European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism. Vol. 1: The 2014 European Election and the Rise of Euroscepticism in Western Europe 3515112537, 9783515112536

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European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I The 2014 European Election and the Rise of Euroscepticism in Western Europe Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

SGEI – SHEI – EHIE

EI SGEI HEI SHEI HIE EHIE Geschichte

Franz Steiner Verlag

European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) Études sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE) Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) Band / Volume 27 Herausgegeben von / Edited by / Dirigé par Jürgen Elvert In Verbindung mit / In cooperation with / En coopération avec Charles Barthel / Jan-Willem Brouwer / Eric Bussière / Antonio Costa Pinto / Desmond Dinan / Michel Dumoulin / Michael Gehler / Brian Girvin / Wolf D. Gruner / Wolfram Kaiser / Laura Kolbe / Johnny Laursen / Wilfried Loth / Piers Ludlow / Maria Grazia Melchionni / Enrique Moradiellos Garcia / Sylvain Schirmann / Antonio Varsori / Tatiana Zonova

European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I The 2014 European Election and the Rise of Euroscepticism in Western Europe

Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagabbildung: © Aurélie Kraft Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2016 Druck: Bosch Druck, Ergolding Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-11253-6 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-11278-9 (E-Book)

Table of Contents / Table des matières / Inhaltsverzeichnis PATRICK MOREAU Acknowledgements / Remerciements / Danksagung ......................................

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BIRTE WASSENBERG Introduction / Introduction / Einleitung ............................................................

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PART 1: EUROSCEPTICISM AND ANTI-EUROPEANISM IN THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: A NEW PHENOMENON? / L’EUROSCEPTICISME ET L’ANTI-EUROPÉANISME DANS LES ÉLECTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE 2014 : UN PHÉNOMÈNE NOUVEAU? / EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UND ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS IN DEN EUROPAWAHLEN 2014 : EIN NEUES PHÄNOMEN ? BIRTE WASSENBERG European Integration and New Anti-Europeanism ...........................................

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MARTIAL LIBERA Le succès des anti-Européens aux élections européennes de 2014 : le poids de l’Histoire, la responsabilité des politiques européennes et le concours de la conjoncture ...........................................................................................................

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UWE BACKES Varianten des antieuropäischen Extremismus und die Europawahlen 2014 .

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PETRA VEIVODOVÁ The Anti-EU Groups in the European Parliament .............................................

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PART 2: NEW EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE UK / LE NOUVEL EUROSCEPTICISME AU ROYAUME-UNI / NEUER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS IM VEREINIGTEN KÖNIGREICH AGNÈS ALEXANDRE-COLLIER The British Conservative Party and the 2014 European Election: Towards Harder Euroscepticism? .........................................................................................

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KARINE TOURNIER-SOL The 2014 Elections to the European Parliament in the UK: The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP)

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DAVID HANLEY The UK Independence Party: Gathering up the Periphery? .............................

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TABLE DES MATIÈRES – INHALTSVERZEICHNIS – TABLE

OF CONTENTS

PART 3: ANTI-EUROPEAN FORCES IN THE EEC FOUNDING STATES / LES FORCES ANTI-EUROPÉENNES DANS LES ÉTATS FONDATEURS DE LA CEE / ANTI-EUROPÄISCHE KRÄFTE IN DEN GRÜNDUNGSSTAATEN DER EG GILLES IVALDI Le Front National and the Politics of Euroscepticism in France ......................

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VIOLA NEU Die AfD in Deutschland .........................................................................................

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DANIELE PASQUINUCCI “Second Generation” Euroscepticism: The Five Star Movement and the European Union ......................................................................................................

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SIMON OTJES/GERRIT VOERMAN Four Flavours of Euroscepticism in the Netherlands ........................................

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ANNEXES / ANHÄNGE / APPENDICES LES AUTEURS / DIE AUTOREN / AUTHORS ...........................................................

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CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE « ÉTUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE »

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ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN DER GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“ ....

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ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” ...

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PATRICK MOREAU The economic crises of 2008–2009, the tensions concerning the Euro, the Greek question and the refugee problem have fueled a strong “Eurosceptic” movement. This vague term hides complex political and social realities as well as an extreme variety of political discourse and practice. At the 2009 European elections and at the national elections between 2009 and 2014, the rise of Eurosceptic forces could be observed in virtually all political systems of the member states of the European Union. Besides the traditional classification as “hard” or “soft” anti-European groupings, within the political, numerous actors can be found who are ideologically both on the left and on the right, extremist or not. Sometimes, for example in Italy, they cannot be assigned to a category at all. This variety was a challenge for the analysis. Does the discourse of Eurosceptic parties of the conservative camp, for example, from Poland or Great Britain, differ from that of national-populist formations from the Nordic countries, France or Austria? Is the anti-European agitation of the Greek or Cypriot extreme right hardliners similar to that of regionalist parties like the Northern League or Vlaams Belang? Can we equate the anti-Europeanism of the Greek and Czech Communists and the alter-Europeanism of post-Communist parties with the positions of “parties of disruption” like the Five Star Movement in Italy or Podemos in Spain? Besides the analysis of the organizations and parties as well as the chronology of their progress and defeats, we had to evaluate the discourses and the voters. What reasons prompt anti-European voters: rejection of immigration, xenophobia, fear of the future, of the loss of the achievements of the past, or acculturation, nationalism, falling back to regionalism and “Heimat”, and the rejection of capitalism and globalization? Or is it the collective disappointment about the incapacity of the European elites to promote their values and communicate with the majority of voters? We tried to respond to all these questions. The immensity of the project required the participation of scientist from the whole of Europe who had already addressed this issue in their research before. Three partners helped us realize several phases of our research project and have supported us this time, too. We greatly appreciate this. The first to be mentioned are the University of Strasbourg and the Centre de la Recherche Scientifique. The have co-financed the excellence project IDEX “The European Integration and the New anti-Europeanism” of the UMR Dynamiques européennes. The support of the scientific and administrative directions of the University and the CNRS was a key factor of success of our work. And finally, we want to express our deep gratitude to the Airbus Group. With a significant financial contribution, it has funded our research and will continue to do so. It is too early to take stock of our activities because they shall continue until the end of 2017. Still, first results are already available.Three international confer-

PATRICK MOREAU

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ences were held, two books were already published, another volume is currently in production, and a fourth one is being prepared1. There, the University of Strasbourg, the CNRS and the Airbus Group support our efforts to understand the present crisis of the European integration. We hope that this way, we shall be able to contribute to the re-foundation and re-vitalization of this great collective project.

REMERCIEMENTS Les crises économiques de 2008-2009, les tensions autour de l´Euro, la question grecque comme celle des réfugiés sont venus nourrir un puissant courant « eurosceptique ». Derrière ce terme vague se cachent des réalités politiques et sociales complexes et une extrême variété de discours et de pratiques politiques. A l´occasion de l´élection européenne de 2009, mais aussi dans la quasi-totalité des systèmes politiques des pays membres de la Communauté européenne, on a pu observer à l´occasion des élections nationales de la période 2009 – 2014, la montée en puissance des forces eurosceptiques. Par-delà la classification traditionnelle entre les formations anti-européaniste « dures » et « molles », on découvre dans les systèmes politiques de nombreux acteurs idéologiquement situés tant à gauche qu´à droite, extrémistes ou non, mais aussi parfois « hors normes » comme dans le cas italien. Cette variété était un défi pour l´analyse. Les partis eurosceptiques du champ conservateur en Pologne ou en Grande Bretagne par exemple tiennent t´ils un autre discours que celui des formations nationales-populistes des pays nordiques, de France ou d´Autriche ? L´agitation anti-européenne de l´extrêmedroite dure du type grec ou chypriote ressemble-t-elle à celle des partis régionalistes comme la Ligue du Nord ou le Vlaams Belang ? L´hostilité à l´Europe des communistes grecs ou tchèques, l´alter-européisme des partis post-communistes est-elle à mettre sur le même plan que les positions des partis de rupture comme le mouvement Cinq Étoiles en Italie ou Podemos en Espagne ? Au-delà de l´analyse des organisations et des partis, de la chronologie de leurs montées en puissance ou de leurs échecs, il nous est apparu nécessaire de nous pencher sur les discours et les électeurs. Quelles sont les motivations de ces votes anti-européens : rejet de l´immigration, xénophobie, peur de l´avenir, de la perte des acquis du passé ou l´acculturation, nationalisme, replis sur le régionalisme et l´Heimat, hostilité au capitalisme et la globalisation ? Ou peut-être une déception collective devant l´incapacité des élites européennes à faire connaitre leurs valeurs et à communiquer avec le gros des électeurs ? Autant d´interrogations auxquelles nous avons souhaité répondre. 1

Les publications effectuées, Bereits erschienen, Already available : Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, Communisme 2014, En Europe. L´éternel retour des communistes 1989 – 2014, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2014 ; Ibid, Communisme 2015, La guerre des mémoires, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2015. En cours d´édition, in Vorbereitung, in production : Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN et Birte WASSENBERG, Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, 2016 ; Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG, Perceptions of « external » states on European Integration. Between Europeanism, Euro-scepticism and alterEuropeanism, Steiner Verlag, 2016.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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L´immensité du projet impliquait une mobilisation de scientifiques venus de l´ensemble de l´Europe et ayant dans le cadre de leurs recherches abordé cette question. Trois partenaires nous ont aidé à réaliser plusieurs étapes de la recherche et soutiendront la poursuite de cette dernière, ce dont nous les remercions vivement. Tout d´abord, l´Université de Strasbourg et le Centre de la Recherche Scientifique qui ont cofinancé le projet d´excellence IDEX « L’intégration européenne et le nouvel anti-européisme » de l’UMR Dynamiques européennes. L´appuis des directions scientifiques et des administrations de l´Université et du CNRS a été une des clés de nos avancées. Enfin, toute notre reconnaissance va au Groupe Airbus, qui a lui aussi largement contribué financièrement à notre recherche et soutient à l´avenir notre travail. Il est encore trop tôt pour faire le bilan de nos activités qui se poursuivront jusqu´en fin 2017. Mais on peut cependant évoquer les premiers acquis. Trois colloques internationaux ont été tenus, deux livres ont déjà été publiés, un ouvrage est en cours d´édition et un quatrième en préparation2. Là encore, l´université de Strasbourg, le CNRS et le Groupe Airbus nous accompagnent dans notre travail qui vise à comprendre la crise que connait l´intégration européenne, ceci afin – et nous l´espérons – de pouvoir contribuer à la refondation – et à la revitalisation de ce grand projet collectif.

DANKSAGUNG Die Wirtschaftskrisen von 2008 und 2009, die Spannungen um den Euro, die griechische Frage und das Flüchtlingsproblem haben eine starke „euroskeptische“ Bewegung erwachsen lassen. Hinter diesem unscharfen Begriff verbergen sich komplexe politische und soziale Realitäten und eine extreme Vielfalt von politischen Diskursen und Handlungsweisen. Bei den Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament von 2009, aber auch bei den nationalen Wahlen zwischen 2009 und 2014 war in praktisch allen politischen Systemen der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union das Erstarken euroskeptischer Kräfte zu beobachten. Neben der traditionellen Unterscheidung zwischen „harten“ und „weichen“ antieuropäischen Gruppierungen finden sich in den politischen Systemen zahlreiche Akteure, die ideologisch sowohl links als auch rechts stehen, extremistisch sind oder auch nicht und manchmal, z.B. in Italien, auch keiner Kategorie zugeordnet werden können. Diese Vielfalt war eine Herausforderung für die Analyse. Ist der Diskurs der euroskeptischen Parteien des konservativen Spektrums, etwa aus Polen oder 2

Les publications effectuées, Bereits erschienen, Already available : Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, Communisme 2014, En Europe. L´éternel retour des communistes 1989 – 2014, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2014 ; Ibid, Communisme 2015, La guerre des mémoires, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2015. En cours d´édition, in Vorbereitung, in production : Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN et Birte WASSENBERG, Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, 2016 ; Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG, Perceptions of » external « states on European Integration. Between Europeanism, Euro-scepticism and alterEuropeanism, Steiner Verlag, 2016.

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Großbritannien, ein anderer als derjenige der nationalpopulistischen Gruppierungen aus den nordischen Ländern, Frankreich oder Österreich? Ähnelt die antieuropäische Agitation der griechischen oder zypriotischen harten Rechtsextremen derjenigen der regionalistischen Parteien wie Lega Nord oder Vlaams Belang? Können die Europafeindlichkeit der griechischen oder tschechischen Kommunisten und der Altereuropäanismus der postkommunistischen Parteien gleichgesetzt werden mit den Positionen von „Umbruchparteien“ wie der FünfSterne-Bewegung in Italien oder Podemos in Spanien? Neben der Analyse der Organisationen und Parteien sowie der Chronologie ihres Erstarkens und ihrer Niederlagen, war es unerlässlich, uns mit den Diskursen und den Wählern zu befassen. Welches sind die Motive der europafeindlichen Wähler: Ablehnung der Zuwanderung, Xenophobie, Angst vor der Zukunft, vor dem Verlust der Errungenschaften der Vergangenheit, oder Akkulturation, Nationalismus, Rückzug auf den Regionalismus und die Heimat, die Ablehnung des Kapitalismus und der Globalisierung? Oder handelt es sich um die kollektive Enttäuschung über die Unfähigkeit der europäischen Eliten, ihre Werte zu vermitteln und mit der Mehrzahl der Wähler zu kommunizieren? Wir haben versucht, all diese Fragen zu beantworten. Der immense Umfang des Projekts erforderte die Beteiligung von Wissenschaftlern aus ganz Europa, die sich in ihren Forschungen bereits mit dieser Fragestellung befassten. Drei Partner unterstützten uns bei der Umsetzung mehrerer Abschnitte unseres Forschungsprojektes und taten dies auch dieses Mal. Dafür danken wir Ihnen herzlich. An erster Stelle sind die Universität Straßburg und das Centre de la Recherche Scientifique zu nennen. Sie haben das Exzellenzprojekt IDEX „Die europäische Integration und der neue Antieuropäanismus“ des UMR Dynamiques européennes kofinanziert. Die Unterstützung der wissenschaftlichen und administrativen Leitung der Universität und des CNRS waren einer der Schlüssel zum Erfolg unserer Arbeit. Und schließlich sind wir der Airbus Gruppe zu tiefstem Dank verpflichtet. Sie hat mit ihrer großzügigen finanziellen Unterstützung unsere Forschung gefördert und wird auch künftig unsere Arbeit unterstützen. Es ist zu früh für eine Bilanz, da unser Projekt bis Ende 2017 fortgesetzt wird. Dennoch können wir bereits erste Ergebnisse vorweisen. Drei internationale Konferenzen fanden statt, zwei Bücher sind bereits erschienen, ein weiterer Band ist derzeit im Druck, ein vierter in Vorbereitung3. Auch hierbei unterstützen die Universität Straßburg, der CNRS und die Airbus Gruppe unsere Arbeit. Wir wollen die derzeitige Krise der europäischen Integration verstehen, um so hoffentlich einen Beitrag zur Erneuerung und Wiederbelebung dieses großen Gemeinschaftsprojektes leisten zu können.

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Les publications effectuées, Bereits erschienen, Already available : Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, Communisme 2014, En Europe. L´éternel retour des communistes 1989 – 2014, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2014 ; Ibid, Communisme 2015, La guerre des mémoires, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2015. En cours d´édition, in Vorbereitung, in production : Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN et Birte WASSENBERG, Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, 2016 ; Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG, Perceptions of „external“ states on European Integration. Between Europeanism, Euro-scepticism and alter-Europeanism, Steiner Verlag, 2016.

INTRODUCTION BIRTE WASSENBERG Since the 2004 enlargement towards the East, the European Union (EU) has been afflicted by severe internal and external consecutive crises. The rejection of the draft of the EU constitution by the negative referenda of the Dutch and French population abruptly stopped the euphoria that had accompanied the process of European integration. 1 The rescue bid of the so-called “simplified” Lisbon Treaty had barely re-launched the European zest in 2008 when the international economic and financial crisis de-stabilized the Euro-zone within the EU to such an extent that Greece was threatened with exclusion from the monetary union. And while the EU member states were still haggling with each other over reform packages to solve this crisis, the next one was already beginning to emerge: For years, the refugee problem had been visible at the maritime borders of Italy, Spain and Greece as well as at the Schengen border of the Channel Tunnel between Calais and Dover. In summer 2015, it escalated when Hungary blocked its external border, and the Dublin agreement was suspended. In addition, since the failed attempt at an economic agreement with Ukraine and the resulting conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014, the EU has been fighting for the reputation of its tediously established European Neighborhood Policy. It does not come as a surprise that in this context, the breeding grounds of anti-European movements have been growing exponentially. In fact, in almost every EU member state, Eurosceptic parties clearly increased their share of the vote at the 2014 European elections.2 However, for a more detailed general or country-specific analysis, three issues ought to be considered beforehand. First, the examination of this phenomenon should not over-emphasize the current situation. Previous research of political scientists and recent findings of contemporary historians have indicated that Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism have been widely known phenomena. 3 In the 1980s, political scientists initially identified Euroscepticism as a British phenomenon entering the British political arena with Margaret Thatcher’s rejection of the European Community (EC).4 They identified two types of opposition against Europe: the rejection of the principle underlying European integration itself (hard Euroscepticism) and opposition against its realization by the EC and later by the European Union (soft

1

2 3 4

Muriel RAMBOUR, “Les oppositions à l’Europe sont-elles structurées politiquement ?” in: Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN, Birte WASSENBERG, (ed.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010, p. 93-109. Europaparl.europa.eu (20.11.2015). Cf. Maria GAÎNAR, Martial LIBERA, (éd.), Contre l’Europe ? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 2) : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2013. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (ed.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, 2007.

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Euroscepticism). 5 Historically, Euroscepticism can be traced back much further: Opposition to Europe is as old as the idea of European integration itself. 6 Contemporary historians point out that Euro-pessimism existed during the early crises of the process of European unification, for example, due to de Gaulle’s policy of the empty chair in 1965, or during the period of Euro-sclerosis in the 1970s. Numerous European projects existed even in the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. But they failed due to the generally anti-integrationist attitude of this period. 7 Secondly, it is important for the analysis of Eurosceptic and anti-European movements within the European Parliament, to study this political phenomenon within its global socio-political and societal context. Since the early 1990s at the latest, opposition against Europe has become a pan-European problem concerning large parts of the population in Europe. 8 Since the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the very narrow French majority for this further step towards European integration, Euroscepticism has been on a steady rise and has in fact become a visible problem for the EU as a whole. The negative reactions at various referenda on the following European Treaty of Nice, the European Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty demonstrate the end of the socalled “permissive consensus” on European integration, i.e., the end of the passive acceptance of this process by the European citizens. 9 Reasons persistently named for the loss of this “permissive consensus” are “the lack of political legitimacy” of the European institutions10, the remoteness of the Brussels Bureaucracy, and the failure to explain the elitist construction of the European institutions to the citizens11. Thus, a part of the growing success of anti-European political parties may also result from the rise of public Euroscepticism. Thirdly, when identifying anti-European and Eurosceptic movements, we have to take into consideration, that since the 1990s, within the political spectrum, the “classic” marginal parties from the left or right wing extreme camp (neo-communist, post-communist, national-populist, and right-wing extremist groups) are no longer predominant. Instead, new anti-European parties have entered the scene (for example the Five-Star-Movement in Italy) while so-called mainstream parties (like the German Social Democrats, British Conservatives, or

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, “The two sides of Euroscepticism: party positions on European integration in East Central Europe”, European Union Politics, B. 3, Nr. 3, 2002, p. 297-326. Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (éd.), Les résistances à l’Europe. Cultures nationales, idéologies et stratégies d’acteurs, Bruxelles, 2007. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, “Préface”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010. Fréderic CLAVERT, “Introduction”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 25. Léon LINDBERG, Stuart SCHEINGOLD, Europe’s would-be polity: patterns of change in the European Community, Prentice Hall, 1970. Simon LANG, “Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 61-93. Eugen PFISTER, “Die Identität Europas und Europabilder in Wochenschauen nach 1945” in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 233249.

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French neo-Gaullists) also champion anti-European or Eurosceptic positions. 12 For this reason, Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism prove to be a particularly complex phenomenon which is neither homogeneous in its political expression nor evenly distributed, uniform or equally strong in all European countries. Above all, this approach requires a very sophisticated analysis proceeding by country as well as using an interdisciplinary approach. The two volumes on the 2014 European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism focus on the analysis of the electoral success of the anti-European parties in the EU member states. In the first volume, anti-Europeanism and Euroscepticism are analyzed as political phenomena and objects of interdisciplinary research. The focus is on the “traditionally” Eurosceptic Great Britain and on the sometimes very recent anti-European movements within the EC founding states (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands). In the second volume, three further groups of EU member states are studied: the Mediterranean states that – with the exception of Cyprus – acceded the EU in the 1980s (Spain, Portugal, Greece), followed by the Scandinavian states (Sweden and Finland) and Austria who had joined the EU in 1995, and finally, the states of the 2004 enlargement, i.e., the Central and Eastern European and the Baltic countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, and Latvia). In the general section of the first volume, Birte Wassenberg first presents the IDEX – Airbus project on European integration and the new anti-Europeanism of UMR Dynamiques européennes of the University of Strasbourg: It aims at taking a comparative approach of two important disciplines of Social Sciences, namely, contemporary history and political sciences. It intends to demonstrate that by using this interdisciplinary approach, we can reveal a number of variables as well as constant and reappearing elements of the phenomenon of anti-Europeanism since the 1980s. The contributions of Martial Libera, Petra Vejvodová and Uwe Backes focus on the analysis of the success of anti-European groups at the May 2014 European elections. Martial Libera emphasizes that there is a cyclical opposition to Europe due to the recent economic crisis as well as a structural one that has turned against “Brussels’” European policy for quite some time. Among the anti-European parties with extremist leanings that participated in the 2014 Europeans, Uwe Backes identifies “hard” and “soft” forms of Euroscepticism, depending on the degree of their anti-liberal, anti-democratic or anti-constitutional leanings. He also examines to what extent these parties question the common good of European democracy. Petra Vejvodová differentiates between the right-wing extremist parties entering rather instable alliances within the European Parliament thus unable to form a strong opposition, and the left-wing Eurosceptic parties that cooperate more intensely and on a more stable base. Traditionally, the British Conservatives are on the forefront of the Eurosceptic parties within the European Parliament. The second part of our volume addresses British Euroscepticism. Agnès Alexandre-Collier explains that after the 2014 Europeans, this Euroscepticism has shifted from the British Conservative Party to the new United Kingdom Independ12

Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, “Die Gegner Europas : Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 141-155.

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ence Party (UKIP) which in turn provoked the radicalization of the Conservative Party’s positions on European integration. Karine Tournier-Sol emphasizes that even compared with the anti-European British National Party (BNP), UKIP was the clear winner of the 2014 Europeans. As a consequence, the BNP is no longer represented in the European Parliament. Still, both parties are hard antiEuropeans and fight for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU. Their rejection of the European project is based on the defense of British national sovereignty. David Hanley confirms that presently, UKIP is the strongest Eurosceptic party of the United Kingdom. Due to its strong emphasis on national identity, it has attracted voters from all established parties. As a consequence, Cameron was forced to promise a referendum on Great Britain’s EU membership. The third part of this volume reflects the fact that at the last Europeans, Euroscepticism did not only increase in Great Britain. The support of anti-European movements was also strong in EU founding member states. Thus, Giles Ivaldi illustrates the National Front (FN) remaining France’s strongest anti-European force in the European Parliament. Being a hard anti-European party, the FN flatly rejects the project of European integration and calls for France’s withdrawal from the EU. With this position, the party is relatively isolated within the European Parliament. In France, however, it continues to stir up public opinion against Europe. Viola Neu confirms that the Eurosceptic right-wing Populist Party „Alternative for Germany (AfD)” has been met with approval in traditionally proEuropean Germany. It had failed to pass the 5-percent hurdle at the German national elections, but in 2014, it succeeded in entering the European Parliament. However, compared to the FN, Viola Neu concedes only a slim chance of survival to the AfD on the long run. In Italy, Beppe Grillo’s Five-Star-Movement achieved a major success finishing runner-up at the European elections. According to Daniele Pasquinucci, this result is alarming because the party is diametrically opposed to the concept of democracy of the European institutions thus undermining the basic principles of the EU. In the Netherlands, Euroscepticism has assumed different flavors, according to Simon Otjes and Gerrit Voerman. It has existed in the parties of orthodox Protestants, right-wing populists, left-wing socialists as well as “animal rights activists”. All of them reject the deepening of the process of European integration. On the scale of Euroscepticism, the radical right-wing Freedom Party is the most and the two orthodox Protestant parties are the least anti-European.

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INTRODUCTION BIRTE WASSENBERG Depuis 2004, date de son expansion à l´Est, l´Union Européenne (UE) a été ébranlée par une série successive de graves crises internes et externes. L´euphorie du processus d´intégration avait décliné à la suite du rejet de projet de constitution européenne en 2005 par les référendums des électeurs français et néerlandais. 13 L´élan européen avait à peine repris sa dynamique grâce à la tentative de sauvetage du traité de Lisbonne « simplifié » de 2008 que la crise économique et financière internationale déstabilisait largement la zone Euro au sein de l´UE et faisait que la Grèce se trouvait menacé d´exclusion de cette dernière. Alors que les Etats-membres de l´UE étaient en train de négocier entre eux le paquet de réformes devant mettre fin à cette crise, une nouvelle crise se profilait insidieusement. La question des réfugiés, qui, à l´été 2015, à la suite de la fermeture de ses frontières par la Hongrie et l´abrogation de l´accord de Dublin, se posait avec acuité, était depuis des années perceptible aux frontières maritimes de l´Italie, de la Grèce et de l´Espagne, ainsi qu´à la frontière Schengen de l´Eurotunnel entre Calais et Douvres. Il n´est pas surprenant que dans un tel contexte un terreau favorable à des mouvements anti-européens soit apparu et ait grandi en importance de manière exponentielle. De fait, les résultats des élections européennes de 2014 montrent une croissance en pourcentage des électorats des partis eurosceptiques dans la plupart des pays membres de l´UE.14 En préalable à une analyse globale plus détaillée ainsi qu´à des présentations nationales spécifiques, il nous faut prendre en compte trois dimensions. Tout d´abord, ce phénomène ne doit pas être analysé sous un angle trop marqué par l´actualité. Les recherches en sciences politiques ainsi que les nouveaux acquis des historiens contemporains montrent que l´euroscepticisme et l´anti-européanisme sont des phénomènes largement connus15. Ils identifient clairement l´euroscepticisme tout d´abord comme un phénomène britannique, qui fit son entrée dans l´arène politique britannique avec l´attitude de refus de Margaret Thatcher vis-à-vis de la Communauté Européenne (CE) 16. A cette occasion, on put différencier entre deux types d´opposition à l´Europe. D´une part, une opposition contre le principe d´unification européenne en soi (hard Euroscepticism) ; d´autre part, une opposition contre la manière dont elle était réalisée, d´abord par 13

14 15 16

Muriel RAMBOUR, « Les oppositions à l’Europe sont-elles structurées politiquement? » in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010, p. 93-109. Europaparl.europa.eu (20.11.2015). Cf. Maria GAÎNAR, Martial LIBERA, (éd.), Contre l’Europe ? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 2) : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2013. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (ed.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, 2007.

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la CE, puis par l´UE (soft Euroscepticism)17. D´un point de vue historique, on peut découvrir l´existence d´un euroscepticisme beaucoup plus ancien. Les résistances contre l´Europe sont aussi vieilles que l´idée d´Europe elle-même18. Les historiens contemporains montrent que des attitudes europessimistes ont existé à l´occasion des crises précoces du processus d´unification européenne, par exemple en 1965 avec la politique de De gaulle de la chaise vide ou dans la phase d´euro-sclérose dans les années 70. Ceci vaut aussi dans l´entre-deux-guerres des années 20 et 30, une période dans laquelle il existait beaucoup de projets européens, mais qui allaient échouer dans l´atmosphère générale d´hostilité à l´intégration de cette période19. Deuxièmement, il est important pour l´analyse des partis eurosceptiques ou anti-européens au parlement européen de replacer ces phénomènes politiques dans un contexte sociétal et socio-politique global. L´opposition à l´Europe est, depuis le début des années 90, un problème global en Europe, qui concerne de vastes franges des populations. Avec le refus des Danois d´adopter le traité de Maastricht en 1992 et la courte majorité de la des électeurs français en faveur de cette nouvelle étape de l´Union européenne, l´euroscepticisme progressait constamment et est devenu, ce faisant, un problème visible pour la totalité de l´UE.20 Le comportement de rejet à l´occasion des différents référendums qui ont suivi – traité de Nice, de la constitution européenne, traité de Lisbonne – illustre la disparition du « consensus permissif » de l´unification européenne, c´est à dire la fin d´une tolérance passive de ce processus par les citoyens européens.21 Les raisons qui en sont la cause ont été analysées de manière concordante : on évoque le « manque de légitimité politique » des institutions européennes22, la bureaucratie bruxelloise loin des citoyens23 ainsi que l´incapacité de rendre compréhensible aux citoyens la construction élitaire des institutions européennes. Le succès croissant des partis politiques anti-européens trouve donc partiellement ses racines dans la montée globale de l´euroscepticisme. Troisièmement, il faut lors de l´identification des mouvements antieuropéens et eurosceptiques faire attention au fait qu´il ne s´agit plus principalement, depuis le début des années 90, de partis de la marge appartenant à l´extrême-gauche ou à l´extrême-droite (formations néo-communistes, postcommunistes, national-populistes ou extrémistes de droite), mais aussi de nouveaux partis anti-européens (par exemple, le Mouvement Cinq étoiles en Italie) aux17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, « The two sides of Euroscepticism: party positions on European integration in East Central Europe », European Union Politics, B. 3, Nr. 3, 2002, p. 297-326. Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (éd.), Les résistances à l’Europe. Cultures nationales, idéologies et stratégies d’acteurs, Bruxelles, 2007. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, « Préface , in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010. Fréderic CLAVERT, « Introduction », in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 25. Léon LINDBERG, Stuart SCHEINGOLD, Europe’s would-be polity: patterns of change in the European Community, Prentice Hall, 1970. Simon LANG, « Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration », in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 61-93. Eugen PFISTER, « Die Identität Europas und Europabilder in Wochenschauen nach 1945 » in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 233249.

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quels s´ajoutent des partis du mainstream (par exemple les sociaux-démocrates allemands , les conservateurs britanniques ou les néo-gaullistes français) qui défendent des positions anti-européennes ou eurosceptiques24. Ce faisant, l´euroscepticisme et l´anti-européanisme se révèlent comme des phénomènes particulièrement complexes, qui ne sont homogènes ni dans leurs formes d´expressions politiques, ni identiques, ni également forts dans tous les pays européens. Une telle approche implique une analyse très différenciée, qui passe par des mises en perspectives par pays, mais aussi interdisciplinaires. Dans nos deux livres « 2014 European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism » , nous nous penchons sur les succès électoraux des partis hostiles à l´Europe dans les pays membres de l´EU. Dans le premier livre, nous portons notre attention sur l´anti-européanisme et l´euroscepticisme comme phénomène politique et objet de recherches interdisciplinaire. Dans cet ouvrage, nous présentons tout d´abord l´euroscepticisme « traditionnel » de la Grande-Bretagne et les nouveaux mouvements anti-européens actifs dans les pays fondateurs de la CE (France, Allemagne, Italie, Hollande). Dans le second volume, nous présentons trois autres groupes de pays membres : les pays de la méditerranée, qui, à l´exception de Chypre ont adhéré dans les années 80 (Espagne, Portugal, Grèce), puis les pays scandinaves adhérents depuis 1995 (Suède et Finlande) et enfin les Etats adhérents en 2004, c´est à dire les pays d´Europe centrale et de l´Est et les pays Baltes (Tchéquie, Slovaquie, Hongrie, Estonie et Lettonie). Dans la partie générale du premier volume, Birte Wassenberg présente le cadre du projet IDEX-Airbus sur l´intégration européenne et le nouvel antieuropéanisme de l´UMR Dynamiques européennes de l´Université de Strasbourg. Il s´agit d´une démarche comparative entre deux disciplines principales des sciences sociales : l´histoire contemporaine et les sciences politiques. Le but est de montrer que cette recherche interdisciplinaire permet de mettre à jour une série de variables et de constances répétitives du phénomène de l´hostilité à l´Europe depuis les années 80. Les contributions de Martial Libera, de Petra Vejvodová et d´Uwe Backes concentrent leurs analyses sur les succès des formations hostiles à l´Europe lors des élections européennes de mai 2014. Martial Libera souligne qu´il existe aussi bien une opposition à l´Europe commandée par la crise économique actuelle qu´une opposition structurelle, qui se concentre depuis longtemps sur le thème de la politique européenne de « Bruxelles ». Pour sa part, Uwe Backes identifie, à l´occasion des élections européennes de 2014, les partis anti-européens de tendance extrémiste en fonction de leur degré d´orientation antilibérale, antidémocratique ou anticonstitutionnel. Il constate l´existence de formes « dures » et « molles », et pose la question de savoir dans quelle mesure ces partis mettent en question le bien commun démocratique européen. Petra Vejvodová différencie, pour sa part, entre les partis d´extrême-droite qui forment une alliance instable au sein du parlement européen et pour cette raison ne constituent pas une fraction d´opposition forte au Parlement européen et les partis de gauche eurosceptique qui coopèrent plus fortement et de manière plus stable. Traditionnellement, les conservateurs britanniques occupent une place de choix sur l´échelle des partis eurosceptiques. 24

Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, « Die Gegner Europas : Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs », in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 141-155.

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La deuxième partie de notre ouvrage analyse l´euroscepticisme britannique. Agnès Alexandre-Collier montre que ce dernier est passé après les élections européennes de 2014 du Parti conservateur britannique au nouveau United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), ce qui a entraîné une radicalisation des positions du Parti conservateur vis-à-vis de l´intégration européenne. Karine Tournier-Sol montre que l´UKIP a triomphé du très anti-européen British National Party (BNP) à l´occasion des élections européennes, le BNP n´étant plus représenté au Parlement européen. Les deux partis sont des opposants durs à l´Europe et s´engagent pour une sortie de la Grande-Bretagne de l´UE. Leur rejet de l´Europe se base sur une volonté de défendre la souveraineté nationale britannique. David Hanley confirme que l´UKIP est pour l´instant le plus puissant parti eurosceptique de la Grande-Bretagne. Grâce à forte identification au fait national, ce parti attire des électeurs venus de toutes les formations établies, avec la conséquence, que Cameron s´est vu contraint d´organiser un référendum sur l´adhésion de la GrandeBretagne à l´EU. La troisième partie de l´ouvrage montre clairement que l´euroscepticisme à l´occasion des élections européennes ne se renforçait qu´en Grande-Bretagne. Les mouvements hostiles à l´Europe perçaient chez les membres fondateurs de l´UE. Gilles Ivaldi explique que le Front National (FN) est la principale force française eurosceptique qui s´est établie au Parlement européen. Il rejette en tant que formation hostile à l´Europe le projet de l´intégration européenne et réclame la sortie de la France de l´UE. Bien que cette formation soit relativement isolée pour cette raison au Parlement européen, elle entretient dans l´opinion publique française un sentiment anti-européen. Dans une Allemagne traditionnellement pro-européenne, un parti populiste de droite et eurosceptique l´Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) s´est fait aussi entendre, ce que montre Viola Neu. Alors que ce parti échouait à franchir la barre des 5 % à l´occasion de l´élection au Bundestag de 2013, il parvenait en 2014 à avoir sept élus au Parlement européen. En comparaison avec le Front National, Viola Neu ne donne toutefois guère de chance de survie politique à long terme à l´AFD. En Italie, le mouvement anti-européen Cinq Etoiles de Beppe Grillo a remporté un succès important en devenant le second parti des élections européennes italiennes. Daniele Pasquinucci juge ce résultat inquiétant parce que cette formation se trouve diamétralement en opposition avec la conception démocratique des institutions européennes et ce faisant affaibli les principes de base de l´UE. En Hollande, Simon Otjes et Gerrit Voerman expliquent que l´anti-européanisme hollandais a pris des formes différentes : il se retrouve dans les formations politiques protestantes, chez les populistes de droite, les socialistes de gauche et chez les « défenseurs des animaux », qui tous rejettent un approfondissement du processus d´intégration européen. Sur une échelle d´intensité eurosceptique, le Parti de la Liberté de sensibilité extrémiste droite se situe au sommet de l´échelle, les deux partis orthodoxes protestants étant les moins hostiles à l´Europe.

INTRODUCTION

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EINFÜHRUNG BIRTE WASSENBERG Seit der Ostererweiterung 2004 wird die Europäische Union (EU) immer wieder von schweren internen und externen Krisen geschüttelt. Bereits 2005 wurde die Euphorie des europäischen Integrationsprozesses wurde schon durch die Ablehnung des EU-Verfassungsentwurfes durch die negativen Referenda der niederländischen und französischen Bevölkerung 2005 jäh gestoppt25. Kaum war der Europa-Elan war durch den Rettungsversuch des sogenannten „vereinfachten“ Lissabonner Vertrages 2008 wieder lanciert, als die internationale Wirtschaftsund Finanzkrise die Eurozone innerhalb der EU weitgehend destabilisierte und zwar so weit, dass Griechenland der Ausschluss aus der Währungsunion drohte. Während die EU-Mitgliedstaaten noch miteinander um die Reformpakete zur Behebung dieser Krise feilschten, bahnte sich schleichend schon die nächste Krise an: die Flüchtlingsproblematik, die im Sommer 2015 nach Abriegelung der ungarischen Außengrenze und dem Aufheben des Dublin-Abkommens eskalierte. Sie hatte sich an den maritimen Grenzen Italiens, Spaniens und Griechenlands sowie an der Schengen-Grenze des Eurotunnels zwischen Calais und Dover schon seit Jahren abgezeichnet. Dazu kämpft die EU seit dem gescheiterten Versuch eines Wirtschaftsabkommens mit der Ukraine und dem dadurch ausgelösten UkraineRussland Konflikt 2014 um das Ansehen ihrer gerade erst mühsam aufgebauten Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik. Es ist nicht verwunderlich, dass in einem solchen Kontext der Nährboden für anti-europäische Bewegungen exponentiell wächst. In der Tat zeigen die Ergebnisse der europäischen Wahlen 2014 einen klaren prozentualen Wählerzuwachs für europaskeptische Parteien in fast allen Mitgliedstaaten der EU26. Für eine nähere allgemeine sowie länderspezifische Untersuchung dieser Ergebnisse sollten jedoch drei Punkte im Voraus berücksichtigt werden. Erstens sollte dieses Phänomen nicht aus einer zu stark aktualitätsbezogenen Perspektive beleuchtet werden. Die bisherige Forschung der Politikwissenschaften und neuere Erkenntnisse von Zeithistorikern weisen darauf hin, dass es sich beim Euroskeptizismus und Anti-Europäismus um ein schon weitreichend bekanntes Phänomen handelt27. Dabei identifizierten die Politikwissenschaftler den Euroskeptizismus in den 1980er Jahren zunächst klar als eine britische Erscheinung, die mit der ablehnenden Haltung Margaret Thatchers zur Europäischen

25

26 27

Muriel RAMBOUR, „Les oppositions à l’Europe sont-elles structurées politiquement?“ in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010, p. 93-109. Europaparl.europa.eu (20.11.2015). Cf. Maria GAÎNAR, Martial LIBERA, (éd.), Contre l’Europe ? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 2) : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2013.

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Gemeinschaft (EG) ihren Einzug in die britische Politikarena fand28. Dabei wurde zwischen zwei Typen der Opposition gegen Europa unterschieden: der Opposition gegen das Prinzip der europäischen Einigung an sich (hard Euroscepticism) und die Opposition gegen die Art und Weise, wie diese von der EG und danach von der EU umgesetzt wird (soft Euroscepticism)29. Aus historischer Sicht kann der Euroskeptizismus noch viel weiter zurückverfolgt werden: Widerstände (résistences) gegen Europa seien demnach so alt wie die europäische Idee selbst30. Zeitgenössische Historiker zeigen demnach auf, dass es europessimistische Haltungen schon in früheren Krisen des europäischen Einigungsprozesses gegeben hat, z.B. 1965 bei de Gaulles Politik des leeren Stuhls oder in der Phase der Eurosklerose in den 1970er Jahren. Sogar schon in der Zwischenkriegszeit der 1920er, 1930er Jahre, in denen viele europäische Projekte existierten, scheiterten diese an der generellen integrationsfeindlichen Stimmung dieser Periode31. Zweitens ist es für die Analyse der euroskeptischen und anti-europäischen Bewegungen im Europäischen Parlament wichtig, dieses politische Phänomen in einen globalen sozialpolitischen und gesellschaftlichen Kontext zu stellen. Opposition gegen Europa ist nämlich spätestens seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre ein gesamteuropäisches Problem, das weite Teile der Bevölkerung in Europa betrifft. Seit der Ablehnung des Maastrichter Vertrages 1992 durch die Dänen und der knappen Mehrheit der französischen Bevölkerung für diesen weiteren Schritt der europäischen Einigung hat der Euroskeptizismus stetig zugenommen und ist zu einem sichtbaren Problem für die EU insgesamt geworden32. Das Ablehnungsverhalten bei den verschiedenen Referenda zu den darauffolgenden europäischen Verträgen von Nizza, der europäischen Verfassung bis hin zum Lissaboner Vertrag illustriert hierbei das Schwinden des sogenannten „permissiven Konsenses“ zur europäischen Einigung, also das Ende einer passiven Duldung dieses Prozesses durch die europäischen Bürger33. Als Gründe für den Verlust dieses „permissiven Konsenses“ werden übereinstimmend immer wieder sowohl die „fehlende politische Legitimität“ der europäischen Institutionen34, die bürgerferne Brüsseler Bürokratie35 und das Versäumnis, das elitäre Konstrukt der europäischen Institutionen für den Bürger verständlich zu machen, genannt. Steigender 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35

Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (ed.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, 2007. Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, „The two sides of Euroscepticism: party positions on European integration in East Central Europe“, European Union Politics, B. 3, Nr. 3, 2002, p. 297-326. Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (éd.), Les résistances à l’Europe. Cultures nationales, idéologies et stratégies d’acteurs, Bruxelles, 2007. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, „Préface“, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 19.Cf. Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010. Fréderic CLAVERT, „Introduction“, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 25. Léon LINDBERG, Stuart SCHEINGOLD, Europe’s would-be polity: patterns of change in the European Community, Prentice Hall, 1970. Simon LANG, „Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration“, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 61-93. Eugen PFISTER, „Die Identität Europas und Europabilder in Wochenschauen nach 1945“ in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 233249.

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Erfolg anti-europäischer politischer Parteien kann daher auch partiell auf den insgesamt ansteigenden öffentlichen Euroskeptizismus zurückgeführt werden. Drittens sollte bei der Identifizierung der anti-europäischen und euroskeptischen Bewegungen darauf geachtet werden, dass es sich im politischen Spektrum seit den 1990er Jahren nicht mehr nur hauptsächlich um die „klassischen“ marginalen Parteien aus dem extremen linken oder rechten Lager (neo-kommunistische, postkommunistische, national-populistische und rechtextremistische Formatierungen) handelt, sondern dass zum einen neue anti-europäische Parteien auftreten (z.B. die Fünf-Sterne-Bewegung in Italien) und zum anderen auch die sogenannten mainstream-Parteien (also z.B. auch deutsche Sozialdemokraten, britische Konservative oder französische Neo-Gaullisten) anti-europäische oder euroskeptische Positionen verfechten36. Diesbezüglich erweist sich nun der Euroskeptizismus und Anti-Europäismus als ein besonders komplexes Phänomen, das weder homogen in seinen politischen Äußerungsformen, noch einheitlich oder gleich stark in allen europäischen Ländern vertreten ist. Ein solcher Ansatz fordert vor allem eine sehr differenzierte Analyse, die sowohl länderbezogen wie auch in interdisziplinärer Perspektive vorgehen sollte. In unseren beiden Bänden zu den „2014 European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism“ wird vor allem der Wahlerfolg europafeindlicher Parteien in den Mitgliedstaaten der EU analysiert. Dabei wird zunächst im ersten Band generell der Anti-Europäismus und Euroskeptizismus als politisches Phänomen und interdisziplinäres Forschungsobjekt untersucht, wobei vor allem ein Blick auf das „traditionell“ euroskeptische Großbritannien und auf die teilweise neu aufkommenden anti-europäischen Bewegungen in den Gründungsstaaten der EG geworfen wird (Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien, Niederlande). Im zweiten Band werden dann aufeinanderfolgend drei weitere Gruppen von Mitgliedstaaten der EU analysiert: die Mittelmeerländer, die bis auf Zypern in den 1980er Jahren der EU beigetreten sind (Spanien, Portugal, Griechenland), danach die 1995 in die EU aufgenommenen skandinavischen Länder (Schweden und Finnland) sowie Österreich, und schließlich die Staaten der 2004 EU-Erweiterung, d.h. die mittel-und osteuropäischen sowie die baltischen Länder (Tschechien, Slowakei, Ungarn, Estland und Lettland). Im allgemeinen Teil des ersten Bandes stellt Birte Wassenberg zunächst das IDEX – Airbus Projekt zur europäischen Integration und dem neuem AntiEuropäismus der UMR Dynamiques européennes der Universität Strasbourg vor: Es handelt sich darum, einen vergleichenden Ansatz zweier wesentlicher Disziplinen der Sozialwissenschaften anzuwenden, der Zeitgeschichte und der Politikwissenschaft. Ziel ist es, aufzuzeigen, dass es mittels dieses interdisziplinären Ansatzes möglich ist, eine Reihe von Variablen sowie konstanten und wiederkehrenden Elementen des Phänomens der Europafeindlichkeit seit den 1980er Jahren zu enthüllen. Die Beiträge von Martial Libera, Petra Vejvodova und Uwe Backes fokussieren ihre Analyse auf die Erfolge von europafeindlichen Gruppierungen bei den Europawahlen im Mai 2014. Martial Libera betont dabei, dass es sowohl eine durch die aktuelle Wirtschaftskrise konjunkturell bedingte Opposition gegen Europa gibt, als auch eine 36

Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, „Die Gegner Europas : Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs“, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 141-155.

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strukturelle, die sich schon seit längerer Zeit gegen die Europapolitik „Brüssels“ richtet. Uwe Backes identifiziert bei den antieuropäischen Parteien mit extremistischer Tendenz, die sich 2014 an den Europawahlen beteiligt haben, je nach dem Grad ihrer antiliberalen, antidemokratischen oder antikonstitutionellen Orientierung sowohl „harte“ als auch „weiche“ Formen von Euroskeptizismus. Er stellt die Frage, inwiefern diese Parteien das gemeinsame europäische Gut der Demokratie infrage stellen. Petra Vejvodová differenziert zwischen den rechtsextremen Parteien, die eher instabile Allianzen innerhalb des Europäischen Parlamentes formen und daher keine starke Oppositionsfraktion bilden, und den linken euroskeptischen Parteien, die stärker und auf stabilerer Basis zusammenarbeiten. Traditionell nehmen die britischen Konservativen auf der Skala der euroskeptischen Parteien im Europaparlament eine Spitzenposition ein. Der zweite Teil unseres Bandes widmet sich dem Britischen Euroskeptizismus, wobei Agnès Alexandre-Collier erläutert, dass sich dieser nach den Europawahlen 2014 von der Britischen Konservativen Partei zu der neuen United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) verschoben hat und so auch eine Radikalisierung der Positionen der Konservativen Partei gegenüber der europäischen Integration ausgelöst wurde. Karine Tournier-Sol betont, dass die UKIP sogar im Vergleich mit der anti-europäischen British National Party (BNP) bei den Europawahlen 2014 einen klaren Wahlsieg errungen hat. Aus diesem Grunde ist die BNP nicht mehr im Europäischen Parlament vertreten. Diese beiden Parteien sind harte Europagegner und kämpfen für den Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der EU. Ihre Ablehnung des europäischen Projektes basiert auf der Verteidigung der nationalen britischen Souveränität. David Hanley bestätigt, dass die UKIP zurzeit die stärkste euroskeptische Partei des Vereinigten Königreichs ist. Dank ihrer starken Betonung der nationalen Identität zieht sie Wähler aus allen etablierten Parteien an, mit dem Ergebnis, dass Cameron zu dem Versprechen gedrängt wurde, ein Referendum über die EU-Mitgliedschaft Großbritanniens abzuhalten. Im dritten Teil des Bandes wird deutlich, dass der Euroskeptizismus bei den letzten Europawahlen nicht nur in Großbritannien zugenommen hat. Auch in den EU-Gründungsmitgliedern fanden europafeindliche Bewegungen starke Unterstützung. So erläutert Gilles Ivaldi, dass sich der Front National (FN) erneut als stärkste anti-europäische Kraft Frankreichs im Europaparlament bestätigt hat. Als harte europafeindliche Partei lehnt sie das Projekt der der europäischen Integration gänzlich ab und fordert sogar Frankreichs Austritt aus der EU. Während sie mit dieser Haltung im Europäischen Parlament relativ isoliert ist, schürt sie auch weiterhin eine EU-feindliche Stimmung in der französischen Öffentlichkeit. Aber auch im traditionell pro-europäischen Deutschland findet nun die europaskeptische rechtspopulistische Partei Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) Anklang, wie Viola Neu bestätigt. Während sie bei den Bundestagswahlen 2013 noch an der 5 Prozent-Klausel scheiterte, gelang ihr 2014 der Einzug ins Europäische Parlament. Im Vergleich zum FN räumt Viola Neu der AfD auf Dauer jedoch trotzdem nur geringe Überlebenschancen ein. In Italien hingegen verbucht Beppe Grillos anti-europäische Fünf-Sterne Bewegung mit dem zweitbesten nationalen Stimmenergebnis bei den Europawahlen einen bedeutenden Erfolg. Für Daniele Pasquinucci ist dieses Ergebnis besorgniserregend, vor allem weil die Partei dem Demokratieverständnis der eu-

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ropäischen Institutionen diametral entgegensteht und damit die Grundprinzipien der EU untergräbt. In den Niederlanden, wie Simon Otjes und Gerrit Voerman erläutern, hat der Euroskeptizismus schon mehrere differenzierte Formen angenommen: Er findet sich bei den Parteien der orthodoxen Protestanten, der rechten Populisten, bei den linken Sozialisten und bei den sogenannten „Tierschützern“, die alle eine Vertiefung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses ablehnen. Auf der Skala des Euroskeptizismus ist die rechtsradikale Partei der Freiheit die am stärksten und die beiden orthodoxen protestantischen Parteien sind die am geringsten europafeindlichen Parteien.

Part 1

EUROSCEPTICISM AND ANTI-EUROPEANISM IN THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: A NEW PHENOMENON? L’EUROSCEPTICISME ET L’ANTI-EUROPÉANISME DANS LES ÉLECTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE 2014

: UN PHÉNOMÈNE NOUVEAU ? EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UND ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS IN DEN EUROPAWAHLEN 2014: EIN NEUES PHÄNOMEN?

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NEW ANTI-EUROPEANISM BIRTE WASSENBERG The IDEX project on “European Integration and New Anti-Europeanism” of the University of Strasbourg’s UMR Dynamiques européennes, realized with financial support of the Airbus Group, seeks to better understand the phenomena of rejection, resistance and opposition to European integration in a long-term perspective, i.e. since the 19th century. By looking at these questions from a historical point of view, but confronting them with the present electoral and societal realities, we mainly propose a comparative approach of two major disciplines in Social Sciences: Contemporary History and Political Sciences. The chosen approach is also interdisciplinary. It makes use of different working methodologies (written and oral archives, interviews and opinion polls, analyses of political discourse and ideologies, etc.) by crossing them and interpreting them in an overall comparative perspective. We believe that this analytical and methodological interdisciplinary approach can contribute to a better apprehension of the logic behind Anti-Europeanism and of what is at stakes when there is resistance to Europe, beyond the traditional enclosure of scientific disciplines. The implementation of our program started with the organization of a first Conference in Strasbourg on 15 and 16 May 2014 – just before the European elections – “Abstentionism, Euro-scepticism and Anti-Europeanism in European Elections since 1979”1. The second Conference, which was held in Strasbourg on 13 and 14 November 2014, aimed at analysing more in detail the results of the last elections to the European Parliament. A comparative and interdisciplinary analysis of these two Conferences should make it possible to identify more precisely the motivations behind the opposition to Europe and to explain why Eurosceptic and anti-European movements have been growing steadily in almost all member states of the European Union (EU). This article goes back to the origins of Euro-scepticism in order to illustrate how it is possible, by means of an interdisciplinary approach to Anti-Europeanism since the 1980s, to decipher a certain number of variables, as well as constant and recurrent elements of this phenomenon. It will demonstrate the advantages of an interdisciplinary approach to Euro-scepticism/Anti-Europeanism and also takes into consideration the research which the historians have already

1

The results will be published in Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN, Birte WASSENBERG, (éd.), Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2016.

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led in the framework of a Junior Project called “against Europe?”, supported by the Maison Interdisciplinaire des Sciences Humaines Alsace (MISHA) in Strasbourg2.

1. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Euro-Scepticism and AntiEuropeanism Provokes a Re-Questioning of the Terminology The studies of political scientists on Euro-scepticism initially distinguished between different degrees of opposition to Europe without however proposing a unanimous and consistent definition of this term3. The notion of Euro-scepticism has been primarily developed with regard to the research on political parties4. Political Scientists have thus shown that a Euro-scepticism “in principle”, which rejects the whole logic of supranational European political and economic integration, should not be confounded with a more attenuated Euro-scepticism that accepts the idea of European integration but challenges its principles of socio-economic organization5. Indeed, Szczebiak and Taggart differentiated between hard and soft Euro-scepticism, and on these grounds elaborated a scale allowing for the classification of political parties6. But this typology was not accepted undisputedly by all political scientists. According to Kopecky and Mude, for example, the distinction established by Szczerbiak and Taggart posed significant problems such as a far too large scope of definition of soft Euro-scepticism as well as the impossibility to clearly distinguish between the two types of Euroscepticism7. They rather suggested a typology constructed on the basis of a distinction between an overall opposition to the foundations of European integration (rejection of the principles of supra-nationality and market economy) and an opposition to the EU in its actual configuration8. Other researchers emphasized instead a more gradual approach comprising several categories of Euro-scep-

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Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN, Birte WASSENBERG, (ed.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010 ; Maria GAINAR, Martial LIBERA, (ed.), Contre l’Europe ? Antieuropéisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 2) : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2013. Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, “The two sides of Euroscepticism. Party position on European integration in East Central Europe”, European Union Politics, 3, 3, p. 297-326 ; Nick SITTER, “The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: is Euroscepticism a government–opposition dynamic?”, West European Politics, 24, 4, p. 22-39 ; Aleks SZCERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism. Comparative and theoretical perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Aleks SZCERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, (ed.), Theorising party-based Euroscepticism: problems of definition, measurement and causality, Sussex, Sussex European Institute, 2003; Paul TAGGART, “A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems”, European Journal of Political Research, 33, 3, p. 363-388. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (ed.), Opposing Europe?, op.cit.; Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, “Contemporary euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 2004, vol. 43, no 1, p. 1-27. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (ed.), Theorising party-based Euroscepticism, op.cit Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, “The two sides of Euroscepticism: party positions on European integration in East Central Europe”, op.cit. Ibid.

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ticism that could be situated on one or two continuums9. Globally, two schools of thought appeared in political sciences: one school insisted on the strategic and pragmatic character of oppositions to Europe, whereas the other retained more the ideological component. These created typologies of Euro-scepticism helped to deliver a first key for the understanding of the resistance to Europe. But to give them a true meaning, it became necessary to integrate “historical” elements into the analysis, namely, to confront them systematically with the respective chronological and national contexts. Indeed, political scientists have already studied how opposition to Europe is rooted and constructed within certain national political spaces – a methodology similar to a historical approach. They focused their research on cultural and historical variables10, for example, by analysing national discourses on European integration11. However, these studies resulted in an ever growing differentiation of the phenomenon of opposition to Europe and made it very difficult to attempt comparative analyses. This differentiation also led to the introduction of new terminology on Euro-scepticism proposing a whole series of options in order to examine certain aspects of the subject: Euro-indifference12, Euro-phobia13, Eurorealism14, critical Europeanists15, and Euro-cynic16. Until today, the different political scientist approaches to Euro-scepticism and anti-Europeanism have not ar9

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12 13 14 15 16

Jean-Benoît PILET, Émilie VAN HAUTE, “Les réticences à l’Europe dans un pays europhile. Le cas de la Belgique”, in Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (ed.), Les résistances à l’Europe. Cultures nationales, idéologies et stratégies d’acteurs, Bruxelles, Éditions de l’université de Bruxelles, 2007, p. 211-225 ; Jan ROVNY, Conceptualising party-based Euroscepticism: magnitude and motivations, Bruges, Collège d’Europe, 2004. Robert HARMSEN, Cas SPIERING, “Introduction : Euroscepticism and the evolution of the European political debate”, in Robert HARMSEN, Cas SPIERING, (ed.), Euroscepticism : party politics, national identity and European integration, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2004, p. 13-35; Roger Antoine NEUMAYER, Frédéric ZALEWSKI, (ed.), L’Europe contestée. Espaces et enjeux des positionnements contre l’intégration européenne, Paris, Lignes de Repères, 2008 ; Claude DARGENT, “Citoyenneté européenne : la concurrence des identités territoriales et sociales”, in Bruno CAUTRES, Dominique REYNIE, (ed.), L'opinion européenne 2000, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 2002, p. 47-69. Robert HARMSEN, “The evolution of Dutch European discourse: defining the limits of Europe”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 9, 3, p. 316-341; Juan DIEZ MEDRANO, Framing Europe: attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003; Tobias THEILER, “The origins of Euroscepticism in German-speaking Switzerland”, European Journal of Political Research, 2004, 43 (4), p. 635-656; Bruno CAUTRES, “Les attitudes des Français à l'égard de l'Union européenne : les logiques du refus”, in Pierre BRECHON, Annie LAURENT, Pascal PERRINEAU, (ed.), Les cultures politiques des Français, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2000, p. 323-354 ; Emmanuelle VIGNAUX, “Les ressorts confessionnels de l'euroscepticisme. Facteurs religieux et comportement politique dans les pays Nordiques”, Nordiques 2004, no 5,p. 83-109. Florence DELMOTTE, “Les résistances à l’Europe au prisme de la sociologie historique de Norbert Elias”, in Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (ed.), op.cit., p. 17-29. Olivier ROZENBERG, “La faute à Rousseau ? Les conditions d’activation des quatre idéologies critiques de la construction européenne en France”, in Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (ed.), op.cit., p. 129-154. Laure NEUMAYER, “Euroscepticism as a political label: The use of European Union issues in political competition in the New Member States”, European Journal of Political Research, 47, p. 135-160. Donatella DELLA PORTA, “The anti-globalisation and the European Union: critics of Europe”, Notre Europe, Policy Paper, 22, 2006. Koenraad ABST, André KROUWEL, “Varieties of Euroscepticism and populist mobilization: transforming attitudes from mild Euroscepticism to harsh Eurocynicism”, Acta Politica, 42, 2-3, p. 282-270.

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rived at a unique definition of the concept nor at a homogeneous analysis of origins, actors and forms of appearance. In a first joint research attempt by political scientists and historians, we discovered that “theoretical and terminological vagueness” was sometimes cultivated on purpose. It allows indeed for a conciliation of apparently very different and non-convergent elements of the “no” to Europe, thus possible making it possible to use a whole range of different terms to describe the phenomenon: Euro-scepticism, Euro-pessimism, Euro-phobia, and Euro-rebellion17. In any case, as an umbrella term for Anti-Europeanism, Euro-scepticism seems inappropriate and may become confusing due to its being historically closely linked to the British opposition to Europe in the 1980s18. Historians therefore often prefer the expression “resistances to Europe” which allows them to cover a much larger panel of case studies and to go beyond the research focus on political parties only19. In fact, this larger definition has already been used by some historians who attempted to trace back the phenomenon of opposition to the beginning of the European project (Jean-Michel Guieu, Jenny, Raflick, Christophe Le Dréau, and Laurent Warlouzet)20. They used it as a means in order to be able to study the process of opposition in the long run. This was not only necessary from their point of view21, but they were also encouraged to do so by many political scientists, for instance, Stefano Bartolini or Yves Déloye22. They recognized that the state of opposition to Europe at a given moment was not sufficient to understand the dynamic process and evolution in time.

2. The Acknowledgement of a Multiple and Complex Phenomenon Our interdisciplinary approach has come to the conclusion that anti-Europeanism is a multi-facetted and complex phenomenon that justifies multiple and differentiated designations23. The debate on the terminology of anti-Europeanism must not conceal the fact that we are not dealing with an objective analysis of the process of European integration, but rather with the manifestation of a series of 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Philippe HAMMAN, “Un regard sociologique : penser les résistances à la construction européenne, des concepts aux territoires”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 39-61. Amandine CRESPY, Nicolas VERSCHUEREN, “Les résistances à l’Europe : une approche interdisciplinaire des conflits sur l’intégration européenne”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 121-141. Ibid. Jean-Michel GUIEU, Jenny RAFLICK, Christophe LE DREAU, Laurent WARLOUZET, (éd.), Penser et construire l’Europe au XXe siècle, Paris, Belin, 2006. Cf. Pieter LAGROU, “Resistance”, Europe Since 1914, Encyclopedia of the Age War and Reconstruction, New York, Thomson/Gale, 2006, p. 2209-2216. Stefano BARTOLINI, Restructuring Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; Yves DÉLOYE, “Exploring the Concept of European Citizenship, A Socio-Historical Approach”, Yearbook of European Studies, Europeanization, 2000, 14, p. 197-219. Cf. Richard BALME, Didier CHABANET, European governance and democracy. Power and protest in the EU, Lanham, Rowman & Littelfied, 2008; Jack GOLDSTONE, “Social movements or revolutions? On the revolution and outcomes of collective action”, in Marco GIUGNI, Doug MC ADAM, Charles TILLY, (ed.) From contention to democracy, Lanham, Rowman & Littelfied, 1998, p. 125-145; Hanspeter KRIESI, “Postface”, in Laure NEUMAYER, Antoine ROGER, Frédéric ZALEWSKI, (ed.), op. cit., p. 253-265.

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negative emotions24: fear of globalization, fear of the loss of one’s job, of a social Europe, anger about the Brussels bureaucracy with innumerable European directives complicating the daily life and habits of the European people, but also disillusionment with a Europe that has not become a reality for the citizen, despite of all promises and political discourses. This is also why the first categorizations of hard and soft Euro-scepticism appear somehow outdated today. Therefore, historians have suggested to insert these categories into a more general approach which considers the concept developed by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle of the so-called “deep forces” (les forces profondes) in the history of international relations25. Following this approach, the focus is placed on the motivations, the social background and the representations of actors opposing Europe. This new concept which combines the political scientist with the historical approach to the opposition to Europe is indeed necessary because an acknowledged scientific theory on anti-Europeanism or Euro-scepticism does not exist. We are rather dealing with a political and social phenomenon expressed frequently by certain components of the European population or by political parties and which has been constantly growing since the 1990s26. Of course, more and more theories on European integration now integrate into their explanatory approaches certain critical positions towards Europe shifting away from the originally very positive and idealistic federalist vision27. But a theoretical framework that allows for a systematic analysis of the origins, mechanisms and the logic behind the phenomenon of anti-Europeanism or Euro-scepticism has not been developed yet. Maybe we can already identify one outcome of the interdisciplinary political scientist-historical approach, namely, that a theory of anti-Europeanism is not feasible28. It can be stated that the support or the refusal of Europe finally always depends on the individual apprehension of the advantages or disadvantages expected from the EU29. In extremis, anyone could become anti-European if he/she considers European integration inconvenient or threatening regarding a certain field of cooperation or regarding a given time.

3. A New Approach to the Origins and Developments of Opposition to Europe Above all, our research on anti-Europeanism proposes a new approach to the origins of opposition to Europe. Whereas the first studies by political scientists 24 25 26 27 28 29

Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, “Préface”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 19-27. Cf. Pierre RENOUVIN, Jean-Baptiste DUROSELLE, Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationales, Paris, Armand Colin, 1964 ; Robert FRANK, Histoire des relations internationales contemporaines, Paris, Masson, 1988. Simon LANG, “Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 61-93. Ibid. Birte WASSENBERG, “Conclusion”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 431. Muriel RAMBOUR, “Les oppositions à l’Europe sont-elles structurées politiquement ?”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p.93-109.

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built on the assumption that Euro-scepticism was mainly a British phenomenon which had developed in the United Kingdom in the 1980s30, we can assert today that resistances to Europe have been accompanying the whole process of European integration from the start. From a historical perspective, for example, when analysing certain political discourses in France, in the United Kingdom or in Germany, Euro-sceptical attitudes can already be observed in the 1950s31. They can even be traced back to the inter-war period, especially when looking at the great many European projects of the 1920s and 1930s that failed due to a predominantly hostile opinion of the general public with regard to the idea of integration – a very typical characteristic of this period indeed32. Concerning the elaboration of a sort of time scale for opposition to Europe, it seems evident that the phenomenon has strongly increased after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, when the process of European integration became a matter of public interest. There was a growing aversion to the EU frequently expressed by the European population33. Since the 1990s onwards, the “so-called permissive consensus” on the principle of European unification was no longer accepted. As a proof, one may name the repeated “no” vote of the majority in various states in the referenda organised on the occasion of the European Treaties of Maastricht, of Nice, on the European Constitution or the Lisbon Treaty34. Possible explanations for this increase of anti-Europeanism range from an alleged lack of political legitimacy of European institutions, an ever growing distance between the Brussels bureaucracy and the European citizens to the accusation of the European Union being elitist and the failure of its political leaders to make the European organization comprehensible and approachable for the population35.

4. A New Focus on the Actors of Anti-Europeanism/ Euro-Scepticism Our multidisciplinary approach allows for a better understanding of the actors of Euro-scepticism/anti-Europeanism. An actor-centred approach enables us to take into consideration the socio-cultural origins and motivations of anti-Euro-

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Menno SPIERING, “British Euroscepticism”, in Robert HARMSEN, Menno SPIERING, (ed.), op.cit., p. 127-150; Robert HARMSEN, “Is British Euroscepticism still unique? National exceptionalism in comparative perspective”, in Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (ed.), op.cit., p. 69-92. Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, “Die Gegner Europas : Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs”, p. 141-155. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, “Préface”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 19-27. Muriel RAMBOUR, “Les oppositions à l’Europe sont-elles structurées politiquement ?”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 93-109. Ibid., cf. also Amandine CRESPY, Nicolas VERSCHUEREN, “Les résistances à l’Europe : une approche interdisciplinaire des conflits sur l’intégration européenne” p. 121-141, Simon LANG, “Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 61-93 Birte WASSENBERG, “Conclusion”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 432.

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pean movements, be it political parties or other groupings36. The analysis is not necessarily unanimous: some identify the process of European integration as an affair reserved for political elites and “superior societal classes” thus pointing to the lower classes of the population as the most probable clients for anti-European movements37. Others allocate anti-European positions mainly to the political spectrum of left-wing or right-wing extremist parties38. Still others speak of argumentative models of opposition to Europe to be potentially found in every political party39. Thus, mainstream political parties might also become antiEuropean or Euro-sceptic. Whether focusing on socio-economic groups of the population or on political parties, the study of actors opposing Europe finally shows a wide range of possibilities for analysis: There is no such thing as an antiEuropean typical actor, but any actor might potentially partake in into the process of resistance to Europe instead40. This larger notion of the anti-European actor helps us to reflect upon the motivations behind the rejection of Europe in a more detailed way. This reflexion leads to the intrinsic question of European identity or the idea of Europe, and where anti-European or euro-sceptic movements finally originate from.

5. A New Concept : Alter-Europeanism Our research activities have already clearly illustrated that mostly, there is no resistance to Europe in general. Rather, opposition to Europe manifests itself against certain representations of Europe41. Often, actors do not reject the idea of European integration itself, but their self-constructed representations of Europe or certain characteristics of the process of integration. These representations de36

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Philippe HAMMAN, “Un regard sociologique : penser les résistances à la construction européenne, des concepts aux territoires”, p. 39-61, Maurice BLANC, “Postface : rêves d’Europe”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 449489 Eugen PFISTER, “Die Identität Europas und Europabilder in Wochenschauen nach 1945”, p. 233-249); David TREFÁS, “Die Vielfalt des Euroskeptizismen in der öffentlichen Kommunikation : eine Analyse der Debatte um die europäische Verfassung 2005 in der deutschen und britischen Kommunikationsarena”, p. 249-269, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit. Simon LANG, “Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration”, p. 61-93 ; Emmanuelle REUNGOAT, “Les résistances partisanes à l’Europe dans les partis français : enjeux de présentation de soi et de labellisation”, p. 155-175), in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit. Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, “Die Gegner Europas: Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 141-155. Birte WASSENBERG, “Regards croisés sur la construction européenne. Diversité des coopérations et des résistances à l’Europe”, Habilitation Thesis, vol. 1, Strasbourg, 2011, p. 95. Emmanuelle REUNGOAT, “Les résistances partisanes à l’Europe dans les partis français : enjeux de présentation de soi et de labellisation”, p. 155-175), Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, “Die Gegner Europas: Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs”, p. 141-155, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, “Préface”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p.19-27.

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pend on the concept of European unification used, on the national origins of the actors concerned, but also on the chronological period or the fields of integration these actors focus on. Therefore, opposition to Europe is linked to a certain image of what is meant by Europe42. It is not necessarily a resistance on principle, but one that seeks to propose a different way to construct Europe – maybe an alternative Europe. For example, the initial opposition to European monetary integration in Germany was not really a rejection of the common currency itself, but rather of the underlying economic theory: the French monetarist approach and the fear of a lacking budgetary discipline43. In the same line of thought, the well-spread Euroscepticism in Scandinavian countries can be explained by their willingness to give priority to the so-called Nordic cooperation – which incidentally led to establishment of the EFTA in the 1960s. This cooperation was then proposed an alternative for the formula of the EEC – the Common Market. The Scandinavians therefore identify themselves with a “Nordic Europe” as opposed to a “Western occidental Europe”44. Another example is the project of a Europe of regions that might be put forward as an alternative to the Europe of states realized within the EU45. In fact, certain actors, in this case the regional authorities in Europe, do not reject the idea of European integration. However, they wish to be associated with this project and seek an alternative political construct for the European project46. This is why this form of Euro-scepticism or anti-Europeanism should rather be called alter-Europeanism. In most cases, it has proven constructive for the process of integration, for example, by introducing, in 1992, the principle of subsidiarity into the European Treaties47. Only a subversive anti-nation state regionalism leads to the rejection of the EU as a whole – thus to a destabilizing anti-Europeanism.

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Eugen PFISTER, “Die Identität Europas und Europabilder in Wochenschauen nach 1945”, p. 233-249); Davis TRÉFÁS, “Die Vielfalt der Euroskeptizismen in der öffentlichen Kommunikation: eine Analyse der Debatte um die europäische Verfassung 2005 in der deutschen und der britischen Kommunikationsarena”, p. 249-269), in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit. Frédéric CLAVERT, “Les concepts et les fondements théoriques de l’opposition à l’euro”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p.195207. Louis CLERC, “Un euroscepticisme nordique ? Le Danemark face à la construction européenne”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p.175-195. Valentina GUERRA, “Aspects de l’opposition des régions à l’Europe au sein du Conseil de l’Europe”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p.269-285. Karen DENNI, “Eurodistricts : une réponse aux manquements de l’intégration européenne”, p. 307-321, Birte WASSENBERG, “Can cross-border cooperation provoke opposition to Europe? The example of the Upper Rhine region”, p. 285-307, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit. Birte WASSENBERG, “Regards croisés sur la construction européenne. Diversité des coopérations et des résistances à l’Europe”, op.cit., p. 98.

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6. Geo-Political Anti-Europeanism Resistances to Europe also emerge when it comes to define or trace the geographical, cultural or political borders of a united Europe. Geopolitical antiEuropeanism raises the question of which states on the European continent could become a part of the European family and when. It has to be taken into account that after 1945, participation in the process of European integration was largely conditioned by the general context of international relations. From a historical point of view, during the cold war, the Eastern European block states were not able to participate in the European Community. But they could present themselves as an alternative communist Europe in opposition to the Western capitalist one48. In the framework of a bipolar international system based on the East-West conflict, the discourse of Eastern European political leaders constantly conjured up the terrifying image of a Western Europe dominated by the United States49. Anti-Europeanism took on the form of a glorified community of values shared by the communist Eastern European states opposing the “evil” capitalist Western European Community. Another important question concerns certain states being included in or excluded from the process of European integration. This parameter may change depending on the historical period concerned and on the European organization considered – the EEC/EU or the Council of Europe. Those who have found themselves outside the European organizations might have felt excluded, whereas those who are inside might be afraid of enlargement and of opening up to the others. The question then arises who belongs to the European family in the end, and which criteria have to be met50. Several alternative Europes can be envisaged: a Europe with or without the United Kingdom, a Europe with or without Russia, with or without Turkey, etc. And there are resistances when the accession of new member states to the EU is at stakes. The enduring opposition within the EU against the admission of Turkey has affected the Turkish attitude towards European unification: The excluded become more and more Eurosceptic, if not anti-Europeanist. They are frustrated by the permanent rejection of their country being qualified as not worthy of Europe51. Finally, there are also repercussions of the EU Eastern enlargement on the European public opinion. The fear of migrant workers has nourished the anti-European attitudes of the population in the “old” Western European member states: They reject the concept of a wider Europe and consider Romanians of Bulgarians intruders and not real Europeans52. 48

49 50 51 52

Paulina GULINSKA-JURGIEL, “Achtung Europa in Gefahr ! Bedrohung als konstitutives Element der staatssozialistischen Europadiskurse im Vorfeld der Konferenz für europäische Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE)”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 339-353. Ibid. Birte WASSENBERG, “Les limites de l’Europe : l’opposition à l’admission de la Russie au Conseil de l’Europe (1992-1996)”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p.353-379. Ismaïl ERMAGAN, “EU-Skeptizismus in der Türkei: eine prinzipielle Gegnerschaft oder schwankender Skeptizismus?”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 339-419. Bernhard GROSS, “Migranten in Wartestellung”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op.cit., p. 379-399.

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Conclusion In sum, already at this stage, our research on anti-Europeanism has well illustrated the pertinence of an interdisciplinary approach of political sciences and history. Historians profit from the extensive research already accomplished by political scientists, especially concerning political parties. In turn, political scientists profit from a historical perspective that allows the resistances against Europe to be interpreted as an ever changing and dynamic process, which developed in parallel and simultaneous with the progress of European integration. Jointly, both disciplines recognise that the phenomenon of anti-Europeanism is highly complex and heterogeneous concerning its various types and manifestations as well as its driving forces and intensity in different European states. Analysing the manifestation of opposition to Europe at different moments in the history of European integration means to be able to show the diversity of its actors and their motivations, for example on the occasion of analysis of the results of the June 2014 Europeans. However, one must bear in mind that these motivations are often more “profound” than some discourses of anti-European political parties might suggest at first, for in the end, they are directly linked to the fundamental question on what is or whether there exists a common European identity.

L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE ET LE NOUVEL ANTI-EUROPÉISME Le projet d’IDEX sur « L’intégration européenne et le nouvel anti-européisme » de l’UMR Dynamiques européennes à l’Université de Strasbourg réalisé avec le soutien financier du groupe Airbus vise à mieux appréhender le phénomène de rejet, de résistance et d’opposition à l’intégration européenne dans une perspective à long terme, c’est à dire depuis le 19e siècle. En analysant ces questions à partir d’un point de vue historique, en les confrontant en même temps avec les réalités électorales et sociétales actuelles, nous proposons une approche comparative entre deux disciplines majeures des Sciences Sociales : l’histoire contemporaine et les sciences politiques. L’angle d’approche choisi est aussi interdisciplinaire. Le présent article remonte aux origines de l’euroscepticisme afin d’illustrer, comment, à partir d’une approche interdisciplinaire de l’antieuropéisme depuis les années 1980, certaines variables et des éléments constants et récurrents de ce phénomène peuvent être déchiffrés.

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EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION UND NEUER ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS Das IDEX Projekt zur „Europäischen Integration und neuem Anti-Europäismus“ der UMR Dynamiques européennes der Universität Strasbourg, das Dank der finanziellen Unterstützung der Airbus Group durchgeführt werden konnte, zielt darauf ab, das Phänomen der Ablehnung, der Resistenz und der Opposition gegen die Europäische Einigung in der langfristigen Perspektive, d.h. seit dem 19. Jahrhundert zu verstehen. Indem wir diese Fragen aus historischer Sicht beleuchten und sie mit der aktuellen sozialen und politischen elektoralen Realität konfrontieren, schlagen wir vor allem einen vergleichenden Ansatz zweier wesentlicher Disziplinen der Sozialwissenschaften vor: der Zeitgeschichte und der Politologie. Ferner ist der gewählte Ansatz interdisziplinär. Dieser Artikel geht auf die Ursprünge des Euroskeptizismus zurück, um aufzuzeigen, dass es mittels eines interdisziplinären Ansatzes möglich ist, eine Reihe von Variablen sowie konstanten und wiederkehrenden Elementen des Phänomens der Europafeindlichkeit seit den 1980er Jahren zu enthüllen.

LE SUCCÈS DES ANTI-EUROPÉENS AUX ÉLECTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE 2014 : LE POIDS DE L’HISTOIRE, LA RESPONSABILITÉ DES POLITIQUES EUROPÉENNES ET LE CONCOURS DE LA CONJONCTURE

MARTIAL LIBERA Le succès des anti-européens aux élections européennes de mai 2014, pour attendu qu’il était, a frappé les esprits. L’ensemble des forces eurosceptiques au sens large – extrême droite, conservateurs britanniques, souverainistes, gauche radicale, populistes et inclassables – rassemble plus de 200 députés, soit 28 % des élus. L’extrême droite et les inclassables totalisent près de 100 députés soit près de 12,5 % des élus. Ils sont représentés dans la moitié des pays membres (13 sur 28) et dans 5 des 6 pays fondateurs. Les forces d’extrême gauche sont présentes dans la moitié des Etats membres. Qui plus est, et c’est une première, les eurosceptiques ont dominé le scrutin dans 4 pays : au Danemark avec le Parti du peuple (DF), en France avec le Front national (FN), en Grèce avec la Coalition de la gauche radicale (SYRIZA) et au Royaume-Uni avec le Parti pour l'indépendance du Royaume-Uni (UKIP) 1. Les eurosceptiques arrivent en outre en deuxième position dans deux autres Etats : en Hongrie avec le JOBBIK et en Italie avec le Mouvement Cinq Etoiles2. La poussée des forces eurosceptiques est également notable dans plusieurs autres pays : en Allemagne, en Autriche, en Belgique, en Espagne, en Finlande et en Suède. Le fort taux d’abstention – près de 57 % – avancé par certains pour tenter de relativiser le succès des eurosceptiques ne change en fait rien à l’affaire. Loin d’être systématiquement synonyme d’approbation tacite, sauf dans certains pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale, l’abstention est bien davantage un signe d’indifférence, voire d’hostilité contenue. Bref, l’Europe est en proie à une poussée eurosceptique. Ce scrutin le montre. Comment l’expliquer ? Quelles en sont les raisons ? La réponse s’articulera en trois temps. D’abord en rappelant les évolutions qui, dans la longue durée, conduisent à s’opposer à l’Europe. Ensuite en évoquant des facteurs d’ordre structurels qui, dans une certaine mesure, expliquent l’accroissement des résistances à l’Europe, enfin en soulignant le rôle clé d’aspects conjoncturels.

I. LE TEMPS LONG DES OPPOSITIONS À LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE Trois éléments, relevant de la « longue durée », me semblent devoir expliquer un regain d’opposition à l’Europe depuis le début des années 1990 : le passage de la 1 2

Alain SALLES, « La mosaïque europhobe », Le Monde [Paris], 28 mai 2014. « Européennes 2014. Résultats dans les 28 pays de l’Union », Le Monde [Paris], 27 mai 2014.

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Communauté européenne à l’Union européenne ; la mondialisation ; l’histoire et les traditions nationales. L’Union européenne d’abord. Jusqu’à la signature du traité de Maastricht en 1992, la construction européenne faisait l’objet du désormais fameux « consensus permissif ». L’Union européenne, qui a plus de prérogatives et de compétences que la Communauté, sur le plan politique comme sur celui de la politique étrangère et de sécurité, qui pèse donc davantage, est source d’inquiétudes et suscite des oppositions nourries, de la part des Etats membres comme des citoyens3. Mais à partir des années 1990, l’Union est également critiquée sur d’autres points : sa légitimité, sa dynamique et sa finalité sont remises en question. Pour bon nombre de citoyens, la légitimité de l’Union fait défaut. Les moteurs – la paix, la démocratie, la prospérité –, qui à ses débuts fondaient son action, ne peuvent plus être mobilisés. L’Union a en quelque sorte trop vite atteint ses objectifs. De la même façon, l’Union ne peut plus se construire, comme elle l’a fait un temps, par rapport à un ennemi commun, en l’occurrence l’Union soviétique. Enfin, la dynamique européenne pose problème. Plus de 60 ans après son lancement, les finalités de l’Union restent floues. A-t-elle vocation à devenir une fédération ou une confédération d’Etats-nations ou à rester avant tout un grand marché commun, voire même une vaste zone de libre-échange ? L’absence de projets clairement affirmés facilite la tâche des détracteurs de l’Europe4. La mondialisation joue un rôle clé dans ces oppositions profondes à l’Union européenne. Elle pose en effet la question de la pertinence de la gouvernance aux différentes échelles territoriales. A priori, l’Union européenne paraît adaptée aux défis que pose la globalisation. Pour peser dans le monde, face à de puissants concurrents, les Européens semblent avoir intérêt à s’unir et à agir à un niveau supérieur à la stricte échelle nationale. Mais, dans le même temps, l’Union, par les politiques de libre concurrence qu’elle met en œuvre, est perçue comme une alliée de la mondialisation économique et financière, une actrice clé de la dérégulation. Pour ses opposants, la critique est aisée : l’Union ne protège pas suffisamment les citoyens européens de la mondialisation. Et pour cause, renchérissent les eurosceptiques, les élites européennes appartiennent aux élites mondialisées. L’Union participerait ainsi au détricotage de l’Etat-Providence, elle réduirait la protection sociale5. Ainsi assimilé à la mondialisation, l’échelon régional européen ne serait plus pertinent. Pour les eurosceptiques, la mondialisation implique donc le renforcement de l’échelon national, seul véritable garant de la protection des citoyens et, au fond, la suppression d’un échelon intermédiaire jugé inutile,

3

4 5

Pour appréhender ces questions, voir l’évolution historique de la construction européenne. Voir, par exemple, Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, Histoire de la construction européenne, Bruxelles, Complexe, 2008, Gérard BOSSUAT, Histoire de l’Union européenne. Fondations, élargissements, avenir, Paris, Belin, 2009), ou Wilfried LOTH, Europas Einigung. Eine unvollendete Geschichte, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Campus Verlag, 2014. Robert FRANK, « Les contretemps de l’aventure européenne », Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire, 60, (octobre-décembre 1998), p. 82-101. Sur la question de la gouvernance à différentes échelles territoriales, voir, par exemple, le cahier de l’UMR IRICE dirigé par Eric Bussière, « Régionalisme européen et gouvernance mondiale au XXe siècle. Premières approches. Actes de la table ronde des 15 et 16 décembre 2011 », Les Cahiers Irice, 9, 2012.

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celui de l’Union européenne. Dans les pays membres, les perdants de la mondialisation ne peuvent que se rallier à cette vision6. Les traditions nationales et l’histoire ne sont pas en reste dans ces « oppositions profondes » à la construction européenne pour reprendre ici, en la transformant quelque peu, la notion de forces profondes introduite par Pierre Renouvin et Jean-Baptiste Duroselle pour mettre en lumière les phénomènes durables qui pèsent dans les relations internationales7. Il suffit ici de rappeler la permanence des positions de la Grande-Bretagne vis-à-vis de l’Europe. D’abord opposée à la Communauté économique européenne, elle y adhère sans véritablement s’y rallier et en conservant un attachement farouche pour son indépendance et sa liberté, en s’opposant aussi, autant que faire se peut, à toute initiative allant vers davantage de fédéralisme8. Le cas français n’est pas moins inintéressant. Promoteurs de nouvelles institutions ou d’avancées conséquentes – la Communauté européenne de Défense, le Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe –, les Français en sont bien souvent aussi les premiers fossoyeurs9. L’histoire explique aussi certains regains d’oppositions à l’Europe. Une partie de la politique hongroise vis-à-vis de l’Europe est étroitement liée aux conséquences du traité de Trianon qui a dépecé le pays en 1920. Tenues sous le boisseau pendant près de 80 ans, les rancœurs hongroises trouvent aujourd’hui leur exutoire contre l’Union10. Une partie des oppositions actuelles à l’Union sont le résultat de ces oppositions anciennes inscrites dans la longue durée. D’autres oppositions relèvent davantage d’une analyse critique des politiques européennes, du mode de scrutin européen, comme du changement de culture politique des citoyens.

II. LA CONTESTATION DES POLITIQUES EUROPÉENNES Depuis quelques années, l’Union européenne et, en particulier la Commission, suscite de très vives critiques. Le fonctionnement de l’Europe de Bruxelles est tour à tour trop technocratique, trop opaque, trop arbitraire. Les priorités des politiques européennes sont aussi mises en accusation : la relégation des questions politiques et sociales au regard des politiques économiques provoque incompré-

6 7

8

9 10

Sur le cas français, voir différents articles dans le numéro de revue suivant : Christophe BOUILLAUD, Emmanuelle REUNGOAT, éd., Opposés dans la diversité. Les usages de l’opposition à l’Europe en France, Politique européenne, 43, 2014. Pierre RENOUVIN, Jean-Baptiste DUROSELLE, Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationales, 4e éd. mise à jour, Paris, Armand Colin, 1991, p. 5-282. Voir également Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, Wilfried LOTH et Charles BARTHEL, éd., Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007. Voir, par exemple, N. PIERS LUDLOW, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the first UK application for the EEC, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, et Simon USHERWOOD, « Margaret Thachter and British Opposition to European Integration: Saint or Sinner? », in Maria GAINAR, Martial LIBERA, éd., Contre l’Europe ? Anti-europésime, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours, vol. 2 : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Franz Steinr Verlag, 2013, p. 75-86. Gérard BOSSUAT, La France et la construction de l’unité européenne de 1919 à nos jours, Paris, Armand Colin, 2012. Miklós MOLNAR, Histoire de la Hongrie, Paris, Perrin, 2007.

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hension et colère11. Dans le même ordre d’idées, les élargissements de l’Europe ont presque toujours suscité des réactions hostiles. Aux yeux de beaucoup d’Européens, l’Union est aujourd’hui l’incarnation d’une bureaucratie soucieuse d’interventions pointilleuses dans le quotidien des citoyens mais inefficace sur les grands dossiers. Tatillon et intrusif dans la vie quotidienne, le « doux monstre de Bruxelles », comme le surnomme le sociologue allemand Hans Magnus Enzensberger, paraît impuissant et inopérant sur l’essentiel12. L’Union est également critiquée pour la complexité de ses institutions. Leur fonctionnement déroute par leur singularité. La transposition d’institutions nationales au niveau européen paraît difficile, sinon impossible. Plus grave encore, ce système institutionnel européen reste étranger à la plupart des citoyens. Cette méconnaissance facilite les amalgames, les confusions, les erreurs. Elle fait la fortune des démagogues. Elle accentue la méfiance vis-à-vis d’une Union jugée peu démocratique et souffrant d’un profond déficit en la matière. Le consensus, essentiel pour comprendre le fonctionnement des institutions européennes, ne correspond en effet guère à la pratique démocratique de certains pays, ni à l’image que s’en font leurs citoyens. Les citoyens reprochent également à l’Europe de ne pas respecter leurs choix. Le Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, pourtant rejeté en 2005 par les Français et les Néerlandais, est remplacé par un autre traité édulcoré mais comparable, celui de Lisbonne. Les citoyens font enfin grief à l’Union d’avoir sacralisé le fonctionnement d’institutions européennes – la Banque centrale, la Commission – et d’avoir ainsi dépolitisé les débats13. Le scrutin européen, au moins tel qu’il existe depuis 1979, constitue un autre élément favorable aux partis eurosceptiques. D’abord parce que les élections européennes sont considérées comme des élections de second rang, de moindre importance. Nombre de citoyens pensent qu’elles n’ont pas de véritable impact. Les campagnes qui les précèdent, sont peu nourries et ternes. Elles n’abordent guère les enjeux européens et traitent davantage de la politique intérieure des pays. Et puis ces élections ne paraissent pas véritablement européennes. Elles n’ont pas lieu le même jour partout, leurs modalités varient. Elles sont parfois organisées en même temps que des scrutins régionaux ou locaux. Pour toutes ces raisons, les élections européennes mobilisent peu14. Et lorsque les citoyens votent, ils le font 11

12 13

14

Ce déficit de politique sociale a longtemps constitué la critique essentielle vis-à-vis de la Commission européenne. Voir, sur le plan historique, Pierre GERBET, La construction de l’Europe, nouvelle édition mise à jour et révisée, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1994, Antonio VARSORI, Les défis de l’Europe sociale, Marie-Thérèse BITSCH (dir.), Cinquante ans de traité de Rome 1957-2007. Regards sur la construction européenne, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2009, p. 185199, et, dans une approche un peu différente, Renaud DEHOUSSE et Nicolas MONCEAU, « Les politiques européennes répondent-elles aux attentes des Européens ? », Renaud DEHOUSSE, Florence DELOCHE-GAUDEZ, Sophie JACQUOT, éd., Que fait l’Europe ?, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2009, p. 29-42. Hans Magnus ENZENSBERGER, Le doux monstre de Bruxelles ou l’Europe sous tutelle, Paris, Gallimard, 2011. A l’approche des élections européennes, les ouvrages critiquant l’Union européenne ont constitué, du moins en France, un véritable phénomène éditorial. Leur ligne, souvent très orientée et parfois outrancière, n’est pas toujours scientifique : Cédric DURAND, éd., En finir avec l’Europe, Paris, La Fabrique Éditions, 2013, François RUFFIN, Faut-il faire sauter Bruxelles ? Un touriste enquête, Amiens, Association Fakir, 2014, Robert SALAIS, Le viol de l’Europe. Enquête sur la disparition d’une idée, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2013, Slavoj ŽIŽEK, Srećko HORVAT, Sauvons-nous de nos sauveurs, trans. Séverine Weiss, Paris, Nel, 2013. Yves DELOYE, éd., Dictionnaire des élections européennes, Paris, Economica, 2005.

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bien souvent par rapport à des enjeux de politique nationale ou par rapport à leurs gouvernements, qu’ils n’hésitent alors pas à sanctionner en optant pour des partis qu’ils hésiteraient à soutenir dans le cadre d’une élection nationale15. Les élections européennes constituent également une tribune favorable aux partis eurosceptiques. Les partis de gouvernement, généralement pro-européens, qui connaissent la mécanique européenne, savent qu’ils devront ensuite rendre compte de leur politique devant leurs opinions publiques. Ils sont par conséquent prudents dans leurs propositions. A l’inverse, les partis eurosceptiques n’ont, pour la plupart, pas vocation à gouverner. Ils peuvent par conséquent avancer des programmes chocs, des mesures phares, faire de la surenchère, être démagogues, frapper ainsi les opinions publiques et attirer un électorat en pleine mutation16. Les cultures politiques des citoyens européens – troisième point qui mérite d’être rapidement évoqué ici – évoluent. La participation aux consultations électorales n’est plus la règle. La distance vis-à-vis de la sphère politique s’est accrue. Elle est encore plus importante vis-à-vis des milieux européens. Certains tabous sont par ailleurs tombés. Le vote pour des partis extrémistes, hors système, s’est généralisé. C’est en particulier le cas des jeunes générations qui votent parfois massivement pour les partis anti-européens. En France, 30 % des moins de 35 ans ont ainsi voté pour le Front National aux dernières élections européennes17. A côté de ces nouvelles cultures politiques, il convient également de souligner la lenteur de l’émergence d’identités européennes. Le vivre ensemble ne va pas de soi pas plus que le degré de confiance envers les autres Européens ou le sentiment d’appartenance à l’Union. Inutile de souligner ici combien les situations sont différentes d’un pays à l’autre et combien elles varient en fonction du niveau de diplôme, du statut social et du degré de confiance en l’avenir18. Quoi qu’il en soit des différents éléments d’explication avancés jusqu’ici, il semblerait que les partis eurosceptiques ne peuvent réellement s’affirmer que lorsque des facteurs conjoncturels leur sont également favorables.

III. LE CONCOURS FAVORABLE DE LA CONJONCTURE Il faut d’abord évoquer ici la crise économique et financière que connaît l’Europe depuis 2008. Cette crise a permis aux anti-européens de critiquer à bon compte la politique économique et monétaire de l’Union, le manque de coordination des Européens, les mesures d’austérité voulues entre autres par l’Allemagne. Qualifiée d’hégémonique, la politique allemande a suscité un rejet massif de l’Europe, qui s’est doublé de dangereux parallèles historiques, que l’on croyait définitive-

15 16 17 18

Nicolas LEVRAT, La construction européenne est-elle démocratique ?, Paris, La documentation française, 2012. Nathalie BRACK, L’euroscepticisme au sein du Parlement européen. Stratégies d’une opposition antisystème au cœur des institutions, Windhof, Poromoculture-Larcie, 2014. Claire GATINOIS, « Un vote anti-UE générationnel, déconnecté du problème du chômage », Le Monde [Paris], 28 mai 2014. Bruno CAUTRES, Les Européens aiment-ils (toujours) l’Europe ?, Paris, La Documentation française, 2014.

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ment révolus19. A la faveur de la crise, le rapport à l’Europe de certains Etats du Sud s’est inversé. Alors que les élites de ces pays considéraient que leurs pays avaient des problèmes et que l’Union pouvait leur apporter la solution, en provoquant de l’extérieur des réformes internes, l’Europe est de plus en plus apparue au fil de la crise comme une source de problèmes20. La crise a en tout cas permis aux partis eurosceptiques d’affirmer un discours anti-euro. Ses conséquences sociales ont également renforcé les mouvements eurosceptiques. L’augmentation dramatique du chômage et de la précarité a nourri les inquiétudes, les mécontentements et la peur du déclassement. Ce chômage endémique a fait de l’Union un bouc émissaire tout désigné en même temps qu’il a légitimé aux yeux d’un grand nombre les propositions des eurosceptiques sur l’immigration et le renforcement du protectionnisme ou la sortie de l’euro21. Mais la crise économique et sociale n’explique pas tout. La situation économique de l’Autriche et du Danemark est plutôt bonne. Pourtant, les partis eurosceptiques y sont puissants. C’est qu’en effet, dans certains Etats tout au moins, la crise actuelle est aussi politique, sociétale, identitaire. L’inquiétude face à une sorte de désagrégation de la communauté nationale, des identités, des cultures régionales, des modes de vie nourrit des réflexes de repli et de fermeture. Tout comme l’immigration et l’Islam, l’euro et l’Union deviennent des boucs émissaires22. La peur et le manque de confiance en l’avenir renforcent également les forces eurosceptiques qui ont su, pour certaines d’entre elles au moins, lier un discours populiste à des thématiques anti-européennes et anti-mondialisation et ont ainsi capitalisé sur ces différents volets en promettant le retour au monde d’avant23. Face aux échecs des politiques gouvernementales successives, il leur a été facile de fustiger l’establishment, le système, les partis de gouvernement, de droite ou de gauche, pour en appeler à voter pour de nouveaux candidats, des forces politiques qui n’ont encore jamais exercé de responsabilités24. La conjoncture, ce sont enfin les hommes et des femmes qui exercent des responsabilités politiques au niveau national et au niveau européen. A n’en pas douter, le succès des partis eurosceptiques est inversement proportionnel à leur envergure, à leur charisme et à leur stature nationale ou internationale. Ici, il faut souligner le rôle délétère des Etats membres qui ont pris l’habitude de s’approprier les succès de l’Union et de rejeter sur elle leurs erreurs25. Il faut rap19 20

21 22 23 24 25

Ulrich BECK, Non à l’Europe allemande. Vers un printemps européen ?, trans. Nathalie Huet, Paris, Autrement, 2013. Daniele PASQUINUCCI, « Euroscepticisme et abstentionnisme lors des élections européennes en Italie (1979-2014) », in Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN et Birte WASSENBERG, éd., Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections Du Parlement européen de 1979 à nos jours, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, à paraître en 2015. Voir, par exemple, la charge de Steve OHANA, Désobéir pour sauver l’Europe, Paris, Max Milo, 2013. Sur l’euro, voir François HEISBOURG, La fin du rêve européen, Paris, Stock, 2013, et Michel DEVOLUY, L’euro est-il un échec ?, 2e éd, Paris, La Documentation française, 2012. Voir, sur ce point, certains développements du livre de David ENGELS, Le déclin. La crise de l’Union européenne et la chute de la République romaine : quelques analogies historiques, Paris, Éditions du Toucan, 2012. De façon polémique, Eric JUILLOT, La déconstruction européenne, Vevey, Éditions Xenia, 2011. Sur ce point, on pense notamment aux critiques classiques du Front national qui s’oppose aux partis de gouvernement et fustige leur soi-disant alliance objective en les qualifiant de partis de système et en les affublant de l’acronyme d’UMPS. Voir, par exemple, pour la France, Gérard BOSSUAT, La France et la construction de l’unité européenne de 1919 à nos jours, Paris, Armand Colin, 2012.

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peler aussi que la présidence de la Commission européenne a, par le passé, été une source d’impulsions et un facteur de relance pour les Communautés26. Il faut également déplorer l’incapacité des médias – ou faudrait-il dire leur incurie – à rendre véritablement compte de ce qu’est l’Europe27. Il faut enfin souligner que les partis eurosceptiques ont souvent des leaders flamboyants, charismatiques – Marine Le Pen, Beppe Grillo ou Nigel Farrage – dont les programmes renvoient à une sorte d’âge d’or national révolu28.

Conclusion Pour conclure, trois points semblent devoir être rappelés. Premièrement, il faut relativiser la victoire des formations eurosceptiques aux dernières élections. D’abord parce que ce n’est pas la première fois que les eurosceptiques font de bons scores. En 1984, ils totalisaient le tiers des députés. Ensuite parce qu’à l’aune de la crise économique que l’Union a traversée, la montée des partis extrémistes paraît maîtrisée au regard de ce qu’elle était 6 ans après la crise de 1929. Enfin, parce qu’il est logique que le projet européen ait ses contradicteurs : les critiques qui lui sont adressées témoignent du rôle central qu’est le sien29. Mais, deuxièmement, la situation n’en est pas moins inquiétante. Elle traduit une forte démobilisation des citoyens pour l’Europe et l’accroissement d’un mouvement de défiance et de refus. Elle montre aussi que le recours à des partis extrémistes n’est plus tabou et que la crise n’est pas réductible à ses seules dimensions économiques. Peut-on, troisièmement, ré-enchanter l’Europe ? Le choix de Jean-Claude Juncker à la présidence de la Commission européenne est en soi rassurant parce qu’il donne aux votes des électeurs un poids réel. Reste que le ré-enchantement de l’Europe passe également par une relance du projet européen, qui ne soit pas une fuite en avant, la définition d’objectifs clairs, le dépassement des égoïsmes nationaux et une volonté de mieux expliquer ce qu’est le projet européen.

26 27 28 29

On pense par exemple à la relance européenne orchestrée par Jacques Delors lorsqu’il était président de la Commission européenne de 1985 à 1994. Sur ce point, il est à remarquer que les journalistes spécialistes de l’Europe sont de moins en moins nombreux. Rares sont les quotidiens à avoir encore un correspondant permanent à Bruxelles. Alain SALLES, « La mosaïque europhobe », Le Monde [Paris], 28 mai 2014. Willy BEAUVALLET et Sébastien MICHON, « Les usages politiques de l’Europe par les eurodéputés de la gauche eurocritique : L’exemple des élus français de la Gauche unitaire européenne entre 1979 et 2004 », in Maria GAINAR, Martial LIBERA, éd., Contre l’Europe ?, p. 127139.

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THE SUCCESS OF ANTI-EUROPEANS IN THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EUROPEAN POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF CONJUNCTURE This contribution analyzes the reasons for the success of the anti-European formations at the May 2014 Europeans. Their “victory” refers to proximate causes. The economic crisis, the identitarian closure, and the charisma of some political leaders opposed to Europe explain the good results of the anti-Europeans. But these “cyclical factors” are not the only elements. On the rather structural side, opposition to Europe also feeds on the rejection of Brussels and the European policies, on the inadequacy of the European election to the issues it represents and to the change of the political culture of its citizens. Finally, and this is too often obscured, opposition against Europe has existed for a long time. The European Union has to face more resistance than the Community did. Globalization poses the question of the suitability of maintaining a level of regional governance between the national and the global ones. Concerning the national traditions of opposing Europe, they are contemporaries of the concept of European integration.

DER ERFOLG DER ANTI-EUROPÄER BEI DEN EUROPÄISCHEN WAHLEN 2014: DAS GEWICHT DER GESCHICHTE, DIE VERANTWORTUNG DER EUROPÄISCHEN POLITIK UND DIE ROLLE DER KONJUNKTUR Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Ursachen des Erfolges der europafeindlichen Gruppierungen bei den Europawahlen im Mai 2014. Ihr „Sieg“ verweist auf unmittelbare Ursachen: Die Wirtschaftskrise, der Rückzug auf die Ethnizität und das Charisma einiger europafeindlicher politischer Führer erklärt die guten Wahlergebnisse der Antieuropäer. Aber diese „konjunkturellen Elemente“ sind nicht die einzigen Faktoren. Strukturell gesehen, speist sich die Europafeindlichkeit auch aus der Ablehnung Brüssels und der europäischen Politiken, aus der mangelnden Angemessenheit der Europawahl an die Themen, für die sie steht, und an den Wandel der politischen Kultur ihrer Bürger. Schließlich, und dies wird oft kaschiert, gibt es die Opposition gegen Europa schon lange. Die Europäische Union muss mehr Widerstand ertragen als früher die Gemeinschaft. Die Globalisierung stellt die Frage, ob eine regionale Regierungsebene zwischen der nationalen und der globalen noch Sinn macht. Die nationalen Traditionen des Widerstandes gegen Europa schließlich sind so alt wie das Konzept der europäischen Integration.

VARIANTEN DES ANTIEUROPÄISCHEN EXTREMISMUS UND DIE EUROPAWAHLEN 2014 UWE BACKES Im Zentrum dieses Beitrags stehen antieuropäische Parteien mit extremistischer Tendenz. Gemeint sind solche Parteien, die einen „harten“ Euroskeptizismus, wie ihn Aleks Szczerbiak und Paul Taggart definiert haben1, mit politischen Positionen und Bestrebungen verbinden, die fundamentalen Werten und Verfahrensregeln europäischer Verfassungsstaaten zuwiderlaufen. Die damit verbundenen Mindestanforderungen haben Eingang in den Lissaboner Vertrag gefunden, wo folgende Prinzipien erwähnt werden: „Achtung der Menschenwürde, Freiheit, Demokratie, Gleichheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und die Wahrung der Menschenrechte einschließlich der Rechte der Personen, die Minderheiten angehören […] Pluralismus, Nichtdiskriminierung, Toleranz”2. Während rechtsextreme Parteien das Ethos fundamentaler Menschengleichheit explizit oder implizit negieren, berufen sich linkextreme Gruppierungen meist emphatisch auf die Werte der „Demokratie“ und „Gleichheit“3. Doch zeigt ihre politische Praxis, dass sie regelmäßig mit anderen Prinzipien des Verfassungsstaates in Konflikt geraten, insbesondere denen der Freiheit, des Rechtsstaates, des Pluralismus und der Toleranz. Zumindest trifft das auf alle Fälle zu, in denen Kommunisten die politische Macht in einem Staat übernahmen4, so dass die Annahme gerechtfertigt erscheint, es handele sich nicht etwa nur um ein akzidentielles, aus besonderen Umständen zu erklärendes, Phänomen, sondern um ein substantielles, das aus dem Politikverständnis dieser Strömungen resultiert. So wie zwischen einem „harten” und einem „weichen” Euroskeptizismus unterschieden werden kann, so lassen sich auch extremistische Tendenzen in „harter” oder „weicher” Form feststellen. Eckhard Jesse und Tom Thieme haben in ihrem Pionierwerk zum Extremismus in den EU-Staaten Unterscheidungsmerkmale auf den Ebenen Ideologie, Strategie und Organisation benannt, die es ermöglichen, zwischen beiden Formen einigermaßen klar zu unterscheiden – auch wenn die Konturen in der historisch-politischen Wirklichkeit nicht selten

1

2 3 4

Vgl. Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, „Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism“, in Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, (eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, vol. 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1-15. Konsolidierte Version des Vertrages über die Europäische Union, Luxemburg, Official Journal of the European Union, 2010, Artikel 2. Vgl. Uwe BACKES, Politische Extreme. Eine Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006, p. 240-248. Vgl. Archie BROWN, The Rise and Fall of Communism, New York, Harper Collins, 2009; Stéphane COURTOIS, Communisme et totalitarisme, Paris, Perrin, 2009; David PRIESTLAND, The Red Flag: A History of Communism, New York, Grove Press, 2009.

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verschwimmen5. Die von Jesse/Thieme formulierten Prüfkriterien lassen sich noch erweitern und präzisieren. Auf der Ebene der Ideologie geht es vor allem um die Frage, ob Parteien starke inhaltliche oder geistig-strukturelle Affinitäten zu den regimebildenden totalitären Großideologien der Vergangenheit (Marxismus-Leninismus, Faschismus, Nationalsozialismus) aufweisen („hart“) oder ob das ideologisch-programmatische Profil eher durch Diffusität und populistische Flexibilität gekennzeichnet ist („weich“). In strategischer Hinsicht erscheint vor allem die Bündnispolitik aufschlussreich: Arbeiten die betreffenden Parteien mit militanten, gewaltgeneigten oder gar systematisch gewaltorientierten Gruppen zusammen („hart“); unterhalten sie freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu autokratischen Regimen im Ausland („hart“); sind sie in der Lage, mit demokratischen Parteien zu kooperieren und tragfähige Kompromisse zu schließen („weich“)? Schließlich ist auf der Ebene der Organisation zu fragen, welches Gewicht „harten“ extremistischen Positionen an der Basis der Parteien, unter den Funktionären und in den Führungszirkeln zukommt. Denn bei den wahlpolitisch erfolgreicheren Formationen handelt es sich meist um heterogene Konglomerate mit ausdifferenzierter interner Gruppen- und Flügelbildung. Ob die „weichen“ oder die „harten“ Varianten die größere Gefahr für die europäischen Demokratien darstellen, ist keineswegs pauschal zu beantworten: „Weiche“ Formen könnten als schleichendes Gift in den Körper der europäischen Verfassungsstaaten eindringen und langfristig zersetzend wirken. „Harte“ Formen hingegen sind leichter in ihrer verfassungsfeindlichen Stoßrichtung erkennbar, lösen frühzeitig Demokratieschutz-Mechanismen aus und mögen aus diesem Grunde weniger gefährlich sein. Dennoch soll die Betrachtung in diesem Beitrag bei den „harten“ extremistischen Parteien ansetzen. Sie richten sich meist explizit gegen fundamentale Werte der europäischen Demokratien, auch wenn Formen politischer Mimikry nicht fehlen. Ihr Anti-System-Charakter tritt deutlich hervor, so dass es zwischen den professionellen Beobachtern weniger Kontroversen um Einordnungsfragen gibt. Aus ihrer Perspektive zeigt sich einerseits, dass der Gefahrendiskurs im Blick auf viele „weiche“ euroskeptische und populistische Varianten mitunter überzogen ist und die integrativen wie kritisch-konstruktiven Effekte des Wirkens zumindest eines Teiles dieser Parteien nicht selten missachtet6. Andererseits lassen sich so Gemeinsamkeiten „weicher“ Formationen mit „harten“ identifizieren – und Problemzonen benennen, die sich unter ungünstigen Umständen zu gravierenden Herausforderungen für die europäischen Verfassungsstaaten entwickeln könnten. Der folgende Beitrag konzentriert sich auf jene Formationen, die bei den Europawahlen vom Mai 2014 Mandate zu erringen vermochten. Ihr politisches Gewicht ist sehr unterschiedlich. Es hängt stark von ihrer internationalen Bündnis5 6

Vgl. Eckhard JESSE, Tom TIEME, „Extremismus in den EU-Staaten. Theoretische und konzeptionelle Grundlagen“, in: Eckhard JESSE, Tom TIEME, (Hrsg.), Extremismus in den EU-Staaten, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2011, p. 11-32, hier p. 17-20. Vgl. Nathalie BRACK, „The roles of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament and their implications for the EU“, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 2015, p. 337-350; Nathalie BRACK, L’euroscepticisme au Parlement Européen. Stratégies d’une Opposition AntiSystème au Coeur des Institutions, Luxemburg, Larcier, 2014; Cécile LECONTE, „From Pathology to Mainstream Phenomenon: Reviewing the Euroscepticism Debate in Research and Theory“, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 2015, p. 250-263, hier p. 256.

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fähigkeit ab. Diese erscheint bei den „harten“ extremistischen Parteien meist erheblich geringer als bei den „weichen“. Allerdings unterscheiden sich der linke und der rechte Flügel der europäischen Parteiensysteme – nicht nur – in dieser Hinsicht beträchtlich. Während es die linken Flügelparteien meist verstehen, eine über mehrere Legislaturperioden hinweg stabile Fraktionsbildung im Europäischen Parlament zu gewährleisten, sind die rechten Flügelparteien notorisch zerstritten7. Konnte die Konföderale Fraktion der Vereinten Europäischen Linken/ Nordische Grüne Linke (GUE-NGL) nach der Europawahl zügig gebildet werden (das Ausscheiden der griechischen Kommounistikó Kómma Elládos (KKE) gefährdete dies angesichts einer komfortablen Stärkerelation nicht), erwies sich die Fraktionsbildung (Mindestquorum: 25 Abgeordnete aus sieben Ländern) bei den Rechtsaußenparteien – wie schon bei den vorhergegangenen – Wahlen als äußerst schwierig (wenn nicht gar als unmöglich). Die maßgeblich von Geert Wilders (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), Heinz-Christian Strache (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) und Marine Le Pen (Front national, FN) geplante Fraktionsbildung scheiterte im ersten Anlauf, da ein vorgesehener Partner, die Slovenská národná strana (SNS), den Einzug ins Europaparlament wider Erwarten verfehlte. Erst ein Jahr nach der Europawahl kam – aufgrund der Spaltung der polnischen Kongres Nowej Prawicej-Gruppe (KNP) und einer „Dissidentin“ der United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) – eine Fraktionsbildung (Europe of Nations and Freedom, ENF) mit knapper Mehrheit zustande8. Ob sie bis zum Ende der Legislaturperiode durchhalten wird, erscheint angesichts der Erfahrungen mit den Rechtsaußen-Fraktionsbildungsversuchen der Vergangenheit zweifelhaft.

1. Linke antieuropäische Parteien mit extremistischer Tendenz Die große Mehrheit linksextremer Parteien mit extremistischer Tendenz und einer gewissen wahlpolitischen Bedeutung war einstmals Moskau-orientiert und steht oft in organisatorischer (nicht notwendigerweise ideologisch-programmatischer) Kontinuität mit den ehemaligen Staatsparteien Mittel- und Osteuropas sowie ihrer europäischen Verbündeten in den Ländern jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs. Um Ordnung in die verwirrende Vielfalt der „postkommunistischen” Parteien zu bringen, haben die Politikwissenschaftler John T. Ishiyama und András Bozóki eine zweidimensionale Unterscheidung vorgenommen. Sie differenzieren kommunistische Nachfolgeparteien danach ob sie umfassend oder partiell reformiert wurden und ob sie eine „Transmutation“ erfuhren9. Die erste Dimension 7

8 9

Vgl. Petra VEJVODOVÁ, „Transnational Cooperation of the Far-Right in the European Union and Attempts to Institutionalize Mutual Relations“, in Uwe BACKES, Patrick MOREAU, (Hrsg.), The Extreme Right in Europe. Current Trends and Perspectives, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012, p. 215-228; siehe auch den Beitrag der Autorin in diesem Band. Vgl. Niklaus NUSPLIGER, „Le Pens späte Genugtuung“, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16. Juni 2015; Helene BUBROWSKI, „Europa von innen heraus bekämpfen“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27. Juli 2015. Vgl. András BOZÓKI, John T. ISHIYAMA, (Hrsg.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe, Armonk, London, M.E. Sharpe, 2002, p. 4-8; Uwe BACKES, Patrick MOREAU, „Conclusion“, in Uwe BACKES, Patrick MOREAU, (Hrsg.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008, p. 535-607.

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weist eine Skala von orthodoxen Kommunismus Moskauer Prägung bis zur Sozialdemokratie auf, die zweite basiert auf der Dichotomie Internationalismus/Nationalismus. Die erste Dimension stimmt im Wesentlichen mit der gängigen Unterscheidung zwischen einer revolutionären und einer refomistischen Linken überein, und die Autoren verbinden diese plausiblerweise mit der Frage nach der Einstellung gegenüber der „liberalen Demokratie“. Die revolutionäre Linke möchte das ökonomische wie das politische Wettbewerbssystem abschaffen, während die reformorientierte Linke sozial-ökonomischen Wandel innerhalb der Institutionen und Verfahrensregeln des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates erreichen will. An diese Unterscheidung knüpfen die Autoren mit den Kategorien „demokratisch“, „semi-demokratisch“ und „anti-demokratisch“ an. Die zweite Dimension trägt der Tatsache Rechnung, dass einige ehemalige Staatsparteien ihr Überleben nach dem Systemwechsel zu sichern versuchten, indem sie sich bemühten, nationalistische, ethnozentrische, mitunter sogar antisemitische Emotionen und Ressentiments zu kanalisieren, und sich auf diese Weise dem entgegengesetzten politischen Extrem annäherten. Auf diese Weise wurden egalitäre und antiegalitäre, links- und rechtsextreme Elemente miteinander verbunden („Transmutation“). Geht man von dieser Terminologie aus und ordnet das entsprechende ideologisch-programmatische Spektrum entsprechend, so können die einstmals Moskau-treuen Formationen fünf Lagern zugeordnet werden: orthodoxe Kommunisten, reformierte Kommunisten, Sozialdemokratie, Grüne Linke und „transmutierte” Linke. Drei dieser Varianten können hier ausgeschlossen bleiben: Für Sozialdemokratie und Grüne Linke bleibt der demokratische Verfassungsstaat der institutionelle Rahmen für ihre sozial-ökonomischen und ökologischen Reformvorhaben. Und die „transmutierte” Linke mit der Kommunistischen Partei der Russischen Föderation als bedeutendstem Beispiel10 spielt derzeit keine Rolle im Europäischen Parlament. Die übrigen drei Lager erfordern eine differenzierte Fallbetrachtung im Blick auf mögliche extremistische Tendenzen, je nachdem, in welche Maße Spannungen zu fundamentalen Werten und Verfahrensregeln der europäischen Verfassungsstaaten erkennbar sind.

10

Vgl. Galina MICHALEVA, „The Communist Party of the Russian Federation“, in BACKES, MOREAU, (Hrsg.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties, p. 437-459.

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Tab. 1: Linke antieuropäische Parteien mit extremistischer Tendenz im Europaparlament, 201511 Land

Partei

Fraktion

Deutschland

DIE LINKE

Frankreich Griechenland Portugal

Spain Tschechien Zypern

EP %/ Mandate

EP Gewinne/ Verluste

NP %/ Mandate

hart extremist.

weich extremist.

GUE/ NGL

7,39 (7)

–0,10 (–1)

8,6 (64)

x

FG

GUE/ NGL

6,61 (4)

+0,12 (–1)

6,9 (10)

x

KKE

NA

6,11 (2)

–2,24 (0)

5,5 (15)

x

CDU

GUE/ NGL

13,71 (3)

+3,07 (+1)

7,9 (16)

x

BE

GUE/ NGL

4,93 (1)

–5,79 (–2)

5,2 (8)

x

IP

GUE/ NGL

10,03 (6)

–

3,3 (9)

x

KSČM

GUE/ NGL

10,98 (3)

–3,20 (–1)

14,9 (33)

AKEL

GUE/ NGL

26,98 (2)

-8,37 (0)

32,7 (19)

x x

Dies trifft besonders auf die „harten“, noch immer eng am sowjetischen Modell orientierten KPen zu. Im nach den Wahlen vom Mai 2014 konstituierten Europaparlament entsprechen vor allem die Abgeordneten der KKE, der KSČM und der PCP (bestimmende Kraft im Wahlbündnis CDU) diesem Muster. Bei den übrigen Parteien in Tab. 1 handelt es sich mit Ausnahme des portugiesischen BE um ehemalige Satelliten der Sowjetunion, die tiefer gehende Parteireformen einleiteten, ohne dass diese jedoch zu einem klaren Bruch mit der Vergangenheit und einer glaubwürdigen Hinwendung zu einem in jeder Hinsicht demokratischen Sozialismus führte. Allerdings bedarf jede Partei einer differenzierten Betrachtung, da sie im Inneren von heterogenen Strömungen geprägt sind, deren Kräfteverhältnisse einem beständigen Wandel unterliegen. Bei manchen ist die Sozialdemokratisierung fortgeschritten, bei anderen hingegen dominieren Kräfte, die an der Idee des Kommunismus festhalten und die Errungenschaften des real existierenden Sozialismus mit Entschiedenheit verteidigen. 1.1. Harte Extremisten Das Lager der im Europäischen Parlament vertretenen harten linksextremistischen Parteien wird von der griechischen KKE angeführt. Ihr Sonderstatus kommt darin zum Ausdruck, dass sie – anders als noch in der Legislaturperiode zuvor – der GUE-NGL fernblieb und so auf die Vorteile einer fraktionellen Einbindung (auch als Beobachter) verzichtete. In den Jahren zuvor hatten sich ihre 11

Quelle: Europaparlament; eigene Auswertung. Erläuterung: AKEL – Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou, Zypern; BE – Bloco de Esquerda, Portugal; CDU – Coligação Democrática Unitária, Portugal; EP – Europaparlament; KSČM – Kommunistická Strana Čech a Moravy, Tschechien; EP – European Parliament; FG – Front de Gauche, Frankreich; GUE/NGL – Konföderale Fraktion der Vereinten Europäischen Linken/Nordische Grüne Linke; IP – Izquierda Plural, Spanien; DIE LINKE, Deutschland; KKE – Kommounistikó Kómma Elládos, Griechenland; NA – fraktionslos; NP – Nationales Parlament.

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Positionen gegenüber der EU und den sie unterstützenden Parteien, einschließlich der dezidiert sozialistischen, weiter verhärtet12. Im Gründungsdokument der maßgeblich von ihr ins Leben gerufenen Europapartei Initiative of Communist and Worker’s Parties to study and elaborate European Issues and to coordinate their activity hieß es unmissverständlich: „We consider that the EU is capital‘s choice. It promotes measures in favour of the monopolies, the concentration and centralization of capital; it is strengthening its characteristics as an imperialist economic, political and military bloc opposed to the interests of the working class, the popular strata; it intensifies armaments, authoritarianism, state repression, limiting sovereign rights”13. Heftig geißelte die KKE den griechischen anti-people consensus of the bourgeois parties14 unter Einschluss der gemäßigteren „Syriza“ von Alexis Tsipras und forderte ihrerseits den Austritt aus der EU. Die KKE und die mit ihr eng verbündeten KPen können nach der Systematik der Politikwissenschaftler John T. Ishiyama and András Bozóki zu jener Gruppe von Linksaußenparteien gerechnet werden, die in der „real-sozialistischen“ Zeit an Moskau orientiert waren und nach dem Ende der Sowjetunion keinen tiefgreifenden ideologischen Wandel vollzogen. Diese mehr oder weniger orthodoxen Kommunisten halten an den ideologischen und organisatorischen Prinzipien des Marxismus-Leninismus im Wesentlichen fest. Sie lehnen es ab, die Massenverbrechen des Stalinismus entschieden zu verurteilen, orientieren sich am Modell der Kaderpartei und lehnen innerparteilichen Pluralismus ab. Sie preisen die „sozialistische Oktoberrevolution“ in Russland als historischen Meilenstein der Arbeiterklasse bei der Brechung der Macht des Kapitals, beim Aufbau des Sozialismus und der Überwindung der Ausbeutung des Menschen über den Menschen. Die bolschewistische Revolution bestätigt in deren Interpretation: „only a Communist Party with a revolutionary strategy, which is guided by Marxism-Leninism, built in the workplaces and the working class communities, can safeguard the leading role of the working class in its alliance with the oppressed popular strata for the ‚revolutionary leap‘“15. Zu den Unterzeichnern der Gründungserklärung der „Initiative“ gehörte neben der Initiatorin KKE nur eine einzige Partei, der 2014 gleichermaßen der Einzug ins Europaparlament gelang: die KSČM. Sie zählt zu den wenigen ehemaligen 12

13 14 15

Vgl. Lazaros MILIOPOULOS, „Länderporträt: Griechenland“, in Uwe BACKES, Alexander GALLUS, Eckhard JESSE, (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie, Bd. 27, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, p. 204-228, hier p. 213-215. Siehe außerdem: Nikos MARANTZIDIS, „The Communist Party of Greece after the Collapse of Communism (1989-2006)“, in BACKES, MOREAU, (Hrsg.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties, p. 245-258. Founding Declaration of the INITIATIVE of Communist and Workers’ Parties to study and elaborate European issues and to coordinate their activity, Athens, November 2013, http:// initiative-cwpe.org/en/documents/founding-declaration/ (12. Januar 2014). The KKE is opposed to the anti-people consensus of the bourgeois parties, http://inter. kke.gr/en/articles/The-KKE-is-opposed-to-the-anti-people-consensus-of-the-bourgeoisparties/, (10. Juli 2015). Statement of the Secretariat of the „Communist Initiative“ in Europe on the 97th anniversary socialist October revolution (11. Juni 2014), http://initiative-cwpe.org/en/news/STATE MENT-OF-THE-SECRETARIAT-OF-THE-COMMUNIST-INITIATIVE-IN-EUROPE-ONTHE-97TH-ANNIVERSARY-SOCIALIST-OCTOBER-REVOLUTION/(2. Juli 2014.)

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Staatsparteien Mittel-/Osteuropas, die nach dem Zusammenbruch des real existierenden Sozialismus an den Prinzipien des scientific socialism16 festhielten und zugleich eine bedeutende Position im demokratischen Parteiensystem erobern und behaupten konnten17. Sie zeigte jedoch größere bündnispolitische Flexibilität als die KKE, arbeitete im tschechischen Parlament zeitweilig mit den Sozialdemokraten zusammen und verweigert sich im Europäischen Parlament nicht der Kooperation mit gemäßigteren Parteien wie „Podemos“ und „Syriza“. Im Unterschied zur KKE gehört sie der GUE-NGL als Vollmitglied an. Dies gilt auch für den Partido Comunista Português (PCP), der zur Europawahl mit grünen Bündnispartnern wie üblich eine gemeinsame Liste bildete (CDU) und drei Abgeordnete ins Europaparlament entsenden konnte – alle treue Parteikader. Strategische Flexibilität ist mit hochgradigem ideologisch-programmatischem Dogmatismus gepaart. Der PCP hält auch in dem Ende 2012 aktualisierten Programm und Statut an den Prinzipien des Marxismus-Leninismus „kritisch“18 fest, versteht sie u.a. als Instrument zur Analyse der sozialen Wirklichkeit, sieht sich in der Rolle einer „Avantgarde der Arbeiterklasse und aller Arbeiter“19 und bekennt sich – anders als der mit dem PCP rivalisierende BE – überdies auch zu den organisatorischen Prinzipien des Leninismus. Daher wird die EU als Hort des „Monopolkapitals“ und Mittel zur Blockierung demokratischer Entwicklung in ihren Grundzügen abgelehnt20. 1.2. Weiche Extremisten Die Zugehörigkeit der KSČM und des PCP zur Fraktion GUE-NGL zeigt, dass die dort vertretenen „weicheren“ Formationen zur Zusammenarbeit mit „harten“ bereit sind. Dies mag nicht zuletzt historische Ursachen haben, auf gemeinsamen Erfahrungen in ehemals sowjetorientierten Organisationen und deren Nachfolgern beruhen. Die in der Europapartei European Left zusammengeschlossenen Parteien der Fraktion GUE-NGL berufen sich in ihren Statuten auf „sozialistische“ und „kommunistische“ Traditionen gleichermaßen21. Die Mehrheit der als „weich extremistisch“ zu qualifizierenden Mitglieder der GUE/NGL-Fraktion können als „Reformkommunisten“ gelten. Diese Parteien halten an bedeutenden Teilen der marxistischen Theorietradition fest (wie Antifaschismus, Antiimperialism, Klassenkampf, teleologisches Geschichtsverständnis), lehnen aber das Organisationskonzept des Leninismus (demokratischer Zentralismus, Fraktionsverbot, Avantgardekonzept, Diktatur des Proletariats) ab und lassen einen innerparteilichen Pluralismus von Zusammenschlüssen und Plattformen zu. In ihren Organisationsprinzipien nähern sich die Reformkommunisten der Ideenwelt des Verfassungsstaates, ihr selektives Festhalten an Tei16 17 18 19 20 21

Vgl. KKE: struggle against fear and illusions (Oktober 2013), http://inter.kke.gr/export/ sites/inter/.content/download/enimerotiko-deltio-DSKEK-en.pdf. Vgl. Miroslav MARES, „Les partis communistes et postcommunistes en République tchèque et en Slovaquie“, in Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, (Hrsg.), Communisme 2014: En Europe, l’éternel retour des communismes, Paris, Vingtième Siècle, 2014, p. 271-295. Partido Comunista Português, Programa e Estatutos, Lissabon, Partido Comunista Português, 2013, p. 85. Ibid., p.82. Ibid., p.24 f. Vgl. Statute of the Party of the European Left, Preambule, http://www.european-left.org/ propos-de-la-ge/documents (14. Dezember 2013).

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len der marxistisch-leninistischen Tradition begründet jedoch ein Spannungsverhältnis, das allenfalls eine semiloyale Haltung erlaubt. Auf mittlere Sicht mag der demokratische Verfassungsstaat, verstanden als liberal-kapitalistisches System, die anerkannte Arena zur Erringung politischer Hegemonie sein, auf lange Sicht aber soll er der „klassenlosen Gesellschaft“ der Zukunft weichen. Eine demokratietheoretische Bewertung dieses Lagers ist schwierig auch deshalb, weil Theorie und Praxis nicht immer übereinstimmen. KPen mit Regierungserfahrung wie die französische vollziehen einen Balanceakt zwischen programmatischem Radikalismus und vergleichsweise pragmatischer Politik22; und innerparteilicher Pluralismus erlaubt ein weites Spektrum von Positionen – vom demokratischen Sozialismus bis zum Kommunismus. Allerdings sind auch die Unterstützter demokratisch-sozialistischer Konzepte in diesen Parteien bereit, harte linksextreme Gruppierungen zu integrieren – wie etwa die Kommunistische Plattform (KPF) der deutschen Partei Die Linke, die wiederum eng mit der ehemals moskautreuen, und heute ultra-orthodoxen Deutschen Kommunistischen Partei (DKP) zusammenarbeitet. In Kampagnen, etwa zur Unterstützung des sozialistischen Kuba, ziehen auf europäischer Ebene orthodoxe und reformierten Kommunisten oft an einem Strang. Die von der Europäischen Linkspartei und ihren Mitgliedsorganisationen praktizierte Kuba-Unterstützung ist durch eine enge Kooperation mit kubanischen Regimeorganisationen gekennzeichnet. Die Organisatoren von Workcamps aus dem Umfeld der deutschen „Linken“ (Cuba Sí) machen die Teilnahme auf der offiziellen Webpage von der „Akzeptanz des kubanischen Systems“23 abhängig. Der langjährige Revolutionsführer Fidel Castro erhielt anlässlich runder Geburtstage mehrfach hymnische Gratulationsschreiben etwa der deutschen Partei Die Linke, auch wenn dies in den Reihen der GUE-NGL nicht auf ungeteilte Zustimmung stieß24. Die immer noch prekäre Menschenrechtssituation im kubanischen Einparteiregime, an der sich trotz zögerlich eingeleiteter Formen unter Raúl Castro bislang (September 2015) noch wenig geändert hat25, scheint für die extreme Linke im Europaparlament kein Thema zu sein. Dies begründet Zweifel an der Systemloyalität auch der „moderaten“ Reformkommunisten, die sich nicht als völlig blind für die Menschenrechtsverletzungen auf der autokratisch regierten Karibik-Insel erweisen. Die Fraktion der GUE-NGL beheimatet nicht nur orthodoxe Kommunisten, sondern zeigt sich auch offen für Vereinigungen, die in der Tradition des Trotzkismus stehen, die „sozialistische Oktoberrevolution“ als historisches Ereignis positiv bewerten, aber den späteren „Staatskapitalismus“ der Sowjetunion und ihrer Satelliten ablehnen. Vor allem die portugiesischen BE ist dieser Tradition zuzuordnen. Ihre Sonderstellung kommt darin zum Ausdruck, dass sie – mit anderen trotzkistischen Vereinigungen wie dem bei der Europawahl erfolglosen französischen Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (NPA) – auch dem Netzwerk der Eu22 23 24 25

Vgl. vor allem Stéphane COURTOIS, Dominique ANDOLFATTO, „France – The Collapse of the House of Communism“, in BACKES, MOREAU, (Hrsg.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties, p. 87-131. Vgl. http://cuba-si.org/114/workcamps (20. Juli 2015). Vgl. http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-left-party-causes-stir-with-fidel-castro-birthday-tri bute/a-15332808 (20. August 2011). Vgl. Human Rights Watch Report 2005, http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/countrychapters/cuba?page=1 (20 Juli 2014).

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ropean Anti-Capitalist Left angehört. Ansonsten treten Trotzkisten vielfach als „Entristen“ in Erscheinung, suchen also reformkommunistische Parteien durch aktive Mitgliedschaft in ihrem Sinne zu beeinflussen. Dies trifft etwa auf die Mitglieder der Sozialistischen Alternative Voran (SAV) oder des Netzwerks Marx21 in der deutschen Partei Die Linke zu26.

2. Rechte antieuropäische Parteien mit extremistischer Tendenz Eine stattliche Zahl komparativer Studien zu den europäischen Rechtsaußenparteien hat mehrere Typologien hervorgebracht, um deren Formenreichtum in überschaubare Einheiten zu gliedern27. In der Forschung weit verbreitet ist die Definition des niederländischen Politikwissenschaftlers Cas Mudde, der die Familie der populist radical right durch die Verbindung von Nativismus (Verteidigung der Vorrechte der angestammten Bevölkerung gegen Immigranten), Autoritarismus (starke Führung, starker Staat) und Populismus (AntiestablishmentHaltung, der „Mann auf der Straße“ gegen „die da oben“) gekennzeichnet sieht28. Sie zählen nach dem Begriffsverständnis des Verfassers zu den „weichen“ Rechtsaußenparteien, die in einem beträchtlichen Spannungsverhältnis (wenn nicht in einem Widerspruch) zum Ethos fundamentaler Menschengleichheit und zur Idee der Menschenrechte stehen, aber nicht immer eine ausgeprägte Antisystemhaltung zeigen und in ihrem ideologisch-programmatischen Profil erheblich von den Faschismen der Zwischenkriegszeit abweichen. Als „harte“ rechtsextremistische Parteien können demgegenüber solche gezählt werden, die ein hohes Maß an Affinität gegenüber den historischen Faschismen, gepaart mit entschiedener Antisystemeinstellung, aufweisen und nicht selten Verbindungen auch zu militanten Gruppierungen unterhalten, die „Straßenpolitik“ gegenüber dem Engagement bei Wahlen bevorzugen.

26 27

28

Vgl. Eckhard JESSE, Jürgen P. LANG, DIE LINKE – eine gescheiterte Partei?, München, Olzog, 2012, p. 116-118. Vgl. Elisabeth CARTER, The Extreme Right in Western Europe. Success or Failure?, Manchester, New York, Manchester University Press, 2005; Karsten GRABOW, Florian HARTLEB, (Hrsg.), Exposing the Demagogues. Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe, Brussels, KAS, CES, 2013, p. 13-44; Richard STÖSS, Der rechte Rand bei den Europawahlen 2014, Berlin, Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, 2014. Vgl. Cas MUDDE, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

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Tab. 2: Rechte antieuropäische Parteien mit extremistischer Tendenz im Europaparlament, 2015 Land

Partei

EPFraktion

EP %/ Mandate

EP Gewinne/ Verluste

NP %/ Mandate

VB

ENF

4,26 (1)

–5,59 (–1)

3,7 (3)

NPD

NA

1,00 (1)

– (–)

1,3 (0)

FN

ENF

24,86 (23)

+18,56 (+20)

13,6 (2)

Griechenland

XA

NA

9,39 (3)

+8,93 (+3)

6,3 (17)

Italien

LN

ENF

6,15 (5)

–4,05 (–4)

4,1 (18)

x x

Belgien Deutschland Frankreich

Niederlande

PVV

ENF

13,32 (4)

–3,65 (+–0)

10,1 (15)

Österreich

FPÖ

ENF

19,72 (4)

+7,01 (+1)

20,5 (40)

JOBBIK

NA

14,67 (3)

–0,1 (+–0)

20,3 (23)

Ungarn

hart extremist.

weich extremist. x

x x x

x x

Quelle: Europaparlament; eigene Auswertung. Erläuterung: ENF – Europe of Nations and Freedom; EP – Europaparlament; FN – Front national, Frankreich; FPÖ – Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Österreich; JOBBIK – Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Ungarn; LN – Lega Nord, Italien; NA – fraktionslos; NP – Nationales Parlament; NPD – Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Deutschland; PVV – Partij voor de Vrijheid, Niederlande; VB – Vlaams Belang, Belgien; XA – Chrysi Afghi, Griechenland.

Tabelle 2 enthält die „weiche“ radical populist right nach der Definition Cas Muddes ebenso wie „harte“ rechtsextremistische Parteien, sofern es ihnen bei der Europawahl 2014 gelang, zumindest ein Mandat zu erringen (wozu in den EUMitgliedstaaten sehr unterschiedliche Quoren erforderlich waren). Ausgeblendet bleiben viele der mit dem oft diffusen Begriff „euroskeptisch“ belegten Formationen ebenso wie diverse Rechtspopulismen, die weder klare Affinitäten zu den Faschismen der Zwischenkriegszeit noch deutlich ausgeprägte Antisystemtendenzen aufweisen. Da die Übergänge fließend und die Phänomene dynamisch sind, birgt die Auswahl im Einzelnen Stoff für Kontroversen, was bei dem Thema jedoch unvermeidlich sein dürfte. 2.1. Harte Extremisten Im Unterschied zur Situation am linken Flügel des politischen Spektrums gehören Abgeordnete „harter“ rechtsextremistischer Formationen keiner der im Europaparlament gebildeten Fraktionen an. Als Hauptkriterium für die Einordnung gilt wie erwähnt die starke Affinität zu den Faschismen der Zwischenkriegszeit. Diesem Bild entsprechen die deutsche NPD und die griechische GD mit ihren Bezügen zum historischen Nationalsozialismus29 sowie die ungarische Jobbik, deren paramilitärischer Arm, die Ungarische Garde (nach dem Verbot 2009: 29

Vgl. Steffen KAILITZ, „Die nationalsozialistische Ideologie der NPD“, in Uwe BACKES, Henrik STEGLICH, (Hrsg.), Die NPD. Erfolgsbedingungen einer rechtsextremistischen Partei, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2007, p. 337-353; Antonis A. ELLINAS, „Neo-Nazism in an Established Democracy: The Persistence of Golden Dawn in Greece“, South European Society and Politics, 20:1, 2015, p. 1-20.

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Neue Ungarische Garde) den politischen Stil und die Symbolik der Pfeilkreuzler imitiert30. Alle drei Formationen sind explizit Antisystemparteien mit nationalistischrassistischer Orientierung. Im Zentrum des 2010 neu beschlossenen NPDProgramms steht – wie zuvor – das Plädoyer für die Wiederherstellung einer ethnisch homogenen „Volksgemeinschaft“ mit der Familie als „Trägerin des biologischen Erbes“ und einer am „heimischen Lebensraum“ orientierten Volkswirtschaft. Es argumentiert zwar ethnopluralistisch, lehnt aber Multikulturalismus in jeder Form ab, erwähnt Ausländer nur in pejorativen Zusammenhängen (wie Kriminalität) und weist jede Form der Integration im Interesse einer „Erhaltung der deutschen Volkssubstanz“31 entschieden zurück. Ähnlich wie die NPD verficht auch die GD, die „vom führenden Neonationalsozialisten Griechenlands“32, dem Mathematiker und früheren Armeeoffizier Nikolaos G. Michaloliakos angeführt wird, a biological conception of nationalism reminiscent of Nazi ideology. Sie will nicht nur den Nationalstaat, sondern auch die nation-race33 bewahren. Bezeichnenderweise fielen Repräsentanten beider Parteien durch abwertende Äußerungen über dunkelhäutige Sportler in Nationalteams auf34. Gemeinsam ist ihnen auch die Verflechtung mit gewaltgeneigten Szenen und die Kombination aus aggressiv-provokanter Straßen- und Wahlpolitik. Jobbik verfügt mit der Neuen Ungarischen Garde sogar über eine paramilitärische Organisation, deren Mitglieder mehrfach durch schwere Ausschreitungen zur Selbstverteidigung gegen „Roma-Kriminalität“35 in Erscheinung getreten sind. Jobbik unterscheidet sich von den anderen beiden Parteien vor allem durch die post-kommunistische Prägung. Die Systemtransformation ist aus Sicht der Partei gescheitert, weil der ungarische Staat Opfer eines Elitenkartells (einschließlich der rechtskonservativen Regierungspartei „Fidesz“) geworden sei, das den Staat zur Durchsetzung seiner materiellen Interessen erobert habe. Die Verschwörungstheorie ist insofern stark antisemitisch gefärbt, als (negativen) jüdischen Einflüssen in Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kultur überragende Bedeutung beigemessen wird36. In der Ablehnung des „Zionismus“ und einer – damit einhergehenden – vehementen Abwehrhaltung gegen den „Westen“, die USA und die EU stimmen Jobbik, die NPD und die GD überein. Wie die anderen beiden Parteien argumentiert auch Jobbik auf der Basis eines ethnozentrischen Nationalismus. Parteichef Gábor Vona propagiert den Turanismus, die kulturelle Zugehörigkeit der Ungarn zu den Turkvölkern und Mongolen, und begründet damit

30 31 32 33 34 35

36

Vgl. Patrick MOREAU, „The Victorious Parties – Unity in Diversity?“, in BACKES, MOREAU, (Hrsg.), The Extreme Right in Europe, p. 75-147, hier p. 130. NPD, (Hrsg.), Arbeit, Familie, Vaterland. Das Parteiprogramm der NPD, Berlin, NPD, 2010, p. 12 (andere Zitate 5, 7, 9). MILIOPOULOS, p. 205. Vgl. ELLINAS, p. 4. Vgl. Ex-NPD-Chef Voigt soll Immunität verlieren, in Die Zeit Online, 26. März 2015; ELLINAS, p. 5. Vgl. Péter KREKÓ, Gregor MAYER, „Transforming Hungary – together? An analysis of the Fidesz-Jobbik relationship“, in Michael MINKENBERG, (Hrsg.), Transforming the Transformation? The East European radical right in the political process, London, New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 183-205, hier p. 190. Vgl. z.B. Gabór Vona, Letter to Ilan Mor, Ambassador of the State of Israel (Budapest, 18. März 2013), http://www.jobbik.com.

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die Sonderstellung des Landes und die zu wünschende Ostorientierung37. Eine weitere Besonderheit: Der Islam erscheint in der Rhetorik von Jobbik-Repräsentanten überwiegend positiv, zumal eine islamisch geprägte Immigration in Ungarn, anders als in Griechenland und Deutschland, keine Rolle spielt. Jobbik hat sich daher im Europawahlkampf entschieden von der Antiislam-Propaganda der weicheren Rechtsaußenparteien (PVV, FN, FPÖ, VB) distanziert38. Ob Jobbik aus diesem Grunde auch der 2014 von NPD und GD gemeinsam mit Roberto Fiores Forza Nuova und anderen kleinen Vereinigungen am rechten Rand gegründeten Alliance for Peace and Freedom bislang ferngeblieben ist, erscheint unklar. 2.2. Weiche Extremisten Die Trennungslinie zwischen den „harten“ und den „weichen“ rechtsextremistischen Parteien ist strenger als diejenige linksaußen. Die „weichen“ rechtsextremistischen Parteien sind in besonderer Weise bemüht, eine Trennungslinie zu den historischen Faschismen zu ziehen, um dem Stigma des Antisemitismus und Rassismus zu entgehen. Dies gilt vor allem für jene Formationen, die in Teilen aus traditionellen rechtsextremistischen Parteien hervorgegangen sind. Die Abgrenzung nach rechtsaußen ist wahlstrategisch bedeutsam, da Nähe zu den Formationen der Zwischenkriegszeit einen gravierenden Wettbewerbsnachteil bedeutet.39 Aus diesem Grunde dürfte im Frühjahr 2015 auch der Vertreter des Front national (FN), Gilles Lebreton, im Immunitätsausschuss des Europaparlaments für die Aufhebung der Immunität des deutschen NPD-Abgeordneten Udo Voigt gestimmt haben, gegen den die Justiz wegen des Verdachts der HolocaustLeugnung und „Volksverhetzung“ ermittelte40. Die Abgrenzung gegenüber harten rechtsextremistischen Parteien geht mit einer Abschwächung ihrer Antisystemhaltung einher – wie ambivalent dieser Prozess im Inneren der Parteien auch beurteilt werden mag41. Die weichen Formationen stellen sich selbst als einzig glaubhafte Alternative zu allen anderen Parteien (aus der Sicht des alten FN: la bande des quatre) dar und kultivieren einen Antiestablishmentaffekt, sind aber gleichzeitig bemüht, sich als die wahren Repräsentanten des demokratischen Systems oder der valeurs de la République zu präsentieren.

37 38 39 40

41

Vgl. András KOVÁCS, „The Post-Communist Extreme Right: The Jobbik Party in Hungary“, in Ruth WODAK, Majid KHOSRAVINIK, Brigitte MRAL, (Hrsg.), Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Politics and Discourse, London et al., Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 223-233, hier p. 227 f. Vgl. J. Arthur WHITE, „Jobbik and Wilders and Le Pen: liberalism and Zionismus are the enemies, not Islam. A conversation with Márton Gyöngyösi on the European Parliament elections“, The Budapest Times, 22. Februar 2014. Vgl. bereits Piero IGNAZI, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 32 f. Vgl. Europaparlament unterstützt Patriotenverfolgung der BRD-Justiz, http://www.udo voigt.de/index.php/menue/24/thema/69/anzeigemonat/06/anzeigejahr/2015/id/4797/in fotext/Europaparlament_unterstuetzt_Patriotenverfolgung_der_BRD_Justiz/Aktuelles.html (15. Juli 2015). Vgl. für den FN: Gilles IVALDI, „Permanences et évolutions de l’idéologie frontiste“, in Pascal DELWIT, (Hrsg.), Le Front national. Mutations de l’extrême droite française, Brüssel, Éditions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2012, p. 95-112; James SHIELDS, „The Front National: From Systematic Opposition to Systemic Integration“, Modern & Contemporary France, 22:4, 2014, p. 491511.

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In einem ostentativen Anti-Antisemitismus haben diese „weichen“ Parteien einen Schlüssel zur erfolgreichen „Dediabolisation” (die strategische Zauberformel Marine Le Pens) und für die Gewinnung größerer wahl- wie auch bündnispolitischer Akzeptanz gefunden42. Sie suchen daher, positive Bezugnahmen auf etwaige Vorbilder der Zwischenkriegszeit zu vermeiden – und gehen, sofern dies dennoch geschieht, auch gegen prominente Mitglieder in den eigenen Reihen vor, welche diese Maxime missachten – wie zuletzt der erneut hochgekochte Konflikt Marine Le Pens mit ihrem Vater und langjährigen Parteiführer JeanMarie Le Pen zeigte, der in einem Interview für die rechtsextremistische Zeitschrift Rivarol von ihm bereits vor Jahren vorgetragene Geschichtsdeutungen mit negationistischer Tendenz (Gaskammern als „Detail“ der Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs) wiederholt und Fundamentalkritik am politischen Kurs seiner Partei geübt hatte43. Bereits lange vor ihrer Antrittsrede in Tours als neugewählte Präsidentin des FN im Januar 2011 war Marine Le Pen auf eine programmatische Linie eingeschwenkt, die sich auch in anderen europäischen Rechtsaußenparteien der wandlungsfreudigeren Art allmählich durchgesetzt hatte44. Ein Meilenstein auf diesem Weg zur Erlangung größerer politischer Akzeptanz war die „Jerusalem Deklaration“ vom Dezember 2010: Vertreter der FPÖ, der deutschen Minipartei Die Freiheit“, des VB und der Schwedendemokraten (Sverigedemokraterna) stellten sich während einer Israel-Reise auf den Boden „jüdisch-christlicher Werte“ und kritisierten den Islam als ein „totalitäres System“45 mit dem Ziel der Weltunterwerfung. Sie unterstrichen das Existenzrecht Israels und suchten den Schulterschluss mit Vertretern der Siedlerbewegung und des rechten Flügels der Knesseth im Kampf gegen „den Islam“. Während einer anderen Israel-Reise im Februar 2011 bemühten sich VB, SD und die deutsche islamophobe Pro-Bewegung um den Schulterschluss mit jüdischen Organisationen im gemeinsamen Kampf gegen „den Islam“46. Zwei Monate später fand eine „Deutsch-Israelische Konferenz“ im Schloss Horst in Gelsenkirchen statt47. Die Gäste aus Israel repräsentierten den 42

43 44

45 46 47

Vgl. für den FN: Adar PRIMOR, „The Daughter as De-demonizer“, Haaretz, 7. Januar 2011. Siehe zur Verteufelung als Voraussetzung erfolgreicher Dediabolisierung: Pierre-André TAGUIEFF, Du diable en politique. Réflexions sur l’antilépenisme ordinaire, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2014. Vgl. Dominique ALBERTINI, „Jean-Marie Le Pen renonce à la tête de liste en Paca“, Libération, 13. April 2015. Vgl. Yves Patrick PALLADE, „Proisraelismus und Philosemitismus in rechtspopulistischen und rechtsextremen europäischen Parteien der Gegenwart“, in Irene A. DIEKMANN, Elke-Vera KOTOWSKI, (Hrsg.), Geliebter Feind, gehasster Freund – Antisemitismus und Philosemitismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Julius H. Schoeps, Berlin, Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2009, p. 409-436; José Pedro ZÚQUETE, „The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?“, Journal of Political Ideologies, 13:3, 2008, p. 321-344; ders., „The New Frontlines of Right-Wing Nationalism“, Journal of Political Ideologies, 20:1, 2015, p. 69-85; Uwe BACKES, „Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die muslimische Welt – eine Entwicklungsskizze“, in Alexander GALLUS, Thomas SCHUBERT, Tom THIEME, (Hrsg.), Deutsche Kontroversen. Festschrift für Eckhard Jesse, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013, p. 393-408. Heinz Christian STRACHE, René STADTKEWITZ, Filip DEWINTER, Kent EKEROTH, Jerusalemer Erklärung (7. December 2010), http://www.diefreiheit.org/jerusalemer-erklaerung/ (13. März 2011). Siehe Heiko KLARE, Bernhard STEINKE, Michael STURM, „Eine ‚deutsche Rechte ohne Antisemitismus‘? Kritische Betrachtung einer ‚deutsch-israelischen Konferenz‘ in Gelsenkirchen und der damit verbundenen Strategie von ‚Pro NRW‘“, mobim-analysen, 5/2011, p. 1-7. Siehe das Video der Konferenz unter: http://www.freiheitlich.me/?p=2992 (12. Mai 2011).

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rechten Flügel der Knesseth. Der Siedler-Aktivist David Ha’ivri, „Außenbeauftragter” eines Bezirks in der Westbank, war als junger Mann Mitglied der später verbotenen Kach-Partei48 – und wiederholt in rechtliche Auseinandersetzungen verstrickt wegen befürwortender Äußerungen im Zusammenhang mit dem Mord an Premierminister Yitzak Rabin (November 1995) und der Schändung einer Moschee49. Ein anderer Teilnehmer, der Literaturwissenschaftler Hillel Weiss, ist für sein „Großisrael“-Engagement bekannt. Und Rabbi Shalom Dov Wolpo gründete im November 2008 zusammen mit Baruch Marzel die rechtsextremistische Partei Eretz Jisra‘el Shelanu, die jegliche Landrückgabe an die Palästinenser kategorisch zurückweist50. Die Verbindung von erklärtem Prozionismus mit pointiert-pauschalisierender Islamkritik war bereits seit längerem das Markenzeichen der niederländischen PVV. Doch deren charismatischer Anführer, Geert Wilders, scheute, gerade weil er diese ungewöhnliche Kombination mit einer gewissen Glaubwürdigkeit verkörperte, vor Bündnissen mit anderen europäischen Rechtsaußenparteien zurück. Im Vorfeld der Europawahl erhöhte sich jedoch der Kooperationsdruck, und Wilders steuerte bald zielstrebig auf Absprachen mit Rechtsaußenparteien zu, die seinem programmatischen Minimalkonsens zu folgen bereit schienen. Im August 2013 trafen sich Wilders und der FPÖ-Bundesobmann Heinz-Christian Strache zu einem ersten Gespräch in Wien51, und im November 2013 kam Marine Le Pen zum Besuch nach Den Haag, um mit dem niederländischen Kollegen eine Kooperation beider Parteien auf europäischer Ebene zu verkünden52. Ende 2013 gaben FN, FPÖ und VB gemeinsam ein „Europapolitisches Manifest“ heraus, das harte Kritik an der EU übte, sich zugleich aber für den Schutz Europas aussprach, „dessen christliche und humanistische Wurzeln durch den Aufstieg radikal-islamistischer Tendenzen in der Europäischen Union bedroht“53 seien. Die Analyse der internationalen Internetplattformen der Kooperationspartner verrät wenig über die zentralen Inhalte ihrer Kampagnen. Die offiziellen Seiten der Europaparteien (European Alliance for Freedom; Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom)54 zeigen mit ihrer Inhaltsarmut, dass sie in erster Linie der Akquirierung von EU-Geldern dienen und wenig Eigenleben entfalten. Das dort präsentierte programmatische Profil ist vor allem durch Lippenbekenntnisse zugunsten demokratischer und europäischer Werte gekennzeichnet, die schwer mit dem aggressiven Stil der Wahlkampfauftritte in Einklang zu bringen sind. 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Vgl. zum politischen Hintergrund vor allem Ehud Sprinzak, Brother against Brother. Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, New York, The Free Press, 1999. Siehe Heiko Klare, Bernhard Steinke, Michael Sturm, „Eine ‚deutsche Rechte ohne Antisemitismus‘?…“, unter http://www.hagalil.com/archiv/2011/04/27/pro-nrw/print/ (10. November 2011). Siehe Harriet SHERWOOD, „Israel plan to demolish unauthorised West Bank outposts condemned“, The Guardian, 8., März 2011. Vgl. HC Strache tritt Geert Wilders zu einem ersten Gespräch in Wien, unter: http:// www.unzensuriert.at/content/0013759-HC-Strache-trifft-Geert-Wilders-zu-erstem-Gespr-chWien (11. Dezember 2013). Cf. Benjamin DÜRR, „Initiative von Wilders und Le Pen: Europas Rechtspopulisten wollen Brüssel entmachten“, Der Spiegel Online, 13. November 2013. Europapolitisches Parteimanifest, 11. Dezember 2012, unter: http://images.derstandard.at/ 2013/12/11/Manifest%20EAF%202014.pdf, 2. (2. Juli 2014). Vgl. http://www.eurallfree.org/?q=de; http://www.menleuropa.eu/. (7. April 2014).

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Analysiert man die Reden der wichtigsten Protagonisten, so zeichnet sich ein programmatisches Profil ab, wie es im Kern in der „Jerusalem-Erklärung“ vom Dezember 2010 umrissen worden war: – Die Werte des „christlichen Abendlandes“ müssen in einem neuen Kreuzzug gegen den „radikalen Islam” verteidigt werden. Der „radikale Islam” ist kein legitimer Bestandteil der europäischen Kultur. Als fremdes Element ist er möglichst vollständig zu beseitigen. – Der „radikale Islam” ist der Hauptfeind, den es in einem clash of civilizations zu besiegen gilt. Die Trennungslinie zwischen j„Islam“, „Islamismus” und Jihadismus ist fließend. – Die Juden und der Staat Israel sind Bündnispartner im Kampf gegen den „radikalen Islam”. Ein gemeinsamer Sieg über die Armeen des „radikalen Islam” bietet eine Lösung für den europäischen Kulturkampf ebenso wie für den Nahost-Konflikt. Dieses neue ideologisch-programmatische Syndrom bricht in mehreren Punkten mit den geistigen Traditionen der extremen Rechten und ist in weit höherem Maße geeignet, Akzeptanz in Teilen der Bevölkerung zu finden, die der älteren extremen Rechten verschlossen blieben. Insbesondere bietet das neue ideologisch-programmatische Syndrom folgende strategische Vorteile für eine effektive Wahlkampfführung: – Prozionism hebelt den Antisemitismusvorwurf aus. Wer gemeinsam mit „den Juden“ gegen „den Islam“ kämpft, kann nicht zugleich Antisemit sein. – Der „radikale Islam” wird als „faschistisch“, „totalitär”, „frauenfeindlich” und „homophob” demaskiert. Auf diese Weise lassen sich Anschuldigungen konterkarieren, man sei selbst faschistisch, extremistisch, misogyn und homophob. – Indem das „christliche” – oder noch besser: „jüdisch-christliche” – Abendland verteidigt wird, entkräftet man den AntiuniversalismusVorwurf und öffnet sich für christlich orientierte Mehrheitsströmungen in der Bevölkerung. Auf diese Weise erledigt sich zugleich der Nationalismus- und Ethnozentrismus-Vorwurf, denn nicht „nationale” Werte werden gegen „Europa” verteidigt, sondern „europäische” gegen „kulturfremde außereuropäische”. Wenn aber so bedeutende Positionen der extremen Rechten aufgegeben werden: Wie können muslimfeindliche Parteien und Vereinigungen dann noch „extremistische“ Tendenzen aufweisen? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, ist zunächst zu fragen, wie glaubwürdig die programmatische Umorientierung vertreten wird. Dient möglicherweise nur in erster Linie dazu, die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in Wahlkämpfen zu erhöhen? Oder ist das Bündnis mit jüdischen Kreisen ein untrügliches Zeichen für einen tiefer gehenden und ernst zu nehmenden Wandel? Geert Wilders, der während seines Studiums mehrere Monate in einem Kibbuz arbeitete, viele Male an den Jordan reiste und immer wieder seine „Liebe zu Israel”55 bekundete, kann den ideologisch-programmatischen Kurs glaubwürdiger als einige seiner Bündnispartner vertreten. Was etwa den FPÖ-Vorsitzenden Christian Strache angeht, so erscheinen erhebliche Zweifel angebracht. Als er während des erwähnten Besuchs in Jerusalem die Holocaust-Gedenkstätte Yad 55

Door Theo KOELÉ, Michiel KRUIJT, „Verliefd op Israël“, Volkskrant, 10. April 2007.

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Vashem gemeinsam mit dem EU-Parlamentarier Andreas Mölzer und dem Wiener Abgeordneten David Lazar besuchte, setzte er statt der üblichen Kippah ein „Biertönnchen“ auf, die traditionelle Kopfbedeckung schlagender deutsch-nationaler Verbindungen. Seine Bundesbrüder in Wien brachen angesichts dieser Geste in höhnisches Gelächter aus56. Straches Verhalten legt den Schluss nahe, dass die Verbindungen zu jüdischen Kreisen für Teile der neuen rechtsextremen Antiislamisierungsfront instrumentellen Charakter besitzen. Die Auswahl der Partner zeigt zudem, dass die Allianz auf einen ethnozentrischen Konsens aufbaut, auch wenn dieser stärker kulturell als biologisch grundiert und ethnopluralistisch begründet ist. Dies dürfte selbst für Geert Wilders gelten, der seine früheren liberal-konservativen Positionen im Laufe seiner politischen Tätigkeit teilweise aufgegeben und sich dem Profil der „national-populistischen“ Parteien angenähert hat57. Allerdings sollten die ideologisch-programmatischen Differenzen des neuen Antiislamisierungs-Netzwerkes zu den harten rechtsextremistischen Parteien vom Schlage der NPD nicht als bloß taktischer oder strategischer Natur unterschätzt werden. Vielsagend war die Reaktion der deutschen NPD auf die „Jerusalem-Erklärung”. Das Parteiorgan „Deutsche Stimme” hetzte gegen die „jüdischen Landräuber”: „Wer sich gegen die Landnahme fremder Völkerschaften in Europa” ausspreche, könne „nicht gleichzeitig die Vertreibung anderer Völker aus ihrer angestammten Heimat befürworten“58. Schon zuvor hatte der sächsische NPD-Abgeordnete Jürgen Gansel vor der falschen Logik des Satzes „Der Feind meines Feindes ist mein Freund” gewarnt: „der Jude ist nicht plötzlich mein Freund, weil ich außenpolitisch gegen USrael [!] bin“59. Im neuen master frame, den das Antiislamisierungsnetzwerk seiner Programmatik und Wahlpropaganda zugrunde legt, ist hingegen für Antisemitismus kein Platz (wie glaubwürdig auch immer die Reorientierung im Einzelfall sein mag). Die weichen rechtsextremen Parteien verbinden die zur Schau gestellte israelfeundliche Haltung mit ostentativen Bekundungen ihrer demokratischen Gesinnung – so wie der Kampf gegen „den Islam“ im Namen der Verteidigung von Freiheit, Toleranz und Pluralismus geführt wird. In ihren Programmen wird man vergeblich nach antidemokratischen Aussagen suchen; z.T. haben versierte Juristen die Texte geprüft und mögliche Angriffsflächen beseitigt60. Professionelle Kritiker der weichen rechtsextremistischen Parteien versuchen daher oft, deren rechtsextremistischen Charakter in erster Linie durch biographische Verbindungen zu harten Rechtsextremisten zu beweisen. Ein Beweis im strengen Sinne lässt sich so jedoch nicht führen. Das Grundmuster, das harte und weiche rechtsextreme Parteien verbindet, besteht offenkundig nicht in einer gemeinsamen Haltung gegenüber der jüdischchristlichen Tradition. Diese ist etwa bei der NPD oder beim neopaganen Flügel 56 57 58 59 60

Vgl. Saskia JUNGNIKL, Harald FIDLER, Julia HERRNBÖCK, „Strache, Biertonnen und das Heilige Land“, Der Standard, 23. Dezember 2010. Vgl. Die überzeugende Analyse bei: Koen VOSSEN, „Classifying Wilders. The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for Freedom“, Politics,31:3, 2011, p. 179-189. Linus TORFHAUS, „Die Reise nach Jerusalem“, Deutsche Stimme, January 4, 2011. Jürgen W. GANSEL, „Mit Islam-Kritik zum Erfolg!“, Deutsche Stimme, November 30, 2010. Vgl. Florian HARTLEB, PRO Deutschland. Auf dem Ticket eines Schmähvideos zur islamfeindlichen Bürgerbewegung?, Berlin, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Parteienmonitor Aktuell, September 2012.

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der Jobbik61 Anathema, während sie der neuen Antiislamisierungsfront als wirksames Mittel der Ab- und Ausgrenzung dient. Unter den Anhänger vorchristlicher nationaler Mythologien oder neopaganer Götter kann dies schwerlich Anklang finden. Das Verbindende zu harten Formen des Rechtsextremismus muss auf einer höheren Abstraktionsebene gesucht werden. Es liegt vor allem in der Art der Gegenüberstellung von „wir“ und „die anderen“. Die Fremdgruppencharakterisierung erfüllt alle Merkmale eines klassischen Feindbildes, bei dem das Gegenüber pauschal negativ attribuiert und dämonisiert wird62. Die Gleichsetzung von Islam, Islamismus, Salafismus, Jihadismus, wie sie etwa in der generalisierenden Abwertung des Koran als „faschistisch“ zum Ausdruck kommt, ist dazu angetan, alle gläubigen Anhänger ins Zwielicht zu rücken. Auf diese Weise werden Misstrauen und Ressentiments gegenüber einer Bevölkerungsgruppe geschürt, die als kulturell abweichende Minderheit unter Assimilierungsdruck steht und in der Mehrheitsbevölkerung vielfach nicht auf das für ein gedeihliches Miteinander notwendige Maß an Empathie zählen kann. Die pauschal-negative Charakterisierung „des Islam” überschreitet die Grenzen einer – in der offenen Gesellschaft grundsätzlich legitimen – Kritik an Wertvorstellungen und Lebensformen muslimischer Bevölkerungsgruppen und ist dazu angetan, diskriminierende, die Menschenrecht von Muslimen verletzende, Verhaltensweisen zu ermutigen63. Die Feindbild-Konstruktion der Antiislamisierungsfront korrespondiert mit einer homogenisierenden Definition der Wir-Gruppe. Ihr liegt, anders als im Falle der NPD, jedoch keine erkennbare biologisch-rassistische Ideologie zugrunde. Sie ist eher ethnokulturell ausgerichtet und bleibt in ihren Inhalten vage. Das „jüdisch-christliche Abendland“ lässt vielfältige Interpretationen zu und ist bei keiner der erwähnten Gruppierungen mit einer spezifischen Glaubenspraxis, Religions- oder Kirchennähe verbunden, dient mithin in erster Linie zur Exklusion all dessen, was als traditionsfremd erscheint. Die Ausgrenzungspraxis wiederum widerspricht im Kern jüdisch-christlichen Kardinaltugenden, zu denen neben der Gerechtigkeit die Mäßigung zählt. Insofern erscheint es zweifelhaft, ob die selbsternannten Verteidiger des „jüdisch-christlichen Abendlandes“ die Werte, auf die sie sich emphatisch berufen, wirklich ernst nehmen.

3. Vergleich Welche Rolle spielen die Parteien mit mehr oder weniger ausgeprägten extremistischen Tendenzen im Europäischen Parlament? Die in diesem Beitrag erfassten 61

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Vgl. Uwe BACKES, „The Unsuccessful Parties – Ideologies, Strategies, and Conditions of the Failure”, in BACKES, MOREAU, p. 156-158; Ádám KOLOZSI, Social Constructions of the Native Faith: Mytho-historical Narratives and Identity-discourse in Hungarian Neopaganism, Master Thesis, Budapest, Central European University Nationalism Studies Program, 2012, p. 65, 105. Vgl. Eckhard JESSE, „Feindbilder im Extremismus”, in Uwe BACKES, Alexander GALLUS, Eckhard JESSE, (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie, Bd. 23, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011, p. 13-36. Marine Le Pen scheint in diesem Punkt differenzierter als Geert Wilders, der sich nicht scheut, den Propheten Mohammed in öffentlichen Reden als Kinderschänder etc. zu verunglimpfen. Vgl. „Le Pen said, she’s no Wilders”, unter: https://www.rnw.org/archive/le-pensays-shes-no-wilders (11. Juni 2011).

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des linken wie rechten Flügels bilden eine kleine Minderheit, deren Einfluss nicht sehr stark, aber auch nicht zu unterschätzen ist. Die Parteien verfügen über 72 von 751 Mandaten. Der Mandatsanteil beläuft sich somit auf 9,6 Prozent. 15 Mandate entfallen auf „harte“ Formationen, also weniger als zwei Prozent. Differenziert man nach den beiden Flügeln des politischen Spektrums, so kommt die extreme Linke auf einen Mandatsanteil von 3,7, die extreme Rechte auf 5,9 Prozent. Der Anteil der „harten“ Formationen an den erfassten linksextremen Parteien ist deutlich höher als der an den rechtsextremen Parteien. Dies dürfte am durchschnittlich höheren Stigmatisierungsdruck gegen rechtsextreme Parteien liegen, wobei der historische Erfahrungshaushalt mit extremistischen Bewegungen von Land zu Land unterschiedlich ist, zu verschiedenen Demokratieschutzkonzepten und typischen Abwehrreaktionen von Seiten staatlicher Institutionen wie der Bürgergesellschaft führt. Diese Zusammenhänge können hier nur angedeutet werden64. Diesem Ausgrenzungsdruck65 unterliegen teilweise auch Formationen, die in diese Untersuchung nicht einbezogen wurden, weil ihre extremistischen Tendenzen zu wenig ausgeprägt erscheinen. Dies gilt für UKIP, die zwar zu den harten EU-Kritikern zählt und die britischen Konservativen zu einer betont europakritischen Haltung anstachelt, aber wenig Neigungen zeigt, Grundwerte und elementare Verfahrensregeln der europäischen Verfassungsstaaten in Frage zu stellen66. Immerhin zeigt das „Überlaufen“ der aufgrund eines Finanzskandals in Ungnade gefallenen ehemaligen UKIP-Abgeordneten Janice Atkinson zur ENFFraktion, dass die Grenzen auch hier fließend sind. Gleiches gilt für die polnischen Abgeordneten der KNP, die sich teils der ENF angeschlossen, teils auf einem Fraktionslosenstatus beharrt haben – wie der schillernde ehemalige Anführer der Kleinpartei, der ehemalige polnische Regimekritiker und Antikommunist Janusz Korwin-Mikke. Auf der linken Seite des politischen Spektrums sind aus ähnlichen Gründen die spanische Podemos und die griechische „Syriza“ ausgeklammert geblieben, weil sie Akkulturationsprozesse und innerparteiliche Klärungsprozesse in der Auseinandersetzung mit linksextremen Positionen durchlaufen haben67.

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Vgl. Uwe BACKES, „Limits of Freedom in Democratic Constitutional States. A Comparative Study on Germany, France and the USA”, Totalitarismus und Demokratie, 3, 2006, p. 108-132; Giovanni CAPOCCIA, Defending Democracy. Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 2005; Gereon FLÜMANN, Streitbare Demokratie in Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten. Der staatliche Umgang mit nichtgewalttätigem politischem Extremismus im Vergleich, Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2015; Martin KLAMT, Die Europäische Union als streitbare Demokratie. Rechtsvergleichende und europarechtliche Dimensionen einer Idee, München, Herbert Utz Verlag, 2012; George MICHAEL, Michael MINKENBERG, „A Continuum for Responding to the Extreme Right. A Comparison between the United States and Germany”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:12, 2007, p. 1109-1123; András SAJÓ, (ed.), Militant Democracy, Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2004; Markus THIEL, (ed.), The „Militant Democracy” Principle in Modern Democracies, Farnham, Burlington, Ashgate, 2009. Vgl. TAGUIEFF; Lazaros MILIOPOULOS, „Moralische Probleme beim Umgang mit Extremismus in Deutschland”, in: Eckhard JESSE, (Hrsg.), Wie gefährlich ist Extremismus? Gefahren durch Extremismus, Gefahren im Umgang mit Extremismus, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, p. 197-220. Vgl. den Beitrag von David HANLEY in diesem Band. Auch die Dänische Volkspartei, Timo SOINIS „Basisfinnen” und die „Alternative für Deutschland” sind aus diesen Gründen nicht berücksichtigt worden. Vgl. die Beiträge von David ARTER und Viola NEU in diesem Band. Vgl. den Beitrag von Antonio ELORZA in diesem Band.

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Für die Einschätzung des Gefährdungspotentials aus der Akteursperspektive68 ist zunächst das Gewicht von Bedeutung, dass die Parteien mit extremistischen Tendenzen auf der jeweiligen nationalen Bühne, gemessen an ihrem Stimmen- und Mandatsanteil, in die Waagschale legen können. Hier fällt auf, dass lediglich in der Hälfte der erfassten Fälle (8 von 16) der Stimmenanteil im Europaparlament geringer ausfällt als im nationalen Parlament. Dies bestätigt nicht gerade die häufig vertretene These, wonach nicht-etablierte Parteien bei Europawahlen günstigere Wettbewerbschancen besäßen. Der deutsche Fall (NPD) beweist die Notwendigkeit der individuellen Fallbeurteilung auf Länderebene: Der Stimmenanteil hat sich gegenüber der letzten nationalen Wahlen verringert, aber aufgrund des Wegfalls der – für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag geltenden – Fünfprozenthürde ist die Partei dennoch mit einem Mandat ins Europaparlament gelangt. Betrachtet man die „harten“ Fälle, so sind die entsprechenden Parteien keinesfalls allesamt auf nationaler Ebene marginalisiert. Auf dem linken Flügel trifft dies auf keinen der Fälle zu: Die tschechischen, griechischen und portugiesischen Kommunisten sind in den nationalen Parlamenten vertreten, wobei die KSČM den weitaus größten Stimmenanteil erringen konnte. Sie verfügt auch über das im Verhältnis zu den beiden anderen Formationen größere Koalitionspotential, wie die zeitweilige Zusammenarbeit mit den tschechischen Sozialdemokraten zeigt69. Auf der rechten Seite des politischen Spektrums ist die Situation insofern anders, als die NPD, wie bereits erwähnt, im Europaparlament (schwach) vertreten, auf nationaler Ebene aber marginalisiert ist (seit ihrer Gründung 1965 ist ihr bei keiner Bundestagswahl der Einzug ins nationale Parlament gelungen)70. Die beiden anderen „harten“ Fälle zeigen ein anderes Bild: GD und Jobbik verfügen über eine Repräsentation in beachtlicher Stärke auf nationaler Ebene. Allerdings schnitt die ungarische Partei bei der Europawahl vergleichsweise schwach ab, während GD im Vergleich zur letzten nationalen Wahl ein noch erheblich besseres Ergebnis erzielen konnte. Während die GD über keinerlei Koalitionspotential verfügen dürfte, erscheint dies für Ungarn keineswegs sicher, da Orbáns Fidesz manches von dem in gemäßigterer Form umsetzt, was Jobbik auf die politische Agenda bringt71. So kann insgesamt nicht einmal für die harten extremistischen Fälle gesagt werden, sie seien vernachlässigbare Randphänomene. Für die „weichen“ Formationen gilt dies schon gar nicht, da sie im Schnitt über das weitaus größere Stimmenpotential und in einigen Ländern auch über ein erhebliches Koalitionspotential verfügen. Auf der extremen Linken stellt AKEL als langjährige Regierungspartei mit extremistischem Programm, aber pragmatischem Politikstil72 eine Ausnahme dar. Frankreich und Deutschland unterschieden sich im Blick auf das Koalitionspotential lange Zeit erheblich. Wäh68 69 70 71 72

Vgl. zur Problematik der Bestimmung des Risikopotentials generell: Uwe BACKES, „Extreme Gefahr aus der Mitte? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen politikwissenschaftlicher Diagnostik”, in: Eckhard JESSE, op.cit., p. 89-111. Vgl. Miroslav MAREŠ, op.cit . Vgl. Gertrud GLEIXNER, „Das Scheitern der NPD – Ende der Ära Voigt”, in: Gerhard HIRSCHER, Eckhard JESSE, (Hrsg.), Extremismus in Deutschland. Schwerpunkte. Vergleiche, Perspektiven, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013, p. 79-96. Vgl. Péter KREKÓ, Gregor MAYER, op.cit., p. 190. Vgl. Andreas STERGIOU, „The Communist Party of Cyprus – AKEL”, in BACKES, MOREAU, (Hrsg.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties, p. 259-281. Siehe auch den Beitrag des Autors in diesem Band.

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rend die Einbindung von Kommunisten in Regierungsbündnisse in Frankreich eine lange Tradition besaß, war sie in Deutschland aufgrund der deutschen Teilung und des SED-Regimes lange Zeit tabu73. Inzwischen hat die Partei Die Linke auf Länderebene Koalitionsfähigkeit bewiesen (in Thüringen stellt sie seit Dezember 2014 erstmals einen Ministerpräsidenten). Auf nationale Ebene dürfte sie hauptsächlich aufgrund ihres bizarren außenpolitischen Profils (sie beheimatet Putinisten, Antizionisten und Castro-Verehrer gleichermaßen) noch für einige Zeit ausgeschlossen bleiben. Auf der extremen Rechten ragt bei den „weichen“ Formationen der österreichische Fall heraus. Die FPÖ stellte in der Ära Haider in Kärnten mehrfach den Ministerpräsidenten und war von 2002 bis 2007 Regierungspartei in Wien. Nach einer Durststrecke bei Wahlen (nach der Parteispaltung 2005) hat sie sich in den letzten Jahren wieder erholt und mit der Bildung einer ersten FPÖ-SPÖ-Koalition auf Landesebene (Burgenland seit Juni 2015) ihr politische Akzeptanz weiter gesteigert74. Eine ähnliche Bilanz kann nur die LN aufweisen, die zwischen 1994 und 2011 an drei Regierungen unter Silvio Berlusconi beteiligt war75. Die Koalitionsfähigkeit der PVV ist im Vergleich dazu wesentlich bescheidener. Immerhin duldete sie in den Jahren 2010-2012 das Kabinett-Rutte, wenn auch von zahlreichen Affären und Querelen belastet76. Ganz anders verhält es sich demgegenüber mit FN und VB. Beide Parteien sehen sich seit vielen Jahren einem „cordon sanitaire“ der etablierten Parteien, einschließlich der gemäßigten Rechten, gegenüber, der nur auf lokaler Ebene mitunter durchbrochen worden ist77. Konsequente Ausgrenzung in diesem Sinne ist aber für die hier relevanten Fälle weder auf der extremen Linken noch auf der extremen Rechten typisch. Ob dies aus der Gefahrenperspektive positiv oder negativ zu beurteilen sein mag, kann kaum pauschal beantwortet werden. Unabhängig von ihrer Bündnis- und Politikfähigkeit fällt die Bilanz mit Blick auf akteursbezogene (von der Frage der Robustheit der Systeme und ihrer Abwehrmechanismen unabhängige) Dekonsolidierungsrisiken gemischt aus: Solange Parteien mit extremistischen Tendenzen auf Gewalt verzichten und die demokratischen Spielregeln weitgehend einhalten, können sie als „nützliches Korrektiv“78 wirken, vernachlässigte Themen aufgreifen, den politischen Wettbewerb beleben und systemferne Bevölkerungsgruppen integrieren. Sie bergen jedoch auch Polarisierungs- und Radikalisierungsrisiken, begünstigen unter Umständen einen konfrontativen, wenig sachorientierten politischen Umgangsstil, können mit ihren systemfeindlichen 73 74 75 76 77 78

Vgl. Isabelle CANU, Der Schutz der Demokratie in Deutschland und Frankreich. Ein Vergleich des Umgangs mit politischem Extremismus vor dem Hintergrund der europäischen Integration, Wiesbaden, Springer Fachmedien, 1997. Vgl. den Beitrag von Patrick MOREAU in diesem Band. Vgl. die französische Debatte um den „gaucho-lepénisme”: Pascal PERRINEAU, La France au Front, Paris, Fayard, 2014. Vgl. Tanja KLEIN, Rechtspopulistische Parteien in Regierungsbildungsprozessen. Die Niederlande, Belgien und Schweden im Vergleich, Potsdam, Universitätsverlag Potsdam, 2012, p. 59-64. Cf. William DOWNS, „How Effective is the Cordon Sanitaire? Lessons from Efforts to Contain the Far Right in Belgium, France, Denmark and Norway”, Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung, 4:1, 2002, p. 32-51. Vgl. Frank DECKER, Der neue Rechtspopulismus, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2004, p. 271. Siehe auch ders., „Vom Protestphänomen zur politischen Dauererscheinung: Rechts- und Linkspopulismus in Westeuropa”, in Uwe BACKES, Alexander GALLUS, Eckhard JESSE, (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie, Bd. 27, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, p. 57-72.

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Tendenzen überdies dazu beitragen, dass Klientelgruppen dem demokratischen System weiter entfremdet werden oder sogar zu gewaltorientierten Handlungsformen übergehen.

Fazit Für pessimistische wie für optimistische Szenarien bieten die erörterten Fälle manches Anschauungsmaterial. Die Erfahrungen mit einer minoritären Beteiligung von Rechtsaußenparteien an Koalitionsregierungen zeigen, dass demokratische Prozesse eher gestärkt als geschwächt werden und die Juniorpartner ihren Protest-Appeal zumindest zeitweilig einbüßen79. Pessimistisch stimmen die strukturellen Gemeinsamkeiten, die – neben den offensichtlichen und bedeutsamen Unterschieden – in den politischen Angeboten der rechten wie der linken Flügelparteien ins Auge fallen. Beide Seiten üben heftige, oft undifferenzierte Kritik an den politischen Systemen der europäischen Demokratien und suchen die in Teilen der Bevölkerung verbreitete Politik- und Politikerverdrossenheit zu kanalisieren. Dabei stehen sie untereinander im Wettbewerb um Wählergruppen, die von den systemtragenden Parteien enttäuscht sind und mit ihrer Stimme nicht nur Sympathie, sondern auch Protest zum Ausdruck bringen. Beide Flügel nutzen Provokation, Zuspitzung, Anklage als Mittel der Fundamentalkritik, sind aber nicht in der Lage, grundlegende Alternativen zum heftig gescholtenen Status quo zu entwickelt und glaubwürdig zu vertreten. Die Vorbilder der Vergangenheit (der „real existierende Sozialismus“ hier, die Faschismen und rechtsautoritären Regime dort) entfalten keine Leuchtkraft mehr und neue, mobilisierungsfähige Regimealternativen sind weltweit kaum zu finden. Dies erklärt in erheblichem Maße die Bedeutung, die manichäischen Feindbildern als identitätsstiftenden Konstrukten an beiden Flügeln des politischen Spektrums zuwächst. Zum einen definieren sie sich wechselseitig als Feinde, indem die extreme Linke ihren Antifaschismus – nach alter Manier – auf nahezu alles ausdehnt, was sie politisch entschieden bekämpft, während der Antikommunismus für die extreme Rechte nach wie vor eine – wenngleich abgeschwächte – Rolle spielt. Zum anderen aber kultivieren die politischen Flügel auch Feindbilder, die sich in verblüffender Weise ähneln, auch wenn die ideologischen Begründungszusammenhänge differieren. Die Ablehnung der Europäischen Union geht mit heftiger Schelte am „Westen“ und an der „Globalisierung“ einher, auf beiden Seiten nicht selten mit antiamerikanischen und antikapitalistischen Stereotypen verknüpft. Merkwürdig muten manche Übereinstimmungen in außenpolitischen Fragen wie der Haltung gegenüber dem Putin-Regime in Russland an. Vor allem die „harten“ rechtsextremistischen Formationen liebäugeln mit östlichen Allianzen (gegen den „dekadenten Westen“), wie zuletzt eine Konferenz in Sankt Petersburg mit dem ehemaligen BNP-Vorsitzenden Nick Griffin und Vertretern der NPD, der GD, der italienischen Forza Nuova (FN) zeig79

Vgl. Sarah DE LANGE, „New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern with Radical RightWing Populist Parties”, Political Studies, 60:4, 2012, p. 899-918; Reinhard HEINISCH, „Success in Opposition – Failure in Government. Exploring the Performance of the Austrian Freedom Party and other European Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office”, West European Politics, 26:3, 2003, p. 91-130.

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te80. Unterstützung aus dem Kreml scheint aber auch bei den „weicheren“ Formationen der extremen Rechten nicht verschmäht zu werden – wie Berichte über einen günstigen Kredit nahelegen, den der FN als Dank für die russlandfreundliche Haltung im Ukrainekonflikt erhalten haben soll81. Am anderen Ende des politischen Spektrums war es der Anführer des FG, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, der die verdeckte Invasion der Krim als „Schutzmaßnahme“ gegen rechtsextremistische „Putschisten“ verteidigte82 – auf einer Linie mit der deutschen „Linken“, die Putin gegen die Politik der USA und der EU in Schutz nahm, während sie den „Faschismus“ in der Ukraine mit unüberbietbarer Schärfe geißelte. Traditionelle russlandfreundliche Reflexe gingen mit einer antiwestlichen, gegen die Politik der USA und der EU gleichermaßen gerichtete, Abwehrhaltung einher. Diese Gemeinsamkeiten sollten aber nicht dazu verführen, die Unterschiede zwischen den Flügeln zu übersehen. Sie sind womöglich prägender als die Gemeinsamkeiten83. Vor allem in der Frage der Einwanderung und des Asyls ist der Links-Rechts-Gegensatz unverkennbar. Propagandavideos, in denen angesichts steigender Flüchtlingszahlen Untergangsstimmungen verbreitet und negative Gefühle gegen Muslime geweckt werden84, sind die Domäne der extremen Rechten, während der extremen Linken aufgrund ihrer immigrations- und minderheitenfreundlichen Haltung Vertrauenskapital zufließt. Dass dieses Vertrauen aus demokratietheoretischer Sicht in anderen Punkten kaum berechtigt ist, wird oft übersehen.

VARIANTS OF ANTI-EUROPEAN EXTREMISM AND THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS This contribution concentrates on anti-European parties with extremist leanings that were able to win seats at the May 2014 European Elections. They combine “hard” Euro-skepticism with political positions and efforts that run contrary to the fundamental values and procedural rules of European constitutional states. We can differentiate “hard” and “soft” formations on the left and right wings of the European party systems by the degree of their anti-liberal, anti-democratic and/or anti-constitutional leanings. The presentation of the various programmatic profiles is followed by the exploration of the question to what extent rightwig and left-wing extremist parties endanger European democracies. It is by no means certain that the “soft” varieties are less dangerous for the European de80 81 82 83 84

Vgl. „West-östliche Achse an der Newa aus der Taufe gehoben”, Deutsche Stimme, 8. Mai 2015; „European Far-Right Politicians in Russia to Support Putin”, New York Times, 22. März 2015. Vgl. „Financement du FN: des hackers russes dévoilent des échanges au Kremlin”, Le Monde, 2. April 2015. Vgl. Silvain BOULOUQUE, „Ukraine: pourquoi Mélenchon est le seul politique français qui donne raison à Poutine”, Nouvel Observateur, 6. März 2014. Vgl. Simon OTJES, Tom LOUWERSE, „Populists in Parliament: Comparing Left-Wing and RightWing Populism in the Netherlands”, Political Studies, 63, 2015, p. 60-79. Siehe zuletzt das Video „Uns steht das Wasser bis zum Hals” der FPÖ-Jugendorganisation „Ring freiheitlicher Jugend”: Robert Klages, „FPÖ-Jugendorganisation hetzt mit Video gegen Flüchtlinge”, Der Tagesspiegel, 5. August 2015.

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mocracies. In fact, they might act like an insidious poison in the bodies of the European constitutional states undermining them on the long run. On the other hand, the anti-constitutional thrust of “hard” variations can be detected more easily. They trigger mechanisms for the protection of democracy at an early stage. This is why they might be less dangerous.

LES VARIANTES D’EXTRÉMISME ANTI-EUROPÉEN ET LES ÉLECTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE 2014 Les partis antieuropéens avec des tendances extrémistes, qui ont tenté de se faire élire aux élections européennes de 2014 sont au centre de cette contribution. Ils corrèlent un « euroscepticisme » dur avec des positions et des perspectives politiques qui sont en contradiction avec les valeurs fondamentales et règles de procédures des Etats constitutionnels européens. Selon leur degré d´orientation antilibéral, antidémocratique et/ou anticonstitutionnel, on peut différencier à l´aile gauche et droite du système politique européen des formations « dures » et « molles ». Au terme de l´analyse des différents profils programmatiques, nous nous penchons sur la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les démocraties européennes sont mises en danger par les partis de l´extrême-droite et de l´extrêmegauche. Il n´est d´ailleurs en rien sûr que les variantes « molles » représentent un danger moindre pour les démocraties européennes. Ces formes peuvent pénétrer le corps des Etats constitutionnels comme un poison lent et agir sur le long terme comme un élément de décomposition. Les formes « dures » sont plus aisément reconnaissables par leur axe anticonstitutionnel, qui provoque de manière précoce les mécanismes de protection de la démocratie et peuvent pour cette raison paraître moins dangereuse.

THE ANTI-EU GROUPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT1 PETRA VEJVODOVÁ The European elections of May 22-25, 2014, were expected to be disruptive and changing elections especially for the political parties intensely critical of the idea of a united and integrated Europe supported so far by the major European political groups. Eurosceptic parties around Europe showed their readiness to act on the European level. Months before the 2014 European elections, far right leaders Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen led the initiative to form a new group in the European Parliament together with like-minded parties. Observers focused on the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and its electoral success in Great Britain. Left Eurosceptic parties as well were observed very carefully because of the economic crisis disturbing and worrying the European citizens.

1. The situation before the 2014 European Elections Eurosceptic parties are on the rise in many European countries. But their backgrounds and political visions differ widely. Before the 2014 European elections, they had already been expected to win a much higher number of seats. But it was uncertain if and how they would be able to form coherent blocks and factions. Even far right political parties determined to cooperate and form a faction after the Europeans had failed before they had even started. The French National Front lead by Marine Le Pen and the populist Geert Wilders, head of the Dutch Freedom Party, announced their plans to form a group of nationalist parties pursuing a common political agenda (based on the European political party European Alliance for Freedom). They counted on the Austrian Freedom Party, the Flemish Interest, and the Italian Northern League, too. According to the procedural rules of the European Parliament, a faction has to consist of at least 25 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from a minimum of seven European Union (EU) countries. The right-wing populist Eurosceptic parties did in fact win additional seats. But this was only due to the fact that the Front National made the largest gains of any political party at the Europeans (23 mandates). On the whole, two parties won additional seats, namely, the Austrian Freedom Party (4 mandates) and the Front National. Four parties lost seats. The Front National`s huge gain compensated for the losses of the Belgian Flemish Interest (1 mandate), the Dutch Freedom Party (4 mandates), and the Italian Northern League (5 mandates). But the FN’s gains could not compensate for the loss of representation of the Slovak National Party. The European Alliance for Freedom was left with more than enough seats (38 with a minimum of 25 MEPs needed) to form a faction. But the group headed by Le Pen and Wilders represents too few countries: 1

This paper was elaborated as a part of the specific research project “Elections, political parties and interest promotion II” , MUNI/A/0846/2013.

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Its members come from only five instead of the required quarter of the member countries which fails to satisfy the seven country rule. The Sweden Democrats, another far right party, was in the game for a while. In late May 2014, however, the party announced that it had decided to cooperate with yet another Eurosceptic faction, namely, Europe of Free and Direct Democracy (EFDD) led by Nigel Farage and UKIP. The Slovak National Party, too, was expected to join the faction. But it failed completely at the Europeans and did not even win one single seat. Considering the different backgrounds of the Eurosceptic right wing parties, the chances of a faction surviving for an extended period would have been by no means certain. The bridge for possible members of the faction was resting on two important issues: the sceptical view of the EU and the issue of immigration. As for the sceptical view on the EU, the common goal was clear: the rejection or at least modification of the EU with the emphasis remaining on national selfdetermination and the organisation of the European order according to nationally defined communities2. The development and evolution of the EU are scrutinised. The EU has been accused of having become a super-state restricting national sovereignty. The EU`s liberalism and social-democratic values are criticised. Already in previous periods, the EU was compared to the Soviet Union and Soviet Block. The EU is also perceived as an arena where the activities of leftwing and pseudo-humanistic forces permit uncontrolled immigration and the proliferation of destructive postmodern values. Furthermore, this critique is combined with a deep distrust of democratic political representation on both national and European levels. The Eurosceptic right wing parties tend to perceive European integration as a bureaucratic and elitist phenomenon undermining concepts and values, such as the nation state, national identity, state sovereignty, and national affiliation. Furthermore, they consider the EU an offshoot of globalisation, which they oppose.3 More and more, the far right identifies immigration as a crucial problem. Immigrants from the Third World are considered the root of all evil, including unemployment and crises of the social security systems.4 Social issues like high crime rates are turned into ethnic ones. In a highly populist way, the far right links crime with immigrants. Very often it uses simplification claiming that higher immigration leads to higher crime rates which in turn means less security for citizens. “The PVV rallies against domestic Moroccans. The FN against the Roma. The Belgians in the VB and the Austrian FPÖ: all are strict in their stance on migration. They want as little as possible, fiercely defending a closed door

2

3 4

Petra VEJVODOVÁ, “A Thorny Way to Find Friends: Transnational Cooperation and Networkbuilding amongst Right-wing and National Populist Parties”, in Karsten GRABOW, Florian HARTLEB, (eds.), Exposing Demagogues. Right-wing and National Populist Parties in Europe, Brussels, Centre for European Studies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2013, p. 377. Ibid., p. 378. Cas MUDDE, “The single-issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue”, West European Politics, 22, 3, 1999, p. 188; Jens RYDGREN, “Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries”, European Journal of Political Research, 47, 2008, p. 746.

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policy.”5 Quite logically and consequently, they strictly reject the accession of Turkey to the EU. Hand in hand with the immigration topic goes the issue of the ‘Islamisation of Europe’ which is frequently discussed. Election campaigns on both European and national levels emphasise the alleged threat. But these ideologically oriented political parties hold very conflicting views on important issues. For this reason, coalitions are very often unstable and tenuous, and attempts to cooperate frequently fail. Take the example of the political faction “Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS)”: It was created by far right political parties in January 2007, after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU.6 Its formation had been initiated at a Vienna meeting organized by the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 2005. Delegates agreed to intensify common actions, and the pan-European party was created in 2007. The Vienna Declaration announced the intention of its members to establish a Europe of free and independent nations within the framework of a confederation of sovereign nation-states.7 Further mutual goals were the rejection of Turkish EU membership and the protection of Europe against ‘Islamisation’, immigration, and American imperialism.8 ITS was the shortest lived faction of the European parliament: It lasted only 10 months. Its collapse was brought about by Alessandra Mussolini’s remarks on Romanians. The Alternativa Sociale-member referred to them as ‘habitual lawbreakers’. Five Romanian MEPs subsequently withdrew from the faction. This left ITS with only 18 members, i.e., two short of the 20 MEPs needed to form a political faction in the EP.9 Promoted and lead by the French Front National and the Dutch Freedom Party, the far right political parties tried to form a faction after the 2014 European elections. But there are many zones of conflict, among them issues like economy, gay rights, or Israel. As for economy, the parties’ approach to how to get their national economies rolling differs widely. While the Front National favours imposing protectionist measures, Wilders is known to be a classical Liberal. The Austrian Freedom Party shifts between social conservatism and liberalism. As for the issue of gay rights, Wilders defends them as a Dutch value in his fight against Islam. By contrast, his companions from France and Austria take a more conservative stance on this question of values. Wilders’ relationship to Israel clearly contradicts the attitudes of the other parties: He is a staunch supporter of Israel, while the FPÖ and the Front National share a history of anti-Semitism.10 5 6

7 8

9 10

“Wilders-Le Pen alliance: what makes it, what breaks it?”, Euractiv, May 16, 2014, http:// www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/wilders-le-pen-alliance-what-makes-it-whatbreaks-it-302155.(2 July 2014). Members of the ITS came from: ATAKA (Bulgaria), PRM (Romania), FPÖ (Austria), VB (Belgium), FN (France), MSI-FT (Italy), AS (Italy), and one independent MP from Great Britain. Petr FIALA, Miroslav MAREŠ, Petr SOKOL, Eurostrany. Politické strany na evropské úrovni, Brno, Barrister & Principal, 2007, p. 177. Cas MUDDE, Populist Radical Right Parties, Cambridge, University Press, 2007, p. 180. Petra VEJVODOVÁ, “Transnational Cooperation of the Far Right in the European Union and Attempts to Institutionalize Mutual Relations”, in: Uwe BACKES, Patrick MOREAU, (eds.), The Extreme Right in Europe. Current Trends and Perspectives, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012, p. 219. “EU Far-Right Bloc Faces Collapse”, BBC News, Nov. 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ europe/7086986.stm (14 August 2014). Euractiv, May 16, 2014.

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The project of the European Alliance for Freedom is dead. This is why the amazing partnership between the Front National and the Dutch Freedom Party also came to an end. The Front National announced the foundation of a new PanEuropean party, the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF)11.

2. The situation after the 2014 European Elections After the 2014 European elections, there are three Eurosceptic factions in the European Parliament. The right-wing political spectrum is represented by two political groups: the “European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)” and “Europe of Free and Direct Democracy (EFDD)”. These factions attract political parties from Eurosceptic and conservative parties (Civic Democratic Party, Czech Republic), national populist parties (Danish People`s Party) to far right parties (Sweden Democrats). On the left side of the political spectrum, there is the “European United Left – Nordic Green Left” (GUE-NGL). Together, these three political factions collected 22.8 % of the vote and received 171 of 751seats. Compared with the previous election period, their position was strengthened: They had held 124 seats during the 2009-2014 electoral period, i.e., 17.6 % of the vote.12 All three factions increased the number of their MEPs as well as their electoral acceptance.13 Table 1: No. of Seats and Percentage of Votes of Eurosceptic Factions in 2009 and 2014 Seats in 2009

% of votes in 2009

Seats in 2014

% of votes in 2014

European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

56

7.5

71

9.5

Europe of Free and Direct Democracy (EFDD)

32

4.3

48

6.4

European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL)

36

4.8

52

6.9

Total

124

17.6

171

22.8

11 12 13

See more Cas MUDDE, “The EAF is dead! Long live the MENL!”, Open Democracy, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cas-mudde/eaf-is-dead-long-livemenl (14 August 2014). Database Parties and elections in Europe (www.parties-and-elections.eu/eu.html). These results are related to the situation at the end of the year 2014. It should be noticed that MEPs can change their affiliation to political parties, or the factions of the European Parliament. At the end of January 2015, Amjad Bashir, a MEP elected as a UKIP candidate and the party`s communities spokesperson, defected to the Conservatives thus increasing the number of seats of the ECR faction by one. Bashir described UKIP as “a party of ruthless self-interest that is amateur and has no policies to offer the British electorate.” (Dave Keating, “UKIP “MET defects to Conservatives”, European Voice, 2015, http://www.europeanvoice.com/ article/ukip-mep-defects-to-conservatives/ (13 July 2015).

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Graph 1: No. of Seats of Eurosceptic Factions

Graph 2: No. of Seats of Eurosceptic Factions in Comparison with the Total Seats in the European Parliament

We also have to be aware of the fact that not all Eurosceptic political parties are members of a faction. Comparing 2009 and 2014, the number of Eurosceptical MEPs not belonging to a faction is about the same: 46 representatives in 2009, and 49 at present. So this makes a total of 220 Eurosceptic MEPs in this legislative term of the European Parliament, i.e., 29 % of the membership. The parties represented in the Eurosceptic factions strongly oppose the EU. This is more than obvious from the speeches of their MEPs as well as the party documents. Nevertheless, the elections to the European Parliament welded these parties together to secure their place at the European level and gain political influence in the EU. Especially for right-wing Eurosceptical parties, the importance of the European level is growing, even though one of the continuous constant

PETRA VEJVODOVÁ

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elements of their programs is their critique of the EU. The partial transfer of national sovereignty to the European level empowers the EU to set individual policies. This creates a situation political actors wish and, indeed, have to respond to. Generally, the European Parliament provides an opportunity to represent political opinions and ideas. This is also true for opponents of the EU. The formation of parliamentary groups and European political parties enables similarly minded actors to reinforce their common voice and to increase their collective political weight. The European level also offers a new chance of success for parties which have failed in national or local elections. EP elections are considered elections of secondary importance by voters. For this reason, they are more willing to test new parties or to give their vote to protest parties. And since the turnout is low, parties with loyal and disciplined supporters have better chances to succeed. And usually, loyalty and discipline are characteristic features of voters of far right and far left political parties. Obviously, the material aspect of co-operation on the European level, i.e., access to EU funding for political parties and parliamentary groups, must also be kept in mind. The following table (table 2) shows the amount of financial means obtained by Pan-European parties – members are members of Eurosceptic factions – in 2013 and 201414. The European Alliance for Freedom is a Pan-European political party founded by Front National, Austrian Freedom Party and other like-minded parties.15 Table 2. Grants for Eurosceptic Pan-European Parties in 2013 and 2014 2013 (maximum grant)

2014 (maximum grant)

1.402.596 EUR

1.958.083 EUR

European Alliance for Freedom (no group)

385.323 EUR

454.366 EUR

The European Left (GUE-NGL group)

947.500 EUR

1.219.120 EUR

Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (EFD group)

813.649 EUR

1.052.747 EUR

Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR group)

At the beginning of 2015, half a year after the European elections, the factions have stabilised. The composition of Eurosceptic factions is shown in the following tables (tables 3, 4, 5).

14 15

European Parliament, Grants to political parties and foundations, http://www.europarl. europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00264f77f5/Grants-to-political-parties-and-foundations.html (14 March 2013). For more information about the motivation of political parties to enter factions in the European Parliament, see Richard WHITAKER, Philips LYNCH, “Understanding the formation and actions of Eurosceptic groups in the European Parliament: pragmatism, principles and publicity”, Government and Opposition, 2014 https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/28315/2/ Whitaker%20Lynch%20Government%20and%20Opposition.pdf, (15 March 2015).

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Table 3. Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, member parties Political party

Member state

New Flemish Alliance

Belgium

Bulgaria Without Censorship

Bulgaria

Bulgarian National Movement

Bulgaria

Croatian Conservative Party

Croatia

Civic Democratic Party

Czech Republic

Danish People`s Party

Denmark

Finns Party

Finland

Alternative for Germany

Germany

Family Party of Germany

Germany

Independent Greeks

Greece

Fianna Fáil

Ireland

Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania

Lithuania

For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK

Latvia

Dutch Reformed Party

Netherlands

Christian Union

Netherlands

Law and Justice Party

Poland

Right Wing of the Republic

Poland

Freedom and Solidarity

Slovakia

New Majority

Slovakia

Ordinary People and Independent Personalities

Slovakia

Conservative Party

United Kingdom

Ulster Unionist Party

United Kingdom

Table 4. Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, member parties Political party

Member state

Free Citizens Party

Czech Republic

Five Star Movement

Italy

Party of Order and Justice

Lithuania

Congress of the New Right16

Poland

Sweden Democrats

Sweden

United Kingdom Independence Party United Kingdom * One independent MEP from France ensures the requirement of having representatives of seven member states.

16

The political party Congress of the New Right has four seats in the European Parliament. One MEP is a member of the faction Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, three are nonaffiliated (independent).

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78 Table 5. European United Left – Nordic Green Left, member parties Political party

Member state

Progressive Party of Working People

Cyprus

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia

Czech Republic

People`s Movement against the EU

Denmark

Left Alliance

Finland

Left Front (French Communist Party + Left Party)

France

The Left

Germany

Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)

Greece

Sinn Féin

Ireland

Socialist Party

Netherlands

Party for the Animals

Netherlands

Left Block

Portugal

Democratic Unity Coalition (Portuguese Communist Party)

Portugal

Plural Left (United Left + Anova-Nationalist Brotherhood)

Spain

Basque Country Unite

Spain

Podemos

Spain

Left Party

Sweden

Sinn Féin

United Kingdom

Since not all MEPs of Eurosceptic parties are members of factions, table 6 shows the political parties whose MEPs are non-attached (table 6). Table 6. Non-attached Political party

Member state

Freedom Party

Austria

Flemish Interest

Belgium

Front National

France

National Democratic Party of Germany

Germany

Communist Party of Greece

Greece

Golden Dawn

Greece

Jobbik

Hungary

Northern League

Italy

Freedom Party

Netherlands

Congress of New Right

Poland

But the way to establish factions was never an easy one, and in the case of Nigel Farage`s Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), the faction is still not very stable. The elections were considered a success of the Eurosceptical parties. Negotiations to form factions were expected, especially of the right-wing Eurosceptic camp. The European Alliance for Freedom was a closely observed initia-

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tive at that time. One of the rumours was that the Alliance had succeeded in finding their two missing partners in the Lithuanian Order and Justice and the Polish Congress of the New Right. But those two parties entered Nigel Farage’s EFDD group. Or more specifically, in the case of Congress of the New Right, one member entered the EFDD faction. The three others have remained non-affiliated MEPs. Anyway, should he have joined the European Alliance for Freedom, the leader of the Polish Congress of the New Right, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, with his ultra-liberal economic views would not have fitted in with the more protectionist economical positions of most of the other European Alliance for Freedom parties. Furthermore, his conservative views of gays and women would create a fundamental conflict with the liberal attitude of Geert Wilders and the PVV.17 Nigel Farage’s EFDD, too, had problems to survive. The faction European Conservatives and Reformists was joined by MEPs from the Danish People`s Party and the Finns Party. In the previous legislative period, they belonged to the faction Europe of Freedom and Democracy on which the current EFDD builds. Given that Europe of Freedom and Democracy already lost the Northern League to the European Alliance for Freedom, this left UKIP with only three partners. In mid-October, it seemed that EFDD would not survive, because Latvian MEP had defected. This meant that the EFDD did not have MEPs from enough member states to be officially recognized. On October 20, 2014, the group released a statement announcing it had recruited a MEP from the Polish Congress of the New Right. The statement pointed out the recruiting of a single member, not of all representatives of the Polish party. Even though UKIP and Front National are big electoral winners (UKIP succeeded in winning 24 mandates, Front National 23 mandates), they struggled to create – or in the case of UKIP – to retain a political faction. One solution could be to work together, but cooperation is almost impossible. Farage himself rejected cooperation with the Front National because of the party`s anti-Semitism and general prejudice. He rejected any possibility for UKIP and Front National to be members of the same faction. However, he has been aware of the fact that they stand on the same side in many political issues.18 On the other hand, the faction European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) was established and led by the British Conservative Party. Presently, it is the third biggest faction in the European Parliament. Besides its wish to enlarge the faction, the Conservative party would like to weaken UKIP. There can be no doubt about this because of upcoming elections in the United Kingdom in 2015. The Conservative party considers UKIP its main electoral enemy, knowing that both will struggle for the support of the Eurosceptic vote which might be split. Evidently, the Eurosceptic right is not very stable. This holds especially true for far right political parties which suffer from personal struggles, fights of egos, and fear of not being labelled extremist. Although attempts at cooperation have been made since the 1980s, these parties are still searching for the way to collabo-

17 18

Cas MUDDE, “Electoral winners and political losers in the right-wing eurosceptic camp”, Open Democracy, 11 June 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cas -mudde/electoral-winners-and-political-losers-in-rightwing-eurosceptic-camp, (15 July 2015). “Farage claims Ukip may have common ground with France`s Front National”, The Guardian, 21 May 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/21/farage-claims-ukip-may -have-common-ground-with-front-national, (15 July 2014).

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rate – and still without success. Their relations are very fragile and break very easily. On the opposite side of political spectrum, the group European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) is very stable and really cooperative. The GUENGL was not against the Euro or the project of the European integration. But it proposed a vision completely different from the neoliberal and predominant one; the latter was blamed not only for being the cause of the strong economic and financial crisis that hit the Union but also for offering totally insufficient answers to this situation. On these premises, a positive result of the GUE-NGL was generally expected. The data immediately reveal that the expected reversal of the negative trend among radical left parties in Europe took place. GUE-NGL has moved from 4.8 % in 2009 to 6.9 % in 2014. This result has led to an increased presence of the GUENGL in the European Parliament. Cleary, the group has gained the most positive results in the three countries both hit by the recent economic crisis and affected by the austerity policies imposed by IMF, European Commission, and European Central Bank: Greece (32.6 % of the vote for GUE-NGL), Italy (4.0 %), and Spain (10.0 %). Two other Southern nations, Portugal (17.2 %) and Cyprus (26.9 %), add up to these three countries.19 GUE-NGL certainly benefitted from the climate of protest against the austerity policies that had hit different countries of the Union.

Conclusion: And what is the Common Interest of the Individual Eurosceptic Factions? The faction European Conservatives and Reformists declares its belief in the idea of Euro-realism as ‘a way that respects the sovereignty of our nations and concentrates on economic recovery, growth and competitiveness’. The ECR explains its position rejecting the European Union as a super state as well as its break-up. The faction follows principles defined in the Prague Declaration. These principles are the following: 1) Free enterprise, free and fair trade and competition, minimal regulation, lower taxation, and small governments as the ultimate catalysts for individual freedom and personal and national prosperity. 2) Freedom of the individual, more personal responsibility and greater democratic accountability. 3) Sustainable, clean energy supply with an emphasis on energy security. 4) The importance of the family as the bedrock of society. 5) The sovereign integrity of the nation state, opposition to EU federalism and a renewed respect for true subsidiarity. 6) The overriding value of the transatlantic security relationship in a revitalised NATO, and support for young democracies across Europe. 7) Effectively controlled immigration and an end to abuse of asylum procedures.

19

Nicola MAGGINI, “The electoral progress of the populist and Eurosceptic right”, Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali, 30 May 2014, http://cise.luiss.it/cise/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/DCISE 6EN_307-312.pdf, (14 August 2014).

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8) Efficient and modern public services and sensitivity to the needs of both rural and urban communities. 9) An end to waste and excessive bureaucracy and a commitment to greater transparency and probity in the EU institutions and use of EU funds. 10) Respect and equitable treatment for all EU countries, new and old, large and small.20 The faction Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy is more critical to the project of European Union and its Euroscepticism goes further. In its program, the faction subscribes to the following statements: 1) Freedom and cooperation among people of different States (the faction rejects the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised European super-state), 2) More democracy and respect of People`s will (the EFDD faction does not believe in the existence of a single European people. The legitimate level for democracy lies with the nation states, their regions and parliaments; the faction opposes further European integration that would exacerbate the democratic deficit and the centralised political structure of the EU); 3) Respect for Europe`s history, traditions and cultural values; 4) Respect for national differences and interests: Freedom of votes.21 The faction European United Left – Nordic Green Left points out that the European Union is a more and more centralized project. It rejects the creation of a super-state. According to the faction, the major policies of the European Union are too frequently based on a radically market-oriented logic of competition, both within the European Union and with regard to third countries. The European Union is not considered a victim of the (economic, financial, environmental) crisis but one of its motors. The extremely institutionalised austerity is deepening the crisis and shifting power from national capitals to the unelected European Commission and European Central Bank. The GUE-NGL demands the reversal of this policy.22 However, there is no common work program. The principle of confederalism is supported. It also means respecting and preserving the diversity of identities and opinions. According to the basic level of agreement, the faction aims at fighting large-scale and increasing unemployment, ensuring respect for the environment, creating a common social area that provides equal rights at the highest level for all citizens, and meeting the needs of those who are forced by poverty to leave their countries and come to Europe. In the last years, common positions included the rejection of the service directive, calls for a stronger regulation of the European finance markets and a clear stance on the right of asylum, expressed in a campaign against the fortress Europe23.

20 21 22 23

ECR The Prague Declaration, http://ecrgroup.eu/policy/the-prague-declaration/ (14 July 2014). EFDD Charter, http://www.efdgroup.eu/about-us/our-charter (14 July 2014). GUE-NGL Policy, http://www.guengl.eu/policy; GUE-NGL About, http://www.guengl. eu/group/about, (14 July 2014). “Another Europe is Possible – The GUE/NGL Group in the European Parliament”, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2010, http://blog.rosalux-europa.info/2010/10/21/gue_ngl_group/, (13 June 2014).

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LES GROUPES ANTI-UE AU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN Ce chapitre analyse les partis eurosceptiques et leurs activités dans le cadre du parlement européen. Malgré leurs positions eurosceptiques, ces partis s´engagent pour trouver des électeurs et gagner des sièges dans cette organisation supranationale. La structure en fraction pousse les partis à collaborer. Les résultats de cette collaboration seront présentés en détail dans ce chapitre. Au lendemain des élections européennes de 2014, il est intéressant d´observer les efforts des partis eurosceptiques pour parvenir à créer une fraction. Ceci vaut tout particulièrement pour la communication intense des partis eurosceptiques du spectre nationaliste et d´extrême-droite. Les observateurs, qui avant l´élection se penchait sur l´avenir, pronostiquaient l´émergence d´une forte fraction politique de droite. Ce qui ne fut pas le cas. Il apparut que l´établissement d´une alliance instable nécessitait de gros efforts. De l´autre côté du spectre politique, on trouve les partis eurosceptique de gauche. Leur collaboration et leur cohésion ont une longue tradition et sont beaucoup plus stables.

ANTI-EU GRUPPEN IM EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENT Dieses Kapitel befasst sich mit den euroskeptischen politischen Parteien und ihrer Arbeit im Europäischen Parlament. Trotz ihres Euroskeptizismus kämpfen diese Parteien um Stimmen und Sitze in der supranationalen Einrichtung. Die Fraktionsstruktur im Europäischen Parlament spornt die Parteien zur Zusammenarbeit an. Die Erfolge ihrer Zusammenarbeit werden in diesem Kapitel detailliert aufgezeigt und analysiert. Nach den Europawahlen von 2014 war die Suche der euroskeptischen Parteien nach Partnern zur Gründung von Fraktionen spannend zu beobachten. Dies galt besonders für die sehr lebhafte Kommunikation der euroskeptischen Parteien des rechtsextremen und nationalistischen Spektrums. Beobachter, die die Zeichen vor der Wahl gedeutet hatten, waren von einer starken rechten politischen Fraktion ausgegangen. Aber diese Erwartungen erfüllten sich nicht. Es zeigte sich, dass große Anstrengungen nötig waren, um wenigstens eine instabile Allianz zu bilden. Auf der anderen Seite des politischen Spektrums stehen die linken euroskeptischen Parteien. Bei ihnen sind Zusammenarbeit und Zusammenhalt erheblich stabiler und haben eine lange Tradition.

Part 2

NEW EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE UK LE NOUVEL EUROSCEPTICISME AU ROYAUME-UNI NEUER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS IM VEREINIGTEN KÖNIGREICH

THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION: TOWARDS HARDER EUROSCEPTICISM? AGNÈS ALEXANDRE-COLLIER The UK is usually presented as the birthplace of Euroscepticism. Scholars like to claim that “there is only one country, namely the UK, where Eurosceptic voices formulate clear-cut principled opposition against the EU”1. In the run-up to the May 2014 election to the European Parliament, the spread of anti-European movements in Britain could have been easily anticipated2. An Ipsos MORI opinion poll conducted between the 4th and 18th of February 2014 indicated that a clear majority (56% ) of the people interviewed agreed with the following statement: “the next European election in my country will be won by anti-European movements”, sharing this opinion with Swedish (60%) and Dutch people (57%). More specifically, literature about Euroscepticism has regularly used the British Conservative Party as the archetypal example of a government party expressing forms of opposition to European integration3. Until recently, this opposition has been moderate, amounting to what Taggart and Szczerbiak termed soft Euroscepticism. Unlike hard Euroscepticism “which might be defined as principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institutions 1

2

3

Silke ADAM et al., “Campaigning Against Europe? The Role of Eurosceptic Fringe and Mainstream Parties in the 2009 European Parliament Election”, Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 12, no 1, 2013, p.9; see also Anthony FORSTER, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics. Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945, London, New York, Routledge, 2002. Oliver TREIB, “The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Elections”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, no 10, 2014, p. 1541-1554; Göran VON SYDOW, “Parties and Politics of Opposition in the EU”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 23, no 1, 2014, p. 69-81. Agnès ALEXANDRE-COLLIER, “Le phénomène eurosceptique au sein du parti conservateur britannique”, Politique Européenne, 6, 2002, p.53-73 ; David BAKER, Andrew GAMBLE, Steve LUDLAM, “Whips or Scorpions ? The Maastricht vote and the Conservative Party”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 46, no 2, 1993, p. 151-166; David BAKER, Andrew GAMBLE, Steve LUDLAM, “1846…1906…1996? Conservative splits and European integration”, The Political Quarterly, vol. 64, no 4, 1993, p. 420-434.; David BAKER, Andrew GAMBLE, Steve LUDLAM, “The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British Ratification”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 47, no 1, 1994, p. 37-60; David BAKER, Imogen FOUNTAIN, Andrew GAMBLE, Steve LUDLAM, “Backbench Conservative Attitudes to European Integration”, Political Quarterly, vol. 66, no 2, 1995, p. 221-233; David BAKER, David SEAWRIGHT (eds.), Britain For and Against Europe. British Politics and the Question of European integration, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998; Anthony FORSTER, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics; op.cit.; Chris GIFFORD, The making of Eurosceptic Britain, London, Ashgate, 2014 [2008]; Philip LYNCH, Richard WHITAKER, “Where There is Discord, Can they Bring Harmony? Managing Intra-party Dissent on European Integration in the Conservative Party”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 15, 2013, p. 317-339.

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such as the EU”, soft Euroscepticism suggests that “there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the future extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make”4. With the success of the Conservative Party at the May 2010 general election of and the formation of a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, the European election in May 2014 placed the Conservative party in a paradoxical position. In most European countries, the expression of protest at European elections is generally based on Eurosceptic voting and voting against the party in power, both of which are often combined. In the UK, the paradox came from the fact that the Conservative Party is both a Eurosceptic and a government party while, elsewhere in Europe, Eurosceptic votes in the European Parliament are generally a means of sanctioning mainstream parties in government for being part of a so-called pro-European consensus. European elections are therefore clearly opportunities for voters to turn away from government parties, and even disapprove of their record in office. European integration was long analyzed as a historically elite-driven project with citizen attitudes being part of a “permissive consensus”5. Since the introduction of universal suffrage for European elections in the late 1970s, it has been admitted that these elections are the main opportunity for voters to express their opinions on Europe6, even though they still operate as second-order elections7, a label which may however seem less relevant in 20148. This is particularly the case in representative democracies like the UK, where direct consultation of the people, through referenda for example, remains an exception. Therefore, more than anywhere else, European elections are used in the UK as mini-referendums against parties in office. In addition, Eurosceptic parties generally draw their support among those with low levels of trust in the national government, negative attitudes towards immigration and extremist ideological positions9. However, with the British Conservatives in the European Parliament now being part of a Eurosceptic party group – the European Conservatives and Reformists – British Euroscepticism has shifted towards UKIP as both a hard and populist Eurosceptic party, i. e. expressing low levels of trust in the government. This chapter will argue that the combination of these paradoxical factors with regard to the Conservative party has contributed to changing the face of British Euroscepticism. It has drawn a new map of Eurosceptic attitudes in the European Parliament in which not only has Euroscepticism become the majority 4 5 6 7 8 9

Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, vol. 1 & 2, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, vol.2, p. 247-248. Ronald INGLEHART, The Silent Revolution. Changing values and Political Styles among Western Publics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 169. Joost VAN SPANJE, Claes DE VREESE, “So what’s wrong with the EU? Motivations underlying the Eurosceptic vote in the 2009 European elections”, European Union Politics, vol. 12, no 3, 2011, p. 406. Karlheinz REIF, Hermann SCHMITT, “Nine second-order national elections – A conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 8, no 1, 1980, p. 3-44. Richard CORBETT, “‘European Elections are Second-order Elections’: Is received Wisdom Changing?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 52, no 6, 2014, p. 1194-1198. Joost VAN SPANJE, Claes DE VREESE, “So what’s wrong with the EU?”, op.cit., p. 408.

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British view of the EU with 43 seats (24 for UKIP and 19 for the Conservatives) out of 73, that is 59% of the total number, but also “hard Euroscepticism” is now the prevailing attitude, with UKIP holding more seats than their “soft” counterpart. The May 2014 European election was also the first time a party other than Labour and the Conservatives won the largest number of seats in a national election. The effect of this restructuring of Euroscepticism in the European Parliament, which this chapter will address, has been to radicalize the Conservative Party’s attitude to European integration as a mechanical reaction to UKIP's victory. As Bale and Gruber recently argued, “the Tories’ strategy on the question of EU integration has evolved into a drama of its own”10. Examining the evolution of the Conservative party’s attitude to European integration is the necessary starting point to understand the nature of Conservative Euroscepticism in the UK. Much has already been written about it11, especially since Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973. In this respect, there was a tendency to describe the Conservative party, back in the 1970s, as “the party of Europe” which gradually turned Eurosceptic in the 1980s under the influence of both Margaret Thatcher and treaty developments such as the Single European Act in 1986. Although the European question has clearly been the most divisive issue in British politics, especially since the Maastricht Treaty after Thatcher’s departure, the reality is more complex. Euroscepticism has in fact always existed in the Conservative Party, being more or less latent depending on circumstances. In reaction to Harold Macmillan’s 1961 announcement that Britain would open negotiations for EEC membership, a handful of Conservative MPs mobilized jointly against it12. In October 1971, the number of Eurosceptic rebels opposing membership had reached 39. The referendum of June 1975 on Britain’s staying in or leaving the Common Market provided them with the opportunity to promote their cause and expand their mobilization outside Parliament, but they remained a minority group. Margaret Thatcher’s governments represented a major opportunity for Euroscepticism to prosper not so much during this period as later. Indeed Margaret Thatcher’s Euroscepticism was more a question of style than of 10 11

12

Oliver GRUBER, Tim BALE, “And it’s good night Vienna. How (not) to deal with the populist, radical right: The Conservatives, UKIP and some lessons from the heartland”, British Politics, vol. 9, no 3, 2014, p. 214. Agnès ALEXANDRE-COLLIER, “Le phénomène eurosceptique au sein du parti conservateur britannique”, Politique Européenne, 6, 2002, p.53-73 ; David BAKER, Andrew GAMBLE, Steve LUDLAM, “Whips or Scorpions ? The Maastricht vote and the Conservative Party”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 46, no 2, 1993, p. 151-166; David BAKER, Andrew GAMBLE, Steve LUDLAM, “1846…1906…1996? Conservative splits and European integration”, The Political Quarterly, vol. 64, no 4, 1993, p. 420-434.; David BAKER, Andrew GAMBLE, Steve LUDLAM, “The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British Ratification”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 47, no 1, 1994, p. 37-60; David BAKER, Imogen FOUNTAIN, Andrew GAMBLE, Steve LUDLAM, “Backbench Conservative Attitudes to European Integration”, Political Quarterly, vol. 66, no 2, 1995, p. 221-233; David BAKER, David SEAWRIGHT (eds.), Britain For and Against Europe. British Politics and the Question of European integration, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998; Anthony FORSTER, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics; op.cit.; Chris GIFFORD, The making of Eurosceptic Britain, London, Ashgate, 2014 [2008]; Philip LYNCH, Richard WHITAKER, “Where There is Discord, Can they Bring Harmony? Managing Intra-party Dissent on European Integration in the Conservative Party”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 15, 2013, p. 317-339. David BAKER et al. in: Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, Opposing Europe?, op.cit., vol1., p.97.

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substance13. Although her determination and diplomatic style showed her as being reluctant to espouse the cause of European integration, her actual policies – signing the single European Act of 1986-87 and eventually agreeing to membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism – signaled a different reality. After her resignation in November 1990, the episode of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was the “watershed moment” when Euroscepticism developed to the point of almost splitting the party in the run-up to the 1997 general election which the Conservative Party lost. Thirteen years in opposition was long enough for the party to radicalize its Euroscepticism, in tune with what its members and voters expected, so that when David Cameron was elected leader in December 2005, it had become the official position of the party. In the European Parliament, the Conservative Party’s deeply engrained Euroscepticism helps explain why its integration in the European People’s Party was so difficult. Indeed, the Conservative Party felt out of place in a Christian Democratic federation and, as early as 1973, membership of the UK, Denmark and Ireland raised the issue of including parties which did not share the Christian Democratic ideals of the founding fathers. Three different tendencies emerged: those in favour of the preservation of a Christian Democratic identity, especially Christian Democratic parties in Italy and the Netherlands; others, especially the CDU under the influence of the CSU, who were favourable to the integration of the Danish and British Conservative parties; a third group advocated further secularization and a clear distinction between Christian Democratic parties and churches. This dispute explains why, in April 1978, a parallel organization was set up, the European Democratic Union, which included the RPR and the British Conservatives14. In 1992, the inclusion of British Conservatives, after long negotiations and questions relating to their Christian identity, gave rise to some controversy. Tensions were so acute that in the run-up to the 1999 European election, the group abandoned any reference to federalism. There were however ideological convergences, especially on free-market principles, individual initiative, tax relief and support for the euro. Gradually, the EPP turned away from its Christian Democratic identity to become a wide centre-right party federation. After the 1999 European election, to seal the rapprochement between Conservatives and Christian Democrats, the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) was renamed the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED), thus becoming the largest party federation in the European Parliament. However, the path followed by the Conservative Party in the European Parliament was different from that in Westminster, MPs being on average more Eurosceptic than their counterparts in Strasbourg. Once elected leader of the party in December 2005, David Cameron seized the opportunity to address the issue of membership of the EPP-ED. The decision to leave the EPP-ED, which was commented upon as “stupid”, was arguably motivated by Cameron’s desire to gain

13 14

Agnès ALEXANDRE-COLLIER & X. JARDIN, Anatomie des droites européennes, Paris, Armand Colin, 2004, p. 33. Ibid., p. 229.

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the Eurosceptic MPs’ support at the leadership contest15. When the British Conservatives actually left the EPP-ED in June 2009, in reaction to growing resentment among Conservatives towards what they considered as the EPP’s federalist agenda, they mainly joined forces with large Eurosceptic parties, such as the ODS of the Czech Republic or PiS in Poland, to form the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), a group claiming to be the main proponent of soft Euroscepticism in the European Parliament. They turned out to be less extreme and more pragmatic than their media caricature suggests16. When the decision was taken in 2005, Conservative MEPs already belonged to the European Democrats (ED), a subgroup of the EPP-ED. The Czech and Polish parties were subsequently approached by the British Conservatives, following David Cameron’s election as leader in December 2005, to form a pan-European alliance known as the Movement for European Reform. After a long process of debate in the Conservative Party about its EP group membership, the ECR was eventually formed17 but Conservative MEPs were divided on the question18. The reasons for forming the ECR remain elusive. Although the Prague Declaration formed a coherent ideological basis for the group, which confirms the motive of policy congruence19, the impact of pragmatism in terms of resources being allocated to groups or the opportunity of gaining influential committee positions in the European Parliament is unclear but should not be underestimated20. British Conservatives indeed lost the opportunity to lead the most active committees as regards legislation, such as the Environment which they had chaired from 1999 to 2004, but as part of the ECR they gained the chair of the Internal Market Committee21. The creation of the ECR may also have arisen from both a desire for publicity and concern with national party-management22. Despite two defeats in 1989 and in 1994 (with only 18 seats out of 84), the Conservative Party has come first in five out of the seven elections held since the first European election: in 1979 with an overwhelming majority of 60 seats out of 78, in 1984 with 45 out of 78, in 1999 with 36 seats and in 2004, 27. In June 2009, the ECR eventually numbered 54 MEPs, including 25 British Conservatives, thus, as it were, institutionalizing mainstream Euroscepticism in the European Parliament as a legitimate stance on European integration. The Conservative Party’s campaign, based on a manifesto entitled Time for Change, was then defined as 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22

Tim BALE, Sean HANLEY, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “‘May Contain Nuts’? The Reality behind the Rhetoric Surrounding the British Conservatives’ New Group in the European Parliament”, The Political Quarterly, vol. 81, no 1, 2010, p.85. Ibid. Philip LYNCH, Richard WHITAKER, “Understanding the Formation and Actions of Eurosceptic Groups in the European Parliament: Pragmatism, Principles and Publicity”, Government and Opposition, vol. 49, no 2, 2014, p. 238. Philip LYNCH, Richard WHITAKER, “A Loveless marriage: The Conservatives and the European People’s Party”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 61, no 1, 2007, p. 31-51. Edoardo BRESSANELLI, “National Parties and Group Membership in the European Parliament: Ideology or Pragmatism?”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no 5, 2012, p. 737-754; Gail MCELROY, Kenneth BENOIT, “Party Policy and Group Affiliation in the European Parliament”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 40, no 2, 2010, p. 377-398. Edoardo BRESSANELLI, “National Parties and Group Membership in the European Parliament”, op.cit. Philip LYNCH, Richard WHITAKER, “Understanding the Formation and Actions of Eurosceptic Groups in the European Parliament, op.cit., p. 239. Ibid., p. 233.

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“unstinting” in its pursuit of the national interest during the campaign23. The 2009 Conservative manifesto was analysed as more Eurosceptic, with the Conservatives favouring national management of foreign affairs, defence and social policies, advocating mixed management for justice and immigration, and supranational management for environment policy24. As usual in EP elections, the turnout was very low (34.7% in 2009) and the Conservative Party came first in every region except the North-East of England25.

1. Election campaign Following a debate about holding the election on a Thursday, like any other election in Britain, the European election of 22nd May 2014 took place in a much more difficult environment for David Cameron who in the meantime had become Prime Minister. Following the failure of the Constitutional treaty in 2005, his “cast-iron guarantee of a referendum” on the Lisbon Treaty, promised in 2007 and motivated by the subsequent financial crisis of autumn 2008, provided a key opportunity for Conservative Eurosceptics to mobilize around their new party leader. But in May 2010, the formation of the government coalition with the proEuropean Liberal Democrats changed the situation. In October 2011, when David Nuttall, a newly elected Conservative MP, introduced a petition demanding a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU and based on e-petitions which had collected 100,000 signatures, the result was an unprecedented rebellion of 81 Conservative MPs, 49 of them having been elected in 201026. In December 2011, Cameron’s veto of the fiscal compact to bail out countries like Greece, represented a major turning-point in the party’s attitudes to the EU but, as the party plunged deeper into Euroscepticism, it also generated a negative climate for the European and Conservative Reformists who already formed the fifth largest group in the EP. Tensions heightened within the leadership of the party when Martin Callanan who diverged from David Cameron, calling for Greece to leave the euro, failed to win re-election in his north-east constituency, thus becoming the first EP group leader to lose his seat. Although the 2014 EP election was the second for the British Conservative Party as part of the European Conservatives and Reformists, many changes occurred among Conservative MEPs between 2009 and 2014. In March 2010, Edward McMillan-Scott defected to the Liberal Democrats. In his resignation letter on 12 March 2010, the MEP quite explicitly condemned Cameron’s decision to form the ECR, accusing the Prime Minister of foul play and duplicity: “your decision to split from the mainstream EPP and create the new ECR group has been universally condemned, even by rightwing commentators such as the Economist, 23 24 25 26

Juliet LODGE (ed.), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 281. Nicolò CONTI, Party attitudes towards the EU in the member states. Parties for Europe, parties against Europe, London, Routledge, 2014, p. 73. Juliet LODGE (ed.), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament, p. 285. Andrew GAMBLE, “Better Off Out? Britain and Europe”, The Political Quarterly, vol. 83, no 3, 2012, p. 468; Chris GIFFORD, The making of Eurosceptic Britain, op.cit.; Philip LYNCH & R. WHITAKER, “Rivalry on the right: The Conservatives, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the EU issue”, British Politics, vol. 8, no 3, 2013, p. 285-312.

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as a “shoddy, shaming alliance”. You say you will not “bang on about Europe” and your spokesmen make warm noises. But I fear that on Europe you say one thing in opposition and will do another in government”. Links with the representative of the controversial Law and Justice party (PiS) were at the core of his disagreement: “you continue to refuse to accept that Michal Kamiński, who now leads the ECR and against whom I stood and won re-election as vice-president of the European Parliament, last July, has had “anti-Semitic, homophobic and racist links”. You say that you are against extremism at home, yet you propitiate it abroad” 27. Another Conservative MEP, Roger Helmer, defected to UKIP in March 2012 while two UKIP MEPs defected to the Conservatives, David Campbell Bannerman in May 2011 and Marta Andreasen in February 2013, demonstrating their “admiration” for the strength and boldness displayed by Cameron in managing the European issue. Most experienced MEPs retired or chose not to stand (Struan Stevenson, Sir Robert Atkins, Giles Chichester and Robert Sturdy), shifting the party further towards hard Euroscepticism as the former intake of Conservative MEPs had been conspicuously more pro-European. For the Conservative Party, the 2014 European Election was mainly concerned with reproducing their domestic agenda or using the election as a platform to convey their political message regarding strict immigration and economic austerity. In the economic field, the main objective of the manifesto was to strengthen and extend the domestic agenda. Based on the idea of “real change”, the manifesto advocated “a stronger economy at home, renewed respect abroad” and “real change in Europe”. The manifesto first stressed the Conservatives’ record in office, mainly concerning immigration and the economy. It included “the first-ever EU budget cut”, having “taken Britain out of Eurozone bail-outs”, “vetoed a treaty that would have damaged Britain’s interests”, “reduced red tape for British business”, having “taken action to fix our immigration system and limit migrants’ access to benefits”28. Among the main pledges for the future, the manifesto pursued the same policy line initiated by David Cameron in January 2013, in his famous Bloomberg speech, promising an in-out referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union by 2017 if the Conservatives were to be reelected in May 2015 and if renegotiations of the terms of membership failed29. The manifesto promised “more powers back to Britain”, “a better deal for British taxpayers”, “continued control of justice and home affairs”, “more trade and continued economic independence – by saying no to the Euro and ‘ever closer union’”30. As well as pursuing the domestic agenda, the Conservatives were also concerned to position themselves against opponents and rivals. They presented themselves as alone able to “deliver an in-out referendum”, either because this promise was not part of Labour’s or the Liberal-Democrats’ objectives or because the UKIP would never be elected in order to implement it. As David Cameron

27 28 29 30

Paul OWEN, “Former leader of Tory MEPs joins Liberal-Democrats”, The Guardian, 12 March 2010. Conservative Party, European election manifesto, 2014, p. 2. David CAMERON, “EU speech – full text”, The Guardian, 23 January 2013. Conservative Party, European election manifesto, op.cit., p. 2.

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suggested: “Labour and the Liberal Democrats won’t give people a say. UKIP can’t give people a say”31. The electoral campaign operated at both supranational and national levels. As regards the European Parliament, four phases were identified: phase one, from September to October 2013, aimed to explain the EP’s new powers and their implications for people living in the EU; phase two, from October 2013 to February 2014, aimed to highlight five key topics which the EP was likely to focus its work on during the next term – the economy, jobs, quality of life, money and the EU in the world; phase three was the “election campaign proper”, which started in February 2014 and focused on raising awareness of the election dates; the final phase, after the elections, focused on the newly-elected European Parliament, its role in the election of the next President of the Commission and the inauguration of the new Commission32. In the UK, the Conservative Party’s campaign was officially launched by David Cameron on 10th April 2014 with a speech at Manchester airport33. The Conservatives’ mobilization was relatively limited as the whole campaign focused on the two TV debates opposing Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage, in which David Cameron and Ed Miliband, the leader of the Labour Party, had refused to participate. Only second-rank Conservative officials took part in lower-profile debates and only one BBC debate involved MEP Syed Kamall, the leader of the Conservatives in the European Parliament, on 13th February 2014 during “Sunday Politics” hosted by Andrew Neil. Posters and videos proliferated with the electoral commission finally stating that the Tories (2.984 m £) had spent 24,000£ more than UKIP (2.96 m £) and almost three times as much as Labour during the campaign34. The main aim of the Conservative party was to address the dangerous rivalry with UKIP. This growing threat was first targeted in Cameron’s speech at Manchester Airport, in which he criticized UKIP for its poor record voting in the EP35. The threat became a major one when opinion polls indicated that UKIP would overtake the Conservatives. Dealing with the populist right has always been one of the main dilemmas of centre-right parties, torn between two options: integration (or absorbing the agenda of the populist right) and differentiation, that is marking a clear distance from it36. This dilemma applies typically to the Conservative Party facing UKIP37. Various commentators seemed to agree indeed on the fact that “treating the populist radical right as a pariah is not ultimately a sustainable strategy”38. Cameron was often accused of discarding UKIP as a

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Ibid., p. 12. Sarah CLARKSON, European Parliament Elections 2014, SN/IA/6895, 21 May 2014, House of Commons, p.9. BBC news, “European elections: PM launches Tory campaign with UKIP broadside”, 10 April 2014. B. KENDER, “UKIP matched spending by Tories on EU election”, The Times, 18 December 2014. Sarah CLARKSON, European Parliament Elections 2014, op.cit., p. 10. Florence HAEGEL, Les droites en fusion. Transformations de l’UMP, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2012, p.2 71-273. Brendan DONNELLY, “2014 Will Bring Challenges for David Cameron’s European Policy”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 23, no 1, 2014, p. 23. Oliver GRUBER, Tim BALE, “And it’s good night Vienna. How (not) to deal with the populist, radical right”, op.cit., p. 248.

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“bunch of fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists”39, not even worthy of consideration. Yet UKIP’s increasing success at European elections made it impossible to ignore them and the only option was for Cameron to sign a “pact of nonaggression” with UKIP’s leader, Nigel Farage40.

2. Electoral results As a result, the May 2014 election was termed “not an unmitigated disaster but not a runaway success either”41. In the European Parliament, the European Conservatives and Reformists form a coherent soft Eurosceptic group, made up partly of governing parties, which attempts to influence policy but is limited by being now the fifth party group in Strasbourg. At national level, though, the British Conservatives suffered a humiliating defeat, becoming the third British party represented in the European Parliament, behind UKIP and the Labour Party. They won 23.1% of votes and 19 seats out of a total number of 73 seats for the UK, as decided by the Lisbon Treaty, compared with 24 seats for UKIP and 20 for Labour. This election clearly functioned as a mini-referendum against the government, while Eurosceptic protest voting benefitted UKIP at the expense of the Conservative Party. With the radicalization of Euroscepticism in Britain, critics of the government tended to view the soft Euroscepticism of the Conservative Party as too compromising and chose instead to give UKIP their votes. As is usually the case, the election was conducted in 12 electoral constituencies, using regional party-list proportional representation in each of the 9 English regions, and in Scotland and Wales, but the Single transferable vote in Northern Ireland. Targeting traditional strongholds (the South-East, London, and the East of England), the 19 Conservative seats were concentrated on these areas, with three in the South-East of England, three in the East, two in London, two in the South-West, two in the North-West, two in the East-Midlands, two in the WestMidlands, one in Yorkshire & Humberside, one in Wales and one in Scotland. Some of these seats were marginal (that is held with a small majority and difficult to keep or to conquer.), Tory aides arguing that the party had topped the poll in marginal areas such as Swindon (South-West), Stroud (South-West), Peterborough (East), South Pembrokeshire (Wales), Basildon (East) and North Warwickshire (Yorkshire)42. Compared with the 2009 EP election, the Conservatives suffered a heavy setback, losing two seats in the South-East, one in London, the North-West, the South-West and the West Midlands but gaining one in the EastMidlands and Yorkshire & Humberside. Socio-demographic data show no significant difference between Conservative voters at EP elections and at general elections, the Conservative median voter being traditionally a middle-aged, middle-class woman. A YouGov opinion poll for the Sun and the Times, on 20-21 May 2014, asked the following question: 39 40 41 42

David CAMERON on LBC, 2006. Carsten VOLKERY, “Lurching Right”, Spiegel Online International, 27 May 2014. Philip LYNCH, Richard WHITAKER, “Understanding the Formation and Actions of Eurosceptic Groups in the European Parliament, op.cit.,p. 255. Rowena MASON, “10 key lessons from the European election results”, The Guardian, 26 May 2014.

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“There are elections to the European Parliament this week, if the following parties were standing in your region, which party would you vote for?” It revealed that among alleged Conservative voters (that is 22% of the 6124 total respondents), there was indeed a majority of women (51%) among voters aged between 40 and 59 (31%), while social class is no longer a relevant criterion of party identification, essentially because political parties (including the Conservative Party) have moved to the centre43.

3.

The Eurosceptic agenda

As a soft Eurosceptic party, it is now clear that the Conservative Party has always wanted to take the lead as regards an alternative vision for Europe by demanding massive repatriation of powers. This was the basic objective contained in the foundation of the European Conservatives and Reformists, whose main rationale was the 2008 financial crisis. From then on, opposition to the trajectory of European integration centred particularly on the economic agenda and the bailout of European member-states following the crisis of the Eurozone. The incompatibility of Conservative demands with the basic principles of the EU, perceived as having been sketched out by a Franco-German agenda, is notable, though not overwhelming. Having vetoed the fiscal compact and keeping Britain out of the Eurozone and out of Eurozone bailouts are part of the Conservatives’ major economic achievements in relation to the EU, while keeping control of one’s own borders, in line with Britain being outside the Schengen area, reflects their aversion to the path chosen by European integration. Conservative disapproval focused on the end of transitional limitations on free movement for Bulgarian and Romanian workers44. Opposing any further transfer of national sovereignty to supranational level and promising an in-out referendum, Prime Minister David Cameron stands out as the only major EU leader pursuing a Eurosceptic agenda, quite at odds with what is advocated by the other member-states. The referendum is conditional however on the coalition government’s success in renegotiating the terms of Britain’s membership, with the hope of changing the course of European integration and shape a “flexible, adaptable and open European union”, based on the features of the “British character” as “independent, forthright and passionate in defence of our sovereignty”45. In addition, Conservative MPs are divided on their objectives, between those who defend a pragmatic approach and those “for whom Euroscepticism was a matter of political faith”46. More precisely, they are to be “found along a spectrum ranging from outright rejectionists favouring withdrawal” to “minimalists taking a “this far but no further”47. The variety of Conservative attitudes to the EU reflects the intrinsic pluralism of the party now characterised by a consensus on a free-market and national43 44 45 46 47

Alison PARK et al. (eds.), British Social Attitude Survey 30, London, NatCen Social Research, 2013, p. 174-179. Brendan DONNELLY, “2014 Will Bring Challenges for David Cameron’s European Policy”, op.cit., p. 24-25. David CAMERON, “EU speech – full text”, op.cit. Chris GIFFORD, The making of Eurosceptic Britain, op.cit., p. 156. Philip LYNCH, Richard WHITAKER, “Where There is Discord, Can they Bring Harmony?”, op.cit., p. 3.

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ist agenda but also by a diversity of views on moral and social issues, with Conservatives ranging from traditionalists to modernizers48. Since 2005, David Cameron’s modernizing agenda of “compassionate conservatism” produced a common ground with the Liberal-Democrats with whom they consequently formed a coalition49. This common ground was mainly found in an agreement on civil liberties which included measures to “reverse the substantial erosion of civil liberties under the Labour Government and roll back state intrusion”, as stated in the coalition agreement concluded between the Conservatives and Liberal-Democrats after the May 2010 general election. Though freedom and liberty are usually presented as among the basic values of Conservatism, in the context of the May 2014 European election, they were limited to their economic overtones or even silenced. As, during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations, the Blair government had managed to obtain a protocol ensuring that the Charter of fundamental rights would not extend the powers of the European Court of Justice over United Kingdom law, the principles of the pluralism of human rights and rule of law as stated by the Charter are part of the Conservative argument. Yet they were not brought to the fore at this particular election which concentrated on strict immigration and economic austerity. The Party was reasserted as “the party of law and order”50 eschewing the image of compassionate conservatism which had dominated the 2010 election campaign as part of David Cameron’s modernization strategy. In the aftermath of the European election, the debate about the choice of the President of the European Commission represented another opportunity for David Cameron to radicalize his Euroscepticism by expressing his opposition to the nomination of the Luxembourg politician, Jean-Claude Juncker. As part of an institutional innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to involve the European Council and the European Parliament more closely in the procedure, most party groups in Strasbourg had decided to promote their own “lead candidates” (or Spiztenkandidaten) for the Commission Presidency. The ECR however abstained from nominating their own candidate and all four of the main British parties carefully avoided the issue. As a result, the Spitzenkandidaten campaigned across the European continent but generally steered clear of Britain51. Cameron's personal aversion to the nomination of Juncker, who was the European People Party's choice and a clear favourite, epitomized the Conservative view, though the Prime Minister only expressed it openly after the EP election. It further signalled the incompatibility of the party's attitude to the whole process as Cameron was ready to lobby for a non-Spitzenkandidat, such as the Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning Schmidt, Jyrki Katainen of Finland or Christine Lagarde of France52. 48 49 50 51 52

Agnès ALEXANDRE-COLLIER, Les habits neufs de David Cameron. Les conservateurs britanniques (1990-2010), Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2010. Philip LYNCH, “European Policy”, in T. HEPPELL & D. SEAWRIGHT (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives. The Transition to Coalition Government, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2012. Ibid., see manifesto p.14; Timothy HEPPELL, “Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 15, no 3, 2013, p. 340-361. EP2014: EU candidates campaign travel map, http://batchgeo.com/map/0825bd95bd 70600dee1d75 1044444e15 (20 February 2015). The Economist, “Cameron versus the Spitzenkandidaten”, 22 May 2014.

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Conclusion As Gifford argues, Euroscepticism has shaped the British political agenda from the beginnings of the coalition government with the eventual rise of a consensus on the referendum, the renegotiation of Britain's membership of the EU and the promotion of an Anglo-Saxon model of deregulated finance which the Conservatives are anxious to protect53. Thus, as a government party, the Conservatives can now claim to have promoted a new European model of openness, deregulation and national sovereignty which other member-states are ready to follow. Yet in May 2014, exactly four years after the general election, voters, as is usually the case, had become weary of the party in power and the European election was the opportunity for the less satisfied to turn away from the Conservatives on the grounds that their European policy had become too moderate in the process. Supporting UKIP was how they felt they could best express their disaffection. The result has been an unprecedented Eurosceptic radicalization of the Conservative party so much so that Britain's membership of the EU is now in question

LE PARTI CONSERVATEUR BRITANNIQUE ET LES ÉLECTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE 2014: VERS UN EUROSCEPTICISME PLUS DUR? Dans la littérature sur l´euroscepticisme, le Parti conservateur britannique est depuis longtemps présenté comme un exemple archétypique de parti gouvernemental faisant opposition à l´intégration européenne. Cependant, cette opposition fut longtemps modérée et correspond à ce que l´on appelle une critique molle de l´Europe. A l´occasion de l´élection européenne de 2014, pour la première fois, un autre parti que le Labour ou le parti conservateur remportait à l´occasion d´un vote national le plus grand nombre de sièges. Ce chapitre montre que cette élection a placé le parti conservateur dans une situation inhabituelle et a contribué ainsi à la mutation de l´euroscepticisme britannique. Les conservateurs britanniques appartiennent au parlement européen à une fraction eurosceptique – Les conservateurs et réformistes européens. L´euroscepticisme britannique s´est de fait déplacé vers l´UKIP, un parti populiste et hostile à l´Europe « dur ». Cette élection est aussi l´expression d´une faible confiance des électeurs envers le gouvernement, car les élections européennes sont utilisées en général comme un moyen de punir les partis de gouvernement. Les conséquences de cette restructuration de l´euroscepticisme, qui sont analysées dans ce chapitre, furent la radicalisation des positions du parti conservateur vis-à-vis de l´intégration européenne, ceci en réaction mécanique à la victoire électorale de l’UKIP.

53

Chris GIFFORD, The making of Eurosceptic Britain, op.cit., p. 169.

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DIE BRITISCHE KONSERVATIVE PARTEI UND DIE EUROPAWAHLEN 2014: EIN TENDENZIELL HÄRTERER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS? In der Literatur über den Euroskeptizismus wird die Britische Konservative Partei seit langem als archetypisches Beispiel einer Regierungspartei genannt, die Widerspruch gegen die europäische Integration einlegt. Jedoch war diese Opposition bisher gemäßigt und entsprach dem was man als weiche Europakritik bezeichnet. Bei der Europawahl im Mai 2014 gewann zum ersten Mal eine andere Partei als Labour oder die Konservativen, nämlich UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party), die meisten Sitze bei einer nationalen Wahl gewonnen. Dieses Kapitel legt dar, dass diese Wahl die Konservative Partei in eine ungewöhnliche Lage gebracht und so zur Veränderung des britischen Euroskeptizismus beigetragen hat. Die britischen Konservativen gehören im Europaparlament nun einer euroskeptischen Fraktion, den Europäischen Konservativen und Reformern, an. Der britische Euroskeptizismus hat sich nun in der Tat zur UKIP verschoben, einer harten europafeindlichen und populistischen Partei. Dies ist auch ein Ausdruck des geringen Vertrauens in die Regierung, da Europawahlen auch generell als Mittel zur Abstrafung der Regierungsparteien genutzt werden. Die Folge dieser Neustrukturierung des Euroskeptizismus im Europäischen Prozess, die dieses Kapitel untersuchen wird, war die Radikalisierung der Haltung der Konservativen Partei gegenüber der europäischen Integration als mechanische Reaktion auf den Wahlsieg der UKIP.

THE 2014 ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE UK: THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP) AND THE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY (BNP) KARINE TOURNIER-SOL In the United Kingdom, the 2014 European Parliament Elections were marked by the historic victory of the eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). It was the first time in contemporary British history that neither the Conservative Party nor the Labour party had won a national election. This political earthquake, which had been predicted by opinion polls in the run up to the election, makes the latter particularly interesting to analyse. This chapter will focus on UKIP and the British National Party (BNP), though more extensively on UKIP, as a result of the collapse of the BNP in recent years – a collapse confirmed by the European Parliament elections, both during the election campaign and in terms of electoral results. Studying UKIP together with the BNP is all the more relevant since both parties have a major point in common: they are the only two (significant) British political parties campaigning for the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union (EU). But they also fundamentally differ in that they do not originate from the same tradition in British politics. Yet, through this analysis of the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, we will see that there are actual points of contact between the two parties, both in terms of ideology and their respective electorates.

1. History 1.1. UKIP There is undoubtedly a strong eurosceptic tradition in the United Kingdom: as a matter of fact, the word “eurosceptic” was coined there in the mid-1980s1. UKIP was actually born out of this eurosceptic tradition. The party was founded in 1993 by some members of the Anti-Federalist League created two years earlier by Dr Alan Sked, an academic from the London School of Economics, to oppose the Maastricht Treaty. UKIP was born as a single-issue party advocating withdrawal of the UK from the European Union – a policy which constitutes the very raison d'être of the party, its core identity. UKIP's relatively short history has been marked by a lot a factional infighting and scandals of different sorts – entryism from the far-right, financial scandals involving some of its MEPs, charges of ra1

Menno SPIERING, “British Euroscepticism”, in: Robert HARMSEN, Menno SPIERING (eds.) Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2004, p. 128.

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cism due to recurrent outbursts from UKIP members or party officials, as well as repeated leadership problems. The organisational and electoral aspects of UKIP's history are inextricably interlinked, together with its ideological evolution. At first, UKIP's positioning as a single-issue party entirely devoted to taking the United Kingdom out of the European Union proved quite beneficial, as it allowed the party to gain representation in the European Parliament. It is worth noting that initially, under Alan Sked's leadership, UKIP's position was to boycott any seats it might win there. Yet, after Sked's departure in 1997, the party reversed this decision and opted to take up its seats and use its position to inform the British people about the workings of the European Union – more particularly to expose waste and corruption and denounce the erosion of British independence and national sovereignty. Following the introduction of proportional representation, UKIP won its first three seats at the 1999 European elections. This was followed by a significant breakthrough in 2004 when the party returned 12 MEPs to the European Parliament, a success which was confirmed at the following EP elections in 2009 when UKIP came second in front of the Labour party, winning 13 seats. Yet, the party's status as a single-issue party soon turned out to be a limitation to its development. Consequently, UKIP first endeavoured to widen its electoral platform by developing a set of right-wing policies bearing close resemblance with the Tory right2. The porosity of the boundary between the two parties is mirrored by the significant number of Tory politicians who have defected to UKIP over the years since its foundation. For instance, the first two UKIP MPs elected in October and November 2014, Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless, are former Conservative MPs. This proximity resulted in the popular perception of UKIP as a splinter group of the Conservative party, from which the party therefore tried to distance itself by undertaking a strategic populist shift designed to optimise its electoral potential. UKIP has progressively grown into a populist catch-all party under the charismatic leadership of Nigel Farage and now explicitly targets the Labour vote as well, dismissing the relevance of any left/right positioning. This populist shift is one of the keys to the party's recent surge. The turning point for UKIP came between November 2012 and February 2013, in a series of three parliamentary by-elections when the party scored up to 27.8 per cent of the vote, pushing the Conservative Party into third place. The party had clearly gathered momentum, as reflected by its significant surge in opinion polls, which translated into substantial gains at the 2013 local elections. However, the party has also benefited from a favourable domestic political context since 2010: the coalition government between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats has provided UKIP with new political opportunities. On the one hand, the Conservatives have repositioned themselves closer to the centre ground in their alliance with the Liberal Democrats, thereby opening up a political space for UKIP on the right of the political spectrum. On the other hand, the accession to power of the Liberal Democrats has benefited UKIP by enhancing its position as an alternative to the three major parties of government. The party has skilfully and successfully

2

Karine TOURNIER-SOL, “Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative: UKIP's Winning Formula?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53:1, 2015, p. 140156.

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exploited those new political opportunities by developing a populist strategy designed to maximise its electoral appeal. UKIP's populist positioning is directly linked with its very nature as a party of “amateurs”, in contrast with the mainstream parties of professional politicians which it denounces in its political discourse. However, the party's increasing electoral success since 2012 has placed it at a turning point in its history, calling for organisational reforms on its way towards institutionalisation. UKIP has recently entered a phase of professionalisation which is a potential source of tension within the party, as it risks conflicting with its core identity as a party of “amateurs”. UKIP is very much centred around the charismatic personality of its leader, Nigel Farage, who is obviously trying to strike a difficult balance between the party's populist anti-political establishment nature and the necessity to introduce some kind of discipline, avoiding scandals which could undermine its credibility on its way towards more respectability. The party was infiltrated by the far right in the past, and has been trying ever since to shed the racist label often attached to its name and to distance itself from the BNP – an effort often made difficult by the recurrent racist outbursts from UKIP members or party officials. 1.2. The BNP Unlike those of UKIP, the BNP's ideological roots are to be found in the British fascist tradition. The party was born in 1982 following the split of the National Front. It was created and led by John Tyndall for 17 years, who was replaced by Nick Griffin in 1999. The party's structure is heavily centralised around an authoritarian leadership. For almost two decades, the BNP remained on the margin of British political life – with the exception of one local candidate elected in Tower Hamlets in 1993. In the early 2000s, Nick Griffin started a modernisation process in an attempt to normalise the party, with the French Front National a major source of inspiration. Ideologically, the BNP tried to distance itself from its original racial nationalism, shifting towards a more moderate form of ethnic nationalism justified by the need to preserve ethno-cultural diversity3. Along with promoting its antiimmigration policy, the BNP campaigns for the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union – like UKIP. From 2002, Griffin's modernisation strategy seemed to bear fruit as the party entered a period of – relative – electoral success, gaining representation in several local authorities and one seat in the London Assembly in 2008. In 2009, for the first time, the BNP had two MEPs elected in the European Parliament, thereby becoming the most successful far right party in British history. Yet, electoral success was short-lived and the party has gradually lost all but two of its elected representatives since then. One of its MEPs, Andrew Brons, left the party in 2012 in protest against Nick Griffin’s leadership but retained his seat in the European Parliament. The BNP therefore entered a period of decline, accompanied by a sharp fall of its membership, on which the party is heavily reliant, notably for 3

Mathew J. GOODWIN, “In search of the winning formula: Nick Griffin and the ‘modernization’ of the British National Party”, in: Roger EATWELL, Mathew GOODWIN (eds), The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain, 2010, p. 178.

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funds. In January 2014, its leader Nick Griffin was declared bankrupt – a reflection of the current state of the party, which is on the verge of extinction. Griffin left the leadership of the BNP in July 2014, after the European Parliament elections, and was expelled in October 2014. The new leader of the moribund party is Adam Walker. The BNP's attempt to normalise has therefore failed, due to its toxic extremist legacy. The party's image in the eyes of the public is very negative and associated with violence. It has also clearly suffered from the competition with UKIP, which benefits from a more positive image than the BNP, as can be seen through their respective treatment by the media.

2. lection Campaign 2.1. KIP UKIP's manifesto for the European elections was launched by Nigel Farage on 22 April 2014, one month before election day. Building on UKIP's rise so far, it was entitled “Create an Earthquake”, thereby urging voters to help UKIP win the election and cause a shock to the British political system. The document is eight pages long with only three pages of text, however, including a preface by its leader Nigel Farage. It is organised in two parts: “Regaining Control” and “Repairing the UK”. First of all, UKIP asks voters to turn the EP elections into a referendum on Europe: “It’s time to decide. We don’t need to wait until 2017 to have a referendum: let’s have one right now. Use the European Elections on 22 May to tell them what you think about the EU”4. There are two recurrent themes in the manifesto: first, leaving the EU would allow the UK to regain its independence and self-government: “We want our country back”. The party raises the threat of “the United States of Europe” and considers that “the EU is not the trading bloc we thought we signed up to”. Second, withdrawal would give back to the country the control of its borders, and therefore permit it to cut “mass immigration” which is damaging the country, in terms of employment and of pressure on public services. Moreover, UKIP denounces the huge cost of EU membership to the UK – estimated at £ 55 million per day –, its bureaucracy and “the burden of EU laws and regulations”. Far from reducing British economic opportunities, the party considers that leaving the European Union would actually increase them by opening the country up to a global market. Predictably, the election campaign was dominated by the key figure of the party, Nigel Farage, whose charismatic personality seems to embody UKIP. The party's strategy rested on a double message, clear and simple, reflecting its populist dimension: leaving the EU is the only way for the UK to regain self-government and control of its immigration. These two themes made up the core of the campaign, and were articulated through various campaigning techniques. The party’s election posters in particular raised significant controversy and were branded as racist by politicians of left and right and also by part of the press. The slogan was the same on all of them and encapsulated the message of the party: 4

UKIP, “Create an Earthquake”, European Election Manifesto, 2014.

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“Take back control of our country”. The most controversial one showed a pointed finger, with the caption: “26 million people in Europe are looking for work. And whose jobs are they after?” Another one which was very much commented upon featured an escalator leading up to the top of the White Cliffs in Dover and saying: “No Border. No Control – the EU has opened our border to 4,000 people every week”. The party clearly opted for a shock campaign strategy with the aim capturing the public’s attention; from this perspective, it was a complete success as the billboard campaign attracted widespread commentary, however critical. Election campaigning also traditionally includes election broadcasts, and in this respect the party obtained a significant victory: in March 2014 the British Media Watchdog Ofcom ruled that growing public support for UKIP meant that it was now a major party and therefore deserved equal broadcast status with the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This decision was of course welcomed by the party as an official recognition which afforded it more media coverage in the campaign and therefore more public exposure. Another high point in UKIP’s campaign was the televised debate between Nigel Farage and the Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the pro-European Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg. On the latter's invitation, the two leaders publicly debated twice – an event which was very much commented upon in the media and which resulted in a decisive win for Nigel Farage according to opinion polls. This undoubtedly boosted UKIP's election campaign, raising its profile and credibility. It also fuelled an increasingly anti-EU pre-election context, thereby enhancing UKIP’s position in the opinion polls. From a general point of view, during this campaign UKIP was very much at the centre of media attention which focused mainly on the recurrent scandals affecting the party – mostly allegations of racism or financial abuse of EU expenses by Nigel Farage. However, although the party came under repeated fire, this negative coverage did not have an effect on opinion polls, which continued to put UKIP in first place for the upcoming election. 2.2. The BNP The BNP’s four-page long election manifesto was entitled “Out of the EU”. The front page features a British bulldog with a torn up European flag in his mouth, and lists five bullet points summarising the party’s programme : “Banning the Burqa; Stopping immigration; British Jobs for British Workers; Scrapping the Bedroom Tax; Out of the EU”5. The party pledges to leave the EU “immediately, without referendum”, so as “to restore British freedom and self-rule”. The huge cost of the EU to the United Kingdom is denounced, relying on the same figure as UKIP: “It costs British taxpayers £55million a day to be ruled by unelected bureaucrats!”. The EU as a whole is fiercely condemned and likened to “an increasingly unstable and dysfunctional bureaucratic tyranny”, with no democratic legitimacy at all. According to the BNP, it is slowly becoming a “federal superstate”, far from the free-trade area the British thought they had joined. More importantly, leaving the EU would allow the UK to ‘regain control of its borders’, as the party makes it clear that ‘the burning issue in this election is immigration’. It 5

BNP, “Out of the EU”, European Election Manifesto, 2014.

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is difficult not to draw a parallel with the UKIP manifesto as the themes and arguments are remarkably similar. However, the tone is very different – more direct and aggressive in the case of the BNP, more overtly racist as well: “The BNP opposes mass immigration because it is a threat to our identity and culture. (…) Britain’s full and it’s time to shut the door”. Another key difference is that the BNP manifesto is openly Islamophobic, castigating the burqa, “cruel and barbaric halal ritual slaughter” and the “creeping Islamisation” threatening the British Christian heritage and identity. The far right party is well aware that UKIP is its main political rival and therefore directly attacks Nigel Farage’s party in the hope of undermining it. UKIP is presented as a splinter of the Conservative party – and both are portrayed as lying to the British public on immigration, contrary to the BNP which claims to be “the ONLY party you can trust on immigration”. In contrast with UKIP, the BNP was almost totally absent from the media during the election campaign. The party launched its manifesto only two weeks before polling day, on 8 May 2014, most probably due to the financial difficulties it met with. On this occasion, Nick Griffin was interviewed on the BBC6. The BNP leader took up the arguments of the manifesto, placing immigration at the forefront of the forthcoming election. He presented his party as the only credible political force on this issue, predicting the burst of the “UKIP bubble” which rested on “false promises”. When asked about the BNP’s internal problems, Griffin attempted to dodge the question, posing his party as a victim: “No party in British politics has ever been vilified and persecuted like the BNP has”. Yet, even in the event of a defeat at the European election, the BNP would go on, because, in the words of Griffin, “We’re British bulldogs, we keep fighting”. The BNP’s election campaign was marked by the fact that the party was asked by the BBC to modify the content of its official election broadcast so as to make it editorially compliant. The original broadcast included a provocative Islamophobic cartoon, notably featuring Muslim gangs chasing a schoolgirl. The BNP called the BBC request censorship and replaced the cartoon with a man in a room talking for 4 minutes7. The party was also criticised for exploiting the murder of Lee Rigsby, a British soldier, by two Islamic extremists, exactly one year before election day. It was not the first time that a BNP broadcast caused scandal – clearly a tactical device on the part of the party, aimed at getting publicity and raising its public profile, as the British media are reluctant to offer the party political coverage.

3 Electoral Results In the UK, polling traditionally takes place on Thursdays, so that the British voters cast their votes before the other member states, on 22 May, but the results were announced on 25 and 26 May, after voting closed in other EU countries. The UK representation in the European Parliament rose from 72 to 73 seats at this election, distributed between 12 regions. UKIP won a historic first place, whereas 6 7

BBC News, 2014. Video available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TTcD46UFjM (2 March 2015). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQFjJvvPUi4 (2 March 2015). The original broadcast is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Lo8JOXFcjM (2 March 2015).

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the BNP lost its representation in the European Parliament. National turnout was 35.4%, compared to a EU average of 43%. Table 1: 2014 European election results, UK Political party

Vote in %

Seats

Change 2009-2014

UKIP

27.5

24

+11

Labour party

25.4

20

+7

Conservative party

23.9

19

–7

Green party

7.9

3

+1

Liberal Democrats

6.9

1

–10

BNP

1.1

0

–2

Others 7.3 6 – Source: the author, after House of Commons Library, European Parliament Elections 2014, Research Paper 14/32, 11 June 2014.

3.1. UKIP UKIP came first in the EU elections, gathering 27.5% of the vote and returning 24 MEPs to the European Parliament. It was undoubtedly a historic victory for the eurosceptic party, which vindicated Nigel Farage's prediction that UKIP would cause a political earthquake in British politics. The table below shows UKIP results in detail: Table 2: UKIP 2014 European election results by region8 UKIP results in %

% Change 2009-2014

UKIP results in seats

Change 2009-2014

North East

29.2

+13.8

1

+1

North West

27.5

+11.6

3

+2

Yorkshire and the Humber

31.1

+13.7

3

+2

East Midlands

32.9

+16.5

2

1

West Midlands

31.5

+10.2

3

+1

East

34.5

+14.9

3

+1

London

16.9

+6.1

1

–

Region

8

South East

32.1

+13.3

4

+2

South West

32.3

+10.2

2

–

Wales

27.6

+14.8

1

–

Scotland

10.5

+5.2

1

+1

Great Britain

27.5

+11.0

24

+11

Source: the author, after House of Commons Library, European Parliament Elections 2014, Research Paper 14/32, 11 June 2014.

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Table 2 shows that UKIP polled strongly across the country: the party came first in six out of the nine English regions, with their strongest performances in the East, the East Midlands, the South East and the South West. Its share of the votes was lower in London and Scotland – but in the latter UKIP narrowly managed to win its first ever seat, which constituted a major breakthrough for the party. In terms of vote share, the party made gains in all the regions compared with the 2009 EP elections. Nationwide, the UKIP vote had increased by 11% since 2009 – unquestionably a remarkable progression. 3.2. The BNP Table 3: BNP 2014 European election results by region9 BNP results in %

% Change 2009-2014

BNP results in seats

Change 2009-2014

North East

1.7

–7.2

0

–

North West

1.9

–6.1

0

–1

Yorkshire and the Humber

1.6

–8.2

0

–1

East Midlands

1.6

–7

0

–

West Midlands

1.5

–7.1

0

–

East

0.8

–5.3

0

–

London

0.9

–4.1

0

–

South East

0.7

–3.6

0

–

South West

0.7

–3.2

0

–

Wales

1.0

–4.4

0

–

Region

Scotland

0.8

–1.7

0

–

Great Britain

1.1

–5.1

0

–2

In stark contrast with UKIP, the BNP lost votes in all the regions. Its share of the vote was almost divided by six compared to the previous EP elections, with a decrease of 5.1%. The party lost the two seats it had won for the first time in 2009 and was wiped out in the European Parliament, thereby confirming its longstanding decline. 3.3. Sociography What was the profile of UKIP voters at the 2014 European elections? According to a YouGov poll carried out throughout April 2014 and based on a sample of nearly 8,900 respondents10, UKIP voters tend to be male rather than female: 31% of male respondents said they intended to vote UKIP at the forthcoming election, against 26% of women. UKIP also performs more strongly among older voters: 9 10

Source: the author, after House of Commons Library, European Parliament Elections 2014, Research Paper 14/32, 11 June 2014. YouGov, The European election, 9 May 2014. Sample : 8,894 British adults. 31 March-30 April 2014, http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/cm3jia833s/Euro pean%20presentation.pdf (2 March 2015).

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36% of the respondents over 60 and 32% of those aged between 40 and 59 years old supported UKIP against only 15% of those under 40. In terms of social profile, the party’s supporters are mostly working-class (34%), even though almost one quarter of middle-class respondents (24%) also supports the party. Geographically, most UKIP voters live in the South of England – excluding London where support is lower, as reflected in the party’s European election results there. Politically, Conservative supporters seem to form the bulk of UKIP support: 42% of those prepared to lend UKIP their vote had voted for the Conservative party at the previous general election in 2010. But the party also takes votes from Liberal Democrats supporters (20%) and, in a lesser proportion, from Labour voters (15%). Therefore, to put it in a nutshell, the typical UKIP voter at the 2014 European election was a working-class male over the age of forty, living in the South of England and who had voted Conservative at the previous general election. These findings confirm the extensive study of UKIP supporters carried out by Ford and Goodwin11, who also point to several common characteristics shared by UKIP and BNP voters. Both radical right parties share a similar pattern of working-class dominance. Yet if male supporters outnumber women in the two parties, this gender bias is even more marked for the BNP. However, the age profile differs between the two parties, as the electoral base of UKIP is older than that of the BNP, which mostly draws support from the middle-aged. Ford and Goodwin also show that supporters of both parties are overwhelmingly white and less educated than the supporters of mainstream parties12. Therefore, the electorate of UKIP, like that of the BNP, is made up of what Ford and Goodwin qualify as the “left-behind” voters. The similar profile shared by UKIP and BNP voters certainly accounts for the BNP’s decline in general and for its catastrophic results at the 2014 European election in particular. It seems that most BNP supporters have switched to UKIP and its more respectable public image. The party does not originate from the fascist tradition and publicly rejects the overt racism of the BNP, although racist outbursts by UKIP representatives are recurrent and have contributed to the party being sometimes referred to as “the BNP in blazers”. UKIP has clearly been absorbing the BNP vote, thereby contributing to the decline of the latter party in recent years – this is actually something Nigel Farage is very proud of: “I don’t think that anyone has done more to damage the BNP than UKIP and I am quite proud of that”13.

4. orm/type of criticism of Europe Both UKIP and the BNP campaign for the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. They can therefore be characterised as hard eurosceptic parties, as defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak in their conceptualisation of euroscepticism which differentiates between hard and soft opposition to European integration: “Hard euro11 12 13

Rob FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, Oxon, Routledge, 2014. Ibid., p. 158-9. The Daily Telegraph, 31 March 2014.

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scepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to one's country joining or remaining a member of the EU”14. It is a principled opposition, whereas soft euroscepticism “involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration”, whether on specific policies or as a defence of the national interest15. Another relevant classification is that made by Kopecký and Mudde, who distinguish between “diffuse” and “specific” support for European integration, leading to four idealtype categories of party positions on Europe. According to this typology, UKIP and the BNP can be classified as belonging to the “Eurorejects”, who “subscribe neither to the ideas underlying the process of European integration nor to the European Union”16. More recently, Vasilopoulou proposed a specific categorisation of radical right parties’ differing degrees of euroscepticism into three patterns of opposition towards European integration: the rejecting, conditional and compromising patterns of euroscepticism17. Here again, UKIP and the BNP stand in the “rejecting” category, according to which “it is necessary to manage all policies solely at the national level and to withdraw from the EU at any cost”18. More interestingly still, Vasilopoulou draws from a study by Sørensen on public euroscepticism which defines four ideal types, among which the “sovereignty-based type” of euroscepticism19 – a particularly appropriate category to analyse the positions of UKIP and the BNP on European integration. The study of their respective programmes demonstrates that their eurosceptic discourse is articulated around the defence of national sovereignty and the rejection of supranationalism. UKIP and the BNP are therefore a perfect illustration of the sovereignty type of euroscepticism: they are nationalist parties advocating withdrawal from the European Union as the only way to restore power and sovereignty to Britain as a selfgoverning nation-state: “We want our country back”20; “The BNP will take Britain out of the EU (…) to restore British freedom and self-rule to allow us to determine our own future in our own land”21. However, the two parties propose two different processes for leaving the EU. The BNP advocates immediate withdrawal, explicitly rejecting a referendum. On the contrary, UKIP’s populist nature means that it promotes popular democracy and giving power back to the people through the use of referenda as the only means of legitimation – the party therefore calls for an immediate referendum on EU membership, dismissing David Cameron’s commitment to hold one in 2017. UKIP and the BNP are strongly opposed to the European project, which according to them is heading towards the creation of the “United States of Europe”. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the EU candidates states of Central and Eastern Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 43:1, 2004, p. 3. Ibid., p. 4. Petr KOPECKÝ, Cas MUDDE, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe”, European Union Politics, 3:3, 2011, p. 302. Sofia VASILOPOULOU, “European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition”, Government and Opposition, 46:2, 2011, p. 224. Ibid., p. 232. Catherina Sørensen, “Love Me, Love Me Not: A Typology of Public Euroscepticism”, Sussex European Institute Working Paper, 101, 2008, Brighton, p. 8. UKIP, “Create an Earthquake”, European Election Manifesto, 2014. BNP, “Out of the EU”, European Election Manifesto, 2014.

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They reject political union altogether and argue that the British people have been deceived as they thought they had merely signed up for a free-trade agreement. The 1975 referendum only asked them if they approved of Britain's membership of a “Common Market”. UKIP and the BNP denounce the fact that the European Union is not the free-trade area they thought their country had joined. While the two parties’ eurosceptic discourse relies on arguments of national sovereignty and self-government, immigration is also a fundamental aspect of their respective forms of rhetoric – which are however very different, with UKIP publicly rejecting the overt racism of the BNP, as demonstrated earlier. UKIP was born as a single-issue Eurosceptic party which subsequently connected its core policy on Europe, which is a low salience issue for British voters, to immigration, which on the contrary is a priority for the electorate. UKIP has made the EU responsible for what they denounce as “open door immigration” from Eastern Europe, particularly warning about the potential influx of Bulgarians and Romanians since January 2014. The BNP’s trajectory is the exact reverse of that of UKIP: the far right party’s main policy was its fight against immigration – a policy which was subsequently connected with EU withdrawal. As well as leaving the European Union, UKIP and the BNP also want to pull out of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

Conclusion Following the European election results, UKIP joined forces with the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S) of Beppe Grillo to form a new group in the European Parliament: the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFD2). Nigel Farage is co-president of the group together with David Borelli from the M5S. Originally, UKIP’s 24 MEPs made up half of the 48-member EFD2, followed by 17 M5S MEPs, but the group also included MEPs from the Sweden Democrats, Lithuania’s Order and Justice Party, the Free Citizen’s Party of the Czech Republic, the Latvian Farmers’ Union and a French Independent MEP (formerly Front National). Earlier, Nigel Farage had refused to form a group with the French Front National because of its “prejudice and anti-Semitism”22. Only five months later, in October 2014, the EFD2 group came close to collapsing following the defection of the Latvian MEP, meaning that the group only had MEPs from six member states, just below the number needed to qualify for official group status. Four days later, the group was saved by the recruitment of Robert Iwaszkiewicz, a Polish MEP from the Congress of the New Right – a far right party associated with racism and anti-semitism, with which the leader of the Front National, Marine Le Pen, had rejected any alliance on the grounds that it was too extremist. This episode raised doubts once more about the non-racist credentials of UKIP. In January 2015, one of the 24 freshly-elected UKIP MEPs, Amjad Bashir, defected to the Conservative party, reducing UKIP’s representation to 23 – a scenario which the party is familiar with, as defections and/or scandals have regu-

22

The Guardian, 18 April 2014.

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larly diminished its representation in the European Parliament in the course of previous legislatures. As for the BNP, its debacle in the 2014 European elections is a reflection of its longstanding decline in the UK. After the results were announced, a bitter Nick Griffin blamed his defeat on UKIP, saying that BNP supporters had voted for “UKIP’s racist policies instead”23. The fact is that UKIP's recent surge seems to have dealt a fatal blow to an already withering BNP.

LES ELECTIONS AU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN DE 2014 AU ROYAUME-UNI: LE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP) ET LE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY (BNP) Ce chapitre porte sur les résultats des formations UK Independence Party (UKIP) et British National Party (BNP) aux élections européennes de 2014. La première partie se concentre sur l´histoire de ces deux partis et montre qu´ils proviennent de deux traditions politiques différentes. Nous analysons ensuite leurs campagnes électorales : le BNP était pratiquement totalement absent des médias, en contraste de l´UKIP. Cette différence se traduisait dans les résultats électoraux, que nous présentons ensuite. L´UKIP à l´occasion de cette élection remportait une victoire historique, alors que le BNP devait quitter le Parlement européen. Visiblement, l´UKIP a pris des voix au BNP, ce que confirme l´analyse des profils électoraux voisins des deux formations. Enfin, l´article se penche sur l´euroscepticisme des deux partis. L´un et l´autre sont des opposants durs à l´Europe et s´engagent pour une sortie du royaume de l´Union européenne. Leur rejet du projet européen se base sur la défense et la préservation de la souveraineté nationale. Les deux partis ont pour gagner des électeurs associés la question européenne à celle de l´immigration.

DIE EUROPAPARLAMENTSWAHLEN 2014 IM VEREINIGTEN KÖNIGREICH : DIE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP) UND DIE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY (BNP) Dieses Kapitel befasst sich mit dem Abschneiden der UK Independence Party (UKIP) und der British National Party (BNP) bei den Europawahlen von 2014. Der erste Teil konzentriert sich auf die Geschichte dieser zwei Parteien und zeigt, dass sie aus zwei verschiedenen politischen Traditionen kommen. Im Folgenden werden die Wahlkampagnen der beiden Parteien untersucht: Die BNP war in den Medien fast völlig abwesend, in krassem Gegensatz zur UKIP. Diesen Ge23

The Guardian, 25 May 2014.

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gensatz spiegeln auch die Wahlergebnisse wieder, die anschließend analysiert werden. UKIP errang in dieser Wahl einen historischen Sieg, während die BNP aus dem Europäischen Parlament flog. Offenbar hat die UKIP die früheren BNPStimmen übernommen, was auch das ähnliche Profil ihrer beiden Elektorate bestätigt. Schließlich untersucht dieses Kapitel den Euroskeptizismus der beiden Parteien. Beide sind harte Europagegner und kämpfen für den Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der Europäischen Union. Ihre Ablehnung des europäischen Projektes basiert auf der Verteidigung und dem Beharren auf der nationalen Souveränität. Beide Parteien haben das Thema Europa mit der Frage der Zuwanderung verknüpft, um so Wähler zu gewinnen.

THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY: GATHERING UP THE PERIPHERY? DAVID HANLEY The steady rise of UKIP over the past decade, culminating in its first place in the European Parliament (EP) elections in May 2014, has provoked a flurry of journalistic and academic inquiry1. The most authoritative commentators see it as “the first new movement with national reach since the emergence of the Labour party at the end of the 19th century”2. Words such as “insurgency” and “insurrection” are used to describe its progress. Although the party’s performance in European elections far outstrips its achievements in domestic British politics there is a clear sense that its domestic strength is growing; some commentators believe that it could have a decisive effect on the outcome of the 2015 general election, if only by its ability to affect adversely the performance of either of the major parties (Conservative and Labour) in a number of key seats3.

1. History UKIP is the latest and most potent, but by no means the sole incarnation of antiEuropean feeling within Britain. The entry of this “awkward partner”4 to the EEC in 1973 was opposed from the outset not just by fringe nationalist groups of the right but by a sovereignist tendency within the ruling Conservative party. Enoch Powell, MP and former Cabinet minister, emerged as the leader and theorist of this, arguing from the beginning that EEC membership was a fundamental attack on UK sovereignty, by which he meant the ability of the UK legislature and executive to function without limitations set from outside5. Although the Powellites were initially the main Eurosceptics (to use a term not then coined), their anxieties would be increasingly shared across a broader spectrum of the Conservative

1

2 3

4 5

Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, Abingdon, Routledge, 2014; Philip LYNCH, Richard WHITAKER and Gemma LOOMES, (2012) “The UK Independence Party: Understanding a Niche Party’s Strategy, Candidates and Supporters”, Parliamentary Affairs, 65 (4), 2012, p. 733-57. Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit.,p. 2. Tim BALE, Paul WEBB, “Why do Tories defect to UKIP? Conservative Party Members and the Temptations of the Populist Right?”, Political Studies Research Note, 2014, 10.1111/14679284.12130; Steven AYRES, “Whither the UKIP vote? The 2014 local elections and implications for 2015’ LSE website British Politics and Society, blogs.lse.ac.uk/politics and policy, 2014; Marcus ROBERTS, Revolt on the Left: Labour’s UKIP Problem and how it can be overcome, London, Fabian Society, 2014. Stephen GEORGE, An Awkward Partner? Britain in the European Community, Oxford, OUP, 1990. Chris GIFFORD, “The UK and the European Union: Dimensions of Sovereignty and the Problem of Eurosceptic Britishness”, Parliamentary Affairs, 63 (2), 2010, p. 321-338.

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party, culminating in the leadership of Margaret Thatcher (1975-1990)6. Labour too has always carried a sizeable Eurosceptic current, seldom as open or as confrontational as within Conservative ranks7, but nevertheless present. Part of UKIP’s success is its ability to speak to mainstream party supporters who feel out of phase with their party and may be ready to switch8. Generally, UK dissatisfaction with the EU remained at manageable levels for party elites until the early 1990s. Thatcher’s “victories over Brussels”, as she liked to present them, on the issue of the UK budget contributions were popular9, and both main parties preferred to keep Europe off the agenda as far as possible10; the salience of the EU in popular perceptions remained low. In the aftermath of the Maastricht treaty and with the single currency on the horizon, this “permissive consensus” came to an end. A new phase of integration beckoned, and against it old oppositions, now reinforced, flared up again. UKIP was an early manifestation of this trend. The party was launched in 1993 by LSE historian Alan Sked, with the avowed intention of contesting the next general election, having previously eked out a modest existence as the Anti-Federalist League11. It was quickly eclipsed by the millionaire James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party, which did enough to cost the Conservatives a number of seats in the 1997 election. Goldsmith’s death left the field free for UKIP, which took full advantage of the Proportional Representation (PR) regime applying to the 1999 EP elections. Low turnout (23%) benefited the party then as now, and its 7% of the poll (some 700,000 votes) brought it 3 MEPs. 2004 was even better; 2.66 million votes (16% of a 38.5% turnout) yielded 12 MEPs, and UKIP beat the Liberal Democrats (Libdems) to third place. 2009 saw UKIP, now led by Nigel Farage, come second to Cameron’s Tories (2.5 million votes, 13 MEPs on a turnout of 34.5%). The advent of the Cameron-Clegg coalition government after the 2010 elections seems to have marked some kind of watershed for the party; as dissatisfaction with the coalition parties and a weak Labour opposition grew, UKIP began to fill the gap thus created. In 2013 UKIP made something of a breakthrough in domestic politics, picking up a few hundred councillors in local elections, though the scattered nature of UKIP support meant that the party only came to control one small town. By now UKIP had

6 7

8 9 10

11

The locus classicus of Thatcherite Euroscepticism remains her Bruges declaration of 1988, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107322 (15 June 2014). Non-anglophone eurosceptics might point out that it should be the Brugge declaration. We should not forget however that the post-1979 Labour party was every bit as eurosceptical as UKIP. Its 1983 manifesto (famously dubbed ‘the longest suicide note in history’) committed the party to leaving the EEC and building a statist autarkic economy (the Alternative Economic Strategy). Later leaders such as Kinnock and Smith gradually recentred the party line on Europe, but there has always remained a fund of scepticism among supporters). Tim BALE, Paul WEBB, “Why do Tories defect to UKIP? Conservative Party Members and the Temptations of the Populist Right?”, op.cit. Stephen WALL, A Stranger in Europe : Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair, Oxford, OUP, 2008, p. 18-40. Tim BALE, “Between a hard and a soft place? The Conservative party and the need for a new ‘eurorealism’”, Parliamentary Affairs, 59 (3), 2007, p. 385-400; David BAKER et al., “Euroscepticism in the British party system” in: Paul TAGGART et Aleks SZCZERBIAK (eds.), Opposing Europe, vol. 1 & 2, Oxford, OUP, 2008, here; Vol.1., p. 93-116. For the early days of UKIP, huge detail is provide by: Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit.,p. 20-106.

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pushed aside its rival from the radical right, the British National Party (BNP)12, which had threatened to capture much of the nationalist/anti-European vote. Much of UKIP’s surge can be ascribed to the fact that its focus had quite suddenly widened. The party realised that it had stumbled on, to quote Ford and Goodwin13, a huge reserve of potential voters who had other grievances besides Europe, but who could be persuaded to link these to Europe, indeed to blame the EU for them. 2014 marked the apex of the curve; UKIP topped the poll (just) with 27.5% and finished with 13 MEPs on a turnout of 34.2%. The election of an MP to Westminster remained out of reach, however, but in 2014 two Tories, Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless, both from the heart of the Conservative South-East, defected to UKIP and were re-elected in by-elections. Whether this was a question of ideological zeal, political opportunism or the start of a deeper trend remained to be seen. In another by-election UKIP came within 600 votes of winning a safe Labour seat in Manchester. Farage was surely optimistic to claim that his party was now the only truly national one that reached across class and regional divides, but a few months away from the 2015 general election, these results were bad news for all the mainstream parties. The main rampart protecting the mainstream remained, even more than before, the UK electoral system with its firstpast-the-post ballot which penalises newcomers. 2015 will show how well this last dyke has resisted. But UKIP had now gone far beyond being a one-issue pressure group trying to twist the arms of other parties (in fact, the Conservatives) over Europe. It was now a serious player in the UK partisan system. Table 1. UKIP’s share of the vote (%), in European (EP) and General Elections (GE)14 1997 (GE)

0.3

1999 (EP)

6.7

2001 (GE)

1.5

2004 (EP)

16.1

2005 (GE)

2.2

2009 (EP)

16.6

2010 (GE)

3.1

2014 (EP)

27.5

12 D 13 14

Mathew J. GOODWIN, New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party, Abingdon, Routledge, 2011. avid CUTTS, Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, “Anti-immigrant, politically disaffected or still racist after all? Examining the attitudinal drivers of extreme right support in Britain in the 2009 European elections”, European Journal of Political Research, 50, 2011, p. 418-440. Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit.,p. 138. Source: Source: Adapted from Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit., p. 153.

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2. Organisation 2.1. Leadership UKIP is basicallly a top-down party. It has had several leaders in the two decades of its existence and there has been frequent infighting on both personal and ideological bases; this is also true of the parliamentary group in Brussels. After the ousting of the academic Alan Sked, businessman Michael Holmes took over but was deemed to be insufficiently Eurosceptic and ousted noisily. There was then a period of stability under the MEP Jeffrey Titford and Roger Knapman, a former Tory MP. Around the 2004 elections UKIP was thrown into turmoil when it was joined by Robert Kilroy-Silk, ex-Labour MP, one time academic political theorist and latterly host of a popular TV chat show. With his ability to express stylishly such familiar UKIP tropes as immigration, EU waste and law-and-order, Kilroy soon caused a media storm. His triumphant election as an MEP seemed to presage a takeover of the party. But the core activists, faithful to old fashioned British ideas about waiting your turn in the queue, saw off his challenge, and a disillusioned Kilroy soon withdrew from politics. The episode suggested that much of UKIP’s base likes a colourful leader, preferably a very rich one; their wish was soon to be granted. Recently the party has been led by Nigel Farage, public school educated and rich enough thanks to his activities as a City trader to retire early and devote himself full time to politics. Farage is in his second spell as leader, after a brief period in which Malcolm Pearson equipped the party with a harder, more anti-immigrant and anti-islamist discourse, while steering rather too close to the Conservatives for many UKIP activists. Farage is clever with the media and does a sharp soundbite (‘EU membership costs us £55 million every day’); he affects a popular style, frequently posing for journalists in a pub with a pint and a cigarette. Some journalists appear to find him charismatic. What is noticeable about nearly all UKIP’s senior cadres is that their background and style is very different from that of their core voters but very similar to that of Conservative cadres. This has doubtless helped to propagate the erroneous view that Ukippers are simply “Tories in exile”. In terms of party organisation, UKIP has equipped itself with the standard features of a modern party, viz. a branch structure which elects delegates eventually to a national committee, a formal programme and electoral manifesto. That said, within this structure the role and profile of the leader are paramount, and Farage feels able to speak on the party’s behalf as he wishes (cf. his admission, when questioned about some of the more eccentric items in the party programme, that he had not actually read the document). 2.2. Membership and Finance Membership has fluctuated from a handful of enthusiasts at the start to today’s figure of some 32,00015, which is a respectable total in a period of general decline in party membership16. A particular rise in membership came in the aftermath of 15 16

At UKIP’s recent conference, the party actually claimed over 38,000. Emilie VAN HAUTE, Party Membership in Europe: Exploration into the Anthills of Party Politics, Brussels, Edns. ULB, 2011.

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the 2004 European elections at the time of Kilroy Silk’s involvement with the party17, when the figure went from 8,500 to 26,000; since then there has been consolidation despite the odd dip18. In financial terms, the income from the MEPs has obviously been crucial, but at various times UKIP has benefited from generous donations from a number of millionaires – Alan Brown (property), Paul Sykes (refuse disposal), Stuart Wheeler (betting) and recently Arron Brown (finance and insurance). Most of them have had previous involvement with the Conservatives. Thanks to such impressive irregular inputs, UKIP has at times been able to outspend its rivals in campaigning. Thus in 200419, the party spent £2.4 million compared to Labour’s £1.7 and the Libdems £1.2 millions. Only the Tories outscored UKIP with £3.1 million. Such firepower is, needless to say, extremely rare for a minor party and shows that as well as having a base among the disempowered UKIP also has something to offer to certain fractions of capital. Particularly since 2010, UKIP has been using these resources to build a professional party machine, passing through what Panebianco would call the institutionalisation phase of party development20. Though there is still much work to do, it is clear that the party has long since ceased to be a one-issue pressure group and is now a serious nation-wide force. It has now reached the point where it begins to seem attractive to seekers of careers and rewards in politics and can thus expect a greater number of incomers, some of whom appear be of reasonable quality and able to avoid the media gaffes perpetrated by some of their predecessors.

3. The Programme : UKIP and ‘Europe’ – brexit or bust UKIP’s core programme has never changed across successive elections; it has just taken on slightly more detail. UKIP embodies “hard” Euroscepticism, as defined by Paul Taggart21. It does not believe that the sacrifices involved in membership can be compensated by any gains in other fields, such as the economy, and thus is not interested in ameliorating aspects of the EU. It wants brexit – Britain out of the EU. UKIP sees, in the Powellite tradition, EU membership as a dilution of UK sovereignty, a process which can only increase until the UK has been absorbed into some European megastate. Sovereignty is a zero-sum game; one cannot divide it or combine it with the sovereignty of other states in ways that may be beneficial to both (effectively Labour’s approach22). The EU is, then, fundamentally undemocratic; decisions are taken regarding Britain by non-Britons. The apparently uncomplaining acceptance of this situation by the mainstream parties is one reason (among many others) for UKIP’s detestation of “establishment elites”. UKIP’s hostility to any European institution was such that it initially considered 17 18 19 20 21 22

Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit.,p. 46 Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., p. 59. Angelo PANEBIANCO, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, Cambridge, CUP, 1988. Paul TAGGART et Aleks SZCZERBIAK (eds.), Opposing Europe, op;cit., here Vol.1., p. 7-10. Chris GIFFORD, “The UK and the European Union: Dimensions of Sovereignty and the Problem of Eurosceptic Britishness”, op.cit.

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not taking up its seats in the EP; But the chance to use a platform for eurosceptic views in Brussels and Strasbourg and to work with similar sceptics from other states proved a stronger lure23, as did the numerous financial and infrastructural resources offered by the EP to a party which is still institutionally weak. It is clear then that UKIP has nothing of the anti-democratic right about it; on the contrary, it is typical of an old British conservative belief in the virtues of parliamentarism and the rule of law. But by the same logic it is clearly opposed to any supranational jurisdiction such as the ECJ and also the ECHR, from which it is pledged to withdraw the UK. From the beginning UKIP saw the EU not just as bad in itself, but the ultimate cause of most major problems confronting the UK. The party’s 1999 manifesto, Better Off Out put it thus: “not only is our country under threat but our entire legal system, our British nationality, our right to free speech and freedom of association, our policy, our armed forces, our own agricultural policy, our right to trade freely and the parliamentary system that underpins British liberty”24. This statement, any one of whose clauses could be disputed, shows the party’s underlying fixation with the EU, but it also contains the germs of its later policy. Detailed policy had to be developed as the party moved beyond being a pressure-group towards full party status; but such policy was always going to be determined by the founding principles. Policy platforms in any area were always going to have to be related to the underlying problematic of being/not being part of the EU. Examination of UKIP’s key themes shows this to have happened. Even UKIP’s earliest proclamations referred, however briefly, to some policy areas beyond Europe. Thus in 1997 voters were offered education reform that would help preserve British national cultural identity; immigration would be limited and illegals pursued; politically correct policies would be opposed25. Under Farage’s leadership, policy has become more strident – yet more stress on reducing immigration, tax cuts, opposing the climate change agenda, restoring selection in secondary education. Interestingly, UKIP is, like the French FN, against “liberal interventionism”, condemning British interventions in the Middle East. The bulk of its proposals aimed at working class conservatives, reveal something of the party’s DNA; for all its posing as a champion of the “left-behind” and talk of appealing to the working class, it really stands for traditional right-wing beliefs, as outlined above, which will only ever appeal to a certain section of this 23

24 25

UKIP has usually joined the main Eurosceptic grouping in the EP. Prior to 2014, this was European Freedom and Democracy (EFD); now it is EFDD, the extra D standing for Direct. Farage has always taken care to have excluded from his groups radical right parties that are perceived as toxic because of their racism, real or presumed. Thus far UKIP has usually managed to scrape up enough allies to beat the EP threshold for group formation (25 from at least 7 states). The main victim of this has been Le Pen’s FN, for all her attempts at “dédiabolisation”. Her powerful delegation, elected by more French voters than the British who elected UKIP, now finds itself exiled among the non-inscrits, while some one-person delegations from smaller states find themselves in a major group, with all the opportunities for speaking, financial and infrastructural support, etc. that this entails. This shows that even newcomers or peripheral parties will behave like cartel parties as soon as they get the chance; see Richard KATZ, Peter MAIR, “Changing models of party organisation and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party”, Party Politics, 1 (1), 1995, p. 5-28. Quoted in Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit.,p. 39. Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit., p. 29.

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group. Such tactics did however work well enough for Thatcher, and there is a case for regarding UKIP as an attempt to re-cement the old Thatcherite coalition of working class Tories and aspirant middle groups, who were all cultural conservatives but felt that they did well during the years of privatisation and cheap home ownership. The 2010 manifesto was in the same vein, offering more stress on law-and-order, Swiss type referenda and restoration of British values. UKIP’s message by now pivoted on euroscepticism, strident demands for controls on immigration (UKIP would like a points system, as per Canada or Australia) and appeal to a traditional sense of national identity26. The 2014 European manifesto offered voters a very succinct distillation of UKIP’s view on the EU, sandwiched between photographs of a grinning Farage and youthful UKIP faces. It says that the party has “one over-riding goal: to make ourselves redundant, by getting Britain out, and returning to the UK the power to govern ourselves”27. The EU is said to be “not just the trading bloc we thought we had signed up to. It’s about ever closer union. The EU is said to control areas that we never imagined – immigration, law and order and energy, to name a few”. This is a classic sovereignist argument; it never explains what is meant by “control”, a concept on which the whole UKIP argument depends. The assumption is clearly that UK governments have no policy autonomy in the above fields, which is clearly absurd. It shows that UKIP cannot accept the realities of modern governance in an interdependent world, where certain areas of decision-making are pooled. For them, governments control every policy area entirely, or none. Believing as it does that “Brussels” is in total control of UK policy, the manifesto does not bother to ask about the extent to which other agencies – the bond markets, the strategists of multi-national companies or the ratings agencies, say – might “control” national economic policy. Starting from this posit that the EU controls everything, it is easy to blame it for all the major problems currently suffered by the UK; these are duly aligned – youth unemployment and low wages, energy prices (thanks to EU climate change policies), pressure on schools, housing and the national health service (thanks to unrestricted immigration), the difficulties of small businesses (thanks to innumerable regulations “which would take 92 days to read [sic]”). UKIP is confident that the strength of the UK economy is such that Britain will be able to leave the EU on its own terms and secure trade agreements that will enable it to carry on benefiting from trade with the continent without having to contribute £55 million a day to the EU budget. The rest of the EU will simply have to go along with this. Once the brexit has occurred, all will be for the best. Britons will feel really good at having “got their country back”. UKIP is the only party that will do this, the parties of government (lying and corrupt) having all sold out to Brussels. In short, this document appeals to voters’ resentments and their worries about losing democracy and promises an easy solution; this is what protest parties do, by definition, and UKIP does it wholeheartedly. What the document underplays is the extent of the party’s neo-liberalism. Do voters know that Farage and Nuttall have spoken about privatising the National Health Service? Or that 26 27

Ibid., p. 90. It is tempting to ask: which nation? Like all British nationalisms. UKIP tends to conflate British with English, UKIP, Create an Earthquake. UKIP European Manifesto 2014, 2014, www.ukip.org/Euro ManifestoLaunch (3 August 2014), p. 3.

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the party’s economic line is generally Thatcherite? The text is also silent about the tension in the party between those leaders like Farage who are strong civil as well as economic libertarians and the mass of activists (and voters) who are much more socially conservative.

4. Electorate Table 2. UKIP and the others: sociology of parties’ core votes, 2004-201328 UKIP

BNP*

Cons

Lab

LD

Nat. average

AB (professional/ managerial

30

22

44

36

43

39

C1 white-collar (clerical/ services)

27

23

28

29

29

28

C2DE (working class, other)

42

55

28

35

27

33

Left school 16

55

62

36

40

31

38

17-18

21

19

24

20

19

21

19 +

24

19

40

40

50

41

Male

57

64

49

49

47

50

Female

43

36

51

51

53

50

Under 35

12

20

24

28

32

26

35-54

31

41

32

38

33

34

55+

57

39

44

34

35

39

White

99.6

99.5

98.9

96.3

98.4

98.0

Non-white

0.4

0.5

1.1

3.7

1.6

2.0

Class

Education

Gender

Age

Ethnicity

* figures for 2007-2013 only

4.1. Social characteristics Table 2 shows the sociology of UKIP’s vote across the past decade and compares it with other UK parties. The underlying features of this electorate have been present for years, and the 2014 elections do not therefore signify some dramatic new breakthrough. It is apparent that the long-received view of the party as “Tories in exile” needs revising; perhaps inspired by the appearance and style of cadres such as Farage, Pearson or Bloom, people tend to think of the typical UKIP supporter as comfortably off, wearing a blazer, sipping gin and tonic in as Surrey 28

Source: Adapted from Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit., p. 153.

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golf club and lamenting the time when Britain was great before the foreigners took it over. This caricature does actually contain elements of truth, but the underlying hard core support of UKIP is much more plebeian. It consists of older white men, often unskilled workers with low educational qualifications, whose prospects seem progressively less good in a globalised economy where educational qualifications are increasingly the key to success. These “left-behind” (laissés pour compte) usually have conservative social instincts and are touchy about national identity, often having grown up in a pre-EEC Britain where people of different languages and colours were much less to be seen. They feel abandoned by mainstream parties. Such a social group is, if one uses odds ratios, far more likely to vote UKIP or even BNP than members of the qualified middle class. UKIP’s recent surge has actually come from a deepening of support from such people, not from the party’s reaching out to other social groups. The middle and upper groups remain harder to penetrate, though it should not be forgotten, in the excitement of discovering the plebeian core of the movement, that significant numbers of social groups AB and C1 do vote UKIP (some 2.16 million people in 2014, according to our calculations) and that few of these would consider themselves as terminal losers in the process of social and economic change. Perhaps these are the fringe UKIP voters, whom Ford et al. identified in earlier studies, who vote UKIP in a ‘secondary’ election and who tend to go back to the Tories in national contests29. Future research may look more closely at these groups and their relationship to UKIP, but it does seem that the ‘Thatcher coalition’ might be reviving under UKIP colours, having decided that Cameron’s Tories are no longer defending their priorities sufficiently well. 4.2. Political origins It is known that the UKIP core has been relatively small, thus many new supporters must have come from different party backgrounds. Not enough is known about long-term voting patterns, but Ford and Goodwin conclude that it is prudent to say that UKIP must have taken votes from all 3 main parties. Probably the Conservatives have lost the most but certainly during the Blair/Brown years, Labour voters began turning to UKIP. Since the advent of the coalition government, however, the Conservatives and Libdems seem to have leaked the most, the latter clearly losing their status as the protest party. If it is true that many of these Conservative defectors are working class, then it is worrying for Labour, as the authors remark, that Labour is not winning them over in sufficient numbers30. This probably reflects an anaemic Labour performance in opposition (to put it kindly); but it also suggests, given that the majority of the “left-behind” seem to stick with Labour (or abstain), that for committed UKIP voters ideology does matter. Such voters like a tidy world-view, where a number of causes for their misery are identified (globalisation, uncaring, corrupt or incompetent governing parties, immigrants, political correctness) and welded together into a narrative; the sol29 30

Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, David CUTTS, “Strategic Eurosceptics.and Polite Xenophobes : Support for UKIP at the 2009 European Parliament Election”, European Journal of Political Research, 51 (2), 2012, p. 204-34. For detailed analysis of Labour’s failure to engage with disenchanted former or potential supporters see Deborah MATTINSON, Talking to a Brick Wall: how New Labour stopped listening to the voter and why we need a new politics, London, Biteback, 2010.

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der for such welding is of course Europe. The EU becomes a proxy for all the causes of their woe. It is also important here to remember that eurosceptic voters do not vote exclusively for UKIP. Gottfried calculates that across Europe only 20% of sceptics vote for parties that can be described as primarily eurosceptic31. He further reckons that some 42% of British voters are eurosceptic (41% Tory, 31% Labour and 13.6% Libdem). His comparative study of 4 electorates in EU states is concerned with more general expressions of euroscepticism than those found merely in UKIP, but he does unearth some interesting evidence. Testing the correlations between eurosceptic opinion across his comparison, he finds class and education to be at best modest predictors of eurosceptic opinions; he also tests for variables such as reactions to immigration and trust in democracy and political parties in one’s own state. In general, the British come out much higher on the eurosceptic scale; whatever the variable tested (class, education, satisfaction with democracy), across whatever social group (upper middle class, middle class, workers), there are many more eurosceptics in Britain than elsewhere. This situation is particularly acute, however, in cultural variables. A massive 57% of UK sceptics see immigration as having bad effects on their culture (only 47% believe this of the national economy). At the same time, 48% of British sceptics reported no trust in parties and 37% only moderate trust; eurosceptic attitudes were embraced by 41% of those dissatisfied with the state of UK democracy, but also by a staggering 46% of those who were satisfied. All this suggests massive resentment of EU or foreign interference with British ways of doing politics and the British way of life. This is indeed an identity crisis, and it is worth trying to unpack briefly what these notions of a national identity, frequently evoked but seldom explored, might involve. Speaking in theoretical terms, it is generally accepted that the British nationstate grew on free-trade before building a huge empire and that this development led elites to see her future in global terms rather than continental32. After 1945, Atlanticist preferences developed, based on cultural affinities and calculations of power; this further militated against any pro-European feelings. From early on, moreover, organic intellectuals had embarked on the construction of a national identity33, which set a Protestant Britain with a strong civil society against its permanent rival, a Catholic centralised France. Such are the broad historical determinants of UK identity, which show up in some form whenever the topic is discussed. But at micro-level, so to speak, where individuals live out their identity more instinctively without theorising about it, there is a highly ideological, if not to say sentimental dimension to this identity; it is often evoked very well by journalists such as Freedland or Meek34. It tends to see the English (coterminous with British in this kind of mentality, which explains the increasing divorce between England and her periphery) as being separate and aloof from the rest; the symbol of this is 1940 when Britain was believed to have “stood 31 32 33 34

Glenn GOTTFRIED, Continental Drift: Understanding the Growth of Euroscepticism, London, IPPR Research Report, 2014, www.ippr.org/publications (4 August 2014), p. 8. David BAKER et al., “Euroscepticism in the British party system”, op.cit. Linda COLLEY, Britons: Forging the Nation, London, Pimlico, 2003, p. 1707-1837. Jonathan FREEDLAND, “Nigel Farage is the Captain Mainwaring of out time”, Guardian, 11 October 2014; James MEEK, “In Farageland”, London Review of Books, 36 (19), 9 October 2010, p. 5-10 ; Dominique REYNIÉ, Les nouveaux populismes, Paris, Fayard, Pluriel, 2013.

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alone” against Nazism. Anyone born in the 1940s or 50s will have been raised on an endless diet of films, books, newspapers and boys’ magazines which commend this British bravery, inevitably discreet and usually seen in officers rather than ordinary soldiers. This British mindset tends to think of the UK as somewhat superior. It has become increasingly passéiste in proportion as Britain’s role in the world has declined and tends to lament an older order of things where there was certainty and people knew their place (deference to one’s own superiors can coexist happily with a sense of superiority over “the other”). It resents otherness, which it sees as a challenge to the fixed order of things (cf. hysterical cries of “we want our country back”, as if the “foreigners” have stolen it). British media, at any rate the popular tabloids, repeat these tropes with a skill all of their own, crudely in the case of the Sun, more insidiously in the case of the Daily Mail, which targets a more middle-class audience. Many of the working classes and lower middle classes who are now feeling the pinch (and who may well have voted for Thatcher) are deeply imbued with this mindset. UKIP’s achievement has been to identify with it and find a way of talking about it that makes people feel comfortable. This it has done more easily than the established parties quite simply because if you have never been anywhere near office, it is quite easy to encourage resentments and perpetuate nostalgia, instead of telling voters that the world has changed and that there is no way back to the past. The hold of such ideology on people’s imaginations is extremely powerful and must be the ultimate explanation of why many struggling popular categories follow a party led by the rich whose policies will only make the rich get richer. Ideology can trump “objective” economic interest; children do throw their toys out of the pram.

5. Future possibilities In terms of opinion poll support, the party has consistently polled double figures since early 2012. Late in January 2015, Anthony Wells’ ongoing poll of polls had had UKIP between 14% and 18% for several weeks, compared with 30%-34% for Labour and 28% to 33% for the Tories35. Recent polls have assessed UKIP’s vote in the 2014 European elections and asked voters about their intentions for the 2015 general election36. It seems clear that 2014 UKIP voters certainly had Europe as a major driver of their vote (79%, much higher than any other party), as well as anger with other parties (over 60%). Yet on issues like who was the best leader, only 31% of the faithful cited Farage as a main reason for voting – a poor return for someone seen as charismatic, at least by sections of the media. A mere 34% wanted UKIP to win the 2015 general election. In other words, the protest character of the UKIP vote still seems strong. In sociological terms there seemed no significant changes either; the party took 27% of the total vote, but did much better among the older age cohorts (35% of the over 60s, compared with 13% of under 34s). If the 23% of categories ABC1 35 36

See ukpollingreport.co.uk/voting-intentions-2. YOUGOV, The Sun/The Times Survey Results, fieldwork done 20-21 May 2014. https://yougov. co.uk/opi. (4 June 2014); Lord Ashcroft POLLS, Post European Election Poll, 24 May 2014, lordashcroftpolls.com (4 August 2014).

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which it took seems high, it may well be the case that the C1s (lower white collars) form a high part of the total; amalgamated as they are with generally more affluent groups, it is hard to know their specific weight in the sample. Certainly among groups C2DE (skilled workers down to and including the unskilled) UKIP polled 33%. In geographical terms, the South East and South outside (multicultural) London remained strongest for the party, with signs of progress in the North (27%) but there was still a big shortfall in Scotland (13%). So far as previous voting patterns go, 39% of UKIP’s voters had voted Conservative (Ashcroft estimates this to be 52%!), as compared with 15% Labour and 18% Libdem. So far as predictions for the 2015 general election go, expert opinion remains divided. If Ashcroft’s polls (2014) suggest that the Conservatives are under the greatest threat, Steve Fisher (2014) suggests that the effect on Conservative/ Labour struggles in key seats would be broadly neutral. Marcus Roberts believes, however that Labour stands to lose most, basing his arguments on detailed studies of key seats rather than aggregate numbers across the electorate as a whole37. Rob Ford suggests that a recent rise in Green voting intentions could hurt Labour particularly in a number of key seats38. We shall find out soon but, whatever the outcome, UKIP has already achieved much.

6. UKIP’s political impact This ranges far beyond any electoral success that the party has achieved and may yet be seen as its major legacy. The mainstream parties have been directly impacted by the rise of UKIP, particularly the Conservatives and Labour. It is important to remember that both have had longstanding problems with Europe. British entry into the EEC was opposed by factions of both parties (Heath’s entry bill only passed with the support of pro-European Labourites led by Roy Jenkins). Wilson, on his return to government in 1974 had to hold a referendum on EEC membership the following year in order to keep his party together. Senior cabinet members (Benn, Shore) campaigned for the no. The yes won two to one, but divisions within both big parties were here to stay. Among the Tories in particular, the increase in young, ambitious but highly eurosceptic MPs has been sharp in recent years. Ever since the 1970s, both have tried to keep Europe off their internal agendas, fearing the fission that it can cause; every advance in European co-operation has been a dangerous exercise, requiring obfuscation, management skills and plain old-fashioned spin. The rise of UKIP has made it ever harder to continue managing European dossiers in this way. As popular discontent with ‘Europe’ (whatever people understand under this heading) continues to grow, the big parties have shifted their ground to try and head off the Eurosceptics; such ‘triangulation’ exercises inevitably can move only one way – towards the position of those whom one is trying to nullify. Cameron has thus conceded an in/out referendum to be held in 2017 if he is re-elected; UK voters will be asked to decide if the bagful of policy conces37 38

Marcus ROBERTS, Revolt on the Left: Labour’s UKIP Problem and how it can be overcome, op.cit., p. 8. Robert FORD, “How Green party surge threatens Labour’s election hopes”, Observer, 24 January 2015.

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sions that he expects to have won from the other 27 states in the meantime is good enough to justify Britain’s staying in. It is of course very difficult to know in any detail what he might try to obtain and what his likelihood of success is. Nor is it certain that other key member states will exert themselves hugely to keep Britain in; an index of exasperation with UK attitudes can be seen in the fact that a longstanding Anglophile such as Michel Rocard is now calling actively for brexit39. Less spectacularly, there has been a sharp anti-immigrant tone to Tory domestic policy, with moves to set targets for non-EU immigration (much to the discomfort of the medical and IT professions), deport illegals (nothing to do with the EU, but it sounds good) and to restrict access to benefits to EU nationals resident in the UK. Labour has moved also. Gordon Brown’s rhetoric about “British jobs for British workers” and his attempts to stimulate a revival of British patriotism (which, couched in a very Scottish accent, must sound odd to those in Southern England at whom they were mainly aimed) would also not have happened without UKIP. Miliband is currently trying to sound tough about immigration. The impression is of the major parties running along before an anti-immigrant tide of defensive nationalism on which UKIP surfs. There has been little attempt to argue positively and calmly about the pros and cons of immigration or of a free labour market. But part of the problem is that it is hard to argue with people who feel about these issues strongly and often angrily; it is easier to tickle people’s prejudices than to ask them to reason things out. To sum up on UKIP’s effect on the political system of Britain, one can only say that it has created huge uncertainty. Thanks to its growth, the outcome of the 2015 election seems impossible to predict; even if UKIP wins but a handful of seats, most experts would agree that a parliament with no clear majority is likely. But after that, all combinations seem possible, including the involvement of the Scottish nationalists, soaring in the polls after their strong showing in the independence referendum of September 2014. Polls suggest a ;landslide for the SNP in Scotland, with Labour losing perhaps 40 seats; this alone would probably put paid to any hope of their being the largest party, never mind having a majority. The worst result for friends of Europe would be a minority Tory government that depended on UKIP’s good will. Even if that were not the case, such a government would feel impelled to pursue an even more aggressive line against “Brussels” in the hope of winning over voters ahead of the election it would soon have to call. All this must remain pure speculation, however, until the results are known in May 2015. But it is certain that the old party duopoly in UK politics is finished for some time, if not forever. UKIP is not the only reason for this (the role of the greens and nationalists is important too) but it is arguably the main one.

Conclusion: the nature of UKIP Many academics who attempt to theorise parties such as UKIP use theories of different complexity. One method is to treat them as populist parties40; populism 39 40

Michel ROCARD, “A French message to Britain : get out of Europe before you wreck it”, Guardian, 6 June 2014. Dominique REYNIE, Les nouveaux populismes, op.cit.

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is a grab-bag concept which certainly captures the anti-elite discourse of such parties (yet mainstream parties are not averse to elite-bashing when it suits them) but which allows so many different types of party to be included as to be analytically useless. Another method is to adopt the left-right scale, which all academics end up doing even though they know, as Seiler remarks, that this tool is fundamentally unscientific41. If this option is taken, one is forced to set up a model “centre-right” or “moderate right” party, against which the newcomers can then be measured and given labels such as “far right”, “extreme right” or “radical right”. Do all these terms mean the same thing? And do such rough-and-ready labels really help us to understand the real nature of these parties? They may be used by their representatives in the EP to rule out potential partners when they are trying to form transnational groups because they are too “extreme” (though are the attitudes of most of those who vote for Marine Le Pen any more “extreme” than those who vote for Farage?). At best such labelling in left/right terms is a useful kind of shorthand, which may enable some practical problems to be solved, but it is some way short of a plausible theory for such parties42. We attempt therefore to situate UKIP in terms of classic party theory, particularly the work of Stein Rokkan which remains highly relevant. This type of theory often finds difficulty with parties of the so-called far right or radical right, or populists43; the origins of such parties cannot, it seems, be readily explained in terms of one of Rokkan’s major societal cleavages (owners/non-owners; Church/ state; centre/periphery and urban/rural). As regards UKIP in particular, the Church/state and urban/rural cleavages have only played minor roles in the development of the UK party system. Rokkanians might be tempted to try and use the class cleavage (haves against have-nots) as a starting point, particularly in view of the weight given by Rob Ford and his colleagues to class factors in their explanation of UKIP support. These authors do indeed canvass, albeit very tentatively, the possibility of a new cleavage opening up between the left-behind and a vast but undifferentiated “middle class”44. The rump of ageing working-class males, fearful for their economic future and feeling abandoned by their “natural” defenders, Labour, nowadays more interested in better-off social groups, might seem to call forth a party to represent them and their interests against the rest. Class considerations of this very basic type (we are a group with distinct interests, who is going to look after them?) are obviously important in determining partisan choice, as the history of any social-democratic party shows. But in the case of UKIP the class-cleavage explanation comes second to – and probably later than – an initial cleavage of centre/periphery type. This may seem surprising, not least given that the core of UKIP support probably remains in the South East, epicentre of UK financial capital and that the party has struggled in Scotland and until recently, the North and Wales. But we should not confuse peripherality with mere geography; the periphery is above all a state of mind. 41 42

43 44

Daniel-Louis SEILER, Clivages et familles politiques en Europe, Bruxelles, ULB, 2011, p. 71. For what it is worth, when asked to play the topographical game, UKIP resolutely refuses to place itself on the far right or indeed anywhere on the right! Its spokeswoman said that they were “centrists who stood for common-sense policies” (election evening special on BBC2 Newsnight 26 May 2014). Daniel-Louis SEILER, Clivages et familles politiques en Europe, op.cit., p. 251 ff. FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, op.cit., p. 159.

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Rokkan’s generalised model of socio-economic development sees the outer regions of states being quite violently affected by economic change. Such processes of change originate in the economic core of the country, usually around the capital; they set in motion the transformation of largely agricultural subsistence economies, introduce modern communications, mobility, literacy and capitalist working practices. The material effects of such transformation are huge, but the cultural effects even greater. Local customs, cultures and even languages are shaken up; a whole way of life is uprooted. The inhabitants of the periphery may view this as a sort of invasion, involving loss of identity, and visited on them from elsewhere. Politically they often fight back by creating ethno-regionalist parties. The core of the centre/periphery conflict remains, then, identity. Is it so very difficult to transpose this situation to UKIP’s legions of the leftbehind? They had a status (regular blue collar jobs), which is now threatened by competition from outside; they had an (English) identity, mostly developed, as Ford et al. remark, in a time before Britain joined the EEC and when delusions about her status in the world were even larger than they are today45. This identity now seems equally threatened by the presence of others, often multicultural and non-anglophone, whom they encounter daily in doctor’s surgeries, council houses and their children’s overcrowded schools. They feel a sense of loss and abandonment; their traditional defenders, Labour, have taken them for granted as they pursue the better-off down the paths of neo-liberalism. Above all they feel that all this is being done to them by others, from the outside; Brussels is a word which sums this up, but the feeling equally applies to the London-based elites with similar dark suits and identical discourse whom they see as doing Brussels’ bidding. They feel out of the picture, unable to control pressures from outside; it is perfectly possible to live in Essex or Luton, close by the centre of economic power, yet feel completely peripheral. Even the better-off ex-Conservatives who vote UKIP may share this feeling of marginality, as they struggle to come to terms with the fact that their nation-state, which they have always imagined free to decide for itself, finds itself bound into a system of multilateral decision-making where it no longer controls the outcome. All UKIP supporters long, in some way, for the past; but the past is the ultimate periphery.

LE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY: UN RASSEMBLEMENT DE LA PÉRIPHÉRIE? Le parti United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) est l´expression politique partisane la plus forte de positions eurosceptiques dans le Royaume-Uni. Ses racines en sont le conservatisme d´Enoch Powell. Ces derniers 20 ans, depuis la fin du « consensus permissif » sur l´Europe, il s´est renforcé de manière permanente. L´UKIP s´est transformé d´un parti minoritaire de protestation fixé sur un seul thème en une force politique à prendre au sérieux dans le système politique. Avec une direction fortement personnalisée et avec le soutien de donateurs mil45

Robert FORD, Mathew J. GOODWIN, David CUTTS, “Strategic Eurosceptics.and Polite Xenophobes : Support for UKIP at the 2009 European Parliament Election”, op.cit.

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lionnaires, ce parti a développé toute une série de thèmes programmatiques, semblables à ceux des droites néo-libérales, mais toujours couplé avec la raison d´être du parti, c´est à dire le retour à la pleine souveraineté britannique, qui ne peut être atteinte que par un Brexit (sortie du Royaume-Uni de l´UE). Le focus actuel sur l´immigration s´intègre parfaitement à cette thématique. A l´occasion des élections, le parti attire non seulement les classes moyennes vivant dans de bonnes conditions et jetant un regard rétrospectif sur la grandeur britannique passé, mais aussi de plus en plus les « laissés pour compte », la plupart des hommes blancs de la classe ouvrière ayant peur pour leur avenir. Sur la base de sa forte expression de l´identité nationale, et ceci malgré son orientation passéiste, l´UKIP attire des électeurs venant des trois partis établis. Bien que le système électoral le désavantage fortement, l´influence de l´UKIP est grande. Cameron fut ainsi poussé à tenir un référendum sur l´adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne à l´UE. D´autres partis ont aussi renforcé leurs positions anti-européennes et antiimmigration. Sur le plan de l´analyse théorique des partis, on peut interpréter la montée en puissance de l´UKIP comme une forme d´opposition entre une vaste périphérie inquiète et un centre de plus en plus puissant et riche

DIE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY: EIN ZUSAMMENRAFFEN DER PERIPHERE? Die United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) ist der stärkste parteipolitische Ausdruck euroskeptischer Haltungen im Vereinigten Königreich. Ihre Wurzeln liegen im Konservatismus eines Enoch Powell. In den 20 Jahren seit dem Ende des „permissiven Konsenses“ über Europa sind sie permanent gewachsen. UKIP hat sich dabei von einem auf ein einziges Thema fixierten Minderheitsprotest zu einer ernst zu nehmenden Kraft im Parteiensystem entwickelt. Unter einer stark personalisierten Führung und mit großzügiger Unterstützung von millionenschweren Spendern hat sie eine Reihe an programmatischen Themen entwickelt, ähnlich denen der neo-liberalen Rechten, aber immer verbunden mit der fundamentalen raison d’être der Partei, d.h., mit der vollen britischen Souveränität, die nur über den Brexit (den Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der EU) zurück gewonnen werden kann. Der jüngste Fokus auf die Immigration fügt sich nahtlos in diese Thematik. Bei Wahlen zieht die Partei nicht nur die in gesicherten Verhältnissen lebende Mittelschicht an, die sich nach der einstigen britischen Größe zurücksehnt, sondern zunehmend auch die „abgehängten“, meist weißen Männer aus der Arbeiterschicht, die sich um ihre Zukunft sorgen. Dank ihrer starken, wenn auch rückwärtsgewandten Form der nationalen Identität zieht sie Wähler aus allen drei etablierten Parteien an. Trotz der schweren Benachteiligung durch das Wahlsystem ist der Einfluss UKIPs stark. Cameron wurde zu dem Versprechen gedrängt, ein Referendum über die EU-Mitgliedschaft Großbritanniens abzuhalten. Auch andere Parteien haben ihre Europa- und antiimmigrationsfeindliche Haltung verschärft. Parteitheoretisch könnte man den Aufstieg der Partei als Ausdruck einer weitverbreiteten und besorgten Peripherie gegen ein immer mächtigeres und reiches Zentrum interpretieren.

Part 3

ANTI-EUROPEAN FORCES IN THE EEC FOUNDING STATES LES FORCES ANTI-EUROPÉENNES DANS LES ÉTATS FONDATEURS DE LA CEE ANTI-EUROPÄISCHE KRÄFTE IN DEN GRÜNDUNGSSTAATEN DER EG

THE FRONT NATIONAL AND THE POLITICS OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN FRANCE GILLES IVALDI The 2014 European elections have revealed the depth of voters’ discontent with the ruling socialist party (PS), while simultaneously showing growing Eurosceptic sentiments in France. Voters’ dissatisfaction has been predominantly reflected in the spike in electoral support for the populist radical right. The Front National (FN) topped the 2014 European ballot with 25% of the vote and 24 seats, eclipsing its 2009 EP election setback where it had polled 6.3%. In contrast, minor left-wing Eurosceptic parties made only marginal gains in the 2014 EU elections. The neocommunist alliance Front de Gauche received 6.6 % of the vote and 4 seats, while Lutte Ouvrière’s Trotskyites polled a mere 1.2%. To the right of the party system, the small neo-Gaullist Eurosceptic party Debout la République (DLR) garnered 3.8% but failed to win any seats. Looking at both the demand and supply-side of anti-EU party politics suggests that the FN has indeed become the main political vehicle for popular protest against the EU, which correlates also with its traditional role as populist anti-establishment force in the domestic arena of party competition in France. The Front National, Europe’s oldest far-right political party, was founded in 1972 to bring together various extreme right groups which included neo-fascists, Vichy nostalgics and former supporters of French Algeria such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party leader1. The FN is generally considered by scholars to be the prototype of the modern radical right party in Western Europe2. In the mid-1980s, the party pioneered a specific populist radical right political mobilization strategy combining nativism, authoritarianism, and anti-establishment populism3. The FN has been notorious for its politicization of immigration and law-and-order issues, which has created a specific electoral niche for the party. Welfare-chauvinist policies of “national preference” have been at the core of the FN’s ethno-pluralist agenda. Additionally, anti-establishment populism has been a key feature of the FN, allowing the party to appeal to disenfranchised and protest voters across all competitive arenas. For over 40 years, the party has virulently opposed France’s political “establishment” and vilipended “corrupt elites” or mainstream politicians – e.g. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s previous attacks on the so-called ‘gang of four’ referring to the main political parties –, while simultaneously claiming to speak for the ordinary people. Because of its far right legacy, the FN has been kept away from mainstream politics by a cordon sanitaire, whereby all other parties have refused to coalesce into alliances with the FN. 1 2 3

James SHIELDS, The extreme right in France: from Pétain to Le Pen, Routledge, 2007. Herbert KITSCHELT in collaboration with Anthony J. Mc Gann, Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 19; Cas MUDDE, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 41. Cas MUDDE, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe , op.cit.

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Ethno-nationalist policies are a cornerstone of the ideology of the FN, and they underpin the party’s rejection of the European integration process. As will be discussed, the current FN exemplifies “hard Euroscepticism” which is defined by Szczerbiak and Taggart as “a principled opposition to the EU and European integration”4. The FN’s position regarding the European project has traditionally revolved around the concept of a “Europe of Nations”, which clearly opposes the EU as a supranational entity, and whereby institutional cooperation can only take place between independent nation-states. During the 1990s, particularly in the post-Maastricht period, the FN took an even stronger negative stance against the allegedly “totalitarian regime” embodied by the EU and “Brussels’ bureaucracy”. Jean-Marie Le Pen would for instance describe the Maastricht Treaty as “a crime against France, perpetrated by ‘Eurofederasts’ and stateless bankers”5. The claim that France should withdraw from the European Union was central to the 2002 presidential manifesto. In 2005, the FN also supported the ‘No’ campaign in the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) referendum, warning French voters against the loss of sovereignty and urging them to “keep France”6. During the same period, the FN reinforced its status as principal anti-globalization force in French politics, too7. More recently, in the context of the global economic crisis, the FN has endorsed economic nationalism and protectionist policies, while maintaining its longstanding criticism of the EU and calling for a French exit from the Euro8. During the 2012 presidential campaign, Marine Le Pen dubbed the European Union “the Trojan horse of ultraliberal globalisation” while comparing it to the former USSR and vilipending the “European Soviet Union”. Turning to the electoral development of the FN, the party remained electorally irrelevant throughout the 1970s. It was not before 1984 that it experienced its first electoral breakthrough in the European elections where it received 11% of the national vote (see Table 1). Since the mid-1980s, the FN has established itself as a key player in French politics winning an average 10-18% of the vote in legislative and presidential elections. Support for the FN peaked in the 2002 presidential election where Jean-Marie Le Pen won an unexpected 16.9% of the vote and progressed to the second-round runoff against President Chirac who polled a spectacular 82% of the vote from a broad coalition of parties and voters across the political spectrum. The 2002 success in trompe l’oeil was followed by a series of electoral setbacks in the 2007 elections, which acted as powerful catalysts for party modernization and a change of party leadership.

4 5 6 7 8

Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Paul A. TAGGART, Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism vol. 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Le Monde, 3-4 May 1992. Paul HAINSWORTH, “France Says No: The 29 May 2005 Referendum on the European Constitution”, Parliamentary Affairs, 59 (1), 2006, p. 98-117. Andrej ZASLOVE, “Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an Anti-Globalization Movement”, Comparative European Politics, 6(2), 2008, p. 169189. Gilles IVALDI, “Towards the median economic crisis voter? The new leftist economic agenda of the Front National in France”, French Politics, Special Issue, forthcoming 2015.

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Table 1. FN National Electoral Results since 1973 Year

Election

% valid

Year

Election

% valid

1973

Legislative

0.5

1997

Legislative

14.9

1974

Presidential

0.7

1998

Regional

15.0

1978

Legislative

0.8

1999

European

5.7

1979

European

1.3

2002

Presidential

16.9

1981

Presidential

–

2002

Presidential(1)

17.8

1981

Legislative

0.3

2002

Legislative

11.3

1984

European

11.0

2004

Regional

14.7

1986

Legislative

9.6

2004

European

9.8

1986

Regional

9.6

2007

Presidential

10.4

1988

Presidential

14.4

2007

Legislative

4.3

1988

Legislative

9.7

2009

European

6.3

1989

European

11.7

2010

Regional

11.4

1992

Regional

13.7

2012

Presidential

17.9

1993

Legislative

12.4

2012

Legislative

13.6

1994

European

10.5

2014

European

25.0

1995

Presidential

15.0

2015

Departmental

25.2

First-round scores; (1) second-round runoff

In January 2011, Marine Le Pen replaced her father as party leader, setting a new agenda of party normalization. Her strategy of “de-demonization” aims predominantly at detoxifying the reputation of the FN as an extreme right party and to present a more amenable face of the FN. As part of this strategy, Marine Le Pen has toned down the party’s rhetoric and severed its ties with some of the most radical nationalist groups around her party. Overall, the FN has been striving to convey a message of moderation to the French public, but there is little evidence of more substantial changes to its ideology, culture, and party system status9. The 2012 manifesto illustrates in particular the persistence of nativist, authoritarian, and populist policies which are characteristic of the radical right10. However, Marine Le Pen has been successful in presenting a softer packaging for her party in the media. Public opinion surveys show that the FN is less perceived as a threat to French democracy, while support of the party’s ideas has grown to about a third of the French population. The electoral revitalization of the FN suggests that de-demonization has allowed the radical right to broaden its support base, setting new historical records in the 2012 presidential and 2014 European elections with 17.9 and 25 per cent of the vote, respectively. The municipal elections of March 2014 showed substantial gains for the FN, with a total of 11 cities with more than 1,000 inhabitants, and over 1,500 municipal 9 10

James SHIELDS, “Marine Le Pen and the ‘New’ FN: A Change of Style or of Substance?”, Parliamentary Affairs 66(1), 2013, p. 179-196; Sylvain CRÉPON, Nonna MAYER, Alexandre DÉZÉ (éd.), Front National : un parti en transition ?, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, forthcoming 2015. Gilles IVALDI, Andrej ZASLOVE, “L’Europe des populismes : confluences et diversité”, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, 53(1/2), 2015, p. 121-155.

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councillors across the country, allowing the party to win two seats in the September 2014 senatorial elections. This success was reiterated in the 2015 departmental elections. In March 2015, the FN demonstrated the strongest presence of all French parties by running candidates in more than 90% of the cantons and totalling an impressive 25.2% of the first-round vote nationally. Current presidential voting intention polls also suggest that Marine Le Pen could win about 30% of the first-round vote and up to 45% in the runoff 11.

1. The 2014 European Election Campaign On European election night, Marine Le Pen began her victory speech by saying: “the sovereign people have proclaimed loud and clear (…) that they want to take back their destiny into their own hands (…) We must build another Europe, a Europe of free and sovereign nations and freely decided cooperation. Tonight is a massive rejection of the European Union (…) To all those French who voted for us, I say that the battle for the greatness of France should unite us in the rediscovered love of our country”12. The 2014 European election campaign of the FN had indeed urged French voters to say “no to Brussels, yes to France”, while portraying the FN as “France’s number one party” following opinion polls that showed the FN emerging as the leading party in the EP election. The deterioration in the socioeconomic situation and deep voters’ discontent with the ruling socialist party provided a very auspicious context for the populist radical right’s anti-party politics and its political mobilization of socio-economic fears among the public. Economic nationalism, xenophobia and anti-establishment populism were at the very core of the FN’s Europhobic appeal in the Europeans, reiterating and accentuating the party’s 2012 anti-EU strategy. The array of economic, cultural and political concerns which underpinned FN Euroscepticism was well in evidence in the party’s 2014 election material: “Today, Marine Le Pen wrote, France is at a crossroads. Either she becomes once more a great country that is free, independent, safe, prosperous and proud of its history and ready to fight for its future and that of its children. Or it disappears in a Europeist magma, multicultural, without influence of power, undermined by economic precariousness and dislocated by a savage globalisation of which the European Union is only the first step (…) Unemployment, social regression, injustices, the loss of our values, uncontrolled immigration are not inevitable but the result of political choices that we can oppose, that we must oppose. France has still a future and she needs you. On 25 May, say Yes to France!”13. Economic nationalism and anti-austerity policies were cornerstones of the party’s platform which predominantly featured the FN’s promise to shed the 11 12 13

Source: IFOP-Marianne, 29 January 2015 (http://www.marianne.net/choc-marine-le-pen30.html (20 March 2015). See http://www.marinelepen.fr/2014/05/europeennes-2014-declaration-de-marine-le-pen/ (20 March 2015 http://www.fn31.fr/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/profession-de-foi-de-louis-aliot-candidat -de-leuro-circonscription-sud-ouest-europeennes-france-mai-2014.pdf (3 April 2015).

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Euro and to return to the national currency. The FN portrayed the Euro as an “anomaly” and a “jail” serving the “sole interests of bankers and the wealthy”, and from which the French people “should free themselves”. The party pledged that it would “regulate the banking system” and oppose austerity packages which “hurt the lower and middle classes” and which “have led to a continuous increase in taxes, destroying our system of social welfare”. The FN advocated that all EU bailout plans should be immediately stopped, alleging that they had already cost the French 70 Bn Euros, thereby increasing the country’s public debt. In addition, the FN professed that it would renationalise the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in order to augment financial aid to French farmers, to introduce new taxes on foreign agricultural products and to enforce national state control over food prices whenever deemed necessary. Protectionist policies and ‘economic patriotism’ were placed high on the FN agenda which pledged to fight “unfair economic competition” internationally and to end free trade agreements with the United States, which were incorporated in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The FN’s European campaign was marked by the continuation of xenophobia and welfare-chauvinism, showing no significant departure from the party’s traditional ethno-pluralist ideology. The FN committed to “defending, in all circumstances, France’s values, identity, traditions and way of life” against the alleged “excesses of Brussels’ technocrats” and what would be stigmatized as a “sieve Europe”. In particular, the party’s 2014 platform lashed out at the Schengen agreement, campaigning on withdrawal, and claiming that the FN would close France’s borders to “stop uncontrolled immigration and put an end to the free movement of Roma and delinquents across Europe”. Welfare-chauvinist positions surfaced in the FN’s pledge to end the Posting of Workers Directive in order to stop the “massive flow of cheap foreign labour” into the country. In line with its 2012 manifesto, the FN also proposed policies which would remove the possibility within French law to regularize illegal migrants. Finally, the FN political mobilization strategy resorted to fervent antiestablishment populism, which aimed at capitalizing electorally on the growing voters’ dissatisfaction with both left and right mainstream parties. During the campaign, the FN repeatedly antagonized the protagonists of the so-called “UMPS caste” – i.e. the conflation of the acronyms of the two main centre right (UMP) and centre left (PS) parties in France –, depicting them as “serial liars” unable to deliver on “their promises of a more protective and more social Europe”. As suggested by Schedler, anti-political-establishment strategies such as those employed by the FN contrapose the political elite against citizens, on the one hand, and against themselves, on the other hand, which feeds anti-party sentiments in the public and helps mobilize against the political establishment as a whole14. In the European arena of party competition, this triangular framing of politics by the French populist radical right symbolically constructs a homogeneous patrician elite encompassing national parties of the mainstream, EU institutions and representatives as well as global economic actors. This elite is placed in direct opposition to the people and the common citizen. Echoing the aggressive and confrontational political message of Marine Le Pen’s 2012 presidential bid, 14

Andreas SCHEDLER, “Anti-Political-Establishment Parties”, Party Politics 2(3), 1996, p. 291-312.

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the 2014 campaign reactivated the party’s appeal to the so-called “silent constituency” at the “bottom of society” (La France d’en-bas), consisting of all the “little people” who are being ignored by mainstream parties. In FN parlance, all the “powerful and representatives of the dominant ‘globalist’ (mondialiste) ideology – i.e. politicians, the European Commission, financial markets, companies of the CAC 40, the ‘super wealthy’ or ‘loutish businessmen’– were blamed for conspiring against the interests of France’s ‘invisible’ –jumbling together “workers, farmers, students, pensioners, shopkeepers, civil servants or employees”. The above overview of the FN campaign suggests that there has been a certain convergence in the socio-economic appeal of the populist radical right and the radical left in France. In the 2014 European elections, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s Front de Gauche (FG) for instance opposed the “ultraliberal” programme of the EU and the “barbaric austerity plans” imposed by the Troika since the outbreak of the financial crisis15. The FG pledged that it would push for a European minimum wage, massive public investment at EU level, and a financial transaction tax. The neo-communists also rejected both the free trade agreements with America of the TTIP and the EU directive on posted workers, although the positions of the FG would refer to social justice and the rights of workers exclusively, and were clearly not xenophobic. Additionally, the EU policy preferences of the two parties were crucially divergent: Despite fierce criticism of the ECB and the Euro, the FG did not explicitly push for leaving the Eurozone but rather called for a drastic change in European monetary and fiscal policy orientation. A degree of similitude was also visible to the right of the party system, most evidently in Nicolas Dupont-Aignan’s neo-gaullist DLR: It joined the FN in advocating a return to France’s national borders and currency while building political connexions with Nigel Farage’s UKIP in the UK. Convergence was also perceptible, albeit to a lesser degree, in the turnaround of the main right-wing opposition party, the UMP, vis-à-vis border control and the possibility that France could withdraw from the Schengen agreement to regain control of its immigration policies16. In the lead up to the 2014 European elections, Nicolas Sarkozy clearly mimicked the FN’s position: “Schengen, he said, must be suspended immediately (…) to put an end to administrative abuses that allow foreigners to enter the Schengen area, and once in, choose where the best social benefit schemes are (…) If we do not quickly react in the coming years, our social pact will explode”17. This reflected previous centrifugal policy shifts by the UMP. Nicolas Sarkozy had already steered his 2012 presidential bid to the right to absorb the cultural agenda of the FN. A first significant move had been apparent in the notorious Grenoble Speech of August 2010, which had been subsequently corroborated by Sarkozy’s positioning in the 2012 elections. The UMP’s presidential campaign had indicated a clear shift of the party’s issue agenda emphasizing immigration, Islam, and national identity issues18.

15 16 17 18

See https://www.lepartidegauche.fr/system/documents/texte_FdG_final1.pdf (3 April 2015). See http://www.lepoint.fr/europeennes-2014/exclusif-nicolas-sarkozy-s-exprime-dans-lepoint-21-05-2014-1826581_2095.php (20 March 2015). Ibid. Jocelyn EVANS, Gilles IVALDI, The 2012 French Presidential Elections. The Inevitable Alternation, Palgrave MacMillan, French Politics, Society and Culture Series, 2013, p. 106.

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2. The Front National in the 2014 European Elections The Front National scored a historic victory and emerged at the top winning 25% of the vote in the 2014 European elections in France. This represented the highest European score for the FN in its electoral history and a particularly notable performance in an electoral arena which had been less favourable to the populist radical right in the past19. The FN garnered a total 4.7 million votes, which represented a 34% increase of its vote share in the 2012 legislatives and an estimated 1.8 million new voters. The party topped the European ballot in five of the eight regional constituencies and 71 out of 96 metropolitan departments, showing significant gains across all regions with scores above 30% in its heartlands of the South and North-East (see Table 2). The list led by Marine Le Pen achieved the party’s best performance in the North-West with over one-third (33.6 per cent) of the vote, receiving an impressive 53.5% in the FN-controlled northern city of Hénin-Beaumont. Table 2. 2014 European Vote for the FN by Regional Constituency Region

Registered

Valid

FN

North West

6 601 676

2 719 153

913 925

% FN 33,6

West

6 353 676

2 725 079

526 002

19,3

East

5 882 243

2 428 600

703 363

29,0

South-West

6 482 664

2 941 083

726 782

24,7

South-East

7 981 771

3 318 163

934 998

28,2

Massif Central-Centre

3 370 832

1 472 743

356 065

24,2

Ile-de-France/FE

8 100 022

3 065 594

520 985

17,0

Overseas Territories

1 782 369

285 221

29 219

10,2

Total

46 555 253

18 955 636

4 711 339

24,9

Source: Ministry of the Interior

According to opinion polls20, the FN made significant gains from the differential turnout in 2014, mobilizing an estimated 54% of its 2012 pool of voters, compared with 49% and 47% of the PS and UMP respectively (CSA). FN results attest to the consolidation of the party’s support base, too: no less than 93 per cent of Marine Le Pen’s 2012 presidential supporters who participated in the EP elections stayed with the FN in May 2014, by far the highest level of voter loyalty across all French parties –comparable figures were 52 and 58% for former PS and UMP voters respectively. Moreover, polls indicate that about half of Marine Le Pen’s 2012 voters did not turn out in the 2014 EP elections. This provides the FN with a

19 20

The FN has traditionally underperformed in European elections, securing on average about 70 per cent of its previous legislative vote share and less than 40 per cent of its presidential support. In this chapter, we use exit-poll surveys by IPSOS, CSA and IFOP: http://www.ipsos.fr/ decrypter-societe/2014-05-25-europeennes-2014-comprendre-vote-francais; http://www.csa.eu/multimedia/data/sondages/data2014/opi20140526-note-d-analyse-csadecrypte-la-mecanique-du-front.pdf; http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2670-1-study_file. pdf (2 April 2015).

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potentially much larger reservoir of votes in future national elections and confirming the stabilization of FN support across all arenas of electoral competition. The socio-demographic makeup of the FN constituency is characteristic of the economic hardship electorate which had already supported Marine Le Pen’s presidential bid in 2012. The FN success corroborates the radical right’s appeal to globalization “losers” who have been most severely hit by the economic recession and who have been politically alienated by left-wing parties. In the 2014 EP elections, the FN’s largest gains were found amongst voters with lower skills, assets, and education, accentuating the trend in working class electoral dealignment that has been visible since the mid-1990s21. According to IPSOS, the FN received 43% of the working class vote, while polling 38% in the lower income groups and 37% among job seekers, as opposed to only 9% among professionals and managers. However, this continuing level of social polarization of the FN electorate should not conceal that the party has won substantial support across a wider section of French voters in 2014. As discussed earlier, the party has redefined its programmatic appeal since 2012, gearing to the interests of a broader electorate. This has rendered its support base more diversified socially. The 2014 FN electorate showed a net rebalancing towards the petty-bourgeoisie which had deserted the ranks of the FN since 2007: In the Europeans, the populist radical right received 26% of the vote among craftsmen and shopkeepers, beating the conservative right runner-up (CSA). Looking at age, the FN certainly performed better considering the youth vote. According to IPSOS, it garnered 30% among voters younger than 35. Furthermore, the party managed a critical mass of support across most age groups, with the notable exception of those aged 60+. This distribution of the FN vote across age categories also reflects differential support for the populist radical right in the economically active population: The CSA poll suggests that the FN received over 30% of the vote among active workers as opposed to 16 % among retirees. Lastly, the party won an equal share of the vote of men and women. This fact confirms the erosion of the traditional radical right gender gap in France while reflecting the recent FN inroads to the “new service proletariat” which is predominantly female and in which women often suffer from a disadvantaged class position22. The FN electoral geography illustrates the gains the party made in the former industrial bastions of the French Left in the North and East, while maintaining its historical strongholds in the Mediterranean South. These areas are marked by high unemployment and pervasive poverty. However, the FN has nationalised its presence, winning between a fifth and a quarter of the vote in the traditionally weaker Centre and Western regions of the country where it had previously failed to achieve significant support. At the sub-national level, the geography of the FN support has shown a clear move from urban to distant peri-urban areas since the early 2000s23. In 2014, Marine Le Pen’s party continued to settle in 21 22 23

Florent GOUGOU, Nonna MAYER, “The Class Basis of Extreme Right Voting in France: Generational Replacement and the Rise of New Cultural Issues (1984-2007)”, in: J. RYDGREN (ed.), Class Politics and the Radical Right, Londres, Routledge, 2013, p. 156-172. Nonna MAYER, “From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: electoral change on the Far Right”, Parliamentary Affairs, 66(1), 2013, p. 160-78. Jérôme FOURQUET, Le sens des cartes. Analyse de la géographie des votes à la présidentielle, Essais, Fondation Jean Jaurès, 2012.

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more rural and ex-urban peripheries away from gentrified city centres, reflecting the spatial distribution of low income lower middle and working class voters. This pattern was observable in the 2012 presidential elections and it became clearly more pronounced in the 2014 EP elections (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Average FN scores in 2012 and 2014 according to distance from main city

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/jerome-fourquet/analyse-front-national-europeennes_b_5443344.html

In many respects, the 2014 French European election fits the “second-order” model popularized by Reif and Schmitt in the early 1980s. In their seminal study, they argue that EP elections are “additional national second-order elections [and that] they are determined more by the domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC”24. Second-order elections typically feature lower turnout rates, a rise in support for smaller parties outside the mainstream, and the electoral punishment of parties in government. Voter turnout has constantly fallen in every EU election since the late 1970s, from 60.7% in the first election in 1979 down to less than half of the electorate since 1999. Participation remained very low in the 2014 French European election at 42.4%, compared with 40.6% in 2009. In the 2012 presidential ballot, the turnout was as high as 79.5%. In the context of the economic crisis and rising unemployment in France, the results of the EP ballot showed strong discontent with the governing Socialists, with the president's low popularity ranging in the 1520% in public opinion polls, and the PS receiving about 14 per cent of the EP vote, the party’s lowest performance ever. According to IPSOS, the vast majority (69%) of voters who turned to the FN did so in order to express dissatisfaction with the PS’s poor economic record and failure to curb unemployment, which compared for instance with 47% of UMP supporters and only 13% of the Front de Gauche. Domestic issues topped the electoral agenda of more than 70 per cent of the FN voters, while another 67 per cent said they mostly wanted to ‘punish’ President Hollande, compared with 52% and 33% among UMP and Front de Gauche 24

Karlheinz REIF, Hermann SCHMITT, “Nine second-order national elections – a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results”, European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 1980, p. 3.

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supporters respectively (IFOP). Anti-establishment attitudes were predominant among FN voters, reflecting also the continuing internal crisis and the many political scandals that had affected the main right-wing opposition party since 2012. Despite a propitious political context, the UMP won a mere 20.8 per cent of the vote as opposed to 27.9 per cent in 2009. The FN cultural agenda topped the European elections: Immigration surged as the most salient issue topping purchasing power and unemployment, with about a third (31%) of the French voters citing immigration as their top concern at the time of voting (IPSOS). Mentions of the issue were significantly higher among FN (64%) and UMP voters (42%), whereas unemployment and peace in Europe dominated the agenda of PS supporters.

3. The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in France While the economic and political situation was certainly conducive to the FN success in the European election, the electoral consolidation of the populist radical right reflected also significant shifts of public attitudes towards the EU in France. As argued by Almeida, European integration is a potential catalyser of political dissent providing powerful issues to populist radical right parties to compete on25. The recent period has seen a decline in levels of support for the European Union in the French public. In May 2014, only 51% of the French said the EU membership was a “good thing” compared with 67% ten years earlier (CSA). The global financial and economic crisis has certainly increased public economic pessimism about the future of European integration, and it has triggered scepticism about the EU’s capacity to protect its citizens from the consequences of recession. In the 2014 EP elections, half (51%) of the French said that “France’s EU membership had aggravated the effects of the economic crisis” –a sentiment culminating at 83% among FN voters–, while only 27% said that it had acted as a protection (IPSOS). Since the outbreak of the global crisis, the nationalist policies of the FN have also resonated with widespread globalization fears in the French electorate. As Meunier suggests, the French have traditionally regarded economic globalization as a threat to their model of social welfare26. In 2005, the ECT referendum campaign had revealed the depth of negative attitudes towards the internationalisation of the French economy27. This connotation was clearly accentuated by the financial crisis. An IPSOS poll 28 conducted a few months before the 2014 EP elections indicated the persistence of high levels of pessimism towards globalization among the French. Over two thirds (68%) said that France’s cultural influence in the world had declined over the past ten years, while an overwhelming 90% also 25 26 27 28

Dimitri ALMEIDA, “Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 11(3), 2010, p. 237-253. Sophie MEUNIER, “Globalization and Europeanization: A Challenge to French Politics”, French Politics, 22(2), 2004, p. 125–150. Gilles IVALDI, “Beyond France’s 2005 Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty : Second-Order Model, Anti-Establishment Attitudes and the End of the Alternative European Utopia”, West European Politics, 29(1), 2006, p. 47-69. http://www.ipsos.fr/decrypter-societe/2014-01-21-nouvelles-fractures-francaises-resultatset-analyse-l-enquete-ipsos-steria (9 April 2015).

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perceived a loss of the country’s economic power. Moreover, the survey showed that economic globalization was considered a “threat to France” by 61% of the French, while another 58% said that the “country should protect itself more in today’s world”. National identity fears were perceptible in mass attitudes towards immigration: the vast majority of the French revealed negative opinions about Islam saying it was “incompatible with the values of French society” (63%), while another two-thirds (66%) would adhere to the claim that “there were too many foreigners in the country”. Amidst economic and cultural anxieties, France’s growing disenchantment with the EU also concerns mass-elite linkages, the institutional arrangements, and what is perceived as the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU. In terms of Sørensen’s typology of public opinion Euroscepticism, current Euroscepticism in France has a strong “democratic” aspect. It centres on what is considered the “inadequate structures of the existent political ‘set-up’” of the EU and the perceived distance of EU institutions from European citizens29. The magnitude of democratic Euroscepticism was revealed in surveys conducted during the 2014 elections: according to 54% of the French, “European institutions were insufficiently democratic”. Public feelings that the voice of citizens was not being heard and that the divide between the EU and its citizen had become wider were also pervasive: No less than 82% of French voters said that “EU institutions were out of touch with the daily life concerns of the citizens”, while another 71% complained that “the EU was too busy making useless fussy regulations” (CSA). On the other hand, polls showed the permanence of a majority in France supporting EU membership and the Euro, which attested to the presence of a diffuse political dissensus rather than a principled opposition to the EU. Criticism of EU governance has not yet translated into any significant alteration of the core public support for the project of European integration. Only 28 and 30% of French voters would want EU and Eurozone exits respectively (CSA), suggesting that a substantial majority of the French continue to adhere to European integration and to support France’s membership. The presence of economic, cultural, and democratic Euroscepticism in France substantiates the claim that Europeanization and globalization have produced a division between an “outward” and an “inward-looking society” in France30. Moreover, the French case corroborates the theoretical argument by Kriesi et al that immigration, European integration, and globalization are three cultural, political, and economic facets of a same process of “denationalization” which has the potential for a new structural conflict between integration and demarcation, opposing winners and losers of those competitive processes31. While the former support the opening of borders, the latter are likely to consti29 30 31

Catharina SØRENSEN, “Love Me, Love Me Not: A Typology of Public Euroscepticism”, EPERN Working Paper, 19, 2008, Guildford: European Parties Elections and Referendums Network, p. 8. Pascal PERRINEAU (éd.) (2001) Les croisés de la société fermée : l’Europe des extrêmes droites, La Tour-d’Aigues, Éditions de l'Aube, 2001. Hanspeter KRIESI, Edgar GRANDE, Romain LACHAT, Martin DOLEZAL, Simon BORNSCHIER, Timotheos FREY, “Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: six European countries compared”, European Journal of Political Research, 45(6), 2006, p. 921–956; Hanspeter KRIESI, Edgar GRANDE, Romain LACHAT, Martin DOLEZAL, Simon BORNSCHIER, Timotheos FREY (eds), West European Politics in the Age of Globalization, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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tute the core support of nationalist parties like the FN. As previously suggested, the FN has articulated a typical agenda of “demarcation” which mixes economically left-wing protectionist anti-globalization policies with exclusionist antiimmigration and anti-EU positions. This allows the party to occupy a specific competitive location within the French party system and to further consolidate its appeal to the lower social strata of the electorate, which are most vulnerable to the current economic crisis and, more generally, to the consequences of globalization. With regard to the EU, the FN clearly expresses “hard Euroscepticism” which, according to Taggart and Szczerbiak, refers to “a principled opposition to the EU”, whereby parties reject the entire project of European integration and call for withdrawal32. Looking at other available classifications of parties, the strident anti-EU position taken by the FN since the early 2000s also embodies the ‘Euroreject’ category produced by Kopecky and Mudde33. This distinguishes the FN from other critiques of the EU within the French party system, which, with the exception of Debout La République, can be characterized as taking predominantly “soft” Eurosceptic positions, that is a “qualified opposition to the EU” concerning specific policy areas or the EU’s trajectory. In the case of the French FN, hard Eurosceptic positions are embedded in the party’s populist radical right profile. According to Mudde, populist radical right parties are characterized by their rejection of fundamental liberal democratic values such as political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities34. These parties’ “illiberal politics” challenge the existing political status quo and contest universal values of freedom, non-discrimination, equality, and tolerance which are core principles of the EU 35. An examination of FN manifestos since 2002 shows the permanence of a stable radical right agenda –including some of the party’s historical policies such as the repatriation of all illegal immigrants or the reinstating of death penalty36. The FN opposes minority rights, calling for an end to legal immigration, a drastic reduction in asylum and the suppression of family reunion rights for migrants. The party’s ethno-pluralist agenda features “national preference” in the allocation of welfare, anti-Islam positions, and the fight against alleged “anti-French racism” and “communitarianism” in France. Recently, the FN has expressed its ideological support for Putin’s autocratic regime in Russia, and there have been revelations of a loan to the party from a bank with links with the Kremlin37. As suggested by Taggart, Euroscepticism is usually found in parties outside of the mainstream, concentrated particularly in anti-establishment actors on the 32 33 34 35 36

37

Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Paul A. TAGGART, Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, op.cit. Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe”, European Union Politics, 3(3), 2002, p. 297-326. Cas MUDDE, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe , op.cit., p. 250. Catherine FIESCHI, “European institutions: the far-right and illiberal politics in a liberal context” Parliamentary Affairs, 53(3), 2000, p. 517-531. Gilles IVALDI, “A new course for the French radical-right? The Front National and dedemonization” in Tjitske AKKERMAN, Sarah DE LANGE, Matthijs ROODUIJN (eds), Up to the mainstream? Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in the New Millennium, Routledge, forthcoming 2015. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/02/18/europes-farright-still-loves-putin/ (20 March 2015).

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extreme left and right38. They share their opposition to European integration as a political “elite-driven” project. Ray confirms that Euroscepticism is primarily a fringe phenomenon39. However, in recent years, EU-critical rhetoric has increasingly permeated mainstream actors in French politics which in return has fed popular resentment against the EU40. Parties of the mainstream, most obviously the PS, have demonstrated a continuing fragmentation over European issues. A brief glance at the structure and dynamics of party competition on Europe in France suggests the persistence of the “double-talk” of Europeanization among French elites. “Scapegoating” the EU has recently occurred in major parties of the left and right. During the 2012 campaign, Hollande was criticized for instance for his vague promises to renegotiate the December 2011 Euro deal while claiming that he would wage a war on finances and would moralise international capitalism. Similarly, Sarkozy adopted a protectionist stance during the presidential campaign, most notably criticizing the EU for its free-trade agenda and threatening to withdraw France from Schengen. The predominance of “soft” Euroscepticism is best exemplified by the Front de Gauche, which represents the main Eurosceptic force on the left in French politics. According to the FG, the current development of the EU is problematic inasmuch as it places too much emphasis on economic liberalization, welfare retrenchment, and fiscal orthodoxy. Criticizing the capitalist orientation of the European integration helps the FG revive the old “reformist” versus “radical” divide within the French left, which serves also as a device for strategic differentiation in domestic politics. The FG’s position was exemplified by the party’s vote against the European Fiscal Compact in October 2012. Whilst stigmatizing EU austerity policies and the financial “dogma” of the ECB, neither the PCF nor Mélenchon’s Parti de Gauche, together forming the FG, would call for a Eurozone exit, though, the latter being only envisaged as a remote possibility in the long term. The variation in the supply-side of Eurosceptic parties is reflected in the demand-side of those parties. Supporters of the FG and the FN share similar attitudes with regards to the current management of the EU. But they differ significantly with regards to the benefits of EU membership. According to IFOP, 78 and 84% of FG and FN 2014 EP election voters respectively said that “they disapproved the way in which the EU is currently run” compared with an average 41% in mainstream parties. Turning to ‘hard’ Eurosceptic positions, on the other hand, reveals substantial differences in mass attitudes of the radical left and right’s electorates, as indicated in levels of support of EU membership and Eurozone exit (see Figure 2).

38 39 40

Paul A. TAGGART, “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems”, European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), 1998, p. 363-88. Leonard RAY, “Mainstream Euroskepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?” Acta Politica, 42(2/3), 2007, p. 153-172. Liesbet HOOGHE, Gary MARKS, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus”, British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 2009, p. 1-23.

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Figure 2. ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic Attitudes among French voters in the 2014 EP elections.

Source: IPSOS poll (http://www.ipsos.fr/decrypter-societe/2014-05-25-europeennes-2014comprendre-vote-francais).

As Figure 2 indicates, a majority of FN voters (58%) said that EU membership was a ‘bad thing’ compared with only 14% of the FG supporters. Similarly, only a fifth (21%) of radical left voters would support a Eurozone exit as opposed to two thirds (66%) of radical right voters. The French case is corroborated by studies of Euroscepticism at the European level. The recent cross-national examination of populist parties in France, Italy, Germany and Austria in the 2014 European elections by Ivaldi and Zaslove suggests that Euroscepticism has only a marginal effect on the support of left wing populist parties while it shows a strong impact on right wing populist voting, in relation to cultural conservatism, anti-globalization, and economic protectionism41. Finally, the FN seems to have channelled most of the Eurosceptic vote in 2014. This was demonstrated by the relative failure and marginalization of other Eurosceptic actors of both the left and right. As can be seen from Table 3, the size of the Eurosceptic vote in toto has varied over time, averaging about 35% across a relatively stable six to eight parties since 1994. These included far left actors such as Lutte Ouvière, the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR/NPA) and the Communist party (PCF) as well as a number of splinter groups which emerged from parties of the mainstream during the Maastricht referendum campaign, i.e. JeanPierre Chevènement’s Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) or Philippe de Villiers’ Mouvement pour la France (MPF). Whilst representing less than a third of the Eurosceptic vote over the past two decades, the FN has won more than two thirds (66.7%) in the 2014 EP elections, achieving a hegemonic position within the Eurosceptic pole of French politics.

41

Gilles IVALDI, Andrej ZASLOVE, “L’Europe des populismes : confluences et diversité”, op.cit.

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Table 3. Total Size and FN Share of the Eurosceptic Vote in France since 1994 Total Eurosceptic vote in %

Number of parties

FN vote in %

FN share in %

1994

38,95

7

10,52

27,0

1999

40,78

6

5,70

14,0

2004

29,43

8

9,81

33,3

2009

25,98

7

6,47

24,9

37,26

6

24,86

66,7

Year(1)

2014 (1) European elections

Conclusion The 2014 European elections confirmed the FN’s status as a major political force in the French party system. Marine Le Pen’s party consolidated and diversified its support base. It also reinforced its role as the principal anti-EU force in French politics, channelling most of the Eurosceptic vote in 2014. The FN has fashioned a powerful demarcation agenda combining economically left-wing protectionist policies with xenophobic, ethno-pluralist, and anti-EU positions. The party occupies a specific place in the competitive space drawing a sizeable constituency of voters who feel threatened by the cultural, economic, and political consequences of the de-nationalization process. The French FN exemplifies the hard Eurosceptic party, rejecting the project of European integration and calling for France’s withdrawal from the EU. The party’s anti-EU positions are incorporated into a typical populist radical right agenda which challenges the fundamental liberal and universalist values of the European Union. Amid growing voters’ discontent with the ruling parties, France has seen a drop in support for the European project since the outbreak of the financial crisis. Declining faith in the EU has been concomitant with the intensification of cultural and economic fears of globalization. While a large majority of the French continue to support European integration, the gap between the EU and its citizens seems to have widened in the current economic crisis, producing a favourable structure of opportunity for Eurosceptic actors such as the FN. The latter has been successful in mobilizing voters who feel that their voice is no longer being heard by the political elite, both national and European. Despite significant gains by a number of populist actors across the continent, the anticipated far right “earthquake” did not materialize in the 2014 EP elections. Marine Le Pen’s and her potential allies’ failure of the European Alliance for Freedom to create a pan-European federation of nationalist anti-EU parties will continue to isolate the FN within the European institutions. This will give the populist radical right coalition little effective power or political impact on substantive EU policies. At the national level, on the other hand, the FN will continue to exert a major agenda-setting and nuisance role. The FN is set to accentuate its presence in the party system and could possibly disrupt the traditional bipolarity of presidential politics in 2017. A persistent populist radical right will

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continue to stir up anti-EU sentiments in the French public, thereby undermining both EU legitimacy and trust in European institutions.

LE FRONT NATIONAL ET LES POLITIQUES DE L’EUROSCEPTICISME EN FRANCE Les élections européennes de 2014 ont confirmé la position du Front national (FN) comme l´acteur politique le plus important et la force anti-UE de la politique française. Alors que le mécontentement d´avec les partis de gouvernement croit et que le soutien à L´UE s´amenuise, le FN a développé une forte base programmatique, qui lie une politique protectionniste de gauche avec des positions xénophobes, ethno-pluralistes et hostiles à l´Europe. Sur la base de ce programme de démarcation, le parti a pu rassembler un vaste électorat, qui se sent menacé par les conséquences culturelles, économiques et politiques de la globalisation. Le FN est aussi un exemple de parti « dur » ennemi de l´Europe, rejetant le projet d´intégration nationale et réclamant la sortie de la France de l´UE. Ces positions d´hostilité à l´UE sont intégrées dans un programme radical de droite et populiste typique, qui remet en cause les valeurs fondamentales libérales et universalistes de l´UE. Ces positions anti-européennes trouvent le soutien d´électeurs, qui croient que leurs voix ne sont plus écoutées par les élites au plan national et européen. Alors que le FN est isolé dans les institutions européennes, il est décidé à accentuer sa présence dans le pays à l´occasion des élections de 2017 en France. Marine Le Pen continuera avant tout à attiser les sentiments d´hostilité à l´UE, à en saper la légitimité et à nuire à la confiance dans les institutions européennes.

DIE FRONT NATIONAL UND DIE EUROSKEPTIZISMUS-POLITIK IN FRANKREICH Die Europawahlen von 2014 haben die Position des Front National (FN) als wichtiger politischer Akteur und stärkste anti-EU Kraft in der französischen Politik bestätigt. Während die Unzufriedenheit mit den Regierungsparteien wächst und die Zustimmung zur EU schwindet, hat der FN einen starken programmatischen Ansatz entwickelt, der eine linke protektionistische Wirtschaftspolitik mit xenophoben, ethno-pluralistischen und europafeindlichen Positionen verbindet. Dank dieses Programms der Abgrenzung konnte die Partei eine beträchtliche Wählerschaft überzeugen, die sich von den kulturellen, ökonomischen und politischen Folgen der Globalisierung bedroht sehen. Der französische FN ist auch ein exemplarisches Beispiel für eine hart europafeindliche Partei, die das Projekt der europäischen Integration ablehnt und Frankreichs Austritt aus der EU fordert. EU-feindliche Positionen sind integriert in das typische populistische rechtsradikale Programm, das die grundlegenden liberalen und universalistischen Werte der Europäischen Union infrage stellt. Europafeindliche Positionen

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finden Widerhall bei Wählern, die glauben, dass ihre Stimme kein Gehör mehr findet bei den politischen Eliten auf der nationalen und der europäischen Ebene. Während der FN in den europäischen Institutionen isoliert ist, ist er entschlossen, seine heimische Präsenz auch bei Wahlen in Frankreich 2017 zu betonen. Vor allem aber wird Marine Le Pens Partei auch weiterhin die EU-feindliche Stimmung in der französischen Öffentlichkeit schüren und so sowohl die Legitimität der EU als auch das Vertrauen in die europäischen Institutionen untergraben.

DIE AFD IN DEUTSCHLAND VIOLA NEU Seit den 60er Jahren ist es keiner „kleinen“ Partei1 gelungen bei einer Bundestagswahl so knapp an der Fünf-Prozent-Hürde zu scheitern wie der AfD 2013. Mit 4,7 Prozent der Zweitstimmen liegt sie gerade einmal 0,1 Punkte hinter der FDP. Dem Wahlerfolg geht jedoch ein langjähriger Trend voraus. Seit Jahrzehnten haben sich die Bedingungen für kleine Parteien kontinuierlich verbessert, da immer mehr Wähler bereit sind, den sogenannten „sonstigen“ Parteien ihre Stimme zu geben. Diese Entwicklung setzte bereits in den 90er Jahren ein. In Hamburg erhielten die sonstigen Parteien bereits 1993 und 1997 über 16 Prozent der abgegebenen Stimmen, 1991 blieben in Bremen knapp 10 Prozent der Stimmen bei den kleinen Parteien und bei der Europawahl 1994 votierten gut 10 Prozent für die Parteien außerhalb des Parlaments. In den 90er Jahren gelang es einigen kleinen Parteien in Parlamente einzuziehen, genau genommen waren es zuerst 1989 die Republikaner, die mit 7,5 Prozent in das Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus einzogen. Seit dieser Zeit gelang es – neben den Republikanern – der StattPartei, der Schill-Partei, der DVU, der NPD, der Partei Arbeit für Bremen und Bremerhaven, den Freien Wählern und der Piratenpartei auf Landesebene zu reüssieren. Langfristig konnte sich keine dieser Parteien etablieren, auch wenn manchen zweimal der Einzug in das jeweilige Parlament in Folge glückte. Ursache des bislang zeitlich und/oder geografisch begrenzten Erfolges der Kleinen ist die Veränderung des Abstimmungsverhaltens. In Folge des schleichenden Rückgang der Parteiidentifikation seit den 70er Jahren und dem Anwachsen ungebundener Wählerschichten hat volatiles Wahlverhalten zugenommen, ist fast die Norm und nicht die Ausnahme. Wer mit „denen da oben“ und den etablierten Parteien unzufrieden ist, entscheidet sich häufig für eine der kleinen Parteien. Sie profitieren von unterschiedlichem Protest – mal konkreter, mal diffuser Natur – und mobilisieren immer überdurchschnittlich viele ehemalige Nichtwähler. Durch ihre Wahlerfolge bei Landtagswahlen und der Europawahl kann man die Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) durchaus zu den spektakulären Parteineugründungen der letzten Jahre rechnen. Zuletzt ist ein ähnlich rascher Aufstieg mit Einzug in Parlamente den Piraten gelungen, die jedoch wieder in der politischen Bedeutungslosigkeit versunken sind.

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Die NPD erhielt bei der Bundestagswahl 1969 4,3 Prozent.

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1. Ursprung und Entwicklung der AfD Zunächst im Umfeld der Freien Wähler und der „Wahlalternative 2013“2 agierend, gründete sich am 13. April 2013 in Berlin3 die AfD. Zwischen den Parteien bzw. der Wahlalternative gab anfänglich personelle Wechselaktivitäten. Die Wahlalternative wollte zunächst mit den Freien Wählern gemeinsame Sache machen, doch bereits bei der ersten Aktion, der Landtagswahl in Niedersachsen, kam es zu Spannungen und Überwerfungen und schließlich zur Gründung einer eigenständigen Partei. So war die AfD von Beginn an eine fragile Allianz unvereinbarer politischer Ziele. Letztlich hat sich die Partei bereits wieder gespalten, als im Juli 2015 der Vorsitzende (Sprecher genannt), Leitfigur und Gründer, Bernd Lucke, nach einer Wahlniederlage um die Kandidatur für den Vorsitz austrat und eine neue Partei gründete (Alfa, Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbau). Doch ist die inhaltliche und strategische Zersplitterung schon lange offensichtlich. Spätestens im Mai 2015 war die innere Zerrissenheit unübersehbar, als Bernd Lucke den „Weckruf 2015“ gründete, um politische Strömungen aus der Partei auszuschließen. „Deshalb kann die AfD nicht erfolgreich sein, wenn manche Führungspersonen weiterhin versuchen, die politischen Ränder aufzuweichen und auch radikale Kräfte integrieren wollen, die grundsätzlich systemkritisch, fundamental-oppositionell und nationalistisch daherkommen“4. Der Machtkampf schwelt jedoch schon seit 2014, als Lucke begann Vorschläge zu entwickeln, wie durch einen Bundesvorsitzenden eine klare Machthierarchie etabliert werden kann, da die Satzung drei „gleichberechtigte“ Sprecher vorsieht. Der organisatorische Strukturwandel war über mehrere Parteitage geplant und soll Ende 2015 abgeschlossen sein. Die AfD konnte rasch auf eine breite mediale und auch wohlwollende Aufmerksamkeit5 bauen. Gleichermaßen unterhielt die AfD die Medien auch mit Streitigkeiten,6 Querelen7, Diffamierungen8, Machtkämpfen9, sonstigen Skurrilitä-

2

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„Wir werden zur Bundestagswahl 2013 mit der neu gegründeten Partei Alternative für Deutschland antreten. Alle anderen politischen Meinungsverschiedenheiten sind angesichts der heutigen Herausforderungen unbedeutend“ schrieb der Sprecherrat der Wahlalternative 2013 vor der Parteigründung, http://www.wa2013.de/index.php?id=208 (2. April 2014). Die erste Veranstaltung fand am 11. März 2013 in Oberursel statt. http://www.weckruf2015.de/gruendungsaufruf (2. Juni 2014). Im Mai wechselte der hessische FDP-Abgeordnete Jochen Paulus von den Liberalen zur AfD. „Gestapo-Methoden, Wünschelruten-Esoterik, Fetisch-Sex, Kampfhundwelpen, Rattenpack und Schlangennester – AfD“, Stern, 18. Juli 2013¸AfD-Politikerin Storch weist Untreuevorwurf zurück. „Medienkampagne“/Vereinsgelder in Schließfach deponiert/Kandidatur für Europaliste, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25. Januar 2014. „Wir streiten über alles – außer den Euro“, Tagesspiegel, 8. September 2013 Der Spion, der uns triezte – In der AfD hat sich ein Netz aus Saboteuren gebildet. Sie beliefern die Öffentlichkeit mit sensiblen Informationen – die Partei macht mit Sicherheitsfirmen Jagd auf denKopf der Gruppe. Wurde er nun enttarnt?, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25. April 2014. Erosion auf höchstem Niveau. Wenn Führungsleute von Parteien sich befehden, kann das zerstörerisch sein. Die Piraten haben es vorgeführt. Bei der AfD ist der Ausgang ungewiss, bei der CDU ging es gut aus, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22. November 2014.

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ten, wie der Parteienfinanzierung über einen Goldhandel10 und merkwürdige Allianzen11. Vorstände wurden gewählt und mussten zurücktreten. Gegen Parteimitglieder werden Ausschlussverfahren beantragt. Kurzum, könnte man das parteiinterne Schiedsgericht12 für das wichtigste Gremium halten. Der (mediale) Erfolg der der AfD ist sicherlich auch einer Reihe nicht gänzlich unbekannter Protagonisten zu verdanken. Mit einem ehemaligen FAZRedakteur und Welt-Chefkorrespondenten (Konrad Adam) und dem Publizisten und ehemaligen Herausgeber der Märkischen Allgemeine (Alexander Gauland) in der Führung, konnte die Partei von Anfang Bedürfnisse der Medien bedienen. Auch die Akademiker (meist Wirtschaftswissenschaftler) in ihren Reihen, sind den Journalisten nicht unbekannt (wobei nicht alle Mitglied sind und manche nur als „Unterstützer“ auftauchen). Der emeritierte Wirtschaftsprofessor Joachim Starbatty13 hat bereits beim eurokritischen Bund freier Bürger kandidiert (1994), insgesamt dreimal beim Bundesverfassungsgericht Klagen eingereicht, die sich gegen europapolitische Entscheidungen der Bundesregierung richteten. Mitstreiter vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht waren Wilhelm Hankel, Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider und Dieter Spethmann, die sich alle auch wieder in der AfD wiederfanden. Der erste Vorsitzende (in der Satzung der Partei: Sprecher), Bernd Lucke, ist ebenfalls Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und ehemaliges CDU-Mitglied. Adam und Gauland waren CDU-Mitglieder und fanden sich im sogenannten „Berliner Kreis“ ein, ein Versuch einiger Konservativer, Einfluss auf den Kurs der CDU auszuüben. Zu den populärsten Persönlichkeiten ist sicher Hans-Olaf Henkel zu zählen. Der engagierte sich bereits für die FDP, die Bundesvereinigung der Freien Wähler und dann für die AfD (Eintritt im Januar 2014 und gleichzeitige Kandidatur für das Europaparlament; Austritt im Juli 2015). Die anfänglichen Versuche der AfD, bekannte Politiker aus anderen Parteien für sich zu gewinnen, scheiterten. Jedoch ist ein großer Teil der hausgemachten innerparteilichen Zerwürfnisse auf die mangelnde Kompromissfähigkeit der ersten Reihe zurückzuführen. Eine Klammer bildete das Hadern zum Teil aus konservativer zum Teil aus wirtschaftsliberaler Perspektive mit den finanzpolitischen Entscheidungen der EU und der Bundesregierung. Nicht umsonst etablierte sie sich zunächst als „Anti-Euro-Partei“14. Erst in den Landtagswahlkämpfen in Sachsen, Brandenburg und Thüringen im Herbst 2014 rückten verstärkt ausländerfeindliche und (rechts)-populistische Töne in den Vordergrund der Kampagnen. Dennoch: Als Programmpartei kann man die AfD beim besten Willen nicht bezeichnen. Auf

10 11 12 13 14

Lammert will Regeln zur Parteienfinanzierung ändern. „Goldhandel der AfD ist rechtmäßig, widerspricht aber dem Grundgedanken des Gesetzes“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22. November 2014. Ein Geheimnis, das keines mehr ist. Die Nähe der AfD zum islamkritischen Pegida-Bündnis, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11. Dezember 2014. Drohungen, Verleumdungen, Unterstellungen. Die Führungsebene der „Alternative für Deutschland“ ergeht sich weiterhin in Stellvertreterkriegen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2. Januar 2014 Joachim Starbatty war Spitzenkandidat der AfD in Berlin. Beatrix von Storch erhielt den zweiten Listenplatz. „Die neue Anti-Euro-Partei. Renommierte Ökonomen und Publizisten sammeln sich“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 3. März 2013.

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dem Gründungsparteitag15 verabschiedete sie (ohne Diskussion) ein recht übersichtliches Wahlprogramm16. Im Mai 2014 beschloss sie in einem Mitgliederabstimmungsverfahren „Politische Leitlinien“, welche stark die Handschrift des Parteivorsitzenden Lucke tragen17. Ein Grundsatzprogramm sollte nach der Bundestagswahl 2013 erarbeitet werden, wurde dann aber verschoben und ist bislang nicht beschlossen18. Lediglich zu den Wahlen hat die Partei jeweils umfangreichere Aussagen beschlossen, die jedoch nur schwer Schlussfolgerung auf ein gemeinsames Bundesprogramm zulassen. Im Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl wird die Auflösung des EuroWährungsgebietes gefordert und die Wiedereinführung nationaler Währungen („Die Wiedereinführung der DM darf kein Tabu sein“). Die AfD schlägt vor, dass in den südlichen Ländern (Frankreich wird zwar als solches gesehen, doch die Beibehaltung des Euros als „politische“ Frage abgetan) nationale Parallelwährungen wieder eingeführt werden, die Abwertungen der Landeswährung ermöglichen. Kurzum, die Südländer sollen aus dem Euro austreten. Die AfD befürwortet einen „Schuldenschnitt“. Banken sollen zudem ihre Schulden selbst tragen. Insgesamt deutet dies alles auf einen starken Rückzug des Staates hin und kann als Marktradikalismus jenseits sozialer Marktwirtschaft interpretiert werden. Die nationalen Parlamente sollen gestärkt und die EU geschwächt werden. Im Steuerrecht schwebt der Partei das „Kirchhoffsche Steuermodell“ vor, ansonsten verbreitet sie eher Allgemeinplätze wie ein „nachhaltiges Energiekonzept“ und eine Reform des EEG, welche insgesamt zu günstigen Energiepreisen führen soll. Die Konservativen konnten in der Bildungspolitik die Linie vorgeben, indem sie „einheitliche Bildungsstandards“ und „Bildung als Kernaufgabe der Familie“ unterbringen konnten. Der Staat soll dies „sinnvoll“ ergänzen. „In erster Linie sind die Eltern für die Bildung und Erziehung ihrer Kinder verantwortlich“. Eine allgemeine Schulpflicht sieht anders aus. Im rechtspopulistischen Bereich verankert sich die Partei mit drei Punkten zur „Integrationspolitik“. Danach braucht Deutschland „qualifizierte und integrationswillige Zuwanderung“, eine „ungeordnete Zuwanderung in unsere Sozialsysteme muss unbedingt unterbunden werden“ und nur „ernsthaft politisch Verfolgte müssen in Deutschland Asyl finden können“. Im Programm zur Europawahl hält sich die Partei zwar an ihre großen Leitlinien, in manchen Punkten fordert sie jedoch disparates bzw. sich gegenseitig ausschließendes. Z.B.: Sie fordert die Reduzierung von „teure(n) und unnötige(n) Strukturen“ auf europäischer Ebene, hält jedoch die Errichtung eines „Subsidiaritäts-Gerichtshofes“ für sinnvoll. Dessen Richter sollen übrigens von den „nationalen Parlamenten ausgewählt“ werden, für die Besetzung oberster Richter hat die Auswahl „auf Basis wissenschaftlicher Leistung und nicht nach politischen Kriterien zu erfolgen“19. Und bei allem Abbau von Bürokratie soll der Europäische Rechnungshof gestärkt werden. 15 16 17 18 19

Nico LANGE, Theresa SAETZLER, Die neue Partei „Alternative für Deutschland“, Entstehung, Programm und Bewertung. Parteienmonitor aktuell, Berlin, 2013. https://www.alternativefuer.de/pdf/Wahlprogramm-AFD.pdf (2. März 2015) https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/AfD_Leitlinien_2014_DE. pdf (2. März 2015). http://www.alternativefuer.de/bundesfachausschuesse/ (2. März 2015). http://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Europaprogramm-der-AfD. pdf, p. 25 f. (2. März 2015).

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Auch Landtagswahlprogramme20 wirken kompiliert und kulturpessimistisch. Sie erwecken den Eindruck, als hätte sich jeder mal Luft machen dürfen (oder wie es schön bei populistischen Bewegungen heißt: „Das wird man doch mal sagen dürfen“). Auf den Plakaten prangt daher nicht umsonst der Spruch „Mut zur Wahrheit“. Welche Schlussfolgerungen nach all dem „wogegen“ die Partei ist positiv gezogen werden sollen, bleibt hingegen eine Leerstelle. Am Ende bleibt auch in der Wortwahl ein recht skurriles Kompilat der Merkwürdigkeiten. Hierzu nur einige Beispiele, die man endlos fortsetzen könnte. Es wird immer nur eine Formulierung aus einem Programm gewählt, obwohl die meisten Inhalte sich in den drei Programmen in ähnlicher Form finden. – „Auf freien Strecken ohne Gefährdungen soll es kein Tempolimit geben.“ (Sachsen) – „Sie (die Meinungsfreiheit, Anmerkung des Autors) darf nicht eingeschränkt durch die Meinungsmonopole der sogenannten Politischen Korrektheit werden.“ (Thüringen) – „Wir fordern Volksabstimmungen zu Art und Umfang von Einwanderung.“ (Thüringen) – „Lehrer müssen wieder in die Lage versetzt werden, durch effiziente pädagogische Maßnahmen sich und die lernwilligen Schüler auf effektive Weise vor solchen Schülern zu schützen, die den Unterricht immer wieder stören und behindern.“ (Thüringen) – Die Schulpflicht wird erweitert um die „nachdrückliche Einbeziehung familiärer Bildungsverantwortung“ (Thüringen) – „Der Theaterbetrieb darf nicht zu einer überdimensionierten Event-Veranstaltung verkommen, die den Geschmack des Publikums und nicht die Aussagekraft von Kunst zum Maßstab nimmt.“ (Thüringen) „[…] statt den formatierten und hochmanipulativen Produkten von Privatradio, Musikindustrie und serieller Seichtbelletristik auf den Leim zu gehen, dann müssen wir zu allererst in die musische und ästhetische Bildung der Kinder und Jugendlichen investieren.“ (Sachsen) – „Die im EU-Haushalt für Thüringen vorgesehenen Mittel […] sind auch zukünftig zu sichern.“ […] „Es muss sichergestellt werden, daß (Schreibweise im Original) unsere Steuergelder dort zum Wohl des Volkes eingesetzt werden, wo sie erwirtschaftet wurden […] in Deutschland und unserem Freistaat Thüringen.“ (Thüringen). – „So sollen kleine einzügige Grundschule erhalten oder wo nötig neu eingerichtet werden“ (In Brandenburg würden so die Klassenstufen 1-6 in einer Klasse unterrichtet) (Brandenburg) – „Die AfD lehnt den Bau von Windkraftanlagen […] ab“. ‚Die „[…] Inanspruchnahme der Landschaft durch Stromtrassen und Pumpspeicherkraftwerke (muss) weitestgehend vermieden werden.“ (Thüringen) „Eine voll20

http://afd-thueringen.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/07/AfD_Thueringen_Wahlpro gramm.pdf¸ http://afdsachsen.de/index.php?ct=wahlprogramm (2. März 2015) ¸ http:// www.afd-brandenburg.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Landtagswahlprogramm-kom plett.pdf (2. März 2015). Die Programme der Bremer und Hamburger AfD, im Duktus und inhaltlich ausgewogener: https://alternative-hamburg.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ Bürgerschaftswahl-Programm-D.pdf (2. März 2015); http://www.alternativefuer-bremen. de/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-05-04_AfD-Bremen_Wahlprogramm-2015_V2.6 -3.pdf (2. März 2015).

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ständige Abkopplung von Energieerzeugung von fossilen Quellen oder spaltbarem Material […] ist eine Illusion“. (Sachsen) „Verantwortungsbewusste Weiternutzung von Braunkohle“ (Sachsen) – „Gegen die Ideologie setzen wir den gesunden Menschenverstand, gegen den Versuch des Altparteienkartells den politischen Diskurs einzuengen, unser Recht auf Meinungsfreiheit.“ (Thüringen) – „-Wir fordern ideologiefreie Hochschulen und Universitäten. Deshalb ist die Förderung der sogenannten Gender Studies sofort einzustellen.“ (Sachsen) „Versuchen, mit Hilde der Gender-Ideologie den Sinn des Wortes „Familie“ […] auf andere Gemeinschaften (als Vater, Mutter, Kind Anmerkung des Autors) auszudehnen […] ist entgegenzutreten. Die Gender-Ideologie steht sowohl im Widerspruch zu den Ergebnissen der Naturwissenschaft und Entwicklungspsychologie als auch zur Lebenserfahrung.“ (Thüringen) – Das „Wolfsmanagement (abschaffen oder umwandeln), in dem alle Wildarten, auch Niederwild wie Hase und Fasan, gleich behandelt werden“ (damit dürften die unter Naturschutz stehenden Tiere gejagt werden) (Sachsen). – Geschichtsunterricht: „Wir wollen einen deutlichen Schwerpunkt auf das 19. Jahrhundert und die Befreiungskriege gesetzt wissen.“ (Dort gewann Deutschland die letzten Kriege) (Sachsen) „Dieser Akademisierungswahn wird weder den Menschen noch der Gesellschaft gerecht […]“ (Brandenburg) Darüber hinaus sprechen viele Elemente dafür, die Partei im Spektrum des politischen Populismus anzusiedeln21. Zwar ist das Vorhandensein eines charismatischen Führers wichtiges Element für den Erfolg einer populistischen Partei, doch kann die Abwesenheit eines solchen auch schlicht bedeuten, dass er nicht zu rekrutieren war. Für eine populistische Partei spricht die Kritik an den Eliten und insbesondere die Kritik an den „verkrusteten und verbrauchten Altparteien“22. Der Ex-Vorsitzende Lucke sprach auf dem Gründungsparteitag über eine „erschreckende Degeneration des deutschen Parlamentarismus“ und dass „fast alle Bundestagsabgeordneten zu meinungslosen Erfüllungsgehilfen der Regierung verkommen“23 seien und davon „dass endlich eine24 neue Kraft sich anschickt, die Zwangsjacke der erstarkten und verbrauchten Altparteien zu sprengen Zu den klassischen Argumentationsmustern des Populismus gehört auch die Ansprache des kleinen Mannes, dessen eigentliche Meinung man repräsentiere. Für die AfD bedeutet dies, dass sie (vermutlich als einzige Partei) über „gesunden Menschenverstand“ verfüge25. Die Vereinfachung der Probleme und die Suggestion, dass es für schwierige Fragen, folgt man dem „gesunden Menschenverstand“, unterkomplexe Lösungen gäbe, ist Populisten meistens zu eigen. 21 22 23 24 25

Vgl. zu den Kriterien: Florian HARTLEB, Rechts- und Linkspopulismus. Eine Fallstudie anhand von Schill-Partei und PDS, Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004; Frank DECKER, Der neue Rechtspopulismus, Opladen, Leske und Budrich, 2004. „Zurück zum Pfennig. Die Alternative für Deutschland hat praktisch nur ein Thema: Raus aus dem Euro“, Tagesspiegel, 12. April 2013 „Europa steht für Enttäuschung. Auf ihrem Gründungskongress startet die Alternative für Deutschland einen Frontalangriff auf etablierte Parteien”, Welt, 15. April 2013. „Einfache Lösungen, viele Fragen. Die AfD vor Programm- und Personaldebatten“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 27. September 2013 http://www.cicero.de/bundestagswahl-warum-die-afd-den-bundestag-gehoert/55814 (2. März 2015); http://www.n-tv.de/politik/AfD-verschiebt-die-Diskussion-article10470446. html, (2. März 2015).

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Bei der Bundestagswahl gibt es nur in einigen wenigen sozialen Gruppen Abweichungen vom arithmetischen Mittel26. Sie schneidet bei jüngeren Wählern etwas besser ab als Durchschnitt. Bei unter 29-jährigen Männern kommt sie auf 6,5 Punkte und in der Altersgruppe der 30-59-jährigen Männer auf 6,3 Punkte. Bei Männern schneidet sie insgesamt besser ab, als bei Frauen, was bei „jüngeren“ und populistischen Parteien schon fast eine Regel ist. Arbeitslose sind mit einem Anteil von 6,6 Prozent wie konfessionslose Wähler mit einem Anteil von 6,6 Prozent ebenfalls etwas über dem Durchschnitt. Es gibt einige Wahlkreise, die gleichermaßen Hochburg der AfD und der NPD sind, wo beide Parteien ihren besten Ergebnisse haben (Sortiert nach dem besten Ergebnis der AfD): Görlitz, Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge, Erzgebirgskreis I, Greiz-Altenburger Land, Gotha-Ilm Kreis, Meißen, Bautzen I, Dresden II-Bautzen II, Cottbus-Spree-Neiße, Leipzig-Land, Berlin-Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Dahme Spreewald-Teltow-Fläming III und Nordsachsen. Dies könnte man durchaus so interpretieren, dass politischer Protest keine Heimat hat. Bereits bei anderen Wahlen zeigte sich, dass das Protestpotential – ohne ideologische Präferenz – für Protestparteien jeglicher Provenienz stimmen konnte. Dass es sich bei der AfD um eine heterogene Sammlungspartei handelt, zeigen die Wählerwanderungsbilanzen27. Die stärksten Wählerströme flossen der Partei von der FDP (+430.000 Stimmen) und der Linken (+340.000 Stimmen) zu. Von der Union kamen 290.000 Wähler und von den Nichtwählern 210.000 und von der SPD 180.000. Die Grünen verloren 90.000 Wähler an die Partei. 610.0000 Wähler kamen aus dem linken und 720.000 aus dem bürgerlichen Lager. Da in der FDP die Frage nach der Zukunft des Euros eine große Rolle bis hin zu einem knappen Mitgliederentscheid28 spielte, könnte hier auch eine politische Alternative vermutet werden. Doch ist über die Wahlmotive nur zu spekulieren. Zu gering war im Vorfeld der Wahl der Anteil der AfD-Anhänger in Umfragen, um vernünftige und belastbare Aussagen zu treffen. Nur gelegentlich findet sich eine Aussage. So wünschten nach einer Umfrage von Allensbach29 sich 80 Prozent der AfD-Anhänger eine Rückkehr zur DM (alle Wahlberechtigten: 37 Prozent). Die Wähler- und die Mitgliederstruktur der Parteien dürfen nicht gleichgesetzt werden. Generell gibt es über die genaue Herkunft der Mitglieder der AfD – wie auch aller anderen Parteien – keine systematischen Informationen. Nur die Parteien selbst verfügen über diese Information, sofern sie überhaupt erhoben wird. Daher ist vieles was berichtet wird spekulativ. Analogien mit anderen kleinen Parteien sind bei der AfD dennoch erkennbar. In vielen der „kleineren“ Parteien engagieren sich häufig Protagonisten, die bereits über Erfahrungen in anderen kleinen wie großen Parteien verfügen und deren Aktivitäten dort vermutlich nicht die von ihnen gewünschte Wirkung entfalteten30. Dies scheint bei der AfD 26 27 28 29 30

Alle Zahlen sind entnommen aus: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Wahltagsbefragung vom 22 September 2013. Infratest dimap, Wahlanalyse Bundestagswahl am 22. September 2013, Berlin, September 2013. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/fdp-mitgliederentscheid-knapper-sieg-ueber-eu ro-skeptiker-11565818.html, eingesehen am 4 Oktober 2013. IfD Umfrage 11006. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/allensbach-analyse-alter native-fuer-deutschland-12151120.html (4. Oktober 2013). Die Daten wurden im April 2013 veröffentlicht. Vgl. zu den kleinen Parteien: Frank DECKER, Viola NEU (eds), Handbuch der deutschen Parteien, 2. Aufl. Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2013.

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nicht anders zu sein. Nach Recherchen der Medien hat die AfD auch eine gewisse Anziehungskraft für Mitglieder eher erfolgloser (Klein)-Parteien. Sie kommen u.a. von der islamkritischen Partei „Die Freiheit“, der Statt- und der Schill-Partei sowie dem Bund freier Bürger, manche kommen wohl auch über rechtsextreme Zusammenhänge in die Partei. Allerdings ist die Erfahrung von Mitgliedern in anderen Parteien kein Indikator für den Erfolg einer Parteineugründung. Es ist nicht auszuschließen, dass mit dem Engagement eine individualistische politische Zielsetzung verbunden ist und gegenüber den in Parteien so wichtigen Prinzipien der Kompromissfindung eine gewisse Reserviertheit besteht. Aus Sicht der empirischen Sozialforschung ist die Datenlage zur AfD einerseits übersichtlich, andererseits kaum belastbar. Zum einen handelt es sich um ein „junges“ Phänomen, daher gibt es so gut wie keine wissenschaftlichen Studien. Zum anderen ist für Auswertungen in normalen Umfragen die Fallzahl der AfD-Anhänger zu klein. In einer fast 2.000 Befragte umfassenden Umfrage der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung waren gerade einmal 68 AfD-Anhänger auszumachen31. In zwei Studien der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung mit mehr als 2.000 Befragten konnten etwa 120 AfD-Anhänger gefunden werden. In normalen Befragungen werden meisten 1.000 Interviews realisiert, dementsprechend groß ist bei einer so niedrigen Fallzahl der Stichprobenfehler und dementsprechend zurückhaltend sollte man bei der Interpretation der Befunde sein. Daher können Umfragen nur bedingt zu Aussagen über die Wahlmotive herangezogen werden.

2. Die Europawahl 2014 Seit der ersten Europawahl folgt das Wahlverhalten eigenen Mustern, welche in einer Analyse von Karlheinz Reif und Hermann Schmitt32 bereits 1980 herausgearbeitet wurden. Mittlerweile hat der Begriff der „Second-Order-Election“ oder Nebenwahl seinen Einzug in die Öffentlichkeit gehalten. In Deutschland könnte man auch von „Fourth-Order-Elections“ sprechen, da selbst Kommunalwahlen für wichtiger gehalten werden. Dies gilt auch bei der Wahl von 2014. 86 Prozent halten die Arbeit des Bundestages für wichtig (sehr wichtig/wichtig), 80 Prozent Nennungen erhält die Arbeit der Landtage, 76 Prozent die Gemeinde- und Stadträte und 56 Prozent das Europaparlament (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen). Da Europawahlen eine geringere Bedeutung als nationalen Wahlen zugeschrieben wird, weicht das Wahlverhalten von nationalen Wahlen erheblich ab. Bei jeder Europawahl kann über Denkzettelwahlen berichtet werden, unter denen die Partei des jeweiligen Regierungschefs zu leiden hat. Am stärksten tritt dieser Effekt in der Mitte der Legislaturperiode der nationalen Regierung auf. Zudem bleiben die Wahlbeteiligungen zum Teil sehr deutlich unterhalb des Niveaus der nationalen Wahlen. Dies Ganze ist verbunden mit größerer Experimen31 32

http://www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de/inhalte/studien_Gutachten.php, http://www. fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de/pdf_14/141120presse-handout.pdf (2. März 2015). Die Studie ist im November 2014 erschienen, die Umfrage fand von Juni bis September statt. Karlheinz REIF, Hermann SCHMITT, ”Nine Second-Order National Elections. A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results”, European Journal for Political Research, 8, 1980, p. 3 ff.

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tierfreudigkeit, wovon häufig Protestparteien profitieren. Der einmalige Einzug der Republikaner in das Europaparlament 1989 (mit 7,1 Prozent der Stimmen) wird in Deutschland als typisches Protestwahlverhalten interpretiert. Gelegentlich taucht auch der Begriff der Ventilfunktion auf. Auch dass die kleineren Parteien zusammen auf etwa zweistellige Ergebnisse kommen, ist für Europawahlen in Deutschland nicht ungewöhnlich. Ein Einzug einer populistischen Partei in das Europaparlament hat jedoch meist keine Relevanz für die nationalen Parlamente. Europakritische Parteien haben es somit leicht, in das Europaparlament einzuziehen, auf der nationalen Ebene gelingt es ihnen hingegen nur sehr schwer, vom Europaskeptizismus zu profitieren. Gleichermaßen kämpfen Europawahlen gegen ein recht weit verbreitetes Desinteresse in der Bevölkerung an. Rückschlüsse von Europawahlen auf die nationale Ebene sind daher nicht tragfähig. Zu sehr folgen diese Wahlen ihren eigenen Gesetzen. Dies kann – im Großen und Ganzen – für alle europäischen Länder festgestellt werden. Nach der ersten Europawahl 1979 haben sich viele Images gebildet, welche die Wahrnehmung der europäischen Ebene bis heute prägen. Obwohl das Parlament mittlerweile fast alle parlamentarischen Rechte erhalten hat, fristet es in der Bedeutungswahrnehmung ein Nischendasein. Das europäische Mehrebenensystem bietet den Menschen nicht die leicht verstehbare und verständliche Konfrontation von Opposition und Regierung und somit ein Mittel, politische Positionen zuordnen zu können. Zumal auch heute nicht von Personalisierungseffekten auf das Wahlverhalten auszugehen ist. Die Kandidatur für eine Position in Brüssel dürfte (bei allem Wohlwollen) für die meisten Wähler kein starkes Wahlmotiv darstellen, ebenso wenig wie die europapolitischen Positionen der Parteien, die den meisten Wählern zudem weitgehend unbekannt sind. So stellt die Forschungsgruppe Wahlen fest: „Mit gewohnt schwacher Beteiligung, besonderen Nebenwahl- und Mobilisierungseffekten, kaum Parteienund Personenwettbewerb, sowie ohne koalitionstaktische Wahlmotive und neuerdings ohne Sperrhürde bleibt die Europawahl ein Unikat“, schreibt die Forschungsgruppe in ihrer Europawahlanalyse (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Europawahl, 25. Mai 2014). Nachdem die AfD bei den vorhergegangenen Wahlen an der Fünf-ProzentHürde scheiterte, erreichte sie mit 7,1 Prozent ein Ergebnis, das sie auch bei dem Vorhandensein der Fünf-Prozent-Hürde einen komfortablen Einzug in das Parlament ermöglicht hätte. Am besten schneidet sie mit 10,1 Prozent in Sachsen ab, gefolgt von Hessen (9,1 Prozent), Brandenburg (8,5 Prozent) und Bayern (8,1 Prozent). Von den ursprünglich sieben Europaabgeordneten gehören seit der Spaltung der Partei im Juli 2015 fünf33 nicht mehr der AfD. Zu den typischen Phänomenen der Europawahlen gehören gute Ergebnisse von euroskeptischen, populistischen bis extremistischen Parteien, auch wenn diese Tendenz in Deutschland eher selten zu erkennen war. Daher wird den Europawahlen auch gelegentlich eine „Ventilfunktion“ zugesprochen, bei der sich diffuse Ängste, Sorgen und Kritik „Luft machen“. Bei der Anhängerschaft der 33

In der AfD verblieben sind: Beatrix von Storch und Marcus Pretzell. Aus der AfD ausgetreten sind: Bernd Lucke, Hans-Olaf Henkel, Bernd Kölmel, Joachim Starbatty, Ulrike Trebesius. Sie sind alle in der Fraktion der Europäischen Konservativen und Reformer.

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AfD gibt es deutliche Hinweise auf Protestwahlmotive. Während die Mehrheit von 67 Prozent aller Wähler die jeweilige Partei aus Überzeugung heraus wählt, sagt dies gerade einmal ein Drittel der AfD-Anhänger. Das bedeutet, dass 60 Prozent „Enttäuschung“ von einer anderen Partei als Hauptwahlmotiv angeben. Lediglich die Linke kommt an diesen hohen Enttäuschungsgrad mit einem Wert von 41 Prozent noch etwas näher heran (Infratest dimap). Die Anhänger der AfD orientieren sich nicht an den Spitzenkandidaten (weder den deutschen noch den europäischen) noch ist eine Parteibindung vorhanden (jeweils Werte von unter 10 Prozent, vgl. Infratest dimap). Eine weitere Besonderheit in der Wahlmotivation der AfD-Anhänger stellt die vermutete geringe Bedeutung der Europawahl dar. 45 Prozent stimmen der Aussage zu „Die Europawahl ist so unbedeutend, da kann man auch mal eine andere Partei wählen“. Von allen Wahlberechtigen sagen dies 20 Prozent (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen). Obwohl man bei den AfD-Anhängern europapolitische Protestmotive erwarten würde, orientiert sich ihre Wahlentscheidung etwa hälftig an bundesund an europapolitischen Motiven (Infratest dimap). In einem Punkt unterscheiden sie sich jedoch sehr deutlich von allen anderen Anhängerschaften: Nur 11 Prozent der AfD-Anhänger sehen in der EU-Mitgliedschaft Vorteile (Gesamt: 46 Prozent) und nirgends werden die Nachteile größer bewertet. So sagen 45 Prozent der AfD-Anhänger, sie würden Nachteile sehen (gesamt 16 Prozent; Infratest dimap). Nach den Wählerwanderungsbilanzen34 von Infratest dimap gewinnt AfD gegenüber der Bundestagswahl 2013 510.000 Stimmen von der Union, 180.000 von der SPD, 110.000 von der Linken, 60.000 von der FDP und 30.000 von den Grünen. Lediglich 20.000 Stimmen kommen von den „sonstigen“ Parteien. Aber der Abfluss an das Nichtwählerlager ist beträchtlich. 910.000 AfDWähler der Bundestagswahl 2013 bleiben diesmal der Abstimmung fern. Damit hat sie von September bis Mai die Hälfte ihrer Wählerschaft der Bundestagswahl verloren und kann nur aufgrund der niedrigen Wahlbeteiligung prozentual profitieren. Die Wählerstruktur der AfD ist fluide und volatil zu sein. Rechnet man die Wanderungen in Prozente um, relativiert sich der Aderlass der Union erheblich. Union und Linke haben prozentual etwa gleich hohe Verluste gegenüber der AfD, was darauf hindeuten könnte, dass der Protest der Wähler – wie in vielen anderen Fällen auch – keine politische Heimat hat. Die AfD findet (wie auch bei der Bundestagswahl) etwas stärkeren Rückhalt bei jüngeren Männern. Übrigens gibt es keine Gruppe, bei der die „sonstigen“ Parteien einen so starken Rückhalt finden wie bei jungen Männern, die schon in 34

Die Wählerwanderungsbilanz von Infratest dimap bezieht sich nicht auf die letzte Europa-, sondern auf die letzte Bundestagswahl von 2013. Dies hat einen einfachen Hintergrund: Da die Rückerinnerung an das Wahlverhalten der letzten Europawahl – gelinde gesagt – schwach ausgeprägt ist, nimmt man als Bezug die letzte Bundestagswahl. Da bei der Bundestagswahl die Wahlbeteiligung deutlich höher liegt, ergeben sich vor allem in der Mobilisierung Unterschiede. Die Wählerwanderungen sollten als aktuelle Bewegungen in der Wählerlandschaft unter den besonderen Bedingungen der Europawahl interpretiert werden. Sie zeigen auch wie „unideologisch“ Wähler ihre Entscheidung treffen. Aufschluss über langfristige tektonische Verschiebungen können sie nicht leisten. Auch die sozialstrukturellen Eigenschaften der Parteianhänger sollten nicht überinterpretiert werden. Vor dem Hintergrund einer gleichermaßen nivellierten wie volatilen Wählerschaft lassen sich nur bedingt Rückschlüsse auf Wählermilieus und deren Verankerung mit Parteien ziehen.

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der Vergangenheit durch eine besondere Experimentierfreude aufgefallen sind. Auch die Piraten konnten während ihrer Hochphase auf diese Wählergruppe bauen. So haben sich etwa 20 Prozent der unter 30-jährigen Männer für eine nicht etablierte Partei entschieden. Die größte Unterstützung finden die „Sonstigen“ bei Wählern mit niedriger Bildung, die jünger als 34 Jahre sind. Hier kommen sie auf einen Anteil von 25,2 Prozent. Die AfD kommt in der Gruppe der jüngeren Wähler (bis 34 Jahre) mit einem mittleren Bildungsniveau auf ihren höchsten Wert (10,6 Prozent).

3. AfD – Die neue Heimat des Protestes35? Protestparteien sind in Deutschland kein neues Phänomen. Bei den Wahlen in 1989 (Europawahl und Abgeordnetenhauswahl Berlin) sowie bei der Bayerischen Landtagswahl 1990 schien es tatsächlich so, als würde sich rechts neben der Union mit den Republikanern eine Partei etablieren. Bei der Europawahl 1989 kamen 43 Prozent der REP-Wähler von der Union36. Bei der 1990 stattfindenden Landtagswahl in Bayern scheiterten die REP mit 4,9 Prozent denkbar knapp am Einzug in den Landtag. Und hier kamen 41 Prozent der REP-Wähler aus dem Lager der CSU. Besonders dramatisch war der Aderlass der CDU bei der Abgeordnetenhauswahl 1989 in Berlin. 77 Prozent der REP-Wähler hatten bei der Vorwahl für die CDU gestimmt. Die REP zogen mit 7,5 Prozent in das Abgeordnetenhaus ein, während die CDU Verluste von 8,6 Punkten hinnehmen musste.

Seit diesen Wahlen existiert die (falsche) These, rechtspopulistische oder rechtsextreme Parteien seien ein Auffangbecken für die Wählerschaft der Union. Denn schon 1992 zeigte sich ein anderer Trend, der bis heute – cum grano salis – immer wieder bei den Erfolgen der „sonstigen“ Parteien bestätigt wird. Bei der Landtagswahl in Baden-Württemberg erhielten die REP 10,9 Prozent der Stimmen. Gleichzeitig verlor die CDU 9,4 Prozent. Wer vorschnell meinte, dies sei „Fleisch vom Fleische der CDU“ gewesen, wurde rasch eines Besseren be35 36

Die folgenden Grafiken beruhen auf eigenen Berechnungen der Wählerwanderungsbilanzen von infas und Infratest dimap. In Bayern schnitten die REP bei der Europawahl mit 14,6 Prozent mit deutlichem Abstand am besten ab.

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lehrt. Die Wählerwanderungsbilanz zeigte, dass die Zusammensetzung der REPWählerschaft auf vielen Säulen basierte. Jeweils etwa ein Drittel der Wählerschaft kam von der CDU, dem Nichtwählerlager und von den anderen Parteien (vor allem der SPD). Bei allen Wahlen (s. u.), bei denen Protestparteien in die Parlamente einzogen, wiederholte sich dieses Muster. Sie mobilisieren auch bei sinkender Wahlbeteiligung ehemalige Nichtwähler. Ansonsten kommen die Wähler aus allen politischen Lagern auch quer zur ideologischen Ausrichtung der Parteien. Für Wähler ist die Wahl der DVU und der PDS oder der Linken und der NPD kein Widerspruch. Auch ein weiteres Vorurteil wurde mit der 1992er Wahl beseitigt und ein neuer Trend entstand. Stimmten in den 1960er Jahren vor allem ältere Wähler für die NPD, hatten die REP eine umgekehrte Alterspyramide. Sie waren umso erfolgreicher, je jünger die Wähler waren. Dieses Muster zeigt sich immer wieder. Eine gewisse Protestaffinität ist bei jüngeren Männern und Wählern mit einem einfachen bis mittleren Bildungsniveau sichtbar. Frauen zeigen gegenüber „neuen“ Parteien insgesamt und schon immer eine größere Zurückhaltung. Selbst die Grünen hatten Anfangs einen Männerüberhang.

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4. Die Herkunft der AfD-Wähler Auch wenn in den Medien behauptet wird, die AfD würde vor allem der Union schaden, so kann dies anhand der Daten nicht bestätigt werden. Die AfD sammelt aus allen politischen Lagern und Richtungen Wähler ein. Die Anteile der Union an der AfD-Anhängerschaft werden überschätzt, weil der Blick auf Nettozahlen irritierend sein kann. Da die Union auf Bundesebene die größte Wählerschaft hat, ist es proportional logisch, dass sie auch in Nettozahlen den größten Wechsel verzeichnet. Innerhalb der AfD-Anhängerschaft ist der Anteil ehemaliger CDU-Wähler jedoch unterdurchschnittlich. Natürlich ist anhand der Daten auch eine umgekehrte Prozentuierung möglich: Hier lautet die Frage: Wie viele ihrer ehemaligen Wähler haben die Parteien an die AfD verloren? Im Wesentlichen ändert sich auch hier nichts an der Tendenz und soll nur am Beispiel der Landtagswahl vom September 2014 in Thüringen exemplarisch geschildert werden. 24,2 Prozent der Wähler der sonstigen Parteien gehen zur AfD. 13,6 Prozent Wähler der FDP gehen zur AfD. Die SPD verliert 6,1 Prozent aus ihrer früheren Wählerschaft. Die CDU und die Linke verlieren 5,5 Prozent ihrer ehemaligen Wähler an die AfD. Ebenso illustrieren die Nettozahlen, dass es sich bei der AfD um eine heterogene Sammlungspartei handelt. Dies soll nur am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 2013 dargestellt werden37. Die stärksten Wählerströme flossen der Partei von der FDP38 (+430.000 Stimmen) und der Linken (+340.000 Stimmen) zu. Von der Union kamen 290.000 Wähler und von den Nichtwählern 210.000 und von der SPD 180.000. Die Grünen verloren 90.000 Wähler an die Partei. 610.0000 Wähler kamen somit aus dem linken und 720.000 aus dem bürgerlichen Lager.

37 38

Infratest dimap, Wahlanalyse Bundestagswahl am 22. September 2013, Berlin, September 2013. Erinnert werden sollte zumindest im Fall der FDP daran, dass in der Partei eine Debatte über den Euro-Rettungsschirm stattfand, welche 2011 in einen Mitgliederentscheid mündete http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/fdp-mitgliederentscheid-knapper-sieg-uebereuro-skeptiker-11565818.html (2. März 2015).

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Da die Piraten die letzte der neuen Parteien waren, die in Parlamente einzogen, lohnt sich eine vergleichende Betrachtung. Hierzu wurden sowohl für die Piraten als auch für die AfD39 die gesamte Wählerschaft der erfolgreichen Wahlen addiert und auf die abgebenden Parteien prozentuiert. In der Zusammensetzung der Wählerschaft der AfD und der Piraten zeigen sich große Ähnlichkeiten, wobei die AfD einen Schwerpunkt bei ehemaligen FDP-Wählern hat, während die Piraten bei den Grünen stärkere Unterstützung finden. Aber auch hier zeigt sich, dass Protest nicht eine Heimat hat, sondern aus allen politischen Richtungen kommt. Union und SPD sind gemessen an ihrer Größe unterdurchschnittlich stark von den Abwanderungen betroffen, die kleineren Parteien aber auch die sogenannten „sonstigen“ Parteien überdurchschnittlich. Der Trend der Mobilisierung von Nichtwählern hat auch hier seine Gültigkeit.

Zudem gibt es immer wieder Wählerwanderungen, die nicht in parteipolitische Lagertheorien passen. Ein Beispiel bietet die Bundestagswahl 2005, bei der die Union von SPD und Grünen Wähler gewinnen konnte, an die Linkspartei hingegen Stimmen verlor.

5. Wahlmotive der AfD-Wähler Eine eindeutige Vermessung der Einstellungsstruktur und Wahlmotive kann derzeit aufgrund der schwierigen Datenlage nicht vorgenommen werden. Es sind jedoch Momente einer Melange sichtbar, die bei der Wahl von Protestparteien regelmäßig auftauchen. In erster Linie zeigt sich eine diffuse Unzufriedenheit, die sich an einem oder wenigen Themen festmacht und von den entsprechenden Parteien mobilisiert wird. Zunächst profitieren Protestparteien auch davon, dass die Wähler glauben, man würde mit der Wahl einer solchen Partei keinen Schaden anrichten und andere Parteien würden wenigstens das Zeichen verstehen 39

Aus methodischen Gründen konnte für die AfD die Europawahl nicht herangezogen werden. Normalerweise wird in der Wahltagsbefragung nach der Entscheidung bei der letzten Wahl auf der entsprechenden Ebene gefragt. Da die Erinnerung an Europawahlverhalten eher lückenhaft ist, wird nach der Wahlentscheidung bei der letzten Bundestagswahl gefragt. Da die Wanderungsbewegungen zwischen Bundes- und Europawahl immens sind (allein schon durch die niedrige Wahlbeteiligung) wurde die Europawahl nicht berücksichtigt.

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und darauf dann reagieren. So sagen 45 Prozent der AfD-Anhänger, dass die Europawahl so unwichtig sei, dass man auch mal eine andere Partei wählen könne (Durchschnitt 20 Prozent)40. Gleichermaßen entscheiden sich 60 Prozent der AfDAnhänger bei der Europawahl aus Enttäuschung über andere Parteien für die AfD. 34 Prozent nennen Überzeugung als Wahlmotiv. Zum Vergleich: Bei der Union sagten 78 Prozent der Anhänger sie hätten die Partei aus Überzeugung gewählt. Ähnlich enttäuscht wie die Anhänger der AfD sind nur noch die Anhänger der Linken41. Innerhalb der Anhängerschaft sind Unzufriedenheiten weit verbreitet. Auf die Frage „Wie zufrieden sind sie alles in allem mit der Richtung, in die Deutschland sich entwickelt“ sind insgesamt 22 Prozent aller Befragten unzufrieden. Bei der AfD beträgt der Anteil 42 Prozent42. Die diffuse Unzufriedenheit äußert sich auch in einer schwach ausgeprägten Demokratiezufriedenheit. Im Herbst 2014 waren 68 Prozent aller Wahlberechtigten mit der Demokratie zufrieden, der Anteil unter den AfD-Anhängern betrug 42 Prozent43. Thematisch weichen die Einstellungen der AfD-Anhänger in zwei Bereichen deutlich vom Bevölkerungsdurchschnitt ab: Sie sind gegenüber Europa skeptischer und Ausländern in Deutschland stehen sie recht reserviert gegenüber. 78 Prozent sehen eine Überfremdungsgefahr durch Ausländer in Deutschland (Durchschnitt 46 Prozent)44. Bei allen auf Europa bezogenen Fragen, weicht das Antwortverhalten der AfD-Anhänger vom Bevölkerungsdurchschnitt ab. Hierzu einige Beispiele: Während nur 16 Prozent der Wahlberechtigten im Vorfeld der Europawahl Nachteile für Deutschland durch die EU-Mitgliedschaft sahen, betrug der Anteil der AfDAnhänger 45 Prozent45. 67 Prozent aller Wahlberechtigten bezeichnen die EU als Erfolgsgeschichte, von der AfD sind es 42 Prozent46. 72 Prozent aller Befragten halten die Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands in der EU für eine gute Sache, bei der AfD sind es 53 Prozent47. Gegen den EU-Beitritt der Türkei sprechen sich 61 Prozent der AfD-Anhänger aus (Durchschnitt 42 Prozent)48. Damit ist bei der AfD die Skepsis gegenüber der EU weiter verbreitet. In anderen Fragen, die von der KAS erhoben wurden, zeichnet sich hingegen kein klares Bild ab. Dies korrespondiert auch mit den Images der Partei. 60 Prozent der Wahlberechtigten sind der Ansicht die AfD stehe für die Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und 58 Prozent bringen die Abschaffung des Euro mit ihr in Verbindung49. Darüber hinaus hat die Partei in den Augen der Wähler das typische Profil einer Protestpartei, von der man zwar keine Problemlösung erwartet, welche die „Dinge wenigstens beim Namen“50 nenne. Bei der Bundestagswahl 2013 stimm40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Europawahl. Infratest dimap, Wahlanalyse Europawahl. Nachwahlbefragung zur Bundestagswahl 2013 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 124 Befragte nannten in der Sonntagsfrage die AfD. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer. Infratest dimap. Nachwahlbefragung zur Europawahl 2014 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 123 Befragte nannten bei der rückerinnerten Sonntagsfrage die AfD. Nachwahlbefragung zur Europawahl 2014 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Nachwahlbefragung zur Bundestagswahl 2013 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach, Oktober 2014. Infratest dimap.

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ten dieser Aussage 44 Prozent aller Befragten zu und bei der Europawahl 41 Prozent. Bei den Landtagswahlen im Herbst 2014 hatte sich dieses Image verstärkt. In den einzelnen Ländern erreichte sie Zustimmungswerte von ca. 60 Prozent. Ähnliche Werte erreichten auch andere Parteien aus dem Protestspektrum. So sagten. 2006 51 der Befragten in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, die NPD löse keine Probleme, nenne die Dinge aber beim Namen. Im Dezember 201451 sehen 67 Prozent diese Imagekomponente bei der Linken erfüllt, um nur wenige Beispiele zu nennen. Die AfD52 wird ausgesprochen polarisierend wahrgenommen. Sie genießt in keiner Anhängerschaft Sympathien. Auf einer Skala von +5 bis –5 erhält sie von CDU-Anhängern den Wert –2,1 und von den CSU-Anhängern –2,2. Nur die Linke (-2,4) und die Piraten (-2,9) werden in der CDU-Anhängerschaft schlechter bewertet (-2,4), während die SPD einen Wert von +0,4 erreicht. Die Anhänger der SPD sehen die AfD mit einem Wert von –2,3 ähnlich kritisch. Die AfD ist für die Mehrheit der Deutschen auch keine koalitionsfähige Partei. 67 Prozent aller Befragten ist gegen eine Öffnung der Union für Koalitionen mit der AfD; in der Anhängerschaft der Union ist die Ablehnung mit 75 Prozent noch deutlicher53. Die AfD-Anhänger stehen Politikern recht reserviert gegenüber. Angela Merkel wird normalerweise in allen Anhängerschaften54 positiv bewertet (Durchschnitt 2,0), von den AfD Anhängern erhält sie mit 0,1 den schlechtesten Wert. Selbst die Anhänger der Linken zeigen mit einem Wert von 0,2 noch etwas größere Sympathie und bei den Anhängern der Piraten beträgt der Referenzwert 0,9. Aber auch anderen Politikern können die Anhänger der AfD keine größeren Sympathien entgegen bringen. Peer Steinbrück (Durchschnitt 0,5) kommt dort auf 0,2, Rainer Brüderle auf –1,6 (Durchschnitt –1,2), Jürgen Trittin (-1,9), Sahra Wagenknecht (-0,8) und Katrin Göring-Eckardt (-0,9) stoßen ebenfalls nicht auf Gegenliebe. Gregor Gysi, der in den Anhängerschaften der Parteien stark polarisierend wahrgenommen wird, erreicht mit 0,1 in der AfD-Anhängerschaft den gleichen Sympathiewert wie Angela Merkel. Kennzeichen der AfD-Anhänger55 ist zudem, dass nur eine absolute Minderheit von 20 Prozent sagt, sie hätten eine längere Neigung zu der Partei. Die längerfristigen Parteineigungen der AfD-Anhänger verteilen sich über das gesamte Parteiensystem. Zum Vergleich: 70 Prozent der CDU-Anhänger neigen der Partei auch längerfristig zu.

51 52 53 54 55

Ähnliche Werte liegen auch in älteren Umfragen vor. Nachwahlbefragung zur Bundestagswahl 2013 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 124 Befragte nannten in der Sonntagsfrage die AfD. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer. Nachwahlbefragung zur Bundestagswahl 2013 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Mittelwerte einer von +5 bis –5 reichenden Skala. Nachwahlbefragung zur Bundestagswahl 2013 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Vgl. Viola NEU, Sabine POKORNY, „Wählen, wählen, immer wieder wählen. Die Bundestagswahl und die Europawahl im Vergleich“, in: Forum Empirische Sozialforschung, Sankt Augustin, Berlin, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Hrsg.), 2014.

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6. Sozialstruktur der AfD-Wähler In der AfD-Anhängerschaft gibt es nur in einigen wenigen sozialen Gruppen Abweichungen vom arithmetischen Mittel56. Sie schneidet bei jüngeren Wählern besser ab als im Durchschnitt. Bei Männern findet sie größeren Rückhalt als bei Frauen, was bei „jüngeren“ und populistischen Parteien schon fast eine Regel ist. Beim Bildungsniveau wird sie etwas stärker von Wählern mit einem mittleren bis niedrigen Bildungsniveau unterstützt. Es gibt einige Wahlkreise, die gleichermaßen Hochburg der AfD und der NPD sind, wo beide Parteien bei der Bundestagswahl ihre besten Ergebnisse haben (sortiert nach dem besten Ergebnis der AfD): Görlitz, Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge, Erzgebirgskreis I, Greiz-Altenburger Land, Gotha-Ilm Kreis, Meißen, Bautzen I, Dresden II-Bautzen II, CottbusSpree-Neiße, Leipzig-Land, Berlin-Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Dahme SpreewaldTeltow-Fläming III und Nordsachsen. Bei den Wahlen erhält sie von Konfessionslosen stärkere Unterstützung als von konfessionell gebundenen Wählern. Auffällig ist, dass bei der AfD-Anhängerschaft der Katholikenanteil unterrepräsentiert und der Anteil der Konfessionslosen überrepräsentiert ist. So sind 49 Prozent der AfD-Anhänger ohne konfessionelle Bindung und 20 Prozent sind katholisch. Die in der Umfrage gemessenen Referenzwerte für die Konfessionslosen beträgt 29 Prozent und für die Katholiken 30 Prozent57.

Fazit Die AfD hat das Wählerprofil einer typischen Protestpartei, wie es sie seit den 1990er Jahren in vielfachen Variationen gegeben hat. Die Auf- und Abstiegszyklen der Parteien werden immer kürzer und unberechenbarer, wie jüngst bei den Piraten zu beobachten war. Die Piraten waren, zumindest bis sie begannen, sich programmatisch zu festigen, Projektionsfläche für alle möglichen Wünsche und Bedürfnisse. Und die gleichen unbestimmten und heterogenen politischen Sehnsüchte scheint die AfD zu bedienen. Inhaltlich basiert die Partei auf einem Konglomerat multipler „Antis“: Anti-Europa, Anti-Integration, Anti-Ein- und Zuwanderung, gemischt mit einem klaren Anti-Parteien-Reflex, der bei so vielen Parteien Gründungspate war. Die Wahlerfolge der AfD basieren nicht auf einer spezifischen Mobilisierung eines Wählermilieus, sondern im Sammeln diffusen Protestes aus dem gesamten parteipolitischen Spektrum. Die Analogie zu den Erfolgen anderer Protestparteien ist sicher nicht zufällig. Wie in der Vergangenheit auch, ist die Union von den Wahlerfolgen unterdurchschnittlich betroffen. Dies könnte man durchaus so interpretieren, dass politischer Protest keine Heimat hat. Bereits bei anderen Wahlen zeigte sich, dass das Protestpotential – ohne klar verortbare ideologische Präferenz – für Protestparteien jeglicher Provenienz stimmen konnte. 56 57

Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Wahltagsbefragung vom 22. September 2013. Nachwahlbefragung zur Bundestagswahl 2013 der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; Vgl. Viola NEU, Sabine POKORNY, „Wählen, wählen, immer wieder wählen. Die Bundestagswahl und die Europawahl im Vergleich op.cit.

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Vorsitzende (erste Sprecherin) der AfD ist seit Juli 2015 Frauke Petry, die ebenfalls Mitglied des sächsischen Landtages ist. Welche Entwicklung die Partei nehmen wird, kann – auch nach der Abspaltung von Alfa – seriöserweise nicht vorhergesagt werden. Doch sind die Analogien zum Zerfall anderer populistischer Parteien offensichtlich. Mangelnde Fähigkeit zum politischen Kompromiss, starke Fragmentierung der inhaltlichen Positionen, tiefe persönliche Animositäten und das Bewusstsein vieler Einzelner in der Partei, über die tiefe Kenntnis der absoluten Wahrheit zu verfügen. Bei dieser Struktur dürfen an der Politikfähigkeit ernsthafte Zweifel angemeldet werden. Andererseits gibt es ein Wählerpotential für (rechts-)populistische Parteien, welches jedoch keine stabile Parteiidentifikation hat sondern eher affektiv die jeweiligen Parteien unterstützt. Da sich die Partei nun dezidiert mit rechtspopulistischen Themen profilieren will, wird sie die ehemaligen Protestwähler aus dem bürgerlichen Bereich und dort vor allem diejenigen, die von der FDP gewechselt sind, wohl kaum noch mobilisieren können.

THE AFD IN GERMANY Since the 1960s, no “small” party has managed to fail the 5%-threshold as closely as the AfD in 2013. After further successful elections in several German states (Bundesländer) and at the Europeans, a process of internal differentiation started. It ended with the split of the party in the AfD (with the chairperson Frauke Petry) and Alfa, chaired by the former AfD chairman Bernd Lucke. To date, the viability of right wing populist parties in Germany has always been limited. They have been able to mobilize a diffuse and politically homeless protest. But they have never been able to retain it on the long run. Even though the question of the

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refugees has created a situation favorable for right wing populist parties, the internal structure of the party indicates a rather limited capacity for policy-making even though regional strongholds have become visible.

L’AFD EN ALLEMAGNE Depuis les années 60, aucun « petit » parti n´a échoué de peu à franchir la barre des 5 % comme l´AFD aux élections au Bundestag de 2013. Après une série de succès régionaux dans les Bundesländer ainsi qu´aux élections européenne de 2014, un processus de différentiation interne au parti est apparu qui a abouti en 2015 à une scission du parti, avec d´une part la présidente de l´AFD Frauke Petry et de l´autre l´ex-président Bernd Lucke à la tête de la formation Alpha. Les partis populistes de droite n´ont à ce jour montré que de faibles capacités de survie. Ils sont en mesure de mobiliser sur des périodes limitées une protestation diffuse et non articulée politiquement, mais ne la conserve pas sur le long terme. Même si la question des réfugiés constitue une opportunité favorable pour les partis de droite populiste, leurs structures partisanes internes ne leur donnent que des capacités politiques restreintes, même si des ancrages régionaux existent.

“SECOND GENERATION” EUROSCEPTICISM: THE FIVE STAR MOVEMENT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION DANIELE PASQUINUCCI 1. Direct Democracy versus the European Union In Italy, the European elections of May 25, 2014, had an unexpected result. The remarkable success of Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party (PD), which had upheld a pro-European stance during the electoral campaign, took all the analysts, including the major polling institutes, by surprise. The Democratic Party won 40.8% of the vote – a level of consensus hitherto never achieved by an Italian party at European elections1. There are many explanations, among which the persistent attachment “to Europe” of the majority of voters is at least just as important as the fact that the Renzi government, having come to power in February 2014, enjoyed a honeymoon period with Italian voters. That said, we need to see the electoral performance of parties and Eurosceptic movements in the right perspective. The fact that the latter had nowhere near the percentage of votes garnered by the Democratic Party does not diminish the fact that something happened which had never occurred in Italy before: the amount of votes won by parties and movements standing for radical Euroscepticism – the Five Star Movement, the Northern League and the Fratelli d’Italia party2 – achieved a significant 30.9%. Table 1. Results of the 2014 European elections in Italy Parties/Movements

Votes

%

Democratic Party

11,172,861

40.82

Five Star Movement Beppegrillo.it

5,792,865

21.16

Forza Italia

4,605,331

16.83

Northern League – Die Freiheitlichen – Basta Euro

1,686,556

6.16

New centre-right (UDC)

1,199,703

4.38

L’altra Europa con Tsipras

1,103,203

4.03

1 2

At the previous European election of 2009, the Democratic Party achieved 26.12 %. Fratelli d’Italia is an extreme right-wing party. It started in December 2012 on the initiative of several politicians from the Popolo della Libertà. During the electoral campaign of 2014, Fratelli d’Italia shared the views of Marine Le Pen’s National Front.

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170 Parties/Movements

Votes

%

Fratelli d'Italia-AN

1,004,037

3.67

European Greens – Green Italia

245.443

0.90

Scelta europea

196,157

0.72

Italia dei valori

179,693

0.66

SVP

137,448

0.50

Io cambio-MAIE

48,450

0.18

Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=E&dtel=25/05/2014 (Feb. 4, 2015)

How then do we interpret this result? It is clear that electoral data alone are not a reliable measure of the effective strength of anti-European sentiment. Since the elections for the Strasbourg Parliament do not constitute a referendum on the European Union (EU), the number of votes for parties claiming to be “antiEurope” cannot be held to coincide with the number of citizens who truly want to give up the Euro or even leave the EU. Rather, the distribution of votes in favour of the Five Star Movement, the Northern League and Fratelli d’Italia shows that criticism of the EU is a catalyst for consensus. The permeability of the Italian electorate to Eurosceptic propaganda has several causes which act on different levels but converge to feed an antiEuropean current. Nevertheless, the heterogeneous and inconsistent nature of these causes is such that Euroscepticism has not succeeded in achieving (at least for now) a “hegemonic” position from which it might politically drive the majority of citizens. In the first place, it can be observed that broad swathes of public opinion, as well as many political (and also economic and academic) milieus, generally tend to attribute to supranational processes – globalization and European integration – the true origins of the problems tormenting Italy, the most important of these clearly being the economic recession, with its consequent dramatic loss of wealth and jobs. However, this tendency has not developed, from a political point of view, into a “constitutional” criticism, so to speak, of the EU. Since there is a risk that every objection to the EU might be taken as an expression of “Euroscepticism” (and therefore as a manifestation of irresponsibility, populism or demagogy), the political parties remaining “loyal” to the Union have refrained from engaging in any in-depth critical debate on European integration. For this same reason they have long avoided (certainly at least until the electoral campaign of

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2014), formulating serious hypotheses of EU reforms, even where there is urgent need, for example in the area of economic governance3. The “pro-Europe” parties thus appear – perhaps in spite of their best intentions – as “parties of the crown” or rather, defenders of the European status quo. Consequently the Eurosceptics have been able to monopolize criticism of the European Union, often tapping into positions which, while critical, still appear completely compatible with the EU’s existence and development. In other words, this monopoly becomes an over-representation of hard Euroscepticism. The success of radically Eurosceptic parties and movements has also been favoured by another factor, and that is the remarkable effectiveness of their communication strategies. Due above all to a highly intelligent use of social networks, they were able to set their own agenda during the electoral campaign, focusing on Italy’s withdrawal from the euro. Thus, on the one hand they cornered the “pro-Europe” parties into a defensive position, making them appear like supporters of the status quo, while on the other stealing political space from those who might have put forward “reformist” ideas regarding the EU4. To sum up, while the disaffection of Italians regarding European integration is certainly on the rise, its extent cannot be deduced simply by looking at electoral results. At the same time, while quantitative data must be interpreted with prudence, there are no doubts that the last European electoral campaign highlighted a qualitative evolution of Italian Euroscepticism. The latter, until recently, was based chiefly on practical and utilitarian considerations, such as the need to match priorities with national interests, a rejection of Europe-imposed restrictions (in particular those tied to the monetary policy) and fear of immigration, seen as a source of criminality and competition on the job market. From this point of view, the entry onto the political scene of the Five Star Movement (FSM) – whose undisputed leaders are the former comedian Beppe Grillo and the “ideologist” Gianroberto Casaleggio – was something of a novelty. Actually, at first glance, there is nothing original in Grillo’s criticism of the EU. He maintains that the Union “has nothing to do with the Europe we want, for it is run by a group of bureaucrats whom nobody elected and who share a passive support for the interests of international speculative finance. We are Europeans

3

4

The most obvious case is Mario Monti’s government which took over in November 2011 from the Berlusconi government, by now completely adrift and internationally discredited. Prime Minister Monti, whose government was supported by a wide range of political forces from Forza Italia to the Democratic Party, took on the role of a strict custodian of orthodox technocratic Europeanism. Following the brief interregnum of Enrico Letta’s (PD) government, Matteo Renzi’s government seemed, especially following such success in the European elections, to be intent on adopting a less “conformist” (yet not at all Eurosceptic) attitude towards the EU. However, bearing in mind also the disappointing results of the Italian presidency of the EU Council in the second semester of 2014, this attitude, rather than expressing a new political orientation, can be understood above all as an attempt to tap into Italians’ sense of frustration and their growing lack of faith in the EU. “If, on the one hand it is a good thing to counter the (sometimes reasonable, often simplistic) arguments of those in favour of the euro-exit, the decision to object implies that the subject to be debated has, when it comes down to it, been chosen by the interlocutor who opened the discussion. The agenda, that is the group of themes which become salient, is their prerogative and they can shift the debate to cover topics a priori more favourable to their position”: Riccardo PUGLISI, “Così i social network portano l’euro in prima pagina”, in: La Voce.info, 12 May 2014.

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because we believe in the idea of community […] and it is this sense of community that forms the basis of the Europe we want”5. In opposition to a Europe of political and bureaucratic élites, Grillo proposes a “federation of nations” whose citizens should be at the centre of the decisionmaking process. This confused federalist option seems to have convinced the FSM leader to present himself as the heir to Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi whose Manifesto di Ventotene, written in 1941 and still the reference text for Federalist Europeanism, has been reproduced in a book, published in 2014 with a preface by Grillo and Casaleggio, describing the Movement’s vision of Europe6. Aside from his claim to a clearly undeserved inheritance, Grillo’s words on the EU could be classified as a classic example of populism, one of whose characteristics is the élite/people dichotomy7. But this classification is only partial and therefore misleading. It can be embraced only if we limit ourselves to Grillo’s direct and explicit discourse on the EU. It is worth noting that this discourse is ambiguous and can be overturned: Grillo, as we have seen, claims in fact to be a “federalist”. To understand the true nature of the Five Star Movement’s Euroscepticism we need to widen our analysis to appraise the conception of politics, democracy, and political parties advocated by Grillo. We then come to the realization that not only is the Five Star Movement incompatible with the EU’s political system, but the challenge it poses with regard to European integration is potentially more radical – and in some way more original – than it appears at first sight. At the heart of Grillo’s political ideas is direct democracy (which must be exercised through the web) with which he intends to replace traditional mechanisms for representing the people’s will. Behind this approach is the idea that citizens must be the driving force of the decision-making process which should no longer be delegated to political parties or other organs of representation. As regards European decisions, according to Grillo-style direct democracy, first of all, there should be a referendum on whether or not Italy should stay in the Eurozone – in spite of the fact that the Italian Constitution does not permit referendums on international treaties. In the same way, every salient question regarding the EU should be directly decided by citizens. This conception of democracy was extended to a European level following the elections of May 2014. On the request of the Italian members, the European parliamentary group which includes the 17 members of the Five Star Movement elected to Strasbourg changed its name from “Europe, freedom and democracy” to “Europe of freedom and direct democracy”(EFDD)8. The group’s Statute declares that its members adhere “to the concept of direct democracy believing it to be the ultimate check on po5 6

7 8

Cf. Sergio DI CORI MODIGLIANI, La voce dei 5 stelle. Vinciamo noi: chi siamo e quale Europa vogliamo, with Prefazione by Gianroberto Casaleggio and Beppe Grillo, Milan, Edizioni Chiarelettere, 2014, p. 61. DI CORI MODIGLIANI, p. 87-113. Moreover, it should be observed that Grillo expresses a positive opinion of one of the “fathers” of Europe, Jean Monnet: cf. Piergiorgio CORBETTA and Rinaldo VIGNATI, “Direct Democracy and Scapegoats. The Five Star Movement and Europe”, in The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 49, 1, March 2014, p. 59. See, for all, Yves MÉNY and Yves SUREL, “The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism”, in the book they edited, Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, p. 12-13. Most of the group “Europe of freedom and direct democracy” which counts 48 members in total, is formed by MEPs from UKIP, i.e., the United Kingdom Independence Party (24 members), and the Five Star Movement (17 members).

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litical élites”. On this basis, it is not surprising that the group has adopted one of the arguments usually used to denounce the “democratic deficit” undermining the EU9: “Only the unelected [i.e. the members of the European Commission] have the right to propose legislation within the European system. Not one of the European Commissioners has been directly voted for by the peoples of Europe; and no single Commissioner be [sic] removed by them; this can’t be and will never be our definition of Democracy!” Nevertheless, for the EFDD the solution to the problem does not at all lie in the extension of powers and responsibilities of the European parliament10: “We propose something completely different – we want to encourage the peoples of Europe to have a direct say in the laws that govern their country. We believe that major decisions can and should be legitimised by free and fair referendum – not just at the national level, but also at the regional and local level”. In line with this vision, which clearly bears the stamp of the Five Star Movement, every new EU treaty, not to mention every change to the current Lisbon treaty, should be voted on in a referendum in all the member States11. At this point, the questions we have to ask are as follows: What role can the direct democracy advocated by Grillo play in the political system of the EU? And to what extent is it compatible with the European decisional process? In reality, the democratic principles on which the Union is founded, as well as the decisionmaking mechanisms employed in its law-making and the formation of its political will, seem incompatible with direct democracy. The Lisbon treaty, in fact, establishes that “the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” (article 8A.1)12. In this regard, in response to the accusation of a “democratic deficit”, the Treaty consolidates the two levels on which political representation of EU citizens is based: directly (expressed in the European parliament) and indirectly which, according to the Treaty, is guaranteed by the action of the governments within the Council of Ministers13. Moreover, in the Treaty, all forms, institutions and circuits that differ from those of political representation (such as the European Citizens’ Initiative procedure which, however, is subject to binding conditions), are considered as complementing representative democracy and in no way aiming at replacing it14. The eschewing of political representation entails the rejection of its institutions and procedures. Let’s take, for example, the principle of the free parliamen9 10 11 12 13 14

Cf. the section “Direct Democracy” on the EFDD site at URL http://www.efdgroup.eu/ about-us/direct-democracy (4 February 2015). http://www.efdgroup.eu/about-us/direct-democracy (4 February 2015). Cf. “Statutes of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group”, on http://files. meetup.com/3936842/EFDD-Statute.pdf (4 February 2015). Cf. the Treaty of Lisbon on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN (4 February 2015). Cf. Cesare PINELLI, “Disposizioni relative ai principi democratici”, in Franco BASSANINI and Giulia TIBERI, (eds), Le nuove istituzioni europee. Commento al Trattato di Lisbona, Bologna, il Mulino, 2008, p. 126. PINELLI, p. 129.

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tary mandate: it revokes the political or juridical responsibility of the elected towards the electors for the whole period the former are in power. This principle is inseparable from representative democracy and has been enshrined within community legislation. When the governments of the member states finally decided to withdraw their veto on the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, the Council of Ministers of the EEC promulgated, on 20 September 1976, the “Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage”. According to art. 138 of the Treaty of Rome (in force at the time) this Act was to establish a “uniform electoral procedure” to be applied in the member states of the European Community. However, the EEC Council of Ministers established a very low level of uniformity because the governments of the Community wanted to maintain as much autonomy as possible in drawing up an electoral law by which they could elect their “own” MEPs to the parliament of Strasbourg15. One of the few binding rules that the national governments agreed to include in the Act, however, was the ban on the imperative mandate for representatives of the European parliament16. In other words, this rule was not considered negotiable at a national level since it was an intangible part of the constitutional traditions of the member states. The ban on the imperative mandate was then incorporated into the Statute for members of the European parliament, which was adopted in 2005 and became effective in July 200917. However, the free parliamentary mandate and the independence of deputies are not among the principles recognized and applied by the Five Star Movement. In fact, FSM candidates elected to the European parliament are obliged to adhere to a Codice di comportamento (Code of Conduct) which establishes the internal ethical rules and demands strict adherence to the Movement’s programme. The Codice provides for the “recall” of deputies deemed “disloyal”. The “recall” procedure is activated when at least 500 FSM militants accuse an MEP of “serious violation” of the Codice di comportamento. The sanction is put to vote via web. If the majority of militants finds the MEP “guilty”, he or she is obliged to resign. Moreover (and this is not a minor aspect of this control mechanism), prior to the European elections, the Five Star Movement candidates had to sign a sort of contract in which they agreed to resign in the event of penal sentence or “recall”. Should the MEP refuse to resign, he or she has to pay the Movement a fine of 250 000 euro which is then donated to charity18. Finally, this conception of direct democracy inevitably implies criticism of political parties. Grillo’s intention, stressed during the European election campaign, is to “make a clean sweep”. This way, he has revived the anti-party tradi-

15 16

17 18

Cf. Daniele PASQUINUCCI, Uniti dal voto? Storia delle elezioni europee 1948-2009, Milan, FrancoAngeli, 2013, p. 187-204. “Representatives shall vote on an individual and personal basis. They shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate”: Act of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, art. 4.1, see: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/act_concerning_the_election_of_the_repre sentatives_of_the_assembly_by_direct_universal_suffrage_20_september_1976-en-726617cf-e 362-4f7f-bec7-e5196fc39c87.html (4 February 2015). Cf. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005Q0684&from= EN (4 February 2015). The Code of Conduct can be consulted on http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/codice _comportamento_europee.php (4 February 2015).

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tion deeply rooted in the history of republican Italy19. But is democracy possible without political parties? Grillo’s answer is that his Movement aims to obtain 100% of Italian votes so as to render parties useless. This is, ultimately, a totalitarian vocation. The Lisbon Treaty establishes that political parties at a European level contribute to the formation of the EU citizens’ political objectives20. Bearing all this in mind, the substantial difference between the way the EU aims to regulate the internal functioning of parties at the European level and the way the Five Star Movement conceives of its own internal democracy should not come as a surprise. Although Grillo’s movement is not a party, this difference can be noted and appraised through reference to the “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations” of September 201221. It should be made clear (at the risk of seeming redundant) that the European legislators felt the need to draw up a statute with clear and precise rules so as to guarantee that parties follow “high standards of governance, accountability and transparency”22. Such a reminder is, in fact, necessary on the grounds that Grillo’s Movement is based on a “non-statute” which governs a “non-association”. This dual play on semantics has important consequences for the Movement: A “non-statute” minimizes the importance of internal rules, thus allowing Grillo considerable freedom in decision-making and discipline. It is worth repeating here that, together with Casaleggio, Grillo is the true dominus of the Movement. On the other hand, the decision to present themselves as a “non-association” implies a weak socio-political integration of FSM militants. This weakness is also a consequence of the decision to entrust all the phases of the life of the Movement to the web: Enrolment, debates, decisions, the selection of candidates, disciplinary measures pass through the web, although, naturally, everything is controlled and directed by the leader. Joining the Movement is individual and personal and “requires no formality other than registration on a normal Internet site”; it lasts until the “user” cancels registration. There is, in fact, no mention of “members” but rather “users” and “aspiring associates”. The “non-Statute” does not provide for managing committees within the Movement (on the contrary, they are explicitly excluded) or for the convocation of a Congress, or for a general assembly (or similar body) to guarantee representation of all members (i.e. “users/associates”) and the selection of the leadership of the Movement23. These same bodies are, on the contrary, expressly required by the Statute governing political parties at a European level.

19 20 21 22 23

Cf. Salvatore LUPO, Antipartiti: il mito della nuova politica nella storia della Repubblica (prima, seconda e terza), Rome, Donzelli, 2013. Lisbon Treaty, art. 8A.4: “Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union”. European Commission, Brussels, 12.9.2012, COM(2012) 499 final, 2012/0237 (COD). Ibid., p. 6. The ‘non-statute’ is on https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/materiali-bg/RegolamentoMovimento-5-Stelle.pdf (4 February 2015).

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2. New Generation of Eurosceptics The Five Star Movement has, then, introduced into the Italian political scene a form of Euroscepticism which could be defined as “ontological” since in essence it is incompatible with several principles and values on which the EU is founded. Naturally, this ontological nature is only attributable if we admit that direct democracy is not a form of government applicable to an entity such as the EU which has, too this day, an insufficient level of political integration24. Moreover, this new kind of Euroscepticism has given parliamentary representation (even if this phrase seems ironic, given all that has been said) to a new generation of Eurosceptics. Not only in Italy, in former years, opposition to European integration came mainly – though not exclusively – from sections of the population with a low level of education and income, without experience abroad (through study, work, or simply tourism) and who were poorly informed regarding the European Community. By contrast, the candidates and voters of the Five Star Movement at the last European elections are of quite a different mould. To verify the truth of this claim, we may begin with an analysis of the biographies of the 73 candidates at the Europeans, all of whom are perfectly representative of the “base” in that, in accordance with the rules of the FSM, they have been chosen by “users” through internet selection and none of them has had any previous experience as a “professional politician”. As regards professions, 27.7% of the candidates were white collar workers, 23.6% were self-employed and 8.3% were university researchers. It is significant that more than 80% speak at least one foreign language and that almost half (48.6%) have had one or more experiences abroad (work or study). There are also candidates who claim to have worked in the institutions of the EU and to have spent study periods in European universities through the Erasmus programme25. Ultimately, therefore, the profiles of the FSM candidates do not match the traditional image of Eurosceptics. Instead, they seem to have a high coefficient of cognitive mobilization, or rather, a store of information, experience and knowledge generally considered to be a determining aspect of a pro-European attitude26. Instead, in this case, the stock of knowledge is used to criticize the EU. The motives of the 73 candidates of the Five Star Movement for assuming a hostile attitude towards the EU can be deduced from their “statement of intent” 24

25 26

See for example what the Swiss legal expert Jean François Aubert says regarding the hypothesis of holding a European referendum on the ‘Constitutional Treaty’ signed by governments of the EU in 2004: “We can only imagine the explosive effect of a 'European' referendum where legislation on a sensitive topic would be adopted by 70 million citizens against 40 million – especially if the divide is a geographical and national one (the states of northern Europe vs. the states of southern Europe, for example)”: Aubert’s contribution is in: Fabrice FILLIEZ and Bruno KAUFMANN (eds.), The European Constitution. Bringing in the People. Contributions on ‘The options and limits of direct democracy in the European integration process’, Amsterdam/ Bern, Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe, 2004, p. 44. The profiles of the candidates of the Movement are on http://www.beppegrillo.it/europee/ candidati/ (4 February 2015). Ronald INGLEHART, “Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity”, Comparative Politics, 3: 1, October 1970, p. 45-70; on the Italian case, cf. Paolo BELLUCCI and Fabio SERRICCHIO, “Cosa pensano i cittadini dell'Europa?”, in: Paolo BELLUCCI and Niccolò CONTI (eds), Gli italiani e l'Europa. Opinione pubblica, élite politiche e media, Rome, Carocci, 2012, p. 135-156.

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published on the Movement’s website. The reasons can be grouped into four main categories: – opposition to the EU as a realm of élites, bankers and technocrats; – the fact that these same élites have betrayed the aim to create a Europe of the people, i.e. a “community of citizens”, – rejection of the “Fiscal Compact” and austerity policies imposed by Brussels; – the need to restore national sovereignty which has been usurped. Thus, we may deduce that good cognitive mobilization is aligned with an “antiEurope” stance which is hardly original. Nevertheless, this traditional propaganda has spread throughout sections of public opinion which, until a short time ago, seemed to be the “reserve” of Italian Europeanism. In order to better understand this evolution, we may study the socio-demographic composition of the Five Star Movement voters, as it emerges from an accurate post-election study published in the Italian daily “Europa”. On the basis of these data, a three-way comparison might be useful: in the first place with the electorate of the Democratic Party – which, as already mentioned, is a pro-European party –, and secondly with the base electorate of the Lista Tsipras, which may be defined as a Euro-critical party rather than a “Eurosceptic” one. In this case, the comparison presents a further element of interest, since for the May 2014 elections, the Lista Tsipras programme sought, from a fully “pro-European” stance, to reconcile the increase of powers and responsibilities of the European Parliament (an objective shunned by the FSM) with the promotion of “forms of direct citizen participation in decisions” (main objective of the FSM)27. Finally, the comparative study is extended to include the voters of the other two radically Eurosceptic parties mentioned above, i.e. the Northern League and Fratelli d’Italia. Compared with the Democratic Party (table 2), the first fact to meet the eye is that the Five Star Movement voters are much younger: 35% of PD voters are aged between 18 and 44, compared to 58% of the Five Star Movement; 30% of PD voters, compared to only 7% of the FSM, are aged 65 and over.

27

The election programme of the Lista Tsipras can be found at http://listatsipras.eu/chisiamo/programmanew.html (4 February 2015). It should be noted that also this programme makes explicit reference, albeit with more credibility than the Five Star Movement, to the federalism of Altiero Spinelli. (Among the Italians from the Lista Tsipras elected to Strasbourg is Spinelli’s journalist daughter Barbara). Furthermore, the programme proposes a constituent campaign to draw up a democratic and constitutional plan “with which to bestow credibility once more on the project of European unity”. On this basis, I find it difficult to include the Tsipras List in the group of Eurosceptics.

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Table 2. Age of Five Star Movement and Democratic Party voters European elections 2014

Source: IPSOS poll published by Europa, 2 June 2014, on http://www.europaquotidiano.it/ 2014/06/02/europee-2014-lanalisi-del-voto-di-ipsos/ipsos09 (4 February 2015).

The other interesting data concern level of education (table 3) which on the whole is higher among Five Star Movement voters. Table 3. Level of education of Five Star Movement and Democratic Party voters European elections 2014

Source: IPSOS poll published by Europa, 2 June 2014, on http://www.europaquotidiano.it/2014/ 06/02/europee-2014-lanalisi-del-voto-di-ipsos/ipsos09 (4 February 2015).

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As we can see, university and high school graduates make up 53% of the voters of Grillo’s Movement, compared to 44% of Democratic Party’s electorate. Furthermore, the PD collects a higher number of voters with only a primary school education or who claim to have no qualification at all. Finally, there are far more men among the voters of the Five Star Movement (65%) while there are more women voting PD (58%). These characteristics are reflected in the professional profiles of the respective electorates (table 4). Table 4. Profession of Five Star Movement and Democratic Party voters, European elections of 2014 Profession

Five Star Movement

Democratic Party

Entrepreneurs/freelance professionals/ executives

8%

6%

Retailers/artisans/self-employed

10%

5%

White collar/teachers

25%

22%

Manual labourers and similar

16%

10%

Unemployed

12%

6%

Students

8%

8%

Housewives

10%

12%

Pensioners

11%

31%

Source: IPSOS poll published by Europa, 2 June 2014, on http://www.europaquotidiano.it/2014/ 06/02/europee-2014-lanalisi-del-voto-di-ipsos/ipsos09 (4 February 2015).

Almost a third of Democratic Party electorate consists of pensioners, compared with 11% of the FSM voters. The Five Star Movement attracts twice as many unemployed voters as the PD (12% compared to 6%, due to the high unemployment rate among young Italians); a similar proportion exists between the two electorates as regards retailers, artisans and the self-employed, i.e., all the professional categories heavily hit by the recession. Finally, and this is not surprising, there are important differences regarding the information sources used by the two sets of voters (table 5). The main difference is obvious concerning the use of the internet (preferred source of the “Five Star” voters) and newspapers (which, together with television, are the main information channels used by the older voters of the Democratic Party).

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180 Table 5. Information Sources of Five Star Movement and Democratic Party voters, 2014 European elections Information sources

Five Star Movement

Democratic Party

Only television

15%

16%

Mainly television

32%

34%

Mainly newspapers

18%

34%

Mainly internet

31%

11%

Mainly radio

4%

5%

Source: IPSOS poll published by Europa, 2 June 2014, on http://www.europaquotidiano.it/2014/ 06/02/europee-2014-lanalisi-del-voto-di-ipsos/ipsos09 (4 February 2015).

We continue with a comparison with the Euro-critical party, the Lista Tsipras (LT), and with the two parties of Eurosceptic hardliners, i.e. the Northern League (NL) and Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). The first aspect to highlight is that, on the whole, the voters of the Five Star Movement are by far the least politically oriented. The following table, in fact, shows that FSM voters are evenly distributed across the right-left spectrum; in addition, a high number (17%) do not identify with the right-centre-left classification. On the contrary, as was predictable, the Lista Tsipras voters are clearly “(centre)-left” while those of the Northern League and Fratelli d’Italia define themselves as “(centre)-right”.

Table 6. Orientation of Electorates of Eurosceptic and Euro-Critical Parties across the Right/Left Spectrum, European Elections of 2014 Right/left

FSM

PD

LT

NL

FdI

Left

20%

26%

67%

2%

2%

Centre-left

18%

53%

27%

5%

3%

Centre

13%

9%

3%

8%

10%

Centre-right

17%

6%

1%

46%

42%

Right

15%

3%

2%

39%

43%

Not defined

17%

3%

–

–

–

Source: IPSOS poll published by Europa, 2 June 2014, on http://www.europaquotidiano.it/2014/ 06/02/europee-2014-lanalisi-del-voto-di-ipsos/ipsos09 (4 February 2015).

If we look at the data relating to age (table 7), the voters of Grillo’s Movement are younger, although more people aged between 18 and 34 elected the Lista Tsipras.

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Table 7. Age of Voters of Eurosceptic and Euro-critical Parties, 2014 European Elections Age group

FSM

LT

NL

FdI

18-24

11%

18%

7%

10%

25-34

17%

21%

12%

15%

35-44

30%

8%

24%

12%

45-54

22%

14%

16%

20%

55-64

13%

17%

16%

18%

65-

7%

22%

25%

25%

Source: IPSOS poll from “Europa”, 2 June 2014, on http://www.europaquotidiano.it/2014/ 06/02/europee-2014-lanalisi-del-voto-di-ipsos/ipsos09 (4 February 2015).

With regard to education levels (table 8), the percentage of voters with a degree is higher in the Lista Tsipras and in Fratelli d’Italia while those with a secondary school education are more numerous in the Five Star Movement. Northern League voters have the lowest level of education. Table 8. Level of Education of Voters of Eurosceptic and Euro-Critical Parties, 2014 European elections Qualification

FSM

LT

NL

FdI

Degree

11%

27%

8%

16%

High School Certificate

42%

38%

28%

34%

Middle School certificate

34%

24%

45%

21%

Primary school certificate/no qualification

13%

11%

19%

19%

Source: IPSOS poll published by Europa, 2 June 2014, on http://www.europaquotidiano.it/2014/ 06/02/europee-2014-lanalisi-del-voto-di-ipsos/ipsos09 (4 February 2015).

Finally, with regard to the professional profile of Eurosceptic and Euro-critical voters (table 9), it should be noted that the Five Star Movement garnered a great deal of support from retailers, artisans and the self-employed in spite of competition from the Northern League whose electoral base is made up of these categories, and among manual labourers (despite competition from the Lista Tsipras). On the contrary, pensioners (who represented 26% of the total electorate at the 2014 European elections) do not take Grillo’s Movement into consideration when they express a Eurosceptic position. Instead, they prefer to give their vote to parties of the extreme right (Northern League and Fratelli d'Italia) and to a slightly lesser extent to the Lista Tsipras.

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182

Table 9. Profession of voters of Eurosceptic and Euro-critical parties, European elections of 2014 Profession

FSM

LT

NL

FdI

Entrepreneurs/freelance professionals/ executives

8%

5%

5%

13%

Retailers/artisans/self-employed

10%

5%

9%

7%

White collar/teachers

25%

29%

21%

17%

Manual labourers and similar

16%

6%

13%

10%

Unemployed

12%

8%

5%

10%

Students

8%

16%

6%

4%

Housewives

10%

8%

13%

8%

Pensioners

11%

23%

28%

26%

Source: IPSOS poll published by Europa, 2 June 2014, on http://www.europaquotidiano.it/2014/ 06/02/europee-2014-lanalisi-del-voto-di-ipsos/ipsos09 (4 February 2015).

In conclusion, the Five Star Movement’s idea of democracy and conception of politics are incompatible with those adopted by the EU. This incompatibility prevails over the Movement’s specific position with regard to the EU and its policies. In this sense, we should not be misled by the generally populist nature of the anti-European stance of the Movement’s leadership and its European parliamentary candidates of the May 2014 elections. Nevertheless, the most important issue is perhaps the Five Star Movement’s ability to obtain the support of sections of the electorate which, until recently, could be considered less permeable to Eurosceptic propaganda. A large portion of Movement sympathizers is made up of young people. Many of them studied and worked abroad – in some cases, in the institutions of the Community. Furthermore, they are de-politicized, with a good or even excellent level of education, a characteristic they share with a Euro-critical party, the Lista Tsipras. Grillo’s success at the May 2014 elections seems to demonstrate that distrust or hostility towards Europe is widespread among voters with a good or even excellent cognitive mobilization. This should lead, at least in Italy, to a reassessment of Euroscepticism. It is neither (or at least not only) a simplistic response to complex problems any longer, nor is it inclined to use Europe as a scapegoat on which to blame the responsibilities of the State for the grave (not only financial) crisis afflicting the country. On the contrary, Euroscepticism seems to be, at least in Italy, a manifestation of motivated criticism, founded on sound knowledge of the EU, its decision-making processes and its policies.

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L’EUROSCEPTICISME DE « SECONDE GÉNÉRATION » : LE MOUVEMENT CINQ ETOILES ET L’UNION EUROPÉENNE En Italie, les élections européennes du 25 mai 2014 ont enregistré un clair succès du Partito Democratico (40,8% des voix), qui a une attitude « pro-européenne ». Toutefois, les partis ouvertement eurosceptiques ont été en mesure d'obtenir le consensus de presque un tiers de l'électorat. Entre eux se trouve le Mouvement Cinq Etoiles, fondé et dirigé par l'ancien comédien Beppe Grillo, qui a obtenu 21,16%, ce qui en fait le deuxième parti le plus voté. L'essai examine la nature de l'euroscepticisme du Mouvement, en considérant deux aspects. Le premier est la compatibilité des principes et du système politique de l'UE avec la démocratie directe prônée par le Mouvement; le second est le profil prosopographique de ses candidats élus et de ses électeurs. L'analyse montre que la conception de la démocratie du Mouvement Cinq Etoiles est l'antithèse de celle adoptée par les institutions communautaires; d'autre part, l'analyse prosopographique révèle l'émergence d'une « deuxième génération » d'eurosceptiques, qui utilise une haute « mobilisation cognitive » afin de contester l'Union européenne. In Italy, the European elections of May 25, 2014, ended with a clear victory of the Democratic Party (40.8% of the vote) which is clearly pro-European. Still, the openly Euro-sceptic parties were able to obtain the support of almost one third of the voters. Between those two camps, there is the Five Star Movement, founded and lead by the former Comedian Beppe Grillo. It reached 21.16% and the second highest number of votes. This essay explores the nature of the Euroskepticism of the Movement concentrating on two aspects: The first one is the compatibility of the principles and the political system of the EU with the direct democracy put forward by the Movement. The second is the prosopographic profile of its elected candidates as well as its voters. The analysis shows that the Five Star Movement’s understanding of democracy is the antithesis of that of the European institutions. On the other hand, the prosopographic analysis reveals the emergence of a « second generation » of Euro-sceptics. They use their high “cognitive mobilization” to challenge the European Union.

EUROSKEPTIZISMUS DER „ZWEITEN GENERATION“: DAS FÜNF STERNE BEWEGUNG UND DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION Die Europawahl am 25. Mai 2014 endet in Italien mit einem klaren Sieg der eindeutig proeuropäischen Demokratischen Partei (40.8% der Stimmen). Aber die offen euroskeptischen Parteien errangen die Zustimmung fast eines Drittels der Wähler. Zwischen diesen beiden Lagern steht die Fünf Sterne-Bewegung, die der frühere Komiker Beppe Grillo gegründet hat und die er führt. Sie gewann 21,6% der Stimmen und erreichte damit die zweithöchste Stimmenzahl. Dieser Essay untersucht den Charakter des Euroskeptizismus der Bewegung und konzentriert sich dabei auf zwei Aspekte: Der erste ist die Kompatibilität der Prinzipien und des politischen Systems der EU mit der direkten Demokratie, die die Bewegung fordert. Der zweite Aspekt ist das prosopographische Profil seiner gewählten

184

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Kandidaten sowie seiner Wähler. Die Analyse zeigt, dass das Demokratieverständnis der Fünf-Sterne-Bewegung derjenigen der Europäischen Institutionen diametral entgegensteht. Ferner enthüllt die prosopographische Analyse das Auftreten einer „zweiten Generation“ von Euroskeptikern. Sie nutzen ihre hohe „kognitive Mobilisierung“ dazu, die Europäische Union herauszufordern.

FOUR FLAVOURS OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE NETHERLANDS SIMON OTJES AND GERRIT VOERMAN, DOCUMENTATION CENTRE DUTCH POLITICAL PARTIES, UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN Dutch politics has always been characterized by pluralism: due to the openness of the electoral system, the existence of multiple historical cleavages and high electoral volatility in recent years, the Netherlands has a high number of parties. This means that Eurosceptic positions have been formulated by different kinds of parties. This chapter analyses four flavours of Euroscepticism: the resistance to European supra-nationalism from Protestant communities; the anti-capitalist Euroscepticism of the left; radical right-wing populism that mixes opposition to EU integration with opposition to immigration; and, finally, the latest shoot of Euroscepticism, the green Euro-critique. These four flavours all won seats in the European elections held on May 22, 2014. Twenty parties1 competed for twenty-six seats. This analysis is limited to the ten parties that won seats in these elections. First, we will describe the historical evolution of the positions of Dutch parties towards the European Union (EU). Next, we examine the programs, the electoral campaigns and the positions expressed taken by party leaders in 2014 in order to determine to what extent the positions of these parties can – or cannot – be classified as Eurosceptic. After having analysed the results of the European elections, we concentrate on the five Eurosceptical parties we have found in the subsequent section: the orthodox Protestant parties Political Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP) and the Christian Union (ChristenUnie), which participated in the elections with a common list of candidates; the left-wing Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP); the radical right-wing populist Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV); and the Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD) with their green Eurocritique. In the last section, we analyse the electorate of these parties in more detail, focusing on their demographics and opinions. The term Euroscepticism is often used to describe a variety of negative attitudes with respect to the EU. In this paper, we follow the definition of Scszerbiak and Taggart, who distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism: they define hard Euroscepticism as “principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU”2 – that is: institutional cooperation based on transferring sovereignty to the European, supranational level. Soft Euroscepticism is not a principled opposition to the European project, but objection to “the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competences that the EU is planning to make”.

1 2

Two parties, the Christian Union and the SGP competed with a common list. Aleks SCSZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, “Theorizing Party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality”, in: Akeks SCSZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART (eds.) Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 247-248.

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1. Historical Perspective: The Positions of the Dutch Political Parties towards Europe Over the years, the core parties of the Dutch party system3, the ChristianDemocratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA) (and its predecessors), the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), and the market-liberal Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) have generally supported European integration (see Table 1)4. These parties together held the vast majority of seats in Dutch parliament. Since 1946, cabinets have always been formed by at least two of these three parties. From the beginning, however, at both wings of the political spectrum, small parties have opposed supranational European integration. According to the orthodox-Protestant SGP, a united Europe would be predominantly humanistic or – even worse – Catholic which would jeopardize the Calvinist character of Netherlands. In 1963 and 1981, two other orthodox Protestant parties entered parliament. They joined the SGP in opposing supranational cooperation. On the far left, the Dutch Communist Party (Communistische Partij van Nederland, CPN) considered European integration a capitalist project, giving free reign to large enterprises at the expense of the interests of the working class. In 1959, the CPN was joined by another left-socialist party that opposed EU integration on similar grounds. For different reasons, both Calvinists and communists rejected any degradation of national sovereignty. With reference to the Dutch history as an independent and Calvinist country and the vision of a communist future for the Netherlands respectively, they took a strong Eurosceptic position. In numbers, the Eurosceptic current in the Dutch Parliament was quite marginal: from the 1950s until the 1980s, the share of these Eurosceptic parties of the left and right averaged less than 9 percent of the total number of seats. The traditional pro-European consensus was challenged in the 1990s when VVD-leader Frits Bolkestein criticized the idea of a federal Europe5. He wanted to limit European integration to a liberalized and efficiently operated common market. He accepted supranational co-operation in order to achieve such a market. Bolkestein did favour monetary integration. He proposed to drastically cut agricultural subsidies and structural funds, which would provide the possibility to reduce the Dutch financial contribution to the EU. Initially, his criticism did not prompt a fundamental change among the major parties, including his own: They all agreed on the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Gradually, however, CDA and Labour also started to criticize the inefficiency, cost and bureaucracy of the EU, and to question a federalist Europe as the final goal of Euro3 4

5

Gordon SMITH, “Core persistence: Change and the ‘people's party” West European Politics, 12.4, 1998, p. 157-168. This section is based on Gerrit VOERMAN, “De Nederlandse Politieke Partijen en de Europese Integratie”, in: Kees AARTS, Henk VAN DER KOLK (ed.), Nederlanders en Europa, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 2005, p. 44-63 ; Hans VOLLAARD, Gerrit VOERMAN, Nelleke VAN DER WALLE, “The Netherlands”, in: Donatella M. VIOLA (ed.), Routledge Handbook of European elections, London, New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 167-187; Hans VOLLAARD, Gerrit VOERMAN, “De Europese opstelling van Nederlandse politieke partijen”, in: Hans VOLLAARD, Jan VAN DER HARST, Gerrit VOERMAN, De Europese opstelling van Nederland, Amsterdam, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2015. Gerrit VOERMAN,“Een euroscepticus in Brussel? Frits Bolkestein, lid van de Europese Commissie (1999-2004)”, in: Gerrit VOERMAN, Bert VAN DEN BRAAK, Carla Van Baalen (eds.), De Nederlandse eurocommissarissen, Amsterdam, Boom, 2010, p. 261-293.

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pean integration. However, they remained yet more reticent than the VVD6. Nevertheless, all these parties endorsed the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, followed in 2000 by the Treaty of Nice. The social-liberal Democrats 66 (Democraten 66, D66), who warmly embraced the notion of “an ever closer union”, also approved these Treaties. With the growing criticism of Europe in the three core parties, D66 soon became the most pro-European party in the Netherlands. For this party, the Treaty of Nice did not go far enough: they wanted Europe to unify faster. While in the 1990s the three core parties became more critical towards the EU, GreenLeft (GroenLinks, GL) developed in the opposite direction. This party was founded in 1990, as the result of a merger of the aforementioned hard Eurosceptic Communists and left-wing socialists with radicals (who opposed the focus of the European Community on economic growth but not the principle of EU integration). From the outset, GreenLeft accepted the European Community (or European Union after 1993) despite reservations about its lack of openness and democratic procedures. GreenLeft recognized that it would not be able to realize its democratic, social and environmental ambitions unless the EU’s supranational character was bolstered. Therefore, the party supported the Nice Treaty while it had voted against the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. Table 1: Positions of Dutch Parties Concerning European Treaties, 1986-2007

Vote

Single European Act (1986)

Treaty of Maastricht (1992)

Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)

Treaty of Nice (2001)

European Constitution (2003)

Treaty of Lisbon (2007)

18/11/ 1986

12/11/1992

5/11/1998

22/11/2001

(vote cancelled)

5/6/2008

PvdA

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

VVD

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

D66

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

CDA

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

In favour

SGP

Against

Against

Against

In favour

Against

Against

CU *)

Against

Against

Against

In favour

Against

In favour

GL *)

Against

Against

Against

In favour

In favour

In favour

SP

–

–

Against

Against

Against

Against

LPF

–

–

–

–

Against

–

PVV

–

–

–

–

Against

Against

PvdD

–

–

–

–

Against

Against

*) Including its predecessors

On the other side of the political spectrum, the orthodox Protestant parties also softened their anti-European stance, but they certainly did not go as far as GreenLeft. The SGP and the Christian Union, which the two small orthodox Protestant parties mentioned above had merged with in 2000, accepted the Treaty of Nice; both parties agreed with the enlargement of the EU without a concomitant transfer of sovereignty. The SGP as well as the Christian Union remained clearly anti-federalist: They did not want to go further than a union of 6

Hans VOLLAARD, Gerrit VOERMAN, “De Europese opstelling van Nederlandse politieke partijen”, op.cit.

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independent European states, and were reluctant regarding the ongoing integration7. Yet both parties softened their traditional rejection of supranational decision-making within the EU, especially concerning the internal market. All in all, their positions can be qualified as soft Eurosceptic. Thus, in the years around 2000, there was still a certain consensus in Dutch politics regarding Europe, but it differed from the consensus of ten years before. The three core parties had become more critical towards European integration, although not all to the same extent. At the same time, Eurosceptic parties had come closer to what could be called a more “critical consensus”, since they had become less negative about “Brussels”. Because of this overall convergence, a hard Eurosceptic voice was lacking in Dutch politics, leaving voters who rejected Europe outright without a voice in parliament. Only one of the new parties emerging in the decades before and after 2000 would provide for this need by explicitly demanding the Netherlands to leave the European Union. Several other newcomers took a Eurosceptic position8. In 1994, the anti-neoliberal, left-wing populist Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) made its appearance in the Dutch parliament. The SP started as a Maoist sect, but gradually transformed itself into a left-wing populist party. After 2000, it adopted a more social democratic course. Its opinion on European integration was crystal clear: It appreciated cooperation between independent states, but rejected any transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level. The party echoed the critique of the communist party: It considered multinational companies and large countries to call the shots in the EU. National democracy and the welfare state would be sacrificed to increased economic competitiveness. Although the SP gradually accepted the EU, it criticized the absence of a “social Europe”, rejected further integration, and remained fundamentally opposed to federalism – which could be labelled a soft Eurosceptic stance. Since the early 2000s, new right-wing populist parties emerged that were also opposed to European integration9. At the parliamentary elections in 2002, the debuting List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) became the second-largest party. Its leader Fortuyn who was killed a few days before the elections had strongly criticized the political establishment for neglecting issues of immigration. His position concerning Europe was somewhat ambivalent: Fortuyn considered himself “a loyal supporter of the EU, while maintaining our own identity and – where possible – our sovereignty”10. On the one hand, Fortuyn appreciated the European Union as a project promoting peace and prosperity, but on the

7 8

9

10

Hans VOLLAARD, “Euroscepticism and Protestantism in the Netherlands”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 7, no. 3, 2006, p. 276-297. From 1989 till 1998 the national-populist and soft Eurosceptic Centre Democrats were represented in Parliament, with one and three seats respectively. This marginal party is excluded here, just as its predecessor the Centre Party, which had one seat in Parliament from 1982 till 1986. Paul LUCARDIE, “Animalism: a nascent ideology: exploring the idea of animal rights parties in Europe”, Paper presented at the Workshop “Political Animals and Animal Politics” of the ECPR Joint Sessions Antwerp 10-15 April 2012; Hans VOLLAARD, Gerrit VOERMAN, “De Europese opstelling van Nederlandse politieke partijen”, op.cit. Pim FORTUYN, De puinhopen van acht jaar paars, Karakter, Copenhagen, 2002, p. 181

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other hand, he was reluctant regarding the ongoing political integration11. He preferred a confederation of sovereign states which would all maintain their own national identity. The European Parliament had to be replaced by a senate composed of representatives of national parliaments. The LPF did not survive long after its leader's demise: In 2006, the party disappeared from parliament. The political and electoral space Fortuyn’s party had left was subsequently occupied by the national-populist Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party, PVV), which made its parliamentary debut in 2006. The PVV was founded by liberal MP Geert Wilders who had broken with the VVD because contrary to his party, he was fully opposed to a possible membership of Turkey of the EU. Wilders insisted on the ‘repatriation’ of sovereignty from Brussels if this was in the Dutch interest; parliament in The Hague had to regain its authority in all policy areas. The PVV aimed for European economic cooperation on a voluntary basis; in a way, the EU should return to the structure of the former European Economic Community (EEC). The views of the PVV regarding European integration radicalized: in 2012 the party adopted a hard Eurosceptical attitude by pleading for the Netherlands to leave the EU: Like Switzerland, the Netherlands would continue to trade with the EU on a bilateral basis. For the first time in decades, this demand was heard again in Dutch Parliament. In 2006, the Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD) also entered Parliament. It advocated the interest of non-human creatures and has therefore been described as “animalist”12. In its view, animals should not be made subjects of economic interests. It had already been a visible part of the campaign against the European Constitutional Treaty, attacking the established parties for supporting the animal unfriendly treaty13. The party rejected the Lisbon Treaty which it believed to subordinate animal rights to non-animal-friendly cultural and religious traditions. The growing criticism of the EU and European integration had clearly manifested itself at the European elections of 2004. It was also expressed in the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty of June 1, 2005. CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA and GreenLeft, together occupying 85 percent of the seats in Parliament, defended the draft; the Christian Union, SGP, LPF, SP, Wilders (at that time an independent MP) and the extra-parliamentary PvdD opposed it. They feared that the constitution would result in a federal European “superstate” in which the Netherlands would lose its sovereignty and identity. Whereas only 39 percent of the Dutch electorate made their way to the polls in the 2004 European elections, no less than 63 percent of voters cast their vote. At 62 percent, the no-voters formed a vast majority. The Lisbon Treaty replaced the Constitutional Treaty and was ratified by the Second Chamber by 111 votes to 39 in June 2008. The soft Eurosceptic Christian Union, the SGP’s partner in the European elections, was now

11

12 13

Cas MUDDE, “A Fortuynist Foreign Policy”, in: Christina SCHORI LIANG (ed), Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, p. 217; Cas MUDDE, Petr KOPECKÝ, “Euroscepsis: een conceptualisatie”, in: Hans VOLLAARD, Bartho BOER (eds.), Euroscepsis in Nederland. Utrecht, Lemma, 2005 p. 15-22. Paul LUCARDIE, “Animalism: a nascent ideology: exploring the idea of animal rights parties in Europe”, op.cit. Simon OTJES, “Animal Party Politics in Parliament”, in: Marcel WISSENBURG, David SCHLOSSBERG (eds.), Political Animals and Animal Politics, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014, p. 107-122.

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part of the governing coalition for the first time and voted in favour. It was the only party to do so that had previously voted against the European constitution. In the first decade of the 21st century the Eurosceptics in the Dutch parliament certainly were a motley crew. Its traditional components – orthodox Protestant parties and far left parties – were still present, although mostly in another organizational form. The SP had replaced the Communists and left-wing Socialists; and two small Eurosceptic orthodox Protestant parties had merged into the Christian Union. The SGP was the only party that had been present from the beginning in the early 1950s – but in the course of time, it had moved from its harsh Euroscepticism to a soft variant. In the 2000s, these parties were joined by the national-populist PVV and the animalist PvdD. At the European elections in 2009, these Eurosceptic parties together received 34 % of the vote.

2. Election campaign 2014 2014 was a record year in terms of the number of parties participating in the European elections in the Netherlands. In total, there were 19 lists, two more than in 2009 (which was also a record then). Eighteen parties participated with a list of candidates of their own; two parties (Christian Union and SGP) had a combined list. The number of competing lists reflected the diversity in the Dutch Lower House which at the time hosted eleven parties. Except for the pensioners' party 50Plus, all these parties managed to obtain seats in the European Parliament (see Table 3). The other parties did not succeed to pass the electoral threshold. 2.1 Top candidates Parliamentary experience at the national or European level seems to have been a precondition to become the leader of the nine parties that were already represented in the European Parliament before the elections of 2014. The two liberal parties VVD and D66, the SP and the CU/SGP combination appointed the same top candidate as in 2009. The four others chose new leaders to head the list. Both CDA and GreenLeft appointed a serving MEP; Labour a former member of the lower house of parliament, and the PVV the leader of their group in the upper house. The top candidate of the PvdD – which had not been successful in the 2009 elections – was member of a provincial council. Dutch political parties do not send their national figureheads to Europe, nor is it customary for Dutch political heavyweights to continue their national career in Brussels and Strasbourg – as for example the former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt did. Although nearly all Dutch leaders heading the party lists at the European election in 2014 had been active in national or European politics, the parties complied with this old tradition: None of them was very prominent. Therefore, the electorate is not really familiar with those leaders. VVD’s top candidate Hans van Baalen was relatively most well-known by the voters (46%). He had served in Dutch Parliament from 1999 till 2009 (with a single interruption) and was the President of the Liberal International between 2009 and 2014. Second came D66 leader Sophie in’t Veld (25%); she has been a MEP since 2004. Labour candidate Paul Tang, member of the Dutch parliament from 2007 till 2010, held

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the third position (20%). All the others scored less than 20%. The three leaders mentioned here were also known by more than half of the voters of their parties; the others were quite unfamiliar to their party’s own electorate14. 2.2 Programs Generally speaking, the programmatic views of the Dutch political parties on the eve of the European elections were in line with their previous basic positions already described15. D66 and GreenLeft were clearly pro-European. The Democrats advocated “a political union in the form of a European federation”; GreenLeft attached much value to the EU “as a political union”. Compared to these two champions of European integration, VVD, CDA and PvdA were more critical towards the EU. The conservative liberals wanted to limit European cooperation to its “core tasks”; the Christian democrats explicitly mentioned in their programmes that they “were and are against a federal Europe”. The PvdA was less explicit, but did not use terms like federalism or political union. It realised that because of the financial crisis, member states had to share competences, “perhaps more than we actually found comfortable”. These three parties placed greater emphasis on national interests either in financial or social terms. The five Eurosceptic parties self-evidently distanced themselves from the European integration process. The CU/SGP claimed that they “were always principally opposed to the process of integration that could or should lead to a federal Europe”. The PvdD stated that “Europe is not a federal state and it is not desirable or necessary to strive for it”. The SP repeated that it did not want a “European super-state nor a European government”. The PVV simply wanted “the Netherlands to leave the EU”. Between the two champions of European integration, D66 and GreenLeft, and the PVV, the only hard Eurosceptic party, there is a group of seven parties that were all opposed to a federal Europe. This does not mean, however, that they held identical opinions which will be demonstrated below in respect of the solutions they offered to solve the euro-zone crisis. Since the European elections of 2009, the European Union has changed drastically. In response to the bank crisis, Brussels established, among other things, the European Stability Mechanism (a structural bail-out program to assist Member States in the Eurozone in financial difficulties), the European Fiscal Compact (permitting the European Commission to monitor Member States budgets) and the Banking Union (transferring supervision of banks from the national to the European level). As a result, the competences of the EU Commission concerning Member State’s economic policies increased substantially16. No wonder the euro crisis and the measures to resolve it featured prominently in the parties’ manifestos for the 2014 European 14 15

16

Jos KESTER, “Achterban kent EP-lijsttrekker vaak niet.”, EP 2014, site.ipsos-nederland.nl/ content.asp?targetid=1300 (24 April 2015). The programs of the parties represented in Dutch Parliament participating in the European elections have been published as a collection; see Huub PELLIKAAN, Joop VAN HOLSTEYN, Gerrit VOERMAN, Rianne HARTEVELD, Verkiezingen van het Europees Parlement 22 mei 2014: Verkiezingsprogramma’s, Amsterdam, Rozenberg Publishers, 2014. Michael W. BAUER, Stefan BECKER, “The unexpected winner of the crisis: The European Commission’s strengthened role in economic governance” Journal of European Integration, 36.3, 2014, p. 213-229.

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elections. Broadly speaking, four possible solutions of the crisis can be distinguished17. Based on two simple scales – more or less Europe; i.e., do parties favour or oppose to the transfer of sovereignty to Brussels. – more or less market; i.e., do parties prefer more or less government intervention in the market. the parties running in the 2014 European elections can be classified according to their position on these two scales (see Table 2). VVD, CDA and D66 favour “more Europe and more market”. They endorse the actions of the European Commission: strict surveillance of the budgets of member states in order to prevent budget deficits. They also favour economic reforms, austerity measures and privatizations in eurozone countries with excessive deficits; and the completion of the internal market which they consider the engine of economic growth and employment. There are differences as well between these three parties. D66, for example, favours far-reaching European integration. The party supports a European tax – that is a European VAT to replace the national contributions to the EU. The VVD is explicitly against this; this item is absent in the Christian democratic program. D66 also advocates joint Eurobonds, by which member states will share their national debts. CDA and VVD are opposed to this. The positions of the GreenLeft and the PvdA have marked similarities and differences compared to the positions of these three parties. Their position is “more Europe and less market”: both parties also stand for more supervision by the European Commission, but at the same time, they stress the need for a social Europe. The European Union should not just monitor budget deficits but also monitor whether eurozone states are combatting unemployment. So both parties do not reject the internal market, but want to impose social limits. This includes a transfer of powers to the European level, for instance in the form of a EU-wide minimum wage. These parties are critical of the current policies of the European Commission, for instance of plans to further liberalize additional economic sectors, which according to some definitions of Euroscepticism makes them soft Eurosceptic18. The fact that they do favour further European integration in order to achieve a “social Europe” shows the limitation of this definition. GreenLeft goes farthest in its vision of a social Europe. The party endorses a far reaching redistribution in Europe through a European financial stabilization fund that would transfers funds from countries with high economic growth to countries in a recession.

17 18

Simon OTJES, “Animal Party Politics in Parliament”, op.cit. Aleks SCSZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, “Theorizing Party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality”, op.cit.

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Table 2: Positions of Parties towards Transfer of Sovereignty and Completion of the Internal Market in Their Manifestos, 201419 Market Europe

Less

More

Less

SP PvdD

CU SGP PVV

More

GL PvdA

D66 VVD CDA

The SP and the PvdD subscribe to the view of ‘less Europe, less market’. Both parties disapprove of the further transfer of sovereignty to the European Commission to resolve the eurozone crisis; the SP suspects that Brussel is abusing the financial crisis to quickly realize a European federation. The PvdD condemns the Commission’s exclusive focus on the financial aspect; member states should not only reduce their financial, but also their ecological deficit. Both parties also believe that the liberalization of the internal market has gone too far. Like GreenLeft and the PvdA, they favour coordinated European policies to limit the market which would imply the transfer of sovereignty: The SP favours the introduction of European minimum standards for taxes and the PvdD a European minimum wage. According to the PVV and the Christian Union/SGP it is not Brussels that will save the day. The Christian Union and SGP opt for less Europe, but want to maintain and complete the internal market. The PVV wants no Europe at all: the Netherlands should leave the European Union and give up the Euro. The party, however, hopes to maintain access to the internal market and its profits by signing bilateral trade agreements with Brussels. The party names Switzerland as an example of a prosperous country outside the EU20. On the basis of this classification we can qualify SGP and Christian Union, SP, PVV and PvdD as Eurosceptic. They differ, however, fundamentally in their opinion about the internal market: the SP and PvdD take similar positions as the far-left parties that historically opposed EU integration as a capitalist project; PVV, SGP and Christian Union oppose the transfer of sovereignty but not the free market that the EU entails. 2.3 Campaign The campaign for the European elections was not spectacular at all21. An employee of a renowned Dutch campaign bureau thought the campaign was “invisible… The absence of the Dutch political parties, politicians and top candi19 20 21

Source: Simon OTJES, “Animal Party Politics in Parliament”, op.cit. The position of the pensioners' party 50Plus can also qualified as less Europe, more market, but since this party was not able to win a seat at the European elections, it will not be taken into account here. Hans VOLLAARD,“Euro-pragmatisme domineert in Nederland”, De Hofvijver, no. 42, 19 mei 2014, www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/9353000/1/j9vvj72dlowskug/vjjsbfn4r2wi?pk_ campaign=hofv-1405&pk_kwd=vjjsbfn4r2wi (24 April 2015).

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dates in the streets, in the debates and through other channels was almost embarrassing”22. A journalist spoke of “a sluggish situation”23. As often in the past, the election campaign was not so much about Europe, but more about national politics; and compared to the European first candidates, national politicians played a relatively prominent role24. The fact that the main European parties had appointed “frontrunners”, candidates for the presidency of the European Commission in the run-up to the European elections, did little to change this national orientation25. The debates between the European presidential candidates held at the beginning and the end of the campaign were not broadcasted on the Dutch television channels – not even the one held in Maastricht. The European top candidates did not visit the Netherlands often26. The frontrunner of the European People’s Party, JeanClaude Juncker, attended a meeting of the CDA, and ALDE’s top candidate Guy Verhofstadt was present at the start of the campaign of D66. VVD and PvdA did not receive the candidates. The campaign committee of the PvdA decided that the Party of European Socialists’ (PES) top candidate Martin Schulz should not participate in the party’s campaign27. The attitude of the VVD was also ambivalent: early in 2014, party leader and prime minister Mark Rutte had mediated between ALDE’s two liberal candidates, Verhofstadt and the Finnish member of the European Commission, Olli Rehn. But Rutte had not been enthusiastic at all about this experiment – probably also because of Verhofstadt’s outspoken federalist views on Europe. Resistance within the VVD to ALDE’s candidate was strong. The party’s spokesman in the Dutch parliament considered “militant Europhiles” like the former Belgian prime minister “more dangerous for Europe” than Eurosceptics like Wilders or Marine Le Pen of the French Front National28. D66, on the contrary, fully supported Verhofstadt – his views regarding Europe strongly resembled theirs. Therefore the surprise was great when during the campaign the national leader of D66 Alexander Pechtold announced that the pace of European integration had to be adapted in order not to lose the Eurocritical citizens. While most established Dutch parties kept the European parties and their presidential candidates at a distance in their campaigns, it was paradoxically the most Eurosceptic party of Netherlands, the PVV, which openly demonstrated its

22 23

24 25 26 27 28

Bram FESTEN, “De verkiezing zonder champagne”, 24 December 2014, bkbcampaignwatch.nl/het-campagnejaar-2014/ (24 April 2015). Teun VAN DE KEUKEN, “De Europese verkiezingen zijn een lamlendige toestand”, in: Het Parool, 22 mei 2014, www.parool.nl/parool/nl/14629/TEUN-VAN-DE-KEUKEN/article/ detail/3659664/2014/05/22/De-Europese-verkiezingen-zijn-een-lamlendige-toestand.dhtml (24 April 2015). Bertjan VERBEEK, “Netherlands”, in: Andrei KULIKOW (ed.), “2014 European Parliament elections: Views from across Europe”, Bulletin on European and CIS Studies, Special edition, Moscow, August 2014, p. 24-27. Paul BORDEWIJK, “Europese verkiezingen of nationale peiling?” 28 May 2014, www. paulbordewijk.nl/artikelen/566 (26 April 2015). Virginie MAMADOUH, Herman VAN DER WUSTEN, “De triomf van de Spitzenkandidat” Geografie, 23.7, 2014, p. 16-18. Chris PEETERS, “Spitzenkandidaten – hoe verder”, www.wbs.nl/opinie/blogs/cpeeters/ spitzenkandidaten-%E2%80%93hoe-verder (26 April 2015). Maaike VAN HOUTEN, “VVD: Niet voor Europa, niet tegen, maar wel héél kritisch” Trouw, 23 November 2013.

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links with congenial parties elsewhere in the EU29. Since 2013, Wilders sought cooperation with the French Front National, the Italian Lega Nord, the Belgian Vlaams Belang, and the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), aiming to form a joint hard Eurosceptic group in the European Parliament after the European elections. He visited several parties, and in November 2013, he received National Front leader Marine Le Pen. Wilders called the cooperation “the beginning of the liberation from the political elite and the monster of Brussels”30. The plan to start the election campaign together with a joint statement in mid-April 2014 was cancelled after racist statements of Andreas Mölzer, the top candidate of the FPÖ at the European elections. After this, the parties cooperated again in the election campaign. Within Wilders’ party, the rapprochement to these radical rightwing populist parties was controversial; one of their MEPs who was regarded as a possible first candidate decided not to stand for re-election for the PVV. During the campaign, Dutch party leaders attacked PVV leader Marcel de Graaff for doing business with a party whose founder Jean-Marie Le Pen had denied the holocaust. De Graaff pointed out that his daughter Marine Le Pen had distanced herself from the anti-Semitic views of her father.

3. Electoral results Electoral turnout increased slightly from 36.8 percent in 2009 to 37.3 percent in 2014. Just like in 2009, the Netherlands had the lowest turnout of the six founding members of the European Economic Community. Moreover, it was below the average European turnout of 43 percent. The voter turnout also remained well below the 74.6 percent of the last national elections. CDA and PvdA lost support in the 2014 elections (see Table 3). Together they obtained only 37 percent of the votes. The Christian Democrats had been the largest party since the European elections of 1989, but now became second. The share of the vote in 2014 (15 percent) was their lowest since the first direct European elections in 1979. In comparison to the latest national elections in September 2012, however, the CDA nearly doubled its share. Like the Christian democrats, Labour (with 9 percent) recorded its worst result by far since 1979; this was particularly notable because in the 2012 national elections, the PvdA had had a strong showing. Facing competition from both the cosmopolitan D66 and the nationalist PVV, the VVD slightly increased its share vis-à-vis the 2009 European elections (when it had recorded its worst “European” result ever): the Liberals went from 11 percent up to 12 percent. The party performed considerably poorer than it had done in the 2012 national elections. As both government parties, PvdA and VVD, had performed poorly, the election result was seen as a punishment for the performance of the government31.

29 30 31

Paul BORDEWIJK, “Europese verkiezingen of nationale peiling?”, op.cit. Jesse VISSER, “Wage bargaining institutions – from crisis to crisis”, European Economy Economic Papers 448, April 2013. Bertjan VERBEEK, “Netherlands”, in: Andrei KULIKOW (ed.), “2014 European Parliament elections: Views from across Europe”, op.cit.

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The winner of the European elections was the cosmopolitan, clearly proEuropean D66, with 16 percent of the vote – an increase of more than a quarter compared to 2009. Since 1979, however, the largest party at the European elections has never won such a small percentage of the vote. It was the first time in its history that D66 became the largest party at national or European elections – in voters, but not in seats: the CDA obtained one seat more than D66 due its electoral alliance with the Christian Union/SGP. GreenLeft, about just as proEuropean as D66, lost a little compared to 2009 but considerably less than it had in the 2012 elections. Table 3: Outcome of the European Elections 2009 and 2014, and National Elections, 2012 Name

Position

Abb.

English

Dutch

Economy EU integration

CDA

ChristianDemocratic Appeal

ChristenDemocratisch Appel

Market

PVV

Freedom Party

PvdA

Labour Party

D66

Affiliation

National elections 2012

European elections 2009

2014

seats

%

seats

%

seats

%

More

EPP

5

20.1

5

15.2

13

8.5

Partij voor Market de Vrijheid

Less

–

5

17.0

4

13.3

15

10.1

Partij van de Arbeid

State

More

PES

3

12.1

3

9.4

38

24.8

Democrats Demo66 craten 66

Market

More

ALDE

3

11.3

4

15.5

12

8.0

GL

GreenLeft

GroenLinks

State

More

Greens/ EFA

3

8.9

2

7.0

4

2.3

VVD

Liberal Party

Volkspartij Market voor Vrijheid en Democratie

More

ALDE

3

11.4

3

12.0

41

26.6

SP

Socialist Party

Socialistische Partij

State

Less

GUE/N GL

2

7.1

2

9.6

15

9.7

CU-SGP ChristianUnionPolitical Reformed Party

ChristenUnieStaatkundig Gereformeerde Partij

Market

Less

ECR

2

6.8

2

7.7

8

5.2

PvdD

Party for the Animals

Partij voor de Dieren

State

Less

GUE/N GL

0

3.5

1

4.2

2

1.9

Total

-

-

2632

–

26

–

150

–

The share of the Eurosceptic parties as a whole remained the same as in 2009. Remarkably, the Eurosceptic SP did not fully reap the benefits of Labour’s poor 32

In 2004, Dutch parties held 27 seats in the European Parliament. Because the Lisbon Treaty had not yet been ratified by all member states in 2009, the European elections were still held in accordance with the Treaty of Nice. As a result, the number of Dutch seats in the European parliament fell by two to 25. When the Lisbon Treaty came in force, the number of seats for the Netherlands rose to 26 in December 2011. The extra seat was awarded to the PVV.

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197

performance; the party went up from 7 percent to 10 percent. However, for the first time, the SP was larger than its main social democratic rival, albeit in percentage terms only: Labour and GreenLeft had also formed an electoral alliance, which resulted in an extra seat for the PvdA. The joint list of candidates of the Christian Union and the SGP gained one percent in comparison to the European elections of 2009. These previous European elections had marked the breakthrough of the nationalist populist PVV, which then became the second-largest party. In 2014, the party lost one fifth of its electorate – which was frequently contributed to his rapprochement with the Front National33. Wilders had taken the last place on the list of candidates in order to attract votes. He was elected MEP but refused to take his seat. The PvdD was able to pass the electoral threshold thus making its debut in the European Parliament. If we take the four positions into account by which we have classified the parties in the Dutch parliament participating in the European elections, we do not discern a clear pattern in the outcome of the elections. In the category “more Europe and more market”, CDA lost but the VVD and especially D66 won. In the category “more Europe, less market”, both Labour and GreenLeft lost. In the category “less Europe, more market” the Christian Union/SGP won, but the PVV lost. Only both parties in the category “less Europe, less market”, SP and PvdD, won. On an aggregate level, however, the pattern is clearer. The parties which (in varying degrees) are in favour of “more Europe” obtained 59 percent of the vote in 2014 and nearly 64 percent in 2009. The soft and hard Eurosceptical parties increased their share a little, to nearly 40 percent in 2014 (see Table 4). Table 4: Eurosceptic Vote at European Elections, 2009 and 2014 (%) Market Europe

Less

More

Less

2009: 10.6 2014: 13.8 PvdD+SP

2009: 23.8 2014: 21.0 PVV+SGP/CU

2009: 34.4 2014: 34.8

More

2009: 21.0 2014: 16.4 PvdA+GL

2009: 42.8 2014: 42.7 VVD+D66+CDA

2009: 63.8 2014: 59.1

2009: 31.6 2014: 30.2

2009: 66.6 2014: 63.7

4. Electoral Bases of Eurosceptic parties 4.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Electorate of the Eurosceptic Parties In this section, we turn to the demographic characteristics of the electorate of the Eurosceptic parties. We focus on five characteristics: education (i.e. whether citi-

33

Ibid.

SIMON OTJES / GERRIT VOERMAN

198

zens have completed their education before or after the age of 20)34, age,35 gender,36 class37 and whether voters are Protestant.38 The last variable is important to understand the voters of the Christian Union/SGP which are both Protestant parties. For each party, we look at both the 2012 national (Table 6) and the 2014 European election voters (Table 5). We analysed the data of the 2014 European Election Study39. Table 5: Demographic Characteristics – Voters European Elections, 2014 Party

PVV

SP

CU/SGP

PvdD

Intercept

–2.08*** (0.51)

–2.48*** (0.40)

–2.33*** (0.47)

–2.49*** (0.62)

Education = After 20

–0.98*** (0.38)

0.42 (0.026)

–0.32 (0.32)

0.40 (0.46)

Age

–1.43 (0.99)

0.76 (0.72)

–1.99** (0.89)

1.18 (1.19)

Gender = Male

0.27 (0.34)

–0.16 (0.23)

–0.19 (0.31)

–0.86** (0.43)

Religion = Protestant

–0.88 (0.55)

–1.01*** (0.37)

2.31*** (0.45)

1.11 (0.75)

Class = Working Class

0.97*** (0.37)

1.22*** (0.28)

–0.33 (0.45)

–0.65 (0.75)

AIC

292

528

332

229

N

708

708

708

708

Percentage

6%

13%

8%

4%

For the PVV, only two demographic characteristics stand out in 2014: It is a party for working class and lower educated voters. Working class voters are about two and a half times more likely to vote PVV than middle or upper class voters. Voters with lower levels of education are one and a half times more likely to vote for the party compared to voters with a higher education. As for its much larger 2012 electorate, three variables stand out: the PVV-voters are again more often working class and less often higher educated. Religion also has an impact: the party is more likely to attract non-Protestant voters than Protestant voters.

34 35 36 37 38 39

Citizens who were still studying were assigned to before their twentieth if they were younger than twenty and after their twentieth if they were older than twenty. For reasons of comparability with the other dichotomies the ratio interval data for age was normalized to fall between 0 and 1. A simple male/female dichotomy. We divide between working class and non-working class voters. We identify Protestant and non-Protestant voters. EES “European Election Study 2014, Voter Study”, Advance Release, 1/1/2015, http:// eeshomepage.net/voter-study-2014/ (5 May 2015).

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199

Table 6: Demographic Characteristics – Voters National Elections, 2012 Party

PVV

SP

CU or SGP

PvdD

Intercept

–1.84*** (0.44)

–1.60*** (0.33)

–1.86*** (0.58)

–3.51*** (0.86)

Education = After 20

–0.90*** (0.32)

–0.16 (0.22)

–0.30 (0.31)

0.32 (0.64)

Age

–1.32 (0.89)

–0.54 (0.63)

–2.80*** (0.89)

–0.29 (1.64)

Gender = Male

–0.04 (0.28)

–0.10 (0.20)

–0.11 (0.29)

–1.41** (0.65)

Religion = Protestant

–1.16** (0.53)

–0.88*** (0.33)

2.41*** (0.30)

–16.65 (1319)

Class = Working Class

0.72** (0.32)

0.68*** (0.24)

0.20 (0.38)

–0.06 (0.79)

AIC

407

702

382

153

N

933

933

933

933

Percentage

6%

13%

6%

2%

For the SP-voters in 2014, two characteristics stand out. In the first place, they are more often working class: people who identify as working class are more than three times more likely to vote SP than other voters. Moreover, these voters are significantly less often Protestant. In 2012, this pattern can also be observed: SPvoters are less often Protestant and more often working class. For the Christian Union/SGP two characteristics stand out clearly: Protestantism and age. Protestant voters are 10 times more likely to vote Christian Union/SGP than voters in general. We see this pattern in 2012 and in 2014 as well. In both years, we also find a negative relationship with age: this means that the Christian Union/SGP attracted younger voters. The PvdD is outstanding on one variable: gender. This party attracts female voters. Women are two to three times more likely to vote PvdD than men. In 2012, the PvdD also attracts more lower educated, younger, non-Protestant and middle or upper class voters but these patterns are not significant. All in all, most electorates of the four parties involved can be identified on the basis of a limited number of key demographic characteristics: the PVV and SP attract working class voters; the PVV moreover also lower educated voters; the Christian Union/SGP attract Protestant voters, a sign of the parties’ Protestant political principles; and the PvdD female voters, which may reflect this party’s post-materialism, as post-materialist parties, like greens tend to attract women voters40.

40

Martin DOLEZAL, “Exploring the Stabilization of aPolitical Force: The Social andAttitudinal Basis of Green Parties in the Age of Globalization” West European Politics, 33(3), 2010, p. 534552.

SIMON OTJES / GERRIT VOERMAN

200

4.2 Opinions of the Electorate of the Eurosceptic Parties Finally, we add five opinion items to our models. These concern egalitarianism,41 environmentalism,42 ethics,43 exclusion44 and Euroscepticism.45 Again, we look at both the 2012 national election (Table 8) and the 2014 European election (Table 7). When we look at the opinion variables, two stand out for the PVV: their exclusionist position on immigration and their Eurosceptic position. This is the case for both 2012 and 2014. In both analyses, the anti-European scale has a stronger effect than the anti-immigration item. In 2012 the party also scores marginally better among voters that are opposed to gay marriage. In terms of the demographic control variables, the effect of a working class background remains significant in both analyses, while for the 2014 electorate, their non-Protestantism is also significant. However, the effect of the opinion variables is far stronger and more significant than the effect of the demographic characteristics Table 7: Policy Positions – Voters European elections 2014 Party Intercept Egalitarianism

41

42

43 44

45 1 2 3 4 5 6

PVV

SP

CU/SGP

PvdD

–6.27*** (1.17)

–5.73*** (0.76)

–5.03*** (1.37)

–7.38*** (1.44)

–0.66 (0.78)

2.93*** (0.61)

0.58 (1.00)

1.40 (1.13)

Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “you are fully in favour of the redistribution of income (0)” to “you are fully opposed to the redistribution of income (10)”. For comparability's sake this variable was normalized to fall between zero and one. It was flipped so high values are more egalitarian. Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “environmental protection should always take priority even at the cost of economic growth (0)” to “economic growth should always take priority even at the cost of environmental protection (10)”. For comparability's sake this variable was normalized to fall between zero and one. It was flipped so high values are more egalitarian. Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “you are fully in favour of same-sex marriage (0)” to “you are fully opposed to same-sex marriage (10)”. For comparability's sake this variable was normalized to fall between zero and one. Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “you are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration (0)” to “you are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration (10)”. For comparability’s sake this variable was normalized to fall between zero and one. It was flipped so high values are more exclusionist. This was a complex variable consisting out of six items: EU budget: EU should have more authority of the EU members’ budget (1) vs. the Netherlands should retain full control over its budget (11). Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “European unification already gone too far (0)” to “European unification should be pushed further (10)”. Voters were asked to place themselves on a scale that went from “the EU should have more authority over the EU Member States' economic and budgetary policies (0)” to “the Netherlands should retain full control over its economic and budgetary policies (10)”. Four-point agreement scale: you trust the institutions of the EU. Four-point agreement scale: the European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens. Four-point agreement scale: you feel a citizen of the EU. Question: Generally speaking do you think that the Netherlands' membership of the EU is a good thing (1), a bad thing (3) or neither (2)? These items form a strong scale (H-value = 0.50).

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201

Party

PVV

SP

CU/SGP

PvdD

Environmentalism

–0.34 (0.93)

0.07 (0.61)

1.04 (1.17)

4.15*** (1.23)

Exclusionism

2.89*** (0.92)

–0.31 (0.56)

–1.16 (1.06)

0.69 (1.01)

Ethics

–0.10 (0.67)

–0.79 (0.53)

5.57*** (0.68)

–0.25 (0.96)

EU

4.66*** (0.99)

3.53*** (0.70)

1.19 (1.28)

2.61** (1.26)

Education = After 20

–0.45 (0.43)

0.65** (0.30)

0.23 (0.50)

0.28 (0.53)

Age

–1.59 (1.25)

0.55 (0.83)

2.79*** (1.39)

–1.62 (1.42)

Gender = Male

–0.68 (0.44)

0.24 (0.26)

–0.90* (0.47)

–1.17** (0.55)

Religion = Protestant

–0.83 (0.67)

–1.00** (0.42)

1.82*** (0.47)

–0.62 (0.80)

Class = Working Class

0.79* (0.48)

0.50 (0.34)

–0.69 (0.65)

–2.14* (1.11)

AIC

209

435

172

173

N

644

644

644

644

Percentage

6%

13%

8%

4%

For the SP two factors stand out: Euroscepticism and egalitarianism. This is true for both the national and European voters of this party. These two effects rival each other in terms of strength. In 2012 and 2014, the voters are significantly nonProtestant. The effect of identifying as working class which was significant above is no longer significant in these analyses. Table 8: Policy Positions – Voters National Elections 2012 Party

PVV

SP

CU or SGP

PvdD

Election

National

National

National

National

Intercept

–6.19*** (0.96)

–4.35*** (0.63)

–5.37*** (1.19)

–8.95*** (1.93)

Egalitarianism

0.74 (0.67)

2.91*** (0.52)

0.20 (0.86)

–0.01 (1.35)

Environmentalism

–0.02 (0.73)

0.20 (0.52)

1.87* (0.98)

5.16*** (1.65)

Exclusionism

2.71*** (0.77)

–0.34 (0.49)

–0.42 (0.85)

0.72 (1.22)

Ethics

0.91* (0.54)

–0.77 (0.48)

4.71*** (0.55)

0.55 (1.23)

EU

3.51*** (0.84)

2.49*** (0.60)

1.22 (1.11)

2.92* (1.65)

SIMON OTJES / GERRIT VOERMAN

202 Party

PVV

SP

CU or SGP

PvdD

National

National

National

National

Education = After 20

–0.25 (0.36)

–0.03 (0.25)

0.15 (0.44)

0.50 (0.71)

Age

–1.55 (1.05)

–0.77 (0.73)

3.41*** (1.22)

0.09 (1.91)

Gender = Male

–0.08 (0.34)

0.23 (0.23)

–0.76* (0.42)

–2.75** (1.08)

Religion = Protestant

–1.02* (0.57)

–0.73** (0.37)

2.06*** (0.42)

–16.41 (1268.64)

Class = Working Class

0.66* (0.38)

0.13 (0.28)

0.18 (0.52)

–0.32 (0.89)

Election

AIC

302

580

225

117

N

828

828

828

828

Percentage

6%

13%

6%

2%

The Christian Union/SGP voters are not defined by their Euroscepticism. The key opinion variable for this group is their ethical conservatism. In 2012, the parties also attracted an electorate marginally more environmentalist. In demographic terms, these voters are also identified by their Protestantism and their youth. The PvdD voters are identified by their environmentalism. This is true for both its 2012 and the 2014 electorates. The party also attracts a more Eurosceptic electorate but this effect is weaker: First, these voters are environmentalist, Eurosceptic second. In both elections, the effect of gender remains consistent with the findings in section 5.1. The 2014 electorate is also less often working class. This effect is not visible in the 2012 data. The PvdD appears to have attracted a more well-defined electorate in terms of environmental and European orientations. Two things can be concluded from this analysis: First, the electorate of each party is defined by one key value: an exclusive national identity for the PVV, an egalitarian distribution of income for the SP, conservative ethics for the Christian Union, and environmental protection for the PvdD. Moreover, three of the four parties consistently attract a more Eurosceptic electorate. The PvdD electorate only shows Euroscepticism at the 2014 European Parliament elections.

Conclusion This article sketched the history, the ideology, and the electoral support base of five Eurosceptic parties in the Netherlands. In historical and ideological terms, we found two currents: one current was left-wing Euroscepticism tracing its roots back to the opposition to the EU as a capitalist project as voiced by the Communist Party. This Euroscepticism is still visible in the discourse of the SP and the PvdD. These parties oppose the expansion of the internal market and the further integration of economic governance. A second stream was right-wing Euroscepticism which we already saw in the resistance to European integration

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203

voiced by the orthodox Protestant SGP in the 1950s: on the right, parties want to maintain the historically grown Dutch identity and independence. The orthodox Protestant parties still voice this concern, but the radical right-wing populist PVV does so, too. These parties support free trade but not the transfer of sovereignty. The PVV stands out from the other Eurosceptic parties because of its hard Euroscepticism and its advocacy of the full withdrawal from the European Union. Examining the electoral bases of these parties, however, we uncovered four distinct electorates. Three parties consistently appealed to Eurosceptic voters, namely, PVV, SP and PvdD. SP voters conform to their party's ideological niche of left-wing Euroscepticism, i.e. egalitarian and anti-European. The PVV electorate also matched their party's anti-European and anti-immigration positions. The voters of the PvdD were environmentalist first, Eurosceptic second. Despite the fact that these parties have the longest track record of Euroscepticism, the voters of the orthodox Protestant parties Christian Union and SGP are not defined by their Euroscepticism but rather by their conservative positions on ethical questions and their Protestantism. All in all, we find four flavours of Euroscepticism in the highly pluralist Dutch party system. Euroscepticism comes from the left and right, from animal advocates and orthodox Protestants. The single largest Eurosceptic contingent is the hard Eurosceptic PVV which mixes nationalism and opposition to immigration with opposition to European integration but not to free trade. The second flavour comes from the SP. Its roots lie in the history of left-wing opposition to unbridled free trade. It is soft Eurosceptic. For the party, antimarket positions are more defining than Euroscepticism. We can see this because the party favours more EU coordination for instance in tax policy. The third flavour comes from the Christian Union and the SGP. These parties are historically critical of EU integration because they adhere to the notion of Calvinist and independent Netherlands; like the PVV, these parties clearly favour free trade. They have modified their Euroscepticism. To their voters, however, their ethically conservative and Protestant background is of higher importance. The final flavour is the PvdD: This party shares the ideological outlook of the SP on the EU. It also focuses heavily on fiscal discipline and pays little attention to other values; the two parties differ in the values they prioritize – for the PvdD, it is environmental sustainability and for the SP, economic equality. For PvdD voters, Euroscepticism is clearly secondary to environmentalism: for these voters the 'Green' part of the Green Euro-critique is more defining than the “Euro-critique”-part.

QUATRE SAVEURS D’EUROSCEPTICISME AUX PAYS-BAS Dans le système parlementaire pluraliste hollandais de 2014, il existe différents types d´Eurosceptiques : Des protestants orthodoxes, des populistes de droite, des socialistes de gauche et des défenseurs des animaux, qui rejettent l´approfondissement de l´intégration européenne. Cet article présente les racines historiques et le développement de l´Euroscepticisme aux Pays-Bas. Il analyse aussi les programmes et les résultats électoraux des partis eurosceptiques aux élections de

204

SIMON OTJES / GERRIT VOERMAN

2014. Enfin, il présente les raisons des préférences électorales pour les partis hostiles à l´intégration européenne. Il apparaît, sur la base de ces analyses, que la plupart des partis eurosceptiques lient à ce thème des positions spécifiques (environnement, économie, éthique et immigration). L´euroscepticisme est le plus affirmé au sein du Parti de la Liberté et le plus faible dans les deux partis protestants orthodoxes.

VIER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS-GESCHMACKSSORTEN IN DEN NIEDERLANDEN Im holländischen pluralistischen Parteiensystem des Jahres 2014 gibt es vier verschiedene Arten von Euroskeptizismus: Orthodoxe Protestanten und rechte Populisten, linke Sozialisten und Tierschützer lehnen die Vertiefung der Integration der Europäischen Union ab. Dieser Artikel skizziert die historischen Wurzeln und die Entwicklung des Euroskeptizismus in den Niederlanden. Er untersucht die Programme und die Wahlergebnisse der euroskeptischen Parteien bei den Wahlen von 2014. Und schließlich analysiert er die Grundlage der Wählerzustimmung für die Parteien, die sich der europäischen Integration widersetzen. Deutlich wird, dass die meisten Parteien Euroskeptizismus mit charakteristischen Positionen zu anderen Themenfeldern (Umweltschutz, Wirtschaft, Ethik und Immigration) verbinden. Am stärksten ausgeprägt ist der Euroskeptizismus bei der rechtsradikalen Partei der Freiheit und ihren Wählern, am geringsten bei den Wählern der beiden orthodoxen Protestantischen Parteien.

LES AUTEURS – DIE AUTOREN – THE AUTORS AGNÈS ALEXANDRE-COLLIER Agnès Alexandre-Collier is Professor of British Studies at the University of Bourgogne and Franche-Comté (UBFC, Dijon, France) and Director of the Centre Interlangues (Texte, Image, Langage, EA 4182).

UWE BACKES Uwe Backes is Deputy Director of the Hannah Arendt Institute for the Research on Totalitarianism and teaches political science at the Technical University of Dresden, Germany.

DAVID HANLEY David Hanley is Visiting Professor at the Centre for European and International Studies, University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom.

GILLES IVALDI Gilles Ivaldi is Researcher in Political Sciences at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France, currently at the Research Unit Migrations et Société (URMS) of the University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.

MARTIAL LIBERA Martial Libera is Senior Lecturer (Maître de conferences HDR) of Contemporary History at the Institut universitaire technologique (IUT) of the University of Strasbourg (France) and member of the team of researchers UMR 7367, Dynamiques européennes.

PATRICK MOREAU Patrick Moreau is a Senior Researcher in Political Sciences at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France and member of the team of researchers UMR 7367, Dynamiques européennes of the University of Strasbourg.

VIOLA NEU Viola is Head of the team Election Research and Party Research of the Department of Politics and Consulting at the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in Germany.

206

ANNEXE

SIMON OTJES Simon Otjes is Researcher at the Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties of the University of Groningen, Netherlands.

DANIELE PASQUINUCCI Daniele Pasquinucci is Associate Professor in History of International relations and Jean Monnet Chair in History of European Integration at the Department of Social, Political, and Cognitive Sciences of the University of Siena, Italy.

KARINE TOURNIER-SOL Karine Tournier-Sol is Senior Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Toulon, France.

PETRA VEJVODOVÁ Petra Vejvodova is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Studies of the Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic.

GERRIT VOERMAN Gerrit Voerman is Director of the Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties of the University of Groningen (Netherlands) and Professor of Development and functioning of the Dutch and European party system.

BIRTE WASSENBERG Birte Wassenberg is Professor of Contemporary History at the Insitut d’études Politiques (IEP) of the University of Strasbourg (France) and member of the team of researchers UMR 7367, Dynamiques européennes.

CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE „ETUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE“ L’importance des recherches historiques ne cesse d’augmenter au sein de l’éventail qu’offrent les recherches scientifiques sur le processus d’intégration européenne, et ce à mesure que le recul par rapport au début du processus d’intégration européenne se fait de plus en plus grand. Même si le délai d’attente habituel de trente ans pour la consultation des archives constitue encore un obstacle pour les recherches sur l’histoire récente de l’intégration, les périodes accessibles à la recherche se révèlent de plus en plus étendues. A l’heure actuelle, les archives datant de la fondation de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier jusqu’au premier élargissement peuvent être consultées ; d’ici dix ans, une étude documentée des conditions générales de l’élargissement méditerranéen et de la conception de l’Acte unique européen sera possible. La contribution des recherches historiques dans le cadre de la recherche sur l’histoire toute proche de l’intégration est dès à présent remarquable. La diversité de méthodes utilisées permet en effet de régler des problèmes engendrés par le délai de blocage des archives. Toutefois, le débat historique s’y rapportant s’inscrit encore généralement dans le contexte de l’Etat-nation et représente, de ce point de vue, un anachronisme par rapport à l’histoire européenne. C’est dans ce contexte que des chercheuses et chercheurs de toute l’Europe et au-delà ont décidé de lancer une série d’ouvrages qui mettent en lumière l’histoire de l’intégration européenne non seulement dans une perspective européenne, mais qui se veut également accessible à un large public européen. Cette série d’ouvrages, intitulée Etudes sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE), a été créée en collaboration avec la maison d’édition Franz Steiner. Le caractère trilingue de cette série – allemand, anglais et français – constitue une particularité exceptionnelle. Chaque contribution est accompagnée de résumés plurilingues, détaillés et éloquents sur le contenu s’y rapportant. Les Etudes sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne offrent pour la première fois aux lectrices et lecteurs intéressés un accès réellement européen aux avancées historiques les plus récentes dans le domaine de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne.

ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“ Mit zunehmendem Abstand zum Beginn des europäischen Integrationsprozesses nimmt die Bedeutung der Geschichtswissenschaften im Spektrum der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des Europäischen Integrationsprozesses zu. Auch wenn die übliche dreißigjährige Sperrfrist für Archivmaterial weiterhin ein Hindernis für die Erforschung der jüngeren Integrationsgeschichte darstellt, werden die Zeiträume, die für die Wissenschaft zugänglich sind, kontinuierlich größer. Heute können die Archive zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl bis hin zur ersten Erweiterung eingesehen werden; in einem Jahrzehnt wird ein aktengestütztes Studium der Rahmenbedingungen der Mittelmeererweiterung und der Entstehung der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte möglich sein. Darüber hinaus ist der Beitrag der Geschichtswissenschaften auch heute schon Rahmen der Erforschung der jüngsten Integrationsgeschichte nicht mehr zu übersehen. Ihre Methodenvielfalt hilft dabei, die durch Sperrfristen der Archive entstandenen Probleme auszugleichen. Allerdings findet der einschlägige geschichtswissenschaftliche Diskurs in der Regel immer noch im nationalstaatlichen Kontext statt und stellt damit, so gesehen, gerade in Bezug auf die europäische Geschichte einen Anachronismus dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben sich Forscherinnen und Forscher aus ganz Europa und darüber hinaus dazu entschlossen, eine Schriftenreihe ins Leben zu rufen, die die Geschichte der Europäischen Integration nicht nur aus einer europäischen Perspektive beleuchtet, sondern auch einem europäischen Publikum vorlegen möchte. Gemeinsam mit dem Verlag Franz Steiner wurde deshalb die Schriftenreihe Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) gegründet. Ein herausragendes Merkmal dieser Reihe ist ihre Dreisprachigkeit – Deutsch, Englisch und Französisch. Zu jedem Beitrag gibt es mehrsprachige ausführliche und aussagekräftige Zusammenfassungen des jeweiligen Inhalts. Damit bieten die Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration interessierten Leserinnen und Lesern erstmals einen wirklich europäischen Zugang zu neuesten geschichtswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte der Europäischen Integration.

ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” With increasing distance to the process of European integration, there is a growing significance of the historical sciences within the range of the scientific research on the European integration process. Even if the usual blocking period for archive sources is still an obstacle for researching the more recent history of integration, the periods which are accessible for the sciences are continuously becoming more extended. Today, the archives on the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community are accessible as far as to the first extension; in one decade it will be possible to gain access to the appropriate files for studying the history of the prerequisites of the Mediterranean extension and the development of the Single European Act. Furthermore, already today the contribution of historic sciences in the context of researching the most recent history of integration cannot be overlooked. Their variety of methods helps with balancing problems resulting from the blocking periods for archives. However, usually the relevant historic discourse still happens in the context of national states and is thus, if we like to see things this way, rather an anachronism in respect of European history. Against this background, researchers from all over Europe and beyond have decided to found a series of publications which intends not only to shed light on the history of European integration from a European point of view but also to present this to a European audience. For this reason, together with the Franz Steiner Publishing House the series of publications Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) was founded. One outstanding feature of this series will be its trilingualism – German, English and French. For every contribution there will be extensive and telling summaries of the respective contents in several languages. Thus, by Studies on the History of European Integration interested readers will for the first time be offered a really European approach at most resent historic insights in the field of the history of European integration.

studien zur geschichte der europäischen integration studies on the history of european integration études sur l ’ histoire de l ’ integration européenne

Herausgegeben von / Edited by / Dirigé par Jürgen Elvert.

Franz Steiner Verlag

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ISSN 1868–6214

Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Hg.) Cinquante ans de traité de Rome 1957–2007 Regards sur la construction européenne 2009. 365 S. mit 5 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09313-2 Michel Dumoulin / Jürgen Elvert / Sylvain Schirmann (Hg.) Ces chers voisins L’ Allemagne, la Belgique et la France en Europe du XIXe au XXIe siècles 2010. 309 S. mit 14 Tab., 4 s/w- und 11 Farbabb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09807-6 Éric Bussière / Michel Dumoulin / Sylvain Schirmann (Hg.) Économies nationales et intégration Européenne Voies et Étappes 2014. 192 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10795-2 Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora Europa der Bürger? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit der europäischen Einigung – eine Spurensuche 2009. 451 S. mit 1 Tab. und 1 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09424-5 Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontaliére. Vol. 1: Les régions frontalière françaises Contributions du cycle de recherche sur la coopération transfrontalière de l’ Université de Strasbourg et de l’ EuroInstitut de Kehl 2010.416 S. mit 29 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09630-0 Urban Vahsen Eurafrikanische Entwicklungskooperation Die Assoziierungspolitik der EWG gegenüber dem subsaharischen Afrika in den 1960er Jahren 2010. 424 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09667-6

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Michel Dumoulin / Jürgen Elvert / Sylvain Schirmann (Hg.) Encore ces chers voisins Le Benelux, l’Allemagne et la France aux XIXe et XXe siècles 2014. 256 S. mit 6 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10931-4 8. Arnd Bauerkämper / Hartmut Kaelble (Hg.) Gesellschaft in der europäischen Integration seit den 1950er Jahren Migration – Konsum – Sozialpolitik – Repräsentationen 2012. 192 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10045-8 9. Jens Kreutzfeldt „Point of return“ Großbritannien und die Politische Union Europas, 1969–1975 2010. 650 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09722-2 10. Jan-Henrik Meyer The European Public Sphere Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969–1991 2010. 361 S. mit 41 Tab. und 26 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09649-2 11. Birte Wassenberg / Frédéric Clavert / Philippe Hamman (Hg.) Contre l’Europe? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours. Vol. 1: Les concepts Contributions dans le cadre du programme junior de la Maison interuniversitaire des sciences de l’homme d’ Alsace MISHA (2009–2010) 2010. 496 S. mit 4 Tab., 5 Abb., 1 Kte., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09784-0 12. Joachim Beck / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen. Bd. 2: Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen Beiträge aus dem Forschungszyklus zur grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit

der Universität Straßburg und des EuroInstitutes 2011. 367 S. mit 11 Tab. und 19 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09829-8 13. Birte Wassenberg / Joachim Beck (Hg.) Living and Researching Cross-Border Cooperation. Vol. 3: The European Dimension Contributions from the research programme on cross-border cooperation of the University Strasbourg and the Euro-Institute 2011. 343 S. mit 5 Tab. und 11 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09863-2 14. Birte Wassenberg / Joachim Beck (Hg.) Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière. Vol. 4: Les régions frontalières sensibles Contributions du cycle de recherche sur la coopération transfrontalière de l’Université de Strasbourg et de l’Euro-Institut de Kehl 2011. 323 S. mit 21 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09896-0 15. Philip Bajon Europapolitik „am Abgrund“ Die Krise des „leeren Stuhls“ 1965–66 2011. 415 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10071-7 16. Oliver Reinert An Awkward Issue Das Thema Europa in den Wahlkämpfen und wahlpolitischen Planungen der britischen Parteien, 1959–1974 2012. 430 S. mit 3 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10112-7 17. Christian Henrich-Franke Gescheiterte Integration im Vergleich Der Verkehr – ein Problemsektor gemeinsamer Rechtsetzung im Deutschen Reich (1871–1879) und der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (1958–1972) 2012. 434 S. mit 3 Abb. und 12 Tab., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10176-9 18. Sven Leif Ragnar de Roode Seeing Europe through the Nation The Role of National Self-Images in the Perception of European Integration in the English, German, and Dutch Press in the 1950s and 1990s 2012. 272 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10202-5 19. Alexander Reinfeldt Unter Ausschluss der Öffentlichkeit?

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Akteure und Strategien supranationaler Informationspolitik in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Integration, 1952–1972 2014. 332 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10203-2 Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora Das Ende der Barbarei Essay über Europa 2012. 148 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10261-2 Maria Gainar / Martial Libera (Hg.) Contre l’Europe? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et altereuropéisme dans la construction européenne, de 1945 à nos jours. Vol. 2: Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile 2013. 363 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10365-7 Joachim Beck / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen. Bd. 5: Integration und (trans-)regionale Identitäten Beiträge aus dem Kolloquium „Grenzen überbrücken: auf dem Weg zur territorialen Kohäsion in Europa“, 18. und 19. Oktober 2010, Straßburg 2013. 353 S. mit 23 Abb. und 7 Ktn, kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10595-8 Kristin Reichel Dimensionen der (Un-)Gleichheit Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten in den sozial- und beschäftigungspolitischen Debatten der EWG in den 1960er Jahren 2014. 273 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10776-1 Kristian Steinnes The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973 2014. 217 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10775-4 Yves Clairmont Vom europäischen Verbindungsbüro zur transnationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisation Organisation, Strategien und Machtpotentiale des Europäischen Metallgewerkschaftsbundes bis 1990 2014. 505 S. mit 18 Tab und 2 Farbabb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10852-2 Joachim Beck / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière. Vol. 6: Vers une

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cohésion territoriale? Contributions du cycle de recherche sur la coopération transfrontalière de l'Université de Strasbourg et l'Euro-Institut 2014. 377 S. mit 38 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10964-2 Patrick Moreau / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I The 2014 European Election and the Rise of Euroscepticism in Western Europe

2016. 212 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11253-6 28. Patrick Moreau / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II The 2014 European Election and New AntiEuropean Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe 2016. 239 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11455-4

The economic crises since 2008, the ten­ sions concerning the Euro, the Greek ques­ tion and the refugee problem have fuelled a strong “Eurosceptic” movement. At the 2014 European elections, the rise of Euro­ sceptic forces could be observed in virtually all Member States of the EU. This publica­ tion regroups the contributions to a Con­ ference organized 2014 in Strasburg by the CNRS­University of Strasbourg research unit “UMR Dynamiques européennes”, in the framework of the IDEX excellence pro­ ject “The European Integration and the New Anti­Europeanism”.

In this first of two volumes, anti­European­ ism and Euroscepticism are examined as political phenomena and objects of inter­ disciplinary research. The focus is on “tra­ ditionally” Eurosceptic Great Britain and on sometimes very recent anti­European movements within the EC founding states (France, Germany, Italy, and the Nether­ lands), their discourses and voters. What reasons prompt anti­European voters: re­ jection of immigration, xenophobia, fear of the future, nationalism or the rejection of capitalism and globalization? Or is it the collective disappointment with the incapac­ ity of the European elites to communicate with the majority of voters?

SGEI SG SHEI SH EHIE E www.steiner-verlag.de

Franz Steiner Verlag

ISBN 978-3-515-11253-6