European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective (Routledge Advances in European Politics) [1 ed.] 0415431735, 9780415431736, 9780203016022

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European Security and Defence Policy

Security and defence is an area in which the EU has advanced considerably in recent years. A principal element of this process, which stands out in the general malaise that has befallen European integration, is the proliferating number of military and civilian crisis management missions around the world. Clearly Europe has come a long way since the disappointments and frustrations of the 1990s and it is since then that the newly developed European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has become the necessary framework for the formulation and implementation of effective European security policy. This book provides an in-depth, critical enquiry of the ESDP in action. It analyzes the implementation of military and civilian missions in the Balkans, Southern Caucasus, Africa and Asia and asks what impact they have on the ground. The editors and contributors cover a broad range of issues such as:

    

the reasons for the proliferation of ESDP deployments; the value that the operational capabilities and roles of the ESDP add to EU foreign and security policy; the strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of missions and their practical achievements in addressing the security concerns of host countries; the interaction between the ESDP and the European Commission, NATO, the USA and ASEAN; the perception of these operations by locals and the possibilities of identifying emerging patterns in the implementation of the ESDP and to tease out lessons for future missions.

This volume brings together a unique mix of senior ESDP mission practitioners and academics; the latter provide research-based expertise while the former offer unrivalled insider knowledge into the operationalization, impact and contexts of the ESDP. European Security and Defence Policy will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, security, European studies, foreign policy, peacekeeping and transatlantic relations. Michael Merlingen is Associate Professor at the Central European University, Hungary. . Rasa Ostrauskaite is a member of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, at the Council of the European Union, Belgium.

Routledge Advances in European Politics

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Democracy and Enlargement in PostCommunist Europe The democratisation of the general public in fifteen Central and Eastern European countries, 1991– 1998 Christian W. Haerpfer

Nationalism in Italian Politics The stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000 Damian Tambini International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 Edited by Peter Siani-Davies Widening the European Union The politics of institutional change and reform Edited by Bernard Steunenberg

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The Changing Face of European Identity A seven-nation study of (supra) national attachments Edited by Richard Robyn Governing Europe Discourse, governmentality and European integration William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr Territory and Terror Conflicting nationalisms in the Basque country Jan Mansvelt Beck Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy and Central Europe Claus Hofhansel Popular Protest in East Germany Gareth Dale Germany’s Foreign Policy Towards Poland and the Czech Republic Ostpolitik revisited Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff Kosovo The politics of identity and space Denisa Kostovicova The Politics of European Union Enlargement Theoretical approaches Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier Europeanizing Social Democracy? The rise of the party of European socialists Simon Lightfoot

Conflict and Change in EU Budgetary Politics Johannes Lindner Gibraltar, Identity and Empire E.G. Archer Governance Stories Mark Bevir and R.A.W Rhodes Britain and the Balkans 1991 until the present Carole Hodge The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union John O’Brennan Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy Edited by Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe Pami Aalto

E-Government in Europe Re-booting the state Edited by Paul G. Nixon and Vassiliki N. Koutrakou EU Foreign and Interior Policies Cross-pillar politics and the social construction of sovereignty Stephan Stetter Policy Transfer in European Union Governance Regulating the utilities Simon Bulmer, David Dolowitz, Peter Humphreys and Stephen Padgett The Europeanization of National Political Parties Power and organizational adaptation Edited by Thomas Poguntke, Nicholas Aylott, Elisabeth Carter, Robert Ladrech and Kurt Richard Luther

Democracy in the European Union Towards the emergence of a public sphere Edited by Liana Giorgi, Ingmar Von Homeyer and Wayne Parsons

Citizenship in Nordic Welfare States Dynamics of choice, duties and participation in a changing Europe Edited by Bjørn Hvinden and Ha˚kan Johansson

European Union Peacebuilding and Policing Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy Michael Merlingen with Rasa . Ostrauskaite

National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union From victims of integration to competitive actors? Edited by John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio

The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945 At the heart of Europe? N.J. Crowson

Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland since 1980 The Totality of Relationships Eamonn O’Kane

The EU and the European Security Strategy Forging a Global Europe Edited by Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson

European Security and Defence Policy An implementation perspective

Edited by Michael Merlingen . and Rasa Ostrauskaite

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business. . # 2008 Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, selection and editorial matter; individual contributors, their contributions All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data European security and defence policy : an implementation perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite. p. cm. – (Routledge advances in European politics) ISBN 978-0-415-43173-6 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-203-016022 (e-book : alk. paper) 1. National security–Europe–International cooperation–Congresses. 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization– Congresses. I. Merlingen, Michael, 1964- II. Ostrauskaite, Rasa, 1974ISBN 0-203-01602-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN13: 978-0-415-43173-6 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-01602-2 (ebk)

. To our sisters Egle and Sonja

Contents

Notes on contributors Preface List of Abbreviations 1

Introduction: The European Union in International Security Affairs

1

The European Security and Defence Policy: History, Structures and Capabilities

9

. MICHAEL MERLINGEN AND RASA OSTRAUSKAITE

2

xiii xv xvi

MARIA RAQUEL FREIRE

3

The Role of ESDP Operations

25

XYMENA KUROWSKA

4

The Police Mission EUPM in Bosnia, 2003–05

43

¨ HLMANN THOMAS MU

5

The EU Military Operation in Bosnia

61

THOMAS BERTIN

6

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia, 2003–05

78

TOBIAS FLESSENKEMPER

7

More than a Balkan Crisis Manager: The EUJUST Themis in Georgia

97

XYMENA KUROWSKA

8

Implementing the ESDP in Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo MARTA MARTINELLI

111

xii 9

Contents From European to Global Security Actor: The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia

128

PAUL KIRWAN

10 ESDP Operations and NATO: Co-operation, Rivalry or Muddling-through?

143

GABRIELE CASCONE

11 The ESDP between Washington and Brussels

159

JEFFREY SIMON

12 The ESDP in Action: The View from the Consumer Side

173

´ KURT BASSUENER AND ENVER FERHATOVIC

13 The Implementation of the ESDP: Issues and Tentative Generalizations . MICHAEL MERLINGEN AND RASA OSTRAUSKAITE

Bibliography Index

189

206 219

Notes on Contributors

Thomas Bertin currently works in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU on politico-military matters. Previously, he served as EU Political Advisor to the commander of EUFOR Althea and Advisor to the commander of NATO’s SFOR. Prior to his deployment to Bosnia, he served as a Desk Officer on Russia and the former Soviet Union in the French Prime Minister’s office (Le Secre´tariat Ge´ne´ral de la De´fense nationale). Kurt Bassuener is Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a transatlantic initiative for accountability in democracy promotion. He served as Strategy Analyst at the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo. He has also worked for OSCE-ODIHR’s Election Observation Mission in Ukraine, the Democratization Policy Institute, the US Institute of Peace’s Balkans Initiative and the Balkan Action Council. He has written extensively on post-conflict security, state-building, and democratization. Gabriele Cascone currently works in the Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate (EIPD) at NATO, where he is Country Officer for Croatia and Bosnia. Before joining NATO, he was an active Duty Officer in the Carabinieri Corps. This included two tours of duty at NATO’s SFOR headquarters (Sarajevo) in 1997 and 1998. He is currently writing a Ph.D. dissertation at the University in Leuven on postconflict state building in Bosnia. Enver Ferhatovic´ has extensive professional experience in the Balkans. He currently serves as the Senior Political Advisor, Political Department, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo. He has a Master of Arts in Political Science and Law, both from the Free University of Berlin. He is currently completing an MA in Islamic Studies at the Sarajevo University. Tobias Flessenkemper has worked in ESDP operations since 2003, currently as Chief of the EU Co-ordination Office of the EU police mission in Sarajevo and until early 2005 as Programme Co-ordinator of EU police mission Proxima in Skopje. Previously he worked for the OSCE,

xiv Contributors UNICEF, and the German Foreign Office in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. He also held the position of the Secretary General of the European Youth Forum in Brussels. Dr. Maria Raquel Freire is assistant professor at the Nucleo de Relac¸o˜es Internacionais, Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal. She has published widely on the EU and the OSCE. She is the author of the book Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of the OSCE. Paul Kirwan has worked in crisis management since 1992. He spent several years in Bosnia working for international organizations such as UNICEF and the OSCE. His later deployments have included Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Moldova, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. After gaining an MSc at Oxford Brookes University, Paul returned to Bosnia for the EU Monitoring Mission, becoming Head of the Bosnia Office and Deputy Head of Mission prior to his deployment to the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Xymena Kurowska is completing her PhD at the European University Institute in Florence, where she works with Friedrich Kratochwil (internal supervisor) and Ole Waever (external supervisor) on a dissertation on the policy design of the ESDP, employing a securitisation framework supplemented by Goffman’s theory of strategic interaction. Dr. Marta Martinelli is a Senior Research Fellow and MA lecturer at the Institute of European Studies, Free University of Brussels (ULB) and visiting lecturer at the UNESCO Chair Programme on Conflict Resolution and Human Rights of the University of Bujumbura, Burundi. She is also a member of the Task Force on Peace Building Policies which assists the Belgium Directorate General for Development in the formulation and implementation of its policies in particular in the Great Lakes. She has published on Security Sector Reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration issues and EU crisis management. Thomas Mu¨hlmann is the Head of Unit dealing with UN matters at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before that, he served, among others, as the Austrian Deputy Representative to the EU Political and Security Committee and as chief political advisor of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia. He has degrees in international economics and political sciences. Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defence University, USA. Previously he was Chief, National Military Strategy Branch at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. He has taught at Georgetown University and has held research positions at System Planning Corporation and the RAND Corporation. Jeffrey Simon has published extensively on European security affairs.

Preface By Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the CFSP In 2006, the European Union (EU) conducted ten operations with around 10,000 men and women serving in them. Across three continents, the Union is providing the key enablers for peace and stability, ranging from military operations to police, monitoring and rule-of-law missions. That is a striking record of activity given that our first mission under the European Security and Defence Policy – the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina – was launched only in 2003, and that some five years ago the acronym of ESDP was hardly familiar even to EU experts. In this innovative book, the editors bring together ESDP practitioners and academics. Together they have produced a volume which provides an in-depth analysis of EU operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, combining original insights derived from first-hand operational experience and academic research. From their conception in Brussels to the deployment to the field and their manifold peacekeeping and reform activities, the EU’s operations are described and analyzed. Moreover, to underline the importance of the transatlantic dimension, the editors invited colleagues from NATO and the United States to share their reading of the Union’s increasing role on the international stage. To make the inquiry even more comprehensive, the views from the ‘consumers’ of the ESDP in host societies are also presented in this volume. As the demand for EU engagement is increasing and the Union is called upon to undertake more missions in ever more challenging circumstances, it is worth reflecting with the authors of this volume on the lessons identified – if not yet learned – from the Union’s previous engagements. The chapters assembled in this book authoritatively suggest that successful crisis management requires commitment, creativity and resources (human and financial), but it also puts forward numerous useful suggestions as to how to make EU deployments more efficient. As the editors argue in the concluding chapter, the EU has successfully transformed itself into a new type of crisis management actor. The challenge for the Union now is to live up to the growing expectations. This book contains compelling analysis and a series of practical recommendations for future ESDP missions. It will be of great interest to ESDP experts and the interested public alike. The book deserves a wide readership, not just across Europe but around the world. Javier Solana

List of Abbreviations

AoR AMM ASEAN AFSOUTH AU BiH CARDS Civcom CJTF CFSP CONOPS DCAF DDR DPA DPKO DSACEUR DUI ECOWAS EAR EC ECAP ECJHAT ENP EP ESDI EPC ESDP ESS EU EUCE EUFOR EUMC

Area of Responsibility Aceh Monitoring Mission Association of Southeast Asian Nations Allied Forces South Europe African Union Bosnia and Herzegovina Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management Combined Joint Task Forces Common Foreign and Security Policy Concept of Operations Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Dayton Peace Agreement Department of Peacekeeping Operations Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe Democratic Union for Integration Economic Community of West African States European Agency for Reconstruction European Community European Capability Action Plan EC Justice and Home Affairs Team European Neighbourhood Policy European Parliament European Security and Defence Identity European Political Co-operation European Security and Defence Policy European Security Strategy European Union European Union Command Element European Union Force European Union Military Committee

Abbreviations

xvii

EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission EUMS European Union Military Staff EUPAT European Union Police Advisory Team in Macedonia EUPM European Union Police Mission in Bosnia EUPOL Proxima European Union Police Mission in Macedonia EUSR European Union Special Representative GAM Free Aceh Movement GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council HQ Headquarters IC International Community ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme IFOR Implementation Force INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe IPTF International Police Task Force ISS Institute for Security Studies IPU Integrated Police Unit KLA Kosovo Liberation Army KDOM Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission KFOR Kosovo Force KPS Kosovo Police Service LEA Law Enforcement Agency LOT Liaison and Observation Team MAP Membership Action Plan MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo MOU Memorandum of Understanding MSU Multinational Specialised Unit NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NHQSa NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo NLA National Liberation Army NRF NATO Response Force NSS National Security Strategy OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OFA Ohrid Framework Agreement OHR Office of the High Representative OPLAN Operation Plan OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE-ODHIR Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights PCC Prague Capabilities Commitment PfP Partnership for Peace PIP Programme implementation plan PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team PSB Police Steering Board

xviii

Abbreviations

PSC PIC ROLSWG RRF RRM SAA SAp SEEBRIG SEDM SBS SFOR SHAPE SIPA SSR TACIS

Political and Security Committee Peace Implementation Council Rule-of-Law-Sector Working Group Rapid Reaction Force Rapid Reaction Mechanism Stabilisation and Association Agreement Stabilisation and Association process Southeast European Brigade Southeast European Defence Ministerial State Border Service Stabilisation Force NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe State Information and Protection Agency Security Sector Reform Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States TEU Treaty on European Union TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia UBK Macedonia’s intelligence agency UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force USAID United States Agency for International Development WEU Western European Union

1

Introduction The European Union in International Security Affairs Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite˙1

The literature on European foreign policy has grown gradually since the 1970s when the members of the then European Communities agreed to coordinate their foreign policies through European Political Co-operation. During the decades that followed the topic was a kind of domaine re´serve´. Only true aficionados devoted their research to what, to many non-specialists, looked like a marginal activity. In the last ten years or so, this has changed, reflecting the Union’s emergence as an important international political and security actor. In particular, the new millennium has seen an impressive expansion of publications on what, since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, is called the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). There are general overviews, theoretical and historical treatises (Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White, 2004; Hill and Smith, 2005; Peterson and Sjursen, 1998; Nuttall, 2000; Smith, K.E., 2003; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Zielonka, 1998). Much of the remaining scholarship falls into one of two broad streams, which overlap at the margins. Simplifying slightly, one stream centres on the operation of the European foreign policy system and its inputs while the other examines the international relations of the EU (Biscop and Andersson, 2007; Giegerich, 2006; Hill, 1996; Holland, 1997; Knodt and Princen, 2003; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Meyer, 2006; Smith, M.E., 2004; Tonra, 2001; White, 2001). The former analyzes what goes on and why within the European Union (EU) and the member states when foreign policy is made. Attention is thus given to, say, the actors involved in this field, the governance structure (material and ideational) and processes through which policy is made and shaped, the effect of national preferences and/or societal identities on common external actions and the Europeanization of national foreign policies, ministries and cultures. The second stream inquires, among other things, into the policy output of the CFSP, its embeddedness in transatlantic relations and the Union’s impact, as a presence or as an actor, on the structure, processes and issueareas of world politics.

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Finally, there are researchers who seek to bridge levels of analysis. Broadly informed by the agent-structure debate in international relations theory, they analyze how the EU governance system influences, and in turn is influenced by, the conduct and identity of the EU on the world stage (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Elgstro¨m and Smith, 2006; Ginsberg, 2001; Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). The impressive scope and depth of recent research into European foreign policy notwithstanding, little sustained attention has been given to its international security dimension and hence to what is emerging as a key area of the Union’s international relations – the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Our book is part of current efforts to rectify this shortcoming and to add to our collective knowledge of the ESDP (Howorth, 2007; Howorth and Keeler, 2003; Merlingen with . Ostrauskaite, 2006). Security and defence is the area in which the EU has advanced most in recent years. A principal element of this process, which stands out in the general malaise that has befallen European integration, is an ever-growing number of military and civilian crisis management missions in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. Clearly, Europe has come a long way since the disappointments and frustration in the 1990s, when, in light of the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, analysts argued that EU foreign and security policy was ‘neither common, nor foreign, nor dealing with security, nor [could] be called a policy’ (Rummel and Wiedemann, 1998: 53). Since then the newly developed ESDP has become the necessary framework for the formulation and implementation of effective European security policy. The growing Brusselization of security policy notwithstanding (Allen, 1998), there is, as Robert Cooper (2005: 189) has pointedly remarked, no member state for which the ESDP is central to its defence and security policies. While an impressive amount of national foreign policy objectives is channelled and filtered through the EU (Ginsberg, 2001), security policy remains either more national in orientation, say, with regard to weapons procurement, or displays a high degree of multilateral co-operation, but under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The latter point leads to another observation. The ‘S’ in ESDP refers mostly to soft security – ethnic conflict, post-violence stabilization, political stability and organized crime. The case studies assembled in this volume clearly reflect this ‘bias’. However, there is a sense in which the development of military and civilian intervention capabilities, although too modest to be used for the purpose of homeland defence – the ‘D’ in ESDP – makes the Union a bit more state-like and a bit less post-modern. However, this point should not be pressed too far. Our volume documents that there is a kind of ‘self-styled logic’ at play in the implementation of the ESDP (cf. Ginsberg, 1989). Importantly, this is a post-Westphalian logic that has little to do with the pursuit of material interests or the sovereign imposition of universal(ized) values and norms on third countries.

Introduction

3

Incidentally, the implication of the priority given by the Union to soft security is that the ESDP constitutes an ‘integrated European interventionism’, at the core of which is the projection of power abroad to achieve civilian ends (Howorth, 2004: 213; see also Charillon, 2004). This volume, then, reflects the growing empirical importance of the ESDP. It goes beyond the debate on whether the EU needs the ESDP or whether the ESDP is good for Europe (Howorth, 2003; Menon, 2003; Sangiovanni, 2003). Rather, it examines the credentials of the policy both by examining how it is put into operation and how it addresses the security challenges of host countries. Implementation research is an established strand of EU studies. It concerns itself with questions such as what is the effect of institutions and interests on the enactment of EU policies and law (cf. Falkner et al., 2004; Knill, 1998). The principal concern of this volume is somewhat different. It centres on the processes of organising and running ESDP missions, their interaction with local authorities and international actors on the ground, including other EU bodies, and on mission outputs and outcomes. The overarching research question guiding the contributions is the following. How has the new security and defence actor that emerged at the European Council summit in Helsinki in December 1999 been employing its new military and civilian crisis management capabilities and to what effect? Many of our contributors analyse the implementation of EU military and civilian missions in Europe and beyond and ask whether they make or made a difference on the ground. Others explore different aspects of the political and institutional contexts of the ESDP. Together their studies take stock of the value that the operational capabilities and roles of the ESDP add to EU foreign and security policy; identify strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of missions; assess their practical achievements; investigate whether the operational experiences gained so far shaped the institutional evolution of the ESDP; ask how such operations are perceived by locals; and inquire into the interaction between, on the one hand, the ESDP and, on the other, the European Commission, NATO, the USA and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It has been said that there are more academics writing about the ESDP than people trying to make it work. We avoid this problem, or at least do not aggravate it, by bringing together a unique mix of policy-shapers and academics/policy analysts. The latter bring their research-based expertise of the ESDP and its contexts to the project, the former, many of whom have publication records of their own, their unrivalled knowledge of the missions or topics they write about.

Theoretical and methodological considerations To ensure a coherent volume and to allow a comparison of the assembled case studies on ESDP missions, we established a common framework that

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contributors were asked to employ in their analyses. To begin with, we selected a number of key issues – the preparation, launch, start-up and organization of the operations as well as their activities and impact – to give a clear focus to the chapters. We also designed a set of generic questions on mission implementation to structure the policy narratives and the evidence marshalled in their support (cf. George, 1979). We provided similar guidelines for those chapters that contextualize the ESDP. Finally, we extensively edited each chapter with a view to ensuring that the disciplines we imposed were leaving their mark on the investigations. However, we did encourage authors to add any further insights that could shed light on the intricate workings of operations and EU security policy more generally. At this point, we want to pause for a moment to express our gratitude to our contributors for being patient with us and putting up with what to some may have looked like a never-ending flow of comments, revisions and requests for changes. We hope that the readers will agree with us that the ensuing contributions are rich in detailed empirical observations, highlighting both more general and idiosyncratic features of the ESDP. Many record evidence that is unavailable to outsiders, even those who do extensive interviews, and that would be lost to scholars unless it is written down by those who participated in the deployments. In conceptual terms, the analyses of operations and their contexts are pre-theoretical. Instead of being self-consciously theoretical, we asked our authors to be deliberately self-reflective. The result is carefully constructed maps of the political settings, actions, interactions, challenges and impact of missions. Of course, these maps do not register an unproblematic reality. The concept-dependency of facts makes the empiricist ideal of pure observations a chimera. In the case of the chapters centred on individual ESDP operations, this epistemological point has a particular ramification (cf. Hollis and Smith, 1991). All these case studies provide insider views whose accounts of what went on in the operations are based on participant observations and interpretations, i.e., to use Knud Erik Jørgensen’s (2004) felicitous phrase, on acts of self-observation; in one instance, the inside story is constructed on the basis of extensive interviews with field staff. Among other things, these policy narratives cast light on the rules (formal and informal), reasons and understandings on which mission leaderships draw/drew in their day-to-day efforts to work toward their mandated objectives. Yet such inside stories, while highlighting facets of the ESDP that would otherwise remain opaque, have an obvious theoretical drawback. They do not address how the perceptions and interpretations of practitioners are themselves shaped by factors beyond their control or even knowledge. For instance, our contributors emphasize the importance attached by missions to the notion of local ownership, and they argue that this is a feature that sets the EU apart from many other international actors. What they do not take into account is how this feature is shaped by broader discourses and practices of global governmentality

Introduction

5

that mobilize, classify and organize subjects with the aim of forging alignments between their personal projects, desires and conduct and the objectives of authorities (Abrahamsen, 2004; Merlingen, 2006). This ‘bias’ of inside stories notwithstanding, we believe that there are good reasons at this stage in research on the implementation and impact of the ESDP to privilege them. There is simply too little known about this dimension of European foreign policy to theorize it. The latter demarche would run the risk of abstract academic work running ahead of actual developments. Theorybuilding and testing has to wait for further empirical research. However, in the concluding chapter we mobilize a number of theoretical concepts to offer, informed by the empirical observations made by our authors, some tentative generalizations about the ESDP.

Organization of the book The book is designed to fall into four parts. The next two chapters deal with the history, structures and capabilities of the ESDP and the formation on the part of the EU of an international security policy role conception. In Chapter 1, Maria Raquel Freire discusses the origins of the ESDP and charts its trajectory. She analyses its institutionalization, provides an overview of the current CFSP decision-making structures and capabilities and explores the political and administrative governance of the ESDP. Freire also draws attention to broader political challenges, related notably to the transatlantic relationship and EU-NATO interaction, which have been limiting Europe’s voice in international security affairs. Before concluding her chapter with a discussion of the limitations of security policy made in Brussels, she situates the ESDP in the panoply of EU first- and third-pillar foreign policy instruments. In the chapter that follows, Xymena Kurowska explains the reasons for the proliferation of ESDP missions, especially civilian ones. She argues that they have become a major vehicle for the EU Council to reshape the Union’s foreign policy role. Her argument emphasizes the importance of what she refers to as the Solana milieu in this strategic moulding and branding of the ESDP. Furthermore, she brings into focus the tensions and rivalries between these policy entrepreneurs and the European Commission, which has itself evolved into an influential foreign and security policy actor. Kurowska goes on to inquire into the grammar that structures the discursive framing of operations and the manner in which they are represented by the Council Secretariat to member states and the European Commission through such mundane formats as lessonslearned papers. She concludes with a discussion that interrogates the claim that the ESDP suffers from a democratic deficit. The second part of the volume comprises a series of process-oriented descriptions and in-depth analyses of ESDP operations. They bring into focus the multiple realities of EU crisis management and peacebuilding. These chapters have the same structure. They begin by situating the intervention in its

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issue-specific and broader political environment in the host country. Following a discussion of the political and organizational aspects of the operation, including its raison d’eˆtre, mandate, preparation, deployment, internal management and co-operation with other international actors, the authors proceed to analyze its activities on the ground, the obstacles it encountered and its impact. Each chapter concludes with a list of recommendations, based on the challenges faced and the mistakes made by the mission, of how to make the ESDP a more effective change agent. Thomas Mu¨hlmann begins this series of ESDP case studies by examining, in Chapter 4, the first-ever ESDP deployment, the EU police mission in Bosnia. Thomas Bertin, in the chapter that follows, covers the Union’s largest-ever military operation – EUFOR Althea. In Chapter 6, Tobias Flessenkemper analyses the EU police mission Proxima in Macedonia, which followed on the heels of the EU military operation Concordia. Next, Xymena Kurowska explores the first EU rule of law mission – EUJUST Themis in Georgia. Marta Martinelli concentrates on the ESDP in Africa. Chapter 8 thus explores the two military and the two civilian ESDP operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, in Chapter 9 Paul Kirwan discusses the first-ever ESDP operation set up in Asia and conducted in partnership with another regional organization – the EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh. Part three of the volume deals with two key elements of the institutional context within which the ESDP is embedded, namely the ESDP-NATO interface and transatlantic relations. Gabriele Cascone, in Chapter 10, considers EU-NATO security co-operation. Its initial institutional form centred on a revitalized Western European Union (WEU). With the decision by the EU to move (partially) beyond a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, the WEU was robbed of its function as a bridge between the two Brussels-based institutions and the mechanics of co-operation between them had to be adapted. This proved a difficult and lengthy process. Cascone singles out for analysis one particular challenge in arriving at what came to be known as the Berlin Plus arrangements – the different corporate cultures of NATO and the EU. He then shows in some detail that compared to the difficulties in negotiating the inter-institutional framework, its implementation on the ground proved rather smooth, occasional tensions and misgivings notwithstanding. Cascone goes on to outline new venues for ESDP-NATO co-operation that might be worth exploring in the future, for instance a ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’ arrangement that would see the EU give NATO access to its civilian crisis management capabilities. The chapter ends by asking how EU-NATO co-operation in operational matters has affected the politico-strategic relationship between the two organizations. Jeffrey Simon’s contribution complements that of Cascone. On the one hand, he places the ESDP in the broader political context of relations between Europe and the USA. On the other hand, he expands the examination of transatlantic co-operation at field level beyond ESDP-NATO interaction to include the US-EU management of security in Southeast

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Europe and elsewhere. The chapter begins by discussing Washington’s initially ambivalent view of the Union’s ambition to evolve autonomous military capabilities. He contrasts these concerns, which persist in the form of divergent security philosophies – Washington’s National Security Strategy and Brussels post-national European Security Strategy – with the good coordination that developed on the ground in regions in which the two sides share geopolitical interests. Simon suggests that there is room for expanding this pragmatic approach. For instance, in the area of security sector reform joint impact could be enhanced by better co-ordinating NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and ESDP law enforcement reforms or by associating the EU more closely with the American-backed Southeast European Defence Ministerial and its Southeast European Brigade. Simon highlights that an important test for minilateral US-EU security management, both at the operational and geopolitical levels, is the task to find a sustainable solution for the ‘Kosovo question’. He concludes by suggesting that for the time being Washington is less concerned about the Union’s growing presence in the security field, but more about it not being able to play a constructive role in it alongside the USA. Part 4 begins with an innovative exploration of the perceptions of the ESDP in host societies. So far, neither academics nor practitioners have paid much attention to the consumers of the security provided by EU interventions. Kurt Bassuener and Enver Ferhatovic´ argue that this oversight may stunt the effectiveness of ESDP deployments. Focusing on the operations in the Balkans, particularly Bosnia, where public awareness of the ESDP is for a number of reasons greater than in other theatres of operation, they draw on interviews and newspaper articles and on whatever polling evidence is available. What emerges from their inquiry is a cartography of ethnically shaped perceptions and fault lines but also a surprising convergence of views on some issues. For instance, EUFOR Althea is perceived by Bosnians as somewhat aloof and more bureaucratic than the preceding NATO peacekeepers. Another unexpected fact unearthed by Bassuener and Ferhatovic´ is that the perception of larger and longer-term ESDP operations is affected by their unintended economic impact on the areas in which military and civilian staff is deployed. They pick up on this issue in the conclusion where they summarize their empirical findings into four general points about public perceptions of the ESDP in host societies and make recommendations on how to ensure consumer input into mission implementation, for instance by establishing mission Ombudsman offices. In . the concluding chapter Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite review and elaborate on salient points raised by the preceding contributions. Moreover, they compare the evidence presented in the case studies with a view to arriving at theoretically informed, albeit tentative claims about emerging patterns in the implementation of the ESDP. The idea for this book was born, so very fittingly, in the Western Balkans, or, to be precise, on the banks of the crystalline Plitvice lakes, where back in

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1991 the Easter Sunday marked the beginning of the violent break-up of Yugoslavia with the first victim being a Plitvice national park police officer. Although our trip from Sarajevo to the Plitvice lakes was meant to be an adventure – which it was – it also inspired us to entertain the idea about a book which would bridge the world of scholars and practitioners so as to examine ESDP operations from both academic and field perspectives and to tease out lessons for future EU engagements. The idea resulted in a heated debate about the concept, structure and the list of yet-to-be commissioned contributors of the volume. While on some aspects agreement was quick – for example, having lived in the region for some two years, we were convinced of the importance of also presenting the consumer side or host country perspectives of ESDP missions, – others required more thought and deliberations. It took us a few months to prepare a full-fledged book proposal with which we approached our commissioning editor at Routledge. Having completed the manuscript for the volume, we are eager to go back to Plitvice, not only to find inspiration for our next project but also because the guide says that the park consists of sixteen lakes and we only saw a few, even though we walked the marked trail around the park.

Note 1 The views expressed are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Council General Secretariat of the European Union.

2

The European Security and Defence Policy History, structures and capabilities Maria Raquel Freire

This chapter aims at clarifying the modus operandi, reach and context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It inquires into its dynamics and how the European Union (EU) tackles the challenge of matching objectives with operational capabilities. To this end, the chapter begins by briefly looking at the precursors of the ESDP. This sets the stage for a discussion of the evolution of the Union’s security policy since 1999. Due attention is paid to the role of domestic and international political factors in this process. The sections that follow offer some general observations about the implementation of the ESDP and an overview of other European foreign policy instruments. Finally, an examination of the limitations of the ESDP provides an opportunity for a critical assessment of what has been achieved so far and what remains to be done.

The precursors of the ESDP The legacy of the Second World War with its tremendous destruction in Europe marked a past that European leaders were determined not to repeat. With a little push from the new superpower across the Atlantic – the USA – Western European governments succeeded in replacing age-old rivalries between their countries with dialogue, and revisionism with compromise. New international institutions were set up. The conclusion of the Brussels Treaty in 1948 – the first attempt after the Great War to prevent conflict through European integration – established the Western European Union (WEU).1 The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community soon followed and even a European army seemed no longer a utopian dream. And yet, so soon after the end of Second World War the idea of national sovereignty remained strong. Hence, even though the European Defence Community Treaty was signed in May 1952 by the six founding members of the Coal and Steel Community, Paris, its principal mentor, did not ratify it due to domestic political opposition. The project was aborted. Instead, a more traditional military alliance was created. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pooled the military capabilities of its members rather

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than integrating them, and it centred on the USA. Integration in Europe, however, was not dead. On the contrary, in 1957, the European Communities (EC) were established by the Treaty of Rome. It was driven by the desire to foster economic co-operation aimed at deepening security and stability in Western Europe, but it refrained from Brusselizing security and defence policy. This set a precedent that lasted for decades. As one observer put it, ‘throughout the Cold War, the willingness of EC members to expand integration beyond the economic and diplomatic fields was rather restrained in comparison to the role that NATO and the US played as guarantors of western Europe’s security’ (Jopp, 1997: 154). It was only in the 1970s that a first, cautious step toward a European foreign policy was taken. The Luxembourg Report of October 1970 established the European Political Co-operation (EPC) ‘to allow member states of the European Community to discuss and co-ordinate their positions on foreign affairs and, where appropriate, act in concert’’ (White, 2001: 71). The EPC, which somewhat belatedly translated Western Europe’s desire to define a common identity on the world stage and to play an active role on it into policy machinery, evolved at the time when East-West negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were ongoing. Not least to the surprise of Washington, the EC countries agreed a common line in these talks. In a precursor of things to come, Europe’s American allies saw themselves compelled to alleviate Washington’s worries about a loss of influence over them. They committed themselves to informing the White House, in a timely manner, about EPC developments. In October 1987, the Hague Platform on European Security recognized the coexistence of the European and Atlantic vectors while affirming that the European identity in security matters was complementary to that of NATO. The end of the Cold War engendered profound transformations in international politics by allowing the emergence of several new states in Europe and eliminating the Soviet threat. The new, more permissive international environment, together with the declining geopolitical importance of Europe for the sole remaining superpower, created an opening for a more autonomous EU security and defence policy. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in 1992, marked the blossoming of attempts to reinvigorate the security dimension within the EU. It transformed the EPC into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), without changing its intergovernmental character. The policy instruments of Joint Actions and Common Positions were added to the Union’s foreign policy armoury. So was the option to resort to the WEU to implement the defence tasks decided within the EU framework. Yet these structural and procedural innovations proved of limited importance when Brussels sought to play the role of peacemaker in the Balkans. The experience of impotence – its failure to stop the bloodshed in Croatia and Bosnia – brought into focus a series of serious security-related shortfalls of the

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Union. Its defence institutions, founded on the priority of territorial defence, were inadequate for the new intra-state wars. In addition, it lacked deployable, professional armed forces, had no common strategic culture and, above all, was incapable of projecting significant forces abroad (Haine, 2006). The setbacks in its backyard taught the EU the hard way that its own role conception was not supported by capabilities. Gradually, European disappointment and frustration, American demands for a fair burden sharing of defence costs among the transatlantic allies and the persistent desire of many member states to upgrade the Union’s international profile led to the narrowing of the capabilities-expectations gap (Hill, 1993). A step forward in this direction was the Treaty of Amsterdam, which gave the EU ‘a recognisable foreign policy for the first time’ (Keane, 2005: 91). It incorporated the Petersberg Tasks of the WEU – humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Moreover, it established the post of High Representative for the CFSP to give greater coherence to the Union’s foreign policy. To support the new function, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was set up. It is tasked with monitoring, analysing and assessing international developments. In order to overcome the inflexibility of consensus-based decision-making, the Amsterdam Treaty established ‘constructive abstention’ as a way for allowing a member state to abstain from engaging in a common endeavour while not preventing the rest from doing so.2 Another procedural innovation of the treaty is Common Strategies. They enable the EU, among other things, to set out clearly its objectives in key domains, say, its relations with Russia or the Mediterranean countries, and to design consistent policies to achieve them. Washington supported the strengthening of the CFSP because the process was expected to be confined to the formation of a European security and defence identity (ESDI) within NATO.3 The alliance agreed to give the WEU access to its capabilities should the EU decide to avail itself of the institution to carry out military operations in which NATO as a whole was not involved. It seemed at the time that the WEU would become the somewhat loosely attached defence arm of the Union and the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Yet these institutional arrangements failed to inject noticeable dynamism into EU security policy. Brussels’ inability to secure a diplomatic solution to the onslaught of Serbian forces against Albanians in Kosovo in the late 1990s once again showed up the dependency of the Europeans on American war-fighting capabilities. Frustrated by this state of affairs and warned by Washington that continued failure to shoulder a greater burden in the security management of their continent would imperil NATO, the Europeans looked around for new policy ideas. The breakthrough in this process came at the St Malo Franco-British summit in December 1998. Both governments declared their support for the development of an autonomous European defence capacity as long as it would not put in jeopardy the

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relationship with NATO. A week after the momentous St Malo summit, the other EU member states endorsed its proposal, which was further elaborated in the following months. For London, in particular, this series of events represented a major strategic reorientation. At the negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty the British government had still vehemently opposed the idea of merging the WEU with the EU, fearing that an autonomous EU military capability would undermine NATO. Just over a year later, London saw in the militarization of the EU the most credible strategy to save NATO from obsolescence.4 To conclude this section, a mix of factors contributed to the decision by the member states to cross the Rubicon and endow the Union with autonomous military capabilities. They include the resurgence of conflict in Europe; a diminished American will to continue providing security and defence guarantees to a Europe clearly less important in geopolitical terms than during the Cold War; and the long-standing goal of many continental European countries to affirm the EU’s vocation as a global political actor.

The institutional build-up of the ESDP At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the decision was taken to put in place the basic ESDP institutional infrastructure. Soon thereafter, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) began their work, albeit initially on an informal basis.5 Reflecting the intergovernmental nature of the ESDP, the European Commission had to accept sharing the power of initiative with the member states who have the final say in all ESDP decisions, most of which, in addition, require unanimity. As to capabilities for action, the Helsinki summit agreed a headline goal for the establishment of a rapid reaction force (RRF). It was to have 60,000 troops deployable within 60 days for at least one year. Already in the lead-up to the summit, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was appointed to the post of High Representative for the CFSP, and the WEU was incorporated into the EU.6 Taken together, these decisions promised to give the EU ‘the hammer and anvil necessary to help forge the implementation of the Petersberg tasks’ (Keane, 2005: 91). They were welcomed by the USA, albeit with a caveat. Washington remained concerned that the ESDP could grow away from NATO, eventually even compete with it (cf. Talbott, 1999). Even after the Helsinki breakthrough civilian crisis management capabilities and bodies were still missing.7 Smaller member states such as Sweden and Finland insisted on balancing the militarization of the EU with the creation of civilian instruments designed to allow the Union to play a constructive role in peacebuilding. Hence, the June 2000 Feira European Council concentrated on ESDP interventions in the areas of the rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection and policing. With the establishment of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom), the

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EU created a civilian counterpart to the military working parties created at the Helsinki summit. The civilian profile of European foreign policy was further strengthened by the adoption one year later of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Its main rationale is to complement the reactive ESDP centred on crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation with proactive conflict prevention. To date, the latest EU treaty revisions were decided at the European Council in Nice in December 2000. The summit contributed to the Brusselization of European foreign and security policy by agreeing the roles, modalities and functions of the ESDP bodies created earlier on an interim basis.8 Also, it specified provisions on the participation of non-European NATO members and EU candidate countries in ESDP operations and described permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation (European Council, 2000: Annex VI, titles III and IV). More generally, the European leaders gathering in Nice reaffirmed the Union’s determination to develop a coherent and effective approach to crisis management that brings together first- and second-pillar instruments. To translate its policy declarations on the ESDP into reality, Brussels organized capability commitment conferences. Their purpose was to take stock of deployable assets, identify and fill gaps. To give this process greater coherence the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was launched. Despite blatant capability shortfalls, the ESDP was declared partly operational at the December 2001 Laeken Council. More important for the operationalization of the ESDP than this premature announcement, was the long-awaited conclusion of the Berlin Plus arrangements at the end of 2002.9 When the Turkish government gave its consent to the deal, under the condition that neither Cyprus nor Malta would take part in EU military decisions and operations drawing on Berlin Plus, the last stumbling block disappeared in these long-winded and difficult negotiations. Finally, the ESDP had access to NATO assets, notably its planning capabilities. The EU did not waste time in making the best of the new situation. Only a few months later, it availed itself of the support of the alliance to put European soldiers on the ground in Macedonia in its first-ever military operation. To clarify and institutionalize the EU-NATO relationship a permanent EU cell was later put in place in NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and a permanent NATO liaison team was set up in the EU Military Staff. While the Berlin Plus arrangements were a milestone in the development of the ESDP, many questions regarding the EU-NATO relationship remained. This was brought into sharp relief by the diplomatic fallout among Europeans from the US-led invasion of Iraq. The Iraqi crisis confirmed the persistence of two established perspectives at the heart of the EU – an Europeanist view and an Atlanticist one. Not only did the Europeans fail to forge a common approach toward Iraq, they publicly displayed their deep divisions. The call by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003, at the height of the Iraqi crisis, to

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create an independent EU planning capability for military operations showed the dissatisfaction of these countries with American policy. Their initiative, if acted upon, would significantly downgrade the importance of Berlin Plus and, hence, the link between the ESDP and NATO. The four countries were opposed by Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Portugal who were firmly behind Washington’s policy toward Iraq and strongly rejected the idea of setting up, even if only in embryonic form, an integrated European general staff capable of planning and running EU military operations. Initially, the public diplomatic wrangling among Europeans suggested to many observers that the ESDP was dead in the water. The crisis demonstrated a lack of leadership in the EU and the existence of rival interpretations of what the ESDP is and should become. Thus, it brought to light the traditional realpolitik game of the parts searching for particular benefits and enhanced power to the detriment of the whole. What appeared to be a virtue at St Malo, constructive ambiguity as to the nature and future of the ESDP, now appeared as a major problem. And yet, the Iraqi crisis did not usher in a renationalization of foreign policy across the EU member states. After tempers had cooled down, Europe’s anti-war leaders were eager to mend their relations with the USA, say, by contributing to Iraq’s post-war reconstruction. Moreover, both Atlanticist and Europeanist capitals sought to demonstrate to themselves and the world that the ESDP was on track. The number of ESDP missions (civilian and military) began to soar. At the same time, a first effort was made to clarify the EU’s security policy aspirations and its relationship with the USA. While the European Security Strategy does not resolve authoritatively the question of whether the Atlanticist perspective of various member states is compatible with the autonomous ESDP hoped for by Europeanist governments, it does contribute, at least for the time being, to a viable compromise. NATO remains a fundamental component of the European strategy, ensuring continued American engagement in Europe while also contributing to the further development of the ESDP (Cornish, 2004: 74). The European Security Strategy, which was agreed in December 2003, sets the general guidelines for common external action (EU ISS, 2003). It identifies five major threats to European and global security. At the top of the list is the threat posed by global terrorism, followed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime. Certain differences notwithstanding (Berenskoetter, 2005), the threat assessment of the European Security Strategy overlaps to a significant degree with that of the USA. As to the Union’s strategic priorities, they are to combat these threats, including through preventive action, to extend the zone of peace and security around Europe and to promote effective multilateralism through the reinforcement of international institutions and law. The security strategy stresses that to meet these objectives, EU security policy must be made more active; more coherent through better

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co-ordination between the various policy-making levels; and more capable, especially through the development of crisis management, diplomatic and intelligence tools. Finally, the European Security Strategy de facto expands the Petersberg tasks by adding joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform to the task list of the ESDP. Freshly equipped with a security strategy, the EU defence ministers, in June 2004, adopted a new action plan known as the Headline Goal 2010. It envisions that member states will ‘be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union’ (Council of the European Union, 2004g: 2). The headline goal set in motion a flurry of activities. Among other things, work was initiated to set up a civil-military cell in the EU Military Staff with a view to smoothing cooperation between the civilian and military elements of the ESDP. The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established to inject new impetus into the ESDP capability development process. Established under a Joint Action, it aims to ‘support the member states and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future’ (Council of the European Union, 2004b). The agency’s four main tasks include the development of defence capabilities; armaments cooperation; the consolidation of a European base for technological and industrial development in support of defence; and advancing military research. The EDA also plays the role of ‘systems integrator’, assisting in the definition of defence requirements and the co-ordination of procurement across the EU (Witney, 2004). Arguably, the centrepiece of the Headline Goal 2010 is the formation of battle groups. They are combined arms, battalion-sized formations of about 1,500 highly trained soldiers. With the battle groups, the EU endowed itself with a credible military rapid reaction capability. The troops are able to respond in full force to a crisis situation no later than ten days after a formal launch decision was taken. Battle groups are sustainable for 30 days, and, if re-supplied, they can stay in their theatre of operation for 120 days. These new forces empower the EU to act in distant places and under difficult conditions, say, in mountains, deserts or jungles. Since 2007, two battle groups are on call at any given time, enabling Brussels to run concurrent military operations. In summer 2004, the member states agreed the text of the draft European Constitution. The document, which foresaw incremental rather than revolutionary changes to the institutions and policies of the EU (Reynolds, 2004), was a compromise between the federalists and those pursuing a less integrationist stance. The Constitutional Treaty dealt in a detailed way with security policy, proposing substantial changes to the CFSP/ESDP. Among the key innovations found in the document is the creation of the post of EU

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foreign minister, the stipulation of a solidarity clause that would for instance come into effect when a member state is the victim of a terrorist attack and the possibility of structured co-operation. The latter was designed to enable those member states with more advanced military capabilities to use the EU institutional framework to pursue more demanding common projects in the foreign and security policy realm. The issue that came to dominate the debate surrounding the ratification of the Constitution had little to do with such innovations. Rather, it centred on the relationship between the European political establishment and their electorates. The rejection of the Constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005 respectively brought the ratification process to a screeching halt. The seven-year battle over the constitution came to an end at the European Council in June 2007 when an agreement was reached to replace the failed constitutional treaty by a slimmed-down reform treaty. At the end of 2004, the EU reached consensus on streamlining its civilian capability development process. Copying the military Headline Goal 2010 process, it agreed a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and decided to hold commitment conferences to address identified capability shortfalls (Council of the European Union, 2004h). The civilian headline goal adds two further priorities to the existing four areas of the civilian ESDP, i.e., missions covering policing, the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. The new mission priorities are monitoring and support to EU Special Representatives. They upgrade Brussels’ capacity to become a major player in security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. Also, the civilian Headline Goal 2008 emphasizes the importance of qualitative capacity improvements and speedy deployment. The objective is to have procedures and resources in place that permit missions to be deployed within 30 days of a launch decision by the Council. In this context, modalities were outlined in the summer of 2005 for the establishment of integrated, multifunctional civilian crisis management resources, including rapidly deployable Civilian Response Teams. The tasks of the latter include carrying out fact-finding missions in a crisis situation; deploying civilian forces as a bridging measure prior to the launch of a full ESDP mission; and reinforcing existing EU crisis management mechanisms, e.g., by supplying appropriate expertise in areas such as mediation and monitoring (Lindstrom, 2006: 6). Although a few experts short of its initial target of 100 personnel trained by the end 2006, the EU is now considering a slight increase in its civilian response pool. In line with the European Security Strategy, the Headline Goal 2008 demonstrates a clear commitment on the part of the EU to the civilian ESDP. By injecting new dynamism into the civilian dimension of EU crisis management, it balances the militarization of the EU brought about by the fashioning of new tools such as battle groups. Moreover, the Headline Goal 2008 complements the civilian capabilities available for international deployment under the European Community pillar.

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The political and administrative governance of the ESDP The principles, general guidelines and common strategies governing the CFSP/ESDP are defined by the European Council. It is made up of the heads of state and government and the president of the European Commission and gathers at least twice a year. The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which is composed of the foreign ministers of the member states, is the main decision-making body dealing with Union external actions. Its meetings are attended by the High Representative for the CFSP and, depending on the agenda, those European Commissioners whose portfolios have a significant external relations component. Convened at least once a month, and twice a year with defence ministers present, it agrees in particular common positions and joint actions, which are the legal basis for any ESDP operation.10 The work programme and the agenda of Council meetings is the responsibility of the country holding the six-month Presidency. Whoever occupies the post has significant agendasetting power as they can include or exclude topics according to national priorities. This having been said, there are a number of countervailing factors which limit the Presidency’s leeway. To begin with, it cannot deviate too far from the role of an honest broker since this would impair its ability to forge a consensus in the Council, which is required for most CFSP/ESDP decisions. Second, the fact that the Presidency lasts for only six months implies that more complicated agenda items, or items that require follow-up measures, will be rolled over from one Presidency to the next. Hence, no Presidency ever develops its agenda from scratch but is constrained by the leftovers of its predecessor. Finally, the best thought-out agenda and work programme might have to be modified or even entirely reshaped if the EU is confronted with an unexpected international event or crisis. Volatility is a major feature of the foreign and security policy process in the EU. The General Affairs and External Relations Council sits at the top of a large Council machinery comprising numerous working parties. Most of the substantive CFSP work, e.g., drafting council conclusions, declarations and joint actions, is done by these parties. As a rule, ministers do not open agenda items already agreed by lower-level bodies and only negotiate politically controversial issues on which no prior agreement could be secured. There are around 30 working parties dealing with the CFSP. They are composed of diplomats from the member states plus a Commission representative. Their pre-decision deliberations are divided along thematic subjects – human rights, non-proliferation, global disarmament and arms control and so forth – and geographic areas – Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, Latin America, Africa and so forth (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 171; Nugent, 2003: 428). Despite the centrality of national capitals in designing the CFSP, day-to-day policy-making is increasingly shaped by these Brussels-based working parties.

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The Political and Security Committee (also known by its French acronym COPS) is the main ambassadorial-level body of the Council machinery dealing with CFSP/ESDP issues. It has a key role in the definition of and the follow-up to the EU’s response to a crisis. It also coordinates and guides various working groups on CFSP issues. The High Representative for the CFSP and the Council’s director general for external relations and politicomilitary affairs attend its meetings if required. Before being approved by the General Affairs and External Relations Council, draft CFSP/ESDP decisions such as joint actions and common positions are reviewed in detail by the working party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (better known as Relex) which translates political agreements into precise legal language, and considers their financial implications. All issues subject to Council decision have to be on the agenda of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper II), the highest-level administrative organ of the Council. While the deliberations of the Political and Security Committee concentrate on the political substance of draft decisions, the Committee of Permanent Representatives concerns itself with their institutional, legal and financial aspects (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 174; Duke, 2005). Coreper thus acts on CFSP matters primarily as a transit and filtering agency between the Political and Security Committee and the General Affairs and External Relations Council (Nugent, 2003: 426). To facilitate the work of the Political and Security Committee, the Nicolaidis Group, composed of junior diplomats of member states, was established in 2003. It assists in the organization of meetings and agenda items and serves as a point of contact between member state delegations and the Council General Secretariat. Below the Political and Security Committee, there are a number of bodies set up to assist it in ESDP matters. The EU Military Committee, which is composed of the chiefs of defence or their representatives, acts as a forum for military consultation and co-operation between the member states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. The committee provides military advice and recommendations to the Political and Security Committee. The EU Military Staff consists of personnel seconded from the member states. It is part of the Council General Secretariat and works under the direction of the Military Committee. Among other things, it is tasked with situation assessments, early warning and the strategic planning of EU security policy. Moving to the civilian ESDP, its hub in the Council machinery is the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Composed of member state diplomats, the committee is in charge of the conceptual elaboration of the civilian ESDP and offers advice to the Political and Security Committee on the planning, launch and conduct of civilian missions. A sui generis body in the Council is the Policy and Early Warning Unit. Made up primarily of seconded national diplomats, it supports the High Representative for the CFSP, functioning in effect as his extended cabinet. Following the recent enlargement of the EU and in anticipation of the External Action Service, the role of the Policy Unit somewhat diminished

History, structures and capabilities 19 . (Merlingen with Ostrauskaite, 2006: 42). It monitors and analyses developments that may have significant repercussions for EU foreign and security policy; identifies areas in which the CFSP/ESDP can add value to national and European Union foreign policy; and produces policy option papers (Nugent, 2003: 429). As to the Council General Secretariat, its formal function in EU foreign policy is mainly supportive, assisting the working parties and the EU term Presidency. Informally, however, it plays an important role in the policy process and the institutionalization of the ESDP (for details see Chapter 3). The Commission, while fully associated with the CFSP/ESDP, plays a secondary role to the Council. The centrality of the Council in the policy area is most pronounced when matters in hand are ‘‘purely political’’ and when the incumbent Presidency is a large member state with a big and effective Foreign Ministry and/or is a member state which prefers foreign policy matters to be conducted mainly on an intergovernmental basis. (Nugent, 2003: 430) The Commission, however, does play an important role in developing policies and policy instruments in the field of conflict prevention. More importantly, civilian ESDP operations are partly paid for by the CFSP budget which is managed by the Commission. Its financial procedures and procurement rules thus have to be followed, a fact which, as a number of chapters in this book argue, makes mission start up a slow and cumbersome process.

From capability development to implementation To date, the EU has deployed a total of 15 ESDP operations (civilian and military). At the time of going to press in April 2007, two more civilian operations, one in Afghanistan and one in Kosovo, are in the making. By the beginning of 2007, seven missions had been completed.11 In a short period, the EU has gained considerable experience in international crisis management. On 1 January 2003, the first EU civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was deployed in Bosnia (see Chapter 4). Initially it had a strength of about 500 police officers and was mandated to improve local law enforcement. On 31 March 2003, 350 EU soldiers arrived in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Code-named Concordia, the Union’s first military mission replaced the NATO operation Allied Harmony. Progress in rendering the military ESDP operational and agreement on EU access to NATO capabilities made possible the deployment of the EU peacekeeping force. The then NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson (2003: 512) described the transition from NATO to the ESDP in Macedonia as an example of successful co-operation between Europe’s two leading security institutions,

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illustrating that transatlantic relations were a positive sum game. In December 2003, Concordia was followed by Proxima, the EU’s second police mission. In June of the same year, following a request by the United Nations (UN), the EU sent 2000 troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo with the aim of preventing a large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in the Northeastern region of the country. Operation Artemis, which lasted until September, was an autonomous European mission, i.e., it was not dependent on NATO assets (see Chapter 8). In addition, it was the first EU military operation outside Europe and, thus, the first concrete step toward implementing the European Security Strategy. It demonstrated that the ESDP had evolved from a regional crisis manager confined to Europe to an actor with the ambition to become a global security player. The significance of Artemis for the EU was described by the High Representative for the CFSP, Solana, in the following succinct words: ‘when there is political will, things get done’ (Solana, 2003b: 11). Within a year, then, the EU deployed both civilian and military operations in Europe and beyond, in co-ordination with NATO, the UN or autonomously. These interventions were the beginning of what became an enlarged EU presence in different areas around the globe, stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. In the process, the EU managed to make good progress in translating its ambitions into reality and in matching commitments with capabilities without overstretching itself. However, resources are not unlimited and decisions and actions are not unrestrained. As the next sections will argue, many political and operational challenges remain on the table. A last observation on ESDP operations. Most are civilian ones, focusing, notably, on reforms of the rule-of-law sector and the policing field. The assets required for such activities are different from those needed for military interventions. While demanding in terms of human and material resources, civilian missions are politically easier than military deployments because NATO is not part of the equation. There is no risk of intra-EU quarrels between Atlanticists and Europeanists over the question of whether or not to run the operation under the Berlin Plus agreements. Nor is there any possibility for arguments over jurisdictions between the two security organizations, as NATO remains a military actor which does not run civilian missions. It is thus no surprise that civilian crisis management has proven fertile ground for the affirmation of the ESDP.

The ESDP in the panoply of European foreign policy instruments The EU has evolved into an influential international actor that is active across the world. Its foreign policy menu covers issues such as crisis management; external energy security; international measures to curb illegal migration, drug trafficking and other undesirable cross-border flows; the

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international promotion of human rights; international environmental protection; external trade; development and humanitarian aid; and so forth. To achieve its objectives in these manifold areas, the Union has developed a large set of political, economic, diplomatic and military policy instruments. One of the EU’s most impressive successes on the international stage has been the promotion of peace, democracy and market economies in ex-communist Central and Eastern Europe. An array of first-pillar or European Community tools, ranging from the enlargement of the Union to association and co-operation agreements with the former Soviet republics and Russia and more recently the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), have been used in this endeavour (Freire, 2006: 15–19; Freire and Sima˜o, 2006). In particular, the enlargement policy has proved to be a powerful tool for fostering fundamental reforms in countries that have been offered the prospect of joining the EU such as the Baltics in the 1990s and the Western Balkans in the new millennium. The European Neighbourhood Policy seeks to replicate this success without, however, promising membership to the concerned countries, e.g., Moldova, Georgia or the Ukraine (cf. Dannreuther, 2006). The ESDP is an integral part of the Union’s strategy to stabilize and democratize the wider Europe. The rule-of-law mission in Georgia and the police mission in Macedonia exemplify the fact that the Council’s ESDP and European Community development and accession policies share the same objectives and, hence, complement each other, at least in theory. The same point applies to the relationship of the ESDP with the policy tools employed under the third pillar of the EU. The external policies of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar cover, among other things, cross-border cooperation among police and customs agencies in the fight against drugs, organized crime and terrorism. The ESDP adds value to these efforts by deploying a significant number of EU personnel to countries in or emerging from crisis, i.e., countries which have little capacity to tackle these justice and home affairs problems. In principle, one of the key strengths of the EU is its panoply of foreign policy instruments which can be used to create maximum impact. In practice, institutional rivalry between the European Commission and the EU Council, bureaucratic infighting within the Commission and a struggle for influence between EU institutions and member states often undermine the unity of purpose and the coherence of European foreign policy. Acknowledging these shortcomings, the draft Constitutional Treaty abandoned the pillar structure of the EU by combining all its external competencies and activities under a single title. It would be the task of the holder of the new office of EU foreign minister, which, according to the draft Constitution, would be combined with the post of European Commissioner for external relations, to implement a unified EU foreign policy. The new EU foreign policy supremo would be supported by an External Action Service to be created by merging the Commission external relations staff with its Council

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counterpart and by adding representatives of the diplomatic services of member states. Taken together, these measures would go a long way toward translating the Union’s potential foreign policy strength – its impressive array of policy tools – into reality. The new reform treaty, which is scheduled to be ratified by 2009, promises to enact most of these conceptual innovations.

Conclusion The EU has gained prominence in security and defence matters in the new millennium. Through the creation and build-up of the ESDP, the member states endowed the Union with a new institutional structure and significant operational capabilities. Their objective to play an enhanced role in the promotion of international security and stability, through preventive action and crisis management, in civilian and military missions, has been translated, at last partly, into practice. Despite the impressive achievements of the EU in developing and implementing the ESDP, there are still many limitations. They are partly due to technical challenges, e.g., with slow decision-making procedures; and partly due to the emerging nature of the ESDP. As it evolves, the centre of gravity in the foreign and security policy process has been moving steadily toward Brussels. The increasingly post-national frame of the ESDP renders policymaking highly complex, not least because the European Commission is too weak in this policy field to play the leadership role in plays in the Community pillar. Partly the limitations of the ESDP have to do with political obstacles, e.g., the absence of a common perception across member states of the objectives of the ESDP and the means needed to accomplish them. The funding of the ESDP illustrates this latter point. Despite the progress on restructuring, flexibility, mobility, rapid reaction and modernization, without the clear commitment of resources the question must remain – how much can actually be achieved? The EU still comes nowhere near to matching the defence expenditure of the USA. (Salmon, 2005: 372–3) This last point raises a fundamental question that has not yet been answered satisfactorily by the EU. Does it want to build a defence policy matched by adequate military means, even though this would in all likelihood end up duplicating NATO assets and divert attention and resources from non-military conflict management, in which it has established itself as a key international player? Critics of the ESDP argue that Europe should concentrate on its comparative advantages – trade, international humanitarian assistance and development aid instead of looking for the chimera of European autonomy in defence (Sangiovanni, 2003). The counter-argument is that Washington made it clear to its European allies that it is no longer willing to tolerate their free riding on its provision of international security

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and stability. The USA wants to see a militarily stronger Europe. Unless the EU agrees to a clear answer to the question as to how exactly it envisions its international security role, the development of the ESDP will remain stunted by ambiguity and the various reservations member states have toward this or that aspect of the policy (cf. Everts and Keohane, 2003; Shepherd, 2006). A series of current limitations of the ESDP underscore the urgency of the problem. EU missions remain limited in scope, and depend on the leadership, commitment and interest of major member states since the Union has neither sufficient capabilities of its own nor an adequate institutional infrastructure. For example, the operational planning for Concordia and Artemis was not carried out by the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff, but by NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and the French national headquarters respectively. Moreover, the ESDP decisionmaking principle of unanimity, while affirming the sovereignty of member states, threatens to undermine other advances in the implementation of a common European security policy, particularly in defence matters. It remains a fact that in many instances, European capitals prefer to act bilaterally or through ad hoc coalitions rather than through the EU. Such national instincts constitute a fundamental obstacle to the EU’s vocation as a shaper of international security. In a similar vein, in major meetings the EU is usually represented by different actors that have divergent definitions and perceptions of interests and policies. The difficulty in reaching common ground among the EU member states gives the impression that the ESDP has ‘been constructed on the premise of what is possible rather than what is needed’ (Lindley-French, 2002: 217). In short, much remains to be done to clarify and streamline the process through which the EU makes and implements foreign and security policy and to strengthen its capabilities (civilian and military). Whether such reforms will be undertaken and whether commitments and actions by member states at the decision-making level in Brussels and in theatres of operation around the world will demonstrate sustained political willingness to empower the EU in security matters remains to be seen.

Notes 1 The Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective SelfDefense, or the Brussels Treaty for short, was agreed by Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 2 This mechanism does not apply if the abstaining member states account for more than one third of weighted Council votes. 3 ‘ESDI was a careful two-way bargain by which the US agreed to support European efforts to gain greater military credibility in exchange for which Europeans committed to pursue their military ambitions inside NATO, thereby granting an element of US political control’ (Sangiovanni, 2003: 196; see also Webber et al., 2002).

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4 Signs of London’s strategic reversal were already visible at the EU summit in Po¨rtschach, Austria, in October 1998 and in a number of subsequent speeches by prime minister Tony Blair. For example, at one such occasion Blair (BBC, 2003) said that it made ‘complete sense [to him] in circumstances where NATO is not engaged, for Europe to have the capability and the power to act in the interests of Europe and the wider world’. 5 The ESDP decision-making structure was agreed upon by the European Council in Nice of 7 to 11 December 2000. 6 According to the WEU decisions in Marseille in November 2000, the WEU maintained its collective defence obligations as well as minimal structures and residual functions to support the transition process (WEU, 2000: 1 paragraph). 7 However, the Helsinki summit agreed the creation of a Co-ordinating Mechanism in the Council General Secretariat to maintain a database of national civilian crisis management personnel that can be employed under the ESDP. 8 The PSC and EUMC were established by Council decisions on 22 January 2001; they explicitly refer to the agreement reached at the Nice European Council. 9 For details of the arrangements, see Chapter 10. 10 As a rule, each term Presidency of the EU hosts an informal gathering of EU foreign ministers; these gatherings are known as Gymnich meetings. 11 The completed operations are the following ones: the police mission Proxima in Macedonia; the police advisory team EUPAT in Macedonia; the military operation Concordia in Macedonia; the rule-of-law mission EUJUST Themis in Georgia; the Aceh Monitoring Mission; the military operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and the military operation EUFOR RD Congo.

3

The Role of ESDP Operations Xymena Kurowska

The period since 2003, when the first operation under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched, has witnessed an impressive proliferation of ESDP deployments. Civilian missions in particular have been gaining salience. The expansive dynamic characterising the ESDP disrupts the received wisdom about the incremental and reactive nature of European foreign policy integration. The neat picture of the European Union (EU) as an economic giant but a political dwarf and a military worm has similarly ceased to reflect the EU stance.1 While debates about whether the EU has grown out of the clothing of a ‘civilian power’ and put on an armour, or whether recent attempts to achieve greater visibility in the field of international security represent a fleeting phenomenon are important, they remain somewhat ‘academic’ as long as they do not carefully examine the actual role and record of the ESDP (Smith, K. E., 2000; Stavridis, 2001a, 2001b; Martinsen, 2003; Treacher, 2004; Whitman, 2006). The chapter takes a closer look at the general features of the ESDP. While it contends that ESDP missions have become a major vehicle for realising EU security policy, it also argues that they serve the broader aim of positioning the EU on the international stage. More concretely, the process of deploying missions is revealed to be a strategic search for opportunities to convey an image of the EU as a unique crisis manager. In developing this argument, the chapter challenges the claim that there is no evidence of top-down initiatives apart from the European Defence Agency (Khol, 2005; Biscop, 2005) and the European Security Strategy (Bailes, 2005). Politics being the art of the possible, however, ESDP decision-makers and shapers do not act unconstrained, if only for the existence of other prominent conceptions of the EU as an international actor. The established views of the member states play a role as well as those of the European Commission.

The ESDP takes over the CFSP Although formally an instrument at the service of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the ESDP has grown to be a major driving

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force behind the advancement of EU foreign policy. Soon after its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, it became clear that the CFSP lacked the tools to deliver on its promise to raise the profile of the EU in international security affairs. It was in need of a fundamental boost, and the ESDP provided it. As Javier Solana put it, with the ESDP we ‘are giving ourselves the tools to deliver’ (Solana, 2000). Interestingly enough, the ESDP has been relatively isolated from the overarching EU integration project. It has developed at a rapid pace unparalleled in other EU policy areas, advancing despite setbacks of various kinds and in spite of the comparative decline in the significance of the CFSP. In the pursuit of a specific rationale, its substance has been shaped by distinct mechanisms, among which the British-French dyad is crucial as opposed to the usual FrenchGerman tandem. Although the Balkans experience of failure might have provided an initial catalyst for the ESDP (Pond, 1999), it has now overgrown its original justification and acquired more proactive features. The contingency and accidental character of many ESDP moves should not therefore obscure a more strategic if fragmentary framework behind the policy. The core of this framework is constituted by operations. They represent the most significant, if not the defining, feature of the ESDP. They are the crisis management tools that the CFSP initially lacked. The operations thus give the EU much greater capacity to translate its CFSP treaty commitments and strategic vision into action. ESDP deployments effectively symbolize the EU search for a niche on the world stage. Crucially in this context, two questions arise. How can this proliferation of ESDP missions be accounted for in relation to EU (domestic) politics, and what is the nature of these deployments, i.e. how does the actual process of selecting and dispatching missions unfold? The latter question is examined in the next section in order to provide empirical evidence elucidating the main argument.

What missions are Formally, missions are reactions to crises on the ground2 as the EU engages in what has been offered to it (Serrano, 2006: 39). However, the decisionmaking process leading to deployments challenges this assertion. Although the situation in Georgia after the Rose Revolution in November 2003 may be categorized as socially turbulent,3 a great deal of dedication was required in order to label the ESDP mission – EUJUST Themis – a crisis management operation. A functionary in the Council General Secretariat put it in the following way. At that time there was a clear moment when in the house [directorate for civilian crisis management], they tried to promote rule-of-law civilian crisis management. Some aspects thereby coincided – preparing

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the concept of rule-of-law missions, the subsequent process of gathering experts for this purpose and the political moment in Georgia.4 Similarly, EUJUST Lex, the integrated rule-of-law mission for Iraq, became a form of therapy for member states to demonstrate good will after the diplomatic fallout from the Iraq war as well as an attempt to initiate some kind of engagement that could flag the EU presence in Iraq. The actual mandate was thus of less importance and ‘rather accidental’ as it largely reflected what was possible to agree on at the time the decision was taken.5 The mission further developed into a vehicle to prove that although the military dimension still represents a contentious area for EU co-operation, the civilian realm is a highly productive field.6 Also, ESDP operations cannot be classified as crisis management tools only. A major rationale underpinning them is that they provide important building blocks in the construction of an EU security policy. Artemis demonstrated that the EU was capable of launching an autonomous, full-fledged military operation far away from its borders. Aceh denoted ‘going global’ while the Balkans and Middle East operations confirm(ed) the EU commitment to sensitive regions in its neighbourhood. The opportunistic search for actionable crises is nevertheless scarcely exposed. Each Joint Action, the legal basis for every mission, contains the customary formulation that the mission was agreed in response to the explicit prior request of the host government. The actual modus operandi, however, looks different. It involves a series of exploratory and pre-factfinding missions before a concrete mission proposal is formally submitted to the Political and Security Committee. Initial examination of whether there is room for an ESDP action is supplemented by research and consultations on the ground. Hence, although a needs-based assessment of the country is a part of the pre-launch discussions, the mandate of the mission is an outcome of concentrated mediation among EU actors in which reputational concerns play a prominent role. As to the official invitation from the host government, it is regularly obtained already in the pre-operational phase of the mission. The argument put forth here neither underestimates the importance of diplomatic rules of procedure nor does it overestimate the neo-colonialist drive behind the action of the Council General Secretariat. Instead, it reveals how ESDP missions are put together by highlighting the political mechanisms involved in the process. The described patterns further point to the pragmatic character of the ESDP (Solana, 2000). Its practitioners argue that although principles are necessary, by themselves they do not make up a policy. They have to be turned into reality (Solana, 2001a). A ‘learning-by-doing’ experience, the CFSP/ESDP has to be shown to work if the member states support it (Solana, 2001b). This is why so little time is spent on worrying about theory or institutional issues and the focus rather is on solving real problems (Ibid.). Javier Solana evokes his experience as the former Secretary General of NATO in a telling testimony before the House of Lords.

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Xymena Kurowska I am very obsessed with the rhythm in which deployments out there can arrive because I have seen this experience. I was Secretary General of NATO when we deployed in late 1995/early 1996 the first troops to Bosnia and I had to take a decision collectively [ . . . ]. If we had waited to have all the elements until the last letter of the document for the first time that NATO was going on to do a peacekeeping operation resolved and understood, it probably would be still without finish or without a start. We had to say, ‘‘Let’s go, let’s do it, we will be able to do it, we have the spirit’’ and, if we had not gone then, by the time we arrived, the catastrophe that we claimed we wanted to stop would have been more difficult to stop or would have been unnecessary to stop because they had killed each other and the reconstruction would have been more difficult, etc, etc. So, to be right in time is very difficult but to be as close as possible right in time for any elements of the crisis management, be it money, be it diplomacy, be it civilian aspects or be it military aspects, in my mind is fundamental and really it makes all the difference. (House of Lords, 2004: 13–14)

This pragmatic focus translates into such provisos such as ‘we make it up as we go’, ‘we refine our ways as we gather experience’ or ‘we deploy a mission to then stimulate our own ability to deploy missions’.7 Yet, notwithstanding the critique that missions come about in an accidental fashion and that they represent a case of ‘putting a tool ahead of the analysis’,8 the decisions to launch them never come out of thin air. Deployment decisions rather reflect a strategic search for opportunities, which, first, make a statement about the EU directed toward external audiences and, second, create useful institutional precedents and evidence that can be used in internal political struggles. The preoccupation with seizing suitable possibilities to deploy missions might result in less emphasis being given to the actual substance of mandates. Far from discounting the merit of any mission, this is instead indicative of the Solana milieu’s proactive approach to the construction of a global security role for the EU. In a similar vein, ESDP deployments are viewed by the EU Council General Secretariat as a testing ground for establishing whether or how the EU is capable of delivering. The Laeken declaration announcing that the ESDP is operational provided an enabling carte blanche in this context.9 Thought by many to be merely declaratory politics, it nevertheless initiated a parade of missions and led to the accumulation of institutional experience. While the challenge of the Laeken declaration of operationability was to convert speech into deed, the relation between the ESDP and the European Security Strategy (ESS) is a case of cross fertilization. The perceived need to provide conceptual and political grounding for missions and to strengthen the ESDP at a time when the CFSP seemed in shambles over the Iraq discord were important reasons behind the formulation of the strategy

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(Mawdsley and Quille, 2003). The perceived necessity to operationalize the latter and demonstrate its feasibility generated a demand for more missions in line with the goals outlined in the strategy. In this sense, the ESS has become a constant point of reference providing justification for further action where the expansion of ESDP missions is seen as an endorsement of the ESS. ESDP operations, then, are as much a response to an international security issue as they are a political means to advance a particular agenda. The process of choosing what mission to launch is therefore highly nuanced. The Council General Secretariat looks for deployments that promise to generate maximum political capital whilst avoiding radical positioning and challenges that might end up in total disaster. This strategic approach has resulted in making the ESDP an impressive success story.

Two political actors in performance The establishment of the office of the High Representative for the CFSP and the appointment of Javier Solana to the post have been the driving force behind the strategic moulding of the ESDP. In reporting their findings from interviews conducted in 2005, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006: 10) emphasized that the ‘Solana effect’ was striking in comments by officials of the Council General Secretariat and the member state permanent representations. Without exception, they referred to Solana’s appointment when asked about the principal changes in the Union’s role as a political actor since 1999. Conversely, commentary from the Commission officials reflected their sense of marginalization from key foreign policy processes and events. Assuming a substantial entrepreneurial role in fleshing out the ESDP, the Council General Secretariat exploits opportunities to paint a particular picture of the EU as a crisis manager that is ‘active but non-threatening’ (Solana, 2006). In order to render the new EU security agenda explicit and visible, in 1999 Solana’s office had already started a quest to put together the missing link of EU security policy, namely a skilful, if at first low-profile, pragmatic leadership. The continuity of this leadership contributes to the build-up of an institutional memory of how to do things effectively and ensures a strategic agenda management. The Secretariat does more than set the ESDP agenda. Its influence extends to what Jonas Tallberg (2006: 68–70) refers to as agenda structuring, i.e. the ranking of issues according to salience, and, by extension, agenda exclusion, i.e. the mobilization off the agenda of certain issues. The ensuing practical emancipation of the Council General Secretariat from the member states has been facilitated by the latter’s wish to ‘informally’ delegate power to the former on issues that require a degree of engagement and expertise they can ill afford. This is not to suggest that member states renounced their prerogatives. On the contrary, the perception on the part of national capitals that on the key issues they are in control of the second pillar has proven instrumental to the development of the ESDP.10 The member states view the ESDP through

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national lenses and become active in ESDP decision-making when a region falling within their interest is on the agenda. Hence, the cliche´s of France’s dedication to Africa and of the preoccupation with post-Soviet space of the Eastern European members apply. As to inter-pillar relations in crisis management, they reflect the larger phenomenon of the Community and the CFSP pillars functioning according to differing working philosophies. This has to do not only with the fact that the Commission is a supranational body and the CFSP is an intergovernmental policy but also with the increasingly diverging ideational principles sustaining their institutional identity. The two institutional entities hold disparate standpoints on best practices in crisis management. Their policies and channels of implementation accordingly reveal contrasting beliefs about the image of the EU as an international actor, including dissimilar security conceptions. Although they essentially agree on what is to be achieved to make the world a better place – the usual ‘European’ values of democracy, rule of law and so forth – they nonetheless characteristically diverge on the matter of best strategies, means and practices to reach the ideal state. Conceptually, whereas the Commission inhabits the world of ‘civilian power Europe’, even if modified in accordance with the changing historical conditions, the Solana milieu has ventured to make the EU a ‘militarized civilian power’, believing such a transformation is the proper response to the exigencies of a globalized world. Solana, as the personification of EU foreign policy, represents the trend of the EU ‘coming of age’ and shedding the clothing of a civilian power only. He generally advocates an approach according to which the security situation has to be stabilized before major long-term development assistance can be initiated. He further favours highprofile political action, which should generate substantial even if cursory political capital and immediate impact in a particular environment. Because of the large publicity they generate, military and civilian missions have become the cutting edge of the ESDP, its essence and, simultaneously, a vehicle for implementing ‘militarized civilian power’.11 This notion was codified in the ESS – a manifesto of Solana’s vision of the international security role of the EU. The European Commission, although initially lagging behind, eventually evolved the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as the embodiment of its conceptual stance on how best to project order and security to the EU’s periphery. A comprehensive attempt to emulate the robust ESDP venture, the ENP is a way for the Commission to upgrade its profile in the field of external policy, i.e., it is the realization of a certain political project. The objective of the ENP as articulated by the Commission is for the EU to act coherently and efficiently in the world by integrating related components from all three pillars; as such, it should also support efforts to realize the goals of the ESS (European Commission, 2004: 6). In practice, however, things may turn out differently. Rule-of-law reforms in Georgia illustrate

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this point. The Council decided that after the mandate of EUJUST Themis expired, Brussels should continue, through the CFSP, to provide assistance to the country’s judicial sector. The staff of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) responsible for the Southern Caucasus was augmented and tasked to monitor, and assist the Georgian government in, the implementation of the Strategy for Criminal Law Reform, which had been drafted with the help of Themis.12 The European Commission, in turn, helped the government to put together the action plan to meet ENP requirements and thus become eligible for receiving benefits on offer under the policy. Yet, once the strategy was, at the request of Tbilisi, incorporated into the action plan,13 the European Commission representatives on the ground claimed primary responsibility for the project and marginalized the role of the EUSR in the process.14 This example highlights the persistence of incoherence and turf battles in EU external action, which can even involve legal action by one institution against the other (see also Chapter 7).15 The claim here is that at least partly these problems can be attributed to the rise of intra-EU politics in the construction of EU external policy, a politics which is fuelled by distinct institutional identities and different visions of the EU’s role in international security.

In this period of peace in Europe, there is a temptation to neglect defences The specific understanding of security evolved by the Solana milieu deserves some attention. Already in remarks to the press after assuming his functions, Solana reformulated in more concrete terms an argument that was vaguely present before, namely that introducing improved military capabilities is consistent with Europe’s growing role in the world. According to this view, the success achieved by the EU in other fields of European integration had to translate into the EU becoming a more active and influential global power; in order to stand up to the global challenge, the EU should have an effective foreign, security and defence policy (Solana, 1999a). Too often in the past, the EU was unable to protect and enhance the values that are at the core of the European project. Steps should therefore be taken to enhance the EU’s credibility in the eyes of the European public, the transatlantic partners and beyond. What ultimately is at stake in building an effective ESDP, according to Solana, is the credibility of the member states. Is their commitment to values cheap talk or are they willing to shoulder the costs of promoting and defending them in a world in which they are violated too often? (Solana, 1999b). More than simply rhetoric, this framing represents an organized interpretation of EU security policy as performed within the second pillar. Challenged by the divergent visions of the member states, their unwillingness or incapability to get their acts together at times, Solana’s discursive intervention has nevertheless developed into the intersubjective consensus underpinning the ESDP. As he put it,

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Xymena Kurowska it has been clear for some time that if Europe is to take its rightful place on the world stage it needs to have an ESDP [...] First the Bosnia crisis and then Kosovo have made it clear that we need more than just declarations of intent. We need to be able to act. And that means having military capabilities. (ibid.)

The conceptual contours of the Solana milieu are significantly shaped by Robert Cooper, the former foreign policy advisor to Tony Blair who is currently director general for external and politico-military affairs in the EU Council General Secretariat. Cooper, whose influence exceeds the formalized competencies attached to his office, believes in a muscled (EU) foreign policy. An editorial in the Guardian went so far as to state that his advocacy, when he was a government official, of force and imperialism was ‘unprecedented and inflammatory’ (Guardian, 2002). Some member states found the proposition in the initial version of the ESS that ‘pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future’ (Solana, 2003a), a proposition for which Cooper was responsible, equally provocative and hence insisted that it be dropped. Cooper’s well-known book explicates the philosophy informing his foreign policy views. Common European values have grown out of common historical experience, which, in extreme cases, can provide a justification for armed intervention. For a postmodern state [which the EU is (becoming), according to Cooper] there is a difficulty. It needs to get used to the idea of double standards. Among themselves, the postmodern states operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state outside of the postmodern limits, Europeans need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the 19th century world of every state for itself. In the jungle, one must use the laws of the jungle. In this period of peace in Europe, there is a temptation to neglect defences, both physical and psychological. (Cooper, 2003: 61–62)

The security development nexus Rigid as the dichotomy may seem, the security versus development debate still maintains its vigour in the conceptual and institutional differentiation between the Council General Secretariat and the Commission. This is seen vividly when one compares speeches by Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for external relations. While both stress the interrelated character of security and development, a closer reading reveals

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subtle differences in meaning. What is more, these nuances are grounded in institutional identities rather than personal idiosyncrasies. Hence, the respective institutional practices reflect these differing understandings. In the European Commission lexicon, development assistance remains a vital issue (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). The Commission stands for the idea that long-term investments in developing democratic practices and in the promotion of the rule of law and of civil society in fragile communities is a key to bringing about security. ESDP interventions are therefore often framed as ‘a drop in the ocean’, aimed at acquiring political clout and hardly capable of inducing systemic changes.16 Conversely, the ESS explicitly spells out that security is a precondition of development as ‘conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible’ (EU ISS, 2003: 324). Although no Council official calls for the reduction of development aid, Solana believes that it cannot be distributed and used in a productive manner if the security situation is shaky (House of Lords, 2004: 8–9). In order to reconstruct post-crisis countries, one has to guarantee security first. We have several examples of how by not creating the conditions of security lots of money has not arrived to where it should arrive and has not been used in the best manner. It does not mean that you have to bring to zero the economic help but it is a question of phases [emphasis mine]. (ibid.) This insistence on a ‘harder’ security vocation of the EU implies not only a reconceptualization of the role of the EU in the international arena but also an institutional recalibration within the EU. The dominant position of the European Commission in external action, which is based on its status as financial development aid provider in chief, is challenged by a more assertive Council, which believes that security is prior to development. In brief, the proliferation of missions is a channel through which the security conceptions of the second pillar become asserted. As such, it marks the realization of a political project advocated by the Solana milieu.

The civilian triumphs over the military The decision by the member states to establish the Rapid Reaction Force as part of the ESDP has been described as ‘Europe’s military revolution’ (Andre´ani et al., 2001) and as breaking the ‘glass ceiling of Europe’s selfdenying ordinance on EU access to military competencies’ (Deighton, 2002). Yet, although the build-up of military capabilities tends to dominate debates (public and academic) on the ESDP, it is the number of ESDP

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civilian missions that has rocketed over the last few years. Likewise, although the launch of the ESDP proceeded on the assumption that to become a credible international actor the EU had to acquire military capabilities,17 the success of the ESDP is largely due to the upsurge in civilian crisis management. Of the fifteen ESDP operations launched by the time of writing in April 2007,18 only three were military ones. However, considerable effort has been made to build up a pool of capabilities readily available for military crisis management. The Berlin Plus agreement with NATO on EU access to NATO assets, the Headline Goal 2010 on capabilities improvement, the establishment of the European Defence Agency and the concept of battle groups come to mind. So does the set-up of military structures in the Council General Secretariat. Also, the symbolic dimension of actually having military missions should not be underestimated. With the deployment in Macedonia of Concordia, which comprised about 400 troops, the EU demonstrated for the first time that it was capable of mounting a military peacekeeping operation. Althea showed off the EU’s growing role in Bosnia as it deployed about 7,000 troops. And Artemis symbolized that the ESDP can function without NATO support under the Berlin Plus agreement. The operation, which was led by France as its framework nation, was conceived as a vehicle for asserting the autonomous capability of the EU to intervene militarily abroad. In short, just like the civilian ESDP, the military ESDP is at least partly the manifestation of the Council’s desire to develop and institutionalize its security vision rather than simply a response to (human) security threats abroad. However, as noted above, the military ESDP has far fallen behind the civilian ESDP in terms of missions launched. Furthermore, it also lacks the kind of institutional, bottom-up inventiveness present in its civilian counterpart. A conventional explanation of these differences might point toward, first, the reluctance of member states to support military missions because of their allegiance to NATO, and, second, the scantiness of military resources at the disposal of the Union. However, another reason appears to be equally important in accounting for the particularities of ESDP development. Early on, the Solana circle realized that the military dimension of the ESDP remained controversial, while there were many political opportunities to deepen and widen the policy via civilian missions. To take advantage of these opportunities as quickly as possible, mission planners even employed modified military scenarios inherited from the Western European Union (WEU) as there were initially no civilian conflict management scenarios.19 Traces of this strange origin of civilian missions persist in mandates and planning documents in the form of military terminology such as the concept of operations (CONOPS) and the operational plan (OPLAN). The greater dynamism of the civilian ESDP, then, is explained by the fact that civilian missions are a comparatively easy option to advance the security profile of the EU. Troop deployments are quite difficult to agree on and high-end military operations require capabilities not yet available under

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the ESDP. Against the backdrop of controversies surrounding military operations, the Council General Secretariat ventured on to the field of civilian crisis management, traditionally occupied by the European Commission, to boost the ESDP. From the perspective of the institution-builders in the Secretariat, civilian missions have a number of advantages. To begin with, they are more ambiguous and hence are less likely to fail, or, more precisely, their shortcomings can be easier disguised as a partial or even full success. The formulation of their mandates is evocative in this respect. For instance, it is difficult to imagine any scenario that would allow critics to describe the EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah as an outright failure. Its mandate tasks it to provide a ‘Third Party presence [emphasis mine] at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority’ (Council of the European Union, 2005h). In addition, civilian missions represent a nuanced engagement with little risk of radical positioning, which might otherwise clash with member state agendas. Finally, they are good ‘value for money’, enabling the EU to engage in relatively low budget ventures that nonetheless flag its presence in a given international situation.20

Stepping on the conquered land The ESDP’s deep intrusion into the area of civilian crisis management has caused frictions with the European Commission, which until not long ago regarded the promotion of the rule of law and institution-building as its exclusive domain. Its institutional resentment of the encroachment of the ESDP on its turf is further aggravated by the current trend that sees the Council reclaim political influence it had previously ceded to the supranational body. In response, the Commission seeks to be involved at every stage of the ESDP policy cycle. This is facilitated by, first, its role as a budget manager and executor of the civilian ESDP and, second, its mandate to ensure consistency and procedural integrity of EU external action at every level of the CFSP. In practical terms, the involvement of the Commission becomes politically tangible in the course of negotiating the formats of particular mission as well as their budgets and adherence to procurement policy rules.21 For instance, the European Commission delegation in Tbilisi had been engaged in advisory assistance to the Georgian justice ministry, focusing on support to the penitentiary system, before the ESDP mission Themis was launched to assist Georgian authorities in drafting its criminal justice reform strategy. Consequently, the European Commission’s priority in negotiating the format of Themis was to ensure that it was kept out of the business of penitentiary reforms.22 However, as the criminal justice reform strategy covered the entire criminal code, from investigations to the penitentiary system, the success of the Commission in limiting the brief of Themis hampered the latter’s impact and frustrated its staff.23

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In light of the empirical record, it is thus premature to claim that the proliferation of ESDP missions implies a second-pillarization of EU crisis management. Rather, political struggles are in full swing with both pillars strategically employing different media and channels to affirm their respective institutional distinctiveness in external action. The concept of emulation is useful to account for this process. Emulation here does not refer to an attempt to imitate or copy but points to a political contest over how to frame reality. Opportunities for engagement open to both pillars give rise to battles over the definition of situations and issues and, consequently, the choice of appropriate policy instruments. Two examples underscore this point, namely the involvement of the European Commission in EUJUST Lex and the intricate structure and status of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova/Ukraine (EUBAM). In the case of Lex, the deputy head of mission, who, incidentally, was appointed without prior consultation with the head of mission,24 was a Commission fonctionaire. She was double-hatted (reporting to both the Council and the Commission) in order to prepare for the further engagement of the Commission in Iraq. The latter regards Lex, which runs rule-oflaw training courses, each three weeks long, for Iraqis outside the country, as a useful, albeit limited training intervention. However, the Commission insisted from the beginning that the ESDP mission had to be enhanced by its own long-term programmes.25 The anchor of this involvement is the Rule-of-Law-Sector Working Group (ROLSWG), which is chaired by the Iraqi chief justice and tasked to co-ordinate the activities of international donors in this issue-area with the aim of producing a comprehensive reform strategy. The EU is represented in ROLSWG by three institutions – the Commission, Lex and the term presidency. The work of the EU in the group is co-ordinated by the Commission in the person of the deputy head of Lex. The intention is to assign this task to the newly established European Commission office in Baghdad, whose work will focus exclusively on ROLSWEG.26 While this example demonstrates the potential for inter-pillar synergy, it also reveals that such synergy does not come easy as both the Commission and the Council seek to mould EU external action according to their political visions. In the case at hand, the co-operation between the two institutions was the outcome of intense negotiations and inter-institutional appeasement for the sake of showing the EU flag in Iraq. Sometimes the political rivalry between the two pillars over EU foreign and security policy does not have such a happy ending as the case of EUBAM shows. The conception and launch of the mission proceeded in the context of intense Council-Commission bargaining over its structure and leadership.27 The European Commission deployed two arguments to reject the demand of the Council to take charge of the intervention by giving it the form of an ESDP mission.28 First, the intervention did not foresee a military aspect and, second, the Commission was already engaged in the region and was thus better placed to take on the job. The result of the

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ensuing haggling was a mission structure that is hardly comprehensible, let alone efficient. The head of mission is a senior political advisor to the EUSR for Moldova and leader of an enhanced support team on border monitoring assigned to the EUSR. The Joint Action on the mandate of the Special Representative was amended to accommodate the new tasks of the EUSR for Moldova in relation to the EU Border Mission for Moldova-Ukraine [which is designed] to enhance the effectiveness of border and customs controls and border surveillance activities in Moldova and Ukraine along their common border, with a particular focus on the Transniestrian section, notably through an EU Border Mission. (Council of the European Union, 2005f) The Council thus implicitly assumes the ownership of EUBAM. Conversely, the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the governments of Moldova and Ukraine on the ‘EC Border Assistance Mission’, which is the legal basis for the project, states that the Border Assistance Mission operates under the auspices of the European Commission and is funded through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the Tacis programme.29 Clearly, here synergy between the Commission and the Council has given way to rivalry and confusion over who runs the mission and guides its activities. To conclude this section, in line with the treaties, the Commission is content with playing a secondary role to the Council when a planned ESDP mission has a military component and when security conditions on the ground prevent it from taking autonomous action. However, tough negotiations between the two institutions are the norm when it comes to the civilian ESDP, especially interventions aimed at rule-of-law reforms and institution-building, and to regions where the Commission has a history of engagement. This specifically pertains to the post-Soviet space which is thickly covered by various European Commission programmes, including Tacis. In short, the construction of the ESDP is a political process in which actors produce and reproduce certain beliefs and ideologies about what the EU should be like and work at constructing alliances around these conceptions (Wodak, 2004).

The success story The Council General Secretariat is not shy when it comes to publicizing the value, as it sees it, that ESDP missions add to Commission activities. Its key messages are, first, that the high political profile and strategic nature of ESDP interventions generate a powerful momentum for reforms in postcrisis societies. This provides the scope conditions for the successful implementation of technical Commission programmes.30 Second, given its political

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nature, the ESDP is neither constrained by institutional rigidity nor impaired by overly complex and time-consuming procedures.31 It is thus a highly flexible tool, that can adapt quickly to different situations;32 missions can be fine-tuned to tackle the unique challenges on the ground. Third, the fact that member states retain control over missions and their national staff makes them more willing to engage in hot spots around the world. Fourth, missions can be deployed rapidly and have access to experts from the highest echelons of the administrative systems of member states. These claims play a significant role in the process of advancing a second-pillar conception of EU external action. In line with the message of the comparative advantage of the ESDP over European Commission instruments, missions ‘are deemed to be successful’ from the moment the decision about the deployment has been taken.33 Hence, there is only one conceivable scenario in which the Council might publicly criticize its deployments, namely if it decided to re-engineer the ESDP, say, the way missions are planned and run. In such a case, the criticism of mission performance would function as a means to justify major institutional change.34 Turning to the related issue of how the Council General Secretariat markets the ESDP to internal audiences, notably the member states, it is instructive to look at the in-house evaluations of missions. Though supposedly a strictly pragmatic exercise, the drafting of lessons-learnt documents and mission reviews is a politically-driven, iterative process in which the most controversial points initially raised by mission leaderships and those mid-level Council Secretariat staffers who have detailed knowledge of missions are gradually toned down or eliminated. Only once the evaluation has been defused, it is presented to the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The point to be made here is that mission reviews and lessonslearned papers constitute a particular genre. They are a politically conditioned exercise, influenced by strategic concerns unrelated to the substance of any particular mission. The wording of these documents reflects the concern of the Solana milieu to play up the success of missions and its reluctance to criticize member states, say, for not sufficiently supporting missions. If any inadequacies do surface, this is through moderate suggestions and the constantly repeated mantra of the need for more coherence across EU tools. The upshot is that not even member states may be fully aware of the actual performance of any given mission.35 Finally, mission evaluations emphasize their successful positioning among other international donors. Such a spin is not only a deliberative move to reinforce the consensus on missions among member states. It is symptomatic of the growing institutional self-interest and confidence of the directorate for civilian crisis management and other Council Secretariat bodies concerned with this issue-area. In brief, the record of the ESDP is shielded from any farreaching critique as it is strategically employed to represent the EU as an

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important, albeit still evolving international security actor. This successful framing of the ESDP has shaped its perception not only by the public, but also the member states, a fact which, in turn, propels the development of the ESDP forward.

Conclusion: the world is the stage36 In conclusion, the chapter addresses two questions often raised about the ESDP. First, is the proliferation of operations a fleeting or a more enduring feature of the international role of the EU? Second, how does the growing number of ESDP deployments affect the democratic deficit in EU foreign policy? A number of reasons, related both to intra-EU politics and to the role of the ESDP in the world, suggest that operations will remain at the heart of the ESDP for the foreseeable future. First, the willingness and ability of member states to transform their diplomatic fallout from the US-led invasion of Iraq from a crisis into a catharsis and a booster for ESDP development underlines the strong commitment in national capitals to continue the ESDP job despite the many hurdles on the way (cf. Menon, 2004). Second, the entrepreneurial role played by the Council General Secretariat in initiating missions suggests as well that operations are here to stay. Third, ESDP missions have proven effective in carving out a niche for the EU as a unique crisis manager among other international actors. The tangible, high-profile presence on the ground has enhanced the EU’s international political status and influence. The ESDP operations have served the political aim of actively fostering a certain image of the EU, which Brussels can now capitalize upon in its international relations. For instance, while the Union has always been an important supporter of the United Nations (UN), a champion of effective multilateralism, the ESDP has given it (potentially) even more powerful means than those available to the UN to promote values shared by both institutions. Importantly, the EU upholds the principle of the primacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and it is committed to contributing to the objectives of the UN in crisis management in accordance with the organization’s charter.37 As some argue, the ESDP provides ‘oxygen for the United Nations’ (House of Lords, 2004: 7). Still, it is the EU that sets the agenda and defines the terms of the relationship with the UN. The latter provides legitimacy for the former even though such a blessing may not always be indispensable (Tardy, 2005: 49–51). Finally, the USA, though it was initially concerned about the potential of the ESDP to undermine NATO (Giegerich et al., 2006: 388),38 has evolved into an important backer of the enterprise. It now sees the ESDP as instrumental in cases when its status as the sole superpower and its correlated international image prevents it from effective crisis management. The EU is thus welcome as a deputy, preaching the same values but less confrontationally, which makes its involvement in certain regions more acceptable.

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Palestine is a case in point. The USA intensively lobbied for the Rafah mission, with secretary of state, Ms Condoleezza Rice, actively participating in the negotiations between the EU and Israel on the ESDP deployment. The issue was first discussed with the EUSR for this region, who subsequently informed the Political and Security Committee.39 Similarly, there was a US diplomatic campaign, supported by the press and Capitol Hill, to launch a fully-fledged ESDP mission to the Georgian-Russian border when, at the beginning of 2005, the mandate of the border monitoring mission of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe was not prolonged because of Moscow’s opposition. While Washington could not conceivably deploy its troops on the border with Russia, it regarded a potential ESDP operation as a viable substitute capable of curbing Russia’s unwelcome assertiveness in the region.40 Finally, what can be said about the ESDP in relation to the principle of democratic transparency? Clearly, the policy area remains a realm of numerous exceptions to generic provisions on the CFSP (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006). It is characterized by extensive confidentiality and a modus operandi that remains uncodified. No wonder, then, that ESDP missions reinforce concerns about the democratic accountability of EU foreign and security policy (Bono, 2002). Arguably, this democratic deficit may not only damage the legitimacy of EU missions, but it may also compromise the EU’s ability to lead by virtuous example (Wagner, 2006: 211). Important as it is, this critique needs to be qualified. First, a distinction has to be made between legitimacy and democratic accountability. While the latter is not a guiding principle in the second pillar, the issue of legitimacy is a crucial one in mission deployments. The EU pays great attention to receiving the backing of the UN or regional organizations for its missions, and it regularly invites non-member states to participate in them. Second, the relative neglect of democratic standards is hardly surprising in the highly sensitive realm of foreign policy-making. Although formally under the scrutiny of national parliaments, the international relations of member states similarly display a high degree of executive discretion unprecedented in other areas. This is not to say that the failure to comply fully with democratic principles, either at the national or intergovernmental level, is to be welcome. However, critics of the ESDP have to take into account the contextual logic and practices constituting the particular milieu of foreign and security policy, which, not least because of the strong reputational concerns associated with it, do not easily lend themselves to democratic transparency. The ESDP simply mirrors domestic practices in this respect.

Notes 1 The expression was coined by a former foreign minister of Belgium, Mark Eyskens, who thereby summed up the extent of European failure in the Balkans.

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2 Interview with a functionary from the private office of the High Representative for the CFSP, Brussels, 14 November 2005. 3 After flawed parliamentary elections in which massive fraud was reported, thousands of Georgian citizens protested on the street of Tbilisi for twenty days. This forced the president Eduard Shevardnadze to resign. The ensuing presidential and parliamentary elections, which were fought on a wave of pro-Western sentiments, brought the opposition and a new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, to power. 4 Focus group in the directorate for civilian crisis management, Council General Secretariat, Brussels, 16 November 2005. 5 Interview with a functionary from the Council General Secretariat, Brussels, 16 November 2005. 6 Ibid. 7 Interview with a functionary from the private office of the High Representative for the CFSP, Brussels, 14 November 2005. 8 Focus group in the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 4 July 2005. 9 The Laeken European Council in December 2001 formally launched an ‘operational’ European security and defence capability: ‘Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop’. 10 Interview with a functionary from the Council General Secretariat, Brussels, 14 November 2005. 11 The term was introduced into the academic debate by Stelios Stavridis (2001a, 2001b), who argued that a civilian power is characterized by the goals it pursues rather than the means it uses. Hence, military might may be necessary under certain circumstances to ‘civilize’ international affairs. 12 Interviews with members of the reinforced office of the EUSR for the Southern Caucasus, Warsaw, January 2006 and Florence July 2006. The technical assistance project lasted from September 2005 to February 2006. 13 Interviews in the Georgian foreign ministry, Tbilisi, June 2005. 14 Interviews with members of the reinforced office of the EUSR for the Southern Caucasus, Warsaw, January 2006 and Florence July 2006. 15 Already in 1999 the legal service of the Community asserted the principle of the pre-eminence of community interests in cases of overlapping competencies between the Community and CFSP pillars. It argued that ‘les relations Communaute´-PESC au sein de l’Union sont gouverne´es par le principe de pre´eminence et de non-paralle´lisme.’ (European Commission Legal Service, 1999:5). This interpretation has become the basis for defending Community competences in lawsuits. In the recent legal action brought against the Council in February 2005 (Case C-91/05), the Commission argued before the EU Court of Justice that actions taken by the Council to combat the spread of small arms infringe on Community competencies under Art. 47 (TEU), since they affect Community powers in the field of developmental aid. 16 Interview with an European Commission desk officer, Relex, Brussels, 11 April 2006. 17 As stated by the Cologne European Council in June 1999, ‘the Union must have the capacity for an autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’. 18 As elaborated later in the text, the mixed-pillar arrangement of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine does not allow for its classification

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19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

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Xymena Kurowska as an ESDP mission. The future ESDP mission to Kosovo is planned to be a rule of law one; available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id = 1100&lang = en (accessed 6 November 2006). Interview with an European Commission desk officer, Relex, Brussels, 18 November 2005. Interview with a national representative to the Political and Security Committee, Brussels, 24 November 2005. Each time a civilian mission is planned, negotiations over its format between the Commission and the Council begin from scratch as no template of co-operation has been agreed as of yet. Interview with the European Commission representative to Civcom, Brussels, 24 November 2005. Interview with the European Commission desk officer for Georgia, Brussels, 18 November 2005. Interviews with Themis experts, Tbilisi, June 2005. Interview in the Council General Secretariat, Brussels, 12 April 2006. Interview with an European Commission desk officer for Iraq, Relex, 11 April 2006. Ibid. Interview with a functionary from the private office of the High Representative for the CFSP, Brussels, 14 November 2005. Interview with the European Commission representative to Civcom, Brussels, 24 November 2005. Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of Ukraine on the EC Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and to Ukraine, 7 October 2005, Article 1 – Mandate. Focus group in the directorate for civilian crisis management, Council General Secretariat, Brussels, 16 November 2005. Interview with a researcher from the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 4 July 2005. Interview with a functionary from the private office of the High Representative for the CFSP, Brussels, 14 November 2005. For instance, in interviews with Themis members, it cropped up repeatedly that it had been decided at the outset to convert the mission into a success story, Tbilisi, June 2005. Interview with a national representative to Civcom, Brussels, 24 November 2005. Interview in the Polish foreign ministry with a former Polish representative to Civcom, 3 January 2006. The title of the section borrows from a paper by Biscop and Coolsaet (2003), which implies that the EU has become a global actor. Cf. the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management, 24 September 2003. See the American insistence on the three Ds, which outline the limits Washington wishes to place on the ESDP (no decoupling of European security from that of America’s; no duplication of efforts and capabilities; and no discrimination against the allies who are not EU members); (Albright,1998). Interview in the office of the European Commission representative to the Political and Security Committee, 25 November 2005. Interview with a member state diplomat based in Tbilisi, 10 June 2005.

4

The Police Mission EUPM in Bosnia, 2003–05 Thomas Mu¨hlmann

Introduction Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a major policy priority for the European Union (EU) over the last 15 years. In the early 1990s, Europe failed to prevent and stop the violent conflicts and allied atrocities in the Western Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. That failure led to some 250,000 casualties and the biggest wave of refugees in Europe since the Second World War. The conflicts had come too early for the newly emerging international security actor. The EU had just taken the step, in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, from a mainly economic association in the form of the European Communities to a still nascent political union, including a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With good intentions, the EU started many mediation initiatives. However, at that time, it did not yet have any collective means to underpin its aims, and it thus remained rather toothless vis-a`-vis the parties to the conflicts. What was left for the Union after the US-led intervention to end the war in Bosnia was to invest massively in post-conflict reconstruction and support the development of the new states in the regions. In the late 1990s, following the shock of the wave of violence in its immediate neighbourhood and its own inability to respond effectively, the EU started to develop a more coherent and organized foreign policy – and to support the CFSP with the development of crisis management capacities under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The elaboration of new crisis management structures within the EU proceeded surprisingly fast, as did the generation of capabilities in the military as well as civilian field. But what was still missing until 2003 was the actual use of these new instruments. Given its recent history, Bosnia seemed to be an ideal candidate for deploying, for the first time, a crisis management operation by replacing the United Nations International Police Task Force (UN-IPTF), which had led international efforts to reform the local police since 1995. At the invitation of the Bosnian authorities and with the blessing of the UN Security Council as well as the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)

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Steering Board,1 the EU launched the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM) on 1 January 2003. It had a mandate of three years. The EUPM was extended in late 2005 for an additional period of two years with a refocused mandate concentrating on police restructuring and the fight against organized crime.2 This chapter focuses on the first three years of the mission. The sections that follow provide a general overview of the political and policing contexts in Bosnia, including the work already performed by the IPTF. Next, the EUPM mandate and structure and its working methodology are introduced. Reference is made to the programmatic approach chosen by the mission, the additional tasks it undertook, its role in the area of police restructuring and its sometimes difficult relationship with other international and European actors on the ground. Before drawing lessons for the ESDP from the major challenges faced by the EUPM, the mission’s main achievements are discussed.

The Dayton Agreement: Peace at the cost of political efficacy The Dayton peace deal ended the war in Bosnia three years after it had begun in 1992.3 It also shaped the political constitution and practices of the new country. The governance structure was designed, primarily, to ensure the peaceful cohabitation of the three main ethnic communities – the Bosniak-Muslims, the Bosnian-Serbs and the Bosnian-Croats – rather than efficient policy-making. Moreover, this structure was supported by a massive international presence on the ground. The Dayton peace accord created a complex, expensive, multi-level and fragmented political order. Its key feature is the separation of the country into two entities – the Federation and the Republica Srpska. While in the Republica Srpska the Serbs are the largest ethnicity after the ethnic cleansing during the war, the Federation is dominated by Bosniaks and Croats. The central state is a very weak construct as almost all governance powers were vested in the entities to address the fears, notably of the Serbs, that their interests would be ignored in a centralized political system in which the other two ethnicities constituted the majority. Furthermore, the Federation itself is split into ten cantons, with some dominated by BosnianCroats, others by Bosniaks. This complex political structure is replicated in the area of policing, which is an entity competency. While the Republica Srpska as the more centralized entity evolved one unified police body regionally subdivided, the fragmented Federation created eleven different and independent police forces: ten cantonal police apparatuses and one Federation police to tackle cross-cantonal crimes. Also, the Brcˇko District, which was placed under international supervision, has its own police. All these law enforcement agencies are very different in size and operate under different rules and regulations.

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The challenge of post-war law enforcement: The legacies of the communist system and the war Besides the structural problems just listed, Bosnia was faced with a political and policing culture that deviated significantly from Western European practices. The country had to cope with many negative legacies of pre-war Yugoslavia, which had made the police an instrument of communist party rule. Two stand out. One was a pattern of political interference in operational policing matters. The other was the organizational culture of the police that generated a number of pathologies, notably over-centralized police decision-making and a lack of responsibility and initiative further down the hierarchy. These generic problems were aggravated by the fact that during the war, the police played a key role in the atrocities, particularly in the Republica Srpska.4 During the conflict, the previously fully integrated police forces were dissolved and split along ethnic lines. This division was entrenched by the Dayton agreement. The fractured security sector has been a major obstacle to making policing more efficient ever since. It partly explains the lack of co-operation and interoperability among police forces and the existence of a wide range of different police management models across the country. It also explains why the police forces remain ethnically divided and under the influence of politicians who emerged from the war as heroes, not necessarily with a clean record. Under these circumstances, it does not come as a surprise that the law enforcement agencies of the Republica Srpska have not been making any effort to get hold of the persons indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. The security sector was itself infiltrated by people active in the support networks for war crime indictees and backed up by politicians who continue to see the police as a partisan instrument of power projection. Policing in Bosnia, then, is undermined by institutional fragmentation, ethno-political interference, a dysfunctional organizational culture and a symbiosis between crime and political extremism. The absence of a unified security area governed by modern standards has benefited criminals. Organized crime is present in many different facets. To this extent, the country is very similar to others in the region. Because of its geographic location, the Western Balkans have traditionally facilitated the trafficking of narcotics from the Middle East, human trafficking from Central Europe and in recent years the trafficking of arms, which are a leftover from the recent conflicts.

The International Police Task Force of the United Nations To reconstruct Bosnia after the war, an unprecedented international effort was agreed. The international community took the lead in building a new, Western-oriented state, including an accountable, modern police. Dayton allocated tasks to different international players. For the purpose of this analysis, it is sufficient to name two: the Office of the High Representative

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(OHR) and the IPTF.5 The former – drawing its mandate from Annex 10 of the Dayton agreement – was tasked to oversee the civilian implementation of the peace under the supervision of the Peace Implementation Council.6 The legal basis of the UN police mission was laid down in Annex 11 of the agreement. The international police officers were initially given an advisory and training role and only later received limited executive powers.7 One of the IPTF objectives was the registration and vetting of police officers with a view to eliminating those insufficiently qualified, guilty of war crimes or otherwise tarnished. This certification process contributed to a substantial reduction of the police from about 50,000 to 60,000 men and women in the immediate aftermath of the war to a more sustainable level of just around 16,000 at the end of 2002. The IPTF also worked to increase the number of officers from minority groups. The UN mission encouraged the relocation of former police officers to areas where they lived before the war and even promoted the transfer of police officers to places where they would belong to the minority. However, the success of these policies was often hampered by difficult working conditions and inadequate housing facilities faced by those transferred and by discrepancies between wages in the Federation and the Republica Srpska. At a later stage, the IPTF also got involved in institution building and the strengthening of state-level policing. At the entity level, police academies were opened in Sarajevo and Banja Luka. In 2000, the State Border Service (SBS) was established and two years later the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA). In its final phase, the UN mission conducted an audit of police forces aimed at identifying and removing institutional obstacles to democratic policing and at establishing a series of standards that police forces had to meet in order to be accredited. These reforms notwithstanding, when the mandate of the IPTF expired at the end of 2002, much remained to be done to transform the Bosnian police into a democratic, ethnically unbiased and efficient service. Among other things, law enforcement agencies had to be equipped according to international standards and rendered capable of fighting organized crime effectively, not least by constraining them to co-operate among themselves, including across the two entities. Arguably the most difficult unfinished business was the transformation of the extant mindsets of police officers and politicians, which stood in the way of changing the Bosnian police from a force instrumental in defending the privileges of the political elite into a service meeting the security needs of citizens.

The EUPM: the launch of the first-ever ESDP mission While the first phase of the ESDP was devoted to institution building, the EU became increasingly interested in deploying its new instruments. To take over from the IPTF seemed an obvious choice for a number of reasons. The Western Balkans have direct security implications for the Union itself. Policing

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was one of the areas prioritized by the capability generation for the civilian ESDP. The security situation in Bosnia, while far from stable, was relatively benign after eight years of international peacekeeping. And the ESDP mission would be able to draw on the experience and build on the accomplishments of the preceding IPTF. In short, a police mission in Bosnia seemed to be a perfect match for the Union’s ambitions at that early stage of ESDP development. In 2001, the UN indicated its intention to terminate the IPTF at the end of the following year. Hence, international deliberation on a follow-on mission started in late 2001.8 The EU agreed internally on an ESDP deployment in early 2002. Its offer to continue policing reforms in Bosnia was quickly endorsed by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board as well as by the UN Security Council. The Council Joint Action on the EUPM, to which the mission statement was annexed, was adopted on 11 March 2002. It authorized the establishment of a planning team which was deployed to the country in May. The overall aim of the mandate guiding the work of the planning team and later the EUPM was very general and ambitious. The EUPM, supported by the Commission’s institution building programmes, should, as part of a broader rule of law approach, aim, in line with the general objectives of Annex 11 of the Dayton Agreement, to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice, and thereby raising current BiH police standards. (Council of the European Union, 2002a) Compared to the mandate of the IPTF, that of the EUPM was less intrusive, reflecting the progress made by the UN mission in improving the police. The EUPM did not have any executive powers, its efforts were to be guided by the principle of local ownership and its supervision of the local police was limited to mid- and senior-level officers.

The structure of the EUPM The authorized strength of EUPM was 512 police officers plus some 60 international civilians. While police officers were all seconded by EU member states as well as third countries,9 most civilians were directly contracted and only a handful seconded. These numbers were supplemented by some 330 national staff, who worked mainly in support functions, but also as legal and political advisors. The EUPM was led by the head of mission and two deputies.10 They reported to the Union’s High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, through the European Union Special Representative (EUSR), Lord Ashdown, who was double-hatted as the High Representative for Bosnia. The headquarters of the EUPM were in Sarajevo. In

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order to implement its mandate effectively, it was decided – following the IPTF example – that most EUPM staff should be co-located with their local counterparts throughout the country rather than sit in headquarters.11 The headquarters had different departments. The most significant one was the programme development and co-ordination department responsible for the design of projects and the supervision of their implementation. The communications centre and the reporting cell were responsible for information flows between headquarters and co-locations and between the former and Brussels. The political (policy advice), legal (legal advice) and media departments (interface with the local media) were all staffed by civilians not directly integrated into the police chain of command. They were distributed throughout the country, mirroring as far as possible the colocation structure.

Mandate implementation Reform programmes The mandate tasked the EUPM to raise Bosnian standards of policing by ‘monitoring, mentoring and inspecting . . . the middle and senior management level’. To introduce countrywide common standards and procedures, a coherent approach was required. Thus, the EUPM decided to use a programme-driven methodology. The mission drew up a strategic implementation plan, which identified four strategic priorities aimed at institution- and capacity-building at management level; combating organized crime and corruption; developing financial viability and sustainability; and promoting police independence and accountability. These priorities were seen as key building blocks in the establishment of an effective, financially viable policing system with internal control mechanisms and the ambition to serve the citizens. After an analysis of the concrete policy requirements within these four priority areas, the mission elaborated seven main reform programmes, which were further divided into about 120 projects. In doing so, the EUPM worked closely with partner organizations and stakeholders – notably the European Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program sponsored by the US Department for Justice and bilateral donors. Among other things, they provided funding for training and equipment, funds that the EUPM did not have. Five of the seven programmes had a thematic topic and two concerned the development of state police agencies, which will be discussed at greater length further below. The programmes centred on the modernization of the crime police, notably by strengthening its capacity to fight organized crime; police education; internal affairs, which includes internal oversight mechanisms to ensure officers comply with procedures and rules; police administration; public

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order and security policing; and the development of the State Investigation and Protection Agency and the State Border Service (for details, see Mer. lingen with Ostrauskaite, 2006). The reform programmes and projects incorporated a set of benchmarks that enabled co-locators to assess the performance of the local police against what the mandate referred to as best European and international practice and, if necessary, to take remedial action to improve local conduct. Yet the language of the mandate notwithstanding, there is no clear international or European definition of best practice in the policing field. To overcome this challenge, the EUPM developed a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, national practices and the personal experiences of mission staff served as a starting point. On the other hand, the EUPM aligned its programmatic activities more closely with the European Commission requirements as described in the Stabilization and Association process. The local ownership strategy Key principles of the EUPM mandate included local ownership and sustainability. To respect them, the mission decided not to design projects alone and then instruct its local counterparts on how to implement them. Rather, it involved senior local police managers in the process. Hence, the programmes and projects were developed in co-operation with them; international stakeholders and bilateral donors, too, were asked for advice. To provide local police authorities with an institutional voice, the mission set up the police steering board (PSB), which was supported by five working groups. These bodies served as fora in which local police leaders could discuss central issues related to the reform programmes and design, ratify and assess the implementation of projects.12 About halfway through its mandate, the EUPM realized that problems in the implementation phase of its reforms hampered the modernization of the Bosnian police. The difficulties were partly linked to a lack of local capacity, say insufficient budgetary resources. More importantly, projects were often not fully implemented because no one in the local police felt responsible for them. Therefore, in 2004, the EUPM introduced project implementation boards in each police force. Its members were put in charge of driving through the various projects, together with the EUPM co-locators. Building a state-wide police Over time, increasing attention was given to the two programmes focusing on state-level institutions to overcome the weaknesses of the policing system created by the Dayton peace deal and to continue the build-up of central police forces started by the IPTF. This was of particular importance in the fight against organized crime, which was held back not just by the lack of co-operation among the Bosnian law enforcement agencies and between

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them and their counterparts in neighbouring countries but also by the absence of a systematic and coherent crime-fighting approach. Beginning with the State Investigation and Protection Agency, under the guidance of the EUPM the toothless agency was transformed from an informational clearing-house into the pivotal, albeit chronically underresourced executive actor in the fight against organized crime.13 The process was facilitated by the prospect of negotiations over a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).14 More challenging than capacity building, at least on some occasions, were personnel decisions. According to the law, the most senior appointments in the agency have to be made by the Bosnian council of ministers. After months of political quarrel in the council over which ethnicity would get which post and pressure from the international community, the High Representative finally appointed the new director and three other key agency staff himself. Turning to the State Border Service, the EUPM gave strategic advice leading to the introduction of new laws concerning the agency and its surveillance of the state border. The unified and updated legislation harmonized the structure of the SBS with that of the other state-level agencies. Also, the competencies of border guards were clarified and work procedures streamlined. In addition to its legal work, the mission helped to secure management training for senior officers. When the key positions had to be re-appointed after the entry into force of the new laws, similar problems arose as in the case of SIPA. This time, the council of ministers agreed on the appointment of the agency’s leadership. However, the High Representative rejected the ethnically divided allocation of the posts and imposed his own personnel decisions. In addition to building up the SBS and SIPA, the EUPM also provided support to the state ministry of security and the Bosnian Interpol office. Although it was initially not planned to co-locate EUPM staff in these two institutions, the importance of this move was appreciated at a later stage. Co-locators played a crucial role in organizing and programming the newly established bodies, which have become key building blocks in the EU’s efforts to modernize the local police. The ministry of security, established in 2002, has responsibility for the political oversight and direction of the state-level police agencies. During the EUPM’s tenure, it progressed beyond the start-up phase by recruiting more staff and establishing internal departments covering all areas of responsibility. A series of important new laws was drafted and adopted, particularly a law that created and regulated a new immigration service and a law on police officials. The Interpol office in Sarajevo evolved into a fully equipped and functioning national office, with trained staff and good contacts with both the Interpol general secretariat in Lyon and partners in the region. Technical agreements between Interpol Sarajevo and the entity and state-level law enforcement agencies were drawn up, allowing these police forces direct access to the Interpol database.

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Additional tasks The seven programmes were the centrepiece of the EUPM reforms. Yet its monitoring, mentoring and inspecting activities were not limited to project implementation. It also carried out a number of additional tasks, the most important of which are listed below.  The mission monitored investigations of complaints against police officers as far as the human resources of the mission permitted it to ensure procedures were followed and the process was transparent;  It reported incidents of misconduct, disreputable or criminal behaviour and non-co-operation by public officials or politicians with responsibilities in policing to the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia;  It monitored criminal investigations with political connotations, mostly at the request of the High Representative;  It monitored the proceedings of the Srebrenica Working Group established to shed light on the atrocities committed in the town of Srebrenica in 1995;  It assisted the local police in establishing dialogue between different parties to defuse ethnic tensions, for instance in the Serb-dominated city of Stolac;  It assisted the local police in dealing with security-related incidents in connection with returnees, in particular through the establishment of returnee fora in certain areas of the country, fora which brought together all relevant stakeholders, including returnees;  It provided an interface between the local police and the crime-fighting activities of NATO’s Stabilization Force and subsequently the military ESDP operation Althea;  It played a leading role in the development of an indigenous intelligence community;  It advised local police leaders on public order maintenance at major public events, for instance the reopening of the old bridge in Mostar in 2004, the football world cup qualifier between Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro in 2004 or the tenth commemoration of the Srebrenica atrocities in 2005.

Finally: police restructuring When the EUPM was deployed, the intention was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the existing policing system. But the then High Representative, Lord Ashdown, started to reform the whole security sector tackling the defence, the judicial as well as the intelligence service sectors. It became obvious to all concerned that security sector reform would remain incomplete if the institutional fragmentation of the policing field was not

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tackled. Hence, police restructuring became an important item on the reform agenda of the international community. A single policing system would go a long way in solving the problem of oversized, costly (and sometimes corrupt) and politically influenced police forces.15 Although not explicitly mentioned in its mandate, police restructuring came to play an increasingly important role in EUPM activities in the second half of its deployment. After a lengthy period of internal preparations as well as the creation of the necessary political leverage by the European Commission and the Peace Implementation Council,16 both of which emphasized the importance of unifying the policing field, Lord Ashdown officially launched a police restructuring commission in July 2004. It was chaired by the former Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens and comprised senior local political representatives and police chiefs as well as the head of the EUPM. The process confirmed and even reinforced the persistence of deep political divisions within the country. The commission was unable to agree on the three restructuring principles laid down by the EU due to resistance from the Republica Srpska.17 The political consultations following the commission’s final report proved extremely difficult too. It was only in October 2005 that the pressure piling up on the Serbs became so strong that they felt compelled to sign up to an agreement that referred to the three principles. Its implementation, however, soon ran into problems again as the Serbs began to backtrack from their earlier commitments.18 Arguably, police restructuring has proved to be one of the most difficult reforms the international community has launched in Bosnia. Despite the fact that police restructuring strongly influenced the work of the EUPM and bound resources, its influence in the matter was limited. As the issue was a political hot potato, extremely sensitive among the local elite, the OHR took the lead with the EUPM providing support. For instance, the head of mission contributed to the deliberation of the police restructuring commission as a full member and EUPM staff served in the commission’s secretariat. In that capacity, they provided technical advice, if requested, and support to the media campaign that followed the release of the commission’s report. Also, the EUPM reached out to the police trade unions in order to make the case for police restructuring to the rank and file. Nevertheless, the full potential of the EUPM, which could have been strategically used to offer neutral, expert-based advice to Bosnian politicians and interested parties, was never really used. This was due to the policy of the OHR to sideline the mission as well as mistakes by the latter such as the lack of internal communication and the failure of the leadership to mobilize the right expertise within the mission for the task. Hence, the EUPM missed the opportunity to make use of its co-location structure to explain to local police officers the advantages of police restructuring. Had it played a more active role, the mission could have helped the OHR avoid some of the mistakes it made in this long and difficult process.

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The OHR/EUSR, European Commission and EUPM: a difficult me´nage a` trois The interaction of the EUPM with the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia, who was double-hatted as EUSR, and the European Commission, while crucial to the success of the mission, was not always easy. As the least powerful actor of the three, it had to struggle to have its voice heard by its partners. The main international interlocutor of the EUPM on the ground was the OHR/EUSR. The joint action establishing the mission placed the EUSR in its chain of command, which meant among other things that the mission had to report to the High Representative for the CFSP through the EUSR. The latter’s mandate, in turn, tasked him to provide local political guidance to the EUPM. In practice, things turned out differently. The High Representative, Lord Ashdown, long resisted having EUSR-dedicated staff and therefore lacked the capacity to guide the police mission as foreseen. Instead, OHR staff tended to regard their EUPM counterparts as their subordinates. On many occasions, the EUPM was disavowed by OHR staff who approached senior local police officers and made deals with them behind the back of the mission. It was only at a later stage in the life of the mission when political pressure by member states was mounting that Ashdown accepted separate EUSR staff. While this improved the co-operation between the EUSR and the EUPM, it did not change the arrogant attitude of OHR staff. As mentioned above, police restructuring was one case in which the mission was sidelined by the OHR until the very end and its expertise and privileged access to police management and front-line officers ignored. Turning to the European Commission delegation in Bosnia, the EUPM established good working relations with it. This was crucial, as the EUPM had no budget to fund the implementation of those of its projects that required capital expenditure. However, Commission financial support was not automatic. Furthermore, the EUPM, because of its short mandate, was dependent on the speedy allocation of funds to its projects, while the Commission was bound to follow its often time-consuming financial procedures.

EUPM achievements and the legacies of communism The EUPM had an ambitious mandate, namely to modernize the Bosnian police according to best international and European practice. It made some progress toward this objective. Among the changes in the local policing field to which it contributed were:  the set-up of a country-wide computer-based intelligence model;  the re-engineering of crime departments according to modern standards;

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 the formulation of anti-human trafficking policies;  the elaboration of guidelines for major public order events such as demonstrations;  the creation of a new police education system;  the establishment of public complaints bureaux;  the build-up of state-level policing institutions; and  the introduction of financial plans to rationalize the use of scarce resources. One of the mission’s most visible projects was the establishment, with the help of the British government, of a crime hotline – Krimo Lovci – where ordinary citizens could call cost-free and anonymously tip off the police on crimes. These accomplishments notwithstanding, the transformation of the local police into a modern, effective and independent service remains incomplete. Yet it was always unrealistic to assume that the first-ever ESDP mission could meet its mandated objectives in just three years in a poor, postconflict country that remained, in addition, stuck with an often uncooperative and ethnically divided political elite. The next paragraph looks at the obstacles to mandate implementation posed by Bosnia’s policing environment including the political context. The section that follows focuses on problems internal to the mission and the lessons that can be drawn from them. Notwithstanding years of immense international reform efforts, not least in the policing area, the EUPM soon found out that the Communist legacy was harder to overcome than it or Brussels had expected. While institutions can be restructured relatively quickly, mindsets cannot. Rooting out the deeply entrenched practices and habits of political interference in operational policing decisions is a long-term process under the best of conditions. In Bosnia, conditions have not been good. The former communist political system evolved into a party system dominated by nationalists, many of whom were communist bosses in their earlier incarnation. This old/new guard has a strong interest in keeping control over ‘their police’. Hence, although the Bosnian police has become less politicized over the years, political interference remains widespread. It takes many different forms, ranging from interference in recruitment procedures to giving instructions on how to take or not to take criminal investigations forward to using the ample opportunity provided by the democratic system to torpedo or neuter legislation aimed at creating independent police forces. Political obstructionism of this sort is facilitated by low levels of public participation in politics. In short, the police reforms in Bosnia confirm the observation that when institutional changes are introduced or imposed by the international community, changes in political culture tend to lag behind.

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Learning from first experiences: EUPM lessons for the civilian ESDP The impact of the EUPM on the Bosnian policing field was also hampered by problems internal to the mission. This should not come as a surprise as the ESDP was in the beginner phase at the time. With no operational acquis to draw on, the mission was bound to make errors. This section identifies key mistakes and draws general conclusions for future civilian ESDP missions with the aim of making them more effective change agents in postconflict societies. The planning phase The planning of the EUPM proceeded under unusually favourable conditions for what was officially a crisis management mission. There was abundant preparatory time, with planners having about eight months before mission launch. Also, EU actors were already present in theatre – the European Commission delegation and the EU Monitoring Mission – and thus could offer advice and access to the political system. Finally, planning did not have to start from scratch as it could build on the accomplishments and the insights of the IPTF, including its concept papers on a follow-on police mission. And yet, mission planning was barely sufficient. A clear strategy was lacking at the start of the EUPM and the reform programmes did not sufficiently take into account the political situation and financial state of the police forces. What went wrong? First, in a team of 23 internationals, the planning team only had six civilians. The importance of civilian expertise had been heavily underestimated and member states were unwilling to second civilians. This led, among other things, to a lack of expertise in procurement and financial management as well as programme development. Second, procurement procedures proved to be a big hurdle. As the equipment of civilian ESDP operations is financed through the European Commission, its bureaucratic rules had to be followed. Even though the EUPM had months of preparation, this proved insufficient to obtain all the requested supplies in time for mission launch. On top of this, a procedural mistake forced the mission to begin the process of procuring computers all over again, which meant that the final delivery of desktops only arrived in December 2003. Third, neither the planning team nor the subsequent mission had secure communications in theatre and between theatre and Brussels. Fourth, the decision to double-hat the last IPTF commander, Commissioner Sven Fredriksen, as head of the EU planning team and subsequently as head of the EUPM proved wrong. Mission planning is a full-time job, but Fredriksen was busy finalizing IPTF tasks. Furthermore, when he took charge of the EU police mission, he became its public face, with the result that most citizens failed to perceive any difference between the EUPM and

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the IPTF. This was aggravated by the decision to aim for a low-key media approach. On a related, albeit more anecdotal note, in the last months of his term at the head of the IPTF, Fredriksen had to make a number of tough decisions, in particular in relation to the certification of local police officers. This resulted in him receiving threats against his life, which, in turn, necessitated providing him with a close protection team, which remained in place even when he became head of the EUPM. When Fredriksen unexpectedly died, his successor Kevin Carty ‘inherited’ this security measure. However, Carty quickly concluded that it was both burdensome and not in tune with the mandate of the EUPM, which emphasized co-operation and local ownership of reforms rather than executive decisions as under the IPTF. Yet it took significant time and resources to terminate the contract with the private security company for which his protection was a lucrative job. Fifth, the transition from the UN to the EU was not optimal. UN documents were shipped to New York and not handed over to the EUPM. Thus, it was rather difficult to assess the state of play of the Bosnian policing field when the IPTF left the country. Finally, the decision in the planning phase to focus on policing matters led to a lack of attention to the link between policing and the wider rule of law. In Bosnia, this turned out to be a particularly severe problem because new regulations made prosecutors the driving force in criminal investigations. By failing to address the crucial link between the police and prosecutors, the EUPM missed an opportunity to tackle a key route through which politics improperly interfered in policing. The EU has learned from the EUPM experience (cf. also Merlingen and . Ostrauskaite, 2007). It now has standard administrative, financial and political procedures for running civilian ESDP missions. For instance, in early 2006 the Council Secretariat and the European Commission agreed on a number of measures to speed up the procurement process. Also, the EU agreed formats for status-of-mission agreements with host countries and for the participation in missions of third countries. Yet, there are furtherreaching lessons that can be drawn from the EUPM. Most fundamentally, it is difficult to correct major errors in strategy once the mission is under way. Brussels needs to put more emphasis on getting the planning right. This means, in particular, that the right expertise must be included in the planning team. It is necessary from the outset to have an understanding of the key mission-related features of the host country – in the case of Bosnia, for instance, of the practice of political interference in operational policing – in order to devise an appropriate reform strategy. Another key point is that missions charged with security sector reform have to be designed in a holistic way to ensure that all parts of the justice system are strengthened and empowered simultaneously. Less crucial, though still important, provisions have to be made for the early deployment of media experts and the allocation of sufficient funds for public information purposes to familiarize the public with the mission and raise the profile of the EU.

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The programmatic approach Initially, it was foreseen that all programmes and projects would be finalized by the end of 2004 to give the mission another year before the end of the mandate to evaluate their effectiveness and fine-tune the results. However, the EUPM was unable to keep to the timetable. Projects were only identified after mission launch and continued to be developed thereafter. Hence, many remained unfinished when the mandate expired at the end of 2005. Too often, external factors like budgetary or legal challenges were underestimated, and too many projects were developed that could not be effectively supervised. Even if projects were well designed and implemented, a lack of co-ordination within the mission and between it and other international actors occasionally created problems. A typical and very telling example centres on the crime hotline Krimo Lovci. As mentioned previously, the hotline was one of the most visible EUPM programmes. Yet soon the creation of new crime hotlines threatened its success. Not only did the military ESDP operation Althea start its own version of Krimo Lovci, even within the EUPM units proved their ‘independence’ by establishing, for instance, a separate hotline for border police issues. The EUPM leadership had to spend a significant amount of time and energy, including enlisting the support of the EUSR, to close down these alternative hotlines and to ensure that there was no duplication of efforts among internationals and no confusion among Bosnians about which number to call to tip off the police. Programme implementation was also held back by the fact that the EUPM consisted mainly of police officers. Project management is not a normal policing task. The international police officers were neither familiar with it nor eager to engage in it. At the start of the mission, they knew little about the programmatic approach that the planning team had envisaged but failed to prepare in time. Then, when projects were ready, they argued that they had too many other things to do to take charge of project implementation. In addition, project implementation plans were very different in quality; many lacked clearly defined end states and temporal sequences for how to achieve them. Finally, local police officers were overburdened by the flood of projects once the programmatic approach fully kicked in. Due to a very hierarchical system, all key decisions were left in the hands of a few officers, who were already busy with their regular duties. It took a great effort on the part of the EUPM to turn itself around in its second year of operation. It made project implementation the centrepiece of its activities and set up new bodies – the project implementation boards mentioned above – to address bottlenecks in the Bosnian police apparatus that hampered reforms. There are a number of general lessons to be drawn from the challenges faced by the EUPM in the implementation of its reform projects. The

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mission did not have the right mix of personnel. It was almost exclusively staffed by police officers. Not surprisingly, they preferred police work to project implementation in which they had no experience and for which they lacked the appropriate skills. Moreover, the mission worked in a highly political environment, where the policing system is closely linked with the political elite. Political obstructionism was thus a main obstacle standing in the way of the EUPM reform drive. Narrow police expertise is inadequate in such circumstances, which are the norm in postconflict societies. Instead, diplomatic skills and experience in political lobbying, i.e., civilian staff, are required, not least in the ranks of senior mission management. Incidentally, such a change would be in line with UN practice. The lack of qualified police officers Another generic challenge faced by the EUPM relates to the quality of the seconded police officers. The mission was tasked to work with local police leaders in its effort to overhaul Bosnian policing. This called for senior international police officers with relevant management experience. However, on many occasions, contributing states seconded junior staff. Since, in the absence of enforcement tools, the mission relied primarily on the professionalism and experience of its personnel to gain the respect of their local counterparts, the lack of seniority severely limited the influence that the EUPM could exercise over the Bosnian police. Also, the mission lacked relevant expertise in certain policing areas. For instance, to transform SIPA into an effective crime-fighting agency, expertise in different areas such as war crimes, financial intelligence, intelligence gathering, money laundering and technical surveillance was needed. EU member states failed to second the relevant experts. At one point, the mission proposed to set up a twinning system according to which one country would undertake to develop a particular investigative section of SIPA. But no contributing state made an offer. On a related note, the EUPM never managed to fill all of its authorized positions – 512 police officers – because of a lack of candidates. What lessons can be drawn from these problems? EU member states should include participation in international missions in the career plans of their police forces. While such a system is quite developed in the military, police officers who want to serve abroad often face obstacles and disadvantages in their further career paths. Thus, many senior police officers think twice before deciding to join a mission. It would also help if member states abandoned their current ad hoc arrangements and developed rosters of civilian personnel who can be deployed in foreign missions. Such rosters would allow domestic police forces to make contingency plans for replacing officers going on duty abroad and thus to overcome a major obstacle to the secondment of qualified personnel.

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Conclusion Following its frustrating impotence in the face of the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, the EU began to evolve the means to become a global player in the security field. The first operational experience in this development process, which is still on going, was the EUPM. It demonstrated to the international community that the Union was serious about its commitment to play a greater role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Equally important, the mission made a difference to Bosnia. Yet it also highlighted the birthing problems faced by the ESDP. Based on the EUPM record, this chapter identified a series of generic challenges faced by the EU as it builds up the ESDP. It also made a number of recommendations on how to tackle them. If the EU draws the right lessons from the challenges faced by its ESDP missions, in Bosnia and elsewhere, then its broad range of political, civilian and military options will make it an effective and respected actor in international crisis management.

Notes 1 The PIC is a constructus sui generis created by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It comprises a coalition of some 55 states and international organizations in charge of the implementation of the agreement. For the day-to-day management of the peace implementation, a steering board was created which is made up of the United States, Canada, Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission as well as Turkey as representative of the Organisation of Islamic Countries. 2 At the time of going to press, the EU Council is considering yet another extension of the EUPM. 3 The Dayton peace accord was agreed in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. 4 Some good background on this can be found in ICG (2005a). 5 The IPTF was part of the broader UN engagement in Bosnia, which was called United Nations Mission in BiH (UNMBiH). 6 NATO was put in charge of implementing the military provisions of the peace treaty. Later this task was handed over to the EU military operation Althea. For more on the latter, see Chapter 5. 7 Following the conclusions of the 1996 Peace Implementation Council, the Security Council authorized the IPTF to investigate human rights violations by local law enforcement officers and, in case of abuse, to request the ministry of interior to dismiss or otherwise sanction the concerned individuals. 8 Initially, it was not clear that the EU would take over from the UN. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) considered deploying a mission. A detailed report was written under the stewardship of Richard Monk, a report which was shared with the EU. 9 Police officers from the following third countries participated in the EUPM: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. 10 The mission started off with only one deputy head of mission, but later introduced a second such position.

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11 Hence, mission staff was divided into various teams under either the chief advisor, who was responsible for the state and entities, or the chief co-locator, who was responsible for the cantons and the Republika Srpska public security centres. These teams were then assigned to the different police forces throughout the country, moving into offices either in the same buildings as their local counterparts or as close as possible to them. This system of co-location allowed for close day-to-day contacts between internationals and locals and the daily monitoring of the latter’s work by the former. 12 The PSB was not a body based on local laws. Therefore, it could not make binding decisions. Rather, it was a body for discussion and consultation, where informal decisions were taken which were subsequently implemented by the PSB members within their chains of command. 13 Initially the agency was called the State Information and Protection Agency. It was only in 2004 that it was renamed State Investigation and Protection Agency to reflect its new executive competencies. 14 The Feasibility Study issued by the European Commission in November 2003 identified 16 areas where Bosnia needed to make substantial progress before a positive avis for the opening of SAA negotiations could be given. They included police reforms and progress in the fight against organized crime. 15 Bosnia’s roughly 16,800 police officers still make the country one of the most over-policed places in the world in terms of the ratio of police to citizens; also the bloated system accounts for the fact that between 75 per cent and 90 per cent of the budgets of the different police forces are used for salaries. 16 In consultation with the OHR, in 2003 the EUPM started to elaborate its first concept papers on the issue. 17 The three principles are the following ones. Exclusive constitutional competency on all police matters is vested in the central state. The local police operate in policing jurisdictions which are designed according to technical and functional criteria, even if this means that a given jurisdiction cuts across the inter-entity boundary line. Political interference in operational police work is eliminated. 18 According to a political agreement reached by key local party leaders in October 2005, a Police Reform Directorate was established later the same year. At the end of 2006, the Police Reform Directorate produced a report entitled ‘Proposed Plan for the Implementation of the Reform of Police Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. In line with the agreement reached back in 2005, the governments and parliaments of the state and entities were expected to adopt this report, along with any necessary amendments, by 2 March 2007. The deadline, however, was missed.

5

The EU Military Operation in Bosnia Thomas Bertin1

EUFOR Althea in Bosnia is the third, to date the largest and most enduring European Union (EU) military operation. It represents a major step forward in the development of the military dimension of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), confirming the Union as an actor in international security affairs. Moreover, by sending a significant number of troops to Bosnia, Brussels has shown that it takes its moral-political responsibilities seriously, vis-a`-vis the country and the Western Balkans more generally. Like all EU actors engaged in Bosnia, Althea works to entrench peace and assist the people and their government on their road to EU membership. The chapter begins with a brief survey of Bosnia’s security situation, covering the period from the end of 2004 to the beginning of 2007 when writing on the piece was completed. Next, the planning, mandate and organization of the EU force are examined, and the challenges it encountered in the process are highlighted. This is followed by an analysis of its activities and impact. Due attention is also paid to EUFOR’s relations with other EU actors on the ground, its interaction with the EU in Brussels and with NATO. In the conclusion, a number of lessons are identified that can be drawn from the experience of the EU military force in Bosnia with a view to strengthening the ESDP.

Peace and stability in Bosnia: A risk assessment When the Union took over the military peacekeeping mission from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 2 December 2004, Bosnia had been stable for several years. It has remained so since then. Nevertheless, peace in the country is not yet self-sustaining. Internal and regional security risks persist. First, Bosnia has a weak economy. The slow progress of economic reconstruction and development, which, in addition, is not yet self-sustaining but is dependent on international aid and remittances from abroad, does not meet the aspirations of its citizens. Second, widespread organized crime

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and corruption and the allied fragility of the rule of law undermine the development of the economy and the integrity of good governance and, in turn, adversely affect the prospects for prosperity and self-sustaining stability. Third, the country is still awash with weapons and ammunition; although, the appetite for fighting has long disappeared. In addition, the entity armed forces have been downsized, restructured and placed under a unified ministry of defence. Hence, they are no longer in a position to wage war against each other. Politically, however, Bosnia remains deeply divided along ethnic lines and across the two entities which make up the country – the Bosniak/Croat Federation and the Serbian Republika Srpska. The political scars of the war remain vivid as public debates and the media demonstrate on an almost daily basis. Clearly, reconciliation has not been achieved and bitterness still prevails. This state of affairs probably makes Bosnia the most complex political construct in the Balkans and a long-term problem. At the time of writing, pivotal reforms designed to make the local government(s) more functional and self-reliant and to decrease the salience of the ethnic factor in the governance of the country, notably police and constitutional reforms, have not been agreed.2 In addition, there are still a number of localized disputes and hotspots around the country. These usually involve disputed mosque or church buildings, inter-ethnic land disputes or provocative displays of nationalism (flags). The local police, with the support of the EU police mission, can usually deal with these. But they can quickly become the focus of outside political exploitation. However, it is important to point out that the threat to internal stability posed by the persistent dominance of divisive ethnic politics has declined in recent years. Bosnia has reached a situation where uncertainty at the political level no longer directly influences the security situation. Moving from domestic to regional security threats, Belgrade retains the potential to unsettle Bosnia. Serbia has not reached the point of no return in its political transition toward democratic values and Euro-Atlantic integration. First, a significant proportion of the Serbian population remains tempted by radical nationalistic rhetoric advocating, among other things, a Greater Serbia. Second, at the time of going to press, it looks likely that Kosovo will be granted independence in the near future, albeit under international supervision. This has potential repercussions for Bosnia. Some Serb politicians publicly linked Kosovo’s independence to the separation of the Republika Srpska from Bosnia. Nearly two-thirds of Bosnian Serbs still have separatist aspirations. At the same time, a similar number of people believe that separation is not a realistic prospect. Overall, it is not possible to predict the precise regional effects of Kosovo’s independence. A violent reaction by Bosnian Serbs is the least likely scenario. More likely is that after the settlement of Kosovo’s status, Bosnian Serb resentments will increase and play themselves out at the political level with the Republika Srpska remaining a difficult partner of the Bosniak/Croat Federation and

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the international community as they try to push forward institutional reforms necessary to build an effective state. As to Croatia, it has long ceased to represent a security threat to Bosnia. No significant political party in Zagreb questions the territorial integrity of the neighbouring country. In addition, neither the government nor the main opposition support those elements among the Bosnian Croats who would like to modify the Dayton peace agreement with a view to creating a third – Croat – entity in Bosnia. In short, as a candidate country en route to membership of the EU, Croatia acts, in the main, responsibly toward its neighbour. Taken separately, none of the risks described in this brief survey constitutes a threat, or heralds a deterioration of the security situation. Taken together, they render stability in the country potentially fragile. Hence, the Peace Implementation Council decided, in February 2007, to keep the Office of the High Representative (OHR) open beyond June 2007.3 EU troops will be needed for some time, albeit at reduced strength, to assist the government and the civilian international actors on the ground in countering the identified risks and achieving durable stability.

The planning, mandate and organization of EUFOR Althea The Union started to prepare a follow-on mission to NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) at the beginning of 2004. This work relied, largely, on the knowledge and assessments of NATO’s SFOR, which had acquired an invaluable understanding of the Bosnian theatre since its deployment there at the end of 1995.4 While the mobilization of NATO expertise facilitated the work of the planners, it also narrowed the room for operational innovation. For instance, some EU member states considered transferring SFOR’s armed police unit – the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) which consisted of about 500 police officers with military status, half of them Italian Carabinieri – to the unarmed advisory EU police mission (EUPM). To these member states, such a reorganization would have been in line with EU concepts, according to which police officers assigned to international missions should be placed under civilian command. In addition, it would have strengthened the civilian police component of EU action in Bosnia, which would have been consistent with the fact that nine years after the end of the war the main emphasis of the international community was squarely on civil institution-building. In particular, police officers from the MSU would have given the EUPM a greater capacity to contribute to the operational development of the local police forces. According to this view, the EUPM mandate should have been reopened to give the mission executive powers. However, the idea was not agreed upon and hence some involved in the deliberations considered the MSU better employed ‘actively’ with EUFOR. Indeed, they argued that the MSU capability was crucial for the success of the force. In their view, police officers with military status

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were necessary because they would enable Althea to handle civil disturbance situations should they exceed the capacities of the local police and to support the fight against organized crime more effectively. Their arguments prevailed, with the result that the MSU remained under military command with EUFOR and was given a new name: the Integrated Police Unit. The planning of the 7,000-strong EU force Althea was a lengthy process. The challenge was not only that it was by far the largest military force the Union had ever deployed under the ESDP, but also that its tasks had to be delimited from those of the residual NATO presence. NATO was to remain in the country after SFOR left to assist in defence reforms and to undertake some operational supporting tasks (this point will be discussed further below). In the field, the EU Planning Team, which set up camp inside SFOR headquarters (HQ) in June 2004, benefited from significant support from its NATO colleagues. The good working relationship contributed to the fact that EUFOR was ready to take over from SFOR as scheduled on 2 December 2004. From an operational point of view, there were two key planning challenges. One was to replace the almost 1,000 American troops, who were due to leave when SFOR’s mandate ended. The other one was to find a substitute for the USA as framework nation of Task Force North.5 The Union lived up to both challenges. It was able to generate enough troops to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of contingents from the USA; and Finland, in a strong show of commitment to the ESDP, volunteered to become the framework nation of Task Force North. The Finns managed to deploy in Task Force North in time for the hand-over of the command from NATO to EUFOR. As for the rest of the troops, since about 80 per cent of SFOR troops were from European nations, they were already in theatre. Therefore, on the day of the transfer of authority, most SFOR troops only had to change insignia, trading their NATO/SFOR badges for those of the EU. EUFOR took over SFOR’s legal mandate, i.e., Annex 1A of the Dayton peace agreement. This robust military mandate allows Althea, if necessary, to enforce peace by force. In addition, Annex 1A provides that the peacekeepers do not have to answer to the civilian High Representative of the international community in Bosnia but only to their own chain of command. In the case of NATO, this was the North Atlantic Council; in the case of the EU, it is the EU Council of Ministers. Overall, by taking over the responsibility for implementing Annex 1A from SFOR, EUFOR has been given considerable freedom of action. Just like the preceding NATO force, Althea initially ran a central HQ located near Sarajevo and three subordinate territorial HQs which were assigned different areas of responsibility (AoR). The three AoRs were Task Force North-West (HQ in Banja Luka), Task Force North (HQ in Tuzla) and Task Force South-East (HQ in Mostar). In February 2007, the decision was taken to reduce Althea to 2,500 troops and to concentrate them near Sarajevo. In its first years of deployment, most operations were conducted

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by the task forces which over the years, going back to the IFOR and SFOR years, had acquired a certain degree of autonomy. In the late SFOR days, task forces could almost be compared to ‘independent Republics’, still subordinate to SFOR HQ but using the room for manoeuvre granted to a military echelon of command to the maximum extent possible. For instance, the speciality of Task Force North West were operations in support of the fight against organized crime. General David Leakey, the first commander of Althea, was eager to reassert control over the task forces and developed large-scale operations at EUFOR level in order to engage, in a co-ordinated fashion, all the troops under his command. Hence, a more unified operational policy was implemented throughout the country. As for the location of EUFOR HQ, it was a much-debated question during the planning phase. Some insisted that one key aspect of the relationship between EUFOR and NATO HQ Sarajevo would be operational de-confliction; therefore, the most practical solution would be the co-location of the two HQs. Others insisted that priority should be given to operational relations between EU partners and to overall coherence of EU action in Bosnia. Therefore, the main EU actors should be co-located. The former view prevailed and since December 2004, EUFOR HQ and the HQ of the remaining NATO presence have shared the same building near Sarajevo in Camp Butmir. Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that relations between EUFOR and its main EU partners, namely the EUPM and the EU Special Representative (EUSR), have turned out to be more intense than with the NATO HQ Sarajevo. By the end of 2006, a few months before Althea’s downsizing was decided, 34 nations furnished troops to the EU force, including all but three EU member states. Denmark decided in 1993 to opt out of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Cyprus and Malta were excluded from participation because they do not have a bilateral security agreement with NATO, which is a prerequisite for participation in any EU military operation with recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities, according to the Berlin Plus agreement.6 Twelve non-EU countries provided troops to Althea. The largest third-country contingent came from Turkey – about 450 soldiers. Other contributions were significantly smaller. For instance, Macedonia provided helicopters while Argentina’s contribution – one officer – was symbolic. It was not incidental that the initial contribution of third countries to EUFOR equalled the number of troops that non-NATO countries provided to SFOR. Clearly, the ESDP is an attractive vehicle for non-EU states wishing to play a role in collective action aimed at the maintenance of international peace and security. As for the assignment of national officers to the key positions in the force, it is governed by a criterion widely used in multinational deployments. The top military positions in Althea – commander, deputy commander and chief of staff – go to the nationals of those EU countries that supply the most troops and that express their political wish to play a key role in the

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operation. This criterion is supplemented by the principle of the yearly rotation of these functions to accommodate the three main contributors to the force, which in the early years of the deployment were Great Britain, Italy and Germany. Hence, the first commanding officer was British, his deputy hailed from Italy and his chief of staff from Germany. After one year, an Italian general took over as commander, and he was assisted by a British deputy and a German chief of staff. In the final rotation among the big three, an Italian deputy and a British chief of staff worked under a German commander. The French, albeit one of the main EU military powers, have played a less prominent role in Althea, partly because they led the first two EU military operations – Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in Congo. Interestingly, in its first year of operation EUFOR was commanded by General David Leakey, a British 2-star general, while the NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR) was led by Yves de Kermabon, a French 3-star general. This nicely illustrates how misleading it can be to describe France as being sceptical toward NATO and Great Britain as being a lukewarm supporter of the ESDP. About a year and a half into Althea’s mission, a number of states announced that they wished to withdraw their troops and/or capabilities. Such statements of intent are not uncommon in international military missions. For instance, the armed forces of some countries may be overstretched because of too many international engagements. Still, no country contributing a significant number of troops to EUFOR has unilaterally withdrawn them; decisions on the evolution of their joint military commitment in Bosnia have been made collectively. Indeed, in December 2006, EU member states decided, in principle, to downsize EUFOR and they reaffirmed their decision at the end of February 2007. The reconfigured force was due to be in place by the end of May 2007.

EUFOR activities For nine years NATO ran a successful peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, first the Implementation Force (IFOR) and then SFOR. Alliance troops secured peace in the country and implemented the military aspects of the peace settlement, e.g., the separation and disarmament of combatants and the control of the activities of the remaining armed forces. At the Istanbul summit in June 2004, NATO formally announced that SFOR would be terminated by the end of the year. Some in NATO considered that the deployment had reached its political objective; it was a case of ‘mission accomplished’. Yet others, including the EU, while acknowledging NATO’s success, judged that the job was not yet finished. NATO welcomed the decision to maintain a continued international military presence in Bosnia. Neither SFOR, in its final years, nor EUFOR since then have had to deal with serious threats to peace by the former entity armed forces or any

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armed groups. The deterrence function, which is one of the principal tasks mandated by Annex 1A of the Dayton peace accord, has gradually become obsolete because potentially violent spoilers of the peace have either disappeared (armed groups) or been tamed (entity armed forces). The ministries of defence of the Republika Srpska and of the Federation officially ceased to exist on 31 December 2005, and the single state-level ministry of defence includes Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat and Bosniak officials and officers.7 In the absence of any acute internal threat to the security of the country, Althea’s main function is reassurance, which is at least partly a psychological concept. The international military presence is a key element contributing to a sense of safety among the local population. The citizenry are convinced that renewed inter-ethnic fighting is impossible thanks to the continued presence of an international military force in their country. The reassuring effect of first SFOR and then EUFOR was documented by opinion polls over a period of three years from September 2003 to September 2006. According to the data, which were commissioned by the international military, in 2006 about a quarter of the population believed war could resume should international troops leave Bosnia and another third feared localized outbreaks of violence. At the same time, the number of Bosnians who thought that international peacekeepers were no longer required to keep the country safe gradually grew over the period of investigation. Between a quarter and a third of the respondents voiced this opinion in 2006, which shows a gradually increasing confidence of the Bosnian population in their country’ stability. However, the opinion polls also show that a large majority of the population supported the continued presence of EUFOR in Bosnia and this remains valid after the force reduction was announced. An important aspect of any military reassurance posture is the credibility of the military force used for the purpose. For the EU, the goal of establishing the credentials of its operation in Bosnia was a challenge. After the inability of the European countries to contain the violence triggered by the break-up of Yugoslavia, the EU was perceived by locals as politically and militarily weak. Indeed, the population in the early 1990s, particularly the Muslims, resented the EU member states for not stopping the 1992–95 war. Under these adverse conditions, how did Althea go about demonstrating its resolve and capacity to guarantee peace in the country? On the one hand, General Leakey initiated a high operational tempo in an effort to demonstrate his troops’ military capabilities and EUFOR communicated proactively about the results of its operations. On the other hand, EUFOR sought to benefit from the credibility of NATO’s engagement in Bosnia by underlining that it would have the same number of soldiers, the same mandate, the same capabilities and the same territorial organization.8 NATO was, and still is, perceived by Bosnians as a strong institution which, following the signing of the Dayton peace deal, made sure that ethnic fighting did not resume.

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In line with its mandate, Althea has been engaging in two types of activities (Council of the European Union, 2004c). Key military tasks are those to which the commander is obliged to give priority, and key supporting tasks are activities which he may decide to carry out, within the constraints of available means and capabilities, on the condition that such pursuit contributes to the accomplishment of the main military mission. Beginning with the key military tasks, they cover in particular the maintenance of a safe and secure environment. EUFOR’s activities designed to promote this objective include patrolling; ‘harvest’ operations designed to collect the weapons still held in the communities; information gathering, which relies on Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) living in the local community throughout the country; and intelligence gathering, which is carried out by specialized units. In addition, EUFOR inspects the Bosnian defence structures, for instance weapons and ammunition storage sites and defence industry factories, to ensure that they comply with the instructions issued by it in line with its responsibilities under the Dayton peace agreement. EU troops also control the movement of weapons and ammunition on the territory of Bosnia. In engaging in these tasks, EUFOR is authorized by its mandate to use force, if necessary. As to key supporting tasks, two stand out. First, EUFOR is conducting regular, albeit discrete, operations designed to track down and catch persons indicted for war crimes and to disrupt their support networks. In doing so, Althea endeavours to prevent Bosnia from being a safe haven for war crime indictees. Fugitives know they run a serious risk of being caught if they are in Bosnia. Hence, it is unlikely that the remaining persons indicted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague, in particular Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, are in Bosnia. A second major supporting task carried out by EUFOR is its involvement in combating organized crime, which is seen by most international observers as a key stumbling block on the road to Bosnia’s normalization and its joining the EU. General Leakey believed that the goals of keeping the peace and supporting the fight against organized crime were complementary, particularly as persons indicted for war crimes and their support networks were thought to be sustained by organized crime. He argued that supporting the fight against the latter was the best way for Althea to be ‘new and distinct’ (Leakey, 2006). It was also the best way for EUFOR to support the Mission Implementation Plan of the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia, another of EUFOR’s key military tasks. Leakey thus made operations targeting organized crime a centrepiece of his agenda.9 He did not only rely on Althea’s police unit with military status – the Integrated Police Unit. He also mobilized purely military assets – ‘green’ units as opposed to ‘blue’ ones. The EU troops employed their surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities and intelligence database to track down illicit activity such as fuel smuggling and illegal timber cutting, which are big business in the country. They made use of the headquarters to plan,

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direct and review crime-busting operations in support of the local authorities and of military communications to co-ordinate operations across the country. They drew on manoeuvre ‘green’ units, which are able to deploy to and concentrate large numbers of soldiers in any part of the country at any time, to man large-scale roadblocks and support the local police in ‘checking’ vehicles.10 Furthermore, Althea conducted joint patrols with local border guards along Bosnia’s mountainous green borders to interrupt the transnational links of Bosnian crime. And it carried out joint inspections with forestry inspectors in sawmills to crack down on illegal logging.11 These activities were significantly reduced following the entry into force of operational arrangements between the EUPM and EUFOR (see below). They will further diminish, as all EUFOR activities, with the implementation of EUFOR’s reduction. Embarking on what for a military force is an unorthodox task prompted critical reactions from a number of contributing states. In response, General Leakey laid down clear principles of engagement. EUFOR is not to act on its own but together with the Bosnian law enforcement agencies (LEAs), and the task of soldiers is limited to creating the conditions in which the Bosnian LEAs not only ‘could’ but ‘would have to’ do their duty. EUFOR can thus incite, enable and embolden the Bosnian LEAs to go after organized crime networks they would not have felt confident enough to tackle on their own, or which they would have deliberately ignored because of corruption or undue political influence. Hence, EU troops are neither involved in specialized police work nor do they have to appear as witnesses in subsequent legal proceedings. Contributing states and contingents that had voiced concerns about Althea’s role in combating organized crime were, in the main, reassured by the fact that its activities are limited to uncovering illicit conduct and ‘freezing the crime scene’ so that it can be handed over to local law enforcement officials for further processing. Still, some nations imposed ‘caveats’ or restrictions on the use of their troops in support of the fight against organized crime. In military parlance, caveats are restrictions on the use of national contingents by the multinational Force Commander. In general, caveats are officially declared from the outset of an operation or national commitment so that the commander knows which troops he can use for which tasks. For instance, some governments did not wish their EUFOR contingents to be employed for the purpose of riot control, usually because they did not have any specialized training. Others objected to their soldiers being (temporarily) transferred to other Task Forces or to Kosovo to reinforce NATO troops there in case of an emergency. However, states may fail to announce their caveats or they announce caveats in response to innovations or initiatives by the Force Commander which were not considered when the operation was agreed. In theses cases, the commander discovers only at a late stage that some units cannot be used for certain types of operations. This was the case with some anti-organized crime operations in support of the local law enforcement

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agencies. Some units could only be employed in such action under strict conditions.

EUFOR’s impact Through its presence as well as its activities, EUFOR has been maintaining stability in Bosnia. Moreover, it is perceived by the population as providing a credible reassurance against a return to armed conflict. Opinion polls show that it enjoys a high level of support, comparable to that of SFOR. More than two-thirds of the population regard EUFOR as credible and useful. To further elucidate Althea’s impact on security and stability in the country some counterfactual reasoning is required. What would happen if the troops were to be withdrawn in 2007? Without the presence of an international military force, an important proportion of the population would feel insecure. There would be a risk that the inter-ethnic tensions, which continue to exist in the localities where several ethnicities live, might escalate into scattered violence. Politically, a premature withdrawal of peacekeepers could be seen as abandonment, particularly by the Bosniak population. It could reinvigorate latent centrifugal forces by emboldening hard-line Serb elements to resist further political reforms aimed at strengthening the central government. The Bosnian Croats could become more assertive in demanding a reopening of the Dayton accord to establish their own entity in Herzegovina. Lastly, without military backup, the authority of the international civilian community on the ground could be diminished. In short, more than ten years after the ethnic fighting was brought to an end by the international community, the military peacekeepers cannot yet leave Bosnia. Althea made a significant contribution to Bosnia’s post-war stabilization and development not only by successfully accomplishing its key military tasks but also through its supporting tasks. In particular, it has been having some impact on the networks of organized crime. Although some remain sceptical about Althea’s role in this regard, arguing that ‘we won’t be having a serious impact on crime until the time when we are shot at’, joint operations with local law enforcement agencies made it more difficult for crime operatives to carry out their illicit activities. The most significant examples are certainly in the field of illegal timber trade. EUFOR helped seize large quantities of illegally marked logs and uncover unregistered transactions. What is more, Althea’s proactive stance made a difference to the prevailing culture of impunity in which organized crime flourishes. It helped to stiffen the resolve of local law enforcement agencies, which now lead the operations and, in some instances, are taking the initiative to ask for EUFOR support. The point to be made here is that EUFOR’s principal impact in this issue-area was its contribution to developing local capacities and changing local perceptions and rather than its immediate impact on organized crime networks.

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Althea’s relations with other EU actors on the ground Althea’s involvement in supporting the fight against organized crime necessitated the development of co-ordination mechanisms with other EU crisis management actors, namely the EU police mission EUPM and the EUSR and his staff. Substantial efforts have been invested in developing an efficient triangular relationship, especially as regards the relations between the two ESDP actors. The EUPM, which has been in Bosnia since the beginning of 2003, has been assisting in the build-up of police capacities through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting the local police forces and by colocating European police officers with their local counterparts (see Chapter 4). It does not have executive powers and, during the first three years of its existence (2003–06) developed a restrictive interpretation of its mandate. On the other hand, as described above, EUFOR has made the support to local law enforcement operations an important element of its activities. The two approaches initially proved difficult to reconcile. In response to these communication and co-ordination issues and following EUFOR’s requests, the EUSR and his staff, whose main responsibility is to ensure coherence among EU actors on the ground, engineered the adoption of principles designed to clarify the relationship between the EUPM and Althea. This measure was further reinforced by the Political and Security Committee in Brussels, which adjusted the mandates of the two ESDP operations, making the EUPM the lead agency in activities aimed at supporting the fight against organized crime. In addition, the EUSR’s co-ordinating role in this area was upgraded. The final point in the adjustment process was reached in the summer of 2006 with the formulation by the EUPM and Althea of Common Operational Guidelines. They translate the adjusted mandates into practical instructions to both EUPM field officers and EUFOR troops. According to the guidelines, the initiative to launch crime-busting operations lies with the local law enforcement agencies. Should a law enforcement agency judge that it needs EUFOR’s support to conduct an operation, its request must be reviewed and endorsed by the EUPM. It is worth emphasizing that under the new arrangements, one ESDP actor – EUFOR – requires the endorsement of another ESDP player – the EUPM – before it can get involved in a key area of Bosnia’s post-war stabilization and development. Due to these mechanisms, a high degree of coherence has been achieved between the two bodies. On the whole, EUFOR’s involvement in supporting the local law enforcement agencies in tackling crime has diminished through the implementation of the Common Operational Guidelines, which clearly establish the EUPM as the lead agency in this issue-area. EUFOR’s downsizing to 2,500 troops by June 2007 reinforces this trend. Still, EUFOR manoeuvre units remain capable of supporting the fight against organized crime, within their means and capabilities.

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As to Althea’s relationship with the EUSR, it is close even though the latter is not in the chain of command of the former, a fact that distinguishes the military mission from the EUPM. EUFOR has been drawing on the political expertise of the EUSR, who, since Paddy Ashdown, has also served as the High Representative of the international community in the country. The generally good relationship is due to the fact that EUFOR’s role can be characterized as political-military in nature, though the importance of personality factors should not be underestimated.12 Althea does not fight enemies on the battlefield, though it is prepared to do so, but rather engages with local authorities at all levels in order to carry out its mandate. Hence, the military welcomes the assistance of the EUSR in establishing relations with government officials and his advice aimed at ensuring that the international community conveys coherent messages to local decision-makers, administrators and the media. Conversely, the EUSR and his team keep Althea updated on political developments which have a security dimension and the EUFOR commander is routinely consulted in advance on planned decisions by the EUSR/High Representative which have a security aspect. In general, everyday interaction between the military and the EUSR is based on mutual respect and support. This was certainly the case when Paddy Ashdown was EUSR/High Representative and General Leakey the commander of EUFOR. For instance, in December 2004, one week after EUFOR had taken over from SFOR, Ashdown asked Leakey if EUFOR could conduct an operation to seize control of an underground military facility in the Republika Srpska where, according to the EUSR, Ratko Mladic had taken refuge a few months earlier. General Leakey agreed and expanded the operation to seize control of all underground military facilities in Bosnia in order to prevent their use as hideouts by war criminals. On 16 December, during a joint press conference with the US ambassador and General Leakey, the High Representative/EUSR announced a number of sanctions against Republika Srpska officials for failing to co-operate with the war crimes tribunal in The Hague and the EUFOR operation. This as well as other high-profile cases attracted significant attention, including from the media (national and international) and thus contributed to establishing EUFOR’s credentials as a robust military force. EUFOR consults with the EUSR on planned operations, particularly those designed to disrupt the support networks of war crime indictees at large. These consultations have two objectives. First, they are designed to check whether the operation may have an adverse effect on the political agenda of the EUSR/High Representative. Second, they allow EUFOR to make a better assessment of the local political context of the operation and its potential impact. Conversely, the military force can rely on strong support from the EUSR. For instance, when, in January 2006, EUFOR was heavily criticized following an operation in which its soldiers, acting in selfdefence, killed the wife of a person indicted for war crimes by a local court,

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the EUSR publicly defended the troops against attacks from local politicians and the media. Finally, EUFOR maintains good relations with the European Commission Delegation. Bosnia’s reform process, which the latter largely steers, promotes the country’s self-sustainability which, in turn, diminishes the need for an international military presence. In other words, EUFOR and the Commission delegation share the same objectives. In addition, the Commission delegation supports EUFOR by funding civilmilitary co-operation projects, which are commissioned by EUFOR and whose implementation is overseen by its engineers. These projects include, for instance, the rehabilitation of schools. Even though, they are small-scale projects, they help Althea ‘win hearts and minds’.

EUFOR’s relations with Brussels At top of EUFOR’s political chain of command is the Council of the European Union. It has delegated its authority to exercise political control over, and give strategic direction to, Althea to the Political and Security Committee. The former thus regularly informs the latter about its activities. The Political and Security Committee, in turn, examines Althea’s mission reviews every six months and, if necessary, issues directions. For instance, in early December 2006, it reached an agreement in principle, which was confirmed by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 11 December, on the troop draw-down in Bosnia in view of the improved security situation in the country. At top of Althea’s military chain of command is the EU Operation Commander, a function which, in line with the stipulations of the Berlin Plus agreements, is performed by NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), currently General Sir John Reith. He regularly reports to the Political and Security Committee and the EU defence ministers, and he regularly briefs the EU Military Committee. The Force Commander in theatre also appears before the Political and Security Committee, albeit less frequently. On political-military matters, his EU political advisor reports to the Council General Secretariat, of which he is a member. The latter mechanism helps ensure coherence between the field and the political levels. Finally, the Operation Commander and the Force Commander periodically address the joint meetings of NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the EU’s Political and Security Committee, the forum in which matters related to the Berlin Plus agreements are discussed.

EUFOR’s relations with NATO The relationship between the EU force and NATO is shaped by two facts. First, Althea is a Berlin Plus operation, relying on NATO common assets and capabilities such as communication and information systems. The implementation of Berlin Plus has been smooth at the tactical level, except

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for one serious issue. NATO was due to transfer selected information pertaining to operations to EUFOR prior to its launch in December 2004 but the transfer did not take place until July 2005. Furthermore, as with the first EU military operation Concordia in Macedonia in 2003, Althea took over from a NATO operation. Therefore, NATO common assets and capabilities were already in place. Implementing Berlin Plus in a situation where NATO is not present would be more challenging. The second element in the relationship between NATO and EUFOR is that after the termination of SFOR, NATO has maintained a ‘residual presence’ in Bosnia in the form of NATO Headquarters Sarajevo. Its mandate is based on Annex 1A of the Dayton peace accord, as is that of EUFOR. The fact that both EUFOR and the NATO residual presence are legal successors to SFOR created some confusion between the two. The former inherited the general mission to maintain stability whereas the latter was given tasks that are more limited. NATO Headquarters Sarajevo is mandated to lead international efforts in assisting defence reforms and to undertake certain operational supporting tasks, namely in the area of counter-terrorism and in supporting the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague to bring to justice persons indicted for war crimes. In addition, NATO has retained certain executive powers which it shares with EUFOR. Consequently, with both being legal successors to SFOR, they had to delineate their respective responsibilities. At the political level in Brussels, a general and rather vague agreement was found on the delineation of competencies. It was left to the tactical level to sort out the details. NATO officials insisted on keeping large responsibilities because of the alliance’s commitment to Bosnia’s stability. Conversely, EU officers were intent on establishing EUFOR as the country’s main security guarantor. A compromise was reached, which included, among other things, the decision to share the authority to vet senior officers of the Bosnian armed forces and to authorize the movement of weapons and ammunition. On defence reforms, the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo has played the lead-agency role and Althea’s involvement is only supplementary. In terms of operational activities, commanders on the ground had to deal with the fact that two international military forces, answering to two separate chains of command, coexist on the same territory. More specifically, both have a mandate to track down war crime indictees in the same area of operation. This created the potential for clashes in the field. To tackle this challenge, EUFOR and NATO Headquarters Sarajevo agreed explicit and precise co-ordination procedures that specify that that each organization has to notify the other in advance of their planned operations. In general, co-operation between EUFOR and the remaining NATO presence in Bosnia has been good in spite of inevitable divergences in interpreting the delineation of tasks. Initially, many thought that NATO would be EUFOR’s main partner in Bosnia given the linkages and overlaps between the two organizations – the role of SFOR in EUFOR’s planning,

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the implementation of Berlin Plus, similar taskings and co-location in the same HQ building. As noted above, it turned out that EUFOR has developed very substantial relations, on a daily basis, with the EUSR and the EUPM. The NATO Headquarters Sarajevo has been an important partner but rather on a case-by-case basis.

Conclusion EUFOR was the latest EU crisis management instrument to be deployed in Bosnia after the EUSR and the EUPM. So far, it has achieved its main objectives. First, it successfully took over the peacekeeping duties from SFOR and established itself as a credible military force. Second, it evolved a distinct identity distinguishing itself from the preceding NATO troops, not least by playing a high profile, albeit supporting role, in the fight against organized crime. Clearly, EUFOR added to the impact and political standing of the Union in Bosnia. However, there are a number of lessons that the EU can draw from the co-ordinating practices that have developed between EU actors in Bosnia. First, the EU should familiarize its personnel with existing EU objectives and co-ordination requirements prior to their deployment and train them in how to engage in civilian-military co-ordination at tactical-operational level. Second, co-ordination should be further mainstreamed into the planning phase of ESDP operations. In particular, due attention should to be paid to making sure that if there is more than one EU mission on the ground, their respective mandates and activities do not overlap. Third, the co-ordinating role of the EU Special Representative vis-a`-vis ESDP operations should be reinforced. Finally, relations between EUSRs and the commanders of EU military operations should be enhanced. This last point is politically sensitive. Two models exist. In the United Nations model, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General has authority over the military force. In the EU model, there is no relationship of subordination between the political and military leaders on the ground and procedures and practices have to be developed to facilitate co-ordination between the two actors. The former model, arguably, provides full coherence while the second prevents political interference by the EUSR in operational matters. There is no point for the EU, at this stage, to change the way it conducts military operations. However, it might want to consider upgrading the competencies of EUSRs in order to empower them to give guidance to military commanders on political matters, for instance, on planned military operations that have a political dimension or impact. The same mechanisms could apply to the relationship between EUSRs and the heads of a civilian ESDP missions. This was debated in the EU at the beginning of 2007 when it planned a reinforced EU presence in Kosovo following a solution to the province’s status. With Althea, the EU has been proving that it can successfully plan and conduct a large military operation. The force is run without a framework

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nation that supplies the bulk of the personnel and capabilities such as command and control systems. Like any multinational military deployment, EUFOR had to deal with national caveats, language problems – some officers had an insufficient command of English – different military cultures and so forth. Still, it passed the test. The final challenge remains to complete Althea and to leave behind a stable and peaceful Bosnia en route toward EU membership. If this goal is achieved, the Union will significantly add to the credibility of the military ESDP and have a sound basis on which to build as it further develops its role as an international security actor.

Notes 1 The views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily reflect the views of EUFOR Althea or the European Union. 2 The Dayton peace accord, which includes the current constitution, succeeded in establishing peace but created a weak state incapable of tackling the many challenges the country faces on the road to stable peace and democracy. Constitutional reform aims at enhancing the governance capacity of the central state and at creating an institutional framework that facilitates co-operation among the three ethnic communities. The objective of police reform is to establish a financially sustainable, ethnically integrated and de-politicized law enforcement apparatus by consolidating the highly fragmented policing field and vesting all policing powers in the central state. 3 The High Representative of the international community in Bosnia is charged with implementing the civilian component of the Dayton peace accord under the guidance of the Peace Implementation Council. 4 In December 1995, NATO deployed the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. In 1997 the name was changed to SFOR (Stabilisation Force). 5 A framework nation supplies the majority of the officers manning an HQ as well as the key command and control capabilities such as communication and information systems. 6 Berlin Plus gives the military ESDP access to NATO planning capabilities and other assets. For details, see Chapter 10. 7 The implementation of the decision to wind down the separate ministries proceeds slowly and is still on-going at the time of writing. 8 In a balancing act, EUFOR sought at the same time to emphasize that it was more than an EU-led version of SFOR. Hence, its public message, on posters and in TV ads, was ‘From Stabilisation to Integration: EUFOR’. The slogan was intended to emphasize both the continuity between SFOR and EUFOR and their difference. General Leakey used to describe the mandate he was given in the following way. While Althea was SFOR’s successor, it was also expected to be ‘new and distinct’. 9 It is important to highlight that EUFOR is not mandated to fight organized crime but to support local efforts. There are three reasons for this self-limitation. In political terms, the common objective of all EU actors in Bosnia is to reinforce rather than substitute for local capacities. In legal terms, EUFOR does not operate under local law and therefore can neither seize evidence nor conduct criminal investigations and arrest anyone. Finally, in practical terms, soldiers are not trained as law enforcement agents and thus have little or no proficiency in this line of activity.

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10 Acknowledging that such road blocks, partially manned by soldiers, could convey a message of abnormality and that, therefore, it could be perceived as an ‘occupation force’, EUFOR encouraged the local police to take the lead in these operations. Also, it refrained from setting up road blocks in the main cities. 11 Initially, EUFOR took the lead in these operations, but then gradually encouraged the local authorities to play a more proactive role. 12 On the difference that personality factors make in EUSR-EUFOR interaction, see Chapter 12.

6

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia, 2003–05 Tobias Flessenkemper1

For a long time, Macedonia was considered a haven of stability in the Western Balkans. The country remained peaceful during the 1990s, seemingly managing the fragile relation between the majority Slav-Macedonians and the ethnic Albanian citizens. However, following the Kosovo war in 1999, the country slipped into inter-ethnic conflict, just about avoiding a full-blown civil war. In 2003, the European Union (EU) first deployed a small peacekeeping force to Macedonia. It was followed by the police mission Proxima. Macedonia thus became the first demonstration of the new capacity of the EU to combine military and civilian crisis management tools under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Also, Proxima was the first-ever mission that was extended with a new mandate and that thus carried out a major overhaul of its activities and procedures while in the field.2 Tasked to carry out police developmental tasks, the mission was initially given one year to achieve its objectives. The incoherence of means and ambitions meant that it remained experimental as it tried to bridge the period between initial post-conflict stabilization and the start of the Stabilization and Association process (SAp) managed by the European Commission. This chapter examines the manifold challenges encountered by Proxima, the way it dealt with them and its achievements as it enacted its ambiguous role as a civilian crisis management mission in a country that had already moved beyond the stage of post-conflict stabilization.

The Macedonian crisis Macedonia seceded from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the wake of a referendum on sovereign statehood in 1991. Macedonians supported independence almost unanimously, but ethnic Albanians, some 25 per cent of the total population chose not to participate. At the moment of independence, Macedonian elites had a firm grip on politics, the economy and public administration, including the police and other law enforcement agencies. As they embarked on a nation-building project, they reinforced the

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feeling of alienation among the Albanian population. Despite their participation in government, Albanian political parties were unable to address their voters’ demands such as Albanian-language university education, bilingual public administration and ethnically unbiased hiring practices in the police, judiciary and other domains of the public sector. These internal difficulties were compounded by the wars and instability of the Balkans during the 1990s and a deep economic crisis. Under these adverse circumstances, the Kosovo war and its aftermath, notably the influx of a great many Kosovo Albanian refugees, triggered a short but intense outbreak of violence between, on the one hand, the Macedonian-dominated police and military and, on the other, Albanian insurgents. In spring 2001, the Macedonian-Albanian National Liberation Army attacked several police stations and police patrols in villages and declared them ‘liberated areas’.3 The police proved unprepared, as they were poorly trained and badly equipped (Stodieck, 2006: 61). Unable to stop the violence, they withdrew. Instead, special police units played a prominent role in counterinsurgency operations. Their abusive behaviour further undermined the confidence of Albanians in the state. However, serious offences were also committed by the insurgents. By August 2001, some sixty military and police officials had been killed and several kidnapped. There were 22 known cases of disappearances – a politically sensitive issue because high-level officials of the crisis-era government and police and of the insurgents were implicated. The Ohrid Framework Agreement signed on 13 August 2001 ended the violence. The agreement stipulated wide-reaching constitutional changes centred on ensuring a broader participation of Albanians in public life. To accompany the implementation, Annex C of the peace deal gave the EU a co-ordinating role on the ground. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was tasked to restore peace. The alliance, which initially deployed 3,500 troops, protected international personnel, especially from the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE).4 Both organizations monitored the situation in the ethnic hot spots of Northwest Macedonia. NATO was also in charge of demobilizing and disarming the insurgents. Weapons collection remained limited though. As one NATO official put it, the international force ‘obtained a representative sample’ as the country remained awash with weapons. The unwillingness of insurgents to be fully disarmed remained a problem. The fact that the policing powers of the Macedonian police were challenged by some Albanian-dominated villages constituted a major challenge for Proxima.

Police reform needs The armed clashes between militants and the police in 2001 brought into focus a number of long-standing, intertwined shortfalls of the Macedonian

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police force. First, a key shortcoming was the lack of equitable representation of Albanians in the police. Among other things, this resulted in ethnically biased policing. In particular, as the Kosovo crisis developed, Macedonians of Albanian origin were regularly harassed by law enforcement officials, based on little more than a generic suspicion of being involved in crime and irredentist activities. The upshot was a public perception in areas inhabited predominantly by Albanians that the police was an ‘occupying power’ rather than a public service. Second, policing practices centred on public peace and order aspects to the detriment of both community policing and criminal investigations. This was a reflection of the socialist legacy, bad management, a lack of training, insufficient equipment and politicization. The latter enabled corrupt highranking officials from the ministry of interior and the police to protect their political and even criminal networks from being investigated. Together, these shortfalls negatively influenced the performance of the criminal police, notably their capacity to fight organized crime. The situation was aggravated by the lack of an appropriate legal framework and a lack of cooperation between the police and the judiciary. Third, the Macedonian police inherited a flawed organizational culture from its Yugoslav predecessor. It was marked by over-centralization and a penchant for control. This undermined both the confidence of the population in law enforcement and the more technical and operational aspects of policing work. For instance, the rank and file showed little self-initiative, preferring to wait for orders from superiors. This contributed to sluggish policing as police chiefs inevitably lacked the resources and information to micro-manage day-to-day policing work. In view of these deep-seated problems, it was a priority for the international community involved in post-conflict peace-building in Macedonia to render the police more accountable to the population. This required tackling corruption and police abuse and promoting consultation between the police and citizens on the policing needs of communities. A key plank of the international reform efforts was the ethnic inclusiveness of the police. The Ohrid peace accord stipulated that some 1,000 minority officers, mostly but not exclusively Albanians had to be trained and deployed to the Albanian-dominated part of the country. Another important reform task was to de-militarize the police, including their attitudes, and to transform them from a force at the services of state officials to a service for citizens. This concerned, among other things, the special police units and the state security and counter-intelligence agency – the UBK. Both had engaged in heavy-handed, ethnically biased regime policing prior to and during the crisis, which contributed to the escalation of tensions between Macedonians and the Albanian minority. Furthermore, responsibility for border control had to be transferred from the military to a civilian police service not least to ensure the proper investigation of transnational crime.

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The role of the EU in the stabilization of Macedonia In an effort to bring the violent clashes between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians to an end and to contribute to the country’s transition to a stable, multi-ethnic democracy, Brussels signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Skopje in April 2001.5 Judged on its merits, Macedonia was not ready for such a close association with the EU. The latter rewarded the country for the burden it had shouldered during the Kosovo war and, at the same time, it sent a strong signal to the parties to the conflict that a stable and democratic Macedonia would benefit from a privileged relationship with the EU. Macedonia thus became the frontrunner in the Stabilisation and Association process, which two years later at the 2003 Thessaloniki European Council was upgraded when the EU declared that all SAA partners were candidates for accession to the EU. In addition to managing this broad political framework linking Macedonia to the EU, the European Commission supported the reforms of the Macedonian policing field carried out under the guidance of the OSCE and other international actors. Among other things, a Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team (ECJHAT) was deployed to assist in the overhaul of the police and ministry of interior. Turning to the involvement of the Council of the EU in the peace process, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, played a major role, together with NATO and American mediators in brokering the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which, in August 2001, ended the Macedonian crisis. In the wake of the peace deal, the EUMM worked with the OSCE to build confidence in the former crisis areas. In early 2003, the EU was invited by the Macedonian government to assume increased responsibility for the stability in the country. This resulted in the deployment of a military ESDP operation code-named Concordia, which replaced NATO peacekeepers. Concordia was a short-term stabilization instrument (Council of the European Union, 2003a). As the country progressed toward stable peace and the police was re-deployed to the former crisis areas from which it had withdrawn during the ethnic fighting, the attention of the EU shifted toward the qualitative improvement of the police. High on the agenda were police-minority relations and general police . reform questions (Merlingen with Ostrauskaite, 2006).

Hiccups: the planning and launch of Proxima In the second half of 2003, a joint Council Secretariat and Commission fact-finding mission explored the need for an enhanced EU policing engagement in Macedonia. The term fact-finding mission is a bit of a euphemism in this context. The ‘findings’ were preordained as Brussels was determined to deploy a police mission to stay in the country beyond its military engagement scheduled to end in December 2003. Hence, the role of

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the fact finders was reduced to structuring and substantiating existing thinking within the Political and Security Committee and the Council General Secretariat. Based on the report of the fact-finding mission, member states adopted a Joint Action in which they approved the deployment of a civilian ESDP mission. Proxima, which followed on the heels of Concordia, was tasked to monitor, mentor and advise the local police with a view, among other things, to consolidating law and order and strengthening the confidence of the population, notably the ethnic Albanians, in the country’s law enforcement agencies (Council of the European Union, 2003f). With the mandate in place, a planning team started working on the concept of operations (CONOPS) and an operation plan (OPLAN). Yet, because of insufficient preparatory work by the fact finding mission and time constraints, the elaboration of these documents ran into problems. One glaring shortcoming was that the OPLAN stipulated that Proxima should dedicate a quarter of its one-year mandate to carrying out its own in-depth assessment of the local police before it started formulating and implementing any substantive activities. Clearly, Proxima got off to a difficult start. Instead of hitting the ground running, it had to replicate, albeit more thoroughly the preparatory work of the fact-finding mission and the planning team. On a similar note, the advance planning for the mission focused on organizational aspects. It was left to Proxima to elaborate reform projects and fashion tools to implement them. While this may be a workable division of labour when it comes to longer-term, development-oriented peace building operations, it proved dysfunctional in the case of Proxima with its short, one-year mandate. The problem was aggravated by the fact that Brussels failed to provide the mission with a police reform knowledge base and an appropriate toolbox for programme management even though it has an inventory of standardized tools and methodologies. However, it is owned by the European Commission and was not transferred to the ESDP police mission. The upshot was that the staff of the latter had to reinvent the wheel. During the better half of the first year of operation, they were busy devising their own programme development and management methodologies. As a result, the mission started its reform projects only about halfway through its mandate. This delay, in turn, was the main reason why many projects remained incomplete when the mandate expired. This held true even though Proxima was in the fortunate situation to be able to draw on the rich experience of OSCE police reform activities, not least because it was led by the former director of the OSCE Police Development Unit in Skopje, Bart D’Hooge. While these shortcomings of the planning phase were in principle avoidable, there was one factor that was not. Mission planning assumed that the European Commission Police Reform Project, which was scheduled to address the long-term needs of the Macedonian police, would run in parallel

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with Proxima. The initiative was conceived as a twinning project, i.e., a member state institution was contracted by the Commission as implementing agency. However, the twinning process was delayed until the end of summer 2004. Hence, the originally foreseen division of labour, which had Proxima provide input into the Commission police project, could not be implemented. This aggravated Proxima’s problems in the first half of its mandate. Moving from the planning to the start-up phase, it painfully exposed that the EU was still missing the basic capabilities required of a crisis manager. Proxima had to ‘borrow’ basic office equipment such as computers and telephones from the EUMM, NATO, the OSCE and the office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) in order to become operational. Moreover, it rented its first vehicles from the local branches of global car-rental companies. Clearly, in a less benign environment the EU would hardly have been able to rely on partner organizations and local commercial suppliers to launch a ‘crisis management’ operation. The procurement problems were compounded by the difficulties of force generation. The member states failed to second a sufficient number of qualified police experts. Indeed, this was not just a challenge in the launch phase. Throughout its initial one-year mandate, Proxima constantly stayed up to 20 per cent below the foreseen strength of 180 international police officers. Only after repeated calls for contribution was the mission able to come close to its projected strength by mid-2004. With the exception of Ireland, which objected to the ‘military’ nature of a small Proxima unit – the 30-officer strong, armed Protection Element6 – all of the then 15 member states seconded police officers. Also, with the exception of Malta, all ten accession countries seconded personnel. Nevertheless, the mission relied substantially on the participation of third countries, namely Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine, who seconded more than 10 per cent of all international Proxima staff. Additionally, the mission dealt with the quantity problem by contracting international civilian experts and national staff. Yet these efforts could not resolve the quality problem of force generation. On more than a few occasions, seconded police officers did not have the required level of policing proficiency to address the main challenges that the Macedonian police was facing.

Identity trouble Proxima was informed by two contradictory ideas about its identity. The ambiguity as to its proper role proved a severe handicap and limited its impact. On the one hand, its mandate reflected traditional political development practices centred on strengthening the rule of law, democratization and public administration reform. Thus, the mission was tasked to promote the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organized crime; the implementation of the comprehensive reform of the ministry of

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interior, including the police; the operational transition toward, and the creation of a border police, as a part of the wider regional EU effort to promote integrated border management; police-citizen relations through confidence-building measures; and co-operation with neighbouring states (Council of the European Union, 2003f and 2004e). Moreover, the developmental approach characterized both the CONOPS and the OPLAN, which stipulated that the mission had to work toward benchmarks derived from European best policing practice. On the other hand, certain parts of the mandate suggested that the mission was merely the ‘civilian’ continuation of the EU military force Concordia, a view supported by some member states. According to this reading, Proxima was primarily a reassurance tool rather than an instrument for reforming the police sector. This particular understanding of Proxima manifested itself in a number of mission features. First, the deployment of an armed protection element was fully in line with the interpretation of the mission as a security presence rather than a change manager. While the host country was in charge of the security of mission staff, the protection element was intended for exceptional situations involving mission personnel when the security forces of the host country could not come to their rescue.7 Second, the deployment pattern was that of a security-oriented mission. It was limited to the former crisis areas in the North and West of the country. Third, Proxima’s oneyear mandate was in tune with a role as a stabilizing influence. Conversely, it was clearly inadequate for addressing the broad range of mostly mid- to long-term development activities that the mission was mandated to carry out. Finally, its organizational structure was that of a typical security presence (Hansen, 2006: 20). This was no accident as it was based on the EU doctrine of international, non-executive police operations – strengthening missions in EU jargon. Though the doctrine is meant to support institution-building tasks, the organizational structure is that of a stability operation. On a related note, identity trouble emerged from an unlikely source. Most member states seconded police officers with first-hand knowledge of the Balkans rather than novices to serve in Proxima. While this facilitated the launch of the mission, it also had unintended consequences in particular during the first year. Proxima ended up with international staff most of whom had gained their regional experience in the United Nations missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. In both cases, international police officers had an executive mandate, i.e., they were authorized to engage in regular law enforcement activities. Once these officers joined Proxima, they were expected to change their role conceptions. Instead of getting the job done themselves, their task was to advise their local counterparts on how to upgrade their job performance and comply with democratic policing principles. Yet mindsets do not change so quickly. Neither did they have much expertise in capacity-building work.

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Mission organization As noted in the previous section, Proxima’s organizational structure was based on the ESDP doctrine of strengthening police missions, which is geared toward operational, security-oriented tasks. During the deployment phase, this proved beneficial. It facilitated the set-up of mission offices. Colocation teams were placed in the regional police headquarters in Skopje, Kumanovo, Tetovo, Gostivar and Ohrid, in local headquarters in the Western towns of Debar, Struga and Kicevo and in several boroughs of Skopje. Also, Proxima staff were co-located in the interior ministry. Yet, once the mission deployment was completed, the operational focus proved to be a major disadvantage. It artificially separated central from field activities and led to an overly complicated chain of command within the mission. In particular, there was insufficient interaction between the department in charge of elaborating reform projects, which was a headquarters function, and those implementing the projects on the ground. This structure deprived the former of crucial information and feedback from the field, which could not but have a negative impact on the design of the reform projects, including their practical relevance. During the spring of 2004, the EUSR and the Council General Secretariat became increasingly concerned about the mission. It produced little visible impact and engaged in what from the perspective of Brussels looked like arguments over jurisdictions with the European Commission delegation and the OSCE. And while Proxima was indeed in trouble, the critique was probably also fuelled by interpersonal dynamics between the main actors in Brussels and Skopje and external factors such as the fact that the EU police mission in Bosnia, too, was struggling. To address the critique of the mission, its head, Bart D’Hooge, and the EUSR, Søren Jessen-Petersen, initiated a management retreat in late spring to review all aspects of its functioning. This led to a complete overhaul of the existing structure, a process which was completed by July 2004. Proxima was reorganized around five programmatic branches in line with the main sectors of the Macedonian police and its linkage with the judicial system. To bring reform developers closer to implementers, they were linked in a simplified chain of command via the directors of the new programmes. This facilitated the flow of information between co-location teams in the field and mission headquarters. The programme directors were supported by a mixed team of police and civilian experts as well as by a central co-ordination unit. Furthermore, the initial liaison concept was changed in order to strengthen the coherence and co-ordination with other international actors engaged in police reforms. Instead of trying to channel information and dialogue only through the head of mission and a liaison officer, programme directors and their teams were made responsible for co-operation with relevant partner organizations. This helped to transform the previously strained

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relationship between Proxima and other players in the crowded Macedonian police aid field into a productive collaboration.8 Finally, as in all such ESDP missions, the Joint Action on which Proxima was based stipulated that the head of mission only had operational control over mission staff. The police officers seconded to the mission remained under full command of the appropriate national authorities. In general, this issue did not pose any problems. The Proxima leadership was able to redeploy staff according to operational considerations and exercise disciplinary control over them, which included sending officers back home before their tour of duty ended. However, the operational control question gained some importance after the end of the mission when the European Parliament (EP) started to enquire into the suspected kidnapping of Mr Khaled El-Masri. This German citizen of Lebanese origin was unlawfully detained on a visit to Skopje in 2004, later flown to Afghanistan by the American Central Intelligence Agency and released some two years later as innocent. The Macedonian police and the UBK were implicated in the detention. Members of the EP called for Proxima police officers to be questioned on this matter by the EU. The EP believes that Proxima could have known about the case, as mission members were co-located with the Macedonian police when the incident occurred. However, their demand remained unfulfilled as the Joint Action clearly stated that the State or Community institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The State or Community institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the secondee.

Ensuring a light expatriate footprint In line with the notion that it is incumbent upon international peace-builders to co-operate with local stakeholders in efforts to entrench peace and democracy in post-conflict societies, Proxima’s reforms were carried out in a spirit of partnership based on the local ownership of the mission’s goals (Flessenkemper, 2004: 3). From the beginning, the mission staff included a senior national legal advisor from the ministry of internal affairs. Later on, following the volatile political situation in spring 2004 after the death of president Trajkovski, a permanent liaison officer from the team of the national director of the public safety bureau was seconded to the mission. As to Proxima’s interventions in the local policing field, they were programmed together with senior local officials of the ministry of internal affairs. However, reform priorities were defined by the mission based on the Initial Field Monitoring and Performance Evaluation Report completed in June 2004.

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Mission reforms The reform programmes and projects addressed a broad range of issues (Ioannides, 2006). Mission staff worked among other things on:  internal and external police accountability, e.g., by monitoring and assessing the work of the internal control units;  community policing, e.g., by bringing together police and citizens in community advisory groups;  building the capacity of the newly created civilian border police, e.g., by training officers in the detection of forged travel documents and by facilitating good working relations with INTERPOL;  crime investigations and the fight against organized crime, e.g., by standardizing the work of the crime police departments. In what follows three key areas of intervention are discussed in more detail to exemplify Proxima’s modus operandi. Crime scene management Proxima’s work on crime scene management nicely documents how the monitoring activities of the mission shaped its reforms. The crash of the plane carrying president Trajkovski and his entourage worked as an eyeopener for the mission. An internationally experienced expert who was to be seconded to the mission flew straight to Sarajevo to accompany specialists from the Macedonian police to the crash site. He immediately realized that even this high-level team was lacking a basic understanding of established international crime scene management procedures, let alone the INTERPOL norms regulating disaster victim identification. This lack of skills and capacity was closely linked to the generic deficiencies of crime investigations in communist Yugoslavia which relied primarily on witness statements and confessions, at times extracted through illegal means. The scientific approach of building chains of evidence was underdeveloped not least because crime was foremost a political category; even property crimes were considered an offence against the order of society. Based on the Trajkovski case and the monitoring of the sensitive recovery of corpses of persons missing from the 2001 crisis, the mission put together a crime scene management project. Through it, Proxima staff were able to tackle a number of systemic law enforcement shortfalls from a technical point of view, a fact which made it easier for local authorities to accept the intervention. For instance, proper crime scene management requires that the crime scene is secured by uniformed police; evidence is gathered by the crime police and handed over to the investigative judge and the prosecution. The promotion of these seemingly technical procedures

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allowed the mission to address a major structural problem of the criminal justice system – the lack of co-operation among its constituent parts. This was done through the production of a series of handbooks and leaflets for police and members of the judiciaries, and the organization of workshops. The crime scene management project also contributed to the de-politicization of the Macedonian police. The appointment of crime scene managers and the codification of working procedures reduced the leeway for senior police managers to interfere in investigations. This was of particular importance in ethnically- and/or politically-motivated cases or war crimes. Hence, in line with its mandate, the mission contributed to building trust and confidence in the objectivity of crime investigations. Law enforcement monitoring Proxima’s key innovation was the creation of a decentralized law enforcement management programme. Realizing that the success of its reforms of the policing field were dependent on a functioning judicial system, it established a team of civilian experts tasked to encourage close working-level cooperation and co-ordination between police, investigative judges, prosecutors and courts. Even though such reforms were foreseen by the Ohrid peace accord, the EU Council Secretariat was initially reluctant to see the mission tackle these issues. However, Brussels soon acknowledged the importance of supplementing police reforms with a broader engagement of the criminal justice system.9 The law enforcement monitors were empowered by the Macedonian ministry of justice to organize regular co-operation meetings with all the players in the criminal justice system. They worked closely with their European colleagues from the crime police and internal control programmes. The monitors helped to identify cases of obstruction, corruption and other dysfunctions. In addition, they drew on their first-hand experience of the criminal justice system to carry out other tasks, including an assessment of detention facilities in police stations, of witness protection legislation and of international prosecutorial co-operation. The permanent co-location of legal experts in the field allowed the mission to address issues of impunity in remote locations, where there is little social distance between the police and the community. In such circumstances, failure to arrest and prosecute people who break the law is frequently the result of non-action rather than the deliberate obstruction of justice. Identifying and tackling such instances of non-action requires an intimate knowledge of the situation on the ground. The law monitors had it. Being immersed in local policing issues, they were able to detect improper conduct and promote the joint management of criminal investigations based on agreed procedures between police, investigative judges and prosecutors.

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Special policing functions Special policing functions, notably special crime investigations and counterterrorism policing, were targeted for reform by international actors for a number of reasons. To begin with, special police units were heavily implicated in the ethnic fighting that took place in 2001. They committed atrocities against Macedonian-Albanians and were investigated by the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Second, organized crime in Macedonia and its transnational links were seen by Brussels as a growing threat to the Union. Third, in the wake of 11 September 2001, concern about regional and international terrorism was elevated to the top of the international agenda. In the case of Macedonia, this meant that international donors assigned great importance to the reform and strengthening of the state security and counter-intelligence agency UBK, which is also in charge of counter-terrorism. Special policing functions are politically sensitive. They often require measures such as the interception of telephone calls, the surveillance of suspects and the use of undercover agents. In a democracy it is crucial that these investigative tools are carefully regulated and that their use is subject to proper judicial and political oversight. In co-operation with its international partners on the ground, Proxima focused on the development of such a regulatory and legal framework. At the operational level, mission experts worked to improve how special police units handle threats to public order and security. For instance, in November 2004, a heavily armed ethnic Albanian group suddenly emerged in the village of Kondovo near Skopje, denying police access to the area. After negotiations with representatives of the Albanian members of government and Albanian political parties, the crisis was defused and the group disappeared. In June 2005, it resurfaced and the same plot was re-enacted. In both instances, mission experts monitored the special units dispatched to deal with the stand-off and provided operational advice. Their hands-on monitoring approach allowed the mission to help stabilize these critical situations, pinpoint shortfalls in the management of large-scale public order policing and recommend reforms to overcome the problems. The creation of a special investigation infrastructure is resource intensive. Macedonia had to rely on financial and technical assistance to carry out the reforms. Initially, international donors had conflicting views on how to proceed. Some advocated that both the UBK and the crime police should share a common infrastructure. Proxima advised against such an approach, arguing that best European practice strictly separates policing and intelligence agencies. In an effort to bridge the divergent views and forge a compromise, the mission finally developed a concept of identical but separate structures. It saves costs in implementation and maintenance while allowing users – the criminal police and the UBK – to comply with their own rules and procedures regarding accountability, control and oversight. The concept

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was agreed with the donors, and the mission monitored and assisted in its implementation. In the case of the UBK, the mission was faced with an additional challenge – the agency’s institutionalized anti-Albanian bias. To enhance the confidence of Albanians in the institution and change its organizational culture, Proxima recommended recruiting ethnic Albanians into the agency dominated by Slav-Macedonians. While its efforts benefited from the fact that it had been given permission by Macedonian authorities to open a colocation office in the secretive UBK, its advice was not welcome by everyone in the house. Some perceived it as a threat because it opened the UBK up to ‘to the enemy’, a perception that was bolstered by the new anti-terrorism discourse emerging after 11 September 2001.

Extensions and transitions Proxima was the first civilian ESDP operation to be extended and the first one to be followed by an ESDP team of experts. Already in the summer of 2004, it was foreseeable that the mission would not achieve its aims by the end of the year. After consultations with the EU Council Secretariat, the EUSR approached the government with the proposal to prolong its mandate. In the ensuing negotiations, the Macedonian authorities voiced their concern that the extension of the EU crisis management operation was an obstacle for Macedonia’s aspiration to become an EU candidate country. After some hesitation and under the condition that the number of international police officers be significantly reduced, the government finally agreed to invite the EU to deploy Proxima for another year and to roll out its activities all over the country. These changes allowed the government to present Proxima as a police reform rather than a crisis management mission. In the process of conceptualizing and negotiating the extension of the mission, policing issues remained secondary. Symptomatic of this lack of attention given to the substance of Proxima’s activities was that the lead actor on the ground in the transition was the ‘political’ EUSR rather than the ‘expert’ head of mission. This approach was reinforced when the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which exercises political control over and gives strategic guidance to ESDP operations, requested that advance planning be conducted only by the Council Secretariat. In parallel, the mission was given strict instructions to finalize all activities by the end of 2004. The emphasis on the discontinuity between Proxima I and Proxima II further complicated the transition process. In November 2004, the Political and Security Committee agreed the basic parameters of Proxima II. Besides the changes mentioned above, the scope of the mission was reduced by limiting it to three reform programmes – Proxima I had five – and its staff was to be gradually downsized to 120 international police officers.

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The absence of programme and planning continuity coupled with the rotation out of the country of most of the mission’s international staff forced Proxima II to start from scratch. The upshot was a delay of two months, the period necessary to develop the new reform projects. Thus, the situation in January 2005 was similar to the one a year earlier. However, thanks to the experience of the first year, Proxima II was able to catch up quickly and become fully operationally by March 2005. By the end of 2005, the EU was no longer in the position to advocate a further extension of Proxima even though the Macedonian policing field continued to require international guidance and assistance. The government was determined to end what it had come to regard as a symbolic burden. The Commission delegation and some member states’ embassies in Skopje supported this position as they wished to secure Macedonia’s candidate status. They argued that any further reforms of the rule-of-law and police sectors could be carried out exclusively under the aegis of European Community assistance. In the end, a compromise was found. Proxima proposed the deployment of an ESDP Police Assistance Team (EUPAT) to bridge the gap between the termination of Proxima and the launch of the Commission follow-on project. The proposal was agreed between Brussels and Skopje. The team of about 20 European police officers and a handful of international civilian advisors were tasked to ensure the transition of all EU-related police reforms to the Commission (Council of the European Union, 2005g). The process was facilitated by double-hatting the EUSR as the head of the Commission delegation, in autumn 2005. The transition from EUPAT to the Commission’s Local Implementation Component for police reform – a twinning project funded by the Commission and implemented by the German police – proved difficult. A number of factors played a role. The Commission instrument was delayed. Planning for the transition took place in consultation with the Council of the EU, but the newly established double-hatted EUSR did not figure prominently in the process. Efforts to ensure continuity of personnel were not co-ordinated with the Council Secretariat; instead, they were left to the implementing agency which maintained hardly any of the previous ESDP police and civilian staff. Despite these hiccups, by the end of June 2006, the ESDP intervention in Macedonia had ended. To conclude this section, it is worth pointing out that Proxima’s position vis-a`-vis local authorities was quite different from that of the EU police mission EUPM in Bosnia. The latter was deployed on the basis of a mandate of the United Nations, derived from the Dayton peace accord, and supported by an invitation of the government. Proxima was only based on a host government invitation. This meant that local authorities were in a much stronger position to determine the kind of assistance they were prepared to accept. Moreover, they were able to exploit inter-institutional animosities as well as divergences among EU member states to promote their own views. Ultimately, the authorities decided on the depth of the ESDP footprint which in hindsight probably should have been deeper.

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EU family co-ordination The central hub for co-ordination in an ESDP civilian crisis management operation is the EUSR with her or his office. Proxima received political guidance from the EUSR and it reported through him to the High Representative for the CFSP and the Brussels-based EU committees in charge of civilian ESDP operations – the Political and Security Committee and the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom). Together with the EUSR, the head of Proxima participated in the regular meetings of EU ambassadors in Skopje. At these occasions, he was able to use political channels to inform capitals of police shortcomings and to build support for mission activities. Proxima headquarters co-located with the EUSR office. This allowed for close and fruitful working relations. However, it also facilitated interference in the operational matters of the mission by members of the EUSR office. For instance, initially the latter micro-managed Proxima’s relations with the Police Unit of the Council Secretariat and the European Commission. Since the EUSR office lacked policing and management expertise, its meddling in operational matters contributed to Proxima’s start-up difficulties. The overhaul of the mission in mid-2004 put an end to these problems. Communications with the Council were mainstreamed and the mission was given a green light to deal directly with the directorate for civilian crisis management of the Council and the Police Unit on operational and policing issues. Difficulties also arose in the interaction between, on the one hand, the EUSR and Proxima and, on the other, the Commission delegation. For instance, the delayed deployment of the European Commission Police Reform Team generated some rivalry between the Commission and the mission. It gave the mission a head start in establishing good working relations with officials from the ministry of internal affairs. When the Commission team arrived one of its members complained that the ministry was ‘occupied by Proxima officers wasting the time of the Macedonian officials’. This inter-pillar jealousy was exacerbated by inter-institutional frictions in Brussels which trickled down to Skopje. The EUSR and the head of the Commission delegation manoeuvred themselves into a proxy turf battle which erupted publicly in spring 2005.10 As a second-pillar operation in the chain of command of the EUSR, Proxima was inevitably affected by these developments. However, the mission managed ultimately to distance itself from the political dimension of this inter-pillar conflict and to establish a sound working relationship with its colleagues in the Commission Police Reform Team. Finally, as Proxima was only the second civilian ESDP mission, Brussels, too, at first concerned itself with the details of its functioning. Civcom demanded detailed reports, issued specific recommendations and so forth. Overtime, with the launch of additional civilian operations, Civcom began to focus on the big picture – the general conduct and achievements of the

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mission. This eased relations between Brussels and the field. The PSC’s engagement with Proxima evolved along the same lines as more political questions such as discussions about Macedonia’s candidate status and about merging the position of the EUSR with that of the head of the EC delegation took centre-stage in its deliberations.

Impact evaluation The issue of performance impact and evaluation was raised time and again by member states and the Council Secretariat. The mission was expected to identify and work against benchmarks. This proved difficult. Although it employed the term benchmarks, it actually worked with a set of flexible project management tools adjusted to the mission’s needs and limited capacity. Hence, in its final report Proxima provided a wealth of data on project implementation rates rather than information on the attainment of benchmarks. In the discussion that follows, a more qualitative evaluation is presented. It centres on the question of where, if at all, the mission was able to increase local policing skills and capacities and change attitudes. Also, the question of what factors limited mission impact is addressed. Generally, Proxima had a stabilizing effect. However, in some villages of the former crisis area the local police remained unable to conduct effective day-to-day policing. This was due to factors beyond the mission’s control. The country was awash with weapons and suffered from economic stagnation and high unemployment. The economic woes, in turn, were a booster for the recruitment efforts of radical political and criminal groups. Another important contextual factor limiting mission performance was the unexpected delay of the new police law, which was only adopted in 2006 after the mission had left. One of its principal innovations was the decentralization of police decision-making and management. This was important for the modernization of the police apparatus and a key stipulation of the Ohrid peace accord. As the police law was linked to controversial constitutional reforms called for by the peace deal it was caught up in a long drawnout process of politicking. The contentious politics of police reform notwithstanding, the mission managed to overcome the reluctance of local authorities to implement far-reaching changes before the new law was in place. In particular, it made a difference to the skills and the organizational capacity of the police. However, it had little impact on its organizational culture and the attitudes of the senior police managers. As far as the improvement of skills is concerned, Proxima had a number of successes. The following account focuses on some of the more salient achievements. To begin with, its advice led to successful operations against drug smugglers and dealers. On the downside, these operations were possible only as long as the police leadership and the interior ministry co-operated. Individual initiatives were often stifled. On one occasion, two police officers who detected a local drug trafficking network and investigated it were

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relegated and removed when they handed the case to their superiors. Seemingly, the two officers had unwittingly interfered in the activities of some powerful people with connections (direct or indirect) to senior police officials. Another issue-area in which the mission achieved good results was internal control. It was agreed with local authorities that it was within Proxima’s brief to accept complaints about police misconduct, to ask for official investigations and to monitor how they were carried out. Thanks to this and the training provided by the OSCE, accusations against police officers were treated seriously and handled according to established procedures. Yet again, political interference remained a potent force. The mission observed several times that an internal control unit team that had a record of running professional investigations suddenly performed badly. The mission believed that this was because on some occasions teams were put on a tight leash by their superiors who had no interest in an impartial and effective investigation. Further noteworthy successes of the mission were the increased capacity of the Macedonian police to co-ordinate their work with the judiciary and neighbouring states. Of particular importance to the EU was the progress made in the fight against organized crime. This was, largely, due to the mission’s work on the establishment of organized crime departments in the ministry of interior and the office of the public prosecutor. These institutional reforms were reinforced by changes at police station level. Proxima tutored commanders on how to move toward more proactive and information-led policing. Finally, there was a clear change in police-judiciary relations thanks to the work of the law enforcement monitors. These achievements notwithstanding, the head of Proxima II believes that the EU could have accomplished more if the mandate of the mission had been extended for a third year.11 Continued deployment throughout the country would have allowed European experts to deepen and widen their reforms and to render them irreversible. The EU Police Assistance Team was too small and its mandate too short to make much of a difference.

Learning from Proxima Proxima generated a number of lessons relevant to the civilian ESDP. For instance, the EU Council Secretariat and the European Commission have started to improve resources and streamline procedures related to general mission support in order to avoid the difficulties that Proxima and the EUPM faced (Hansen, 2006). A more interesting set of lessons concerns the conceptual and programmatic side of ESDP operations. Proxima I demonstrated that the deployment of a police or, for that matter, a rule-of-law operation in only one part of the host country is ineffective. Any serious policing or legal shortfalls are likely to be rooted in dysfunctions of the state’s police apparatus or judicial system, in particular if it is highly centralized. In such circumstances, territorially limited reforms

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will make little difference in the end. While Proxima’s initially limited deployment to the former crisis area and the interior ministry was due to restrictions imposed by Macedonia, the EU was too ready to accept these limits. It should have made it clear to the authorities that it regarded permission for countrywide deployment as a test of its host’s commitment to reform. On a related note, Proxima could have had a greater impact if it had had a more intrusive mandate. The experience of the EUPM shows that an ‘inspection’ mandate is an important tool in any strengthening mission. It empowers international police officers to have full and unimpeded access to all documents and information held by the host country police chain of command. In addition, it gives them the right to initiate and lead independent investigations into possible cases of obstruction, manipulation, corruption and other cases of police mismanagement. Findings can then be brought to the attention of the host country government and EU representatives for political follow-up and be fed into the domestic criminal justice system. Another general lesson is that training is an important element in any reform of post-conflict policing. In the Macedonian context, the decision to exclude a training dimension from Proxima’s mandate was probably justified as other international actors, notably the OSCE, were focusing on police education. However, in general the lack of a rapid response capability to address training shortfalls limits the impact of a strengthening mission. Incidentally, by refraining from including a training component in mission mandates, the EU downgrades the value of the co-location tool, one of whose strengths is to bring to light gaps in the local training regime. The difficult start of Proxima suggests that ESDP fact finding missions and planning teams should include a program department in nucleo. It would be deployed early to undertake the necessary preliminary assessments, prepare start-up packages for incoming mission members and ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to co-ordinate mission activities with reform initiatives of the European Commission, member states and other relevant international actors. Local authorities also need to be involved in preparing the programmes at an earlier stage. In this respect, the EU Council Secretariat needs to be strengthened. The point that the Council General Secretariat remains under-resourced when it comes to ESDP support was also driven home by its inability to transfer insights across missions. For instance, Proxima and the EUPM simultaneously underwent a reorganization, but the Council Secretariat proved incapable of managing these reforms in a co-ordinated manner. It thus missed an opportunity to standardize working methods and approaches across civilian ESDP operations. Also, Proxima found out the hard way that there is no overarching concept defining the division of responsibilities across the first and second EU pillar and scripting the transition from ESDP co-location to institution building by the European Commission. Finally, more attention needs to be paid to integrating ESDP operations into the external dimension of the

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third pillar as police and rule-of-law missions are inevitably affected by broader justice and home affairs issues. To conclude, Macedonia was an important test for the ESDP. The country plunged into a crisis at a time when the EU was evolving new foreign and security policy instruments. This explains why this time around the EU passed the test in the Western Balkans and was able to play a constructive role in resolving the crisis and assume a leading role in the implementation of the peace deal. Through Proxima, the EU Council gained invaluable experience as a peacebuilder. The mistakes made in the process have already contributed to making the ESDP a more effective instrument. Yet more remains to be done to overcome limitations of the civilian ESDP highlighted by the EU police mission in Macedonia.

Notes 1 The views expressed in this text are my own. I am grateful to many colleagues in Skopje, Sarajevo, Brussels and elsewhere who helped with their advice and experience, in particular the former Proxima heads of mission Bart D’Hooge and Ju¨rgen Scholz as well as Florian von Ko¨nig from the office of the EU Special Representative/European Commission delegation in Skopje. 2 From December 2003 to December 2004 (Proxima I), the head of mission was Bart D’Hooge of Belgium. From December 2004 to December 2005 (Proxima II), Ju¨rgen Scholz of Germany was the police commissioner in charge of the mission. From December 2005 to June 2006, Scholz was heading the follow-on operation, the European Union Police Assistance Team (EUPAT). 3 The Albanian insurgents in Macedonia used the same acronym as the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Ushtria C ¸ lirimtare Kombetare or UCK. 4 The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), a second-pillar albeit not an ESDP instrument, was set up in 2001 to replace the European Commission Monitoring Mission, which was established in 1991 to observe cease-fire agreements in the then on-going wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The EUMM is mandated to provide the EU with timely information and early warning with regard to the political and security developments in the Western Balkans, notably on inter-ethnic relations and refugees. 5 The agreement only came into force three years later. 6 The protection element was provided by one contributing state – France. The tour of duty was three months. An extension was requested in mid-March 2004 at a time of national and regional insecurity, following the death of president Trajkovski and the unrest in Kosovo. The mission and the EUSR made no further request in June 2004 as it became clear that no contributing state would provide a trained team. 7 On the ground, it was well understood that this would also include other international personnel located in the former crisis areas. 8 Proxima’s unrivalled assets in this interaction were its extensive field presence and access to the whole chain of command of the local police. 9 In its second year of operation, Proxima doubled the number of law enforcement monitors. Also, the EU police mission in Bosnia became involved in this issuearea in 2006. 10 The Macedonian daily Utrinski Vesnik reported on 1 April 2005 on the conflict under the heading ‘Chiarini [the head of EC delegation] and Sahlin [the EUSR] fighting for power’. 11 Interview with Ju¨rgen Scholz on 16 December 2006.

7

More than a Balkan Crisis Manager The EUJUST Themis in Georgia Xymena Kurowska1

Between July 2004 and July 2005, the European Union (EU) deployed its first-ever rule-of-law mission under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EUJUST Themis was also the first-ever operation in postSoviet space. The host country, Georgia, was shaken by social turmoil and entangled in long-standing conflicts of an ethnic nature. Still, Georgia could hardly be classified as an urgent crisis management case. In particular, the choice in favour of a rule-of-law intervention is puzzling given that the most obvious security threat to the state was posed by the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, the judicial system was overcrowded by international agencies (state and non-state) eager to contribute to the modernization of the Georgian state after the Rose Revolution in November 2003. Why did the EU decide to extend the ESDP to a region that until then barely registered on the foreign policy agenda of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)? And what does the stormy story of the mission tell us about the ESDP? This chapter explores the context and unfolding of Themis and the follow-up rule-of-law programme run by the office of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Southern Caucasus. While the ‘Brussels angle’ is prominent in the analysis of the political intricacies involved in the making and termination of the ESDP mission, the perspective of members of Themis and the EUSR office is also incorporated since it is crucial for understanding the operational dimension of the mission and its successor programme. The section that follows sets the stage for this exploration by providing a brief overview of Georgia’s geopolitical position and the previously lukewarm engagement of the EU in the country.

The Balkans of Eurasia: Georgia’s difficult start Before the Rose Revolution, Georgia had a corrupt government run by a former Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. He failed to initiate the fundamental institutional reforms necessary for the economic and political modernization of the country. As a result, it was hardly a state at all,

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as The Economist (2003) put it, but more a loose association of fiefs. One of the few positive features of pre-revolutionary Georgia was that unlike the mass media in other post-Soviet republics, those of Georgia were relatively free from official censorship. In the wake of the Rose Revolution, reforms of the economy and the political system were set in motion. Yet the country’s road to stability and good governance remains severely affected by the lack of central control over the two separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, neither of which is recognized by the international community. These frozen conflicts are at the source of Georgia’s difficult relations with Russia. Moscow has been actively boosting the secessionist aspirations of the two regions; a policy that many Georgians think is a punishment for their distinctly pro-Western inclinations. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Georgia is an important link in the energy corridor connecting the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. Its geo-strategic importance for Western energy security notwithstanding, Tbilisi has little say in the Great Game played by the major powers (global and regional) in the conflict-ridden regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia – ‘the Balkans of Eurasia’ as Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997:123–24) aptly calls them.

Overture: technical and unenthusiastic Throughout the 1990s, the EU’s approach to Georgia was the same as its approach to other former Soviet republics. Brussels signed a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Georgia and the European Commission provided technical and financial assistance under its Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme. Georgia also participated in other regional EU frameworks such as TRACECA – the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transportation corridor – and the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) programme designed to support co-operation in the area of oil and gas infrastructure. In 1998, the Commission chose Tbilisi as the most suitable location for its delegation in the region. Drafted initially in 2001 and then revised in 2003, the European Commission Country Strategy paper for Georgia indicated the priority areas of co-operation: rule of law and good governance, human rights, poverty reduction, conflict prevention and resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation (European Commission, 2003). Since April 2001, the Commission has been an observer in the Joint Commission overseeing the Russianled peacekeeping operation in South Ossetia. Its overall financial assistance to Georgia amounted to no more than 420 million euro between 1992 and 2004 (European Commission, 2005a). Finally yet importantly, the limited engagement of the European Commission in pre-revolutionary Georgia is underlined by its initial refusal to include the country and its neighbours in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).2 The footprint of the EU Council in Georgia before 2003 was equally light. The Swedish Presidency in the first half of 2001 declared the Southern

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Caucasus one of its priorities and produced a paper calling for a major review of extant policy (Lynch, 2006: 61). The then external relations Commissioner Chris Patten and Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh published an article in the Financial Times (2001) insisting that ‘the EU cannot afford to neglect the South Caucasus’ and that Brussels should play a more assertive role in the region in order to contribute to the settlement of its many territorial conflicts. The EU Council took up this call and publicly declared its intention to pay more attention to the Southern Caucasus (Council of the European Union, 2001a). The political deliberation that followed culminated in the designation of an EUSR for the region. Posted in Helsinki, the Finnish diplomat Heiki Talvitie was mandated to increase the Union’s political profile in the area and support international efforts to secure regional co-operation and the settlement of the frozen conflicts (Council of the European Union, 2003e). Tbilisi was not overwhelmed by the demarche. It soon began to criticize the EUSR for his inconspicuous role and his tendency to avoid any decisive action (rhetorical or otherwise), especially if it could antagonize Russia.3 Others, however, regarded his conduct as being appropriate for an honest broker seeking to resolve an entrenched conflict.4

The Rose Revolution: Georgia in the international spotlight The Rose Revolution in November 2003 provided a genuine political opening in Georgia, an opportunity to reshape the fate of the country. Rigged parliamentary elections sent thousands of Georgian citizens to the streets of Tbilisi in a protest that lasted for twenty days. Under intense domestic and international pressure, Eduard Shevardnadze resigned. New presidential and parliamentary elections were held and a pro-Western president – Mikheil Saakashvili – came to power. While the West hailed these developments as a victory for the Georgian people, official Russia saw the events differently. Moscow spoke of a coup d’e´tat, financed and directed by, among others, the American billionaire George Soros.5 Domestically, the new administration revived enthusiasm for reform. It brought to power a team of predominantly young political activists, many educated in the USA. Their conspicuous lack of experience notwithstanding, they had big plans for cleansing Georgia’s corrupt institutions and for standing up to Russia to finally re-integrate the breakaway territories into the motherland.

The Baltic states and the Council Secretariat join forces The idea of an ESDP mission in Georgia was first discussed internally by the Estonian Permanent Representation to the EU.6 The proposal for an ESDP rule-of-law mission was introduced to the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom) in February 2004 by the then representative of Lithuania – at the time still a candidate country with only observer status in the Council machinery.7 Challenged by some Western

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European countries, which were concerned about antagonizing Russia, the proposal was keenly supported by the directorate for civilian crisis management in the Council General Secretariat. This was no accident. At the time, the directorate was busy finalizing the doctrine of rule-of-law missions. It thus welcomed the opportunity to test its ideas in practice and to get the civilian ESDP ‘out of the police box’.8 The Lithuanian initiative also benefited from the fact that the member states wanted to show to the soon-to-be members that they took them seriously and regarded them as co-equals. The reputation of the eastern accession countries as specialists in the politics of post-Soviet space further gave credibility to the initiative. Moreover, there was a desire among the existing member states to widen the geographical scope of ESDP missions which, until then, had largely been confined to the Western Balkans.9 A mission in Georgia was seen as an excellent means to signal that the EU was in the process of becoming politically more active in its immediate neighbourhood. Finally, the pro-Western political changes in Georgia were seen as imposing an obligation on the EU to enhance its engagement in the country and to assist the new government in carrying out its reforms.10 As to Tbilisi’s acceptance of the idea of an ESDP rule-of-law mission, the government was eager to receive a strong diplomatic signal of political support from the EU. While the official line in Brussels is that Themis was launched at the behest of the Georgian authorities (Solana, 2004c), the latter were actually lobbying for any kind of upgraded political involvement by the Union. Once the Union suggested a rule-of-law mission, the government accepted it.11 An important actor in this regard was without doubt the new Georgian foreign affairs minister, Salome Zurabishvili. She was previously a French diplomat active in the development of the ESDP and a former French ambassador in Tbilisi.12

Rivalry: the European Commission and the EU Council The European Commission initially did not support the idea of deploying an ESDP mission to Georgia. To begin with, it saw it as an unwelcome conceptual stretching of the civilian ESDP. Originally, civilian missions were envisaged as accompanying military operations, notably peacekeeping ones. Themis, however, was to be a stand-alone endeavour. Further, the Commission did not regard Georgia as being in a crisis or post-crisis situation, and it therefore saw no reason for an ESDP operation. Instead, it favoured enhancing the development-oriented activities of its own delegation in Tbilisi.13 Also, the international promotion of legal reforms has traditionally been a realm occupied by the Commission. Finally, the Commission was already engaged in important rule-of-law reforms in Georgia. In 2004, several projects financed by the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and the policy advice budget line were implemented. More specifically, the European Commission delegation assisted the justice ministry in modernizing the

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prosecutor’s office and the penitentiary system.14 Also, the Commission provided technical assistance and policy advice to the interior ministry with regard to its transformation into a civilian institution (Helly, 2006a: 89). As to the member states and the Council General Secretariat, they insisted from the outset that the mission had to be organized outside of the Commission framework.15 Two major arguments were put forward in support of this view. First, an ESDP operation would ensure that the Council remained in control of the endeavour.16 While this argument can be read as an expression of member states’ preferences for intergovernmentalism, it is also intimately connected to the lack of operational capabilities on the part of the European Commission. The latter does not run its own international projects but outsources them to third parties which, in the Council’s view, implies a loss of effective control over their implementation. Second, the member states and the Council Secretariat argued that an ESDP mission in Georgia would be able to carry out quick-impact measures and generate a higher political profile for the EU than any Commission action which inevitably would be more technical than political in character. In March 2004, the Council sent an exploratory mission to Georgia to identify the scope for a possible ESDP action in the Georgian justice system. It concluded that international assistance was needed to render the system more coherent and effective. Controversially, the exploratory team suggested including the reform of the penitentiary system in the brief of the mission.17 Soon after the Council experts had tabled their report, the Georgian Prime Minister, Zurab Zhvania, invited the EU to assist Georgia in reforming its judiciary. The next step in the launch sequence was the deployment of a proper Council fact finding mission to the country. To the chagrin of the European Commission, it included penitentiary experts. After the European Commission had lost the opening dispute over the pros and cons of launching an ESDP mission, it focused its energy on defending its reform brief against encroachments by Themis.18 Contrary to the recommendation of the exploratory team, it insisted and achieved that the mission was frozen out of the reforms of the penitentiary system, which it regarded as its ground. In an effort to limit the negative consequences of what was clearly a dysfunctional disaggregation of Council and Commission reforms, the two EU actors agreed informally that one Themis experts would deal with this issue in co-operation with the Commission penitentiary experts.19 Finally, it is worth pointing out that the decision to deploy Themis was taken in a fairly hasty manner. As the situation in Georgia could hardly be classified as a crisis, there would have been ample time for the Council and the Commission to discuss all relevant issues and hammer out a more coherent policy toward Georgia. It seems that this did not happen because the Council wanted to underscore its comparative advantage vis-a`-vis the Commission in terms of the speed with which it can implement international rule-of-law interventions.20 The result of inter-institutional politics in this case was not only a high degree of fragmentation in how the Union engaged

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Georgia but also that Themis ended up with a mandate that did not exactly reflect the needs of the country. This is not to say that the mission was superfluous. Rather, the claim is that the process through which the mandate was formulated limited Themis’ chance of success.

On the ground: muddling through On 28 June 2004, the EU Council officially decided to launch EUJUST Themis by adopting a Joint Action (Council of the European Union, 2004a). It envisaged an ambitious mandate, albeit one limited to one year. In close co-ordination with the Commission and international donors, Themis was to assist local authorities in developing an overarching criminal justice reform strategy that was to be based on the principle of local ownership. The start-up of the mission was difficult due to the lukewarm political support from the Georgian authorities and the constraints of Commission procurement rules. The mission had to struggle to establish its credentials as a serious EU actor vis-a`-vis its local counterparts and to be granted high-level access to national experts in the institutions in which its members were colocated. Moreover, as the civilian ESDP is financed via the CFSP budget, which is managed by the European Commission, the head of Themis had to comply with the Commission’s cumbersome and slow financial and procurement procedures. As a result, the mission did not have computers for the first three months of its deployment. To these hiccups have to be added more mundane problems such as the fact that Themis experts initially were not assigned any desks in the institutions in which they were co-located. Once these challenges were overcome, Themis co-located eight senior European experts in a number of Georgian institutions in order to provide assistance on a daily basis.21 They were accompanied by national legal assistants who provided language help, the know-how of the Georgian criminal code and an in-depth understanding of the local context. Co-location was perceived as a concrete application of the national ownership principle. It reportedly allowed Themis experts to become embedded in the system and to develop relations of trust with their local counterparts. Importantly, co-location also served to distinguish the mission from other donors, who tended to transfer ready-made solutions. Themis, which was headed by Sylvie Pantz, a French judge with international field experience, was made accountable to its Brussels superiors via a benchmarking system that was proposed by Civcom (2004) to ‘enable a systematic evaluation of the mission’. The benchmarks were laid out in the mission’s operation plan (OPLAN). It divided activities into three consecutive phases: an assessment phase (2 to 4 months), a drafting phase (4 to 6 months) and an implementation-planning phase (2 to 4 months). Each phase was expected to end with the realization of specific objectives – the comprehensive assessment of the Georgian criminal justice system by Themis; the drafting of a reform strategy by a high-level working group

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composed of local and Themis experts; and the formulation of a plan for the implementation of the reform strategy by a high-level strategy group again made up of local and Themis experts.22 As to the Brussels-Themis link, the head of mission reported to the EUSR and frequently appeared before the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is in charge of giving political direction and strategic guidance to ESDP missions. In addition, Civcom was briefed on a weekly basis by the Council directorate for civilian crisis management. The desk officer for Georgia in the directorate was also periodically dispatched to the country to draft three-monthly mission assessment reports. In Tbilisi, the high-level working group in charge of putting together the judicial reform strategy barely met; the sub-groups that were formed later to deal with specific issues experienced the same fate. The slow pace of the reform process was largely due to developments outside the control of the mission. Themis’ local counterparts were reluctant to push ahead with the reform strategy, not least because the new government was busy cleansing the state apparatus from the cronies of the old administration. More specifically, the mission was handicapped by constant staff reshuffles in the judicial system and the appointment of inexperienced Saakashvili supporters recruited mostly from non-governmental organizations. Besides hampering the accomplishment of Themis’ mandate, these developments also gave rise to concern among its members about the independence of the judiciary, especially when a number of judges were dismissed because of alleged corruption but often because of the wrong political affiliation. The mission also objected to some legislative proposals – say, plea bargaining, jury trials and the creation of an ombudsman with prosecutor-like prerogatives – that their Georgian counterparts considered viable options. It regarded these ideas, which stemmed from American influence exerted through non-governmental organizations involved in the drafting of the reform strategy, as inappropriate for a volatile and corruption-prone justice system. Similarly, Themis criticized the amendment of the constitution which strengthened the executive branch, thus exacerbating the existing flaws in the system of checks and balances.23 Expected by Brussels to show quick results, Themis tried as best as it could to negotiate the political and institutional obstacles it faced.24 It did not always succeed. For instance, despite a clear deadline, the Georgian side failed to do its part in finalizing the draft strategy. The head of mission informed the EUSR of the situation and travelled to Brussels in an attempt to mobilize political support in the EU and to put pressure on the Georgian authorities. However, the latter continued to drag their feet. Hence, the mission, in a clear violation of the principle of local ownership, decided to draft parts of the strategy without Georgian input. Tbilisi accepted the draft, which dealt with police reform.25 In mid-May 2005, the local authorities finally submitted their contribution to the criminal justice reform strategy.26 President Saakashvili adopted the revised draft – the National

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Strategy for Criminal Justice Reform – in July 2005 by decree, excluding parliament from the procedure.27

A measure of success? It is not easy to evaluate whether or not Themis was a success. Arguably, the mandate envisaged objectives that were too ambitious for a one-year mandate and for a mission operating in a volatile post-revolutionary environment. The initial logistical difficulties faced by the mission did not help either. To top it off, Themis enjoyed at best a shaky political support in Tbilisi. While it benefited from the backing of prime minister Zurab Zhvania and his successor Zurab Noghaideli, both of whom issued crucial decrees to get the mission started,28 it was only in October 2004 that president Saakashvili gave his formal stamp of approval to the mission by issuing a decree creating the high-level working group tasked with developing the reform strategy.29 However, as noted earlier, the working group and its subgroups rarely met. Hence, the strategy was finalized belatedly. Moreover, instead of being the product of a genuine team effort, it rather reflected the input of Themis and those of a few enthusiastic Georgian members. As far as its content is concerned, mission experts voiced doubts about certain elements, e.g., relations between the courts and the prosecution and the development of the bar.30 Yet these problems pale in comparison with Themis’ main failure. The mission made little progress toward the objective of the third and final phase of activities as foreseen in the OPLAN – the planning of the implementation of the criminal justice reform strategy. What nevertheless gives the story a happy ending is the fact that the implementation of the strategy was included in the Georgian action plan of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Based on a Georgian initiative, this move is likely to ensure that at least parts of the strategy will actually be implemented. What, then, was the impact of Themis? Mission members highlight three points. First, a reform strategy was drafted as stipulated by the OPLAN. Second, the mission managed, in line with one of the premises of the mandate, to bring together the different local stakeholders of the fragmented criminal justice system and to entice them to co-operate on the reform plans. Third, its shortfalls notwithstanding, the strategy for the reform of the Georgian criminal justice system is a blueprint to nudge the country closer to European standards.31

Follow-up within the EU family Already in May 2005, there was an agreement in the Council that Brussels should remain engaged in the reform of Georgia’s criminal justice system and assist it in implementing the strategy elaborated with the help of Themis. However, the institutional form of this engagement was unclear, though there emerged a consensus that it should not take the form of a

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revamped EUJUST Themis. There was little interest in such an option in Tbilisi – the Georgian government did not issue a formal request to the EU to prolong the mission – and few in Brussels wished to see the mission continue beyond its original mandate.32 First, it was important for the member states and the Council Secretariat to be able to publicly present the first-ever ESDP rule-of-law mission as a success. The timely conclusion of Themis would help in this public relations endeavour.33 Second, the political mileage to be gained from prolonging the mission was limited. The Council was already on the lookout for opportunities for politically more salient ESDP deployments. Third, the principle of the local ownership of the judicial reforms, which had been strongly emphasized in the mandate, seemed to make it politically inopportune to prolong Themis.34 In view of these considerations, the idea of a bridging measure between the termination of Themis and the gradual transfer of the implementation task to the European Commission delegation was entertained. Two proposals on the institutional form of the follow-up to Themis circulated. The first one was to reinforce the EUSR office by rule-of-law experts, although not necessarily Themis members, and to make them responsible for monitoring and guiding the formulation of an implementation plan for the criminal justice reforms. The second proposal was to make a clean break with the ESDP operation and to hand over the task of pushing forward the implementation of the reform strategy to the European Commission delegations in Tbilisi. In the end, it was decided to place two former Themis experts in the office of the EUSR. Working in Tbilisi from 1 September 2005 to the end of February 2006, they were tasked to monitor and assist in the work of the Steering Committee set up by the local authorities to draft the implementation plan for the criminal law reforms. This plan, in turn, was to be included in the Georgian action plan of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The European Commission delegation was expected to provide advice on the financial implication of the plan.35 On paper, this arrangement looked like a formula for creating synergy between the different EU players on the ground. The reality, however, proved more problematic. Placed within the enhanced border monitoring team of the EUSR, the rule-of-law experts were somehow left to their own devices in terms of both the substance and method of their work.36 The operating assumption in the EUSR office and in Brussels seems to have been that they should rely on the experience and political capital accumulated during their stint in Themis.37 As to the European Commission delegation, its lack of support for the two Council experts was conspicuous. This was partly due to unfortunate circumstances. The Commission encountered problems in recruiting experts for strengthening its extended rule-of-law tasks. The ensuing delay meant that the Commission delegation only became involved in the formulation of the implementation plan for the criminal justice system in mid-December.38 Institutional rivalry played a role too. Once the experts had arrived, the

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Commission delegation took it upon itself, in the context of negotiating the action plan of the European Neighbourhood Policy with the Georgian government, to assume the lead in the formulation of the implementation plan. This, in turn, soured the relationship between the Council experts and the Commission delegation and led both sides to be reluctant to share information and co-ordinate their actions.39 Overall, then, the rule-of-law experts in the EUSR office received little guidance and support from Brussels and their EU colleagues on the ground, and their impact, consequently, was limited. These problems and limitations are a manifestation of a more general shortcoming of the EU, namely the absence of an overarching foreign policy vision and institutional fragmentation. As to the Georgian government, the difficulties bedevilling the CFSP follow-up project to Themis further reinforced its impression that the whole thing was a case of symbolic politics.40

Themis and the ESDP The limited impact of Themis and the follow-up CFSP project notwithstanding, the Council engagement proved important for the EU. The mission reflected the strategic entrepreneurship of the Council General Secretariat – what can be called the Solana milieu. It is constantly searching for opportunities to deploy ESDP operations. A twofold aim underpins this activism. The Council wants to raise the Union’s profile as a security actor on the world stage and accumulate relevant operational experience that can be translated into political capital in intra-EU political struggles over the EU’s external policy (see also Chapter 3). Georgia was such an opportunity, enabling the Council to demonstrate that the ESDP is a ‘global’ project rather than one confined to the Western Balkans. This analysis in no way distracts from the fact that ESDP operations such as Themis represent an innovative and pragmatic way of responding to the needs of countries in transition toward democracy. The distinct formula of Themis, based on the conceptual contribution of highly skilled experts to the formulation of a national reform strategy for the justice sector, is of particular importance in this regard. As to the broader political impact of Themis in the region, it was moderate. While it was the first-ever ESDP deployment in post-Soviet space, it did not herald a more assertive policy of the EU in this part of its neighbourhood. This is also illustrated by the decision not to deploy an ESDP border monitoring operation on the Georgian-Russian border after the extension of the mission run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe had been vetoed by Russia in December 2004.41 Themis once again highlights the issue of co-ordination within the EU family. Although formal channels of co-operation exist to ensure coherence, they tend to reinforce institutional difference rather than to generate an overarching EU approach. This has to do with the rise of identity-based intra-EU politics in foreign and security affairs where the Council and the Commission respond to the same policy windows by pursuing their distinct

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policies in line with their different philosophies and agendas.42 Still, identity politics hardly justifies the extent of the rivalry between Themis and the European Commission delegation, which left Georgia wondering in bewilderment what is going on. Turning to lessons that can be drawn from Themis for the ESDP, it is crucial that Brussels makes sure that its ESDP deployments enjoy sufficient authority on the ground. While the political malleability of the ESDP is one of its strengths – each mission can be tailored to the situation at hand – this does not mean that Brussels can abdicate its responsibility for establishing a political context in the host countries which is conducive to the achievement of mission mandates. The Council has to engage the host governments and give the missions its full backing in their search for political support to achieve their objectives. Peacebuilding and state reconstruction are complex and politically sensitive tasks, which cannot be left to technical experts. On an operational note, the case of Themis suggests that there is a need further to strengthen the mission-support capacities in the Council General Secretariat. One option is to set up mission-specific teams of experts (political and technical) to provide advice and support to missions. Although there is a team of police and rule-of-law experts in the directorate for civilian crisis management, the officials are overburdened, supervising numerous projects simultaneously. More streamlined and mission-specific teams would also be well positioned to provide Civcom with more thorough information and insightful analysis than is currently the case. Finally, they could carry out professional mission evaluations. Among the more specific lessons that can be drawn from Themis is that the construction of mission mandates and OPLANs should follow a ‘functionalist’ approach. The Council has to take into account the interconnectedness of issue-areas and disregard institutional boundaries between the first- and second-pillar of the EU. To place artificial limits on mandates, as in the case of Themis, is likely to hamper mission success. Co-location has become the principal tool of the civilian ESDP to put into practice the principle of local ownership. It embeds European experts in the institutions to be reformed and fosters homegrown solutions rather then imposing foreign ones.43 Still, in its current format, co-location suffers from a shortcoming. As acknowledged by the head of Themis and her team, in particular in rule-of-law missions an initial phase of ‘getting to know’ the legal system of the host country would be very useful. While such an initiation period leads to a loss of speed in rendering a mission operational, it also creates the necessary familiarity with the local justice system on the part of mission members. This, in turn, enhances the likelihood that they can accomplish their mandate. In a similar vein, Themis illustrates that national legal assistants are a key asset in international rule-of-law interventions. Initially, they were not allowed to participate in the weekly staff meetings of the mission. Yet it soon became apparent that without their detailed knowledge of the local situation, Themis could not succeed.

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Finally, the logistical problems of Themis and in particular the strict procurement policy requirements have received much attention in internal EU evaluations. The main lesson to be drawn from these difficulties is that even a small mission needs an administration component, possibly including a financial officer who deals on a daily basis with EU financial provisions unfamiliar to mission experts.44

Notes 1 I would like to express my gratitude to Themis members and Georgian national legal assistants who generously shared their time and thoughts with me on numerous occasions in Tbilisi and elsewhere. 2 For a comprehensive discussion, see Lynch (2003). 3 Interviews in Tbilisi, June 2005. See also Kurowska (2006b: 8). 4 Interview in the Council General Secretariat, directorate for Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Brussels, 14 November 2005. More recently, the mandate of the EUSR has been strengthened (Council of the European Union, 2006a), and Talvitie’s successor – Peter Semneby – has been playing a more active role. 5 The then Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, made the following statement in an interview for Konsomolskaya Pravda (4–6 December 2003): ‘Various definitions are now being given to the events that have occurred. Some call this democratic bloodless revolution, others a ‘‘velvet revolution’’. It seems to me that neither this nor that description is suitable here. Actually what happened – I assert this as a witness – was the forced removal of the current lawful president form office’ (cited in: Lynch, 2006: 24). 6 Interview with a member state diplomat, Tbilisi, 9 and 15 June 2005. The Estonians envisaged a mission targeting Georgia’s general administration services for reform. Civilian administration missions are one of the four initial categories of the civilian ESDP agreed by the Helsinki and Freira European Councils in 1999 and 2000 respectively. 7 Lithuania promoted a reform strategy for Georgia that mobilized its own experience of the mid-1990s when Vilnius designed and successfully implemented a comprehensive reform of the justice sector. Interview in Tbilisi with a deputy head of Themis, 9 June 2005. 8 Focus group in the directorate for civilian crisis management, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 16 November 2005. 9 Interview in the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2005. 10 Interviews in the Polish foreign ministry, Warsaw, January 2006. 11 Interviews in Tbilisi, June 2005, in the Council General Secretariat and the directorate general for external relations, European Commission, Brussels, November 2005. 12 In February 2005, with Themis fully operational, Madame Zurabishvili expressed her position rather clearly ‘L’Union a devant elle une occasion formidable de jouer dans cette re´gion trouble´e un roˆle constructif et novateur. Bruxelles doit trouver le moyen de proposer, dans le cadre de sa politique de voisinage, des solutions qui permettront a ces pays d’eˆtre de bons voisins’ (Le Temps, 2005). 13 Interview with an European Commission desk officer for Georgia, directorate general for external relations, Brussels, November 2005. 14 The penitentiary reforms supported by the Commission centred on the establishment of a probation service, the strengthening of the penitentiary administration and the rehabilitation of the penitentiary infrastructure.

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15 Interview with a former national representative in Civcom, Warsaw, January 2006. 16 Interviews in the Council General Secretariat, Brussels, November 2005 and in the Polish foreign ministry, Warsaw, January 2006. 17 Focus group in the directorate for civilian crisis management, Council General Secretariat, Brussels, 16 November 2005. 18 Interview with an European Commission desk officer for Georgia, directorate general for external relations, Brussels, November 2005. 19 Interview with a member of Themis, Tbilisi, June 2005. 20 Interview with an European Commission representative to Civcom, directorate general for external relations, Brussels, November 2005. 21 The seconded European experts came from Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands, Poland, Italy and Germany. The mission was headed by a French judge. The institutions were co-located in the justice ministry, interior ministry, general prosecutor’s office, council of justice, public defender’s office, supreme court and appeals court. 22 Interviews with Themis members, Tbilisi, June 2005. 23 Ibid. 24 Interview with a Themis member, Tbilisi, 8 June 2005. 25 Interview with a Themis expert, Tbilisi, 16 June 2005. 26 The Georgian justice minister Konstantine Kemularia was invited to address the Political and Security Committee. The mission hoped that the minister would on this occasion pledge to accelerate work on the criminal justice reform strategy. And while he indeed made such a commitment, the development of the draft was in no way accelerated after his return to Tbilisi. 27 Presidential Order No. 549, information given by the deputy justice minister in September 2005 to Damien Helly, see Helly (2006a). 28 Government of Georgia, Order No. 74, 10 July 2004, Tbilisi, ‘About assistance to the activities in Georgia of the special Mission of the European experts – EUJUST THEMIS’, unofficial translation. Order No. 195, 20 May 2005, Tbilisi, ‘On the strategy of reform of the Criminal legislation of Georgia’, unofficial translation. 29 President of Georgia, Decree No. 914, October 19, 2004, Tbilisi, ‘On the creation of the working group to develop a strategy for reforming Georgian criminal legislation’, unofficial translation. 30 Interviews with Themis experts and national legal assistants, Tbilisi, June 2005. 31 Interviews with Themis experts, Tbilisi, June 2005; interview with a former national legal assistant, Florence, July 2006. 32 Interviews in the Polish foreign ministry, Warsaw, January 2006. 33 Interviews in Tbilisi, June 2005 and in national permanent representations in Brussels, November 2005. 34 Focus group in the Council General Secretariat, directorate for civilian crisis management, 16 November 2005. 35 Interviews with one of the post-Themis rule-of-law experts, Warsaw, January 2006. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Interview with a former post-Themis rule-of-law expert, Florence, July 2006. 40 Ibid. 41 Although Georgia explicitly asked for ESDP support in this matter, the EU only agreed to enhance the EUSR team by incorporating into it a number of border experts. They are mandated to report on and assess the border situation, facilitate confidence building measures between Georgia and Russia and assist the

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Georgian government in preparing a comprehensive border management reform strategy. The mandate explicitly excludes Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These concessions reflect a desire on the part of the Council General Secretariat to avoid policies that are politically controversial among the EU member states and the concern of a number of governments not to antagonize Russia. 42 For more on this point, see Chapter 3. 43 For a distinct perspective on co-location as a power relationship and thus a . device of control, see Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2005). 44 Interview with an European Commission research fellow, Florence, October 2005.

8

Implementing the ESDP in Africa The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo Marta Martinelli1

The European Union’s (EU) approach to international security based upon conflict prevention and crisis management is no longer news. The realization that no development is possible unless conditions are established for peace and stability has led conflict prevention and reduction to become central tenets in EU external policies. The trilogy of peace, security and development, reinforced by the imperative of good governance, is a principle enunciated in various official documents and notably the EU Security Strategy which states that the EU is a global actor and as such must be prepared to take responsibility for international security and for a better world (EU ISS, 2003). The EU is striving to operationalize such concepts through its instruments for external action such as development, trade and environmental policies as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, increasingly, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (German Development Institute (DIE), 2004). The balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ components of EU security policy has become clearer. As member states have increasingly come to recognize that security implies far more than force and coercion, they are striving to improve co-ordination and coherence between the hard and soft tools at their disposal (Ibid: 645). Perhaps nowhere more than in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) can we see the EU’s determined efforts to use the inter-institutional framework devised at Maastricht and the inter-pillar co-ordination required to make full use of the available toolbox to assist the country in its transition to democracy. Brussels does so through civilian and military crisis management instruments coupled with humanitarian assistance and longer-term development policies. It has been noted that the challenges faced by ESDP missions on the ground are ‘only gradually becoming the subject of research-based evaluations’, as evidence for systematic assessment increases with the number of . operations (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005a: 215). Together with the other chapters in this volume, the following analysis of the EU involvement in the DRC contributes to the task of adding to our collective knowledge of the ESDP ‘in action’. An overview of the conflicts in the DRC and of the transitional period leading to the 2006 elections provides the background

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for situating the ESDP interventions in their proper contexts. This is followed by an investigation of the rationales, mandates and organizational aspects of four EU missions – EUFOR Artemis, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC DR Congo and EUFOR RD Congo. The discussion of the challenges they face(d) in the field as they implement(ed) their mandates sets the stage for an evaluation of their impact on the DRC. Finally, the chapter touches upon the question as to how the Union’s operational experience in Congo influences the ESDP, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European foreign policy more general.

EU support for the African peace and security architecture The EU’s support for the African Peace and Security Agenda, developed through the African Union at the continental level, and sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Intergovernmental Authority of Development, responds to concrete strategic objectives. Not only is African security a pre-condition for the continent’s development but it is essential for Europe’s security as well, as state failure and conflicts fuel organized crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism. In recognition of Africa’s strategic importance, the EU has long been involved on the continent. It is the largest donor in Africa and its biggest trading partner. Its integrated approach to preventing conflict in Africa draws on all economic, diplomatic, political and military instruments at its disposal. And it is firmly anchored in a regional approach to crisis management and peacebuilding. Stemming from its commitment to attain the Millennium Development Goals agreed by the United Nations (UN), its awareness of the impact of globalization and the recognition that the security environment has changed, the EU has progressively redefined its approach to developing countries and toward Africa in particular (cf. Joint Statement, 2005). Thus, in December 2005, the European Council pledged to promote sustainable development, security, and good governance in Africa, and it identified security as a pre-requisite for attaining the millennium goals. In a similar vein, the European Commission’s Strategy for Africa (European Commission, 2005b) reiterates that peace and security are essential pre-conditions for sustainable development and that Brussels intends to step up its efforts to promote peace and security in all stages of the conflict cycle. It emphasizes, among other things, support for African peace support operations, disarmament, conflict prevention initiatives and tackling the root causes of conflict. Furthermore, the European Council conclusions of 13 November 2006 confirmed that the EU, on the basis of its concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, stands ready to reinforce its support for the efforts of the African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organizations to promote security and

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development on the continent. The principles driving the EU-AU relationship are local ownership, political dialogue and a demand-driven process. Measures and initiatives derived from the concept, which was jointly elaborated by the Council General Secretariat and the European Commission, are to support the establishment of an African peace and security architecture, including the creation of an African stand-by force. Alongside the development of European policies, member states also maintain extensive bilateral relationships and have important interests in Africa and the Great Lakes region. In particular, France and Belgium have a long experience linked to their colonial past in the area. They maintain important cultural ties which are kept alive by promoting la francophonie. More recently, their renewed engagement in the Great Lakes is partly motivated by their desire to improve their international image that was tarnished by the role they played in pre- and post-genocide Rwanda. Similarly, for Great Britain Africa represents an area of strategic investment. In 1999, London initiated a review of its conflict prevention policy on the continent, and it established, in 2001, an inter-ministerial co-ordinating mechanism called the African Conflict Prevention Pool.2 Amongst the strategic areas funded by the pool is security sector reform. Great Britain is advocating a coherent security sector reform/good governance approach in various countries including the DRC and Burundi. In the geo-strategic game that characterizes bilateral approaches to Africa, London’s main interests are in Western Africa, but it supports French and Belgian ambitions in other regions in order to get their support in international fora when it comes to its own areas of interest. Also, the Netherlands has been actively involved in security sector reforms in the DRC, in particular by contributing funds to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to support the logistical and supply capacity of the Congolese armed forces. Such multilateral and bilateral engagements by EU member states in the DRC are shaped by relations with regional actors such as South Africa and Angola. The former is actively pursuing an agenda of regional leadership and hence has long been interested in increasing stability in the region. Pretoria played a key role in mediating various regional conflicts including in the DRC, and it is committed to engage in long-term peacebuilding activities in the wider region. Angola, on the other hand, has been deeply involved militarily in the DRC and has important defence programmes in the country as well as economic interests.

Historical background of the conflict in Congo Since its independence from Belgium in 1960, the DRC has known political instability, massacres, the proliferation of security actors and the sustained involvement of external players intent on exploiting the mineral assets of the country and supporting one or the other rebel group.

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By the end of the 1960s, the government was firmly guided by JosephDesire´ Mobutu (better known as Mobutu Sese Seko). Stability, though, was short lived. Mobutu’s policy of entrusting members of his own ethnic group – the Ngbanda – with control of security matters led to ethnic conflicts and a series of coup attempts in the 1970s. His disastrous economic policies caused serious economic decline in the 1980s. The mismanagement of the state administration and the decay of the military forces contributed to the dissolution of societal bonds. For instance, military officers used their power to enrich themselves by smuggling diamonds, gold and other goods. As the distinction between business, the state administration and security forces became increasingly blurred, the state gradually lost its monopoly on the use of force and when challenged by an insurgency, it proved largely incapable of controlling unrest. In response, the regime became increasingly despotic, leading to further unrest and opposition. In these circumstances, regional events came to shape Congo’s destiny. In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, almost one million, (mostly) Hutu Rwandese fled to the Kivus in the eastern part of the DRC. Amongst them were Hutu militias who began almost immediately to organize and attack Rwanda from Congolese soil, leading to increased tensions between the two countries. The great number of refugees disturbed the precarious social balance between the different ethnic groups of the area, in particular the Tutsi Banyamulenge and the Hutu Banyarwanda, who have been in the country since pre-colonial times. The Hutu militants from Rwanda exploited the resentment of the Banyarwanda toward the other local ethnic groups, which was fuelled by political and economic rivalries, to recruit them en masse for their militias. They also ran successful recruitment campaigns in the Hutu refugee camps set up in the wake of the exodus from Rwanda. The inability of the Congolese forces to respond to this situation was interpreted by the Tutsi government of Rwanda as a deliberate policy of Hutu forces and the Congolese state to undermine it. In response, Kigali, joined by the Tutsi government of Burundi, formed an anti-Mobuto alliance with Uganda and the Banyamulenge elite in the DRC. It was headed by Laurent Kabila. Between 1996 and 1997, the country was ravaged by conflict until a victorious Kabila established a new government. However, the alliance between Kabila and the forces that supported him did not last long, and the violence between the Banyamulenge and the Banyarwanda in the Kivus continued, which meant that the economic potential of the area could not be exploited. Concerned about the country’s persistent instability and the presence of foreign troops from Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila decided to reinforce his domestic political and social base by forging an alliance with Hutu forces. The results of this strategic turn-around were that Uganda was denied control over the economic resources for which it had backed Kabila and that Rwanda’s influence in Congo, and the security gains associated with it, were sharply reduced. Kabila’s decision to expel Rwanda and

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Uganda prompted a second generalized war in which the whole region was involved. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia supported the government; they controlled two-thirds of the western part of Congo. Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia, controlling mostly the eastern part of the country, backed various rebel groups. A cease-fire agreement signed in Lusaka in 1999 largely failed and violence continued on a large scale. Kabila’s assassination in January 2001 brought to power his son, Joseph, who proved politically more astute than his father. His government resumed peace negotiations and ended the ban on political parties. The signature, in December 2002, of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, which was facilitated by South Africa, opened the way for a transitional period during which a new constitution had to be approved; armed groups had to be dismantled and reunified in an integrated, reformed Congolese army; and general elections had to be organized. A power-sharing transitional government led by President Kabila and an interim parliament came to office in June 2003. The government was composed of one president and four vice-presidents, three of which were drawn from rebel groups. The peace process, however, was complicated by the continuing enmity between the main political leaders and their refusal to integrate their troops into the new Congolese national army. As the International Crisis Group (2006: i) reported, the reluctance to move forward with reform in many security structures [was] a deliberate strategy on the part of the leaders who fought the 1998–2002 war to preserve their ability to respond with force if elections do not turn out to their satisfaction. In spite of such difficulties, and renewed bouts of violence between splintering rebel groups, especially in Katanga and in Ituri, voters approved the new constitution in December 2005; it was finally adopted in February 2006, paving the way for the election of a new government. The first round of presidential elections was held in July 2006 and the second one three months later. The winner was Kabila.

International support for the transitional process in Congo After the 2002 peace accord came into force, the international community resumed their support for peace in Congo more intensively. MONUC, a peacekeeping force which had been in the country since the Lusaka ceasefire agreement of 1999, decided to increase the number of personnel. This made MONUC the largest UN operation in history; at the end of 2006, it had in excess of 16,000 troops. Moreover, in response to the continuous fighting between rebel groups, the mandate of the operation was placed firmly under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Initially mandated only with monitoring the cease-fire agreement, MONUC’s tasks were later expanded to facilitate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector

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reform and the protection of the main transitional leaders, transitional institutions and civilians in imminent danger. International players were also instrumental in supporting the creation of institutions essential to the organization of elections and the day-to-day management of the transition process. Donors, which gathered in the International Committee for the Accompaniment of the Transition, guided and oversaw the democratization process. The committee’s principal role was to put diplomatic pressure on the government, reminding it of its commitments under the peace accord. Also, its support for the independent electoral commission proved essential for ensuring it operated with integrity during the presidential elections. Conversely, international donors were less successful in co-ordinating bilateral and multilateral initiatives on sensitive issues such as security sector reform. More importantly, they were unable or unwilling to put pressure on the government to set up two important commissions that were supposed to be part of the transitional architecture: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Commission against Corruption. Clearly, most of the international attention was focused on organizing elections, which was an exceptional endeavour in a country without roads and infrastructure where an estimated 28 million voters had to be registered. However, the low level of attention that internationals gave to issues such as reconciliation limited the impact of their peacebuilding efforts.

The role of the EU: diplomacy and aid The EU has been deeply involved in the peacemaking processes in the Great Lakes region in recent years. An important dimension of this effort is the political dialogue with the African Union. Regular ministerial meetings are held between the AU and EU. Such meetings allow for the exchange of opinions on matters relating to peace and security in Africa and on specific conflict situations, as well as on capacity building for conflict prevention and crisis management. On a more practical level, Brussels, under the CFSP, appointed a Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes. The incumbent is Roeland Van De Geer; until February 2007, the post was held by Aldo Ajello. Throughout his long tenure, Aldo Ajello has played an important role as mediator. For instance, he succeeded in averting a major political crisis in the DRC when one of the four vice-presidents left the government and the capital under the pretext that not enough progress was made in the transition toward democracy.3 Moving from diplomacy to development policy, the appointment of Louis Michel as European Commissioner for development provided new impetus for Brussels’ involvement in Africa. During the Belgian presidency of the EU in 2001, when he was the country’s foreign minister, member states agreed to devote 0,7 per cent of their gross domestic product to development; and the EU Council adopted resolutions calling on the European

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Commission to speed up participatory measures enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement for better consultation with the civil societies of developing countries. A focus on aid in conflict situations, in particular in the Great Lakes, also dates from the Belgian presidency. More importantly, Michel is amongst the chief architects of the transitional political and constitutional architecture in the DRC. The Cotonou Agreement represents the framework for political and economic relations between the EU and the countries of the Great Lakes. While its main objective is the reduction of poverty and the promotion of economic growth through economic partnerships, the maximization of regional, sub-regional and national capacities to deal with the root causes of conflict is at the heart of the accord (cf. Martinelli, 2005). Initiatives under the agreement are financed by the European Development Fund. The EU also developed a set of crisis-specific financial tools such as the African Peace Facility, which supports African peacekeeping missions, and the Rapid Reaction Mechanism for the speedy disbursement of funds.4 In the DRC, for instance, 2 million euro was released under the mechanism to support the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, to launch preparatory actions for the reintegration of child soldiers and to support independent media and other confidence building initiatives. Moreover, the European Commission is a major player in the country’s security sector reforms. It offered 24 million euro to fund the training of up to 60,000 police officers and contributed 9 million euro to the ESDP police mission (Keane, 2006). The Commission’s European Humanitarian Office provides humanitarian assistance and through it supplements security sector reforms. For instance, the office helps the families of soldiers who are demobilized in the context of the reform of the armed forces. Also, the Commission contributes to the deliberations on how to reform the Police Nationale Congolaise. More generally, it is fully behind the implementation of the good governance agenda in the DRC, for example allocating 33 million euro to a governance project that tries to co-ordinate donors’ activities in this issue-area. With justice viewed as key to implementing good governance, 7.9 million euro has been allocated to justice reform in Eastern DRC (Keane, 2006). Finally, the EU supported the transition in the DRC by funding more than half of the overall costs involved in the election process, and it deployed a large election observation mission, which was headed by General Philippe Morillon.

Operation Artemis The military intervention in the DRC, in 2003, was the first ESDP initiative in Africa. Code-named Artemis, it had 2,000 personnel deployed in the capital of Ituri. It was requested by the UN Secretary General when Uganda’s withdrawal from the province prompted a security vacuum that plunged the area into violence that MONUC was unable to control (Mace,

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2003). With France as the framework nation responsible for the operational command, the mandate of the mission was limited to the town of Bunia. Artemis, among other things, was tasked to stabilize the security situation and to ensure the protection of internally displaced people, UN and humanitarian personnel (Council of the European Union, 2003d). It proved willing to use force in line with its robust mandate. Although of short duration – it lasted from June to September – the operation secured the town and thus prepared the ground for a reinforced MONUC to take over. Artemis was a case of successful UN-EU co-operation, representing in concrete terms what the European Security Strategy would later term ‘effective multilateralism’. It showed the EU’s operational readiness and proved a good indicator of its ability to act outside its neighbourhood without the use of NATO assets (Ulriksen et al., 2004). Finally, it confirmed that the ESDP can be deployed to support the United Nations in short term crisis management situations. Far from being a ‘one off’ operation (Gegout, 2005: 429), Artemis provided a precedent for subsequent operations as demonstrated by the UN request to the EU to support MONUC during the electoral period.5

EUPOL Kinshasa Amongst the priorities identified in the 2002 peace deal are measures to ensure the security of the population, the institutions and the main political leaders. This put the creation of an effective and accountable police corps high on the priorities of the transitional government. It asked the EU to assist it in setting up a specialized police unit of about 1,000 officers within the Congolese police force – the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) – to protect the state institutions and reinforce the internal security apparatus. Brussels agreed. To begin with, it assisted in the rehabilitation of a training centre and provided basic policing equipment for the new service. Second, it supported the training of the IPU. Third, it deployed EUPOL Kinshasa to guide and supervise the IPU in carrying out its policing tasks (Pauwels, 2005). EU support for the IPU has been delivered by both the Commission and the Council. It has been their first joint project. However, whilst creating synergies, it also highlighted institutional rivalries and different institutional cultures. The Commission favoured deploying a small team of no more than 15 contracted independent experts, equipped with a precise mandate and terms of reference established by itself. This stance reflects the Commission’s long-standing experience in development-oriented work based on local capacity- and institution-building. Conversely, the Council preferred a crisis management approach focused on the rapid response to a well-identified situation. This approach requires the co-ordination of multiple tasks by a centrally located actor, the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment, an adequate number of personnel and a well defined, hierarchically organized chain of command through which Brussels exercises control over the

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mission. The upshot of these opposing views was a compromise. The Commission financed, through the European Development Fund, the refurbishing of the IPU training centre and the basic training of the force. This aid was terminated at the end of April 2005. The Council deployed EUPOL Kinshasa to follow up on the reforms of the Commission project (Council of the European Union, 2004d). EUPOL Kinshasa, which began to be deployed in February 2005, is mandated ‘to monitor, mentor, and advise the setting up and initial running of the IPU in order to ensure that the IPU acts . . . according to international best practices’. Among other things, it assists the IPU in establishing an effective chain of command and in developing the leadership capacities of its senior officers. Also, EUPOL advisors accompany IPU patrols – since June 2005, the unit has been patrolling the buildings of the national assembly, senate, electoral commission, supreme court of justice and the office of the general prosecutor – to identify operational shortcomings and offer recommendations on how to overcome them. Finally, the mission checks that the military equipment distributed to the IPU is used in strict accordance with European standards. At the end of 2006, the mission comprised approximately 23 officers headed by Adilio Ruivo Custodio, from Portugal.6 Originally set to expire at the end of December 2005, it was extended to December 2006 (Council of the European Union, 2006b) and again to the end of June 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2006e).7 The overall political control and strategic direction of EUPOL Kinshasa is carried out by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU Council, which is aided by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom). The High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, gives guidance to the mission through the EUSR for the Great Lakes region. The head of EUPOL Kinshasa, in turn, reports back to the High Representative via the EUSR. Another task of the EUSR is to co-ordinate the activities of the police mission with those of other EU actors on the ground. As a civilian ESDP operation, the police mission’s operational costs are covered by the CFSP budget, which is administered by the European Commission. Based on a contract with the Commission, the head of mission distributes this money – 9,945 million euro until June 2007 – while remaining legally accountable to the Commission. Both the Commission and the Council experienced delays in delivering their aid. Interviews conducted in Brussels reveal some frustration with the slow process. In the initial phase, co-ordinated by the Commission, the refurbishing of the IPU training centre, carried out in collaboration with local workers, and the conclusion of contracts with international police trainers took quite some time. Delays in the second part of the project, coordinated by the Council, were due to cumbersome procurement procedures and logistical problems. For instance, at first the 23 officers deployed in Kinshasa had to work from their hotel until their operational base was ready. What is more, they did not have any computers. Part of the logistical

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problems, such as delays in obtaining telephones, cars and IT equipment, were because these items were coming from the Balkans where EU missions were scaling down and the organization of the transfer took some time. As far as the co-ordination between the field and Brussels is concerned, it is generally perceived as successful, at least by the latter. The Police Unit within the Council General Secretariat offers technical support and advice to the mission and provides an indispensable link between events on the ground and member states in Brussels. However, there clearly is room for improvement to ensure that multilateral EU aid does not duplicate the bilateral initiatives of member states.

EUSEC DR Congo The 2002 peace deal stipulates the reform of the Congolese armed forces and the disarming of the militias. The signatories also agreed a ‘memorandum on army and security’ in March 2003, which outlines the mechanism for building an integrated national military. Hence, disarmament and demobilization, on the one side, and the integration of former combatants into the military, on the other, have been central features of the Congolese peacebuilding process. Another ESDP mission – EUSEC DR Congo – is an important player in this area. Following a request by the government in Kinshasa, it offers technical assistance and practical support for the creation of leaner, professional and accountable armed forces. EUSEC, which was launched in June 2005, is thus conceptually and operationally different from EUPOL as it focuses on the army rather than the police. It is also smaller, with only 15 experts (Council of the European Union, 2005b). The mission mandate runs until June 2008. At the time of going to press, the EU is considering extending its engagement in security sector reforms in the DRC, possibly in the form of a single integrated operation which combines EUSEC DRC and EUPOL Kinshasa. The mandate of EUSEC DR Congo is to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the army . . . while taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law. The mission, which is headed by the French General Pierre Michel Joana, has an office in Kinshasa. The rest of the mission staff is assigned to key posts in the Congolese administration such as the private office of the defence minister, the army general staff and the national committee for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. As in all civilian ESDP operations, the head of mission is responsible for the day-to-day management. Mission

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members, excluding Joana, are seconded by member states or EU institutions and remain under the control of the sending authority which covers all costs relating to the secondment and deals with any complaints of or about the secondee. The chain of command linking EUSEC to Brussels is the same as in the case of EUPOL Kinshasa as is its funding source – the CFSP budget. In line with its mandate, EUSEC DR Congo supports and mentors the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and it guides and supervises the reform of the chain of payment of the armed forces. The latter was identified as a major problem by the EU fact-finding mission preparing the launch of EUSEC. It concluded that there was a complete assimilation between the chain of command and the chain of payment. This created an ideal breeding ground for corruption. Money and food for the troops that was to be distributed through the military hierarchy disappeared as it was ‘privatized’ by senior officers. The rank and file, in turn, resorted to extorting money and food from the population. Furthermore, the number of troops, estimated at 120,000 by EU experts and at three times that level by local sources, was inflated to maximize the illicit gains. All this reinforced the mistrust between the population and the military, further widening the gap between the ‘rulers’ and ‘ruled’ in the DRC. To address this problem, EUSEC worked on decoupling the system of payment from the chain of command by transferring the former to the defence ministry and developing its institutional capacity to handle the additional task. Besides tackling corruption, a regularly paid and professional army is more appealing to those ex-combatants who were initially opposed to being integrated into it. Although the launch of EUSEC DR Congo was formally a response to a request for assistance by Congolese authorities, its rationale lies in the strategic interests of two member states, France and Belgium, who have been deeply involved in defence programmes in the DRC. There was a certain reluctance on the part of other EU capitals to get involved in a Congolese security sector reform mission and to support it financially. This was partly due to the suspicion that France wanted to use the European platform to finance its activities in the area. While these doubts translated into a rather small mission, EUSEC has been having some success as mentioned previously. The experience of General Joana and his personal links with the Congolese armed forces facilitate a good relationship with the defence ministry and the president himself. This in turn increases the ‘acceptability’ and the credibility of the mission. Also, the leadership style of Joana is very similar to that of the EUSR, which contributes to excellent communication and co-ordination between the two EU officials. Finally, EUSEC DR Congo is grounded in locally identified needs and an awareness of local constraints. It is an attempt to tackle issues such as corruption, an attempt which may lead in time to a redefinition by Congolese officials of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour on the part of locals and donors

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alike. The potential impact of the mission thus goes beyond the security sector as it may render governance in the DRC more transparent and accountable.

EUFOR In December 2005, the UN Under-Secretary General for peacekeeping operations, with the endorsement of Congolese authorities, asked the EU to consider the possibility of deploying a military force to the DRC to assist MONUC in maintaining peace and stability during the upcoming presidential elections. Brussels responded to the UN request with caution. Initial deliberations by the EU Military Committee and Civcom were followed by a request for more information on what kind of military force New York was requesting. Also, a mixed EU military-civilian fact-finding team was sent to the DRC. Three intervention scenarios were subsequently drafted by the Military Committee. Each option envisaged that in addition to EU troops being deployed in Congo, there would be a standby force pre-positioned either in Europe, a country neighbouring the DRC or on a naval vessel. Furthermore, all scenarios foresaw sending an ‘advance presence’, anything between 50 and 4,000 soldiers, to Kinshasa before the elections. Only three member states had the military capability to command the military operation in Africa: Great Britain, France and Germany. The former, due to its heavy commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, made it clear that it was not keen on taking the lead. France, who had commanded operation Artemis, felt that it was time for another EU country to take charge of a new Congolese mission. This is how a reluctant Germany got the job. On 30 July 2006, following an authorization by the UN Security Council, the EU deployed about 400 troops to Kinshasa (Council of the European Union, 2006c). A stand-by, battalion-size force was stationed in Gabon. All together, the EU (plus Turkey and Switzerland as third states) committed about 1,800 troops to the operation. They were under the command of Major General Christian Damay from France, who was appointed EU Force Commander in charge of forces deployed in Kinshasa and their operations. He reported to the Operation Commander, German Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck, whose headquarter was in Potsdam and who had overall command of all the elements and the logistics comprising the force both in Kinshasa and the ‘stand by force’ in Gabon. The objective of the mission was to add a rapid reaction capability to MONUC and thus assist it in providing security in the run up to, during and after the presidential elections. More precisely, EUFOR was tasked to provide a backup to MONUC should the UN troops face serious difficulties in fulfilling their mandate; to contribute to the protection of civilians in its areas of deployment; to secure the airport in Kinshasa; and to extract individuals in danger. The

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costs of the operation – 16,700,000 euro – were borne by contributing states, based on the principle that ‘costs lie where they fall’. The so-called Athena mechanism was used to finance common operational costs. Incidentally, member state support for the military operation was decidedly more widespread than for EUSEC and EUPOL. Twenty-one EU countries contributed troops. However, not least because of Berlin’s insistence, the mandate of the mission was limited to at most four months after the first round of elections.8 In line with this schedule, EUFOR RD Congo was terminated on 30 November 2006. Although EUFOR was an element of the EU’s broader commitment to transition in the DRC, its international political context was different. It was launched at the request of the UN and co-ordination with New York, both at headquarters and field levels, was required. In the field, meetings between the two actors were quite frequent and constructive. On the EU side, General Damay, together with the EUSR established close contacts with MONUC as well as local authorities. In addition, General Viereck liaised with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. At the political level, the head of EU foreign policy, Solana, assisted by the EUSR and in co-ordination with the EU term presidency, acted as the primary point of contact with New York on EUFOR RD Congo. Co-operation between the two institutions was good, although there were some problems with the exchange of intelligence, linked to the military nature of the operation and the sensitivities that go with it, both in the field and between Brussels and New York. As outlined in the Council Joint Action that provided the legal basis for EUFOR, the Political and Security Committee exercised political control over, and provided strategic direction to, the operation. It did so via a chain of command that linked the Operation Commander in Potsdam to the headquarters of the stand-by force in Libreville and, finally, the Force Commander in Kinshasa. In short, communications between Kinshasa and Brussels went via Gabon and Germany. Not surprisingly, this set-up made decision-making on the ground cumbersome. Moreover, the fact that EUFOR was allowed to act in support of MONUC only with an explicit request by the UN force meant that during unrest in Kinshasa following the announcement of the results of the first round of elections in August 2006, EUFOR’s reaction was delayed. In a similar vein, when the building of the supreme court of justice was set on fire, MONUC did not request EUFOR’s help. This made it more difficult for locals to understand what to expect or not to expect from the EU troops although local authorities generally expressed their appreciation of EUFOR. Finally, the operation highlighted gaps in interoperability among national contingents making up EUFOR, particularly in terms of secure communications capabilities. A European Parliament delegation sent to Kinshasa to observe EUFOR concluded that some of these interoperability problems could be addressed by a greater emphasis on the joint training of troops.

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Challenges encountered by the ESDP in Congo When evaluating the challenges faced by the ESDP (military and civilian) in the DRC, some general observations can be made that are both linked to the situation in the country and derived from the interplay of the different international stakeholders on the ground. The 2002 peace accord left a number of problems unresolved, including the establishment of a unified army and of an effective and accountable police. Whilst the EU is supporting the DRC in this area, the transitional period has been marked by persisting mistrust between rival political groups, many of which have or had their own armed militias. The state, in turn, has not been a neutral provider of public security but an interested party in the local power game. This situation made many local actors reluctant to move forward with security sector reform and unwilling to rely on the public police and the armed forces for the maintenance of peace and security (ICG, 2005b: 1). Corruption is another major problem in the DRC. It is aggravated by the fact that the local authorities and political groups show a marked unwillingness to co-operate with donors on this issue. In general, locals prefer to play internationals off against each other, to maximize the benefits they receive from them and to concede as little as possible in return. Impunity is also widespread in the country, which makes it even more difficult to assess the real impact of training on the police and on the military. Even when notions of human rights and professional behaviour are included in international training programmes, without strong internal controls in these institutions and in the absence of an effective justice system, it remains very difficult to combat the abuse of power. The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons is a further impediment to the consolidation of peace, security and development in the country and in the greater sub-region (Martinelli and Pauwels, 2005). Civil society groups have documented the link between small arms and human rights violations including sexual violence, recruitment of child soldiers, murder and plunder (Amnesty International, 2005). Additionally, the presence of small arms makes the work of ESDP operations much more dangerous. Moving from the environmental challenges encountered by the ESDP in the DRC to problems created by EU structures and processes, the different institutional cultures informing Council and Commission interventions in crisis areas have been troubling the EU peacebuilding efforts. This was especially evident in the case of EUPOL Kinshasa, but the point can be applied more generally. The EU Council squarely frames security sector reform as a tool that may serve ‘an important role in serving the EU’s strategic objectives as outlined in the European Security Strategy’ (Council of the European Union, 2005d). Conversely, the European Commission’s institution-building agenda views security sector reform in terms of both state and human security and it regards the military only as one instrument

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for providing security for the population. For the Commission, security sector reform is an essential part of its objective to reinforce good governance, democracy, the rule of law, protection of human rights and the efficient use of public resources. The Commission’s assistance in this area may extend beyond the state and its institutions to include civil society actors engaged in the debate on security issues. Also, it emphasizes nationally and regionally owned reform processes. Inter-institutional differences and rivalries have only partly been remedied by an agreement between the Commission and the Council on a comprehensive EU approach to security sector reform in the DRC. The joint demarche highlights the importance of covering both short- and long-term measures; of a nationally owned reform concept developed in partnership with the international community and framed by a good governance agenda; of close EU-UN co-operation in this issue-area; and of co-ordination among international stakeholders and among them and the host government. A final factor complicating EU efforts to overhaul the security sector in the DRC are bilateral programmes set up by member states such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Great Britain. Their agendas are not always complementary to EU initiatives, and yet EU capitals are reluctant to have their military aid supervised by Brussels. This reluctance is even more pronounced when it comes to international donors that do not hail from the EU such as the USA, South Africa and Angola. While the former lacks experience in Africa and has little understanding of regional dynamics, the latter have leadership ambitions in the region. However, all these international players are united in their commitment to increasing African military capabilities to deal with crises on the continent, and thus they all contribute to the African Peace and Security Agenda. Finally, Union activities in the DRC testify to the successful co-operation between Brussels and New York. It is facilitated by their Joint Declaration on Co-operation in Crisis Management and, in the case of the EU, by a commitment to effective multilateralism, which is for instance emphasized in the European Security Strategy. Also, through its Congolese operations, the EU has been able to learn from the extensive UN experience in peacebuilding missions in general and security sector reform in particular. Yet, as in most relationships, not everything is perfect. Some commentators point at a turf war between the two organizations in Congo (Mobekk, 2006). Tensions occurred between EUSEC DR Congo and MONUC. EUSEC is the main EU vehicle for driving forward reforms of the Congolese security sector but the issue is also part of MONUC’s mandate. However, the UN department of peacekeeping operations indicated that it is not prepared to deal with long-term security sector reforms in the DRC and that it favours a continued engagement of the EU in this area. In the Union itself, on the other hand, some countries such as Germany do not favour a big ESDP role in Africa, which is perceived as rather distant. This complicates discussions on

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what the EU can offer to contribute to the reform of the security sector in Congo.

Conclusion The experience in the DRC highlights some of the potentials and limits of the Union’s ambition to be an effective international peacebuilder, notably in the field of security sector reform. Arguably the key structural limit is that internationals find it hard, if not impossible, to promote such reforms if the locals do not co-operate. In the case of the DRC, many local stakeholders showed very little interest in having accountable and professional police services and armed forces. Effective security sector reforms require a combination of short- and longer-term measures. The EU is well positioned in this regard, as it can act through flexible modules, including quick-impact interventions carried out under the CFSP/ESDP and longer-term European Community programmes. The case of the DRC illustrates the synergies that can be generated by joining diplomacy, military force and development aid. To succeed, security sector reforms in transition countries have to be holistic, covering the judicial triad, and they must include those bodies responsible for the oversight of public security agencies, notably parliaments (OECD, 2005). Whilst the EU is aware of this, through its participation, inter alia, in the development of an integrated framework for security sector reform within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the internal organization and the different mandates of the Council and the Commission as well as the mandates of the different general directorates in the Commission themselves render the formulation of such holistic and comprehensive reforms difficult. However, the progressive blurring of Commission and Council initiatives as exemplified by EU aid to the Integrated Police Unit holds the promise of a cross-fertilization of methods which may in the future improve the overall coherence and effectiveness of ESDP operations.

Notes 1 The author would like to thank the Poˆle Bernheim for Peace and Citizenship at the Free University of Brussels and the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond for their financial support during research leading to the present publication. 2 There are two pools, one dealing with British conflict prevention policy in Africa and one that extends to regions outside of Africa and is called the Global Conflict Prevention Pool. They join the financial and personnel resources of the foreign office, the ministry of defence and the department for international development. 3 The fact that the vice-president left the capital raised concerns at the time about a possible political schism and the creation of two rival ‘capitals’. 4 The Rapid Reaction Mechanism is a financial envelope designed to facilitate the rapid use of specific financial resources in strictly defined circumstances. The

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civilian initiatives financed by it, which cannot last longer than six months, are designed to re-establish the stability necessary for the implementation of European Commission assistance and co-operation activities. The mechanism was replaced by the Instrument for Stability in January 2007. Interview with Aldo Ajello, EUSR for the Great Lakes, 19 January 2006. Contributing nations include France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium as well as two third-countries, Canada and Turkey. At the time of writing, the EU is considering extending EUPOL Kinshasa beyond June 2007. It was subsequently extended until June 2008 under the new name EUPOL RD Congo. Before the deployment of the mission the German defence minister promised that German troops would be back home before Christmas, mirroring the general unwillingness of Germans to get involved militarily in areas that do not appear to be of strategic importance for the country.

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From European to Global Security Actor The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia Paul Kirwan

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was a first for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in several regards. It was the first mission set up in Asia, the first one launched in partnership with another regional organization and the first one required to be fully operational on day one of its mandate. In this chapter, the difficulties involved in planning, funding, staffing and managing a mission in such a short time are investigated. Also, due attention is paid to the challenges faced by an operation jointly run by the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The importance of the AMM resided in the fact that it had a very active part to play in the Aceh peace process, a significant departure from the role of a conventional monitoring mission. This ‘active monitoring’ role is explored in the context of the Aceh situation and compared and contrasted with the role of other international monitoring mission.

From conflict to peace in Aceh With a population of some 200 million, Indonesia is the world’s largest majority Muslim state. Colonized by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the archipelago that makes up modern Indonesia was also the target of other European powers during this period. They were after the rewards available to anyone who could control and exploit the spice trade. The Dutch colonial power held the archipelago for the most part up until 1942 when the Japanese took control. Indonesian independence was declared when the Japanese surrendered in 1945, but the Netherlands attempted to re-establish their domination over the territory. It took mediation by the United Nations (UN) before Indonesian independence was fully acknowledged. Even during the Dutch colonial period, Aceh was known for its independent spirit. In the struggle for Indonesian sovereignty, both Aceh and Islam became focal points for the anti-colonial resistance. Indeed, the roots of the independence movement in Aceh that fought for its objective for 30 years up to August 2005 can be traced back to the fiercely defended

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status of Aceh as an independent entity prior to colonization. This history has characterized the relationship between Aceh and Jakarta, and highlights the unresolved relationship between the Indonesian political centre of Jakarta and its provinces, some of which have significantly different sociopolitical identities than that of the centre. The stresses induced by these unresolved relationships evident in Aceh are also present elsewhere in the country. The full-scale political crisis that developed in East Timor during the 1990s resulted in its breaking loose, a fact which had important repercussions for the resolution of the Aceh situation as well as for other political disputes elsewhere in Indonesia. While these circumstances made finding a resolution more complex, they also held out the possibility that a solution that could be made to work in Aceh might also provide a framework for resolving disputes in other Indonesian provinces. Over the years, a number of peace initiatives were launched to end the conflict in Aceh between the Indonesian armed forces and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), most recently the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in Geneva in 2002 (Sukma, 2004). However, the political commitment to implement the agreement was lacking at the time and the process collapsed in acrimony in mid-2003, just as earlier peace efforts had come to naught. Following the failure of the 2002 initiative, opportunities for political progress looked bleak in the medium term and the political establishment resigned itself to a likely protracted period of internal conflict (Yudhoyono, 2006). Even though the first contacts were actually made before the events of December 2004, the break point came in the aftermath of the devastating Indian Ocean earthquake and the tsunami that followed. As word started to filter out of the magnitude of the destruction, the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ordered a halt to offensive military operations against the insurgency and the reorganization of the Indonesian military forces present in the province to act in support of assistance efforts for the survivors. As many as 200,000 of Aceh’s inhabitants were reported dead or missing, while the survivors were left in desperate need of food, shelter and basic medical facilities, in advance of the extensive need for reconstruction of the shattered infrastructure and economy. In financial terms alone, in Aceh the cost of the damage done to private and public infrastructure is assessed to have been in the order of 4.5 billion dollar (World Bank, 2004). This in an underdeveloped region where the level of infrastructure was already poor. As the scale of the situation became known, external intervention, once tightly controlled and systematically prevented by the Indonesian security forces, was requested. In a matter of days following the tsunami, government policy on access to Aceh was transformed. The region’s status went from a closed internal political situation where visitors were not encouraged to one where the assistance of the outside world was urgently requested on a range of humanitarian and

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infrastructure support issues, and pertinently, on a wider social front. The opening up of Aceh to foreign assistance programmes in the aftermath of the tsunami was an irreversible step that led to consequential political developments. With Aceh in the midst of a profound humanitarian crisis and with the once closed province now open to foreign intervention for the purposes of immediate emergency relief and other much-needed aid, discussions quietly went forward on a new peace initiative. By July 2005, it had become clear that ongoing background talks were proving useful and that the political will needed to initiate a new attempt at a peaceful settlement existed. The insurgency was prepared to drop its claim to full independence in favour of far-reaching autonomy including significant economic independence for Aceh, the establishment of local political parties and the reintegration of its fighters into Acehnese society. Reintegration was to include a general amnesty, pardons for political prisoners, a favourable economic package for former fighters and further support to families affected by the war and other victims of the conflict. For their part, president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and vice president Yusuf Kalla were ready to take the political risks required to push the peace initiative through the Jakarta political scene and to face down those opposition forces who were ready to exploit the situation should the process run into difficulties. The new peace deal was brokered in Helsinki by the Crisis Management Initiative, led by former Finnish president Ahtisaari. On 15 August 2005, the minister of law and human rights, Hamid Awaludin, and Malik Mahmud for the Free Aceh Movement signed a memorandum of understanding between the Indonesian government and the insurgency, otherwise known as the Helsinki MOU (2005). During the negotiations, it became clear that a credible neutral outside body was needed to monitor the implementation of the peace deal and to verify that a series of tracking points had been reached. The recent history of East Timor meant that the UN was not in a position to take on this role. Political circles in Jakarta found UN supervision of the peace process unacceptable, since many held New York to have been to some degree complicit in the secession of East Timor. Any new role for the international organization as part of the resolution of the Aceh conflict aroused suspicion that this intervention could be a Trojan horse designed to support another separatist agenda; a situation Jakarta was not about to allow in Aceh. Eventually, the negotiators agreed on a joint mission by the EU and ASEAN. The decision to deploy an ESDP mission was not without debate. While many member states saw an opportunity to expand the reach of the ESDP to Asia and to demonstrate that the Union had matured into a serious international security player, others had concerns that the political and diplomatic risks to the EU were high, while the short implementation time line coupled with the support requirements would be difficult to meet. The complex and difficult political and operational

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circumstances notwithstanding, the EU Council decided to launch the mission (Council of the EU, 2005d).1

The mission ASEAN is not structured to perform complex foreign interventions. Conversely, the EU has formalized legal structures for running international missions. Hence, it was uncontroversial that the AMM followed EU procedures. Most of the funding for the mission also came from the EU, although, as will be seen later, a variety of funding sources was one of the mechanisms used to ensure that the AMM was able to fulfil its mandate. The mission faced several significant problems. Some are common to all ESDP operations; others were unique to the AMM. Issues such as timely financing and procurement are familiar, though in this case they were more acute given the compressed timeline. Other problems were more particular to the AMM. No previous ESDP mission had to commence full operational duties on day one of its mandate nor did any ESDP mission have so little time for legal procedures and administrative issues to be negotiated prior to mission inception. The AMM was the first ESDP mission in Asia, and it operated a long way from EU support structures. It was deployed in an area of extremely limited infrastructure, in a Muslim society where Sharia law was being progressively introduced and within a social and political framework that was a largely unknown landscape to those mission staff who hailed from the EU. Additionally, since the AMM was a hybrid enterprise, jointly run by the EU and the five ASEAN nations of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, a relationship between Brussels, the mission and the five ASEAN participants had to be worked out. While the peace deal foresaw the rapid establishment of the AMM, EU financial and legal procedures are not designed to respond so rapidly. There was considerable concern that a political vacuum could occur between the signing of the memorandum of understanding in mid-August and the commencement of AMM operations on 15 September. Moreover, there were security considerations, not only those generated by the existence and function of the mission in Aceh, but also related to issues which might arise due to political events beyond Indonesian borders. The Mohamed cartoons published in Danish newspapers in January and February 2006 and later repeated in the print media of several other European countries were a case that did have such an impact on AMM security. Also, there was a diplomatic worry. While a successful mission would have the additional benefit of providing a substantial boost to political relations with Indonesia and those ASEAN countries involved in the mission, should the mission fail there could easily be political fallout resulting in a negative impact on the EU’s diplomacy in the region.

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Mandate, planning, deployment, internal organization and management The AMM was an unarmed civilian ESDP mission. Its mandate was defined in the Helsinki memorandum of understanding and included the following tasks:  monitor the demobilization of fighters of the Free Aceh Movement and the decommissioning of their armaments  monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops  monitor the reintegration of members of the insurgency into civil society  monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field  monitor the process of legislative change  rule on disputed amnesty cases  investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the peace accord  establish and maintain liaison and good co-operation with the parties. Furthermore, the AMM head of mission had the authority to make binding rulings, after consultation with the concerned parties, to resolve disputes among them related to the Helsinki memorandum of understanding. If necessary, he could refer disputes to President Ahtisaari for a final ruling, although in the event this provision was never called upon, as the mission in consultation with the parties could resolve all disputes. The planning of the AMM was much compressed and rendered complex by the need to co-ordinate actions among both the EU and ASEAN. On the signing of the Helsinki provisions, the technical assessment mission that had deployed to Aceh 12 days earlier became the AMM-IMP, the Initial Monitoring Presence. This was not a legal EU formation; it was a precursor to the AMM which filled the gap between the signing of the memorandum of understanding on 15 August and the deployment of the AMM on 15 September. It addressed concerns that without an immediate visible presence on the ground, the peace deal might unravel. The personnel deployed to the Initial Monitoring Presence was operating under the diplomatic umbrellas of its respective embassies, along the lines of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), the forerunner to the 1998 Kosovo Verification Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. KDOM personnel were likewise funded by their own governments, with all costs covered on the basis of ‘costs lie where they fall’. Finally, just as in the Kosovo mission, those deployed in the Initial Monitoring Presence were absorbed by the mission proper once it got underway. The EU Presidency at the time of mission launch was held by Great Britain whose Jakarta embassy offered significant support by way of timely finances and specialist staff – both international and local. They offered much needed political, social and cultural expertise. This support continued

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for the duration of the mission, as far forward as its liquidation phase. Both the Finnish and Swedish governments as well as EU Council Secretariat staff were also heavily engaged in the Initial Monitoring Presence, with significant financial support being provided by these governments to help cover set-up costs. Finland provided a group of technical specialists who made up the main component of the Decommissioning Planning Team. Helsinki also provided the team with a budget for expenditures incurred during the Initial Monitoring Presence. This ensured that the decommissioning component was immediately deployable on 15 September when the first decommissioning event took place with considerable public attention. The Swedish government made available the services of the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, which is a technical assistance organization capable of providing integrated logistical, communications and IT support for international operations. Stockholm also endowed its rescue agency with a four million euro budget to spend on procurement of assets and services for the AMM. This financial support, part of the national contributions of six million euro to the mission, which supplemented the nine million euro allocated from the budget of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, allowed the Initial Monitoring Presence and subsequently the AMM to cover a significant part of their initial procurement needs. The direct financial contributions to the AMM from other member states and the non-EU countries Norway and Switzerland gave the mission further flexibility to spend funds outside of European Commission financial expenditure rules. This was a tacit acknowledgement that the current cumbersome financial and procurement rules and procedures are not designed to accommodate rapid deployment missions such as the AMM. However, even with these alternate mechanisms for procurement and expenditure in place, difficulties in timely supply remained an issue for an operation put in place at such short notice. Apart from dealing with procurement and support issues, the Initial Monitoring Presence engaged in a number of further activities to prepare the launch of the AMM. Eleven district offices were opened and preparations made for the arrival, training, equipping and deployment of the main body of almost 240 mission staff. The main training event was carried out during 12–14 September 2005 in the city of Medan just outside of the mission area, with monitors arriving under their own government auspices. In addition to mission specific issues, the training programme also covered human rights; social, political and cultural issues; health, safety and security; first aid; and communications systems operation. Briefings were given by a mixture of mission specialists, experts brought in from Europe and significant Indonesian social and political figures, both from Aceh and Jakarta. District office teams were formed during this period and they were deployed directly to their areas of responsibility from Medan or via Banda Aceh depending on the most sensible road access. The decommissioning component of the mission went directly from Medan to initiate the first

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decommissioning event. By 15 September 2005, having negotiated the immediate hurdles, the AMM was fully staffed, deployed and operational. The first decommissioning event successfully took place on the very same day. No other international mission has ever deployed and become fully operational faster.

Mission structure and staffing With the mission made up of both EU and ASEAN personnel, personnel decisions were more complex than is the case in a normal ESDP operation. From the outset, there was a recognition of the importance of having the AMM genuinely reflect its joint EU-ASEAN nature. Hence, due attention was given to the issue of representation within the mission structures, both in terms of ASEAN-EU general ratios, and also as far as possible within the ASEAN and EU member state contingents. At a senior level, the principl deputy head of mission was always an ASEAN post. Six of the eleven district offices were led by members from ASEAN, the rest by EU nationals. In all cases, the deputy post was held by a member of the alternate organization. Similar efforts were made in the headquarter hierarchy, although administrative structures which had to conform to EU procedural rules were in the main staffed by Europeans who were either seconded by member states or contracted by the mission. Personnel could only be hired once the mission was given legal force and hence could only join the AMM a week or more after its start. Continued support by the EU Council General Secretariat during this time was essential. Even after contracted specialists formed the majority of the administrative staff, the mission continued to rely on assistance by Brussels. This was because although most hired personnel had significant work experience in their areas of expertise, few had been on EU missions or were familiar with their inner workings. A further complication was that neither the Council nor the Commission provide accountancy software or templates for mission administration. This may not be such an acute problem for a mission with a slow build up, where administrative procedures can evolve in response to specific demands. Yet in any future rapid-onset ESDP operation, the administrative challenges faced by the AMM will likely resurface. The seconded monitors from ASEAN were almost all drawn from their respective armed forces, while the EU member states’ contributions, along with those of Norway and Switzerland, were split between, on the one hand, civilian staff and, on the other, serving or former military personnel. In spite of this, the mission structure remained civilian and the ranks held by military monitors were not used when determining appointments within the mission. Staff strength varied during the course of the mandate and reflected the mission activities as directed by the peace accord. Initially having 229 men and women split between AMM headquarters, district offices and decommissioning teams, the mission had a recognizable structure

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with an inner office of the head of mission and the usual departments of operations, administration, logistics support, press and public information as well as a reporting cell originally within operations. Later, when the demobilization, decommissioning and withdrawal phases had ended, the reporting and analysis cell became a stand-alone department. As the mission progressed, the number of monitors declined. The personnel was first reduced by the closure of the decommissioning teams at the end of their work in December 2005. At that point, there were 197 staff left. With the peace process moving forward, mission strength was again reduced in March 2006, halving the field presence, though still remaining deployed throughout the mission area. In September 2006, there was a final streamlining of the operation when numbers were lowered to 36, with all remaining staff being based in Banda Aceh or assigned to roving patrols operating across the mission area. In this phase, the essential purpose of the patrols was to provide continuity of activity up to the elections, which took place on 11 December. The mission closed on 15 December 2006, leaving behind only a small liquidation team. A final observation on the working relationship between EU and ASEAN monitors. There was some concern at the beginning about cultural obstacles to effective co-operation. This turned out to be largely unfounded. Moreover, ASEAN monitors clearly added value to the mission, for instance when it encountered challenges that required local cultural insight and nuanced diplomatic negotiations attuned to the local context.

Mission activities on the ground The AMM set up four decommissioning teams. Their work characterized the early visible activity of the mission and public expectations were high. As part of the peace deal, the insurgents had to hand over their weapons to the AMM for destruction in four stages. The process commenced on 15 September 2005 and was completed a few months later on 15 December. In parallel to the weapons decommissioning, the Indonesian military and police in the province had to be reduced to numbers consistent with those of security forces in the rest of Indonesia. The military also stepped down from conducting internal security activities. For the first three months of the mission, the decommissioning activities provided a public demonstration that the peace process was moving forward. Indeed, they were far more public events than the AMM had anticipated. Much planning had gone into weapons decommissioning and destruction by the mission, not least because there were significant security worries. The insurgents had to arrive at the decommissioning sites with their weapons. The possibility of violent incidents between them and the armed forces at this point was taken very seriously as it could have derailed the entire process. It was assumed that the Free Aceh Movement would choose jungle sites for the hand in and decommissioning. The AMM anticipated providing

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a screen of monitors that would establish a wide perimeter around the site to help establish confidence for insurgents that they would be safe at this moment. In the event, the Free Aceh Movement caught all by surprise by making the astute choice of a sports field in Banda Aceh for the first decommissioning event, thus setting the tone for all future decommissioning events. Huge crowds arrived and the press was on hand to see the rebels arrive with their weapons in canvas sacks, giving them to the AMM. After their serial numbers were recorded in the presence of Indonesian military officers, the weapons were cut up by the AMM while observed by the public, the press and the representatives of the government. The destroyed arms were handed over to the military. These very public decommissioning and troop withdrawal events served to enhance trust and confidence in the peace process while also building trust in the AMM as a transparent mission effectively working to achieve its goals as set out in the Helsinki memorandum. Other less public activities were also progressing. Of particular importance was the work of the Commission for Security Arrangements, a meeting forum not foreseen by the provisions of the peace accord. It was introduced by the AMM head of mission as the main body for driving forward the peace process. The establishment of the commission echoed the Joint Military Commission set up in Bosnia following the Dayton peace agreement. The Commission for Security Arrangements was the principle mechanism used to monitor the implementation of the entire peace process; to reinforce compliance with human rights; and monitor and facilitate the reintegration of the 3,000 former combatants into civil society. They received economic facilitation packages, farming land, and/or employment opportunities. If unable to work, former combatants were eligible to receive sufficient social security. The Indonesian government also provided funding for the rehabilitation of public and private property that was destroyed during the conflict. Aside from the committee arrangements, pertinent issues could also be discussed by way of separate bilateral meetings between, on the one hand, the AMM and, on the other, the government or the Free Aceh Movement. This was frequently the initial manner of contact when complaints were raised. The meetings of the Commission for Security Arrangements were chaired by the AMM head of mission and attended by senior figures from the government and the rebels. Initially held twice per week, they were later reduced to bi-weekly and then monthly sessions by mission end. The commission enabled both the parties and the AMM to raise any issue relating to the peace process and to discuss the interpretation and application of the Helsinki memorandum of understanding. At the meetings, practical arrangements of how its stipulations were to be carried out were agreed and detailed with a view to mitigating the risk of misunderstanding between the parties and their personnel deployed in the field. All major decisions in the commission were made by consensus, and every meeting was followed by a

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mutual press statement, sometimes also by a press conference with all three parties involved, on the issues discussed and the outcome reached. By making this process as transparent as possible, citizens could monitor the overall progress and take stock of the achievements as well as the problematic issues under discussion. A further important point covered by the Commission for Security Arrangements was ‘serious incident resolution’, where the phrase ‘serious incident’ referred to violations of the Helsinki memorandum of understanding. Both during the Initial Monitoring Presence and continuing into the mission proper, cases of non-compliance occurred. It was the duty of the AMM to investigate and rule on these events, publicly noting violations if they were deemed to have taken place. The first breaches of the peace accord happened during the Initial Monitoring Presence, when in separate cases first insurgents and then Indonesian troops were found responsible for shooting incidents. These were the first tests of resolve for the mission and of the intent of the parties to the peace deal. While any allegation that the Helsinki memorandum was violated was a potentially emotive and contentious charge, on these and all subsequent occasions the rulings made by the head of the AMM to defuse the conflict were accepted by both the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian armed forces. To enhance the legitimacy of the rulings of the Commission for Security Arrangements, it was decided that those issues which could be dealt with at a lower level should be resolved at secondary meetings. To this end, commission meetings were organized at the regional offices of the AMM. These meetings mirrored the central commission activities. By adding a local layer to the principal post-Helsinki conflict resolution mechanism, the AMM contributed to building trust and political consensus between the parties at the grass roots level. It also provided a conduit for communication between the AMM, district officials and representatives of the insurgency. The regional meetings of the Commission for Security Arrangements thus allowed for the planning and co-ordination of peace-related activities at the local level. One such activity was the publication of the memorandum of understanding. The programme was carried out throughout the mission mandate ensuring that the terms and progress of the peace process were understood by as broad an audience within Acehnese society as possible. The means used for this purpose ranged from large-scale social events with music and theatre to poster campaigns, local press engagements and the sponsoring of radio shows in which AMM personnel answered phone questions. During the latter exercise, transistor radios donated by a Dutch non-governmental organization in co-operation with an Indonesian broadcasting corporation were distributed by the mission across the province. Aside from the Commission for Security Arrangements (central and local), two issues required specific AMM input. The memorandum of understanding tasked the AMM to monitor the process of legislative change and to resolve any amnesty disputes that might arise during the peace process.

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The amnesty issue was potentially very contentious. Hence, although the authority of the head of mission to make binding rulings extended to the amnesty issue, the mission decided to work only in an advisory capacity on the cases of the nearly 100 imprisoned rebels held for a variety of offences who had not originally been included by the government in the list of those being eligible to receive an amnesty under the peace accord. An AMM legal specialist seconded expressly for this purpose was able to quietly review all case papers and make recommendations to the parties on a case-by-case basis. It was significant that neither party attempted to exploit this obviously serious issue and that they accepted the recommendations in full, a fact that was not publicized so as not to politicize the process. Deciding the new Law on Governance of Aceh held great complexities. While other points of the peace accord were negotiated between the parties themselves, the Law on Governance had to pass through the parliamentary process. Only the parliament could actually make law, irrespective of the intent expressed at the signing of the Helsinki memorandum. When finally passed in July 2005, the new law was considered to have had more public participation in its formulation than any other law passed by the Indonesian parliament. The Law on Governance of Aceh is a long and complex text covering many aspects of governance. Most importantly, it assigns the Acehnese authorities a role in the administration and management of all public sectors except for foreign, defence, security, judicial, monetary and national fiscal policies as well as certain religious affairs. These sectors remain under the authority of the central government. In those areas of governance which were decentralized, the degree to which local authorities were empowered varies depending on the sector. In some, the province has broad competencies. For example, the appointment of the Aceh police chief and the attorney general require the approval of the governor. In other issue-areas such as the management of oil and gas resources, responsibilities are shared with the central government. Additionally, the Law on Governance of Aceh modifies the rules governing political representation, allowing local political parties to be established. While the new law broadly conforms to the Helsinki memorandum of understanding, it falls short of it in certain details which remain outstanding. At the time of going to press, a presidential decree is in the pipeline to meet these outstanding issues, while the parties agreed to continue consultations, provide further clarification and make any further changes through formal legal channels.

The role and policies of the European Commission As noted, prior to the relief effort in the wake of the tsunami, international access to Aceh province was severely limited. Since the failure of the 2002 agreement on the cessation of hostilities and the introduction of military rule, no significant work had been carried forward on governance issues.

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Indeed, even following the tsunami and the subsequent rapid relaxation of access procedures for international agencies, any programme that came near to addressing the political dispute behind the insurgency remained a no-go area. However, with the signing of the peace accord, the European Commission was able to initiate the first phase of a 28 million euro peace and good governance programme. It centred on supporting local government and assisting in the demobilization and reintegration of former political prisoners and combatants. It also covered the needs of those communities which received these former prisoners and combatants. The programme, which was implemented by the International Organization for Migration, provided reinsertion and reintegration packages to 3,000 former rebels and over 1,500 former political prisoners. Subsequent Commission funding went to the local elections programme of the United Nations Development Programme, and police and justice sector reform projects. The police support programme focuses on training, with particular reference to community policing and compliance with human rights standards. The justice programme looks to the modernization of the civil district courts system, again with particular attention to human rights. These activities were designed by the Commission from the outset to ensure that the longer-term aims of the peace process are adequately addressed beyond the remit of the ESDP mission.

Mission impact The AMM enjoyed a high level of social acceptance in Aceh, even during the Initial Monitoring Presence. Public perception at this time was that the AMM already existed and cases were brought to the district offices as soon as they were seen to be occupied, in some instances weeks before the mission mandate existed. The mission got a further boost when the weapons decommissioning and the parallel troop withdrawals, both of which it monitored, made a good start. The result of these actions was a confidence in society that the armed conflict might be ended for good this time, a confidence which was also demonstrated by the success of the early public relations events held by the mission in all major towns in the province. These events became celebratory gatherings involving music, dance and theatre which went on into the night. They were the first such events for many years in a province that had lived under military rule. It was clear that the Acehnese population not only wanted peace but also felt that the 2005 memorandum of understanding between the parties to the conflict was the most serious effort yet. The desired strategic end state of the Aceh peace process is a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict, with the governor of the province being elected through a fair and democratic process within the republic of Indonesia. At the commencement of the AMM, Aceh still had curfews operating in many towns; urban populations feared using country

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roads especially at night and the province had been governed under emergency military orders for over two years since the failure of the previous peace accord. By the time of its departure from Aceh on 15 December 2006, the AMM had witnessed elections held under the new Law on Governance of Aceh, and independent candidates and local political parties had been able to stand for office. The state of emergency was long gone, along with the non-organic military and police units, internal security now being a matter for the Aceh police. The Free Aceh Movement had decommissioned its guns, demobilized its fighters and taken significant steps toward playing by the rules of normal politics. Irwandi Yusuf, the former representative of the insurgents to the AMM and the government, had won the elections to become governor of the province. In brief, the AMM was held in high esteem by both parties to the peace accord and made a genuine contribution to building peace in Aceh. Because of this success, the peace agreement for the province is looked upon by Indonesia as a potential framework suitable for resolving other internal conflicts (Feith, 2007).

Lessons identified The AMM was established in a remarkably short time using a variety of alternate funding and supply mechanisms to ensure full mission function on day one of its mandate. This was a considerable achievement but one which was gained by working through member state financial contributions outside of European Commission procedures rather than by making use of existing ESDP support and funding structures. Hence, the success in setting up the AMM serves to highlight the fact that the current procedures for ESDP mission start up are not suitable for such rapid onset operations. Also, the terms of the standard special advisor contract between the Commission and heads of mission are not appropriate for these circumstances. This contract, which entitles the head of mission to spend the funds made available to a civilian ESDP mission from the Commission-managed CFSP budget, presumes that there are months available to work out the details of financial arrangements rather than the very short period actually available in the case at hand. Apart from allowing a degree of financial flexibility and timeliness not possible under the generic provisions of the special advisor contract, the augmentations of the AMM budget by contributing states also allowed unanticipated and immediate expenditures to be made for significant and time-sensitive operational issues not covered by the mission budget. Normally, an application has to be made to the European Commission for use of contingency funds. However, the process is not designed to respond to immediate situations. It, like other Commission financial procedures applied to ESDP missions, is more geared to development missions where the duration of these procedures is not a limiting factor.

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Beyond these institutional shortcomings, the AMM underlines the importance of mission leadership. The choices made for the head of mission and his chief of staff had a significant impact on mission success. The former was Pieter Feith who also has the post of deputy director-general in charge of the ESDP in the Council Secretariat. The chief of staff was Justin Davies, a national expert seconded by Great Britain to the Council’s civilian crisis management directorate. Both men combine substantial operational experience in the Balkans and the Middle East with considerable knowledge of Brussels procedures, structures and personnel. The close interface that the AMM established with the Council and the Commission, an interface that was essential to get the mission up and running within the very limited time available, was in no small part due to the presence of Feith and Davies at its helm. The AMM needed those procedures which would normally take months to complete to be fast tracked and dealt with in days or weeks so that it could meet its operational requirements. Without the close personal links of the mission leadership with Brussels, it is difficult to imagine how the mission could have successfully negotiated these procedures in a timely fashion. Thus, while this chapter criticizes current institutional procedures as inappropriate to ESDP requirements, this should not distract from the considerable efforts of Commission, Council and mission personnel, who made sure that the AMM did not stall for procedural reasons.

The AMM: A Model for the Future? As noted above, the AMM enjoyed significant success. But the contextual features that made this possible are unlikely to always be present in future ESDP operations of this kind. In the longer term, those limiting factors, which are partially generated by the structural relationship between the civilian ESDP and the European Commission – factors which recur as issues in many ESDP missions – need to be addressed and resolved in such a manner that future operations can be fully supported by internal procedures, alleviating the need for using external funding and procurement channels. Turning to what will probably turn out to be the principal legacy of the AMM, with the operation in Aceh the EU significantly upgraded its role as an international monitor. The concept of ‘monitoring’ has come a long way since the inception of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in the Balkans in 1991. The ECMM was established to enable Brussels to understand what was happening on the ground in Yugoslavia at a time when there was little reliable information available. Although the mission did have a negotiating remit, this was essentially for dealing with local situations rather than the resolution of the wider conflict. The ECMM was later renamed European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and at the time of writing, it remains on the ground in the Western Balkans.2 Unlike the ECMM/EUMM, the AMM was tasked to actively guide the

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peace process and to defuse conflicts that arose in the process. The mission had political links to the highest level of authority in Indonesia to draw on, should the need arise. Once the AMM had established its impartiality and genuine intent to mediate and drive the process forward, the parties to the peace accord were prepared to accept the AMM as an honest broker which would find solutions to those situations that, if left unattended, could result in impasse and even the reversal of the peace process. Finally another feature of the AMM that is worthy of emulation is its short duration. This is a healthy departure from ESDP operations notably in the Western Balkans. Although the mission extended to 15 months (Council of the EU, 2006d), three months longer than the maximum extension envisaged at its inception, this was at the direct behest of the Indonesian president who was keen to see the mission stay on the ground until after the local elections had taken place in December 2006. During these last months there was a sense within the mission that it should soon leave so that the new political landscape could properly reveal itself and develop. The AMM, once an essential component of the peace process, had clearly identified the proper time to leave the challenges ahead to the rightful political forces – those mandated to govern.

Notes 1 For a more detailed description of conflict in Aceh see, Braud and Grevi, 2005. 2 In 2007, the EUMM has monitors in Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo.

10 ESDP Operations and NATO Co-operation, Rivalry or Muddlingthrough? Gabriele Cascone1

Introduction The Balkans were the first region where operational co-operation between the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was translated into practice, first with operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and subsequently with operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Co-operation in this framework is also one of the main success stories to date in the co-operation between the two organizations and one of the areas where such co-operation continues to develop and progress. It is therefore worth examining it in detail both for its achievements and for its future prospects. My goal in the present text is therefore to provide an overview of how the co-operation between NATO and the EU in the operational field started, how it was subsequently enshrined in the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements, how it was put into practice and, finally, what could be learnt from this experience and how it could be further developed.

In the beginning: NATO-WEU co-operation Co-operation between NATO and European defence institutions actually predates the ESDP and was originally developed in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). It was in fact in June 1992, at the foreign ministerial meeting in Oslo that NATO ministers stated their ‘support for the objective of developing the WEU as the defence component of the EU and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance’ (NAC, 1992). This declaration was followed by increased co-operation and consultation between the two organizations. This led to the decision, at the NATO Brussels summit in January 1994, to ‘make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Allies further declared their support for ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’ (NAC/NACC,

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1994). This was translated in operational terms through the idea of creating Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to facilitate the dual use of NATO forces and command elements for NATO- and WEU-led operations. The process was completed at the Berlin NATO foreign ministerial meeting in June 1996 which confirmed the conclusion of work on the CJTF concept and reaffirmed the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in WEU-led operations (NAC, 1996). It is important to underline that the developing crisis in the Balkans played no small role in leading to these developments. In fact, they made evident to the Europeans that there might be crises in their backyard where the USA might not wish to be involved while at the same time NATO was the most convenient and accessible structure for European countries for the conduct of multilateral operations. This last point was proven, in particular, by a somewhat renewed enthusiasm of France toward the military structure of the Alliance, as made clear by its December 1995 decision to participate fully in NATO’s Military Committee which it had abandoned in 1966 (Gnesotto, 1997; Grant, 1997). At the same time, and largely for the same reasons, the USA also welcomed the development of a European military capability, provided that this supported the transatlantic strategic goals rather than ran counter to them. Undoubtedly, this initial co-operation between the two institutions was also made easier by their parallel institutional configuration. They both have a collective defence clause in their founding acts, and they both sought to diversify their activities in the post-Cold War era, looking into the possibility of including peace support and crisis management operations in their repertoire. Finally, and this is of particular relevance in light of what we will see looking at the EU, all fully-fledged WEU members were also NATO members, which made communication and the exchange of information relatively easy. The NATO-WEU co-operation had only one limited test on the ground – the joint naval operation Sharp Guard in 1993 to enforce the United Nations (UN) arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, – but it led to a number of seminal decisions which retain their validity in the NATO-EU context. At a political level, NATO-WEU cooperation led to the emergence of a ‘European Security and Defence Identity’, which defined the specific position and role of the European allies within the alliance. At an operational level, a number of planning measures were examined and approved to make the provision of NATO assets to the WEU possible. Mostly, these measures remain in force in the NATO-EU framework.

The birth of the ESDP and the Berlin Plus arrangements At the end of the 1990s, the decision by the EU to establish its own security and defence policy and abandon the so-called ‘WEU approach’, which considered the WEU as the natural framework for establishing European military capabilities, unavoidably led NATO to review the terms and prospects

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of its co-operation with European institutions in defence matters. NATO was actually quite rapid in acknowledging the changes brought about by the St Malo declaration. At the Washington summit in May 1999, the allies outlined the main tenets of what would become the Berlin Plus arrangements – the ‘plus’ signifies the fact that the NATO-EU arrangements were seen as an evolution of the 1996 Berlin decision concerning NATO and the WEU. However, the speed with which NATO recognized the need for arrangements for military co-operation with the Union was not matched by the speed with which such arrangements were devised and put into place. Three factors mostly contributed to the lengthy negotiation process. First, some allies were concerned that the development of EU defence capabilities might negatively influence Europe’s commitment and contribution to NATO. This concern was most eloquently outlined by the then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in an article published in the Financial Times where she outlined the ‘Three Ds’ (or better, ‘the three don’ts’) policy: no decoupling (of NATO from the EU), no duplication (of military/defence efforts) and no discrimination (of non-EU members of NATO) (Albright, 1998). Second, there was the stumbling block of Cyprus’s accession to the EU which, in light of the unsolved issues concerning the status of the island, led to a tangle of legal, political and strategic problems, especially for the relations between the two NATO allies Greece and Turkey. Third, some European nations, such as France, worried that Berlin Plus might result in a droit de regard of NATO over EU operations or, more generally, in an excessive limitation of the EU’s autonomy to act. These three factors continue to play an important role and re-emerge, in different forms and fashions, every time NATO and the EU discuss the strategic aspects of their relationship. As a result, an agreement on NATOEU co-operation could only be reached at the end of 2002, when the two sides issued a joint declaration on the ESDP (NATO Press Release, 2002b). At the same time, both organizations acknowledged that their co-operation in the framework of Berlin Plus would only apply ‘to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the Partnership for Peace, and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO’ (European Council, 2002). This effectively meant excluding from the Berlin Plus framework both Cyprus and Malta (once they joined the EU), which do not meet the aforementioned requirement.2 The December 2002 statements paved the way for the approval, on 17 March 2003, of the Berlin Plus arrangements, which still constitute the cornerstone for co-operation in operational matters between NATO and the EU. The Berlin Plus arrangements are a set of jointly approved documents, which cover the following aspects (De Witte and Rademacher, 2005):  A NATO-EU Security Agreement covering the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules;

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 assured EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;  presumed availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations;  procedures for the release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;  terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), who becomes the Operation Commander of any EU-led operation under the Berlin Plus arrangements (and who is always a European), and European command options for NATO;  NATO-EU consultation arrangements in an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;  incorporation within NATO’s long-established defence planning system of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations. This is not the place for a detailed analysis of Berlin Plus. But a brief discussion of one of its documents, the NATO-EU Security Agreement – the only document in the package in any case which is fully accessible to the public (Council of the EU, 2003c), – provides a good illustration of the difficulties encountered in the negotiations leading to the accord. In the first instance, the conclusion of the NATO-EU Security Agreement required a partial convergence of the different corporate cultures of the two organizations. NATO had developed strict and detailed security regulations in the Cold War period while the EU prided itself on its openness and transparency. In this case, it was the EU which had to make greater adjustments by introducing a security architecture which was until then alien to its organizational culture and largely modelled on that of NATO. Indeed, as most NATO information is restricted, it was necessary to have some form of security arrangement in place even before the rest of Berlin Plus was approved, so that NATO planning and military documents could be made available to the EU for the development of the rest of the package. An interim security agreement was approved in summer 2000 and enforced within the EU through what a number of non-governmental organizations described as a ‘coup’ by EU foreign policy supremo, Javier Solana. The European Parliament even started a court case against the EU Council, which was only dropped when the EU approved a new set of security regulations in 2002. The action by the European Parliament was probably motivated, at least in parts, by the fact that the interim agreement only applied to the EU Council and the European Commission, thereby excluding the parliament and other EU bodies from access to protected information. The interim agreement was replaced by a permanent agreement signed on 14 March 2003 and included in the Berlin Plus package. Incidentally, it

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too, does not empower the European Parliament to have access to restricted NATO information. Even for NATO, however, the agreement constituted a sea change in its culture. The only security agreement with an organization rather than a state, and one which was used as an initial springboard for the NATO-EU agreement, was that with the WEU which was, at any rate, a purely intergovernmental institution like NATO. The idea of having to deal with an institutional framework as complex as that of the EU was something that gave shivers to more than one NATO official. Additionally, because of the openness so much vaunted by the EU, most NATO security officials perceived it as a ‘colander’ and were concerned that signing the agreement would limit the willingness of non-EU allies to provide sensitive information to NATO. At the same time, the agreement became, unusually so for what should be mostly a technical document, highly charged politically, as it included an express reference to the exclusion from access to NATO classified information of those nations which are neither members nor part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. This reinforced, from a legal perspective, the political exclusion of Cyprus and Malta from Berlin Plus. Finally, and as already noted, the agreement identified the EU Council as NATO’s main counterpart for the exchange of classified information. This was for reasons that had to do as much with the primacy claimed by the Council in representing the Union in foreign policy as with the fact that, due to its intergovernmental nature, the Council was seen as more ‘similar’ by the NATO side (Reichard, 2004). The Berlin Plus arrangements were put into practice for the first time in Macedonia immediately after their approval. The handover to the EU of NATO operation Amber Fox had already been discussed for a while between the two organizations but could not take place because of the lack of a framework for the co-operation between them. Therefore, it was only on 31 March 2003 that operation Concordia, the first-ever military ESDP crisis management mission, took over the responsibilities of Amber Fox (Council of the EU, 2003a). The European force provided security backup for international monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU. In accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements, NATO’s DSACEUR was appointed as the Operation Commander of Concordia; he was assisted by an EU director of operations. NATO mainly supported the EU with strategic, operational and tactical planning. An EU operation headquarters was set up at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, to assist the Operation Commander. In addition, an EU Command Element (EUCE) was established at Allied Forces South Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, Italy. The chief of staff of AFSOUTH also became chief of staff of the EU Command Element. These dual NATO-EU posts guaranteed the linkage between the EU and NATO at all levels of the chain of command during the operation.

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At the time of its launch, the operational usefulness of Concordia was put in doubt by some analysts who highlighted what looked like a quite stable situation in Macedonia. Concordia proved however a successful and useful test for NATO-EU co-operation, leading to the deployment of some 400 military personnel from 13 EU Member States and 14 non-EU countries. The operation, which was concluded on 15 December 2003 and succeeded by the EU police mission Proxima (Council of the EU, 2003f; 2004e), showed the determination of both organizations to work together and encouraged them to develop a ‘concerted approach on security and stability in the Western Balkans’ (NATO Press Release, 2003a). An assessment of this document is not easy and cannot be definitive. On the one hand, it was the first and so far only attempt to outline a common strategy of the two organizations for a specific geographic area. Some significant results have been achieved, such as the participation of both organizations in the Ohrid regional border management process. On the other hand, the practical impact of this document has generally been limited and the approach of the EU and NATO to the Western Balkans is still largely independent, although moving along similar lines, such as the commitment to the progressive integration of the countries in the region into both organizations. The co-ordination of the work of the two institutions in the Western Balkans occurs mostly at the level of practical co-operation on the ground, where there is a clear need for a common position of the international community. It is facilitated by the more general efforts of some nations to push for similar, coherent policies in both institutions. Again, however, the main issue is political, not technical or legal. If the two organizations were to agree on common work in the Western Balkans, the concerted approach would provide the basis to do so, but this document cannot by itself achieve what remains essentially in the hands of the EU member states and their NATO counterparts.

Stormy weather ahead The approval of the Berlin Plus arrangements took place against the backdrop of growing transatlantic tensions over the intervention in Iraq. While these tensions did not directly affect the transition from Amber Fox to Concordia or other types of operational planning, they clearly had an impact on some developments which followed the conclusion of the Berlin Plus arrangements, most notably the decision in April 2003 by four NATO and EU allies – Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg – to establish a planning headquarters capability for ESDP missions. In itself, this is clearly one of the options for ESDP missions, the other two being the ‘lead nation’ framework or the use of NATO assets at SHAPE. However, in the tense context of the discussions related to Iraq, this decision appeared as an attempt to divorce ESDP operations from the need to rely on NATO capabilities and assets; this was clearly the interpretation of most American observers,

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some of whom disparagingly dubbed the meeting in the Belgian locality of Tervuren the ‘Praline Summit’. This criticism, and concerns over the risk of an even wider transatlantic rift, led to a review of this decision later in 2003, resulting in the establishment of a more limited civil-military planning cell within the EU Military Staff. Another issue of possible dissension was the decision by the EU to launch operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2003. Although limited in time (it lasted only three months), location (it was limited to the town of Bunia) and numbers (it had around 2,000 personnel), this French-led mission took place without any previous consultation with NATO or exchange of information. This infringed on what some allies, notably the USA, had advocated up to that moment, i.e. the so-called ‘right of first refusal’ for NATO (Larrabee, 2004). According to this, never formally defined, right, NATO should have been given the privilege to choose whether to get involved in the crisis management operation. Of course, those EU members such as France that feared from the beginning the risk of a confinement of the EU by NATO, or its subordination to it, were eager to establish that such a right simply did not exist. As in the case of the Tervuren meeting, the effect was more that of rubbing salt into existing wounds rather than of breaking dramatic new ground, as it remained clear that, for long-term and sustained operations, the EU still lacked those assets – strategic airlift, communications, and so forth – that NATO could provide through Berlin Plus.

Operation Althea: framework and results The idea of a NATO-EU transition in the international military presence in Bosnia was initially raised at the European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002 (European Council, 2002). Actual work on such a proposal could, however, only begin after the approval of the Berlin Plus arrangements and after the Amber Fox-Concordia transition had proven, on a smaller scale, that these arrangements could actually work. The project therefore took off only at the end of 2003, when NATO foreign ministers announced the alliance’s intentions to assess options for the future size and structure of SFOR [Stabilisation Force], to include possible termination of SFOR by the end of 2004, transition possibly to a new EU mission within the framework of the Berlin+ arrangements and to a new NATO Headquarters Sarajevo. (NATO Press Release, 2003b) This statement was matched by the readiness expressed one week later by the European Council to launch a military ESDP mission in Bosnia that would draw on the Berlin Plus arrangements. The EU summit also welcomed NATO’s readiness to start consultations with the Union.

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The transition from a NATO-led force to an EU-led force presented challenges that were not only technical but, again, political. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and later SFOR had clearly been a success story, securing the peace and other objectives of the Dayton peace accord. For this reason, SFOR, and thus NATO, had acquired an indisputable credit among large sectors of the Bosnian population and their withdrawal was viewed with concern by these sectors (for details, see Chapter 12). In particular, there was widespread concern that a European force would be a ‘new UNPROFOR’; the label refers to the unsuccessful United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation, which was deployed in the country from 1992–95. Some openly argued that, in order to keep the peace, it was necessary to keep the USA in Bosnia, as it was the only country that had the ‘teeth’ to face renewed hostilities. Keeping the USA clearly meant keeping NATO. Hence, the EU and NATO devised a framework which foresaw the transition to an EU force which would inherit most of SFOR’s tasks, while some functions – assistance to defence reform, counterterrorism and the temporary detention of indicted war criminals – would be taken up by a ‘legacy’ NATO Headquarters Sarajevo that would remain on the ground after SFOR’s withdrawal. For these reasons, as well as for the greater size of the operation, the replacement of SFOR by Althea – the codename for the EU troops – proved a much bigger task than the Amber Fox-Concordia precedent. Work proceeded along two tracks. The DSACEUR elaborated the content of Althea’s operations plan (OPLAN), while at the political level, NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee started consultations to review preparations for the handover. These meetings helped the EU to present its views on co-operation with NATO and its own actions in Bosnia, including the role of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU police mission EUPM and the Stabilisation and Association Process. NATO, for its part, briefed the EU on its plans for the final year of life of SFOR, and, in particular, the decision to transform SFOR into a deterrence force made up of around 7,000 troops by mid-2004. This work also helped to further refine NATO’s structures and procedures for Berlin Plus missions. As mentioned earlier, the key military officer for the Berlin Plus framework is the DSACEUR. He is a senior officer, normally a four-star general, from an EU member state – currently Great Britain – who serves as the deputy NATO supreme military commander. Under Berlin Plus, the DSACEUR is the EU Operation Commander. This means not only a second title but also, more importantly, a second staff and a new political supervisory body. As EU Operation Commander, the DSACEUR is responsible to the EU and reports regularly to the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS). The former provides military advice to the Political and Security Committee while the latter, working under the direction of the EUMC, carries out early warning,

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situation assessment and strategic planning for the military ESDP. The DSACEUR is assisted by an EU director of operations and the EU Staff Group, which is made up of officers from EU member states, with the exception of the two countries excluded from Berlin Plus. The function of the EU Staff Group is to provide a link between the DSACEUR and the EU Military Staff for the Berlin Plus duties. The EU Staff Group also supports the DSACEUR by ensuring that NATO’s SHAPE staff provides the necessary help for the planning and conduct of operations. This apparently complex arrangement works in practice quite smoothly and, as it has been said, was fully utilized in the preparation for the Althea handover. Progress made in planning during the first half of 2004 allowed NATO heads of state and government to announce, at their Istanbul Summit from 28–29 June 2004, the decision to conclude the alliance’s successful SFOR operation by the end of 2004 and to welcome the launch of the follow-on EU operation. Further details were worked out in the first half of July 2004, with an NATO-EU exchange of letters, in which the DSACEUR’s role as Operation Commander was confirmed; a UN Security Council Resolution (2004a), which welcomed the EU’s intention to launch an EU mission in Bosnia; and the adoption by the EU Council on 12 July 2004 of the Joint Action on the EU military operation (Council of the EU, 2004c). With this, all of the building blocks were in place for the SFOR-EUFOR transition. On 15 July, NATO’s Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and the EU High Representative Solana visited Bosnia to show the unity of purpose between the two organizations and inform the local authorities in detail of the timing and modalities of the transition. Two more key decisions intervened in the course of the fall of 2004. First, in October the EU foreign ministers adopted the OPLAN and the rules of engagement for Althea. Second, the UN Security Council passed a resolution which declares that both EUFOR and NATO Headquarters Sarajevo inherit the powers that were enjoyed by SFOR under the Dayton Agreement (UN Security Council, 2004b), for example, the power to dismiss obstructive officers or to limit the movement and training of local military units. With the finishing legal touches in place, de Hoop Scheffer and Solana attended the ceremony in Sarajevo on 2 December which officially launched Althea and terminated SFOR. Such a lengthy and meticulous decision-making process may sound excruciating, but it actually proved useful. As two organizations with different membership and corporate identities were involved, every move on one side had to be exactly mirrored by a move on the other, so that there would be as little ambiguity as possible as to the content of the decisions. Also, somewhat paradoxically, the case of Althea suggests that working out the operational framework, which is the one which decides the success or failure of a mission, may actually be less difficult than steering through the

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intricacies of the political process involved in a Berlin Plus operation. This was certainly the case in Bosnia, where Althea did not have to be set up from scratch, but followed on the heels of a NATO operation with extensive powers and linked inextricably to the provisions of an international treaty, namely the Dayton Agreement. The positive side of the story is that most sources, at least on the NATO side, confirm that the amount of detail put into setting up the operation helped greatly to avoid misunderstandings and overlap at the practical level and was instrumental in ensuring that the operation has been a success so far. There were undoubtedly some issues that required greater care or more intensive effort than others, for example, ensuring a reciprocally satisfactory exchange of information, but no major complaint is heard when speaking to the ‘voices from the ground’. This applies not only to the degree of support provided by NATO to EUFOR, but also to the relationship on the ground between EUFOR and NATO Headquarters Sarajevo. The co-existence of two headquarters on the ground could have created the potential for rivalry and misunderstandings, which analysts often associate with the NATO-EU relationship. However, in fact it proved a quite successful model of cooperation. A number of factors can explain this result. First, the long and detailed planning work to set up the Berlin Plus framework led to a detailed and exhaustive delineation of tasks between the two headquarters. It was clear from the beginning that NATO Headquarters Sarajevo would move into the footsteps of SFOR in its last year and focus principally on advising Bosnia on defence reform, which was a key requirement for making the country eligible to join NATO’s PfP programme. Hence, most of the operational work was left in the hands of EUFOR, which had significantly more operational forces on the ground than the residual NATO presence. Second, successful liaison relations were immediately established on the ground between EUFOR and NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, starting from the two commanders and reaching down to the different staff divisions. This helped minimize misunderstandings and resolve disagreements at the lowest possible level, before they could escalate into controversies between the two organizations. Third, at headquarters level, a regular exchange of information was organized between NATO and the EU to notify each other of developments on the ground. In particular, the close interaction and co-operation established between the DSACEUR’s EU staff and the NATO/SHAPE staff reduced to a minimum the chance of disagreement and misunderstanding. Once Althea was up and running, the different badges worn by staff of the respective organizations had a rather limited significance. Berlin Plus, then, has successfully passed two tests so far. But in the longer-term, operational co-operation can only work if it is supported, as foreseen in Berlin Plus itself, by other elements, such as the development of common or at least interoperable capabilities. It is to this issue that the chapter turns next.

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The capabilities issue: a stumbling block? As outlined previously, a key component of Berlin Plus is the ‘incorporation within NATO’s long-established defence planning system of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations’. As a result, both NATO and the EU agreed, within the Berlin Plus package, a document called ‘EU and NATO: Coherent and Mutually Reinforcing Capability Requirements’, which focuses on the issue of capabilities development. This document is fully in line with the policy of the ‘three-Ds’ and, in particular, non-duplication. It establishes the NATO-EU Capability Group, which has a broad mandate to delimit areas for NATO-EU capability co-operation. Under the aegis of the group, a number of NATO-EU meetings on capabilities issues such as the meetings of the PCC/ECAP groups were held; the PCC, which stands for Prague Capabilities Commitment, is the NATO framework for capability development and ECAP, which stands for European Capability Action Plan, is the EU counterpart. Inter-institutional co-operation, however, has become more difficult with the establishment, in 2005, of the European Defence Agency, which is progressively absorbing the competencies of the ECAP groups. As those groups were the ones expressly mentioned in the Berlin Plus package, their disappearance has been considered by some on the EU side as reason to suggest a review of the current arrangements. Also, after the big bang EU enlargement in 2004, and its more limited follow up in January 2007, capability development in the Union relies on the input of all 27 countries, which is difficult enough even without the additional constraints imposed by Berlin Plus. The upshot of these complications is that the ambitious, joint EU-NATO target of building up ‘coherent and mutually reinforcing’ capabilities appears to give way to the mere ‘exchange of information on the capability development process’ (Permanent Representation of France to the EU, 2005). This makes the important issue of non-duplication more dependent on the goodwill of the member states of the two organizations than on any coherent and coordinated process between NATO and the EU. Quite clearly, there are high stakes in an area which involves national sovereignty and industrial issues, but in light of the shrinking defence budgets of most states, in particular in Europe, the current set-up clearly does not ensure the best use of available funds. In addition, a lack of mutually reinforcing capabilities could create problems for future Berlin Plus operations if EU and NATO assets, for example in the field of communications, are not interoperable. If nothing else, then the expenses involved in developing two different sets of equipment, one for EU, the other for NATO purposes, should induce states to find pragmatic ways to co-operate.

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Recent developments The main institutional development after the launch of operation Althea has been the establishment, in September 2005, of the EU Cell at SHAPE and of the NATO Permanent Liaison Team in the EU Military Staff. These two structures allow SHAPE and the EU Military Staff to maintain daily military-to-military contacts and to take care of the planning aspects of Berlin Plus missions. These structures could also become very helpful if the DSACEUR were to obtain officially a role which so far has not been formally acknowledged, namely that of strategic co-ordinator for NATO-EU military-to-military relations. In other words, while the DSACEUR as Operation Commander is entrusted with running Berlin Plus operations, nothing is said of who should be in charge of conducting the strategic planning for future operations or review the relevant policies and procedures as doctrines evolve. The DSACEUR would be ideally suited to deal with these duties and responsibilities. Indeed, de facto, the DSACEUR is acting as strategic co-ordinator, but as long as this role is not institutionalized, it remains open to challenges.

NATO and the EU in the Western Balkans and beyond: what other forms of co-operation? Operations in the Berlin Plus framework are not the only area in which NATO and the EU have co-operated so far in the Western Balkans. Another such area is that of security sector reform. The most interesting experience in this respect is the previously mentioned Ohrid Border Process, launched in 2003, where the EU, the OSCE, NATO and the Stability Pact agreed a common platform for border security and management in the region. The Ohrid Border Process has achieved a number of significant results, most notably the demilitarization of the borders in the region.3 Yet it also has a broader political significance. Through the Ohrid process, the four lead organizations established not only a series of goals and principles, but also a division of labour for their work. This model could be applied on a broader scale, as both NATO and the EU and, to a lesser degree, the OSCE are in different ways engaged in the process of security sector reform in the Western Balkans. For NATO, this mostly means involvement in defence reform processes. Defence reform is one of the key aspects of the work of the alliance in the framework of the PfP; it constitutes a central requirement for countries aspiring to NATO membership. In the case of Bosnia and Serbia, NATO established defence reform benchmarks when they applied to join the PfP, and it co-operates with national authorities in defence reform commissions or groups designed to ensure that the benchmarks are met. In addition, NATO is involved in setting up Trust Funds under willing lead nations to help manage the consequences of downsizing military forces by providing alternative livelihoods for redundant personnel.

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Two such projects exist, one in Serbia and another in Bosnia. They are implemented by the International Organization for Migration. NATO’s focus on defence reform is complemented by the EU, which is heavily involved in providing support in other areas of security sector reform in the region, for example, through its ESDP police missions. Greater synergy between these efforts could be created by elaborating a coordinated security sector reform concept. Such a move would also help address those situations, not uncommon in the region, in which forces that are considered part of the police still have inventories which belong more to a military force than to a law enforcement agency. In such instances, NATO could help these forces to review and assess their equipment requirements, while the EU could focus on their professional competencies and training. The organizational and structural aspects could be addressed jointly. What is in fact important to note is that NATO’s expertise in defence reform processes is not only, or even primarily, an expertise in weapons systems and equipment, but a methodological expertise. NATO’s reforms centre on encouraging a rationalization and reorganization of the military based on a thorough threat analysis, an assessment of the available resources (financial, human etc.) and the cost-effective use of resources to counter the identified threats. This apparently straightforward process is in practice made very complex by the fact that the composition of the armed forces has at least as much to do with ‘spurious’ reasons such as prestige, tradition, political pressure and industrial interests as it has to do with the external security needs of a country and its defence. Clearly, the applicability of this methodology – threat analysis, resource assessment and the definition of an optimal mix of instruments under given circumstances – is not limited to military forces. It can be used for other security sector agencies, e.g., police forces, border security agencies and intelligence services. NATO could therefore bring a methodological expertise to areas in which the EU could contribute its technical and professional expertise. Such a synergy would be beneficial both for the countries in the region and for the credibility of the efforts of the international community. New forms of NATO-EU co-operation may also emerge from developments in Kosovo. While at the time of writing, the negotiations, led by UN envoy Ahtisaari, on Kosovo’s final status are not yet concluded, it is assumed by all observers that NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) will continue to ensure the main international security presence, while the EU will play the lead role in civilian peacebuilding. This division of labour constitutes an ideal springboard for renewed and enhanced co-operation between the two organizations. NATO and the EU will need to work closely together in Kosovo but, as this is not going to be a Berlin Plus operation, there is no ready-made institutional framework for orchestrating their interaction. While some insiders argue that this co-ordination challenge can be addressed on the ground, this view ignores that, in view of the likelihood of strong

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challenges (local and regional) to any internationally devised settlement, the international community will need to work in unison at political level. ‘Operators’ on the ground will simply not be in a position to forge a united political front and to determine policy themselves. The solution might be what has been called a ‘Berlin Plus Plus’ scenario. It envisages that the institutional structure agreed by the Berlin Plus accord such as the periodic meetings between NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee are used for the purpose of political partnership between NATO and the EU in the absence of an ESDP military operation drawing on NATO assets. Some might be tempted to maintain that co-operation between NATO and the EU in such cases would have to include all EU member states, including Cyprus and Malta. This argument suggests that to become reality a Berlin Plus Plus arrangement will have to overcome some major political hurdles. Finally, an interesting idea to advance EU-NATO co-operation has been floated in academic circles: ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’, i.e., the use of ESDP assets for NATO operations (Flournoy and Smith, 2005). While the notion seems for the moment far fetched when it comes to military capabilities, as NATO’s inventory is still more complete than that of the EU, it may be worth considering allowing NATO to avail itself of ESDP civilian capabilities. It is indisputable that military thinking, especially in light of recent operations, is more and more evolving toward co-operation with civilian organizations in the planning and execution phase of a military operation to help in particular in stabilization and reconstruction tasks. In the USA, this has been discussed for some time under the label of an effects-based approach to operations. This thinking appears to be making inroads into the alliance’s doctrine. Its notion of ‘comprehensive planning and action’ means that future planning will have to take fully into account the interaction with non-military actors and other international organizations (Scheffer, 2006). This could be the gateway to Berlin Plus in reverse, according to which the EU could, for example, ‘lend’ NATO its civilian police capabilities. While this looks like a promising option, any concrete development will have to clear a number of political hurdles. At the same time, it can be argued that an embryonic form of Berlin Plus in reverse is contained in the EU decision, adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council in January 2006, to provide funding for the civilian activities of NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. What is currently only a commitment to provide funding could, under different circumstances, become a commitment to provide EU personnel and assets.

Assessment: sufficient but not enough The Berlin Plus arrangements have so far successfully passed two tests. Both NATO and the EU earned high marks. Berlin Plus thus accomplishes what it was designed for. It empowers the EU to carry out large-scale stabilization

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operations. Moreover, it has more general beneficial effects. It constitutes, to date, the most successful experience in NATO-EU co-operation, demonstrating that the two organizations are reliable partners that can work together in the most sensitive field, the operational one. Also, it fosters a habit of consultation between them. However, a number of problems have to be flagged that could undermine EU-NATO co-operation further down the road. In particular, if NATO and the EU are not able to move beyond co-operation on the military aspects of a specific operation or issue to a more rounded and comprehensive partnership, there is the risk that their evolving military capabilities, doctrines and tools increasingly diverge, making it impossible for the two institutions to work together under Berlin Plus. At the same time, all the political sensitivities and ‘red lines’ that were in place when Berlin Plus was launched are still present. It is therefore difficult to imagine, at least for the foreseeable future, that the arrangements may be revamped and made more flexible. On a more general note, co-operation in operational matters is a quite limited result when compared to the different areas in which the interests and commitments of the two institutions overlap. It is also a form of cooperation which has worked effectively when the two organizations had sufficient time to work out the details of their interaction. When the urgency of the crisis called for quick action, the result has been much less impressive, as exemplified by the logistical assistance operation to the African Union in Darfur. The latter asked both NATO and the EU to support the deployment of its troops to the Darfur region of Sudan, which is ravaged by a war between government troops and rebel militias. With little time for agreeing on the modalities of the co-ordination of this operation, which is, in the words of an official of the alliance, ‘a political beauty contest between NATO and the EU’, the two institutions ended up establishing parallel assistance missions in June 2005. It was left to their respective staff on the ground in the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa to find pragmatic solutions to what on the face of it looks like a duplication of efforts.4 This episode also raises some more general questions as to the commitment to, and interest in, Berlin Plus of some EU members. The only two ESDP operations so far which drew on NATO assets were operations in which the alliance was already on the ground and the issue was one of transition to an EU-led force. This is also the scenario evoked in August 2006 by president Chirac (2006), with reference to Kosovo, in his speech to the annual conference of French ambassadors; and it was again suggested by French defence minister Miche`le Alliot-Marie (2006) in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. The question thus arises whether the lack so far of a genuine Berlin Plus operation, i.e., one in which the EU relies on NATO to design a troop deployment from scratch, is just a matter of chance. Or is it, to some extent at least, the result of the desire of some EU states to limit Berlin Plus only to those cases in which, due to a previous NATO presence

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on the ground, it would be patently inefficient not to make use of NATO’s experience and assets already on the ground. The possibility, evoked informally by EU officials in the summer of 2006, to have a Berlin Plus framework for an EU operation in Lebanon would have maybe answered these questions, provided it had materialized. Finally, Berlin Plus has so far failed to deliver on the broader political objectives that many associate with it. Rather than constituting a springboard for greater and deeper NATO-EU co-operation, it gave rise to a selfcontained field of activity, with little cascading effect onto wider transatlantic issues. This helped isolate EU-NATO co-operation in operational matters from the diplomatic fallout from the US-led invasion of Iraq but it did little to reinforce the unity of purpose of the Western allies. While initiatives such as the ‘Transatlantic Dinners’ of the 32 foreign ministers and staff-level working contacts are helpful, they are not a replacement for joint decision-making arrangements. Whether Berlin Plus will in the end be able to live up to these political expectations or whether new mechanisms will have to be invented remains an open question. An initial answer will possibly be provided by NATO-EU co-operation in Kosovo.

Notes 1 The views expressed in this text only represent the personal position of the author. I am grateful to a number of NATO colleagues who helped me with their advice and assistance but, in particular, I would like to thank Stephan Oenning, from the political advisor’s office in SHAPE, who skilfully steered me through the nuances and complexities of the practical operational arrangements. 2 Malta joined the PfP for a short spell in 1996 and withdrew subsequently. 3 It has been a limitation of these reforms that the replacement of military forces by border police structures/agencies has not always been complemented by strong efforts to upgrade the training and equipment of the new civilian police forces. This is not a minor point as the real issue is not the status of the border guards – many EU member states have militarily organized border forces – but their law enforcement training and equipment. For a discussion of these aspects, see Hills (2002, 2005). 4 For a more detailed analysis, see Burwell et al. (2006: 14).

11 The ESDP Between Washington and Brussels Jeffrey Simon1

Many Americans have fundamental questions about the efforts of the European Union (EU) to build an independent defence capacity wondering whether these efforts will enhance or undermine the transatlantic relationship. They wonder where the EU is headed in its pursuit of defence integration. Is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) merely a political gambit, or will it produce real military capabilities that can and will be used in future crises in and around Europe? Equally important, will this effort enhance transatlantic relations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or will it undermine them? Can this effort be channelled in constructive directions so that both European unity and Atlantic solidarity benefit?

The sceptical hegemon: Washington’s view of the birth of the ESDP During the Cold War there was a transatlantic consensus, embedded in NATO’s Military Committee 161 threat assessments, on the danger posed to Western Europe by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. While the West knew its opponent’s capabilities, it did not know its intent. The defence of Europe remained a central priority of the USA and NATO as expressed in the alliance’s strategy of ‘flexible response’. In 1978, NATO agreed to maintain sufficient capabilities in the Long Term Defence Plan by committing 3 per cent of gross domestic product to defence. The alliance passed many defence challenges during the Cold War. These included crises in Berlin in 1961 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Perhaps NATO’s greatest test, though, came with the politically contentious dual track decision of 1978–84 that aimed at establishing parity between East and West in midrange nuclear missiles in the European theatre. Domestic opposition, in particular in West Germany, against plans to deploy missiles in the country to counter the threat of forward-deployed Soviet nuclear missiles was strong. In the end, NATO weathered the storm and implemented its decision while maintaining internal cohesion. Throughout the Cold War, the alliance never had to invoke the mutual defence clause of Article 5.

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Yet the Warsaw Pact forces remained an omnipresent reminder of the need for it. With the 1991 dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, NATO’s perception of a common threat withered away. This opened an opportunity not only to widen the EU by granting membership to countries of the former East bloc but also to deepen it by reinforcing its foreign policy dimension and by adding international security to its integration agenda. In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and foresaw the future framing of common defence policy that could lead to a ‘common defence’. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty allowed for the creation of a High Representative for the CFSP and introduced the Petersberg Tasks – humanitarian assistance, rescue tasks, peacekeeping, crisis management and unspecified peacemaking – as the types of missions that the EU was willing to undertake. NATO, too, began reinventing itself. It redefined its mission by agreeing on a new strategic concept at the Rome Summit in November 1991 and by reorienting its capabilities at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. The latter established the groundwork for post-Cold War NATO by adopting the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces. CJTFs are military structuring arrangements that allow for an EU-led force to be assembled from the NATO force pool. The concept was intended, among other things, to support the formation of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). However, soon ESDI was displaced by the ‘autonomous’ ESDP. Differing perceptions of the challenges emerging from the dissolution of Yugoslavia became apparent among the transatlantic allies during the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo. There was a growing disagreement over the nature of the threats faced by Europe and the capabilities required to deal with them. Hence, one possible motivation behind the decision of some EU countries to advance the CFSP was a desire to develop military capabilities that could be used if a crisis erupted on the Union’s European or African periphery and Washington was uninterested in getting involved. Behind-the-scenes disagreements centred on whether the development of the CFSP with its defence component should potentially strengthen European autonomy and enable the EU to break free of the military dependence on the USA and NATO, a view represented by France. The opposing view, represented for instance by Great Britain, argued that the EU should embrace the concept of retaining NATO as the key institution for security and defence policy in the transatlantic area. During the 1990s, neither stance triumphed, remaining in competition with each other. With the advent of the new Labour government in Britain in 1997, London’s position changed somewhat. Prime Minister Tony Blair was painfully aware that Europe under French and German leadership was steering in the direction of greater unity. He also believed in the importance of deeper integration of Great Britain with the rest of the continent. After some vacillation, the government decided that the ESDP was the area where

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London could play a unifying and leadership role. British engagement would also provide an opportunity to guide the process, preventing it from breaking the link with the USA and NATO. At St Malo in December 1998, London and Paris initiated a new bilateral push on EU defence efforts with their declaration that the EU should develop ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis’ (EU ISS, 2001). During the 1990s, NATO engaged for the first time in Article 4 peace support operations and extended bombing campaigns, while at the same time being handicapped by an ever-evolving transatlantic capabilities gap. As a result, NATO’s April 1999 Washington summit adopted yet another strategic concept and a Defence Capabilities Initiative designed to narrow the gap. At roughly the same time, in order to further develop the ESDP, the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 appointed Javier Solana – the former Secretary General of NATO – as the first High Representative for the CFSP. Yet neither of these measures generated any substantial new capabilities, further contributing to what Robert Kagan (2004: 8–10) has described as a psychological divide between American power and European ‘weakness’. The more general point to be made here is that while the USA continued to see NATO as an instrument for defence, many Europeans increasingly saw the alliance as an instrument for managing European stability.

Transatlantic relations and the ESDP in action Co-operation in the Western Balkans Since the end of the Cold War, the Balkan region has presented major security challenges to the USA and Europe. Balkan regional tensions erupted in several wars resulting from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in 1991. After a slow initial response from Europe to the war in Bosnia, a NATO bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb targets –code-named Operation Allied Force – changed the balance of forces on the ground between the Serbs and their Muslim-Croat opponents and thus prepared the ground for the Dayton peace accord. To prevent a return to ethnic fighting 60,000 NATO peacekeepers were deployed to the country. In 1999, in an effort to halt a humanitarian catastrophe involving acts of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO engaged in an extensive air campaign – Operation Allied Force – against Serb targets in the province and Serbia proper. When Serb forces began to withdraw from Kosovo, the alliance established the 50,000-strong Kosovo Force (KFOR) to keep the peace in the territory administered by the United Nations (UN) (cf. Simon, 2005: 1–14). The Yugoslav wars during the 1990s reinforced the view that Europe was unable to handle its own security challenges and that the EU needed to

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improve its military capabilities and be able to deploy forces outside its borders. So in 1999 the Union launched its ESDP. Its Helsinki Headline Goal called for a European Force of 60,000 troops to deploy within 60 days for up to 12 months to focus on the Petersberg Tasks. Over the past decade since the Dayton peace accord was signed, NATO and EU ranks have swelled with new members and partners so that both institutions now bound the Western Balkans geographically. This has created conditions for building co-operative security by fulfilling NATO and EU membership aspirations through the alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and its Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). Dual enlargement and integration incentives have played, and continue to play a very important role in enhancing the region’s stability and security. Along with Greece and Turkey, who have been NATO members since 1952, the accession to the alliance of Hungary in 1999, and Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania in 2004, helped form a stable security boundary around the six states presently comprising the West Balkans. The PfP and MAP keep Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, which collaborate in the Adriatic Charter (Adriatic Three), constructively focused on reforms and engaged in co-operative security activities consistent with NATO principles. These countries perceive the PfP as their initial pathway to Euro-Atlantic structures and legitimacy. Albania and Macedonia joined the PfP in 1994 and 1995 respectively and the MAP in 1999, while Croatia only joined the PfP in 2000 and the MAP in 2002. To help maintain its stabilizing role in the region, NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006 sent a strong signal to the Adriatic Three regarding membership invitation prospects for 2008. Moreover, it offered invitations to join the PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia in an effort to tamper nationalistic tendencies and to enhance long-term stability in the West Balkans (NATO Press Release, 2006). Although the six West Balkan aspirants see EU enlargement as a longerterm process than joining NATO, the Union plays a critical stabilizing role particularly since the June 2003 Thessaloniki Summit opened up prospects for their ultimate inclusion.2 Of particular importance in this regard is that the SAAs with the countries of the region contain provisions for future membership. However, recent events have raised some questions about the EU’s commitment. Following the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands on the EU Constitution in May and June 2005 respectively, the EU foreign ministers meeting in Salzburg, Austria, in March 2006 conveyed the message to the Western Balkans that their integration prospects are slipping into the distant future. The Western Balkan aspirants have made some, albeit halting progress toward EU integration. Macedonia and Croatia signed SAAs in April 2004 and February 2005 respectively, and Albania signed one in June 2006, though corruption continues to undermine respect for the rule of law.

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Bosnia started negotiations in November 2003 but remains a laggard. In 2006, efforts by the international community to have the constitution amended to strengthen the central state over the two ethnic entities – the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republica Srpska – failed. The viability of the country remains in doubt. Serbia and Montenegro started SAA negotiations in October 2005 as one country, but had them suspended in May of the following year because of the failure of Serb authorities to deliver Ratko Mladic to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Then Montenegro proclaimed independence from Serbia in June 2006. The EU quickly recognized the country as a sovereign and independent state, opening the way for separate SAA negotiations. By now it should have become clear that the Western Balkans provide lucrative opportunities for co-operation between, on the one hand, the USA and NATO, and, on the other, the EU. Initially, when the regional wars began in 1991, no international organization responded. Ever since, NATO and the EU have engaged in stabilization, co-operation and integration activities in the region. Yet there remains room for improved transatlantic co-ordination and co-operation. For instance, one result of the Balkan wars has been the explosion of organized crime involving human, drugs and arms trafficking. To tackle this transnational problem, the USA, NATO and the EU need to reinforce their programmes and activities to combat organized crime and counter terrorism. One way forward would be to revise the MAP that NATO developed for Central and Eastern Europe in 1999 so that it accommodates the peculiarities of Southeast Europe and to co-ordinate this move with the EU’s support to state institutions. The PfP programmes should place new and greater emphasis on the issue of organized crime. Consistent with the Prague Summit’s ‘Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism’, their scope ought to be broadened to include partnership goals in the field of policing. As to the EU, it should focus on furthering Western Balkan co-operative regional security sector reforms. Another example that illustrates the potential for greater transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans is the Southeast European Defence Ministerial (SEDM). With strong backing from Washington, the group commenced annual meetings in 1996 to enhance transparency and build regional co-operation in Southeast Europe. Its membership includes Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, along with the Adriatic Three – with the USA, Italy and more recently Ukraine and Moldova as observers. At the Southeast European Defence Ministerial in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in November 2004, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia were ‘guests’, and Ukraine requested to become a full member, which it did in December 2005. In 1999, the body approved the creation of the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG), with headquarters now in Constanta, Romania. The force of 25,000 troops can be assembled and employed in conflict prevention or peace support operations under NATO or EU leadership. In the autumn of 2004, NATO’s Joint Forces Command in Naples certified that

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SEEBRIG had achieved full operational capability. At the beginning of 2006, a brigade of 350 troops was deployed to serve in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Operating under the SEEBRIG motto – ‘One team, one mission, no matter what nationality or religion’ – the troops operated successfully under NATO command for its six-month rotation. In addition to peace support operations, SEEBRIG has also begun focusing on developing disaster relief capabilities within the framework of a project called Employment of SEEBRIG in Disaster Relief Operations. Although more embryonic, as SEEBRIG begins to move into this issue-area, opportunities open up for co-operation with the ESDP to promote security sector reforms among those countries of the region with weak institutional disaster response capacities. The EU could help the Southeast European Defence Ministerial to broaden to include civil emergency planning and interior minister participation to create a new Southeast European Homeland Defence Ministerial. Instances of successful Balkan co-operation between the EU, NATO and the USA include their role in ending ethnic fighting in Macedonia. At the beginning of 2001, when armed clashes between Macedonian security forces and Albanian extremists made war look likely, the three actors co-ordinated negotiations that led to the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. It incorporates numerous amendments to the Macedonian constitution and far-reaching legislative changes to address the root causes of the conflict.3 In the wake of the agreement, NATO launched a 30-day operation – codenamed Essential Harvest – with 3,500 troops and logistical support to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. This was followed by a three-month operation – Amber Fox, – which was tasked to provide protection to the international monitors overseeing the implementation of the peace settlement. To minimize the risk of destabilization, NATO then agreed to continue support with a new mission – Allied Harmony – which lasted from December 2002 to the end of March 2003, when it was handed over to the EU. Operating under the Berlin Plus agreements, the EU conducted military operation Concordia from March through December 2003, when it was replaced by the EU civilian police mission Proxima. ESDP police authorities co-operated with the Macedonian police and assisted in the implementation of the comprehensive reform of the interior ministry and the operational transition toward a border police as part of a broader EU effort to promote integrated border management (for details see Chapter 6). Following irregularities and problems in Macedonia’s local elections in March 2005, the parliamentary elections in July 2006 were seen as a key test in meeting its NATO and EU objectives. While the campaign was marked by confrontations sometimes resulting in violence not only between the two ethnic Albanian parties, but also between the two ethnic Macedonian parties, the election itself was greatly improved compared with past elections. It gained the approval of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.

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Another case of successful NATO-EU Berlin Plus co-operation involved the transfer of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (Council of the EU, 2004c). After nine years of NATO stabilization operations – ranging from initially 60,000 troops in January 1996 to 7,000 troops in December 2004 – EUFOR’s 7,000 troops assumed responsibility for security in Bosnia. Operating under the same mandate as the NATO peacekeepers, Althea co-ordinates with the headquarters of the residual NATO presence. While the former provides deterrence and supports the police, the latter assists local authorities in defence reform as well as counter-terrorism and intelligence gathering (NATO update, 2006). Managing the future of the region Though the region has been pushed to the background in recent years, notably after 11 September 2001, serious security challenges are likely to resurface in the coming years. The region contains a fragmentation bomb: Kosovo.4 In March 2006, negotiations, led by the special UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari, began between Serbia and Kosovo’s Albanian majority about the province’s secession from Belgrade. What will be the impact of an independent Kosovo, which at the time of writing had not yet been established, on the stability and security in the Western Balkans, Southeast Europe, and beyond, in, for instance, Transniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia? As the potential for conflicts and state failures in the region re-emerges, it requires renewed attention by the USA and Europe. To begin with, NATO’s credibility is tied to Kosovo’s future, where its commitment has been substantial and remains real. NATO’s 78-day air campaign not only represented the first time that NATO actually went to war, but its KFOR commitment of roughly 16,000 troops by the end of 2006, which is down from 50,000 in 1999, is still substantial compared to its commitment of 32,000 troops to Afghanistan, a country 60 times the size of Kosovo (Shanker, 2006).5 This imbalance is indicative of the fact that although the security situation in Afghanistan is much more dangerous than in Kosovo, many European NATO members and partners see Kosovo, which is closer to home, not Afghanistan, as a priority. The violence that erupted in Kosovo in March 2004 was a surprise to the international community with potentially dire consequences for regional stability. Moreover, it demonstrated the inability of KFOR, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to protect Kosovo’s minority communities. But NATO learned from the experience. National caveats and rules of engagement prevented KFOR from responding expeditiously. Though KFOR ultimately proved effective, it had no crowd control capacity. As a result, it underwent a transformation – from four multinational bases to five multinational task forces that are more mobile and flexible and operate with fewer national caveats – that was completed in autumn 2006. Presumably now prepared for

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riot control operations, KFOR will remain a necessary security presence in the country for the foreseeable future. As to the international impact of Kosovo’s independence, Slovakia and Romania fear that, with a little help of Russia, it might become a model for the secession of Transniestria from Moldova. Georgia and Ukraine are concerned about the possibility that Russia may play the Kosovo card to make more mischief in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Bulgarians perceive potential disintegrative pressures in multi-ethnic Macedonia; while Macedonian’s themselves worry that their existing border with Kosovo could become contested. Finally, Hungarians harbour concerns about the status of their ethnic brethren in the Serbian province of Vojvodina. In short, Kosovo’s independence will put enormous stress on the inter-ethnic fabric of the Western Balkans and potentially be a harbinger for secessions in post-Soviet space. Clearly, these are enormous challenges for the USA, NATO and the ESDP. To deal with them, Washington and Brussels will have to do a number of things. First, they will need to reach out to Serbia to build democratic structures there to ensure that its surrounding environment is secure and stable. While the EU told Serbia in September 2006 that it would not resume suspended talks because of the failure to turn over indicted war criminal Ratko Mladic, NATO in a bold and significant move at the Riga Summit invited the country to join the PfP. Providing assistance to the Serbian defence establishment, which has made significant progress in reform efforts, notably under defence minister Zoran Stankovic, and building military ties and co-operation with neighbouring NATO partners – Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania – and members – Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary – will be critical to building Western Balkan regional stability and security. Second, NATO will need to assist in building Kosovo’s defence establishment. In order to strengthen Western Balkan regional stability and security, the alliance has to ensure that Kosovo evolves armed forces that have NATO interoperability and contribute to regional stability and security. Kosovo’s military has to be tightly entwined with its Serbian and Montenegrin counterparts through a combined PfP exercise programme. Also, it must be constrained to maintain a defensive posture. For instance, it must not be allowed to acquire offensive weapons such as 155 mm howitzers, which would be seen as provocative by Serbia, and encouraged to limit itself to defensive weapons such as 82 mm mortars. As to KFOR, it will need to become more efficient, learning from the experiences and lessons of EUFOR in Bosnia. NATO and the EU will need to co-ordinate their PfP and SAA activities and programmes to enhance regional co-operation and keep integration prospects, which have proved essential for institutional reform, credible. Also, NATO and the EU must plan for the possibility of protecting Kosovo Serbs, particularly from the enclaves such as Mitrovica.

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Finally, the USA, NATO and the EU have to use a policy of carrots and sticks vis-a`-vis Russia so that it does not take Kosovo as a pretext to legitimize the independence of Moscow-leaning breakaway regions in its neighbourhood. This requires strong American leadership, possibly some side payments, and could involve a greater ESDP involvement in some of the troubled regions. Such a Western demarche will be difficult even though Kosovo, as part of the former Yugoslavia, is not comparable to breakaway regions in former republics of the Soviet Union, republics whose territorial boundaries were internationally recognized when independence was declared in 1991. Many Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian energy sources and Russia has demonstrated its willingness to play the energy card for political ends. NATO and the EU, though, are well prepared to tackle many other Balkan problems. One of the great advantages today in the region has been the maturation of the PfP programmes and the SAAs, coupled with the successful evolution of regional organizations such as the Southeast European Brigade. Also, the NATO and EU members Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia provide a core for co-ordinating NATO and EU activities in promoting Western Balkan security sector reform. These changes are cause for optimism. However, if future conflict is to be avoided, the USA, NATO and the EU have to do more. The PfP and the SAA programmes should develop and co-ordinate a Western Balkan strategy to enhance integration prospects, co-ordinate security sector reforms to tackle the security threats prevalent to the region, and link the PfP and SAA efforts to institutionalized regional co-operation. If integration prospects were to lose credibility among the Western Balkan states, security could be severely undermined because some nations, in particular the Adriatic Three, might be tempted to move in unhelpful directions. With this in mind, NATO’s 2006 Riga summit established more precise goals and timelines for keeping its ‘open door’ policy credible for the three remaining MAP members by establishing the prospect of membership for the following summit, possibly in 2008. Similarly, the EU needs to reiterate and make credible its 2003 Thessaloniki commitment to remain open to the new states of the Western Balkans. Finally, NATO and the EU have to develop a common strategy and to move beyond stabilization to improve co-ordinated co-operation-and-integration activities on the ground. If these measures are taken, Washington and Brussels can provide sufficient ballast to weather the gathering storm. Out of area: Washington and the ESDP beyond the Western Balkans The EU’s growing desire and ability to become an actor in global security policy has been demonstrated by its increasing number of missions. In the 1990s, during the Balkan conflicts, Europeans showed a complete inability to address a security crisis on their doorstep. Only NATO with dominant

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American involvement was able to address these problems. The interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were largely American-led shows. Lessons learned from that decade made it possible for Europe to start pursuing missions based on their own growing capabilities and with new mechanisms created within EU structures. One such example was operation Artemis. In May 2003, UN peacekeepers were overwhelmed by violence in and around Bunia, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sought French help. Paris agreed to mount an EU-led operation but made it clear that it did not want to involve NATO and use the Berlin Plus mechanism. Hence, France itself acted as the framework nation, with five EU members – France, Germany, Belgium, Greece and Great Britain – contributing forces, and another six countries providing personnel – Austria, Spain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. France provided 1,651 troops out of a total of 2,020. They were commanded by French Major General Bruno Neveux (for details see Chapter 8). In general, the operation, limited as it was, could be classified as a success by halting violence and protecting civilians, though some critics suggest that it was basically a French operation under the EU flag. They also claim that the cost of 40 million euro for a three-month operation was prohibitive to Paris and raised questions about the ability of the Union to undertake such missions in the future (cf. Chapter 13). Numerous additional ESDP operations have been launched in recent years, including in Georgia, Palestine and Indonesia. The growing activism of the EU in international security affairs is in line with the long history of EU member states in conducting peacekeeping operations under the UN flag. It is also an expression of the fact that the Union’s capabilities were substantially enhanced after recent enlargements in 2004 and 2007. Adding to the EU personnel involved in various ESDP operations those engaged in missions around the world under the aegis of other organizations, for instance UN peacekeeping in Africa and the Middle East and NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, it is obvious that the EU can be an important and capable player in international peacekeeping, stabilization and reconstruction. As to Washington’s view of these EU activities, including, notably, those carried out under the ESDP, it is generally positive. Certainly, the EU’s comparative advantages in rule-of-law and police missions along with relief efforts are greatly appreciated and fill a global need. If anything, the USA would like to see the ESDP able to do more in these places. If there is a concern, it is that the EU rhetoric far outstrips the reality of what it is either willing or able to deliver. To conclude this analysis of co-operation among the USA, NATO and the EU in the Western Balkans and further afield, it has to be noted that it is generally quite good. This is somewhat of a paradox given Washington’s initial scepticism of the ESDP and of French motivations in particular. Washington appreciates that by shouldering a greater burden in the Western

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Balkans, the ESDP relieves pressure on its overstretched armed forces. And through its operations outside the Western Balkans, the ESDP supplements, albeit not necessarily always very effectively, the American war on terror, for example, through its integrated rule-of-law mission EUJUST Lex for Iraq; and American strategic goals, for example, through its police mission EU COPPS in Palestine.

The ESDP, grand strategy and institutional co-operation across the Atlantic The events of 11 September 2001 brought the threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts to the forefront in both Washington and Brussels, blurring the lines between external and internal threats. The Bush administration’s clear and pragmatic view of global threats to the security of the USA is found in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002. It stresses that the struggle ‘will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time . . . [adding that the] distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing’ (US Presidency, 2002: 5, 31). Similarly, the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 notes that ‘distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand’ (EU ISS, 2003: 166). Although the two views appear similar on the surface, it is highly unlikely that a consensus across the board between Washington and its European allies, similar to the one that existed during the Cold War, can be reached in the future. Even though the Europeans often share the same general assessment of threats confronting both sides of the Atlantic, they often differ with the USA on the approach that should be taken in dealing with the challenges of the twenty-first century. While the EU tends to rely on multilateralism and international law in conflict resolution, Washington often relies on the use of military force and sometimes pre-emption. Hence, differences in approach sometimes overshadow areas of general consensus. The USA has always viewed the North Atlantic Alliance as the instrument of choice for dealing with security matters. Yet when it comes to institutional co-operation between NATO and the EU, surprisingly little progress has been made since the establishment of the ESDP. One key obstacle in developing relations between the two institutions has been the difficulty in agreeing to and implementing a set of arrangements known as Berlin Plus (see also Chapter 10). They originated at the NATO Brussels summit in 1994 and were confirmed two years later at the Berlin NATO ministerial where foreign ministers agreed to make NATO assets available to operations led by the Western European Union (WEU) – the then defence arm of the EU. During NATO’s 1999 Washington summit, this provision was extended to EU-led crisis management operations under the ESDP when the Alliance as a whole was not engaged. The compromise included

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access for the EU to NATO planning and other capabilities and common assets, the use of NATO’s European command for EU-led operations as well as the adaptation of NATO defence planning to incorporate the availability of forces for EU missions. The implementation of the Berlin Plus agreements, however, was stalled for three years, due to blocking manoeuvres by Turkey and Greece. Ankara insisted on assurances that NATO assets would not be provided for an EU operation in the vicinity of Turkey without the ability of Ankara to have a voice in planning and conducting such a mission. An agreement was finally reached in 2002, based on a British proposal that stipulated assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led crisis operations. A Framework Agreement, which consisted of an exchange of letters between the Union’s High Representative for the CFSP and NATO’s Secretary General, was finalized in March 2003 just before the ESDP operation Concordia, which used NATO assets, commenced. Despite this success, the diverging strategic approaches of various EU members toward ties with NATO remain a potent source of tensions hampering efforts to bring the EU and NATO together. Some countries, like France, prefer a fully autonomous ESDP, while others, like Great Britain, see NATO as the institution of first preference. At present NATO-EU cooperation at the official political level is practically non-existent. The EU refuses to fully and officially engage with the alliance. The inability to hold substantive consultations is related to the fact that Cyprus, which is not recognized as a state by Turkey, and Malta have not signed an agreement on the exchange of confidential information with NATO. This precludes the addition of anything to the agenda of the joint meetings of NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the EU’s Political and Security Committee that goes beyond the operation in Bosnia. Although this is a problem generated by the unresolved problems on NATO’s southern flank, it remains a transatlantic issue because France continues to jealously guard the EU’s independence within the ESDP, creating an obstacle to a closer EU working relationship with NATO. A change of attitude in Paris toward the future role of NATO will be crucial if the two organizations are to develop closer co-operative relations. Yet other states, too, have to review their policies. To prevent strategic divergences from becoming predominant and overshadowing the areas of consensus, the USA and the EU need to make a conscious effort to focus on concrete issues where a convergence of threat assessments and interests exists. Once NATO members are able to agree on specific missions, it will be politically easier for the Europeans to generate the resources appropriate for the challenge. By increasing the probability that military reforms are implemented, NATO will address the major concern that the USA has about it, namely that it is in danger of becoming a militarily useless institution that lacks capabilities and the political will to address common threats.

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EU military capabilities and the future of transatlantic relations The future of transatlantic relations also will be influenced by the success or failure of the development of ESDP capabilities. So far, the military power built up by the ESDP has fallen far short of the Union’s rhetorical claims. Moreover, some on this side of the Atlantic question whether the little that has been done has not distracted some European allies from delivering on their NATO capabilities commitments. NATO and the EU took significant action with regard to capabilities after September 2001. NATO’s November 2002 Prague Summit adopted decisions on the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Prague Capabilities Commitment and a major revision of its command structure. The NRF, fully operational since October 2006, consists of a brigade-size land component with forced-entry capability, a naval task force of one carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group, an air component capable of 200 combat sorties a day and a special forces component (NATO Press Release, 2002a). The NRF can be used for a wide range of tasks such as non-combatant evacuation operations, support for consequence management, crisis-response operations including peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations (NATO, 2003). The EU Helsinki summit in 1999 adopted the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal in which member states agreed to be able by 2003 to deploy and sustain a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 ground troops with air and naval assets. Although the RRF was the EU’s centrepiece defence programme during 1999–2003, it was notable for making only very modest progress. Although Brussels declared the goals met in 2003, it remained obvious that its operational capability across the full spectrum of Petersberg Tasks still left much to be desired. In 2003, European militaries still lacked the necessary equipment and structures to mount a substantial mission independently of the USA and to sustain it for an extended period. Clearly, the EU’s ambitions did not yet match its capabilities. Recognizing the problem, the Brussels European Council in June 2004 adopted a new 2010 Headline Goal that reaffirmed the Helsinki approach and extended the deadline for developing the missing capabilities. It also laid down specific milestones such as the set-up of a civil-military cell within the EU Military Staff which can generate an operations centre capable of planning and running military operations and the establishment of a European Defence Agency to advance the acquisition of capabilities such as strategic lift capacity. One of the principal elements of the new headline goal is the creation of battle groups. They represent an important step for defining and developing the ultimate shape of the RRF. Battle groups are combined arms, battalionsized forces of 1,500 troops who are reinforced by combat support and combat service elements (EU ISS, 2006: 345–46). They are a counterpart to NATO’s NRF. Although both programmes will include the same set of

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forces, they cannot be double-hatted because designated troops may have to deploy in concurrent missions on a very short notice. Like the NRF, EU battle groups are to rotate every six months through three phases – training, operational readiness and stepping down. The battle group concept is largely based on future missions resembling those that were carried out in the Balkans. A key difficulty, aside from the lack of certain capabilities and scarce resources, is the unresolved question of where they are to be used and under what type of chain of command. One forecast holds that these light infantry forces will be used mainly for expeditionary missions in Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions where major combat operations are not needed. Although the original EU headline goal and effort to stand up the RRF failed to create forces that could be deployed in an emergency, it was important as a political development within the ESDP process. At the same time, while the battle group concept and the Headline Goal 2010 might be seen as lowering the requirements compared to the RRF, it might actually succeed in generating real European capabilities. In this context, many voices in the USA worry less about the EU/ESDP becoming a peer competitor, but more about it not delivering the capability that it has promised. In this vein, many view the Berlin Plus successes in the Balkans as a model for future NATO-EU co-operation that can contribute to strengthening the transatlantic relationship in the post-11 September 2001 era.

Notes 1 The views in this chapter are my own and do not reflect the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Department of Defense or any other government agency. 2 Just ahead of the EU-Western Balkans Thessaloniki Summit, the then European Commissioner for external relations Chris Patten (2003) said: ‘The prospect of membership in the EU is real, and we will not regard the map of the Union as complete until you have joined us . . . But membership must be earned.’ 3 See, Annexes A and B, Ohrid Framework Agreement, August 13, 2001. 4 Kosovo’s economic conditions remain poor, with unemployment in the 50 per cent range, inadequate infrastructure to sustain economic growth and a lack of foreign direct investment. Of the 200,000 Serbs who have left Kosovo since 1999, only 14,300 (7 per cent) have returned. 5 NATO’s 26 members and 11 non-Alliance partners have committed 32,000 troops to Afghanistan, with 12,000 Americans assigned to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Another 8,000 US troops are in Afghanistan carrying out counterterrorism operations under American command in Operation Enduring Freedom. Kosovo is 10,887 sq. km compared to Afghanistan, which is 652,000 sq. km.

12 The ESDP in Action The View From the Consumer Side Kurt Bassuener and Enver Ferhatovic´

Since the inception of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1998 at St Malo at the initiative of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, in the shadow of the simmering Kosovo war, the European Union (EU) has gone from the drawing board to realization, fielding a variety of military, police and rule-of-law missions under its own flag through the ESDP. The literature on the construction by the EU of a security and defence component and missions deployed is ever growing. It is therefore surprising how little attention has been devoted to the demand side of the equation: the perspective of the consumers of security provided by these ESDP operations. This is an astonishing omission that can stunt the effectiveness of ESDP deployments. Their mechanics, while much discussed in Brussels, are not of immediate interest to the citizens of post-conflict societies, though there remains a void of understanding. What is most important at the consumer end is the impact of the EU soldiers and civilian crisis management personnel on the ground, notably how effective they are in maintaining a safe and secure environment. This chapter details how ESDP missions have been received by host societies. It is based on interviews, polling data, a review of what literature there is from this angle and personal observations over careers as policy advocates, advisors and implementers. We argue that the consumer side of the equation in ESDP operations has been given inadequate consideration in mission design, approach and outreach. The chapter focuses primarily, though not exclusively, on how the ESDP operations in the Balkans, most specifically in Bosnia, but also in Macedonia, are or were perceived by their host societies. The ESDP was essentially born as a result of the EU’s searing experience in the region in the 1990s. Moreover, both countries have hosted international forces for an extended period. Hence, host country perspectives on the ESDP are more developed there than elsewhere and can be subjected to more meaningful examination than other cases. In the concluding section, we venture beyond the Balkans and provide a number of concrete recommendations of how the ESDP can be rendered more consumer-friendly.

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The EU’s baggage in Bosnia The EU did not start with a clean slate in Bosnia, nor for that matter in Macedonia, but with considerable baggage, owing to the 1992–95 war. This history has been dealt with exhaustively elsewhere. However, it must be briefly noted as a reminder that the ineffectual European response, which was not restricted to the EU and its institutions per se, remains to this day seen as complicity in the suffering by many Bosnians, albeit from different angles, depending on what side they took in the war. What comes close to a consensus view among all Bosnians, and the peoples of the region more generally, is that the EU did not function as a coherent actor in its own right. Its credibility as an actor in the post-war development of a European security policy for the Western Balkans thus operates at a deficit, to the extent it is recognized as distinct from the international engagement as a totality. The bottom line is that ESDP operations in Bosnia and in the Western Balkans have an uphill battle providing the psychological elements of security in a political context that perpetuates and reanimates the latent insecurities that stem from a brutal war that in its very strategy aimed at destroying trust in ‘the other’.

The security consumer perspective: Bosnian views on NATO’s involvement In discussing the ESDP operations in Bosnia, the perceived role of the preceding NATO mission bears brief review, as the on-the-ground reality is – understandably – that EUFOR Althea, the flagship of the ESDP in Bosnia, stepped into the role of NATO as Dayton security guarantor. Bosnia is composed of two entities – the Republica Srpska, which is predominantly Bosnian-Serb, and the Bosniak/Croat Federation. Hence, when discussing local perspectives, one must always use the plural in Bosnia, as each community has distinct, and often contradictory, concerns. Even dividing the Bosnian population in this way is overly simplistic; quite a few Bosnians do not feel they fall neatly into the box of Serbs, Croats or Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), and resist being pigeonholed, even though not aligning into one of the three condemns one to second-class citizenship under the Dayton formula. But certain generalizations can be fairly made about how the nine-year NATO-led international security commitment in Bosnia was viewed. EUFOR has benefited and suffered as well from this inheritance, as most citizens perceive EUFOR as essentially an SFOR Mark II, without the Americans. Given the fact that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with which most Bosniaks identified, was on the defensive for most of the 1992–95 war, Bosniaks are most concerned about a withdrawal of the international community and the reduction of NATO’s role as security guarantor. The common view among them is that the EU was at best ineffectual, at worst

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complicit, during the war, and that the USA was ultimately their only ally. Hence, the departure of NATO in an operational capacity unnerved most Bosniaks. Yet there is deep disappointment that those perceived as mainly responsible for their suffering in the war, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, remain at large, and NATO is perceived as responsible for this fact. British credibility among Bosniaks has improved as a result of the aggressive approach toward war crimes indictees taken under Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, the policies of the John Major government during the war and the view that the commander of the United Nations Protection Force, General Michael Rose, was hostile to Bosnia and indulgent of the Bosnian Serbs have not been forgotten. France remains in low esteem due to the policies of President Franc¸ois Mitterand, who is widely seen by Bosniaks as having aided and abetted the ethnic cleansing campaign conducted by Bosnian Serb and Serbian forces. Germany was seen as having been largely proCroat and to a lesser extent pro-Bosniak in its policies during the war, and acted as a major destination for war refugees, having previously been a prime employer of Yugoslav Gastarbeiter. The country was, owing to its legacy as an occupier during the Second World War, absent from the military equation during the Bosnian war, though it was a major diplomatic player and part of the original Contact Group. But the conflict forced Berlin to reassess its foreign policy altogether, including military engagements abroad. This process led to it evolving into the third major actor in the ESDP. Finally, Washington’s credibility with Bosniaks owed more to its policies of 1995 than to actual operational activity that differentiated it from its EU and NATO partners in peace implementation. Bosnian Serbs were more likely to see NATO as an occupier earlier on in the post-Dayton period, and they occasionally protested over actions to arrest war crime indictees still seen as heroes or at least not alone in their criminality. Yet over time, the NATO, then EU, force have been seen as important to preserving Bosnian Serb autonomy in the Republika Srpska, as the common view of the Dayton Agreement has evolved from an unfair international imposition into a defensible bulwark against state-building. Common Bosnian Serb views of various contingents tend to be polar opposites of those held by Bosniaks, with the Americans having been the least popular, perhaps along with the Turks, for the same reasons. The USA remains regarded by Bosnian Serbs as the main patron of the Bosniaks and the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which many, if not most, view as an impediment to their own aspirations of unity with Serbia. The Bosnian Croats fall somewhere in between in terms of their common perception. Some high-profile actions by NATO troops, such as the 2001 raid on the politically connected Hercegovacka Banka, and arrests of war crime indictees led to protests. Croats are more likely to identify with the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina than Serbs, though less so than Bosniaks and ‘others’, and correspondingly viewed NATO involvement as a guarantee that the country would not be partitioned. However, Bosnian Croats

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often express frustration that their community is treated as less than equal and unfairly put-upon, and the indictment and trial of a number of Croat war crime indictees, arrested by NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR), is seen by many as evidence of this. By the time of SFOR’s departure, at the end of 2004, there was widespread acceptance across communities of its role as Dayton guarantor. While all communities have misgivings about the Dayton framework – one finds few sincere Dayton cheerleaders in Bosnia – it set the context for an end to the war. NATO was recognized as an essential factor in this formula, and an essential institutional tie to the US.

Exit SFOR, enter EUFOR: credibility at the expense of EU branding The transition from SFOR to EUFOR was mooted for years within the EU before it occurred. Many in Bosnia think that it was driven by a perceived opportunity to show that the EU was capable of fielding multinational peacekeeping forces under its own flag and to project power as an independent policy actor. Irrespective of whether this was the actual motive, EUFOR essentially piggybacked on a long-term NATO mission. Aware of their tarnished image in the country, Europeans, prior to Althea’s deployment, ran a major public information campaign to allay Bosnian fears of international abandonment. In any case, the shift did not entail a large physical rotation of forces; most of SFOR’s troops were sent by EU member states, along with EU aspirants and other associated countries that were part of the coalition. The posters explained the shift by showing a moving jeep with the SFOR insignia changing into an identical jeep with the EUFOR insignia, to underline that EUFOR would effectively be no different from SFOR. This message seems to have been internalized by the vast majority of Bosnians. This was facilitated by the smooth transition process, which was due to good EU-NATO co-operation and the fact that many Althea soldiers had served in Bosnia under NATO. Guaranteeing a safe and secure environment is EUFOR’s most significant contribution to the post-war reconstruction efforts of the international community in Bosnia. Whenever the objective has been pursued aggressively, it has led to significant returns of those ‘cleansed’ during the war. Althea’s operational capacity is limited, and shrinking. Its footprint is relatively small, given the absence of potentially disruptive heavy armour and its concentration on long-established bases, save for regular patrols, soldiers on leave, and two-person liaison and observation teams (LOTs), which are spread in over 40 locations throughout the country. The reduction of from 7,000 to 2500 troops has been officially justified by changed circumstances on the ground. But the ‘but for’ reason is clearly the gravitational pull toward Afghanistan for NATO member force contributors.

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Who is calling? Civilian-military co-ordination EUFOR was deployed after the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia, Lord Paddy Ashdown, who was double-hatted as EU Special Representative (EUSR), was already in-theatre. This held the potential for, at long last, institutionalized civil-military co-ordination. Ashdown, a former royal marine elite Special Boat Service member, worked together effectively with Force Commander General David Leakey, a British co-national. They focused their efforts on identifying and disrupting the support networks surrounding war crime indictees and related organized crime networks, both of which are politically connected in a political-criminal nexus forged during the war and reinforced afterward. This activity was welcomed among a considerable cross-section of Bosnia citizens, not merely among Bosniaks. Yet this civil-military co-ordination proved heavily reliant on the personalities involved. General Leakey and Ashdown ended their respective tenures within weeks of each other. Their successors, beginning with the Italian general Gianmarco Chiarini and the German politician Christian Schwarz-Schilling, did not develop the same rapport, and the level of coordination dropped off. It also must be said that Germany has not covered itself in glory in multilateral military operations in Bosnia, either under the NATO or EU umbrella. It conveyed a strong aversion to risk, as illustrated by the ignominious retreat in the face of violent demonstrations in March 2004 in Kosovo. German defence minister Franz Josef Jung’s unexpected statement in October 2006, apparently uncoordinated with allies, that German troops would withdraw from EUFOR did nothing to allay the perception among many Bosnians that Berlin was not taking its responsibilities as opposed to its privileges in numerous Balkan leadership roles seriously (Schwennicke, 2006).

Bosnian perspectives on EUFOR As with the case of SFOR, the views on the proper role and necessity of EUFOR among Bosnian politicians reflect the cleavages among the constituent peoples. Among civil society figures, including media commentators, there is a similar spectrum, generally respecting the same divisions. However, the hostility level toward EUFOR is low, even among those, usually Bosnian Serb, who want to see it withdraw. Among civically oriented persons who identify as Bosnian, i.e., not ethnically, and many Bosniaks, there is frustration that EUFOR, just like the NATO forces that preceded it, has not done enough to catch the ‘big fish’ war crime indictees, Karadzic and Mladic. Bosnians’ main requirement for EUFOR is public security and stability, or the perception thereof. This is mainly manifest in areas of eastern

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Bosnia, but in a way that is more below the radar than in the public eye. In addition, many Bosnians see EUFOR as the definitive guarantor of Bosnia’s sovereignty and linkage to the EU. The international community ‘checked the box’ on Annex 7 of the Dayton peace accord, which guarantees the right of Bosnians to return to their pre-war homes, by considering it completed with the completion of the property law implementation process. Yet having a legal title to one’s property and the confidence to return to it to live there are obviously two different things. While economic factors certainly come into play and deter returns to areas with little productive economic activity, the perceived insecurity in many ‘cleansed’ areas remains a real factor, and may be on the rise with the political reconquista of eastern Bosnian municipal governments by Serb parties after the 1 October 2006 general elections.1 Bosnia’s political stability came into question during the campaign before the autumn 2006 election, with a resurgence of nationalist rhetoric a decade after the war. Declarations by the leading Bosniak politician calling for the abolition of the Republika Srpska and the leading Bosnian Serb threatening an independence referendum were drivers of this uncertainty, and the June 2006 declaration by the Peace Implementation Council that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) would close in a year’s time, pending review, was a contributing factor.2 The presence of EUFOR was reassuring to a nervous population at a time when rhetoric was reminiscent of the mid1990s. Of course, the facts that local military capabilities were dramatically lower than they were just a few years ago, popular will to fight was low and the militaries of the Federation and the Republika Srpska were unified under a Bosnian defence ministry, enhanced Althea’s credibility as a security guarantor. The sizeable force reduction announced by EUFOR in December 2006, and confirmed in February 2007, generated security concerns, particularly in the Bosniak community. They were concerned about the risk that with the departure of British and Dutch forces and the concentration of remaining forces at two bases in Sarajevo, Althea’s operations would be reduced to a ‘Potemkin’ or showpiece quality. The decision contributed to a growing impression among many Bosnians that there is a flagging EU commitment to their country. Whether the correlated fears, especially among Bosniaks, are underpinned by an accurate reading of the local security situation is not the issue. The bottom line is that EUFOR force reductions, driven not by a threat assessment in Bosnia but by demands for NATO members to deploy forces to Afghanistan and elsewhere, followed on the heels of the announced plan to close the OHR in June 2007. This led many ordinary citizens and media commentators to question the EU’s – and by extension the international community’s – commitment to ensuring Bosnia’s peace and stability. The effects of the January 2007 decision by the Quint – the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy – to extend the OHR until the end of June 2008 and end Schwarz-Schilling’s mandate in

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June 2007 had yet to unfold at the time of writing, but it appears likely that the damage done during 2006 by projected incoherence will have a lasting impact. In any case, there is no parallel reassessment of the troop drawdown, so an extended international civilian presence will, the Bosniaks fear, be less ‘persuasive’. In its 27 February 2007 session, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council decided against confirming the closure of the OHR while reaffirming that it is in the interest of all for Bosnia to take full responsibility for its own affairs. The policy of ownership remained the guiding principle while the international community would help the country make the final steps from peace implementation to Euro-Atlantic integration. The security concerns of the Bosniaks were amplified by remarks made by Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Dodik in the wake of the 2006 elections. He suggested that Bosnia could be divided into three or four entities, and that the High Representative could essentially not touch him. Among Bosnian Serbs, the popular attitude toward the force draw-down is ‘good riddance’, especially since ties between Banja Luka and Belgrade have drawn closer under Dodik. However, it is the continued presence of Althea that allowed Dodik to describe the newly united Bosnian armed forces as altogether superfluous and to call for their elimination. Incidentally, the demand is a non-starter for the Bosniaks, whose only advantage over the Bosnian Serbs for most of the war was manpower, and who only reluctantly abandoned conscription in 2005 to complete defence reform and merge the ethnically divided armed forces.

EUFOR and war crimes indictees Four persons indicted for war crimes during the Bosnian war remain at large, all Bosnian Serbs. EUFOR has not made a forcible arrest of any person wanted by the war crimes tribunal in The Hague since taking over from SFOR. The popular perception that EUFOR is not actively looking for those indictees undermines the force’s credibility in the eyes of much of the general population, especially among Bosniaks. The fact that the previous commander Chiarini stated before his departure in 2006 that there was no sign that Karadzic was in Bosnia did not help. The claim was not only seen as unconvincing by most citizens, but was interpreted as selfexculpatory and indicative of a lack of vigour or will to capture these war crime indictees. It also stood in direct contradiction to statements by the chief prosecutor of the Hague tribunal, Carla Del Ponte, who asserted that Karadzic regularly travelled from Montenegro and Serbia into the Republika Srpska. However, there was a case in January 2006 in which a Bosnian Serb who had been indicted by a Sarajevo Canton court for war crimes in the eastern Bosnian town of Rogatica, Dragomir Abazovic, was violently arrested, leading to the death of his wife and seriously wounding his son. The incident

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caused no little opprobrium for EUFOR, which had only weeks before come under the command of General Chiarini, who defended the use of deadly force by the Italian Carabinieri who conducted the arrest. The case was later investigated by an Italian prosecutor. The operation was seen by some international observers as having cast a pall over Chiarini’s tenure as it began, limiting his operational engagement in Bosnia. In the Bosnian Serb media, the incident was portrayed as unwarranted and reckless, and it did nothing to change the common Serb view of EUFOR as the military fist of an ‘anti-Serb’ international posture in Bosnia. On a more general note, Althea is perceived by Bosnians as somewhat aloof. They see or interact with the European soldiers only when they are on patrol, on liberty or immersed in local communities in LOTs. It does not seem on this level that Bosnians differentiate between EUFOR and its NATO predecessor. Yet among the narrow stratum in Bosnia’s think-tank, non-governmental, and academic community, there is a sense that EUFOR is more bureaucratic and distant than SFOR had been. When comparing the two in terms of access and support for public information and outreach, EUFOR was judged as significantly less forthcoming and concerned than NATO with its relations with the Bosnian public.3

Public perceptions of the EU police mission (EUPM) The EUPM, which operates essentially as a cadre mission aimed at reforming the domestic rule-of-law sector, has had reasonable visibility in the field with its police officers spread across the country’s police stations, police headquarters and interior ministries.4 Its tasks, however, are not clearly understood by most Bosnians, and its focus, since 2006, on centralizing the highly fragmented local policing field leaves the mission hostage to the political dynamics of this contentious issue, the resolution of which depends on political power, not facilitation by the ESDP. Many Bosnians thus question what the EUPM actually does, given that it has no executive policing powers, and what it has accomplished since it first arrived in the country in January 2003. More generally, the European police officers and civilian experts do not evoke the strong feelings that NATO troops once did, the echoes of which remain attached to EUFOR as the international community’s boots on the ground to guarantee that war will not be allowed to re-erupt. The EUPM runs a number of public information campaigns aimed at advancing its mandated objectives in the broad rule-of-law arena and at raising its public profile. At the time of writing, there are three such campaigns – against drugs, for traffic safety on Bosnia’s infamous roads and in support of a ‘crime hunters’ (Krimo Lovci) hotline which was initiated by the EUPM and handed over to the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) in 2005. The other two campaigns are run in collaboration with Bosnian law enforcement agencies. The impact of these well-intentioned

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outreach efforts, though, is questionable given the rather high level of public cynicism and boredom, which is the result of having been saturated over the years by public information campaigns of the international community. The relationship between EUFOR and the EUPM has not been as tight as could be hoped from two manifestations of the ESDP in Bosnia. Some of this may be attributable to personalities. But a good deal of this may be due to arguments over jurisdictions as well, with the EUPM now holding sway over anti-organized crime activities that had been undertaken by EUFOR in the General Leakey era. This has left some local and international actors criticizing both organizations for lack of co-ordination, and the EUPM for its less than robust actions and its lack of will to act on intelligence, especially in the northern Republika Srpska, where EUFOR was assessed to be more aggressive when it dealt with organized crime issues.5 While the lack of a unified strategic approach of the EU family of institutions in Bosnia and the institutional friction and underperformance have not entered into the public consciousness as such, their effects in reduced operational performance are perceptible to many Bosnian commentators and observers. Since 2006, the EUPM has been headed by the Italian Carabinieri Brigadier General Vincenzo Coppola. He derives much of his visibility from his role with the Police Reform Directorate – the local body in charge of police restructuring. However, given the stalled reform, the EUPM as a whole is not viewed as successful by those favouring a unified police structure in Bosnia. Those who are against the centralization of law enforcement, primarily Serbs in the Republika Srpska who fear the loss of police control to Sarajevo, have viewed the entire exercise as being directed against them. Hence, they do not have a favourable view of the EUPM either. In general, given a lack of executive power and visible successes, the mission does not have the influence to command the respect of ordinary citizens and local stakeholders in the policing field.

The ESDP and local economic concerns International deployments, both civil and military, have major economic effects on their host communities, for good and for ill. Mass cash infusions help spawn service industries, including the seamy underworld of brothels and human trafficking, while also jacking up rents exponentially. They skew employment, drawing the best and brightest with higher pay than the local market can usually bear. The host society adjusts to this, and the addiction to foreign infusions can take a deep hold. The reduction of this presence can be wrenching, and affects many communities quite dramatically, including the fuelling of a brain drain of the local talent that had worked within international missions to greener pastures abroad. In Bosnia this is a serious problem as the international community has been present for a long time and with a great number of personnel. In particular, the reduction of EU troops raises economic concerns for all citizens,

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irrespective of their ethnic affiliation. The fears of economic dislocation are widespread, but most pronounced where EUFOR’s economic footprint was greatest – Banja Luka, Mostar, and Zenica, specifically. In these localities, the force size was not economically insignificant, not least because Bosnians were hired for support roles and local services drew customers from Althea and associated personnel. With the reduction of the collective international footprint in the country, Bosnians worry about how to compensate for the loss of the income this presence has generated for the past decade. So far the EU has not done enough to alleviate these concerns.

Selling the ESDP or one-way communication Minimal effort has been made by the EU, aside from unidirectional public information campaigns to explain the transition from SFOR to EUFOR, to describe the purpose of the ESDP missions in the country.6 According to local actors, EUFOR, unlike NATO, has not exerted itself to identify indigenous partners with whom to collaborate in outlining its own role and that of the broader ESDP to policy audiences and the general public. NATO and SFOR engaged actively in this regard through public outreach to both civil society actors and local stakeholders. There is no interactivity or giveand-take with Bosnians in the EU approach. For instance, the Union does not make funds available for local think-tanks or academia to work on ESDP-related issues and publicize their research in the Bosnian language.7 Hence, it is hardly surprising that there is no strong local constituency for the EU operations and that the EU brand remains somewhat ethereal to most citizens. Yet the EU enjoys a positive image in Bosnia and the region more generally, and the ESDP benefits from it. A key concern to the population is whether EU policies, programmes and incentives promote a stable and prosperous democracy. Despite initial scepticism and misgivings, most citizens have become reassured of the EU’s commitment to the task, mainly due to the complementary work of other EU instruments that are present in the region, including the Stabilisation and Association process and associated financial assistance programmes. These instruments have a greater public salience than the ESDP and have made a large contribution to positive local perceptions of the Union. Yet, while the European perspective promised to the countries of the region by Brussels resonates with a wide cross-section of the populations, its manifestation is strongly connected to the expectation of personal gains, for example, access to Europe in terms of visa facilitation. There is thus the risk of a popular backlash if the EU does not deliver. So far, however, the ESDP has indirectly gained from the positive image of the Union. Hence, those who are aware of the ESDP operations in Bosnia view them as a strategic symbol of their ambition to establish closer links with the EU, including full membership.

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Local academic and intelligentsia views on the ESDP The overwhelming majority of Bosnian citizens are not aware of the ESDP as a distinct policy instrument, owing mainly to their tendency to see the EU’s field operations in the country as mere continuations of international community efforts to implement Dayton and maintain a safe and secure environment. Yet, as suggested in the previous section, this lack of awareness also can be attributed to a dearth of public outreach on the topic in the local language. The ESDP is an elite issue. Comprehension of the multifaceted EU family presence in Bosnia is confined to a handful of policy actors and advisors, heavily concentrated in the directorate for European integration of the central government, to academics, those interested in the policy, NGO specialists and other curious souls. In general, the EU is perceived as a positive influence in the country and the Western Balkans region. Public support for a closer relationship with it remains high while EU membership is seen as a prospect and final goal of the regional transition.8 Among those local observers who have made it their business to become familiar with the ESDP, a certain scepticism regarding its importance and future development prevail. Authors such as Sarajevo-based Nerzuk Curak (2006: 3) express doubt as to whether the newly developed EU post-conflict mechanisms will translate into a stronger Europe. Others are confident in the Union’s economic and post-conflict transformative powers.9 However, Europe’s ineffectuality in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, particularly the failure of its military contingents in the United Nations Protection Force to enforce the mandate of the latter to protect innocent civilians, entrenched an image of the EU as an authority incapable of dealing with security challenges in its neighbourhood. Another important local view is that the EU launched security missions not for the sake of stability in the region, but rather used Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo as convenient laboratories for the ESDP in order to bolster Brussels’ credibility as an international security actor (ICG, 2004: 2). Curak, for instance, insists that security issues in the Western Balkans made possible the development of the ESDP, giving the EU the opportunity to gain the respect of the USA as a relevant geopolitical actor in its own right (Curak, 2006: 3). He criticizes the Union for reducing the role of Bosnia to that of an experiment in which it is testing its new security toolbox. As for the Bosnian authorities, Curak blames them for not being more assertive vis-a`-vis the international community instead of begging for international donations (ibid.). Another analyst, Zoran Popovic, makes a similar point. He emphasizes that the ESDP is a work in progress and that, hence, the failure of ESDP operations in the Western Balkans, where they are so extensively engaged, would seriously damage prospects for further ESDP development and deployments in the future. If Brussels were to prove unable to be a positive and transformative force in its immediate neighbourhood and future

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member states, how could such operations be successful somewhere else, he asks rhetorically (Popovic, 2005: 60). Popovic also reminds his readers that the EU operations in Bosnia and Macedonia enjoyed a convenient jumpstart, inheriting stable operations from NATO and large parts of its resources and staff (Popovic, 2005: 64). Finally, there are also those regional analysts who offer a more positive assessment of the ESDP. For instance, Oxford South East Europe Studies Centre analyst Dimitar Bachev praises the EU for, among other things, successfully preventing conflicts and stabilizing the region; facilitating peace agreements; running cities; administering economies; and dispatching peacekeepers and police officers while also driving forward its pre-accession agenda (Bachev and Andreev, 2005).

Popular perceptions of EU peacebuilding in Macedonia and beyond In 2001 Macedonia came perilously close to civil war after months of fighting between the majority Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. While the international community patted itself on the back for its ‘prompt reaction’ to the violence, the dominant local perception is that it made haste slowly at best, especially in consideration of its experience with the war in Kosovo, the assets available to it to help stop another Balkan war and the fact that both parties to the conflict requested NATO intervention, albeit on their respective sides. Many ethnic Macedonians tend to view the belated international political intervention by the EU and the USA that arrested the deepening conflict in Macedonia as having been in effect a pro-Albanian intervention, preventing a military defeat of the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA). The USA is accorded most of the blame by those with this view, but the EU is criticized too. The Ohrid peace accord, which was brokered by Brussels and Washington, brought the ethnic fighting to an end and obligated Skopje to accept Albanian as an official language in areas where ethnic Albanians are concentrated. Its stipulations on decentralization were seen by ethnic Macedonians as an internationally imposed defeat that they would not have suffered had they been allowed to continue military operations. Also, the majority have their view of the EU coloured by the dispute with EU member Greece over the name of their country, which Athens insists be called by the cumbersome ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)’ in the EU and other international fora to ensure differentiation from the part of northern Greece that is also part of historical Macedonia. From the Macedonian-Albanian perspective, the international political engagement in the country and the subsequent Ohrid Framework Agreement assisted their community in gaining greater political power at the central and local levels after years of exclusion from the public sector and discrimination. Here, Washington’s role is regarded as decisive. In addition, ethnic Albanian attitudes in Macedonia were profoundly affected by the

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1998–99 war in neighbouring Kosovo. While the March – June 1999 air campaign against Serbia was a NATO operation, the USA was seen as the prime mover in intervening, and is hence viewed favourably by Macedonian Albanians. Turning to the ESDP in Macedonia, the EU military operation Concordia, which operated in Macedonia from March to December 2003, inherited perceptions of the preceding NATO peacekeeping troops, which were deployed in the aftermath of the armed conflict. In the 2001 conflict, the interior ministry, in charge of all policing, was implicated in human rights abuses against members of the ethnic Albanian community, both combatants and civilians. The then minister, Ljube Boskovski, was later indicted by the Hague war crimes tribunal. As in Bosnia, accusations of war crimes are commonly viewed through an ethnic prism, with ethnic Macedonians prone to defend ‘their police’ when accusations of abuses occur, and ethnic Albanians inclined to believe any accusations of misconduct. The fact is that special police units of the interior ministry, working alongside the armed forces and paramilitaries, were involved in operations against the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army. Hence, the international community considered the reform of these units and the police more generally as being essential to post-conflict stability. Given their interpretation of the Ohrid peace deal, many Slav-Macedonians viewed the reforms of the ESDP police mission Proxima, which aimed among other things at decentralizing the police and giving local communities, including ethnic Albanians, a greater voice in policing decisions, as being ‘pro-Albanian’ and unfair.10 Yet despite the cleavage between Macedonia’s two dominant and polarized communities, the aspiration to join the EU is shared, just as it is in Bosnia.11 In addition, Macedonia’s state institutions had some capacity to take aboard and implement EU standards while the political consensus for a rapid rapprochement of the country with the EU was secured (Andreev and Bachev, 2005: 1). The result is that Brussels’ efforts, including the ESDP operations, in the country are generally viewed in a positive light. As to ESDP operations beyond the Balkans, anecdotal evidence suggests that they have an even lower public profile than those in the region. This is probably due to a number of reasons. To begin with, there is the small number of deployed international personnel – for instance fewer than 20 in the rule-of-law mission Themis in Georgia and 33 in the police mission EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories. Furthermore, all these missions lacked executive powers, which would have made their involvement in host societies more visible. Finally, most missions have been deployed to countries and territories whose EU membership aspirations are considered distant at best in Brussels, as in the case of Georgia, or non-existent by all parties involved, including the general population, as in the case of Palestine. The pattern that seems to emerge from ESDP deployments is that the

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further away from Europe they are, the less citizens know about the EU and the less they are aware of these missions. However, this assessment has to be taken with a pinch of salt. The consumer side of ESDP missions is very difficult to discern from afar. At the time of writing, there are few accounts available from the host country perspective as to their reception or impact.

Conclusions and recommendations A few general conclusions may be drawn from adopting a consumer perspective on ESDP operations. Primarily, public opinion of these missions largely derives from their perceived ability and will to address the security needs and fears of citizens. What matters most is whether these missions create a safer and more secure environment. The institutional dynamics of missions rarely register in the public consciousness, however important they are in Brussels, EU member capitals or to host country policy actors and intelligentsia. In this sense, the Union’s efforts to brand itself as a distinct actor in international security affairs, including peacekeeping and postconflict stabilization, are more for its own purposes than for the host societies or, put differently, security consumers. The consequences of intra-EU institutional rivalry and insufficient coordination reduce public confidence in the Union. This is particularly visible in the Western Balkans, where the wartime legacy adheres to the EU to this day, despite the widespread popular aspiration to join the club for both economic and security reasons. In the absence of a forceful, unified strategic approach to local problems, the USA remains seen as the default setting and backbone of international engagement in Bosnia and elsewhere in the region. This is so despite the preponderance of EU and EU-associated forces, personnel, projects and funds and Washington’s draw to other ‘hotter’ engagements points further east. The EU is still seen on the ground as less than the sum of its parts by most locals. Where the EU does ‘greenfield’ deployments, i.e. where it is not following a NATO or other international security operation, it is often invited because of what it is not. For example, it is often seen as a more desirable or trustworthy actor than NATO, with the political weight the USA holds in the alliance. This was certainly the case with the EU police operation and the EU border assistance mission in Palestine, given American support for Israel. A similar argument pertains to the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia. It was preferred to a United Nations deployment because the global organization was regarded by Jakarta as instrumental in driving East Timorese independence. Finally, there seems to be a more widespread perception on the part of local actors that ESDP missions are more about themselves – designed to show the EU flag abroad to intra-EU audiences – than to achieve the stated mission objectives. This was certainly the view among a majority of Bosnian observers of the SFOR-EUFOR transition. EU Themis, too, was driven by

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‘reputational concerns’ more than clear goals (Kurowska, 2006a). This raises the question as to who the architects of ESDP operations believe are the real consumers: host societies or EU policy-makers, shapers and citizens? Given the observations and conclusions drawn, some recommendations for designers and implementers of ESDP operations can be made. Some of these recommendations derive from ESDP-specific observations. Many could also apply to the deficiencies of other international force deployments. Since the ESDP is still in its early days, it should avail itself of the chance to create new international best practices. Lessons-learned reports are currently written by the practitioners themselves. While recording and transmitting their observations and experience – the lessons they learned – is critical for institutional memory, there is an inherent conflict of interest in relying primarily on their reviews to gauge effectiveness. At present, there are no institutionalized efforts to talk to those on the receiving end of the ESDP for their views on how the missions function. There is no independent evaluation of operations from the consumer perspective – all available writings are self-referential or derived from the practitioner or political perspective. Dispassionate and independent evaluation of ESDP missions is essential for their further development and effectiveness. On a related note, the populations in the places where ESDP operations are deployed have no ‘consumer advocate’, as distinct from public information personnel to promote understanding of the mission. To be fair, this is in keeping with the practice of other multinational military and police missions. The EU could help establish a new international standard by including in its ESDP deployments an integral Ombudsman as an attached, though independent, focal point for public feedback and concerns about the missions’ functioning and impact. The Ombudsman would also be the address for allegations of misbehaviour, malfeasance and/or criminality on the part of mission staff. There is growing recognition that this is an unfortunate reality in the case of all international force deployments and missions in general, but mechanisms and policies to address this remain insufficient. Finally, one aspect of the Ombudsman’s role could be to work with international donors, including the European Commission, and the communities in which ESDP operations are based to develop strategies to fill the economic footprint left by departing ESDP operations. For instance, one income-generating option is to set up small businesses loan programmes for former local mission staff to enable them to either start businesses or develop new opportunities for existing ones. Finally, as with most international interventions, ESDP mission personnel have short rotational schedules, rarely allowing them to become acquainted with the on-the-ground reality, much less assimilate it and draw upon it analytically for operational purposes. Longer deployments by mission-dedicated personnel would allow internationals to get a better understanding of local concerns and preoccupations and make possible closer contacts between locals and internationals.

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Notes 1 The political gains of Serb parties in eastern Bosnia in 2006 was related to the change in voter lists, with the launch of passive voter registration by the Bosnia Central Election Commission just prior to the 2006 general election. Voters were automatically registered to vote in the municipality that issued them their identity card. Since many returnees to eastern Bosnia remained registered for identity purposes in the Federation rather than the Republica Srpska to avail themselves of better social benefits, they were no longer eligible to vote in the municipality in which they lived and had voted in 2004. This new reality had the side effect of ensuring that a special election to replace a deposed mayor or municipal council required a much lower returnee vote than in 2004. 2 The Peace Implementation Council supervises the implementation, by the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia, of the civilian component of the Dayton peace accord. 3 Interview with Becirovic Denis, Center for Security Studies, Sarajevo, 15 December 2006. 4 Initially, the EUPM had over 500 police officers. At the time of writing, total international personnel is 179. See http://www.eupm.org/Documents/Weekly.pdf for the current total (accessed March 5, 2007). 5 Discussions with international staff of the Banja Luka branch of the OHR, autumn 2006. 6 Interview with Becirovic Denis, December 15, 2006. 7 Ibid. 8 According to a recent Omnibus Survey conducted by EUFOR in Bosnia in January and September 2006, more then 80 per cent of citizens support the country’s membership of the EU while the majority of citizens assess the EUFOR and EUPM operations as a success. 9 The majority of political stakeholders in ESDP host countries in the Western Balkans support(ed) their presence. Press statements and interviews with stakeholders from Macedonia and Bosnia conducted in 2006. 10 Interviews with Macedonian interlocutors, Skopje, December 2006. 11 Support for EU membership in Macedonia ranges between 88 per cent and 97 per cent according to recent polls conducted by the UN Development Programme, the International Republican Institute and the Institute for Democracy.

13 The Implementation of the ESDP Issues and Tentative Generalizations . Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite1

The concluding chapter falls into two parts. In the first part, we highlight and review salient points raised by the preceding analyzes of ESDP implementation with a view to elaborating on them. In the rest of the chapter, we shift into a more theoretical mode. We employ select theoretical concepts to draw out some tentative generalizations from the ESDP case studies when a comparison across cases suggests that distinct patterns may exist. However, we do not press the empirics into a coherent theoretical frame. As we argued in the introduction, theory building and theory testing have to wait for further detailed knowledge of the intricate workings of ESDP operations. Rather, we present a rough, theoretically informed sketch of emerging regularities, more suggestive than conclusive. In both parts of the chapter, we supplement the evidence presented by our authors with observations on operations not covered in the volume. We begin with an issue touched upon by virtually all ESDP case study chapters – the institutional arrangements through which the ESDP is implemented and co-ordinated with other Union foreign policy actions. In general terms, the problem is well known. As the director general for external and politico-military affairs in the EU Council Secretariat, Robert Cooper (2005: 189), put it, the EU ‘was never designed as a foreign policy organisation in a traditional sense’. Hence, neither the bureaucratic structures nor the decision-making procedures of the complex, variegated and multi-layered EU foreign policy-making system lend themselves to rapid and coherent policy formation. Rather, they institutionalize consultation, deliberation and negotiations at multiple levels and across institutions. Our case studies offer additional insights into how these institutional features act in the implementation phase of the ESDP. Tobias Flessenkemper, for instance, argues that although the EU police missions in Macedonia and Bosnia were reorganized and streamlined at the same time to make them more effective, the Council General Secretariat found it challenging to manage these reforms in a co-ordinated manner. This, he claims, meant that an opportunity was missed to standardize working methods and approaches across civilian ESDP operations.

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Recent developments show that the Council General Secretariat has learned from this and other experiences. However, they also underline that reforms of the governance structure of the ESDP are often viewed suspiciously by the member states who fear a loss of influence. A first initiative by Javier Solana to reinforce the implementation capacity of civilian crisis management structures in Brussels was met with some resistance by member states. His proposal to strengthen the civilian crisis management department, which has a staff of about 50 compared to some 200 experts in the EU Military Staff, was criticized as an attempt at ‘empire building’. Yet scepticism gradually gave way to pragmatic assessment. Against the background of an increasing number of civilian ESDP actions, repeated calls for stronger operational and political support from Brussels for missions, the acknowledged lack of a credible assessment capacity and other shortcomings, a consensus emerged among the member states that Council Secretariat structures needed to be strengthened. The start of preparations for the most challenging civilian ESDP endeavours so far – in Kosovo (the largest ever operation) and in Afghanistan (the first operation in a truly non-benign environment), further enhanced this understanding.2 At the time of writing, the need to overhaul the civilian crisis management department and establish a civilian planning and conduct capability, headed by a civilian operation commander, is widely accepted. According to blueprints, the new civilian chain of command is in some respects similar to that of military ESDP operations. The Brussels-based operation commander is responsible for the command and control of civilian missions at the strategic level, providing guidance to their leaderships and reporting to the Political and Security Committee. He or she acts within the strategic guidelines set by the latter and under the overall authority of the High Representative for the CFSP. The advantages of appointing a civilian operation commander are many. First, the civilian chain of command is clarified and a counterpart for the military chain is established. This makes civilian-military co-ordination easier and contributes to avoiding the kinds of tensions between military and civilian operations discussed by Thomas Mu¨hlmann in Chapter 4 and Thomas Bertin in Chapter 5. Second, a more hands-on approach to the control of missions by Brussels promises to constrain the former to be more responsive to the evolving realities on the ground and to refocus mission activities when necessary. Changes in the leadership of on-going operations would not necessarily disrupt operations as it happened, for instance, in the case of EUPOL Proxima (see Chapter 6). The civilian operation commander would provide leadership for the inbetween period. Finally, the somewhat patchy approach to the assessment and identification of lessons to be learned from civilian missions that was highlighted by, among others, Xymena Kurowska in her chapter on EUJUST Themis, is rectified by the creation of a body with horizontal oversight over all civilian missions. This will make the ESDP more cumulative, enabling it to build up a repertoire of effective crisis management practices.

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On a related note, a number of case studies highlighted the challenges missions encounter in implementing their mandates because there is no overarching concept defining the division of responsibilities across the first and second EU pillar and regulating the transition from an ESDP operation to European Commission good governance projects. For instance, in Chapter 6 Flessenkemper documents how inter-pillar jealousies hampered co-operation between the parallel police reform activities of the European Commission and EUPOL Proxima. Similar problems were encountered in EU Just Themis as discussed in Chapter 7. The proposed EU Constitution, briefly discussed by Maria Freire in Chapter 2, was intended to alleviate problems such as these. It was scheduled to enter into force before 2007, but its rejection by referenda in France and The Netherlands led to an impasse. Officially, the ratification process was not abandoned, and in fact continued to be pursued by some. However, in the absence of a consensus among member states about what to do with the constitutional project, a ‘reflection pause’ was announced by the European Council in the aftermath of the failed referenda. It ended when the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, acting in her capacity as the president of the European Council for the first half of 2007, used the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaty to bring the issue back to the table. Although the term ‘constitution’ is conspicuously omitted, the Declaration of Berlin promised ‘a renewed common basis’ for the European Union by 2009. At the European Council in June 2007 the heads of state and government, after acrimonious negotiations, agreed to revive what Britain’s former Europe minister, Dennis MacShane (2007), called the ‘mummy of Tutankhamen — beautifully fashioned, but dead’. The new reform treaty, which is scheduled to enter into force in 2009, will among other things introduce a beefed-up foreign affairs chief ‘‘who will combine the posts of High Representative for the CFSP and vice-president of the European Commission in charge of external relations’’. Although one of the most innovative provisions of the original constitutional text, it generated little controversy among member states. Together with the creation of an European External Action Service (drawn from the officials of national diplomatic services, the Council Secretariat and the European Commission, including the network of its about 120 oversees delegations with their roughly 5,000 experts) the creation of what amounts de facto to an EU foreign minister will do away with the pillared structure that has been hampering the implementation of ESDP operations and coherence between them and follow-on European Commission projects. Not wishing to wait for the treaty amendments that are required for ushering in these innovations, the EU took steps to bring in elements through the backdoor. The seeds sown during the extended negotiations on the Constitution bore fruit in an under-reported development. Mirroring the provision in the Constitution and on a proposal emanating from Solana’s milieu, the head of the European Commission delegation in Macedonia was ‘double-hatted’

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as EU Special Representative (EUSR) in 2005. Ironically, the strained relationship between the Council and Commission representatives in Skopje was resolved by appointing a Commission official to the position of the Council’s representative in the country. Not all member states were happy about this development. Some were concerned about blurring the red lines between the two pillars. Others jumped on the opportunity to create a strong and united EU presence on the ground. In the end, pragmatism and innovation prevailed. A small EUSR-dedicated team was attached to a several times stronger Commission delegation in order to implement the mandate of the double-hatted EUSR. Interestingly, the latter was, albeit for a very brief spell, even in the chain of command of the ESDP police operation Proxima. The merger of Council and Commission functions in the form of a personal union proved successful. At the time of going to the press, Brussels is considering opening an EU, i.e., a joint Council-Commission representation to the African Union in Addis Ababa. Following the closure of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia scheduled for mid-2008, the Union is also likely to appoint one person as both EUSR and head of the Commission delegation in Sarajevo. However, the difficult transition from the EU Police Advisory Team in Skopje to the Commission police reform project underlines that a personal union is not sufficient to tackle all complications on the ground that flow from the pillared structure of the EU. The difficulties were because the double-hatted EUSR did not figure prominently in the Brussels-centred process through which the transition was managed. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that there is no functional alternative for the measures foreseen by the reform treaty if the coherence of European foreign and security policy in the implementation phase is to be enhanced. If the complex and pillared governance mechanisms through which the EU makes and implements foreign policy constitute a challenge for its aspiration to fashion itself into an influential international actor, so does the acquisition of civilian and military capabilities to be deployed in ESDP missions. Freire discusses some of the difficulties bedevilling the capability development process in Chapter 2. Here we want to expand on two crucial points, finances and the European Defence Agency. Beginning with the former, it is common in the scholarly literature as well as in the mass media to point out the limited funds available to the ESDP. The base line (implicit or explicit) of this comparison is often the USA. The assumption is that unless the Europeans match Washington’s defence budget – at the moment they spend less than half of what the USA spends on defence, – the ESDP will remain a minor league player in international security affairs. While this is a questionable point, not least because the EU is not trying to match America’s war-fighting capability, there is a sense in which the ESDP will suffer from a capability-expectations gap until the member states agree to pool more of their military resources to underpin the Union’s emerging security policy role identity. So far progress on this issue has been slow.

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Even before the first military operation was deployed, EU military experts agreed that some form of common financing encompassing both administrative and in-theatre expenditures was necessary if the Union was serious about acquiring a rapid military response capability. With France squarely behind the project, member states, except for Denmark which opted out of EU military activities, agreed a limited arrangement to finance certain common pre-deployment and operational costs of EU-led military operations.3 The remainder had to be covered, a´ la North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on a ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ basis. The limits of the 2002 burden-sharing arrangement were shown up by EU military operations Concordia and especially Artemis. In the case of the latter, the Union’s first autonomous military operation, the framework nation had to do the major work in terms of providing both human and financial resources. Transportation and accommodation costs exceeded tens of millions of euro, but had to be born by France according to the ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ principle. The so-called common costs amounted to a mere 10 per cent of the overall mission budget. The case was made by Paris and other capitals that this undermined the credibility of the ESDP. While the majority of member states disagreed, they conceded the need for a permanent financing mechanism for EU military operations. However, Athena, which was established in early 2004, is based on a restricted definition of ‘common costs’. They remain limited to the incremental costs incurred in setting up and running headquarters and in providing support to the military force as a whole, for instance expenditures for infrastructure and medical services. Despite the provision that the transport and lodging of EU troops can be financed in common if the Council decides to do so for a particular operation, the member states never arrived at such a decision, not least because of serious concerns by Germany – the biggest contributor to the Athena budget.4 An attempt by some member states to extend the scope of Athena in the context of its review in 2006 proved unsuccessful as it was met with the counterargument that doing so might produce a reverse effect, that of a reduced appetite for joint military operations. However, at the end of December 2006, a step forward was taken in the common funding of military interventions to add credibility to the battle group concept. After a lengthy negotiating process, the member states agreed that the Athena mechanism would cover a portion of the expenditure for airlifting battle groups to their theatres of operation. Incidentally, this agreement mirrors the compromise reached by NATO at its Riga summit of November 2006, where NATO allies agreed to share the costs of airlift for short notice deployments of their Response Force (NRF). While the political difficulties surrounding the financing of the military ESDP seem to suggest that the capability-expectations gap in this area will affect the EU for some time to come, good progress is being made in tackling the funding challenge when it comes to the civilian ESDP. As indicated by some of the preceding chapters, the clear institutional bifurcation of the

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ESDP into civilian and military operations is correlated with different modes of financing. Unlike military expenditures, civilian ESDP deployments are financed from the so-called CFSP budget line of the European Community budget. Albeit still limited compared to the latter, which in 2006 was 112 billion euro, the CFSP budget has risen steeply in recent years. The initial amount of some 30 million euro back in 2002 grew to some 60 million in 2005. Reflecting the proliferation of missions, the CFSP budget was nearly doubled in 2006 when it reached about 100 million euro. Further gradual increases are planned under the 2007–13 financial perspective, by the end of which the CFSP budget should reach 250 million euro per year. Further political momentum for funding the growing aspirations of the ESDP was created when EU foreign policy supremo Solana appointed a personal representative for relations with the European Parliament in CFSP matters in 2006. The European Parliament, it has to be remembered, has budgetary powers in relation to the CFSP. The budgetary constraints on the development of the civilian ESDP, then, differ from those on the build-up of military capabilities. Yet the size of defence budgets is only one factor in the capability development process. Another crucial element is how the money is spent. Unlike the USA, there is neither an overall European procurement strategy nor a consolidated Europe-wide defence industry. Hence, the demand for the acquisition of military capabilities is mostly determined by the requirements of national armed forces, and the supply is often provided by national defence industries. This fragmentation of markets and procurement policies means that Europeans get less capability for each euro spent than the Americans. And what is more, what they get may not be interoperable. The quality dimension of the problems is further aggravated by the fact that EU capitals allocate five times less funds to military research and technology than Washington. The result is that the technology gap that for example hampered co-operation between American troops and their EU allies in the war over Kosovo continues to widen. To tackle the non-monetary challenges faced by the military ESDP, member states, excluding Denmark, agreed to set up the European Defence Agency in 2004.5 It has a staff of about 100 and its budget in 2007 was some 30 million euro. Headed by the High Representative for the CFSP, who chairs the Steering Board meetings on which the defence ministers of all participating countries are represented, the agency is basically an informational clearing house and a facilitator. It does not have steering or enforcement powers, acting instead, as its chief executive put it, ‘as a conscience and as a catalyst, and an incubator of ideas and initiatives’ (Witney, 2005). The agency demonstrated its ability to inject new political momentum into the capability development process when its initiative to create a European defence procurement regime was accepted by the member states. Launched in July 2006, this intergovernmental regime comprises all agency members except Spain and Hungary. Its main objective is to regulate how

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national procurement contracts exceeding one million euro are handled. According to the agreed rules, the agency has to be informed of such tenders, and they have to be publicly announced on an electronic bulletin board administered by the agency. Although the regime does not usher in a single defence market policed by the European Commission and subject to legal enforcement, it does constitute a first significant step in establishing a common defence equipment market across the Union. Shortly after the introduction of the regime’s code of conduct, the agency issued a report containing its long-term vision of European defence capability needs. While inevitably sketchy in its depictions of the future of international security, the analysis does contribute to the convergence of national defence policy planning expectations around a set of shared markers. The report argues that for the EU to raise its international security profile and respond to the challenges it will have to face, the ESDP has to, among other things, develop truly expeditionary and multinational forces with network-enabled capabilities and an emphasis on civil-military interoperability. Based on the report, the participating states agreed in December 2006 on the principles of a new capability development plan. It will map out Union priorities in the defence realm beyond the Headline Goal 2010. Material capabilities are important but so are ideas. A key contribution of the Eastern European member states to the ESDP is the fresh perspective on European security they bring to the table. Working together, they managed to deflect the ESDP from its original geopolitical trajectory. As our volume underlines, the Western Balkans have been playing a major role in the development of the ESDP. Its formation was partly a response to the failure of European foreign policy in the region in the 1990s, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. Later the Balkans became the ‘testing ground’ for the first ESDP deployments, as well as the theatre of their largest operations. The lessons learned in the region have been helping to improve the manner in which Brussels goes about planning and running its military . and civilian interventions (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2007). And the region retains its importance for second-pillar activities. At the time of going to press, preparations for the launch of the largest-ever and most complex civilian operation – an integrated rule-of-law mission in Kosovo – are nearing their end. Yet our chapters on Aceh, Congo and Georgia also show that the reach of the ESDP has been significantly enlarged since its beginnings in the Western Balkans. Of particular geopolitical importance is the policy’s extension into post-Soviet space, not only to Georgia but also to Moldova and Ukraine – the border assistance mission EUBAM Moldova. The European Security Strategy (EU ISS, 2003) identifies the European neighbourhood as a crucial arena for European foreign policy. A ring of well-governed countries to the east of the EU is described as a crucial prerequisite for its security. Yet were it not for the lobbying of the ex-communist EU member states, the ESDP’s eastward turn would not have taken place.

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On many issues, the Eastern European members of the EU, including since January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria, loudly celebrate their differences. Yet when it comes to what they bill as sluggish EU policy toward Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood, they are resolute and united. Without colonial baggage and thus without strong interests in Africa, Asia or South America, their involvement in the Union’s foreign policy debates tends to be limited to that of a mere supplement – neither a plus nor a minus. But take Russia and the frozen conflicts in post-Soviet space, and instead of simply accepting the existing political consensus which they consider as evidence of old Europe’s intellectual and even moral exhaustion, the newcomers challenge it. This is not to suggest that since the 2004 big-bang enlargement EU policy toward Russia has been dramatically changed in either substance or style. Yet there is consensus in the EU Council that the rule-of-law mission in Georgia and the EU border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine would not have been deployed if it were not for the new member states. Of course, the fact that Georgia and Ukraine were basking in the afterglow of their respective Rose and Orange revolutions facilitated this eastward push. While at first, the newcomers worried about how to press for a change of EU policy toward Russia without being perceived by their fellow Europeans as driven by backward-looking anti-Russian instincts, the former concern eventually prevailed. They made the European neighbourhood policy and the eastward enlargement of the ESDP their flagship foreign policy programmes. This eastward turn, although limited (so far), was not built on mere noise made by the new member states. Russian language skills and good knowledge of and experience in overcoming the legacy of the Soviet legal system proved crucial assets in making the ESDP work in post-Soviet space. Moreover, while in all other ESDP operations Eastern Europeans play a comparatively small role, they fill(ed) a significant percentage of posts including senior positions in EUJUST Themis and EUBAM Moldova. On a more symbolic note, even presidents and prime ministers of the new member states pay visits to ‘their’ missions. The bottom line is that while old Europe might see these ESDP operations as one-off experiments, the new member states count on their replication in the future. Continuing with the new Eastern European member states, somewhat surprisingly they have had limited impact so far on the relationship between the EU and NATO. Official EU-NATO meetings continue to be formal in tone and format, narrow in agenda and extremely light in substance. The two organizations, though they have a largely overlapping membership, opt for ‘EU-izing’ or ‘NATO-izing’ issues rather than tackling them jointly. It is therefore not surprising that occasional frustration results in bold admissions, for instance by the NATO Secretary-General, that NATO-EU relations are ‘stuck in the ‘90s’ and the bandwidth of co-operation between the two organizations remains astoundingly ‘narrow’ (Scheffer, 2007). Yet the bureaucratic squabbling is largely confined to the corridors of power in

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Brussels. In the field in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the two work pragmatically side-by-side (cf. Keohane, 2006). Although, as Gabriele Cascone underlines in Chapter 10, EU-NATO interaction on the ground is unlikely to advance beyond a certain point without the blessing of the headquarters. This caveat notwithstanding, a new bottom-up approach is evolving whereby solutions to co-ordination problems are hammered out by staff-to-staff meetings in theatres of operation and only then sent to headquarters for approval. While in Bosnia a top-down approach still prevailed (see Chapter 5), this was no longer the case in Kosovo where the mechanics of co-operation between the ESDP rule-of-law mission and NATO’s Kosovo Force were designed on the ground. Finally, the first-ever participation by the USA in an ESDP operation – in Kosovo – will in all likelihood also contribute to the smoothening of co-operation between the EU and NATO, in particular if it should set a precedent for the future. In the remainder of the chapter, we turn to a different mode of analysis. We draw on select theoretical concepts to sketch out, in tentative fashion, patterns emerging in the implementation of the ESDP. The ESDP is often described as an intergovernmental policy format – governed by the member states. Our case studies, in line with research on the administrative governance of the CFSP more generally (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006; Smith, M.E., 2004), show that a more nuanced analysis is required to capture the complexity of the Union’s international security actions. In her chapter on EUJUST Themis, Kurowska documents how its initiation and implementation was influenced by policy entrepreneurs in the Council General Secretariat who regard the ESDP as their baby and wish to see it become stronger and more effective. Member states played an important role in the policy process but they did not control it. The proposal for an ESDP rule-of-law mission was introduced to the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management by Lithuania. It was a Brussels-based initiative rather than one coming from the foreign ministry, which at the time was still in the early phase of getting to know the intricacies of the comitology in the EU capital not least because the country was not even yet a full member of the Union. The proposal was keenly supported by the directorate for civilian crisis management in the Council Secretariat, which made a difference in a decision context characterized by the absence of strong national preferences either for or against a civilian ESDP intervention in Georgia on the part of extant member states. The Council staff had two reasons to wish to see the initiative succeed. First, it was an excellent opportunity to test the doctrine of rule-of-law missions, work on which they were just completing. Second, they wanted to move the development of the civilian ESDP forward by getting it ‘out of the police box’ in order to demonstrate, both to third countries and the European Commission, its broader relevance for EU crisis management. Incidentally, the importance of the Solana milieu in launching Themis also shows that it

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is too simple to describe the ESDP as reactive. There clearly was also a proactive element at play, although the pro-Western Rose Revolution preceding the deployment was an important factor in the decision to raise the profile of the Union’s engagement in the country. As to the implementation of Themis, it, too, was influenced by dynamics that go beyond intergovernmentalism pure and simple. Tensions existed between, on the one hand, the member states and the Council Secretariat and, on the other, the European Commission, which was already working on law reforms in the country and thus initially questioned the rationale for an ESDP mission. While the member states ‘won’ this debate, the ensuing inter-institutional negotiations about Themis’ mandate resulted, on the insistence of the Commission, in the functional disaggregation of first- and second-pillar rule-of-law reforms. This, in turn, limited the mission’s impact. Analysts have identified the variegation of the governance mechanisms shaping the production of European foreign policy as one of its characteristics (Jørgensen, 1997; Rosamond, 2005; White, 2001). The same can be said about the ESDP even though it does not stretch across the three pillars of the EU. Its multiple realities have to do with the fact that it is a partial policy still under construction and with its vaunted flexibility, which is often seen as setting it apart from European Commission external action. Paul Kirwan’s analysis of the EU involvement in the implementation of the peace accord ending the conflict in the Aceh province of Indonesia highlights how the ESDP policy process and its timelines were creatively circumvented to create an Initial Monitoring Presence. The purpose of this formally extralegal body was to fill the gap between the signing of the peace accord and the commencement of the ESDP operation. After about a month, the time needed for the regular policy process to be finalized, the Initial Monitoring Presence was transformed into the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Once the mission was formally underway, heterodoxy continued to be a feature of policy implementation. For instance, due to the excellent personal contacts between, on the one hand, the mission head and his chief of staff and, on the other, the Council Secretariat and the European Commission, the Aceh Monitoring Mission was able to receive special treatment by Brussels. Financial and other civilian ESDP procedures which normally take months to complete were fast-tracked and dealt with in days or weeks by imaginatively interpreting and at points bending rules (Feith, 2007). There is an important strand of research that claims that the ESDP is of limited use, marginal and unimportant. Shortcomings in military hard- and software such a strategic lift and network enabled capabilities and in speedily deployable civilian expertise as well as a lack of political solidarity among member states are highlighted to support the claim (Jakobsen, 2006; Shepherd, 2006; Salmon, 2005). Yet this argument suffers from what can loosely be called omitted variable bias. Yes, the ESDP has civilian and military capability shortfalls, and political divisions about the functions and scope of Union interventionism persist. Yet these ‘input’ problems notwithstanding, the

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‘output’ generated by the ESDP does make a difference even though all its operations so far have been ‘low intensity’ (Lucarelli and Menotti, 2006: 152). To render this difference visible, one has to choose host countries, rather than European or global order, as the level of analysis, and peacebuilding and crisis management as objects of analysis, rather than, say, the fight against terrorism. Our case studies demonstrate that a number of ESDP operations did/do have what Roy Ginsberg (2001) calls significant ‘external political impact’ on third countries. Clearly, this was/is the case with the EUPOL missions in Macedonia and Bosnia, with the EUFOR operation in Bosnia and with the monitoring mission in Indonesia. All these deployments made/make an indispensable contribution to peacebuilding in their host countries by changing local policies, institutions, practices and/or attitudes. Among other things, ESDP operations were/are active in Europeanizing local police forces (Proxima and the EUPM); building trust among former enemies and steering the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants (the Aceh Monitoring Mission); and deterring spoilers of the peace and reassuring the victims of the former conflict that they will not again become the target of aggression (EUFOR Althea). From among the operations not covered in detail in this book, EUBAM Moldova and EUBAM Rafah did/do change facts on the ground, notably by reducing cross-border smuggling between Ukraine and Transniestria and facilitating the cross-border movement of Palestinians between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.6 Yet external political impact is not only material; it may also be symbolic or as Ginsberg (2001) calls it, cognitive. Our case studies underline that symbolic policies that are designed to enhance the legitimacy and reputation of the EU abroad are an important output of the ESDP. For instance, the military operation Concordia in Macedonia had only 400 soldiers and lasted about nine months. It was important not primarily because it prevented a slide back into inter-ethnic fighting – peace was well entrenched in Macedonia at the time and the country was moving forward on the reform agenda of the Ohrid framework accord. More important than the mission’s security impact on the ground were two of its features. It was the first EU military operation in the Balkans, where the Union had failed as peacemaker in the 1990s and where, consequently, its reputation as a security actor was low. And it was the first Berlin Plus operation, i.e., the first time the ESDP drew on NATO assets. Together, these two features demonstrated to the Western Balkans and the world that the EU, at the beginning of the new century, was a different actor than that of the 1990s – more responsible and powerful. Similar points can be made about EUJUST Themis and EUFOR RD Congo. While the 400 EU soldiers in a country the size of Western Europe were a symbol of the Union’s commitment to peace in Africa, the 10 rule-law-experts in Georgia symbolized Brussels’ new willingness to get involved in democracy promotion and peace-building in

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post-Soviet space. Likewise, the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia with a staff of 240 raised the Union’s profile in Asia and, incidentally, encouraged ASEAN countries to strengthen the security dimension of their cooperation. It is easy to dismiss the symbolic dimension of the ESDP as some analysts do (Helly, 2006b). Yet all major international relations theories from realism to liberalism and constructivism argue in their different ways that how an international actor is perceived or discursively framed by others makes a difference to its ability to achieve desired outcomes. This general point can be illustrated by the example of EUFOR Concordia. The perception inside and outside Brussels that the operation symbolized the Union’s new military role and the smooth functioning of EU-NATO cooperation under Berlin Plus did much to empower the EU to relieve NATO in Bosnia, where EUFOR Althea has since then been playing an important role in ensuring peace and stability. There is one more point we want to discuss in relation to the ESDP’s external political impact. Critics correctly point out that in many cases the EU does not intervene in situations where its (limited) capabilities could conceivably stop grievous harm being inflicted upon innocent people. The civil war in Darfur, which has been associated with massive human suffering if not genocide, is often mentioned to illustrate the argument. Yet this critique, while important, does not do full justice to the complexity of the politics of international interventions. In the case of Darfur, the EU did prepare for a possible employment of troops. It carried out an informal fact finding mission, and there was significant support among Solana’s milieu and a number of member states to launch an operation. But Brussels ran into opposition from within Africa. To understand the resistance a bit of context is required. Africa has been marred by more than 20 major civil wars since 1960. The record of the international community in these conflicts, especially in Rwanda and Darfur, has been poor. Furthermore, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions are not always regarded by African governments as a welcome solution to African problems. Although the large majority of UN troops is made up of Africans and Asians, they are operating under the political direction of the UN Security Council, which is widely perceived on the continent as being dominated by the West.7 In light of this, the African Union took a decision in 2003 to create an African Standby Force. Once it is fully-operational in 2010, it will be made up of five regional brigades of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers each, and it will have the capacity to handle complex peacekeeping missions as well as post-conflict peacebuilding. Interventions to put an end to genocide are an explicit part of the objectives of the force. The African Union regards the standby force as an attractive alternative to United Nations and European military involvement on the continent. The latter two organizations lend their support to the creation of a regional firebrigade that would act as a first responder to wars and other crises. For

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instance, the EU, through its African Peace Facility, which channels funds earmarked for development to peace and security initiatives in Africa, contributes around 100 million euro per year to the African Union Peace Fund that, among other things, finances the creation of the African Standby Force. With the standby force not yet operational but with a first multilateral operation in Burundi under its belt, the African Union agreed in 2004 to deploy a small monitoring mission to Darfur. It was later significantly strengthened to stop the fighting between, on the one hand, the troops of the Islamic government in Kharthum and their allies, the Janjaweed militia, and, on the other hand, the rebels of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement. African-led and staffed, the mission in Sudan (AMIS) is primarily financed by the EU and its member states whose commitment up until February 2007 exceeded 400 million euro. It is in the overall political context just described that those voices in Africa prevailed who argued that an ESDP intervention in Darfur would undermine the agreed policy of creating African capabilities to solve African problems. Taking into account African ownership, the EU Council thus decided not to deploy a fully-fledged ESDP mission to Darfur. Instead, it agreed to support AMIS. Since 2005, EU police experts and military observers have been seconded to the African Union. We want to conclude this chapter by asking what will happen to the ESDP after the departure of Javier Solana as the High Representative for the CFSP? This is a legitimate question given the central role Solana and his milieu played in creating the ESDP and raising its security policy role performance (see Chapter 3). Is there a risk that under a less skilful and visionary management, the ESDP will lose its dynamism? The governance and output of the ESDP show the imprint of the first High Representative for the CFSP and his entourage. Partly this is simply a reflection of Solana’s personnel decisions – whom he appointed to which posts in the foreign policy machinery of the Council. For instance, one of Solana’s closest advisers and his deputy head of cabinet, Pedro Serrano, was appointed as the head of the civilian crisis management directorate. More fundamentally, under his leadership and often in response to his initiative the administrative governance of the ESDP and the strategic culture underpinning it were elaborated. New bodies were created and existing ones were granted more (or occasionally less) staff, resources or competencies. Many of these actions required political authorization of the member states. But in all cases, the Solana milieu played a key role in how these decisions were implemented. The making of the European Security Strategy is a case in point. The role of the Solana milieu in elaborating it has been discussed, albeit incompletely. Besides the High Representative himself, the head of the directorate general for external relations, Robert Cooper, the head of the Policy and Early Warning Unit at the time, Christoph Heusgen, and Patrice Bergamini, Policy Unit member, provided crucial input. Incidentally, the

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three key drafters represented the Big Three – Great Britain, Germany and France. Later, they were joined by Leonardo Schiavo and Pedro Serrano, the head and deputy head of Solana’s cabinet. With the Italian and Spanish representatives on board, the core drafting team represented the European Quint. In brief, even while acknowledging that the principals – the member states – left their imprint on the genes of the ESDP, it is in more than one way the ‘baby’ of the agents, Solana and his collaborators, whom they charged with forming it. This brings us back to our original question. How will Solana’s departure affect the ESDP? The short answer is not much. Naturally, the political profile of his successor both within the EU and beyond it and the leadership style and qualities will be important determinants of her or his ability to influence the ESDP. So will be the institutional affiliation. As we saw earlier, from 2009 onwards the High Representative will also serve as the European Commissioner for external relations. Yet there are good reasons to believe that whatever the value of these variables will be, the ESDP is unlikely to deviate far from the trajectory on which it was put by the first High Representative. These reasons have to do with factors that in the literature on international institutions are covered under the rubric of institutional stickiness or, more formally, path-dependency (Pierson, 1998; Pollack, 1996). Here we concentrate on two elements of the institutionalization of the ESDP initiated under Solana that will contribute to a certain degree of continuity in how the ESDP evolves in the future. They are not necessarily the most important factors but they allow us to discuss important dimensions of the ESDP highlighted by our case studies.8 Our volume provides ample evidence that the ESDP enlarges the EU foreign policy agenda without necessarily diminishing the scope of national foreign policies. The fact that the ESDP expands the overall output of the European foreign policy system has to do with the politics of scope (Ginsberg, 1989). In the Balkans, for instance, the ESDP allowed the Europeans to relieve the USA, and to take on the role of military peacekeepers, a role which would be very difficult to play for any single member state. In other cases, national governments can do the job themselves but they prefer to act under the ESDP in order to enhance the legitimacy of the intervention. This is exemplified by the French-led military operation Artemis in the Ituri province in Congo, which was discussed by Martinelli in Chapter 8. The point to be made here is that the functional logic underpinning the politics of scale will remain operative in the ESDP as long as member states retain their interest in shaping world politics. As there is no evidence that Europeans are ready to become the ‘world’s Scandinavia’ – sticking their heads into the sand (Telo`, 2006: 58) – a significant downscaling of the Union’s security policy ambitions is unlikely. The institutional stickiness provided to the ESDP by the logic of scale is connected with both the structure and processes of world politics and the size of its key units. International security affairs approaches the ideal type of unipolarity and only nation-states of

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a certain size such as the USA, or perhaps Russia and China in the future, have the human and material resources to play a global leadership role. Other countries have to act together to bear in a systematic manner on world affairs. In the case of the EU, institutional co-operation is facilitated and encouraged by, among other things, the relations of interdependence that bind the member states together. Cost-benefit calculations and the international context within which the ESDP is embedded, then, can be expected to inject a strong element of continuity into the institutional and policy trajectory of security co-operation after Solana. Another factor making significant changes beyond what is already envisaged unlikely has to do with the unintended consequences of the EU’s construction of a particular presence – a certain identity, reputation, status and legitimacy in the field of international security. The EU’s presence is the result of both what it is and what it does. It is a relatively modest military power, or to put it more positively, a civilian power (Ducheˆne, 1973; Orbie, 2006; Stavridis, 2001a, 2001b; Whitman, 1998). As to what the EU does, as we argued above, sometimes the output of the ESDP is designed to be primarily symbolic. But there is a more basic point to be made about ESDP actions, irrespective of whether or to what extent they engender material or symbolic effects. The Union evolved a European way of doing crisis or post-conflict management. Official EU discourse highlights this differentia specifica, and the scholarly literature tends to agree that the Union is a unique international security player, though this consensus melts away when it comes to identifying the reasons for this state of affairs. There are a number of salient features that set the security policy of the post-Westphalian EU apart from those of traditional great powers. Among other things, the EU regards force as a tool of last resort, has a pronounced preference for peace support operations over war-fighting and believes that interventions should be legitimized by international law (cf. Berenskoetter, 2005; EU ISS, 2003; Lucarelli and Menotti, 2006; Kagan, 2004; Wallace, 2005). Our case studies highlight another important element of the Union’s differentia specifica – the emphasis put on the local ownership of the security sector and other reforms promoted by the ESDP. Operations as diverse as the EU police mission EUPM, EUFOR Althea and EUJUST Themis took/take pains to associate local stakeholders in their reforms in an effort to forge an alignment between local interests and circumstances and the Union’s images of political order. Arguably, the discourse and practice of local ownership, just like the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph, have become part of the Union’s normative ethos, its particular understanding of its mission civilisatrice, and a way to develop its own distinct international security role conception.9 The institutionalization of this identity makes it highly improbable that the ESDP will in the foreseeable future deviate from its current path which was, in no small measure, shaped by Solana and his entourage. This effect of the institutionalization of

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the ideational dimension of the ESDP is reinforced by a closely linked process of externalization (Schmitter, 1969). The EU’s reputation as a co-operative international security actor that can draw on sizeable military and civilian resources, feels bound by international law, is fair and committed to generating a light expatriate footprint feeds back into the development of the ESDP.10 It encourages third countries to approach the Union with requests to assist them (or others) in solving their security problems. Brussels’ response to such pleas, in turn, may entail an upgrade of the ESDP. Such an externalization dynamic was at play in the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission analyzed by Kirwan. While the Indonesian government was suspicious of the United Nations because of the role it was seen to have played in the secession of East Timor, Jakarta was ready to ask the EU to monitor and steer the disarmament and demobilization process foreseen by the Helsinki memorandum of understanding that ended the conflict in Aceh province. The Aceh Monitoring Mission, in turn, expanded the geographical reach of the ESDP and its inter-institutional links. It was the first mission in Asia and the first one launched in partnership with another regional organization, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Moreover, the mission set new standards for ESDP rapid response. It was set up within a very short time period and fully-operational on day one of its mandate.11 Similar externalization processes were present in the EU’s engagement on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Neither the USA nor the UN enjoyed an international standing among both Palestinians and Israelis that would have allowed them to play the role of impartial border monitors. Hence, with Washington’s active encouragement, the two sides turned to Brussels to assist them in finding a solution that would allow the opening of the border closed by Israel in response to the Intifada. Finally, externalization is also present in the Union’s security relations with post-Soviet countries such as Moldova who hope that equipped with the ESDP Brussels will act in a more robust manner to assist them in addressing their pressing security challenges. EUBAM Moldova is partly a reflection of these expectations. In short, there is clear evidence that the international security presence of the EU creates an international demand for ESDP interventions, which, in turn, is likely to fuel the reinforcement of the Union’s role in security affairs. To conclude our discussion of the future of the ESDP, while the member states have not lost their formal power to remake what they created, for example, by significantly limiting the scope of the ESDP or evolving it into a single, hard-power oriented policy, their actions are powerfully constrained by its institutionalization under Javier Solana. The future of the ESDP will be shaped in important ways by two institutional logics, namely the logic of consequences, which we discussed in relation to the politics of scale, and the logic of appropriateness, which we discussed in relation to the Union’s security role conception.

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Notes 1 The views expressed are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Council General Secretariat of the European Union. 2 While the Afghanistan mission, which is in the pipeline at the time of going to press, will be the most difficult from the perspective of mission security, EUBAM Rafah also faces significant challenges. The unexpected election victory of Hamas in the occupied territories and the continuing stalemate of the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis has had a negative effect on the security environment in which EUBAM Rafah operates. EU staffers are said to be ‘genuinely concerned for their lives’ (Katz, 2007). 3 ‘Common costs’ are those that cannot be allotted to individual states taking part in the military operation, for example, the costs incurred in the administration of headquarters, the hiring of local staff and public information activities. 4 EUFOR Althea in Bosnia, the EU supporting action to the African Union Mission in Sudan and EUFOR RD Congo are/were financed by the Athena mechanism. Germany’s contribution exceeds 20 per cent of the overall Athena budget. 5 The creation of the agency was foreseen in the draft European Constitution. Title V, Chapter II, Art 1–41 provides that ‘Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. An Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) shall be established to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.’ 6 Other ESDP operations have significantly less effect on their target societies. However, in assessing these cases, it is important to distinguish between internal and external political impact of the ESDP. For instance, in Chapter 3 Kurowska argues that an important rationale for the launch of EUJUST Themis and EUJUST Lex was to build up internal political capital to be used in inter-institutional negotiations (Themis) and to demonstrate that the ESDP was alive and kicking after the diplomatic fallout from Iraq among member states (Lex). In other words, missions are not necessarily intended to make a big difference on the ground. 7 The EU provides less than 5 per cent of UN peacekeepers. By way of comparison, the biggest EU contributing state – Poland – deploys some 700 peacekeepers under the banner of the UN, while the biggest overall contributing state – Bangladesh – deploys some 10,000 troops, twice as many as all EU member states combined. 8 For instance, one factor that is likely to play a significant role in shaping the future of the ESDP but which we do not discuss is socialization. 9 We borrow the term mission civilisatrice from Paris (2002). 10 This international image of the ESDP notwithstanding, there is room for reinforcing how the Union implements its local ownership strategies and limits its expatriate footprint. Greater concern for the consumers of ESDP operations, which is discussed by Bassuener and Ferhatovic´ in Chapter 12, would be one way . forward. Additional recommendations are found in Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2006). 11 The only other ESDP operation so far that deployed with a comparable speed was EUBAM Rafah, which, however, is significantly smaller than the Aceh Monitoring Mission.

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Index

Abazovic, Dragomir 179–80 Abkhazia 98, 166 Aceh province, Indonesia: earthquake and tsunami (2004) 129–30; history of conflict in 128–29, 130; Law on Governance of Aceh 138, 140 Aceh province, Indonesia, ESDP Monitoring Mission (AMM) 6, 27, 128–42, 198, 199–200; activities 135– 38; amnesty disputes 137–38; closure 135, 140; Commission for Security Arrangements 136–37; deployment 132–33, 134; governance issues 137– 38; Initial Monitoring Presence 132– 33, 139; lessons from 140–41; mandate and planning 132; mission impact 139–40; mission leadership 141; organization and management 133– 34; rapid establishment of 131; reconstruction 136; serious incident resolution 137; structure and staffing 134–35; weapons decommissioning 135–36 Afghanistan: ESDP civilian mission 19, 190; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 164, 172n; NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams 156, 168 African Conflict Prevention Pool 113, 126n African Peace Facility 200 African Union: African Peace and Security Agenda 112; and Darfur 157; and EU 112–13, 192; Peace Fund 201; and Sudan 201 Ahtisaari, Martti, UN special envoy in Kosovo 130, 155, 165 Ajello, Aldo, EUSR in Congo (DRC) 116 Albania 162

Albright, Madeleine, US Secretary of State 145 Alliot-Marie, Miche`le, French defence minister 157 Amsterdam, Treaty of (1997) 11, 160 Angola, and DRC 115 Annan, Kofi, UN Secretary General 168 Ashdown, Lord, as High Representative for Bosnia 47, 51–52, 72, 177 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 128, 130; coordination with EU mission (AMM) 131, 132, 134–35, 204 Awaludin, Hamid, Indonesian minister of law 130 Bachev, Dimitar 184 Baltic states, and Georgia 99–100 battle groups 15, 171–72 Belgium: EU presidency (2001) 116–17; and former African colonies 113 Bergamini, Patrice 201 Berlin, 1961 crisis 159 Berlin, Declaration of (2007) 191 Berlin Plus arrangements 13, 14, 34, 73–74, 76n; assessment of 156–58; and capabilities issues 153; and future of NATO-EU co-operation 155–56, 170; and NATO-EU relations in Bosnia 145–48, 151–52 Blair, Tony, UK Prime Minister 24n, 32, 160–61, 173, 175 Bosnia: civil war 43, 44, 160; economy 61–62, 181–82; ethnic complexity 174; and EU accession 162, 163; European Union Special Representative (EUSR) 53, 71–73; IFOR Implementation Force 66;

220

Index

illegal timber trade 70; Krimo Lovci crime hotline 57, 181; law enforcement 45–46; legacies of communism 54; Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) 63–64; Office of the UN High Representative (OHR) 45–46, 50, 52, 53, 63, 178–79, 192; organized crime 61–62, 70; perceptions of EU and ESDP in 174–84; Police Reform Directorate 60n; police restructuring 51–52, 58; political complexity 62; Srebrenica Working Group 51; Stabilisation and Association Agreement 50; State Border Service 46, 50; State Investigation and Protection Agency 50, 181; transition from UN to EU 56; United Nations International Police Task Force (UNIPTF) 43, 45–46, 49, 55–56; view of NATO in 174–76; views of intelligentsia on ESDP 183–84, see also Bosnia, EU Military Operation (EUFOR Althea); Bosnia, EU Police Mission; Dayton Agreement; Republika Srpska Bosnia, EU Military Operation (EUFOR Althea) 61–77, 149–52, 165, 174, 176–80; activities of 66–70, 176; as Berlin Plus operation 73–74, 76n; Bosnian perspectives on 177–79, 180; economic impact 182; force reduction 178–79; maintenance of stability 70, 176, 177–78; planning, mandate and organization 63–66; public relations 182; relations with Brussels (Council of the EU) 73; relations with NATO 73–75, 165; relations with other EU actors 71– 73; relations with SFOR 64–65; search for war criminals 68, 177, 179–80; as successor to SFOR 61, 63, 75, 150, 151, 176; targeting of organized crime 68–69, 76n; UNPROFOR (1992–95) 150; weapon control 68; work with law enforcement agencies 69, 177 Bosnia, EU Police Mission 6, 7, 19, 46– 60, 192; achievements 53–54; additional tasks 51; and lessons for ESDP 55–59; local ownership strategy 49; mandate implementation 48–51; and Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) 63; planning phase 55–

56; Police Reform Directorate 181; and police restructuring 52, 60nn; programmatic approach 57–58; public perceptions of 180–81; reform programmes 48–49; relations with EUFOR (Althea) 71–72, 181; relations with OHR/EUSR and European Commission 52, 53; statewide police force 49–50; structure of 47–48 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 98 Bulgaria 162, 163 Burundi 201 capability commitment 153, 171; conferences 13 capability development 19–20, 153, 195 Carty, Kevin, EUPM commissioner 56 Caucasus: instability 97–98, see also Georgia Central and Eastern Europe, role of EU in 21, 195–96 Chiarini, General Gianmarco 177, 179, 180 Chirac, Franc¸ois, French President 157, 173 Civilian Headline Goal 2008 action plan 16 Civilian Response Teams 16 Cold War: end of 10; NATO Long Term Defence Plan 159–60 Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom) 12–13, 18, 38; Congo (DRC) 119, 122; Georgia 99, 103, 107, 197; Macedonia 92–93 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 1, 10, 11, 160; and Bosnia 43; and European Commission 30– 31; and European Council 29–30; and mission financing 119, 121, 194; office of High Representative 29, 160; Petersberg Tasks 11, 15, 160; policy-making 17; and pre-eminence of Community interests 41n; relationship to ESDP 25–26, see also European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) concept of operations (CONOPS) 34, 82, 84 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 10 Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC): background of conflict 113–15;

Index challenges for ESDP missions 124– 26; corruption 124; Cotonou Agreement 117; elections (2006) 115, 122–23; ESDP missions 6, 20, 111– 27, 168; EU diplomacy and aid 116– 17; EUFOR 122–23, 199; human rights violations 124; Lusaka peace agreement (1999) 115; Operation Artemis 117–18; police and justice reform 117; and Rwanda genocide 114; security problems 124, 125; transitional process 115–16; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 116; UN Mission (MONUC) 113, 115– 16, 117–18; weapons availability 124 Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC), EUPOL Kinshasa 112, 118– 20, 127n; Integrated Police Unit (IPU) 118 Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC), EUSEC DR Congo 112, 120–22; mandate 120, 121; tensions with MONUC 125 Constitutional Treaty 15–16 Cooper, Robert, EU Council General Secretariat 32, 189, 201 Coppola, Brigadier General Vincenzo 181 Crisis Management Initiative 130 crisis management missions 2; implementation 3–4; inside stories 4– 5; need for overhaul of civilian missions 190; predominance of civilian over military 33–35, see also ESDP missions; Operations Croatia 63, 162 Croats, Bosnian 175–76 Curak, Nerzuk 183 Cyprus 65, 147, 170 Czechoslovakia, 1968 crisis 159 Damay, Major General Christian, EU Force Commander in Congo (DRC) 122, 123 Darfur, Sudan, EU and NATO in 157, 200–201 Davies, Justin, AMM chief of staff (Aceh) 141 Dayton Peace Agreement 44, 46, 76n, 162, 175; and EUFOR mandate 67, 151; and SFOR mandate 64; weakness of policing system 49 de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap, NATO Secretary General 151

221

Del Ponte, Carla, Chief Prosecutor at ICTY 179 Denmark 65, 194 development, versus security 32–33 D’Hooge, Bart, OSCE Police Development Unit in Skopje 82, 85, 96n disarmament operations, joint 15 Dodik, Milorad, Bosnian serb prime minister 179 East Timor 129 El-Masri, Khaled, kidnapping of 86 ESDP missions: administrative support for 134, 140; and AMM as model 141–42; in Bosnia 174–84; civilian 19, 20, 33–35, 82; and Darfur 157; EUSEC DR Congo 120–22; external political impact of 199–200; importance of leadership 141; inhouse evaluations 38–39, 187; Joint Action (EUFOR in DRC) 123; Joint Action (Proxima) 86; Joint Action (Themis) 102; local ownership (differentia specifica) 203; local perceptions of 173–88; military 19, 61; need for countrywide deployment 94–95; planning headquarters capability 148–49; pragmatism 27– 28; recommendations 186–87; role of 25–42; role for Ombudsman 187; size of 185–86, 187, 199, see also Bosnia; European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); Operations Estonia, and Georgia 99 EU African Peace Facility 117 EU Border Assistance Missions: Moldova/Ukraine 36, 37, 195, 196, 199; Rafah 35, 199, 205n EU Council General Secretariat 32, 34, 35, 190; and Aceh mission (AMM) 134; and civilian ESDP missions 197–98; fact-finding mission in Macedonia 81–82; and Georgia 99– 100, 101, 107; and mission support 94; need for strengthening 95; promotion of ESDP missions 37–38, 39 EU Military Committee (EUMC) 12, 18, 122, 150 EU Military Staff (EUMS) 12, 13, 18, 150–51, 190 EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts 13

222

Index

Europe-Caucasus-Asia transportation corridor (TRACECA) 98 European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) 13, 153 European Commission: and CFSP 30– 31; and civilian crisis management 35–37; and ESDP 5, 12, 19; European Humanitarian Office 117; and Georgia 35, 98, 100–102; Police Reform Project 82–83; policies in Aceh 138–39; and policy-making 31; relations with European Council 21, 32, 36–37, 100–101, 118, 124–25, 191; view of development 33 European Communities (EC) 1, 10 European Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme 48 European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), Balkans 141 European Constitution: draft 15, 21, 191, 205n; foreign ministry 16 European Council: and Africa 112; Copenhagen (2002) 149; Feira (2000) 12; Helsinki (1999) 12; joint project with Commission 118; Laeken (2001) 13, 28, 41n; and mission to Aceh 130; and principles of ESDP 17, 24n; relations with EUFOR (Althea) 73; rivalry with European Commission 21, 32, 36–37, 100–101, 118, 124–25, 191; role of 19, 35; Rome (1991) 160; Thessaloniki (2003) 81, 162 European Defence Agency (EDA) 15, 34, 194–95, 205n European Defence Community Treaty (1952) 9 European Development Fund 117, 119 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 21, 30; Georgia 98, 106 European Parliament, and NATO-EU Security Agreement 146–47 European Political Co-operation (EPC) 10 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 160 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 2, 5–6, 173; capability development 19–20, 195; civilian response plans 16, 33–35; commitment to 39; decision-making processes 26–27; and EU democratic deficit 40; and EUFOR (Althea) in Bosnia 71, 73, 149–52; financing of

192–94; implementation 19–20, 189– 205; institutional arrangements 12– 16, 189–90; instruments for external action 111; lessons from EUPOL Proxima (Macedonia) 94–96; and NATO 6, 13, 143–58, 169–70, 196– 97; origins of 5, 9–24; perceptions of 173–88; place in EU foreign policy 20–22, 75, 202–3; political and administrative governance 17–19, 197–98, 201–2; precursors 9–12; progress on 22–23, see also Berlin Plus arrangements; Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); ESDP missions European Security Strategy (ESS) 7, 14–15, 169, 201–2; and ESDP deployments 28–29; and EU as global actor 111; and view of development 33 European Union (EU): and African Union 112–13, 192, 200–201; and autonomous defence capacity 11–12, 195; defence expenditure 22, 192; democratic deficit in foreign policy 40; enlargement 153, 162, 196; European and Atlanticist divisions within 13–14; foreign policy instruments 20–22; and foreign policy system 202; as global actor 111, 141, 168, 202–3, 204; implementation research 3; institutional co-operation with USA 169–70; international security policy 111; military capacities 171–72; move towards political union 43, 160; and NATO (Berlin Plus arrangements) 145–48; and planning structures 56; relations with former Soviet republics 98, 166; relations with USA 6–7, 11– 12, 22–23, 160, 169–70; role in stabilization of Macedonia 81; and security policy 2–3, 31–32, 33; Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) 50, 81, 162–63, 167; and Western Balkans 167–68, see also member states European Union Special Representative (EUSR): Bosnia 53, 71–73; Congo (DRC) 116; Georgia 97, 103, 105; Macedonia 85, 92–93 External Action Service 18, 21–22, 191 Eyskens, Mark, Belgian foreign minister 40

Index Feith, Pieter, head of AMM (Aceh) 141 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, European Commissioner for external relations 32 Finland, and Aceh 133 Flessenkemper, Tobias 189 France: Bosnian view of 175; and EU defence 11–12, 161; and EUFOR Althea 66; and financing of ESDP missions 193; and former African colonies 113; and Macedonia 96n; and NATO 144; and Operation Artemis 118, 168; rejection of Constitutional Treaty 16 Fredriksen, Sven, UN-IPTF commander 55–56 Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 129, 140; weapons decommissioning 135–36 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), working parties 17 Georgia: Baltic states and 99–100; border concerns with Russia 106, 109–10n; corruption 97–98; elections 41n; EU relations with 98–99, 168, 196; European Commission delegation 105–6, 107; National Strategy for Criminal Justice Reform 103–4; reform of judiciary 101, 102– 3, 108n; Rose Revolution 97–98, 99 Georgia, EUJUST Themis operation 6, 21, 26–27, 30–31, 35, 97–110, 185; and ESDP 106–8; evaluation of 104, 186–87, 198; follow-up 104–6; Georgian support for 104, 105; launch of 102–3; progress of 103–4 Germany: Bosnian view of 175; contribution to EUFOR 66, 177; EU presidency (2007) 191; and EUFOR operation in DRC 122–23; and financing of ESDP missions 193, 205n Great Britain: and Africa 113; Bosnian view of 175; contribution to EUFOR 66; EU presidency (2005) 132; and NATO 160; view of ESDP 11–12, 160–61; view of EU defence policy 24n Greece 163, 170; and Macedonia 184; and NATO 162 Hague Platform on European Security 10

223

Headline Goal 2010 action plan 15, 34, 162, 172, 195; battle groups 15, 171 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, Aceh 130, 136 Heusgen, Christoph 201 Hungary, and NATO 162 Indonesia 128–29, 130, 168; relations with UN 130, see also Aceh international law 203, 204 International Organization for Migration 155 Interpol: in Bosnia 50; in Macedonia 87 Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) 98 Iraq: EU Mission 13–14, 36; US invasion of 13–14, 39, 148 Ireland, and EUPOL Proxima 83 Italy, contribution to EUFOR 66 Ivanov, Igor, Russian foreign minister 108n Jessen-Petersen, Søren, EUSR 85 Joana, General Pierre Michel, EUSEC DR Congo 120, 121 Jung, Franz Josef, German defence minister 177 Kabila, Joseph, President of Congo (DRC) 115 Kabila, Laurent, President of Congo (DRC) 114–15 Kalla, Yusuf, Indonesian vice-president 130 Karadzic, Radovan 175, 177, 179 Kemularia, Konstantine, Georgian justice minister 108n Kermabon, General Yves de 66 Kosovo 7, 11, 160, 172n; Diplomatic Observer Mission 132; ESDP civilian mission 19, 190; KFOR force 66, 165–66; Kosovo Police Service (KPS) 165; and Macedonia 78, 79; NATOEU mission 155, 158, 161, 165–67; rule-of-law mission 195; UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) 165 Leakey, General David, EUFOR commander 66, 67, 68–69, 72, 76n, 177 Lebanon, EU operation in 158

224

Index

Lindh, Anna, Swedish foreign minister 99 Lithuania 197; and Georgia 99, 100, 108n Luxembourg Report (1970) 10 Maastricht Treaty (1991) 1, 26, 43; inter-institutional framework 111, see also CFSP Macedonia 80, 162, 164; corruption 80; ethnic problems 78–79, 89, 184–85; EU Monitoring Mission 96n; EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement 81; European Commission delegation and EUSR 191–92; intelligence and policing 89– 90; need for police reforms 79–80; Ohrid Framework Agreement 79, 81, 93, 164, 184, 185; organized crime 89; popular perceptions of EU peacebuilding 184–86 Macedonia, EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) 6, 19–20, 34, 78– 96, 164, 185; co-operation with local stakeholders 86, 93–94; coordination of EU committees 92–93; ESDP Police Assistance Team (EUPAT) 91, 94; extensions and transitions 90–91; identity problems 83–84; impact evaluation 93–94; lessons from 94–96; limitations of 82; mission organization 85–86; planning and launch 81–83; and police reform 84, 93, 94; reform programmes 87–90; special policing functions 89–90; as stabilizing mission 84 Macedonia, Operation Concordia (ESDP) 19–20, 34, 81, 147–48, 185, 199 Macedonian-Albanian National Liberation Army 79, 184 MacShane, Dennis, British European minister 191 Mahmud, Malik, Free Aceh Movement 130 Major, John, UK Prime Minister 175 Malta 65, 147 Martens, Wilfried, Bosnian police restructuring commission 52n member states: commitment to EU security policy 31–32; contribution to EUFOR Althea 65; contribution to EUPOL Proxima 83; Eastern

European 195–96; and financing of ESDP missions 193; place of ESDP in 2, 202; restrictions on use of troops 69–70, see also individual countries; non-member states Merkel, Angela, German Chancellor 191 methodology 3–5 Michel, Louis, European Commissioner for development 116 Mitterand, Franc¸ois, French President 175 Mladic, Ratko 72, 163, 166, 175, 177 Mobuto Sese Seko (Joseph-Desire´ Mobuto) 114 Moldova 163, 166; EU Border Assistance Mission 36, 37, 195, 199 Montenegro 162, 163 Morillon, General Philippe, EU observer mission in Congo (DRC) 117 Namibia, and DRC 115 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): applications for membership 154; and autonomous EU defence capacity 11–12, 171–72; and Berlin Plus arrangements 145– 48, 151–52; in Bosnia 174–76; and capabilities issue 153; and CFSP 11; and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJFT) with WEU 144, 160; and Darfur 157, 200–201; and defence reform 155; and ESDP interaction 6, 13, 143–58, 169–70; and ESDP mission planning 23; and EU Command Element (EUCE) 147–48; and EUFOR (Althea) 73–75, 143, 149–52; and financing of ESDP missions 193; future for co-operation with EU 154–56, 196–97; International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan 164; Istanbul summit (2004) 151; Joint Forces Command (Naples) 163–64; in Macedonia 79, 143, 164, 185; Partnership for Peace programme 7, 147, 152, 154, 162; Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) 153, 171; Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Afghanistan 156; role of DSACEUR 146, 147, 150–51, 154; Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR) 51, 61, 63, 64–65, 74, 174,

Index 176; Washington summit (1999) 145, 169; and WEU 143–44, 169, see also SHAPE Netherlands, rejection of Constitutional Treaty 16 Neveux, Major General Bruno 168 Nice, Treaty of (2000) 13 Noghaideli, Zurab, Georgian prime minister 104 non-member states 2, 9–10; contribution to EUPOL Proxima 83 Norway, and Aceh 133, 134 Ohrid Border Process 148, 154 Ohrid Framework Agreement, Macedonia 79, 81, 93, 164, 184, 185 operational plan (OPLAN) 34 Operations: Allied Harmony (NATO) 19, 164; Amber Fox 147, 164; Artemis (ESDP) 20, 27, 34, 112, 117– 18, 149, 168; Concordia (ESDP) 19– 20, 34, 81, 147–48, 185, 199; EUFOR Althea 61–77, 149–52, 165, 174, 176–80; EUFOR RD Congo 112, 120–22; EUJUST Lex (Iraq) 27, 35; EUJUST Themis (Georgia) 6, 21, 26–27, 30–31, 35, 97–110, 185; EUPOL Kinshasa 112, 118–20, 127n; EUPOL Proxima 6, 19–20, 34, 78– 96, 148, 164, 185; EUSEC DR Congo 112; Sharp Guard (former Yugoslavia) 144 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 40, 81, 147, 164; and Georgian border mission 106; and security sector reforms 126 Palestine 168; EUBAM Rafah mission 35, 199, 205n; EUPOL mission 185 Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme 7, 147, 152, 154, 162, 167 Patten, Chris, EU external relations commissioner 99, 172n Peace Implementation Council (PIC), Bosnia 43, 59n, 63, 178, 179, 188n Pantz, Sylvie, head of Themis 102 Plitvice lakes 7–8 Policy and Early Warning Unit 18–19 Political and Security Committee (PSC/ COPS) 12, 18; and EUPOL Kinshasa mission 119; and extension of Proxima mission 90–91; and NATO 156; relations with EUFOR

225

(Althea) 73; reporting procedures 190; and Themis mission 103 Popovic, Zoran 183–84 procurement: Commission procedures 102; European Defence Agency 194– 95; problems for EUPM in Bosnia 55 Rapid Reaction Force 33, 171–72 Rapid Reaction Mechanism 117, 126– 27n Reith, General Sir John (DSACEUR) 73 Republika Srpska 44, 62–63, 163, 178– 79; EU sanctions against 72; policing 45, 46, 60n, 181; view of EU operations 174, 175 Rice, Condoleezza 40 Riuvo Custodio, Adilio, head of EUPOL Kinshasa mission 119 Robertson, Lord, NATO SecretaryGeneral 19 Romania 162, 163 Rome, Treaty of (1957) 10 Rose, General Michael 175 rule-of-law missions 195, 197–98 Rule-of-Law-Sector Working Group (ROLSWG), in Iraq 36 Russia: energy supplies 167; EU, NATO and USA and 166, 167, 196; relations with Georgia 98, 99, 106, 108n Rwanda, genocide 114, 200 Saakashvili, Mikheil, Georgian president 99, 103–4 St Malo, Franco-British summit (1998) 11–12, 14, 145, 161 Schiavo, Leonardo 201 Scholz, Ju¨rgen, Proxima head of mission 96n Schwarz-Schilling, Christian, High Representative in Bosnia 177, 178–79 security, versus development 32–33 security sector reform 15, 16, 126 Serbia 162, 163, 166; and membership of NATO 154–55; relations with Bosnia 62–63 Serrano, Pedro, civilian crisis management directorate 201 SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)) 147, 148, 154 Shevardnadze, Eduard, President of Georgia 97–98, 99

226

Index

Slovenia 162, 163 Solana, Javier, NATO SecretaryGeneral: and Berlin Plus arrangements 146; and commitment to defence policy 31–32; and EUFOR Althea 151; and EUFOR mission in DRC 123; and EUPOL Kinshasa mission 119; as High Representative of CFSP 12, 20, 29, 30, 47, 161; and implementation capacities 190; legacy of 201–2, 204; and Ohrid Framework Agreement 81; on pragmatism 27–28 Soros, George, and Georgia 99 South Ossetia 98, 166 Southeast Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) 163–64; Disaster Relief Operations 164 Southeast European Defence Ministerial (SEDM) 163, 164 Soviet Union: former 21, 160, see also Russia Sudan: AMIS mission 201; EU and NATO in Darfur 157, 200–201 Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement 201 Sweden 98–99, 133 Switzerland 133, 134 Tacis programme 37, 98 Talvitie, Heiki, EUSR 99 terrorism: concerns about 89; support for combating 15 Trajkovski, Boris, President of Macedonia, death 86, 87 Treaty on European Union (1992) 10 Turkey 163; and Berlin Plus arrangements 13, 170; contribution to EUFOR Althea 65; and NATO 162 Uganda, and DRC 114–15 Ukraine 163; EU Border Assistance Mission 36, 37, 195, 196, 199 United Nations: and Africa 200; cooperation with EU (Operation Artemis) 118; ESDP operations and 39, 40; EU contributions to peacekeeping 205n; and EUFOR in Congo (DRC) 122–23; and Indonesian independence 128; Millennium Development Goals 112; Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) 113, 115–16, 117–

18, 122, 123, 125; Office of the High Representative in Bosnia 45– 46 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), local elections programme in Aceh 139 United Nations International Police Task Force (UN-IPTF) 43, 45–46 United Nations Security Council, and Bosnia 43, 47, 151 United States of America: and Bosnia 168; Bosnian view of 175; and CFSP 11; co-operation with EU in Western Balkans 161–65; defence spending 192; institutional co-operation with EU 169–70; and invasion of Iraq 13– 14, 148; and Kosovo 165–67, 168; Macedonian perception of 184–85; National Security Strategy 7, 169; and NATO 10; relations with Russia 166, 167; view of ESDP 12, 22–23, 39–40, 159–61, 167–69 Van De Geer, Roeland, EUSR in Congo (DRC) 116 Viereck, Lieutenant General Karlheinz, EUFOR Operation Commander 122 Warsaw Pact 160 Washington summit (1999) 145 Western Balkans: Eastern European member states and 195; NATO and 148, 154–55; USA-EU co-operation 161–65, 166, see also Bosnia; Kosovo; Macedonia; Serbia Western European Union 9, 10, 11; incorporation into EU 12, 24n; and mission plans 34; Petersberg Tasks 11, 15, 160; relations with NATO 11, 143–44 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, President of Indonesia 129, 130 Yugoslavia, disintegration of 2, 10–11, 43, 160 Yusuf, Irwandi, governor of Aceh 140 Zhvania, Zurab, Georgian prime minister 101, 104 Zimbabwe, and DRC 115 Zurabishvili, Salome, Georgian foreign minister 100, 108n