Turkey and European Security Defence Policy: Compatibility and Security Cultures in a Globalised World 9780755610754

Citation preview

For my parents, Ahmet and Sevda

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of terrorism 2. Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of the spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction 3. Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of organised crime 4. Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of an accident in a nuclear power station 5. Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of a World War 6. Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of an accidental launch of a nuclear missile 7. Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of ethnic conflicts in Europe 8. Percentage of the EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of a nuclear conflict in Europe 9. Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of conventional war in Europe 10. Comparison of fears among EU15 citizens and Turkish citizens, respectively (2004) 11. Comparison of fears among new EU member states citizens and Turkish citizens (2008)

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12. Percentage of EU citizens who are for one common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union towards other countries 13. Comparison of the percentage of EU citizens and Turkish citizens who are for one common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union towards other countries 14. Percentage of EU citizens who are for a common defence and security policy among the European Union member states 15. Comparison of the percentage of EU citizens and Turkish citizens who are for a common defence and security policy among the European Union member states 16. Comparison of the percentage of EU25 and Turkish citizens who think that decisions on foreign and defence policies should be made jointly within the European Union

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has been altered several times after frank critiques and comments by colleagues and friends but mostly by my Ph.D. supervisor Professor Edward Moxon Browne. Without his encouragement, guidance and patience this work might have never been completed. Thanks to the Center for European Studies and the Faculty of Politics and Public administration at the University of Limerick for providing me with wonderful research possibilities and a wonderful home. I thank all of my colleagues and professors, especially Andrew Cottey, UCC who reviewed my work and guided me through all the hard work. Others whose contributions were so vital include Orhan Diren, MP in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, without whom the research in the Turkish Parliament would not have been possible. Also, I want to acknowledge my gratitude to Yasemin Elibol, Expert on International Relations in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, who opened doors for me, introduced me to the Parliamentary Assembly of Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE PA) in Copenhagen and is still helping me in my further research on EU-Turkey relations. During my research in OSCE PA, I worked alongside good friends and colleagues. Thanks to: R. Spencer Oliver, Secretary General, Tina Schøn, Deputy Secretary General, Gustavo Pallarés, Adviser to the President of OSCE PA, and Andreas Baker, Press and Programme Officer, for all the support and assistance in OSCE PA. Last but not least, I want to thank my family who has been the biggest support during my research. I especially want to thank my aunt, Aimée Lindenmayer Ay who helped me to clarify some parts of this book. My mother, Sevda provided constant support during the years, cheered me up whenever I was down and has always been there for me. This book is dedicated to her and my beloved father.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BiH BTC CEECs CFSP DLP DP DRC ENP ESS ETA EU3 EUPM FYROM ICJ IMF JDP JP MEDA MEPP MNCs MONUC NAP NATO

Bosnia and Herzegovina Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Central and Eastern European Countries Common Foreign and Security Policy Democratic Left Party Democrat Party Democratic Republic of the Congo European Neighbourhood Policy European Security Strategy Basque Homeland and Freedom Britain, France and Germany European Union Police Mission Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia International Court of Justice International Monetary Fund Justice and Development Party Justice Party Principal financial instrument of the European Union for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Middle East Peace Process Multinational Corporations United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo National Action Party North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

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OSCE OSCE PA PA PKK PLO PP RMA RPP RRF SAP TESEV TGNA TPP UNDP WEU WMD WP WRR WTO

TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly of Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe Palestine Authority Kurdistan Worker’s Party/ Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan Palestine Liberation Organisation Prosperity Party Revolution in Millitary Affairs Republican People’s Party Rapid Reaction Force Southeast Anatolian Project Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) Turkish Grand National Assembly True Path Party United Nations Development Programme Western European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction Welfare Party Wetenschappelijke Raad Voor Het Rgerinsbeleid (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy) World Trade Organisation

Introduction

This book analyses the gap between the security cultures of the European Union and Turkey, and highlights two perspectives of the discussion, ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’, on Turkey’s possible effect on EU security. The book answers the primary question: ‘Is there a gap between EU and Turkish security cultures?’ and the secondary question: ‘To what extent is Turkey an advantage for the European Security Defence Policy (ESDP)?’, in relation to the security culture literature, while revealing the European Union’s effect on the conduct of Turkish foreign policy. Having set the conceptual framework for globalisation and security, the book examines the theoretical constructions of security culture and theories, before going into details of the effects of globalised security threats on the EU and Turkey. Analysing the historical development of Turkish foreign policy, including the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, helps in understanding the cultural element in the Turkish security perception. Changes that are witnessed in foreign policy in different eras are examined, and changes in perceived threats are clarified in these eras separately. In the same manner, developments in EU foreign policy are studied. In order to illustrate the gap between the security cultures of the EU and Turkey, citizens’ views in the EU and Turkey regarding the security threats, and the fears of the people, are compared. Furthermore, the comparison of the policies of Turkey and the EU towards the neighbouring countries (of the Middle East and Black Sea regions) not only clearly demonstrates the gap, but also, in this framework, illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of Turkey for the ESDP. The book emphasises the importance of the ‘security card’, a doubleedged sword in disguise, which should be played very carefully. More

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importantly, it is essential not to simplify the EU, as the ‘optimistic’ perspective does, by considering it only as a military organisation which needs Turkey’s manpower and army. As the book argues, the manpower and security perception of Turkey may be a matter of concern in Turkey’s relations with the EU; this is also indicated in the Negotiating Framework Agreement (2005): In the period up to accession, Turkey will be required to progressively align its policies towards third countries and its positions within international organisations with the policies and positions adopted by the Union and its Member States.1 Here, the main focus is the incompatibility of the external policies of Turkey and the EU – the differences between two actors’ perceptions of foreign policies, and security policies. It is strongly argued here that, in particular, the globalisation of security threats substantially affects Turkey and the EU, and the interaction between them. However, the aim of this book is not to argue whether or not Turkey should be a member of the Union. Turkey’s membership in the EU is dependent on a number of variables, and therefore is a complicated issue which cannot be reduced to the differences in conceptualisation of ‘security’. Turkey’s long journey to reach candidacy status, in itself, proves the complexity of the issue.2 The book begins with the chapter on globalisation and security, in which a conceptual framework of the relationship between these two terms is created. From a wide range of definitions of globalisation, five main categories are taken into consideration: economic, cultural, political, communications and technology, and security. Also in this chapter, the impact of globalisation on nation states is explored. This is key since the sections on security and the impact of globalisation on nation states are used, in subsequent chapters, in the explanation of the differences between Turkey’s understanding of security and the EU’s perception. In this first chapter, globalisation’s influence on economy, communications and culture is discussed, but the key emphasis is on globalisation’s role in the threats towards the states. It is argued here that security problems are no longer constructed in terms of concrete threats. Therefore, a special emphasis is given on the challenges of globalisation for security, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international terrorism, organised crime, global epidemic

INTRODUCTION

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diseases, ethnic and religious conflict and environmental threats. In particular, issues raised here play a crucial role in subsequent chapters, when the differences between EU and Turkish security understandings are examined, to illustrate the differences between the actors and which challenges of globalisation are more important in Turkey and the EU. Chapter 2 defines security culture and analyses it in four different theories of security: the traditional approach, liberal institutionalism, democratic peace theory and globalist approach, respectively. Here, the differences between Clark’s definition of security and the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) definition (in its 1994 Human Development Report) set the scene for the differences between Turkish and EU perceptions. Besides these theories, the constructivist approach is highlighted, due to its close relation with culture. Here it is argued that the culture element enables us to leave behind unitary state actors and illuminates the cultural context in which states emerge and flourish. To highlight the significance of culture and its role in security policies, special attention is paid to security culture. The succeeding chapter focuses on Turkey’s foreign policy and conception of security. The historical background starts with the Ottoman Empire, simply because that Empire indelibly influenced the policies later pursued by the Republic of Turkey. Although the regime type was changed in the 1920s, when Atatürk, founder of the Republic, undertook various reforms, the legacy of the Empire continued to affect policy makers and the public. In particular, the attitudes of the Turkish people towards Europeans and Arabs have been deeply affected by the Ottoman Era and the War of Independence Era. This third chapter gives details of the security threats perceived by Turkey in the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Middle East. Throughout the chapter, different periods are examined in terms of foreign policy and security understanding, and this aids in the comparison of Turkey’s security perceptions with those of the EU, with a special emphasis on the effects of the 9/11 incidents. Furthermore, the differentiation of periods helps us to understand the changes that Turkey experienced throughout the years, emphasising the concept of national security. The chapter starts with a discussion of identity in Turkish foreign policy: state, nationalist and Islamic/conservative. These identities are

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exemplified by the domestic debate, positions of the political parties, Turkish Armed Forces and Presidents to clarify the perspectives in security conceptualisation in Turkey. In the second part of the chapter, the meaning of national security and the characteristics of Turkish national security policy in different periods, starting with the Ottoman Era, are examined. Chapter 4 compares the security cultures of the EU and Turkey. The chapter starts with identifying the EU as a security actor and defines its role in the world. The comparisons made here are based on Eurobarometer public opinion polls. Based on the questions asked by their researchers, the chapter focuses on fears, support for a common foreign policy, common defence and security policy and joint decision making in foreign policy and defence. This chapter also shows the impact of the terrorist actions of 9/11 on the attitudes of EU Member States. In addition to the comparison based on the surveys, European security culture and European Security Strategy (ESS), and the international character of the EU’s foreign policy are examined. This section places emphasis on the definition of civilian power by Duchene, Holsti and Manners in particular, in relation to the EU, and locates it as a civilian global actor. Finally, Chapter 5 examines Turkey as both a security provider and a security consumer, in the light of the evidence presented in the previous chapters. There are two subtitles, the ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’3 perspectives, highlighting the subjective aspect of the discussion. In the ‘optimistic’ perspective, Turkey is presented as a security provider for the EU, based on the following arguments: • Turkey’s membership will show the world that there is no ‘clash of civilizations’. • Turkey is a secular state and therefore can act as a role model for Middle Eastern neighbours • The population and size of the country are crucial assets for the EU. • Turkey’s membership will strengthen the ‘Southern Dimension’ of the Union. • The military capabilities of Turkey will make the EU an

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important actor in the military field, in a global context. • Turkey’s geo-strategical position is important to the EU energy supply, since crucial oil and natural gas pipelines pass through it. In the ‘pessimistic’ perspective, Turkey is represented as a security consumer for the EU based on: • The differences between the two actors understandings of maintaining security, • The population and the size of the country, which are not seen as assets but, instead, as disadvantageous for other EU Member states, • Arguments that the military power Turkey offers is not the military power that the EU requires, • The geographical position of Turkey, which is problematic since it is difficult to deal with problems in the area, • The effects of globalisation, making it harder to solve the issues around Turkey. The book ends with a concluding chapter, returning to the initial hypothesis and evaluating the findings in the context of the evidence that has been adduced.

1 GLOBALISATION AND SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction The aim of this chapter is to assess the significance of globalisation and to define it with particular emphasis on the security aspect of the term. The chapter starts with a variety of general definitions of globalisation, and illustrates the differences between previous ‘globalisations’ and the globalisation of the 21st century. This section demonstrates how globalisation is perceived in this work, as a brand new era that is different from the internationalisation of previous eras, by stressing the changes occurring in the economical, cultural, communication and technological, and political spheres due to globalisation. The last section of the chapter pays particular attention to the security aspect of the terminology. This chapter first presents what is understood by globalisation and, more importantly, throws light on Turkey’s perception of globalisation. In subsequent chapters, the analysis of Turkey’s perception of security benefits from various definitions that are studied here. This is the starting point of the comparison between Turkey and the EU, since it is important to understand how the EU and Turkey perceive the 21st century globalised world, in order to compare their security perceptions. The definitions analysed here constitute the basis for the theoretical approach of Chapter 2, which sheds light on the differences between Turkish and EU security cultures. Therefore, at the beginning of this book it is necessary to analyse the relationship between globalisation and security.

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General definitions of globalisation The word globe, in reference to the Earth, became current when the planet was discovered to be round. Global meant world-scale and spherical. From the 1940s onwards, the words globalism and globalise became popular. Globalisation first entered the dictionary in 1961, meaning to make global in scope or application.1 The vocabulary of globalisation has also spread in other languages over the past several decades. The many examples include lil ’alam in Arabic, quanqiuhua in Chinese, mondialisation in French, globalizatsia in Russian and globalización in Spanish. Among the most widely spoken world languages, only Swahili has not (yet) acquired a concept of globalisation, and that exception is perhaps largely explained by the widespread use of English in elite circles of the African countries concerned. In less widely spoken languages, too, one now finds globalisaatio in Finnish, bishwavyapikaran in Nepalese, luan bo’ot in Timorese, and so on. If a word is being used frequently, it reflects the value of the concept in world affairs, such as the common use of the word ‘international’ in the 1870s. Relationships between nations were the core issue at that time, and this popularised the word international.2 In the 20th century, especially starting from the 1980s, the words globalisation, global, and various other forms of the word were in widespread usage. In sociology, for example, Roland Robertson began to ‘interpret globality’ in 1983. Concurrently, Theodore Levitt of the Harvard Business School wrote about ‘the globalisation of markets’. These years also witnessed a shift of focus in international relations towards ‘global interdependence’.3 But what is globalisation? There have been diverse answers from different perspectives to this question. Some definitions emphasise increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information and culture; some define it as a decoupling between space and time or a compression of space and time, and a shrinking of the world, or as a process leading to greater interdependence and mutual awareness (reflexivity) among economic, political and social units in the world, and among actors in general.4 Rosenau explains globalisation based on what it is not, rather than what it is:

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Globalisation is not the same as globalism, which points to aspirations for an end state of affairs, wherein values are shared by or pertinent to the entire world’s five billion people, their environment, their roles as citizens, consumers or producers with an interest in collective action designed to solve common problems. Nor is it universalism-values that embrace all humanity, hypothetically or actually.5 Anthony McGrew, on the other hand, tries to specify globalisation as: Multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation states (and by implication in the societies), which make up the modern world system. It defines a process through which events, decisions and activities in one part of the world can come to have a significant consequence for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe.6 As Nigel Thrift said, our world is ‘a world whose economics, societies and cultures are becoming ever more closely intertwined.’7 Philip Cerny offers: Globalisation redefines the relationship between territoriality and authority, shifting authority from the level of the state to supranational and subnational units, perhaps offering more to grasp onto in operational terms but precious little in causal terms.8 For Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, globalisation is an intense form of internationalisation, which is the growth of interaction, communication and the relations between the states.9 Dicken also suggests that globalisation represents a more advanced and complex form of internationalisation, which implies a degree of functional integration between internationally dispersed economic activities.10 On the other hand, Daly argues that internationalisation is different from globalisation because international means relations between or among nations. However, globalisation does not acknowledge national boundaries. International trade (governed by comparative advantage) becomes inter-

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regional trade (governed by absolute advantage).11 Internationalisation is about states, and describes the reconfiguration of their external relations. In contrast, globalisation claims to project us into a world beyond states and territoriality, distinct from state-authored activities.12 It is strongly argued here that the globalisation experienced in the 21st century is a new phase in the history of humankind. Although Egyptian, Hellenic and Roman epochs are sometimes cited as early examples of a globalisation process, globalisation is unlike these eras. First of all, the process of globalisation in the 21st century is not only based on nation states or empires. There are other salient actors on the world stage in this century, other than states per se. Global organisations not bound by national ties have important roles in politics. MultiNational Corporations (MNCs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), media cartels, think tanks, and even individuals who are richer than some states have become the new actors. Among these actors, the MNCs who wield more financial power than some states have a very important and particular place in world affairs today.13 Although some argue that the MNCs are still nation state based, and nation states are still the core actors14, one should also consider that the emergence of MNCs and their ability to influence world affairs are novel features of the globalisation that is witnessed in the 21st century. This research does not deny the continuing importance of nation states, but one should also accept the fact that these nation states can acquire a say in world politics as they communicate with the other actors on the stage, i.e., international institutions. It is very challenging for nation states to continue their existence without being a part of the international system. This is one of the main differences between previous ‘globalisations’ and that which is experienced in the 21st century. Secondly, related to the first point above, it is perceived that the security of states can only be obtained with cooperative security in this century, since globalisation is inherently unstable and violent.15 The peculiarity of globalisation today is that the dependencies within global networks are so great, and interactions are so dense, that they form a sphere in themselves. The global institutional order has gained strength in itself, and has its own logic more or less independent of the local configurations it encompasses. The movements and interactions

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in global space are now patterned and institutionalised to such an extent that local societies have explicitly to react and relate themselves to a global configuration.16 The final point is that market reforms and the retreat of the state have been witnessed before in history, but this time it is in combination with the explosive growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), multilateral institutions and the spread of a single ideology.17 The economic interpretations of globalisation also include increased international capital mobility and a growing incidence of mergers and acquisitions and of strategic alliances18 that can be seen as evidence of the novelty of the globalisation that is experienced today. Definitions of Globalisation In view of the wide range of definitions of globalisation that are possible, it is useful to assign these to five main categories: economic, cultural, political, communications and technology, and security. Economic definitions Defining globalisation by focussing on liberating the market, through privatisation, deregulation, and trade liberalisation is basically a neo liberal definition, which was adopted in two particular eras in the past. The first is the Thatcher-Reagan version, which is usually referred to as ‘hard’; the second is Blair-Soros, which is usually labelled as ‘soft’. Although their approaches are different, their aims are ultimately much the same.19 These politicians had an important effect on the interpretation of the world as a global one, but also these two particular eras helped to define globalisation in economic and financial terms. Herman E. Daly is one example of thinkers defining globalisation as the ‘global economic integration of many formerly national economies into one global economy, mainly by free trade and free capital mobility. It is the effective erasure of national boundaries for economic purposes’.20 As Cox has observed, globalisation sometimes appears loosely associated with neo liberalism and with technocratic solutions to economic development and reform.21 Robert Gilpin22 defines globalisation as the ‘increasing interdependence of national economies in trade, finance, and macroeconomic

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policy’, emphasising the abolition of all kinds of restrictions, barriers, and borders in economic relations among states, which is also referred to as liberalisation – a confluence of economic phenomena23. This definition includes the liberalisation of markets as well as the deregulation, privatisation, and retreat of the state functions, the diffusion of technology, cross-national distribution of manufacturing production, and the integration of capital markets. It refers to the worldwide spread of sales, production facilities and manufacturing processes, all of which reconstitute the international division of labour.24 However, this is not the only aspect of globalisation affecting human life. Besides the economic and financial aspects, cross-border advocacy networks and organisations defending human rights, the environment, women’s rights, world peace and so on are examined under globalisation. The environmental movement has raised the banner of globalism in its struggle for a clean planet, as in its ‘Think Global, Act Local’ slogan.25 In particular, human rights have been an important part of the global world today. Global bodies such as the UN and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have led to the greater integration of foreigners, including migrants, into citizenship schemes. Universal humanitarian standards applied to war crimes or crimes against humanity are good examples of the idea of cosmopolitan law, which has been developed to refer to a form of law that differs from that internal to nation states, and also to that operating as agreements between national jurisdictions.26 Concepts such as democracy, human rights, a market economy and freedom are on the agenda of almost all countries in the 21st century, and the countries which do not possess these values are motivated to acquire them in the contemporary world. So, it is not realistic to restrict the meaning of globalisation only to its economic and financial aspects. Therefore, the cultural and political dimensions are emphasised more in the following sections. Cultural definitions Globalisation is also reflected in issues relating to culture, and the term is used interchangeably with ‘universalisation’ when connoting a homogenisation of culture. It is a well-established fact that concepts such as democracy, human rights and freedom have originated in the

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West. Therefore, globalisation is sometimes perceived as a crucial tool helping western countries to spread their own values to the rest of the world. In cultural terms, globalisation is sometimes defined as ‘westernisation’, by those assuming that the world is moving towards a homogenised culture based on a western model. This is sometimes popularly referred to as ‘McDonaldisation’ and ‘Americanisation’ rather than ‘Europeanisation’.27 The term Americanisation was first used to describe the movement during the first quarter of the 20th century, whereby immigrants in the USA were induced to assimilate American speech, ideals, traditions, and ways of life. Today, the term is generally used to refer to the USA exerting hegemonic influence in promoting its values and habits through popular culture and the news media. It is argued that the USA dominates the entertainment industry, which in turn helps it to dominate all the cultural aspects of life in other countries as well. As Thomas Friedman puts it, ‘Globalisation wears Mickey Mouse ears; it drinks Pepsi and Coke, eats Big Macs, does its computing on an IBM laptop with Windows 98’. 28 It can be argued that globalisation is a homogenisation of values around the principles of capitalism and democracy, albeit a strictly American variant of both, built on Protestant values that purportedly epitomise the Enlightenment.29 These propositions support the ideas of Francis Fukuyama in his book The End of History and the Last Man, where he argues that: This process guarantees an increasing homogenisation of all human societies, regardless of their historical origins, or cultural inheritances. All countries undergoing economic modernisation must increasingly resemble one another: they must unify nationally on the basis of a centralised state, urbanise, replace the traditional forms of social organisation like tribe, sect, and family with economically rational ones based on function and efficiency, and provide for the universal education of their citizens…. Moreover the logic of modern natural science would seem to dictate a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism…. The social changes that accompany advanced industrialisation in particular universal education appear to liberate a certain

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demand for recognition that did not exist among poorer and less educated people. As standards of living increase as populations become more cosmopolitan and better educated and as society as a whole achieves a greater equality of condition, people begin to demand not simply more wealth but recognition of their status…. Communism is being superseded by liberal democracy because of the realisation that the former provides a gravely defective form of recognition.30 However, it is believed here that defining globalisation as homogenisation of culture based on western values is an over-simplification of the globalisation process itself. James Lull argues that potent homogenising forces, including military weaponry, advertising techniques, dominant languages, media formats, and even fashion trends, undeniably affect consciousness and culture in virtually every corner of the world. Such spheres of influence introduce and reinforce certain standardising values and practices. But these political-economic-cultural influences do not enter cultural contexts uniformly. They always interact with diverse local conditions.31 According to Anthony D. Smith, if by culture is meant a collective mode of life, or a repertoire of beliefs, styles, values, and symbols, then one can only speak of cultures, never just culture; for a collective mode of life, or a repertoire of beliefs, and so on, presupposes different modes and repertoires in a universe of modes and repertoires. Hence the idea of a global culture is a practical impossibility.32 In the 21st century, diverse and remote cultures are becoming accessible via TV, Internet, newspapers, supermarkets, shopping centres, and so on. A person can have an English breakfast in the morning, an Italian pizza for lunch and Indian dinner in the evening. But at the same time, one may wear American brands and listen to African music as one eats that Indian dinner. This is a very simplified example of a convergence of remote cultures in a regular individual’s everyday life, which shows cosmopolitanism as an integral part of day-to-day life. The mixture of different cultures shows itself in an individual’s life as a result of the developments in communications and in the technological sphere.

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Communications and technology The communications and technology aspect of globalisation emphasises the importance of the technological and social revolution of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, without which none of the above-mentioned developments could have been realised. According to Stephen Kobrin33, globalisation can be described as being driven by technology and information flows rather than foreign trade and investment, because all the economic developments are realised as a result of the developments in communications and technology. These developments facilitated cross-cultural exchanges, transnational investment, production and trade in goods and services, the opening of new markets, and the expansion and integration of the global economy. In particular, the high speeds of technological developments that are witnessed in the transportation industry have changed the way the economy functions, as well as the way people live. As Ross argues: Globalisation unleashes technology, which in turn drives firms to plan production and sales on a global basis. Technology changes the work we do and in nearly all cases, the jobs created by it demand more education and training. It also changes the way business operates by transforming relationships between suppliers, producers, retailers and customers.34 In return, as a consequence of the transformation in relationships between the suppliers and customers, the firms, employers and employees move from one country to another. Technological developments in the transportation industry make it possible for goods, products and people to move faster than was possible in the previous century. Due to developments in technology and economics in some parts of the 21st century world, people are not bound to anywhere in particular, as they can work in a different country than the one whose passport they possess. Besides this, developments in the communication sectors have increased the ability of the mass media to spread information and communications among populations. In particular, the Internet has become a very significant tool in spreading news. Politicians, minority

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groups, terrorist organisations, environmentalists and so on, now have the chance to communicate faster, and more effectively, via the Internet. For instance, the Internet has enabled minority groups to share their struggles with the rest of the world in Mexico, in the USSR and in the Balkans. In 1995, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo announced the start of a military offensive aimed at capturing the Zapatista leader Subcomandante Marcos35 and bringing the rebellion in Chiapas to a decisive close. Within hours, the President’s words were on the Internet via the rebels’ fax machines and laptop computers. Many thousands of protesting faxes were sent directly to the president, and the government ordered its troops to halt. In addition, the Catholic Church human rights office in San Cristobal gathered information about human rights abuses and sent the information to an internet server in Mexico City, for distribution across the networks. As Guillen36 has pointed out, what governments should really fear are not rebels in the jungle, but a communications expert, in the 21st century. Furthermore, stories that newspapers have declined to publish because of political pressure have circulated widely on the Internet.37 It has been observed that most countries that have allowed Internet access have tolerated freer expression online than is permitted in the local news media. Therefore, it has become a headquarters for every type of political action, from plans for corporate boycotts to tactical deliberations; and it is used in disputes all over the world, i.e., from Peru to Ecuador to the Tibetan Information Network out of London distributing information to Tibetan exiles. It is used to support separatists in Chechnya, Nigeria and East Timor. Citizens of Arab countries have debated and conversed with Israelis in ‘chat rooms’ and online forums at times when it is difficult or impossible to have face-to-face contact. It has also helped rescue missions in places such as Kobe, in Japan. Furthermore, emails made it easier for the people to reach the public authorities.38 Then again, developments witnessed in the communications and technological realm also deepen economic inequalities at both the global and national level. As a consequence of the ability of wealthy countries to invest more on R&D, production levels in developed countries increase faster than in poor countries. Ultimately, developed countries export these technologies they produce to the rest of the

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world at a high price, whereas the less developed countries export only agricultural products and raw materials. In this cycle of trade, it becomes less possible for developing countries to gain the technologies they need to reach the levels of the developed countries. Thus, a difference in wealth creates disparities between states. Moreover, even within a state, not every citizen accesses technology with the same intensity, and this creates disparities between people – disparities which become a bigger issue as the population of the world increases. The economic problems in a bigger population act as a crucial factor on the capabilities and instruments of the independent actors. The concentration of power and wealth ‘cannot provide real stability, security or welfare for the global majority’.39 Technological developments do not reach every individual, and the globalisation process is an uneven one, which does not give an equal chance to every human being. The new technologies require a new kind of literacy, access to high quality equipment and a high-speed network connection; basically, this means money, and therefore new information and communication technologies deepen educational and economic inequalities. However, technological developments, when accessible, change a way of life profoundly. Developments witnessed in technological and communication sectors have had an essential effect on the finance sector, in addition to the above-mentioned realms. It is now possible for some currencies to have instantaneous transplanetary circulation, i.e., the US Dollar and the Euro. In global finance, various types of savings and investments flow instantly on a world scale.40 Due to these technological developments, a small event can have global repercussions. As Jacques Chirac stated: Globalisation means that the “butterfly effect” is everywhere at work. The mistakes of a stockbroker in Singapore or the collapse of the Baht in Bangkok, the decisions of a Finnish industrial concern, or what the Governor of Minas Gerais in Brazil decides to do about his State’s debt, have had consequences for the world as a whole.41 In this century, every little event in any part of the world means something for the rest of the world, and the importance of geographical distance

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has diminished, as witnessed in Australia. The anti-globalist argument states that Australian corporations participate in the oppression of workers and peasants in poor countries, and that Australian mining and forestry companies are involved in extracting wealth from countries such as Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Furthermore, the Australian support for trade liberalisation is accused of opening up markets in poor countries, which results in local farmers being put out of work. On the other hand, the globalist arguments state that this same trade liberalisation, which is supported by Australia, opened up American and European markets to Brazil and Argentina. Another important effect of globalisation on Australia would be the benefit of more than $7 billion a year as the protection levels were reduced.42 Finally, as a result of globalisation, Australian companies are creating new employment in other countries, and FDI creates wealth in Australia as well. This illustrates the importance on the world stage of a country geographically remote from other continents, and can be perceived as more evidence of the uniqueness of the type of globalisation that we are experiencing in the 21st century. The previous ‘globalisations’ were limited to countries close to each other, due to limited technological developments and less sophisticated communications. This definition also suggests that a revolution is taking place not only in relations between states and the economy, but also with civil society. Proponents of this view believe that: In the developed countries of the west, new technology will lead to big productivity increases that will cause high economic growth – actually waves of technology will continue to role out through the early part of the 21st century. And then the relentless process of globalisation, the opening up of national economies and the integration of markets, will drive the growth through much of the rest of the world. An unprecedented alignment of an ascendant Asia, a revitalised America and a reintegrated greater Europe – including a recovered Russia – together will create an economic juggernaut that pulls along most other regions of the planet. These two meta trends – fundamental technological change and a new ethos of openness – will transform our world

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into the beginnings of a global civilization, a new civilization of civilizations, which will blossom through the coming century. 43 In the 21st century, civil society is not limited to NGOs or international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), but also trade unions, foundations, faith-based and religious groups, community-based organisations, social movements and networks, and ordinary citizens are active in the public sphere. All these elements in civil society have become a significant part of international relations, especially after the conclusion of the Cold War. Civil society development is a crucial element in globalisation, since the civil society often represents people at a global level. Especially considering the disparities between the haves and havenots, environmental issues and so on, civil society has a unique role to play in the 21st century. Environmental issues have been an area where civil society can prove itself in the West, e.g., Greenpeace activities forcing leaders to make better trade-offs between the environment and economic development. Environmental issues are now on the political agendas of western political parties; this has been perceived as a success story of civil society. At the global level, civil society became visible especially after the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, where thousands of different nationalities engaged in protests, which were followed by protests in Seattle, in 1999. The flow of information due to technology challenges old beliefs, creates new identities, and makes it possible for the people to communicate, which in turn helps increase civil society in the 21st century. All in all, developments in the technological and communication sectors have brought the term ‘de-territorialisation’ to the fore. These developments include the increase in the world count of radio receivers from less than 60 million in the mid-1930s to over 2,400 million in 1997, the proliferation of mobile phones from less than a million in 1985 to 700 million at the end of 2000, the growth in the number of Internet users from zero in 1985 to 606 million in 2002, the increase in the annual count of international air passengers from 25 million in 1950 to 400 million in 1996, the rise in the average volume of daily transactions on the global currency markets (with simultaneous transworld determination of foreign exchange rates) from $15 billion in 1973 to $1,490 billion in 199844, and so on.

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Globalisation is ‘a process, which increasingly reconfigures social space away from and beyond notions of delineated territory and transcends existing physical and human borders imposed upon social interaction’45, decreasing territorialisation, or diminishing the political significance of traditional territorial divisions; in other words, emphasising spatiality in international relations. Globalisation has challenged dominant conceptions of political space in International Relations.46 Scholte defines globalisation as the growth of supraterritoriality, or the spread of de-territorialised relations between people. This involves the spread of transworld or transborder social spaces; a trend that he believes is relatively recent and quickening since the 1960s, when it became clear that states were not the only actors. There has been a proliferation of new actors affecting the outcomes of international interactions. Some of these actors have legal status, some of them have changed values, and some are expressions of identity such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna / Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). In the 1960s, transnational companies increased their FDI in different countries, which in turn changed their activities. Before the 1960s, the activities of MNCs were basically concerned with production, but in the 1960s they became more technological and they also began to embrace the service sector. These developments accelerated the integration process among states.47 Scholte claims that social connections are becoming more detached from territorial logics as the world becomes a single space. Supraterritoriality is generated by a combination of the emergence of global consciousness, spurred by the extension of rational knowledge, the growth in international (especially finance) capitalism, operating worldwide production, marketing and distribution strategies, technological innovations (especially in communications and data processing) and the development of regulatory frameworks, still involving nation states but increasingly supranational institutions as well.48 Scholte also emphasises the deterritorialisation aspect of globalisation, by offering three conceptions of globalisation: cross-border relations, open-border relations and trans-border relations. Moreover, he elaborates on the territorialisation aspect by arguing that global relations are not links at a distance across territory, but circumstances with-

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out distance and relatively disconnected from particular location.49 As global communications increase in the world, the global organisations all over the world increase in number, as well. The consequence of this is an increasing sense of global identity, in which the world is conceived less as a collection of territorial states and more as one place or one planet.50 However, geography continues to preserve its significance; as it is stated in ESS in 2003, ‘geography is still important and countries need well governed neighbours’.51 Geography shapes ways of living, knowledge, economics, government, production and so on; therefore spatiality is a crucial factor in defining globalisation. In the 21st century, territorial space still preserves its importance in relations among countries, but due to technological developments this work also accepts the changes brought to spatiality. This research agrees with Cha, in defining globalisation as both a boundary-broadening and a boundaryweakening process.52 As a result of the latest technological, economic and communicational developments, the world appears to be a smaller place, where people move faster and more freely than in the previous centuries, broadening their boundaries. However, at the same time this becomes the biggest challenge of globalisation, in terms of the security of states and peoples. Political definitions All of the above-mentioned definitions have political implications. In other words, they all indicate globalisation’s effect on the state. The global era brought considerable changes to the state system and nation states. In the 21st century, individual nation-states have lost their monopoly of power on the world stage, and international institutions (the EU, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), MNCs, NGOs, INGOs and so on) have begun to share the stage with individual states. These new actors have been perceived as the rivals of the nation state in world affairs, decreasing the role and significance of individual governments.

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The most important feature of the state throughout history has been its sovereignty; but today, in an age of globalisation different from internationalisation, it is argued that this characteristic of the state has been diminished. Sovereignty is the supreme authority exercised within a given territory, where the social institutions of the state, the states ability to act autonomously with respect to society, and the state’s identity to that of the society are the main features. According to Holsti, the state’s main characteristic is the legitimacy of the state institutions in the eyes of its own domestic constituency.53 This is a modern notion of political authority. Historical variants can be understood along four dimensions – the holder of sovereignty, the absoluteness of sovereignty, and the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty. The state is the political institution in which sovereignty is embodied. Although some believe that the origins of sovereign states are seen in the 1450s, it was not until 1648 Peace of Westphalia that the concept of the sovereign state emerged. Before that time, empires and transnational religions had often characterised the world. With the Peace of Westphalia, the key principles of sovereign states54 were proclaimed,55 and it provided a general way to formulate, implement, monitor and enforce social rules.56 Sovereignty has both an internal and external effect. States are seen as being the only authority in their own territories, bringing forward the idea of independence outside the territory. States were the core authorities, and other actors, such as international organisations like the UN and the IMF, did not have the right to intervene in the sovereign states’ territories. This is still valid, according to the UN Charter. However, in reality, and especially after 9/11 and the War in Iraq, the idea of sovereignty is also experiencing some further modifications. The Iraq War in 2003 was a significant landmark in terms of international relations, state sovereignty and international law. One of the founding principles of international law is the sovereignty of states. Therefore, it had been perceived that international intervention would take place against an antagonist state, as in the Gulf War of 1991. However, by the 2003 Iraq War, the international equilibrium had greatly changed. Although a regime change in Iraq by international forces was conceived but not thought wise in 1991, in 2003, ‘disarmament’ had been a sufficient reason for ‘international’ intervention and regime change. The 2003 Iraq

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War is perceived as an example of the diminished powers of nation states as a result of changing security threats, such as international terrorism, and an increase in the value placed on human rights. However, the 2003 Iraq War has also been perceived as evidence of the continuation of national sovereignty in Europe. The discord among EU countries on the War in Iraq, the inability of the EU’s common decision making to stop Member States disagreeing over what course to take, demonstrated sovereignty as an absolute – where there can be no degrees of sovereignty, and it cannot be progressively eroded, as Clark suggests. The security aspect of globalisation All these above-mentioned changes in economic, cultural, political, communication and technological spheres have meant changes in the definition of security, both for the states and the individuals. In the 21st century, where the meaning of sovereignty has gone through considerable modifications and attention has been diverted to the difference between the security of the state and the security of society, it is almost impossible to accept Clark’s definition of security as ‘the protection of vital interests within a sovereign space’.57 Therefore, in this section more emphasis is given to conceptualise security in a globalised world according to the changes that have been witnessed in the other spheres of life, i.e., economic, governance and governmental, political, cultural, technological and so on. Concept of Security A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war. Walter Lippman58 Security in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. Arnold Wolfers59

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In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. Barry Buzan60 Security means survival in the face of existential threats but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors. Buzan, Waever, Wilde61 People and groups can only achieve stable security if they do not deprive others of it; this can be achieved if security is conceived as a process of emancipation. Booth62 Throughout history, the conceptualisation and perception of security threats have been in a process of constant change.63 The conclusion of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, and the war in Yugoslavia have all changed the world map dramatically. The war in Yugoslavia brought a vicious, dev­ast­at­ing and long-lasting conflict into a region which had been peaceful for fifty years. The ethnic or religious motives of the groups involved had been suppressed by Cold War bipolarity. The decline of one of the superpowers removed the ideological restraints, leading to the creation of a political vacuum that, in turn, sparked a crisis close to the EU’s borders. Furthermore, when the Cold War concluded, it was assumed that military force would not be as essential as it had been and that spending on weaponry would decrease; this proved not to be the case, and terrorism and organised crime, which are non-governmental security issues, became global in terms of their effects. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, there occurred an important authority gap in ‘Eurasia’, between Europe and Asia, leading to conflicts in Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. In particular, conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus have been destabilising, since these areas hold significant resources of oil and natural gas for

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Western countries.64 The global system is now much more polycentric, with contrasting forces at work; on the one hand, there are globalising trends, on the other hand, there are religious or ethnic conflicts and, in between, the regionalisation experiments of some groups of states. In the 21st century, due to the deterritorialisation process discussed above, it is harder to locate, monitor and contain security threats. The scope of security has widened, as well, to include computer viruses, diseases, environmental problems, drug smugglers, political terrorists, criminal organisations and ethnic insurgents.65 As a result of globalisation, security threats are neither concrete nor specific, unlike during the Cold War, when the West expected the threat to come only from the communist world. In contrast to the Cold War era, in the 21st century, as Tony Blair has said, ‘…..the threat is chaos’.66 Moreover, in the Cold War era, superpowers had managed to persuade the majority of countries to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other treaties to prevent an increase in the number of countries with nuclear capabilities. However, globalisation brought about a global trade in nuclear materials, not only between states but also between non-state actors and organisations.67 Crawford argues that high technology combined with globalisation creates a global market for military resources.68 Due to the lack of states’ control on the global market, the control of states on security matters decreases. Nonetheless, this argument alone cannot explain the whole security challenge that the world currently faces. Both states and non-state actors have a role in security challenges. Globalisation forces states to change their security policies as new challenges in the contemporary period appear. Terrorism Especially after the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York, security threats are perceived as more complicated than those of previous centuries, where a specific country or ideology was the perceived threat. According to Wolfowitz, along with the globalisation that creates interdependence among the world’s free economies, there is a parallel globalisation of terror, in which ‘rogue’ states and terrorist organisations share information, intelligence, technology, weapons materials and know-how.69

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At present, it seems terrorist activities, which are ambiguous in terms of their origins, supersede territorial defence on the security agenda of individual states. The sphere of the influence of terrorist activities was expanded by the 9/11 attacks, as they were perceived as a reaction against the effects of globalisation, and aimed to undermine the western hegemony.70 Furthermore, as the methods and means change, the ideology behind terrorism has altered. As Martha Crenshaw argues, the causes are numerous and various, and are logical and understandable, as well as emotional and irrational.71 Thus, authorities cannot negotiate with terrorists because there are neither cards to show nor common points that can be negotiated. As Margolis argues about terrorism: Its nature is hardly clear. It lacks a determinate perpetrator of the right kind; it makes no explicit claims or demands; it advances no official rationale or grievance; it has no geographical home or source; it implicates no state’s initiative; and it gives no hint of any possible final or rational resolution.72 Furthermore, the domain of terrorist activities has expanded as a consequence of technological and communicational developments, enabling such attacks as those on 9/11 in New York and the Pentagon, in October 2002 in Bali, in May 2003 in Riyadh, in March 2004 in Madrid73 and in July 2005 in London. One of the most central characteristics of the new terrorist attacks is that they are unpredictable. The unthinkable is no longer unthinkable. Terrorism changes its forms due to the developments introduced by globalisation. It has been argued that terrorists are: hyper mobile, horizontally dispersed across a myriad of nations and seemingly can operate in a fashion whereby initiative is delegated to a low level obviating the need for tight and frequent communications between its cells and the centre.74 Globalisation is assisting ‘Talibanisation’, the rise of extremist, fundamentalist groups within an Islamic society, in various parts of the world. Economic globalisation brings economic insecurity, and this re-

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moves cultural diversity and attacks the political freedoms of citizens.75 Reactions against globalisation can also give birth to security threats. These reactions include: Reactions against the globalisation of American images and values by stressing their own roots and local identity, the primacy of technology and economy by exploring emotions and spiritual values, universal materialism by stressing non materialistic values, the pooling of governance capacity on supra national scale, by demanding decentralisation and decisions nearby, the alienation caused by the further abstraction globalisation of life brings and unsafety by looking for scapegoats by demanding protection from the terrifying foreign refugees, foreign culture and foreign products.76 Therefore, the conventional military power of countries has altered since globalisation changed the threat perception. This alteration made it possible for states to realise that military might cannot be the sole power that the states aspire to, thus boosting economic relations and competition in this sphere. Moreover, ‘the reproduction of their cultures, the welfare, health and education for the citizens, the stability of ecology, information technology, and knowledge’77 are crucial on the international scene. As Michael Harbottle argues: Proper soldiering set out to show that while armed forces will continue to be the guardians of national security, they, like everyone in our emerging world will need to adapt to new responsibilities and to broaden their definition of security. Security cannot any longer be categorised in purely military and political terms. Security has a holistic dimension, embracing in its broadest sense the whole gamut of human relationships-economic, social, cultural, ethnic, sectarian, humanitarian and environmental. In truth military and political security considerations should not be thought of as being paramount but subordinate to human security requirements.78

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The impact of globalisation on nation states, as mentioned in the previous section, necessitates a distinction between individual, national, and international security. In the Cold War era, security was defined in terms of national security, which was mostly linked to the military power of the states as opposed to the wider conceptualisation – including political, economic, environmental, societal and legal security – of the 21st century. Therefore, the security of the state is interconnected with the idea of sovereignty, but the security of society is associated with identity. Societal challenges Societal security analyses national, ethnic and religious identities in general and can be defined as the survival of an identity79 or ‘we-feeling’. This subdivision is a vital element of security conceptualisation in the 21st century. Societal security establishes the concept of internationality in the notion of security, since society is about identity, and identities do not necessarily overlap with states. Globalisation and its challenges, particularly terrorism, also increased insecurity in this sphere. Ethnic and religious identities are crucial in personal identification, but these are both constructive and destructive. Ethnicity and religion give people a sense of security and a feeling of belonging to a group; on the other hand, ethnic and religious motives have often been the most visible raison d’être of vicious conflicts: About 40 percent of the world’s states have more than five sizeable ethnic populations, one or more of which faces discrimination.... Ethnic clashes often have brutal results. Since 1983 in Sri Lanka, more than 14,000 people have died in the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Since 1981 in former Yugoslavia, more than 130,000 people have been killed and more than 40,000 women have been raped. In Somalia in 1993, there were up to 10,000 casualties from clashes between rival factions or with UN peacekeepers.80 Conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Kashmir and Chechnya, and the problem of the Kurds in Turkey,

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Iraq and Iran have all been the objects of attempted solutions by international organisations. Some of these conflicts have been resolved, but most are still volatile. It is difficult for the international community to intervene in these conflicts partly because of the nature of civil war and partly because interference in civil wars is limited by the UN Charter to those [that] endanger international stability.81 Such conflicts cannot be limited to the regions where they originate; as a consequence of refugees and illegal migration, the number of countries that are involved directly or indirectly in ethnic conflicts has increased. But also, technological developments and communicational improvements alter the structure of ethnic conflicts by facilitating ethnic groups in reaching a wider audience in the world. Media coverage is arguably a cause of conflict escalation82, and this influences the rest of the world while, at the same time, changing the internal dynamics of the conflict areas. Moreover, this work strongly agrees with Myers that societal and human security cannot be limited to being safe against national or international attacks, but that it also means being able to have enough food, a healthy environment, clean water, and clean air to breathe. The contentment of an individual is the focal point of human security, and that is why environmental security should be examined in this sense.83 Environmental security is interlinked with economics and politics, which constitute the most important part of the life of a state (e.g., economically, the Indonesian forest fires in 1997 caused significant political tension among the Southeast Asian states, as the number of tourists decreased). Since a decline of economic well-being may lead to a decrease in state legitimacy and an increase in the divisions in society, potentially resulting in a failed state, environmental security is not a concern only of the environmentalists, but also a concern of national and international institutions.84 Therefore, there have been several international agreements to foster international awareness on environmental issues.85 As Al Gore states, there is a need for a global Marshall Plan for the environment86, because this concerns everybody in the world

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arena. Environmental security includes disruption of ecosystems, energy problems, population issues, food problems, pollution and other kinds of environmental damage. This is an important element of international security, since threats against the environment can be seen as threats against civilization and all mankind. The environment sets the conditions for social, political and economic life for the world’s population. In other words, if conditions are poor, the quality of people’s lives is poor87, which brings epidemic problems into the new security agenda. Infectious diseases are more than a health issue; they are perceived as a national and international security threat, evident from the American Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) concern on the issue. As a consequence of developments in the transportation industry, it is assumed that epidemic diseases are more inclined to spread around the world. As Jordan Kassalow has stated, ‘increased trade and travel, population movements and a shared food supply spread health risk across the globe and the socio-economic spectrum’.88 The gap between the rich and poor is reflected in the number of doctors per person. In some countries like Norway, Iceland and France there are 300 doctors per 100,000 people, but in some less developed countries this number decreases to as low as 15. The same disparity between rich and poor is evident in health spending. In the northern countries of Europe, health spending per capita may reach $2,300; in the southern countries, it may be as low as $12. Therefore, international cooperation is perceived as a vital tool in the fight against epidemic diseases, as much as in the fights against terrorism, organised crime, and conventional weapons. As a result of globalisation in the 21st century, challenges and threats are not limited to the regions where they originate, and this increases the significance of cooperation at the global level. This brings us to the following security threats: those against political and economic security. Political and Economic Challenges Political security also transposes security to an international level. The interdependent and institutionalised relations among various states and international institutions bring issues such as sovereignty, legitimacy, and governing authority to the agenda of international relations. The

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same logic applies to the economic sphere and economic security. The global market and the intense relations among the different economic areas, countries, and institutions constitute the international sphere. International crime organisations have been the main menace in the economic security sphere, and in the 21st century they are perceived as global organisations. Moreover, the general trend of deregulation, the progress of the Euro market and the proliferation of financial secrecy havens89 – all elements of globalisation – make it harder to find, freeze, and forfeit these criminal actions, according to the UN. The observed trend among organised crime organisations is the virtual ‘privatisation’ of national economies in developing countries, which constitutes a considerable threat for these countries, since the existence of such organisations is directly proportional to the prevalence of corruption. As a result of profit-making orientations in these organisations, they are believed to be one of the main sources of manipulation in the developing countries’ political systems.90 Corruption is a vital issue in all countries, whether developed or developing. Corruption brings the loss of trust in the state, government, and police forces, decreasing the credibility of institutions. Thus, crime organisations break down the sovereignty of the states internally, potentially transforming them into failing or failed states. Failed states are perceived as the greatest threat to global security, as they create a safe haven for terrorist groups. One main reason behind the increase in international organised crime is assumed to be the disappearance of the political geography of the Cold War era. International crime can consist of gambling, prostitution, automobile smuggling, art and archaeological theft, trafficking of arms or persons, credit card fraud and similar activities. Although some international crime organisations specialise in specific areas, most operate globally, due to the freer movement of people, capital, and goods. Less border control, especially in the EU, is coupled with an increase in immigration, helping these organisations to broaden their area of influence. Moreover, technological developments combined with the free movement of goods and capital help organised crime to transfer illegal earnings to legal sanctuaries. It is believed that technological improvements help states to detect these organisations,

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but, at the same time, the ability of these organisations to benefit from the same technological improvements makes it harder for police forces to detect them. Differences between the jurisprudence of various states create a ‘beneficial sphere’ in which these organisations can act freely. The absence of international governance also gives a helping hand to the ‘success’ of these organisations.91 The privatisation of security (as regards to warfare, custody and transport of prisoners, etc) is also a product of the economic impact of globalisation. In particular, demobilisation after the Cold War, when thousands of soldiers were out of work, increased the numbers of the workforce for these private companies, such as Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Executive Outcomes, Sandline and Blackwater Executive Outcomes. MPRI is the leading firm in logistics, and companies such as Airscan lead in aerial surveillance. These private firms have played roles in some civil wars, e.g. Sierra Leone, where since 1991 the number of casualties has reached 20,000. The involvement of these corporations and freelance mercenaries has been controversial because, for instance, it is reported that Executive Outcomes have been fighting on both sides in most of the conflicts that they have engaged in. Another problem is the outsourcing of war, meaning that public law and international law lose their importance in wars when private firms are engaged, since these companies are not bound by the international law which allows adjudication of them in the ICJ.92 Similar to other challenges of globalisation, there are no black and white areas in this issue. Although the UN is one of the biggest opponents of these private companies’ use in warfare, CARE Canada is very supportive. The UN Human Rights Commission urges UN member nations to outlaw these companies. However, the legislation of individual states prevents this sort of action. In the USA, for instance, private military companies are not against US law; in the UK, legislation is being considered in order to regulate such operations, but not to outlaw them. Supporters believe that foreign legions comprised of paid, volunteer, professionally trained people would be more helpful in crisis situations, since the issue of identity loses its importance in such interventions.93 Although this dispute is not settled, the privatisation of military forces demonstrates the loss of states’ supremacy even in pursuing their foreign and domestic policies.

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Technological Challenges Another issue that must be addressed is the technological aspect of security. One of the realities of the 21st century is that military resources are available on the global market and that states have minimum control over that market. Nuclear technology makes states less dependent on society as the instrument of security; population is not the only force that states have to defend themselves. Today, instead of vast armies of soldiers, technologically developed weaponry is used to defend states. ‘From the mid 1950s onwards, nuclear weaponry has had an accelerating influence on war preparation. Its primary effect has been to demobilise societies.’94 The revolution in military affairs has abolished the separations between military and civilian, combatants from non-combatants, and organised violence from everyday life.95 The bomb which destroyed Hiroshima in the Second World War was the first step towards the global battlefield. Especially in the Cold War era, the production of nuclear weaponry by the USA and the USSR had a very important impact on the establishment of the globe as a battlefield for all. Other countries also involved in nuclear weaponry production were Britain, China, and France. Although the nonproliferation agreements seemed to have a considerable effect, the fear over nuclear missiles is not over. According to Erhan, in the period 1992-2001, the amount spent on world armament was $7 trillion, 625 billion. In 2006, there were approximately thirty countries with nuclear capabilities.96 Although this may seem a small number, even one country with nuclear capabilities can be considered a big threat to world peace. Privatisation in the military sphere allows the world’s largest aerospace and defence corporations, i.e., Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and United Technologies, to build weapons systems necessary to wage nuclear war. The US spends $34 billion annually to maintain and upgrade Cold War era nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, providing billions of dollars in contracts to weapons corporations. Northrop Grumman has built twenty-one B-2 Stealth Bombers, which cost $2.2 billion each. The US government is spending $145 million to keep the production line open for more planes. Lockheed Martin was recently awarded a $589 million contract for twelve more D5 nuclear missiles

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for Trident submarines. The government has already bought 372 D5s at a cost of nearly $60 million each.97 The US is not the only country with a nuclear capability. The United Kingdom spends considerable sums of money on nuclear weaponry as well, over £1.53 billion annually of public money for the UK nuclear system.98 On the other side of the world, Indians boast about successful nuclear tests, while pouring cans of Coca Cola in the gutter in defiance of Western corporations and globalisation.99 Nuclear technology makes states less dependent on society, as Martin Shaw has pointed out.100 Technological developments in the military sphere, which constitute a revolution in military affairs (RMA) have had a profound effect on the military capabilities of states, without the need for society. In the 21st century, manpower is superseded by technological developments on the battlefield, eradicating the separation between civilians and soldiers. In previous centuries, soldiers have been perceived as those primarily in danger on the battlefield, but today, due to technological developments in military affairs, there is no specific battlefield as such. The result is a redistribution of security challenges for states and individuals. Conclusion Although states continue to take the leading roles on the world stage, there is much evidence to demonstrate that they are not the sole actors, neither on stage nor behind the scenes. In particular, after the Second World War, changes in international affairs greatly altered international politics. The increase in the significance of human rights, the rights of minorities, women and children, the rule of law, democracy and environmental issues, and so on, affects individual states dramatically as a result of international law’s power to bind states. States enter into unions and organisations voluntarily, and this restricts their legal sovereignty; the best example of this is membership of the EU.101 Decisions and outcomes do not correspond with the choices of sovereign wills, and are not contained by the boundaries within which they operate.102 Today, new images of world order speak of the emergence of the global citizen and a global civil society, stimulated once again by [the]

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corrosive effect of migration and global communications on nationalism and parochialism.103 The international community has decided to recognise certain values (the dignity of the human person, self determination of peoples, democracy and peace) that must prevail over any other form of national interest.104 Especially after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, democratic processes have spread over much of the world. Although Ian Clark argues that globalisation also places impediments in democracy’s way105, the fear of isolation and the help of international organisations have increased the number of democratic countries in the world, though further progress can be made. After the collapse of communism, there were important steps that moved the globe towards greater interconnectedness and produced more complex global concentrations of state power, resulting in previously autonomous nation-states becoming incorporated into blocs for military and other purposes. This emerging global system is part of an increasingly complex globalisation of authority, with the extension of both national forms of state alongside global institutions that mediate and curtail notions of national sovereignty, including the promulgation of international personhood norms and rights. In the case of the more advanced west, this led to the creation of more sophisticated and specialised global economic institutions regulating the world economy. 106 Furthermore, the progress of the global economy restrains the ability of the state to establish and manage an autonomous national economy. As Strange says, where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets, which on many crucial issues are the masters over the governments of states.107 Today, there is a common belief that nation states are dead, which can be attributed to the 4I’s (according to Ohmae), which are investment, industry, and individual consumer and information technologies. Investment is not geographically constrained, industry is not dependent on the interest of the home governments, information technology makes it possible for a company to operate in various parts of the world and individual consumers have also become global in orientation.108 There are two important roles of nation-states: as an orchestrator of social cohesion and economic

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cooperation between major social interests at national level, and as a guarantor of the rule of law and of enabling plural communities to coexist without excessive conflict.109 It is perceived that globalisation has influenced people to become more aware of themselves as citizens of the world, more aware of alternatives to the status quo and to conventional forms of authority and morality, via the Internet and TV.110 This is reflected in the state as well; people’s awareness forces the state to respond to the needs and demands of its citizens more and more, everyday. Furthermore, as a consequence of globalisation, new cultural identities and issues such as gender, sexual orientation and ecology have emerged. Moreover, much of the lobbying on such issues is aimed at supraterritorial or international bodies, such as the EU or the UN. International bodies like these have become the gatekeepers of information. Besides supranational organisations such as these, other small supraterritorial civil society organisations have also become gatekeepers. Organisations such as the Assembly of European Regions and the Committee of the Regions bring sub-national units together under umbrella organisations which eliminate national differences. The nation states have lost their role as an ultimate gatekeeper in today’s world. However, one should accept the fact that globalisation clearly constrains governments: globalisation does not dissolve the state, but it has not left it untouched either.111 Globalisation changes the role of the state, rather than abolishing it. Therefore, neither of the extreme ends of the spectrum is true; nation states continue to provide both the means for increased worldwide economic globalisation and also its regulatory control. However, the state has lost the three legs of the sovereignty tripod, which were military, economic and cultural self-sufficiency. In order to retain their law and order policing ability, states had to seek alliances.112 Thus, participation in international organisations is especially important if a state wants to have a say in the world affairs of this global era. As Mitrany suggests, integrationism and supranationalism are regarded as particularly effective responses to the challenges of a globalising world, i.e., the need to manage global economic liberalism and the rise of multinational companies113, the globalisation of security threats, and changing political and societal demands. Especially, the

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ability to seek alliances and cooperation in the realm of security is vital for the states’ survival. It is argued here that the difference between international and national security had disappeared by the end of the Cold War, especially in the West. Furthermore, with the whole idea of a newly globalised world, the perceived risks have changed; thus, international politics became intertwined with national politics. Besides the military threats to states, globalisation brought new security challenges as well, such as ‘resource, environment and demography.’114 It is also argued that in the 21st century, internal security includes issues such as immigration and control of transborder flows, and thus, ‘Internal security is a transversal vision of some knowledge about public order and surveillance inside the territory, associated with specific devices of control’.115 As Kaldor tells us, ‘binary oppositions that shaped our interpretation of violence, between private and public, or between external and internal, can only be applied with difficulty to the contemporary context.’116 Thus, globalisation in security means the detachment of security from territoriality; the enmeshment of security in global networks; the creation by globalisation of a new security agenda; and the diminished capacity of a state to provide security for its citizens. The effect of deterritorialisation on national securities, while decreasing the perceived authority of states in providing security, has increased interdependence among states in the 21st century. The ambiguity of the sources of threat has forced states to cooperate more. After the conclusion of the Cold War, the separation of East and West was replaced by cooperation against an unknown or diffuse threat. Due to the increase in the scale of security threats, it is now believed that ‘the greater the number of allies, the smaller the amount of available territory for terrorist training facilities or safe havens.’117

2 SECURITY CULTURE AND THEORIES

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to define security culture and analyse it using four different theories of security: the traditional approach, liberal institutionalism, democratic peace theory and the globalist approach, respectively. The theoretical framework illustrated here constitutes the basis for the comparison of security cultures in Turkey and the EU, which is perceived as an example of a regional security community. This chapter first studies the traditional approach in security perception, which is based on the Realist theory of international relations, followed by the Liberal Institutional approach. The second part of the chapter focuses on the importance of institutions in maintaining security and representing identity and interests. The Liberal institutional approach is closely related to the Constructivist approach, which makes culture its focal point. The culture element enables us to leave behind unitary state actors and highlights the cultural context in which states emerge and flourish. Therefore, the prominence of culture in respect to security is elaborated in detail before going into the details of the democratic peace theory. The last two theories tackled in this chapter are democratic peace theory and the globalist approach, which hold ample cultural aspect. All in all, the four theories studied here are closely connected to the security culture literature in security studies. Culture and foreign policy are inseparable in the sense that culture has an effect on instruments used in foreign and security policy, and nationality, geography, and weapons do have effect on the culture.

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Therefore, the policies and culture feed each other continuously. Moreover, the incorporation of theories with the security culture reveals the differences between Turkey’s more traditional approach, and the EU’s more global, liberal institutional approach believing in the link between democracy and security. The approaches these actors take are closely linked to the security culture they hold in relation to their interactions with neighbours and their historical experiences. The following chapters take a historicocultural approach in these actors’ security perceptions in relation to the approaches. The Traditional Approach Traditional conceptions of national security begin and often end with the military defence of territory.1 This approach is based on the Realist theory of International Relations (IR), in which relations among states are perceived as a struggle for power and the main aim of states is to achieve their interests, even though this may mean harming other states with whom they interact. This approach uses individualist deductive assumptions based on the state of human nature to understand international affairs. The roots of this theory go back to Nieburh and Morgenthau, when they defined humans as evil, and using the Hobbesian paradigm, presented the ultimate desire of men as self-preservation and the domination of others. Using this position, humanity itself is understood as egoistic2, and states, due to a lack of trust in each other, attempt to build strong, efficient militaries to defend themselves in a world ruled by anarchy. As Waltz states, ‘no state lacking the military ability to compete with other great powers has ever been ranked among them.’3 For Waltz, the international system consists of a number of great powers, each seeking to survive. This approach does not argue that states are always at war, but that there is a constant insecurity and fear among states which may lead to war. Thus, although states can cooperate in certain areas, this cooperation does not last very long, as their leaders put their own state’s interests before others.4 Cooperation among states is established on the expectation that this system will check other states and thus help to counter the threat. In this traditional view, security is taken as militaristic and political and, to some extent,

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economic. Military security is the traditional area of security studies. Buzan, Wæver and Wilde argue that the referent object in the military sector is the state, and they suggest that the Traditional approach tends to see all military affairs as instances of security.5 The presence of heavily armed and expansionist states is identified as the major threat. Besides political security, the organisational stability of the social order, economic security, and the ability of states to maintain independent military production capability and capacity are also elements of the Traditional approach. In the traditional view, militaries seek to maximise autonomy and size, and to reduce uncertainty. Escalation is expected, because restraint contradicts the very nature of offenceoriented, war-winning military organisations.6 Ideological threats, nationalist movements, the effect of different values on states7 can all be included in the political realm. In the 21st century, globalisation and its challenges are the main threats to which states must respond. To realists, globalisation reflects the hegemonic influence of the major powers in international politics; they tend to see proximity creating vulnerability, which leads to conflict.8 Furthermore, identity and nationalism are assimilated into this approach by treating nations as states.9 The French revolution and birth of the American republic had brought the relationship between nation and state together. Tamir says, ‘The false identification of nation with state reflects the historical processes that accompanied the emergence of modern nation-state’.10 Therefore, a different identity within the state is perceived as a threat against the state itself. The global era causes a relative decline of nation states, which simultaneously brings fragmentation of collective identities. In other words, large scale, homogenous and unified identities lose their weight in the international system. It is believed that there has been a change of self-recognition and self-identification in the global world which, at the state level, is reflected as separatist movements. These ‘would-be states’ (Basques, Kurds, Chechens, Quebecois and so on) are considered to be the main threat within the state. The Traditional approach sees the issues arising from cultural diversity within a society11 as an immense threat to the existence of the state and the protection of its territory. The main criticism of the Traditional approach is the lack of cooperation between states, the security dilemma which was first

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expressed by John Herz as ‘a structural notion in which self help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend regardless of intention to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening’.12 In short, lack of confidence in the ‘other’ states produces constant mistrust, which leads to offensive and aggressive military capabilities. Principles like non-proliferation, international law or international society may be seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the state and thus can be considered a threat to the security of the state, which would invoke the military. This dilemma is seen as the main reason behind the failure of interstate cooperation. Before the conclusion of the Cold War, alliances were established against a solid threat: either communism or capitalism. After the Cold War, when the communist threat disappeared, the international stage witnessed the continuation of cooperation. The Traditional approach argues that the mistrust among states continues despite cooperation, and that this is evident in the increase in the number of countries with nuclear capabilities, in spite of agreements such as Arms Reduction agreements and the Non Proliferation Treaty. The other hindrance to cooperation among states is the issue of relative gain. As the Traditional approach argues, states are interested in gaining more than their partners in cooperation. Therefore, the ultimate goal of states is not the continuation of cooperation between them and a long peaceful life for everyone, but instead, the ultimate goal is to achieve, by means of cooperation, the greatest advantage. However, Glaser is more optimistic about interstate cooperation. He argues that there are some situations where states had to cooperate instead of competing, in order to gain more from the situation.13 Accordingly, he also argues that by the 1990s, states had realised that cooperation is better than competition for their security. As time has passed, the understanding of national security and implied cooperation has changed. By the conclusion of the Cold War, an understanding had emerged which supports ‘more cooperation to achieve more in international relations’ in some parts of the world, i.e., Europe. National security has begun to be understood as not being independent of other states’ national security, but, in contrast, linked to other states’ well

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being. This argument leads us to the second approach, namely, the Collective Security approach. The Liberal Institutionalism/Collective Security Approach In the 1990s, as the notion of national security changed, the importance of institutions increased. Although institutions were not previously seen as key players in security issues, their perceived role has increased on the international scene, especially after the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that international organisations such as the Western European Union (WEU), Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EU and NATO were established before the 1990s, their role remained essential after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, since, as Keohane and Martin argue, ‘Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity’.14 In this system, the framework of institutions and law should be protected. Any kind of threat to the system is a threat to all states concurrently. The Collective Security approach argues that a state’s aggression against other states poses a threat to the state itself, as seen in Bosnia, Rwanda and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Therefore, establishment of a stable world order is necessary to provide a secure setting for individual states, and is in their common interest. The Liberal Institutionalists share the same worries about vulnerability and sensitivity of interdependence with the traditional approach; however, liberal institutionalism sees states cooperating under international organisations. Collective security systems are created to prevent war. Thus, one can’t restrict the definition of collective security only to the treaties signed by, or to the non-violence between, the member states. Collective security includes creating instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes, reducing ecological destruction, equalising economic standards, protecting minorities, developing confidence and security building measures, controlling and reducing weapons.15 Thus, the UN, EU, WEU, OSCE, and NATO are all considered security communities, and are all parts of collective security in this sense. Due to alterations in challenges and threats, the significance of international institutions increased drastically, as the Collective Security

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approach argues. The ‘butterfly effect’ of the 21st century increases the vulnerability of the states and individuals. Therefore, states engage in various types of cooperation in the international sphere, such as security regimes, security communities and regional security complexes. Security regimes are the principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate, as Jervis asserts.16 A ‘security community’ is a concept christened by Karl Deutsch. It means that a group of states develop a sense of community and they share a mutual interest in keeping secure relations. This kind of community (such as the EU) assumes that there is no chance of a military conflict between its members. These communities are defined by three basic characteristics: shared values and identities (a ‘we-feeling’), intense relations, and long-term interests. In the following chapters, as the EU is discussed in further detail, the creation of shared values, a ‘we-feeling’ and identity at the European level is seen. Furthermore, the detailed examination of the EU also shows a security culture created at the EU level that is different from the security culture of the national member states. Finally, a ‘regional security complex’ is ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.’17 As argued by Buzan, it has two levels: higher and lower. The higher level includes the great powers and the lower level includes the smaller states. Regional organisations such as the OSCE, Union du Maghreb Arabe (AMU), and the Euro-Mediterranean Process are examples of security complexes. This approach agrees with the Traditional approach on the idea of anarchy, but institutionalism is ‘more interested in how self-interested states construct a thin version of society through the guise of institutions and regulative norms in order to promote their interests.’18 Moreover, international organisations and institutions provide the means for states to monitor each other, because they produce transparency and disseminate information. Thus, multilateral organisations are increasingly accepted by states, since they are seen as the enactment of regional security.19 Furthermore, international institutions are increasingly important due to their role of generating identities, i.e., the Gulf

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Cooperation Council (GCC) promoting Gulf identity, the EU promoting European identity, and NATO promoting ‘western’ identity. One of the crucial points of international organisations, other than collecting the states with like interests under the same roof, is that the members share identity and values – the ‘we-feeling’. International institutions help to reconstruct the interests of the states through various ways, i.e., personal and organisational pathways. Liberal institutionalism believes that domestic politics and culture shape the identity of the nation-state, and nation-states construct the international environment. Thus, the problems and conflicts in domestic affairs are projected into the sphere of international relations.20 The material gains mean something for the people and societies if they can appeal to their ideas and values. The element of constructivism in the liberal institutional model reinforces the idea that culture matters in international relations, as it is closely related to such various issues as the difference between idea and matter, language, ideas, idealism, materialism, advertisements, lyrics, universalism and pluralism and so on. The national character and the political culture have been prominent in foreign affairs. A fundamental principle in constructivism is that ‘people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of [the] meaning that the objects have for them.’21 Furthermore, these meanings and identities are the basis for the interests, based on if they are identified with the fate of others22 and they develop in interaction. Constructivist Approach Constructivism challenges the rational approach of IR by seeing the social world as constructed rather than given, and offers an alternative understanding of issues such as anarchy, state identity, interest, power and changes in the world. The Constructivist’s main aim has been interpreting meaning and grasping the influence of changing practice, rather than empirically validating explanations of independent mechanisms.23 Wendt argues that identities and interests are constructed and supported by inter-subjective practice, and in relation to this, the international system is intersubjective rather than material.24 For Wendt, the rationality of a situation can be understood by the nature of the interaction between the individual actors faced with anarchy25,

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and ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. The International environment is in a continuous process of interaction; thus, in understanding IR, any attempt to eliminate interpretation will fail, given that human beings use moral criteria and interpretation26 and they are a product of culture, according to Geertz. Here, Wendt defines constructivism in relation to IR: Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.27 As Wendt stresses the constructed interests in relation to identity in IR studies, Kratochwil relies on understanding ‘political action in terms of meaningful, rather than purely instrumental, action.’28 Therefore, Wendt’s position is not the only determinant in constructivism. There are two other perspectives: one arguing that transnational communication and shared values undermine the traditional loyalties29 and the other introducing norms and rules, which are regulatory and constitutive. Social relations construct human beings; therefore, society and people make each other in an ongoing, two-way process30, and in this process there is a need for rules and norms. Kratochwil sees the intersubjective context, which enables actors to make sense of the world, as based on and mediated by rules and norms.31 Rules give action meaning and guidance, and they are the means allowing people to pursue goals, share meaning, communicate with each other, criticise assertions, and justify actions.32 At the same time, rules lead to an uneven distribution of benefits, and a condition of rules is that some agents will use them to exercise control and obtain advantages over other agents. Onuf argues that rules are the basic ingredient of politics, which is potentially about privilege and involves normative questions.33 This creates a power relationship among the people, and also among the states in the international era.

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Security Culture In the liberal institutions, security is defined in the community where the meaning, identities and values are shared. The emphasis on these principles brought the issue of culture into international relations, something which was lacking in the traditional approach, as constructivists also argued. From Snyder to Huntington, culture has played a crucial role in the theoretical development of security studies. Snyder, Stein, Lalman, Rosecrance, and others argued that the traditional approach could not explain ‘security’, since the elements of culture were not included in this approach. The prominence of culture in politics was first emphasised by Almond and Verba as political culture, and defined as the beliefs and values of a society that relate to its political system.34 Political culture has origins in language, religion, customs, socialisation, and in shared experiences. Geertz argued that this culture shapes the interpretation of the world and leads to distinct behaviours35; thus, the interpretation of security, construction of danger, threat, and security policies are all assumed to be closely related to culture, starting with Thucydides. Especially, the concepts of threat and danger are socially constructed phenomena, which arise within particular political contexts,36 as this work elaborates on, especially in the chapter on Turkey’s security perception. One contemporary example of the construction of danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is considered one of the challenges of globalisation. The Constructivist would argue that it is not such weapons themselves that matter, but who holds these weapons and how those states are perceived37, because a state will understand others according to the identity it attributes to them.38 Katzenstein argues that culture is a ‘broad label’ that ‘refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what actors exist in a social system, how they operate, and how they relate to each other.’39 Sowell40 claims that cultural differences play an important role in the relations among states because actors see issues from their own cultural perspectives, and failure to appreciate these differences leads to misconceptions.41 Manzaar states that ‘culture serves as the dominant blueprint for social, economic, and military structures and institutions,

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thus exercising a strong influence on the behaviour and prospects of nation-states in the world community’.42 The culture element enables us to leave behind unitary state actors, and highlights the cultural context in which states emerge and flourish. It also helps to emphasise the historical elements in the relations among states. This is crucial, since meaning cannot be understood only by interaction. State and system identities are socially constructed via historicocultural calls for unity.43 Beyond interaction, a historical bombardment of influences from social and cultural institutions comes to constitute what is called identity44; thus, historical constructivism is important in understanding the construction of an identity.45 Clausewitz advanced the ideas on security/strategy culture by addressing the importance of people and mobilisation of masses in supporting war.46 In 1977, with Snyder, security culture became an essential part of security studies. He defines it as: The sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to …. strategy.47 Booth and Gray emphasised this idea by focussing on the influence of strategic culture on security policy choices. Gray defines security culture as: referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms.48 Booth, in a similar line, argues that: Strategic culture refers to a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.49

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However, Johnston criticises Gray and Snyder by arguing that ‘If “strategic culture” is said to be the product of nearly all relevant explanatory variables, then there is little conceptual space for a nonstrategic culture explanation of strategic choice.’50 Johnson separates the discussion on strategic culture into three generations. The first generation, according to him, originates from the Cold War era, arguing that security culture is shaped by stable factors, such as historical experiences, national character and geography.51 He criticises this generation by saying that it is mechanical deterministic, because it claims only that strategic culture tends to lead to particular strategic behaviours or that strategy is in part a product of culture.52 Another criticism that he brings up is that the first generation discards the possibility of disjunction between the behaviour and culture. In the second generation, the focus (according to Johnston) is the separation of security culture and behaviour as well as declaratory and secret doctrine. Johnston believes the second generation establishes available orientations to violence and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against enemies.53 Johnston criticises this generation also, though not at severely as the first, by arguing that the issue between symbolic discourses is not clear and that, therefore, it is not possible to understand if strategic discourse influences behaviour. The third generation, with which Johnston identifies himself, treats culture as an independent variable and behaviour as a dependent variable, and argues that strategic culture matters if there is a correlation between strategic preferences and behaviour. All in all, as Longhurst states, strategic culture is ‘a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process’54, implying that in international relations, security culture is ‘beliefs, images, and symbols, carried by the people, of a country regarding the relationship between their country and the rest of the world’.55 Therefore, the perceptions, norms, ideas, and beliefs guide the decision-makers in sorting out the strategic priorities of the foreign and security policies. Although liberal institutional theory is not the only theory in international relations closely related to security culture, it has a crucial

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place in security culture studies, since it answers the question: ‘Who maintains the strategic/security culture?’ Due to the fact that security culture is the property of collectivities, international organisations became the one keeping the culture in international affairs. It is argued here that history and experiences construct the security culture which is protected by elites and institutions in a nation state. Elites have a considerable effect in forming the security culture in a country, because the culture is shaped by the elites as well; it is maintained according to their perception of themselves, as realist, liberal or revolutionary. In the international arena security culture is protected by international organisations. Six factors identifying the security culture (the geopolitical setting, military history, international relationships, political culture and ideology, the nature of civil-military relations and military technology56) create the close link between the theories and security culture itself. Liberal institutional theory is connected to the culture by constructivism, as elaborated above. In the global approach, culture is believed to play a crucial role, i.e., global values, humanitarian intervention, shared threats, universally embraced ideas and norms such as human rights, which will now be studied in detail. To begin with, one of the examples is the most-discussed ‘clash of civilizations’ theory, which is based on the role of culture in international relations and wherein, as Huntington suggests, conflict is more likely to occur between states of different civilizations. Therefore, according to him, culture creates the framework for international relations and the source of conflict. More importantly, globalisation is seen as the process where a global culture is facilitated based on human rights and equality. Especially, changes in the perceived security threats force the security culture to renew its components. Increases in the non-traditional security threats (epidemiological and environmental threats, resource scarcity, terrorism, etc., as mentioned in Chapter 1) force the states to alter their security perception and culture in the 21st century. As the meaning of security moves from state security towards societal security, from militaristic to non-militaristic security, inevitably one witnesses a change in the security culture, as Fukuyama and Huntington would argue. Security culture can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded, and culturally translated.57

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Desch argues a complete separation between realism and security culture58; here it is argued that one cannot have an absolute separation between them since the traditional approach focuses on interests, which cannot be separated from culture. Although the cultural aspect of security came into the agenda as a reaction to the realist tradition, it is still closely related to the traditional approach, as regards geographical situation, history, threat and values. Moreover, the constructivist approach accepts the role of power in the relations among states, and there are some realists who argue that nonmaterial factors should be understood, in order to fully understand international relations (i.e., Morgenthau, Wolfers, Carr). Realist traditional approach affirms that not every individual is aggressive and not every individual is otheroriented, that there is an interaction between these two groups (otheroriented and aggressive) which brings out the power maximisation as a central issue in international affairs. Therefore, the realist traditional approach also believes in such interaction. Morgenthau’s discussion on peace, below, shows the importance of the interaction in constructing peace: Peace is subject to the conditions of time and space and must be established and maintained by different methods and under different conditions of urgency in the every-day relations of concrete nations.59 Moreover, Habermas argues that communicative action can be an emancipatory force.60 Questions of culture and identity have always been part and parcel of the analysis of the social world. As Gray argues, culture shapes the process of strategy making, and influences the execution of strategy, no matter how close actual choice may be to some abstract or idealised cultural preference.61 This research shares the arguments made by Gray in defining culture as a part of every aspect of a country’s life; thus, nationality, geography, weapons and functions, simplicity-complexity, generations and grand strategy (meaning the instruments used in foreign and security policy) all have influences on the security culture. Therefore, the theories and the literature on security culture are used

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together to elaborate on states’ policies in their foreign affairs, and theories cannot be separated from the effects of culture, since culture is literally everywhere62, as Gray asserts. Democratic Peace theory’s belief in alliances among those who share the same identity shows the definite connection between the security culture and the theory itself, which will be examined now. Democratic Peace Theory This theory is based on the assumption of the impossibility of an outbreak of war among democratic states, as foreseen by Kant in ‘Perpetual Peace’. Kant emphasises three conditions to preclude the possibility of war: being a republic, interstate organisation63, and world citizenship. Although he did not specify democracy, his definition of a republic, as a legal equality among citizens as subjects on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers64, is the basis of a democratic regime today. Another important aspect of Kant’s ideas is the process whereby people learn that wars are immoral and destructive and that they result in economic, political and social disasters. The regime being a republic makes it possible for people to affect the state’s policies. Therefore, the learning process and the establishment of democratic states constitute the basis of Democratic Peace theory. Furthermore, it is believed that democratic representation, respect for human rights, and transnational interdependence would promote peace. Thus, relations between democracies fit into the category of security community, in which states not only do not fight each other, they do not expect to fight each other or significantly prepare to fight each other.65 First of all, this theory subscribes to the idea that domestic politics in democratic countries constrain leaders from going to war. States’ diplomatic actions are seen to be deeply effected by culturally constructed core values and notions of identity, in this approach. Elections and public debate are vital factors in this process. Leaders desire to stay in power and citizens in democratic countries do not favour violence, therefore democratic countries do not engage in conflicts. Furthermore, this theory argues that democracy brings external involvement, accountability, trust and respect, public constraint, group constraint

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(collective identity), slow mobilisation, no surprise attacks, and public access to information, which all lead to peace.66 Democracies rarely go to war or engage in militarised disputes with each other because they share common values in which the use of military force is illegitimate.67 Democratic Peace theory claims that a system of checks and balances on leaders constrains them in democratic states, because when a state accepts the democratic way of life, institutions and rules in the system become the modus operandi for leaders to follow. This point is linked to the idea of collective identity. Democratic states form groups, organisations, and communities where there are clear-cut rules. This feature ties Democratic Peace theory to the liberal institutional theory. These institutional settings provide a forum for pursuing and negotiating settlements of disputes. Democratic states tend to be members of international organisations, since organisations provide guidance and bring benefits to members.68 These institutions reinforce the peace between liberal democracies and make it difficult for political leaders to mobilise their people for wars against fellow democracies.69 Although the main focus is put on the institutions here, shared identity provides the basis for liberal democratic peace.70 Therefore, it is also believed here that culture (both political and security) plays a crucial role in democratic peace theory. This theory does not expect war between democracies, because the culture that is shared prevents them. However, democratic peace theory admits there is a possibility of war between a democratic and a non-democratic country, because of the lack of shared experience, beliefs, and ideas – in short, culture. Although there are several criticisms of this theory, critics also accept that democracies have rarely fought each other. It should be also admitted that although democracies sometimes engage in conflicts, e.g. Turkey-Greece, they try to solve issues at the international institutional level. It is argued that international organisations, the complexity of the democratic system, and the complexity of the interstate system force democratic states to negotiate and mediate. Another important criticism is that there are other factors besides the existence of a democratic regime that constrain states from engaging in war. Rivalry and non-rivalry affect states. It is argued that at the systemic level, non-rivals would engage less in conflict. If states

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are rivals, democratic regimes are not especially helpful in preventing conflict.71 However, this criticism also concedes that democratic regimes are less prone to war. Here it should be mentioned that a few sub-theories have arisen within Democratic Peace theory. One of them is Separate Democratic Peace theory, in which the idea is not only that democratic countries do not fight each other, but also that those democratic countries generally try not to fight other countries. However, the main evidence against this theory is the War in Iraq in 2003. Globalist Approach The global society school of thought articulates that, at the beginning of the 21st century, the process of globalisation has accelerated to the point where the clear outlines of a global society are now evident. The emergence of a global economic system, global communications, and the elements of a global culture have helped to provide a wide network of social relationships which transcend state frontiers and encompass people in all parts of the world.72 However, this process creates an asymmetric relationship among the states, and people, creating new security threats and changing the meaning of security for both states and people. As Hall argues, the erosion of nation-state, national economies, and national cultural identities is a complex and unstable moment, since, entities of power are dangerous when they are ascending and when they are declining and it is a moot point whether they are more dangerous in the second or the first moment. The first moment, they gobble up everybody and in the second moment they take everybody down with them.73 Clark identifies four ways that globalisation changes the security structure and the system of the states: the detachment of security from territoriality, the enmeshment of security in global networks, the creation by globalisation of a new security agenda, and the diminished capacity of the state to provide security for its citizens.74 Therefore, it is argued that national and international approaches to the conflicts that humanity experiences are not sufficient in the present

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day. Katzenstein claims that the changing world has forced a broadening of the concept of security; as a result, a certain need for new approaches and new policies has emerged. Thomas and Tow summarise this as: The end of the Cold War generated a major re-evaluation of normative and policy assumptions as these apply to international relations (IR). In particular, new attempts were undertaken to explain what made people ‘secure’. Historically, security was understood in terms of threats to state sovereignty and territory. Alternative explanations of security politics were introduced throughout much of the 1990s, spanning such concerns as access to basic foodstuffs, the quality of the global environment and the economic welfare of populations inhabiting developing countries. These alternative explanations of security generated discussion about how far the security paradigm could be widened and about what is the most appropriate way to achieve this expansion.75 New forms of wars and conflicts have come about in the present era due to the globalisation of security threats. Although the reasons for these conflicts still seem to be based in nationalism, the old ways of quelling atrocities are not adequate in the 21st century. Humanitarian motives are among the new reasons, and pretexts, that lead to a scale of intervention (i.e., the 2003 War in Iraq) which was not conceivable in the past. Although, in the previous century, humanitarian intervention was justifiable in the case of a humanitarian crisis (e.g., a civil war), the 21st century widened the meaning of humanitarian intervention to preemptive action, which is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people’s fundamental freedoms, and focussing on protecting people from risks and pervasive threats. Moreover, globalisation emphasises the security of individuals, where human rights are emphasised76, rather than state security per se. In relation to Democratic Peace theory, respect for human rights and the exercise of democratic means are perceived as the predominant points in defining threats. Therefore, the Globalist approach argues that human rights violations and undemocratic regimes are perceived, in the 21st century, as adequate reasons for intervention.

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Although the end of the Cold War created the image of a peaceful world, regional conflicts continued, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the civil war in Yugoslavia and conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. According to Robert McNamara, racial, religious and ethnic tensions will remain. Nationalism will be a powerful force across the globe. Political revolutions will erupt as societies advance. Historic disputes over political boundaries will endure. And economic disparities among and within nations will increase as technology and education spread unevenly around the world.77 It is argued that the decline in the powers of nation states increases the regression to a very defensive form of national identity. When the nation states cannot respond to the needs of the people, the response seems to go in two ways. One is global, the other is local.78 At the global level, international institutions’ and the other states’ responses to this continuation of conflict change as the technology and capabilities change. And localisation, as a response to globalisation, may bring peripheral and central identities over against each other. In the global era, national security is not perceived as sufficient to ensure the security of citizens in a ‘sovereign’ territory. Thus, the concept of security has been enlarged, as the terms could not meet the expectations. Although Meddings argues that the humanitarian side of security has been part of international politics since 1864, from the beginning of humanitarian law, human security was first mentioned by the UNDP in 1994: The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as a global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation states than to people…. In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons - it is a concern with human life and dignity.79

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According to the UNDP, human security is a universal concern including interdependent components such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Furthermore, it is argued that human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later reaction. A final feature is that it is people-centred; it is concerned with how people live, their freedom, social opportunities, and so on. Thomas’ definition of human security is parallel to the UNDP’s definition, arguing that security is achieved only when basic material needs are met and ‘meaningful participation in the life of the community’ and human dignity are realised.80 Nevertheless, there is no one definition of human security, either. Thomas takes human dignity as a key element; Meddings makes rights the key component of human security.81 Numerous countries also perceive it differently. Therefore, the UNDP’s definition is only a guideline for countries. For instance, Canada’s official opinion is that: human security addresses threats to the survival and safety of people from both military (e.g. intra-state war, small arms proliferation, communal-based violence) and non-military sources (e.g. human rights violations, famine, infectious diseases).82 On the other hand, the Japanese definition of human security is more comprehensive, taking environmental security into account as well. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights identifies seven areas related to human security: persecution, unnecessary harm, housing, healthcare, sanitation, food and clothing.83 Thus, the idea of human security as a global concept is the focus of security relations among the states today. The nature of security has shifted from national security to human security in the past few decades. Power relations on the international scene have changed in the global era. As Strange84 points out: • Power has shifted upwards, from weak states to stronger states with global or regional reach beyond their frontiers • Power has shifted sideways from states to markets and hence to non-state authorities • Some power has evaporated in so far as no one exercises it.

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The global era came with different challenges to people and nationstates, and resulted in the formation of organisations such as the UN, the IMF, the EU, and the World Bank, which became the agents for providing insurance against the financial costs of major catastrophes. Furthermore, international action is essential not only in reacting against adverse developments, but also in preventing, protecting and compensating for them.85 Security culture has gone through some alterations as well, as the perception of security has changed. The challenges of the global era (as Clark suggests, examined above) brought the understanding of asymmetry and a transformation of military discourse. Before the global era, modern generals expected opponents to fight by the same practice as they did; however, post-modernist opponents are unlike the modern armies. Therefore, military organisation is going through alterations in terms of tactical and operational innovations. In the 21st century, nuclear technology makes states less dependent on society, as Martin Shaw has pointed out.86 Technological developments in the military sphere, which constitute a revolution in military affairs (RMA), have had a profound effect on the military capabilities of states, without the need for society. In the 21st century, manpower is superseded by technological developments on the battlefield, eradicating the separation between civilians and soldiers. In previous centuries, soldiers have been perceived primarily as those in danger on the battlefield, but today, due to technological developments in military affairs, there is no specific battlefield as such. The result is a redistribution of security challenges for states and individuals, and RMA discourse being readjusted to asymmetrical battles. This point is crucial in understanding the changes in the security/strategy culture, since the war on terrorism is a new culture of warfare, which affects the elites and institutions which construct and maintain the culture in security. Therefore, this research separates itself from the arguments on security culture resisting change. Although it had been argued87 that since the political elite and bureaucracies maintain legitimacy by the established norms, culture is not challenged, slow change, especially after the 9/11 attacks, is witnessed.

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Conclusion Here, the close relationships between the security culture and the theories such as traditional, liberal institutional, democratic peace and globalist have been studied. The chapter started with the Traditional approach, which is based on Realist and Neorealist theories of IR, where the relations among states are perceived as a struggle for power and security as mainly militaristic and political. The definition of security of this approach, in relation to geographical situation, history, threat and values, emphasises the element of culture in international affairs, although it may be argued that security culture literature was born as a reaction to the limitations of the traditional approach. The other criticism of this approach on the security dilemma opens the way for the liberal institutional theory. Especially, the alterations to challenges and threats in the global world re-emphasise the significance of international institutions. These institutions are significant in international affairs, firstly because they provide the means for states to monitor each other, and secondly because they generate identities. The members of international organisations share values, identity, and ‘we feeling’, which relates this theory closely to security culture and constructivism literature. This chapter has argued that the element of constructivism in liberal institutionalism reinforces the prominence of cultures in relations among states. This chapter has focused on the literature on security culture and defines security culture as the beliefs, images, and symbols carried by the people of a country/entity regarding its attitudes towards the rest of the world. The third section of this chapter has examined democratic peace theory, which is based on the assumption of the impossibility of an outbreak of war among democratic states. It has been argued here that this theory is interlinked with culture, in relation to collective identity, which also demonstrates the link to liberal institutionalism, and shared values, meaning democracy. This theory does not anticipate war between democracies, since the shared culture puts a stop to a clash of interests among them. And finally, the globalist approach and its relation to security culture have been examined. The emergence of global economics, communications and culture, changes the security structure and the

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system of states. The global system is now much more polycentric, with contrasting forces at work. On the one hand, there are globalising trends, reorganisation of the mode of production88, techno-economic changes, the spread of democratic practice, and international law and its institutions; on the other hand, there are religious or ethnic conflicts, issues such as homelessness, economic conflicts, unemployment, contradictions of the free market, foreign debt, the arms trade, nuclear weapons, mafia and drug cartels, and, in between, the regionalisation experiments of some groups of states. The challenges of globalisation, as studied in the previous chapter (i.e., conventional weapons, WMD, international terrorism, organised crime, epidemic diseases, ethnic and religious conflicts, environmental threats), change the meaning of security from state security to societal security, as the Copenhagen School argues. Instead of state security, human security is the focus of the security relations among states. It is argued, here, that as the meaning of the terminology changes, the culture changes as well. The understanding of asymmetry and military transformations, redistribution of security challenges for states and individuals and RMA discoursed being adjusted to meet the needs of asymmetry inevitably alters the security/strategic culture. Culture is an essential part of life, by all means, and security policy orientations are not free from culture, either. However, in order to fully understand the security perception in the comparison of Turkey and the EU, the theories and culture have to be studied together. The EU’s perception of itself as liberal institutional and democratic and Turkey’s perception of herself as a realist increase the prominence of theories in this comparison. On the other hand, the EU perceives democracy, human rights, rule of law, and a liberal market as indispensable parts of its identity, and values to be protected. These values create a ‘wefeeling’ in the Union; they bring the member states closer to each other. Moreover, the changes in the meaning of security in the globalised world, the incapability of military to tackle the new security threats, the need for revision in military organisations, such as the changes NATO went through between 2000-2006, increase the significance of security culture. Although this work does not believe in the clash of civilizations, this theory is the essential ingredient of the optimist

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side of the debate on Turkey’s effect on European security. This theory of Huntington’s is based on a clash of identities, values, religion, and norms – in short, cultures – in the global era. Therefore, traditional, liberal institutional, globalist and democratic peace theories are used together with the culture effect in security studies in the following chapters.

3 TURKEY’S SECURITY PERCEPTION

Introduction The emphasis of this chapter is on the Turkish security perception and the debate over foreign and security policy. The first part of the chapter focuses on the domestic debate and identifies four main identities affecting the security perception; these are state, nationalist, Islamic/ conservative and European identities. The section concludes by defining national security according to the Turkish National Security Council, Constitution, and Ministry of National Defence. The classification of these identities is based on the domestic debate, the positions of the political parties, Turkish Armed Forces and Presidents. In the second part, the reflection of these identities on foreign and security policies is studied in six different eras: the One Party government (the 1920s to the 1950s); the transition to a multiparty system (up until the 1980 coup d’état); 1980 to the 1990s; the era after the end of the Cold War; the era after 9/11; and the era after the start of accession negotiations. In examining these eras, the study shows the strength of the established foreign policy, the resistance of the system to any shift, and the significance of the traditional approach in shaping the relations between Turkey and the countries in question. The third section concentrates on the Turkish perspective on regions that are perceived as security threats. The regions that are examined are the Mediterranean (mainly Cyprus and Greece), the Middle East and the Black Sea. Relations with neighbouring countries (i.e., Syria, Iraq, Iran, Israel and Armenia) are the main concerns of this section. The main

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aim here is to reveal the effect of the globalisation of security threats on Turkey and her relations with the neighbouring countries. This section gives the opportunity to observe changes in Turkey’s policies towards her neighbours, since it elucidates the former policies and the new policies, after globalisation, which had an effect on the security agenda. Throughout the chapter, the examples of the former foreign policies help in understanding the security culture in Turkey, and the new policies reveal what changes, if any, have been made. This chapter is at the heart of the comparison of EU and Turkish security perceptions. Domestic Debate – Identities Affecting the Security Conceptualisation and Perception Turkey straddles the border between Europe and Asia. Thus, the country projects both an ‘eastern’ and a ‘western’ personality in its culture and society. There are various similarities with eastern cultures, when it comes to family relations, relations between men and women and the weight of religion in social life. However, there is also westernisation and modernisation, which have been effective for almost two centuries now, at the state level. Democracy, secularism, and the free market economy have become integral parts of the character of the state. Moreover, Turkey is in an influential position in the Middle East and the wider Black Sea region, both of which have vital oil reserves, and also in the Mediterranean region, the Black Sea and the Straits, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Therefore, Turkey seeks a role for herself in both the West and the East. She sees herself as the bridge between Asia and Europe and therefore tries to participate in almost every international organisation, i.e., the OSCE, NATO, and Organisation for Islamic Conference (OIC). However, her desire to be a part of European civilization is overwhelming and reflects a strong attachment to the West.1 Partly as a result of this perceived role between the West and the East, partly due to the historical development of the Republic, and partly due to Turkey’s attachment to the West, there are four main ‘identities’ affecting the Turkish security perception.

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State Identity The main focus of the state’s identity is military security2, the real or imagined fear that the country is surrounded by enemies; therefore, the idea of the ‘other’ is embedded in its ideology.3 State identity perceives the army as the protector of Turkey against external and internal threats, and shows itself in the degree to which the public places its trust in the Turkish Armed Forces. The relationship between the military and the people is reciprocal. The Turkish Armed Forces may put pressure on the public, but that public supports and trusts them the most among all institutions.4 Although state identity has repercussions in domestic politics, it can be also observed in external affairs. Since military security has been the fundamental concern, the military expenditure of the country consists of 5.3 percent of GDP.5 The importance of military security may also be seen very clearly in the establishment of the National Security Council, after the 1960 coup d’état. Up to the year 2000, the army retained its privileged status in external and internal politics. However, as Turkey has become involved in the reforms required by the EU, the role of the military in internal politics has decreased. Although the Turkish Armed Forces did not resent these reforms, they invoked the geopolitical situation in the region, and neighbouring Syria, Iraq, Russia, the Caucasus, and Iran, as reasons for Turkey to have a powerful and invincible army.6 This identity is represented in Turkish political life mainly by the Turkish Armed Forces, and the Republican People’s Party. However, this doesn’t imply that it did not affect the other political parties. As an indication of the traditional approach, almost all of the political parties, Prime Ministers and Presidents, as well as the Turkish Armed Forces, have re-emphasised the importance of the organisational stability of the social order, economic security, the ability of states to maintain independent military production capability and capacity, as discussed in the second section of this chapter. In line with the traditional approach, state identity focuses on globalisation as a reflection of the hegemonic influence of the major powers in international politics, and state identity pays particular attention to identity and nationalism. State identity sees the emergence of different ethnic identities in Turkey (i.e., Kurds) as a threat to the indivisibility of the country. As Deniz

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Baykal7 stated repeatedly in his speeches in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA)8, Turkish national identity is believed to be based on neither ethnicity nor race, and therefore ethnic identities are a part of individuals’ personal lives rather than public. For that reason, the Turkish Armed Forces together with the Republican People’s Party (RPP) had opposed the Kurdish language courses and broadcasts in Kurdish. After the 2004 report of the European Commission9 on Turkey, the issue of minorities became a critical topic once again. The main argument on the Turkish side has been the absence of ethnic minorities in Turkey, that all citizens are Turkish citizens, and that these kinds of discussions weaken national integrity. It is asserted that the ethnic minorities cannot be defined by cultural, religious or linguistic differences. The status of ‘Minority’ can be created only if and when a group feels itself as the ‘other’, as different from the rest of the population. Another issue that has been raised by the state identity in relation to minorities is the meetings between European leaders and minorities’ religious leaders. Haşim Oral10 repeatedly stated in the TGNA that those meetings of the European politicians would create religious fragmentation in Turkey, which cannot, and should not, be allowed. This is also closely related to the mistrust towards the Western countries; however, this mistrust does not only reveal itself in the RPP and Turkish Armed Forces, but in almost all of the political party representatives’ speeches in the TGNA, such as: As it was the case years ago, today some powers reinvigorate the separatist movements in our country; however, our nation is able to fight against these powers, since the Turkish nation was up against these powers for centuries now.11 Yaşar Tüzün (RPP) In response to the report prepared by the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission on Turkey [May 2003], I invite the European countries to apologise for their ignorance and arrogance; identifying Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, Turkish culture, secularism, and Turkish Armed Forces as the handicaps on the way to the EU membership.12 Sadık Yakut ( JDP – Justice and Development Party)

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If only one percent of the terrorist activities of the PKK happened in Europe, they would have taken the precautions and necessary measures.… It is argued here [the TGNA] that the relations with the EU are getting better and we are getting closer to the EU! We say that these relations are better now, because we are making concessions all the time and this is not becoming closer, this is concession.13 Kemal Çelik (TPP – True Path Party) On February 24, 2005 in the EU-Turkey meetings, there had been very ugly incidents, in which Greek Cypriot and French parliamentarians assaulted the independence of the Turkish State and attacked our diplomat. This is an indication of the European countries’ aim to bring the Sevres Treaty once again in front of Turkey. We have to consider these aims in length….14 Yaşar Nuri Öztürk (APP – Ascension of the People Party) If the benefits of a society are in contradiction with the international forces, we should be able to take the risk and go against the world. That is what Atatürk did, but today, the foreign policy decisions of the governments fail to comply with our traditions.15 Sema Tutar Pişkinsüt (CDP – Communal Democrat Party) These days we see a trend in European countries to start a smear campaign towards Turkey. It is sad to see these friends supporting these campaigns.…16 Bülent Arınç ( JDP) Nationalist Identity Nationalist identity foresees the future of the country as converging with the whole Turkic world, an area stretching from Anatolia to Central Asia, emphasising Turkish nationalism and represented by the National Action Party17 (NAP). Priorities of the NAP in foreign policy include the Kurdish question, Cyprus and relations with Israel. Nationalist identity has been against the use of the Kurdish language in schools and broadcasts in Kurdish, similar to the state identity. This

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approach pays particular attention to Cyprus in terms of security and the Turkish identity, and supports continuing relations with Israel; because of lobbying issues in the USA, Jewish lobbies are perceived as a significant tool against Armenian lobbies. It is believed that good relations with Jewish lobbies will assist Turkey’s relations with the USA. In relation to the Cyprus problem, this identity has affected Turkish foreign policy orientations deeply throughout the years. The NAP has been against the demands of the EU on opening harbours and ports to the Greek Cypriots and negotiations that would bring any compromise in Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus. Any retreat in this issue has been perceived as a treason felony, and the EU’s demands have been seen as against the territorial integrity of the Turkish state.18 The NAP had been against the EU membership of the Greek Cypriots and the referendum on the Annan Plan in 2004. They have argued that the EU did not have a Plan B in case the Greek Cypriots reject the Annan Plan, and that this would complicate and even make it impossible to bring a solution to the Cyprus issue. They also emphasise the importance of the geopolitical and strategic position of Cyprus, in relation to the globalisation of security issues and the increased social unrest in the Middle East. Therefore, it has been argued that Turkey should not retreat from her rights in Cyprus, no matter what the EU demands. The National identity perspective sees the Cyprus issue in relation to the problems with Greece and Turkey’s influence on the Middle East. Therefore, any retreat in Cyprus would be seen as leading to a decrease in the power of Turkey in her relations with her neighbours. The NAP proposes three options for solving the Cyprus issue. The first option is that Turkey’s rights in Cyprus should be secured and the number of the Greek Cypriots who will be accepted into the northern part of the island should be restricted. The second option is the integration of northern Cyprus with Turkey, as a response to the EU’s ignorance in not implementing the international agreements that declare Turkey as a guarantor country. The third option that the NAP presents is to work with the countries that are ready to recognise Northern Cyprus as an independent state. Although the last two options were not taken seriously, the other political parties, such as the RPP (opposition to the 59th Government) and JDP (59th Government

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party), had widely accepted the first option. The JDP stressed the importance of securing Turkey’s position in northern Cyprus, while the RPP focussed on the number of Greek Cypriots who can move to the northern part of the island.19 Besides this, the Nationalist Identity focuses on the relations with the Turkic Republics in Central Asia, foreseeing the establishment of a Ministry of Turkic People and development of the economic and trade relations under the Common Market of the Turkic People. Another project is the Union of Eurasia, where the Turkic countries develop economic, cultural and political relations with the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean countries.20 Islamic/Conservative Identity From this perspective, Turkey’s main mission is to be the leader of the Islamic world. One of the most important indicators of this identity in Turkish foreign policy is the establishment of D8 as an alternative to G7. D8 is described as the Eight Developing Islamic Nations, comprising Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia, Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey and Nigeria, and its aim is economic and technical cooperation. The main emphasis in foreign affairs in this approach is on the Muslim identity of the country instead of the Turkish identity, preferring foreign policy to be based on accepted norms and ethical considerations. In Turkish political life, two parties based on this identity have been established: the Welfare Party21 (WP) and Prosperity Party22 (PP).23 However, the Constitutional Court’s decision on closure of these two parties and the resistance from the National Security Council and the Turkish Armed Forces made it clear that these foreign policy orientations are not accepted by the foreign policy decision making mechanism. The JDP, which was established by some of the members of the WP after the WP was banned, adopted a conservative identity rather than an Islamic one. The Conservative identity emphasises the Islamic values in relations with other countries; however, it does not foresee a shift in the established foreign and security policies. This identity reveals itself in the debates held in the parliament since the JDP became the governing party in 2002, specifically, in the debates over the conflict in the Middle East. The debates over the Palestine Authority are a

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clear indication of this identity’s influence. The meetings and activities of the Turkish-Palestine Inter Parliamentary Friendship Group became more visible in the TGNA after the election of the JDP in 2002. The debates focussed on the oppression on the Palestine Authority, but the rights of different religions to be expressed in the region were also emphasised, and the Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, repeatedly condemned the policies of Israel and acknowledged them as violent.24 Another indication of Islamic identity has been the focus on the Alliance of the Civilizations as a response to the theory of Clash of Civilizations, after the 2002 election victory of the JDP. Turkey had rejected her own Islamic character from the 1920s until 2001. Still, the RPP rejects Turkey’s recognition as an Islamic country, perceiving this recognition to go against the secular identity of Turkey, as Atatürk established it. However, the JDP government emphasises Turkey’s responsibility as a role model to other Islamic countries, and it also argues that Turkey’s membership to the EU will end the polarisation between Muslims and Christians. In that respect, under the UN, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan started the project Alliance of Civilizations, to encourage collective action across diverse societies in order to combat extremism and overcome cultural and social barriers between Western and Muslim countries. The aim of this alliance is: to forge collective political will and to mobilise concerted action at the institutional and civil society levels to overcome the prejudice, misperceptions and polarisation that militate against such a consensus. And it hopes to contribute to a coalescing global movement which, reflecting the will of the vast majority of people, rejects extremism in any society.25 This attempt can be easily considered as a shift from the established identity of the Turkish state, since it emphasises the Islamic characteristics of Turkey. However, the emphasis on these characteristics has not been a handicap in the reforms on the road to the EU membership. The JDP has been one of the most enthusiastic government parties for this membership and the speeches of the government party members in the parliament indicated this objective.26

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European Identity After the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkish governments have worked hard to pass the necessary parliamentary legislation to reach the level set by the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU. In 2002, at the Copenhagen European Council, it was declared that the EU would open negotiations with Turkey ‘without delay’ if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. In this framework, both in domestic and international affairs, Turkey’s Europeanisation gained momentum and, therefore, the government adopted a multilateral, cooperative, win-win approach in foreign policy.27 Before the realisation of the candidacy status and the start of the accession negotiations, Turkish governments had the tendency to avoid Turkey’s Middle Eastern and Caucasian neighbours, with an aim to avoid conflict, as it was strongly believed by the state identity followers that intense relations with eastern neighbours would mean fewer relations with the western allies. However, starting from the 1998 Regular report on Turkey, the EU Commission emphasised that ‘Turkey must make a constructive contribution to the settlement of all disputes with various neighbouring countries by peaceful means in accordance with international law.’28 The EU’s notifications regarding the importance of normalisation of relations with the neighbouring countries, including Greece, Syria, and Armenia, continued. Each year, reports of this kind drew attention to the significance of Turkey’s alignment with the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies, as well as neighbourhood policies, in increasing regional stability.29 Also, the EU’s demands on decreasing the military’s role in the country, and demilitarisation of politics changed the character of Turkey’s foreign policy. On the other hand, since the 1990s, Turkey’s main aim has been to create a zone of influence to lead the regional countries towards integration with the EU and increase her influence in the region and beyond.30 With these concerns in mind (alignment with EU policies and influence in the region), Turkey’s new foreign policy has been designed with an aim to guarantee her own security and stability by taking on a

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more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in her environs.31 It has been argued that Islamic character and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire might bring more benefits in relations with the west and that ‘the acceptance of Turkey’s placement in the West will be more likely through the strengthening of Turkey’s links to the East.’32 In this framework, five principles33 have been put into force in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy: • • • • •

Balance between democracy and security Zero problem policy towards neighbours Developing relations not only with neighbours but beyond Multi-dimensional foreign policy Rhythmic diplomacy

These new principles of foreign policy aimed to change Turkey’s position in the world from an introverted military power in the region to a more active and global power. These approaches have constituted the main features of Turkish foreign policy throughout the years. Based on these, four dimensions of foreign policy are identified. The first and most important dimension of Turkish foreign policy is the cultural dimension. The mixture of eastern and western is crucial in Turkish external and internal affairs. Turks are very loyal to their leaders and it is part of the imperial heritage that people would, for the most part, follow their leader unquestioningly. On the other hand, western oriented reforms constitute an important part of life in Turkey, due to the desire to reach the level of contemporary civilization in Western Europe. Secondly, history is important. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire has always been an integral part of Turkish foreign policy. Historical experiences, such as the First World War and the War of Independence (1919-1923) have inevitably affected Turkish foreign policy. In particular, the era before the War of Independence, just after the First World War, when Turkish territory was divided up among western countries, has an undying effect on the minds of the people. The strategic location of the country is a third facet of foreign policy. Turkey occupies a unique place between Europe, the Balkans,

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the Middle East, and the Caucasus. These places are pivotal in the international system, as the Middle East and the Caucasus are very rich in natural resources, and the Balkan states are of special importance, since most of the regional conflicts have originated there. Thus, the insecurity of the surrounding region is an indicator of Turkish foreign policy. Due to the location of the country, and historical legacies, Turkey feels obliged to feel cautious. Fourthly, another element in Turkish foreign policy is national independence. After the Ottoman Empire collapsed, independence became the most important element in the foreign policy of the new republic.34 Today, retaining that independence still holds an important place in the policy making psyche. The security perception is deeply affected by the Ottoman Empire and its collapse. The security policy of the Ottoman Empire was based on offence, from the first years of its establishment and throughout its expansion. For the Ottomans, power maximisation, conquest, and domination were the foremost policies. Until the 1700s, they gave priority to war. By the 1700s, Anatolia, the Arabian Peninsula and even the Southern Mediterranean regions were all under Ottoman control. However, with the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its power (for several reasons, such as incompetent Sultans, bad administration, and corruption) and instead of offensive measures, it developed more defensive policies. From that time on, the Empire tried to find a place for itself within the developing European system. There had been several changes in military affairs and administration between 1728 and 1730. In this era, the Ottomans began to envy the success that European states had accomplished. A crucial decision was to send permanent delegations to European capitals. The Empire sent delegations to Vienna, Paris and Moscow in order to make commercial agreements, but these delegations were also responsible for sending reports to İstanbul on the lifestyle and cultural activities in these cities. Based on these reports, new palaces were constructed. However, the Empire did not have enough economic capacity to fund these constructions, at which point it began to obtain economic aid from its western neighbours. Military technology also began to be imported. Baron de Tott, who was at the time working in the French army, was

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brought to İstanbul to establish an artillery battalion.35 Other than this, the Ottomans tried to establish a new naval force on the Aegean coast and a new academy was established to train soldiers, in İstanbul. Another reform movement took place between 1789 and 1807. This time, new militaristic, administrative and economic reforms were made, based on reports of the delegations. The old armies were abolished and, instead, modern armies were brought into the system, and named as the New Order. The main aim was to increase the standards of the army and navy to those of European countries. In this new army, a new squadron system was established. In its formation, French squadrons were taken as examples. Also, the administration was changed when a new cabinet system was introduced. In civilian life, the first postal service and the first newspaper were established, and the uniforms of civil servants were modified, based on European examples. In 1839, the first constitution was introduced, which established new state courts and new financial and criminal legislation, derived from the European systems. In 1908, another attempt to have a constitutional system based on the European examples was witnessed, which brought the parliament and the new administrative system back to life. As the Empire lost its military power, the Ottomans tried to find alliances with the new rising stars in Europe. Membership of the Concert of Europe was celebrated in this context. European states were also interested in the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the geo-strategic importance of its position, and especially that of the Straits in regard to the Russian threat. Thus, the European powers ingratiated themselves with different minority groups in the Empire and thereby gradually increased their power in domestic politics, a situation which greatly contributed to the disintegration of the Empire after the First World War. All of these points mentioned here are reflected in Turkish external and internal affairs. In the 1990s, the Customs Union was celebrated in Turkey, since it represented the European identity of Turkey, as had the Concert of Europe in the 1850s. (The mentality represented by the Concert of Europe was the same for Turks, as it had shown the Ottoman Empire to be an active part of the European state system.)

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On the other hand, the issue of minorities is still a very controversial subject in the Republic of Turkey. Today, the Ottoman legacy of fear that ‘the Europeans want to control us and divide our country’ is still valid in the public mind. Thus, the Turkish conceptualisation of security has its roots in the Ottoman Empire. Especially, the protection of the Ottoman legacy became an important part of the policies36, which re-emphasises the importance of historical constructivism in understanding the security culture and construction of identities in a society. The founders of the Turkish Republic constructed a national identity, which accepts the Traditional/Realist approach in foreign policy and the non-interference principle in the Middle East. This constructed identity emphasised the heightened perception of danger and threat. As Campbell tells us, danger is not an objective condition and it is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat.37 Danger is always present at the border. Danger might involve pressure on the external boundaries, it might involve the violation of internal boundaries, it might be located in the margins of the boundary, or it might arise with contradictions from within; where there are no borders, there would be no danger, but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity.38 In Turkey, an identity that is against the threat at the border, and against the enemies violating internal boundaries, has been socially constructed. This identity is not dependent on ethnicity, traditions and customs; it was constructed for a collective aim, independence. The founders of the Republic abstained from ethnic nationalism, in order not to disturb the ethnic identities and the Russian Federation that was controlling almost all of the Turkic Republics at the time. Ethnic nationalism attributes that members of an ethnically defined national grouping share physical characteristics, culture, religion, language and a common ancestry.39 Since the 1970s, an ethnic national identity has become visible in Turkish political life, and a distinction between national and state identity is made in this work. As Ahmad argues,

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the new Turkish Republic inherited a society in which the notion of a Turkish identity was almost totally non-existent.40 In the Ottoman Era, the people identified themselves with their religious affiliations rather than ethnicity. However, as Mardin clearly states, the republican reforms revealed a clear distaste for religion.41 A bureaucratic elite with strong centralist tendencies42 who were influenced by the French Revolution, aiming to make the new regime ‘national’ and secular, created the Turkish Republic. After the Turkish Independence War, one of the main problems was creating one identity for all the people living within the borders of the new Republic. The first action, then, was breaking the ties with the past. For that reason, there was a need for a revolution, which came from above. Thus, The republican state, which fostered a Jacobin mentality, led to the creation of an official, monolithic, absolute Turkish identity either by suppressing or by ignoring the multiple identities that come to be imprisoned in the periphery.43 Owing to this Jacobin mentality, Turkish nation building aimed to create a fixed, national identity, which the state wanted to protect from outside influences. Hence, the state dominated political, social, economic and cultural spheres, including religion.44 As İçduygu and Kaygusuz stated: The period between 1919 and 1923 witnessed the first formulations of definitive, boundary producing (both physical and ethical) discourses of Turkish political life, such as the supreme political objective of political unity, based on territorial integrity, the Muslim majority as an organic totality, terms of ethnic and religious differentiation, the unity disruptive minority rights, threats to national security and the cultural and political meaning of Turkishness in mainly the foreign policy texts of the nationalist government.45 Based on these identities and the influence of the Ottoman Empire on the new Turkish Republic, the national security is defined by the

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Turkish National Security Council, the Ministry of National Defence and the constitution, emphasising the historical experiences and the state identity. The (Turkish) National Security Council defines national security as: the protection of the constitutional system of the state, presence and the indivisibility of the state, and protection of the interests of the state including political, cultural, and economic interests at the international level.46 The Ministry of National Defence has defined national security as: the protection and maintenance of the principles set forth by Kemal Atatürk, the state’s political, social, cultural and economic interests and the indivisibility of the state’s territory.47 In the Constitution of the country, Article 5 defines national security as: to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society…. Bayülken summarises the attitude of the Turkish state when it comes to the national security issue as being able to have capabilities and opportunities if there is a need. It is believed that the location of the country forces her to accept the principle of the Roman Empire, which can be summarised as ‘If you want to live in peace, you should be ready for war whenever necessary.’48 (This echoes the traditional approach, which is examined in Chapter 2.) Therefore, Turkey has always given priority to her security agreements and alliances with other countries. This attitude has sometimes been referred to as the national security syndrome.49 The frequent references to the historical facts in the debates in the TGNA reveal the significance of identity construction in domestic affairs, and the historically constructed perception in foreign affairs. Regardless of the political orientations of the parties,

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references to the First World War, the last years of the Ottoman Empire and the Independence War are observed throughout the years in the parliamentary debates, such as: History repeats itself. Elements, which shaped the international relations in the early 1900s, continue shaping international relations today.… Europeans continue their old policies on Turkey, the Middle Eastern neighbours continue to stab us from the back and our European friends’ attitude towards the smear campaigns against us are all very similar to the ones in the Ottoman era. We have to respond to these immediately as we did before, in the 1920s.50 Europeans memorised some of the words, they keep using them. Violent Islam, special partnership, open your borders, close your borders, don’t cough, don’t walk, change your legislation, and so on…. Very similar to the policies towards the Ottoman Empire earlier, the minorities are again being used for their own agendas. Today, Armenians are being used by the European ‘friends’. Earlier, the French could not find any other group that would work for their imperialist aims. Therefore, they did not just arm the Armenians but also located them in administrative positions as well. They sent the Armenians to the regions where Brits were withdrawing…. The French owe the Armenians for all their losses in the First World War. Therefore, now they are passing the legislations related to the so-called Armenian genocide.51 Government is asking economic policies to the IMF and the other international organisations. This is very similar to the policies of the Ottomans in the last years of their era.52 Reflection of Identities on Security Perception in Different Eras One Party Government Years (the 1920s to the 1950s) In 1919, the Ottoman Empire fell apart de facto. By the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, different states occupied various parts of the Empire.53 After the four years of the Independence War, the new Republic of Turkey

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was founded in 1923 by M. Kemal Atatürk, and was based on western ideas. There were to be many reforms in the state system. First and most importantly, a democratic system was adopted to replace the Sultanate. There were now elections, and a new parliament was established. The alphabet was changed, as well; instead of the Arabic alphabet, the Latin alphabet was adopted. The legislative system was changed, and legislation from Switzerland, France, Italy and Germany was adopted. The Sharia courts were abolished, and new secular courts replaced them. Modes of dress were also an important part of the reforms; the fez was substituted by an ordinary hat, wearing of the headscarf was forbidden in government institutions, and all other traditional modes of dress were forbidden in public offices. All religious organisations and the financial resources of these organisations were nationalised. Furthermore, the calendar was altered, and Saturday and Sunday were accepted as weekly holidays instead of Friday. The foreign policy of the new republic adopted as its objective ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, which indicates, to those studying Turkish foreign policy, the importance given to non-interference in other states’ affairs. Especially, the new Turkish Republic tried to keep away from the Middle Eastern neighbours’ affairs. The Middle East has traditionally been considered problematic and negative, and therefore the relations with these neighbours were kept at a minimum level. One reason for Arabs to be considered negatively was the association of Arabs with Islam, and Islam’s association with backwardness. Another reason has been the perception of Arabs as treacherous, because the Arabs’ alignment with the British, when they were under Ottoman rule, was considered a stab in the back. This development in the last years of the Ottoman Empire deeply affected the new Turkish Republic, and there has been distrust towards the Arabs from that time on. However, the non-interference policy mentioned above has not been applied to goals that are in conflict with the interests of the Turkish state.54 Atatürk tried to maintain peaceful relations with Russia, which explains why any kind of pan-Turkic, or very nationalist, views couldn’t find acceptance. In 1921, even before the new Republic of Turkey was established, he signed a Treaty of Friendship with Russia, which aimed at mutual non-interference.55 The policy was status quo oriented, as a

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result of the Ottoman legacy. As a consequence of these policies, Turkey did not take part in the Second World War, but showed her sympathy to Western friends by turning to the West for aid. During the Second World War, Turkey made treaties with such Western powers as Britain, France and Germany. Relations with the Middle East fell into abeyance in this period. Thus, in this era foreign policies came to be extensions of domestic politics; the ‘others’ were excluded56 and foreign policy was very much dependent on the considerations of the state identity. Multiparty Era After Atatürk’s death in 1938, İsmet İnönü was elected as president. After the Second World War, he introduced multi party elections.57 The Democrat Party58 (DP) came to power, replacing Atatürk’s RPP59. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes wanted an American lifestyle for the Turkish people and to create a ‘little America’.60 As an indication of her western orientation in this period, Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Menderes criticised the RPP’s etatist policies, and instead promised a liberal programme highlighting democracy, free enterprise, and conservative values. Although he was successful in his efforts at economic and structural transformation in the early 1950s, he failed to establish a democratic atmosphere and took authoritarian measures against the opposition. Nevertheless, the DP won the 1954 and 1957 elections by an overwhelming majority, especially thanks to the peripheral votes. In the Cold War, there were fewer foreign policy alternatives for Turkey. Neutrality was not an option that the country could afford to follow. Turkey did not have enough economic, technical and military resources to be able to stay neutral. In this respect, she needed to find a place for herself in the western world. In 1945, Russia was demanding a reconsideration of the situation in the Straits. The main demand of the Russians was the right to have bases in the Straits. Moreover, Molotov declared that they wanted to have agreements with Turkey similar to those with Poland and other satellite countries. After the Second World War, communism became an important threat, not only from Eastern Europe but also from some western countries. Also, civil war in Greece at this time, and Bulgarian and Yugoslavian communist influence in

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this civil war, forced the Turkish government to search for a place in the western bloc.61 Until the 1990s, the influence of communist Russia was the primary security threat.62 At the beginning of the Cold War era, Turkey had searched for financial aid for her Armed Forces. In 1947, with the Truman Doctrine, Turkey received $183 million in financial aid, and $200 million in military aid in 1950. At the same time, an alternative Mediterranean Pact between the UK, France, Greece and Turkey was suggested. Turkey did not accept the idea of dividing the Mediterranean into two, and the only option for the Turkish government was to be involved in NATO. NATO membership gave Turkey a valuable opportunity to protect her security interests in the Cold War years. The geo-strategic and geographical position of the country made this membership imperative.63 However, NATO membership cannot be perceived simply as a security issue; to Turkey, it was a cultural one as well, which demonstrated that she belonged to the West. It was the way to be a ‘respectful member of the civilised world’, as İnönü stated. When the Korean War started, politics changed and the USA decided to recruit Greece and Turkey as members of NATO. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister at the time, chose to send troops to Korea under the UN. In the 1952 Lisbon meeting, members decided to enlarge NATO membership, and Turkey became a member. In the 1950s, the integration of Turkish forces and the western powers in terms of the defence structure was rapid. About three quarters of Turkish Land Forces were allocated to Commander in Chief Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and Air and Sea Forces were allocated to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). A number of air bases were constructed in İncirlik, Karamürsel, Çiğli, Diyarbakır, Sinop, Samsun, and Trabzon. By the end of 1960, there were 24,000 US officials residing in Turkey. Between 1948 and 1968, $2.27 billion was given in aid. Moreover, between 1950 and 1962, $1.38 billion of aid was given by the Western powers.64 Turkey’s membership in NATO increased the domestic power and influence of her army, since one consequence of membership was the necessity to maintain a bigger army than would otherwise have been needed. The General of SACEUR, Lauris Norstad at that time, emphasised the importance of the Turkish Armed Forces

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in every visit that he made, and this increased the popularity of the Turkish Armed Forces in the country.65 On the other hand, Turkey continued to have relations with her Middle Eastern neighbours. These relations were bilateral66 rather than collective, and their main objective was mutual non-interference. The aim behind these relations could also be considered as minimising the dangers to the country’s core objectives and interests, in line with the traditional approach, which suggests that cooperation among states is established on the expectation that this system will check other states and thus help to counter the threat. However, the DP era did not last long. Turkey had her first coup experience on May 27, 1960. The DP government had been intolerant towards criticism and had instituted press censorship; thus, the government became increasingly unpopular, especially in the military, which feared the ideals of Atatürk were in danger. The Turkish Armed Forces believed that domestic policies had departed from Kemalist orthodoxy. The DP government was more tolerant towards traditional lifestyles and different forms of the practice of Islam, in contrast to the RPP. One of the most controversial issues in this era was the legalisation of the Arabic call of prayers, which had been banned in the RPP era (when Turkish had been substituted). Thus, internal policies had developed conservative elements, rather than those more fitting to the state identity. To counter this, after the coup a new constitution was adopted and the Turkish Armed Forces made sure that the political, social and economic life would henceforth be based on Kemalist reforms. On the other hand, foreign policy was pursued in accordance with the traditional and state identity. In this line, Turkey continued to maintain a friendly foreign policy towards western powers but resumed her relations with the Middle Eastern countries as well. Whatever the reason67, it is a fact that Turkey was the second state to recognise Syria, when Syria decided to break away from the United Arab Republic. Turkey tried to improve relations with her Middle Eastern neighbours in line with the non-interference principle, especially after 1964, when the USA used the İncirlik air base without consulting Turkey. After the 1960 coup, the MPs from the DP established another

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opposition party, the Justice Party ( JP)68, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel. The JP became a majority government in 1965 and 1969. However, after the general elections in 1969, social unrest between the leftist and rightist groups escalated, especially in the universities, and resulted in street clashes. In 1971, the military demanded a strong and credible government and warned the civilian officers that unless the JP government resigned, the army could take over the rule of the country. After Demirel’s resignation, the RPP came back to government with the assistance of the army. In the coup d’états and interventions experienced up to the 1970s, state identity was reinstated in internal policies. However, the foreign policy has been in line with the state identity and the traditional approach in all the governments, regardless of their domestic policy orientations. The 1970s were not an exception to this orientation, either; the traditional approach and state identity revealed itself in the intervention in Cyprus, and its consequences. In 1974 Turkey’s military operation in Cyprus started as a response to a Greek military junta backed coup in Cyprus deposed the Cypriot president and archbishop Makarios III and installed Nikos Sampson in his place. This junta started an intercommunal conflict on the island. Turkey decided to act on the conflict, as a guarantor under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and sent troops to the island in 1974. The Johnson Letter played an important role after the Cyprus incident. Lyndon Johnson had stated very clearly in his letter to the Turkish government on June 4, 1964 that if Turkey intervened in Cyprus, there would be consequences, such as an arms embargo and a break in diplomatic relations. Although Turkey had always tried to be a most loyal ally of the USA, she chose this time to disregard American warnings. In 1974, Bülent Ecevit69, Prime Minister at the time, went to London and talked with British and American officials, but none of the key actors, including Joseph Sisco and Henry Kissinger, could dissuade Ecevit from the intervention. This incident is illuminating, because it shows how Turkey can sometimes react, even against its western friends, if a crucial interest is at stake. This issue is still shaping Turkish foreign policy today. After the arms embargo, Turkey began to establish its own industry to provide a military capability. In this era, Turkey’s attempts to have friendlier relations with the Middle

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Eastern states are evident. They were also evident during the ArabIsraeli wars, when Turkey did not allow western powers to use her air bases. This can be interpreted as Turkey’s attempt to secure her territory. Turkey, like other Mediterranean states, does not have full confidence in her western friends. Turkish foreign policy reveals a certain fear that the West does not want the Turks to be safe in the region. The ‘EU is not so much an ally closely identified with but a hostile foe that has to be vanquished’.70 This finds its place even in proverbs such as ‘Only a Turk can be a friend of a Turk.’71 However, this does not anticipate that Turkey will relinquish relations with the western part of the world, since those relations are the political, economic, cultural and social aim of the Republic of Turkey. Although there are actors in the country who regard the new EU institutions as a repetition of the Concert of Europe, which had the aim to ‘destroy’ the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is still very enthusiastic about being with her western partners in all spheres of world affairs. All in all, from the 1960s onwards, Russia and the spread of communism were counted as the biggest security threats towards Turkey. Also, the conflictual situation in Cyprus72 made Greece one of the top priorities in national security concerns. On the other hand, Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours did not have top priority for national security concerns at these times. The 1980 Coup d’état The third, and the last, coup that Turkish political life experienced took place on September 12, 1980. The main reason behind this coup was the escalating violence between leftist and rightist groups, and the incompetence of the government and the police in dealing with it. According to the chief of the general staff, Kenan Evren73, the reason for the anarchy and terror in the country was a lack of moral values. Thus, after the coup, religious courses became obligatory in the primary and secondary schools. Moreover, the new military government introduced a new constitution in 1982, which constrained many of the rights and freedoms of citizens, especially political rights. Islamic identity was now being used to support state identity, by the very military that had previously fought to keep it out. Consequently, the

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conservative identity reemerged in this period. The intervention placed more importance on Islamic values than ever, incorporating them into the state identity, something which had not been accepted by the RPP, which considers itself Atatürk’s party. On the one hand, Kemalist ideology was reinstated; on the other, Islamic and conservative identity were used, focussing more on the identity of Turks, cultural heritage, and moral values. After the army withdrew from the government, in 1983, first the Ulusu and then the Özal governments came to power. This era witnessed some changes in Turkish foreign policy, especially towards Middle Eastern neighbours and the USA. The most significant aspect of the new relations with the USA was the agreement on defence and economic cooperation between the two countries. This agreement made it possible for Turkey to obtain more aid in the economic and military spheres. In 1984, the military aid given by the USA to Turkey was around $715 million, and Turkey was third on the list of countries getting American aid, after Israel and Egypt. In the Cold War era, Turkey’s main objective was to be an active player in the western union, to fulfil its obligations as a NATO member. The Ulusu government accepted American demands to use the İncirlik airbase in 1983. After the Cold War, Turkey retained the exact same objective, and Turkey accepted NATO forces using airbases on her territory in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The İncirlik bases played an important role in this war, and in case of an attack from Iraq, Turkey increased the number of troops at the border to 120,000. Furthermore, President Özal insisted on sending troops to Musul and Kirkuk, in case of the disintegration of Iraqi territory. However, the Turkish Armed Forces did not agree with Özal, and the plan was not implemented. In this period, the USA became more of an ally than ever, and began to dominate most of the security structures in Turkey. (Today, Turkey’s air force is dependent on the USA, as are its conventional weapons.) Moreover, the possibility of attacking a neighbouring country had been stated by a Turkish President, which showed a change in Turkish foreign policy towards a more offensive posture. Meanwhile, as always, Turkey tried not to upset her big northern neighbour, and gave priority to her economic relations with Russia. Russian financial aid in the

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1960s and 1970s is the best example of this new orientation. In 1967, Turkey obtained $200 million in credits from Russia; in 1972, the figure was $288 million, and in 1975, $700 million. Although Turkey had become a NATO member and demonstrated her orientation towards the western powers, in 1972, the two countries signed a Good Neighbourhood Relations Declaration. Russia was an important actor for Turkey, due to the Cyprus issue in the 1970s. Russia did not want American troops to be located in Cyprus on the Greek side, and although this was not a policy that Russia implemented to support the Turkish position, Turkey tried to use this policy in favour of her own policy in Cyprus. In this period, between 1980 and the 1990s, internal security issues began to gain importance. The Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan/Kurdistan Worker’s Party’s (PKK) terrorist activities began at this time. Although the Özal government did not take the issue very seriously, Kurdish separatist activities influenced every policy in the country, as well as Turkish foreign policy. At the same time, the fear of Russia and communism pushed the country towards memberships other than NATO, such as the Baghdad Pact, which, although it did not live long, illustrates the continuing importance of the Russian threat in Turkish foreign policy. In the Cold War era, the conservative identity was used as a tool against communism, as well. Although in external relations Turkey did not want to upset her biggest neighbour, it was Islam, nationalism and conservative components that shaped domestic politics. Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the JP, and Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the Democratic Left Party74 (DLP), became two extreme poles (conservative and leftist) that shaped internal politics. However, neither the conservative nor the leftist parties adopted a more liberal security understanding in foreign policy. They preferred following the established foreign policy line. The international and domestic developments re-emphasised the role of the Turkish Armed Forces and the importance of the realist understanding in the region. As the traditional approach suggests, constant insecurity and fear shaped the relations between Turkey and her neighbours, and military security as well as political security,

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indivisibility of the territory, ideological threats and ‘would-be states’ occupied the foreign affairs of Turkey. Although, Özal shifted the foreign policy orientations towards a more assertive and offensive stance, and departed from the state identity’s non-interference principle, the realist understanding continued to dominate the foreign policy and security perception. The end of the Cold War After the Cold War, if NATO had only been seen as a military security organisation, Turkey might have decided to be neutral. However, NATO was no longer only a military security organisation for Turkey; NATO was the bridge between Turkey and the western powers’ institutions and ideology. Turkey decided to remain a part of NATO even after the Cold War, not because of security reasons but because it was part of belonging to the West.75 Although Turkish politicians thought NATO had served its purpose, that it was successful in the fight against the enemy, communism, and ‘became useless afterwards’76, the country did not disentangle itself from the other western actors. After the Cold War, it became more evident that Turkey differentiated between the European powers and the USA. These two actors were no longer seen as the western block. In the 21st century, this belief became a fact in Turkish foreign policy, and it began to be stated explicitly by the politicians in the country.77 After the Cold War, the balance of power in the region had changed dramatically. Although the Cold War was over, the conflicts in the region did not end.78 Turkish politicians, very much under the influence of the writings of Brzezinski, have adopted his ideas on Eurasia. According to Brzezinski, Eurasia accounted for 75 percent of the world’s population, 60 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy resources, and, therefore, a power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over Western Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Africa.79 Thus, the security threats for Turkey, after the Cold War, became the conflicts in the region.80 In 1991, in the NATO summit after the Cold War, it was decided that NATO should attend to instabilities in regions such as Central Europe, Russia, the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean.

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When the bi-polar system ended in the 1990s, the concept of security changed in the world.81 NATO had been successful in the fight against communism, but after the collapse of communism, new threats had emerged. The instabilities at that time, and today, have been caused by ethnic conflicts, border clashes and economic difficulties. All of these problems led to an increase in the number of weapons, an increase in fundamentalist ideologies, and problems and/or conflict among states. In response to these new threats, NATO had to change itself. The big transformation in NATO was thus started by the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union. These events had a significant effect on Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia. As a result of the Russian threat, Turkey had not been able to contact the Turkic Republics in the region. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognise these new independent Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this era, the traditional approach reveals itself in the tendency to have closer relations with the Central Asian countries, as Turkey tried to benefit from the political vacuum that had been created by the change in the international system. The orientation towards the Central Asian countries in foreign policy was a result of the election of the NAP and its becoming a coalition partner with Motherland Party (MP) and DLP in the 1990s. Also, from the 1990s on, Turkish policy became more interventionist in some senses. Power politics have become an important part of the country’s foreign policy. When the Cold War ended, Turkey wanted to make sure that none of the ethnic groups, or states, in her part of the world would try to change the status quo and exploit the political vacuum in the region. In particular, the terrorist activities of the PKK were irritating Turkey. For this reason, especially, the Turkish Armed Forces ‘had to operate in the Iraqi territory nearly seventy times to hit the PKK camps and disrupt their logistic lines.’82 The 1991 Gulf War did not improve the situation in northern Iraq, either. As a consequence of the war, 450,000 refugees fled from northern Iraq to Turkey; only 1,000 of these were able to go on to European countries. The rest were left in Turkey. This became an issue especially for economic reasons, but at the same time, these refugees were problematic since they were Kurdish.

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Another problem was the closure of the oil pipeline in the region,83 which had a significant economic effect; unemployment rates increased dramatically, creating a very suitable environment for terrorist groups. Northern Iraq, in particular, became the centre for the PKK as a result of the political vacuum in the region. Thus, the Turkish Armed Forces felt justified in intervening in the situation in northern Iraq. Another aspect of Turkish foreign policy was her close relationship with the Israelis after the Cold War. Military cooperation between the two countries consisted of ‘joint naval, air, and land exercises, joint training programs, the use of respective air spaces, defence industrial projects, and intelligence exchanges.’84 Not only military agreements, but also some economic agreements were made between the two countries. In 1998, the volume of trade reached $761 million, from $407 million in 1995.85 Relations with Israel reveal the importance of the Turkish Armed Forces in Turkey’s external affairs. The Turkish Armed Forces have played the main role behind the improvement of relations between Turkey and Israel. Civilian initiatives followed the military initiatives in improving these relations. The relations with Israel show the significance of the military in Turkish political life, but also reveal the importance of the traditional approach as the main approach that the Turkish foreign policy adopts. The changes in the government from nationalist to leftist did not change relations with Israel. However, Turkish governments, in spite of good relations with the Israelis, continued to support the Palestinians. The Turkish government supported Resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN Security Council86 and promised $50 million in credit to the Palestinians. All in all, Turkish defence policy is based on developing peaceful relations with countries in the region, promoting peace and stability, and ensuring socio-economic development in a peaceful environment. However, as it has been clearly stated87 on several occasions, military force can and will be used if necessary. Both the 1991 Gulf War and the War in Yugoslavia had proven that conflict did not stop when the Cold War came to an end.88 Thus, it would be very optimistic to think of a world where armed forces would not be needed.89 In the 1990s, the coalition government of the TPP 90 and the WP tried to represent the conservative and the Islamic identities in foreign

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policy and change the established foreign policy line. Necmettin Erbakan, as the Prime Minister, paid visits to countries such as Libya and Iran, stopped the reforms towards EU membership, and seized the relations with Israel. However, the decisions of the Constitutional Court on banning the WP, and the National Security Council’s advice to the government (on February 28, 1997) to step down, brought an end to these changes and foreign policy orientations again represented the traditional approach and state identity, to a certain extent. The era after the 9/11 attacks The events of 9/11, in conjunction with globalisation, have profoundly affected the perception of security threats. The changes in the threat perception have forced the states to change their defence structures, including changes in the military forces. Effective response to these new security threats requires rapidly deployable troops, and national armies needed to transform themselves to be able to intervene anywhere in the world. New weapons and new systems of cooperation were also needed in this new world.91 Inevitably, this new threat framework also affected Turkey. When Al Qaeda attacked the HSBC Bank and the British Consulate in İstanbul, on November 20, 2003, Turkey realised that not only internal terrorist organisations but also international groups constituted a threat against the country. Turkey became the target of these terrorist organisations because of its relations with the West. Turkey’s status in NATO and in the OSCE, and as a candidate for membership of the EU, made the country a target for these new terrorists. From the interviews with government officials, conducted by the author, it is clear that these attacks are perceived as attacks against the link between the West and Turkey. On the other hand, it is evident that these new threats made the EU and the USA understand the importance of terrorism. ‘Turkey is a country which suffered from terrorism for a long time. And now western friends understand the importance of the issue’ became the common understanding among politicians, regardless of their political orientations.92 It had been believed that the EU had an aloof attitude towards terrorism up to 9/11, and it was assumed in top echelons of the Turkish bureaucracy that the attacks in the USA, Europe and İstanbul

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would force the EU to change this aloof attitude, since the 9/11 attacks were the trigger for Europe to freeze the PKK’s assets in European banks and restrict its activities in Europe.93 Turkey started to criticise the EU’s attitude on terrorist groups, and in the debates in the TGNA, regardless of the identities that are represented, the common argument pointed out the European countries’ mistake of differentiating between good and bad terrorists by identifying some as freedom fighters and some as terrorists.94 Moreover, the War in Iraq had an effect on the perception of security threats against Turkey. The instability in the region, resulting from the American operations there, changed the status quo. This change, added to the problems existing before 9/11 and the War in Iraq, made Turkish politicians and Turkish Armed Forces more cautious about the region. Although the JDP government is working towards more active politics in the Middle East95, the RPP supports the state identity in relation to its focus on non-interference in the region: Our established foreign policy line, suggests that we should keep away from the problems in the Middle East. The Middle East is a violent political geography and conflict occupies this region. It is an obligation for Turkey to keep away from the region. Turkey has a traditional established foreign policy line, which says not to be embroiled in the controversies in the region…. Turkey has always tried not to be a part of the fire in the region. Turkey should never ever be a part of the controversies and the politics of this region.96 In the 21st century, Islamic identity has become less important in Turkish policy, both internally and externally. Although JDP members are former members of the WP, they have focussed on conservative identity more than Islamic identity. The JDP started to be compared with the Christian Democrats in Europe. In these years, the relations with the Turkic Republics in Central Asia are being neglected. More importance is given to the relations with Western countries, and being a part of the EU has become a priority. The JDP government became one of the most active in introducing reforms for EU membership. In line with the conservative identity, the JDP government values the

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Turkish identity and cultural heritage, and it is cautious about the developments in Northern Iraq. State identity became less explicit since the Turkish Armed Forces tried to become less involved in politics, and because the RPP is in the opposition. Here, there are two important points to be mentioned. First, the Turkish Armed Forces decided on their own to limit their involvement in politics. Civilian governments and the public were not the cause of this withdrawal from politics. Second, the Turkish Armed Forces decided to move closer to the people and state their views publicly, rather than behind closed doors. Now, rather than exerting direct pressure on governments, the Turkish Armed Forces use the public as a means to influence politics, The public has always attached a special significance to the Turkish Armed Forces, which are seen as a part of the populace, and the higher echelons of the military forces are perceived as the most intellectual and well-educated part of society. Another identity that shows itself in this era is the national identity. As mentioned above, the minority issue and the Kurdish question (below) are the best illustrations of this identity in this era. The era after the start of accession negotiations After the accession negotiations started with the EU, on October 3-4, 2005, Turkey started to feel the European effect on its identity both at the domestic and international levels. After the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey had already gone through a number of changes in her political and economic policies, which were reflected in her foreign policy as well. Especially, the changes in civil-military relations due to the democratisation reforms, civil society organisations’ entry into politics, and increasing economic effect on relations with the neighbours transformed Turkey’s policies towards her neighbours.97 The Europeanisation process has also affected domestic stability in a positive way, which increased economic investment98 and, in turn, increased Turkey’s confidence in the region. In this era, nationalist and state identities have been seen in the opposition parties’ politics, rather than in those of the government. The Government’s foreign policy style has been redefined, and a multidimensional approach called ‘strategic depth’ perspective99 has been implemented. According to

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Davutoğlu, in order to formulate a long-lasting strategic perspective, one needs to take into account historical depth, which provides a sound assessment of the links between the past, present, and future, as well as a geographical depth, penetrating into the indicated dynamics of the relations between domestic, regional, and global factors.100 Accordingly, the above mentioned five principles have been effectuated while security perceptions have started to change and, therefore, some of the perceived security threats have been taken out of the agenda. Friendly relations with neighbouring countries have been emphasised and strong economic, trade, cultural and political ties with neighbours such as Syria have been prioritised in this era. It has been observed that Turkish policy towards Syria, focussing on extending economic and trade relations, is much more aligned with the EU’s approach to Syria.101 Syria ceased to be seen as an enemy after the resolution of the crisis in 1999.102 Furthermore, following bilateral agreements on trade, tourism and educational exchange, high level visits have been realised between the two countries. In 2007 Syria and Turkey agreed on creating a free trade zone which resulted in abolishing visas between two countries. Iraq has been one of the top five priorities of the government103, due to the perceived threat from Northern Iraq. For several decades, by several Turkish governments, it has been declared that an independent Kurdish state would not, and could not, be accepted in the region. This time, the Turkish government reemphasised the importance of the territorial integrity of Iraq, but, unlike in previous eras, Turkey made efforts to discuss the issue at the international platforms, i.e., the Neighbouring Countries Process104, rather than reacting via coercive diplomacy or absolute military power. In relation to the territorial integrity of Iraq, dialogue with Kurdish authorities has been increased since 2005, and even the possibility of official visits at the Presidential level has emerged. Another effect of the EU on Turkish foreign policy has been observed concerning the energy routes and Turkey’s efforts to present herself as a transit route for natural resources. Although Turkey has been engaged in several projects intended to link energy routes from Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East to Europe, it has

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been observed that Turkey’s efforts have been accelerated since 2004, i.e., Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan, NABUCCO, Samsun-Ceyhan pipelines. In relation to energy routes, the Black Sea region and the Caucasus attracted deserved attention after EU interest in the region increased due to its latest enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria. The Turkish Perspective on Regions that are perceived as Security Threats Turkish perspective on Mediterranean security In the Mediterranean, Turkey’s main aim is to prevent a block constructed by Greece and Cyprus, while avoiding jeopardising relations with Greece.105 The problems with Greece regarding Cyprus and the Aegean Sea have a very long history in the Republican Period. In other words, they have been part of the traditional security problems of the country.106 Cyprus The issue of Cyprus has been a hot topic in Turkish foreign policy because the island is considered vital for the security of the country. Cyprus is only 70 km from the Turkish coast; this proximity reveals the importance of the island in terms of military security. The strategic location of the island107 is crucial for Turkey, since it is the largest island in the eastern Mediterranean, and therefore controls access to ports in the region. Thus, Turkey does not want other actors to control Cyprus. Another importance of the island derives from the existence of natural resources in Central Asia and the Middle East. The exit point for oil and natural gas reserves is seen as the eastern Mediterranean, and this increases the significance of the island for Turkey. In particular, after the agreement on the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the island became even more important for Turkey. Another reason for concern is the Southeast Anatolian Project (SAP). The Eastern Mediterranean is crucial for the trade of agricultural and industrial products that are produced by the SAP. Mersin and İskenderun harbours open Southeast Anatolia to the world. In this respect, the combination of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and the SAP increases Turkey’s power in economic and strategic terms. Thus,

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Cyprus, standing astride trade routes that link Turkey to the world, plays a unique role in Turkey’s internal and external politics. Another crucial point to be mentioned on the Cyprus issue, and relevant to perceived security threats in Turkey, is the relations between Greece and countries such as Syria, Iran, and Armenia. These relations have taken the form of cooperation agreements on different issues, but are seen as part of a containment policy implemented by Greece against Turkey. Cyprus has become even more important in Turkish politics, both external and internal, since it became the number one priority in the negotiations with the EU. On this matter, the government and opposition hold different views. The JDP government is aware of the fact that Cyprus is a significant problem in the relations with the EU, especially after the EU membership of Southern Cyprus. It is a common belief in the Turkish government that the EU is obliged to recognise Northern Cyprus.108 Information gleaned from interviews in TGNA suggests an understanding in the government that the EU has ignored international agreements in the membership of Southern Cyprus and is not acting neutrally on this issue. The London Zurich agreements appointed Turkey, Greece and the UK as the guarantors for Cyprus, and therefore the Turkish government believes it, as one of the guarantors, should be consulted in any development regarding the island’s political status.109 It is believed that the EU did not seek the opinions of the guarantor countries in the membership of Southern Cyprus in 2004. The Turkish government insists that the Cyprus issue should have been solved before October 3, 2005, which was the agreed date to start negotiations between Turkey and the EU.110 In the government’s view, issues such as Cyprus cannot be negotiated.111 Also, Yaşar Yakış, the chair of the European Union Harmonisation Committee in the Turkish Parliament, has clearly stated, ‘Turkey will not sign any agreement with Cyprus. The agreement on the extension of the Customs Union to the new members will be signed with the Commission but not Southern Cyprus’, in the briefing given to the members of the parliament.112 On the other hand, the opposition party, the RPP, believes that a country cannot and should not make any protocol with a country

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which is not recognised.113 To them, the agreement on the extension of the Customs Union to the new 10 countries amounts to recognition of Southern Cyprus. Also, they advocate that although Turkey did not recognise Southern Cyprus on December 17, 2004, Turkey has promised to recognise Southern Cyprus in the future, but not before the problem on the island is solved. The JDP has had a more flexible and tolerant view on the Cyprus issue than the opposition party, the RPP. Although the JDP had resisted, for a year, the EU’s demands on opening the ports to the Greek Cypriots, just before the meeting of EU leaders on December 14-15, 2006, the Turkish government proposed opening one port and one airport to traffic from Southern Cyprus. Until December 2006, Turkey had insisted that the EU should end the economic isolation on northern Cyprus, but the possibility that relations with the EU might freeze due to the Cyprus issue forced the JDP to propose opening a few ports to Southern Cyprus. In return, the Turkish government wanted the same number of ports to be opened for northern Cyprus. However, this proposal did not find acceptance at the EU level, and EU foreign ministers decided to freeze eight chapters in negotiations. Since the proposal was a verbal proposal, the JDP government consulted neither the National Security Council nor the President. This created very hot debates, both in the press and among the political parties, as seen in the following newspaper excerpts. The JDP government still cannot see the Cyprus reality. The issue for Europe and the Greek Cypriots is not the opening of one or two ports but working it so that all of Cyprus is given to the Greek Cypriots. The JDP government’s mess over the policies it pursues with the EU drags everyone down into a state of despair. Hürriyet (11.12.2006) On Cyprus, there are three main principles on which Turkey will make no concessions as long as there is no final solution: Not to recognise the Greek Cypriot administration as a state; Not to decrease the number of Turkish troops in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; Not to open [the port of ] Maraş. This is

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state policy. Without giving any sign of making concessions on these principles, and with just with a ‘verbal offer’ on the ports, the government is seeking to influence the EU process in favour of Turkey Milliyet (11.12.2006) What is the reason behind this urgent offer, which has been made on a national issue like Cyprus without negotiating with anyone (neither with the opposition and the general staff, nor with the President)? Does the JDP government want to enter the election year by agreeing with influential outside forces? Is that why Cyprus is being sacrificed? The Cyprus issue is not a problem to be handled lightly. There is great need for widespread agreement on it. Cumhuriyet (11.12.2006) Turkey’s offer showed that the side which is always ready to take the initiative is Ankara. Although the European leaders, from Merkel to Barroso, found the plan insufficient, they agreed that the step was positive. Turkey has shown the EU that the Cyprus issue must be solved as soon as possible. Zaman (11.12.2006) It was not only the politicians voicing their opinions on the problem; the military stated their own ideas on the Cyprus issue on January 25, 2005. The Commander of the Land Forces, Yaşar Büyükanıt, stated that ‘not even one Turkish soldier will leave the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) until a permanent and precise agreement between the two parts is decided.’114 In his speech in TRNC, he stressed the importance of independence and the island’s strategic importance. In relation to Ankara’s proposal to open two ports to Greek Cypriots, Turkish Armed Forces criticised the government on not consulting them, and argued that this has been a shift from the established foreign policy line. The same argument was made by the Presidency, that the President was not informed and that this is a very big shift from the traditional state policy, which should have been discussed with him and the Parliament.

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Turkish Cypriots voted in parliamentary elections in April 2009, in which Turkish Cypriot hardliners won. The right wing National Unity Party (UBP) won the elections by 44.06 percent of the votes. The leader of UBP, Derviş Eroğlu, said that they want to rethink the federal model that has been discussed by Talat and Christofias. However, Turkey warned the new government, and Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan stated: The process must continue exactly as before…. We will never support a move that would weaken the hand of Turkish Cypriot leader and chief negotiator Mehmet Ali Talat.115 The conflict over the island also affects relations with Greece, for obvious reasons. Moreover, the issue affects relations with the EU and Turkey. One of the main problems is that of aid for Turkey, as a result of the veto power used by Greece on financial aid programs. The problem between Turkey and the EU on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can be seen as a result of the problem between Turkey and Greece.116 However, it should be mentioned here that holding Greece responsible for Turkey’s position in the ESDP is not realistic. In order to be in the decision making process of EU policies like the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or ESDP, a country should first of all be a member of the Union. It is a fact that the veto power of Greece had an effect on the EU financial programmes but not on security related policies, in which a candidate state cannot participate. It is not realistic to relate it to Greece only. Greece After the First World War and the War of Independence, relations between Greece and Turkey were good until the 1950s. The Cyprus issue, minority issues between the two countries, violence against minorities in both countries and, finally, the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus all contributed to a deterioration in relations between the two neighbours.117 The main problems between the two countries are the extent of their respective territorial waters, the delimitation of the continental shelf, the militarisation of the Eastern Aegean islands,

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airspace-related problems, islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean, and maritime boundaries. One of the most serious recent incidents took place in 1995-96, when a crisis arose over the Kardak rocks in the Aegean Sea. In the end, troops were sent to the rocks by both Greece and Turkey.118 However, especially after the earthquakes in both Turkey and Greece, personal relations between George Papandreou and İsmail Cem (the Foreign Ministers of the two countries) helped relations to improve. This friendship, between two Foreign Ministers, affected the economic and tourism relations as well as trade, cultural and environmental issues. Also at this time, the two countries collaborated in the fight against illegal immigration. These kinds of developments in relations affected the document on national security threats prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Armed Forces and the government (2005). It was envisaged in the new document that Greece would be mentioned as a ‘partner’. This was an important step in the evolution of Turkish foreign policy, because it was the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkey that Greece was seen as an ally rather than an enemy. However, problems such as maritime boundaries, air space, the extent of territorial waters, and the delimitation of the continental shelf are still problematic issues in the relations between the two countries. The Middle East The Middle East is a problematic region in the world for at least five main reasons; the strategic importance of the region is the first. Water is another, since the countries in the region have trans-border water resources. Both these reasons become more important when they are combined with the problem of terror in the region, the Arab-Israel conflict, and specifically the Palestine issue. This latter problem is interlinked with terrorism. It is also a fact that leadership in the Arab world is an important issue and all the countries, including Turkey from time to time, want to assert leadership in the region; this brings rivalries and hostilities to a head. Finally, the way that these countries achieved their independence is an important factor, as there were no big wars of independence in the Middle East. The bigger western countries granted them their independence, and this means that western countries are another actor in the region, too. 119

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Turkey is very concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the political vacuum in the region. Another perceived threat is the increasing US role in the Middle East, especially by means of a military force, as in Iraq in 2003. This is seen as a threat to Turkey because it could jeopardise the integrity of Iraq, which might in turn bring about a Kurdish state. Turkey sees ‘Kurdistan’ not as a political name but as a geographical concept. The word was first used by the Sultan of the Seljuk Empire, Sancar, to mean the border region between Iran and Iraq, and did not include Turkey. In the Ottoman period, this name was used as an administrative term. It did not have any ethnic or racial connotation. Moreover, the area was not as large as it is represented today. For Turkey, due to a separation of the concepts of citizenship and ethnic identity, rather than a ‘Kurdish’ identity being thought of as separate from a ‘Turkish’ one, they are seen as interlinked.120 The oil crisis in 1973, the increase in oil prices in 1980-81, and the increase in the demand for oil in Turkey all affected relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries. Turkey tried to separate its Middle Eastern policy from its West European policy, and emphasised bilateral relations with the Middle Eastern countries instead of multilateral ties. On the other hand, and more importantly, she has tried to avoid being involved in conflicts in the region. Thus, the main principle in these relations was that if there were no humanitarian aims or NATO involvement, she avoided being involved in any kind of conflict. Today, Islamist terror groups, the rise of fundamental Islamists in the country, the Kurdish issue, and water problems all affect relations between Turkey and the Middle East. In all of these issues, Turkey follows a realist model of relations, which is based on military preparedness.121 In this respect, the relations with Syria, Iraq, Iran and Israel are the most important. Syria Syria is a country with which Turkey does not have very friendly relations. The main problems are the Cyprus issue, support for the PKK, and water. The problems between Syria and Turkey are not new; there were problems in the Ottoman Era as well, and the problems

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today can be seen as the continuation of those. In the Ottoman Era, Arab nationalism was a problem for the Ottoman administration. When Arabs, under the leadership of Syria, aligned with the British and began the ‘independence’ movement, the Ottomans saw this act as a stab in the back. This development in the last years of the Ottoman Empire deeply affected the Republic of Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours. All throughout the centuries there has been distrust towards the Arabs. The distrust continued during the Cold War, when Turkey attached itself to the West, but Syria chose to align with the USSR. The other two main problems have been the problems of water and the PKK. The problem of water Water scarcity is a huge problem in the Middle East. It is sometimes considered as being more important than oil in the region, for countries such as Syria, Turkey, Israel, and Iraq. Water is more important than oil in the sense that whereas oil resources are seen as belonging to one country, water resources literally cross borders. Moreover, the increase in the population, the decrease in water resources, and the usage of water for purposes other than agriculture, due to rising living standards, all affect the problem. The bone of contention between Syria and Turkey is the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which originate within Turkish borders but flow to Syria and Iraq. These two rivers are the most important water resources for three countries. Therefore, it became a problem with Syria when Turkey decided to build the Southeast Anatolian Project (SAP), on the Euphrates. The project that Turkey constructed has 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric power plants and 17 irrigation schemes. Turkey refused to sign the UN’s legislation on water resources in 1997 (as did China and Burundi) and occasionally has declared that water resources are national resources like oil. When he was Prime Minister, Özal stated in one of his speeches that ‘the control of the rivers is in the hands of Turkey, so our neighbours need to find a way to get along with us!’122 The SAP directly affected Syria’s water resources. Of course, the amount of water that Syria received was decreasing, but there were other concerns:

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Syria’s ability to generate its own hydroelectric power is curtailed by the depleted water levels. The 800-megawatt generating Tabqa Dam completed in 1977, was supposed to meet Syria’s energy needs well into the next century. In 1993 however, of the eight turbines only one was operational…. The reduction in the flow of Euphrates waters also affects water supply available for Syria’s agriculture.…123 The demands of Syria are that the Euphrates and Tigris rivers should be recognised as international waters and the level of water being given by Turkey to Syria should be increased. Syrian governments argue that the problem of water is not only an issue between Syria and Turkey, but is a problem that affects the whole Middle East, because the amount of water given by Turkey to Syria also affects the amount that Syria can give to Israel. Thus, Syria seeks to discuss this issue under the UN framework.124 In 2007, the two countries signed the ‘Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between Turkey and Syria’ concerning ‘Politics and Security’, ‘Economy’ and ‘Energy and Water’. A deepening of the cooperation between the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and the Syrian Oil Company, and progress in visits and opinion exchange in the field of water were agreed. Also, Turkey designed a ‘Three Staged Plan’ based on the fact that the Euphrates and the Tigris make up a single transboundary river system, and envisages the preparation of common inventories of water and land resources for a final allocation of water between the riparian states. The PKK Another problem has been the PKK.125 Syria has been supporting the PKK for almost 20 years. It was a known fact that the leader of the group, Abdullah Öcalan, was residing in Damascus for more than 10 years. Also, from the statements of Abdullah Öcalan, it was clearly understood that Syria was one of the countries that helped Öcalan and the PKK.126 Former General Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, Doğan Güreş, often stated that even though Turkish officials informed Syrian officials of the whereabouts of the leader of the

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PKK, including his phone number and address, Syrian officials were reluctant to take action. In 1996, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to Damascus on the PKK issue and froze all relations with Syria. The main themes of this memorandum were demands that Syria should capture the members of the PKK terrorist group within its borders; return Abdullah Öcalan and other members of the leadership cadre of the PKK to Turkey; and stop the supply of weaponry and the logistic help to the terrorist organisation. In 1998, the Turkish government took some other diplomatic steps, but neither was Öcalan apprehended nor did the Syrian government bring an end to its support to the PKK. In the same year, Turkey decided to solve this problem militarily, and sent troops to the border. The Commander of the Turkish Land Forces declared that Turkey’s patience was at an end and if Syria could not fulfil Turkey’s expectations, they were ready to take any action necessary.127 This conflict ended as a success for Turkey; Öcalan was expelled from Syria and he was finally captured in Kenya. It is hard to guess exactly what would have happened if Syria had not forced Öcalan to leave its territory, but there is no evidence that Turkey would not have attacked Syria. The two countries signed the Adana Agreement that year, as well, which confirmed Syria’s undertaking not to support the PKK. However, Turkey still remains suspicious towards Syria. Furthermore, the water problem and the PKK issue are very much related. 128 As Özal stated during his presidency, the water issue is not just a water problem between neighbours. Water has been a crucial tool in the hands of Turkey against Syria’s support of the PKK in the 1980s and the 1990s. Therefore, as long as the terrorist activities of the PKK continued to find support in Syria, the water problem was not solved between these two countries.129 Only in 2005 did Syria and Turkey start negotiations on the water issue, after the PKK’s terrorist activities came (temporarily) to a halt. In January 2004, the President of Syria visited Turkey and had meetings with the President of the TGNA. This visit was the first at the Presidential level between the two countries in 57 years. Although the visits have been seen as positive, there is still suspicion and distrust towards the Syrians due to the historical experiences.

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Iran Turkey and Iran have been rivals for a long time, dating back to the Ottoman and Persian Empires. In the Republican period, Iran did not become any friendlier. It is believed in Turkey that, as a result of the differences in their regimes, Iran and Turkey could not easily establish friendly relations as neighbours.130 After the 1979 Iranian revolution, relations deteriorated further, as Turkey perceived Iran as the underlying cause of the Islamist movements within Turkey. Tehran perceived Turkey suspiciously because of its cooperation with the USA. In the 1970s, the first Islamist political party was established in Turkey, the National Welfare Party131 (NWP); after that, the WP was established and, in 1996, the WP came to power in a coalition with the TPP132. This increase in the support for an Islamist party, and its success in becoming a part of the government, caused serious problems between Islamists and secularists in the country, where many demonstrations ended in violence. At this time, Prime Minister Erbakan tried to pursue better relations with Iran and Libya, and this was seen as a divergence from orthodox Turkish foreign policy.133 In the 1990s, the training of radical Islamic militants, who were responsible for the assassinations of several Turkish intellectuals, increased tensions between the two countries when Turkey accused Iran of interfering in her domestic affairs. The most publicised case was the assassination of Uğur Mumcu ( January 24, 1993), who was a secular intellectual. Just four days later, there was a failed assassination attempt of a Jewish businessman in İstanbul. These attacks increased the tension between the two countries. Iran also accused Turkey of intervening in its domestic affairs by letting the Mujahedeen-e Khalq members remain in Turkey. This diplomatic crisis escalated and, in 1997, the Iranian Ambassador was expelled to Iran, although the Turkish government was an Islamist one at that time.134 Moreover, Turkey had suspicions that Iran was harbouring PKK bases. It was argued that the PKK had camps where they train, and organise smuggling and trading in petrol, in Iran.135 Some journalists, including Yavuz Gökalp and Cüneyt Arcayürek, have claimed that PKK/KADEK changed their centre from northern Iraq to Iran, as a result of Turkish Armed Forces’ intervention in northern Iraq.

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Although Iran and Turkey signed an agreement in 1993 to prohibit support for terrorist organisations, this did not prevent Turkey having close relations with Israel as a reaction to the links between Iran and the PKK. In 2005, Iran’s possession of nuclear devices was the subject on the table. The Vice President of the Eurasian Strategic Research Centre stated that these nuclear devices would give Iran hegemony in the region, and he stressed that Turkey should watch this very closely.136 In the new version ( June 2006) of the document on national security policies, Iran is cited as one of the most important security threats. The missiles and the nuclear capacity of Iran are seen to be a crucial threat. The worries of the Turkish government and military forces focus on the range of the missile that Iran is working on, namely the Şahap 3. On the other hand, trade between the two countries reached 2.3 billion USD in 2004, and in 2007 Turkey reached an agreement with Iran to transport Iranian and Turkmen natural gas to Europe.137 But more importantly, Turkish and Iranian security forces signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate on promoting security measures against the PKK.138 Israel Israel is an important military partner for Turkey. Many securitybased agreements have been signed between the two countries. Turkey decided to modernise its military and defence structures, and she needed a partner to provide this type of service. Since it was not possible to get arms and weaponry from western allies139 due to the human rights violations in Turkey, she decided to obtain them from Israel. On this matter, there have been several agreements on training between the two countries. These agreements included the training of the two armies, and enhanced the potential of operational cooperation between the two countries. Turkey has also allowed the Israelis to use her air space. In addition, relations included the trade in weapons. Israel supplied the weaponry that Turkey needed after the arms embargos were put in place by other western allies, such as Germany.140 However, in the improvement of relations between Israel and Turkey, other actors such as Greece, Syria and Iran played an important role.

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The modernisation of the Turkish army and Turkey’s close relations with Israel are seen as perfect dissuasive tools against Syria. The same applies to the case of Iran. In particular, Turkey is most concerned with the armed forces of Iran and the defence expenditure of this neighbour, since the amount of military manpower available in Iran (18,319,545) is even greater than that available in Turkey (16,756,323).141 Another worrying point is the percentage of GDP spent by Iran, which was 3.3 percent in 2002.142 Another actor, Greece, had an influence on the improvement of relations with Israel. Turkey has interpreted relations between Greece and Armenia on military issues, and those between Syria and Greece, as security threats. In relations with Israel, Turkey’s main concern has been Palestine (PA) and the peace process. In the previous decades, Turkey tried to stay out of the conflict between Israel and Palestine as much as possible. However, after Turkey’s candidacy to the EU was announced and the accession negotiations started, Turkey began to perceive the Palestine question as an area of responsibility and an opportunity to claim a constructive role in the region.143 In 2006, HAMAS came to power in Palestine, and Turkey asked HAMAS to put an end to terrorist attacks, seek a solution based on the idea of two independent states, and honour the previously signed agreements between Israel and Palestine. Also, Turkey offered to put efforts into managing an industrial zone on the border of Israel and the Gaza Strip through the Union of Chambers of Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. In 2006, after the HAMAS election victory, Turkey pursued diplomatic relations in the EU to resume economic aid to the Palestinians. All these efforts of Turkey showed that in line with the EU policies, Turkish politicians and elites started to perceive trade and economic relations as the main basis of cooperation in conflict situations. Iraq As with Syria, one of the problems in relations between Turkey and Iraq has been the confrontations over water. Before the American intervention, the Iraqi government claimed that Iraq had gained rights on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers even before the Republic of Turkey.

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Therefore, Iraq argued that the water from these rivers should be distributed according to the planned Common Technical Committee’s decisions, which are based on the needs of the countries. The issue of water and the claims of the new Iraqi government were not known at the time of writing (2009). At this stage, the most important issue for Turkey on Iraq is the independence and sovereignty of the country. Turkey gives high priority to Iraq’s independence and sovereignty and, most importantly, the indivisibility of its territory. The Turkish government has preferred agreements between the Kurds and Baghdad, which would put Kurds under the authority of Iraq again. It is important for Turkey that all of the groups living within Iraq’s borders should be represented by its new government. As stated in the White Paper of the Ministry of National Defence, ‘Turkey declares that she will not tolerate any activity that will harm, on the one hand, the territorial integrity and the political unity of Iraq in northern Iraq and developments in this direction and, on the other hand, Turkey applies with decisiveness all kinds of measures to make ineffective the terrorist elements, who are taking advantage of the lack of authority and are trying to settle in this region.’144 The war in Iraq had been heavily criticised in the TGNA from the day it started, and Turkey has not allowed US troops involved in the Iraq war into her territory, on constitutional grounds. This had been identified as an unjust war, lacking international support, by the parliament.145 However the government tried to persuade the parliament by re-emphasising the strategic partnership between Turkey and the USA, but the efforts of the government were wasted. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Armed Forces perceive the possibility of the disintegration of Iraq and the formation of an independent Kurdish state to be one of the biggest security threats towards Turkey in the region. Here, the emphasis is put on the terrorist group, the PKK, and any attempt to establish a Kurdish state. In 2001, a commander in Diyarbakır stated his ideas on a Kurdish state in northern Iraq very clearly when he said a Kurdish state in the region is a reason to go to war.146 In this respect, the issue of Kurdish terrorism in the region will be addressed first, followed by an examination of the other terrorist organisations in the country.

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The Kurdish Question First of all, it must be clarified that the problem is not seen as a Kurdish issue, but a problem of the PKK operations in Turkish territory. Those two concepts are treated differently. In Turkey, the PKK/KADEK is not seen as the political party of the Kurdish people. It is a terrorist group that oppose the Turkish state and the Turkish Armed Forces. The war with the PKK has cost around $90 million and at least 30,000 people have died in the conflict. In the 1980s, Abdullah Öcalan started the campaign against the Turkish State to form an independent Marxist Leninist Kurdish State.147 However, Kurds were affected more negatively than the Turks, since the conflicts occurred on a territory where the population is mostly Kurdish. A former General Commander of Turkish Armed Forces, Doğan Güreş, has said on different occasions in the parliament (after he became an MP) that being a Kurd and being a terrorist are two different issues. From the speeches of the ‘state of emergency governor’ in 1988, it was understood that the first and foremost condition that had to be met before cultural rights were granted to the Kurdish people was the ending of bloodshed and terrorist activities in the region. The same attitude was seen in 1999, too. In one of the meetings between journalists and the experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a document distributed by the ministry entitled ‘Turkey, Europe, Terrorism and the Kurdish Problem’148 shows the same stand on the issue. Turkey holds the PKK terrorist organisation responsible not only for the murders of at least 30,000 people in the country, but also for many organised criminal activities, especially drug, weapon and human smuggling and money laundering.149 The PKK presents itself as the freedom fighters of the Kurdish nation in the region. Since its beginning, the group has been Marxist Leninist in its ideology, Stalinist in its leadership, and Maoist in its strategy for the conquest of power.150 It was established in 1978, and its first goal was to challenge Turkey and establish ‘Kurdistan’ in the region, and then spread the idea of socialism all over the world.151 Turkey responded to this terrorist group very firmly and, for 20 years, the Turkish Armed Forces have fought against the PKK. The public, the state and the military usually compare the conflict between

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the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK to the Independence War after the First World War. This has been a very expensive war. Between 1994 and 1995, 250,000-300,000 soldiers were sent to Southeast Anatolia; at least 30,000 people died, and 4 percent of GDP was spent on this action, which amounted to $7 million in 1995.152 After Öcalan’s capture, the group declared a ceasefire, so they stopped their attacks temporarily (until 2004). During this time, the Kurds in Turkey gained certain cultural rights, such as broadcasting in their own language and learning the Kurdish language in school. These rights have been given to minorities as part of Turkish attempts to seek membership of the EU. However, when the ceasefire came to an end on June 1, 2004, and the attacks against the police and military forces started, the Turkish Armed Forces declared they ‘are determined to do everything necessary to eradicate this new type of threat, and the struggle will last until the last terrorist is eliminated.’153 An independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq is not an acceptable proposition for the Turkish state, which believes that such a development would change the balance of power in the Middle East. First and foremost, relations with the USA would change dramatically if the USA insisted on an independent Kurdistan. The scenario would be a disaster for Turkish-Western relations, since Turkey would require the USA to vacate the İncirlik air base, and she would also request that all US soldiers leave the country. Turkey-Israel relations would be disrupted, and instead there would be better relations with Syria and Iran, as those countries also have Kurdish minorities in their territories. For this reason, Turkey does not believe that the USA will insist on a Kurdish state; but if a Kurdish state were formed in northern Iraq, that would be a declaration of war for Turkey. One of the nightmare scenarios is a civil war in Iraq, and the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Turkey is against a Kurdish state in northern Iraq because Kirkuk is a key economic and oil-producing centre. Thus, a Kurdish state would be an attraction for Kurds in Turkey, and threaten Turkish territorial integrity. A Kurdish state that included Kirkuk would control rich oil resources, with a potential to fund PKK/KADEK, and so would be unacceptable to any Turkish government.

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In Turkey itself, sending troops across the border is generally viewed as a legitimate response to an impending or actual Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk that would, in Turkish eyes, threaten the rights of its Turcoman population.154 Moreover, one billion dollars in aid that the USA proposed to give to Turkey was not accepted after the vote on March 1, 2003. The main aim of this donation before the Iraq War was to obtain use of air space and bases in Turkey. This aid was also to ensure that Turkey did not intervene in northern Iraq. Up to March 4, 2005 Turkey did not attempt to get that aid. In the eyes of the American and Turkish governments, this is seen as evidence of the possibility of intervention by Turkey in northern Iraq if there is a clear need.155 The situation now is unusual in the international system. The border between Turkey and Iraq does not exist de facto. There is a Kurdish state there de facto. However, it is not accepted by any of the states in the region, since that kind of recognition would change power politics in the area. Today, since the ceasefire ended between the Kurdish militant groups and the Turkish Armed Forces, the conflict is not at a very high level, but the clash between two Kurdish groups and a low level of conflict between Turks and Kurds are still problems in the area. Europeans are not trusted on the Kurdish issue in the region. Some politicians and academics are concerned that the proposed Turkish EU membership is, in fact, being used as a means to solve the Kurdish issue. It is largely believed that the Europeans are using the ‘membership card’ to give freedom to the Kurds in the region and help them to establish their own state, according to newspaper columnist Erol Manisalı.156 On December 3, 2000 the headlines of the Turkish newspapers highlighted a ‘mistake’ made in the EU bureaucracy: the Chief of the Turkish Desk in the EU had sent an official letter to the PKK, which was accepted as an EU-PKK link.157 It is also regarded as a reason not to believe in westerners or ever trust them. Another example is the Sixth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee in the UK, July 2002. In article (o) it is declared that the PKK was a terrorist group and European partners should designate the PKK as a terrorist organisation.158 However, at the time of the report, KADEK had already been established and was functioning in the same way as the PKK, as a separatist terrorist

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organisation; yet, it was not included on the list of terrorist groups. Germany, Greece and France are the countries with which Turkey has had the most problems regarding this issue. Germany did not want to recognise the PKK as a terrorist organisation for some time; it even gave shelter to the terrorists, so that, for example, PKK members were able to build up their own districts in Germany.159 Former President Demirel made several statements on the issue. The same kind of help was seen to come from Greece. One of Demirel’s claims was that Greece gave the Lavrion Camp to terrorist groups, where they were able to train.160 One of the claims of the Turkish authorities is that the PKK was allowed to open a representative office in Athens in 1994. Öcalan’s speeches, which referred to the moral and economic support from the Greek authorities, are used by the Turkish authorities to support their claims in different fora.161 Also, the problems in the Aegean Sea have been related to the PKK, in that these problems escalated at times when the Turkish Armed Forces were preparing to fight against terrorists in Southeast Anatolia. Commanders from the Turkish Armed Forces support the claim that this was not coincidence. Former PM Bülent Ecevit, in his statements after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, stressed the same point. Another European country, France, has also been seen as a supporter of the PKK.162 However, the support from France was identified as more intellectual than physical. The discrepancies between different countries’ designations of the terrorist groups have been a major issue, but these differences are decreasing, as terrorist activities become a more pervasive problem in European cities.163 Everything is more complicated in the Middle East. As the Israelis would say, ‘every clock shows a different time in the Middle East.’164 Turkish perspective on the Caucasus Armenia Turkey’s problematic relations with Armenia have been another foreign policy issue, and Turkey has borne the brunt of continuous EU criticism. After 1991, there had been no diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia for a decade. The Nagorna Karabakh conflict and the deaths of approximately 1.5 million ethnic Armenians in the early 20th century have been the main problems in the relations between

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Turkey and Armenia. In 2001, tentative steps were taken, such as the establishment of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, involving several civil society organisations, parliamentarians and local governments’ representatives, with a view to encourage Turkey and Armenia to open the Kars-Gyumri border gate. In 2002, some further positive developments in the relations with Armenia took place; as seen in the Regular Report: ….positive developments have taken place in bilateral relations. Bilateral meetings between the Turkish and the Armenian foreign ministers took place on several occasions. The Armenian foreign minister visited Turkey to attend the Black Sea Cooperation Council in Istanbul in June 2002. Visa requirements for Armenian citizens entering Turkey by plane from Armenia have been simplified. Several initiatives have taken place at the grass root level of civil society to promote closer co-operation between the two countries. The activities of the Turkish Armenian Business Council (TABC) are worth mentioning in this context. 165 In 2007, there were steps taken to further relations with Armenia, and the EU welcomed the high level meetings between Armenian and Turkish officials. Turkey began implementing some confidencebuilding measures, including facilitation of transit transportation to and from Armenia, and direct flight connections between Yerevan and various destinations in Turkey. Besides these measures, an initiative regarding the establishment of a commission comprised of Turkish and Armenian historians, as well as other experts aiming to study the 1915 events, was welcomed by the Europeans and perceived as a constructive step towards normalisation of relations. Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform Turkey initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform in 2008, in which all countries of the region would be represented with an aim to create an international platform for regular dialogue in the region. After the War in Georgia in August 2008 (a.k.a. the five-day war), the stability and security of the Caucasus became more

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important, as the fragility of the balance of power in the region became more visible to the European states, as well as the regional states. Just after the war broke out in Georgia, after Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia and Russia’s counterattack on August 8, 2008, Turkey took steps towards the establishment of the Caucasus Stability Pact, an agreement that was originally suggested almost a decade before. After French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Tbilisi, the Turkish Prime Minister paid visits to Moscow and Tbilisi, and the region became one of Turkey’s foreign policy priorities as it worked towards establishing the Stability Pact in the region. Turkey’s aim in establishing the Pact has been the restructuring of the Caucasian republics’ economies, ensuring development and cooperation, boosting economic cooperation, fostering trade, supporting the private sector, ensuring environmental protection, putting to use existing and future energy and transportation lines extending from the east to the west, regulating the administrative structure, ensuring administrative transparency, and tackling refugee issues. In addition to the above Platform, the establishment of the Caucasus House Initiative was proposed, to serve as a platform among Caucasian intellectuals and nongovernmental organisations and to ensure the inclusion of civil society participation in the process. The Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform is associated with the OSCE, and the first meeting of the Platform was organised at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, on December 4-5, 2008. Five members participated: Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is believed that this platform will facilitate the resolution of frozen conflicts in the region. Conclusion In this chapter, the Turkish security perception has been examined in detail, with reference to the debate over security policy and the impact of historical experiences. Here, the division of the history of the Turkish Republic into six eras facilitates the thorough understanding of security perception, in reference to the positions of the actors in security policy (i.e., the political parties, President, National Security Council and Turkish Armed Forces). From the foundation of the Republic up to

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the 1990s, the established foreign policy line has been protected, with particular emphasis on the non-interference principle. In 1991, during the Gulf War, President Özal’s attempts to transform Turkey into a more active player in the Middle East were resisted by the opposition parties and the Turkish Armed Forces. Prime Minister Erbakan’s government of the mid 1990s tried to change the foreign policy towards a more Islamic, rather than a western, orientation. However, this trial failed, as the President and Turkish Armed Forces asked the government to step down on February 28, 1997, in the National Security Council meeting. The state identity had been preserved up to the 9/11 attacks in the foreign and security policy of Turkey. All throughout these years, the realist/traditional approach, emphasising the significance of efficient military forces, protected its place in the security understanding. The Traditional approach retained its place after the 9/11 attacks as well. In this analysis, it is observed that the 9/11 attacks gave Turkey the opportunity to justify her view on terrorism: that it is a priority for all. This made it possible for Turkish foreign policy to become more pro-active towards countries such as Iran and Syria, and also in the case of the possibility of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. This effect of the 9/11 attacks on Turkey, combined with the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in the political life of the country, compels us to re-emphasise the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in the foreign policy orientation of Turkey. Although politicians are divided into two camps on the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in politics (one group identifying it as a second government166 and the other as an indispensable asset in Turkish politics), they both emphasise the crucial role of an invincible army in the region.167 Both the JDP government and the RPP opposition also accept the importance of the realist perspective in dealing with Turkey’s neighbours, especially those in the Middle East. This position also represents the general understanding in the region, that cooperation among states is established on the expectation that this system will check other states and thus help to counter regional threats. However, there has been a shift observed in the foreign policy of Turkey, especially after the start of accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, which gave Turkey candidacy status, Turkey’s Europeanisation started, and domestic

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political stability and economic progress increased Turkey’s confidence in the region. A new foreign policy approach has been accepted, of which the main tenet has been ‘If Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances with the EU.’168 Therefore, between 2005 and 2009, it has been observed that Turkey has been engaged in several international, global and regional initiatives, such as the Alliance of Civilisations, the Caucasus and Stability Pact, and so on. At the same time, it has been observed that Turkey has started to put more emphasis on economic, financial and trade relations, not only with her neighbours but also with the countries of Africa and East Asia, especially China.

4 A COMPARISON OF TURKEY AND EU SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

Introduction The main aim of this chapter is to compare the EU security culture with the security culture of Turkey. This chapter starts with the nature of the EU as a global actor, emphasising its civilian and international character. This section utilizes the definition of civilian power by Duchene, Holsti and Manners in particular, in relation to the EU, to identify it as a civilian global actor. The second section takes surveys, carried out by Eurobarometer in the EU and Turkey, as a basis for examining these security perceptions. In this chapter, fears, support for a common foreign policy, support for a common defence and security policy, and joint decision making in foreign and defence policy are studied. By discussing fears of international terror, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), organised crime, world war, nuclear conflict, and so on, the aim is to show the effects that the events of 9/11 had on EU citizens. In the comparison between Turkish and EU citizens, the figures start from 2004, simply because Turkey was first included in the Eurobarometer that year. In order to understand the effects of accession negotiations, the figures from the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 are used. In relation to the ESS and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU’s Mediterranean, Middle East, Black Sea and Caucasus policies are examined to show the international character of EU foreign policy. This chapter brings together information from the second and third chapters on globalisation and security in the European context at the

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public level, and helps to compare Turkish foreign policy from the viewpoint of public opinion. Furthermore, this comparison and the information in this chapter will be used in the subsequent chapter to illustrate problems that may arise in the accession of Turkey to the EU, in the light of security and foreign policy issues and the effect of the globalisation of security issues at the governmental level. The nature of the EU as a security actor For a very long time, foreign and security policies have been considered the sole policy areas over which the nation states have control. However, international organisations such as the UN and NATO have proven the essential role that non-state actors play in these specific policy areas. The EU in particular has evolved to be a security actor, and has created a foreign policy for itself that is uniquely different from nation states’, due to its own uniqueness. From the theories that have been studied in Chapter 2, it is evident that realism denies the competence of institutions such as the EU in foreign and security policies. However, more pluralist theories such as Liberal Institutional and globalist theories challenge the nation state’s sole authority in these areas. As discussed earlier, in Chapter 1, the end of the Cold War and globalisation brought interdependence and re-conceptualisation of the relationship between states and markets, and challenged the traditional security understanding suggested by the Traditional approach. The end of the Cold War opened the way for EU initiatives regarding security issues and for cooperation with Central Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.1 After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and implementation of the single market programme, the EU has been perceived as an economic world power. However, in terms of EU political power, weaknesses have been revealed. These weaknesses, which are discussed in detail below, are due to the historical and institutional limitations, the balance of power between individual member states and internal disagreements, all affecting the EU’s legitimacy in the world. Nevertheless, enlargements have made the EU the largest common market in the world and an essential actor in world affairs. Today, the very ‘presence’ of the EU has a profound impact on the structure of

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the international economic system.2 In other parts of the world, it is witnessed that countries are forming associations and unions that are similar to the EU in their aims, scopes, and institutional structure. The EU has become a model for other regions in the world.3 It is a key player in world trade negotiations, and a main source of development assistance to Third World Countries. Therefore, as Cameron argues, the EU is a significant global economic power; it is a much sought-after interlocutor on political affairs by an increasing number of countries and regional groupings.4 Although the EU has deficiencies in political coherence and military organisation, it does not lack economic power. The EU has sought to take a single position at the numerous international conferences dealing with environmental, social and economic issues. However, it has been far more challenging for the EU to have one single position on political issues. On the political front, the EU supports democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, and directs its assistance towards countries that adopt these conditions. As detailed below, the EU is an ongoing source of development and emergency aid to various parts of the world, e.g., Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Although initially the EU’s external aid was concentrated on the former colonies of its Member States’, it has expanded to Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, the Balkans and so on, aiming not only to improve development but also to help reconstruction, institution building, macro-economic programmes and to promote human rights. It has long been argued that the EU is an economic giant, but a political dwarf; today, it is witnessed that the EU, in spite of its limitations, has a weight in political issues which is based on civilian power rather than military power, which uses soft security rather than hard security. The concept of civilian power was developed to characterise the EC by Duchene, who defined it as an actor that did not use military means, used persuasion rather than coercion, and carrots rather than sticks.5 Holsti puts forward six ways that a civilian power can act; using persuasion (eliciting a favourable response without explicitly holding out the possibility of punishments); offering rewards; granting rewards; threatening punishment; inflicting nonviolent punishment; or using force.6 Another feature of civilian power

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is determined as the willingness to envisage open diplomacy and to encourage a more sophisticated public discussion of foreign policy matters.7 In the EU, the decision making mechanism in foreign affairs is open and visible, watched by the member states and parliaments, and therefore the EU is not a militarised super state but a peaceful Europe of cooperative nations, committed to peace and stability, strengthening international security in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter.8 The goals of the EU are defined as ‘milieu goals’, different than the ‘possession goals’ of the nation states, aiming to shape the environment in which it operates. The EU is still under construction; so far, an identity has been created for the Union based on shared values, ideals, and practices. Unlike the nation states’ identity, the identity for the EU is not created in relation to the ‘other’9, but is created based on values, rule of law, respect and protection for minorities, respect for human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance – but more importantly, instead of the balance of power, it is the rule of law that governs the internal and external business of the European Union.10 In line with its identity, European security includes the strengthening of democracy, respect for human rights and the rights of national minorities, socio-economic welfare, and environmental protection.11 In relation to these values, the EU has emerged as a civilian actor in domestic and external policies. As observed in the EU’s relations with third countries, it has taken great care to keep its civilian character; even the actions of its Rapid Reaction Force have been limited to humanitarian assistance. The EU’s Petersberg Tasks are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.12 The EU emphasises its capacity to engage in non-military crisis prevention, where there is a need for a more civilian/political contribution to peace building (e.g., trained police forces, specialised military units such as engineers and transportation, civil administrators, civilian monitors and human rights specialists). Romano Prodi emphasised the status of the EU as a global civilian power at the service of sustainable global development by stating: ‘After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security’.13 Prodi’s

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definition of the EU is along the lines of the definition of civilian power – focussing on economic power to achieve the national goals, diplomatic cooperation, and willingness to use supranational institutions to achieve international progress.14 Although military instruments are adding to the civilian instruments15, civilian power culture is a fundamental and integral part of a European security culture. Besides its nature as a civilian power, Manners identifies the EU as a normative power. He argues that it is emanating from ‘its genesis as an explicit rejection of the divisive nationalism, imperialism and war of Europe’s past; its unique character as a hybrid polity, and the development over the past 50 years, of a body of values which are firmly embedded in successive Treaties and in the Union’s practices.’16 The idea of the ‘pooling of sovereignty’, the importance of a transnational European Parliament, the requirements of democratic conditionality, and the pursuit of human rights such as the abolition of the death penalty, are not just ‘interesting’ features – they are constitutive norms of a polity which is different to existing states and international relations.17 And he locates Europe in a discussion of the ‘power over opinion’, idée force, or ‘ideological power’, and the desire to move beyond the debate over state-like features through an understanding of the EU’s international identity.18 The EU, as a civilian and a normative power, has a civilian role in international relations, either as a role model as mentioned above, or as a promoter of norms associated with the protection of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance.19 In reference to these roles, the EU’s policy instruments in foreign and security policies are diplomacy, political dialogue, and economic instruments. In fighting against the challenges of globalisation, the EU intensifies political dialogue, economic and financial aid to Pakistan, Iran, India, central Asian countries and Gulf Cooperation States, and supports multilateral approaches to arms control and non-proliferation. After the 9/11 attacks, the EU focussed on the causes of these terrorist activities and called for an in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being.20 As Bretherton and Vogler state:

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The European Union grew up in the shadow of the Cold War and under the protection of NATO. After the collapse of attempts at defence integration in the early 1950s, it effectively became a non-military actor with civilian identity… that the EU does retain an alternative identity and that its acquisition of limited military instruments does not imply militarisation… Military intervention is only justifiable for the EU if there are no other valid options.21 Thus, a distinctly European way of dealing with security came into existence, emphasising multidimensional response, institutionalism, rules, norms, cooperation, consultation and multilateralism. In summary, the European way ‘derives indigenously from the interests and values of Europeans.’22 The priorities of the EU in international affairs are the priorities of the people of Europe, emphasising human security rather than state security. The idea of civilian power does not only apply to the elites, but to all Europeans, as analysed below. Fears 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2004A

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Fig. 1 Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of terrorism In the EU, the level of fear of terrorism in Autumn, 2001 was 86 percent, but soon afterwards, in the Spring of 2002, it decreased to 78 percent. Although there are slight fluctuations in 2002 and 2003, as seen in Figure 1, the fear of international terrorism is high among EU

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citizens, starting from 9/11. Although the effect of 9/11 decreases, this fear is one of the most conspicuous among the citizens of Europe. 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2004S

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Fig. 2 Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of the spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction Figure 2 shows the same tendency as Figure 1. After 9/11, the level of the fear of WMD is 79 percent, and in Spring, 2002, this level goes down to 62 percent. Although the War in Iraq and the discussions on WMD increase the level of fear of WMD to a certain extent, it does not reach the level of 9/11, which clearly shows that the 9/11 attacks lose their impact on European public opinion. 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2004S

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Figure 3 shows the effect of 9/11 on the fear of organised crime. Although in Spring 1999 the proportion of this fear was 57 percent, in Autumn 2001 it increased to 79 percent. Although there are some fluctuations in the levels of this concern between Autumn 2001 and Spring 2003, there is a decrease in the level. 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2004S

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Fig. 4 Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of an accident in a nuclear power station The percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of an accident in a nuclear power station is 76 percent, in the year it is included in public opinion polls. However, as the impact of the 9/11 attacks fades away, the level of this fear goes down gradually, and has remained lower than 65 percent after 9/11. 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

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Fig. 5 Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of a World War

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9/11 had an important effect on the fear of world war among EU15 citizens. As is seen in Figure 5, although the War in Iraq and the resulting conflict among EU member states pushed the levels up, they do not reach the level of 9/11. 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

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Fig. 6 Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of an accidental launch of a nuclear missile Fear of an accidental launch of a nuclear missile is similar to the fear of world war. After 9/11, it is at the level of 65 percent, but afterwards the impact is less powerful; the level goes down to 50 percent. However, the campaign against nuclear weapons, and the War in Iraq pushed the fear of nuclear missiles up to 58 percent in Autumn 2002 and 57 percent in Spring 2003. The 9/11 attacks affected EU15 citizens in their fear over ethnic conflicts in Europe, since the following years show a considerable decrease. It is an established fact that these attacks crystallised not only the vulnerabilities of states, but also the vulnerabilities of individuals, in the minds of those surveyed. According to psychological research, it has been seen that the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon increased anxiety, out-group hostilities and prejudices.23 However, it is believed that the peace agreements in Bosnia; more information on enlargement and fewer problems in the Balkans; the establishment of democratic regimes in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); and a greater emphasis

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placed on the harmony of civilizations rather than their clash, have all helped to decrease the level of fear of ethnic conflicts in Europe in the years after 9/11. 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

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Fig. 7 Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of ethnic conflicts in Europe The percentage of EU15 citizens who claimed to be afraid of a nuclear conflict in Europe in Autumn 2001 was 60 percent. Afterwards, there is an impressive decline to 45 percent. However, in Autumn 2002 this goes up to 52 percent, and in Spring 2003 the level of fear decreases by two points to 50 percent. Although the war in Iraq, and the discussions on WMD and nuclear weapons had an impact on the level of fear, it does not regain the level of Autumn 2001, after September 11, in that year. 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

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Fig. 8 Percentage of the EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of a nuclear conflict in Europe

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60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

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Fig. 9 Percentage of EU15 citizens who claim to be afraid of conventional war in Europe In a Eurobarometer public opinion survey, EU citizens were asked if they were afraid of a conventional war in Europe (i.e., not nuclear, bacteriological or chemical). This fear was expressed at 56 percent in 2001. Throughout the years, there are some fluctuations in the level of this concern. Although the level is not higher than those of the other fears among EU15 citizens, in this instance, 50 percent can be considered a very high percentage, in a security community such as the EU, where economies are interlinked, borders have been abolished, and a huge number of the policies are adjusted among the countries. All these fears show that the 9/11 events affected the Europeans heavily. The attacks in the USA made Europeans think more about security issues, and increased their fears of WMD, nuclear missiles, world war, ethnic conflict and so on. However, as time passed after the attacks, the fears of WMD, organised crime, accidents in nuclear power stations, world war, nuclear missile, ethnic conflicts in Europe, and nuclear conflict all decreased. Comparison of Fears of EU15 and Turkey However, when these fears are compared with those of Turkish citizens in 2004 (Figure 10, below), it is seen that Turks in general have higher levels of fear than EU15 citizens do. Only the level of fear of international terrorism is similar to the EU level; but the difference is high in other

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fears, such as those of WMD, organised crime, and a nuclear power accident. The biggest difference is the fear of nuclear conflict in Europe and conventional war in Europe. It is remarkable to see the extent to which Turkish people believe in the possibility of war in Europe, which is seen as the world’s best functioning security community. This illustrates the differences between the perceptions, based on military security, and the real or imagined fear of the possibility of war regardless of place. In contrast to the Turkish security perception, European perceptions tend more to emphasise issues such as human rights, political cooperation, promotion of democracy and the rule of law. The collapse of the USSR and communism had an important effect on the security perceptions of those living in the EU. As Flechtner says, the territorial threat from the Eastern Bloc had vanished and with the eastern enlargement of the Union, there was an opportunity for the peaceful unification of the continent.24 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Terror

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Fig. 10 Comparison of fears among EU15 citizens and Turkish citizens, respectively (2004) The absence of a threat on the doorstep helped the Union to place more emphasis on human rights, political cooperation, promotion of

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democracy and the rule of law, as will be seen in the priorities of EU citizens and the ESS towards the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, Turkey put more emphasis on military threats, due to its real or imagined fear of neighbouring countries. Comparison of Fears of New EU Member States and Turkey The differences between levels of fear in new EU Member States and Turkey are high, as well. The new members are less concerned about world war, conventional war in Europe, ethnic conflict, and epidemics. For all the fears listed, the Turkish public is more concerned than the new members. This is an indicator of the difference between the security perception of the new members and Turkey. The new members are closer to the EU15’s security perception than Turkey’s. 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Terror

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Fig. 11 Comparison of fears among new EU member states citizens and Turkish citizens (2008) Figure 11 also demonstrates the impact of state identity and the nationalist identity in Turkey, not only at the state level but also among the people. As is the case for the EU15 member states, after the Cold War, the threat on the doorstep for the new member states vanished. However, the percentages for new EU member states’ citizens are

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higher than for the EU15 citizens. This may be explained by the culture of fear that had been created by the communist regime. Nevertheless, percentages do not reach the Turkish levels; a significant difference between new EU member states’ citizens and Turkish citizens is observed. International Character of the EU The issues that are illustrated above reveal the international character of the European security perception, as indicated under the heading ‘Nature of the EU as a Global Actor’ at the beginning of this chapter. However, the security policies of individual EU member countries differ. Although in some states the use of force in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration takes priority, the fact that European Security Policy is based on 27 Member States’ perceptions prevents the use of force being the accepted policy at the EU level. Therefore, the European policy on security issues tends to be the lowest common denominator of the security policies of the member states. The Iraq War has been the latest example of this tendency, i.e., the UK maintaining that force must be used to defend interests, while Sweden, Austria and Finland argue that force must be restrained as much as possible.25 In the EU, formation of the European Security Policy depends on the attitudes of 27 Member States, and their common threat perception, political will, and civilian and military tools. Although the deficiencies of this policy area are not the subject of this research, they play a crucial role in understanding the EU’s security perception. It is an established fact that states give priority to their own national foreign policies and national security, and have their own agendas. Furthermore, it is undeniable that EU Member States’ ‘special’ relations with third countries affect the extent of their integration within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sphere. However, dialogue and cooperation continue at the EU level to a certain extent, and there is a visible eagerness among members to establish the European Security and Defence Identity/ Policy (ESDI/ESDP). Even though integration in this sphere is at an intergovernmental level, a constant but slow progress is noticeable. Since the EU could not afford to build up a new security culture,

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multilateral international cooperation has become part of the EU security culture today. Moreover, the EU has included private enterprise into the sphere of governance, particularly European-wide, industrybased, standards-setting organisations. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has accumulated competencies in virtually every area that national governments control, and these are now often backed up by decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), whose supremacy is acknowledged by the legal systems of all the member states. The result has been a multilayered system of governance, a suprastate rather than an interstate organisation, with decisions that help determine member governments’ objectives at both national and European levels. It has been estimated that some 80 percent of economic and social legislation and perhaps 50 percent of all other legislation passed at the national level within the EU now emanate from Brussels.26 However, nation states are still the core actors in some policy areas, such as foreign, security and defence policies. In 1947, Article II of the Italian constitution clearly stated the relation between national sovereignty and international cooperation: Italy consents, on condition of parity with other states, to limitations of sovereignty necessary to an order for assuring peace and justice among nations; it promotes and favours international organisations directed towards that end. The European Defence Community (EDC) was the first example of an attempt at cooperation in foreign and security policy. It was a plan in response to the rearmament of Germany, aiming to form a pan-European defence force as an alternative to Germany’s NATO accession. Although the Treaty on the EDC had been signed on May 27, 1952, the failure of the ratification process meant that the Treaty never went into effect. The EDC had been a progressive proposal, since it envisaged a common budget, armaments and institutions, and remains significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrated, by its failure, the persistence of national sovereignty at that time, but it also confirmed the prominence of foreign policy and defence issues even at the start of the European integration process. In the 1970s, on the

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basis of the Davignon Report, European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established. This was a small step, as had been foreseen by the functionalist approach. The only change for member states was their obligation to inform the other members of the community when they were engaging in an international policy which would affect the others. This initiative was respectful of national sovereignties; cooperation in the international sphere was strictly intergovernmental, so as not to antagonise any of the members. This was the main understanding in the Single European Act (1986), too. The basis for cooperation, intergovernmentalism, was not disturbed. By the 1990s, the world had changed dramatically, as it had witnessed the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. As a result, Germany was unified and new independent CEECs were born. Furthermore, the world experienced the 1991 Gulf War and also the War in Yugoslavia. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the European Community (EC) condemned the attack and imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. However, in the Yugoslav Crisis, the recognition of newly independent states became a problem between Germany and Greece. Due to the clash of national security concerns of the Member States, the EU was late to act in the crisis. Therefore, the war in Yugoslavia acted as a catalyst for the rebirth of a European Defence Policy. The EU’s realisation that it needed to rely on the US for peace keeping in Europe, forced the EU members to focus more on the ESDP. Subsequently, the Maastricht Treaty initiated the CFSP, including ‘the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’. Before Maastricht, the methods of the EU in this policy area were joint declarations, information exchanges, and consultations in this respect. Maastricht introduced ‘common positions’, and ‘joint actions’. In 1992, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU added the military structure with the Petersberg Tasks, which comprise humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations and involvement of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.27

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The European Security Strategy (ESS) and European Neighbourhood Policy It can be argued that the EU owes the continuation of cooperation and dialogue among its members to the vagueness of its declarations. For instance, in Solana’s ESS, Europe’s strategic objectives were listed after the disputes over the war in Iraq. One of these objectives is ‘Building Security in the EU’s Neighbourhood’. It is stated in ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ that: We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region. The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.28 General Mediterranean Policy As the borders of the EU expanded, the EU felt the necessity to change its foreign policy from ‘politics of exclusion’ to ‘politics of inclusion’, as Smith argues.29 Due to the enlargements, EU borders had reached ‘trouble’ areas such as the Mediterranean, Middle East and Balkans. As Solana30 stressed, the strategic importance of the neighbouring countries required the EU to have good relations with its neighbours and create a ‘ring of friends’ around its borders. In order to fulfil this requirement, the EU is engaged in various agreements with its neighbours, i.e., quasi-membership, accession associations, neighbourhood association, development cooperation and transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s Mediterranean policy falls under the title of neighbourhood association. In this framework, the EU started the Barcelona Process with Mediterranean neighbours, in 1995. The main aim of this process

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has been the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and also the creation of an area of dialogue, cooperation, peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. In 2000, in Feira, the European Council adopted a common strategy aiming at: • creating an area of peace and stability based on fundamental principles, including respect for human rights and democracy. • creating an area of shared prosperity through sustainable and balanced economic and social development, and especially the gradual establishment of free trade between the EU and its partners and among the partners themselves with a view to the creation of the wider Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. • the improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the development of an active civil society.31 This process is underpinned by a network of bilateral relations between each partner country and the EU, embodied in Association Agreements, which provide for political dialogue, for free trade between each partner and the EU to be established over a transitional period, and for various forms of cooperation. In these Association Agreements, the MEDA programme is an important aspect of these bilateral relations. It provides financial support for the objectives of the Association Agreements and the Barcelona Process.32 In 2000, the EU designed the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region33, to reinvigorate the EMP and revitalise the Barcelona Process. However, before this strategy even became functional, the EU, after the enlargement waves in 2004 and 2007, decided on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which changed its Mediterranean policy as well. The ENP offered ‘everything but the institutions’.34 The EU aimed at developing a comprehensive partnership between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean, with the Barcelona Process and the ENP. Therefore, the Barcelona Process and the ENP have been inextricable policies of the EU in bringing bilateral and multilateral policies together.

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However, even in 2005, the EU’s Mediterranean Policies were being criticised. In order to revitalise the Mediterranean Policy and answer the criticisms, the EU published a five-year work programme emphasizing measures that extend political pluralism and participation by citizens, increase the freedom of expression and association, enhance the neighbourhood action plans, establish substantial financial facility, implement code of conduct on countering terrorism, and liberalise the financial sector while increasing the north-south and south-south regional or sub-regional cooperation.35 Conversely, just two years after the publication of this programme, in October 2007, French President Sarkozy proposed an intra-Mediterranean union, under the name ‘Mediterranean Union’, with the aim to create a Union bringing together only countries from the (northern and southern) Mediterranean basin. The group would be led by a rotating presidency dealing with issues such as energy, security, counter-terrorism, immigration and trade. However, Sarkozy’s idea of Mediterranean Union has been heavily criticised by some Mediterranean countries (e.g. Turkey) and EU members (e.g. Germany). The original idea for the Union has been modified and renamed the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), as a part of the Barcelona Process and the ENP, with an aim to ensure co-ownership of policy in the southern Mediterranean, such as the co-presidency system between the EU and its partner countries. Also, the institutional structure of the UfM includes a Secretariat with the task of examining project initiatives, and a Brussels-based Joint Permanent Committee with the task of assisting and preparing the meetings of the Senior Officials and ensuring the appropriate follow-up, as well as acting as a mechanism created under this new initiative to help the EU and the partner countries to react rapidly if a crisis situation arises in the region. Bilateral relations of the EU with Middle Eastern and some Mediterranean countries The EU and Syria Syria is a partner country in the ENP, and the EU Commission has established a Delegation in Syria, responsible for political issues, human rights, economics and trade, technical cooperation projects, information

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and culture. The Delegation analyses Syrian political and social developments, the human rights situation, and the foreign policy orientations of the Syrian government, and reports on these issues to the European Commission Headquarters. In the same sense, in economics and trade, the Delegation reports to the Headquarters on economic reforms, trade and investments.36 EU-Syria Association Agreement It is foreseen that the Association Agreement will replace the Cooperation agreement, which was signed in 1977. This Association agreement will have the same structure as the other Association agreements that the EU has signed with other countries such as Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, the PLO on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Algeria. The main aim of the Association Agreement will be to establish a political dialogue between Syria and the EU, to create a Free Trade Area between these two actors, and cooperation in economic development, finance, social matters, justice, migration, the fight against organised crime, and culture. This Agreement will make it easier for Syria to benefit from the EU internal market, and vice versa. 37 In addition to this association agreement, the EU has other projects in Syria, such as the Municipal Administration Modernisation Project, Institutional and Sector Modernisation Facility, a power sector action programme, the Tempus programme, water supply and sanitation support, telecommunication sector support programme, and so on. EU priorities in Syria are institution building, industrial modernisation, trade enhancement, and respect for human rights and democracy while building civil society. However, these plans could not be realised, due to the serious problems between the EU and Syria. One of the issues that cause problems in relations has been human rights violations in Syria. In 2004, The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network drew attention to the deterioration of the human rights situation in Syria. Especially in 2006, the cases of political prisoners have raised an alarming issue between Syria and the EU. Syria reacted to the EU’s demands for release of the prisoners by accusing the EU of interfering in its internal affairs.38

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Moreover, Syria’s support of Iran’s nuclear programme has been a problem in the relations. The Syrian president repeatedly expressed their support as: ‘It is the right of every state to own nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Countries that object to that have not provided a convincing or logical reason.’39 The EU-Mediterranean partnership agreement clause requiring Syria to revoke its alleged WMD programme constitutes one of the biggest concerns between the EU and Syria, since the agreement could not be signed without this clause. Furthermore, the relations between the EU and Syria came to a halt as a result of the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq al-Hariri. Syria has been the object of international suspicion due to its military and political involvement in Lebanon, in addition to its alleged support for terrorism. The definition of terrorism has been a problem since 2001 between the EU and Syria in the discussion on the war in Afghanistan. Syria has been one of the strongest opponents to the intervention in Afghanistan. Another issue has been Syria’s support of Hezbollah. In particular, the EU expressed its concerns over the supply of weapons to Hezbollah by Syria and Iran. The EU was concerned about the possible spread of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon, in 2006, due to the relationship between Hezbollah and Syria. According to the EU, the main challenges in Syria are in the areas of administrative and political reform, economic reform and national coordination, and Syria’s need to strengthen its capacity to develop national and sector strategies. Therefore, the EU is focussing on institution building, industrial modernisation, human resources development, trade enhancement and human rights/civil society development under the Barcelona Process.40 In accordance with these challenges, there are three priorities defined for Syria: i) support for political and administrative reform, ii) economic reform and iii) social reform.41 The EU and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) In the case of Israel and Palestine, the EU helped to produce a ‘road map’ to bring an agreement that would lead to peace and security. The EU foresees institution building as an important step for peace and

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security in the region, and believes that reform and institution building should come from within. It is stated that: The peace process and the stability of the region cannot be hostage to terrorism and violence. Terrorist attacks against Israel have no justification whatsoever. The EU strongly condemns all terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and recognises Israel’s right to protect its citizens from these attacks, in accordance with international law. The EU also urges the Palestinian Authority to show determination in the fight against extremist violence and to confront individuals and groups conducting and planning terrorist attacks.’42 Also, the EU calls on Israel to withdraw its military forces, to stop extra-judicial killings, to lift closures and all restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, and to freeze settlement activities and dismantle settlements. The EU requires both sides to respect the Venice Declaration of June 13, 1980, the Berlin Declaration of March 24, 1999 and the Seville Declaration of June 22, 2002. Between them, these declarations characterise the EU prescription for a Middle East Settlement: a two-State solution with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side-by-side within secure and recognised borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbours in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1402, and 1515 and on the principles of the Madrid Conference; • a solution in the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks; • a fair solution to the complex issue of Jerusalem and a just and viable and agreed solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees.43 •

The European Council, the Council of the EU, the High Representative of CFSP, the President, the Special Representative for the MEPP, the Commission, the EU Delegation to Israel and the European Parliament are all involved in this process.

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The EU tries to promote peace and prosperity via political dialogue. Since the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000, EU assistance reflects a mix of emergency support, more medium-term institution building measures, and support to the reform process. Together with Norway, the EU co-chairs meetings of the international donor mechanism, the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to the Palestinians (AHLC). The Union is also closely involved in local donor coordination and the humanitarian assistance group. Bilateral economic and financial cooperation with all parties involved in the MEPP, provided by the MEDA Programme, and other instruments of cooperation aim at creating conditions for peace, stability and prosperity in the region. The EU is the biggest trading partner and a major economic, scientific and research partner of Israel. Furthermore, it tries to promote political and economic reforms in the region, such as institution building and support for elections, and to monitor and support the implementation of Palestinian civil reforms. EU policies towards the Middle East can be examined under three headings, namely, financial and economic support for the peace process; efforts at regional stabilisation and the search for multilateral solutions; and support for Palestinian state and institution building. The EU believes in the close relationship between economic stability in Palestine and progress in the peace process. It is believed that economic growth and stability would help the establishment of a democratic state in the region, which would be in the interests of Israel as well. It is widely accepted in the EU that as a natural consequence of a democratic state in Palestine, the interaction between the civil societies in Israel and Palestine would decrease the enmity between the two actors. Therefore, the EU emphasises the economic development and budget support for the PA, institution building and civil society development in the region. After the start of the intifada in 2000, the financial aid took the shape of humanitarian aid, but the direct budget support to the PA continued as well. Besides this, the EU aided projects between Israel and the PA which were intended to foster civil society. However, these attempts could not bring reconciliations between the populations.

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In terms of multilateral solutions, the EU included the PA in the Barcelona Process; this helped the Arab states’ acceptance of Israel as a partner in the process, in the 1990s. However, after the intifada in 2000, Syria and Lebanon boycotted the talks. Therefore, the EU initiated the working groups on arms control, refugees, water, environment and regional economic development, but the lack of a genuine peace process hindered the success of these working groups. Hence, the multilateral attempts to bring regional stability came to a halt. As mentioned before, the financial aid to the PA, election monitoring, material assistance, and training intended to help institution building in the PA also failed. Although the EU wanted to emphasise the political reforms, it had been realised that these means could not bring a genuine peace in the region. Since political means and peaceful negotiations failed, after the intifada the EU decided to take an active part in crisis management. However, differences among EU member states also hindered the EU’s active role in the crisis. In the MEPP, the EU has always been an advocate of peaceful talks and negotiations, and has been against economic sanctions in the region, since economic aggravation is believed to worsen the crisis. However, the election of HAMAS in the PA constituted a big problem for the EU, which has recognised HAMAS as a terrorist organisation since 2003. Their election in 2006 made it very difficult for the EU to decide on a policy towards the PA. Although the EU warned HAMAS to renounce violence and recognise Israel, it did not apply full sanctions on the PA, still believing that economic stability is an essential ingredient in the peace process. In 2007, the EU resumed its relations with the PA and re-established political dialogue. In its relations with the Palestinian Authority, the EU focuses on establishment of an independent, impartial, and fully functioning rule of law; strengthening legal guarantees for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly and association; ensuring the respect of human rights and fostering a culture of non-violence; financial accountability and sound management of public finances; and increasing people to people contacts, especially through education programmes such as Tempus. On the other hand, Israel has been an active partner in the ENP, and EU-Israel collaboration on trade liberalisation in agricultural products,

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fish and fishery products; collaboration in aviation; and cooperation and dialogue in education and training have all improved relations between the EU and Israel. The EU Delegation in Israel coordinates various programmes such as ‘The EU People to People Programme’, ‘the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’ and regional projects for strengthening the peace process. In the scientific field, the Delegation helps implement the science and technology agreements between Israel and the EU, and promotes cooperation between the Israeli technological and scientific organisations and their European counterparts. The EU has criticised Israel for its lack of progress regarding the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights, in particular because of Israel’s policies in Gaza (i.e., the 18-month blockade of Gaza). The protection of the Israeli Arab minority has been unsatisfactory, and restrictions to freedom of expression and assembly were noted.44 Although the official civil society representatives from Israel and EU member states come together in United Nations organised international seminars on tackling racism and xenophobia, there have been no concrete results achieved. The European Commission has been active in creating a platform to bring together Israel, the Palestine Authority and the EU, with an aim to reinitiate the peace process, in particular in the energy and transport fields. Unfortunately, these attempts have not been successful. Of several policy areas in which the EU has been involved, the utmost importance is given to education, youth and cultural activities which would bring civil society representatives, students, teachers and all related stakeholders together. In 2008, the Middle East crisis deepened as a result of the collapse of a six month long truce between HAMAS and Israel, and Israel’s operation called ‘Cast Lead’, in which 1315 Palestinians were killed, 5500 wounded and 14 Israelis were killed. The EU and Iraq The EU focuses on political relations with Iraq that would enable the restoration of security, democracy, and rule of law. The EU also states on every possible occasion that it is supporting the UN Security

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Council Resolution 1546 and that it supports the UN in Iraq. The main points that are emphasised in EU Conclusions on Iraq are partnership, political dialogue and human rights. Also, the EU has been very much in support of elections in Iraq, which are seen as a big step towards a democratic life in the country.45 Between 2003 and 2004, the EU gave € 300 million for the rehabilitation of services such as water, sanitation, education, health, poverty and reforms for fostering civil society and human rights. Also, another € 30 million was given for the elections.46 The EU continues to support financing of the UN protection force in Iraq, and gives funds for implementation of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. In the February 2009 Council Meeting, the EU has emphasised the importance of democratisation to build a stable, secure, unified and prosperous country. Still, among the countries that are mentioned here, Iraq is the only country where the EU enforces sanctions and restrictions which include: confirmation of the embargo on arms and related material; restrictions on trade in cultural goods; freezing of funds and economic resources; transfer of such funds and economic resources to the Development Fund for Iraq; restrictions concerning payment for petroleum and gas exported by Iraq; immunities; and prohibition to satisfy claims, with regard to contracts and transactions whose performance is affected by the measures taken in accordance with Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions.47 The EU and Iran The EU does not have a Commission Delegation in Tehran. In February 2001, the European Commission adopted a Communication setting out the perspectives and conditions for developing closer relations with Iran. Over the last few years, EU relations with Iran have been developing in a positive direction, and a Comprehensive Dialogue in the form of semi-annual troika meetings at the level of Undersecretary of State/Deputy Minister was established. This dialogue covers regional conflicts, non-proliferation of WMD, human rights and terrorism. Also, the EU decided to explore the possibilities of cooperation in areas such as energy, trade, investment, and refugees and drugs control.48 Iran carries the heavy burden of a refugee population of 2.5 million,

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mostly from Afghanistan, that poses a serious regional problem. Thus the European Commission anticipates total development assistance to Afghanistan of about € 185 million, and humanitarian aid. In drugs control, the European Commission has been working with the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) contributing € 190,000 to a drug control coordination unit, and € 1.7 million to the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) for projects relating to reduction in demand, raising of awareness and legal assistance and since the early 2000s Troika expert meetings on drugs have been organised. Furthermore, the EU is Iran’s main trading partner in imports and exports. 80 percent of EU imports from Iran are oil products, but exports to Iran are diversified, such as power generation plants, large machinery and electrical and mechanical appliances.49 In 2001, the EU decided to develop closer relations with Iran, which eventually would lead to a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). These negotiations were thought to be the first step toward an agreement between the EU and Iran to have closer economic and political ties. The envisaged TCA would have been non-preferential and for an unspecified period of time, aiming: • to establish contractual arrangements for managing trade between the EU and Iran in accordance with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, e.g. most favoured nation treatment, national treatment, non-discrimination and setting the level of tariff protection; • to assist Iran in its efforts to adjust to WTO rules; • to establish closer cooperation in areas such as energy, transport, the environment, drug control, asylum, culture, migration and refugees; • to encourage and support reform, consolidate the rule of law and bring about greater respect for human rights.50 The EU has both political and economic reasons for developing closer ties with Iran. Given Iran’s strategic geographical position and its large reserves of natural gas and oil, it could play a key role in the future of the Gulf region. The Commission considers that a greater

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degree of democratisation and respect for human rights in the country would help bring about greater stability and peace in the area. Thus, in both political and economic cooperation, the EU puts reforms as a precondition. On the political front: • A regular dialogue should be established between Iran and the EU in the matter of human rights. • The EU calls Iran to establish a more conciliatory foreign policy, and stop supporting extremist groups such as Palestinian Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Lebanese Hezbollah. • Finally, Iran’s nuclear programme is a worrying point for the EU.51 The conclusion of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement has been dependent on the Political Dialogue Agreement, which was launched in 2002. Negotiations on TCA came to a halt in 2003 as a result of the continuation of Iran’s uranium enrichment programme in spite of the EU’s efforts to increase economic incentives for its discontinuance. EUIran relations had been more stable in the 1990s under the leadership of Khatami in Iran. The diplomatic relations had started in terms of diplomatic visits between EU and Iranian officials. Especially, working groups that had been established on energy issues had considerable input in the increase of political dialogue. The 1990s had been an era where both EU and Iran showed good intentions. However, after 2003, and especially after the election of Ahmedinejad in 2005, relations between the EU and Iran seriously deteriorated. The political rights violations in the elections in 2005, and the exclusion of reformists from the elections brought a setback in trade agreements. The military support for Ahmedinejad brought more controversy to relations. Moreover, the increase in human rights violations, such as torture, unequal rights for women, use of the death penalty, religious discrimination and lack of an independent judiciary, all hindered the trade talks. Of course, Ahmedinejad’s view that Israel should be wiped off the world map did not help to eradicate the EU’s suspicions about him. Therefore, as a result of political and social issues, the economic relations could not go further between the EU and Iran.

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That said, the EU3’s efforts in negotiations over Iran’s uranium enrichment programme are worth mentioning. As a consequence of the allegations that Iran’s nuclear programme is a threat to international peace and security, the EU3 (Britain, France and Germany) started negotiations with Iran to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. In November 2004, Iran agreed to suspend its nuclear fuel cycle research activities while it negotiated with the EU3 on an acceptable agreement for both parties. However, in 2009 the EU addressed the result of Iranian Presidential elections and concerns regarding the conduct of elections, while the violence on the streets and the use of force against demonstrators has also been criticised. The EU has called upon Iran to engage with the international community and find a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue, since Iran’s nuclear programme remains the biggest concern for the international community and the biggest threat to security both at the regional and international level.52 These efforts show the will of the EU to pursue dialogue and peaceful negotiations in the Middle East. This strongly supports the EU’s role as a peaceful moderator in the region. Moreover, even though there have been several deadlocks in negotiations, the EU continues to cooperate in counter-narcotics and Afghan refugee assistance with Iran, as mentioned earlier. In general, relations between Middle Eastern countries and the EU focus on the fight against terrorism, organised crime, illegal immigration, and so on. However, the protection of human rights, the rule of law and democracy are just as significant. EU Member States present the importance of these issues and of cooperation at the international level at every opportunity. As observed in the OSCE PA, the priorities of European countries are the fight against WMD, drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism through a dialogue between Europe and Mediterranean countries.53 The dialogues with Central Asian and Caucasus countries on human trafficking, arms trafficking, terrorism, ethnic minorities, migration and ecological security are given the same value. Furthermore, migration is perceived as a security concern, due to the political security repercussions of economic migration, which requires better border monitoring, dialogue and cooperation among

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countries.54 International cooperation rather than intervention is proposed to be the tool to overcome the issues rising from human rights, such as the equality of human beings, gender equality, combating poverty, human trafficking, the rule of law, transborder cooperation in the fight against organised crime and terrorism.55 It is a common belief among EU Member States that the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism should be the number one priority.56 It has been observed that the EU parliamentarians have been in favour of political dialogue and negotiations in resolving issues, even though there are serious differences between the opinions of the EU officials and opponents. EU Policy towards the Black Sea and the Caucasus After the enlargement waves in 2004 and 2007, the EU’s borders reached the Black Sea and the Caucasus region. Especially after the membership of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the EU became an actor in the regional politics in the Black Sea. The Black Sea region has become the EU’s near abroad and an integral part of the evolving policies and strategies of the European states. The region is a bridge between Europe, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, and possesses the huge deposits of natural (particularly energy) resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Therefore, the EU gives special importance to energy and infrastructure projects as the most promising fields for constructive cooperation in the region. In this framework, the EU felt the necessity to design a policy towards the region, and the Black Sea Strategy Paper was published in 2008. This paper promoted the concept of regional cooperation and local ownership and brought together all the major political actors, while facilitating good neighbourly relations, cross-border cooperation programmes and sectoral partnerships.57 In 2009, just a year after the publication of the Black Sea Synergy Paper, a new initiative called Eastern Partnership (EaP) was born under the German EU Presidency. Although the Black Sea Synergy Paper had a more inclusive approach towards all the actors in the region, the EaP has a more differentiated and a more limited approach, in which only Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine take part. It was believed that EaP would be more effective

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to establish stronger channels of communication through its bilateral and multilateral measures.58 Furthermore, EaP aims at socialisation and Europeanisation more than the Black Sea Strategy. Both of these initiatives are very new and being constructed day by day; however, in the long term the regional countries believe that the EU can play a role in mediating between the actors in the region via its consensus-driven policy making approach59 and its Europeanisation effect. In this framework, both the EU and the Black Sea states aim to increase the communication between the European Parliament and the regional countries’ parliaments through increasing joint parliamentary activities, such as EuroNest and the Permanent Delegation for Cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC) and the European Parliament. Still, there are deficiencies in the EU’s policies towards the region. There is still no general consensus regarding the strategic importance of the region, but also the Black Sea has never been perceived as a European sea, like the North Sea. Instead, countries like Turkey, Russia and Ukraine embraced the region.60 However, both the Black Sea Synergy Paper and the EaP can be seen as the policy instruments that the EU proposed to solve regional problems requiring region-wide efforts, and to align the partner countries with the EU.61 Other features of the European Security Strategy (ESS) Another important issue in the ESS is the subject of ‘An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism’. Here, Solana has stressed the significance of the rule-based international order. As mentioned before, the EU has been an important guardian of multilateral dialogue. Although there is nothing new in Solana’s declaration, the ESS is the first time that the EU has formally stated its beliefs on foreign affairs, thus showing its international character. The ESS can also be seen as the first time the EU has formalised its soft power understanding, including economic, political and social relations among the countries. Besides this, it has been a crucial document in which the EU reiterated its unwillingness to use ‘hard’ power, and declared that military tools could and should only be used for humanitarian reasons. In 1998 in St Malo, the EU established the European Security and Defence Policy

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(ESDP), which is divided into two parts, the Petersberg Tasks and Conflict Prevention. Also, the Petersberg Tasks are divided into two: military crisis management and civilian crisis management. The goal – to make the ESDP operational in 2003 – was not achieved, but the institutional structure has been incorporated into the EU framework. In crisis management, the EU is still dependent on NATO, since the EU needs to use NATO resources, including military capabilities and operational planning capabilities. The military component of the ESDP was introduced in the Helsinki and Nice European Councils. In Helsinki, EU member states decided on the capability of the deployment of 60,000 troops in 60 days. The Nice Council Political and Security Committee (PSC) keeps track of international developments, and helps to define policies and monitor the implementation of agreed plans. The PSC is assisted by a politico-military working group, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC gives military advice to the PSC and the High Representative while the EUMS, which is part of the Secretariat of the Council, is responsible for early warning, strategic planning and situation assessment.62 Also, in 1999 and in 2001, the EU decided to create the civilian component of the policy and to establish four main instruments: • police cooperation: [the] possibility of providing up to 5000 policemen, including 1000 within 30 days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with a military force to the training of local police. Candidate countries, Iceland and Norway participate in this cooperation by providing police capacities; • strengthening the rule of law: [the] possibility of providing up to 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts in the field; • civilian administration: possibility of providing a team to establish or guarantee elections, taxation, education, water provision, etc.; • civil protection: possibility of assisting humanitarian actors through emergency operations, etc. The EU will have to be capable, within three to seven hours, of providing two to

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three assessment teams consisting of ten experts as well as intervention teams consisting of 2000 people. 63 It is crucial to understand, at this point, that military developments at the EU level are intended for humanitarian actions, and for more cooperation in terms of justice and home affairs, rather than building a European Army as such. EU forces are not the same as NATO forces; nor are they analogous to the forces of the national governments. The EU is a unique international organisation, and its decisions must be common to all the Member States, who have different national interests, and relations with third countries. Furthermore, the EU was not established to counter a threat such as communism or terrorism. Thus, when the EU’s military force is examined, it has to be differentiated from nation states’ military forces or those of a military organisation such as NATO. The attempts of the Union to build a military force reveal its aim to take a role in crisis management and humanitarian assistance, according to the Headline Goals of the Union. This is an important element of the Union culture, too. The Union is not willing to have an army, as such, but wants to be able to stop conflicts so that their consequences will not harm the Union. There is a commitment that the proposed Security Research Programme will not be used for the development of any offensive weaponry. As Ryning states: A European use of force will most likely resemble that of the doctrine of ‘just war’: military coercion will take place only when mandated by international law (jus ad bellum) and the use of force will be severely constrained (jus ad bello).64 The Union is bound by international law and will act according to that law, since, all things considered, it is an international organisation itself. The Union is neither prepared for, nor willing to practice, pre-emptive strikes. The Union feels that soft security measures, meaning economic, political and diplomatic instruments, should be used to prevent conflicts in the world and if these do not work then, as a last resort, the use of force may be supported. Furthermore, the forces are intended to bring an end to conflicts and to help in the democratisation process after the missions.

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The importance given to the internationalisation of security culture can be seen in Recommendation 724 of the WEU Assembly. In the second part of the recommendations under the title of Policy on training for the military, Article 11 states that: In Germany, in certain specific areas with a strong internationalist ethos, some training programmes are already provided internationally. For example, the curriculum offered to army, navy, and air force staff officers by the Bundeswehr Joint Staff College includes a European joint exercise, a part of which is taught in conjunction with the national staff colleges of France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The Netherlands and Portugal to date have supplied instructors. Another association has been set up, comprising other training schools (in Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) offering a curriculum based on existing training programmes. Poland has also shown interest in this area. The training character as a result of instructor and student exchanges also reflects this trend. Within the Bundesakadamie für Sicherheitspolitik (Federal Institute for Advanced Political and Security studies) present and future senior management staff drawn from political and government circles, the armed forces, business and other civilian walks of life concerned with security policy receive training through general seminars. These are also open to a limited number of foreign participants by invitation of the Federal Chancellery. The Institute also hosts other seminars and colloquies like those on the European Security and Defence Policy, which are attended by EU officers.65 This Article is crucial in the sense that it demonstrates the potential in the EU for cooperation, even over a very sensitive issue such as that of armies. As seen, a number of countries are working together, in a sense, in training army officers. This is another example of the EU’s uniqueness. The cooperation in curriculum of the training of army, navy and air force officers is not a common application to be observed in bilateral partnerships. The individual states, such as Turkey and Israel, prefer military exercises rather than unification of training of their officers.

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Since Turkey decided to modernise the military and defence structures, she needed a partner able to provide this kind of service. It was not an option to get the arms and weaponry from the western allies, due to the embargo after 1974. Therefore, she decided to emphasise relations with Israel, as illustrated in detail in Chapter 4. Thus, there have been several agreements and training cooperation between the two countries. These relations included the training of the two armies, via operational cooperation between them. Turkey also allowed the Israelis to use Turkey’s airspace. However, cooperation between these two countries, in spite of their close military relations, did not reach the level of cooperation within the EU. Especially, a politico military decision making authority like the Franco-German Defence and Security Council, is not a level of cooperation that can be observed in the rest of the world. Finally, as regards cooperation among the Member States, the proposed European Security and Defence College, which is intended to ‘reflect the entire spread, civilian and military, of the European Security and Defence Policy’66 is essential. This college must be thought of in a different way than the NATO Defence College. NATO and the EU are very dissimilar; thus, training in the Colleges would have separate aims. The training of the officers in the EU, for the EU, would definitely bring a culture aspect more evident than today’s, focussing more on international cooperation in economic, social and political aspects of the relations. Furthermore, the aims of the two organisations are very much different from each other. Although NATO Article V indicates a collective defence, the Petersberg Tasks focus on humanitarian, evacuation and logistical support operations, and peacekeeping missions’ crisis management. The 9/11 attacks created the illusion of a high level of international cooperation in the fight against organised crime, terrorism, drugs and every global challenge. However, it can be observed that national security concerns prevent a high degree of international cooperation at the global level. National security concerns, relations with third countries, national foreign policy agendas, and so on have affected the EU, as well. However, there is a slow but consistent improvement in cooperation at the EU level, in spite of the differences among Member States. Even though, after the 2003 War in Iraq, fractions, discrepancies

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and different tendencies became apparent, the cooperation in the third pillar ( JHA) slowly continues. This feature of EU security cooperation is reminiscent of another characteristic of the security perception of the EU: that the threats laid down in the Solana Document are not purely military threats. The policy was never military-based and it cannot ever be solely military. The Union has always had a broad set of policy tools and hard power67 that would be used only as a last resort. The example of the Islamic Republic of Iran is important in this sense, too. There are serious allegations against Iran about nuclear weapons. The EU is trying to negotiate non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with Iran on the basis of financial support and trade. In addition, the EU3-Iran talks also indicate the will of the EU; they are the best example of the EU’s determination to solve international crises by international cooperation and dialogue rather than intervention. Support for Common Foreign Policy and Common Defence and Security Policy From Figure 10, it can be seen that discussions on WMD, the War in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan and the EU enlargement have increased the support for a common foreign policy among Member States. 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2008

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Fig. 12 Percentage of EU citizens who are for one common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union towards other countries

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In the year 2007, support for one common EU foreign policy reaches the highest support level, which can be explained by the enlargement waves in 2004 and 2007. However, in subsequent years, the support does not reach that level. It is clear that issues such as the reconstruction of Iraq and the continuing conflicts there; the unilateralist approach of the USA; enlargement of the EU, and the new member states relations with third countries have all affected EU citizens’ views. 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2005

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Fig. 13 Comparison of the percentage of EU citizens and Turkish citizens who are for one common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union towards other countries Overall, Turks do not support a common EU foreign policy to the same extent as EU citizens. The opponents of a common foreign policy in Turkey are relatively stronger than the opponents in the EU and support is less than the support in the EU. There is also a steady decrease in Turkish support that is observed throughout the years, in spite of the European identity effect on the foreign policy making of Turkey. It would be right to argue that the extent of Europeanisation at the state level has not yet filtered down to the Turkish people. Figure 15 shows that over the years, EU citizens’ support for common defence and security policy increased, and the percentages of EU citizens who are for a common defence and security policy (up to 77 percent) are higher than the percentages of EU citizens who are for a common foreign policy (70 percent). It is believed that terrorism, organised crime, the attacks in London and Madrid, and the necessity

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of being in a constant state of vigilance are the reasons behind higher support for a common defence and security policy, and there is a clear tendency to look for security in the EU itself. Hence, it can be argued that the public in the EU is more supportive for the policies that will secure their lives inside the Union territory rather than policies which would have more effect outside the EU. 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2005 2006 2007 2008

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Fig. 14 Percentage of EU citizens who are for a common defence and security policy among the European Union member states Comparison of Figures 12 and 15 demonstrates that the Turkish people support neither a common foreign policy among the EU members nor a common defence and security policy among the EU members. Also it should be mentioned here that the distinction between foreign policy and security and defence policy is hazy in Turkish policy, in spite of the changes that Turkish foreign policy have gone through due to her desire to become an EU member state. In Figure 16, it is clearly seen that the level of support for national decision making on common defence and foreign policy in Turkey is higher than the support for joint decision making in the EU. Turkish citizens are not attached to the idea of having joint decision making in the area of foreign and defence policies. However, the high percentages of support on joint EU decision making once again confirm the international cooperation culture among European citizens.

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90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2005

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Fig. 15 Comparison of the percentage of EU citizens and Turkish citizens who are for a common defence and security policy among the European Union member states 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2005

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Fig. 16 Comparison of the percentage of EU25 and Turkish citizens who think that decisions on foreign and defence policies should be made jointly within the European Union Conclusion The EU has evolved to be a security actor and has created a foreign policy for itself based on multilateralism, dialogue, cooperation and intensification of economic relations. During the 1990s, after the EU’s enlargement towards the Mediterranean, southern Mediterranean countries became important in EU policies. Thus, under the Barcelona

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Process, the EU started to extend its relations to countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Syria, and so on. As the EU’s economic power increased, there has been a need for a structured foreign policy. Meanwhile, the EU became one of the biggest markets in the world, as it continued to enlarge to CEECs and the Black Sea countries. As the EU enlarged, it started to become an actor in different regions (i.e., the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caucasus). Furthermore, the globalisation of security threats, 9/11 events, and the terrorist bombings in London and Madrid forced the EU to design a security strategy and a more effective foreign policy towards its neighbours. That is how the ESS of 2003 and ENP of 2004 came to life. In both of these policies/strategies, the EU showed its international civilian character in foreign and security issues. The EU has been working on its economic, trade and financial relations with the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Caucasus countries in order to establish a ring of friends who are governed by democratically elected governments which respect the rule of law and human rights. The EU strongly believes that economic stability and growth would bring democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights within a country. Therefore, PCA agreements have been based on financial and trade relations between the countries named above and the EU. Respect for human rights and the rule of law are vital for the Union, and the failure of states to comply with these two basic elements of democracy damages relations, e.g., Russia in Chechnya.68 After the 9/11 events, the EU adopted a different approach from the US by focussing more on the root causes of these attacks, in line with its unique international civilian character. The extraordinary European Council meeting of September 21, 2001 called for ‘in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being’ and ‘the integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development’.69 The European Council stated that ‘force should be used only as a last resort’ and emphasised the importance of reinvigorating the MEPP if peace and stability are to be brought to the region.70 In 2003, with regard to the WMDs, the EU developed ‘Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of

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Mass Destruction’. These principles had two stages; one foresaw the strengthening of the multilateral non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes, and the other advocated the use of force as a last resort. This is also evident in the document, known as the Solana document, entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’71 which emphasises strengthening the decision making mechanisms of the UN and providing it with standby forces, in order to create an effective crisis management capacity, and setting up a UN counter agency that coordinates the work of the various UN, regional and national bodies active in the fight against terrorism. The following are listed as the aims of the EU, in the same document: • Contributing to the building of local conflict prevention mechanisms and crisis management capabilities in key regions, such as central Africa, • Reinforcing the verification mechanisms of the non proliferation treaties and export control regimes and establishing a counter proliferation committee under the Security Council • Monitoring compliance with relevant agreements and resolutions collectively defining common criteria adopted to recent security environment for the use of coercive measures, military and other in order to provide a response to states that do not live up to their commitments vis a vis the international community as well as their own population and • Countering threats at an early stage, In this respect, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has done the groundbreaking work, by assessing the circumstances under which the principle of non-intervention must yield to the international communities’ responsibility to protect. The Secretary General has already announced (in September 2003) the establishment of a high level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to formulate recommendations on these issues promoting regional integration in order to consolidate peaceful relations between states and strengthen states’ position on the global order.

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Thus, the EU has always been one of the most important aid donors in the world. The Union is the largest provider of development assistance in the world. The EU has established trade relations with various countries either as trade agreements with regional organisations like ACP, or bilateral agreements with individual states. Moreover, the Union is the largest provider of humanitarian assistance. In addition to all this economic aid, the EU pays 40 percent of the UN’s regular budget and around the same percentage of the peacekeeping operations, and 50 percent of all UN Member States’ contributions to UN funds and programmes. The EU provides 55 percent of the international official development assistance and the share of the European aid has increased to 20 percent.72 Furthermore, the EU has economic relations with the Central Asian countries. Today, besides the trade connection between two parts of the world, humanitarian assistance is important in relations as well. Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)73, is the most crucial support programme in the region; it includes humanitarian assistance and food aid. The TACIS programme also involves Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) and Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA), which were established to connect Europe to Asia as a modern ‘Silk Road’, in a sense.74 These programmes aim to construct highways, terminals and railways to connect the two sides, which would ease oil and gas transport to Europe. Since 1994, PCAs have been signed, aiding the communication between the Central Asian countries and the EU. In sum, this chapter has tried to show the differences between the foreign policy orientations of the EU and Turkish foreign policy orientations. The security perceptions of the two actors are different, in the sense that the EU, since it is an international organisation, is more internationally oriented than Turkey. Although Turkey is a member of international organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO, the Turkish public enjoys the independence that she maintains in structuring her own foreign policy priorities. In this chapter, it has been demonstrated that even after the accession negotiations started, the Turkish public did not change their attitudes in line with the Europeanisation process that has been observed at the state level.

5 ‘OPTIMIST’ VERSUS ‘PESSIMIST’ PERSPECTIVES

Introduction1 This chapter examines Turkey both as a security provider and a security consumer in the context of the previous chapters, in two sections: what I have called the ‘optimistic’ perspective and the ‘pessimistic’ perspective. Before going into details of these perspectives, it has to be clarified that these terms seem to be subjective and rather valueladen terms. Optimistic, meaning disposed to take a favourable view of events or conditions and to expect the most favourable outcome; and pessimistic, meaning a tendency to stress the negative or unfavourable or to take the gloomiest possible view, are not 100 percent objective terms. This work is aware of this subjective aspect, and indeed it aims to highlight this element in the field. Defining Turkey’s role either as a security provider or a security consumer depends on the window through which one looks at the issue. This chapter aims to bring the two aspects of the discussion together. The ‘optimistic’ perspective sees Turkey as an asset to the EU Foreign and Security Policy, and accordingly, sees Turkey as a security provider for the EU. The arguments in this section are based on the report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, which was published in September 2004. This perspective argues that Turkey’s inclusion in the Union will falsify Huntington’s Theory of Clash of Civilisations; that she will be a crucial asset for the Union’s foreign and security policy, thanks to the military capabilities of the country and its geo-strategic position, (i.e., its proximity to oil and natural gas pipelines, etc.); and that Turkey will strengthen the Southern Dimension of the Union.

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In the second section, the ‘pessimistic’ perspective argues that Turkey would be a security consumer for the EU because Turkey’s membership would force the EU to spend more on the military, and focus more on military affairs as a result of the geo-strategic position of the country. In the ‘pessimistic’ perspective, pipelines, the geo-strategic position of the country, the population and size of the country, and the military capabilities of Turkey are examined from a security consumer perspective. Also in this section, the differences in the understanding of security by both actors, with specific reference to the globalisation of security threats, and the classical dilemma of realism vs. liberal institutionalism are examined. After the Second World War, the US and British militaries in particular were suspicious that ‘in the event of a Soviet move into Iran and the Arab world, Turkey would allow the Soviets safe passage.’2 Therefore, it was important for the West to integrate Turkey into the NATO structure. Correspondingly, Turkey’s main desire has been to be a part of the Western Club. And so, in the Cold War years, Turkey presented herself as a security provider to her European/Western ‘friends’. Turkey was the buffer zone between the liberal/free world and Communism. However, after the collapse of the USSR and Communism, it was difficult for Turkey to continue to present itself as a security provider. After the 1989 NATO Summit in Brussels, where it was accepted that there was an ongoing change in the Soviet Union and the East European countries, EU policy makers began to see Turkey as a security consumer rather than a security provider. In the late 1980s and 1990s, East and West Europe started working on a common security agenda to overcome the traditional security dilemma, with an aim to bring an end to the ‘balance of power’ system in the region. As relations developed, the West began to open its doors, such as membership of NATO, to the Eastern European countries. The EU started initiating Association Agreements and, in the late 1990s, the Eastern European countries were on the doorstep of the Western institutions, i.e., NATO and the EU. As a consequence, Turkey lost her role in maintaining the security of Europe in the early 1990s. She was no longer at the border between the liberal/free world and the communist world. Since she

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was the neighbour of the USSR in the Cold War years, her strategic importance kept attention focussed on her, and obviated the need for an independent foreign policy. She always saw herself as a reliable security partner to the West. She had been a member of NATO since 1952 and is a founding member of the Council of Europe (1949) and of the OSCE. Turkey believed, as Fischer argues, that she has always been of strategic importance to Europe’s security due to her geography and history.3 Therefore, the conclusion of the Cold War left her like a fish out of water. As Bağcı argues, ‘Turkey has failed to adopt a broad understanding of security and became stuck to the notion of military security; it has become increasingly difficult to present Turkey as an asset to this civilian power EU.’4 Indeed, Turkey had spent the decade after the Cold War representing herself as a security provider, but it was not until after the EU’s move to deploy a rapid reaction force that Turkey found a valid excuse to present herself as a security provider once again. The ‘Optimistic’ Perspective Clash of Civilisations Theory and Turkey’s EU membership According to Samuel Huntington, the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Although nationstates will remain the most powerful actors, a clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. During the Cold War the world was divided into First, Second and Third Worlds. Huntington has argued that these divisions are no longer relevant. Instead, it is more meaningful to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems, but rather in terms of their culture and civilization. Civilisation identity will be increasingly important in the future; according to the Clash of Civilisations Theory, the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations, i.e., Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization.5 Huntington argues that the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another. As a consequence of globalisation, civilizations, which are

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differentiated from each other by history, culture, language, tradition and, most importantly, religion, become more aware of each other and their differences. Thus, people identify themselves by their civilizations rather than their nations. Therefore, this ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ relationship will increase. The ‘optimistic’ perspective argues that Turkey’s EU membership will undermine this theory by bringing Islamic and Christian civilizations together. This point is raised also in the Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey: Admission of Turkey to the European Union would provide undeniable proof that Europe is not a closed ‘Christian Club’. It would confirm the Union’s nature as an inclusive and tolerant society drawing strength from this diversity and bound together by common values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. In the great cultural debate of the twentyfirst century, all too often fuelled by ignorance and prejudice and misused by criminal phenomena such as international terrorism, a multiethnic, multicultural and multi faith Europe could send a powerful message to the rest of the world that ‘Clash of Civilisations’ is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind. Presenting an alternative model to the exclusive, sectarian and closed society propagated by radical Islamists, Europe could play an inestimable role in the future relations between the ‘west’ and the Islamic World.6 The State Minister of Turkey, Mehmet Aydın, in the European Religious Leaders Summit in Brussels in 2004 stated clearly ‘If there is a possibility of a clash of civilizations, one of the best ways to prevent it, would be Turkey’s participation in the EU.’7 Turkey’s accession to the EU would confirm that the EU is not a Christian Club and not an antiMuslim organisation, since Turkey is a Muslim country. Furthermore, membership would show that two civilizations could live together, joining forces in a political and economic union. Turkey’s membership would make an important step towards bringing the different civilizations of Europe, the Middle East and Asia together. It would

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be a model for other countries in the region, inspiring the Middle East and Asia to develop further. In addition, the optimists argue that this membership will bring an end to the negative attitude of the Middle Eastern and Asian countries towards westerners. Although, in the past, Turkish pro Europeans have always argued that any sign that highlights Turkey’s Islamic identity would harm its European ambitions, now there are signs that the moderate Islamist government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan intends to build up an Islamic policy in parallel with the pursuit of EU membership. After the attacks by fundamental Islamists in New York, London, and Madrid, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül stated that, ‘at a time that people are talking about clash of civilizations, Turkey is a natural bridge between civilizations.’8 Turkish policy makers place more emphasis on Islamic values, to show that Islam is a peaceful religion. It is also believed that Turkey’s membership of the Union will demonstrate that Islam is not a fundamentalist religion but is a peaceful way of living. This membership will not only change the attitudes of Christians towards Muslims, but also the attitudes of Muslims towards Christians, in a positive way.9 This argument found its place in the negotiations on a framework agreement on October 3, 2005. During the ‘crisis’ over the framework agreement, Prime Minister Erdoğan held a press conference where he mentioned the value of Turkey’s membership in stopping the clash of civilizations, especially after the events on 9/11. The Secular Structure of Turkey According to the research of Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (TESEV)10, the Turkish government and civil society guarantee that the country is secular, and the population is also happy with the secular structure in the country. The research by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak on religious and political behaviour in Turkey in 1999 and 2000 shows that the public is not in favour of an Islamic system, in spite of 99 percent of the population being Muslim.11 The research shows that while most of the interviewees identified themselves as religious believers in Islam, 67.2 percent of the same interviewees did not want religion to be a part of the state system, and believed that religion

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should be kept out of the public administration and political sphere. Only 16.4 percent of the interviewees were in favour of a state system based on religion. The percentage of the interviewees against political parties using religious symbols was as high as 60.6 percent. A secular republic is supported by 77.3 percent. Also, the research demonstrated the support for democratic reforms among the public, and that people do not want Islamic rules to apply in daily life, or in the courts. Only 1.4 percent of the interviewees were in favour of punishment according to the Koran. Moreover, this research shows that the people identify themselves as Turks rather than as Muslims. The percentage of people who identify themselves as Muslim is 35.7 percent and as Turk is 53.9 percent. 12 This is also confirmed by Wetenschappelijke Raad Voor Het Rgerinsbeleid (WRR)13 in 2004, in its report ‘The European Union, Turkey and Islam’. Here it is stated that the ‘great majority of the population wants nothing to do with fundamentalism and religious intolerance and express a preference for moderate political parties.’14 The report confirms that the Turkish state is constitutionally protected against religious influences. In this respect, the country has the same rigorous separation between state and religion, as does France. Indeed, France’s so-called laicism provided the model for the constitution of the Republic of Turkey. However, unlike the French state, the Turkish state still exercises a strong control over religion.15 The WRR believes that the fact that Turkey is a country with a majority Muslim population is no hindrance to its EU accession.16 In addition, in the report it is pointed out that the protection of the state from religious influence is so strict that the European Parliament has urged the Turkish government to adopt a more relaxed attitude towards Islam and religion in general, in order to reduce intolerance and violent religious extremism. Secularism was seen as the way towards modernisation in the early years of the Turkish Republic, so the official modernisation project maintained a distance from Islamism by harsh authoritarian measures, oppression and the elimination of rivals through dictatorial means.17 The institutionalisation of secularism not only excludes Islamic symbols from public life, but also controls Islam in the public sphere. One of the most crucial examples of this control was changing the call to prayers

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from Arabic to Turkish, in the 1930s. Another crucial step taken by the founders of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk and his colleagues, has been the secularisation in clothing of men and women. Women’s clothing had been a very important means for the state to show the western face of the country to the world. In particular, pictures of Turkish women wearing bathing suits were put on billboards, and the bathing suit has been the symbol of the abolition of the authority of Islam over the female body and replacing it by the authority of secularism.18 Also, a direct link between political rights and wearing the veil has been established. In the early years of the Turkish Republic, it was made clear that political rights were available to women and could be exercised only if the mark of Islam, the veil, was removed. All these symbols have continued to have significance in the public sphere in Turkey up until the present. In addition to women’s clothing, men’s clothing has also been controlled by the state. The Hat Law (1925) required men to wear a suit, a tie and a hat in the public sphere if they wanted to exercise their political rights. So it can be seen that by controlling the dress code in the country, Islam was kept within limits and secularism was emphasised in every aspect of life. That is why the headscarf issue has been seen as a threat to the secular structure of the Turkish Republic in recent years, and precautions have been taken against the veiling of university students in the country. Since veiling is perceived as a rebellion against the secular republic, it is not allowed in places related to the state. Women can use the headscarf in their private lives, but not in the parliament, work place (unless it is a private company), universities, high schools, hospitals and so on. The wives of ministers or MPs who use headscarves cannot accompany their husbands to receptions in the Presidency, either. The former President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, invited only MPs or ministers themselves, but not their wives, if they are wearing headscarves, when he organised receptions for the national holidays, i.e., October 29, April 23, May 19 or August 30. Furthermore, wives with headscarves could not attend ceremonies or receptions organised by the Turkish Armed Forces. Only women who are not wearing headscarves attended these ceremonies. As the President changed in 2007, under the Abdullah Gül’s presidency,

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it is now more common to see headscarve represented in the official receptions and ceremonies. Although the current government party is formed from the members of the old Islamist parties, i.e., Welfare and National Salvation Party, it has been the most efficiently working government in terms of the road to EU membership. Although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a former protégé of Necmettin Erbakan19, he emphasised his political transformation before and after the elections several times. Now, he is pro-European and pro-American, working hard to meet IMF and EU requirements. At every opportunity, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made clear that his party is a secular party and he is against the use of religion in politics. In 2009, secularism still enjoys an unchallenged status in the public sphere20, although the Prime Minister himself comes from an Islamist background. As Jack Straw stated after the start of the accession negotiations’ ceremony on October 3-4, 2005, Turkey is a Muslim, secular and a European country.21 Turkey has made the biggest progress towards meeting the Copenhagen Criteria under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with various reform packages passed by parliament. After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the first step taken was amending Turkey’s Constitution under the Bülent Ecevit government, and the widespread changes were not restricted to political issues. Such changes included the shortening of pre-trial detention periods, abolition of the death penalty, expansion of the freedom of association and the strengthening of civil authority in the National Security Council. These amendments have been followed by harmonisation packages, which introduced further reforms in the fields of human rights, such as protection of minorities and freedoms of expression and association, especially after the Justice and Development Party22 ( JDP) came to power. The most important reform has been the changes in the restrictions on broadcasting in Kurdish. 2003 saw the introduction of two democratisation packages on Political Parties, the fight against torture, freedom of the press, procedures for setting up associations, and the property rights of non-Muslims.23 Other reforms, related to non-Muslim communities, include addressing the specific conditions pertaining to the legal problems regarding real estate held

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by community foundations, the recognition of non-Muslim groups which were not listed in the Treaty of Lausanne, and allowing places of worship to be built by all religions and faiths in the country. Another reform package, which entered into force in July 2003, lifted Article 8 of the anti-terror law, thus expanding the freedom of speech and broadcasting in Kurdish. Reforms undertaken on the Kurdish issue include laws dealing with the teaching of foreign languages; the opening of Kurdish language courses is now allowed; laws to permit parents to name their children in Kurdish; a partial amnesty and reduction in sentences for persons involved in the activities of an illegal organisation; and implementation of the project to return those displaced during the conflict to their villages has continued. Other reforms to expand the freedom of expression include prohibition of the closure of printing houses, and that the procedure for dissolution of political parties has been made more difficult. The official definition of propaganda in connection with terrorist organisations – in a way that encourages the use of the term ‘terrorist methods’– was amended by replacing ‘terrorist methods’ with ‘resorting to violence or other terrorist means’. Changes have also been made in the Press Law to extend the freedom of expression. Similarly, there have been changes in the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, such as reducing the age limit for organising demonstrations, and allowing civil society organisations to organise meetings and demonstrations that fall outside their scope. Restrictions were placed on governors’ abilities to postpone meetings, restrictions on membership to associations were eased, restrictions on making announcements were relaxed, foreign languages were allowed to be used in their international contacts and unofficial correspondences, and so on. In May 2004, there were Constitutional amendments introduced to harmonise the Constitution with the previous democratisation packages. The democratisation package in 2004 repealed the provision that had allowed the Secretariat General of the National Security Council to nominate members of the High Audio Visual Board. There have been other reforms to decrease the role of the military in the political sphere, such as: the advisory nature of the National Security Council has been enshrined; the representative of the National

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Security Council has been removed from the Board of Cinema, Video and Music, a civilian is now appointed to the post of Secretary General of the National Security Council, and the military representative in the Higher Education Board has been removed. After the amendments to the Constitution, tougher penalties are prescribed for perpetrators of torture, and more serious punishments are envisaged for corruption, particularly that involving government and business. For the first time, genocide, crimes against humanity and the trafficking of people and human organs are mentioned in the Turkish Penal Code. Discrimination on religious, ethnic or sexual orientation is now a crime in Turkey, as a result of the reforms of the JDP government. The new legislation stipulates a life sentence for those indulging in ‘honour’ killings of those accused of dishonouring the family through illicit affairs. Provocation will no longer be a defence in ‘honour’ killings. The societal code of ‘honour’ had once been part of the Turkish legal code. Henceforth, these are to be treated legally as attacks on individuals.24 Population and military power ‘Optimists’ claim that population and military power are positive features, since they demonstrate Turkey’s ability to provide necessary manpower for Europe in case of an emergency. In particular, NATO assets, crucial for the EU to act in a conflict situation, plus military power are seen as valuable in the fight against terrorism, organised crime, trade in human beings and illegal migration. During the Cold War, when the geopolitical system was centred on two alternative models of politicaleconomic organisation, military-focussed conceptions and practices of security characterised the era.25 In the Korean War, Turkey acted as a security provider both in manpower and in representing an international force against communism. Especially after Turkey’s admission to NATO, it was clear that the country was seen as a security provider, since she had the military capabilities in a geo-strategic location. After the Cold War, this conception of security continued to be followed in Turkey, and showed itself in investment in high-tech weaponry imported from the USA and Israel, as we saw in Chapter 3. In the Gulf War years, Turkey served as a core ally in that strategically

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important part of the world, again as a security provider. However, after the Gulf War, Europe put more emphasis on non-military tools of security policy-making, such as second track diplomacy, international mediation, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in Europe.26 This made it harder for Turkey to represent itself as a security provider to Europe. There was no demand in Europe for the kind of security that Turkey was able to offer. However, the ‘optimistic’ perspective argues that the EU’s move to set up a military power gave Turkey a chance to offer the security that the EU is asking for, and that Turkey is again able to act as a security provider in terms of military and hard security options. ‘Optimists’ claim that yesterday’s answers are the right answers for European security today. Since the EU has now focussed more on the military aspect of security threats, as seen by the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), it is believed that Turkey’s contribution to EU military crisis management efforts could be significant, and that the military force that Turkey possesses would be a crucial asset for the EU. As Bilgin argues, ‘a European Union which is interested in developing its own military crisis management capability would need Turkey because Turkey has become a large, effective and modern military power both in its own region and in NATO.’27 Turkey had always been proud of its role as security provider for the western powers, and has stressed the geo-strategic position of the country in a region that is the epicentre of tension, unresolved conflicts and wars. There are three important assets for Turkey, according to the optimist argument: membership of NATO, military power, and geo-strategic position. Turkey has a considerable military capacity28 and is an important ally for operations in European security regions such as Southeast Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Müftüler-Baç has argued that ‘the reason behind the European Council decision to elevate Turkey’s status to that of candidate country is [the] EU’s evolving security role’29, and according to her there are three assets that make Turkey an indispensable actor in the European security system: membership in NATO, military capabilities and geo-strategic position. Hakkı also supports Müftüler-Baç, by arguing:

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Turkey, which was a forward post of NATO against [the] Soviet Union during the Cold War, has become a protective belt for the West against the lawless states of the Middle East.30 Similarly, Eralp argues that Turkey fulfils an indispensable role for the EU in linking the EU to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia in terms of trade, transportation and energy. Therefore, the EU decided on Turkey’s candidacy in Helsinki in 1999.31 Also, it is argued that the EU’s launching of the RRF at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, to back up the ESDP with crisis management, humanitarian rescue missions, and peacekeeping, has affected the EU’s decision to elevate Turkey’s status to that of candidate country Müftüler-Baç also argues that the population, the closeness of the country to natural resources, and the size and location of the country are crucial reasons for the EU to decide on granting candidacy status to Turkey in 1999. The location of the country, size, population, topography and terrain, climate and natural resources are recognised as crucial variables in foreign policy decision making.32 Turkey’s important assets in this sense have been accepted as population, geography and military force.33 Last but not least, Bağcı and Yıldız argue that the EU needs Turkey, as a country experienced in unconventional guerrilla warfare, in order to have peace in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. Therefore, they believe that the EU has been underestimating Turkey’s value as a strategic asset.34 The main focal point, in order to assess Turkey’s value as a strategic asset, is the fact that she is surrounded by five different but related power axes: Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Caucasus. Therefore it is argued that Turkey, with its pivotal position at the heart of the Eurasian region and as a western pillar of the wider Middle East, can be of indisputable benefit to European action in this area. For the emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Turkey’s considerable military capabilities and the country’s potential as a forward base would be important and much needed assets.35

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The Neighbourhood Dimension The last enlargement waves, in 2004 and 2007, brought Central and Eastern Europe, the Black Sea and also two vital Mediterranean countries into the EU. The inclusion of new member states strengthened the Eastern, Black Sea and Southern Dimension. The Union is already committed to the Mediterranean region through the Barcelona Process.36 However, the membership of Cyprus and Malta pushes this process further. The ultimate goal is a stable and prosperous Mediterranean region, with its southern and eastern flanks fulfilling their true potential.37 Turkish membership would add value to this Southern Dimension to be a more powerful actor in the wider context. The report of the Independent Commission on Turkey states that ‘Turkey with its pivotal position at the heart of [the] Eurasian region and as a western pillar of the wider Middle East can be of indisputable benefit to European action in this area.’38 The EU concentrates on its Mediterranean policies and it seeks to create a ‘ring of friends’ around itself. The EU’s ambition is to help promote solutions to poverty in the region, stimulate tolerance, enhance security, address migration issues and, above all, to promote democracy, to have a peaceful neighbourhood.39 It is believed that it has to engage with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and offer full cooperation. The ‘optimistic’ perspective argues that Turkey is important in bringing a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because she is the most suitable actor in the region to play a mediator role, since she has good relations with both of the actors, as a result of trade relations with Israel and religious ties with Palestine. It is certainly believed that Turkey’s closer relations with the EU would increase the Union’s centre of gravity in the Black Sea region, as well. Although Turkey’s relations with Armenia are problematic, since 2007, improvements in the relations have been observed. Some of the main steps taken to further relations with Armenia include Turkey’s implementation of some confidence-building measures, such as facilitation of transit transportation to and from Armenia, and direct flight connections between Yerevan and various destinations in Turkey. Besides this, an initiative on the establishment of a commission comprised of Turkish and Armenian historians, as well as other experts aiming to study the 1915

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events, was welcomed by the Europeans and perceived as a constructive step to move forward on the track of normalisation of relations. These steps were perceived as Turkish efforts toward establishing friendly and non-problematic relations with the neighbouring countries, in line with Turkey’s EU membership desire. In this framework, Turkey’s efforts in the establishment of the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform, after the War in Georgia in August 2008 (a.k.a. the five-day war), have been seen as an effect of her desire for EU membership as well. Therefore, it is believed that Turkey’s efforts to have close relations with the EU show that she is ready to play a more constructive role in the region, which in return may be beneficial for the EU, as well. Oil Pipelines and Energy Resources Turkey is at the crossroads between Europe and several volatile, strategically and economically important regions rich in natural resources. Thus, Turkey’s energy policy can supply Turkey, and other western countries, with energy while fostering important international relations among allies and neighbours. Turkey is located right in the middle of the biggest oil and natural gas deposits in the world, namely the Caspian and Gulf Regions. Although the Caspian region oil and gas reserves are not as big as those of the Persian Gulf region, they are significant enough to motivate countries such as Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, and international oil companies to embark on development projects. In 1998, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to build an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea, Baku via Tbilisi to Ceyhan (BTC pipeline). The BTC pipeline will carry one million barrels of oil per day. Construction of the BTC Pipeline began in September 2002 and was finished in May 2005. Turkmenistan hopes to transport 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year through the Trans Caspian Pipeline, with 16 bcm per year going to the Turkish market and 14 bcm per year going through Turkey to Europe.40 Furthermore, the agreement signed between Turkish and Iranian authorities to purchase $23 billion worth of gas over the next two decades, makes Iran Turkey’s second largest gas supplier after Russia.41

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Russia has traditionally been Turkey’s largest gas supplier. The 842 km Russia-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline transports gas from Russia through Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria into Turkey. To increase the quantity of natural gas, the $3.3 billion Blue Stream Pipeline was built jointly by Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), each having a 50 percent share. The Blue Stream Pipeline partly runs under the Black Sea and will finally deliver 565 bcf of natural gas annually, from 2009 onwards. Russia also delivers oil to Turkey, which is transported via the same pipeline.42 Western Europe’s energy consumption increased by 8.5 quadrillion Btu between 1992 and 2001.43 The increase was led by natural gas, 4.9 quadrillion Btu; petroleum, 2.0 quadrillion Btu; and nuclear electric power, 1.3 quadrillion Btu, which together more than offset a 1.3 quadrillion Btu decrease in coal consumption. In 2030, Europe will have to import 95 percent of its oil and gas if production methods and consumption habits remain the same as today.44 Turkey’s energy policy therefore overlaps with the EU’s energy security policy and opens a further area for cooperation between Turkey and the EU. Thus, Turkey is indispensable to the EU, not only in terms of military and security issues but also ‘energy-wise’, or so the ‘optimistic’ perspective argues. Another pipeline that is being constructed is the Greek-Turkish Pipeline, which will broaden supplies, but more importantly, bring Caspian oil and gas to the West without going through Russia. This pipeline is significant for the EU, since it helps to diversify the EU’s gas supplies and access to natural resources.45 This pipeline is expected to carry 405 billion cubic feet of gas a year, when it is completed. It is 280 km in total and will connect Komotini in Greece and Karacabey in Turkey. Furthermore, the EU welcomes Italy’s involvement in the agreements to extend this pipeline to Italy across the Adriatic. It is believed that this pipeline may be the future main link in the Southern European Gas Ring Project, since it is the first major step in the creation of a system of pipelines carrying natural gas from the Caspian region, the Caucasus and the Middle East to Europe. The agreement on this pipeline also emphasises the economic cooperation between two so-called enemy nations who can focus on what unites them.46

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In addition to these pipelines, the agreement on the NABUCCO Pipeline is to supply natural gas from the Caspian region, Middle East, and Egypt  via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria and further on to the Central and Western European countries. The first contract to supply gas from Azerbaijan to Bulgaria was signed in 2008, and in January 2009, financial support from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was secured. On 13 July 2009, the Prime Ministers of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey, and Austria signed the agreement in Ankara. The NABUCCO pipeline will be 3,300 km long, and 2,000 km of this pipeline will go through Turkey. It is expected that the deliveries will be around 13 billion cubic meters per year. The ‘Pessimistic’ Perspective The ‘pessimistic’ Perspective emphasises the differences in the understanding of security and military power. Furthermore, the military capabilities of Turkey, the population and the size of the country, the geo-political/strategic position of Turkey, and the pipelines (natural gas and oil) are taken as the main points to prove that Turkey would be a security consumer which would force the EU to invest more on defence, border control and weapons. Moreover, this perspective argues that Turkey’s membership would put pressure on the EU to become more of a military power, rather than remaining a civilian power. Differences in the perception of Security The Hobbesian concept of security is the ultimate determinant of national security and success in Turkey, as is understood from the previous chapters. As is explained in Chapter 2 under the traditional approach heading, Turkey does not trust its neighbours, and that is why it feels the necessity to have a large efficient military force. Even before the Ottoman Empire, the Turks had a war culture as a result of the immigration from Central Asia to Anatolia (starting on August 26, 1071). Although her European counterparts moved on, to the understanding of human security, Turkey chose to focus on state security, due to her geo-strategic position (See Chapter 4). From the security approaches that are examined, Turkey falls under the category

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of traditional approach, where especially ‘would-be states’ within a state are considered as the main threat (such as the Basques, Kurds, Chechens, Quebecois and so on.) The ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ distinctions of Kagan can best explain the difference between European and Turkish security conceptions. Europeans are preoccupied by threats such as ethnic conflict, migration and environmental degradation.47 The most powerful tools for the EU are trade and development policies towards neighbour countries to create a ring of well-governed states. The ESS argues, ‘European security and prosperity depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based international order should be our objective.’48 As ESS suggests, the EU, in contrast to Turkey, is a believer in liberal institutionalism rather than a traditional approach. As mentioned in Chapter 1, globalisation has changed the security environment in which the state operates. All things considered, the state is portrayed as having a diminished capacity to provide security: the globalisation of security presents yet another policy challenge to the already over-burdened state. In the 21st Century there is a high level of interdependence among states, as Kofi Annan stated in the UN’s 60th Anniversary Summit: Whether our task is fighting poverty, stemming the spread of disease or saving innocent lives from mass murder, we have seen that we cannot succeed without the leadership of the strong and the engagement of all.49 After the end of the Cold War, the threat from the East had ended; but now, it seems, the threat is everywhere. Therefore, cooperation among states has become more vital than ever for their own survival. All states, big or small, benefit from alliance. Besides the military threats to states, globalisation has brought new security challenges as well, such as ‘resource, environment and demography.’50 As Kaldor states, ‘binary oppositions that shaped our interpretation of violence, between private and public, or between external and internal, can only be applied with difficulty to the contemporary context.’51

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Thus, globalisation in security means the detachment of security from territoriality; the enmeshment of security in global networks; the creation by globalisation of a new security agenda; and the diminished capacity of the state to provide security for its citizens. In 2009, preemptive action is a possibility, as discussed in Chapter 2, and was not a possibility ten years ago; states are more dependent on each other more than they were even then. The EU is an example of a political actor that accepts these changes and requires more of an international mode of dealing with threats. On the other hand, Turkey, as pointed out in Chapter 3, is still emphasising the fact that, if necessary, she is ready to fight alone against ‘her’ terrorists. It is a common understanding in the EU that it is capable of being a political and economic leader in the world, but not a military power (as shown below). After all, most of the threats facing the EU Member States in the post-cold war environment have not led to a military response.52 Although the Union tried to develop a military aspect for itself, as observed in the Iraq war, the UK, Spain, Portugal and Denmark decided to pursue their own policies and took part in the war alongside the USA. Differences between North and South, East and West, the UK and others, conservative and centre-left, new and old, and big and small countries prevented the EU from uniting against, or for, the policies of the USA in the Iraq war. Capabilities of the EU53  

 

LEADERSHIP TYPE

 

TYPE

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

MILITARY

CAPABILITY

POSITIVE

POSITIVE &NEGATIVE

NEGATIVE

It is believed that the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, democracy, multiculturalism, secularism, peace and justice, and economic growth requires political and economic leadership – both positive capabilities of the EU. However, military power requires solid policies, a well-trained army and, most of all, a singular decisiveness. Moreover, effective military power is limited without a sharing of intelligence, and the Union’s ability to gather and consolidate military

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intelligence is not highly developed. The Western European Union’s Satellite Centre in Spain became the EU Satellite Centre in 2002.54 However, it does not have its own satellites. Thus, EU intelligence relies on national intelligence gathering. For EU intelligence to be effective, an officer should be able to reach all the intelligence that is gathered by all the member states. Today, an officer may obtain information from another Member State only subject to certain conditions.55 Intelligence cooperation is a top priority, but the institutional structure causes conflicts. Emphasising national sovereignty over shared intelligence has held European intelligence back. Although there are on-going projects such as Galileo, the development of these policies depends on the relationship between European operations and NATO.56 The EU has neither the bases nor the headquarters needed to gather the information together and decide on military policy. Another obstacle has been the Member States’ fear of jeopardising their privileged relations with other countries, such as the USA. Privileged relationships among Member States and third countries have produced new institutions and more bureaucracy. Most of the NATO members have bilateral agreements with the USA in the sharing of intelligence. The fear is that intelligence sharing between EU members would jeopardise special relations with the USA. Therefore, EU members are hesitant to share information with each other.57 Although, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the greater the number of allies, the smaller the amount of available territory for terrorist training facilities, the latest terrorist attacks on European countries persuaded EU members to become more introverted, as evidenced by the French suspension of the Schengen agreement. Accordingly, it is believed that terrorist activities such as the London bombings ( July 7, 2005) may actually have a negative effect on intelligence sharing among EU countries. The EU lacks the prerequisites for a solid military policy. There is no one decision making body, and the ESDP has an intergovernmental structure where members have agreed to cooperate, but decision making is intergovernmental, and by consensus. Furthermore, there is no single European army58 and, more importantly, there is no will to have a military force analogous to national military forces. Although

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the ‘optimistic’ perspective suggests that the military capabilities of Turkey are an important asset for the EU, it should be remembered that the ESS does not emphasise military capability, but sees the EU’s main global role as ‘contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures.’59 As the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has stated, ‘the first and foremost line of defence in the fight against terrorism is provided by the competent authorities of the Member States themselves. The EU does not seek to intervene in areas where Member States can take the most effective action themselves. The European Union is adding value to these operations of the Member States.’60 Although the Union experiences a number of difficulties, it has been able to deploy a small reaction force aimed at peacekeeping operations distinct from national military forces. The EU RRF has been engaged in three missions since January 2003: in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in the FYROM and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). On the whole, over 2000 police and military personnel have been involved in these operations. Military operations are test cases for the Union’s ability to apply some of the security policy instruments envisaged under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal.61 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) After Tito’s death in 1980, there was resentment against centralised government62, and the first clashes occurred in 1981 between the Serb administration and Kosovo Albanians. After the 1990 elections within Yugoslavia, BiH held a referendum on independence, which the Bosnian Serbs boycotted. At the end of the referendum, BiH’s independence was declared. Serb paramilitary forces started bombing and shooting, and the siege of BiH began. During this time, European countries were concerned about these conflicts, but could not provide security for the region because of a lack of capacity and resources. Therefore, the USA was once again called upon to secure peace in Europe. The USA responded to the call for help from European countries, especially from the UK and France, by sending 25,000 troops to the region. The other European countries contributed to this force by sending troops. After the USA solved the

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crisis in the region and everything was more or less settled, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) took over. The EUPM in BiH is the EU’s first civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP. A total of 531 police officers – about 80 percent from EU member states and 20 percent from third States – performed monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities.63 The mandate of the mission expired at the end of 2005. The annual budget of the mission was € 38 million, and 20 million of this was from the EU budget. Four hundred support staff backs up the police officers and there are three departments in the headquarters: Operations, Planning and Development, and Administration and Support Services. The EUPM does not have an executive mandate and does not perform any operational duties, such as investigations. The work is conducted by police experts of the EUPM, co-located with police officials at middle and senior management levels throughout the country.64 The EU’s mission covers reconstruction of infrastructure, return of refugees and displaced persons, democratisation and reform (civil society, independent media, education, health, etc.), support to the new state institutions, economic regeneration (promoting business, agriculture, industrial development, credits, etc.), and mine clearance and humanitarian assistance.65 The results are tangible in this mission, since the EU is now considering BiH for candidate status. However, this mission does not show the military capabilities of the EU in BiH. As we have seen, the EU is responsible for political and economic development in BiH. The EU has already proven its capabilities in economic development, and is pushing for democratic reforms in the third countries. Therefore, this has not been a new area for the EU to function in, since the EU could not show its achievements in ESDP. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) In 1991, because of a lack of consensus on the best way to stop the civil war in Yugoslavia, the EU could not act on the issue at all. When crisis emerged in the region, although EU Member States tried to develop a common policy, some of the member states pursued their individual policies. International organisations such as NATO, the UN and also the EU wanted to preserve the integrity of the country at the beginning

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of the unrest. Therefore, the USA and the EU wanted to encourage compromise between the parties by offering aid and declaring that they would only recognise a peaceful agreement as to the future of Yugoslavia.66 However, on this specific occasion some member states, including Germany, pursued their own policies by recognising Croatia and Slovenia. This forced the EU to recognise these countries in 1992. This brought an end to the hopes for a peaceful solution to the issue. Since the Union could not react, attention turned to NATO and the USA. In 2001, NATO undertook the task of disarmament in FYROM. The EU participated in this process as an observer, with OSCE. On March 31, 2003 the EU launched the Concordia mission in FYROM. This was the first military operation of the EU. The EU took over the mission from NATO, contributing further to a stable, secure environment, and ensuring the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. The budget of the mission was € 6.2 million and 13 of the member states and 14 non-member states were involved in the mission. There were in total 350 lightly armed personnel in FYROM. This mission became an important test case for EU-NATO partnership for crisis management, because this was the first time that the EU used NATO assets according to the Berlin Plus Agreement.67 Today, the EU supports FYROM in its economic reform efforts. In December 2003 the mission came to an end, and the EU’s police mission, Proxima, took over in place of the military mission for 12 months. The FYROM Mission proved that the EU could act with NATO. However, it should be remembered that the mission did not test the military capabilities of the EU, since it did not push it to the limit. Moreover, the mission was taken over from NATO after the armed conflict was over. Thus, the EU did not engage in an armed conflict on this occasion. As in BiH, the mission did not reveal the military capabilities of the Union. Instead, it was essentially a peacekeeping/peace building exercise. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) With the aim of preventing a large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in Ituri, a region in the North East of the DRC, the EU responded to an appeal by the United Nations Secretary General and launched a military

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operation on June 12, 2003. In accordance with the mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (May 30, 2003), the Artemis mission sought to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the Ituri capital. The multinational force was mandated to protect camps of internally displaced persons, and to secure Bunia airport, as well as to ensure the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the wider humanitarian presence. The force comprised 1,800 soldiers, mostly French. The operation was planned to end on September 1, 2003, at which point a strengthened UN mission (MONUC) took over. After the deployment of an interim EU force, violence increased in the region, where the EU forces remained very limited in scope and depended heavily on the leadership, commitment and interest of major EU Member States.68 The combined spending on the armed forces of the EU25 totals over € 1.8 million. From these forces, the Headline Goal agreed to enable the deployment of 60,000 troops within 60 days, sustainable for a year. Given the need to rotate forces, the Headline Goal requires a pool of 180,000, allowing for forces on stand-by and standing down, each equal to the force deployed. After contributions from the ten new Member States, and the six non-EU European members of NATO, a number of substantial qualitative shortfalls were identified in the fields of secure and deployable command, control and communications, intelligence and strategic transport.69 Furthermore, since a substantial number of forces are still geared to ‘traditional’ territorial defence, they are less usable70 for deployment abroad. Finally, it should not be forgotten that deployments impose a severe budgetary impact that is often difficult to sustain for Member States with limited defence budgets and a high percentage of personnel costs. If the EU needs to undertake significant combat operations, implementation will be less quick and less ‘clean’ than comparable US operations. The ESS has yet to be translated into more detailed military ambitions, in order to define how many operations the EU would be able to implement at any one time.71 In the meantime, the ESS has not given any detailed information on the future operations of the Union. When the ESS is compared with the national security strategies of the individual countries, it is vague. It

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places emphasis on international cooperation and UN intervention rather than any other political actor. Another reason for EU slowness is the institutional structure of European foreign policy making. There are various institutions in the decision making process of the ESDP. The High Representative, European Council, Commission, Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), Political and Security Committee, Directorate General (DG) for External Relations, DG for External and Politico-Military Affairs, and a number of other institutions all have significance in decision making. Some have more power than others, but in the end all these institutions need to work together to form a foreign policy. In this diverse range of institutions, officers come from different backgrounds with different traditions. In EU decision making, these differences need to meet at a common point to build a policy on relations with third countries. The Union is prevented from acting in unison on a given area in external relations, e.g., in the Middle East, by the intergovernmental structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the special relations of the Member States with third countries. European countries are directly and indirectly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of their geographical proximity to the region, their dependence on Middle Eastern oil and their fears of an insecurity spill over, but also because of the special relationships that many Member States have with the region as a consequence of their pasts as colonial powers.72 Hubel suggests three levels in understanding EU policies towards third countries: • The domestic policies of Member States • The decision making process between EU member states and among EU institutions • The interactions and negotiation processes between the EU and its partners.73 Besides the difficulties in the decision making process as a result of the complicated structure, as such, Member States have thus far displayed no desire whatsoever to set out binding foreign policy

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convergence criteria that might limit their freedom of action.74 One of the best examples is EU policy toward the Middle East, in revealing political divisions among the three big member states. France, for instance, had been a crucial player in the EU’s relations with the Middle East. The declarations of the Union bore the mark of French influence. Not only the French connection to the Middle East, but also the French desire for the EU to have a policy independent from the USA, had been crucial in EU policies toward the Middle East. In the case of Germany, Israel has an important role to play. German governments have always been careful about criticism of Israel’s policies. Thus, French initiatives to have a pro-Arab EU policy have not always been in the best interests of Germany. That is why Germany has launched peace initiatives independently. Finally, the UK’s policy towards the Middle East is more pro-American than those of the other two countries, as a result of the high priority given in London to transatlantic relations. To sum up, these Member States, for very different reasons, have encouraged the development of a common European Middle East policy: France, in an effort to strengthen the EU’s international role vis-à-vis the USA; Germany, in order to develop its relations with the Arab states without harming its relations with Israel; and the UK, for historical reasons but also as a way of taking on the role of mediator between the EU and the USA, in order to ease transatlantic tensions.75 However, as a result of the differences in the priorities of these countries it has been almost impossible for the EU to come up with a solid policy that would help the solution of the crisis in the Middle East. Furthermore, the lack of the ‘other’ in European conceptions of military force and security is crucial. For a long time, Europe’s ‘other’ has been temporal rather than geographical.76 Today, Europe’s ‘other’ is neither Islam nor any specific country or ‘civilization’; rather, Europe’s ‘other’ is Europe’s own past, which should not be allowed to become its future.77 European consciousness is concerned with averting any form of racism, nationalism, or any repetition of the horrors of the Second World War, and the Holocaust in particular. In this context, social groups have been, and will be, essentially problematical – because they encompass individuals, because people’s identities are partly constituted by their groups’ affinities. Social groups

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reflect the ways that people identify themselves and others, which lead them to associate with some people more than others, and to treat those others as different.78 In that sense, preserving differences among nations in Europe is significant. Especially today, since cultures and societies are becoming very much linked, social groups seek to promote their uniqueness. However, the enemy of Europe today is the possibility of these differences turning into racism. If this promotion of difference turns into hostilities, or racist actions, then Europe’s own past would become its future. Although we cannot ignore differences among nations, cultures and groups, the major focus should be the main motivation behind the formation of the EU, which was to live in prosperity and peace in a region that has suffered from racism and hostilities for a very long time. The EU started as a formation where opposites met, i.e. France and Germany. If rising hostility is not prevented, neither prosperity nor peace can survive in Europe. Respect towards each other, and a certain level of understanding among the cultures is sine qua non in the EU. Clashes between social groups, nations, cultures, and religions would mean the end of the EU. Thus, the real ‘other’, the true ‘enemy’ of the EU, is the reconstruction of hostilities among various groups. For nation-states such as the USA, Turkey, France, and Israel, there have always been ‘others’, as enemies. Today, although the construction of Islam as Europe’s ‘other’ is back in the headlines, Islam cannot convincingly be Europe’s ‘other’, since Europe itself has millions of Muslim citizens.79 The ‘other’ for the EU cannot be the Muslim population, the Mediterranean population or the Middle East. These identities are all part of the EU, either as citizens of member countries or as candidates, like Turkey. Especially after the Report on October 6, 2004, after the advice of the Commission on the start of the negotiations with Turkey80, and the actual start of the negotiations on October 3-4, 2005, it is no longer possible to identify the Muslim population as ‘other’. This forces the EU to be more international, and more cooperative than single nation states. Since it owes its very existence to cooperation with ‘others’, (i.e., France-Germany), the EU believes more strongly in liberal institutionalism/collective security.

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Military power and the population The two issues of military power and population are very much related to each other, and would have an important effect in the EU in the case of Turkish membership. It is assumed by the UN that the population of Turkey will be 82,150,000 in 2015, 88,995,000 in 2025 and 97,759,000 in 2050. For the same years, Germany’s population will be 82,497,000, 81,959,000 and 79,145,000. Obviously, Turkey would become the largest country in terms of population, with a very big military force. The issue of demographics has often been cited by Valery Giscard d’Estaing in recent years, to support the ‘pessimist’ viewpoint.81 Although the ‘optimists’ think that the population and the size of the country are not important, because with the new changes in the voting system (Lisbon Treaty-2009), Luxembourg and Turkey would have the same effect, it is hard to believe that Turkey’s membership would not have an impact on the intergovernmental issues such as foreign policy. Even in the midst of a large and costly defence modernisation programme (perhaps as much as $80 billion over the next decade, $150 billion over the next 25 years), the Turkish military devotes enormous resources to the conduct of operations against the PKK. One consequence of this effort has been a steady improvement in the mobility and operational readiness of Turkish forces, a development with implications for the military balance with Syria, Iran, Greece, and Russia. For Turks, operations against the PKK are defined as counter terrorism, and the primacy of this activity gives Ankara a strong interest in seeing cooperation against terrorism incorporated in NATO discussions.82 Objectively, there can be little strategic rationale for premeditated conflict on either side.83 Numerous issues are on the agenda with Syria – disputes over the Tigris and Euphrates waters, continued Syrian claims on the Turkish province of Hatay, Syrian criticism of Ankara’s relations with Israel, weapons of mass destruction, and above all, Syrian support for the PKK. The last has been a proximate and serious source of risk.84 If significant Syrian territory is lost or the survival of the Assad regime is threatened, it is not unimaginable that Syria might employ Scud B and C missiles against Turkish targets, possibly including Ankara. Adana and İskenderun would in any case be particularly vulnerable.85

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Even without being a member of the Union, Turkey has shown its importance in military issues in the Berlin Plus Agreement and in the Iraq war. As a result of Turkey’s attempts to block the EU’s use of NATO assets before the Berlin Plus Agreement, EU leaders had decided to enable non-European allies, such as Turkey, to raise concerns if an EU operation was conducted in its geographic proximity or if an EU operation affected its national security interests86, such as the Aegean Sea, the Balkans, and the East Mediterranean region, in the case of Turkey. After Turkey protested by vetoing EU access to NATO assets, the EU decided to consult the non-EU NATO members before deciding on policies. As stated in the Aspen European Dialogue, ‘As for Europe there can be no opting out: Iraq shares a border with an EU candidate in the process of negotiating accession that is Turkey.’87 As Arnaldo Abruzzini, the Secretary General of Euro Chambers, the European Association of Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated during his visit to Turkey: ‘None of the 25 Member states thinks positively about your membership. Turkey is a big country. If you become a member, Russia, Iran and Iraq will be our neighbours. This is scary for us’. There is an ongoing war at the border of Turkey, even as a candidate, that affects the EU. As a member, it will mean the EU’s engagement with these conflicts as much as Turkey’s. For instance, the EU’s position on the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq will definitely be affected, since Turkey recognises this kind of a development as a reason for war, although it is not stated in the National Security Document.88 Furthermore, combating terrorism is another issue that needs to be clarified between Turkey and the EU, whose approach towards the terrorist/separatist activities in Turkey has been very much different than the Turkish approach. Turkey reacted harshly and militarily against these activities in South East Anatolia. The EU preferred a more civilian approach, as stated in the Agenda 2000: In combating terrorism in the southeast, Turkey needs to exercise restraint, to make greater efforts to uphold the rule of law and human rights and to find a civil, and not a military, solution.89

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However, in Turkey, as explained in detail in Chapter 3, the solutions to the terrorist activities do not include civil instruments. The government has already made changes in the constitution to give more cultural rights to the Kurdish population in the country, such as Kurdish language education and broadcasting in Kurdish, after the capture of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. Future reaction of the government against the terrorist organisations would be via the military forces. Not only the army, but also the public, believes in the Turkish Army’s right to fight against the PKK or any other terrorist activities. The question is whether Turkey will try to soften her policies towards her neighbours, and whether the EU can have hard military policies towards these countries. As can be seen from Chapter 4 on EU foreign policy, the EU is more concerned about the economic aspect of the relationships; for example, to promote democracy in the Mediterranean region, the EU emphasised economic aid. The approach the EU took was to reward states for democratic reforms either with membership or economic help, rather than intervention in undemocratic states. The main problem here, for the EU, is that international elements of soft power include the ability to convince states to cooperate. States must not only be able to force cooperation; they must attract cooperation via positive incentives such as the appeal of political and/or economic principles and norms. Soft power requires states to work within the new mechanisms of globalisation – such as the rules and procedures of international institutions – to build effective coalitions90, which is the way that the EU conducts its relations with third countries. The EU has been effective to date, because the countries that the EU dealt with as neighbouring countries were willing to cooperate with the EU; either they wanted to become a part of the Union or they wanted to have economic relations with the Union. However, when the EU encounters countries which lack any enthusiasm to be involved in the Union, results will be different. Today, the position of the EU is not a risky one, like the Middle East or Central Asia. Thus, the EU today does not need the military power that Turkey offers and emphasises. The EU thinks non-military instruments are the ways to solve conflicts, but Turkey is not a believer in exclusively soft security instruments, as discussed above (in Chapter 3).

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As Bilgin argues, ‘the project of EU expansion is a non-military security policy adopted to maintain security in Europe.’91 However, the problem of Turkey’s membership is the difference between the countries the EU deals with now, and the countries that the EU will deal with in the case of Turkey’s membership. Before Turkey’s membership, the countries that the EU has dealt with have had an interest in friendly and close relations with the Union, either as a prospective member or associated partner. The problem occurs, according to the ‘pessimistic’ perspective, when countries do not want to be a part of the EU. It is a fact that not all of Turkey’s neighbours in the region are friendly to western countries; many do not share Turkey’s enthusiasm to be a part of the western club.92 The question then becomes whether the EU has instruments to deploy in case there are conflicts with other states. Will the EU be able to cope with the armed conflicts? And will the EU and Turkey come to an understanding on defining ‘terrorism’ and a ‘terrorist’? These two questions are the focus points of the ‘pessimistic’ perspective. When the Russian or American ways of dealing with terrorism and regional conflicts are considered, the question is, will the EU’s soft security measures resist? These are the elements that define Turkey as a security consumer rather than as a provider in the ‘pessimistic’ perspective. Without Turkey’s membership, the EU is further away from conflict areas such as the Middle East. Although ‘globalisation’ has decreased the importance of distance, as argued in Chapter 1, distance is still important in the foreign policies of the countries involved, as well as that of the EU. It is a fact that a crisis in the Far East affects the countries in the ‘Far West’, but the foreign policies of countries are still shaped according to neighbouring countries and the situation in the neighbourhood. This is emphasised in the ESS, as even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is much easier for the EU to protect its present borders than it will be if Turkey’s borders become the EU frontier. Turkey’s membership will bring changes in the foreign and security policies of the Union by bringing the EU closer to some hot spots in world politics. Turkey’s membership means more defence expenditure for the EU member states. The Turkish Army is seen as the protector of the country and the foreign policy is based on security concerns, so the military expenditure of the country consists of 5.3 percent of GDP.93 The percentages in European countries for the

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same expenditure are approximately 2 percent. The European national governments are not willing to increase military spending, as a result of electoral constraints, and budgetary constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact and the financial costs of Eastern enlargement.94 Another issue, which would arise with Turkey’s inclusion, is the possibility of an increase in military values over values of democracy, with increasing numbers of military advisors, military analysts, and professional soldiers taking part in the decision making process.95 International pressures or choices made by democratic states on their own initiative may overwhelm the demilitarising effect of democracy. Democracies may find themselves militarised by war and international pressure, or they may adopt aggressive or imperialistic foreign policies that produce the same result.96 The ‘pessimistic’ perspective is concerned that as the EU becomes closer to the political geography of the region of the Middle East, it may give more importance to the military as a result of the international pressure on the region. This would mean the end of one of the cornerstone policies that the EU has had since the Second World War, demilitarisation. Thus, the ‘pessimistic’ perspective argues that Turkey’s membership would change the present direction of the EU, because the EU would have a military force not only for peacekeeping but also for defending itself, creating a contradiction to the EU ideal of having a ‘ring of friends’. Arms increases ‘cannot only create conflicts and tensions [between states] but also provide the dynamics triggering war,’97 because ‘the constant accumulation of such weapons of offence leads to a restless suspicion of other nations which are pursuing the same policy.’98 As the suspicion increases among the neighbours, insecurity in the region would increase.99 This argument explains the situation in the region where Turkey is located. Since there is so much suspicion among the countries of the region, i.e., Turkey, Syria, and Iran, expenditure on defence increases, and with Turkey’s inclusion in the Union, the Union will find itself in this ‘cycle of suspicion’ whether it wants it or not. Pipelines Although, as the ‘optimistic’ perspective argues, pipelines are a reason for the EU to include Turkey as a member, the ‘pessimistic’ perspective

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takes the same pipelines as a reason for the EU not to include Turkey as a member. Basically, these pipelines increase rivalries in an area where countries are already suspicious of each other. In particular, the BTC Pipeline integrates Turkey, Azerbaijan and Central Asia into a single economic and political network and excludes Russia and Iran. In this sphere, Russia also tries to thwart Iran, Turkey and China because of its fears of Pan-Turkism, fundamental Islam, or of any influence at its southern borders that might change the status-quo. Russia fears Iran playing a leading role in this ‘anti-Christian war’. Furthermore, Russia’s new definition of national interest and mission is incompatible with efforts by Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan to use their energy resources as a means of integrating with the West, rather than with Russia. Russia perceives the borders which are not under her own influence as an open door to a western threat. Therefore, Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey were not welcomed by the Russian authorities in the early 1990s.100 Russia wanted the BTC pipeline to be constructed via the Black Sea rather than through Turkmenistan. However, Turkey refused this proposal, based on the 1936 Montreux Treaty and the safety of the Straits in Istanbul. Turkey wanted the pipeline to pass from Turkmenistan through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and then to Eastern Turkey. At the end of the discussions, Turkey’s preference prevailed, and the pipeline has been constructed with the help of the US. The US is a crucial actor complicating the situation, since Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan are trying to gain the biggest piece of this great energy pie. The US does not accept the routes that Iran can offer; similarly, Russia does not accept the routes that Iran and the USA promote. Russia does not want the USA or Iran to gain power in the region, and the USA does not want Russia and Iran to be powers in the region, either. In the same manner, Iran is rejecting the USA and Russian involvement in energy policies, since she wants to be the only power in energy security. Therefore, US involvement is bringing further complications to already existing complications – such as rough terrain, ethnic violence, bureaucratic fighting and individual ambitions. The pipeline routes are vulnerable to political risks, due to the fact that the region is undergoing political and economic reforms where there are various ethnic groups living together. These reform movements – such as the efforts of countries such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan

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to become more democratic and liberal – bring a certain level of social unrest among the social groups. Azerbaijan has been lucky in avoiding Islamic radicalism in the country, since stability in Azerbaijan is crucial for the countries around it (i.e., Iran, Russia and Turkey). However, this trend should not be taken for granted, because Azerbaijan is a country where corruption, poverty, and refugee issues continue to increase. Another worrying conflict is that of Nagorno-Karabakh, which negatively affects the safety of the northern routes. One of the biggest fears is that this issue may escalate into an armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, where Russia would get involved. One nightmare scenario is Armenia and Russia’s possible attempt to undo Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and integrity, which would concern Turkey. The fear is the escalation of the crisis leading to Russia once again threatening Turkey with nuclear weapons, as happened in 1992.101 As seen, there are already conflicts of interests among various countries in the region on energy policies, pipelines and their safety. The ‘pessimistic’ perspective believes that more internationalisation of the issue will bring more individual political interests, more special relations and more conflict of interests. Therefore, ‘pessimists’ believe that the EU could find itself in a conflict area, which would cause differences among the member states themselves. Besides, there is a belief that EU involvement would cause more rivalries in the region. Cutler argues that the USA promotes alternative transit routes where Turkey is the transit country, but that Europe does not. He argues that Europe focuses more in the South Caucasus, which increases the rivalry between the USA and Russia by giving teeth to Russia102 when the USA is trying to exclude Russia and Iran.103 The Caucasus is a high-risk region for Iran, Russia and Turkey, where a conflict can break out from which none of these countries can isolate themselves.104 ‘Pessimists’ argue that Turkey’s inclusion to the EU will make the EU a neighbour to this high-risk region and that the EU will not be able to isolate itself from the armed conflicts. Conclusion Research shows that Turkey perceives her potential role as an EU member in a solely ‘optimistic’ framework, and that she ignores the

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incompatibility of her security and foreign policies with those of the EU. In this era after the 9/11 attacks, Turkey believes that western countries will understand the importance of the armed reaction to terrorist activities. Turkish Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and so on, have stated on various occasions that these attacks will help their European friends to understand the importance of the fight against terrorism, which Turkey has been trying to promote for a very long time. The attacks in New York, Madrid and London were seen as factors which would increase the importance of the Turkish army, and its experience in guerrilla warfare, as regards Turkey’s EU candidacy. It is witnessed, in this period, that Turkey totally ignores the differences between her traditional understanding of security and that of Europe, and that she believes European states will suddenly change their policy of ‘soft power’ into that of ‘hard power’, in response to these and future terror threats. Turkey’s security role is double-sided. ‘Optimists’ argue that Turkey’s membership would show that the EU is not a Christian Club, but it is a Union where democracy, rule of law, and human rights are respected. At the same time, this may be seen as an opportunity to falsify Huntington’s theory of the Clash of Civilisations. However, it has to be remembered that this membership may push neighbouring countries into perceiving Turkey as an ‘other’ to them. Throughout history, Turkey has never had very friendly relations with her Arab or Middle Eastern neighbours. Her face has always turned to the West, rather than the East, and her Muslim neighbours did not welcome Turkey’s relations with Israel. This gap in relations may become more visible as Turkey becomes an EU country. Even before Atatürk, the Ottomans started the westernisation process, and EU membership is seen as the last phase of this process, fulfilling Turkey’s goal to reach the level of contemporary western civilization. This would end Turkey’s role as a bridge, by bringing her totally into the West. Secondly, military capabilities and population can be studied in both ‘optimist’ and ‘pessimist’ frameworks, as well. Turkey has advanced military capabilities, on which she has spent more money than European countries spend on their militaries. She also has experience in guerrilla warfare, as a result of the terrorist activities on her soil and

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the geographical conditions in the region. As ‘optimists’ claim, Turkey is undeniably an important part of NATO and, as a result of the crucial position of the country, the NATO assets on her soil are essential for the EU, as well. Turkey has proven her importance in NATO-EU relations in the Berlin Plus Agreement. Finally, Turkey has served, historically, as a bodyguard for Europe at the crossroads of conflicts. Although the ‘pessimist’ perspective cannot falsify these facts, it argues that Turkey’s involvement in EU foreign and security policy will have a negative effect on the policy area, because: • The policy area is intergovernmental at the moment, and Turkey’s different understanding of politics and security will bring more discrepancies to an area where members already cannot agree, and • Even if the EU can manage to have more supranational structure in this area, Turkey’s population will be bigger than that of any other member country at the time of her membership, which will make her voice louder than the others. Therefore, the ‘pessimists’ fear that Turkey’s influence on the Union will bring an end to the dream of an ever-closer union. I agree, with the ‘optimists’, that Turkey’s membership will complete the Neighbourhood Dimension of the Union. ‘Optimists’ also claim her membership will present the EU in a more sympathetic light to Black Sea region and Middle Eastern countries, increasing the Union’s influence. Finally, in this chapter I have discussed the ‘optimist’ and ‘pessimist’ frameworks on energy resources. The BTC, Blue Stream and NABUCCO pipelines link Europe to the energy resources in the Caucasus and Russia. Turkey, as an optimist, would argue its potential to bring alternative energy routes that would meet the increasing energy needs of Europe. Turkey’s membership would make Europe a neighbour with the most important energy resources. However, in return for this proximity to natural gas and oil, the EU will bring more internationalisation to an area where there are already big rivalries between actors such as Russia, the USA, Iran and Azerbaijan.

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‘Pessimists’ believe that too many cooks spoil the broth, thus the EU will have a negative influence in a region where stability is a major concern. What I am trying to say in this chapter is that there are two sides to every question. When we examine Turkey’s role in the security of the EU and the influence of Turkey on EU foreign policy, we need to elaborate on both sides. The EU gains some advantages with Turkey’s involvement in the EU structures, but at the same time loses some. Therefore, the risk factors involved should be considered. Especially, the similarities in the security understandings of Turkey and the USA, the problems with Armenia, and the differences in political culture and security understandings between European countries such as Germany, Italy, the UK, the Nordic countries and so on (except Greece and Cyprus) necessitate more emphasis in the ‘pessimist’ perspective.

CONCLUSION

The starting point of this book was the belief that the Turkish institutions in charge of preparations for EU membership have been negligent, in regard to the need for the foreign policies of both Turkey and the EU to be adjusted, in order for that membership to happen. Turkey accelerated her preparations for EU membership in other policy areas after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, where the EU announced Turkey’s candidacy; but it is only after the start of the accession negotiations that some changes in Turkish foreign policy have been observed. In order to adjust herself to the EU acquis communautaire, Turkey experienced transformations in various spheres, such as civil, political and human rights, civilianisation of domestic politics, the Kurdish question, non-Muslim population rights, and so on. There have been numerous adjustment packages debated in the Parliament, which drastically transformed the 1982 Turkish Constitution. The changes in every sphere of policy are already profoundly influencing people’s everyday lives. Nevertheless, the ups and downs in EU-Turkey relations, Turkey’s problematic relations with neighbouring countries, her hard security understanding, and her military’s prominent role in the country’s decision making structure have prevented the necessary modifications in the foreign policy field. Only since 2005, when the accession negotiations started and the role of the military changed, has Turkish foreign policy making been changed and softened. The increased interdependence among states has coupled with technological and economic developments to change the nature

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of security threats in the 21st century. As a result of globalised security threats, the shift in security requirements affects Turkey, the EU, and the interactions between these two actors on the world stage. Today, globalisation has altered the perception of risk and of security requirements; it is a brand new era, quite distinct from the ‘internationalisation’ of the previous century. Domestic issues are no longer the only concern of domestic politics; international pressures and interventions by other actors, such as international institutions or single states, can trigger governmental and policy changes. Thus, the main focal point is no longer the state itself. Globalisation changes threat perception and the meaning of security both for people and for states, and security does not only imply protection of territory or the integrity of a state, anymore. Based on the new conceptions of security, a wider understanding of security is formulated in a theoretical framework, which helps in establishing the diversity between Turkish and EU security cultures. The traditional approach helps in the understanding of Turkey’s security culture; on the other hand, it is the collective and globalist approaches that aid understanding of EU security culture. In line with the traditional approach, Turkey bases its concerns on military security, political sovereignty, and the fear of neighbours and disintegration. In creating this kind of security culture, Turkey’s history played its part. In the light of the Ottoman legacy, Turkish security culture has been characterised by state, nationalist, and Islamic/conservative identities. Nonetheless, after 2005, a European effect has also become visible in the foreign and security policies of Turkey. The EU has been especially sensitive regarding Turkey’s relations with her neighbours: In the period up to accession[,] Turkey will be required to progressively align its policies towards third countries and its positions within international organisations with the policies and positions adopted by the Union and its Member States.1 However, since the security understandings of the countries in the region are shaped by traditional security concerns, the globalisation of security threats has a different effect on Turkey than on the EU. The

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lack of perceived threat in the EU has pushed the European security culture to a more collective and globalist understanding. Furthermore, the institutional structure and the functioning system of the Union have been crucial in establishing a security culture away from the traditional understanding, at the EU level. After 9/11, the EU started ‘in depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being’2; it asks for integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity, and improved development. The EU assumes that stalled economic development is the main cause of trouble in the world; therefore, the EU has always been one of the most important aid actors in a global context. The Union is the world’s largest provider of development assistance, and it has trade agreements with almost every country. The Union is also the largest provider of humanitarian assistance. In addition to all this economic aid, the EU pays 40 percent of the UN’s regular budget, around the same amount of the peacekeeping operations, and 50 percent of all UN Member States’ contributions to UN funds and programmes. The EU provides 55 percent of the international official development assistance, and the share of the European aid has increased to 20 percent.3 So the question is, to what extent would Turkey be an advantage to Europe’s security? There are two perspectives to answer this question: what this work calls the ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ perspectives. The ‘optimistic’ perspective sees Turkey as a security provider for the EU and, accordingly, as a key asset for EU foreign policy. It is believed that Turkey’s membership will upgrade the level of relations between the East and West, while the secular structure of Turkey is believed to set a good example for other Muslim countries. In addition to this mediation role, Turkey’s military power, role in securing energy supplies, and role in strengthening the EU’s position in the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions are the main arguments of the optimists. In contrast, the ‘pessimistic’ perspective argues that all these points mentioned by the optimists have a downside, and therefore they fear that Turkey’s influence on the Union will bring an end to the dream of an ever-closer union.

APPENDIX

The Accession Treaty was signed on October 3, 2005 [United Kingdom (UK) time] or October 4, 2005 [Turkish time]. In order to reach this point, Turkey went through an intense reformation process in the political, social, and cultural spheres to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, especially between 1999 (after the European Council’s decision to elevate Turkey’s status to that of candidate country) and 2005. After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the first step had been amending the 1982 Constitution not only in political terms but also in a wider range i.e., the shortening of pre-trial detention periods, abolition of the death penalty, expansion of the freedom of association and the strengthening of civil authority in the National Security Council. These amendments were followed by harmonisation packages, which introduced further reforms in the fields of human rights, protection of minorities, freedom of expression and association. The most significant reform has been the reduction in the restrictions on broadcasting in Kurdish. In 2003, several more reforms were introduced, including two democratisation packages on political parties, the fight against torture, freedom of press, procedures for setting up associations, and the property rights of non-Muslims. (Derviş et al., 2004:19) Other reforms related to non-Muslim communities include addressing specific conditions pertaining to legal problems regarding real estate held by community foundations, recognition of non-Muslim groups which were not listed in the Treaty of Lausanne, and allowing places of worship to be built by all religions and faiths in the country. The reform package, which entered into force in July 2003, lifted Article 8 of the anti-terror law, thus expanding the freedom of speech and of broadcasting in Kurdish. Reforms undertaken on the Kurdish issue also include amendments to laws dealing with teaching of foreign languages paving the way to the opening of Kurdish language courses. This reform package also includes changes in laws to permit parents to give their children Kurdish names, and a partial amnesty and reduction in sentences for persons involved in the activities of an illegal organisation. Furthermore, implementation of a project to return those displaced by the conflict to their

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villages has continued. Other reforms include the expansion of the freedom of expression including prohibition of closure of printing houses. Also, the procedure for the dissolution of political parties has been made more difficult, and the official definition of propaganda in connection with the terrorist organisations was amended. Similarly, there have been changes in the freedom of peaceful assembly and association such as reducing the age limit for organising demonstrations, allowing civil society organisations to organise meetings and demonstrations that fall outside their scope, bringing restrictions on governors to postpone meetings, reducing restrictions on membership in civil society organisations; reducing restrictions on making announcements, allowing usage of foreign languages in their international contacts and unofficial correspondences, and so on. In May 2004, the Constitution was amended to bring it into harmony with the previous democratisation packages. The democratisation package in 2004 repealed a provision that had allowed the Secretary General of the National Security Council to nominate a member of the High Audio Visual Board which was established after the 1980 coup d’etat, and had been a useful platform for the military to control the media regarding Islamism, ethnic minorities and Communism. There have been other reforms to decrease the role of the military in the political sphere, such as: relegation of the advisory function of the National Security Council, removal of the representative of the National Security Council from the Board of Cinema, Video and Music, appointment of a civilian to the post of Secretary General of National Security Council and removal of the military representative from the Higher Education Board. Today, after all these amendments, the issues of minorities are no longer taboo, and the role of the military can be discussed explicitly. In 2005, Turkey passed two essential legislations, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedures Law. Also, in Summer 2005 the Turkish government signed an additional protocol to the Customs Union Agreement with the EU, extending it to the new member states. However, Turkey declared that signing the protocol does not imply any form of recognition of the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus. The Cyprus issue had been a problem both in the negotiations of the Framework Agreement and Negotiations on full membership. Nevertheless, all these problems were overcome, and Turkey and the EU signed the Accession Treaty. It has to be mentioned here that USA played an important role in defusing the crisis between Austria, the EU and Turkey. Since the EU was deadlocked on the decision to start negotiations with Turkey, Condoleezza Rice intervened in the process. One of the main problems had been the so called paragraph 5, afterwards paragraph 7, on the membership of the other EU member states accession to other international organisations, such as Cyprus’ membership to NATO in the future. Turkey wanted to hold onto her right to veto Cyprus in case of a NATO membership. Although EU countries tried to persuade Turkey, Rice’s diplomatic attempts

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helped Turkey to keep her veto power. (Yunan Televizyonları: “Gül, Tarihi Yolculuğa Çıktı”, www.haberturk.com, accessed on 03.10.2005) There are thirty-five chapter headings in this agreement, ranging over a wide scope from free movement of goods to environment issues. There are two chapter headings: External Relations and Foreign Policy, and Security and Defence Policy, which matter a great deal in the case of Turkey’s membership to the EU. It is important for states and unions, to have safe borders to protect geographical integrity. As stated by the ESS in 2003 geography is still important and countries need well-governed neighbours. (European Security Strategy, 2003) Geographical integrity encourages common values, strengthens the unions and increases the life expectancy of both states and unions. Turkey’s EU membership on the other hand has the potential to contribute unsafe borders. Turkey is at a crossroad between Asia and Europe, Christianity and Islam, democracies and dictatorships, economically liberal countries and statist systems. Being a bridgehead country has always been difficult because it requires a stable and powerful economy, military, political and social system as Turkish governments - regardless of their political orientations - highlighted in previous decades. Besides, Turkey’s membership possesses the risk of making Turkey the “other” for neighbouring countries, to the East. EU membership carries the potential risks at its borders, since Turkey will represent the EU in the region. (İlhan, 2003:55)



Notes

Introduction 1. Article 7 in Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 03.10.2005. 2. Four decades after the Association Agreement (1963), EU leaders decided, in December 2004, to set a date for the start of accession talks with Turkey. 3. It has to be mentioned here that the ‘pessimistic’ perspective does not mean being against the EU or the reforms that country goes through to become a member. I believe in the necessity of these reforms with all my heart, to make the country a more modern and civilised country. The ‘pessimistic’ approach that is mentioned in the fifth chapter is not a ‘pessimistic’ approach towards the EU or the reforms that are necessary for the membership, such as reforms in the human rights issues, structural changes, and institutional reforms and so on. The name ‘pessimistic’ perspective is given to show the ‘pessimistic’ aspects of Turkey’s membership to the EU in terms of security and border control. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Chapter 1  Globalization has a long history, yaleglobal.yale.edu, accessed on 10.02.2004. J. A. Scholte, ‘What is Globalisation? The Definitional Issue Again’, CSGR Working Paper, no 109/02, (December 2002), www.warwick. ac.uk/csgr accessed on 13.02.2004. ibid. M. F. Guillen, ‘Is Globalisation Civilising, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science Literature’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol 27, (2001): 236. J. Rosenau, The Dynamics of Globalisation: Towards an operational Formulation, paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, San Diego, 18 April 1996, 3-4.

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23. R. Higgott and S. Reich, ‘Globalisation and sites of Conflict: Towards Definition and Taxonomy’, CSRG Working Paper, no 01/98 (March 98). 24. S. Reich, ‘What is globalisation? Four Possible Answers’, the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies Working Paper Series, no 261, (1998). 25. M. F. Guillen, ‘Is Globalisation Civilising, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science Literature’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol 27, (2001): 237. 26. R. King and G. Kendall, The State, Democracy and Globalisation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 181. 27. J. A. Scholte, ‘What is Globalisation? The Definitional Issue Again’, CSGR Working Paper, no 109/02, (December 2002), www.warwick. ac.uk/csgr accessed on 13.02.2004. 28. K. Porter, Excerpts from The Lexus and the Olive Tree by Thomas Friedman, www.globalization.about.com, accessed on 25.02.2004. 29. S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 76-77. 30. F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (NewYork: Free Press, 1992), xiv-xv and xviii-xix. 31. J. Lull, ‘Media, Communication, and Culture: A Global Approach’, in Globalisation the Reader, ed. J. Benyon and D. Dunkerley, (London: Athlone, 2000), 42. 32. A. D. Smith, ‘Towards a Global Culture?’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol 7, (1990), 172-173. 33. S.J. Kobrin, ‘The Architecture of Globalisation: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global Economy’ in Governments, Globalisation and International Business, ed. John H. Dunning, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1997), 147-148. 34. D.P. Ross, Family Security in Insecure Times, National Forum on Family Security, (Canadian Council on Social Development, 1993), 7. 35. Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos (recently changed to Delegado Zero) describes himself as the spokesperson for the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) but, since he is a prominent figure, he is considered by many to be one of its main leaders. According to the Mexican government, Marcos’ name is Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente. 36. M. F. Guillen, ‘Is Globalisation Civilising, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science Literature’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol 27, (2001): 237. 37. L. Main, ‘The Global Information Infrastructure: Empowerment or Imperialism’, Third World Quarterly, vol 22 no 1, (2001): 84.

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38. ibid. 39. B. K. Gills, ‘Empire’ versus ‘Cosmopolis’: The Clash of Globalisations’, Globalisations, vol 2 no 1 (May 2005): 9. 40. J. A. Scholte, ‘What is Globalisation? The Definitional Issue Again’, CSGR Working Paper, no 109/02, (December 2002),www.warwick. ac.uk/csgr, accessed on 13.02.2004. 41. J. Norberg, ‘Globalisation-golden straitjacket or goldmine?’, lecture at the Progress Foundation, Zurich, Switzerland, 1 December 2004, http://www.progressfoundation.ch, accessed on 16.04.2006. 42.  What Does Globalisation Mean to Australia, http://www. globalisationguide.org, accessed on 16.02.2004. 43. P. Schwartz and P. Leyden, ‘The Long Boom: A History of the Future, 1980-2020’, Wired, (1997). 44. J. A. Scholte, ‘What is Globalisation? The Definitional Issue Again’, CSGR Working Paper, no 109/02, (December 2002), www.warwick. ac.uk/csgr accessed on 13.02.2004. 45. C.W. Hughes, ‘The Reflections on Globalisation, Security and 9/11 ’, CSRG Working Paper no105/02, (August 2002), www.warwick.ac.uk/ csgr accessed on 15.02.2004. 46. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), 36. 47.  Globalleşmenin Tarihsel Gelişimi, www.canaktan.org/yeni-trendler, accessed on 03.03.2004. 48. R. King and G. Kendall, The State, Democracy and Globalisation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 151. 49. J.A Scholte, ‘Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalisation’, in Globalisation: Theory and Practice, eds. E. Kofman and G.Youngs, (Continuum International Publishing Group, 1996), 430 – 431. 50. R. King and G. Kendall, The State, Democracy and Globalisation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 151. 51. A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, (Brussels, 12 December 2003). 52. V. D. Cha, ‘Globalisation and the Study of International Security’, Journal of Peace Research, vol 37 iss 3, (2000), 392. 53. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 59. 54. The key principles of the Treaty of Westphalia are; • The world consists of and is divided in to, sovereign territorial states that recognise no superior authority;

Notes •

55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

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The processes of law making, the settlement of disputes and law enforcement are largely in the hands of individual states; • International law is oriented to the establishment of minimal rules of coexistence. [R. King and G. Kendall, The State, Democracy and Globalisation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 34].  Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, plato.stanford.edu, accessed on 18.02.2004. At the core of this mode of governance stood the principles of statehood and sovereignty. Statehood meant that the world was divided into territorial parcels, each of which was ruled by a separate government. This modern state was a centralised formally organised public authority apparatus that enjoyed a legal monopoly over the means of armed violence in the area of jurisdiction. The state exercised comprehensive, supreme, unqualified and exclusive control over territory. Comprehensive meant; the sovereign state had jurisdiction over all affairs in the country. Supreme meant; recognising no superior authority. Unqualified meant that although Westphalian times witnessed periodic invasions and occasional debates about possible duties of humanitarian intervention on the whole the state’s right of total authority over its territory was treated as sacrosanct by other states. And exclusive meant; the sovereign states did not share competences in regard to their respective domestic jurisdictions. There were no joint competences or pooled sovereignty. ( J. A. Scholte, ‘The Globalisation of world Politics’, in The Globalisation of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, ed. J. Baylis and S. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 20. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 114. Working Group on Curriculum Development, Partnership for Peace Consortium on Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, National Security Dimension, www.isn.ethz.ch, accessed on 20.03.2004. A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 150 in A. Rucis, Latvia Towards Europe: Internal Security Issues, (Riga: NATO, 1999), 6. B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 18-19. B. Buzan et al. Security A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 27 in F. Bichi, ‘European Security Perceptions vis a vis the Mediterranean: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations from the 1990s’, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and

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TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY International Politics, no 39 (November 2001), www.fscpo.unict.it, accessed on 12.03.2004. K. Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, vol 17 no 1 (1991): 317 in T.S. Seng, Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, May 2001), www.ntu.edu.sg/IDSS, accessed on 12.03.2004. F. Attina, ‘Partnership and Security: Some Theoretical and Empirical Reasons for Positive Developments in the Euro-Mediterranean Area’, Jean Monnet Working Papers, aei.pitt.edu, accessed on 06.05.2004. Küreselleşme Tehdidi, teror.gen.tr , accessed on 05.03.2004. V. D. Cha, ‘Globalisation and the Study of International Security’, Journal of Peace Research, vol 37 iss 3, (2000), 392. ibid, 333. C. Coker, ‘Globalisation and Terrorism’, The Prospects for the Canadian Summit, (Tokyo: Nippon Press Centre, June 10, 2002) in O. Lizardo The Effect of Economic and Cultural Globalisation on Anti – US Transnational Terrorism 1971-2000, 11 www.u.arizona.edu/~olizardo, accessed on 07.02.2004. P. Bilgin, ‘Rethinking Turkey’s Security Discourse: the Challenge of Globalisation’, American Political Science Association (Boston, August 29-September 1, 2002). P. Wolfowitz, ‘Building a Military for the 21st Century’, prepared statement for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, United States Department of Defence, Washington D.C., 3-4 October 2001, 37 in M. K. Rasmussen, ‘A Parallel Globalisation of Terror: 9/11, Security and Globalisation’, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of Nordic International Studies Association, vol 37 no 3, (2002): 330. D. J. D. Sandole, The Causes of Terrorism, www.gmu.edu/depts/icar, accessed on 07.12.2004. A. M. Loureiro, Can terrorism be politically (ethically) justified? A philosophical approach, ontology.buffalo.edu/smith, accessed on 30.11.2004. J. Margolis, ‘Terrorism and the New Forms of War’, Metaphilosophy, vol 35 no 3 (April 2004): 402. There were 200 deaths and more than 1500 wounded as a result of the attack. Although the Spanish government blamed ETA, Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for exploding 10 bombs in a train. S. L.v. Gorka, Hyper Terrorism: The Globalisation of Terror, www.censa. net/publications/Gorka, accessed on 08.03.2004. V. Shiva, Globalisation and Talibanisation, aktuell.nadir.org , accessed on 08.03.2004.

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76. J. Koorevaar, The Dynamic of Globalisation, http://www.xs4all. nl/~koorevaa/html/dynamic.html accessed on 10/03/2004. 77. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 113. 78. K. Broda-Bahm, ‘Finding protection in definitions: The quest for environmental security’. Argumentation and Advocacy, vol 35 iss 4 (1999): 164. 79. O. Wæver, ‘Societal Security: the Concept’ in Identity, Migration and the New security: Agenda in Europe, ed. Ole Wæver et al., (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993), 25. 80. Human Development Report 1994, Chapter 2:New Dimensions of Human Security, hdr.undp.org/reports, accessed on 25.03.2004. 81. J. Koorevaar, The Dynamic of Globalisation, http://www.xs4all. nl/~koorevaa/html/dynamic.html accessed on 10/03/2004. 82. E. J. Wilson III, Globalisation, Information Technology and Conflict in the Second and Third Worlds, www.rbf.org, accessed on 07.12.2004. 83. The prominent names in this approach are Norman Myers, Jessica Tuchman – Mathews, and Arther Wedding. 84. C. Chen, Globalisation is inevitably changing the way states pursue their security, how inevitable is globalisation and what is its connection to security? , www.defence.gov.au/ADC accessed on 10.03.2004. 85. These are namely, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Furthermore, there are some treaties such as the Convention of the Law of the Sea, the Convention on Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, and the Convention on Marine Pollution from Ships, which concern some states more than others, in these respective fields. 86. M. Soroos, ‘Environmental Security’, National Forum, vol 75 iss 1, (Winter 1995). 87. B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security a New Framework for Analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 92. 88. B. Boxer, ‘Providing Basic Human Security’, The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 2003): 201.

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89. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Programme Against Money Laundering, www.unodc.org/unodc, accessed on 12.03.2004. 90. Discussions from OSCE PA, Expanded Bureau Meeting, Copenhagen, Denmark, 18 April 2005. 91. R. Godson and W. J. Olson, ‘International Organised Crime’, Society, vol 32 iss 2, (1995). 92. The most recent example of this kind would be the DynCorp in Bosnia. There were some rumours, which involved the firm, the ‘soldiers’ of the firm in sex trafficking. They were supposed to be judged but they returned back to their country and no trials were held. 93.  Safety at Price: Military Expertise for Sale or Rent, www.post-gazette. com/headlines/, accessed on 03.03.2004. 94. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), 120. 95. L. Freedman, ‘The Revolution in Strategic Affairs’, Adelphi Papers No 318, (London: Oxford University Press, 1998) in I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 121. 96. Ç. Erhan, Küreselleşme Döneminin Tehditleriyle Mücadele, www. stradigma.com, accessed on 21.03.2004. 97. S. Staples, Nuclear Weapons and Globalisation, www.converge.org.nz/ pma, accessed on 08.03.2004. 98. R. Street, Globalisation, Militarism and Security, www.russfound.org/ Launch, accessed on 08.03.2004. 99. S. Staples, Nuclear Weapons and Globalisation, www.converge.org.nz/ pma, accessed on 08.03.2004. 100. M. Shaw, ‘The Contemporary Mode of Warfare’, Review of International Political Economy, vol 7 iss 1 (2000):173. 101. S. D. Krasner, The Exhaustion of Sovereignty: International Shaping of Domestic Authority Structures, Une Nouvelle Gouvernance Mondiale Pour le Development Durable, www.iddri.org/iddri, accessed on 03.03.2004. 102. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), 81. 103. R. J. Holton, Globalisation and the Nation State, (New York: St Martins Press, 1998), 2. 104. A. Cassese, Human Rights in a Changing World, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 168. 105. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), 152. 106. R., King, G., Kendall, The State, Democracy and Globalisation,

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(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 147. 107. S. Strange, ‘The Declining Authority of States’, in The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, ed. S. Strange et al., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4. 108. K. Ohmae, ‘The End of Nation State’, in Globalisation The Reader, ed. J. Beynon and D. Dunkerley, (London: Athlone Press, 2000), 240. 109. P. Hirst, ‘Why the Nation Still Matters’, in Globalisation The Reader, ed. J. Beynon and D. Dunkerley, (London: Athlone Press, 2000), 246. 110. ibid, 149. 111. In short; under the influence of globalisation the constituencies of the state have been changing. The sovereign state normally promoted domestic interests and acted as a protective barrier against external intrusions. In contrast, the post sovereign state often advances transborder as well as national causes. • Large-scale globalisation has arguably constrained states to engage in more frequent and more intensive multilateral consultations. • Accelerated globalisation since the 60s may have reduced the chances of major interstate war. [ J. A. Scholte, ‘The Globalisation of World Politics’, in The Globalisation of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, ed. J. Baylis and S. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 23.]. 112. Z. Bauman, ‘After the Nation State What?’, in Globalisation The Reader, ed. J. Beynon and D. Dunkerley, (London: Athlone Press, 2000), 254. 113. R. King and G. Kendall, The State, Democracy and Globalisation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 169. 114. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 110. 115. D. Bigo, ‘When Two Become One, Internal and External Securitisations in Europe’ in International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration; Power Security and Community, ed. M. Kelstrup and M. C. Williams, (London: Routledge, 2000), 173. 116. M. Kaldor, ‘Reconceptualising Organised Violence in Archibugi’, quoted in I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 111. 117. M.I. Midlarsky, ‘The impact of External Threat on States and Domestic Societies’, International Studies Review, vol 5 iss 4 (2003):17. Chapter 2 1. F. S. Tipson, ‘National Security and Role of Law’, in National Security Law, ed. J. N. Moore et al., (Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1990), 5.

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2. B. A. Thayer, ‘Bringing in Darwin, Evolutionary Theory, Realism and International Politics’, International Security, vol 25, no 2, (Fall 2000): 129. 3. R. N. Lebow, ‘The Long Peace, The End of the Cold War and Failure of Realism’, International Organisation, vol 48, no 2, (Spring 1994): 259 . 4. For more information on the origins of the egoist human behaviour and desire for domination, see B. A. Thayer, ‘Bringing in Darwin, Evolutionary Theory, Realism and International Politics’, International Security, vol 25, no 2, (Fall 2000): 124 – 151. 5. B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security a New Framework for Analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 22. 6. J. W. Legro, ‘Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II’, International Security, vol 18, no 4, (Spring 1994): 114. 7. ibid, pp 155-159. 8. K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: Random House, 1979) and J.J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) in S. Kay, ‘Globalisation, Power and Security’, Security Dialogue, vol 35, no 1, (March 2004): 11. 9. Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil, ‘Revisiting the ‘‘National’’: Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?’ in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory ed Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (London: Boulder, 1996), pp. 105–26. 10. Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 60. 11. C. Geertz, ‘The Uses of Diversity’, Michigan Quarterly, vol 25, no1, (1986): 114-5. 12. J. Baylis, ‘International Security in the Post Cold War Era’, in The Globalisation of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, ed. J. Baylis and S. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 257. 13. C. Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Selfhelp’, International Security, vol 19, no 3, (Winter 1994/95): 51. 14. R. Keohane and L. Martin, quoted in J. Baylis, ‘International Security in the Post Cold War Era’, The Globalisation of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, ed. J. Baylis and S. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 262. 15. S. Jaberg, Concept of Collective Security: Origin and Meaning, (The Hague, 13 May 1999), members.lycos.fr/afnulorraine accessed on 01.12.2004. 16. R. Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organisation, vol 36 no 2, (1982): 357. 17. B. Coppieters, ‘The Caucasus as a Security Complex’, in Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. B. Coppieters, poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders, accessed on 24.09.2004.

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18. E. Adler and M. Barnett, ‘Theoretical Perspective in Security Communities’ in Security Communities, ed. E. Adler and M. Barnett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 11. 19. M. Barnett and E. Adler, ‘Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison and History’ in Security Communities, ed. E. Adler and M. Barnett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 419. 20. V. Depkat, ‘Cultural Approaches to International Relations’ in Culture and International History ed J.C.E. Gienow-Hecht and F. Shumacher (New York: Berghahn, 2003), 182. 21. A. E. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, vol 46, no 2 (Spring 2002): 396-397. 22. M. Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations The Politics of Reality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 15. 23. ibid, 4. 24. A.E. Wendt, ‘Levels of Analysis vs. Agents and Structures: Part III’, Review of International Studies, vol 18 (1992): 183. 25. N. Inayatullah and D. L. Blaney, ‘Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory’, in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory ed Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (London: Boulder, 1996), 71. 26. F. Kratochwil, ‘Protagorean Quest: Community, Justice, and the ‘Oughts and Musts’ of International Politics’, International Journal, vol 43, no 2, (1988): 206-7. 27. A.E. Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political Science Review, vol 88, no 2 ( June 1994): 193. 28. F. Kratochwil, ‘The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik without Politics’, Review of International Studies, vol 19, (1993), 65. 29. S. M. Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, Foreign Policy, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring 1998): 41. 30. M. Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations The Politics of Reality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20. 31. ibid, 98. 32. F. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 11. 33. N. G. Onuf, World of Or Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 22.

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34. G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 11-14. 35. C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89. 36. K. Grayson, ‘Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to Liotta and Smith-Windsor’, Security Dialogue, vol 34, no 3 (September 2003): 338. 37. A.E. Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics,’ International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 73. 38. T. Hopo, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International Security, vol 23, no 1, (Summer 1998): 175. 39. P. J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’, in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics edited by P.J. Katzenstein. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 6. 40. T. Sowell, Race and Culture: A World View, (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 1. 41. R. P. Anand, Cultural Factors in International Relations. (New Delhi: Abhinav Press, 1981), 15. 42. M. J. Manzaar, ‘Culture in International Relations’, Washington Quarterly, (Spring 1996), www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz, accessed on 03.12.2006. 43. S.C. Pasic, ‘Culturing International Relations Theory: A call for Extension’ in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory ed Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (London: Boulder, 1996), 100. 44. ibid, 90. 45. i.e., Turks and Greeks. National education becomes a part of the construction of the ‘other’ and the stories told to the children, books, even fairytales become a tool of construction of the other. See Turks and their nation in the worldview of D. Theodossopoulos, ‘ Greeks in Patras’, History and Anthropology, vol 15 no 1 march 2004 pp 29-45. 46. J. S. Lantis, ‘Strategic Culture and National Security Policy’, The International Studies Review, vol 4 no 3 (December 2002): 93. 47. Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1977), 8. 48. C. S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, (lanham, Md: Hamilton Press, 1986), 36-37. 49. K. Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.,1979), 121. 50. A.I. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, vol 19, no 4, (Spring 1995): 37.

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51. ibid, 32-44. 52. ibid, 38. 53. B. S. Klein, ‘Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics,’ Review of international Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 1988): 136. 54. K. Longhurst, Strategic Culture: The Key to Understanding German Security Policy?, (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2000), 200. 55. G. Skemperis, Strategic Culture in Post War Europe, (Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs: Syracuse University, 2003), 3. 56. K. Longhurst, Strategic Culture: The Key to Understanding German Security Policy?, (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2000), 303. 57. C. S. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: the first generation of theory strikes back’, Review of International Studies, vol 25, (1999): 52. 58. M. C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 156. 59. H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 217. 60. J. S. Barkin, ‘Realist Constructivism’, International Studies Review, vol 5, (2003): 336. 61. C. S. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: the first generation of theory strikes back’, Review of International Studies, vol 25, (1999): 55. 62. C.S. Gray, ‘In Praise of Strategy’, Review of International Studies, vol 29, (2003): 294. 63. For example, formal institutions established to ‘organise’ the world of sovereign states. 64. J. L. Ray, ‘Does Democracy Cause Peace’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol 1, iss 27 (1998): 28. 65. B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Principles for a Post Cold War World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 42. 66. S. Rosato, ‘The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory’, American Political Science Review, vol 97, no 4 (November 2003): 586. 67. B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Principles for a Post Cold War World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 33. 68. B. B. de Mesquita et al., ‘An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace’, American Political Science Review, vol 93, no4 (December 1994). 69. Z. Maoz and B. Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,’ American Political Science Review, vol 87, no. 3 (1993): 624–638. 70. T. Farrell, ‘Strategic Culture and American Empire’, SAIS Review, vol 25, no 2 (Summer-Fall 2005): 5. 71. K. Rasler and W. R. Thompson, ‘Rivalries and the Democratic Peace

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78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY in the Major Power Subsystem’, Journal of Peace Research, vol 38, no 6 (2001): 679. J. Baylis and S. Smith, (eds) The Globalisation of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 269. S. Hall, ‘The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity’ in Culture, Globalization and the World System, ed A.D. King (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 25. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 114. N. Thomas and W. T. Tow, ‘The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention, Security Dialogue, vol 33, no 2, (2002): 177–8. The Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organisations, Why the EU Should Focus on Human Security, www.dochas.ie, accessed on 08.03.2004. R. S. McNamara, ‘Reflecting on War in the 21st Century: the Context for Nuclear Abolition’, in Alternative Nuclear Futures: the Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post Cold War World, ed. J. Baylis and R. O Neill, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 167-182. S. Hall, ‘The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity’ in Culture, Globalization and the World System, ed A.D. King (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 27. Human Development Report 1994, Chapter 2:New Dimensions of Human Security, hdr.undp.org/reports, accessed on 25.03.2004, 22. C. Thomas, ‘Introduction’, in Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience, ed. C. Thomas and P. Wilkin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 3. F. Booysen, ‘The Extent of and Explanations for International Disparities in Human Security’, Journal of Human Development, vol 3, no 2, (2002): 273. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Elements of the Concept of Human Security, www.humansecurity.gc.ca, accessed on 25.03.2004. A.J. Bellamy and M. McDonald, ‘The Utility of Human Security’: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas and Tow’, Security Dialogue, vol 33, no 3 (September 2002): 376. P. Dicken, ‘Issues of Global Governance: Confusion and Contestation’, in Globalisation The Reader, ed. J. Beynon and D. Dunkerley, (London: Athlone Press, 2000), 261. G. King and C. J. L. Murray, ‘Rethinking Human Security’, Political

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Science Quarterly, vol 116 no 4, (2001-2002): 608. 86. M. Shaw, ‘The Contemporary Mode of Warfare’, Review of International Political Economy, vol 7 iss 1 (2000): 173. 87. G. Skemperis, Strategic Culture in Post War Europe, (Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs: Syracuse University, 2003), 9. 88. R. Abbinnett, Culture and Identity: Critical Theories (Politics and Culture), (London: SAGE Publications, 2003), 53. Chapter 3 1. A. Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference, Turkish Grand National Assembly, 17.12.2004, www.haberturk.com accessed on 17.12.2004. 2. D. Jung, Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy, 4, www.copri.dk/publications, accessed on 12.07.2004. 3. ‘We need to be cautious for any kind of threat around our territories consisting of 7350 km sea and 2800 km land.’ [H. Bayülken, TürkiyeYunanistan Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası ile İlgili Sorunlar, (Ankara: T.C Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 1986), 35] 4. The most trusted institution, by 84 percent is the Turkish Armed Forces. (Eurobarometer 2008). 5.  The World Fact Book, www.cia.gov, accessed on 10.08.2004. 6. Declaration of the Turkish Armed Forces, www/cumhuriyet.com.tr accessed on 01.11.2004. 7. Leader of the RPP. 8. 92nd Meeting of the TGNA on 23.04.2006, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol 117, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 9.  2004 Regular Report on Turkey, www.europa.eu.int, accessed on 02.10.2004. 10. MP from the RPP, 115th Meeting of the TGNA on 14.07.2004, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 57, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 11. 59th Meeting of the TGNA on 01.04.2003, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 11, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 12. 70th Meeting of the TGNA on 23.04.2003, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 12, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 13. 46th Meeting of the TGNA on 03.01.2002, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 81, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 14. He is a theologian in Istanbul University. He was elected as an MP from the RPP in 2002. He left this party afterwards and formed his own party, APP. 73rd Meeting of the TGNA on 22.03.3005, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 78, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006.

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15. She was a member of the DLP and elected as an MP from that party. However, left the DLP and formed her own party, Communal Democrat Party (CDP). 90th Meeting of the TGNA on 23.04.2002, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 92, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 16. 92nd Meeting of the TGNA on 23.04.2006, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 117, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 17. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. 18. Press releases of the NAP Leader Devlet Bahçeli and R&D Cyprus Report of the NAP (23.02.2003), www.mhp.org.tr accessed on 12.12.2006. 19. Speeches by A. Gül ( JDP) and O. Öymen, (RPP) 69th Meeting of 06.04.2004 TGNA, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 44, www.tbmm.gov. tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 20. Party Manifesto of the NAP, www.mhp.org.tr, accessed on 12.12.2006 NAP Program. 21. Refah Partisi. 22. Selamet Partisi. 23. Necmettin Erbakan established PP after Constitutional Court’s decision to ban WP. 24. 17th Meeting of the TGNA on 09.11.2006, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006 and 25th Meeting of the TGNA on 29.11.2006, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 25.  Alliance of Civilizations, www.unaoc.org accessed on 12.12.2006. 26. B. Arınç, 78th Meeting of the TGNA on23.04.2004, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 47, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 27. T. Oğuzlu, ‘Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 61, iss 1, (2007): 89. 28. European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, (1998): 21. 29. European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession (2007). 30. B. Gokay, ‘The Politics of Oil in the Back Sea Area: Turkey and Regional power Rivalries’, in Politics of the Black Sea Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict, ed. Tunc Aybak, (I.B. Tauris: London, 2001), 18. 31. A. Davutoğlu, ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An assessment of 2007’, Insight Turkey, vol 10, no 1, (2008): 80. 32. A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik Türkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu, (İstanbul:Küre Yayınları, 2001), 323 – 454. 33. The effect of these principles on concrete policies are examined below under the title; ‘The era after the start of accession negotiations’.

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34. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005. 35. A. Palmer, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Son Üç yüz yıl Bir Çöküşün Tarihi, (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1995), 80. 36. Interview by author, Turkish Grand National Assembly, January 2005. 37. D. Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 1. 38. ibid p.80. 39. C. A. Kupchan, ‘Introduction: Nationalism Resurgent,’ in Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, ed. C. A. Kupchan, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), 4. 40. F. Ahmad, Making of Modern Turkey, (New York: Routledge, 1993), 77. 41. Ş. Mardin, ‘European Culture and the Development of Modern Turkey’, in Turkey and the European Community, eds. A. Evin and G. Denton, (Leske, Budrich: Opladen, 1990), p 21. 42. Ç.Erhan, Asian Dimension of Turkey’s Character: An Obstacle or a Catalyst for European Union Membership, paper presented in Asian Values in the International Society of the 21st Century, Kobe Gakuin University & Awaji Yumebutai International Conference Centre, 3-5 December, 2002 www.aprc.jp, accessed on 25.06.2005. 43. A. Kadıoğlu, ‘The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no 2(April 1996): 192. 44. D.Ergil, Turkish Nationalism, Then and Now, www.cyprus-conflict.net, accessed on 25.06.2005. 45. A.İçduygu, Ö. Kaygusuz ‘The Politics of Citizenship by Drawing Borders: Foreign Policy and the Construction of National Citizenship Identity in Turkey,’ Middle Eastern Studies, vol 40, No 6, (Nov. 2004): 27. 46.  Code of National Security Council and General Secretary of National Security Council, mgk.gov.tr, accessed on 07.08.2004. 47. H. M. Tagma, ‘The Impact of Globalisation on National security: the Turkish Case’ (MA diss., Institute of Economics and Social Science of Bilkent University, 2002), 15. 48. H. Bayülken, Türkiye-Yunanistan Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası ile İlgili Sorunlar, (Ankara: T.C Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 1986), 35. 49. Several speeches by former PM Mesut Yılmaz, www.milliyet.com.tr. www/cumhuriyet.com.tr, accessed on 15.03.2004. 50. E. Yalcinbayir, MP from the JDP, 6th Meeting of the TGNA on 11.10.2006, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 131, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006.

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51. O. Öymen, MP from the RPP, 8th Meeting of the TGNA on 17.10.2006, TBMM tutanak Dergisi, vol. 132, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 52. A. O. Güner, MP from the TPP, 64th Meeting of the TGNA on 13.02.2002, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 86, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12 .2006. 53. The region around İzmir was given to Greeks, eastern Anatolia was divided between Kurdistan and Armenia and the southern part of the country was given to France and Italy. Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles were given to the administration of the Allied Financial Commission. 54. This is evident in Atatürk’s speeches like; ‘In the formulation of our foreign policy we pay particular attention to the safety and security of our country and to our capability to protect the rights of citizenry against any aggression.’ (B. Criss and P. Bilgin, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol 1, no 1, ( January 1997), www.biu.ac.il, accessed on 15.04.2004) This is a crystal clear statement in the sense that it shows the Republic of Turkey would be ready to defend itself if there is a need. Turkey never hesitated to use military means in the modern state era under any circumstances. 55. The relations with Russia are still important for the Republic of Turkey, as evident in the Putin visit, which took place on September 1-2, 2004. The January 2005 opening of a Turkish Shopping Centre in Moscow has been perceived as an important step in the relations with Russia. 56. B. Aras, H. Köni, ‘Turkish-Syrian Relations Revisited’, Arab Studies Quarterly, vol 24 no 4, (Fall 2002): 47-61. 57. Even before Atatürk died, there were attempts to adopt a multiparty system but because of the (mostly) Islamic orientations of the parties these attempts were not successful. 58. Demokrat Parti. 59. Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi. 60. Ç. Erhan, Türkiye’nin Karakterindeki Asyalı Boyut: Avrupa Birliği Üyeliği için bir Engel ya da Kolaylık mı?, www.stradigma.com, accessed on 07.08.2004. 61. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005. 62. Interview by author, TGNA, June 2003. 63. ibid. 64. W. Hale, Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000, (İstanbul: Mart Maatbası, 2003), 115-116. 65. ibid, 136. 66. One of the best examples of these bilateral relations is the Sadabat Pact

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that was signed with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 67. B. Criss and P. Bilgin argue that this has been an extension of western oriented foreign policy. Their explanation for this is ‘Turkey was happy to see a rift between the regions to most anti western states.’ (B. Criss and P. Bilgin, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol 1, no 1, ( January 1997) www.biu.ac.il, accessed on 15.04.2004). 68. Adalet Partisi. 69. Leader of the RPP at the time. 70. D. Jung, Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy, 7-8, www.copri.dk/publications, accessed on 12.07.2004. 71. There is a very common joke that would explain the problem of trust in the country towards the EU. There are three countries knocking at the EU’s door and whoever answers the questions correctly will go in. The question for Romania is ‘When was the atomic bomb first used?’ the question for Bulgaria is ‘Where was it first used?’ and those two countries respond correctly. When it is Turkey’s turn, the question is ‘Can you list all the names of the people who died in Hiroshima with their addresses?’ This little joke shows the problem of trust between the two parties very clearly. When these kinds of feelings are backed by the written reports, like Simon Serfaty’s in Policy Watch , they become more evident. 72. For more information on the effects of Cyprus on the national feelings in Turkish politics, please see; F.B. Adamson, ‘Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 116, no 2 , (2001): 277-303 and N. Canefe and T. Bora, ‘The Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: The case of Radical Turkish Nationalism’, Turkish Studies, vol. 4, no 1 (spring 2003): 127-148. Also, Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem, by Ioannis D. Stefanidis (1999) gives detailed information on the formulation of Greek and Turkish policies and the effect of nationalism on these policies. 73. The General Commander of Turkish Armed Forces in charge of the coup d’état. 74. Demokratik Sol Parti. 75. Ö. Orhun, ‘The Uncertainties and Challenges Ahead: A southern Perspective’, Perceptions, vol. 4, no 1 (1999): 30. 76. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005. 77. Interview by author, Secretariat General for the EU Affairs, June 2003 and Interview by author, TGNA, June 2003. 78. Interview by author, TGNA, June 2003.

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79. For more information see, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives by Z. Brzezinski (1998). 80. All of the interviewees stated Brzezinski’s views as an important part of their understanding of foreign policy. Also, the debates in the parliament show a clear indication of the importance given to his theories based on military, technological and cultural superiority, i.e., 69th Meeting of the TGNA on 05.03.2002, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 87, www.tbmm. gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 81. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005. 82. A. Karaosmanoğlu, ‘Globalisation and Its impact on Turkey’s Security’, in The Europeanisation of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, ed. A. L. Karaosmanoğlu and S. Taşhan, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2002), 18. 83. Interview by author, TGNA, June 2003. 84. A. Karaosmanoğlu, ‘Globalisation and Its impact on Turkey’s Security’, in The Europeanisation of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, ed. A. L. Karaosmanoğlu and S. Taşhan, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2002), 19. 85. W. Hale, Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000, (İstanbul: Mart Maatbası, 2003), 321. 86. Resolution 338, odsddsny.un.org and Resolution 242 daccess-ods.un.org accessed on 15.08.2004. 87. ‘Bearing in mind the politico-military environment we are living in, it is only natural that maintaining a deterrent posture is also an integral part of this policy.’ Defence Policy, www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay, accessed on 07.08.2004. 88. Interview by author, TGNA, June 2003. 89. O. Öymen, Silahsız Savaş Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi, (İstanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 2002), 164. 90. Doğru Yol Partisi. 91. Interview by author, TGNA June 2003. 92. Interviews by author, TGNA, January 2005, and June 2003 and Interview by author, Secretariat General for the EU Affairs, June 2003. 93. Interview by author, Secretariat General for the EU Affairs, June 2003. 94. 83rd Meeting of the TGNA on 04.04.2006, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 115 www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 95. R. Tosun, MP from the JDP, 22nd Meeting of the TGNA on 15.01.2003, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 3, www.tbmm.gov.tr accessed on 14.12.2006. 96. D. Baykal, Leader of the RPP, 21st Meeting of the TGNA on 20.11.2003,

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TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 31, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 97. B. Aras, R. K. Polat, ‘Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the new geographic imagination’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 61, iss 4, (2007): 477. 98. T. Oğuzlu, M. Kibaroğlu, ‘Incompabilities in Turkish and European Security Cultures Diminish Turkey’s Prospects for EU Membership’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol 44, iss 6, (2008): 958. 99. A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik Türkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu, (İstanbul:Küre Yayınları, 2001). 100. A. Davutoğlu, ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An assessment of 2007’, Insight Turkey, vol 10, no 1, (2008): 80. 101. Z. Öniş, Ş. Yılmaz, ‘Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era’, Turkish Studies, vol 10, no 1, (2009): 17. 102. A. Murinson, ‘The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol 42, no 6, (2006): 946. 103. The others are: energy routes, relations with the USA, Cyprus issue and relations with the EU. 104. This initiative aims to bring together Iraq and its neighbors for Ministerial consultations. 105. Ç. Erhan, Türkiye’nin Karakterindeki Asyalı Boyut: Avrupa Birliği Üyeliği için bir Engel ya da Kolaylık mı?, www.stradigma.com, accessed on 07.08.2004. 106. For detailed information on the history of the Cyprus problem, M. Moran (Sovereignty Divided: Essays on the International Dimensions of the Cyprus Problem, CYREP, Turkey, 1999) is a fairly objective source to get information about the period between 1960 and 1974. Also A. C. Gazioğlu (Two Equal and Sovereign Peoples: A Documented Background to the Cyprus Problem and the Concept of Publication, CYREP, Turkey, 1997) gives a very informed background with the documents from 1960 to 1997. On the other hand, S. Sonyel (Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic: British Documents 1960-1965, Paul & Company, 1997) gives the point of view of the British side, one of the guarantors, from the British documents. O. Öymen (Silahsız Savaş: Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2002) is another source giving a very detailed history on the Cyprus issue from a fairly objective point of view. The web pages of Foreign Ministry of Greek Cypriots and Foreign Ministry of Turkey are giving very detailed information on the history of the problem, from a very partisan point of view.

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107. As Öymen argues, not only for Turkey but also for Greece and UK, that the location of the island is strategically important. Thus, the UK government insisted in the past on having land, sea and air bases on the Island. 108. Interviews by author, TGNA, January 2005. 109. Interviews by author, TGNA, January 2005. 110. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005. 111. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005. 112. Also, this point is mentioned in the interviews conducted at the TGNA. Interviewees stated clearly that the extension of the Customs Union to the 10 new members, will not mean recognition of Southern Cyprus either directly or indirectly and the agreement on the Customs Union will be signed with the Commission but not Southern Cyprus. 113. Interview by author, TGNA, June 2003. 114.  Various newspapers (Milliyet, Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet, Sabah and so on) on 25.01.2005 and 26.01.2005. 115. ‘Ankara warns Turkish Cypriot election winner over peace talks’, TurkishNY.com, 21.04.09, http://www.turkishny.com/en/english-news/6511ankara-warns-turkish-cypriot-election-winner-over-peace-talks.html accessed on 15.07.2009. 116. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005. 117. The detailed history of the problems between Greece and Turkey can be read from V. D. Vamik and N. Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks, Neighbours in Conflict, (London: The Eothen Press, 1994). The history begins with Anatolia before the Turks, Persian Wars, and a detailed history of the Ottoman Empire, the last century of the Ottoman Empire, the War of Independence. Also, the Cyprus issue, Davos, the effect of the Gulf War and the cultural similarities and dissimilarities are explained in detail in this book. 118. The historical background of this issue is given in great detail in O. Öymen, Silahsız Savaş Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2002). 119. For further information see the speech given by O. M. Otter, ‘Avrupa ve Orta Doğu Ülkelerinin Terrör Karşısındaki Konumları’, Doğu Anadolu Huzur ve Güvenlik Sempozyumu, 17-19 December 1998, (Elazığ: Elazığ Valiliği İl Emniyet Müdürlüğü and Fırat Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü, 1998). 120. M. Öztürk, ‘Bir Savunma Stratejisi Teklifi: Sınırötesi Tahkim’, Doğu Anadolu Huzur ve Güvenlik Sempozyumu, 17-19 December 1998, (Elazığ: Elazığ Valiliği İl Emniyet Müdürlüğü and Fırat Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü,1998). 121. Interview by author, TGNA, June 2003.

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122. H. Cemal, Kürtler, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 108. 123. M. Jouejati, ‘Water Politics as High Politics, The Case of Turkey and Syria’ in Reluctant Neighbour Turkey’s Role in The Middle East, ed H. J. Barkey, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 133. 124. Y. G. Yıldız, Oyun içinde Oyun Büyük Ortadoğu, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2004), 268. 125. The history of the PKK is mentioned in the subsequent pages. 126. ‘Syria’s role in our fight is very powerful and permanent.’ H. Cemal, Kürtler, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 41. 127. W. Hale, Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000, (İstanbul: Mart Maatbası, 2003), 326. 128. M. Jouejati, ‘Water Politics as High Politics, The Case of Turkey and Syria’ in Reluctant Neighbour Turkey’s Role in The Middle East, ed H. J. Barkey, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 133. 129. H. Cemal, Kürtler, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 107. 130. Quotation from former President Süleyman Demirel, in H. Cemal, Kürtler, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 122. 131. Milli Selamet Partisi. 132. Doğru Yol Partisi. 133. S. Ayata and A. Ayata, ‘Türkiye’de Güvenlik Sorunları, Ortadoğu Politikaları ve Güvenlik’ in Yeni Yönelimler, ed. A. R. Norton, (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2000), 80. 134. It should be noted that the military warned the government about these Islamist movements and forced the Erbakan Government to resign in that year as well. 135. Y. G. Yıldız, Oyun içinde Oyun Büyük Ortadoğu, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2004), 268. 136. S. Kohen, ‘Türkiye için Tehdit mi?, Milliyet, www.milliyet.com.tr, accessed on 25.08.2004. 137. ‘Turkey to transfer Iran gas to Europe’, Press TV, www.presstv.com accessed on 15.06.2009. 138. A. Murinson, ‘The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol 42, no 6, (2006): 958. 139. In the fight against the PKK, in the 1990s the western allies of Turkey applied an arms embargo on Turkey as a result of the violation of human rights in Southeast Anatolia. The first country to apply arms embargo was Germany and the other NATO members followed. Although Turkey argued that, as Öymen says, this was against the NATO Agreement, the arms embargo was realised. 140. For further information see M. Kibaroğlu, ‘Turkey’s Threat Perception

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from the East, A Roadblock in its March Toward the West’, in The Europeanisation of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, ed. A. L. Karaosmanoğlu and S. Taşhan, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2002). 141.  The World Factbook, www.cia.gov,accessed on 03.02.2004. 142. ibid. 143. B. Aras, R. K. Polat, ‘Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the new geographic imagination’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 61, iss 4, (2007):478. 144.  White Paper Defence, August 2000,http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/ GnPPD/pdf/p2c4.pdf, accessed on 03.11.2004. 145. 39th Meeting of the TGNA on 01.03.2003, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 6, www.tbmm.gov.tr, accessed on 14.12.2006. 146. H. Cemal, Kürtler, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 140. 147. Although in the several interviews conducted with Öcalan, he stated that he is not a Marxist or Leninist, the programme of the organisation and the statements were in that direction. In one of his interviews with Hasan Cemal, he identified himself as democratic socialist. [H. Cemal, Kürtler, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 40]. 148. From the documents seen in the internship, also a part of this document is in H. Cemal, Kürtler, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 457. 149. White Paper Defence, www.msb.gov.tr, accessed on 03.11.2004. 150. M. Radu, ‘The Rise and Fall of the PKK’, Orbis, 45 no 1 (2001), www. oranim.ac.il, accessed on 04.06.2004. 151. ibid. 152. W. Hale, Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000, (İstanbul: Mart Maatbası, 2003), 214. 153. B. Şık, ‘Kerkük’e 18 saatte müdahele planı’, Milliyet, www.milliyet.com. tr, accessed on 01.11.2004 and ‘Caydırıcı Ordu Zorunlu’, Cumhuriyet, 31.08.2004. 154. International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears over Kurdish Ambitions’, Middle East Report no 35, ( January 26, 2005), 11. 155. ‘Türkiye, ABD’nin 1 milyar dolarlık yardımını almayacak’ www.milliyet. com.tr. accessed on 04.03.2005. 156. Columnist in daily newspaper Cumhuriyet and Lecturer in İstanbul University in Economics Department. 157. E. Aydınlı, ‘Decoding Turkey’s Struggle with the PKK’, Security Dialogue, vol 33 no 2 (2002): 219. 158. Foreign Affairs Committee, Response to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Affairs, (London, July 2002), 6. 159. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005.

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160. ibid. 161. One of the campaigns that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs used against the relation between PKK and Greece, was to publish booklets and books on this issue. These booklets include pictures of Abdullah Öcalan with Greek MPs, visits of Greek Parliamentarian Delegation to Öcalan. The plans of the camps situated in Greece. Examples of the European newspapers and magazines, such as The Observer, and Europe, writing on the support given by Greece to PKK and testimonies of the terrorists trained in Greece. [Greece and PKK Terrorism, (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 1999)]. 162. Interviews by author, TGNA, January 2005 and December 2004. 163. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005 where the interviewee does not deny that there were issues between Turkey and the European countries on terrorism but as the security threats are globalised, s/he believes that these will decrease everyday. 164. H. Bağcı, Ortadoğuda Muhtemel Gelişmeler ve Türkiye, (Ankara: Başkent Üniversitesi Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2003). 165. European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, (2002):128. 166. Interview by author, Turkish Grand National Assembly, June 2003 and interview by author, Secretariat General for the EU Affairs, June 2003. 167. Former President Süleyman Demirel quoted in H. Cemal, Kürtler, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 41 and interviews by author confirmed S. Demirel in his arguments. 168. A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik Türkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu, (İstanbul:Küre Yayınları, 2001), 551-563. Chapter 4 1. C. Rhodes, ‘Introduction: The Identity of the European Union in International Affairs’, in The European Union in the World Community, ed. C. Rhodes, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 3. 2. Allen and Smith argues that the state-centric views makes it difficult to analyse European foreign policy and therefore it becomes difficult to account for the significance of the EU’s international role. They have suggested using the concept of international presence to make it possible to study the impact of EU in the world. D. Allen, M. Smith, ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena, Review of International Studies, vol. 16, (1990): 19-37. 3. In line with J. Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power, the EU chooses to co-opt rather than coerce. It obtains the outcomes it wants in world poli-

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tics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. ( J.S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5. 4. F. Cameron, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor: Far from Pushing its Political Weight Around’, in The European Union in the World Community, ed. C. Rhodes, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 19. 5. F. Duchene, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Europe Tomorrow, ed. R. Mayne (London: Fontana, 1972) and F. Duchene, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’ in A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European communities, eds. M. Kohnstamm, W. Hager, (London: Macmillan, 1973). 6.

7.

K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis 7th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NG: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp. 125-6. Christopher Hill, ‘European foreign policy: power bloc, civilian model – or flop?’, in Reinhardt Rummel, ed., The Evolution of an International Actor (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 44.

8. ‘Security and defence-priorities and deficiencies’, European Parliament, P5_TA (2003) 0188, A5-0111/2003. 9. O. Waever, ‘Discursive Approaches’, in European Integration Theory, eds. A. Wiener, T. Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 210. 10. O. Rehn, Values define Europe, www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu, accessed on 18.12.2006. 11. ‘Rationale for a European Security and Defence Policy’, European Foreign and Security Policy Newsletter, issue no 1, (March 2000). 12. TEU, Title V, Article 17.2. 13. R. Prodi, 2000-2005 Shaping the New Europe, (European Parliament, 15.02. 2000), 3, europa.eu, accessed on 18.12.2006. 14. K. Twitchett, Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), 1-2 and H. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no 5 (1990): 92-3. 15. S. Biscop and R. Coolsaet refer to the EU power as comprehensive security due to the integration of the military forces in EU’s civilian instruments. They suggest that this division within the literature on civilian power is already apparent in the earliest author’s writings such as Duchene and Maull. (S. Biscop, R. Coolsaet, ‘The world is the Stage-Global Security Strategy for the European Union’, Groupement d’études et de recherches Notre Europe Policy Papers, no 8, (December 2003): 31).

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16. I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no 2 (2002):239. 17. ibid, 253. 18. I. Manners, R. Whitman, ‘Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU’s Network of Relations’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 21, no 2, (1998): 231–49. 19. C. Bretherton, J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, (London: Routledge, 2006), 56. 20. S. Biscop, R. Coolsaet, ‘The world is the Stage-Global Security Strategy for the European Union’, Groupement d’études et de recherches Notre Europe Policy Papers, no 8, (December 2003): 17. 21. ibid, 213. 22. R. H. Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics Baptism by Fire, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 276. 23. C. L. Coryn, et al., ‘Response to September 11: Anxiety, Patriotism, and Prejudice in the Aftermath of Terror’, Current Research in Social Psychology, vol. 9, no 12 (March 2004): p 167-168-169. 24. S. Flechtner, New Impulses in European Foreign and Security Policy The Draft Constitution of the Convention and the European Security Strategy, www.colombiainternacional.org, accessed on 08.05.2005. 25. S. Ryning, ‘Towards a Strategic Culture for the EU’, Security Dialogue, vol. 34 iss. 4 (2003): 483. 26. R. King and G. Kendall, The State, Democracy and Globalisation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 176. 27. Defence Forces Ireland, Defence Forces Annual Report 2003, 11, www. military.ie, accessed on 05.05.2005. 28. European Security Strategy-A Secure Europe in a Better World, ue.eu.int, December 12, 2003 accessed on 06.05.2005. 29. M. Smith, ‘The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order’, Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 34 (1996): 5. 30.  European Security Strategy-A Secure Europe in a Better World, ue.eu.int, December 12, 2003 accessed on 06.05.2005. 31.  The Barcelona Declaration, www.euromedrights.net, accessed on 08.05.2005. 32.  MEDA Programme, europa.eu.int, accessed on 08.05.2005. 33. European Council, Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region, 2000, consilium.europa.eu accessed on 09.03.-2009.

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34. R. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe -A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’, Sixth ECSAWorld Conference. Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, europa.eu. 35. Council of the European Union, 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit, Barcelona 27th and 28th November 2005, Five Year Work Programme, 28.11. 2005, Brussels, ec.europa.eu. 36.  The European Commission’s Delegation Role in the Country, www.delsyr. cec.eu.int, accessed on 08.05.2005. 37.  Potential Impact of a EU-Syria Association Agreement, www.delsyr.cec. eu.int, accessed on 08.05.2005. 38.  Syria Condemns EU for Interfering in Domestic Affairs, english.people. com.cn, accessed on 29.07.2006. 39.  Syria Supports Iran in Standoff with West, www.csmonitor.com, accessed on 29.07.2006. 40.  Euro-Med Partnership Syria Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2004, Brussels, 2002, p15. 41. European Commission, National Indicative Programme 2011 – 2013 for Syria Concept Note , April 2009. 42.  Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, europa.eu.int, accessed on 08.05.2005. 43.  EU and Middle East Peace Process, europa.eu.int, accessed on 08.05.2005 44. European Commission, Progress Report Israel, Brussels, 23.04.2009. 45.  Council Conclusions, September 13, 2004, July 12, 2004, and June 14, 2004, europa.eu.int, accessed on 08.05.2005. 46.  Council Conclusions, October 13, 2003, europa.eu.int, accessed on 08.05.2005. 47.  Council Conclusions, September 13, 2004, europa.eu.int, accessed on 08.05.2005. 48.  The EU’s relations with Iran, europa.eu.int, accessed on 14.07.2005. 49. ibid. 50.  EU’s Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, europa.eu.int, accessed on 14.07.2005. 51. ibid. 52. Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on Iran, 2938th General Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 27 April, 2009. 53. A. Hastings, speech given in OSCE PA Expanded Bureau Meeting, 18.04.2005, (Copenhagen). 54. P. de Crem, Draft Report, For the General Committee on Political Affairs and Security, 18.04.2005, (Copenhagen), 6-8.

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55. A. M. Lizin, Draft Resolution, For the General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions, 18.04.2005, (Copenhagen), 4. 56. ibid. 57. Y. Tsantoulis, ‘Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different CEntres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals?’, ICBSS Policy Brief, no 12, (February 2009): 3. 58. ibid. 59. D. Triantaphyllou, Y. Tsantoulis, ‘Looking Beyond the Georgian Crisis: The EU in Search of an enhanced Role in the Black Sea Region’, ICBSS Policy Brief, no 8, (October 2009): 12. 60. S.A. Andreev, ‘The future of Euroepan Neighbourhood Policy and the Role of Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Area’, Southeast Euroepan and Black Sea Studies, vol 8, no 2 (2008): 102-103. 61. Y. Tsantoulis, ‘Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals?’, ICBSS Policy Brief, no 12, (February 2009): 5. 62.  The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Introduction, europa.eu.int, accessed on 04.08.2004. 63. ibid. 64. S. Ryning, ‘Towards a Strategic Culture for the EU’, Security Dialogue, vol. 34 iss. 4, (2003): 485. 65.  Assembly of West European Union, Document A/1816, ‘Developing a Security and Defence Culture in the ESDP’, Art 11, assemblyweu.itnetwork.fr, accessed on 08.05.2005. 66. ibid. 67. Here I mean military power; although occasionally economic power has been perceived as hard power, I refer to military power as hard power here. 68. European Commission Delegation, External Relations: a Global Commitment, www.delscg.cec.eu.int, accessed on 26.08.2004. 69.  Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, ec.europa.eu, accessed on 27.08.2004. 70. S. Biscop and R. Coolsaet, ‘The World is the Stage-A Global Security Strategy for the European Union’, Policy Paper, no 8, (December 2003), www.notre-europe.asso.fr , accessed on 28.04.04. 71.  European Security Strategy-A Secure Europe in a Better World, ue.eu.int, accessed on 16.05.04. 72. The European Union, A Global Player, www.delvnm.cec.eu.int, 30.08.2004.

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73. Grant – financed technical assistance to 12 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), and mainly aims at enhancing the transition process in these countries. (EU’s Relations with Eastern Europe and Central Asia, europa. eu.int, accessed on 13.04.2006). 74. A. Rahr, ‘Europe in the New Central Asia’, in Integrationsmodelle in Sentralasien und Europa, Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, Almaty, May 25-27, 2000. Chapter 5 1. This chapter does not intend to say if Turkey should be a member or not. The whole aim of this chapter is to illustrate the two faces of the security card that Turkey has to play. 2. S. Deringil, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürk’, in Turkish Foreign Policy New Prospects, ed by C. H. Dodd, (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press 1992), 3. 3. J. Fischer, Turkey’s European Perspective: The German View, www.esiweb. org accessed on 06.02.2006. 4. H. Bağcı and A. Yıldız, ‘Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): from Confrontational to Cooperative Relationship’, in The Europeanisation of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, ed. A. Karaosmanoğlu and S. Taşhan (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), 92. 5. S.P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations’, Foreign Affairs, vol 72 no 3 (Summer 1993), www.foreignaffairs.org, accessed on 05.01.2005. 6. Independent Commission, ‘Turkey in Europe, More than a Promise’, (September 2004), 16, www.independentcommissiononturkey.org accessed on 06.02.2005. 7. Ö. Şahin and E. Şen, Zaman, 29.09.2004. 8. A. Taheri, ‘Turkey’s Bid to Raise Its Islamic Profile and Court Europe may Backfire’, Arab News, October 6, 2004, www.benadorassociates.com , accessed on 06.10.2004. 9. Interview by author, TGNA, January 2005. 10. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. 11. A. Çarkoğlu, and B. Toprak, Türkiye’de Din, Toplum, ve Siyaset, www. tesev.org.tr , accessed on 30.05.2005. 12. ibid. 13. Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. 14.  The European Union, Turkey and Islam, www.wrr.nl, accessed on

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13.07.2004, 9. 15. ibid, 8. 16. ibid, 9. 17. A. Çınar, Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, Bodies, Places and Time, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 15. 18. ibid, 63. 19. A. Zarakol, In the National Interest, Turkey Turns over a Blank Leaf, www. inthenationalinterest.com, accessed on 29.07.2005. 20. A. Çınar, Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, Bodies, Places and Time, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 177. 21. ‘İşte Türkiye’nin Önündeki Engel Avusturya’nın Önerisi’, Haberturk. 22. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. 23. K. Derviş, M. Emerson, D. Gros, and S. Ülgen, The European Transformation of Modern Turkey, (CEPS: Brussels, 2004), 19. 24. B. Choudhury, Turkey’s New Aspiration, www.frontlineonnet.com, accessed on 29.07.2005. 25. P. Bilgin, Turkey & The EU: Yesterday’s Answers to Tomorrow’s Security Problems?, www.csrc.ac.uk, accessed on 09.08.2005. 26. N. B. Atıyas, ‘Yeni Dünya Eski Yaklaşımlar’, Foreign Policy (Turkish Edition), ( January February 2001): p 41-54 in P. Bilgin, Turkey & The EU: Yesterday’s Answers to Tomorrow’s Security Problems?, www.csrc.ac.uk, accessed on 09.08.2005. 27. P. Bilgin, Turkey & The EU: Yesterday’s Answers to Tomorrow’s Security Problems?, www.csrc.ac.uk, accessed on 09.08.2005. 28. Turkey’s military force is the second biggest army after the USA among the NATO member countries, having 635,500 active troops, and with availability of 16,756,323 man power. 29. M. Müftüler-Baç, ‘Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Security and Foreign Policies’, Security Dialogue, vol 31 issue 4, (2000): 489. 30. M. M. Hakkı, ‘Will the European Union Allow Turkey In?’, American Foreign Policy Interests, vol 27 (2005), p 397. 31. A. Eralp, ‘Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Türkiye Avrupa Birliği’, in Türkiye’nin Yeni Dünyası, Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri, ed by A. Makovsky and S. Sayarı (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları 2002), 252. 32. P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations, (London: Longman 1980), 58. 33. O. Öymen, Türkiye’nin Gücü, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye, Avrupa ve Dünya, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003),100. 34. H. Bağcı, A. Yıldız, ‘Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): From Confrontational to Cooperative Relationship’ in

234

35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY The Europeanisation of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, ed. A. L. Karaosmanoğlu and S. Taşhan, (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute 2004), 88.  Independent Commission, ‘Turkey in Europe, More than a promise’, (September 2004), http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/ report.html, accessed on 06.02.2005, 18. For more information, look at europa.eu.int, M. Emerson and G. Noutcheva, ‘From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy Assessment and Open Issues’, CEPS Working Document, no 220, (March 2005), www.euromedrights.net, accessed on 11.09.2005. G. Verheugen, The Enlargement and the Vision of the European Union in the New Century, www.eic.ac.cy, accessed on 25.08.2005. Independent Commission, ‘Turkey in Europe, More than a Promise’, (September 2004), 16, www.independentcommissiononturkey.org , accessed on 29.05.2005.  European Neighbourhood Policy, www.europa.eu.int, accessed on 30.05.2005. P. Suart, Caspian Basin Oil Pipeline Company Founded, www.wsws.org, accessed on 28.07.2005. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources website, www.enerji.gov.tr/, accessed on 10.06.2005.  Blue Stream Gas Pipeline, www.gazprom.ru, accessed on 28.07.2005. S. Stern, Turkey’s Energy and Foreign Policy, globalisation.icaap.org, accessed on 10.06.2005. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources website, www.enerji.gov.tr, accessed on 10.06.2005. European Commission Press Releases, Loyola de Palacio welcomes the agreement on the interconnection of Greek and Turkish gas networks, europa.eu.int, accessed on 14.02.2006. H. A. Kaloudis, New Age in Greek-Turkish Relations, www.acci.gr , accessed on 14.02.2006. F. S. Berenskoetter, ‘Mapping the Mind Gap a Comparison of US and European Security Strategies’, Security Dialogue, vol 36 no 1, (March 2005): 74. ibid, 86.  In Quotes: UN World Summit, news.bbc.co.uk, accessed on 23 January 2006. I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), 110. M., Kaldor, ‘Reconceptualising Organised Violence’ in Reimagining Po-

Notes

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

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litical Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, eds. Archibugi et al., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) in I. Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), 111. A. Treacher, ‘From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU’s Resistible Transformation’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no 9 iss 1, (2004): 52. European Union for the World Leadership, Report of KalDer International Workshops, 12, www.kalder.org, accessed on 10.11.2005. B. Gierich and W. Wallace, ‘Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces’, Survival, vol 46 no 2, (Summer 2004): 176. G. de Vries, at the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, New York, June 24, 2005, ue.eu.int, accessed on 15.11.2005. B. Gierich and W. Wallace, ‘Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces’, Survival, vol 46 no 2, (Summer 2004): 176. J. M. Nomikos, The European Union’s Proposed Intelligence Service, www. pinr.com accessed on 28.08.2005. RRF is not an army in the form of a traditional national army, which has peacekeeping duties rather than peace making. S. Duke, ‘The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no 9, (2004): 469. G. de Vries, at the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, New York, June 24, 2005, ue.eu.int, accessed on 15.11.2005. A. Missiroli, ‘The European Union: Just a Regional Peacekeeper?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no 8, (2003):496. T. Domin, History of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Origins to 1992, www.euforbih.org, accessed on 06.02.2006. ibid, 497. EUPM Mission Statement, www.eupm.org, accessed on 29.07.2005. EU in Southeast Europe: The European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina, www.delalb.cec.eu.int, accessed on 29.07.2005. S. Tull, Negotiating ‘Europeanisation’ in Croatia: Competing National, Regional, and International Interests, www.isanet.org, accessed on 09.02.2005. 2003 Berlin Plus Framework allows the EU to act militarily by using NATO assets only if NATO as a whole does not wish to act. The main purpose of the Berlin Plus is to avoid unnecessary duplications of what NATO can provide for collectively. This framework consisted of four topic that needed to be settled so that EU can have access to the collective assets and capabilities of the alliance; assured access to NATO’s planning

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68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81.

TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY capabilities, pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets being at the disposal of the EU, identification of a range of European command options, further adaptation of NATO’s Defence Planning System. However, this framework created a discontent among non-EU NATO members such as Turkey. Turkey was afraid of the possibility that the EU would use military force in the areas that she has national security interests. Thus, as a NATO member she did not let the EU use NATO assets without taking her into the decision making process. At the end of long discussions, Turkey obtained a privileged treatment when an EU led operation requires the use of NATO assets and capabilities Turkey (and other non EU NATO members) can participate in the EU led military crisis management operation and can be a part of the planning as well. A. Missiroli, ‘The European Union: Just a Regional Peacekeeper?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no 8, (2003): 501. S. Biscop, ‘Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no 9, (2004):513. ibid, 513. ibid, 515. C. Musu, ‘European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging Parallels’?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no 8, (2003): 36. H. Hubel, ‘The EU’s Three Level Game in Dealing with Neighbours’, European Affairs Review, no 9, (2004): 349. C. Musu, ‘European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging Parallels’?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no 8,(2003): 38 ibid, 44. T. Diez, ‘Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol 17 no 2, ( July 2004): 325. ibid, 325. J.E. Fossum, ‘Identity Politics in the European Union’, Arena Working Papers, No 01/17, www.arena.uio.no, accessed on 10.02.2006. S. İlhan, in his book Avrupa Birliğine Neden Hayır Jeopolitik Yaklaşım, argues that EU was constructed against the other. However, this kind of statement not only ignores the historical facts on the construction of EU but also misleads the people. Today, it is not fair to say EU’s other is Muslims, since not only Turkish Muslims but also Muslims from all over the world live in various EU countries. The negotiations between Turkey and EU started on October 3, 2005. On November 8, 2002, he told Le Monde newspaper that people who backed Turkey’s accession were the adversaries of the European Union,

Notes

82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

88. 89.

90. 91. 92.

93.

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Turkey is not a European country and the accession of Turkey in EU would be the end of EU. In the same speech he told the newspaper that ‘a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life’ and its demographic dynamism would potentially make it the biggest EU member state.’ After the decision on the start of the negotiations between Turkey and EU he also stated ‘I learnt of the news with sadness and surprise... It was said recently that the wishes of citizens are not taken into account sufficiently... The French people said four months ago, ‘We are against Turkey’s entry’, and here we are, four months later, and it’s happening.’(In Quotes: Turkey-EU Talks Deal, news.bbc.co.uk, accessed on 10.11.2005). I.O. Lessler, NATO Looks South; New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean, (RAND Publications: 2000), 30. ibid, 31. ibid, 36. ibid, 38. ‘Making European Defence Work: Copenhagen, Berlin Plus and ECAP’, European Security Review, no 16, (February 2003), www.isis-europe.org, accessed on 28.07.2005. M. Dassu and R. Mendotti, ‘Why Europe is Divided on Foreign Policy: Learning Lessons from the Iraq Debate’, at International Conference Aspen European Dialogue, Rome, February 28 - March 1, 2003, web2003. senato.it, 7. Interviews by author, Turkish Grand National Assembly June 2003 and January 2005.  For a Stronger and a Wider Union Part Two: The Challenge of Enlargement, Part VI. Relations with Turkey, (Strasbourg: Communication of the Commission DOC 97/6,15 July 1997), www.uni-siegen.de, accessed on 23.09.04. S. Kay, ‘Globalisation, Power, and Security’, Security Dialogue, no 1 (March 2004): 9. P. Bilgin, Turkey and the EU: Yesterday’s Answers to Tomorrows Security Problems?, (EU Civilian Crisis Management Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 2001), 44, www.csrc.ac.uk, accessed on 17.08.2004. As an example, Russia may be given. Russia was not very enthusiastic about Turkey’s candidacy to EU and on December 17, 2004, when Turkey’s candidacy was secured, one of the headlines of newspapers in Russia was ‘Goodbye Turkey!’ (M. Çetinkaya, ‘Batı Soğuk Eserse Moskova-Ankara Aşkı Filizlenir’, Zaman, October 3, 2005, http://www.zaman.com. tr/?hn=215806&bl=yazarlar&trh=20051003, accessed on 03.10.05).  World Fact Book, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/

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Index

9/11 3, 4, 22, 25, 26, 58, 63, 90, 91, 114, 117, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 151, 156, 163, 192, 197 Adana Agreement 103 Agreement 12, 29, 33, 42, 68, 73, 77, 80, 85, 89, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 103, 105, 106, 107, 113, 118, 125, 133, 136, 137, 141, 143, 144, 145, 151, 156, 157, 158, 163, 172, 173, 174, 177, 180, 197 Almond and Verba 47 Americanisation 13 Association Agreement 134, 136, 160 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 21 Balkans 16, 24, 64, 72, 119, 125, 133, 169, 170, 186 Berlin Plus Agreement 186, 193, Black Sea 1, 63, 64, 69, 94, 112, 117, 146, 147, 156, 171, 173, 190, 193, 197 Booth 24, 48 BTC 94, 172 Butterfly effect 17, 44 Buzan 24, 41, 44

Caucasus 24, 64, 65, 73, 88, 93, 94, 111, 117, 133, 145, 146, 156, 158, 169, 170, 173, 191, 193 Caucasus House Initiative 113 Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform 112 Caucasus Stability Pact 113, 115 Chirac 17 Clark 3, 23, 35, 54, 58 Clausewitz 48 Cold War 19, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32, 33, 37, 42, 43, 49, 55, 56, 63, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 101, 118, 122, 132, 160, 161, 168, 170, 175, 176 Collective security 43, 184 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 182 Communication 2, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 35, 46, 54, 59, 136, 142, 147, 158, 181 Communicational 26, 29 Community 19, 44, 47, 48, 57, 132, 167 Constructivism 45, 46, 48, 50, 59, 75 Copenhagen Criteria 71, 166 Copenhagen School 60 Cox 11

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Crawford 25 Crenshaw 26 Cross-cultural 15 Customs Union 95, 96, 200, 74 Customs Union Agreement 200 Cyprus 63, 67, 68, 69, 83, 84, 86, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100,171, 194, 200 Daly 9, 11 Democratic Peace 52, 53, 54, 55 Desch 51 Dicken 9 Directorate General for External Affairs 182 Eastern 64, 71, 72 Eastern Aegean islands 98 Eastern Bloc 24, 128 Eastern enlargement 189 Eastern Europe 80, 160, 171 Eastern Mediterranean 69, 94 Eastern Partnership 146 Eastern Turkey 190 Environmental security 29, 30, 57 ESDP 1, 98, 130, 148, 170, 177, 179,182 ESS 4, 21, 117, 129, 133, 147,156, 175, 178, 181, 188, 201 Ethnicity 28, 66, 75, 76 Eurasia 24, 69, 87 Eurasian 105, 170, 171 Euro 17, 31 Euro Chambers 186 Euro-Mediterranean 44, 134, 136 European Army 149 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 174 European Commission 66, 136, 141, 142, 143

European Council 71, 134, 138, 148, 156, 169, 182 European Court of Justice 131 European Defence Community 131 European Defence Policy 132 European identity 45, 74, 153 European Investment Bank 174 European Parliament 66, 121, 138, 147, 164 European Political Cooperation 132 European Religious Leaders Summit 162 European Security Policy 130 Europeanisation 13, 71, 92, 114, 147, 153, 158 Fukuyama 13, 50 Geertz 46, 47 Gilpin 11 Glaser 42 Gore 29 Gulf War 22, 85, 88, 89, 114, 132, 168, 169 Habermas 51 Hall 54 Harbottle 27 Helsinki Summit 71, 92, 114, 166, 170, 195, 199 Hirst 9 Hobbesian 174 Holsti 4, 22, 117, 119 Human security 29, 56, 57, 60, 174 Humanitarian 12, 27, 50, 55, 56, 100, 120, 132, 139, 142, 143, 147, 148, 149, 151, 158, 170, 179, 180, 181, 197, 207 Huntington 47, 50, 61, 159, 161, 192

INDEX ICJ 12, 32 IMF 21, 22, 58, 78, 166 International community 29, 35, 145, 157 International Cooperation 131, 146, 151, 152, 154, 182 International institution 11 International organisation 44 International system 10, 24,40, 41, 45, 46, 73, 88, 110 Iraq War 22, 23, 107, 110, 130, 176, 186 Islam 78, 79, 82, 86, 163, 164, 165, 183, 184, 190, 201 Islamic 3, 26, 63, 64, 69, 70, 72, 84, 85, 89, 91, 104, 114, 144, 152, 161, 162, 163, 164, 191, 196 Islamism 164, 200 Islamist 100, 104, 162, 163, 166 Johnston 49 Justice and Development Party 68, 69, 70, 91, 95, 96, 97, 114, 166, 168 Kaldor 37, 175 Katzenstein 47, 55 Kobrin 15 Kratochwil 46 Kurdish 66, 67, 86, 88, 92, 93, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 166, 167, 186, 187, 195, 199 Kurds 28, 41, 65, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 175, Legitimacy 22, 29, 30, 58, 118 Levitt 8 Liberal Institutionalism 43 Liberalisation 140, 11, 12, 18 Lippman 23

265

Longhurst 49 Lull 14 Manzaar 47 Margolis 26 Marshall Plan 29 McGrew 9 Mediterranean 3, 44, 63, 64, 69, 73, 81, 84, 87, 94, 117, 129, 133,134, 135, 136, 137, 145, 155, 156, 170, 171, 184, 186, 187, 197 Mercosur 21 Middle East 1, 3, 56, 63, 64, 68, 69, 73, 75, 79, 80, 87, 91, 93, 94, 99, 100, 101, 102, 109, 111, 114, 117, 133, 137, 138, 139, 141, 145, 162, 163, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 182, 183, 187, 188, 189 Military power 5, 27, 28, 72, 74, 93, 119, 168, 169, 174, 176, 185, 187, 197 Mitrany 36 Multilateral 11, 71, 100, 121, 131, 134, 139, 140, 147, 157, 175, 211 Multilateralism 122, 155 Multinational Corporations (MNC) 10, 20, 21 Myers 29 NABUCCO 94, 174, 193 NAFTA 21 National Action Party 67 National Security Council 63, 65, 69, 77, 90, 96, 113, 114, 168, 200 Nation-state 41, 45, 54 NATO 21, 43, 45, 60, 64, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 100, 118, 122, 131, 148, 148, 149, 151, 158, 160, 161, 168, 169, 170, 177, 179, 180, 181, 185, 186, 193, 200

266

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Negotiating Framework Agreement 2, 180, 200 Non-governmental organizations (NGO) 10, 19, 21 Non-Proliferation Treaty 25 Northern Cyprus 68, 95, 96, 97 Ohmae 35 Ohrid Framework Agreement 180 Onuf 46 Ottoman 1, 3, 4, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 100, 101, 104, 174, 192, 196 Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan 86 Peace of Westphalia 22 Political and Security Committee 182 Political Dialogue Agreement 144 Power 59, 65, 66, 68, 72, 73, 74, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 93, 94, 98, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 109, 110, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 136, 143, 147, 152, 156, 160, 161, 162, 166, 168, 169, 170, 173, 174, 176, 182, 185, 187, 190, 192, 197, 201 Realist 12, 39, 40, 44, 50, 51, 59, 60, 75, 86, 87, 98, 100, 114 Regular Report 71, 112 Republican People’s Party 65, 66 Republican Period 94, 104 Samsun-Ceyhan 94 Security community 39, 44, 52, 127, 128 Security culture 3, 4, 7,39, 40, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 58, 59, 60, 64, 75,

117, 121, 130, 131, 150, 196, 197 Security provider 4, 159, 160, 161, 168, 169, 197 Single European Act 132 Smith 14, 133 Snyder 47, 48, 49 Soft power 147, 187, 192 Southeast Anatolian Project 94, 101 Sovereignty 22, 23, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 42, 55, 107, 121, 131, 157, 177, 191, 196 Sowell 47 Stability and Growth Pact 189 Strange 35,57 Strategic community 48 Talibanisation 26 Thompson 9 Thrift 9 Thucydides 47 Trade and Cooperation Agreement 143, 144 Traditional Approach 3, 39, 40, 43, 47, 51, 59, 63, 65, 77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 114, 175, 196 Treaty of Westphalia 206 Turkish Armed Forces 4, 63, 65, 66, 69, 81, 82, 86, 89, 91, 92, 97, 99, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 165 UN 12, 21, 22, 28, 29, 31, 32, 36, 43, 58, 70, 81, 101, 102, 118, 120, 138, 142, 143, 157, 158, 175, 179, 181, 182, 185, 197 UN Security Council 89, 141, 181 UNDP 3, 56, 57 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 57

INDEX Waever 24, 41 Wendt 45, 46 Western 19, 34, 64, 70, 71, 72, 73, 79, 80, 81,82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 105, 109, 110, 114, 151, 160 , 165, 169, 170, 171, 188, 190 Western Civilization 192 Western Countries 13, 25, 66, 72, 91, 99, 172, 188, 192 Western Europe 72 Western European Union (WEU) 43, 150

267

Western Hegemony 26 Western Identity 45 Western Values 14 Westernisation 13, 64, 192 Westphalian 207 Wilde 24, 41 WMD 2, 60, 117, 123, 126, 127, 128, 137, 142, 145,152, 156 Wolfers 23, 51 Wolfowitz 25 World Bank 58 would-be states 41, 87, 175