The Future of European Security and Defense Policy 9781685852436

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The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

Werner J. Feld

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder Adamantine Press Limited a London

Published in the United States of America in 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 Published in the United Kingdom by Adamantine Press Limited 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Feld, Werner, J. The future of European security and defense policy / by Werner J. Feld p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-353-7 (alk. paper) 1. Europe—National security. 2. Europe—Military policy. I. Title. UA646.F45 1993 355'.03304—dc20 92-30722 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0-7449-0100-6

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

To Elizabeth

Contents

List of Illustrations Acknowledgments List of Acronyms

ix xi xiii

1

Introduction

1

2

The Changing Nature of NATO

7

3

Growing Demands for a New Security System

19

4

The Struggle for Political Union and Security Policy

35

5

Security Implications of the 1992 Integration Plan

49

6

The Usefulness of CSCE

63

7

Expansion of WEU?

73

8

New EC Institutions for Defense Policy Planning and Military Forces Coordination

9

91

Experiences from Franco-German Military Cooperation

101

10

Implications of the British and French Nuclear Forces

109

11

Political Union and Security: Interests, Plans, Institutions

115

vii

viii 12

Contents The Eventual Choice

135

Appendix A: Proposed Consolidated Draft Treaty Issued by the Presidency of the IGC on Political Union

151

Appendix B: Luxembourg Presidency's Concept of Political Union, June 1991

157

Appendix C: The Agreement of Maastricht as Signed on February 7, 1992

161

Index About the Book and Author

169 178

Illustrations

Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5

Should the EC Move Beyond a Single Common Market? Should a European Government Be Responsible to the European Parliament? Possible Functions of the EC Institutions Sociopolitical Profile of Those in Favor of a European Government Growth of Real GNP/GDP in the OECD Area Total Employment Number of Unemployed as a Percentage of the Civilian Labor Force Real Compensation of Employees per Head Perceived Benefits of EC Membership

24 25 26 27 52 52 53 53 55

Figures 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7

Need for Strong National Defense and Confidence in NATO Decisions Western European Security: NATO or EC? Desired EC Response to the Gulf Crisis Effects of the Gulf Crisis on the Prospects for Political Union Support for Unification and the EC, Autumn 1990 EC Membership as a "Good Thing" Sociopolitical Profile of Supporters of EC Membership EC or National Decisionmaking on Specific Issues EC or National Decisionmaking: Where Countries Stand The 1992 Integration Plan: Hope or Fear Social Charter as a "Good Thing" ix

28 29 31 32 56 56 57 57 58 59 60

Acknowledgments

I am especially indebted to Dr. Guy Vanhaeverbeke, f o r m e r director of Information Services for the European Parliament, who was instrumental in procuring many sources of knowledge and data essential for preparation of this book. I would also like to thank Dr. Paul Viotti, former chair of the political science department of the U.S. Air Force Academy, for providing me with opportunities at several professional meetings to discuss the various topics examined in this volume. I am most grateful to Pam Mercer for typing the manuscript with great competence and care and for never complaining about the innumerable changes I asked her to make. I would also like to thank Martha Peacock and the helpful staff at Lynne Rienner Publishers for the effective collaboration that took place during (he publication process. Finally, my thanks go to my students at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, and at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs for the many excellent ideas that surfaced during class discussions. In particular, the master's thesis on the W E U written by Julia Myers in 1991 was a superior piece of work and very useful to parts of this book. Werner J. Feld

xi

Acronyms

BAOR

cn

CDU CFE

eis

CPC CSCE CSO DG DRG EC ECOFIN ECSC ECU EEC EPC EPP ESPRIT EURATOM FAR FDP GNP IAEA IEPG IGC IRBM MBFR MEP

British Army of the Rhine command, control, communications, and intelligence Christian Democratic Union (German) Conventional Forces in Europe Commonwealth of Independent States Conflict Prevention Center Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Committee of Senior Officials directorate general Defense Representative Group European Community Economic-Financial Council European Coal and Steel Community European currency unit European Economic Community European Political Cooperation European People's Party European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technology European Atomic Energy Community Force d'Action Rapide Free Democratic Party (German) gross national product International Atomic Energy Agency Independent European Programme Group intergovernmental conference intermediate-range ballistic missile mutual and balanced force reduction member of European Parliament xiii

xiv MIRV MLRS NACC NATO OECD SACEUR SDI SEA SEM SHAPE SPD SWG WEU

Acronyms

multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle multiple-launch rocket system North Atlantic Cooperation Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Strategic Defense Initiative Single European Act Single European Market Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Social Democratic Party (German) Special Working Group Western European Union

1

Introduction

The extraordinary changes that were ushered in during 1989 and 1990 in East-West relations as a result of the political and economic transformations in Eastern Europe and the gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union have altered the existing bipolar East-West system into a unipolar one, with the United States the only remaining superpower. In turn, these changes were affected by the rapidly emerging crisis in the Gulf that started with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Backed by a number of UN Security Council resolutions, the coalition formed under the leadership of the United States and composed of European and Middle East countries as well as Japan rapidly defeated Iraq (in the "hundred-hour" ground war) and liberated Kuwait. But the financial costs for some members of the coalition, even those participating militarily only to a very small extent, were high, reaching into the billions of dollars. Germany and Japan were the outstanding examples. 1 Finally, the ongoing civil war in what was once Yugoslavia affected the regional security situation in Europe. The European C o m m u nity (EC) sought to impose a cease-fire on the fighting between the federal forces and Croatia, possibly through the intervention of the UN Security Council and the dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces, but the task turned out to be much more difficult than expected. Prior to the Gulf crisis and war, the decline in the perceived threat of the Soviet military had already begun to modify European and U.S. views of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( N A T O ) for European security and had sparked considerations of new missions for this Atlantic alliance and even alternatives to NATO. A number of Western Europeans began to see the Western European Union (WEU) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, also known as the Helsinki Act) as a potentially useful base upon which to build an all-European security and defense policy system. Thought has also been given to a possible expansion of the EC institutional framework to accommodate a fully inte-

1

2

The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

grated f o r e i g n and security policy setup. I n d e e d , the c o m m u n i q u é s o f the E u r o p e a n C o u n c i l m e e t i n g s in Dublin in April and J u n e 1990 e m p h a s i z e d t h e n e e d f o r " E u r o p e a n " s e c u r i t y . 2 S i m i l a r i d e a s w e r e e x p r e s s e d b y an i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r of m e m b e r s of the E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t , a n d it s e e m s that E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n president J a c q u e s D e l o r s s u p p o r t s a f u t u r e E C s e c u r i t y p o l i c y as part of t h e E C ' s f u n c t i o n s . T h e F r e n c h , G e r m a n , and D u t c h g o v e r n m e n t s also a p p e a r c o m m i t t e d in v a r y i n g d e g r e e s to t h e E C ' s b e c o m i n g , in d u e time, a federation with a military role, a l t h o u g h t h e last w o r d o n this m a t t e r has not been s p o k e n , and the nature of a " f e d e r a t i o n " is very u n c e r t a i n . 3 W h e n the United States r e s p o n d e d to the i n v a s i o n of K u w a i t o n A u g u s t 4 , 1990, a n d b e g a n to r u s h i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s to S a u d i A r a b i a , the E u r o p e a n N A T O allies w e r e p r o m p t l y i n f o r m e d b u t n o t consulted in the sense that their o p i n i o n s w o u l d o r could h a v e m a d e m u c h diff e r e n c e o n W a s h i n g t o n ' s decision. O v e r the d e c a d e s the issue of true c o n sultation a m o n g the alliance partners has o n o c c a s i o n b e e n a sore s u b j e c t f o r W e s t E u r o p e a n s and has fostered their p e r c e p t i o n s of u n d u e d e p e n d e n cy o n the United States. Indeed, it w a s the M i d d l e E a s t crisis that in the v i e w s of c o m p e t e n t E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s h i g h l i g h t e d t h e c o n t i n u e d c o m plete d e p e n d e n c e of E u r o p e o n the United States f o r its security n e e d s and that r e f l e c t e d d i v e r g i n g r e a c t i o n s of t h e m e m b e r s of the E C . 4 H o w e v e r , because President George Bush frequently phoned European leaders r e g a r d i n g the crisis and s u c c e s s f u l l y solicited their military s u p p o r t w h e n e v e r possible, n o n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s o n U . S . - W e s t E u r o p e a n relations s e e m to have developed. Indeed public opinion with respect to security policy b e c o m i n g part of the functional and policy f r a m e w o r k of the E C w a s m i l d ly positive in 1989 (36 percent vs. 3 0 percent) if seen f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e of the E C as a whole, although this support varied f r o m m e m b e r state to m e m b e r state. 5 A f t e r the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, this support s t r e n g t h e n e d : 61 p e r c e n t of E C c i t i z e n s stated in O c t o b e r 1 9 9 0 that a c o m m o n d e f e n s e system w a s necessary f o r the E C , 29 percent e x p r e s s e d a c o n t r a r y v i e w , and 10 percent "did not k n o w . " As to the impact of the crisis o n the progress toward political union, 33 percent of the r e s p o n d e n t s b e l i e v e d that it had e n h a n c e d this progress, 25 percent thought it had b e c o m e m o r e d i f f i cult, and 32 percent did not attribute any d i f f e r e n c e . In s u m , m o r e p e o p l e believe the crisis has b e e n a help rather than a h i n d r a n c e to the m o v e m e n t toward political u n i o n . 6 A s f o r E u r o p e a n public opinion toward the U.S. e f f o r t in the G u l f , s u p port w a s especially strong in Britain, G e r m a n y , and F r a n c e (80, 75, and 7 3 percent, respectively). H o w e v e r , w h e n it c a m e to reasons to j u s t i f y the stationing of forces in the Gulf, there were significant d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g t h e three countries. In Britain and F r a n c e the restoration of K u w a i t ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e evoked 5 7 and 48 percent positive r e s p o n s e s but in G e r m a n y o n l y 38

Introduction

3

percent. In that country 34 percent considered the international force justified, but only 24 percent of French and British respondents shared that opinion. 7 Meanwhile, the existing security systems in Europe, as far as they were able, attempted to respond to the crisis. N A T O ' s Mediterranean facilities were employed to assist allied warships and personnel moves to and from t h e G u l f , a n d t h e B r u s s e l s f a c i l i t i e s of N A T O a n d t h e S u p r e m e H e a d q u a r t e r s Allied Powers Europe ( S H A P E ) in M o n s , B e l g i u m , were available f o r planning and logistics. The W E U ministers met on August 21, 1990, in extraordinary session at the initiation of the French president of W E U to coordinate their actions in respect to the Iraqi invasion. Observers from Denmark, Greece, and Turkey accepted an invitation to attend this session. T o strengthen the efforts of the W E U members to ensure that Iraq c o m p l i e d with the e m b a r g o of the U N Security Council and render the sanctions on Iraq as effective as possible, W E U established working groups of officials from the members' foreign and defense ministries and developed close coordination in areas of operation and logistical support. 8 Although it is contributing to the European security issue in the field of conventional force reductions and has been instrumental in producing significant confidence-building measures, C S C E was not able to respond to the crisis as an organization. And of course the EC as an organization did not have any institutional means in the security area to react to the crisis, but in terms of foreign policy, the EC responded as a unit under the auspices of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the foreign policy-coordinating mechanism of the twelve EC member states. Indeed, in their joint d e c l a r a t i o n s , the EC foreign ministers fully supported the v a r i o u s UN Security Council resolutions vis-à-vis Iraq, and they stated in October 1990 that they would deal with the situation only as a unit. 9 They opposed individual initiatives to free hostages held by Iraq such as undertaken by the former West German chancellor, Willy Brandt, in early November 1990, b u t he t r a v e l e d to B a g h d a d a n y w a y w i t h t h e r e l u c t a n t b l e s s i n g of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. With the successful conclusion of the Gulf War and the liberation of Kuwait, full attention returned to the developments of the European security systems, despite the continuing civil war in the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a n republics. But one could argue that the current Yugoslav situation highlights the need for a careful examination and analysis of what would constitute the most effective and efficient security system for Western Europe, possibly linked with the EC. Such an exploration is the main purpose of this book. In addition, I inquire into related political issues. How would such a system affect the progress toward political unification of the EC, and how would the adoption of political union in turn influence security and defense policies in Europe? How would the emerging European security

4

The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

and d e f e n s e s y s t e m s c o n t r i b u t e m o s t e f f e c t i v e l y to e n s u r e E u r o p e a n and g l o b a l p e a c e ? H o w w o u l d it m e e t U.S. interests to r e m a i n an i n f l u e n t i a l f a c t o r in E u r o p e a n e c o n o m i c s and politics? I b e g i n w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n of the c h a n g i n g nature of N A T O and p r o c e e d to analyze t h e g r o w i n g d e m a n d s f o r c h a n g e s in current security s y s t e m s . T h e E C C o m m i s s i o n h o p e s that E u r o p e ' s e c o n o m i c integration (also k n o w n as " P r o j e c t 1 9 9 2 " ) will, b y t h e end of 1992, result in an i n t e r n a l m a r k e t w i t h o u t f r o n t i e r s that e n s u r e s the f r e e m o v e m e n t of g o o d s , p e r s o n s , s e r v i c e s , and c a p i t a l ; h o w will t h e e f f e c t s of t h i s e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n i n f l u e n c e the search f o r an up-to-date security and d e f e n s e s y s t e m ? W h a t is t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n military m u s c l e and political u n i o n ? I t h e n m o v e to an e x a m i n a t i o n of n e w institutions n e e d e d f o r E C d e f e n s e p l a n n i n g and m i l i t a r y f o r c e s c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of t h e E C , w h i c h w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y be a m a j o r d e p a r t u r e f r o m e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s . W o u l d it b e j u s t as u s e f u l to e x p a n d W E U f o r this p u r p o s e , o r c o u l d the f r a m e w o r k of C S C E o f f e r g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s a f t e r s o m e of its institutions have been strengthened or new ones added? Certain c o o p e r a t i v e activities b e t w e e n m i l i t a r y u n i t s of the E C m e m b e r states are a l r e a d y in e x i s t e n c e ( t h e F r a n c o - G e r m a n j o i n t b r i g a d e c o m e s to m i n d ) . C a n t h i s m o d e l be used b y other E u r o p e a n countries, and m i g h t t h e n o t i o n of " m u l t i n a t i o n a l " d e v e l o p into an e x t e n s i v e c o n c e p t for use in o r g a n i z a t i o n s s u c h as N A T O ? W h a t can w e learn f r o m the e x p e r i e n c e and activities of the F r a n c o - G e r m a n c o u n c i l of d e f e n s e and s e c u r i t y ? W h a t a r e t h e l e s s o n s derived f r o m the E C e f f o r t s to s t o p the civil w a r in the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a ? Finally, in what w a y , if at all, c a n the British and F r e n c h n u c l e a r f o r c e s be linked with a n e w security and d e f e n s e system tied to the E C ? T h e c o n c l u sions to this v o l u m e o f f e r us a vista into a m o r e rational world, at least in E u r o p e , a n d i n s i g h t s into h o w e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l p r o g r e s s c a n be s t r e n g t h e n e d through f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g security systems. B e f o r e w e b e g i n o u r e x a m i n a t i o n of the a b o v e issue areas, it m a y be u s e f u l to m a k e a f e w o b s e r v a t i o n s about the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the c o n c e p t s of s e c u r i t y a n d d e f e n s e p o l i c i e s . A c c o r d i n g t o A r n o l d W o l f e r s , " S e c u r i t y , in a n o b j e c t i v e s e n s e , m e a s u r e s t h e a b s e n c e of t h r e a t s t o acquired values, in a subjective sense, the a b s e n c e of f e a r that such v a l u e s will be a t t a c k e d . " 1 0 H e n c e , the m a j o r o b j e c t i v e s of any security policy m u s t be the creation of national and international political c o n d i t i o n s f a v o r a b l e to the protection of vital national or regional v a l u e s against e x i s t i n g and potential adversaries, as well as the a s s u r a n c e of territorial integrity. 1 1 T h e term " d e f e n s e p o l i c y " is m u c h n a r r o w e r and f o c u s e s o n the utilization of military activities and strategies to assure the a t t a i n m e n t of pertinent s e c u rity o b j e c t i v e s and the n e c e s s a r y m i l i t a r y f o r c e and d o c t r i n e s f o r t h e i r e m p l o y m e n t . T h i s is a c o m p l e x order and requires an a d e q u a t e o r g a n i z a tional f r a m e w o r k and e f f e c t i v e task p e r f o r m a n c e . It also n e e d s to take into

Introduction

5

consideration the ups and downs of domestic politics and their influence on relevant budgets for the EC and member states. Public opinion on this subject in the EC member states is, clearly, important and may furnish valuable insights. 1 2

Notes 1. In spring 1991 Finance Minister Theo Waigel of Germany conferred with Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady on the United States on what the final cost of the Gulf War had been. The figure given to Waigel was in "excess" of $42.5 billion, but Brady told him that eventually the figures would come closer to $54.5 billion. The Week in Germany, March 29, 1991, p. 1. 2. European Community News, No. 26/90 (June 17, 1990). 3. The Economist, August 4, 1990, pp. 41-42. 4. See Guy de Carmoy, "Franco-German Relations in the New Europe" (Insead-Fontainebleau, October 1, 1990, unpublished paper), p. 11. The Yom Kippur War in October 1973 and the differing energy vulnerabilities of the United States and Europe reflected their differences in interests, which were settled mainly along Washington's desires. For details, see Panayiotis Ifestos, Nuclear Strategy and European Security Dilemmas (Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 32-33. 5. This will be discussed in detail later in the volume. 6. Eurobarometer Flash, October 18, 1990. 7. Gallup Telefax, October 17, 1990. 8. For further details, see Willem van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security Order: WEU's Contribution," NATO Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (August 1990), pp. 18-23. 9. New York Times, October 29, 1990. 10. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150. 11. Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simone, "An Introduction to the Study of National Security," in Frank Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds.. National Security and American Society: Theory, Process, and Policy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1973), p. 36. 12. See the discussion by Douglas T. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, "Defense Policy in Comparative Perspective: An Introduction," in Murray and Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 3-9.

2 The Changing Nature of NATO

In the face of the extraordinary political and economic shifts in Eastern Europe, NATO is anxious to maintain its dominant position in the Atlantic community and its security framework, which would enable the United States to continue its influential role in Europe. Yet the long-term prospects for NATO are uncertain. There is no question that NATO was the primary actor in assuring the peace in Europe for four decades by providing the necessary deterrence against possible Soviet aggression through available conventional and nuclear forces. But with the sharp reduction of the Soviet threat brought on by the disintegration of the Soviet government and society into a looser Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the rationale for NATO as the defender of Western values, so clearly visible over the last forty years, seems to be disappearing. Still, it must be emphasized that an extensive and modem nuclear arsenal continues to exist in some of the CIS states, and their military forces remain very substantial—whereas their cooperation has not been fully assured. For West Europeans, as well as for many Americans, the need for defensive action by NATO forces on the Continent has been reduced substantially; at the same time, Europe's longstanding dependency on NATO and the United States, not always seen as a pleasant phenomenon, has diminished. Moreover, Soviet opposition to a unified Germany's membership in NATO was overcome by an agreement between President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl in July 1990,1 and this agreement again confirmed a much friendlier Soviet attitude toward the West in general. On the other side, Secretary of State James Baker of the United States provided assurance to the former Soviet leadership that the security needs of the Soviet people would be safeguarded. This might be done by a series of nonaggression pacts between individual CIS and other East European states and NATO, as the Warsaw Pact ceased to be a viable partner for such an agreement when the latter was formally disbanded on March 31, 1991.2

7

8

The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

This offer of nonaggression treaties was part of the London declaration on a transformed North Atlantic alliance issued by the NATO leaders on July 5 - 6 , 1990. 3 It also stated that "in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians, and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe." 4 It was not until meetings in Copenhagen in May 1991 and in Rome in November of that year that details of this suggestion were spelled out (and they are discussed later in this chapter). In any case, with German sovereignty fully restored in principle by the peace treaty of October 2, 1990, U.S. and other foreign military forces are gradually being withdrawn from German soil, and whoever should remain, perhaps temporarily, may require a contractual base under international law. Cries about the burden of U.S. troops in the form of maneuver damages and low-flying jet fighters were heard frequently during the 1980s, and even if there were good reasons for these inconveniences, it is understandable that Germans prefer to be rid of them, despite the financial cost of their departure. 5 There have been suggestions to give NATO new missions, such as ensuring and supervising the implementation of arms control treaties—the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and perhaps a future strategic arms reduction treaty—including the task of agreement verification, or moving into economic planning. While the former idea may be feasible, for NATO to enter the economic field makes little sense, considering the existence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and of course the EC. A major feature in the assessment of NATO's future must be its cost, which is estimated at about $144 billion for fiscal year 1992. This figure includes the cost of the forces allocated to NATO; nevertheless, even the expenditures for the administrative and logistical overhead of NATO headquarters (including SHAPE) are substantial. Any bureaucratic organization has a desire to prolong its life, and this is especially the case if that organization has been very successful in accomplishing its mission—as NATO has been during its forty-odd years. It may also be the normal tendency of any bureaucracy to seek the extension, if not further growth, of its life. Indeed, bureaucratic jealousy in Brussels may play an important role in future security policymaking for Europe if and when CSCE receives a broadened institutionalized base, WEU activities are intensified, or the EC Commission is expanded to accommodate a common security and defense system for the EC. 6 Before any assignment of new missions to NATO could be finalized, the war in the Gulf became a critical issue as 1990 began to turn into 1991. As a consequence, on December 17 and 18 a "Statement on the G u l f ' was issued at NATO headquarters in Brussels. It pointed out that the crisis in

The Changing Nature of NATO

9

the Gulf posed a potential threat to a NATO ally having common borders with Iraq and that Article 5 of the Washington treaty (NATO) would be applied if Turkey became a target of Iraqi armed aggression. "We reiterate our firm commitment to the security of the entire Southern Region, the strategic importance of which is highlighted by the crisis." 7 While combat in the Gulf ended successfully for the coalition partners and the issue of Iraq's violations of the UN cease-fire has been settled, supporters for the continuation of NATO as the foremost security and defense organization emphasize that credible deterrence for Western and Central Europe can only be assured through an effective alliance. They also remind those who have their doubts on this issue about the continuing strength of the former Soviet forces (conventional and nuclear) and CIS delays in finalizing the CFE process as well as difficulties that arose in coming to an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons reduction. NATO supporters thus expect crises on Western Europe's perimeter and extensive instabilities elsewhere during the next several years. If this is the case, the responsibility for overcoming such events must be fully shared by all members of the alliance, and new command arrangements may have to be devised that may incorporate multinational formations in order to overcome the onus of "occupation troops" in a particular NATO country. But without question, there will be difficulties regardless on what command level multinationalism among military forces is introduced. And this is a question not only of l a n g u a g e and c o m m u n i c a t i o n but also of n a t i o n a l pride. As David G r e e n w o o d of the Centre for D e f e n c e Studies at the U n i v e r s i t y of Aberdeen in Scotland notes: "Not that managing multi-nationality will be free of pitfalls. To take just one pertinent example, while there are good practical reasons for nominating a lead nation for new bi-national or multinational formations, the corollary—that some countries must accept junior partner status in such entities—may not be appealing to those member states so designated." 8 Another problem for a revised and perhaps renewed NATO may be the shape of its force structure. One proposal offers a premium for the defense over the offense (defensive superiority), which may lead eventually to a reduction of the defense industrial base and thus contribute to a build-down of the institutionalized military-industrial infrastructure. This approach would be quite different from the more traditional force structures needed for such concepts as forward defense or air-land battle that may no longer be relevant for current circumstances in Europe "because they would perpetuate a division of Europe that by then will be history." 9 This assertion by Hans Giinter Brauch may be too optimistic, but his following comments follow through on this idea:

10

The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

O n l y if o n e s u c c e e d s in gradually d i s m a n t l i n g the "national security state" or the "military industrial bureaucratic c o m p l e x e s " in the U . S . , in the U S S R , and in Europe can ambitious peace plans and a gradual shift from a c o m p e t i t i v e system of c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e f e n s e via military a l l i a n c e s to a c o o p e r a t i v e p a n - E u r o p e a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m have an opportunity to be realized. Thus alternative confidence-building force structure proposals may become a tool both to o v e r c o m e the institutional remnants of the cold war and to establish a new p e a c e architecture. 1 0

Residual Tasks for NATO Regardless of the assignment of new missions to N A T O in the future, a number of residual tasks will have to be carried out for which N A T O may remain essential as an organization. First, after all the discussions about a united G e r m a n y ' s becoming a member of NATO, this process should be carried out in order to ensure a smooth "embedding" process of the new Germany into the emerging economic and political order of the new Europe. With the military forces of the united Germany planned to be limited to 370,000 men and the reduction of U.S. and perhaps British forces speeded up by their partial movement to the Gulf region, the total n u m b e r of forces stationed in Western E u r o p e is being diminished not only for the time being but most likely permanently. If the G e r m a n idea of e s t a b l i s h i n g m u l t i n a t i o n a l ( c o r p s level) f o r c e s became N A T O policy, some problems burdening Germans as the result of hosting foreign troops may be eliminated, but frictions within the multinational ranks of the military could arise. If, as is likely, strong German sentiments demand complete ejection of n o n - G e r m a n forces f r o m G e r m a n y unless a contractual base under international law can be developed, U.S. units would have to be shifted to other N A T O c o u n t r i e s . T h e c u r r e n t German government may want to continue the present N A T O situation, as indicated by Chancellor Kohl in a recent declaration to the Bundestag, 1 1 but significant political forces may oppose it and lead to a reconsideration, even by a g o v e r n m e n t made up of a coalition of Christian D e m o c r a t i c Union (CDU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) leaders. Second, in Britain, which is strongly supportive of N A T O ' s continuation, a basic rationale may be the maintenance of a balance of power not only against the CIS, despite its obvious weakness at present, but perhaps also a g a i n s t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e s u r g e n t , p o w e r f u l n e w G e r m a n y . Anxieties about a more assertive Germany may also induce some of the smaller West European states to make serious efforts to retain a U.S. military presence through NATO. It is doubtful that the Germans would accept such a rationale for the continuation of NATO, and in due time the German

The Changing Nature of NATO

11

government may look for other security measures for the protection of its national interests. 12 Third, even if NATO were to retain operations only for a few years, the United States would continue to have a key role in intelligence and the provision of early warning capabilities. It would also be a major contributor to NATO's command, control, communications, and intelligence (C 3 I) activities and ensure involvement in planning operations. With respect to the nuclear force posture, there may be dissension about modernization and employment of short-range weapons. Germany has been strongly opposed to the modernization of the Lance missile and has prevailed. It does not like the employment of the standoff missile on U.S. (and British) aircraft but may be persuaded to accept it. Nuclear artillery seems to be eliminated completely, and this is acceptable to all. NATO could be changed substantially and combined with a purely European security system such as CSCE, WEU, or an expanded EC. I discuss these possibilities in later chapters of this volume. In the meantime we should ponder what Strobe Talbott had to say about the organization: The trouble is, N A T O is broken, at least conceptually. Its reason for being was to deter the Soviet Union from launching an invasion through West Germany to the English Channel. With that danger diminished to the vanishing point, NATO is already undergoing its own deconstruction, more subtle, dignified and gradual than that of the Warsaw Pact, but in the long run just as relentless. 13

Plans for the Future In early 1991, a conference of experienced U.S. policymakers, legislators, and scholars under the auspices of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, proposed possible changes in NATO's objectives, strategies, and organization in the light of the dramatic changes in Europe. The lines of departure for the deliberations were that the United States continues to have a fundamental interest in preserving European peace and security and that NATO remains an essential instrument for pursuing this interest. Moreover, NATO continues to play a crucial role in ensuring the smooth transition to a Europe that is truly free. There were three major points in the proposals: 1. U.S. forces in Europe should be reduced from the 1990 level of 300,000 to fewer than 100,000. U.S. combat forces in Europe should operate as part of multinational military formations in which regiment-sized national units are organized at the level of corps or numbered air force.

12

The Future of European Security and Defense

Policy

2. To reflect changes in relative national contributions, N A T O ' s European members should assume a more proportionate role in N A T O decisionmaking processes. For example, a European could be named as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). In such an event, control of U.S. nuclear forces assigned to NATO should be vested in a U.S. deputy to the European SACEUR. 3. Even as NATO is preserved and restructured, CSCE, encompassing all the nations of Europe plus the United States and Canada, needs to be nurtured and its functions expanded. It should discuss European security issues, coordinate confidence-building measures, and verify arms control measures, evolving gradually into a mediating and peacekeeping body. Participants in the conference believe that U.S. military involvement in NATO has served vital functions for European security and certainly has maintained the peace in East-West relations. The executive summary of the conference concluded as follows: Thus, although substantial changes in the c o m p o s i t i o n and level of America's material support to, and role in, the Alliance are in order, the United States, in our view, must preserve its commitment to the peace and security of Europe for years to come. Through its participation in the N A T O alliance and its active engagement in the CSCE process, the United States serves vital functions for European security, reassuring allies and former adversaries alike. U.S. military involvement on the Continent has provided, and will continue to provide, the stabilizing influence necessary for steady progress toward European integration and EastWest reconciliation. 14

Although in terms of U.S. interests the above proposals seem to be reasonable, they may not be fully persuasive to many Europeans. Dependency on U.S. security and defense policy decisionmaking with little influence by European leaders is a continuing concern in Germany, and EC member states are increasingly suspicious about possible East-West deals at European expense. Another concern is that NATO costs for military forces and administration are perhaps too high, and the acquisition of weapons and material may be of greater benefit to the United States than Europe. Finally, as public opinion surveys have shown, a growing n u m b e r of Europeans would like to make security and defense policy decisions on their own (see Chapter 3). As Armand Clesse, a political science professor at the University of Saarland in Germany, has observed: "What is needed is a change of attitude. West Europeans must give up their intellectual and political passivity. In the past they have accepted American protection. Some have ostracized the modalities of this security relationship or even its

The Changing Nature of NATO

13

essence; they were, however, not prepared to involve themselves actively in the process of change to improve the working of the Alliance." 15 But no matter what concerns are expressed by some European scholars or what predictions Strobe Talbott has made about the future of NATO, NATO leaders seek to develop plans that seem to diverge from the advice of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute and of some Europeans. Their plans are based on current studies undertaken by a group working for the NATO assistant secretary-general for policy and plans, Michael Legge, a Briton.

An Initiative for NATO's New Look The details of what may be NATO's new look were discussed in spring 1991 and a general shape has emerged. In place of the "layer cake" of eight allied army corps lined up along what used to be West Germany's eastern border, there will be half as many. Most of the corps will be further back, although there may be some "guard formations," perhaps a German corps, well forward. The one U.S. corps left after removal of other U.S. forces to the Gulf region and a couple of German corps will likely remain national units. One or two other corps will be multinational units composed of three or four national divisions. At the end of May 1991, at a council meeting in Copenhagen, NATO announced agreement among its members on the detailed outline of the new look of its forces in Europe. It included a 50 percent cut at least of overall U.S. forces and a smaller reduction of the alliance as a whole. 16 It meant that the issue of NATO's restructuring was being faced in view of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and it followed the substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Europe as some units were moved to fight in the Gulf and then returned to the United States. It is noteworthy, however, that the NATO reductions will only begin at the end of 1994 and are expected to be completed by the end of the decade. This means that NATO activities, although in an altered form, will continue and that the concerns of the NATO bureaucracy in Europe to remain as much as possible in charge have been fulfilled, although some decline in numbers can be expected as the result of the reorganization. The centerpiece of the reorganization will be a multinational rapidreaction corps of 50,000 to 70,000 troops under British command, partly headquartered in the United Kingdom and based in Germany. It is planned that this corps will include troops from Germany, the N e t h e r l a n d s , Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, Greece, Spain, and possibly Turkey. Some ground forces from the United States may also be included. Washington would also provide planes, helicopters, and logistical support. The rapid-

14

The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

reaction force is expected to respond in five to seven days. It would i n c l u d e a heavy armored British division, about 15,000 troops, stationed in G e r m a n y , and another British division of light armor and parachute t r o o p s as well as two multinational divisions. 1 7 T h i s n e w r a p i d - r e a c t i o n f o r c e c o u l d be u s e d o u t s i d e E u r o p e if t h e N A T O t r e a t y w e r e a m e n d e d ; at p r e s e n t N A T O ' s role is l i m i t e d to t h e E u r o p e a n c o n t i n e n t , N o r t h A m e r i c a , T u r k e y , and the i s l a n d s u n d e r t h e jurisdiction of any N A T O m e m b e r s in the North Atlantic area north of the T r o p i c of C a n c e r . 1 8 In addition, G e r m a n y is l i m i t e d by its c o n s t i t u t i o n (Basic L a w ) f r o m sending troops abroad. T h e g o v e r n m e n t of C h a n c e l l o r Kohl would like this provision of the constitution a m e n d e d , but that w o u l d require the agreement of the opposition Social Democrats, w h o currently seem to be willing to consent only to G e r m a n forces cooperating with U N peacekeeping activities anywhere in the world. In addition to the rapid-reaction corps, there would be s e v e n c o r p s strength units of ground forces, each with 5 0 , 0 0 0 to 70,000 troops. Six of these c o i p s are to be in Western Europe. All would be m u l t i n a t i o n a l — t w o c o m m a n d e d b y G e r m a n y , o n e b y B e l g i u m , a n d o n e by a c o m b i n e d G e r m a n - D a n i s h staff. A seventh corps would be in the territory of what had b e e n E a s t G e r m a n y ; this c o r p s w o u l d b e e x c l u s i v e l y G e r m a n b e c a u s e N A T O is forbidden to operate in the area as a result of the agreement o n G e r m a n u n i f i c a t i o n . 1 9 N A T O ' s top field c o m m a n d e r u n d e r t h i s o v e r a l l structure would remain a U.S. general. T w o more c o m p o n e n t s are expected to m a k e u p the future N A T O : a brigade-sized mobile unit of about 5,000 troops that could respond to a crisis within seventy-two hours and an augmentation force of u n d e t e r m i n e d size, probably exclusively American, that would reinforce existing N A T O units in the event of imminent war and would consist of both active and reserve troops. T h e radical changes in N A T O ' s military structure announced in spring 1991 and presented in s o m e detail above suggest that the alliance felt it n e c e s s a r y to r e s p o n d to the s h a r p l y r e d u c e d t h r e a t but s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s o u g h t to forestall m o v e s by the E C to d e v e l o p an i n d e p e n d e n t d e f e n s e capability (discussed in detail in C h a p t e r 8). In addition, this r e v a m p e d structure gives the United States a strong rationale to continue its political and e c o n o m i c influence in Europe during the crucial period of Project 1992 w h e n the E C might display considerable d y n a m i s m and potential leadership. T h e mere fact that a U.S. officer is certain to remain the S A C E U R for the i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e g u a r a n t e e s W a s h i n g t o n an o n g o i n g c e n t r a l role in Western Europe. T h e influence of the S A C E U R on the multinational staff is normally pervasive, and this influence is likely to filter through the highranking staff m e m b e r s of other national military forces to important nonmilitary officials of various European governments.

The Changing Nature of NATO

15

T h e emphasis on the role of the British military in this new structure is also s i g n i f i c a n t because it tends to isolate F r a n c e , a l t h o u g h P r e s i d e n t François Mitterrand immediately declared that F r a n c e w o u l d r e m a i n a "loyal ally" but was also determined to preserve its independence in relation to the alliance. 2 0 T h e above plans have been fully accepted by all E u r o p e a n m e m b e r g o v e r n m e n t s of N A T O except F r a n c e , w h i c h h a s r e j e c t e d t h e idea of forming a new integrated command, seeing it as a retreat. 2 1 This is a very complex issue. As the Economist states with a great deal of insight: " T h e trick is to find a way of giving the Europeans enough of a feeling that they can pursue security policies of their o w n without at the same time forming a European defense association which would drive the Americans away." 2 2 At a N A T O meeting of heads of state and government of the m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s h e l d in R o m e N o v e m b e r 7 - 8 , 1 9 9 1 , t h e p l a n s m a d e in Copenhagen earlier that year were generally approved. Also during that meeting President Bush challenged his N A T O partners to state whether they wanted the U.S. role in the defense and the affairs of Europe to continue or if it would be made superfluous by European union. If the latter were the case, "if your ultimate aim is to provide individually f o r your o w n defense, the time to tell us is today." 2 3 The president's remarks brought a flurry of assurances f r o m leading West European spokespeople, including French officials, insisting that all supported the presence of U.S. forces in Europe and that the Europeans did not want to push the United States out of Europe. 2 4 But of course the political integration process of the EC, no matter how slowly it may proceed, will in due time impact on NATO, and the competing security and defense organizations of WEU and CSCE, no matter how weak they currently are in providing any assurance of defense and peace, must be kept in mind with respect to their role in the future. In the meantime, responding to requests by East Europeans (former Warsaw Pact members), N A T O leaders have approved the creation of a twenty-five-nation cooperation council as a way of giving formal structure to growing links between the alliance and the former Soviet bloc, including the three Baltic countries. The mandate of the council is to discuss regional security issues and promote confidence-building m e a s u r e s at a time of growing national and ethnic disputes in Eastern Europe and across the former Soviet Union. 2 5 On D e c e m b e r 2.0, 1991, the first m e e t i n g of the N o r t h A t l a n t i c Cooperation Council ( N A C C ) took place at the N A T O h e a d q u a r t e r s in Brussels. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and a representative of the CIS participated. Their shared goal was to make Europe "whole and free." The focus of the N A C C con-

16

The Future of European Security and Defense

Policy

sulfations and deliberations will be on security and related issues such as "defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military relations of air traffic m a n a g e m e n t , and the conversion of d e f e n s e p r o d u c t i o n to c i v i l i a n purposes. 26 Meetings of the NACC are likely to be quite frequent throughout the year and to be or the highest level (namely, ministerial) as well as on lower levels. The purpose of this schedule is to develop a more intense institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues with the new East European partners. It also strengthens N A T O ' s rationale to continue its presence in Europe, an important objective of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, it creates a system in which the military assets and services of the United States become an indispensable part of the European interrelationships in general. At the Rome summit in November 1991, the NATO members also adopted a comprehensive document that contained a "new strategic concept." 27 The security tasks for NATO are listed as follows: 1. [To establish a] stable security environment in Europe in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. 2. To serve as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issue that affect[s] their vital interests. 3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state. 4. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe. 28

The document recognizes that other European organizations such as the EC, WEU, and CSCE also have roles to play in these fields. The creation and recognition of a European identity in security and defense will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However, the document shows that the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is therefore seen as the essential forum for consultation and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members. 29 According to the document, the alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect it acknowledges the valuable contributions being made by other organizations such as the EC and the CSCE and points out that the roles of these organizations and of the alliance are complementary. 30 The document stresses that the allies are now committed to pursuing cooperation with all

The Changing Nature of NATO

17

states in Europe. This policy of cooperation is seen as the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. 31 A s far as the n e w strategic environment is concerned, the document emphasizes that a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and multidirectional risks, which in turn have engendered the new force structures 32 discussed earlier in this chapter.

Notes 1. New York Times, July 17, 1990. 2. Denver Post, March 31, 1991. 3. See NATO Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (August 1990), p. 32. 4. Ibid. 5. See New York Times, April 6, 1990; and Le Monde, October 8, 1990. See also Article 7 of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. 6. Financial Times, October 2, 1990, p. 7. I return to the details of the predicted CSCE and WEU developments in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. 7. NATO Review, No. 6 (December 1990), p. 5. 8. NATO Brief, No. 6 (1990), p. 6. For an excellent general discussion of multinational NATO forces, see Rolf Hallerbach, "Zauberformel der Zukunft: Multinationale NATO-Truppen," Europäische Sicherheit, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 21-24. 9. Hans Günter Brauch, "German Unity, Conventional Disarmament, Confidence Building Defense and a New European Order of Peace and Security," paper presented at the Thirty-Second Convention of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, B.C., March 20-23, 1991. 10. Ibid. 11. Focus on Germany, April 1991, p. 2. 12. See in this connection Phil Williams, "The United States and European Security in the 1990s," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September 2, 1990. 13. "Defusing the German Bomb," Time, July 2, 1990, p. 34. 14. "The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe," a report by the Working Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance, Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1991. 15. "U.S. Nuclear Arms and the Future of West European Security," in Richard L. Rubinstein, ed., The Dissolving Alliance (New York: Paragon, 1987), pp. 92-113, on p. 108. 16. New York Times, May 29, 1991, pp. Al, A6. 17. New York Times, May 23, 1991, p. A6. 18. Article 6, NATO treaty. 19. New York Times, May 23, 1991, p. A6. 20. New York Times, May 30, 1991, p. A3. 21. Economist, March 31, 1991, p. 44. 22. Ibid. 23. New York Times, November 8, 1991, p. 1. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., November 7, 1991, p. A7.

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The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

26. NATO Review, No. 1 (February 1992), p. 30. A second NACC meeting was held on January 10, 1992. 27. See Europe Documents, No. 1742 (November 9, 1991). 28. Ibid., par. 21, p. 4. 29. Ibid., par. 22, p. 4. 30. Ibid., par. 28, p. 5. 31. Ibid., par. 30, p. 5. 32. Ibid., pars. 40-54, pp. 7-10.

3 Growing Demands for a New Security System

Beginning with the late 1980s, calls for European security systems closely tied to the E C have come from several quarters. One o f the reasons was o f course the radically changed East-West relationship and the political and economic disintegration o f the Soviet Union. But the prospect o f E C economic and political unification also played an important role.

The European Council Initiative T h e most significant call originated from the European Council meeting in Dublin in June 1990. Council members agreed to hold an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on political union in Rome in December o f that year, the issue of security to be high on the agenda. Already at the preceding European Council meeting in April 1990, also in Dublin, it was agreed that the future dynamic development o f the EC had become an imperative not only because it corresponded to the direct interests o f the twelve member states but also because it was a crucial element in the progress toward establishing a reliable framework for peace and security in Europe. Such a framework may require "the transformation o f the Community from an entity mainly based on economic integration and political cooperation into a union o f a political nature, including a common foreign and security policy." 1 The proposal for a common foreign and security policy goes beyond the coordination mechanism of E P C as it currently functions with respect to the foreign policies of the twelve E C member states and necessitates the definition of the security dimension as well as the integration of economic, political, and security aspects o f foreign policy. If appropriate tasks were transferred to E C institutions, the corresponding increase in the power and responsibilities of these institutions could well lead to the strengthening of

19

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The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

the E C ' s diplomatic and political actions vis-à-vis third countries, international organizations, and in other multilateral fora. 2 O n the one hand, the inclusion of the security d i m e n s i o n m a y prove beneficial for E C efforts to m o v e political union forward. T h e concept of creating military muscle for the special use of the E C m a y appeal to a n u m ber of Europeans w h o would like Europe to speak with one voice and w h o chafe at the thought of being too dependent o n the United States for their security and d e f e n s e needs. As already suggested in Chapter 1, the Gulf crisis might have strengthened such perceptions. O n the other hand, progress toward political union, w h o s e nature m a y a p p r o x i m a t e a federal system in d u e time, would foster e s t a b l i s h m e n t of facilities for E C security and defense policies. One could, then, conceive of a positive interaction b e t w e e n m o v e m e n t t o w a r d political u n i o n and the creation of an E C security system. Such a process, h o w e v e r , is likely to be slow and would very m u c h depend o n the attitudes and actions of the m e m ber states to bring about political unification. T h e president of the European C o m m i s s i o n , Jacques Delors, m a y well sympathize with the possibility of beneficial links between E C security policy and progress toward political union. In any case, he supports the develo p m e n t of a n E C s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . As m e n t i o n e d e a r l i e r , t h e F r e n c h , G e r m a n , and D u t c h g o v e r n m e n t s also b e l i e v e the E C s h o u l d e v e n t u a l l y b e c o m e a federation with a military role, 3 but no final decisions h a v e b e e n made.

The European Parliament's Proposals In the E u r o p e a n Parliament, calls for an EC-related E u r o p e a n security system were heard by a n u m b e r of deputies in the last part of 1989 and the first half of 1990. O n J u n e 7, 1990, t w e n t y - o n e m e m b e r s of t h e E u r o p e a n Parliament ( M E P s ) from center parties proposed a resolution that included a d e m a n d for the development of fresh bases of c o m m o n security policies to reflect the new quality of the relations a m o n g European states. In addition, they suggested that a working group be set u p within the f r a m e w o r k of E P C in order to d r a w up the " f u t u r e architecture of E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y " with c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the C S C E s y s t e m . 4 T h e s e and similar r e s o l u t i o n s w e r e approved by 199 votes in f a v o r and 28 against, 5 but the type of security system that will satisfy the M E P s is just beginning to e m e r g e and could be a strengthened C S C E , a strengthened W E U , a modified N A T O , or a n e w system to be part of the EC. In June 1991, by 130 votes in favor, 66 against, and 10 abstentions, the E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t a d o p t e d a r e s o l u t i o n on the i m p o r t a n c e of a " E u r o p e a n security p o l i c y . " S p o n s o r e d b y G e r m a n C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t

A New Security System

21

Hans-Gert Pottering, chairman of the Security and Defense Subcommittee, it recommended the granting of competences to European institutions in matters of foreign and security policy similar to those they have in other fields of EC policy. Specifically, the parliament asked for the following actions: •

•

• •

•

•

•

•

creation of a Council of Ministers responsible for questions of defense in the context of the EC and the setting up of regular joint meetings of foreign and defense ministers acting as a security council to "examine the fundamental questions of security policy and make decisions"; setting up of a decisions procedure facilitating "the forming of consensus while taking into account majority opinion, so as to allow the rapid adoption of common positions and . . . joint actions for this or that sector, to define precisely foreign and security policy with the possible a priori application of the principle of a three quarter majority"; nonexclusive right of initiative for the Commission in problems of foreign and security policy; nomination of a member of the Commission specifically responsible for foreign and security policy, called on to answer to the European Parliament; creation by the Commission of a specific independent agency charged with observing and controlling the production of and trade in arms among the member states and to third countries; full association by the parliament in the foreign and security policy activities through powers of control; an obligation for the Council to inform the parliament regularly; the setting up of consultation p r o c e d u r e s allowing for dialogue a m o n g the p a r l i a m e n t , the Council, and the Commission in these fields; compulsory approval by the parliament (by absolute majority by its members) of all fund a m e n t a l decisions relating to f o r e i g n and d e f e n s e p o l i c y ( f o r example, military alliances, modification of the foundations of military strategy, decisions on military approaches in the case of conflict); c o m p u l s o r y approval by the p a r l i a m e n t in the s i g n i n g of agreements with third countries and international organizations as well as f o r agreements on disarmament and other security policy treaties and agreements; institutionalization of the CSCE as a c o m p l e m e n t to E u r o p e a n union concerning European interests in matters of security, and a j o i n t representation by the three E C institutions, a l o n g s i d e the member states, at all levels of the CSCE; development of an arms exports policy "within the competencies of

22

The Future of European Security and Defense Policy

• •

•

the European Commission" and immediate renunciation by m e m b e r s t a t e s , b e f o r e the c o n c l u s i o n of the I G C o n p o l i t i c a l u n i o n , to recourse to Article 2 2 3 of the treaty, which e m p h a s i z e s the national character of security policy; implementation of defense doctrines based exclusively on d e f e n s i v e strategies; creation of multinational European units and, should the case arise, their d e p l o y m e n t to guarantee peace and security in all the m e m b e r states of the EC; reflection on the harmonization of the legal bases of military service and the alternative civilian service in states c o n c e r n e d b y this question. 6

S o m e of the above proposals, if accepted by the E C as a whole, w o u l d c o n f l i c t w i t h the p l a n s and spirit of the N A T O i n i t i a t i v e d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 2, especially the creation of exclusively E u r o p e a n m u l t i n a t i o n a l units and their d e p l o y m e n t policies. But t h o u g h support of the E u r o p e a n Parliament can play a significant role for the determination of the f u t u r e security and defense policy f r a m e w o r k in Europe, the p a r l i a m e n t ' s e f f e c tiveness attaining m a j o r structural changes of the E C is limited. T h i s certainly has been obvious during the attempt to have the 1982 d r a f t treaty for European union accepted by all the m e m b e r states. Another attempt following the D e c e m b e r 1990 I G C on political union m a y be m o r e s u c c e s s f u l as the climate of opinion for the appropriate changes in external p o l i c y m a k i n g m a y have improved, partially because the p a r l i a m e n t ' s influence in internal decisionmaking has been strengthened since the introduction of the Single E u r o p e a n Act ( S E A ) of 1987. But there are still n e g a t i v e a s p e c t s to be overcome. In m a n y parliamentary sessions, half of the M E P s are absent and hence d o not vote, and frequently the topics debated hold little interest for the public in the E C m e m b e r states. Nevertheless, m a n y of the technical details so boring to the public—and in this category fall the nearly 2 , 0 0 0 a m e n d m e n t s to the C o m m i s s i o n ' s single-market l a w s — a r e fascinating an i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r of l o b b y i s t s , at p r e s e n t a b o u t 200, w h o c a n n o w be found working full time in the parliament. 7 And it is precisely the e x p a n d ing attraction of lobbyists to the p a r l i a m e n t that is likely to e n h a n c e its political clout and reduce the "democratic d e f i c i t " about which m a n y people in the E C complain. 8 T h e wishes of many M E P s to give a future security and d e f e n s e system a distinctly E u r o p e a n flavor find a legal basis in the SEA. T h e key article is N u m b e r 30, Section 6, which reads as follows: (a) The High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation o n questions of European Security w o u l d contribute in an essential w a y to the

A New Security System

23

development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security. (b) The High Contracting Parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They shall work to that end both at the national and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies. (c) Nothing in this Title (III) shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security between certain High Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance. 9

Analysis of EC Public Opinion T h e t h o u g h t s e x p r e s s e d in t h e S E A a b o u t E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y a n d t h e r e s o l u t i o n s p a s s e d in t h e p a r l i a m e n t d o i n d i c a t e w h a t a n u m b e r o f E C a n d p e r h a p s n a t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s , as w e l l as s e g m e n t s of t h e p u b l i c , c o n s i d e r d e s i r a b l e o b j e c t i v e s . B u t it will t a k e m u c h m o r e t h a n t h e p a r l i a m e n t t o m o d i f y t h e c u r r e n t s e c u r i t y and d e f e n s e f r a m e w o r k , w h i c h r e m a i n s p r i m a r i l y c e n t e r e d o n N A T O , and c o n s t r u c t a f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t s y s t e m . C e r t a i n l y , t h e c o m m i s s i o n w o u l d h a v e to b e the m a j o r i n i t i a t o r f o r s u c h a p r o j e c t , a n d t h e C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s and the m e m b e r g o v e r n m e n t s w o u l d h a v e to p a r t i c i p a t e in a n d f u l l y s u p p o r t s u c h a d i f f i c u l t t a s k o f f a r - r e a c h i n g m e t a m o r p h o sis. A n i n f l u e n t i a l f a c t o r in this e n t e r p r i s e w o u l d b e t h e v i e w s a n d a t t i t u d e s of t h e p e o p l e in t h e E C m e m b e r states. O p i n i o n s u r v e y s o n r e l e v a n t i s s u e s w e r e t a k e n d u r i n g 1987 and 1988 to find o u t (1) w h e t h e r t h e p e o p l e w e r e p r e p a r e d to g o f u r t h e r in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f E u r o p e t h a n a " s i n g l e c o m m o n m a r k e t , " ( 2 ) in w h i c h d i r e c t i o n t h e y w o u l d like t h e E C to m o v e , a n d (3) w h i c h policy areas should b e c o m e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of an e v o l v i n g European government. The survey included questions on "security/ defense." A m o n g the r e s p o n d e n t s in t h e s e s u r v e y s , a s t r o n g m i n o r i t y in t h e E C ( 4 8 p e r c e n t in t h e fall of 1 9 8 7 ) w a n t e d to s e e the E C m o v e b e y o n d t h e s i n g l e c o m m o n m a r k e t ( T a b l e 3.1). A b o u t half w a n t e d a f u t u r e " E u r o p e a n " g o v e r n m e n t to b e r e s p o n s i b l e to the E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t , b u t t h e n u m b e r v a r i e d in i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s t a t e s , w i t h t h e s t r o n g e s t s u p p o r t s h o w n in Italy and F r a n c e ( T a b l e 3.2). A m a j o r i t y o f p e o p l e in all m e m b e r s t a t e s w h o w a n t e d to m o v e b e y o n d the single c o m m o n m a r k e t felt that s e c u r i t y / d e f e n s e s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d in t h e f u n c t i o n s of t h e E C i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n I r e l a n d , w h i c h is n e i t h e r a N A T O m e m b e r n o r b e l o n g s t o t h e W E U , 6 9 p e r c e n t p r e f e r r e d this o p t i o n . F r a n c e , P o r t u g a l , a n d G r e e c e w e r e m o s t in f a v o r of h a v i n g s e c u r i t y / d e f e n s e b e c o m e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f a E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t ( T a b l e 3.3). B r e a k i n g d o w n t h e d a t a b y s o c i o p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , T a b l e 3.4 s h o w s t h a t

24

The Future

of European

Security

and Defense

Policy

T a b l e 3.1 S h o u l d the EC M o v e B e y o n d a S i n g l e C o m m o n Market? (in p e r c e n t a g e s ) Yes

No

Don't Know

Belgium 1987 1988

56 55

21 16

23 28

Denmark 1987 1988

16 13

61 70

23 17

Germany 1987 1988

48 41

27 29

25 31

Greece 1987 1988

50 47

15 19

35 34

Spain 1987 1988

38 40

20 26

42 33

France 1987 1988

47 47

35 30

18 23

EC12 1987 1988

48 44

29 31

23 25

Ireland 1987 1988

27 35

30 27

43 38

Italy 1987 1988

79 71

10 12

12 17

Luxembourg 1987 1988

44 35

36 36

20 29

Netherlands 1987 1988

48 40

32 43

20 17

Portugal 1987 1988

46 43

21 15

33 42

United Kingdom 1987 1988

28 24

49 57

22 19

Source: Eurobarometer,

No. 29 (June 1988), Table A15.

A New Security System

Table 3.2 Should a European Government Be R e s p o n s i b l e to the European Parliament? (in percentages) For

Against

No Answer

Belgium 1987 1988

55 56

12 25

33 19

Denmark 1987 1988

13 11

64 67

23 22

Germany 1987 1988

41 43

28 30

31 28

Greece 1987 1988

39 42

21 18

41 39

Spain 1987 1988

49 52

10 14

40 34

France 1987 1988

60 62

19 16

21 22

Ireland 1987 1988

39 44

23 18

38 38

Italy 1987 1988

70 68

11 10

19 22

Luxembourg 1987 1988

52 46

21

32

28 22

Netherlands 1987 1988

45 45

25 30

29 25

Portugal 1987 1988

42 42

14 9

44 49

United Kingdom 1987 1988

31 31

45 44

24 26

49 49

24 24

28 27

EC 1987 1988 Source: Eurobarometer,

No. 29 (June 1988), Table A16.

25

26

The Future of European Security and Defense

Policy

Table 3.3 Possible Functions of the EC Institutions External Relations

Cooperation with Third World

Security/Defense

Belgium

75

67

69

Denmark

77

72

65

Germany

86

82

68

Greece

81

86

81

Spain

85

89

71

France

88

86

84

Ireland

85

95

69

Italy

85

87

72

Luxembourg

86

85

66

Netherlands

77

80

75

Portugal

74

85

80

United Kingdom

83

84

77

Source: Data based on Eurobarometer, No. 29 (June 1988), Table 10. Note: Figures shown are percentages of those who responded positively to the question in Table 3.1 regarding above policy areas.

f e w d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t in t h e s u p p o r t f o r s h i f t i n g E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y / d e f e n s e p o l i c i e s to the m a n a g e m e n t of the E C w h e n a n a l y z e d o n t h e b a s i s o f g e n d e r , a g e , e d u c a t i o n , i n c o m e , o p i n i o n of l e a d e r s h i p , v a l u e o r i e n t a t i o n , a n d p o l i t i c a l s e l f - p l a c e m e n t . T a b l e 3.4 r e v e a l s that o l d e r r e s p o n d e n t s f a v o r this o p t i o n m o r e and t h o s e w i t h h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n s o m e w h a t l e s s . A s f o r v a l u e o r i e n t a t i o n s , it a p p e a r s that t h e " p o s t m a t e r i a l i s t s " 1 0 a r e least in f a v o r of t h i s o p t i o n , a l t h o u g h this m a y n o t s u g g e s t a s t r o n g s u p p o r t of e i t h e r N A T O o r W E U . W i t h r e s p e c t to political s e l f - p l a c e m e n t , t h e c e n t e r is m o s t s t r o n g l y in f a v o r of a E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y and d e f e n s e p o l i c y . T h e r e a r e h a r d l y a n y d i f f e r e n c e s in t h e r e s p o n s e s of i n c o m e g r o u p s f r o m h i g h e s t to l o w e s t , a n d t h e s a m e c a n b e said of o p i n i o n l e a d e r s . 1 1 In 1 9 8 9 a n o t h e r s u r v e y w a s c o n d u c t e d to d e t e r m i n e a t t i t u d e s in t h e E C m e m b e r states about (1) the current need for strong n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e p a t t e r n s , ( 2 ) t h e l e v e l o f c o n f i d e n c e in N A T O d e c i s i o n s , ( 3 ) w h e t h e r N A T O s h o u l d c o n t i n u e to b e t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f o r u m to m a k e d e c i s i o n s a b o u t the s e c u r i t y of W e s t e r n E u r o p e , and (4) w h e t h e r in t h e f u t u r e s u c h

A New Security System

27

Table 3.4 Sociopolitical Profile of Those in Favor of a European Government In Favor

External Relations

Cooperation Third World

Security/Defense

Gender Men Women

52 45

44 44

44 41

59 60

Age