287

22 U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 848-52. 23 Memorandum of off-the-record conversation with Johnson, June 24, 1965, from a copy in the Arthur Krock Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. 24 Memorandum of a conversation with McNamara, April 22, 1965, from a copy in the Krock Papers. 25 Quoted in Henry Graff, The Tuesday Cabinet: Debate and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon B. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 134. 26 Quoted in Jim Heath, John F. Kennedy and the Business Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 91. 27 U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, Hearings: A Foreign Economic Pohcy for the 1970s, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 64. 28 Quoted in Peter Dale Scott, "The Vietnam War and the CIA—Financial Establish­ ment," in Mark Seiden, ed., Remaking Asia: Essays on the American Uses of Power (New York: Pantheon, 1974), p. 107. 29 Quoted in Richard Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican Challenge to His Own Party (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 86. 30 "Economic and Political Developments in the Far East," Report by Senator Charles Percy to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 30, 1973, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1. 31 Ibid. 32 Quoted in Wills, Nixon Agonistes, p. 20. 33 Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, November 22 and 23, 1975. 34 NSC-68, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950 (declassified, February 27, 1975).

Bibliography Ball, George. The Discipline of Power. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. An insider's survey of how America neglected Europe in the Vietnam War. Barnet, Richard J., and Muller, Ronald E. Global Reach. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974. The role of multinational corporations in the making of one world. Brandon, Henry. The Retreat of Power. New York: Doubleday, 1973. An excel­ lent look at the Nixon-Kissinger strategy. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. How the best and the brightest got carried away, if they did. Schurmann, Franz. The Logic of World Power. New York: Pantheon, 1974. Ideol­ ogy and practice.

288

PICTURE CREDITS PAGE 2 The Bettmann Archive 3 Daniel and Charles Asso­ ciates. Laurence Dunst, copywriter; Murray Smith, art director; Steve Horn, photographer 5 Françoise Sully, 1967. N ewsweek 7 The B e ttm an n Archive 10 The Bettmann Archive 13 Oil painting "View of New Orleans Taken from the Plantation of Marigny, November 1803" by Baqueto de Noieseri. Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society 14 The Granger Collection 17 Brown Brothers 18 The Bettmann Archive 25 Historical Pictures Service 27 Historical Pictures Service 30 New York Historical Society 35 Dennis Harper, Dallas Notes; Thames and Hudson Ltd. 36 Library of Congress 37 Lithograph "Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898" (Japanese). Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society 38 Library of Congress 39 The National Archive

41 Historical Pictures Service 44 Brown Brothers 48 N ew York Herald, December 16, 1902. New York Public Library 50 Library of Congress 60 Library of Congress 66 Bostwick-Frohardt Collection. Owned by KMTV, Omaha 69 Culver Pictures 71 Historical Pictures Service 72 Brown Brothers 83 The National Archive 86 New York Public Library 87 Library of Congress 88 The Bettmann Archive 94 From The Independant, October 23, 1916. Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester 96 International News Photo 98 British Museum 103 Sovfoto/Eastfoto 105 United Press Inter­ national 109 The National Archive 111 The National Archive 114 The Brooklyn Eagle 115 Culver Pictures 116 Minnesota Historical Society 119 Library of Congress 126 Brown Brothers 127 United Press Inter­ national

289

129 133 134 136 139 143 146 148 149 153 153 154 158 161 164 168 169 172 179 180 181 191 192 196 197 198 203 208 209 211 214 215 218 219

290

Wide World Photos Wide World Photos FDR Library Wide World Photos Culver Pictures Richmond (Va.) TimesDispatch Imperial War Museum Wide World Photos United Press Inter­ national Captured Japanese records, United States Navy photo The National Archive Photoworld, a division of F.P.G. Library of Congress West Point Museum Collection, United States Military Academy Wide World Photos Wide World Photos Brown Brothers Wide World Photos Sovfoto United Press Inter­ national Wide World Photos Walter Sanders, LIFE Pease, Newark News Sovfoto/Eastfoto Eve Arnold, Magnum Photos Wide World Photos Francis J. (Red) Grandy Wide World Photos United Press Inter­ national United Press Inter­ national Wide World Photos Wide World Photos Wide World Photos David Seymour, Magnum Photos

220 From Heiblock’s Special for Today (Simon and Schuster, 1958) 221 Wide World Photos 223 Wide World Photos 228 Wide World Photos 234 Wide World Photos 235 Sovfoto 236 Sovfoto 237 Sovfoto 241 Grey Villet, LIFE 247 George Tames 249 © 1962 St. Louis PostDispatch. Reprinted courtesy of Bill Mauldin 250 Fischetti, reprinted by permission, Newspaper Enterprise Association 251 United Press Inter­ national 254 Pat Oliphant, © Los Angeles Times, reprinted by permission 257 Larry Burroughs, LIFE 261 Roger Malloch, Magnum Photos 262 United Press Inter­ national 270 Jules Feiffer, © 6-3-1965 271 United Press Inter­ national 271 Ollie Atkins 275 United Press Inter­ national 277 United Press Inter­ national 279 Wide World Photos 280 Don Wright, The Miami News 281 United Press Inter­ national 282 Wide World Photos 284 Stayskal, The Chicago Tribune

Index

Acheson, Dean, 183, 184 and Cold War policy, 195-97 on Ho Chi-minh, 210 Adams, Abigail, 12 Adams, Henry, 39 Adams, John Quincy, and Pan Ameri­ can Conference, 15 Adenauer, Konrad, 231 AFL-CIO Conference on World Affairs, 234 Agrarian Reform Law (Cuba 1959), 250 Agricultural Adjustment Act, 128 Agricultural Labor Convention (1937), 140 Aiken, George, 275 Algeciras Conference (1906), 53

Allende, Salvador, 281 Alliance for Progress, 249 Allied Control Council, 190 Allies loans, WWI, 83 intervention in Russia, 101-4 and lend-lease, 150-52 Amau Doctrine, 143 America China Development Co., 42, 46 American Asiatic Association, 35, 37 American Development Co., 78-79 American Investment Corp., 80 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 214 antitrust laws and foreign-trade com­ bines, 62

291

Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo, 240 Articles of Confederation and liberaldemocratic state, 8, 9 Aswan Dam, 217 Atlantic Charter, and Big Three, 159-67 Axis Tripartite Pact (1940), 148

292

Baghdad Pact, 213-14 barter agreements, Germany and Brazil, 137-38 Batista, Fulgencio, 137, 240 Bay of Pigs affair, 251-53 Bemis, Samuel Flagg, on intervention in Russia, 103 Benes, Eduard, 189 Berlin occupation, 189-90 Blockade, 190 Russian ultimatum on, 232-34 tension over, 259-60 Wall, 260 four-power pact on, 278. See also Germany Big Four, 195 Big Three and Atlantic Charter, 159-67 of neutralism, 217 Blaine, James G., and McKinley tariff, 24 blockade, WWI, 84 Borah, William, 119 Boxer Indemnity Agreements, 47 Boxer Rebellion, 38-39, 40 boycott of Mexican petroleum prod­ ucts, 141 brain trust, 126-27 Brazil intervention in, 26, 27 trade with Germany, 137—38 Brest-Litovsk Treaty (1917), 101 Bretton Woods Conference (1944), 172, 173 British Commonwealth and Imperial Preference System, 173-74 Bryan, William Jennings, 17, 59 as Wilson's secretary of state, 64-67

Bryan-Chamorro Pact, 64 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 125 Byrnes, James F., 178 Cabrera, Manuel Estrada, 63 Calhoun, John C , on executive power, 245-46 Calles, Plutarco, 112 Camacho, Avila, 141 Cambodia independence, 226 incursions into, 276 Canal Zone, Roosevelt's diplomacy in, 47-53 Cannon, Joseph, 29 Cardenas, Lázaro, 138, 139-40 Carnegie, Andrew, 53 Carranza, Venustiano, 72-74 Cassini, Comte, 40 Castillo Armas, Cados, 240 Castro, Fidel takes power in Cuba, 240-42 and Nixon, 248 and missile crisis, 250-51, 261-64 assassination attempt, 251, 283 Central America. See Latin America Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and uprising in Iran, 215 and U-2 incident, 234—35 in Guatemala, 240 and attempt to assassinate Castro, 251, 283 and Bay of Pigs affair, 252 revelations about, 282-83 Chamberlain, Neville, 134, 144 Chang Tso-lin, 116, 117 Chiang Kai-shek and Sino-Russian ''mini-war," 116-17 and Far East showdown, 145 and Cold War, 191-94 Chile, American actions in, 281 China Germany demands Shantung penin­ sula, 29 Open Door policy in, 33—40 Boxer Indemnity Agreements, 47

Consortiums, 74—82, 113 and Japan's Twenty-One Demands, 79 post-WWI peril, 113-20 "mini-war" with Russia, 117 Japan invades, 133-34, 145, 147 and Far East showdown, 142-50 and Cold War, 191-99 Nixon visit, 278-79 Chinese Eastern Railway, 42 and China Consortiums, 75, 76 Chiang seizes, 116-17 Churchill, Winston, 151 and Big Three, 159-67 and Potsdam Conference, 167 and lend-lease, 170, 174-77 on iron curtain, 180 and war in Vietnam, 225 Clark, J. Reuben, memorandum, 112 Clay, Lucius, 188, 189 Clayton, Will, 171 Cleveland, Grover, 20, 26, 27 and intervention in Cuba, 28 coexistence, peaceful, 236, 237 Cold War Mexican votes in UN during, 142 beginnings, 159 and Truman Doctrine, 178-86 and reparations, 186-94 U. S. policy and agent thesis, 194-99 Colombia, war with Pern, 113 Commercial Treaty (1911), abrogated, 147-48 Common Sense (Paine), 11 containment and lend-lease, 174-78 and Truman Doctrine, 178-86 Kennan on, 181-83 Co-Prosperity Sphere, 148 counterforce, 255-56 Cuba revolutions, 17, 19 and Spanish-American War, 19-21 U. S. intervention in, 26-31 American protectorate in, 31-33, 49 U. S. withdrawal from, 111 revolutionary activity, 135-37

Castro takes power, 240—41 missile crisis, 250-51, 259-65 Bay of Pigs affair, 251-53 expelled by OAS, 258 Czechoslovakia, coup, 189, 200-201 Danish West Indies, U. S. purchase of, 67 Davis, William Rhoades, 141 Dawes loans, 110 Declaration of Liberated Europe, 164, 165 Declaration of Moscow (1943), 162 de Gaulle, Charles, 167, 265 Denby, Charles, 34 Diaz, Porfirio, 68 Diem, Ngo Dinh regime begins in Vietnam, 226-29 regime overthrown, 266 Dienbienphu, besieged, 222, 226 Dillon, C. Douglas, 273 on Berlin, 233-34 disarmament, Washington Naval Con­ ference on, 113-15 Dominican Republic, intervention in, 65-66 Dulles, Allen, 252 Dulles, John Foster and Cold War policy, 197-98 on drawing the line, 207 and liberation, 209, 210-13 and Baghdad Pact, 213-14 and Middle East crisis, 213-21 and Iran uprising, 215-16 and SEATO, 221-29 and Saigon government, 226 and Indochinese independence, 226-29 and divided vs. disarmed Germany, 231-33 and Khrushchev ultim atum on Berlin, 232-33 and Castro takeover in Cuba, 240 Duvalier, François, 258 economic significance of Sputnik, 236-37

293

economy and managed currencies, 124-26 balanced, 126-27 France, after Indochinese indepen­ dence, 227 and Vietnam War, 272-73 Eden, Anthony, 160 and Baghdad Pact, 213-14 Edge Act (1919), 63 Egypt Suez crisis, 216-20 Israel invades, 219-20 Eisenhower, Dwight D. and liberation, 209, 210-13 and Middle East crisis, 213-21 entertains Khrushchev, 233 and U-2 incident, 234-35 and Castro takeover in Cuba, 241-42 on military-industrial complex, 253 Eisenhower Doctrine, 220-21 Eisenhower era, end of, 236-39 Emergency Tariff (1921), 97 empire, and slavery, 15-16 enfranchisement, and liberaldemocratic state, 7-8 England, beginnings of liberaldemocratic state in, 6-8 Estrada Palma, Tomás, 32 European Defense Community, 230, 231 European Recovery Program, 188 Export-Import Bank, 131, 141 expropriation of U. S. properties in Mexico, 138-40

294

Far East. See China; Japan; Manchuria Farouk, King, 213, 214 The Federalist, 12-13 Federal Reserve Act (1913), 61 Federal Trade Commission, 62 Feis, Herbert on America's Japan policy, 147 on Roosevelt's reciprocal trade treaty program, 130 Ford, Gerald, 281-82 Fordney-McCumber Tariff (1922), 97-98

Foreign Affairs, 182, 274 foreign aid, U. S. vs. Soviet, 237-38 foreign trade expansion under McKinley, 24—26 and Wilson's tariff policy, 60-63 Roosevelt's policy on, 128-32 and Vietnam War, 272-73 Forrestal, James, 186 Fortune, on American imperialism, 8 France and Middle East crisis, 213—21 withdrawal from Indochina, 222-23, 226 economy after Indochinese indepen­ dence, 227 Francis, David R., on combination for foreign commerce, 62 frontier, as issue at Philadelphia Con­ vention, 9 Fulbright, J. William, 267 Gardner, Frank, on Dominican treaty, 52 Gavin, James, 275 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, 226, 228 Geneva Disarmament Conference (1933), 134 Gentlemen's Agreement on Japanese immigration, 44-45 George, Walter F., 184, 218 Germany demand for Shantung peninsula, 29 invasion of Belgium, 82 blockade of Britain, 84 reparations post—WWI, 108—10 managed currency, 125 Nazis come to power, 127 trade in Latin America, 137-38 reparations, and Cold War, 186-94 Federal Republic established, 190 divided vs. disarmed, 231-33. See also Berlin Goldwater, Barry, 273 Gompers, Samuel, 19 Good Neighbor policy, 135—42 Gorky, Maxim, 106

Graebner, Norman, 154 Grant, Ulysses S., 16 Great Britain and Open Door in China, 35 alliance with Japan, 40 blockade of Germany, 84 managed currency, 124-25 and Far East showdown, 144-50 and Big Three, 159-67 and Bretton Woods program, 173-74 and lend-lease diplomacy, 168-74 and Middle East crisis, 216-21 Great China Market, 142, 146 Great Depression and war debt moratorium, 110 symptoms in Latin America, 111-13 Greece, civil war in, 183 Green Berets, 256, 257 Gresham, Walter Quintín, 17-18 Grey, Sir Edward, 84, 85 Guam, annexation of, 37

Haiti intervention in, 66-67 U. S. withdrawal from, 111 and ouster of Cuba from OAS, 258 Hamilton, Alexander, 12 Hanna, Mark, 29 Harriman, Averell, and lend-lease and containment, 176-78 Harriman, E. H., 42, 46, 75 Hawaii, annexation of, 26, 27, 34, 37 Hawkins, Harry, 132 Hay, John, and Open Door in China, 37-40 Henry Pu-yi, 118 Hilldring, John, 189 Hilsman, Roger, 266, 274 Hitler, Adolf, 175 Ho Chi-minh, 210, 212 Hoover, Herbert, 93 and post-WWI loans, 99-100 economic policy toward Russia, 105-07 and Great Depression, 124-26 and reciprocal trade agreements, 131 Hopkins, Harry, 171

House, Col. Edward M., 82 peace plan, 84-85 Huerta, Victoriano, 69-71 Hughes, Charles Evans, and Washing­ ton Naval Conference, 113-15 Hukuang Railway, 75 Hull, Cordell and fight for multilateralism, 128-32 and U. S. neutrality, 132 and Good Neighbor policy, 135-42 and Far East showdown, 146—50 and Big Three, 162, 163-64 Humphrey, George, 239 Humphrey, Hubert, 274 Hungary Hoover policy on, 105-6 Freedom Fighters, 220 Hwai River Valley conservancy project, 78-81 immigration from Japan, Gentlemen's Agreement on, 44-45 Immigration Act (1924), 117 imperialism, Founding Fathers' view on, 8 Imperial Preference System. See Ot­ tawa Preference System Inchon offensive, 201 Indochina Japan occupies, 154 French withdrawal from, 222-23, 226. See also Vietnam: Vietnam War Ingersoll, Robert, 6, 59 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), 172, 173, 238 International Monetary Fund, 172, 173 intervention in Brazil, 26, 27 in Venezuela, 26, 27 in Cuba, 26—31 in Panama, 49 in Santo Domingo, 49-52 in Dominican Republic, 65—66 in Haiti, 66-67 in Nicaragua, 63-64, 112 in Russia, 101-4

295

intranationalism, 126 and fight for multilateralism, 128-32 Iran, uprising (1953), 214-15 iron curtain, Churchill on, 180 Ishii Kikujiro, 81, 82 Israel, invades Egypt, 219-20 James, William, 232 Japan alliance with Britain, 40 war with Russia, 40-41 U. S. fleet in, 44 Gentlemen's Agreement, 44—45 and China Consortiums, 76, 77 Twenty-One Demands, 79 and Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 81-82 intervention in Siberia, 101, 103 Manchurian protectorate, 117-18, 124 managed currency, 125 invades China, 133-34 and Far East showdown, 142-50 occupies Indochina, 154 and Cold War policy, 197-99 need for markets in Southeast Asia, 223-24 and Nixon Shock, 280 Jefferson, Thomas, 14 Johnson, Lyndon B., 247 and Vietnam War buildup, 266-69 and public disenchantment over Vietnam War, 269-73

296

Kellogg, Frank, 112 Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, 117 Kennan, George F. on containment, 181-83 on post-WWn Japan, 198-99 and Truman Doctrine, 186 Keynes, John Maynard, 169-70 and Bretton Woods program, 172-73 Kennedy, John F. on Cuba, 245 and New Frontier, 246-47 and Bay of Pigs affair, 251-53 and buildup of nuclear arsenal, 254-56

and Cuban missile crisis, 259-65 Kennedy, Robert, 264, 271, 274 Khrushchev, Nikita, 220 and Berlin ultimatum, 232-34 and Cuban missile crisis, 260-65 Kim Il-sung, 200 Kissinger, Henry, 276 Knox, Frank, 141 Knox, Philander C., 57 and China Consortiums, 74-77 Knox-Castrillo Convention (1911), 64 Kolchak, Aleksandr, 106 Korea and Taft-Katsura Memorandum, 43 War, 199-202 truce, 213 Kim, Béla, 106 Kuomintang party, 114 Ky, Nguyen Cao, 267 LaFollette, Robert, 25 Lansing, Robert on supporting Pancho Villa, 73 and China Consortiums, 81-82 and Versailles Treaty, 95-96 Lansing-Ishii Agreement (1917), 81-82 cancelled, 117 Laos, independence for, 226 Latin America U. S. policy in, 63-67 symptoms of Great Depression in, 111-13 League of Nations, 93-94 Congressional stance on, 95-97 and Manchurian crisis, 118-19 lend-lease diplomacy, 167-74 and containment, 174—78 Lenin, and postwar Russia, 100-104 liberal-democratic state, 6-8 liberation, as Eisenhower policy, 209, 210-13 Lincoln, Abraham, on slavery, 15 Lind, John, 69-70 Lloyd, Henry Demarest, 19 Lloyd, Selwin, 221 Lloyd George, David, 104 loans, post-WWI, 97, 99-102 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 95

London Economic Conference, and Hull's fight for multilateralism, 128-32 London Foreign Ministers' Conference (1945), 178 London Naval Conference (1930), 117 London Naval Conference (1934), Japan withdraws from, 143 Louisiana Purchase, 14 Lublin Committee, 166 Lusitania, sinking of, 84 Lytton Commission, 118, 119

MacArthur, Douglas and Cold War policy, 197-98 and Korean War, 201-2 dismissal, 207-8 Machado, Gerardo, 135 Macmillan, Harold and Cuban missile crisis, 262-63 and SEATO, 221-22 Macpherson, C. B., 6, 8 Madero, Francisco I., 68 Madison, James, 12 Maheu, Robert A., 251 Maine, battleship, sinking of, 28-29 Manchuria Open Door in, 43 and Root-Takahira Agreement, 47 and Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 81 Japanese protectorate, 117-18, 124 nonrecognition, 127 Soviet occupation, 193 Mao Tse-tung, 193 Marcantonio, Vito, 184 Marshall, George C., 190 mission to China, 193-94 Marshall Plan, 184, 190 Martin, Joseph, 207 McCarthy, Eugene, 270-71 McCarthy, Joseph, 196, 197, 273 McCarthy, Mary, on Vietnam War, 5-6 McDermott, John, on welfare imperial­ ism, 4-5 McKinley, William, 23 and Spanish-American War, 20-21 trade expansion under, 24-26

and American protectorate in Cuba, 31-33 and Open Door policy in China, 35-40 McKinley Tariff, 24 McNamara, Robert and buildup of nuclear arsenal, 254-56 and Cuban missile crisis, 263-64 and Vietnam War buildup, 269 Memoirs (Hoover), 100 Memoirs (Hull), 132, 163 Memoirs (Traman), 184, 195 Mendes-France, Pierre, 226 Mendieta, Carlos, 137 Mexican Labor Board, 139 Mexico Revolution, 67-74 post-WWI, 111-13. See also oil Middle East crisis, 213-21 Military Advisers Group, 193 military-industrial complex, 253 Mitchell, William (Billy), 145 on Japan, 144 Moley, Raymond, 126, 129 Molotov, V. M., 162, 167, 177 and European Recovery Program, 188 Molotov Plan, 190 Monroe, James, 14 Monroe Doctrine, 14 Roosevelt Corollary, 49-53 Clark memorandum downgrading Roosevelt Corollary, 112 Morales, Carlos, 51 Morgan, J. P., 42 Morgan, John T., 17 Morgenthau, Henry, on Far East markets, 144, 145 Morgenthau Plan, 187 Morrow, Dwight R., 112 Moscow Conference (1943), 162-63 Mossadegh, Mohammed, 214-15 Mukden incident, 117-18 multilateralism, 128-32 Munich Conference (1938), 134 Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 209

297

Nasser, Gamel Abdul, 216 on dictatorship, 229 National Association of Manufac­ turers, 24 and tariff question, 58 National Foreign Trade Convention (1946), 174 National Foreign Trade Council, 61,62 National Recovery Act, 128 National Security Council, Paper No. 68, 200 Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939), 159, 160 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 217 neutralism, 217 neutrality, illusion of, 132-35 New Deal, 123-24 as intranationalism, 126 and balanced economy, 126-27 Nicaragua revolution and intervention, 63- 64, 112 U. S. withdrawal from, 111 Nicholas H, Tsar, 87 Nine-Power Treaty (1922), 115 Nixon, Richard, 225 on Sputnik, 236-37 and Castro, 248 and Vietnam War, 273-79 Nixon Shock, 280 Nobel Peace Prize, to Theodore Roose­ velt, 42 Nomura, Kichisaburo, 149, 152 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (NATO), 190 and Mutual Aid Assistance Program, 209 and Dulles threats, 229-33

298

oil U. S. ownership of fields in Mexico, 112 Mexican expropriation of, 139-40 Mexico retains control of fields, 142 Arab boycott, 281 Olney, Richard, 19, 20 OPEC, 281 Open Door policy in China, 33-40

and Russo-Japanese War, 40-41 in Manchuria, 43 in South America, 48 in Morocco, 53 Organization of American States and Castro takeover in Cuba, 240 expels Castro, 258 Ottawa Preference System (Imperial Preference System), 125, 128, 168, 173, 174 and lend-lease, 169 Paine, Thomas, 11 Panamanian Revolution (1903), 48-49 Pan American Airways, 138 Pan American Conference (1826), 15 Pan American Conference (Monte­ video), 135 Pan-American Highway, 141 Payne-Aldrich Tariff (1909), 59 Peace Corps, 256-57 peaceful coexistence, 236, 237 Pearl Harbor, attack on, 155 Pentagon Papéis, 267 Percy, Charles, 277, 278 Pem, war with Colombia, 103 Petróleos de México (Pemex), 138, 142 Philadelphia Convention (1787), 9, 11 Philippines, U. S. occupation of, 35-37 Phoenix Program, 283 Pinckney, Charles, 11 Platt Amendment, 32, 33, 49 protectorates, 52-53 abrogated, 137 Poland Big Three and dispute over, 166—67 Traman on, 177 Port Arthur, battle of, 40 Portsmouth, N. H., peace settlement of Russo-Japanese War, 41-42 Potsdam Conference, 167 Powell, William F., 51 Powers, Francis Gary, 235 protectorate in Cuba, 31-33 in Santo Domingo, 51-52 "Platt Amendment," 52—53 in Manchuria, 117—18, 124

Punta del Este OAS conference, 258, 260 Rayburn, Sam, 260 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934), 130-31 extended, 238 reciprocity vs. protectionism, 25 Redfíeld, William C., 61 Reinsch, Paul S., and China Consor­ tiums, 78-81 Reischauer, Edwin O., 199 reparations post-WWI, and war debts, 108-10 post-WWn, and Cold War, 186-94 Rhee, Syngman, 200, 213 Rhodes, Cecil, 18 Rickenbacker, Eddie, 109 Ridgway, Matthew, 224 Rio Treaty, 262 The Road to Pearl Harbor (Feis), 147 Robertson, J. L., 51 Rockefeller, Nelson, 247 Rockhill, W. W., 46 Rogers, William, 276 Roosevelt, Franklin D. on tariff, 123 and illusion of neutrality, 132-35 Quarantine Speech, 135 and Good Neighbor policy, 135-42 and lend-lease, 150—52 on four freedoms, 157-58 and Big Three, 159-67 and lend-lease and containment, 174-77 and reparations, 187 Roosevelt, Theodore and settlement of Russo-Japanese War, 40-42 and Taft-Katsura Memorandum, 43 and Root-Takahira Agreement, 47 and Canal Zone diplomacy, 47-53 and tariff question, 58 Roosevelt Corollary, 49-53 downgraded, 112 Root, Elihu and Platt Amendment, 32 and Open Door in Morocco, 53

on Japanese occupation of China, 43 and Versailles Treaty, 95 Root-Takahira Agreement (1908), 47 Roper, Dan, on cotton exports to Japan, 145-46 Rusk, Dean, 258, 269 Russia war w ith Japan, 40-41 and China Consortiums, 75-76 Revolution, 87-89 Bolshevik regime begins, 100-102 post-WWI, 102-8 "mini-war" with China, 117 and Big Three, 159-67 and lend-lease and containment, 174-78 occupies Manchuria, 193 and Hungarian Freedom Fighters, 220 and divided vs. disarmed Germany, 231-33 detente, 279 Russo-Japanese War, 40-41 San Francisco, school segregation in, 44 San Martin, Grau, 135-37 Santo Domingo call for annexation of, 16 intervention in, 49-52 Semmel, Bernard, on social imperial­ ism, 18-19 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Tm m an Doctrine, 184-85 Senior Advisory Group, 272, 273 Shanghai, Japanese occupation of, 118 Sherman Antitrust Act, 62 Siberia, Japanese intervention in, 101 Sinclair Oil Corp., 141 Sino-Russian "mini-war," 117 slavery and empire, 15-16 Smith, Walter Bedell, 189 social imperialism, 18-19 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, on Yalta Conference, 165 Southeast Asia, Japan's need for markets in, 223-24 South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 221-29

299

South Manchuria Railway, 41, 42, 76 Soviet Union. See Russia space race, and end of Eisenhower era, 236-39 Stalin, Joseph and Big Three, 159-67 and Potsdam Conference, 167 and lend-lease and containment, 174-78 and Korean War, 200 Stettinius, Edward R., 177 Stevenson, Adlai, 220 Stimson, Henry L., 112, 113, 127 and Manchurian crisis, 118-20 Stimson Doctrine, 118 Straight, Willard, 46, 80 and China Consortiums, 75-76, 79 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 279 submarine warfare, WWI, 84 Sun Yat-sen, 114

300

Taft, William Howard, 57 and tariff question, 58-59 policy in Central America, 63-64 and China Consortiums, 74-77 Taft-Katsura Memorandum (1905), 43 Tang Shao-yi, 46, 47 tariff Roosevelt and, 58 Payne-Aldrich, 59 Underwood, 61 Emergency, 97 Fordney-McCumber, 97-98 FDR on, 123 and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 130-31 Taylor, Maxwell, 266, 267 Teller, Senator, 34 Teller Amendment, 31, 32 Tet offensive, 269-70 Texas, call for annexation of, 15 Third World and Eisenhower's liberation policy, 212 Soviet foreign aid to, 237-38 Tito, Marshall, 183, 217

Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 267 trade expansion, McKinley's policy of, 24-26 Trade Expansion Act (1962), 272 Trading with the Enemy Act, 141 Trans-Siberian Railroad, and RussoJapanese War, 40, 41 Truman, Harry S. on freedom, 157 and Potsdam Conference, 167 and lend-lease and containment, 177-78 and reparations and Cold War, 186-94 and Korean War, 199-202 Truman Doctrine, 178-86, 190 Tyrrell, Sir William, 70 Tzu Hsi, empress dowager of China, 39 U-2 incident, 234-35 Underwood Tariff (1913), 61 United Fruit Co., 240 United Nations Mexico's votes during Cold War, 142 declaration of 1942, 162 projected role, 163-64 and Cuban missile crisis, 264 Valley Forge Freedom Foundation, 228 Vandenberg, Arthur, 184, 185 Vanderlip, Frank A., 80 Venezuela intervention in, 26, 27 and Canal Zone diplomacy, 48, 49 Versailles Treaty, 93 Vietnam near war (1954), 224-25 Geneva Agreement on, 226, 228 under Diem, 226-29 Vietnam War motives for U. S. involvement in, 1-6 buildup, 265-69 and American disenchantment, 269-73 tmce agreement, 279

Villa, Pancho, 73 von Sternberg, Speck, 48 Wake Island, annexation of, 37 Wallace, Henry, 140 war debts and reparations, post-WWI, 108-10 Warsaw Pact, 190 Washington Naval Conference (1921-22), 113-15 Watergate, 280 Webb-Pomerene Act (1918), 63 welfare imperialism, 4 -5 Welles, Sumner, and revolutionary activity in Cuba, 135-37 Westmoreland, William, 266, 270, 273 White, Harry Dexter, 173 Wills, Garry, 266, 278 Wilson, Charles E., 253 Wilson, Henry Lane, 57, 68 Wilson, Woodrow "New Freedom" platform, 60—61

tariff policy, 60—63 policy in Central America, 64-65 and Mexican Revolution, 67-74 and China Consortiums, 78-82 and WWI, 84-89 and League of Nations, 95-97 and post-WWI Russia, 102-7 Wood, Leonard, on stable government, 31 World Bank. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development world economic conference, proposal for, 125, 127-28 World War I, 82-89 World War H, 152-55 Yalta Conference, 163-65, 176, 187 Yom Kippur War (1973), 280 Young Plan, 110 Yuan Shih-k'ai, 77-78 Zelaya, José Santos, 63-64

6 B 7

a

c 8 D E F G H I J

9 0 1 2 3 4 5

301